FEDERALISM, DIPLOMACY AND EDUCATION:
Canada’s Role in Education-Related International Activities, 1960-1984

BY

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Education
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Amongst Western nations Canada has had the rather unique distinction of not having a centralized Ministry of Education. The division of powers in the Canadian constitution assigned education to the provincial governments while constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs was assigned to the federal government. As a result of this separation of powers, there has been an ongoing and unsatisfactory effort on the part of both federal and provincial governments to address the difficult issue of who represents Canada in the field of education abroad.

In the period following the end of the Second World War, indifference towards the question gave way to ad hoc treatment of the issue by the federal government. The provinces and federal government tried to insulate themselves from divisive issues by delegating them to pan-national educational organizations. The Council of Ministers of Education, Canada (CMEC) is the closest equivalent to a national, ministerial-level education organization in modern day Canada.

During the 1960s, the constitutional differences could not be regulated between the two levels of government. Instead, the continued unsatisfactory relationship combined with incipient nationalism led to conflict. The government of Quebec declared that the provinces were institutionally capable of representing their own interests in diplomacy in education.
The federal response in the 1960s can be traced from Mitchell Sharp's publication of the pamphlet *Federalism and International Conferences on Education* in the spring of 1968, at the height of the crisis with Quebec. This publication was as much a response to contemporary events, as it was the portent of a broader, more hands-on approach to the issue by the federal government.

While the 1960s were punctuated by the broadsides from Ottawa and Quebec as the issue became tied to Quebec nationalism, the 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by uncomfortable compromise over the question. The changing international system, the OECD Review, and the ongoing federal-provincial jockeying combined with the new presence of the CMEC, did not help in the regularization of this relationship. Since there has never been closure over this issue, diplomacy in education continues to be *ad hoc* and an important test of Canadian federalism.
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APPENDIX
Chapter 1
Introduction: International Relations in Education
And Canada

"Education is in reality one of the basic factors in international relations – quite as important as diplomacy and military power in its implications for war or peace."
-Senator J. William Fulbright

Part I: A History of Absence

The history of Canada's international relations in education has hardly begun to be written. In order to have a good understanding of how education fits into Canada's foreign affairs, its history and its role must be seen in the broader past. Particularly, it must be seen in the development of provincial and colonial involvement in international relations. In the past, there has been little consensus and much dispute as to who in government actually represented Canada in international education. This issue will be analyzed and documented here and it is hoped that in so doing, the international role the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada took on in the late 1960s will be better understood.

The development of Canadian diplomacy in this field is primarily a history of absence. Education fits uneasily into the "middle-power" framework of Canadian foreign policy generally. Issues of war and trade have taken precedence for the greater part of the last two centuries. Education was not seen as having any part in the established foreign policies of nations. Emergent bureaucracies and the emphasis on war and imperial policies resulted in a freelance approach to the whole question. As Canada

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1 J. William Fulbright was a United States Senator at the time of the Vietnam War. His scholarship program created in the wake of World War Two was intended to foster international exchange. J. William Fulbright, "Foreword," The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), by Philip Coombs, p. x.
2 See Andrew F. Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1997), p.25.
became more actively involved in international politics, educational issues were only hesitantly placed on the agenda. Nonetheless, with time came the emergence of international educational organizations and the signing of education treaties. Finally, Canada's independent role in international relations in the postwar era (1945-1967) coincided with the increasingly important - yet still subordinate - role of education in Canada's foreign policy. Post-war Canadian policy makers and elites recognized the benefits of international collaboration in education in a rapidly changing world.

**Historiographical Issues**

At the best of times, historians are faced with a challenging job when trying to piece together the past, and this is also the case with this area of inquiry. Putting together a history of education's introduction into, and place in, a changing international system over a period of several centuries, is one of the more complex of these jigsaw puzzles. In his study of civilizations, *A History of Civilizations*, Fernand Braudel, the French historian of the *Annales* School, suggests that to examine civilizations from afar (from the perspective of five hundred to a thousand years) is to go "blue-water cruising on the high seas of time." This analogy is evocative and helpful. It can be extended to apply to this topic. This survey will be content however with staying at the edge of the so-called 200 mile limit rather than venturing into the deeper oceans.

Such an examination of the past is thus not without its dangers. Between this self-defined tour of past Canadian history and the broader blue waters of time there is still "a lot of sea." That is to say, international contacts in the period between 1794 and the twenty-four years under study, 1960 to 1984, came in an incredible variety. Not only were there contacts between administrators and educators, but there were also contacts
between teachers and their relatives in Europe and around the world. There were also significant exchanges of educational ideas and methodologies. Few would have thought of them as exercises in international relations, but this cultural component was an essential element of international life. By focusing on government contacts, one is prey to the danger of looking at an extremely small portion of the total picture. Also, by taking on a fairly large period of time, it must also be acknowledged that many of the issues covered will be examined only in passing and not in great depth.

**Why Study Canadian International Education?**

Still, alerted to these hazards and pitfalls, the current motives of governments, and quasi-governmental organizations have become more transparent and understandable as critical historians have revealed their origins. In this particular area, a close examination of the past has not yet taken place. Not only has it not happened in the case of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, but little has been written on the broader past of this aspect of international relations.

Also, by looking closely at this past, we will better be able to appreciate the ongoing process by which the world and its various civilizations are evolving, as new highly visible and planet-wide structures emerge. National borders may look quite high but they are a lot lower than they were before the fall of the Berlin Wall. They seem to be dropping further with the advent of the Internet and almost instantaneous global communication networks. As historians, the current generation is uniquely placed. They have one foot in the older era when "international" automatically elicited visions of

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2. I am thinking here of both the proverbial “West” and the Islamic World, along with other significant civilizations. Quite interesting in this regard is the future for Africa. Braudel, *A History*, p.150. & passim.
distance and difference; their other is in a future where both friends and strangers are no longer distant on the other side of the planet.

Moreover, this project gives another view on the debate over what exactly is the nature of the international system. Is it presided over by a unipolar Western hegemon, the United States, or is it a more multipolar environment where military might is no longer the principal playing card? Is it a system of interdependency where everybody yields "power"? Should we still speak of an international system? Has it changed so much that we can speak of "virtual diplomacy?" and does this bring into question the need for traditional diplomatic representation? Global change is a process that is continuing and of which education is an integral part.  

To gain a knowledge of the diplomacy and governance of international education also deepens one's ability to evaluate the waves of change that seem to be forever breaking over the walls of the local school and all educational institutions, as well as to know the origin of these transformations. The extent to which Canadian schools were influenced by trans-border circulation of American curriculum in the 1930s is one problem that comes more into focus when it is examined through this frame. Yet another issue that is more distinct is the role of universities. To the extent that international activities have reached down to the local level, universities are the first in line to be affected. Increasingly, their independence has been curtailed and the warp and weft of international education organizations' activities have woven their roles and missions into patterns unforeseen a generation ago. In addition, student exchanges and the movements of scholars can also be seen anew when looked at in this way.

This history additionally focuses on the question of “the local” and how it is influenced by the wider environment of the world stage. Randall White recently wrote that he sees international factors having an equally important role as regional factors in the development of areas in any particular state.

Similarly, it seems to me impossible to write about Ontario's political and economic development without touching periodically on the history of other parts of Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom (and what used to be called the British empire), and France. This perhaps partly reflected my own particular fascination with the extent to which Ontario has been shaped by larger national and international forces.\(^7\)

White’s fascination is echoed here. Some of the other factors influencing how this study came to be can now be examined.

**Part II: The School and the World; Personal Motivations**

Notwithstanding the above reasons for this project, there are also personal motivations to look at international education. Canadian federalism and foreign policy are not often thought of in the same context as education and the school system. Yet modern day schools are influenced by diplomacy. This thesis is in many ways a distillation of my own thoughts while witness to and part of the school system.

My interest in examining the role Canada plays in international relations in education and how our federal system of government has influenced this comes out of my abiding fascination with the chaotic dynamics of international relations in the contemporary world. In part it has also been influenced by my previous studies and

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experiences.\textsuperscript{8} As someone who took training in international relations and education in quick succession, I have always been struck by the poor understanding of the connections between what we regard as Canadian education, its politics and traditions, and the broader international sphere.\textsuperscript{9} My need to examine Canada’s role in this area has additionally been shaped by a conviction that whether the process of global change is called “internationalization,” “globalization,” or more prosaically, “Americanization,\textsuperscript{10}” Canadian and indeed all human activities are taking on an increasingly planetary orientation. These activities in very fundamental and very subtle – and not so subtle - ways reach down to the elementary classroom whether it is in rural Guelph Township, midtown Toronto, or in the mountainous regions of northwest Pakistan. Education is thus a significant, yet very much unheralded and neglected, side of international relations.\textsuperscript{11}

Along with interest in the dynamics of the global system, there is also another deeper concern that has motivated this effort. In recent times, I have become aware of the struggle going on at the global level for the heart and soul of education.\textsuperscript{12} Will education be used by individuals and societies for their intellectual enrichment and human development as well as the pursuit of wisdom? Will it instead be dominated by

\textsuperscript{8}To see the international side of that background, see, John Allison, \textit{Political Context, Rationality and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Liberalism and Islam}, M. Sc. dissertation, University of Bristol, 1990.

\textsuperscript{9}My experiences as a teacher in the Ontario public school system gave me a glimpse into its workings. The basic educational administration text for teacher’s college of that era cryptically suggests that the absence of a federal presence in education “complicates” Canada’s foreign relations. Lawrence Bezeau, \textit{Educational Administration for Canadian Teachers} (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1989), p. 74.

\textsuperscript{10}The debates over this in the popular press are ongoing as we approach the millennium. See National Geographic Society, “Global Culture,” \textit{National Geographic Magazine}, Vol. 196, No.2 (August 1999).

\textsuperscript{11}While education is increasingly significant in foreign relations, it receives little attention in the foreign policy community. While Nossal’s text discusses Quebec’s activities in the 1960s, it doesn’t address other facets of education-related international activities in any systematic way. See, Kim Richard Nossal, \textit{The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy} (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1989).

\textsuperscript{12}For an examination of this in the Canadian context see, Heather-Jane Robertson, \textit{No More Teachers, No More Books} (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1998).
the free market principles of Frederick von Hayek, and the "Life-long learning," and human capital accounting philosophies which are synonymous with some economists' perspectives on education? Much of this contemporary debate will lay the foundation for the type of education system that will be in place in twenty-first century societies and needs to be actively addressed by scholars studying education. I expect to pursue that aim here.

Definitions

My interest is followed by a need to define and set some terms at the outset. Throughout this dissertation the terms "international relations in education," "diplomacy in education," and "international education" are mentioned. These are for the purposes of this project synonymous. I have taken a broad view of the question of diplomacy. Rather than confining it merely to the Foreign Service Officers serving with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, it includes the vast number of officials and politicians that go abroad to conduct business on behalf of the government. I also acknowledge and differentiate it from "public diplomacy." I would characterize this to be more the realm of groups and individuals acting in an extra-governmental capacity, but nonetheless their activities are also important, taking Canada's values, views and interests beyond the state's borders.

The matter of the current governing body in Canadian education is also relevant. It is the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada. Alternately it is known as the CMEC.

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14 Public Diplomacy can also be thought of as the public pronouncements of foreign ministries and governments, designed to sway publics.
or simply, the Council. Similarly, the Canadian Education Association is the CEA and the Dominion Education Association, the DEA. An appendix of abbreviations follows the text of the thesis and additional terms are found there.

**Problem**

The question of education and Canadian foreign policy is one of significance and one that is intriguing. According to the Canadian constitution, education is a provincial responsibility. Section 93 of the *Constitution Act, 1982* clearly lists education as a provincial jurisdiction. So why then is the federal government involved in Canada’s education-related international activities? Surely this is one area where the provinces should be allowed to exercise their constitutional responsibilities to their full extent. The question remains open as there is ongoing disagreement and conflict over how this matter should be best addressed by both levels of government. From the independence of action of the provinces on the international stage to the unified work of a centralized national ministry of education, the alternatives in this area remained contentious in the era between 1960 and 1984. As such, it was a test of the Canadian constitution. The issue crossed over the separation of powers. In addition, it tested governments in the functional or technical sense that it required day-to-day solutions to problems. In contemporary times, it is an issue that continues to function on several levels. Gladiatorial style politics, public administration, and limited popular and democratic input are all familiar arenas when dealing with this question, both in the era under study and today.

**Limitations**

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There are many facets of an issue as complex as education and only a limited number can be addressed in a study of this type. In terms of education, or more properly public, state-sponsored schooling, this thesis does not deal in a detailed fashion with issues of curriculum, exchanges, and administrative change. These issues all have international aspects to them. Rather, they are in this case subsumed under the broader rubric of politics. They are the stuff of the game, not the rules, nor the players.

This thesis concentrates primarily on who controls and who governs at the provincial, federal and international levels. The dynamics of elementary, secondary, and higher education are discussed only in passing. There is a substantial literature in the fields of comparative, international and developmental education that deals with the international aspects of higher education. Consequently, while mentioned as they are pertinent to this history, organizations such as the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, the Canadian Association of University Teachers, and the Commonwealth Universities Association are not looked at in great detail.

Moreover, the federal government is an enormous organization and this study only begins to look at the international initiatives that are now coming not just from the foreign ministry, but also from a variety of other ministries and organizations. The evolving role of international organizations on the Canadian scene, and also the influences of multi-national corporations represent another area where more work needs to be done.

Chapter Overview

In Chapter Two, the thesis starts by examining federal-provincial collaboration over the issue in the context of the longer-term past. It is clear that efforts to get a
broader view of education by going abroad were not undertaken in any systematic way. Instead, it was left up to the leaders of particular educational systems to decide when and if they would go abroad in order to search out other educational ideas and theories.

In the third chapter, the question of Quebec's involvement in international relations in education is examined along with the implications for Ottawa. Quebec remains a "special case" because of its unique origins and the ongoing issue of nationalism in that province. Ties to the Catholic Church and the Curia Romanan, the Papal government in Rome, make for interesting twists in the international relations of the province. With the coming of the 1960s and the election of Jean Lesage, the Quebec state modernized. Along with this, there was a renewed emphasis on the international aspects of the Quebec politics. The interaction with the federal government became increasingly conflictual as the province wanted to "extend its competency in its jurisdiction internationally." The federal government was drawn further and further into the situation as the French government sided with the officials in Quebec City. Several diplomatic problems ensued, not the least of which was the incident over the international education conference in Gabon.

The problems with Quebec resulted in a much firmer approach to the question of international relations in education by the federal government. In Chapter Four, the genesis of the brochure Federalism and International Conferences in Education is examined, along with other significant federal developments of this period. Education for a whole host of reasons was starting to mean much more than simply schooling. Most significant for government was the growing dimension of training for the workplace both in terms of apprenticeship programs and post-secondary diploma programs. These two
areas resulted in an overlap between the more traditional education portfolio and the labour portfolio.

In Chapter Five, the picture is broadened. Many influences placed a great deal of pressure on the Canadian federation in the 1970s and 1980s, and this in turn made compromise on the issue more difficult. Significant among the international changes that had an effect on Canadian education and diplomacy were the global transformations associated with the Vietnam War and its aftermath. Not only did this event result in military clashes, but it also produced a substantial wake in terms of economic fallout. The inflation and changes that came with the war had an effect on the emphasis that elites and politicians placed on education. Similarly, the evolving nature of international organizations also impacted on the situation. As witnessed all over the world, international education organizations were becoming much more interventionist in their policies. This was witnessed particularly with the evolution of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development of Paris. The OECD through the latter part of the 1960s developed a system of country reviews of education systems.

In Chapter Six, the level of cooperation between Ottawa and the provinces is looked at in terms of the Canadian OECD Country Review. As a result of the lack of established structures the cooperation that went on between the two levels of government was *ad hoc* and not overly satisfactory for both groups. The entire OECD process is examined from the beginning to end and the temporary nature of federal-provincial cooperation is highlighted.

In Chapter Seven, the ongoing sources of friction between the federal government and the provinces in the area of international relations in education in the 1970s and early
1980s are examined. The growing pains of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada during this era were one source of the ongoing unsatisfactory compromise. The CMEC took a considerable period to define what its role would be. Not only was the organizational question problematic, provincial education ministers were arrayed along a continuum of how much they wanted to participate in the organization and where they thought it should go. The CMEC emerged during a highly combative period. Federalism in the 1970s was the arena of periodic clashes between Ottawa and provincial governments over a wide range of issues. Prominent among the problems that the federal union was experiencing was a proliferation in its executive agencies. This played to the egos of politicians and intensified an already difficult situation. Issues that were previously dealt with at an administrative level or were non-political suddenly became the ammunition for politicians, who in turn left the country wide open to the international changes that were progressively leaving all nation states with less control over their territory. Lastly, the federal government had its own reasons for delaying the longer-term resolution of Canadian international relations in education. Ottawa was fully participating in the internationalization of its resources, still interested for economic reasons in “education,” and had diplomatic issues to resolve. In particular, it wanted to safeguard its prerogative in terms of federal abilities in this area. It also underwent a series of internal changes that tightened the relationship between the diplomats in the field and the short-term educationalist diplomats.

In my conclusion, I review the findings of this study and assess the legacy of the arrangement that came out the development of Canada’s education-related international activities. Moreover, I look to the future and the need or possibilities for change.
The period between 1960 and 1984 illustrates clearly the power of education as an issue in international relations and this dissertation clarifies some of the questions associated with it in the uniquely Canadian context.
Chapter 2
A History of Absence:
The International Activities of the Early Canadian Colonies, and the Canadian Education Association, 1800-1967

Pre-Confederation to 1895

The early development of a Canadian role in international relations in education was a haphazard activity. This reflected international and national trends because in the era between 1800 and 1919, education was not of sufficient importance to rank among the priorities of nation-states. Rather, it remained for the most part the priority of churches and religious organizations. Establishing and maintaining international relations in education was also very much a freelance occupation because European empires encouraged a culture where education was tied to their imperial aims and goals. An examination of the British Colonial Office is a very good case study of this. International relations in education remained lastly a do-it-yourself experience as educational bureaucracies were only beginning to function in the mid-nineteenth century. Initiative was with individual Canadian, American, and European school leaders. By the turn of century, organizations were becoming more important. Their interests were elsewhere, however, as was demonstrated by the newly formed Dominion Education Association.

The European international system between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was a system in which the primary concerns of foreign policy continued to be war, economics and the international pecking order; not at all education. This period was also an era of relative stability, and most practitioners of the trade of foreign policy were disinclined to make changes to this equilibrium.\(^{17}\) The Congress of Vienna had changed the way in which European powers dealt with each other. Rather than fighting and bickering with each other, they paid attention to empire.

\(^{17}\)The story of Talleyrand illustrates the remarkable continuity during this era. Many of the chief ministers involved in foreign relations had known each other for decades. See Jean d'Orieux, Talleyrand: The Art of Survival (New York: Knopf, 1974).
building in the African and Asian continents. Bull and Watson characterize this era in the following way:

Nor should it be overlooked that the European states as they evolved this non-hegemonial system in their relations with one another, at the same time established a number of empires which, while they were rival and competing, taken together amounted to a European hegemony over the rest of the world, which in the nineteenth century became an immense periphery looking to a European center.¹⁸

In such an environment, education was not seen as a principal instrument in the foreign policy of great powers. Educators and philosophers, it was thought, would spread their ideas through the dissemination of their works rather than through diplomacy. Schooling itself was to remain the responsibility of the church.

Given the lack of interest in education in foreign policy establishments, international relations in education did not have its start with them. What of the individual "empires?" How did they look at education? Schooling and education had a similar place in the imperial scheme of things. The notion of going abroad in order to learn about pedagogy and methodology struck many imperialists as unconscionable. Education was firstly the province of the established churches. If it was to have a life over and above that, then it was necessary to enlighten conquered nations after the troops had pulled out.

Moreover, colonies of the era did not provide the initial locus for international education. Those born of conquest were slightly different than those occupied by early settlers from the imperial heartland; education was seen as an overtly "civilizing" tool in the former, while it was simply transplanted in the latter. Members of the education system in Canada during the early period were for the most part relocated from the British Isles or from France. Some were in favour of imperialism, others were against British imperialism in particular, and others had little incentive to explore what lay beyond their

classroom door, let alone find out what other foreign educators did in their schoolhouses. In the earlier period, in New France in particular, the division between education and the state was very clear.

The time had not yet arrived when education, in the manner of war, trade, and foreign affairs, was an instrument of national policy. It should be remembered that until the nineteenth century and the rise of the modern state, the notion of learning as a public enterprise was little accepted in most lands.

By the start of the nineteenth century, it was clear that educators and practitioners from Britain and France had transplanted many of their customs into the first European schools in Canada. Audet describes some of that original cultural transference, illustrating both the "ties that bind," but also the cultural inheritance with which colonists had to come to terms. In this situation a truly international exchange of ideas and their adaptation into school systems was not remotely considered as a possibility.

...the state of elementary and secondary education in France during this century is of paramount importance to us since about half of the 10,000 colonists who settled in New France during the French Régime arrived between 1608 and 1700...It was only natural that French school masters who became Canadians were inclined to set up schools and colleges based on those in which they had previously been students or teachers.

It was following a similar development in Upper Canada that the first state-funded schools were established through public funds in 1797. They came into being with the acceptance of a petition to King George III for the endowment of a school in each administrative district and for the establishment of a university.

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20Magnuson, *Education*, p. 64.


Royal intervention, although it laid some of the groundwork for Canadian schooling, also did not influence the development of international activities in education. Not only did education remain for the most part outside public control, but schooling in Canada continued to function under the watchful eye of the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office was the overarching authority for British colonies around the world. That authority, although again not principally interested in education, had some impact on it. The Colonial Office set out the broad lines of educational policy in the colonies. In a situation similar to that which existed in New France, the Colonial Office presumed from the beginning that education was to be primarily left to the established church, and the Colonial Office's role was to mediate disputes. Many of the early communications with the Colonial Office illustrate this point as they dealt specifically with arbitration between churches. In particular, claims over clergy reserves and similar issues occupied much of its time. The role of the Colonial Office is analyzed by Bernard Hyams.

Thus it can reasonably be concluded that a continuity of the Colonial Office view of education prevailed in the period under examination. It supported, indeed championed, the contemporary notion that education was synonymous with religion and was a vital instrument in inculcating appropriate social and cultural values amongst colonial youth. But that principle had also to be pursued within the context of local sectional rivalries, and harmony within the respective colonies was an even more overriding concern for British governments of the day. The Colonial Office followed a line which was influenced by several important considerations. One was the reality of Imperial financial limits to educational investment. Another was a keen appreciation of contrasting circumstances between the respective colonies. Above all, there had developed a firm policy regarding the position of the Church of England.3

Through the provision of clergy reserves and the granting of university charters the Colonial Office developed its influence over education. Colonists were very much on the receiving end of this type of policy rather than making policies of their own. This was particularly so in that such a rigid distinction was made between education, which was a

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church matter, and international relations which was a government matter. Any examination of different pedagogical ideas would have to take place within the church itself.

By the middle of the century, education was becoming a secular issue and the situation started to change. Public school systems were being established throughout the Americas and Europe. The type of international politics Talleyrand and Metternich excelled at still meant little to administrators and teachers within the colony - other than being of passing interest in current events. Still, with the establishment of school systems, more interest in what other educators were doing started to develop and leaders in the province began to agitate for change. This agitation provided the context in which the era of freelance international relations in education began.

While the Colonial Office still established policy in the colonies, as time went on, colonial leaders were emerging and some were starting to look outside their own jurisdictions for different ways of addressing educational problems. Amongst the first of these was Egerton Ryerson. While still outside government in the 1830s, Ryerson made his first contacts with the Colonial Office. In 1832, he went on his first trip to England. There he presented a petition to the Colonial Office from Methodists with regard to the question of church education and clergy reserves. Ryerson’s first trip to Britain was also important as it illustrated how experiences abroad can shape one’s perspective. He returned affecting a very romantic view of Britain.

If he saw abounding evidences of "dark satanic mills", he does not record them....He was young, colonial, provincial, and, compared to Mackenzie[William Lyon Mackenzie], warmly illusioned about England, impressed by being there at all ....he relished the courtesy with which he was treated by men like Mr. Stanley (Secretary for the Colonial Office) and certainly he sensed and was awed by the immense resources of power, both intellectual and physical, that underpinned the government of Britain and that could be turned against any colony that spun out of its appointed orbit.24

While Ryerson went about his efforts in aid of Methodism and had no comments on the Industrial Revolution (a political neutralism he again resorted to during the rebellions of 1837\textsuperscript{25}), other politicians also became involved in international activities. One politician who became involved early on was Charles Duncombe.

In 1835, Duncombe along with Thomas D. Morrison and William Bruce were appointed by resolution of the Assembly to inquire into foreign educational systems. After an investigation of those in operation in the United States, England, France and Prussia, a report with a draft bill attached was presented. This Bill passed the Assembly by a vote of 35 to 10 but was defeated by Legislative Council.\textsuperscript{26}

Duncombe was also noteworthy among early international educationalists as he started out as an American-born doctor. In looking into school systems, he was sent to several American cities including: Lexington, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, New York and Albany. Much of his eventual bill was based on the operation of school systems in the state of New York, but it was prescient in its outlook regarding the character of school systems in general.\textsuperscript{27} In addition to Duncombe's efforts, other "international" activities began to take place in the field of education. Ryerson shows up on the scene once again in 1835.

Ryerson's contributions as an international educationalist must be prefixed with some thought as to his role as the "creator" of the Ontario education system. Ryerson accomplished an incredible amount in his time as the leader of education in Ontario. It is often claimed that he did this without any outside influence - it sprang fully formed from his mind. Yet Susan Houston points to the emergence of several innovators like Ryerson around the same period of time, and to their ongoing communication with each other.

\textsuperscript{25}Thomas, \textit{Ryerson}, p. 80. See also, Ronald Manzer, \textit{Public Schools and Political Ideas: Canadian Educational Policy in Historical Perspective} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 81.

\textsuperscript{26}Speirs and Reynolds, \textit{Inventory} 2, p. 6.

The myth of progress, enlightenment, and humanitarian concern which evolved originally as an account of the history of American education spilled over to fill the vacuum in Canadian educational historiography. Unfortunately too much and too little has made been made of the North American and international cast of Canadian school provision. At the same time, faith in the potentiality of education has been associated too narrowly with the United States. As one tenet of Liberalism, the ideology of educational advance was an international phenomenon. "The schoolmaster was abroad": Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth in England, Victor Cousin in France, Thomas Dick in Scotland. These men and their counterparts in virtually every European country, formed a community of articulate and self-conscious educational innovators.28

This community was one of the first international communities specifically of educators. All were innovators in their own way, but also worked in a period of common educational change. The other point to note was the frequency with which these educators traveled. In the course of his career, Ryerson took no less than seven different trips to Europe and the United States. Other innovators also had hectic travel schedules.29

Ryerson's commitment to international education was evident as early as 1835, when he undertook a trip in order to solicit funding for a Methodist Academy in Coburg. This time, the level of interaction with the Colonial Office was significant and inflating for Ryerson.

I...did....communicate to the Colonial Secretary...and Under-Secretary...on the posture of Canadian affairs and the parties and principle questions which have divided and agitated the Canadian public. I repeatedly received the thanks of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, for the pains I had taken in these matters....30

Ryerson really started to take on an international perspective on education when he became Chief Superintendent. He travelled to Europe in 1844 and remained there for 13 months. While there, he examined European school systems in an effort to distill the best

30 Thomas, Ryerson, p. 77.
practices that could be applied to the school system in Ontario. The transfer of the Irish curriculum to the Ontario system followed hard on the heels of his journeys.31

Ryerson also travelled to Switzerland during his first European tour and this was a significant step on the road towards the development of international educational connections for Canada. There he came in contact with the disciples of the Swiss educator, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi. Pestalozzi's methods found their way back to Upper Canada with Ryerson amongst others.32 In addition to the meeting with the disciples of Pestalozzi, Ryerson travelled to several European countries - to learn, and absorb.

Now he travelled with a status which he enjoyed, plentifully supplied by Lord Aberdeen, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with letters of introduction to the British Ambassadors in all the countries he wished to visit, "including Holland, Belgium, France, Naples, Florence, Sardinia, Switzerland, Wurtemburg, Bavaria and Prussia....The worlds Ryerson travelled through external to education's mission were to be learned, not felt; he went as observer, not participator, assured of and protected by his unshaken sense of triple identity - Methodist Minister, British Canadian and Educator....His attitude imposed its limitations upon his experience, but it also had its enormous strength.33

Ryerson's trips were also notable in that he additionally picked up travelling companions along the way, and benefited from their experience to widen his own learning. The 1844 - 45 trip spurred him to learn French. With French, he felt he was much better able to follow the debates in the Academie Français and ask his own questions rather than rely on others. On his return to Canada, Ryerson came by way of New York, stopping to inspect a normal school - thereby completing what he saw was a comprehensive picture of educational methods of that time.34

31 Alison Prentice and Susan Houston, Schooling and Scholars in 19th Century Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 113-114.
32 Ryerson did not exclusively import Pestalozzian pedagogy, it also came with students and teachers who studied it in Switzerland and then came to Canada. Ryerson was however the first leader of a school system in Ontario to run across this methodology.
33 Thomas, Ryerson, , pp. 98-99.
34 Thomas, Ryerson, p. 100.
Following the return from his foreign ventures, Ryerson illustrated the value of overseas experience as he wrote his Report and had the Common School Act of 1846 introduced in the Ontario Legislature. Some, notably Wilson, argue that Ryerson stopped dead in its tracks the Americanization of the Canadian education system with his centralizing efforts. Ryerson continued to keep his hand in the international arena of education, undertaking four trips abroad during his tenure as Chief Superintendent of Ontario. The voyage of 1855 was particularly interesting. This time, rather than the initial experience of going to Europe to see other systems of education, Ryerson had additional ideas.

I propose to visit Paris, Brussels, the Hague, Hanover, Berlin, Dresden, Vienna, Rome, Naples, Turin and Switzerland with the view of refreshing my inquiries into their systems of public instruction believing a few months of traveling would fully re-establish my health and that during the season of the Universal Exhibition at Paris, I might render such a visit useful to the objects of my department.

There were also other personal reasons for this trip - notably "a finishing educational trip abroad," for his daughter Sophie. Such was his usefulness that the government also declared him to be an Honorary Commissioner to Great Exhibition in Paris of 1855.

It was in both a curriculum-oriented and a quasi-legislative sense that Ryerson had exercised the conduct of international relations in education during this era. He was a representative of Upper Canada in a time when ostensibly it was still under the suzerainty of the Colonial Office. In exercising his initiative, he solved problems that would later involve many layers of bureaucracy. Also, in the best sense of international relations in education, he gleaned much of use, both personally, and for the education system, in his travels around Europe. Finally, he worked in an era when representative government was

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36 1850, 1855, 1867 being the other three dates.
37 Egerton Ryerson, Chief Superintendent to the Earl of Clarendon. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. July 1855; Ministry of Education Files; RG2, E-1, Envelope 9; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
38 Thomas. Ryerson. pp. 199-120.
establishing a firmer toehold in colonial affairs. By the end of his tenure, not only had he been on many travels in Europe, but the communications links and systems of transport that underpinned international relations made it easier for others to follow in his footsteps.

Other Canadian provincial superintendents followed similar paths towards diplomacy in education in the middle of the 19th century. Some went to the lands of their backgrounds, while others saw the United States as the source of international innovation. Superintendent Dawson of Nova Scotia began his education in Scotland and it was natural for him to look to that country as source for inspiration. Others such as Jean-Baptiste Meilleur of Quebec benefited from education in the United States and this in turn helped shape their outlook on education in the more international perspective.

With the departure of Ryerson and his peers in the 1870s, international activities in education were carried on by other means. Bureaucracies were under-developed. With regard to both the search for excellence in curriculum design and the establishment of a Canadian education presence abroad, there was very little effort to coordinate major programs. What there was, however, were exhibitions, fairs, and universal exhibits. While the earlier generation had been to the Paris Exhibition in 1855, "international activities" in the latter half of the 19th century included other World's Fairs. Ontario was represented at the World's Fair in Philadelphia. The Philadelphia exhibition took place in August of 1876. Exhibits demonstrated the best in Ontario teaching. Their unfortunate result however, was to bring foreign visitors to Ontario who saw first-hand the real state of education in the province. These guests were not impressed with what they saw and were shocked to see the lower quality of Canadian schools versus those in Europe.

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41 In contemporary times this has changed with the establishment of Canadian offices in Southeast Asia and increased government involvement in education. See further chapters.
Thus some forays into the international realm were not altogether successful. Some reflected the still-embryonic development of the Ontario education system; but others were more successful. Witness the commentary on the Chicago Exposition of 1893.

Further on into the 20th century, there were other exhibitions. There was also the request to participate in an exhibition at Bradford, England put forward by George Hodgins. This was a more modest affair being an exhibition of various children's paintings and crafts, but it had as its aim to include most of the countries of Western Europe amongst its participants. This would not have been an important transfer of pedagogical ideas of the earlier type (i.e. between Ryerson and the disciples of Pestalozzi), but a simple exchange of finished products.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Canadian education had come to occupy a much more significant place in governments and politics of the day and increasingly in diplomacy. This was the last phase of development in this period. The early efforts of Ryerson and other leaders to visit other jurisdictions and to analyze their methods had started on an ad-hoc basis. World fairs had played a significant role in encouraging international dialogue. Education systems were now edging towards the stage. As a result of pressures to establish a national vision of education for Canada, the Dominion Education Association (DEA) was established in 1891. Although its creation

\[\text{References:}\]

\[43\text{Joseph Schull.} \text{L'Ontario Depuis 1867 (Toronto: Province d'Ontario, 1978), p.84.}\]

\[44\text{George Hodgins, Historiographer to Richard Harcourt, Minister of Education, July 17, 1903; Ministry}\]

\[45\text{Mary Gregory, Chair of Education Society, Bradford to George Hodgins, Historiographer, July 15,}\]

\[\text{1903: Ministry of Education; RG2, E-1, Folder 3, Envelope 9; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.}\]
had been discussed for many years beforehand, and its establishment was modelled after the National Education Association of the United States, it was looked upon to fulfill a definite need.

While the Dominion Education Association addressed the necessity of having a national organization, its principal organizers did not focus their attention on international activities. Instead, one of their central concerns was Canada's place in the British Empire. This was not surprising given the ongoing relationship that Canada had with London. In the early years of the DEA, the Colonial Office in London was still the organization responsible for Canada's foreign affairs. In addition to the establishment of the DEA, 1895 also marked another evolution in Canadian society. Imperialism of a much more strident form was fashionable. "International" affairs were seen as so many imperial adventures which children could enthuse over at home. The DEA was to be consumed with this preoccupation for years to come. Stamp outlines this imperialism and education.

Politicians and educators who seemed to want to promote Canadian nationalism in the schools actually spent more time strengthening the imperial sentiment. In truth, perhaps, they saw no real difference between the two and the so-called "double loyalty" rested easily with them. The promotion of imperial sentiment in the schools owed much to...George Ross, Ontario's Minister of Education ...."we need your help for some years yet, ' Ross wrote to Grant in 1899, "in the evolution of a higher Canadian sentiment and in strengthening that Imperialism which has practically revolutionized the attitude of the Colonies to the Empire."[47]

George Ross took a leading role in the campaign for imperialism. Ross started his career as a schoolteacher and subsequently became Minister of Education for Ontario(1883-1899). He was ably suited for the job by Schull's account.

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It is not surprising that Ross, who was very much the imperialist, and who was also very much involved in the establishment of the DEA, would shape it into an instrument that would encourage practices extolling imperialism in the Canadian school system.

By the end of this initial period in international relations in education, there had been a great deal of change. Canadians were not involved in international activities in education in the early part of the 1800s because there were very few international events. Foreign ministries and chancelleries were mostly concerned with the maintenance of European peace and the terms of the Congress of Vienna. In the Canadas, as part of the evolving British Empire, the Colonial Office oversaw matters of church and schooling. It was not through this agency, but rather through individual freelance efforts that the first contacts were established and the first international activities in education carried out.

Ryerson’s voyages and contacts with fellow educationalists provide one example of this. The use of exhibits at international fairs furthered the interaction between different educators and served to disseminate new ideas about methodology. Towards the end of the century, Canadians turned once again to institutionalization with the creation of the Dominion Education Association. While a noble idea, the DEA’s early years saw a more intense focus on British education rather than the international comparisons that marked the Ryerson era. This imperialist slant was particularly due to George Ross, one of the founders of the DEA and also the Minister of Education in Ontario. At the end of the early period, there was little to suggest any real commitment to international relations in education. Instead, there had been a few high points where specific individuals had

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48 Schull, L’Ontario, p. 84.
stepped beyond their roles and helped the entire system through their contacts with the outside world. A more engaged approach to international relations in education would await future efforts.
From Empire to War - The CEA in the Foreign Policy Environment (1895-1917)

The era between 1895 and the end of the First World War saw new challenges and problems in Canada's external affairs. International relations in education continued to be of a low priority for a whole host of reasons. The continued focus on the British Empire inhibited Canadian educators and administrators from looking further afield for new ideas and strategies for the classroom. The Catholic church played an incredibly strong role in the education system in Quebec, limiting the possibilities that existed for Quebeçois to look to secular Europe and other societies for ideas on education. The whitewash Canadianization of new immigrants and failure to use the opportunity they represented to further international contacts in education also limited the development of international educational activities in the West, in Saskatchewan in particular. Finally, the advent of the war exacerbated the situation and further limited new opportunities for international relations in education.

In 1895, the first steps were taken towards a real Canadian presence in international relations in education, following belatedly Ryerson's efforts a quarter century before.49 On the organizational side of things, among the first international contacts that took place between Canadian educators and those abroad were those undertaken by the DEA. Contacts were made with the National Union of Teachers in Great Britain soon after the founding of the organization in 1895.50 Friendly greetings aside, these early contacts were important because they marked the first time Canadian governments spoke with one voice on education in the international sense. These contacts, however, although now "Canadian," illustrated the imperial domination of Canada's worldview.

Beyond contacting the British, the international activities of the DEA were infrequent and not at all coordinated. The early years of the DEA were also a period of

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50 Stewart Freeman, Inter-provincial Co-operation in Education(Toronto: Gage, 1957). p. 15.
marked change in international relations. As the situation in Southern Africa
degenerated towards the Boer War, Canada faced unpleasant policy choices because of its role in the Empire.

[Although]...Sir John A. Macdonald had resisted such wild-eyed adventures in 1884, it was not so easy for Laurier fifteen years later. That was a measure of the change, of a world grown smaller through linked networks of transport, communication, electricity - and news. South Africa was closer in 1899 than Khartoum had been in 1884. It was a world growing vain with dreams of empire, with the glory of races: Russia with Panslavism; France and Britain rivals in, of all places, the Sudan, to say nothing of West Africa, Indo-China and the South Pacific...51

Foreign policy at the turn the century was tuged in many different directions. When the government did not get involved in the Boer war, volunteers saw fit to go anyway. In this environment, international relations in education were still rudimentary. While the turn of the century saw the continued swagger of empires as the colonial and imperialistic urges of the European powers continued to be played out on the world stage, the DEA continued with its own pro-imperialist agenda. The DEA, in coordination with the various ministries of education, moved to make the day preceding May 24th, "Empire Day" at their convention in 1898.52 This was sponsored by George Ross, minister of education for Ontario and soon to be premier of the province. Ross, like Ryerson, was making his mark on Ontario politics and education. Ross, unlike Ryerson, did not travel extensively in either his tenure as minister of education or in his time as premier.

Prior to the First World War, the lackadaisical nature of the DEA's meetings continued to hamper the development of international activities. Interests were so much focused elsewhere that the executive of the DEA was unable to meet.

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52Stewart, Inter-provincial, p. 16.
Although it was planned that the DEA would meet in 1911, so many DEA members and representatives were in Europe that summer and again in 1912, that the meeting was further delayed.53

Perhaps - hopefully, but not likely - the executive was in attendance at an international conference on education.

While Canada continued to be isolated from the wider world, secure in its British and developing American connections, moves to establish a formal bureaucracy of external relations were getting underway by 1909. The first under-secretary of state for external affairs was Sir Joseph Pope. Some of the activities that the new organization dealt with included the approval of passports, preparation for Imperial Conferences, and trade policy.54 The new bureaucracy was a definite improvement on the previous arrangement despite the absence of any change at the top.

From the time of Confederation, the prime minister of Canada has played a central role in dealing with questions on external relations coming before the government...With no member of the cabinet assigned responsibility for external affairs, it fell to the prime minister to deal with matters himself or to delegate them on a case-by-case basis, to a colleague.55

With the establishment of the External Affairs organization, first contacts began to be made with it through provincial departments of education. Many of these were routine requests for information or documentation, however as time went on and the educational relations of Canada abroad expanded, so too did the frequency and nature of the interaction between the two agencies.56 It was only with a change in statute, and the desire to keep Louis St-Laurent in cabinet, that External Affairs became separated from

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53Stewart, Inter-provincial, p. 25.
54National Archives of Canada. Office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1997).
56Joseph Pope, Under-Secretary of External Affairs to Mr. Wallis. Department of Education, June 23, 1915; Ministry of Education Central Registry Files; RG2-P3, Box 12; Toronto: Archives of Ontario. One of the first contacts between the two organizations was a letter confirming the delivery of passports to ministers in the Ontario government who had been unexpectedly called to New York City. Others later included a letter to Arthur Meighen from an American industrialist about private schools. Meighen in his secondary capacity as Secretary of State for External Affairs transferred the letter to the Ontario Department of Education.
the prime ministership after the Second World War. The emphasis on diplomacy, trade, and war remained central to the preoccupations of the organization in the early years.

In Quebec, international relations in education developed a special meaning. After the trauma of the Conquest, the shock of the 1789 Revolution in France, and the turmoil of the Napoleonic periods, Quebec turned very much to the Catholic Church and to Rome. Indeed, there was much more of the mother country-colony relationship between the Holy See and Quebec City than existed in the province’s dealings with France. During the last half of the 19th century, the influence of the church in Quebec became more and more important and entrenched. For many French, Swiss, and Belgians, the province of Quebec was the last refuge from a Europe gone mad with republicanism and godlessness. The power of the church is noted by Linteau.

C’est une Église puissante, triomphante, et qui n’hésite pas à intervenir dans tous les domaines où elle croit la foi menacée....malgré ces limites, l’Église catholique demeure au Québec une force importante...pour une bonne part dans le quasi-monopole qu’elle exerce sur certains services indispensables à la collectivité comme ...l’éducation...57

On two particular educational issues, the special relationship between Quebec and the Vatican was quite clearly illustrated. For a long period, international relations in education were relations with the Vatican. The first issue was the question of Jesuit lands. It was similar to the questions of Methodist and Anglican lands in Upper Canada and had been simmering as an issue for decades. The problem with the Jesuits worldwide dated back several centuries. With the repression of the Jesuit order by the 18th century pope, Clement XIV, a remarkable train of events was set in motion. As a result of the reassertion of papal power in Rome, all the Jesuit estates in Canada fell to the suzerainty of the Colonial Office. They were then given over to the government of Lower Canada which eventually became the government of Quebec. When favour once again shone on

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the Jesuits and they were allowed to re-establish in Quebec in 1842, they once again laid claim to the properties that had formerly been theirs.

The Premier, Honoré Mercier, decided the matter in 1888. Mercier, however, offered compensation of about $400,000 and asked the Pope to distribute this money as he might wish. Throughout the province and even more so in the rest of Canada, there was vehement protest against what looked like encouraging a foreign power to interfere in this country's affairs. Eventually, the money was split between Laval University, Protestant school boards, and the Canadian Jesuits. It did however, provide valuable lessons in the conduct of international relations and particularly to what extent external organizations would have a bearing on the activities of Canadian governments in the realms of religion and education.

The Vatican's interference in Quebec's educational affairs continued to lend a special character to Quebec's diplomacy in education in the late 1890s. The second time the question of Papal intervention popped up was with the proposed legislation on the re-establishment of a Ministry of Education in Quebec in 1897. This project immediately occasioned a response from Rome to the Quebec Premier.

"[The] Pope requests you defer action on public instruction bill. Letter follows today." Although the proposed legislation did pass through the National Assembly, it was later defeated by the Legislative Council under pressure from Monseigneur Bruchési, archbishop of Quebec. In order to preserve their particular power over education, ecclesiastical officials often invoked Rome's influence and this brought an entirely different dimension to the issue of international relations in education.

While relations with the Catholic Church had a significant impact on Quebec's role in international relations in education, immigration to the West also shaped the way provincial education bureaucracies viewed contact with the outside world. Immigration

was one of the important defining events of Canadian history on the prairies. This had big implications for the development of Western school systems. What is less well known is the international component of that immigration. To what extent did educational authorities attempt to understand or integrate teachers from Europe into the Prairie's educational system by contacting European countries? Did ministers undertake to visit Europe? The record is dismal, but also reflective of the times. Instead of integrating the best of foreign education systems à la Ryerson, Prairie governments fired teachers who taught too much of the language or culture of their mother country. As a result, a great many of the new teachers from Normal schools on the Prairies endured hard times in the educating of the first generation of immigrants to Canada. Also, talent in education was lost to the system as educators from Europe were forced to do other things instead of teaching.

The nub of the issue was as follows.

Canadian born teachers were inexperienced in the European tongues and few foreign teachers available were usually viewed with suspicion by provincial educational authorities. In the end, the law of teacher supply and concern for "Canadianization" triumphed over family backgrounds and any pedagogical considerations. But there still remained the problem of attracting the young Canadian-born teacher to the rural immigrant community.

Once again education, international relations, and immigration slammed head-on into the question of race and ethnicity. R.J. Vincent's comment on the age of European ascendancy illustrates clearly the cross-currents that affected new Canadians as they came into the education system.

So while it is far from being the case that racial discrimination (and not only by white men) is a thing of the past, international society has now banned as illegitimate all doctrines to justify it. This is a dramatic change from the attitudes that typified the age of European ascendancy, when notions of a biological hierarchy among different human types that

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60 Stamp, "Education," p. 305.
justified and even required the subjection of one to another were considered respectable.\textsuperscript{62}

The latter-day banning of doctrines justifying discrimination was far from the minds of educators as the immigration into the Prairies was undertaken in the early part of the century. Most countries east of the Oder River were considered inferior and of little concern. It is not highly surprising then that an examination of the archives of Saskatchewan shows that principal concerns exterior to the province in education dealt with the exchange of teachers (to Britain and France), examination of schools in Illinois, and correspondence principally with the United Kingdom, Ireland, and departments of education in American states.\textsuperscript{63}

Immigration, religion and education in general were refocused towards the end of this period. The obvious agent of this refocusing was the outbreak of the First World War. This was in many ways the last gasp of the European hegemons, tired after a century of expansion in the "hinterlands" of Africa. War resulted in an absolute decline in international relations in education between Canada and the outside world. The larger reasons for this decline were simply the preoccupation with the struggle and the inability to maintain normal communications in a state of hostilities. Canada, particularly Ontario, saw the war much in terms of its role in the Empire. Contacts would continue with the organizations within the Empire that were dedicated to education, but contacts with enemy combatants were out of the question. The nature of the times was illustrated in correspondence between the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Education in Ontario. The government in Ottawa received from Britain a series of cartoons depicting the war in Belgium and the nature of German atrocities there. These "Raemaeker's Cartoons" were to be distributed to high schools by the provincial


\textsuperscript{63}Archives of Saskatchewan, electronic-mail to the author, November 1997.
authorities. Pedagogy was not - other than in a patriotic sense - a concern in the relations between nations. In the previous era, the 1880s and 1890s, there was a great deal of interest and attention paid to Prussian and other European systems of education, and their accomplishments. It wasn't until the defeat of Germans at the end of the war that mention of Germany surfaced again at the conference of the Canadian Education Association.

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64 Joseph Pope, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to A.H. Colquhoun, Deputy Minister of Education, February 23, 1917; Ministry of Education Central Registry Files; RG2, P-3, Box 43; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
The Interwar Years- The CEA in Foreign Policy (1917-1942)

While the First World War raged, education around the world suffered as many teachers left the profession to enlist in armies. International relations were also constrained pending the outcome of the conflict. The normal mechanisms that would enable education to be an effective part of international interaction were given over to other issues. Yet, the war helped in the longer term to push issues such as education back onto the agenda of international relations. Globally, there was increasing recognition of the political value of education. War also provided Canada with the opening to start to pursue its own foreign policy. Canadian leaders, notably Mackenzie King, chose to be cautious and, as a result, Canada became a hesitant partner on the international stage. The increasing distance that it maintained between international and domestic issues revealed that the principal focus continued to be centered around the domestic political agenda, rather than an international one.

Following the Armistice and the end of the First World War, the Tenth Conference of the Canadian Education Association(CEA) was held on November 20th, 21st and 22nd, 1918.65 This conference was not a stellar event in terms of international relations in education and Canada's place therein. As noted earlier, the keynote address of the conference paid attention to educational developments in the defeated Germany as well as those in Britain and in France.66 References to international relations in education were beginning to reappear in CEA documents. The proceedings of the CEA conference held in 1922 centered around the establishment of a bureau of education in Ottawa. In particular, the conference document delineated the international aspect of the bureau's work in more concrete terms.

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65 The organization went through several name changes. It was the Dominion Education Association, the Canadian Education Association, the Canada and Newfoundland Education Association, and again the Canadian Education Association.
The scope of the work of a Dominion Bureau might be summarized as follows:

3. It might give information regarding educational effort and results in other lands that would be informing and stimulating to all in Canada.67

These words clearly echo the mission that Ryerson had undertaken in his trips abroad, but unfortunately they were not immediately acted upon. While developments in the Department of External Affairs and the CEA continued to contribute to international relations in education, the rise of international agencies during this period also changed the existing environment. One of the foremost organizations in the international environment was established in the 1920s as the International Bureau of Education (the IBE). Canadians were initially exposed to the concept of the IBE, as the subject came up at a Toronto conference of the World Organization of Education Associations.

The second decision, which was later to have unforeseeable repercussions, was the one to devote a "special effort to the preparation of the congress of the World Federation in 1929." P. Bovet had already met Augustus Thomas, President of this World Federation of Education Associations, which had been founded in 1923 in San Francisco by the National Education Association in order to bestow an international character on its annual assembly. But while the congresses that the Federation organized in Edinburgh (1925) and Toronto (1927) had been accessible only to English speaking teachers; the one planned for Geneva was to endeavour to interest European public opinion and to bring together the efforts of all teachers to achieve strong international links.68

These conferences did not provide the necessary stimulus for Canada to officially join the IBE when it was established in 1929. Instead, Canada continued to maintain observer status throughout this period.

In the 1920s, the CEA had entered into a moribund period where it was not active, let alone carrying on international activities. This was different from the Americans south of the border. The American National Education Association and its offspring became much more active during this time. For the most part, international activities

during this time period were carried out independently through the provincial ministries of education, or they didn't happen at all. On other fronts, much attention was given to returning veterans of the wars and the training needs of Canadians. Throughout these times, delegates continued to attend international conferences, but they were also not necessarily allied with the CEA or any other organization.

In the mid-1920s, there were other developments at the Department of External Affairs that increased the profile of education in foreign relations. O.D. Skelton had recently become Under-Secretary of External Affairs. During his tenure, the department started to handle more diverse issues. Among the important concerns that were addressed were the League of Nations, relations with the Imperial government, Canadian-American relations, trade, management of foreign consulates and embassies, and other issues of a defense nature.69 The scope of international activity was gradually increasing over time.

The early 1930s saw the IBE become more assertive in the conduct of its international affairs, and this brought responses from Canadian governments. From this point onward the organization

"invite[d] all the Ministries of Public Education of all countries to communicate to the third meeting of the Council a report on the educational progress made in their countries during the year 1931-1932 and to send representatives to the Council's meeting at which those reports will be presented."...Nevertheless, 24 states responded to this appeal, Canada sending three reports (British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan), while Geneva was the only Swiss member.70

Canadian participation is documented from the early 1930s onwards. Correspondence between Canada and the IBE continued between 1931 and 1968.71 The 1930s saw the limited participation of Canada in the IBE. They also saw the more significant results of the Great Depression at home and moves towards the Second World War. The situation

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70 Suchodolski, et al., The International, p. 69.
71 IBE Secretariat, electronic-mail to the author, Fall 1997.
the CEA faced in dealing with these international questions was uncertain. The 1930s also witnessed continued forays by individual provinces into international relations in education. During the mid-1930s, the government of Ontario arranged a teacher exchange agreement with Bermuda. Under this arrangement there was to be the professional development of Bermudan teachers in the Canadian school system and the opportunity for Canadian teachers to have some international experiences.\textsuperscript{72} Another contact with the international system came with questions from the New Zealand ministry of education regarding the nature of the Ontario teacher training program, remuneration of trainees, and what to do about the Depression.\textsuperscript{73} The Department of Education’s response found its way through External Affairs’ channels back to Auckland.

By the latter part of the 1930s, Canada’s external posture changed and became much more insular in terms of how the world was viewed.\textsuperscript{74} As well, the rhetoric of war and the disorder and mayhem of the Second World War effectively shut down the transnational operations of the IBE. The IBE continued to function during this time, however.\textsuperscript{75} The war resulted in a changing series of activities in international relations in education. One of the activities that the IBE undertook was the organization and shipping of thousands of books to prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. The IBE also sponsored the establishment of "Internment Universities."\textsuperscript{76} The CEA’s participation in these activities did not take place as Canada was one of the belligerents in the conflict after September 1940. In the summer of 1940, a decision was taken by the IBE to postpone the next conference on education until after the cessation of hostilities.

\textsuperscript{73}W.H. Measures, External Affairs to A.H. Colquhoun, Oct 18th, 1933; Ministry of Education Central Registry Files: RG2, P-3, Box 181; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
\textsuperscript{74}For an excellent treatment of this and European Jews see, Harold Troper and Irving Abella, None is Too Many (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1983).
\textsuperscript{75}Suchodolski, et al, The International, p. 79.
It was not until its meeting on 16 August 1940 that this bureau yielded to the fact that the Conference would have to be postponed. Recording this decision three weeks later, the Management committee requested the Director to inform the ministries of the postponement, "bringing it however to their attention that the activity of the Bureau was being pursued as usual." It also called on the ministries to send the Director "their reports on educational developments during the 1939-1940 school year" and announced that they would be reproduced in the *Annuaire international de l'éducation et de l'enseignement.*

Another issue that the IBE dealt with in the latter half of the war was the question of foreign teaching staff working on the redevelopment of war torn countries.

The war marked other changes in international relations in education. As was the case in the First World War, there was a cessation of ties with enemy combatants. There was also a heightened emphasis placed on educating the citizens of the country for the war.

As well, every imaginable step was taken to champion the ideals of the British Empire and Commonwealth which had helped to nurture that civilization. "Empire Day" instituted in the heyday of the late Victorian epoch, was still very much a national institution.

The end of the war marked the return of relative normalcy. The Cold War was to bring other new challenges for the CEA. One of the immediate concerns was how to deal with the newly emergent splits in the geopolitical map east of the Oder River. That the Soviet bloc established itself did not mean a great deal in the politics of education, however, the CEA was nonetheless concerned. The other big event of the period at the international level, following the establishment of UNESCO, was the increasingly close relationship between the IBE and UNESCO. This first started in the early 1950s with an agreement between the two organizations to coordinate the use of their names and symbols and share the sponsorship of the International Conferences on Public Education.

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77 Suchodolski, *et al., The International*, p.82.
Since the middle of the 1940s, further international matters had come up for the CEA to consider. At CEA conventions, resolutions came up regularly regarding the formation of the United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization (UNESCO). Linda Goldthorp, in her dissertation on UNESCO, mentions the "actions of the provinces" only in passing, and the CEA not at all. Federal bureaucrats in the Department of External Affairs were very cognizant of the fine line they walked in dispensing with their international responsibilities and not treading on provincial toes.\(^{80}\) Philips, in his work on Canadian education, also discusses provincial reluctance to participate in UNESCO, attributing some of the responsibility for this to "Catholic Quebec," and "Social Credit Alberta."\(^{81}\)

The war had also caused Canadians to increase the number of intra-Empire education contacts in order to demonstrate Canada's "imperial solidarity."

Thus there were any number of patriotic poster competitions like the one sponsored by a British Board of Trade anxious to promote greater intra-Empire commerce in wartime. Another popular device was collecting of pupils' signatures for a statement on "Strengthening the Bonds of Empire," which was prepared from material forwarded by Britain's zealous Ministry of Information and ultimately bound and dispatched to a presumably grateful King and Queen.\(^{82}\)


\(^{81}\) Philips, *Development*, p. 356.

The Last War Years and the Start of the Modern Era (1943-1967)

The War’s End and the Early Post War Period

During the last war years and the beginning of the Cold War era, Canada’s diplomacy in education entered into a new phase. While the last part of the war saw much effort turn towards the coming period of reconstruction in Europe and, the evolution of the new United Nations organization; it also saw increased diplomatic activity in Canada. The Cold War shaped most of this diplomacy, but new links were also being forged with international education organizations. Notably, the Canadian Teacher’s Federation (CTF) began to play a role on the international stage. Finally, the evolution of the CEA into the CMEC started in the early 1960s with the establishment of the Standing Committee of Ministers as a committee attached to the CEA. This development was also to have an impact on Canada’s international relations in education.

Towards the end of the war, the Canadian Education Association became more involved in international relations in education. The nation was still in a wartime frame of mind and this was reflected in the agenda of the 1944 Convention of the CNEA.83

Early in 1944, the attention of the Executive Committee was directed to the efforts being made to secure international cooperation in the field of educational reconstruction, particularly concerning countries which have been under enemy control. Requests were received that the CNEA should urge upon the Dominion government the desirability of having a Canadian representative on the proposed United Nations Organization for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction. Your executive officials offered the services of the CNEA to the prime minister of Canada in the selection of a representative or representatives when appointed. The Prime Minister replied with a letter of appreciation, but stated that Canada had not yet decided to participate directly.84

The CEA also became more assertive in its attitude with the establishment of a new, more permanent headquarters in Toronto. October 1944 was a notable date as the CEA and the

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83 Canada and Newfoundland Education Association. The modern title was adopted in 1950.
provinces were instrumental in the establishment of a bi-national panel with the United States. The Canada-US Committee on Education was set up. It would continue in operation until the early 1960s.85

As an adjunct to the CEA's activities at the end of the war, another significant event took place in 1945. For just over a year, John Althouse had been Chief Director of Education in Ontario. It was in that capacity that he undertook a tour of England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Denmark and Sweden with Justice Hope in order to examine new ideas in pedagogy that could be incorporated into Ontario schools. This tour was a preparatory exercise undertaken prior to the writing of the Hope Report. The Hope Report eventually came out in 1950. Although the Hope Report was not implemented86, Althouse and Hope had briefly revived the "Ryersonian" approach to international activities in education.87

In this period, the federal government's views regarding UNESCO and other matters solidified as well. Their thinking on this issue had started as early as 1943 and continued into the postwar period. In February of 1945, Gordon Robertson of External Affairs expressed his view that the provinces had to be consulted on UNESCO participation and wrote a letter to that effect. This letter never got to the provinces.88 In September of 1945, the headquarters of the CEA was set up in Toronto. Following a meeting of the Board of Directors, another letter concerning UNESCO went from the CEA in November of 1945 to the prime minister. This was just after Canadian delegates from External Affairs participated in the final conference on the creation of UNESCO. The instructions to these delegates were clear. They were not to do anything that would

85MacLeod and Blair, *The Canadian*, p. 103.
86The Hope report came out during a period when conservative views dominated. It was not implemented because it took more radical positions on issues of funding of schooling.
disturb the federal nature of Canada. The CEA however, was extremely concerned not to be left on the sidelines and stated that in its letter.

(To the Prime Minister) That the Canada and Newfoundland Education Association is the only organization representing the departments of education of the provincial governments, which are the legally constituted authorities over education in Canada and that as such the Canada and Newfoundland Education Association is the proper body to be consulted on any educational matter affecting Canada as a whole.

The pressure exerted by the organization eventually brought results. These developments are summed up in Freeman Stewart's work on the CEA.

Prior to 1950, Canada was occasionally represented at the Geneva conference by a junior member of the Canadian embassy staff or by some Canadian educationist who happened by coincidence to be in the area at the time of the conference. This casual arrangement was hardly an appropriate way to provide representation at an international conference having considerable prestige....[UNESCO] was established in 1946 as an official inter-governmental agency to which Canada became an early signatory. Even while the formation of this organization was under consideration, CEA records clearly indicate that Association officials were keenly interested in the idea and insistent that the CEA should play substantial role in Canadian participation.

On November 23, 1945, the secretary addressed the Prime Minister, Mr. W.L. Mackenzie King, drawing his attention with respect to the proposed establishment of UNESCO to a resolution passed by the CNEA directors on November 20, 1945. Presumably as a result of these and other representations, Dr. G.F. McNally was selected by the Canadian government as one of the five delegates to the UNESCO General Session in Paris in 1946.

Following the early post-war relationship between the CEA and External Affairs, the two parties remained wary regarding diplomacy in this field. One example perhaps will suffice: the CEA and the provinces were frozen out by the federal government from participating in international activities in education such as the 1947 UNESCO

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89 Goldthorp. Reluctant, p.50.
90 Stewart. Inter-provincial, p.54.
91 Stewart, Inter-provincial, pp. 127-128.
conference held in Mexico City.\textsuperscript{92} Still, progress in furthering provincial representation in international activities was being made on other fronts. The CEA’s interest in becoming involved in the UNESCO process came with the following newsletter article.

UNESCO....The President of the CEA, Mr. A.R. Lord and the Secretary, met with the Acting Under-Secretary of State in the Department of External Affairs on October 31st concerning UNESCO relations with this country. CEA officers, on behalf of the Association, expressed some concern that, in their opinion, matters affecting UNESCO were not as expeditiously handled in Canada as they might be, particularly in comparison with other countries.\textsuperscript{93}

With regard to other developments, particularly with the IBE, the 1950 conference of the CEA was important. Following the war, the IBE came out of its period of stasis, and international activities were again undertaken.

The CEA proposed to the Ministers of Education, meeting at the CEA convention in Victoria in 1950, that each of the eight largest provinces (by population) increases its annual grant to the CEA by $150, while the two smallest provinces (by population) pay an increase of $50; if this were agreed to the CEA might "on appropriate occasions," send representatives to conferences abroad. This proposal was approved. Beginning in 1952, therefore, the CEA has been regularly represented at the UNESCO-IBE Annual Conference. The Association was first represented in 1950, when its Secretary, being in Geneva at a meeting preceding the Conference, at UNESCO expense remained for the Conference.\textsuperscript{94}

The CEA claimed that it was not informed about the events that were taking place on the international scene, particularly with UNESCO. The CEA was also critical of the frequent changes made to staff monitoring developments at UNESCO within the Department of External Affairs.\textsuperscript{95} After a certain period of time, the CEA entered into a more stable arrangement with the Department of External Affairs.

\textsuperscript{95}Stewart, \textit{Inter-provincial}, p. 130.
"The procedure that has evolved is that the External Affairs Department, which is the responsible federal government department, consults the CEA on matters pertaining to public education. Provincial departments of education are in agreement with this procedure, and on a number of occasions they have indicated to the CEA that they expect it to serve in this capacity for them."96

This was the situation in the early and mid 1950s.97 G. Fred McNally, one of the CEA presidents, also reflected on this period in his memoir of life in the Canadian Education Association.

In 1946, on the nomination of the CEA, the Dominion government appointed me a member of the five-man delegation to the first general conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. I was a member of the survey committee which produced a significant report on the chief educational needs of the Dominion of Canada.98

In the second half of the 1950s the nature of the relationship with UNESCO had become somewhat more clarified. The head of the CEA at the time suggested to External Affairs that the CEA was a convenient organization to which the government could address specific questions if the government wished. Should matters arise of a more important technical and political nature then they would be addressed by the specific provincial department of education in question.99 Kathryn Heath, addressed the CEA's evolving role

The Canadian Education Association...performs certain quasi-public functions in the field of education....By the terms of its constitution, senior permanent officers in the Provincial Departments of Education call on the Association to provide informal liaison, facilitate joint action, and also serve as connecting technical link between them and various bodies (such as IBE and UNESCO) with which more than one Province is concerned. At the Federal level, the Department of External Affairs calls upon the Association to prepare certain non-statistical reports on education in

96Stewart. Inter-provincial. p. 129.
97MacLeod and Blair. The Canadian. p. 104.
"As a result of a memo, the Ministers of Education meeting there [Victoria, B.C.] agreed to provide a special grant to the CEA to enable it to send a representative to international education conferences, usually the International Bureau of Education conference in Geneva. Representation began in 1952, leading to more active and extended relations with the External Affairs department."
Canada as a whole using information provided by provincial Departments of Education.\(^{100}\)

While these changes and debates took place at home, other events were happening overseas. In her 1962 overview of world-wide ministries of education, Kathryn Heath, notes that for the most part governments were working out some sort of sharing arrangement between the federal or central Ministries of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when dealing with international relations in education. Most of the ministries of education here were part of the federal or the central government.

The Commonwealth Office of Education in the Commonwealth of Australia is shown as the agent for the Department of External Affairs on specified matters. The Government of Japan reports Ministry of Education responsibility for pertinent [matters] implementing negotiations once the Government has entered into international agreements and treaties. Constitutional legislation in the Kingdom of Sweden centralizes communications with foreign Governments in the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Related responsibility of the Minister of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs includes consultative service in the Council of State before the Government enters into agreements on educational matters.\(^{101}\)

While the Canadian Education Association played an official role in the postwar era as the de facto representative of Canadian education in international affairs, other organizations were also starting to establish international profiles. A brief examination of these other organizations quickly reveals the increasing sophistication of international relations and the forces pushing outward towards greater global interaction. In particular, the Canadian Teachers Federation was becoming more involved in global aspects of education. The CTF did this primarily through membership in the World Confederation of Teacher’s Organizations (WCTOP). In addition to this, the CTF was also involved in the establishment of the National Commission for UNESCO in Canada. It entered into bilateral arrangements with teacher organizations around the world, focusing in particular


on specific regions and encouraging exchanges. Finally, the organization was also involved in the efforts to increase understanding along both sides of the Canadian border with the Canada-US Education organization.

In the CEA, the development of the international portfolio continued in the 1960s. The records indicate the increasing need for the CEA to give attention to international affairs in education; there was no other office to act as an agency for the provincial authorities, and the External Affairs Department recognized that education was primarily a provincial responsibility, at least internally in Canada. Discussions at Executive and Directors' meetings were regularly concerned with UNESCO, the International Conference on Education (now involving UNESCO as well as the introduction of political problems, regarded as outside the interests and competence of professional educators). ...  

Dr. Stewart, as one the secretaries of the organization, played an important role in Canada's international relations in education. His biographers point out his travels and it becomes clear that Stewart was replaying Ryerson's career as, for a certain period, the primary intermediary for Canada in education abroad.

He was chairman, secretary, treasurer, member of numerous national and international committees. He was Canadian delegate to this and that: He spoke for Canadian education at Geneva, Montevideo, New Delhi, Lagos, London, Canberra.  

While the postwar period marked the rise of the CEA in terms of its influence in international relations in education, as time wore on the new importance attributed to international affairs across the country declined. This decline was particularly marked following the departure of Lester Pearson from External Affairs to political office. Under the influence of Norman Robertson, Lester Pearson and others, the department departed from its earlier relative obscurity and became an important part of the Ottawa scene. The establishment of new embassies and the participation in new organizations

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104 Carmen F. Moir, _Priorities and Purposes_, presidential address, CEA Convention, Calgary, Alberta, 1977.
had the profound effect of widening the horizon for political authorities. It was becoming more and more clear as well that the "middle-Atlantic" notion of the world did not hold anymore, and that the Pacific was playing a much more important role in the global system. In addition to this, barriers to communication and transportation fell very quickly in the 1960s. With the development of relatively safe and effective jetliner travel, countries that were previously days away by oceanliner were now hours away by plane.

In terms of communication, the establishment of a more effective worldwide telephone system brought down the distance between continents, and for a brief time increased "international relations." No longer were the ex-colonial powers and the United States completely able to call the shots. Again, Bull and Watson are instructive in characterizing the nature of the environment in which the international relations in education was being conducted in the 1960s.

Although the period since the Second World War has witnessed an immense growth of international law, diplomatic representation and international organization, it is clear that the member states of the universal international society of the late twentieth century are less united by a sense of a common interest in a framework of rules and institutions governing their relations with one another than were the European powers of the period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the First World War.\textsuperscript{105}

As the 1960s proceeded, it became more-and-more obvious to ministers of education who had formed the Standing Committee of the CEA that, institutional change would have to happen. The CEA was unable to carry out all the necessary tasks of the ministers and fulfill its other obligations. This view also held true with regard to the CEA's international activities. The mechanics of the changeover from the CEA to the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada have been examined elsewhere.\textsuperscript{106} In terms of international activities, the transition period lasted over the greater part of a decade.

\textsuperscript{105}Bull and Watson, \textit{The Expansion}, p. 430.
\textsuperscript{106}See for example the early annual reports of the CMEC.
The initial issue of transferring the ministers of education to a different organization came up in January, 1967. Following proposals to make changes, an agreement was made to establish a new council in September of 1967. Freeman states in his work that after the Council of Ministers was established, the work of the CEA on the technical side of international activities continued unabated. With the preparation of the report for the IBE and the Commonwealth Education Conference in Lagos, Nigeria, the CEA continued to provide liaison with the outside world.107

The issue of who took responsibility for international activities came to the fore as time went on.

There was the problem of distinguishing which of the many interprovincial and international activities that had been regularly dealt with by the CEA would now be the responsibility of the Council. The Secretary, for instance had been advised by the federal officials concerned that they had been instructed that they were no longer to address the CEA on international activities, but instead were to address the office of Mr. Davis as Council Chairman. The uncertainty had been further underlined by a letter the CEA had received from the Quebec Department of Education which questioned “whether the CEA should be holding a pre-convention meeting of (education) Information Officers without prior approval of the Council.108”

At this point the chairman of the new Council of Ministers was one of the new ministers of education in the 1960s, William Davis of Ontario. After an interval, the Council chair and the executive of the CEA got together.

...With respect to reports that had to be prepared for international conferences, he felt there was a joint role as he did not think the Council would be preparing such reports, that being a CEA function. The Council would be concerned essentially, he said with international relations in education and with the federal government on matters involving “manpower, post-secondary education, universities, and related problems of Departments of Education”.109

108Stewart, The Canadian, p. 44.
109Stewart, The Canadian, p. 44.
Although Bill Davis clarified the situation to a certain degree, there remained uncertainties in the nature of the relationship between the CEA and the CMEC that persisted into the 1970s. By the mid-1970s however, there was increasing clarity in the demarcation of the functions of the two organizations. The situation improved markedly in the eyes of the CEA with the appearance of Lucien Perras as the director-general of the CMEC in January of 1976.

Conclusion

A trip through Canadian history, a voyage that demarcated the edge of the 200 mile limit of time has provided several glimpses of the past. The picture is far from complete. What has become clearer, however, is the nature of Canada's external relations in education. The early period was marked by a conspicuous lack of continuous international activities. This absence was punctuated by various freelance attempts by leading educators to make contacts with other systems and other practitioners of education. Ryerson and the school promoters of his generation formed the first international community of educators that engaged in international relations. With their departure from positions of influence, international activities expanded to include vigorous participation in international exhibitions and fairs. At the turn of the century, imperialism was very strong in Canada and this had a substantial impact on the desire of organizations, such as the newly formed Dominion Education Association, to participate in international activities. When organizations such as the International Bureau of Education were established, Canadian participation gradually increased but still reflected reticence and hesitancy rather than enthusiastic participation. The study of absence continued.

With the Second World War, priorities were refocused on the goals of the war and education reflected this. With the end of the hostilities, there was a resumption of international life, but a new and an equally difficult period opened. Following the reconstruction of the Second World War, the focus for educationalists came to be placed
on UNESCO. Other organizations in Canadian education also became involved in the process of working with the wider world. In this post-war period, Canadians also took part in the grand survey trip to Europe as did Dr. Althouse and Justice Hope prior to working on the Hope report. The Standing Committee of Ministers of Education was established in 1960 and became actively involved in educational policy formation. Provincial ministers of education were now more insistent as to their role in international education activities. This expectation and other factors led directly to the establishment of the CMEC and the turbulent handover of responsibilities from one organization to the other. From there, the development of the new organization took on prominence and increasingly it has assumed the international role that Ryerson played a century before. Education was not at the top of the Canadian foreign policy agenda, but it was starting to be part of it.
Chapter 3
The Rise of Education-Related International Activities and the Fleur-de-lys:
Quebec's Role, 1960-1969

Obstacle, il y a donc. Aujourd'hui comme hier, entrer dans le monde scolaire, c'est pénétrer dans un autre univers. La question est de savoir, pour maintenant, comment aménager cet univers afin que la migration soit possible et ait pertinence pour ceux qui la subissent ou l'assument.110

Introduction
The absence of interest in international relations in education ended in the 1960s. Rather than continue on the twisted path that characterized the Canadian approach to diplomacy in education prior to this era, the burgeoning expansion of provincial governments sparked active and ongoing confrontation with federal authorities over the issue. Conflict, particularly between Quebec City and Ottawa, illustrated the difficulties inherent in assigning the jurisdictions of education and foreign affairs to two different levels of government. The Quebec Ministry of Education’s desire to assert an expanded role in international activities was the source of some of the conflict. Increasingly close collaboration in education with other states in the international system was also instrumental in precipitating the more antagonistic climate. French diplomatic and educational authorities during this period began to work closely with their counterparts in Quebec. Finally, bickering over membership in international educational organizations and representation at international conferences only served to prolong the ongoing dispute. Conflict over diplomacy in education in Canada’s dispersed federal system struck at the very heart of Canada’s international persona.111 Briefly, in the space of nine

111 Ivan Head portrayed the problem in the darkest language: “[the Gabonese invitation] was one of the most serious threats to the integrity of Canada that this country has ever faced....It contained the seeds of the destruction of Canada as a member of the international community.” Nossal, The Politics, p. 275.
years, events had moved the federal-provincial relationship in this area far away from the indifference of the earlier era.

Quebec's confrontations with the federal government over this matter did not occur without consequences for other provincial ministries of education. The ministers of education from Quebec, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, and Jean Guy-Cardinal were all members of the Standing Committee of Ministers of Education, and subsequently the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada during the 1960s. Any analysis of the CMEC and the development of its inter-provincial approach to foreign affairs must start with an understanding of the events in Quebec during this era. These circumstances, to a great degree, provided the conditioning for the interaction between the federal government and the CMEC in the 1970s and decades to follow.

The History of Quebec's International Activities in Education
Arguably, Quebec's confrontational position vis-à-vis the issue could be attributed solely to the changes undertaken by Jean Lesage's newly minted Liberal government of 1960; however, the reality was much more involved. Quebec's combativeness had roots in its long history of undertaking international obligations and establishing its own quasi-diplomatic presence in other foreign capitals. The stance it took during the 1960s also reflected the effects of its isolationist Catholic heritage and its linguistic exclusion from the North American mainstream. Moreover, participation in the international activities of the Canadian Education Association in no way moderated the province's bellicose position. Instead, membership in the CEA served as an insightful excursion into Canada's existing international relations in education. It further served as a reminder of the CEA's anglophone orientation and the predominance of
anglophones within its structure. Participation in Commonwealth Education summits, although laudable, was not relevant to the Quebec experience.

Quebec was more inclined to challenge the perceived status quo in the field of education and other areas internationally because Quebec had a history of international activities. For most of its provincial history, Quebec had been represented by an agent-general in important world cities, primarily London and Paris. These agencies dealt with matters of immigration, visits of political authorities and issues of trade. They were completely closed down under the 1936 government of Maurice Duplessis. Duplessis dealt with international questions primarily through the Catholic Church. In particular, international conferences were routed through ecclesiastical officials. When an invitation to such a conference was received, usually through the federal government, the response was worked out between the Quebec government and the church. Duplessis would ask whether there was a priest who would be interested in going to the conference. When an individual with the right qualifications stepped forward, then Duplessis would award a scholarship to this individual. He could then attend the conference in question.  

Adélabrd Godbout, premier in 1936 and again between 1939 and 1944, took a more expansive view of the world during his time in office and renewed Quebec's international drive. During the Second World War, he re-opened the agencies that Duplessis had earlier closed. An agent-general's office was established in New York in 1941. During this period the representatives of Quebec faced similar problems to those that their predecessors dealt with, particularly the issues of dual representation (i.e. with Canada) and diplomatic status. Most agent-generals did not enjoy diplomatic privileges.

\footnote{Claude Ryan, "Quebec's Cultural Diplomacy." \textit{Canadian Culture: International Dimensions}, ed. Andrew Cooper (Waterloo: Center for Federalism and Foreign Policy, 1985), p. 60.}
This situation changed only much later, and only with France. The full effects of Duplessis’ international policies were not to be reversed in any significant way until the Lesage government came to power in 1960. Still, the experience of having participated in the international system was part of the province’s past and its collective memory.

Another significant historical factor that inclined Quebec to be more combative in establishing international links in education was its heritage. The province’s cultural milieu was predominately Catholic, and for a greater part of the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church towered over international cultural relations and most of the education system in the province. The Church itself went abroad when it had a need that it was unable to satisfy at home. It took advantage of the changing political landscape in France to bolster its own position in Quebec. Archbishop Bourget encouraged the importation of French Catholic orders whose arrival was designed to strengthen the Catholic character of Quebec society and education. The populace during that era was substantially behind this move.

Most French Canadians believed as did the clergy that a strong state voice in education would lead to the dissemination of republican ideas and lay education. Events unfolding in late nineteenth century France and Germany had confirmed the clergy’s worst fears. In France’s Third Republic legislation was passed banning the teaching of religion and the engagement of clerics in state schools. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were also particularly fertile periods as Quebec exported both missionaries and education systems. While religious needs and

expectations predominated in the earlier period, in the more contemporary era they became less vital and less respected. Anti-clericalism reached new heights during the Duplessis regime as resentment increased over continued church control of education. The recognition that Québécois could go beyond their borders to further their educational and societal goals awoke repressed desires to go out and participate in the world. That, along with the passing of responsibility for education to the new secular authorities, raised the ante with regard to Quebec’s international presence.

In the postwar era, because of the structure of the Canadian Education Association, representation in that organization did not satisfy the international needs of the province, thus adding to the pressure to be self-reliant in this field. Paul Gérin-Lajoie was an active participant in the CEA. He did not however, mix his obligations towards the CEA, and his views on Quebec’s new role in diplomacy in education – publicly at least. When he was chairman of the Standing Committee of Ministers of the CEA, during the 1963-64 term, he addressed the CEA Convention in Quebec City. His topic was the future of education. In his speech he discussed the developments going on in Quebec, and dealt with the ongoing fiscal concerns of education, but did not assert international competence in this field.

Voila pourquoi ma question de tantôt doit se préciser ainsi : "Quel est l’avenir de l’éducation comme domaine de juridiction provinciale"?....

....If Canada has a part to play in international affairs, advanced education, that will give rise to the establishment of centres of learning and to intellectual creativeness that will meet the highest standards, is an absolute necessity.118


Important questions and fine sentiments on advanced education, but little hint as to the change that was going on in Quebec City. Several systemic issues also compounded Gérin-Lajoie's participation in the international activities of the CEA. One was the overwhelmingly English Canadian direction of the organization. This was reflected in the nature of the international educational organizations to which the CEA belonged. With the exception of the IBE\(^{119}\) and eventually UNESCO, Commonwealth organizations were very much in the English tradition.\(^{120}\) Additionally, notwithstanding the practice of moving the annual conference to different provincial capitals in order to highlight its inter-provincial nature, hosting the conference for the government of Quebec was not the same as having greater input into the direction of the organization. Finally, the inter-provincial approach did not give Quebec politicians the credit they felt their due. Quebec wished to be involved in international relations on its own, not as a participant in a non-governmental agency. Despite these impediments, Gérin-Lajoie, during his chairmanship of the Standing Committee, received an apprenticeship in Canada's existing international relations in education. Quebec, with the re-creation of its Ministry of Education, would benefit from that apprenticeship as well.

\(^{119}\) The IBE remained a classic example of the problems of federalism and diplomacy in education. Canada was not a member because education was a provincial responsibility. Only national governments could join. Ottawa would not. The subject was mooted again in the 1960s at the third meeting of the SCME. *Minutes of the Third Meeting, September 18-19, 1962; Standing Committee of Ministers of Education Minutes 1961-1969;* Toronto: Archives of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada.

The Ministry of Education - Establishment of a Ministry

Notwithstanding the history, the confrontations with the federal government over diplomacy in education that marked the latter part of the decade owed their origin in large degree to the changes undertaken in the early 1960s. The winds of change swept through the government of Quebec with the election of Jean Lesage. One of the big changes that came with the dawn of the Quiet Revolution and the start of a new way of looking at Quebec society was the diminishing role of the Catholic Church. The state took over as the principal provider and creator of public services. International activities in education, along with many other things, became public property as the power of the religious authorities declined.

Among other steps, the government nationalized electricity, established a state investment corporation to aid small business and tabled plans for a state-operated steel complex, which became a reality later in the decade. And while these measures did not alter the economic order in any fundamental way, they served notice that a spectator government was a thing of the past. Between 1960 and 1966, six new government ministries were created and the number of civil servants increased by more than two-fifths, 29,000 to 41,000. An enlarged state apparatus meant occupational opportunities for a rising generation of well-educated French Canadians and a strengthening of the already dominant position of Francophones in the public administration.\(^\text{121}\)

The state’s new influence and the departure from the previous system were particularly conspicuous in education. Although clerics continued to extol the values of the religious school system, many amongst their number had become critical of the lack of opportunity that the streamed system of classical education offered. The Duplessis government in particular was demonized as being retrograde in terms of its role in the religious school system of the past. Grants were often withheld or reduced based on the political inclinations of the particular school district in question. The late administration of grants

\(^{121}\text{Magnuson. A Brief, p.104.}\)
often gave school officials no time to compensate for the inevitable fluctuations in enrolments that all schools went through with the arrival of the baby-boom generation. Furthermore, rather than convey a series of grants administratively from the legislature, the Duplessis government would dispatch one of its members to personally hand deliver the grant to the school board in question.\textsuperscript{122}

Changes to the old system were significant in terms of a shift of power. The newly-strengthened state gave few hints of the Ministry's intention to encroach on federal jurisdiction and move into the area of international diplomacy. The initial international activities in the field of education during the Lesage era seemed innocuous enough. In the tradition of Ryerson and Meilleur, and as part of the effort to restructure the system, the president of the commission of inquiry into education, Alphonse-Marie Parent, traveled.

\begin{quote}
Au cours de leur travaux, qui s'\'échelonnent de 1961 à 1966, les commissaires reçoivent 300 mémoires et visitent plusieurs institutions scolaires au Canada, aux États-Unis et en Europe.\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

Parent's voyage abroad was part of a very familiar tradition now. Educational change in Quebec, as well as in many other provincial systems, was buttressed by a sideways glance at what was happening in other jurisdictions.

**Throwing Down the Gauntlet-Treaty Power**

Once the Ministry of Education was officially re-established in 1964,\textsuperscript{124} the first signs of its desire to take a more assertive approach in its international activities became apparent. Early annual reports give initial indications of the new direction. Under the

\textsuperscript{122} Magnuson, *A Brief*, p.106.
\textsuperscript{124} The exact date was May 13, 1964. Gérin-Lajoie, *Combats*, p. 322.
title "The External Co-operation Service," the 1963-1964 Annual Report does not mince words in delineating the international responsibilities of the new ministry.

For the full and effective performance of operations falling within its area of competence, the Quebec Government must maintain close relations with external governments and public bodies. This obligation applies particularly in the field of education – a field in which Quebec holds exclusive jurisdiction…it also seems essential that it transcend national boundaries. Quite naturally and without any necessary restriction to this sphere, it should attach a high importance to the establishment and development of ties between Quebec and French-language countries…Its role is that of coordinating the relations of the department with foreign governments and public organizations.\textsuperscript{125}

The policy of extending provincial jurisdiction beyond Quebec’s borders was now public knowledge.

On February 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1965, confrontation spilled out into the open with the signing of an "entente" between Quebec and France and the public declaration of Quebec’s new independence in this field. This agreement treated various aspects of education.\textsuperscript{126} The Ministry of Education started to develop a relationship with its French counterpart in Paris following the re-establishment of provincial ties with the French capital in 1960. The agreement that Minister of Education Gérin-Lajoie signed came about after meetings that took place between government officials on both sides. These meetings took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris and at the Department of Education in Quebec City during the summer and fall of 1964.\textsuperscript{127} Under the Canadian constitution, Quebec did not have the power to sign treaties. Gérin-Lajoie had alerted the federal government to Quebec’s intentions in a meeting with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul

\textsuperscript{127} Quebec, \textit{Report}, p. 114.
Martin, early in the summer of 1964. Treaty signing power remained a federal jurisdiction and Martin had alerted the Quebec minister to Ottawa’s position. This resulted in the creative use of words to determine the best title of the proposed deal. Eventually, “entente” was settled on. This is how the situation was described in a general history of Canadian education in the early 1970s.

As early as 1965 the Quebec and French ministers of education signed a cultural agreement providing for a series of exchanges in education and technical fields involving an annual expenditure of some $2,000,000. Its aim was to train Quebec teachers and technicians in France and to supply Quebec with a number of experts to strengthen the province’s greatly expanded educational and technical programs. Ottawa kept a wary eye on such developments, but concluded that technically they fell within the scope of the 1965 Ottawa-Paris agreement that authorized any province to enter into a cultural agreement with France.

Ottawa was technically able to claim that the regulations of jurisdiction had been covered through an exchange of letters with the French government in late autumn 1964, and yet another exchange of understandings on the same day that the Franco-Quebec accord was signed. These however, had the effect of closing the barn door after the horse had bolted. Both the educational and governmental authorities in Quebec City felt that they had made a significant diplomatic breakthrough. More recently published memoirs of the top participants underline this. Claude Morin, as deputy minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, describes the significance of the event.

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Fin février 1965, je me trouvais à Paris avec Gérin-Lajoie qui allait y signer la première entente internationale du Québec avec un pays souverain.132

Pure excitement at the prospect and reality of signing an international agreement was the order of the day. Paul Gérin-Lajoie had a distinct perspective on the question of education. As a descendent of Savoian forbearers who had fought on the Plains of Abraham with the Marquis de Montcalm, and recipient of a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford, he saw the question of education from both a historical and a well informed intellectual perspective.133 On signing the agreement, he chose however, to be low key and emphasized the technical nature of the accord. In meeting with Charles de Gaulle, President of France, he aired the possibility that this would be the first of many agreements with other French speaking countries.

Boldness also propelled Minister Gérin-Lajoie’s push for the establishment of an international francophone group. It was seen as the next logical step and the idea met with de Gaulle’s approval.134 Gérin-Lajoie had brought up this idea on an earlier visit to France in 1961, but participation in the CEA and awareness of its international activities would have also sensitized him to the importance and role of multilateral education organizations such as the Commonwealth. He hoped to foster the development of similar organizations in the French-speaking world.

131 An additional agreement was signed in November 1965. This was less than the federal government wanted as well. Gabrielle Mathieu, Les Relations Franco-Québécoises de 1976 à 1985 (Québec: Centre Québécoise de Relations Internationales. 1992), p.32.
134 Gérin-Lajoie. Combats, p. 325.
Gérin-Lajoie additionally demonstrated his ongoing desire to broaden the influence of the Ministry of Education in the international sphere in a speech to the consular corps in Montreal in April 1965.

En février 1965, dans un discours au corps consulaire de Montréal, Gérin-Lajoie proposa une doctrine constitutionnelle, révolutionnaire dans le contexte d’alors. Selon lui, le Québec joissait de ce qu’il appelait "le prolongement externe de ses compétences internes." Ce qui revenait à des accords portant sur des échanges en matière d’éducation, ce domaine relevant de Québec et non d’Ottawa. Qui plus est, Gérin-Lajoie précisa que le Québec n’avait nulle obligation de consulter le gouvernement fédéral là-dessus, à la condition, bien sûr, de respecter la politique étrangère du Canada. Par exemple, il ne négocierait pas d’accords avec des pays non reconnus par Ottawa.135

Many felt that Gérin-Lajoie’s position, because it got the support of Jean Lésage on the return from his vacation, was the basis for future events. Had Lesage decided otherwise, then the diplomatic forays that followed would have not taken place.136 Gérin-Lajoie provoked a quick reaction in Ottawa. The prime minister, Lester Pearson, Paul Martin at External Affairs, and later in a more long-term fashion Marcel Cadieux, all responded to the speech.137 Gérin-Lajoie’s thrust to the diplomatic corps was that the extension of Quebec’s jurisdiction in areas of its competence beyond its borders was a natural development in an ever smaller world.138 All the federalists strongly disagreed with this viewpoint.

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137 Cadieux was deputy-minister at External. Thomson, Vivre, pp. 149-151.
138 Gérin-Lajoie, Combats, p. 326.
While the Minister was publicizing the government's position, his ministry also pushed to develop stronger ties with its French counterpart.

In its genius for accumulating power, Quebec's education ministry began to resemble strongly France's top heavy Ministry of Education. The resemblance may not have been coincidental. Since the signing of the Franco-Quebec Entente of 1965 there had been close ties between the two political entities. No small number of Quebec students, teachers and government officials have attended schools in France where they have been exposed to the gospel of political centralism, to the notion that the state can do no wrong. Like its counterpart in France, the Quebec Ministry of Education has shown an increasing disregard for local tradition by intervening into every aspect of school life.\textsuperscript{139}

\textbf{The Decline – Life in the Quebec Bureaucracy}

The Ministry of Education in the period following the signing of the entente was at the height of its powers as the strong desire to join the diplomatic swirl had been fulfilled. Not only had it scored a coup by signing the entente, but it was also expanding into other areas of international activity. With the Ministry of Education's achievement however, other Quebec government agencies became interested. They too expected they would sign substantive agreements with the French government in their areas of expertise. The sparks flew especially between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture.

Moreover, it is precisely good will that is most absent. The Ministry of Education, which felt that it had a transcendent vocation would have certainly consented to manage cultural exchanges between Quebec and France.... but the Ministry of Cultural Affairs was jealous of its autonomy and cared most about its own dignity.\textsuperscript{140}

The notion of several distinct agreements, while having some advantages, also had drawbacks that alarmed the political leadership. The increasing emphasis on France

\textsuperscript{139} Magnuson, \textit{A Brief}, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{140} Morin, \textit{Mes Premiers}, p. 109.
caused problems of representation at government offices in Paris.\textsuperscript{141} It also caused the premier, Lesage, the most headaches, as he was the one who had to arbitrate between different ministries when international affairs were involved. He was also frustrated with what he saw as the actions of « franc-tireurs », or “freelance” bureaucrats. He saw them as jeopardizing the legitimacy and the aim of the entire international exercise. They instead made the government of Quebec look like a troupe of lordless court jesters.\textsuperscript{142}

The international stage became increasingly cluttered however, as more Quebec ministries clamored for the same recognition. Grudgingly, in the case of the Ministry of Culture, Lesage ceded the battle. A cultural treaty was eventually signed with France. Despite this, providing a challenge to the existing federal distribution of powers was proving easier to do than staying afloat in a sea of jealous equals all scrambling for a place in the sun. The higher the Ministry of Education rose, the greater its success in realizing its goals, the greater the clamor became.

The Quebec Ministry of Education once more came under scrutiny from its peers following meetings between the French Minister of Education, Alain Peyrefitte and his Quebec counterpart in September 1967. The minister at this time was Jean-Jacques Bertrand. The expectations of both parties were high at this stage, as both thought the other would be announcing new programs. Finally, when the two sides got together, they decided to increase by ten times the number of exchanges that were taking place between Quebec and France. Additional structures would also be created to accelerate the transfer of pedagogy and technology training. Furthermore, as part of the package there would be

\textsuperscript{141} All the ministries wanted to put a representative in Paris.
\textsuperscript{142} John R. Saul has some thoughts on this. Saul, \textit{Reflections}, p.380.
new bursaries for Quebec students who wished to undertake some of their studies in France.143

The diplomatic accomplishments and institutional prerogatives that the Ministry of Education acquired came under siege once again at the end of the 1960s and on into the 1970s. With the establishment of the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, there was a gradual decrease in the responsibilities assigned to the Ministry of Education. This was not well received within the Ministry of Education and over time there was a bureaucratic battle to keep responsibility for international programs. In 1974, the Bourassa government decided that bureaucratic control over international affairs would rest with the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs. As a result, the Ministry of Education focused primarily on its domestic responsibilities. With this change, the most confrontational stage of the history of Quebec’s diplomacy in education drew to a close. All international obligations were channeled through the newly expanded Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs.

Diplomacy in Education with Other States

While the growing assertiveness of the Quebec Ministry of Education marked one aspect of a more confrontational diplomacy in education, closer collaboration with France, as well as other states in the international system, marked an additional side of the increasingly strained relations with Ottawa. Quebec was able to defy the traditional norms of diplomacy in education because it found support in other capitals. In a metaphorical sense it found willing dance partners. Quebec also favoured this approach over the CEA’s multilateral approach because it retained more control. The confluence of factors that led France to choose Quebec and Quebec to choose France for the dance of

143 Morin, L’Art, p. 83.
diplomacy at this particular time was quite remarkable. French diplomatic and
educational authorities during this period were being buffeted by strong historical and
political tides, not the least of which went by the name of Charles de Gaulle.
Encouragement in the diplomatic dance was given by more than one francophone African
state, who, beyond their ties to France, also saw gains in having links to Quebec. Had
France and the nations of francophone Africa not seen things this way, the confrontation
with the jilted partner (i.e. Ottawa) in diplomacy in education might have been much
shorter lived.

**France**

The closer association between Quebec and France was of recent origin, but the
relationship that upset Ottawa had a history of centuries, was one of “family,” and yet
one of estrangement. Quebec owed its soul as a society to the French colonization and
settlement of the territory in the era prior to Louis XV. Education, although severely
limited and highly regulated by the Catholic Church, was part of that colonialization
period. The other side of this relationship was the estrangement that French-Canadians
felt with the Conquest, the subsequent revolutions in France and the secularization of the
nineteenth century. For many, the end of French rule was lamented, for others it meant a
less restrictive national agenda and more freedom of trade. The twentieth century, with
the exception of the earlier comings and goings of agent-generals, was remarkable only
in the absence of interest, and the sometimes hostility that characterized Franco-Québec
relations.\(^\text{144}\) Change came with the machinations of Charles de Gaulle.

France became a willing participant in Quebec's diplomacy in education and the
conflict with the federal government because Quebec offered a geopolitical opportunity.

\(^\text{144}\)Thomson, *Vivre*, passim.
Geopolitics had dealt de Gaulle some poor cards in the postwar grand scheme of things. Not only was de Gaulle dealing with the breakup of the French empire, he was also searching for a strategy to confront and limit the development of American power in Europe. At the same time he wished to ensure that the Americans remained disposed towards the Europeans in the event of conflict with the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{145} For the French, Canadian constitutional minutiae and diplomacy in education were submerged into greater global strategy. Jules Léger, former ambassador to France, commented on the de Gaulle position in one of his submissions to the federal government.

After a year as ambassador to France, he[Léger] estimated that the president would “probably continue to be irksome;” however, at seventy-five, time was running out for him. Canada’s difficulties with de Gaulle were related in large part to the “defiant atmosphere” of Franco-American relations; while he had been helpful in many respects, his “anti-American bias” was now “playing against us.” On the other hand, that sentiment was not deeply rooted in the French population and would not last much longer than he did, “unless the Americans act very foolishly.”\textsuperscript{146}

By making the Americans upset in their own backyard, de Gaulle thought he could effectively refocus attention away from France and carry forward with his own agenda.\textsuperscript{147}

This approach found its instrument in the French Ministry of Education.

Quebec was not the target of «la mission civilisatrice» of the traditional cultural diplomacy and education programs of the Alliance Français. rather, de Gaulle saw a society that appealed to his deeper sense of «la gloire. »\textsuperscript{148} Quebec had evolved in a very sophisticated manner since his wartime visits to Canada. At that time, his Free French assistant, Father d’Argenlieu, when sent to Canada, returned empty-handed. He

\textsuperscript{145}Henry Kissinger, \textit{Diplomacy} (Toronto: Simon and Shuster, 1994), pp. 611-619, passim. Kissinger gives one view on some of the broader problems that faced French foreign policy in this period.

\textsuperscript{146}Thomson, \textit{Vivre}, p. 163.

\textsuperscript{147}Saul, \textit{Reflections}, pp. 375-379.
was sent to convince the Québécois that the Free French were similar in their views and that they should help them in their fight against the Nazis. In the period following the war de Gaulle had been more deeply involved in French politics. After becoming President, he visited Canada once more in early 1960. At this point he was still not convinced that anything new was happening in the province. The legacy of Duplessisism was still everywhere to be seen.

With the election of Jean Lesage in 1960, the elite that de Gaulle felt was necessary to establish an independent state, and which he had seen so many times before in African colonies was now making its appearance. A more substantial indication of the evolving relationship was the opening of La Maison du Québec in Paris in October of 1961. This event was important from several points of view. De Gaulle, although not among the principals involved, oversaw the whole event from the top. Arthur Lapalme had been one of the initial contacts to present the idea of a French-Canadian trade office. By incredible luck, he was able to talk to one of the leading French ministers, André Malraux, within a day of arriving in France. Malraux waxed poetic in his appreciation of the subject.

...he sat down near them,...began one of his famous monologues on Western civilization.... "Were the French government to take the initiative, its motives might be suspect....Go ahead with your plan...open that Maison du Québec, establish yourselves in Paris, and we will meet you half way..."

De Gaulle was rapidly reassessing the possibilities for Quebec and the favourable response by Malraux was an indication of his new views towards the province.

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150 Thomson, Vivre, p. 93.
In addition to encouraging the establishment of the *Maison du Québec* in Paris, in another move that upset Ottawa, the French President gave the consulate in Quebec City additional powers. He altered standard diplomatic practice by having the consulate report directly to the French foreign ministry at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris, rather than go through the embassy in Ottawa. This not only changed perceptions of the role of Ottawa, but it also raised the eyebrows of a great number of French bureaucrats in Paris. The annual education report for the 1967 year makes it look like the most natural occurrence in the world.

In order to speed up the procedures followed in the exchanges, the French government has decided that the Consulate-General of France in Quebec City would now report directly to the Foreign Ministry...At the methodological level, two extremely important measures were taken....First of these was, after the Johnson-Peyrefitte meeting, the policy decision to hold periodical ministerial meetings.

Diplomacy in education was also an easy instrument for the French to use during the 1960s as a pro-Quebec faction had developed within the French civil service. It was as much as possible supportive of Quebec's post 1960 goals. Within the French Foreign Office in the 1960s, Jean-Daniel Jurgensen was the Director of North American Affairs and he was substantially responsible for creating the network of pro-Quebec bureaucrats.

From his strategic position in the Quai d'Orsay, Jurgensen soon assumed the *de facto* leadership of the "Quebec mafia." The network was growing. Another member, Bernard Dorin, also a diplomat, was attached to the office of the minister of education, Alain Peyrefitte. René de Saint-Léger de la Saussaye, diplomatic counselor to the president, was, if not a member, at least sympathetic to the cause. Through him, Jurgensen was able to pass material to de Gaulle without going through his minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, or Hervé Alphand, secretary-general of the...
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both of whom frowned on their intrigues on behalf of Quebec.\textsuperscript{153}

Thomson also states that the SDECE\textsuperscript{154} was one of the organizations that the French president used to keep informed about the Quebec situation. Interestingly, it was also asserted that SDECE had a unit working in Quebec during this time period.\textsuperscript{155}

By the late 1960s, the French government, and de Gaulle were working in a hostile environment at home and supporting educational and cultural diplomacy with Quebec became the least of their concerns. Towards the end of his reign de Gaulle continued to uphold a policy that would advance the relationship with Quebec. By doing this however, he was also acquiring opponents at a rapid pace. Parts of the press and the opposition led by François Mitterrand continued to distance themselves verbally from the President's position. They felt that France should not be meddling in what were clearly Canadian jurisdictions, regardless of which ministry was involved. They also felt that Canadians should be left to sort out their own constitutional problems.

In his final years, de Gaulle took to writing his memoirs, but they gave little clue as to his thoughts on Quebec. Despite working very hard at finishing them, de Gaulle did not reach the point before his death where he dealt with the North American events of the 1960s. Instead, biographers relied on his earlier thoughts about Canada to try and understand his final views on the country. He was an advocate of a European Community approach as a solution to Canada's constitutional question.\textsuperscript{156} Certainly education and culture figured amongst his thoughts about Quebec. The extraordinary

\textsuperscript{153}Thomson, \textit{Vivre}, p. 159.
\textsuperscript{154}The French equivalent of CSIS, MI5 or the CIA. \textit{Services de documentation, d'enquête et de contre-espionnage}.
changes and conflicts in diplomacy in education that Quebec sponsored in this period were in no small way attributable to his intercession and continued interest.

**Africa**

The participation of France was absolutely essential to the realization of Quebec's more confrontational diplomatic agenda in education during the 1960s, but Quebec's other partners on the diplomatic stage, particularly Gabon, were also important. Some scholars attribute their participation in the conflict over education to the pressures from the French government. While France certainly had a great deal of influence in the situation, the reality was again more complex. During this era, states such as Gabon were in a profound period of upheaval. Empires collapsed and newly independent nations emerging from the wreckage had to learn how to do everything at once. Some succeeded at this, while others did not. This led to a diplomacy of expediency rather than one of reflection and tradition. Missionary traditions also had some influence on the disposition of the new states towards Quebec. Finally, aid programs established in the period of the Quiet Revolution also beckoned these states into actively participating in Quebec's diplomatic breakout.

The 1960s marked the coming of age of both Gabon and Quebec, making them ideal partners. Gabon formed part of French Equatorial Africa in the early part of the twentieth century. In 1960 it became independent from France and Leon M'ba became the first president. At the time of independence, Gabon, like many other states of French Equatorial Africa, did not have a well developed government structure. In the next few years it would go about establishing those structures. The existing education system was

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156 Thomson, *Vivre*, p. 299.
designed to serve colonial interests, and to a lesser extent the interests of the elite. The systems of education from colonial times were segregated on the basis of race and were to a large degree dependent on the location of missionary groups.\textsuperscript{158} The Minister of Education in Gabon in 1968 was Paul Malekou. Quebec got the attention of the Gabonese in the 1960s as it sponsored a series of Gabonese students to attend universities in the province.\textsuperscript{159} The government and the ministry of education were willing to accept aid from most states because of the fragile state of their infrastructure. Gabon was also enticed to involve itself in Quebec's international activities in education because it wished to please the French who still wielded a fair degree of power in the tropical nation. Finally, unlike other African states who saw dangers in meddling in a nation's internal issues when they had enough of their own problems, Gabon chose instead to follow a politically risky foreign policy. The expectation on the part of some Gabonese was that by supporting Quebec's efforts diplomatically, Libreville would end up with two new delegations in its embassy district. Should the government of Quebec establish a delegation, then Ottawa would be forced to establish an embassy there as well. This did not work out as planned. Quebec did not establish a delegation and Ottawa suspended diplomatic relations after the problems arising from the 1968 education conference.\textsuperscript{160}

The positive way in which African countries received Quebec's new diplomatic initiatives was furthered by the fact that Quebec had a long missionary tradition in the


region. The legacy of the work of missionaries of the Quebec Catholic Church in Africa was widespread. Indeed, officials of the Ministry of Education in the 1960s were building on experiences that were over a century old. French-Canadians of a religious vocation had participated in "cultural relations" by teaching extensively in Africa since the 1860s. It was at that point that the first Oblate missionaries went to Basutoland and established the first schools. According to Basutos, it was because of their efforts that the eventual elite in Basutoland (present day Lesotho) arose. The efforts of Quebec missionaries also had profound effects in Africa, as many of the school structures in several countries owed their existence to the work of missionaries. The development of the school system from primary school through to normal school and university in Rwanda was one example. The reality of politics in the 1960s was that much of the credit from missionary work lost its value completely or had a limited value. Yet, in some cases, Francophone African leaders gave very warm welcomes to Quebec officials. On the diplomatic plane, however, they could ill afford to offend Ottawa and saw problems in getting mixed up in Canadian internal politics.

The final factor that African states took into account in deciding whether or not to support Quebec's diplomatic activities in education was the level of aid they received from Quebec. In Quebec and Canada during the 1960s, there had been a push to increase the level of general and educational aid to Francophone African states. Speakers at *L'Institute Canadien de L'Éducation des Adultes* Conference in January 1965 gave some indication as to the direction that was being taken. Jean-Marc Léger of *Le Devoir* set out some goals for Quebec's educational aid to Africa.

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En termes concrets, il me semble qu’il serait souhaitable de dégager sur le budget même du Québec, certains crédits dont l’utilisation se traduirait principalement des deux façons suivantes:

a) la mise à la disposition de certain États africains d’un nombre forcément restreint… d’enseignants du supérieur ou du secondaire et de quelques experts…

b) la contribution à l’équipement de bibliothèques et de laboratoires des jeunes universités africaines ainsi que de certain instituts spécialisés…

Remarquons aussi qu’il serait à souhaiter que le Québec soit progressivement chargé de la gestion de la plus grande partie des crédits fédéraux destinés à l’Afrique francophone, car il est beaucoup plus apte qu’Ottawa à agir efficacement en cette matière.162

Not only did Léger want to redirect money towards educational aid in Africa, but he also wanted Quebec to take control of Ottawa’s aid in that direction, as he asserted Quebec would be more capable in that area – particularly in the field of education.

During the period when Gérin-Lajoie was Minister of Education in Québec, he advocated the use of educational aid, as he wanted to continue to develop all possible avenues to raise Quebec’s profile in other Francophone countries. With this in mind, he made a proposal to help Tunisia with a program of cooperation, the value of which would be approximately $450,000. This was the figure he initially submitted to the government; it was later revised downwards to $300,000.163 Tunisia was ready to proceed further with Quebec and sign treaties on education. At this point Ottawa stepped in and prevented any additional action.164

While educational aid attracted the attention of some African states, it succeeded best in stirring up federal interests and opposition. In a flurry of notes between the Quebec premier, Jean Lesage, and the prime minister, Lester Pearson in the winter of

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163 Gérin-Lajoie, Combats, pp. 330-331.
1965, Pearson rejected most of Lesage’s demands, particularly the call for Quebec’s education ministry to undertake contacts abroad. From his perspective, particularly as a former foreign officer, responsibility for external contacts lay not with the provincial ministry of education, but rather in its traditional place, the Ministry of External Affairs. Pearson was succinct. 

La demande de Lesage visant à permettre des contacts réguliers entre ministères africains et coopérants québécois fut aussi rejetée par Pearson dans une réponse de huit pages....À propos des coopérants québécois, Pearson sait valoir que, dès l’instant où ils se trouvaient à l’extérieur en mission d’aide canadienne, ils relevaient des représentants diplomatiques du Canada chargés, eux, des relations nécessaires avec les ministères africains. Les contacts directs entre le Ministère de l’Éducation et les gouvernements africains n’étaient pas plus souhaitables qu’utiles: selon Pearson, les services fédéraux étaient largement en mesure de fournir à Québec les informations désirées sur les conditions de travail des enseignants. 

Although African states were brought to Quebec’s side in the diplomatic dance, the combination of their own interests, historical contacts, and aid was only partially successful in bolstering Quebec’s position with them for any period of time. 

International Organizations and International Conferences

The final element that characterized both broader Canadian diplomacy in education, and Quebec’s dramatic activities during this period was the province’s participation in international organizations and conferences on education. Diplomacy in education in the Canadian context revolves around several essential elements. There has always been the need for an outward looking organization, whether that is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, or a non-governmental organization that is charged with that responsibility. There has also been the need for other nations interested in bilateral and multilateral relations. All these things were present in the case of Quebec

165 Morin, L’Art, p. 63.
during the 1960s. Multilateral education organizations would additionally deal with the social and functional aspects of education in the international sphere. While the Canadian Education Association continued to send delegates to UNESCO and IBE conferences in the latter part of the 1960s, Quebec City was taking participation in these organizations in a different direction. Bickering over education conferences centered on several issues. Did sub-national governments who had jurisdiction in education have the legal power to join new international organizations and sit at the same table as sovereign states? Who would represent Canada and Quebec at international conferences on education put on by these organizations? Finally, how did all this fit in with the existing arrangements and the newly established Council of Ministers of Education, Canada?

Joining COMENAM

The question of conferences came to the fore with the establishment of the Conférence des Ministres de l’Éducation Nationale des Etats Africains et Malgache d’expression française (COMENAM).167 This took place in the early 1960s and was something that the presidents of the newly independent African states of French Equatorial Africa had spoken of for a long period of time. Leopold Senghor of Senegal, President Bourguiba of Tunisia, and others had called for distinctly French and African groups. Originally the organization was set up under the auspices of AUDECAM168, an organization that was based in Paris. It took responsibility for the funding and running of education conferences until 1966.169 In the early years of this organization, France

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166Morin, L’Art, p. 65.
169Bougouma Ngom, Secretary-General of CONFEMEN to author, e-mail correspondence, 20 February 1998.
continued to have a great deal of sway over its activities. COMENAM's primary activity was to hold annual meetings. Francophone African ministers of education were regularly invited and the organization was expanding. The secretariat of the organization had its headquarters in Dakar, Senegal after 1966. Jacques Foucart, a French official at the Élysée Palace who was the Secretary-General for Francophone Community, African and Malagasy Affairs, was instrumental in ensuring Quebec's participation in COMENAM. It would be several years before the issues of “member country,” “participating government,” “delegation,” and “representative” would be ironed out between Quebec, and Ottawa. Final agreement on the issue was never reached, rather there were a series of ad hoc arrangements as each series of conferences approached. In joining COMENAN, Quebec, with France’s support was taking provocative steps to which the federal government would have to respond.

Controversy also arose with the question of Quebec’s membership in L’Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique (ACCT). Although this organization was a more general organization for La Francophonie, the question of membership that had arisen in the context of education was also applicable here too. While Quebec was invited to become a member of this organization at the governmental level, Ottawa also insisted on participation. The federal government asserted that not only was it a necessary partner, but its role as a francophone government could not be denied. The question of provincial powers and jurisdiction came into play once again. Quebec was flexing its muscles in an area where it had jurisdiction. Claude Ryan asserts that this was not the result of an inherent separatist surge, but rather Quebec’s desire for distinctiveness.

170 Thomson, Vivre, p. 268.
171 Ryan, “Quebec’s,” p. 65.
marked by language and tradition. Membership in the educational organization depended to a great extent on the patronage of France, and in this era, Quebec was able to obtain that patronage. Membership was fine so long as it did not translate into participation in conferences. Quebec’s attendance at the COMENAM conference is exactly what happened, however.

The Conferences of Ministers of Education
The main conflict of this era centered on the COMENAM conference held in February 1968. The host country was Gabon and the conference would start on the fifth of February of that year. The rationale for this particular conference was to group together Francophone countries and see where they could help each other in terms of their pedagogical needs. The topics would include educational economics, pedagogy, administrative structures and teaching programs. The early unofficial invitation to participate in this conference went to Quebec City, but was not sent to Ottawa.

Dispute over participation in the conference started to manifest itself soon after the federal government learned that Quebec was going to take part. Ottawa now took a very active interest in diplomacy in education because it saw that the federal prerogative in foreign affairs was now threatened. Its response, although slow in the beginning, quickly became more focused once the implications of Quebec’s movements started to become clearer. The feeling on the part of the senior bureaucrats in Quebec was that Quebec City should not go to bat on behalf of Ottawa in order to try and obtain an invitation for the conference. This would only result in the presence of a federal delegation in Libreville and that would in turn reduce the impact and stature of the

\footnote{Morin, L’Art, p. 113.}
Quebec Minister of Education. Johnson clarified the point to his ministers and deputy-ministers.

Comme il s'agit de l'éducation, le Québec doit être invité directement, sans truchement ou canal fédéral, et si Ottawa par diverses manoeuvres, réussit à s'emparer d'une invitation qui nous est destinée pour , ensuite, nous la transmettre avec son paternalisme usuel, nous ne l'accepterons pas. même si on propose au ministre québécois la présidence de la délégation canadienne.  

In other words, Johnson felt that the jurisdiction over education ensured Quebec's inclusion in the conference, and if Ottawa could obtain an invitation in another fashion, that was up to the federal government. Quebec would not participate in a federal delegation however.

Ottawa tried to secure an invitation to the meeting, but to no avail. One of the solutions that Marcel Cadieux, the deputy minister for External Affairs, tried to implement with Claude Morin was the combination of a Quebec "presidency" with a Canadian delegation. Ottawa also suggested that the establishment of a Canadian delegation would ensure the inclusion of francophone representatives from other provinces, notably New Brunswick and Ontario. The letter that Lester Pearson wrote to Daniel Johnson at the beginning of December 1967 had this as its central theme. Johnson received the letter but did not respond preferring instead to continue to stay his course and let the government in Ottawa figure out its own solution.

The matter became more critical for the two levels of government at the end of December 1967 as the conference approached. It was scheduled for early 1968. The government in Quebec and the Quebec Minister of Education had not yet received the invitation for the conference and were becoming increasingly worried about whether or

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not it would appear. As a result of the increasing time pressure, contact was made with Quebec's Delegate-General in Paris, Jean Chapdelaine. Chapdelaine was a good contact because prior to his current job he had been Canadian ambassador to several South American and African countries.¹⁷⁵

The Gabonese insisted on the presence of Quebec to the exclusion of Ottawa, thus deepening the federal government's exasperation.¹⁷⁶ Early in January 1968, the federal government started to issue diplomatic notes to other francophone African countries in order to enlist their sympathy regarding the conference. The central gist of the federal authorities' message was that they would regard any move to send invitations to education conferences to the individual provinces as interference in Canadian affairs, and that all such invitations should go to the national government in Ottawa.¹⁷⁷

In the end, the Quebec Minister of Education, Jean-Guy Cardinal received a formal invitation to the conference. It was as follows:

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République Gabonaise présente ses compliments au ministère des Affaires étrangères du Québec et a l'honneur de lui faire parvenir sous ce pli pour remise à son haut destinataire, la lettre d'invitation no 00116/MCCNSC/CAB/IA du 5 janvier 1968 de monsieur le Ministre de la Coordination, Chargé de l'Éducation national et du Service civique, relative à la Conférence annuelle des ministres de l'Éducation nationale des pays Africains et malgache d'expression française qui se tiendra à Libreville du 5 au 10 février prochain.¹⁷⁸

The same day that the letter was received, the Quebec Minister of Education, Jean-Guy Cardinal responded, saying that he would bring three colleagues with him to the

¹⁷⁴Thomson, Vivre, p. 268.
¹⁷⁵Thomson, Vivre, p. 268.
¹⁷⁸Morin, L'Art, p. 121.
conference. Gabon acknowledged acceptance within the day. Cardinal, for his part, had a clear view of the way that Quebec should proceed on the international stage. He was an adherent of the school of assertive provincial diplomacy.

[Translation] It is also important because that permits Quebec, in certain areas of competence such as education, to exercise its competence out to its possible limits. It is also important because that would permit Quebec, that is a State, that is a government, to have an extension of its influence, not only at the local level, but also on the international level as today, and justly so, the means of communication, the way in which people live make it possible for the least smallest state to maintain such relations. 179

Cardinal followed in the footsteps of Paul Gérin-Lajoie in underlining the importance of the jurisdictional primacy of Quebec in the area of education. Cardinal’s tenure as minister of education and deputy premier often put him at odds with Jean-Jacques Bertrand. He was much more active in his desire to extend Quebec’s jurisdiction than both Daniel Johnson and Bertrand. He was therefore closely watched as he signed three additional accords with France just prior to the resignation of de Gaulle. 180

In the final run-up to the conference, the federal government tried several last ditch efforts to guarantee its participation. The Canadian Ambassador to Cameroon attempted to obtain an audience with the Gabonese president. He was refused, having no standing in Gabon. A trade-mission which was in the region “just by chance” wanted to come to Gabon at the very time when the conference was about to start. This was also refused. 181

The actual conference itself was replete with diplomatic firsts for Quebec and for Cardinal as minister of education. There was the issue of the flags and the significance

181 Morin, L’Art, p. 127.
that the Quebec government gave to the prominent display of their flag as compared to the flag of Canada. The Minister of Education of Quebec was also accorded the privilege, along with the French Minister of Education, of staying in Omar Bongo’s presidential palace for the duration of the conference. The French Minister of Education in his speeches to the Conference was effusive and very flattering about the presence of Quebec. While many of these things were “window dressing,” Cardinal was also invested into a Gabonese order as a richly titled *Commandeur de l’Ordre de L’Etoile Équatoriale*. Canadian ministers of education have not traditionally been recipients of any Canadian orders, so this honour, however dubious its merit, was not soon to be repeated in the annals of Canadian education.

In a note sent to the Gabonese embassy in Washington upon Cardinal’s return home, the Canadian government protested its exclusion from the conference, and underlined its prerogative in setting Canadian foreign policy. Quebec had a recognizable competence in the field of education, provided that it was only applied within its own territory. Paul Gérin-Lajoie’s assertion of an extension of provincial competencies outside its territory did not find any resonance. Foreign affairs was exclusively a federal jurisdiction. The Canadian government concluded by suspending negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations with Gabon.

**Kinshasa**

The conference in Libreville stretched the boundary of what provinces could attempt to do in diplomacy in education. Not only had a minister of education participated in an international conference, but he had also debated matters of substance with other ministers of education from sovereign states. This extension of provincial jurisdiction did not happen in a vacuum, however. Ottawa would not let go unchallenged
the actions of Quebec, France and Gabon. For the federal government, primacy over foreign policy was at stake—regardless of the provincial jurisdiction over education. Ottawa would also not let provinces follow this through to its logical conclusion (i.e. the internationalization of all provincial activities). The annual conference of COMENAM in 1969 was to take place in Zaire. The federal government noted this and made its preparations. It also targeted Gabon in particular and more generally all other Francophone African states in the aftermath of the Libreville conference. As previously noted, in March of 1968 in an exchange of notes, the government in Ottawa “suspended” diplomatic relations with Gabon. It also sent another mission of aid and friendship to other Francophone countries in order to entice them to its side in this diplomatic contest. The Gabonese government responded in a lively fashion deploring the “regrettable act” and proceeded to recall its own ambassador. The government of Quebec also issued a communiqué again arguing its right to control its international activities in the field of education.\textsuperscript{182} The sparring at the political level continued on into the spring of 1968. Jean-Guy Cardinal attended the second part of the COMENAM meeting in Paris on April 22, 1968. France declined to recognize Ottawa’s concerns and de Gaulle once more got into the act by declaring that Trudeau did not speak for the interests of French-Canadians.\textsuperscript{183} Ottawa’s request for an invitation to this meeting was also refused.

By the middle of 1968, the fallout from the Gabon conference was well and truly settled and attention turned to the next diplomatic event, the conference in Kinshasa, Zaire. Zaire\textsuperscript{184} was much different in nature than Gabon. Zaire’s colonial history was unique in Africa. Belgium was a late starter in the race to establish empires in the 1880s.

\textsuperscript{182}Thomson, \textit{Vivre}, pp. 273-274.
It did however manage to secure a huge territory that eventually became Zaire, as well as smaller territories on the opposite side of the African Great Lakes. These later became the present day states of Rwanda and Burundi. French influence, which was strong in coastal states such as Gabon, was weaker in Zaire. The 1960s were a time of great turbulence in Zaire because the transition to independent statehood was not smooth. The new state was not universally accepted, which in turn led to periods of ongoing civil war. Colonel Joseph Mobuto, later Mobuto Sese Seko, came to power in 1965 and by the time of the conference was still consolidating his power. Avoiding being dragged under by yet more plots and mutinies was his full-time preoccupation.\(^{185}\)

Ottawa had followed Zairian affairs throughout this period and was better prepared for any diplomatic gambits of provincial origin. Canada had established a consulate and plans were in the making for substantial packages of aid to find their way to the huge African state. Diplomacy in education was enmeshed in nets made from other diplomatic and political tools when it concerned Zaire. Ottawa had a much greater resiliency in this regard and a greater ability to provide aid. It relied heavily on this to fulfill its desire to snare an invitation and its participation in the conference.\(^{186}\)

Quebec City, because of its much more ineffectual position with regard to Kinshasa, had to find other leverage to use against its possible exclusion from the 1969 conference. The new Quebec premier at the time, Jean-Jacques Bertrand (Daniel Johnson had recently died of a heart attack), addressed a letter to President Mobuto. In it he attempted to convince the president that Quebec had good educational relations with

\(^{184}\) Zaire will be used throughout. The Congo became “Zaire” in the 1970s.  
\(^{185}\) Colourful is a poor word to describe the Machiavellian and ruthless nature of Zaire’s internal struggles in the period following independence. See: Dennis Austin, *Politics in Africa* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1986), pp. 80-81.
Zaire and that he desired to continue those relations. Above all, he wished for continuity in the interaction between the two governments. The presence of numerous Congolese students in Quebec was one aspect of the relationship. As well, there was much work being done by Quebec teachers in the African country.\(^{187}\)

Despite the ongoing efforts on the part of the Quebec government, it was Ottawa that was the first government to receive an invitation to the conference from the government of Zaire. For both Ottawa and Quebec, the invitation brought with it a delicate issue. Ottawa did not have jurisdiction in education. Therefore it was incumbent on the federal government to enlist provincial cooperation in order to make the delegation official. On the Quebec side of things, however, there was a division of opinion as to whether Quebec would want to participate in a federal delegation should a request come. Most of the senior ministers and deputy-ministers were for this type of participation. There had to be guarantees though. Otherwise, the efforts that had been so recently made to augment Quebec's diplomatic profile would be undermined.

Dans cette perspective, l'important était de leur faire accepter un certain nombre d'exigences. Par exemple, Ottawa devait être amené à comprendre que le Québec ne se plierait jamais à des instructions fédérales concernant une matière comme l'éducation; au contraire, il devrait s'exprimer là-dessus en son propre nom chaque fois qu'il le jugerait opportun. Il était également entendu, pour nous, que, même si Ottawa était invité dans l'avenir à ces conférences, le Québec devrait lui aussi être formellement convoqué, c'est-à-dire autrement que par l'entremise pure et simple des services fédéraux.\(^{188}\)

After some more negotiations, and the offer of an invitation to Quebec, things finally moved to a climax in January 1969.\(^{189}\) At this point Quebec was fully ready to go on its

\(^{186}\)Thomson, *Vivre*, p. 287.
\(^{188}\)Morin, *L'Art*, p. 149.
\(^{189}\)Sabourin, "Canada," p. 144.
own to the conference in Kinshasa, but in order to cover all its bases it was also in
negotiation with Marc Lalonde of the federal government. It wanted to secure the best
possible position within any delegation that was going from Ottawa. It was at this point
that Mobuto signaled to Quebec City a change in plans. The message in brief was that
there would only be one Canadian delegation. If representatives from Quebec wished to
participate, then they were to go along with the federal delegation from Ottawa.190

The rules governing participation in international conferences on education had
been reduced to expediency and temporary arrangements as a result of the infighting
surrounding the two conferences. The accords between Ottawa and Quebec City were
limited in nature, just to the Kinshasa conference itself, rather than being more generally
applicable to other conferences on education. From the point of view of Quebec City, there
was no guarantee that having the presidency of the Canadian delegation would exclude
Ottawa's representatives from discussions on education. Rather, there continued to be
the feeling that the federal government would use provincial participation as a front for
federal control. In the view of Quebec City, there was not yet a satisfactory way to treat
the question of education in the international environment.

Ottawa savait évidemment n'aurait rien à apporter sur les techniques
d'enseignement, la formation des maîtres ou l'administration scolaire,
mais tenait néanmoins à être présent...au cas où des participants de pays
peu au fait des fineses du fédéralism s'aventureraient, à la faveur des
discussions, dans des directions relevant, au Canada, du pouvoir central.191

Contrast this with the Quebec Annual Report on Education of 1968-1969. It gives little
indication of the extent to which political machinations swirled around the Kinshasa
conference. It does however lay a strong emphasis on Quebec's participation.

190 Sabourin, "Canada," p. 144.
During a session of the Conference of Ministers of Education that was held in Kinshasa in January 1969, the minister president of the Quebec delegation, the Honorable Jean-Marie Morin, indicated that Quebec would participate in a program of exchange of African school masters in sending a certain number of professors of modern mathematics to Africa. It was thus that three professors, specialists in this field visited five African countries during the months of July and August.¹⁹²

The final part of this conference would be held in Paris as the concluding round to the series that had started in Kinshasa. This time Quebec again had the upper hand and the federal government had to improvise. The major debate over participation in this conference took place between Trudeau and Jean-Jacques Bertrand. It again centered on the issues of primacy and jurisdiction in diplomacy. Unlike the conference in Kinshasa held in January, Ottawa did not have the same ability to influence the French. Trudeau recognized this in his first communication with Bertrand. He argued that Quebec, in the event that they received an invitation, should insist on an additional invitation being sent to Ottawa. In the event that they were unwilling to do this, then instead they should not participate in the conference altogether. Bertrand’s response to this was to continue to hammer away at the issue of provincial jurisdiction in education.

[Translation] It is necessary to recall that, from the beginning the conference in Paris concerns education, a field of exclusive provincial competence. It is thus a subject which the federal government has neither an internal competence, nor an external competence. In this matter, the federal government does not have the authority, neither to discuss it with foreign countries, nor to engage in discussion with any of the provinces of Canada: nor is it able to give any instructions on this subject to Canadian representatives taking part in an international conference dealing with education.¹⁹³

The extension of provincial jurisdiction in education to international relations was clear in Bertrand’s letter. Whether this would hold up in a Supreme Court reference was

another question — and one that was not being put forward by either level of government.

In the run-up to the December second round, Bertrand accepted the role that Pearson and Trudeau had been pushing for a long time — that of the presidency of the Canadian delegation. Claude Morin for his part was very disappointed in the turn of events because he saw the federal government using the provincial government for its own ends, and that Quebec had lost a significant lever in the pursuit of its international aims.

The federal perspective on international conferences on education was also forcefully put forward by Mitchell Sharp, in his capacity as Secretary of State for External Affairs in Trudeau’s 1968 government. His response to Cardinal’s participation in the conferences at Libreville and Paris was to publish a booklet on the issue. In it, Sharp argued that authority over foreign affairs rested in the absolute sense with the federal government. If an area were demonstrably within provincial responsibility, then the federal government would have to respect provincial jurisdiction. At the same time, it would have to provide the necessary federal support so that the activity could be undertaken at the international level. Sharp, despite his literary efforts and his position as minister responsible for External Affairs, saw most of the confrontation over the international conferences on education from the sidelines.

Consequently, although as foreign secretary I strongly defended the indivisibility of foreign policy and foreign relations, it was the Prime Minister and my French-Canadian colleagues, particularly Gérard Pelletier, who bore the brunt of the “battle of the flags” in encounters with the Quebec government and with representatives of the French government at home and abroad.195

193 Morin, L’Art, p. 166.
194 Morin, L’Art, p. 169.
195 Mitchell Sharp, Which Reminds Me (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 188.
With the end of the Kinshasa conference, the confrontational period in diplomacy in education came to an end between Quebec and Ottawa. With the election of the Bourassa government, there was a desire to “normalize” the relationship with Ottawa in the field of international activities in education. Until the election of the Parti Québecois government and the 1977 COMENAM conference, political attention turned elsewhere.

Establishing the CMEC's Role

The Council of Ministers of Education, Canada had just been established when confrontation broke out in Canadian diplomacy in education. Several distinct views on its utility in the field were emerging. Quebec nationalists such as Claude Morin were dubious of its value. Federalists saw the organization much more positively. It had not yet carved out a role, but was to be shaped by these views.

Lester Pearson wrote to Daniel Johnson at the time of the Libreville conference, and promoted the CMEC’s role in international education.

Rappelant que le premier ministre québécois n’avait pas encore répondu à celle qu’il lui avait fait parvenir sur le même sujet le 1er Décembre, mais reconnaissant avoir eu des conversations téléphoniques avec lui dans l’intervalle. Pearson revenait avec la proposition selon laquelle le ministre du Québec pourrait, « dans la plupart des cas, » présider la délégation canadienne. Il suggérait aussi que le Conseil des Ministres de l’Éducation, organisme interprovincial dont faisait partie le Québec, puisse « élaborer des recommandations touchant la composition des délégations canadiennes aux conférences sur l’éducation. »

In his work on the subject, Morin makes several comments about the CMEC. He saw that because it was composed of all of the ten provincial education ministers, it played a

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196 Although there were further disagreements over ACCT conferences and the Victoria Charter in 1971, these questions did not deal exclusively with the issue of education. Jack Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 154-156.

useful role in the coordination and reflection on matters of national importance that concerned education. The fact that the organization did not have any links to the federal government was also of importance to Quebec. It prevented Ottawa from having any influence on the field, where it otherwise might be tempted to jump in with all its jurisdictional force. The danger for Quebec in the situation surrounding the conferences in Gabon and Paris was the propensity of English-speaking provinces to reach compromises with the federal government. Provided that Ottawa continued to finance programs and continued the flow of grants, there was not the same fundamental desire to be separated from its grasp.\textsuperscript{198} The role of the CMEC was seen as a Trojan horse. Working within the confines of the CMEC was in this circumstance, tantamount to selling out to the enemy.

The CMEC had yet to become a recognizable authority in education in Canada and abroad, however the diplomacy of the period left its mark. National prominence would come with time – a time beyond the conflictual diplomacy in education that predominated the 1960s. Nonetheless, the sparring that characterized the conferences was well noted by all within the Council.

**Conclusion**

The international activities of Quebec in the field of education in the 1960s represent a politicization and a change in approach towards such events. Suddenly education became a headline-getting event in diplomacy and the results were extraordinarily turbulent for the Canadian federal system. International activities in education in Quebec became tied to the changes that Quebec as a society was undergoing in the 1960s. While the press scrutiny was new, international activities in Quebec had a

\textsuperscript{198}Morin, *L'Art*, p. 135.
substantial past. Some of the principal antecedents of Quebec’s desire to participate fully in diplomacy in education were plain to see. Bureaucratic change in government resulted in the creation of new organizations such as the Ministry of Education. The Ministry was, from the beginning, keen to extend its grasp into the international arena. The collective memory the government, the church, and the people had of the ongoing efforts by missionaries to establish school systems in Francophone Africa also provided some of the impetus. Finally, the topsy-turvy change in governments and their attitudes towards delegations in other foreign capitals, and the outside world also prodded change. The isolationist sentiments of Duplessis did much to provoke a backlash – even amongst Québécois, who, unlike Paul-Émile Borduas, did not exile themselves to Paris during that era. Federalism in this period stands out because of the conflictual nature of federal-provincial relations that developed. In order to participate in the diplomatic tango in education, provinces needed several things. There had to be a willingness on the part of provincial education authorities to expend more of their creative energy on international questions. In the period between 1960 and 1969, creative energy went a long way in Quebec’s case. The principal proponent of the new international thrust was Paul Gérin-Lajoie. As someone who had studied abroad and had experienced the wider world, he was an excellent spokesman for this cause. In his April 1965 speech to the consular corps in Montréal he argued for the « prolongement externe de ses compétences internes » - that there should be an extension of Quebec’s internal competence in education to the international system. This statement of principle came at the same time as did development within the ministry of education of an internationally oriented bureaucracy. Not only did the diplomatic tango of education require willingness on the
part of the protagonist, in this case Quebec, but it also necessitated a partner, or partners with whom to dance the dance.\footnote{The metaphor of dancing is extremely useful. The federal government could be seen in the role of governess or spurned mate, France and Gabon as willing suitors, and international organizations as the}

France, Gabon and to a substantially lesser extent the other states of Francophone Africa provided the international partners in the confrontational relationship with Ottawa. France approached the question with several interests in mind. A shared heritage and language could not help but add to the renewed interest between the two francophone societies. France, under de Gaulle, was also following a very vigorous foreign policy. The calculus of geopolitics suggested to de Gaulle that by stirring up North America, he could make gains within Europe both in terms of security and in terms of France’s relative standing among nations. Finally, de Gaulle transposed his experiences in Africa on to the emerging situation in Quebec. He saw changes, that to his way of thinking, led towards an independent state, and not towards an invigorated form of federalism.

In the case of Gabon, its rationale for supporting conflictual diplomacy in education was multi-sided. It acted primarily as a client of France. It also acted as a newly independent state, unsure of the international environment, and unable to access a self-made foreign policy tradition. It was also in the throes of leadership succession and the establishment of a new government. Per force, the attentions of the Gabonese state, such that they were at this time, were focused elsewhere.

The final element of the confrontational diplomacy in education of the 1960s was the role of international organizations. COMENAM was primarily a French organization. Membership in it was secured with the help of Paris. The independent nature of the
nation-state within the organization was not to be underestimated however, as witnessed by the actions of Mobuto Sese Seko and Zaire. The federal government was able to intervene because of Mobuto's actions, but it was unable to negotiate a permanent agreement on participation in education conferences with Quebec authorities.

The legacy of this period for diplomacy in education is unfortunately one of mistrust and concern. Whether the CMEC could change this remained to be seen.
Chapter 4
Diplomacy, Education and Ottawa's Evolving Role, 1960-1970

Introduction
Two distinct periods in Canadian international relations in education have been examined thus far. In Chapter Two, a study of the history of international relations in education and federalism prior to 1960 revealed on the one hand, sporadic, and marginal interest on the part of the federal government, and on the other, minimal coordination between the provinces in their own efforts. The third chapter examined the conflict-ridden relations between Ottawa and Quebec, as nationalism and education became intertwined in Quebec City’s drive to extend its international profile in the 1960s. Here once again the subject will be looked at during the 1960s, but this time the changing federal role in the field will provide the focus of the discussion.

The point of departure for this chapter is provided by the publication of Mitchell Sharp’s pamphlet Federalism and International Conferences on Education in 1968 which was as much a response to contemporary political events, as it was the portent of a broader more hands-on approach to the issue. The appearance of Sharp’s publication brought the federal government to a new height on the national stage by extending an already-expansive trend towards federal centralization. The booklet’s emergence also neatly coincided with federal growth in the area of education, changes in the Department of External Affairs, and the advent of a “section” specifically dedicated to international activities in education. Lastly, it came during a time when the federal government, using a different definition of education, made significant inroads into the field of technical training. This also had implications for international relations in education.

Mitchell Sharp and a Hands-On International Education Strategy

Mitchell Sharp was Pierre Trudeau’s first Secretary of State for External Affairs and he held the post during the most turbulent period in diplomacy in education. Sharp, like Trudeau, came to his position when crises were breaking out frequently over this matter. Prior to his appointment, he had been a cabinet minister in other departments and before that he was a career civil servant. While his credentials in government were good, he had little direct experience with international activities in education. This quickly changed in response to the situation provoked by Quebec’s stance in federal-provincial relations. This in turn was directly linked to the province’s international initiatives. Despite the leading role played by Pierre Trudeau and others, Sharp’s sideline role was important. He codified the governing principles of this field for the first time.201

When Sharp published *Federalism and International Conferences on Education* in 1968, the obvious target-audience was to be found in Quebec.202 Its secondary and more subtle purpose was to convey to the other provincial governments that Ottawa was willing to take on an enhanced role in what they had claimed as their jurisdictions. As the federal state grew, so too had its propensity to undertake adventures in fields that had been solely the responsibility of the provinces or non-governmental organizations. Sharp’s document dealt with several key questions. Answers to concerns regarding the nature of foreign policy, general international conferences on education, francophone issues, international aid and future proposals were dealt with in separate chapters.203 The

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201 See Chapter 3, p. 88, and Sharp, *Which Reminds Me*, p. 188.
booklet was thus a sophisticated articulation of the federal position after several years of increasingly sharp disagreements in this area.

The resounding message was federal control first. Provincial interests would come afterwards. This was heralded at every available opportunity. Foreign policy was not divisible. It did not matter whether the policy issue fell under provincial jurisdiction. Sharp backed up this assertion with a decision from a 1937 court case. The decision distinguished between internal legislation and external obligations. Note the distinction between being able to legislate on some issues and being able to sign treaties on all matters.

.... the Parliament of Canada could not legislate in areas of provincial jurisdiction simply as a result of the Canadian Government's entering into international agreements.... the judges of the Supreme Court....explicitly recognized that the Canadian Government could enter into treaties on all subjects....in no respect did the judges question the external affairs power of the Canadian Government as such or support the view that provincial competence extended abroad.204

Further to the court decision, Sharp declared that federal and provincial governments had to work on a cooperative basis towards the implementation of international education treaties.205 Sharp also made another crucial point. Should a condition of partial sovereignty exist, i.e. each province acting with its own international persona, it would be very difficult for the federal government to coordinate policy. This would increase conflict between the federal government and the provincial governments, particularly if there was a difference of opinion on a specific policy. The issue of partial jurisdiction also evoked questions as to who would take on the lead role in international activities in

204Canada, Federalism, p. 10.
205While this was true for the most part, the problems surrounding the creation of CAME and Mackenzie King, and the problems that Howard Green had with the first meeting of the Commonwealth Education Conference revealed another side of the relationship. See Note 252.
education. This issue of divided sovereignty was unacceptable for the federal government.

From the federal point of view, the issue of who participated in international conferences and under what terms of reference was also something that needed further clarification and a hands-on solution. Quebec’s Machiavellian provocations led to a calculated federal response in this area. The tenor of that response set the stage not only for Quebec, but also for other provincial governments. Sharp’s treatment of conferences made reference to different activities in which educational authorities had participated in the past. In this context he argued that delegations were to be composed of a variety of officials, however, the federal government would scrutinize all nominations. Naturally, there would be consultation with the provinces. He also particularly singled out the CMEC as part of this process.

The Council of Ministers of Education, its predecessor, the Standing Committee of Ministers of Education, and, in earlier years, the Canadian Education Association, acting as a liaison office for the provincial departments of education, have played a significant role in establishing the composition of Canadian delegations to Commonwealth education meetings. It is also worth noting, in connection with the composition of the delegation to the Lagos Conference, that, as in the case of earlier conferences, the delegation represented Canada as a whole.  

A similar system was put in place for relations with UNESCO and its specialized agencies. Sharp set out a series of federally-oriented guidelines for UNESCO conferences. Within these guidelines, then, the federal minister also encouraged the participation of provincial ministers at UNESCO conferences. In 1967, the Canadian government finally made arrangements to attend IBE conferences in an official capacity,
rather than just as an observer or in a "private capacity." Sharp made reference to the newly-developed relationship with the International Bureau of Education, choosing to emphasize the growing federal role, rather than the reasons why Ottawa refused to participate in the past.

In handling la francophonie, Sharp applied the same principles and continued to emphasize the federal role. The government took the high ground in educational relations with the French. Sharp emphasized the harmonious relationship the two governments had had in the past, rather than the recent acrimony. On the specific issue of international relations in education, Sharp also set up a framework for forthcoming conferences with francophone states. He reiterated Lester Pearson's comments on sovereignty.

A sovereign state -- and Canada is one- must maintain responsibility for foreign policy, and for representation abroad, or it ceases to be sovereign.

Much of this rhetoric was directed at the governments of Quebec and France, but it effectively set up the ground rules for other provinces as they looked at the issue of international conferences. In dealing with the question of la francophonie, Sharp also took the opportunity to clearly state the federal view on the conference in Gabon.

Sharp's final aim in his presentation was to reiterate the federal view in the clearest possible and most hands-on terms. Any delegations sent to international conferences on education should speak for Canada. Delegations could-and-should include

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208 This not only countered Quebec's aspirations but also addressed an issue that the provinces had discussed for a long time. See Chapter 3, Note 119.
209 Increasingly there was also the view that the problems with the French were a "Gaullist" phenomenon, not representative of Franco-Canadian relations. De Gaulle would not last forever.
210 Canada, Federalism, p. 36.
211 See Chapter 3 for further discussion of the actual events of the Quebec incidents.
a substantial provincial component, and be headed by a provincial minister of education if possible. The CMEC should have a primary role in choosing delegations. This was not to increase the powers of the provinces, but rather to identify Quebec’s interests with those of the greater community of ministers of education. Educational matters were to be decided on by the provincial governments or the CMEC. The federal government was to be present at all international meetings, but was only to involve itself insofar as diplomacy, foreign policy, and budgetary matters were concerned. Provinces should not, it was expected, take on free-lance education commitments like Gabon in the future. That type of activity would conflict too openly with the established order and would be rewarded with penalties of an equal magnitude.

National and International Changes – The Centralizing State and Modernization

Not only did the appearance of Sharp’s publication signal a new hands-on approach, but it additionally brought the federal government to a new peak in terms of its influence. It extended centralization in another direction. These two trends had impacts across Canada. This rendered them significant not only in the pressure-cooker atmosphere of Ottawa, but also throughout major communities and the rest of the country.

Federalism and International Conferences on Education in a very public way staked out Ottawa’s position regarding ultimate authority over Canadian education in the international sphere and spoke to the nature of Canadian federalism during this era. This assertion of prerogative reflected the increasing centralization in government in the early postwar period. The path towards centralization in Canada started during the Second World War and continued unabated into the 1960s. It was very much directed towards

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212 Canada. Federalism, p. 54.
fostering a sense of Canadian identity. Corry underscores the protective role of government in his commentary on the constitution.

No constitution however good will supply us with resourcefulness and mental adroitness. Look at what we did without the aid of war powers from 1950 on! The centralizing trend begun in the war was continued by imaginative use of the fiscal, monetary and spending powers. By 1970 the long reach and preservative influence of the federal government were striking features of Canadian federalism.

For a very long time prior to World War II, there was an extremely wide division of opinion and views as to the federal government's role in relation to the provinces in Confederation. In the early postwar period, the Liberal government reconsidered its role and opted for continued centralization. Its aims became clear at the time of the 1945 White Paper on Incomes and Employment, and the proposals put forward at the 1945 Federal-Provincial Conference. The new centralization was underwritten by federal spending power. In the next two decades, Ottawa would increase support for the provinces in a variety of areas in order to ensure national standards in accordance with the increasingly widespread acceptance of the welfare state.

Rocher and Smith delineate the differences between the processes of centralization and decentralization. A federal state that is centralizing is increasingly exercising its power at the expense of the provincial authorities, despite what the basic law or constitution might say about the issue. The centralizing state is also one that relies

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much more explicitly on the supremacy of the ruling authority and its definition of what constitutes “the nation.” Moreover, it has the financial muscle to back up its wishes.217

Decentralizing states are characterized by the flight of powers and jurisdictions to hinterland capitals. Local sub-national governments exert ever-greater control over national priorities and powers. They also exert increasing financial control over the central government’s power structure.218 There has been some movement towards the decentralization of the Canadian federation with changes in fiscal federalism.219 At the same time there has not been a substantial shift in other areas. For example, provincial power to nominate senators has not come to pass.220 Were this the case, the Senate would certainly play a different role in federal-provincial relations than it has throughout Canadian history.

As part of the movement towards centralization that took place after the war, a variety of forces were at work. Some argued that the bureaucracies took a leading role in encouraging concentration of authority in Ottawa.

So all pervading was the arrogance of the Ottawa Mandarins that even potentially useful programs in equalization and economic development became subtle – and not so subtle devices for expanding federal power in areas hitherto exclusively reserved to the provinces. Thus “education” became “training”; municipal affairs” became “problems of urban growth”; and “community development” emerged in the guise of the “fight against unemployment.”221

220 With the exception of the votes for senators in Alberta.
Others emphasized politically-inspired changes and innovations as being the prime motivators behind centralization. The federal government became a much more activist organization in all areas.

The second round of change occurred in the mid-1960s when the Pearson government launched several major social policy initiatives, including the Canada Pension Plan, Medicare, further old age security increases, the Canada Assistance Plan and federal assistance to higher education and manpower training.  

Modernization

Sharp's prominent publication of the pamphlet and the sparring matches with Quebec City not only said much about the evolving nature of Canadian federalism, but these events also reflected the new view of "education" in contemporary Western states. Twentieth-century governments were molding education into something that was virtually unrecognizable to the architects of the BNA Act and to nineteenth-century educationalists. The contrast with the previous century was marked. The emphasis on factories, industrialization, social conformity and an education that ended with elementary school had disappeared. The new combination was characterized as a "post-industrial society" by some.  

A post-industrial society is a term coined.... to describe the new social structures evolving in industrial societies in the latter part of the 20th century which point the way to the emergence of a new form of society...[the] 'axial principle' of post-industrial society is "centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation of policy formation for the society....it will be marked by the ...pre-eminence of the professional...

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223 The terminology is replete with words and definitions to describe the process. Eisenstadt's word will be used as a subtitle, but Daniel Bell's concepts, and John K. Galbraith's prescriptions will be most heavily cited. See S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change(London: Prentice-Hall, 1966) and Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society(New York: Basic Books, 1973). The Galbraith citation will follow in the text.
and technical class and in decision-making by the creation of new 
"intellectual technology."  

Education was now centrally important to the functioning of government and the international economy. Skilled workers and planners were now - more than ever before - necessary for the smooth operation of society. Canada, like all other states in the West, was caught up in these developments.  

In order to create the caste of skilled workers that the changing state and society needed, the previous definition of education had to change. One of the ongoing motivations that brought both government and business to embrace the university and secondary school systems was the creativity and innovation that they increasingly supplied. 

.... the technostructure has become deeply dependent on the educational and scientific estate for its supply of trained manpower. It needs also to maintain a close relation with the scientific sector of this estate to ensure that it is safely abreast of scientific and technological innovation.  

Business executives on boards of colleges and in government were not only there for philanthropic reasons; their position also gave them early access to new ideas and an edge in the business environment.  

Economic theories provide one way of looking at the history of Canada and changing federal-provincial relations in education during this era. They show the changing economy as a subtle cause of the increasing tension between the federal and provincial governments in the latter part of the 1960s. They divide the past in a highly unique way. The state and the broader tides of history, as represented by economic  

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225 This does not forget the “East”, the “South,” or the “Far East.” They have additional influences and other problems as well.
change, make the specific political events appear as tempests on the edge of a gargantuan storm. Despite the centrality of the broader economic/societal change, politics remained important.

If socialism can no longer be considered the controlling framework of the good or even the plausible society, neither can capitalism in its classical form. Central is the fact that as the modern economy has developed and expanded ever more responsibilities have been imposed on the state. . . . There is the further fact that the modern economy cannot, without government intervention, ensure a satisfactory and stable overall economic performance. . . . Any president or prime minister knows that he or she will be held rigorously and often disastrously accountable at election time for the performance of the economy.

The context of international relations and the convergence of standards on the global level also influenced domestic politics. Educationalists and academics took note of this change, but saw it from a different point of view.

Quietly but surely technology and business assumed large controlling interests in education. Such combinations possessed the power to dominate an area of society traditionally reserved for public control, largely because educators were not equipped to judge accurately between technological advances with valid educational usefulness and others advocated by sales pressure from private enterprises’ cherished profit motive.

The emergence of the post-industrial state had an important influence on how education was being perceived. Having acknowledged the broader national and international developments, one can now look at how these trends manifested themselves when Federalism and International Conferences on Education appeared; an appearance that

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228 This is what Braudel’s and the Annales School described as the histoire événementielle. See Ernest Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval and Modern (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 372-373.
took place at the same time as centralization and post-industrial development collided with education in Canada.

**Federalism, Education and External Affairs**

Federal interest in education in the postwar era climbed steadily. Growth in this area was nearly non-existent in the 1940s and early 1950s. The rapid changes that occurred soon after complemented changes in other government departments, notably for this study, the Department of External Affairs. The 1950s and 1960s saw several competing forces influence this department. These forces often passed over education as an area of interest. Increasingly however, as the 1960s wore on, education became an entity in External Affair's mandate. The expansion of External Affairs into political analysis and specific geographic regions was a priority in this turbulent era. The critical examination and reorganization of the department on several different occasions during this decade pointed to some of the important international areas that needed more attention however. Education was among these. The changes and re-evaluations that led to the emergence of a section specifically dedicated to international activities in education brought the drive for centralization to fulfillment in this field.

At the outset there was little federal interest in international relations in education.

Until the 1950s, the federal role in education was largely "at the margin."... The Massey Commission ...linked education to culture...education [thus] did not come exclusively within the jurisdiction of the provinces.231

Not only did the federal government make a linkage here, but it also saw as fundamental to the national character the issues of language and training.232 Concurrent with these developments was the federal position that it could spend on areas such as education in

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order to provide national equalization of opportunity. The federal government also
became more involved in the financing of universities from the 1950s onward. Ottawa,
moreover, derived some of its legitimacy from the unpredictability of world affairs.

In addition to the sanction that Canadian crises have given to the federal
presence, the panorama of unprecedented world-shaking events since 1939
have lent it an additional and quite distinct air of legitimacy.233

That the nature of what was considered education had radically changed since the Second
World War was also underlined in terms of its relationship to industry.

The federal presence in education is involved in these serious questions
and dozens of other related to: industrial development, productivity, and
competitiveness; Canadian identity; the impact of scientific technological,
and other research activities, such as the supply of essential statistical
information... education has assumed a more fundamental, central
relationship with virtually all major aspects of Canadian society.234

Many welcomed a federal role. Throughout the latter part of the 1950s and into the
1960s, the federal government's expansion into the field of education and other fields
was also motivated by new ideas about fiscal policy.235 Increasingly, there was a move
towards recognizing the human costs and benefits of education as well.

Until this period the concept that education.... could be significantly
related to economic development... was simply not recognized as
important. After 1960 however, forces within a much more complex
society and the human capital arguments of the Economic Council of
Canada (which were later repudiated) stimulated unprecedented federal
initiatives resulting from equally unprecedented educational growth.236

Of similar concern was the belief that education needed to be equal across the country.

The federal incursion into provincial jurisdiction was expected to equalize opportunities

and complete the goals of a previous century, albeit in a way that was previously
unimaginable. Societal changes also brought pressures to bear in the area of student
aid. The federal government made its biggest incursion in this field in the 1960s, going
over the heads of provincial authorities to effect that change.

The expansion of the federal government into realms of provincial jurisdiction in
education set the stage for the important and forceful role that it was to take on in
asserting and extending its place in the area of international relations in this field. The
emergence of expertise specifically dedicated to diplomacy in education also followed a
series of changes that took place at the Department of External Affairs during the postwar
years.

Changes at External Affairs

The federal government began to expand its foreign affairs bureaucracy
immediately following the end of the Second World War and this expansion and the
successful competition for recognition and resources by External’s “political divisions”
initially resulted in few opportunities for education and cultural affairs in the department.
Despite this, it was during this period that education started to become visible in
departmental thinking. The rate at which the foreign ministry expanded virtually
guaranteed some presence for the field.

Over the next 25 years, the eight divisions at war’s end would grow, by
fission and conjugation, to 71 administrative, managerial, functional and
geographic units by 1971. Indeed, by the late 1960s, External’s
headquarters had become so large that it had long since spilled out of the
East Block of the Parliament Buildings into a dozen office buildings
dotted around downtown Ottawa.

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Education first came to the attention of the Canadian foreign policy establishment because of the United Nations. The burgeoning pressures to grow started in the 1940s with demands coming from the United Nations and the newly emergent UNESCO.

Political problems on the horizon continued to direct much of the department's energies entirely into the international security side of operations. The rapidly changing European situation, the birth of Israel and the subsequent Middle Eastern wars required new and different specializations. In addition, the rapid de-colonization and movement of displaced peoples following the end of the Second World War brought with it new demands both for embassies and foreign service officers to staff them, and within the federal government in Ottawa. In Canada as well, the move by Newfoundland to join the country, and the increasing press interest in External Affairs' explanations of the government's policy on particular world problems caused pressures on the organization. Finally, increasing participation in international commissions and organizations such as the International Indochina Commission of the late 1950s continued to use a great deal of the resources of the department.

**Re-Organization at the Foreign Ministry and Education**

Education gained significance in External Affairs' hierarchy through departmental expansion, but it also gained through External's re-organizations. The changes undertaken during the Trudeau years were most significant; however, earlier changes also helped enhance the field's stature.

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Among the first critical examinations of External Affairs was the Royal Commission on Government Organization or the Glassco Commission of 1960. Under the auspices of this commission, Maxwell Cohen of the Faculty of Law of McGill University did an examination of the structure of the organization and its processes. The senior management of External Affairs had several suggestions for Cohen to concentrate on.

....the departmental representatives drew attention to their chronic concerns about administration: the importance of taking full account of overseas as well as headquarters operations, the growing number of “hardship” posts in developing countries, the difficulties caused by overspecialization. the problems of dealing with the control agencies, the desirability of better interdepartmental co-operation abroad, the need for bi-lingualism. the awkwardness of dispersal among several buildings in Ottawa... Cohen found out some interesting things about the foreign ministry and these were not altogether in line with the proposals that the senior administration had put forward in their initial meeting.

We therefore recommend that: The operations of the Department in the political field be placed under a Deputy Under-Secretary of State....the preliminary instruction of probationary foreign service officers be expanded....The positions of divisional head be staffed with more senior and experienced personnel and deputies be provided to them where necessary....Supporting and administrative services be staffed with experienced personnel possessing such special skills as may be required.

The concerns that Cohen stressed touched on international activities in education. They had surfaced before. They repeated the disquiet of non-governmental educational

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Several other evaluations followed the Glassco Commission.
242 Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s, p. 204.
organizations in the 1950s. The Canadian Education Association and provincial officials bemoaned the continual switching of the “desk officer” for UNESCO in the earlier decade.\footnote{244} Cohen was blunt. At the time, the Information Division dealt with educational issues.

In one calendar year no fewer than twenty-three staff changes were made. The shortage of information-service experience among the staff can hardly be defended on the grounds that greater importance is attached to departmental experience, for at the time of this inquiry officers were being posted to the Division with only one month’s experience in the Department. Career foreign-service officers regard service in the Division, if not as a penance, at least as an episode to be endured.\footnote{245}

Cohen got some results. The emergence of the Education Liaison Section in 1964 was partly attributable to his activities.

Concurrent with the reception and absorption of the Glassco Commission recommendations, the early 1960s saw other important changes that had an impact on the standing of education in the Department of External Affairs. One of these was the creation of the OECD, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Clearly, it was an economics-and finance centered organization; it was also increasingly considered as an educational organization as time went on.\footnote{246} Its education-related activities would have to be tracked by External Affairs as they became more of a factor in international relations.

While the full impact of the OECD on the foreign ministry and Canada was not yet realized, there were still further developments that enhanced the profile of education in the department in the early 1960s. These were in the field and not at headquarters.

\footnote{244} Stewart, \textit{Inter-provincial}, p. 130.  
\footnote{245} Canada, \textit{Royal Commission}, p. 78.  
Not only new countries but also developments affecting international
organizations gave rise to changes in Canadian representation during the
period. In 1959, an officer was added to the staff of the embassy in Paris
to act as permanent delegate to the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In the following year, arrangements were made for representation at the headquarters in Paris of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Changes within the department also had effects on the direction of international relations
in education. The External Aid Office, as the precursor to CIDA, had some
responsibilities in the field of education, but its mandate was taking it in different
directions.

While the External Aid Office obviated the necessity for Economic
Division II, it did not entirely eliminate the department’s responsibilities
in the aid field, which included, for example, activities related to
UNESCO and planning for a Commonwealth education conference in New Delhi in January 1962.

In the early spring of 1968, Pierre Trudeau, the new prime minister, became the
overseer of this world and immediately undertook a critical reappraisal of External
Affairs’ organization. Trudeau had several specific concerns with the Department of
External Affairs. Why was diplomacy necessary? Why was so much money spent on
foreign policy? Why didn’t the advice from the department reflect the views of the news
media and the public at large? Trudeau was also very agitated by the activities of
Quebec and did not want to see a further expansion of provincial diplomacy. Just prior to
his ascent to power, a special task force was established.

In order to deal more effectively with provincial activities abroad,
especially those of Quebec, the under-secretary in January 1967
established a special task force on the international aspects of federal –
provincial problems. The group was headed by [Alan] Gottlieb until his
appointment as legal adviser and assistant under-secretary in the summer,

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247 Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s, p. 177.
248 Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s, p. 180.
and then by his successor as special adviser on federal-provincial questions, Max Yalden. The task force met regularly during 1967, taking up not only relations with France but also such matters as the negotiation of cultural agreements, policy towards French-speaking African countries, cooperation with the provinces on foreign aid, and arrangements for visits in connection with Expo '67 in Montreal.\textsuperscript{250}

Although this was an excellent move, it was a belated recognition of issues such as provincial diplomacy in education. During the course of Trudeau's first government, increasing attempts were also made to integrate the operations of the foreign affairs apparatus.

The main mechanism chosen was a new Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations. The membership included key members of the senior civil service. On this committee sat the Clerk of the Privy Council, the Secretary of the Treasury Board and the deputy ministers of Manpower and Immigration, IT&C and Public Works, and the president of CIDA. The undersecretary of state for external affairs was given the chairmanship, but External Affairs was given no authority to manage the external operations of the different departments.\textsuperscript{251}

The reorganizations of the 1960s were important because they elevated education into the policy structure of External Affairs. The emergence of increasingly sophisticated international organizations also led to the enhancement of the profile of diplomacy in education in the department. Trudeau's critical analysis of the organization that argued for less "high politics' and greater emphasis on basic issues was also a significant development. The results of his critique would not be implemented for some time, but a new momentum had started. Part of the structure he inherited was the new educational liaison section.

\textsuperscript{250}Hilliker and Barry, Canada's, p. 399.
\textsuperscript{251}Nossal, The Politics, p. 141.
"Educational Liaison"

The beginnings of a specialization in education can be followed from the 1950s. As noted earlier, Ottawa first had to pay attention to education in the context of CAME\(^{252}\) and UNESCO. Under the heading "UNESCO and International Exchanges," External's activities for 1951 are noted.

The Information Division is responsible for preparing background material and instructions for the Canadian Delegation to the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. It is also the channel between UNESCO and organizations and individuals in Canada interested in its affairs.... The Division also deals with scholarships and fellowships abroad offered to Canadians....\(^{253}\)

For many years UNESCO was the only recognized international educational organization.\(^{254}\) Many other educational activities were handled in liaison with the Canadian Educational Association but received little or no acknowledgement in official External Affairs publications. This had two effects. There continued to be a vacuum at the foreign ministry both in terms of the constitution and policy making. With the move to centralize government, this would be corrected, but consolidation also opened up the organization to greater problems later on as provinces took a greater interest in extending their jurisdiction over education.

With the election of the Diefenbaker government, diplomacy in education disappeared for the space of three years.\(^{255}\) In the annual reports for 1960, 1961, and 1962, the Information Division that oversaw education vanished completely from sight.

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\(^{252}\) CAME: Committee of Allied Ministers of Education established during the Second World War to oversee post-war re-development of school systems in Europe. See Linda Goldthorp, *Reluctant Internationalism*.


as did information on UNESCO and other education-related international activities.256

When education emerged from the shadows in 1964 under the Pearson government, it
had its new title, "Education Liaison" and new prominence. The newly created section
now covered many other educational activities.

During the year the Department has been preparing for the Third
Commonwealth Education Conference, to be held in Ottawa in August
1964. A Canadian Planning Committee, broadly representative of the
provincial education authorities, the university community, professional
and other organizations concerned with the programme, was established in
January...much attention was also given during the year to developing a
programme of academic and cultural exchanges with countries of French
expression.257

In the 1965 report, the raison d'être of the Education Liaison Section was more clearly
enunciated. This report came out in 1966, so this also reflected an appreciation of the
policies that the Lesage and Johnson governments were pursuing.

The Department provides liaison with competent national organizations on
educational matters deriving from Canada’s relations with other countries
and its membership in various international organizations....In carrying
out these responsibilities, the Department has the invaluable advice and
assistance of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada on
matters of interest to institutions of higher education, the Canadian
Educational Association, which provides liaison with the provincial
departments of education and many other organizations with specialized
interests in the educational field.258

255 A full slate of international activities continued throughout these years and there was ongoing contact
between External Affairs and the Canadian Education Association. The reason for the absence of
information on cultural diplomacy in the annual report during these years is not clear.
256 The Diefenbaker years also saw conflicting activities regarding education in the Department of External
Affairs. Sidney Smith (SSEA. 1957-1959) was the “educationalist” foreign minister, while Howard Green
(SSEA. 1959-1963) had alienated many with his bungling of the 1959 Oxford England Commonwealth
Conference on Education. See “Education in the Commonwealth.” Globe and Mail, Thursday July 30,
1959, p. 6.
44.
47.
Although there are fulsome references to collaborative relationships, the reality, particularly in the case of Quebec, was more gritty and conflict-ridden. The message was clear however; Ottawa had moved into the field and was staying. In the latter half of the 1960s, not only was greater attention paid to French educational connections, but there was also a greater awareness of all international activities in education. Beside a picture of Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs at the time, and Pope Paul VI at the Vatican, “Education Liaison” got greater visibility in the 1966 annual report.

The Department continued to provide liaison with the competent national organizations on educational matters deriving from Canada’s relations with other countries and its membership in various international organizations.\(^\text{259}\)

Not only had “Educational Liaison” become more prominent, but there also continued to be additional exposure given to Canadian activities in UNESCO. This situation continued in 1968 with the following very assertive account.

Since there is no federal ministry of education, the Department of External Affairs frequently receives inquiries regarding education in Canada. These are directed to the proper quarter. Liaison with provincial and national organizations is also provided by the Department in educational matters arising from Canada’s relations with other countries and its membership in international organizations....In carrying on these activities, the Department has the advice and assistance of the Council of Ministers of Education of the Provinces, the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, the Canadian Education Association and other bodies in Canada concerned with education.\(^\text{260}\)

In the 1969 report, international activities in education continued to be part of the fields covered by the Public Affairs Division.

This Section provides liaison between national and provincial organizations in educational matters arising from Canada’s relations with


other countries and its membership in international organizations... The section also takes part in negotiations on educational exchanges and, since there is no federal department of education, directs to the proper authorities the frequent inquiries received at Canadian embassies about education in Canada.\textsuperscript{261}

Changes in federal-provincial relations and increased activities at the provincial level prior to the appearance of Mitchell Sharp's booklet were making themselves felt as well. The latter part of the 1960s saw the appearance of the Coordination Division. Hilliker and Barry write:

Other changes arose from the need to deal with the provinces' - especially Quebec's - increasing assertiveness in international affairs...This... led to the conversion of the Cultural Affairs Section of the Information Division into a new cultural affairs division in January 1966. Included in the mandate were the negotiation of cultural agreements, liaison with cultural and educational organizations, academic exchanges with other countries... the Coordination Division (formerly a section of the Legal Division) was created, with responsibility for external policy issues involving federal-provincial relations. The "general function" of the division was to "ensure liaison" with other parts of...government, and with the provinces on foreign policy matters with federal-provincial implications.\textsuperscript{262}

Centralization now saw the sudden emergence of several layers of bureaucracy specifically to deal with international relations in education and the surrounding federal-provincial issues. The system, like the society it reflected, had become something vastly different from Ryerson's one-man show of the previous century.

**Training, Federalism and Diplomacy**

The change from Ryerson's times was also marked in the area of "training."

Mitchell Sharp's booklet came out during a time when the federal government, using a new definition of education, made significant inroads into the field of technical training.

\textsuperscript{262} Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's*, p. 318.
This had implications for international relations in education by broadening its definition. By 1968, a very lively and turf-centered debate was being played out over the issues of education and training. This debate drove and continues to drive part of the educational question in twentieth-century Canada. As this dispute helped define training and the federal government’s role in this area, it is worthwhile to explore it in order to understand how training came to be mixed up with education’s international persona.

Increasingly some theorists and governments saw education as being in the service of the state. According to these scholars, mostly economists, its role was to help train an increasingly capable caste of workers. Others, notably philosophers, but also educationalists, saw education in a different way. While the contest between the two groups became vociferous during the latter part of the 1960s, it was also highly relevant for earlier generations. Educationalists were notably provincial in political orientation because provincial governments were the primary organizations involved in education.

It is precisely because the educationalists’ philosophy centres upon man as a whole that it cannot admit a distinction between an educated individual and one who is trained. A properly trained person is also educated and a properly educated person trained. A merely trained individual can only be the monstrous product of a narrowly economic point of view….263

The economists by contrast saw training and education in a very different light. Their view was much more centered on the notion that education would enhance the productivity of the nation and that it was one of several different ways of reaching that end goal.264 Federal officials continually expressed concern that there would not be the human resources available to exploit newly emergent economic opportunities. Skills had

to be there when they were needed.\textsuperscript{265} Similarly, educational institutions had to be able to change quickly to absorb the latest developments that the economy came up with. This continued to be a frustration for the corporate elite who were unable to understand why the education system could not be turned around fast enough to suit their needs.\textsuperscript{266}

**The Federal-Provincial Context**

The development of a federal place in the area of training was highly influenced by these long-running theoretical battles. Still riding the wave of centralization, Ottawa pressed forward. It is also important to examine the highlights of federal-provincial schemes up to and including the 1960s, as the debate influenced how training issues were treated at the international level. The 1960s were not the first decade in which the federal government had become involved in various schemes to encourage training in Canada. Throughout the twentieth century, particularly in times of national emergencies and need, Ottawa intervened in this field.

Increasing industrialization in the 1920's led the federal Department of Labor to play a growing role in Canadian education; a bureau of technical education, with a Dominion director of technical education was established as part of the ministry. Yet the department was careful of provincial responsibilities, and it concentrated on supporting existing provincial initiatives.\textsuperscript{267}

The development of the 1942 Vocational Coordination Act came during war. It was much more oriented towards a primary role for the central government. Following the war, the federal government spent twenty-five million dollars on training in order to reintroduce veterans back into peacetime society.\textsuperscript{268}

\textsuperscript{265} Dupré, et al. *Federalism*, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{266} Yet they were the same group who liked the innovations that the education system provided.

\textsuperscript{267} Stamp, "Government," p. 455.

\textsuperscript{268} Stamp, "Government," p. 456.
The terms of the original training act remained in effect until 1960 at which time the Diefenbaker government replaced it with a new Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act (TVTA). It represented one peak in federal centralization in the fields of training and labor.

Effective for six years following April 1, 1961, this Act authorized Ottawa to enter into agreement with a province to contribute towards capital and operating costs of vocational education. It provided federal money for the building and equipping of vocational training facilities, the training of technicians, vocational teachers, and students in technological training programmes and the training and retraining of many categories of Canadian citizens.269

Once the act became law there was a steady stream of requests for financial assistance from technical and vocational organizations. By 1965, the number of new projects that were exclusively financed by the federal government had risen to 737; in March 1965, there were over 251,000 new places for students in vocational programs.270 In annual terms, these projects were worth more than eighty million dollars. Overall by 1965, the federal government had contributed $350 million in total to technical training in the space of five years.271 Amongst the areas where federal penetration into provincial jurisdiction was the highest was the additional support for high school vocational programs. The rationale that the letter of the constitution was being followed was to be found in the regulations of the act. The federal government would only assume fifty percent of the cost of TVTA programs and the expenditures arising from these could not be used on capital projects.272 The monies allocated under this project were to be used specifically to support courses where fifty percent of the school time was devoted to subjects of a

271 Canada, Department of Labour, Annual Report 1965, p. 29.
vocational nature. The regulations also stipulated that courses must be set up to prepare students for the job market or for further training in a particular vocation.\textsuperscript{273}

Two other developments illustrate the increasing centralization resulting from the federal government's incursion into the field of training. Not only was money going directly into secondary school programs, but there was also an increasing effort to establish inter-provincial standards in the area of training. In particular, apprenticeship exams were to be developed to a national standard. As the 1960s continued, the ongoing efforts in this area meant that increasingly each trade was developing a national Canadian component in the form of inter-provincial certification.

The second change associated with the TVTA Act was the establishment of an Advisory Council. Although this organization meet very infrequently, it was important. Through its operations and its committees, it brought to the forefront a broad spectrum of Canadians interested in the education of trades-people. Amongst their number there was a not insignificant group of educators.

There are two standing Advisory Committees:

1. The National Advisory Committee on Technological Education, consisting of a chairman and 10 other members selected from technological institutions and associations and from industry, labour and governments, reports to the Minister through the National Technical and Vocational Advisory Council.

2. The Inter-Provincial Technical and Vocational Correspondence Courses Committee, made up of provincial representatives specializing in correspondence courses, appointed to advise on the preparation and revision of courses and other related matters.\textsuperscript{274}

Given the distribution of representation on the committees, these bodies, along with others, could have been very easily converted into components of a federal ministry of

\textsuperscript{272} Canada, Department of Labour. \textit{Annual Report 1965}, p. 32. This applied to Program 1 (Vocational High School Training) only.
\textsuperscript{273} Canada, Department of Labour. \textit{Annual Report 1965}, p. 32.
education were the times amenable to this kind of development. Particularly in light of what has been characterized as "Father Knows Best" federalism, this could have been a natural progression had the political cycle gone in a different direction.

The federal TVTA Act also made inroads into the area of community college development. Much of the funding from the Act went to technician training programs in colleges across Canada. The aim of this was to standardize, on a cross-country basis, the certification of technicians as separate from trades people.

In 1967, the TVTA Act ended and a new scheme emerged to deal with technical instruction. This new scheme was called "adult occupational training." In establishing this scheme, the federal government wanted to distance themselves from vocational education, and concentrate specifically on the adult aspect of instruction. The new program was a complete change from the orientation of the previous one and more in keeping with the economist's view of education and training.

The entire structure of operating relations crumbled with the advent of adult occupational training. Federal selection and counseling, leading to federally purchased training and thence to federal placement... this was the new order of the day....there awaited on the threshold of this brave new world an entirely unfamiliar group of federal officials.

Because of the existing views regarding education and training, there was an increasingly bitter confrontation between the two levels of government. Throughout 1966 and 1967,
federal and provincial officials hammered out an agreement on the new act. The outcome was an entirely new system. Both levels of government did not come out of these scuffles unscathed. Rather, both retained their own orientations regarding training as the end of the 1960s approached. Many of their constituents and the bureaucracy bore the brunt of these changes. Adolescents and single mothers, in particular, were turned away from the system.\textsuperscript{281}

That the centralist approach had made much headway was now evident: economists, rather than the educationalists, were now playing a determining role in developing training programs for adults.

The Ontario Design bent in its own way before the federal presence. The counseling and selection of individual adult students, part and parcel of a truly integrated education system, passed into federal hands. Institutional planning would henceforth have to take account of federal analysis of the labour market, if indeed such analysis would be forthcoming. Totally new machinery for intergovernmental liaison had to be accepted, breaking the tradition of a quarter-century.\textsuperscript{282}

The other ongoing reality was that while the federal government had the economists and greater economic clout, the provinces continued to be the primary suppliers of institutions and the specific curriculums under which revitalization of the workforce would occur. The federal government now expected to purchase training from various organizations. These could be provincial institutions such as schools and school boards or industrial plants and corporate agencies.

...the federal government placed its initial emphasis overwhelmingly on the purchase of institutional training. This was primarily the product of the negotiations that forced a federal guarantee to maintain institutional

\textsuperscript{279} That is to say vocation training was to be meant for adolescents and post-matriculation students, while adult occupational training was to a retraining, career change program.
\textsuperscript{280} Dupré, et al, Federalism, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{281} Stamp, "Government," p. 463.
referrals at ninety per cent of the man-days purchased in the previous year.\textsuperscript{283}

One thing that made it more difficult for Ottawa to purchase training from private industry was the nature of Canadian industry and its general un-preparedness to offer training programs.\textsuperscript{284}

In this environment provincial institutions continued to garner federal dollars. Resistance to federal centralization undertaken with the Adult Occupational Training Act (AOTA) of 1967 centered around these organizations. The provinces would establish basic entry requirements for people who wished to get into training programs. At the lower end, they expected a minimum of Grade Eight or Grade Six for persons entering the various training streams. During this period, a group of over forty-percent of Canadian males had not gone beyond an elementary education.\textsuperscript{285} Thus, the provinces could, to a substantial extent, influence who got into federal training programs, and who did not. There was, as a result of this, an increased demand for basic education to fill in the gaps that otherwise existed in particular candidates' backgrounds.\textsuperscript{286}

While the federal government continued to beat down the path of centralization, the provinces were also taking a second look at training during the period of the TVTA Act. By the time of the Adult Occupational Training Act and Sharp's publication they had left internal squabbles behind and were turning to face the new federal threat.

During the early part of the 1960s, there was no branch within the Ontario Ministry of

\textsuperscript{283} Dupré, et al., \textit{Federalism}, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{284} This is an ongoing theme in Canadian industry. The Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) was recently critical of the societal view of vocational training, but also in a position uncharacteristic of their organization, also bemoaned the concentration on white collar occupations rather than the shop floor in the corporate training environment. See Michael Porter, et al, \textit{Canada at the Crossroads}(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991), p.171.
\textsuperscript{285} Dupré, et al., \textit{Federalism}, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{286} Dupré, et al, \textit{Federalism}, p. 128.
Education that dealt with training. When a "training" branch was eventually created its role and philosophy were both derived substantially from the outlook of educationalists within the ministry and the existing school system. Concurrently, the provincial Department of Labour went through a period of revitalization in the 1960s. Significant in this revitalization was the changing definition of what constituted apprenticeship. This sparked an early interdepartmental turf struggle at the provincial level.

The most noteworthy feature of the new act was the broadening of the Department of Labour's role in industrial training beyond apprenticeship. The minister was authorized to enter into "one or more" agreements with the Minister of Labour of Canada respecting "apprenticeship or manpower training." The pitched battles and sniping between the two provincial departments absorbed a great deal of energy at this level. By the mid-1960s the premier had to intervene. The issue came to a head with the end of the federal TVTA Act in 1966. In the new world of Adult Occupational Training the two provincial departments were forced to drop their differences to come to terms with the new federal program.

The International Consequences

- Ottawa's continued drive to centralize, and the ongoing bickering with the provinces spilled over into Canada's foreign policy and international relations in education in a not insignificant manner. The rapidly changing global environment where

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289 Dupré, et al., *Federalism*, p. 75.
290 Dupré, et al., *Federalism*, p. 82.
increased coordination in training could give a country economic advantage did not make allowances for the ongoing feuds of federalism and disputes over jurisdiction.

Opportunities provided by multilateral organizations and by transnational corporations could be snatched or lost. The issues of federalism and training also compounded the federal government’s own woes as Ottawa was also forced to have a hard look at its internal arrangements concerning international representation and training. They were shown to be lacking and confused. There was little cohesion between the international activities of External Affairs and other ministries involved in this field. Lastly, with the new centralization and the publication of Mitchell Sharp’s booklet, historic collaboration between governments on some international training and labour issues gave way to an era in which the federal government pressed for quicker ratification of international regulations. Training, while not the subject of these 1960s international conventions, did come up with the release of the Gill report.

The Changing Multilateral Face of Training – the 1960s

The rapidly changing global environment did not make allowances for the ongoing feuds of federalism and disputes over jurisdiction. Opportunities in this highly charged arena were ephemeral. The issue of training and the international system was closely tied to changes in the International Labour Organization (ILO) throughout the twentieth century. This organization remained the primary establishment in this regard throughout the 1960s. Established in 1919, it set standards and conventions for labour and fixed thresholds for particular skill-sets. External Affairs had overriding authority in the relationship with this organization, but the issues and training questions it dealt with
were quite clearly within the purview of the Ministry of Labour. The "educational" aspects of these questions were continually downplayed in the whole process.

The continued ILO interest in training was manifest in Ottawa as the branch dealing with international labour activities expanded its scope in the early 1960s. It became involved in a wider range of activities that included attending international conferences, evaluating ILO conventions on training and labour conditions, and importantly, coordinating international labour responsibilities within the broader federal jurisdiction. The 1966 Department of Labour report gives an overview of its expanded activities.

[Of the Canadian ILO budget] The greatest amount, 44 per cent was used to assist in manpower organization including vocational training....Numerous Canadian experts were assigned to missions in the developing countries and trainees from these countries were sent to Canada on ILO fellowships....To assist in reporting to ILO on Canadian law and practice compared with ILO standards, the Branch consulted....with a view to the early ratification of a comprehensive package of ILO Conventions, both federal and federal-provincial in content, studies and consultations were continued with the federal and provincial departments concerned.

It was also during this period that the ILO revamped some of its organization and established an international training center in Italy. "During this long twenty-two year period the number of member States doubled....In 1960, the ILO created the International Institute for Labour Studies at its Geneva headquarters, and the International Training Center in Turin in 1965."
The emergence of the OECD also put a new emphasis on the definitions of education, training and their associated international activities. Training had a significant history with the OECD. Despite its ongoing efforts to accommodate all educational viewpoints, the economic priorities of the organization had a significant effect on what it did.

The primacy of the educational constituency as the source and target of activities must in no way be interpreted as serving the narrow interests of an educational lobby, of encouraging isolationism. On the contrary...it has proved useful in demonstrating to educationalists the importance of relating to other sectors of policy and leading them to understand how their own interests, and those of education as part of the body politic, are best served by greater appreciation on their part of these interrelationships.  

The economic priorities of the organization were also evident in the wide-ranging review of science training undertaken in the late 1950s. In several instances, discussion did not center on educating the whole person. Rather, "higher education training systems" were to be studied, and training for the longer-term manpower needs of the economy pursued. Again, efforts continued to be made to widen the scope of views that the organization heard, but the era of increasing technological sophistication also influenced this mindset. The links between what had been previously considered education and a newer definition of education were quite clear. The OECD's new prominence and views on training also got the attention of the bureaucracy and public in Canada.  

Internal Problems

While domestic training disputes and the evolution of multilateral organizations in the field of training had some influence on international relations in this area, the

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296 Papadopoulos, Education 1960, p. 13.
297 Papadopoulos, Education 1960, p. 27.
centralizing federal government also had to contend with jurisdictional sniping over the issue between its own ministries as well. As government organizations expanded their international competencies, and as the definition of education shifted to include a more economic focus, overlapping bureaucracies were created and there was an increase in friction in the federal government.

Ironically, by the late 1960s, there had developed curious parallels with the early years. Numerous agencies were involved in the formulation and execution of different aspects of Canada's foreign policy. Not only did External Affairs, Trade and Commerce and Manpower and Immigration each maintain a separate foreign service, but federal programmes were also being delivered by numerous other departments represented abroad. While a profusion of interdepartmental committees in Ottawa tried to coordinate the efforts of these agencies, and while External Affairs exercised a broad leadership role, in the main each department went about its business within its own policy sphere largely resistant to central coordinative tendencies.299

In 1966, when implementation of the TVTA Act was transferred over to Manpower and Immigration along with some other responsibilities, training was put with another internationally oriented policy area, that of immigration. Both in terms of federal-provincial cooperation and the ongoing worldwide movement of people, immigration remained contentious.300 Despite the increasingly international orientation of the training portfolio that went along with its move to the new department, prospects of closer collaboration with External Affairs did not look any brighter.

No blueprint for broader interagency cooperation emerged. A study prepared in late 1967 found that there was still no framework for coordination, that objectives towards which External Affairs should direct its efforts had not been developed, and that there was no center of authority for formulating and administering a policy on relations with other departments. Careful negotiation did give hope a few months later

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for “a more rational approach” to dealing with the representatives of at least one department, Labour. Still pending, however, were “an examination within this Department of the most effective way of coping with the proliferation of representatives abroad of other government Departments . . . .”\textsuperscript{301}

Departmental collaboration would not significantly change until the arrival of the Trudeau government in 1968. Even then, the ongoing debates over jurisdiction and departmental infighting at the federal level made the whole exercise one in frustration. An economically-focused definition of training had redefined however how the federal government saw Canadian training and education, as well as its international component. The new definition would continue to affect how international activities in education were seen for the foreseeable future.

**Training and Federalism**

Training was for a long time little noticed by practitioners of Canadian foreign policy. Although Mitchell Sharp mentions the ILO and training obliquely in his booklet, by the time of the pamphlet’s publication training’s apologists were still struggling for recognition.

Educational matters. when they involve participants from other governments at an international conference, cease to be purely technical and domestic questions and take on a new dimension, involving foreign policy. The very nature of international affairs is such that it is not possible to divide external relations into one category that relates to “technical” or “provincial” matters and another which deals with “foreign policy.” The work of various UN agencies, such as UNESCO, the ILO...affords ample proof of the political character of international co-operation in technical fields.\textsuperscript{302}

Collaboration with the provinces in the area of training had gone on in a functional way in the past. International relations had been channeled through the federal Department of

\textsuperscript{301}Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s, p. 336.
\textsuperscript{302}Canada, Federalism, p. 12.
Labour. Note the following letter from the 1950s to the federal deputy minister of labour from his provincial counterparts in labour and education.

Dear Dr. MacNamara:
In reply to your letter of March 1 with regard to vocational training of adults, including disabled persons – I.L.O. Conference – the attached comments have been worked out in a joint report by the Labour and Education offices.
We hope these suggestions will be useful to you at the conference....Yours Sincerely...F.S.Rutherford, Deputy Minister of Education and J.B. Metzler, Deputy Minister of Labour\(^\text{303}\)

Preparation for ILO conferences was one aspect of this functional relationship. The movement of “trainees” through the Ontario education system and industrial sites under the auspices of the Columbo Plan and the UN technical assistance administration was another area where the two levels of government collaborated.\(^\text{304}\)

By the late 1960s, the federal government’s centralizing bent led it to press the provinces for change in other aspects of the international structures governing training as they applied to Canada. In particular Ottawa now wanted quick ratification of ILO Conventions. These conventions treated all different aspects of labour and training. By 1970, Canada had signed a total of 24 of the Conventions of the ILO.\(^\text{305}\) In the past, Ottawa had difficulties in getting provincial ratification of those conventions that fell under their jurisdiction.\(^\text{306}\) Training was not the subject of 1960s conventions, however, the issue did come up with the release of the Gill report. Ernest Gill submitted the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Unemployment Insurance Act to the federal government in 1962. While coming in the period of the TVTA Act, Gill’s commission

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\(^{303}\) Rutherford and Metzler to MacNamara, April 4, 1950; Records of the Department of Labor, RG7-61, Box No.8, Folder “I.” ILO, Vocational Training; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

\(^{304}\) R.J. Cudney, Deputy Provincial Secretary to Alice Buscombe, Statistician, Department of Labor, October 19, 1953; Records of the Department of Labor, RG7-61, Box No.7, Folder “I.” ILO, Movement of Trainees File; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
focused on the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1940. The commission made a long list of forty-five recommended changes to that act. In addition to all the other recommended changes, Gill saw that Ottawa was inadequately fulfilling its role in post-training placement of workers. While training and instruction of adults often came from provincial sources, the provinces had also taken on more responsibility for national placement and the overall functioning of the labour force in the early postwar period. Gill now made reference to the federally ratified ILO Convention Eighty-eight. The articles in this convention set out in full what constituted an effective manpower system. By using publication of neglected international regulations to effectively shame the federal government into compliance, Gill unwittingly gave Pearson and the Liberals a tool to further Ottawa's centralizing drive. The federal government, as a result of this and other critical reviews, moved towards establishing better-funded Canadian Manpower Centers in the 1960s and a “vertically” integrated human resources plan. 307 The ratification and implementation of ILO Convention Eighty-eight thus became part of the ongoing disputes over training and manpower policy. The interconnectedness of federalism, international relations and educational “training” activities was becoming very clear. In a sophisticated worldwide environment of multilateral organizations such connectivity would also become increasingly important. 308

.... the Gill committee’s adoption of the ILO model was not without strategic significance: Canada happened to be a signatory to Convention 88. The committee was therefore in a position to urge implementation of a neglected international obligation. 309

The jealous guarding of jurisdictional prerogatives in education and ongoing
suspicion that the federal version of "training" was a Trojan horse designed to
incrementally invade that jurisdiction continued to make for some rougher going in this
area in the latter part of the 1960s. Although education of the "whole person" remained
distinct from the "trained employee" even in the international sphere, Ottawa was now to
play a more substantial role in the direction of both policy areas.

Conclusion

The publication of Mitchell Sharp's booklet, Federalism and International
Conferences on Education represented a significant event in the history of international
relations in education in Canada. It was a public declaration that forthwith Ottawa would
be taking a hands-on approach to the question of educational diplomacy. In broader
terms it was also one peak in eighteen years of increasing centralization on the part of the
federal government across the country. It paid homage to the changed face of the
Canadian nation. The world of the post-industrial society was an age removed from the
interests of the nineteenth century school promoters. The appearance of Sharp's booklet
additionally coincided with a high point in Ottawa's involvement in education. From the
early 1950s, the federal government had increasingly taken on greater fiscal
responsibilities, at the same time succeeding in accomplishing this without stirring up too
much constitutional controversy.

The broadening recognition of the importance of international relations in
education and its federal-provincial implications were also due to the view taken on the
issue within External Affairs. Expansion and reorganization of the bureaucracy in the
postwar era, and on into the 1960s, resulted in the enlargement of the parts of the
organization dealing with "high politics." External Affairs' Focus also turned increasingly towards international education organizations. Changes coming through reorganizations also helped consolidate the advances made within the bureaucratic structure. By 1964, an Educational Liaison Section had been established. Concurrent with the Quebec incidents, bureaucratic change accelerated. There was increased awareness that the activities of provincial governments in the field of international relations needed to be monitored. The establishment of the Coordination Division also augmented federal resources involved in watching provincial activities in this area.

The issue of training and labour was additionally one that was allied to that of international relations in education. For a long time, a philosophical parting of company had characterized the federal/provincial relationship in training. The federal government in general terms saw that people could be trained to work in a specific occupation, while provincial officials instead were concerned with the whole person. This was linked with ongoing federal-provincial squabbles over policy, such as the battles over the TVTA Act, and its successor the Adult Occupational Training Act. It also underlined how far both levels of government had yet to go in effectively squaring their constitutional responsibilities with the new realities of global competition. In terms of international activities in education, the 1960s also saw the emergence of agencies in multilateral organizations that ascribed to the "training" philosophy. Additionally, the emergence of international activities in training contributed to the sniping and confusion that characterized federal ministries who dealt with the question and its foreign policy aspects. Lastly, with the appearance of the Gill report, Ottawa used ILO conventions in an attempt to garner even more policy prerogatives for the central government.
The issues raised in this decade combined federalism, education and diplomacy to a much greater degree than they had in the past. The constitutional arrangements on which the country was founded – now a century old - would continue to scuttle the best efforts of all concerned to find an arrangement that was satisfactory across the country in this area. This, despite a changed society, and a changing definition of education. Moreover, notwithstanding the federal governments’ active intervention into this field, provincial forays and challenges would characterize international education for the foreseeable future.
Chapter 5
New International Challenges

Introduction

The end of the 1960s saw important milestones both in Canadian education and the international activities associated with it. Institutional conflict was addressed by the federal government whose new energy in latter field reached its zenith with the publication of *Federalism and International Conferences on Education*. Two brief retrospective views taken of the school system as it was prior to the late 1960s and as it is in the 1990s underline the changes that came from the outside.

Expansion of the school system was the watchword of 1965, coming hard on the heels of Canada’s national baby boom. Central schools built in great numbers replaced the single room schools from the previous hundred years. By 1975, this boom in construction and the optimism accompanying it had disappeared, replaced with grim prognostications about the future of education and a halt in new initiatives. In the more recent period between the 1980s and the 1990s, outside change was equally visible. Microsoft, IBM, and other international corporations drew local schools and educators into their corporate strategies. As the new millennium approached, teachers and students have become habituated to using personal computer networks. Within a decade it became common to email fellow teachers and students in different schools, to keep in touch with friends and colleagues world-wide, and to connect to their local school from computers at home. When their school computer needed repair or upgrading they could

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take it to an IBM-certified shop with IBM-trained and approved technicians at their
district board office.312

Cursory glances at the changes taking place over a longer time span gives one a
glimpse at the deeper historical transformations that were affecting schooling. Significant
forces on a grand scale were at work. This chapter looks at some of these international
forces, particularly in the earlier period. This broader view will set the stage for
understanding more detailed political issues and how they tested Canadian federalism and
diplomacy in education in the 1970s and early 1980s. Some of the immense international
energies that molded education in these decades operated over long time spans, while
others worked almost overnight. The increasingly interventionist nature and ongoing
change in the international system contributed greatly to the replacement of the earlier
educational reality with one that, while it had continuities with the past, contained many
elements unrecognizable to those present in the earlier time.313

The Vietnam War and the broader contingencies that arose from that conflict
initiated some of the transformations that had unavoidable impacts on Canadian
education. These economic changes, in turn, altered governments’ views towards
education in Canada. Similarly, the enlarged presence of transnational enterprises, and
the increasing mobility of human capital were also forces that had an impact on the
environment in which education, federalism, and diplomacy would operate. Lastly,
more efficient strategies pursued by educational organizations affected the international
circumstances in which Canadian society approached the question of schooling. Outside

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312 This briefly outlines some of the practices of the Upper Grand District Board of Education, 1995-1997. Author’s experiences. The corporation in question could also be any big multi-national computer corporation.
organizations increasingly attempted to influence countries and encourage broader adherence to their goals and to comply with their policies in the 1970s. Together these circumstances helped create the school system of the contemporary era by reorienting Canada's international policies for dealing with education.

Contingencies: The Vietnam War and Economics

Toynbee's quotation "some historians hold that history is one damned thing after another" is a no-nonsense way of saying that the past is more circumstantial than it appears at first sight. Historians who hold this view are only partially right however. This perspective only begins to explain the multi-dimensional nature of the past. It undervalues the surprise when contingency brings the consequences of distant or unconnected events into uncomfortable and often unforgiving juxtaposition in the crucible of the present. Moreover, for this study, it says little about the multiplication in levels of complexity in both governments and in societies as the 1970s opened. In modern times the present is expanding: we are now more than ever aware and in awe of simultaneous events happening around us. This, it is argued, is combined with an increasing lack of awareness of the past. Such a course is perilous and negates the links between the past and present. Toynbee's explanation needs to be supplemented. This is particularly true when one looks at a phenomenon that operates on many different levels, as did the Vietnam War. Characterizing this event, its causes, and the totality of its consequences defies chronology. Historians can only ever hope to present part of the

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313 Desks and the chalkboard would be identifiable elements. Big screen video and all news web-pages would not. See Breisach, Historiography, pp. 3-4.
war dimly. Contingencies link the quarter-century spasm of senseless violence and death that characterized the Vietnam conflict with the shifting sands of education and the agenda of the West.\(^{316}\)

The practicality of thinking in terms of contingency is aptly demonstrated when looking at Vietnam, because the consequences of this war will be with the world for some time to come. Indeed, some historians, economists, and analysts argue that the war will continue to have effects for the foreseeable future. Veterans' benefits are but one obvious example of this. It is possible that they will continue to be paid out well into the 2040s and their total cost will be as much as two hundred and ninety-five percent over and above the original cost of the war.\(^{317}\) This history, it is clear, will leave a big footprint on the future.

The connection between the Vietnam War and the Canadian education system of the 1970s is to be found principally in the economic changes the war caused in the American and world economies of the period.\(^{318}\) These transformations had a profound effect on governments' views towards schooling. Gilpin links the war to global economic changes caused by the United States in the following way.

In the late 1960s, however, the United States began to pursue economic policies that were more self-centered.... Beginning with the escalation of the war in Vietnam and continuing in the Reagan Administration, with its massive budget deficit, the United States exploited its Hegemonic position

\(^{316}\) Contingency is thought of in terms of Gould's description. "A historical explanation does not rest on direct deductions from laws of nature but on an unpredictable sequence of antecedent states where any major change in any step of the sequence would have altered the final result. This final result is therefore dependent or contingent, upon everything that came before – the unerasable and determining signature of history." Stephen Jay Gould, *A Wonderful Life* (New York: Norton, 1990), p. 283.


\(^{318}\) Antiwar demonstrations during the conflict that included university community participation are another important link between the two at a different level. Douglas Ross, *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954-1973* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p. 306.
in ways that released inflationary forces and contributed to global economic instability.\textsuperscript{319}

Inflation was one of the first economic consequences of the conflict in Asia after 1965. Beginning with the Kennedy Administration, and continuing through to the end of Lyndon Johnson's presidency in early 1969, there was a continued and concerted effort to keep the conflict and American domestic economic wellbeing in two separate spheres. Prior to 1965, America and the world were in recovery from earlier economic woes by stimulating the development of their economies through tax cuts. The American government was looking forward to a period of smooth growth; Vietnam was still a distant country and as of yet of minor importance.\textsuperscript{320}

Ever-higher price levels became a more significant issue as increasing amounts of money were spent on the war, a trend that accelerated when the decision was taken to broaden the conflict.\textsuperscript{321} Prices climbed as the demands of a wartime economy became felt. The contradiction between these demands and the domestic programs of Johnson’s “Great Society” became unavoidable. The “Great Society” was a package of spending designed to deal with pressing social problems such as poverty in the cities and, notably, education reform. The Great Society became a target for successive Congressional changes and cuts. President Johnson foresaw this type of resistance and wanted to overcome it. The money transferred from the anti-poverty program to military expenditures fueled the inflationary cycle however. In effect, inequities persisted and

military costs spiraled out of control. Campagna notes the effects of military spending over the longer term.

After a long period of price stability, inflation revived in 1965.... National defense obligations also rose sharply in the same quarter by about eight percent or by 33 percent at an annual rate. While this concurrence seems extraordinary, there is widespread agreement that the inflation of the next decade began here and was a direct result of increased military spending.\(^\text{322}\)

Others, notably Seymour Melman, have argued that having the American economy on a wartime footing was not an accident of the Vietnam War. Rather, it was a permanent fixture of the Cold War, and military expenditures originating with this conflict outstripped all others, including the value of all other American assets in this era.\(^\text{323}\) The ultimate characterization of America’s economy remains subject to interpretation, but unquestionably, large increases in military spending substantially changed the economic face of America in the late 1960s.

The overheated American economy initially acted as one spur in the development of Canada’s education system. As the United States saw increased demand for goods and services, demand for Canadian goods also shot upwards, contributing to economic developments north of the forty-ninth parallel. Gonik illustrates its impact on the Canadian economy, starting with the latter part of the 1960s. By helping to speed up the economy, the war had an impact on government spending and on education.

The cumulative effect of these diverse trends was bound to result in a new burst of investment, the first since the mid-1950s. But while the ultimate effect of capital investment is an enlarged productive capacity capable of accommodating a larger demand for goods, the immediate effect is to add to the inflationary pressures just beginning to emerge. The sudden explosion of investment in new plant and equipment created shortages of


materials and of certain kinds of labour, resulting in major cost increases that were soon to work their way through the economy.... Vast expansions also occurred in housing, schools, universities, roads, hospitals and the like... Dramatic price rises occurred ...in 1965, and they soon spread throughout the economy until the inflation became widespread.\(^{324}\)

Although the added demand had positive benefits on both sides of the border, it quickly became apparent that the inflationary surge that accompanied it was not going to slow down. Once this realization sank in, governments started to look for a solution to the problem.

While the quest for something to ease inflation sent authorities running off in many directions, it was clear that the directions being taken to avoid the consequences of the war were increasingly ominous for education. In the United States, inflation brought with it a massive trade deficit. Soon after the inauguration of Richard Nixon, economic policies pursued by the new administration resulted in an economic downturn just as the government wanted and just as it started to withdraw from Southeast Asia. Economists and government officials thought that the end of the war and the slowing down of the economy would put a brake on inflation. However, to their surprise, this was not the case.\(^ {325}\) As the inflation bubble continued to expand, governments tried to correct the situation with greater intervention. This resulted in wage and price controls and the devaluation of the currency.

Despite the awareness that the world had changed, senior American economic officials did not include the Vietnam conflict among the causes of the change.\(^ {326}\) Rather, they saw the world in terms of the "temporary pause," as noted by Hobsbawm.

\(^{325}\) Stevens, *Vain*, p. 113. & p. 192.
\(^{326}\) Stevens, *Vain*, p. 116.
...the Golden Age [1947-1973] had, for the first time in history created a single increasingly integrated and universal world economy largely operating across state frontiers ('transnationally') and therefore also increasingly across the frontiers of state ideology....Initially the troubles of the 1970s were seen only as a hopefully, temporary pause in the Great Leap Forward of the world economy. Increasingly, it became clear that this was an era of long-term difficulties, for which capitalist countries sought radical solutions, often by following secular theologians of the unrestricted free market.... The basic units of politics themselves, the territorial, sovereign and independent 'nation-states', including the oldest and stablest found themselves pulled apart by forces of a supranational or transnational economy, and by the infranational forces of secessionist regions and ethnic groups....

Hobsbawm later mentions Vietnam and specifies the economic connection, but those in the highest circles of American government were more apt to attribute the rundown of the economic system to the unfairness of "foreigners" and to short-lived aberrations.

While the United States played havoc with the international economic system, the bad news for educationalists continued. Concern mounted amongst those charged with governing and financing education in Canada.

As a result of its unfavorable balance of payments and increasing inflation, the United States felt that it was absolutely necessary to change its relationship with the international economic system. The Nixon Administration's adjustment to the relationship caused a shock wave that reverberated throughout the decade. In August 1971, a decision was taken to abandon the fixed conversion exchange system based on the dollar. In associated measures, a ten-percent tariff was levied on all goods entering

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128 Stevens, Vain, p. 116.
130 Not only was the shock in the markets. The events of the early 1970s are seen by many as the watershed markers between the "Fordist" system of production, and the emergence of "post-industrial, post-modern,"
into the United States. Prior to this, the American economic system dominated the post-war world and financed its endeavors in American dollars. Gilpin takes note of this.

During this period the United States ran its foreign policy largely on credit by taking advantage of its role as world banker. It printed money to finance its world position, a tactic similar to the British issuance of “sterling balances” that British colonies and dependencies had once been required to hold.\textsuperscript{331}

Worse scenarios were also contemplated however. Secretary of the Treasury John Connolly’s aborted plan to eliminate the Auto-Pact was one such Canadian nightmare.\textsuperscript{332}

In the latter part of the 1970s, the emergence of an unregulated international monetary system that followed American actions created an environment that, in terms of Canadian education, changed the underlying certainties by which many provincial economies operated. Inflation, deflation and currency speculation were some of the broader economic problems that came out of the international changes. Expenditures were transferred as a percentage from education to other areas (i.e. policing, social welfare, healthcare, etc.) despite increasing real term dollar figures.\textsuperscript{333} Both the specters and the realities of the times added tension to federal-provincial relations and this spilled over into policy areas such as education. The expansion of the school system that symbolized the 1960s was now a thing of the past.

Following quickly on the heels of the inflation caused by the Vietnam War, and the devaluation of the United States dollar, other unexpected intersections of contemporary history - other contingencies - also influenced the disposition of

\textsuperscript{331}Gilpin, \textit{The Political}, p. 136.
\textsuperscript{332}The termination of the Auto Pact was a very near thing, only held up by a sharp eyed American bureaucrat. See Granatstein and Bothwell, \textit{Pirouette}, pp. 65-71.
governments of industrialized countries towards education. As a result of the oil-crisis of 1973, Western states' existing economic arrangements became exposed and vulnerable. The rise in oil prices was, at least for OPEC states, a peculiar sort of payback. Campagna looks at the oil crisis, and at the Vietnam War. He argues that aside from the foreign policy questions and the immediacy of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and neighboring Arab states, oil price increases had a purely practical economic function. The hike in prices was partially designed to regain some of the purchasing power that oil producing countries had progressively lost due to the rising price of imported goods from the United States and other inflated economies coming out of the Vietnam era. Oil wars, being the offspring of several hot wars, were also disruptive to the education systems of the West and Canada.

The oil crisis brought to an end the Western optimism that had characterized the previous two decades. For the first time since the Second World War, the idea of scarcity began to return to economic thinking. Governments in the 1970s were thoroughly chastened by their dependence on Arab oil. The implication for Canadian federalism was discord and hostility. Provincial governments and Ottawa heatedly debated the new state of affairs. Papadopoulus summarizes the oil crisis and its impact on education systems in member OECD states.

The turning point was the onset of the 1973-75 recession, consequent on the first oil shock. Overall educational expansion had been slowing down in many countries for some years, and this was perhaps inevitable after the hectic rate of growth in the fifties and sixties... This combination of resource constraints, high unemployment and demographic downturn had a direct impact on the demand for education as well as on the perception

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334 The OPEC crisis equaled the end of "cheap energy." Green, Education, p. 12.
335 Campagna, The Economic, p.118.
of its role and of its contribution to social and economic development....
the educational debate became increasingly politicised.\textsuperscript{337}

In the face of an increasingly adverse economic tide, foreign policy priorities and
ministry of education goals shifted. In Canada, interest in international education
questions that previously peaked with the publication of Mitchell Sharp's 1968 booklet,
waned. Instead, the Department of External Affairs became intensely focused on
continental integration,\textsuperscript{338} global economic trends,\textsuperscript{339} and on interdepartmental power
struggles over energy policy.\textsuperscript{340} At the same time, provincial education administrators
had at the top of their priorities upkeep of the vast educational state that they had just
labored to expand.\textsuperscript{341} In broader federal-provincial terms, the oil embargoes also
increased sparring between Alberta and Ottawa in the mid-1970s. This, in turn,
heightened the general enmity between the two levels of government.

One more significant but under-appreciated economic event that would alter the
view towards education in the West was the start of the Tokyo Round of GATT
negotiations in 1973.\textsuperscript{342} On the surface, these discussions were designed to regularize
international trade regulations. The negotiations were also designed to the deal with the
problem of national governments intervening in the workings of their own economies

\textsuperscript{337} Papadopoulos, \textit{Education 1960}, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{338}While there was increased emphasis on Canadian-American relations, there remained a curious
"disconnect" in public between the critical examination of American foreign policy, and American
international economic policy. Vietnam was not seen as a crucial factor in all the economic changes. See,
Ross, \textit{In the Interests}, pp. 327-328.
\textsuperscript{339}Canada, External Affairs, \textit{Annual Review}(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1973), p.27 gives an overview of the
move towards the "Third Option," and Canada, External Affairs, \textit{Annual Review}(Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1974), pp. 2-3., gives a highlighted discussion of the global state of affairs. External Affairs' world
had (suddenly!) become a busy place!
\textsuperscript{340}Granatstein and Bothwell, \textit{Pirouette}, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{341}Dennis Dibski, "Financing Education," \textit{Social Change and Education}, eds. Ratna Ghosh and Douglas
Ray( Toronto: Harcourt Brace; 1995), p. 76. See also, Lawton, \textit{et al}, \textit{The Cost of Controlling the Cost of
Education Canada}(Toronto: OISE, 1983). In some cases educational authorities also started to contract the
educational state.
\textsuperscript{342}This was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT). Gilpin, \textit{The Political}, p. 195.
and, at the same time, to address their increasing need to be part of an international system that was interdependent in terms of the flow of commerce around the planet.\(^{343}\)

While the Tokyo Round dealt with technical issues, the groundwork was laid to deal with service industries and questions such as "training" (i.e. education) in future years.

The key paradigm shift that had tied education more closely to economic factors of production came with the move to discuss non-tariff issues and common codes of conduct. Non-tariff and code questions at Tokyo included government procurement, health care subsidies and pricing policies of government run liquor control boards.\(^{344}\)

This list would grow. Equally significant was the fact that as the GATT discussions started to deal with non-tariff issues there was increasing room for federal-provincial discord and for provincial governments to fall out of line with national policies. Much of what would be discussed in the non-tariff category would fall under provincial jurisdiction.\(^{345}\)

The changing orientation of the global trade regime reflected economists' continued efforts to champion education as a factor in international competitiveness. The following description of Japanese macro-economic policy reflected these views.

The Japanese and certain of the NICs have been exceptionally successful in their use of macropolicy. These economies have pursued remarkable growth-oriented fiscal and monetary policies, have made substantial investments in education and have encouraged exceptionally high rates of national savings. The thrust of these policies has been to accumulate the basic factors of production and increase the overall efficiency of the economy. It is correct to conclude, therefore, that this type of "macroindustrial" policy and state intervention works. Japan and a number of other societies have also pursued compensatory policies with a considerable degree of economic success.\(^{346}\)

\(^{343}\)Gilpin, The Political, p. 196.
\(^{344}\)Finlayson, "Canadian," p. 34.
\(^{345}\)Finlayson, "Canadian," p. 34.
\(^{346}\)Gilpin, The Political, p. 213.
For governments around the world who listened to this type of account, the popular view was that education was no longer aimed at the whole person. Rather, the new view of education conceived of students as a factor of production which would produce economic results. Economists wanted educators to focus on the purely "economic benefits" of education and training in the increasingly cutthroat environment of the 1970s. Western governments participating in the GATT process in the period following the Tokyo Round accepted these views. It was in the Japanese capital, however, that participants were first given indications that government "factors of production" would soon be the subject of future discussions.

Several external events - America's catastrophic war in Vietnam, the economic fallout of the war, the oil crisis that came quickly on its heels, and the shifting perception of education as a factor in international economic policy - helped induce the shift in governmental attitudes towards education in the early 1970s. These developments clearly altered the direction in which Canadian education was headed. In the world that was emerging, federal-provincial relations would be more fractious. The goals of diplomacy in education would increasingly reflect the move towards economic imperatives.

**Transnational Corporations and Human Capital**

The forces of international economics and war changed the realities of education, however, internationally, education was also influenced by the increasing prominence of multinational corporations. These transnational enterprises had been around for a long time by the 1970s. They also had a lengthy record of operations in Canada that extended

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back several centuries. They, particularly the Hudson's Bay Company, were also influential in education. By the 1970s, while no longer directly involved in running schools, transnational corporations were much more numerous, financially persuasive, and had increasingly global influence. They were also becoming more significant in the operation of Canada's regional economies and local education systems. Lastly, they also influenced the movement of human capital.

The enhanced reach of transnational corporations also made them influential in Canada. Indeed, one author saw them as becoming coequal with governments.

My conviction two decades ago was "that the manifest technical advantages of large enterprises and of strong governments will lead men in the future to insist on both."

Things did not quite work out according to Raymond Vernon's original idea, however, transnational organizations' penetration of markets resulted in an increasing homogenization of goods and, to a lesser extent, world-wide culture during this period. Because of their economic influence and new energy, multi-national corporations were of rising significance but, notwithstanding their fresh importance in the global system, their growth went through some ups and downs. Their expansion was greatly affected in the

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348In a manner much more open than are present transnational corporations, the Hudson Bay Company was deeply involved in schooling in the nineteenth century. It established schools in Manitoba and British Columbia prior to Confederation. The ultimate supervision of these schools was at the company's headquarters in London, England. Manoly R. Lupul, "Education in Western Canada Before 1873," Canadian Education: A History, eds. Donald Wilson, et al (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 247.
latter part of the 1970s by governments which nationalized external holdings inside their borders.352

Multi-national corporations were a reinvigorated force of huge proportions despite obstacles to their new ascendency. Eden argues that three factors characterized their development in this period in theoretical terms: convergence, synchronization and inter-penetration.353 Convergence was the increasing trend within the most economically advanced states to bring production, financial and technology structures to an equal standard.354 Eden saw education as one of the factors of production, although “bringing it to an equal standard” in the countries of the West or world-wide was a much trickier proposition.355 Of similar importance was synchronization. In the past, cycles of business fluctuated in different parts of the world and did not have substantial impacts on other economies. By the 1970s however, business cycles of the industrialized Western states moved beyond their national foundations.356 Finally, inter-penetration which refers to

the growing importance of trade, investment and technology flows, both inwards and outwards, within each domestic economy357

was significant in the development of transnational corporations’ policies towards labor and education in specific states. These factors moved transnational corporations to a more

353This section draws heavily from Lorraine Eden’s work.
355The movement towards comparative achievement statistics is very much oriented towards developing a picture of education in the West. Partially this is to encourage convergence, however they are often used to point to the superior educational performance of other states, not taking into account other differences.
357Eden, “Bringing,” p. 46.
planetary level of operations and increased the pressure on individual governments to conform to their expectations.

Not only did American, European, and Japanese corporations spread out during this era and develop truly global reach, they also became more involved in the development of regional and sub-national economies. In Canada's case, the presence of so many provincial governments made this a challenging undertaking.

The power of the provinces is disturbing for private sector companies and multinational enterprises. Decentralization of power to the provinces means an increase in the costs of doing business. Corporations must learn to staff offices and acquire information about eleven governments instead of one. They also have to respond to eleven types of regulations and bureaucratic environments.... there is ongoing tension between federal and provincial powers over the economy.358

Multinational corporations nevertheless still became a visible part of provincial economies by the 1970s. For the most part, the establishment of a local head office and plant, or in more remote locations, resource extraction facilities, characterized their appearance. In practical terms, all these activities had some impact on local education structures. They drew people to work in plants and changed the composition of local schools. They sometimes resulted in the construction of new schools as well.

Transnational corporations were also attracted to Canadian provinces where there were highly skilled labor forces, able to innovate and usually supported by sophisticated education systems.359

Although the Department of External Affairs, the Council of Ministers of Education and governments across the country did not have educational “Missions”, in

the diplomatic sense, to the world headquarters of IBM, McGraw-Hill or Shell, the increasingly persuasive presence of these organizations in Canada started to influence the direction of education and schooling. Books, computers, and the physical plant of schools came under the sway of the international marketplace starting in the 1970s. Multinational corporations, although influential through their increasingly persuasive presence in the market, were less likely to be supportive of the education sector, particularly universities, with direct funding. When they did fund something, it was usually to put themselves in the best public light, and more often than not, funding went to building projects. As well, decisions made in transnational head-offices abroad started to have an impact beyond just Canadian regions and provincial governments. They affected the choices Canadian school systems made in terms of the necessities for the school year.

Although the role of teachers and consultants was not only to teach, but also to create curriculum, the reality of the educational day and year in many cases made it much easier to purchase off the shelf resources from specialist international enterprises. Similarly with literature and books, the time factor made educators less likely to pursue alternatives in their own community. Local authors, regardless of their quality, don’t get the same exposure as authors in commercial book club flyers or in promotional material sent to school libraries. Supplies were often purchased from commercial organizations that were considered local. The broader global linkages of these companies did not figure into boards of educations’ equations. As noted at the beginning of this chapter and in this author’s experience, this trend continued so that by the 1980s and 1990s local

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boards of education negotiated agreements with multinational computer corporations for exclusive access to sales and maintenance of computers systems in their jurisdictions. International business was through the decades increasingly successful in seeking entry into the education system and molding educational priorities.

An additional transformation stemming from the international system that would affect Canadian education, and thus Canada's posture towards diplomacy in education, was the increasing mobility of "human capital" during the 1970s. While changes in transportation made borders more porous for many, two principal groups comprised what was normally termed human capital. Multinational corporations, Sklair argues, encouraged one segment of the newly footloose through their fostering of a transnational class.

The transnational capitalist class (TCC) is transnational in at least three senses. Its members tend to have global rather than local perspectives on a variety of issues; they tend to be people from many countries, more and more of whom begin to consider themselves "citizens of the world" as well as their places of birth...

At the same time, Hobsbawm points to the increased international transience of university students in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

These masses of young men and women and their teachers...were a novel factor in both culture and politics.... They were transnational, moving and communicating ideas and experiences across frontiers with ease and speed

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and were probably more at ease than governments with the technology of communications.  

Thus, national education systems were suddenly greeting bigger and new international constituencies for their programs. Students from other countries, and international corporations that wished to obtain the most well educated managers could shop globally for education systems that best suited their needs. In Canada, the implications for Canadian education systems and federalism were several. The amount of human capital in Canada as a whole and in individual provinces was not only being educated for the country, but a certain percentage would work and live abroad. Undergraduates from all over the world came to Canada, completed their university education and returned to their country of origin for their career. Education in Canada became at all levels, first at the tertiary level, but also to an increasing extent at the primary and secondary levels, a question with international implications. Competition between provinces and universities for the best faculty was no longer just internal, nor was it completely national, but in some cases, it started to develop a continental and international character as well.

The growing ease with which some people could cross borders as students, the “business class,” and as immigrants provided formidable challenges that would pressure national foreign policy officials, immigration officials, and provincial education

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364Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 298.  
366This brought up the continued issue of transferability and equivalence of qualifications.  
367There was also the opposite concern in the mid-1970s. Too many foreign faculty, particularly American, quickly raised concerns of a more restrictive nature.
authorities to work in unison throughout the decade.\textsuperscript{368} International educational organizations were the third outside force that had an impact on education in Canada.

\textbf{International Education Organizations}

While economic forces affected the environment in which education, and subsequently its diplomacy were conducted, education organizations’ enhanced role also contributed to the new reality in education in a significant and sophisticated way. Green argues that their contribution came concurrently with the economic changes of the early 1970s.

The last 20 years have been an exceptional period for international traffic in educational ideas.

There are a number of reasons for this, including the work of international agencies such as the OECD, CEDEFOP, the World Bank, and the EU, and also the proliferation of educational exchanges among staff and policy-makers. Perhaps most significant, however, has been the intensification of economic competition between nations and the perception by governments the world over of the importance of education and training for economic advance. The current wave of policy borrowing in the advanced nations appears to have begun in the mid-1970s just as governments were facing common problems of recession and mass unemployment.\textsuperscript{369}

Green defends the place of the nation state in the evolution of international relations in the longer run. He is also clearly concerned about the nature of globalization and the ongoing process of state formation. The issue of the nation-state’s long run survival is still very much in question and hotly debated. In this disputed environment, Green identifies international organizations as being among the key players in the expansion of the international discourse in education.

\textsuperscript{368}This acknowledges that the barriers to mobility also continued to be very high for the majority of immigrants during this era. The primary barriers were financial and ideological. Harold Troper, “Canada’s Immigration Policy,” pp. 272-274.

\textsuperscript{369}Green, \textit{Education}, p. 173.
The changes that international education agencies now deemed necessary were not imposed through an enforced system of compliance, rather, these organizations, to a greater extent than ever before, counted on their new-found role as dispensers of legitimacy. States, in the majority, wanted to have the reputation as being countries that were working within the framework of international standards. Thus, member countries within international organizations were quick to apply new regulations to their own jurisdictions. McNeely uses the notion of "progress" to illustrate this.

Thus, for example, as the world polity confers "progress" as a major aspect of the state, it [the state] constructs "proper" strategies for pursuing and accounting for it.\textsuperscript{370}

International education organizations were not always successful in this process, as was witnessed with the spectacular breaks that the United States and the United Kingdom made with UNESCO in the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{371}

"Legitimacy granting" was thus a new tool brought into play by these agencies to influence states. Its mechanisms included requirements for legal ratification of international regulations under state constitutions, scrutiny and review of local national conditions, reporting on those conditions to the ever more sophisticated and critical publics, and the establishment of regional centers of expertise and technological demonstration projects.

Another way that "technical experts" and international organizations influenced states' education systems is described by Finnemore through what she calls "the teaching function."


\textsuperscript{371}There were without question a lot of different factors at work in these events: the state not following the international organization's prescriptions being only one of them.
Technical experts provide a particularly good illustration of the way in which international organizations act to enhance diffusion of world polity institutional prescriptions. Working through international organizations, they "teach" states to value and adhere to certain policies, practices, and structures as legitimate and appropriate aspects of statehood.\(^{372}\)

While her examples derive primarily from the developing world and she acknowledges a bias towards international organizations, her contribution underlines the new assertiveness of world-wide education agencies during the 1970s.\(^{373}\)

In concert with international education organizations, regional economic and educational organizations were also acting in the field by giving impetus to change in educational systems. The OECD, being the obvious example, will be looked at momentarily. First, however, another example will illustrate the range of options pursued in effecting change in state systems. In Southeast Asia, organizations such as ASEAN and SEAMEO encouraged development and became more interventionist in the field of education from their foundation in the late 1960s.\(^{374}\) SEAMEO was established in 1965, while ASEAN was set up in 1967.\(^{375}\) SEAMEO immediately became deeply involved in various aspects of education, while ASEAN became more involved in the 1970s. Newly emerging nations had to set out survival strategies in a world that had been indifferent and hostile at the time of their birth.

... the situation confronting the new industrial economies of the Pacific Rim (the Tigers), which industrialized in the second half of the twentieth century, was even more daunting. They faced competition in world markets not only from Britain and the USA, but also from the second-

\(^{372}\) Finnemore in McNeely. McNeely, *Constructing*, p. 35.
wave countries such as Germany and Japan. This had a profound effect on the way in which the relationship between the education systems and the productive systems developed.376

The need for Southeast Asian nations to find like nations in similar circumstances was thus overpowering. The need to share educational resources in the face of the onslaught of the outside world was also at a very fundamental level keenly felt. State formation in the "Tigers" was thus extremely closely tied to the development of education systems.377

Collaboratively the representatives of SEAMEO and ASEAN responded to the standard that Japan and particularly Singapore set for education in Southeast Asia. They were determined to emulate the examples of these ascendant states.378 Both the tiny city-state and the reborn constitutional monarchy were par excellence examples of state formation in overdrive.379 Singapore quickly became a hub of ASEAN and SEAMEO efforts as it had the most advanced education and training system among the newly industrialized countries of the region. The goals of Singaporean education in the 1960s underscored this hyper-activity.

The first was to establish a sense of national identity and commitment, and the second was to sustain the development of the economy. The political leaders saw it as their task to ensure that, as industry developed, the human capital was in place to make effective use of the physical capital. The result was a very close relationship between the education and productive systems.380

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379Singapore is a complex example that combines the very hard-nosed political calculus of its founder Lee Quan Yew, a strict almost Confucian society, and an incredible capacity to work. Rolf Vente and Chow Kit Bocy, *Education and Training for Industrial Development* (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1984), p. 91.
The Singaporean education system and economy went through several phases. In the first phase, elementary education and low wage jobs were key to the city-state’s success. This was followed by a period in which the country moved away from basic industrial production to more value added products. This had a significant effect on the country’s education system.

In order to attract the higher-value-added industries required for the second phase, the education system was upgraded and a new training infrastructure put in place under the auspices of the Vocational and Industrial Training Board (VITB) while within the education system there was an attempt to shift the emphasis of the curriculum away from the academic to the technical. The government [also] adopted a second front and sought to act directly on the employed adult labour force to improve the basic skills of those already in work, launching a series of programmes aimed at enhancing the skills of mature workers.  

Regional education organizations absorbed this model and, through it, helped area governments augment their educational expertise in a variety of areas. SEAMEO and ASEAN established Singapore as a hub for training through several regional ASEAN award schemes and other incentives.

The development of regional education organizations and centers of specialization in Asia did not happen without implications for Canada. Canada did not enter into a relationship with these organizations until much later and multinational centers of excellence were not a feature of the North American educational landscape. There was no North American Ministers of Education Organization. Despite the differences, the intensity of the Asian effort, the noticeable results in the development of the Tiger economies, and the continued hyping of both the economic and educational achievements

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381 Ashton and Sung, “Education.” p.211.
383 Vente and Boey, Education and Training, p. 102.
of the region by economic theorists and international business increasingly gained the attention of Canadian policy makers in the 1970s. The view that there was a link between education and economic profitably was reinforced yet again. The consensus that education must be further integrated into the economic cycle in order to be competitive globally was also gaining ground.

The OECD Country Study Process

World-wide, international education organizations were becoming more effective in their dealings with nation-states and were using more sophisticated tools to shape and encourage change in education systems in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Asian Organizations were some of the most intensely focused in this respect. The increasing competence of organizations in pursuing their strategies in the North American and European context became evident through the development and the implementation of the OECD National Reviews of Education process.

The OECD’s tools for molding education systems, as noted previously, derived from the OECD’s interest in economic productivity. Education was not mentioned in the original 1960 OECD Convention.

There is no explicit reference in the OECD Convention to education being among the concerns and purposes of the Organization. The nearest it comes to getting such a reference is in Article 2(b), on policies designed to promote the development of Member countries' resources in science and technology, encourage research “and promote vocational training.”

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385 UNESCO’s development and size put it in a class of its own. It also had a more ambiguous position and legacy by the 1970s. See, Richard Hoggart, An Idea and its Servants: UNESCO from Within (London: Chatto and Windus, 1978).

386 See Chapter 4.

387 Papadopoulos, Education, p. 11.
From this inauspicious start, education gradually took on a more important role in the agency's work.\textsuperscript{388} Partially it derived from the self-conscious view that the organization had of itself and its mission.

With the [joining of] the US, Canada and Japan, and, later, Australia, New Zealand and Finland, the Organization more than doubled its economic gravity. It now produced more than two-thirds of the world's goods and accounted for more than four-fifths of this trade. In purely economic terms, it represented a greater proportion of world wealth and productive capacity in one co-ordinated economic body than had ever been seen, or is likely to be seen again.... the atmosphere of the OECD in the 1960s and early 1970s was electric with enthusiasm, heady with a sense of universal responsibility.\textsuperscript{389}

This "sense of responsibility" was formalized into a policy on education because effective education systems were seen as essential to maintaining the economic gains that member countries made in the 1960s. Education's inclusion in the agency's brief was also derived from the OECD's tendency to feel free to criticize all government policy.

...it has evolved a style. Independent, it criticizes less-than-best practices in members and non-members alike.... countries had held up publication of their Economic Surveys for months trying to persuade their peers of a different tone or prescription – only sometimes successfully...\textsuperscript{390}

The use of surveys of national education systems as an instrument to evaluate their development and promote change became a possibility after reorganizations were made in the structure and the allocation of resources at OECD headquarters. In common with several international education organizations (such as UNESCO), the agency developed distinct educational research "programs" throughout the 1960s.

The educational activities of the OECD come under four distinct programmes. Two of these – that of the Education Committee (EDC) and that of the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) – are the core programmes which deal with the full range of educational issues.

\textsuperscript{389}Sullivan, \textit{From}, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{390}Sullivan, \textit{From}, p. 49.
and are controlled by intergovernmental bodies in which all Member countries participate. The other two are more specialised programmes, one dealing with Education Building (PEB) and the other with problems of Institutional Management in Higher Education (IMHE), with more limited country membership, in the case of PEB, and mainly institution-based membership and finance in the case of IMHE.\footnote{Papadopoulos, \textit{Education}, p. 15.}

These programs encouraged understanding of ways in which education systems could be tied more tightly into the productivity of developed states.

The development of the OECD's surveys of education systems also built on the organization's initial commitment to examine scientific institutions in member countries. In the early part of the 1960s there was a great deal of interest in the scientific and technical side of state formation.\footnote{Canada participated in one of these reviews early on. It was focused specifically on higher education, science and technology. OECD, \textit{Training And Demand For High-Level Scientific And Technical Personnel in Canada} (Paris: OECD, 1966).} The organization wanted to look at national training structures for science in order to encourage their orderly development. Scientific training turned out to be the tip of the iceberg, however.

Over time these reviews have evolved into a permanent and powerful instrument of the organization's educational work. Their techniques and function have remained practically the same, but their scope and coverage have been considerably enlarged. The turning point came in the early sixties with the spread of national educational planning itself stimulated by the OECD, resulting in the preparation of national plan documents which provided a much more solid foundation for reviewing country policies.\footnote{Papadopoulos, \textit{Education}, p. 25.}

As country scientific and technical reviews evolved into education “Reviews,” the Task Force on Education provided administrative leadership for the process. This organization selected Examiners who conducted country studies and presented final reports both to the country in question and to the OECD at the Château de la Muette in Paris, the
organization's headquarters. At a final "confrontation" meeting between the Examiners and a delegation from the country in question, a summary of the Examiners findings was given. During this presentation, aspects of the education system in question were brought forward and discussed. Critical commentary would often follow. After this session, the final report of the Examiners would be published along with a summary of the meeting.

When the OECD conducted its first series of broader surveys in Europe, it demonstrated the power of the Country Review as an instrument to examine distinct components of education systems. National governments in member countries had different ways of doing things and the Reviews highlighted those differences. Underlying the contrasts however, the OECD Reviews emphasized commonalities between the member states. One of the themes that was hammered away at was the important role of an education system in a competitive economy. The continuing emphasis on this theme and how to strengthen the ties between the two spheres was one way in which this organization attempted to reshape the environment for national education systems.

The OECD reports have always emphasized the importance of education in the economy. The Irish Review of 1966 (published 1969) related how Ireland had been making a systematic effort to develop her economy. "Educational progress, as the cornerstone of this effort, is meant to ensure that Ireland will benefit fully from the fruits of economic and technical progress."

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394 Sullivan, From, pp. 70-71.
Subsequent Reviews also emphasized the economic aspect of education. The message, the "legitimacy granting" subtext, was simple. States either had to get on side with the economics/education connection, or risk being deemed "less effective" and thus have less legitimacy in world affairs.

Another component of national education systems that OECD Reviews examined with the aim of encouraging change was the educational economic planning process. In so doing, the OECD was able to encourage broader visions and longer term time horizons for planning. By the 1970s, the planning model had moved through several degrees of sophistication. Initially, the one to one relationship between economics and education was emphasized. The Dutch experience was illustrative.

The Dutch, as represented in their review held in 1969, were concerned to make society more productive through education. This theme was certainly not abandoned by the time of the 1976 review but the broadening of both the goals and the techniques of planning in the intervening years is clearly evident from the 1975 Contours Plan. ...The Contours Plan in 1975 was seen...in contrast, as an attempt to see education as a whole. It was commended as an approach for other countries.397

In the longer run, planning goals became more socially oriented, but the emphasis on productivity continued to provide an underlying focus for the process. Kogan emphasized this.

In rehearsing these changes of emphasis from the quantitative to the qualitative mode and from the economic to the political, it should be recognized that national planning systems always must take a view of the patterns of expenditure.398

397Kogan, Education, pp. 36-37.
398Kogan, Education, p. 37.
The evidence that the OECD was also pursuing an examination of political arrangements came with the Review's new focus on governance.\textsuperscript{399} The emphasis on government was at its very foundation something that educational organizations had not done before. Perhaps this sprung from the original non-educational, but economic mission of the OECD. In the Reviews, examiners often focused on the structural nature of educational governance, and the level of participation in government. Reviews continued throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The jurisdictional issues of the relationship between the German Federal and provincial governments, the similar problems experienced in Canada and Australia, are themes which are partly but not wholly independent from the new demands for participation. In Holland, however, the "structural pluralism" entailed in the distributions of rights to different confession and other groups led the examiners to comment on the dangers of authoritarianism that might develop when smaller groups rather than the whole national authority have a determinant say.\textsuperscript{400}

For Canada, the evaluation of governance represented a critical test.

Educationalists found themselves in a situation not unlike a traffic accident and the distortion of one's temporal reality that accompanies its associated events. That is to say, split second events seemed to take infinite amounts of time. The political elites could foresee the political aspect of the Reviews as they were undertaken in other OECD member countries. This early indication that something was happening was reinforced when the invitation to participate in the Review appeared. Lastly, when it was too late, the focus on governance could be seen up close as the Review process got underway. As with novices in any process. Canadian education leaders went into it with their eyes open, but without the wisdom that they later gained from the journey. The OECD Review, in

\textsuperscript{399}The emphasis on politics was not so much an overt policy, but rather inherent in the focus on governance.
\textsuperscript{400}Kogan, Education, p. 38.
contrast to the non-intrusive tone set by international organizations in their conferences on education in earlier decades, was the first real occasion on which the governance of Canadian education was critically examined from the outside. 401

When the OECD approached Canada concerning the possibility of a national evaluation, it quickly became apparent that all aspects of the Review process would play a part in shaping the future face of Canadian education. Canada was prepared to submit to the evaluations of the OECD Review. It came up as a possible choice for the Education Committee to consider with the expansion of the OECD and the completion of many of the Reviews in Europe. 402 The reputation of the process was also spreading and becoming increasingly popular with states outside the initial membership group at this stage. Peer pressure, and pressure from non-members made the initial invitation to participate in the Review all the more difficult to resist. Accepting or declining an invitation would have repercussions either way.

The shakeup in Canadian education that the OECD Review process provoked was evident from the first political and administrative hurdles. Note the initial careful crafting of the response of the Council of Ministers to the invitation to participate.

Regarding the proposed OECD review of education policies in Canada, there was consensus about the usefulness of such a study. On motion by the Honourable Guy Saint-Pierre, seconded by Mr. Hanley, it was decided to set up a task force of 3 to 5 members, chosen on a regionally representative basis to assume responsibility for the realization of the study. However, since a similar project was now underway in another federal country (West Germany) it was suggested to defer decision on the points of focus for the study until a comparison with the German experience was possible. It was moved by Mr. Saint-Pierre and seconded

401 Participation in the UNESCO and Commonwealth processes of writing annual reports was not in the same way critical of the “national” system.
402 The OECD became less overwhelmingly a Western European organization, and more a “developed countries” club in the mid and latter part of the 1960s with the admission to membership of Japan, Australia, Finland, and New Zealand. Sullivan, From, pp. 30-33.
by Mr. Hanley that the Secretary of State for External Affairs should be advised accordingly.\textsuperscript{403}

When the invitation to participate was accepted, internecine feuds continued between the Department of External Affairs and provincial education authorities. One of the first in a series of challenging questions regarding Canada’s participation in the OECD Review was who would pay the bills for the process. This question was eventually resolved with decisive intervention from Ottawa. The key letter between the Council of Ministers and the Department of External Affairs outlined the funding that the provinces were to receive.

\textit{...Dear Mr. Minister:}

It gives me great pleasure to inform you that the Government of Canada has approved a financial contribution to the maximum amount of $500,000 for the OECD review of educational policies in Canada. This review could therefore be initiated as soon as possible. I sincerely hope that it will prove to be a successful undertaking.

Yours sincerely,

MITCHELL SHARP

The Honourable François Cloutier
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Education…\textsuperscript{404}

Despite the federal action, added marginalia reflected ongoing provincial doubts.

Nat. Council Committee…called for more than Sec of State will agree to. Can recover, however, so long as we agree that Feds are involved when “federal concerns are clearly involved.” However earlier correspondence (Miller-Sharp) should have cleared this. Q is, why this backtracking? But we will go along, if things get rough, we can pull out.\textsuperscript{405}

\textsuperscript{403}Background Paper for the CMEC Executive Task Force Meeting, Montreal, September 11, 1972; Council of Ministers of Education Files 1972-1974; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG2-40 Accession 84-1090, Box 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

\textsuperscript{404}Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State, to François Cloutier, Chairman of the Council, November 8, 1973 in Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Deputy Ministers of Education, December 5, 1973; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1974; RG 2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 1, Folder 2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

\textsuperscript{405}Marginalia, the writer is unidentified however was undoubtedly a senior official in the Ministry of Colleges and Universities. Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State, to François Cloutier, Chairman of the Council, November 8 1973 in Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Deputy Ministers of Education, December 5, 1973; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1974; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090. Box 1, Folder 2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
Not only did accepting the invitation and sorting out the funding of the OECD process break new ground for Canadian educationalists, but the intrusion of the international process also initiated renewed discussions between the two levels of government on the question of their relative roles in education. The federal government in particular wanted clarification on what role it would play in the external international process.

Dr. Richer indicated that apparently the federal representatives on the OECD Review Coordinating Committee still required further clarification as to their role on the Committee. In his letter of November 28th 1973, Mr. L. H. Amyot, Director of the Federal-Provincial Coordination Division with the Department of External Affairs had proposed the following text concerning the participation of the federal government in the review:

"The representatives of the federal government will participate in the work of the coordinating committee and in the decisions taken by the committee by virtue of the federal government’s responsibilities in the area of international affairs and whenever the interests of the federal government are clearly involved."

"Interests of the Federal government" covered a wide field.

The effectiveness of the Examination process as a catalyst to reshape Canadian education was reinforced as educationalists wrote an internal profile of the system for the OECD. The composition of this report forced authorities to address questions of jurisdiction and overlapping authority, and look closely at what they had developed.

Particular provinces and regions (i.e. Atlantic Canada, Western Canada, and Quebec) in the country wished to prepare their own reports on the state of education in their jurisdictions rather than "interregional" reports that would come out of one central office.

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Footnote:

The federal government did not participate in writing these reports, with the exception of a discussion on areas where it alone was responsible (i.e. the Northwest Territories, Defense, etc.).

The coordinating committee was recommending that no interregional study be undertaken for the internal report. There was consensus that the interregional study be replaced by a common introductory section.

Unlike looking at education in a unitary state such as Greece, the resulting volume would look at five discrete regional education realities. The Canadian federation, rather than being cooperative and flexible, came up short in the face of international scrutiny. It was revealed as being disconnected and atomistic. Despite its tortuous conception, the report that emerged from Canada’s internal survey was voluminous and drew favorable reviews.

First, a six-volume background report describing the state of education in Canada was prepared under the direction of the coordinating committee and completed in April 1975.

With the internal report in hand, the education and foreign policy communities moved to welcome the OECD Examiners into the country to do a specific appraisal of the Canadian system in June of 1975.

With an increasingly steady eye on their own political needs, educationalists of the day thought hard about the education system when options for a team of Examiners were given to them by the OECD. In order that the best possible examiners be chosen,

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408 Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Education, September 10-11, 1974; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1974; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 2, Folder 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
410 The examiners toured the country for a month (May 31st to June 30th, 1975). OECD Review Of Education Policies in Canada: Schedule For Visit of External Examiners; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1974; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78; Accession 17719, Box 3, Folder 6; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
the CMEC/Government of Canada Committee recommended several criteria by which they would be selected.

i) that at least two examiners be citizens of countries with a federal system of government
ii) that at least two examiners be bilingual
iii) that the majority of examiners be professional educators
iv) that each proposed examiner be internationally recognized

The complex requirements that the examiners had to meet significantly narrowed the number of Examiners that were possibly eligible. This was also different for the OECD. Those that in the end participated as Examiners were hard pressed to understand the context into which they had been dropped. Jumping through all the machiavellian hoops and avoiding the political traps that were a daily part of federal-provincial relations in Canada were not things to which they were accustomed as they congregated for the first time to look at Canadian education in operation.

Conclusion

During the course of the 1970s the Canadian education system, like all education systems, became the focus of immense international energies for change. The “Golden Age” ended and the era of global economic growth ground to a halt. The new reality was to be forged with continuities to the recent past, but also through the incorporation of elements that were part of an unpredicted future.

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411 Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Education, September 10-11, 1974; Council of Ministers of Education Files, Canada 1972-1974; Ministry of Education; RG2-40 Accession 84-1090, Box 2, Folder 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
413 Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, of all the Examiners, was somewhat familiar with federal-state chicanery in the German context. Her view towards the federal-provincial policy relationship in Canada was one of distaste: “[Policy relations were like] sex as it used to be in times of prudery. You do it but you do not talk
Changes in the international system affected the environment for Canadian education as they made the underlying political structures more focused on economic viability. The long shadow of war fell on Canadian education systems with the decade long hemorrhage resulting from the Vietnam conflict. The economic aftereffects of this war were contingency driven and resulted in unforeseen juxtapositions and change. Inflation, the devaluation of the dollar, the abandonment of the gold standard, and the adoption of new monetary policies were the most visible signposts of this shock to the system. The oil crises of 1973, and later 1979, drew politicians, educationalists, and foreign policy practitioners to re-evaluate the importance that they attached to education.

The forces of war, and economic unpredictability were joined by newly powerful multi-national enterprises as yet another impetus for change. The environment in which Canadian governments ran education systems and conducted their education-related international activities was irrevocably altered. Transnational corporations also became involved in the intricacies of regional and local economies during the 1970s. Their new energy combined with the nomadic habits of students and business people brought new global demand for Canadian educational institutions. All levels of government had to start thinking of their education systems in a more international context.

Along with the shifting economic tides, changes in the activities of international education organizations also had a significant effect on how Canadians viewed education and thus diplomacy in this field. While UNESCO increased its focus on the problems of Africa and Asia, and SEAMEO became a vibrant organization with several regional centers, the OECD expanded the scope of its Country Reviews in the late 1960s and early

about it and even if you should allude to it, you never use the right words.” Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, et al. “The OECD Review,” p. 16.
1970s. Originally devised to get a snapshot of scientific and technical training in OECD countries, Reviews became increasingly focused on the health of education systems in general.

As a result of their penetrating and provocative nature, OECD activities such as the Country Reviews were effective in influencing national education systems. Increasingly positive peer pressure resulted in countries wanting to become involved in the process. In addition, the OECD Reviews concentrated on issues that were rarely looked at before in the field of education or by governments. Governance was a prickly issue for many countries, and particularly so for Canada, and it became one of the important components of the Reviews. Political impediments to the smooth transition between education and economic productivity were publicly identified and states were urged to eliminate them. Equally sensitive were questions of the connection between a country's economy and the long term planning for its education system.

The sweeping thoroughness of the OECD Country Reviews became evident from the early phases of the Canadian Review process. Governments at both levels stumbled, unsure how to handle something new that was based on a pointed examination of the Canadian system of education. It was a process of self-examination and justification that they were unaccustomed to. Evidence of federal-provincial beginner's hesitancy started with conflict over how the Review process was going to be funded. Once this was resolved, discussion gave way to other questions of how the preliminary internal analysis of the country's education system was to be conducted.

The forces emerging from the international system in the 1970s had a powerful impact on the environment in which Canadian education would develop. This in turn
would profoundly alter the development of the federal-provincial relationship in 
education-related international activities. Given this background, the specifics of 
Canadian diplomacy in education in this decade, the rest of the OECD Review and its 
aftermath can now be examined in further detail.
Chapter 6
The OECD Review, The Domestic Response and The Statement

Introduction
The highly-energetic international environment and the newly-active forces that emerged from global change did much to influence the seas on which the Canadian nation-state sailed in the 1970s. Against this background, and shaped by it, the role and politics of Canada's education-related international activities were developed and played out. These politics remained centered on political exigencies rather than reflecting any longer-term determination to effect fundamental reforms in this area.414

The completion of the OECD Review reflected the compromises that surrounded diplomacy in education. The implementation of this approach saw limited and specific agreement on the mechanics of the Review. Each aspect of the procedure, the Examiners' visit, the Confrontation Meeting, and the publication of the final report was negotiated anew by both levels of government. The cost of this type of diplomacy was apparent in the way in which the outcome was received once the Review was completed.

A divided Canadian state and society skeptically received the reasoning behind the diplomats' international rhetoric about the Canadian education system. The procedure clearly played a part in shaping Canadian education, but opinions on the combined activities of diplomats, educationalists and politicians garnered low marks. Fundamental change was not going to come from their external activities. The result was that the Review engendered more temporizing activity on the part of the federal and provincial governments at the international level. In responding to the OECD Examiners

414 Some efforts to revise and change the process were being undertaken concomitantly with the OECD process and they will be chronicled and analyzed in the final chapter. As will be seen, serious change in the execution of education-related international activities was not an outcome of negotiations for change in this turbulent era however.
through the *Statement by Canadian Authorities for the OECD Appraisal of Country Educational Policy Reviews*, diplomacy was once again used as both an apologia to defend Canada’s political divisions and structures, as well as a mechanism to find fault with the outside process. This usage exemplified some of the structural faults of Canadian federalism and its education-related diplomacy.

**The Completion of the OECD Review and *Ad Hoc* Compromise**

The formulation of the OECD Review diplomacy, in its latter stages, reflected the politics of expediency on the part of both the federal government and its provincial counterparts. For the purposes of both international and domestic consumption, the two levels of government compromised on the mechanics of the exercise. The goal of getting through the Review process and showing the world the progressive nature of Canadian education dominated the agenda of the participants.

The compromise solution to the intervention of the OECD in Canada was evident once the initial beginner’s hesitancy evaporated and as the political stakes became increasingly clear for all parties. From the start of the Examiners’ inspection voyage to Canada, both levels of government were clear that limited collaboration was in their best self-interest. In numerous meetings of the preparatory committee, this visit was highly scripted. Through these meetings, the nature of the visit and destinations were mapped out. The basic issue of who would meet the Examiners and for what length of time dominated the discussions. The visit was to include all regions of the country, but there was also much discussion as to where the Examiners would best spend their time.\(^4\)

\(^4\) One proposal that had earlier been aired was the idea of “regional examinations.” Because of the highly fractionated nature of Canadian education, it was thought that Examiners could conduct exams during their inspection visit to Canada, thus being able to focus on “concerns specific to a particular region.” Regional exams were later abandoned as being too complicated, un-manageable, and time consuming. *Minutes of*
allocation of days to the particular aspects of the visit was finally tied down in a series of co-ordinating committee discussions.

The following tentative schedule is being considered by the committee for the visit of the external examiners in June, bearing in mind, that out of a seven-day week, one day is to be set aside for rest and travel, while the other day is to be reserved for meetings of team members for the purpose of preparing their report.

5 days – Western Region
5 days – Atlantic Region
10 days – To be shared by Ontario, Quebec, the federal government and national education agencies with a possible breakdown:
3.5 days – Ontario
3.5 days – Quebec
2 days – “Feds”
1 day – Interest Groups

Despite federal-provincial discussions and meetings with the Examiners to discuss issues surrounding the voyage, compromise between the two levels of government lessened the effectiveness of the trip.

The inspection tour became an exercise in creative scheduling, as Examiner Hildegard Hamm-Brücher described in her reflections on her experience in Canada.

Almost everyone in government wanted and got an audience with the Examiners, who in turn were run ragged by the pace.

We were, as many of our critics noted, a “European” team, and perhaps too European in the philosophy underlying our approach. The Canadian authorities, however, who expressly approved our nomination knew this from the beginning and could have objected. The time we had to prepare ourselves was too short, and during our four-week trip, the periods for quiet work after a tiring day were also too short and too infrequent. And it was only in the course of our tour that we were able to devise a suitable

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*the Twentieth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, September 10-11, 1974; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 2, Folder 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.*

*Status Report of the OECD Review Item 8 Reference 27 OECD Review Coordinating Committee; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3, Folder 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.*
approach.... After the visit to Canada we faced the almost insurmountable task of evaluating the fantastic amount of documentation that had been supplied to us. As the OECD report observes, “Canadian educational administration threatens to drown in a sea of unread, unstudied and unevaluated reports.”417

With the completion of the inspection tour, the federal and provincial ad hoc compromise continued in preparation for the Confrontation Meeting in Paris.

Planning the Confrontation Meeting

Following the Examiners’ inspection, expedient collaboration remained central to federal-provincial international education strategy as the Confrontation Meeting approached. Government worries centered on the degree of risk to their public image in the Review process. Consequently, the preparation of a team to go to the Paris meeting was of the utmost importance. The issue came up on several occasions. In early January 1975, in a status report given by the CMEC/Government of Canada Coordinating Committee on the OECD Review, one is given an indication of the concerns of both sides.

The status report was given.... So far as representation at Paris, there was concern about Federal representation. Finally, it was proposed and agreed that the delegation proposed to the Federal Government should be made up of: Chairman of the Council as Chairman of the delegation, at least two ministers of Education, the Secretary of State for Canada, regional Directors of the OECD Review and one representative from each province.418

In an exchange of letters between Alan MacEachern, Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Thomas Wells, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the Minister of Education for the Province of Ontario, the issue was also aired.

418 Minutes of the Twenty - First Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, January 23-24, 1975; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3, Folder 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
...Insofar as federal participation is concerned it would seem reasonable to think in terms of a representation of four or five, comprising representatives of this department (including our OECD mission in Paris), the Secretary of State Department, and possibly other federal departments or agencies which might be particularly interested in the comments that the external examiners will make in their report. As I have indicated above, however, it would be preferable to defer any decisions in this respect until we have seen the report.\textsuperscript{419}

The wait and see attitude developed by the two levels of government played for time in the most necessary way. In order to maximize their options by picking the most politically astute team, both sides wanted all the data on the table before proceeding to further commitment.

The activities of the Coordinating Committee moved into high gear and "limited collaboration" became the received word as the envoys prepared for Paris in the autumn of 1975. In a detailed submission to the Council of Ministers on November 13-14, 1975, Dr. James Hrabi, Chair of Coordinating Committee for the OECD Review set out a series of points of information, recommendations, and opinions on the preliminary report received from the Examiners.

Requested to comment on the coordinating committee's views with respect to the examiners' report, Dr. Hrabi indicated that members felt it was essentially a good report, given the limitations imposed on all those involved. One difficulty was pointed out – although the internal reports had been prepared regionally, the examiners had chosen to deal with various issues on a cross-country basis, with the result that they were not able to produce an in-depth report.\textsuperscript{420}

That the Examiners had chosen to study issues on a pan-Canadian basis was alarming for the Committee – there had been an expectation that the regional reports would be

\textsuperscript{419}Alan MacEachern, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Thomas Wells, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada and Minister of Education for the Province of Ontario July 29, 1975; Council of Ministers of Education. Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Colleges and Universities: RG32-78. Accession 17719, Box 3, Folder 2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
responded to with regional rather than national critiques. The Committee also had several other concerns. Some dealt with specific factual errors while others were much more specifically geared towards the question of federal-provincial relations. This issue, all agreed, was to be avoided and side-tracked if at all possible in the interest of short term collaboration, and also to minimize any diplomatic and media repercussions of the Review. The federal members of the coordinating committee also acceded to the pre-eminence of the CMEC to speak on educational matters.

c) It was suggested that reference be made in the opening statement to the difficulty which had arisen from the fact that the examiners had chosen to draw national conclusions from regional reports as the present remarks about the examiners’ report seemed excessively laudatory.

d) There was consensus that, for all questions requiring input from federal authorities, relevant provincial or, where appropriate, Council positions should be stated.421

In addition, specific provisions regarding federal-provincial relations were accepted. This agreement stressed the nature of the OECD as a forum but also the desirability of not examining these tougher questions in the OECD context.

f) The examiners’ questions regarding federal-provincial relations should not be discussed at the examination meeting, as it was considered inappropriate to debate constitutional issues in an international setting.

g) The present plan to have the Canadian delegation agree in advance to which question(s) should be answered by a given delegate and then have the delegate speak accordingly should be implemented as fully as possible.422

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420 Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Advisory Council of Deputy Ministers of Education, November 13-14 1975; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 1, Folder 2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
421 Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Advisory Council of Deputy Ministers of Education, November 13-14 1975; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 1, Folder 2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
422 Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Advisory Council of Deputy Ministers of Education, November 13-14 1975; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 1, Folder 2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
Although *ad hoc* compromise was achieved with the federal-provincial preparations, it came at a cost. The nature of their agreement aimed to squelch any outside discussion of the educational governance of Canada. As will be seen, this did not foil the OECD Examiners, nor were they distracted by the attempt at solidarity on the part of the Canadian delegation.

Limited collaboration remained the watchword for the delegation while in Paris. There were nineteen people from two levels of government and various departments. The numbers included significant representation from the provincial ministries of education, as well as officials from the federal Secretary of State. In addition, there were representatives from the federal ministries of Indian and Northern Affairs, and Manpower and Immigration. In a practice that continued from the past, the Department of External Affairs was also included in the delegation in order to look in on the proceedings and ensure that no foreign affairs questions arose. This type of surveillance, albeit livable, chafed for the provincial delegates.  

**The Confrontation Meeting**

While the period prior to the OECD Confrontation Meeting was important in showing the *ad hoc* nature of the understandings between Ottawa and the provinces in diplomacy in education, the Château de la Muette meeting of December 9-10\(^{th}\), 1975 was also significant. It illustrated the educationalists’ and foreign policy authorities’ self-interests at work under the watchful eyes of the OECD Examiners. The Confrontation Meeting posed a particular challenge for the group of federal and provincial officials who

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423 The exact composition of the Paris Review delegation is to be found in the Review Document. OECD, *Reviews*, pp. 11-12.

424 Educationalists in this context includes politicians and bureaucrats from the Minister of Education down.
made up the delegation, as there was a limited number of people that could attend the meeting in Paris, and the opportunity to consult on compromise replies prior to answering the Examiners' questions would never be sufficient to deal with some of the most vexing issues.425

It quickly became evident to those who were new to the process that more than Canadian curriculum was under scrutiny when the Examiners opened the Confrontation Meeting with a presentation of their report. They outlined a series of effective aspects of the Canadian education system. They then moved on to general problem areas.426 Among the latter, the Examiners were particularly interested in addressing the difficult and sensitive question of intergovernmental relations. Their attention to this issue was illustrative of the extent to which they, as an outside organization, dissected national education systems in a critical fashion.

Problems of inter-government relations tend to become acute whenever these relations involve an area of policy in which there is great activity, development and change. Certainly this is the case for education in Canada, where educational policy in inter-government relations reflect the intense activity and creative change taking place in the educational arena.427

The Examiners also illustrated the vaunted "sense of responsibility" of the OECD in bluntly critiquing the activities of the more senior government officials and the politicians

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425 This problem had been mooted earlier in September, 1974 at the twentieth CMEC Council meeting. At that stage the Council raised, discussed and rejected the possibility of the earlier mentioned "regional examinations." While allowing a more Canadian face on the process, the issuing of managing examinations in several different regions ultimately led to their downfall. Management at the Paris meeting also proved to be the key issue. Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada September 10-11, 1974; Council of Ministers of Education. Canada Files 1972-1974; Ministry of Education: RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 2, Folder 1: Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
426 Canadian Education Association, Reactions, pp. 7-10.
427 OECD, Reviews, p.122.
who were involved in education.\footnote{See Chapter 5, p. 158. above.} In particular, they took issue with the quick turnover in educational governance.

Because Ministers of Education in Canada change quite frequently (a three year tenure, or less, is quite usual) and do not usually bring with them into office much administrative experience or deep specialized knowledge of education, and because the educational administrations themselves have been caught up in the recent past in the immediate concerns of expansion of the capacity of the educational system, it is quite important... that they take thought not only concerning general educational policy problems but also for their own roles and responsibilities. To this end, a certain critical stance and perhaps also some advice from outside may be helpful.\footnote{OECD, \textit{Reviews}, p. 75.}

Also, despite Canadian solicitations and agreements to the contrary\footnote{see following paragraph.}, the Examiners took aim at the question of the Canadian constitution and education.

The fact that there is, and apparently can be, no Federal Department of Education has created a kind of vacuum in educational policy at the higher federal decision-making level. This empty space is invaded by federal agencies responsible for “neighbouring” policy areas: manpower policy, general economic policy, regional development policy....foreign policy and so forth. Typically, such agencies tend to view education as an instrument for their particular missions, and not as a field of policy in its own right.\footnote{OECD, \textit{Reviews}, p. 93.}

The Examiners were also quick to expose this critical weakness of Canadian education and of the diplomatic team sitting in front of them. Short-lived cooperation between the two levels of government in education matters was frankly seen as a fundamental flaw in achieving forward movement in the Canadian educational endeavour.

At present, discussions, negotiations and agreements between the federal government and the provinces in educational matters tend to go forward on a bilateral or piecemeal basis. This procedure may answer certain provincial (and federal) political needs, but it has unfortunately also made much more difficult the task of making something more systematic out of the highly fractionated structure of education in Canada. The need now is to put in place greatly improved mechanisms for inter-provincial co-
operation, and for federal-provincial discussion and co-operation on a multilateral basis.\footnote{OECD, \textit{Reviews}, p. 96.} In the OECD Examiners' view \textit{ad hoc} governance would end if an important role were assigned to the Council of Ministers of Education. A more high profile CMEC would be more influential in Canadian educational policy formation, more inclusive of all groups, the federal government included, and less of a gathering place for the Ministers of Education.\footnote{CEA, \textit{Reactions}, p. 17.}

The Canadian delegation to the meeting responded in a vigorous, but defensive manner to the Examiners' critiques.\footnote{The delegation was composed of nineteen federal and provincial officials, thirteen of which were provincial civil servants, and the other six came from federal departments. The director of the federal-provincial relations section of the Department of External Affairs, along with officials from the office of the Secretary of State and Indian Affairs participated. OECD, \textit{Reviews}, pp. 11-12.} Wedded to their compromise position, they attributed the conflicts and problems of educational governance in Canada to the country still being "young" and not yet fully on its own in its internal arrangements. Perhaps, but one hundred and nine years by most human measures remains quite a long time to be young \textit{and} tinkering around with the problems of youth.\footnote{Canada remains one of the last of the federal experiments of the 1860s to continue under substantially the same basic law. Many recent documents now refer to Canada being one of the \textit{oldest} federations in the world. It cannot be both ways. For a European perspective on this see Michael Burgess, \textit{Canadian Federalism: Past, Present and Future}(New York: Leicester University Press, 1990), p. 1.} In keeping with the spirit of their temporary accord on the OECD process, or possibly as a measure of that youth, the delegation, in the full glare of the international spotlight, adopted the joint position of refusing to respond when issues strayed into the constitutional and political realm. The delegation stated unequivocally that discussion of the constitutional politics of education was not the organization's role.

The Canadian authorities would like to inform the examining team, the OECD Secretariat and the members of the Education Committee of the
one condition that was agreed to by the Canadian federal and provincial authorities prior to the beginning of the review. This condition was that the review was not to be used as an arena for the debating of constitutional issues. It is the Canadian view that the nature of these issues is such that they do not lend themselves to discussion in international settings. ... As a consequence of the condition agreed to by the Federal and Provincial authorities the Canadian delegation respectfully requests that, while Questions 5 and 6 are extremely significant and concern basic issues, it is their express wish that they not be the subject of discussion on this occasion.\footnote{The two questions referred to dealt with the paucity of national control in education. OECD, Reviews, p. 126.}

In keeping with the united front position, federal and provincial officials at the meeting stressed that CMEC sub-committees and committees composed of provincial as well as federal officials obviated the need for a federal ministry of education, a national policy, or any radical rethink of Canadian educational governance. The Chair of the Council of Ministers of Education and head of the delegation, Ben Hanuschak, explicitly expressed this view in addressing the Confrontation Meeting.

In Paris, Mr. Hanuschak replied that there is no unfulfilled need to establish structures and procedures for the development of national policy...\footnote{Mike Heron, “The OECD Review of Education Policies in Canada: A Teacher Perspective,” Reactions to the OECD Review – Canada (Toronto: CEA, 1976), p. 39.}

Another illuminating light was cast on the fleeting nature of cooperation between the federal and provincial governments at the decisive meeting in the exchanges between the Examiners and the delegates from Quebec. Examiner Hamm-Brücher opened the discussion with a series of questions dealing with the matter of inter-governmental relations. Two of the questions were as follows:

1. What are the possible alternative avenues to strengthen and systematize interrelationships and co-operation among provincial educational authorities?
5. In the light of the role played by the federal government in the financing of education and in the light of educational issues recognized as country-
wide in character is the present "official" exclusion of the Federal
government from any role in establishing relevant policies for education
considered to be essential.\footnote{OECD, Reviews, p. 129.}

Following commentaries by both the Chairman of the Canadian delegation, Ben
Hanuschak, and Peter Roberts, an official from the federal Secretary of State, in which
neither directly addressed question five \footnote{OECD, Reviews, passim, pp. 131-135.}, Maurice Mercier, Quebec Assistant Deputy
Minister of Education, spoke. He was realistic about the limits of cooperation, both at
home and in his role as educational envoy.

Mr. Maurice Mercier observed that the Examiners had fulfilled the role
not only of critical observers, but also of prophets. They warned us to be
careful here, to look out there, for there were troubles ahead....[Mercier]
would do his best to answer them, bearing in mind the agreement within
the Canadian Delegation not to touch on constitutional problems. This is
the Canadian way of showing inter-provincial and federal-provincial
solidarity.\footnote{OECD, Reviews, p. 135.}

Mercier continued by not explicitly rejecting continued "official" exclusion of the federal
government from educational policy formation. Rather, he rejected a federal role by
insisting on the provincial role in determining the structure of schooling.

The provinces are not willing to be simple objects of federal dictation in
educational matters, for they insist on a role in the definition of goals and
means for education and in the allocation of fiscal resources....The
provinces are opposed to the overriding of their educational development
plans by changes dictated by so-called "national" goals, in the definition
of which they have had no systematic role.\footnote{OECD, Reviews, p. 136.}

While determining the structure of schooling, Mercier also felt that the provinces were to
be commended on their "national" achievements.

In developing their own coherent provincial systems of education, the
provinces are indeed serving well the national interest of Canada as a
whole. The Examiners will have found that all the ministers of education are proud of their achievements.\textsuperscript{442}

In both diplomacy and in education at home, the emphasis for the Quebec delegate was centered on minimal collaboration, and on the enhancement of provincial accomplishments.

In the views of both the Chairman of the Canadian delegation and of the Quebec delegate, diplomacy in education would continue to be determined in a transitory fashion, by the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada. The sub-committee in that body that would be most specifically involved in the relationship between the two levels of government in foreign affairs and diplomacy was FPCCERIA, the Federal-Provincial Consultative Committee on Education-Related International Activities.\textsuperscript{443} If the logic of the two envoys was extended to cover this organization, then the FPCCERIA, rather than any federal ministry, was to be the principal locus for decision-making in Canadian international relations in education. This being the arrangement, then it or its precursor should have been prominent in the conflict-ridden days of the 1965-1968 international activities of Quebec. That was not the case: as of yet this type of sub-committee cooperation between the two levels of government was a matter for the future. In the mean time, the provincial world-view of Canadian education continued be advanced by the chair of the Canadian delegation. He preferred that the OECD look at the individual regions in their report, rather than discussing Canada as a whole.\textsuperscript{444} By looking at the whole country, Hanuschak felt that the reality of Canadian education was distorted.

\textsuperscript{442} OECD. Reviews, p. 136.
\textsuperscript{443} More on the development of this in the next chapter.
\textsuperscript{444} OECD. Reviews, p. 126.
Notwithstanding the attempt to defend the inter-provincial vision of the education system, the effort largely fizzled, the envoys revealed their less than national colours and the Examiners' critiques stood. Canadians now had to evaluate what they thought of the OECD's examination of Canada's education system. Once the Confrontation Meeting concluded, the OECD Secretariat moved to publish the Examiners' external report. Their role in examining the Canadian system was finished. Back at home, however, the compromises of the meeting in Paris and the fragile accords put in place to address this exercise in diplomacy quickly dissolved as provincial and federal officials returned to their respective capitals, and as media and academic commentators began to digest the OECD exercise.

The end of the Review process marked a high point in the involvement of the Department of External Affairs. It was most visibly involved in the release of an explanatory communiqué, announcing of the issuance of the Examiners' external report in August 1976. This news release had come about through earlier discussion with the CMEC.

In view of the imminent publication of the OECD Review, the executive director reported that Ms. B. Augaistis of the secretariat was discussing with federal representatives the possible text of a joint CMEC – federal government press release, and simultaneous press conferences by the chairman of the Council and the federal ministers concerned.445

The eventual press release was a summary of the OECD process. The Department of External Affairs struck a cautionary note towards the end of its statement however. In an exemplary piece opaque prose it was written that:

445 Minutes of the Twenty - Fifth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, June 18, 1976; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
In their report the examiners found much to praise in the systems of education in Canada but also raised critical questions for consideration by Canadian education authorities. The report, and particularly the questions raised by the examiners, will be reviewed carefully by government authorities, and will no doubt be of interest to individuals and organizations concerned with education in Canada.\(^{446}\)

The communiqué left many issues up for further discussion. After opening this proverbial “can of worms,” the Department of External Affairs returned to its other responsibilities and devoted little further energy to diplomacy in education in 1976.

The CMEC, in addition to consulting with the Department of External Affairs on an agreed-upon response to the issuance of the Final Report of the OECD Examiners, issued its own version of events in the autumn of 1976 in the form of the agency's Annual Report. Much of what the report noted was a simple factual recounting of the significant events of the previous three years and did little to encourage a deeper understanding of the problems the two levels of government faced in undergoing the Review. This evasion was evident in their description concerning the OECD Review:

The final report of the review by the OECD was published in August 1976. This report brought together the three elements of the review process in one volume... It is expected that this critical assessment of Canada’s education policies will stimulate a great deal of discussion across Canada about the future direction of education in this country.\(^{447}\)

Further response came with the opening up of the analysis of the report to other groups within the Canadian education community. The organization had to deal with the delicate question of discussion, not only because discussion would deal with the Review, but also because it might lead to a reconsideration of the role


the CMEC played in the Canadian education system, and whether there should be
“national” as opposed to “inter-provincial” cooperation in the field.448

The Divided Responses to the Review

When the active phase of the diplomacy was complete, the domestic response
made it rapidly apparent that limited effort could not replace more durable structures and
relationships. The politesse and polish the envoys had summoned in the name of inter-
provincialism could not hide the underlying structural ambiguities and bottlenecks
created by Canada’s existing federal structure and the lack of well-defined paths for
educational governance. The defensiveness and divisions of the diplomacy had
illustrated this problem.

Replies to the Review came from different segments of Canadian society and
were concerned with aspects of education reflecting their needs. Those that grappled with
the issue of the diplomatic exercise and the related questions of governance divided into
two groups. Some wished to expand the dialogue on educational structures at the
national level, while others once more defended the status quo. In the reformist-minded
replies to the Review, there was a skepticism that the deeper questions of political power
and the constitution would not be addressed with enough energy to bring about
“improved mechanisms of federal-provincial co-operation” let alone the more
unattainable goal of constitutional change.449 The educational constituencies that
expressed these views were on the outside of the OECD process. Their responses to the

448 In the autumn of 1976 the CMEC took the plunge and asked for submissions from twenty countrywide
education organizations. Some of these organizations are discussed in this chapter. Council of Ministers of
449 While the Review engaged the education and to a lesser extent the foreign policy communities, there
was less interest in the process by society in general. The Republican convention in the United States and
the federal-provincial first ministers meetings on other questions dominated the press in the summer of
1976.
diplomatic exercise will be looked at first and then those of government affiliated organizations will be examined.

The eclipse of the diplomatic effort was first heralded in the Canadian news media. The release of the OECD Report in the summer of 1976 was met with muted, uninformed and uncritical reviews by journalists. Despite this, much of what was reported furthered the factual explanation of the process to the public and conveyed the differing views on the outcome of the process. In the Globe and Mail of August 18, 1976, following the release of the report, journalist Jeff Sallot echoed provincial ministers’ comments downplaying the report and its conclusions. In the view of the provincial ministers, the report was flawed as it took a national perspective on education rather than an inter-provincial or purely provincial viewpoint. The Globe and Mail article was not a critical examination of the issues of governance and curriculum, but served to stake out the government position behind the carefully-crafted Canadian presentation in Paris.\footnote{450}

Journalists of the Canadian Press and the Toronto Star had little to say about the OECD Review, but their coverage sustained the notion that the federal-provincial collaboration in Paris was little more than a temporary exercise. They recited the OECD Examiners’ position.

Ottawa and the provinces must co-operate in forging new national education policies, the Paris-based Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development said yesterday....Canada’s education system, while one of the most sophisticated in the world, is threatened by a striking lack of policy planning in most provinces and by little federal-provincial co-operation.\footnote{451}

\footnote{451} Canadian Press, “Planning lack threat to schools, study says,” Toronto Star, Wednesday August 18\textsuperscript{th}, 1976, Section B, p. 17.
The *Toronto Star* did not quote any of the provincial Ministers of Education nor did it convey provincial Premiers’ responses to the Review.

In the Quebec press, the tone taken toward the report was much more sweeping, but there continued to be intense skepticism about national collaboration and a single international face for Canadian education. In *Le Devoir*, the Examiners’ report was summarized and specific attention was drawn to both the positive and negative critiques of the Canadian education system. The absence of a national conception of the future of Canadian education was the central headline of the *Le Devoir* article and the author came back to this point in the presentation.

Dans le monde des réformes éducatives, le Canada se distingue de la plupart des grands pays industrialisés d’une part par l’absence de critères politiques fondés sur une conception définie de l’avenir du pays, et d’autre part par le fait que le gouvernement fédéral ne s’est guère opposé à la réalisation de ces réformes….452

Reaction in *Le Devoir* was also centered around the question of bilingualism and the distinctiveness of Quebec’s education system in Canada.

The business community during the period following the Review was also not influenced in its views by the temporary nature of the diplomacy in Paris. Most knowledgeable business leaders continued to have a dim view of the role that federalism played in Canada and that the approach taken at the international level in education was only another variant on this theme. Anything that would complicate productivity was deplored. The OECD Review confirmed some of their dubious reactions. Many levels of government did much to complicate the smooth flow of policy and inhibit the creation of

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conditions that were suitable for business to flourish. Beyond that, there was little that could be said about the process.

Governments had guarded their access to the Review procedure thus failing to elicit corporate interest or participation. Business briefs although not explicitly excluded from the process were not solicited. Business organizations had not presented briefs during the Examiners' Canadian tour. With the publication of the results of the Review in 1976, the desire on the part of the business community to effectuate change remained constant. In what was to become the clarion call of business leaders, they continued to state their dislike of the waste and conflict in educational affairs during this period. They called for renewed cooperation to ensure that Canada did not fall behind in its "industrial competitiveness."

In contrast to the business position, the temporary aspect of international federal-provincial collaboration was supported by traditional groups involved in education, as they dismissed the notion that there should be any kind of "national" authority in Canadian education. After the CMEC, the Canadian Education Association was most representative of this type of position. Since the CMEC split away from it in latter part of the 1960s, the CEA continued to present itself as being broadly representative of all the constituencies of Canadian education. It remained however particularly provincially

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453 In the course of their visit to Canada, at no time did the Examiners meet with any business organizations nor did they receive business briefs. OECD Review of Education Policies in Canada: Schedule of Visit of External Examiners; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 4 Folder 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

454 School financial officials talked about educational finance, but the business productivity question was not brought up. OECD Review of Education Policies in Canada: Schedule of Visit of External Examiners; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 4, Folder 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

455 This type of reaction continues throughout the period up to the present. Economist Michael Porter makes a plea for the improvement of intergovernmental policy coordination in the field of education, among others, in his analysis of Canada's competitiveness. Michael Porter, Canada, p. 87.
oriented in character and included a fair number of upper echelon bureaucrats in its ranks. One of its major tasks in the 1970s was the promotion internally and externally of bilingualism.\textsuperscript{456}

In his discussion of the OECD Review, Freeman Stewart, the long serving Executive Director of the CEA, was supportive of the continuation of the non-constitutional ways of doing things. He felt that this was the best way of doing things between the federal government and the provinces.

This section of the OECD report (Federal Government and Education) is fascinating to read...This is a year in which new light is being cast on Canadian education. While a few skeletons may be revealed, sometimes carefully preserved, they are not really illegal under our constitution. Indeed, as the OECD report says, "behavior that strikes outsiders as elaborate make-believe may, in fact, be a necessary price, willingly paid to hold together a political confederation of disparate provinces." Some such behavior along with a degree of confidentiality, is often functional...\textsuperscript{457}

His commentary reflected the provincial view of the situation. It also defended the piecemeal and \textit{ad hoc} state of affairs at the national policy making level.

CEA President Carmen Moir also dismissed the notion of thinking beyond temporary arrangements as expressed in Paris and emphatically supported the inter-provincial status quo. He mounted a vigorous defense of provincial prerogatives in education, and argued that through provincial collaboration there was already a national plan and system.

Provide and define national goals, said the OECD report. Let there be no mistake. First of all, we do have national goals. We have always had them, even if we have not articulated them too clearly. Second, they will be defined, felt and expressed in action and emotion, in words and reason....Third, if we are to set them forth more formally, it must be by inter-provincial agreement, at the Council of Ministers' level perhaps,

rather than by central proclamation. The stimulus and the initiative must come from all components and all levels of Canadian education — from, in fact, those represented in the CEA.458

Moir reiterated the provincial response to the OECD exercise. He did not see the utility in exploring other forms of constitutional organization in order to change the situation. In interesting contrast, it was during the same period in the United States that President Carter elevated education to its own cabinet level position with the creation of the U.S. Department of Education.459 No similar movement was to be seen in Canada.460

The critical receipt of the temporary diplomatic accord on the education system continued in the next three years as organizations addressed the Review and its outcomes. Among the other organizations to deal with the question were the Canadian Association of School Trustees, and the Canadian Association of University Teachers.461 There was a general consensus that the CMEC should be strengthened and become the principal federal-provincial body in education. There was also discussion that there should be federal representation on the Council, possibly with the addition of the Secretary of State. This group did not see the ad hoc accords that governed international relations in education and the OECD diplomacy as constructive models for future activities.

While interested and nationally-oriented Canadians censured the provisional nature of the OECD diplomacy, OECD Examiners themselves reiterated their view that the temporary nature of agreement on educational issues, including the Review,

460 Australia, by contrast, had both a body similar to the Council of Ministers, the Australian Education Council (AEC) which had been in operation since 1936 and a federal Department of Education (created in 1972). The federal department takes care of international education, and the Secretary of Education sits as full member of the AEC. E.A. Holdaway, "Federal Initiatives in Education in Australia," Education Canada, Vol. 16. No.3 (Fall 1976), pp. 6-8.
continued to distract governors of the education system from discharging their principle responsibilities towards their end-users, the students. In their reflections, they continued to point out that the general changes that they wished for were not happening. They also pointed out that the specific structural changes to the system of Canadian educational governance that they had pressed for were not coming together as quickly as they had wished. They expressly highlighted the “national” as opposed to “inter-provincial” role that the CMEC could assume.

The report expressed the hope that the role and functions of the Council of Ministers of Education could be clarified and expanded. The Council manifested its potential by sponsoring the OECD study, but has yet to become an effective organ serving provincial, inter-provincial and national purposes. The examiners noted that the Council’s small secretariat, despite its dedicated staff, is unable to generate the research and documentation necessary for policy formulation. This observation also applies to the federal scene where the designated department, that of the Secretary of State, does not have sufficient expertise in matters of education. Canada has too few institutions concerned with education from a national perspective.\[462\]

While the Examiners reflected on the outcomes of the process, they also noted very energetically that there was a continued lack of long-term national planning and research in education. Any possible momentum that might have come out of the OECD Review had not materialized.\[463\]

Examiner Harold Noah in his reflections on the OECD Review stated that there was “an absolute vacuum of officially-sponsored consideration of a Canadian policy for


educational development." In his view, the purpose of the Review was to serve as a catalytic exercise. He warned that it could get laden down with outside interests.

I would merely warn against trying to go too far in the direction of routinizing and bureaucratizing the review procedures. It is, I think, worth emphasizing that the review process is essentially a set of acts of "discovery"—often self-discovery by the country concerned, and creative discovery by the examiners and the Education Committee of the OECD in Paris. It is fashionable nowadays to ask of every investment of public funds "What will the product be?" With respect to the reviews of educational policy, it might be useful to tolerate a certain amount of untidiness, in return for many of the benefits flowing from this unusual international exercise.

Noah was also of the view that the momentum built into the Review process could propel a country to do many things with its education system, if that energy was sustained. In counter-distinction to Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, he did not feel that Canada had lost momentum after the completion of the Review.

With the end of the Paris Confrontation Meeting, provincial authorities returned to business as usual and continued to defend their own particular view of "national institutions" in education. The diplomatic effort had done much to reinforce these views. Change would come in the governance of education and in the evolution of an "educational foreign policy" only when the provinces saw that it was in their best interest. Many of the provincial participants, once freed from the strictures of being in the delegation, turned any feelings of discontent outwards, towards the process, and towards the international organization. Previously, the province of Quebec had special international education interests and expressed them. Increasingly, other provinces also expressed their interests. As international agencies became more bold, so too did individual governments.

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Support for the practice of temporary agreements in Canadian international relations in education came from some of those deeply involved in the process. One of the members of the delegation and the chair of the Canadian coordinating committee, Dr. Hrabi, reflected on the OECD Review in the summer of 1976 and gave it his qualified approval. He made his remarks at the annual convention of the Canadian Educational Association.

Have the goals been achieved? Have we an internal report which is a status study of Canadian education in 1974? Yes. In the Foreword to the examiners’ report the internal document is described as follows: “The basic document made available to the examiners in preparation for the visit is itself a landmark in OECD country preparation for such a review of educational policy.” On the negative side, the documents were also referred to as presenting a “sometimes blandly positive picture of the situation.”

Hrabi also stated that the Canadian delegation to the Paris meeting was not happy with the draft of the OECD Review they had received. They expressed this view to the OECD and this resulted in some changes in the final external report. He further examined the question of establishing a federal presence in education and saw obstacles as well as opportunities for change in this area.

...there exists in Canada today educational policies masquerading under other names, such as manpower policies, etc. I have a strong personal feeling that directions identified...should not be dropped until every possible model for federal-provincial-agency involvement is analyzed. Undoubtedly the smaller and less powerful provinces see advantages to moving in this direction. They have little to lose and much to gain. It remains to be seen if the larger and/or more powerful provinces see a move in this direction as desirable...They have much to lose as well as much to gain....The resolution of the issue may not rest exclusively with the provinces.

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Despite his apparent openness to change, Hrabi did not elaborate further on the nature of the gymnastics required to encourage this transformation and at the same time indulge the enduring eccentricities of Canadian federalism. In the end he also attributed any failings of federalism listed in the OECD Examiners' report to their inability to understand the nature of Canadian fiscal transfers and the peculiarities of the Canadian federal system.468

The commentary of Quebec bureaucrats also upheld the existing state of affairs in federal-provincial relations in education and diplomacy. Jean Marie-Beauchemin, of the Ministry of Education, asserted the uniqueness of Quebec in Canada and particularly in the field of education. As representative of one of the two founding nations, Quebec was not a province like the others.469 In Beauchemin's view, the OECD Examiners were very much directed by their "Canadian interlocutors" and the formulations of Anglophone inter-provincialism looked suspiciously like cloaked federalism. Beauchemin did not wish to associate himself with this, instead he wished to highlight Quebec's distinctive position.470 The Quebec civil servant did not see the OECD as an international organization that was performing a "teaching function" in the way Finnemore described it. Rather, the effort would have some impact in a limited fashion on provinces and in their relationships amongst themselves.

Was the Review of Educational Policies in Canada worth doing in order to arrive at these conclusions? Did it reach its goals? I shall answer no and yes! No, because to my mind, the reports do not reflect completely the present reality of education in Canada; yes, because having already prodded our pride, the review will not fail to release a common inter-provincial desire to find solutions to the problems, current or newly raised.471

After dealing with the specifics of the Examiners' critique of Canadian education, and the possibility of a desire for change, Beauchemin was a realist about the possibilities for the future and change in the structures of education and diplomacy.

Will the exercise to which the provinces and the federal government have lent themselves have a tomorrow? Or...will inertia...succeed in relegating this new report to the shelves? This danger is real, the examiners hint, as Canada has a tradition of pragmatic and "unreflective" reforms; apart from the natural mechanisms of self-defense, there is also provincial autonomy in education and the difficulties inherent in the co-existence of two cultural and linguistic communities; these factors are certainly not among the most favorable leading to an agreement on Canadian educational policy as the examiners would wish.472

Lastly, Beauchemin took aim at the idea of a federal ministry of education. He felt that the Examiners in their haste to avoid discussing "political-party" differences over education grabbed at the concepts of a strengthened CMEC, or alternately, a federal ministry of education to solve their dilemma. 473 Instead of seeing the need for change then, Quebec bureaucrats were willing to retain the existing system and use it to their greatest advantage.

While provincial officials generally saw that the Paris-type diplomacy would continue, other government officials clamored because they were outside the Review process altogether.474 They charged that the authorities responsible for setting up the Confrontation Meeting delegation made no effort to include representatives from the local level. They too wanted a place in the company of the federal and provincial envoys.

It is deplorable that neither the Council of Ministers, nor the Secretary of State, nor the Minister in charge of External Affairs, saw fit to include

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472 Beauchemin, "Educational," p. 34.
473 Beauchemin, "Educational," p. 35.
474 See final chapter. Numerous non-governmental conferences also looked at the Review.
representatives of local governments in education (school board people) on the Canadian delegation to this session.\textsuperscript{475}

The CMEC and the Coordinating Committee had been blunt with their exclusion of local officials from the international process prior to the Confrontation Meeting. To balance this however, they tried to temper their restriction on representation with as broad as possible a regional spread in delegates.

b) that education organizations requesting observer status at the examination meeting be advised that such status was restricted to government officials.

c) that an effort continue to be made to ensure that the Canadian delegation be as representative as possible, from a geographic point of view.\textsuperscript{476}

Local officials were also very definite in their view that there should be a federal ministry of education and that that would alleviate some of these problems. A federal structure would allow them more representation than they would continue to have in the current group of organizations.

Not only did provincial and local officials reiterate their views on the process following the end of the Confrontation Meeting, but provincial politicians also aired their views on the question following the publication of the final external report. There was disagreement between various civil servants and politicians about the extent to which the international aspects of the OECD Review should be discussed. Deputy Ministers reflected this position in a meeting following the Confrontation Meeting and the release of the report.

Item B6: Review of Educational Policies in Canada


\textsuperscript{476}Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Advisory Council of Deputy Ministers of Education November 13-14 1975; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 1, Folder 2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
The Deputy Ministers have recommended to Council (on the sheet in the book) five recommendations. Summing up these recommendations, the emphasis is that the council take a fairly active stance in responding, and inviting others to respond to the OECD Report. This is at odds with our Ministry position that the report be allowed to die quietly. However, a number of other provinces and their ministers seem to be gung ho on this type of public linen washing exercise so we are probably a voice in the wilderness... ⁴⁷⁷

While defending the current nature of education and educational governance in Canada, provincial governments took issue with some of the conclusions of the Examiners’ report. In the case of the government of Ontario, particularly the Minister of Colleges and Universities, the view was that the OECD report did not reflect the situation as it then existed.

Dr. Harry Parrott, minister at this time, took exception to the statement that colleges were holding areas for students not wanted in universities. He argued that this sort of relationship was not characteristic of the Ontario system. ⁴⁷⁸

Because the review adopts a national perspective, many statements do not reflect the situation in Ontario said Dr. Parrott.... For example, a reference to community colleges as “waste baskets or holding areas for students unwanted by universities” is an irrelevant notion in this province. It suggests a hierarchical relationship which does not exist in Ontario, and was never intended to exist. ⁴⁷⁹

Parrott’s response is similar to others from government agencies, who having agreed to go along with the education-related international exercise wanted to distance themselves

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⁴⁷⁷ ItemB6: OECD Review of Educational Policies in Canada: Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1974; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
⁴⁷⁸ News Release: Dr. Parrott responds to OECD Review Education Policy in Canada; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1974; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
⁴⁷⁹ News Release: Dr. Parrott responds to OECD Review of Education Policy in Canada; Council of Ministers of Education Files, Canada 1972-1974; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3, Folder 6; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
from some of its outcomes. Diplomacy was useful only so long as it portrayed provincial actions in a positive light.

**Diplomacy and the Statement**

Foreign policy priorities other than education frequently arrested Ottawa’s attention throughout much of the 1970s.\(^{480}\) After the completion of the OECD Review and still smarting from the domestic Canadian response, yet another round of diplomacy was launched in 1978.\(^{481}\) Despite the lapse of time, and the learning that had ostensibly taken place in the course of the Review, the two levels of government acquitted themselves no better the second time around. They remained tied to the temporary accords that had marked earlier diplomatic activities.

In part, the second diplomatic engagement with the OECD would seek to redress the wounds of the earlier Review and put a greater emphasis on the education side of foreign policy. On invitation to participate, the federal government issued a *Statement by Canadian Authorities for the OECD Appraisal of Country Educational Policy Reviews*. This was a significant event in educational diplomacy as it fitted in with the just-completed OECD Review process and was an opportunity heaven-sent for Canadian politicians wishing to have a final word. The new document came out of the “Government of Canada” and the CMEC.\(^{482}\) Financial support for the *Statement* came from the Department of External Affairs, rather than the Secretary of State.\(^{483}\) Canadian

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\(^{480}\) Trudeau and Head’s review of the era, makes little mention of education. More attention will be drawn to this absence in the final chapter. Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau, *The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy 1968-1984* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995).

\(^{481}\) Other aspects of the Canadian role in the OECD, such as representation on the Education Committee continued uninterrupted.

\(^{482}\) The “Government of Canada” does little to indicate the document’s true origin. In some government document collections it is included with documents from the Prime Minister’s Office.

\(^{483}\) It is explicitly stated thus at the beginning of the document, “the preparation and the publication of this report have been made possible through the financial assistance of the Department of External Affairs and that of the provincial departments responsible for education....” Council of Ministers of Education,
authorities were now able to revisit recent history and rebut some of the most important criticisms of the Canadian education system. The two levels of government once more collaborated to take their views about education and about international education review processes to the diplomatic stage. Several points that been brought forth in the earlier Confrontation Meeting were reiterated.\textsuperscript{484}

Making fellow-OECD states aware of what they thought of the process was one of the foreign policy objectives of the Canadian government and the CMEC in making the decision to participate in the follow-on \textit{Statement} process. There was little press and little notice drawn to the \textit{Statement} in the publications of External Affairs.\textsuperscript{485} Despite its low profile, the two levels of government were reiterating one of the significant knowledge-disseminating objectives of the original Review.

\textit{\textsuperscript{i}) to furnish to OECD and its member states insights into Canadian educational developments and educational policies in a type of federal state which is unique among those member states.}\textsuperscript{486}

Canadian authorities wanted to let the rest of the world know what they felt about the process and the OECD's insensitivities concerning Canada's "unique" federalism.

Many of the comments in the new diplomatic document dealt with areas in which the Examiners were critical of Canada, or where Canadian officials felt that the process revealed too much of their domestic concerns. The lines of division between the provinces and the federal government remained quite clear in the makeup of the \textit{Statement}. Where the two levels of government agreed was in their criticism of the

\textsuperscript{484} OECD, \textit{Reviews}, passim.
\textsuperscript{485} There was not, for example, a press release, such as was the case for the OECD Examiners' report.
\textsuperscript{486} CMEC, \textit{A Statement}, p. 2.
Examiners and the Confrontation Meeting process. They suggested the following remedies.

i) ...more precise guidelines[should be given] to country authorities and examining teams with respect to
   - definition of objectives of the review
   - identification of advantages and disadvantages of a global review
   - planning of internal studies and reports
   - purposes of the external examination

ii) ...early appointment of examiners

iii) regular communications with the examining team concerning developments with respect to internal activities pertaining to the review in the subject country.487

From the nature of the criticisms there was an evident concern about future reviews. Whether Canadian reproaches had any kind of substantial impact in other capitals is improbable. The impact at the OECD headquarters was also muted as it was they who had initiated the Statement process. The OECD would change, but more often than not change came through the pressure of global economic events rather than with the input of countries’ critical responses to educational reviews.488

The two levels of government also made general observations about the Review process. There was criticism of the way in which the international organization handled the planning phase of the review.

While Canadian authorities received some early advice from OECD with respect to overall planning of the project and welcomed the latitude to plan, organize, and carry out the internal aspects of the Review, more guidance from OECD might have led to fewer negative reactions by the Examiners to some features of their consultations within the country.489

487 CMEC, A Statement, p. 27.
488 For the leaders at the OECD, less important were changes to the Review process than were initiatives to develop new ways of looking at educational problems. Papadopoulos, Education 1960, pp.141-142.
489 CMEC, A Statement, p. 25.
In a further twist to the whole question, the Canadian team recommended that the OECD set up a series of guidelines for future reviews and OECD involvement in education.

If it is desired by OECD that internal planning should be structured more uniformly for its own purposes or to facilitate the convenience and expectations of the Examiners, it would be helpful if OECD would set out some guidelines with respect to: objectives of a country review – elements of an internal report – purpose of the external examination.\textsuperscript{490}

The federal and provincial governments additionally continued to be in tacit accord, making it abundantly clear that constitutional issues were fixed and not open to discussion in a forum such as the OECD. This position was set out in the introduction of the \textit{Statement}.

For the purposes of a perspective concerning education in Canada, it is necessary to bear in mind that under the British North America Act education is under the jurisdiction of the respective governments of each of the ten provinces….Educational developments are therefore predicated on the constitutional reality that Canada has a multiplicity of unique and distinct systems of education.\textsuperscript{491}

When it came to the specific examination of the reasons why the different levels of government went in different directions and why “national” programs were not in favor, the 1978 document cited provincial predisposition.

\textit{[the Statement]} did offer such an appraisal, based on the Canadian exercise, 1973-1975, and also attempted a tentative assessment of the impact of the review. Events were grouped in three categories: “those related to the review and external report, features of the report which evoked negative responses, and developments congruent with but not necessarily related to the report.” The national associations were generally in favor of the examiners’ thrust for national goals and a national forum, but the provincial authorities were not…..On the whole, the \textit{Statement} reflected primarily the satisfaction of the provincial authorities with existing structures and directions and acknowledgement that improvements within those limits were desirable.\textsuperscript{492}

\textsuperscript{490}CMEC, \textit{A Statement}, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{491}CMEC, \textit{A Statement}, p. 1.
There remained the expectation on the part of the ten provincial governments that the existing status quo would continue.

Moreover, Ottawa and the provinces took aim at the question of federal involvement in the CMEC. That Ottawa agreed to this underlined the temporary nature of collaborative arrangements in the field of education.

Full involvement of the federal government in the affairs of the Council of Ministers of Education is impractical since, by definition, the Council is an organization of provincial ministers of education who are constitutionally responsible for education within their respective provinces. A more acceptable and mutually beneficial approach therefore is to cultivate working procedures and arrangements which provide for collaboration with the federal government in respect of matters of common concern.

The experience of the earlier part of the decade reinforced the CMEC tendency to tread cautiously in federal-provincial relations in this field in order to maximize the possible return on any particular actions that they might wish to take. Underlying concern about political costs and the ramifications of opening the Pandora's box of structural change were some of the latent reasons why the short-term collaboration continued.

Authorities from both levels of government made the further distinction between the internal report that they wrote and the external report that the Examiners authored.

It should be noted that the Internal Report addressed itself to educational matters and issues on the basis of the constitutional responsibility for education, and that the External Report was cast in the basic perspective of education as a national concern. This difference in perspectives has added a new dimension to the discussion and debate, the results of which may become more apparent in terms of impact in the next few years.

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495 CMEC, A Statement, p. 11.
Acknowledging the possibility that a national perspective on education might add a "new dimension," was an adroit way of handling questions of education on a Canada-wide basis. It also brushed under the carpet the notion that there was a history of "education as a national concern" and a history of various leaders' thoughts on structural change in education going back to John A. MacDonald. The possibility of change was an issue that both levels of government, to varying degrees, wanted to keep nebulous and undeveloped.

In response to OECD criticisms, the two levels of government argued that the views of grassroots educational organizations were considered in the development of Canadian educational policy. Despite the post-Review participation of these groups, the emphasis remained on "submitting views" and "a forum for discussion" rather than sharing governance responsibilities or ideas for institutional and structural change. Such was the response to this issue in the Statement.

In 1976 the Council of Ministers of Education invited twenty interested countrywide non-governmental organizations to submit their views concerning dimensions of the External Report which have national implications. Those which replied gave particular prominence to the importance of the themes of national goals and of a forum for countrywide and continuing dialogue concerning educational objectives, issues and policies. Ad hoc collaboration also entailed agreement to discount the position that the Canadian education system did not have any particular course or control.

All the Canadian authorities appreciate the importance attached by the Examiners to educational goals, the inference that the Canadian educational system is virtually rudderless in that respect, especially in terms of national goals, is viewed as a misinterpretation of historical evolution of the schools and the present situation. It is felt that the

496 Despite reassessments to the contrary, MacDonald in a letter to Ryerson thought that education should be under the control of the central government. Stamp, "Government," p. 452.
497 CMEC, A Statement, p. 12.
Examiners did not fully appreciate the realities of Canadian federalism, or indeed that the constitutional structure in Canada with respect to education has functioned in a manner reasonably acceptable to Canadians for over a century.\textsuperscript{498}

The Statement was very much a temporary response to the division of views that were expressed in Canada in the weeks and months following the conclusion of the Confrontation Meeting in December 1975. By reaffirming the status quo it did nothing more than vigorously defend provincial jurisdiction, to the disappointment of those that wished to see a change in the education system.\textsuperscript{499} Additionally, it attempted to curb and reduce the impact of the reforms that the OECD had advocated. The net result for government remained an inability to recognize that there was the possibility to change educational governance in Canada. Having a local perspective, rather than one that relied on a more sophisticated educational diplomacy and a broader international view, provincial governments reinforced parochial notions of how their educational systems should be run in the 1970s.

As a general observation, there is little evidence to indicate that the Review has yet had noticeable direct impact on educational policy changes in the individual regions. The interest and response of country-wide non-governmental organizations concerned with education was almost immediate and has been reflected in considerable discussion activity in conferences and other meetings...Federal and provincial governments, preoccupied with the on-going process of educational affairs, have judged it prudent to take time to consider the report...meanwhile to encourage public discussion of the review.\textsuperscript{500}

For the OECD itself, these types of criticisms had been received before and would be again. The emphasis of the Education Committee and the Examiners had to remain on the critical evaluation of all aspects of the education system, pointing out good and bad

\textsuperscript{498} CMEC. \textit{A Statement}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{499} In the latter part of the 1970s, groups wanting change remained predominately interest groups and some of the lower level school and board officials.
facets of its performance. Critical replies were often addressed to the Education Committee.\textsuperscript{501} The evaluation of many countries, all of them complaining to a lesser or greater degree about the process, did not overwhelm the Committee. Nor did these other countries quit the OECD. Rather, despite their complaints, most countries, Canada included, would not jeopardize their longer standing connection with the OECD over these issues. Hence, although the Statement was the foreign policy of Canada, it was done \textit{sotto voce} and did not threaten other ongoing economic initiatives with the OECD.\textsuperscript{502} Protests had to be seen to have been done.

That the Review had long term effects, remained to be seen. Certainly it gave the various organizations pause to consider how they approached education. In the process of examining the various perspectives, this reflection came up over and over again. Over time however, the outcomes of the Review became less important and the suggestions more muted as other items moved onto the agenda. In particular, the economic change that had wreaked havoc in Canada in the early part of the 1970s continued apace and the result was that all possible changes to education or any other part of the human services sector would be considered in the light of the increasingly tight economic strictures.\textsuperscript{503}

Conclusion

Several different elements characterized the international aspect of the OECD Review in the mid-1970s. However the development of this diplomatic exercise in education was heavily influenced by the \textit{ad hoc} compromises between the federal and

\textsuperscript{500} CMEC, \textit{A Statement}, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{501} By the late 1970s, this organization and other organs of the OECD were testing out different ideas to deal with the economic downturn. While undertaking the Statement process was important, this was part of a broader move to re-examine the ways in which the OECD looked at education. Papadopoulos, \textit{Education}, pp.142-143.
\textsuperscript{502} Canada remained represented on the Education Committee throughout this period.
the provincial governments. The Examiners' visit to Canada saw several different issues come up that entailed concessions on both the federal and provincial sides. The Examiners, as a result, were rushed and overwhelmed with documentation during their inspection trip. Similarly, the Confrontation Meeting in Paris also required *ad hoc* accord. One of the key questions to be answered in this instance was the composition of the delegation that would attend the examination. That, and the chairmanship of the delegation, made a statement on the way in which Canadians conducted education-related international activities. The provinces retained the chairmanship of the delegation, while the federal government provided watchdogs from the Department of External Affairs.

The element of *ad hoc* collaboration continued on into the Confrontation Meeting itself, but this event was difficult to stage-manage effectively because overriding control of this encounter was held by the Examiners. Canadian delegates were on the defensive trying to salvage the best possible outcome from the event. The Examiners for their part were deliberately orientated towards establishing the nature of problems in the system, hence when examining Canadian ministries of education, the lack of clear federal authority and process was central to their discussion.

The diplomacy of the OECD Review was also characterized by the domestic response it received in Canada. In addition to the concerns about the Review process itself, interested Canadians’ conclusions reflected divided views on diplomacy in education and the surrounding issues of federalism. There remained very strong supporters of the existing system and the *ad hoc* agreements that were part of the OECD experience. These supporters included the Canadian Education Association. Members of

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this organization saw no need to reform the existing system. Supporters also included the ranks of the educational bureaucrats and the political leadership, comprising the CMEC and associated provincial ministers. Groups and individuals that were less satisfied with the existing structure and the supporting role that diplomacy played in this structure included national organizations such as the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, the OECD Examiners themselves, and, notably, the prime minister, Pierre Trudeau. With a different objective in mind, officials from Quebec were also dissatisfied with the existing set of rules. The shifting sands of Quebec politics at the time of the Review underlined Quebec's unique position on diplomacy in education. At the national level, the Review was a yet another occurrence in a long line of federal-provincial challenges in which the federal government was determined to maintain their ascendancy over the development and direction of foreign policy. The provinces, however, retained sufficient strength to mold that foreign policy in their own direction in the field of education as was quite evident with the OECD Review.

The post-Review environment and the issuance of the *Statement* marked another phase in the *ad hoc* use of diplomacy in education. The compromise needed in order to bring together the various participants and once more enunciate their position was now a familiar exercise. The *Statement* condemned various aspects of the OECD Review process. In their examination of the Review, officials from the two levels of government were critical of the time-lines of the Review, the nature of the reporting, the nature of the communications with the national (i.e. Canadian government) government and several other issues. Many of these self-same questions had arisen at the time of the Review, and the directions taken in their resolution were in part determined by the CMEC. Both
levels of government also took particular issue with the idea that the OECD would stick its nose into Canadian constitutional issues.

Attention can now be turned in the final chapter to the evolution of the place of the CMEC in Canada’s education-related international activities and the tangled questions that accompanied its rise. Although it was to emerge from a relatively weak position in the 1960s to become increasingly part of the equations of politicians in Canada during the 1970s, its fundamental structural inadequacies continued to affect its long-term development. It also incarnated the trend towards “executive federalism.” The era of the latter part of the 1970s also marked the beginnings of the federal government’s turn towards private and commercial education in international relations, yet another change that marked a departure from previous decades.
Chapter 7
The CMEC, Federalism and "the Ottawa Way" in Education, 1970-1984

Introduction
Notwithstanding the shifting international scenery that was profoundly altering the outside world, Canadian diplomacy in education in the 1970s and the early 1980s remained marked by misunderstandings, provisional accords, and last minute compromises. The emergence and evolution of the CMEC from a committee of the CEA into a larger separate organization with its own secretariat contributed to the contingent nature of the relationship between federal and provincial authorities in this era. Accommodating the growing pains of a new agency led to circumstantial agreements on a wide range of educational issues. Self-definition remained an important matter for the CMEC during most of this period.

Moreover, the integration of the Council of Ministers into the wider context of Canadian federalism during this period correspondingly retarded the regularization of international relations in education. Throughout the 1970s numerous new agencies emerged and had a profound effect on the day-to-day operation of federalism in Canada. Political-elites and administrators, despite their coolness to change, benefited from the transformations taking place in transportation and communications. As had been the case a century before with maritime travel, the ongoing revolution in air travel and telecommunications made the distances much less overwhelming. The effect of bringing

504 Pierre Trudeau and Ivan Head's book The Canadian Way can perhaps be better entitled using the capital city. At least provincial leaders would think so! Trudeau and Head, The Canadian Way, p. ix.
previously-isolated provincial and federal elites closer together accelerated and altered the dynamics of the federal-provincial relationship.505

Continued federal interest and involvement in education at the international level did not ease the settlement of the issue between the two levels of government. Federal attention was heightened as internationalization continued to make an impact on economic systems and on governments around the world. Furthermore, the issues of nationalism and Canadian unity drove the federal government’s interest in this field, both in matters of strategic importance and in the minutiae of policy. In an era of increasingly close alignment between activities, news, and response time, the federal government saw it in its self-interest to ensure that its transitory diplomats briefed its traditional envoys, the ambassadors and consuls that served in “line” positions in embassies in foreign countries.

**The CMEC**

During the first decade and a half of its existence, changes in the CMEC organization and mission contributed greatly to the provisional character of its relationship with the federal government in the area of diplomacy in education. The underlying issue of the organization’s search for a role at both the national and international levels during this period permeated the *ad hoc* cooperation that did occur between the two levels of government. The repeated attempts to establish a place for itself in Canadian international relations occurred simultaneously with the organization’s evolving view of its capacities in this domain. The alternatives that it faced varied widely. Full control and monitoring of all international education activities – effectively taking on

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505 The change was dramatic. The example of the first meeting between Premier Ernest Manning of Alberta and C.D. Howe, federal Minister of Trade and Commerce, which only took place in 1952 after both
the tasks of a national ministry of education - would potentially mean involvement with
or taking over the responsibilities of sixty federal agencies.\textsuperscript{506} This would include
international educational activities in everything from CIDA to the Ministry of Labour.
Given the small size of the CMEC secretariat, this was not feasible. Simply working
with the Department of External Affairs, by contrast, was a much easier but weaker
option. The federal department also dealt with a much-narrower portion of Canadian
international education as time went on and continuing to go to it would prolong a
disadvantageous relationship.\textsuperscript{507} Other options called for the individual provinces to
retain some control over their own education-related international activities. In this last
scenario, the CMEC would involve itself only in the most general of international
activities. Individual provinces would pursue their own regional international interests
and in some cases would represent themselves alone at international conferences.\textsuperscript{508}

Contacts with the federal government remained provisional in the early years as
the CMEC rejected the \textit{status quo} relationship that the Standing Committee of Ministers
of Education had had with Ottawa. That interaction consisted primarily of limited
communication of information received from overseas, and requests for
recommendations regarding delegations to international events. There was no discussion
as to who controlled the governance and the policy-making of Canada's foreign relations

\textsuperscript{506} Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Deputy Ministers of Education, May 12, 1976; Council of Ministers of Education Files, Canada Files 1974-1978; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 4; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

\textsuperscript{507} Increasingly, non-governmental organizations were coming into the field.

\textsuperscript{508} The last option re-surfaced in a innocuous paragraph in the 1973 CMEC Task Force Report on
International Education Events. Echoes of the 1968 conferences in Libreville, Gabon and Paris, France
continued to prod provincial efforts forward to assert their influence on the international stage.
\textit{Involvement of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada in International Education Events, January 10, 1974; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1974-1978; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 4; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.}
in education. There were indications that the Council wanted to do more. In early 1973, the Secretary of State and the Council met. It was at that meeting that the Council stated it wanted a joint effort to address the issue.

With reference to the provincial position paper on Council involvement in international education, the ministers stressed the importance of an early joint meeting on this question in light of the recommendations presented. The provinces stated anew that they want to be consulted when overall policy is established. Mr. Faulkner indicated that he would pass on their paper and comments to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The initial inter-provincial feistiness was seen as more saber rattling in the already-expanding battle between Ottawa and provincial authorities over jurisdiction in a wide variety of areas. This also did not convince the federal government that it should alter the transient character of contact with the provinces and the CMEC in this field; rather, it reinforced a “wait and see” attitude. Ottawa continued to be the preponderant actor in international educational affairs in this period and thus could watch the CMEC’s efforts with a degree of confidence about its role.

During the latter part of 1973, the Council of Ministers further prolonged the temporary nature of the relationship with Ottawa in this area through its internal activities. In an effort to define more clearly its direction, the CMEC established a task force on international relations. Coming in the aftermath of the early contacts with the

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510 Secretary of State Hugh Faulkner met with the Council. Minutes of the Meeting Between the Council and Federal Government Representatives, February 20th, 1973; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1974; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.  
511 Minutes of the Meeting Between the Council and Federal Government Representatives, February 20th, 1973; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1974; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.  
512 Nossal discusses this in general terms; the threat to federal primacy was gauged and the response calibrated in turn. Nossal, The Politics, p. 273.
federal government, its mandate was to investigate and report on education-related international activities. It was also to focus on the Department of External Affairs in an effort to obtain a more "equal" arrangement. Its final report was presented at the Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Deputy Ministers on December 5th, 1973. The document underscored the Council’s lack of satisfaction with the existing arrangement. It acknowledged the federal government’s role, but decried the international ignorance of the Council’s capacity in education matters.

The Council... fully recognizes and accepts the federal government’s position that the Department of External Affairs is the agency responsible for carrying out Canada’s foreign policy. It should be pointed out, however that, since the Council of Ministers of Education is made up of all provincial ministers responsible for education, it is the only national body representing those jurisdictions which have the constitutional responsibility for education in Canada. Therefore, the Council requests the federal government to recognize the competence of the provinces to speak to educational content at all international conferences dealing with education and to accept the Council’s role in providing the leadership and continuity which are necessary to ensure adequate involvement of the Canadian education community in international education events.

The Council proposed to establish a coordinating framework for education-related international activities.

It is the wish of the ministers of education that a mechanism for cooperation between the Council and the Department of External Affairs be established which would take into account these dual responsibilities. It is primarily for the purpose of strengthening Canada’s position in the international education community that the Council feels it should assume a more important role in the coordination of Canadian involvement in international education matters....

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513 Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Deputy Ministers of Education December 5, 1973: Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
This report helped to extend the ad hoc nature of existing contacts between the two levels of government as it pressed a position that provincial authorities should become the locus of control for diplomacy in education. This view remained untenable for the Department of External Affairs. It would direct foreign policy. Relations with the CMEC would continue to focus on the day-to-day activities, while at the same time, Ottawa watched these new developments with an unblinking vigilance.\(^{516}\)

As time went on, both the Council of Ministers and the Advisory Committee of Deputy Ministers of Education (ACDME)\(^{517}\) continued to search for the best way to put an inter-provincial imprimatur on education-related international activities, and to establish longer-term processes and structures that were provincially directed. Just how to influence the federal-provincial interaction in order to maintain the best CMEC position evolved with each subsequent meeting and document. The minutes of the Council of Ministers meetings also conveyed the continued reality of the ad hoc arrangements between the provinces and the federal government on education-related international events. Time-limited agreements on exchanges, participation in conferences, and the distribution of related documentation continued unabated. The following is typical of this era.

13. Canada-USSR Exchanges Agreement – The proposed new agreement is attached. It should be noted that we have already made our comments through the Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs on this proposed new agreement. Six particular terms of the new agreement are suggested for special attention in the Council documents.

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\(^{516}\) Mitchell Sharp’s document continued to set the framework for education-related international activities. Canada. Federalism, 1968.

\(^{517}\) The ACDME was established in September 1972 as an adjunct to the more primary political Council of Ministers and to streamline Secretariat activities. Selected List of Council Activities 1968-69 to 1975-76; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1974-1978; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78. Accession 17719, Box 4; Toronto: Archives of Ontario. Also, CMEC. Annual Report 1972-1973 (Toronto: CMEC, 1973), p.2.
Of these six we made reference either directly or generally to all of these with the exception of exchanges to study the question of mutual recognition of diplomas, degrees, and certificates. The other important new area which we did refer specifically to in our comments to the TEIGA people was the extension of exchanges into the field of vocation and technical education. Perhaps this one should be emphasized at the deputy’s meeting in Montreal.\textsuperscript{518}

The Council continued to wrestle internally with the issue, and it remained unresolved. The power to decide who did what in international activities was wished for, yet at the same time there was continued reticence on the part of the Council to undertake any further financial obligations in a time of provincial retrenchment.\textsuperscript{519} This curious duality by a small organization confronting huge federal ministries with large budgets did much to undermine the credibility of those who wished to be the modern-day Talleyrands and Ryersons in Canadian international education.

While internal task forces and meetings did much to reinforce the provisional character of diplomacy in education and little to put the administration of this question on a longer-term footing, other inter-provincial approaches foundered as well. Contact with federal ministers of foreign affairs was another avenue that the Council attempted to use to address the issue and also clarify the Council of Ministers’ position towards it.\textsuperscript{520}

More often than not however, ministerial contacts, whether they were meetings or

\textsuperscript{519} The reluctance to take on further financial commitments can be attributed to several factors. Primary amongst these was the changing importance of education generally as the 1970s progressed. Also of importance was the recognition on the part of provincial authorities that having an international presence cost large amounts of money. Kim Richard Nossal, “Anything but Provincial: The Provinces and Foreign Affairs,” \textit{Provinces: Canadian Provincial Politics}, ed. Christopher Dunn (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1996), p. 506.
\textsuperscript{520} Meetings between the two levels of government were not frequent. Mitchell Sharp met with the CMEC in June 1973. Following this meeting, the issue was primarily addressed in correspondence. \textit{Summary of Discussions and Correspondence Relative to the Role of the Council in International Education Activities;}
correspondence dealt *per force* with the immediate financial needs of specific international activities and did not speak to the broader issues of the relationship.\textsuperscript{521} Also, in many cases more serious discussions were often diverted at the last minute because of other pressing issues. This pattern continued to engender frustration on the part of the provincial ministers in this era and contributed to the prolonged state of incertitude.

By the end of the CMEC's early period, diplomacy in education remained an activity based on limited agreements with Ottawa, *ad hoc* correspondence and last minute ministerial accords. The coming era of the OECD Review saw the pressure for change mount, but basic agreement on a new process remained the Gordian knot at the center of the question.

The 1974 to 1976 period marked a public shifting of gears in diplomacy in education with the OECD Review, and the public reappraisal of the whole question of national governance in education. It also marked continued turbulence within the CMEC and the elusiveness of a longer-term accord in its relationship with Ottawa over diplomacy. In the aftermath of the OECD Review, and concurrently with Prime Minister Trudeau's musings at a First Ministers Conference on the utility of a federal-provincial "forum" on higher education\textsuperscript{522}, the organization's Secretariat produced the document *Future Directions for the CMEC*. This discussion paper was designed to elicit opinions and discussions on where the Council should go in the future. Provincial ministers of education, provincial Premiers, and deputies were asked to give their input into the

\textsuperscript{521} As noted in the last chapter, contacts between the CMEC and the Minister of External Affairs also dealt with the most pressing concerns in the diplomacy of education, as was the case with the OECD Review.
process. The commentary of the New Brunswick Deputy Minister of Education gives some idea of the frustrations with the existing organization. It also underlines the as-of-yet tentative nature of the CMEC’s self-view and activities in 1976. It was written to the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers at the time, Lucien Perras.

Dear Mr. Perras:
Perhaps the discussion on future directions for the Council of Ministers on May 12 in Montreal was as frustrating for you as it was for me. It became increasingly apparent to me during the meeting that there are ten systems of education, and people for each province identify, educationally, only with his own province. This point of view precludes any kind of national orientation...
Best Wishes.
Sincerely,
P.J.H. (Harry) Malmberg

The other provincial responses were mixed. Some felt that the exercise was an excellent starting point for future discussions on the orientation of the organization, while others questioned the relevance of the agency. The Alberta government was particularly concerned that future movement on the question of reorganization of the CMEC would have implications in terms of cost. The British Columbians, for their part, were concerned about the overall aim of the CMEC. Should its primary orientation be political or should it be administrative only? Officials and politicians from the Manitoban Ministry of Education were concerned that the organization had to walk a tricky line between political intervention, and at the same time respect for the political jurisdiction of provincial governments. Other provinces put the emphasis on improving the organization’s image. They also felt that the CMEC should differentiate itself from

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provincial lobby groups on education. It should reflect the countrywide needs of the students using the education system rather than the goals of the state.\textsuperscript{524}

Notwithstanding the commentary over the issue of governance and structural reform within the CMEC, the Council's position on international relations in education remained that of the 1974 Task Force report.\textsuperscript{525} The importance given to education-related international activities in this document reflected the priorities of the CMEC. Competing priorities were emerging, funding for second-language education and higher education, in particular, but the Council continued to have only limited resources to address them all.

In 1976, by the time of the twenty-sixth Council\textsuperscript{526} meeting in Halifax, the direction of the CMEC's relations with Ottawa concerning international relations in education remained provisional in nature. This meeting took place between the nineteenth and twenty-second of September and was a rare departure from earlier meetings as it included a session with the federal Secretary of State. The Council was keen to address several issues with the federal minister, not the least of which was the availability of ministers.

The CMEC has been trying unsuccessfully for two years to arrange meetings with federal ministers to discuss the effects of federal programs and policies on education matters....The CMEC therefore wants an arrangement that will permit it to talk to all relevant federal ministers e.g. Manpower and Immigration about foreign students, manpower training, career planning; External Affairs about representation at international

\textsuperscript{524} Agenda Item 2: Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Deputy Ministers of Education, December 5, 1973; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1972-1976; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 84-1090, Box 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

\textsuperscript{525} Future Directions of the Council of Ministers of Education; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1974-1978; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 4; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

\textsuperscript{526} The Ministers of Education as opposed to the earlier meetings of the Deputy Ministers (the ACDME).
education conferences; Secretary of State about bilingualism, post-secondary financing.527

In spite of concerns about the frequency of federal/provincial meetings, the Council’s encounter with the Secretary of State illustrated the ongoing inability of the two levels of government to come to some sort of longer term accord on issues in the education sector, notably diplomacy, among others. The federal aim in the meeting was to establish a closer link with the Council of Ministers to cover all issues in education. Ottawa was also specifically interested in focusing on post-secondary education. The federal government wanted the CMEC to become the vehicle for communications between the two levels of government. This type of arrangement would augment agreements that Ottawa already had in place with non-governmental organizations such as the AUCC, the CAUT, and the CBIE.528 It would do so by formalizing a federal-provincial structure in education.529

Much of the CMEC/Secretary of State meeting was spent entangled in definitions. In particular both sides could not agree on what constituted a “national forum.” The federal minister, John Roberts, and his predecessor, Hugh Faulkner, did not want to be drawn on what exactly this meant preferring to leave it to be sorted out by others. This perplexed the provincial education ministers. They thought that the federal minister would come to the table with new ideas – and they also felt that any talk of

527 G.S. Posen, Director, Federal-Provincial and Interprovincial Affairs Secretariat to Mr. E.D. Greathed, Executive Director, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
528 Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, the Canadian Association of University Teachers, and the Canadian Bureau of International Education.
529 G.S. Posen, Director, Federal-Provincial and Interprovincial Affairs Secretariat to Mr. E.D. Greathed, Executive Director, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
existing "national forums" led to the Council itself. The ministers also took particular exception to John Roberts' statement that the Secretary of State was to be the only contact between the federal government and the CMEC. Dr. Harry Parrott of Ontario argued that the Secretary of State could act to insulate federal ministries and the provinces from discussion rather than facilitating it. The British Columbia Minister of Education, Patrick McGeer, suggested that having a federal minister who dealt with all education questions, was by any other name, a federal Minister of Education. John Roberts did not agree with either of these views. The discussion then dissolved as Roberts did not have a "clean text" copy of his proposals to distribute to his fellow ministers. That the matter remained unresolved caused many memoranda and much discussion within the CMEC.

The provincial ministers danced around one central question in their meeting with the federal minister: What was to be the future nature of federal interaction with the CMEC? It was one area that they had discussed in the past and the consensus was that the CMEC remain strictly an inter-provincial organization. Roberts and the federal government wanted to put in place a more established procedure whereby Ottawa would be able to place items on the agenda of the meetings of the Council of Ministers. The statement that the ministers agreed to, "Relations with the Federal Government," did not go into the fine print of how federal-provincial cooperation would be worked out in

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530 Meeting of the CMEC with Sec. of State on Sept. 20/76; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
531 Meeting of the CMEC with Sec. of State on Sept. 20/76; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
532 Meeting of the CMEC with Sec. of State on Sept. 20/76; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
future cases, rather it expressed the provinces' continued desire to further inter-provincial co-operation in education. Relations with Ottawa would only be carried out on a consultative and co-operative basis with regard to specific programs. Provisional treatment of diplomatic questions would continue.

Provincial desire to retain power in the area of education as expressed at the meeting with John Roberts stated education-related international activities to remain transient in nature. The notion that the federal government could join provincial ministers through full partnership in a "forum" or through continued access to CMEC meetings was unacceptable. The federal government, for its part, also wanted the proposed "forum" to supersede some of the functions of the CMEC and this was equally untenable.

While the mid-1970s saw the provisional character of diplomacy in education drawn out with the changing nature of the CMEC, the latter part of the decade started to see the emergence of more collaboration and compromise between the two levels of government. Despite this, it would take another decade before a continuous regulating committee was established to manage the question.

Signs that the ad hoc nature of education-related international activities was being addressed came in early 1977. Following the meeting between the federal Secretary of State and the Council of Ministers in the late summer of 1976, the Council spent that

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533 Proposed Text For A CMEC Statement on Relations with the Federal Government; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
534 Proposed Text For A CMEC Statement on Relations with the Federal Government; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
autumn revisiting the questions raised in the earlier meeting and how to better address them. Correspondence continued with the Secretary of State and it was agreed that existing communication methods would be used for the time being to further discussion. Now that federal ministers were more willing to be available and gave more recognition to the place of the CMEC, contacts with the Secretary of State for External Affairs started in late winter of 1977. By the summer of that year, both the CMEC and the foreign ministry were discussing the administration of international education activities on a more co-operative basis. Provincial reservations remained however.

Dear Mr. Hanuschak,

It has recently been brought to my attention that, in spite of the reassurances contained in my letter of March 2, the Council of Ministers of Education still has certain reservations.... on Canadian delegations to international education conferences....I thought, however, that it would be helpful at this stage if I were to spell out in some greater detail than has heretofore been possible, my own understanding of the important consultative relationship between the Council and my Department in this matter of international conferences.537

Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson, in addition to wishing to allay CMEC, and by extension provincial, wariness towards the idea of coming to some sort of accord on the issue of diplomacy in education also addressed the constitutional issue.

I believe it essential that any procedure we follow in this matter take into full account the constitutional responsibilities of the provincial governments in the field of education, the expertise of the provincial authorities and the responsibility of the Secretary of State for External Affairs for the conduct of Canada's external relations.538

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536 FPCCERIA was created in the latter part of the 1980s.
538 Don Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ben Hanuschak, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Education and Minister of Education for Manitoba, August 22, 1977: Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
Having addressed these concerns, Jamieson discussed the mechanics of his proposal for augmented collaboration in this area. It placed much of the responsibility for the composition of delegations to international conferences in the hands of the CMEC, provided that there were ongoing consultations with the foreign ministry. Jamieson also included the caveat that the provinces had to consider several national factors amongst their criteria for the establishment of delegations. Delegations should reflect the diverse linguistic makeup of the country, and naturally the two major language groups. They should also take into account both the need for efficiency, and the need for economy.  

The CMEC was favourably inclined towards Jamieson’s perspective and shortly thereafter in late September 1977, the first set of Procedures for Canada’s Participation in International Education Conferences, 1977 was agreed to by the federal government and the provinces.  

As the first federal/provincial “understanding,” the Procedures represented a substantial step towards a longer-term agreement on diplomacy in education. However, the remainder of the decade and the early 1980s still saw continued disagreements and provisional diplomacy. One of the problems that arose was the CMEC’s view that they were out of the foreign policy “loop.” Much of the international communications received in Ottawa regarding diplomacy in education remained in the capital. The CMEC had successfully petitioned to obtain an annual list of all conferences to which Ottawa received invitations, but the mechanics of that process were still too slow to be

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539 Don Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ben Hanuschak, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Education and Minister of Education for Manitoba, August 22, 1977; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.  
effective. There were also issues with the selection of delegates and the activities of delegates once they were in the country where the international conference on education was being held.\textsuperscript{541} On one occasion in 1980, the Department of External Affairs unilaterally de-selected a provincial minister from the list of delegates to the UNESCO General Conference in Sofia, Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{542} In a summit meeting held in April 1981, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan and provincial ministers of education agreed to set up a temporary "working group" on diplomacy in education.\textsuperscript{543}

Over a year later, in September of 1982 a further understanding of agreement was established between the Council of Ministers of Education and the Department of External Affairs, \textit{Participation of Delegates in International Conferences Related to Education}.\textsuperscript{544} The meetings of the working group, and this further "understanding" represented additional steps towards the longer-term resolution of the issue. The continued appearance of problems with the mechanics of the process however led to further disagreement and more last-minute accords. The establishment of agreed-upon terms of reference and a more permanent consultative federal/provincial body on which to build diplomacy in education were not yet a reality and would have to wait.\textsuperscript{545} At the end of the Trudeau era in 1984, such a structure had not yet emerged, although through

\textsuperscript{541} The CMEC continued to have a dubious view that understandings would be adhered to by the federal government during this period. \textit{Minutes of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, September 25-27, 1977}; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1978; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 17999, Box 78/2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

\textsuperscript{542} \textit{CMEC Summary Record of Discussions: Meeting Between the Council of Ministers of Education and The Honourable Mark MacGuigan...}; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1981; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 22321, Box 81/1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

\textsuperscript{543} \textit{CMEC Summary Record of Discussions: Meeting Between the Council of Ministers of Education and The Honourable Mark MacGuigan...item 4, p. 5.}; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1981; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 22321, Box 81/1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

\textsuperscript{544} Council, \textit{Understandings}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{545} Only with the further efforts did the CMEC and the Department of External Affairs establish FPCCERIA in March, 1986. This Committee was designed to put in place once and for all a mechanism
the joint working group, discussions were continuing on the issue. The ad hoc character of diplomacy in education persisted.

**Federalism and Diplomacy in the 1970s**

While looking at the changing nature of the CMEC provides a partial explanation of the incidental character of diplomacy in education, another key to understanding why it remained ad hoc for such a long period of time can be found by studying the features of federalism of this era. Resolution of the question was delayed because the climate of federalism in the 1970s and early 1980s was one of flux and change. Canada during this time was on its way to becoming one of the most decentralized, and in the words of one author, “quasi-feudal confederations” in the world. With the changing roles of governments, issues that in previous times were entirely administrative in nature suddenly became the purview of politicians. In this period as well, formerly nonexistent provincial powers not only sprouted up, but also became nakedly apparent in both their aspect and execution. The provinces, in their continued desire to expand their horizons, sought greater profiles domestically, and in some cases further involvement on the international stage. Furthermore, the appearance of new federal/provincial agencies such as the CMEC and the changing nature of “executive federalism” complicated what was already a crowded institutional environment.

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546 Discussions carried on through to 1984 and election of a new federal government. *Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Deputy Ministers of Education, December 7-8th, 1983; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1983; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 29327, Box 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.*


549 For more on the variety of nations see Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.32.
The contingent character of international education persisted as traditional notions of what constituted "politics" and what was meant by "administration" broke down during the 1970s. The "classical" federalism of the past century in which the two levels of government carried out their constitutional responsibilities in idealized isolation from each other had passed. Whitaker characterizes the earlier Canadian federal system in his examination of elites.

The constitution of Canada has been from 1867 onward, an arrangement between elites....The deference to elites and, more especially, to political elites resulted in the emergence and acceptance of often closed negotiations of pacts on matters of general public concern between elected and appointed officials of the two levels of government.550

Under this system, government elites did not intervene in a great number of different fields, and much of the day-to-day work was left to the ongoing administration. In the 1970s, this had changed radically. In sheer size, the number of areas where government was active had dramatically increased. Moreover, there were political costs and benefits for every step that a government took. The stable politics of good government were giving way to a slicker calculus of polls, and the need to develop a winning record for the next election.551 Governments and political parties were also forced to re-structure their political coalitions. Traditional allegiances had broken down. The federal government for its part sought out under-represented groups and targeted their interests. In the context of the Council of Ministers and international education, one example of this type of change came with curriculum. Over time, and because of evolving OECD standards, the question of curriculum developed international implications that had an impact on

551 While foreign affairs did not get the same treatment as domestic issues did, increasing attention was being paid to international issues both in the media and through polling. Nossal, The Politics, p. 116.
Canadian politics, particularly at the provincial level. Its overall thrust was no longer just in the realm of administrators, to say nothing of teachers and curriculum specialists. Political careers were increasingly on the line.

The new federal-provincial "political" reality, in addition to discouraging more established processes, also reinforced the federal-provincial divide in education. In times of necessity, banding together across provincial political ideologies to establish a common front was seen as a more effective way of dealing with federal/provincial "political" issues, such as diplomacy in education.

Federal-provincial conflicts were becoming too serious, too profound, and too sensitive to be safely entrusted to the diplomatic and managerial skills of subordinate officials...At the same time or subsequently a number of other serious conflicts emerged which involved provinces other than Quebec: conflicts over tax-sharing and the financing of health, education, and welfare, over economic relations with the United States, over regional development and the competitive scramble for investment, and over the division of benefits from natural resources. All of these matters were clearly "political" rather than "administrative."

Far from the days when going to a Commonwealth education conference was a junket for provincial politicians and education officials to celebrate internationally the successes of yet another year, international education was also increasingly the subject of scrutiny by the media and the public. Nothing could be left to chance and the "higher"(i.e. federal) level of government. Ottawa was approached with a calculated level of mistrust. There remained a tendency as well to retreat to one's own provincial position, particularly if

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552 Not much of this was evident in the early days, obviously the OECD Review was more highly visible in this regard. In contemporary times there is greater transparency between the provincial and international. The setting of the policy agenda can be seen in documents such as OECD, *The Introduction of the New Information Technologies in Education: Policy Trends and Developments in Member Countries* (Paris: CERI, 1984).

553 Stevenson, *Unfulfilled*, p. 192.

554 Stevenson, *Unfulfilled*, p. 192.
other provinces weren’t in agreement over a particular issue. “Politics” would not end here and would continue in times of ongoing economic uncertainty.\footnote{Hobsbawm, \textit{Nations}, p.81. Heather-Jane Robertson also continues this history in the more contemporary context with a discussion of the economic side of this question. Robertson, \textit{No More Teachers}, pp. 28-29.}

Concomitant with the politicization of issues, provincial power surged forward during the decade and was another factor that deferred the resolution of the matter of international education. The re-regulation of federal-provincial relations proceeded through newly-established and assertive ministries of inter-governmental affairs. Claude Morin set the pace in the 1960s and early 1970s in Quebec.\footnote{See Chapter 3.} Most anglophone provinces followed suit and established intergovernmental affairs offices in the 1970s. Their appearance in Alberta(1972), Newfoundland(1975), Ontario(1978), British Columbia(1979) and Saskatchewan(1979) heralded a new wave of provincial influence in Canadian politics.\footnote{Brock, "The End," pp. 97-98. These moves were followed in 1993 by one of the few acts of Kim Campbell’s short-lived government, the shift of the Federal-Provincial relations office to report directly to the Prime Minister. Although Campbell does not mention this in her autobiography, she does discuss federal-provincial relations; Kim Campbell, \textit{Time and Chance} (Toronto: McClelland-Bantam: 1997), pp. 330-331.} Many officials from inter-governmental affairs offices served as resources when interactions between governments were not going well. The presence of provincial intergovernmental affairs officials at one of the meetings of the CMEC in the middle of the 1970s in Halifax was notable, but in the end these officials did not possess any magic cure that would resolve the ongoing issues that cropped up in the organization’s interaction with Ottawa.\footnote{G.S. Posen, \textit{Director Federal-Provincial Affairs Secretariat to E.D. Greathed, Executive Director, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, September 27th, 1975}; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78. Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.}
Agreement on questions using intergovernmental machinery was slow, and provincial ambitions for greater control constantly hovered over all activities, whether they were national or international. The more political problems and obstacles that were apt to arise, and the wider the audience of interest, the greater the likelihood that the process would bog down. Diplomacy in education was one of those areas that covered a lot of territory.

Along with the machinery relating to the most comprehensive concerns of the two levels, there is a vast and complex network of federal-provincial interactions dealing with more specific matters. These range in specificity from meetings related to the national inventory of historic buildings to the annual conference of ministers of health, labour, the environment, and so on. As a general rule, the more limited the scope of such interactions the more likely there is to be agreement—agreement based on the professional norms of engineers, foresters, social workers, public health specialists, and so on.\textsuperscript{560}

There was no common ground in federal/provincial interactions in international education.\textsuperscript{561} Participants from both levels saw themselves as diplomats and statesmen. Ministers and senior officials from the provinces had a sophisticated knowledge of the education system, while the federal minister focused exclusively on international questions and how they were to be treated in the Canadian context.\textsuperscript{562}

The continued aspirations of Quebec also remained influential in stalling movement away from \textit{ad hoc} diplomacy in education during this period. Quebec’s activities in this area remained a benchmark by which things were measured. The early part of the decade saw the federalist Bourassa government working within the Canadian

\textsuperscript{560} Smiley, \textit{Canada}, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{561} To say nothing of domestic educational issues. Few politicians and educationalists wished to agree over the national standardization of teaching qualifications as one example. This remains an ongoing question.
\textsuperscript{562} Ministers had more political acumen, officials knew how to administer the system, while teachers, parents and students dealt with "public education." As noted earlier, the overall effectiveness of ministers and deputies over the longer term was limited by the revolving door nature of the education portfolio.
The rise of the Parti Québécois and their success in winning power in 1976 changed this state of affairs. The spillover of Quebec nationalist fervor into the discussions of the Council of Ministers of Education was not insignificant. Quebec ministers acted with the intent of warding away federal intrusions into the field of education and any efforts to set up "national" education-related forums. This perspective was very succinctly put in Minister Jacques Yvan-Morin’s welcoming speech to the CMEC Council meeting in January, 1977 in Quebec City. In his speech, Morin advanced *sotto voce* the sovereignists’ approach to educational issues. The Parti Québécois government embraced the CMEC as something that could be used to enhance its position in preparation for a push towards separation. The Quebec minister contended that the provinces should continue to pursue actions that would further their autonomy. In the context of this, they should also work towards increased inter-provincial solidarity. The action that they should not take was to allow federal participation in decision-making on educational issues. Particularly unpalatable to separatists was the notion that the inter-provincial Council of Ministers of Education should be reformed to allow Ottawa to have a permanent seat on the Council. Morin’s presentation did not brook any public opposition from his assembled peers, nor did it hurt his position on the Council. In the latter part of 1977, he quickly became vice-chairman and subsequently chairman of the organization.

Quebec Minister of Education Morin’s case illustrates the diversity of viewpoints that the Council of Ministers had to accommodate in dealing with issues such as

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diplomacy. A number of the anglophone ministers, although not comfortable with proposed arrangements for the Council that included Ottawa, had a greater acceptance of the notion of some sort of federal participation. The following memorandum witnesses the Ontario Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs' view on this issue.

The CMEC's intention to develop more regular contacts with the federal government and to consider federal-provincial issues suggest that continuing intergovernmental representation would be desirable if for no other reason but to ensure that Ontario delegations in one forum are aware of what other Ontario representatives have said in other forums on similar issues. For example, the CMEC might well wish to speak with the federal Minister of Manpower and Immigration about manpower training issues. However Manpower issues in general are already discussed in a federal-provincial forum of ministers responsible for manpower in which Ontario is represented by the Minister of Labour. By being part of the Ontario delegation to both sets of meetings, an Ontario intergovernmental representative can contribute to ensuring consistency in the Ontario point of view and to identifying any inconsistency in the federal approach.565

Ottawa, for the Quebec separatists however, remained an anathema. Much less than identify "the inconsistencies in the federal approach," the new Quebec City government wanted nothing to do with the federal capital. As such, the different straining directions in which the CMEC could go limited the number of long-term processes and subsidiary organizations that could be set up in all areas, not the least of which was education-related international activities.566

565 G.S. Posen, Director Federal-Provincial Affairs Secretariat to E.D. Greathed, Executive Director, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, September 27th, 1976; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1975-1977; Ministry of Colleges and Universities; RG32-78, Accession 17719, Box 3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
The provisional character of diplomacy in education must ultimately be addressed with the influence of "executive federalism" in mind. Agencies dedicated to inter-provincial and intergovernmental relationships multiplied exponentially during this era. Some of these were set up strictly at the administrative level, while others were made up of deputy ministers. Still others included politicians, administrators, and both levels of government. Some were solely inter-provincial in character. The very public, and often combative arena of federal-provincial First Ministers conferences became a highly visible and symbolic emblem of this type of federalism. The panoply of elite institutions that had developed since the Second World War promoted a climate in which the constitution and the division of powers was denigrated in favour of both levels of government. Newly aggressive administrations asserted special and exclusive interests. Moreover, inter-provincial organizations, in executive provincial fashion, contended that due to their territorial specificity they had greater prerogative to represent the views of the citizenry than was the case of the more distant federal government. Lastly, to expect clarification from the top was not possible, as First Ministers' Conferences gave only broad directives. The annual assemblies of the Premiers and the Prime Minister had their more substantive political capital invested in addressing intractable conflicts such as the repatriation of the constitution and transfer payments.

The milieu of "executive federalism" encouraged the advancement of special interests to the consternation of those seeking collaboration and cooperation on national issues. This also helped to keep the issue of diplomacy in education unresolved and

567 "Executive Federalism" may be defined as the relations between elected and appointed officials of the two orders of government in federal-provincial interactions and among the executives of the provinces in inter-provincial interactions. Smiley, Canada, p. 91.
568 This section draws on the scholarship of Donald Smiley. Smiley, Canada, pp. 91-116.
contentious. Rather than working together, and acknowledging the limitations of the constitution, both levels of government wanted to claim the matter as their own. Federal governments were very comfortable continuing with the *status quo ante*, that is to say directing foreign policy in the field with minor consultation of the provinces. The provinces, by contrast, wanted to take control of the matter without the financial obligations connected to it. Illustrative of the ongoing separation of constitution versus interests were the federal and provincial positions in 1977. At the January CMEC meeting, the Ministers of Education summarized the provincial viewpoint.

...At its meeting on January 13-14, 1977, the CMEC agreed that the current situation is still unacceptable and substantial changes are needed in the existing practices of the Department of External Affairs to reflect the jurisdiction of the provinces in education.\(^{569}\)

The federal defense of the established way of doing things came later in May 1977 in the context of a meeting between officials from both the CMEC and the Department of External Affairs. The specific issue in question was provincial control over the composition of delegations to international education conferences.

The External Affairs officials indicated that they were unable to agree to the above proposal at this time because, in their view, it impinges on the responsibility of the Secretary of State for External Affairs with respect to the appointment of delegations. Implicit in this responsibility is the right of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to communicate directly with all citizens and groups in Canada. Nevertheless, in the interest of reaching consensus on this issue, the External Affairs officials agreed to undertake further study of the CMEC proposal.\(^{570}\)

\(^{569}\)Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh Executive Committee Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, June 19-21 1977: Council of Ministers of Education. Canada Files 1977; RG2-40, Accession 17227, Box 77/1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.

\(^{570}\)Meeting Between CMEC Secretariat Staff and Officials at the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, May 31, 1977: Council of Ministers of Education. Canada Files 1977; RG2-40, Accession 17227, Box 77/1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
Notwithstanding the efforts of the officials, for the most part the mediation of the issue was being attempted by the “executives.” In the constitutional hothouse of Canadian politics, this had special effects on the process. By nature, the leaders of the two levels of government would defend their interests in any forum.

...at the same time [changes to intergovernmental machinery] tended to exacerbate that competition by strengthening the influence of politicians and officials who were predisposed by the nature of their responsibilities and institutional perspectives to emphasize the power and prestige of their governments rather than to give priority to programmatic objectives or the avoidance of intergovernmental conflict. At the same time and as a consequence, the influence of program specialists was reduced and their authority curtailed. The growing distaste of both levels of government for shared-cost programs was in part a reflection of this redistribution of power and influence within their respective bureaucracies.571

Issues that were of low-level importance in the broader scheme of things thus became the grist for debates between the leaders at the highest level of the political system. These debates also distracted their attention away from the more important issue of federal co-operation in face of a very uncertain world.

Provincial leaders, while adherents of executive decision-making, also continued to identify with their own regions (i.e. the West, the Prairies, the Maritimes, Quebec, and Central Canada), repeatedly stating the view that they had a much better justification for handling diplomacy in education than was the case with Ottawa. At the very most in “provincial” minds, this matter could be seen as being inter-provincial in orientation. Politicians in capitals such as Victoria could see that they had a much greater connection to education-related events happening around the Pacific than did diplomats based in Ottawa.572 In similar circumstances, other organizations such as the Council of Maritime

572 The implementation of the OECD Pacific Circle Project was one example of this that the Department of External Affairs and the Council of Ministers of Education dealt with in the latter part of the 1970s. It was
Premiers focused on their regional and “Northwest-Atlantic” goals. Agencies such as the Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission, an offshoot of the Council of Maritime Premiers, were much more liable to have coastal interests rather than be focused on the concerns of the other Canadian provinces further to the west. This regional orientation towards education-related international activities had as its biggest advocate Quebec, but the anglophone provinces in a quieter fashion now persisted in this view. Accruing the advantages of both the joint action of the CMEC and provincial regionalism would only bedevil the efforts to resolve this issue in the coming years.

Lastly, frequent First Ministers’ Conferences were a relatively new phenomenon in the 1970s, but to anticipate direction from them on diplomacy in education was not something that either federal or provincial educationalists expected. The Prime Minister and the Premiers were already overburdened with issues such as the oil price, constitutional affairs, and transfer payments. While First Ministers addressed educational issues from time-to-time at these conferences, diplomacy in education did not have the monetary momentum to put it on the agenda and end its provisional character any earlier. Diplomacy and foreign affairs in general were questions internal to the Department of External Affairs, not matters for federal/provincial First Ministers run in the end out of the University of Victoria, School of Education. The view on this was much clearer in the British Columbia capital than in either Toronto or Ottawa. Special Meeting of the Pacific Rim Nations CERI Representatives, May 27, 1977; Council of Minister of Education, Canada Files, 1977-1978; Ministry of Education; RG2-40. Accession 17999. Box 78/2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario. Minutes of the Thirty-Second CMEC Meeting, January 22-23, 1979; Council of Minister of Education, Canada Files, 1979: Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 1892, Box 79/3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario. Minutes of the Forty-Second CMEC Meeting, January 24-25, 1983; Council of Minister of Education, Canada Files. 1983: Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 29327, Box 1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario. Indeed, by 1983 the government commitments had devolved to an institutional support only. In this case it was UBC. The CMEC was involved in a “watching stance” capacity.

573 The Council of Maritime Premiers was established in 1971 and was comprised of the first ministers of the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. Newfoundland chose not to participate. The organization also had a not insignificant secretariat. See CMP, http://www.cmp.ca/index.ca
conferences. Diplomacy in education can be contrasted with minority-language education in this regard. The latter issue was one area where education did surface prominently at federal-provincial First Ministers’ conferences. Unlike minority-language education, diplomacy in education did not have a visible political component. It was unheard of in the school system. Minority-language education was a political issue, coming in a period when the federal government wanted to appear to be addressing the issue of national unity in the wake of the Parti Québécois victory in Quebec. There were also provincial interests in claiming credit for this issue, particularly as education was specifically a provincial jurisdiction. Minority-language education received attention from the Premiers at their eighteenth annual conference in August 1977. The Council of Ministers was asked to report back on the current state of minority-language education.575

Education-related international activities were profoundly influenced by the changing nature of “executive federalism” in the 1970s. Smiley points out the longer-term consequences of this type of political and administrative organization in Canada.

In summary, the institutions and processes of executive federalism are disposed towards conflict rather than harmony....the pursuit of jurisdictional autonomy increasingly takes place outside a shared acceptance of constitutional and legal norms about the respective powers and responsibilities of the two orders of government.576

The environment was one in which the number of executive federal agencies was burgeoning. The political tensions that arose from this not only resulted in more

574 Smiley, Canada, p.105. The MPHEC Acts set out that the organization should “facilitate arrangements” outside the region for purposes of higher education. MPHEC, http://www.mphec.ca/htm/acts/page04.htm
576 Smiley, Canada, p. 116.
irritations on the plane of party politics, but also on the axis of federal-provincial relations. Resolution of the question of diplomacy in education would not come from any of these new leadership groupings nor did 1970s federalism provide for a longer-term fix for the question.

**Ottawa’s Evolving Interests 1975-1984**

The settlement of the matter of diplomacy in education was not eased, in the last analysis, by the ongoing federal need to be involved in education at the international level. Ottawa remained interested in this field in the latter part of the 1970s and into the early 1980s as recent events had made the federal government watchful when it came to provincial demands in this area. Ottawa’s focus on this issue also continued because of its current needs in the 1970s. Changes at the global level continued to concern national education systems. The issue of Quebec nationalism and Canadian unity remained very much alive as well. The federal government, and particularly the Department of External Affairs, wanted to keep their options open in an era when the prestige of the foreign ministry had declined, and was continuing to do so.

Throughout the 1970s, the federal government needed to continue its involvement in international relations in education. Collectively, federal politicians were wary of any kind of repetition of the events of the late 1960s. The group of ministers who ran the federal government were substantially the same as those in the period following Pierre Trudeau’s first election, and Trudeau himself continued to provide the direction in which the federal government was heading.\(^\text{577}\) Institutional memories of Mitchell Sharp’s pamphlet and the divisive interference exercised by France on the issue in the 1960s
continued to echo in Ottawa in the next decade. Given the historical antecedents, the automatic response to the provincial clamor for more involvement in the governance of educational diplomacy was prudence and caution. Quebec’s demands, in particular, continued to set off alarm bells at all levels. It was felt that without federal presence the separatist government would continue to pursue its nationalist agenda on the world stage through any possible means. Education was thus one avenue in that crusade. This historical memory was reinforced by the exigencies of the moment when the Parti Québécois came to power in 1976.

The establishment of longer-term harmony between the two levels of government over the issue also did not come easily in the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s as the federal government became more internationalized in its outlook. The increasingly outward focus of the national government can be illustrated with healthcare. In a world where the vector for a deadly disease such as Ebola might be one wide-bodied transoceanic flight from the tropics to Montreal, the span of health-related issues had spread far wider than Canada’s national borders. A federal official described the question.

...I want to describe why we think we are not a domestic department and conversely, why DFAIT is not merely the foreign ministry. All international issues must relate either to the government’s agenda or to the welfare of Canadians. Most so-called domestic departments have large foreign policy agendas and only a small part of those foreign policy agendas come through DFAIT. The biggest challenge for the foreign ministry is articulating how it relates to the domestic agenda.  

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577 The dominance of the prime minister in the determination of the government’s priorities in this era has been recently noted. Donald Savoie, Governing From the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press. 1999).
Not only did the more-general turn towards the outside world get in the way of agreement on education-related international activities, a long-term federal-provincial agreement on the matter remained elusive as Ottawa continued to want to remain informed about the activities of the OECD and other education-related international organizations. Ottawa also wanted to be involved in the development of UNESCO and OECD economic links to education as these would influence economic policy.

Temporary approaches to international education were also likely to continue as Ottawa began to capitalize on the business opportunities of schooling in the early 1980s. The selling of education and educational resources (i.e. books, school supplies, and expertise) had become big business. Education was becoming more linked to trade and investment as a commodity that Canadians could buy and sell. The economic chill of 1979 focused thinking towards these new objectives, particularly how to package education for export sales. As the economic malaise continued, the evolution of the Department of External Affairs from a foreign ministry into a clearinghouse for Canadian international trade accelerated. From the early 1970s to 1981, Annual Reports of the department stated word-for-word almost exactly the same line about international education: the foreign office was an exemplar of cooperation in federal-provincial and non-governmental relations.

The Department continued, in co-operation with other departments and the Council of Ministers of Education, to facilitate Canadian participation in international education conferences and meetings under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, UNESCO and the Commonwealth.579

What a world this statement covered! In 1982, a change occurred. Gone were statements of co-operation with other departments and the CMEC. Taking their place were broad declarations linking foreign affairs, education, and significantly, trade.

...one of the essential tasks of the Department of External Affairs is to try to increase public knowledge of Canada, especially among influential opinion makers in other countries. International cultural and academic relations stimulate interest in an attractive way, while information on the quality of life in this country serves to advance Canada’s foreign policy and trade objectives.580

This was the leading edge of the increasing commercialization of Canadian “culture” (including education). These international activities continued throughout the 1980s.581 Swooping around federal-provincial conflicts to encourage the selling of a product through “lead” business institutions was to be the wave of the future.582

Over and above the emergent education/business possibilities, Ottawa continued to need to be involved in education-related international activities from the standpoint of national unity and this also affected the search for a longer-term solution to the question. Federal participation in international education and cultural matters was done in such a way as to acknowledge provincial prerogatives in the field, yet at the same time, give a clear message as to who provided the over-arching foreign policy superstructure, and to move slowly in the alteration of that hierarchy. In the early 1970s with the establishment

581 Thus in the 1985-1986 Annual Report one can read, “Cultural and educational industries are emerging as major economic sectors. The Department has increased efforts to support their international marketing activity....To remain competitive, Canada must promote the sale of goods and services in the education field such as training programs and packages, text-books, education films, etc. “Canada, The Department of External Affairs Annual Report, 1985-1986(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1986), p. 56. See also, Martin Rudner, “Canada and International Education in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Canada Among Nations 1997: Asia Pacific Face Off, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Maureen Appel Molot and Martin Rudner(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), p. 212. for a contemporary view of this phenomenon.
582 Still the division of powers makes everyone tiptoe around education and international relations. Rudner also argues that the impediments of federalism continue to shackle education-related activities after they
of *L’Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique* (ACCT) and the ongoing conferences of Francophone ministers of education, Ottawa elaborated a carefully-considered strategy. When separatist Quebec education ministers pushed the Council of Ministers to proclaim,

a) the responsibility of the federal government for the conduct of foreign affairs within the boundaries of its jurisdiction

b) the right of provinces to speak on their own behalf, either individually or collectively through the Council, on international matters related to education

in the mid-1970s, the federal government also worked to diffuse these policies through a multi-part strategy. The “carrots” of closer collaboration and “understandings” were two approaches. While more staid and non-separatist anglophone provincial governments rejected pure provincial individualism in favour of simpler, more functional regional and national alliances, the reality was that they too continued to build their fiefdoms. Ottawa had to continue to be perceived as helping meet citizen’s needs, yet at the same time consolidating its own hold over the federation. "Patchwork" Confederation was not an option.

A noticeable counterpoint to the ongoing Liberal wish to box in nationalism and consequently stop the use of diplomacy in education as a tool for Quebec’s nationalistic purposes can be drawn from the period of the Clark government, between May, 1979,

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583 Ottawa continued to send representatives to Francophone education conferences along with Quebec, New Brunswick and in some cases Ontario. Things became more tricky in terms of recognition issues at the heads of state and government (sovereign states and governments) meetings of La Francophonie in the 1980s. Trudeau and Head, *The Canadian*, p. 291.

584 *Changes Suggested by Quebec to the “Proposal Concerning Procedures of the Participation of the Provinces in International Education Conferences,” June 1977,* Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1977; RG2-40, Accession 177227, Box 77/1; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
and January, 1980. Joe Clark's approach to this issue was to conceive of Canada as a "community of communities," a reworked version of the 1880s provincial "compact" view of Confederation.586 The first heralds of the alternate "Clark" view of Confederation in the education world and in the area of education-related international activities were David MacDonald and Flora MacDonald.587 In a speech to the Council of Ministers autumn 1979 meeting, the Secretary of State, David MacDonald gave clear signals of Ottawa's changed position and readiness to accede to provincial needs in education.

I also welcome this first opportunity to meet with provincial ministers responsible for education because of the commitment of my Government, reaffirmed most recently in the Speech from the Throne, to seek improved relations with the provincial governments through a new spirit of cooperation and consultation. It is my hope that this approach will prevail not only with respect to the items on the agenda of this meeting but also in regard to all matters in which we may have mutual interests.588

Clark's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Flora MacDonald indicated a willingness to re-examine the issue of diplomacy in education in her correspondence with the Council during this period, thus opening the door to further provincial control over the issue. In particular, she was willing to give the provincial education leaders much more leeway in the planning, execution and follow-up on international conferences. Had the Progressive Conservative government continued, diplomacy in education may have

586 Stevenson, Unfulfilled, pp.53-60. and Ramsay Cook, Provincial Autonomy, Minority Rights and the Compact Theory, 1867-1921. Study No. 4 of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969)
587 The brief period of Conservative rule was characterized by contending individuals struggling for power in External Affairs and there being no clear winner. John Kirton, "Elaboration and Management of Canadian Foreign Policy," From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau: Forty Years of Canadian Diplomacy ed. Paul Painchaud(Quebec: Les Presses de L'Université Laval. 1989), p. 71.
gone down a very different path. Flora MacDonald’s legacy was the movement towards a federal/provincial consultative coordinating body that would eventually oversee education-related international activities.

With the restoration of the Liberals to power in 1980, federal ardor to accommodate provincial needs in conducting international relations in education once more cooled. Throughout the last phase of Pierre Trudeau’s prime-ministership, other events took the spotlight. Squelching the drive for sovereignty and limited accession to provincial demands remained central to Ottawa’s strategy in this era.

The provisional character of diplomacy in education continued as well, as Ottawa wished to remain active in education-related international activities in a practical sense. In an era of declining prestige for foreign ministries, the Department of External Affairs needed to keep its options open. Many new competitors were looking for a piece of the action. The need felt by both the central leadership and External Affairs to safeguard the prerogatives of the federal government in the face of provincial demands across a broad range of foreign policy issues was strongly felt. The expectation that External Affairs would reorganize for maximum effectiveness in these new circumstances also had an impact on the way diplomacy in education was viewed. The desire to integrate the activities of provincial educational diplomats into the broader scheme of Canadian diplomatic procedure combined with several structural changes in the Ottawa ministry, retarded longer-term agreement over the issue.

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588 Opening Remarks by Secretary of State David MacDonald, Meeting with the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, October 22, 1979; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1979; RG2-40, Accession 18921, Box 79/3; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
589 The need to safeguard federal prerogatives was commonly felt, but pursued in different ways. Trudeau initially saw little need for the foreign ministry.
In conjunction with the rise of alternative channels for diplomacy, Ottawa and the Department of External Affairs continued to defend federal prerogatives against provincial incursion. This prolonged the *ad hoc* nature of Canada's approach to international education. Temporary understandings and mechanisms would arise from the interaction between the two levels of government. The existing system was simply not equipped to deal quickly with the negotiation of treaties between sovereign states, Canada, and provincial authorities in the matter of education. Thus, the reiteration of federal prerogative took place not exclusively, but notably in the area of educational treaty formation. The CMEC, in the latter part of the 1970s, expected to be present when negotiations took place for international treaties on education and render decisions as to whether they would be implemented in Canada. This initially met with cautious federal approbation. Ottawa continued to see a consultative role for provincial authorities while the national government would have the final say. The federal authorities would lead the process and control the outcome. One example where the defense of Canadian prerogative was an issue was the negotiation of the UNESCO convention on degrees and diplomas of 1978. The CMEC position was clear from 1973 forward.

4. Regarding the signing of agreements which involve educational relations with other countries, the Council should be represented on any negotiating team in order to ensure adequate input on the part of the provincial education authorities.590

In 1969, the federal minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp had reiterated that the power to negotiate agreements and sign education treaties, as per the ruling in the *Labour

Conventions Case of 1937, was within federal power. Provincial representation was not something that the federal government was in any way obliged to grant during the negotiation of treaties concerning education, rather it was done as a courtesy and in the spirit of practicality. Where the provinces could limit the impact of an international treaty was in the implementation of that document. Ottawa was not able to pass legislation to impose implementation of a treaty on the provinces.

The provisions of the constitution, legal precedents, and federal documents such as the Mitchell Sharp’s brochure aside, representatives of the Council of Ministers of Education aggressively insisted on leading in the negotiation of treaties as the 1970s progressed. The federal need to defend their prerogative became evident when the provinces asked that Ottawa abstain from voting on the treaty as they needed more time to digest its substance.

Notwithstanding the caveats which form part of the text, it is the opinion of the provincial ministries/departments responsible for education that Canada should abstain from voting on this Convention in order that the following concerns of the provinces can be fully reviewed and considered prior to a definitive position being taken on the Convention.

It is our view that an agreement between the two orders of government for the implementation of the Convention in Canada is needed before a decision can be made on ratification......

It is the opinion of the provincial authorities that abstaining on the vote at the UNESCO conference would give our officials time to develop a possible mechanism.....

591 The document stated it thus, “The case decided that the Parliament of Canada could not legislate in areas of provincial jurisdiction simply as a result of the Canadian Government’s entering into international agreements. However, the judges...explicitly recognized that the Canadian Government could enter into treaties on all subjects....Canada, Federalism, p. 10.
593 Patrick McGeer, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada and Minister of Education for British Columbia to Flora MacDonald, Secretary of State for External Affairs, December 7, 1979; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1980; Ministry of Education; RG2-40, Accession 20135, Box 80/2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
The mixed federal-provincial Canadian delegation complied and Canada abstained from voting on the treaty, or Convention as it was known. This vote was an intermediate action, the federal government could still adhere to the Convention by signing it at a later date. Ottawa could also ratify the Convention through the Canadian Ambassador to UNESCO. While the provinces could hold up a treaty, in the end Ottawa could still sign it. Such was the underlying message of one explanatory document that External Affairs sent to the CMEC during the course of discussions on this treaty.

Following the provincially-directed abstention from UNESCO treaty negotiations, the CMEC and the mixed Canadian delegation came up with further obstacles. The delegation recommended a committee to oversee the question of diplomas and federal-provincial concerns. The CMEC, under Patrick McGeer of British Columbia, while partial to the recommendations of the delegation, wanted to further back up the process with its own set of demands.

....we would prefer a meeting in which officials of the CMEC Secretariat and senior officials of your department designated to this effect would participate. The meeting could be held in the coming weeks for the purpose of formulating a short text to constitute an agreement between the ministers of Education and the federal government on the following issues: responsibility of the provincial governments regarding the necessary consultation with postsecondary education institutions and professional associations....

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594 Canada and the Signing of International Treaties, June 10th, 1980; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1980; Ministry of Education: RG2-40, Accession 20135, Box 80/2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
595 Canada and the Signing of International Treaties, June 10th, 1980; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1980; Ministry of Education: RG2-40, Accession 20135, Box 80/2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
596 Patrick McGeer, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada and Minister of Education for British Columbia to Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, July 11, 1980; Council of Ministers of Education, Canada Files 1980; Ministry of Education: RG2-40, Accession 20135, Box 80/2; Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
Chairman McGeer further recommended the establishment of an ad hoc mechanism to deal with the application of the Convention to the Canadian situation. The Convention was eventually adhered to, but in the intervening time the federal government had to drag the process out and be subject to the expectations and fears of the provinces. In this case, Ottawa reinforced the view that while the provinces may talk about a treaty, and they may even take the lead in negotiating it, in the end however it remained Ottawa's call.

Preserving a role for formal diplomacy in a time when numerous competitors, both governmental and non-governmental, were emerging required new approaches in the late 1970s and early 1980s and this also had an impact on the longer-term resolution of the issue of diplomacy in education. An insistence on close coordination between what Canadian education “diplomats” were doing and the overriding interests of on-site diplomats was one facet of this. Federal obstinacy over the issue also was evident with the reorganizations that the Department of External Affairs underwent in this period.

The federal government did not want any unexpected surprises when dealing with its diplomatic missions and its educationalists. Tying diplomacy in education more tightly to Canada’s overall diplomatic strategy was a delicate aspect of this. There was an ongoing concern that Canadian educational “diplomats” could arrive in a country or at an organization (i.e. the OECD) without prior briefing of the embassy staff on site, attend their conference, and then depart, again without any post-conference explanation. As the

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knowledge of foreign affairs of the "educationalists" was taken to be minimal, the foreign ministry officials did not want problems in the host country because of 'beginners' blunders.598

Reorganizations at home at External Affairs' headquarters also had an impact on Ottawa's perspective towards long-term agreement with the provinces on the issue of education-related international activities. Through the latter part of the decade and into the 1980s, the changes that took place in the Department were increasingly designed to enhance the centralizing and economic aspects of the organization.

External's move to secure a more pervasive coordinative effectiveness formed the central dynamic of the foreign policy decision-making process from 1974 to 1980. The need for such a coordinative centre stemmed from several factors. Within Ottawa, a declining civil service complement, the imposition of austerity in 1978 and the institution of an "envelope" system of financial expenditures heightened conflicts over allocating real resources....External Affairs moved, with forceful intellectual and bureaucratic leadership, to transform its role to that of a modern central policy agency operating throughout the policy universe as a whole.599

In the existing fractious climate of federal/provincial relations, the move to centralize control over the leadership of foreign policy development ran directly counter to the decentralist ambitions of the provinces. In Allan Gotlieb's view, as Under Secretary at the time, a modern central agency was one that led on key issues of national interest, and that as such, it would produce coherent policies that could be used to guide other agencies.600

Further to this, Gotlieb spoke of domestic policies.

If domestic policies with foreign dimensions are improperly co-ordinated with external policies, or are inconsistent with Canada's international goals and objectives, we in the Department of External Affairs are obliged

to intervene.... we are essentially a central foreign policy management agency.... The exercise of leadership is complemented by the provision of service to the Canadian foreign policy community inside and outside the federal government. The Department....must try to ensure that all those who contribute to policy formulation....provincial officials...received foreign affairs information and services tailored to their individual needs.601

Gotlieb pushed for a strengthening of External Affairs' role at all levels in Ottawa and having a firm line regarding the extent of provincial activities was part of this effort. The fusion with the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce in 1982 was another watershed event for External Affairs as it marked the start of a much more aggressive trade policy by the Canadian government. It marked the first time that the Canadian department of foreign affairs had both foreign affairs expertise and economic expertise all under one roof. Diplomacy in education continued to be an area where there was an assertion of policy direction, yet because of this, it also became an area where economic expectations took priority.602

Conclusion

The period between 1970 and 1984 was marked by an ad hoc approach to diplomacy in education. The lack of a longer-term solution to this question was not surprising given other aspects of the development of the Canadian state and federalism during this era. The era was characterized by the new Council of Ministers and its changing nature. Until the ministers of education and their officials in the Council Secretariat were able to formulate a coherent approach to diplomacy in education, their efforts did little to encourage Ottawa. In fact, several of their approaches to the matter did more to slow down the regularization of the issue, rather than to facilitate it. They gave

601 Gotlieb, Canadian Diplomacy, pp. 8-9.
602 Kirton, "Elaboration," p. 76.
confused signals by both working toward the recognition of diplomacy in education as a CMEC responsibility, while at the same time insisting on provinces' individual rights to pursue diplomatic initiatives in isolation from one another. Task forces, meetings with federal ministers, and the continued presence of questions concerning the nature of the CMEC (i.e. solely inter-provincial, federal-provincial?) on the agenda of the CMEC at the same time contributed to the failure to address the issue satisfactorily.

This era also saw Canadian federal state in a period of flux. Extensive changes in how the relationship between the two governments functioned and in the relative powers of the two levels of government also contributed to the prolonged period of contingent decision-making in international-relations in education. As Smiley notes, and it is worth reiterating again, the appearance of many of the executive federal organizations at this time did much to increase conflict by focusing on the distribution of powers, and new arenas in which to pursue advantages, rather than encourage governments to work co-operatively on common problems. In tandem with other Western states such as the United States, and West Germany, the period saw the emergence of “high politics” bodies at the highest levels of the federal state. In Canada’s case, the steep division between what was the federal sphere of influence and what was the provincial sphere of influence was exacerbated by the construction of structures that relied on agreement between executives, and on the facilitation of issues that become newly-politicized in what was an increasingly power-and media-driven political culture.

Longer-term resolution of the question of diplomacy in education was not aided by the federal government’s continued insistence on playing an active role in this matter as well. Ottawa remained vitally concerned and interested in diplomacy in education. As
the 1970s progressed, the operations of all federal government departments began to look outward towards international opportunities. Why would Ottawa want to change or diminish its role in education-related international activities in such a climate? Economic priorities also made it imperative that Ottawa maintain an interest in education and education systems. The evolving issue of energy made all government expenditures in Western nations contingent on the highly volatile politics of the Middle East. The basic issues of the on-the-ground co-operation between educationalist diplomats and traditional diplomats also informed federal views on the question. While the provincial education envoys viewed the traditional diplomats as "good on the ground" sources of information, ambassadors and heads of mission did not want the activities of educational delegates to influence their ongoing relationship with particular countries in any negative way.

Transient, *ad hoc*, and contingent remained the descriptors for international education as the Trudeau era drew to a close. Education-related international activities would become all that much more significant with the dawning of the information era.
Chapter 8
Conclusion:
Reconsidering Foreign Policy in Education

Where Do We Go From Here?

At the end of the Trudeau era in 1984, moves were being made towards the longer-term resolution of the difficulties associated with education-related international activities, but indications of the temporary and transient nature of the relationship between the two levels of government in this area continue into the contemporary era. Martin Rudner has pointed to where things have gone in 1990s with his discussion of Canada’s involvement with APEC and international education.

Canada’s involvement in APEC educational and human resource development initiatives has been greatly complicated by this country’s federal system of government, which places education wholly under provincial jurisdiction. The ambivalence in Canada’s approach to international education generally, and as regards the Asia-Pacific region in particular reflects the underlying ambiguities and turmoil affecting Canadian education policy.603

The present, it is clear, continues to live up to its less-than distinguished past. Le plus ça change, le plus ça reste le même. The French expression very nicely encapsulates the dynamic that influences this issue, namely: continuity and change.

The Constitutional Mobius Circle and Continuity with the Past

The constitutional conundrum that binds education and foreign policy together thus continues. This ongoing test for Canadian governments can be envisioned in terms of a mobius circle, “a one-sided surface with a single edge that is obtained by giving a

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strip of paper one twist and joining the ends together. At first glance there are two jurisdictions and two separate issues, but the intervention of the constitution has twisted and locked the two sides together into a single and unworkable continuum.

This problem might have been worked out as a result of the activities of the late 1980s, but there is slim evidence of any change. With the establishment of the FPCCERIA committee in 1986, there was additional momentum to better communicate and coordinate federal/provincial positions in this regard. The committee addresses many of the issues associated with international relations in education. The record is still silent, however, as to whether this committee has actually been successful. Past experiences saw repeated disputes over the formulation and implementation of diplomatic projects because of the constitutional vicious circle. Moreover, many of the CMEC’s recent corporate reports are equally opaque about the inner-workings of committees such as the FPCCERIA. In the Council’s 1995 report its existence is merely noted. In contradistinction to the reports of the 1980s, where the members of the committee were actually listed, that is no longer done. Additionally, the report comes out every second year further limiting understanding and evaluation of the committee’s role. Insofar as presence on the World Wide Web is concerned, the CMEC is equally ambiguous as to the place of the FPCCERIA. It is quite clear that the CMEC is involved in education-

605 It will be recalled that the CMEC is a corporation under the laws of Ontario and not in any way an officially government created or constitutionally mandated body. Its “corporate” report is in actual fact just that.
606 Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, Biennial Report, p. 16.
607 It is mentioned in a document found only after searching the agency’s Website. Then the description of its organization and activities is very brief. Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, “An Update on CMEC’s Activities,” http://www.cmecc.ca/nafored/english/update.htm
related international activities, but not that they would have any connection to the federal government in that regard.\textsuperscript{608}

The quandary of the constitutional mobius strip also persists as amendment to Canada's basic law remains taboo in the contemporary era. Were the federal government to wade further into the field of education, provincial attacks on any federal proposal to take over education would make the activities of ancient \textit{berserkir} warriors or alternately the Marines look like child's play.\textsuperscript{609} The provinces would vociferously defend what is perceived to be theirs, as has been evidenced by the recent sniping between Ottawa and Quebec City over the issue of the Millennium Scholarship Plan. Equally significant are the questions surrounding federal/provincial agreements and the “understandings” that currently govern international education. These are limited agreements and could be torn up very quickly were either the federal government or the CMEC to decide that they were no longer relevant. None of these accords is entrenched in the constitution. Change in this area remains a problematic question under the best of circumstances.

General reform of the CMEC is yet another avenue by which the issue could be addressed, but the possibilities for structural modification of that organization remain doubtful. The vehement resistance to any dealings with Ottawa, particularly on the part of Quebec will be recalled. Proposals for a federal seat on the Council consistently got shot down in organizational reviews. Additionally, the testiness, and atmosphere of circling cats surrounding \textit{ad hoc} meetings with federal ministers has been part of the organization’s institutional furniture for a long period of time. Resistance to full federal

\footnote{While the “Understandings” are now online, the Council gives little indication the conundrum that foreign policy poses. See, Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, “CMEC and education-related international activities,” \url{http://www.cmecc.ca/international/indexe.stm}.

participation and status within their organization was a hallmark of the era under study, and this remains substantially true today. The impetus for change must come from the ministers of education themselves, and as they continue to be more politicians preoccupied with their own jurisdictions, and less educationalists, this remains an unlikely possibility. In the years since the Future Directions document there have been changes, but the CMEC remains below the horizon of the public and most politicians, hence deep structural change along the lines of the Australian or any other model remains unlikely.

**Persistent International Change and the 1960-1984 Period**

In the 1990s, corporate and multinational enterprises have embraced the human capital accounting model and see "gray matter" as an exploitable resource, thus continuing to change and redefine the goals of international education. Governments are confronted with this on an ongoing basis, and have been drawn into the process. Diplomacy in education is one of the conduits by which this model has been carried worldwide. The Hayekian approach, it would seem, is ascendant across the globe. Indeed, the Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair in the United Kingdom and President Bill Clinton's New Democrats in the United States have also whole-heartedly embraced this approach. The rest of the West can only but follow in this direction if they are not already there. The global forces at work and the transformations that were started in the twenty-year period under study have continued. Many of the problems associated with education, training and jurisdiction also endure. Citizens, in order to

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611 Joel Spring's recent work has several critical perspectives on this. Spring, *Education*, p.173.
exercise their democratic responsibilities, need to re-examine and to recast the language of this discussion.\footnote{Spring, \textit{Education}, pp. 140-149.} This is an incredibly daunting enterprise as much of the current global system is dominated by this point of view. Recent developments in Ontario with the creation of the new Ministry of Training and Universities reconfirm the deep penetration of this model.

Contemporary times have also witnessed an accelerated focus on information technology as yet another transition on the “golden road” to prosperity and globalization. Many speak of the opportunity that this road has afforded Canada. Both the federal government and the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, have embarked on this supposedly-gilded thoroughfare, mounting web-sites on the Internet and heralding the education-business initiatives that are being undertaken.\footnote{And the emphasis is on citizens as opposed to consumers. See, Bernard Shapiro, “The Case for Public Education,” \textit{The University of Toronto Bulletin}, Monday, March 29, 1999, p.16.} These institutions insist that Canada’s accountability and testing programs make Canadian education standards rise in competition with our fellow OECD member-states. Diplomacy in education has now gone digital.

To this author, the enthusiasm for the Web and the accountability mania belies the reality and the record of the past in Canadian diplomacy in education and educational governance. Canadian educational historians earlier in the century were often apologists and travelers on their own golden roads towards progress. The record of the twenty-four years between 1960 and 1984 clearly illustrates a different dynamic at work. Canadian provincial and federal governments do not have a firm grasp on the creation, process or

\footnote{Ottawa has become quite deeply involved in selling education. See, DFAIT, “Canadian Education Centre Network & Other Marketing Service Centres,” \url{http://www.dfair-maei.gc.ca/culture/educationmarketing/service-e.htm} and DFAIT, “Marketing Canadian Education,” \url{http://www.dfair-maei.gc.ca/culture/educationmarketing/menu-e.htm}}
governance of Canadian diplomacy in education. The intervention of information technology may resolve some issues, and is a positive challenge, but whether communication is through email or letter, the fundamentals have not been altered. The constitution remains remarkably fixed in time, despite the digital winds of change swirling around it. Diplomacy in education consequently remains a test and a trap of Canadian federalism in the information age.

Zero Interest and the Lessons of History

It is important to recognize that unless there is a transformation in the system of educational governance and diplomacy in education that arose in the era from 1960 to 1984, nothing will change. Much time will continue to be spent on trying to stay clear of federal-provincial cross-fire or alternately engaging in it. In continually addressing process-related issues, rather than critically confronting and indeed working to shape the governing philosophy of education on a global level, Canadians will remain passive receptors of human capital economics, and international education standards. They will also not be engaging in creating, if not a complete and useful public education system, at least one that is coherent. Inheritors of Ryerson, indeed.

As I completed my research for this study, the possibilities for a more consistent approach to diplomacy in education remained just those, potentialities. As related here, there continues to be zero interest in acting on the latent need for reform. Revising the constitution to include education in the federal jurisdiction will not happen. The constitutional conundrum or mobius circle that characterizes Canadian education-related international activities remains unresolved. It will remain so as long as the lessons of this period of history go unacknowledged and are not put into use. Governments at both
levels will continue to have an innate ability to wander mesmerized into the constitutional, administrative, and political mazes that surround this matter. Significantly, many of these snares will be of their own making.
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AEC – Australian Education Council (Canberra)
ACCT – Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique (Paris)
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Manila)
APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (Singapore)
AUDECAM – Association Universitaire pour le Developpement, L’Education, et la Communication en Afrique et dans le Monde (Paris)
CEA – Canadian Education Association (Toronto)
CMEC – Council of Ministers of Education, Canada (Toronto)
CMP – Conference of Maritime Premiers (Halifax)
CONFEMEN – Conference des Ministres d’Éducation des Pays ayant le Français en Partage (Dakar)
DEA – Department of External Affairs (Ottawa)
DEA – Dominion Education Association (Toronto)
DFAIT – Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Ottawa)
EU – European Union (The Hague)
FPCCERIA – Federal-Provincial Consultative Committee on Education-Related International Activities (Toronto)
IBE – International Bureau of Education (Geneva)
ILO – International Labour Organization (Geneva)
Monbusho – Japanese Ministry of Education (Tokyo)
MPHEC – Maritime Provinces Higher Education Council (Halifax)
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Paris)
SEAMEO – Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (Bangkok)
SSEA – Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa)