HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF COMMUNITY

by

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Abstract

The focus of this thesis is Heidegger’s ambivalent relation to the question of community. Specifically, I argue that, while Heidegger’s rigorous analysis in *Sein und Zeit* opens up the possibility of engaging this question, he nevertheless refrains from such an explicit engagement not just in *Sein und Zeit* but throughout the course of his thinking. I argue further that this avoidance of the question of community is not accidental to Heidegger’s thinking but plays a critical role in his privileging the question of Being above all other questions. Finally, I demonstrate how a careful development of this question in terms of both *Sein und Zeit* and certain exigencies in Heidegger’s later work leads to a clearer comprehension of his thinking and of community itself.
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Dedicated to Jennifer, Liam and Eilidh

(an inadequate response to your patience)
1. Introduction: On the Way to Community

For questioning is the piety of thought.

- “The Question Concerning Technology”

My central thesis is that, while Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* opens up the question of community in an unprecedented manner, this question is almost immediately closed off again; indeed, its closure is essential for maintaining the authority of another question which orients Heidegger’s whole path of thought: the question of Being. I will demonstrate that community, even as withdrawn from explicit consideration, plays a determinative role in Heidegger’s writing, a role which has yet to be thought through rigorously.

This having been said, one could legitimately question the value of pursuing such a project: Why focus on the relation between Heidegger and community, between *this* proper name and *this* general referent? What can such a relation really be expected to demonstrate?

Indeed, this juxtaposition is curious, whether it develops into a passage through the theme of community in order to better understand Heidegger’s thought or vice versa. “Community,” after all, receives only marginal attention in his writing; and when it *does* come to the surface (as *Gemeinschaft, Volk, Gemeinwesen, πόλις*, etc.), it is often linked to his enthusiastic engagement in what may well be the most reprehensible of concrete “communities” to have coalesced in the 20th century.

Thus, I begin with a preliminary justification.

1. Heidegger and Community

If we consider Heidegger’s thinking in terms of the *themes* it presents for discussion, *Gemeinschaft* is certainly low on the list. Case and point: there is only one brief section in *Sein und Zeit* (§74) where this term takes on explicit significance. Nevertheless, if we turn to two other themes, *Being-with* [Mitsein] and *historicity* [Geschichtlichkeit], themes which Heidegger does develop explicitly, we see that his thinking suggests — at least indirectly — a unique stance towards community:

1. *Being-with*: That entity which each of us is — Dasein — shows itself, when considered with phenomenological rigour, to be *with Others* in its very Being; its Being “is” Being-with (*Sein

1VA, 40/QCT, 317.
**und Zeit, Division I, chapter 4**). Not only does Dasein always happen to be with Others in a factual sense; there is indeed no sense in which Dasein’s relation to and experience of itself as an I is prior to its relation to and experience of Others. Being-with is, as Heidegger says explicitly, equiprimordial with Dasein’s Being (ibid., 114). Clearly, though such a view of existential with-ness does not in itself imply a theoretical determination of community, it nevertheless has great implications for thinking what community can be on the existentiell level. For one thing, it problematizes the central tenet of liberalism, i.e., that a We is comprehensible only as a coming together of ‘I’s which somehow exist discreetly as individuals prior to their relation to each other.

2. **Historicity**: In addition to being with Others, Dasein is also historical in its very Being. Its existence is such that it always stands in relation to possibilities which it has not chosen but which have been handed down to it. As gradually emerges through the course of Heidegger’s thinking, the most fundamental possibility destined to Dasein, a possibility which situates all other possibilities, is that of naming Being. To summarize briefly: though Heidegger’s history of Being traces the very withdrawal [Sichentziehen] of Being qua Being from articulation, this withdrawal happens in each case as a prior address to Dasein, an address which draws [zieht] Dasein along (WHD, 5/WCT, 9). The address speaks silently through the lack of an account of Being as the ground of beings; as such, it appeals to historical Dasein to respond, to produce if not an account then at least a name for Being, a name which will compensate for this lack, at least provisionally. This destinal address has implications for understanding community, for the addressee of withdrawn-Being is never merely this or that particular Dasein but rather us: that we which first gathers itself together in its responsive naming of the Being of beings. The destined community, located at its historicco-ontological site, is thus always determined by an address prior to it, addressed to it, an assignment or imperative which is in no way issued by the community itself.

Though Being-with and historicity do not imply a clear articulation of what community is for Heidegger, they do, at the very least, demand a divergence from many other approaches towards this theme. To begin with, Being-with requires that the analysis of the We avoid taking the isolated subject as its point of departure: because I am already with others and have always already experienced this, my “being with them” does not first happen through something which a separate I

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2 As I discuss in chapter 2, even Heidegger’s authentic “I” is already with Others in its Being.

3 For Heidegger, the term “existentiell” identifies those possibilities at Dasein’s disposal, i.e., possibilities which it might or might not pursue in its concrete existence. The term “existential,” on the other hand, identifies those structures of Dasein’s Being which makes possible its concrete existentiell pursuits.
does in order to overcome its separation. Whether such community-constitutive action be thought as the empirical I’s entrance into a Hobbesian contract (such that a We is constructed by and constructed from the discreet subject) or an a priori intentional act (whereby a community of transcendental subjects is synthesized by and grounded upon the intentional structure of the transcendental 15), being-with is prior to such action.

Granted, Heidegger is hardly the first to acknowledge that “with-ness” is somehow constitutive of the subject, prior to its separation. Hegel, for instance, saw that the apparently fundamental self-certainty of the separate I is in fact contingent upon a with-ness constitutive of self-hood: the I=We of the Phenomenology. And already in Kant, the transcendental subject, qua practical, stands in an a priori ethical relation to others via the categorical imperative (i.e., the transcendental will is bound by the universalizability of maxims in the context of the kingdom of ends6). As we shall see however, there are significant differences: Heidegger’s “with” — contrary to Hegel’s — is not a matter of mutual recognition;7 nor does Dasein’s a priori relation to other Dasein have to do with anything “universalizable”.

Secondly, historicity entails that, at the very least, community be radically historical — not in the facile sense that each community “has” a history, nor in the sense that the concept of community undergoes transformations throughout the course of history, but rather in the sense that community happens as history. It is the originary temporal site, not situable “in” time but the site of time’s very opening, first rendering possible all orientation in terms of past, present and future.8 This temporal opening — in terms of which our historical world unfolds and without which nothing would be — happens through communal receptivity and response to the address of Being. Thus, for Heidegger, community’s historical character can be adequately assessed only if we take into account its responsive relation to Being’s irrecuperable withdrawal.

And yet, however radically Heidegger’s work might challenge our presuppositions about community, there is certainly reason to be cautious. In 1933, and indeed for many years afterwards, he identifies National Socialist Germany as the site where such a responsive Gemeinschaft might emerge. And despite his denial that he is an anti-humanist,9 his thinking does call into question

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4 See for instance Niv, 206-8.
5 See chapter 2, section 1.
7 The development of the mit in the context of Sein und Zeit precludes the possibility of recognition which culminates in the I=We. Somehow, though Dasein is with others before it is itself, its definitive, singular relation to its ownmost death — along with the inaccessibility of the Other’s ownmost death — entails that the Other is that in the face of which Dasein does not recognize itself. I will consider this tension between the mit and death in more detail in chapter 2.
those humanist presuppositions which seem to secure at least the hope of approaching a just society (for instance, Mitsein itself places the "rights of the individual" in question).

To be sure, one could not legitimately denounce Heidegger's destabilization of humanism as being unconcerned about responsibility. For him, thinking is nothing if not responsible, since to think is precisely to submit our presuppositions -- including humanist ones -- to that address to which we are but the gathered response: the assignment of Being [Zuweisung des Seins] which precedes all "ethical" responsibility. As Heidegger writes in "Letter on 'Humanism'":

Only so far as man, eking into the truth of Being, belongs to Being can there come from Being itself the assignment of those directions that must become law and rule for man....Only the assignment is capable of dispatching man into Being. Only such dispatching is capable of supporting and obligating [binden]. Otherwise all law remains merely something fabricated by human reason (W 360-1/LH 238-9).

The proper response to this assignment is the saying which "brings the unspoken word of Being to language"(ibid., 361/239). Here, to bring Being to language does not mean to present it in language but rather to "acknowledge"[Anerkennen] its prior withdrawal from all presentation: the "not of nihilation"[das Nicht des Nichtens](ibid., 359/237). And while this archi-responsibility to Being does not stand in opposition to "ethical" responsibility (ibid. 353/232), it is prior to it and presupposed by it.

Yet how can we take this proto-ethical "communal-responsibility" seriously if it not only precludes any secure standpoint from which something like National Socialism can be rejected without reservation but goes so far as to obligate Dasein (or Heidegger at least) to actively support National Socialism?10

This question of responsibility -- specifically: is it responsible to take Heideggerian responsibility seriously? -- will orient my reading of Heidegger. My juxtaposition of this proper name with the referent "community." It is, of course, not a new question, having recurred several times in the history of Heidegger scholarship (most recently in the wake of Victor Farias)

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10 Granted, the nature of Heidegger's support is elusive. Both Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe have indicated that, while it is impossible to identify Heidegger's thought as a simple resistance to National Socialism (as Heidegger would often have us believe), it is also impossible to reduce it to a simple endorsement of fascism (as Farias, for instance, has claimed) (See Derrida's Of Spirit, 38-9 and Lacoue-Labarthe's Heidegger: Art and Politics, ch. 10). The ambivalence of Heidegger's support is evident, for instance, in the interview "Only a God Can Save Us," where he claims to have "confronted" National Socialism (OGS. 101) and yet simultaneously maintains his basic commitment to the "inner truth" of the movement (ibid., 94-7). Appealing to a difference between vulgar and noble National Socialism. Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe claim further that we cannot resolve this ambivalence by breaking down Heidegger's thought into its "components" in order to distinguish a fascist stratum from an uncontaminated stratum (Of Spirit, 38ff., Heidegger: Art and Politics, 18ff.). For them, the political stakes of Heidegger's thinking cannot -- despite his most deplorable, never renounced commitments -- be circumscribed within the realm of particular political positions or theses. for reasons which I will attempt to clarify.
Yet, its very recurrence is cause for doubt: has the long-standing engagement in this question brought us any closer to a resolution where Heideggerian responsibility is concerned? If one were to ask certain Heidegger critics — for instance, those who assess his thinking in terms of liberal-democratic principles — the answer would be yes: either it is possible, as Lawrence Vogel has recently argued, to isolate at least a stratum of Heidegger's thinking which supports a responsible politics in line with basic liberal-democratic principles; 12 or it is possible, as Farias has argued, to dismiss completely the political component of Heidegger's thinking as rooted in the most reactionary agrarian ideology, a racist and techno-phobic ultra-nationalism.13

Yet, there are also those who would answer no (Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, David Farrell Krell, to name a few14). Is this because there really does need to be more deliberation before a decision is reached on Heideggerian responsibility, on its ethico-political status? Or — as the cynical critic might say — is it because fervent Heideggerians wish to reserve the right to insist, irresponsibly and against a preponderance of evidence, that Heidegger's thought must have some positive, though perhaps still hidden, ethico-political relevance?

Derrida's response to such speculation is clear: while he admits that no "final decision" can be expected from those who take Heidegger seriously, he also insists that cynical interpretations of their continued and insistent questioning are unjustified.15 Indeed, for Derrida, to "settle" the question of the relation between responsibility and "Heidegger's thought as such" — even if a decision is reached in Heidegger's favour — can only be to misunderstand Heidegger's thought. This is not because we have yet to fully comprehend the ethico-political position latent in Heidegger's thinking; rather, it is because his thinking cannot be identified with a position; it functions on another register.

11 Tom Rockmore outlines the trajectory of this question in the history of French Heidegger scholarship in his "Heidegger's French Connection and the Emperor's New Clothes".
12 The Fragile "We": Ethical Implications of Heidegger's Being and Time (see especially chapters 4 and 5). Similarly, Ferry and Renault claim to have located the point where Heidegger's thinking becomes irresponsible, i.e., where he abandons serious consideration of Dasein's autonomy (French Philosophy of the Sixties, 223ff.). This point, for them, is Heidegger's abandonment of the problematic of schematization in the Kantbuch and his corresponding turn from the overcoming of metaphysics towards Gelassenheit — a shift which Ferry and Renault interpret, along Kantian lines, as the substitution of heteronomy for autonomy. of "a nature to which the will is subject" for the ideal of a "nature which is subject to a will" (ibid., 227).
13 Such is the claim which Farias develops in Heidegger and Nazism (for a summary of the argument, see his brief introduction). For a concise critical assessment of Farias' claims, see the concluding supplement to Lacoue-Labarthe's Heidegger. Art and Politics.
14 See, for instance, Krell's "Of Spirit and the Daimon: On Derrida's De l'esprit".
15 "Comment donner raison"(Points); cf. "Like the Sound of the Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man's War".
2. Position and Question

As I have indicated, the themes of Being-with and historicity in Heidegger's work demand, at least tacitly, that we depart from conventional ways of approaching community. However, this gets us only so far. If we are interested primarily in the significance of community in Heidegger's thinking, and if we approach his thinking exclusively in terms of the position it takes regarding this or that theme, "community" [Gemeinschaft] resists serious consideration. Even if, as I have suggested, a stance towards community seems implicit in Heidegger's writing, such extrapolation is risky: to address a position in the work of a thinker when that position remains undeveloped in his/her work warrants at least a modicum of suspicion.

And yet, Heidegger's own readings of other thinkers suggests that perhaps something besides position-taking is at stake in his texts. Indeed, it might seem to go without saying that a basic maxim for approaching a particular theme in another thinker's work would be: delineate his/her fundamental position. And yet, this is a maxim which Heidegger transgresses several times. "Heidegger's Kant" and "Heidegger's Nietzsche," just to name a few examples, emerge through quite unconventional readings of their work, readings which sidestep what are typically viewed as their respective "positions" in order instead to focus on marginalia and to underscore lines of thought that these thinkers might or might not have followed themselves.¹⁶

Heidegger's focus on such marginalia is not merely an effort to bring inadequately treated themes to the center in order to help him affirm or deny the position of the thinker in question. Indeed, when considered more carefully, his approach to the work of others shows itself in the first instance not to be an attempt to isolate unequivocal positions at all; rather, it pursues what remains questionable in their thinking — not just contingently questionable, pending this or that thetic resolution, but essentially questionable.¹⁷ That Heidegger's thought is, according to his own testimony, a submission to the question (WHD, 85/WCT, 121) does not mean he engages in the interrogative pursuit of aporias in order to reduce them; rather, he engages aporia in order simply to acknowledge — rather than resolve — the questionable qua questionable. The interrogative mode for Heidegger is no mere intermediary step leading to (and subordinate to) thetic knowledge; it is itself

¹⁶Specifically, in his reading of Kant, Heidegger focuses on Kant's suppressed insight into the "collapse of the primacy of logic in metaphysics" (KPM, 252): according to Heidegger, Kant began to articulate this collapse in the transcendental deduction of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and then proceeded to recoil from it and marginalize it in the rewritten deduction of the second edition. Likewise, Heidegger attempts to establish the inner connection between Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence" and "will to power" (see especially NJ[1], 462ff./Nii, 198ff.) by relying less on Nietzsche's major published works than on his Nachlass.

¹⁷On the nature of the "aporetic," see Heidegger's remarks on the παντοπόρος-ἐκτορος of Sophocles' Antigone (EM, 161ff./IM, 151ff.; I, 74ff.).
already the most essential “knowledge” (SB, 13/SA, 474), the thinker’s relation to the always already withdrawn condition for the possibility of thetic presentation: the Unthought [Ungedacht] the presentation of which could only be its fundamental obfuscation. This is not to say that Heidegger stands opposed to the rigorous pursuit of thetic knowledge; rather he insists that the pursuit of thetic knowledge acknowledge its relation to that which makes it possible, however elusive this condition might be.

Thus, if we are to take Heidegger’s approach seriously, the fact that no developed position on community emerges in his work does not necessarily preclude its questionable status in his thinking, its offering itself as “food for thought” to an attempt to engage his path of thinking and his Unthought. Indeed, I will argue that the term “Gemeinschaft” marks one of the most questionable -- if most often unquestioned -- points of tension in Heidegger’s thinking. To be sure, Heidegger does have much to say about Being-with and historicity in his texts; thus something like a position on community is at least suggested. Nevertheless, such an approach fails, on its own, to take into account the broader context of his thinking. Though it is neither possible nor desirable to do away with positions, Being-with and historicity are best oriented, first and foremost, in terms of the question.

Heidegger’s engagement with the question is, to be sure, a complex one, hardly a topic to be dealt with in a set of introductory remarks. Nevertheless, in order to sketch what is at stake in the question of community, we must, moving in an admittedly preliminary and cursory fashion, bring the question as such into sharper focus.

Already in Sein und Zeit it is our relation not to a position on Being but to the question of Being that is the over-riding concern; the question qua question, however, is given little attention here. Though Being is approached through questioning, though Dasein is chosen as the primary entity of inquiry because it has the capacity to question, and though the question itself is carefully assessed in terms of its hermeneutic structure (Gefragte, Befragte, Erfragte [§2]), it nevertheless remains unclear just how questioning as such relates to Dasein’s Being or to Being as such. However, a few years later in his lecture “On the Essence of Truth,” Heidegger goes so far as to say the primordial disclosure of being as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen] and the beginning of

18 As Heidegger says in “On the Essence of Truth”: “Philosophical thinking...does not disrupt the concealing but entraps its unbroken essence into the open region of understanding and thus into its own truth” (138). And many years later he writes: “Every thinker oversteps the inner limit of every other thinker. But such overstepping is not ‘knowing it all’, since it only consists in holding the thinker in the direct claim of Being, thus remaining within his limitation. This limitation consists in the fact that the thinker can never himself say what is most of all his own. It must remain unsaid, because what is sayable receives its determination from what is not sayable...Not to know this inner limitation, not to know it thanks to the nearness of what is unsaid and unsayable, is the hidden gift of Being to the rare thinkers who are called to the path of thought” (EP, 77-8).
Western history happen as a question; in fact, he associates this questioning event with the ""time" which, itself unmeasurable, first opens up the open region [das Offene] for every measure". In the language of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger here saying that Dasein’s disclosedness [Erschlossenheit] -- its very da -- is first opened up through questioning. If we turn to what he says several years later in his Nietzsche lectures, we get another glimpse of this questioning. At one point he says: "Every question specifies as a question the breadth and nature of the answer it is looking for. At the same time, it circumscribes the range of possibilities for answering." (Niv, 206). Though Heidegger is here explicitly concerned with the most basic question asked by metaphysics, "Was ist das Seiende?," these comments, in conjunction with his remarks in "On the Essence of Truth," begin to clarify his assessment of questioning in general: truth claims can never be thought to stand on their own, neither individually nor in relation to each other; indeed, each assertion takes place as an answer which corresponds to that prior "knowledge" which questioning already is, occurring within the field of possibility opened up by and as a question. Thus, each assertion happens as the choice of one of various possible responses to a question, whether that question be voiced explicitly or, as is often the case, merely implicitly.

Granted, rather than submit fully to Heidegger’s interpretation — which might appear, at first glance, to involve an overly “mystical” relation to the question — one might attempt to acknowledge a difference between the assertoric and interrogative modes without privileging the interrogative to such a degree. For instance, one might argue that assertion and interrogation, different though they are from each other, are both essentially oriented in terms of the theme (isn’t every question, as much as every assertion, about something?) and indeed function together in the hermeneutic unfolding of the theme within a shared horizon. According to such a view, the “Unthought” would be that which remains questionable in a theme: still indeterminate, still pending explicit, assertoric presentation (in what is, perhaps, an infinite movement of presentation which never fully resolves the question).

We must keep in mind, however, that for Heidegger the Unthought is not something the concealment of which is merely accidental. Indeed, its inaccessibility is its very essence; it can

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19 See chapter 3 for a discussion of why even the term “condition” is problematic here.  
20W, 190/OET, 129.  
21 As Heidegger says explicitly in “On the Essence of Truth,” the opening up of das Offene “happens” through the questioning which discloses das Seiende im Ganzen (190/128-9). We must keep in mind that das Offene is the Lichtung discussed in SZ (§28), that most primordial “prior field of possibility”.  
22 Despite his acknowledgment that rigorous questioning can only reach answers which are themselves incomplete, open-ended, Gadamer’s circumscription of the question within the “logic of question and answer” (Truth and Method, 369ff.) shows that, for him, questioning is in each case directed ultimately towards the resolution of the questionable. For more on this problematic, see my discussion in chapter 3.
never show itself as such, neither all at once nor gradually, for it is the very background in terms of which and as a response to which thetic assertions can present themselves (the ληθη at the heart of θ-ληθη). Thus, though questioning is, to be sure, always tied to a theme, the Unthought is not simply the thematic "content" of a question yet to be asked. For Heidegger the question is precisely the theme's openness to the unthematizable abyss which underlies it. This is why thoughtful questioning does not "move forward" towards thetic resolution (not even an infinite, open-ended resolution) but interrupts itself, falling back further into itself as it traces what has already withdrawn from it.

More specifically, questioning's falling back into itself happens when a particular question -- to which various thetic responses might be possible -- runs up against the more primordial question which lies within it, destabilizing it. It is this unsettling movement which traces the withdrawal of the Unthought. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, for instance, Heidegger develops the question "why are there beings rather than nothing?"(which he calls the fundamental question) to a point where it falls back upon the question "what is the meaning of Being?"(which he calls the preliminary question). Regarding this development, he writes:

Ordinarly a preliminary question is dealt with before and outside the main question, though in reference to it. But, in principle, philosophical questions are never dealt with as though we might some day cast them aside. Here the preliminary question is not by any means outside of the main question: rather, it is the flame which burns as it were in the asking of the fundamental question: it is the flaming center of all questioning (EM. 45/IM. 42; cf. N[I]. 455/Nii, 191ff.)

Questioning "maintains" itself only by differing from itself, and it is here, in this differential movement -- rather than in this or that discreet question, be it tacit or explicitly posed -- that the Unthought addresses us.

Returning to the Gemeinschaftfrage: Any attempt to express "what community is" is first and foremost a carrying out of one possibility within the field held open by the question "what is community?". The issue; then: for us: what would constitute a thoughtful relation to this question of community? Recall that, for Heidegger, secure directedness towards solutions, fixed safely within a stable question-horizon, never thinks. To thoughtfully engage a question is not merely to pursue an answer within an already open and for the most part unacknowledged horizon; it does not involve scrambling after solutions. Rather it develops the question itself as a question, tracing -- though never capturing -- the very "field" within which possible solutions can emerge. Thus, a thoughtful response to "what is community?" must not leap after this or that answer, thereby taking the question itself for granted; it must instead develop "what is community?" as a question, tracing it as it falls back into itself.
Ultimately this means relating “what is community?” back to what Heidegger considers to be that most originary of explicit questions: “what is Being?” For him, this “Seinsfrage” is a question which, for us, is presupposed by every question. It opens up the region within which all explicit questioning thus far has been situated.\(^{23}\) If any given question — the question of community included — is to be engaged thoughtfully, engaged as a question, it must reveal how it is situated within the field opened up by the question of Being.

But what, then, of the juxtaposition of the proper name “Heidegger” and the general term “community”? Given the transposition of thinking from position-taking to questioning, is the pursuit of this juxtaposition responsible or irresponsible?

I would argue that this pursuit is responsible. Indeed, I would argue further that the failure to engage in this pursuit could well be irresponsible:

1. On the one hand, this juxtaposition certainly highlights something in Heidegger’s thinking which is immediately damning: his endorsement of National Socialism, an endorsement which is utterly irredeemable.

2. On the other hand, this juxtaposition — thought seriously in terms of the Heideggerian question — problematizes those very assumptions upon which our contemporary liberal-democratic understanding of community is grounded; thus, it problematizes that in the name of which Heidegger’s endorsement could be legitimately dismissed. (on this point, see chapter 8)

To foreclose the question of Heidegger and community in the name of justice without acknowledging this tension is, at the very least, irresponsible. Not only does it ignore the quite legitimate demands which are voiced by Heidegger; it also belittles the very principles to which it appeals by refusing to submit them to serious questioning. It is not fervent Heideggerians but impatient critics who, through over-simplification, run the greatest risk of undermining both a justified critique of Heidegger’s irresponsibility and an understanding of what is at stake in the term “community”.

This is precisely Derrida’s point when he claims that the question of Heidegger and responsibility must remain an “open” question. However irresponsible Heidegger’s actions, his reflections — in what they disclose about questioning and thinking — reveal precisely how irresponsible it would be to take up a position on ‘responsibility as such’ (e.g., to present it in terms of a fixed “principle” at our disposal). Responsibility is something the primary demand of which is not that we articulate a position on it but that we respond to it, and for Heidegger such a response is,  

\(^{23}\)The question of the ‘sense of Seyn’ is the question of all questions....The Seinsfrage is the spring into Seyn...”(BzP.)
first and foremost, an acknowledgment of the unanticipatable obligation addressed to us via the withdrawal of the questionable.24

I maintain that to grant Derrida this point and to engage Heidegger on the question of community is not, simply and irresponsibly, to “defer once again” the question of responsibility in Heidegger’s work.

On the one hand, to grant this point does not protect Heidegger from immediate judgment. I concur with Derrida that, despite the extent to which Heidegger subordinates existentiell culpability to existential culpability (e.g., the Schuldigsein of Sein und Zeit), despite the extent to which he subordinates “ethical” responsibility to ontological responsibility (e.g., W, 353-4/LH, 232), we can — and must — judge him: his actions, insofar as they support national socialism (and insofar as he express no remorse about them afterwards), were inexcusable; he must be held accountable for what he did.25 However why he must be held accountable, and precisely how this judgment and accountability are to be understood, is another matter altogether; indeed, here very little is clear, precisely because of the inescapable demands Heidegger’s thinking places upon us. In Heidegger’s wake, we must keep in mind — as certain recent thinkers have noted in different ways — that judgment, though it must certainly be a response to something, does not necessarily rest on prior and adequate thematized principles (liberal principles, for instance).26 Lyotard for instance, following Aristotle, emphasizes that where justice is concerned, judgment — in this context always judgment of opinion rather than verifiable truth — is precisely what happens in the face of a lack of criteria for judging.27 What Lyotard calls a “wrong” is a singular case in which no available criterion is capable of measuring an act of injustice; 28 and it is in just this case that judgment is called for, a singular judgment which not only precedes its justification but actually modifies whatever calculus of justification is in place.

Hence, Derrida is not refusing to engage the “why” which the judgment of Heidegger is obliged to give: he is, however, resisting the notion that an immediately accessible “why” can be isolated as an adequate stopping-place in this engagement. Such quick condemnation might have been possible if Heidegger’s reflections on thinking and questioning had not so radically upset our presuppositions about the stability and accessibility of ultimate grounds.

11).
24 Granted, as Derrida argues in Of Spirit, even locating responsibility in questioning rather than in position-taking is not without its problems. We will consider this in detail in chapter 7.
25 See “Comment donner raison” (Points, 194).
26 See, for instance, Jean-Luc Nancy’s “Lapsus Judicis” in L’imperatif catégorique.
27 Just Gaming, 14, 26ff. 73ff. Compare Derrida’s remarks on decision in “Dialanguages” (Points, 146ff.).
28 The Differend, ch. 1.
On the other hand, neither does granting Derrida this point endorse a radical separation of Heidegger's "actions" from his "thinking," a separation which might salvage an "uncompromised stratum" in his work. The difference between action and thought, πράξεις and θεωρία -- insofar as it has been determined and put to work by position-taking -- cannot locate Heidegger's questioning. and thus can neither condemn it nor save a segment of it from contamination. Indeed, Derrida underscores that the elusive character of Heidegger's thinking demands critical strategies which -- if we are to understand both what we are criticizing and how the very notion of criticism must itself undergo a transformation -- require a bit more complexity than an inquest.

In the following section, I will clarify briefly how Heidegger's thinking -- as an engagement with the elusive question -- finds a limit, of sorts, in the Seinsfrage; I will suggest, further, how a thoughtful consideration of the Gemeinschaftsfrage might function with respect to such a limit.

3. Seinsfrage and Denkweg

For Heidegger, the most fundamental (explicit) question determinative of our history, of our field of possibilities -- the metaphysical question par excellence -- is "What are beings?" [Was is das Seiende?]. Rigorous metaphysical thinking, whenever and wherever it occurs, engages this question. However, this does not mean that "what are beings?" by itself determines metaphysics' most basic field of possibilities. To ask "what are beings?" is to ask about the ground of beings; it is to ask about the Being of beings. Yet, according to Heidegger, never in metaphysics' field of possibilities is this "ground" itself questioned. "What is Being?" remains unasked, and indeed it must remain unasked, for the difference between Being and beings -- a difference presupposed by the question "what are beings?" -- can maintain itself only if Being as such is simultaneously: a. referred to indirectly in all fundamental questions, remaining their essential (and essentially tacit) backdrop, and yet b. never itself submitted to direct interrogation, to the schema "what is x?" which would reduce it immediately to a being and thus collapse the difference between Being and beings. Indeed, it is the Seinsfrage (what is Being?) -- but precisely as tacit, concealed, unasked -- which opens up and maintains the metaphysical clearing [Lichtung]. "The questionable" as such, the unthought background without which there could be no foreground, recedes from our language and our thinking through the term Being; and only for this reason can the question "what are beings?"

29 On this point, see Robert Bernasconi's "The Fate of the Distinction between Praxis and Poiesis" (Heidegger in Question).
in its various guises, maintain itself as the most fundamental of explicit questions, itself determining the field of all merely “ontical” questions.

And yet, as should be clear from the fact that Heidegger does talk explicitly about Being qua Being, we are no longer, according to him, simply situated “within” metaphysics. He argues that metaphysical thinking has, through its rigorous questioning, exhausted the possibilities opened up by the question “what are beings?” and thus can no longer present (i.e., misrepresent) Being as this or that. Metaphysics has come to a point where it can only ask about the very essence of metaphysics itself, for the first time it asks the fundamental but ultimately self-undermining question: what is Being? Nevertheless, though the direct encounter with the Seinsfrage cannot save metaphysics — though it cannot enable us to once again present Being as this or that — it is more than a last futile gesture of thought. Indeed, Heidegger maintains that we must learn to think Being’s unrepresentability otherwise than as a mere lack or ontic negation (e.g., Niv, 215); and it is via a rigorous engagement in this Seinsfrage that thinking can come, if not to leave the language of metaphysics behind, then at least to acknowledge the “phenomenon” which escapes all metaphysics: the withdrawal of Being, or more precisely, Being as withdrawal from presentation.

To be sure, Being is an explicit issue for metaphysics: from Plato to Nietzsche, thinking strives again and again to answer the question “what are beings?,” i.e., it strives after determinations of the Being of beings. However, the names for Being which emerge in the context of metaphysics (e.g., φύσις, oôδοσία, actualitas, subjectum, subject, will to power, etc.) do not adequately present Being; indeed, they conceal it absolutely and must conceal it insofar as they present it. By seeming to present Being as it shows itself from itself, such names dissimulate the true “phenomenality” of Being: its essential self-concealment, its a-phenomenality. We always encounter beings, and we encounter them illuminated in the light or truth of Being; but it is only ever beings that are lit up. Being itself is never illuminated for it has always already withdrawn to allow beings to stand forth in its light. It “is” this withdrawal and, as such, remains unthought. Heidegger argues that this self-concealment — this originary ἄθνη prior to and necessary for ἄλθησιν — is not something which can simply be negated, for it is the essence of Being itself. To have Being itself stand in the light of

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30See Niv, 206-8.; also N(I), 451ff./Nii, 187ff. and Niii, 182-3. Granted, Aristotle asks τι το Ὀν, and many after him reformulate this question in various ways. Heidegger’s point, however, is that Aristotle and those who follow him ask about Being only with respect to the way it grounds beings. Never is Being qua Being interrogated.

31In his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger clarifies what determines this exhaustion: the history of metaphysics is a gradual exhaustion of possibilities because its trajectory gradually closes off the difference between Being and beings as Being is reduced fully to a being. It is in Nietzsche’s thinking — according to Heidegger — that the difference is completely closed off, absolutely forgotten (see, for example, “Metaphysics as History of Being” [N(II)/EP] and “Nihilism and the History of Being” [N(I)/Niv]).
Being would necessarily be its dissimulation, the reduction of Being to a being; and this is indeed the dissimulation most proper to metaphysics.\textsuperscript{32}

In this context, thinking cannot be thought of simply as choosing which question to ask. Neither the \textit{Seinsfrage} nor the question “what are beings?” can be thought of as acts which are, at some time or other, accomplished by this or that ontic subject. They involve, rather, an ur-event which opens up and maintains the clearing [\textit{Lichtung}] within which the “subject” first finds itself to \textit{be} as ek-sistent historical Dasein. According to Heidegger’s analysis, all “I” can ever do is participate in this originary questioning which I do not initiate, responding to the \textit{Seinsfrage}’s prior demand; and indeed “I” \textit{am}, first and foremost, this response\textsuperscript{33}: the question precedes the questioner (even the “first” questioner), granting him/her \textit{Spielraum}. As residing within metaphysics, we find ourselves already situated in the question of Being (albeit, prior to its being formulated as such), either resting comfortably with a solution to “\textit{Was ist das Seiende?}” which has been handed down to us or scrambling after a determinate solution ourselves (i.e., pursuing a determination of Being as the ground of beings).

To thoughtfully engage the most primordial field of questioning is to develop the \textit{Seinsfrage} as a question. We now see that this means somehow to think Being not as a presentable being but as self-concealment. And yet, if this most essential “essence” is, in each case, always already withdrawn, inaccessible, unthought, then how could thinking possibly acknowledge it? This question leads us to what Heidegger calls the “path of thinking”\textit{[Denkweg]} and ultimately back to the essence of questioning as such.

From \textit{Sein und Zeit} onwards, Heidegger characterizes his thought as following a path [\textit{Weg}] (cf. SZ, 437) and doing so not accidentally but essentially: thinking is thinking only insofar as it follows this path.\textsuperscript{34} The path of thinking, whether considered in terms of the history of metaphysics in general or Heidegger’s thought specifically, is the path whereby thinking engages what is most questionable for it, what is separated from it and thus not at its disposal. This path is opened up through that Unthought which has always already receded ahead of what is explicitly thought; it is opened up as that tacit and most basic question which, in a given instance, underlies the range of possible determinate responses. In the context of metaphysics, this means thought’s allowing itself to be determined by what is still questionable about beings, receiving the destiny of Being

\textsuperscript{32} Niv, 208.
\textsuperscript{33} Cf. my chapter 2, sub-section 3. In both “On the Essence of Truth” and “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” Heidegger discusses how the “free active subject” can coalesce only in terms of the prior grant of the \textit{Lichtung}.
\textsuperscript{34} Granted, “this” path is in a crucial respect \textit{discontinuous} in that, rather than leading us towards Being, it leads us rather towards a multiplicity of “dead-ends,” points where we run up against Being’s inaccessibility. Hence Heidegger’s reference
[Geschick des Seins] from its Unthought (from “Being qua Being”)\textsuperscript{35}. In our case however, situated as we are at the end or closure of metaphysics and thus at the exhaustion of possibilities for presenting Being, this means our thinking must allow itself to be determined by the very absence of a determination of Being and by the absence of any promise of such a determination. We must not dismiss this absence as a mere ontic negation or loss but must rather see in it the very thing which has been granted to us to think: an “absence” which is not simply the negation of presence but — somehow exceeding the presence-absence opposition — the very “event” of Being: Being itself as withdrawal.\textsuperscript{36}

The current task for thinking — its task for us — is what Heidegger calls the Schritt züruck. The path which opens up before us grants us our exposure to Being’s never having been accessible to metaphysics. It is our exposure to the “fact” that the path of metaphysics is thought’s relation to what stays away [ausbleibt],\textsuperscript{37} its relation to what sends “food for thought” from out of its own withdrawal. Here thinking is allowed, for the first time, an encounter with the underlying “not” in its very not-ness, an encounter with that prior oblivion to which it is indebted (whereas all thinking is situated upon a path opened up in advance for it, only now is this path granted to us to be thought explicitly in its very “Weglichkeit”). The task for thinking at this point along its path is not to advance upon this oblivion in order to overcome it, but rather to reside within it, to step back and thus make room for the arrival of what is still to be thought.\textsuperscript{38} Our assignment is to await and respond to the emission of the Unthought, and it is by taking up this finite assignment that thinking can acknowledge “Being” in its self-concealment. When Heidegger says that thinking must be provisional or preparatory,\textsuperscript{39} he means we must submit to what still remains questionable in our own thought: we must submit to the self-concealing matter of thought [Sache des Denkens].

And yet, what does this entail for the question of community?

It is only in terms of this path and what it holds in store for us that the question of Being — and thus the question of community, situated as it is in terms of the question of Being — can be engaged rigorously. Only by following this path can thinking address Gemeinschaft on Heidegger’s own

\textsuperscript{35} “Weg” as a multiplicity (for instance, the maxim of the Gesamtausgabe: “Wege — nicht Werke;” also the epigraph which opens Holzwege). I will address the issue of the path’s “unity” in chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{36} “As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws.... We may call this luminous keeping to itself in the truth of its essence the ἐποχή of Being.... From the epoche of Being comes the epochal essence of its destinng [Geschick], in which world history properly consists. When Being keeps to itself in its destinng, world suddenly and unexpectedly comes to pass” (EGT. 26-7).

\textsuperscript{37} See “Nihilism and the History of Being” (Niv, 224ff.).

\textsuperscript{38} For the full significance of this “Ausbiehren,” see Niv, 221-9.

\textsuperscript{39} See ZSD. 31-2/OTB. 29-30 and Niv. 243-4.

\textsuperscript{39} ZSD. 38ff./OTB. 35ff.
terms. Yet this would seem, in principle, to leave only a sharply delimited role for the question of community in Heidegger's thinking. The question of community — though surely not just the question of one kind of entity amongst others — appears to be situated in advance by the question of Being. However, this delimitation depends, as we will see in detail, upon the status of the difference between the Seinsfrage and the Gemeinschaftsfrage as it is maintained in Heidegger's thinking.

4. The Argument

My main intention in this thesis is to expose Heidegger's ambivalent relation to the question of community in order that we better understand both Heidegger's thought and community itself. Specifically, I will show that, while Heidegger's rigorous analysis in Sein und Zeit opens up the possibility of engaging the question of community, he nevertheless refrains from such an explicit engagement not just in Sein und Zeit but throughout the course of his thinking. I will argue further that this avoidance of the Gemeinschaftsfrage is not accidental but plays a crucial role in the privilege Heidegger grants to the question of Being. Finally, I will demonstrate that a careful development of the question of community in terms of both Sein und Zeit and certain exigencies in Heidegger's later thinking leads to a clearer comprehension of both Heidegger's thinking and the theme of community.

My overall argument is divided into two sections. The first section, "Heidegger's Circumvention of Community." will develop and defend two general claims: a. there is an exigency essential to Heidegger's thinking that the question of Being be developed in terms of the question of community; b. despite this exigency, Heidegger avoids any such development — and sustains this avoidance throughout the whole of his path of thinking — such that the question of Being maintains an apparently secure but ultimately unjustified relation with a conception of community never seriously called into question. The second section, "Reinscribing the Question of Community in Heidegger's Path of Thinking," will: a. argue that Heidegger, at a crucial point quite late in his thinking, once again opens up the possibility for engaging the question of community; and b. explicitly pursue this engagement in terms of Heidegger's own path of thinking.

The first section is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the relation between Being and community in Sein und Zeit, the second tracing this relation in Heidegger's subsequent thinking. The first chapter in Part A (chapter 2) will explicate Sein und Zeit's initial approach towards and

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40 As I argue in chapter 5, this appears to be the case even in the notorious writings of the 30's where Gemeinschaft
subsequent withdrawal from the question of community; the next chapter (chapter 3) will briefly clarify the overall methodological significance of Sein und Zeit in order to emphasize the continuity between this text and Heidegger's subsequent work (thus emphasizing as well the relevance of Heidegger's early avoidance of the question of community for his subsequent work). Part B of Section 1 consists of three chapters: chapter 4 will briefly consider the role Heidegger's avoidance of the Gemeinschaftsfrage plays in his consideration of the essence of truth in 1930; chapter 5 will trace this avoidance through Heidegger's focus on τέχνη in the mid-30's; and chapter 6 will briefly consider Heidegger's subsequent development of the concept of Ereignis in terms of this avoidance.

The second section consists of two chapters: chapter 7 will exhibit how Heidegger's engagement, in 1957, with the essence of language brings his path of thinking to a point where the priority of the question of Being is displaced, thus allowing the question of community to be inscribed, for the first time after Sein und Zeit. "within" this path; and chapter 8 will carry out this inscription, reintroducing the Gemeinschaftsfrage into the analysis of Sein und Zeit and outlining some of the implications of this inscription for our understanding of both Heidegger's thought and the nature of community.
SECTION I: HEIDEGGER'S CIRCUMVENTION OF THE QUESTION OF COMMUNITY

In this first section, I will develop and defend two general claims: a. there is an exigency, essential to Heidegger's thinking, that the question of Being be developed in terms of the question of community; b. despite this exigency, Heidegger avoids any such development -- and sustains this avoidance throughout the whole of his path of thinking -- such that the question of Being maintains an apparently secure but ultimately unjustified relation with a conception of community never seriously called into question.

This section consists of two parts: part A will focus upon the relation between Being and community in *Sein und Zeit*; part B will trace this relation in Heidegger's subsequent thinking.
A. SEIN UND ZEIT

This first part of Section 1 deals with the relation between Being and community in Sein und Zeit and consists of two chapters. Chapter 2 will demonstrate three things: a. Heidegger’s ontological analytic of Dasein in Sein und Zeit, because it asks about the “subject” in its very Being, frees for the first time the problematic of inter-subjectivity -- and likewise, the question of community -- from the hegemony of ontic subject-discourse (sub-sections 1-2); b. though Heidegger frees this “Gemeinschaftsfrage” for explicit consideration, and though the asking of this question is crucial for his project, he nevertheless fails to ask it. instead taking a “position” on what community is (sub-section 3); and c. Heidegger can think of the ontological analytic as “our” possibility and the Seinsfrage as available to us as “our” question only because of a prior avoidance of the question of community -- whether this be viewed as Heidegger’s avoidance of the Gemeinschaftsfrage or vice versa (sub-section 4).  

Chapter 3 will digress from the explicit consideration of community in order to focus on the methodology of Sein und Zeit. Here, I will demonstrate that, contrary to certain readings of Heidegger, the approach to the question of Being in Sein und Zeit prefigures and is to a large extent consistent with the approach to this question in his subsequent work. Establishing this continuity is crucial for my project; for if, as I argue in chapter 2, the relation between Being and community in Sein und Zeit is problematic, and if Heidegger’s later consideration of the Seinsfrage hangs upon initial developments in Sein und Zeit, then the avoidance the question of community remains a problem in Heidegger’s subsequent path of thinking. Thus, chapter 3 functions as a bridge to section B, which focuses on the relation between Being and community in Heidegger’s work after Sein und Zeit.

1 Here I am alluding to the possibility that the oblivion of community might be analogous to the oblivion of Being which Heidegger argues, is less a matter of our withdrawal from Being than its withdrawal from us (e.g., ZSD, 31/OTB, 29). The precise character of this withdrawal will be addressed in detail.
2. Taking Intersubjectivity Seriously: the ‘We’ in Sein und Zeit

The intrinsically first being, the being that precedes and bears every worldly Objectivity, is transcendental intersubjectivity.

- Edmund Husserl

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1. Transcendental Intersubjectivity

As I mentioned briefly in the introduction, Sein und Zeit was written prior to Heidegger’s explicit articulation of the full significance of the question; and in fact, though the Seinsfrage is already the guiding question of this text (§2), it appears to be oriented ultimately towards the pending presentation of an “about which” (“...Being, as that which is asked about [das Gefragte], must be exhibited in a way of its own...”[6]). However, as I will show in detail in chapter 3, this does not imply that the question as such is not yet at issue in Sein und Zeit; indeed, I will argue that the movement of this text marks the point at which a thinking oriented towards establishing a position encounters its own prior rootedness in the question.

Nevertheless, Sein und Zeit does present itself primarily as a thetic approach to Being, and it is in terms of this approach that we must first ask: what is the status of the Gemeinschaftsfrage in this text?

In the neo-Kantian Umwelt out of which Sein und Zeit emerged, this question is framed in advance by the problem of “intersubjectivity”. That is to say, the thematic of transcendental subjectivity, dominant at the time, required that any treatment of community confront the following problem: since experience and knowledge of the objective world are in each case constituted synthetically by an individual I-subject -- by me -- it is necessary to account for how such an I-subject can experience and know itself to be a member of a “We,” i.e., a group of I-subjects who share a world in common. If the discourse of transcendental subjectivity is to escape solipsism, it must offer an intersubjective solution to this I-We aporia, explaining how it is possible that I experience and know others, not simply as I-objects constituted synthetically by me, but as other I-subjects who constitute the objective world in their own right. Before turning to the question of

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1 Cartesianische Meditationen, 182/156.
2 See Heidegger’s remarks in On Time and Being (ZSD, 47ff./OTB, 44ff.) concerning how both Husserl’s work and his own early work were staged in this neo-Kantian context. See also John van Buren's The Young Heidegger (58-61, 87ff., 203-219) and Theodore Kisiel’s Genesis of Being and Time (40ff.).
community in *Sein und Zeit*, we will consider intersubjectivity briefly, because it is from precisely this that the *Gemeinschaftsfrage* in *Sein und Zeit* takes its departure.

One of the tasks which Husserl sets for himself in his 1929 lectures (*Cartesian Meditations*) is to articulate a rigorous account of intersubjectivity in order to defend the transcendental ego against the charge of solipsism.³

In these lectures, he sets out to establish a secure foundation for philosophy and science (§2) by isolating a stratum of apodeictic evidence in terms of which all other evidence can be evaluated (§6). He claims to have found this stratum through what he calls the "transcendental reduction." Specifically:

If I put myself above all this life and refrain from doing any believing that takes "the" world straightforwardly as existing — if I direct my regard exclusively to this life itself, as consciousness of "the" world — I thereby acquire myself as the pure ego, with the pure stream of my cogitationes (60-1/21).

This passage reflects Husserl's distinction between the "natural attitude," whereby consciousness takes the world it experiences to be an existent world, and the "transcendental attitude," whereby consciousness suspends all judgment concerning this world as existent and instead reflects upon its own experience of that world as experience. This latter attitude grants me access to apodeictic evidence; for, while it is possible that my experience might not correspond with the real, that I am having this or that experience cannot be doubted. This secure stratum of evidence is not restricted to an undifferentiated "I am;" it extends rather to the living stream of my pure conscious processes and the ideal unities constituted synthetically by them (§9, §14): in each case, a conscious act must be understood as an "I intend x," an intention wherein both the intending I and the intended (ideal) x are given in experience as apodeictically certain. It is Husserl's appeal to this apodeictic and differentiated stratum that opens up the problem of solipsism, for it entails that each and every objective truth be constituted synthetically by my conscious intending.⁴

It is in his fifth and final meditation that Husserl attempts to deal with this problem. He begins by arguing that there is, within the horizon of transcendental experience, a more fundamental core, the sub-stratum of "ownness" [*Eigenheit*]. This primordial transcendental stratum can be described via a second more radical reduction which disregards not only "worldly existence" but "all

³In this text, the subsumption of the theme of community under that of intersubjectivity is explicit in §55.
⁴Husserl is not espousing an idealism akin to Berkeley's such that the "real world" is exposed to be, at root, ideal. Rather he distinguishes, as Kant does, between the *empirically real* and the *transcendently ideal* — two related but distinct strata, each of which has its own set of criteria for establishing what is true within it. Husserl's transcendental idealism is not a "product of sportive arguments, a prize to be won in the dialectical contest with 'realisms'"(118-19/86): rather it is an abstraction from all judgments concerning the real — not in order to raise seriously the question "is there an existent world?" but in order to narrow our focus on the *ideal meaning* of reality as such.
constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity..." (12493); it abstracts from the We and all that it entails. According to Husserl, this sphere of ownness, despite the reduction of other subjectivity, is still capable of constituting on its own a "unitarily coherent stratum of the phenomenon world" (127/96) as well as the prior givenness of my own intending ego (§46). His task is thus to explain how, given this seemingly solipsistic intentional sub-structure, the experience of other egos and the Objective world we share is possible.

Though Husserl's solution to this problem is intricate, it rests on a single intentional function which he calls "appresentation" [Appräsentation]. Briefly, he maintains that while other egos are never presented to me in my experience as they are in themselves (i.e., as transcendental world-constituting subjectivities), there is nevertheless a "certain mediacy of intentionality" whereby subjectivity achieves "a kind of making 'co-present'" [eine Art des Mit-gegenwärtig-machens] (139/109). This is a synthesis which takes my own experience of myself as a psycho-physical organism and transfers it by analogy to others in the world, making it possible for me to regard them as like me, as alter egos. Though the worldly bodies I encounter in my sphere of ownness do not render other egos "present" to me, I infer that -- because they are bodies like mine and because they exhibit harmonious behaviour consistent with mine -- they are likely the bodies of egos who are "there too" (ibid.) and are there with me. This anticipatory synthesis is not only structurally prior to any actual empirical encounter with the other ego, it is never validated through such an encounter (i.e., the existence of an other ego is never rendered present to me but is always pending further verification). Without this analogical intentional structure, according to Husserl, not even this mediate experience of others would be possible.

Starting from the fundamental stratum of ownness, the transcendental ego, by way of this appresentative analogy, is able to constitute various strata of community and of a world which is intersubjectively accessible. By synthesizing what is present in experience with what is appresented (§55), subjectivity maintains a secondary intentional structure grounded on that of ownness; specifically: We (transcendental intersubjectivity) experience our shared world. It is in terms of this original We that a determinate community -- with its shared space, shared time, history, culture, etc. -- is constituted (§55-6).

Thus we have Husserl's most basic response to the question "what is community?": though subjectivity must always be understood as an I in the first instance, the intentional structure of this I-subject is such that a We -- an archi-community of transcendental subjects -- is synthesized from out of the sphere of ownness and is thus constitutive of the objective world [der objektiven Welt] and of the determinate communities situated there.
2. The Displacement of Husserl’s I-We Aporia

Heidegger’s articulation in *Sein und Zeit* of Dasein’s “Being-with-one-another” [*Miteinandersein*] is essentially a rejoinder to Husserl’s analysis of intersubjectivity and thus to the way Husserl delimits the question of community. Granted, *Sein und Zeit* predates Husserl’s lectures by two years; but we must not forget that intersubjectivity figures prominently in Husserl’s work as early as *Ideas*, well before his most fully developed treatment of it in 1929; and Heidegger, who had access to *Ideas* and to Husserl’s other unpublished work while writing *Sein und Zeit*, (cf. SZ, 38 [note 1], 47 [note 1]) was certainly no stranger to his teacher’s ongoing struggle with the I-We problem. But external connections notwithstanding, the significance of Heidegger’s refusal to use even the term “intersubjectivity” in his analysis of Being-with-one-another stands out most clearly when considered in light of Husserl’s fifth meditation, the most fully developed articulation of his position. Indeed, *Sein und Zeit* opens up a radically different approach to the question of community, one which does not simply put forth a more convincing solution to the problem of intersubjectivity but which transforms the problem itself.

Read in isolation, the opening of *Sein und Zeit* seems to present a Dasein which, like Husserl’s transcendental ego, is first and foremost an I. Heidegger emphasizes right from the start that the Being of Dasein is “in each case mine [je meines];” each Dasein is “delivered over [*überantwortet]*” to its own Being, to that which is “an issue for every such entity” (41-2). Indeed, “[because] Dasein has in each case mineness [*Jemeinigkeit*], one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am’, ‘you are’” (42). At first glance, this mineness suggests something akin to Husserl’s “ownness,” that underlying primary stratum of experience. However, though Dasein is given ontically as an I-myself, and though its Being is in each case mine, Heidegger is careful to point out that “[this] definition indicates an ontologically constitutive state, but it does no more than indicate it” (114). He goes on to write:

The assertion that it is I who in each case Dasein is, is ontically obvious; but this must not mislead us into supposing that the route for an ontological Interpretation of what is ‘given’ in this way has thus been unmistakably prescribed. Indeed it remains questionable whether even the more ontical content of the above assertion does proper justice to the stock of phenomena belonging to everyday Dasein. It could be that the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein just is not the ‘I myself’ (115).

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5 Already in *Ideas II* [§§43-45], Husserl’s analysis of intersubjective constitution hangs upon “appresentation.” Though the treatment of this notion is much more cursory here than it would become in *Cartesian Meditations*, its constitutive function is the same: in *Ideas*, just as in *Cartesian Meditations*, appresentation is essential for the transition from “material constitution” to “spiritual constitution,” from the constitution of worldly objects to *Gemeinschaft* (20ff.).

6 “...*darum es diesem Seienden je selbst geht.*”
Heidegger is not disputing the rigour of Husserl’s approach but rather its self-determined limits. He agrees with Husserl that Dasein is ontically given in experience as an I-subject and he explicitly acknowledges the self evidence of this I-myself. Heidegger demands, however, that we avoid taking this givenness for granted, that we consider it carefully as a phenomenon in its own right – something which Husserl does not do. Indeed, after careful scrutiny of this givenness Heidegger concludes that the I-We aporia and the consequent scramble for an account of intersubjectivity are the results of an insufficiently radical phenomenological point of departure: despite the predominant way it “gives” itself to us, Dasein is ontically not a subject, not an I-myself. Nor is the Being of Dasein something that can be understood in terms of an I.

But if the phenomenon of Dasein’s with-ness is not rooted in an I-subject, how is it to be understood?

In short, the with-ness of Dasein’s Being-with-one-another is not grounded upon any more primordial sphere of evidence (e.g., a sphere of ownness) but is equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world (114). As Heidegger first suggests in §12, Being-in-the-world is the basic and differentiated structure of Dasein’s Being: “that Dasein is” means that it is in each case already thrown into its world of concernful dealings and is thus thrown towards what it can concretely be and do in this world. Since worldhood and Dasein’s Being-in are irreducible and inseparable elements of Being-in-the-world,7 no fundamental stratum of Dasein can be abstracted from either of them: contrary to Husserl, there can be no worldless transcendental I.8 A crucial aspect of this a priori structure is that Dasein is always already in a world which includes a plurality of other Dasein in advance. Granted, Husserl argues similarly that intersubjectivity is an a priori structure which anticipates others in advance through appresentation. For him, however, with-ness is secondary, grounded upon and subordinate to the more radical stratum of ownness. Thus appresentation must act as a bridge between primary evidence and the natural attitude, and the stability of this bridge must be demonstrated if transcendental idealism is to respond to the charge of solipsism. In contrast, Heidegger’s analysis of Being-in-the-world sidesteps both Husserl’s natural attitude/transcendental attitude distinction and the dilemma of solipsism that accompanies it. The question “how can my isolated subjectivity come to experience and know other subjectivities?” loses its pertinence because

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7 "Worldhood" and “Being-in” are the themes of chapters 3 and 5, respectively, of Sein und Zeit, division 1.

8 Granted, for Husserl there is no realm of experience which is not already immersed in the “world.” For him, as for Heidegger, I find myself always already “in the world.” The transcendental I is “worldless” for Husserl only in the sense that the evidence which I encounter “in the world” is not apodeictic but is grounded upon the more primordial evidence of the I: “The Objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and always will exist for me, the only world that ever can exist for me — this world, with all its Objects. I said, derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to the fore only with transcendental-phenomenological epoché”(CM, 65/26).
I am already with others in my very Being. Heidegger renders empathetic, representative synthesis superfluous; his concern is rather how Dasein’s prior and irreducible with-ness can be demonstrated and articulated coherently without slipping back into a classical subject discourse.  

In §26, Heidegger offers a brief but densely packed analysis of Dasein’s with-ness. Here he explains that the world, disclosed in each case by Dasein’s Being-in, frees not only ready-to-hand and present-at-hand entities for their worldly involvements; it also frees [gibt...frei] entities which, “in accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein themselves...are ‘in’ the world in which they are at the same time encountered within-the-world, and are ‘in’ it by way of Being-in-the-world. These entities are...like the very Dasein which frees them, in that they are there too, and there with it” (118). Heidegger refers to this “freeing” of other Dasein as Being-with [Mitsein] and the worldly Being for which they are freed as Dasein-with [Mitdasein](ibid.). It is this “freeing of others” that determines Dasein’s with-ness.

§26 must be read very closely, for Heidegger’s main point in it is easily misconstrued. As he underscores several times in the previous section, our tendency is to interpret the Being-with/Dasein-with schema in terms of intentionality, in terms of an a priori “I intend x.” Understood in this way, the entity Dasein is ontically structured such that, via Being-with as a mode of “comportment” [Verhalten], it “constitutes” others synthetically as Dasein-with. Indeed, Heidegger appears to say as much: “Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one’s own Dasein; Dasein-with characterizes the Dasein of Others to the extent that it is freed by its world for a Being-with” (121). And a bit further on Heidegger refers to Being-with as a “Being-towards [Sein zu] entities encountered within-the-world” (ibid.), which seems to suggest that it is a mode of comportment.

Admittedly, Heidegger’s brief treatment of with-ness does not emphasize clearly enough his departure from Husserl’s intentionality in general and from his intersubjectivity in particular. Consequently, some scholars have failed to sufficiently underscore the crucial differences.

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9 Indeed, Heidegger’s refusal in Sein und Zeit to orient Being-with-one-another in terms of “empathy” [Einfühlung] (124-5) is a blunt rejection of Husserl’s intersubjective thesis in Ideas II (Section Two, Chapter 4: The Constitution of Psychic Reality: in Empathy).

10 In §25, Heidegger cautions us, again and again, against allowing our transcendental analysis to take for granted the “giverness” of the 1 (115-16). It is precisely this giverness that grounds Husserl’s intentional analysis.

11 Gregory Schufrider, for instance, completely ignores pre-intentional Being-with when he assumes the Heideggerian task to be to understand community as “a collective work, instituted through the intersection of a variety of singular paths (fates) all of which converge in our being-with-one-another.” as “somehow constituted by the coming together into one of many” (“Heidegger on Community,” 33) — as if such community-constitutive “work” as the synthesis of the “one” from the “many” weren’t precisely what is displaces in Heidegger’s analysis of Being-with! Likewise, Lawrence Vogel, in his interpretation of “liberating solicitude” as authentic Being-with-others, seems to sidestep the pre-intentional character of Being-with altogether in favour of a strictly intentional relation remarkably close to Husserlian analogical apperception: “[liberating soliciudte] involves an attunement to the particularity of others, to others as truly other, stemming from an
However, if we keep in mind that Being-with and Dasein-with are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world, and if we further keep in mind the nature of this “freeing” as it is previously worked out in the text, Heidegger’s difference from Husserl quickly becomes evident. In §18, where he is discussing ready-to-hand entities, Heidegger distinguishes two senses of “freeing”: On the one hand, Dasein, in its ontical dealings with ready-to-hand entities, can let them be involved -- thus “freeing” them -- in an ontical sense such that they are encountered within and function in terms of their context of involvement, their world. Such freeing is not accidental to the entities in question; indeed, it allows them to be, for as Heidegger says, the Being of ready-to-hand entities is precisely their worldly involvement (84). This ontically constitutive freeing could safely be called “intentional.” On the other hand, in order for such ontical freeing to take place, Dasein must have previously freed everything ready-to-hand as ready to hand, freeing it ontologically through the prior disclosure of ready-to-hand Being (i.e., Bewandtnis) (85). And yet, this “previous freeing” [vorgängige Freigabe] is no characteristic of Dasein in the sense of a property or an existentiell possibility; it is, paradoxically, not something Dasein does but something Dasein “is,” something through which Dasein “happens,” as it were. While Dasein, ontically speaking, “gives freedom” to ready-to-hand entities, it is a kind of ontological “archi-freedom” which has always already “given” Dasein (cf. OET, §4). This prior freedom is disclosedness [Erschlossenheit], the archi-event of the Lichtung, Dasein’s “Being-in” whereby it already understands the world as such (85-6; cf. 132-33). Such ontological freeing has nothing intentional about it for every possible instance of intentionality presupposes it.12

Being-with is such an ontological Freigabe, though one that makes room for other Dasein rather than for ready-to-hand entities. It does not free this or that other ontically, but previously frees all others for their worldly Being [Dasein-with]. Being-with lets them be as “Dasein encounterable within the world,” first opening up that social-clearing wherein they can exist together as a multiple “for-the-sake-of-which” [Worum-willen] which shares a world (123). To be sure, Being-with is a “Being towards entities,” but only in an ontological sense: it is not Dasein’s ontico-existentiell intention, but an “existentielle”13 which first grants such intentions their Spielraum; it does not merely “discover” [entdeckt] entities but discloses [erschließt] their Being in

12See, for instance, Basic Problems of Phenomenology on intentionality (56ff.: 265ff.: 327) and the remarks on Husserl and the Lichtung in “The End of Philosophy and the Task for Thinking” (ZSD, 69ff./OTB, 62ff.).
13In Sein und Zeit, the term “existentiell”(44) refers to aspects of Dasein’s existence-structure, the conditions for the possibility of this or that concrete existentiell comportment.
advance, thus rendering the ontic discovery of them possible. As such it is always already in the background with respect to the ontico-existential engagements it makes possible.\textsuperscript{14} Heidegger states clearly the ontological level of this “Being towards” when he claims that “Being-in is Being-with Others” (118).\textsuperscript{15} As for our existential relatedness to others: just as Dasein’s “concern” [Besorge] can engage ready-to-hand entities ontically only through a prior understanding of Bewandtnis (85), likewise “solicitude” [Fürsorge], as the existential determination of Being-with, can engage this or that other Dasein existentially only through a prior mit-lich understanding of Dasein-with.\textsuperscript{16}

Once Heidegger’s analysis is freed from all misleading intentional interpretation, the most radical ontical implication of the ontological status of with-ness becomes clear: not only is it presumptuous to begin a phenomenological analysis with the pure individuated ego, one cannot even isolate such an ego.\textsuperscript{17} To be sure, I experience myself as distinct from others, as distinct from “those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out”(ibid., 118). And yet, though I can — and most often do — view myself as radically distinct from others in my experience of myself as a “Being-present-at-hand-along-with’ them within the world”(ibid.), this experience misses my most basic relation to the “with.” This “with,” according to Heidegger, is “something of the character of Dasein”(ibid.), constitutive of its existential structure; and this requires that “otherness” be reassessed such that it has always already “contaminated” Dasein existentially. Heidegger does not so much reject the experience of the “I” as expose its hidden ground, a ground which precludes the “I” from being transcendental: “I” am essentially “Being-there-too with them”[Auch-da-sein mit ihnen](118), and my Being-one-of-them is constitutive of my ownmost self. This is not to say there is no difference between my Dasein and the Dasein of another — indeed, the whole of Sein und Zeit hangs on this difference. Heidegger is saying, however, that conventional categories are inadequate for bearing witness to the full phenomenon of this difference; it must be thought otherwise. To reverse Husserl’s stance: the experience of others does not arise through my encountering them alongside a

\textsuperscript{14}Cf. chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{15}If Being-in is in each case Being-in-with, this would seem to entail that Erschlossenheit [disclosedness] is always a Miterschlossenheit and the Lichtung is always a Mit-lichtung. I will show in §3, however, that matters are more complex.
\textsuperscript{16}Heidegger himself is not sufficiently clear regarding Fürsorge’s relation to Being-with. Though he correlates solicitude with concern (the latter being related to ready-to-hand entities), he also correlates Being-with with concern, thus failing to clarify the important difference between Being-with qua ontological and Being-with qua ontical (i.e., solicitude). This difference is a bit clearer on p. 124: “...the explicit disclosure of the Other in solicitude grows only out of one’s primarily Being with him in each case”(124).
\textsuperscript{17}Granted, Heidegger claims that ‘that for the sake of which’ I exist (i.e., my ownmost Being-able-to-be [Seinkönnten]: Being-towards-death) individuates me as this singular Dasein. However, as I suggest later in this chapter and discuss fully in chapter 8, even this authentic Dasein, in its presumably non-relational [unbezüglich] Being-towards-death, is still mit-lich to its very core, existing as much for the sake of others as for the sake of itself. Indeed, Heidegger himself says as much (SZ, 123). As I will argue in sub-section 3 of this chapter, Sein und Zeit never resolves the tension between authentic existence and with-ness.
“me” who is prior; rather, the experience of my “self” arises through my encountering me alongside a “them” who is prior (129). Thus Heidegger writes: “Knowing oneself [Sichkennen] is grounded in *Misein*, which understands primordially”(124).

Yet, if Dasein is not primarily an I-subject, we must then ask why it is given to be one at the level of apodeictic evidence? As will be discussed briefly in §3, the existential structural element *Das Man* is such that it leads Dasein to conceal its very Being from itself and regard itself as a *vorhanden* I-myself. The discourse of the subject and intersubjectivity arises, at least in part, from this dissimulation.18

We can say then, that Heidegger takes the “inter” of inter-subjectivity very seriously — too seriously, in fact, to investigate it strictly in terms of classical subjectivity. By following the (often tacit) development of this “inter” in *Sein und Zeit*, we have come to see that the question “what is community?” if it be pursued rigorously in light of Heidegger’s thinking, can be oriented neither in terms of a multiplicity of existent subjects between which there happens to be something held in common nor in terms of a constitutive synthesis accomplished in each case by a singular subject. Rather, it must be oriented in terms of the very “between” itself, the irreducible existential *inter* which “comes between us” before all else, first making the “us” — and indeed the “me” — possible. That the *Gemeinschaftsfrage* is freed from the problematic of transcendental subjectivity means that it is freed for the problematic of the *inter*.19

3. The Aporia’s Re-emergence in *Jemeinigkeit*

My concern here, as I suggested briefly in the introduction, is not so much to articulate the explicit role of community in *Sein und Zeit* — this would require very little work. Rather, I wish to

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18 This is not to say that subjective/intersubjective discourse as such is “inherently inauthentic,” something to be avoided (Heidegger makes it sufficiently clear that there is neither a delimitable “authentic” nor “inauthentic” discourse. The difference between the two modes is not so easily locatable, as this passage suggests: “Even [authentic] resolutions remain dependent upon *’das Man’* and its world. The understanding of this is one of the things that a resolution discloses...”[299]). Nevertheless, insofar as this discourse appeals to the subject’s *Vorhandenheit* — to its (self)presence — without interrogating the nature of this “presence,” the dissimulation of Dasein as something merely present can be located here.

19 Two important points: 1) Though I have stressed the dominant stratum of Husserl’s treatment of intersubjectivity wherein he subordinates the “inter” to the self-present subject, I am not suggesting that his analyses are reducible to this stratum. As both Levinas and Derrida have argued (see Levinas’ “Philosophy and Awakening,” 213-14 and Derrida’s “Eating Well” in *Points*, 263-4). Husserlian apperception — despite his subordination of it to presentation — discloses precisely the *unpresentability* of Others, an unpresentability which displaces the authority of presence itself. 2) The “inter” at stake here is not at all the “*inter-esse*” which Levinas discusses in *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*. In this text, the inter is presented as the “*conatus* of beings...Being’s interest takes dramatic form in egosism struggling with one another, each against all, in the multiplicity of allergic egosisms which are at war with one another and are thus together...the extreme synchronism of war”(4). As I will argue in chapter 8, the “*inter*” at stake in Heidegger’s thinking — though it is, in a sense, “polemic” — is not a matter of war but of singular responsibility to the Other.
expose: a. the usually tacit — but nevertheless operative — exigency in Heidegger's project that community be treated thoroughly, and b. Heidegger's careful avoidance of this exigency. Because what is at issue here is Heidegger's avoidance of the question of community, this section will not focus primarily on community as such but rather on the coherence of *Sein und Zeit* in order to show how *Gemeinschaft* is not interrogated explicitly, despite the fact that the logic of *Sein und Zeit* demands just such an interrogation.

Though Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of Dasein does indeed side-step the I-We aporia, thus freeing the *Gemeinschaftsfrage* from the problematic of classical subjectivity, this aporia resurfaces in his treatment of "mineness" [*Jemeinigkeit*], an essential characteristic of Dasein's Being. I hold that this aporia re-emerges precisely at that point in Heidegger's analysis where the question of community needs to be addressed explicitly but is instead suppressed. In order to adequately consider the re-emergence of this aporia, we must carefully trace the development of mineness in Heidegger's project.

Mineness characterizes the Being of the entity Dasein: Dasein's Being is in each case *my* Being. What, then, is mineness if not the Being of an I-myself?

At this point I can only suggest, in a few provisional remarks, what I will show in detail in this section. To begin with, we must keep in mind that, for Heidegger, my Being is never my "Being-actual" such that I am an actual self. Rather, as becomes clear gradually in *Sein und Zeit*, my Being is my Being-possible. One of Heidegger's main goals in this text is to escape the way the interpretive schema of actuality or presence-at-hand [*Vorhandenheit*] stands in the way of a disclosive interpretation of the entity Dasein. The problem, for him, is that when we present Dasein via an assertion as "what it is," we immediately disseminate the temporal character of Dasein's Being — a temporal character of which the "present" is but one aspect. At first glance, Heidegger's articulation of Dasein's Being as Being-possible seems to achieve this liberation from presence-at-hand by simply reversing the traditional privilege of actuality over possibility. Yet, though Heidegger does indeed insist that "[in] each case Dasein is its possibility"(42) and that possibility is "higher" than actuality (38; 143-4), what takes place in these claims is no mere reversal. Heidegger is quite aware not only that "possibility," as this notion has been handed down to us, makes sense and can make sense only in terms of its pending actualization, but also that to present possibility as a theme which stands in relation to the theme of actuality is already to reduce it to something present. Indeed, whether the theme in question be "actuality" or possibility," it is the actual which is acknowledged — tacitly or explicitly — to be determinative inasmuch as the
"thematic," the "present-at-hand" is what is appealed to in the final instance. Thus, in order to bear witness to the phenomenality of Dasein -- a phenomenality dissimulated not just by "actuality," narrowly speaking, but by the possibility/actuality schema -- Heidegger problematizes this very schema: on the one hand, this schema, which situates Heidegger factically, is determinative of the sole philosophical lexicon and grammar at his disposal; it plays a necessary role in his thinking. On the other hand, however, Heidegger's explicit analysis of Dasein, necessarily carried out in terms of this schema, discloses points where the schema in question is not adequate for presenting the phenomena in question. At these points, the interpretive schema of actuality/possibility functions as simultaneously necessary and impossible -- it "interrupts" itself, so to speak. Indeed, Heidegger presents Dasein's Being in terms of possibility while at the same time straining the logic of presented possibility to the breaking point, using the schema of presentation in order to bear witness to that which necessarily exceeds presentation (thus we have such immediately paradoxical claims as the following: "...[Dasein] is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being [Seinkönnten], it is not yet"[145]).

Only through such twisting of traditionally fixed terms is Heidegger able to expose, if only furtively, the elusive temporality which characterizes Dasein: a "not yet" never brought to completion, an ahead-of-itself which differs from and defers itself such that it never is what it actually is in itself.

As this section will demonstrate, that I am Being-possible -- that I am not an "actual" self -- means, for Heidegger, precisely that "I" can be either a self or a non-self: Dasein is the singular possibility of its own self-hood -- not an indeterminate I open to its possible determinations but an indeterminacy open to the possibility of being an I, of comporting itself towards l-hood. Jemeinigkeit signifies this existential openness, an archi-indeterminacy which makes possible (and requires) a paradoxical decision prior to agency, the decision whether or not to exist as an "agent," an "I" (see sub-section c, to follow). It is through this first and most sweeping existentiell decision - - mine prior to my self -- that the entity Dasein might or might not be determined as an ontico-existentiell I.

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20 On the strategy of "mere reversal," see "Nietzsche's Overturning of Platonism"(N[1], 231ff./Ni, 200ff.) and "Letter on 'Humanism'"(W, 328/LH, 208).

21 This "method," of course, is not restricted to the theme of "possibility." Heidegger's whole analysis of Zuhandenheit, of worldhood, of Being-in, and of Dasein's temporality in general, are all attempts not so much to "present" a phenomenon as to bear witness to a phenomenality which, as the condition for the possibility of all presentation, exceeds presentation (cf. chapter 3 on this point).

22 It should be kept in mind that Dasein's ability and tendency to refer to itself as "I" -- though it does presuppose the possibility of authentic l-hood -- most often does not disclose this l-hood but flees from it. As Heidegger says, "Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says 'I am this entity', and in the long run says this loudest when it is 'not' this entity"(115).
This *jemeinig* Being-possible is not a matter of this or that determinate possibility but of Dasein's very Being-in, that prior ontologico-existential "clearing" [*Lichtung*] without which there could be no determinate possibilities. And this clearing must be understood not as primarily "spatial" but as a locus of Dasein's capability, an *enabling disclosedness* [*Erschlossenheit*]. As Heidegger argues in §31, Being-in is always a Being-able-to-be [*Seinkönnen*], a clearing of *possibility*. Dasein, in each case, already understands its *jemeinig* Being-able-to-be and understands itself existentially in terms of this prior existential "scene of possibility." It is because of its relatedness to this scene that Dasein has the determinate possibility, prior to self-hood, of "choosing" self-hood; and the choice of self-hood is, first and foremost, a determinate disclosive comportment towards Being-able-to-be itself.

And yet, as will be explicated in detail in chapter 3, it is no simple matter to "be oneself," to comport oneself disclosively towards Being-able-to-be such that this \( \phi \alpha \nu \partial \epsilon \nu \omn \) shows itself, appearing "as such." Indeed, though Being-able-to-be is, as Heidegger says, always understood in advance, it resists explicit exposure as the unpresentable condition for the possibility of the present as such. As *Lichtung*, it holds itself back from the interpretative determinacy of the "as such," in each case having already receded into the background so as to allow that existentiell determinacy which it makes possible to stand forth. In other words, we tend to encounter mineness as it is *not* -- not in its proper and elusive indeterminacy but as having already diverted itself into this or that concrete possibility of itself (146): an existentiell Being-able-to-be-*this*.

Thus, it would seem that Dasein's existentiell relation to its own Being-able-to-be -- its explicit "interpretative" [*auslegend*] comportment towards and comprehension of its mineness -- could only be a determination whereby the already understood disclosure is obscured, misrepresented inasmuch as it is presented. As we shall see, however, this \( \phi \alpha \nu \partial \epsilon \nu \omn \) *can* show itself, but only through a seemingly impossible inflection of phenomenality itself: "as" the self-withholding "background" out of which every *as* emerges and which every *as* necessarily obscures.

I will demonstrate in this section that the extent to which Dasein allows its disclosedness to manifest itself existentiell (as that which withholds itself from the "as such") is, for the Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit*, the extent to which Dasein has chosen to exist as an *I*:

1. When Dasein's explicit interpretative comportment towards its *Seinkönnen* happens through that circumspection [*Umsicht*] which lets itself be determined primarily by its worldly...

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23 As Heidegger expresses it in §18, Dasein has in each case already assigned itself from a "for-the-sake-of-which" -- i.e., from a *Seinkönnen* -- to the "with-which" of an involvement [*Bewandnis*] (86). The for-the-sake-of-which shows itself only through this concrete assignment.

24 Cf. my chapter 3, sections 2 and 3.
engagements, Dasein is inauthentic (146), dissimulating Being-able-to-be “as such” and comporting itself away from the existentiell possibility of being an I.

2. Likewise, when this comportment happens through that “transparency”[Durchsichtigkeit] which focuses on existence as such, Dasein is authentic (ibid.), letting Seinkönnen show itself from itself and comporting itself towards the possibility of being an I.

But why this connection between I-thood and the existentiell engagement with disclosedness? Precisely what is meant by authenticity and transparency, and why this connection between them? In order to understand this we must work through, concretely, the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity (a-b) and then clarify precisely the disclosive character of the authentic self (c-e). Only once this has been achieved can we see how the I-We aporia re-emerges in mineness (f-h).

a. Inauthenticity

As Heidegger argues in §§35-8, Dasein finds itself engaged, for the most part, in dissimulative comportment towards both its Being and its existentiell possibilities. That is to say, though Dasein “is” its disclosedness existentially, it exists — existentiell — such that disclosedness itself (Seinkönnen, Lichtung, διάθεσις) is most often avoided, left unacknowledged. This comportment is inauthentic because it flees from that Being which is an issue for Dasein, fleeing into the busy engagement with worldly beings which is made possible by Being.25 It is in this tissue of engagements that Dasein is dispersed [zerstreut] existentiell (SZ, 129), alienated [entfremdet] from its Being-able-to-be (ibid., 178). As having surrendered itself to the concrete totality of circumspective involvements [Bewandnisganzheit] into which it finds itself thrown, Dasein is existentiell cut off from both that disclosedness which it “is” and the full scope of factico-existentiell possibilities pursuable in terms of this disclosedness. To be sure, Dasein still “is its possibilities,” but it allows them to be prescribed and proscribed by that ontic field in which it is immediately engaged. “My” existence is effectively abandoned to whatever task happens to be at hand (i.e., abandoned to whatever “with-which”[Womit] Being-able-to-be has currently assigned itself [cf. 86-7]). This predominant everyday determination of the “there” Heidegger refers to as Dasein’s fallenness [Verfallen], a fallenness away from itself yet also, oddly, into itself, for Dasein falls into and is “absorbed in”[aufgegangen bei] that world which is constitutive of its own Being (176).

25 As Heidegger indicates in §18. Bewandnis refers not to Dasein’s involvement but to the involvement of ready-to-hand equipment [Zeug] in its referential totality [Verweisungsganze].
As I’ve suggested, it is not the case that, prior to fallenness, “I stand there” faced with the choice whether or not to flee from my Being, as if this choice were in each instance at my disposal, yet to be decided. Because facticity is constitutive of disclosedness, the decision has always already been made, and not by “me”: Dasein finds itself thrown into a fallen way of existing (179), without “stance.” It is thrown inauthentically towards its possibilities, already dispersed prior to any coherent I which might gather itself together, ready for its choices. This is why Heidegger says that Dasein’s initial task, if it is to be authentic, is first to find itself in its possibilities (144).

According to Heidegger, it is possible to get a glimpse of this prior fallenness by considering that towards which Dasein flees, that in which Dasein tends to lose itself as it flees from itself; and his analysis reveals gradually that the temptation to which Dasein finds itself already succumbing is, at root, a “voice” of sorts, a “call.” Heidegger refers to this murmur which beckons constantly as “idle talk” ([Gerede] (167-70; cf. 177).

The anxious flight into idle talk is possible because Dasein finds itself immersed, a priori, in communication [Mitteilung] with others. That is to say, because Being-with is equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world, Dasein is always engaged in a determinate way of Being-with-Others disclosively. In §§33-4, Heidegger argues that communication is a mutual existentiell comportment towards what is already understood; it is a shared interpretative comportment [Auslegung] made possible by language. As such, this “Mit-teilung” (literally “sharing-with”) lets me see, with an Other, what s/he has pointed out, or vice versa (155); it lets us share and participate in the explicit disclosure of the φαινόμενον. Communication, however, also carries within it the possibility of turning away from what shows itself: as inauthentic, it is still tied to the φαινόμενον, but in its flight it turns away from all self-showing. Thus, in idle talk, what the talk is about (the proper focus of disclosive comportment, of διάφανες [diasphanteschus]) is ignored in favour of what is said in the talk, allowing discourse (Re.de, λόγος) to manifest itself only as gossiping and passing the word along [Weiter- und Nachredens] (168). However, this gossip is not so much a consequence of Dasein’s anxious flight but rather this flight itself, for it is precisely in this submission to the obviousness of what is said in the talk that Dasein flees from the phenomenon, protecting itself from explicitly encountering what the talk is about. Here, there is no disclosive comportment towards the “things themselves” — only a resistance to them as we simply pass along, without engaging, what “Others” have said. In listening to this idle talk — a listening which is, as we shall see, precisely a safeguard against any other interruptive voice — Dasein exists as inauthentic.

For Heidegger, the “voice” of idle talk belongs not to this or that singular Dasein but to “das Man,” to those “others” [die Anderen] who are always indeterminate. These others are not the
authors of what is said but function, rather, as a kind of homogeneous medium, merely relaying what has been said. Moreover, they do not face “me,” opposing my prior freedom such that “I” am ensnared by them. Rather, “I” am, for the most part, already listening to them and thus am already one of them (118), explicit in the enslavement, a docile participant in idle talk. As Heidegger argues in §27, inauthentic Dasein’s Being-with-one-another is an undifferentiated Being-among-one-another [Untereinandersein] in which it is never “I” but always das Man who hands Dasein’s possibilities over to it.

The implications for the I and the We are quite radical: our everyday co-existence is determined, via idle talk, by the ontic world into which all of us are thrown together: the current shared environment prescribes and proscribe not just who I am, but who We are — though strictly speaking, this existential determination allows for a “We” just as little as it allows for an “I.”

Indeed, “our” shared dispersal in a given factual situation means that “the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that ‘it was no one’”(127). Who Dasein is, as inauthentic, is indefinite and dispossessed a priori, “not this one, not that one, and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, das Man” (126). To the extent that Dasein finds itself having already chosen its own dispersal, its I-ness — and its We-ness — have been lost in advance, preempted by das Man-selbst (129), for whom every Dasein (and no Dasein) is the undifferentiated representative (126). Turned away from its Being-able-to-be, Dasein, qua das Man-selbst, is for the sake of das Man (129), comporting itself towards “their” Being-able-to-be, i.e., Being-able-to-be qua alienated and semblant.

And yet, ironically, it is precisely here — where no discrete I is possible — that the I stands out authoritatively, proclaiming loudly to itself: “I am this entity”(115). As Heidegger writes, it is “in terms of das Man, and as das Man, [that] I am given proximally to myself”(ibid.), and this givenness is such that Dasein interprets both itself and others as present-at-hand “I-subjects”:

From the kind of Being which belongs to das Man — the kind which is closest — everyday Dasein draws its pre-ontological way of interpreting its Being. In the first instance ontological interpretation follows the tendency to interpret it this way: it understands Dasein in terms of the world and comes across it as an entity within-the-world. But that is not all: even that meaning of Being on the basis of which these ‘subject’ entities get understood, is one which that ontology of Dasein which is ‘closest’ to us lets itself present in terms of the ‘world’. But because the phenomenon of the world itself gets passed over in this absorption in the world, its place gets taken by what is present-at-hand within-

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26 To be sure, inauthentic Dasein is such that there are different roles and functions available in the world. Heidegger’s point is simply that these roles and functions are not tied to singular Dasein but can be filled and performed by anyone.

27 A crucial point concerning inauthenticity: while das Man-selbst is existentially contingent, merely one possible — albeit predominant — determination of Dasein’s Being, das Man is an existentiale, a structural component of Dasein’s Being. That is to say, while Dasein might or might not exist as inauthentic, it is always exposed to idle talk, the tempting [versuchend] and disorienting chatter of das Man.
the-world, namely, Things. The Being of those entities which are there with us, gets conceived as presence-at-hand (ibid., 130).

It is through this inauthentic self-interpretation that Dasein views itself as an I “which maintains itself throughout its manifold experiences” (ibid.).

In this section, I have merely explicated Heidegger’s analysis of inauthenticity as it is presented in the text — particularly the way the dissimulative voice of idle talk goes hand in hand with the “choice” of non-self-hood, of Dasein’s dispersal. The extent to which Heidegger’s analysis presents problems for the coherence of Sein und Zeit as a whole is a matter I will address later. At this point, we have still to see how the explicit disclosure of Being-able-to-be is possible and what kind of “authentic I-hood” manifests itself in this disclosure, countering inauthentic existentiell dispersal.

b. The Call to Authenticity

Because everyday Dasein is in thrall to das Man, authentic existence can only be an existentiell modification of Dasein’s everyday inauthentic existence (130). If a transparent [durchsichtig] relation to Being-able-to-be is to emerge through such modification, “[Dasein’s] listening away [to das Man] must get broken off; the possibility of another kind of hearing which will interrupt [unterbricht] it must be given by Dasein itself” (271). 28 And indeed, it is only in Dasein’s existentiell turning away from das Man and hearkening to another voice that something like a Self can emerge. I am not there in advance, awaiting the call; rather, it is the call itself that calls me forth into I-hood. In hearing it, “I” — qua das Man-selbst — receive the possibility of becoming my Self qua authentic. Thus, while it is this transparent Self which lets the φαινόμενον (Being-able-to-be) show itself from itself in the very way it shows itself from itself, we must keep in mind that this Self is only in and as this interruptive “letting-show,” in the disclosive comportment which breaks free from das Man and sights Being-able-to-be explicitly. There is no Self apart from this comportment.

The interruptive Call does not offer any “information” to Dasein; it is a silent call. However, through its very silence it discloses explicitly to Dasein the nullity of its Being; i.e., it discloses Being as precisely that which withdraws itself from Dasein’s purview, from every “as such”.

Heidegger locates this other voice in the phenomenon of conscience [Gewissen], claiming that, when conscience calls, it addresses Dasein as “Guilty!,” telling him/her that s/he is the basis of some kind of “lack” or “nullity.” For Heidegger, however, this lack is not an existentiell ‘being

responsible for something". a privation which might, in principle, be replaced or made up for by something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. It is, rather, an existential lack, constitutive of Dasein’s Being. Heidegger maintains further that, while “I” am not, in any immediate sense, the addressee of the call, neither is the addressee some other Dasein (nor is it someone other than Dasein): “The call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me”(275). The call of conscience is grounded, prior to existentiell I-ness, in the structure of Dasein’s Being, in “care”[Sorge]:

a. The caller is Dasein as factual (in its already-Being-in); however, a careful reading of the text reveals that, for Heidegger, the call must arise not from the existentiellly determinate entity Dasein but from its very Being: Dasein calls precisely as having found itself [sich gefunden] anxious in the face of its facticity and anxious about its Being-able-to-be; and because Dasein has always already found itself thus, the call has always already been voiced, perpetually past. Never at my disposal; it emerges not from me but through me, an existentiell.29

b. The call addresses the non-self of das Man-selbst, i.e., the “Self” as dispersed, fallen into das Man (in Being-alongside the world of its concern).

c. The call summons the existentiellly dispersed “Self” of das Man-selbst to its ownmost Seinkönnen (Being-ahead of itself...) (278).30

Though the call is itself silent (273-4), offering nothing which might be passed along as idle talk, this “having nothing to say” actually gives Dasein something to understand insofar as it interrupts the constant chatter of das Man. It is not that the silent call interrupts this chatter so that Dasein can hear “something else.” What speaks is precisely this silent interruption itself, offering to Dasein’s understanding its very disclosedness, which is essentially not present-at-hand and not

29Specifically, the call arises “from the soundlessness of [anxious] uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit]”(296) which translates literally as “being-not-at-home.” So there is, oddly, a foreignness, a lack of secure situatedness, in Dasein’s relation to its “ownmost” Being. This uncanny anxiety is not just one possible existentiell condition amongst others but is always latent [latent] in Being-in-the-world, pursuing Dasein constantly (189). It is only through the determinate “hearing” or “failing to hear” this call that existence becomes existentiellly determinate as authentic or inauthentic (279). This is not to say, however, that the caller of conscience, as treated in Sein und Zeit, escapes all tension between the existential and the existentiell. Indeed, there is another stratum of the text which determines the caller as existentiell, as the authentic “I” (Heidegger does say, for instance, that the caller is “the Self which has been individualized [vereinzelte] down to itself in uncanniness and been thrown into the ‘nothing’”(277), that it is “that entity which in each case I myself am”(278). It is this stratum which Christopher Fynsk legitimately underscores in his reading of the call of conscience (Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, chapter 1). In chapter 8, I will demonstrate what is at stake in the existential-existentiell undecideability of Heidegger’s caller.

30On this “self-ness,” see c and d, to follow.
What is disclosed in anxiety is, as Heidegger remarks, “completely indefinite” (186), lacking the comfortable quality of ontic determinacy.

This disclosed “lack” or “nullity” is thus not something Dasein encounters in an *Anschauen*, something “in view” alongside which Dasein can tarry [*verweilen*]. Indeed, at stake here is a shift in registers: Dasein encounters this lack not as a representable “as such,” but “as” a silent (as-less) *command* which interrupts all the disorienting interpretations of das *Man* as well as the apophantic “as” itself. This disclosure, not so much *indicative* as *imperative*, calls Dasein into transparency by calling it to be *responsible* for the nothing, to *take over being its own thrown basis* (284).32 Not that the call tells Dasein to become the “foundation” for its existence such that it gets its Being firmly in hand from the ground up33 — precisely the opposite. The call commands Dasein to acknowledge that it “has been released from its basis, not *through* itself but *to* itself, so as to be *as this basis*” (285).

The “basis” in question here is the thrown, factical character of Dasein’s Being — not this or that particular set of facts with which it happens to find itself faced, but the very “fact” of its always already being entangled a priori in determinate, worldly existence. That Dasein is “released from” and must exist “as” this factical basis suggests, contrary to Kant, that responsibility is not a matter of autonomy over and against heteronomy (i.e., of a self-given law independent of and opposable to the natural order).34 And yet, that Dasein, released from this factical basis, is not released “through itself” indicates, contrary to Hegel, that this basis is not something in which Dasein could ever recognize itself.35 Indeed, Dasein is released “to itself” because it is thrown up against the unavoidable “fact” of its ownmost existence, a “fact” which, rather than presenting something recognizable, presents a radical “uncanniness,” a “not-being-at-home-with-itself” prior to all propriety. Thus, the call discloses to Dasein that at most it can — and *must* — take up and assume responsibility for that existential *Situation* (cf. 297-301) which is *not* at its disposal and with which it cannot identify itself. Dasein, if it hears this call and takes up this responsibility, acknowledges its finitude and exists as an *authentic Self*. This is what Heidegger means by “transparency” — a term not without irony.

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31 As will be discussed in chapter 3, the interruption of the hegemony of the apophantic “as” (of *Aussage*, *Vorhandenheit*, *das Man*, what is said in the talk, etc.) is the only way to acknowledge the pre-understood *echarpov*.

32 And Heidegger does formulate this as an imperative, as something Dasein *must* do: “Das Selbst... hat... existierend das Grundsein zu übernehmen” (284).

33 Indeed, this call highlights a crucial difference between Heidegger and Sartre (see “Letter on ‘Humanism’”).

34 See Kant’s *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 440-41.

35 Hegel’s attempt to trace the development of Spirit as it surpasses the *Weltanschauung* of Kantian morality comes down to this: a recognition of the *unity* of duty and actuality in the conviction of conscience [*die Überzeugung des Gewissens*] (see the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, especially 396-7).
The call calls Dasein into its 1-hood, calling it forth towards its ownmost Being-able-to-be by calling it back from idle talk and back to the null basis of its existence, the basis from which inauthentic existence flees perpetually. This basis is experienced in anxiety as facticity: the bare and inescapable 'that it is' of existence (135), that from which and in terms of which I have no choice but to be. However, because Dasein is anxious not just in the face of its "thrown"-Being-in-the-world but also about its "ability"-to-be-in-the-world, this existential nullity is not restricted to facticity but in fact permeates Dasein's care-structure through and through (285):

a. Though Dasein is constantly its "that it is," it has not laid this basis itself and can never gain control of it. This is the existential nullity of Being-already-in (the world) [schon-sein-in-(der Welt)].

b. As factual, Dasein is in each case thrown into its world. As such it is free for its engagement in worldly possibilities. "Freedom, however, is only in the choice of one possibility -- that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them"(285) [italics mine]. Dasein's choosing to pursue this worldly possibility is, in each case, a waiving of other such possibilities; and this reveals Dasein's inability to gain control of its world, i.e., the existential nullity of Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world) [Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden)].

c. As factual, Dasein is thrown into its Being-possible, and whatever existentially possibilities Dasein projects in terms of its Being-able-to-be, this Being-able-to-be has its own possibility which outstrips [uberholt] all others: Dasein's death, the possibility of the very impossibility of existence, the utter nullity of Dasein (306). This is the existential nullity of Being-ahead-of-itself [Sich-vorweg-sein].

Thus the call offers to (or rather imposes upon) Dasein's explicit understanding the clearing [Lichtung] itself in its nullity, Dasein's self-withholding Being-in-the-world. However, this offering is of little significance to Dasein unless Dasein can somehow choose to listen to it and thus become its Self:

c. Understanding the Call: the Advent of the Self

"Hearing the call" is Dasein's explicit existentiell engagement with the full disclosedness of its Being. This hearing is a matter of choice; but as I suggested earlier, understanding this choice requires a phenomenological reassessment of what choice is. At issue here is an archi-choice, paradoxically prior to agency -- indeed, the "choice" whether or not to be an agent. "In
understanding the call (i.e., in projecting oneself upon one's ownmost authentic potentiality for becoming guilty), Dasein is *in thrall to its ownmost possibility of existence*. It has chosen itself" (287). This does not mean there is first *this* Dasein, present-at-hand, with a set of possibilities at its disposal, one of which is its "ownmost." Existentially, Dasein starts out as dispersed. There is no "this Dasein" to begin with; only *das Man*. The possibility is my ownmost possibility not in the sense that "I" can pursue it, but rather in the sense that I might emerge through it; I might "happen".

Understanding the call means "wanting to have a conscience" [Gewissen-haben-wollen] (288); i.e., being ready to be appealed to. It is in terms of this initially agent-less desire -- desire qua "Being-towards" -- that I cohere from out of *das Man-selbst*. I come into being as the existentiell gathering together of "my ear" from out of prior dispersal [Zerstreung] and towards what I listen for. For Heidegger, authentic Dasein is, first and foremost, this "ear," ready for the call's silent but disclosive command, ready for the nullity underlying existence. That existentiell determination of disclosedness whereby Dasein hears the call Heidegger refers to as resoluteness [Entschlossenheit]:

The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is... constituted by anxiety as state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience -- *this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety* -- we call 'resoluteness' (296-7).

Because Dasein is 'in the world', resoluteness is not a "state prior to action" such that Dasein first listens for the call's command and then acts accordingly. As resolute, Dasein is already "taking action" (299-300), for resoluteness befalls a dispersed Dasein which has been determined through and through existentiell by the "action" in which it is inextricably engaged; it befalls a Dasein already responsible for concrete commitments which it has not chosen as a "self." Indeed, the concrete possibilities towards which a given Dasein directs itself offer no help in detecting its "degree" of resoluteness; for it is not these possibilities themselves but that in terms of which such possibilities are pursued which determines whether Dasein is resolute or irresolute.

Both resolute and irresolute Dasein assign themselves understandably from the 'for-the-sake-of-which' to a 'with-which' of involvement. For irresolute Dasein, the 'for-the-sake-of-which' -- i.e., that in terms of which the with-which is engaged -- is determined as *das Man*. Irresolute

36 Granted, Dasein, as thrown towards death, is individuated. However, as engaged in the world it shares with Others, it has already lost itself -- i.e., its possibilities -- in the general Situation of *das Man*, having fallen away, existentiell, from its existentiell individuation. The distinction between existential and existentiell individuation will be discussed in §6.

37 We must keep in mind that this is not the emergence of an "actual" Self from previously indeterminate Dasein. Only the *vorhanden* is actual, whereas Dasein exists as authentic in the "not-yet-ness" of its existence, in its disclosively Being-
Dasein's existence in its Lichtung is its distracted flight from the nullity of the Lichtung as revealed by the call, a flight towards the presence-at-hand of the with-which, a distractedness whereby everything appears as "at my disposal," either actually or potentially. In contrast, resolute Dasein, because it is ready for its anxiety about its Being-able-to-be-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein-können], has its ownmost Being-able-to-be as its 'for-the-sake-of-which'. Resolute Dasein's existence in its Lichtung is also a Being-towards the with-which of involvement, but one which acknowledges the null Lichtung wherein this involvement happens, one which 'sights' the with-which (with which it is always already involved) in terms of the Lichtung as it reveals itself in the call.

This acknowledgment of the null Lichtung is Dasein's resolving to submit to the call, to emerge as itself (as 1) by "being the basis" of its existence, by assuming responsibility for the existential 'there' not at its disposal, the 'there' in which it finds itself. The 'there' as disclosed in transparent resoluteness Heidegger calls Dasein's "Situation" (299).

This "Situation" is not a "present-at-hand mixture of circumstances and accidents which we encounter" (299). It is the phenomenon of existential nullity itself, that open and self-concealing background upon which and in terms of which all worldly possibilities are situated. This phenomenon is the 'there' itself (299), a 'there' which I have no choice but to be, either willingly or in a fugitive fashion. Yet because resoluteness, like irresoluteness, is immersed in worldly engagement, it has no "immediate access" to a 'there' purified of the existentiell. Indeed, it can disclose the 'there' only as existentiell determination, as having already taken up specific possibilities within the world. Thus, "[the] resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time" (298); it is the disclosure of the 'there' as crystallized in this existentiell determinacy granted by it.

For das Man-selbst, on the other hand, the sole explicit issue is given concrete possibilities as they are given; that is to say, the character of their "givenness" is avoided. Thus, for das Man, "the Situation is essentially something that has been closed off. Das Man knows only the 'general situation' [allgemeine Lage], loses itself in those 'opportunities' which are closest to it, and pays Dasein's way by a reckoning up of 'accidents' which it fails to recognize, deems its own achievement, and passes off as such" (300). We must not be too quick, however, to dismiss

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38It is crucial to realize that a resolution is, in each case, existentiell concrete: only in this way can we avoid the false-impression that resoluteness is some kind of "state" prior to taking action.

39In §18, Heidegger emphasizes that Dasein's disclosive Being-in has always already committed itself in each case to a determinate engagement with this or that worldly being: constitutive of Being-in-the-world is an "assignment" [Hervweisung] from my Being (Worum-willen) to this concrete scene. to this "with-which" [Womit] that I am concerned with here and now and that I "let be" (86).
irresoluteness as pure dissimulation. It is, after all, just as much an instance of disclosure as irresoluteness. Resolute disclosure is "more" disclosive than irresolute not because it discloses more existentiell possibilities (though it almost inevitably does this) but because it acknowledges explicitly that there is more at issue for Dasein than the set of available possibilities.

d. Anticipatory Resoluteness and Singularity

As I've indicated (section b), the nullity underlying Dasein's existence does not show itself in some undifferentiated simplicity. Indeed, it is differentiated in accord with the three-fold structure of care: Being-already-in, Being-alongside, and Being-ahead-of-itself. It is only in Dasein's existentiell acknowledgment of the full differentiation of this nullity that Dasein comes to exist as a Self. In this section I will demonstrate this and will highlight one crucial component of this nullity: *existential singularity*.

In Heidegger's initial analysis of resoluteness, he isolates two components of existential nullity: I encounter "factical nullity" in my impotence with respect to my bare 'that-it-is', and I encounter the "nullity of worldly engagement" in my always having to choose (and having already chosen) only one of a multiplicity of existentiell possibilities. However, as Heidegger's analysis progresses, we see that if the disclosure of nullity through resoluteness were restricted to these two existentiaia — i.e., Being-already-in and Being-alongside — it would present no urgency, offer me no imperative. In fact, it would present no real possibility of authenticity.

Specifically, if nullity were found only in these two existentialia and not in Dasein's "ahead-of itself," then Dasein's Being-able-to-be — its "not-yet-ness" — would be existentielly open-ended, infinite. In such a case, Dasein could, with "good conscience," defer choosing in terms of its Situation and instead allow *das Man* to dictate its course of pursuit — at least, "for now." Because it would have "all the time in the world" — i.e., because an indeterminate and open-ended "not-yet-ness" would be constitutive of its Being — there would be no hurry, no urgent need to prioritize possibilities in relation to each other. Why would such a Dasein ever dwell now on what anxiety discloses if it could safely (and perpetually) put off this troubling concern until later?41

Of course, as becomes clear in §§61-2 nullity does permeate the "ahead-of-itself" as well. Heidegger writes: "Resoluteness brings itself into authenticity only when it projects itself not upon

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40Heidegger treats this apparent "open-endedness" extensively in Division II, chapter 1 and again in Division II, chapter 5 (e.g., "Once one has grasped the finitude [Endlichkeit] of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless [endlosen] multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one..." [384]).
any random possibilities which just lie closest, but upon that uttermost possibility which lies ahead of every factual Being-able-to-be of Dasein, and, as such, enters more or less undisguisedly into every Being-able-to-be of which Dasein factically takes hold'(302). For Heidegger, this uttermost possibility is death, the absolute nullity of existence, and resoluteness is authentic only when it anticipates [vordilhafter] death.

Resoluteness, wanting to have a conscience, resolves upon Being-guilty; that is to say, Dasein is resolute when it acknowledges its finitude, when it assumes responsibility for the null, unrecognizable basis of its own factual existence. But, as Heidegger emphasizes, Dasein is Guilty as long as it exists. Thus, an understanding disclosure of Dasein’s Being-guilty requires that “Dasein [disclose] to itself its Being-able-to-be, and [disclose] it ‘right to its end’”(305). It is important to keep in mind precisely how Heidegger is using the term “end” here. He distinguishes various determinations of “end”: the “fulfillment”[Vollendung] of a course of development (e.g., the ripeness of a piece of fruit); the mere “stopping”[Aufhören] which is either a “passing over into non-presence-at-hand”(disappearance) or a “Being-present-at-hand only when the end comes”(e.g., a finished product) (244-5). In contrast to such determinations, the “end” characteristic of Dasein’s death is quite different. As Heidegger argues in §48, Dasein, as a Being-able-to-be, is never at its end, i.e., its end is never “actualized” for it. Rather, “just as Dasein is already its ‘not-yet’...it is already its end too”(245). Indeed, if, as Heidegger claims, Dasein’s possibilities are not simply aspects of what Dasein might “actually” do at some “now-point in the future” but are rather determinative for Dasein’s “is”(cf. SZ, 42), then the primary significance of death as a possibility cannot lie in its being a pending, actualizable event. What is more, death resists – even more than do other possibilities – being articulated in terms of actuality. As that “end” towards which Dasein always comports itself, is certainly a possibility for Dasein; but it is not the possibility of something available to Dasein, something at its disposal. The possibility of death is not an existentiell possibility at all; it is rather the existential possibility of the very impossibility of existence. of no-longer-Being-able-to-be-there [Nicht-mehr-dasein-können](250), what one might risk calling the absolute closure of Dasein’s disclosedness (die Verschlosseneit der Erschlossenheit).42 It is a possibility which does not belong to worldly involvement but to the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ itself – indeed, as its very limit.

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41 Indeed, it is because das Man-selbst regards its available possibilities in just this way that it is able to flee from anxiety’s disclosure.

42 ...[Death] as possible is not something possible which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but a possibility of Dasein’s Being’(260); indeed, it is the possibility of not-Being-there [Verschlossenheit] in relation to which Being-there [Erschlossenheit] necessarily stands. As Heidegger later puts it, not-being-there (i.e., death) is the supreme victory, not over existentiell possibilities, but over Being itself (EM, 186-7//M, 178).
It is through the existential possibility of death that the full nullity of care is disclosed to Dasein's resolute existence (306). Only because death is certain, outstrips all other possibilities and could come at any time (§52) — foreclosing all of Dasein's existentiell possibilities — is the call of conscience an urgent call that must be acknowledged now. Dasein's Being-able-to-be is sighted in a transparent fashion only when it is understood to be a Being-towards-death, and it is only in terms of this that Being-able-to-be-guilty is fully disclosed. This wanting to have a conscience, projected towards death, Heidegger refers to as anticipatory resoluteness [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit], the full authentic determination of Dasein's 'there'.

The three-part nullity which permeates care through and through is essential to Dasein's disclosive emergence into I-hood. Yet there is a component of this nullity which I have avoided treating explicitly thus far, though it is essential to anticipation. This component must be singled out and underscored explicitly if the emergence of the authentic Self is to be fully understood.

This other nullity is that of the 'who' of authentic Dasein. The 'who' of inauthentic Dasein, remember, is indeterminate and dispossessed — the "everyone and no one" of das Man. One of the essential characteristics of this inauthentic 'who' is infinite substitutability: "...one Dasein can be represented [Vertretbarkeit] by another..."(239), and indeed such that "one Dasein can and must, within certain limits, 'be' another Dasein"(ibid.). This substitutability is essential to the inauthentic disclosure of death. For das Man, "death certainly comes, but not right away"(258), which is to say, though it is a possibility by which one [man] is always threatened, it does not threaten "me, here and now;" it threatens someone else. Where its death is concerned, inauthentic Dasein always allows the indeterminate Other to stand in for it. As inauthentic, "I" always "still have time," for death is something which happens to Others now — and perhaps to me later. In contrast, the authentic disclosure of the possibility of death disrupts this dominant everyday substitutability, revealing that death is, in each case, that which must be faced by me and faced alone (384). To begin with, though I can be "with the Other" in a sense as s/he dies, I cannot be towards death with him/her. Indeed, what I comport myself towards — what I "experience" — in such an instance is precisely that which slips away from my experience and from any possibility of recognition:

Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as is experienced by those who remain. In suffering this loss, however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being as such which the dying man 'suffers'. The dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense: at most we are always just 'there alongside'(238-9).

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43 Das Man-selbst is, despite its dissimulative tendency, as much Being-towards-death as is authentic Dasein. It comports itself towards death, but in a fugitive [flüchtig] way, such that death is disclosed as "semblance"[Schein]. By presenting death as a merely existentiell possibility which can be avoided "for now," das Man places death at Dasein's disposal, concealing its essential nullity (cf. SZ, 264).

44 Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy's remarks in La communauté désoeuvrée (82-3).
This impossibility of a shared comportment towards death entails that no one else can represent me in my death (240). Death -- my ownmost non-relational [unbezüglich] possibility -- cuts me off from all ties to Others: it is, in each case, this Dasein who dies.45

Thus, when Dasein exists authentically towards its death, the call of conscience is not only an urgent call which must be acknowledged now; it must be acknowledged now by me and no one else. I am unable to let an Other take responsibility for the call, for it singles me out in my mortality, calling me to be myself. (To be sure, it is precisely in terms of this “absence of relation”[Unbezüglichkeit], this marginalization of the Other’s death in favour of my ownmost death, and this interpretation of death as an essential “possibility” rather than an essential “impossibility” that Levinas critiques Heidegger; and this analysis certainly warrants serious consideration. I will return to this (in chapter 8) once I have completed tracing the Gemeinschaftsfrage in Heidegger’s thought.)

According to the logic of Sein und Zeit, the singularity at work in this “being singled out” must be thought in a two-fold sense:

1. Singular being: As Heidegger shows in §64, it is in anticipatory resoluteness, the authentic determination of Being-towards-death, that Dasein coalesces as this addressee, as this singular being. As a “self-chosen I” maintaining itself in the transparent disclosure of its Lichtung (i.e., the radical nullity underlying its existence), this being ek-sists towards its own concrete possibilities, possibilities illuminated and circumscribed for it by its ownmost singular possibility. It is in this respect that “I” am self-possessed, unrelated to others.

2. Being-singular: When we ask “how does Dasein’s Being ‘make possible’ this singular being, this existentiell individualisation?,” we encounter a second sense of singularity. As we have seen. Dasein’s “is,” its “existence,” must be understood in terms of Being-in, disclosedness, the Lichtung. Since Dasein is always already with other Dasein in its Being-in-the-world, it would seem to follow that the Lichtung is one we share, that disclosedness [Erschlossenheit] is a universally applicable Mit-erschlossenheit -- not only open to and for a multiplicity of individual Dasein, but the very ground of their ontic individuation. However, if we turn to another textual exigency, matters reveal themselves to be less straightforward. Dasein, whether authentic or inauthentic, always exists towards the singular possibility of its own

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45 This is not to say that, according to Heidegger’s logic of mortal singularity, the genus “death” is empty, communicating nothing (we do, after all, understand something when we say: “A is alive; B is dead”); rather, what we communicate in our shared comportment towards “death” is what we flee towards in the flight from what is in each case my ownmost unbezüglich (and unmittel-ig) possibility. Indeed, we flee from singularity towards the security and comfort of sharability/communicability.
death; and since death, always singular, is a possibility not of this or that existentiell
determination but of Dasein’s very Being-able-to-be, and thus of its Lichtung, Being itself is
always Being-singular — what Heidegger could easily have named “Sein-einzeln”.\(^{46}\) Dasein,
if it is determined existentiell as a singular being, can maintain itself only through the
transparent disclosure of Being-singular, of the Lichtung as mine.

This Being-singular — this mineness of Being-able-to-be — reveals that the Lichtung is not a
common existential clearing which “we share,” in which “we dwell” (cf. p. 54); it shows that the
“there” of Erschlossenheit is not simply a universally accessible ("all-gemein," and thus "gemein-
schaftlich") Being-in through which each of us is existentiell individuated as “this” Dasein.
Indeed, Dasein’s authentic disclosure of Being-in is, in each case, the opening onto its “ownmost
singular loss” — not a relative but an absolute loss: not-Being (or better, Being).

There is, to be sure, something about “ownmost loss” and the “possibility of impossibility”
which is oxymoronic, warranting suspicion.\(^ {47}\) Christopher Fynsk, for instance, speculates that here
Heidegger perhaps gives in to “one of the oldest and greatest ruses of philosophy — an
appropriation of the very event of disappropriation” (Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, 38). That
is to say, despite Heidegger’s emphasis on finitude and the apparent acknowledgment of
impossibility, he still seems to submit loss to possession, impossibility to possibility, placing death
at Dasein’s disposal, as its possibility of loss. Yet, while one can read Heidegger as having decided
for possession over loss, it is also possible — though more difficult — to read him as having decided
for loss over possession. Charles Scott, for instance, has argued that the term “ownmost” in
Heidegger’s consideration of death is not without irony: death is situated at the very limit of
possession precisely because, in death, possession as such is revealed to have its ground in absolute
loss.\(^ {48}\)

What we must keep in mind here is that Heidegger’s constant reference in Sein und Zeit to the
axis of possession/dispossession (Eigentlichkeit/Uneigentlichkeit) locates not so much his own
thinking as what his thinking is up against. Sein und Zeit demonstrates that, factically, we find
ourselves already interpreting the world in terms of the possession/loss opposition, indeed, such that
possession is always privileged over loss, possibility over impossibility, presence over absence. He

\(^{46}\)One might argue that I am overestimating the importance of Being-able-to-be for the overall structure of the Lichtung.
However, we must keep in mind that “the primary item in care is the ‘ahead-of-itself’” (236).

\(^{47}\)As Levinas has pointed out: e.g., Totality and Infinity, 56-7, 235.

\(^{48}\)According to Scott, the radical “self-possession” of authenticity, though it manifests the proper, demands the inversion
of propriety as such: death, as Dasein’s ownmost possibility, does not submit loss to possession; rather it shows precisely
that all possession is oriented around an axis of the most radical dispossession: the possibility of impossibility is the
impossibility of possibility (“Nonbelonging/Authenticity”).
realizes, further, that in order to displace this economy, it is necessary to turn it against itself. And this is just what he does in his treatment of death: though the term “death” is, like all terms, situated factico-historically in the logic of the proper, it marks a fissure in this logic, a point of weakness which threatens its coherence from within.

In death, possession runs up against “something” which first appears and is typically interpreted as a loss, the negation of possession. However, a more thorough analysis reveals that what death discloses is neither loss nor possession — both of which must be understood, for Heidegger, in terms of existentiell possibilities — but rather their prior, existential “ground”: Being-singular. That Heidegger’s point of focus, in his treatment of Dasein’s Eigentlichkeit, is what is typically held to be the most radical loss, is hardly accidental. Indeed, just as Heidegger’s apparent reversal of the privilege of actuality over possibility in fact functions to displace the actuality-possibility schema so as to disclose a phenomenon which exceeds it (see the introduction to section 3 of this chapter), likewise the possession-loss schema and the possibility-impossibility schema which so dominate our thinking are here displaced in the very same way: it is only through the self-interruption of these factically unavoidable schemata that the phenomenon of Being-singular can be allowed to show itself.

Granted, it is possible — this reading notwithstanding — to highlight certain segments of Heidegger’s treatment of death such that Dasein’s end appears to be of primarily existentiell rather than existential significance. Such a reading, however, misses what is most radical about the singularity of death as treated in Sein und Zeit, i.e., what appears at first to be a purely existentiell singularity gradually reveals its existential character:

1. The treatment of death in division two is geared towards delimiting the “whole of the entity” Dasein (232), which suggests an existentiell limit rather than a limit constitutive of Being-in as such. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s discussion, which culminates in §§47-8, shows gradually that the possibility of death — though it does indeed limit all of my existentiell possibilities — is itself an ontologico-existential limit: “In dying, it is shown that mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for death. Dying is not an event; it is a phenomenon to be understood existentially…”(240). Dasein does not reach its end, existentiell, in death; rather, its existence is such that it always comports itself towards (while never reaching) this limit: Dasein “is” a “Being-towards-the-end [Sein zum Ende]...”(245). Though there are certainly different existentiell modes of this Being-towards-death, Being-towards-death as

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49 Indeed, Charles Scott suggests this (ibid.) as does Christopher Fynsk (Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, 50-1)
50 My emphasis.
such is constitutive of Dasein’s Being: “Death is a way to be [Weise zu sein], which Dasein takes over as soon as it is” (245; cf. 247-8).

2. Once the existential character of death is granted, one can immediately pinpoint passages which demand the singularity not just of the Dasein-entity but of Being itself:

   a. “By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it ‘is’ at all” (240). It is only in terms of this phrase -- assuming we are acknowledging the existential significance of death -- that we can understand what Heidegger means when he says Being is in each case mine (42).

   b. “Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost possibility-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost possibility-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the utmost one” (250).

   c. “...we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being [Seinsverlust] as such which the dying man ‘suffers’...We are asking about the ontological meaning of the dying of the person who dies, as a possibility-of-Being [Seinsmöglicheit] which belongs to his Being” (239).

3. It is in terms of this existential death-limit -- Being-in as Being-towards-death -- that Heidegger articulates the finitude of temporality (385-6), i.e., the finitude of the very “meaning” [Sinn] of Dasein’s Being. And this determines, retrospectively, the finitude of truth itself (see §44, especially p. 221).

If the loss proper to death were merely existentiell, relative, Dasein could say to itself, “I may cease to be, but Others will still be there.” However, it cannot say this -- at least not when considering its death with any phenomenological rigour -- for in dying it “takes” its Da -- and its Being-with -- with it.

Yet, in the face of this reading of Being-towards-death, one must ask: how does it help to explain one kind of singularity (existentiell) by claiming it to be grounded in another (existential)?

The issue of individuation is, like every issue, framed in advance by the tissue of inauthentic interpretations into which Dasein finds itself thrown; specifically, it is seen through the lens of presence-at-hand: entities, taken not as they show themselves to be but as present-at-hand, are interrogated as to their “present-at-hand individuality.” What is sought in such an interrogation is

51 Cf. chapter 3.
the constant and universally applicable (i.e., perpetually present-at-hand) condition for the possibility of their individual existence.

While such an approach might work for present-at-hand entities -- assuming that their ground could be understood in terms of presence-at-hand -- it does not work for ready-to-hand entities, and it certainly does not work for Dasein. We have referred to the Lichtung as an always already withdrawn background in terms of which entities stand forth. However, if we presume in advance this "background" to be a stable, constant and continuous one shared by all Dasein, we have already brought it into the fore-ground, rendering it manageable, at our disposal. We have, in short, reduced Dasein's Being to something perpetually present-at-hand.

Still, we must not view the existential possibility of death simply as evidence of a "fragmentary" or "discontinuous" ontological background. Such a reversal misses the point. At issue is the constant tendency of our interpretations towards dissimulation and the way in which the λόγος can let the φαινόμενον interrupt this tendency, thus problematizing accepted verities. In the case of death, it is the interpretative authority of "continuity," "permanence" and "universal applicability" which dissimates existential nullity, and in Heidegger's text the λόγος lets this φαινόμενον show itself precisely by exposing a radical singularity which cannot be grounded in presence-at-hand.

e. Jemeinigkeit: Care and Selfhood

We now see that mineness must not be understood as a constant and universally applicable existential. Jemeinigkeit -- the "in-each-case-mine-ness" of Being (42) -- is Being-singular: it is not because I am the possessor of Being that Being is mine; rather, it is because Being is, in "each" case, apportioned as this finite opening -- a rift standing in relation to its absolute closure -- that I can coalesce as its unique "possessor," as my (anticipatory resolute) Self. It is only through existentially prior mineness that an existentiell I can emerge for whom -- and solely for whom --

52 Zuhanden "equipment" is encountered in the first instance not as this individual tool situated under the genus Zeug but as a totality of equipment [Zeuganzheit]. It is only in terms of this prior (and never vorhanden) totality -- which is not a universal -- that "individual items" can emerge (68ff.).

53 We normally think of dissimulation as that which prevents us from getting a comprehensive view, that which stands in the way of our getting a sense of the whole (this is the expectation which is active in §7 and at the opening of Division 2, chapter 1 -- prior to Heidegger's radical displacement of this expectation). What Heidegger's analysis reveals, however, is that where death is concerned it is precisely the inauthentic expectation of the "whole," of everything being within reach, that is the dissimulation, cutting us (or rather das Man-selbst) off from the null truth of Being-singular. Heidegger's analysis suggests that perhaps bearing witness to the prior disclosure of "Being" is not exclusively a matter of the "whole," but is, at least to some extent, a matter of the fragmentary, of that which breaks off, of the "singular shard" which is not simply the splinter of a prior totality.
“there is” [es gibt] this Being. Indeed, the first gift of Being to “me,” granted through Being-towards-death, is (my) “Being-able-to-have-Being” -- the “Sein-haben-können” which allows me to emerge as the singular recipient of my singular Being.

This singularity is disclosed to Dasein in the ‘that-it-is-and-has-to-be’ of anxiety, i.e., this null basis from which and as which Dasein has no choice but to exist. The call of conscience is, in each case, the singular assignment of my responsibility; and my assuming responsibility for the there qua Situation (an assumption through which “I” first emerge) is my choosing to be responsible for this singular existential opening.

It should now be clear what is at stake when Heidegger, in § 64, denies that care is grounded upon an I (i.e., upon a subject qua subjectum, ἑποκειμένον) and claims instead that the existentiell possibility of I-hood is grounded in care. For Heidegger, authentic Dasein is, to be sure, self-constant Dasein; but this “self-constancy” [Selbst-ständigkeit] is not without irony: one “maintains oneself” existentially in anticipatory resoluteness -- an existentiell determination of mineness -- precisely by refusing to maintain oneself and instead by resolving to repeat one’s interruptive resolve in the face of the singular Da (322-3). What is constant about authentic Dasein is its resistance to self-closure, its responsibly holding itself open to the call of conscience which has never “finished” calling but which always directs attention away from the “self” and towards the singular Situation, the there, to which I -- and not a programme in which I already participate -- am responsible here and now.

To sum up briefly, then, Heidegger’s consideration of I-hood and mineness hinges on two crucial points:

1. The “I” is a possible receptive response to (i.e., a possible existentiell determination of) a prior existential appeal.

2. The singularity of the “I” is grounded not in a constant universally applicable structure, but in mineness, in Being-singular.

f. Being-Singular and the Mitsein-Mitdasein Relation

We saw initially how Heidegger escapes the traditional dilemma of intersubjectivity by investigating Being-with-one-another not only at the ontico-existentiell level but at the ontologico-
existential level as well. By acknowledging a Being-with and a Dasein-with which are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world (114), he avoids the phenomenologically unjustified assumption that a self-possessed I stands somehow prior to its relations with others: for Heidegger, with-ness is fundamental; there is not “something else” which grounds it. Nevertheless, as we now see after having considered Dasein’s I-hood in terms of mineness, there is a definite tension between “Being-singular” and “Dasein-with,” two equiprimordial aspects of Dasein’s Being. This tension is evident in the following passage:

The non-relational [unbezüglich] character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualizing is a way in which the ‘there’ is disclosed for existence. It makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our ownmost Being-able-to-be is the issue. Dasein can be authentically itself only if it makes this possible for itself of its own accord (263)

Here Heidegger claims that Dasein, when it stands in transparent relation to its ‘there’, indeed stands in existentiell relation to its Being-singular (its ownmost Being-able-to-be), to a singularity which somehow does not concern other Dasein. And he claims this even though the “with,” as equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world, seems to preclude any self-possessed Being-singular which is radically distinct from the Being of others (Dasein-with). Indeed, one would think -- contrary to Heidegger’s claim here -- that the existential difference between us is problematized through and through: while each Dasein’s exclusive relation to its own death is the condition for the possibility of its singularity, “my ownmost Being” is somehow always already contaminated by the other’s Being; for the equiprimordiality of the “with” requires that on some level my Being-towards-death also be a Being-towards the Other’s death (the death constitutive of the singularity of Dasein-with), which would seem to undermine the nonrelational (i.e., singularizing) character of “my” Being.56

Still, Heidegger was aware of and repeatedly dismissed the possibility of any such tension. This is clear in the way he immediately qualifies the above passage:

But if concern and solicitude fail us, this does not signify at all that these ways of Dasein have been cut off from its authentically Being-its-Self. As structures essential to Dasein’s constitution, these have a share in conditioning the possibility of any existence whatsoever. Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost Being-able-to-be rather than upon the possibility of the they-self (ibid.).

How can he dismiss this tension so quickly and confidently?

One might speculate that perhaps Heidegger does not dismiss this tension at all, that he simply intends to let it stand, a non-relation which is precisely that most paradoxical of “relations” (one

56 Christopher Fynsk does an excellent job highlighting this tension (Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, 42ff.).
which somehow relates me to others by way of my separation from them\(^{57}\) — what Blanchot would call a relation without relation. However, while Blanchot and Levinas (Totality and Infinity, 79ff.) are certainly justified drawing from Heidegger’s Unbezüglichkeit in order to point towards an originary difference prior to all self-possession, this is not a path which Heidegger himself follows. Indeed, the acknowledgment of such an unresolvable tension would require, at the very least, that Heidegger address how Dasein’s (non)relation to the Other bears upon the self-possession characteristic of authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]. A few ambiguous remarks notwithstanding (e.g., the isolated references to the equiprimordiality of the “with”\(^{114}\) and to Being-for-the-sake-of-others \(^{123}\)), Heidegger never comes close to this topic. Indeed, this holds even of his discussion of the call of conscience — the segment of Sein und Zeit which, perhaps more than any other, seems to entail an Other at the very heart of Dasein’s relation to itself.\(^{58}\)

And yet, though Heidegger does not pursue this issue further, it is possible to trace, in what the above passage implies, a move towards resolving this tension. In short, Dasein can “[project] itself upon its ownmost Being-able-to-be” and do so precisely as “solicitous Being-with” (i.e., as comporting itself towards the Being of the Other) only if there is a division in that Being towards which it comports itself: Heidegger needs a radical separation between Dasein’s Being-singular (its ownmost Being-able-to-be) and the Being of the other (Dasein-with); though both are irreducible existentialia, equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world, they must nevertheless stand apart, located in distinct structural elements of Being-in-the-world:\(^{59}\)

a. Dasein’s ownmost Being-able-to-be is exclusively a matter of Being-in as such, structuring the singular finitude of the Lichtung. Granted, it is impossible to speak of a Being-able-to-be which is not already engaged in the world, for “any Dasein has already diverted its Being-able-to-be into a possibility of understanding”\(^{146}\), i.e., into a concrete existentiell worldly determination. Nevertheless, though Being-in and worldview function together in every existentiell comportment, the distinction between them is sharp at the existential level.\(^{60}\) My

\(^{57}\) See note 19 from Christopher Fynsk’s Foreword to Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Inoperative Community (153).

\(^{58}\) Specifically, Heidegger refers to the call of conscience as the “voice of a friend that every Dasein carries with it” (SZ, 163), without ever reflecting on the “alterity” of this friend. Christopher Fynsk points to the tension underlying this voice when he writes: “Who is this friend whose voice Dasein always carries with it?... The voice of the friend is always there, just as Dasein itself is always there as thrown. Perhaps all we can say now in response to the question ‘Who?’ is that when Dasein finds and assumes itself in its constancy, it finds that there is always another with it, speaking to it” (Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, 42).

\(^{59}\) In The Fragile “We,” Lawrence Vogel attests to this separation when he distinguishes between “existentialist” and “historicist” interpretations of Sein und Zeit; however, his resolution of these opposing interpretations in his “cosmopolitan” reading of Sein und Zeit does not go far enough. Indeed, Vogel is able to articulate his “Heideggerian liberalism” only because he fails to address the implications of this separation rigorously.

\(^{60}\) As Heidegger puts it: “…while Being-in-the-world cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having several constitutive items in its structure” (53). This is not to say, however, that Heidegger
ownmost Being-able-to-be -- Being-towards-death\textsuperscript{61} -- is not, for Heidegger, a matter of "significance" (i.e., of worldhood [cf. §18]) but of that "for-the-sake-of-which" in relation to which worldhood is situated, that "for-the-sake-of-which" which is none other than Being-in itself (143, 146; 262-3).

b. Less obvious is the way Heidegger locates Dasein-with in \textit{worldhood}. Once again, at the existentiell level, one cannot speak of my comportment towards the other, the other's comportment towards me, or the other's comportment towards him/herself, without speaking of Being-in. As Heidegger says, "Being-in is Being-with Others"(118). Nevertheless, as he also makes clear much later, Dasein is, at the \textit{existential-ontological} level, radically cut off from the other's Being-ahead-of-itself (263), i.e., from its Being-in; and this separation reflects a crucial interpretive decision concerning the \textit{Mitsein-Mirdasein} relation: as I argued in section 2, just as concern [\textit{Besorge}] has previously freed all ready-to-hand entities for their ready-to-hand-Being (\textit{Bewandtsein}) such that things can have a \textit{worldly} involvement, likewise Being-with has previously freed other Dasein for their Dasein-with such that others can have a \textit{worldly} existence with me (118); now we see that worldhood is the sole aspect of the other's Being-in-the-world to which \textit{my} Being-with relates. Thus, if we are to take the exigencies of §53 seriously, Being-with must be powerless with respect to others' Being-ahead-of-themselves (with respect to their Being-in). World is a "with-world"(118) precisely because the "with" is restricted to the existentielle worldhood.\textsuperscript{62}

Thus does Heidegger appear to resolve the tension between self-possessed Being-singular and that existential difference between us which must be conceived in terms of Being-with.

Still we must ask: why is this crucial separation left so much in the background of \textit{Sein und Zeit}? And why does it emerge -- at least to the extent that it does emerge -- so late in the text, long after the explicit treatment of the \textit{Mitsein-Mirdasein} relation?

As we shall see, the tension at work here is not resolved as easily as Heidegger suggests: for Being-with is not exhausted by Dasein's having previously freed others for their worldly possibilities; my Being-with relates to more than just the \textit{worldly} Being of others.

\textsuperscript{61} As I have argued, Being-towards-death as such is not existentiell for Heidegger but \textit{ontologico-existential}: my death is \textit{a pure} possibility, a "not yet" which, thought never actualizable for me, lies perpetually ahead of me, an existentielle.

\textsuperscript{62} As one might expect, this restriction of the "with" to worldhood is essential for Heidegger's treatment of Being-towards-death: "...when we speak of 'Being-with', we always have in view Being with one another in the same world. The deceased has abandoned our 'world' and left it behind. But in terms of that world [\textit{AUS IHR HER}] those who remain can still..."
g. The Existentiell I-We Relation as Treated in §74

The relation between Dasein-with and Being-singular, and the ontico-existentiell possibilities opened up by this relation, are treated most explicitly in Heidegger’s analysis of Geschichtlichkeit, the “historicity” or “Being-historical” essential to Dasein’s existence-structure. In transcendentental terms, historicity is the temporally grounded existential condition for Dasein’s existentiell relation to history; it is in articulating this condition that Heidegger demonstrates the possibility of an existentiell historical “We,” of a concrete “community.” Thus, we will begin with a brief sketch of historicity.

In division two, chapter 5, Heidegger argues that Dasein’s temporality is not grounded in the fact that Dasein “stands in history;” indeed, Dasein exists historically because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being (376). By this point in the text, Heidegger has already argued that care, the structure of Dasein’s Being, has its unity in temporality (§65): the ahead-of-itself is grounded in the “future”[Zukunft]; Being-already-in is grounded in “past-ness”[Gewesenheit]; and Being-alongside is grounded in “making present”[Gegenwärtigen]. Moreover, he has argued that this temporality underlying Dasein’s Being, because of its essential relation to Dasein’s death, is finite (ibid.). In division two, chapter 5, Heidegger wants to show how the historical must be radically rethought in terms of this finite temporality. He claims that, though history somehow has to do with “the past,” just what this signifies is by no means self-evident.

As one might expect, his consideration of “historical past-ness” begins with its inauthentic interpretation (recall that, as I indicated briefly in section a, this is not a specific interpretation which is “in itself” inauthentic, but rather a dissimulative tendency, with respect to a factically given interpretation, to focus disclosive attention only on “what is said in the talk” at the expense of “what the talk is about”). Heidegger argues that the conventional, historiologial [historisch] approach to history, though oriented towards the past, focuses primarily on “things” as they were present-at-hand in the past (§73) and does so without ever reflecting upon the nature of this present-at-hand pastness. In this approach, past Dasein is granted a tacitly secondary status, interpreted in terms of these “historical things”(388); and it is hardly accidental that this historicism is consistent with das Man’s tendency to conceive of Dasein in terms of presence-at-hand (130). As Heidegger shows, however (interrupting “what is said in the talk” in favour of “what the talk is about”), presence-at-hand, when engaged rigorously, reveals itself to be not prior to but contingent upon readiness-to-hand, and ready-to-hand entities themselves “are” only insofar as they have been freed for their

be with him”(238). However, as I will underscore in the following sections, there is also a stratum of Sein und Zeit which grants a much broader ontological significance to the “with”.
involvement in a world opened up by Dasein’s Being-in. It is thus not in terms of “past things” but rather the “world which is no longer” and Dasein as “‘having-been-there’ [da-gewesen]” (380) that past-ness should be understood.

More precisely, my Dasein, as it finds itself thrown, has been submitted to a “world,” and exists factically with Others (383). Such submission is, existentially, a submission to the concrete worldly possibilities which have been handed down to it – prior possibilities disclosed to Dasein only because it exists, in each case, in terms of a heritage [ein Erbe] (383). That is to say, possibilities are disclosed in advance for me by the Dasein who has-been-there, by that da-gewesen who previously existed in terms of its possibilities in a “world which is no longer” (385).

Dasein, whether authentic or inauthentic, always exists in relation to its heritage and thus to the concrete possibilities disclosed through such a heritage. It can do this only because it is structured existentially such that, grounded in finite temporality, it hands down [überliefert] its possibilities to itself (383). This Being-able-to-hand-down possibilities is its historicity.

The predominant existentiell mode of historicity is, of course, inauthentic. Dasein typically hands down (i.e., understands) its factual possibilities “as having thus come down” (383), that is to say, “as” they have already been interpreted for it by das Man. In this case it is not individuated Dasein but das Man-selbst who hands down its “general Situation” (300) to itself via idle talk. Clearly, such inauthentic historizing [Geschehen] puts to work an active avoidance of possibilities (of Dasein’s ownmost possibility, particularly), for possibilities, when locked into rigid interpretations, are severely restricted, just barely possibilities at all.

In contrast, Dasein, as anticipatorily resolute – as having “chosen itself” – is authentically historical. Because it acknowledges its null Being-thrown-towards-death, it can critically engage the interpretations of das Man and stand in its open Situation (ibid.), in transparent relation to its heritage as “what is factically possible at the time”:

Only Being-free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one’s existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one – those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly – and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals] (384).

Dasein is “fate-ful” insofar as it explicitly discloses its finite having-been (facticity) in terms of its finite futurity (Being-towards-death) and thus stands in authentic relation to its finite current (worldly) possibilities, able to be its heritage and choose this as a Self (385). As fate-ful, Dasein engages in the explicit repetition [Wiederholung] of possibilities that have come down to it (385). This is not to say it lets itself “be persuaded of something by what is ‘past’, just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may recur” (386). Such a repetition would merely perpetuate
the ossified “as,” that “as” which, as we have seen, must be interrupted. Rather, the repetition hands a possibility down to itself in order to challenge the as-such which determines and restricts it. “...[The] repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder [erwiderl] to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there”(386).

For Heidegger, the choice is thus not whether or not to engage tradition, but how best to engage it; and it is in terms of this engagement that the possibility of the “We” emerges in Sein und Zeit. Because Dasein exists factically “with Others”(383), it finds itself always already having shared its possibilities with them. Dasein, whether authentic or inauthentic, is in communication [Mitteilung] with Others “a priori” regarding the factual existentiell possibilities which it hands down to itself: handing down is always shared. When inauthentic, such shared handing down (i.e., shared historizing) cannot lead to anything like an existentiell “We;” for if it is das Man who is historical, it is not a multiplicity of individuated Dasein but das Man-selbst -- Dasein as the undifferentiated ‘one” -- who shares possibilities. Communication, in this case, is not a participation in a “We” but a fallenness into an amorphous “one.” However, when it is authentic, shared handing down is, for Heidegger, an existentiell “We;” it is authentic community: “[Since] fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people”(384). The relation here between authentic historicity and community is one of reciprocal necessity: authentic handing down -- the event of “historizing” -- is possible only for a community, and yet a community is possible only insofar as a multiplicity of Dasein participate in a shared repetition of inherited possibilities, in a shared “handing down” which is constitutive of “us”.

To be sure, Dasein, as authentic, is radically individuated, standing in transparent relation to its singular Being-able-to-be, its Being-in. Its ahead-of-itself is determined existentially as the “I myself” comporting itself towards “my death.” The “We” in question here -- the community -- emerges not through a sharing of Being-in but through a sharing of that other constitutive component of Dasein’s Being: worldhood. This “We” is possible only through authentic historizing, through our ability to hand down not “our Being-able-to-be” but our factual existentiell possibilities, those concrete historico-worldly possibilities which we share a priori:

Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating [Mitteilung] and in struggling [Kampf] does the power of destiny become free (384).

63 “Wenn... das schicksalhafte Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein wesenhaft im Mitsein mit Anderen existiert, ist sein Geschehen ein Mitgeschehen und bestimmt als Geschick. Damit bezeichnen wir das Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes.”
We communicate with each other when we share an interpretive [auslegend] comportment towards what is already understood; i.e., when we take part in the factual interpretations available through our heritage. And, as Christopher Fynsk notes, the struggle at issue here is no agonistic relation between our community and those external to it; it is rather an agonistic relation between our interpretive comportment and the heritage to which it must "reply"[erwidern] (Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, 47). Moreover, this struggle with our heritage is also a struggle with each other, for we engage these possibilities each in our own way, each in terms of his/her ownmost Being-able-to-be. Authentic struggle emerges as the difference proper to repetition, as the tension between the various "reciprocative rejoinders" to the same possibility. Thus can Heidegger stress simultaneously that Dasein's full authentic historizing is determined by its "fateful destiny in and with its 'generation'[Generation]"(385) and yet at the same time that such "fateful destiny," though it be primarily a matter of having been thrown into a world with Others, is possible only for anticipatorily resolute -- and thus singular non-relational -- Dasein. With respect to authentic Dasein, the Lichtung is mine, opened up in terms of my ownmost Being-able-to-be, but the world is ours. Being-in-the-world is such that there cannot be the one without the other.

Thus, for Heidegger, it appears that a We exists insofar as a plurality of authentic Dasein -- without collapsing into an undifferentiated unity -- comports itself towards a determinate factual heritage held in common within a prior shared world.

h. The Aporia

What, precisely, are the existential parameters of this "We"?

We will first attempt to isolate them not in terms of Heidegger's discussion, in §§25-26, of the Mitsein-Mitdasein relation, but in terms of his apparent resolution, in §74, of the Mitdasein/Being-singular relation. Following this, we will turn back to §§25-26 in order to problematize these parameters.

The shared heritage discussed in §74 is always 'there' for a generation of Dasein. However, it is only those Dasein who are existentially individuated -- each comporting itself in transparent fashion towards its own death -- that actually take hold of this heritage, appropriating it explicitly. That authentic Being-towards-death is the basis of authentic historicity means that it is in each case

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64 Only a misreading of this "struggle" and "reply" in Sein und Zeit could make possible the shortsighted claim that "...authenticity demands the subordination of the individual to a common destiny"(Karsten Harres, "Heidegger as a Political Thinker"[Review of Metaphysics, June 1976, vol. XXIX:4, 651). Cf. Gregory Schufricde's more sympathetic but nevertheless equally shortsighted remarks in "Heidegger on Community"(31ff.).
an I -- albeit one who is always already with Others -- who can be its heritage and be the possibilities disclosed in it, taking hold of them as mine. That a possibility is "ours" ultimately means that there are other authentic 'I's in the world with me, comporting themselves towards the same heritage and the same possibilities -- but doing so separately, each in terms of its own Being-singular (in terms of its ownmost Being-able-to-be).

Granted, since my being already there with them impinges factically on their decisions, and their being already there with me impinges factically on my decisions, such decisions are, in a sense, ours -- requiring "communication and struggle." Nevertheless, it is in each case I who am responsible for my possibilities, who must decide [entscheiden]. Here, as is the case for Husserl, We-hood is ultimately contingent upon I-hood.

It seems then that, for Heidegger, Dasein-with and Being-singular are reconciled existentially. for We exist as a We not by compromising the integrity of singular Being-in but only by devoting ourselves to the "same affair in common" (122) -- perhaps not comporting ourselves towards the same τέλος but at the very least towards the same existentiell possibilities, those presented us by our shared heritage (385-6). And if it is true that "We" are with one another solely via the mediation of the world, via our shared comportments not towards each other but towards worldly possibilities, then We are not so much "face to face," as Levinas would prefer to say, but rather "side by side".

But precisely when and where could there be such an authentic We?

Based on these parameters we can never know for sure. A "We" exists whenever and wherever anticipatorily resolute Dasein -- invisible to each other as anticipatorily resolute -- explicitly share their already implicitly shared world. Here, ironically, we once again run into Husserl's problem: the Other, determined existentiell as authentic, is inaccessible to me. Would Heidegger, if pushed on this point, have acknowledged a kind of "appresentation of authentic I-hood"? Does this not bring us right back to the very problem of intersubjectivity that Heidegger seemed to avoid with his disclosure of Being-with?

In any case, if someone (perhaps das Man, perhaps not) were to raise the question "Are we a 'We' or not?," the phenomenologically rigorous response would have to be "Who knows?" A "We," if it existed, could not communicate its We-ness: recall that, for Heidegger, "communication" [Mitteilung] is no transmission of information from one "subject" to another but rather an explicitly shared interpretive comportment towards what is already understood (155); and

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65 Heidegger goes so far as to say that historicity is essentially the historicity of the world (388).

66 In terms of this logic, even so-called "collective" decisions depend upon my prior decision to participate in them.
yet We have no prior understanding of a presumed “authentic We-ness,” for the Being-in and thus the authenticity/inauthenticity of other Dasein is in each case inaccessible to my comprehension.67 Indeed, the parameters in question leave us with what could hardly be called a “We” – unless We-ness is watered down to include a multiplicity of radically singularized Dasein who, though thrown into the same Situation, are unable to touch one another in their ownmost Being-able-to-be. It seems to me that this is precisely the “fragile We” which Lawrence Vogel develops in his reading of Sein und Zeit:

We coexist authentically and so for an “authentic We” when each feels that he belongs to a common project yet encourages the others to pursue the project in a way that attests their own individuality. This keeps the group from becoming a mere collectivity in which each must subordinate his own freedom in order to further shared ends. Every “authentic We” is fragile because it is composed of self-responsible members who live at the boundary of this membership....Individuality is not the enemy, but the condition of our being “authentically bound together”(The Fragile "We," 79).

Yet though this weak “We” seems to be entailed by Heidegger’s analysis in §74, we must ask: is this the kind of “We” suggested initially in his discussion of Being-with and Dasein-with? Does it adequately acknowledge the equiprimordiality of these structural elements with Being-in-the-world?

Indeed, it is not and it does not. In division one, chapter 4, it is clear that Heidegger thinks of Being-with as having a much broader, stronger role in care. In his treatment of the possible existentiell determinations of Being-with in solicitude, for instance, Heidegger writes:

A Being-with-one-another which arises from one’s doing the same thing as someone else, not only keeps for the most part within the outer limits, but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The Being-with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust. On the other hand, when they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of. They thus become authentically bound together [Verbundenheit], and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity [Sachlichkeit], which frees the Other in his freedom for himself (122).

This passage would be consistent with what we have said so far about the relation between Dasein-with and Being-singular if it were not for the last line’s reference to authentic Verbundenheit, a Verbundenheit whereby the Other is freed in his freedom for himself. Here Heidegger suggests a “We” capable of freeing the Other not for this or that existentiell possibility but for its ownmost Being, a We which can exhort the Other to participate explicitly (and perhaps even “performatively”) in collective authenticity: “Join us. Let us be authentic!”

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67 Christopher Fynsk rightly highlights the covert demand in Sein und Zeit that: a. the call of conscience is in some way the voice of the Other which addresses Dasein, a voice which somehow speaks to Dasein of its death (42-3); b. “Dasein’s resolute repetition of its own thrownness is...also a repetition of the other’s resolute being toward death”(47-8). Nevertheless, Fynsk fails to address how Mitteilung, as articulated by Heidegger, leaves Dasein’s Being-singular completely incommunicable, thereby problematizing this demand.
And in fact, this authentic *Verbundenheit* is not merely a "being authentically alongside" the other in our shared worldly concerns. Rather, it involves my (or perhaps our)

[leaping ahead] of [the Other] in his existentiell *Sekön nen*, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care — that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a ‘what’ with which he is concerned: it helps the Other to become transparent [*durchsichtig*] to himself in his care and to become free for it (122).

Here, Heidegger is not talking about merely offering worldly responsibility to the Other in the hope that, if the Other happens to have chosen itself, this might add to the scope of its existentiell possibilities. He is talking about a We which comports itself directly and authentically towards the Other’s Being, exhorting the Other to transparency. Indeed, soon thereafter he clarifies what is at stake in authentic *Verbundenheit*: “[As] Being-with, Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of Others [*umwollen Anderer*]” (123).69 “With-ness” is constitutive not just of Dasein’s Being-already-in-a-world, but of its for-the-sake-of-which — its “ownmost” Being-able-to-be. Contrary to his stance in §74, Heidegger here maintains that care is “permeated through and through” by Being-with: I do not exist simply for the sake of that Being which is mine. I exist for the sake of Dasein-with as well — for the sake of the *Being of Others* (and thus for the sake of our Being). Being-with and Dasein-with are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world in that Others have always already infiltrated “my” Being-able-to-be (just as I have already infiltrated “theirs”).

Indeed, even in §53, immediately following his first attempt to dismiss any tension between Dasein-with and Being-singular, Heidegger acknowledges that death, though it is a non-relational possibility, nevertheless “makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the Being-able-to-be of Others” (264). Though he leaves ambiguous, at this point, what such an “understanding” might mean and how it would be possible via non-relational anticipation, he seems to be hearkening back to Being-for-the-sake-of-Others.

Later, in §60, he backs away still further from this radical “with” — but perhaps not yet completely away:

In the light of the “for-the-sake-of-which” of one’s self-chosen Being-able-to-be, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Dasein’s resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost Being-able-to-be, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the

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68 For Heidegger, it is perhaps this authentic *Verbundenheit* which challenges the domination of *das Man*, causing variation in the hegemony of *das Man* throughout history (129).

69 Many scholars have drawn attention to this passage (and the few others which collaborate it) in an attempt to underscore the possibility of an ethical — or perhaps “proto-ethical” — relation to the Other in Heidegger’s thought (cf. Peg Birmingham’s “Ever Respectfully Mine: Heidegger on Agency and Responsibility,” 114, 119; Christopher Fynsk’s *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity*, 35; Lawrence Vogel’s *The Fragile “We,”* 72ff.). While I agree this is a legitimate and indeed urgent task, this passage must also be set in relation to the predominant stratum of the text, a stratum which renders such a relation impossible.
solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of Others. Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another -- not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the ‘they’ and in what ‘they’ want to undertake (298).

Here, though Heidegger acknowledges the “co-disclosure” of Being-able-to-be in the solici
tude which leaps forth and liberates, and though he goes so far as to acknowledge that authentic Dasein can be the ‘conscience’ of Others, he qualifies these claims when he says it is only Dasein’s resoluteness towards itself that makes it possible to let Others be in their ownmost Being-able-to-be.

One must here ask how it is possible to “co-disclose” (my? our?) ownmost Being-able-to-be if such a co-disclosure is grounded upon my exclusive non-relational comportment towards my Being-able-to-be. Perhaps by “co-disclosure” Heidegger means merely that the Other discloses its ownmost Being-able-to-be alongside me as I disclose mine -- if so, however, this is not at all the Being-for-the-sake-of-Others mentioned in §26. In any case, it appears that Heidegger is here still struggling with two conflicting exigencies: radical with-ness and Being-singular. By the time we reach §74, this struggle is, as we have seen, no longer in play. In a decisive move without any apparent justification, Being-singular wins out over Dasein-with.

To sum up: Heidegger, in §26, explicates a Being-with which appears to maintain itself within an extreme tension: Being-with is an existential “archi-comportment” which has always previously freed the Being of entities which are both: a. within the world and yet b. not simply “things” in the world but entities having Being-in as their mode of Being. Thus, §26, taken in isolation, suggests that Heidegger -- unlike Husserl -- refuses to decide whether I first relate to others as “subjects” or as “worldly objects,” and that he refuses precisely because the equiprimordiality of Being-with with Being-in-the-world places it prior to such decisions. Later, however, in §74, Heidegger backs away from this undecidability in favour of Being-singular.

In my initial treatment of §74, I avoided these strong claims regarding Being-with and Dasein-with for the simple reason that Heidegger avoids them there. Indeed, what he says in §74 hangs together only if these claims are not explicitly considered. But why this retreat from Being-able-to-be-with [Mit-seinkönnen], a retreat made most explicit in §74?

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70 If the call of conscience were an existentiell call (see note 29, above), this passage could be read such that it seriously undermined the non-relational character of authentic Dasein. However, the call of conscience is, as I have argued, existential. Heidegger’s placing ‘conscience’ in scare-quotes should be noted here, for he is most likely saying that I can, by remaining existentially reticent (i.e., by not participating in idle talk), allow the Other to hear his/her conscience -- provided s/he is listening for it. It is only in this sense that I can be the ‘conscience’ of the Other.

71 And it is clear that, only a year later, Heidegger was already flustered with the way his “resolution” of the tension between Dasein-with and Being-singular was being received: “Many times, even ad nauseam, we pointed out that this being qua Dasein is always already with others and always already with beings not of Dasein’s nature...In choosing itself Dasein really chooses precisely its being with others and precisely its being among beings of a different character” (MFL. 190).
In short: Heidegger's thinking, bound as it is to a certain interpretation of singularity will not tolerate it. Specifically, his analysis is committed to an existentially singular being which is self-possessed, existing in terms of a Being-singular which is in each case my "ownmost" and "non-relational." Granted, Heidegger's appeals to the "ownmost"[*eigenst*] and to "authenticity"[*Eigentlichkeit*] are not as simple as they might first appear: as I argued in section d, Heidegger not only transposes the essence of appropriation from the existentiell to the existential level (i.e., to Being-singular); he goes so far as to displace the possession-loss schema itself. This notwithstanding, however, the conjunction of ownmost and non-relationality [*Unbezüglichkeit*] immediately (and unjustifiably) locates singularity in what is "mine" as opposed to what is the "other's." Whatever displacements and reinscriptions are put in play in Heidegger's text, *this* particular conjunction is not called into question -- he treats it as if it went without saying, and this despite the fact that singularity does not in itself imply a radical distinction between my relation to my Being and the Other's relation to his/her Being. Indeed, Heidegger's identification of Being-in as a kind of "archi-between"[§28], along with his discussion of the "mit," would seem to suggest a singularity which is somehow shared before it belongs -- existentially or existentially -- to this or that Dasein. This thread however is, as I have argued, dropped in *Sein und Zeit*: to have acknowledged that Dasein's ownmost Being-able-to-be is contaminated by "with-ness" would have been to forfeit the possibility of self-possessed authenticity; it would have been to forfeit the purity of the authentic [*eigent-lich*] Self. Heidegger, it seems, was not prepared to make this move.

A quick synopsis of the aporia:

1. On the one hand, Heidegger, in his phenomenological analysis of "with-ness" in §§25-26, discloses that any notion of "We-hood" must be grounded in a with-ness which permeates care through and through, thus precluding, in principle, the possibility of a We composed of 'I's which are in any way prior to Being-with-one-another.

2. On the other hand, Heidegger must dissolve the tension between Dasein-with and Being-singular, and -- given his interpretation of Being-singular -- he can accomplish this only by compromising radical with-ness and any sense of "We-hood" which could be grounded upon it. That is to say, the existential parameters set by his treatment of the Dasein-with/Being-singular relation requires that We-hood be grounded upon an anticipatory resoluteness (authentic I-hood) which is non-relational [*unbezüglich*].

Thus we see, in *Sein und Zeit*, a displaced recurrence of Husserl's I-We aporia. For Husserl, the aporia arises in the attempt to move from my prior cognition of myself as an ontical (albeit transcendental) I to our cognition of ourselves as an ontical We. For Heidegger, the aporia arises not at the ontic but at the ontological level; moreover, it is inverted as Heidegger attempts to move
from Dasein’s prior understanding of the Mitsein-Mitdasein relation (the existential condition for the possibility of the existentiell We) to Being-singular (the existential condition for the possibility of the existentiell I). In the end, Heidegger “overcomes” this aporia by pushing it aside — or perhaps it is this aporia which pushes him aside, withdrawing from his analysis. In any case, the implications of a radical “with” are sacrificed for the sake of self-possessed singularity; and the result, ultimately, is an authentic We subordinate to and grounded upon the authentic I.

4. Summary of the Stakes

The importance of the “We” in Sein und Zeit shows itself on the very first page. It is no accident that, in the passage from The Sophist used by Heidegger to introduce his whole project, it is we who are “perplexed by Being” (ηπορηκαμεν): we philosophers, we who stand face to face with our uncanny experience of Being, as opposed to those who — as das Man-selbst — think they understand. As I showed in sub-section g, a “We,” for Heidegger, comes to be only when several Dasein share an explicit comportment towards what they already understand, i.e., only when the existentiell Being-with is determined existentiell through concrete communication. In the case of “we philosophers,” what is communicated is Being — or more precisely, our perplexity in the face of Being. Both the history of ontology and the possibility of this history’s Destruktion ($\S$6) rest upon the communicability of the φαινόμενον of Being, upon the We’s ability to explicitly appropriate Being. Thus, Sein und Zeit itself, inasmuch as it is λόγος, and more specifically, a body of apophantic assertions [Aussage] ($\S$7,$\S$33), is first and foremost a communication; it is Heidegger’s letting us share with [teilten...mit] him what he has pointed out in its definite character.

It is crucial then, for the possibility of both the ontological analytic and the later thinking which emerges through it, that a communication of the φαινόμενον be possible. And yet, given Heidegger’s interpretive decision regarding the We, a decision which restricts with-ness, and thus communication, to worldhood, we must ask: could there be such a communication? Could there be such a “We” which shares the φαινόμενον?

No, there could not; and here we see why the maintenance and suppression of the I-We aporia is essential for fundamental ontology. According to the parameters set by Heidegger’s delimitation of Being-with and Dasein-with in $\S$74, all that Dasein can communicate — all that “we” can comport ourselves towards in a shared understanding — are worldly possibilities. Specifically: 1) The existential possibility of death, because of its ontological singularity, is not communicable, not even through reticent interruption; for even a silent co-understanding of “our” ownmost Being-able-to-be
would be a shared authentic comportment towards “our” death(s) — an impossibility for Heidegger. 1. On the one hand, if the authentic communication of the transparent disclosure of Being is to be possible, an authentic We which is not grounded upon and derivative of the authentic, non-relational I must be possible. In other words, I can engage in a co-comportment with Others towards Being only if “I” am contaminated by with-ness in my very Being-able-to-be, always already for-the-sake-of-Others as well as myself.

2. On the other hand, if that authenticity whereby Dasein is its self-possessed self — standing in disclosive relation to Being — is to be possible, the non-relational self-possession of authentic singularity must be preserved. Thus, the authentic We must be nothing else but a multiplicity of authentic ‘I’s who share only their “having been thrown into a world together” and thus cannot communicate a fundamental ontology.

This problem is not — and could not be — acknowledged in Sein und Zeit itself. Once exposed, it undermines the possibility of our shared participation in the Seinsfrage, our “ontological heritage.” Sein und Zeit, though it introduces the possibility of engaging the question of the We, of community, never asks it; it merely “takes a position” in §74 — and an impossible one at that. Though the problematic of “inter-subjectivity” is opened up in Sein und Zeit, it is closed off again as Heidegger commits himself to a We subordinate to the authentic I.

Yet why is it so easy for Heidegger to deflect this aporia in Sein und Zeit? Why is it so easy for him to avoid developing the question of community?

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72 On this impossibility see §47.
73 Not that Heidegger acknowledges this consistently throughout Sein und Zeit. Indeed, in §34, he speaks of a reticent “...Being-with-one-another which is transparent [durchsichtig]”(165), an authentic keeping silent which can “’make one understand’”(164). This appeal to a silent communication of our Being — like the remarks about “leaping ahead” of the other in order to be his/her conscience (122, 298) — reflects a tension in the text: Heidegger acknowledges, at certain points, the exigency of communicating a shared Being; and yet, as I have tried to show, he is ultimately unable to exhibit the possibility of such a communication.
*Sein und Zeit* is set up such that ontical concerns tend to be set aside once they are situated—even provisionally—within the ontological problematic. In §44, for instance—though it appears to be truth and not the We which is at issue—Heidegger has already situated the question of the We:

*Why must we presuppose that there is truth?...It is not we who presuppose ‘truth’; but it is ‘truth’ that makes it at all possible ontologically for us to be able to be such that we ‘presuppose’ anything at all (227-8).*

And a bit further:

We must ‘make’ the presupposition of truth because it is one that has been ‘made’ already with the Being of the ‘we’ (228).

If we keep in mind that ‘truth’ here refers to Dasein’s disclosedness, its very Being, we see that Heidegger is committed to the pre-eminence of the *Seinsfrage* over any possible *Gemeinschaftsfrage*, and he is so committed prior to any thorough ontico-ontological consideration of *Gemeinschaft*. At this point we must ask: is it not necessary first to work through the “Being of the ‘we’” carefully if we truly want to comprehend what it “presupposes”?

*Sein und Zeit* is able to sidestep the I-We aporia because its questioning maintains itself in close proximity to the question of community, subordinating the latter to the question of Being while simultaneously excluding the former from explicit consideration. That is to say, though fundamental ontology needs to show how the question of Being stands with respect to the We in order that the possibility of ontological communication be demonstrated, any such demonstration is replaced by an apparently critical but ultimately dogmatic stance on the We. Derrida’s logic of the supplement is at work here: the discourse of the *Seinsfrage* strives to both circumscribe and exclude the essential but problematic *Gemeinschaftsfrage*.

If *Sein und Zeit*, and the problems which emerge from it, were simply an initial phase of Heidegger’s thought, a phase left behind by his subsequent work, this suppressed aporia might well be of narrow significance. However, as I will argue in chapter 3, *Sein und Zeit* is a crucial point of departure [*Ausgang*] for Heidegger’s path of thinking, and the aporia which plague it cannot simply be dismissed as localized problems.
3. The “Transcendental” Methodology of Sein und Zeit

This chapter will offer an interpretation of the overall “methodology” of Sein und Zeit in order to clarify what is at stake in this text’s avoidance of the question of community. More specifically, I will argue that:

1. Heidegger’s transformed relation to the question and to the path of thinking is first opened up not in his later work but already in Sein und Zeit; and thus

2. One cannot set Sein und Zeit aside when considering Heidegger’s later reflections on the question: indeed, subsequent developments can be fully understood only by carefully passing through the thinking of Sein und Zeit upon which they depend. For these reasons, I maintain that the avoidance of the question of community in Sein und Zeit is of crucial significance not just for this text but for the subsequent unfolding of Heidegger’s thought.

1. The Status of “Frage” and “Weg” in Sein und Zeit

Sein und Zeit is generally regarded by Heidegger scholars and indeed by Heidegger himself as an important point of departure [Ausgang] — if not for his whole path of thinking then at least for his explicit formulation of the question of Being.1 But precisely what does this mean? In what sense is Sein und Zeit an “Ausgang”? And where does this text stand with respect to “question” and “path,” the two notions which — as I suggested in my introduction — gradually become central to Heidegger’s reflections?

In certain respects, the significance of question and path in Sein und Zeit seems to anticipate what I described in chapter 1:

1. Frage: Heidegger states explicitly in the introduction how the question of Being is the fundamental question circumscribing and underlying all other questions (the fundamental question of philosophy), and he orients the whole of Sein und Zeit in terms of this question.

2. Weg: At the end of the published portion of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger seems to indicate an “open-ended-ness” to his inquiry, acknowledging that his thinking does not anticipate a fixed end-point but is, rather, radically “underway”[unterwegs](437).

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1 As many scholars have emphasized, Heidegger’s pursuit of the meaning of Being was well underway long before he wrote Sein und Zeit (see, for instance, John van Buren’s The Young Heidegger and Theodore Kisiel’s Genesis of Being and Time). Nevertheless, Sein und Zeit marks the point at which Heidegger first engages Being explicitly in terms of its questionable character — an “Ausgang” significant enough to motivate Heidegger’s defense, many years later (e.g., W. 343-4/LH. 222-23; ZSD. 30/OTB. 28), of the originality of his fundamental ontology.
These factors notwithstanding, however, Heidegger's own departure from the aporia which opens Sein und Zeit suggests something quite different. As underscored by the citation from the Sophist which opens the text (1) and the critical reflections in §1, the point of departure of Sein und Zeit is the encounter with the questionable status of "Being." Yet this questionable status is taken up immediately in terms of its resolution; it presents a task to be accomplished. Specifically: §2 develops the question as such in terms of the "pursuit for a solution [das Erfragte]," and the question at issue -- the rigorous questioning pursuit of the meaning of Being [Sinn des Seins] -- is quickly broken down into a two-part "task": the formulation of and subsequent solution to the question. The latter is achieved when the concealed phenomenon of Being is "wrested [abgewonnen] from the objects [Gegenständen] of phenomenology"(36), thus resolving what Plato calls our "perplexity" [ἀπορία] concerning Being. Thinking's first "assignment" with respect to this task, it seems, is to submit the ausganglich and aporetic experience of Being to the method which will accomplish the adequate formulation and subsequent explicit disclosure of Being: phenomenology as fundamental ontology (ibid.). Though it would be premature to judge Heidegger's relation to question and path in Sein und Zeit solely on the basis of what is sketched out in the introduction, this portion of the text certainly points towards quite a different determination of question and path than appears in his later thinking:

1. In Sein und Zeit, the question par excellence is the Seinsfrage, the question of the meaning of Being. It is not treated as an "ur-event" which first opens up the Lichtung but as the existentiell pursuit (12-13) of the grounding meaning [Sinn] which underlies all explicit interpretations of Being, the pursuit of the answer to the question "What is Being?"(26). It is something in which Dasein can but does not have to engage. This is why the project of Sein und Zeit begins with the interrogation of Dasein concerning its Being: the adequate formulation of the question of Being demands an ontological analytic of the entity which questions, and Dasein is the sole entity which is existentially capable of questioning.

2. Consequently, the path of thinking as mentioned in Sein und Zeit, though open-ended in one sense, is ultimately situated in the horizon of "question and answer," a horizon of existentiell pursuit. Though there are always questions still outstanding, their ultimate significance is determined by the answer that is sought. There is no evidence here of an irreducible ζητηθει granting the path.

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2 "Every inquiry is a seeking [Suchen]. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought [das Gesucht]"(5).
3 On the nature of the "aporetic," see Heidegger's remarks on the ποιητικός-δύνατος of Sophocles' Antigone (EM, 161ff./LM. 151ff.; F. 74ff.).
In short — and I shall develop this in detail in the next section — *Sein und Zeit* situates the question in a *transcendental inquiry*: the "Erfragte" — that which the question pursues — is the meaning of Being, the condition for the possibility of all knowledge concerning beings.4

This forces us to ask: how does this transcendental locus of the question relate to his subsequent determination of the question? Was there a correction? A refinement? A reversal of some sort? Some have argued for a "Heidegger I/Heidegger II" distinction based on the transition from an early, "transcendental" Heidegger to a later, "post-transcendental" Heidegger;5 and indeed, there are passages in Heidegger's texts which would seem to support such a reading.6 But how, then, are we to understand the continuity, underscored by Heidegger himself, between *Sein und Zeit* and his later thinking?7

I will address this problem by focusing on two points: 1) the significance of the question in *Sein und Zeit* is determined by the way it is situated, in advance, by the methodology of the project; 2) this very methodology gradually displaces itself in the text, transforming the question in the process.

2. The *Sinn/Auslegung* Relation

The questionning of *Sein und Zeit* is oriented towards a transcendental inquiry which is "hermeneutic": questioning must work back from the "interpretations" [*Auslegungen*] in which it finds itself factically situated to the ground of these interpretations, to their tacit "meaning" [*Sinn*] which is always already understood (5). This does not mean transcending interpretations as such so

4 See, for example, SZ. 11-13, 27, 35, 38, 324-5.
5 Indeed, this view has remained a prevalent one through the history of Heidegger scholarship. See, for instance: William Richardson's *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, (22); Otto Pöggeler's *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, 127-131; Charles Guignon's *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, 77-84; 197: 206-219; Michael Zimmermann's *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, 147, 166. Recently, Reiner Schürmann has modified this interpretation of the *Kehre* slightly, i.e., he isolates not one but two points of radical transformation along the course of Heidegger's *Denkweg* (see his *Heidegger: On Being and Acting* [17]. With respect to the first point of transformation — the "Kehre proper" — Schürmann writes: "The notion of 'sense' [*Sinn*] in *Being and Time*...can be freed from its neo-Kantian overtone — 'meaning' — and be correctly understood as directionality only through the historical-destinal conception of 'truth'..., which casts off the subjectivist, neo-Kantian inflection"[18]). Finally, Charles Scott identifies a reversal within *Sein und Zeit* itself, a reversal whereby Heidegger, in following the path of thinking in *Sein und Zeit*, came - - gradually and inadvertently — to see the inadequacy of the project ("The Destruction of Being and Time in *Being and Time*." 91-2, 105-6).
6 E.g., W, 327-8, 357/LH, 207-8, 235.
7 See, for instance, W, 322, 343/LH, 202, 222, as well as Heidegger's preface to William Richardson's *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. 
that immediate access to underlying meaning is gained. Rather, it means turning interpretation back on its meaning so that meaning itself can be explicitly interpreted or "laid out" [ausgelegt], allowed to show itself as meaning (152-3).

The Sinn/Auslegung relation articulates that difference whereby and wherein Dasein understands [versteht]. Indeed, this relation structures Verstehen itself. We will thus approach meaning and interpretation through a brief treatment of understanding.

In §31 Heidegger argues that understanding must be understood as an existential component of Dasein’s "Being-in"[In-Sein]. Earlier (§28), he had used Being-in to refer to Dasein’s “there,” the ontological clearing [Lichtung] in which it finds itself already situated in each case, its own existential “not-being-closed-off” [Erschlossenheit]. In short, Dasein is “not-closed-off” in that it exists as “thrown possibility;" it finds itself already “there” in a Situation (299-300) which is not at its disposal but which offers to it everything that is factico-existentially at its disposal. Dasein finds itself already projected [entworfen] from its factical situatedness towards what it can be; as such, it is literally "ahead of itself"[sich-vorweg] in its Being. Thus, Being-in is that ontological envelope held open between throwness [Geworfenheit] and projection [Entwurf], that envelope which offers "Spielraum" to the existentiell possibilities into which Dasein finds itself thrown.

Understanding -- which Heidegger also refers to as "Being-possible"[Möglichsein] -- is not merely a kind of cognizing, though such a sense of understanding is indeed grounded in the sense Heidegger intends. It is rather the condition which allows Dasein to be ahead of itself, directed towards its existentiell possibilities (towards what it can be); this projective Being-on-the-way to possibilities -- which is the comprehension of them -- is what first lets them be as possibilities. Moreover, Dasein can comprehend its existentiell possibilities only if it has comprehended in advance its own Being-possible, its own Being-able-to-be [Seinkönnen]. Thus, understanding is, first and foremost, a disclosure of Being-in-the-world as a whole.

In §32, Heidegger articulates the structure of understanding in terms of the Sinn-Auslegung relation:

1. **Interpretation** is the explicit working out of a projection of understanding; it lays out something as something, exposing it ontically as what it is. Assertion [Aussage], as commonly understood, is but one mode of interpretation.

2. **Meaning**, like interpretation, structures the disclosedness proper to understanding; i.e., it is that which is already tacitly understood, that from which and in terms of which explicit interpretation emerges as an “articulation” of meaning (151; cf. 149, 37). Meaning is the non-explicit "upon-which"[Woraufhin] underlying the projection which understands, that wherein the explicit intelligibility of something maintains itself (151).
This relation between interpretation and meaning is itself regulated by a further structural component — the very component, in fact, which makes rigorous phenomenology a necessity: every instance of understanding, i.e., every emergence of an interpretation from out of meaning, is itself prefigured by what Heidegger calls the "fore-structure" of understanding (fore-having [Vorhaben], fore-sight [Vorsicht] and fore-conception [Vorgriff][150]). This fore-structure anticipates, in advance of explicit interpretation, how the meaning will be articulated in interpretation in each case.

It is this fore-structure which questioning must engage if the φαινόμενον (meaning) is to be allowed to show itself from itself. More specifically, though we always find ourselves with a factual pre-ontological comprehension of Being-in-the-world, we also find this understanding as already having been diverted towards this or that possibility of its explicit development (this or that "how" of meaning's articulation), thus already geared towards this or that determinate interpretation. To be sure, every interpretation resides in (i.e., emerges from) a meaning, but the operative fore-structure can — and most often does8 — yield but a narrow, dim disclosure or "sight." Such an interpretation is "out of tune" with the meaning, with the "things themselves:" it dissembles what is understood, preventing — or at the very least limiting drastically — the self-showing of the φαινόμενον, yielding only semblance. It is out of this tendency of interpretation towards dissimulation that the hermeneutic task of phenomenology emerges:

...[We] genuinely take hold of [the positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing] only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our Vorhaben, Vorsicht, and Vorgriff to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves (153).

Heidegger's appropriation of the "hermeneutic circle" takes hold of the existentiell possibility of laying out meaning explicitly: interpretation — by submitting itself to interrogation and thus by turning back upon the fore-structure which allows it to emerge from meaning — can critically engage the way this fore-structure articulates meaning. In this way, it can reflectively alter the fore-structure so that the interpretation is true to the meaning (i.e., to the φαινόμενον; 37), allowing it to show itself from itself.

This "hermeneutic transcendental method," however, seems to run into a problem, one which threatens to undermine its transcendental status; namely: the very ground grounded distinction which guides the inquiry (i.e., Sinn/Auslegung) falls prey to "ontico-existentiell contingency." That is to say, the questioning of Sein und Zeit is first and foremost an existentiell engagement with

8This everyday "dimness" is the result of our falleness [Verfallen] into das Man (see my remarks in chapter 2).
what is already understood (§3). It develops existentially as an “interpretation” of the meaning of Being, an interpretation articulated in transcendental terms. Since every explicit interpretation is situated upon a meaning which necessarily recedes into the background [Worauftihin],\(^9\) remaining unarticulated, all explicitness emerging through this interpretation — including the presentation of the Sinn/Auslegung distinction itself — is rooted in a meaning [Sinn] which remains inexpressible. This would thus seem to undermine the transcendental status of this interpretation, not merely opening it up, in each case, to an unexpressed ground but calling into question the stability of the explicit “ground/grounded” (Sinn/Auslegung) distinction itself inasmuch as this distinction, in its concreteness, is itself but an explicit interpretation “grounded” in what does not present itself.

Yet, this fragility of the Sinn Auslegung distinction is not something of which the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit is unaware. To begin with, he emphasizes in the introduction that the existential analytic — itself a determinate instance of interpretation — does not transcend ontico-existential contingency but is indeed rooted in it: \(^11\)

...[The] roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately existentiel, that is, ontical. Only if the inquiry of philosophical research is itself seized upon in an existentiell manner as a possibility of the Being of each existing Dasein, does it become at all possible to disclose the existentiellity of existence and to undertake an adequately founded ontological problematic. But with this, the ontical priority of the question of being has also become apparent (SZ, 13-14).

And later, in §63, he writes:

If the Being of Dasein is essentially being-able-to-be [Seinkönnen], if it is Being-free for its ownmost possibilities, and if, in every case, it exists only in freedom for these possibilities or in lack of freedom for them, can ontological interpretation do anything else than base itself on ontical possibilities — ways of potentiality-for-Being — and project these possibilities upon their ontological possibility? (ibid., 312)

Granted, while it is true that the interpretation, for Heidegger, can base itself only upon ontical possibilities, the explicit task of the ontological analytic is precisely to work back through these available possibilities in order to disclose the meaning of Being “presupposed” by them (ibid., 313). Nevertheless, we must ask what such an interpretive ‘working back through’ and such a ‘disclosure

\(^9\)Here, “interpretation” refers to Heidegger’s Interpretation rather than to his Auslegung. We must keep in mind that the latter term refers to every instance of understanding determined through an “as such” whereas the former refers exclusively to those Auslegungen determined through the apophantic “as such,” i.e., through assertions [Aussage](see §§32-3).

\(^10\)The full significance of my translation of “Worauftihin” as background (rather than Macquarrie and Robinson’s “upon-which” and “that for which”) will gradually become clearer. What I have in mind is tied to Heidegger’s brief remarks on Being-in at the opening of division one, chapter 5. Here he says that with the expression Being-in, he is thinking less of the commercium which is present-at-hand between a subject and an Object than of the existential between itself (132).

\(^11\)On this point, see Robert Bernasconi’s “‘The Double Concept of Philosophy’ and the Place of Ethics” (Heidegger in Question). Focusing mainly on a 1928 lecture course published as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Bernasconi’s reading shows that Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology” had always been directed towards the explicit acknowledgment of its ontic fundament, of its having fallen victim to facticity (Heidegger in Question, 34; cf. MFL, 155-6).
of meaning' might mean, given the contingency of the Sinn-Auslegung distinction which they presuppose. Indeed, we must ask: how can Heidegger both maintain his claim to be doing 'transcendental philosophy' and acknowledge the disruptive implications of this Sinn-Auslegung distinction?

Some Heidegger scholars -- Gadamer foremost among them\textsuperscript{12} -- have argued that Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology is a re-vamped transcendental philosophy which does (or at least tries to\textsuperscript{13}) acknowledge the excess of meaning over interpretation by transforming how ground must be understood. According to Gadamer's reading, Heidegger's hermeneutic circle describes the authentic existential endeavour of directing interpretation back upon the meaning wherein it resides, thereby rendering this meaning existentially explicit. This fundamental task of hermeneutics is a transformed transcendentalism because it can never be 'completed': for every meaning rendered explicit in an interpretation there is a further tacit meaning which can and should be pursued, i.e., called into question and disclosed explicitly. This task must be repeated [wiedergeholt] infinitely, expanding -- or at the very least maintaining -- the horizon of explicit comprehension, advancing upon what has already been tacitly projected.\textsuperscript{14} This way of reading Heidegger acknowledges that the status of terms like "transcendental" and "ground" -- like the status of any term -- is not absolute but is always conditional, pending further and more radical interpretation.\textsuperscript{15}

However, as Jean-Luc Nancy has argued in his essay "Sharing Voices," this hermeneutics, insofar as it is a reading of Heidegger, misrepresents the Sinn/Auslegung relation. Heidegger tells

\textsuperscript{12} Truth and Method, 256-7.

\textsuperscript{13} Both Charles Guignon and Michael Zimmermann acknowledge that, in Sinn und Zeit, Heidegger attempts to rework transcendental philosophy such that it is both transcendental and radically historical. In their eyes, however, Heidegger ultimately fails (see Guignon's Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, §15, and Zimmermann's Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, 146, 166.).

\textsuperscript{14} Here I can only sketch, in cursory fashion, how Gadamer's "dialogic hermeneutics" is rooted in Heidegger's Sinn-Auslegung relation. For Gadamer, we always find that our relation to others is characterized by confusion ("Destruktion and Deconstruction," 106). By this he means that there is a disparity between my interpretation concerning X and the interpretations of others concerning X (the disparity can range from a minor disagreement to a difference in the very language of the interlocutors). According to Gadamer, this disparity is remedied through dialogue, i.e., the explicit participation of the interlocutors in the shared meaning (horizon) in which they are already situated; by working back from the explicit interpretations to the presuppositions underlying them (rendering these presuppositions -- and thus the Sinn -- explicit), the dialogue calls into question both my own biases and those of the others towards X, allowing us to move towards an interpretation which is mutually agreeable -- not so much because a "new" agreement is arrived at, but because the agreement we had already tacitly shared is rendered explicit and acknowledged. As he writes in Truth and Method: "Methodologically conscious understanding will be concerned not merely to form anticipatory ideas, but to make them conscious, so as to check them and thus acquire right understanding from the things themselves" (269). These "things themselves" are none other than the more deeply rooted anticipatory ideas which we share (ibid., 447-8), all such ideas being rooted ultimately in "that language [which] has its true being only in dialogue, in coming to an understanding" (ibid., 446).

\textsuperscript{15} As Gadamer puts it, "...a word exists only in conversation and never exists there as an isolated word but as the totality of a way of accounting by means of speaking and answering" ("Destruktion and Deconstruction," 112).
us that “[in] interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself” (148). Nancy maintains that, with this, Heidegger is not articulating — contrary to Gadamer’s reading of him — a supplemental “interpretative” act of comprehension whereby understanding projects possibilities upon already projected possibilities, allowing explicit projections (interpretations) to emerge from and stand upon “tacit” ones (meanings); rather, Heidegger is working out the structure of understanding itself: in any instance of explicit comprehension, meaning and interpretation are not distinct projections; rather, the Sinn-Auslegung relation articulates the differential existential movement of projection itself.16

Interpretation is not, strictly speaking, something “other” than understanding, for each understanding disclosure, as a projection, emerges from tacit meaning into explicit interpretation — neither of which is itself “a” projection. Projection “is” only in this from-into structure. It is, in each case, the “becoming-interpretation of meaning” (the becoming-explicit of an ontologically prior comprehension) only in the sense that it happens as the emergence of an interpretation from a meaning which recedes; only in the sense that it is the very separation of meaning and interpretation. Meaning, as this receding “ground” of interpretation, can itself never become a projection because it is that recession constitutive of projection itself. Indeed, the “becoming-interpretation of meaning” is not a meaning which becomes an interpretation, but the perpetual rising forth of interpretation in relation to the unpresentable “sinn-ig” background.17

As Heidegger would later state more explicitly, the priority of meaning is no priority “in time” but the priority of temporality [Zeitlichkeit] itself (cf. MFL [145-8] on the relationship between priority [προτερον] and temporality [χρόνος]). There is no tacit meaning “there before” the explicit interpretation which it holds forth. Indeed, inasmuch as Dasein finds itself in the world a priori, engaged in its concrete dealings, the tacit has always already allowed the explicit to emerge. The priority of meaning is rather that of the opening-up [Erschlossenheit] of the Lichtung itself, an opening-up from which and in terms of which the explicit stands out as explicit (and the explicitly “before” and “after” can stand in relation to each other). It is only because of this irreducibly tacit open-ness that we can find ourselves faced with possibilities already there and project ourselves.

16 We can see this in Heidegger’s explication of understanding in §31 when he writes: “As factual Dasein, any Dasein has already diverted its Being-able-to-be into a possibility of understanding” (146). To use the language of the subsequent section, Heidegger is here describing understanding projection as already having understood (tacitly) the meaning which constitutes its “upon which” and as already having been diverted factico-existentially into a concrete (existentiell) possibility of itself (an interpretation). To be sure, there is the “transparent” [durchsichtig] possibility of an understanding projection directed existentially towards Being, but such a projection is not itself the primordial pre-comprehension of Being; rather it is grounded in it.

17 Though, indeed, this can no longer be termed a “relation,” strictly speaking, for a relation is truly possible only where each of the relata are presented.
towards what is not yet actual; and it is in terms of this self-opening [s'ouvre (Nancy, 222)] of understanding that interpretation can be thought as the “working out” [Ausarbeitung] (148) of possibilities in understanding.

Though interpretation always announces [kundgibt] meaning,\(^{18}\) and though it can go so far as to direct itself existentially and explicitly towards meaning, meaning is never presented: Because interpretation is only as the withdrawal of meaning, meaning undoes the authority, the full presence, of the interpretation. To be sure, we do speak about meaning, and we do so explicitly, but meaning conceals itself (qua background) precisely by presenting itself — in the very words “Sinn” or “Grund,” for instance.\(^{19}\) Seen in this way, meaning and interpretation are not so much separate “constituents” of understanding as they are understanding’s difference from itself, its emerging-forth from itself — or rather, its “withdrawing from itself” as an opening. Understanding presents itself explicitly by withholding itself as meaning; it presents itself as its own retention.\(^{20}\) Thus, meaning is essential to the very “structure” of disclosedness (151); as the Lichtung, it is the “scene” itself, the background which presents/withholds itself so that what takes place upon it [interpretation] can come into explicit view. It is, in each case, what has already withdrawn from the explicit but is nevertheless not absent — just as the explicit, as emergent from meaning, is never fully explicit, never fully present.

As Nancy says, “[the] ‘meaning’ of ἔρμηνεύειν holds onto itself in this advance of meaning” (224). It is not “...an ‘other meaning, superior, transcendent, or more original, but a meaning itself as other, an alterity defining meaning” (ibid.). Meaning is meaning as other, as always different (antecedent/deferred) from that interpretation which is explicitly understood. Thus, meaning is never “what it is,” since only interpretation is that as which it is; meaning is not simply “something else” than what is presented. Indeed, we might say, anticipating the later Heidegger, that meaning — ψεινομενον as ψεινοσθει — is the self-othering emergence of Lichtung.\(^{21}\) On this reading, one cannot, strictly speaking, refer to the difference between meaning and interpretation, for meaning is not ‘what it is,” rather — to anticipate one of Heidegger’s later formulations\(^{22}\) — meaning (is) the event of self-difference from which and in terms of which the explicit (existentiell) difference between “Sinn” and “Auslegung” emerges.


\(^{19}\)Cf. Derrida’s “Difference” (Margins of Philosophy, 6).

\(^{20}\)To use Heidegger’s later vocabulary, it is the “presence of an absence,” the “default” [Ausbleiben] of ground (Niv. 221ff.).

\(^{21}\)On the self-othering character of Being, see Niv, 214-5.

\(^{22}\)See his The Question of Being.
As should be apparent, this reading of the Sinn/Auslegung relation assumes that already in Sein und Zeit Heidegger acknowledges, at least on some level, an originary ληθηη or “self-concealment” underlying ω-ληθηη, a ληθηη which he would refer to in 1930 as the non-essence [Un-wesen] of truth.23 (We should be cautious, however, when considering his brief reference to ληθηη in §44 of Sein und Zeit. Though it might be tempting to view this ληθηη as a reference to the “self-concealment” we are discussing here, a careful reading of the text does not bear this out. Granted, Heidegger does refer, in this section, to the essentially privative structure of ω-ληθηη, thereby granting hiddenness a certain priority over disclosure [222]. Nevertheless, the ληθηη mentioned here appears to be a matter of strictly ontic truth, the truth of beings rather than the truth of Being. For instance, he writes: “Truth [uncoveredness] is something that must always be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness”[222]. Here, it is not truth as the Lichtung but entities ‘in their truth’ which stand in relation to a prior hiddenness. And just prior to this is a passage which suggests that every instance of hiddenness presupposes a prior and uncompromised disclosedness, truth as the open Lichtung: “...[Only] in so far as Dasein has been disclosed [erschlossen] has it also been closed off; and only in so far as entities within-the-world have been uncovered along with Dasein, have such entities, as possibly encountered within-the-world, been covered up [hidden] or disguised”[ibid.]. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that, in §44, the most originary sense of truth [Erschlossenheit] is ever placed in relation to a prior untruth [Verschlossenheit].)

Admittedly, it is curious, given my reading of the Sinn/Auslegung relation, that §44 would fail to acknowledge originary ληθηη (I will consider this explicitly in sub-section 5). Yet, despite what is and is not rendered explicit in §44, my reading of Heidegger’s Sinn/Auslegung logic demonstrates that an originary existential ληθηη is operative in Sein und Zeit.

It should be clear, then, that what makes Heidegger’s “transcendental philosophy” unique is that the transcendental “ground” erases itself (is the erasure of itself), withholding itself from the “said.” The emergence of interpretation is possible only through this withholding (which Gadamer acknowledges, at least to some extent) and this withholding’s intrinsic and representation-defying self-concealment (which Gadamer does not acknowledge), its concealment behind and as its self-presentation.24 §§31-2 are crucial for understanding Heidegger’s “method,” for in them, he


24 Though Gadamer attempts, in his hermeneutics, to acknowledge a sort of “radical alterity” (e.g., “‘...the person who wants to understand a text is ready to be told something by it. So a hermeneutically trained mind must from the start be open to the otherness of the text’”[“On the Circle of Understanding,” 73]), every relationship between the same and the other is ultimately situated within a shared horizon (e.g., that ἅνεγιγνωκός towards which we are always directed “...is not only that
articulates a background-foreground logic which structures the whole of his analysis, from the self-concealment of world (75) onwards.  

Whereas transcendental ground is traditionally articulated as a present-at-hand condition which is necessary with respect to what it grounds, Sinn structures the non-present-at-hand disclosedness of Dasein’s Being qua understanding, i.e., qua Being-possible. It is this opening (Lichtung) of possibility (possibility as opening) that replaces the function of “necessary condition,” resisting representation via presence-at-hand and thus displacing the transcendental schema:

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formal structure       meaning (or rather meaning)
structured contents    \rightarrow          interpretation
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Yet though the questioning of the Sinn-Auslegung relation is not transcendental philosophy in the strict sense, neither is it dialectical, for there is no initial immediacy of the meaning from which interpretation unfolds. Because Sinn is always already dispersed into determinate interpretations, there is an unresolveable difference underlying every meaning from the start.  

Of course, this reading of the Sinn-Auslegung relation raises some serious questions. To begin with, precisely how does this reading allow us to understand the “meaning” of Being which presents itself to us as a phenomenon only through that “interpretation” which is the existential analytic? Moreover, if this displacement of transcendental philosophy is indeed operative in Sein und Zeit, why is it never discussed explicitly? Why does the unique character of the Sinn-Auslegung relation go untreated? We will address such concerns throughout the remainder of this chapter.

3. Being as \( \phi \alpha \nu \nu \omicron \nu \nu \)  

We can begin by asking what Heidegger means when he says Being must be rendered a \( \phi \alpha \nu \nu \omicron \nu \nu \nu \), when he says the meaning of Being must be exposed explicitly: If meaning were a projection, as Gadamer suggests, it would be clear what its explicit disclosure could mean: the

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25In Heidegger in Question, Robert Bernasconi argues convincingly that the ontic groundedness of the existential analytic’s “transcendental” distinctions was to have been brought explicitly into the problematic of Sein und Zeit in the portion that was never published. This was to have been carried out through what Heidegger, in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, calls “Metontology” (154-9).

26Because there is no immediacy of meaning, there is likewise no loss of (i.e., departure from) immediacy nor any subsequent Aufhebung of antitheses which would return to the unity lost in the departure from immediacy. The difference between meaning and interpretation — a difference always already “there” — is never aufgehoben.
conversion of a tacit "sinnig" projection to an explicit "auslegend" projection. But, as Nancy argues, "hermeneutics," for Heidegger, is not so simple.

Heidegger speaks often in Sein und Zeit about the difficulty of bearing witness to the φαίνομενον of Being. He stresses that "where 'the thing itself is deeply veiled'," as it is in fundamental ontology, "one must take pains not to overestimate the results"(26). It is not just that the Being "proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all"(35), but indeed, where inquiry into Being is concerned, "we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'"(39).27

I maintain that, for Heidegger, allowing Being to show itself as a φαίνομενον is not accomplished by voicing a disclosive assertion adequate to it but by bringing interpretation, determined as assertion, to the point where it must acknowledge that which, of its very essence, cannot be rendered present by assertion. Interpretation does not turn back on meaning so as to circumscribe it or expose it; indeed, it can let meaning show itself qua meaning only by exposing, again and again, its own impotence in the face of the always prior gift of meaning, thus allowing meaning to emerge/recede as background: to show itself from itself as it is in itself; i.e., as not present (but neither simply as the absence of something present). In this section and the next I shall show how this "decisive inflection of phenomenology," as Nancy calls it,28 develops in Heidegger's text.

Meaning is the "self-showing" gift of φαίνομενον (38). It has always already shown (but not presented) itself in that it is understood in advance -- albeit, tacitly -- and understood not as a "content" but as the prior clearing necessary for all possible content. Since this φαίνομενον has already shown itself, the "problem" (i.e., the possibility of "semblance") lies not in its self-showing but in the corresponding "letting show," ἀποφαίνεσθαι, λόγος καὶ ἔρμηνευέσθαι: as we have seen, the φαίνομενον is never encountered "purely;" it has always been dispatched and dispersed into factual interpretations as explicit (and re-tellable) world-historical assertions -- it is into this that we are thrown. Existentially, this "fallenness"[Verfallen] into factual assertions is, for Being-in-the-world, both a falling away from and an inextricable tie to the φαίνομενον: it dissembles the φαίνομενον but nevertheless points to it in its concealedness via each and every assertion.

When understanding becomes explicit as interpretation, the engagement of the hermeneutic fore-structure is always a dimming of the background in order to focus in on the "something as something;" there is an intrinsic narrowing of vision; indeed, "vision"[Sicht], as it functions in

27See IM, chapter 2.
28"Sharing Voices," 220.
Heidegger’s text, is this narrowing. Where assertion is concerned, however, this dimming down is extreme: the whole ready-to-hand network of worldly involvements is dimmed down completely so that Dasein loses touch with its world (and thus with its Being-in-the-world), everything having been reduced to the uniformity of the present-at-hand (158). Here, the background and its self-withdrawal are completely concealed, forgotten. Though this apophantic “as” is grounded in the existential-hermeneutical “as,” everything now appears to be presentable, immediately visible, present-at-hand in principle. Thus, we must take note when Heidegger says the λόγος which “lets the φανόμενον show itself from itself in the very way it shows itself from itself” is ἀποφαίνεσθαι; for he is here speaking of interpretation as assertion [Aussage]: the dissimulation of φανόμενον is not only brought about by assertion; it must be redressed by assertion as well, by apophansis: In Dasein’s explicit engagement with the question of Being, assertion must engage itself.

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger argues that assertion most dissimulates the φανόμενον precisely at the point where it appears to confront the phenomenal event as such; namely, in the explicit consideration of “truth” as traditionally understood. He argues in §44 that our contemporary interpretation of truth (i.e., the agreement of an assertion with its object [SZ, 214]) is grounded upon a more primordial truth of which we have lost sight, a ‘truth’ which the ancient Greeks called ἔλειθυς, “uncoveredness”[Entdeckheit]. Specifically, Heidegger denies that assertions are best understood as present-at-hand things which stand in relation to other present-at-hand things which they represent. He claims, rather, that to say an assertion is true signifies, in the first instance, that this assertion is a disclosive event which uncovers an entity as it is in itself (ibid., 218). What the Greeks saw -- and what we have forgotten -- is that an entity’s ‘truth value’ is no matter of correspondence but is its very Being-uncovered [Entdeckt-sein]. And Heidegger argues further that the truth of entities as Being-uncovered is possible only because Dasein is essentially Being-uncovering [Entdeckend-sein]: Being-in -- Dasein’s existential disclosedness (ibid., 133) -- is that Lichtung within which entities can show themselves. Finally, Heidegger proceeds to show that explicit assertions concerning truth -- and the historical development of these assertions -- constitute

29 Compare SZ, 146ff., 149. One might question what seems here to be Heidegger’s presumptuous privileging of the visual paradigm -- a privilege which seems to function at the very basis of his “disclosive” phenomenology. What would be truly presumptuous, however, would be to think we might simply choose to adopt or discard such paradigms at will. Indeed, we should view Heidegger’s focus on Sicht less as a blind endorsement of the “visual” than as a participation in and displacement of one of the dominant interpretive schemata in which we find ourselves immersed factically. As he says: “...from the beginning onwards the tradition of philosophy has been oriented primarily towards ‘seeing’ as a way of access to entities and to Being. To keep the connection with this tradition, we may formalize ‘sight’ and ‘seeing’ enough to obtain therewith a universal term for characterizing any access to entities or to Being, as access in general” (147).
the semblant (mis)representation of disclosedness itself, the semblance of the disclosive ur-event which is the *Φαινόμενον* of phenomenology:

*When an assertion has been expressed, the uncoveredness of the entity moves into the kind of Being of that which is ready-to-hand within-the-world. But now to the extent that in this uncoveredness, as an uncoveredness of something, a relationship to something present-at-hand persists, the uncoveredness (truth) becomes, for its part, a relationship between things which are present-at-hand (intellectus and res) — a relationship that is present-at-hand itself...* Though it is founded upon Dasein’s disclosedness (*Er schlossenheit*), the existential phenomenon of uncoveredness becomes a property which is present-at-hand but in which there still lurks a relational character, and as such a property, it gets broken asunder into a relationship which is present-at-hand. Truth as disclosedness and as Being-towards uncovered entities — a Being which itself uncovers — has become truth as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world. And thus we have pointed out the ontologically derivative character of the traditional conception of truth (225).

Here, Heidegger is arguing that the *Φαινόμενον* (Being, truth, meaning, *Lichtung*, etc.) is indeed engaged by assertion, but it is misrepresented *inasmuch as it is presented*, i.e., *inasmuch as* it is rendered present-at-hand through a mode of interpretation. Does this mean that Heidegger’s assertions about disclosedness and *Διάλογος* “correct” the problem, finally articulating what traditional assertions about “truth” have missed?

By no means, as we shall see.

### 4. Repetition and Interruption

Essentially, the *λόγος qua Ερμηνευτικόν* (qua apophantic assertion) lets this *Φαινόμενον* “show itself from itself in the very way that it shows itself from itself” through what Heidegger calls *repetition* [*Wiederholung*]. Because Heidegger explicates the existentiell possibility of repetition in his treatment of authentic Dasein as “anticipatorily resolute” [*vorlaufende entschlossen*], we will begin with a brief sketch of the latter.

As discussed in chapter 2, when Dasein’s existentiell engagement in understanding projection becomes transparent [*durchsichtig*] with respect to its Being, it is because Dasein has chosen to be itself; to orient itself in terms of its *ownmost* Being-able-to-be [*Seinkönigen*]. As such, Dasein is anticipatorily resolute.

Resoluteness is an existentiell determination of Being-able-to-be whereby Dasein projects itself upon its *ownmost* Being-guilty (*SZ*, 297), i.e., upon its having been “*released* from its [existential] basis, not *through* itself but *to* itself, so as to be *as this basis*” (ibid., 285; see my chapter 2). Like every projection, this is a becoming-interpretation of meaning; in it, Dasein’s Being-guilty, already understood, is engaged concretely in interpretation. This is a unique interpretation, however, for
what it renders explicit is but a "nothing," a nullity (283ff.). It is Dasein's taking responsibility for that existential nullity which is not at its disposal but from which and through which it must be.

The possibility of \(\text{ἀπὸφαίνεσθαι}\) — Dasein’s letting the \(φαίνομενον\) show itself — lies precisely in its always compromised comportment towards this nullity. In §60, Heidegger claims that, though "["resoluteness"] signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the 'they'," and thus into transparency, "...[even] resolutions remain dependent upon the 'they' and its world. The understanding of this is one of the things that a resolution discloses, inasmuch as resoluteness is what first gives authentic transparency to Dasein"(299)[my emphasis]. We see here that the existentiell "transparency" Heidegger has in mind is not Dasein's rendering its null existence-structure present-at-hand, accessible to itself in an assertion. Rather, as Being-guilty, it is the explicit interpretive \([\text{auslegend}]\) acknowledgment of Being's withdrawal from Dasein's existentiell power (284), from its power to interpret. Here, interpretation turns back on itself, resisting the pervasive tendency to remain dispersed in the tissue of factual assertions, of uninterrupted presence-at-hand.30 This is a resistance which lets Dasein see — without seeing — its own non-present-at-hand "ground," the limit which escapes representation. Such resistance is not merely a "case" of acknowledgment — it is the very basis of acknowledgment as such.

Indeed, Heidegger indicates not merely that authentic interpretation is impotent in the face of Being, but that its acknowledgment of this impotence is constitutive of authenticity:

In resoluteness the issue for Dasein is its ownmost Being-able-to-be, which, as something thrown, can project itself only upon definite factual possibilities. Resolution does not withdraw itself from 'actuality', but discovers first what is factically possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost Being-able-to-be in the 'they'(299) [my emphasis].

Indeed, the very notion of "transparency" seems to recoil upon itself here, for what is disclosed is both the irreducible necessity of underlying meaning and the fact that interpretation's every determination has already fallen victim to facticity and is thus cut off from the possibility of laying out meaning qua meaning. Dasein is transparent only through its disclosive participation in this radical break, this rupture which conceals itself in the very "structure" of comprehension. Likewise, transparency is Dasein's encounter with both the inescapable expectancy and ultimate impossibility of transparency-to-self -- the former due to Dasein's fallenness into the hegemony of presence-at-hand, the latter due to meaning's unrepresentability.

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30-'The laying-bare of Dasein's primordial Being must...be wrested from Dasein by following the opposite course from that taken by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpretation...Existential analysis...constantly has the character of doing violence [Gewaltsamkeit], whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and its tranquilized obviousness"(311).
Yet it is one thing to demonstrate the existentiell possibility of such a transparent interpretation, and quite another to show what this signifies on the still more determinate level of assertion. This is a crucial point, for Sein und Zeit itself is, after all, but a concretization of this resolute interpretation [Auslegung] as a body of apophantic assertions (i.e., as an Interpretation). In it, as I have emphasized in chapter 2, Heidegger strives to communicate [mitteilen] the truth of Dasein’s Being, to let Others share with him (155) the disclosive comportment towards the evasive ϕανόμενον. But how, exactly, can Sein und Zeit, as a body of assertions, hope to do this? How can the acknowledgment of the finitude of disclosure take place in a “collection of assertions”? Heidegger deals with this question — at least tacitly — in his treatment of resoluteness as anticipatory.

The term “anticipatory resoluteness”[vorlaufende Entschlossenheit] refers to that existentiell possibility whereby Dasein explicitly acknowledges its ownmost Being-guilty (i.e., Dasein takes explicit responsibility for its existential nullity). Yet why must resoluteness be anticipatory?

For Heidegger, a fully resolute relation to Being-guilty must involve a ‘futural’ aspect: because “not-yet-ness” (Being-ahead-of-itself) is constitutive of Dasein’s Being, Being-guilty must be thought as a Being-able-to-be-guilty. He proceeds to argue that, as such a potentiality, Being-guilty is situated in terms of Dasein’s ownmost Being-able-to-be, in terms of its death as the possibility of impossibility (ibid., 306). Without this uttermost Being-towards, Dasein would never encounter the absolute nullity of that for which it is responsible. As Heidegger says: “Only when it ‘qualifies’ itself as Being-towards-death does resoluteness understand the ‘can’ of its potentiality-for-Being-guilty”(306).

If we consider this particular “capability” which is the Being-able-to-be-guilty, and if we do so in terms of what Heidegger calls “Being-certain” [Gewißsein], we can see how interpretation — and more specifically, assertion — can emerge as fully resolute:

1. **Being-certain**: Being-certain refers to a mode of interpretation, for it is a way of Dasein’s explicitly appropriating what has already been disclosed (307; cf. 148), and is thus a “Being-related-existentially-to-meaning.” Specifically, it is interpretation’s way of explicitly engaging the true, entities as they stand forth in the truth (in λόγον as Being-uncovering). It is what Heidegger calls a holding-for-true [für wahr halten], and “[holding] something for true is adequate as a way of maintaining oneself in the truth, if it is grounded in the uncovered entity itself, and if, as Being towards the entity so uncovered, it has become transparent to itself as regards its appropriateness to that entity”(256). Heidegger refers to such an adequate Being-certain as conviction [Überzeugung]. Consequently, where the primordial truth of existence (i.e., Being-
guilty) is concerned, conviction happens when Dasein is determined, existentially, as resolute: herein lies authentic interpretation.

2. Repetition: As anticipatory, resoluteness involves not just being resolute ‘now’ but being able to “maintain” oneself in that which resoluteness discloses (ibid., 307; cf. 151). And yet, resoluteness is not the assumption of responsibility for something which remains constant ‘through time’; rather, it is the assumption of responsibility, here and now, for this ‘case’, for this factual Situation into which I find myself thrown. Thus, to maintain oneself existentially in what resoluteness discloses -- and to continue maintaining oneself there -- entails a conviction which somehow anticipates the singularity of the factual Situation. For Heidegger, this happens as a conviction which resolves to keep repeating itself:

Such certainty must maintain itself in what is disclosed by the resolution. But this means that it simply cannot become rigid as regards the Situation, but must understand that the resolution, in accordance with its own meaning as a disclosure, must be held open and free for the current factual possibility. The certainty of the resolution signifies that one holds oneself free for the possibility of taking it back -- a possibility which is factically necessary. However, such holding-for-true in resoluteness (as the truth of existence) by no means lets us fall back into irresoluteness. On the contrary, this holding-for-true, as a resolute holding-oneself-free for taking back, is authentic resoluteness which resolves to keep repeating itself. Thus, in an existentiell manner, one’s very lostness in irresoluteness gets undermined (ibid., 308).

From what we have seen thus far, it should be clear why assertion can be transparent only through repetition. The “rigidity” which threatens here is, at least in part, the rigidity of interpretations as they are determined in assertions and handed down. Any asserted interpretation (the whole of Sein und Zeit included) which is anticipatorily resolute is thus bound by a strict requirement: the interruption of the ossified tissue of Auslegungen, and the perpetual repetition of this interruption.

As I’ve indicated, understanding is always already dispersed [zerstreut] into existentiell interpretations. We nevertheless have a kind of interpretive “access” to the differential structure of understanding, for interpretation is in each case encountered as having emerged from meaning, carrying the trace of this never explicit meaning. And so, since the φαινόμενον which shows itself is that very meaning which withdraws itself from the explicit, showing itself only as the background, as the “having-always-already-receded,” authentic interpretation does not “present” this φαινόμενον but critically engages that factual “general situation”[allgemeine Lage]300 dominated by das Man, that body of factual interpretation which assumes in advance the presentability (presence-at-hand) of everything. Interpretation can let meaning show itself from itself in the very way it shows itself from itself only by setting it free from interpretation’s – and
more specifically, assertion's -- control, even though this means de-stabilizing the very field upon which Sein und Zeit as concrete interpretation maintains its authority.

It is only repetition which bears witness to meaning, interrupting again and again the ossified coherence of received interpretation in its ongoing reconfiguration. This "bearing witness" does not mean making the meaning of Being fully explicit (i.e., present-at-hand, actual), bringing meaning as such to interpretation in a "correct statement," but rather allowing the understanding of Being to unfold "from meaning into interpretation," and to do so again and again as interpretation's self-interruption. Where authentic interpretation of the meaning of Being is concerned, this sought-after meaning is always both "behind" and "ahead of" the interpretation; in neither direction can it be rendered explicit qua meaning, only qua interpretation. The Sinn-Auslegung difference structures understanding never completed arrival; it involves rethinking "self-showing" and "letting-show" in terms of a repeated ongoing task, a transparent bearing witness to what can never be rendered present-at-hand.

In the following section I will demonstrate how this repetitive-interruptive "methodology" effects Sein und Zeit's relation to both transcendental philosophy and the question as such. Prior to this, however, I must digress briefly, turning back to my discussion in chapter 2.

I argued in chapter 2 that Being is explicitly disclosed to Dasein only through a silent interruption -- an interruption which cannot be asserted [ausgesagt] and which is thus not communicable. This would seem to be at odds with what I have claimed thus far in this section, for here I have argued that assertion can, by interrupting itself, bear witness to Being, disclosing it as meaning. I maintain, however, that the limitations discussed in chapter 2 still stand and are, indeed, consistent with my remarks here.

There are in fact two interruptions at issue:

1. The call of conscience is the interruptive voice, breaking in upon the constant chatter of idle-talk; it interrupts precisely in its silence, i.e., in its not presenting any determinate content. However, "silence" in and of itself, divorced from the factual tissue of interpretations, is not Heidegger's concern in Sein und Zeit, for such "pure silence" would simply fail to engage interpretation determined as idle-talk (164-5). Recall that Dasein exists as dispersed, for the most part, in the everyday tissue of assertions, the authority and coherence of which is unquestioned. Interruption occurs when this "valid" tissue of assertions comes face to face, in its very ground, with an opposing assertion which it can neither accommodate nor deny (for instance, the assertion: "the ground of assertion escapes assertion"). In an immediate sense it is, indeed, the assertion which interrupts -- as I have underscored in this section. Ultimately,
however, it is not the voiced assertion as such which interrupts idle-talk but rather the irreconcilable difference between this assertion and the tissue of assertion which it opposes. This difference is silent, an aporia which always emerges between irreconcilable assertions. Thus, though assertion functions essentially for interruption, interpretation’s differential self-interruption is voiced through Dasein’s “having nothing to say,” through that “keeping silent” [Schweigen] which opens up a distance between Dasein and “what is said in the talk” [das Geredete].

2. The above interruption — interruption as voiced in the call of conscience — never takes place in and of itself existentially; it is accomplished only in the ear — in authentic hearing, the comportment which “listens toward” the call and thereby explicitly interrupts Dasein’s hearkening to (and dispersal in) idle-talk. As I emphasized in chapter 2, the call of conscience does not “happen” but has always already been voiced; that is to say, the interruption does not befall idle-talk through the saying of this or that assertion; rather, idle-talk itself is precisely the discursive flight from a silent voice which has interrupted it in advance. To encounter the call through this or that interruptive assertion, this or that aporia, is precisely to hear — here and now, in this factically determined hearkening — a voice which had always appealed to “me” but which “I” had previously avoided.

It is in the incommunicability of this second interruption that Heidegger’s task runs aground: since it is not assertion — nor even the self-interruption of assertion — but hearing which accomplishes existentiell interruption, the explicit grasp of Being’s unrepresentability takes place not through my participation with Others in a shared “articulated” interruption, but through my interruptive “listening away” (i.e., which turns towards my singular Being-towards-death): hearing interrupts its captivation by idle-talk only as my hearing (271).

5. The “End” of Transcendental Philosophy and the Displacement of the Question

a. The Factual Necessity of Transcendental Philosophy

As I argued briefly, Sein und Zeit is, in certain crucial respects, structured like a transcendental inquiry, a progression from entities as we encounter them (i.e., as interpreted, as “ausgelegt”) back to the conditions for the possibility of this encounter (i.e., to the meaning of Being). Sein und Zeit never departs explicitly from this task.
Nevertheless, as I have also indicated, the carrying out of this task gradually displaces the very transcendental parameters which guide it: meaning as such reveals itself not as an articulable “condition” but as a meaning which withdraws from every articulation.

As one might expect, this displacement imposes strict limits on what the “fundamental ontology” of Sein und Zeit can hope to achieve. Most importantly, when Heidegger says the meaning of Being “is time,” he is not claiming to have rendered the meaning of Being present in an interpretation, but rather to have let the receding meaning bring itself to language in its withholding, “presenting” its disappearance. Heidegger does indeed bring the meaning of Being to speech. The question is: precisely what can such “bringing to speech” be? It is, as I have argued, letting self-withholding show itself in the very way it shows itself from itself: as self-withholding from the as; as granting yet another interpretation (from) which it withholds itself.

To interpret the meaning of Being as “time” is to find a strategic word which disrupts, here and now, the factual authority of the ossified interpretations of Being, allowing us to glimpse this meaning as the trace of transcendence (or transcendence as trace). Indeed, for Heidegger, the effective interruption of interpretation can be accomplished only through a painstaking tracing-back-through the historically sedimented interpretation (ἐμπνεύειν as ἔγος) of Being in order to isolate where and how ‘time’ has been suppressed in this interpretation. This historically sedimented interpretation is less a matter of what previous thinkers actually held about Being and time than it is a critical engagement with the way this history is interpreted today (22-3). To “lay out” the meaning of Being is thus to challenge systematically the dissimulative assertions concerning Being which we find handed down to us. In the rigorous treatment of the relation between the terms ‘Sein’ and ‘Zeit’, this body of assertions is critically engaged such that the φαινόμενον is freed to show itself.

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31 Recall that to ask about the meaning of Being is to ask about “Being itself insofar as it enters the intelligibility [Verständlichkeit] of Dasein” (152). It is to this “insofar as” that we must devote careful attention.

32 In §6, Heidegger writes: “If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at the primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being — the ways which have guided each since” (22). It should now be clear that these “primordial experiences” involve that prior comprehension which is never “given,” properly speaking. These already tacit “experiences” are arrived at explicitly only through interpretation’s self-interruption. Moreover, it should also be clear at this point that these “experiences,” once arrived at, cannot be preserved in a body of transmittable present-at-hand assertions. They can be maintained, rather, only in anticipatory resoluteness.

33 One might question this reading of the φαινόμενον—freeing “zeigen lassen” by pointing out that the ἔγος is described not just as a “letting X show itself” but also as a “wresting X from concealment” (36, 222, 311). I maintain, however, that what X is wrested from is not “Being” but the presence-at-hand of assertion.
It is crucial here to keep in mind that for Heidegger to posit “time” as the meaning of Being is nothing like an adequate presentation of a meaning. Indeed, any attempt to regard temporality [Temperalität] as “the” answer to the question of Being -- at least, without seriously reassessing what “answer” might mean here -- misunderstands the Sinn-Auslegung relation. As Heidegger would eventually write many years after Sein und Zeit: “Time, which is addressed as the meaning of Being in Sein und Zeit, is itself not an answer, not a last prop for questioning, but rather itself the naming of a question. The name ‘time’ is a preliminary word for what was later called ‘the truth of Being’” (ZSD, 30/OTB, 28).34

I have argued that Heidegger’s “method” can result in no grasp of the “actual” meaning of Being, for an authentic relation to meaning is one which perpetually holds open the possibility -- and indeed the necessity -- of re-interpretation, of resisting the deceptive ossification of the present-at-hand. The authentic pursuit of the meaning of Being is a pursuit which strives to bear witness to Being insofar as it enters into the intelligibility of Dasein (152); this means, first and foremost, a bearing witness to Dasein’s Being, to the irreducible and open Sinn-Auslegung relation. This is what Heidegger means by repetition: the acknowledgment that “possibility” (specifically, that originary Being-possible which is the Lichtung, the background) is higher than “actuality” (presence-at-hand), ἀποθέωσις.

We now see how Gadamer and others assume wrongly that, for Heidegger, the rift between meaning and interpretation marks, in each case, a “dilemma” to be solved, a bridge to be crossed.35 Such a reading assumes that the rigorous pursuit of the meaning of Being turns interpretation back on its meaning, bringing the meaning of Being as such into explicitness and thus negating, existentially, the difference between meaning and interpretation. To assume this, however, is to radically misunderstand the Sinn-Auslegung relation, and thus to misunderstand what is at stake in hermeneutic phenomenology.

And yet, in the face of this displacement -- this shift from transcendental philosophy towards something else -- we must ask: why pursue this course? Why begin with transcendental philosophy? What can this trajectory of inquiry hope to accomplish?

Such questions touch on a crucial point, for just as it does not engage Heidegger’s thinking rigorously to read fundamental ontology as a kind of “transcendental gesture” (i.e., as an attempt to render present-at-hand the condition for the possibility of our comprehension of beings), to emphasize to too great a degree the departure of fundamental ontology from transcendental thought

34 Cf. EM, 214-15/IM, 205-6; BzP, §34.
35 As I’ve suggested, though difference is indeed a crucial component of comprehension for Gadamer, it is, in each case, something to be overcome, placed in the service of agreement.
likewise misses the mark. Transcendental philosophy is not something which Heidegger’s thinking merely “happens” to have started out from, something which he passes through quickly and “leaves behind.” Indeed, Heidegger never escapes the exigency of transcendental philosophy, for it is precisely the inescapable exigency of his own factual situatedness.

As Robert Bemasconi points out, it is not enough simply to admit that the ontological difference (and the distinctions grounded therefrom) is rooted ultimately in facticity; “The ideal must be carefully unfolded in the form of an existential analysis” (Heidegger in Question, 36). That is to say, if we are truly to engage what we are granted to think, we must, according to Heidegger’s logic, rigorously follow the path of transcendental thought — which is,factically, our path — thinking it through to the limit. The revelation of ontology’s “turn-about” [Umschlag] must take place at the strategically appropriate moment,36 at the right point along the path of thought as it works back through itself.

Indeed, this helps explain why Heidegger is so cagey with respect to the pending Umschlag of the existential analytic (and, more specifically, with respect to originary ζηθη). As we have seen, he hints at the Umschlag briefly only twice in Sein und Zeit — in the introduction and in §63. Moreover, he never clarifies the full significance of the Sinn Auslegung relation as the displacement of transcendental philosophy (i.e., as the locus of the Umschlag). Bemasconi cites a remarkable passage from The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic supporting this reading:

> Not only do we need [the existential] analytic [of Dasein], but we must produce the illusion, as it were, that the given task at hand is the one and only necessary task. Only the person who... in the course of action, can treat what is in each case seized upon as wholly singular, who at the same time nonetheless realizes the finitude of this activity: only such a one understands finite existence and can hope to accomplish something in it (158)[my emphasis].

To produce this illusion is to participate concretely and “in good faith” in one’s factual situation, i.e., to put forth interpretations which are compelling with respect to this situation; it is only by way of such concrete participation that interpretations can then be brought to acknowledge their finitude. In light of this, it should be clear why it is both correct and incorrect to say that Sein und Zeit "applies" a transcendental methodology.

The criticism that Sein und Zeit does not "purify" itself adequately of transcendental method is ultimately short-sighted, misunderstanding what is at stake in Heidegger’s “project.”37 Indeed, to "purify" Sein und Zeit in this way would be to render it innocuous, preventing it from engaging its

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36 According to Heidegger (MFL. 154-9; W. 327-8/LH. 207-8), this was to have taken place in the reversal of the matter [Sache] of “Being and Time” in Part I, division 3 (“Time and Being”). Cf. BzP. §41, on this “rechten Augenblick den Umschlag.”
factical Situation. For Heidegger to have attempted to isolate a “more adequate” point of departure would have been for him to deny the facticity of his thinking. Factualiy, Heidegger’s thinking is thrown into a situation determined in many respects by the authority of transcendental method. The analysis of Dasein is an attempt to think back through this determinate situation in order to displace it and thus let the \( \phi \alpha \nu \nu' \mu \varepsilon \nu \nu \) show itself\(^\text{38}\) — though certainly not “once and for all”.

In summary, then: \textit{Sein und Zeit} both \textit{is} and \textit{is not} transcendental philosophy. It is transcendental philosophy inasmuch as it engages (and must engage) the factico-existentiel exigency which is that transcendental interpretation in which current rigorous philosophical thinking is situated; it is not transcendental philosophy inasmuch as it pursues this transcendental thought rigorously to the point that it opens on to what exceeds it, bearing witness to what apophatically ossified “transcendental philosophy” in itself cannot bear witness.\(^\text{39}\)

b. The Two-sided Frage of Fundamental Ontology

Questioning, as it functions within transcendental philosophy, is an endeavour in which Dasein \textit{can} participate. As a comportment which anticipates a present at hand solution (a \( \phi \alpha \nu \nu' \mu \varepsilon \nu \nu \) wrested from concealment, captured in an assertion), the question is subordinated to an answer which is still pending, to the resolution of the \( \delta \pi \rho \sigma \iota \alpha \). In the specifically “hermeneutic” transcendental schema of \textit{Sein und Zeit}, what questioning pursues is something which -- though it is already understood, tacitly available to us -- still requires explicit appropriation via assertion. This relation to the question is, as I’ve mentioned, quite different from what eventually emerges in Heidegger’s thinking, i.e., the question as no mere comportment but as the elusive “background” of all comportment, a background in which we are always already engaged.

Clearly, a shift takes place at some point in Heidegger’s thinking. Where, exactly, does \textit{Sein und Zeit} stand with respect to this shift?

\(^{37}\) See, for instance, Charles Guignon’s \textit{Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge}. §15 and Michael Zimmermann’s \textit{Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity}, 146, 166.

\(^{38}\) The displacement of this received transcendental axis (and of the distinctions grounded upon it) takes place through its exposure as “factico-existentiell” determined, thus through the exposure of its essential misrepresentation of the \( \phi \alpha \nu \nu' \mu \varepsilon \nu \nu \). Heidegger hints at this in the introduction: “The task of an existential analytic of Dasein has been delineated in advance, as regards both its possibility and its necessity, in Dasein’s ontical constitution”(\textit{SZ}, 12-13). By Dasein’s “ontical” constitution, Heidegger is here referring to its factual-historical situatedness — its very thrownness into transcendental philosophy (cf. \textit{MFL}, 155-6). It is this ontical constitution that phenomenology must engage — and engage violently (\textit{SZ}, 31ff.) — if the meaning of Being is to be disclosed explicitly.

\(^{39}\) This is not to discount the disclosive event which transcendental philosophy is. Rather, it is to critique an ossified-ossifying way of reading transcendental philosophy. As Heidegger emphasizes in his introduction, he is not trying to negate the history of ontology, but to stake out its positive possibilities (22).
We must keep in mind, first of all, that our factual situation regarding transcendental philosophy is also a factual situation regarding the question as such. Thus, if Heidegger’s thinking in *Sein und Zeit* is to radically engage the question, it can do so not by engaging the phenomenon “directly” but must explicitly participate in and displace the interpretation of questioning which has been handed down to it. More precisely, Heidegger must bring the discourse on the question to *interrupt* itself.

The whole project of fundamental ontology is laid out in terms of the question of Being, a question oriented towards the explicit disclosure — via assertion — of the already tacitly understood meaning of Being. The operative assumption here, however, is that what is already understood is a hidden but potentially *assertable* content; it is precisely this assumption regarding the “understood” which subordinates questioning to assertion. As we have seen, Heidegger’s analysis interrupts this assumption: that towards which the question of Being tends, the “meaning of Being,” gradually reveals itself to have withdrawn itself in advance from any and every articulable assertion. “What” is already understood is not a tacit potentially assertable content, something which Dasein can render more explicit; indeed, our prior understanding of the meaning of Being — an understanding which is constitutive of our very Being — is our very questioning relation to it: the question “what is Being?” is not a comportment on its way to comprehension; it is *already* comprehension. As Heidegger puts it several years later:

*Seeking* — already the holding-itself-in-the-truth [*Sich-in-der-Wahrheit-halten*], in the open of the self-concealing and self-withholding. *Seeking* (originary) as ground-relation to hesitant refusal. *Seeking* as questioning and yet reticence.... *Whoever seeks has already found!* And the originary seeking is that laying hold of the already found, namely of the self-concealing as such (Beiträge zur Philosophie, §38).\(^{40}\)

*Sein und Zeit* is the accomplishment of the transition from questioning as existentiell comportment to questioning as prior background — though, strictly speaking, this is no transition from one position to another; it is, rather, an acknowledgment that our dominant and predominantly tacit position on the question is possible only because of our prior aporetic relation to it. This unfolding of the existentiell questioning of Being into the disclosure of existential Being-in-question makes up the transformation of questioning which *Sein und Zeit* is.

\(^{40}\) Compare these passages: “In *Sein und Zeit* the question of the meaning of Being is raised and developed as a question for the first time in the history of philosophy” (EM. 89/IM. 84). “*Sein und Zeit* serves this transition-preparation, i.e., it
c. Heidegger's "Abandonment" of Fundamental Ontology

I have argued, thus far, that there is strong continuity between the "project" of Sein und Zeit and Heidegger's subsequent thinking. There is, however, still the problem of Heidegger's abandonment of Sein und Zeit less than half-finished: as is clear from the introduction, the published portion of Sein und Zeit accomplishes the interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality; however, neither the explication of time as the "transcendental horizon" of Being nor the explicit destruction of the history of ontology in terms of temporality are completed (SZ, 39-40).

It should be clear at this point that this text was not left incomplete because, as some have suggested, Heidegger realized the "inadequacy" of his own transcendental questioning. Granted, certain passages, read out of context, do suggest such a realization. For instance:

The experience which tries to find expression for the first time in Being and Time and which in its transcendental manner of questioning must still in a way speak the language of metaphysics has indeed thought the Being of beings and brought it to a conceptual formulation, thus also bringing the truth of beings to view, but in all these manifestations of Being, the truth of Being, its truth as such, has never attained to language, but has remained in oblivion. The fundamental experience of Being and Time is thus that of the oblivion of Being [Seinsvergessenheit] (ZSD, 31/OTB, 29).

The temptation, of course, is to regard this impotence of Sein und Zeit's transcendental manner of questioning (its inability to bring the truth of Being to language) as the reason this project was abandoned. As I have argued, however, this impotence is precisely the strength of Sein und Zeit: fundamental ontology bears witness to the φαινόμενον of Being precisely by exhibiting its own inability to escape its factual imbeddedness in the language of metaphysics and thus its inability to adequately present [auslegen] the φαινόμενον of Being. Indeed, if we turn to what Heidegger says years later, in "Letter on 'Humanism'," we see that he acknowledges the factual necessity of explicitly participating in this metaphysics: "...Being [in Sein und Zeit] is thought on the basis of beings, a consequence of the approach — at first unavoidable — within a metaphysics that is still dominant"(W, 337/LH, 216). He continues:

"The introductory definition, 'Being is the transcendenst pure and simple'. articulates in one simple sentence the way the essence of Being hitherto has illumined man. This retrospective definition of the essence of Being from the Lichnung of beings as such remains indispensable for the prospective approach of thinking toward the question concerning the truth of Being"(ibid., 337/217).

And in the same text, an explicit reference to the language of metaphysics:

"This language is still faulty insofar as it does not yet succeed in retaining the essential help of phenomenological seeing and in dispensing with the inappropriate concern with 'science' and

already stands authentically in the grounding question [i.e., what is Being?]...[and] for the grounding Being is no answer or answer-region, but rather the most question-worthy [Fragwürdigste]"(§34).
‘research’. But in order to make the attempt at thinking recognizable and at the same time understandable for existing philosophy, *it could at first be expressed only within the horizon of that existing philosophy and its use of current terms*" (ibid. 357/235) [my emphasis].

And yet, if *Sein und Zeit*’s transcendental leanings are not a weakness, why then is it left unfinished? In what other sense might it be inadequate?

Though Heidegger never offers a precise account of this other inadequacy of *Sein und Zeit*, he does occasionally refer to it. In “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” for example:

> The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking [i.e., the thinking of Dasein’s ecstatic relation to the *Lichtung* of Being] that abandons subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of *Being and Time* the third division of the first part, “Time and Being”, was held back. Here everything is reversed. The section in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning [Kehre] and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics (327-8/207-8).

My hypothesis: though *Sein und Zeit* does indeed acknowledge the truth of Being by bringing *Auslegung* to interrupt itself, it nevertheless adheres to the *Sinn-Auslegung* schema all too “irresolutely.” That is to say, it’s questioning, at least on a certain level, considers this schema adequate for engaging the *Seinsfrage*. It is Heidegger’s realization of this presumptuous adequacy which led him to abandon *Sein und Zeit*.

In the following chapter, I will explain what I take to be the weakness of fundamental ontology by contrasting *Sein und Zeit* with the 1930 lecture, “On the Essence of Truth”.

More importantly, however, the following chapter will bring us back to our main concern: now that we clearly see the continuity between fundamental ontology and Heidegger’s subsequent questioning, we can trace the fate of the question of community as it functions covertly in Heidegger’s path of thinking after *Sein und Zeit*. 


B. FROM FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY TO EREIGNIS

In this section, I will demonstrate that Heidegger's ambivalent relation in Sein und Zeit to the question of community -- i.e., his initial approach towards and almost immediate withdrawal from it -- functions essentially for the coherence not just of Sein und Zeit but of his path of thinking as a whole.¹

Thus far, we have seen that: a) Heidegger's thinking is oriented in terms of the question [Frage] and the path of thinking [Weg], and more specifically, in terms of the question of Being (introduction, chapter 3); b) The question of Being -- as it emerges in Sein und Zeit -- is able to maintain its centrality and authority in this text only through the avoidance of the question of community (chapter 2). Now we will assess what these two factors entail for Heidegger's subsequent thinking as it unfolds from out of Sein und Zeit. Specifically, we will consider this trajectory in three stages: a. the reflections on truth which closely follow Sein und Zeit (chapter 4); the turn towards art which takes place in the 30's (chapter 5); the gradual development of the notions of "Ereignis" and "Seyngeschichte" (chapter 6).

With respect to this task, there are a few points to keep in mind:

1. If thinking is, as Heidegger claims, a participation in questioning which is essentially "underway" [unterwegs], then the primary significance of the question of community does not lie in a solution towards which it tends. Rather, its significance lies in what withdraws, unthought, and what emerges out of this withdrawal as "food for thought" in the self-unfolding of Heidegger path of thinking.² Thus, for example, though the problematic of singularity, discussed in the previous chapter, naturally draws one's attention towards the later Heidegger, who had much to say about this,³ we should resist the temptation to assess the question of community -- as it functions in Sein und Zeit -- retrospectively, in terms of the "resources" which became accessible only later. We will instead trace the way the proximity

¹"Wholeness," of course, is not a term which grafts readily on to Heidegger's thinking. As he himself says, there is no such thing as "Heideggerian" philosophy (ZSD, 521, OTB, 48), which is to say there is no collection of propositions endorsed by him whereby his "position" might be located -- dialectically or otherwise. Indeed, what wholeness there is is that of an uncertain gesture, one which is finite, nearly blind, "complete" only insofar as it responds to that Unthought which exceeds it absolutely. The "whole" of Heidegger's thought is the trajectory of this response, the tracing of what has already withdrawn -- though, as Robert Bernasconi has recently argued, even this trajectory is no simple unity, for it interrupts its own narrative continuity (Heidegger in Question, xx, xxiii, 9). The problematic character of this "wholeness" is something we will address gradually in this chapter and the next.

²Though, as we will see in chapter 7, this leaves open the possibility that such a re-tracing of the path of thinking might well displace the very notion of "path".

³See, for example, Identity and Difference, and the essay "Language".
of *Gemeinschaftsfrage* and *Seinsfrage* unfolds along Heidegger’s path of thinking, in accordance with its logic.

2. It is crucial — if we are to engage not merely the “positions” which seem to present themselves in Heidegger’s writing but also his *thinking* — that we reread him in ways which diverge sharply from his own reading of himself, that we acknowledge exigencies in his texts that he did not and could not have foreseen. Only in this way, by tracing his “inner limit,” can we acknowledge the unthought in his thinking.⁴ In light of this, my retracing of Heidegger’s path of thinking cannot expect to achieve a definitive demarcation of his “trajectory” (an impossible task); rather, situated on Heidegger’s “inner limit,” it will do two things: a. it will faithfully repeat and underscore the exigencies which are explicitly acknowledged in Heidegger’s texts, exigencies around which his own self-reading coheres; b. it will explicate these exigencies — mainly by focusing on the covert function of the question of community — to the point where they undermine themselves, thereby displacing Heidegger’s self-reading, acknowledging his unthought.

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⁴As Heidegger himself says: “Every thinker oversteps the inner limit of every other thinker. But such overstepping is not ‘knowing it all’, since it only consists in holding the thinker in the direct claim of Being, thus remaining within his limitation. This limitation consists in the fact that the thinker can never himself say what is most of all his own. It must remain unsaid, because what is sayable receives its determination from what is not sayable...Not to know this inner limitation, not to know it thanks to the nearness of what is unsaid and unsayable, is the hidden gift of Being to the rare thinkers who are called to the path of thought” (EP. 77-8).
4. Αφήθη: From Self-withholding to Self-withdrawal

As argued in chapter 2, *Sein und Zeit* sidesteps a fundamental aporia -- one which threatens its very coherence -- by excluding the question of community from explicit consideration while simultaneously subordinating it to the question of Being. Now, given our analysis in the previous segment, we must ask: how does this avoidance play itself out after *Sein und Zeit*?

The 1930 lecture "On the Essence of Truth" does not speak explicitly of community. Nevertheless, it is community as determined in *Sein und Zeit* which tacitly carries much of the weight of this lecture. Indeed, the reason neither we-hood nor community are discussed as such is that, as far as Heidegger is concerned, they go without saying. Indeed, his analysis begins by taking for granted the factual givenness of a factically determinate We. Concerning the "commonsense"("*der gemeine Menschenverstand*, which one might also translate as "communal-sense") that determines the predominant relation to truth, he writes:

"...[We] ourselves remain within the sensibleness of common sense to the extent that we suppose ourselves to be secure in those multiform 'truths' of practical experience and action, of research, composition, and belief. We ourselves intensify that resistance which the 'obvious' has to every demand by what is questionable.

Therefore even if some questioning concerning truth is necessary, what one [man] then demands is an answer to the question as to where we stand today. One wants to know what our situation is today. One calls for the goal which should be posited for man in and for his history. One wants the actual 'truth'. Well then -- truth!'"(W, 178/OET, 118).

The We in this passage, a We to which Heidegger returns again and again throughout the essay, is in no way accidental to the argument: nor is it proper to a puerile common-sense which a more radical comprehension might simply "transcend." Indeed, it is precisely in our common-sense call for the "actual truth" that we already know, on some level, what truth is (ibid.). It is this We, and only this We, which finds itself 'in the truth'. The essay develops as a working back through the ordinary understanding of truth (ibid.) in order to engage this prior yet concealed understanding -- our understanding.¹

Moreover, the essence of truth, an essence which Heidegger strives in this essay to articulate as the ever-elusive "(non)essence of truth", is tied directly to the possibility of history -- and more precisely to the history of a We since it is our understanding of truth which is at issue:

¹ Thus the question voiced at the conclusion of §4 must be understood less as Heidegger's question than as the question which the community addresses to itself as it stands in relation to Being: "...[How] are we to comprehend the non-essence in the essence of truth?" [my emphasis](W, 191/OET, 130).
Here the factual determinacy of the We in question becomes clear: we Westerners standing in relation to our history. This, of course, leads to crucial questions: Can the we-hood underlying this We simply be taken for granted? Precisely how is such we-hood to be understood? In what sense is there a “we” which already comprehends truth as such? Heidegger unfortunately does not take up these concerns. That there is at least the possibility of a We and that it is from this entity that the inquiry into truth must begin is not once called into question: the avoidance of the l-We aporia in §74 of Sein und Zeit maintains itself still in 1930.

What is at stake in the continuation of this avoidance? In short, everything: community, the question, destiny, Being -- even truth itself. Recall that in Sein und Zeit Heidegger had said: “We must ‘make’ the presupposition of truth because it is one that has been ‘made’ already with the Being of the ‘we’”(228). The above passage from “On the Essence of Truth” is essentially built upon this assessment. The unconcealment which is “experienced for the first time” in the question what are beings? is originary truth: ὀρθονήθεια. The “open region”[Offene] is the Lichtung -- and it is indeed our Lichtung.

This appeal to the Lichtung as ours is made already in Sein und Zeit -- or, more precisely, in that stratum of Sein und Zeit which acknowledges a radical Being-with as Being-for-the-sake-of-others and which recognizes the importance of a shared Lichtung for the very possibility of fundamental ontology.2 As I have shown, however (chapter 2), this stratum of Sein und Zeit stands in sharp opposition to another; the need for a shared Being-in is contested by the need to radically separate my relation to my ownmost Being and my relation to the Other’s Being. It is only because Heidegger circumvents this tension that he is able, in §74 of Sein und Zeit, to articulate an authentic community which shares a common Lichtung; and it is only in terms of this ultimately unjustified appeal to community and to our Lichtung that the Heidegger of “On the Essence of Truth” can refer assuredly to a shared “Offene”.

At work here is the quasi-transcendental3 move from the ontico-existentiell “We” to the “time/truth” that it presupposes. And once again, Heidegger fails to dwell on the reciprocal

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2See my chapter 2.
3See previous chapter.
implication: that this articulation of truth, as origin [Anfang] of the We, is itself arrived at only by way of the We which it presumably grounds, the We from which our questioning begins [beginnt]. Thus, in terms of the path which thinking follows, the articulation of truth as ἀνθρωπός is contingent upon and determined by the We as its point of departure -- a We which is itself never questioned rigorously.

Granted, the We of “On the Essence of Truth” is at least presented differently than the We of Sein und Zeit -- particularly when viewed in terms of its participation in questioning. The former We, though it certainly requires our explicit participation in an already tacitly shared heritage, including a tacit comprehension of Being, is not contingent in any way upon a shared pursuit of the question of Being (recall that the explicit function of questioning in Sein und Zeit is always pursuit [cf. my chapter 3]). In “On the Essence of Truth,” however, the primordial opening (truth) of beings as a whole -- and likewise the opening-up of the realm of history, of the We -- happens when Dasein engages the question concerning beings as such. Here, questioning itself is a crucial component of the Lichtung’s self-opening and thus of the We’s possibility. To be sure, Heidegger does not mean to suggest that historical man “accomplishes” this Lichtung, for neither the “time” spoken of here nor questioning as such are, strictly speaking, at man’s disposal. Indeed, just as Sein und Zeit introduces a Being-possible prior to and necessary for all existentiell possibilities, “On the Essence of Truth” introduces an originary freedom prior to and necessary for what is at our disposal:

Man does not “possess” freedom as a property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Dasein, possesses man -- so originally that only it secures for humanity that distinctive relatedness to being as a whole as such which first founds all history (ibid., 190/129).

Nevertheless, man, represented and led by the thinker, can participate and has participated in what this “time” accomplishes -- indeed, such that the accomplishment itself happens through man. We are free to be historically because we stand in a unique relation to the Lichtung itself; and it is precisely through our (existentiell) participation in the disclosive questioning of beings as a whole that the Lichtung opens itself and holds itself open.

Likewise, in “On the Essence of Truth” it is through this participation in questioning -- an always prior participation which determines our very essence -- that we come to stand, precisely as a we, in relation to the originary (non)essence of truth: though everyday Dasein is little concerned

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4 In the language of Sein und Zeit, the origin is the Lichtung itself -- that meaning [Sinn] which is always already tacitly “there” --, whereas the beginning is that factual tissue of interpretation [Auslegung] from which questioning must take its departure if it is to move towards an engagement with the origin. Cf. Hölderlin’s Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und ‘der Rhein’, §1. on the Beginn/Anfang distinction: “The beginning [Beginn] is that with which something begins [anhebt]; the origin [Anfang] is that out of which something springs forth” (3).
about the “essence of truth” inasmuch as it is always this or that “true being” which is at issue, such ek-sistent turning away from the essence of truth — which is simultaneously an insistent turning towards ‘true things’ (ibid. 195ff./134ff.) — is possible only because we already dwell in irreducible, though most often hidden, relation to the mystery [Geheimnis], to that self-concealment which is most question-worthy. And indeed, this groundless “ground” of non-essence contains within it an other possibility for us — that of “not being led astray” (ibid., 197/136), of explicitly acknowledging the mystery in its unavailability: λῆθη itself as the inaccessible, the self-concealing (ibid., 197ff./136ff.). As Heidegger emphasizes, this is a possibility available to us even in our most dispersed errancy; and indeed, we can pursue this possibility only if we come to terms with the inescapability of our errant dispersal. It is, in short, the possibility of participation, of thoughtfully engaging the question of the Being of beings (ibid., 198/137) — the unmasterable question wherein we always already reside.

As one might expect from my reading of Sein und Zeit’s “transcendental methodology,” I maintain that these implications for the We (i.e., that our questioning participates in the Lichtung’s self-opening and that we stand in relation to λῆθη), implications made explicit for the first time in “On the Essence of Truth,” are not as radical a departure from Sein und Zeit as might first appear. In fact, they follow directly from a reading of Sein und Zeit which acknowledges the transitional character of its questioning. But this continuity has its own significance, for it is precisely by tracing Heidegger’s subsequent articulation of what had lain dormant in Sein und Zeit that we can see how the neutralization of the question of community is not left behind in his thinking but continues to be preserved within it.

And yet, there is another shift which takes place in “On the Essence of Truth,” one which does not merely unpack what had been contained in Sein und Zeit; namely: that λῆθη which, in Sein und Zeit, appears to have the character of a self-withholding (i.e., meaning) begins to transform, showing itself as a self-withdrawal; there is a shift in how the “unthought” is understood, a shift from στάσις to κίνησις.

This στάσις corresponds to what I referred to in the previous segment as the inadequacy of fundamental ontology: Heidegger’s outline of the task of thinking (Sein und Zeit, §§5-8) adheres all too “irresolutely” to the static meaning/interpretation [Sinn Auslegung] schema — a schema which would indeed be adequate if meaning simply withheld itself from interpretation and maintained itself in this self-withholding. However, there is a κίνησις proper to meaning itself, as Heidegger first begins to acknowledge in “On the Essence of Truth”: 
1. "...[Truth] is disclosure of beings through which an openness [Offenheit] essentially unfolds [wird]" (W, 190/OET, 129). This "wird" is the pivotal point of the lecture, for through it Heidegger is not saying, in the manner of Sein und Zeit, that entities emerge forth into presence within an already open Lichtung; he is saying, rather, that truth — the Lichtung itself — emerges forth in the self-concealing unfolding of unconcealment (i.e., the Lichtung unfolds such that within it entities can be discovered in their truth — but the unfolding itself withdraws from the scene). Here, essence [Wesen] first begins to be thought in the verbal sense, as essence-ing; transforming the most "fundamental ground" from στάσις to κίνησις.5

2. As the following passage suggests, this kinetic δ-νηθεία demands of philosophical thinking a provisionality which is still, to be sure, an interruptive resistance to every philosophical "project" (i.e., interruption as resolute repetition [cf. my chapter 2]), but which is also an openness to what comes to us through the movement of unconcealment/self-concealment:

Philosophical thinking is gentle releasement [die Gelassenheit der Milde] that does not renounce the concealment of being as a whole. Philosophical thinking is especially the stern and resolute openness [die Ent-schlossenheit der Sirene] that does not disrupt the concealing but entreats [nötigt] its unbroken essence [Wesen] into the open region of understanding and thus into its own truth (W, 199/OET, 138).

While this passage seems to parallel the "lassen zeigen" of Sein und Zeit's hermeneutic phenomenology (or at least my reading of it in the previous segment), there is a crucial difference: what philosophical thinking engages is no longer the self-concealed but the self-concealing; the unbroken essence [Wesen] which it "entreats" is, once again, to be understood verbally, as an essence-ing. The task of thinking is thus not simply to trace the movement of interpretation in order to let what resists this movement "show itself" in its self-concealment; it is rather that releasement [Gelassenheit] which becomes attuned to the movement of self-concealing, thereby allowing the Lichtung — δ-νηθεία itself — to rise forth through the withdrawal of νηθησις and unfold into the openness of its own truth. In short, thinking is a response to a movement which has always already taken place; yet, at the same time, thinking (as resolute questioning) is needed by this movement, for δ-νηθεία happens through man's thoughtful questioning (W, 189-90/OET, 128-9).6

As Heidegger summarizes in the epilogue added several years after the lecture, thinking must experience the essence of truth as the truth of essence. That is to say, thoughtfully engaging the essence of truth requires that "essence" itself be thought back to its truth; and, in such thinking back

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5 On this verbal essence-ing, see VA, 34ff./QCT, 311ff.

6 On this verbal essence-ing, see VA, 34ff./QCT, 311ff.
which is no mere representation -- both essence and truth are transformed: 

which reveals its rootedness in \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \), and ultimately in originary \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \) (a transformation already present in \( \text{Sein und Zeit} \)), and essence as \( \text{quidditas} \) reveals its rootedness in \( \text{wesen} \), in verbal essence-\( \text{ing} \) (a transformation not yet found in \( \text{Sein und Zeit} \)). The question for us, of course, is what relevance this transformation has for the \( \text{We} \) and vice versa.

According to the logic of \( \text{Sein und Zeit} \), participation in fundamental questioning is underway [\( \text{unterwegs} \)] inasmuch as thinking -- as interruptive -- must strategically trace back through sedimented interpretations in order to acknowledge self-withholding \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \). In “On the Essence of Truth,” Heidegger begins to understand our path otherwise: because \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \) is now self-withdrawing \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \), the path of thought is the “wake” or “trace” of this absolutely Other movement, a wake which our thinking is compelled to follow and which is locatable in the question of Being. This is not a case of a different “representation” of the path, for the transformation which occurs here is not a matter of representation; rather, it happens through the “saying of a turning \( \text{[Kehre]} \)”(\( \text{W}, \text{201/OET, 140} \)), a saying which is not an assertion but the beginning of a transformation in questioning as such (ibid., 202/141).

This transformation of the pathway resituates the \( \text{We} \), altering what the \( \text{We} \) must listen to and respond to -- as well as how such listening and responding are to be understood. Nevertheless, the overall character of the \( \text{We} \) remains the same as in \( \text{Sein und Zeit} \): as a receptive-responsive entity, the authentic \( \text{We} \) which articulates and communicates the question of Being appears to maintain itself in “our” \( \text{Lichtung} \) (in “our” \( \text{Dasein} \) only because the question of community -- the question of “\( \text{We-ness} \)” -- has been avoided, the \( \text{We} \) being grounded upon the self-possessed \( \text{I} \).

And while this transformation leaves the \( \text{We} \) of \( \text{Sein und Zeit} \) intact, unquestioned, this \( \text{We} \) is itself absolutely essential for this transformation: factically, “our” thinking can engage the essence of man (and of “Western history”) only if it has already passed back through the \( \text{l-We} \) aporia of transcendental subjectivity; for only if the tension between my \( \text{Lichtung} \) and our \( \text{Lichtung} \) is somehow “overcome” can \( \text{Dasein} \) be thought as the essential ground of historical man and self-withdrawing \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \) be thought as the abyss \( \text{[Abgrund]} \) of this historical truth.

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\( ^6 \)Thus Heidegger’s transformation, a few years later, of Aristotle’s definition of man: “\( \phi \sigma\epsilon \tau \zeta = \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \zeta \gamma \tau \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \nu \xi \omicron \omicron \nu \)\ radiation, overpowering appearing, necessitates the gathering which pervades and grounds being-human”(\( \text{EM, 184/IM, 175} \)).

\( ^7 \)On this “transformative saying,” see \( \text{Beiträge zur Philosophie, 441} \).

\( ^8 \)As Heidegger says in \( \text{Beiträge zur Philosophie:} \) “The eventual task -- for a thinker still to come -- is to have forgotten the previous type of questioning about Being as being-\( \text{ness} \). This forgetting is no mere ‘shedding’ but a transformation in an originary stand of questioning”(\( \text{278} \)).
In summary then: the relation between self-concealing \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \) and path, a relation which remains the crux of Heidegger's thinking from "On the Essence of Truth" onwards, is available to thought only through the neutralization of the question of community.
5. Tέχνη and the Question “Who are We?”

As Lacoue-Labarthe rightly points out in *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, τέχνη -- that communal bond translated in the *Rektoratsrede* as “Wissenschaft” -- undergoes a displacement after 1933: τέχνη refers no longer to “science” but to “art,” and consequently, the “community [Gemeinschaft] of researchers, teachers and students” referred to in “What is Metaphysics?”(W, 103/WM, 96) gives way to the community of artistic creators and preservers (H, 54-5/OWA, 66-7). This displacement opens up the brief period along Heidegger’s path of thinking where Gemeinschaft (and Gemeinwesen) receives its most explicit treatment.

In this chapter, I will argue that, significant differences aside, the focal concern for Heidegger is the same in 1930, 1933 and afterwards: the communal Lichtung, the shared essence of truth. The shift from science to art signals no radical rethinking of what the We is (throughout, the Gemeinschaftsfrage remains unasked), though it certainly resituates the locus of truth, and thus of community, transforming the way the We relates to the Seinsfrage.

In the following three sub-sections, we will consider how this same We -- albeit, with some variation -- functions in both τέχνη as science and τέχνη as art. Section 1 will clarify the self-assertive nature of this We; section 2 will highlight the differential character of this self-assertion; and section 3 will trace the transformation undergone by the We’s essence in the shift from science to art.

1. Our “Self-assertion”

Throughout the course of Heidegger’s thinking in the 30’s, τέχνη -- whether it be approached through “science” or “art” -- involves a “self-assertion”[Selbstbehauptung], yet one which paradoxically has a participatory and receptive relation to the arrival of the Lichtung. Which is to say, this self-assertion somehow involves a participatory-receptive We. Thus, it maintains continuity with the notion of “freedom” as first developed in “On the Essence of Truth”: not a freedom which we possess but one which possesses us.

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1Fragment 123. Heidegger’s translation: “Sein (aufgehendes Erscheinen) neigt in sich zum Sichverbergen”[Being (emerging appearing) inclines intrinsically to self-concealment](EM, 122/IM, 114).
a. \( \tau \chi \nu \eta \) as “Science”

In his exhortative 1933 Rektoratsrede, Heidegger does not merely describe but exalts “science” [\( \text{Wissenschaf} \)] understood as \( \tau \chi \nu \eta \) (SB, 11/SA, 472), referring to it as the “fundamental happening” of a community:

Science is the questioning holding of one’s ground [\( \text{Standhalten} \)] in the midst of the ever self-concealing totality of what is. This active perseverance [\( \text{Ausharren} \)] knows, as it perseveres, about its impotence [\( \text{Unkraft} \)] before fate...Only if we resolutely [\( \text{entschlossen} \)] submit to this distant command [\( \text{femem Verfügung} \)] to recapture the greatness of the beginning, will science become the innermost necessity of our Dasein. Otherwise it remains an accident we fall into or the settled comfort of a safe occupation, serving to further a mere progress of information...But if we submit to the distant command of the beginning, science must become the fundamental happening [\( \text{Grundgeschehnis} \)] of our spiritual Dasein as part of a people [\( \text{unseres geist-volklichen Daseins} \)] (ibid., 12-3/473-4).

In this depiction of science, Heidegger is articulating that “self assertion” whereby we will our essence and thus become who we are (9/470) -- the “we” in question here being that of the German university.

Given the historical context and Heidegger’s explicit political commitments at the time, the language and the tone are disturbing, to say the least. It is difficult to hear the references to “holding one’s ground,” resolute submission to the “distant command,” and the “recapture of the greatness of the beginning” without interpreting this as -- at worst -- Nazi rhetoric pure and simple\(^2\) or -- at best -- an exhortation towards willful, communal self-actualization. In either case, the \( \tau \chi \nu \eta \) at issue seems to be one through which the German people, united in their relation to science, will themselves (9-10/470-1; 19/480) by taking hold of and affirming their own finitude.\(^3\) As Miguel de Beistegui argues in *Heidegger and the Political*:

> What is most striking about this self-assertion is that its mode of positing is that of the will, as if assertion itself were necessarily of the will. Specifically, the very term “self-assertion” is one that belongs to the metaphysics of the will, that metaphysics that Heidegger will precisely confront and submit to the most rigorous questioning starting in 1935...The voluntarism that seems so overwhelmingly present in the address, and that seems to echo and amplify the willful rhetoric of National Socialism is a metaphysical overdetermination that can be traced back to the very origins of modernity, a tendency which remains unquestioned and unproblematicized in the address (44-5).

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\(^2\)There is, indeed, much that is questionable in the essay: the necessity that the German people will its essence by submitting to its “unyielding spiritual mission” (9/470); the reference to the *spiritual world* of a people as the power which “most deeply preserves the people’s strengths, which are tied to earth and blood” (14/474-5); the need for community to model itself as a “battle community” (18/479).

\(^3\)The “impotence before fate” (12/473) of which Heidegger speaks appears to be a loss which Heidegger exhorts the German community to appropriate as their own. The echo of German idealism is unmistakable: for instance: “...the German student body...places itself under the law of its own essence and in this way for the first time determines that essence. To give the law to oneself is the highest freedom” (15/475).
The resonances of the Rektoratsrede with Nazi rhetoric is certainly there, as has often been pointed out. Heidegger was, to be sure, not unaware of this. And yet, we must resist drawing premature conclusions; for, as I will argue, there are other resonances in this text as well, resonances which render problematic the claim that this text is rooted uncritically in a “metaphysics of the will.” Such resonances must be underscored if the τέχνη and the We of the Rektoratsrede are to be understood.

A quick point of clarification: my remarks in this section are not intended to defend the Rektoratsrede. I maintain that Heidegger’s political commitments — of which the Rektoratsrede is certainly an example — were unjustifiable. The function of these remarks, rather, is to acknowledge the complex relation between this address and Heidegger’s most rigorous questioning and to acknowledge the consequent difficulty of saying, confidently and concisely, why Heidegger’s commitments are absolutely unjustifiable.

To begin with, much of the language of the address echoes the language of Sein und Zeit and “On the Essence of Truth”: the emphasis on fate [Schicksal], resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] as the submission to a call,4 unguarded exposure to the questionable.5 As my analysis in the previous sections has shown, neither of these texts are concerned with “willful self-creation” but with an ultimately receptive and responsible openness to Being. Thus, we must wonder: has Heidegger simply compromised his thinking, lending his terminology to something with which his earlier work is inconsistent? Or is another strategy at work?

Such questions bring us to a crucial point: the Rektoratsrede, in referring back to the terminology of these other texts, is also referring back to a textual strategy which is, as we have seen, one of displacement; i.e., the displacement of interpretative structures which have been handed down to us factically. Recall that the essay “On the Essence of Truth” participates, initially, in the conventional interpretations of truth and freedom, only to think back through their factically given manifestation (truth as correspondence; freedom as our possession) to their most question-worthy essence (truth as ἀληθεία, freedom as possessing us). I propose that the Rektoratsrede, in similar fashion, participates, initially, in a factically determined notion of science — the interpretation of science as “willful self-creation” (an interpretation which belonged to the Nazis.

4The call [Ruf] of Sein und Zeit is here transposed into the distant command [fernen Verfügung].
5Heidegger’s brief remarks on the question, in the Rektoratsrede, are indeed consistent with what I have already underscored about questioning in Sein und Zeit and “On the Essence of Truth”: “What was in the beginning the avowed perseverance of the Greeks in the face of what is, transforms itself then into the completely unguarded exposure to the hidden and uncertain, i.e., the questionable. Questioning is then no longer a preliminary step, to give way to the answer and thus to knowledge, but questioning becomes itself the highest form of knowing” (13/474).
but not *exclusively* to them) — only to think back\(^6\) to its question-worthy essence (τέχνη), where the notion of will, though not discarded, is turned inside out.

Specifically, in his attempt to engage the essence of science, Heidegger refers to a line from Aeschylus’ *Prometheus*:

\[ \text{τέχνη δ' ἄναγκης ἀδελφεστέρα μακρό (Prom. 514 ed. Wil.)} \]

“Knowing [Wissen], however, is far weaker than necessity.”\(^7\) This is to say: all knowing about things has already been delivered up to overpowering fate and fails before it. Just because of this, knowing must develop its highest defiance: called forth by such defiance, all the power of the hiddenness of what is must first arise for knowing really to fail. Just in this way, what is opens itself in its unfathomable inalterability and lends knowing its truth (11/472).

Here, we see that science’s relation to its own essence is its impotence in the face of “the hiddenness of what-is.” Only in science’s “highest defiance” of hiddenness — and indeed in the “failure” of this defiance — can it achieve truth. Given his emphasis on “will,” Heidegger appears here to be saying that science gains hold of itself self-assertively when it willfully appropriates the impotence of its own will, making this loss its own. Such appropriation would be closely tied to the issue of community. As I’ve indicated, the *Rektoratsrede* equates willing the essence of science with the self-willing of a community (9-10/470-1; 19/480); Heidegger confirms this as he continues: “For the Greeks science is not a ‘cultural good,’ but the innermost determining center of all that binds human being to people and state”(12/473). The above passage thus appears to suggest that the appropriation in question — both for the Greeks and for the Germans — is a people’s taking hold of itself through a grasping of its own finitude, a self-constitution through the willful appropriation of its loss.

However, Heidegger immediately qualifies his comments on Aeschylus: “Encountering this Greek saying about the creative impotence of knowing, one likes to find here all too readily the prototype of a knowing based purely on itself, while in fact such knowing has forgotten its own essence...”(11/472). Indeed, a few pages later, the strategic placement of certain terms from *Sein und Zeit* and “On the Essence of Truth” reveals how science as our self-effection gives way to science as our receptive participation in the *Lichtung*’s self-unfolding (i.e., science as τέχνη):

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\(^6\)That such a “thinking back” is at work in the *Rektoratsrede*’s treatment of science is strongly suggested on p. 12-13/473.

\(^7\)“Wissen aber ist weit unkräftiger denn Notwendigkeit.”

\(^8\)Regarding how the theme of “spirit”[Geist] functions in the *Rektoratsrede*’s relation to the rest of Heidegger’s writing, see Derrida’s *Of Spirit.*
To "will" the essence of science -- to acknowledge its groundedness in τέχνη -- is to create the spiritual world of the community. Yet Heidegger's careful choice of "Entschlossenheit" to characterize this creation shows that willing, when thought back to its essence, is radically transformed: willing in this sense involves no pursuit of a τέλος (not even in order to subordinate that τέλος to an unfettered "will to will") but is rather a holding-open which is irreducible to any determinate pursuit; open to that which, prior to all willing, holds us: Being. This openness marks precisely the point where the "will to hold oneself open" exposes itself to be just as much an "already being held open," a "will" which is somehow neither active nor passive. The "highest defiance" and "failure" of which Heidegger speaks indicate not an accomplishment of the will but a radicalized relation to its essence wherein willing itself must be thought otherwise.

To be sure, in this holding open we are still tied to our concrete pursuits, but we are now exposed to that which, in our very Being, withdraws from them absolutely. As I emphasized in chapter 2(3c), resoluteness in Sein und Zeit involves a gathering together -- prior to myself as willing agent -- of "my ear": I coalesce as a listening away from those existentiell pursuits in which "I" am always already dispersed; this listening away hearkens towards a call [Ruf], towards a voice which comes from beyond me, preceding me: the voice of Being. In Sein und Zeit, it is I who coalesces in response to this prior call; in the Rektoratsrede -- after the accomplished avoidance of the Gemeinschaftsfrauge -- it is the We which coalesces, not my but our ear which hearkens to the "distant command" [Vernen Verfügung].

The resonance of this passage with "On the Essence of Truth" helps clarify further how τέχνη is to be thought as this holding open. As Heidegger shows in 1930, we cannot but dwell in questioning -- and thus, in the Seinsfrage. The 1933 "will to the essence of science" is -- as the "questioning, unguarded holding of one's ground" -- one mode of such dwelling, a mode whereby the essence of Being, constitutive of us, resonates through us. Essence [Wesen] here retains the verbal sense underscored already in 1930: by hearkening to Being's very self-unfolding, we let ηθεια emerge forth from ηθη and thus we experience and acknowledge what is most questionable. The community is not so much the maker of its world as it is its active recipient, participant in its self-emergence: the world worlds through us.

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9 Compare Heidegger's remarks on the will in H, 55/OWA, 67-8.
10 In truth, the active-passive schema cannot account for Being's resonance through us: for Being is not a being and thus can have neither an active nor a passive relation to us. The acknowledgment of this is precisely what is at stake in Heidegger's repeated use of the double genitive (e.g., "the setting into work of truth" [H, 65/OWA, 77].
In sum, then: if the appearance, in the Rektoratsrede, of certain central terms from Sein und Zeit and “On the Essence of Truth” is in some sense a compromise on Heidegger’s part, this is not due to his inserting his terminology into a metaphysics of the will. Rather, such terms function as guiding markers, points of reference along the path back from science as willful self-creation to science as \( \text{Sein} \).\n
In chapters 2 and 4 I traced the trajectory of the “We” in Heidegger’s thinking from Sein und Zeit to “On the Essence of Truth.” We see now that the Gemeinschaft which emerges in 1933 continues rather than interrupts this trajectory.\(^{11}\) Granted, the university community of “teachers, researchers and students” mentioned briefly in 1929\(^{12}\) is not articulated as pivotal for the overall German community nor even as specifically German — both of which would be the case in 1933. Nevertheless, the emphasis, in §74 of Sein und Zeit, that community happens only through a shared, destinal [geschicklich] relation to determinate, factico-historical possibilities allows us to see how the university community for the Heidegger of 1929 was never resistant to the possibility of a specifically German determination: a community whose task was to explicitly hand itself down to itself (cf. SZ, 385-6) as a self-questioning German institution.

It is clear in any case that Heidegger, in explicitly taking on the spiritual leadership [geistigen Führung] of the German university community in 1933, attempts to “awaken” an authentic We in the opening paragraph of the Rektoratsrede — indeed, in an exhortative manner already suggested in Sein und Zeit.\(^{13}\)

b. \( \text{Sein} \) as “Art”

Already in 1933, as we have just seen, an important concern for Heidegger is to find a pathway in contemporary language whereby he can respond to the Unthought which conceals itself in \( \text{Sein} \).\n
He engages the terms “knowledge”[Wissen] and “science”[Wissenschaft], hoping they will assist him in this response. Soon after 1933, however, he begins to realize that \( \text{Sein} \), approached in this way, brings us to a dead-end: “science” no longer offers possibilities for thought; it does not

\(^{11}\)Lacoue-Labarthe, for one, recognizes this: “It is not...necessary to say, as Löwith does, that between 1927 and 1933 Heidegger inflected the ontology of Gemeinschaft or that he ‘translated’ the je eigenes Dasein as deutsches Dasein. At best, he made that translation explicit: Gemeinwesen was always for Heidegger that of a people, and his analysis of historicity has no meaning if it is not seen against this horizon”(Heidegger, Art and Politics, 108).

\(^{12}\)W, 103/WM, 96. Heidegger would later say to Karl Löwith that “his concept of ‘historicity’ [worked out in §74 of Sein und Zeit] was the basis for his political engagement”(Karl Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933, 57.).

\(^{13}\)Sein und Zeit, 122; Cf. my remarks in ch. 2, §3b.
disclose the way the Lichtung is "brought forth" by Dasein, essence-ing through us. As he puts it several years later:

...[T]he case of the rectorate 1933/34 would seem to be a sign of the metaphysical state of the essence of science. A science that can no longer be influenced by attempts at its renewal, nor delayed in its essential transformation into pure technology. This I came to realize only in the following years... (SB, 39/SA, 497-8).

Heidegger is not implying here that viewing τέχνη as science is simply an "error," a fall from what is true. After 1933 he continues to acknowledge that truth does indeed happen through science. As he eventually puts it, science adheres to that very mode of "revealing the true" which shapes our epoch: the mode of challenging forth [herausfordern] (VA, 18/QCT, 296). This mode of truth brings forth what is concealed into un/concealment by setting upon nature (φιλοσοφία), extracting the true from what is hidden (ibid.). This relation to the true thus determines the hidden as "standing reserve" [Bestand], as that which is "on call for a further ordering." (ibid., 20/298). The reason science no longer offers possibilities for thinking is that the mode of truth to which it submits -- herausfordern -- conceals the essence of truth, i.e., because science determines all bringing forth as willful challenging forth, it is incapable of acknowledging that all bringing forth, challenging forth included, is ultimately grounded in the grant of ληθή: that emerging forth from concealment into un/concealment in which we can (and must) participate receptively but which we cannot control (ibid., 31ff./309ff.). In order to discover τέχνη's relation to this primordial essence-ing of truth, it is thus necessary to find another echo of this Greek term in contemporary language, an echo which still offers possibilities for thinking.

After 1933, Heidegger attempts to approach τέχνη along a different trajectory. The language of "self-assertion" and "will" is maintained but has shifted to art rather than science. Artistic creation [Schaffen] -- which modern subjectivism interprets today, according to Heidegger, "as the self-sovereign subject's performance of genius" (H, 63-4/OWA, 76), as willful self-expression -- is traced back to its rootedness in τέχνη and is rethought as submission to the arrival of truth, as allowing truth to "happen." In "Origin of the Work of Art" (1936), Heidegger explicitly questions the conventional view that creation is "the self-sovereign subject's performance of genius" (63-4/76) or, more specifically, a "making" [machen] whereby a form [έιδος] is imprinted upon some pre-given matter [τάλην] (14-15/29-30). Moreover, Heidegger questions this view in a way which repeats, more explicitly, his attempt in the Rektoratsrede to displace the sense of the term "creation":

\[14\text{Cf. H, 35, 55/OWA, 49, 67.}\]
We think of creation [Schaffen] as a bringing forth [Hervorbringen]... However usual and convincing the reference may be to the Greek practice of naming craft and art [two modes of “bringing forth”] by the same name, τεχνη, it nevertheless remains oblique and superficial; for τεχνη signifies neither craft nor art, and not all the technical in our present-day sense...[τεχνη] never signifies the action of making [Machen](H45-7/OWA, 58-9).

He goes on to explain, as he had already in 1933, that “creation,” understood through τεχνη, is a mode of knowing [Wissen] and that for Greek thinking the essence of knowing consists in ἀλήθεια, the uncovering [Entberfung] of beings (ibid.): “Τεχνη, as knowledge experienced in the Greek manner, is a bringing forth of beings in that it brings forth present beings as such beings out of concealedness and specifically into the unconcealedness of their appearance”(ibid.).

For Heidegger, artistic creation possesses -- just as science had possessed in 1933 -- a singular significance amongst all modes of τεχνη, for it does not merely bring forth a present being into unconcealedness (though it does this as well); it brings forth truth itself -- the very openness of the Open -- through what Heidegger calls truth’s establishing itself in the work:

The establishing of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being such as never was before and will never come to be again. The bringing forth places this being in the Open in such a way that what is to be brought forth first clears the openness of the Open into which it comes forth. Where this bringing forth expressly brings the openness of beings, or truth, that which is brought forth is a work. Creation is such a bringing forth. As such a bringing, it is rather a receiving [Empfangen] and an incorporating [Entnehmen] of a relation to unconcealedness (ibid.).

Truth happens through the artwork and in doing so “uses” the artist, whose role, as Heidegger says here, is not to actively make but to receive and incorporate truth. Just as the thinker, in “On the Essence of Truth” -- and presumably the “scientist” in the Rektoratsrede -- had submitted to the essence of truth, it is now the artist who takes on such submission in the process of “creating” the artwork. Moreover, Heidegger considers the most originary mode of artistic expression to be poetry broadly construed, for only poetic saying (as opposed to the assertoric discourse of science) “[names] beings for the first time, first [bringing] beings to word and to appearance. Only this naming nominates beings to their being from out of their being. Such saying is a projecting of the Lichtung...”(61/73).

Here, as in 1933, the happening of truth cannot be thought independently of the We: just as the thinker/scientist, as truth’s δημιουργος, had been responsible for creating our communal-spiritual world, it is now the artist who transmits our unconcealment to us:

The poetic projection of truth that sets itself into work as figure [Gestalt] is...never carried out in the direction of an indeterminate void. Rather, in the work, truth is thrown toward the coming preservers, that is, toward an historical group of men (ibid., 63/75).

And a bit further on:
Whenever art happens [geschicht] — that is, whenever there is a beginning [Anfang] — a thrust enters history, history either begins or starts over again. History means here not a sequence in time of events of whatever sort, however important. History is the transporting of a people into its appointed task [Aufgegebenes] as entrance into that people’s endowment [Mitgegebenes](ibid., 65/77).

These passages require some explication. Heidegger claims here that the community’s relation to truth hangs upon its being a historical group who somehow preserve what opens up via the artwork. To begin with, this does not mean that truth is first set to work in the artwork and then, subsequently, we find our role in preserving what has already been established “in the past.” On the contrary, preservation does not somehow “come after” the original truth; it is truth’s very perdurance, its holding (itself) open. As Heidegger says: “[The founding of truth]...is actual only in preserving”(63/75). To be sure, there is an obvious sense in which the artwork is already there “in time” prior to our comportment towards it. But to think in this manner is to misunderstand the most basic ontologico-temporal significance of the artwork. For Heidegger, the work is a kind of “beginning” [Anfang], but “[a] genuine beginning, as a leap, is always a head start, in which everything to come is already leaped over, even if as something disguised. The beginning already contains the end latent within itself”(64/76). The “beginning” of which Heidegger speaks here is an archi-beginning, prior to and necessary for the beginning-end schema used to calculate temporal succession. Indeed, just as Heidegger had suggested in the 1930 essay (cf. W, 189-90/OET, 128-9), the event of truth does not arrive “in time” but is the very opening up of time wherein all beings obtain their duration.

It is in terms of this beginning, this ontologico-temporal opening, that the community’s preservative role must be understood. Specifically, the reception and incorporation of truth which happens in the artwork requires that truth resonate in that which receives it; and the site of this resonance is in each case “We.” Truth could not “be” without the We which receives and incorporates it; indeed, truth needs us:

Art, as the setting-into-work of truth, is poetry. Not only the creation of the work is poetic, but equally poetic, though in its own way, is the preserving of the work: for a work is in actual effect as a work only when we remove ourselves from our commonplace routine and move into what is disclosed by the work, so as to bring our own nature itself to take a stand in the truth of what is (OWA, 74-5).

The originary poetic saying of world and earth, wherein truth is set to work, needs to leave its trace throughout that language which “preserves the original nature of poetry”(62/74) and indeed is this preserving resonance: our language. Community dwells in this prior opening precisely by maintaining it as an opening, preserving the echo of that originary poetic saying which first named beings in their Being. This dwelling, for its part, is “historical” not only because the poetic beginning offers communal preservation a starting point in relation to which it can measure itself
temporally; but also because it grants community the very "time" in which its preservative saying can unfold.

Shifting attention back to our general problematic, then, the crucial point to keep in mind where the We is concerned is that in 1936 -- just as in 1933 -- the submission, via τεχνη, to the Wesen of Being is the submission to the arrival of our Lichtung. This submission develops hand in hand with the continued avoidance of what this "our-ness" might mean (i.e., the continued avoidance of the Gemeinschaftsfrage). Indeed, "The Origin of the Work of Art" repeats -- once more -- what I have argued to be the gratuitous and explicit subordination of the question of community to the question of Being in 1928. Recall Heidegger's words in Sein und Zeit:

We must 'make' the presupposition of truth because it is one that has been 'made' already with the Being of the 'we'(228).\(^{16}\)

And now, eight years later:

But it is not we who presuppose the unconcealedness of beings; rather, the unconcealedness of beings (Being) puts us into such a condition of being that in our representation we always remain installed within and in attendance upon unconcealedness (H, 39/OWA, 52).

2. Our Пόλεμος

In 1933, an aspect of the "We" which had only been hinted at in Sein und Zeit\(^{17}\) is now addressed more explicitly: the historical-spiritual mission into which we are thrown -- and in relation to which we first emerge -- is not a homogenous one, but is distributed to us differentially. We are assigned to take part in a communal struggle [Kampf] with one another -- our roles within this struggle having been distributed in advance. Thus, though resolute self-assertion is, first and foremost, a taking-up of the mission assigned by Being, we submit precisely by asserting ourselves in our differential task, i.e., by struggling against the opposing elements of the community in a mutual striving (18-19/479).\(^{18}\) It is through this kinetic strife, ever resistant to stasis, that world unfolds.

We see then that the task of science -- located factico-historically as the task of questioning proper to the institution of the German university -- stands in an essential relationship to the other

\(^{15}\) See my reading of "On the Essence of Truth" in chapter 4.

\(^{16}\) See my chapter 2, section 4.

\(^{17}\) Specifically, in Sein und Zeit Heidegger attributes to das Man the leveling down of singularity, of all rank and order (127). In 1933, he strives to recall such "rank and order" in the way our historical mission is "distributed" to us.
essential tasks of the German people;\textsuperscript{19} and even within the “scientific community” the task is differentiated, teachers and students standing in the essential and reciprocally challenging relation of leaders to followers. Each of these tasks, in the way it stands over and against other such tasks, is oriented in its own resolute way towards Being.

It is clear, however, that for Heidegger the task of the university is privileged: just as teachers must function as leaders in the context of the university’s self-questioning relation to its own essence, likewise the university community must function as leader in the context of the German people’s self-questioning relation to its own essence. It is the university community which Heidegger exhorts towards self-assertion, towards creative leadership (i.e., a directedness towards the essence of science -- receptive τέχνη -- whereby world is brought forth [14/474-5]). To be sure, “leadership” in Heidegger’s sense is itself a kind of following inasmuch as it obeys the “spiritual mission” of the people (9/470). And the leadership of the university does not stand by itself; it needs and is bound by that which stands opposed to it: the task of the rest of the German community to follow, to receive the world brought forth via science. Nevertheless, a certain hierarchical structure (reminiscent, at least in certain respects, of Fichte’s “Deductive Plan”) is evident enough in this articulation of community and of the university’s role within it.

Heidegger would be quick to defend the “ranking” inherent in this differential assignment by pointing out that those elements of the deutschen Gemeinschaft which follow the leadership of the university do not do so in blind obedience, but rather participate “self-assertively” in this relationship of reciprocal challenge (18/478-9). Likewise, he would dismiss charges that his notion of Gemeinschaft is an endorsement of “violent confrontation” ordinarily understood. As he emphasizes several years later in discussing his Rektoratsrede,\textsuperscript{20} the Kampf used to characterize the relations within the university community (and ultimately within the German community as a whole) was never a reference to “war”[Krieg] but to πόλεμος as evoked in Heraclitus’ 53rd fragment.\textsuperscript{21} a πόλεμος the ultimate meaning of which — on Heidegger’s reading — lies in δείκνυσι (to show) and in ποιεῖ (to bring forth). Here, Heidegger is not interested in any particular relation between opponents; he is interested, rather, in the differential “between” itself

\textsuperscript{18} Compare my remarks in chapter 2(3g) on the “struggle” operative in the historicity of Sein und Zeit (384). Here, as there, our struggle with one another is rooted in the struggle with our heritage.

\textsuperscript{19} Compare Heidegger’s characterization of the πόλεις two years later in An Introduction to Metaphysics.

\textsuperscript{20} SB, 28-9/SA, 488-9.

\textsuperscript{21} The passage to which Heidegger refers: πόλεμος πάντων μεν πατρί ἐστιν, πάντων δὲ βασιλείας, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἐδείξε τοὺς δὲ ἄνθρωπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐπίτρεπε τοὺς δὲ εἶδοφθοὺς. Heidegger translates this as: “Conflict is for all (that is present) the creator that causes to emerge, but (also) for all the dominant preserver. For it makes some to appear as gods, others as men: it creates (shows) some as slaves, others as freemen” (EM, 66/IM, 62)
which precedes and makes possible every opposition. We might best understand this appeal to Kampf and πόλεμος if we recall Heidegger’s brief remark, in 1927, concerning the Lichtung as a kind of originary “between” (SZ, 132): the archi-event of truth is a differential setting-apart, a clearing which allows entities to show themselves in their opposition to each other and yet which has always already “receded between” the different beings which are brought forth — a self-concealing difference. Indeed, just two years after the Rektoratsrede — and thus after the realignment of τέχνη — Heidegger writes:

The πόλεμος named [by Heraclitus] is a conflict [Aus-einandersetzung] that prevailed prior to everything divine and human, not a war [Krieg] in the human sense. This conflict...first caused the realm of being to separate into opposites: it first gave rise to position and order and rank. In such separation cleavages, intervals, distances, and joints opened. In the conflict a world comes into being...The struggle meant here is the original struggle, for it gives rise to the contenders as such: it is not a mere assault on something already there. It is this conflict that first projects and develops what had hitherto been unheard of, unsaid and unthought. The battle is then sustained by the creators, poets, thinkers, statesmen (EM, 66/IM, 62).

Later in this lecture, in his reading of Sophocles’ Antigone, Heidegger claims that the Greeks understood the site [Orr] of this differential setting-apart to be the πόλις. This term. most often translated inadequately as “city” or “city-state,” means

the place, the there [do], wherein and as which historical being-there is. The πόλις is the historical place, the there in which, out of which, and for which history happens. To this place and scene of history belong the gods, the temples, the priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler, the council of elders, the assembly of people, the army and the fleet (EM, 161/IM, 152).

Here, Heidegger is not equating πόλις and ontico-existentiell community (the determinate We). He is not saying that, wherever these different elements come to be and relate to each other, there arises πόλις and thus history. On the contrary, the πόλις comes first (not first in time, but first as the self-opening of time itself) as the differential site, the “between” itself: the emergence and interrelatedness of the various communal tasks happens through the unfolding of originary difference, of the Lichtung’s rift, the “crossing-point” [Kreuzungsstelle] (ibid.) which sets apart and first allows “this” to emerge in its distinction from “that.” Community is, in each instance, gathered about a breach, one which opens up through our very Being:

...the Da-sein of the historical man is the breach [die Bresche] through which the being embodied in the essent can open. As such it is an in-cident [Zwischen-fall], the incident in which suddenly the unbound powers of being come forth and are accomplished as history (EM, 172/IM, 164).

This is why the “creators,” though situated at a privileged site within the πόλις, are simultaneously ἄπολις (without πόλις): they must stand in relation to the breach itself, which is without order or
rank and thus utterly unheimlich, in order to "create" order and rank (i.e., bring them forth from \( \lambda \eta \) into \( \alpha \lambda \eta \) through which the determinate We unfolds.

Granted, this articulation of community grounded in “difference,” given the concrete community to which Heidegger belonged in 1933, is bitterly ironic. And whatever difference is acknowledged in Heidegger’s Kampf and πόλεμος is always oriented in terms of a We which is itself never questioned, always maintaining itself about a differential but ultimately locatable “center”(SB, 18/SA, 479). Nevertheless, if we are to understand how this We functions for Heidegger in the 30’s, we must acknowledge the extent to which this Kampf problematizes the identity of the We:

1. On the one hand, our specific identities within the community (who we are in our respective determinations) can be located in one or another of the various “opponents” in the overall strife constitutive of community (bodies of resistance determined as teachers, as students, etc.).

2. On the other hand, our identity “in general” (in the context of the Rectoratsrede: who we are “as Germans”) cannot itself be presented for Heidegger, for it is the strife itself: every articulable identity is rooted in a difference which has, as the between of the Kampf, always already withdrawn from presentation.

To be sure, this leads immediately to the question: what justifies such a presentation of this presumably unpresentable strife — a presentation which is specifically German, no less?

On the one hand, the logic of doubling which I articulated in chapter 3 is still at work here; which is to say: the unpresentable must present itself — albeit “inadequately” — in order that it be able to withdraw from this presentation. “[Who we ourselves are”(SB, 9/SA, 470) needs to present itself in a figure in order to withdraw from this presentation. And yet, on the other hand, there seems to be no justification for Heidegger’s locating this event of presentation-withdrawal in terms of one rigid community-figure.

Here, I would insist once again that the avoidance of the Gemeinschaftsfrage, which first emerges in Sein und Zeit, is behind this insistent but unjustified appeal to “German-ness” — an appeal which plagues what I take to be an otherwise rigorous reflection on the differential character of community. Indeed, it is no accident that, though Heidegger’s path of thinking maintains itself through the suppression of the question of community, the doubled “manifestation” of originary

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21 See my closing remarks in section 1 of chapter 7.
\[ \lambda \eta \theta \eta \] happens precisely through the We. The We – held in close proximity but never submitted to rigorous analysis – continues to function essentially for the unity of Heidegger’s path.

In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” shortly after his 1935 lectures, Heidegger articulates: a. how \( \pi \alpha \lambda \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) is constitutive of truth “as such,” and b. how “polemic truth” happens in the art-work:

a. The differential opening of this breach must be understood, first and foremost, as the \( \pi \alpha \lambda \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) between \( \varphi \alpha \kappa \theta \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) and \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \), named, in 1936, the tension between “world and earth.” This terminology is both an affirmation and re-orientation of world as explicitly treated in \( \textit{Sein und Zeit} \): it acknowledges that the determinacy of existence, of Being-in, is in each case gathered in its world; but at the same time it places this world, as the site of disclosedness \( \textit{[Erschlossenheit]} \), of \( \varphi \alpha \kappa \theta \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \), in \textit{explicit} relation to originary closure \( \textit{[Verschlossenheit]} \), to a \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \) which does not and cannot present itself.

\( ^3 \varphi \alpha \kappa \theta \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \), as world, is synonymous with the “Da,” with the \( \pi \alpha \lambda \varsigma \) as explicated in \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics}. It is

...the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being \( \textit{[Menschenwesen]} \). The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people \( \textit{[dieses geschichtlichen Volkes]} \). Only from and in this expanse does the people first return to itself for the fulfillment of its vocation \( \textit{[Bestimmung]}(\textit{H}, 28/\textit{OWA}, 42) \).

And a few pages later, the groundedness of time-space in this \( \varphi \alpha \kappa \theta \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) is made explicit:

By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits. In a world’s worlding is gathered that spaciousness out of which the protective grace \( \textit{[Huld]} \) of the gods is granted or withheld \( (31/43) \).

In contrast, \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \), as earth

shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate into it...[It] appears openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is by nature undisclosed \( \textit{[Umerschließbare]} \), that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up \( \textit{[verschlossen]} \)...The earth is essentially self-secluding \( \textit{[Sichverschließende]}(33/47) \).

World and earth do not subsist separately and then somehow come into polemic contact. They “are,” rather, only through the polemic “between” which separates them:

...the relation between world and earth does not wither away into the empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there...The more the struggle overdoes itself on its own part, the more inflexibly do the opponents let themselves go into the intimacy of simple

\[ ^{23} \text{It is important to note that though Heidegger, throughout the 30’s, repeatedly asks the question “who are we?,” the question “what is we-ness?” is never addressed.} \]
belonging to one another. The earth cannot dispense with the Open of the world....The world, again, cannot soar out of the earth's site...(35/49).

As is the case in the Rektoratsrede, “[in] essential striving...the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their essence”(ibid.). And once again, the opponents’ respective “[self-assertion] of essence...is never a rigid insistence upon some contingent state, but surrender to the concealed originality of the source of one’s own Being”(ibid.). Here, however, the opponents do not appear as complementary communal tasks but as αληθεία and λήθη themselves.

And yet, while this analysis of the breach is significantly different from that of 1933 in certain crucial respects (for instance, as I will discuss below, Heidegger’s reflections on art — more so than his reflections on science — bring him close to the essence of τεχνη and to the realization that polemic community might not be possible, here and now, for “us”), this amounts to no fundamental change of stance where πολεμος is concerned. It is not the case that in 1933 the essential breach was located in the differential structure of the community whereas in 1936 it is located elsewhere, in truth itself. Indeed, “The Origin of the Work of Art” indicates clearly that, while the most primordial struggle out of which and in terms of which all other struggles are situated reveals itself to be between λήθη and α-λήθεια, earth and world, “We” are still very much the resonant site of this a-lethieic breach (e.g., H 66/OWA, 78).

Here, the doubling logic of Sein und Zeit and the Rektoratsrede is at work once more. Originary λήθη presents itself, via “earth,” in the only way it can — as its withdrawal from itself: a. on the one hand, earth is located on one side of the breach, as that self-withdrawal which stands opposed to world; b. on the other hand, the most originary self-withdrawal is the breach itself (the between necessary for and necessarily withdrawn from every explicit opposition), which can present itself only by misrepresenting itself (i.e., as opposable).

b. In τεχνη as artistic “creation,” the art-work is brought forth as a unique being, one which allows a world to be set up [aufstellen] and the earth to be set forth [herstellen], each in tense opposition to the other. The art-work does not resolve the strife between them but allows it to remain a strife (H, 35/OWA, 49):

Truth establishes itself as strife within a being that is to be brought forth only in such a way that the conflict opens up in this being, that is, this being is itself brought into the rift-design [Riß]...Truth establishes itself in a being in such a way, indeed, that this being itself occupies the Open of truth. This occupying, however, can happen only if what is to be brought forth, the rift, entrust itself to the self-secluding factor [i.e., the earth] that juts up in the Open (ibid., 51/63).
Here, the art-work is "itself brought into the rift-design [Riß]" inasmuch as it presents this rift-design, bringing it forth in a figure [Gestalt] "fixed in place" (ibid., 57/69).

Thus far, I have stressed the consistently polemic, rissig character of τέχνη in Heidegger's thought from 1933 to 1936. This places my reading at odds in some respects with that of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, who claims in Heidegger. Art and Politics that Heidegger — in his treatment of τέχνη prior to 1955 — subordinates difference to figural identity. On the one hand, Lacoue-Labarthe thinks that it is precisely Heidegger who teaches us that

τέχνη is the deputizing function (la suppléance) demanded by the essential "criptophilia" of φαντασία or, what comes down to the same thing, of the λόγος that is constitutive of θαλάσσα[.] This is why τέχνη [μύθος] is not representation in the sense of a second, specular presentation or a reproductive, duplicative one, but representation in the full sense of the word, i.e., in the sense of making present. The difficult thing is, as ever, to think an originary secondarity — or rather to think the origin as second, as initially divided and deferred, which is to say in difference (en différence) (Heidegger, Art and Politics, 83-4).

On the other hand, however, Lacoue-Labarthe maintains that prior to 1955 Heidegger's thinking of τέχνη is plagued by an exclusion of μυθος (ibid., 85), i.e., the exclusion of an originary difference which precedes and makes possible every figure. Specifically, he claims that Heidegger subordinates the semantic chain of "tearing" or "breakage" [reiß] (Riß, Aufriß, Grundröß, Durchröß, Umröß, etc.) to that of figural "placement" [stellen] and "imprinting" [prägen] (Gestalt, Gestell, Herstellen, Darstellen, Feststellen, Prägung) (85). I will restrict myself, here, to a few summative remarks in order at least to situate myself roughly vis-à-vis his interpretation:

1. Lacoue-Labarthe claims that the τέχνη to which Heidegger — in 1933 and afterwards — exhorts the German and eventually the European community is subject to a logic of figural identity. More precisely, he thinks that Heidegger exhorts Germany to an imitatio which seeks the Greek as its model — not a model of this or that existentially determined state geared towards actualizing such a state, but a paradoxical 'model-less' model of "pure self-emergence, of...pure originality: a model of self-formation" (ibid., 79; cf. 81ff.) whereby we produce ourselves as collective subject (78). Thus, for Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger — or at least the dominant stratum of his thinking — falls prey to a dream which the philosophical tradition has engendered in German thought (ibid., 66): the "dream of the City as work of art" (ibid.). And though Lacoue-Labarthe does acknowledge that, in "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1936), the semantic chain of stellen and prägen comes into competition with that of reiß, he insists that the latter chain is ultimately subordinated to the former: despite
Heidegger's emphasis on difference, "[t]he work is, none the less, Gestalt or, in other words, figura, of the truth...") (85).

My reading of ἐπιφάνεια, as articulated thus far, calls into question these elements of Lacoue-Labarthe's interpretation. To begin with, we must question whether Heidegger actually exhorts Germany to a founding act of identification resulting in a unified collective subject. Granted, there is, as Lacoue-Labarthe suggests (ibid., 78), a great deal of tension in Sein und Zeit between Mitsein and the Gemeinschaft mentioned briefly in §74 -- a tension which, moreover, is not addressed subsequently. Still, as I showed in chapters 2 (cf. chapter 8), this does not boil down to a "confusion of Mitsein with a notion of community as substance...or even, quite simply, with an entity..."(ibid.); at issue, rather, is a confused relation between the differential "with" and singular Being-towards-death. What is more, Lacoue-Labarthe fails to discuss the strong continuity between: a) the differential notions of Kampf and πόλεμος in 1933 and b) the later notions of Bresche (1934) and Riß (1936) -- which is to say, he fails to discuss the continuous acknowledgment of difference underlying Heidegger's engagement with community. Heidegger's consistent emphasis of these terms suggests strongly that whatever unity the community has is, paradoxically, a differential unity which doesn't fit neatly under the rubric 'community as substance' or even 'community as self-identical entity' (Heidegger, Art and Politics, 78).25 As concerns "The Origin of the Work of Art," Lacoue-Labarthe fails to consider that it is precisely in the "competition" between Gestalt and reißen that everything is at stake: if, as I have argued, it is none other than the differential Riß of truth which is "set to work" in the Gestalt of 1936, then this Gestalt itself -- and the "semantic chain" linked to it -- marks no subordination of difference to figural identity but rather an "identity" already destabilized by originary difference (still a gathering into "one," to be sure, but into one difference). I propose that here, long before 1955,26 Heidegger points to precisely that "originary secondarity" or archi-supplement which Lacoue-Labarthe associates with the rigorous thinking of μιμησις (ibid., 81).

To what extent, then, can we refer to the Greeks, in the context of Heidegger's thought, as a "model" for German community? Granted, the very reference to the "Greeks" is already contingent upon a figure. And yet, does this reference necessarily reflect the hegemony of the

24 Or at least, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, up until the 1955 text. The Question of Being (Heidegger, Art and Politics, 86).

25 What is more, I have not yet discussed how, for Heidegger, community maintains its "identity" only through its differential relation to its gods (see section 3 of this chapter).

26 Cf. Heidegger, Art and Politics, 86.
figure in Heidegger’s thought?\textsuperscript{27} My suspicion is that the figure of the “Greeks” is privileged, for Heidegger, not because he sees in it the (impossible) model of auto-poiesis, but because of its radical instability. As Lacoue-Labarthe is well aware, Heidegger hears in the \( \phi\tau\sigma\iota\varsigma - \tau\varepsilon\chi\nu\eta \) relation the echo of an original secondarity at the heart of Greek “identity,” a (dis)figuration underlying, and thus displacing, the Greek “figure.” Assuming this to be the case, the “model” at stake here might well be one which interrupts itself in advance—presenting itself, but in a necessarily inadequate fashion.

2. The Heidegger texts which Lacoue-Labarthe cites are consistent with his interpretation; however, they are too ambiguous to stand on their own as support for his reading. To begin with, though Lacoue-Labarthe is right to call Heidegger’s relation to \( \mu\upsilon\mu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma \) in both the early Nietzsche lectures and An Introduction to Metaphysics “puzzling”(86), “enigmatic”(78), this does not in itself provide sufficient evidence for any submission to the Platonic condemnation of \( \mu\upsilon\mu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma \) (ibid.)—particularly when there are other possible ways of interpreting Heidegger’s relation to \textit{Gestalt} and \textit{Prägung} (such as the one I have suggested). Likewise, while it is possible to read Heidegger’s 1955 letter to Junger in the way Lacoue-Labarthe does, i.e., as Heidegger’s effort to revise his own interpretive stance on \( \tau\varepsilon\chi\nu\eta \) (more specifically, his effort to reject “the whole onto-typological thematics of the figure [\textit{Gestalt}], of the stamping and the imprint [\textit{Prägung, Gepräge}], which had none the less been his since 1933”(86)), Lacoue-Labarthe fails to clarify why Heidegger’s remarks in the letter cannot be read as a critique of Junger’s insufficient appropriation of such terminology.

Assuming, then, \( \tau\varepsilon\chi\nu\eta \)’s consistently \textit{rissig} character along Heidegger’s path of thinking, we must continue to underscore the differences between 1933 and 1936. We saw how, in the \textit{Rektoratsrede}, the community which is grounded in the polemic \textit{Riß} is broken up into “leaders” and “followers,” such that the university is allocated a privileged position within the differential task of the Germans (just as the philosopher is allocated a privileged position within the differential task of the German university). We must consider how this privilege is transformed in Heidegger’s reflections upon \( \tau\varepsilon\chi\nu\eta \) as art.

It appears first of all that, where the establishing of truth in the work is concerned, the complementary freedom of leadership \([\textit{Führung}]\) and following \([\textit{Gefolgschaft}]\) gives way to the complementary freedom of artistic creators \([\textit{die Schaffende}]\) and artistic preservers \([\textit{die}

\textsuperscript{27} I should say that, where “German thought since the end of the \textit{Aufklärung}”(ibid., 66) is generally concerned, I find Lacoue-Labarthe’s hypothesis compelling. It is only with respect to his placement of Heidegger that I have my doubts.
Bewahrende]. The work of art displaces us radically, transporting itself and us into the openness of beings:

To submit to this displacement means: to transform our accustomed ties to world and to earth and henceforth to restrain all usual doing and prizing, knowing and looking, in order to stay within the truth that is happening in the work. Only the restraint of this staying lets what is created be the work that it is. This letting the work be a work we call the preserving of the work. It is only for such preserving that the work yields itself in its createdness as actual, i.e., now: present in the manner of a work....Just as a work cannot be without being created but is essentially in need of creators, so what is created cannot itself come into being without those who preserve it (54/66).

Clearly, this parallels the Rektoratsrede where the followers are necessary to let the leaders lead. And just as the leaders and followers emerge polemically out of the one differential task assigned to the German people -- a task oriented in terms of the essence of science -- likewise, in 1936, “we” emerge polemically according to the one differential task; but this time, the task is oriented in terms of the essence of art: “If art is the origin of the work, this means that art lets those who essentially belong together at work, the creator and the preserver, originate, each in his own essence”(58-9/71). Moreover, just as the differential “scientific community” plays a leading role in the Rektoratsrede for Germany as a whole, likewise the differential “community of artistic engagement” plays a leading role in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” Granted, Heidegger acknowledges that artistic “beauty” is but one of the ways in which truth happens (43/56; cf. 49/61-2). Nevertheless, since “[language]...is poetry in the essential sense”(62/74) -- i.e., since language is essentially the happening of truth as art -- and moreover since “language alone brings what is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time”(61/73), we see that, for Heidegger, poetic saying is not merely “one” of several possible ways in which truth happens. It is the most primordial and essential event of truth.

We have thus far underscored the continuity in Heidegger’s thought from 1933 to 1936 where ἔρημος is concerned. This continuity notwithstanding, we must keep the differences in mind. That the polemic ἔρημος of “The Origin of the Work of Art” is interpreted in terms of art rather than science has four major implications for community:

1. That Heidegger, in his descriptions of the oppositional structure of community, moves from the language of “leader-follower” to “creator-presenter” places a certain rhetorical distance between his vocabulary and that of Nazi propaganda. This is significant in itself, whether one views his hierarchical language of 1933 as an attempt to oppose or to endorse National Socialism.28

28 On the hidden complicity between Heidegger’s defense of the “inner truth” of National Socialism and those discourses which condemn National Socialism, see Derrida’s Of Spirit.
2. Shifting the privileged site within the German people from science to art (and more specifically to poetry) no longer identifies the "heart" of the community with a delimitable, locatable institution (i.e., the university) possessing an over-determined relation to the state.

3. The shift from science to art comes closer -- according to Heidegger's own testimony -- to engaging the essence of \( \text{τεχνη} \). This permits Heidegger to further articulate community as the receptive site for the advent of truth; for it provides him the resources with which he will resist the tacit interpretation of community imposed by the technological epoch of "will to will" and Gestell (wherein community's relation to truth can be determined only by "challenging forth" [\( \text{hervorfordern} \)], by our setting upon nature [\( \phi\sigmaνς \)], by our extracting the true from what is hidden. In this view, beings of whatever sort -- ourselves included -- are merely the standing reserve [\( \text{Bestand} \) in terms of which the will can will itself].

4. Already in Heidegger's first lectures on poetry in 1934, polemic community -- in its essential relation to art rather than science -- is viewed not as something which is necessarily capable of asserting itself imminently, but as something which might well not be possible here and now, for "us." The following section will consider this fourth point in detail.

Where, then, is philosophy in this artistic Kampf? What is philosophy's assignment in the Gemeinschaft which emerges through this \( \pi\ολεμος\)? In 1933, philosophy is clearly at the pinnacle of every Gemeinschaft: the philosophical community is the leading community within the leading community (i.e., Wissenschaft) within the leading community (i.e., Germany) of the West. And then in 1936 it is not philosophy but "artistic creation" which takes the leading role. Has philosophical discourse moved from the role of leader to that of follower? Is the community of preservers mentioned in 1936 intended to reflect the philosophers (and, more broadly, the scientific community as a whole), now demoted to a more modest rank? (granted, the image of the "neighborhood of poetizing and thinking" [\( \text{der Nachbarschaft des Dichtens und Denkens} \) [cf. "The Nature of Language" (US, 157ff./OWL, 57ff.)] might seem to suggest otherwise; still, we must keep in mind that in Heidegger's initial articulation of differential community in 1933, relative rank is a component of that reciprocal challenge constitutive of "us." Is there reason to think Heidegger pulls away from such ranking in his subsequent thought?)

And yet, in attempting to locate "philosophy" in this Kampf, we must be mindful of Heidegger's shifting relation to this term. As early as 1934 Heidegger begins gradually to differentiate between "philosophy" on the one hand and "thinking" [\( \text{denken} \)] on the other; and

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29 Lacoue-Labarthe designates this technological interpretation of community "national aestheticism," wherein community, as will, is compelled to create even itself as its own "work of art" (Heidegger, Art and Politics, chapter 7).
though Heidegger does acknowledge that it is precisely philosophy which has, since the ancient Greeks, played a crucial receptive-preservative role with respect to prior creative-poetic saying, this is true for him only to the extent that philosophy participates in thinking.

To begin with, it is the correspondence [Entsprechen] between “thinking” and poetizing”[dichten] -- rather than that between philosophy and poetizing -- which Heidegger uses in his 1934 Germanien lecture to frame the πόλεμος in question. Granted, it quickly becomes clear that, if philosophy is not identical to thinking, thinking certainly happens through it:

There is a correspondence -- not an identity -- between poetic saying and the thoughtful saying of philosophy (41).

And a few pages later:

...the historical Dasein of the people, the ascent, height and transition, springs forth out of poetry and out of this the essential knowledge in the sense of philosophy and out of both the obtaining of the Dasein of a people as a people through the state [Staat] -- politics (51: cf. EM, 28/IM, 26).

Nevertheless, only a year later, in An Introduction to Metaphysics, the privileged examples of thoughtful saying are drawn from Parmenides and Heraclitus, thinkers who precede the birth of philosophy proper (i.e., the birth of philosophy as Platonic ἐπιστήμη). While it would be foolish to interpret this as a denigration, on Heidegger’s part, of the history of Western thought since Plato, it certainly marks the point where he directs us to view our historical origins differently: perhaps the elusive, aporetic writings of the pre-Socratics are not, as many have claimed, simply “pre” or “proto” philosophy -- thinking in its infancy, awaiting rigorous assertoric articulation (cf. EGT, 13ff.). Perhaps the thoughtful saying of the pre-Socratics stands in a more primordial relation than the works of Plato and Aristotle to the Greek poetic μῦθος (to Sophocles, for instance [EM, 155ff. /IM, 146ff.]). And perhaps we -- in order to stand in a receptive, preservative relation to that poetic saying which addresses us -- need to engage a possibility for thought which precedes the possibilities which have come down to us through the history of philosophy as ἐπιστήμη, a possibility which still somehow echoes in the fragments of the pre-Socratics. This, in any case, is Heidegger’s speculation from 1935 onwards, a speculation made possible not just by the distinction between thinking and poetizing but also by that between thinking and philosophy.

It is only in light of such distinctions that we can begin to appreciate the significance for Heidegger of this passage from Hölderlin’s Hyperion (Ende erster Band, II, 187) cited early in the Germanien lectures (21):

...But I pause in order to grasp how this poetic-religious people [the Athenians] should also be a philosophical people -- this I do not understand.

I would even say that, without poetry, they would never have been a philosophical people!
Reciprocally, what has philosophy — the cold elevation of this science — to do with poetry? I would say that poetry, my secure matter, is the origin and the end of this science. Like Minerva out of Jupiter’s head, it springs forth out of the poetry of an endless divine Sein. And so, at length the incompatible converge in it [philosophy] in the secret-laden origin [geheimnisvolle Quelle] of poetry.

It is precisely this question, “what has philosophy — the cold elevation of this science — to do with poetry?,” which leads Heidegger to distinguish **thinking** (that originary, pre-assertoric saying which stands in polemic, preservative relation to poetry) from **philosophy** (the ground of science). What is “incompatible” for that philosophy which strives to resolve aporiai assertorically is the forgotten, irreconcilable πολεμικός of its very origin: the dialogue of poetizing and thinking.

3. Our Poetic Essence

In *Heidegger and the Political*, Miguel de Beistegui offers what is for the most part a careful and nuanced reading of Heidegger’s 1934/5 Hölderlin lectures. One of the key points of his interpretation of Heidegger concerns the *We* as articulated in these lectures:

> We recall how, in his rectoral address, Heidegger repeatedly referred to a ‘we’ that remained unproblematized: beside the ‘we’ of the scientists, the ‘we’ of the community of professors and students, lay the ‘we’ of the Volksgemeinschaft, of a community bound by its forces of blood and soil. In a way, one can read the whole of the 1934/5 lecture course as an attempt to launch this question of the *We* anew, of turning it into a real question, of problematizing it. In the lecture course, the ‘we’ is no longer a fact, but a question and a quest... (100).

I maintain that, though Heidegger’s treatment of the *We* does undergo an important shift in these lectures, he fails to “problematize” it to the extent suggested by de Beistegui. In this section, I shall analyze this *We* as it is taken up in 1934/5. I will argue contrary to de Beistegui that, while the questions “what are *We*?” and “who are *We*?” are asked explicitly in these lectures (e.g., GR, §6g), *We-*ness as such lies uninterrogated; indeed, the *We* remains very much a “fact.” This is not to deny certain crucial differences between the *We* of 1933 and the *We* of 1934/5; these differences, however, must be viewed in their proper context.

In 1933, the decision concerning our essence (i.e., who we are), though not an easy decision to “make,” is at least easy to locate. Heidegger is concerned, first and foremost, with the “community of researchers” situated “polemically” in its assigned leading-role within the German community as a whole: here, Heidegger thinks, everything is at stake for us (Germans). As he says in 1929 (W, 103/WM, 96) and again in 1933 (SB, 9-10/SA, 471), the mission of this University community is determined by the essence of *science*. Through an engagement in the historical-spiritual essence of science (by thinking back through to τέχνη as originally determined in Greek thought), we
(Germans) explicitly take up our assigned task and become who we are -- not that we passively submit to the Greek notion of science; rather we critically engage (in an "Erwiderung," to use the language of Sein und Zeit) the Greek notion so that we can submit to what speaks to us through it. By resolutely facing the "essence of science," we create [schaffen] for our people its world (14/474-5) in which it can stand forth as a We.

After 1933, on the other hand, locating our essence becomes less straightforward.

Immediately following Heidegger's shift from science to art, it becomes clear that, for him, the purest and highest form of ἄρχη is poetry [Dichtung] (H, 60ff./OWA, 72ff.); and as early as 1934, in his lecture course on Hölderlin, he underscores the crucial relationship between poetry, community, and the essence of individual Dasein -- i.e., the essence of the "singular-being" [Einzeln]:

Poetry -- no play: the comportment towards it is not playful, self-forgetting relaxation, but the awakening and the coming together [Zusammenfluß] of the ownmost essence of the singular-being [des Einzelnen], through which it reaches back into the ground of its Dasein. Each singular-being emerges from there; thus the true gathering of singular-beings in an originary community has already happened [geschehen] in advance. The coarse false-engagement [Vorschaltung] of all too many in one so-called organization is only a makeshift arrangement, but not the essence (8; cf. 72).30

At first, the shift from science to poetry seems to leave the site of "our decision" intact, simply locating it elsewhere: as before, our gathering into an originary community is not something we can accomplish by ourselves, however hard we might try; indeed, as the above passage stresses, we are already gathered together in the shared ground of our historical Dasein -- a ground which now reveals itself in poetry rather than science. It would seem, as before, that what we can and must do is engage this prior shared ground explicitly. However, what appears initially to be a mere relocation of decision gradually reveals a sharper divergence from 1933. Specifically, with poetry, it is not "we," strictly speaking, who engage anything, for poetry "happens" precisely in the absence of the We.

In this section I will argue that, for post-1933 Heidegger, the withdrawal of the We's essential determination does not grant a site where decision is available to "us:" on the contrary, what Hölderlin's poetry reveals to Heidegger is that, contrary to the Rektoratsrede, We can no longer assert ourselves by engaging science (or art, for that matter) in its essence. In fact, we can no longer exhort ourselves to our essence in any fashion -- not even through the most submissive destinal self-assertion. "Our" dilemma is more radical. This is not simply because the locus of ἄρχη shifts from Wissens-gemeinschaft -- a questioning We which is already situtable in a concrete historical "institution" (the university) -- to a more ephemeral Kunst-gemeinschaft. Rather, it is because, as
early as 1934, Heidegger acknowledges that the question ‘who are we?’ offers itself, through poetry, as food for thought precisely at the point where we are at a loss -- indeed having lost ourselves --, completely incapable of being “who we are”.

Granted, in the Rektoratsrede, the engagement with science also happens in a kind of “absence” of the We, for choosing to will ourselves (10-11/471-2, 19/479-80) is precisely to comport ourselves towards a differential essence which, as I’ve indicated, withdraws itself from presentation. We become who we are not yet not by imprinting a form on some prior receptive matter, but by “imprinting” upon ourselves the differential self-withholding of our “center” -- the never resolved “not yet” which constitutes us.31 This notwithstanding, however, the Rektoratsrede still maintains that our essence is in some sense within reach, i.e., by comporting ourselves existentially towards the essence of science, we can participate in the essence-ing whereby we emerge forth for and as us: we (Germans) can be who we are. Each individual existentiell being (each “je einiges Dasein”) can “awaken”(9/470) to its proper task and can thus strive -- albeit responsively -- to reach back into the shared, elusive, polemic essence of its Dasein.32 Dasein, as articulated in the Rektoratsrede, has an essential possibility at its disposal: it can participate in the essence-ing of its ground.

In 1934, the essence-ing of the We is, to be sure, still what is at stake. However, what it means for “us” to participate in this essence-ing has shifted. As the above-cited passage suggests, participation33 in τέχνη, when thought as poetry, no longer reflects the awakening of each of us Dasein, each already situated in relation to the differential but locatable “center.” Rather, it reflects the awakening of essence [Wesen] itself. This is a subtle difference, but an important one: prior to any response we might offer, the differential essence must itself awaken -- not as a “coming to consciousness” but as a stirring which puts in play all prior στάσεις, an essential [wesentlich] movement whereby the locatable (albeit differential-polemic) center itself “slips away.” This is the awakening of the center itself, its κίνησις: no longer a withdrawal locatable in it or through it but its withdrawal qua center. This essence-ing does indeed call (us) from “1-ood” to attend to our

30 The resonance between this “Verschaltung” and Nazi “Gleichschaltung” is hardly accidental.
31 In the Rektoratsrede, this constitutive “not yet” is evident: “Whether [our emergence] will happen or not depends alone on whether or not we, as a historical-spiritual people, still and once again will ourselves”(19/480). Granted, more than once Heidegger asks “do we will ourselves?” only to follow immediately with “yes, we do!” or “yes, we already have!”(14-15, 19/475, 480). It would be a mistake, however, to interpret the latter as constative claims that we have already willed our essence, that we already are who we are, determined as such and such. They reflect, rather, the Rektoratsrede’s constant oscillation between constative and performative (to use terms which are not fully appropriate here), between speaking about the ontologico-historical watershed upon which Germany is poised and enacting or participating in that responsive self-willing through which the German We arrives, an ongoing emergence.
32 Heidegger makes it clear that the Dasein who decides for its essence is always individuated: “Every individual participates in this decision, even he, and indeed especially he, who evades it”(19/480).
33 In section e, to follow, I will consider Heidegger’s explicit characterization, in 1934, of this “participation”[teilnehmen].
"We-hood;" yet -- as the slipping away of the center itself -- it immediately reveals that this "We-hood" has abandoned "us." 34

This does not mean that the issue of the We is left behind; it means, rather, that the transition from one center to another requires, initially, the loss of the center which had held sway: an empty "we-less" time. For Heidegger, the decision of "We-hood" (the decision to be who we are) is perhaps possible -- but not yet, and not for any community which "we" might imagine. First "we" must acknowledge and learn to dwell in the absence of "We-hood," in the Unheimlichkeit of the question "who are we?" This is, at the moment, "our" only possible response to the kinetic shift in what had seemed a secure site. The question "who are we?" -- though it can surely be voiced at any time by any one -- has force and significance only in relation to such essence-ing/withdrawal. As with the Seinsfrage, the explicit and thoughtful engagement with the question "who are we?" happens only when the We -- our gathered differential assignment -- has withdrawn, i.e., when we can no longer exist as who we are. Faced with this situation, all thinking can do is engage this question and so disclose the extent to which "we" are at a loss, without "we-ness." Such a disclosure is, for Heidegger, a necessary preparation for the thinking which might one day again receive the arrival of "our" essence. Only a preparatory thinking pulled along with this essence-ing, and with the We's withdrawal, can perhaps arrive -- eventually -- at decisions concerning "who we are."35

All of this, however, reveals itself only gradually through a careful reading of Heidegger's Germanien lecture. We must keep in mind that here, in the wake of his "größte Dummheit," Heidegger is not moving confidently through familiar territory but is taking his first tentative steps into the dialogue between poetizing and thinking. In the following three sub-sections, I will show how the withdrawal of We-ness shows itself, bit by bit, in these steps.

a. The Whirl [Wirbel] of Conversation

The poem Germanien opens with the line "Not they, the blessed, who once appeared".36 For Heidegger, this line encapsulates, through the sharp negation of this "Not," the caesura which

34 This "center" motif is in no way foreign to Heidegger's thinking of the We. See, for instance, his attempt in 1942 to think the πόλις as πόλος (I, 81)
35 Thus, when Heidegger says that "...the true gathering of singular-beings in an originary community has already happened [geschehen] in advance"(8), he does not mean that such gathering always holds sway. He means, rather, that when and where community exists, it does not come about as an ontic "event" but has always happened in advance of our concrete comportments.
36 Nicht sie, die Seeligen, die erschienen sind.
separates singular-being \([\text{Einzeln}]\) from its essence. Our situation is one in which the I, previously secure in its I-hood, has lost itself because it has lost its gods, i.e., it has lost all source of stable order and rank (§5a). It is here, in this distress, that the I first comes to glimpse its ontologico-historical rootedness in the We, in the people which stands in relation to its gods (i.e., to its essence) — though this glimpse takes place only once the gods have fled and We-ness has thus lost its stability (§5b). At this juncture, the time of the “Not they...,” the poet emerges. His/her task is to be the δαίμον of the We, of the people, to herald the new gods through poetic saying and thereby ground the We once more:

The poet compels and averts the lightning of the god into the word and places this lightning-laden word into the language of his people. The poet does not deal with his soulful experiences, but rather stands “under the storm of the god” — “with bare head”, defenselessly abandoned and given away from himself (30).

Likewise:

Storm and lightning are the language of the gods, and the poet is he who, without avoidance, bears and absorbs this language and places it in the Dasein of the people (31).

Here, once again, we are faced with the question which plagued the \textit{Rektoratsrede}: what justifies Heidegger’s seemingly arbitrary privileging of the “Dasein of the people”? And more specifically — since, for Heidegger, Hölderlin addresses the \textit{Germans} — what justifies the privilege of the German people?

In the \textit{Rektoratsrede}, Heidegger never clarifies why or in what sense the \textit{Germans}, (and more precisely the \textit{German} university) have factual priority where Dasein’s relation to the tradition of questioning is concerned. By way of contrast, the lecture course on \textit{Germanien} appears to address the priority of German-ness, at least obliquely. Indeed, \textit{language} becomes the determining factor for communal identity, and the priority of this or that language-community shows itself to be contingent upon how the people stand in relation to \textit{poetry}.

According to the above-cited passages, the poet bears the language of the gods and places it in the language of the people. With this, however, Heidegger is not saying that there is \textit{first} the language of the people in which we and our poet are situated and then, \textit{subsequently}, the gods’ address to us. As Heidegger would emphasize just two years later, we share in a language to the extent that the artistic-poetic ur-event has happened, i.e., to the extent that the poet’s address has opened up the polemic difference between earth (\(\lambda\eta\theta\eta\)) and world (\(\delta\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\lambda\delta\)) — here, between inaccessible, divine language and accessible, mortal language — and fixed this difference in place in the figure \([\text{Gestalt}]\) of the poetic address (cf. H, 60ff./OWA, 73ff.).
“Our” language does not precede and situate the poet but is the preservative echo of the poetic event which constitutes it (ibid.). Thus, for Heidegger, Hölderlin is the “poet of the Germans” not in the sense that his poetic address presupposes and happens in the German language but in the sense that German, as the people speak it, is a response to or echo of his poetic address. Moreover, any privilege which Heidegger grants the German language must rest ultimately upon the privilege of the aletheic, poetic event which institutes it.

I do not wish to suggest that this poetic-linguistic determination of German-ness is any less problematic than that of the Rektoratsrede. Nevertheless, understanding precisely why it is no less problematic will require explication of the “we” Heidegger claims to find in Germanien, a “we” whose privilege is perhaps less straightforward than it might first appear.

Early in the Germanien lectures, Heidegger traces Dichtung and dichten back to δείχνωμι, which he translates: “to show, to make something visible, open — and indeed, not generally but rather in the way of a singular ostension [eines eigenen Weisens]” (29). This “showing,” while it picks up on the apophantic ἐρμηνεύειν of Sein und Zeit, is a poetic saying, one which is no longer a matter of assertions [Aussagen] (and thus no longer a matter of science) but rather of the transmission or echo of the hints [Winken] of the gods:

[poetry] is the echo of such hinting [das Weiterwinken dieser Winke] in the people, or seen from out of this, poetry is: the Dasein of the people placed in the region of this hint: i.e., a showing, an ostension, in which direction the gods become evident [offenbar], not as something meant and viewable, but rather in their hint (31-2).

The gods speak to us not in assertions, but in the “storm and lightning” of hints, and the poet can disclose the Riß and its Offenheit as ours precisely because there is, in the differential Riß separating gods and men, the possibility that these hints be reflected in us, in a We in its essential emergence. Again, there is no “we” prior to the gods’ address; we come to be only insofar as this reflection or echo of the gods happens through us.

Here, in the “divine voice,” the double-logic which I have already mentioned is at work once again, making it impossible to locate precisely whose voice is echoed in the language of the people:

1. On the one hand, what is echoed in our language is the language of the gods who stand opposed to us -- gods who are, to be sure, withdrawn, but who are nevertheless located inasmuch as they are named, speaking to us from a distance, via hints.

2. On the other hand, what is echoed in our language is the between itself, always already withdrawn such that we and the gods stand forth in opposition to each other. This middle is

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37 On the continuity of ἐρμηνεύειν in Heidegger’s thinking see US, 121ff./OWL, 29ff.
38 See US, 114/OWL, 24ff.
the τεχνη of poetizing, a letheic-aletheic event never at the poet’s disposal but one in which s/he participates as δοκιμον.\textsuperscript{39}

Thus, for Heidegger, to hear in Hölderlin a clear distinction between the saying of the gods and the saying of the poet would be to misunderstand what is at stake. Indeed, Heidegger emphasizes that it is precisely self-withdrawal which characterizes Hölderlin’s gods: “...the heavenly is immediately fugitive”(§6e). It is not only the case that “...the gods hint simply in that they are”(§4d); in fact, they are simply in that they hint -- and withdraw through their hints. The prior withdrawal of poetic saying, as it leaves determinate and stable differences in its wake, is mirrored in the saying of the gods. This mirroring is, of course, inadequate, in that the gods stand opposed to us; but, as I’ve said before, such inadequacy is essential for bearing witness to what withholds itself essentially. In any case, that “withdrawal” is itself constitutive of the divine has certain implications for the time of the “Not they...,” the time in which the gods have fled; for, paradoxically, this time must be that of the withdrawal of that withdrawal proper to the divine. That is to say, the time of the “Not they...” is not the time in which the gods are experienced as beings no longer present-at-hand. It is rather the time in which the elusive, differential poetic address no longer resonates explicitly; it is the time in which the hinting withdrawal constitutive of the divine is no longer acknowledged, thereby allowing the gods to be thought as present-at-hand beings which might be either present or absent.

On Heidegger’s reading, Hölderlin — whose concern is first and foremost to thoughtfully engage the essence of poetry — follows a path which parallels Heidegger’s own, i.e., Hölderlin attempts to “think back” (albeit, poetically) from the “I” to the “We”(cf. my chapter 2), and from there back to “historical Man”(cf. chapter 2, chapter 4), and from there, finally, to “language.” To summarize briefly:

1. (§5a) The I refuses the previous gods, refusing what had been the essence of its 1-ness (i.e., of singular-being determined as 1-subject).
2. (§5b) In this way, the I, having lost its secure determinacy and groundedness, gives way to the We which awaits the rising/dawning of the new gods who will move and determine us.
3. (§5b) But the We, in turn, reveals itself to be rooted in Man — essentially historical Man.
4. (§5b) Man, in turn, “is” only inasmuch as he listens -- and has listened -- to the “eagle,” i.e., to the arrival of language itself through the poet, through that δοκιμον who is neither god nor man.

\textsuperscript{39}Heidegger explicitly articulated this double-logic several years later. See his reflections, in Early Greek Thinking, on this passage from Heraclitus (B 32): “Εν το Σοφόν μονόν λέγοντι οὐκ εἴδει, / καί ἐδειξε Ζηνός ὄνομα...The One, which alone is wise, does not want / and yet does want to be called by the name Zeus. (Dels-Kranz)'(72).
I have suggested what is at work in our relation to the gods, but in what sense is the We rooted in Man? And in the eagle?

In each case the We, though its “identity” is ultimately differential, is the gathered destination, the reflective site or “sounding board” of what emerges/withdraws in τεχνη via the artistic figure. As I have argued, this receptive community which has as its polemic “center” the singular artistic figure does not itself escape κινησις. Indeed, singular ‘We’s emerge forth and pass away, and what links one community to another, one polemic center to another, is historical Man:

‘Man’. Who is this Man? He beholds as far as the Orient, and from there up to him many transformations are encountered: Indus, Parnassos, Italy, Alps. To our position ‘Man’, awaiting, beholding, has stepped (§5b).

For Heidegger, this “Man” is to be understood neither biologically nor anthropologically, but historically, as that which moves, in distinct steps, from antiquity to “our position.” Man is no over-archering genus under which all of “us” — from all identifiable societies and all periods of history — are subsumed; there are not simply “instances” of Man distributed “in time,” instances amongst which historical relations can be traced. Rather, Man is the fragmented yet traceable trajectory of the rise and decline of historical ‘We’s; it is the path along which the polemic-artistic “center” moves in its self-unfolding, distributing gods and communities in relation to one another. This trajectory does not unfold “in time,” since time itself — and indeed, truth itself — opens up only in terms of this or that We (in its relation to its gods). As we shall see, the temporality of this trajectory must be thought otherwise.

It is the voice of the eagle, that lethic voice which happens through poetic τεχνη, which calls — as the double of itself — to Man and which is echoed when this or that singular We happens through Man.

In the poem the I, the We, Man and the eagle all speak authentically. “They speak from language — that language which names and in naming releases the unspoken”(45). Yet the dislocative movement from the I to the eagle is a progressive destabilization — first the I, then the We, then man losing their respective secure determinations as thinking comes to acknowledge the abyssal de-centering character of poetic saying. Indeed, this saying/naming offers no security; it is, rather, completely disorienting — a “whirl”[Wirbel], quite literally:

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40 Wirbel is a term which characterizes Gerede in Sein und Zeit. One could say that because authentic discourse, in Sein und Zeit, is always tacitly “scientific,” located in άγος qua Aussage (albeit, self-undermining Aussage) poetry, because it is not a matter of assertion, is tacitly relegated to Gerede. Perhaps, then, the re-emergence of the term Wirbel in a positive light is an indication of Heidegger’s transformed relation to the “unstable” discourse not subordinated to assertion (incidentally, “Wirbel” later takes on significance several years later in Heidegger’s discussion of πολις as πολος [1, 81]).
...[This] saying is a manifold.... It turns completely such that 'no one [of us] knows, how it happens to him' (V. 27). The poem is now already no longer even a text — with which one is likewise burdened with the projection of a 'sense' — but rather this jointure-of-language [Sprachgefuge] is in itself a whirl, which pulls us somewhere (45).

This whirl pulls us into language, into the conversation [Gespräch] which brings language to language (45). And yet, here it seems that, despite the disorientation and de-centering of this whirl, something withstands this decentering, for Heidegger does not say that a We emerges forth from out of this whirl, but rather that it is precisely "us" who are pulled along by its movement. This "We" is pulled along via a task — the task of naming and saying (45) — and, as Hölderlin claims (and Heidegger reaffirms), the we who is assigned this task is identifiable as the "maiden Germanien".

Whatever might appear evident, however, one crucial point must be kept in mind: though Germanien — the German Volk — is in some sense the addressee of the eagle, it is not yet clear just what this task involves and what it entails for this We which is addressed. In order to understand this, we must carefully assess Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin as it progresses.

b. Our Time

Our first task, according to Heidegger, is to refrain from merely "observing" this whirl and rather participate in it. The situation [Lage] of the indifferent observer — ensconced in an I-ness no longer secure — must undergo a shock [müß erschüttert werden] (46), a shock which emerges through the poem itself and which is ultimately a matter of time — not my time but our time:

...[This] truncating, severe 'Not they...' pulls us even still into the whirl of a conversation in which the world-time of the people and our world-hour come to language. This 'Not they...', with which our poem begins, is a time-decision in the sense of the originary time [ursprünglich Zeit] of the people (51).

This "world-time of the people" has nothing to do with its measurable history, its "duration" in time; for it is, as Heidegger had already made clear in "On the Essence of Truth," the opening up of time itself (time qua Lichtung), an opening up without which there can be no duration or measure. As Heidegger would put it two years later:

Whenever art happens — that is, whenever there is a beginning — a thrust [Stoß] enters history, history either begins or starts over again. History means here not a sequence in time of events or whatever sort, however important. History is the transporting of a people into its appointed task as entrance into that people’s endowment (H, 65/OWA, 77).

This, our time, is the time of authentic creating [Schaffen], the time of the poet, thinker and state-creator (GR, 51). Heidegger contrasts this mysterious time of the people with the time of the singular-being, the time of the I:
The time of the brief Dasein of the singular [person] is surveyable. We can calculate this time and insert it between the counts of birth-date and death-date. But the time of the years of the people is concealed from us....We are not familiar with our authentic historical time....We do not know who we are, when we ask about our Being, about the authentically temporal (ibid., 50).

Thus, the thinking back which moves from the atomized I to the We is at the same time a thinking back from everyday time — the calculable time which is at my disposal — to that originary time in which the former is grounded.

Clearly then, the question is: when and how do we come to know this originary time? The response, from the perspective of 1933, should be clear: we know our time when we participate in the decision regarding the essence of science, when we participate in the creation of our historical-spiritual world. In 1934, however, Heidegger does not exhort us towards self-assertion; instead he cites Hölderlin’s *The Titans*:42

But it is not
The time. Still are they
Unbound. The Divine does not befall
Those who do not participate [untheilnehmend] (56).

We do not know who we are so long as we fail to know our time. So then, who knows this time? No one, according to Heidegger. Even the creators themselves do not know this time, for they know only “when the time of the event [Ereignis] of the true is not” (ibid.). Thus, the poet can, at best, disclose only as much as is disclosed in the above-cited passage from “The Titans”: the divine does not befall those who do not participate. But if our time is unavailable to us, how can we participate in it? What avenue is available to us through poetry if all it can echo is a “not yet...”? Indeed, what is the character of this “not yet...”? How can we decide about who we are?

c. Participation in Poetry

Heidegger argues that it is precisely in Hölderlin’s hesitation, in what his poetry does not say, that his greatness lies. For Heidegger, Hölderlin’s strength as a poet is that he resists saying more than he is assigned to say.

To be sure, “But it is not/ the time” leaves us in a bind concerning who we are:

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41 Here, in sharp contrast to Heidegger’s analysis in *Sein und Zeit*, the time of the singular person [Einzelen] — of that Dasein who is in each case mine — appears to have been subordinated to the more authentic time of the community. Why does Heidegger present such an odd reversal here? Because, on a certain level, he assumes §74 of *Sein und Zeit* to have allowed him to make the move from the authentic temporality of singular Dasein to the authentic temporality of its factual community. As I have shown (cf. chapter 2), §74 fails to achieve any such demonstration.

42 *Poems and Fragments.* (531-5).
Participation and Being-bound constitute the necessary condition for that which generally becomes time for us. But participation in what? Bound in what way? This is, to be sure, not said (57).

And yet, perhaps this very "not said" is more disclosive than anything which might be "said" explicitly. As Heidegger goes on to suggest, any determinate answers to these questions—answers which would present who we are in terms of or that ontico-existentiell avenue of pursuit—have necessarily lost sight of 'who we are' in advance. More specifically, while that in which we participate ontico-existentiell determines what we are (e.g., a shoemaker is someone who participates in shoe-making; this is 'what s/he is'), that we are what we are presupposes in each case a prior decision concerning who we are, a prior participation—unpresentable as a "what"—in the opening up of that region wherein the ontic can unfold (§6g-h).

That we ask the question 'who are we?' and expect a determinate "said" (i.e., a presentable "what") as a response perhaps already says much about "us." Perhaps it indicates our no longer standing in relation to the elusive, differential poetic voice and thus our no longer standing in relation to our essence. And, if this is indeed the case, then for Hölderlin to confront us with the "not said" is for him to confront us—albeit, by way of a hint—with our own having lost ourselves and with the exigency that, in the face of this loss, "we" open ourselves to that participation in poetry which might institute the We once more. I propose that this is in fact what Heidegger suggests in the following passage:

The participation meant by the poet constitutes our Dasein as one such [Dasein]; it is that manner of our Dasein in which Being [Sein] and not-Being are generally at stake. In this participation, how we are that which we pursue decides itself in advance and constantly. If it is not said wherein we should then participate and towards what we should be bound [angebunden], if participation is spoken of only simply..., herein is directly 'said' the necessary condition for this: that it become the time when 'the divine befalls' us, when the lightning strikes (58).

To speak of our participation in poetry "only simply" such that it is not presented as this or that is to open ourselves to the question 'who are we?', which simultaneously involves:

1. refusing the reduction of the who to the what.
2. acknowledging that "we" have lost and must somehow regain (poetic) access to the who.

For Heidegger, the time of Hölderlin's poetry is the time of the "Not they...," the withdrawal of the divine which entails, reciprocally, the withdrawal of our essence; it is the time of this question. While lightning does indeed strike through Hölderlin, his poetic mission is not to bring us immediately to a decision concerning who we are but rather to interrupt our frenzied pursuit in order that we might listen, wait, stepping back from what may well be an all too self-evident "we."

The essential hint of Hölderlin shows us that it is not yet time to decide who we are; it is time rather to prepare the possibility for such an eventual decision:
Now is disclosed: it is not only the case that we do not know who we are; we must in the end take part, first and directly, in poetry even in order to first of all create [schaffen] the necessary condition for it, that it becomes the time in which we can then generally experience who we are (58-9).

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Admittedly, my explication thus far appears to raise more questions than it offers answers: precisely what is entailed by our not knowing who we are? How exactly are we to create the necessary condition for it to “become the time” for such eventual knowledge? Surely it is not enough merely to pose the question “who are we?” Or is it? And, once again, in exactly what sense does Heidegger privilege the German people where this We is concerned? A major problem in attempting to respond to such questions is the ambiguity of the text itself: Heidegger -- perhaps in keeping with the way Hölderlin shelters the “unsaid” -- is leaving much unsaid himself. Indeed, more than one reading is possible here. I shall first present what I take to be de Beistegui’s responses to these questions before contrasting them with my own.

To begin with, de Beistegui summarizes the 1934/5 We-dilemma in the following way:

If...politics indeed begins with the utterance of a “we,” this most familiar and yet enigmatic pronoun, to ask, as Heidegger does, “who are we?” is to take a step back from politics in order to reveal the question which politics would have always already answered. It is even to ask whether this “we” that is commonly referred to actually is, whether, in other words, we are sufficiently in relation to that which constitutes us as a We in order to be able to say “we.” “We,” We who? We “here” and “now”? But where and when do “here” and “now” begin? Where and when do they end? How are “here” and “now” given? We “men,” perhaps? But who is man? We, the people. What people? The German people, perhaps? But do we know what “German” means? How do we go about answering such a question, even about raising it, at a time (1934-5) when everyone knows what it means to be German, to belong to a Volksgemeinschaft and a Geschlecht, a race that has become the object of an absolutely rigorous science?(101)

De Beistegui claims that poetry -- and Hölderlin’s poetry in particular -- brings Heidegger towards an answer to these questions. Specifically, poetic saying happens as the most originary “event”[Ereignis] -- not an event “in time” but a break with that time which “had” opened up between man and gods, a break or caesura which institutes a new time:

“The event that is here in question, the event that describes who “we” are, is the unfolding of this time of the between, this time that remains suspended and torn between the flight of the gods and the coming of the new gods. In this time of distress and destitution, the earth itself is revealed in a specific way: it is no longer the earth that is loved and cherished by the gods, no longer the earth that is inhabited by men in proximity to the presence of the divine, but the earth that is abandoned to what Heidegger, in his Nietzsche lectures, begins to call the “will to will,” the will that culminates in the planetary domination of the technological....Being and the gods have abandoned the earth to its own dereliction, thus turning it into a planetary wasteland (ibid., 105).
Hölderlin's poetry — in the face of this desperate situation which it itself has disclosed — offers us "a way of returning to the earth, of instituting a different relation to it, one whereby the earth will again become the site of an originary dwelling..."(ibid.). This "homecoming"[Heimkunft], according to de Beistegui, is no nostalgic return to a lost origin (whether this be thought as "Greek," "German" or otherwise), but engages our own history in order to point "in the direction of an origin to come, of a primal leap or an originary source beyond the devastation of the desacralized earth"(ibid.); indeed, this homecoming points toward a singular relation between gods and man which has never before taken place. Moreover, this poetic relation to the origin is tenuous, for it offers no promise but only the possibility that the new gods will come:

"...[Poetry] only indicates this way and prepares the way for the coming of the new gods. In no way can it summon them to present themselves. Man is left powerless in the face of his destiny. for destiny itself is a gift of history: the future does not belong to us; it is not ours. We cannot say when or even if the gods will visit anew (104).

Anticipating the charge that Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin is somehow "Euro-Germanocentric," de Beistegui suggests that perhaps the essence of German destiny (and more broadly, the essence of Western destiny) of which Heidegger speaks is not itself German (or Western):

This essence, which Heidegger designates as the origin, and the proximity to which Hölderlin situates himself, might indeed be seen as an origin that exceeds its Western appropriation: the origin is none other than the truth of being, a truth that might very well be more essentially experienced, better preserved and more genuinely understood in the East...(107-8).

This reference to the East is not without significance: de Beistegui, drawing from Heidegger's subsequent readings of Hölderlin's Stromdichtungen, claims that the "homeland" is not so much a place as our movement of approach towards our essence, a movement which happens only through an experience of the absolutely foreign which precedes and makes possible any being at home:

The homeland...is not simply given from the start, but affirmed in the very movement of becoming at home [Heimischwerden] or homecoming [Heimkunft]. Every homeland is a coming home as a coming into the proper, but in such a way that the coming into the proper presupposes the appropriation of that which is most foreign: to be at home is to return beyond the experience of the foreign [das Fremde], which is an experience of the Unheimisch or the unhomelike. This suggests that this movement of return is not a movement of returning to something that was originally, but that the origin itself is constituted through this movement of return....[It] is precisely in the movement of exile that the proximity of the source comes to be (108).

Finally, de Beistegui argues that the "proper" at issue here is none other than the "national" itself, which by his account is "the ability to dwell and be at home in proximity to the earth"(109); and it is in terms of this idea of the national that he puts forth his hypothesis on Heidegger's post-1933 German nationalism:
Isn’t the difference between Greece and Germany...that Germany is still to come, that it has not yet begun, and that it can begin only by repeating that which marked the beginning of the history of the West, namely the ability to relate to what is most alien to it in such a way that what is closest to it becomes its own? (110)

As I’ve mentioned, I think that de Beistegui’s reading of the 1934/5 lectures is on the whole thoughtful and rigorous -- with the exception of its consideration of Heidegger’s “We.” I will summarize my disagreement with him by addressing two points.

**First point:*** while de Beistegui is on target in claiming that, in some sense, “Germany is still to come” (i.e., that there is not yet a “we” which could legitimately call itself “German”), I find problematic his assumption that, for Heidegger, there is a “we” which somehow resides in this “between time” prior to the arrival of the new gods (ibid., 105). Granted, throughout his *Germanien* lectures, Heidegger refers again and again to “us,” to that “we” which resides in the desolate time of the “Not they....” Still, we should perhaps be cautious in assessing the function of this “we.” As de Beistegui himself point out, these lectures take place at a time when “everyone knows what it means to be German, to belong to a *Volksgemeinschaft* and a *Geschlecht*” (101) -- in short, these lecture take place at a time when everyone presumes to know not just *who* we are but *that* we are. Can “we” be so sure ‘that we are’?

I maintain that if, for Heidegger, authentic community exists only to the extent that it stands in polemic relation -- via the poet -- to the divine, then the time of the “Not they....” the time of the absent gods, is correlatively the time of the absent We. The “between time” to which de Beistegui refers is not the time of an event which “describes who ‘we’ are” (105) but the time of we-less-ness.

And yet, what of Heidegger’s continuous reference to the we -- the German we -- throughout his lectures? Here, it seems to me, he begins from a factual situation in which it goes without saying that and who we are; and from this point he gradually destabilizes this we. To be sure, he never reduces the We explicitly (by consistently suspending it between quotation marks, for instance). And yet, who in the Germany of 1934 would have felt secure doing this? Perhaps Heidegger -- addressing “us” in our self-confidence and proposing, with Hölderlin’s help, to ‘get to the bottom of this us’ -- proceeds to reveal the abyssal character of this ‘bottom’. Perhaps he exhausts the sense of this We, pointing (albeit cautiously, furtively) to the possibility that this We, which is such an object of certainly, in fact is not.

But isn’t it patently absurd to suggest that, somehow, “we are not”? Not if we recall *das Man-selbst* of *Sein und Zeit*, that amorphous “one” which, though it is neither “I” nor “we,” refers to itself with these pronouns loudly and often (see my chapter 2[3a]). Is it possible that in this age of technological planetary domination, the obvious *Vorhandenheit* of the “we” -- a we which goes without saying -- is precisely what most clearly marks the We’s absence for Heidegger? And is it
possible that for Heidegger the experience of this absence might also be the experience of "our" destinal task to prepare for that We which is still to come?

This, I propose, is what Heidegger thinks he has found in Hölderlin; specifically: though Hölderlin's poetry is certainly written in German and addressed to the "Germans," his message is not at all what it first appears; it is not an exhortation to be German, nor is it even a self-effacing exhortation that we Germans engage and displace this metaphysical desire to be German; rather, it says simply: "There is nothing you can do. You are not the We you think you are; for, indeed, you are not at all. The We may come, but it is not you." Thus, preparing for the We to come does not mean that "we" must somehow create ourselves, willing ourselves into existence as the German Gemeinschaft. Rather, "we" -- in our distressed relation to the "not said" -- must allow "our" futile desire to be who we are to be interrupted by this poetic call to patience: "But it is not the time." In this way it is not so much "we" but poetry which renounces the mirage of German-ness, though this renunciation certainly needs "our" participation (and needs "us" to participate, paradoxically, by not being us) in order that the fundamental tone [Grundstimmung] of "mourning"[Trauer] (GR, §8) resound through "us." The mourning at issue here concerns "our" relation not just to the absent gods, never to return, but also -- and once again correlatively -- to the absent We.

"Our" participation in this Grundstimmung is, for Heidegger, a participation in the question "who are we?" This question provides no answer but engages what is sent through it, what is sent to "us" to think -- in this case: our loss, understood in the most radical sense, not the loss of something which had been held in common but the loss of any holding-in-common which might be constitutive of We-ness. And yet, though the determination of the We has fled us, "we" must not engage this withdrawal recklessly:

We close ourselves off from the poetic as the ground-jointure [Grundgebige] of historical Dasein if we do not first of all, through poetry, allow the question, who we are, to become a question in our Dasein, a question which we really ask, i.e., bear through the whole [of our] brief lifetime (GR, 59).

The question "who are we?" gains urgency only once "we" have lost ourselves and our time. It is a question for a "we" which one might think of as a spectre, as the residue or echo of a We which is

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43 Regarding this mourning, de Beistegui correctly notes: "Mourning, as sacred mourning, as Grundstimmung of a poem determined in the historical-ontological sense remains irreducible to the vocabulary and the grip of psycho-pathology. Rather, the tone that is at stake here serves to describe the way in which a historically decisive event -- the flight of the ancient gods -- is gathered and preserved" (97).

44 And this urgency is evidently still felt by Heidegger a few years later as he writes his Beiträge, one section of which (§19) bears the title "Philosophie (Zur Frage: wer sind wir?)." Indeed, as the following passage demonstrates, he is more forthcoming, in this later text, concerning the possibility of "we-less-ness" than he had been in 1934: "In the question 'who are we' lies and stands the question, whether we are. These questions are inseparable [unzertrennlich], and this inseparability is again merely the signal of the concealed essence of human-being [Menschsein] and indeed of the historical [geschichtlichen]" (51).
no longer -- that is, if "we" had not been radically cut off from every prior We by having lost "our time", by no longer dwelling in the time of any "former" community. Arising in the gap between times, the task this question announces to "us" -- a task which complements, polemically, the poet's task of naming and saying (GR, 45) -- is one of catharsis (a catharsis which would be self-sacrificial if there were indeed a self to sacrifice). "We" must, by allowing this question to echo as the question that it is, undercut "our" own futile desire to assert ourselves. Only in this way can "we" acknowledge the loss of the bygone We and leave room for the We that is (perhaps) yet to come. Thus, Germanien is called to recognize precisely that she -- as a receptive conduit destined to be immolated through what she transmits -- cannot recognize herself in the mirror of the "to come," that she cannot become "who she is." Only in this way can she clear space for the We to come, a We which will (perhaps) emerge, along with its gods, through that thrust which enters history, a thrust whereby "history either begins or starts over again" (H, 65/OWA 77).

For Heidegger, the repetition of this "thrust" -- a repetition constitutive of history -- is no progression in time but the movement of rhythmic time itself, the temporal "steps" of man from we to we. And there is no hypostasis underlying these steps, for this movement, this repetitive, interruptive historical "event," is man's very presencing. Heidegger would say, perhaps, that the dialogue between man and gods -- the poetic event whereby the differential rift unfolds -- happens as the passage from we to we, a syncopated passage with spacings between the beats. And "we" occupy one such spacing, one such poetic Atempause wherein the only time available is the calculable time of the "year count" (G, 50).

And yet, while "we" do not have the possibility of sacrifice -- due to the fact that we are not -- the theme of sacrifice, rare though it might be, is an important one for Heidegger. There is, for instance, the elliptical reference in "The Origin of the Work of Art" to the "essential sacrifice" as one of the ways truth happens (H, 49/OWA, 62). And a few years later, Heidegger speaks of sacrifice as somehow being the essential task of the poet (e.g., BzP, 395). Thus, we might ask: if sacrifice is not "our" possibility, where does each one of "us" stand with respect to sacrifice? Does this, singular, unbound Dasein who participates in we-less-ness have, for Heidegger, the possibility and perhaps the responsibility of sacrifice for the sake of the We to come? The following passage from the Germanien lectures seems to touch upon such questions:

The camaraderie [Kameradschaft] of soldiers at the front has its ground neither in their having found themselves together because other men, from whom they were distant, were missing, nor in their first agreeing upon a common enthusiasm [Begeisterung], but rather -- at the deepest and most singular -- in this: the nearness of death as a sacrifice places each before the same negativity, such that this is the spring [Quelle] of unbound belonging-to-one-another. Straightaway death, which each singular man must die for himself, which isolates [vereinzelit] each singular-being at the extreme [außerste] upon himself, straightaway death and the readiness for its sacrifice creates first of all the prior space of
community out of which the camaraderie springs forth. Does the camaraderie thus spring forth out of Angst? No and yes. No, if one, as the bourgeois, understands by Angst only the helpless trembling of a panicked cowardice. Yes, if Angst is grasped as the one and only highest self-constancy [Selbständigkeit] and readiness which might give [geschenkte] metaphysical nearness to the unconditioned. If we do not force power into our Dasein — this [power] just as unconditioned as death (as free sacrifice) to bind and to isolate, i.e., to approach the root of the Dasein of each singular-being, and just as deep and standing wholly in one genuine knowledge — then no 'camaraderie' emerges: it comes at most to a varied form of society (72-3).

This is, to begin with, an extremely odd passage.\textsuperscript{45} It marks perhaps the only point after Sein und Zeit in which Heidegger addresses the themes of community and Dasein's singularity together (themes whose relation constitutes an immense and most often hidden problem in Heidegger's work, as I have argued in chapter 2). Moreover, it links them together via the motif of "sacrifice" which is completely absent from his brief consideration of community in §74 of Sein und Zeit. Indeed, in that text, Being-towards-death is in no way a matter of sacrifice — Heidegger makes this quite clear (SZ, 240, 261). Now suddenly, in 1934, sacrifice is presented as a component of Being-towards-death and this component somehow makes the "space of community" and "camaraderie" possible. Somehow, what had been Dasein's ownmost, singular, non-relational possibility becomes, as sacrifice, the "same negativity" out of which springs "unbound belonging-to-one-another".

What could Heidegger be saying here? Is he suggesting that, in this presumably "we-less" epoch, a "We" can somehow emerge in -- of all places -- shared military sacrifice? What exactly is he suggesting with this example, if example it is?

I am not at all confident that this strange passage can be reconciled with the general development of Heidegger's thinking. I will, however, offer the following hypothesis as a possible explanation.

Perhaps Heidegger's point is that the soldiers' relation to their ownmost singular deaths pulls them away from the illusory "We" to which they, like all of us, have become accustomed. Could it be that, for Heidegger, this pulling away, this shift into an acknowledgment of we-less-ness is precisely what makes not community itself but the "space of community," leaving room for the We to come? Perhaps Heidegger uses the odd term "Kameradschaft" rather than "Gemeinschaft" because the relation which springs out of this space of community refers not to a We, not to a community, but to the broken, we-less participation in the traurig Grundstimmung. If so, this "camaraderie" is that of those who sacrifice themselves not for something they recognize but for a

\textsuperscript{45} Lacoue-Labarthe devoted much attention to this problematic passage in his 1998 lecture course on Heidegger's Hölderlin lectures.
We to come, a We in which they -- as sacrificial victims, as it were -- cannot participate. In any case, Heidegger does not pursue this issue; this passage is as close as he comes to it.

Perhaps these are the questions Heidegger addresses to “us” by way of this passage: can “we” recognize ourselves in this “example”? (or better, can we recognize here the impossibility of self-recognition?) Can we cease to be concerned with “ourselves” as ultimate ἔλος so as to leave room for the (perhaps) coming We?

This is, in any case, my interpretation of the “we” in the Germanien lectures. While I grant that the 1934/5 lectures are open to a reading such as de Beistegui’s (wherein this “between time” -- this interim, “god-less” time -- is that of a desolate We alienated from its Being), I maintain that thinking this “between time" as the we-less time between ‘We’s is more in keeping with the logic of gods and community at work in Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin.

Second point: whether de Beistegui’s reading or my own best engages Heidegger's 1934/5 lectures on the locus of the We, there is another, more fundamental problem in these lectures -- a problem which escapes de Beistegui’s attention. He claims that for the Heidegger of 1934/5 “the ‘we’ is no longer a fact, but a question and a question...”(100): who are we? And yet, de Beistegui fails to acknowledge that, while this question certainly holds the identity of the We in question, it does not call into question We-ness itself. I maintain that in 1934/5 -- just as before -- Heidegger keeps his distance from the more radical questions he has been evading since Sein und Zeit: what is community? what is We-ness? is there such a thing? why the We?

However much the 1934/5 lectures might acknowledge (on my reading) the flight of we-ness from “us,” this lack of we-ness is nevertheless subordinated to a We to come. Indeed, while 1934/5 may well mark a point in Heidegger’s thinking which breaks with the “crude” National Socialist We, the We of immanent Volksgemeinschaft, it also marks an odd proto-communal commitment tied to the notion of sacrifice. Even if Heidegger is speaking of a We which is “not yet,” an absolutely unknown (non-German) We, such that “our” responsibility is determined by “our” relation to this coming community, every singular appeal which might emerge from this or that singular Dasein is subordinated a priori to the We as its end, inasmuch as “we” must prepare for its arrival. Every singular act in which one of “us” engages must be subordinated to that cathartic τέχνη which “sets truth to work,” opening up the place where gods and community might once again stand in relation to one another.

Moreover, even if Germany can be read, in Heidegger, as a non-we, it still maintains an odd privilege in relation to the We to come by virtue of Hölderlin’s poetic-cathartic voice, for it is presumably through him, the poet of the “between time,” that a space might be cleared for the
coming community. Likewise, even if the language of the coming community (i.e., the language which arises from the poetic address as the language of the people over and against the language of the gods) is not German, the German language nevertheless maintains a privileged relation in that the cathartic echo of Hölderlin’s poetic voice resounds — or at least has the possibility of resounding — through it. In short, Heidegger’s We, whether it is a possibility here and now or still to come, points to Germany as an ontico-existentially privileged site of α-ληθεία and subordinates all praxis to one, over-arching preparatory task.

And yet, is it possible that there is more to Heidegger’s 1934/5 remarks concerning our current “we-lessness” than he himself realized? Is it possible that he misunderstood — or perhaps even recoiled from — the significance of we-lessness? Given the neutralization of the Gemeinschaftsfrage in Sein und Zeit and the perpetuation of this neutralization in 1934, might we not interpret contemporary we-lessness differently than Heidegger suggests? In short: perhaps it is not “who” we are that has withdrawn, leaving “us” without identity, but the security of “We-ness” itself, a We-ness which Heidegger never questions but to which he comes quite close in his reflections of 1934? Perhaps the insight of 1934/5, from which Heidegger almost immediately backs away, is the problematic character of the “We” itself.

While it is perhaps true that the question ‘who are we?’ is circumscribed by the self-concealing question of Being, might the unasked question ‘why the We?’ point to what is most self-concealing of all for Heidegger’s path of thinking? Is it possible that the withdrawal of the We is, even more than Heidegger suspected, the “draw” [Ziehen] in which thinking now finds itself?

* * *

It is crucial, at this point, that we not dismiss Heidegger’s thinking of 1933 as shortsighted compared with that of 1934, as having given in to the ontico-existentiell pursuit of the essence of science. Recall that in the will towards the essence of science, the self-assertion of the German university is still fundamentally a submission. It is not we, situated within the Lichtung, but Being itself which “wills” (that is, one might be able to say this if Being were viewable as an agent; and of course, it is not); all we do, in “creating” our spiritual world, is echo and carry out the assignment [Auftrag] granted us by Being, thereby allowing the Lichtung to unfold [west] through us. On my reading, the essential difference between 1933 and 1934 is in the interpretation of the assignment

46 On this privilege see Derrida’s remarks in Of Spirit (67ff.).
47 See WHD, SWCT, 9.
itself: in 1933, we are to participate directly in the decision concerning our essence; in 1934, on the other hand, "we" are to await what is yet to come.\footnote{Clearly, there is a shift in the \textit{Auftrag}: the assignment of Being presents itself differently to Heidegger in 1934 than it had in 1933; indeed, this shift is responsible for his alleged turn to "quietism." Not surprisingly, in the 1934 lecture on \textit{Germanien} (§6c), Heidegger suggests that Hölderlin went through a similar transformation, one whereby he gradually came to acknowledge an impotence or failure [\textit{Scheitern}] at the heart of the execution of poetry.}

In conclusion, then, all we can say about “our essence” for the Heidegger of 1934 is that it has \textit{withdrawn} from us and that we (or rather: “”) must therefore dwell thoughtfully in this abandonment to withdrawal, in this “\textit{Wir-verlassenheit}.”
6. Ereignis and Our Seynsgeschichte

At this point, we have traced Heidegger's avoidance of the question of community from Sein und Zeit, through his consideration of the essence of truth, to his reflections on truth and art in the mid-30's. Now I would like to turn to a theme which Heidegger begins to develop soon after his initial reflections on art; namely: Ereignis.

I will not argue that there is, in Heidegger's reflections on Ereignis, any significant development in his relation to the Gemeinschaftsfrage; indeed, I maintain that very little changes. Nevertheless, discussing this period of his thought, at least briefly, is important for two reasons: 1. it helps to show that Heidegger's fails to address the We throughout his path of thinking; 2. Heidegger's reflections on Ereignis help clarify the sense in which the "We" which he takes for granted "has a history".

* * *

Though "Ereignis" is a quite common term in German typically translated as "event," Heidegger appropriates it in a more precise way. John van Buren has pointed out that Heidegger had introduced this term into his philosophical lexicon already in his 1919 lecture course (The Young Heidegger, 12) only to drop it once more in the 20's. It is in 1934 that he turns to Ereignis once more, engaging this term as it emerges in Hölderlin's Mnemosyne (GR, §6e-f). In the context of Heidegger's 1934 reading of Hölderlin, this term points — in the manner of a "hint" — towards not just any event but the ur-event of Seyn. Heidegger says little more about Ereignis at this point, but this occurrence of the term in relation to "poetic saying" sets the stage for its full development beginning a few years later in the Beiträge (1936-8).

Ereignis can perhaps best be thought in terms of the polemic difference which characterizes truth in the Rektoratsrede and "The Origin of the Work of Art." In its self-withdrawing occurrence, it grants the Lichtung; it is the "Es" which "gives"[gibt]. What it grants, more specifically, is that ownness [Eigenheit; Eignung] whereby each settles into its allotment, i.e., into what belongs to it, determining it as "this" rather than "that." This apportioning of ownness is differential, the essence
of each emerging only through the struggle against what it is not, facing what opposes it across the Riβ in a mutual “belonging-together” [Zusammengehöören] (cf. ID, 20ff./laD, 19ff.).

The Es of Ereignis (is), as differential singularity, a κινησις prior to every subjectum, perpetually withdrawing (from) itself, other than itself (ID, 28ff./laD, 27ff.; cf. US, 24-5, 28ff/L, 202; 206ff.). As Heidegger argues in “The Principle of Identity” (1957), the ur-event of Ereignis underlies all else to the extent that even identity itself (τὸ αὐτὸ) turns out to be “grounded” in difference (ID, 18ff./laD, 17ff.). More specifically, whether the disparate elements in question are man and Being (Identity and Difference), world and thing (“Language”), thinking and poetry (“The Nature of Language”), or time and Being (“Time and Being”), Ereignis is in each case — and it always occurs in the singular — a ge-eignen: a gathering/separating of the disparate which brings each into its own [eigen] for the first time. This differential event, which is no longer the ontological difference, is what withdraws as it distributes presence. It is the πείρον which grants every περας (EGT, 53-4), the primordial “between” (US, 24ff/L, 202ff.) which, as the Riβ that “holds together yet apart,” opens up the Lichtung; allowing it to arrive.

That self-withdrawing ληθη is to be thought as “originary difference” helps us respond to a crucial concern first raised, at least tacitly, in Sein und Zeit: how can there “be” a self-withholding if there is not something which withholds itself — something which (is), if not an entity, then at least a unity in some sense, an “as such”? How could grammar and logic permit a saying capable of articulating this? While thinking Ereignis as the event of difference (i.e., Das Ereignis ereignet) does not “answer” such questions, it does fully engage the tension underlying them such that their very formulation is problematized.

At first glance, it might seem that Heidegger is simply positing the reverse of a long-standing metaphysical privilege: rather than claiming that identity is in some sense prior to difference, he appears to claim the opposite. However, Heidegger — who is always cautious regarding such mere reversals — is quite aware that the term “difference” just as much as “identity” is caught up in an oppositional logic from which it cannot be neatly extracted: to speak of difference “as such” already presupposes its identity as difference, i.e., it carries with it the tacit priority of identity over difference. Still, despite its rootedness in metaphysics, the term “difference” is essential to Heidegger’s thinking in the following way: the conventional subordination of difference to identity

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1 Most notably, the history of metaphysics — the history of the “Being of beings” — unfolds through the essence-ing of the πολέμος between Being and beings.

2 On the tension between gathering and dispersal in Heidegger’s use of the prefix “Ge-,” see Derrida’s “Sending: On Representation”.

3 Cf. ZSD, 24-5/OTB, 23-4.
-- i.e., the way in which difference always presupposes a prior identity uncontaminated by difference -- has been sustained in its privilege throughout the history of metaphysics only through the suppression of the ways in which identity likewise presupposes difference. Thus, by highlighting identity's dependency on difference, its contamination by difference, Heidegger does not merely enact a reversal; he displaces the identity-difference schema itself such that something else "comes to language," something which shows itself, however furtively, as neither identity nor difference, strictly speaking. This disclosure, which is akin to the transformation of essence and truth mentioned in "On the Essence of Truth," though it does not escape the language of metaphysics, forces this language to turn against itself and bear witness, despite itself, to something it is incapable of articulating. Specifically, in the thinking of Ereignis, the term "difference" functions provisionally to help us see that "what" withdraws in this event of difference-ing is prior - - in an impossible and unlocatable priority -- to both identity and difference, neither identical with nor other than the weave of difference(s) which emerges through its withdrawal.

In short, then, self-withdrawal of Ereignis is as much a self-differing/deferring withdrawal from any sense of self-hood as it is a withdrawal of self; it happens [ereignet], withdrawing/arriving as Enteignis/Ereignis, leaving us with difference(s) in the metaphysical sense; i.e., with "this" as distinct from "that," each assigned its own suitability [Eignung] within the tension of the Riβ, each standing over and against that which it is not.

The implications for the question and for the path of thinking are readily apparent: the questioning in which we participate, the path which we follow when we engage the most question-worthy -- these cannot be understood in terms of a secret [Geheimnis] which, though it is withheld from us, is somehow "there." To be sure, the Es appears, in some respects, like a secret: that which is withheld, unavailable, having not been given. And yet, here there is [es gibt] no secret, no potentially receivable yet withheld gift, for once it is "that which it is" -- even if only as hidden -- it has already been left behind by the unpresentable movement of differential singularity, a movement which is never identical with itself. Every presentation of this difference-ing movement misrepresents it, reducing it in each case to the secondary differentiation of a prior identity. Thus, already for Heidegger in 1950, as much as for Derrida seventeen years later, thoughtful questioning bears witness to the paradoxical necessity of an originary secondarity; and the path


5This relation between Ereignis/Enteignis is neither an identity nor a difference. As Heidegger says in his prefatory remarks to The End of Philosophy: "Ereignis and Enteignis can never be separated from each other, but rather constitute a relation which is what is most original of all (but not original in the sense of being a cause)..." (xiii-xiv).

6I am thinking of Heidegger's discussion of difference in the 1950 lecture "Language" and Derrida's 1967 essay "Differance" (in La voix et le phénomène).
traced by questioning could already, in 1950, be identified as an archi-trace of sorts, a path which is the wake left by "nothing" as much as by "something." Such parallels, however, are subject to strict limitation, as I will argue in the following chapter.

And yet, precisely what, for Heidegger, is the difference between *Ereignis* and Being? How is the relation between these two terms to be understood? In order to respond to such questions, we must turn briefly to Heidegger's "history of Being" [Seynsgeschichte].

As we noted in chapter 4, what the Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit* calls "meaning" [Sinn] undergoes a shift in 1930: ληθη, in *Sein und Zeit* a matter of self-withholding self-concealment, becomes a self-concealing self-withdrawal through which the *Lichtung* happens. Afterwards, Heidegger gradually comes to acknowledge that this "Sinn" has a "history" distinct from ontic-existentiell history.

The history of Being (i.e., of Ἱερον) is what Heidegger calls an "epochal history." As I touched upon briefly in my introduction, though the question "what is Being?" (the ground-question [Grundfrage]) is never broached in any depth within metaphysics, the question "what are beings?" (the guide-question [Leitfrage]) is asked often, and receives various determinate answers through Western history. Heidegger charts the way the response to this latter question unfolds, isolating various "epochs," each characterized by its groundedness in a specific response. He does this less because he is interested in the latter question per se than because every answer to it rests upon a tacit response to the first question. That is to say, the answer to the question "what are beings?" is an articulation of the ground of beings, i.e., Being. Each response isolates and names Being (whether as φύσις, ὄντα, actualitas, subiectum, etc.). So, though determinations of this ground (i.e., Being) do emerge historically, no one ever seriously raises the question: what is the character of this supposed "ground," not with respect to what it grounds, but as such? What is Being qua Being? For Heidegger, metaphysics is determined, first of all, by the path of pursuit followed by the guide-question, and we find ourselves and our history determined by this trajectory.

The "end" of metaphysics is the point at which the question "what are beings?" having run its course, exhausts all possible responses to it. At this point lies the possibility — previously concealed beneath the resolute pursuit of the first question — of seeing that the question of beings is grounded in the prior question "what is Being?" This forgotten possibility, prior to and concealed by the possibilities of metaphysics, is that of the transformation of our relation to Being and to questioning as such. Heidegger attempts to participate in this transformation — or, at the very least,
to participate in its preparation\(^7\) -- through the naming/saying of Ereignis. This saying happens \([\text{ereignet}]\) at the point where Seyn -- or \(\text{Seyn}\) -- as the difference between Being and beings, is finally brought to light, brought into the Lichtung such that the essence of truth is thought as the truth of essence.\(^8\) At this juncture, Being -- no longer that hidden, sheltered "resource" which, by withdrawing itself, grants metaphysics its site -- finally exposes itself as having been the blind-spot of metaphysical thinking; in this way, Being ceases to be the unthought which guides thinking. The naming of Ereignis is an attempt to begin preparing thought for a wholly other relation to a wholly other unthought, one which is both "earlier" than Being and yet still to come: a repetition, not of the specifically Greek origin, but of that originary, an-archic event with which the Greek world first opened up and history commenced:\(^9\)

The happening of the truth of Seyn must, out of a simple jolt of essential thinking, be displaced from the first origin into the other: with that the wholly other song of Seyn resounds (BzP, 8-9).

As should be evident from the fact that the articulation of the epochal history of Being emerges out of the reflection, in 1930, upon the essence of truth, these epochs do not occur as a datable "sequence in time", particularly since datable time itself can open up only within a prior epoch of Being:

That which is original occurs in advance of all that comes. Although hidden, it thus comes toward historical man as pure coming. It never perishes, it is never something past (EP, 75).

Nor does anything ontically identifiable stand out in this occurrence:

What happens in the history of Being? We cannot ask in this manner, because there would then be an occurrence and something which occurs. But occurrence itself is the sole happening. Being alone is. What happens? Nothing happens if we are searching for something occurring in the occurrence.

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\(^7\)Even the earliest reflections on Ereignis are in accord with the "shift towards the preparatory" taken by Heidegger's thinking in 1934. In the Beiträge zur Philosophie, for instance: "The 'contributions' [Beiträge] ask in a track [Bahn], which is first opened up through the transition to another origin, a transition into which Western thinking now enters. This course/track brings the transition into the opening of history [Offene der Geschichte] and establishes it as a perhaps very lengthy sojourn in which the execution of the other origin of thinking remains always only that which is anticipated but indeed still decided... With this the 'contributions' -- though they already and only speak of the essence of Seyn, i.e., of Ereignis -- do not yet enable the free juncture [Fuge] of the truth of Seyn itself to cohere [fügten: join] from out of this" (4).

\(^8\)For Heidegger, the difference between Being and beings is first covered over in metaphysics through the two-fold meaning of οὐδείς (W, 329-30/LH, 209) [a duplicity which is itself rooted in the two-fold meaning of τὸ ὤν (EGT, 32-3)] as both "presence" and "what is present." Thinking this difference means thinking "...the essence-ing [Wesung] of Seyn itself, that which we name Ereignis" (BzP, 7).

\(^9\)Granted, there are times when Heidegger seems to identify Being and Ereignis and Being seems to maintain a crucial role in thought's relation to the other origin (e.g., ZSD, 25/OTB, 24). Heidegger's point in such passages, however, is that thought can hold itself open to the possibility of this other origin if it thinks back through the history of metaphysics (ZSD, 44/OTB, 41).
Indeed, we can begin to understand Heidegger’s epochal history of Being by altering slightly what we have taken to be the fundamental “axiom” of “On the Essence of Truth,” thus: the essence of epochality is the epochality of essence. Recall that for Heidegger this type of “proposition” marks a transformation; in this case, the existentiell concept of “epoch” is brought to bear witness to another epochality:

1. In §74-76 of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger works through Dasein’s historicity, which could also be called the “essence of epochality”. At this point in the text, we have already come to see that Dasein “is” its disclosedness, i.e., that the structure of Dasein’s Being as care is the open character of the Lichtung, of the da. We have also come to see that the Lichtung itself is grounded in primordial temporality [Zeitlichkeit]. In working through historicity, Heidegger attempts to show what it means for entities -- both Dasein and “things” -- to be “historical,” given that the meaning of Dasein’s Being is temporality. He maintains that historical truth, like all truth, is grounded in Dasein’s Being-uncovering (in the Lichtung). That is to say, Dasein relates to what is historical by being towards the existentiell possibilities opened up through the world within which other Dasein, “historical Dasein,” were at one time situated -- that world which constitutes another “epoch.” Only insofar as it understands [versteht] the world of an other in advance can historiological Dasein interpret [interpretiert] this other and the “things” to which it had been related. Thus, only insofar as both historiological Dasein and historical Dasein are both situated within a common Lichtung, a Lichtung which makes available shared possibilities, is history possible. 

2. In contrast, the “epochality of essence” is the epochality of “Wesen” in the verbal sense. As such, it is not concerned with epochs accessible and comprehensible within the Lichtung, but is rather the epochality through which the Lichtung itself opens up as Being withdraws itself. In his 1950 essay “The Anaximander Fragment,” Heidegger provides a concise synopsis of “epochality” in this latter transformed sense:

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11 Granted, Heidegger uses “Zeitalter” rather than “Epoche” in Sein und Zeit (see §76); Nevertheless, “epochality,” as developed later, emerges from and is intended to stand in sharp contrast to the explication in Sein und Zeit of historicity.

12 See especially Sein und Zeit, 392ff. As we have seen, the notion of a shared Lichtung presents serious problems for the coherence of Sein und Zeit.
The being itself does not step into this light of Being. The unconcealment of beings, the brightness granted them, obscures the light of Being.... As it reveals itself in beings. Being withdraws.... In this way, by illuminating them. Being sets beings adrift in errancy.... Error is the space in which history unfolds.... Without errancy there would be no connection from destiny to destiny: there would be no history.... Being thereby holds to its truth and keeps to itself.... Its early sign is Μ-ιτονοετοι. As it provides the unconcealment of beings it founds the concealment of Being.... We may call this luminous keeping to itself in the truth of its essence the ἔποχη of Being.... The epoch of Being belongs to Being itself: we are thinking it in terms of the experience of the oblivion of Being.... From the ἔποχη of Being comes the epochal essence of its destin ing, in which world history properly consists. When Being keeps to itself in its destin ing, world suddenly and unexpectedly comes to pass. Every epoch of world history is an epoch of errancy (EGT. 26).  

The ἔποχη discussed here is quite different from Husserl’s suspension of natural attitude judgments. Indeed, it signifies the emerging-opening of the Lichtung itself via the ἔπεξεῖν proper to Being: Being’s prior withdrawal or self-suspension whereby truth itself is granted to us, arriving as its essence “happens” [ereignet].

To be sure, there is a sense in which each specific solution to the question “what are beings?” occurs within a series, each a particular, datable “epoch” amongst others; thus, the epochality in question might seem to be articulable as a sequence of events which unfolds in ontico-existentiell fashion in time. However, we must keep in mind the unique dilemma in which Heidegger finds himself when he discusses the history of Being. On the one hand, he is trying to bear witness to the ur-event of Being’s withdrawal — an “event” which happens not in time but as the very arrival of time and which, moreover, does not happen “all at once” but somehow distributes itself along multiple points of commencement, configuring the temporal-aletheic Lichtung differently at each point along Being’s self-differing withdrawal. On the other hand, in articulating this proto-temporal movement, Heidegger can only speak the language of metaphysics, i.e., his act of narrative gathering must necessarily utilize the historiographical, subject-oriented vocabulary of the epoch of Being in which he finds himself. Thus, Heidegger’s narration bears witness to the ἔποχη of Being by: a. presenting a coherent narrative which appears to represent metaphysics historiographically and thus to willfully overcome [überwinden] it, while b. simultaneously turning this vocabulary against itself in order to expose that which necessarily exceeds and makes possible all such narrative gathering (EP, I, 75ff., 91ff.).  

What unites the various epochs of Being into a narrative is their shared participation in the question “what are beings?,” a question which can maintain its metaphysical priority only through the oblivion of Being (more specifically, the history of metaphysics has unfolded as the pursuit of

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14 On Heidegger’s double relation to narrative coherence, see Robert Bernasconi’s Heidegger in Question (xx, xxiii, 9).
answers to the *Leitfrage*, 'what are beings?', only because it has forgotten the *Grundfrage* which underlies the *Leitfrage*: 'what is Being?' [cf. NIV, 206-8]: the progression of the epochal history of Being is marked by the accumulation of interpretive detritus left in Being's wake, each epoch "building upon" the oblivion of the previous one as avenues of questioning are pursued and exhausted. The task for thinking, then, is precisely what Heidegger had already outlined in §6 of *Sein und Zeit*: the excavatory *Destruktion* of the history of ontology. The following passage from *On Time and Being* points to the necessity of such a *Destruktion* and underscores the difference between the two approaches to epochality outlined above:

The epochs overlap each other in their sequence so that the original sending of Being as presence is more and more obscured in different ways... Only the gradual removal of these obscuring covers -- that is what is meant by 'Destruktion' -- procures for thinking a preliminary insight into what then reveals itself as the destiny of Being. Because one everywhere represents the destiny of Being only as history, and history only as a kind of occurrence [Geschoken], one tries in vain to interpret this occurrence in terms of what was said in *Sein und Zeit* about the historicity of Dasein (not of *Sein*). By contrast, the only possible way to anticipate the latter thought on the destiny of Being from the perspective of *Sein und Zeit* is to think through what was presented in *Sein und Zeit* about the *Destruktion* of the ontological doctrine of the Being of beings (ZSD, 9/OTB, 9).  

This thinking of *Ereignis* and the epochality of Being radicalizes the development of questioning already accomplished in "On the Essence of Truth." To begin with, though Heidegger had already begun, in 1930, to trace a path opened up for thinking by the self-withdrawing "unthought" (see my chapter 4), it is through the thinking of *Ereignis* that we first begin to see how the various essential responses made by thought as it moves along this path emerge, each in its singularity, as the opening-up of particular epochs. Secondly, in the thinking of *Ereignis*, we begin to see the undecideable relation Heidegger's own thinking has to epochality: his path of thinking is situated "in" this epochal history, for it continues to trace the unthought which has left this epochal history in its wake. Yet at the same time, it is not in this history, for his thinking is, for the first time, sent the 'Wesen of history as such' as food for thought (ZSD, 44/OTB, 41). It is thus perhaps best to say that his interrogative steps -- steps which trace back through the *Seynsgeschichte* in search of a possibility for thinking "prior" to it -- traverse, without "crossing over," the margin of Western history itself.

But how do matters stand, then, with the *We* and community?

There are, to begin with, a few points which should be immediately evident: it should now be clearer how the *We* of Heidegger's 1934 Hölderlin lectures might have a history -- a history which "is" the *We*’s relatedness to Being and which is prior to and necessary for existentiell-ontic history;

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15Cf. *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, §12.
similarly, it should now be clearer how, for Heidegger, this history relates to our Lichtung, allowing it to unfold epochally out of originary difference (Ereignis).

And then, there is a less obvious point: as I suggested previously, and as Heidegger himself anticipates in his 1934 lectures (§5), the reflections on Ereignis take place at a point along the path of thinking which requires first passing through the We as “food for thought.” And, as I’ve tried to show in this chapter and in the previous one, Heidegger does not so much pass through the We as pass over it; he pushes it aside, never engaging it thoughtfully. While the tension involved in passing over the We in this manner is marginalized in much of the later reflection on Ereignis, it is much more pronounced in the first considerations of Ereignis in 1936-8, just as it had been in the 1934 lectures.

In his Beiträge zur Philosophie (1936-8), Heidegger takes up the question which had been raised in 1934: who are we? Here he maintains just as he does in 1927 and again in 1934 that, though our thinking must begin by considering the factically given “I,” its task is to pass back through this I-subject which no longer maintains authority over us, thinking back to “us” in our essence. As Heidegger points out (ibid., 68), German idealism had already acknowledged that thinking back through the I-subject to its essential relation to others is not a rejection but rather a radicalization of self-reflection.16 According to Heidegger, however, idealism was not in a position to think what is most essential about this self-reflection because it did not yet comprehend self-reflection in terms of the Seinsfrage:

16 In my introduction (§1), I discussed briefly how, for both Kant and Hegel, “with-ness” is constitutive of the subject prior to any separation which might characterize it.
the-ground-be" (ibid., 31). And, just as in 1934, the attempt to think the question of Being as the fundamental relation between Being and man must pass through another question: "who are we?":

...insofar as 'we' ourselves -- after the originary establishment of the essence of reflection as self-reflection -- also move in the region of the question, the philosophical question [specifically, the Seinsfrage], can be brought to the question-form: who are we? (ibid., 48).

And, once again as in 1934, Heidegger emphasizes that this question is distinct from the question "what are we?"

Something becomes immediately apparent: the way that which is interrogated in the question is put forth: 'we' already contain a decision concerning the Who. That is to say: we cannot -- untouched by the Who-question -- put forth the 'we' and the 'us' as if they referred to a present-at-hand being [Vorhandenes] which is only still missing the determination of the Who (ibid., 48-9).

The We is no ὦΑη awaiting its μορφή, for as Heidegger had already shown in 1934, each we is -- in its factual We-ness -- already decided as to what it is. This does not render absurd the question "who are we?," rather, it demands that the relation between the We and the Who be thought otherwise than in terms of the ὦΑη/μορφή distinction: 17

In the question 'who are we' lies and stands the question, whether we are. These questions are inseparable [unzerrtrennlich] and this inseparability is again merely the signal of the concealed essence of human-being [Menschsein] and indeed of the historical [geschichtlichen].

Here, a view is opened up into a whole other type of context [Zusammenhang], other in type than those known by the bare calculation and concern of present-at-hand Man-essence [Menschenwesen] -- as though, where [Man] is concerned, it were only a matter of a shapelessness [Unformung], like that which the potter takes up with the lump of clay (ibid., 51).

More specifically: a. what we are has in each case been rendered possible by a prior who-decision, a decision concerning self-Being; b. this decision concerning self-Being is not at our disposal; it happens [ereignet] not when "we" choose to be ourselves. stamping ourselves with "our essence," but only when the wholly Other is reflected through us, using us. It is of this reflection of the wholly Other that Heidegger is thinking when he claims that a reflection of the Kehre (ibid., 49) lies in the question "who are we?." As we saw in the previous section, only seldom in the history of Seyn (specifically, at the points where "our" essence has abandoned "us") does the dominant what-question allow this who-question -- and thus the question of self-Being -- to emerge with any force.

And for Heidegger it is emerging for "us" now; for however many times "we" might ask ourselves "who are we?," all our pursuit discloses is the extent to which "we" are without resources for finding an answer:

17 See my brief discussion, in chapter 5, of Lacoue-Labarthe's reading of Heidegger. Recall that, for Lacoue-Labarthe, the eidetics at work in onto-typology always presuppose the ὦΑη/μορφή schema.
Do we know us -- ourselves? How should we be ourselves, if we are not ourselves? And how can we be ourselves without knowing who we are, thereby certain of whom we are, to be thus that we are?

The Who-question is therefore no superficial/external [äußerlich] supplement, as if through its answer some additional information about Man might be given -- information which is, in terms of the 'practical', superficial. Rather, the Who-question puts forth the question about Self-Being and thereby about the essence of self-hood (ibid., 51).

It is ultimately in terms of Ereignis, the differential rift wherein history unfolds, that Heidegger in 1936-8 attempts to engage the who-question and the self-question in their relation to the wholly Other: "The Self-hood of Man -- of the historical as of the people -- is a region of occurrence [Geschehnisbereich] in which he is suited to himself [sich zu-eignen] only if he himself is handed down to the open Time-Space in which a suitability or own-ness can occur"(ibid.). This passage articulates self-Being as a suitability [Eignung] which can be allocated to us only within a region of suitability -- the region opened up via Ereignis.

This Eignung also anticipates the belonging-together of Man and Being as worked out much later in Identity and Difference, for here already the "identity" of the self is grounded upon an Eignung which "is" only through its separation from and belonging-to [zugehörige] the truth of Being (ibid.). Thus, any 'separation from/belonging' to each other which might characterize the relations within a determinate community has its ground in a more primordial relation: that Eignung which is both our separation from and our belonging to the gods:

A people is a people only if it receives its allotted history [Geschichte] in the finding of its god: that god who assigns the way to the people itself and thus places it back in being .... The essence of [a] people finds its ground in the historicity of self-belonging out of the belonging-ness to the god. Out of Ereignis, wherein this belonging-ness historically grounds itself, first springs forth the proof [Begründung] why 'life' and body, generation [Zeugung] and species [Geschlecht], race [Stamm], in ground-words means: the earth, belonging to history and in its manner again taking back history into itself, and in all this subservient only to the strife of earth and world, carried out by the innermost timidity, ever to be an unconditioned. Then its essence is indeed, because it is in this strife, at the same time near Ereignis (§251).

Volk, Gemeinschaft, the We -- as far as Heidegger is concerned, each of these can be understood in their essence not through "biologism" but only through the destined and polemic between [zwischen](§42) of Man and gods, a between which happens as Ereignis itself.

And while it might seem that Heidegger expects "we the people" to somehow engage the gods before "we are" as a people, he anticipates such a dilemma:

Yet how should [they, the people] find the god if they are not those who discretely search for the sake of the people, and if, even as these seekers for the appearance [of the god], [they] must stand against the not yet communal community [das noch nicht volkhafe 'Volk']! Yet these seekings must themselves first be: as existing [seiende] they are preparatory [vorzubereiten (?)](§251).

18A biologism which Heidegger regarded, right up to the end, as a "contaminant" in what could have been a "purer National Socialism (see "The Rectorate 1933-34: Facts and Thoughts").
Heidegger maintains, contrary to a thinking which allows its understanding of "essence" to be guided by ἐποίησις and μορφή, that just as entities still are -- and indeed are more than ever -- when Being (Wesen) has withdrawn, likewise each of "us" still is when "who we are" has withdrawn. It is possible, even necessary, for Heidegger, that existence take place "in the gaps between 'We's, in the "residual Lichtung" left by a bygone belonging-together of gods and people (in "our" case, in the shadow of the epoch of subjectivity). All "we" can do is prepare for a we to emerge, a we which cannot simply be "us" stamped with some form or other. Indeed, even to ask whether and how "we" might come to participate in the we which is yet to come is to misunderstand: for Heidegger, "we" can, at most, prepare the way; "we" have no future for "we" are not. The essence-ing of Being needs [braucht] the complementary emergence of a we, to be sure; but this we is not "us." To posit such an identity is more than Heidegger's thought will allow.

And yet, though Heidegger acknowledges that the We is grounded in originary difference, this difference is itself compromised by his refusal to interrogate the We as such. Heidegger does, to be sure, go to great lengths to engage the question "who are we?," and his thinking is, within these limits, rigorous. The problem is not in the way Heidegger pursues this question, but in how the pursuit of this question is complicit with the avoidance of another: the Gemeinschaftsfrage, the question which does not ask "who are we?" but "why we?." As this unequivocal claim from the Beiträge shows, the problematic of the We is, in the end, safely contained within the question of Being: "...the question 'who are we?' must remain purely and fully inserted in the question of the ground-question: how does Sein unfold?"(§19).

What is the significance of this passage, given our analysis in chapter 2 of the neutralization of the question of community in Sein und Zeit? What is its significance given the trajectory we have traced from Sein und Zeit to the thinking of Ereignis? Could it be that it is not "who we are?" which Heidegger experiences as having withdrawn from "us" but, more radically, We-ness itself? Is it possible that the unasked question "why the We?" points to what, throughout the course of Heidegger's path of thinking, is the most self-concealing of all?

In any case, the We and community still possess a secure status in Heidegger's thinking up through his reflections on Ereignis -- a status which is maintained only because neither of them are at any point submitted to rigorous interrogation. Though Heidegger's passage from the essence of truth to τέχνη as art to the history of Being and Ereignis is indeed an acknowledgment of the We's groundedness in originary difference, what is left standing along this path of Destruktion is the determinate We -- a We which, from the very beginning (1927), demanded analysis and never received it.
Thus far, we are faced with a task and a dilemma:

1. As discussed in chapters 1 and 3, thinking is gathered for Heidegger, however precariously, in a path which opens up through the question of Being. And as we saw in chapters 4 to 6, what is situated in this path, in relation to the Seinsfrage, is precisely a We (albeit, perhaps one yet to come); and its role is not at all accidental, for where the very arrival (essence-ing) of the Lichtung is concerned, we — structured differentially as creators and preservers — are the recipients of the Es' gift, the very sounding board of its withdrawal: the Lichtung happens through us, and “we are” only in and through its happening.

Our Task: to engage the question of Being; that is to say, to await what is sent to “us” through this question, sent for “us” to think. This means, at the same time, to prepare for the arrival/essence-ing of the receptive-participatory We itself.

2. And yet, as discussed in chapter 2 and in chapters 4 through 6, this “we” is itself problematic; for the question of Being maintains itself as ours in its priority and centrality only through its covertly inconsistent relation to the question of community. Specifically, while it is through the appeal to the Seinsfrage that Heidegger can justify sidestepping explicit consideration of the Gemeinschaftsfrage, it is conversely only through this avoidance of the Gemeinschaftsfrage that the Seinsfrage maintains its authority:

i. In the context of Heidegger’s path of thinking, to thoughtfully engage the question “what is community?” would involve not merely answering it but developing it as a question, i.e., “situating” it in relation to that abyssal ground [Abgrund] of questioning, the Seinsfrage. It is because of this “ground position” of the question of Being within questioning that the question of community, like all other questions, possesses at best a secondary status for Heidegger and can thus presumably be avoided.

ii. Yet the question of Being, as “grounding question”[Grundfrage], is able to be the kinetic but traceable conduit through which the Es withdraws, granting us in our difference from Being, only if we are possible as participatory recipients. The We is, as Derrida might say, an unavoidable supplement without which Being would not “be;” and just as Being needs us — or at least the possibility of an us — so does the pathway of Heidegger’s questioning. Thus, Heidegger does not engage the aporetic question of
community at any point in his thinking because to do so would, as we have seen, jeopardize the *We*, the point of reception for the Es' sending.

"*Our* Dilemma": how must "we" engage Heidegger's thinking now that the previously tacit significance of the *Gemeinschaftsfage* -- not only in *Sein und Zeit* but throughout his path of thinking -- has been brought to light?

In the following two chapters, I will attempt a response to this dilemma: chapter 7 will exhibit a point along Heidegger's path of thinking where the priority of the *Seinsfrage* is displaced, allowing the question of community to be inscribed for the first time "within" this path; chapter 8 will carry out this inscription, reintroducing the *Gemeinschaftsfage* into the analysis of *Sein und Zeit* and outlining some of the implications of this reintroduction.
7. Up Against the Question

Only the singular is repeatable.

- Beiträge zur Philosophie, §20

This chapter will digress from explicit consideration of the question of community in order to address certain methodological concerns. I maintain that this will make possible a more radical analysis of the Gemeinschaftsfrage in Heidegger’s thought than would otherwise have been possible.

More specifically, I will show here how the gradual movement of Heidegger’s thinking towards the essence of language displaces, at a precise juncture, the quasi-archaic role of the question of Being in his thought. I will show further that this displacement allows the question of community to be inscribed for the first time “within” Heidegger’s path of thinking — an inscription which will be carried out in chapter 8.

This chapter consists of two parts:
1. Point of Inflection: Ereignis and Sprache
2. Towards a Responsible Protocol

1. Point of Inflection: Ereignis and Sprache

Even a cursory reading of the trajectory of Heidegger’s reflections on language [Die Sprache] reveals that he gradually comes to regard Ereignis as not merely the ground of language but the very event of language: Ereignis happens [ereignet] as language. In this segment we will see that this insight, worked through rigorously, undermines what had allowed Heidegger to avoid the question of community and thus demands the explicit Destruktion of the We as it functions in his thinking.

In Sein und Zeit, language plays a crucial role. As I emphasized in chapter 3, the Dasein of Sein und Zeit exists understandingly in its world by being in relation to both a meaning (or the already withdrawn background for all comportment) and an interpretation (the determinate comportment which already stands forth from out of meaning, crystallizing possibility as this or that). An existentiale which plays a crucial role with respect to this meaning-interpretation [Sinn-Auslegung] relation is Discourse [Rede], a constitutive element of the Da, equiprimordial with state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] and understanding [Verstehen](165). Discourse is, as Heidegger
demonstrates in §34, what has always broken down or articulated [gegliedert] in advance the intelligibility of something, and has done so prior to any appropriative interpretation (161). Indeed, it is only because discourse articulates the very clearing of meaning’s self-withdrawal, breaking down the background into a “totality of significations”[Bedeutungsganze] (ibid.), that determinate interpretations can emerge forth from out of meaning into concrete comportment.

Language has an essential function here, for discourse, if it is to articulate intelligibility in the world, needs to manifest itself in the world, i.e., it needs to be expressed; and language is precisely the way in which discourse [die Rede] shows itself within the totality of worldly significations; language is the way discourse gets spoken out [hinausgesprochen]: “Language is a totality of words -- a totality in which discourse has a ‘worldly’ Being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand”(ibid.). Still, though language is certainly important for Heidegger’s analysis of Being-in-the-world, its treatment in Sein und Zeit is not only provisional but is also viewed only in terms of Dasein’s Being and the “truth of beings” (i.e., the disclosive Lichtung viewed in terms of the uncovering of beings). How, and indeed whether, language is a relevant concern for the truth of Being is not yet clear.

It is not until 1934 that Heidegger begins explicitly to discuss the nature of language -- an awkward and painstaking discussion which develops gradually over the course of several years. As I suggested in chapter 5, his initial steps in this discussion are evident in the 1934 Hölderlin lecture, where he indicates for the first time the poetic ground of language; specifically: it is poetic τέχνη which allows the hints of the gods to be echoed in the language of the people (§4c-d); and it is in terms of this difference at the heart of language -- a difference between the call of the gods and this call’s response/echo in our communal voice -- that the difference between Being and beings voices itself, the grounding-event [Grundgeschehenis] of exposure in being (§7g). A few years later, we come to see that language as poetic saying -- the most originary form of τέχνη -- is “the setting-into-work of truth”(H, 63/OWA, 74); which is to say, language happens as the Rifβ which separates and holds together earth and world, self-concealment and un-concealment (ibid., 48ff./60ff.). And by 1938, Heidegger explicitly refers to the differential character of language as the silent difference of Ereignis:

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1 "Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache”(161)
2 "Our interpretation of language has been designed merely to point out the ontological ‘locus’ of this phenomenon in Dasein’s state of Being”(166). And yet, though the analysis in §34 is provisional and not at all comprehensive. Heidegger suggests almost thirty years later that it still warrants careful reflection (US, 137-8/OWL, 41-2).
3 US, 93-4/OWL, 8.
Language finds its ground in silence [Schweigen]. Silence is the most concealed measure-holding. It holds the measure in which it first sets the standard [Maßstab]. And so language is the setting-of-measure in the innermost and widest; setting-of-measure as bringing-to-essence [Ereignung] of the joint [Fug] and its joining [Fügung] (Ereignis). (BzP, 510; cf. ibid., 34)

Thus, the difference between the language of the gods and the language of the people — between Winken and Weiterwinken — is a silent difference. And somehow history itself happens through this Schweigen which lies at the heart of language: “If the gods of the earth call and in the call a world echoes and so the call rings out [anklingt] as the Da-sein of Man, then language, as historical, is [the] history-grounding word”(ibid.).

In Letter on Humanism (1946), well after Heidegger’s turn towards Ereignis, the silent essence of language is taken up once again. Here he writes: “Language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of Being. Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings”(W, 318/LH, 199). We are blind to language’s essential [wesentlich] relation to the truth of Being because, mired as we are in the metaphysical epoch of subjectivity, language appears to us as a tool through which it is possible for us to represent and name everything we encounter — to “confront the mystery”(ibid., 318-19/199), as it were, via the power of the “said”. 4 It is the way this epoch, via its determinations of Being and truth, manages the representation of language (double genitive) that makes “silence” the challenge for our thinking:

Everything depends on this alone, that the truth of Being come to language and that thinking attain to this language. Perhaps, then, language requires much less precipitous expression than proper silence. But who of us today would want to imagine that his attempts to think are at home on the path of silence? At best, thinking could perhaps point toward the truth of Being, and indeed toward it as what is to be thought (ibid., 344/223).

In terms of this epoch, silence, like the “nothing”,5 has been reduced in advance to the absence of representation, a mere void waiting to be filled; likewise language is reduced to something at our disposal, something which can always be made to explicitly articulate and thus present what is intended. Language appears to be that which fills the void of silence, and this stance toward language deafens us in advance to the possibility that we should hearken to silence itself — silence not as the simple absence of “something said” but rather as the silent difference which is the measure of all saying, the “lighting-concealing advent [Ankunft] of Being itself”(ibid., 326/206). And yet, what could it mean that the truth of Being “comes” to language? How could this “coming” involve “silence”? What might “our” proper acknowledgment of the silent-differential essence of

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4 According to Heidegger, the “instrumental” view of language, though it does not emerge fully until the epoch of subjectivity, is prefigured by an interpretation of language (αγορα) as old as metaphysics itself (cf. BzP, 276).

5 Heidegger first began to reflect on the “nothing” in “What is Metaphysics?”.
language be? What would distinguish such an acknowledgment from non-acknowledgment? And, finally, what is at stake in such an acknowledgment?

We will consider the last question first. In the 1953 lecture, “The Question Concerning Technology”, Heidegger discusses the “bringing-forth” [Her-vor-bringen] which manifests itself in different ways in Aristotle’s four causes. He argues that, differences aside, the essence of all bringing-forth is truth, διάλεγμα, since bringing forth as such “comes to pass only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment” (ibid., 15ff./293ff.); he claims moreover that, for the ancient Greeks, the term ποιήσις captured the broadest sense of bringing forth, including not just the handicraft production and artistic creation of τέχνη but also φύσις, that “bursting forth” proper to the natural world (ibid.). By way of contrast, we today have no grasp of ποιήσις, for we find ourselves at the tail-end of that epochal movement wherein, though we have been granted successive determinations of truth, the essence of truth has withdrawn into ever more profound oblivion; indeed, for us bringing-forth (ποιήσις) has given way to a determination of τέχνη which merely challenges forth: “the revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging-forth [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such” (ibid., 18/296). Here, it is not man who decides to relate to nature (and ultimately to himself [ibid., 30-1/308]) in this technical manner, for the stance which man takes in any given epoch is but a response to the prior, destinial call of Being — in this case, a response to “that challenging claim which gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve: ‘Ge-stell’” (ibid., 23/301).

This may seem to have little to do with the question raised above. However, it is in precisely this Gestell which has called us into absolute oblivion concerning Being and truth that the possibility of acknowledging the essence of language lies; and it is here that the stakes of such an acknowledgment become clear. For Heidegger, the Gestell which characterizes the modern, technological dispensation of truth is not merely one danger amongst others but the danger (ibid., 308): the danger that “all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing reserve” (ibid., 38/315), the danger that man might never enter into a “more original revealing and hence...experience the call of a more primal truth” (32/309). And yet, drawing from the couplet from Hölderlin’s “Patmos” in which the site of “danger” [Gefahr] is identified paradoxically as the very site of “saving power” [Rettende], Heidegger asks:

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6 Though this lecture, in its current form, was first given in 1953, an earlier version had been presented to the Bremen Club in 1949.
But might there not perhaps be a more primally granted revealing that could bring the saving power into its first shining-forth in the midst of the danger that in the technological age rather conceals than shows itself? (ibid.: 38/315)

For Heidegger, *Gestell* presents man with two essential possibilities; for though, on the one hand, it grants him a mode of truth which is completely cut off from the originary essence of truth (i.e., from the ληθη - ἀληθεία relation), it is nevertheless a mode of truth, and thus also grants him the possibility of thoughtfully engaging this having been cut off from truth’s essence so that he can enter a new relation with this essence, the essence which Heidegger in the *Beiträge* refers to as the “other origin”.

7 The otherness here must be taken seriously, for Heidegger is not interested in a nostalgic return to the original Greek sense of τεχνη and ποιησις (cf. VA, 154/BDT, 337). However much these terms may reflect the Greeks’ proximity to the essence of truth, “our” task here and now is to ready ourselves, as the Greeks had, for that singular and unprecedented event [Ereignis] which might open up a possibility “older” than those which are specifically Greek: a completely other history, a completely other We. Heidegger’s hope — and we must remember that nothing is certain where this possibility is concerned (VA, 39/QCT, 316) — is that such a new relation might come about through a hearkening to poetic saying:

> There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the name τεχνη. Once that revealing which brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant appearance was also called τεχνη. Once there was a time when the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was called τεχνη. The ποιησις of the fine arts was also called τεχνη. (ibid., 38/315)

Τεχνη as poetic saying is, as we have seen, the essence of language which first opens up the relation between gods and man, Being and beings. The stakes here are, for Heidegger, the most radical imaginable: either we will be cut off absolutely from the essence of truth, falling into a challenging-forth which reduces not just nature but also ourselves to mere standing reserve for the will to will, or we enter into a new relation with truth which once more makes it possible for man to dwell in relation to the gods — thus once more making possible “originary ethics,” in Heidegger’s sense of the term.

8 To return to our other questions, that the truth of Being “comes to language” has nothing to do with such and such a content being expressed through language; rather it is, as Heidegger would later say, language itself that comes (US, 161/OWL, 59), arriving as the truth of Being, the disclosive, archi-linguistic event of bringing-forth (τεχνη) without which beings could never

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7 “The happening [Geschehen] of the truth of Seyn must, out of a simple joli [Ruck] of essential thinking, be displaced [versezett] from the first origin in to the other; with that the whole other song of Seyn resounds”(8-9).

8 In “Letter on ‘Humanism’”(253ff/231ff.), Heidegger argues that “ethics” as such makes no sense unless it is thought in terms of the Greek sense of “ήθος” as originary dwelling. For him, of course, this is the archi-dwelling of man in relation to the gods prior to any ontico-existentiell dwelling.
emerge forth from unconcealment. That language here comes to itself does not mean that something emerges from one linguistic “register” into another; it is not the case, for instance, that there is “first” the language of the gods and then, “subsequently,” an echo of this originary language in the language of the people. Rather, this coming to itself of language marks, as I’ve already suggested, a break or Riβ within language itself which first makes possible the difference between a “from here” and a “to there,” the difference necessary for every coming from concealment into unconcealment. Indeed, this Riβ does not happen to a previously coherent, unified language but is the self-othering event of linguistic essencing (“wenen” in the verbal sense). The Riβ is what “comes” before all else.

The arrival of this Riβ is silent because, as originary difference, it precedes and makes possible each determinate “said” in its difference from other such “saids.” Its prior withdrawal from every emergent articulation is the withdrawal or “default”[Ausbleiben] of Being (i.e., the truth of Being). Language is the “house of the truth of Being”(W, 333/LH, 213) because it is the arrival of the primordial ókoς, the disclosive “between” through which the Geschick of Being unfolds and which is “nearer” to us than any entity. Moreover, when Heidegger says “...thinking in its saying merely brings the unspoken word of Being to language”(ibid., 361/239), we begin to see how the “acknowledgment” of the essence of language must be conceived. Here, he is indicating that thoughtful saying must, rather than represent what arrives, hold back from representation in order to acknowledge this difference.9 Thinking participates in τεχνη qua “bringing-forth” by stepping back [geschritten zurück] to make room for and shelter the arrival in its nameless coming/withdrawal.

If we turn to the 1950 lecture “Language,” we begin to sense how elusive this acknowledgment actually is. The whole of this essay is geared less towards saying something about language than towards listening to what comes to language in the phrase “die Sprache spricht”(US, 12/L, 190). Heidegger says we can best hear what happens in this phrase by finding “something that is spoken purely rather than [picking] just any spoken material at random”(16/194). And for him, not surprisingly, “[what] is spoken purely is the poem”(ibid.);10 thus he enjoins us to hear what happens in the poetic saying of Georg Trakl in his poem “Ein Winterabend.” We shall consider Heidegger’s reading of this poem briefly, though this will require some preliminary digression into some of his other texts.

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9 Compare this passage from the Nietzsche lectures: “Thinking to encounter does not omit the default of Being. But neither does it attempt to gain control of the default and to brush it aside. Thinking to encounter follows Being in its withdrawal, follows it in the sense that it lets Being itself go, while for its own part it stays behind”(Niv, 225).

10 This “purity” of poetic saying clearly reflects Heidegger’s earlier remarks in “The Origin of the Work of Art”(61ff./72ff.).
To begin with, Heidegger’s *Gespräch* with Trakl in the essay “Language” is best understood in conjunction with another essay, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” written around the same time (1951), for both essays are oriented towards the difference between what Heidegger at that time calls *fourfold* and *thing*. In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger rethinks the earth-world *Riß* of 1936 -- not that he “corrects” his previous claims; rather, as I will demonstrate here, he explicitly underscores the *doubling* already operative in the term “earth”(*ληθή*) as treated in “The Origin of the Work of Art”.

Recall that Heidegger’s concern, in 1936, is to show how Dasein’s engagement in τεχνή qua art functions for truth: the art-work accomplishes truth’s very “setting itself into work”(*H*, 50/OWA, 62), its being fixed in place in the figure [*Gestalt*](51/64). What is fixed in place is, more precisely, the rift itself, the polemic strife between originary concealment and unconcealment, earth (*ληθή*, self-concealing φύσις) and world (*ἀλήθεια*) (50/63). However, the fixing in place of the earth-world opposition in the work of art was never intended by Heidegger to be an adequate and self-sufficient *Stellung*, for “earth” did not -- not even in 1936 -- isolate originary *ληθή* as such.¹¹ That is to say, what withdraws itself from presentation in the open clearing of world is not merely earth (as opposed to world) but the very *Riß* which grants the difference between earth and world.

Indeed, “what” is disclosed through the accomplishment of the art-work -- the instigation of strife, its being fixed in place -- happens through a *double* move: the unifying locative event of the art-work does, as Lacoue-Labarthe points out, *gather and present* *ληθή* and *ἀλήθεια* in their opposition, thereby submitting the semantic chain of *Riß/reissen* to that of *stellen* and *pragen*;¹² but at the same time this gathering is, already for the Heidegger of 1936, one which problematizes itself: what it presents is precisely the *impossibility* of presenting the *Riß*: the latter is “presented” only through and as its prior withdrawal from all *stellen*. As I argued in chapter 3, this doubled logic, already at work in *Sein und Zeit*, is a central component of Heidegger’s thinking. A careful reading of “The Origin of the Work of Art” in terms of this logic discloses that the “earth” of 1936 simultaneously can and cannot be opposed to “world;” it is ultimately unlocatable, unopposable.

In certain respects, “Building Dwelling Thinking” repeats the trajectory of “The Origin of the Work of Art.” To begin with, the term “earth” appears once more and -- though it is no longer opposed explicitly to world -- it still resembles “earth” as articulated in 1936: it is still described in

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¹¹ The following passage, for instance, indicates that no fixed term, whether it be “earth” or some other term, could adequately designate what is at stake in originary *ληθή*: “The earth appears openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is by nature undisclosable, that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up...The earth is essentially self-secluding. To set forth the earth means to bring it into the Open as the self-secluding”(*H*, 33/OWA, 47).

¹² See my remarks on Lacoue-Labarthe in chapter 5.
the lethic φοιτίς-language of self-concealment; it is still thought as that unrepresentable background from which and out of which mortal Dasein dwells (VA, 143/BDT, 149); and it still emerges only through and in its opposition to its other. Now, the other of the earth is not world as had been the case in 1936 but "sky," the locus of the gods who, in turn, stand opposed to mortal, earth-bound Dasein. Thus, once again, the earth is oriented in terms of the "Reβ" — albeit, as shifted and altered: the opposition in question is no longer simply dual but is the "fourfold"[das Geviert] of earth, sky, mortals and divinities. These four "elements," held together yet apart in the tension of their reciprocal difference (earth opposed to sky; gods opposed to mortals), function together via the Reβ which locates them, each dispatched into its Eignen, its proper facing-onto its other (VA. 142ff./BDT, 148ff.). Heidegger refers to this "between" in which we dwell as the "mirror-play"[das Spiegel-Spiel] of the fourfold, an image which strongly suggests a relation of "recognition" between the opposing elements, the identity of each being reflected in (and perhaps constituted by its relation to) its other. And yet, we must keep in mind that Heidegger's primarily interest is that originary difference which is prior to and necessary for every identity; his concern is thus the rissig mirror-play which underlies every logic of recognition.

In addition, Heidegger again stresses — as he had already in 1936 — that we dwell in this polemic Reβ, now designated the fourfold, insofar as it is itself preserved and held open through our very dwelling (ibid., 145ff./151ff.), i.e., through that τεχνη which — because it is no simple "making" [machen] but a bringing forth — secures the Reβ in and through the thing. In 1936, the thing in question is the work of art which fixes the Reβ in the figure [Gestalt], “[setting it back into the heavy weight of stone, the dumb hardness of wood, the dark glow of colors”(H, 51/OWA, 63); in 1951, this thing becomes that which, as constructed or built [gebaut], opens up a site [Ort] which keeps or secures the presence of the fourfold (VA, 145/BDT, 151).

Despite the similarities which link the 1936 essay to the 1951 essay, there are, amongst the many crucial differences, two which directly concern our analysis:

1. Whereas τεχνη, in "The Origin of the Work of Art," is discussed — at least explicitly — only as the bringing forth of the Reβ into the gathered and unified Gestalt of the thing, the τεχνη of "Building Dwelling Thinking" is a dual bringing forth:

   ... [Building] brings the fourfold hitier into a thing... and brings forth the thing as a location, out into what is already there, room for which is only now made by this location (VA, 154/BDT, 159).

13 See "The Thing," 172ff./179ff.

14 Several years later. Heidegger relates this mirror-play: more directly to Hegelian dialectics: "Wherever a present being encounters another present being or even only lingers near it — but also where, as with Hegel, one being mirrors itself [sich spiegelt] in another speculatively — there openness already rules, open region is in play. Only this opens to the movement of speculative thinking the passage through which it thinks" (ZSD, 71-2/OTB, 64-5).
2. Though "Building Dwelling Thinking" seems to leave the notion of "world" unaddressed, the other essay written in this period -- "Language" -- claims explicitly that what the fourfold names is none other than "world" itself. Thus, the world-earth opposition is not simply left behind in 1951; it is displaced.

While it is tempting to view these differences as "modifications" of Heidegger's "original 1936 position," such a reading misses the point. What is at issue is not a modification of a position but a shift of focus. For one thing, "Building Dwelling Thinking" does not cease to emphasize the essential tension between \( \text{Riβ} \) and \( \text{stellen} \): the fourfold is still gathered and unified in that "thing" which grants the fourfold a "site" [Ort] (VA, 148-9/BDT, 154). However, this essay shows -- more emphatically than had "The Origin of the Work of Art" -- that \( \tau \varepsilon \chi \nu \eta \) is not reducible to this \( \text{stellen} \).

Here, though the fourfold is, in a sense, subordinate to the gathering of the thing, the thing is equally subordinate to the fourfold (to the \( \text{Riβ} \), brought forth into the open difference). Indeed, it is no accident that Heidegger's re-articulation of \( \tau \varepsilon \chi \nu \eta \) as a doubled bringing forth exacerbates rather than rectifies the tension latent in 1936: \( \text{Riβ} \) (i.e., the fourfold) is itself presented as an element on one side of the \( \text{Riβ} \) (the between of fourfold and thing); it eludes its very presentation.

A second, closely related shift in focus: In 1936, Heidegger presents the self-concealment of \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \) under the name "earth," which is situated on one side of the \( \text{Riβ} \), in opposition to world (\( \vartheta \lambda \theta \varepsilon \eta \varepsilon \varepsilon \)). In 1951, earth is no longer opposed to world but is situated as one element of the "fourfold" [Geviert] which constitutes world -- a world which now stands in opposition to the thing. Thus, thought Heidegger maintains earth as an opponent in a "\( \text{Riβ} \)" of sorts (i.e., earth-sky), he simultaneously indicates that the most originary \( \text{Riβ} \) "as such" has withdrawn from this opposition, now traceable in terms of the difference between world and thing. Despite appearances, his thinking here has not somehow "passed beyond" whatever oppositional significance earth -- as self-concealing \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \) -- might have had in relation to \( \vartheta \lambda \theta \varepsilon \eta \varepsilon \varepsilon \); he has not moved on to a more "primordial" opposition (world-thing, for instance). Rather, the very withdrawal of the \( \text{Riβ} \) beyond the opposition world-earth shows that what is most self-concealing can be located neither on one side or the other of an opposition nor as this or that determinate opposition -- precisely because the self-concealing self-withdrawal of \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \) happens through and as the \( \text{Riβ} \) itself. the "between." Far from demonstrating the "inadequacy" of the attempt, in 1936, to name this self-concealing \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \) "earth," Heidegger's reintroduction of earth in 1951 suggests -- at least obliquely -- quite the contrary: because \( \lambda \eta \theta \eta \) is the elusive "between" itself, the only name which is "adequate" to it is

\[ ^{15} \text{This point is, as we shall see, developed more fully in the essay "Language".} \]
one which represents it inadequately; this is precisely what the term “earth,” in 1936, does: what it names and thereby situates on one side of the Rifβ is, impossibly, the Rifβ itself.

In light of this reading, it should come as no surprise that language is a point of focus for Heidegger in 1950-1, especially given his focus on the problems involved in naming the Rifβ. With this in mind, we will now return to the essay “Language,” and more precisely, to Heidegger’s reading of Trakl’s “Ein Winterabend.” I will not consider Trakl’s poem explicitly, but the above summary of the world-thing opposition — and its relation to the Rifβ — should help clarify Heidegger’s reading of it. We will consider two passages; first:

The speaking of the first two stanzas speaks by bidding [heißt] things to come to world, and world to things. The two modes of biding are different but not separated. But neither are they merely coupled together. For world and things do not subsist alongside one another. They penetrate [durchgehen] each other. Thus the two traverse a middle [Mitte]. In it, they are at one. Thus at one they are intimate. The middle of the two is intimacy [innigkeit] — in Latin, inter. The corresponding German word is inter, the English inter-. The intimacy of world and thing is not a fusion. Intimacy obtains only where the intimate — world and thing — divides itself cleanly and remains separated. In the midst of the two, in the between of world and thing, in their inter, division prevails: a difference [Unterschied]. Being the middle, it first determines world and things in their presence, i.e., in their being toward one another, whose unity it carries out. The word [dif-férence] consequently no longer means a distinction established between objects only by our representations. Nor is it merely a relation obtaining between world and thing, so that a representation coming upon it can establish it. The difference is not abstracted from world and thing as their relationship after the fact. The dif-férence for world and thing disclosingly appropriates [erreignet] things into bearing a world; it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of things (US. 24-5/L, 202-3).

Language speaks [die Sprache spricht] by “bidding.” Thus the essence of language, the Wesen whereby the Lichtung arrives, has more to do with the “call,” the command or request proper to direct address, than with “speaking about” what is the case. Poetic saying bids world and thing into the intimacy of their difference; in this difference, world and thing each come into their own for the first time.

On the one hand, speaking names things (21/199) and in doing so calls them into place (i.e., “... commending them to the world out of which they appear”[22/200] so that they may bear upon men as things (22/199). But this place is not prior to the thing: each thing — in its “thinging”[Dingern](ibid.) — is a thing only inasmuch as it “carries out” the fourfold openness of world (22-24/200-202); it is the very site which bears “place-ness” as such, “clearing space”[einraumen] for it, so to speak: “The things that were named, thus called, gather to themselves sky and earth, mortals and divinities”(22/199). As Heidegger says in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” the naming of a thing establishes a site which secures and preserves world.

Conversely, speaking names world, calling world to come to things (24/202), entrusting it to things (24/201): the world is not so much a “thing” called into place (it is, after all, “place-ness”
itself) as it is a place called into things. But just as the world is not prior to things, neither are things prior to world: “world grants things,” keeping them in the splendor of world (24/201-2).

Clearly, it is the differential singularity of Ereignis which holds world and thing together yet apart, granting them that intimacy, that common threshold [die Schwelle], without which neither would be given. Indeed, in this second passage from “Language,” Heidegger highlights Ereignis as the essence of language:

Only the third stanza gathers the bidding of things and the bidding of world. For the third stanza calls primarily out of the simplicity of the intimate bidding which calls the difference by leaving it unspoken. The primal calling, which bids the intimacy of world and thing to come, is the authentic bidding. This bidding is the nature of speaking [Sprechen]. Speaking occurs in what is spoken in the poem. It is the speaking of language. Die Sprache spricht. It speaks by bidding the hidden, thing-world and world-thing, to come to the between of the difference. What is so bidden is commanded to arrive from out of the difference into the difference (28/206).

The first stanza bids things to come into their difference over and against world. The second stanza bids world to come into its difference over and against things. In contrast, “[the] third stanza bids the middle for world and thing to come: the carrying out [Austrag] of their intimacy” (26/203). Ereignis ereignet in the poem; it is here that language speaks [die Sprache spricht] in a speech which first opens up the “here” as such, the place [Ort], opening it up via poetic “building” [Bauen].

It should be clear at this point -- particularly given the re-inscription of Bauen -- that what takes place in the poem is not to be understood in the first instance as the “creative act” of the artist. It is not the poet who bids the difference to come, for “[the] difference is the bidder. The difference gathers the two [world and thing] out of itself as it calls them into the Riß that is the difference itself” (29/207). The third stanza of Trakl’s poem does not speak about Ereignis; rather, the bidding which occurs in this poetic saying is presumably Ereignis itself: in the poem, Ereignis ereignet. From what Heidegger says in Identity and Difference, we see that this always singular saying of Ereignis cannot be a call identical with itself. The “silence” of this call, a silence to which Heidegger refers again and again, is not simply the withholding of a secret which maintains a coherent yet withheld self-identical content. On the contrary, as the differential essence of γι' αυτό, this secret (is) itself without identity -- not as the mere privation of identity but as that from which all identity is granted. It is for this reason that we cannot bear witness to the essence of language by “speaking about” it. Likewise, the unspoken bidding of Ereignis is not silent in the sense of mere “soundlessness” (29/206); rather, what it accomplishes (i.e., the arrival of the between, the threshold) can better be understood as a type of “gesture” [Gebärde] or “hint” [Wink], which shows or lets shine what differs (OWL, 26, 44-5, 47/US, 117, 141-2, 145) in a showing prior to all
representation. To use a term Heidegger would surely find suspect, the saying of Ereignis is, at least in certain respects, performative. It performs the "stilling" [Stillen] or "arresting" of world and thing into their intimacy, bringing them forth, letting their difference shine:

*Language speaks as the peal of stillness.* Stillness stills by the carrying out, the bearing and enduring, of world and things in their presence. The carrying out of world and thing in the manner of stilling is the appropriative taking place of the difference. Language, the peal of stillness, is, inasmuch as the difference takes place [ereignet]. Language goes on as the taking place or occurring of the difference for world and things (US, 30/L, 207).

As we saw in chapter 5, Heidegger had already acknowledged, as early as 1934, a difference constitutive of language as such: the difference between the hinting language of the gods which the poet must bear and absorb and the corresponding language of mortals which echoes the storm and lightning of the gods. In 1950, however, this difference is pursued further.

For Heidegger, "...the human is indeed in its nature [Wesen] given to speech — it is linguistic" (30/207). By this he does not mean speech is a capacity or characteristic we "have." Rather, human being is first brought into its own through the peal of stillness (30/208), through the saying of Ereignis prior to all human utterance: we are appropriated [geeignet] to language, called into our "own-ness":

Such an appropriating takes place in that the very nature, the presencing, of language needs and uses [braucht] the speaking of mortals in order to sound as the peal of stillness for the hearing of mortals. Only as men belong within the peal of stillness are mortals able to speak in their own way in sounds...Mortal speech is a calling that names, a bidding which, out of the simple onefold of the difference, bids thing and world to come (30/208).

Mortal speech can only ever cor-respond [ent-spricht] to the prior peal of stillness, and it corresponds by acknowledging [anerkennen] the command which comes to it in its receptive listening (32/209).

Thus we see what had still remained ambiguous in the "Es gibt" of "Letter on Humanism": the giving of the Es (is) the speaking of Sprache; Es gibt says the Same as die Sprache spricht. Mortal speech is always a response to what has already withdrawn as the silent and unnamable "source" of all difference.

And yet, this reflection on language as the "peal of stillness" raises a question concerning the "language of the gods." On the one hand, the divine speech referred to in 1934, like the peal of stillness of 1950, is clearly intended to refer to a prior, silent utterance which demands Man's response. On the other hand, the peal of stillness seems to differ sharply from this divine speech, for, as the mirror-play of the four-fold suggests, the gods themselves emerge in their opposition to Man only through this differential peal which is prior to them both. It might thus appear that Heidegger's later attempt to think the essence of language as the "peal of stillness" is, once again, a
modification of earlier reflections. To read Heidegger in this way, however, is to misunderstand both the peal of stillness and divine speech:

i. Already in 1934, the gods have a dual significance. They are, on the one hand, that which withdraws from Man in a situtable (i.e., namable) fashion, standing in opposition to him as his Other. On the other hand, they also reflect Seytn itself, that differential and ultimately unnamable self-withdrawal which precedes all opposition: it is not the name of the god but the inadequacy of this name which marks the withdrawal of Being from every name.16

ii. In 1950 Heidegger once again engages this logic of the (in)adequate name. This time, however, he is concerned, at least explicitly, not with the gods’ prior address but with the address-event as such: Ereignis as the arrival of language. As I indicated briefly in chapter 6, Ereignis, as the Es which gives, must be thought as prior to both identity and difference, as both/neither different from and/or identical with what it grants. In 1950, Heidegger shows how Ereignis, as the peal of stillness (the Es) which grants the possibility of all human utterance, conforms to this necessity: if the peal of stillness is opposed to that mortal speech which it makes possible — and it must be so opposed insofar as we speak of it — it cannot escape participating in precisely that opposition which it grants and from which it must withdraw. Thus we see that the arrival of language can present itself, in the name Ereignis, only as its own withdrawal from its self-presentation, i.e., as an (in)adequate name. That Ereignis is presented as the differential-singular event which first opens up the relation between earth and sky, mortals and gods, does not entail that it is prior to the divine, a “condition” for the possibility of our relation to the divine, as it were. Indeed, we must keep in mind that, with both Ereignis and divine names, what is at stake is “that” which can be named only (in)adequately. And we must keep in mind further that Heidegger addresses the name Ereignis to “us,” here and now; he addresses it, from out of his engagement with Hölderlin, to “us” for whom the gods are absent. In this god-less (and we-less) context wherein the divine can be conceived only as a present or absent being, thinking has, for Heidegger, the possibility of reflecting upon the poetic language-event (cf. VA, 32ff./QCT, 310ff.) such that the rift which underlies all naming might still be acknowledged; and it is this acknowledgment which might once again grant the possibility of a we which dwells in relation to its gods.

Years after the lecture “Language,” Heidegger returns to this matter in “The Nature of Language”(1957). Much of this later essay retraces the path of “Language”: once again, Heidegger
emphasizes that we cannot come to the essence of language by “speaking about it” (US, 179/OWL, 75), rather we must undergo an experience with language in the sense that we must “endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it” (ibid., 159/57). And once again, we come to see that the essence of language must be thought in terms of Ereignis. This time, however, Heidegger’s explicit focus is less the differential character of Ereignis than the transformation of “nature” or “essence” [Wesen] required for thinking Ereignis. Indeed, he takes up once more the “equation” originally articulated in the epilogue to “On the Essence of Truth,” altering it to read: the essence of language: the language of essence.

Considered in terms of “On the Essence of Truth” (cf. my chapter 4), this odd formulation would seem to mark, for Heidegger, the displacement of a question: though one might simply seek an adequate answer to the question “what is the essence of language?,” thereby presenting language in terms of that concept of “essence” which has come down to us through the history of metaphysics (i.e., essence thought as quidditas), one might also allow the question to recoil upon itself such that both “essence” and “language” interrupt the way they have been determined by this history. Indeed, Heidegger’s refusal to use a copula to reflect the relation between the “essence of language” and the “language of essence” underscores the questionable status of this relation. Thus, it seems likely that the Heidegger of 1950 is repeating his “essential” gesture of 1930 — this time with respect to language rather than truth.

However, as Derrida has recently argued, there is more at stake in this essay than the displacement of this particular question. Indeed, it is ultimately the displacement of the question as such which is at stake.

In “The Nature of Language,” Heidegger is attempting to hear what is said in his title. He writes:

We are all getting somewhat surfeited with all this big production of natures [des vielen Wesen] for reasons which we do not quite understand ourselves. But what if we were to get rid of the presumptuousness and triteness of the title by a simple device? Let us give the title a question mark, such that the whole of it is covered by that mark and hence has a different sound. It then runs: the essence? — of language? [Das Wesen? — der Sprache?] Not only language is in question now, but so is the meaning of Wesen — and what is more, the question now is whether and in what way Wesen and language belong together (US, 174/OWL, 70).

This maneuver seems consistent with the course of Heidegger’s path of thinking up to this point. Indeed, here he removes the copula not only from the “assertion” about the essence of language but from the question itself: the essence? — of language? However, he soon shifts direction:

16 On the “adequate inadequacy” of naming, see Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus’ fragment B 50 (EGT, 72ff.). See also BzP §41.
If we put questions to language, questions about its \textit{Wesen}, then clearly language itself must already have been granted to us. Similarly, if we want to inquire into the \textit{Wesen} of language, then that which is called \textit{Wesen} must also be already granted to us. Inquiry and investigation here and everywhere require the prior grant [\textit{Zusage}] of whatever it is they approach and pursue with their queries. Every posing of every question takes place within the very grant of what is put in question (175/71).

Heidegger’s point here is simple: to undergo an experience with language — and it is only in this way that we can think language — cannot happen through what is fundamentally a “questioning” of language (175-6/72). To be sure, questioning \textit{may} be a thoughtful response to an experience with language, but only if questioning is the way in which our listening response has been attuned \textit{[gestimmt] in advance} by the \textit{Zusage}, by language’s (i.e., \textit{Ereignis’}) prior direct address to us. We do not ourselves choose or structure such attunement for, as Derrida points out (\textit{Of Spirit}, 129ff.), the \textit{Zusage} addresses us prior to any “autonomy” we might come to possess. Nor is this attunement determined by some archi-question; for every question — even the most tacit — is opened up only through the address in which it is granted, through the silent pre-interrogative \textit{claim} which, to be sure, demands a response, but one which is not necessarily an answer to a question. Indeed, even when thinking does involve questioning, the \textit{question} as such is still not that with which thinking has its most essential relation.

What is not so simple is the task of responding thoughtfully to the simplicity of the \textit{Zusage} — the silent and originary “saying to...” which situates us as \textit{addressees} before all else:

1. Prior to Heidegger’s disruptive reflections on the essence of language, thinking stood in relation to an unlocatable \textit{Ereignis} perpetually concealed in its self-withdrawal; nevertheless, the task for thinking, at least, was \textit{locatable}, for the trace left by this self-withdrawal was none other than the trajectory followed by that question of questions, the \textit{Seinsfrage}. There was, as Heidegger says, the “connection from destiny to destiny,” a connection without which “there would be no history” (EGT, 26). Though this connection was grounded in the differential absence of “what” withdraws, it was able to be a connection by participating in the \textit{unity} of this withdrawal’s “echo.” As I argued in chapter 5, a determinate \textit{We} is in each case the gathered destination, the reflective site or “sounding board” of Being’s silent call; and each of these destinations has its own identity insofar as it participates in “Man” — Man understood neither biologically nor anthropologically but as participant in the destined \textit{question}:\textsuperscript{18} Man unfolds historically as the “epochally distributed recipient” of the question of questions (the \textit{Seinsfrage}), emerging forth again and again as \textit{this} singular, questioning \textit{We}.

\textsuperscript{18}Already in \textit{Sein und Zeit}. Dasein is understood primarily as the capacity for questioning (\textit{Sein und Zeit}, §2; cf. Derrida’s \textit{Points}, 260ff.). It is precisely Heidegger’s tendency to locate and delimit the “essence of Man” — as questioner, as non-animal, etc. — which Derrida takes to task in \textit{Of Spirit} and elsewhere.
Thus for Heidegger, the essence of Man (or, what amounts to the same thing, the essence of the question), though this essence is used/needed [gebraucht] by the most differential event [Ereignis], stands safely outside the play of difference. The task of thinking is locatable in the unified trajectory of Ereignis' destination/reflection, whether this trajectory be named "Seinsfrage" or "Man".

Granted, Heidegger does not understand the We simply in terms of figural identity such that difference is subordinated to identity. As I indicated briefly in chapter 5(2), figuration is necessary in order that (dis)figuring differential-singularity can withdraw from it: the figures of the We are figures ‘behind which’ the (dis)figuring essence of the We conceals itself. The blind-spot, for Heidegger, is that the echo of Being’s withdrawal always happens through the figuration of a We; and it is this delimitation of the echo which grants Seynsgeschichte its unified, traceable trajectory. Here, the stakes of the Gemeinschaftfrage’s avoidance are clear: the question Heidegger never asks -- why the We? -- can be reformulated thus: why delimit the echo of singular-differential Being to the We-figure?

2. In 1957, however, Heidegger pursues the question of language -- the Sprachesfrage -- in earnest, engaging the relation between Sprache and Ereignis until this question of language suddenly reveals itself to be a renegade question -- the Sprachesfrage reveals itself to be the Sprachesfrage: though the questioning of language starts out with language safely circumscribed within the question of Being, it eventually discloses that it is in fact all questioning which is circumscribed within language, such that questioning can no longer locate (the withdrawal of) its center in the grounding question. but rather in language as such, in the Zusage. Though Heidegger does not proceed to draw out the implications of this disclosure, they are nevertheless evident: not only does the Sprachesfrage undermine the Seinsfrage’s ability to gather all questions under itself; it also displaces questioning as the locus of thinking, as the point of reception of Ereignis’ gift. Along with the priority of the question falls the priority of the Seinsfrage and thus the priority of Sein itself, for thinking must now acknowledge its rootedness in a difference which, in an always singular address, is

191 have tried to demonstrate how the Seinsfrage displaces the metaphysical appeal to center and ground only to replace them with a kinetic -- but covertly “centrist” -- trajectory of withdrawal, i.e., the withdrawal of Sein always happens through the Frage.

20 As Derrida notes: "...the whole lecture 'Das Wesen der Sprache' will be ordered according to this thinking of the Zusage. It is understandable that Heidegger denies proceeding to an artificial and formal, ‘empty’ ‘reversal’ [Umkehrung]. But it has to be admitted that the thought of an affirmation anterior to any question and more proper to thought than any question must have an unlimited incidence -- nonlocalizable, without possible circumscription -- on the quasi-totality of Heidegger’s previous path of thought. It is not an Umkehrung, but it is something other than a turning [Kehre]. The turning still belongs to the question. Heidegger says this explicitly. This step transforms or deforms (as you like) the
absolutely unlocatable. At this juncture, the Seinsfrage and Man are put back into the play of difference.

Here, the question of community is, at least in principle, released from its neutralization; for it is precisely the locatability of the center of questioning and thinking that: a. cannot abide the rigorous questioning of the We; and b. provides the We -- whether current or yet to come -- a historico-linguistic site around which to gather and anchor itself, via originary naming (e.g., φύσις, αληθεία, υπόσ, subiectum, subject, will to power, etc.), as a We.

And yet, neither in 1957 nor afterwards does Heidegger explicitly pursue the question of community, nor does he explicitly pursue what his reflections on language entail for the question of Being -- despite the fact that both the We and Being are problematized by his thinking in “The Essence of Language”.

2. Towards a Responsible Protocol

Can “we” say, then, that the We is Heidegger’s unthought? Is it possible that the We and Gemeinschaft mark the “inner limit” of his thinking? That to which his thinking responded but which was never granted him to think explicitly? Could we say, moreover, that perhaps now the We is emerging in thinking (emerging as questionable), sent for “us” to think?

It might be possible to say such things if the engagement with the question of language did not entail the displacement of the schema underlying such an “inner limit” and such a “sending.” In this section, I will demonstrate the exigency of this displacement.

In Heidegger’s 1957 essay, we see that thinking has not simply “reached a point” where the Seinsfrage and the path of thinking no longer have authority; for the passage which allows thinking to move from one identifiable point to another, receiving this or that delimitable “gift” (i.e., this or that thinker’s “inner limit”), has dissipated. In fact, it is precisely the desire to “reach a point,” to occupy a locatable site, which dissimulates this dissipation. Once this dissimulation is engaged rigorously and the path of thinking itself no longer stands outside the play of difference, we lose all stable points of reference — even that of a trajectory.

It is Derrida who, long before his assessment of the Zusage in Of Spirit, had already pursued this dispersal, questioning at various points: the priority and centrality of the Seinsfrage (Of

whole landscape to the extent that that landscape had been constituted before the — inflexible — law of the most radical questioning” (Of Spirit, 133).

21 According to Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin’s Germanien, for instance, the language and history of what has come to be called “German” is what it is only inasmuch as it grounds (i.e., brings forth receptively) Sein via its poets (§4d; §5b; §6h).
Grammatology), the extent to which difference must be tied to the ontico-ontological difference ("Différence," Of Grammatology), the presumption that thinking moves along an identifiable path ("Différence," “From Restricted to General Economy”), the coherence of Heidegger’s epochal Seinsgeschichte (“Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” “Sending: On Representation”). Indeed, Derrida has questioned through the course of his writing nearly all of the aspects of Heidegger’s thinking which I have argued function implicitly with the neutralization of the Gemeinschaftsfrage.

But then we must ask: does not this textual operation mark the most radical impotence theoretically, ethically and politically speaking? At least the Heidegger who submitted to the question of Being -- despite the way he subjugated all theory, ethics and politics to thinking -- was bound by a locatable responsibility, and thus his questioning followed a protocol which could make a claim to a kind of accountability. With the Zusage, on the other hand, neither responsibility nor protocol seem possible; for if this “textual operation,” insofar as it exceeds every univocal trajectory, highlights the undecidability, unlocatability and (self)deferral from which no text — and indeed no mark or utterance — can escape, is it not also a denial of the possibility of event and decision? Does it not say that there are and can be no decisive breaks? No rigorous distinction between responsible and irresponsible judgments? Between responsible protocol and irresponsible protocol?

On the contrary, Derrida insists that event, decision and responsibility are not neutralized by the deconstructive textual operation but are indeed its essential concern. The task of thinking is precisely to allow such terms to express themselves otherwise than they have been conventionally understood. It is the task of bearing witness to the way the hegemony of presence and autonomy (self-presence) dissimulates the singularity which characterizes event, decision and responsibility.

Our conventional understanding of terms is rooted in this: though we never occupy a self-identical self-contained site, and though we are, in all respects, contaminated through and through by undecidability, we nevertheless find ourselves participating in the resistance to dispersal, in the desire for self-presence which ceaselessly pursues an impossible identification. It is precisely this desire which strives to contain and neutralize event and decision, and also to prescribe and proscribe (i.e., contain) responsibility, thus neutralizing it as well. It is thus this desire and its dissimulative “effects” which Derrida confronts in rethinking these terms:

i. event: when thought in terms of the “now” as the self-identical moment of full presence, the event functions in complicity with the desire for self-presence; however, Derrida resituates the

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22 See, for instance, W, 353ff./LH, 231ff.
event in an instant which "slides and eludes us between two presences; it is difference as the affirmative elusion of presence. It does not give itself but is stolen, carries itself off in a movement which is simultaneously one of violent effraction and of vanishing flight. The instant is furtive..." (Writing and Difference, 263).

ii. decision: when thought as the capacity of a rational and autonomous I-subject, decision -- the culmination of speculative calculation -- is clearly complicit with the desire for self-presence, for return to self; however, Derrida appeals to a decision which is possible only at the point of paralysis of such speculative calculation:

It is from the moment one surrenders to the necessity of divisibility and the undecidable that the question of decision can be posed: and the question of knowing what deciding, affirming -- which is to say, also deciding -- mean. A decision that would be taken otherwise than on the border of this undecidable would not be a decision... The only decision possible is the impossible decision. It is when it is not possible to know what must be done, when knowledge is not and cannot be determining that a decision is possible as such. Otherwise the decision is an application: one knows what has to be done, it's clear, there is no more decision possible: what one has here is an effect, an application, a programming (Points, 148; cf. 273).

Nor is indecision, as the necessary condition for decision, arrived at through calculation: "Indecision happens. One grapples with indecision. If it were nothing but calculation, it would be a sinister tactic..." (ibid.).

iii. responsibility: Ultimately, the decision of which Derrida speaks can never be located, for it always happens in the interval between locations, between "subjects." Indeed, decision is an instance of obedience; when it happens, it is always the other who decides:

To remain undecided means to turn oneself over to the decision of the other.... Indecision, from this point of view, is in fact being unable to decide as a free subject, 'me', free consciousness, and thus to be paralyzed, but first of all because one turns the decision over to the other: what has to be decided comes back, belongs to the other (Points, 149).

This is why decision involves a responsibility prior to autonomy. It is never accomplished by "me;" rather it happens, prior to my freedom, in relation to the other.

Thus we see that event, decision and responsibility can -- and must -- be thought in terms of difference. That is to say, though they function primarily within the hegemony of presence (i.e., within the uncompromising resistance to dispersal), they can be read/written such that they turn this hegemony against itself, forcing it to acknowledge what it cannot control.

It is no coincidence that this displacement of event, decision and responsibility become central in Derrida's reading of "The Essence of Language," for this displacement is operative already in this essay.

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23. Deconstruction, I have insisted, is not neutral. It intervenes" (Positions, 93); cf. Writing and Difference, 273ff.
First of all, the Zusage which shows itself in Heidegger’s text to be prior to questioning is, as Derrida notes (Of Spirit, 130), the most primordial event. It is Ereignis itself. As is already evident in the 1950 essay “Language,” this linguistic event is, for Heidegger, both radically singular and an originary difference:

The word difference is now removed from its usual and customary usage. What it now names is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences. It exists only as this single difference. It is unique (US. 25/OWL. 202).

Close consideration of this dual characterization reveals that, for Heidegger as well as for Derrida, the event is elusive, evading every ostensive pursuit, every appeal to self-presence:

i. We could legitimately say the differential bidding of language “arrives in each case as this singular address” — if the terms “case” and “this” did not already marginalize difference, converting the singular into a mere particular presented as such in terms of its universal.

ii. Likewise, we could legitimately say this singular address “arrives in each case as originary difference” — if the term “difference” did not already imply a duality (i.e., a relation of the one to the other) which marginalizes singularity.

Heidegger was certainly aware of this tension, this simultaneous union and separation of singularity and difference (and isn’t this what is already at stake in the πολεμικός which first emerges in his Rektoratsrede?). And indeed, the instability of what I have called differential singularity — a name which would be as much at home in Heidegger’s writing as in Derrida’s24 — reflects no shortsightedness in either of their thinking. Rather the instability of this name condenses an irreducible tension, mobilizing that doubling of language which renders naming necessary yet in each case inadequate. “Differential singularity” maintains itself, however briefly, in proximity to this doubling precisely through its failure to maintain itself. In this failure it acknowledges a “phenomenon” which is impossible to deny yet impossible to present: that elusive (non)originary event of language, that “singularity that dislocates or divides itself in gathering itself together...”(Points, 262).25 It is through this furtive (proto)linguistic event that Heidegger once again attempts to think that which is both/neither identity (τὸ ἑαυτό) and/or difference (τὸ διάφορον).

Secondly, this Zusage-event disclosed by Heidegger involves a decision in Derrida’s sense of the term; for it involves an a priori interruption of every speculative calculation. Indecision

24 Indeed, the term “Einfalt” from “Building Dwelling Thinking”(VA, 144/BDT. 150) reflects just this differential singularity.

25 And doesn’t this suggest a possible re-tracing of the opening of Hegel’s Phenomenology? Specifically, one which, though it acknowledges the singularity of sense-certainty (as well as the tension between identity and difference arising from it), does so without equating singularity with simple undifferentiated immediacy?
“happens” because the Zusage happens, arriving in an always singular address which resists subordination to any program, leaving the addressee without resources, yet compelled to respond nevertheless.

Finally, this decision is, at root, not a matter of autonomy but of responsibility. It is readily evident that responsibility is a central theme for Heidegger from very early on. In Sein und Zeit, for instance, to be authentic means precisely to assume responsibility [Schuld] for one’s factual Situation (282ff.), for one’s Being-in-the-world. This initial articulation of responsibility -- already understood in terms of the question of Being -- develops gradually into thought’s responsibility to cor-respond [entspricht] to its unthought, to the most question-worthy. As with Derrida, responsibility for Heidegger always comes from beyond me, assigned in advance. However, unlike Derrida, Heidegger almost always locates this responsibility in terms of the Frage, and specifically, the Seinsfrage: our responsibility comes to us through the conduit of this “archi-question.” In “The Essence of Language,” however, a shift takes place. Here, thinking is obliged to cor-respond neither to the Seinsfrage nor to any other question but to the Zusage itself. I find myself in each case with language having already granted itself to me in this singular address, such that whatever choice I make is, before all else, a response to an address which obligates me in advance. As before, each decisive utterance or inscription which appears to reflect autonomy, be this decision affirmative or negative, is already engaged “in a responsibility it has not chosen and which assigns it even its liberty” (Of Spirit, 130). Now, however, this a priori obligation, always a central concern for Heidegger, is no longer chained to the gathered movement of the Seinsfrage but instead emerges through differential singularity, through the Zusage.

As for the “source” of responsibility -- the very first decision, that prior decision to participate in language -- it is still “mine” in this schema, yet it is mine as having been assigned to me rather than being one I have made. Thus, oddly, the event of decision (and the responsibility which accompanies it), when engaged rigorously, reveals itself to be “earlier” than the decision-maker, leaving him/her in its wake. While this holds true as well for Heidegger’s thought prior to “The Essence of Language,” the emergence of the Zusage entails that this “source” of responsibility can no longer be located, i.e., traced back along a trajectory of questioning.

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26 According to Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s Zusage, I participate in language -- that is to say, I am linguistic -- only through my prior acquiescence to language: a silent “yes” before every spoken/written yes or no (Points, 261-2), a “yes” whereby “I” consent to being the conduit of language. Yet in fact, this acquiescence precedes my identity as “consenting subject,” dividing me in advance, since I emerge in my identity only as a gathered response to it. Thus, in the Zusage, it is ultimately language which acquiesces to itself, engaging itself.
We see then how both Heidegger's and Derrida's writing participate in a movement which—despite appearances and despite the fact that it has no immediate "practical applications"—is not at all neutral. Indeed, their thinking acknowledges that responsible decision necessarily participates in Weglosigkeit, in unlocatability. And yet, despite the rigorous acknowledgment of irreducible unlocatability—an acknowledgment which happens between these proper names—the gathered trajectory of the pathway is not simply left behind. In fact, that elusive event in relation to which this thinking happens still seems to "situate" writing in a passage of sorts—albeit, one which cannot be thought univocally.

This "other path" stands out most clearly in Derrida's writing. For one thing, despite his recurrent appeals to a site-less open-ended textual operation, he speaks at various points of that "era" or "epoch" to which we belong (e.g., Writing and Difference, 280; Of Grammatology, 6, 12-14). Granted, he qualifies such belonging, pointing out that what we belong to is not, strictly speaking, an era or an epoch but knots of nodal resistance in the weave of difference, knots which futilely resist their dispersal but manage through this resistance to perpetuate the illusion of their own self-containment. Thus it seems that we belong only to the mirage of an epoch, "the concept of epochality belonging to what is within history as the history of Being" (Margins of Philosophy, 22). Nevertheless, Derrida also claims that we "must understand the expressions 'epoch', 'closure of an epoch', 'historical genealogy' in a new way" (Of Grammatology, 14), a way which is best reflected in what he names the "trace".

When Derrida says that deconstructive writing traces the closure of an epoch, he is not referring to closure as an end-point or moment of completion (Of Grammatology, 13ff.; cf. Positions, 12). He means, rather, that this tracing traverses the limit of an epoch's presumed self-containment, violently inscribing inside this margin what this illusion of self-containment needs to exclude in order to maintain itself (or vice versa). This writing retraces the semblance of absolute closure, but displaces it slightly in this repetition such that it perpetually reveals, in a gesture which is never complete, the fissures and gaps which can be concealed but never left behind. Thus this tracing of the margin transforms what it traverses and does so differentially; located neither inside nor outside the (merely apparent) epoch, it aggravates and intensifies the disturbance by which the margin is already plagued: "[By] means of the work done on one side and the other of the limit the field inside is modified, and a transgression is produced that consequently is nowhere present as a fait

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27To assume that a discursive "act" can be "ethical" only insofar as it has "practical applications" is to subordinate action to programme: πράξεις to κοινωνίας (on Heidegger's resistance to such subordination, see Robert Bernasconi's "The Fate of the Distinction between Praxis and Potesis").

28Knots of tension which Derrida refers to as "focal points of economic condensation, sites of passage necessary for a very large number of marks, slightly more effervescent crucibles" (Positions, 40).
accompliT (Positions, 12). The trace does this in a movement which differs from itself perpetually, never having had an original starting point and never returning to itself. As Derrida says, it is this limit itself which is always at work (ibid.).

On the one hand, it seems that the trace can be thought of as a trace, a pursuable passage, only from “within” the epoch of presence. The notion of trace as “passage” appears to be merely provisional, pending the disclosure of its prior contamination by difference. Yet as we have seen — and as Derrida emphasizes — the event of the Zusage is just as much singular as it is differential, for the unspeakable arrival of language is reflected in the tension between these terms, neither of which is adequate by itself. Thus, if the term “trace” is to bear witness to this tension we must say - - and not only from “within” an illusory epoch — that there is [es gibt] a differential-dispersive tracing gathered in this singular address (the Zusage), in this differential point of passage. To be sure, there is no locatable move “from A to B” (on what solid surface could it possibly be mapped?); yet, as impossible as it is to say this, differential singularity arrives: the event happens; “I” am responsible, “here” and “now,” for “this.” This unarticulable (quasi)location, akin to the thrownness of Dasein in Sein und Zeit, marks the “current status” of the differential textual operation, this in which thinking finds itself, neither inside nor outside.

Clearly, this singular “site” makes possible nothing like a stable, mappable trajectory, for there is only this textual operation which differs/defers itself, weaving/unweaving “a” self-othering reading, always open-ended, erasing itself as it writes. There is this nexus caught up in various (and ultimately unidentifiable) knots of resistance, a nexus suspended in a “difference of forces” which is itself transformed by the passage through it.

As one might expect, this “other path,” this point of passage held in suspension between inside and outside, is scarcely visible in Heidegger’s writing;29 and it should now be clear why this is the case. Though Heidegger acknowledges from very early on the essential tension between difference and singularity, and though he eventually thinks this tension as the very essence of language (i.e., Ereignis as Zusage), he never allows the implications of this tension to touch the “path” of thought’s movement:

1. As we have seen, the Es of Ereignis, of the “Es gibt,” can be voiced only in a doubled saying, and indeed it arrives/withdraws as the double of itself: it gives precisely by dividing itself, presenting itself simultaneously as identical with and different from what it grants.

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29It suggests itself, at least vaguely, in The Question of Being (1955); and while Heidegger’s remarks on the pathway in “The Essence of Language” (US, 1977/OWL, 91ff.) do not oppose his insight regarding the Zusage, the implications for the pathway are not drawn out explicitly.
2. For Heidegger, the path of thinking, which is the highest gift of this *Es*, is never subject to such doubling. Though it emerges forth from what he acknowledges to be the most radical doubling, it maintains itself in the stable epochal trajectory of the question of Being.

Now, situated as (we) are at the displacement of questioning by Zusage, (we) see that the appeal to weg-lich unity has lost its source of justification. *Es gibt den Denkweg* — a phrase which, to my knowledge, Heidegger never wrote and the implications of which he did not think through in any case. In this phrase — which is no mere "proposition" — neither the *Es* nor what it grants can be isolated as such, for the "giving" which happens here is the Zusage which allows neither the giver nor the gift to escape the doubling of language. Just as the saying of the *Es* must speak of that which is both the same as and other than the self-withdrawal which grants it, the saying of the path — of the gift — must speak of that which is both the same as and other than that which grants it. In other words, any attempt to map out the path of thinking — which is, for Heidegger, also the path of history, the path of the "West" — must, in its pretense to adequacy, suppress that this path is no pure gift but the double of itself, a self-doubling which presents/withdraws itself, unfolding through a completely unmappable différence.

The singular responsibility assigned at this singular point of passage: to respond responsibly to this prior address of language (this Zusage) such that its self-doubling is acknowledged, such that the singular and unlocatable otherness of its call is preserved (*Points*, 276). Such a tautological articulation of responsibility is of course inadequate — though if a more precise articulation were possible, it would not be an articulation of responsibility but the axiom of a programme (ibid., 272).

While this responsibility cannot be located, it commands thinking nevertheless, and even offers it a protocol: whereas the thinking of Sein und Zeit finds itself imbedded in a historical accumulation of inauthentic interpretations which cloud its grasp of phenomena (§6), the thinking which submits to the Zusage finds itself in thrall to various elusive and ever-shifting nodes of resistance, nodes which resist their own dispersal and thus resist acknowledging the self-othering address of language. The task of thinking is thus to follow that "path" which is the double of itself, i.e., to trace those discursive trajectories which present themselves as self-possessed and seek the points where they split, fray. For it is precisely at the points where these paths lose themselves that they bear witness to the Zusage to which they are but the response.

As both Heidegger and Derrida would acknowledge — though in very different ways — such discursive trajectories most often gather themselves about certain key "words," configurations around which nodes of resistance gather themselves. Such "words" — "Being" for instance —

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30 Cf. ZSD, 18-19/OTB, 18-19.
simultaneously present themselves as the mark of what is most essential and conceal the doubling to which all such "fundamental names" are subject.

The word "community," "Gemeinschaft," condenses, here and now, one such point of nodal resistance, a point which demands thinking -- particularly in relation to another name: "path." Our tracing of the question of community in Heidegger's thinking has been, up to this point, an intensification of this condensation:

1. As I've demonstrated, the very possibility of a path as a historico-interrogative trajectory depends upon both the essential status of community and its protection from questioning. This protection, which first occurs in Sein und Zeit, is maintained through the course of Heidegger's work.

2. This questioning path is preserved through Heidegger's thinking up to the point at which it undermines itself through the explicit engagement not with the Gemeinschaftsfrage but with the Sprachfrage -- that "renegade" question" which, in its disclosure of the Zusage, undermines the hegemony of the question.

3. The implications of this crucial juncture in Heidegger's thinking (a juncture the protocol of which I outlined above) are not engaged with respect to the Gemeinschaftsfrage, another "renegade question." Thus the central though predominantly tacit figure of community in Heidegger's path of thinking calls for consideration, here and now.

Now, having followed Heidegger's path to the point where it opens on to another protocol, another responsibility, we will retrace this early point of tension in his thinking; specifically, the point in Sein und Zeit where the I-We aporia emerges and is quickly covered over.

Of course, one might well ask by what right we posit the engagement with the question of community as the task for thinking; and further, by what right we claim this task to be so sharply focused in Heidegger's texts.

To use a phrase of Heidegger's from 1962, one which is often echoed by Derrida: "This question comes too late"(ZSD, 6/OTB, 6). Something has happened "in" Heidegger's essay "The Essence of Language" -- an event which, for reasons we have discussed, cannot be located, strictly speaking. This event, in conjunction with the nodes of resistance around which Heidegger's thinking is situated, has already assigned thinking its responsibility; and it has exposed the question of community as the locus of such responsibility -- at least, at this juncture, here and now.

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\footnote{As I argue in chapter 3, what is clouded here eventually presents itself as the questionable status of Being.}
Before concluding this first portion of my overall project, I should reiterate the importance of
the trajectory to which my reading of Heidegger has adhered thus far; for in the face of such a
circuitous path, one is certainly justified in asking: why bother with the gradual development of the
Sprachefrage in Heidegger’s thinking? Why not consider community solely in terms of its emergence in Sein und Zeit, where the suppression of the Gemeinschaftsfrage happens? Why not narrow the scope?

Quite simply, what is at stake in the question of community — at least in the context of
Heidegger’s path-logic — is not just a matter of its all too brief consideration in Sein und Zeit. As is
the case with the question of Being, the course of this question’s self-withdrawal is at least as
crucial as its explicit emergence; and we have traced this self-withdrawal to the point where
“pathway” is itself displaced — where, for the first time, not only the possibility but the
responsibility of engaging the question of community from “within” Heidegger’s path of thinking is
opened up.

Granted, we could have restricted our focus to the aporetic notion of community as presented in
Sein und Zeit. However, this would have problematized community in a very different way — and
in fact less radically; for by itself, the community of Sein und Zeit condenses a knot of resistance
much less tangled than that which gathers itself in the fully developed reflections on
Seinsgeschichte, Weg, Ereignis, and ultimately Zusage.32 Better to follow through the logic of
nodal resistance in Heidegger’s own writing to the point where there is a shift in terrain, or as
Derrida says, a restructuring of a space (Of Spirit, 132).

And the “terrain” has shifted drastically. The emergence of the Zusage in thinking demands
that we re-trace the course of Heidegger’s path, that we go back to Sein und Zeit. But it demands
that we do this via a repetition which transforms what it traverses, unraveling what had previously
appeared secure. Return, in this case, is simultaneously the interruption of return: the self-othering
repetition of Ereignis.

32Heidegger’s “trajectory-logic” is quite resilient, incorporating all disturbances and gaps into the responsive but univocal
path of thought. Specifically, aporias emerging from what had previously been thought are always taken to be: a) what had
not yet been sent for us to think then; b) what is sent for us to think only now.
8. Community and its Shadow

*Ich bin du, wenn*

*ich ich bin.*

- Paul Célan

Thus far I have underscored that Heidegger’s thoughtful participation in the question of Being requires a We as the historical site through which the call of Being can echo. I have also outlined roughly how both Heidegger’s political venture of 1933 and his subsequent archi-political response to it are bound up with this site, this We (see chapters 5 and 6). Finally, I showed that he is able to appeal to such a We — and maintain this appeal — only because of his sustained avoidance, from *Sein und Zeit* onwards, of the question of community.

Now, after having engaged Heidegger’s “Zusage” in chapter 7, we see that this site, when engaged rigorously, reveals itself otherwise: it maintains itself at no gathered historical locus but is a singular-differential pseudo-location, a between without a univocal trajectory. With this, Heidegger’s path brings itself to acknowledge its own doubling or dispersal.

This revelation, as it happens “within” Heidegger’s path of thinking, presents us with not just the opportunity but the responsibility of re-tracing the question of community, for the doubling of Being’s receptive/reflective site (see chapter 7[2]) renders impossible the community upon which Heidegger depends; i.e., it renders impossible the Heideggerian conception of the We, a We both necessary for and contingent upon the univocal, traceable trajectory of the path of thinking. This withdrawal of the We, of community, is, here and now, the task for thinking — both Heidegger’s thinking and “ours.”

Thus, taking up the protocol announced in chapter 7 (a protocol, moreover, which emerges out of Heidegger’s own thought), I will repeat Heidegger’s consideration of the “with” in *Sein und Zeit* — this time in terms of the *Zusage.* This repetition will reshape the terrain of *Sein und Zeit,* allowing previously concealed exigencies to surface. Following this, I will suggest briefly: a. how my reading of Heidegger might require reassessing the relationship between his thought and ethico-political discourse; and b. how such a reassessment, rooted in Heidegger’s own thinking, might come to bear on judging Heidegger himself.

Chapter 8 consists of 3 sections:

1. Reconsidering Heidegger’s With-logic
2. *Sein und Zeit*
3. The Echo of the Imperative Voice
1. Reconsidering Heidegger’s With-logic

If we return to Sein und Zeit from the differential singularity of the Zusage, it becomes clear how the logic of with-ness -- a logic which is suppressed in Sein und Zeit in favour of Heidegger’s “interpretive decision” regarding Being-singular -- is ultimately a logic of differential singularity. As we saw in chapter 2, the determination of Gemeinschaft in §74, whereby Heidegger forecloses any development of the question of community, suppresses the I-We aporia. This aporia, I propose, is rooted precisely in the tension between singularity and difference in Heidegger’s account of Dasein.

Though Sein und Zeit does, as I have argued, acknowledge the singularity of Dasein Being, this singularity is ultimately not regarded as differential. Rather it is a matter of Dasein’s mineness [Jemeinigkeit]. of a non-relationality [Unbezüglichkeit] which does not, contrary to Blanchot’s relation without relation, engage my stance vis à vis the Other, but rather avoids it. Indeed, the difference between my Dasein and that of others is always skirted over, situated first and foremost in terms of this self-possession.1 Granted, for Heidegger, the issue of both self-possession and “my difference from others” is shifted from the ontico-existential to the ontologico-existential level. Despite this shift, however, serious consideration of this difference and its implications are avoided throughout the text, as I have shown (chapter 2).

Still, at another stratum Heidegger bears witness, at least partially, to this tension in Dasein’s existential structure: the phenomenon of Dasein’s Being-with-one-another, when considered carefully, calls into question these determinations in their clear-cut separation. It points towards a kind of originary differential singularity in which the very distinction between “mine” and “other’s” is problematized at the existential level.

At the beginning of Division One, chapter IV of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger claims unequivocally that the “with” of Being-with-one-another is equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world (114). He also indicates clearly the divided structure of this with: Being-with is constitutive of my Being; Dasein-with is constitutive of the other’s Being. This structural divide is what allows both myself and the other to be Dasein without being one and the same entity. And yet, this is no merely ontic principle of individuation. As I have argued in chapter 2, while it is all too easy to misinterpret Being-with as

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1 And though this “self-possession” is thought through to the point that the very difference between possession and loss is problematized (see next section), it is always thought in terms of my possession or loss and never in terms of what happens between “us”.

ontic intentionality, both Being-with and the Dasein-with which corresponds to it are *existentialia*, aspects of Dasein's Being.

I maintain that, as existential, the structural divide of this with, when thought explicitly in terms of Dasein's Being-singular, reveals itself as differential singularity; as such, it demands that we rethink not just the ontic I-We relation, but the *Lichtung* itself -- a *Lichtung* which I must share with others a priori. Specifically, recall that the *Lichtung* of *Sein und Zeit* is in each case mine, structuring and delimiting possibility in terms of this singular Being-in: Dasein, whatever its concrete existentiell involvements, is always situated in relation to its ownmost Being-able-to-be ([Seinkönnen](that existential potentiality granted to Dasein as its Being-singular). As we saw in chapter 2, Heidegger resists thinking this singular *Lichtung* in terms of Being-for-the-sake-of-others, at least in the dominant stratum of *Sein und Zeit*, instead restricting authentic Being-able-to-be to a Being-for-the-sake-of-my-Being. Now -- after having considered the *Zusage* of Heidegger's later thought -- we see not only that but *how* this Being-able-to-be constitutive of Dasein's mineness, is already contaminated by with-ness. The *Lichtung* is, to be sure, a singular "site." But Dasein's distribution into Being-with and Dasein-with demands that this site, despite its singularity, not be self-contained, identical to itself; it must be, rather, differential inasmuch as it is determined *a priori*, through the with, as a relation to other such sites and inasmuch as it is already permeated by these other sites. I am for the sake of others precisely because the most primordial "site" is between locations, "inter-subjective" -- or better, "inter-jective" -- for it is not "we" but the differential-singular between which is thrown: as Heidegger himself is at least partially aware, the *inter* precedes what it holds apart (*Sein und Zeit*, 132). To be Dasein qua Being-with is to be always open in advance -- through the with -- to the Other's Being (Dasein-with); it is always to be for the sake of the Other prior to all existentiell comportment. (a quick point of clarification: it might seem here that the "for-the-sake-of-which" implies a teleological structure for the "with;" this, however, is not the case. As Robert Bernasconi argues in "The Fate of the Distinction between Praxis and Poiesis"[Heidegger in Question, 9] -- and as I argued in chapter 2 -- this term refers to an existential structure which is prior to and necessary for any comportment towards an end and which cannot itself function as an end. At stake here, in Being for the sake of the Other (SZ, 123), is a responsibility for the Other which precedes all comportment.)

And so, contrary to the dominant stratum of *Sein und Zeit*, my Being-in does not relate to the other merely through worldhood. Thought in terms of differential singularity, it is a Being-with which discloses Dasein-with; it is an in-ness which is open to a kind of lateral dispersal or effraction: the *Lichtung* is not "what it is;" it is other than itself inasmuch as, in its singular my-in-ness (and it is always singular), it opens out -- and is already opened out -- onto the in-ness granted...
to others: the *Lichtung* is mine as ours, a self-othering sharing prior to all sharing. To echo Jean-Luc Nancy’s formulation in *The Inoperative Community*: my in “*[e(s)]tro [tou autre que]*” the in of the other (74/29). There is no contradiction here — as long as singularity is understood as a singular between. Ontologically, sharing-with-others is constitutive of mineness and vice versa. Of course, this demands a thorough re-assessment of Being-towards-death and the non-relationality which characterizes it. We shall pursue this in section 2.

It is in the light of this effraction that we must read the following crucial passage: “...Dasein’s world frees entities which not only are quite distinct from equipment and things, but which also — in accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein themselves — are ‘in’ the world in which they are at the same time encountered within-the-world, and are ‘in’ it by way of Being-in-the-world”(SZ, 118). Again, Dasein does not encounter the in-ness of the other through some kind of Husserlian analogical appresentation whereby the entity as encountered precedes in-ness as a characteristic of it. Rather, my singular Being-there is already a Being-there-too-with-others (the “too,” here, is not accidental but essential), a singular but shared and differentiated Being-in through which I and others are existentiellly.

It is the implications of this lateral dispersal, implications which problematize the unity of the question of Being, of the path of thinking and of the *Lichtung*, that Heidegger eventually recoils from in §74.

But why could this with-logic not fully surface in *Sein und Zeit*? And why can it surface here and now with Heidegger’s reflections on the *Zusage*?

As I’ve indicated, *Sein und Zeit* is incapable of fully acknowledging this inter and this a priori responsibility to the Other (cf. my ch. 2) because the coherence of its project demands that the issue of the “between” be subordinated to the question of Being and, more generally, to the question as the locus of thinking. As I demonstrated in chapter 7, however, Heidegger’s relation to both the inter and responsibility is eventually displaced. It is in terms of πολεμος, *Riß*, and finally *Ereignis* thought as the event of the *Zusage*, that this inter, this site-less site, can begin to be addressed within Heidegger’s path of thinking — though the very notion of “path” is, as we saw in chapter 7, radically displaced in the process.

* * *

In chapter 7, we saw how the differential singularity of the *Zusage* happens [ereignet] as the prior address of language, as the “saying to...”*[sagen zu...*] to which all determinate saying is a response. Thus, we must consider Heidegger’s with-logic not merely in terms of differential
singularity but in terms of the differential-singular address. To be sure, Heidegger, already in *Sein und Zeit*, thinks of community as constituted in “our” response to a prior address (as we saw in §74 of *Sein und Zeit*, *Gemeinschaft* requires a shared authenticity, i.e., a shared response to the call of conscience). However, it is only with the *Zusage* that this address loses its locatability, i.e., it is no longer thought to emerge through the question of Being; indeed, it is thought as prior to questioning as such.

We saw briefly in chapter 7(2) how the *Zusage*, in its address to us, problematizes “us-ness” as such inasmuch as this address doubles itself. Specifically, not only must the addressor — the *Es* of the *Es geben* -- differ from itself, failing to maintain itself as what it is; the *addressee* — as both gift and recipient of the gift -- must be other than itself as well, “a” differential-singular ear ultimately unlocatable within any traceable destiny.

Given this, what might it mean to say that the effactive *Lichtung* discussed above -- the *Lichtung* as shared out [mitgeteilt] in advance through the with -- happens as such an address? Or, to formulate the same question differently, what might it mean to say that the call of conscience -- the always prior imperative address through which I am exposed to Being -- arrives not simply as “my” secure site but rather *between us*?

In short, the doubling/withdrawal of the *Zusage*, when thought in terms of Heidegger’s call of conscience and his with-logic, entails the doubling/withdrawal of community itself:

1. To begin with, the “community” at issue in the address can be no locatable community, no determinate *We*: for not only the origin but also the destination of the *Zusage* eludes in advance every presentable *I* and *We*. Indeed, the address both emerges from and is ultimately addressed to a singular-differential between: that *Mitlichtung*, always shared in advance, out of which and into which each of us emerge.

Granted, the address always presents itself as this singular address: as this addressor speaking to this addressee. This would seem to suggest, at the very least, a determinate community of interlocutors. And yet, as I have argued, the differential address-event, though it certainly needs to present itself, happens precisely as its withdrawal from its own self-presentation and thus from every presented addressor and addressee.

Expressed in terms of the with-logic of *Sein und Zeit*, the address has always already receded from itself, having withdrawn from and apportioned itself into my Being (Being-with) and the other’s Being (Dasein-with). Arriving as the singular-differential ‘between’, as the very middle (both *Mitte* and *mit*) which leaves us in its wake, this with-address distributes into mouth and ear, addressor and addressee -- a rift which spaces us. This “Mitlich” address-event is, like the call of conscience, imperative; yet unlike this call it commands us, each time,
asymmetrically: 1) the one(s) compelled to speak to the other(s), obligated to voice what is said ‘in’ the address itself; and 2) the other(s) compelled, prior to any command which might be explicitly voiced ‘in’ the singular, determinate utterance, to at least listen to and respect the address of the addressor(s).  

Here, we see that the singular, determinate address from the one(s) to the other(s) echoes and indeed accomplishes the with’s prior archi-address to “us.” Yet just as this “with” functions ultimately as an impossible addressor -- an addressor which withdraws from itself, failing to maintain itself -- it likewise functions as an impossible addressee, for the “us” in question here is also that differential “with” which, withdrawing from itself, fragments every “us” in advance. In this way, *Sein und Zeit*’s call of conscience is displaced; for while the caller of the call of conscience, as developed in that text, is presented as unlocatable (inasmuch as the call “comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me”[275]), the authentic I is presented as a singular, self-identical addressee, emerging here and now as this ear which fragments in listening towards this call (cf. my chapter 2). Now, however -- with the Zusage as our point of reference -- we see that such a stable, locatable addressee is not possible, whether it be thought of as an I or as a we. Indeed, now we see, contrary to the dominant stratum of the text, that: 1) this determinate addressor (this/these other(s) who face me/us) can present itself only as that through which the archi-addressor recedes; 2) this determinate addressee (me/us) can present itself only as that through which the archi-addressee recedes. To transpose Heidegger’s phrase from 1950: the address arrives “from out of the difference into the difference”(L, 206) such that neither addressor nor addressee escapes the originary interruption constitutive of it.

2. However, this singular addressor/addressee relation must present itself -- (in)inadequately -- in terms of a locatable community. As I have argued, the archi-address needs to present itself in the singular, determinate address in order to withdraw from this presentation. And yet, the presentation of the “singular” addressor and addressee appears immediately problematic, for presentation as such always happens, for Heidegger, through a factically determinate interpretive schema which has already gathered all that is presentable into a ‘totality of beings’.  

Hence, the beings at issue here -- the addressor and addressee -- can

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2 As Levinas recognizes in *Totality and Infinity*, the responsibility to affirm the address is prior to any affirmation or negation of what is said ‘in’ the address: there is a ‘yes’ which underlies even every explicit ‘no’. Levinas writes: “The other is maintained and confirmed in his heterogeneity as soon as one calls upon him, be it only to say to him that one cannot speak to him, to classify him as sick, to announce to him his death sentence; at the same time as grasped, wounded, outraged, he is ‘respected’”(65/69).

3 In the context of *Sein und Zeit*, this totality of beings would be the first sense of “world” mentioned on pp. 64-5.
present themselves only in terms of this totality: as participants in a 'community of present-at-hand interlocutors', however broadly or narrowly this community might be defined. The singular addressor/addressee relation is — as presented — always this/these Other(s) who address me/us, obligating me/us to him/her/them in a factical context where others are already there alongside us and where a factical code of behaviour has already been prescribed. The call of conscience presents itself here and now, between us, in terms of that locatable, factical community granted by (and essential for) the withdrawn with.

On the one hand, this interpretive schema and the totalizing community which it entails appear simply to betray the singularity of what is presented (for instance, my every attempt to present the singular phenomenon betrays this singularity by appealing to universal terms: "this" addressee, "this" addressor, even the term "singular" itself). And yet, on the other hand, we must keep in mind that this betrayal is itself absolutely essential for the singularity which is at stake in this differential logic of presentation-withdrawal. Indeed, the "inadequacy" of each presentation of the singular phenomenon (this address, this addressee, this addressor) indicates not that its truth lies in universality but that the singular is itself inherently differential, withdrawing from its own self-presentation. "What" is singular is not something which presents itself; nor is it something which withdraws from presentation. It is that differential "with" which does not maintain itself as a "something," i.e., as a particular case of a universal.

Thus we see that every presentation of a determinate, presented community, of a We, is the echo or shadow of an originary archi-community, of a communal "transcendental condition" as it were; and yet, this archi-community is itself nothing but community's absence, the withdrawal of We-ness from its own presentation.

As I argued in chapter 3, the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit is engaged in the displacement of transcendental philosophy. To recap briefly: a. transcendental philosophy appeals to a difference between the condition of presentation and the conditioned presentation; b. it articulates this difference, however, as a presented opposition, such that the condition of presentation — necessarily prior to determinate presentation — is itself presented; thus, c. Heidegger, in attempting to think this difference otherwise, concludes that the transcendental condition must be the double of itself, both presenting itself and withdrawing from this presentation. For him, the true "condition" of presentation is the always already withdrawn "between" in terms of which what is presented stands forth. This unpresentable, self-othering "condition" can thus disclose itself only through a

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4 Cf. SZ, 130.
presented transcendental condition which — though absolutely necessary for what it conditions — explicitly underscores its own inadequacy as presented.

It is this displaced transcendental logic which allows us to disclose the phenomenon of community in terms of the \textit{Zusage}: the withdrawal of the \textit{We} is not, as it had been for the Heidegger of 1934, provisional, awaiting the arrival of the \textit{We} to come (cf. chapter 5); it is the essence of community as such. \textit{Gemeinschaft}, in its determinate presentation, is the shadow of its own absence. Likewise, where “ethics” is concerned, the force of any explicitly presented ethical principle (the categorical imperative, for instance) lies in the extent to which this presentation acknowledges — despite whatever authority it might possess — its own essential inadequacy and thus echoes the prior self-withdrawal of the imperative voice from presentation (cf. section 3a, to follow).

Granted, this reading has yet to show, with adequate precision, what this doubling of \textit{Gemeinschaft} and of the imperative voice entails for the function of responsibility in Heidegger’s thinking; moreover, it has yet to show how such an appropriation of the call of conscience can make sense of non-relational \textit{Being-towards-death}. These are crucial concerns, and I shall address them in the next section.

These concerns notwithstanding, however, it is now clear how the differential singular address does — and yet does not — involve a determinate \textit{We}. Indeed, the address — the “saying to” —, in order that it withdraw from itself, must leave its trace “in” us, doubling itself as: 1) what is said to me by the Other(s) who stand(s) opposed to me, each of us here, at this site, \textit{with} one another within this factual community; and 2) the other which recedes from this address, the between which is opposed to nothing, other \textit{even} than itself. The latter comes to us only through (its interruption of) the former.

Community is, as I have shown, certainly one of the “unthoughts” of \textit{Sein und Zeit}; in fact, the avoidance of the \textit{Gemeinschaftsfrage} makes possible the illusion that a community, a “\textit{We},” can be gathered together around and as one proper and locatable response to the Unthought — a \textit{We} free of this singular-differential effraction. Heidegger is right, in 1934, to say that the \textit{I} reaches a point where it realizes its groundedness in a crisis of “\textit{We}-ness.” But rigorously engaging the question of community, the question of \textit{We}-ness, reveals that it is in terms of the self-othering address, and \textit{not} in terms of a community-addressee still to come (cf. chapter 5), that the withdrawal of the \textit{We} must be thought.
2. *Sein und Zeit*

But what happens to *Sein und Zeit* when this with-logic and this doubling of community are no longer muffled?

As I will demonstrate, several key elements within the text are displaced -- yet not in the sense that something external to the text moves them; rather, they shift as the text continues to interrupt itself, bearing witness to the self-othering withdrawal which is its "object." In the following two sub-sections, we shall trace this shift as it takes place in Being-towards-death and the call of conscience.

a. Singularity and (Dis)possession

As I showed in chapter 2, Dasein's mineness -- its Being-singular -- is disclosed to it via its ownmost possibility, i.e., its death. Only because Dasein, in its existential relation to its death, is unsubstitutable, can there be a "self" which is mine and no one else's, a self which coalesces as a gathered hearing of the call of conscience. This call singles me out, and does so precisely by calling me to acknowledge my death; "I" come to be by acknowledging death not merely as an ontic possibility but as this ontological finitude. Indeed, the singularity of this singling out must be understood in a two-fold sense:

1. Singular being: Dasein can be authentic, i.e., it can be the singular being which exists towards its own concrete possibilities, possibilities illuminated and circumscribed for it by its ownmost singular possibility.

2. Being-singular: Death -- that ownmost possibility which allows Dasein to be "this singular being" -- is itself a possibility not of this or that existentiell determination but of Dasein's pre-intentional Being-able-to-be, and thus of its Lichtung. Thus, a transparent [durchsichtig] comportment towards death discloses Being itself as Being-singular.

It is easy to misconstrue Heidegger's analysis of death, for though he refers to death as my ownmost possibility, a close reading reveals that it is neither "possible" nor "my own," strictly speaking.

To begin with, as I emphasized in chapter 2, Heidegger has not simply taken up the notion of "possibility" as handed down to him through the philosophical tradition. Indeed, his analysis of Dasein unsettles the relation of possibility to both actuality and ontico-existentiell determinacy. When he claims that "[in] each case Dasein is its possibility"(42), he is not simply reversing the conventional privilege of actuality over possibility. Indeed, because the phenomenon to which he is trying to bear witness does not abide the actuality/possibility schema, he can allow it to show itself
only by displacing this oppositional schema itself. Thus, the possibility which characterizes Dasein and its death refers neither to possibility nor actuality in their stable — and always relative — sense.

Likewise, though possibility is normally understood as onico-existentiell, as the possibility of something determinate (and actualizable), the "possibility" which characterizes Dasein is, first and foremost, ontologico-existential, its Being-able-to-be. Thus, though death can be and most often is thought as a pending "event," its primary significance for Heidegger has to do with that Being-in which is prior to and necessary for all onico-existentiell possibilities, that Being-in wherein events take place. It is at this point that Levinas -- on many fronts perhaps the most insightful critic of Heidegger -- fails to grasp what is at stake. As we shall see, though Levinas is careful to acknowledge the uniquely ontological status which the possibility of death has for Heidegger, i.e., its specifically transcendental character with respect to all other possibilities (Time and the Other, 70), his failure to follow through the implications of this "archi-possibility" leads him to treat it, ultimately, as onico-existentiell. It is this misinterpretation which prevents him from seeing the ethical implications of mortality in Sein und Zeit.

Secondly, the way in which the possibility of death is Dasein's ownmost possibility destabilizes another closely related schema: that of possession/loss. Despite his emphasis on Dasein's finitude, Heidegger still seems to submit loss to possession, placing death at Dasein's disposal, as its possibility of loss. Yet, as I argued in chapter 2(3d), while one can read Heidegger as having decided for possession over loss (or, indeed, for loss over possession), it is also possible to read him as having displaced the possession/loss schema as such.

Levinas primary argument against Heidegger's understanding of death is not concerned with whether Heidegger privileges possession over loss or vice versa. It is concerned, rather, with the fact that, for Heidegger, death is interpreted solely in terms of the economy of the Same, the economy of the "I can" wherein the possession/loss schema is located. For Levinas, as for Heidegger, the I's primary relation to itself is a kind of originary "self-possession" — not such that the I "has" itself in its possession but such that the engagement in possessing is constitutive of the I's identification with itself. Moreover, this possession (again, as with Heidegger) is a matter of possibility: the identification of the same in the I is no tautological "I am I" (Totality and Infinity, 37) but a "dwelling"[demeurer] in the world, a dwelling which "lives from" [vit de] its world (ibid.,

5 See my chapter 2(3).
110), not so much using it to achieve a further end as enjoying its nourishment (ibid., 110ff.). The otherness of the world affords me the archi-possibility -- essential for all other possibilities -- of being myself, i.e., of nourishing and maintaining myself:

The way of the I against the ‘other’ of the world consists in sojourn, in identifying oneself by existing here at home with oneself [chez soi]...Dwelling is the very mode of maintaining oneself [se tenir], not as the famous serpent grasping itself by biting onto its tail, but as the body that, on the earth exterior to it, holds itself up [se tient] and can. The ‘at home’ [Le ‘chez soi’] is not a container but a site where I can, where, dependent on a reality that is other, I am, despite this dependence or thanks to it, free....The site, a medium [Le lieu, milieu], affords means. Everything is here, everything belongs to me; everything is caught up in advance with the primordial occupying of a site, everything is comprehended. The possibility of possessing, that is, of suspending the very alterity of what is only at first other, and other relative to me, is the way of the same. I am at home with myself in the world because it offers itself to or resists possession (ibid., 37-8).

As Levinas says, the home or dwelling [la demeure], as the very structure of the “I can,” of possibility, is the “possession” par excellence, first making possible that interiority which constitutes me as possessor of worldly things (ibid., 157-8). It is only in terms of this dwelling-structure that the relation between possession and loss is possible. And yet, the Other who obligates me is not present within this economy of the same, of possibility; rather, s/he interrupts this economy from a position of exteriority. My encounter with the Other involves precisely my calling this economy into question (ibid., 82ff.) such that my relation to him/her is one of generosity: it is by giving to the Other that I acknowledge him/her, in an acknowledgment which exceeds all economic possibility -- an infinite (non)relation.

It is in order to understand this (non)relation, this transcendence, that Levinas strives to demarcate those phenomena which only seem to indicate transcendence without really touching upon it (ibid., 109); and for him, Heidegger’s Being-towards-death is just one such simulacrum.

Granted, Levinas holds that death does indeed indicate true transcendence, but only when it is considered as the “impossibility of possibility”:

[The relation to death] is a relation with an instant whose exceptional character is due not to the fact that it is at the threshold of nothingness or of a rebirth, but to the fact that, in life, it is the impossibility of every possibility, the stroke of a total passivity....Thus the fear for my being which is my relation with death is not the fear of nothingness, but the fear of violence -- and thus it extends into fear of the Other, of the absolutely unforeseeable (ibid., 235; cf. Time and the Other, 101).

Indeed, my relation with death is, at least in certain respects, analogous to my relation with the unanticipable Other who interrupts every economy, every possibility; death marks, like the Other, the impossible as such. This is why Heidegger’s interpretation of death as the “possibility of impossibility”(SZ, 250, 262) is so problematic for Levinas: though it seems to acknowledge an interruption of the possible, it actually subordinates impossibility and all that it entails to possibility; more specifically, to Dasein’s ownmost possibility. And even if Heideggerian death is interpreted
such that it discloses a radical loss underlying possession, the schema of possession/loss -- a schema which, for Levinas, is always a matter of the "I can" -- seems still to be left intact, oriented in terms of me: my capabilities and my limitations. This is why, for Levinas, it matters not whether authenticity is structured as Dasein's ownmost or its "ownleast;" in either case it fails to touch upon the ethical relation, the relation between the Same and the Other which exceeds the schema of possession/loss.

However, while Levinas is justified questioning the extent to which any logic of (dis)possession can acknowledge what escapes the economy of the Same, he too quickly situates Heidegger's thought in this logic. According to Levinas, though death never occurs within the time of the I, it nevertheless stands, with respect to the I, as a futural instant:

Death is a menace that approaches me as a mystery; its secrecy determines it -- it approaches without being able to be assumed, such that the time that separates me from my death dwindles and dwindles without end, involves a sort of last interval which my consciousness cannot traverse, and where a leap will somehow be produced from death to me. The last part of the route will be crossed without me; the time of death flows upstream; the I in its projection toward the future is overturned by a movement of imminence, pure menace, which comes to me from an absolute alterity (ibid., 235).

Presumably, the problem with Heidegger is that he interprets death -- the "instant infinitely future for the I who awaits it"(ibid.) -- as an instant which Dasein can anticipate with an "extreme lucidity and hence an extreme virility," indeed "grasping" death as "an event of freedom" rather than one of "passivity"(ibid., 70-1). And yet, as I argued in chapter 2(3d), death for Heidegger is ultimately not a possibility which Dasein relates to as an "instant" which approaches. For him, such an impending instant would necessarily be an existentiell possibility in contrast to that existential possibility which death is: a structural component of that Lichtung which situates all "instants" in advance. We must keep in mind that Heidegger's constant reference, in Sein und Zeit, to the axes of (im)possibility (Möglichkeit - Unmöglichkeit) and (dis)possession (Eigentlichkeit - Uneigentlichkeit) locates not so much his own thinking as what his thinking is up against in engaging the Lichtung. He realizes that in order to displace not just the factual privilege of possession over loss and possibility over impossibility but the very logic which makes such oppositions possible, it is necessary to turn this logic against itself. And this is just what he does in his treatment of death: though the term "death" is, like all terms at our disposal, situated factically in the logic of the proper, of the ontico-existentiell possible, it marks a fissure in this logic, a point of weakness which threatens its coherence from within. In death, possession runs up against "something" which first appears and is typically interpreted as a limitation of existentiell possibility, a loss, the negation of possession. However, a closer look reveals that death discloses neither loss nor the tragic, virile appropriation of loss but the ground of the schema out of which both emerge in their relative coherence. That
Heidegger's point of focus, in his treatment of Dasein's authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] and of its ownmost possibility is the most radical loss, inaccessible as an ontico-existentiell possibility, is hardly accidental: the conflation of — or rather the undecideability between — possession and loss, possibility and impossibility, marks for Heidegger the point at which this logic is no longer adequate to the phenomenon. (and is this not ultimately the case for Levinas as well? Does not the "impossibility" to which he refers interrupt the possibility/impossibility schema whose logic lies within the economy of the same?)

We see then how, for Heidegger, death marks no limit dividing power from impotence but rather the shift from the axis of ontico-existentiell possibility and teleology towards something quite other than a \( \pi\epsilon\lambda\omega\zeta \). What is "mine" here is neither possession nor loss, neither possibility nor impossibility, but Being-singular, that \( \mathfrak{D} \) which is disclosed in the inflection, at the very heart of the "ownmost"[Eigensf], towards an "ownleast" which is not simply a loss. As discussed in chapter 2, this "something other" is encountered precisely in the call of conscience — an interruptive-imperative voice (chapter 2[3b]) — and this is where Sein und Zeit touches upon the "ethical relation." The ownmost at issue here is my ownmost responsibility to this call (mine prior to "me," as I have argued); and the ownleast is the way the imperative always calls to me from beyond, such that my attention and my response are directed "elsewhere," away from any schema of power/impotence, possession/loss, possibility/impossibility. Dasein is inflected from its preoccupation with the world of available possibilities towards an obedience to a radical imperative.7

Perhaps surprisingly, one thinker who is close to Heidegger in acknowledging death as "my ownmost possibility" is Georges Bataille. Granted, Bataille is engaged in no existential analytic; he is not at all concerned with Heidegger's question of Being. Nevertheless, Heidegger's thought, after passing through the exigencies of the Zusage, is no longer able to hold itself at a distance from those who "fail" to take Being into account (see chapter 7); and indeed, without such a stable axis the points of connection and divergence between thinkers become much more elusive.

It would be premature to contrast Heidegger's language of authentic self-possession with Bataille's language of loss and expenditure in order to posit a radical incommensurability between these two thinkers. As I will argue, Bataille, like Heidegger, sees in death a phenomenon which

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6 On thinking Heidegger's for-the-sake-of-which [Worumwillen] otherwise than as a \( \pi\epsilon\lambda\omega\zeta \), see Robert Bernasconi's "The Fate of the Distinction between Praxis and Poiesis"(Heidegger in Question).  
7 Compare this passage from Totality and Infinity: "Freedom...is inhibited, not as countered by a resistance, but as arbitrary, guilty, and timid; but in its guilt it rises to responsibility. Contingency, that is, the irrational, appears to it not outside of itself in the other, but within itself. It is not limitation by the other that constitutes contingency, but egoism, as
does not abide the appropriation/expropriation opposition. Despite their differences, both thinkers propose that death discloses the “limit” of the pervasive economy (of relative loss and possession) in which we find ourselves, an economy which leads us to believe that everything, including death, can be presented as an object of speculation. For the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit, the “economy” in question is that of worldhood: the “in order to” relation which structures Dasein’s engagement with beings, situating them in terms of ends beyond themselves (§18). The limit in question here is Dasein’s Being-possible, Being-able-to-be, a for-the-sake-of-which which must be thought otherwise than as an end, a τέλος. For Bataille, the restricted economy in which we find ourselves is one in which every expenditure of energy is put to work, an investment geared towards return, profit. This economy’s limit is thought as absolute expenditure, as a sovereign gesture geared in no way towards an end (The Accursed Share, vol. I, 19ff.).

In his consideration of death, Bataille, like Heidegger, touches upon something which does not present itself but which leaves its trace in the notion of death, or more specifically, in this notion’s resistance to being “put to work” (and that Bataille refers to this self-effacing “something” as the night of “non-knowledge”[Inner Experience, 111] and as the “blind spot”[tache aveugle][ibid., 110] surely resonates with Heidegger’s unthought). Specifically, though death, in Bataille’s texts, appears to be a moment of absolute loss — and Bataille’s claims, taken out of the context of their movement, would seem to support this — this sovereign event displaces, while still remaining in contact with, the economy of appropriation/loss. Ultimately, the events of loss and appropriation make sense only in terms of the restricted economy in which they function relative to one another. The “loss” characteristic of death points beyond this relation, simultaneously using and exhausting its terminology.

Still, we must keep in mind a crucial difference: for Heidegger, the essential determination of death is its singularity, and this is not reflected in Bataille’s writing. On the contrary, what death discloses for Bataille is, in certain crucial respects, the very collapse of the singular. To begin with, an individual man, for Bataille, is but a “particle” inserted in “unstable and tangled groups”(ibid., 84):

...From one single particle to another, there is no difference in nature, neither is there any difference between this one and that one. There is some of this which is produced here or there, each time in the form of unity, but this unity does not persevere in itself. Waves, undulations, single particles are

unjustified in itself. The relation with the Other as a relation with his transcendence...introduces into me what was not in me”(203).

It is precisely this point that Derrida underscores in his 1967 essay on Bataille and Hegel: Bataille does not oppose an economy of loss to Hegel’s speculative economy; rather, his writing forces the former to inscribe itself — albeit, furtively and inadequately — in the latter (Writing and Difference, 270ff.).
The "communication" which links one particle to another must be understood as

contagions of energy, of movement, of warmth, or transfers of elements....Life is never situated at a particular point: it passes rapidly from one point to another (or from multiple points to other points), like a current or like a sort of streaming of electricity. Thus, there where you would like to grasp your timeless substance, you encounter only a slipping, only the poorly coordinated play of your perishable elements (ibid., 94).

In this context, death is a particle’s complete dissolution in this slipping movement, its ceasing to be an obstacle to those forces which overflow it (ibid., 96). “The self in no way matters” (ibid., 50) precisely because its only “meaning” is its dissolution in this communication without sense:

Life will dissolve itself in death, rivers in the sea, and the known in the unknown. Knowledge is access to the unknown. Nonsense is the outcome of every possible sense (ibid., 101).

In contrast to Bataille, Heidegger pinpoints in his own consideration of death an "excess" or "loss" which, though it escapes every singular entity, does not escape ontologico-existential singularity. Thus, Heidegger acknowledges that the "excessive" possibility of death is unsubstitutable. Because Being is Being-singular, I cannot step in for the other in his/her relation to his/her death. At most I can “stand alongside” (239). Each Dasein’s relation to its own death must be understood as mine (240). For Heidegger, unlike Bataille, Dasein’s relation to its death involves no dissolution of the singular in the continuum.

And yet, it is precisely this absence of a “continuum” in Heidegger’s consideration of death that constitutes his blind spot. While his treatment of singular death does displace the relation between possession and possibility, he does not consider this singularity in terms of his own “with-logic,” i.e., he does not acknowledge that, in the displacement of the possession/loss schema, Being-singular is shared: it is my ownmost possibility precisely as our possibility (the sense of the “our” here inflected towards a shared margin of [dis]possession prior to any existentiell possession or loss). Though Bataille fails to acknowledge the singularity underlying the “subject’s” relation to death, he nevertheless exposes a kind of differential “medium” constitutive of our existence.

By rethinking Heidegger’s Being-towards-death in terms of his with-logic -- a logic suppressed for the most part in Sein und Zeit -- we come to something akin to Bataille’s continuum, a

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9 For Bataille, we subsist in a relation of anguished tension to this impending dissolution, torn between “the desire to give oneself completely to the bacchanalia which breaks out and destroys, and the concern to last, to participate in the bacchanalia without being dead” (ibid., 194).

10 As Derrida points out, Bataille’s continuum does not erase discontinuity (Writing and Difference, 263). Indeed, “Pushing itself toward the nonbasis of negativity and of expenditure, the experience of the continuum is also the experience of absolute difference, of a difference which would no longer be the one that Hegel had conceived more profoundly than anyone else...” (ibid.).
continuum which emerges not contrary to but as differential-singularity. To be sure, Being-singular is apportioned to me prior to my ontic determination, mine prior to me; it "is" this clearing in terms of which the existentiell I can emerge. Its singular finitude is revealed to me in the possibility of my death. However, thought in terms of that "with" which is equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world (particularly in terms of the way the very Being-in of Dasein is apportioned into Being-with and Dasein-with), this Being-singular is no self-identical enclosed site, but an originary difference which opens up prior to and between sites, distributing them in relation to one another. The finitude of the Lichtung -- glimpsed in the possibility of death -- is a shared finitude, a shared "loss" which passes between us prior to every us and every I. The inflection of ownmost towards ownleast is also the inflection of mineness towards ourness (and this is why Dasein's relation to its own for-the-sake-of-which is at the same time its relation to the Other's for-the-sake-of-which).

This sharing does not negate the singularity and unsubstitutability of my Being-singular; rather, it clarifies that what is singular-unsubstitutable about this Lichtung is that its unlocatable path of withdrawal from me passes between singular beings, between myself and the Other, distributing "us" face to face across thissingular rift. What is ours before all else is that Being-singular which has always already come between us, proper to none of us.

In his essay "The Inoperative Community," Jean-Luc Nancy engages this aspect of Heidegger's thought, perhaps better than anyone else. Though this text appears to be primarily a reading of Bataille, its trajectory actually passes between Bataille and Heidegger, highlighting what I have suggested are their complementary blind-spots, their shared "loss." Specifically, Nancy uses the term "exposure"[exposition] (an inflection of Heideggerian "ek-stasis"[The Inoperative Community, 6]) in order to articulate a Being-outside-of-itself which is neither possession (a coming to occupy an outside) nor loss (a relinquishment of an inside), and which is, more importantly, both singular and shared:

1. Exposure is always singular, the facing-outwards of this Dasein (ibid., 29), a facing-outwards not accidental to it but constitutive of its very Being.11 For Nancy, however, -- like Heidegger and unlike Hegel -- this facing-outwards is absolute: always already outside of itself, it is "...suspended on the limit of its access to self"(ibid., 19). My very Being precludes the possibility of returning to any point of origin.

2. Exposure is a facing-outwards which is always shared, and shared in a way that reflects Heidegger's suppressed and effective with-logic. For Nancy, the Being of the ecstatic being is first of all "a division of sites,...an extension -- partes extra partes -- such that each
singularity is extended" (ibid., 29); this Being "makes [finite-being] exist only by exposing it to an outside. This outside is in its turn nothing other than the exposition of another... singularity -- the same other. This exposure, or this exposing-sharing, gives rise, from the outset, to a mutual interpellation of singularities... " (ibid.). Thus, Being is my opening out onto an outside which is also the other's outside, the common irreducible margin which links and separates us, prior to each of us.

This exposure displaces the logic of possession/loss because what is "possessed" -- whether it be thought as mine or ours -- is precisely what escapes me/us. Though ours, it grants no recognition -- neither I that is We nor We that is I -- for in 'sharing us out' it interrupts our we-ness as an untraversable rift, a prior "loss" which, as with Levinas, prevents us from occupying the same site. This rift constitutes every single one of us, leaving in its wake a division of sites: "‘you (are/and/is) (entirely other than) I’ (‘toi [e(s)t] [tout autre que] moi’)" (ibid.). It leaves a we which cannot possess itself as a we, since what is most ours escapes us, a spacing which has already fragmented us12: "Community, which is not a subject, and even less a subject (conscious or unconscious) greater than 'myself,' does not have or possess... consciousness: community is the ecstatic consciousness of the night of immanence, insofar as such a consciousness is the interruption of self-consciousness" (ibid., 19).

Here, the phenomenon of death is crucial for Nancy; for it is through its relation to its death that the finite-being gains a furtive glimpse of its singular-shared Being, and thus of community. The following passage offers a clue for understanding this glimpse:

... there is no entity or hypostasis of community because this sharing, this passage cannot be completed. Incompletion is its 'principle,' taking the term 'incompletion' in an active sense, however, as designating not insufficiency or lack, but the activity of sharing, the dynamic, if you will of an uninterrupted passage through singular ruptures... It is not a matter of making, producing, or instituting a community; nor is it a matter of venerating or fearing within it a sacred power -- it is a matter of incompleting its sharing. Sharing is always incomplete, or it is beyond completion and incompletion. For a complete sharing implies the disappearance of what is shared (ibid., 35).

This incompleteness is marked in the phenomenon of death, in the radical interruption which it discloses. And yet -- as with Heidegger -- we must be cautious here. It is tempting to think of death ontically, as the loss of finite beings. It is tempting to regard this singular death as the absolute withdrawal of an entity from the attempt to establish community, as a loss which prevents the completion of such projects.

11 Nancy underscores again and again this priority of ek-stasis or exposure; for instance: "The open mouth is not a laceration... It exposes the 'outside' an 'inside' that, without this exposition, would not exist" (ibid., 30).
12 It is important here to keep in mind Nancy's proximity to Derrida, for this prior spacing is itself no locatable origin; it is, like différence (Margins of Philosophy, 11), already fragmented: "‘The ‘ground’ [of singularity] is itself, through itself and as such, already the finitude of singularities' (The Inoperative Community, 27).
As should be clear at this point, however, such an interpretation regards “incompletion” as the mere negation of achievement, as a loss still situated in the economy of propriety. And indeed, Nancy’s references to an incompletion which is “not insufficiency or lack,” which is even “beyond completion and incompletion,” suggest rightly that something quite different is at stake: for Nancy, as for Heidegger, the term “death” locates a weak point or fissure in the logic of possession, making possible the interruption of a schema which rigidly delimits the scope of our thinking. Indeed, it betrays an ek-stasis which is neither ownmost nor ownleast. However, Nancy — unlike Heidegger — acknowledges explicitly the radical implications this interruption has for the relation between the Self and the Other.

Tracing Hegel and Bataille as much as Heidegger, Nancy argues that it is because of death that my facing the Other cannot be the recognition of myself in the other:

...[I]t is in the death of the other...that community enjoins me to its ownmost register, but this does not occur through the mediation of specular recognition. For I do not recognize myself in the death of the other -- whose limit nonetheless exposes me irreversibly....Heidegger leads us farthest here: “The dying of Others is not something that we experience in an authentic sense; at most we are always just 'there alongside'...By its very essence, death is in each case mine.” Here, the specular arrangement (of recognition of the self in the other, which presupposes the recognition of the other in oneself, and, consequently, the agency of the subject) is -- if I may say so -- turned inside out like a glove: I recognize that in the death of the other there is nothing recognizable”(ibid., 33).13

To be sure, the desire for recognition is always at work (ibid., 31), often behind the scenes as Hegel has shown so clearly. However, the phenomenon of death reveals something incommensurable with this desire -- not so much something which eludes it, desired but beyond reach; but rather something which the desire for recognition flees from: ek-stasis/exposure itself.

Recall that, for Hegel, desire is not simply consciousness’ desire for something other than itself; indeed, it is just as much consciousness’ desire for itself, its desire to have itself as its own object and thus be self-consciousness in and for itself. In order to accomplish this, at least the most rudimentary stage of community or inter-subjectivity is necessary: I need the other so that I can recognize myself in him/her and so that I can be recognized by him/her.

Hegel recognizes (and neither Heidegger, Levinas, Bataille nor Nancy would disagree) that if self-consciousness is to be possible, it must somehow pass through the death of consciousness. That is to say, the only way a free self-consciousness can expose itself to another as self-consciousness and thus be recognized by another is to demonstrate its freedom, its purely negative

13Here, Nancy shows how careful consideration of the Other’s death discloses nothing recognizable and thus discloses the margin which separates me from the Other. We must not, however, assume that the Other’s death has greater disclosive power than my death. My reading of Heidegger has underscored that one can also begin with a relation to one’s own death and arrive at the same dispossession, the same shared margin. What interrupts both trajectories is the insight that the singularity which makes death “possessible” is itself shared, ultimately.
relation to its every determinacy. And the only way it can do this is to show its willingness to sacrifice itself absolutely, giving up its every attachment to positivity, giving up its very life. For Hegelian self-consciousness, death must be put to work: 1) I can recognize myself in the other only if the other uses its death to demonstrate to me its in-itself; 2) I can demonstrate my in-itself to the other only if I use my death to do so.

Yet can death be put to work for recognition in this way? Can the subject use its relation to its own death in order to demonstrate its freedom to an other? Can it use its relation to the other's death in order to recognize the freedom of the other? And finally -- and more generally -- can Spirit use death in order to move from the isolated subject to the "I that is We and the We that is I"?

Derrida has underscored, in his reading of Bataille, that Hegelian Spirit is able to put death to work, reducing it to a means, only through a ruse, only through substituting a manageable representation of death for what has always already eluded us in this phenomenon. Not that Hegel's treatment is in some way inadequate; indeed, its "weakness" is its very adequacy: the thematization/objectification of death, in presenting death, conceals the inadequacy which is essential to death itself, the inadequacy which prevents it from showing itself, from being "what it is". Nancy continues this engagement with Hegel by taking Derrida's reading a step further. Specifically, his analysis shows why death cannot be used to bring the isolated "I" to recognize others and thus to accomplish and participate in a "We".

Following Heidegger and Bataille, Nancy argues that death is a "Loss" prior to and constitutive of possession/loss: We might say this differential-singularity tears into us, violently removing something/someone from us -- if there were any "us" prior to this singular-differential tear. It is only because our relation to each other is our facing each other across a withdrawn/withdrawing chasm -- the possibility of death which is ours only by belonging to none of us -- that we communicate and share our Being (and Heidegger, of course, saw this in his repeated engagements with πολέμος, though he never followed through the implications for the "with").

This is the "incompletion" of which Nancy speaks: not an interruption of project, but an interruption of economy itself.

Thus, though we desire recognition and immanence, we cannot attain them -- yet not because of a loss which could, in principle, be compensated. When Nancy says that death does not merely escape but holds in suspension all specular recognition (The Inoperative Community, 19), we must

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14 Though Hegel -- to his credit -- does acknowledge an inadequacy in the recognition that takes place in the struggle to the death (The Phenomenology of Spirit, 114-15), this inadequacy is itself put to use -- aufgehoben -- in the subsequent master-slave relation (ibid.); it is, like all the "inadequacies" in the Phenomenology, ultimately rendered adequate.

15 Cf. The Inoperative Community, 30.
remember that it is not simply the satisfaction of desire that is suspended, but the very economy in which such desire is situated, the economy of relative possession and loss. And this “suspension” is why it is never possible to subordinate communal sharing to any economy, any project, any organicity: community, the “We,” cannot be accomplished; it cannot blossom forth from the sublation of prior moments as a result or outgrowth:

1. Hegel saw clearly and correctly that the only way a self-conscious subject could exist — and develop as self-conscious inter-subjectivity, as “We” — would be to return to itself through the work of death.

2. What Hegel fails to see, and what Nancy expresses, is not only the absurdity but the injustice of such labour, of such unlimited desire for recognition: not only does it misidentify death and community as possible means and end and thus misunderstand the essence of community; it also prevents us from seeing that the most primordial sharing happens precisely in the relation to death, a relation prior to any labour; thus the work of death works against our acknowledgment of the only community there is: Being-in-common [être en commun], that fragile singular-differential margin which separates and binds us as we face each other across our death, absolutely responsible for the singular — yet doubled — Other.

Granted, this reading of Being-towards-death appears to run precisely counter to Heidegger’s emphasis in Sein und Zeit. Not once does he suggest that death is in any sense shared, that it somehow comes between us. Indeed, it seems immediately absurd, given Heidegger’s explicit analysis, to think of death as anything other than mine.

And yet, our analysis has not denied that Dasein’s relation to its death must be understood in terms of mineness; in fact it has affirmed this. However, a radical thinking of mineness reveals that I am singular as my self precisely in my Being-with, i.e., precisely in the way I face others a priori. As Nancy puts it, my “inside” is only as an opening onto its outside, an outside which is also the outside of the other (The Inoperative Community, 29). The singular-differential margin which separates us is the “ground” of mineness/Otherness, and it is in terms of this that death must be thought. To be sure, I experience the death of the Other as the singular loss of him/her; but this loss is the double of itself: withdrawing through the presentation of itself, separating itself from itself, it exposes the gap which links and separates, distributes and withdraws, my/our finite Being-singular. As “loss,” it is, strictly speaking, no more mine than it is the Other’s who has died. It arrives —

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16In Hegel’s preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit, the language of both organicity (e.g., 2) and labor (e.g. 10) are used to describe the self-othering self-gathering self-articulation of Spirit.

17Cf. note 16 to this chapter.
happening for us and to us — precisely in that it withdraws, escaping us, the effective spacing of the 
Lichtung.

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I would like to suggest that here — now that the exigencies of the Zusage (section 1) and of 
Being-towards-death (this section) have been thought through explicitly in terms of the with-logic 
of Sein und Zeit — Dasein’s “finitude” presents itself quite differently; so differently, in fact, that it 
might also be described in terms of an “infinity” which borders upon the Levinasian problematic: 
the infinity of the Other.

To begin with, Heidegger’s with-logic as I have explicated it precludes that the self- 
withdrawing address of language (the Zusage) be sharply separated, as he would like, from the 
address of the Other who faces me.18 Thus, Heidegger can no longer locate community (be it 
scientific, German, artistic or Western) as the prior site which makes possible my derivative relation 
to the singular Other. Whether or not Levinas’ sharp critique of Heideggerian Being hits its mark,19 
he is certainly on target in at least one crucial respect: “...[The] comprehension of Being in general 
cannot dominate the relationship with the Other....Already the comprehension of Being is said to 
the existent, who again arises behind the theme in which he is presented” (Totality and Infinity, 47- 
8). Once Heidegger’s thinking is brought to acknowledge this point, it must likewise acknowledge 
that Dasein’s Being is conditioned by an “infinite alterity” — albeit, an alterity whose logic differs in 
certain respect from that of Levinas.

To be sure, a thorough consideration of the relation between Heidegger and Levinas on this 
point would require much more than a few synoptic remarks about Levinas. Nevertheless, without 
pretending to do full justice to the latter, I would like to trace the possibility, disclosed in my 
reading, of a specifically Heideggerian infinity.

Recall that, for Levinas, the Other addresses me from on high (ibid., 75), obligating me 
absolutely from a site infinitely distant from my own (ibid., 35-6). The “distance” in question here 
does not concern a measurable “between” which locates me and the Other at different points in a 
common space; it is rather the Other’s absolute, prior withdrawal from the space which I occupy — 
a withdrawal constitutive of his/her very mode of existence (ibid.). It is the breach of totality (ibid.)

18Heidegger’s subordination of the singular Other is not restricted to the marginalization of Mitdasein in Sein und Zeit. 
For example, he says, in 1953, that “[the] much-discussed I/Thou experience, too, belongs within the metaphysical sphere 
of subjectivity”(US, 129-30/OWL, 35-6. Compare Levinas’ remarks, in Totality and Infinity (89), on Heidegger’s 
subordination of the relation with the Other to ontology;
19 See, for instance, the sub-section of Totality and Infinity entitled “Metaphysics Precedes Ontology”(41ff.).
which renders impossible any site which we might share. This distance or transcendence is not one which I “comprehend,” properly speaking; rather, it happens in the Other’s direct address to me. It is a matter of “height” because s/he addresses me as my teacher, my master -- an authoritative 2nd-person expression which is prior to, necessary for, and inarticulable in terms of 3rd-person thematization:

[The essence of language] resides in the irreversibility of the relation between me and the other, in the Mastery of the Master coinciding with his position as other and as exterior. For language can be spoken only if the interlocutor is the commencement of his discourse, if, consequently, he remains beyond the system, if he is not on the same plane as myself (ibid., 101).

The Other is “infinite” for Levinas not because it “[encounters] on the outside nothing that limits it, overflowing every limit...”(ibid., 26), but because its mode of existence is its withdrawal, qua addressee, from every idea I might have of it (ibid., 48ff.; 79ff.), from every limit which might be inscribed in a thematization.

On my re-reading of Sein und Zeit, something similar is at stake in Heidegger’s thinking. To be sure, Dasein’s existence is, above all, a matter of finitude: Dasein, through its relation to its own mortality, stands as this singular entity in the clearing of its ownmost Being-singular (cf. my chapter 2). As I have argued, however, neither this existential clearing nor this being can be thought as nonrelational [unbezüglich], for the death which presents Dasein with its own finitude discloses itself ultimately as shared, as having always already withdrawn between us and as having distributed us in asymmetrical relation to one another, i.e., in the singular address from the one(s) to the other(s). It is this shared existential margin which entails an “infinite distance” constitutive of “us,” yet not because we are in some way radically separate existents prior to being gathered together synoptically under the neutral term Being (ibid., 42ff.). On the contrary, in the very mitllich event of Being, neither the Other nor the I maintains itself in the address: both addressee and addressee withdraw (in)finately from themselves, and do so precisely through their (in)adequate presentation as this existent Other who is with and who addresses this existent I.

b. The Call to Responsibility

If we avoid -- as Heidegger was never quite able to do -- the relationship between Being-towards-death and the “with,” authentic responsibility is easy to summarize (cf. ch. 2): The call of conscience is an a priori call constitutive of Being-singular itself. Dasein is authentic when it allows the distractive and dispersive chatter of das Man to be interrupted by this call; as a listening-towards the call, Dasein gathers itself together existentially as a self (as an ear) for the first time, coalescing
out of its prior ontic dispersal. This call, an imperative first and foremost, does not call Dasein to transcend its dispersal in worldly involvement; rather it demands that Dasein take responsibility for this prior dispersal. That is, the call orients Dasein's worldly involvement in terms of its own Being, its finite Lichtung, that for-the-sake-of-which which situates all involvements. The finitude of this Lichtung as mine, and thus the determinacy of my responsibility, are disclosed only through my authentic relation to my own death as existential possibility.

This summary falls short in light of our re-tracing, in the previous sub-section, of the relation between Being-with/Dasein-with and death. How, then, are we to re-assess responsibility in Sein und Zeit?

To begin with, we must reconsider whence the call of conscience comes to us: who calls and where does s/he call from?

As Heidegger puts it, rather elliptically: "The call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me" (275). In what sense does it come from me? In what sense does it come from beyond me and over me? In chapter 2, I argued that the most rigorous way to read this phrase, with respect to the logic of authenticity, is to take the call to be existential: the caller calls from beyond me and over me because it is precisely Being that calls. The call comes from me, this existentiell being, not because it is voiced by me but rather because it emerges through me, arising not through some other ontic source but from my very Being-singular.

And yet, as I also noted in chapter 2 (see footnote 29), to read the caller as "Being" does not resolve all tension in the text. There are passages which suggest that the call is not existential but existentiell, voiced by the authentic self (e.g., 277-78). I maintain that here -- regardless of the extent to which Heidegger was explicitly aware of it -- he is already struggling with the "double-logic" which guides his thought. The problem, in this particular case: how can we speak of this call, this imperative, as the "voice of Being" without collapsing the ontological difference, reducing Being to an entity? And, of course, we cannot. All we can do is acknowledge the inadequacy inherent to such saying; more specifically, we can acknowledge the self-doubling of this voice: the way it presents itself, in each case, by withdrawing from its own presentation as the existentiell voice of this singular Dasein.

I have already argued, in section 1 of this chapter, that the with-logic of Sein und Zeit demands that the call of conscience -- when considered in terms of the address of the Zusage -- can happen only by presenting itself to me through the Other as addressee and by withdrawing from this presentation. Indeed, Christopher Fynsk, in Heidegger: Thought and Historicity (41-45), underscores the tendency of the Other, in Sein und Zeit, to slip -- covertly, for the most part -- into
the role of caller; and this despite what appears on the surface to be a caller located in the existentiell I.

Of course, this raises the question: if this logic is already operative in the call of conscience, why does Heidegger fail to acknowledge it? Why does his existential-existentiell indecision concerning the addressor of the call involve not the Other but the authentic self?

I have shown, in chapter 2(3h), the extent to which Heidegger's project in Sein und Zeit invests in a certain interpretation of singularity, an interpretation which precludes my Being-in voicing itself through the existentiell Other. It is only now, after rethinking the relation between Being-singular and the with, that the doubling of the existential call of conscience through the existentiell voice of the factically situated Other can be thought. (It can, moreover, be expressed otherwise, as the doubling of the Other: the Other who addresses me, obliging me, is both this Other who stands opposed to me and the self-othering event of language which grants and withdraws itself from all opposition; the Zusage.)

In addition to the "whence" of the call, we must also reconsider its "whither": who is called?

As I stressed in chapter 2, the authenticity of Sein und Zeit happens between the voice and the ear, both essential, neither one grounded in the other. I coalesce as this authentic Dasein only insofar as I listen away from my prior dispersal in idle-talk [Gerade] and listen towards the call of conscience. And yet, given the doubling at work in this address, and given the prior interpenetration of my Being-in with the Being-in of the Other, am "I" the addressee, pure and simple? Or is the ear which hears the call doubled as well?

Indeed, as was also emphasized in section 1 of this chapter, the addressee is as little capable of maintaining itself as the addressor. On the one hand, I emerge forth, in the address, as this addressee who is obliged by this Other. However, on the other hand, my ear --- this ear, here and now --- coalesces through and as the withdrawal of another ear, one which eludes, in advance, every presentation. This other ear, neither mine nor the Others, is our ear --- provided that the "We" be rethought in terms of our analysis thus far. This ear, as shared, withdraws between us and withdraws from itself, such that the "we" in question here is not itself; it does not occupy a site, fragmented in advance by the singular-differential effraction of Being-in. This non-site of reception is the between itself, the with which withdraws in advance, already distributed into Being-with and Dasein-with such that my ear can present itself and receive the address of the Other. Each of us, separate yet together, are granted the prior address of language; we are addressed and situated in relation to each other by the Zusage. As recipients of our address --- assigned to enact it as addressor and addressee --- we are commanded to our responsibility.
By acknowledging the ultimate unlocatability of the addressor and addressee of the call of conscience, I am not at all suggesting that responsibility is itself open, indeterminate. Indeed, it is always I who must assume responsibility for this concrete existential situation and it is ultimately to the Other that I am responsible. The address which obligates is -- qua address -- always voiced to me by him/her/them and, as Levinas emphasizes, it obligates me absolutely, with an irreversible asymmetry (Totality and Infinity, 36). The arrival of the Zusage -- this prior address -- happens through the Other's address to me. Still, this differential movement is, in a sense, prior to the "different interlocutors" themselves and their specific utterances: it is an address which passes between addressor and addressee -- never coming into either one's possession -- rather than simply passing from the one to the other. It is the silent "peal of stillness," an address which precedes "us," assigning us as the "relata" which emerge from a relational responsibility.

Thought in this way, language has in each case already situated interlocutors in relation to each other, both granting and destabilizing "our" identity in advance before we say anything to each other.20 Referring to such a responsibility, Derrida writes:

The singularity of the 'who' is not the individuality of a thing that would be identical to itself, it is not an atom. It is a singularity that dislocates or divides itself in gathering itself together to answer to the other, whose call somehow precedes its own identification with itself, for to this call I can only answer, have already answered, even if I think I am answering 'no'..."(Points, 261).

Finally, having considered the whence and the whither of the call, we must ask: what of the call itself? What is said in it? As an imperative, to what does it summon its addressee?

Of course, the archi-imperative address cannot simply be "what it is" -- it must, as I argued earlier in this chapter, withdraw from itself. Moreover, it must, in withdrawing from itself, present itself in this singular echo: in this address from the Other to me. And this determinate address can present itself only through a factual interpretive schema which has already situated it within a totality -- a totality wherein the legitimacy of its appeal can be measured in terms of a principle (in terms of an explicitly formulated "categorical imperative," for instance). As I mentioned, the legitimacy of such a "measure" depends upon the extent to which it "echoes well" that self-interruption which leaves it a practically necessary but necessarily inadequate principle.

I maintain that, for Heidegger, this echo is accomplished in the way the imperative voice calls Dasein to that singular, unrecognizable death which unhinges the authority of every absolute ethical principle. In chapter 2, I underscored the silent and interruptive character of the call of conscience: it appeals, through its very reticence, to that inauthentic Dasein which is dispersed [zerstreut] in idle
talk [Gerede] and, by interrupting this idle talk, it calls Dasein to his/her ownmost Being-able-to-be, i.e., to the singular, unpresentable possibility of my death. Recall that, for Heidegger, to comport oneself in this transparent manner towards death is precisely to take responsibility for one’s factico-singular mortal existence, to be the ground of a nullity (SZ, 284).

Now, as a result of our re-assessment of Being-towards-death and the call of conscience in terms of the with and the Zusage, we can see how this silent command is not non-relational (at least, not in Sein und Zeit’s sense of unbezüglich) but happens between us:

1. The silence in question, inasmuch as it interrupts recognition, interrupts every presentable I and We. That the call summons me to “my ownmost possibility” -- death -- and yet insistently “has nothing to say” in the face of this death -- voices precisely my inability to recognize either myself or the Other in what is most “mine.” As I emphasized in the previous segment, our shared relation to death -- a death which exceeds the economy of possession/loss -- disrupts every I that is We and We that is I.

2. The command calls me to my singular responsibility for the Other precisely by having called “us” to our shared responsibility. The imperative which calls Dasein to its death, once it is free from subordination to any presentable I or We, presents itself as singular, yet also as doubled. On the one hand, the summons to acknowledge death summons me to an impending event: both I and the Other will die. In our Being-with-one-another, in which I am always already subjected to his/her singular (and factically determinate) appeal to me, I comport myself toward the most radical and unpredictable closure of our shared existence. This finitude of our Being-with-one-another demands that I respond, here and now, to his/her appeal; I cannot justify deferring my response in the name of this or that principle or programme. On the other hand, the finitude of our being-in-common, though it certainly does assign determinate responsibility, withdraws from its presentation as “pending event.” As I’ve emphasized, death is a “loss” which withdraws from us -- and from the very economy of possession and loss -- because it names the effective spacing of the Mit-lichtung itself. Thus, finding myself in responsible relation to the Other who faces me across our death requires our already having said “yes” to the call -- though this we, this ear, has receded from us in advance, having distributed the I in relation to the Other. Indeed, my responsibility to respond, here and now, to the Other’s appeal is, in each case, the echo/accomplishment of that

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20 As should be clear at this point, it would be a grave error to regard language (or writing) as having some “fundamental” status in either Heidegger’s or Derrida’s thinking. For both of them, language (writing) marks a provisional “site”: something in the names “language” and “writing” asks to be thought, here and now.
prior responsibility which has always already called me and the Other into our very relatedness.

In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger views the singularity of death as non-relational, as the singular shard of Being destined to me, assigning my responsibility prior to and independent of any relation I might have to others. What he did not think through, however, is the possibility of a singular difference or division whereby my responsibility is in each case a singular responsibility to the Other(s) who is/are radically separated and absolutely different from me. Indeed, we must rethink the "loss" of death as shared -- a "loss" always mine as ours, and we must rethink the responsibility entailed by this loss as shared as well.

3. The Echo of the Imperative Voice

Though Gregory Schufreider, in his essay "Heidegger on Community," fails to consider what is most problematic about this topic (i.e., he fails to address Heidegger's never having called community into question), he does make an insightful judgment concerning what is at stake there:

...any attempt to think Heidegger's idea of community on the basis of his political involvement, in effect, begs the question; for it turns out that how this involvement is itself to be interpreted depends largely upon our construal of his idea of community (49).

My remarks in this section will be oriented in terms of this claim, yet not -- as Schufreider would prefer to say -- because there is a sense of community which is operative in Heidegger's thinking and which must be taken into account if his political commitments, and indeed his relation to the ethico-political as such, are to be understood. To be sure, Schufreider is right on this account: there is such a sense of community at work in Heidegger's texts, a sense which, as I have argued, is never interrogated and which is explicitly tied up in his ethico-political choices (see the closing section of my chapter 5). And yet, as I have also argued, Heidegger's thinking can be brought to engage community, the We, as what is most question-worthy *[Fragwurdigst]*, as possessing a "sense" which is precisely the withdrawal of sense (Δημος): an essential We-less-ness. When Heidegger is read in this way, the implications of the above-quoted passage present themselves quite differently; namely: interpretations of Heidegger's politics which presuppose, overtly or covertly, a determinate sense of community in his thinking, must be brought to acknowledge this default *[Ausbleiben]* of community, this We-less-ness at the heart of every "We." And, as I will show, such a We-less-ness demands not only that the "context" of Heidegger's ethico-political involvement be considered differently than has most often been the case, but that the relation between thinking and ethico-political engagement be thought otherwise as well.
In this concluding section, then, I shall consider two themes (art and liberalism) which have played a configurative role in recent analyses of Heidegger and the ethico-political; and I shall relate these themes briefly to the logic of community as I have developed it thus far (section a). (While the way in which the Gemeinschaftsfrage in Heidegger's thought relates to the scope of determinate ethico-political concerns certainly warrants treatment in its own right, such treatment, carried through rigorously, would require a major digression from my topic. Thus, I will restrict myself here to a few cursory remarks indicating directions for further inquiry.) My aim in doing this is not so much to locate Heidegger, more accurately than others have, on an ethico-political "spectrum" as to consider: a) how the question of community in his thought might require thinking ethics and politics differently; and b) what this reconsideration of the ethico-political might entail for judging the "Heidegger case" in its singular determinacy (section b).

a. Heidegger and the Ethico-Political

i. Art

In chapter 5(2), I briefly discussed Lacoue-Labarthe's reading of τεχνη as it functions in Heidegger's thought. Recall that for Lacoue-Labarthe, Heideggerian τεχνη -- in 1933 and afterwards -- is subject to a logic of figuration which subordinates difference to figural identity. He argues, moreover, that dangerous political implications follow from this logic, since the πολιτική, for Heidegger, happens precisely through τεχνη as originary artistic event. Specifically, Heidegger allegedly falls prey to the "dream of the City as work of art" (Heidegger, Art and Politics, 66) -- a dream wherein the πολιτική figures itself, presenting itself as figure via an imitatio which follows no determinate political model but rather looks to ancient Greece as a paradoxical model-less model, as the possibility of "pure self-emergence, of...pure originality: a model of self-formation" (ibid., 79) whereby we produce ourselves as collective subject (ibid., 78). And yet, as I argued in chapters 5(2) and 7(1), art (τεχνη) for Heidegger, though it is always linked to figuration, is not, as Lacoue-Labarthe proposes, a matter of privileging figural identity over difference but rather the exposure of a (dis)figuration at the heart of figuration.21

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21 This point is perhaps not unrelated to the following critical remark addressed from Jean-Luc Nancy to Lacoue-Labarthe: "...[You] tend always...toward an effacement of the 'figure'...whereas I feel myself continually led back to the exigency of a certain figuration, because the 'interruption' of myth does not appear to me to be a simple cessation, but a cutting movement which, in thus cutting, traces another place of articulation" ("Scène: un échange de lettres," 77).
I maintain that explications of Heidegger which engage the relation between his thinking and politics are often guided, in their conclusions, by the extent to which they agree, explicitly or tacitly, with Lacoue-Labarthe’s general view concerning Heideggerian \( \tau \chi \nu \eta \). In light of this, I would like to address, briefly, three readings of Heidegger which hinge in one way or another upon this point: those of Véronique Foti, Samuel Jisseling and Robert Bernasconi.

In *Heidegger and the Poets*, Foti does acknowledge that the \( \tau \chi \nu \eta \) which Heidegger strives to acknowledge in the work of art is “an inherently differential modality of un-concealment”(xvi). Nevertheless, she soon qualifies this, claiming that Heidegger, where art is concerned, ultimately subordinates difference to identity:

This book traces its own genesis to what was at first an inchoate but persistently troubling awareness of a deflection in Heidegger’s reading of his chosen poets, which occludes transgression, excess, or loss and constrains the poetry to fit the exigencies of an essential if always ‘polemic’ (or differential) unification. A problematization of Heidegger’s unifying moves gradually brought into view the structures and dynamics of the complex confusions indicated (ibid., xix).

Indeed, Foti claims that “Heidegger treats the poem as a cryptogram to be decoded by the thinker”(54); which is to say, his relation to art is still informed by the “19th century project of retrieval”(ibid., 111), i.e., by the way the “disclosive power of the poetic word”(ibid.) grants us disclosive access to the most primordial of historical origins: an “essential vision”(ibid., 111). For Foti, the “essence” at issue here is not the verbal, radically differential *wesen* which I have emphasized in my reading of Heidegger but a dangerous privileging of essential identity over interruptive difference; indeed, “[even] Heidegger’s notion of the essential unsaid emerges...as a totalizing move”(xx). She holds that Heidegger, through his over-emphasis on essential manifestation (on totalizing, figurative disclosure), fails to acknowledge the “opacity and...sinister powers”(ibid.) of poetry – exemplified by Célan’s poetry, for instance. Concerning Heidegger’s relation to poetry in general, Foti writes:

The poetic text is, first of all, an art-work [for Heidegger]: and, as Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert notes, it is one of the ‘neuralgic points’ of Heidegger’s reading of poetry that he ‘hypostatizes’ the art-work (by rendering it essentially independent of human activity and culture), allowing it to become ‘the interpretive horizon for human destiny’....Despite Heidegger’s expropriation of poet and thinker, and his displacement of them into the straits of interlocution, his insistence on the essential unsaid as the unitary source of textual configuration repudiates [what Rodolphe Gasché calls] unreadability, the antidote to totalization (ibid., 45-6).

While Foti does not dwell at length on the determinate political implications of Heidegger’s reading of poetry, this concern constitutes the background of her analysis. To begin with, she aligns herself with Lacoue-Labarthe’s conclusions regarding Heideggerian \( \tau \chi \nu \eta \):

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22 Compare her brief remarks on Heideggerian \( \phi \sigma \alpha \varsigma \) (113).
Heidegger's deflections and conflations have the fundamental character of an aestheticization of the political (conjoined with a mythical recasting of history); as Lacoue-Labarthe has insisted, such aestheticization constitutes the key aspect of his involvement with National Socialism (ibid., xix).

Moreover, she explicitly ties this reading of Heideggerian τέχνη to the ethical register, arguing that Heidegger's totalizing hermeneutics prevent him from acknowledging that elusive alterity which sometimes speaks through poetry. She opposes to the violence of Heidegger's readings a poetic voice which bears witness to my primordial obligation to the singular Other, an obligation unmediated by any prior ontological totalization (ibid., xx-xix; 112ff.).

And yet, however problematic Heidegger's relation to the singular Other might be, is it fair to say he “decodes” poetic saying, as if there were some hidden but presentable meaning — i.e., a figure — to be unearthed there? Does he truly privilege figural disclosure over “opacity”? Does he “hypostatize” the art-work? And can the “essential unsaid” which situates the dialogue of poetizing and thinking be regarded simply as a “unitary source” — a figure — which, as Fóti suggests, repudiates textual unreadability?

On the contrary, Heidegger is in search of no “meaning” in the poem but rather an encounter with that disorienting “whirl”[Wirbel] which leaves no meaning intact (cf. chapter 5[3]), that whirling, lethic “jointure of language”[Sprachgfuge](GR, 45) into which the poem pulls us (hence his narrow, violent, and, as some would say, arbitrary dissection of poems cannot be, for him, the betrayal of the poems' meaning or internal logic, for such things are not his primary concern. He is interested rather in the way the poem addresses thinking and in the way thinking can offer its own proper response to the poem). And if Heidegger’s mode of engagement with the poem appears oriented in terms of disclosure or manifestation, we must not forget the extreme opacity at the very heart of disclosure: self-concealing λήθη (and we must not forget that such opacity needs explicit manifestation, figuration). As for the presumed “hypostatization” of the art-work, there are, as I will discuss below, problems in letting art function as the “horizon for human destiny;” yet if, as I have suggested, the artwork figures the very ῥήβ which displaces all figuration (chapter 5[2]), it is unclear how such problems could be a matter of art’s “hypostatization.” Finally, since the “essential unsaid” is itself rissig in “nature,” it is less the “unitary source” of textual configuration than it is the unreadable as such.

Complementary to Fóti's reading, which tries to identify an excessive figuration at work in Heidegger’s treatment of the art-work, is the claim that Heidegger, in his privileging of art, actively subordinates φρόνησις to τέχνη, πράξις to ποίησις. In “Heidegger and Politics,” Samuel Ijsseling writes:
...[If] one looks at the beginning and history of political thinking, one sees there are two basic options in politics: politics can be understood as ποιήσις or πράξις. When one understands politics as ποιήσις, one understands it from a Platonic standpoint. According to this view the state or πόλις is seen as a work that must be made, instituted, or founded. Eventually it is seen as a work of art, or the total work of art (Gesamtkunstwerk). In a politics understood as πράξις — that is, as negotiating, as debate, as deliberation — one is always compromising, and one must always take part in the play of the power game. In this view of politics as πράξις, which is the more Aristotelian position, the state or πόλις is seen as an already existing place where one must deliberate. Radical politics is always a poietical politics, one in which the ideal society has to be built from the ground up, preferably as fast as possible and with all means available. Politics as πράξις is always a politics of the feasible; it has to realize the good in this concrete situation, at this given place, at this given moment, and therefore it is involved in making compromises. For radical politics, this sort of politics is a kind of drudgery....

Heidegger tends to conceive of politics as a ποιήσις, that is, as the state-founding act (7-8).

Here, as in Foti's reading, "art" is understood not in terms of differential πόλεμος but in terms of the unified figure it produces, i.e., as making, instituting or founding a "work." Moreover, the artwork par excellence for Heidegger's "poetical politics" is here, as in Lacoue-Labarthe's reading, the πόλις. In short, Heidegger is once again interpreted as uncritically taking up — rather than displacing — the terms τέχνη and ποιήσις as they have been handed down to us through the history of metaphysics.

In contrast to Foti's and Ijsseling's respective interpretations of τέχνη and ποιήσις in Heidegger's thought, Robert Bernasconi, in his essay "The Fate of the Distinction between Praxis and Poiesis," offers what to me seems a more nuanced reading. Bernasconi turns to Heidegger's brief remarks, in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic and in Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, concerning Aristotle's apparent subordination, in Nicomachean Ethics, of ποιήσις to πράξις and of τέχνη to φρόνησις. The passage in question from the Ethics:

Thought alone moves nothing, but only thought for-the-sake-of-something [hau heneka] and concerned with action. This indeed governs poiesis also, since whoever makes something always has some further end in view: that which is made is not an end in itself, it is relative and for someone. Whereas that which is done [to praksan] is an end in itself, since doing well [eupraksan] is the end, and what desire aims at" (VI. ii. 5, 1139a35-1139b4).

Regarding this passage and Heidegger's relation to it, Bernasconi writes:

The important point is....that the practical is construed [by Aristotle] as the final cause of poiesis, as is indeed suggested by the reference to the hau heneka in the previous sentence. Praxis may bear its own end in itself, but how can it be the cause of poiesis without being conceived as an external goal? And if we grant to Heidegger that the doctrine of the four causes has its source in the experience of making, then Aristotle's reference of praxis to causality -- be it the efficient or the final cause -- places it within the referential teleology of poiesis. In this way praxis -- at the very time that it is privileged over poiesis -- comes to be interpreted in the light of poiesis, and phronesis is referred to techne (GA 26, 146; MFL, 118). Even if I would hesitate before declaring this passage the decisive moment in the history of the traditional subordination of praxis to poiesis, it is striking that Aristotle appears to accomplish the reverse of what he intends. For when praxis is construed as the goal of poiesis, does it not cease to be praxis?(8).

And a bit further on:
What Bernasconi is underscoring here is the simultaneous necessity and impossibility of presenting πραξις, and he traces this elusive, (un)presentable phenomenon back to Sein und Zeit, prior to Heidegger’s explicit engagement with art or poetic saying:

When, in section 18 of Being and Time, Heidegger refers the ‘toward which’ of serviceability’ to the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, he repeats the Aristotelian integration of poiesis and praxis through the hou heneka,23 which as we have seen, distorts the nature of praxis....[But] Heidegger does not in fact confine the Worumwillen, or for-the-sake-of-which, to a form of teleological thinking. The for-the-sake-of-which is that wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand. It is that for which entities are freed, relating us to the horizon in which we are situated and in which entities may be encountered. Heidegger’s introduction of the notion of horizon to elucidate the worldhood of the world and his subsequent reference to the Lichung, or clearing, show instead that he is not so much underwriting as undercutting the tendency to understand the metaphysical tradition in terms of teleology. He does this not by turning his back on that tradition, but by repeating it in order to show its primordial sources (9).

My interest, where Bernasconi’s argument is concerned, is his refusal to point quickly to an over-emphasis, on Heidegger’s part, upon ποιησις and τέχνη; he shows instead that, for Heidegger, what have been termed “πραξις” and “φρονησις” -- not despite but precisely because of their elusive singularity24 -- need to withdraw from their presentation in ποιησις and τέχνη in order to ‘be’.

And yet, whatever oversights may plague certain interpretations of art in Heidegger’s thinking, art is not without its problems for him. Even when it is viewed as the exposure of an originary (dis)figuration, it is still explicitly linked, at least prior to a rigorous engagement with the Zusage, to the opening or arrival of the historic-communal site, our site.

What, precisely, is the problem here? And what role might art play in Heidegger’s thinking once the Zusage is carefully considered?

I propose, first of all, that it is not Heidegger’s consideration of art as such which renders the ethico-political implications of his thinking suspect. The problem, rather, as I indicated in chapter 7, is his withholding We-ness from interrogation, keeping the communal-historical from the polyvalent play of differential singularity: he always assumes that differential singularity echoes itself exclusively through the (in)adequate figure of the We. What is taken for granted here is not figuration as such (as I have tried to show, figuration is unavoidable); it is, rather, Heidegger’s privileging of the figuration of the We and his placing this narrow figuration at the service of

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23 Jacques Taminiaux draws this connection as well in his “Heidegger and Praxis”.
24 as Ijsseling puts it: “in this concrete situation, at this given place, at this given moment”(8).
Seinsgeschichte: those communal “steps” through which the essence of man happens [ereignet] historically (cf. my chapter 5[3]), unfolding in its trajectory.

As should be clear from my reading of Hölderlin's Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'der Rhein' (chapter 5[3]), the We is not an “artwork” for Heidegger. Poetic saying, rather, is that prior differential voice which first opens up the rift through which gods and community emerge, opposed to one another. Nevertheless, the essentially rissig artwork is always harnessed, for Heidegger, to the unquestioned figure of a We.

What, then, happens to art when differential singularity is thought in terms of the Zusage, and in terms of a radicalized reading of the “with” of Sein und Zeit? What happens to art when Ereignis echoes not only through an impersonal We but through the singular address of the one(s) to the other(s)?

These are questions which I cannot consider in detail here. I suspect, however, that the development of just such questions may offer a way of responding -- or at least of beginning to respond -- to the shrewd challenge with which Véronique Foti closes Heidegger and the Poets: “...[What] Heidegger’s interlocution with the poets calls for is an articulation of the chiasm linking the ontological and ethical aspects of alterity, namely, responsiveness to the enigma of manifestation and responsibility for the Other”(114).

ii. Liberalism

Heidegger never focuses explicit attention on liberalism as such, either in its particular articulations (e.g., Locke, Kant, Mill) or in the history of its development. Indeed, he sees no need to do this. For him, liberal-democratic discourse -- which I would define most broadly as a discourse of “rights” -- is rooted in and determined by the metaphysical epoch of subjectivity, and he subordinates\(^\text{25}\) this discourse, along with all humanist discourse, to the task of preparing for an other commencement which would no longer be determined by either the epoch of subjectivity or the ‘history of Being’ which situates this epoch (W, 344ff./LH, 224ff.; OGS, 104ff.). Thus, in the context of Heidegger's thinking, an explicit engagement with liberalism hardly seems an urgent task. Likewise, any attempt to seek out and articulate a compatibility between Heidegger’s thinking and liberal discourse would seem immediately wrong-headed.

And yet, as I have already argued, it is possible to underscore strata in Heidegger’s texts -- strata which conceal themselves for the most part in the way these texts are usually interpreted --

\(^{25}\) a subordination, moreover, which shows itself at times as an outright rejection (EM, 48-50/IM, 45-6).
such that quite unexpected exigencies stand out in his thinking. Is it possible that his relation to liberalism might be thought otherwise? Is it possible, moreover, that the term "liberalism," beneath its various articulations, might contain within itself the possibility of being thought in a radically different manner?

Lawrence Vogel, in his book *The Fragile ‘We’*, pursues precisely these questions. By opening up a dialogue between the Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit* and a specifically Kantian determination of liberalism, he gradually arrives at what he holds to be a kind of "Heideggerian liberalism." Before discussing Vogel’s conclusions, however, I will first summarize the Kantian liberalism to which he appeals.

Recall that, for Kant, the very possibility of a will which engages in practical reason (i.e., a will which acts according to principles [*Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 412]) is contingent upon the idea of freedom:

> Now I claim that we must necessarily attribute to every rational being who has a will also the idea of freedom, under which only can such a being act. For in such a being we think of a reason that is practical, i.e., that has causality in reference to its objects. Now we cannot possibly think of a reason that consciously lets itself be directed from outside as regards its judgments; for in that case the subject would ascribe the determination of his faculty of judgment not to his reason, but to an impulse. Reason must regard itself as the author of its principles independent of foreign influences. Therefore as practical reason or as the will of a rational being must reason regard itself as free (ibid., 448).

Kant maintains that this free will is possible only if it somehow transcends the natural order wherein each cause must itself be an effect of an antecedent cause. For him, this transcendence is possible only if: a) a distinction is acknowledged between the natural order and the intelligible order and b) these two orders can subsist mutually without contradicting each other. Starting from this double demand, he writes:

> ...all representations that come to us without our choice (such as those of the senses) enable us to know objects only as they affect us; what they may be in themselves remains unknown to us. Therefore, even with the closest attention and the greatest clarity that the understanding can bring to such representations, we can attain to a mere knowledge of appearances but never to knowledge of things in themselves....This must provide a distinction, however crude, between a world of sense and a world of understanding; the....Even with regard to himself, a man cannot presume to know what he is in himself by means of the acquaintance which he has through internal sensation....Therefore with regard to mere perception and the receptivity of sensations, he must count himself as belonging to the world of sense; but with regard to whatever there may be in him of pure activity...he must count himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which he has, however, no further knowledge (ibid., 450-1).

The freedom at issue here — a freedom essential to every rational will — is a cause which, while standing independent of the natural order, nevertheless produces effects within it. Kant argues that, while we cannot "know" this other cause due to its standing apart from the natural order in which all
cognition takes place, we can at least have a cognitively unverifiable “idea” of it as possible (cf. Critique of Pure Reason, 409-411; 464ff.).

On Kant’s view, it is not in cognition but in praxis that the empirically engaged will of the natural order finds itself free (i.e., determined by the will qua intelligible); and he claims that we encounter the empirical effects of this intelligible will in our experience of duty, wherein we feel obligated to make our actions adhere to the following rule: “I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (Grounding, 402). This categorical imperative is a necessary, universally binding, a priori law, one which is not contingent upon empirical ends distinct from and determinative of the will but which the will, as intelligible, gives to itself in its purely intelligible relation to itself. That we feel this duty, regardless of the ends towards which we direct our will, shows that the will as empirically determined in the natural order is consistent with -- and indeed is grounded in -- the will as purely intelligible:

...[When] we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and know the autonomy of the will together with its consequence, morality: whereas when we think of ourselves as obligated [subject to the law], we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and yet at the same time to the intelligible world (ibid., 453).

Granted, it might seem that while this explication of the will has much to say about the freedom of the individual subject and the grounds of ethics, it has little to offer where political structures are concerned. And yet, if we turn to Kant’s articulation of this will via the categories of unity, plurality and totality (cf. Critique of Pure Reason, 111ff.), his grounding of ethics does appear to entail a version of liberalism:

1. The unity of the form of the will is the universal formula of the categorical imperative itself. Whatever determinate maxims the will might adhere to, their form ought to be consistent with this formula (Grounding, 436).

2. The plurality of the will’s matter (i.e., its end) lies in the formula’s tacit demand that practical reason must have itself as its ultimate end: any rational being -- any will -- must be considered not merely as a means to another end but as an end in itself in relation to which any merely empirical end must be subordinate (ibid.).

3. The totality of the system of ends is a necessary ideal because all rational beings stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as an end in himself. Hereby arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom that may be called a kingdom of ends (certainly only an ideal), inasmuch as these laws have in view the very relation of such beings to one another as ends and means....A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member when he legislates in it universal laws while also being himself subject to these laws (ibid., 433).
It is in the third part of this formulation -- the "kingdom of ends" -- that Kant appears to align himself with liberalism in the most general sense; for he envisions a community which places a high priority on individual liberty, upon the "right" of the rational subject to pursue the end or good of its choice rather than a pre-given end which binds all members of the community (an end articulated in a theory of "human nature," for instance). More precisely, the ultimate ends of Kantian community -- the ends to which all empirical ends must be subordinated -- are the members of the community themselves as rational beings: a multiplicity of free wills with a capacity to collectively legislate universal laws which reflect their freedom from each and every determinate end.

And yet, while all articulations of liberalism appear to prioritize the notion of "right," the nature of this priority can vary greatly; and it is this which ultimately sets Kantian liberalism off from other forms. For instance, it is possible to argue, contrary to Kant, that the priority of "right" reflects simply one end amongst others. As John Stuart Mill writes:

> It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being ("On Liberty," 485).

Indeed, when Mill claims that to have a right is "to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of"("Utilitarianism," 459), this "ought," for him, is grounded not in an a priori kingdom of ends but in the determinate, empirical end of humanity. Mill's liberalism is a teleological liberalism.

Kant's thinking, on the other hand, entails that liberalism be not teleological but deontological, such that the subject's responsibilities are determined by principles rather than by empirical ends. This is the only kind of liberalism possible for Kant, for his articulation of the kingdom of ends presupposes a subject radically free of the natural order: that I have a sense of duty to adhere to the categorical imperative means that my will stands distinct from the ends towards which it strives. As Michael Sandel puts it:

> ...For justice [i.e., right] to be primary, certain things must be true of us. We must be creatures of a certain kind related to human circumstance in a certain way. In particular, we must stand to our circumstance always at a certain distance, conditioned to be sure, but part of us always antecedent to any conditions. Only in this way can we view ourselves as subjects as well as objects of experience, as agents and not just instruments of the purposes we pursue. Deontological liberalism supposes that we can, indeed must, understand ourselves as independent in this sense (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 11).26

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26 As Sandel points out, there are forms of deontological liberalism (that of Rawls, for instance) which depart radically from Kant by claiming that an absolute priority of rights can be established empirically without any appeal to the transcendental. Though I cannot adequately discuss this version of deontology here, I will say that I agree in principle with Sandel's critique of it, i.e., that deontology ultimately cannot avoid appealing to a kind of empirically unverifiable, transcendental subject.
Returning then to Vogel’s reading of Heidegger, it should be clear, first of all, that there is a great deal of tension between this deontological articulation of liberalism and Heidegger’s analysis in Sein und Zeit (e.g., between the transcendent, ahistorical free will and factically situated Dasein, between the universal categorical imperative and the singular call of conscience, between the rational kingdom of ends and authentic community grasping its historical destiny). Yet it is important to keep in mind that Vogel is not attempting to demonstrate a presumed compatibility between Heidegger’s thought and deontological liberalism; nor is he attempting to subordinate one to the other. Rather, he is engaged in a critical encounter between the two. On the one hand, the Heideggerian liberalism arrived at by Vogel displaces Kantian-based liberalism inasmuch as Heidegger’s focus upon historicity is brought to bear upon Kant’s primarily a-historical subject; on the other hand, Vogel holds that his Heideggerian liberalism also displaces the dominant “amoral” stratum of Sein und Zeit by stressing exigencies in the text which are, contrary to Heidegger’s own intentions, very close to those of Kantian liberalism.27

To begin with, Vogel identifies the following dilemma in Sein und Zeit: while the “morally conscientious person,” traditionally understood, is inauthentic, having abandoned self-responsibility in favour of they-responsibility (19ff.), the appeal to an authenticity which transcends the prescriptions and proscriptions of moral conscience appears to problematize the very possibility of ethics:

...the relation between one’s existential self-responsibility and moral responsibilities to others remains unclear, especially because authentic freedom-unto-death individualizes Dasein and calls into question the universal, impersonal perspective from which the self as a moral agent understands himself as just one among others. Insofar as the individual’s resolve is without foundation, the grounds for action ultimately rest upon a first-personal decision. If the task of practical philosophy is to articulate the possibility of an objective basis for preferring some alternatives over others, fundamental ontology appears to undermine such a foundationalist enterprise (ibid., 25).

Vogel then proceeds to summarize two distinct interpretations of Sein und Zeit which, through their respective shortcomings, reflect this dilemma: 1) the existentialist reading — a “radically individualistic, egocentric, volunteeristic and decisionistic”(ibid., 38) reading — leads to a distressing ethical egoism, i.e., it leads to the conclusion that “the significance of entities within my world depends wholly on my projects”(ibid., 39); 2) the historicist reading — which, focusing on the notion of historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] in Sein und Zeit, emphasizes “the heritage and community to which one already belongs and which one can never wholly master ‘from the ground up’”(ibid., 50) — escapes the ethical egoism of the existentialist reading only to fall immediately into a cultural-historical relativism, an arbitrariness on the level not of the individual but of the group (ibid., 54).
What both of these readings fail to acknowledge, argues Vogel, is that the two exigencies which they emphasize, respectively (Dasein’s individual freedom and its cultural-historical imbeddedness), must be thought through together. Vogel claims that, while these two exigencies are never brought together in a fully satisfactory fashion in the dominant stratum of Sein und Zeit, the resources are nevertheless there, in Heidegger’s thinking, for accomplishing this, for formulating what Vogel calls a “cosmopolitan” reading of Sein und Zeit:

[Perhaps] there is a level of moral conscience more primordial than the one to which Heidegger refers when he claims that the morally conscientious person flees his particularity and escapes into ‘the security of the universal’. The more primordial moral conscience of which I speak does not involve a subordination of self and others to a common standard that would provide a decision-procedure telling anyone what he ought to do in a particular situation; rather, it involves an attunement to the particularity of others, to others as truly other, stemming from an awareness of the singularity of one’s own existence. Such an attunement would not evidence itself in a preoccupation with adopting an impersonal stance so as to apply without prejudice universal rules to particular circumstances; rather, it would manifest itself as an interpersonal orientation motivated by one’s desire not to incorporate others into the ‘universal’ but, rather, to ‘let others be’ in their freedom for their own possibilities and to allow one’s own self-understanding to be informed by theirs.... This kind of interpersonal relationship seems to be precisely what Heidegger describes under the name ‘liberating solicitude’: an orientation toward others ‘made possible by’ an authentic self-relation...[Authenticity] points toward a form of coexistence in which one remains attentive to others as centers of transcendence and possibility who are never subsumed by the public projects in which they happen to be absorbed (70-1).

Vogel argues that, by way of this “liberating solicitude” (cf. SZ, 122ff.), it is not only possible but obligatory that authentic Dasein be the conscience of the Other, “provoking the general question ‘Who am I to be?’ in the soul of the other” (The Fragile ‘We’, 77). More specifically:

The goal of authentic communication is not to get the other to abstract from his particularity so that he can follow the pure rationality of an argument but to lead the other to question and reflect upon the hypostatizing interpretations of the pale public world in such a way that he is freed to interpret the meaning of his existence for himself (ibid., 78).

With this demand that Dasein be the conscience of the Other, Vogel is able to argue simultaneously for: 1) the radical freedom of individual Dasein (though this freedom is rooted not in pure, ahistorical reason as it had been for Kant but in Dasein’s singular relation to its own death); and 2) a call of conscience which calls for the fundamental liberal principle of “respect for all persons” (ibid., 105), a call to the Kantian ‘kingdom of ends’ which is precisely a call away from any determinate articulation of the ‘good’ which would compromise the freedom of the I as an end in itself:

If in leaping ahead the other person is revealed as an end-in-himself, then what Kant called ‘the kingdom of ends’ would be rooted in an encounter of reciprocal or mutual leaping-ahead... We coexist authentically and so form an ‘authentic We’ when each feels that he belongs to a common project yet encourages the others to pursue the project in a way that attests to their own individuality. This keeps the group from becoming a mere collectivity in which each must subordinate his own freedom in order to further shared ends. Every ‘authentic We’ is fragile because it is composed of self-responsible members who live at the boundary of this membership (ibid., 79).

27 Hence, Vogel’s proposal that “Heidegger be read against Heidegger” (ibid., 105).
It is through this reading of *Sein und Zeit* that Vogel enters into the liberalism-communitarian debate, ultimately defending his version of "Heideggerian liberalism" against both naïve liberalism and that communitarianism which opposes it (ibid., 106). He begins by emphasizing the respective proximity between: a) the existentialist's authentic Dasein and modern liberalism's a-historical, a-cultural, atomistic I,28 and b) the historicist's factically constituted Dasein and communitarianism's culturally and historically imbedded I, an I constituted by the "historically contingent social roles" which it does not choose but finds itself always already playing (ibid., 109). He then argues that both modern liberalism and communitarianism fall into the same complementary short-sightedness as the existentialist and historicist misreadings of Heidegger. That is to say, they both fail to acknowledge that liberating solicitude which allows the culturally-historically imbedded self to be both free for its own possibilities and open "to the existence of other persons in such a way that one feels responsible for -- even compassionate towards -- their plight" (ibid., 124).

Vogel is quite aware of the charge that his position is bound to provoke, namely: the legitimacy of his interpretation, of his Heideggerian liberalism, hangs upon the denial of its own cultural-historical imbeddedness. In response to this charge, Vogel appeals to Heidegger's articulation, in *Sein und Zeit* (7ff., 152ff., 314ff.), of the hermeneutic circle:

Heidegger admits that the structures laid out by fundamental ontology only become accessible within a particular interpretive framework. But he denies that 'the hermeneutic circle' precludes his making truth-claims about Being-in-the-world. The circle is positive and productive, for Being-in-the-world could only be accessible existentially to one who participates in its structures and the perspectives it affords in the first place (122).

Regarding his cosmopolitan reading specifically, Vogel writes:

In asserting that all persons are worthy of respect as ends-in-themselves one does not adopt a 'view from nowhere'. Perhaps the cosmopolitan reading of *Being and Time* conveys the misleading impression that an authentic individual anywhere and at any time would be subject to the obligations stemming from the universal attribution of moral personality. One must give, however, a more historically sensitive version of the cosmopolitan reading by recognizing that fundamental ontology as a whole and authenticity as a personal ideal were not possible within pre-modern horizons. This does not compromise the truth-claims that Heidegger makes about the structure of human existence. It is just to say that this self-understanding would only have been possible given the tradition from which Heidegger writes and, in particular, the historical development Nietzsche called 'the death of God' (122).

In response to Vogel's position, I will begin by saying that his point of focus -- the "We" as the locus of the ethical dimension of *Sein und Zeit* -- engages one of the most important and most often overlooked problems in Heidegger's thinking: the I-We aporia (as discussed in my chapter 2).

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28 What Michael Sandel refers to, critically, as the "unencumbered self" ("The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," 85ff.).
Despite this, however, Vogel’s argument suffers from serious flaws which prevent it from engaging this aporia on a fundamental level:

1. Point of methodology: Vogel appeals to a certain tension between the ahistorico-transcendental and the historico-empirical in order to: a) situate two classes of flawed Heidegger interpretations (the existentialist and the historicist); b) link these interpretations to liberalism and communitarianism, respectively; c) resolve this tension between the ahistorico-transcendental and the historico-empirical — and likewise between liberalism and communitarianism — by appealing to Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle. On Vogel’s reading, this circle allows him to both maintain the historical-interpretive imbeddedness of all truth claims and yet to rescue Heidegger’s truth claims about the “structure of human existence” (122) from relativism. And yet Vogel, like many others, misses what is at stake in the hermeneutic circle. In short, he reads Sein und Zeit as a historicized transcendentalism, a hermeneutics which — though it can never render underlying ontological structures (i.e., Sinn) fully transparent due to the factically situated interpretations (Auslegungen) through which they must always present themselves — nevertheless does stand in relation to and disclose these structures by way of interpretation. Thus Vogel misses Heidegger’s radical displacement of the transcendental-empirical (structure-structured, condition-conditioned) distinction, a displacement which I have explicated in chapter 3: recall that, though Sein und Zeit does formulate a meaning-interpretation (Sinn-Auslegung) distinction which is modeled after the transcendental-empirical distinction, the structure to which Heidegger appeals (Sinn) ultimately reveals itself to withdraw from itself, to differ from itself: Sinn functions as the unpresentable ground of presentation not by always holding in reserve a hidden yet in principle presentable ground but by not maintaining itself, presenting itself only by interrupting its own self-presentation.

And so, if Heidegger does, as Vogel argues, articulate a “structure” of human existence which is consistent with or which entails a kind of liberalism, the significance of this structure is missed if we regard it, as Vogel does, exclusively as a ground for “truth claims.” Indeed, we must consider the disclosure which takes place when this “liberal” structure comes to interrupt itself, thereby destabilizing any truth claims grounded upon it; we must focus interpretively upon Sinn to the point that it discloses the self-withdrawal constitutive of it.

2. In his hurry to resolve the I-We aporia in Sein und Zeit in a manner compatible with liberal principles, Vogel misses the primary phenomenon: the unresolvable tension between difference and singularity, a tension which, as I have argued (chapters 2 and 8), is concealed beneath Heidegger’s avoidance of the Gemeinschaftsfrage and which demands ultimately that
community be thought in terms of that singular-differential address which precedes distinct and autonomous “subjects”.

More specifically, in his discussion of liberating solicitude as authentic Being-with others, Vogel fails to take into account that, for Heidegger, the “with” is pre-intentional, equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world (SZ, 114). Vogel writes: “[liberating solicitude] involves an attunement to the particularity of others, to others as truly other, stemming from an awareness of the singularity of one’s own existence” (The Fragile ‘We’, 70). While Vogel’s claim here is not incorrect, strictly speaking, it is misleading, for he fails to recognize that the “singularity of one’s own existence” is always already tied up, prior to any comportment towards others, with that pre-intentional Being-with which is equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world. It is here that the most basic problematic of the We lies.

In general, Vogel develops his reading by appealing to several isolated segments of Sein und Zeit (most notably, 188, 264, 297-8), segments which do indeed support his reading. What he fails to take into account is the tension which separates the stratum which he emphasizes from the dominant stratum of the text (e.g., by simply accepting at face value Heidegger’s claim that Dasein can be the conscience of another [SZ, 298], Vogel takes for granted — contrary to certain crucial exigencies in Sein und Zeit [cf. my chapter 2] — that the call is an existentiell rather than an existential call). In short, he side-steps the real dilemma.

3. Vogel’s quick move from the call of conscience to the synoptic, 3rd-person ‘kingdom of ends’ effaces the asymmetrical, imperative character of this direct-address (cf. my chapters 2, 7 and 8).

4. It is of course legitimate that Vogel restrict his focus primarily to Sein und Zeit. However, given that the topic in question — the “We” — is engaged more explicitly after Sein und Zeit than in it, that Vogel never allows his reading to be informed by the subsequent developments, clarifications and reconfigurations of Sein und Zeit’s major themes leaves many essential questions unaddressed (for instance, questions concerning language, art, historicity of beings in contrast to the historicity of Being, Ereignis, Ge-stell, the essence of truth, Heidegger’s withdrawal from the authenticity of singular Dasein in favour of communal authenticity).

Despite these shortcomings, however, Vogel’s reading — more precisely, his isolation of a “liberal-friendly” stratum in Sein und Zeit — is not without importance. Indeed, this reading is possible precisely because the factual-interpretive context out of which Sein und Zeit emerges is, as I pointed out in chapter 3(5), that of transcendental idealism. I propose that, just as Heidegger’s thinking displaces the transcendental-empirical distinction in order to acknowledge a primordial
phenomenon which is not simply a presentable structure (cf. my chapter 3), it likewise can be brought to displace Kantian-based liberalism in order to acknowledge that which this liberalism discloses yet simultaneously conceals, despite itself:

1. **Unity**: for Kant, the unity of the will -- it's universality -- lies in it's being duty-bound to that categorical imperative which it voices to itself: any will, qua will, finds that all of its possible actions stand in relation to a principle which exceeds the natural order, a grounding, a priori principle which precedes and has authority over every empirically determinate end or good; and it is through this practical transcendental principle that the empirically engaged will is confronted perpetually with its own intelligible essence, the formal unity of the will.

What might Heidegger's displacement of the transcendental-empirical schema entail for this imperative principle?

I propose that the call of conscience functions precisely as a reinscription of the categorical imperative. Kant's fundamental practical principle is very close, in certain respects, to Heidegger's call of conscience as I have re-interpreted it in this chapter; indeed, both locate the essence of the "I" in its responsible relation to a prior imperative address. And yet, Kant's categorical imperative requires reinscription because he fails to acknowledge that the force of every such principle lies not in its adequate presentation (e.g., in the explicit formulation of the principle: "I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law" [Grounding, 402]) but in the principle's refusal to maintain itself as a principle, in its withdrawal from its own (in)adequate presentation of itself. This refusal is acknowledged, by Heidegger, in the singular silence of the call -- a silence which is not an absence of explicit articulation but the self-interruption of it (cf. my chapter 3, section 4), the prior withdrawal of the archi-address from that which is explicitly voiced in it (cf. the conclusion of section 1 of this chapter) such that it "comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me" (SZ, 275). This is a reinscription rather than a dismissal of Kant's categorical imperative, for the silence of the call of conscience needs an explicit articulation from which and through which it can withdraw. I maintain that the strength of Heidegger's analysis lies not so much in something which it presents for the first time as in the way it interrupt's Kant's categorical imperative in the presumed adequacy of its formulation; indeed, it is through this interruption of Kant's grounding ethical claim that the phenomenon of the archi-address is allowed to show itself, as much through Kant's voice as through Heidegger's.

Thus we see that, for both Kant and Heidegger, the call comes from "beyond" such that there is a necessary -- and one could argue "liberal" -- distance between responsibility and any determinate good or end. The difference between Kant's and Heidegger's analysis lies in the
character of this “beyond”: for Kant, it is the a priori, universal authority of what the voice of the will presents; for Heidegger, it is the archi-address in its withdrawal from itself (and from any “will”) and thus from whatever “universal” it might present.

2. *Plurality*: for Kant, the plurality of the matter (the ends) of the will lies in its having itself and all other rational beings as ends-in-themselves which transcend the empirically determined ends of the natural order: each being which is capable of being a legislator of the moral law – i.e., of voicing the categorical imperative to itself, of listening to the law which it itself has voiced, and of acting in accord with this law -- is worthy of respect as an end in itself. In contrast, for Heidegger (at least as I have reread him in this chapter) the originary imperative voice is not something an “I” addresses to itself; rather it is, as I have argued, an address which withdraws from itself but which, in doing so, needs a presentation of itself to withdraw from. This presentation which echoes the withdrawal, when it is thought rigorously in terms of the with-logic of *Sein und Zeit*, is never the “I’s” address to itself but always an address from the other(s) to “me/us” such that the addressee is always beholden to the addressor prior to anything said in the address: addressor and addressee make up a *plurality* which does not precede but which arises out of and accomplishes the address-event itself.

And yet, though the imperative address requires a plurality for Heidegger, there is no universality of ends here, for the “end” in question is the singular addressor to which the addressee finds itself obligated in its very being: the Other towards which I find myself directed prior to all intention.

3. *Totality*: for Kant, the plurality of wills – of “ends-in-themselves” – have, as their ideal relation, a kingdom of ends wherein each rational being “legislates...universal laws while also being himself subject to these laws” (*Grounding*, 433). For Heidegger, on the other hand, the totality which unifies plurality functions quite differently. The imperative address is, for him, inherently differential, both in terms of its withdrawal from itself and in terms of the prior distribution of its “echo” into addressor and addressee. Because this presentative echo -- wherein the singular addressor obligates the singular addressee -- always manifests itself through a concrete voice in this or that factual situation, a determinate interpretive schema always structures what it says. For instance; universal terms (I, Other, addressor, addressee, etc.) formalize and thus betray the elusive singularity of the address, which is itself interpreted in terms of a totality (e.g., a community of conversants).

And yet, for Heidegger, this totalizing betrayal of the address-event is precisely the in-adequacy of its presentation, that which accomplishes the address’ self-interruption. The issue is not whether or not totalization happens (it *always* happens) but the extent to which it
interrupts itself explicitly, allowing the radical self-withdrawal upon which it is grounded to show through. It is in the extent of this “showing through” that the echo of the archi-address might be accomplished “well” or “poorly”.

Thus, it is perhaps possible to speak of a “Heideggerian liberalism” quite different from anything Vogel has in mind. To begin with, Heidegger’s call of conscience, when considered rigorously in terms of the Zusage and his with-logic, radically displaces the Kantian subject: the freedom of the autonomous, individual will becomes the freedom of the address-event prior to and necessary for its interlocutors, a shared freedom which we do not possess but which, to echo the Heidegger of 1930, possesses “us,” situating “us” face to face in the address as addressor/addressee, holding me singularly responsible, a priori, to the Other.29 Secondly, Heidegger also displaces Kant’s community of rational beings. The totality of self-legislative free wills becomes a factically unavoidable, totalizing presentation in terms of which my responsibility to the Other is interpreted explicitly and through/from which the archi-imperative voice withdraws in its unrepresentable singularity.

Differences notwithstanding, however, we must keep in mind Heidegger’s general proximity to deontological liberalism where freedom is concerned. Specifically, both Kant and Heidegger, however differently they might view this transcendence, appeal to a freedom which is possible only insofar as it transcends the order of presentation.30 And this freedom, for both of them, happens through “our” being obligated to an a priori imperative voice. Indeed, Heidegger, as much as Kant, stands by the “liberal” principle that responsibility not be subordinated to a determinate articulation of the good.

Of course, Heidegger’s displacement of the principles of deontological liberalism could easily be viewed as a direct attack upon the liberal conception of individual (and communal) self-determination -- a conception which, one might argue, underlies every coherent contemporary articulation of justice. However, we must not forget that this interruption of a factically situated interpretive schema (here, deontological liberalism) is not tantamount to its rejection. Heidegger is not interested in replacing liberal principles with something more “adequate” but in bringing this schema to acknowledge the elusive character of its own principles, to echo this elusiveness explicitly. And he would surely acknowledge that the way in which this echo might displace determinate articulations of liberalism and justice (or even whether they do so) are within neither his nor any other thinker’s power. The question, it seems to me, comes down to this: which

29 See Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Experience of Freedom.
30 As Kant says in his conclusion to Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: “...even though we do not indeed grasp the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral imperative, we do nevertheless grasp its inconceivability”(463).
determinate, factically situated utterance best echoes or accomplishes, here and now, the archi-imperative address where the reflection upon ultimate principles is concerned? Is it deontological liberalism’s appeal to an explicitly formulated, a priori, imperative principle? Or is it Heidegger’s self-interrupting appeal to an address which withdraws from itself? There is, of course, no criterion for deciding, as far as Heidegger is concerned -- one of the weaknesses of linking responsibility to the accomplishment of an always singular address. Indeed, for Heidegger, one can never be sure in advance what one’s responsibility is. Perhaps his displacement of deontological liberalism, as much as his displacement of transcendental idealism in general, forms a particularly disclosive echo of the withdrawn archi-address, of the archi-community. In any case, if this is liberalism’s precarious existentiali force for “us” and we fail to acknowledge this force, clinging instead to sacred, uninterruptible principles, might we not be guilty of the most radical injustice: the refusal of the imperative voice as such?

b. The Fall of the Ethico-Political

I propose that Heidegger’s key insight -- what I have called differential singularity -- might best be thought as a “fall,” a “lapsus,” not a fall “from” the transcendental “into” the empirical, but the prior differential event which makes such distinctions possible and yet simultaneously impossible. This fall is the archi-address’ withdrawal from its own presentation or, as Nancy might put it, its simultaneous having withdrawn from and yet fallen into its own “casus” (cf. “Lapsus judicii” in L’impératif catégorique). As I have indicated, such an event is operative in Heidegger’s thought, “in principle,” from Sein und Zeit onwards (cf. chapter 3).

I have argued that this fall, when worked through carefully in terms of the Zusage and an inflective re-tracing of the Gemeinschaftsfrage in Sein und Zeit, exposes a kind of fallen or broken “responsibility” in Heidegger’s thinking: a responsibility which doubles itself as 1) “our” prior, shared responsibility to that archi-address which, having always already withdrawn from “us,” situates “us” -- singular addressee and singular addressee -- in asymmetrical relation; and 2) the singular addressee’s responsibility to the singular addressee; which is to say, my/our responsibility, in this factically determinate context, to this/these determinate Other(s). At stake here is an imperative address which doubles itself, which might be viewed as a fall from “ethics” into “politics” -- or, more precisely, an originary fall whereby the always already withdrawn archi-imperative (an unrepresentable “categorical imperative,” as it were) doubles itself, leaving its trace in the existentially determinate, “politically” situated address from the Other(s) to me/us. To be sure, “ethics” for Heidegger is always primarily a matter of the community’s responsive responsibility to
the gods: Heraclitean ἡθος — the dwelling of man in nearness to the god (W, 355/LH, 233) — is always the dwelling of a We. I maintain, however, that when the Gemeinschaftsfrage is developed within Heidegger’s thinking, the impersonal We is no longer the stable, exclusive addressee of the imperative address.

And yet, what difference does this make? That is to say, what does this displacement of responsibility, of the ethico-political, entail for concrete praxis? With what force does it command me/us as addressee(s) of the doubled imperative voice, to act in one way rather than another?

To begin with, we must ask whether such a thing as responsible action — or indeed “response” period — is even a possibility in terms of the address-event as I have articulated it. Given that I/we happens only in the singular address-event and only as addressee, any attempt to posit an I/we which maintains itself from one address-event to another and which shifts from addressee to addressor (e.g., an I/we which, as addressee, is commanded and then subsequently responds, as addressor, to this command), seems immediately wrong-headed. Indeed, if the address-event is truly “singular” rather than “particular,” it cannot be situated within a multiplicity — either simultaneous or successive — of address-instances. To the contrary, multiplicity can happen only as the address-event itself, in its withdrawal from itself.

Nevertheless, there is a kind of a “response” at work in this singular event inasmuch as “our” emergence into the addressor-addressee relation responds to the address which “has” withdrawn from it a priori: I find myself having been obligated to listen to the address, and I respond precisely by being addressee; the other finds itself having been obligated to speak the address, and it responds by being addressor. While this is less a response that “we make” than one which makes us (or at least one which happens as us), it is a response nevertheless, one which the differential address needs in order to be accomplished as address.

At first glance, such a portrayal of “response-ability” seems to have little connection to concrete praxis, for it involves neither agency nor temporal succession (what could determinate responsibility be without the appeal to temporal succession? what could it be if we were not able to say “it is your responsibility to do X, which has not yet been done”?) And yet, we must keep in mind that the response whereby the address is accomplished happens through what the other says to me. It is in this factically determined “said” — a necessary betrayal of unrepresentable singularity — that the address-event presents itself as a plurality of “particular” events which can be gathered together via simultaneity or succession. Thus, it is here, at the level of presentation, that events can be collected into narratives and the “I” can be presented as maintaining itself, through time, from addressee to addressor: an “agent” as potentially responsible respondent to a voiced imperative.
To be sure, the determinate presentation at stake here is, in a sense, a “misrepresentation” of what withdraws from it. However, it would be a mistake to think of the presented as somehow less “real” or “true” than the withdrawn (as I have argued, differential-singularity is neither something presented nor something withdrawn, though it needs both). To view myself as an “agent” (capable of being both addressor and addressee) situated in a “sequence of events” would be an error if I could somehow present myself more adequately. Adequate presentation, however, is not possible; indeed, as I argued in chapter 7, it is precisely the desire for such adequacy which resists responsibility. What is possible is participation in that shared response which accomplishes the address, a response which happens -- well or poorly -- through our singular, asymmetrical responsibility to each other and thus through those factual presentations of address, addressor and addressee which situate this responsibility a priori.

Still, precisely what distinguishes our responding “well” from our responding “poorly”? Of course, responding well (i.e., accomplishing the address-event well) cannot simply mean either adhering to or rejecting a factically given political programme or set of ethical principles. Nevertheless, this response, to the extent that it echoes explicitly at the level of presentation the simultaneous necessity and contingency of all such programmes and principles, perhaps marks a limit of sorts, a “minimum condition for ethical action” which might be expressed in the form of a paradoxical imperative: the imperative voice must (be) interrupt(ed).

I am suggesting here that to ‘obey’ the imperative -- to respond well to our ‘sense of responsibility’ -- is, at the very least, to hold the address open. Not that the differential openness constitutive of the address-event is contingent upon the appropriateness of our response -- indeed, this openness always happens, echoing in the determinate address, regardless of “what” is said in it. Rather, our determinate response is an echo which can hold the address open in that it can explicitly hold forth the openness in question, exposing as much as possible its interruptive (un)presentability. Such a “holding open” is not at all a withdrawal from determinacy, for it is a matter of our participation in this concrete address from the one(s) to the other(s). As presented, here and now, this imperative demands that we resist, in each case, any attempt to maintain the security of this or that determinate, voiced address, any attempt to guard it from the differential play of presentation-withdrawal (which would amount to guarding it from itself). It entails that we resist the address’ pretensions to maintain its determinate identity either in its presentation or in its withdrawal (i.e., its pretentious to maintain itself as common knowledge or as sacred secret).

Might we not be obliged then to resist withholding any determinate utterance (be it imperative or indicative) from the play of the address-event? Not that we should embrace a nihilism which flatly denies the authority of every principle. Indeed, one can, as I suggested in my discussion of
liberalism, acknowledge the concrete, factual authority of an articulated principle despite the precariousness of its "transcendental" status. However, we must acknowledge the authority not merely of what an ethical principle commands but also of the way it speaks to us; we need to acknowledge the authority of its withdrawal from itself. This might seem, at the level of concrete practice, to entail nothing more than a resolute caution where principles are concerned. And perhaps this is what my reading of Heidegger's imperative voice comes down to. Still, is such an interruptive vigilance so simple to "maintain"? Or does it perhaps require a rigorous, ongoing engagement with our own facticity, an interruptive engagement which discloses again and again, furtively each time, an imperative voice which calls us beyond anything we might be able to "maintain"? Might we not be obliged, at the very least, to participate in the movement of the address, to voice or to hear its self-interruption, thereby allowing determinate utterances (categorical imperatives included) to stand forth in their own precarious, existentiell singularity, exposing their own constitutive "default"[Ausbleiben]?

* * * *

Let us turn, finally, to the "Heidegger case," to that singular "fall" whereby he addresses us, a fall which must be presented — in a betrayal of singularity — as one particular casus.

To begin with, how are we to understand this case?

Like all cases, it is, first of all, the very arrival of the imperative address-event constitutive of "us," a differential event which has always already distributed "us" — singular addressee and singular addressee — in an asymmetrical relation of shared obligation, the former having been obliged to speak, the latter having been obliged to listen. Yet this case is, secondly, the (in)adequate presentation of this address-event here and now, in this singular voice and this singular ear; and this concrete presentation necessarily happens, as I have argued, through a factically determined interpretive nexus which has already located this voice (in this case, as that of "Heidegger" and of those who continue to speak for him) and this ear (in this case, as that of "we" who are engaged in reading Heidegger) in relation to each other such that a successive response to one another is possible.

Given this, then, what might it mean for us, here and now, to respond responsibly to the Heidegger case?

If, as I have suggested, responding responsibly to the doubled address-event means, at the very least, allowing the self-interruption constitutive of it to echo explicitly in my/our response, our primary obligation concerning the Heidegger case is not to affirm "what" he has said to us (about
Being, “ethics,” language, etc.). Not that we should avoid engaging “what” he has said, of course; for we are obliged, as addressees, to listen carefully to this “what” in all its factual determinacy, in its dialogue with and displacement of those principles which situate us, here and now. Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that the way in which the imperative voice speaks through Heidegger -- withdrawing itself from its presentation in his voice -- may well meet resistance, at crucial points, in what he says (and perhaps even in the way he claims self-interruption to be at work in what he says). And indeed, if Heidegger’s address to us fails to echo well the withdrawn archi-imperative, our responding well to the imperative voice which speaks to us here and now through his voice perhaps requires speaking against him in the most determinate manner.

Here, by “speaking against Heidegger” I do not mean simply “reading Heidegger against Heidegger” such that the self-interruption at work in his text is exposed. Rather, I mean, more specifically, a direct accusation addressed to him: “you have done wrong.” I am not suggesting that such accusation is merely consistent with thinking, but that it may well be, in certain “cases,” the thoughtful response which is required (i.e., the response which best echoes the self-interruptive address-event).

A few examples of where such accusation might well be our responsibility:

1. With respect to Heidegger’s nearly complete silence, after the war, on the Nazi extermination.31
2. With respect to Heidegger’s subordination, throughout his work, of the voice of the singular Other to the voice of Being.
3. With respect to Heidegger’s marginalization of concrete, factically given principles of justice in favour of the thoughtful preparation for the cathartic “we” yet to come.

This, in any case, is how I reconcile the apparent tension between: 1. a thought which radically calls into question those presuppositions underlying our contemporary views of justice and 2. an accusation of this thought in the name of precisely those principles problematized by it32 (cf. section 2 of my introduction). As I have argued, the “inadequacy” of articulated principles does not simply negate their authority, for the presentation of fundamental principles can only ever be

inadequate. Our responsibility is to interrupt, in each case, not only the presentation of principles but also that thoughtful voice which calls such presentation explicitly into question; and we must do this in order that the archi-imperative continue to be echoed in the determinate voice.
# Abbreviations of Heidegger’s Works

## Works in German

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BzP</td>
<td>Beiträge zur Philosophie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Einführung in die Metaphysik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Holzwege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>Hölderlin's Hymn 'Germanien' und 'der Rhein'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Identität und Differenz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N(I-II)</td>
<td>Nietzsche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>&quot;Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität&quot; und &quot;Das Rektorat 1933/34 - Tatsachen und Gedanken&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZ</td>
<td>Sein und Zeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Unterwegs zur Sprache</td>
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<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Vorträge und Aufsätze</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHD</td>
<td>Was Heißt Denken?</td>
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<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>Wegmarken</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZSD</td>
<td>Zur Sache des Denkens</td>
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## Translated Works

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BDT</td>
<td>&quot;Building Dwelling Thinking&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Basic Problems of Phenomenology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td>Being and Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>The End of Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Hölderlin's Hymn &quot;The Ister&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>lAd</td>
<td>Identity and Difference</td>
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<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>Introduction to Metaphysics</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPM</td>
<td>Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics</td>
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<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>&quot;Language&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>LH</td>
<td>&quot;Letter on 'Humanism'&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFL</td>
<td>Metaphysical Foundations of Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N(i-iv)</td>
<td>Nietzsche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGS</td>
<td>&quot;Only a God Can Save Us’: Der Spiegel’s Interview with Martin Heidegger (1966)&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>OET</td>
<td>&quot;On the Essence of Truth&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>OWA</td>
<td>&quot;The Origin of the Work of Art&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>OWL</td>
<td>On the Way to Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTB</td>
<td>On Time and Being</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCT</td>
<td>&quot;The Question Concerning Technology&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>QB</td>
<td>The Question of Being</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>&quot;The Self-Assertion of the German University&quot; and &quot;The Rectorate 1933-34: Facts and Thoughts&quot;</td>
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<td>WCT</td>
<td>What is Called Thinking?</td>
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<td>WM</td>
<td>&quot;What is Metaphysics&quot;</td>
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"Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität" and "Das Rektorat 1933-34 -- Tatsachen und Gedanken." Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.


Other Works


