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RUKH: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PROTEST
1988-1992

by

Orest Wasyl Zajcsw

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Ph.D.
Graduate Department of Political Science
University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT

Rukh: The Social Construction of Protest
1988-1992

Ph.D., 1998
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This dissertation is a study of Rukh, the main national movement in Ukraine between 1988 and 1992. The time frame under study embraces the inception of Rukh, the period of Rukh's greatest influence on Ukrainian politics (including Ukraine's eventual declaration of independence from the USSR), and finally, the decline and splintering of the movement in the aftermath of independence. Using Ukraine as a case study, we see the rapid transition of ethnopoltics in the Soviet Union from ethnic federalism to ethnonationalism.

There have been a variety of studies of nationalism and national movements in the Ukrainian (and former Soviet) social science literature. These works tended to focus largely on nationalism. But to round out our understanding of the complex changes going on in Ukraine between 1988 and 1992, it is necessary to study the movement as well. This dissertation utilizes the social construction approach (taken from the social movement literature developed in the West), and in particular, concepts of collective identity, frame alignment, and multiorganizational fields, which, taken together with traditional approaches to nationalism, allow us to understand more fully the rise and forms
of ethnonationalism that occurred in Ukraine.

First, the social construction approach lets us view the ways in which Rukh framed and guided the nationalist debate in Ukraine. Next, by examining how Rukh's opponents and allies changed their strategies for mobilizing support (due to factors within and outside Ukraine), the multiorganizational field helps us analyze how and why Rukh's support grew and then faltered during the time frame studied. For example, in 1989, Rukh was the focal point of opposition to the Ukrainian Communist Party (CPU). But by the end of 1990, Rukh found itself competing not only with the hardline faction of the CPU, but with an increasing number of political parties (many of which were allies of Rukh), along with an increasingly pragmatic faction within the CPU led by Leonid Kravchuk.

It is also argued here that it is important to examine the evolution of historical memories and myths of different regions of Ukraine to understand how and why Rukh leaders used varying strategies in Eastern and Western Ukraine to mobilize support. Overall, the social construction approach not only shows a great deal of potential for analyzing the evolution of Rukh, but also for examining the processes of nation and state building that are taking place in Ukraine today.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a study of Rukh, the main national movement in Ukraine between 1988 and 1992. The time frame under study embraces the inception of Rukh, the period of Rukh's greatest influence on Ukrainian politics, including Ukraine's eventual declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, and finally, the decline and splintering of the movement in the aftermath of independence. Using Ukraine as a case study, we will see the rapid transition of ethnopolitics in the Soviet Union from ethnic federalism to ethnic nationalism. Political elites in the Soviet republics moved from arguing with their counterparts in other republics and with the centre over resources within the existing political framework, to battling for sovereignty and ultimately independence for their republic, which required profound changes to the existing political order. How and why did this transition occur, and why did it occur at this particular time? What types of strategies were used by political elites to mobilize support? Who were these political elites and why did they become involved in this mobilization of protest? What problems did elites encounter in mobilizing support? To help answer these questions, this dissertation will go beyond traditional approaches to the study of nationalism in the USSR, and utilize a theoretical framework developed in the study of social movements in the West.
I. Traditional Approaches to the Nationality Question in the USSR

a. The Focus of Soviet Studies

Until the time of Mikhail Gorbachev's ascent to power, the nationalities question, namely, the potential for the non-Russian nationalities (which, by the 1980s, comprised about 50% of the Soviet population) to disrupt Soviet society, had been largely downplayed, if not ignored. The overwhelming percentage of studies were geared towards Moscow and Russia. Researchers concentrated on Moscow-based individuals, events, and institutions, and often assumed that data that applied to Russia would be valid for the Soviet Union as a whole (Subtelny, 1994b). An overdependence on Russian language sources meant that experts tended to become Russocentric, if only subconsciously (Olcott, 1995). For many researchers, the belief in the contention of the Communist Party's Ideology Department that the nationality question was "solved" meant that the study of non-Russian-nationalities could be relegated to the periphery. Emigres, dissidents, or scholars (often members of the same ethnic background of the republic about which they were writing) who argued that the study of nationalism was still

---

important were often labeled as nationalists themselves, and their contributions to the field were minimized. As Orest Subtelny concluded, Sovietologists were confusing the suppression of nationalism with a solution to the problem of nationalism (Subtelny, 1994b). When Gorbachev took over the reins of power in 1984, however, researchers soon began to realize that, not only was the nationality issue relevant in Sovietology, it was perhaps the crucial issue that led to the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union.

It was not immediately evident that with a change of leadership in the Party hierarchy, nationalist forces in all the republics (including Russia) would be unleashed. Progressive policies of glasnost', and democratization (to be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three) lifted the lid off a cauldron of longstanding republican grievances against Moscow. In fact, not only were republican grievances and nationalist aspirations towards Moscow revealed, but inter-ethnic animosities, largely assumed to have disappeared, were also exposed. Events in Nagorno-Karabakh showed evidence of Armenian-Azerbaijani hostilities that had lingered underneath the surface for years. By 1988, only four years after Gorbachev took over the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and only two years after the implementation of his crucial perestroika policies, the Baltic states all had popular fronts that confronted Moscow at virtually every turn. A year later, almost every republic had followed the Baltic example and had its own popular front opposing Moscow. By
this point it was becoming very clear to Sovietologists that the nationality issue had to be dealt with.

On the whole, between 1988 and 1991 (the year of the demise of the Soviet Union), the main type of research on the national question was historical and descriptive. Works that fell into this category, such as Diuk and Karatnycky's (1990) *The Hidden Nations: The People Challenge the Soviet Union* and Nahaylo and Swoboda's (1990) *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR* provided background information on how the various republics were treated by the centre and updated events in the rapidly changing USSR. Events changed so quickly in fact that new volumes appeared frequently, each trying to keep track of and make sense of the political and social situation in the USSR. Two of the most comprehensive works that appeared, which were published just after the Soviet Union collapsed, were *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics* (1992), edited by Gail Lapidus, and *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (1993), edited by Ray Taras and Ian Bremmer.

As Subtelny commented, it is interesting to note that even as more notice was being taken of the nationality issue and of the non-Russian nationalities in general, Sovietologists (even those who had concentrated their attention on nationality issues) were continually caught by surprise at the speed of events in the USSR, and by the successful actions and resolve of nationalist groups in the USSR (Subtelny, 1994b). At this time as well, theorists such as Alexander Motyl and David Laitin began to criticize the state of
Sovietology in general, arguing that the field was too insular. Motyl concluded that Soviet studies had to have a stronger base in theory and/or have a comparative component in order to be able to create broader conceptualization and interpretations (Motyl, 1990, 1992). Laitin argued that even some of the best pieces written about Soviet nationalities in English lacked a common theoretical framework concerning the dilemmas of nationalism: "In sum, nationalities are variously presented in the volumes as primordially real, historically reconstituted, or socially organized - without any synthesis to reconcile these distinct visions (Laitin, 1991, 141)." As the Gorbachev era was coming to a close, and then, as theorists had time to contemplate the reasons behind the demise of the USSR, several volumes appeared dealing seriously with nationalities issues from a variety of theoretical perspectives.

In 1990, two studies were published that examined the implications of federalism on the nationality issue. Gregory Gleason, in *Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR*, argued that the organization of the Soviet federal system, which was meant to eliminate nationalism, had instead fostered the creation of nationalist bureaucracies and institutions, which through self-protective strategies had actually sustained and fostered the growth of nationalism in the republics. In *Soviet Federalism: A Comparative Perspective*, Stephen Kux examined the theoretical concept of federalism as well as various existing models of federalism in the international system. Kux
concluded that even more than constitutional reform, the Soviet system needed radical reform of its political institutions and political culture in order for a new Soviet-style federation to have any chance of success. At the same time Kux recognized that even a "true federation" might not be enough to hold the Union together, and that giving more power to the republics might aggravate centre-periphery relations even further, rather than improve them.

In 1992, Motyl edited a volume titled *Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities*, in which a variety of scholars, some of whom specialized in studies of the Soviet Union and others who did not, cast about for theoretical and comparative frameworks upon which to base potential analyses of the nationality question in the Soviet Union. The contributions in this work ranged from perspectives of nationality based in game theory and rational choice, to a comparison of ethnic relations between the Soviet Union and India.

Several other approaches to the national question began to appear later in the decade as well. Robert Kaiser, in his 1994 work *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* argued that policy and political elites were over-examined in Sovietology. Rather, his study focused on geography and national territoriality, exploring "the dynamic societal processes that restructured human communities as nations, and geographic places as homelands (Kaiser, 1994, xviii)."

Rasma Karklins (1994) sought to clarify the linkages between the political consequences of ethnicity and the
transition from a non-democratic to a democratic regime. One of the main theses of *Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy* is that ethnicity can play a constructive, rather than a destructive role in this transition to democracy.

Although, in the above-mentioned work, Karklins included a detailed examination of Latvia to make her case, overall, studies of a comparative nature or studies with a strong theoretical component had not yet begun to appear to the same extent in the literature on individual republics. This was particularly true in the case of the political science literature on Ukraine, which was slow to confront the glasnost'/perestroika era.

b. The State of Ukrainian Studies

As Subtelny noted, even as the sub-fields of non-Russian nationalities studies were marginalized within the field of Sovietology, a variety of classic works were produced providing analyses of the evolution and nature of Ukrainian nationalism at differing points in history. John A. Armstrong's *Ukrainian Nationalism: 1910-1945*, first published in 1955, was and continues to be a seminal work in Ukrainian politics. Armstrong was one of the first to realize the importance of examining the Ukrainian case. For Armstrong, the study of Ukrainian nationalism was significant because nationalism emerged much later in Ukraine than in other East and West European territories. In Ukraine, nationalism became a force at the same time that Marxist socialism was becoming influential in the Russian empire. This interaction between socialism and nationalism meant that the Ukrainian case was
unique and worthy of study. Second, Armstrong pointed out that, despite the fact that Ukraine did not establish an independent state, it was still intrinsically important to study Ukrainian nationalism. Ukraine made up about a fifth of the population of the Soviet Union, and support for Ukrainian nationalism was a key factor in how and why the USSR took the form that it did (Armstrong, 1955).

One of the most interesting studies to come out was Paul Magocsi's *The Shaping of a National Identity*, in 1978. The focus of Magocsi's work was the development, over a hundred year period (1848-1948), of a national consciousness among the Rusyn peoples of the Subcarpathia region, an area bordered by Ukraine, Hungary and Slovakia. This volume is of particular interest because not only does Magocsi offer us a view of how a local intelligentsia was trying to work out, develop and formulate a national identity and consciousness that would be accepted by the population, but he analyzes how leaders gravitated towards different cultures for their influences. Over the years, various cultures had greater influence than others, and the intelligentsia found itself divided for a long period of time as to whether the area might have a Hungarian, Slavic (Ukrainian, Russian, or Slovak), or its own unique Rusyn identity. Magocsi described the changing cultural settings and political environments over the century of study, and concluded that it was only after World War Two that the area followed a specifically Ukrainian orientation.

In *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth*
Century Ukraine (1985), Bohdan Krawchenko documented the development of a national identity in Ukraine from the turn of the century to 1972. Focusing mostly on Eastern and Central Ukraine, Krawchenko noted the ebb and tide of Ukrainian national consciousness, from the high point of Ukrainianization (korenizatsija) in the late 1920s and early 1930s to the lowest point, namely Stalin's purges and the artificial famine, to the renewal of Ukrainian national assertiveness in the post-Stalin years.

While these studies represent some of the best examples of writing on the Ukrainian national question, there is a relative dearth of analytic study of the national question since Gorbachev came to power. In large part of course, the reason for this is that we are still dealing with a recent period of history, and there has not yet been time for a large amount of work to appear. The volumes that have been published have been largely descriptive, trying to keep up with rapidly changing events in Ukraine. A variety of authors were more interested in the international security ramifications of an independent Ukraine.²

Other authors have continued to look at nationality issues in an earlier period in Ukrainian history. John Paul Himka's 1988 study Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century examined the growth of national consciousness in

rural Halychyna (Galicia) at the end of the nineteenth century. Himka detailed how the national movement found a resonance in, and in fact, changed village society in Halychyna, where it was able to develop a mass constituency. George Liber concentrated on the period of Ukrainianization in the 1920s. In *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR 1923-1934*, Liber (1992) traced the interplay of Soviet policies of urbanization, industrialization and Ukrainianization, concluding that these policies together produced a modern urban Ukrainian identity. The creation of this identity led Stalin to change the course of nationality policy in the USSR, revoke korenizatsija, and favour the ethnic Russian population.

In the last several years, however, several excellent works have appeared that have begun to analyze the rise in Ukrainian nationalism in the Gorbachev era, as well as in the period leading up to Gorbachev's reign. For example, in 1988, Mark Beissinger wrote an article entitled "Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neo-imperial Integration: Ukrainian and RSFSR Provincial Party Officials Compared." In this piece Beissinger compared recruitment patterns between RSFSR and Ukrainian SSR provincial party secretaries over the previous two decades. He concluded that there has been an ethnic component to these recruitment patterns that has been overlooked, that could have the potential of reducing Russian dominance over the political process and increasing the penetration of local nationalism into the party apparatus (Beissinger, 1988).

Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger edited *The Nationalities*
Factor in Soviet Politics and Society (1990), which included a chapter by Solchanyk comparing the Ukrainian, Belorussian and Moldavian struggles for national survival. Charles Furtado Jr. and Michael Hechter contributed a piece in Motyl's 1992 volume titled "The Emergence of Nationalist Politics in the USSR: A Comparison of Estonia and the Ukraine," suggesting that the divergent paths of the Estonian and Ukrainian movements could be explained by general theories of group solidarity.

Andrew Wilson's most recent publication Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith (1997) is an excellent study of the evolution of Ukrainian nationalism, with a particular focus on the 1980s and 1990s. Wilson argues that a narrow Ukrainian ethno-nationalism might be popular with a minority of Ukrainians for historical, ethnic and linguistic reasons. Moreover, Wilson concludes that the potential for confrontation between the more nationalist Western Ukraine and the more Russophilic Eastern and Southern Ukraine will continue to exist (especially in the context of any strain in the relationship between Ukraine and Russia), meaning that the national question will continue to be of the utmost importance and deserving of study.

Since the advent of glasnost' and democratization, the greater accessibility to research materials and the establishment of a greater number of publishers, a wide array of literature on various aspects of Ukrainian political life has begun to appear in Ukraine itself. In 1991, O.V. Haran' edited a volume titled Ukrajina Bahatopartijna (The Multi-Party System in Ukraine) which
provides the programmes of the new political parties appearing in
the Ukrainian political system in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In *Politychni Objednannya Ukrajiny* (Political Coalitions in
Ukraine), A.O. Bilous (1993) went one step further, noting these
parties' political orientations and looking at their respective
bases of support. He also provides a wide array of survey data
showing how people of varying sociological backgrounds felt about
certain issues and about certain political parties and movements.
Volodymyr Lytvyn contributed *Politychna Arena Ukrajiny* (The
Ukrainian Political Arena), which provides a detailed discussion of
political events taking place in Ukraine between 1988 and 1993,
with a strong focus on the internal battles going on in the
Ukrainian Communist Party in this period, and with accompanying
biographies of some of the key players in the Ukrainian political
system at this time.

These and other studies show that Ukrainian academics were
beginning to take the lead in the study of Ukraine in the Gorbachev
era (and beyond), providing a number of publications that offered
details of organizations and parties and their leaders that had not
been previously available, or had not been previously compiled. In
*Natsional'na Samosvidomost' Students'koji Molodi* (The National
Consciousness of Student Youth), N.J. Chernysh et al. (1993)
provides a sociological analysis of Ukrainian youth on a wide array
of subjects including religious attitudes, political and social
influences, etc. Of great importance to this dissertation, in 1993,
O.V. Haran' wrote *Ubyty Drakona: Z Istoriiji Rukhu ta Novykh Partij*
Ukrainy (To Kill the Dragon: A History of Rukh and the New Parties in Ukraine), which offers the first detailed account of the evolution of Rukh to the end of 1990. In 1995, Volodymyr Kovtun published his work Istorija Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy (A History of Rukh), which presents a complete history of the movement and its transformation into a political party in 1992. Although the majority of the works mentioned do not have a strong theoretical component, they present a wealth of information for other researchers in their efforts to write on the national question.

II. The Fit of the Ukrainian Case with the Literature

a. 'National' vs. 'Movement'

Most of the above-mentioned studies share an emphasis on the 'national' part of national movement, as opposed to the movement aspect. Even though the focus of their work was the Rukh movement, neither Haran' nor Kovtun offer a theoretical base as to why the study of the movement is important. Sovietologists in general have often downplayed the role of the movement organization in mobilizing support for the cause of nationalism. In writing about the growth of national movements in the USSR, the movements seemed to be grouped together, with the assumption that the ethnic republican population would have a natural tendency to support the national movement. But in each republic, the national movement had different obstacles to development, both internally and externally, and had a different evolution than did other national movements in the former USSR.
First, in terms of external obstacles, the republics did not all have the same relations with the centre. Because of differences in population size, contributions to the Soviet economy, natural resource holdings, etc., larger republics were bound to face greater scrutiny than smaller republics. From Moscow's point of view, movements that sought sovereignty or independence in the smaller republics would be treated differently than movements in larger republics.

Movements in the different republics faced different internal obstacles as well. Each republic had different percentages of indigenous ethnic populations vs. non-indigenous (largely Russian-speaking) populations. For example, in Lithuania, 80% of the population were composed of ethnic Lithuanians, while only 52% of the Latvian population were ethnic Latvians (Misiunas, 1990). Also, the republics became part of the Soviet Union at different times. Those republics (or portions of republics) that became a part of the Soviet Union at a later date missed the worst of the Stalin atrocities, and were better able to develop movements based on language, culture and national and historical myths and symbols, thus enhancing the mobilization potential of the population. Similarly, those republics that had had recent periods of independence were also able to develop movements that could more easily access historical memories of separation from Moscow, and create a movement built on nationalism.

In addition, if one focuses on the movement organization and its set of allies and opponents, one can see how and why certain
portions of the population were able to be mobilized into supporting a more nationalist agenda, while others continued to support the old order. One can also see the pressures that an increasingly powerful movement had on the national Communist elites. In each republic, the behaviour of Communist elites differed. In some republics, the elites remained closely aligned with Moscow, while in others they quickly moved to seek alliance with the national movements. By focusing on the movement, we can see how and why Communist leaders reacted one way in one republic, and in a completely different manner in another.

A further aspect to the study of national movements that is generally overlooked, or at least understated, in the literature is the fact that the movements were not just made up of nationalist groups or groups that were concerned with national issues of culture, language, etc. One cannot examine the path to sovereignty and independence of any republic without a detailed analysis of the evolution of groups and organizations that came to make up the national movements that were to become powerful forces for change.

Moreover, in order to understand how these first groups came into being during the Gorbachev era, one must examine both the macro processes of change going on in the Soviet Union at the time (i.e. the policies of perestroika, glasnost' and democratization) and the micromobilization processes. How and why were individuals becoming involved in these groups? Where did the leaders of these groups come from? How did they come together to form the movements? It is only through unpacking the national movement in this way that
we can get a better idea of the processes that went about to creating a national opposition in the various republics.

Finally, at a time when a large segment of the population of the Soviet Union was looking for new leadership (with the Communist Party losing legitimacy daily in the eyes of the general population) we see that a battle was going on between leaders of the old constituency (the CPSU) and the new constituencies (such as leaders of the newly established national fronts). Elites from both sides attempted to create policies and present ideological packages that were most palatable to the general public. The group that is most successful in presenting a package most congruent with the attitudes of the general public is likely to be most successful (factors such as legitimacy and resources available to different groups come into play as well). The process described above is part of the social construction approach (which will be described in more detail in the next chapter).

With this approach we connect the macro level of analysis to the micro level. As Viktor Stepanenko has noted: "The theoretical model of "social construction" grasps the essence of the process which occurs as a result of interactions between identity-makers and the public, and through communication between the "macro" level of political decisions and the "micro" level of everyday life (1995, 11)." Not only will we be able to see how elite decision-makers were able to affect individual participation (whether it be in terms of supporting the national movement or the party in power), but we will also have insight into how elements of history, and
national myths and symbols also played a role in influencing the packages that were presented to the public.

b. Studying the Ukrainian Case

Let us now look at some of the external and internal obstacles that the Ukrainian national movement specifically faced as it tried to emerge as an opposition force. First, in terms of external obstacles, Ukraine and Russia were considered to be the two most vital republics in the Soviet Union. Ukraine was the second most populous republic, with a population of over fifty million people, and its highly developed agricultural and industrial sectors made up about one fifth of the USSR's total output in these areas. As a result, from Moscow's point of view, the drive towards sovereignty or independence would be treated differently in the Ukrainian case as opposed to the much smaller Baltic republics for example.

Secondly, while Rukh originally pursued goals similar to those of the Baltic movements and learned from organizations such as the Lithuanian national movement Sajudis, Rukh faced unique internal obstacles. In states such as Lithuania, it was easier to create a cohesive collective identity based largely on a common language and culture. In Ukraine, however, the national movement could not base its collective identity so strongly on language and cultural issues without alienating a large segment of the Ukrainian population. Western Ukrainians, having been incorporated into the Soviet Union at a later date than eastern and Southern Ukraine, in general had a stronger attachment to the Ukrainian language, culture, and identity than did the eastern Ukrainians, who had been more
successfully assimilated and had a Soviet identity. As Furtado and Hechter concluded: "This [Western Ukrainian/Eastern Ukrainian] distinction made it more difficult for the Rukh to pursue the classic nationalist political paradigm, for the more it sought to exalt the Ukrainian language, culture, and identity, the more it risked alienating a significant element of its own national constituency (1992, 185)."

The issue of behaviour of Communist elites was also critical in the Ukrainian case. Certain leaders within the Ukrainian Communist Party (CPU) moved from being among the staunchest supporters of the old Communist order to somewhat reluctant supporters of a sovereign republic, to enthusiastic supporters of independence. This radical and rapid transition can best be understood through an examination of the growth of the movement. As the movement grew to be more popular, and as the Communist Party (both republican and Soviet) became increasingly less popular, Communist leaders sought out strategies that would allow them to retain legitimacy with the general public. Moreover, the ultimately successful transformation of former Communist elites into the leaders of the newly formed Ukraine can be examined through a concurrent analysis of the relatively unsuccessful transformation of Rukh from a national movement to a political party.

Finally, the case of Ukraine is an excellent model for social construction analysis because by the end of the 1980s, Ukraine was very much a society in transition, as the old system of government, basic values and way of life were all being questioned, and there
was a unique opening for a new force to change how people thought of themselves, their state, their society. Policies put into place by the state (namely perestroika, glasnost' and democratization) provided much of the impetus for this transition to take place. In this context, Rukh was able to step in, and begin a process of social construction in which people would think differently about what it meant to be Ukrainian. Would being Ukrainian be more ethnically or territorially based? What kind of political institutions should Ukraine have? Without a developed tradition of statehood, should Ukraine seek independence?

Rukh began the policy of identity construction, offering a vision of Ukraine that was democratic, multi-ethnic, and inclusive. As Krawchenko noted, "It is the national movement which has led the battle for the democratization of political structures, the abolition of censorship, and the removal of the most nauseous forms of privilege.... The national movement in Ukraine is the democratic movement (Krawchenko, 1993, 86)." Although Rukh was ultimately unsuccessful in its attempt to totally transform the Ukrainian bureaucracy and was unable to transform itself into a successful political party, it played a crucial role in establishing a peaceful transformation of Ukraine from the Ukrainian SSR to an independent state.
III. METHODOLOGY

a. Sources

There are three main sources of information for the study of Rukh in this dissertation. First, a wide variety of secondary sources such as O.V. Haran's study of Rukh, The Report on the USSR Bulletins, and articles in the Ukrainian print media (for example in Literaturna Ukrajina) provide a base from which to describe events taking place in Ukraine and within Rukh between 1988 and 1992. Second, records from the Rukh archives were used to supplement the information from the secondary sources, and in particular, to provide details of the debates from the first four congresses. Third, an extensive set of interviews (approximately 30) further enrich our understanding of the debates and strategies taking place within Rukh. Among those interviewed were past leaders of Rukh who are now involved in other organizations (for example Ivan Drach and Mykhajlo Horyn'), present leaders of Rukh (including Ivan Zajets', Bohdan Bojko, and Viktor Tsebaljuk), a number of Rukh Parliament Members (including Jurij Kostenko (the Environment Minister), Roman Omel’chuk, and Valerij Aljoshin), and leaders of groups that opposed Rukh (in particular, Leonid Kravchuk, the first President of Ukraine). These interviews were especially useful in providing detail about the personalities, conflicts, and compromises that led to the initial formation of Rukh, and the continuing conflicts that were to lead to the eventual breakup of Rukh as a movement into a much smaller entity as a political party.
b. The Dialogue of Sources

In fact, the breakup of Rukh was one of the main reasons that an archival search for information relating to Rukh's pre-history as well as its evolution between 1988 and 1992 was so difficult. Although I was granted access to the Rukh archives, very little material related to the period before 1992. Following the Fourth National Congress in 1992, when a large number of former supporters left the movement, most of the archival documents went missing as well. Although various people said certain leaders had the missing documents, I was then referred by these people to other sources, who would decline knowledge of any archives, but would in turn suggest other possible sources. This process would continue throughout my stay in Ukraine. In fact, there was such a dearth of information about the early days of Rukh, that as of the summer of 1995, the Rukh publishing house was just preparing to put out a detailed transcription of the speeches and debates of the Second National Rukh Congress. Even worse, however, was the fact that the publishing house did not yet have a source for a full transcription of the First National Rukh Congress. They had tapes that consisted of parts of the Congress, but not the Congress in its entirety (Bondarenko, 1995).

Another problem for researchers of the movement was that, in the beginning, archival records may not have been kept because the participants may not have been aware of the ultimate significance

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3 Personal interview with Olena Bondarenko, member of Rukh Secretariat; Kyiv, July, 1995. All references to this interview will be indicated by (Bondarenko, 1995).
of their meetings. When they first began to meet and debate the idea of a national movement, they would not have known that ultimately the movement would claim millions of supporters and provide an impetus towards the creation of an independent Ukraine. In addition, one must remember that when these meetings began, there was still a great deal of harassment from government authorities, and participants may have feared to keep any kind of official documentation. Even where records of meetings do exist (or have existed), copies have often not been made. Thus many originals have either been lent out, are missing, or have been lost. One of the Deputies of Rukh, Serhij Kendzjor, videotaped the opening congress of the Kyiv region as well as the First National Congress, but most of the tapes had been lent to other journalists, or had been previously lent and not yet returned.

Finally, one of the main people involved in the physical organizing of the movement, the man whom most sources said was responsible for pulling all the disparate groups together to form a single umbrella movement, Vjacheslav Brjukhovetskyj, told me that he had all kinds of archives in his possession that showed how the process of forming Rukh occurred. He also told me that these archives would not be made available to me because they were totally disorganized, and his apartment was being renovated which made them even more disorganized. Second, he had possible plans in the future to write his own version of how Rukh came into being, and these archives would allow for his own unique interpretation of events. Third, he said that the archival documents were of such a
nature that only if one were intimately familiar with them could one understand the significance of any particular document.

Ultimately, however, records of the main National Congresses were found, containing the debates that led to the creation of Rukh's main platforms throughout the period being studied, and also records of the conflicts that led to the breaking apart of the movement. Although one has to be careful when using interviews for research purposes, as interviewees can often be guilty of revising and/or distorting history (be it purposefully or not), the material from the interviews serves to provide more context to the archival material obtained, and fleshes out various debates and conflicts that took place within Rukh at various times. By putting together the available archival and secondary sources, as well as the interview materials, we are able to utilize social construction theory to examine the development and evolution of the Rukh movement.

IV. CHAPTER SUMMARIES

The dissertation will be broken down into the following sections. Chapter one will present the theoretical framework to be utilized. It will examine the traditional approaches to the study of ethnonationalism in the USSR, and explore how different approaches must be utilized to advance our understanding of ethnonationalism, the mobilization of protest, and the varying degrees of success and failure that social movement organizations
have in mobilizing support. The dissertation will then look at theoretical frameworks developed in the West to look at new social movements, the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) and New Social Movement (NSM) approaches, and will outline the attempts at synthesizing the two approaches. We will detail the social construction approach, and in particular, the concepts of collective identity, frame alignment and multiorganizational fields and explain how these concepts will be used in the study of the Ukrainian national movement. This section will conclude with an analysis of how this approach, taken together with traditional approaches to nationalism, may allow us to understand more fully the rise and forms of ethnonationalism that occurred in Ukraine.

Chapter Two will look at several major flashpoints in Ukrainian history which affected the political and social environment in which the national movement, Rukh, found itself at the time of its inception, and which affected Rukh's strategies in terms of mobilizing support. Among the flashpoints to be examined are the Kyivan Rus' dynasty, the Cossack era, the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1918, the policies of korenizatsija and collectivization in the 1920s and 1930s, and World War II. Historical memories and myths with respect to these events have developed differently in different regions, with the result that Rukh had to create strategies to mobilize support in regions where historical memory meant that the local population were suspicious of Rukh and the Rukh leaders' intentions.

Included in the discussion of these flashpoints is the
creation of regional distinctions through partitioning (which hindered Rukh's efforts at mobilizing support in all regions in Ukraine). Another factor to be discussed will be the eventual creation of national borders and a national governing apparatus when Ukraine joined the USSR, which, in a practical sense, enabled the idea of a sovereign (and later independent) Ukraine to develop concretely. This chapter offers the necessary historical background to understanding the state of ethnopolitics in Ukraine at the time that Gorbachev's policy reforms were about to be implemented itself in, and also to understanding the collective beliefs and historical myths and memories that existed in different regions of the country. It helps explain how and why various groups adopted particular strategies to construct their versions of reality and to mobilize support.

Chapter Three begins our examination of Rukh. In this chapter we will concentrate on the macro political factors, most stemming from the implementation of Gorbachev's policies of glasnost', democratization, and socialist pluralism that directly and indirectly affected the creation of the myriad groups and organizations that came to make up Rukh. We will continue our analysis of Rukh, discussing how and when the idea of creating a nation-wide umbrella movement came about, and also analyze Rukh's multiorganizational field. We will see how this field changed as the various groups pulled their resources together to form a single major opposition group to the ruling Communist Party. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a look at Rukh's initial draft program,
and both the public and Party reaction to the document.

We switch focus in Chapter Four from the macro level of analysis to the micro and intermediate levels. We will begin this chapter with examples of how and why different people became involved in Rukh, examining how in some cases the intermediate level of recruitment networks may have been a key to participation, while in other instances, the macro factors were most important. We will then continue to examine the growth and flourishing of Rukh up to the summer of 1990, when Rukh's influence may have been at its highest point.

In Chapter Five, we chronicle the decline of Rukh, and witness the way external factors begin to function as the catalyst behind political change in the republic. We will see how and why the movement became more radicalized, and how its environment changed, when new parties appeared on the political horizon, splintering the opposition forces. In addition, certain elements in the Ukrainian Communist Party began to support Rukh's earlier, less radical platform, thus causing a further loss of support. Finally, we will analyze the ultimate irony of the fact that Rukh's greatest victory, the independence of Ukraine, virtually coincided with its demise as a national force for change. The transition of Rukh from a movement to a political party will be documented, with a focus on the internal battles over the direction of the movement.

Having applied the social construction approach to the study of Rukh, the conclusion of the dissertation will elaborate on the validity of the theory. We will also examine several dilemmas that
are brought out of the social construction framework, by virtue of studying the Ukrainian case, including the problems of collective identity and history. The conclusion will also present ideas for future study, and will involve an overall assessment of the inherent potential in using the social construction approach as a theoretical foundation in the study of social movements, and the usefulness and validity (in terms of comparing movements in two different systems) of including the study of non-western cases into the social movement field.

By providing a detailed account of an independence movement in a major republic, whose proclamation of independence helped spell the end of the USSR, the study should prove interesting and useful in Eastern European scholarship. But it is especially important that this study is grounded in a theoretical framework that goes beyond Soviet studies. It is hoped that this thesis will help bring Soviet studies more into the mainstream of political science, and show that the study of former Soviet republics has broader usefulness and/or implications for political science than previously realized. It will also be seen that the social construction approach not only shows a great deal of potential for analyzing the evolution of Rukh, but also for examining the processes of nation and state building that Ukraine is undergoing today. Finally, the crucial role that Rukh played in beginning this process of social construction and the direction this construction was to take will be realized. We now begin with an examination of the theoretical framework that will be used in this dissertation.
CHAPTER ONE

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

I. THE STUDY OF NATIONALISM

In examining national movements throughout Soviet history, analysts have tended to focus on the concept of nationalism, rather than on the concept of movement. The term nationalism itself is complex and controversial. Karklins remarks that one of the root meanings of the term is "the self-assertion of ethnic groups' or nations" (1994), and that the term has varying value connotations in different societies (and, as will be seen in the Ukrainian case, even within the same society). Overall, Rogers Brubaker concludes that according to this "substantialist" approach to defining nations, "Nations are understood as real entities, as communities, as substantial, enduring collectivities. That they exist is taken for granted, although how they exist - and how they came to exist - is much disputed (Brubaker, 1996, 13)."

1 This tendency has begun to change recently, however, with the breakup of the Soviet Union. For example, Jan Arved Trapsas edited a 1991 volume studying the three Baltic movements. Jane Dawson has written a volume called Eco-Nationalism: Anti-Nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania and Ukraine. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1976, concerning the evolution of ecological groups in the former Soviet Union using western based social movement theories as well. Two volumes on Memorial have also appeared. Kathleen Smith wrote Remembering Stalin's Victims: Popular Memory and the End of the USSR. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1996; and Nanci Adler released Victims of Soviet Terror: The Story of the Memorial Movement. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993.

2 Brubaker goes on to note that the various categories of nationalism that will be examined in this chapter are all substantialist in nature, that is, they presuppose that nations are real entities, even as they hold different views as to how nations and nationalism should be defined. Brubaker adds that asking the question "What is a Nation?" presupposes the existence
Another term that can be used to understand more fully the complexities of the Ukrainian national movement and the relations between ethnic groups within Ukraine and the Soviet Union, is ethnopolitics. Ethnopolitics has been defined as "any politics that impinges on the relative power or position of ethnic groups" and "focuses on the causes, content, and consequences of politicized ethnicity" (Karklins, 1994, 4). The term can thus include instances where there is ethnic conflict over a certain issue, as well as cooperation among ethnic groups, and conflict within ethnic groups.

Ethnonationalism is a subtype of ethnopolitics. At the time where one sees the emergence of ethnonationalism, one sees ethnic politics escalated to the point where the institutional structures that help control and steer ethnic relations are profoundly affected. For example, in the case of the Soviet Union, when Gorbachev began his reign as head of the CPSU, ethnopolitics was filtered through the existence of a very strong centre that largely controlled the development of ethnic conflict. As well, the federal system in place gave more power to certain ethnic groups over others (those that had their own republics vs. those that had autonomous territories for example) and allowed for a forum for certain kinds of disputes between groups to take place. It should be noted that this relationship between the centre and the republics had been changing since the Khrushchev era. Under

of a nation as a real entity of some kind. Instead, Brubaker proposes that we "treat nation not as substance but as institutionalized; not as collectivity but as practical category; not as category, but as contingent event (Brubaker, 1996, 16)."
Khrushchev's trimming of Stalin's terror apparatus and with Brezhnev's policy of "respect for cadres", local republic cadres had greater institutional and at times even popular support than previously, and therefore more leeway in terms of pushing for their own interests. In fact, these cadres were sometimes able to take more assertive stands against Moscow. Philip Roeder refers to this developing relationship as ethnofederalism (Roeder, 1991).

Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, however, there were limits as to how far this assertiveness could go. In Ukraine, for example, in 1972 Petro Shelest' was removed from the republican leadership because of his support for "local nationalism." But by the time that the USSR collapsed, the structures that controlled the nature of ethnic politics had been undermined. Ethnonationalism was a major force, as republics were now demanding sovereignty and independence, meaning they were rejecting a system that had been in place for decades.

a. Approaches to Nationalism in Sovietology

The USSR, with its multiplicity of nationalities, was a logical site for the study of nationalism and ethnopolitics. Two main approaches to the study of ethnicity and nationalism developed in the general literature and applied to the Soviet case were the primordialist and instrumentalist schools. Within the primordialist school, ethnic identity is seen as a given of social existence, and ethnonational protest is an expression of communal solidarity (Smith, 1984). Brubaker defines primordialists as those that believe in emphasizing the "deep roots, ancient origins, and
emotive power of national attachments (Brubaker, 1996, 14).” Crawford Young has concluded that primordialism “helps make comprehensible the emotionality latent in ethnic conflict, its disposition to arouse deep-seated anxieties, fears, and insecurities, or to trigger a degree of aggressiveness not explicable in purely material interest terms (Young, 1993, 22-23).”

The term 'primordialist' is somewhat problematic. The term was popularized by Clifford Geertz. As Connor describes:

...[h]e perceives “primordial sentiments” or “primordial attachments” as a number of distinct and only sometimes overlapping phenomena. Psychological ties stemming from a common linguistic, racial, tribal, regional, or religious background are treated by Geertz as totally separable, though often reinforcing, fundamental identities (Connor, 1994, 103).

However, the term has evolved somewhat over the last two decades. Analysts have begun grouping together those who define nation objectively, as with Geertz above, that is, in terms of shared objective characteristics such as those mentioned, including language, religion, race, etc., and those who define nation subjectively, that is, in terms of subjective characteristics such as shared myths and shared memories.

For example, Anthony Smith has been referred to as a primordialist by several authors, but Smith argues that both subjective and objective characteristics are important in defining nation. In order to understand relations between ethnic groups, one “must come to terms with the basic myths and symbols which endow popular perceptions of ethnic boundaries and identities with meanings and sentiments, and which mediate changes in those
identities set in motion by external forces (Smith, 1984)." According to Smith, the term ethnic community refers to: a common proper name, myths of common ancestry, historical memories, distinctive elements of culture, association with a certain territory, and a sense of social solidarity (Smith, 1992, 50).

Walker Connor focuses primarily on the subjective aspects of nationalism. For Connor, tangible (or objective) characteristics do not constitute the main component of nationhood. Rather, it is the spiritual essence of nationhood that is most crucial, and that the idea of a nation could survive without tangible factors. In answering the question of what constitutes a nation, Connor writes: "...it is a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related. It is the largest group that can command a person's loyalty because of felt kinship ties...(Connor, 1994, 202)." But Connor also goes on to note that this sense of 'extended family' does not always coincide with factual history. In fact, it is not factual history but felt history that is the key to a nation. For Connor, the national bond is subconscious and emotional, rather than conscious and rational (Connor, 1994).

For other researchers, this idea of a primordial identity, consisting of biological or spiritual references to the nation, has caused some discomfort and led to the search for new terminology. Hank Johnson prefers the term "primary" as opposed to primordial:

This [primary nature of national identity] captures the sense that national culture and values are passed through primary socialization and maintained through primary social relations. Language, the ordering of experience by tacit cultural and linguistic knowledge, and the way these help define and structure interaction, are sources
of primary ethnicity... (Johnson, 1992, 98).

Unfortunately analysts have used the term primordial when referring to discussions of nationalism in which writers concern themselves with the importance of tangible factors such as language, race, and religion, as well as by authors such as Connor and Anthony Smith who focus on the spiritual and non-rational aspects of nationalism, and also by social scientists who examine other aspects of national identity where ethnicity is seen as the primary characteristic of nationalism. This has led to some confusion as to the specific content of primordialism.

The instrumentalist school, in contrast, sees ethnic identity as contingent, and sees the rise in ethnonational protest as goal-oriented behaviour, with the goal often being socio-economic gain. In other words, ethnic identity is used as a basis for collective action when that particular ethnic identity offers a comparative advantage over alternative identities (Roeder, 1991). Susan Olzak refers to the above concept as "reacting ethnicity." According to this approach, economic development and state expansion are the keys to providing new organizational bases for ethnic movements in contemporary states (Olzak, 1985). Olzak continues by arguing that "the conditions under which ethnic collective action occurs are to be found in examining the political and economic characteristics of contemporary states that create, maintain, and at times, dissolve ethnicity (Olzak, 1985, 66)."

Roeder notes that none of the approaches by themselves can explain the rise of ethnonationalism, and that the approaches are
"narrow and incomplete":

These paradigms fail to take two facts into consideration. First, the attitudes that sustain either primordial or instrumental agendas exist side by side in many Soviet ethnic communities and often within the same individual. They coexist among Soviet cadres as well as in the general population. Second, the politicization of either primordialist sentiments or instrumental interests and the mobilization of ethnic communities in sustained, large-scale action has required the conjunction of these attitudes with resources that can mobilize an entire ethnic community. The attitudes cited by one or the other paradigm are necessary, but not sufficient, for the explanation of ethnopolitics (Roeder, 1991, 230).

A third approach to nationalism called the deconstructionist or modernist approach has also developed in the west. In this approach, nationalism is seen as an epiphenomenon of economic modernization. Hobsbawm, for example, looked at elements of national myths as "invented traditions", introduced by self-interested groups or individuals at specific times in history (Armstrong, 1992). Benedict Anderson referred to the nation as an "imagined political community" and that the creation of nationalism was "the spontaneous distillation of a complex 'crossing' of discrete historical forces... capable of being transplanted... to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations (1984, 14)." Brubaker summarized that adherents to this approach generally saw nations as being shaped by "such forces as industrialization, uneven development, the growth of communication and transportation networks, and the powerfully integrative and homogenizing forces of the modern state (Brubaker, 1996, 15)."
Anthony Smith argues that the deconstructionist approach is important for recognizing the role of modes of communication and cultural invention in the formulation of people's conceptions of nationhood. He also notes that the way nationalist sentiments and ethnic ties can be used in competitions between elites in the modern era (post 1800) reveals differences between the premodern and modern types of community, and also shows how cultural boundaries can change over time (Smith, 1992).

However, Smith also argues that the primordial approach still plays a crucial role in understanding nationalism today:

The central difficulty in the current academic perspectives is their failure to take sufficiently seriously the formative role of preethnic ties, and the ways in which preexisting ethnic identities help to shape the forms, trajectories, and characters of modern nations and modern polyethnic states. Without an adequate understanding of these premodern ethnic identities, we debar ourselves from coming to terms with the often deepseated conflicts between ethnic communities that continue to erupt and shake the fabric of even the most powerful of polyethnic states, and from realistic consideration of the problems of forging any kind of "political community" in such circumstances (1992, 47-48).

According to Smith, (writing before the breakup of the Soviet Union), the Soviet Union provided an excellent example of the need to place a greater importance on the role of ethnic ties in history and ethnonationalism in the modern world. He argued that economic inequalities between ethnic groups may have existed, but that there was little evidence to show that this economic inequality did anything more than exacerbate preexisting tensions and grievances. Thus, to understand and try to address interethnic tensions one had have a better grasp of the different ethnic and regional histories.
(Smith, 1992).

b. Nationalism and Ukraine

The above approaches thus offer us a starting point from which to view the growth of national movements in the former Soviet Union. However, as Smith and Roeder have noted, none of the approaches in and of themselves is adequate in explaining the changing ethnopolitics in the Soviet Union. Elements of each approach must be considered in conjunction with each other. How can the Ukrainian case help us understand the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches? In addition, by examining the Ukrainian national movement from the side of movement theory, taken in conjunction with theories of nationalism, will we be able to further illuminate how and why ethnopolitics changed in the manner that they did?

First of all, the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches help us to understand why people might become involved in a national movement. But, in the case of Ukraine, neither approach is able to explain why a national movement gained different levels of support across Ukraine. These approaches also are not able to project what strategies a national movement organization might use to overcome obstacles in presenting a potentially unpopular nationalist agenda to the public.

Moreover, in the Ukrainian case, there is a further difficulty with respect to the primordial (in the broader sense) approach. Even Smith's definition of ethnic community is problematic. While there is an association with the given territory, varying regions of the
country have very different cultures, historical memories and myths, and some regions are more closely related to other nations than they are to other Ukrainian regions. All this makes the creation of social solidarity and the creation of a broad based national movement more difficult practically, and more problematic to analyze.

Walker Connor's conception of nation as shared consciousness comes into play here. Connor asserts that it is not factual history that is key to the nation, but sentient or felt history. Members of a nation must share the conviction that their nation is unique in origin (Connor, 1994). In Ukraine, however, as we will see, these different and often conflicting myths and histories affected the fostering of a national consciousness and national identity, and affected the development of the national movement. Competing groups offered different historic memories and myths to the public, and the degree to which these different groups were successful both in terms of meshing with public opinion, as well as influencing public opinion, affected the ultimate success of these groups. We will be examining some of the key battlegrounds in Ukrainian history that have given rise to conflicting myths and memories in Chapter Two.

In addition, as Smith noted above with respect to the case of the Soviet Union in general, interethnic conflict was less a case of one group having economic advantage over another, than a case of two regions having historical grievances with one another. The difference in the Ukrainian case is that we are not necessarily talking about interethnic conflict (i.e., Russians vs. Ukrainians),
but an interregional conflict of Ukrainians living in the East and living in the West, ostensibly members of the same ethnic community.

The deconstructionist approach is able to provide some clues as to how nationalist movements have evolved, and how processes of urbanization and modernization have helped create the idea of nationalism that exists today. However, this approach by itself does not get at the question of why people would become attracted to the national idea. In the case of Ukraine, one must take account that there was not one specific national idea. Instead, different groups represented varying degrees of nationalism. For some, nationalism meant support for an independent Ukraine, while for others it meant a support for Ukrainian sovereignty, and for others still, the whole notion of nationalism was an evil which would give rise to civil war amongst the various ethnic groups. Different groups even offered unique approaches to Ukrainian nationalism. Some groups called for a Ukraine where Ukrainians of ethnic descent would be favoured. Other groups like Rukh campaigned for a civic nationalism where all those who lived on Ukrainian territory would benefit equally from an independent Ukraine. One must therefore examine how these groups competed to mobilize support.

This concept of mobilizing support brings us to our final major point. While these approaches offer differing conceptions of what makes a nation, these approaches do not focus on how people join the nation, or come to believe they are part of the nation. What will make an individual join that "imagined political
community"? How is shared national consciousness developed and transmitted to the population? And as Smith noted, how can this community be created when different regions within the proposed community might have deep-seated historical reasons for distrusting each other? Finally, why have some national movements in Ukrainian history been more successful than others?

Overall then, in order to understand the rise and fall of the national movement in Ukraine and the transition from ethnic federalism to ethnic nationalism, one has to go beyond the literature on nationalism, and look at movements. In addition, we need to have a better comprehension of how the macro processes taking place within this approach connect with the micro (i.e. individual) level of decision-making. Through the approaches outlined below, a more thorough macro-micro connection will be made. We will be able to see how national policies affected individual decision-making with respect to movement participation, and how these policies afforded new groups the opportunity to be born and to flourish, thus creating more competition for potential supporters. We will also see the wide variety in conceptions of nationalism, and analyze how and why some conceptions were more popular among the wider public than others.

In the end, we will argue that the formation and development of Rukh, which would ultimately contribute to the formation of an independent Ukraine, could only take place at a time when a confluence of factors were in place. A suitable approach must be able to answer questions of how, why and when as well. First, the
idea of a national movement was only able to come into being because of policies emanating from Moscow in the mid 1980s. Moreover, Ukrainian (and indeed much of the rest of the Soviet) society had become disillusioned with the Communist system of government and Communist-dominated society and were ready for new leaders and new ideas at this time, including a more nationalist idea. Third, although the national movement was able to make significant strides without a large reserve of resources, it was only when virtually all the players in the Ukrainian political system (and especially those with the most resources, the former Communists) backed the idea of an independent Ukraine, that the general public showed great enthusiasm and support. The social movement theories developed in the Western literature show this kind of promise in advancing and rounding out our understanding of the growth of nationalism in Ukraine between 1988 and 1992.

II. THE STUDY OF MOVEMENTS

a. Locus Classicus

The two main approaches to the study of social movements in the west are resource mobilization theory (RMT) and the new social movements (NSM) approach. Generally speaking, the European-based NSM approach comes from a macrosociological and culturalist paradigm (Neidhardt and Rucht, 1991). Adherents argue that it is important not only to examine grievances, but to examine the factors that generate the grievances which create new potentials for protest in highly industrialized societies. This approach
examines larger structural issues, such as the structural causes of social movements and their relation to the (changing) culture of society. The largely American-based RMT approach has its roots in the rational choice paradigm (although, as will be seen later, not all RMT theorists would subscribe to a strict rational choice paradigm) and focuses largely on the availability of resources that allow for the mobilization of movements. Put differently, the NSM approach focuses on structural changes in society and on the preconditions for the genesis of social movements as a whole, while the RMT focuses on the alignments of individuals into movements, and on an individual’s decision to participate in these movements (Tarrow, 1991). Critics of NSM theory argue that the NSM approach de-emphasizes the study of the movement at the group and individual level, neglecting the question of how social movements form, and focusing too much on why movements form. Conversely, critics of RMT argue that it focuses too much on organizations and resources, and not enough on the structural preconditions of movements. In other words, RMT focused on the question of how social movements formed, but did not look at the question of why they formed.

i. Resource Mobilization Theory

Traditionally, social movements, defined as "a form of behaviour in which a large number of people try to bring about or resist social change" (Clark et al., 1975, 1), were said to form when grievances existed in society. Adherents of RMT argued that there were always some type of grievances in society, and that grievances alone were not enough to explain the emergence of social
movements (Klandermans, 1991). Rather, the "availability of resources and opportunities for collective action" were more important. One then asks what factors generate resources, and what opportunities are critical for collective action. This approach is made up of three key elements: the costs and benefits of participation, the level of organization, and the expectations of success.

The first of these elements, that of costs and benefits of participation, has a heavy base in rational choice theory, and in particular, in Mancur Olson's work *The Logic of Collective Action*. According to rational choice assumptions, individuals would join groups in the belief that group action would provide individual benefits. Still utilizing rational choice theory, Olson took this logic one step further. If it was indeed rational to maximize one's own benefits, would it not be more rational for people not to join the group and not to participate in the group's activities, yet still share in the benefits that might result from the group's activity (Olson, 1965)? This was known as the "free rider" problem. The larger the group, the more pervasive the problem because each individual's participation and action means less in larger groups (Phillips, 1990). Olson thus posited that groups would have to offer selective incentives to individuals to encourage participation. This theory thus helped explain why people did not join in collective action, even if the group's goals were in their interests, but it did not explain why people joined groups without these incentives.
Other theorists, (e.g., Hough, 1990, drawing on Soviet experience), however, suggest that there are many "non-rational" factors that can induce collective action. Society may try to inculcate values such as honesty and collective responsibility into its citizens, and these values may transcend strict individual rationality. Second, human beings are not completely rational. Rather, emotion is part of being human, and a part of politics. People may get involved because they are angry and they want to express themselves. As well, people may get enjoyment out of participating in collective action. Finally, Fireman and Gamson (1979) suggest that solidarity and principle are important factors in participation. People may be linked together in a number of ways that promote a sense of common identity and shared fate with one another. Thus people may participate without material incentives because they feel a part of the group:

When a person's fate is bound to the fate of the group, he feels threatened when the group is threatened; and he expects others in the group to feel the same way.... Solidarity blurs the distinction between individual and collective goods. When a person's self-concept and way of life are tightly bound to a group, especially when the group is democratically organized and when the group is powerful, participants experience a control over their fate that they lack as individuals (Ibid., 35).

As well, individuals can get inherent benefits from participating in a cause they believe to be just. As Motyl states, the intensity with which people hold certain values or the intensity with which people want to further their own ends can be critical to the formation of collective action.

These refinements of Olson's theory are important, for they
suggest that individuals will act to maximize benefits, but that some of these benefits are related to individual (and group) values and beliefs, and not pure self-interest. Some of these values and beliefs may coincide with the general values and beliefs of a society, that is, coincide with a society's culture. Since nationalist movements and ethnic groups can be seen as carriers and defenders of particular cultures, Motyl concludes that "there is a natural and evident connection between collective action and ethnicity, [and] rational choice theory should be well suited to examining ethnically based collective behaviour in general and nationalist collective action in particular... (Motyl, 1990, 41)."

Motyl also notes that just as there can be positive sanctions offered to gain support for collective action, negative sanctions can also hinder support for collective action. In the case of collective action such as the formation of nationalist movements for example, the target of anger and change is the state. However, the state has resources that can be used to implement negative sanctions against those participating in collective action. If strong enough, these sanctions can deter the mobilization of collective action. Finally, the state also has resources that can be utilized to affect identity formation. In the case of the USSR,

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3 According to theorists such as Jean Cohen, however, one cannot add considerations of solidarity, collective identity or consciousness without breaking the framework of resource mobilization theory. The free-rider problem can only be solved when collective action is seen from a non-strategic viewpoint: "In other words, only if one sees solidarity and identity as goals of group formation, in addition to other goals, can one see that, with respect to these goals, collective action is costless (Cohen. 1985. 687)."
Soviet leadership spent decades trying to deemphasize ethnic differences between the Soviet citizenry and create a new identity of the Soviet people (Sovjetskyj Narod) to which all peoples in the USSR belonged (Stepanenko, 1995).

The degree of organization is also an important resource for a social movement. Within the RMT literature, the oft-used formula is the higher the degree of organization, the less the costs of participation for individuals, the greater the ability to recruit people, and the greater the chances for success (Klandermans, 1991). Leadership plays a key role, for good leaders are able to organize the group and its activities. Good leadership and organization would also be able to promote feelings of solidarity among participants, and create a feeling of their cause being just. These could be important factors in getting more people mobilized into collective action (Fireman and Gamson, 1979).

Coinciding with the elements of costs and benefits and degree of organization, one must also consider the element of expectations of success. When there is a favourable political opportunity structure and chances for success are higher, collective incentives to participate seem to increase (Klandermans, 1991). A favourable political climate can provide groups with extra resources that can increase the effectiveness of participation. For example, a sympathetic press, or support of a political party can bring resources and/or legitimacy to a particular movement (Tarrow, 1989). Theorists in this area also note that protests by one group can affect the opportunity structures of other groups, as issues
are placed on the agenda, and certain gates may be opened that other groups may attempt to go through.

ii. New Social Movements Approach

The second approach, the new social movements approach (NSM), focuses not on resources, but rather on the factors that generate grievances. In this approach the larger societal context is at the core of the study. Alberto Melucci (1980) defines social movements as a type of collective action that "implies the existence of a struggle between two actors for the appropriation and orientation of social values and resources... (203)." A social movement is seen as having three main characteristics: first, a social movement is a form of collective action which involves solidarity, meaning the actors see themselves as part of a single social unit; second, a social movement is engaged in conflict, having an adversary that lays claim to the same goods and values; and third, a social movement "breaks the limits of compatibility of a system", meaning the system is pushed beyond the range of variations that it can tolerate without breaking apart or changing its structure (Melucci, 1989). These new movements are different from the old (generally characterized as the labour movement) in terms of values, action forms, and constituency (Klandermans, 1991).

Firstly, in terms of values, the traditional values of a society (in the case of western-based movements, a capitalist society) are questioned, bringing to light new ideas with respect to humankind's relationships to nature, to labour, to the opposite sex, etc. Second, the action forms taken by these new movements are
less conventional in nature. The movements often display an antagonism towards conventional politics, and the organizations around which the movements are run are more decentralized and directly democratic in nature. Melucci (1985) notes that the organizational form of these movements is a goal unto itself, and a symbolic challenge to the dominant patterns in society: "As prophets without enchantment, contemporary movements practice in the present the change they are struggling for: they redefine the meaning of social action for the whole society (801)."

Third, two population groups are primarily predisposed to participating in these new movements. The first group is made up of those people who have been marginalized by societal developments. The second group is made up of a "new middle class", for though they may benefit from societal changes, they are also aware of problems resulting from these changes (Klandermans, 1991). Offe concludes that as diverse and perhaps incoherent as these issues and concerns may appear to be, they have a root in certain values which are not in themselves new, but are given a different emphasis and importance within the new social movements. Included in these values are the need for autonomy and identity, and opposition to manipulation, control, and bureaucratization (1985).

Having described these Western based approaches, can one make the case for applying them to movements based in a completely different political system? Are the national and social movements of the former USSR part of the "new social movement" phenomenon described in the West? How can these approaches add to our already
existing, but limited, understanding of national movements in the
former USSR? Finally, is it productive to use these approaches for
better understanding the Ukrainian case?

iii. The Contribution of Social Movement Theory for Further
Understanding the Ukrainian Case

RMT and NSM approaches have been used to study the women's,
students', environmental and peace movements of the last thirty
years. There has been a continuing debate over how, if at all, all
these types of movements are related, particularly in the NSM
literature. What makes these movements unique? Some theorists, such
as Hanspeter Kriesi, strictly limit the scope of new social
movements to those movements that defend a lifestyle choice (for
example, feminism, homosexuality, etc.). The labour movement is
seen as part of a distribution paradigm, and ethnic or regional
movements are seen as falling within an authority paradigm. These
last two types of movements are said to emerge within the
traditional institutional structure, while the NSMs presuppose the
death or waning influence of these institutions and the creation of
new identities and new ties (Kriesi, 1988).

However, other theorists have looked at ethno-national
struggles as being part of or analagous to these new social
movements. Claus Offe, for example, includes cultural, ethnic,
national, and linguistic heritage and identity along with issues
such as the physical conditions of life, man's survival, sexual
identity, the body, etc (Offe, 1985). Sydney Tarrow examined the
career of an Italian religious community, arguing that even within
old institutions, traditional interpretive frames can be transformed into new ideologies, having been influenced by a particular cycle of protest (Tarrow, 1988). Finally, Melucci argued that in studying ethno-national social movements, one raises the same kinds of issues as one would with other movements:

Ethno-national conflict is rooted in the past and testifies to the continuity of historic questions and ancient solidarities, but within this legacy it also introduces discontinuous elements, associated with the transformation of complex societies.... The ethno-national question must be seen, therefore, as containing a plurality of meanings that cannot be reduced to a single core. It contains ethnic identity, which is a weapon of revenge against centuries of discrimination and new forms of exploitation; it serves as an instrument for applying pressure in the political market; and it is a response to needs for personal and collective identity in highly complex societies (Melucci, 1989, 90-91).

These types of questions about collective identity, ethnic identity, societal transformation, as well as that of the need to recognize how resources come into play in ethnic protest (discussed earlier) indicate that both RMT and NSM approaches seem particularly well-suited to the study of national movements in the former USSR.

We can use NSM theory, to look at changes in Communist society (as opposed to capitalist society in the West, which is traditionally examined), and the resultant changes in the types of social (nationalist) movements generated. The traditional values of Communist society were coming under ever more intense scrutiny during Gorbachev's tenure. In the 1960s and 1970s, so would run the argument, many Soviet dissidents wrote that changes had to be made with respect to the nationalities question, but that these changes
could be made within the federal structure using Leninist principles (for example Dzjuba, 1968). At first, the national movements in Gorbachev's era supported major changes within the federation, but when reforms did not come quickly enough, the movements began to demand wholesale changes, including independence, a dismembering of the Communist system, and a move towards a free market oriented economic system. Thus, even though the precise factors that would generate grievances in the Soviet system were different from those traditionally outlined in the western NSM literature, the approach itself can be applied to a non-capitalist system.

In both the western and Soviet cases, there is a disjunction between an inherited world view and a person's reality. With this disjunction comes a loss of legitimacy. In the west, for many groups the maturation of the capitalist system (development of a post-modern state) has led to the exclusion and alienation of a variety of people. This alienation meant that certain segments of the population have been attracted to new social movements that provide alternatives to the state authority structure. In the USSR, with the advent of glasnost', democratization, and a more open media, people were better able to see what life was really like, both in the west and at home. What they saw most clearly was that Soviet citizens were not economically better off than their counterparts in the west, and that their leaders had not been telling them the truth about many subjects over the years. As more and more information about past atrocities of leaders such as
Stalin became a part of general knowledge, and as the economy under Gorbachev continued to deteriorate, Communist leadership found itself losing legitimacy among the general population. Again, groups that had new ideas to offer, such as Rukh (or even more extreme groups such as Pamjat) were able to move into the void and attract supporters. One thus sees similar processes taking place in both the east and west.

RMT can provide a useful framework for explaining why national movements did not flourish until Gorbachev's time, especially since republican grievances had been in existence for as long as there was a Soviet Union. Under previous Soviet leadership, dissidents championing nationalist causes had been harshly suppressed by the state. Analyzed in terms of RMT, even if the value of maintenance of national language or culture is held dear, there is a point at which the negative costs/state sanctions (as Motyl commented) are so strong and so pervasive that those who try to mobilize interests, or those who participate in showing their displeasure may literally be defying imprisonment or death by doing so. From a "rational-personal" point of view, it thus becomes more logical not to act.

Under Gorbachev however, these negative sanctions were slowly removed. By putting policies of glasnost' and perestroika in place, Gorbachev was creating a unique structural opportunity for the formation of organizations that would eventually become wide-scale national movements. Not only was the state not punishing the creation of these organizations, it actually encouraged their
proliferation in order to legitimize the changes it was trying to make. Even when these organizations began to move into policy areas with which he was uncomfortable, and even when they began to defy him, Gorbachev could not make a strong move to quash the protest without undercutting his own policies. Many of these groups were formed as a spin-off of glasnost' and were using the slogan perestroika for their self-defined purposes, often inconsistent with Gorbachev's original intent. Getting rid of these groups would have meant that the policies of perestroika were failures and that there would be no possibility of getting the support he needed to help him fight his battles for economic and political reform.

These two approaches provide an alternative starting point from which to look at national movements in Ukraine. However, neither is fully satisfying, because, as stated earlier, the approaches are trying to answer different questions. RMT focuses on the resource side of movements and movement organizations. The NSM theorists look at the macro societal level structural changes that lead to the formation of social movements. Both kinds of approaches are necessary to understanding social movements. However, in this dissertation I attempt to connect these two approaches via a linking of the macro level of structural change with the micro level of individual participation in collective action (and within social movement organizations). The aim is to generate new fields of analysis for this area of study, adding to the substantial potential offered by both approaches.
b. Towards Fusion

i. Political Opportunity Structure

In fact, advocates for both approaches have recently begun to take note of one another. As Neidhardt and Rucht (1991) note, Sidney Tarrow and Bert Klandermans initiated a debate that aimed not only to show the complementary nature of the two approaches, but also tried to link them systematically. Tarrow, as noted earlier, tried to situate social movement activities in a larger political context, promoting the concept of "political opportunity structure", whereby social movements would tend to be more successful if a certain political environment or context were in place (Tarrow, 1989). Thus Tarrow began by looking at the "when" of social movement formation, and went on from there.

Tarrow concentrated on how movements capitalized on these opportunities, once they arose. He examined movements' repertoires of collective action by analyzing the organizational structures that linked the centre to the broad mass of people who formed the movement, and by looking at the collective action frames which represented and justified a movement's existence (Tarrow, 1994). As Snow and Bedford define the term, within collective action frames, social movements "frame, or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to mobilize antagonists (1988, 198)." Tarrow further argued that these frames are formed around cultural symbols that are available, and then adapted to the needs of the movement:
...[M]ovement entrepreneurs do not simply adapt frames of meaning from traditional cultural symbols... - if they did, they would be nothing more than reflections of their societies and could not change them. They orient their movements' frames towards action, and fashion them at the intersection between a target population's culture and their own values and goals.... When a movement organization chooses symbols with which to frame its message, it sets a strategic course between its cultural setting, its political opponents and the militants and ordinary citizens whose support it needs (Tarrow, 1994, 123).

Finally, solidarity and collective identity within a movement are attained when a movement has successfully created consensus around common meanings and values, some of which have been inherited and others of which have been constructed by the movement organization.

Thus Tarrow has begun to connect the two approaches. He concentrates on the inheritance of myths and symbols, and the construction of new messages by the movements which help mobilize support. He then links the movement to the culture of the society, arguing that the symbols and messages that the movements have chosen affect the values and goals of the society's culture.

It is also interesting that he applies this connection to the study of nationalism as well. Tarrow acknowledges Anderson's ideas concerning the importance of symbolic construction in politics, but argues that this process must be taken one step further: "...[Anderson] so foreshortens the process of diffusion and assimilation of nationalism into the transmission of a universal grammar that political strategy and consensus mobilization - where the practical work of social movements is carried out - is left to his readers' imagining (Tarrow, 1994, 122)." The instrumentalist approach, where attitudes towards nationalism and ethnicity are
situational and contingent then comes into play. At the same time, however, in looking at how movements utilize existing cultural symbols, Tarrow also realizes that the primordial element of a nation's culture and identity still play a role in how movements mobilize support, particularly in the case of nationalist movements, by providing a repertoire of symbols, memories and myths that can be utilized.

Tarrow thus combines elements of RMT and NSM approaches with his added concept of opportunity structure. Tarrow tries to look at questions of when, why and how movements form, by studying the opportunities and how movements are able to take advantage of them (looking at organizational structures as do proponents of RMT), and then looking at issues of identity and culture that are central to the thinking of many NSM theorists.

Jane Dawson has applied a combination of RMT and NSM theory in examining environmental movements in the Gorbachev era USSR. Dawson concluded that, through its focus on mobilizational resources, organizational forms, and opportunities, RMT provided an excellent explanation for the absence of independent collective action in the USSR before 1985, and the advent of such collective action with the creation of perestroika. But she also argued that the concept of identity, as presented by NSM theorists such as Melucci, was crucial in understanding individual participation in movements. She thus used a resource-identity hybrid to compare anti-nuclear activism in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine (Dawson, 1996).
ii. The Social Construction of Protest

Other theorists have put even more emphasis on the idea of constructing symbols and identity in linking the two approaches to social movements. Bert Klandermans refers to this approach as the "social construction of protest". The social construction approach stresses that not all social problems become issues and generate social movements. Even though proponents of RMT took this into account when saying that resources played an important role in generating social movements, they did not consider the process by which meanings are given to events and situations. Just because a problem exists does not mean that a collectivity will see it as important, even if, objectively, it is a crucial issue. How and why do some issues become the foci for collective action, and others not? According to Klandermans there are two important principles at stake: "(1) what determines the individual's behaviour is not so much reality per se as reality as the individual perceives and interprets it; and (2) social movement organizations themselves play an important role in generating and diffusing meanings and interpretations (1991, 30)." This involves not only the individual's perception of grievances, but resources, political opportunities and potential outcomes as well.

In the last decade researchers have begun examining the ways in which people define situations and the methods social movement organizations use to create such meanings and definitions. For Melucci (1989), the central goal of a movement organization is to establish a collective identity for the group. A movement that has
successfully created a collective identity has a shared, defined view of the social environment, shared goals, and shared opinions about possibilities and constraints of collective action. Without this collective identity, groups cannot accomplish any collective action. If a collective identity is successfully created, the new idea will be integrated into the people's everyday lives, as a result of which the potential for mobilization will be that much greater.

However, at any point in time, different groups compete for the support of the public. Klandermans also utilizes the concept of collective action frames and frame alignment (where movement organizations try to make interpretations of individuals congruent with those of the organization). Tarrow referred to this process of framing, or assigning meanings to events and conditions, as a process of social construction. Klandermans also refers to Gamson's concept of "sponsorship of ideological packages" to look at the mobilization of support for a particular movement. According to this concept, for any particular issue at any given moment there are a variety of packages of ideas available to individuals, and different groups compete in diffusing these packages through society (Gamson, 1988). This concept is related to that of frame alignment, but Gamson focuses more on the influence that mass media have on societal opinion, and on the role they play in supporting particular ideas that are put forward by movements and their counterparts. Neidhardt and Rucht expand on the idea of competition between groups for public support:
Of course, these attempts at setting and structuring the agenda are far from being easy and non-controversial [sic]. Apart from the fact that various factions within a social movement usually compete with each other in framing processes, the movement's opponents... struggle to delegitimize the movement's frames and push forward their own versions. We think that the outcomes of these competitions are decisive for the impact of social movements on public opinion and, moreover, for their success in general (Neidhardt and Rucht, 1992, 445).

The competing groups, competing ideas, and competing frame processes interact in what Klandermans terms multiorganizational fields.

iii. Multiorganizational Fields

According to Klandermans (1992), movement organizations are embedded in multiorganizational fields, which can be defined as "the total number of organizations with which the movement organization might establish specific links (95)." But the multiorganizational field contains sectors both supportive of and antagonistic to one another. These sectors consist not only of other movement and countermovement organizations, but also of parts of the political system (political parties, elites, government institutions), that are also integral parts of these fields, playing either supporting or antagonistic roles. One must therefore look at the relationship between movements and countermovements, between movements and sympathetic and unsympathetic political parties and institutions, and the movements' relationship with the mass media to understand how social movement organizations develop and change. As Klandermans notes:

The concept of a multiorganizational field also provides us with a new way of looking at the mobilization of
individual citizens. We can no longer analyze mobilization and participation within the simple frame of an organization that appeals to separate individuals.... The social construction of protest takes place within the context of a community's multiorganizational field. It is there that the grievances are interpreted, means and opportunities are defined, opponents are appointed, strategies are chosen and justified, and outcomes are evaluated.... As a social movement organization competes to influence public opinion or the opinion of its constituency, its multiorganizational field determines its relative significance as an individual actor (Klandermans, 1992, 99).

As well as focusing on how social movement organizations go about constructing frames, interpreting grievances and meanings, and mobilizing support (as he does within the concept of recruitment networks to be discussed below), Melucci also emphasizes the importance to society of this process of social construction in creating a collective identity, and what the actual existence of these social movements means.

iv. Collective Identity

Melucci begins by using Pizzorno's theories of collective identity to deal with the free rider problem as posed by Olson. Pizzorno argued that the logic of group action could not be reduced to the sum of individual actions, but had to be considered as the result of a combination of different elements, e.g., organization, leadership, etc. More importantly, it was only when the individual was a member of the group that he or she could truly assess the effects of action, and the potential costs and benefits of a possible decision to mobilize (Diani and Melucci, 1991). Melucci then concludes that the concept of collective identity is crucial, for it is only when the individual finds himself in a system of
relationships where he sees himself as belonging (i.e., being a part of a collective identity) that the individual will be able to assess the effects of his action: "...the single member of the group relocates his individual rationale within a different, wider and more complex one that corresponds to the norms of collective identity (Diani and Melucci, 1991, 153)."

The next step is the focus on the social networks where this collective identity is incubated. Melucci refers to these networks as recruitment networks - an intermediate level of study between the macro structural level and the individual level to understand how individuals become mobilized. It is within these networks that individuals interact, influence each other, negotiate with each other and develop frameworks for action (Melucci, 1988). These networks include not only formal organizations but "also the network of "informal" relationships connecting core individuals and groups to a broader area of participants and "users" of services and cultural goods produced by the movement (Melucci, 1985, 798-799)." Thus, within this network and with this interaction, individuals begin to create a collective identity, producing "common cognitive frameworks" where they assess their environment and the costs and benefits of their actions. But Melucci argues that because networks of relationships are already present in the social fabric, the processes of involvement are facilitated and the costs of participation are lessened (Melucci, 1988). Individuals then begin to activate relationships with each other, communicating, negotiating, and making decisions.
But Melucci also argues that resources play a crucial role in the development of a collective identity, and it is at this level of recruitment networks that he tries to bring the RMT approach into play:

The propensity of individuals and sub-groups to involve themselves in collective action always depends upon their differential access to resources, such as information, access to networks, and professional or communicative skills, which enable them to participate in the process of identity building. These differences also influence the starting point and the duration of their involvement, the intensity of their participation and the quality of their expectations (Melucci, 1989, 35).

Thus resources will play a role in how the collective identity is shaped and created, but it is this very process of creating the collective identity that is crucial to society. The types of models of organization and types of solidarity created deliver a message to the rest of society, providing a symbolic challenge to dominant codes and ways of thinking.

This intermediate recruitment level is important for Klandermans as well, and serves as the meeting ground for his and Melucci's thinking. Klandermans refers to mobilization potential, or the number of people in society who could possibly be mobilized into supporting a movement. Klandermans argues that it is only when a movement has access to these recruitment networks that a movement's full mobilization potential is realized. He focuses on the need for movement organizations to recruit into other networks. Rather than focus on the forging of collective identity, Klandermans looks more at the way movements should organize themselves, and how they must offer incentives to maximize their
mobilization potential:

Networks condition whether people become targets of mobilization attempts. The more a movement's reach-out networks are woven into other organizations, the more people are reached by mobilization attempts.... During a mobilization campaign a movement organization has to mobilize and activate its recruitment networks by mobilizing persons who hold positions in it.... With respect to collective incentives, a multiplicative relationship is assumed between the value of the collective good and the expectancy of success.... Movements must communicate to potential participants the extent to which collective and selective incentives are controlled by the movement (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987, 520).

These attempts at fusion will thus provide the basis for conceptualizing the emergence, transformation, and collapse of the Ukrainian national movement Rukh. Through the concept of multiorganizational fields, we will be able to document the evolution of informal organizations that became allies to form an umbrella movement called Rukh. Using this concept we will see how Rukh was able to gain strength and popularity in the face of its main opponent, the Ukrainian Communist Party (CPU). At the height of its popularity, we will then see how Rukh's support began to fragment, first, as new political parties began to flourish, draining resources and leaders from the main movement organization, and second, as the CPU began to propound similar ideas and occupy the same ideological territory as Rukh, further draining support for the movement. Even at the height of its greatest success, i.e., the achievement of an independent Ukraine, Rukh found itself as a relatively spent force.

Utilizing conceptual tools such as frame alignment and collective identity, the framework of social construction allows us
to analyze the battle between Rukh and its opponents more closely. In the battle for public support and popularity, a variety of factors other than access to resources came into play. While the CPU had greater resources in terms of media access, financial capabilities, control over availability of buildings for meetings, etc., the CPU began to suffer from a lack of legitimacy, which negated some of the advantages noted above. This allowed for new players such as Rukh to overcome its resource deficiencies to make a definite imprint on the Ukrainian political scene.

We will examine how Rukh and its opponents presented different ideological packages to the public, and seek to explain why the general population was more receptive to certain packages than others, and how leaders of both sides began to adjust their presentations accordingly. We will see that, coinciding with these adjustments, Rukh faced unique difficulties in that certain parts of its platform were very popular in one area of Ukraine, but, as mentioned earlier, much less well-received in other areas. This factor forced Rukh into the difficult position of supporting a nationalist agenda based on cultural and language issues, and using symbols such as the Blue-Yellow flag in Western Ukraine (from which most of Rukh's support came), while large segments of Eastern and Southern Ukraine (the most populous regions of Ukraine) feared nationalism and were suspicious of the use these symbols. In the Eastern and Southern regions Rukh tried to downplay the outright nationalist parts of its platform and focused on trying to gain support by promoting an agenda based on ecological and economic
issues. But a more conservative population in Eastern and Southern Ukraine found that it could not rally towards a movement that was espousing nationalist issues in other areas of the country, even if it could support Rukh on other issues such as the economy and ecology. Rukh was never able to satisfactorily resolve this inner tension and was not able to gain the necessary inroads in the East and South that would ensure it continuing success and prevent a resurgent CPU from displacing Rukh as the primary force for change in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.

Moreover, in examining how certain individuals became involved in Rukh, we will explore how intermediate-level recruitment networks influenced Rukh's popularity and the mobilization of supporters. In some cases the existence of these networks facilitated people's involvement in Rukh, while in other cases, without any networks, people still became involved in supporting Rukh. In these cases we will notice that there was no intermediate connecting factor between the macro and micro level, but that government policies such as glasnost' and socialist pluralism allowed individuals a new freedom to make more informed decisions (such as whether or not to support a new movement). Also, the previously mentioned loss of legitimacy of the state allowed new actors to enter the fray and be considered by the public.

Ultimately, it is only through this added dimension of studying the national movement that we will be able to get a broader understanding of nationalism in Ukraine. How and why did the Ukrainian public so overwhelmingly support the option of an
independent Ukraine in 1991, when only months previously, especially in Eastern Ukraine, there was still only lukewarm support for the idea? How and why did the former Communist leadership get to the point of fully supporting an independent Ukraine, when two years previously the same leadership was struggling to keep a movement such as Rukh from even forming? One cannot comprehend the change in public support without examining the change(s) in the CPU. Similarly, without an examination of the evolution of Rukh, the changes in CPU thinking cannot be properly analyzed.

Finally, the tone of nationalist rhetoric, i.e., that support for an independent Ukraine would mean a better Ukraine for all Ukrainians, not just ethnic Ukrainians, and that the ethnic minorities in Ukraine would have their languages and cultures promoted, was set by Rukh, even though it was eventually usurped by Leonid Kravchuk and his followers. Thus without this analysis of Rukh and the battle for support between the CPU and Rukh, without this analysis of the movement, our understanding of the processes underlying the Ukrainian declaration of independence in 1991 are indeed incomplete.

v. Social Construction: Past and Present

An extra dimension of study is needed to make the analysis of Rukh more complete. Herbert Kitschelt notes that a comprehensive theory of social movements would encompass three levels of analysis: the actors and their definitions of their environments, the institutions and formal organizations in which they act, and
the societal context. The societal context should "reconstruct the interplay of institutions and actors against the backdrop of central technological, economic, political and cultural patterns in a social formation (Kitschelt, 1992, 338)." Before one gets to the point of understanding how these organizations affect one another's strategies in this field and affect each other's relative significance, there must be a broader political and historical context in place. One needs the historical knowledge to realize how the organizations under study came into being, how they came to have the power (in terms of resources and legitimacy) to influence collective beliefs, construct meanings and mobilize participation, and why some organizations would have more power than others.

This larger historical context, which provides the repertoire of meanings, symbols, etc. would then be combined with Tarrow's conceptualization of political opportunity structure to get a broader understanding of how an organization's multiorganizational field becomes established. This historical dimension seems to be missing from the social construction approach as put forward by Klandermans. Klandermans claims:

Collective beliefs and the way they are formed and transformed are the core of the social construction of protest;... Collective beliefs are constructed and reconstructed over and over: in public discourse, during the mobilization of consensus, and in the process of consciousness raising during episodes of collective action.... Incoming information is processed and anchored in existing collective beliefs through interpersonal interaction. Only when actors are able to direct this interaction so that their message becomes anchored in existing beliefs can they transform collective beliefs [emphasis mine] (Klandermans, 1992, 100).
While the focus on transforming collective beliefs is crucial to the understanding of mobilization of support, Klandermans seems to assume an unproblematic understanding of collective beliefs, and that, to maximize support, groups will all somehow be able to align their beliefs with the existing collective beliefs. Klandermans also claims that a social movement's multiorganizational field determines its relative significance as an actor.

However, for a group to be successful in transforming collective beliefs and in assessing its situation in the multiorganizational field, the group must understand the development of the beliefs in question, have a "take" on the development of the symbols and meanings that have constructed these beliefs, and understand when and where these symbols and meanings might be more or less powerful. In other words, a successful movement must be able to learn from experience (both the history of national experience, and the experience of organizations in other republics for example) to assess which strategies for mobilizing support will be most successful. Finally, to be successful the group must then be able to construct that experience so that it will resonate with the memories and values of the general population. A group will be able to transform collective beliefs when the symbols and myths used by the group have their roots in the existing beliefs and memories already in place.

The following chapter will provide the historical component to our examination of the national movement Rukh. Rather than provide
a history of Ukraine or a history of national movements in Ukraine, this chapter will offer different interpretations of various points in Ukrainian history that have affected the creation of a cohesive national identity in Ukraine. In offering varying interpretations of Ukrainian history and historical myths, competing groups presented their conceptions of being Ukrainian. The acceptance of often conflicting conceptions in various regions has meant that different identities have been created. This chapter will also focus on historical factors such as the partitioning of Ukraine that has led to the creation of distinct regional identities on Ukrainian territory.

It is only with this sort of historical analysis that one can see how and why certain symbols, values and myths were utilized by some groups and not others, how and why strategies by Rukh differed depending on which region they were in, and why the process of creating a collective identity was so difficult for the movement. Once this historical context has been established, we can go on to more recent history, establishing the political context of the late 1980s with the development of Gorbachev's policies of perestroika, glasnost' and democratization, and analyzing the birth and evolution of Rukh utilizing the theoretical constructs of social construction and multiorganizational fields described above.
CHAPTER TWO

UKRAINIAN HISTORY AND UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

This chapter is not primarily about history. It is about the making of historical myths and the construction of history. Rukh had many difficulties in trying to develop a coherent identity that could appeal to all regions of Ukraine. A part of these difficulties stemmed from the fact that different regions had varying and often conflicting historical memories concerning the same historical events. A national movement such as Rukh was unable to harken back to historical myths and symbols that might serve to unite the Ukrainian population and mobilize republic-wide support, as these myths had positive connotations in some regions, but negative ones in others. Clearly it is beyond the scope and nature of this dissertation to provide a detailed account of a territory whose capital has recently celebrated its 1500th anniversary. Instead this chapter will focus on five flashpoints (and their interpretations) in Ukrainian history, that, first, have come to make up the substance of historical memory, and second, have contributed to the evolution of different identities we see today in the regions that make up Ukraine.

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORICAL MEMORY

As we noted in Chapter One, Walker Connor has written that the feeling of belonging to a nation is non-rational, that is cannot
simply be explained by objective criteria such as speaking a common language or living on a common territory. For Connor, "The essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way (Connor, 1994, 197)." Connor continues by arguing that belonging to a nation is a kind of social construction, that is, "...that it is not what is but what people perceive as is which influences attitudes and behavior. And a subconscious belief in the group's separate origin and evolution is an important ingredient of the national psychology (Ibid.)." In order to examine this belief in separate origin and evolution, one has to look at the collective historical myths and memories of a people.

A variety of scholars have noted the importance that historical myths play in mobilizing support for ethno-national movements. Andrew Wilson concluded that:

Historical myths... are an extremely effective means of firming up a target group's collective identity, encouraging group coalescence, and stimulating political mobilization. The more effective historical myths help to provide an ethnic group with a sense of its own identity as a historical and political subject, to connect a given group with a sense of its own past (imparting powerful emotional appeal by linking the fate of present generations with that of both ancestors and descendants), and, by relating to the individual's own sense of identity, time and space, helping to make sense of the present (Wilson, 1995, 265).

But as we noted earlier, it is not factual history that is important, but what people perceive to be history that is important (Connor, 1994). Moreover, historical memory is constantly being
reinterpreted and reshaped by political elites and by events taking place in the present (Wilson, 1995). As Wilson notes, even as elites play a crucial role in developing historical memory, elites do not invent memories. For historical memories to take hold in a public's imagination, they must have resonance and somehow connect with popular memory and experience (Ibid.).

Some of the strongest and most popular historical myths have to do with homeland, the idea that their particular group was the first to occupy a given territory. But what if different groups claim proprietary rights over a certain territory? And what if different sets of elites present differing historical memories with respect to the same event(s)? Which myths will prevail? How will national identity and the mobilization of ethno-nationalism be affected by the existence of conflicting historical memories on the same territory? These are questions that must be dealt with in order to analyze and understand the different ways in which Rukh strategists had to deal with the historical legacy they inherited.

Rukh leaders (as well as leaders of other national movements in Ukrainian history) have had to present a conception of Ukrainian history and of the very roots of the Ukrainian ethnie that directly conflicted with historical conceptions put forward first by Russian elites and then by Soviet elites. In some parts of Ukraine, the historical myths put forth by Soviet elites were so powerfully embedded in the memory of those regions that Rukh was virtually never able to gain a significant stronghold in those regions, due to Rukh's use and propagation of certain historical myths and
symbols. Why have national movements in Ukrainian history had such difficulty in presenting the idea of a unique Ukrainian identity whose origins go back over a thousand years?

Historians have often had difficulty answering the question, "What is Ukraine?" (Von Hagen, 1995) since there has been little continuity of state and national traditions throughout its history. As various empires seized different regions of Ukraine over the years, there has been a constant changing of borders and a permeability of cultures. Each empire left unique marks on the regions it occupied. In fact, throughout the centuries Eastern and Western Ukraine have spent a great deal more time as parts of different empires rather than as a united entity. This lack of continuity of borders and state traditions has made it difficult to create a coherent history that would connect the different regions into a single historical legacy and to secure consensus on that history. As George Grabowicz has summarized: "...the heart of the matter is the question of institutions: the centuries-long and discontinuous process of the formation of both state and ethnos on the territory of what is now Ukraine, and the lengthy and more than usually complex process of Ukrainian nation building (Grabowicz, 1995, 676)."

For the purposes of this dissertation, five highlights of Ukrainian history will be examined. The first two periods to be discussed will be Kyivan Rus' and the Cossack era. These two eras

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1 For the full discussion on von Hagen's essay, "Does Ukraine Have a History?", see Slavic Review 54, no. 3 (Fall. 1995).
have been the source of heated debate between Russophiles and Ukrainophiles for decades, as Ukrainian historians have sought to connect most of the territory that makes up today's Ukraine to the days of the Cossacks and as far back as Kyivan Rus', while arguing that of the Slavic groups, only Ukraine had this unique connection to the far past. The third point of history to be examined is the period of Ukraine's brief independence in 1918. This point of history was significant because before 1991, Ukraine had enjoyed only two periods of true independence. From 1648-1654, the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks led by Bohdan Khmel'nytskyj controlled a large portion of the territory now known as Ukraine, and from 1918-1920, the Ukrainian Central Rada declared its independence (both events will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter) (Stent, 1994). In addition, following this struggle for independence, Ukraine became a part of the Soviet Union. The sovietization of Ukraine and the evolution of the Soviet federal system provided definite borders and a bureaucratic and political infrastructure that would later give Ukraine a potential for creating its own independent state.

The fourth point to be analyzed is the period comprising the years 1922 to 1937. This period witnessed the implementation of the policy of Indigenization (korenizatsija) (to be discussed in detail later) and the height of the Great Terror under Stalin, which included the artificial famine of 1932-33 and the series of purges of the mid 1930s. Korenizatsija allowed for such a flourishing of Ukrainian language and culture that many future Ukrainian
nationalist leaders looked on the 1920s as a golden age for Ukrainian culture and language, even though Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the policies of collectivization (and in particular, the artificial famine) and purges of government and party apparatuses were to become a part of historical memories used by national movement leaders to show how Ukrainians were oppressed within the Soviet system, and demonstrated the need for Ukraine to become a sovereign (and later independent) state.

The final historical highlight to be examined in some detail will be World War II. During this very confusing period, Ukrainians were often fighting against Ukrainians. Differing historical myths concerning the war developed over time, as Western Ukraine, which witnessed the rise of several ultranationalist groups which fought both for and against the Germans, and of which many fought against the Soviet Red Army, even after the war was over. Over time, the majority of Eastern Ukrainians, a great many of whom fought against the Germans and who were to become eulogized as defenders of the motherland, were to see these Western Ukrainian groups, and subsequently any nationalist groups that developed in Western Ukraine, with increasing suspicion. Rukh leaders had tremendous difficulty in dealing with the repercussions of the war and the conflicting historical memories of groups such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Significant hostility towards certain symbols such as the trident and the blue-yellow flag which were often associated with Western Ukraine, still remained in many regions of Eastern Ukraine. We will
begin our discussion of flashpoints of Ukrainian history with the
Kyivan Rus' dynasty.

II. KYIVAN RUS'

The territory that now makes up Ukraine has been home to a
variety of settled and nomadic peoples going back as far as 3500 BC,
but the modern Ukrainian ethnie began with the migration of various
Slavic tribes to the region from about the fifth century AD. They
established political unity under a strong Viking influence in the
eighth century. The capital of the princedom known as Rus' was in
Kyiv. At its height, Rus' consisted of most of the territories of
modern day Ukraine, Belarus, and northwestern Russia (Subtelny,
1994a). Christianity came to the area in 988 when Prince Volodymyr
the Great was baptized, and even after the Great Schism in 1054,
Rus' was under the authority of the Eastern (Orthodox) Church,
based in Constantinople. Rus' reached its peak under the leadership
of Jaroslav the Wise, and declined in influence steadily following
his death in 1054, until Kyiv was finally sacked by the Mongols in
1240.¹

Russian and Soviet historians have insisted that, following
this period, the mantle of Rus' was transferred to Muscovy and then
to Russia. These historians argued that Russia, Ukraine, and

¹ For a more detailed account of Ukrainian pre-history and the rise and fall of Kyivan Rus', see
such volumes as Orest Subtelny's *Ukraine: A History*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1988; and Mykhajlo Hrushevskiy's *History of Ukraine*, New Haven: Yale University Press,
1941.
Belarus all came from the same Rus' nation, but that only Muscovy, and therefore Russia, inherited all the political, religious and cultural traditions that had made up Rus'. Ukraine and Belarus were therefore denied their claims to be separate nations (Wilson, 1997).

Ukrainian historians, however, have argued that there has been a stable population continuously in the territory around Kyiv since the days of Rus' and therefore Ukrainians, not the Russians, are the closest descendants of Rus'. This last view was presented most prominently by Mykhajlo Hrushevskyj, an historian writing at the turn of the twentieth century. Hrushevskyj argued that Ukraine and Russia had separate historical developments, and that Russia's roots lay in Muscovy, while Ukraine's were in Kyivan Rus' (Kuzio, 1996). As well, the kingdom of Halychyna-Volyn', on the territory of what is now Western Ukraine, survived until the fourteenth century and was seen as more of a direct successor to Rus' than was Muscovy (Wilson, 1997). For Hrushevskyj, the goal was to write a history that could unite Eastern and Western Ukraine, regions that had had separate cultural, political, and economic development for centuries. By choosing to write about the people and the ethnic territory of Ukraine rather than about the Ukrainian state, Hrushevskyj reached back into history, to Kyivan Rus' and to the times of the Cossacks to establish that all regions of Ukraine had a common heritage (Plokhy, 1995).

This debate between historians was of more than academic importance. At the heart of the debate was the Ukrainian national
identity: were Eastern and Western Ukrainians of the same ethnie? And were Ukrainians and Russians of the same ethnie, with Ukrainians speaking a dialect of Russian? Leaders of Ukrainian national movements have had to deal with these issues for centuries, trying to convince ethnic Ukrainians that they were unique, that they had their own history, language and culture, and were worthy of being a distinct nation. Meanwhile, the occupying empire, from the times of the czars through to the USSR, had worked to convince Ukrainians that they were a part of the Russian legacy, and were one of the Russian peoples.

To compound the problem of uncertain founding myths, Ukraine was partitioned among different empires. This factor affected the development of a coherent national identity in Ukraine and fostered the development of strong regional differences on the Ukrainian territory. The process of partitioning began early in Ukraine's history. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, the territories that now make up Ukraine had been partitioned among several empires. Zakarpattja (Transcarpathia) was a part of the Hungarian empire by the eleventh century, Halychyna was occupied by the Poles between 1340-59, and the territories of Volyn' and Kyiv became part of the Lithuanian empire. Under Lithuania, the Orthodox were still able to practice their faith, and more significantly, the territories of Muscovy and Novgorod in the north became formally separated from the Kyivan territories (Wilson, 1997). However, the Union of Lublin in 1569, and the Union of Brest in 1596 brought major changes to these Ukrainian territories.
According to the Union of Lublin, Kyiv and its surrounding territories were now under direct Polish control, and the Poles had a much greater tendency towards centralization than did the Lithuanians. The Polish state also had a strong Jesuit influence.

To avoid outright Catholicization or Polonization, many Orthodox leaders, particularly in Western Ukraine, fought for the formation of a Uniate Church, where the liturgy would still have an Orthodox rite and be performed in Old Church Slavonic, but the Church would be under papal authority. For supporters of this religious hybrid, the Uniate Church was a compromise that allowed the continuation of religious traditions held since Volodymyr's time, and with the Brest Treaty, the Uniate clergy would have the same official status as the Polish clergy. In the eastern territories of Ukraine, however, where the Polish influence was not as strong, the Uniate were seen as traitors to Orthodoxy (Wilson, 1997). This difference in religious identity between Eastern and Western Ukraine has persisted to this day.

III. THE COSSACK ERA

There had long been attempts to colonize the steppes in the southern and eastern portions of Ukraine. The sparsely populated area, known as the "wild field" (dyke pole), was agriculturally rich, but dangerous to live in, as it faced constant raids from the Tatars and Ottoman Turks to the south. A new society began to emerge in the steppes in the 1480s, made up of a class that would come to be known as Cossacks, the Turkish word for a free
masterless man (Subtelny, 1994a). The population of the steppes grew considerably after 1569, as the imposition of serfdom became more widespread and Polish migration to western Ukrainian lands increased. The bulk of the Cossacks were thus runaway peasants, seeking to keep their freedom and their Orthodox faith (Wilson, 1997). The Cossacks eventually built a series of fortresses in the frontier area, the most important of which was the Zaporizhzhian Sich, built on the Dnieper below a series of rapids. With this strategic location, the Cossacks served as a buffer between the Poles and the Turks and Tatars, defending the frontier from southern raids (Subtelny, 1994a). The Polish government often showed ambivalence and confusion towards the growth of the Cossack movement on its borders. Polish nobility created a register for the Cossacks, who would be given rights and pay when their services were required to battle Muscovy or the Ottomans. On the other hand, the register was very limited, and the majority of Cossacks who were not on the list were in danger of becoming serfs again (Subtelny, 1994a). In the late 1500s and early 1600s, there were a series of rebellions that led to a growing identification of Cossacks as defenders of Ukrainian culture and faith. The Cossacks saw themselves as a state within a state, and as such elected their own leaders, and had their own foreign policy. For the Poles, as the Cossack popularity grew within Ukraine, the need to break the rebellion overrode the usefulness of hiring the Cossacks as a military force. As such, the Poles mounted a concerted attack on the Cossacks and by 1638, had completely quashed the rebellion.
The terms of victory were very onerous. Peasants suddenly had to provide labor to their land-owning lords for three-four days a week, and in the case where the land was leased, peasants were often forced to provide even more labor, as well as pay a tax on their homes and animals to the treasury (Ibid.). This disaffection led to the great revolt of 1648. Led by their leader (hetman) Bohdan Khmelnytskyj, the Cossacks advanced against the Poles, and first conquered Left Bank Ukraine, and then, with peasants continually joining the Cossacks in their rebellion, Right Bank Ukraine as well. For the first time since the thirteenth century, Kyiv had a form of self-government. The success of the uprising was relatively short-lived however. Having to worry about fighting on three fronts (Russians, Tatars, and Poles) Khmelnytskyj decided to go Muscovy to seek an alliance with the Russians. The result was the Treaty of Perejaslav, signed in 1654.

Historians have again differed on the significance of this treaty. Russian scholars referred to the treaty as a reunion of a single ethnic nation that had been unnaturally divided (Wilson, 1994a). This is also one of the events that gave evidence of anti-Semitism in Ukraine, and has made it a part of the Ukrainian historical legacy and national identity, which groups like Rukh have fought to change over the last decade.

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3 During this uprising, huge numbers of Polish nobles and priests, as well as Jews were killed by Cossacks and peasants. At this time Jews were not allowed to own land, and were only able to lease it from the Polish nobility. By the time of the uprising over 50% of Ukrainian lands had been leased, mostly to Jews. In order to make any profit from the land, lease holders often made the peasants provide even more labour than did the land owners, and as such became very unpopular with the peasants. During the 1648 uprising, thousands of Jews were massacred, and the event is still considered as one of the most horrific in Jewish history (Subtelny, 1994a).
1997, 6)." In fact, in 1954, when the 300th anniversary of the Perejaslav Treaty was celebrated, Khmel'nytskyj was praised as a hero for realizing that "the salvation of the Ukrainian people lay only in unity with the great Russian people (Subtelny, 1994a, 135)." Ukrainian historians, on the other hand, argued that the treaty was an agreement signed by two sovereign states. Some saw it as a military alliance, some saw the treaty as an agreement whereby the stronger state (Muscovy) agreed to protect the weaker state from invaders, under the condition that the czar not interfere in Ukrainian affairs and that Ukrainians provide the czar tribute and military aid when needed (Subtelny, 1994a).

Whatever the interpretation, Ukraine's and Russia's futures were now inextricably bound. The Hetmanate did continue to exert influence and authority over Eastern Ukraine, and there were further attempts at rebellion and at breaking the link with Russia over the years. But by 1775, Russia continued its drive to the south and the Cossack era ended with the destruction of the Zaporizhzhian Sich in 1775 (Subtelny, 1994a). Ukraine again found itself partitioned. At first Ukraine was split between Poland and Russia, but with the collapse of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795, Ukraine found itself divided between Russia and the Austro-Hungarian empire, with Russia controlling most of the territory, and the Habsburg empire occupying the three western provinces of Halychyna, Bukovyna, and Zakarpattja (Wilson, 1997).

Ukrainian historians have focused on the fact that large parts of Eastern and Southern Ukraine, which are now predominantly
Russian-speaking and which have experienced significant increases in their ethnic Russian population are connected to the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks. As Wilson noted:

For Ukrainian historians from Mykhailo Hrushevskyi onwards, most of what is now the Donbas was under the control of the Zaporizhzhians, ... naval expeditions by the Zaporizhzhians supposedly brought most of the Black Sea littoral and its river system under Ukrainian control, reaching as far as the river Don. 'At its fullest extent' the Zaporizhzhians occupied 'the east of what is now the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia' oblasts, 'almost all of Donetsk'k and Luhans'k'... In short, therefore, the Ukrainian version of history is that the 'Zaporizhzhian territories belonged ... to the Ukrainian people'. The Ukrainians were there first. It was only from the late eighteenth century onwards that Tsarist immigration policy began to Russify the region artificially (Wilson, 1995, 272-273).

Ukrainian movement leaders for the last century have been trying to advance this interpretation of Ukrainian history in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. For Rukh leaders, as we will see, this push culminated in the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the Zaporizhzhian Sich in 1990. During several days of festivals and speeches, tens of thousands of Ukrainians from all over the republic (especially Western Ukraine) descended on the birthplace of Zaporizhzhia, trying to instill a sense of the importance of the Cossack era to the Ukrainian identity onto a largely hostile, or at least suspicious, audience.

IV. UKRAINE'S BRIEF INDEPENDENCE: 1918-1920

The nineteenth century was said to be the age of nationalism, but Ukraine would find itself hampered in the effort to develop a national identity, especially in the case of territories under
Russian rule (Himka, 1994). There were wide differences between the way Ukrainians were treated in the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the Habsburg empire and in Russia. These differences have had an impact to this day on how Ukrainians view themselves. There were delays in the development of a Ukrainian national identity in all areas of Ukraine, but the extent to which the Ukrainian language was banned and the degree to which dissemination of the national idea was repressed in different territories meant that the factor of delays in modernization and urbanization was closely intertwined with the factor of partitioning.

The reaction of the Russian intelligentsia to the rise of nationalism in the 1800s was that all subjects of the Orthodox religion and Russian nationality were considered Russians. White Russians and Little Russians (Ukrainians) were all part of the Russian nation; they simply spoke dialects of Russian (Takash, 1996). From 1804 to the collapse of the empire, Ukrainian was banned from the schools both as a language of instruction and as a subject, and all school activity had to be carried out in Russian (Krawchenko, 1985). In 1863 and 1876, Russian authorities also banned the publication of Ukrainian language books (Takash, 1996).

Because the vast majority of Ukrainians were peasants at this time, and because they did not speak Russian, even those who did manage to get to a classroom could not get a proper education (Krawchenko, 1985). According to the 1897 census, the illiteracy rate among Ukrainians was 87%, and even higher (91-96%) in the countryside. With this rate of illiteracy, it became virtually
impossible for those with nationalist conceptions to disseminate their ideas among the general population. As Takach summarized: "In contrast to Western countries, where the state, with its education system, legal codes and centralized administration, played an active part in the nation building process, in Ukraine the Russian state became the greatest obstacle to that process; in fact, it was the overt enemy of any semblance of an autonomous Ukrainian national identity (Takach, 1996, 647).

On the other hand, the territories of Halychyna and Bukovyna demonstrated the highest levels of Ukrainian national consciousness. This was largely due to the fact that, from the 1860s to 1914, Ukrainians in Austria had the right to publish Ukrainian periodicals, form legal Ukrainian voluntary associations, and attend Ukrainian language schools (Himka, 1994). Even educated Ukrainians in these territories however, were still confused about their ethnic identity. Some opted for Russian identity, others for Ukrainian identity. Foremost among the groups responsible for the dissemination of the Ukrainian national idea in Halychyna was a group called Prosvita (Takach, 1996). Prosvita was formed by a group of L'viv students in 1858, and it established reading clubs all over the countryside, hoping to connect the peasantry to the leadership of the Ukrainian national movement. In fact Prosvita reading clubs had a membership of almost 200,000 (Himka, 1988). But with a population of 2.5 million mostly illiterate peasants, groups such as Prosvita managed only to begin the process of integrating of the national idea into the general populace (Takach, 1996).
a. Delayed Urbanization and Modernization

Meanwhile, the processes of urbanization that were occurring in other parts of Europe were not occurring in either Western or Eastern Ukraine. According to certain theorists such as Ernest Gellner, urbanization and the move away from separate agrarian communities paved the way towards a more standardized and homogenized culture. Urbanization was one of the preconditions of modern nations (Gellner, 1991). This is not to say that Ukraine did not have cities and that urbanization was not taking place, but that ethnic Ukrainians were not yet a part of this process, as the overwhelming percentage of Ukrainians still lived in the countryside. For example, according to the 1897 census, in the four cities in Eastern Ukraine that had more than 100,000 inhabitants, Ukrainians made up only 16.6% of the population. The pattern was similar in Western Ukraine. In 1900, Ukrainians comprised only 14% of the urban population in Western Halychyna, and 25-30% in Eastern Halychyna (Takash, 1996).

New territories in the east and south were becoming urbanized, but not by ethnic Ukrainians. Odessa was becoming a major cosmopolitan city by the turn of the century but was being settled by a variety of ethnic groups, such as Greeks, Germans and Serbs and also had a large Jewish population. As well, in Eastern Ukraine, and particularly the Donbass region, the mining and metallurgical industries were being developed, but the vast majority of the workers living in these centres were either
Russians or Russian speaking (Wilson, 1997). Thus, by the time the Russian empire under the czar collapsed in 1917, the Ukrainian national movement was not ready to seize the moment in the same way that national movements in other countries were. The national movement relied on the support of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, but the intelligentsia made up only .5% of the population at the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, only 32% of the intelligentsia was made up of ethnic Ukrainians (Wilson, 1997).

In addition, the national movement was not able to make huge inroads among the peasants in Eastern Ukraine, who were less interested in the idea of an independent national state, and more concerned with socio-economic reform to improve their impoverished status (Ibid.). The rural population was thus more prepared to support a group such as the Russian Socialists led by Lenin, who were calling for extensive agrarian reform and a shift of power from the ruling elite to the working classes. But even with various sectors of the population ready to support the socialist revolution, Lenin and his followers were still concerned with how national movements might affect the planned revolution. Thus, Russian Socialist leaders began making overtures to supporters of national movements all over Eastern Europe.

The support that the Bolsheviks were offering national movements was only tactical in nature. Indeed, Lenin spoke strongly against nationalism (remarking once that "aggressive bourgeois nationalism... drugs the minds of the workers, stultifies and disunites them in order that the bourgeoisie may lead them on the
halter (Gleason, 1990, 28). However, he also recognized that nationalism and national movements could be useful in advancing the cause of socialism. Lenin argued that nationalist enmity within the czarist empire was due to past oppression under the czars. Once the oppressors were removed from power, the reasons for this antagonism among nations would disappear, and would give way to international proletarian identification, which would in turn lead to political solidarity. Therefore, under the guise of nationalism, power could be consolidated and power could be put into the hands of the workers (or the party), the cause of socialism could be advanced, and capitalism vanquished. At the Second Congress of the Russian Socialist Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) in 1905, the program included several proposals on the national question brought forth by Lenin, including the right of nations to self-determination (Gleason, 1990). Using Lenin's logic then, a nation, through the right to self-determination, was offered the right to secession. But, he reasoned, if the nation were offered that right it would not use it. On the other hand, if the nation were not offered the right to secession, it would fight for that right (Ibid.).

b. Attitudes of the Provisional and Early Soviet Governments Toward Nationalism

In the wake of the February Revolution in 1917 and the accession to power of the Provisional Government, independence movements were offered only vacillating support for national self-determination. The Ukrainian intelligentsia took advantage of the weak Provisional Government, establishing a Central Rada (Council)
in March, 1917, led by the historian Mykhajlo Hrushevskyj. Initially, the Rada supported the Provisional Government, and called for Ukrainian autonomy within a democratized Russia. Over the summer of 1917, other organizations offered support for the Rada, including the Ukrainian National Congress, and two assemblies of peasants and soldiers, held in May and June. As the Provisional Government's position weakened over the summer with a failed offensive against the Germans, in June the Rada issued a "First Universal" whereby Ukraine's right to self-government was declared, and a General Secretariat was created that was to serve as the executive authority in Ukraine. The Provisional Government recognized the Secretariat's authority but only in five central gubernijas (Wilson, 1997). Meanwhile, at the Seventh RSDLP Conference of May 12, 1917, both Stalin and Lenin railed against the Provisional Government for not extending the right of secession to Ukraine and Finland. Moreover, the conference endorsed the right of all nations forming a part of Russia to freely secede and become independent states (Connor, 1984).

It is, however, important to note that only days before the October Revolution, even as the Bolshevik strategists were focusing on gathering support from national movements within the Russian empire by utilizing the slogan of national self-determination, Lenin was again making it clear that his support for self-determination was qualified. Lenin claimed that the Party had to proclaim the national right to self-determination, but that workers would be advised not to use that right (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990).
Lenin wrote that while feeling obliged to recognize the right to secede, "... we do not favour secession. We want as vast a state, as close an alliance of the greatest possible number of nations who are neighbours of the Great Russians.... We want free unification.... But we want unification.... (Lenin, Vol.26, 1964, 75-6)."

For the Russian Bolsheviks then, the true spokesmen for the nationalist movements were the local Bolsheviks, who were members of regional organizations of the Russian Bolshevik party. The fight against the local bourgeoisie (meaning the non-Bolshevik governments established in various republics) would mean that military aid would be needed from the Moscow Bolsheviks. This would result in the overthrow of the local government and the establishment of a Soviet Bolshevik government in its place (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). The local Bolshevik parties sometimes followed this line and sometimes did not.

Following the fall of the Provisional Government during the October Revolution, a number of new states came into being in what used to be the Russian empire, including Lithuania, Latvia, Finland and Ukraine. In October of 1918, two major groups waged a battle over control of the Ukrainian government: the Kyiv Soviet of Workers' Deputies led by the local Bolsheviks, and the Central Rada, made up of several socialist parties, including the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDRP) (Mace, 1983). The Kyiv Soviet of Workers' Deputies meant to take over and recognize Lenin's
government in Petrograd, but the Central Rada, with broad based support among peasants and soldiers, held power. On Nov. 7, 1917, the Rada issued its 'Third Universal', which claimed supreme authority over the nine gubernijas where ethnic Ukrainians constituted a majority, and Ukraine was named the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) (Wilson, 1997). At this point, the goal of the Rada was not to secede from Russia but to help in its transformation into a federation of equal partners (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990).

Following this declaration, the Kyiv Soviet, worried that the choice between the Rada and the Soviet would look like a choice between the oppressed and the oppressor, changed its name to the "Social Democrats of Ukraine" and announced that it was a Bolshevik Party for Ukrainians that Ukrainians could support. There was thus a general recognition that nationalist sentiment fostered by national movements was still strong, and that the parties making up the Rada were better able to harness this support than the local Bolsheviks. However, even with the new name, at an all-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the Bolshevik Party failed to gain support, as the majority of the Congress endorsed the Rada (Mace, 1983). On December 16, 1917, the Russian government adopted a manifesto reaffirming Ukraine's right to self-determination, recognizing the Ukrainian People's Republic, and recognizing its right to secede or to enter into treaty negotiations with Russia to establish federal relations with them (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990).

However, the manifesto also expressed displeasure with certain
policies of the Central Rada, particularly the Rada's support of General Kalinin, the leader of the Don Cossacks, who had not recognized the Bolshevik government's power over the Don lands. Moreover, the Rada refused to allow free passage for the Russian Red Guards through Ukrainian territory, and was disarming Red troops stationed in Ukraine (Ibid.). Finally, despite the fact that in Ukraine the Bolsheviks received only 10% of the votes cast for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in November of 1917 (Mace, 1983), Lenin concluded this manifesto with the following statement:

We accuse the Rada of conducting, behind a screen of national phrases, a double-dealing bourgeois policy, which has long been expressed in the Rada's non-recognition of the Soviets and of Soviet power in the Ukraine.... Their ambiguous policy, which has made it impossible for us to recognize the Rada or a plenipotentiary representation of the working and exploited masses of the Ukrainian Republic, has lately led the Rada to steps which preclude all possibility of agreement.... In the event no satisfactory answer received within 48 hours, the Council of People's Commissars will deem the Rada to be in a state of open war with Soviet power in Russia and the Ukraine (Lenin, Vol.26, 1964, 361-3).

The invasion began soon after, from the northeast.

**c. Ukraine's Brief Independence**

On January 22, 1918, with tension high between Ukraine and Russia, the Rada issued the 'Fourth Universal', which totally severed Ukraine's ties to the Bolsheviks, and declared Ukraine to be an independent state. But Ukraine's experiment with independence would prove very short-lived. First, a rift developed between the Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionaries that delayed action on a crucial land reform bill, causing the Rada to lose a great
deal of support from the rural population. As well, the Soviet invasion was quickly successful as the UNR did not pay enough attention to the buildup of its armed forces (Wilson, 1997). By February, 1918, Soviets were in control of Ukraine, and the UNR had to decamp to the West. The UNR leadership was able to return in March of that year as the advancing Germans occupied Kyiv. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty signed in March recognized Ukrainian independence as proclaimed by the Rada earlier, but Ukraine was now a protectorate of the Central powers (Subtelny, 1994a).

The leaders of the Rada were unable to hold power for very long. German leaders were wary of the left-leaning leadership, and engineered a coup whereby a conservative landowner, Pavlo Skoropadskyj, became the new leader. Under Skoropadskyj, Kyiv became a haven for supporters of the old czarist regime and Russian conservatives. Skoropadsky also supported the land-owning class in the battle over land reform. Thus, despite pushing for advances in Ukrainian language education and literature, Skoropadskyj was seen by many as being both unpatriotic and reactionary, a leader only able to hold power because of Germany. With the German defeat in WWI, the left-wing parties that made up the UNR reformed into the Ukrainian National State Union, led by Symon Petljura. In January 1919, the Rada was renamed the Directorate, and merged with the West Ukrainian People's Republic, which had formed following the collapse of the Habsburg empire in November of 1918 (Wilson, 1997, Subtelny, 1994a).

The success of the Directorate was also limited, as relations
between the two merged republics were often strained, the Directorate having more left-leaning leaders, and the West more right-leaning (Wilson, 1997). As well, war was continuing on a variety of fronts, with the Directorate fighting Bolshevik troops, Denikin's White Army, and the Poles in the west. The situation in Ukraine was very confused as a number of insurgent armies formed all over the country, some of which supported the Bolsheviks, and some of which supported the Directorate (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). As the decade ended, the Bolsheviks gradually reentered territories that had been controlled by the White Army or by foreign powers.

As the Red Army re-conquered old territory, a flexible formula was put into place by the Party, whereby the Bolsheviks championed national rights, while also stating that self-determination could be denied in any case when it might be detrimental to the Soviet state. If national self-determination were deemed to be against the interests of the proletariat, it would be branded as being counter-revolutionary. As Stalin wrote in 1920: "The interests of the masses of the people render the demand for secession of the border regions at the present stage of the revolution a profoundly

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4 The situation was even more complicated than offered here. The insurgent armies described above were often forces unto themselves and would frequently fight against all sides, Russian and Ukrainian, and would sometimes form allegiances, seemingly on a whim (Nahaylo, 1990). One of the most formidable insurgent armies was led by Nestor Makhno, who led an anarchist movement from his stronghold in Southern Ukraine. Makhno was largely hostile to the Directorate, and fought both with and against Bolshevik forces. For a better understanding of the complexity and confusion of the years 1918-1920, see Mace, James E., *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933*, Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.
counter-revolutionary one (Connor, 1984, 49)." Therefore, since the working masses would be led by the vanguard - the local Bolshevik Party, national self-determination could be supported in the knowledge that secession would never be desired.

By the end of 1919, the short-lived union between Eastern and Western Ukraine was broken. Poland reconquered Volyn' and Halychyna in July of 1919, Bukovyna became a part of Rumania in November of 1918, and Zakarpattja became a part of Czechoslovakia in April of 1919 (Wilson, 1997). By late 1920, the Bolsheviks controlled the rest of Ukraine, establishing the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This particular partitioning of Ukraine was to have profound implications for the development of separate identities within the various regions of today's Ukrainian territory.

This brief period of independence played an important part in historical myths propagated by nationalist groups later in the century. In fact, independence was so short-lived, and the Ukrainian government's hold on power was so tenuous, that there was little opportunity for the government to make any kind of mark with respect to social or political policy. But for elites in national movements, this period of independence was crucial for several reasons. First, as Hank Johnson noted, in passing on ideas of national culture, values, and history from one generation to the next, memories of independence can shape the ideas of future political generations. When independence has been denied for long periods of time, it becomes more difficult to pass the nationalist faith from one generation to the next (Johnson, 1992). Thus
national movement leaders had a more recent period of history to focus on than the Cossack era, the last period of Ukrainian independence. One example of the use of this date in history to try to mobilize support was the organization of the Great Human Chain (to be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four) in 1990. Rukh leaders organized a human chain linking L'viv to Kyiv, involving hundreds of thousands of participants, which commemorated the anniversary of Ukrainian independence in 1918 and the unification of Eastern and Western Ukraine. Rukh leaders utilized this historical memory to remind Eastern and Western Ukrainians of a relatively recent period when they were both unified and independent.

The fact that this brief moment of independence also coincided with the unification of Eastern and Western Ukraine is another reason why this period plays such an important role in historical memory. It has already been noted how Eastern and Western Ukraine have spent much more time divided than united, and a celebration of the reunification of the two regions in 1919 reminded Ukrainians that they did not have to think of themselves as Western or Eastern Ukrainians, and that their roots and identities were the same. This battle to downplay regional differences between East and West and make Ukrainians think of themselves as a single entity with one unique identity was one of the most difficult that Rukh leaders would face in their quest to mobilize support.

Finally, the decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to create sovereign Soviet republics (thus
officially dividing the territories of Ukraine and Russia), rather than incorporating the various conquered nations within the Russian Republic was to have enormous significance for future Ukrainian national movements. This decision was undertaken for two main reasons. First, by creating these republics, a buffer zone was put in place between Russia and Europe, whereby if an invasion came from the west, the Russian Republic would not be attacked first. The second reason had to do with the strength of the national movements that the Bolsheviks had experienced first hand in 1917-18 (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990).

d. The Evolution of Soviet Federalism

By creating nominally sovereign Soviet republics, the local Bolshevik parties could claim national freedom on the basis of recognized sovereignty, and undercut nationalist parties, which had been accusing the Bolsheviks of simply continuing the policy of czarist imperialism. Russian parties would not be installed by force as was done in February of 1918. Rather, the Red Army would encourage local Bolshevik parties to establish their own Soviet governments, which would be recognized as sovereign by Moscow. Red Army troops would thus be met as liberators and not oppressors, and the units could "render all possible support to the provisional Soviet governments in Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania, but of course, only to the Soviet governments (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, 24)." Utilizing this strategy, the central government could later say that these republics had their sovereignty recognized by Russia, proving that Russia did indeed support a nation's right to
self-determination. By 1920, Lenin basically regarded the republics as linked in a *de facto* federation. And even though the republics were ostensibly considered separate and sovereign, the Eighth Party Congress in 1919 implied that a unitary centralized Communist Party be established to direct all other parties: "All decisions of the RCP and its leading authorities are unconditionally binding on all parts of the Party, irrespective of their national composition (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, 25)." This system was the precursor to the even greater centralizing system that would develop in later years. In December 1922, the Ukrainian SSR formally became a part of the USSR, and on January 31, 1924, the definitive version of the Soviet constitution was confirmed by the Second Congress of the Soviets of the USSR.

Thus Ukraine was part of the Russian sphere of dominance again, albeit in a much different form than before. The Ukrainian national movement had ultimately failed, whereas movements in other countries in Eastern Europe, such as Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had succeeded. In Ukraine, movement leader failed to move fast enough on the issue of land reform to maintain support among the peasants in the countryside. As well, the ultimate failure of the movement showed that levels of national consciousness were still low, particularly in the cities and in most of Southern and Eastern Ukraine (Wilson, 1997). But although the Bolsheviks conquered Ukraine and incorporated it into the USSR, Ukraine did now have its own republican government and territory, albeit without certain Western Ukrainian provinces, and albeit within a
federation under tight control of Russia.

As will be seen later, the reality of the federation was such that the rights granted to the republics in the Soviet constitution (sovereignty, right to secession) existed on paper only, and these republics were to suffer more under Stalin than they had under any czar. As several analysts pointed out, however, the fact that Ukraine was part of a federation, and had its own territory with established borders, and a government apparatus was very significant:

The national-territorial principle [of the federation] gave formal status and political recognition to the leading groups and recognized their claim to a homeland. National statehood came into being. This national-territorial principle gave a sense of self-determination, a promise of autonomy, and a feeling of natural representation to the national minorities (Gleason, 1990, 33).

The promise of autonomy and self-determination would dissipate under Stalin, but the national-territorial principle was a significant factor in Ukraine's path to independence under Gorbachev.

V. KORENIZATSIIJA AND COLLECTIVIZATION

a. Korenizatsiya

Even though the Bolsheviks controlled Ukraine by 1922, Lenin was very aware that Communist Party support in Ukraine was still at a low level. In fact, only 23% of the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1922 were Ukrainian (Wilson, 1997). Therefore, a policy of korenizatsiya, or indigenization, was implemented by Moscow in
1923. This policy was meant to promote equal rights for the non-Russian nationalities. The government apparatus, for example, was to undergo a change whereby the indigenous population would administer the areas in which they lived, in the language of the area. This indigenization was both political and cultural in nature:

[Adopted resolutions] provided the nationalities with development, in their own languages, of courts, administrative and agricultural organisations, and local organs of government, by indigenous people, understanding the way of life and the psychology of the local population. They could also develop in their native languages, their own press, schools, theatres, and cultural and educational institutions. The schools would offer a general as well as a vocational education and courses would be devised for an accelerated training of native cadres (Olivier, 1990, 78).

These policies thus had the express purpose of gaining popularity for the Party in the Republics and increasing the efficiency of the Soviet bureaucracy within the Republics.

There were many difficulties in implementing korenizatsija, and results of the policy were very uneven across Ukraine. There was a good deal of progress with respect to national language and cultural development, and the development of an indigenous political cadre in Ukraine. For example, by 1929, over 80% of general education schools, 55% of vocational schools, and 30% of university level institutes offered instruction solely in Ukrainian, and overall, 97% of Ukrainian children were taught in Ukrainian (Subtelny, 1994a). There were also great strides made in increasing literacy in Ukraine, raising literacy rates in Ukrainian cities from 40% at the time of the revolution to 70% a decade
later, and in rural Ukraine, raising the rate from 15% to 50%. Most significantly, this education was taking place in Ukrainian, not Russian (Subtelny, 1994a).

Administrative reform offered new possibilities for occupational social mobility of the Ukrainian rural intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia. A new working class was being created in the cities, and for the first time the majority of the new recruits were Ukrainian. As well, by the end of the 1920s, three quarters of the peasantry had been organized into cooperatives, whose leadership was almost entirely in Ukrainian hands (Krawchenko, 1985).

In terms of the government bureaucracy, the use of Ukrainian language was promoted within the Party, and while in 1922 only 20% of government business was conducted in Ukrainian, five years later 70% of business was conducted in Ukrainian. In addition, more ethnic Ukrainians were being employed by the government and were also becoming members of the Communist Party. In 1923, 35% of government employees and 23% of Party members were Ukrainian, but by 1927, the figures had risen to 54% and 52% respectively (Subtelny, 1994a). It should be noted, however, that ethnic Ukrainian representation was most prominent in lower levels of the bureaucracy and the Party. For example, only 25% of the Communist Central Committee was Ukrainian (Subtelny, 1994a).

b. Stalin and the Subjugation of the Nationalities

But conservatives in Moscow and Ukraine began to feel that the policy was too successful in some respects, actually fostering the
growth of nationalism. As such, once Stalin had solidified his leadership position, the indigenization policies ended, and indeed were reversed (Wilson, 1997). As well, by 1929-1930, new objectives of collectivisation, increased industrialization, and national economic planning were felt to require a greater concentration of power at the all-Union level, and Stalin moved ruthlessly and quickly to force the republics and nationalities into line with his new policies (Olivier, 1990). Local elites were criticized as exhibiting local nationalism and were soon persecuted. These included former members of non-Soviet governments, former members of non-Communist parties, Bolsheviks who had previously belonged to other parties, and finally any Bolsheviks guilty of such criminal acts as "national deviation." Almost all of the leaders of non-Russian republics lost their lives. In Ukraine, of 102 members of the Ukrainian Central Committee in the 1920s, only three lived to take part in the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1938 (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). The party ranks, mostly made up of those who worked within the Soviet system but tried to maintain the national rights ascribed to the national minorities in the constitution and by Stalin himself, were thus decimated, and those who were left had to follow the Stalin line. Indigenization was indeed over, as most of those party leaders replacing the previous leadership in the republics were again Russian (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990).

Mass persecution also occurred via the policy of collectivization. According to this policy, land was appropriated by the state to form collective farms, and the rural population
would work on these farms. Opposition to this policy was especially fierce in the Ukrainian countryside, particularly among the class of peasants known as kulaks, peasants who were more well off and owned land. In fact, part of the policy of collectivization was known as dekulakization. The most severe aspect of dekulakization was the state imposed man-made famine in 1932-33, where six million Ukrainians lost their lives, and the kulaks were eliminated as a class (Krawchenko, 1985). This famine had the same kind of effect on the national consciousness of Ukraine as the Holocaust did on the Jewish national consciousness; it was to become a symbol of the Soviet oppression of Ukrainians. Along with the destruction of the political elite and the elimination of the kulaks came a policy of Russification and the destruction of the cultural elite. Among the prime targets were members of the cultural intelligentsia, including writers, literary scholars, engineers, and professors, most of whom were charged with various crimes having to do with nationalism. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were killed, imprisoned or exiled as a result of these policies (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990).

The purges wiped out an entire generation of cultural and political leaders who had championed national causes, creating a leadership vacuum that would take decades to fill. In addition, because the prospect of supporting nationalist sentiment held the potential for prison or death, participation in nationalist causes

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was obviously very low. Personal liberty was virtually non-existent, national languages and cultures were being destroyed through Russification, and the centralized party gave virtually no representation or power over local decision-making of any sort to the republics. These deficiencies would never be fully corrected and nationalist leaders would focus on these grievances once Stalin passed away, and would come into particular focus during the Gorbachev era.

To try and downplay the effects of the tragedies suffered by Ukraine and other republics under Stalin, during the 1930s and 1940s Soviet historians, rehabilitated the Russian-centred historical narrative of imperialist Russia, whereby according to the slogan "friendship of peoples", Russians were the older brothers of the rest of the peoples. Ukrainian official history was treated as a much less important endeavour than Russian history, and incidents and personages in Ukrainian history were often downplayed, distorted, or ignored (von Hagen, 1995). It is again interesting to note that the processes discussed above were all examples of social construction, an attempt by Soviet leaders at forming a new social identity and reality for those living in the USSR, that of the Soviet people (Sovjetskyj narod). As Viktor Stepanenko described: "The Sovietness itself was a grandiose project of constructing a new artificial social identity which was intended to overcome all traditional national and cultural meanings (Stepanenko, 1995, 13)." This process of creating a Soviet identity was largely successful, as after seventy years of Soviet rule, a
great many people in Ukraine identified themselves as Soviets first, rather than Ukrainians, even after Ukraine became independent (Stepanenko, 1995).

c. Korenizatsija and Collectivization as Part of Historical Memory

Within the fifteen year time frame that we have just examined, the policies of korenizatsija on the one hand, and the policies of collectivization and dekulakization on the other hand were both to become a part of historical memory to be used by national movement leaders in the future. The policy of korenizatsija was seen as fostering a cultural revival in Ukraine. Along with the advances in education and administrative and political reform, the 1920s witnessed an outpouring of creative energy that was to produce a variety of internationally known artists. For example Mykola Kulish became a renowned playwright through such works as Myna Myzailo and Patetynka Sonata. Oleksander Dovzhenko's films Arsenal and Zemlia also received international acclaim. The advances made in Ukrainian language, education, and culture all showed the potential that the Soviet system had in fostering the growth and development of the ethnic minorities of the Soviet Union when Party leaders so desired, a culture that celebrated the ability of Ukrainians to write, speak, learn and create in the language of their ancestors (Subtelny, 1994a).

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6 It must be noted here that reference to the 1920s as a golden age by nationalist leaders culminated in the 1960s and 1970s. As will be seen later, Ivan Dzjuba's Internationalism or Russification highlighted the idea that korenizatsija fostered the development of the Ukrainian language and culture, and that the policies of Stalin that destroyed the languages and cultures of...
On the other hand, as noted, the artificial famine of 1932-33 took on mythological proportions. Soviet historians and apologists tried to either downplay the effects of the famine or deny that the famine ever took place. But by the time that Gorbachev's reforms were taking place and some of the worst excesses of Stalin's regime were being exposed, the true extent of the famine was finally becoming public knowledge, fifty years after the fact. The famine was used by Rukh leaders as evidence of the worst excesses of the Communist system, of the need of Ukraine to attain sovereignty (or independence) so people living on Ukrainian territory would not again suffer such atrocities, and of the need to put decisions that affected Ukrainians in the hands of Ukrainians.

VI. WORLD WAR II AND THE AMPLIFICATION OF REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

a. Western Ukraine between the Wars

As we noted earlier, the partitioning of Ukraine following WWI greatly exacerbated existing differences between Western and Eastern Ukraine, and was the source of a great deal of tension for Rukh strategists in trying to unite supporters from all regions of the republic. Although the provinces in Western Ukraine were

minorities in the USSR were deviations from the earlier policies of Lenin that led to the Ukrainian renaissance in the 1920s. Dzjuba argued that a return to Leninist policies and away from Great Russian chauvinism would mean that languages and cultures could be preserved within the socialist framework. By the time of the formation of Rukh (and particularly by 1990), there was less emphasis on the successes of korenizatsija, as so many of the groups that were a part of Rukh had anti-Party sentiments and were looking to reform the entire system. The focus of these groups thus became the failures of the Party as opposed to the successes.
partitioned between three countries that dealt with Ukrainians in different ways, it is still possible to refer to these provinces as making up a single entity, in that they were not under Soviet rule, and thus escaped the worst excesses of the Stalin era (Himka, 1994). This is not to say that Ukrainian nationalist sentiment was not suppressed in these provinces in the interwar years. Both the Rumanian and Polish states reworked administrative-territorial boundaries so as to integrate and assimilate Ukrainian territories (going so far as to eliminate the name of Halychyna from Polish official language). Land reform favoured Rumanian and Polish colonists over Ukrainian peasants. The Ukrainian school system was replaced with a bilingual school system where Polish or Rumanian was favoured over Ukrainian. Only members of the state nationality were hired to the national civil service. As well, the Polish government tried to weaken the Ukrainian national character in the churches in Western Ukraine, forcibly converting or destroying hundreds of Orthodox churches in the Kholm, Volyn' and Polissja regions (Himka, 1994).

It is interesting to note that Western Ukraine followed the same pattern of behaviour as much of the rest of Europe in the

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7 The treatment under Czechoslovakia was quite different. Although Ukrainians did not get the autonomy in Transcarpathia and the Subcarpathian region that they were promised, they were treated better by the Czechs than by any other occupying country. Ukrainians in Transcarpathia actually caught up to other areas of Western Ukraine in the areas of education and culture, having been largely left behind because of harsh assimilatory policies under the Hungarians during the last half of the nineteenth century. For example, the number of schools that taught in the local language had increased from 34 in 1913 to 425 by 1931. As well, land reform favoured the Ukrainian peasants, and not the Czech or Slovak colonists (Himka, 1994).
1930s. There was an intense polarization between left and right, and the middle was occupied by weak moderate forces. In Western Ukraine, the policies of Poland and Rumania caused a great deal of frustration for Ukrainians, and there were many drastic and sometimes brutal policies in place that were meant to assimilate the Ukrainian population. However, the Ukrainian population avoided the type of annihilation put into place in Soviet Ukraine which completely eradicated the Ukrainian intelligentsia. As Himka noted, "This meant that the Ukrainian population of Poland and Romania was constantly insulted and constantly frustrated in its efforts, but never effectively broken (Himka, 1994, 353)."

This frustration meant that by the 1930s, moderate nationalist groups such as the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), which had been unsuccessful in improving local conditions for Ukrainians, were losing support to far right organizations, the most important of which was OUN, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Although many Western Ukrainian intellectuals were attracted to Communism, particularly in the late 1920s as the policies of indigenization and Ukrainization were coming to fruition in Soviet Ukraine, it was groups like OUN that were receiving growing popular support. The OUN's mentor was Dmytro Dontsov, a writer who called for a Ukrainian state that would be free of Russian, Polish and Jewish influence, a state that would not tolerate political opposition, and a state what would be achieved only through intense struggle (Wilson, 1997). The OUN's military wing carried out terrorist tactics against the Polish
occupiers and against Ukrainian moderate leaders. The harsher Polish policies against Ukrainians became, the more supporters groups like OUN received.

As Himka has noted, the rise of support for these radical right groups had both internal and external factors. Polish and Rumanian repression left Ukrainians politically frustrated, the Great Depression weakened them even more economically, and the popularity of the left wing option had been ruined by the excesses of Stalinism in Soviet Ukraine. As well, Ukrainians in this area felt betrayed by the western powers that had ignored Ukrainian aspirations for independence for those of other central European countries. As well, dictatorships were emerging all over the continent by the 1930s, and Ukrainian youth found themselves especially energized by the rise of Nazi Germany, which was calling for countries' borders to be redrawn with respect to ethnic principles, and calling for the post World War I settlement that Western Ukrainians hated, to be redrawn. The Nazis were also Anti-Communist, anti-Russian and anti-Polish (as well as anti-Semitic, a feature to which many were also attracted). The anti-Slavic bent of Naziism was generally ignored. Thus when WWII began, and particularly with the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, many Ukrainians in Western Ukraine saw an opportunity to establish a "Ukraine for the Ukrainians (Himka, 1994)."

b. The Legacy of World War II

As was the case in the post World War I period, the 1940s were a tumultuous, complex, and again, extremely confusing time for
As well, more than in perhaps any other era, this time period has been subject to a variety of different interpretations, in particular with respect to the OUN and its later military adjunct, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). As one historian has noted, "...a full and balanced history of these organisations still remains to be written. Until now, they have been rather a matter of legend - heroic to their supporters, villainous to their foes - rather than sober and scholarly appraisal (Kosyk, 1993, 24)." A journalist that was interviewed commented to me that books are being written and conferences are taking place all over Ukraine today, as newly released archives have become available, and the debate over the role of the OUN and UPA has been renewed following the Declaration of Ukrainian independence (Kobzar, 1995). This section of the chapter will attempt to outline why this time period has become so contentious, and why it became one of the most important symbols of the rift between Eastern and Western Ukraine.

First of all, before Germany invaded the USSR in 1941, the USSR temporarily annexed Halychyna and Volyn' in 1939, as part of the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Nazi-Soviet pact. Soviet rule in this area was quite harsh, and a variety of unpopular policies caused anti-Russian sentiment to rise, and Ukrainian nationalism came to the fore. Legal parties such as UNDO disappeared, but OUN

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8 More and more information about this period is being released from archives all over Eastern Europe. One of the best collections of archives concerning this time period is the Peter Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Ukraine at the Petro Jacyk Research Centre at Robarts Library at the University of Toronto.
survived. Thus by the time the Nazis invaded the USSR, many Ukrainians, both within OUN and without, looked upon the Germans as liberators. As such, the OUN had a long history of collaboration with German intelligence, and when Germany invaded, OUN units crossed the border with the German army.

This period of collaboration is still a focal point of debate, as some have argued that Ukraine collaborated with Germany simply to further its own nationalist cause and that these units would become quickly disillusioned with German policies, while others have accused OUN units of fully backing the Nazi war effort. There are probably elements of truth to both versions, as it will be seen that OUN acted against German wishes and was to fight against the Germans as well as the Soviets later in the war, but at the same time there were semi-autonomous Ukrainian divisions that fought for the Nazis throughout the war (Wilson, 1997).

The OUN(b) took advantage of the German invasion and victories in Western Ukraine to proclaim independence and the restoration of an independent Ukrainian state. Some have argued that OUN(b) did this with German support, but documents seem to show that, while

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9 OUN survived but in a split form. From February, 1940, there were two OUN's, named after their respective leaders. the OUN(b), led by Stepan Bandera, and the OUN(m), led by Andrij Melnyk. OUN(b) was much more radical and more committed to violent and direct action, while OUN(m) was more moderate and stronger in the emigre circles (Kosyk, 1993).

10 Questions about Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust have also been raised over the years. There is evidence that many Ukrainians participated in the L'viv pogroms of 1941, and that many Ukrainians worked in concentration camps and assisted in the deportation of Jews throughout the war. There is also evidence, however, that many Ukrainians tried to protect their Jewish neighbours when possible. The most famous example would have been Metropolitan Sheptyskyj of the Catholic Church (Wilson, 1997).
OUN(b) was ready to cooperate with Germany against Soviet Russia on the condition that the Germans recognize an independent and sovereign Ukraine, the actual declaration on June 30, 1941, took place without the knowledge or approval of the Germans (Kosyk, 1993). As a result, the Germans arrested OUN(b) leaders Bandera and Jaroslav Stesko one week after the proclamation, and demanded they recant their declaration, which they refused to do. With the arrest of its more radical leaders, OUN(b) took a more moderate turn, and replaced its fascist rhetoric with more democratic ideas, including the equal treatment of all citizens of Ukraine, whatever their ethnicity. As it was becoming apparent the Germans were not going to liberate Ukraine any more than the USSR in 1943, the OUN(b) declared itself in opposition to the Germans and the Soviets, and committed itself to fighting on both fronts (Wilson, 1997). To aid in the struggle against these two forces, OUN leadership called for the various irregular army groups to combine forces as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a military organization that was to grow in popularity towards the end of WWII and beyond.

The UPA was particularly popular in Western Ukraine, where at its peak it had perhaps 100,000 fighting members. UPA fought against both Germans and Soviets, but given that UPA fought mostly in the last part of the war when the Soviets were again advancing westwards, and still fought seriously against the Soviets even after the war (pockets of resistance continued until 1954) was over, it is not surprising that UPA has always been referred to in an extremely negative fashion in Soviet history books (Subtelny,
1994a). Moreover, over two million Ukrainians fought for the Red Army, and it is believed that up to thirteen million Ukrainians were lost to death or deportation during WWII (Sluzhynska, 1995). Given the continued emphasis by Soviet leaders on the importance of Soviet victory in the "Great Patriotic War", and considering that UPA was accused of holding a reign of terror over Ukrainians who cooperated with or were sympathetic towards the Soviet cause, again, it is not surprising that the antipathy to UPA in Eastern Ukraine has continued to this day. As will be seen in Chapters Three and Four, when nationalists in Western Ukraine began to rehabilitate the UPA and speak of OUN and especially UPA in positive terms, it can be readily understood why many in Eastern Ukraine feared a rise in nationalism, and why terms such as Banderite still carried such profound weight fifty years after the fact.

The final ironic result of the war was that Stalin succeeded where Ukrainian nationalists had failed, namely in uniting Eastern and Western Ukraine. Halychyna and Volyn' were seized in 1939 (and again in 1945), Bukovyna and northern Bessarabia in 1940, Transcarpathia was annexed in 1945, and finally Crimea became a part of Ukraine in 1954 (to mark the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Perejaslav) (Wilson, 1997). These territories were to undergo considerable repression under the Soviets in the next 50 years, but again, as with the formation of the Ukrainian SSR, the establishment of an expanded and united Ukrainian SSR had potential for creating a Ukrainian national consciousness that was to be
realized in the 1990s. Wilson expresses similar thoughts concerning the expansion of Ukraine and other development under Stalin as did Gleason earlier:

The establishment of the Ukrainian SSR created the first bounded territorial entity of the modern era with which Ukrainians could identify as their national homeland.... Moreover, although the Soviet system may have been federal in form more than in content, Ukraine was furnished with a whole accoutrement of national leaders, political institutions, state symbols, an Academy of Sciences, and so on. These served both as foci for popular identification and as incubators for a new... elite. Stalin's manoeuvrings to ensure that Ukraine became a founder member of the UN and kindred organisations also had the unintended side effect of providing important symbolic gains to underpin national sentiment (Wilson, 1997, 18).

Rogers Brubaker took this analysis one step further arguing that Soviet citizens were divided into set of over a hundred mutually exclusive ethnic nationalities. A person's identity was codified, from, birth, on the basis of ethnic descent, and this identity was registered in a person's personal documents. Brubaker thus concluded that: "...ethnic nationality served not only as a statistical category, a fundamental unit of social accounting, but also, and more distinctively, as an obligatory ascribed status (Brubaker, 1996, 18)." Ethnic nationality was at times used to either promote, or block, some nationalities from access to higher education and to certain jobs. Therefore "...territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality were pervasively institutionalized social and cultural forms (Ibid.)." However, the potential that existed for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state was not to come into fruition for many decades.
VII. ATTEMPTS AT RETRIEVING HISTORY

a. The Thaw and the Shestydesjatnyky

Following the death of Stalin in 1953, a thaw began to take place in the Soviet Union. In 1956, new leader Nikita Khrushchev delivered his secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow, where he denounced the excesses of Stalin. Republics were given more say in how their budgets were spent, particularly with respect to certain aspects of their local economies, and a number of industrial enterprises were taken over by the republics. In terms of language and literature, significant progress was also made by the non-Russian republics (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). Because negative sanctions by the state seem to have become more limited following Stalin's death, and because a generally more tolerant approach was being taken, some people began to be more willing to raise aloud concerns about certain state policies.

Rudolf Tokes divided this increasing dissent into four phases: 1) from 1946-1954 - the subversive militant phase; 2) from 1956-1964, the political counterculture; 3) from 1965-1971, the nationwide movement; and 4) from 1971-1975, retrenchment and ideological polarization (Tokes, 1975). The subversive militant phase was considered to be made up of various disaffected individuals and smaller groups who worked very much underground, such as Communist intellectuals, religious sects, and all their study circles (Tokes, 1975).[11] Although Tokes referred to this last phase as ending in 1975 when the article was published, we will see that this retrenchment was to continue until the Gorbachev era.
The last pockets of armed resistance in Western Ukraine were also eliminated in this period. The second phase began partly as a reaction to Soviet involvement in Hungary and Poland in 1956. Secret discussion groups among students were being formed, and samizdat (self-published) journals were being produced. In Ukraine, jurist Levko Lukjanenko led the formation of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (UWPU), a group that called for Ukrainian independence through the legal secession of the republic from the USSR. The UWPU called for change through peaceful means, as opposed to the OUN's violent means. The UPWU also represented a change in participation in the national movement, as the UPWU and future groups like it made up the intelligentsia, while OUN was made up of peasants. The leaders of this group were all arrested in 1961 (Wilson, 1997). The UPWU was the forerunner of groups that would make their appearance in the third stage, the Shestydesjatnyky (members of the sixties generation), members of the Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia whose roots lay in the Khrushchev thaw and All-Soviet dissident movement, as opposed to the influences of UPA and OUN (Wilson, 1997).

The third phase, that of a nationwide movement, coincided with the fall of Khrushchev and a wave of arrests all over the Soviet Union. Especially key was the Daniel and Sinjavskyj trial in 1965, which caused an outpouring of signed statements of protest by prominent individuals from various societal communities - cultural, scientific, political, and so on (Tokes, 1975). Previously passive elements of society became involved in this dissent, and new
leaders were appearing. At this stage there was a heightened awareness of common interests among those who were concerned about nationality issues and about the Soviet leadership in general, but there were as yet no formal associations organizing mass collective action. Thus Tokes' term 'nation-wide movement' is a bit misleading. The trend Tokes refers would be considered as a movement in the sense that dissent was becoming more widespread and systematic in republics all over the Soviet Union, rather than involving a few isolated individuals.

By 1970, elements of cultural opposition were becoming more widespread, and samizdat was becoming a network whereby uncensored material was regularly being produced and distributed. Discontent was growing among workers as well. There were reports of strikes and slowdowns at an automobile plant in Moscow at this time. Socialist groups such as the Russian Socialist Party in Leningrad and the Union of Independent Youth in the city of Vladimir appeared. In Ukraine, the United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine and the Ukrainian National Committee were organized in the L'viv region (Saunders, 1974).

It is important to note that even though there were some moves by the centre away from the worst aspects of Stalinism and towards a less harsh treatment of the republics, a variety of policies and slogans concerning the nationality question were still coming out of the ideology wing of the Party that supported the strengthening of the Soviet idea. For example, ideologists claimed that a process of "sliianie", or fusing together, of the nationalities was taking
It was argued that the Russian language was a 'mighty medium of communication', and that national narrow-mindedness was keeping the country from drawing together as close as it could be (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). Those nationalist leaders who attempted to question these policies and processes, and argued that the Soviet nationalities were distinct and deserved preservation faced harassment from the authorities.

Writers, poets and journalists such as Ivan Dzjuba, Ivan Drach and Vjacheslav Chornovil led a Ukrainian literary and poetic revival and campaigned against the processes of Russification going on in Ukraine, and particularly in Ukrainian schools. The most important document that appeared in this period in Ukraine was probably Ivan Dzjuba's *Internationalism or Russification?* which appeared in samizdat form in 1966. This document was of particular interest because Dzjuba critiqued Soviet policies of Russification from an Orthodox Marxist-Leninist perspective. Dzjuba was not calling for Ukrainian independence, but was criticizing 'Russian Great Power' chauvinism as being the main obstacle to socialist national construction, and was calling for the return of rights to the republics that already existed in the Soviet constitution.

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12 Of particular concern was a new education law proposed late in 1958 - Thesis 19 - where parents were to be allowed the right to choose to send their children to schools where the curriculum was taught in Russian or where it was taught in the national language. There would be no obligatory study of Russian in the native language schools, or the native language in the Russian schools. The problem was that since knowledge of Russian was seen as a gateway to science and higher learning, there was an implicit pressure for the parents to send their children to the Russian schools (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990).
### Table 1 The ethnic make-up of Ukrainian lands, 1897–1989 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ukrainian lands* means all territories that were eventually incorporated in the Ukrainian SSR by 1954.

### Table 2 Regional distribution of ethnic and ethno-linguistic groups in Ukraine in the early 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ethnic balance</th>
<th>Linguistic balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Ukrainian–Russian)</td>
<td>(Ukrainophone–Russophone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>93.0–5.3</td>
<td>95.0–5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>93.9–4.5</td>
<td>82.1–17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcarpathia*</td>
<td>78.4–4.0</td>
<td>73.6–26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>70.8–6.7</td>
<td>72.2–27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Bank</td>
<td>88.8–7.6</td>
<td>73.5–26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>79.7–15.6</td>
<td>45.8–54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bank</td>
<td>88.2–10.1</td>
<td>56.8–43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>59.3–36.1</td>
<td>13.4–86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>65.0–23.6</td>
<td>13.9–86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimeab</td>
<td>25.8–67.0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>72.7–22.1</td>
<td>43.4–56.6*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

* The figures for Transcarpathia did not allow for self-identification as Rusyns.

b Some 260,000 Crimean Tatars had returned to the peninsula by October 1993, lowering the Ukrainian percentage of the local population to 24 per cent and the Russian figure to 62 per cent. The figures for linguistic balance in Crimea are subsumed in the total for the south, but are between 4 per cent and 5 per cent Ukrainophone and around 82 per cent Russophone.

* Figures include Ukrainophone and Russophone 'others'.

Map 2  Russian Speakers in Soviet Ukraine, 1970  
(Source: Orest Subtelny. Ukraine: A History. P.522)
History provides one set of conditions or legacies affecting mobilization. The demographic makeup of the republic also impacts on the mobilization process. The charts on the previous page provide a demographic breakdown of the various regions of Ukraine, to further familiarize the reader with the differences between regions in terms of their ethnic makeup. The charts also show the growth in influence of the Russian minority in Ukraine through the Soviet era. The map on page 119 shows the extent to which Russification policies were successful throughout Ukraine, and also shows the extent to which the ethnic and linguistic balance between Ukrainian and Russian speakers in Western regions is so much different from the Eastern and Southern regions. As we see, virtually every urban centre in Eastern and Southern Ukraine has more than 50% of the population identifying themselves as Russian-speaking, while in Western Ukraine, less than 25% of the population living in urban centres describe themselves as Russian speaking.

The fact that Russian-speaking populations are so high in the urban centres show the success of Russification and the extent to which the education advances made under Ukrainianization in the 1920s had all but disappeared. Ivan Dzjuba argued that virtually all aspects of Party, economic life, and business administration were carried out in Russian. In terms of education, whereas in 1927, 75.9% of children in Ukrainian cities attended Ukrainian

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schools, in 1958, only 21% of Ukrainian children did so. As well, in certain Ukrainian cities such as Donetsk, Kharkiv and Odessa, Ukrainian schools were the exception not the norm (Dzjuba, 1968).

b. Retrenchment

The fourth phase began with a new wave of arrests all over the Soviet Union, and also coincided with the forced public recantation by Dzjuba of his work (in 1973) and the downfall of Ukrainian Party leader Petro Shelest, who had been accused of fostering local nationalism in Ukraine. Shelest was the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party from 1963-1972. In this time period the case of Shelest offered insight into nature of elite ethnopolitics in the Soviet Union. Several analysts have argued that he was more hard-line than the Moscow leaders of the time, and was certainly not a Ukrainian nationalist. But while suppressing any reformist tendencies that might potentially "infect" Ukraine (for example, economic and political reform such as that which occurred in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s), Shelest did seem to strongly defend Ukraine's interests within the Soviet Union, defending Ukraine's standing as an equal of all the other republics, including Russia (Subtelny, 1994a). As such, Shelest argued that Ukraine should receive the same amount of goods and resources from the USSR that it produced. Also, as befitting its stature as an equal partner within the USSR, he supported and defended Ukrainian linguistic and cultural rights. Shelest was removed from his post in 1972, accused of being too soft on Ukrainian nationalists. He was replaced by his chief rival Volodymyr Shcherbytskyj (Ibid.).
This phase continued throughout the Brezhnev era and included a final wave of arrests in the late 1970s that virtually silenced public dissent. It should be noted here that under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, a strong cadre of indigenous Ukrainian elites had reestablished itself, a cadre that had become strongly dependent on the CPSU for its position of power, meaning that it was in their interests to dissuade national movements (and their elites) from gaining power. As Roeder explained, the central Soviet state would keep the nationality question from becoming an issue by:

(1) creating within each ethnic homeland an indigenous cadre assigned a monopoly over the mobilizational resources of the community, (2) constraining the behaviour of this new ethnic cadre by creating an incentive structure that deterred the expression of unsanctioned... ethnic agendas, and (3) assigning the cadre the responsibility for creating an ethnically distinct stratification system within official institutions and for impeding the emergence of alternative ethnic entrepreneurs outside these institutions (Roeder, 1991, 203).

This new version of korenizatsija was eventually very successful in Ukraine for Moscow. For although Shelest was eventually arrested, the next generation of leadership under Shcherbitskyj (even though he was of Ukrainian ethnic descent), was extremely aggressive in its repression of Ukrainian nationalism. As one of Rukh's leaders was to remark, the leadership was "more Catholic than the pope."

One of the only organized groups in the late 1970s was the Ukrainian Helsinki Group which formed in 1976 and existed until 1981. This group documented human rights and national rights transgressions by the Soviet government in violation of the Helsinki Accords which the Soviet government had signed in 1976.
However, the group had a very small membership and most were arrested by the end of the decade (the Helsinki Group and its leaders will be discussed in more detail in future chapters). These groups and leaders that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were very important, as they would come to play a crucial role in forming and leading nationalist groups in the 1980s.

This phase of retrenchment, with strong repression of nationalist sentiment, particularly in Ukraine, lasted throughout Brezhnev's tenure. Soviet ideologists claimed that national differences in the Soviet Union were disappearing, and that the process of 'sliianie' was giving way to the creation of a people with a new identity, the 'Sovietskyj Narod' (The Soviet People). As Brezhnev noted in one of his speeches:

The formation of a historically new social and international community - the Soviet people - has become an important characteristic of developed socialism in our country, an indication of the growing homogeneity of Soviet society and the triumph of the nationalities policy of the CPSU. This means that the common features of Soviet people's behaviour, character and world view which do not depend on social and national distinctions are gradually assuming decisive importance in our country (Connor, 1984, 404).

Following Brezhnev's death, nationalist sentiment continued to be repressed under the short reigns of his successors Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Andropov, when he was general Secretary of the CPSU, stated: "Comrades, in summing up what has been accomplished, we naturally give most of our attention to what still remains to be done. Our end goal is clear. It... is not only to bring the nations closer together but to fuse them.... On no account must there be either any forestalling of events or any
holding back of processes that have already matured (Connor, 1984, 407)." Chernenko added that the USSR represented the optimum state form for the cohesion of Soviet nations and ethnic groups in order to attain the program goals of the Party (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). This was the legacy left to Mikhail Gorbachev, the next leader of the CPSU.

This chapter has attempted to provide a foundation for understanding the events that would take place in the Gorbachev era. This section suggests the following conclusions. Only through looking at flashpoints of Ukrainian history that have become the stuff of myth can one understand the difficulties that a movement such as Rukh had in trying to develop strategies and create an identity that would strike a resonant chord in all parts of Ukraine. Rukh leaders would try to focus on historical memories of an independent Ukraine in the Cossack era and in 1918 to remind Ukrainians of all regions that there was a historical legacy of East and West being united within a unique Ukrainian entity. In addition, conflicting historical memory with respect to World War II in particular made the use of certain symbols and rhetoric by Rukh more tricky in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. This meant that different strategies would be used by Rukh in trying to mobilize support in these regions. As well, extensive effort would have to be made by Rukh in educating people in the East and South about what the symbols used in the West really meant, and to show that the interests and identity of Ukrainians living in the East and West were in fact the same.
This chapter has also shown, that in looking through myth at the concrete events described, other factors such as partitioning, delays in urbanization and modernization, and Russification have led to varying rates of national identity development. We have also identified how the federal nature of the Soviet state and the national-territorial boundaries and infrastructure that were created via the USSR provided the potential institutional base for a national movement to develop and flourish.

In addition, we have seen how a new generation of leaders emerged in the 1960s, and how a new and influential cultural intelligentsia was blooming. Although the repression in the 1970s eliminated public dissent, these leaders would play a crucial role in reviving the national movement in the 1980s, and the cultural (and in particular, the literary) intelligentsia was to play perhaps the most important role in instigating the creation of Rukh, a nation-wide movement that would support the processes of change in the Soviet Union. Finally, we have also seen the types of grievances that had evolved throughout the life of the Soviet Union: overcentralization of decision-making in Moscow, cultural policies that were destroying national languages and cultures, and of course mass human and national rights abuses, including policies of genocide, that had taken place over the years. We will now move to the Gorbachev era and begin our examination of Rukh.
CHAPTER THREE

THE EMERGENCE OF RUKH

Following our presentation of the theoretical framework and our discussion concerning historical factors that have led to the evolution of a weak national identity and strong regional differences, we can begin our analysis of the Ukrainian national movement Rukh from the time of its inception, 1989, to its demise as a movement in 1992. But how best to analyze the development of a social movement like Rukh?

Until the 1970s, social movement research was dominated by theory focused on the micro-level of analysis, that is, social-psychological theories of social movements. Why were people attracted to social movements? Among explanations given were: personality traits, marginality and alienation, and grievances and ideology (Klandermans, 1984). The rapid growth of social movement activity in Europe and the US in the 1960s and 1970s showed that these traditional conceptions had certain deficiencies. Involvement in student, civil rights, environmental and other movements did not necessarily occur because of marginality or alienation. Also, the importance of grievances, ideology and various personality traits with respect to social movements were shown to be ambiguous (Klandermans, 1984). The growing number of critiques of this approach led to a shift in focus from the micro level to the macro political and structural level of discussion. In the US, the primary theoretical perspective to emerge was resource mobilization theory (RMT) and in Europe, the various approaches came to be
grouped under new social movement theory (NSM).

But as McAdam notes, there is still a need to look at both micro and macro levels of analysis to understand better the complexities of collective action:

Movements may occur in a broad macro context, but their actual development clearly depends on a series of more specific dynamics operating at the micro level. Just as clearly, these micro dynamics must be seen against the larger political-economic context in which they occur if we are to fully understand the timing and specific form they take (McAdam, 1988, 127).

I. INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURAL FACTORS

The question of determining what is micro and what is macro is a difficult one to deal with. In looking at how macro structural factors have affected the mobilization of participants into social movements in Ukraine, how 'macro' do we go? If we look at the case of Ukraine and the Soviet Union, we will see that political and economic decision-making was so centralized, that the policies of perestroika, glasnost' and democratization that Gorbachev would put into place had an enormous impact on institutions of all sorts (both on the all-Union institutions and the republican ones, including Ukraine) which then affected individual behaviour.

For the purposes of this dissertation, we will utilize the historical institutional literature to define the appropriate level of macro analysis. Steinmo and Thelen argue that historical institutionalism "represents an attempt to illuminate how political struggles "are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place" (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992, 2)." They also note that in
defining the institutions to be studied, one would include the rules of the electoral process, the relations among branches of government, the organization of societal actors such as unions, etc. As Steinmo and Thelen conclude, historical institutionalism works at a middle range, looking at the institutional arrangements that structure relations between state and society.

Steinmo and Thelen also refer to "institutional dynamism", the process through which institutions affect politics, and also the process where the broader political context mediates institutions. Examples of institutional dynamism are changes in the political context that can produce a situation where institutions that lay dormant suddenly become significant. Another source of dynamism is a situation where old institutions find themselves in a position of playing new roles. In addition, old actors in old institutions can adopt new goals to deal with new political realities. The types of institutional dynamism that are referred to above are all in evidence in the Ukrainian case.

Perestroika changed the way the bureaucracy was run, democratization changed the electoral system (allowing more than the chosen Communist candidate to stand for election), and glasnost' opened up the media. All these changes had tremendous ramifications on events that were to take place in the Soviet Union. The old federal system of government in the USSR and the accompanying constitution, which had previously proven to be of minimal utility in representing republican interests (although, as argued in Chapter One, republican cadres had become somewhat more
assertive in defending their interests under Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's tenures of power) would, in the space of a few years, prove to be a major factor in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Republics began to declare rights that were embedded in the constitution, and the government infrastructure and republic bureaucracies that had been created to work towards following the needs of Moscow began to establish and fight for their own needs against Moscow. In other words, ethnic politics was evolving from ethnofederalism to ethnonationalism.

In the case of Ukraine, it will be seen that former Communist Ideology Chief Leonid Kravchuk would utilize the existing Ukrainian government infrastructure to create a more sovereign Ukrainian Republic, developing its own currency, army, and foreign relations, and would eventually lead Ukraine to independence. Institutional characteristics of the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine's seat in the United Nations, which had previously been little more than an extra vote for Soviet interests, would be used as a way of asserting Ukrainian independence and making foreign contacts, bypassing Moscow.

The changes in the electoral system had a profound effect on centre-republic relations, on relations of actors within the Communist Party, and on societal actors as well. With the Party allowing multi-candidate elections, republican Communist Parties found themselves having to change strategies in order to retain some popular support, which also strained relations between the Communist Parties of the republics and the all-Union Communist
Party. In addition, these changes meant that societal actors could become more involved, either participating directly by joining other movements or parties, or more indirectly just by having a choice in the voting process. Moreover, old institutions took on new roles with the new political processes. In Ukraine for example, the Ukrainian Writers' Union played one of the main roles in leading the formation of the Ukrainian national movement.

Overall "by placing the structuring factors at the center of the analysis, an institutional approach allows the theorist to capture the complexity of real political situations, but not at the expense of theoretical clarity (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992, 13)." Thus, in the case we are going to examine, we will see the complexity of the Soviet situation, and how Party policies changed political institutions, relations between institutions, and state-society relations. Ultimately we will see how the interplay of all these variables affected the creation, development and demise of the national movement we are going to study.

II. THE PRE-HISTORY OF RUKH: STRUCTURAL TRIGGERS

a. The Evolution of Perestroika and Glasnost'

Before Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power, there was little evidence that the nationalities question and republican issues and grievances were a priority in his mind. He was the first Soviet leader whose political career did not include a period in a non-Russian republic. As such, he came to power relatively ill-prepared
to deal with the nationalities question, and early speeches contained only the usual platitudes on the subject (Lapidus, 1989). During his career in Stavropol in the North Caucasus, he made speeches concerning "friendship of peoples." As the Central Committee Secretary of Agriculture, Gorbachev delivered a speech in Lithuania on the fortieth anniversary of Lithuania's annexation to the Soviet Union entitled "Friendship of the USSR Peoples - an Invaluable Achievement." These early speeches showed evidence of following the official line and expressing an optimism towards the Soviet 'solution' to the question (Motyl, 1989). On May 8, 1985, shortly after being appointed General Secretary of the CPSU, Gorbachev stated: "The blossoming of nations and nationalities is organically connected to their all-round drawing together. Into the consciousness and heart of every person there has deeply entered the feeling of belonging to a single family - the Soviet people, a new and historically unprecedented social and international community (Ibid., 157)." Speeches such as these, basically repeating the party line as delivered by Brezhnev, showed Gorbachev's complacency in this area.

By the time the 27th Party Congress was convened in February 1986, Gorbachev's overall direction of policy-making was becoming clearer. The main focus had to do with an acceleration of economic growth. As his thinking and policy-making developed, Gorbachev's concept of perestroika evolved:

Perestroika is the all-round intensification of the Soviet economy, the revival and development of the principles of democratic centralism in running the national economy, the universal introduction of economic
methods, the reconciliation of management by injunction and by administrative methods, and the overall encouragement of innovation and socialist enterprise (Gorbachev, 1988, 21).

Together with perestroika, Gorbachev also used terminology such as intensification, uskoreniie (hurrying up), and discipline in hoping to get the economy growing faster and to get improvements in production and management. Bureaucratic reform was also a key element of perestroika (Goldman, 1992).

By the time Gorbachev was in power, the Soviet bureaucracy had become huge, bloated, and inefficient. There were more than 100 central ministries and another 800 in the republics, and the bureaucracy was able to dictate its will on the general population, bypassing the will of soviets and other elected bodies (White, 1990). Two sets of rules were followed by the bureaucracy. The first set had to do with providing "sound ideological slogans" that would provide the theoretical base for its activity. The second had to do with rules aimed at maintaining and strengthening their positions and interests (Hazan, 1990). Thus several reforms were put forward, shifting the emphasis from an excessively centralized system of management relying on orders from the centre, to a more decentralized and democratic system, in which associations and enterprises would have more independence and authority. These bodies would move to become more self-financing and self-accounting, and the work collective would be responsible for both efficient management and the final product (Gorbachev, 1988).

Gorbachev stated that one of the major problems with the Soviet economy was that the political system had some major
shortcomings that were hampering such sectors of the economy as housing, food supply, and transport. Moreover, the principle of collective leadership in the party had been violated, as leaders seemed to be above criticism, and were at times at the centre of criminal activities (White, 1990). As such, Gorbachev promoted the policy of glasnost', to be used primarily to expose corruption and wasteful leadership. By promoting glasnost' Gorbachev hoped to get people to vent their frustrations with the Soviet bureaucracy openly. It was believed that criticism from below would lead to changes in the bureaucracy. With support coming from below, changes made to the bureaucracy from above would then be enforced, and there would be even more pressure on a bureaucracy attempting to maintain all its privileges and power to implement the desired changes (Braun and Day, 1990).

Throughout 1985, glasnost' was seen as well-suited to exposing corruption, as ordinary people and the media began to criticize corrupt local officials. But as the bureaucracy fought back, and as local party officials began to harass local media or local citizens who criticized them, Gorbachev began to believe that the policy of glasnost' had to increase in scope. At the 1986 Party Congress, Gorbachev called for criticism of certain subjects that had previously been off limits, but the policy had definite boundaries, and was still meant to deal more with exposing corrupt officials (Goldman, 1992).

By 1987, however, Gorbachev began to loosen the restraints on glasnost', and developed the slogans of democratization and
"socialist pluralism" as well. In February, 1987, Gorbachev met with heads of the mass media and insisted that: "There must be no forgotten names, no blank spaces, either in history or in literature (Goldman, 1992, 102)." Glasnost' came to represent a gradual decrease in censorship, increased permission to discuss previously taboo topics, and the abandonment of an obligatory "general line" that must be followed meant that there was a potential for a freedom of expression in the USSR that had not been seen since the 1920s (Melville and Lapidus, 1995). As a part of this policy of glasnost', democratization was also promoted.

Gorbachev first used the term democratization in a public forum in September 1986, when he stated that "perestroika would be more dynamic if we focused greater attention on the question of expanding democratization in our society (Goldman, 1992, 103)." One part of democratization included the call for multi-party elections and a secret ballot (although these elections did not go as far as the republican or party secretary level) (Goldman, 1992). In addition, as the political system came to be more and more open to diversity, an increasing number of grassroots organizations began to form.

Finally, in June 1987, following a Central Committee Plenum, Gorbachev called for the adoption of a policy of "socialist pluralism". Even though the word socialist was placed before pluralism, meaning there were still limits as to what could be printed, there was also a new legitimacy provided for political debate and a diversity of opinion on political and social issues
in Soviet publications (Brown, 1991). In 1988, in the resolution on glasnost' passed at the party conference, a positive reference was made concerning the "socialist pluralism of opinions", a victory for reformist forces. Acknowledging that the Party was not the only source of truth meant that the door was open for a pluralism of opinions. This meant, especially taken together with glasnost' and democratization, that there were major new opportunities to challenge old myths and develop new ideas (Melville and Lapidus, 1995).

b. Glasnost' and the Mass Media

An important aspect of glasnost' and democratization and socialist pluralism was an allowance of greater openness in the media. Before these policies were developed, the Communist Party controlled the mass media, printing and broadcasting those views and those issues which it felt were in the Party's interest. With glasnost', however, Gorbachev hoped that a more open media would allow for a wider public debate of certain issues, in particular those mentioned above (support for perestroika from below, reforming the bureaucracy).

Gorbachev envisioned a more open mass media as playing a supporting role in perestroika. He still meant for the Party to stand at the centre of public affairs in every sphere of life. Although there was to be a discussion of both the good and bad in society, the Party was to know all and would improve those aspects that needed it. Finally, all aspects of the mass media, "the most representative and massive rostrum of glasnost", were to deal with
new topics, moving from being a forum for monologue to one of dialogue (Gorbachev, 1988). A journalist from Kirovohrad who was interviewed explained to me how the policies affected his job:

In Kirovohrad there was an increase in community involvement with Gorbachev's reforms. I was a journalist working for a youth newspaper, which had editions in every oblast'. The people working there weren't necessarily young, but not old either. We really felt alive. Suddenly there was the possibility of really writing about things and of talking about everything. We began writing about various issues. For example, I wrote about people who died in the famine, and others wrote about other moral issues (Kobzar, 1995).

Although Gorbachev meant the Party to play the leading role in making the necessary changes to improve various spheres of public life, the policy of glasnost' actually sowed the seeds of the death of the Party. For example, one of the main debates that would take place would be the ultimate role of the Party in state and society. The Party would of course eventually lose this particular battle, along with many others. A variety of issues were brought into media discourse that the Soviet leaders would rather have avoided. But once this process of openness started, it was difficult to control.

William Gamson argued that:

[...U]nderstanding the nature of media discourse and how it changes over time is crucial to understanding how mobilization potential is formed and activated. Media discourse, then, is one part of a larger issue culture, both reflecting it and helping to create it (Gamson, 1986, 224).

This is particularly true in the Soviet (including Ukrainian) case. The new openness of the mass media provided a forum for a more

1 Personal Interview with Volodymyr Kobzar, journalist. Kyiv, July 2, 1995. All references to this interview are indicated by (Kobzar. 1995).
frank discussion of political and societal issues and ultimately
led to a tremendous reformation of the Soviet political system. In
addition, the very fact that the mass media were showing signs of
offering divergent viewpoints and discussion of previously
unallowed topics, was an important signal in itself that changes
were occurring in Soviet society. New voices were being heard. This
openness in media discourse, taken together with the more liberal
version of glasnost' were to have profound effects on the emergence
of reformist and nationalist groups all over the Soviet Union,
including Ukraine.

c. The Growth of Societal Organizations in the USSR

With the advent of glasnost', came a proliferation of
voluntary associations appearing, ranging from philanthropic
foundations to hiking clubs. This was tolerated and at times
couraged by the state. In fact some of these associations were
incorporated into the institutional framework of the state (Colton,
1990). By December, 1987, it was estimated that about 30,000
unofficial grassroots organizations had come into being.

However, many of the groups forming became more controversial
in nature. Some groups represented veterans of the war in
Afghanistan. Others based their formation on environmental,
cultural, and religious issues. By 1988, for example, 1610
religious associations were registered in the Soviet Union,
including the Russian Orthodox, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim and

2 From now on, all references to glasnost' will refer to the more liberalized policy that
Gorbachev supported in 1987, unless otherwise noted.
Pentecostal faiths (Bonnell, 1991). Finally, many groups began to articulate nationality issues, issues that would have brought prison sentences only a few years before to those people openly discussing them. These nationality issues were not only brought forth by the Baltic republics (which forcibly became a part of the Soviet Union in 1940 and still had very distinct national identities), and central Asian republics (consisting of peoples of a very different ethnic and religious background than Russia), but also by republics such as Byelorussia, which had previously been dismissed as not having a distinct ethnic identity. These nationality issues emerged in Ukraine as well. We begin our discussion of Ukraine with the emergence of the first informal organizations that were to eventually form the pillars of support for Rukh.

d. The Formation of Civil Rights and Human Rights Groups

A typology of groups that came to form Rukh has not yet been developed in the literature of this area of study. In an extensive interview, former student leader and present Minister for Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Ivan Zajets', suggested that, broadly speaking, the Ukrainian nationalist movement can be described as having three main pillars of support (Zajets', 1995). The first pillar was the civil rights and human rights groups (Pravozakhysnyky); the second pillar - 

3 Personal interview with Ivan Zajets'. Minister of Relations with C.I.S. nations. member of Rukh Party; Kyiv, July 11. 1995. All references to this interview will be indicated by (Zajets', 1995).
organizations that formed around ecological and cultural issues, largely led by students and members of the teaching intelligentsia (teachers, professors, etc.). The third pillar of support would be the Writers' Union.

The civil and human rights groups were among the first to become organized. The most important and influential group within the first column of support was the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. The forerunner to this group was the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, established in 1976, and which essentially collapsed by 1981, following the arrests of most of its members. Many prominent dissidents from the 1970s returned to leadership roles in this transformed group during Gorbachev's tenure. Future political party leaders such as Levko Lukjanenko, Vjacheslav Chornovil and Mykhajlo Horyn played leading roles in the UKU.

As is suggested by the name, the 1970s version of the Helsinki monitoring group was set up to review and monitor the Soviet government's record with respect to human rights as required by the signing in August 1975 of the 'Final Act' of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation. From its inception, the Ukrainian monitoring group issued statements declaring that it considered human rights as inseparable from national rights, and that in Ukraine there were great violations of both sets of rights. Although many of its members were arrested and continually harassed through its four years of existence, the Helsinki monitoring group managed to issue many documents that laid out the violation of
human and national rights in Ukraine, and dealt with a wide number of religious and regional issues as well. Finally, the group also declared its support for an independent Ukraine (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). This group then, was not only a societal group (i.e., a group out to protect and/or represent a segment of society) but had political overtones as well. However, facing a very repressive regime, the political aspirations of this group went unfulfilled.

With the advent of perestroika and the release from prison and exile of many of its members, this group reemerged as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU). However, this version of the Helsinki group saw itself as more of a national rights group (and thus more overtly political) than as a human rights group. For the UHU leaders, it was a tenet of logic that if Ukraine's national rights would be protected, then each individual would be better off. As Lukjanenko explained: "the societal philosophy of the UHU relies on the fact that the fate of the individual citizen depends on a large part on the fate of the whole nation (Haran', 1991, 6)." The Union stressed that it was not a political party, and as such, in July of 1988 issued a 'Declaration of Principles', as opposed to a party platform. However, leaders saw the group's role as "an overall activation of the people, to create a mechanism for the participation of the nation in leading the state, and the eventual control of the state apparatus (Haran', 1993, 13)."

In fact, the Declaration of Principles issued by the UHU went much further than the demands of the Helsinki Group of the 1970s.
The UHU wanted the USSR transformed into a confederation of independent states, with perhaps an intermediate stage of a federation of sovereign democratic republics where there was maximum political, economic and cultural decentralization (Haran', 1993). It also stood for the Ukrainianization of education, the military and government, the development of a mixed economy, the legalization of banned religious groups, and KGB and judiciary reform (Kuzio, 1989). By 1989, the UHU had over 1,000 members (from a high of about 40 in the 1970's), and had regional branches in every oblast', although the highest concentration of members was in Western Ukraine.

The UHU was able to survive and indeed thrive in the Gorbachev era, despite its radical nature for two main reasons. First, in the eyes of the general population, this group had a certain legitimacy based on the past activity of its members. In the 1970s, in the face of brutal repression, the leaders of the UHU had all faced great hardship because of their membership in the Helsinki Group. The revitalized UHU was thus led by people who were seen as having made sacrifices and who were well respected for their sincerity and integrity. Second, in terms of the Soviet government, the UHU could not be repressed in the same way as previously, without inviting comparisons with the Brezhnev era system, from which Gorbachev was trying to distance himself. As well, the UHU took care to adhere to the principles of glasnost' and perestroika as set forth by Gorbachev. For example, before resuming publication of the human rights journal The Ukrainian Herald (which had existed from 1970-
1572), Vjacheslav Chornovil wrote an open letter to Gorbachev in August 1987 where he announced:

I am informing you that several Ukrainian journalists and writers, who are presently experiencing a ban on their works and within their profession, including myself, are legally reviving the publication of the sociopolitical and literary journal, The Ukrainian Herald... This journal wholly conforms to the present stipulations of glasnost' (Kuzio, 1989, 11).

Thus Gorbachev could not repress these types of groups without seeming to contradict his own policies.

e. The Proliferation of Youth, Cultural and Ecological Organizations

The second pillar was made up of groups that were represented by youth and the teaching intelligentsia. By 1989, with the policies of glasnost' and perestroika in place, according to a Ukrainian Komsomol survey, there were over 800 socio-political clubs operating in higher education circles in Ukraine. These included organizations for the protection and preservation of historical and cultural monuments, ecological clubs, cultural development organizations, and language societies (Kuzio, 1989). Some of the more significant groups included The Ukrainian Culturological Club, Spadshchyna (Heritage), Hromada (Society), The Lev Society, the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, and Memorial. Before providing an overview of the more significant of these groups, two of the major influences behind their emergence shall be discussed, namely, the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl', and

4 Chornovil later went on to say that the UHU was an alternative political organization to the Communist Party, and that the human rights part of their agenda was just a mask (Garjevskaja and Shapoval, 1991).
the rise of the popular fronts in the Baltics.

i. Chernobyl'

The first major event that triggered the growth of many of these groups was the explosion at a nuclear station in Chernobyl' in April, 1986. There was great anger at the Soviet central government for not informing people in the immediate areas of the great danger that existed because of the accident, and for being more concerned about the government's image than the well-being of its citizens. This accident brought into question the whole issue of "guaranteed safety" with respect to the nuclear program that the Soviet government had been espousing throughout the previous decade. This commitment had already been proven erroneous (Marples, 1968). This issue was especially important because central authorities were planning to construct five new nuclear stations in 1987-88. Moreover, as the health of many people living in the surrounding areas of Chernobyl' began to deteriorate, peoples' mistrust of the bureaucracy began to escalate. Marples has noted that "The authorities had become alienated from their own public; there was a credibility gap, nurtured by official secrecy about Chernobyl (Marples, 1991, 137)." Indeed, as Solchanyk concluded, for Ukrainians, "...Chernobyl' became identified with the duplicity and failure, indeed the complete bankruptcy, of the Soviet system as a whole. It also served to mobilize large masses of people against that system (Solchanyk, 1991g, 21)."

ii. Ecological and Cultural Organizations

The Chernobyl' nuclear accident provided the impetus for the
creation of hundreds of groups in Ukraine. Many of these groups were ecological groups. For example, Zelenyj Svit (Green World) was a major ecological association led by its chairman (who would later lead the formation of the Green Party in Ukraine), Jurij Shcherbak. Marples suggests that the credibility gap between what authorities were saying about the repercussions for peoples' health and welfare as a result of the nuclear accident, and the reality of what people were experiencing was the biggest catalyst behind the creation of Zelenyj Svit (Marples, 1991). This group spearheaded several successful protests against potentially environmentally hazardous projects in Ukraine. For example, in March 1990, work was halted on a huge chemical plant being built on the borders of the Rovno, Ternopol and Khmel'nytskyj oblasts after extended protests (Marples, 1990e). As well, construction of a radar site near Mukachiv in the Zakarpatskaja oblast' eventually ground to a halt after the local oblast' authorities joined the local population in opposition. In a more general sense, these ecological clubs formed the base of what was to become the national movement. In order to protect their homeland from being destroyed by "outsiders", a sovereign (later independent) Ukraine was the only solution to protecting the ecology on Ukrainian territory. During a wide-ranging interview, Ukrainian Environment Minister Jurij Kostenko added:

The ecological clubs were the first [groups] to have a national awareness, an awareness that independence and statehood could be achieved by concentrating on ecological issues. [These groups] would argue that events such as Chernobyl' would not happen in an independent Ukraine. These ecological organizations were the first
that were allowed to appear and make themselves heard, and meetings that would be held on ecological topics would often become forums for more political discussions and pronouncements. [In this way] the role of green organizations was great in the uniting of all the democratic forces (Kostenko, 1995).'

Moreover, Chernobyl' became a rallying cry for all kinds of groups, not just ecological.

At this time, a wide variety of groups formed that were concerned with the decreased use of Ukrainian in the country. Of these groups, the largest was the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society (TUM). As the first leader of TUM, Dmytro Pavlychko, noted, the 1958 school reform law, Thesis 19, had a disastrous effect on the use of Ukrainian. According to this law, as we noted in the previous chapter, parents were allowed to choose to send their children to schools where the curriculum was taught in Russian or where it was taught in the national language. But the implicit pressure on children to study Russian in order to be able to further their career prospects, as Pavlychko noted, meant that by 1978, only about 16% of schools in Ukrainian cities were Ukrainian language schools, and that about half of the republic's children were being taught in Russian schools (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). Pavlychko thus argued that the law was anti-democratic and hypocritical:

The right to choose the school language is only well suited for making sure that that language will not be the native language... behind this law are the conditions of life, and these conditions are organized in such a way that the need for

5 Personal Interview with Jurij Kostenko, Environment Minister and Rukh member; Kyiv. July 12, 1995. All references to this interview will be indicated by (Kostenko, 1995).
this or that national language no longer exists. (Ibid., 272)

It is interesting to note, as well, how Chernobyl' not only became a rallying point for various groups, but how the word "Chernobyl'" itself acquired a unique symbolism. For example, at the opening congress of the Shevchenko Language Society, the author Oles' Honchar referred to the Brezhnev-Suslov policies in Ukraine which spelled impending disaster for the Ukrainian language and culture, and spoke of a future "linguistic Chernobyl'" in Ukraine (Haran', 1993).

In the summer of 1988, the first oblast' organization of TUM was established. Analogous organizations (albeit with different names) appeared quickly all over Ukraine. For example, the club "Ridna Mova" (Mother Tongue) was established in Poltava, and the society in the name of D. Javornyts'koho was founded in Dnipropetrovsk. By December of 1988 representatives of these organizations gathered to create a national organization, and in November of the next year a national congress took place in Kyiv (Ibid.). This congress had delegates from all parts of Ukraine, and even had the "active support of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet" (Ibid., 26). The first head of TUM, Dmytro Pavlychko, and members of the Head Council of TUM, including Vitalij Donchyk, Ivan Zajets', V. Chervonyj, and others were all to become important figures in the creation and evolution of Rukh.

At this point it should be noted that these groups (and indeed 'pillars' that are being described here) were not totally
independent of each other and people were often members of many groups. For example, the Ukrainian Culturological Club, which was formed in 1987 in Kyiv, was more than just a group concerned about Ukrainian culture. Led mainly by former political prisoners, the group campaigned to have all remaining political prisoners released, and to increase discussion of certain 'blank spots' in Ukrainian history, in particular the famine of 1932-33 (Kuzio, 1989). This group also sought to democratize the existing political system (Haran', 1993). On April 26, 1988, the Club organized a rally in Central Kyiv to mark the second anniversary of the Chernobyl' disaster. On June 5, the Club arranged celebrations to mark the Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine. This club spurred the growth of other clubs devoted to culture and ecology, which in turn led to the organization of more radical groups in the future, both in Western and Eastern Ukraine (Kuzio, 1989). Oles' Shevchenko, a leading figure in the Club was also to become head of the Kyiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, and Leonid Milyav'ski was to help found the Ukrainian Democratic Union political opposition party (Ibid.).

Memorial was another group that was concerned with the reexamination of 'blank spots' in Soviet history. Memorial was actually a pan-Soviet organization, founded in Moscow in 1988. The founding committee included such noted figures as A. Sakharov, Ju. Afanasjev, R. Medvedev and others, and had the support of the 19th Conference of the Soviet Communist Party. Memorial concerned itself with more than the renewal of truth in history. Its members also
called for the creation of a commission to look into the social and political rights of deported nations and the return of their homelands. As well, the group also called for the investigation of mass graves near the village of Bykivnja, along with analogous sites near other cities (Haran', 1993).  

Ukrainian chapters of Memorial also began to be founded in 1988. In March of 1989, the founding conference of the Ukrainian Memorial took place. The official statutes of the conference stated that this chapter was part of the all-republic Memorial, and would work together with other chapters (Tanjuk, 1995). However, differences began to appear within the organization (both within the Ukrainian chapter, and between Ukrainian and Memorial representatives from other republics), as many members wanted to go beyond looking at the repression under Stalin, and examine the period from the time of the Communist Revolution in 1917, in order to look at Lenin and Communism more critically. According to several respondents whom I interviewed, many in the Ukrainian chapter felt that there should be a break of Memorial from the larger Russian group (Tsembaljuk, 1995). By the summer of that year there were several organizations of Memorial; it was not


7 Personal interview with Les' Tanjuk, head of the Ukrainian chapter of Memorial and Rukh Party member: Kyiv. July 10, 1995. References to this interview will be indicated by (Tanjuk, 1995).

8 Personal interview with Rukh Secretariat member Viktor Tsembaljuk: Kyiv. June 9, 1995. All references to this interview will be indicated by (Tsembaljuk, 1995).
uncommon for two alternative organizations to exist in the same city (Haran', 1993).

As with other groups, several of these organizations began to move from concern with bringing out historical truth into socio-political groups opposed to the Communist Party. At the founding conference of the L'viv chapter of Memorial, led by such luminaries as Ihor Jukhnovskyj and Vjacheslav Chornovil, among the resolutions adopted was one to reexamine the pre-Soviet era national history of Western Ukraine, and to renew the memory of the fighters of groups that died trying to free the country, and to restore the memorials that had been destroyed under Communism from the 1930s to the 1980s (Haran', 1993). Resolutions of such groups as these augured well for their later politicization and the eventual formation of Rukh.

iii. Youth Organizations

Finally, student organizations and organizations of young intellectuals, representing a new generation of activists who appeared as the policies of glasnost' and perestroika were developed. The attitudes and concerns of these young people often stood in contrast to the generation of older leaders and former dissidents who led groups such as the UHU and the Culturological Club (Kuzio, 1989), and the more conservative members of the Writers' Union.

Hromada was a student organization set up at Kyiv University in the spring of 1988. Among its concerns was the removal of the Soviet military school from the seventeenth century Mohyla Academy in Kyiv (the Culturological Club and Hromada actually coordinated
their activities with respect to this issue). It also led a boycott of military instruction classes at Kyiv University, arguing that military education should be voluntary, not mandatory. The group had some success on this latter issue, and soon became more politicized.

In October of 1988, an open letter to the plenum of the Communist Party of Ukraine was published in which the Party leadership was criticized as being responsible for the stagnation in Ukraine that had existed since the Brezhnev era. In addition, Hromada called for the removal of Ukrainian Communist leader Shcherbytskyj and the rest of the leadership, claiming they were responsible for the present catastrophic state of the Ukrainian language and culture. At first this group was not bothered by the authorities, but as it became more critical and politicized, according to Kuzio, there was greater and greater official harassment (Ibid.).

The group Spadshchyna was made up mostly of teachers in various institutions in Kyiv. Various informal gatherings of students, teachers, and other intellectuals led to the belief that some type of structure was needed that would unite young intellectuals, and would have a program that would defend Ukrainian culture. Spadshchyna became an officially registered group in 1988. It worked in conjunction with other groups such as the Tovarystvo Leva in L'viv to defend national monuments of all kinds and to defend the Ukrainian language (Zajets', 1995). Again this group quickly became more politicized. As one of the main leaders, Ivan
Zajets', explained to me:

In 1988 we had our first official meeting at which we talked about an article by Ivan Dzjuba about the totality (tsilistnist') of the Ukrainian culture. This was a controversial idea because we understood that Ukraine in economic, political, and cultural life was a part of the Russian empire, and that it didn't have its own political-economic system serving its own interests. So we interpreted this idea of totality of culture, as needing an ideological ambush on all aspects of life (Zajets', 1995).

The group realized its interests in defending culture meant that it had to move into the political realm, but Spadshchyna was still careful to show a more benign face to the authorities. For example, Petro Kunin, a philosopher who was a member of the Communist Party, was chosen to head the group. Kunin was chosen even though he favoured bilingualism, an idea not popular within the organization. But Spadshchyna was able to gain official registration because Kunin was the head. As well, in order to get permission to hold one of the first major official mass meetings in November of 1988, they had to convince authorities that they were going to deal with ecological issues only, and that if they argued about making political reforms, it was only so that reforms could bring about ecological improvements (Ibid.) In fact, the slogans that came out at this meeting were "Ecology of Language, Ecology of Spirit, and Ecology of Nature". It was groups such as Hromada and Spadshchyna that led the way beyond the activization of support for ecological matters to a new era of political activization. Some groups, in particular youth groups, grasped this political activization enthusiastically, while other more conservative groups were not yet ready to take this next step.
iv. The Emergence of National Fronts in the Baltics

Important influences on Ukrainian groups were not confined to Ukraine. The multiorganizational framework reveals the points at which contagion groups influence events and strategies of the group(s) we are studying. In the case of Ukraine, apart from the policies of perestroika, another major external impetus to the formation and politicization of all these groups was the creation of hugely popular national fronts in the nearby Baltic republics. Again, it was the macro structural factors of glasnost' and democratization that allowed the dynamics of institutional change to take place in the Baltics.

In Latvia, the Club for the Defence of the Environment was the first informal group out of which radicals would emerge. Although ostensibly fighting for the environment, this group was at the centre of all political meetings and demonstrations in the formative years of dissent in the glasnost' era. As the president of Latvia's Popular Front stated, "In Latvia everything began with the movement to save the environment. The Club... was founded. Individual fighters arose, prophets. The great awakening had begun (Trapans, 1991, 29)."

The national movement in Estonia can be said to have begun in the spring of 1987. At first there was an eruption of protest after Moscow announced that it planned to open several phosphate mines in Estonia. If realized, this plan would have brought a huge number of non-Estonians into a republic where the ratio of ethnic Estonians to non-ethnic was rapidly shrinking (Ilves, 1991). The ensuing
protest took on a more overtly political tone in August of that year, when demonstrations took place in all three Baltic republics, marking the 48th anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which led to the Baltics being partitioned between Germany and the Soviet Union. After this event Baltic activists and the Baltic creative intelligentsia demanded that Baltic history be reexamined and that national rights be restored (Nahaylo, 1991). On April 1-2, 1988, a plenum of Estonian Creative Societies passed a resolution aiming for greater changes in the republic and in the republic's relationship with Moscow, changes that would lead to real economic and political autonomy. Within a couple of weeks, a popular front was organized to press for these changes, within the framework of perestroika (Missiunas, 1990).

Moscow was slow to react to these developments, and did not yet fully realize that a significant problem was beginning to develop in the Baltic republics. Two events provoked Party and non-Party intellectuals in Lithuania into following Estonia's steps of forming a national movement. First, delegates to the 19th Conference of the CPSU were appointed from above by the Party leadership. Second, Moscow decided to expand the chemical industry in Lithuania despite the Lithuanian decision prohibiting such expansion due to terrible pollution problems (Vardys, 1991). On May 23, 1988, a commission was established at the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences to examine how changes could be made in the Lithuanian constitution to accommodate policies of perestroika, democratization, and glasnost'. On June 3, an initiative group was
elected to organize mass support for perestroika, which became known as Sajudis. This initiative group included members of the artistic community, which lent it significant publicity, senior members of the Academy of Sciences and many members of the Communist Party, which gave it political clout, and a number of youth representatives, which gave the movement a certain energy to mobilize support and activate protest (Senn, 1991).

At the time of its first Congress, Sajudis' main goals were "the support and deepening" of perestroika that was initiated by the CPSU; achievement of sovereignty within all areas of Lithuanian life within a Leninist Soviet federation; and the goal of a "pluralist society" with no organization usurping political power (Vardys, 1989). However the focus of Sajudis and the other movements quickly became more radical as their support and legitimacy in the eyes of the general population increased. Huge meetings and demonstrations took place in the summer all over the Baltics (Vardys, 1991). On August 23 over a quarter million people attended a protest marking the 49th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact and brought the issue of national self-determination to the front. On Nov. 17, 1988, the Estonian Supreme Soviet made a declaration of "republican sovereignty" and placed the republic's legislation above all-Union laws and the all-Union Supreme Soviet (Vardys, 1991). Before Lithuania could follow suit, Party First Secretary Brazauskas was called to Moscow, and on the following day, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet refused to pass similar declarations. Sajudis representatives were angered by the
decision and stated: "Lithuania's will is its highest law... [and] only those laws will be respected that do not restrict Lithuania's independence (Ibid., 17)." Sajudis now stood in clear opposition to the Communist Party.

Following a meeting in Moscow where the three Baltic First Secretaries argued that certain concessions had to be made for the local parties to maintain some degree of legitimacy with the populace, several resolutions were passed. The Communist Party of Estonia legalized the Estonian national flag and confirmed that economic autonomy would begin in Estonia in 1989, cutting the republic's links with the relevant ministries in Moscow, and allowing Estonia to establish a market oriented economy (Germroth, 1989). Similarly, in Latvia, concessions were made promising economic autonomy for that republic, as well as promising to allow amendments to the Latvian constitution with respect to the Latvian language, citizenship, and culture (Germroth, 1989). In May of 1989, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declared that all laws passed by the all-Union Supreme Soviet were only valid if approved by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Moreover, the revised constitution provided for Lithuanian citizenship, and a law on economic self-management was also issued. Finally, a declaration of republican sovereignty was passed (Vardys, 1991).

These were all great victories for the Baltic movements. The pace of change was dizzying. The declarations and successes of the movement were both advantageous and disadvantageous to nationalist groups watching from other republics. First it should be noted that
because of glasnost', media coverage of the events in the Baltics was much more comprehensive than it would have been in the past. Second, the pace of change was terrifying to many, who were worried that if similar protests were to take place in Ukraine, there would be a major confrontation with Moscow. But third, and virtually all of the leaders of the various groups acknowledged this fact, events in the Baltics were advantageous to nationalist groups because they provided a model for Ukrainian organizations to follow.

Indeed, the Baltic fronts did not just provide abstract support for Ukrainian organizations. There was also a degree of direct contact between many of the Ukrainian leaders and those of the Baltic fronts. For example, in the summer of 1988, Ivan Drach, the future head of Rukh, met with Latvian poet Janis Peters and Lithuanian poet Al'himantas Baltakys. Here Drach was informed as to how the national fronts were to be formed in those republics, and to the role that the creative unions (writers, artists, etc.) would play in the formation of these fronts (Kovtun, 1995).

Ukrainian activists often found safe haven in the Baltic republics. For example, the People's Democratic League of Ukraine attempted to hold a congress in early 1989 in Kyiv, but 60 members were arrested. In June 1989 the group was able to hold its opening congress in Riga without any harassment (Muiznieks, 1995).

On June 11 and 12, 1988, leaders from national rights groups from Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine met in L'viv and established a Coordinating Committee of the Patriotic Movements of the Peoples of the Soviet Union. While many of the
leaders involved in the meetings were advocates of independence for their respective republics, the final programmatic policies adopted fell into the framework of perestroika and democratization, and called for the "complete political and economic decentralization of the USSR into a "confederation of separate sovereign states (Nahaylo, 1991)."

In September of 1988, there was a huge congress of Sajudis in Lithuania. Groups like Spadshchyna sent people there to observe how a movement based on the national idea was run. In October of that year, the Lev society attempted to hold a conference where guests from the Baltic national fronts were to be invited. But reaction from authorities was so strong that not only did the conference not take place, but the Baltic representatives were intercepted in L'viv and forced to return (Nahaylo, 1989). In January 1990, the Latvian popular Front sponsored a conference in Jurmala, Latvia on "Ukrainian Independent Statehood and Ways of Achieving It." This conference was attended by various Ukrainian groups as well as by members of the Ukrainian-Latvian community (Muiznieks, 1995).

By the middle of 1988, I was told, not one, but several leaders were thinking how to unite all the diverse organizations in Ukraine under one banner (Zajets', 1995). The multiorganizational field within Ukraine at this time was one where a myriad of groups, such as those described above, came into existence as a result of a variety of internal and external factors. These groups found themselves increasingly in opposition to the Ukrainian Communist Party (CPU) hierarchy. Under perestroika, Gorbachev had hoped to
get republican leaders to follow his new line of thinking. In Ukraine, however, with the CPU under the leadership of Volodymyr Shcherbytskyj, a Brezhnevite holdover, perestroika had meant change in name only. Police were frequently brought in to chase away and arrest people attending demonstrations or public meetings. Party bureaucrats withheld permission from these new groups for holding authorized meetings in public buildings, forcing the groups to stay underground (Haran', 1993). In fact, in his book Istorija Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrajiny, Volodymyr Kvtun documents a multitude of actions in which Party authorities harassed, detained and/or arrested activists and leaders all over Ukraine in the early months of 1989 (Kvtun, 1995).

Gorbachev was put in a difficult position with respect to Shcherbytskyj's attitude to perestroika. On the one hand, Gorbachev needed the economic reforms of perestroika to be successful in the republics, and in Ukraine especially, because Ukraine played such an important role in the overall economic picture of the Soviet Union. Improvements had to be made in Ukraine's agricultural and industrial sectors in particular if the overall economic program was to work. But Gorbachev was not eager for Ukrainian nationalist groups to begin gathering popular support and challenging Communist hegemony in the way that the Baltic fronts were doing. Political stability in Ukraine was crucial - without a Ukraine, there might not be a viable Soviet Union.

Leaders of these various organizations in Ukraine realized that taken separately, an individual group might not provide a
formidable challenge to the CPU. The CPU had a great deal of power and resources at its disposal. If the hundreds of organizations and groups that had been formed republic-wide could be brought together under one umbrella movement, however, then the CPU would face a more focused and potentially more formidable challenger. The CPU would still control the bulk of resources, but opposition forces working together instead of separately would utilize their resources better. Also, having a much larger opposition group would mean that its existing base of support would be that much wider, meaning that the opposition would have a much larger future mobilization potential. It is this quest for the unification/coordination of these organizations that leads us to the discussion of the third pillar of the Rukh movement, the Ukrainian Writers' Union.

c. The Ukrainian Writers' Union Emerges as Leader

A variety of leaders of smaller groups, such as Ivan Zajets', felt that a movement that united the smaller organizations into a larger whole would prove more effective. A consensus existed among many leaders that the Ukrainian Writers' Union was the only group that could lead this process of unification. As Zajets' explained:

In Sajudis it was the authors, artists, musicians and theatre groups that were at the base of organizing Sajudis... Although here, I wasn't sure about the artists because recently they had been allowed a bit more freedom to show and sell their work, but this independence was intimately tied to the state.... In Ukraine, the writers had a certain independence. They were ideologues of the Communist Party and could speak about the concept of a national idea. Noone else had such authority, and noone else had such potential freedom from harassment as the Writers' Union, so we had to turn to them (Zajets',
According to Zajets', much of the push towards unity came from the student groups as well as more radical groups from the West like the UHU.

There had already been several attempts to create a republic-wide movement, mostly centred in Western Ukraine. The most important of these occurred in L'viv in the summer of 1988. In June, the first unsanctioned mass demonstration took place in L'viv. At this demonstration, a wide spectrum of political forces took part - from the Ukrainian Helsinki Union to the city Komsomol, all of whom declared support for the formation of a democratic front. The newspaper Lenins'ka Molod' (Lenin's Youth) announced that on August 3 there would be a meeting at the city Komsomol for those who wanted to participate in the formation of a national movement. However, senior Party members forced the Komsomol to cancel the meeting, and at an August 4 demonstration, the police brutally broke up the gathering using attack dogs to chase away participants (Haran', 1993). In this way, city and republic Party leaders were able to delay the formation of a movement. It seemed a more 'legitimate' group was needed to take the initiative.

In fact, certain members of the Writers' Union had already been taking steps in this direction. At the Ninth Congress of the Ukrainian Writers' Union in June, 1986, the prominent author Oles' Honchar spoke about the need for Ukrainian authors to promote and protect the Ukrainian language. He also added that Chernobyl' had changed the way Ukrainian writers were viewing the world, arguing
that writers had to fight to protect the physical environment (i.e., the ecology) as well as the linguistic environment (Solchanyk, 1991g). These same themes were part of a speech given by poet Boris Olijnyk at the USSR Writer's Congress several weeks later. Olijnyk also added that the national question had to be reexamined. (Ibid.) The language issue was of paramount importance to members of the Union, and as such many became members of and played important roles in various groups that tried to defend the Ukrainian language and culture. The most important example may have been Dmytro Pavlychko's role as president of the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society.

But even as certain leading figures in the Writers' Union began to formulate plans for the creation of a national movement, these same leaders recognized that this process would be more difficult in Ukraine than in the Baltics. Drach explained that the kind of plenum that took place in Riga, for example, where all the creative unions met to form the Latvian Popular Front, would not be possible in Ukraine. The republican government would prevent this kind of plenum from taking place at any cost. In order for the discussion of a national movement to take place, the idea would be discussed at an open meeting of the Kyiv Writers' Union (Kovtun, 1988).

In July of 1988, the Writers' Union met and gave very low marks to the Ukrainian government, criticizing it for its lack of movement in adopting policies of perestroika and glasnost' (Haran', 1993). Party leader Shcherbytskyj retaliated with a stinging attack
on the Writers' Union, which led to a meeting on November 1 of the
Kyiv chapter of the Writers' Union, where the topic of a mass
movement was formally brought up. Poet Viktor Teren argued:

I think the time has come to create... an initiative
group of writers for the support of perestroika, whose
first obligation would be to unite into one organization
all the supporters of perestroika in the republic, and to
consolidate these forces.... The initiative group must
create a joint program of a national front for the
support of perestroika, and later we can discuss the
project, fill in and broaden the details at various
forums, at a united plenum of the creative unions, and
then publish [the results] in the republican press
(Haran', 1993, 20).

An initiative group was formed at that point, but there was some
conflict between Party and non-Party members. Pavlychko had
proposed to add the Party committee to the initiative group, while
Pavlo Movchan, a non-Party member argued that the movement was to
be a popular movement, not just a Party movement (Solchanyk,
1989a). There was also evidence of conflict within the Writers'
Union itself. The idea of a national movement was certainly not
endorsed by all the members of the union. Many of the more
conservative Party members were against the formation of the
initiating group. Even Borys Olijnyk, who had previously supported
the idea, soon distanced himself from Rukh, commenting that Ukraine
didn't need the kinds of fronts and confrontations that were taking
place in the Baltics (Kovtun, 1988).

I was told that various youth groups continued to push the
Union to hurry the unification process along (Teren, 1995 and...
others). On November 13, 1988, the first sanctioned mass demonstration took place at the Central Stadium in Kyiv. As noted earlier, permission for this demonstration was granted only because it was to deal with ecological issues, but groups such as Spadshchyna, Hromada, Zelenyj Svit, Noosfera and others were pushing for Union leaders to call publicly for the creation of a national front. Zajets' recalled that he persuaded Pavlychko to be the first to get up and speak at this demonstration and announce that there was a need to create a wide-ranging massive movement for reforms to deal with the cultural-ecological problems, and to announce that an organizing committee had been established to get things started. Pavlychko refused at first, but then went on and spoke of the need for a movement, albeit in a very "subtle, non-confrontational" way. The demonstration broke up early before the names could be read out, but the idea was now in the public realm, and had gathered a certain momentum (Zajets', 1995).

A plenum of the Board of the Writers' Union took place in Kyiv at the end of November. At this plenum, it was decided that the Party organization of Kyiv writers would take over the initiative group (although non-Party writers such as Movchan protested this decision) (Solchanyk, 1989a). The first point the plenum made was that a message had to be sent to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to accelerate the development of a law making Ukrainian the state language. The second point was to create a draft program for a

9 Personal interview with Viktor Teren, People's Deputy, former member of Rukh; Kyiv, July 12, 1995. All references to this interview will be indicated by (Teren, 1995).
National Front of Ukraine for Perestroika (Haran', 1993). Included in these resolutions was an item stating that the heads of the branches of the various Writers' Unions at the local level were to automatically become part of the initiative group. In this way, a broad nation-wide network would be created from the start (Solchanyk, 1989a).

The initiative group soon moved beyond the limits of the Writers' Union, encompassing leaders of many of the other groups. The organizational threads were being brought together into a mass umbrella movement. The two main tasks of the initiative group were to create the ties between the multitude of organizations all over Ukraine that could be conceived as being part of the movement, and second, to create a draft program for the movement.

The creation of ties between organizations was a very complex, multi-layered process, but it was aided by the overlapping membership. One key to this process was the work of people in the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, led by Dmytro Pavlychko. As there were a large number of organizations fighting for the defense of Ukrainian language and culture, these all had to be brought into the movement. The Language Society also helped build an important bridge between L'viv, the centre of discontent in Western Ukraine and Kyiv (Zajets', 1995). The L'viv-Kyiv connection, as well as the connection between the old dissident movement and the new Party-member Kyiv intelligentsia was further strengthened when some of the L'viv delegates to the upcoming first national congress of Rukh were asked to take part in its leadership. This was significant
because it meant that the base of membership was broad. As one of the radicals, Mykhajlo Horyn' explained to me:

Nobody covered up the fact that the leaders of Rukh were not only those who had ties to the Party and were still tying the organization to the Party, but also those that came from the camps.... It was very good working together - to have Communists like Drach and Pavlychko on one side, and people like me on the other. Without this kind of underlying spirit, the founding congress would not have been possible (Horyn', 1995).

Many of the leaders noted that the creation of Rukh involved a series of compromises on the part of many of the people involved. Some participants had difficulties with some of the compromises, but at this point, there was a recognition that some type of unified/coordinated movement was a necessity, and that one could still be a member of a particular group and a member of Rukh. Therefore one could disagree with other Rukh members who might be members of another group with conflicting views.

As well, the work of Institute of Literature member Vjacheslav Brjukhovetskyj should be noted. Virtually all the leaders interviewed mentioned him as being most responsible for the actual legwork of getting the multitude of organizations involved and ready to send delegates to the founding Congress of Rukh (Haran', 1993 and others). One of the keys to embracing so many different kinds of organizations was the conservative nature of the draft program for Rukh being prepared in Kyiv.

10 Personal interview with Mykhajlo Horyn', leader of the Ukrainian Republican Party; Kyiv, July 5, 1995. All references to this interview are indicated by (Horyn', 1995).
III. THE DRAFT PROGRAM FOR RUKH

There was no single author of the draft program. Rather a wide variety of specialists were brought in; many people had an input into the final draft. Some names that were specifically mentioned included Venyamin Sikora, who worked on the economic part of the platform, the jurist Serhij Holovatij, who helped with the legal aspects, and Serhij Plachynda, a well-known publicist, who helped with the ecological statements in the program. Finally, the group used the existing programs of the Baltic fronts as a model from which to build its own program (Solchanyk, 1989a). On Feb. 16, 1989, the draft program of Rukh was published in Literaturna Ukrajina, the publishing organ of the Writers' Union and Institute of Literature.

The draft program consisted of a series of general principles, and was followed by sections relating to human rights, social justice, the economy, ecology, and finally, the nationality question, language and culture. While dealing with issues such as the need to support perestroika, and help defend Ukrainian language and culture, the program was very careful to cater to non-Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians as well:

The main aim of the movement is to assist the Communist Party in creating and working out a democratic mechanism that will serve the development of society based on genuine people's power and a balanced economy. The movement comes out against any breaches of social, political, national, and ecological rights of an individual. The movement will strive to raise the level of consciousness, political culture and civic activities of the Ukrainian people and of all nationalities living within the Ukrainian SSR... The movement will resolutely counteract any attempts to assimilate the national
minorities in Ukraine; and it will assist the development of culture and education of all of them, and in their places of residence assist their administrative and economic self-rule (Furtado Jr. and Chandler, 1992, 226).

Other highlights of the program included the call for sovereignty of the Ukrainian Republic, a "rational restructuring" of the national economy, a re-examination of the policy on energy and nuclear power, and finally specific statutes dealing with the Ukrainian language, such as making Ukrainian the official state language, and making the Ukrainian language compulsory at all schools and colleges in the Republic (although again, there are notes stating that every citizen would enjoy the right to use his/her native language, and that these minority communities could have schools and classes taught in their own languages) (Furtado Jr. and Chandler, 1992).

This draft program reflects a clear compromise between the more radical elements of the movement and the more conservative (on the whole) Kyiv intelligentsia who were members of the Party. For example, one of the key items of contention was in the General Principles section: "The movement recognizes the leading role of the Communist Party in a socialist society and is a unifying link between the Party's ideals of restructuring and the initiative of the widest strata of the popular masses (Ibid., 226)." During a heated moment of his interview, the head of the Prosvita Society noted that for many groups such as the UHU and Spadshchyna, this line was seen as almost offensive, and served to preclude those who weren't part of the Party, who did not want to be in it, and who
were antagonistic (Movchan, 1995). For leaders such as Drach and Brjukhovetskyj, however, it was a compromise that was meant to protect the movement from the Ukrainian authorities (Tsembaljuk, Horyn', and others, 1995). In the end, the more radical leaders reluctantly agreed to the compromise. The draft program was very critical of the slow movement of the present Ukrainian leadership in implementing the policies of perestroika and democratization. But if the Ukrainian leadership attacked the movement, they would be attacking Gorbachev and his policies.

Critics argued that the Rukh draft program did not go as far as the programs of the Baltic fronts (Zajets', 1995). Again, this represented a general desire on the part of much of the leadership to go slower, so as not to frighten people who did not know much about the movement and not to alienate much of the population, especially in the south and east. Attitudes towards the Ukrainian language issue differed greatly between the east and the west. It was a much more popular issue in the west (we will discuss this point in more detail in later chapters). The leadership thus concentrated on issues that were of a primary concern to all those living in Ukraine, such as ecological issues (again using Chernobyl' as the main reference point) and economic issues. They argued that Ukrainian sovereignty was needed so that there would be no more Chernobyl's on Ukrainian soil and so there would be a healthier economy, with economic decisions made in Ukraine, meaning

11 Personal interview with Pavlo Movchan, head of the Prosvita Society; Kyiv, July 14, 1995. All references to this interview are indicated by (Movchan, 1995).
all Ukrainians would be better off. And again, the Ukrainian language was to be paramount but concessions were made so as not to alienate any particular group (in particular, the Russian minority, which was feeling very alienated by the Baltic fronts' language and citizenship policies). Even the name Rukh itself was meant to be a compromise. The leadership chose the word 'movement' rather than 'front', because 'front' was seen as confrontational, having to be a front against something. 'Movement' however, suggested a greater inclusivity (Horyn', 1995).

At this point it was clear that different factions within the Rukh leadership had an input in creating a platform for Rukh, but also that the Writers' Union members such as Drach and Brjukhovetskyj held a great deal of influence in terms of making the platform of the movement more conservative than it might have been. The fact that compromises were made meant that the key role of Writers' Union leadership was acknowledged, and also that the more conservative approach might mean less harassment from the authorities. It also meant that the role of unification/coordination had been undertaken successfully by the Writers' Union, as a draft program had been created, and although compromises had been needed, leaders from a myriad of groups within Rukh worked to support and promote the draft program.

It was then clearly critical to get the draft out into the public realm. But as I was told by several leaders, despite their best attempts, the draft program was published only in Literaturna Ukraina, which had a circulation of about 100,000 (Drach, Horyn',
1995)\textsuperscript{12}. The rest of the mainstream press was largely critical of the draft program, and none printed any of the resolutions. There were even letters to the editor criticizing the program appearing in the newspaper "Soviet Ukraine" two days after the draft was published in \textit{Literaturna Ukrainina} (signed by several leading figures in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences), leading many to believe that the Soviet leadership had been ready to criticize the program no matter what its contents (Haran', 1993). Party leaders such as the Head of Ideology Leonid Kravchuk were careful in their criticism, arguing that it was not the idea of the movement that they objected to, but the organization leading the movement. They called the leaders extremist and 'separatist' (Nahaylo, 1992). They argued that a movement in support of perestroika already existed in Ukraine, and it was being led by the Party. At this point then, the vast majority of Ukrainians had only heard criticism of the draft program of Rukh, and had not had a chance to read it.

Despite this lack of publicity, however, the idea of Rukh gained increasing popularity in the eyes of the general public. How were Rukh organizers able to accomplish this in the face of hostile opposition from the CPU and a general inaccessibility and/or hostile reaction from the mass media? To answer this question, the next chapter will continue our analysis of Rukh, examining strategies that Rukh used to try to mobilize maximum support. The chapter will also include a section where we look at the micro

\textsuperscript{12}Personal interview with Ivan Drach, former head of Rukh; Kyiv, July 5, 1995. All references to this interview will be indicated by (Drach. 1995).
level of analysis, i.e., how and why did certain individuals become involved in Rukh. This section will also offer us clues as to how a movement can succeed in the face of adversity, and lacking significant resources.
CHAPTER FOUR

RUKH'S SUCCESSFUL MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT

To begin this chapter, we will offer the example of four individual's involvement with Rukh. Statistical data will tell us only so much about the variety of conduits and recruitment paths formulation. Personal profiles will offer us more detail on how and why people became interested in Rukh, and the degree of their interest. Participants were chosen on the basis of having very different experiences with respect to their initial involvement in Rukh. We will see instances where macro changes in the political system directly affected the individual's participation, and cases where the intermediate level of recruitment networks came into play.

I. THE MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT INTO RUKH

a. Ivan Zajets'

The first case to be examined is that of Ivan Zajets', a Deputy from Rukh who is the present Minister of Relations with CIS Nations. In the mid 1980s, Zajets' was a University student in Kyiv. Three events stimulated an interest in Ukrainian political and societal issues for Zajets' and his friends at university. The first was the policy of perestroika (and later, glasnost' and democratization as well). For these students, perestroika, or rebuilding, meant the renewal of Ukrainian culture. Second, the Chernobyl' disaster had a profound impact. Third, events in the
The Baltics provided an example for those who wanted to become involved (Zajets', 1995). The last two events were only able to influence these students because of policies stemming from the advent of perestroika and glasnost'. Without the permission of authorities to form groups and begin dialogues with respect to certain issues (for example, in the Baltics, the opening of potentially ecologically harmful chemical factories, language issues, etc. as discussed in Ch. 3), and without a new freedom within the media to report and discuss these issues, people would not have been in a position to use the Baltics as an example to follow.

Zajets' became involved in the formation of a group called Spadshchyna (Heritage), which was devoted to the study of Ukrainian language and cultural issues. Most of the members of this group were either teachers or were studying to be teachers, and most lived in one particular dormitory. All sorts of evening gatherings were held in the dormitory, with a variety of topical issues being discussed. The most interested would also gather regularly in cafes on the Khreshchatyk (the main street in Kyiv) to talk about what their group might do. At the end of 1987, these students also had close ties with a youth theatre group organized by Les' Tanjuk, who would later play a prominent role in Rukh and who would eventually become a leader in Memorial. Later, after Spadshchyna became officially legalized and had a concrete program, expeditions and ties were created with other student groups such as the Tovarystvo Leva in L'viv; together these groups sought to defend the preservation of all kinds of Ukrainian monuments and also to defend
the Ukrainian language from falling into disuse (Zajets', 1995).

These youth groups were an example of one type of network that was created and that would become a part of Rukh. Universities and colleges have formed the base of a great deal of social movement activity in the west (civil rights, women's rights, etc.), and this was true in Ukraine as well. Participants in these groups would see each other constantly at school, and many of them lived together, providing them with the opportunity to discuss issues, and reinforce their support for one another and for what they were doing. Glasnost', socialist pluralism, and democratization allowed for the proliferation of groups such as Spadshchyna on campuses all over Ukraine.

The creation of such groups was again important not only because they would become mobilized in a movement that was to support perestroika and later Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, but was also symbolically important. Now a new generation of youth was becoming socially and politically active, and was often raising its voice against the political authorities, something which would not have been thought possible only several years before. As well, a new generation of leaders was being created that had experienced this new openness and tolerance, ready to find a place among those who had spent their whole lives being allowed only to follow the Party line. As Drach explained, these students played a major role in radicalizing Rukh with their passion and impatience for change, wanting to move faster than their elders who had spent their lives under a more authoritarian
regime and were thus more conservative (Drach, 1995).

In the case of Zajets' then, we see that both the macro and intermediate levels of recruitment networks were key to his involvement. First, without the policies of perestroika and glasnost', a group such as Spadshchyna would not have been able to form. In addition, without a greater openness in the media, leaders such as Zajets' would not have been influenced by events in the Baltics, pushing them towards the formation of a national movement. Second, the informal network of students and teachers that existed, in Zajets' case, in the dormitory where he lived, provided fertile ground for a discussion of ideas and actions. In networks such as these, fellow students could support and reassure each other at times when it seemed that the obstacles in their way were too high, or that outside pressures (i.e., authority harassment) were affecting their possible involvement in the movement. Similar networks existed on campuses all over Ukraine, presenting an excellent source of mobilization for a movement like Rukh.

b. Leonid Butkevych

The second case to be examined is that of Leonid Butkevych, the manager of a factory in the city of Vyshhorod. Butkevych was a member of Rukh until 1992, at which time he left Rukh to join the Ukrainian Republican Party. Butkevych's network of support was much smaller than that of the case mentioned above. In the late 1980s he went to meetings of the Ukrainian Language Society, and eventually would come to participate in various demonstrations in Kyiv and Vyshhorod. In the beginning of the process (1988) there were very
few people with whom Butkevych could get together and discuss ideas. An author from Vishhorod named Drobach had been to Kyiv and was familiar with some of the groups that had been forming. He was also aware of the possibility of the creation of a widespread movement. The core group here consisted of only three people. Drobach came back with some statutes of TUM and asked Butkevych and another friend to familiarize themselves with these documents.

Their meetings had to be held in secret - even when meeting in someone's apartment they made sure that no neighbors could overhear their conversation. These three felt that organizations such as TUM deserved more widespread support, but even though the times weren't as repressive as before, they were still very careful as to how they mobilized support. Until Rukh became more established, these three decided to only talk to their closest friends, and then have these people talk to their closest friends, and so on. Eventually a larger group of people became involved, going to demonstrations in Kyiv, and then forming their own local chapters of many of these organizations and political parties. The Great Chain event (to be discussed later in the chapter) seemed to provide a catalyst for support. Until then, there were still few people involved, and most were still afraid to express themselves. For Butkevych, part of getting involved in these groups was a desire for change, and part was for gaining a feeling of solidarity with others:

I got involved because I thought we had to improve things so that the next generation can have a better life than we had.... Many of us had heard stories from our aunts, uncles, parents, grandparents, where they talked about people who had sacrificed themselves for their country,
and that they were proud and that I should be proud...
When I got out of the institute, I found that there were people with whom you could share these kind of thoughts (Butkevych, 1995)....

For Butkevych then, involvement in Rukh had more to do with his upbringing and education with respect to Ukrainian symbols and myths that had been taught to him by his family. He did not have an extensive network through which to get involved, yet even when it was still dangerous to talk about certain issues, he did become involved. Again, the macro aspect is important here, as groups like the Ukrainian Language Society only began to form after glasnost', but for people like Butkevych, there was a primordial character, a connection to Ukraine that a movement like Rukh could tap into.

c. Serhij Khondozhko

Serhij Khondozhko, the youngest of those interviewed, got involved a bit later in the evolution of Rukh, namely at the time of the All-Union referendum in 1991. In the mid 1980s, Khondozhko thought of himself as a Soviet citizen, learning of the history of the USSR, the history of the Communist Party, of the victories of socialism and the Soviet state, etc. But once he got into higher levels of school, his thinking began to change a little. For example, he once had to work at a collective farm to help collect the harvest. The head of the farm got upset at the students for collecting too much hay, explaining that if the farm were to collect less hay the following year, they would get less money from the state. When Rukh's program initially came out, Khondozhko was intrigued. Newspapers would criticize the draft program, mentioning
well-known names such as Drach, Jaworlwsyj and Pavlychko, but no one would publish the program. This only made Khondozhko (and many others who were interviewed) more curious about Rukh and its program (Khondozhko, 1995).

This last fact goes against the grain of much of the thinking about the role of the mass media in the emergence of social movements. Kielbowicz and Scherer argue that the mass media play a crucial role in creating the preconditions for a movement, that is, creating some consciousness of shared grievance or situation. The media also play a role in mobilizing support into movement organizations. However, the authors assume that the media must be sympathetic in order to fulfill this role (1986). In the case of Rukh, the media did play a role in letting people know about the existence of the movement, but the media were largely critical of Rukh. Literaturna Ukrajina was virtually the only newspaper that published the draft program, and that was sympathetic to the movement. The rest of the print media and virtually all of the television and radio media were very negative in their assessment of Rukh (Drach, 1995). However, the important fact was that, despite the negative publicity, people in general were beginning to hear about Rukh, and becoming curious about getting more information. With the advent of glasnost' and perestroika, people were learning about what was going on in Eastern Europe (the fall

1 It should also be noted that at this point, many people may have still have had a rather cynical attitude towards a media that had been the mouthpiece of the CPSU for so many years. Therefore any organization that raised the wrath of the media might be noted with interest by some observers.
of the Berlin Wall, etc.), in the Baltics, and beginning to wonder if similar processes could occur in Ukraine.

Kovtun noted that an informational bulletin with the name of "Rukh" was published by the Coordinating Committee of Rukh in Kyiv, but that this publication only appeared at the end of June, was only about four pages long, and only appeared once a month. "Rukh" was thus trying to stake out the point of view of the movement amidst a wave of dailies, led by Pravda_Ukrajiny and Radians'koji_Ukrajiny, which were extremely negative in their assessments of Rukh. Other regional Rukh organizations had their own publications as well (for example, L'viv had a journal called Viche), but again, compared to the larger publications, these publications had limited press runs and received limited distribution (Kovtun, 1995).

In terms of television coverage, a series of debates between members of the Communist hierarchy and Rukh leaders was televised, which was meant to portray the Rukh leaders as ultranationalists and as a danger to civil order in Ukraine. These debates allowed people to make their own judgements about Rukh and its program. In general, Rukh leaders such as Drach acquitted themselves very well, and these debates were very effective in helping to dispel the fear that Rukh was an ultraradical organization. Overall, although largely shown in a negative light, it was crucial for Rukh to at least be discussed and acknowledged in the media, to get guaranteed exposure, and to let people know they existed and were potentially a force to be reckoned with. As many Rukh leaders expressed, "Any publicity was good publicity (Koval', 1995, and others)."
Khondozhko was most influenced by two factors. First the new openness in the media meant that Rukh was able to get at least some publicity, and Khondozhko was able to make his own decision concerning involvement with Rukh. Second, Khondozhko's own experiences, such as the one at the collective farm, were causing him to begin doubting the Communist system and Party leadership. For so many people, each passing day showed more evidence of a faltering economy and of a system where only the chosen few Party apparatchiks got most of the benefits. Thus, with each day, the Communist Party had less and less legitimacy in the eyes of the public. A large percentage of the population was thus ready for an group such as Rukh to appear on the scene and offer an alternative to the Communist Party.2

d. Mykhajlo Horyn'

The final case is that of Mykhajlo Horyn', the current leader of the Ukrainian Republican Party and one of the original founders of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in the 1970s (also the oldest participant interviewed). Horyn' is an example of a person who was deeply committed to Ukrainian cultural and human rights issues even at a time when it was dangerous to express such views publicly. When Horyn' was a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, he was one of only about forty members, and he was soon arrested and spent many years in a prison camp for his activities. Despite this

2 Again, however, we must note that an alternative group such as Rukh could only come into existence through glasnost', and people could only get a true realization of how badly off they were compared to the West as a result of greater openness in the mass media.
arrest, once he was released in 1987, he immediately went to L'viv and began organizing a renewed Ukrainian Helsinki Union. For Horyn', it was important to take advantage of the democratization processes set in motion by Gorbachev, and he, along with his brother and a small group of former dissidents, began publishing a new Ukrainian journal (Visnyk) that would deal with issues of individual and state rights (Horyn', 1995). The major difference for these former dissidents was that they were not alone in their activities as they were (relatively speaking) in the 1960s and 1970s. By 1988, the idea of popular fronts was beginning to be appear in the Baltics, and soon similar ideas were circulating in L'viv. As well, throughout Ukraine, other groups were appearing that were working towards the protection of Ukrainian language and culture. While the majority of Ukrainians, even those involved in organizations such as the Ukrainian Language Society and Memorial, were not as radical (that is, talking about Ukrainian sovereignty, and then Ukrainian independence at a very early stage) as those in the reformed Ukrainian Helsinki Union, with the policies set forth by Gorbachev, the mobilization potential at this time was much higher than fifteen years previously.

It is important to note that this network of dissidents was one of the few that was already in existence at the time that the perestroika policies started, and that this network was not very large. Theorists such as Klandermans have argued that "The strength of indigenous networks and organizations in a subculture is the crucial factor determining the level of mobilization that is
reached initially (Klandermans, 1988, 174)." And indeed, it was not until a variety of groups concerned about the ecology, about cultural issues and about the Ukrainian language began organizing themselves that the possibility of starting a broad-based national movement could become a reality. Finally, it is no coincidence that these fledgling groups gravitated towards the established and highly respected existing organization of the Writers' Union with respect to leading the movement formation. The Writers' Union had a variety of cultural leaders who were respected by Communist leaders and by Ukrainians in general, and they also had their own newspaper, *Literaturna Ukrajina*, which could promote their ideas.

While the lack of networks cannot be ignored, it must be acknowledged that due to the environment created by a state that severely punished those trying to create a subculture to deal with issues such as culture, language and human rights, people were prevented from actively participating in such networks. Similarly, media closed to alternative ideas meant that the general population could not participate even indirectly by reading or hearing about such ideas. Thus, it is crucial to understand why these networks did not exist originally, and what changes occurred that allowed the creation and evolution of new networks. Again, we have an instance of institutional dynamism. With the opportunity structure opened up by Gorbachev's domestic policies, groups and organizations were created that were able to ultimately organize themselves within the movement Rukh. In some instances existing networks facilitated the creation of these groups, in others it did
Horyn' was thus quite a unique case, a person who had a deep love for and commitment to the Ukrainian language and the idea of an independent Ukraine. He was one of a few individuals who dared to display his beliefs publicly in the face of harsh government repression in the Brezhnev era. For some individuals, then, the primordial connections to the homeland and their love for their nation are so strong that they would risk their lives for their beliefs. For these kinds of individuals, the existence of recruitment networks and even macro changes in political policy would not matter to their involvement. Someone like Horyn' would have gotten involved again no matter what kind of regime was in place. The significance for Horyn' lay in the fact that, first, a new regime allowed himself and other former dissidents to go free. Second, with the macro changes that had taken place under Gorbachev, the chances for success with respect to the reforms that they desired had a greater chance of taking place.

This section is not meant to be an exhaustive study of how people were mobilized into supporting Rukh. In fact, the number of ways people could be mobilized into supporting Rukh and the extent and breadth of their support for Rukh were extremely varied. This section is meant to explore how the macro processes begun by Gorbachev's policies had a variety of consequences on the mobilization processes in Rukh. Policies of democratization and glasnost' resulted in the release of former dissident leaders such as Lukjanenko and Horyn' and allowed them to resume their
leadership mantle. These policies also allowed for the formation of all kinds of organizations and groups, and the increased openness in the media exposed these groups to the wider public (even if it often was in a negative light), providing groups such as Rukh with a greater mobilization potential. We can thus see directly how the macro structural level had a direct bearing on the micromobilization level. Without the macro changes that allowed for the release of these former leaders, and formation of new groups and openness in the media, individual mobilization would not have taken place.

In examining these four cases we have also seen how difficult it is to assess the motivation for an individual's involvement in Rukh. As we will see later, motives become even more difficult to assess when we look at the sudden nation-wide support for the independence of Ukraine. For some people like Mykhajlo Horyn', the passion for Ukraine was incredibly strong, and had always been of utmost importance. For others, the concern about Ukrainian language and cultural issues was able to come forth within a strong support network, where it could be nurtured and developed (as in the case of the student networks). Finally, for people such as Khondozhko, who grew up without this sense of connection to Ukraine, Rukh was attractive because it provided an alternative to the CPU and a chance for reform. For these individuals, there was no primordial connection as such, but rather they felt that Ukraine would be a better place to live if it had sovereignty or independence. For many, the fact that all these processes were taking place and that
groups like Rukh were coming into existence was symbolically important, as people began to feel that their society was indeed changing, which also increased the mobilization potential.

II. RUKH BEGINS TO FLOURISH

a. The Growing Popularity of Rukh

During the spring and summer of 1989, the idea of Rukh began to gain momentum all over Ukraine. National congresses such as those for Memorial, and for the Ukrainian Language Society, officially supported the formation of Rukh (Haran', 1993). Second, on March 18, a meeting of representatives of over seventy supporting organizations took place, and a coordinating council was chosen. Myroslav Popovych, a Party member and head of the Ukrainian Philosophy Society was the leader of the council. Even at this early stage, the organizers of Rukh were careful to include representatives of various viewpoints - from reform-minded Communists to groups such as the UHU, which were very anticommunist in outlook (Haran', 1993). As noted earlier, in the spring of 1989, three televised debates were broadcast nationwide between leaders of Rukh and Communist Party leaders, led by Leonid Kravchuk. Rukh representatives such as Drach and Popovych were seen as very conciliatory and hardly the radicals that many had accused them of being (Solchanyk, 1989a). Using Party members and national figures such as Popovych and Drach to take part in these debates granted the very idea of Rukh a greater legitimacy. Moreover, Rukh was able to gain the potential of a more widespread mobilization of
support than might have been possible under the sole leadership of the dissident-anticommunists (Haran', 1993).

Opponents of the Ukrainian Party apparatus gained further impetus with the All-Union elections in the spring of 1989. This was the first time in decades that there were multi-candidate elections for deputies. Although many non-Communist candidates were prevented in various ways from standing as candidates, about a third of the candidates running were put forward by organizations that had sprung up in the last two years (Haran', 1993). However, the inability to get popular candidates such as Ivan Drach registered (even though Drach had the support of 37 labour collectives, authorities prevented him from registering in the L'viv district) caused much consternation in many districts, leading to mass demonstrations and protests. Again this led to greater support for the idea of a movement that would speed the process of perestroika (Ibid.). Voters showed their displeasure with the existing leadership and the still undemocratic nominating system by voting against Party members when the latter were the only candidates standing in their particular districts. The most infamous example was Konstantin Masik, First Secretary of the Kyiv City Party Committee, who ran unopposed, and was turned down by 62.8% of the electorate. Of the fifteen Party members running in Kyiv's seven electoral districts, only one member was elected (Solchanyk, 1989b).

Many reformist and nationally minded candidates were elected at this time, particularly in Western Ukraine. The success of these
candidacies, as well as the skewed nature of the system (towards the entrenched Communist Party members) provided more momentum and publicity for forces wanting to change the system, which led to the process of the various provinces creating regional organizations of Rukh, and choosing delegates to represent these organizations at the upcoming founding Congress of Rukh.

b. The Establishment of Regional Organizations

Provinces in western Ukraine were the first to establish these regional organizations. Ternopil was the first regional group to get registered, in March 1989 (Tsembaljuk, 1995). Other founding conferences were held in the following months in other provinces, including the hugely popular conference in the L'viv region in May of that year, where hundreds of thousands of people were showing their support for a popular movement at various demonstrations and mass meetings (Pavljuk, 1995). A great many Communists were involved as well, as the winds of change flowing over the Baltics were being felt in Western Ukraine especially. And just as many local Communists were involved in the national fronts in the Baltics, a large number were involved in Western Ukraine. In addition, as Zajets' noted, these mass demonstrations and mass mobilization of support in Western Ukraine were crucial to the overall success of Rukh at this stage:

There was a great outburst in Western Ukraine, a great internal energy, and it had an original character. [The West] was like a locomotive, where they took it upon themselves to educate the east and south. It was only in the West that we had the kind of critical mass necessary to create and sustain a national organization such as Rukh. But with that energy from the West we were able to
create a more national vision, including representatives from all over Ukraine (Zajets', 1995).

These founding conferences were taking place in the south and east as well, but with less success. In the West, the conferences were able to take place in buildings sanctioned by the authorities and many reformers in the Party took part. But in other areas, the local Communist Parties were much more hostile to the formation of any reform-minded groups. In the south, initiative groups often were not even able to hold any meetings in the regions they were meant to represent. For example, in August 1989 the Odessa region was to hold its inaugural conference, but authorities would not allow them to hold them there so the conference was held in the city of Kishinev in Moldovia, where delegates to the founding national congress were chosen (Tsembaljuk, 1995).

While nationalist fervour and support for Rukh were not nearly as high in Kyiv as in Western Ukraine, opposition from the authorities towards Rukh had become somewhat more muted by the summer of that year. Thus, in July 1989, the Kyiv region of Rukh was able to hold its first conference in an officially sanctioned building. The conference was attended by 442 delegates representing more than 200 Rukh locals, as well as almost 200 invited guests from other oblasts, public and creative organizations, and other republics as well (Solchanyk, 1989c). Moreover, a number of representatives from the Baltic national fronts appeared to offer support to Rukh. At this conference, there were no really significant new initiatives taken. Most of the speeches were
critical of the republican government and their continuing conservatism, especially with respect to the environment, the spring election campaign and the language issue. Convention delegates were particularly critical of the republican government on the issue of language. Republican leadership had promised to make Ukrainian the official state language, but were showing almost no movement towards actually passing such a law (Ibid.).

When Leonid Kravchuk spoke at the conference, he seemed to give evidence of a new strategy on the part of the republican leadership. Rather than criticize all of Rukh, Kravchuk focused on those whom he called the "extremists", such as members of the UHU like Chornovil and Horyn', who also spoke at the conference and who had clearly developed leadership roles in Rukh:

One cannot ignore the fact that there are sober, realistically thinking people among the initiators of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika. They are gradually realizing the necessity of seeking compromise solutions, they support the idea of forming coordinating councils of public organizations. But there is the danger that individuals who are inclined to be anti-Socialist and anti-Soviet could take over the leadership of the Popular Movement's structures (Solchanyk, 1989c, 25).

Reports in newspapers such as Pravda Ukrayiny were also critical of the fact that Lithuanian and Latvian representatives spoke of the need for "genuine democracy, a law-governed state, and our independence", and that delegates applauded this type of pronouncement (Ibid.).

c. Rukh’s Momentum Builds

As we noted previously, Rukh had significant weakness in terms of presenting its arguments in the face of hostile reactions from
most of the mass media. But Rukh leaders had other strategies whereby they were able to make their views known and raise the profile of their movement. By far the most popular strategy was the mass meeting. As Kovtun documented, in 1989 there were mass meetings throughout Ukraine virtually every day, and in some large Ukrainian cities they became weekly events. At some of these gatherings over 50,000 people would show up, and various Rukh leaders would speak about reforms needed in the system. Sometimes these meetings were broken up by police or by provocateurs. Other times, participants in the meetings gathered and marched to government buildings to protest, or to historical monuments for more speeches (Kovtun, 1995). In general, these meetings played an important role in the transmission of information and in the development of momentum for Rukh.

Another factor that played an important role in the growth of Rukh was support from the diaspora. Every Rukh leader interviewed mentioned that money donated from the West allowed Rukh to build an infrastructure, and provided Rukh with enough resources to establish regional organizations nation-wide, even where the idea of a national movement was not as popular. These resources meant that Rukh leaders could travel and organize events that would help publicize the movements. Positive publicity in the West also meant that the movement was given greater legitimacy and could not be easily (or harshly) dealt with by the Communist powers.

Finally, the last factor that allowed the idea of a national movement for perestroika to gain momentum was the growth of a
labour movement led by the coal miners. In the summer of 1989, coal miners all over the USSR went on strike in some of the most important industrial areas, including the Donbass in Ukraine. Labour in these areas became much more politicized at this time, and began to demand that representatives of their choosing run the local factories, mines, councils, etc. They also began to demand various changes in how the economy was run (Haran', 1993). This was a crucial development for the development of Rukh because areas such as the Donbass were heavily russified, and issues such as Ukrainian as the state language, or blank spots in history were generally not as important here.

As Ivan Drach noted, Rukh had the potential to make great inroads in this area:

...we are talking about what must occur in Ukraine as a republic, a sovereign republic that... is to be part of a new union of republics on the basis of a new union agreement.... If we build all this up in such a way that the Russian worker in Ukraine has opportunities and conditions that are better than he has in any other republic, including in the Russian Federation, then I think this will be the main reality for which we should struggle along with the Russian worker.... I think that here, first of all, we must raise, very realistically, ecological problems, economic problems, and problems of the individual's social welfare - bringing this individual from his knees to his feet. I think that this will be the first, elementary precondition after which that Russian-speaking worker will sense that he must support "Rukh."... And I think that then the problems of language, culture and national symbolism will come up by themselves... (Solchanyk, 1989f, 20-21).

Several Rukh leaders mentioned that their strategy was to become more attractive to the labour movement, concentrating on the ecology and on dissatisfaction with the Communist regime, areas
where labour was becoming increasingly involved and politicized. The Ukrainian Communist Party could no longer say that it was the defender of the interests of the Ukrainian worker, and Rukh now had the chance to woo the labour movement in areas where it had not made huge inroads, and could become a more powerful, more inclusive, truly national organization.

At this time, however, some strain was already showing between various groups within Rukh. Writing about the Three Mile Island experience in the US, Edward Walsh and Sherry Cable note:

Dilemmas for [social movement organization] decision makers often derive from tensions between the complex internal dynamics of a protest organization and its necessarily more simplified public image. Grass-roots movements commonly include personality conflicts among contending leaders, ideological disputes over goals and means.... Contemporary perspectives on social movement phenomena emphasize the role of protest organizations as mobilization agents which frame structural discontents and coordinate individual responses..., but they tend to ignore the internal tensions and dynamics occurring within and between these organizations themselves (Walsh and Cable, 1989, 200).

In the case of Rukh, we must certainly examine the inner tensions within the movement. As might be expected within an umbrella organization composed of groups with vastly different ideologies, and with a wide array of public figures, some rifts began developing between the more radical factions of Rukh and the more centrist factions. Chornovil was critical of a speech made by Vitalij Donchyk, who spoke of the evolution of Rukh, but who did not mention the role of the UHU in that evolution, and who did not mention the earlier attempt at establishing a similar movement in L'viv the previous year. Chornovil was also very critical of the
fact that Rukh still supported the leading role of the Party despite the fact that it had spent the last 70 years "pillaging the country" (Haran', 1993). These kinds of conflicts were ongoing throughout Rukh's history, but tended to be more muted in the tenuous early stages of Rukh's development.

The very fact that such cities as L'viv, Kyiv, and Kharkiv had held these opening conferences secured Rukh's existence, at least in the short term. The next step for Rukh would be to hold an inaugural national conference, in an attempt to further consolidate the opposition forces.

d. The First National Congress of Rukh

From November 8-10, 1989, the first national congress of Rukh took place, in the Kyiv Polytechnical Institute (again, a building sanctioned by the authorities). One reason that the authorities allowed the Rukh Congress to take place was that Rukh leaders were said to have threatened to hold their opening Congress in Lithuania, if authorization was not granted in Kyiv (Muiznieks, 1995). 1158 members of Rukh, representing 1247 organizations from every province in Ukraine were to attend the conference. In the end 1109 delegates were registered, and were said to represent nearly 280,000 members of Rukh (Haran', 1993). The profile of these delegates was revealing, showing that Rukh was overrepresented in terms of Western Ukrainians and in terms of ethnic Ukrainians. Of these delegates, 85% were of Ukrainian ethnicity (Russians made up most of the rest of the representatives), 72% had a higher education (including 11% that were candidates and doctors of
science), and 20% were Communist Party members. About half the delegates were from Western Ukraine (about twice the proportion of Ukrainians living in that region compared to the overall population), 9% came from the southern regions (which has 19% of the total population), and less than 6% from Eastern Ukraine (which has 25% of the population) (Marples, 1990a).

As with the Kyiv Congress, there was some conflict between the so-called 'radicals' and centrists. Speakers such as Chornovil, Lukjanenko and Horyn' were beginning to talk about the eventual independence of Ukraine, while reformist delegates such as Javorivskyj and Drach concentrated on the idea of a sovereign Ukraine within a federated USSR. However, a compromise with the radicals was made in that Congress documents no longer referred to the leading role of the Party (although Rukh still officially supported the decrees from the 19th All-Union Party Conference) (Haran', 1993). In his final address at the Congress, newly elected President Ivan Drach remarked that part of the program was copied into the Ukrainian Communist Party platform, while the UHU claimed that part of the Rukh program came from the UHU Declaration of Principles, so there was something for everyone in Rukh (Haran', 1993). As Tsembaljuk noted:

Calling it a Movement for Perestroika was a reflection of what some people actually thought, while for others it was a camouflage. There were people who wanted some type of democracy in the Soviet Union, there were people who believed in the Communist system but wanted to liberalize it a little, there were social democrats, there were those who wanted Ukrainian independence (including many Communists), there were monarchists, democrats, and we had to take all these views into account (Tsembaljuk,
As Zajets' further noted, the goal at this point was to not alienate any particular group, and to get as many people as possible involved (Zajets', 1995). To this end, there was a great deal of discussion of the issue of language in Ukraine and the need to placate both minority groups in Ukraine and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Thus, while there were resolutions calling for a national rebirth and drastic changes to the education system and state apparatus with respect to the use of the Ukrainian language (with the ultimate goal of making Ukrainian the language of interethnic communication in Ukraine), significant overtures were also made to minority groups, including resolutions "To all Non-Ukrainians in Ukraine", "Against Anti-Semitism", and many others (Haran', 1993). In the final analysis, the final program was one of compromise, careful to maintain support of both the more radical West and to not alienate potential support from the East and South, and included resolutions that might mobilize greater support for Rukh in these areas.

The contrast of the Ukrainian national movement's program with those of the Baltic fronts is interesting to note. The Baltic fronts put language and cultural issues at the top of their list of grievances, and used these issues to mobilize support from the general populations. However, the fronts also seemed to be teaching ethnic Estonians and Latvians in particular, to equate anti-Soviet with anti-Russian, and often blamed the Russian population in the Baltics for the economic and cultural problems within the Baltic
republics (Bungs, 1991). The fear of losing their national language and possible extinction as a distinct people were very real concerns, especially in Estonia and Latvia.

In 1939, before the Baltic states were forcibly incorporated into the USSR, members of the titular nationalities in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia made up 81%, 88%, and 77% of the total populations. By 1989 however, the total figures had dropped to 79.6% in Lithuania, 61.5% in Estonia, and 52% in Latvia (Kionka, 1991a). In Estonia, before WWII, the republic was on its way to a level of industrialization appropriate to its size. After the war however, Moscow planned on creating new industrial centres in Estonia that required a huge influx of labour brought in from other parts of the USSR. Along with this influx of largely Russian immigrants came a policy to promote the primacy of the Russian language and culture at the expense of the Estonian (Kionka, 1991b). A similar situation existed in Latvia, but was exacerbated by the fact that recent immigration of Russians meant that the Latvians made up only about half the populations of their republic, and that the number of births of Latvian children was not enough to guarantee population replenishment (Bungs, 1991).

At the same time, the fronts also supported policies that were meant to protect the minorities in their republics. For example, Sajudis' draft program stated "Propagation of Lithuanian language should be encouraged, while simultaneously supporting development of the culture of the languages of the national minorities (Furtado Jr. and Chandler, 1992, 151)." But these types of statements did
little to assuage fears of intolerance towards minorities, given the blame being put on the Russian immigration for the problems of the republics. One of the results of this tension between the minority and majority populations in the Baltic republics was the formation of Interfronts, or Intermovements (from internationalist movement), that sprung up to protect minority rights and interests. As Vladimir Lebedev, an ethnic Russian who lived most of his life in Estonia explained, he did not support the conservative views of the Estonian Interfront, but stated that he was a member for the following reasons:

If a person is beaten and is part of a minority, that person must seek allies. For the same reason, we are forced to ally with the so-called Moscow conservative forces. It's too bad that we did not find allies among the Estonian intelligentsia, people who do not assume that the indigenous population has priority. The fundamental value all over the world is the individual person. But our republic's contribution, unfortunately, comes at the expense of nationality (Kionka, 1990, 23).

We can see then, that the Baltics were again an influence on Rukh leaders, as they worked very hard at trying to create an inclusive draft programme rather than exclusive, and concentrated heavily on issues that were of a priority all over Ukraine (for example, the economy and ecology), rather than issues that would be a priority to ethnic Ukrainians (Zajets', 1995). With respect to

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3 The Intermovement phenomenon was actually quite complex, as these movements were often a combination of minority populations who actually did feel threatened, and partly "domestic fifth columns" that Moscow was controlling in order to reassert control over a particular republic. These interfronts had the support of Moscow conservative hardliners such as Yigor Ligachev, and their rhetoric corresponded with that of the conservative middle level apparatchiks who attacked Gorbachev's progressive policies at a July, 1989 Central Committee meeting (Ilves, 1991).
resolutions on protection of the environment and protection of minorities, Zajets' concluded that these types of pronouncements were the strength of Rukh, and that they were organizing themselves like a part of [Western] European civilization, which would be appealing to all members of the Ukrainian population (Zajets', 1995). When criticizing the Party, it was clear that Rukh leaders were criticizing Communism, not Russians. Moreover, when dealing with the language issue in Ukraine, the Rukh leadership made it clear that while Ukrainian would be promoted as the state language, Russian speakers would not be adversely affected. In fact, Rukh was constantly seeking approval and trying to mobilize support within the Russian speaking population. In the end, Ukrainian minorities were eventually very receptive to the idea of an independent Ukraine (although were still quite hostile to the more radical direction Rukh was to take), and interethnic tensions never reached the same levels in Ukraine as they did in other republics.

III. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PROTEST

a. The Concept of Frame Alignment

Having examined the processes by which macro structural factors affected the mobilization of support, we now turn to how social movements themselves try to enhance the mobilization potential. In this section we will examine how Rukh tried to compete with the CPU in the hopes of gaining support for its platform. According to Gamson:

Sustained collective action involves a symbolic struggle.
In the broadest sense, it is a struggle over the legitimacy of a regime and trust in the incumbent political authorities.... It is a constant, uphill struggle for those who would sustain collective action in the face of official myths and metaphors.... Each struggle takes place in a particular issue arena. For every challenge, there is a relevant discourse - a particular set of ideas and symbols that are used in the process of constructing meanings relevant to the struggle. To achieve and sustain mobilization, a challenger must participate in such a discourse (Gamson, 1988, 219-221).

Social construction theorists use the metaphor of framing to conceptualize the process of shaping and defining ideas. Social movements "frame, or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists (Snow and Benford, 1988, 198)." Those social movements that succeed in frame alignment, where the ideas, ideology, and beliefs of the social movement are congruous with the ideas ideologies and beliefs of the individual, will be most successful in mobilizing support (Snow et al., 1986). Snow and Benford describe how social movements have "core" framing tasks, that is, diagnose some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of improvement, propose a solution, and finally actively engage in moving towards a solution.

b. The Use of Symbols in Social Construction

In order to frame an issue successfully, the movement must present a package that individuals will see as containing important issues, and use symbols and meanings that individuals can relate to, especially when competing groups are presenting packages using
similar terminology. When a group is successful in correlating its package with an individual's beliefs, the group has achieved cultural resonance. As Gamson and Modigliani argue:

Not all symbols are equally potent. Certain packages have a natural advantage because their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes. Resonances increase the appeal of a package, they make it appear natural and familiar. Those who respond to the larger cultural theme will find it easier to respond to a package of the same sonorities (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, 5).

Similarly, Snow and Benford use the term 'narrative fidelity' to describe this congruence, arguing that frames "resonate with cultural narrations, that is, with the stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one's cultural heritage and that thus function to inform events and experiences in the immediate present (Snow and Benford, 1988, 210)." The frames with the best resonance should provide the largest mobilization potential. It is within this concept of narrative fidelity that we can explore the uniqueness of the Ukrainian case.

As we saw in Chapter Three, Rukh had many potential issues and symbols to utilize in their mobilization of support. The most powerful of these symbols was that of Chernobyl'. This symbol was able to transcend two of the main constraints that affect potential potency of ideas, those of centrality and credibility. If the movement is trying to promote values or beliefs that are not of value in the overall belief system, it becomes more difficult to mobilize support. Next, if the movement is seen as making claims or statements that are not credible, or easily disputed (that is, are opponents able to create more credible frames than the movement),
then again, mobilization potential is hurt (Snow and Benford, 1988).

The Chernobyl disaster was the perfect symbol for Rukh because it had happened very recently, and people all over Ukraine were still very worried about both the consequences of that disaster and the potential for similar future nuclear disasters. The Chernobyl issue also transcended ethnic and class lines. It did not matter what one's ethnic background or socio-economic status was, a nuclear plant meltdown had the same effect on everyone. Finally, the Chernobyl issue clearly helped Rukh establish its own credibility and establish credibility for the idea of Ukrainian sovereignty, but also significantly hurt the credibility of both the Ukrainian government and the Gorbachev government.

Neither level of government was forthcoming with information about the disaster in the immediate aftermath. From the beginning, there were attempts to control the amount of information released, as well as downplay the amount of potential damage that might occur, (the Ukrainian Minister of Health was among those who tried to downplay the impact of the incident). A thirty kilometer restricted area around Chernobyl was evacuated, but the areas immediately surrounding this zone were poorly monitored, and the inhabitants of these areas were told they were in no danger although there was little evidence to suggest that contamination had been contained within the restricted area (Marples, 1990d). Leadership at both levels of government tried to avoid the issue.
Gorbachev made only one television appearance that dealt specifically with the issue, and Ukrainian Party leaders played virtually no role in the aftermath of the disaster, believing it to be of either all-Union or oblast' jurisdiction (Marples, 1990d).

Finally, the governments' credibility shrunk even further when it became clear that radiation contamination was causing health problems in populations well outside the thirty kilometer zone. Although the earliest evidence of contamination was found in Belarus, the first crisis in Ukraine occurred in the Narodichi Rajon in the Zhytomyr Oblast'. Local residents complained that health authorities were ignoring their concerns about high incidents of sickness in their region, so they turned to politicians and journalists to publicize their plight (Marples, 1990b).

Again the policy of glasnost' had a significant effect in allowing criticism of the authorities to be published and released. First, several highly critical documentary films by independent film-makers were released in 1988-1989 which drew widespread attention to the problem. The films were Pomih (Threshold), Mikro-fon!, and Zapredel (Beyond the Limits) (Marples, 1990d). Second, a series of articles on the Narodichi crisis began appearing in newspapers in Ukraine and in the Soviet Union. The first of these articles, "The Big Lie" appeared in Moskovskije Novosti in October. The article claimed that, from the beginning, officials covered up the effects of the accident, and that for three years, people living in areas affected by radiation were not
told the truth. Shcherbytskyj and former Belorussian Party First Secretary Nikolai Slynkov were named as two of the main culprits (Marples, 1990b).

Later, several articles appeared in the weekly _Literaturna Ukrajina_ and the dailies _Molod' Ukrajiny_ and _Radjans'ka Ukrajina_ dealing with the same issues, demanding that authorities pay more attention to these areas outside the official zone (Marples, 1990d). Finally a series of reports appearing in _Molod' Ukrajiny_ stated that in the Zhytomyr Oblast', more than 455 settlements with a population of about 93,000 people, including 18,000 children, were affected by the radiation (Marples, 1990b). Eventually it was realized that about 3 million Ukrainians and Belorussians were living in areas that had been exposed to high levels of fallout (Marples, 1990d).

With all these reports being released, and with authorities slowly admitting that the problem was greater than it had originally claimed, the public's confidence in local health authorities and experts diminished to the point that even accurate information was not believed. Marples summed up the public's attitude in this way:

_Chernobyl'_ has divided Soviet society. It has nurtured a popular distrust of scientists and Party leaders. The suffering of the population in Ukraine has strengthened the belief that Ukrainians should have the final word about which industries are located on their territory. But even now... for the average citizen there remain too many unanswered questions: How many people have in fact died as a result of the accident?... How many areas have been affected? What casualty toll is still to come? And have the lessons of _Chernobyl'_ been learned (Marples, 1990d, 14)?
Finally, as noted earlier, the word Chernobyl' even became part of the vocabulary, used as a metaphor for any kind of impending disaster. Thus when people spoke of a cultural Chernobyl referring to the disappearance of the Ukrainian language, they were using a terminology that both served to remind the audience of an incredible disaster and served to show the potential implications on the Ukrainian language that government policies were causing. But representatives of both governments were able to use their own symbols, and their own versions of historical memory to great effect against Rukh as well.

The most prominent use of historical memory by Rukh opponents had to do with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and their leader Stepan Bandera, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) (mentioned in Chapter Two). Whenever government representatives wanted to score points against Rukh and similar groups, they would call Rukh members Banderivtsi. In Eastern and Southern Ukraine, the use of the name Bandera still conjures up images of terrorism, fascism and ultranationalism. In fact the name Bandera had the same kind of power as the name Hitler. As several historians have noted, part of the core identity of Ukrainians who were veterans of the Soviet Army (and their descendants) in Eastern and Southern Ukraine was that of defenders of the Soviet Union, of the homeland, during the Great Patriotic War (von Hagen, 1995). The UPA, however, fought against the Soviet Union and, it was believed, often fought with the fascist Germans. This then made the UPA enemies of the Red Army veterans. In fact, a veterans organization
was created in Ukraine in 1995, in which veterans of all kinds of
wars were supposed to join together, old WWII veterans, Afghan
veterans, and veterans of the Ukrainian Army. But the old Red Army
veterans rebuffed the Ukrainian group as enemies. As one People's
Deputy remarked: "They can't find a path towards common
understanding, towards getting a common history (Aljoshyn, 1995)."

In Western Ukraine, there was some attempt made to reexamine
the roles of OUN and the UPA during and after WWII. For example,
Rostyslav Brytun', a People's Deputy from L'viv, noted that OUN was
"an extreme manifestation of opposition to the Polish occupation",
and that the UPA was the first to group in the Volyn' region to
fight against the Germans (Solchanyk, 1990a). People's Deputies
from the east described how they would try to educate the public
about these issues. In Kirovohrad, the geographical centre of
Ukraine, there have been conferences held to try to understand what
really happened during the war with UPA and the UAI. For example,
how many died in particular battles, which groups were involved,
etc. Local historians were becoming actively involved in doing
their own research about the time period and trying to better
understand that particular period of history (Aljoshyn, 1995).

In the east, in Sumshchyna, local Rukh representatives tried
to educate the public about the symbols that they were using. In
that area, people did not take well to the symbolism, saying that
it was some sort of "banderite" symbolism they had not seen before.
In a personal interview, one People's Deputy remarked to me that he
had tried to make the point to his constituents that the symbols
Rukh were using (e.g., the trident, and the blue-yellow flag) were a part of an older history. He reintroduced an ancient crest of the city, one which was older than the crest used at the time. The ancient crest was from the fourteenth century and had yellow-blue colors and a cross in it. Representatives from Rukh tried to write about these symbols, and tried to write about the UPA and OUN, but invariably, there were seven or eight negative articles appearing beside any two or three written by Rukh people (Tkachenko, 1995). Again, the greater access of Communist authorities to the media disadvantaged Rukh efforts in educating the public about these issues and increasing their mobilization potential.

But when this whole complex period of Ukrainian history is examined, it seems clear that the experiences of Eastern and Western Ukraine were very different, and as a result, the types of myths and symbols that have positive connotations in one region, have negative ones in the rest. Memories and myths of great devastation and loss were brought out, and of course, would make groups like Rukh less sympathetic in their eyes. As one Deputy noted:

You have to remember that in the east and south you have had Ukrainian repression as a part of everyday life since the twenties. We are talking three or four generations. Starting from kindergarten you are in Pioneers. Then you are in Komsomol. You forget all the other things, and instead learn to just follow the red flag. That is what

4 Personal interview with People's Deputy and Rukh member Volodymyr Tkachenko, Kyiv July 12. 1995. All further references to this interview will be noted as (Tkachenko. 1995).
you believed in (Omel'chuk, 1995). The media, again, played a critical role in the transmission of these symbols and images. As was noted in Chapter Three, the mass media were very unsympathetic to Rukh, especially in the early period of its existence. It was noted that the fact that Rukh was discussed at all in the media was important in that people's curiosity was raised and Rukh leaders at least had some opportunity to debate Party leaders. Because Rukh's draft program was not widely published and because only articles and commentaries that were negative in nature towards Rukh were published (for the most part), it meant that the criticisms of Rukh had greater impact than they should have.

Ukrainian leaders such as Shcherbitskyj, Ivashko, and El'chenko all used terms such as "ultranationalists" and "extremists" to describe Rukh to try to put fear into those Ukrainians (largely based in Eastern and Southern Ukraine) who did not speak Ukrainian and into those who were not ethnically Ukrainian. These leaders would use terms like ultranationalism and extremism to bring forth images of potential Nagorno-Karabakh, and possibilities of civil war. If the Rukh leaders had had better media access and more media sympathy, Rukh might have been able to make better inroads in the East and South, as their draft program went to great lengths to show that while Ukrainian language was to be granted state language status, those who spoke Russian would not be punished.

5 Personal interview with People's Deputy and Rukh member Roman Omel'chuk, Kyiv: June 30, 1995. All further references to this interview will be noted as (Omel'chuk, 1995).
As well, secretariats for minority relations were established in Rukh, and the draft program took care to note that ultranationalism was not a positive concept, that ethnic minorities would be encouraged to establish schools where students could be taught in their language of origin, and that Ukraine was to be a democratic, multiethnic state where different cultures could flourish and coexist (Furtado Jr. and Chandler, 1992). Because this position was not adequately transmitted to the general population, particularly in areas where there was a historical antipathy to any groups claiming a nationalist mantle, it was very difficult for Rukh to overcome suspicion to garner the kind of support it had in the West to make it a truly republic-wide power.

In fact, the battle over the use of symbols was not limited to Rukh and other groups in its field. There was frequent disagreement within Rukh throughout its existence as to the types of symbols it should use and the extent to which it should use them. For nationalists in Western Ukraine the use of the blue-yellow coloring of the old Ukrainian flag and the use of the trzyzub (trident) as a national symbol came naturally. Zajets' commented that when the leaders of Rukh were sending out invitations to the first national congress, there was a debate over whether the invitations should have blue-yellow coloring or not. For him, this should not have even been an issue. Members of the organizing committee such as Brjukhovetskyj and Popovych argued against the use of these colors, noting that the colors might have a psychological effect of alienating representatives from the east and south. Zajets' argued
that, despite not understanding the history of the blue-yellow flag in Eastern Ukraine, it was up to the Rukh leadership to educate the Eastern population as to the meaning of these symbols: "You cannot love what you cannot see. They would learn to love that symbolism, but they need to see it first, and as soon as possible (Zajets', 1995)." Ultimately, the more conservative members of the Writers' Union won out, and it was decided not to send the invitations with the blue-yellow design.

The debate continued up to the congress itself. At the beginning of the conference, several delegates noted that the only flag in evidence was the Ukrainian SSR flag, and a blue-yellow flag was quickly erected beside it (Tsembaljuk, 1995). But again, the fact that the flag was such an issue revealed the difference in history between Eastern and Western Ukraine. In Western Ukraine the blue-yellow flag had been allowed under Polish rule and only disappeared from use after the Soviet occupation. In Eastern Ukraine the flag had not been seen since the days of the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1920 (Krawchenko, 1990). Moreover, the Ukrainian government controlled a media campaign that attacked those who supported the blue-yellow flag as nationalists, and as a purely Western Ukrainian and even Banderite invention, and not a true national symbol.6

6 Once again we see the debate between historiographers taking place, this time with respect to the history of the blue-yellow colors. For Ukrainian nationalists, the history of the blue and yellow colors goes back to the fourteenth century and the Halychyna-Volyn' kingdom. Although the Cossacks used crimson as a predominant color, they also used blue-yellow combinations. Finally, the Ukrainian People's Republic adopted the blue-yellow colors as its national symbol,
Even when the Ukrainian government fought against the use of symbols from past Ukrainian history, they were left with a major weakness, the unpopularity of their own Soviet symbols. For many, the red Soviet flag was a symbol of the system, of secret stores, privileged housing and was a banner for the partocracy. For Ukrainian nationalists, the red flag was obviously even more of a hated symbol. A poll taken in Kyiv in the summer of 1989 (and in the town of Kozjatyn in the Vinnytsja oblast' of Central Ukraine), showed that 29% of Ukrainians, 45% of Russians, and 28% of Jews were satisfied with the existing symbols. Interestingly, the same poll showed that making the blue-yellow flag the national flag of Ukraine was supported by 35% of Ukrainians, 25% of Russians, and 22% of Jews (Krawchenko, 1990). At this time then, the majority of Ukrainians were wary about symbolism coming from both sides.

IV. THE PATH TO SOVEREIGNTY

a. The Aftermath of the First National Rukh Congress

Although the opening Congress of Rukh showed that there was a wide variety of political forces represented under the umbrella of the Rukh movement, one point of common interest among these forces

and since Western Ukraine also claimed these colors for its flag in 1918, the colors were truly all-Ukrainian (Krawchenko, 1990). Soviet historiographers would deny the lineage back to the fourteenth century and argue that the blue-yellow flag was discredited because "under these colors were committed all kinds of horrors (Krawchenko, 1990)."
was opposition to the Shcherbytskyj regime (Koval', 1995 and others). Orest Subtelny compared Shcherbytskyj's leadership with that of a corporate executive managing a branch plant (Ukraine) for a corporation (Moscow). Thus when Moscow called for policies of Russification, Shcherbytskyj moved to quell support for national culture and language, arguing that these "local particularities" got in the way of efficiency and progress. Shcherbytskyj had thus been the CPU leader through some of the worst periods of repression in the 1970s and 1980s (Subtelny, 1994a). As noted, he was also not making significant movement with respect to perestroika and glasnost'. Throughout the Congress, calls for his resignation as Ukrainian Party leader rang out from the more radical fringes of Rukh to, more importantly, Communist participants (Haran', 1993). The fact that the Congress was held at all was an important symbolic victory for anti-Shcherbytskyj forces.

This antipathy towards Shcherbytskyj became particularly evident during the second day of the proceedings, where an open letter to Gorbachev about the current situation in Ukraine was read out to the delegates (Mihalisko, 1989). The letter was signed by 18 USSR people's deputies who had formed a "Republican Deputies Club" that was allied to the Interregional Group of Deputies in Moscow where Yeltsin and Sakharov were leading figures. The letter stated that "the inflexibility and sometimes deliberately provocative activity" of the Communist Party in Ukraine was leading to rising

7 Personal interview with Vasyl' Koval', member of Rukh Party Secretariat; Kyiv, June 16, 1995.
tension within the republic, and that Party claims that Rukh was a nationalist Banderite organization were patently false, noting that Rukh membership included Russians, Jews, Hungarians, Byelorussians as well as other nationalities (Ibid.). Finally the letter warned that Gorbachev's policies of perestroika were being sabotaged by the republican leadership, and that only through a change in leadership could faith in perestroika be renewed:

The authority of our highest republican leaders has dropped to zero and continues to fall. Faith has been undermined not only in individual authorities and the current power structure but in the renewal of socialism.... Resolutions are being passed at numerous gatherings and meetings of workers' collectives that demand the resignations of Volodymyr Shcherbitsky and Valentina Shevchenko [chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet]. As we are worried about the fate of the Ukrainian SSR and the future of perestroika in our country, and feel personally responsible for what is taking place, we ask that our appeal be published in the central and republican press and examined at all levels (Ibid., 23).

Although Shcherbytskyj was indelibly linked with Brezhnev and represented the type of stagnant leadership that Gorbachev was seemingly moving away from, many commentators wondered why Shcherbytskyj had not yet been removed as leader of the Ukrainian Party. Some had speculated that the Kremlin needed a strong authoritarian hand in Kyiv to keep Ukrainian nationalism in check (Ibid.). However, it was also clear that Gorbachev's policies did not have much credibility in a republic with such a conservative leader, who had been responsible for many destructive policies with respect to Ukrainian cultural and intellectual life. In September of 1989, at a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Ukraine, Volodymyr Shcherbytskyj announced that he was retiring as republican first secretary, a position he had held for seventeen years (Solchanyk, 1989d). Volodymyr Ivashko, the previous second secretary, was elected as the new Party leader.

On the surface, this change appeared to be a victory for the Rukh forces, as Shcherbytskyj represented all that they considered wrong with present day Ukraine. For pro-reform supporters, any leader would have the potential to be more progressive and conciliatory. But the plenum, at which Gorbachev was present and playing an active role, also made it very clear that the Party was going to stress continuity and in particular, "take more decisive measures against nationalists" (Solchanyk, 1989e). The plenum seemed to make clear that it was not just Shcherbytskyj, but the higher echelon of Ukrainian Party leadership that was responsible for the present era of stagnation. For example, the Ukrainian Ideological Secretary Jurij Jel'chenko claimed that the Rukh founding congress had a program that camouflaged a desire for "separatism, national exclusiveness, and isolation (Solchanyk, 1989d)." The First Secretary of the Odessa Oblast Party Committee Heorhij Krjuchkov continued in this vein, arguing that the Central Committee had to be more active and tough:

...whether we are talking about rebuffing the extremists from "Rukh", who are lunging to seize power and attempting to force upon our people the nationalist ideology, a course aimed at separating Ukraine from the Soviet Union, to rehabilitate Banderism, and to consolidate nationalist symbols; or the ambitions of the so-called Interregional Group of Deputies, which is impudently trying to force its positions upon other deputies and the entire people (Solchanyk, 1989e, 18).
Finally, Ivashko himself stated that it would be better to speak of similarities than of differences between himself and Shcherbytskyj (Ibid., 19). Thus, despite the advent of new leadership in Ukraine, it seemed that a determined opposition to Rukh and to democratic and nationalist forces in general, was to continue and perhaps even increase.

In a personal interview, Leonid Kravchuk summed up for me the CPU's attitude towards Rukh in this way:

The Communist Party of Ukraine was one of the most conservative of all the republics. The greatest enemies of Ukraine were seen to be nationalists, Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. At any kind of demonstration or meeting, ideological or otherwise, members of the Politburo did not hesitate in denouncing nationalism. This was fundamental. So any national movements were seen automatically as enemies. So Rukh, initiated by the Writers' Union, was seen automatically in a negative light. The goal was to criticize Rukh, not allow it, show how they were enemies, show that they were enemies of the Ukrainian socialist nation. This was the conceptual directive from the Communist Party of Ukraine. So in the early stages of the public demonstrations we were very confrontational with Rukh leaders, in particular Drach and Pavlychko (Kravchuk, 1995)." 

Faced with this kind of opposition, and seeking to build momentum from a successful opening congress and Shcherbytskyj's subsequent resignation, Rukh leaders searched for ways to further boost their movement's popularity. Once more their eyes turned to the Baltics for inspiration.

b. The Great Human Chain

On August 23, 1989, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the
signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Baltic fronts organized the formation of a human chain extending from Vilnius to Tallinn, involving hundreds of thousands of people. In December of that year, the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) separated from the CPSU, and the tension between Lithuania and Moscow began to escalate even more than previously (Senn, 1991). Gorbachev heavily criticized this move by the LCP and in January of 1990 made a speech condemning the Lithuanian action. During this speech Gorbachev referred to the Ukrainian situation, stating that the entire Donbass was Russian and that Kharkiv was a Russian city (Haran', 1993).

Ivan Drach made a speech on January 13. In response to Gorbachev's claim that Kharkiv was a Russian city, Drach suggested that Rukh should organize a human chain that would link Ukraine from east to west, from L'viv to Kyiv to Poltava to Kharkiv (Ibid.). Rukh's organizational abilities in the south and east were not great enough to organize such a chain, and instead it was announced that on January 21 a human chain would be formed from L'viv to Kyiv, marking the anniversary of the union of the Ukrainian People's Republic (whose capital was Kyiv) and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (whose capital was L'viv) into one country. This event was of critical importance for two reasons. First of all, it was important to show that the movement could assume these kinds of organizational challenges, and that the various oblast' organizations could work together with the national organization to stage such an event (Horyn', 1995). The western
oblachts' especially showed their organizational skills as the national organization left it up to the oblasts to make sure that the chain had enough people in their particular regions, and that there was enough transport to get people to the less populated areas (Bojko, 1995).

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the human chain was a symbolic victory for the movement, a great show of strength, in that hundreds of thousands of people participated in making the human chain. The chain commemorated the last time that Ukraine was independent, and marked the historic linkage between central and western Ukraine, thus showing support for the idea of a sovereign Ukrainian state. Moreover, although the chain did not extend beyond Kyiv into the east, the publicity surrounding the event was such that mass demonstrations in support of the chain and commemorating the last period of independence of Ukraine were held throughout the country, from Mukachevo in the far west, to Kharkiv in the east (Nahaylo, 1990).

Finally, even though many of Ukraine's daily newspapers condemned the idea of the human chain to commemorate this period of independent statehood, party authorities announced that they would not interfere with the event, meaning that the idea of a sovereign Ukraine was being brought out in the open, and meaning that the Ukrainian movement was showing signs of having the same kind of potential to mobilize support for its movement as was occurring in the Baltics. By being able to hold this event without harassment by the authorities, hundreds of thousands of people were activized
into physically supporting an act that was not sponsored by or supported by the Communist Party. In participating in this event, these people were proving to themselves that they were indeed living in a different era, where the potential for change might indeed be possible.

Later that summer Rukh sponsored another event that garnered significant publicity for the movement and involved tens of thousands of supporters, namely the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Kozachynna (the Cossack state) in Zaporizhzhja. This celebration was symbolically important because it was taking place in a region that was composed mostly of ethnic Russians and Russian speaking Ukrainians. Similar to the Great Human Chain, Rukh was again trying to connect different regions of a country by reaching back into history to a time when Eastern and Western Ukraine were united. In addition, Rukh organizers were able to hold a major event in a region that was not oriented towards nationalism, and showed people in this region at least, that they were not to be feared. As one Deputy who participated in the event explained to me:

Let me tell you what happened in Zaporizhzhja. Radio announcements said that people should lock up their kids because they would be kidnapped, and that some black force was coming down on the people. When we got there, it was like the city was uninhabited. Such a big city and there was almost no one there. But by the second and third day, more people were coming out, and seeing that we were not like that. There were songs and concerts, and finally a dialogue, where we were able to talk to people and explain the symbols, etc. (Omelchuk, 1995).

Again, one must stress that these events had a greater impact
on the population in Western Ukraine than in the east or south. Tens of thousands of participants from Western Ukraine took part in celebrations like these, and others that were to take place in the future. Without question, Rukh was able to mobilize a great deal of support in the West, and their momentum in that area was growing rapidly. Elsewhere, the reaction was more muted. As deputies from areas such as Sumshchyna and Luhansk noted, there was some media coverage of events which raised the curiosity of some individuals, but in general, these events did not make much of an impact in many parts of Ukraine. Overall though, events such as these and those that were taking place in the Baltics were making Moscow increasingly concerned about the national question.

c. The Draft Nationalities Policy of the CPSU

By the spring of 1990, it was very clear that the nationalities question had taken on the utmost importance for Gorbachev. But his overall approach to dealing with the republics was inconsistent. At times he would seem to be conciliatory towards the republics but at virtually the same time he would provoke them. For example, even as he condemned the Baltic republics' statutes that allowed republican laws to override all-union laws, Gorbachev increasingly admitted the weaknesses of the old Communist Party policy on nationalities. He called for the building of a completely new political system, where a loose federation of republics would be created, where republics would be on an equal footing, and where they would have more power of self-determination (Kux, 1990).

The CPSU Central Committee Plenum that looked at the
nationalities issue in September of 1989, admitted that the republics' sovereignty was in reality only "legally formal." Gorbachev also went so far as to concede that "up to now our state existed as a centralised and unitary state and none of us has yet had the experience of living in a federation (Ibid., 2)." Moreover, the political and economic realities "violate the constitutional provisions of the Soviet federation both in letter and spirit" with the result that "the very idea of federation has been seriously compromised (Ibid.)." At the same time however, Gorbachev still castigated nationalists and separatists in the republics and declared that, "The ideas of national separatism were always alien to the spirit of socialist internationalism which is the core of the foundation of the multi-national state (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, 346)." He also claimed that "nationalist, chauvinist, and extremist elements" were "kindling interethnic conflicts" (Furtado and Chandler, 1992), a direct rebuke against the popular fronts that were gaining in popularity all over the USSR, and particularly in the Baltics.

In the final analysis, although the Plenum was held specifically to deal with the nationalities problem, Gorbachev and other party leaders did not take any firm stand on the national question. There was no timetable set on drafting a new constitution, no mandate was given, and various leaders stressed that the road to reform should not be too hasty (Kux, 1990). In addition the Draft also specified the importance of the developing the Russian language on the same footing as the state language of
the republic, and that favourable conditions should be created for "the development of national-Russian and Russian-national linguistic communication (Furtado and Chandler, 1992, 31)." The continued stress on maintaining the Russian language, in the face of concerns that in many cases the Russian language was already predominant over the state language of the republics, meant that the needs of groups seeking to preserve and nurture their state language were largely ignored.

Although events with respect to the nationalities may already have been moving too quickly for any leader to devise an effective solution, by not taking a proactive stance and not taking any strong direct action in support of the republics, Gorbachev (may have) lost his last chance (however temporarily) to deal with the national question. Instead, events continued to speed along, and Gorbachev found himself eventually offering concessions that were probably two or three years late in coming.

d. The Elections of March, 1990

One particular concession that Gorbachev offered provided a window of opportunity for nascent political parties and social movements and impacted heavily on the local Communist Parties especially. In February of 1990, Article 6 of the constitution was removed, thus taking away the guarantee that the Communist Party would play the leading role in society. Gorbachev stated that the monopoly on power had to be given up and the CPSU would have to compete directly with other political groups for the right to govern. Suddenly, the March 4 elections to local soviets and the
Supreme Soviet in Ukraine held the potential for great political change.

Had the March 4 elections been more open, Rukh leaders might have had to decide at this time whether to begin the transformation of the movement into an official political party to compete in these elections, or remain a national movement that would offer support for certain groups or candidates. There was confusion within the movement at this time, as some leaders wanted Rukh to remain a movement, while others were beginning to speak of Rukh as a "political party that is ready to take upon itself the burden of perestroika (Mihalisko, 1990a)."

What we know is that the cards were stacked against groups like Rukh. Several factors kept Rukh and other organizations from participating in the elections as a formal party or organization. First, in August 1989 the draft election law was published. Quotas were to be established for public organizations. The Ukrainian Parliament (or Supreme Council) was to have 450 seats. Candidate nomination was to be controlled by district election commissions (DEC's), created by local oblast' executive committees, which were Communist controlled (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). Thus, even though groups of 200 electors could nominate candidates, the DEC's could, and often did, work in collusion with local authorities and prevented many independent candidates from running (Mihalisko, 1990a). As well, election laws stated that nominations from public organizations had to take place at congresses at or below the oblast level, meaning that groups such as Zelenyj Svit or the
Ukrainian Language Society, which were registered at the republic level, but not locally, could not have representatives nominated (Ibid.). Rukh could not participate officially in the nomination process because the statutes of the organization were not registered by authorities until February 9, which was well past the deadline for nominating candidates. All this did not mean, however, that members of these organizations did not succeed in running in these elections.

In fact, on November 18, 1989, members from forty-three informal organizations, including Rukh, Zelenyj Svit, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, and the majority of religious and youth groups, formed an opposition coalition to the Communist Party called the "Democratic Bloc". The program formulated by the Bloc appeared to be an abbreviated version of the Rukh program, but more importantly, the platform focused on gaining the anti-Communist vote, criticizing the old system, the failure of perestroika, the continuing slow pace of reform by the nomenclature, and the violation of constitutional rights and freedoms (Marples, 1990c).

In the end, despite widespread manipulation and the blocking of nominations of many independent candidates, the Democratic Bloc was relatively successful in these elections. They obtained between 25 and 30 percent of the seats, with the greatest successes coming in the west in Halychyna, where they won 43 of 47 seats, and in cities such as Kyiv, where they won 16 of 22 seats. The Bloc even fared well in such russified cities as Donets'k and Kharkiv.
However, overall, the Bloc did quite poorly in the east, and exceptionally poorly in the south (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994) (see map on following page). Once again, this showed the inability of groups such as Rukh to make inroads beyond the west and centre of Ukraine, areas that had to be reached in order to establish a true national movement.

However, the elections were significant in that local elections broke the Communist monopoly of power. Democratic Bloc candidates gained absolute control over several oblast councils and in many urban areas, meaning that opposition forces now had some institutional resources at their disposal, and had a strong foothold from which to build and grow (Ibid.) As well, because Communists were no longer guaranteed a leading role, Communist candidates all over Ukraine had to reexamine the party's policies. Even in the east and south where the Communist candidates fared relatively well, there was still a fairly strong anti-Communist backlash and a large group of uncommitted candidates found themselves elected. Many Communist candidates had to distance themselves from the policies of the conservative leadership to maintain some degree of popularity and legitimacy in the wake of rising anti-Communist sympathies (Ibid.).
Map 3  Percentage of Democratic Bloc Candidates Originally Elected in the Spring 1990 Elections (Source: Andrew Wilson. Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, P. 122)
CHAPTER FIVE

THE TRANSFORMATION OF RUKH

I. UKRAINE’S PROCLAMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE AFTERMATH

a. The Beginning of the Fragmentation of Rukh

By the summer of 1990, it was becoming evident that Rukh was beginning to be pulled part by the very policies that had given it a wide degree of popularity in the first place. The inner tensions described in Chapter Four were becoming increasingly prominent and significant. Because Rukh was trying to be all things to all people, that is, trying to satisfy the more nationalist and increasingly more radical western groups while also trying to woo the more populous and conservative eastern and southern provinces to give Rukh a truly national voice and power base, Rukh ended up losing some support from both radicals and conservatives.

The increasing radicalization of Western Ukraine was led by leaders of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. Leaders such as Levko Lukjanenko and Vjacheslav Chornovyl were constantly trying to take Rukh to a more nationalist position, and were much more at ease using nationalist symbols such as the Blue-yellow flag and the trident than were the leaders in Kyiv, who were trying for a more gradual change. Throughout 1989, demonstrations were becoming more and more popular throughout Western Ukraine, and there was still a great deal of harassment by authorities at these demonstrations. Several mass meetings had experienced provocation by the Black Berets, a Special Purpose Militia Detachment. Participants were
often beaten, chased away by attack dogs, or detained by police. Finally, following an unprovoked attack on demonstrators at a rally in L'viv on October 1, 1989, the UHU led the formation of a radical strike rally (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). Three days later, there was a two hour strike and a mass meeting in L'viv protesting the behaviour of the police detachment, and a general strike was organized for October 27. Rukh was hesitant about supporting what they saw as radical action by the workers and in fact, did not support the October 27 strike, insisting that the committee should have consulted with central Rukh leadership before undertaking such actions (Ibid.).

Rukh also faced problems with members from the east, who often argued that the Rukh leadership was too nationalist and extremist in its views. Instances of this tension between east and west included the resignation of fifteen members of Rukh in Kharkiv, who argued that the "anti-democratic nature of several of the principles in its program and charter" meant that they would start up a rival popular front (Ibid, 115). As well, delegates from the Voroshylovohrad strike committee also resigned from Rukh, stating that they would return, however, if the movement was to move away from nationalist and separatist issues.

This chapter will thus focus on the fragmentation of Rukh and increasing marginalization of the movement in terms of the political situation in Ukraine in 1990. We will see that the birth of a multi-Party system in Ukraine meant that Rukh was no longer seen by many as the central figure in the opposition to the CPU.
Many of these parties began to take away resources and people from Rukh in building up these party organizations. As many leaders within Rukh began concentrating on parties outside of the movement, and as student and labour organizations began acting on their own without involvement from Rukh, Rukh found itself increasingly following and reacting to events, rather than leading them as it had previously. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that developments outside Ukraine continued to change quickly the relationship between the republics and Moscow, and that elements inside the Ukrainian Communist Party were beginning to reorient the Party on a more pragmatic and nationalist path.

In terms of our theoretical framework then, we will see how Rukh's multiorganizational field was becoming much more complex and fluid. Rather than having one opposition force (Rukh) against the party in power, the opposition forces were splitting into more and more organizations, thus weakening their overall position. In other words, Rukh soon found itself competing with other groups for the leadership mantle of the opposition. At the same time, the party in power was not sitting still, and was radically making itself over in order to retain and/or regain legitimacy with the general population.

b. The Birth of a Multi-Party System

On March 8 1990, between the first and second rounds of voting for elections to the Ukrainian Parliament, a pronouncement appeared in the newspaper Literaturna Ukrajina, calling for the establishment of a separate Communist Party in Ukraine independent
from Moscow. The pronunciation was signed by Rukh leaders and Communist members Drach, Pavlychko, Javorivskyj, Holovatyj and others, as well as by non-Communists such as UHU leaders Mykhajlo Horynt and Levko Luknenko. These leaders also called for an extraordinary Congress of Rukh to reconceptualize Rukh as a political party (Haran', 1991). About 800 delegates met in Khust in Western Ukraine to decide the future of Rukh at the end of March. At this time it was decided that Rukh would remain an umbrella movement for various organizations. At this meeting, even the writers of the pronunciation backed away from their proposal:

We do not need to recreate Rukh into a party. This is obvious. Even the authors of the Pronouncement did not really believe, and did not really want, for Rukh to recreate itself into a Party. We simply wanted to wake up our society - to show, that within society there are already organizations that are ready to transform themselves into parties (Haran', 1991, 9).

At this meeting Drach and Pavlychko also announced that they had left the Communist Party and spoke of their desire to form a Democratic Party. However it was the Ukrainian Helsinki Union which was first to act in this regard.

i. The Ukrainian Republican Party

The inaugural Congress of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union was to have been held in November 1989, but was delayed as its leaders concentrated on the creation of Rukh and the subsequent elections. By early 1990 however, critics within the UHU were claiming that the UHU was no longer the vanguard of the changing socio-political processes in Ukraine, and that the role of pushing a more radical agenda could be performed better as a political party. On April 29-
30, 1990, the founding Congress was held, transforming the UHU into the Ukrainian Republican Party (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). The URP claimed that the Union Treaty of 1922 (where Ukraine became a republic of the USSR) was illegal as it was signed by an illegal government, and called for complete independence for Ukraine. It also called for the nationalization of CPSU property, the priority of ecological over economic concerns, and the creation of a state bank and private banks and a national currency (Ibid.) The URP had an advantage over other parties that began forming at this time because, although its major centre of power was western Ukraine, it did have branches in all the provinces of Ukraine, and also had very well known leaders, known both within Ukraine and abroad, which gave the party a more significant stature (Haran', 1993). Levko Lukjanenko was elected chairman, and Stepan Khmara and Hryhorij Hrebenjuk vice-chairmen.

The major criticism of the URP statutes came from former UHU luminary Vjacheslav Chornovil. First, he claimed that the UHU was originally an organization in which people from a wide spectrum of political beliefs were involved, and as such the UHU should have evolved into a variety of parties, not just one party. Second, the economic platform was not seen as adequately developed (Ibid.). Third, Chornovil especially criticized the centralized nature of the URP. Lukjanenko conceptualized the URP as having tight internal discipline, while Chornovil argued that the URP was creating an organization of the 'Bolshevik-Fascist type', and was betraying its original federalist-human-rights roots. So Chornovil kept his
distance from the party (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). Chornovil also wanted the term 'democratic' in the name of the party, but delegates voted for republican as opposed to democratic by a 3-1 margin. Haran' noted that following the congress, it became clear that the URP would stand as a centre-right party according to western classification (Haran', 1993).

ii. The Creation of Parties on the Right and Left

Although the URP was one of the first of the nascent political parties to be officially registered (late in 1990), the next year or so witnessed the establishment of 20 political parties all over the political spectrum, with about 30,000 members (Bilous, 1993). The first declared political party in Ukraine was actually the Ukrainian National Party, formed in October, 1989, in L'viv. The party only had between 150-200 members, and boycotted the Supreme Soviet elections (Ibid.). In April 1990, the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Union was formed on the heels of the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the winter of 1989 and spring of 1990. The party had a nationalist, christian, anti-communist bent, and despite having a few thousand members, like other right-wing parties that were to form in Ukraine, it experienced significant divisions, and effectively split in 1991 (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994).

A variety of right-wing ultranationalist radical groups formed at this time. These groups did not have widely different ideological positions, but were critical of each other in their bid for the leadership mantle of the nationalist right (Ibid.). The UNP lead the formation of the Inter-Party Assembly (IPA) which included
radical groups that found Rukh to be too conservative. The IPA eventually came under the control of the ultra-right Ukrainian National Union, whose leader compared the fortune's of his party to that of the Nazis in the time of the Weimar Republic, and hoped that the declining state of the Ukrainian economy would lead to a similar transformation of the party's popularity (Ibid.).

Similarly, a variety of parties formed on the left. The social democrats attempted to form a party in May of 1990, but there was an immediate split between 'left' and 'right' forces, which lead to the formation of the United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (USDPU) and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU) (Bilous, 1993). The Ukrainian Peasants Democratic Party was formed in June of 1990, and called for the renewal of the agrarian lifestyle, and a reorganization of the collective farming system in place. The Green Party finally had its inaugural congress in September of 1990. It put ecological issues at the forefront, but also supported Ukrainian independence, arguing that the only way that Ukraine could control the environment was by having its own country. There were also a variety of student organizations that formed in this time, such as the Ukrainian Students Union, the Student Brotherhood, and the Association of Independent Youth, but these groups also tended to share the same problems of sectarianism and inner dissent that the right wing groups had (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994).

Two of the stronger parties to emerge from the centre were the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine (PDRU) and the Democratic
Party of Ukraine (DPU). As noted earlier, the DPU had its roots in the Rukh Great Council Meeting at Khust, where several Rukh leaders announced their intention to form a democratic party. In May of that year, in a manifesto appearing in Literaturna Ukrayina, a variety of Rukh leaders and deputies of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet as well as the All-Union Supreme Soviet signed their approval of the formation of the DPU which unequivocally supported the independence of Ukraine (Haran', 1993). In December the DPU was officially launched. Originally the strategy of forming the DPU was meant as a way to distance Rukh from the URP's increasingly radical policies, and to transforming Rukh into a political party. But eventually the URP and DPU moved closer together, with the URP representing mainly the ex-dissidents, and the DPU, the cultural (mostly literary) intelligentsia. Both parties soon moved towards similar positions on the national question (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). The formation of and rapprochement between these two parties were significant for the future of Rukh, because the leaders of these parties began to concentrate more on their particular parties, and less on the movement. Indeed they often found themselves criticizing Rukh.

Communist members who had once belonged to Rukh also formed their own party, which was first referred to as the Democratic Platform of the Ukrainian Communist Party. On July 27, 1990, the Democratic Platform announced that it was going to break away from the CPU, which meant that 28 members of the Supreme Council of Ukraine were members of this new party, named the Party of
The Classification of Political Parties in Ukraine by Ideology (as of 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communism</th>
<th>Social Democrat</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Fascist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Ukraine</td>
<td>United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine</td>
<td>Rukh</td>
<td>Ukrainian National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants’ Party of Ukraine</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Ukraine</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Revival in Ukraine</td>
<td>Union of Ukrainian Students</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Ukraine</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Ukrainian Republican Party</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Ukrainian Democratic Peasants’ Party</td>
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Democratic Accord. This party was made up of democratic Communists and non-party centrists, many of whom had been members or supporters of Rukh, but had grown wary of Rukh's increasing radicalism and nationalism. Included in the membership of this party was Myroslav Popovych, Rukh's original head in Kyiv (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). The party, later renamed the Party of Democratic Revival, had an equal balance of Ukrainian and Russian speakers, and would later play an important role as a bridge between the more radical elements in Western Ukraine and the Russian speaking radicals in the east. Recognizing this Russian element, leaders stressed economic issues rather than nationalist ones, and also added that links would have to be maintained with Russia no matter what Ukraine's future.

c. The Proclamation of Ukrainian Sovereignty

Even as these various parties were in the process of formation, the Ukrainian Supreme Council was already in session. Factions of parties that were formed still lacked unity and traditional party discipline. There were even factions within the Communist Party, which had usually been seen by scholars as monolithic in its views. In June 1990, Literaturna Ukrajina announced the formation of an opposition named the People's Council, based on the Democratic Bloc. By the summer, various independents and the Democratic Platform of the CPU joined the faction giving it between 115-133 members (Ibid.). This group was opposed by the hardline CPU faction known as the Group of 239 (from the size of this conservative majority in the Supreme Council).
How was this opposition group able to get a proclamation of sovereignty passed while it was opposed by the conservative majority? In this case again, events outside the republic influenced the passing of this historic resolution. First, on March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet voted to reaffirm Lithuania's 1918 declaration of independence. The name of the Baltic state was changed to "Republic of Lithuania" and references to Soviet and SSR were dropped from the name. Moreover, a series of laws were passed suspending the USSR and Lithuanian SSR constitutions. In order to emphasize the continuity of the Lithuanian state, they were replaced with the 1938 Constitution of the Lithuanian Republic (Girnius, 1990). Later that spring, the other Baltic republics followed similar paths. On March 30, the Estonian Supreme Council passed a decree "On the State Status of Estonia", and on May 4, the Latvian Supreme Council passed a declaration "On Restoration of Independence of Latvian Republic". Most importantly perhaps, on June 11 of that year, the Russian Republic passed its own sovereignty law "On State Sovereignty of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Sheehy, 1990)."

It should be noted that even conservative members of the CPU had been preparing for Ukrainian sovereignty. The Central Committee Plenum incorporated the idea of state sovereignty within a "renewed Soviet federation" in November, 1989, and this concept was reaffirmed in March 1990. Ivashko also referred to the need for a new union treaty, which Gorbachev had also conceded. Many of the views of conservative leaders such as Ivashko and Vitol'd Fokin,
Chairman of the State Planning Committee, seemed to mirror positions that Rukh had been putting forth the previous year and which the party had heavily criticized (Solchanyk, 1990c). However, it must be noted that these leaders' support for sovereignty was in fact limited. Ivashko and others were critical of Lithuania and the other Baltic republics for their nationalism and separatism. In several speeches Ivashko called for the strengthening of the Soviet federation, and commented on the need for a "strong socialist state (Solchanyk, 1990c)." Thus conservatives saw sovereignty within the framework of a renewed USSR while the opposition saw sovereignty as a goal unto itself.

In the end, several factors led to the July 16 proclamation being more radical than the conservatives had envisioned. First, People's Council deputies had been able to acquire leadership roles in several committees and had disproportionate representation on the influential Presidium, where they were able to form ties with less conservative members of the CPU (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). Second, at the end of June and beginning of July, the two week long CPSU Congress was being held in Moscow and 63 Communist members, including Ivashko, attended the sessions there. On July 6, the Supreme Council of Ukraine called for the return of these delegates to Kyiv so that the work of Parliament would not be hindered. Not only was Parliament debating the declaration of sovereignty, but was also dealing with a series of debilitating strikes in the Donbass coalfields. Most delegates refused to return (Mihalisko, 1990b). Even worse for conservative loyalists, however, was that on
July 11, Ivashko was elected to the position of deputy general secretary of the CPSU, resigning his post as First Secretary of the CPU. This move was seen as a critical point in the sovereignty debate. Conservative members felt that their leader had deserted them at a crucial stage of the session. Five days later, by a vote of 355 for, and 4 against, Ukraine issued its "Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine (Mihalisko, 1990c)."

The final declaration was an uneasy combination of five alternatives that had been discussed. In some ways the declaration gave significant power to the republic. For example, not only did the document guarantee the supremacy of Ukrainian laws and the Ukrainian constitution on its territory, but it also called for the right for Ukraine to have its own army and security forces, and asserted the intention of the republic to become a neutral, militarily unaligned state (Ibid.). One had to recognize that the declaration was more of a statement of intent than a legally binding document (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). The process of hammering out a constitution and writing out laws that would provide a more concrete form to sovereignty would prove very difficult in the coming year. Second, opposition leaders did not get everything they wanted in the adopted version of the declaration. Specifically, the declaration did not use the term "Ukraine" when referring to the republic, but the Ukrainian SSR. Moreover, the final clause stated that "the principles of the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR are to be used in the preparation of a new Union Treaty (Mihalisko, 1990c)."
Six months earlier, this clause would not have been cause for consternation for the opposition, as a renewed federation was one of the demands put forward by such movements as Rukh. However, by this time, opposition groups were beginning to argue that a new Union Treaty would not be a solution to their problems. To more fully understand why the concessions offered by Gorbachev were not enough, one has to look at the proposed changes to the constitution, and then the proposed Union Treaty in more detail.

d. The New Union Treaty

Following the removal of Article 6 from the Soviet constitution, the Soviet government passed a variety of laws aimed at legitimizing the Soviet federation, and providing the potential for putting a new Union Treaty in place. In April 1990, a law on secession was adopted. This was seen as a crucial step by the government because, even as previous constitutions declared that secession was a right for every republic, there was no mechanism for secession. By adopting this law, the party believed it was legitimizing the right to self-determination and secession. The law set the conditions. If a republic wished to secede, it had to hold a referendum. This decision to secede would be considered by the union if approved by at least two-thirds of those citizens entitled to vote. As well, the law specified how union-republic negotiations would transpire in a transition period if the referendum passed (Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), May 16, 1990).

In addition, legislation was passed in May 1990 setting out the powers of the USSR and of the republics. These laws stressed
that "each Union republic retains the right of unrestricted secession from the USSR," explicitly listed the jurisdictions of the Union, and declared that republics would have all power not assigned to the USSR (CDSP, June 13, 1990). With these laws in place, and with most republics having passed various declarations of sovereignty, the federal government finally unveiled its new Union Treaty in November 1990.

The Union Treaty ostensibly dealt with many of the republics' concerns. First, it expressly stated that "Each republic that is a party to the Treaty is a sovereign state and possesses full state power on its territory (CDSP, Dec. 26, 1990, 14)." Moreover, the republics would be able to independently determine their state structure and systems of administration, and democracy based on popular representation would be recognized. The republics would be considered as owners of the land, and the protection of all forms of property ownership, including that of citizens and their associations, would be guaranteed (Article 7) (Ibid.). Finally, the proposed treaty declared that republics would independently make their budgets and taxing policies (Article 8), and that republic legislation would have supremacy on all issues, except those issues that fell within the Union's jurisdiction (Article 9) (Ibid.).

Thus it seemed that Gorbachev was offering the republics significant reforms in return for their signatures on the Union Treaty. In reality however, there were a variety of aspects to the law on secession and the Union Treaty itself that were of grave concern to the potential signatories. In terms of the secession
law, separate referenda could be held in autonomous regions or minority enclaves within the republic. The law then stated that "Peoples of autonomous republics and autonomous formations shall retain the right to decide independently the question of staying in the USSR or in the seceding Union republic, as well as to raise the question of their own legal status (CDSP, May 16, 1990, 20)."

Moreover, the results of these referenda would be considered separately from the other results. If the referendum were passed, a five year transition period with negotiations would take place, and after all that, the Congress of People's Deputies would still have to ratify the republic's secession. Thus, despite having a mechanism for secession in place, there was still a great deal of confusion as to what would result even with a successful referendum. What would happen if an autonomous region in the territory rejected secession? Would this nullify the overall result? Could the territory in question be partitioned? What would entail a 'concentration of national groups', and what if they rejected secession? The law also stated that if the referendum failed, a new referendum could not be called for another ten years. And, if the referendum passed, a call by 10% of the population would allow for a new referendum to take place. Finally, the seceding republic would also have to pay for the resettlement of any person wishing to remain in the USSR (Ibid.).

Another problem most republics had with this law is that non-nationals made up a significant portion of most of the republics' populations, and these citizens might tend to vote to stay in the
Union (although this is a generalization, as a majority of non-Ukrainians would vote for independence the following year). For many republics then, two-thirds of the vote might be too high a hurdle. For a republic like Lithuania, where only 20% of the republic are non-Lithuanians, this would not be as worrisome. But in other republics, the native ethnic group makes up a much smaller proportion of the population. Estonians, for example, make up 61% of the population of that republic, Moldavians make up 64% of their republic, while Latvians make up only 52% of their republic's population (Clcott, 1990).

The draft of the new Union Treaty, while seemingly providing major concessions to the republics, was also full of caveats that would have had the potential to limit republic sovereignty. Many of these caveats appeared in Article 5 of the treaty, setting out the powers of the Union. Section 2 was particularly ambiguous. It gave the USSR the powers of "protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union; fixing and guarding the USSR state border; [and] ensuring the state security of the USSR (CDSP, Dec.26, 1990, 15)." This provision seemed to give wide-ranging powers to the union, and a republic seceding from the union could very well be seen as falling under the "state security" provision of the law, thus allowing the union to prevent secession if it wished. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 further supported this ambiguity, stating that "USSR laws adopted with respect to questions within Union jurisdiction have supremacy and are binding on the territory of all republics (Ibid., 16)." Again, in conjunction with Article 5, the
Union would seem to have the authority to override a wide array of republic legislation, including the right to secede.

Further affecting any possibilities of reconciliation between the republics and the centre was Moscow's harsh retaliation against the Baltic republics and a conservative backlash towards the opposition in several republics, including Ukraine. Throughout the summer and fall of 1990, the three Baltic republics were subject to increasing economic pressure (which was eventually to become a blockade), displays of military force, and the attempted mobilization of Russian minorities in the form of Interfronts (Goble, 1990). However, in doing so, Gorbachev seemed to only further radicalize the Baltic republics, and further alienate nationalist movements in other republics, including Rukh. As Nils Muiznieks commented, "...what was done to the Balts became more important than what they did (Muiznieks, 1995, 15)." Even more conservative Rukh leaders such as Ivan Drach stated that, as evidenced by Moscow's reaction to the Baltic proclamations of independence, a free union of free peoples as envisioned by Gorbachev would only be possible if each republic gained true independence and then voluntarily joined a union (Goble, 1990).

e. New Leadership in the CPU

In Ukraine, following Ivashko's resignation, Leonid Kravchuk, who was best remembered for his opposition to the establishment of Rukh, was elected as Chairman of the Supreme Council, and Stanislav Hurenko was chosen as First Secretary of the CPU. Hurenko especially represented a return to the old guard. He argued that:
"What is particularly worrying is the continuing underestimation of the danger of anti-communism and the absence of even the slightest attempt at countering its increasing onslaught (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994, 153)." The conservative backlash mentioned above was quite harsh in Ukraine. In the summer of 1990, demonstrations near Parliament were banned, troops were massed outside of Kyiv, the Communist majority in Parliament changed procedures and blocked opposition initiatives and reduced opposition accessibility to the airwaves, and administrative obstacles were put in the way of regional and local councils that were controlled by the democratic opposition. A radical deputy, Stepan Khmara, was arrested on fabricated charges, had his parliamentary immunity stripped and was put in prison. Other opposition deputies began to fear that they might be next. Also, as rumours that martial law might be declared began to circulate, memos to supportive regional and local councils were sent out, suggesting which organizations should be banned and which people should be arrested (Krawchenko, 1993).

Within Parliament itself, opposition leaders claimed that hardline Communists were trying to obstruct the evolution towards sovereignty. Volodymyr Javorivskyj pointed out that the Group of 239 had voted down a proposal to give the declaration of sovereignty the status of constitutional law. In addition, the conservatives had introduced a measure that had given the USSR Ministry of Defence a pretext for sending Ukrainian army recruits outside Ukrainian borders. To show evidence of Ukrainian sovereignty, reform-minded deputies had wanted to be able to keep
Ukrainian military recruits within its territory (Mihalisko, 1990d). Moreover, Prime Minister Vitalij Masol, a holdover from the Shcherbytskyj era, was to create an economic reform plan for Ukraine that would somehow conform to Moscow's economic plans and at the same time allow for a unique Ukrainian path to reform. Masol stated that he was advocating slow and tentative change (as opposed to the more radical economic medicine being advocated in Moscow at the time), and that there would be continued all-Union control in many economic sectors in the foreseeable future (Marples, 1990g). Masol's proposals were seen as inadequate by both the opposition and the conservative majority, and he was accused of advocating the continuing economic hold of Moscow over the republic. Essentially, Masol was seen as the symbol of the inability of Ukrainian Parliament to make the transition to sovereignty (Mihalisko, 1990d). In an effort to protest this halting of the sovereignty process, opposition groups called for demonstrations and a general strike to be held October 1.

f. The Student Protest

October 1 was the opening day of the fall session of Parliament. There were several major demonstrations, including one in front of the Supreme Soviet, but overall, the call for a general strike went unheeded in most of the republic (Mihalisko, 1990d). However, in the end, it was a smaller group of demonstrators that eventually led the conservative majority in Parliament to make several major concessions.

In examining the American Civil rights movement, Lewis Killian
noted that spontaneity on the part of certain political actors is a variable that must be accounted for and considered with the same importance as rational strategy making by social movement leaders:

Hence we conclude that while organization and rational planning are key variables, social movement theory must take into account spontaneity... and the forces which generate them. It must treat as important, not as irrational, the ... cognitions which sometimes cause individuals to throw caution to the winds and act in the face of great or unknown odds. It must include as an essential part of its analysis how social movement organizations and their leaders deal with the changes in the course of a movement which unpredictable, spontaneous actions introduce, and how they are transformed or even superseded in the process (Killian, 1984, 782).

In the Ukrainian case we see a group of students taking matters in their own hands, and as we will see later, from this point forward, outside events and internal disputes would continually leave Rukh leaders a step behind other actors in the multiorganizational field.

Starting on October 2, a small group of about 150 students, organized by L'viv's Student Brotherhood and Kyiv's Ukrainian Students' Union, staged a hunger strike on October Revolution Square in downtown Kyiv (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). Unlike other demonstrations, the one led by a small group of students caught the imagination of the general public. With each passing day the number of demonstrators rose. Students in post-secondary institutions all over the republic went on strike.

Rukh did not react to the strike at all in the first few days, and did not provide any material or other help, until about a week into it (Korpalo, 1991). On October 16, a demonstration of 150,000 people was led by navy cadets and a large group of Afghan veterans.
Finally on Oct. 18, workers from Kyiv's largest factory, Arsenal, walked out and joined the demonstrations. That night, Parliament officially capitulated to virtually all the student demands (Krawchenko, 1993).

Included in the list of concessions was passing new laws on military service, bringing the republic's constitution in line with the Declaration of Sovereignty, setting up a commission to look at the issue of nationalizing Komsomol and Communist Party property, and postponing the possibility of signing Gorbachev's Union Treaty until a new Ukrainian constitution had been passed (Mihalisko, 1990d). As well, Prime Minister Masol was forced to resign. Thus this small group succeeded in provoking changes when larger groups that had leading roles had failed. Why did Rukh seem to lose its momentum?

g. The Radicalization of Rukh

Following a session of the Rukh Grand Council in Khust in March, and Lithuania's subsequent declaration of independence, Rukh found itself in a state of turmoil, facing all kinds of organizational challenges, as well as suffering an identity crisis. The movement seemed unable to form clear goals concerning its very nature: was it a party or a movement? What policies was it supporting as other republics seemed to becoming more radicalized?

The next Grand Council session of Rukh was held on June 25-26, and the inner bureaucracy of Rukh came under great criticism. One delegate complained that the Rukh Secretariat found out about an all-Union Miners' Congress through the Moscow media and not from
the Donetsk Rukh organization. As well, the secretariat complained that 80% of the area organizations were not meeting their financial obligations, and if not for outside revenue (namely diaspora contributions), Rukh would have long been bankrupt (Haran', 1993).

This session witnessed the beginning of what would be a radicalization of the Rukh platform. Being greatly influenced by events in the Baltics (and Moscow's reactions to these events, as stated earlier) and by more radical leaders within Rukh, particularly those who were from western Ukraine and/or the URP, Rukh leaders offered their official support for Lithuania's proclamation of independence. Western Ukraine was more attuned to what was happening in the Baltics than the rest of Ukraine, and as their regional organizations were by far the strongest and best organized (as well as having control of local councils in several oblasts') they were able to move Rukh in a more radical direction (Bojko, 1995 and others).

Several Western Ukrainian Rukh leaders interviewed commented that they had indirect links with Sajudis in particular throughout the time frame being studied here. Most of the links had to do with Rukh having easier access to printing facilities in the Baltics than they had in their own republic. Rukh and other groups would publish newspapers that had their print runs in the Baltics, and in making these trips were heavily influenced by the events taking place there (Zajets', Bojko, and others, 1995).

The Second Congress of Rukh was held in Kyiv from October 25-28, soon after the hunger strike and concessions by the
conservative Parliament. The radical turn Rukh was to take was immediately apparent in Ivan Drach's opening speech, in which he spoke of an independent Ukraine. The Rukh Secretariat recognized their weakness in the east and south and called for the creation of groups from Western Ukraine to go into the East and work more thoroughly at educating and preparing citizens for mass actions. It was not enough to just go there, have a demonstration and concert and then go home (Haran', 1993). Many called for Rukh to be a movement supporting democratic forces, as opposed to simply opposition forces. Others wondered whether the overall goal of Rukh should be to prepare the country for the last strike (towards independence), and leave the role of creating a functioning democratic structure to the existing political parties and democratic blocs in the Supreme Soviet. Then debate centred on whether political parties should be associated with Rukh (group membership as opposed to just individual membership), and whether members of the Communist Party should be allowed to be members of Rukh.

In the end, it was decided that the main goal of Rukh was to help build a path towards an independent democratic Ukrainian state. As such, the movement would not be called "Rukh in Support of Perestroika", but simply Rukh. With respect to the question of membership, it was decided that political parties could have an associate membership within Rukh, as long as its goals coincided with the Rukh program. Moreover, any party members whose leadership base was outside Ukraine (specifically the CPSU) would be denied
membership (but if the CPU became independent of the CPSU, it could in theory become associated with Rukh) (Ibid.).

Two further facts bear on the declining popularity of Rukh. First, although membership in Rukh was now up to 633,000 members, delegate representation to the congress was still overwhelmingly skewed towards the West. There were as many delegates from the four western oblast's of L'viv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivno, and Ternopol' as there were from the other 21 oblast's put together. Only 3.8% of Russians made up the delegate total whereas they made up 22% of the population. Thus the continued weakness of Rukh's presence in the east and south was evident (Ibid.). Second, there was evidence of an evolving conflict between political party leaders who worked within Rukh, and Rukh members who were not involved in political parties. Parties such as the URP and the DPU did not choose to be officially associated with Rukh, yet leaders within these parties such as Mykhajlo Horyn' continued to hold important positions in the Rukh hierarchy (Ibid.). As I was told, however, the feeling was growing that these parties were utilizing Rukh resources and the fact that Rukh had organizational bases in every Ukrainian district, to help them get established and build support all over Ukraine. The accusations would grow over the next year, that these parties were using Rukh to advance their own self-interest, and were criticizing Rukh and whittling away at its membership from within (Tsembaljuk and others, 1995).

We thus see that more conservative and pragmatic leaders were caught between a rock and a hard place. The nationalist sentiment
coming out of the West was becoming increasingly fervent and was constantly gathering momentum. If Rukh wanted to maintain its leadership role as the main opposition force, and if it wanted to avoid becoming irrelevant in Western Ukraine, the movement had to support independence for Ukraine. In other words, Rukh, by becoming more radicalized, was able to maintain cultural resonance with the public in Western Ukraine. In the east and South, however, as much as Rukh would continue to try to emphasize issues like the economy and ecology, the die was cast. Rukh's ideological package no longer coincided with a large part of the conservative population in the East and South.

For example, by the summer of 1990, the coal miners seemed to be ready to be wooed by a movement such as Rukh. Dissatisfaction among coal miners with both the republican and union governments was at a very high level, and even in the heavily Russian-speaking areas, they were becoming very politicized. Indeed, David Marples has argued that in October of 1990, coal miners had become "one of the most disaffected groups in Ukrainian society, but national consciousness among them has remained relatively undeveloped (Marples, 1990f, 13)." The miners were demanding much greater local control over their industries. But in their demands, miners hardly ever mentioned Rukh. In fact, a Rukh organizer from Luhansk who was interviewed stated that, at first, Rukh had very strong relations with workers. Rukh helped organize a strike committee for miners and held joint demonstrations with them. But when Rukh started advocating an independent Ukraine, there was a major split as some
miners wanted to support independence while many others, while wanting political and economic reform, thought independence was too extreme (Bondarenko, 1995). In addition, Rukh organizers mentioned that in using symbols that were foreign to their experience, many people were alienated from supporting Rukh (Krawchenko, 1990). These people were now ready for a group other than Rukh or the conservative CPU to offer an alternative. As it would turn out, this alternative would come from the CPU itself.

But, as 1990 came to a close, Parliament was still moving in a conservative direction. Demonstrations outside Parliament were still prohibited. The arrest of Stepan Khmara took place in November, and accusations against other opposition leaders were released. On December 7, the Kyiv military garrison was ordered to defend Soviet monuments when needed and to destroy 'fascist monuments'. In L'viv, on December 13, a letter was sent from the Soviet Ministry of Defense to military officers to increase their combat readiness against nationalist elements in their area. Later that month the CPU passed a motion calling for the prevention of construction of monuments dedicated to nationalist heroes (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). As in previous instances where conservatives seemed to have the upper hand, it was outside events again that led to the discarding of the CPSU, and to a further shift in thinking within the CPU.

h. The March Referendum

Following a summer that witnessed increasing tension between Lithuania and Moscow, with Lithuania refusing to take part in Union
Treaty negotiations unless it was first considered an independent state, Gorbachev began to follow an even tougher line with the republic. On January 7, 1991, the USSR Ministry of Defense announced that troops would be sent to six republics, including the Baltics, to enforce the draft call-up, which had been ignored by a high percentage of draftees. However, only Lithuania received any of these extra troops. On January 10, Gorbachev again called for the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to revoke any decisions it had made that were at odds with the Soviet constitution. The next day, the Soviet troops took over the press centre and National Defense Department in Vilnius by force. The same day, a `National Salvation Committee of Lithuania' announced that it was taking over control of the republic. Two days later, the committee proclaimed that anti-Soviet propaganda was being transmitted from the Vilnius TV tower. The leader of the Russian troops agreed, and a column of tanks and troops went to the tower and opened fire on people who had gathered to protect the building. Fourteen people died, hundreds were wounded, and the images of the attack were broadcast internationally and within the USSR (Girnius, 1991).

The whole affair was a public relations disaster for Moscow. The Lithuanian government had shown signs of wanting to negotiate with Moscow under certain conditions, but now every group within the republic, regardless of ideology or nationality, supported independence. The attack also galvanized support for the Baltics from the West. Finally, within the other republics, the CPSU and its conservative followers were even further discredited, and even
more members of the CPU began to rethink the conservative line that the CPU had recently been following. Elections would be upcoming and if the Communists in Ukraine wanted to retain popularity, they would have to make some changes (Krawchenko, 1993).

The CPU was now witnessing the creation of a serious breach within the party. The first signs of this breach had appeared in 1990, but were now becoming more and more apparent. The events described above would have an impact on the March 17, 1991 referendum vote on the future of the Union. On this date, Gorbachev would present the question "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which human rights and the freedoms of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994)?"

One wing of the party was led by the conservative Stanislav Hurenko, while the other side was led by the increasingly pragmatic Leonid Kravchuk.

II. ON THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

a. A Split in the CPU

Following the October 17 accord with the students, Kravchuk headed a 59 member committee of experts to look at constitutional reform. Hurenko stated that he and Kravchuk had "different points of view concerning the realisation of sovereignty (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994, 158)." But, as stated earlier, tension across the country was high as the ongoing attempts to mute the conservative opposition was continuing. At that time a poll found that the
Party's popularity rating had fallen to 10% in Kyiv, and that over 220,000 people had left the Party over the last year (Solchanyk, 1991b). Moreover, in a poll of most popular politicians in the republic, Kravchuk did not even make the top twenty (Krawchenko, 1993). But following the crisis in Lithuania, a split was evident as the Presidium of the Supreme Council (led by Kravchuk) stated that it supported "legally elected state executive organs of the Republics" and that it considered "inadmissible the use of military force on the territory of any Republic for solving of internal and inter-ethnic conflicts without the approval of the legitimate authorities of the Republic (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994, 158)."

Meanwhile the CPU central committee took the opposite view, condemning the nationalist-separatist forces in Lithuania and called for support for "our party comrades who are being persecuted in this region... (Ibid.)."

Further evidence of a split in the CPU came when the old Group of 239 was unable to pass a resolution to present Gorbachev's question by itself on March 17. A proposal by radical members of the Supreme Council to boycott the referendum or to ask a question concerning independence was also rejected. Instead Kravchuk passed a vote whereby a specifically Ukrainian question was asked - "Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign States on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty in Ukraine (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994, 159)?" Moreover in the three oblasts in Halychyna, local councils were able to add a third question on the ballots, where voters were asked whether they
Table 4 Percentage of Yes Votes on the 17 March Referendum in Ukraine
(Source: Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson. Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence. P. 161)
wanted an independent Ukrainian state.

It should be noted here that the debate concerning the March referendum was not just limited to Ukraine. In fact, the three Baltic republics, Georgia, Moldavia, and Armenia all boycotted the referendum, meaning only nine republics participated. Lithuania, Georgia, Latvia and Estonia all held polls on the question of their independence, and all received healthy majorities. Azerbaijan agreed to hold the referendum a week before the set date. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan all simplified the referendum question, asking if the republic should be part of the Union, and not whether the Union should be preserved. The RSFSR added a question concerning the institution of an elected Russian republic president. Overall, the Central Asian republics had the highest percentage of yes votes (over 90%), while Belorussia and the RSFSR voted about 80% in favor of preserving the Union (Sheehy, 1991b).

In Ukraine, leaders of all sides were able to proclaim victory, as 70.5% of voters voted yes on the Gorbachev question, 80.2% voted yes to the specifically Ukrainian question, and in Halychyna, 89.9% voted for independence (Solchanyk, 1991c). Conservative leaders claimed that the results showed support for the Union, but others saw the ten point difference between the two questions as evidence of growing support for Ukrainian sovereignty. Results of the referendum showed that even in heavily Russified and traditionally conservative oblasts such as Donetsk, Zaporozhe, Poltava, and Odessa, over 80% of voters voted yes on the republican question (Ibid.). Throughout the spring and summer of
1991, Kravchuk continued to move towards the centre, not actively promoting independence, but passing laws that gave Ukrainian sovereignty more legitimacy and, overall, beginning a period of nascent state building (Krawchenko, 1993).

In the first half of 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament passed about sixty laws that enhanced the prospect of Ukrainian statehood. These included the establishment of a national bank, plans to eventually create a Ukrainian currency, placing all external trade under Ukrainian jurisdiction, and establishing commissions to eventually form an independent Defense Ministry and a Ukrainian army. As well, Ukraine agreed to exchange diplomats and signed economic treaties with several countries, and also signed a bilateral agreement with Hungary that established consulates in their respective capitals, an agreement which bypassed Moscow (Krawchenko, 1993). At the same time as these laws were being passed, the constitutional committee was working to write a new constitution, and a debate was continuing over Ukraine's participation in the negotiations over a new Union Treaty.

b. The Union Treaty Revisited

In the spring of 1991, Gorbachev was putting the republics under increasing pressure to sign a new draft of the union treaty. Following the spring referendum, Gorbachev called for the leaders of the nine republics that had participated (including Ukraine and Russia) to meet on April 23 to hammer out an agreement (Solchanyk, 1991d). In Ukraine, Hurenko was supporting Gorbachev's vision of a treaty that would follow a '9 + 1' formula, that is, nine strong
republics and a strong centre. Meanwhile the opposition in Parliament was pushing for either outright independence, or at least a '9 + 0' formula, with nine equal partners, but no centre (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). Gorbachev had presented a revised draft of the union treaty on March 9, which contained several more concessions to the republics, but the treaty retained the essential elements of a federal state, such as giving federal laws primacy in matters of federal competence. This revised treaty was rejected immediately by Yeltsin, so Gorbachev was ready to offer more concessions in the April 23 meeting (Sheehy, 1991).

Kravchuk again staked out the middle ground, saying that he did not want to break up the Soviet Union, but at the same time did not want powerless republican parliaments taking orders from a strong centre. He called a meeting on April 18 of five republican leaders to present a united front against Gorbachev (Solchanyk, 1991e). On April 23, Gorbachev was able to get agreement with the ten signatories signing a statement emphasizing the need to sign a new union treaty. Gorbachev made several new concessions, including making autonomous republics a part of delegations of their constituent republics rather than giving them status as independent entities (which had been an important concession to Yeltsin, especially). As well, in the joint statement, the republics were referred to as sovereign states (Solchanyk, 1991e).

However, there were still disputes with respect to the form the new association would take. After offering new concessions and reworking the joint statement during negotiations, Gorbachev stated
that the signatories had agreed to "a federal structure for the future Union with a single all-Union market with a common monetary system, finances, price policies and taxes (Ibid., 2)." In fact, from the joint statement it was not clear that the signatories had agreed to this. Thus there was still a fundamentally different conception of what form a new union would take - that of a 'union of states' vs. a 'union state'. Gorbachev's desire to get a signed treaty by mid-July, when the Group of Seven industrial nations were meeting, became impossible.

But Gorbachev had one more draft treaty to present to potential participants. On July 23, 1991, Gorbachev and five republic representatives agreed to sign the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States. This version of the treaty was by far the most radical and would have spelled the end of the USSR as it then existed. The draft treaty recognized each participant as a sovereign state, and referred to the USSR as the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics, "formed as a result of the association of equal republics and exercising state power within the limits of its powers, which are voluntarily vested in it by the parties to the treaty (Furtado and Chandler, 1992, 46)." The USSR would be reorganized as a loose confederation of sovereign states, with much of the power devolving from the centre to the republics. But even this last effort at keeping some sort of USSR together proved futile. First, Ukraine continued to insist on an elaborate signing process. On June 27 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution that prevented Ukraine from signing any version of a
draft treaty until the opening of the fall session of Parliament, that is, September 15 (Solchanyk, 1991f). Second, as we shall see later, this version of the draft treaty was seen by the conservative old guard as a signal that the Soviet Union was going to be dismembered, and that a coup was the only way to prevent that from happening.

c. Kravchuk Stakes the Middle Ground

Along with this delay in the signing of any treaty, Kravchuk was also publicly starting to refer to the process of nation-building that Ukraine was undergoing as Ukraine's third attempt at establishing national independence (Khmelnytskyj after 1648 and the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918-20). As well on June 18 it was proclaimed that July 16 would become a public holiday celebrating Ukraine's Day of Independence, not just sovereignty (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). Kravchuk now effectively had support of a large part of the former Group of 239, who saw him as taking the more popular path. Kravchuk also had the support of almost seventy members of the Supreme Soviet who were part of the industrial apparat (enterprise managers), 44 members of the agricultural apparat and 16 members of the institutions apparat (leaders of scientific or cultural institutions), who all saw state sovereignty and state-building as serving their own interests. In a Soviet economy with increasingly fewer resources, these leaders saw that if resources were concentrated in Ukraine, there would be easier access for them, which would serve their best interest (Ibid.). Kravchuk was now being identified with the sovereignty issue, and as such,
becoming more and more popular. By June of 1991 54% of respondents in Kyiv responding in a poll chose Kravchuk as their choice for President of Ukraine. Stanislav Hurenko received less than 1% support (Krawchenko, 1993). In an interview in the summer of 1991, Kravchuk reported that the Group of 239 no longer existed, and that "Communists have begun to think sovereignly - that is, as statesmen (Solchanyk, 1991f)."

At this point then, Kravchuk had succeeded in reinventing himself, moving from the position of heading the opposition to the Movement for Perestroika, to heading a faction of the CPU that was supporting Ukrainian sovereignty, and passing laws that were making sovereignty a reality, while not yet promoting outright independence for Ukraine. Kravchuk occupied the middle ground between hard-line Communists and the more radicalized Rukh.

In terms of our conceptual framework, Kravchuk and his coalition were beginning to occupy a part of the field that had previously been staked out by Rukh. The frame that Kravchuk was presenting to the public was one of caution, yet also one of change. He was making strides towards making Ukrainian sovereignty a reality, by establishing a Ukrainian currency, setting up Ukrainian Ministries that would run independently of Moscow, etc., while still dealing with Moscow and the other republics in the hopes of signing a new Union Treaty. The frame Kravchuk presented was one where change was occurring and the old system was being reformed, with the Ukrainian Republic having more powers. But within this frame (as opposed to Rukh's more radical proposals),
change would not mean great upheaval. With these types of changes, there was less chance of confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv, and less chance of inter-ethnic conflict within Ukraine. This frame did not have as much appeal in Western Ukraine where they were ready for independence, but had a great deal of resonance in the south and east, as evidenced by the polls showing that Kravchuk would receive the most support for the post of President of Ukraine.

The event that led Kravchuk to think that the time was ripe to support independence was the failed August putsch in Moscow. During our interview, he explained:

In 1988-89 I was not yet ripe for the idea that Ukraine had to be independent. Maybe it was a desire, but it was not yet a conscious idea that it could happen.... Independence as a theory and idea began in the summer of 1990 with the declaration of sovereignty... but at the time it was a declaration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, not Ukraine. The name wasn't changed until later. The language that threw away the socialism and everything else, and the new path towards independence was not yet firm, not in the people's minds or in terms of practical steps, or in terms of documents.... A big question [with respect to independence] was how - they would not just let Ukraine go from the USSR. So for me I had to worry about when and how, waiting for the USSR to fall apart by itself. When that happened, Ukraine could leave with everyone else. Then the pressure on Ukraine would decrease by tens of times.... With the August putsch, the idea that Ukraine could be independent truly came into the minds of the people.... After the putsch, Russia proclaimed its independence, and Ukraine went along with it (Kravchuk, 1995).

d. The August Coup and its Aftermath

In August of 1991, an event took place that basically spelled the end for any possible future union treaty as well as an end to the remaining credibility of the CPSU and the Soviet system. On
August 19, 1991, eight Russian conservative leaders attempted a military-backed coup. As we saw earlier, throughout 1990, Gorbachev seemed to be moving in a more conservative line even as the republics were gaining more and political power at Moscow's expense. Following the events in Lithuania however, Gorbachev seemed to move back to a reformist position, and with revised union treaties in hand, and particularly with the version that was ready to be signed on August 20 by five republics, including Russia, was making major concessions to the republics. However, the coercive machine that he helped create the previous year saw that the draft treaty as a potential death knell to central authority and therefore to their own interests. The coup members thus were compelled to take action when they did (Foye, 1991).

The men who took over power from Gorbachev formed a "State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR." All eight were older hard-line members of the CPSU, and all but one were directly linked to the armed forces, the secret police, or the defense industry (Teague, 1991). The Committee included the leaders of Internal Affairs, the Defense Ministries, and the KGB, the effective heads of industry and agriculture, and the Vice-President and Prime Minister in Gorbachev's government (Billington, 1992). On August 19, at 7:00 AM, the Committee announced that it was taking over the reins of power of the USSR. At first glance it appeared that the coup was successful. Gorbachev was under house arrest in the Crimea, and television and radio control was in the hands of the putsch leaders. A large military force was taking up positions in
Moscow. There seemed to be little resistance to the events taking place (Ibid.).

But the coup leaders made several errors that would prove to be their downfall. First, the leaders hesitated in arresting Boris Yeltsin. On June 12, Yeltsin had been elected Russian President and enjoyed a legitimacy with the Russian people that other leaders did not have (Shub, 1991). Thus, when Yeltsin climbed aboard a tank outside the Russian White House and called for Russians to resist the putsch leaders, it struck a resonant chord with the population. Later on the evening of the 19th a number of supporters responded by forming a wall around the White House. As night fell, the wall of supporters grew bigger and bigger (Billington, 1992). The opposition in the White House was also able to send a number of messengers to dialogue with various armed forces units around the capital. Slowly, over the next two days, several military units and commanders went over to the forces supporting Yeltsin. The leader of a tank battalion announced his opposition to the coup (Ibid.). Soldiers and officers told reporters they would not fire on civilians. Even senior officers were seen as not supporting the coup. In Moscow and Leningrad, commanders were known to have cut deals with local leaders and did not support the coup leaders (Foye, 1991). A projected attack by KGB forces on the White House was continually delayed until it was too late. By August 21, it was becoming clear that the putsch had failed. Gorbachev returned to Moscow on August 22, but in a much weaker position than previously. As one commentator noted, "he could not prevent the coup in the
first place; and he himself did not defeat it (Breslauer, 1991, 3)." The USSR as it was known was now finished.

In Ukraine, during the fateful days of the coup, Kravchuk again played his cards very close to his chest. Although he assured Ukrainian citizens that there was no state of emergency in Ukraine and that all elected organs were running normally, he also did not directly condemn the coup. He told reporters later that he had privately told Yeltsin that he would never support the coup leaders, but publicly simply stated that the coup was further evidence of the centre's incapability of governing (Solchanyk, 1991h). The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued a declaration on August 20 stating that Ukrainian sovereignty and laws would continue to be in effect, but did not offer public support for Yeltsin and the coup opposition in the RSFSR. The democratic opposition in the Supreme Soviet argued that the statement was too little and too late, and later Kravchuk agreed that the wording might be "soft (Ibid.)." But on August 21, as the coup was unraveling, Kravchuk finally came out with an outright condemnation of the coup. On August 24, Kravchuk then announced that he had resigned from the CPSU Central Committee and from the Politburo and Central Committee of the CPU. As well the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet banned the CPU and then adopted a declaration of independence. This declaration was to be ratified in a referendum to be held Dec. 1, when presidential elections would also be held.
e. The Referendum on Independence

Following the declaration of independence in August, opposition political parties and nationalist organizations, including Rukh, found that their primary objective had been attained, and in campaigning during the referendum battle, found that all groups were fighting essentially the same battle. There was no 'us vs. them' mentality any more, as the CPU had been abolished, and the wing of the Communist party (led by Kravchuk) that had led the process of nation-building was now campaigning on an independence platform as well. There were six candidates for the presidency, and all six supported independence, democracy, and a move to the market economy (Nahaylo, 1991). Opponents of Kravchuk had the opportunity of working together to present a single candidate but were unable to come to an agreement. Rukh's official candidate was Vjacheslav Chornovil. However several members of Rukh's hierarchy and the political council of Rukh supported URp member Levko Lukjanenko. DPU leader Jukhnovskyyj was also a candidate. The Rukh Grand Council also decided that local branches could campaign for any democratic candidate. The Donetsk branch ended up supporting Kravchuk (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994).

In fact, Kravchuk continued to present himself as a centrist in the eyes of the voters. He had trod a careful line towards sovereignty and then independence, and was now naturally closely identified with these issues as he had been in power during this eventful period. Kravchuk used his position as head of the Ukrainian Parliament to present himself as a statesman and national
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmelnyts'kyi</td>
<td>96.30</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donets'k</td>
<td>83.90</td>
<td>12.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhans'k</td>
<td>83.86</td>
<td>13.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>90.66</td>
<td>7.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovs'k</td>
<td>90.36</td>
<td>7.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>89.45</td>
<td>8.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>90.13</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odesa</td>
<td>85.38</td>
<td>11.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimeaan ASSR</td>
<td>54.19</td>
<td>42.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevastopol' city</td>
<td>57.07</td>
<td>39.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea Fleet</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>90.32</td>
<td>7.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Support for Independence in the December 1991 Referendum
(Source: Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson. Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence. P. 189)
leader, giving him an advantage over the other candidates (Nahaylo, 1991). Finally, Kravchuk was also leader throughout a period of transition and tension, when the potential for some kind of conflict within Ukraine or between Ukraine and Moscow was quite high. But Ukraine emerged into the new era relatively smoothly, without the threat of bloodshed. He was thus seen as a leader who could provide stability in a time of change, and had support all over the country.

As well, judging by his margin of victory in the eastern and southern regions of the country, voters still did not trust the democratic opposition candidates, but felt that Kravchuk was a pragmatic leader who was not too radical. Kravchuk had convinced them that the only way out of the economic mess the country was in was to take control themselves through independence, and that all people would be better off in an independent Ukraine, not just one ethnic group or another. As Ivan Drach remarked, Kravchuk was seen by "the silent majority of Ukrainians" as a "stabilizing factor (Ibid., 3)."

In the end, Kravchuk's margin of victory was impressive. He won 61.6% of the overall vote, including 72.4% in the East, and 66.7% in the South. Kravchuk's margin of victory would have been even greater in these regions except that one of the candidates, Vladimir Grinev, an ethnic Russian from Kharkiv who was a member of the Party for the Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, who also campaigned for greater Russian autonomy in an independent federalized Ukrainian state, averaged about 10% of the votes in
areas such as Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Odessa (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). Following a barrage of media attention concerning the national message, over 90% of voters supported independence on Dec. 1. The independence question received overwhelming support even in such russified oblasts as Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizzhia, with between 80 and 90% of voters voting for independence, and the question passed in every oblast' (Ibid.). Evidence of the great success of the campaigners for independence was shown in a survey held in September following the announcement of the independence declaration. In this survey only 58% of people in the south and 55% of people in the east supported independence. In the space of two months, the support in these regions went up about 25% (Solchanyk, 1991).

It is interesting to note how widespread the support for independence was at the time of the referendum. Virtually all the Rukh leaders mentioned how two years earlier, none of them would have thought it would be possible to see an independent Ukraine in their lifetimes. And even a year earlier, Rukh was losing support in the east and south because it was campaigning for an independent Ukraine. Why did the referendum pass with such overwhelming approval, receiving support even in areas that had high percentages of ethnic Russians?

The answer probably lies in the total discrediting of the CPSU following the August putsch, as well as the complete support that independence received from all the campaigning groups and candidates. Following the putsch, once Gorbachev was back in power,
he had virtually no authority left, as Russia proclaimed its independence and Ukraine was negotiating directly with Yeltsin's Russia, not Gorbachev. Not only was the idea of a USSR now discredited, but there was no one in a legitimate position of authority to offer a real alternative to an independent Ukraine. Finally, with all the candidates pushing for independence and democracy, the media presented a barrage of positive publicity for the idea of an independent Ukraine. With all the candidates presenting the same package and the media supporting the same package, politicians were able to construct a positive conception of an independent Ukraine, a conception that had support in every oblast' in the country.

Ukraine was now an independent state, and Leonid Kravchuk was its first president. What would now happen to Rukh, now that an independent Ukraine had been attained?

III. THE DECLINE OF RUKH

a. Whither Rukh?

The problems that had existed within Rukh, as evidenced by the indecision regarding support for presidential candidates in the December election, were exacerbated in the succeeding months. During his interview with me, Viktor Tsembaljuk provided his version of events that were to lead to the eventual split in Rukh. In Odessa on December 21 there was a provincial meeting of Rukh where it was decided that the structure of Rukh had to change, and that leadership had to change. Participants at these meetings made
two decisions. First, leaders in Kyiv did not have the right to be the sole representatives of Rukh. Second, related to this issue, they determined that members of other parties should not be members of Rukh as well. They especially had in mind people like Mykhajlo Horyn' who was leading figure in the URP and a major figure in Rukh. There was a special concern that leaders like Horyn' might be in a conflict of interest in some situations where the URP party line might be different from the Rukh line (Tsembaljuk, 1995). On January 21, 1992, the heads of 12 area organizations gathered to concretize these demands, and to prepare them for the Third National Rukh Congress, which was to be held from the 28th of February to the first of March. These regional organizations wanted Chornovil as their head, and they wanted to make it clear to the Kyiv leaders that they did not simply obey what their leaders told them (Ibid.).

b. Rukh’s Third National Congress

The third Congress almost witnessed a breakup of Rukh as an entity. The debates concerning the future of Rukh were often bitter and acrimonious. On the one side were figures such as Drach, Horyn' and Jukhnovskyyj, who still felt that Rukh had a role to play as an all-inclusive democratic movement. First these leaders argued that Ukraine was at such an early stage of its new found independence that such organizations as Rukh could not afford to be destructive in their opposition to Kravchuk. Kravchuk was a member of the former Communist apparat, but he had campaigned on a platform of
independence (and on basically the same platform as Rukh), and Ukraine had achieved that independence. Kravchuk thus deserved some degree of support from all Ukrainians to begin the process of nation-building, especially as it was yet unclear whether the political situation might destabilize somehow. Ukraine (through Kravchuk) had to speak with a clear voice to provide a strong presence on the international scene (Narodnyj Rukh Ukrajiny, 1995). Kravchuk even made a personal appeal at the Congress, stating that he recognized Rukh's role in attaining independence, but that Ukraine still had to be "developed, strengthened, and arranged", and that all forces, including Rukh would have to work together: "If we could get back to the times of slogans, then I would say the most important slogan today is doing hard everyday work to create an independent country (Kravchuk, 1993, 157)."

Second, Horyn' argued that the country still needed a movement that would lead the process of building a democratic state and society, and argued that different parties could still be a part of Rukh even if they did disagree on certain issues:

I believe that Rukh should play the role of consolidating organization of democratic forces in Ukraine. This comes from my position that Rukh is a constructive state-building force. Only a union of democratic forces can undertake the responsibility for the renewal of cadres in government structures, or to prepare for upcoming elections. Only a united democratic front can oppose the destructive anti-state forces in the country and cities.... There have been many cases of sharp conflicts between Rukh and the URP, between Rukh and the DPU. But to this I would add: there have been just as many misunderstandings within Rukh itself: the Vinnysja, Donetsk and Zakarpatja regional organizations have split into two and even three parallel organizations. But we have regional organizations where members of various parties work well together. This is in Kharkiv and Rivno
Drach added, that for him, Rukh would not be the same if it did not include distinguished people such as Lukjanenko, Javorivskyj, Jukhnovskij, as well as members of some of the other smaller parties. Finally, Drach commented that Rukh should be renamed "The National Movement of Ukraine for Statehood and Democracy (Ibid., 27)."

Opponents of this position argued that Ukraine was independent in name only, and that the goal of Rukh was not just to create an independent state, but also a democratic one. Chornovil stated that the cadres in power had also been in power in a Communist Ukraine, and would prevent changes to the system that would make Ukraine more democratic:

First, the repainted nomenclature has reached its maximum goals, retaining the same system and retaining the key positions of power. Second - any kinds of radical reforms - political, economic, or social, will not be allowed, which means that it would not allow the processes which would in reality lead to the building of a truly independent nation and an open society in that nation (Ibid., 134).

Thus, Rukh had the role of destroying the cadre system, starting from the bottom up, in order to make real change to a democratic state possible. He emphasized that he was not saying that the President himself would have to be opposed necessarily, but that the system had to be opposed, and that this battle with the nomenclature would be a battle for the future of the Ukrainian state (Ibid.). Bohdan Bojko added that members of other political parties had to be excluded from Rukh because, first of all, as the Presidential elections showed, if there were conflicts between the
parties and Rukh, then party members followed the line of the parties, not Rukh. Second, these parties were being built up at the expense of Rukh. Party leaders were recruiting members from within Rukh, utilizing Rukh resources to build up their own popularity, and yet criticized Rukh when they felt the time was right (Ibid.).

In the end, Rukh almost broke apart at this Congress. On the last day, a compromise was reached between the leaders on the opposite sides of the issue, and a triumvirate of Horyn', Drach and Chornovil was chosen to lead Rukh. Members of other parties would be allowed to be in Rukh, but could only be in positions of power with special permission (Ibid.). However, the compromise was very short-lived. Throughout the summer, the regional organizations continued to battle for the exclusion of members of other parties from Rukh, and to recreate Rukh as an official opposition party. Moreover, after the Congress, the concept of a triumvirate seemed to disappear. Horyn' became head of the URP that summer and concentrated on Republican Party issues (and again, many Rukh members asked how Horyn' could head the URP and Rukh at the same time). Drach also kept a very low profile following the Congress. Chornovil was, de facto, the sole leader of Rukh by the summer of 1992 (Kovtun, 1995).

c. The Fourth National Congress - Rukh Becomes a Political Party

Although Rukh did not officially take the form of a political party until March of 1994, by the time of the Fourth National Congress in December of 1992, Rukh was no longer an umbrella movement of various democratic parties and organizations, but as
one critic stated, "just one more party among others (Narodnyj Rukh Ukrajiny, 1993, 235.)" And although Chornovil, who had considerable stature, was chosen as leader, Rukh lost a great many widely popular and well-known figures, such as Drach, Horyn', Lukjanenko, Jukhnovskyj and many others. There were a great many members of Rukh who were not affiliated with other parties who left as well, disillusioned by the path it was taking (Ibid.). By 1992, Rukh was restructured to be an opposition party, but in doing so, found itself diminished, no longer able to unite diverse segments of society as it had previously. As one participant remarked, "The Fourth Congress 'laid to rest' the conception of Rukh as a uniter of all state-building political forces (Porovskyj, 1993, 21)."

Many researchers studying national movements have argued that the primary goal of these movements is to gain independence for their nation. Once this goal has been attained, the movement will either break up, or be transformed into another entity such as a political party. In the case of Rukh then, should we not look upon the events of the Third and Fourth Congresses as natural occurrences? The goal of independence had been attained, and the transformation from movement to political party should have been expected. I would argue, however, that this is breakup of the movement and subsequent transformation to a party was not necessarily the natural option, and to this day, many of the leaders on both sides of the debate over Rukh's future still have very strong feelings about Rukh's break-up.

The main reason for my argument is that Rukh was not just a
national movement or an independence movement. Yes, many groups in Rukh did have a nationalist agenda from Rukh's inception. But we must remember that Rukh was also a democratic movement (and began as a democratic movement), a movement that was seeking to reform and overhaul the Communist bureaucratic structures that were in place. Even when the nationalist agenda took priority and the idea of independence gained prominence in 1990 and 1991, the need for reforms had not lessened. Thus, even when Ukraine gained independence, in essence, much of the old Communist system (along with the bureaucrats who ran the system) was still in place. As one person interviewed commented: "It was as if you were to wake up one morning to find Switzerland had invaded Canada. There would be Swiss flags everywhere, but other than that you would not be able to tell if anything had really changed (Tarakhonych, 1995)." Thus, in the minds of many Rukh members, there was still a lot of work to be done in terms of reforming the system, to provide more meaning to the Ukrainian independence that had been achieved. A nation-wide movement would have more potential in this regard, but with the break-up of the movement, individual parties and organizations were left to fight for reforms on their own.

By the end of 1992 then, the political spectrum in Ukraine had changed drastically from that which prevailed when Rukh had begun. When Rukh was first formed, Ukraine was a one-party state, and Rukh was launched as an umbrella movement of all kinds of democratic, political and social organizations that tried to support socio-political change in Ukraine. At its height of popularity Rukh had
over 600,000 members and 5,000,000 supporters from all over Ukraine, with a wide range of ethnicities and ideologies represented. It was the focal point of the opposition movement. But at this point Rukh began to lose its momentum. As documented in the chapter, important occurrences in Ukraine were being more influenced by events outside the republic than by Rukh. Even during the turbulent summer of 1990, it was the students who led the way to the conservative concessions, not Rukh.

Then, as Ukraine became a sovereign state, and as a multi-party political system began to evolve, a faction of 'national Communists' undertook a policy of state-building, and gradually adapted a more nationalist and democratic platform, one that was more and more closely resembling Rukh's first platform. As Rukh supported outright independence for Ukraine, a vacuum was created in the middle between Rukh and the hard-line Communists that Kravchuk and his followers were able to fill. Then, when Ukraine achieved independence, Rukh found itself at a crossroads, with one of its main goals achieved, and with major internal differences as to its future. But again, a major split within the movement meant that the multiorganizational field was even more crowded. Rukh was no longer the single major opposition force. In fact, because a large component of Rukh leaders such as Drach, Javorivskyj and Horyn' were supporting Kravchuk in the immediate aftermath of Ukraine's independence, in terms of the field, Rukh was weakened even further. Even many of its own leaders were supporting Kravchuk and his followers. Chornovil and his followers strove to
transform Rukh into a political party that would strictly oppose Kravchuk and the former Communists. This move led to the final major split of Rukh in December of 1992. By the time of the Fourth Congress of 1992, its membership was down to 50,000, and although it had a storied name and well-known leader in Chornovil, it was now one democratic party among many. The democratic movement, as such, was over.
CONCLUSION

The independence of Ukraine in 1991 came as a great shock to experts in the field and to participants in the process alike. In a few short years, ethnopolitics in Ukraine had changed from republican leaders battling for resources within a highly centralized USSR with virtually no societal participation, to the point where the Ukrainian government (along with other republican governments) was campaigning for complete independence from Moscow, with the support of a majority of the population. In other words, we saw the rapid evolution of ethnofederalism to ethnonationalism in Ukraine. In order to understand this transition better, this dissertation has focused on the role that the Ukrainian national movement, Rukh, played in this process.

I. THE EMERGENCE OF ETHNONATIONALISM IN UKRAINE

As noted in Chapter One, there have been a variety of studies of nationalism and national movements in the Ukrainian (and former Soviet) social science literature. These works tended to focus largely on nationalism, but we argued here that it was necessary to study the movement as well, to round out our understanding of the complex changes going on in Ukraine between 1988-1992.

In Chapter Three we argued that the informal groups and organizations that would eventually make up Rukh were only able to come into being because of the policies of glasnost', democratization, and socialist pluralism of opinions that the Gorbachev government put into place in 1987 and 1988. These
policies allowed for a more open media, permitted public discussion of a variety of issues that had previously been taboo, and allowed for the creation of groups and organizations (outside the Communist Party) in order to encourage participation in dealing with important societal issues. These policies had been put forth largely to help Gorbachev speed the pace of economic reform, and gain support in his fight to reform the bureaucracy. Gorbachev hoped that the new openness would encourage individual citizens to raise their voices against corrupt bureaucrats and party officials. He hoped that the reform from above would be accompanied by support from below to make his fight against the bureaucracy more successful.

Unfortunately for Gorbachev, his policies encouraged more than just citizens actively seeking out corrupt apparatchiks. Instead, organizations that were dealing with a variety of issues that Gorbachev had not meant to be in the public realm began to emerge. The groups and organizations that concerned themselves with nationality issues were the ones that would eventually stir up unrest in the USSR and would ultimately lead the way to the breakup of the country.

In Ukraine, there were two major catalysts (or triggers) that spurred the growth and development of a variety of organizations, and gave a large number of individuals the incentive to become involved in a number of societal and political debates. The first catalyst was the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in 1986. Following this tragedy, and particularly after the republican and all-Union
governments seemed to show more concern for their own reputations than for the safety of those living in and around the affected area, leaders of governments at all levels lost a large amount of legitimacy with the Ukrainian population. Such a loss in legitimacy meant that Ukrainian society was more receptive to what other societal actors had to offer.

The second major catalyst was the emergence of popular fronts in the Baltics in 1988 and 1989. The fronts showed Ukrainians that popular protest on a mass scale was possible in the USSR. The fronts also provided an example from which potential Ukrainian movement leaders could learn, in terms of action forms, strategies for mobilization and organization, etc. In addition, various groups and organizations in Ukraine took advantage of the easier access to buildings and printing facilities in the Baltics to hold meetings and print publicity materials for their groups. As we have noted throughout, it is important to remember that without the macro structural changes mentioned earlier, the Baltic fronts would not have emerged (at this time). Just as importantly, without a more open media reporting on events in the Baltics, and reporting and investigating catastrophes like Chernobyl', people would not have been informed to the point that the above mentioned events would have been catalysts. A trigger is only effective when people know about it.

A variety of groups and individuals became involved in debates concerning the ecological situation in Ukraine, language and cultural issues, and the need for reforming the Soviet system. We
identified individuals who became involved because publicity about these groups provided information that made them curious. Other individuals became involved as a result of recruitment networks (an intermediate level of analysis between the macro and micro level of analysis). Ivan Zajets' for example, became involved in Spadshchyna, a student group he helped organize, made up of like minded individuals whom he studied and lived with in his dormitory. Still other individuals, such as Mykhajlo Horyn', who had been a dissident in the 1960s and upon his release from a prison camp, immediately resumed a leadership role in the battle to preserve the Ukrainian language and culture. Leaders such as Horyn' had a great deal of legitimacy with the public as they had put their lives on the line for what they believed in.

Leaders of these various groups turned to the Ukrainian Writers' Union to help unite and lead the nascent movement. The Writers' Union was well-suited to this role as the union had a number of individuals who were known throughout Ukraine for their talent, they had their own newspaper (Literaturna Ukrajina), and many of them were Communists, who wanted to reform the party. In fact, the Writers' Union, aided by leaders in other organizations such as the UHU and TUM succeeded in establishing the Movement (Rukh) in Support of Perestroika in 1989. Rukh's draft programme included support for Ukrainian cultural, language and ecological issues, but from the beginning Rukh tried to present an image that all people living on Ukrainian territory could support, not just ethnic Ukrainians. Even the fact that it was a movement, not a
front, meant that the leaders were trying to keep the organization from appearing confrontational.

The draft programme was originally published only in Literaturna Ukrajina. The other media castigated the programme en masse, without publishing its contents. However, a series of debates on republic-wide television between Communist and Rukh leaders allowed individuals to make their own judgments about Rukh. Despite the fact that Rukh organizers still faced harassment from government authorities, and still lacked complete access to the media or to larger meeting places to hold demonstrations, over the next year, Rukh organized a wide number of meetings and events that provided great publicity for the movement, and increased its support dramatically.

From roughly the summer of 1989 to the summer of 1990, the Rukh leadership was able to show extensive skill in presenting a draft programme for the movement, holding an inaugural congress, and coordinating activities between the smaller oblast' and rajon organizations all over the country to hold a variety of successful protests and demonstrations that raised the movement's profile and generated widespread positive publicity. This was not an easy task, for the movement was made up of a large number of groups with disparate goals and strong-willed leaders who wanted faster or slower paces towards change. Over this first year, the leadership was able to negotiate a number of compromises in order to present a united platform to the Ukrainian public. For example, in the original draft programme, the leading role of the Communist Party
in the reform process was mentioned. Many people disagreed with this line of thinking, but accepted it thinking that Communist authorities would be less able to attack the movement if the movement acknowledged the Party's leading role.

Up to the summer of 1990, Rukh seemed to have built up a great deal of momentum which culminated in the declaration of Ukrainian sovereignty. By this time, however, Rukh leaders were having an increasingly difficult time maintaining a unified front. Up to now, Rukh leaders had largely been able to create planned, rational strategies to raise the support of Rukh all over the republics. So as not to alienate the Eastern and Southern regions, they concentrated on concepts of economic and democratic reform, and ecological issues, which would have a more powerful resonance in the east and south than language issues would. In addition, Rukh leaders tried to minimize or at least downplay the use of symbols such as the trident or the blue-yellow flag while in the east and south, as these symbols seemed to generate suspicion and even hostility in many regions (we will discuss this more in the next section on collective identity). Events such as the Human Chain and the celebration in Zaporizhzhja were well organized and very successful.

But, by the summer of 1990, a number of internal and external factors meant that Rukh would lose its momentum in mobilizing support. Internally, the birth of a multi-party system meant that Rukh was no longer alone in opposition to the CPU. In fact, several leaders within Rukh led their own political parties. In addition,
Western Ukraine was becoming increasingly more radicalized. Events such as the economic blockade of the Baltic states (and early in 1991, the storming of the TV tower in Vilnius) hardened the support of movement supporters, further cemented opposition to the Communist regime, and led to a radicalization of Western Ukraine. Sovereignty was no longer the goal. Instead, groups in Western Ukraine began demanding outright independence. If Rukh was to maintain its position of leadership in Western Ukraine, it had to become more radicalized as well. As such, in October of 1990, Rukh officially supported Ukrainian independence from the USSR.

A growing split within the Ukrainian Communist Party also complicated the situation for Rukh. A reformist faction of the CPU, led by Leonid Kravchuk, began to take the middle road between the hard line set forth by one faction of the CPU led by Stanislav Hurenko and the more radical one that Rukh represented. Kravchuk seldom strayed from his middle path, not actively promoting independence on the one hand, but on the other hand, passing laws and building an infrastructure that were making Ukrainian sovereignty more of a reality.

Kravchuk continued to try to negotiate a union treaty with the other republics and the centre, wherein Ukraine would have remained a part of the USSR (in some form). But external events (especially the failed putsch) eventually led Kravchuk to support and promote independence. At the end of 1991, with every presidential candidate campaigning for independence, a national referendum showed overwhelming support for the idea of an independent Ukraine. At the
same time Kravchuk, with his more conservative approach to independence, was becoming increasingly popular with a majority of the population, particularly in the Eastern and Southern regions, and was elected President. Candidates supported by Rukh drew a far smaller percentage of the vote than did Kravchuk. It seems ironic that as Rukh was becoming less popular, it achieved its ultimate goal, the creation of an independent Ukrainian state.

As we noted in Chapter Five however, it is important to remember that Ukrainian independence was not the only goal of Rukh. Reform of the bureaucratic system was originally a top priority of the movement. But Rukh broke apart at the Fourth Congress in December 1992, emerging as a political party. If Rukh had been able to maintain its strength as a movement, or perhaps stay together during the Fourth Congress and reorganize itself as a movement for reform, perhaps there would have been a greater possibility of democratic reform of the Ukrainian bureaucracy. Instead, although Ukraine is independent, much of the infrastructure skeleton from the old Communist system still remains, and many of the same people remain in power. Thus reform has been slow to come to Ukraine. And although the newly reformed Rukh Party still calls for democratic reform, its voice is much softer and often lost amidst the other opposition parties.

II. EXAMINING RUKH THROUGH OUR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of multiorganizational field showed how different groups in the field would utilize strategies to mobilize support
according to the positions of both opponents and allies. At first we saw how the various groups that had formed under glasnost’ and democratization would be more effective if they were able to unite and coordinate their activities and efforts. In speaking with leaders of various groups and organizations that made up Rukh, it was clear that the one thing they had in common was opposition to the Shcherbytskyj regime. Shcherbytskyj was in power during some of the worst periods of repression in Ukraine, and was also seen as moving very slowly in terms of making any kinds of reforms of the type that the all-Union government desired. The leaders of these myriad groups decided that, rather than try to battle the regime separately, an umbrella movement of organizations would provide a larger forum for those who wanted to show their antipathy to Shcherbytskyj, and would be able to speak with a louder and more effective voice.

By examining how both Rukh's opponents and allies changed their strategies for mobilizing support throughout Rukh's existence, the multiorganizational field concept helps us understand how and why Rukh's momentum began to fall in the summer of 1990. As we discussed earlier, social movement organizations may have difficulty dealing with spontaneity (for example, the sudden appearance of new groups both within the movement and without) when trying to make rational plans for a movement organization. Many social movement organizations also find that inner tensions within the leadership hinder the decision-making process of the movement (Walsh and Cable 1989, Killian, 1984). By the middle of 1990,
Western Ukraine was beginning to become more radicalized. Following in the footsteps of the Baltics once again, leaders from Western Ukraine began to call for more than just economic and democratic reform, but were calling for outright independence. In the previous year, local Rukh organizations had often been trying to coordinate activities with the centre, but now the Western oblast' organizations were holding demonstrations and campaigning for independence, which the Rukh leadership had not yet officially supported.

In addition, by this time, a number of political parties had begun to form and many Rukh leaders were spending more time concentrating on their political parties rather than on Rukh itself. Rukh was not the single focus of the opposition any more. Instead, the opposition was starting to split, and resources were being expended on individual organizations rather than on the movement effort as a whole. The leadership often found itself floundering at key moments. For example, in October 1990, when the Hurenko government seemed to be moving backwards in its promises of reform and sovereignty, a group of students organized a hunger strike that eventually led to major reforms.

Rukh now found itself having to compete not only with the CPU in terms of presenting a programme and mobilizing support, but also with an increasing number of allies. Local Rukh organizations (and other groups) in Western Ukraine were holding demonstrations and making demands on their own initiative. At the same time, the central Rukh organization was still trying to build support in the
east and south, but the increasing radicalization of Western Ukraine made this more difficult. By the time of Rukh's Second National Congress in October 1990, recognizing that a number of Western Ukrainian groups were taking a leadership role in the drive towards independence, the Rukh leadership decided that it was now time to actively promote Ukrainian independence itself so as not to become completely marginalized in the debate.

Further complicating the multiorganizational field was the new Leonid Kravchuk, who was reinventing himself as a supporter of Ukrainian sovereignty, and who was placing himself between the newly radicalized Rukh on one hand, and the old guard conservatives led by Hurenko on the other. For those who were looking for a new figure to support who did not seek radical change, but who represented some degree of change nonetheless, Kravchuk was the answer. It is interesting that by 1991, Kravchuk, the former arch-foe of Rukh, had usurped the package that Rukh had been promoting two years previously, (that is, he was occupying the same space in the field that Rukh once occupied) and was able to garner excellent support for this package, especially in the east and south. Moreover, following the failed August putsch, all the presidential candidates, including the ones supported by Rukh, supported the same package, and were all fighting for the same position within the field. Kravchuk emerged victorious however, as he had generated an enormous amount of goodwill with the population by virtue of leading Ukraine through a very difficult and tense period. Kravchuk had also been more moderate in his support for sovereignty and then
independence, which was more in step with what the populations of Eastern and Western Ukraine especially were ready to support.

We also used the concept of social construction of protest to analyze how different groups competed in mobilizing support from the general population. Each group tries to present its interpretation of reality to the population. The group that is able to achieve the most resonance or fidelity, will be more likely to gain support. For example, as Rukh was in its infancy, its leaders presented a draft programme that called for a number of reforms to the economy, ecology and culture of Ukraine. This draft programme raised concerns that resonated with many members of the Ukrainian public. Rukh also had a number of widely respected leaders. Thus, Rukh's popularity steadily increased, and Rukh was eventually seen as the leading democratic movement in Ukraine. As the CPU had been steadily losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the public, groups like Rukh who had a new program to present, were able to step in and begin to mobilize support and gain popularity.

The social construction concept also allowed us to examine how and why Rukh was forced to use different strategies in trying to mobilize support in different regions of the country, and why Rukh had mixed success in mobilizing support. While focusing on cultural and nationalist arguments would make the movement more popular in the west, these arguments would be largely met with suspicion in the east and south. Therefore, in the east and south, Rukh organizers tried to focus more on issues that were important to all those living on Ukrainian territory, such as the need for
ecological, economic, and democratic reforms. This mixed success in mobilizing support leads us to the examination of certain concepts that the social construction approach extracts from the Ukrainian case study, which will be discussed in sections four and five. First, however, we must look at the significance of Rukh in a larger context.

Alberto Melucci argued that "Contemporary movements operate as signs, in the sense that they translate their actions into symbolic challenges to the dominant codes.... In this respect, collective action is a form whose models of organization and solidarity deliver a message to the rest of society (Melucci, 1989, 12)." On top of the practical efforts that Rukh made in pushing for Ukrainian sovereignty and then independence, and even in the nation-building processes going on today, Rukh had a symbolic importance that in the final analysis may outweigh its practical contribution.

It must be acknowledged that the very formation of Rukh was of tremendous significance. Chapter Two outlined previous national movements in Ukraine. It was seen that these movements were more smaller in scale and often had only limited support. Rukh had a membership that was far greater than any previous movement, particularly in the Soviet era. Rukh was led by members of the literary intelligentsia who were highly respected. Even though the Rukh leadership was vilified in the press, the fact that they were not arrested, and were even allowed to debate their positions on television meant that changes were occurring in Soviet Ukrainian
society. As mentioned previously, events like the Great Human Chain involved hundreds of thousands of participants, participants who would not have been able to undertake similar activities a decade earlier. Getting involved in the chain was not dangerous in the way that getting involved in demonstrations was once dangerous, and represented an action form that allowed thousands of people to become politically involved in a way they might not have believed possible, only a few years earlier.

Just as significantly, Rukh framed the debate over what it meant to be Ukrainian in a way that still has resonance in Ukraine today. In other words, it began the process of socially constructing the Ukrainian identity into the form that we see now. From the beginning, in its draft programme, Rukh called for changes to take place in Ukrainian society that were to benefit all those on Ukrainian territory, regardless of their ethnic identity. This approach to the development of a Ukrainian nationalism that was not ethnically based, but territorially based, is still continuing today, and is much of the reason why, despite tensions over Ukrainian language and over the use of certain symbols, the transformation of Ukraine from republic to independent state was so peaceful, and why a majority of people of all ethnicities in Ukraine supported independence. This theme of inclusivity continues today, as the constitution adopted in 1996 continues to strike a compromise between the interests of ethnic Ukrainians and the minorities living on Ukrainian territory. As the preamble states, the Supreme Council acted "in the name of the Ukrainian People -
citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities (Wilson, 1996)."

Another signpost that Rukh left had to do with Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Chapter Two included several instances where Ukrainians had acted against Jews in such a horrific matter that Ukrainians have developed a reputation of being extremely anti-Semitic. Rukh took it upon itself to try to repair this reputation as much as it could. Rukh established a secretariat to deal with Ukrainian-Jewish relations, adopted a resolution against anti-Semitism in its platform, and has defended the Jewish community in Ukraine. Oleksander Burakovskyj, cochairman of the Shalom Aleichem Jewish Cultural and Educational Society in Kyiv commented:

The situation today is that Ukraine is now virtually the only place in the Soviet Union where Jews can live really peacefully. I am convinced this is the case not because there are no anti-Semites here, not because there are no people here who would like to advance those slogans that we hear from "Pamyat" on the squares of Moscow and Leningrad, but only because "Rukh" is pursuing democratic policies (Solchanyk, 1991a).

I am not arguing that Ukraine is now the epitome of democracy and utterly without ethnic tension. There is still anti-Semitism in Ukraine, and there are still ultra-nationalists hoping for an opportunity to take power. However, the main tone of the nationalities debate has been conciliatory, and to this point, extremists have been very much in the minority. Rukh, as a broadly based movement, contributed to this situation. One might conclude then, by arguing that external factors directly affected the creation of the national movement and the eventual independence of Ukraine, but internal factors affected the shape and tone that the
movement took. Rukh deserves much of the credit for the relative ethnic peace that Ukraine has today despite the awful economic state the country finds itself in.

Having summarized our findings, we can now use the Ukrainian case study for a critical reevaluation of the utility of several concepts within the social construction framework.

III. THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

The first puzzle with which we must deal with is that of collective identity. It will be recalled that Alberto Melucci argued that a social movement could call itself successful when it had created a collective identity for itself, where the movement had a defined view of the social environment, shared goals, and shared views of possibilities for action within identified constraints. Without this shared identity, collective action would not be possible (Melucci, 1989). Having interviewed a variety of former leaders within Rukh, and having examined the stated goals of leaders of different groups within Rukh, it became apparent to me that Rukh did not have a single identity around which it mobilized widespread support across the country.

Rukh was a movement that served as an umbrella organization for a wide variety of parties and organizations, and many of these groups had goals that were not the same as those that the leadership publicly offered. Rukh was at first quite successful in gaining support, but eventually became more radicalized and lost its chance at becoming a lasting nation-wide phenomenon. As it
became more radicalized, it developed a more coherent identity, but this new identity served to alienate a large segment of the population, which greatly weakened the movement. In examining the concept of identity more closely with respect to Rukh, we see that the creation of an identity for a movement is problematic. A paradox emerges. When the collective identity of the movement was less coherent, the popularity of the movement was more widespread, with potential support coming from all regions and ethnic groups in Ukraine. There was a limit to this support however, and as the movement developed a clearer focus and identity, support was lost in the eastern and southern regions. Let us examine this process more closely.

For many of the Rukh leaders, particularly those who were Party members and/or from areas where there were significant numbers of ethnic Russians or Russian-speaking Ukrainians, wanted Rukh to focus on democratic reforms, and improving the ecology and economy, to improve the life of the average Ukrainian. This focus on political, economic, and ecological reforms did not mean that leaders such as Drach were not worried about the future of the Ukrainian language or the renewal of Ukrainian culture, but meant that they considered that Rukh should support reforms that had a greater potential for support all over Ukraine, even among those who feared any kind of change. At this point in time, therefore, many influential leaders within Rukh supported an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary change in Ukraine (Zajets', 1995).

For other Rukh leaders, particularly those from western
regions and those who represented youth and human rights groups, a
more revolutionary ideal was in place. Once the number of groups
and organizations forming in Ukraine was growing, and once the
strength of the Baltic fronts was becoming apparent, these leaders
wanted a movement that would confront the Communist leadership in
the same way. As such, when asked about whether Rukh had any kind
of concrete identity at the time of its formation, most Rukh
leaders stated that their identity was based on being anti-Party,
and then an identity based on Ukrainian ethnicity (support for
Ukrainian as the state language, return to traditional Ukrainian
symbols, etc.) (Bojko, Koval' and others, 1995).

This anti-Party image was problematic for Rukh from the
beginning. First of all, as Drach pointed out, over 200 delegates
at Rukh's first Congress were Party members, who wanted to reform
the system through the Party, and who did not want Rukh to become
a focus of direct opposition to Party authorities. Rukh would have
a better chance of survival and success, they argued, if it tried
to make changes slowly, without completely altering the political
superstructure. At first, this faction of Rukh was at least
somewhat successful in keeping down the anti-Party invective. Rukh
was not a popular front (which implied opposition to something) but
rather a movement, and also was a movement in support of perestroika, a government policy.

Despite having different approaches in different regions of
the country, and thus having identities in these regions (one
deputy described the movement as trying to have an identity of a
democratic movement in the east, while having a democratic-nationalist identity in Western Ukraine (Tkachenko, 1995), Rukh was able to build a tremendous amount of support in its first year of existence. The support was skewed towards Western Ukraine, but there were Rukh organizations in every region in the country, and the potential for mobilizing even greater support all over the country seemed almost limitless, as discontent with the government was rising all over. The problems for Rukh began at a time when it achieved some of its most important goals, namely in October of 1990, when Prime Minister Masol resigned, and Parliament renewed its support for Ukrainian sovereignty, following a prolonged student hunger strike in Kyiv.

Looking at the situation through the social construction framework, we can see that up to this point Rukh was able to build support for itself because it occupied a frame that was completely different from the frame presented by the Ukrainian government. Because dissatisfaction with government policies was escalating all over the country, Rukh was able to take advantage, gaining huge support in Western Ukraine, and lukewarm support in Eastern and Southern regions, despite widespread negative media publicity, and despite suspicions about Rukh's nationalist leanings. Rukh was thus able to attract support from those who wanted outright independence for Ukraine, and to those who did not want huge change, but simply wanted the present system to work better.

But in October of 1990, during its Second National Congress, Rukh became more radicalized, renaming itself as Rukh (without the
"Support for Perestroika"), and stating that its main goal was building a path towards an independent Ukrainian state. As well, Rukh banned political parties that had their leadership base outside Ukraine, thus effectively banning CPSU members from being a part of Rukh. Rukh's strongest support had always been in Western Ukraine, and with several oblasts having nationalist leadership, with the Baltic republics having proclaimed their independence, and with several political parties in Western Ukraine publicly supporting the idea of Ukrainian independence, Rukh leaders followed suit and announced support for independence. By supporting independence Rukh kept itself from being marginalized in Western Ukraine, where other groups were ready to take the leadership role if Rukh did not want it. As well, Rukh's identity became more clearcut. It was less of an umbrella movement for any groups that wanted change, and more of a movement that wanted to create a new political entity, that of an independent Ukraine.

Of course, in becoming more radicalized, Rukh lost the support of many moderates in other regions of Ukraine that wanted either a gradual change in the Communist system, or at most a renewed Ukrainian SSR with a new Union Treaty. Rukh was losing momentum in many areas even as both the republic and union governments were becoming increasingly unpopular. Rukh leaders in the east described difficulties in dealing with a more conservative population. For example, television news would show footage of people in Western Ukraine removing statues of Lenin by putting a noose around his neck. In many eastern regions Rukh organizers did not try to have
Lenin monuments removed, and often tried to keep political discussion on the level of making democratic reforms (and soft-pedaling around the issues of language and independence), but these kinds of actions hurt Rukh in the East and South (Kobzar, 1995).

Rukh leaders realized that there were regional differences and tried to create strategies for mobilizing support that would be most effective in the regions in which they were campaigning. For example, in the east, they would concentrate on the state of the economy and ecology, with a focus on the need for sovereignty for Ukraine to ensure that all citizens would be better off. In the western regions Rukh could speak about language and nationalist issues, using symbols such as the trident and the yellow-blue flag to evoke a sympathetic response from the audience. Rukh could fight for the sake of an independent Ukraine not just on the grounds that people would be better off, but that it was a historic right for Ukraine to be independent, invoking images of the 1918 independent Ukraine, and even going back as far as the Cossack days to remind people that Ukraine was and should be independent.

The problem for Rukh was that it is not always possible to separate one's arguments in the manner mentioned above. Nationalist arguments in one region not only might not work, they might have a negative effect in other regions. Thus when the eastern regions heard that Rukh was a nationalist party in the west, and they saw the yellow-blue flags being raised at rallies, and they saw statues of Lenin being torn down, they might worry less about the argument about being better off and worry more that the Ukraine they know
will change to their detriment. This is where the problem of historical memory comes in, as Rukh leaders had to deal with the fact that certain symbols evoked different memories in different regions. One can see then that it was difficult, if not impossible, for Rukh to use symbols and refer to historical memory to generate support all over Ukraine, as certain symbols and memories evoked opposite responses in different regions.

What we see then is that, perhaps, when there are strong regional differences in a country with respect to certain issues, symbols, myths, etc., it is NOT always best for a movement to have a strong, coherent identity. It might be best for a movement in this situation to have a more multi-faceted, looser identity, so that more people in more regions can support the movement. This idea is, of course, problematic in itself, as people will not support a movement that does not really stand for something specific. But in the case of Rukh, when the movement stood for change in a general sense, a wide spectrum of people could support it. But, when the movement specifically advocated Ukrainian independence, Rukh effectively lost a broad range of support among people who wanted change, but in a more conservative way. Coincidentally, Rukh's decline in popularity was hastened by the evolution of Kravchuk's faction, which received the support of the more conservative former Rukh supporters as well as those who never had supported Rukh. It is not clear whether, in Rukh's case, there was any solution to this dilemma that would have led to a more successful outcome for the movement.
IV. THE MOTIVATION FACTOR

While providing an interesting and informative framework from which to view the establishment and growth of Rukh as a movement, as well as in examining the ideological battle both within Rukh, and between Rukh and its main opponents, social construction theory is less useful in determining why Rukh evolved into a party, rather than remaining a democratic movement. When asked why Rukh evolved into a political party, most Rukh leaders said that it was a natural process, following in the footsteps of other movement organizations in other places, such as Sajudis in Lithuania and Solidarity in Poland. Now that Ukraine was independent, the raison d'être for Rukh as a movement was finished; now it was time to try to grasp power, so ran the argument.

However, as noted in Chapter Five, several leaders such as Ivan Drach argued that a democratic movement was still a necessity in Ukraine. Even with an independent Ukraine, so much of the old anti-democratic infrastructure remained that to ensure Ukraine went through with wholesale changes to the system, a strong democratic movement from below would keep pressure on leaders in power, as well as the bureaucracy, to make the necessary changes to democratize the system (Drach, 1995). Unfortunately, many of the Rukh leaders responsible for making these types of arguments were in political parties such as the URP and the DPU, and were themselves trying to seek power. Meanwhile, a whole cadre of Rukh workers who had spent the last few years toiling for Rukh,
mobilizing support for the movement, wanted Rukh to actively seek power for itself. As a large segment of Rukh workers saw it, Rukh was being used as a resource pool for these political parties, who gained benefits without returning anything to Rukh. These workers wanted to reap their own benefits.

A focus on social construction can show how the different sides of this argument were presented, which ideological packages were more appealing, etc. But social construction does not get at the motivations of the people making this argument, which one needs to understand why Rukh broke up. A different approach is necessary to examine why Rukh supporters at the regional level deeply wanted Rukh to become a political party, while a host of Rukh leaders wanted to keep Rukh a movement. Although very difficult to prove, I would argue that a rational choice type paradigm would be more useful here.

When speaking to present day high ranking Rukh officers, and when examining speeches made at the Third and Fourth National Rukh Congresses, one can see that several regional leaders of Rukh were able to parlay regional movement leadership into national Party leadership. For example Bohdan Boyko moved from Ternopil to the national executive. Olena Bondarchuk moved from Luhansk to the national level. Similarly, Viktor Tsembaljuk moved from Odessa to a national executive position. These openings in leadership were all created when Rukh broke apart in 1992, and political parties such as the DPU and RPU were prevented from participating in Rukh. Looking at the example of similar movements that had grasped power
recently, a large group of Rukh members saw an opportunity for the taking. The infrastructure, with Rukh organizations in every oblast', was already in place, and the party had a name that was more widely identifiable than any other democratic-type party. So Rukh was seen to be ready to make a move on the national political stage.

On the other side, leaders of Rukh who were also leaders in parties such as RPU and the DPU, can be seen as supporting the idea of a continuation of the movement, because if Rukh did not become a party, their particular political parties stood a better chance of gaining widespread support. Rukh as a movement had a name, an organization, and resources that could be utilized, but if Rukh were to become a party, then suddenly the URP and the DPU would have another opponent that was further trying to split the vote of the people who were leaning to these democratic-type parties. It was thus in their best interest and the best interest of their parties to have Rukh remain a movement. As well, a rational choice argument could be made that leaders such as Mykhajlo Horyn' and Ihor Jukhnovskyj, leaders of the URP and DPU respectively, were more concerned about their leading roles in their parties, because within the Rukh movement, they were big names in a sea of big names, and also a wide range of groups and organizations. But in a smaller political party, they were suddenly the biggest names, the most important members of their organizations. Of course, in the end, these conclusions are intuitive on my part, and at best, might only consist of part of the motivation behind these different
groups. Even in-depth interviewing with the leaders involved would probably not reveal the total motivation behind the actions taken. But the ultimate point is that social construction does not offer much insight into this particular area.

In fact, even when we look at the multiorganizational field presented throughout this dissertation, and the leading actors that opposed each other, the question of motivation is again not answered. For example, how can one account for the change in Leonid Kravchuk over a five year period, from heading the Ideology wing of the Ukrainian Communist Party and heading the opposition to Rukh, to becoming the first president of the independent country of Ukraine? Social construction provides interesting insights into how Kravchuk won the popular battle over groups like Rukh, how he took over that portion of the multiorganizational field, and that ideological package that Rukh was presenting for himself, and rode that package to success. But one cannot see why he changed his ideas so fundamentally. One could argue that he saw that his only chance at keeping power lay in stripping himself of his conservative Communist colours and begin looking and talking like a Ukrainian sovereigntist, and then a nationalist supporting independence when the time was ripe. Kravchuk himself stated that even when he was head of ideology he tried to tone down the rhetoric against Rukh, and that he wanted an independent Ukraine but he was waiting for the right time to make the move, etc. (Kravchuk, 1995). But only he knows what his reasoning was - how much patriotic love he had for Ukraine, and how much of that love
The case of Vjacheslav Chornovil is also interesting. During the Second Congress, Chornovil stated that:

If Rukh becomes one with other parties, it will die, it will lose, it will be reborn as an organization of cultural propaganda,... Parties will manipulate it and defeat it. Rukh, to save itself and continue to play its role... must become a coordination centre that will unite political parties and other groups (Kovtun, 1995, 270).

A year and a half later, he was supporting the transformation of Rukh into a Party. Kovtun argued that this change was due to Chornovil's desire to create his own political party (Kovtun, 1995). Based on my own interviews with various Rukh cadres, I would state that this statement is only partially true. While it would be difficult to discount Chornovil's political ambitions, I would also argue that the lower level Rukh activists who were working to transform Rukh into a party needed a leader with national stature to lead the transformation. By all accounts, it took several months before Chornovil could be convinced, but it now appears that Chornovil's and the activists' interests dovetailed nicely.

This motivational question can also be asked of many who supported either Rukh, or Kravchuk, or other political groups. Were these people supporting Rukh because they wanted change and were truly worried about issues of language, culture, and ecology, or did they see an independent Ukraine as offering more economic opportunities for them? Why did so many people all over Ukraine suddenly support independence following the putsch in 1991? Did they suddenly have a love for the idea of being Ukrainian, were they convinced that they would be economically better off in an
independent Ukraine, or that it was the only realistic option at that time?

According to a poll conducted in 1991, support for independence was based largely on socio-economic motives, civil democratic motives (rejection of the Communist legacy), and finally, a strong national orientation. But as Stepanenko notes, the three motives become entangled because:

What at first glance appears to be a purely pragmatic desire for a better standard of living acquired a patriotic content because it could be realised only in a sovereign and independent Ukraine. At the same time every voter understood that the future of the Soviet Union as a political entity depended on the results of the Ukrainian referendum. In these historical circumstances, the Ukrainian national idea was equal to the civil democratic idea (Stepanenko, 1993, 4).

At the same time that we note the difficulties of untangling these motivations, we must also comment on how the study has only begun the process of showing how social construction theory can be used to study the Ukrainian case. First of all, in terms of the effects that media had on the evolution of the movement, this dissertation has only provided anecdotal examples of how the media did or did not support Rukh (i.e., how many newspapers, radio stations etc. supported Rukh, in which cities, etc.), and how this support or lack thereof affected Rukh's mobilization of support. In their works on political discourse and media, theorists such as Gamson have looked at media coverage of a particular event (in Gamson's case, nuclear energy) in comprehensive detail. Using studies by such groups as the Media Institute, Gamson was able to determine exactly how much network coverage nuclear energy received.
before and after certain events such as Three Mile Island, and make conclusions concerning the role of collective action on opening the discourse on nuclear power based on that data (Gamson, 1988).

In the Ukrainian case, it was beyond the scope of the study to get that kind of detailed data. Instead, some general conclusions were offered as to how media coverage both helped and hindered Rukh's attempts at increasing its support. Moreover, we saw how more open media were a major factor that allowed easier transmission of information for groups like Rukh, as well as allowing people to read about and see the changes that were going on in Eastern Europe and in the Baltics.

Second, more extensive surveys and interviewing should be done as to how, when and why (or why not) people supported Rukh. With more comprehensive data, one would get a better picture of the networks that existed previous to perestroika, and those that came into being once Gorbachev's policies came into place. With more data on the existence of these kinds of networks, one might get a better understanding of how crucial networks are to the formation of a successful social movement. With in-depth interviewing one could also get a better grasp of how individuals are mobilized, and which factors must exist for people to join movements, that is, are macro factors such as mass grievances necessary, do people become more involved when they have friends involved, etc. One could also get at issues of motivation. With careful questioning, one might be able to untangle how and why peoples' perceptions of independence changed, and how and why (or why not) they would support such a
movement as Rukh.

More survey data could also be generated on the issue of identification with Rukh. People could be asked what Rukh represented to them, as well as how they might identify themselves. Finally, one could then see whether there was a correlation between how people saw Rukh and how they identified themselves; and whether identification is as important an issue as social construction theorists maintain.

V. THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICAL MEMORY

Finally, as noted in Chapter One, it is the element of history/historical memory that is missing from social construction theory. Only with an understanding of Ukrainian historical myths can one understand why Rukh's attempts at transforming collective beliefs worked in Western Ukraine, but was problematic in other regions of Ukraine. Only with a knowledge of Ukrainian historical memory can one understand why cultural resonance was so difficult for Rukh to achieve in certain regions of Ukraine. And only with this knowledge of history can identity makers undertake social construction and have any chance of success. Creating an identity for a movement becomes impossible when using certain myths and symbols to mobilize support will work in one region but will only create suspicion in another. We identified several historical flashpoints, whose conflicting interpretations have led to different regional identities. In the case of Rukh, leaders realized that regional differences existed, and tried to create strategies
that would allow for Rukh to be successful in all regions. Why did Rukh leaders then switch strategies in midstream, moving towards a more radical position, that threatened to cut the movement's support in the east and south?

As we noted earlier, two reasons for this shift in thinking were the higher participation of Western Ukrainians in Rukh (in the leadership and the rank and file), as well as the need to maintain Rukh's high profile in an increasingly radicalized Western Ukraine. What we see here is a conflict between individuals acting as rational actors, and groups acting as rational actors. At the group level, it would seem to be rational for Rukh to try to support policies that would allow it to grow in popularity all over the republic. But individuals, particularly from Western Ukraine, were becoming increasingly attracted to the idea of independence, were aware of the situations in the Baltics where their national fronts were becoming increasingly radicalized, and were participating in action forms of various sorts on an increasingly frequent basis. For these individuals, support for independence was not just due to ecological and economic reasons, but for emotional ones as well. Thus the conflict between group and individual rationality led to a decision-making process that discounted the historical divisions between the regions.

Rukh leaders mentioned that they hoped that the fervency of support in the west would infect the other regions, and trusted that these regions would become accustomed to the symbols that the west was using. Instead, as we noted, another group came up the
middle between Rukh and the hardline Communists, a group that was able to siphon off a great deal of support. Thus, it is worth noting, that even though Rukh organizers were aware of the historical factors that would make territory-wide mobilization difficult, it is another matter entirely to find a way to deal with the historical factors that would allow the movement to garner maximum support in all regions of the territory.

In conclusion, the social construction approach continues to be applicable to Ukraine today. Rasma Karklins has argued that a new democratic political culture has emerged in Russia, particularly among the younger and more educated segment of Russian citizens (1994). I would argue that, both in the case of Russia and Ukraine, there is a potential for a democratic political culture to emerge and develop, but it is much too early, and the political and economic situation is too precarious to say that it has emerged completely. Ukraine is still in its infancy as a nation-state and has a long way to go to determine what kind of identity (or identities) it will have, and what kind of political and civic culture will develop. As such, it appears that the social construction approach will continue to have potential as a theoretical base from which to study an independent Ukraine's evolution. The fact that this western based approach has the potential to provide such interesting insights into events past and present in a country that belonged to another political system is very exciting, both for those involved in Ukrainian studies, and
for those political scientists interested in examining new cases. In fact, because Ukraine is such a new country, with a constitution barely a year old, and virtually no historical tradition of statehood (but with an ethnie over one thousand years old) the use of Ukraine as a case study holds enormous potential for study in virtually every area of political and indeed, social science.
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