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'COMMUNITY POLICING' - A STUDY OF LOCAL POLICING, ORDER AND CONTROL

by

Benedikt Josef Fischer

a thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Centre of Criminology
University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the concepts and practices of ‘community policing’ on the basis of a field study in a large urban centre in Canada. The focus of this inquiry was to understand ‘community policing’ as a governmental technology mobilized jointly by police and select social or ‘community’ resources and interests, and to investigate the empirical practices through which the concept’s predominant ‘reform’ and ‘empowerment’ rhetoric materializes. Field observation and interview data have been collected with the divisional ‘Community Response Unit’ of the police force under study, as well as with a number of local ‘neighbourhood’ organizations acting as ‘community’ in these contexts. The central findings include that on a police organizational level, ‘community policing’ is established as an isolated add-on to existing police functions, rather than an organizational reform effort embracing the institution of police. Traditional organizational values, performance indicators and management strategies remain unchanged, while many officers suggest a lack of clear guidance or vision on how to ‘do’ ‘community policing’ on the side of their superiors. In terms of operations, the observed ‘community policing’ efforts concentrate heavily on street disorder phenomena, like prostitution, drugs, liquor offenses. The main operational tools are discretionary combinations of surveillance, informal control as well as criminal and non-criminal law enforcement activities, while ‘problem solving’ occurs predominantly through efforts of aggressive ‘problem displacement’ out of the local jurisdiction.

‘Community’ in the socio-economically diverse study contexts consists primarily of self-
organized, selectively homogenous white, middle-class and property owning residents pushing for an elimination of street disorder phenomena from their locales. For these purposes, ‘community’ provide ‘legwork’ for police in terms of surveillance, but also put into operation their own effective local control schemes through the mobilization of exclusion mechanisms, by-law enforcement, licensing and regulatory schemes, etc. ‘Community’/police contacts, however, predominantly limit ‘community’ to provide input, while decision-making on ‘policing’ remains a police matter. In essence, the practices observed maintain the police’s central and hegemonic power role in ‘community policing’, while reinforcing it through marginal, facilitative and symbolic involvement of ‘community’. ‘Community policing’ is recognized as a local governmental technology which ‘re-socializes’ the police, and constructs ‘policable’ communities.
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Background

It has been argued that over the past 15 years or so, a dramatic shift has occurred in public policing (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994, Greene and Mastrofski 1988, Moore 1992). With the advent and establishment of the paradigm of 'community policing' as the overarching framework of how the public police is being thought about, the philosophical, organizational, professional and operational parameters of how the public police are presenting themselves and their work have become fundamentally revised. Thus, it is suggested that through 'community policing', the public police have principally changed the way they see themselves, act and function as a unique agency of state authority.

First, it is suggested that the new framework of 'community policing' has turned the public police from an isolated, distanced and highly professional organization singularly dealing with law and order issues into an organization that openly seeks input from and cooperation with other social actors in defining target issues, approaches and solution strategies within their mandate and jurisdiction (Kelling and Moore 1988). Primarily, 'community policing' suggests that it facilitates the policing that the 'community' wants, to incorporate the 'community' in the process of defining policing concerns and objectives, devising solution strategies, and to implement them in a joint fashion with these new 'stakeholders' and 'partners' (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, Skolnick and Bayley 1988). In this context, much of the recent discourse around the public police has assumed a corporate language, in which 'public policing' is presented as a 'service' rather than 'duty' or 'authority', and 'subjects' of its powers have become transformed into 'customers'. While traditional policing strongly emphasized the professional and 'non-political' enforcement of the law and the maintenance of order as its key mandates and principles and primarily measured its success through quantitative indicators reflecting on these activities, 'community policing' has presented its observers with new, predominantly qualitative and locally ambivalent operational variables.

'Community policing' language proposes 'problem-solving', proactive policing' and 'prevention' as its key operational and guiding terms, and refers to 'community safety', 'fear reduction' and 'quality of life', as well as further subjective, qualitative indicators as central objectives (Goldstein 1990, Eck and Spelman 1987). Generally, the emphasis in ordinary police
work has been changed from policing as an expert 'jump in, do the job, and pull out'-exercise to an operational mandate that seems to define the police as an omni-present 'social' stakeholder in the 'community' not only with respect to explicit law and order issues, but for a wide variety of issues that are directly or indirectly related to 'community safety' or local 'quality of life'. Overall, in a more political context, this 'paradigm shift' in policing has been hailed as the necessary and crucial shift to deal with a perceived growing level of decay and disorder primarily in urban settings, a growth in crime, and the general admission that the traditional 'crime control' model relied on by the police in the past has failed (Kelling and Coles 1996, Skogan 1990).

While the concept of 'community policing' has dominated both police theory and practice in most Western countries now for more than a decade, analytic examinations of what it does, what it accomplishes and what its wider social implications are (rather than what it symbolically promises and projects) have been limited. Much of the writing on 'community policing' has remained at the rather descriptive level, failing to investigate the practices and realities that are going on under the umbrella of 'community policing' (see Greene and Mastrofski 1988, Eck and Rosenbaum 1994). It seems that even much of the academic writing on 'community policing' has been swayed and seduced by a new set of language that seems to promise, imply and guarantee change, but have fallen short in analytically documenting what it in practice means from the perspective of the police or its social subjects (Ericson, Carriere and Haggerty 1993). However, the terms of 'community', 'proactive policing', 'problem-solving' and 'quality of life' are rather ambiguous and not very meaningful just by themselves. They neither tell us explicitly what they mean, nor do they unambiguously distinguish themselves from events and outcomes that happened in public policing before 'community policing' arrived. As such, 'community policing' first and foremost appears as a set of symbols that suggests 'change', but on an empirical level it is not clear at all if and what kind of change actually occurs.

The Problem

While there has been a great amount of writing on the concept of 'community policing', and the area has also produced a huge and ever-increasing body of 'evaluation' studies on 'community policing', a variety of key issues related to the concept, practices and the wider impact of 'community policing' have remained insufficiently examined.

First of all, it is generally not clear what 'community policing' actually means as a concept.
While some have argued that it is a 'philosophy' rather than a practical concept that requires to be filled with practical meaning by the ones who do and practice it, there has been a clear lack of inquisitive work that would fill that knowledge gap (see Skolnick and Bayley 1988). Although 'community policing' is predominantly being presented as reform of the institution of the public police per se, it remains largely unclear what the new concept means for the organization of public police (Greene, Bergman and McLaughlin 1994, Seagrave 1996). Traditionally conceived as a hierarchically structured, paramilitary organization with specialized compartments for different police 'functions', the fundamental question is what the effects and consequences of 'community policing' are for the public police organization in general. Is 'community policing' a reform movement of public policing in general in that it has brought reform to the overall organizational body of the police, or is 'community policing' a new or added police 'function' which has left traditional organizational functions and units pretty much unchanged? While it is obviously the case that basic traditional police functions and organizational units are still in place in the age of 'community policing', how do they relate to, participate in and fit into what falls under the umbrella of 'community policing'? And finally, 'community policing' poses challenges for management structures and practices in the police organization. Traditionally, the public police have relied on a command system based on hierarchical principles. 'Community policing', with its suggested emphasis on responsibilized front-line officers, discretionary powers for frontline staff and 'lean management' principles seems to pose challenges to this old framework, but it is not clear how these have been resolved or reconciled with old or parallel structures.

On a more micro-operational level of police work and practices, there is not much detailed analytical knowledge on what distinguishes the 'community police' officer in his/her 'police work', professional personality and attitudes from his/her traditional peers. It is also not sufficiently documented what distinguishes 'community police work' from what other, regular patrol officers do specifically in comparison to what we know about them on the basis of a variety of seminal field studies (Bayley 1994, McConville and Shepherd 1992). While the conceptual 'community policing' literature hints at fundamental changes in the objectives, operations and approaches of police work, there is not much solid documentation on how these suggested new approaches to 'policing' challenges are actually implemented in practical 'community police' work. A central question relates to the traditional role and function of 'law enforcement' within the practical parameters of 'community policing's' frontline realities.
There is a strong suggestion that the front-line 'community police' officer has been reformed from a predominant 'law enforcer' to a 'constable generalist' who is concerned with local problems' 'safety' and 'order' rather than just 'crime', and searches for and devises solutions through many more diverse types of interventions than primarily the enforcement of law (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, deLint 1996). These 'solutions' are encouraged to be discretionary, locally-based and flexible rather than standardized and formal. There is also the argument that 'law enforcement' was never effective in solving the crime and order problems that the public police were confronted with on a daily local level, and that 'other' solutions promise to be more effective as well as less costly with respect to police resources. However, it is not clear to what extent and how front-line police operations, its practices and the key 'work tools' being used in everyday police work have actually been modified along the lines suggested above. Is 'community policing' frontline work operationally, practically and professionally different in a significant and detectable way from what regular patrol officers used to do, or is it old practices in new symbolic wrapping?

While obviously a number of fundamental questions with respect to the ideology, organization and operations of the police have remained unanswered within the 'community policing' complex, the other side of the equation has triggered equally fundamental questions. Generally, one of the most ambiguous aspects related to 'community policing' refers to the question of who the 'community' actually is within this framework, what role it is supposed to play within the project, and how its various aspects of participation are envisaged to occur and unfold (Mastrofski 1988, Crawford 1994). While 'community' is a predominantly ambiguous and elusive concept especially in late modern times - what exactly defines a 'community'? - and the image in practice at best refers a large multitude of conflicting or overlapping 'communities' that exist in contemporary social environments, 'community policing' concepts have failed to tell us who 'the community' is which it persistently refers to. It does not enlighten us sufficiently about how 'community' is actually comprised, selected and recruited for its practices, how it would be effectively integrated into the decision-making behind policing operations, and what its precise roles and functions are in this social enterprise. In light of these conceptual gaps, there has been a lack of inquiry investigating what forms and shapes 'community' in practice has taken within the framework of 'community policing', and what specific characteristics the social entities feature that, for whatever systematic or coincidental reason, play the role of 'community' in these contexts of crime, order and safety. 'Community policing' suggests a rather harmonious, consensual and
natural image of 'community' for its purposes. Acknowledging the considerable socio-political conflict properties of law, order and policing in contemporary society, a more investigative look into these aspects behind the curtains of the 'community' facade is clearly needed.

While 'community' in 'community policing' is used as a sort of an 'apple-pie' concept - who could disagree with its ubiquitously positive symbols and values? - there is much need to explore who forms 'community' in these contexts (and who does not), what interests and agendas are carried by the actors and entities that function as 'community' in cooperation with police, and how the interests, resources and processes of 'community' are being utilized by the police within the new framework of 'community'-oriented operations. How do the police in 'community policing' contexts define, construct and act towards 'community', and how does the 'joint venture' project of 'community policing' identify its subjects and targets of control, ordering and policing?

It has not only been suggested that 'community' inform and reactively partake in 'community policing' operations, but it has been proposed as an active and responsibilized entity in contemporary local policing contexts (O'Malley and Palmer 1994, Marx 1989). While much has been written on the social control and order practices and implications of public policing, these aspects with respect to the entity of 'community' and its new role under the umbrella of 'community policing' have largely remained unexplored. 'Community' action features and encourages activities of safety resource mobilization, surveillance, information gathering as well as the ordering, controlling and 'taking back' of neighbourhoods and local public spaces often independently from police intervention and resources (Kelling and Coles 1996, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). However, there exists a considerable lack of analytic knowledge with respect to how 'community' organizes itself around law, order and safety issues and what these issues precisely are, how concerns, targets and subjects of such mobilization processes are constructed, and what the central mechanisms and instruments are that are being utilized for these objectives. In short, the 'policing' or social control efforts, mechanisms and implications of 'community' itself - independently from the police - under the 'community policing' framework require much clearer examination. These are especially necessary in order to gain a better understanding of what 'community policing' actually means for what has been critically examined as the broad phenomenon of 'policing' over the past two decades or so (Shearing and Stenning 1987). Only through such a perspective of examination, we will be able to understand the larger social, practical and theoretical implications evolving out of the everyday practices and realities of what
is commonly referred to as 'community policing'.

This study aims to provide a more detailed analysis of the realities, practices and implications of 'community policing' in response to the social and empirical issues as well as the existing analytical gaps referred to above. In order to do so, this investigation will examine the setting, practices and effects of a 'community policing' project as implemented within the boundaries of a large division within one of Canada's largest metropolitan police forces. In terms of its overall framing, this study is probably best described as an ethnographic case study of 'community policing' in a local setting. Considering these parameters of the investigative framing, the study does not and cannot aim to provide broad generalizations about 'community policing' concepts of policing issues; rather, it is an effort to explore how the practices and realities of 'community policing' materialize in a specific case setting as seen from the perspective of a multiple field research approach.

The Study

This study will focus on two substantive core segments of inquiry, with two methodological levels of investigation each. First, the examination will concentrate on relevant research questions with respect to the meaning and impact of 'community policing' on structures and operations within the public police. Second, my inquiry aims to analyse the meaning, practices and impacts of 'community' constitutive of and relevant within 'community policing', as they pertain to the nature, role and practices of 'community' as a social entity constructed and performed for the purposes of new forms of 'policing' in local contexts.

More specifically and practically, within the parameters of the focus and the methodology of this research, this study involves the four following central empirical components of examination, with the subsequent central questions of inquiry outlined below. These empirical study components will be prepared and framed by a review of the relevant 'community policing' literature. This review will be focussing on the questions of what evolutionary developments in the field of 'policing' have brought us to the contemporary model of what is described as 'community policing', what wider social developments seem important to consider for a constructive examination of the concept (i.e. the devolution of the state as the central welfare authority, the increased responsibilization of local social entities in government functions, etc.), and what relevant problem areas or unanswered questions there are to be considered for a more
analytical understanding of the concept's meaning, practices and implications.

More concretely, the first section of the empirical part of this inquiry examines the meaning and impact of ‘community policing’ structures and practices on the institution of the public police. Precisely, this study will investigate how ‘community policing’ is being set up and implemented within the organizational structures of the police division examined. It will look at how the organizational transition or possible respective dynamic between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of policing have occurred in the research site, and how these organizational entities interact and cooperate in police work practice. It will aim to illustrate further how these different organizational entities relate to each other operationally, and how they might differ in their approaches to police work, the matters they focus on, and the principal operational mechanisms utilized. As well, it will explore what distinguishes ‘middle’ and front-line management structures and practices in ‘community policing’ structures from the ones practised in ‘traditional’ police environments. Finally, the examination sets out to explore how officers engaging in ‘community policing’ are characterized and motivated distinctly from their peers in other functions.

The second component of inquiry focusing on the ‘police’ component of ‘community policing’ will concentrate on the micro-level of ‘community police work’ as performed by the ‘community policing’ frontline officer. The investigation collected an empirical impression of the issues, targets and subjects of ‘police work’ that ‘community police’ officers preoccupy themselves with in their daily work, and what the main ‘policing tools’ are that they are utilizing for these objectives. In particular, it will be a central question to examine how ‘community police’ work translates the emphasized operational components of ‘proactive policing’, ‘problem-solving’, ‘prevention’ into professional practice, and if these approaches differ substantially from what we know about the characteristics of ‘traditional’ types of police work. The inquiry will investigate what role ‘discretion’ plays in the ‘community police’ officers’ daily work, and how they use this power in their professional operations. Then, it will be important to examine what ‘community’ actually means for the ‘community police’ officer at work, how they relate and refer to ‘community’, how ‘community’ shapes and influences the issues they deal with as well as their responses, and how ‘community’ becomes involved in day-to-day, practical frontline police work on a practical level.

The next section of the study will aim to provide an idea of who ‘community’ actually is, how it is staged and constructed, and what it is concerned with in the practical contexts of
‘community policing’ as explored in this field study. Within the research site examined, ‘community’ from the perspective of the police is primarily operationalized through a variety of local ‘neighbourhood’ groups and organizations that have organized themselves around issues of crime, order and safety. One of the key objectives of this study is to provide a distinct overview on who is involved in these ‘community’ groups with respect to the social, demographic and economic as well as attitudinal makeup of their members - the people they include as well as the ones they seem to exclude. It shall be elaborated on what perceptions, perspectives and agendas characterize them with respect to crime, order and safety issues and what issues they are concerned with within that context. Finally, an analysis is presented of what sort of approaches and solutions they expect and advocate ‘community policing’ efforts to take and accomplish around these issues, what role they see for police as well as ‘community’ within this framework, and how they assess the advances and accomplishments made by ‘community policing’ so far.

This examination will provide a more general picture of how these organizations that have been recruited by the police to represent ‘community’ for their needs and purposes conceive of ‘community policing’ in terms of agendas, objectives and targets. The inquiry will finally aim to elaborate on why the cooperation of the public police with these existing ‘community’ groups under the umbrella of ‘community policing’ is a mutually convenient and beneficial enterprise for both sides. However, it will be argued that the construction of ‘community’ through these highly selective and organizationally peculiar social entities has fundamental social implications for the sort of local order structure and operations that public policing is concerned with as determined by the evolving parameters of ‘community policing’.

Finally, a closer look at the internal characteristics, concerns and activities of the ‘community groups’ described will suggest that the meaning of ‘policing’ in local contexts cannot sufficiently be analysed without closely taking into consideration their own practices of order and control. This inquiry will focus on analysing the informal but well-organized local regime of surveillance, information gathering and local ‘policing’ embedded into frameworks of order, safety and security implemented by the local ‘neighbourhood’ groups. These not only inform police needs and practices, but are rather systematic and efficacious in their own ends towards producing a particular regime of local order. A number of examples will document the nature and effects of these informal mechanisms of local control outside the explicit realm and reach of formal police interventions. Here, it will be key to unveil how these informal structures of local
order operate silently but quite effectively in an ambiguous ‘grey’ space between state and social spheres, between formal regimes and informal control, between private’ and ‘public’ jurisdictions and legitimacy.

Methodologically, besides the use of empirical data and literature sources, this study will centrally be based on primary qualitative data gathered through participatory observation with the police division as well as with the various ‘community’ groups examined. In addition, interview data from local ‘community police’ officers as well as representatives of the ‘community’ organizations examined will form the basis of field data on which this study is based.

The final chapter will provide a synthesis of the study, the data, findings, and outline implications. The conclusions will aim to explain why it is essential for a contemporary, comprehensive understanding of ‘policing’ to look beyond the organizational and operational boundaries of the public police, and closely examine the nature, organization and activities of ‘community’ within collaborative frameworks like ‘community policing’. It will point to implications evolving from this study for the possibility of the reform of the public police, and the wider consequences of ‘community policing’ for recent, late modern trends in state, society and governance. Important questions for further research will also be outlined.
The Setting

This is an ethnographic study on 'community policing' and processes of social control in a local urban setting. As such, it is a case study that aims to understand, analyse and document the forms, realities and features that policing and control have taken in a local context. It therefore aspires to be an empirical, grounded research project in the format of a sociological case study, or a local ethnography. As such, it attempts to put reality-based and practice-grounded meaning to organizational, theoretical and rhetorical phrases, concepts and symbols as they are abundant in 'community policing' discourses, texts and literature.

The context or 'field' of this study is an area in the wider downtown core of one of Canada's largest municipal jurisdictions ('The City'). This 'field' area is confined by the boundaries of one of the divisions ('99 Division') of the municipality's urban police force. Although the boundaries of this police jurisdiction are arbitrarily drawn by the police force rather than reflecting natural urban socio-economic, ethnic or geographical division lines, this study has acknowledged these boundaries for purposes of simplicity in the operationalization of study objectives and field work. It is within the reality of these field boundaries that the meaning, practices and effects of 'community policing' have been explored. All field data that are used for the purposes of this study have been collected in this field area.

Data and Methods

This study is primarily a grounded qualitative, ethnographic inquiry. For the purposes and objectives of the study as elaborated above, this study relied on two main data sources, and two fundamental and distinct methods of data collection within its ethnographic framework.

First, the data investigating 'community policing' within the parameters and from the perspective of the police have been collected within the recently established 'Community Response Unit' ('CRU') of the urban police force's 99 Division. The unit is the operational entity of the division which is primarily responsible for 'community policing' within its divisional jurisdiction. Two main types of data have been collected, observational and interview data. Participatory research observation data were collected over the research period, usually by way of the investigator being teamed up with a CRU sergeant or a CRU team for a set amount of time,
and passively observing the officers' professional activities. Second, after the conclusion of the participatory research phase, interview data were collected from a sample of CRU sergeants and officers on issues and questions relevant to this research inquiry.

The second key source of information for the purposes of this study was a variety of local 'community' or 'neighbourhood' organizations active within the field boundaries that have organized themselves around issues of crime, order and safety. The data collection with the 'community' aspect of this study followed a pattern similar to the research conducted with the police. Over the research period, the investigator conducted observation with the 'neighbourhood' groups under investigation, primarily by passively attending and observing meetings or other activities of these groups. After the conclusion of this observation component, a sample of representatives of the 'community' groups examined were interviewed on issues relevant to this field study.

The study's participatory observation component also extended to the 'Community Police Liaison Committee' (CPLC), a forum at which representatives of 99 Division and the 'community' groups working within the divisional boundaries meet on a regular basis to discuss matters of 'community policing'.

It should be noted here that the research inquiry purposely excluded one local area, and its respective members or 'community', of the division under study from its investigative efforts. This particular 'community' has traditionally been characterized by a unique and complex socio-economic and ethnic make-up, and has had a long history of strained relations with the local police force. These tensions, which erupted again shortly before the field research period began, culminated in a few violent incidents and demonstrations, including a local anti-police 'riot', and a few other exceptional occurrences.

The researcher acknowledges the peculiar and sensitive nature of the relations between this particular community and the police (and vice versa). These are, among other symptoms, also expressed in the fact that this 'community' and its members, at the time of research, were not represented at the local 'CPLC', but were then trying to build up a separate committee with the police division. Both the 'community' and the police division acknowledge the existing particular and tense relations, and agree that they need and deserve special attention, both in efforts to understand as well as ameliorate them. These special and particular relations between the police and this specific 'community', their contexts and implications as they apply to matters of
community policing' could not have been adequately analyzed by the scope and nature of this research project, and all efforts to do so would not have done justice to the situation, either on the community's or the police side. It should therefore be noted that for these reasons this study intentionally excluded this particular local segment of the division studied.

**Police observation**

In spring of 1996, The City Police Force was approached with the request to conduct a field study into the practices and effects of 'community policing' in 99 Division. This division had been chosen since it has been known as one of the farthest advanced divisions in The City area with respect to 'community policing' efforts. Also, its unit commander had indicated a general willingness to allow such a field study within the parameters of his division.

The request for the field study and its two key components - observation research and the collection of interview data - was approved by 99 Division's unit commander on behalf of The City Police Force. It was made clear, however, by the unit commander in the research agreement that none of the research tasks could be imposed on or mandated on any of the division staff by authority, but that all research to be conducted would be limited by the willingness and consent of officers to partake in the research exercises requested. These context variables obviously eliminated all possibilities of random sampling techniques, and are an important aspect of the methodologies applied in this study.

The participatory observation component with the police occurred in two major segments. The initial, exploratory participatory observation research protocol was for the researcher to spend individual shift days with different teams of the division's CRU. Two different shift cycles existed during the research period: 'morning': 7am - 5pm, 'evening': 5pm - 3am. The emphasis of this field component was for the investigator to get to know as many different teams, different neighbourhoods, different work styles, and police work profile differences between 'morning' and 'evening' shift as possible, and thus to gain a basic understanding of the organization and operations of 'community policing' as well as of the variability that existed among these research items within the setting under investigation.

At the time of research, the CRU usually operated with teams of two officers each. Approximately 16 such constable teams existed then, supervised by five sergeants. In terms of the research procedure, the CRU's staff sergeant or one of the team sergeants of one of the four
platoons on duty at any given time would approach officer teams, presenting them with the request for observation research during their 'on duty' time. For the teams that were generally agreeable to making themselves available for observation research, either the sergeant would suggest a time for a 'walk-along' (on foot) or 'ride-along' (on bicycle), or the researcher would arrange such an observation period with the officers directly. Usually, the researcher would then meet the officers at the pre-arranged time at the station, and spend the shift day or a considerable part of the shift day at their side, in and outside the police station. In case the teams split up, the researcher would consistently stay with one of the officers selected prior to the onset of the field observation.

In terms of data documentation, field notes were composed by the researcher within a 24 hour period after the conclusion of the observation time with one team. However, no field notes were taken during the observation time or in the presence of officers, but officers were made aware of the fact that research notes would be made at a later point.

Such an initial observation segment was conducted with approximately eight officer teams of the CRU, which encompassed approximately half of the total number of officer teams actively working in the unit at the time of research. It should be mentioned that some of the teams were obviously not considered by their sergeants for the research exercise for a variety of reasons. A few teams seemed categorically opposed to or denied the request, or considered the proposed observation as inconvenient for their work in general, or for specific activities of police work they were currently engaging in. Others, again, during the time frame of this particular research component, were either off duty, seconded to other functions, on sick leave or on holiday, or available only at times inconvenient to the researcher. It should also be mentioned that some of the individual observation periods were cut short due to officers being called for internal or special duties, court functions, or starting their shifts late or finishing early for personal or other reasons. In total, around 120 hours of field observation time were completed and data collected. This research component took place in October and November of 1996.

Ordinarily, at the beginning of each field observation period, the researcher would explain to the officers what the scope and objectives of the study were, why these particular data collection methods were utilized and what research questions were to be answered. As part of the consent proceedings, the investigator then outlined the research terms guaranteeing the anonymity of the officers' identity as well as those of all subjects encountered during the course of the
research (in order to protect completely the identity of officers, field and interview data are also reported in gender-neutral terms). The confidentiality of any field data and information with respect to colleagues, superiors, other members of the police force, as well as members of the public was also guaranteed. Before the beginning of the observation research module, the officers were invited to ask any questions or express any concerns they may have, and to make clear to the researcher the code of conduct for potentially problematic situations in terms of safety or police protocol.

After the end of this observation segment, a second, more in-depth observation research component with the CRU was implemented. In order to get a more detailed, differentiated and consistent data pool on the ‘community policing’ under investigation, the researcher requested to spend one complete shift week each with three different individual CRU teams. One shift week consists of a total of eight consecutive working days, usually from Thursday to Thursday covering one of the two (‘day’ or ‘night’) work shifts. One of the key objectives of this research component was to explore the variability that existed with the nature, practices and operations of ‘community policing’ in the CRU over a more extensive period of time. The research was therefore requested to be conducted with individual CRU teams that had, during the course of the initial observation research phase, indicated fundamentally different approaches, work styles and other aspects relevant to the operationalization of ‘community policing’. In order to gain the best possible impression of the effects of the external variable of supervision, this research component was also conducted with teams from three different Platoons and consequently under the supervision of three different CRU sergeants. Finally, in order to control for the impact of policing environments on ‘community policing’ modes displayed, three teams policing different ‘neighbourhoods’ within the division were chosen.

The researcher was subsequently assigned to three different officer teams from three different Platoons and supervisors, spending one shift week with each of these officer teams. One of the intensive observation periods, however, was cut short after three days due to the fact that the team became involved in undercover and plainclothes drug enforcement work, and the platoon supervisors requested a termination of the observation research field work due to safety concerns.

This second phase of intensive observation research modules with CRU teams, involved an additional 200 hours of field data collection. This observation research segment was conducted in December, 1996, and January, 1997.
**Police Interviews**

As the second main data collection method for the police research component following the participatory observation module, a series of interviews with CRU officers was conducted, including both constables and sergeants.

These used a semi-structured interview protocol containing primarily open-ended questions. The content and course of the interviews was grounded in the previous field observation research, meaning that the interview aimed to gather more in-depth or follow-up information on issues and questions relevant to the topic of investigation which had arisen during the course of the observation research. The interview protocol was followed in a loose and flexible manner. In general, the researcher aimed to cover all basic topics of investigation with each subject; however, in cases in which a subject had much information to offer on one particular topic, or in areas where a number of interviews had not produced any great variation of responses, the interview schedule was focussed or curtailed accordingly. The full interview schedule contained some 30 questions or topics of inquiry. These were complemented with further detailed or probing questions whenever this was considered necessary.

A total of 15 CRU constables, as well as all five CRU's sergeants were interviewed. This means that approximately half of the division's CRU constable roster were interviewed for this study. In terms of the selection of the CRU constables interviewed, each platoon was approached by their sergeant with the request for the research interviews. The constables who were willing and available to participate in an interview identified themselves to the sergeant or the researcher, and then an interview was arranged.

The interviews were held in a private and confidential setting, and took between 60 and 90 minutes. All of them were conducted at the station house of the police division under study. Before the start of the interview, the officers were ensured their anonymity would be guaranteed in all data documentation and reporting, and that research data would be kept confidential both within and outside the police force. For these reasons, interview or observation data are reported in gender-neutral form. With the consent of the interview subject, interviews were audi-taped (all interview subjects consented to this procedure). The audiotapes were later transcribed in part, excluding sections irrelevant to the scope and aims of the research. All transcribed police interview data are presented in italics, and marked with either a [C] (for Constable), or [S] (for Sergeant) identifier.
The interviews with the police officers were conducted between January and March, 1997.

'Community' observation

The first phase of data collection with the local 'community' organizations also occurred through participatory observation. With the assistance of the police division commander, and by means of a couple of initial visits to the CPLC meeting, the list of neighbourhood groups active within the division in 'community policing' matters was compiled. Subsequently, each of these groups was contacted, informed in brief about the nature, scope and objectives of the research project and asked in what sort of forum they would usually meet, exchange information and make decisions, or pursue their policing and safety relevant activities. Most of the groups held meetings on a regular basis (i.e., weekly or monthly). Where this was applicable, the researcher asked for permission to attend such meetings (which were usually held in public places) as an observer for the purposes of the research.

A total of approximately 50 meetings or other 'community events' with almost all community organizations active within the divisional boundaries were visited and observed by the researcher over the research period. This led to an accumulated total of some 100 hours of observational research data in that research segment. Ordinarily, at the first time of being present at a particular group's meeting, the researcher would introduce himself and give a brief summary of the scope, objectives and methods of the research project, encouraging members of the organization to ask any questions they may have. In general, during meetings the researcher maintained a research practice of passive observation, taking written notes during the proceedings of the meetings.

In addition to the group meetings, the researcher also participated as an observer in numerous outside activities pertaining to the 'community' safety, order and policing activities of some of the 'neighbourhood' groups that were relevant to this research study. In particular, the majority of the 'neighbourhood' groups examined undertook so-called 'neighbourhood safety walks' or local 'safety audits' which were covered as part of the field research.

'Community' interviews

Using a method similar to that used with the police, the 'community' research segment of this study also included an interview component. After the completion of the participatory
observation phase with the 'community' organizations, a sample of representatives of these organizations were recruited for one-on-one interviews. The recruitment occurred by the researcher stating the request to interview two or three representatives of each of the groups personally in neighbourhood group and CPLC meetings, as well as through a memo to that effect circulated within these groups. The request invited 'community' volunteers for such an interview who considered themselves knowledgeable in the local crime and safety aspect of their individual group's work to get in contact with the researcher.

The interviews were arranged in a private location convenient to the interview subject, in many instances in the subject's home. As part of the consent agreement, the interview subjects were guaranteed anonymity of their person, and any other people they referred to during the interview, as well as the general confidentiality of the information recorded for the purposes of data collection, processing and documentation. For these reasons, interview or observation data involving 'community' respondents are reported in gender-neutral form. The interview subjects were asked for their permission for audio-taping the interviews (none of the subjects declined this request).

The interviews followed a semi-structured interview schedule covering and elaborating on topics pertaining to the 'community' perspective of this study grounded in the field observation research. The 'community' interview schedule reflected a considerable range of the topics covered with the police interviews in order to allow for a comparability of the empirical data collected on issues central to the thematic core of the inquiry. All questions were open-ended, and the interview schedule was handled flexibly by the researcher as required. The interviews were transcribed in parts as they were relevant for the topics of this study. All transcribed 'community' interview data are presented in italics, and marked with a [Comm] identifier.

The 'community' phase interviews were conducted in May and June, 1997.

Data analysis and limitations

This study utilized a variety of research methods and steps for data collection and analysis. The study's research approach is based in a grounded framework of inquiry. In both the main research 'fields' outlined below - 'police' and 'community' - the field was initially approached with a core set of research questions about the realities and practices of 'community policing' which the study aimed to answer. In the case of the police, this initial, exploratory research phase
consisted of the initial participatory observation events with different CRU teams; in the case of the 'community' research, this phase consisted of the initial participatory observations at 'community' meetings and other 'community' activities.

On the basis of these exploratory initial findings, the research focus and questions were refined, and subsequently taken into the second, more extensive and in-depth phase of observation research which aimed to follow up on and take into consideration data structures and themes that had been established through the preliminary inquiry phase. In the case of the police research, for example, the initial observation phase had established that there were three major 'typologies' of 'community police' work among the officers observed. Within the given natural limitations of this study, the researcher requested that the ensuing in-depth field observation with CRU teams should be conducted with three different officer teams which in first instance appeared to represent the different officer team typologies established in the previous observation phase.

The subsequent interview phase in both the police and 'community' sample, in terms of issues, themes and questions was grounded in the previously conducted observation research. On the one hand it inquired into issues that had been explored or documented by the observation research with a view to validating the available observation findings through interviewing methodology. On the other hand, the interviews were also used to investigate topics and questions with both 'community' and police samples that could not be sufficiently explored during the observation phase.

The research approach and the subsequent data analysis were couched within two main frameworks of inquiry. The first objective was to examine realities, practices and phenomena within the research context of 'community policing' and to establish a reflection of their general and comparative results with respect to the data produced in the particular research samples and fields examined. Here, the primary focus of data analysis was structured around the data’s characteristics of prevalence, consistency and variability. For purposes of data analysis, all data (observation data, field notes and interview data) were analysed according to a thematic matrix of the core issues and questions of this research inquiry. This form of data analysis examined the research data collected with specific focus on a certain research topic or question. The available research data organized through this method was then examined for matters of prevalence, consistency and variability, and findings are reported within these frameworks where possible. These findings report the 'prevalent' or typical form of documented reality or practice on any
given issue, as well as observed deviations and 'minority' realities. Many of the research themes and questions of this study are based on central questions, claims and hypotheses that have been made elsewhere about particular aspect of 'community policing'. In other words, the data collection and analysis method employed in this study aimed for a presentation of the research data that, principally, allowed to state that for 'Proposition 1', this research has found 'Data variability from A to C'. Furthermore, when examining the research data with regards to consistency, the analysis aimed for conclusions that, for example, on Issue 1 within 'Data variability A to C, Result B has been found to be the most prevalent'.

For example, with respect to the question of the main focus of 'community police' work, the data analysis scanned the relevant observation and field notes data gathered with the officer teams, as well as the interview data which made reference to 'community police' work in a broad sense. These different types of data were combined into a picture of data results allowing for basic conclusions about the general foci and priorities of 'community police' work within the research context examined. The officers observed and interviewed presented a wide variety of 'community police' work tasks and methods (variability), but majorities emphasized particular work tasks and employed select methods to deal with them out of a wide pool of options (prevalence and consistency).

A second approach to data analysis was more intuitive and exploratory. Especially in the interview data, many respondents often pointed to or elaborated on themes, issues or perspectives which shed a unique or distinct light on research questions and contexts under examination. These data were equally incorporated into the results and findings, but are marked as such in the context of the presentation and discussion.

Naturally, the data collection methods, approach and analysis applied have important limitations and potential weaknesses. First of all, the fact that the sampling of field situations for observation as well as research subjects for observation and interviews (both on the police and 'community' side) could not be random, and was to a considerable extent influenced by the choices and preferences of the respective organizations under examination presents limitations for the representativeness of the data. For example, it cannot be judged if the CRU officers who were not willing or available to be observed or interviewed would have provided a significantly different picture with respect to the 'community policing' practices and realities researched. Field data derived from the remaining un-researched sample of officers may have significantly altered
the variability and consistency of the study data presented. It may, for example, be the case that there is a correlation between the willingness of CRU officers to get involved in external police research, and certain attitudes and practices towards policing methods, priorities or opinions about 'community policing' (both, after all, have to a significant extent to do with a basic openness of the police towards the public), and that the data presented in this study may be skewed in one direction or the other. This study does not have the means to exclude such a possibility, nor to control for such possible imbalances.

Second, the nature, practices and outcomes of police work depend on a great many circumstances and variables which would require most extensive field work in order to all be covered and controlled for to a satisfying degree. In contexts of participatory observation, it can also never be excluded that research subjects act differently in the presence of an investigator (although it has to be stated in this case that after an obvious initial period of caution or nervousness on the side of most research subjects in the both the case of police and 'community' groups, they seemed to quickly resort to 'work as usual' after 'checking out' the researcher for a while; see, for example, Burgess 1989).

In this context, the initial field observation work as well as the more in-depth field observation periods with three CRU teams could only provide a snapshot glimpse of police work scenarios, the consistency and generalizability of which cannot be reliably asserted or proven on the basis of the data presented in this study, neither for the force under investigation nor for 'community policing' in Canada or elsewhere in general. Similar limitations are true for the 'community' data collected and presented, although there, at least in terms of field observation, access was much less restricted than with the police. However, it should once again be underlined here that the key aim and objective of this study is not to provide a fundamental and general analysis of what 'community policing' looks like in Canada or other jurisdictions. Rather, it utilizes a field study approach presenting a specific account of the determinants, realities and practices of 'community policing' in a particular research site which specifically tests and examines some of the key hypotheses and questions around 'community' and police in 'community policing' contexts, and aims to provide a grounded empirical basis for further systematic, informed and critical inquiry on the subject.

Qualitative and ethnographic field-based research, naturally, always makes the researcher a 'part' of the field and the setting, and thus incorporates a fundamental research subjectivity into
observation, interviewing and data analysis. It is usually impossible to analyse observation and interview data in terms of yes/no, pro/con or black/white structures, since they are all contextual, dependent and often ambiguous. The research and data analysis methods applied, in order to arrive at a set of presentable data and research findings at the end of the research process, must resort to a simplification of the wealth of research impressions and data collected which, inevitably, include and embed the researcher’s and data analyst’s subjective perspective on research questions, settings and data produced.
The birth of 'community policing'  

A 'revolution' or a 'paradigm shift' emerged with respect to how policing, and in particular the institution and work of the public police were thought and talked about when the concept of 'community policing' started to enter police texts, manuals and discourses in the beginning of the 1980s. One can argue that 'community policing' became established as a fundamentally new 'idea' wrapping the phenomenon of the police. This discussion will largely build on Klockars' concept of the 'idea' of police. The analytical framework of the 'idea' of police suggests that the unique institution of 'police' featuring its special power of coercive force has been effectively veiled in changing symbolic imagery or 'wrappings' over times as determined by evolving social, political and institutional contexts (Klockars 1985, 1991). The image of 'community policing', so the hypothesis goes, is a further step in the series of 'ideas' through which the police institution and its work has been projected and thought about through the years. 'Community policing' gradually has become the prevailing paradigm of the idea of police in late modern, post-welfarist years.

The idea of the public police evolved to be dominated by the imagery or paradigmatic umbrella of 'community policing' as a response to a variety of social, political and empirical factors. The concept of 'community policing' implied a large variety of new and different fundamentals to public policing, all of which, however, are characterized by the prevailing
common denominator that they seem to embody and initiate ‘reform’. For example, they propose reform with respect to how the public police positions itself as an unique institution of the state, how it relates to social actors within the social environments it is rooted in, how it ‘works’ and does what it is supposed to do, how it organizes itself towards and interacts with the outside (organization towards surrounding social world) and on the inside (organization of its institutional roles and actors).

Principally, the emerging idea of ‘community policing’ indicated reform to a number of core aspects which had dominated the thinking around public police between the 1960s and 1980s. The idea suggested a fundamental change with respect to where the police would stand and locate itself as an organization of state and government, and the mandate that it carried in this role when exercising its unique mission and powers towards the social world. The ‘traditional’ police had understood its social role and position as a unique professional mission that centred around the issue of ‘crime’ and its control. This mission was deemed specific to the police and therefore nobody else’s business, it could only be dealt with professionally by avoiding the involvement of non-police forces or influences, and it had to be kept isolated from general social dynamics or conflict in order to maintain its particular and sensitive nature.

The evolving concept of ‘community policing’ suggested that the public police is part of a wider ‘meta-idea’ or ‘grand project’ of government or society, where the police institution and its work comes to be considered an integrated, constitutive and interactive part. This is expressed, for example, in that concepts of ‘safety’ or ‘quality of life’ - which are territories of issues claimed and occupied by many other social agencies - have replaced the exclusive focus on ‘crime’ in the discursive environment of ‘policing’. ‘Community policing’ suggested a fundamental philosophical and operational inclusion and instrumentalization of the outside social world into the broadened project of ‘policing’. While the traditional model had implied that the police are the ones to identify, analyse and deal with ‘crime’, and do so best without interference from the outside, the recent idea of ‘community policing’ suggests that the public becomes an active, integrated and constructive ‘part’ of policing in a variety of ways. Indeed, much of the ‘community policing’ idea is proposed under a scheme of ‘partnership’ in which ‘partners’ - ‘community’, ‘citizens’ or other social, government or private institutions - become not only part of the process of defining what policing should be all about, but also of the actual production of its desired outcomes.

‘Community policing’ thus suggests a transformation of basic social entities that had been passive
objects of policing into active co-producers of the new ‘policing project’.

The ‘community policing’ idea proposed a fundamental shift in how the police would conceptualize and work towards its objectives. While the traditional scheme of public policing attempted to realize ‘crime control’ through preventative patrol and emergency response that would both react to crime incidents through standardized mechanisms of law enforcement, ‘community policing’ has dramatically widened that scope of operations in terms of ‘how’, ‘why’ and ‘when’. ‘Community policing’ claims a different, much broader focus on its tasks or ‘problems’ which may be crimes, phenomena that have become generalized as public ‘disorder’, contexts that have seen a prevalence of crime or order problems before, or incidents or situations that are understood as possibly leading to crime (‘criminogenic’). It aims at ‘problem-solving’, a goal that colonizes the enforcement of the law as one possible but certainly not the only resource available to this task of police work. Rather, it is proposed that law enforcement may be the answer by itself, occur in combination with other measures or not be part of police intervention at all. ‘Community policing’ has substantially opened up the spectra of time, place and nature of intervention that may trigger or characterize what the police do in response to ‘policing’ issues in the social world in which they operate.

Central to these ideas of the reform of public policing, a new concept of the ‘community policing’ officer is projected. In contrast to his predecessor, a professional ‘crime controller’ or ‘law enforcer’ operating in a command-structured organization, the ‘community policing’ officer is projected as the human embodiment of this new idea of police. S/he is actively interested in, searching for, building and incorporating social agents, interest and participation via ‘community’ into his/her work, s/he is looking for and analysing policing relevant ‘problems’ rather than just ‘crime’ alone, and s/he is flexible, creative and multi-talented in the measures, tactics and resources from inside or outside the classical police domain that s/he applies towards the solution. These suggested reform tenets emerging out of the ‘community policing’ idea also relate to a reform of organizational structure and principles of the police institution, traditionally structured as a para-military, hierarchical, command-based and centralized organization. ‘Community policing’ proposed ‘decentralization’ of the police in terms of physical installation and presence as well as operational units and decision-making, it claimed more participatory and progressive style of management in which front-line officer do not find themselves at the bottom of a hierarchical command-line but responsibly and actively make discretionary decisions that are based much more

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on horizontal consultation rather than vertical order structures.

The idea of ‘community policing’ has been presented, discussed and examined extensively from a wide variety of perspectives in a vast body of literature. However, these elaborations may in fact have left more open questions than they have answered with respect to the challenge of how to make sense of ‘community policing’, what its meaning and implications are with regard to the core tenets of implied reform suggested above, but also what some of the wider social contexts are that have spawned this particular idea of a reformed public police just exactly at the time when they did. The following discussion will examine some of the core debates that have shaped the discussion of ‘community policing’ in the literature, setting the agenda for the field-based research examination to follow. The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of the socio-political context and variables that spawned the birth of the paradigm of ‘community policing’. It shall then be examined how the idea of ‘community policing’ fits into the evolution of historical steps in the ‘idea’ of the public police. A good part of the discussion will be devoted to a critical examination of the central claims and tenets of ‘community policing’ as a reform of the philosophy, institution and work surrounding ‘community policing’. Finally, the examination will take an initial critical look behind the surface of the celebrated but largely mythical and amorphous concept of ‘community’ that has become to dominate the idea of ‘community policing’.

Basic considerations

Both the discussion around as well as the concept of ‘community policing’ has been characterized by features of ambiguity and vagueness (Manning 1993). In fact, a great deal of the writing on ‘community policing’ has been devoted to a search for ‘meaning’ of the term with respect to who the police are, what they do and what they are working towards under this new umbrella of public policing. As Skolnick and Bayley point out, the “reality is that, while everyone talks about it, there is little agreement on meaning. Community policing has been embraced as a buzzword, and the activities associated with it have little in common” (1988:4). A crucial part of the phenomenon and problem of ‘community policing’ appears to be that not only the linguistic packaging of the idea of ‘community policing’ but also most of the characteristics associated with it did not indicate clear concepts, goals of operations or guidelines as to ‘who does what and why’. Rather, the discourse of and around ‘community policing’ materializes as an onslaught of
vague, abstract and ambiguous terms alluding to values and ideals that its advocates would like to see ‘policing’ associated with. The powerful terms and metaphors of ‘partnership’, ‘service’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘safety’ and above all ‘community’ present a long list of ‘motherhood’ or ‘apple pie’ concepts - ideas that nobody would want to disagree with, that are embraceable by all, that deny or silence social or ideological conflict and cast a veil of consensus over what policing does and does not. In short, they all embed ‘policing’ in a cloud of symbols that we all “yearn and wish” for (Manning 1984, Crank 1994). It is presented as a “romantic delusion” conjuring up a “harmonious idyll where the police was everybody’s friend” (Waddington 1984:94).

A number of key proponents and discussants of the ‘community policing’ idea have gone to great lengths to underline that in fact, ‘community policing’ must not be misunderstood as a specific ‘program’ or ‘tactic’ but is to be conceptualized as a ‘philosophy’ (Trojanowicz and Carter 1988, Gramckow and Jacoby 1993, Kratcoski and Dukes 1995). More specifically, elaborate attempts have been made to draw objective distinction lines between ‘Police - Community relations’, ‘Problem-solving’, ‘Team Policing’, versus ‘Community Policing’ as distinct modes of ‘community policing’ (Kratcoski and Dukes 1995, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, Eck and Spelman 1987, Moore 1992). Upon a closer look, the purpose of such exercises seems evasive. While the operational details of these different variations on a ‘new’ way of policing may show minor differences, the key point of importance is that they all in the same vein allude and appeal to values and objectives that traditional policing apparently has missed or neglected, and that an all-encompassing ‘reform’ spirit has taken a hold of public policing. The assertion that “community policing is not a single program or even an accepted core of programs” (Skolnick and Bayley 1988:4) seems to suggest that it is not what the police do and what its effects are that stand at the centre of its mission, but rather that the way we think of ‘police’ and its symbolic tasks become the guiding aim of this new police ‘idea’.

Interestingly enough, as Ericson et al. point out (1993), when trying to fill the celebrated ‘community policing’ ‘philosophy’ with substance and meaning in a real context of social relations, Trojanowicz and Carter very much resort to programmatical, functional and tactical operatives, i.e. by suggesting to “intensely involving the same officer in the same community on a long-term basis, to encourage two way information flow so that the residents become the officer’s eyes and ears on the streets. The community policing officer acts as a uniformed armed presence to deter crime, but...also takes action with citizen assistance to resolve problems before they erupt
as crime” (1988:17).

Similarly, a great deal of critical examination of ‘community policing’ has occurred under the slogan-like inquiry as to whether the concept was either “rhetoric or reality” (Mastrofski and Greene, 1988). This simplistic conceptual juxtaposition suggesting that ‘community policing is either ‘out there happening’ or ‘just being talked about while what is really happening has remained unchanged’ neglects the crucial fact that the police and our conceptualization of policing are subject to social processes of interaction and the symbolic construction of meaning. Our discourses and symbols positioned around ‘community policing’ determine how we conceive of the police, and conversely the police’s identity and activities assume social meanings via the symbolic contexts constructed around them. Thus, “rhetoric and reality should be seen as mutually constitutive components in processes of political representation. [It] is constitutive of realities and interests, and it is simultaneously real, interested and linguistic” (Ericson et al. 1993:44). Thus, the symbolic framework of ‘community policing’ has given the idea of the ‘police’ a new social reality. Rather than providing policing with a new framework of operational or functional tasks or a new social objectivity in terms of what ends policing is striving for and featuring measurable aims, ‘community policing’ offers a new social and symbolic context in which policing is talked and thought about.

As such, the phenomenon of ‘community policing’ may express a similar function and opportunity that McBarnett (1981) and Ericson (1982) have described with respect to the relationship between the police or criminal justice institutions, and the law. They both argue, on the basis of different empirical investigations, that is not the that the law exists as a firm entity with a clear substance and borderlines which are unilaterally constitutive of what the police do. Rather, the law provides a flexible framework of legitimization and a platform for ‘accountability’ for the police as a political and coercive institution, the way they approach and position tasks and problems, and the action they take. ‘Community policing’ thus may provide the new veil of legitimacy and ‘accountability’ for the police as an institution, the matters and subjects they are concerned with, and the daily operations they engage in. Thus, there is a clear need for comprehensive and thorough examinations of the realities, effects and wider social implications of the public police’s existence, role and practices as they materialize under the umbrella of ‘community policing’. The key question, however, must not be whether ‘community policing is ‘rhetoric or reality’ but what contexts have led to the new social reality of ‘community policing’,
what forms and appearances does it clothe itself in, and what are its effects on the social environment, on the organization of police, and its institutional ‘microcosm’, the ‘community police’ officer.

**Historical steps in the ‘idea’ of police**

The idea of police has been subject to a constant process of social factors and influences shaping the social identity of the police, as it is expressed in its institution, its relations to social actors and its operations. ‘Community policing’ is only the latest one in a series of fundamental frameworks or veils that have come to dominate and contextualize the social identity of police. As such, it is also important to conceptualize the recent idea of ‘community policing’ not as an isolated, coincidental phenomenon at the centre of which the public police nowadays presents itself, but rather as an evolution of and dialectic response to frameworks of and challenges to its social identity that have materialized in previous contexts.

(A) Pre-modern policing

In many instances, it may appear as if the concept of ‘community policing’ and its suggested core features has brought us ‘full circle’ from the prime characteristics of the early phases of the ‘modern police’, and developments that led to its establishment. There and then, a system of private police has acted in the form of private citizens who were organized locally, patrolled the streets and largely concentrated on “past-oriented bandit catching” (Shearing 1995:74). Within the then existing feudal system, the state only played a remote function of supervision from the distanced centre, while the actual police work was considered an elementary part of the citizen’s duty (Critchley 1979, Radzinowicz 1948). Only after the breakdown of this pre-modern system of ‘feudally sanctioned vigilantism’ was an actual state-based police apparatus able to emerge. It was Sir Robert Peel’s ideas about the modern concept of the police that established it on one hand as a distinct jurisdiction of state power, but on the other hand in terms of focus, political responsiveness and operational resources, elementarily rooted it in the local realm of ‘community’. The emphasis shifted from the pre-modern version of ‘crime control’ to one of future-oriented prevention and order maintenance, in which the primary aim of police officers was to gain the cooperation and respect of local residents while understanding themselves as active members of local communities (Bowman 1992, Shearing 1995, Radzinowicz
Peel's contention was that through a closely woven, consistent and ubiquitous “gaze” or “unremitting watch” over streets, houses, people and suspects, and the overwhelming threat of getting caught and punished, the occurrence of crime would be eliminated (Foucault 1979). This was, by and large, only possible through the operational and informational involvement of local citizenry as a complement to the police apparatus, expressed in Peel’s idea that “the police are the public and the public are the police” (Reith 1975) or the contention that “a community must literally police itself, with certain members paid to do it full-time in uniform, while the rest did it part-time as they went about their daily work” (Braiden 1992:18).

Similarly, early American policing was conceived of as a joint responsibility between government officials and citizens, but the processes of industrialization and urbanization eventually spawned the evolution of a professional law enforcement apparatus (Bowman 1992). The era of a state-based, salaried and uniformed law enforcement apparatus with very close ties to local political and interest entities is what Kelling and Moore have described as the “political” idea of the modern police (1988). Although the law played some role in their work, their main authorization came from local political powers rendering them “adjuncts to local political machines” (1988:7, see also Fogelson 1977). Their work featured a combination of order, control but also many ‘social service’ functions, and their departmental structures were locally based, while their operational focus also heavily relied on being embedded in and connected with local institutions, people and knowledge (Monkkonen 1981). While it is suggested that the police then were “integrated into neighbourhoods, enjoyed the support of citizens” and citizens believed that they “prevented or solved crime when they occurred”, this mode of local policing soon started to suffer from political arbitrariness, discriminating against less powerful and minority groups, lack of control over individual officers and the development of widespread organizational corruption (Kelling and Moore 1988, Kratcoski and Dukes 1995).

(B) The ‘professional’ reform model

The response to the erosion and contamination of the locally politicized model of police were developments that came to be characterized as the ‘professional’ or ‘reform’ idea of police. Its main tenets were that the police should disentangle themselves from the involvement of political and local interests that had originally authorized and mandated their work. Many police staff positions were turned into civil service positions, and non-police trained and employed
professionals began to have more input into the planning, operating and oversight of police institutions. Generally, the police started to distance themselves as an organization as well as an operation both from apparatuses of political power and influence as well as the subjects of its interventions (ibid.). In some areas, officers were now even prohibited from living in the jurisdictions that they policed. In the latter half of the 20th century, technical advancements facilitated this institutional, operational and communicational separation and distancing of ‘the police’ and ‘the policed’ (Reiner 1992). The introduction of patrol cars took the officer off the pavement and into the car, placing various barriers between the police and the people policed. The telephone and the radio as the main communication links of the police intended and to the outside world further reduced contacts to incidents for the purposes of information exchange, creating the apparently perfect embodiment of a ‘professional police’ that was now described as a force predominantly reacting to crime incidents and related calls for service (Reiner 1992, Bayley 1994). Only when triggered by an incident of crime or related occurrence would the police leave their state of isolation, engage with the public for purposes of ‘crime control’, related investigations and modern ‘bandit-catching’, but then immediately retreat to its state of an isolated professional organization that monopolitistically took care of its own planning, leadership and organizational control.

A key feature of the idea of the ‘reformed’ or ‘modern’ police, however, was the suggested shift of their fundamental mandate, authorization and responsibility from local political influence or guidance to what Klockars has dubbed the ‘legalization’ paradigm of the police institution. Arguing on the basis of Bittner’s central hypothesis that the police is at its core the unique and monopolistic legitimization of the only state institution to use “coercive force” in order to regulate social affairs, he suggests that the ‘legalization’ of the authorization and operation of the police is one of various “circumlocutions” that have shaped the idea of police over the past century (Bittner 1970, Klockars 1988). Over the mid-decades of this century, the much idolized societal role and value of the ‘law’ became crucial to the idea of police as an independently mandated and controlled authority. It suggested that through the law, the police was to be kept distanced from political influences and dominance but instead guided by the will of the people, and controlled or contained only by the courts as institutions themselves emphasizing their political independence and constantly struggling to keep themselves free of undue political constraints (Klockars 1988). The model of the police as “impartial, professional law enforcers”
who were portrayed as answerable to the "law and the law alone" evolved (Denning in: Shearing 1995:78; see also Kelling and Moore 1988:15, Wilson 1968).

Classical field and observation studies of practical police work emerging post-1950, however, indicated that the notion of 'discretion' rather than the assumed rule of objective impartiality and uniformity inherent to the police had to be understood as a driving feature and dynamic force behind police work in practice. In fact, empirical evidence showing that only a small proportion of police interventions actually resulted in formal legal or law enforcement processes, or eventually made it to the courts, started to undermine earlier notions (Reiss 1970, Ericson 1982, Black 1980). Related to the 'legalization' of the police idea - as with many other social services provided by or within the post-war welfare state, such as social work or psychiatry - the 'professionalization' concept of the police emerged. Again, a central tenet behind it was the intention to render the police institution independent of political influences, but it primarily implied that only the police institution knew, and knew best, what 'professional police work' had to look like, how to advance that knowledge and its application by resources and technology, and how to select, train and educate officers towards becoming 'professional' policemen (Greene 1994). Thus, it was argued that "police possessed a body of special skills and knowledge both to do and to understand their work" (Klockars 1988:534), all this being understood as the "objective neutral and analytic approach to policing" (Manning 1993:10). Only the proper protection of the institution of the public police from undue political influence from the top (state) and the bottom (social actors) as an autonomous public organization, as well as the provision of the necessary human and material resources to advance their professional mandate and operations, so it was argued, would allow them to provide 'good police' within a valorized framework of 'good government'. Public policing became a "legal and technical matter to be left to the discretion of professional police executives under the guidance of the law" (Kelling and Moore 1988:11).

Organizationally, the institution of the public police increasingly centralized the command and control of its activities. Operationally and strategically, the institution, following contemporary organizational and bureaucratic theory, featured an increasing degree of specialization of tasks, labour and responsibilities, with the different dimensions of administrative, managerial and operational functions divided into a increasingly complex structure of levels and units. In terms of strategy and objectives, the police shifted to a tactic of 'crime control' (Ericson 1982, Reiner 1992). The focus now was on crime incidents brought to the attention of the police
either in the course of random patrolling or calls for service, and the objective was fast response, apprehension of suspects and ‘crime solving’. In fact, besides the various attempts to distance the institution of the police from the population and social influences, the overall focus of police work also shifted from ‘persons’ to cases, a notion also fuelled through the rapidly expanding complexities around the processing of crime incidents including paperwork, specialist functions for prosecution, occurrence data and reports, etc..

(C) The emergence of the idea of ‘community policing’

A number of factors directly related to the organization and operations of the police as well as wider social developments led to the erosion of the predominantly ‘professionalized’, ‘legalized’ and ‘militarized’ idea of the police sometime during the 1970s. In essence, the diagnosis seemed to be that the police had removed itself too far from its social field and subjects of operations, and that the ‘crime control’ approach itself was ineffective and did not allow the police to play the role expected by society. The subsequently evolving ‘community policing’ idea of police appealed to reverse some of the principles and trends that had occurred previously, and seemed to bring the idea of police ‘full circle’ in many of these regards. The ‘community’ era of police generally is characterized by attempts to re-attach and re-integrate the police institution and its operations into the midst of people and real social contexts (Johnston 1992). Its notion of ‘decentralization’ proposed localized police structures and operations. Police became, again, thought about and constituted in local social-geographic contexts like ‘community’, ‘beat’ and ‘neighbourhood’ (Bayley 1994, Ericson et al. 1993). Active engagement, interaction and involvement with the ‘outside’ - the people but also other ‘social’ institutions - for the purposes of planning, oversight and operations was promoted as a new integral element of the police mandate.

In terms of operations, the police started to remove barriers that had effectively separated them from local contact and social involvement. The initial seminal works of Alderson (1979) and Goldstein (1979) paving the way towards the idea of ‘philosophy’ of ‘community policing’, in fact, strongly advocated that, in order to receive the public’s support, and in order to do effective police work for and in cooperation with the public realm, the police again needed to become an institution and agent firmly rooted in and connected with social spheres. The ‘community police officer’ started to symbolize the new embeddedness, accessibility and involvement of police in real local structures. The ongoing definition of policing in local contexts - what it was concerned with
and how it would go about its identified tasks - became projected as a joint, mutual, cooperative effort between police and other social elements that shaped and constituted ‘community’.

“Cooperation” and “partnership”, “full and personalized policing service” and “close appreciation of community needs” became predominant themes, and the “joint negotiation of community priorities and expectations” became key sources for legitimacy and authority of ‘community police’ work (Manning 1993:10). In fact, police was not anymore conceptualized as primarily a closed organization operating upon ‘cases’, ‘suspects’ and ‘jurisdictions’ but it increasingly became the social project of ‘community’ that shaped and constituted ‘police’ as an integral component of wider social processes. This wider social project of ‘community’ and its general ideals also became seen as the new source of authorization and legitimization for police. Even literally, police terminology shifted from ‘professional police’ - an organizational and authoritative body and linguistic ‘object’ or ‘fact’ - to ‘community policing’, an activity projecting policing as an ongoing, constitutive activity with a primary focus on ‘community’ as the central and relevant social body and basis, diverting much of the attention from the ‘body’ or material fact of the police itself. In essence, police through various strategies was suggested to become ‘re-socialized’. Its operative focus shifted from a narrowly define, ‘professional’ definition of ‘crime control’ to a wider definition of ‘safety’ and ‘security’, not preoccupied with or to be accomplished by crime or ‘law’ work alone. The police became described as the key local agent of ‘safety’ and ‘quality of life’, and instead of intervening as a ‘force’, police operations assumed the corporatist image of a ‘service’ dealing with ‘customers’. Prevention, again, became shifted to the core of what was considered its main mission (Ericson 1995), and emergency response and traditional law enforcement were increasingly de-emphasized - while never blocked out - of the local police mission.

Paradigm shift in the ‘idea’ of police: Why?

But what social factors and variables gave rise to and facilitated the erosion processes of the ‘professional’ and ‘legalistic’ idea of police that would lead to a paradigmatic re-construction of how police became thought about? A number of factors appear relevant for this evolution, some of which are linked directly to the police as an organization, their operations and the perceived outcomes of their mandated work, others based in more general developments of state and society in late modern years following the mid-1970s. The variables pushing for change that
were rooted in the police itself may be aptly subsumed under what Crank (1994) has described as
the emerging "loss of legitimacy" for the public police materializing over the past two decades
(see also Mastrofski 1991).

A key factor was certainly that many Western jurisdictions saw a consistent trend of rising
crime figures starting in the late 1960s, which continued through most of the following decades.
With the police’s declared plain and simple goal of ‘crime control’ in that era, the natural
conclusion came to be that the police was not effective in keeping crime at bay, and even further
from reducing it (Walker 1980, Crank 1994). Related to these indicators emerged the
phenomenon especially in more recent years that ‘fear of crime’ and perceived chances of
‘victimization’ levels in the public realm started to rise, implying that the police was increasingly
less able and successful in keeping people, streets and cities ‘safe’. From a social science
perspective, a number of comprehensive studies on the efficacy of police work strategies
suggested that the impact of random patrol and other crime control strategies on crime incident
levels was minimal at best, and cast fundamental doubt on the assertion that the “standard police
strategies of random patrolling, rapid response, and follow-up investigative work resulted in more
arrests and less crime” (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:77, Kelling 1981; Spelman and Brown 1984).

But aside from the functional effectiveness of police operations, much of the loss of the
police’s legitimacy was based in developments in the relationship between the police and society.
A series of key incidents across the developed English-speaking world pointed to systemic
mistreatment of and discrimination against minorities by the police. The police became accused of
abusing the law and a high prevalence of deviance inside the police organization as well as in
dealing with the outside. Claims of corruption created a general sentiment of mistrust, distrust and
suspicion in society towards the police (Crank 1994). It was then argued that in its current form
there was a “fundamental separation of police from community - civil service conflicted with
efforts to hire minorities, a militaristic rank structure contributed to a ‘we-them’ siege mentality
[towards] the local community” and organizational structures meant that the police could not
effectively “tailor police delivery of service to the needs of particular neighborhoods” (Crank

However, also starting in the late 1970s, the development of a dramatically expanding
trend of the “commodification” of security, safety, order maintenance and crime prevention
started to claim large parts of what was traditionally seen as classic operational territory of the
public police (Ericson 1995, O'Malley and Palmer 1994). This phenomenon which largely materialized through the spread of 'private police' agencies, systems and services (Shearing and Stenning 1987), led to the effect of a pluralization of 'policing', and an end of the "monopoly" of the public police for many of its classical function around crime and safety, but also an "identity crisis" (Bayley and Shearing 1996:586f) of the public police. This "identity crisis" on one end had to deal with an erosion of its mandate as a state authority, perceived efficacy and public confidence, on the other side with a growing front of 'competitors' in the crime and security 'business'.

Furthermore, the emerging dismantling of the traditional welfare state systems that had shaped Western democracies in the post-war decades brought new material and ideological realities for the institutions of public police. Despite rising public concerns over 'increasing crime' and 'unsafe streets' police budgets began to be cut in times of neo-conservative approaches to state and government reforms through the past decade. But state, government and budget reforms initiated during that time also shifted the idea of government from the strict monopoly over classical state functions (education, pensions, health care, and so on) that would be administered in non-competitive and bureaucratic fashion, to governmental schemes that tried to increasingly orient themselves towards corporate and 'market' structures and values. Many traditional jurisdictions of government became totally privatized, most of the ones remaining under formal state authority started to develop corporate cultures and images, providing 'opportunities to customers' rather than public service functions to citizens, with participatory customer input and evaluative feedback as well as cost-effectiveness as driving features (see Keat and Abercrombie 1991).

In addition, the emerging neo-liberal era of state and government also departed from the conceptual idea of the state as an unlimited provider and care-giver of its classical functions and services. Instead, the idea of a 'responsibilized' society emerged in which, rather than infinitely providing and fixing societal shortcomings upon demand, the state would play the role of a facilitator assisting citizens and social entities to recognize shortcomings and needs of social improvement and interventions. Instead of being involved in the active "rowing" with respect to providing, moving and doing social affairs, the state would assume much more of a "steering" role by regulating, connecting and facilitating genuine social potentials, resources and interests in doing so themselves (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). In this context, social entities would then either
assume the complete responsibility to deal with these social challenges, or to at least substantially contribute to the successful dealing with social and individual challenges of life (O'Malley and Palmer 1994, Beck and Gernsheim 1988). The state assumed the role of facilitating individual and individualized steps and measures in dealing with everyday life in the 'risk society', as expressed, for example, in privatized pension schemes, the reduction of welfare systems, market-based education schemes, etc. (Beck 1987, Ericson et al. 1993). This notion of the 'responsible individual' or society in conjunction with the retreat of the state as a monopolistic provider of elementary 'social goods' - of which safety, security and justice were considered key components - also crucially started to enter the realm of public police work.

The 'community policing' idea - core claims and tenets

Despite or in light of all ambiguities as well as definitional and contextual inconsistencies, the idea of 'community policing' implied and proposed changes to a 'different' kind of police doing a 'different' kind of policing with respect to a number of key aspects and levels. They might best be summarized and examined in five distinct topical categories for the purposes of discussion, which refer to more or less distinct, yet interdependent aspects of reform of the public police and the policing it does. These aspects are: a) philosophy of police, policing and crime, b) operational, c) organizational, d) professional, e) evaluative.

a) Philosophy of 'police' and 'policing'

'Community policing' embeds the public police's policing function in a new conceptual environment with respect to who the police 'are', how they understand their role and tasks, and what matters they are concerned with. This new philosophy in which 'public police' and 'policing' are being couched is key in shaping the social understanding of both the institution and its activities, while at the same time contributing to the formation of its social role in fundamental terms as well as in mundane, everyday details.

A couple of key tenets emerge. The traditional idea of police has very much been centred around 'crime' as the core of the police function, its legitimacy and operations. The police were an institution primarily organized around the phenomenon of crime, they were there to fight crime and their operations (primarily in the form of response to emergency calls) were structured around crime incidents, with 'crime numbers' ultimately indicating the state and effectiveness of police
operations. ‘Community policing’ very much de-emphasizes crime as well as the law as the main and sole pillars of their existence, legitimacy and operations. Instead, it renders the police as a broadly interested and involved social institution that is to be concerned with much wider, general and extended social affairs that indicate great overlap with other terrains of ‘social professionalism’ (Goldstein 1990). Philosophically, the police’s traditional pillar of ‘crime’ has become replaced by a rhetoric of local ‘safety’, ‘order’ and ‘quality of life’ (Bayley and Shearing 1996).

All of these emerging and newly popularized social values or projects are, as the ‘community policing’ image is itself, ambiguous and vague themselves, and upon first glance do not necessarily invoke the idea of police presence or intervention as the prime and foremost carrier for their realization. Rather, they are projects of general social nature, in which the new police play one of many roles, but in which, on the other hand, no advancements or effective plans of action can be imagined or constructively thought about without involving the police in their new role as a principal social actor. As such, the police within the new philosophy of ‘community policing’ embracing their institution and operations have developed or claimed a dramatically widened space of ‘social territory’ in which they act, and in which their presence and participation are demanded and incorporated. ‘Community policing’ “seeks to remove the police from narrow and traditional definitions of policing as crime fighting, to broader role definitions which view the police as problem-solvers and community advocates” (Greene 1993:80).

Further indicative of the shift away from the predominant focus on factual crime incidents is ‘community policing’s’ emphasis on crime ‘prevention’, ‘order maintenance’ and ‘problem solving’ (see Eck and Rosenbaum 1994, Moore 1992, Ericson 1995). All of these concepts are strategies that aim to circumscribe ‘crime’ as the sole and central preoccupation of the police’s past, while at the same time allowing and requiring the police to dig into and concern themselves with social spheres that were formerly closed off and uninteresting to them. However, these issues and fields of involvement are now opened to the ‘community police’ under the rationale that these borders need to be crossed in order to effectively deal with the wider environments and causal factors of crime, disorder and threats to safety. Wilson and Kelling first indicated such a paradigmatic shift in the conceptual focus of police work when they argued that ‘social disorder’ was the fertile grounds to crime, and that therefore the concerted focus, approach and effective elimination of these phenomena offered the key approach to more effective ‘policing’ (1982, see
also Skogan 1990). With ‘social order’ being determined by a multitude of factors outside the traditional police jurisdiction, police work has thus become embedded in a substantially widened social territory that at the same time has become ‘de-criminalized’, ‘de-legalized’ and ‘de-policed’. Social life now includes police as one of its main constitutive and protective agents, and policing gradually becomes a ubiquitously social phenomenon.

Related to the previous point, the issues and goals that contemporary police are concerned with, and the efforts that ‘policing’ is all about have become a ‘common’ interest, venture or project between the organization of the police and the sphere of the ‘public’ in general, the ‘community’ and ‘citizenry’ (Greene 1994, Bennett 1990, Skolnick and Bayley 1986). While the traditional model of police implied that the police knew what ‘policing’ was all about, what the problems were and how to tackle them, the ‘community policing’ idea suggests that it is now all about shared or joint knowledge, expertise, and input around ‘safety’, ‘quality of life’ and ‘crime’. In Skolnick and Bayley’s words, a “central premise is that the public should play a more active part in enhancing public safety. Neither the police nor the criminal justice system can bear the responsibility alone. In an apt phrase, the public should be seen along with the police as ‘co-producers’ of safety and order. Community policing thus imposes a new responsibility on the police to devise appropriate ways for associating the public with law enforcement and the maintenance of order” (1987:4f). The ‘partnership’ and ‘co-production’ imagery of ‘safety’ and ‘quality of life’ as social goods (rather than professional products delivered by police alone) proposes that there is a social consensus on what policing is all about, who gets policed, and how. It assumes that at all various stages of the policing process, police, social actors and interests should consult, coordinate and cooperate and that in fact the ‘non-police’ stakeholders in the ‘community policing’ venture are equal partners with regards to these processes as much as the police themselves. In order words, ‘community policing’ includes a “declared shift in responsibility for crime control to other organizations and institutions” (Ericson et al. 1993). It is no longer police property, but instead becomes the “joint property of the community...as well as the local agency delivering public security services” (Leighton 1991:487, see Ericson et al. 1993).

B) Operational issues

Despite much of the emphasis that ‘community policing’ is said to be not a tactic or a strategy, its postulates implied central changes in police operations, and the way the police are
supposed to go about their work. One of the key assertions under this umbrella is that policing is
to become “ends oriented”, meaning that it is not so much the process (of crime control,
professional law enforcement etc.) that is being emphasized, but rather its results (reduction of
crime, disorder, fear of crime etc.; see Eck and Rosenbaum 1994). This more forward-looking
approach to police work and its objectives has been aimed for technically through a “reorientation
of patrol activities” that is now pro-actively aiming at crime and its prevention, rather than
primarily reacting to past incidents (Skolnick and Bayley 1987:5). Operationally, “community
policing” thus has couched its affairs in a new pragmatism, implying not so much an emphasis on
the process of ‘how to do policing’ but rather ‘to do things that produce the goals of policing’
with a primary focus on outcomes.

While a large variety of programs and strategies have been put into place and discussed,
their common denominator is that they are de-emphasizing ‘crime’ as the central legitimizing,
limiting and defining aspect of police intervention. This is, on the one hand, expressed through
‘community policing’s’ strong focus on crime prevention, in which police argue for undertaking
steps and measures that do not primarily react to crime after it has happened, but concentrate on
interventions that will eliminate the prevalence of crime in a future-oriented manner. A similar
rationale is postulated by the credo of ‘proactive policing’, again suggesting the notion that the
police are present, analyse and understand situations that lead to crime and its associated negative
effects, and that their central mandate is to work on and modify the conditions and circumstances
that allow crime to happen (Goldstein 1990, Trojanowicz and Carter 1992, Ericson 1995). While
none of these tactics explicitly reveal what key measures or resources (that have not been tried or
utilized before) will be put into place, it is implied that such police work is aiming at intervention
that happens before the fact of crime, not as a reaction to it.

In fact, many such initiatives have proposed and recruited the public as a fundamental
resource and agent for crime prevention. ‘Neighbourhood watch’, ‘community safety’ programs
and traditional crime education schemes have all been presented as forms of ‘crime prevention’
under major involvement of the ‘public’ through which measures and strategies are developed and
devised that make crime less likely and convenient to occur. From the point of view of police
front-line work, the foot patrol officer has come to starkly embody the ideology, values and
symbolisms of ‘proactive policing’ (Greene 1994). The officer’s presence, mobility and visibility
in local realms (with the assumed effects of deterring crime or increasing the chances of successful
crime control intervention), the local knowledge about problem spots, trouble makers and intervention resources as well as his/her role of constantly thinking and advising local stakeholders about how to increase 'safety' and decrease the chances of crime all symbolize the mission of her/him being there as a 'crime preventer' and 'safety provider' rather than as a 'crime controller' or 'law enforcer'. This new role has been described by others: "The police should demonstrate a presence in the community. They should be visible, accessible and caring, with the goal of reducing fear and deterring crime" (Goldstein 1987). Generally, operational shifts within 'community policing' programmaticas have thus been linked with the expectation of reduced demand for emergency response (Kelling and Moore 1988).

A second key tenet of operational re-orientation of police work within the framework of 'community policing' is expressed through the notion of 'problem-solving'. Again laden with ambiguity, it symbolizes the idea that police are not there anymore just to deal with and process crime incidents in isolation, but that their work is to dig 'underneath' and to work on the bottom-line factors that facilitate or cause the symptoms of crime or disorder. This basis of legitimization for police intervention, of course, called on the police not only to react to 'crime' incidents (as defined by violations of standing law), but also to investigate and proceed against phenomena that had effectively been analysed, claimed and presented as 'disorder', and were seen as a violation of possibly rather subjective, volatile and ambiguous social standards. Problem-solving implies that fundamental to the idea of community policing work is "the activity of thought and analysis to understand the problem that lies behind the incidents to which the police are summoned" (Moore 1992:120; see also Goldstein 1979, Eck and Spelman 1987, Cordner 1985). However, some analysts were quick to see that this framework of reasoning, in anticipation of realist and leftist arguments, would eventually lead to the 'discovery' of unfavourable social conditions and inequalities as the causes of crime that need to be addressed as fundamental matters of social justice and reform, rather than simply a narrow emphasis of enhanced effectiveness of police strategies. Moore, for example, quickly pointed out that the advocated 'community police's' concern and preoccupation with social matters and 'problems' "is not the same thing as seeking out the root problem of the crime problem in general. It is a much shallower, more situational approach. It takes seriously the notion that situations might be criminogenic and that crime can be prevented by changing the situations that seem to be producing calls for service. The problem-solving challenge is to imagine and design a plausibly effective response to solve underlying
Based on the ideology proposed in the seminal works of Wilson and Kelling (1982), Skogan (1990) and subsequently Kelling and Coles (1996) about ‘disorder’ being the cause and facilitating factors for crime and its related negative impacts on social environments, the tactics of ‘order maintenance’ have emerged as a policing strategy combining the elements of ‘prevention’, ‘proactive intervention’ and ‘problem solving’. Crime, and fear of crime, so the argument goes, grows out of disorder, and so ‘community policing’ is called upon to effectively deal with these causal circumstances (ibid.). Subsequently, ‘community policing’ projects have translated this dictum into “the proactive application of formal and informal sanctions to the presumed proximate causes on the beat and in general much greater attention to the minor crimes and disturbances thought to disrupt and displease the civil public. [A]ggressive order maintenance has been offered as an all-purpose curative for neighbourhood disorders” (Mastrofski 1988:53f). The conceptual dilemmas of ‘community policing’ were sharply expressed by a fundamental debate and disagreement that emerged around the idea and scope of the ‘problem solving’ formula. From a more conservative approach, it was argued that disorder is the root and chronological precursor of crime, and that the necessary measures had to be taken, and discretionary and operational resources had to be given to police to eliminate disorder phenomena (Wilson and Kelling 1982, Kelling and Moore 1988). Crime was seen not so much as the result of social or structural tensions and discrepancies in local environments, but as being caused by a phenomena of “criminal invasion” into communities (Crank 1994:343, Wilson and Kelling 1982). This existential threat to the communitarian life and ideal allowed, even necessitated, rigorous and effective intervention clearly subordinating individual interests and liberties to community protection, values and “rights” (Alpert and Dunham 1988, Kelling 1985). The more liberal approach to ‘problem solving’, on the other hand, conceded that much crime and threats to safety observed on local levels originated in deeper social or structural spheres of ‘communities’, and that the police indeed were limited in their abilities, qualifications and resources for repairing these. As such, it was emphasized that in the end, much of the social ‘repair’ efforts would have to be completed either by ‘community forces’ themselves, or other institutional agents working in the domain of social and structural development. The police would thus be seen as a ‘facilitator’, a ‘provider’ and a ‘community builder’ allowing these wider social and structural processes to be initiated and to occur. The police’s main role would be to “assist the community in self repair”, while at the same
time contributing its special share of work and expertise - crime and safety work - to the big and complex social project of 'community' (Crank 1994:343, see Alpert and Dunham 1988).

Finally, also important with respect to the operational propositions of 'community policing' discussed above, it has been suggested that in order to accomplish the prominent ends of police work presented, the police should substantially expand its 'tool box' beyond merely the law and its enforcement. With safety and order 'problems' now being conceptualized in 'social' or 'situational' spheres much beyond just the formal violation of legal statutes, the 'community police' officer is required to resort to forms of action or interventions that are effectively dealing with the wide and diverse challenges of that nature. As Eck and Rosenbaum note, "problem handling represents a departure from the past [and] traditional crime control". While this ideology, at least in theory, featured law and its enforcement at the core of police work, a "problem oriented approach adds a variety of ways to control crime that do not rely on the application of the criminal law" including "situational prevention and social prevention, addressing the root causes of crime [and] education and redirection of potential offenders before they get into trouble" (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:10, see also Clarke 1992). These proclamations probably refer to one of the core socio-political and legal implications of the 'community policing' dogma. While the traditional idea of modern police work generally limited the application of police power and intervention to crime as forms of violations of the law, 'community policing' actively and explicitly opens the door for the police to intervene in scenarios and contexts where 'risk', 'safety', 'problems' and 'prevention' needs can be successfully identified by experts on these matters - who usually come in the form of the police themselves. In becoming a broad and ambiguously social project, 'community policing' has lost a clear definition and cut-off line in terms of where its mandate and jurisdiction of intervention into social and individual realms begin and end. This, in connection with the particular role and powers of the police (see Bittner 1970) has been a challenging problem and dilemma ever since the police came to exist. Within the framework of 'community policing', these circumstances have potentially much wider and deeper socio-political implications with respect to where, towards whom and how these police powers are used, what they are used for, and who stands and acts behind the processes that influence and direct these processes. With 'community policing' and its (seemingly utilitarian) guiding philosophy and principles, the mission, powers and boundaries of the police have been widened to ambiguous, potentially subjective and volatile socio-political grounds, and the actual implications
and effects of these circumstances deserve much attention and analysis.

b) Organizational issues

The idea of ‘community policing’ also implied new structures and concepts for the police as an organization, and with respect to how professional and managerial relations are structured inside the organization, as well as between agents of the organization and the outside world. Three main streams of reform developments in the organizational realm seem to be suggested (Mastrofski 1995).

First, it is implied that ‘community policing’ necessitates basic reform of the police from a traditionally centralized, narrowly triangularized (leadership at the top, subordinate levels spread out below) to a ‘decentralized’ and ‘spread-out’ organization (Kratoski and Dukes 1996, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1994). The notion of ‘decentralization’, again refers to a variety of aspects within the organization of police work, namely the structuring and organizational set-up of resources, as well as “service and command” (Greene 1993:80). One of the key concepts behind the idea of ‘community policing’ is the notion of ‘localization’. ‘Community policing’ is presented as being about local accessibility, distinctly local problems, local knowledge and resources, local solutions and the general belief that “the smaller and the more local is better”. All of these propositions, clearly, depart from the traditional police idea that there was one organization-wide ‘blueprint’ for intervention against crime and disorder that could uniformly be applied to all settings (Skolnick and Bayley 1987:14). In other words, ‘community policing’ is claimed to be “associated with shifts by police organizations from centralized, functional, organizational structures to decentralized geographic structures that encourage closer ties with local communities” (Moore 1992:103). Since one of the central concerns working against traditional police work had been that its local presence, sensitivity and the meaningful incorporation of local concerns and resources had gone missing, the proposed ‘decentralization’ of police operations appeared as a natural response. ‘Decentralization’ thus stands for the expectation to “bring the service close to the customer so that citizens and line-level police officers can have input into the services to be produced” (ibid.). In many instances, the placement of police satellite offices or sub-stations in local areas has been suggested as the key step towards a localization of police resources. Such steps were on the one hand expected to symbolize and underline the presence and integration of the police in local domains and affairs, and on the other
hand they were to enhance the general accessibility of the police by local stakeholders as well as, conversely, the accessibility and penetrability of the socio-local terrains by the police.

There remained, however, fundamental inconsistencies and gaps with respect to the meaning of 'community policing' for the police as an organization that had traditionally defined itself structurally by specialized functions, not 'philosophy'. While some argued that 'community policing' would embrace, and be implemented by the "police organization as a whole", others presented 'community policing' more as a new, specific and additional function taken on by police organizations at local levels (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, see Kratcoski and Dukes 1995). Those who argued that 'community policing' would be taken on and 'done' by the whole police organization left many questions unanswered. It was, for example, not clarified how 'emergency response' functions and resources would be affected or modified within such an approach, also considering the fact that these modes of police work seemed to clearly rely on different operational parameters (reactive vs. proactive intervention, and so on). Further gaps for clarification with respect to the incorporation of 'community policing' principles remained around the role or modification of police functions not directly related to 'street' or 'public order' type of incidents and tasks, in particular issues that are usually dealt with under the umbrella of criminal investigations.

In fact, much of the emerging empirical work suggested that most operations and initiatives under the 'community policing' umbrella occurred as 'add on' components to traditional police functions and operations, in which separate units and/or strategies were established (on the basis of either added or converted resources) that were now looking into 'community policing' type of 'concerns' with more 'community policing' types of methods (Rosenbaum and Lurigio 1994, Moore 1992, Greene 1994). Many of the 'foot patrol' initiatives, for example, were built up on personnel and other resources that had traditionally been used for random, car-based patrol, operating out of separately established and coordinated units that were now responsible for these 'community policing' matters and functions. Not much research evidence is available on the organizational and operational impact of such a 'bifurcation' of police functions and structures on the outside (in terms of work styles, efficacy, perception by citizens) or intra-organizationally. For example, there is not much evidence about whether 'community policing' and car based 'random patrol' units and efforts constructively complement themselves in terms of their interventions, work styles and impacts, or if they may even become
counterproductive in certain ways. There are open questions about the different 'types' of officers and their professional skills and inclinations that are drawn to the different units, and styles of work and professional priorities that they are putting to work. There is also the issue of impact and perceptions of such organizationally 'bifurcated' efforts on the receiving ends of police services, namely residents, local businesses, etc. It is not clear on the basis of the available evidence whether 'community policing' has generally changed or improved the nature and effects of police services provided, or if it is indeed the core focus of a specific function and pool of officers who are primarily looking into 'community matters' and approaching those with so-called 'progressive methods'.

Related to the organizational make-up of the police apparatus comes the implication of 'community policing' as triggering a basic reform of the ways police work is managed. 'Community policing' proposed a new form of organizational managerialism that departs from the old para-military, hierarchical command style in which commands are given downward to lower ranks, and the front-line work is done typically by agents of the organization with the least experience, resources, power and discretion (Mastrofski 1994, Bittner 1970). Instead, it was idealized that the localization of police command and service in 'community policing' frameworks would facilitate a new structure of flexible and self-sufficient 'mini units' or 'teams' of staffing, authority, decision-making and operations, which would center around the front-line 'community police officer'. In other words, the model of the localized police apparatus would mean the establishment of a chain of 'mini police units' all the way down to a local level that would exactly replicate the power, mandate and authority of the police apparatus in the larger dimension. These organizational reform moves were seen as the antithesis to the previous modern police "ideal of eliminating officer discretion through routinization and standardization" (Kelling and Moore 1988:20). These efforts to explicitly equip the frontline officer with an emphasized share of decision-making and operational autonomy seemed to suggest a constructive reversal of the traditional proposition to "limit the discretionary authority of police officers through rules and procedures and a system of command and control" (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:16). This approach, however, was burdened with fundamental limitations in practice as shown by multiple examples of empirical evidence (ibid.)

These 'localization' efforts culminated in the new concept of a front-line police officer in the role of a 'neighbourhood police chief' with the comparable authority and responsibility carried
by a division chief for a larger jurisdiction. Skolnick and Bayley allude to all these new notions of the all-encompassing universality of 'community police' forces and their officers by suggesting that a "key assumption of community policing, however, is that communities have different policing priorities and problems. Policing must be adaptable. To accomplish this, subordinate commanders must be given freedom to act according to their own readings of local conditions. Decentralization is necessary in order to take greater advantage of the particular knowledge that can come through the greater police involvement in the community and feedback from it" (1987:13). The assumption was that officer re-empowerment would result in the effective realization of the appealing organizational values of 'flexibility', 'mobility', 'problem' and 'customer proximity' that had been eroded and stalemated by the traditional inflexible command/control structures (see also Bayley 1994): "The rationale...is that to be responsive to community members and to address problems, decision makers need more information than is usually available to high level commanders, and the police need to be more flexible than is usually possible by following the chain of command. These changes will bring officers closer to the communities they serve and provide them with the authority to act on their behalf" (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:16).

This form of the constructive 'atomization' of the general police service function and resources into self-sufficient, localized units naturally also suggested a new style of management, especially for the professional relations between front-line officers and mid-level command. Instead of merely exercising commands from mid-level managers made on the basis of an assumption of greater experience and authority, the 'community policing' blueprints suggested considerably expanded discretion and decision-making authority for the front-line officer on exactly the claim that s/he is closest to local realities and resources, and thus knows best what to do in the day-to-day activities and tasks of police work. It was expected to push "operational and tactical decision making to the lower levels of the organization" (Kelling and Moore 1988:20), a form of "participatory management" based on the idea that decisions would be made on the basis of local evidence and context- rather than on the basis from command from above. This was to allow the inferior front-line police rank the necessary freedom to do what is needed to 'do the job' without compromising organizational integrity or fundamental legal or procedural standards (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:16).

The police were to become an organization of 'community police' work managers structured not by authority or discretion potential, but by increasing proximity to local affairs and
circumstances. Again, Skolnick and Bayley write: “The enhancement of decision-making responsibility under community policing extends beyond subordinate commanders. It involves the rank and file as well. Officers must have the capacity to think on their feet and be able to translate general mandates into appropriate words and actions. A new breed of officer is needed as well as a new command ethos. Community policing transforms the responsibilities of all ranks: subordinate ranks are to become more self-directing; senior ranks are to encourage disciplined initiative while developing coherent plans responsive to local conditions” (1987:14). The emphasis on the 'atomic' or micro-structures based model of the police organization - with the skills, performance, integrity and function of the frontline officer presented as the core of a healthy professional organization as opposed to organizational structures shaping and controlling well functioning individual agents, similar to the ‘family as the cell of a healthy society' concept - has led to the point that improved ‘officer satisfaction’ and morale became part of the list of explicit organizational goals within the 'community policing environment' (see Wycoff 1988, Kelling and Moore 1988). The 'professional health' of officers as expressed in performance and perceptions about the 'community policing' job and mission came to be presented as a significant element of the quality of police work and its institution.

In general, these suggested moves in terms of the organizational features of police reflected 'community' themes that had emerged in reformist organizational theory and corporate management though the 1980s (Clairmont 1991). It was the shift from Fordist to post-Fordist production and management structures in the corporate world that had launched and established the ideals of “decentralized decision-making, client-responsive service structures, autonomy and entrepreneurship, quality circles and leaner management staff” (Mastrofski 1994:13, see also Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy 1990).

d) Officer professionalism

The concept of 'community policing' also projects a new model, ideology and philosophy of the individual front-line officer as embodying and putting to work the police function within these new contexts. This “new breed of officer” (Skolnick and Bayley 1987) drastically departs from the previously projected front-line, end-of-command-line concept of the patrol officer who was primarily characterized by limited authority and an executive function responding to command calls from higher up in the organizational structure. The traditional officer was formally
limited to his/her small realm of authority and standardized tasks around the response to crime incidents and the enforcement of the law within clear boundaries. In exercising these tasks, s/he was constantly referring to either higher command levels in the organization or other specialist functions as soon as the job required action beyond these limits.

The ‘community policing’ officer is presented as being released from these constraints. ‘Community police’ officers are projected as multi-talented, multi-skilled and multi-resourced ‘generalist’ police professionals who are much less limited in authority and tasks or by hierarchical supervision, but rather find themselves fundamentally focused and rooted in their generalist police role in local environments. As such, the new officer is suggested as providing, embodying and utilizing on a local level all of the functions, skills and resources the police as an organization is offering on a more general level within the ‘community policing’ umbrella. S/he is a generalist in his/her role, mandate and power, and at the same time a specialist in dealing with the particular and unique challenges of ‘safety’, ‘crime’ and ‘quality of life’ issues centred around police in local contexts and affairs (deLint 1996). The ideal officers are “efficient, courteous and accessible, and combine ... both specialist and generalist functions” (Manning 1988:30). Officer specialization within the ‘community policing’ framework appears to be defined through the particularities of external and environmental conditions as opposed to internal limitations (see also Alpert and Dunham 1988).

The ‘community police’ officer has ceased to be a distant, ‘professionalized’ producer of police work in which professionalism is expressed and maintained through the emphasis of process and means-oriented crime control procedures. Instead, the new values are the re-integration and re-socialization of the officer into the local, social environments that constitute the basis, challenge and ends for his/her police work. The police officer is again thought of as ‘part of the people’, part of a ‘community’ environment and an integral, active element in shaping the local social processes constituting local life. S/he is expected to understand and partake not only in specialized police work, but also in the social dynamics and processes surrounding and creating it, and in constantly interacting with its representatives and interests. This notion is very much symbolized through the ‘community police’ officer’s presence and integration in seemingly trivial local affairs, from activities like local charity to sports events to educational functions in schools (Bennett 1995). These propositions are based on the claims that ‘community police’ are envisioned to “come to a neighbourhood, and are there to stay as generalist government agents
responsible for the quality of life in the micro-community” (Hoover in: Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:10).

Related to these aspects is the notion that in terms of officer professionalism, the officer has shifted from a routinized administrator of professional crime control measures to a “local neighbourhood clinician, screening the neighbourhood for problems, diagnosing them, analysing them, treating them and assessing the results”. The overall performance objectives of his/her work are based on “the capacity to scan for problems, analyse them, search for and select alternatives, and evaluate results” (Mastrofski 1994:20). As primarily expressed in the concept of ‘problem solving’ as the guiding police work philosophy, the central mandate is that of “diagnosis, treatment and inference” which implies that the police are focussing on “underlying causes of problems in their diagnosis and treatment ... and stresses cooperation with other professions as sources of expertise and as collaborators in finding solutions” (Ericson et al. 1993:55; see also Eck and Spelman 1987, Goldstein 1990).

The ‘community policing’ concept inclined to borrow analogies from the field of medicine and the health sciences. It suggested the notion of a ‘social medicine’-like profession emerging around ‘community health’ in which disorder and crime are existential ‘social illness’ symptoms, and in the context of which the ‘community police’ officer appears as the ‘general practitioner’, “someone whom we know personally, who is readily accessible, caring and responsive, as well as professionally competent with an array of methods for diagnosing our problems and correcting them” (Mastrofski 1994:21, see also Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). This also goes very much hand in hand with Crank’s (1994) observation of the ‘community police’ officer in his/her role as the local ‘watchman’, and in the role of an ubiquitous “trustworthy presence” (Moore 1992:115) constantly on the lookout for people, circumstances and elements that may disturb or endanger the health and peace of localities.

In fact, the ambit of knowledge, analysis and diagnosis relevant to the ‘community police’s’ ability to preserve or restore ‘community health’ is wide and general, extending to “poverty, unemployment, poor education and work skills, inadequate housing, poor health and other underlying causes of crime” (Leighton 1991:494f), even “homeless people, appropriate drug and sex education” (Greene 1993:85). This broad scope and mandate for the deeper and systematic analysis of symptoms of threats to ‘community health’ as the mandate of police work in turn renders the “treatment mode expansive, covering police participation in urban planning,
environmental design, compliance of social service agencies, and lobbying for changes to legislation" (Ericson et al. 1993:55, see also Goldstein 1990).

At the same time, the 'community police' officer is presented as a facilitator of the local, social life and the newly activated community processes and structures aimed at its effective preservation and protection. The designated role of the 'community police' officer is to initiate, provide and support processes that allow 'community' to prevent crime, enhance order and thus to protect and improve the overall quality of life. Much of these processes are envisioned to be accomplished via the establishment and operation of informal social control without the dominant or exclusive intervention of police, but primarily an activated and responsibilized role of the 'community'. These schemes propose the police as 'enablers' or 'empowerers' of local 'safety' and 'quality of life' goals and values that are seen as traditional, just, locally appropriate and inherently social rather than imposed by conventional police properties like authority and coercion (Manning 1988, Crank 1994, Rosenbaum 1988). Therefore, in a sense, 'community policing' purports to accomplish a two-fold, 'win-win-type' set of basic and most valuable goals in the contemporary local government of social affairs. It leads towards the pursuit of objectives that are locally just and universally acceptable - safety, order, less crime - and works towards the elimination of factors that are presented as lessening the quality of social life, and it does so through a genuinely social, constructive, democratic, participatory and sensitive process based on desires, input and approaches rooted in the social basis itself, the 'people' (Greene 1993, 1994). The intrusiveness, coerciveness and negative power of the state and its institutions of control as expressed by the traditional police seem to have disappeared, and 'community policing' emerges as new form of constructive and positive government for and by the people - a system apparently featuring governmental qualities that so many philosophies and theories of state and society have (unsuccessfully) striven for in the past.

Within this ubiquitous, all-powerful and generalist mandate couched in the responsibility for the 'well-being' of citizens and 'communities', the 'community police' simply "operate on the surface of social life" (Moore et al. 1988:4). The officer's mandate and responsibilities in that realm are almost endlessly wide, and so are his/her resources for dealing with the challenges that emerge in these contexts. The necessary decisions, choices and strategies to be assembled for these tasks emphasize the relevance of broad autonomy in the function of the local officer, as well as the nature of 'community police' work as a "craft" rather than a bureaucratic or standardized
professional function (Mastrofski 1994, Crank 1994).

e) Evaluative

A final central notion integral to the idea of ‘community policing’ emerges around the phenomenon of a new emphasized culture of ‘evaluation’ and ‘accountability’ associated with the public police and their work. In contrast to the traditional police work paradigm in which the police defined the ‘problem’, identified the appropriate solutions and also judged how well they were doing within their own framework of ‘professionalism’, ‘community policing’ proposes a diverse scheme bringing the police and their work under more constant, explicit and multifold scrutiny. The concept poses policing in a new paradigm of constant and ubiquitous ‘reflexivity’, where police work is subject to ongoing assessment and evaluation. ‘Community policing’ is dominated by an evaluation and accountability culture that is based on the presumption that ‘community’ has input in defining problems and disorder conditions as well as their remedies. It is alleged that it is primarily citizens and the local subjects of policing who are setting directions and priorities for ‘community police’ work in that “police are creating new formal committees and councils to advise them about security needs and operations” (Skolnick and Bayley 1988:12). Thus, ordinary citizens are throned as local experts, as the ones defining issues, setting priorities, defining solutions together with ‘community police’. Crime and safety, it is implied, become social property, with the police largely implementing and exercising what the real experts and stakeholders in the ‘community’ advise, allow and desire them to do. The corporatist, ‘customer’-oriented language around police implies that safety and security have been re-located into a market setting, with the consumer (the ‘community’) having rights (to receive the goods and values they are paying for), receiving service (that is oriented towards what is demanded), and that there is potential and leverage on the ‘customer’ side to intervene if the ‘goods’ or ‘services’ delivered are not up to quality standards (Klockars and Harver 1993). The “partnership”, “cooperation” or “co-production” models between ‘police’ and ‘community’ imply, however, that there are two equally interested, empowered and resourced entities involved in the business of ‘safety’, each of them contributing, deciding and acting upon the given tasks and challenges. The goal is to “mobilize public participation, assess consumer opinion about police services, and communicate information that will allow the police to carry out their duties more effectively” (Skolnick and Bayley ibid.).
Some have also suggested that in these contexts, the idea of ‘community policing’ may pose a powerful means and potential for a ‘democratization’ of police, and more specifically for “the governance of police and in the conduct of police work” (Mastrofski 1994:5, Shearing 1994). In fact, the “promises of democratization” are an exceptionally powerful element in the reform rhetoric, and it is perhaps this aspect of the idea of ‘community policing’ that has produced much of the vigorous support it has seen over time (ibid.). This is because the police, as a unique agency of coercive state authority, have always been perceived as exercising a particular form of power that in turn necessitated strict democratic controls and balances. However, in recent times the police have also been revealed as violating basic democratic or justice principles undermining much of the public’s confidence in the institution, and so the aspect of democratization may have been crucial in presenting ‘community policing’ as a socially much more desirable new paradigm for police.

In light of a growing trend towards external and civilian review of police organizations and performance, the much emphasized principle of ‘accountability’ as an integral part of ‘community policing’, in combination with the ‘localized’ structures certainly also invoked strong hopes and expectations. In a sense, the simplistic slogan of ‘citizen satisfaction with police service’ somehow seemed to imply that more or less the whole idea or apparatus of police was to be put under effective civilian scrutiny, that real sanctions and control mechanisms would be made available if basic standards were violated, and could be invoked if citizens were not satisfied with police service or performance. Not much analysis has been done around the question of what forms and processes of control and ‘accountability’ have actually been established under the ‘community policing flag’, and how extensively and effectively they are being used. Attention, however, also needs to be paid to Ericson’s (1982) as well as McBarnet’s (1981) seminal theory around the role of the law for ‘accountability’ of the police, posing the question whether ‘community policing’ possibly more than anything else offers the police more structures, mechanisms and potentials to make them more ‘able’ to give ‘account’ on what they do without providing much opportunity for effective scrutiny or achieving substantive change (see Kelling and Moore 1988:22, Ericson 1982).

The idea of ‘community policing’ has also very much incorporated ‘evaluative’ themes into its operational agenda-setting. Constant “assessment” and “evaluation” of ‘problem-solving’ strategies, solutions and their impact present the police as an institution that claims to be very
much in the business of actively and constantly evaluating its work (see Eck and Spelman 1987, Eck and Rosenbaum 1994, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). The emphasis is on constant and penetrating self-reflexion, in accordance with post-modern postulates of organizational culture (Giddens 1992). However, the ‘reflection’ is primarily directed towards the police’s own agenda, their own work, according to their own standards expressed by outcomes that are presented in categories and indicators rooted in and promoted by the traditional police value system. The ideology and symbolism of ‘evaluation’, nevertheless, has become an acclaimed spectacle that seems to have been privileged under the veil of ‘community policing’.

On the other hand, the idea of ‘community policing’ has also spawned an enormous ‘evaluation’ movement and industry by academics and semi-corporate partnerships that have been established in many instances between police or police organizations and academic ‘investigators’. Triggered by the fact that much of the earlier ‘community policing’ material set out with (still rather undefined) goals aiming at changing police performance, service and public perceptions of safety, ‘community policing’ was seen as providing major opportunities to investigate the impact of these initiatives in response to what has been seen as the ‘failure’ of the ‘crime control’ model. However, the investigation and discussion of the ‘community policing’ phenomenon quickly moved into the dichotomous ‘rhetoric or reality’ perspective, that seemed to propose that ‘community policing’ was either ‘out there’, or that ‘it was not’, and curious minds just had to go out and measure the new policing ‘reality’ in order to determine if the ‘rhetoric’ is ‘lying’ or not (Greene and Mastrofski 1988, Eck and Rosenbaum 1994). Many such studies - a good part of them presenting questionable conceptual and methodological sophistication and quality - have been primarily concerned with presenting evidence to answer the question of whether ‘community policing’ is actually ‘happening or not’, and what its alleged effects are.

Efforts to gauge 'reality' and 'effects' of 'community policing'

Now that we are well into the second decade of the existence of the idea of 'community policing' as the dominant umbrella for the work and mission of the public police, a considerable number of efforts have been undertaken to examine, gauge and measure the effects and impact of 'community policing' in places where it has been implemented (for key compilations and summaries, see Greene and Mastrofski 1988, Rosenbaum 1994, Moore 1992). The 'vagueness', 'ambiguity' and inconsistency of the paradigmatic meaning of the concept as well as that of its
more practical and operational elements - elaborated at length above - have in many instances rendered such ventures exercises of dubious value. Some of the key problems were that these examinations had to struggle with methodological obstacles in getting to the object and data of inquiry (as, for example, experienced in efforts to measure 'crime prevalence' as opposed to relying just on reported crime). Also, the proclaimed outcome indicators themselves relied heavily on 'subjective' indicators (e.g., 'fear of crime', 'perception of safety', 'officer satisfaction') the measurement of which was hard to operationalize even in theory (Greene and Taylor 1988, Manning 1988, Trojanowicz and Carter 1988). Partly related to these problems, a good many of the studies that have attempted to assess the effects and impact of 'community policing', have presented inappropriate and unsatisfactory conceptual, design and methodological frameworks (Clairmont 1991, Weatheritt 1987). Many of the studies have been merely descriptive, lacked proper control mechanisms, lacked validation of subjective perceptions or observation, and thus failed to live up to fundamental standards of evaluation science (ibid., Moore 1992).

Somewhat paradoxically (and disappointing for some) it seems up to this point generally acknowledged that "almost nothing is certain about the effects of community policing programs" (Moore 1994:294). The "extant empirical evaluations of ... programs fall considerably short of ringing success", and if one is to apply a basic standard of methodological rigour, "there is little from these studies that can be concluded, one way or another; the results are at best mixed" (Mastrofski 1988:57, also Greene and Taylor 1988). Again, when looking at some of the empirical results available, ambiguity seems to be the guiding theme. A few different meta-analyses of 'community policing' evaluation studies suggest that some show positive, some negative and some no effects at all with respect to the different quality or outcome indicators operationalized (Greene and Mastrofski 1988). Others show temporary or short-term effects, that fade when examined over longer periods of time (see for example, Moore 1992).

A series of investigations that have examined the effect of 'community policing' initiatives have not been able to conclude that these have resulted in a general reduction of 'crime prevalence' or criminal behaviour in targeted localities. Rather, there is "almost no evidence yet that community policing programs can be successful in preventing or reducing crime and criminal victimization" (Moore 1994:295) and the "concern about the crime and order maintenance effects of these programs remains" (Greene 1989:169, see also Greene and Taylor 1988, Yin 1986). For example, Rosenbaum's examination of a number of projects reported increases as well as
decreases in crime in target areas during implementation periods (Rosenbaum 1986). Similar ambiguities arise from evaluation data presented by Trojanowicz (1986) and Pate et al. (1985). In other study sites, changes in crime and disorder prevalence indicators tended to follow those of 'un-treated' control areas, often with both of them moving toward the direction of lower values (Greene and Taylor 1988, Bennett 1990). Some evidence is presented suggesting the effectiveness of 'community policing' efforts in reducing actual criminal victimization prevalence in certain 'community' populations (Wycoff and Skogan 1994). Again, the complexities and potential impossibilities of such evaluative efforts might be underlined by the fact that most of the studies rely on traditional crime prevalence indicators. However, if the police consistently followed through on one of the 'community policing' premises to de-emphasize the use of law enforcement in favour of alternative interventions, an identical prevalence of crime would naturally lead to less reported or documented crime 'numbers'. Conversely, the application of 'aggressive order maintenance' schemes relying on heavy law enforcement tactics carries the potential of turning an identical 'amount' of crime or public deviance into substantially different statistics.

Efforts aiming at measuring levels of 'fear of crime' and of victimization in various American cities suggested that the increased presence, visibility and accessibility of 'community police' often resulted in, at best some temporary reductions of the prevalence of these vaguely defined problems (Moore 1992, Cordner 1988). Skogan (1994) and Bennett (1994) again point to ambiguous effects from multi-site experiments in the US and Britain. Greene and Taylor even refer to some kind of 'initial enthusiasm effect' in populations policed by 'community policing' initiatives associated with initial drops in fear of crime indicators, which then returned to previous levels, or in some cases eventually even increased to higher levels (1988). Ambiguity is also emphasized by studies that have looked at the efficacy of efforts in plainly involving or mobilizing citizens and residents in 'crime' and 'safety' initiatives embedded in 'community policing' campaigns (Moore 1994). Rosenbaum concluded that such programs in the long-run are not effective in causing "local residents to engage" or direct citizen participation in neighbourhood safety activities, and that these programs may "have been oversold" (1986, see also Moore 1992, Davis, Lurigio and Rosenbaum 1991).

Assessments of the effects of 're-orientation of patrol' efforts towards more 'proactive' and 'preventive' form of operations departing from the heavy reliance on emergency response work also suggest ambiguous outcomes (Kelling and Moore 1988, Skolnick and Bayley 1988). A
'proactive policing' project in Edmonton did not reduce emergency- and repeat-calls at significant levels, and American studies indicate identical trends (Moore 1994, Hornick et al. 1991, Cordner 1988). Clairmont even thinks that it is unreasonable to expect decreases for emergency service requests by such measures, because 'community policing' efforts are usually established in addition to rapid response resources, they aim at making the public more aware of and involved in police work and carry the potential to increase demand for service loads (1991). Principal doubts are raised as to whether there are any alternative police service qualities at all that may replace the public's preference for and insistence on fast and reliable emergency response service (Weatheritt 1987).

Equally ambiguous are the outcomes of documented 'problem solving initiatives', especially with regard to Goldstein's optimism that such solutions would make the police "choose not to enforce the law" but rather have them apply appropriate tools from their wide spectrum of alternative social interventions and resources (1987). A study on the New York 'COP' project indicated how 'problem solving' under an umbrella of 'order maintenance' evolved as being 'aggressive order and problem enforcement', producing law enforcement on much more intense levels than before, and primarily against a multitude "of minor problems not often addressed on regular patrol" such as "annoying" incidents and nuisances, or simply "drunk and disorderly men" (Weisburd and McElroy 1988). An overview on a series of foot-patrol based initiatives concludes that these "more resembled traditional policing and crack-downs than community policing or problem-oriented policing" (Cordner 1988). Closer examination of a variety of 'problem solving' initiatives suggested that these were "based largely on traditional methods of police work" rather than innovative new interventions (Moore 1994:295, Roehl 1994). Other American studies suggest similar trends (Wycoff 1988, Greene and Taylor 1988). It should, however, also be taken into consideration at this point that many of these studies are now a decade old.

Studies on the impact of 'community policing' initiatives on the police's front-line work force also present mixed results. First, a general tendency is suggested within police forces towards basic resistance towards non-legal, proactive work, which is often perceived as a type of 'social work' or 'soft policing' (Weatheritt 1988, Clairmont 1991). Initially higher 'job satisfaction' among 'community police' officers through increased contact with the public, widened discretion and broader professional spectrum was observed in a number of studies (Trojanowicz and Carter 1988, Greene 1989). However, many of these subjectively measured and (and in many instances
even statistically insignificant) indicator results were not found to be holding over longer periods of time, and in many instances faded out after relatively short observation periods (Greene 1989, Wycoff 1988). It is also often ignored that 'community policing' initiatives in most instances drew from a selected pool of officers that indicated more advanced levels with respect to these professional characteristics to begin with in comparison to control groups (Cordner 1988).

Thus, in light of the relative lack of substantive or consistent evidence that initiatives under the 'community policing' banner have fulfilled their 'hard' promises, reduced crime or made 'better' police organizations, and conclusions to the effect that claims for its "superior effectiveness have been exaggerated" (Weatheritt 1987:11), it seems quite surprising that the popularity of 'community policing' among police as well as civilians and residents seems unscathed. It may, however, be quite instructive to attend to Moore's somewhat perplexing conclusions that the most 'clear' and 'robust' finding about the concept's basic effects is simply that "citizens like community policing programs" (1994:294), that the "most consistent finding of evaluations to date is that community policing improves popular assessments of police performance" and that there is "evidence that a public hungry for attention has a great deal to tell the police" (Skogan 1994:178ff). Facing a sort of a complete void of strong empirical or validated data indicating improved functionality and efficacy of police work under a 'community policing' umbrella, Skolnick and Bayley, almost desperately, resort to the 'common sense' approach to things. ‘Community policing’, they propose, is "advancing not because it has yet been shown to be demonstrably superior" but because "it seems to make sense" (1988:29). Clairmont even suggested a priori and without an apparent need for thorough examination of outcomes and effects that "there is reason to believe that the public will express much satisfaction" with the idea of 'community policing' (1991:479). Not surprisingly, strongest findings on the impact of 'community policing' projects have been presented for 'subjective' measures like the "awareness" of citizens and residents about the new 'identity' of police, their redirected efforts, and their increased involvement with social issues and entities (Rosenbaum 1986, Cordner 1988, Bennett 1991).

‘Community’ in ‘Community policing’: Abstract entity, myth, and social conflict site

Probably the most critical aspect of the 'community policing' concept that has remained significantly under-examined and conceptually under-analysed is that of the notion of
'community'. As suggested above, the 'community' concept is a most fundamental and critical component instrumentalized and making the idea of 'community policing' possible, while at the same time, most critical investigations have overlooked the question of how, and what sort of social and empirical characteristics are featured by the 'community' produced and activated by 'community policing' frameworks. The assumption of a dynamic, interactive and constitutive relationship between 'community' and 'police' should not be ignored. Very much reminiscent of Peel's ontology of the "police are the public and the public are the police", the police within the 'community policing' framework are again being thought about not as an exclusively self-sufficient concept, purpose and product (the 'professional police') but more as a means to an end, as an integrated concept determined by and working towards a dependent variable: 'community'.

As such, this uniquely new role for the idea of police and the function of policing as an architect, engineer and care-taker of these new 'social' parameters may not be regarded as surprising in this day and age. In a time when it is lamented that basic social structures have disappeared, communitarian values have been eroded, and the general mobility, division of social spaces, the distancing effects of communications and the starkly increased individualization of lives and existences have resulted in a 'loss of the social' altogether, we might expect to observe a general thirst for the maintenance or the restoration of 'community' (Beck 1987, Rose 1993).

The constitution and projection of 'community' in this paradigm presents an interesting 'fall-back' to a thinking mode starkly reminiscent of the construction and utilization of the idea of a firmly normative and empirical 'society' during the age of social functionalism and objectivism after the Second World War (see Merton and Nisbet 1971). 'Community' in 'community policing' is presented as a very similar, solid and static social entity within local parameters. It is projected as a rock-solid foundation of local life and norms that is undisputably 'there', objectively obvious and clear in its shapes and desires, as well as providing the appropriate and ready-made social grounds from which the new project of policing can take its course. Implicitly, 'community' is brought into the discussion as a core of social existence that has so far been ignored, neglected or pushed to the sidelines by the realities of traditional forms of policing. Furthermore, its vulnerability and possible erosion through crime, disorder and other destabilizing social developments now necessitate state-initiated, decisive and determined intervention in order to counter such destructive currents.

The project of 'community' recruitment, activation and involvement in itself is suggested
as a sufficient new basis of legitimacy for public policing. In this ‘community’ oriented framework, it is not exclusively relevant any more how the police works and performs, if the institution in itself makes sense and if it fulfills the basic standards of legitimacy. Rather, it is emphasized that policing primarily becomes an existential, constitutive and ongoing contributor to and participant in ‘community’ as the atomic basis of contemporary social life. Like the presentation of ‘society’ some decades back, the proclamation of ‘community’ established through the grand idea of ‘community policing’ rather blatantly ignores and silences the forces and mechanisms of social construction behind the image of ‘community’. It denies the structures and processes of social conflict that are working underneath the surfaces of the constitution of ‘community’, and it suggests that ‘community’ carries the unambiguous potential to recognize and act towards people, issues and behaviours that violate its seemingly obvious and undisputed rules and norms. As such, it denies the role and reality of ‘community’ itself as a key site of social conflict and struggle. The implications of ‘community policing’ on these aspects of social conflict in the local realms of ‘community’ are probably occurring on two main levels. First, ‘policing’, through ‘community policing’ or other forms can be assumed to be a powerful, manipulative and divisive process imposing its effects on entities described as ‘community’. Secondly, it must be assumed that the overall, widely celebrated process of ‘community’ construction, recruitment and involvement for the purposes of ‘community policing’ is not a socially neutral event, and produces equally conflict-based or divisive effects.

The concept of ‘community’ is presented and utilized in probably three distinctly fundamental ways in the idea of ‘community policing’; normative, constitutive, and instrumental or functional. First, it is assumed that ‘community policing’ is based on a set of fundamental norms and values that shape and unite ‘community’ and which need and demand protection from ‘community policing’ efforts to counter the currents that work towards their erosion. ‘Community policing’ is about the protection of joint and collective values as well as the “moral reserve” (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, see also Manning 1988) facilitating social life, and it is aimed at sheltering and strengthening the collective of the “law-abiding people in the community” from the ones who are not (Bennett 1993: 128). The aims and goals of ‘community policing’ are based on, or required by, a fundamental “moral mandate” to protect social order and well-being (Sykes 1986, Mastrofski 1988). The emphasis on the moral or normative as an integral and explicit ‘end’ of the ‘community policing’ idea versus the former emphasis on ‘means’ also
becomes clear in its stark conceptual focus on 'disorder' (including 'vice-ful' issues like drugs, prostitution, etc.; see Wilson and Kelling 1982, Skogan 1990), which tend to enjoy central attention in neo-conservative environments aiming to re-instate family, decency and morality as core social values and cohesives.

In its constitutive role, the 'community' is introduced and utilized as the necessary ground that makes 'community policing' thinkable, doable and possible. It is presented as socially positive, constructive and facilitative and thus "justifiable in its own right in that it contributes to the establishment of a civil, livable environment in which citizens may exercise their right to pursue their livelihood, commerce, self-expression, entertainment, and so on" (Mastrofski 1988:48). It is the concepts of the 'partnership', 'cooperation', 'co-production' efforts between 'community' and 'police' that allow the aims and values of 'community policing' to materialize. The police in the 'community policing' idea, in a very Peelian sense, are presented as part of the 'people' and the 'public', and 'community' is thus argued as the grounds on which 'community policing', its institutions, agents and norms are set and rooted (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994, Trojanowicz and Carter 1988, Skolnick and Bayley 1988).

'Community' is presented as the foundation and entity from which values, mission and power originate, and to where they properly return. This idea, for example, is expressed in the emphasized notion of 'community accountability' - as in forms of directive democratic government institutions, it is projected that the police are doing authority from their social basis, which can constantly be checked and withdrawn if required. Police, within the framework of 'community policing' allegedly do what 'community' request, empower and allow the police to do, and thus all progress and effects to be accomplished by 'community policing' seem to hinge on the effective role, involvement and input of 'community'. 'Community policing' is presented as a conceptual body or 'opportunity structure' that must be filled with life and/or meaning by the blood, breath and resources of 'community', thus charging it in this imagery with a much more active and responsible role than just that of a passive 'partner' being hauled along on a journey.

Of similar importance for the 'success' of 'community policing' are the functional or instrumental roles of 'community'. The 'community' is ascribed a significant role as a structure and environment of 'social control' outside the realms and mechanisms of police and the law, which are to be activated, governed and utilized, but not actually implemented or run by police. The 'social control' role is presented as an important aspect of the 'rowing' function of the
'community' in which the police have retreated to the 'steering' seat (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). The 'community' is also the facilitator and provider of critical information structures and content that form an existential 'knowledge' and 'local intelligence' basis for the order maintenance, prevention and crime control objectives ascribed to the project of 'community policing'.

On this basis, 'community' has become debunked as a myth of the "new legitimating mandate for police" that was built on "powerful metaphors", namely those related to democracy, urban morality, local autonomy and consent (Crank 1994:335, see also Manning 1984, Gordon 1991:122). This 'community' myth projected that there, in fact, exist 'communities' in the "sense of groups of like-minded individuals" who are living in "urban areas, have similar values and norms, and share a common perception of social order" (Crank ibid.), as well as a basic commonality of "history, beliefs and understandings, and often a shared territory" (Klockars 1991:535). The implications of the 'community myth' are shaping the concept of how the wider social environment and working grounds of 'community policing' become thought about:

"Geographically and ethnically identifiable groups become 'neighbourhoods', or moral entities characterized by a sense of belonging, a sense of common goals, involvement in community affairs, and a sense of wholeness" - all of which is now to be protected by the community police officer in his/her new role as "community watchman" (Crank 1994:336f). The idea of 'community policing' also builds on the nostalgic notion for the North American "democratic grass roots tradition of citizen initiative" (Mastrofski 1991:515).

There has been a sense of general conceptual ambiguity about what describes and defines 'community' historically and in present contexts. Nevertheless, in particular in times of shrinking state, government and public budgets, the enormous socio-political dynamics and conflict potentials enmeshed in local government and policing affairs per se, but also the ones possibly sparked by the joint, cooperative efforts of the entities of 'community' and police, have been blatantly ignored by many 'community policing' proponents, and even many of its critics (Greene and Taylor 1988, Gordon 1991). 'Community policing' has predominantly been presented as a socio-politically 'neutral', 'consensual' and utilitarian idea and process, neglecting its inherently fundamental and wide ranging social and political implications in its mobilization as well as its practices and effects.

While many have celebrated the opportunity of 'community policing' as a form of civil empowerment, possible improvement and sensitization of police relations with minorities and a
chance for more socially just policing (Bennett 1991, Trojanowicz and Carter 1988, Skolnick and Bayley 1988), only a few have explicitly pointed to its ‘social conflict’ potentials. Bayley and Shearing propose that the implications of ‘community policing’ may indeed “exacerbate the dualism between rich and poor” in that it may “reinforce the growing inequity along class and racial lines” enshrined in the various faces that policing can assume today (1996:593f). The ‘community policing’ veil and mandate would, for example, allow police to initiate traditional high-level enforcement and order maintenance strategies in poorer, lower class and high crime neighbourhoods while others would be ‘blessed’ with the ‘policing luxuries’ of more preventive and peaceful, and less intrusive operations. Or, the police could choose to apply ‘community policing with a vengeance’ on the basis of ‘problem definition’, ‘community engagement’ and ‘intelligence’ against an evolving group of enemies or scapegoats in socially heterogeneous or diverse areas, and thus further exacerbate social division and threshold lines.

Indisputably, ‘community policing’ conjures up an idea in which the potential for opportunity and failure in the sense of social conflict seem to lie closely together. Similarly, while there may be need and potential for ‘community policing’ to serve as a reinforcing mechanism for human rights and social justice issues on local levels, it may on the other hand carry the dangers of allowing for the severe erosion of constitutional rights and legal process protections against declared ‘enemies’ under its emphasized ‘utilitarian’ umbrella (Moore 1992). ‘Community policing’ may present considerably large social opportunities for the groups and interests that it works for, but it may also mean a drastic increase of social tension or conflict around social groups who become the target of its persistent and vigorous order maintenance, ‘problem solving’ and intelligence gathering operations. The theoretical and programmatic elaborations on ‘community policing’ indeed require much clarification and explanation with respect to how potential power and interest disparities in the ‘community’ realm would be controlled or balanced out in a setting in which explicitly “the public is made an interest group for the police” (Bayley 1988:228).

The newly emphasized situation under the umbrella of ‘community policing’ in which the police actively offer themselves “at the disposal of the public” raises a number of key issues around the schemes and practices in which the ‘community-police’ cooperation is put to work on a day-to-day level. Even in a cautious assessment, it has been acknowledged that “communities are complex” (ibid. 232). While the factors causing and shaping the complexities of ‘community’
are manifold, there is the key question of how such differences influence the wide array of potentially conflicting "interests, priorities and values" in such settings with regard to policing, and what may make some dominate over others. 'Community policing' and its emphasis on the maintenance of order appears as a rather hollow and simultaneously ambiguous proposition right from the outset without sharing a basic "definition of what constitutes right order, threats to it and appropriate methods of maintaining it", as well as a "sense of group-identity or attachment", a sort of local "we-ness" (Mastrofski 1988:49).

While there are undoubtedly neighbourhoods in which such naturally collectivizing and communitarian streaks and processes can be detected, it should be kept in mind that 'community policing' is most commonly called for and utilized in areas - i.e. highly diverse downtown cores - that do not fit these characteristics, but rather present sites of major ethnic, socio-economic, normative and general 'lifestyle' diversity and conflict. Rosenbaum, for example, has shown that the general social homogeneity, relative affluence and predominance of middle class values in a neighbourhood predict more substantive and effective neighbourhood organization and activisms around safety issues (1987). Greenberg and Rohe's work on existing values systems in local neighbourhoods concludes the general absence of shared norms about order in low income areas that are characterized by patterns of social heterogeneity (1986). A comparative field study in two urban Toronto neighbourhoods indicated that less than one third of the residents sampled agreed on any sort of crime or disorder phenomenon as presenting a "big" problem that required intervention (Murphy and deVerteuil 1986). An ethnographic study on inner-city Chicago neighbourhoods suggests that while neighbourhoods may appear to share norms and value consensus, closer examination and queries suggest that these appearances stand on thin ground (Horowitz 1983).

Other field studies on the organization and power politics of neighbourhood interests have shown that crime and safety issues are generally grounded in an environment of social conflict presenting one or more set of agendas over another. The successful determination and hegemonic assertion of one set of interests is usually linked to a variety of social and infra-structural parameters linked to the competing groups (Crawford 1995). The empirical reality of community organization is far from the idyllic image that "everyone will come forth and get involved"; this assumption has been proven "generally false and is especially fallacious when applied to inner-city minority neighbourhoods, where participation levels are historically low" and social "relations are
poor at best” (Rosenbaum and Lurigio 1994:304).

Indeed, much of the research along these lines indicates that interests, organizational resources and infrastructure around crime and safety issues are “developed out of social conflict and distrust against neighbours”. These are typically brought forward, launched and put into place by a “small minority of households” which do not necessarily reflect majorities of local stakeholders or “value consensus but only the political or cultural dominance of one group over others less well organized or connected” (Mastrofski 1988:50, see also Rosenbaum 1987). The proclaimed ‘benevolent local politicization’ of the police through ‘community policing’ programs intended to produce the “genuine bonding between interests of the police and the served citizenry” (Skolnick and Bayley 1988:27) elsewhere has suggested that these initiatives clearly “favoured the interests of racially dominant groups and established interests” in local jurisdictions (Skogan 1994:178). Others suggest that the practical realities of the praised and emphasized civil ‘co-producers of crime and safety’ are in fact nothing but “nonexistent and uninterested communities” which make “perfect partners” for the police since these hollow forms and phrases in practice allow them to implement the police’s own agendas under a ‘collaborative banner’ (Klockars 1991:536, see Skolnick and Bayley 1988).

A further concern is linked to the call under the ‘community policing’ umbrella for communities to develop and strengthen their own systems of ‘informal social control’, and that in fact these constitute the core basis for the successful maintenance of ‘order’ in the local territories targeted. Such informal social control mechanisms on the basis of surveillance, intelligence, informal and civil control and even schemes of civil punitiveness may be fairly consensual and undisputed when directed against drug dealers or crack houses, but they may also pose tempting opportunities to move against other “unpopular persons”. Informal social control’s darker reality may come in the form of and “even encourage vigilantism” (Bayley 1988:232, also Cordner 1988). In fact, a number of American ‘let us take back our streets’ proponents advocating rigorous social tactics to restore ‘order’ in public places have been hard pressed to defend their strategies against the charge of vigilantism. The last line of defence used against these charges is usually that these activities are legitimate on the basis that they follow and aim to enforce ‘consensual’ ‘community’ norms, and work towards an ubiquitously desired and approved local framework of ‘order, safety and decency’ that traditional state agencies are not capable of fulfilling. There has not been much evidence on what shapes, forms and effects ‘informal social
control’ initiatives take in real local settings, if they are generally welcomed as constructive elements within the wider agenda of police goals and operations, or what measures police take to balance potential vigilante initiatives under ‘community safety’ banners with basic constitutional, legal and justice principles.

The following study will aim to shed some empirical light on some of the questions left unanswered by ‘community policing’ and raised in this overview.
Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to explore the empirical reality and practices of a number of the key organizational and occupational hypotheses, claims and issues of ‘community policing’ reform that have been proposed in its theory in the context of the division under study. These matters include the organizational structures of and around ‘community policing’ operations, its organizational relations with other policing sectors, management and leadership within ‘community policing’, occupational culture and resistance, quality of work and performance indicators, as well as issues around staff selection, training and general ‘workplace health’. All of these distinct issues will be explored in a similar fashion. The following discussion will give a brief overview on previous research and existing empirical knowledge on these issues as they relate to ‘community policing’. The study will then look into the realities and practices of these issues and matters as they have materialized and presented themselves in the practical field research. The documentation and analysis will use observation data and field notes as well as transcribed interview data from which to draw findings and conclusions on these issues.

However, first a brief outline of the history and evolution of ‘community policing’ in Canada, as it has been documented and discussed within the various levels of police forces over the past couple of decades, will be presented.

Excursion: The emergence of ‘community policing’ in Canada
The idea of ‘community policing’ began to be embraced by Canadian police organizations in the mid-1980s, and in terms of their discursive ideology, imagery and self-understanding has been “alive and well in Canada” (Leighton 1991:503). The history of ‘community policing’ in Canada since then can simplistically be divided into two distinct phases: From the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, ‘community policing’ was ‘discovered’ by Canadian police forces, and a large variety of initiatives with alternative organizational structures, operations or community-police links became initiated under the ‘community policing’ banner. From the early 1990s on to the present time, ‘community policing’ has become the official and formalized credo in many Canadian police forces, with laws, regulations, mission statements and senior management explicitly postulating that their forces are ‘doing’ ‘community policing’. Around the turn of this last decade, it is suggested that the idea of ‘community policing’ became “the dominant ideology and organization mode of progressive policing” (Chacko and Nancoo 1993:3), as well as the “official morality with respect to policing in Canada” (Clairmont 1992). It has been said to be “lauded by community and police leaders alike” (Kennedy 1993:279, see also Friedmann 1992:99ff).

At the beginning of the 1990s, evidence for the supposed “commitment” to ‘community policing’ could be found in “mission statements of every major police force in Canada, all of which use the term community policing” (Seagrave 1996:164; see also Bayley 1991, Horne 1992). Specifically, Normandeau and Leighton’s seminal report ‘Vision of the Future of Policing in Canada’, commissioned and published by the Solicitor General in 1991 and fundamentally advocating for ‘community policing’ as the governing paradigm of policing in Canada towards the next millennium, “provided the catalyst for many police agencies to seriously consider” organizational and operational reform towards these ends (Seagrave 1996:164, see Normandeau and Leighton 1990, Melchers 1993).

The new Ontario Police Services Act, enacted in 1990, explicitly presents ‘community policing’ and its alleged principles as the governing paradigm for policing in this Canadian province (Chacko and Nancoo 1993). Documents and statements by other police organizations, or the government ministries and departments responsible for policing (Solicitor General, etc.) present the concept as the guiding ‘vision’ with respect to how policing should and will be done in their respective jurisdictions, proposing that there is a “growing consensus across Canada that community policing is the most appropriate policing approach to the past, the present and the
future” (Normandeau and Leighton 1993:31). It has been suggested, however, that the critical question whether ‘community policing’ in Canada was actually practised or had led to any noticeable changes in police organizations, their work and impact, is rather “obscured by unrestrained support for the approach” (Leighton 1991).

Murphy presents us with the interesting observation that in Canada, “‘community policing’ has developed with relatively little external social or political pressure” that had apparently led to police reform initiatives in other jurisdictions (1993:14, also Clairmont 1991). Indeed, the Canadian public policing scene - maybe with the example of isolated incidents in urban centers like Toronto, Montreal or Halifax - through the 1980s did not see the extreme and systemic racial and social tensions triggered by frontal clashes of aggressive public police interventions against marginalized populations observed in Britain, the US and elsewhere. Nor did Canada experience the extreme crime and disorder ‘epidemic’ emerging in the US which was responded to there with a vigorously expanding neo-conservative ‘law and order’ mentality and strategy, with much of it symbolized and carried out by the public police. At the time, Canadian police were described as “publicly popular, well-financed, politically autonomous, organizationally stable, and ideologically powerful”, and the urban spaces, populations and social contexts policed were characterized as “unarmed, orderly and safe”, presenting police “with relatively few serious policing problems” (Murphy 1993:14). In this context, it is interesting to notice that the TCPF’s ‘community policing strategic document arguing for a paradigmatic ideological, organizational and operational ‘move’ towards ‘community policing’ leaves these notions explicitly unchallenged - with one exception: it laments that “budget constraints” and a “poor and worsening financial climate” presented a new reality for the police force, and that therefore a “cost-effective, customer-oriented service” needed to be put into place (1994:2ff). While the ‘cost-savings’ argument for ‘community policing’ is hardly ever used anywhere explicitly, it may not be a coincidence that ‘community policing’ initiatives with their ‘feel good and safe’ approaches are launched by police organizations in times of shrinking budgets that may threaten to create the impression that the public police is so squeezed for resources that it is not capable anymore of keeping people and property ‘safe’.

While it is argued that in most organizational, operational and ideological regards, Canadian police forces are heavily influenced by their American counterparts and traditionally tend to react to or follow developments South of the border, a key difference exists between these two contexts of public police. In the US, police forces are predominantly rooted in and organized
on the basis of local jurisdictions - mostly municipalities - and authority, funding and accountability structures are also centered in these local frameworks. Canada, to the contrary, presents a unique mix of public policing which in many regards is influenced by the British tradition of policing, comprised of some self-sufficient municipal police forces policing large urban centers (predominantly in the eastern part of the country), a handful of provincial police forces with special jurisdictions and the responsibility of policing provincial territory and populations outside the large urban areas policed by the Metropolitan forces, and a federal police force (RCMP; see Friedmann 1992). The RCMP has special, primary jurisdiction over certain specific police functions (i.e., drug enforcement or international crime), but also performs local contract policing for select provincial and local jurisdictions (Leighton 1991). During the 1970s, there seemed to be a predominant political and organizational trend in Canada towards fewer and larger police forces driven by economical factors, which, for example, led to the regionalisation of some forces. The macro-organizational context of public police forces in Canada, dominated by large, extensive and complex agencies thus may have constituted an initial and considerable obstacle to the proposed acceptance and implementation of organizational and operational reforms under the ‘community policing’ banner. Such initiatives and reforms, upon first glance as well as in theory, seemed more feasible in the context of US forces with their predominant local nature, thus suggesting a greater possible responsiveness to local needs and naturally lower bureaucratic barriers to locally driven reform (Monkkonen 1992).

However, Murphy also points to a possible advantage of Canadian police demographics for the advancement of ‘community policing’. The majority of Canadian police jurisdictions, in fact, are small and mid-sized towns rather than metropolitan urban areas. It is suggested, in a rather idealized vision, that “community policing is attempting to accomplish” what small town policing “is presumed to be about. Policing stable integrated communities, active police citizen contacts, decentralized management, responsive police services, and community accountability...make small town policing an ideal model of community policing” (1993:16f). From another perspective, it may thus have been the case that small town policing was “so far behind urban policing” that with respect to ‘community policing’ reform, it may “now be seen as being ahead of its time” (Braiden 1986); or, as it is Bayley’s (1994) argument, that small town police forces had been doing ‘community policing’ all along. On the other hand, the fact that many of these smaller urban jurisdictions have been policed by commissioned units of larger
(provincial or federal) police forces may have eliminated these possible advantages with respect to their local rootedness (Murphy 1985). Even more so, many smaller and rural police forces have actively striven to copy the predominant characteristics of metropolitan police forces with respect to rapid response and crime control operations, professional management ideology and organizational bureaucratization.

Despite the predominant and ubiquitous ‘community policing’ discourses and imagery in official Canadian police statements, documents and communications (Normandeau and Leighton 1993), explicit and observable examples or projects under this banner in Canadian police forces have been limited in number. Such efforts have mostly been restricted to strictly confined, isolated experiments within small units or local territories. A wholesale, broad-scale implementation of a ‘community police force’ or a force-wide, unlimited ‘community policing’ strategy within a police force have rarely been attempted. At the beginning of this decade, it was concluded that “in Canada...[community policing] had infrequently been put into effect in any police organization in an integrated, thorough-going fashion” (Clairmont 1991:470). Murphy’s account of ‘community policing’ initiatives within the Metro Toronto Police Department since 1982 point to the spotty and symbolic rather than “systematic” presence of organizational and operational efforts within this paradigm until recently (Murphy 1993). His list, hardly convincing evidence for systematic and organization-wide changes, illustrates that “the management of police operations has been decentralized to zone or neighborhood districts; community planning officers have been created to generate community-based policing strategies; two experimental police store-front operations have been successfully implemented; foot patrols have been increased in specific neighborhoods; and community advisory committees have been established in some policing districts” (Murphy 1993:18). A descriptive account of the store-front operations found them to be well received by the public, but does not apply any evaluative standards (Lambert 1988). Similar vague statements are mobilized by Friedmann in describing ‘community policing’ efforts that have been implemented with “large urban police forces” in the country: “Management has been decentralized to zones or districts, planning officers were added to devise community policing strategies and several programmes such as foot patrol and storefront operations were implemented” (1992:105).

Further efforts in Canada under the ‘community policing’ banner have been described as “sketchy” (Leighton 1991:502) or as “apples, oranges and bananas”, with most initiatives characterized as being “not much more than business as usual, based on a ... reorganization of
traditional patrol work” (Bayley 1993:43). A good number of these programs, however, are recognized to “focus on core urban areas, on specific community groups and employ strategies such as foot patrols, home visits, store fronts, community councils and directed patrols” (Friedmann 1992:105).

In Montreal, constables have been appointed as ilotiers for small communities of local residents or businesses, primarily charged with the maintenance of security and order. Some 360 of such assignments existed at the beginning of the decade, with plans to cover all of Montreal with this system, combined with ‘citizen advisory councils’ for local police work (Bayley 1993:40). Community policing efforts in Halifax have been implemented in the form of ‘team policing’. In this citywide project, the urban police force joined up constables with detectives, and the core jurisdictions for these multi-functional ‘team units’ are local police ‘zones’ in the city. Most functions of the police are carried out by the ‘team officers’ within these zones, including an increased presence of foot patrol (Clairmont 1991 and 1993). The municipal police force of Fredericton “emphasizes various aspects of community service and involvement” that supposedly include special programs with respect to sexual assault and child abuse as their form of ‘community policing’ implementation (Friedmann 1992). In Edmonton, starting in the late 1980s, a couple of dozen constables have been assigned to special ‘problem beats’ characterized by comparatively high demand for service. Some of the officers operate out of local community stations also staffed by volunteers, and they interact with ‘community liaison committees’. The preferred mode of operations for the community officers is foot patrol (Hornick et al. 1993). In Vancouver and Victoria as well as Winnipeg, starting as early as in the late 1970s, ‘community policing’ has been practiced in the form of limited numbers and experimental storefront or mini-police stations (Leighton 1991). Many of these, however, were subsequently abandoned due to their high cost. Both British Columbian cities also initiated ‘crime prevention’ offices and units cooperating with various social and business groups and schools as part of ‘community policing’ initiatives (Walker and Walker 1993). The Metro Toronto Police embarked on a small number of demonstration and experimentation projects labelled as ‘community policing’ efforts starting in the mid-1980s. Among them were two projects in the ‘Parkdale’ and ‘Jane/Finch’ area which are described as having a “high density of public housing, a mix of ethnic and racial groups, a relatively transient population, a history of ethnic conflict with the police and higher crime rates than average for the city” and thus “having persistent policing problems” (Murphy 1988:198).
The Ontario Provincial Police embarked on the ‘community policing’ ship through officially establishing ‘Community Police Officers’ in most of its districts. These officers liaise with local groups, largely from small and mid-sized towns, with regards to specific policing and crime prevention concerns, at times with advisory councils. Similarly, the RCMP has put into place “community consultative groups” within local detachments that are supposed to inform and guide the local operations and priorities of patrol. The RCMP also practices a “long inventory of crime prevention programs” that are implemented at local commanders’ discretion. Traditionally, the RCMP has resisted a devolution of its organizational and operational structures into local police stations, although some exceptions have been initiated (Bayley 1993). Bayley emphasizes the spotty, inconsistent and seemingly random initiation of ‘community policing’ initiatives in Canada. Only in a few such initiatives, he notes, “officers have been given full time responsibility for community liaison, crime prevention and problem solving”. Formal interactions with or involvement of community entities in police work vary “from ad hoc to formally constructed, or to non-existent”. Only in a few select cases, evaluation efforts have been made. Even in most of these cases, methods and measures applied have been inconsistent and ambiguous, mostly focusing on “process of implementation rather than the impact of programs” (Bayley 1993:43; see Bayley 1993 and Leighton 1991 for entire Canadian review above).

THE CITY POLICE FORCE under study (subsequently referred to as ‘TCPF’) officially began to incorporate the ‘community policing’ paradigm into its ideology, structure and operations at the beginning of the current decade. The presentation of the ‘community policing’ model was put forward by a series of landmark comprehensive and long-term planning and policy documents by TCPF. Primarily, these included a comprehensive strategic plan document issued in 1991 which set out TCPF’s fundamental policing concept, framework and objectives into the new millennium. This planning document and was then followed by an equally comprehensive and highly publicized task force report in 1994, which outlined the plans and directions for the implementation of the objectives set out in the 1991 strategic planning document (TCPF 1991, 1994).

Both reports set out and reached for a fundamental and comprehensive “community policing model” for TCPF. This model predominantly suggested the basis and goal of an emphasized “partnership with the wider community...to establish priorities, maintain order and enhance public safety”. Organizationally and operationally, it underlined “the core function of
policing as solving problems related to both the safety and well-being of persons and the protection of property”, “recognize[d] the front-line officer [as] the most important element of the organization” and aimed for the “empowering of members of the organization and the community”. The model put the “front-line officer” at the helm of “delivering community policing”, and suggested that officers “must be selected, trained, assisted, evaluated, rewarded and promoted” on the basis of their contribution to this “core function of policing” described by “long-term problem solving and crime prevention” (1994:iv).

As the core organizational pillars for the establishment and implementation of the “community policing model” within its force, TCPF stipulated and defined the structural and operational settings for ‘community response’ operations within the force. These eventually included the set-up and operations of ‘Community Response Units’ within each division of the force, now featuring a three-pronged operational approach to its overall policing functions through the components of ‘Emergency Response’ (‘ER’; motorized response directed via radio dealing with high-priority police matters), ‘Alternative Response’ (‘AR’; a “range of alternate methods used to address non-emergency incidents [and] low priority calls”, with this special unit being “entirely responsible for addressing” these calls; TCPF 1994:ix) and ‘Community Response’ (‘CR’; doing long-term oriented ‘neighbourhood’ based policing with the objective of ‘problem-solving’. See TCPF 1994). Furthermore, it included the establishment of ‘Community Police Liaison Committees’ between police and ‘community’ representatives in order to facilitate “working partnerships with the community”, and the definition of ‘community response work’ and its officers as “neighborhood based problem solving” (ibid.).

The role of leadership towards ‘community policing’ reform

There has been considerable discussion about the role, relevance and impact of ‘leadership’ with regard to the practices and reforms intended by ‘community policing’ (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994). But the attention to ‘leadership’ issues and dynamics in studying organizations like the police is not a new thing. Ever since Max Weber’s sociology of bureaucratic organizations, a strong argument has been made for the crucial importance of ‘leadership’ in influencing the possibility of organizational change, i.e. in the form of facilitating reform or, conversely, restricting the potential for change in institutions (Dyer 1990, Ott 1989). Leaders, from this perspective, are the key variable and potential in the attempt to “develop a new set of
values or an alternative management philosophy”, which is then “conveyed to old and new employees. Leaders can alter an organizational culture by changing their activities, agendas and interpersonal skills to reinforce new behavior” (Seagrave 1996:165, see also Sapienza 1990). This hypothesis is, naturally, based on the assumption that the values, goals and ideology projected and embodied by the organizational leader are being spread throughout the organization according to a ‘top-down’ scheme of dynamics. Seagrave suggests on the basis of empirical research that there is the possibility of an organizational change movement towards ‘community policing’ characteristics that have been initiated by determined leadership in British Columbia forces. These phenomena of change are interpreted to occur in the form of a “trickle down” process, but at the same time, attention is called to the fact that “the change process is only in its very initial stages” and that it “needs to be adopted in a slow incremental way in order to allow officers to ‘buy into it’” (Seagrave 1996:177). In a slightly different vein, others have argued, however, that the necessary requirement for organizational change through leadership can only materialize through a change in leadership (Pettigrew 1990). It is proposed that it is new leaders who “indeed appear to be the creators and transmitters of culture” in organizational contexts (Dyer 1990:223).

For the more specific area of the introduction of principles of and reform procedures towards ‘community policing’, it has been suggested that leadership from senior management - i.e. chiefs or unit commanders - and their commitment to such objectives is of key importance. It has even been singled out as “the most important factor in determining whether or not community policing innovations will succeed” (Seagrave 1996:165, see also Goldstein 1990, Clairmont 1993 and Weisel and Eck 1994). For example, Hunt and Magenau’s biographical ethnography of American police chiefs concludes that they must be understood as the crucial individual propellant and guide behind the larger institutional and cultural evolution of their respective police departments (1993). While there is a substantial amount of research on front-line officers or even middle management, research on police leadership is scarce in Canada and elsewhere (Crank 1986, Reiner 1991, Clairmont 1991).

The case study of the adoption of ‘community policing’ concepts, ideals and imagery within the The City Police Force provides some evidence of the relevance of leadership for at least the occurrence of ‘visionary leaps’ within police organizations. While the strategic planning task force, agenda and initial report were struck and produced under the leadership of the previous chief of the TCPF, it was not until the arrival of the new chief in 1995 that the ‘community
policing' model came to be hailed, communicated and spread as the new guiding image of the TCPF. In fact, the new chief was supposedly selected on his 'pro community policing' stance and platform, and was soon seen as the commander who would 'bring community policing' to the TCPF. Indeed, his first couple of years at the helm were characterized by statements and promises to make 'community policing' the working paradigm of the TCPF, and to approach issues and challenges through 'community policing' solutions. It was under his leadership that the first divisions started to act upon recommendations made in the TCPF strategic planning document with respect to organizational structures and reform towards the establishment of 'community policing' initiatives.

On the lower, divisional level of the police force examined 'community policing' did not exist as the official rhetoric or guiding ideological framework, and organizational efforts to put it into practice in one form or another had not been initiated until 1995. The police division investigated by this research study ['99 Division'] traditionally presented a deeply entrenched tough, repressive and hard line reputation that was to a great extent embodied and reinforced by its previous commander who was labelled by several people within the divisional jurisdiction as practising an 'occupation force' type of policing (Field notes). The unit was popularly referred to as 'Fort Apache' among residents and some officers alike (Gilmor 1996), and there was an abundance of stories, myths and rumors - as well as a few concrete legal accusations - of repeated police brutality, especially against ethnic minorities. In particular, there was a history of ethnic tension between divisional officers and members of the local ethnic communities in the city's largest social housing projects (Jim Ward Associates 1996).

A key incident was when in 1995, two 99 Division patrol officers arrested, searched and detained two black men who supposedly fit the descriptions of two armed robbery suspects. The officers, however, arrested the wrong men, one of them a popular anchor with one of The City's TV stations. In the wake of the ensuing public outcry over this further incident of alleged aggressive and racist police behaviour in the division pushed by the media, the officers were suspended and disciplined. Protesting against these moves, the entire 99 Division went on a wildcat strike, and its commander was unsuccessful in (and to some appeared unwilling to) end the strike. As a consequence, the division commander was relieved of his duties, and just a few weeks later, in the fall of 1995, the chief appointed a new division commander; a move that supposedly opened the 'community policing' era in 99 Division.
The senior officer appointed as commander had been an inspector in a neighboring division, was considered a sort of progressive 'young and radical' outlier, and a rising up-and-coming star within the Force, with considerable academic credentials from outside police institutions, a strong flair for communication with non-police agencies and stakeholders, and a deep commitment to and belief in 'community policing' ideals (Gilmor 1996, Field notes). It was only after the new commander’s arrival and a long list of personnel changes among front-line ranks as well as middle management initiated by him that a number of the police force’s recommendations (as listed in the various ‘community policing’ reports) pertaining to ‘community policing’ structures, reforms and concerns in the division were tackled with some vigor and an apparent sense of determination in the division. The overall impression within the local public and relevant stakeholders was that the new commander ‘brought community policing to the division’ and that he himself stands for, embodies and practices ‘community policing’ at the leadership level (ibid.). A ‘Community Response Unit’ sergeant comments on these circumstances:

*This division commander is a big supporter of community policing. When [Commander X] came here, he immediately increased the numbers of constables and supervisors in the [Community Response Unit], he gave us free reign of what equipment we needed, gave us the bicycles, the van, whatever we needed to do the job. He is a big supporter of Community Policing, while other inspectors still reject it more as 'soft policing' or 'warm and fuzzy policing'.* [S02]

Similarly, there was a strong belief also among the supervisors as well as the front line officers in the CRU that the attention to and efforts towards the realization of ‘community policing’ were primarily a discretionary issue lying in the hands of the unit commander. In fact, it was broadly assumed and underlined that the new commander, his opinions, vision and goals expressed in his leadership were the key to ‘community policing’ changes and reforms that were taking place or had been initiated in the division. This hypothesis is probably further validated by the fact that although the recommendations to establish ‘community policing’ structures and operations within the individual divisions had been mandated by the TCPF under investigation back in 1994, only one other than 99 Division actually embarked on such efforts to a significant degree over the following two years.

**Organizational structures, dynamics and reforms**

The proponents of ‘community policing’ have put a considerable emphasis on the
relevance of organizational issues and mechanisms for the possible accomplishment of the proposed goals and objectives (Greene et al. 1994, Kelling and Moore 1988, Seagrave 1996). However, knowledge about the shape, process and dynamics of the organizational integration of ‘community policing’ within police organizations is generally rather limited, and its impact, organizational structures and relations as a whole remain ambiguous (Langworthy 1986). Indeed, the TCPF itself argues that “neighbourhood policing will be successful only if traditional organizational structures are altered to be compatible with the new vision” (1994:1). But it was not clear from the available ‘community policing’ documents what these alteration efforts would look like in practice.

While some of the organizational propositions of ‘community policing’ (e.g., ‘decentralization’) have been seen as ends in themselves, other have been set out as means to higher ends. An example is the objective of ‘participatory management’ that aims at a number of things, including more responsibilized officers, increased proximity of decision-making to “customers”, enhanced job satisfaction, etc. (Goldstein 1979). These ideas are basically rooted in the assumption that in order to attain ‘community policing’ ideals and practices, fundamental and crucial reforms of organizational structures of the police need to occur. In fact, one of the key questions for police practitioners and researchers alike has been to investigate the question of “how does one change an organization in order to get personnel to carry out the prescribed activities” (Weisel and Eck 1994:53, see also Wilkinson and Rosenbaum 1994).

Knowledge about the dynamics of organizational change within police bodies is very limited, especially concerning the impact of organizational culture on such processes (Greene et al. 1992). It has been generally recognized that there are substantial and significant organizational contingencies from within that have the potential to hinder, stall or sabotage the introduction and establishment of ‘community policing’ values and practices. For example, there is the much mythologized and examined professional ‘police culture’ which, as many have suggested, is a genuine source of opposition for the professional and operational reform values that ‘community policing’ allegedly strives for. Greene et al. summarize some of the main tenets which are basically reflective of classical organizational theory: “Police organizations are rank and power centered, they maintain an emphasis on control, and they remain rooted in the call-response-call technology... Culturally, police organizations remain inward-looking; they are often distant from their clients and they shun most civic oversight attempts” (1994:93; see also Moore 1992, Kelling
and Moore 1988). These structures, so the ubiquitous tenor among ‘community policing’ reform advocates, have been the main cause of the “existing problems in police organizations, including a 911 system that makes officers prisoners of endless non-emergency calls, an impersonal system of performance evaluation, and other factors that lead to low officer morale, high levels of cynicism, and an inability to work closely with the community in a problem-oriented framework” (Wilkinson and Rosenbaum 1994:112).

Concerns over organizational ‘community policing’ reform may meaningfully be described as ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ perspectives (Weisel and Eck 1994). While many of the organizational aspirations with regards to ‘community policing’ aim at operational ends towards the outside, other issues are primarily of intra-organizational relevance; for example, the organizational dynamics of ‘community policing’ in relation to other general or specific policing functions, or issues of staffing and training. This perspective of the interactive properties and processes of the police on the inside as well as with the outside were given increasing consideration starting some decades ago with a series of empirical landmark studies outlining such dynamics and their effects on police behavior and decision-making (see for example, Skolnick 1966, Black 1970, Reiss 1971). Greene and colleagues furthermore point out that, while intended reforms are ideally to mold and shape organizational structures into a form supportive of the envisioned goals and practices of ‘community policing’, the opposite often happens in that the “change efforts adapt to the organization, rather than the organization adapting to the intended change” (1994:93). In fact, most historical “police reform efforts” have concentrated primarily on “changing the organizational structures” on the basis of which police agencies operate (Wilkinson and Rosenbaum 1994:112). Generally, police organizations have been recognized as fundamentally shaping police responses (Manning 1977).

The fundamental organizational step within the TCPF’s blueprint for the implementation of their ‘community policing model’ and for their ability to “deliver successful community policing...through the development and implementation of working partnerships with the community” was that ‘Community Response Units’ (CRUs) were to be established within each division. Explicitly, the TCPF’s recommendations stipulated that “Community Response Operations be a separate divisional office with two sub-functions: community response and traffic” (1994:118). It further required that “unit commanders be expected to maintain a minimum percentage of constables...in the three functional areas within the division”. On that basis, it was
required that “at least 10% of all divisional resources will be dedicated to community response” (1994:114). At the same time, the TCPF molded its organization into three basic “functions”, divided into ‘Emergency Response’, ‘Alternate Response’, and the ‘Community Response’ function described above.

While these structural provisions may seem fairly standard and trivial, and appear as a basic step in the organization of police work and service provision in a large size force, they are of fundamental significance for a multitude of organizational, operational and cultural aspects in the police force examined, especially as they relate to ‘community policing’ reform. The organizational semantics of the ‘three-function’ model within TCPF, with a ‘community police unit’ as one separate unit of its overall organizational body basically indicate that ‘community policing’ was not primarily to be a set of values, cultures or objectives that were to penetrate the whole organization, but was to be ‘organized’ within the institution as a separate organizational component. This structural set-up implied that ‘community policing’ could be arranged and ‘done’ as and through a separate organizational entity from other police ‘functions’, and thus suggested the desired existence and structures of a ‘specialized function’ of ‘community policing’. These organizational features on the one hand suggested that ‘community policing’ would be concentrated in a ‘corner’ or ‘slice’ (“at least 10% of all divisional resources...”) of the organization and its operations as a whole. On the other hand these circumstances raised the question of what effects the isolated concentration of ‘community policing’ resources, objectives and operations would have for the rest of the police organization and what would be its work relations with those. These contexts point to some fundamental queries, as cautiously put forward by Friedmann, that if “the foot patrol constable is the one who ‘does’ community policing, the question is raised as to how other police roles will ‘fit’ into this model”, and from this point of view he reasonably speculates that “even when foot patrols and storefronts are operational they remain isolated strategies that have little application to the entire department” (1992:108).

As a matter of institutional planning, ‘community policing’ thus became organizationally established as part of a ‘three-partitioning’ of general police service and front-line work in the division examined. The further research exploration and discussion of results will need to refer back to the fundamental implications of this finding. From this abstract empirical perspective of the divisional organization, ‘community policing’ in the research site has clearly become institutionalized as the much criticized “add-on” provision to other functions and organizational
elements, rather than an ideology, reform and practices spread all through the police organization (Normandeau and Leighton 1990:47). While this may limit the overall potential impact of these initiatives to a small segment of the organization, it may, in addition, trigger negative, polarized resistance, rivalry or tension dynamics with the other, traditional organizational segments. These dynamics deserve much attention in the following examination.

Decentralization of police work

'Decentralization' and 'localization' of police structures, resources and frontline operational efforts have been presented as central organizational objectives of 'community police' reform efforts. However, the division under study - which traditionally operated out of one central station facility under which all its divisional functions were subsumed - in practice consistently refrained from bringing itself physically closer or deeper into the socio-geographic environment to which it had been mandated to provide 'community police' services. While there exist a couple of 'mini-stations' within the jurisdiction of the TPCF and its 'community policing' implementation report explicitly recommended that "where appropriate, mini-stations be established" (1994:146), middle and upper management in 99 Division rejected numerous opportunities to decentralize or localize part of their frontline operations, out and away from their central station and into the levels of smaller local areas, 'neighbourhood' or 'community'. The division thus followed a general trend among police organizations to resist pressures for "formal decentralization" as well as the "flattening" of their organizations described elsewhere (Weisel and Eck 1994:65).

During the period of field research, there had been a few attempts from the outside to formally and consistently incorporate and transform the division into different forms of localized or 'mini-station' projects. One such effort repeatedly emerged out of a 'community safety office' that had been set up through a government grant in one of the division's large social housing projects, and which for the limited grant time and primarily on the basis of volunteers, provided crime information and prevention services to many of the different ethnic groups in the multi-thousand resident housing complex. The division, however, was never formally involved in the set-up or operations of this local 'safety' facility, although naturally considerable overlap and contacts existed between staff and activities. During the research at least two further efforts were made to set up additional such offices under similar objectives that aimed to formally and actively incorporate the local division's 'community police' resources, but the divisional management
seemed to have made a clear and deliberate decision to ‘stay out’, and not to commit themselves to a more formal and explicit localization of their ‘community police’ resources. There was the argument that the division simply did not have the resources to permanently assign officers to such a venture with one local jurisdiction, and ‘off the cuff’ comments on the matter suggested that reasons against such moves were that this would be “too messy”, you “get sucked up into the politics”, and “once you are in there you are stuck” [Field notes]. Substantial efforts were made by a number of ‘CRU’ sergeants and constables, however, to influence the structuring of the existing ‘community safety’ offices, and to ensure that the logistics of the ‘safety station’ and the information it produced would be available and of good use to their ‘community police’ unit. While the division resisted official and formal decentralization of its operations into smaller and more local geographic territories, the ‘community policing’ schemes which were introduced nevertheless brought the division to think and present themselves more locally. These efforts, however, happened usually in a way that maintained the greatest unilateral control and flexibility with regards to these aspects on the police’s side. Some related efforts occurred under the following instructive organizational caveats. Partly in congruence with an internal document that required each of the force’s individual divisions to sub-divide its divisional jurisdictions into ‘neighborhoods’ along natural social boundaries, the CRU operations carved up the divisional territory into approximately 8 such ‘neighborhoods’ (see TCPF neighborhood task force 1996). While the ‘natural features’ of these ‘neighborhoods’ are debatable and more likely reflect existing socio-economic ‘walls’ and obstacles for social exchange and penetration between certain populations (e.g. social housing residents versus middle class residents), these neighborhoods quickly became the governing mode of thinking, envisaging and contextualizing localities, problems, people and appropriate responses within the division from the perspective of the police. A further interesting feature was that there did not seem to be a consistent logic or systematic approach in how these ‘neighbourhoods’ were organized, i.e. with regards to the nature or prevalence of crime and safety problems they were dealing with. The ‘community police’ coverage or resources assigned to the different ‘neighbourhoods’ consequently was the subject of great variation. While some ‘neighbourhoods’ were assigned one or two officer teams for each shift (out of two shifts per day, seven days per week), others were assigned just one officer team. In practice, this would mean that the latter would have police coverage only every other shift week,
and on alternating shift schedules (since coverage was provided by the CRU over two 10 hour-shifts every day). An important variable in decisions regarding the distribution of limited ‘community police’ resources to local priorities, first and foremost, seemed to be a response - although this was never explicitly discussed in such a way - to organized ‘community’ interests and pressures on the police. It seemed to be the case quite consistently, especially within the first year after the ‘neighbourhood’ grid scheme was introduced in the division under study, that the ‘neighbourhoods’ featuring a tightly organized, assertive and vocal body of ‘community’ interests around crime and safety issues were given considerably more attention and coverage than others. The settings of more direct, intensive and frequent contact between police and community stakeholders provided an environment in which the CRU office could not avoid ‘knowing’ about the prevalence of certain problems in areas from where they were persistently communicated, complained about and pressured.

The ‘neighborhood assignment’ versus the ‘decentralization’ option, however, seemed to present further implicit organizational advantages to the ‘community response unit’ respectively the division and its management as a whole. While the ‘neighbourhood’ assignment scheme allowed the officers and the unit commander to argue that local jurisdictions - ‘neighborhoods’ - were given ‘their’ police officers who knew and were sensitive to their specific needs, it left the officers themselves and the unit a great deal of flexibility that was translated into action by them unilaterally. In fact, officers consistently only spent a small proportion of their patrol time in the ‘neighborhood’ they were assigned to but, for various reasons, would frequently and intensively engage in policing activities in other ‘neighborhood’ jurisdictions (see next chapter). Often, it would also be the case that certain ‘neighborhood’ areas would not be policed at all due to the fact that ‘their’ officers were on leave, seconded to other functions, or transferred out, etc. These circumstances would be determined unilaterally in the division or the CRU, and in most instances come to the local residents’ or businesses’ attention only after the fact, for example when they had not seen their officers for a while or had not been getting a response when calling in. Such flexibility and unilateral decision-making about the assignment and presence of police resources to certain ‘neighborhoods’ would, likely, be a more difficult practice in settings of more formalized decentralized offices or stations. It is in this context that the division has refrained from decentralizing its local resources in a formal way that would also likely have rendered it more committed as well as exposed to public scrutiny with respect to the quality and consistency of its...
`community police` services. In other words, it can be argued that such moves of a more explicit and formal decentralization of `community police` structures, resources and efforts may have provided for a broader and more truthful `accountability` of the local police division in the context of its `community policing` efforts, but were rejected as such. While tendencies towards the localization of `community police` resources and services have been superficially considered by the division as shown, they were set up and practised in such a way that ultimate decisions, priorities and modifications with regard to these organizational features remained uni-laterally on the side of the police. For these and other reasons, it can be argued that the `localization` efforts of `community police` work and structures observed were predominantly symbolic, and in practice maintained and reinforced the institutional hegemony of the police with respect to such issues.

The ambiguity of organizational reforms

While `community policing` advocates and practitioners alike often suggest that `the police force as a whole is `doing community policing`, the structures of the research setting illustrated above have rather alluded to an organizational and professional bifurcation - `community policing` versus others - of police work and services along functional lines. In fact, more thorough examinations of police institutions engaging in `community policing` indicate, for example, that the resources and officers assigned to `community policing` usually constitute "a small proportion" of the entirety in the divisions (McConville and Shepherd 1992:117). As has partly been suggested in the well known `community policing - rhetoric or reality` argument, there is much emphasis on `community policing` imagery and reform symbols within the entirety of police organizations; however, concrete and substantial initiatives or features of such nature are limited, or are considered as secondary or subordinate to other functions (Greene and Mastrofski 1988). Furthermore, the overall organizational and operational picture of `community policing` forces reflects "both an ambivalence in the commitment of forces to the beat officer ideal and a difficulty of matching demand to available resources" (McConville and Shepherd 1992).

There was a clear and basic discrepancy between, on the one hand, the significance and emphasis on `community policing` imagery, ideals and messages as the prevailing policing identity or paradigm in the division under study, especially in communications to the outside, and, on the other hand, the subordinate organizational and operational role of its initiatives in practice. These
discrepancies were recognized by many CRU staff in 99 Division in various ways. First, CRU staff confirmed the impression that ‘community policing’ is currently emphasized and communicated as the most important concept, image and ‘message’ for the division, especially by management when communicating the role, practices and interests of the police to the outside, but also in terms of its internal processes. The interpretation of a high emphasis on ‘community policing’ as a communicated priority in and from the division was shared by a majority of the CRU officers without notable exceptions, as illustrated by the following CRU officers’ comments:

Community policing is probably on top of the list of organizational priorities only because it’s a very high profile thing. It’s involving members of the community and of course politicians that represent those members. So I think, on the list it would be number one at the moment. This priority is certainly followed up by management. We are very well supported by the management. We have a lot of flexibility with respect to what the community wants and most of the time gets. [C01]

Organizationally, it has been given a very high priority, and I think that has a lot to do with the corporate mandate, and my personal feeling is that for a unit commander, or to be perceived to be successful, he or she has to have implemented community policing within his or her division. So, the unit commander is going to do whatever he or she has to in order to be perceived as being successful to get that community policing working, and whatever that format that should take remains to be seen. We certainly bring in a lot of resources here, a lot of personnel, a lot of latitude to pursue the goals and objectives that we perceive are key to community policing. I think that within the division, the repercussions of that haven’t really been felt. It’s a relatively new concept. [C03]

However, the majority of the officers respondents were also quick to point out that the ‘communicated’ image and priorities in many instances were not in keeping with actual operational or resource commitments towards ‘community policing’. In fact, many CRU officers described the status of ‘community policing’ in the division as being communicated as a divisional priority, but practised as a secondary or subordinate function. One officer, for example, alludes to a discrepancy or tension between the aspired organizational image of the division, and the constraints and reality of its operational practice:

There is a different priority level. First of all, Emergency Response, and I don’t think anybody would ever disagree, is number one priority. Safety of the public, and obviously the officers are included in that, property, safety, you know, like emergency calls are definitely front line. Your ARUs, are more of a call-in system, and I would suggest that would be the third of the three in the priority level. As far as community policing, as far as the [local police force’s] idea of community policing goes, it’s being pushed very solidly right now, because it is the foundation of the future of policing, and a lot has been based on it, and a lot resources have gone into it. I would not say that it is as high a priority as the Emergency Response, because that will always be your number one. But the concepts that they are trying to implement and are
implementing quite well, well it's going to be happening for the next 20 years. It's called [TCPF's strategic community policing document], we are just developing different stages right now. As far as headquarters thinks of community policing, I would say that they think it is a very high priority level. [C02].

A considerable number of officers saw different forms of 'hidden agendas' between these proclamations of commitment by the force and the division to 'community policing' as the guiding paradigm for police operations. In particular, it was often pointed out that while 'community policing' may be the organization's preferred and aspired imagery to describe policing operations, the operational resources and commitment provided pointed to a different motivation and reality. In fact, 'community policing' examinations elsewhere have reported a general perception by constables of "testimony to contradictory messages from above", and a "resentment of managerial indecision about community policing" (Fielding 1994:309). The following statements from CRU officers illustrate these perceived ideological versus operational discrepancies and contradictions at various levels of the police organization as they were pointed out by a good number of CRU officers interviewed.

For whatever reasons, the force has decided to go into community policing full force [...], and now they say they are really committed to doing it. I know there have been studies in other cities that say that community policing does not work. From what I know about this police force, right now, I think that community policing is the flavour of the day. They are sort of jumping on a bandwagon and say, oh sure, we'll do community policing. I don't honestly think that the brass really has a strict definition of community policing, everybody has their specific definitions, including the guys upstairs, including the chief, and from what I've seen, the police force is more interested in giving itself a good self-image in saying, oh yeah, we really like the community, we are really going to work with you guys, you know, we are totally indebted to doing what you guys want, because you pay our salaries, blablabla, but when it comes right down to it, I don't know how much commitment there is upstairs, and that causes huge problems all the way down the chain of command, to myself who is the officer on the street, and gets to see what is happening. [C11]

As far as management goes, community policing is top priority, really. It's the most emphasized area that they want covered. That is what it appears to be anyway. Resources. Well, resources are a problem. I think that is the area where they are a bit inconsistent. there is a lot of resources, manpower that are not there. And most things we can't do. But I think they don't even know what they need for community policing, and a lot of it is in response to complaints or going to meetings. I still don't think that they can write out a precis or a rule book, because it is in a process of orientation. But of course, they don't say that. They come to us with definite answers, because this is, as police officers, how we live and think and work. Is this either the right way or the wrong way, is this what we are doing? Tell us what we should do, and we'll do it, even if we don't like it. But it is changing all the time, they're not sure what's being done and what should be done.[C12]

I think that community policing is mostly big rhetoric and talk, but no action. It's not followed up.
Especially the higher ups, there is a lot of things that they say, but they don’t mean it. I think that maybe they are just saying it for political gain, the higher ups, they are like politicians. They are only saying what they think the public wants to hear. There are some good aspect about, but I think they are going about it the wrong way. If they are not really into it, if they don’t mean what they say, it’s kind of a fart in the sky, and it does not make sense to bring other people onto it. [C13]

While almost all CRU officers interviewed emphasized the ‘reputational’ and ‘symbolic’ priority of ‘community policing’ within the organization, many of them qualified their judgment specifically with regards to the practical and operational level in pointing to a phenomenon that has been called the “centrality of the relief” or emergency function within the police organization and its professional culture (McConville and Shepherd 1992:189). This phenomenon is multi-faceted, and presents enormous implications for police work and its reform. One of the major issues stressed by police practitioners and researchers alike is that the police organization cannot afford to substantially reduce their emergency potentials and resources from given levels, or rather that the public would not accept such a change. The ‘emergency response’ function has traditionally been projected and idealized as the “backbone of all policing, the first at scenes of crime, responsive to any incidents, ever ready and ever available” (McConville and Shepherd 1992:190, see also Wycoff 1988) by the public and the police, not to be restricted or compromised under any circumstances. While most ‘community policing’ efforts were originally thought out to be as relief to emergency response policing operations in that they would “supplant conventional relief policing...by officers with whole-division responsibility” (Fielding 1994:305), the ‘relief function’ provided by ‘community policing’ in 99 Division assumed a fundamentally different role and reality.

The CRU office in terms of staff and resources in many instances functioned as the primary officer and resource ‘backup pool’ for conventional units within the division, primarily the Emergency Response and the Criminal Investigations Bureau (CIB). For these units, the CRU and its resources were frequently used to compensate for short-staffing problems, resource support, or special operational needs that required additional officers. This “tendency for community constables to be taken off their beats to fulfill other commitments” has been observed by others (Fielding 1994:306). During the observation research period, a couple of homicides occurred in and were investigated by the division. In both cases, the CIB instantly pulled up to 6 or 8 officers out of the CRU into their investigation teams, many of them for a period of a couple of months or more. These secondments happened with very short notice, no replacements were
provided for the ‘community officers’ assigned CRU areas and tasks, and the local neighborhoods affected by the secondment of ‘their’ officers found out only after the fact.

In many other instances, the CRU staff was used to fill up staffing holes that had broken up in the ER platoons, reducing their personnel strength below numbers required as minimum standards. In such instances, the necessary numbers of officers, usually at parade and without advance warning, were pulled from the corresponding CRU into the ER platoons. With a CRU platoon strength of 6 or 7 officers on paper, which in practice would consistently be reduced by at least 2 officers due to various forms of leave or absence of officers, these additional deductions had significant further negative impacts on the number of CRU officers out there engaging in ‘community policing’ work. In some instances, and in particular on weekends or holidays, due to this peculiar ‘relief’ function of the CRU to other divisional units, the CRU was in practice completely eliminated, with its ‘on duty’ officers all working in other functions. These practical dynamics and constraints imposed by traditional divisional functions on ‘community policing’ structures and resources in the research site underline and illustrate the “structural marginality” that has been ascribed to ‘community policing’ initiatives within police organizations (Fielding 1994:321).

The organizational structures and provisions for ‘community policing’ in conjunction with its operational practices in the field also had the effects of stirring up an organizational dynamic in terms of police work priorities, and led at times to considerable organizational tensions within the division. The vast majority of the CRU’s work focused on so-called public order, street crime and nuisance phenomena and problems, primarily in the form of street prostitution, liquor offences, public drunkenness, loitering, as well as small-scale illicit drug dealing (see Chapter 5). These occurrences dominated the CRU officers’ day-to-day work on the street, but they also frequently engaged in longer term, coordinated and investigative ‘projects’ on such matters, e.g. the multi-day observation of a local bar that supposedly was illegitimately selling liquor and catered to street prostitutes. Most of these tasks and mandates traditionally, however, had fallen into the jurisdiction of the division’s ‘plainclothes’ or ‘morality’ unit, specifically designated to cover prostitution and liquor matters on a divisional level. With the emergence of the CRU and its focus on these activities, the ‘Plainclothes’ unit now had an operational competitor within the division, or found there to be a ‘second cock in the hen house’ [CRU sergeant, Fieldnotes].

In many instances, the situations observed and comments made by CRU officers on these
issues of intra-organizational dynamics suggested an actual competition for ‘turf’ between certain units, sparring over authority and jurisdiction with regards to certain operational tasks. Coordination between these units was perceived predominantly to be rather sparse and ineffective by a considerable number of the officer respondents, and a number of occasions were noted on which one unit single-handedly trampled over and practically ‘sabotaged’ an investigative or enforcement game-plan prepared by the other side. For example, a CRU officer team investigating a local bar suspected of facilitating drug trafficking and other illegal activities had observed the place for a few weeks and was gathering evidence to clamp down massively on them on the basis of a variety of offences. In the meantime, the ‘Plainclothes’ unit had supposedly heard of the allegations about illegal occurrences in the bar within their ‘turf’, and raided it one night without any pre-announcements or internal coordination, destroying the air of unobtrusiveness and the investigative plan that the CRU team had set up for its own operations [Fieldnotes].

The majority of CRU officers referred to some sort of considerable ‘tensions’ or counterproductive dynamics between the CRU and other operational units in the division that were influencing their ‘community policing’ work. Only a couple suggested a fully ‘smooth’ coexistence and cooperation with other units. The following quotes from CRU officers representative of the majority’s perspective elaborate on the difficulties and dynamics they perceive, some of which are also triggered by the newly broad and comprehensive nature and mandate of ‘community policing’ work.

*Again, because the CRU is a relatively new concept here, we are still sort of stretching and searching. Because it is change, one of the things that we have looked at is closing down liquor license premises by other than traditional means, like doing liquor license raids. And if you have a unit like the plainclothes unit, whose mandate it is to look after [Liquor Licence] premises, such activities become very threatening. And they don’t see what we are doing really is not infringing on them at all. We are not going to go into the bars, and check for underage drinkers any more than we would normally do. It is just that if it is a concern in our community, we have to address it. And the approach is that my partner and I have taken is that, if they want to get on board, great, if they don’t, that’s fine too. There is historic rivalry between uniform and [the Old Clothes unit], as well as Old Clothes and Plain Clothes. Those spots were seen as privileged positions, and only certain officers could do it, and only certain types of people could do it, and to see uniform officers working in these capacities is a little threatening. It is like, ‘I am the Old Clothes guy, I am the one going in there, what are you doing in your Old Clothes, going in there doing my job’. [C03]*

*There has always been a jealousy gap between the guys in the cars and the guys on the foot. Working in the cars is the most stressful job on the police force, running from call to call. The guys in the cars have to justify every single second of the day, and they see us going off to breakfast or something, they go, ‘oh,
there go the foot guys. Having a two hour breakfast and a workout and then go home?* We don't have to justify every minute, and I am not saying that we should, but we don't have to, because we don't do emergency type stuff, but we deal with the community, with community issues, whether that means we go out and arrest drug dealers, or do something else, but I don't see too much cooperation with other units. We decided to go under cover and do a drug sweep for this area as part of the community strategy to deal with the drug dealers, and caused a flap up in the detective's office. The head of the [Criminal Investigations Bureau] ordered his guys not to help us out with the paperwork, because he did not agree with it, and he thought that his guys, the major crime guys, should be doing this. They saw us invading their turf, big time. They used to call us [the unit commander's] babies, because he is big into community policing, and he put a lot resources into this here very quickly, it upset a lot of people. I haven't really seen any cooperation with other units. We are seen as spoiled and the easy living type of officers, and that somehow backfires institutionally. [C11]

There are definitely rivalries. With community policing, with the mandate that it has been given, which is to use resources of community, and identify the solutions, basically, our mandate is much broader. The flexibility is a lot greater, we've been given a lot more responsibilities. If you think your neighborhood needs policing at specific times, you can change your shift, if you have the right reasons. Because we have been given a little more flexibility in what we do, we can switch into plainclothes, we can do observation, we can run a project basically. These are the domains that have traditionally been reserved for the Plainclothes and the [Major Crime unit].

The officer then moved on to elaborate on these intra-organizational dynamics from his/her perspective as they were featured by the 'bar incident' mentioned above:

As an example, the bar next door, my partner and I want to close it down, because it is a problem spot, a hangout for drug dealers, and the way we want to go about it, is a traditional intelligence gathering, plainclothes way of doing things. We found that when we approached the plainclothes office for some assistance, and some information, because they had been doing something similar in a bar just up the street, we got basically stonewalled. They did not appreciate the fact that we were doing something and going after what they saw as their thing to deal with. Ideally, we would love to say that we can draw on the resources of the division, and that they will give us the resources. A lot of times, however, it totally depends on your personal relations with the individual officer in the other unit. Guys have a tendency to say, this is my area, and this my project, I'm going to do it, and don't step on my turf. It was interesting, as soon as we let people know that we were doing this, within the next week, the other half of the CRU did a project on the building right next to the bar we were targeting, that was even connected in terms of the people to the bar we were looking into. And in hammering that area, what they did was a traditional enforcement module, and it made a short term difference to them, but it made a significant enough difference that we could not continue our project, because the whole scene had been shaken up by our own guys, and we had no idea that they were doing this. The only reason why we found out about it is because we happened to talk to the store owner here next door, who told us about it. So we went and checked it out, and we found out that they had done this. So the left hand not knowing what the right is doing is a problem, and it does not seem to change. [C05]

The interpretation of the situation of rivalries and frictions between the CRU and other divisional units varied starkly among the CRU sergeants. While a couple tried to convey the image
that things may be a bit rough here and there, but that generally the cooperation was great and
effective (as everywhere in the police force), others seemed rather bitter and disillusioned about
such problems at fundamental levels essentially hampering the CRU’s work. The issue of
conflicting mandates, turf conflicts and organizational tensions perceived by some is discussed
further in the following quote from one of the CRU sergeants’ perspective. S/he suggests that the
introduction of ‘community policing’ has not only triggered some superficial tensions within the
police organization, but it also may have much more existential implications for some traditional
parts or functions of public policing since it may eventually render some of them redundant.

On the whole cooperation side of units and such, like between the CRU and Plainclothes, there is a big
jealousy thing happening. You have to understand, community policing affects many different aspect of
this job. We are stepping on a lot of people’s toes within the organization. Many of the CRU sergeants and
officers have CIB experience, and we should know how to do that stuff, and how to prepare a case and do
the paperwork. To dedicate a whole unit to plainclothes functions does not make sense in the age of
community policing. You don’t need that unit anymore. They are basically assigned to the work that is
part of our everyday’s functions. They are redundant, if you wish, and their manpower could give us an
extra man per team. They have the problem that we can deploy up to 16 officers per shift, to do
plainclothes, whatever we want them to do. [S01]

Very much related to these organizational dynamics, and referring to the context of the
‘fragmented’ practical set-up of ‘community policing’ as one separate and contained unit
alongside others in the division, a number of the CRU officers described that they often and in a
variety of ways encountered disapproval, friction, resistance and subtle forms of ‘road blocking’
from staff in the ER or CIB units. These dynamics, in many instances seemed to originate in
perceptions that the CRU officers did not do ‘real police work’, were ‘getting off easy’ due to the
perceived leisure and discretion potential of their work, and were upper management’s popular
and ‘spoiled darlings’. Some CRU officers illustrate these points:

There are certainly some rivalries between the Emergency Response [unit], the guys in the cars doing the
emergency type things and the fellows out there doing the community based policing. Community based
police are doing a lot of meetings, attending a lot of school type kind of stuff. The fellows in the cars, you
know, don’t have the luxury to get out of their cars a lot, you know, and do sometimes a lot of the stuff that
they’d like to do. They’re pretty well ruled by the radio in the car and be available if there is an
emergency. So they can’t stop off for an hour and have a conversation in a restaurant. That choice simply
is not available to them, so there is some friction there and the fact that they see that they, what shall we
say, do the important emergency type of work whereas ours is not such a high priority, as far as
emergency response is concerned. [C01]
I think at this point you are mostly seeing cooperation working one way. For the most part, we will approach them and we will handle problems, for instance just last week, there was an incident just out on parade, about a possible sex offender in [Neighborhood X], and the report had not even come in yet, because the Emergency Response people were tied up and it was late. And I took it upon myself to follow up on that issue. Even before the report came in, I think that is just one incident of CRU members doing that sort of thing, and following through on this sort of thing, whereas normally that is not our sort of responsibility. But I think there is still a resentment on the side of the other officers, because I believe that we are considered to be very important by the divisional management, and I think that some of the other officers have a slightly bitter taste in their mouth over it. I believe that mostly the officers in other units are cooperating, but maybe the rank and file in those offices don't necessarily agree. [C04]

Lately we have experienced quite a bit of friction, especially where the detective's office has been concerned due to the fact that a lot of neighborhood concerns are about dealers, drug dealers and prostitution where we shed our uniform and act as Plainclothes officers, in a Plainclothes manner. And sometimes then they get quite upset and get their backs against the wall, saying that we are taking their jobs more or less. I've had that happening from the CIB. But I think this is only temporary. When they realize that we are not trying to take their jobs or their calls, they'll back off. And all that stuff usually only happens when we are doing their kind of work. It's mostly temporary. With the other units, we work and cooperate quite well. If they are short of units, we'll do their job. For example, when [the Emergency Response unit] is short in teams, we'll fill the cars and do their work. [C08]

Forces of Occupational Culture and Resistance

Police departments have been found to be “notoriously hierarchical and bureaucratic both in practice and in law” and as such fundamentally opposed to and structured against “dramatic organizational change” (Clairmont 1993:97, see Apostle and Stenning 1988). Several studies that have analyzed the effects and pervasiveness of the police's occupational subculture with regards to attempts at organizational change judged its potential as “capable of resisting and ultimately thwarting change efforts” (Greene et al. 1994, Grimshaw and Jefferson 1987, Holdaway 1984). Conclusions to that end have also been presented by Guyot's seminal study on the efforts in a police organization to modify the departmental rank structure (Guyot 1979). As a further example of such dynamics of resistance, it has been argued that the attempted introduction of 'team policing' eventually fell prey to and failed because of resistance from the police occupational subculture (Greene et al. 1994).

While some have suggested with regard to the police's occupational subculture that “the concept of resistance to change is overrated, and is less pervasive than widely assumed” (Weisel and Eck 1994:70), others have judged the police subculture as the single biggest obstacle in police organizational change (Sparrow et al. 1990). Some writers have questioned abstractly whether, in order to accomplish the desired changes towards 'community policing' goals and objectives
within the police, operational or organizational changes should be introduced first, in the expectation that they would create an institutional context capable of creating and maintaining the more fundamental changes desired (Wilkinson and Rosenbaum 1994). Conversely, it has been suggested that due to their particular organizational characteristics, police organizations provide environments not conducive to fundamental, quick and consistent organizational change. A police organization, so Wilkinson and Rosenbaum argue, that is “heavily invested in the professional model of policing - with a centralized, hierarchical and bureaucratized command structure - will have difficulty creating an environment that is conducive to community policing strategies” (1994:124). They argue that these parameters do not necessarily exclude the possibility for change, but “doing so may require the creation of an informal support structure within the organization or a completely isolated unit with its own sets of rules, regulations, and performance standards for some period of time” in order to compensate for the “cultural and organizational forces” working against these processes of change (ibid.).

These difficulties for organizational change efforts in the context of police organizations have led to the proposition that, rather than aiming for “transformational” change, “incremental change” - suggesting a gradual step-by-step process of reform - would constitute a more promising model for such objectives (Seagrave 1996, Egri and Frost 1991). Several studies suggest that a number of parameters may serve as predictors for increased resistance of officers against organizational change towards ‘community policing’ efforts. The “age of officers, length of service, and educational level may play a major role in their support or opposition” towards such reform attempts (Weisel and Eck 1994:68, see Skolnick and Bayley 1988).

The majority of CRU officers interviewed in 99 Division in fact thought that in all of the division, ‘support’ for ‘community policing’ existed with about half of the staff. These data suggest that opposition to ‘community policing’ proved to be considerable in the organization as a whole, and that support is partial and fragmented at best. A number of the CRU officers actually indicated that they themselves had been similarly opposed and held similar negative attitudes about the ‘community policing’ idea until they were - on a temporary or accidental basis - transferred into the CRU unit, where they gradually changed their opinions. Exemplary themes that were cited by the officers as the sources or rationales of resistance or opposition against ‘community policing’ initiatives within the other divisional units were that ‘community policing’ was “not about real police work” but “pancake flipping” or “warm and fuzzy policing” in which
"the community and not the police decide what we do and how we do it" [Field notes].

A couple of CRU officers elaborated on the notions of professional prejudice and resistance that a good number of 'community policing' officers perceived themselves to be exposed to from other parts of the police organizations:

The officers who have more than 20 years on are very hard line against it, and the younger officers are more for [community policing]. So at [99 Division] which is quite young demographically, I'd say it's about 70/30. I think a lot of older officers really don't want civilian input. [They think that] policing is to be done by policemen, and all decisions that have to do with it. They see themselves as an entity of their own, saying 'don't interfere with us, we're gonna do the thing our way, and you, Mr. Citizen, don't tell us what to do'. It's a generational thing. [C07]

A lot of officers are opposed to community policing. A lot of them see this as jabbering and pancake flipping, and they don't think that this is a police officer's role. I don't think so either, going out there and shake everybody's hands and flip hamburger. It's a good idea to go out in the community and build up some respect, but you don't have to go and shake everybody's hands. The best way to get the community's respect is by doing a good police officer's job. I'm sure the community would respect that. A lot of the stuff is just supervisor stuff who think, oh, let's try this, let's try that. I think that a lot of the stuff does not have a place in the police force. I think it is only backed by a small minority of officers. You may see a lot of officers say, oh yeah, I agree with that or I agree with this. But a lot of times, they just won't say it because they don't want to contradict the official line of the force. [C13]

Another CRU officer confirms the hypothesis of the deeply embedded organizational resistance to change in the police division and its officers staff examined. However, s/he also suggests that much of it may be rooted in a deep sense of insecurity and lack of education among non-CRU officers with regards to this 'new thing' of 'community policing' that the force's staff were expected to embrace fast and apparently without much systematic preparation:

People resent change. The same here in the police. A lot of officers have been on for 10, 20 years. When you tell them you are going to change how you do things, right away, people will resist. It is a little bit that they are scared of the unknown. Education is another thing. As I said, until now, I have not been told what community policing is. So it is an education factor. So really, what is community policing, what are we supposed to do, what do they expect of us? What do we do different? And the only thing we do different really is that they have broken things down into different departments, and you are working on things from a certain department. This is the way we are going to do things. A lot of people will tell you that it is not any different than things were done twenty years ago. So in keeping with that, we are not really changing the way we were doing things. We are still going out there answering radio calls and dealing with the call as it happens, so why is it any better if you are not changing the way you are dealing with things? [C14]

However, the elaborations of two CRU sergeants instructively suggest that fundamental
sources of resistance against the alternative modes, operations and goals of ‘community policing’ are deeply entrenched, consistently built up, and systematically reinforced in the occupational culture of police. This perspective presented by the middle management officers suggests that ‘breaking-up the ice’ of opposition against such reforms must be a long-term, broad-scale and systematic effort that clearly needs to be based in the areas of training, management, rewards and performance evaluation. On the other hand, their comments may also imply that superficial and inconsistent initiatives of organizational change are likely in the end to be wasted efforts since they will not accomplish the reforms they set out to achieve.

The resistance to community policing is first of all based in the initial training and introduction to policing. For the most part, up until the early 90s, the traditional training focused on a disproportionate enforcement approach. Underlying to how an officer thinks, to what an officer does, the reward system and structure, the professional satisfaction - the central, core thing is always arrest, apprehension. And that contributes to the mind set. You look at the officers who are adult people working in a policing environment. What is core to their values is that satisfaction through the arrest and the apprehension, and that mind set is created and built up when they first came into the organization. Most of them are not very interested in alternative exposure or a widening of their mindsets. And all of this is confounded by the managerial structure that perpetuates and builds into the reward system the quantitative components of our work. In terms of a good reward for a good arrest, which is to go out and get the bad guys. You get acceptance or rewards, like calls to specialized units, based on your quantitative record, which is enforcement. All this is deeply embedded in how the organization works. We want somebody to go to the hold-up squad because we see that he is a high-end enforcer, which is means in that mind set that he is a high worker and producer. That produces all that organizational mind set, and that is a major barrier. And changing that towards a more community policing mind set will be very difficult and tedious. It will take a long, long time, if it ever happens. [S03]

I don’t think that the resistance against community policing is as large as it used to be. It is like anything else. You get taught to be a policemen, which is about putting bad people away. We are not taught how to be social workers, and a lot of community policing is dealing with the community, doing kind of social work. And a lot of officers resent and resist that. Because they were taught to be police officers. I am a prime example. I was taught to be a police officer. I’ve been arresting and arresting, for years and years. Until I worked in the community. And I realized that there is needs out there. And until you act and work with the, you don’t even know that they are there. Because all you do all your life is see and deal with bad people and you put them away. [S04]

A central argument around ‘community policing’ reform has been that, while the means, ends and objectives of policing may have been said to change, these reform attempts have not managed to significantly change central occupational-cultural values which shape and dominate day-to-day police work. A key example for these fundamental tensions working against reform is that the “arrest/process criterion continues to dominate” (Fielding 1994) the work, value scheme
Performance and ‘quality of work’ issues

‘Community policing’ concepts have set principal goals towards police operations. Essentially related, they have also proposed the establishment of fundamentally new standards and perspectives to assess the quality of ‘community police’ work and the performance of its officers which are supposed to reflect those new operational paradigms. Numerous ‘community policing’ advocates and critics alike have agreed that the traditional arrest and other conventional performance indicators are not conducive but rather counterproductive for organizational, occupational and cultural change. In practice, the concept, nevertheless, has so far unsuccessfully struggled with the dilemma and “difficulty in accounting for its performances by measures as direct as arrests” (Fielding 1994:306, see also Fielding, Kemp and Norris 1989). The traditional occupational value and job evaluation system had made police work performance conveniently ‘countable’ through numbers of arrests, tickets, summonses etc. In this traditional context, evaluation of “members and the organization itself is largely based on quantitative activities such as arrests, parking tags, and clearance rates, with creativity and innovation often unrecognized and unrewarded” (Kelling, Wasserman and Williams 1988). But even more so, the professional police culture centered around ‘arrest’ as the peak, the crowning of ‘good police work’, meaning that a problem or an incident was ‘professionally’ and ‘successfully’ dealt with and concluded by ‘arresting the bad guy’, an act which at the same symbolized that the ‘crime was solved’ and, at least from a police work perspective, the case was ‘closed’.

The majority of the celebrated ‘community policing’ values (e.g. prevention, reducing fear
of crime, community satisfaction, quality of life, etc.) present the enormous organizational difficulty that they are ambiguous, difficult to measure and quantify in principle. This proves even more difficult with regards to the formal officer performance assessment tools available in the organization. Some of the organizational principles of ‘community policing’ even stand in fundamental contrast to traditional occupational police values. As a consequence, effective ‘crime prevention’ or the use of alternative ‘problem solving’ mechanisms other than law enforcement can lead to an actual reduction in arrest numbers. This, in traditional values of course, would indicate a ‘decreased’ quality of police work. In an exemplary way, a study of half a dozen police organizations doing ‘community policing’ initiatives, has pointed out that the “continued emphasis on traditional performance measures (such as arrests) is noteworthy”, and that in these agencies “a reduced emphasis on arrests has not occurred or, at least, community involvement has not supplanted arrests as an evaluation criterion” (Weisel and Eck 1994:66f).

The ‘community policing’ unit in the division under study displayed a deeply embedded commitment to these traditional occupational values among the majority of officers. As well, the field data suggested a strong degree of inconsistency, or a sense of organizational inability or indeterminacy with regard to fundamental changes in occupational processes and structures as they relate to these issues. The large majority of the CRU officers questioned still considered a ‘good pinch’ as the highlight and indicator for ‘good police work’, while there was clearly an unwritten hierarchy with regards to the status and quality of different types of ‘pinches’. Prostitution and cannabis arrests, for example, were seen by most as ‘chicken-shit’ and waste of time tasks, while cases involving larger amounts of crack or cocaine were seen as ‘good arrest’. However, ‘kings’ among ordinary arrests on the local level were ‘gun arrests’ (in form of finding a suspect in possession of an illicit weapon), or to arrest somebody who was sought in connection with a sex or violent crime. Two of the CRU’s officers observed would, after investigating suspected drug dealers, regularly question them as to whether they knew of anybody carrying an illegal gun. At least one of the CRU team supervisors was said to having instructed his officers on a basic ‘minimum number’ of arrests that were expected from them for a given work period [Field notes].

A situation indicative of the prevailing occupational values in the ‘community policing’ context observed around law enforcement and arrests was displayed when one of the CRU teams in its entirety for about one week performed observations on a donut shop which allegedly
functioned as a drug-dealing location. One evening, the team raided the place, and arrested about half a dozen people for drug offences, also seizing some cocaine. While the arrests were processed, the division’s acting staff inspector called into the station and congratulated the team sergeant for the work and the ‘good media coverage’ that he had just seen on TV. The sergeant was quite thrilled about the coverage and the fact that the inspector had seen the report, since it “showed him and the community out there that we are doing good and effective police work, that we are arresting the bad guys and taking them off the streets. We have brought this project to a very successful end” [Field notes].

When CRU officers were asked about the ‘effectiveness’ of local or problem specific police work projects they engaged in - e.g., a ‘community’ group initiative on a street block where drug dealing, loitering and thefts had been a major problem - the predominant indicator for their ‘effectiveness’ would usually be given in the form of references to the numbers of arrests made. A CRU sergeant and one of the officers describe the attitude presented by the majority of the CRU respondents:

Currently, we are focusing on a five week project, a zero tolerance project. We are working as a group, we are swarming the streets, and anything that we see, traffic, disobey lights, crossing, spitting, trespass, any kinds of offenses, we enforce it, zero tolerance. It was done in New York City, very successful. We do that in the whole division, especially in the areas that are full of high crime. We did two arrests, a dozen summonses, and 28 [person identification forms] just this morning, which is very good. We do hooker sweeps, they are successful. We do drug sweeps, they are very successful. Numbers make them successful. The more you get, the more successful the operation is. It is as simple as that. That’s the bottom line. If you go out there and you don’t get any, you would not be successful. That is what makes the success of a project. Numbers. That shows you how good it is. [S04]

[Is our police work] successful? Depends what you call successful. When we are looking at numbers like arrests, seizures of cocaine, we have been very successful, considering the period of time we did it for. Six guys, out for a month, we did 30 arrests and seized over thirty grams of crack cocaine. That’s not bad for six guys, pretty effective, I think. On an overall view - is it successful, is it going to help things? It is going to slow things down a little bit, but just for a short period of time. A lot of these people are still in jail, some of them are back on the street again. You gotta decide what success is. Success - is it the arrests and the seizures, maybe it is not success. I don’t know. [C14]

One of the CRU officers concisely provides his/her occupational world view on the indicators of the quality of his/her own and other officers’ work:

Well, you got your [performance evaluation] reports, with your stats, your arrest numbers, how many...
people you've investigated. That is basically the only way how you are evaluated. I guess anyone who's been around here for long enough sees the amount of people that you arrest, it doesn't take long to figure out who the guys are that are working, and who isn't. [C07]

Generally, however, in explicit discussions on the matter, there seemed to be a broad awareness and agreement among the majority of CRU constables and sergeants that the old performance evaluation system and its quantitative indicators were not appropriate quality indicators for 'community policing' work. There was a sense of a professional vacuum or lack of direction as to what good alternatives would be. This was also reinforced by the fact that the police force up to this point had failed to provide new guidelines or formal mechanisms (in terms of process, forms, etc.) to evaluate the CRU officers' quality of work. The predominant result was that officers seemed to feel pretty much in the dark about what would actually indicate that they are doing 'good work'.

The CRU's middle management, on the other hand, mostly were well aware of the fact that something needed to change in terms of how they evaluated their officers, but they were unclear what it was, what indicators to use, or how to do it. In cases where indicators other than 'numbers' were suggested as performance quality indicators, sergeants and officers alike primarily relied on and referred to 'input from the community' - in itself a fundamentally ambiguous, subjective and unstandardized measure. While no specific data on such officer evaluations was accessible, it must at the time of writing be suspected that CRU officer performance indicator outcomes other than the traditional numbers are likely scattered, subjective and un-systematic, and that the emphasis on the old performance indicators has not been significantly altered. Two sergeants elaborate on these discrepancies between old 'principles' and new 'practices' of performance and quality of work assessment, and the ambiguity and possible contradictions they present:

I evaluate my officers on the basis of feedback from the community. Productivity also. They are not just community officers, they are police officers. They are not working with the community all the time. They are police officers. And as a police officer, I expect them to interview people, stop people, question people, arrest people. And that reflects on their workload. That is all part and parcel of how I evaluate them. A lot of it is feedback from the community though. If I have feedback, like, hey, these guys are great, then I know these guys are working. If I don't hear anything, then I know they are not. I listen to the communities. [S04]

We would be able to assess the quality of work that our community policing officers do a lot better if we
had better support and resources from the division, like we would need a clerk to enter and process data. If they were serious about this assessment stuff, they would give us these tools. We have sheets that we could collect data on community meetings, on community problems that are just sitting there collecting dust, on the basis of which we could go out into the community and say, this is what the problems are, and this is what our resources allow us to do about them. We can’t do that, because we don’t have the means and time. We are all over the bloody place. We are touching many different areas, but we cannot develop them properly because we don’t have the support. So we just have to take the community input at face value, instead of being more analytic about it. [S01]

A larger number of CRU officers expressed considerable uncertainty, skepticism and almost a sense of anxiety with regards to how their performance in the CRU would be evaluated. These sentiments stand in significant contrast to the spirit and direction of the recommendations made by the TCPF’s ‘community policing’ strategic document with regard to “member performance...evaluation and recognition”, where it was mandated that “the performance evaluation system [of community officers] must focus on the achievement” of the goals of neighborhood policing. It must “ensure that the criteria...emphasize teamwork and community problem-solving activities”, and the “rewards and evaluation systems must reinforce the behavior and performance required of officers in the Neighborhood Policing environment” [TCPF 1994:75].

The following statements are exemplary for the majority of the CRU officers’ perceptions around the ambiguity, uncertainty and inconsistency of ‘community policing’ work in the research division under study:

[How they will evaluate the quality of our work] needs to be seen since we have not done an evaluation yet. I think it becomes very subjective, and I can see where this would fall down somewhat in terms of a formal evaluation, because you can’t say, you see, this officer is working tremendously hard, because this officer has 3000 summonses and a billion arrests, conversely, you can’t say that this officer is a slug, because he or she has not written a summons all year. I think at this point it would be pretty beneficial to have your supervisor or whoever it is to buy into your vision on community policing. I assume if we were off, we’d be told, I’m assuming. I don’t know, maybe it is one of those wait and see, maybe you will eventually get this evaluation, and you are told ‘you wasted a year’, and you really don’t deserve to have a job. [C03]

I have not had an evaluation, and I am waiting to see. Historically, our evaluations have been numbers oriented, how many arrest have you made, how many tickets, how many tags. So hopefully has been developed to look at the way the way we are policing the area, because otherwise I am not going to have a very good evaluation. [C04]

I don’t know how they assess what we are doing. I am not aware of anything specific. I don’t know if it is
by speaking to the community, what the community thinks of the officers, how many meetings you go to, I am not sure what they are looking at. But I think they listen a lot to the local activists, who call here every day. They listen to them quite a bit. When they say we’re great, they are happy, when they bitch, they run and the shit runs downhill. [C13]

A couple of constables’ perceptions of the ‘new’ evaluation process point to the suggested nature of the ‘community feedback’ component within performance evaluation mentioned in some of the previous comments. While the practical characteristics of ‘community feedback’ within a local ‘community policing’ setting need to be discussed in more detail below (see Chapter 6, 7 and 9), it seems quite obvious that the feedback is selective and provides for considerable ambivalence in terms of assessing officers’ quality of work in the public realm, and in some instances seems to follow a route of self-fulfilling prophecies about the expected quality of the division’s ‘community policing’ work:

Feedback, feedback from the community. That is how we evaluate ourselves. Our commander is quite a supporter of community policing. And he gets phone calls all the time. And he comes down to us, frequently, 2 or 3 times a week, I know you guys are out there, I know you are doing a good job, this person phoned, that person phoned. So we are constantly reinforcing that we are doing a good job, because people out there know what we are doing, and they tell us. Our sergeants tell us, I went to a meeting, and your names came up again. So, we are on the right track. I never had a negative reply. That’s the feedback we get from the community from our boss, that’s the positive effect we seem to be having. [C10]

To find out how they evaluate us, you better ask the sergeants. I have no idea, really. We have not been told. I think they still mainly look at the [performance evaluation] sheets, which gives your arrest numbers, the tickets, the [person identification form]. They still look at that. If they hear from community members, they take that into consideration. But very selectively. Like I said when I was brought up on the carpet [in response to a community complaint], that’s what upset me about it. I felt I was doing a good job down there, and then there is a guy who is a little bit off his rocker, never explained to me properly what the problem was, and now the boss is coming down on me. That’s not right. I think you’re kind of rated how you do at community meetings, and if the community is happy with what you do. [C11]

The predominant occupational-cultural emphasis on traditional law enforcement work and values was not only indicated in CRU officers’ work profiles and evaluation, but also in internal dynamics within the CRU unit. While a solid majority of the officers conceived of their work around law enforcement and arrests as ‘good police work’, a handful of officers approached and understood their job and tasks rather differently (see Chapter 5). They generally emphasized the interaction with ‘community’ representatives, residents, business owners, etc., and understood ‘problem solving’ as a task and approach that did not necessarily require vigorous and constant
law enforcement, but the possibility to utilize other means to eliminate a problem, as seen from at least one perspective. These CRU officers were in the minority, however, and were often the subject of considerable ridicule, nasty comments and negative peer pressure coming from other CRU officers, e.g. suggesting that they were just ‘running around doing nothing’ and that their activities were a ‘waste of time and resources’ [Field notes]. A CRU constable describes how s/he sees the situation and value of the ‘minority’ officers’ work as deviating from the predominant ‘community police’ work principles and practices:

We got some guys who go out there, and the main reason they are here is the 8 [days on] and 6 [days off shift], the freedom, and because they don’t have to make an arrest, because they basically don’t have to and the numbers don’t mean anything, and they just think if you keep the community somewhat happy, that will do the job. Some of them just go out there, walk up and down the street, and do nothing all day. But then you even got supervisors who say, look at these guys, they are doing a much better job than you are. And here you are, trying to make arrest in the community with people who are absolute dogfuckers, and they are saying the other ones are doing a better job. So that’s kind of frustrating. And you get people who are just so politically motivated, they suck up to every agency or whatever supervisors they have to, and they write these big 20-page reports, put their names on all it, and just trying to use all that as a stepping stone. [C13]

The “20-page report”, this officer was referring to was a document that had been written up by a CRU ‘neighbourhood’ team of two officers that had set up and staffed a ‘community station’ in a public park for a period of a few days in order to deter drug dealers and hookers in the area. After completion of this task, which had been negotiated and prepared with the ‘community’, they wrote a report on the project to the divisional management, outlining the goals, means, and the significance to and perceived effects on the ‘community’ of their efforts. The document, circulating among the CRU officers, triggered cynical, dismissive and ridiculing comments by many of them, one of them stating that

the criminals are laughing themselves silly when they find out how some of our officer do community policing. Sitting at the computer all day, writing fancy, pseudo-academic reports. But do you think these clowns would ever go out and arrest somebody? [Fieldnotes]

New officer and management ideology

‘Community policing’ concepts in general, and the TCPF’s ‘community policing’ model more specifically projected a new type or “breed” of officer for ‘community policing’ frontline work described by a “redefinition and enlargement of their jobs” from a managerial perspective.
The features of the new type of ‘community police’ officer also corresponded to and couched in a new philosophy of frontline officer management in ‘community policing’ settings (Lurigio and Rosenbaum 1994:147). Within this new ideology, the “front-line or neighborhood officer” was projected as “the most important element of the organization” (TCPF 1994:25). This central status of the patrol officer for the accomplishment of ‘community policing’ objectives was to be realized by the philosophical and operational mandate and role of the “constable as the neighborhood problem-solver” who has the authority to use his/her “knowledge, skill, and values to identify problems and work toward their solution”. S/he also has the “autonomy to develop strategies and to make decisions reflecting the desires of the neighborhood and the resources available” (ibid. 25ff) and, “unlike his/her predecessor... to get meaningfully involved in all basic police functions” (Clairmont 1993:93, see also Mercer et al. in: ibid.). The ‘neighborhood officer’ is presented as the central analyst, carrier of knowledge and decision-maker for all matters relevant to policing in his/her local area, a sort of local chief of police within the paradigm of ‘community policing’ in which “police officers are given broader freedom to decide what should be done and how it should be done in the communities - they assume managerial responsibility for the delivery of police services to their areas [since they] are the most familiar with the need and strengths of their communities and thus in the best position [to produce] effective solutions to local problems” (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994:22, see also Moore 1992 and Bayley 1994).

These operational ideals were presented as being in harmony with the managerial objective to “ensure that decisions are made at the lowest appropriate level” (TCPF 1994:26). Such intentions and the implicit organizational re-structuring efforts were celebrated as leading to the overarching goal of “empowerment of front-line officers”, which in Clairmont’s terms involves bringing down operational responsibilities from higher to lowest possible ranks, and reversing the traditional concept of top-down management and command and control systems (TCPF 1994:27, Clairmont 1993, Greene et al. 1994). While the idea of ‘officer empowerment’ appears as another one of the many idolized ‘apple pie’ concepts that are part of the ‘community policing’ idea, it implies a few expected tenets that may be fairly difficult to live up to or accept in police practice. First, “empowerment” of lower ranks in operations and decision-making is, of course, not only invented or promoted to make the lower ranks happier or occupationally more satisfied, but also because it may be cheaper, leaner and more cost-effective to have, for example, constables do what would traditionally be a sergeant’s job, or to eliminate the supervisory ‘need’ or function.
altogether because the ‘responsibilized officer’ is now expected to handle tasks all by him/herself. Second, and related to this point, a working form of lower rank ‘empowerment’, of course, also requires that the front-line officer is actually given the skills, resources and support that are needed to fulfill the responsibilized, discretionary and self-sufficient function that s/he is expected to do. If these basics or tools are not made available, an ‘empowered’ officer can not make much use of his/her new mandate and autonomy. To the contrary, the as yet fairly hollow ‘empowerment’ proposition may even backfire in cases where the frontline officer does not perform better or more satisfactorily, despite the promise of ‘empowerment’, for example due to a lack of support or resources for the expected tasks or functions s/he is expected to fulfill.

In the TCPF ‘community policing’ model, the ideal of ‘empowerment’ on the officer’s side was to be translated into the concept of “participatory management” by supervisors on the other side of the operational equation. Within this framework, ideally, the frontline ‘community police’ officer identifies a policing problem, devises an appropriate solution and implements these steps self-sufficiently and responsibly while keeping the supervisor duly abreast, as opposed to having all these steps hierarchically imposed on him/her through instructions from the supervisor figure (Kelling and Moore 1988, Lurigio and Rosenbaum 1994). Participatory management was thus projected as the “key means by which empowerment can occur” in that “employees should have input into decisions about their work”. In this context, it was expected that “supervisors should no longer need to guide and direct patrol officers’ every movement: supervisors should be facilitators, mentors, motivators, and ensure that necessary resources are available” (TCPF 1994:28).

In 99 division’s CRU, ‘participatory management’ largely assumed the day-to-day reality that the supervising sergeants gave their officers considerable freedom with respect to what they did during their regular assignment periods on the beat, as long as certain expectations from the ‘community stakeholders’ were met with respect to the CRU’s police work. These referred primarily to the expectation on the side of the police that the ‘community’ would realize that “the officers are out there”, and that complaints that had been brought to the attention of the CRU by ‘community stakeholders’ were looked into in some way or another. Goldstein’s request that “improvements... in the management” of frontline officers within ‘community policing’ should be driven by “direct concern with the outcome of policing” (1979:236) in this research context seemed to limit itself to the expected regular presence of the CRU officers in their assigned
'neighbourhood' spaces. The CRU's primary outcome concern seemed to be the overall objective of communicating to the 'community' public that the police are 'there', and working on 'community policing' issues and tasks that were identified as concerns by local stakeholders.

There was a general expectation across the board in the CRU that the teams would go and spend a minimum part of their shift's time in their assigned 'neighbourhood' area. However, the CRU sergeants - with the exceptions noted above - would usually not instruct their teams specifically what to do there. In cases of specific problems or projects in local areas (i.e. a persistent 'drug dealing hotspot'), the CRU officers would usually initiate smaller steps or interventions themselves, but check less ordinary or larger initiatives (e.g., longer term observation, the involvement of other teams for a concerted 'take down', etc.) with the supervisors to get their input or blessing. Most of the CRU officers, however, suggested that they had almost 'absolute freedom' with regard to the 'community police' work they did day-to-day in their areas.

The following officer quotes describe how the majority of them perceived the management of themselves and their work by their direct supervisors in the CRU:

_We are almost given a carte blanche in deciding what we are doing, and how we do it. As long as we are not fooling around, not being productive, wasting our time. As long as we see that we are beneficial to the area, to the community, they'll go with it. There is no explicit mandate or instructions. Really, unless they received a complaint or instructions from the community leaders, yes, we want you to attend this meeting or work on this problem, but besides that, we basically just go out there being visible and do what we got to do._ [C08]

_Not much in terms of instructions. I guess because he knows that we have been in our area for quite some time now. He likes us to keep him updated with respect to what is going on. And to what we are working on and what the problems are. It is pretty free wheeling. Unless we need something or need a resource, need him to help us in some way, we pretty much go out and do our own thing. There is no expectation in terms of numbers. Obviously, you gotta be doing something. With our performance sheets, there gotta be some numbers at the end of the cycle. Especially in this division, it is impossible to work down here for 18 days out of the month and not speak to one person and not see one criminal, it is just impossible. You've got to have something at the end of the month. And to me, that is just common sense. You gotta have, even when it is not too busy out there, there is always something out there._ [C09]

_Management got a little bit softer about managing us. Right now, you as the officer determine what the problems are in your area, and what to do about them. If you got a big enough head on your shoulders, you can figure that out yourself. Do whatever it takes. If it takes to go in plainclothes and attack the problem, do that. It gives you a free reign on what to do, and that is good. On prostitution, for example. I think they have given the officer more leeway in deciding what to do about certain problems. If it does not work, try something else. If plan A fails, try plan B. And I've generally received good support._ [C14]
However, a smaller number of the officers perceived the 'freedom' and 'do-as-you-like' management practices they saw themselves exposed to somewhat more problematically and skeptically. Most of them were suggesting that the large amount of 'freedom' given to them for their 'community police' work originated principally in a lack of systematic direction or a big plan for 'community police' work operations and its management on the side of their supervisors, and that the managerial follow-through in terms of resources and commitment to special initiatives was burdened with severe limitations:

*Leadership and management - this is where it gets problematic, this is where it falls down. Because there seems to be a lack of cohesion among the supervisors, in terms of their expectations. Our supervisor seems to be fairly on top of what community policing is, while he is fairly fragmented with other projects and objectives that he has in mind. For example, there is a supervisor who is in charge of the [X community] - I've never spoken to him about the [X community], he's never spoken to me. I would think that as the supervisor in charge of that, he would like to talk to me and find out what we are doing. And I think that there is a real lack of leadership. Now in our case, that's not really an issue, because my partner and I pretty much know what we are doing, so we look at leadership as a possible encouragement to what we are doing, because it is just somebody else that we would have to explain it to. But it is mostly unclear what the specific expectations are, we sort of set our own objectives and goals, and we just move along in our own little world. [C03]*

The [X neighbourhood group] has a lot of problems, prostitutes and drug dealers in [X Park]. The head of the group kept asking or kept telling me that previously that they had the community station in H Park, and that the police performed spot checks on [Y Street], which had really helped. And I agreed with that. So I told him that I would do my best to get the van and get spot checks done. So I mentioned it to my supervisors, and nothing happened. I was frustrated at every turn in trying to get the community van, and the spot checks. It's just rhetoric from the top down. They say, [Officer Alpha] is now the officer in charge in your neighbourhood, he's responsible for taking care in the area, whatever he needs to do that, we'll get it for him. It's our job to make that available. Well, that's what I started doing, started asking for the van and the spot checks, and nothing ever happened. So the [X neighbourhood group] was getting more and more upset, because nothing moved. But I was on the hook, because they kept coming to me. Where is the van, where are the checks? And I tried to explain with limited manpower and stuff, and finally, they went right to deputy chief and complained about it. [C11]

*I think they don't really know what they want us to do. They don't know - that is the thing. If you ask them, you are the sergeant, you tell us what you want us to do. Oh no, you go out there, and you go and problem solve and stuff. There are some good articles out there, go and read 'The Broken Window', etcetera. So I find that so frustrating. I just don't agree with it. I think community policing is a good concept with good aspects, and it could be implemented in a certain way. But I still think you have to focus on what the problems and the solutions are, and arrests are core to that. Especially in this division. The main thing is drugs out here, and the community is complaining about them and wants people arrested. So that's what we should do. I think that is what the community wants us to do anyways. [...] I've had problems for making too many arrests. They said, arrest is not the only thing. You should go into schools, more meetings, find other solutions instead of arrests, and if you ask them, what are they, they go, oh, there are these articles, you should read these articles. Well, you are the supervisor, you should be able to tell me what to do. You*
know what the problems are, you should know what the better solutions are. How am I going to figure it out if you can’t? [C13]

The CRU sergeants in their supervisory positions, conversely, across the board confirmed a ‘laissez faire’ approach to the management of their front-line officers management, at least in day-to-day operations which they noted were markedly different from what patrol officer supervision looked like under the traditional regime and its rules. Most of the sergeants seemed to be fairly relieved about the fact that the broad ‘community policing’ mandate and its structural framework allowed them to send out their officers with the broadly general mandate ‘to do community police work’, without having to give them precise and constant instructions.

I allow my guys a lot of freedom, they are grown men and women. I try to let them come up with their own initiatives and problem solving approaches, and I’ll be there as a form of support and back them up, whether it is a good plan or a bad plan, we try to encourage them to create different remedies, for solving the different problems. And again, that has not happened in years. It has always been the sergeant who told the constables that this is what you are going to do, this is how you are going to do it. It allows them to think for themselves, it allows them to come up with different ideas, and it allows them to build self-confidence in them, putting their own plans together, whether they are going to work or not, and I see my position in there to giving them the support and the resources to accomplish what they have decided. I am out there supervising, but not looking over their shoulders, just allowing to do their jobs. We are dealing with a different breed of policemen too, a different breed of police officer. [S02]

The officer in the squad car is managed very differently than the officers here in our CRU. The officer’s job in the squad car is a completely different function, it is a reactive function, they are responding to crises. They don’t have the luxury to pick and choose where they go and to work towards and arrive at resolutions to community problems in a semi-controlled atmosphere. The cars is primarily high pressure, high end crises, while the CRU officers are given relatively complete autonomy to what they do. The criteria I have is that as long as their work coincides with the mandate of the CRU, I want to see them working on community concerns, I want them to work towards resolutions, and I want them to understand the concepts of long-term, short-term resolutions, all these different initiatives. The limitations that I put on them is, because all this is so much in the early stages, I have to be directly involved in the process. I don’t want them to work in complete isolation and then resolve something without me knowing. [S03]

I give my officers a lot of leeway. They are police officers, they are responsible for what they do. I want them to act on their own. They are grown men and women, they don’t need to be led around. They should know what they are doing. I sit back and wait. And if they do screw up, or if they don’t screw up, I go and praise them. That’s what community policing is, those officers are in charge of their communities. I want them to work their communities. [S04]

Staffing, selection and training

A strong argument made by policing analysts suggest that in order to achieve the sort of
reform striven for with ‘community policing’ initiatives, a sensible selection of officers must occur, and - especially in the light of the occupational culture issues discussed above - specific and effective training must be provided to the officers working in these functions (Bittner 1985, Goldstein 1979, Kelling and Moore 1988).

The assignment of officers to the CRU within the division under study occurred through a number of selective steps. Officers of constable rank working in other divisional functions interested in a CRU assignment were required to put in an application, and when considered as generally eligible and qualified for the CRU function, they were interviewed and eventually selected by the CRU sergeants. The ‘selection’ process of CRU officers from the general pool of constables in other functions may have been an additional factor in creating the sense of the CRU being some sort of ‘elite’ or isolated unit among equals, although no systematic data on this issue were collected. The majority of CRU officers interviewed about the selection process suggested that the sergeants were primarily looking for and screening candidates for their ability to communicate, to be a people person who likes dealing with people in the community, to have some interest in issues of local concern, and to have some basic sense and ability to independently analyze problems and come up with solutions [Interview data]. In fact, with a few exceptions, the officers in the CRU appeared to show a basic interest in the local matters they were dealing with in their work. The majority of them did seem to feel fairly comfortable with the substantial ‘communication’ and public exposure role and tasks expected of them, including numerous and constant ‘problem’ requests, calls, meetings with residents, business etc., as well as presentations, talks, information sessions, etc., at local meetings.

While the TCPF’s ‘community policing’ planning document itself argued that the “essential competencies” expected from ‘community policing’ officers required that “sufficient ongoing training be provided to community response constables...so that they have adequate tools and information to carry out” ‘community policing strategies’ (1994:74), there was hardly any evidence of the CRU officers being systematically or specifically prepared, trained or educated for the special function they were assigned to. This void has been identified in other police organizations aiming for ‘community policing’ reform (Fielding 1994). Rather, the abilities and skills of the constables in the ‘neighborhood officer’ functions seemed to be expected to evolve and mature as a mix of ‘natural talent’ for certain things (i.e., communications), general ‘on the job’ skills and experience, and a ‘learn as you go’ approach. The majority of CRU officers, in fact,
pointed out that they believed that 'community policing' officers needed to have a special set of skills that distinguished them from other patrol officers. However, in sharp contrast to the suggested credo that turning front-line officers into "creative problem-solvers [with the] necessary skills and motivation will require radically different training programs" (Wilkinson and Rosenbaum 1994:110), most of the CRU officers indicated that they did indeed perceive a general lack of training for these qualities. Generally, most of them suggested that they either brought the necessary 'talents' required for the CRU job with them, or acquired or refined these skills in practical settings and scenarios elsewhere in- or outside the job. On the basis of the rationale that the CRU officer is more or less responsible him/herself to bring or acquire the skills necessary for the CRU job, most officers also rejected the idea of the CRU being a good placement of position for young officers or even recruits to start their frontline career. To the contrary, most of them believed that the CRU job required mature and well-seasoned officers in order to master its challenges and tasks (see Bayley 1994).

The following comments represent the majority view among CRU officers interviewed on this issue:

*There is absolutely nothing to help you develop these specific skills that are necessary for our line of work, if it's not for you. There is nothing out there that the force has that I know of that can help you. Either you bring and have the abilities and talents that are needed here, or you don't. If you don't, you're going to find that out the painful way within the first few months down here in the CRU, and you ought to leave and go back to the ER, then it's not for you, basically. [C08]*

*I don't know if we have any special skills. Most of the time it's just by the seat of your pants policing, which is the best way of policing in most cases anyway. I think you can take courses until you have it coming out of your yin-yang, and it's not working. Either you have the ability to go out there and talk to people and do your job, or you don't. I've taken so many courses, but in the end you still have to be able to go out and do your work. If we would send recruits out on the streets like we used to, they'd be lost. They would not have a clue. The way we did it before was that we threw them right out to the wolves, and you'd walk out there and think, oh god, where do I hide, but now, there is a lot more pressure to be able to solve things. For a young officer out there today, even with 2 or 3 years experience, I think they'd be in a lot of trouble. You have to have a lot of experience. Before you do CRU, you should have at least 5 or 6 years uniform. [C10]*

*We are not really trained. We are modified. There is certain basic training, like, you are trained to shoot a gun. But by and large, it is a hit-and-miss. It's more like either you have the talent to do that job or you don't. It's like so many things, like to go on the drug squad, some people have the talent, and some don't. And if you are identified as having such a talent, or you are perceived to have such a talent, if you are lucky, then you are put into positions where you can further develop these talents. A lot of times the way the police service works, you learn the things that you need on the job, and some people take the*
The majority of CRU officers agreed that consistency and a longer-term commitment to a local area was an important pre-condition to make their ‘community policing’ activities work. It was predominantly confirmed that it would take a minimum of one year to really get to know a ‘neighborhood’ area, its relevant profile, policing determinants and factors, as well as the people (who were usually divided into two groups - ‘law-abiding, decent citizens’ and ‘the criminal element’). Most of the officers also suggested that a minimum of a two year assignment to an area was needed in order to be able to translate the knowledge built up about a local area into adequate and effective ‘community policing’ work there.

In contrast to the emphasis on basic consistency with regard to their work area in order to do ‘good community police’ work expressed by CRU officers, Fielding describes the prevalent high prevalence of internal and external transfers in and out of the respective units observed elsewhere as an “aggravating problem” to ‘community policing’ (1994:312). While the TCPF recommended a minimum of one year “for assignment to community response” (1994:76), the commander of the division under study generally promised that neighborhoods would have ‘their own officers’ for a period of two years in order to fully exploit the benefits of their assignment there. However, that promise could in practice only be fulfilled in the most limited number of cases. The officer staff in the CRU displayed a very high staff turnover rate that seemed to be strongly at odds with the emphasized principles of staffing consistency in ‘community policing’ contexts as expressed by the force’s planning document as well as by the commander’s promises. Within about 5 months after the conclusion of the field research in the CRU, approximately half the staff that had been there during the research phase had already left the unit again for a variety of reasons. The majority of the officers who actually had been part of the CRU for a period of one or two years had changed their assigned ‘neighborhood’ areas a couple of times, moving from one beat to another, for reasons including things like that their partner had left the CRU, that they did not get along with their ‘community’, that they needed a change of scenery, etc. Only a couple of CRU officer teams in the research division had actually consistently policed their assigned ‘neighborhood’ for the proclaimed ‘minimum period’ of approximately two years. This suggests that while the principles and expectations of ‘community policing’ in theory emphasize consistency and commitment of officers to local spaces and issues, the institutional and staffing
realities of this large urban police department, as established in the research site, appear to render this a practical impossibility.

Officer motivation and satisfaction

It has widely been expected that through its proposed reforms to police work, the responsibilization and diversification of its frontline officers, and its new management practices, ‘community policing’ would make for positive effects on officers’ professional motivation as well as satisfaction (Fielding 1994, Wilkinson and Rosenbaum 1994, Goldstein 1990). These occupational parameters stand in general congruence with initiatives and objectives in late modern industrial (mass) production sectors in, in which fragmentation of professional routines, specialization and the lack of satisfaction from the ‘whole product’ had led to lack of motivation, work quality and high absenteeism among workers. These wide-spread deficiencies were recognized as having very negative effects on quality and economics of scale in industrial production, and subsequently triggered dramatic changes towards concepts like ‘team production’ in which teams of workers would carry out the assembly of a complete car rather than just adding one little piece on an assembly line (e.g., Kettl 1997, Champy 1995). Along very similar lines, ‘community policing’ intended to enhance the ‘quality of working life’ of its officers in terms of motivation, commitment and job satisfaction as particularly triggered by “job variety and enrichment and participatory decision-making” (Clairmont 1993:97, see Rinehart 1986).

It was instructive to see that a large number of the CRU officers felt rather ambivalent about the CRU assignment before they arrived there, and the reasons and rationales for starting this assignment in the first place were mixed. With many, the prevailing approach was that they saw the CRU as an opportunity for an escape from police work they were unhappy with, or they wanted to ‘check out’ what ‘community police’ work was like. In many instances, the primary motivation for coming to or deciding to ‘test out’ the CRU work was not that they found ‘community policing’ work so attractive per se but largely that they were dissatisfied, frustrated and exhausted from their work in the Emergency Response cars where most of them worked prior to their CRU placement. There, a sort of police work ‘assembly line syndrome’ seemed prevalent, with officers becoming desperate for occupational change in a variety of ways, some of which ‘community police’ work appeared to offer. In particular, many of the CRU officers underlined that in Emergency Response, they were not able to decide, shape and pace their work in terms of
priorities, approaches and independent decision-making. There was, however, a strong sense among the officers that in the CRU context, it was not so much the work controlling and regimenting the ‘worker’ or patrol officer (primarily through the schedule imposed by the radio as well as supervision in the Emergency Response function), but that the ‘worker’ was again more in control of his/her work.

Another point underlined was the fact that the CRU officers did not feel as strong a sense of alienation from their police work tasks and subjects as had been the case in their ER assignments. Many of them underlined that, in doing ‘community police’ work, they were able to get to know the people and their concerns a little better and more personally, and that there was now more opportunity to follow-up with issues and interventions. Specifically, the officers lauded the fact that they could now also see the outcome or impact of certain police work initiatives that they had launched, and that they were able to get direct feedback from the people that they were working with and for, rather than never seeing them again or not even finding out about the end-result of a radio call.

Some CRU officers elaborate representatively on their perceptions with respect to the improvements in ‘workplace health’ and ‘job quality’ provided by the ‘community police’ job that were shared by most of their colleagues:

*I’ve been in the radio cars for most of the career. I probably like the cars better than the foot, but I needed a change. I was burnt out, getting a little bitter, getting sick and tired of going into emergency situations with my heart pounding all the time. Like I said, in the cars you have to justify every single second, I was tired all the time, so I needed a change. In the foot patrol, you work 8 [days] on, 6 [days] off, and you have no night shift. As a change, I thought great. Get out of the cars, go on the street, and see what is going on in [99 Division], find out who the bad guys are, who the movers and shakers are, so that when I later go back to the cars, and arrest people, I know who they are. And I wanted to meet some of the people in this division. Because all you meet, really, is people who hate you, scream or bleed. And I wanted to meet some of the real people in this division. [C11]*

*I wanted more, with the community policing you have more time to be able to help with the problems, but when you are in the cars, you go and do your call, and that is the end of the call. You go and do another one right away. You don’t have time to follow up on anything. But this way, it’s different, you can start something, and you can follow up until the end. You just get burnt out in the cars, need a change, different pace. But now we can see changes that we make through our work. In that sense it is satisfying. Because people say, wow, there is no hookers around anymore. Just things like that, you see, wow, that had an impact, that is good. [C06]*

One of the officers outlines how s/he utilized the possibilities in the CRU to convert his
job situation from one where s/he was the object of rigorous work regimen to one where s/he felt
s/he was in charge of his/her work.

I joined the CRU for very selfish reasons. I wanted to try and do some investigative policing of my own,
going out there and doing some of my own investigation and not being tied to the radio and do what is
brought on me, but rather bring something on somebody else. I was tired of working in the cars. My
expectations about working in the CRU have been absolutely fulfilled. I would do this kind of work until
the end of my days in the force if they'd let me. [C07]

Other CRU officers underlined the increased human contact aspect of ‘community
policing’ work, as well as the basic human needs of professional gratification and satisfaction that
had been missing in their previous assignments. The vast majority of responses suggested that at
least on a temporary basis, ‘community police’ work gave the CRU officers certain ‘human’ and
‘holistic’ values that had been missing for them in the intensive, demanding and highly structured
work in the ER patrol. Some of the officers referred to CRU work as a sort of ‘occupational spa’
or opportunity for regeneration from the demands and stresses of ER work.

I really like the part of meeting the people. It’s more a one-on-one type of work. It’s more gratifying. You
can actually see that you are helping a community or a person in the community. When you are a squad
car officer, which is a busy job, a hard job, but it’s not self satisfying job, because you just show up at a
call, you don’t know the person, you don’t know the area, and you deal with it, and you drive on to your
next call. It’s just not as gratifying. I noticed it a lot since I joined and gotten to know all the different
neighborhood people. Our work now is appreciated in our particular neighborhood. It is very satisfying.
Especially the type of work that we do down here. There is no quick fix especially to the drug and
prostitution problems down here, it’s more or less all just a bandaid approach to everything. [...] So we’ll
have to see, we’ll hopefully have less numbers to deal with, but it will be nice to see if it did get better long
term. [C09]

If I wanted to be a career constable, and never get promoted, I would want to do CRU work. I think it is
great. I get a lot of satisfaction out of it, I really enjoy the long-term prospects. I enjoy the contact with the
people that I am interacting with, I enjoy the politics involved, and the whole environment. I don’t derive
an enormous sense of pleasure out of kicking doors in, I do ER because it is a job, it is not particularly
satisfying, whereas this, there is sort of small victories in this kind of work. It’s a different stress in this
line of work, because you have more control over your work. In the cars, as I said, you start work, you sit
in the car, you go where you are told. You have no control what you do, what your day is going to be like,
what’s going to happen to you, and that is very disempowering. Whereas in a unit like this, you can plan
things a little better, you can have an idea that, today is a snowstorm out, this is not a good day to walk
around outside, let’s do other stuff. But it’s a different type of stress, because you have to plan things. You
have to prepare for things, like at the end of the day, you can’t go home and say, that’s done, tomorrow is
another day, but we have this lined up, and that lined up, and these people to speak to. It’s a little bit more
responsible with respect to long term growth. [C03]
Some CRU officers, however, also pointed out that the increased level of professional responsibilization, the ‘laissez faire’ management approach and the necessity to seek out work tasks made it necessary that officers actively ‘took charge’. Numerous respondents argued that in order to do ‘good community police’ work, officers needed to bring the necessary motivation to do their work - a situation that was often an unusual one for them in contrast to the radio-driven work styles in the cars where they were predominantly instructed what to do, where to go, and watched while doing so.

*Most important thing is, you have to be self-motivated. You are given a lot of leeway and a lot of opportunity to do nothing if you want, basically. Because you are your own boss. So if you are not self-motivated and enjoy your job and want to make a difference, you’re going to be a total waste, and so will the community policing model. If the officer does not want to do it, and does not have the resources, it’s not going to work.* [C07]

But it was not only that the officers saw potential occupational benefits to themselves from the work in the CRU. Most of them also demonstrated a considerable awareness and expectation that this assignment and experience would be very beneficial for their police career in the long run, and quite a few suggested that this had been one of the factors they considered when they decided to go for a CRU assignment.

*I expect this to be absolutely beneficial for my career in the force. Any officer who is successful in the CRU, in its mandate, writes their own ticket. Right now, it is the biggest and most publicized program, for a lack of a better term, that the police force has going right now. Everybody’s eyes, from headquarters on, are upon the CRU units of the city.* [C04]

While the explicit and primary focus of ‘community policing’ initiatives has been on the suggested operational and functional advantages and potential of the quality of police work and services to the outside, the occupational appeal and potential of ‘community police’ work to front line officers have been neglected with a few notable exceptions (see Rosenbaum and Lurigio 1994). On the other hand, the research data suggest, and other studies confirm, that there is a strong sense of frustration, dissatisfaction and professional burn-out with patrol officers working in Emergency Response functions. While this may not be a primary intention of ‘community policing’ initiatives, there seems to be a basic awareness among police force management that the job contents, work patterns and management styles in ‘community policing’ structures and
settings provide the basis to render officers somewhat happier, more motivated and satisfied, and even healthier in terms of stress, pressure and other holistic occupation health levels. Such a ‘keeping the workers happy’ spillover effect of ‘community policing’ work realities may not be irrelevant in the professional context of the many other pressures and constraints of police work, and thus may not be an irrelevant organizational advantage. That does not necessarily mean that these types of occupational advantages or benefits are necessarily also to the benefit of the social environments or people policed. ‘Community policing’ may give the CRU officer the professional discretion to disregard or de-prioritize a certain local problem that otherwise would have been imposed on him/her through the radio, and make his/her work day happier or easier. But this does not necessarily mean that such a choice on the CRU officer’s part occurs in accordance with the policing ‘needs’ and priorities presented by ‘community’, or provides for better policing or safer streets to the public. The different levels of ‘quality of life’ or ‘satisfaction’ benefits derived from ‘community policing’ - one internal to the police organization and its staff, the other one with the public receiving police services - may, in fact, stand in some basic state of tension or contradiction.
THE WORK OF ‘COMMUNITY POLICE’

‘Community police’ work in theory
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- The ‘community police’ work toolbox
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‘Community police’ work in theory

There has been tremendous ambiguity and often disagreement about what ‘community policing’ is actually supposed to do and look like in practical operations (Skolnick and Bayley 1988). The smallest, albeit abstract common denominator brought forward by its proponents, however, is that ‘community police’ would go differently about ‘doing’ police work, including the general understanding of what police work and its mandate are all about, what its central tools and approaches are, and with what kinds of goals (Trojanowicz and Bucqeroux 1990, Kelling and Moore 1988). There is, interestingly enough, a fundamental gap in the ‘community policing’ literature with respect to what ‘community police’ are actually supposed to do and accomplish in practice in order to meet its more philosophical criteria and objectives. Some analysts have excused this fact on the basis of the claim that “community policing is not an operational program” (Skolnick and Bayley 1988). This void of practical and prescriptive characteristics of ‘community policing’ concepts has also been described as the “utility of ambiguity” phenomenon (Moore 1995:289) according to which there may never be “one best way” towards ‘community policing’ goals (Moore 1992:120). Rather, it is argued and emphasized that all local policing contexts are different and particular, and creativity, discretion and the search for alternatives may produce a wide ambit of possible ‘community police’ work responses to locally given situation that would fit the abstract ‘philosophy’ with practical ‘meaning’.
Nevertheless, a broad analysis of the central claims and assumptions of the ‘community policing’ literature presents a handful of characteristics that seem to inform or shape ‘community policing’ operations in terms of its suggested ‘work’, especially as it is to distinguish itself from ‘traditional’ front-line, general public police work. A good part of these operational reforms aimed for in ‘community police’ practices is a response to what Goldstein almost twenty years ago has lamented as the “means over ends syndrome” (1979:238) of public police work. In a nutshell, he argued that traditional or ‘crime control’ oriented police work was primarily focusing on the given process, procedures and practical parameters, primarily law enforcement - the “means” of its operations. As a result of this preoccupation with process, the police had gradually forgotten to pay attention to the effectiveness, the outcomes, and the efficiency of its work, especially in how it related to its ‘customers’ - the public - and their concerns around crime and safety. Goldstein points to the illustrative quote of a police commentator suggesting that the guiding vision for traditional police work describing these circumstances used to be “Here is a detailed code. Enforce it” rather than “Here is the problem. Deal with it” (1979:242).

Generally, ‘community policing’ reform has been explained with and legitimized by the need and goal to re-prioritize the ends and outcomes of police work in terms of “effectiveness, equity and efficiency” (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:6). Implicit to these calls for operational reform are laments about the fact that the police, over time, had become too concerned with the way they used their considerable and constantly scrutinized powers (coercion, constraints on individual rights and freedoms, access to private information, etc.) - what Brodeur described as the “opposition between internal process and external output” (1994:13) - and needed to get rid of this ‘institutional caution’, and instead refocus on their primary work and mandate. Or, in other words, the “goal of perfecting internal bureaucratic objectives had displaced the proper goals of police, which were to identify and solve the community’s problems” (Mastrofski 1994:3). Through ‘community policing’, the primary goal and objective of public police work at its basics should again become the effective, pragmatic and successful response to “problems” as they related to crime, order and safety, making the means to get to these ends a less emphasized concern (at least in terms of what constraints would apply to them). ‘Community policing’ was to become, literally, “problem-oriented” rather than ‘process-oriented’ policing, “stressing results [over] process” (Goldstein 1990:15), and “operational results” were to become the new credo (Moore 1992:102). Simplistically speaking, it was in the end the fact that the ‘problem’ was dealt
with and not the well-played out ‘process’ through which it was to be approached (with questionable success) that was crucial for the relevance, legitimacy and existence of the police serving the public.

These proposed refocussing efforts of ‘community policing’ were to be translated into the following main guiding beliefs and operational revisions of practical ‘community police’ work.

‘Analytical’ policing

First, it was argued that ‘community police’ work had to become founded on ‘analytical’ conceptualizations and operations of day-to-day police work. Police work analysts suggested that traditional policing had so far only looked at “incidents” or rather the symptoms of crime, “rather than the underlying problems which cause these incidents” (Eck and Spelman 1987:31). The ‘community policing’ perspective invoked the positivistic image that incidents that the police deal with have underlying dynamics, roots and causes, and that these need to be examined and tackled effectively in order to “solve problems” (Goldstein 1987). The celebrated new gospel for successful “problem solving” work focused on the “activity of thought and analysis to understand the problem that lies behind the incidents to which police are summoned” (Moore 1992:120, see Sparrow et al. 1987), not so much being concerned with the “repeated application of tactics or methods” but rather “solutions to local problems” (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:9). It thus “asks officers to use their heads, to look for the underlying dynamics behind […]incidents, rather than to focus on the individual occurrences as isolated events” (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990:8).

Rather than automatically and routinely invoking a standardized response to a police incident, the new tasks and duties at the core of the ‘community police’s’ job become “identifying, studying and solving problems” (Eck and Spelman 1987:48, see Kelling and Moore 1988), and “only after they have invested the time in analyzing the problem... they are expected to diagnose it formally and begin the search for a solution” (Goldstein 1987:17). This emphasis on analysis and diagnosis of “problems” leading to “tailor-made” responses (Goldstein 1990) rather than just invoking standardized intervention procedures, spawned the image of the ‘community police’ officer as the “neighborhood clinician - screening the neighborhood for problems, diagnosing them, analyzing them, treating them, and assessing the results” (Mastrofski 1994:20, also Ericson et al. 1993). In this primary role, the officer is called on to “day after day diagnose the beat area and then develop problem-solving approaches” (Trojanowicz and Carter 1988:19).
The following two aspects relate to a broadening of the police work mandate and operations in a variety of ways under the 'community policing' umbrella, both of which are presented as being of highest significance for the new realities of police work.

Policing as 'proactive', 'preventive' and 'problem solving'

A further key item in the suggested list of operational reorientations of police work is what in 'community policing' terminology has become known as 'proactive policing' or 'prevention', also covering many of the tenets of 'problem-oriented policing'. What is the crucial core focus and emphasis of these operational concepts or umbrellas is that, first of all, they call the police to distance themselves from their traditional reactive mode of operations (Kelling and Moore 1988). Traditional 'crime control' policing, by definition, required an incident ('crime') to occur before the police would reactively initiate a response or any form of intervention; otherwise, it would rely passively on the mechanisms of preventative patrol, primarily building on its deterrence effects (Trojanowicz and Carter 1988). Based on the concession that these procedures were rather ineffective, costly and often considered a waste of valuable police time and other resources, the new mission of the 'community police' called for the addition of a "vital proactive element to the traditional reactive role of the police ... exploring new ways to protect and enhance the lives" of citizens (Trojanowicz and Carter 1988). Comparing the 'community police officer' to the 'general practitioner' within the emphasized "medical model" analogies between principles and perspectives of health care and policing, the "broader proactive role" of health promotion and prevention applied to the 'crime-as-social-disease' model were listed as exemplary reasons why the "prevention of disease" would have to be a necessary and fundamental operational element towards the improvement of the "overall health of society" (ibid. 36f). The emphasis on proactive and preventative work became also very much based in the much celebrated logic presenting that 'crime' as the ultimate threat to "community wellness" could be recognized as the end-result of a gradual evolution of social processes and dynamics, primarily starting with disorder, decay or breakdowns of social control. With crime only being the 'disease symptom', the cause and only effective opportunity to tackle the problem constellation, so the line of argument, was to be found in the underlying or preceding social dynamics of disorder or general erosion of social control. Based on this rationale, proactive and preventive police work visions and measures were presented as the only really promising interventions towards these problem structures.
In this "proactive policing" context, analytically inclined ‘community police’ officers would assume an almost prophetic role and "instead of passively waiting" for calls or crime incidents to occur, they would “anticipate future calls by identifying local crime and disorder problems” (Normandeau and Leighton 1990:44). In fact, the proactive and preventive focus on "criminogenic commodities and situations", focusing on external parameters or factors outside criminal offenders’ rational control, emerged as the new credo of a promising vision for crime control work (Moore 1992:114). Therefore, the logical conclusion within the ‘community policing’ paradigm was that the earlier in this process and the more effective such grounds or potential causes could be identified and tackled, the more effectively would policing efforts be enhancing safety and quality of life (Wilson and Kelling 1982, Skolnick and Bayley 1988, Trojanowicz and Carter 1988).

To many, this approach boiled down to the "common sense" view that "preventing crimes is better than waiting for them to occur" (Moore 1992:112). This, of course, was also associated with the new ‘analytical’ and ‘diagnostic’ thinking and working mode of ‘community policing’, in that, once it was understood what the ‘causes’, ‘origins’ or initial symptoms of a ‘problem’ were the recognition of those in other scenarios or circumstances would allow for an earlier, more effective and efficient intervention. One of the related core objectives was to incorporate civil, non-police resources - ‘community’ - into the work of ‘community policing’ (Kratcoski and Dukes 1995). Their involvement and cooperation was deemed necessary in order to “identify problems, to develop an understanding of the particular circumstances that give rise to them, to craft enduring preventive remedies” (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:9), since the “most effective means of combating crime must involve residents in the proactive interventions and participatory projects aimed at reducing or precluding the opportunity for crime to occur in their neighborhoods” (Rosenbaum 1987:19).

If not fundamentally triggered by it, the attractiveness of the logic to shift from reactive ‘crime control’ work to the operational concepts of ‘proactive’, ‘preventative’ policing was certainly strongly influenced by research findings on the effectiveness of crime control policing conducted between the 1970s and 1980s. The bulk of this research suggested that the hypothesis proposing that the “visible presence of the patrol police [is] preventing crime [was] difficult to sustain” (Ericson 1982:6), and that the suggestion that ‘more of the same’ would lead to higher efficacy was an equally false assumption. The most frequently cited evidence for this claim is
certainly Kelling et al.’s Kansas City random police patrol experiment, which found that increasing preventive patrol had no significant effect on the prevalence of crime incidents in the areas researched (Kelling et al. 1974, see also Kelling et al. 1979). Similarly, the availability of a larger number of emergency response resources (cars etc.) placed in a given police patrol environment, and thus shorter emergency response times, did not appear to have any significant effect on the prevalence of crime incidents and calls for service (Pate et al. 1976, Spelman and Brown 1984, see also Ericson 1982). Further research suggested that even the fastest possible response times to emergency calls led to an arrest or a ‘crime solved’ outcome in only the smallest numbers of cases - far less than 10% (Larson and Cahn 1985).

Reactive patrol officers were also found to have substantial amounts of unused time (Skolnick and Bayley 1988, Eck and Spelman 1987). And finally, the evolving general disillusionment and skepticism over the deterrent as well as rehabilitative potentials, limits and effects of existing criminal justice measures over the past couple of decades led to the situation that the confidence shared in the “professional strategy of policing [built on] operational crime controlling programs [had] eroded” (Moore 1992:112, see also Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990:109ff).

The ‘community police’ work toolbox

‘Community policing’ advocates urged its practitioners not only to refocus the objectives of their police work, but also their instruments and operational tools. More precisely, they argued that a fundamental broadening of the police’s operational toolbox would have to occur in community police work, departing from the traditional view that “the most important responsibility of the police is to control crime and that the most powerful instrument for achieving that objective is to make arrests under the criminal law” (Moore 1992:108). The basic argument was that a focus on disorder and decay, or the fundamentally wider ambit of ‘problems’ or ‘criminogenic situations’ in combination with the objective to strengthen informal and social control mechanisms outside the immediate institutional realm of the police required ‘problemsolving’ mechanisms, devices and instruments outside the criminal law and its enforcement. In other words, ‘community policing’ operations were “asserting up-front that the [community] police job is not simply law enforcement, but dealing with a wide range of community problems, only some of which constitute violations of the law” (Goldstein 1987:16). Advocates of
‘community policing’, however, insisted that law enforcement would not be completely lost through ‘community police’ work, in that “[o]fficers are not precluded from using traditional police methods to solve ... problems, but they are urged to resort to more than just the criminal justice system; to employ instead many different alternatives” (1987:15). Police were called to “engage in a broad search for solutions [by using] alternatives to the criminal justice system” (Eck and Spelman 1987:37) and to add a “variety of ways to control crime that do not rely on the criminal law” (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:10).

Besides the invocation of and referral of tasks to other social, health or non-legal agencies (Goldstein 1979, Eck and Rosenbaum 1994), these “alternatives” were also explicitly called to build on the role and resources of ‘community police’ officers as “informal authority figures, wielding the discreet threat of force to get results” (ibid., also Kelling 1987). They were encouraged to focus on and reinforce the potentials of “informal social controls” rather than formal legal processes to obtain the desired results (Goldstein 1987:10). In fact, the ends-oriented pragmatism of ‘community police’ work seemed to provide full legitimacy for almost all imaginable interventions by its officers. It proclaimed that the ‘community police’ “often find that informal actions may be the most effective and direct way of putting an end to a problem” and that it is “especially desirable that officers have the option ... to choose not to enforce the law if another alternative appears more effective” (Goldstein 1987:22f). Accordingly, albeit vaguely, the TCPF proposes that its ‘community policing’ operational strategy “requires the use of high profile, targeted enforcement strategies for specific types of problems; it requires a wide range of problem-solving activities for other types of problems” (1994:4).

The ‘ends over means syndrome’ of ‘community policing’, it seemed, had replaced the process and rule-centered role of police work through its core task of law enforcement, with the officers’ “imagination and creativity” forming the only limits in working practice (ibid. 17). However, the critical implications for this pragmatic ‘carte blanche’ for ‘community police’ in terms of interventions may not lie in the realm of its efficacy on crime and safety, but rather in the yet much neglected and ‘trampled over’ areas of accountability, due process and control of the police (see Ericson 1982, McBarnet 1981). In a reality of day-to-day operations of policing in which discretionary authority and decision-making, local informalism and non-legal ad-hoc solutions are the prioritized modus operandi, rather than an occasional occurrence outside standardized practice, for the patrol officer fundamental questions remain unanswered: How was
it envisioned that checks and balances on police power and proceedings be conducted, rule violations be established and enforced, and a systematic and standardized 'policing of the police' be possible (Bayley 1988)?

On the other hand, there has always been a "certain ambivalence about the role of the law and of legal values" in the reality and practices of traditional police work (Moore 1992:109) that may, in fact, contribute to the "complex, contradictory and ... confused" nature of the police role in society (Reiner 1992:138). While "professional law enforcement, crime control and criminal apprehension" became the celebrated theoretical grounds of legitimacy as well as operations of the traditional police (Kelling and Moore 1988:11ff) and thus a core element of its mythologized tale (Klockars 1988, Ericson et al. 1993), a more empirically based perspective suggested a different story. The central conclusion of the massive bulk of research on what the (traditional) "police do" actually concludes that "very little of the work patrol officers do has to do with crime" (Bayley 1994:17). This imbalance, however, may be caused by a variety of factors, including the fact that either the incidents to which the police are summoned are not of a criminal nature, or that the police eventually choose to dispose of them in a non-legal, informal or discretionary way.

Actually, a variety of British and American studies suggests that only between 15 and 25% of all calls to the police are about criminal matters (Southgate and Ekblom 1984, Whitaker et al. 1981, for an extensive overview see Reiner 1992:139ff). Moreover, a number of studies have suggested that a majority of the incidents that were reported to the police as crimes were eventually found as being not of criminal nature, or were responded to without resort to the criminal law, even further shrinking the share of actual 'crime control' and 'law enforcement' work in the narrow sense by the police (Bayley 1994, Reiss 1971). Other empirical research suggests that only between 3 and 6% of regular patrol officers' time is "spent on incidents finally defined as 'criminal' [and] officially regarded as a criminal matter" (Ericson 1982:3f, see Reiss 1971). In fact, the share of violent crime or criminal occurrences in general in the total pool of incidents brought to the attention of the police and calling for some sort of intervention is minimal, and trivial incidents "such as minor shoplifting, disturbing the peace, vandalism, minor property theft, and so on" dominate the agenda. Many of these, still, are dealt with authoritatively or informally through the exercise of discretion with or without the enforcement of the criminal law (Bayley 1994; see Goldstein 1979, Skolnick and Bayley 1988): The vast majority of police
work and responses to the total pool of incidents it deals with consists of “restoring order and providing general assistance. ... Police interrupt and pacify situations of potential or ongoing conflict”, and in fact, “most of the time the police do not use the criminal law to restore calm and order” (Bayley 1994:18ff).

As far back as 1964, Banton observed that “the policeman on patrol is primarily a ‘peace officer’ rather than a ‘law officer’. Relatively little time is spent enforcing the law in the sense of arresting offenders; far more is spent ‘keeping the peace’ by supervising the beat and responding to requests for assistance” (in: Reiner 1992:139). Others, of course, have argued that it is the public themselves who “[are] more frequently concerned about non-criminal, non-emergency quality of life problems” (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:8), implying that it may possibly be the police sensitivity to the public’s concerns and priorities after all that may have determined the existing profile of police work. However, these numerous and in-depth empirical accounts of the realities of police work which emerged some time ago did powerfully “challenge the stereotype of the police function ... as consisting primarily of preventing crime and apprehending criminals” (Goldstein 1977:25).

In the US, police officers only make a handful of arrests each per year, while data for Canadian officers suggests that they each encounter on average one criminal offense per week, and make one arrest per month (Pate and Hamilton 1990, Ericson and Shearing 1986). Among patrol officers’ most common responses to reported incidents is to advise, warn, refer elsewhere, or leave without any action at all (Bayley 1986, Shapland and Hobbs 1989, Bayley 1994). The centrality of non-legal interventions, informalism, discretion and alternative measures to law enforcement in police work so passionately advocated by ‘community policing’ operational credos may thus not lead to such a new reality in street policing practices at all. The relevant news may rather be that these sorts of interventions, proceedings and ‘solutions’ are now officially promoted by the police organization and by the overarching philosophy of contemporary new policing concepts.

‘Community policing’ and public order

As mentioned, ‘community policing’ texts have suggested that the key to its success - on the basis of its ‘analytical’ and ‘criminogenic’ beliefs - lies in the broad maintenance of order, and elimination of substantive or symbolic threats to it as the fundamental mandate of police work.
(Skogan 1990, Kelling and Coles 1996, Goldstein 1990). This, however, is not such a new dogma, and may not be so far from what has been empirically known about what police work has traditionally focused on. Some police analysts have suggested for a long time that the core function of the public police has always been the maintenance of order - especially in the areas and territories that are mandated to the public police, namely public spaces. More specifically, it is suggested that the actual history of the modern police, its function and its “main raison d’etre” ultimately needs to be understood as the evolution of a ‘public order’ force (Reiner 1992:144, see also Bittner 1990). From a conflict-structural perspective, it has been argued that the underlying motive behind the ‘invention’ and establishment of the modern police was the control of the lower-class segments of the population - the ‘poor’ and the ‘proletarians’ - in the emerging scheme of “class stratification” of modern society (Parks 1984, Bacon in: ibid.). It was in this context that the police were given their main power and repression instruments for a systematic control of these populations, primarily via vice and vagrancy laws that were particularly aiming at the socio-economic underclasses by “governing private behavior” in public places (ibid.). The early forms of the modern police were “a response not only, or even primarily, to crime per se, but to the possibilities of ... disorder. Not crime and danger but the ‘criminal’ and ‘dangerous classes’ as part of the urban social structure led to the formation of the [modern] police”, with the “maintenance of order” gradually developing as a core specialization and central career elements of the modern police force (Bordua and Reiss 1967:280f).

Thus, within the parameters of these contexts of the core police function as one of governing socio-economically stratified populations, the “primary function of the uniformed police has always been to patrol the petty”. On this socio-functional basis, subsequently, it evolved that the “more police one has the more petty matters will be pursued, especially if organizational procedures are in place to measure and reward that pursuit” (Ericson 1982:6f). In the early half of the 19th century, shortly after the establishment of the new police force, 85% of arrests were made for non-indictable offenses, such as intoxication in public or disturbing the peace (Ignatieff 1978). Parks gives an instructive account of how alcohol prohibition, drug control and prostitution laws and their enforcement evolved over the past century in the US and elsewhere, effectively forming a core preoccupation of the police in terms of their patrol focus, work time and resources spent and people processed (Parks 1984). In fact, still between 1954 and 1956, arrests for drunkenness constituted between 43 and 46 percent of all arrest bookings (Allen
1958). A similar account of the history and evolution of 'vagrancy laws' in North America as instruments to control the poor and the petty is presented (Chambliss and Seidmann 1982, Hagan and Leon 1980). In the evolution and the context of the focus and the use of these vice and order laws, it has been illustratively shown how the police primarily function as a keeper of 'public order' or the "public peace" (Bittner 1967). This order maintenance and restoration function is ambiguously embedded into the police's mandate and functioning as an "omnibus service agency" (Clark and Sykes 1974:462) in which the police officer is conceived and operates as a "philosopher, guide and friend" (Hagan 1985:236). This is especially so because many or even most of the incidents to which the police are summoned in one or more of these roles are situations that involve or concern an issue or a threat to public or social order. In these 'order maintenance' contexts, the patrol officer primarily operates as a "watchman" (Martin 1995, Crank 1994). Within the public police officer's work environment and culture, "few arrests or formal sanctions will be imposed for minor incidents"; the focus is on "undesirables to be removed ... and peace maintained". This approach to patrol policing is common in urban and "middle class communities in which the police job is to protect orderliness against outsiders" (Martin 1995:72).

However, the order maintenance function of the police in practice has traditionally been exercised in terms of the ad-hoc, situational "emergency maintenance of order" and "not the creation of its preconditions" (Reiner 1992:144) or the deeper, underlying or structural causes of disorder or social tensions. In other words: The police are the "social equivalent of the AA or RAC patrolmen, who intervene when things go unpredictably wrong and secure a provisional solution" (Waddington 1983:34).

The further technicalized specialization of police functions, the almost exclusive reliance on reactive car patrol as well as shrinking budgets curtailing marginal and 'non-emergency' functions through the past two decades have made the police turn away from many of their previous disorder concerns and interests in public places, at least in proactive, non-citizen-initiated types of policing. In many urban areas, police forces neither had the organizational interest nor the necessary resources to go out and proactively police public disorder and vice behavior in public places without receiving public complaints. In some urban areas, in fact, these parameters had led to situations of 'de facto' toleration of certain such 'disorderly' or 'viceful' behaviors. For example, in many Canadian urban centers, the enforcement rates for marijuana or other drug possession are dramatically lower than in their surrounding rural jurisdictions (Fischer, under
review), possibly confirming Martin’s claim that “tolerable levels of disorder” are significantly lower in “smaller suburban communities” (1995:72). Similarly, enforcement rates for street prostitution have varied in highly erratic manners across urban Canadian jurisdictions over the past years (Larsen 1995).

But against all these practical-operational developments of urban policing, the emerging ideology and concept of the “new realism” in policing (Matthews 1992:19) has made a fundamental argument and ideological plea for a reversal of these trends. There has been a strong push through ‘community policing’ concepts to re-emphasize the police’s key and core role in controlling and eliminating disorder, and subsequently to responsibilize and activate other social entities in social control functions working against public order phenomena (Wilson and Kelling 1982, Matthews 1992). The central argument is that crime, and all its undesirable side effects - fear of crime being a central one among them - is the end product of criminogenic environments and factors in social context, thus spawned and created by disorder, decay and incivilities, all of which has come to be known as the popular “Broken Windows’ theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982) which ‘revolutionized’ popular “thinking about crime” (Wilson 1986). It suggests that disorder allows, facilitates, invites and thus causes crime as the end point of a criminogenic cycle, and at an early stage the situation and its evolving destructive cyclical effects, supposedly look something like this: “A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children, the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unmarried adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the cornerstore. The merchants asks them to move, they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery, in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off: Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers” (Wilson and Kelling 1982:32). As the necessary consequence, “serious street crime flourishes in areas where disorderly behavior goes unchecked. ... Muggers and robbers, whether professional or opportunistic, believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on the street where potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger, or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place” (Kelling and Coles 1996:20).

It is suggested that, for reasons of their criminogenic-causal properties, urban neighborhood residents are increasingly and fundamentally “preoccupied with issues such as
encampments, public drunkenness, squeegeeing, panhandling, prostitution, and other forms of disorder”, and persistently demand the police to effectively tackle and eliminate them from neighborhood corridors (Kelling and Coles 1996:3, see also Skogan 1990). The promised way to reduce crime and increase safety is thus to “restore order and regain control of streets ... with new police strategies emphasizing order maintenance and crime prevention, and citizen involvement in crime control efforts in concert with police” (ibid. 5ff).

‘Community involvement’ in ‘community policing’

A final core tenet of the operational principles set out for ‘community policing’ is mainly presented under the most common denominator of ‘community involvement’ in ‘community policing’, or the police’s “deeper involvement with the community” (Skolnick and Bayley 1988:8, see Normandeau and Leighton 1990, Kratcoski and Dukes 1995). ‘Community policing’ unambiguously aims to terminate the distanced, uninvolved, isolated, ‘come in, solve the crime, and get out’ approach of the professional policing model (Kelling and Moore 1988). However, the critical question consists of what sort of relationship between ‘community’ and police the ‘community policing’ concept aims to replace this model with, or how the ambiguous proposition of the ‘involvement’ between police and community is to be filled with practical meaning. The literature is full of ambiguity in this respect, and this may have most significant implications for the nature and effects of the wider social dynamics of ‘community policing’ (i.e., Kratcoski and Dukes 1995, Gramckow and Jacoby 1993, Bennett 1995). One perspective on ‘community involvement’ suggests that this ‘involvement’ should materialize in a resource role of the ‘community’ for police and their work. This resource role is proposed to promote “cooperation between citizens and the police”, primarily allowing the police to collect information as the most relevant policing good “through both formal and informal contacts” (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990:11). To the TCPF, in more specific terms, it had become “increasingly clear that [it] cannot solve many crime and public order problems alone”, and it was thus necessary to engage in “partnerships” with “others who have resources to offer, including time, money, expertise, ideas, energy, equipment, and more” (1994:41).

Others present ‘community’ as the central but passive object of policing, with patrol officers’ central task being “to get to know” and to “develop a greater familiarity with the community” in order to do their crime, safety and order work (Skolnick and Bayley 1988:8, see
Goldstein 1987). The police would actively engage in activities that lead the 'community' to reactively realize, experience and learn positive things, like “leaving the citizens feeling safer and more satisfied with their police services” (Eck and Spelman 1987:33). ‘Communities’, in the ‘community policing’ paradigm are presented as social entities in need of the professional, institutional and operational attention, advice and intervention of the police in order to realize their needs for safety, mechanisms for protection, and ability to facilitate effective police work. All of this is to become realized in the police’s new (but seemingly unilateral) “trusting relations with the communities”: “Even more far reaching, police are creating new formal committees and councils to advise them about security needs and operations. ... Their purpose is to mobilize public participation, assess consumer opinion about police services, and communicate information that will help the police carry out their duties more effectively” (Morgan in: ibid. 12).

In the practical frameworks of ‘community policing’ it is the “new responsibility” of the police to “devise appropriate ways of associating the public with law enforcement and the maintenance of order” (Skolnick and Bayley 1988:3). And, on a larger scale, the ‘community police’ officer is projected as the crucial, powerful and active carrier of knowledge, action and decision-making in the role of the “community ombudsman - the person who receives complaints and has the knowledge, contacts and ability to pressure other public and private agencies to provide needed services” (Goldstein 1987:19). Although this is usually presented under the umbrella of the seemingly consensual and utilitarian objective that “the community can play an important role in reducing crime and promoting security”, there is, upon second thought, enormously powerful implications to the claim that “community policing sees the community not only as a means for accomplishing crime control objectives but also as an ends to be pursued” (Moore 1992:123, see Sparrow et al. 1990). It may mean that within ‘community policing’, despite the fact that social development “is not the mandate of the police” (Ericson 1982), they may become active agents not only towards the reproduction but even towards the creation or molding of an evolving or new social or ‘community’ order.

Some proposed ‘community policing’ models ostensibly designed towards “empowering ... members of the community” (TCPF 1994:iv) suggested that ‘community policing’ would solicit the ‘community’ into “effective working partnerships” with the police (Skolnick and Bayley 1988, Moore 1992). Loaded with both ambiguity and hesitation, ‘community’ and police are now “sharing power”. In this “dramatic departure from the past”, the police “agenda is influenced by
the community’s needs and desires, not just the dictates of the department. It provides a quid pro quo [to the community]: If you provide information and assistance, in exchange, you receive an opportunity to have input into the police priorities in your community” (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990:12). The ‘community policing’ literature is laden with references to how civilians, residents and ‘community members’ become ‘partners’, ‘stakeholders’, ‘informers’ in police priority-setting, decision-making and ‘problem-solving’ (Kratcoski and Dukes 1995, Normandeau and Leighton 1990, Bennett 1993, Greene 1993), but there is a confusing absence of clarification as to what extent the police are expected to concede or give up their hegemonical or principal role in these processes, where the power of the police ends and ‘community empowerment’ begins, and who is to watch over the practicalities and balances in this suggested redistribution of power.

For example, Moore points out that “community policing also seeks to make policing more responsive to neighborhood concerns” but subsequently underlines that “none of this is intended to make the police ... subservient to communities and their desires” (1992:123). Goldstein is aware of these implicit tensions and ambiguities and attempts to address these implicit charges of the hollowness and superficiality of the new ‘power balance’ between police and ‘community’. He is, however, not very convincing: In “community policing” the “community... will participate in making some of the important decisions. Some programs that police agencies have initiated operate in only one direction: they seek to engage the community by working with the citizenry and using their eyes and ears, but the agency retains all responsibility for making decisions. Other programs commit themselves to listening to the community and perhaps to consulting with it ... but with ultimate decisions made by the police. In contrast to these models, community policing in other jurisdictions has been advanced primarily as a method of giving citizens greater direct involvement in determining how they are policed. These projects stress the accountability of the police to the community being served” (1987:24f).

Some ‘community policing’ blueprints, in possible contradiction to their predominant emphasis on ‘results’ elsewhere, also suggest a new celebration and focus of process, while de-emphasizing old-fashioned and traditional objectives of crime control, safety and justice by acknowledging that many of its efforts may “do little to control crime. But they are all successful in increasing communication between the police and the public” (Eck and Spelman 1987:34). In an almost infantilizing way, it has been suggested for ‘community policing’ that “[t]he ability of
members of the community to know their ... officers by name is considered a measure of success” (Goldstein 1987:9). In this context, it may sound rather progressive upon first glance when the TCPF suggested that its advocated ‘community involvement’ goal within its model of ‘community policing’ “involves sharing with the public the responsibility for preserving the peace, preventing crime, and improving the quality of life in the community”. And further, “in cooperation [with other agencies] and members of the public, the services provided by the police be reviewed and changes are made as needed, or partnerships be created to set priorities, or deal with them more effectively” (TCPF 1994:22). However, the reader is brought quickly back to reality by one of the central “examples” for such reform, which is the idea of “sub-contracting the supervision and administration of school crossing guards to another organization, with the ultimate responsibility remaining with the police” (ibid.23). Despite the apparent general interest of ‘community policing’ to broaden the police’s mandate in the realm of ‘community health, safety and quality of life’, it is interesting to see that the TCPF then makes a point that seems to run contrary to the omnipresent intention of the police mandate, but again carries an ambiguity of choice remaining with the institution of the police institution: It outlines that “the police cannot carry sole responsibility for non-emergency incidents” and that residents often do not distinguish police work from issues that are currently the responsibility of other agencies, such as noise complaints or health hazards”. It must thus as a basic pre-requisite for ‘community police’ work “[be defined] which services are most appropriately provided by the police and which are not” (TCPF 1994:22).

A clear understanding of the real and practical nature of power dynamics, decision-making, and priority setting between the police and the social stakeholders of ‘community policing’ in its trivial, day-to-day settings and operations is crucial to assess its effects and impacts. This is especially true in order to make any valuable and informed judgments on the dramatic claim that through ‘community policing’ “the interests of the police and the community can be fully harmonized” (Goldstein 1987:10). The core concerns around the pending hypothesis of ‘community involvement’ actually being a means to reinforce and expand the dominant and hegemonial status of the police’s social, organizational and operational position in acting upon ‘community’ is aptly illustrated by Mastrofski with respect to order perceptions and initiatives raised by neighborhood groups. He concludes that the underlying key challenge and real objective for the police is to “channel [these] into a framework palatable to the police. [T]he bulk of communication is from the police to the citizen, explaining and selling prepackaged strategies
devised without the particular neighborhood and its residents' preferences in mind. [T]hey emphasize to do crime prevention, not to stimulate the neighborhood to voice its demands in matters of police business” (Mastrofski 1988:52; see also Lindsay and McGillis, and Schneider in: ibid.).

These concerns about the hidden and potentially expansive institutional hegemony of the police in ‘community police’ processes and work deserves thoughtful attention. This is important in particular when comparing the proposed hegemonical, patriarchal and dominant features of the ‘community police’s’ role with the subordinate and subjectified status and function of the ‘public’, as suggested, for example, in the TCPF recommendations on the reorientation of police activities. There - under the explicit proposition that “real empowerment must be given to the community; their involvement must not be, or appear to be, simply lip service” - it is proposed that “the local police division be made responsible for the development and implementation of working relationships with the community ... as an essential element of effective problem solving. ... The divisional unit commanders be required, in consultation with the divisional community-police liaison committees and/or other community groups, to prioritize and focus the divisions’ community response resources to areas of highest need or to specific community problems” (TCPF 1994:40ff).

It is under these proposed parameters, objectives and outlined features of ambiguity that the practical realities of ‘community police’ work shall be examined.

**The diversity of ‘community police’ work**

The majority of 99 Division's CRU officer staff communicated the impression that there was a definite lack of a clear and coherent definition or vision, a ‘big picture’ of what ‘community policing’ really is, and what it would mean for their work and day-to-day operations. As already indicated in the previous chapter, CRU officers, in particular, felt disillusioned about a lack of directions or guidance from their managers with regards to the operational definition of their new ‘police work’ mandate and goals. The predominant but abstract ‘direction’ or expectation they were firmly aware of was that they were supposed to be doing something ‘new’ and ‘different’, and that they were confronted with different expectations about their police work both from their leaders as well as from their police service ‘customers’. Many of the officers observed and interviewed felt that their CRU leaders did not have a concrete plan or idea of how to fill the new
principles, slogans and promises of ‘community policing’ with practical and operational meaning and directions. As a result, many officers suggested that they, being at the frontline of police work, had to deal with the negative consequences of these voids and discrepancies since they were left without clear guidance and instructions, but had to live up to high expectations and substantial promises of a new ‘kind’ of police work producing ‘new results’.

The following comments of a CRU officer with respect to the basic question of what ‘community policing’ means for ‘community police’ officers and their frontline work illustrate these insecurities, tensions and frustrations:

_I guess what they are trying to tell us, anyway, is that, they want us to go out there, they want us, they get us all divided into teams, and different areas of the division, and have officers work in these areas. They want the officers to go out and speak to stakeholders and people in the community and try and identify the problems going on in the communities. They say they want the officers to try and figure out what the problem is, and find solutions, and working with the communities, and the stakeholder stuff to find remedies for these problems. That's what they say. But a lot of times it seems that they don't know that they don't really know what community policing is themselves. I heard on many occasions from the supervisors or higher-ups, saying community policing is a crock of shit. It should just be the way it used to be. We go out and arrest people, and that's it. It depends a lot on who defines what the problems are. But a lot of problems that you find, you end up going and arrest these people. And in the past, when you've done that, we have supervisors who end up saying, it's not all just about arresting people, we don't want you only to go out there and arrest people. So one minute they tell you are doing a great job, and the next minute it's shit. They think, maybe, well, community policing should be going this way, and if I get my foot in the door, for something, I'll get my name attached to it, and they change it all on you. So you never know, you could be going down one road, and all of a sudden they veer off in a completely different direction. We get such inconsistent messages about it. Big time._ [C13]

On this somewhat ambiguous and unstable conceptual basis as understood by the CRU officers, ‘community police’ work presented itself as highly diverse, rather unstructured and situational business as globally observed in the day-to-day practices with various teams on different days and shifts in 99 division. The forms, procedures and outcomes it assumed seemed to depend on a large number of variables inherent to the CRU officer, the people s/he is dealing with, as well as to a long list of environmental and external factors that the officer in many instances takes into consideration in his or her decision, most of which are usually beyond his or her control.

The practical ‘community policing’ as observed from a universal perspective in 99 division primarily presented itself as a modified version of patrol policing. In its basic approach, it seemed not completely dissimilar to traditional patrol policing by car since the majority of teams - with the
exception that they were either on foot or on bikes - for most of the time ventured out into their patrol areas, and focussed in a patrol style manner on streets, public places, and private or semi-public facilities, establishments and institutions of public attention. In most instances observed, CRU officers, when leaving the station, did not have a specific plan or idea in mind as to what exactly they would do or what would happen in their forthcoming work hours. Rather, ‘community police’ work by most officers was accepted and practised as a sort of ‘situational’ police work in which the officers would let real and practical situations and their momentary environments determine what they would do, what they would spend their time with and how they would handle a situation. CRU officers presented their ‘community police’ work as an extremely multi-faceted and diverse professional activity, which largely consisted of looking, investigating, checking out, information gathering, reacting to situations, information and incidents, and making decisions and taking action as deemed appropriate within these multi-variable contexts. However, what seemed to render ‘community police’ work significantly different from traditional police patrol work was the fact that all these activities happened under an active and constant proclamation and celebration of ‘community policing’ from the officers towards their environments. While traditional police patrol work had kept itself deliberately distant and isolated from its social environments and the people, ‘community police’ work is constantly preoccupied with bringing itself, its message and new professional activities into these social environments, to the people it deals with, and into the spaces it claims via ‘community policing’. In this instance, much of its regular and routine activities, its decisions and outcomes are significantly influenced and shaped by these variables. For example, instead of just patrolling through a public park, CRU officers go into the park and seek to speak to the operations manager or staff in the facility and ‘information gather’ or investigate on the basis of their input or jointly with them. Conversely, their routine ‘checking out’ or investigations of places or suspects concentrates on areas, facilities or people that have been identified or pointed out by ‘community’ information sources or complaints, and thus in many instances take a different direction than they may have done traditionally. Also, it appeared that in their decision-making and action, ‘community police’ are not only interested in the functional outcome of their action, but are very considerate of what impact their action will have on the way they and their work are perceived by the - in their view-relevant people and environments they are dealing with. Upon first glance, these aspects have become significant ‘circumstances’ in which ‘community police’ work decisions on ‘problems’ or
'police matters' are being made.

'Community police' work in practice presents a widely diverse and seemingly unpredictable gambit of decisions, actions and proceedings towards 'problems', 'suspects' or 'crime'. Described very globally, in some instances, the chosen course of action is towards "making crime" (Ericson 1982) and responding to it with formal legal means ('arrest'), in many other instances an alternative, non-formal and/or non-legal way of dealing with and disposing of the matter is chosen.

From the research point of view, the constable staff of 99 Division's CRU - some 25 officers - divided itself into a tripartite scheme of 'working types'. These three CRU basic working types as defined by their distinct features were initially devised on the basis of the field observation data collected, and later independently elaborated on and validated through interview data with the CRU officer sample. They have probably most aptly been described by one CRU officer as the basic categories of "enforcers, floaters, and communicators" [C03].

The working patterns of the 'enforcers' would be characterized by a predominant police work and goal orientation towards law enforcement, e.g. in that they would leave the station with the plan and certainty to 'arrest somebody before and somebody after lunch', in many instances even with an emphasis on a certain kind of offense (often drugs). 'Enforcers' would not spend much time on alternative interventions to law enforcement, and also tended not too get involved with 'community' or communications with the outside or social events, since they usually saw these activities as distracting or disturbing with regards to their 'police work' consisting of 'law enforcement'.

The 'floaters' would predominantly go out on beat patrol without a specific game plane in mind, and then either join into a larger group effort focusing on a larger drug or prostitution project, or just walk around and see 'what is coming up, what we feel like doing, and how it fits into the rest of the day'. They usually would not seem to have a particular preference in terms of the work modes put into practice. They would not be keen on constantly arresting people, but would do it in cases where the situation and its environment seemed to necessitate such action. On the other hand, they would also practice a variety of alternative, non-formal interventions and 'community police' work activities, also largely depending on situational circumstances. 'Floaters', for example, would actively avoid making an arrest that would cut into the pre-planned lunch hour, gym time or group investigation project scheduled for later in the day. In most
instances, their police work and its tasks would be very much opportunity- and situation-driven - ‘problems’, incidents or tasks they ‘run into’ while ‘floating’ in their beats.

As an example, one of the ‘floater’ teams who are described by another CRU officer as “just going out there without a vision or a sense of the greater picture, acting mostly ad-hoc”, on the way to their neighborhood where they intended to investigate some drug dealing complaints, walked by a car that had been stopped in a ‘no parking zone’ on a main street, with the engine idling. One of the officers decides to give the driver a (parking) ticket because he “just does not like when people do that kind of stuff. The car could get stolen so easily”. While he is issuing the ticket, the driver arrives and apologizes profusely, explaining that he was late on delivery, and the officer is about to retract the ticket. In the meantime, the radio room informs the officers that the license plate of the car and the vehicle’s description do not match. The driver, first lying about the circumstances, finally admits that he had taken the license plate from another vehicle, that the vehicle he illegally parked is not licensed, and that he has no insurance on the car. The CRU officers decide to charge the man for all applicable traffic offenses, a total of five. The work involved in processing all these offenses on the spot, including the removal of the vehicle, paperwork, and other logistics, consumes the rest of their work day. They never make it into their original neighborhood destination where they had intended to do patrolling in for most of their shift. [Field notes]

The ‘communicator teams’’ primary objective seems to be going out, bringing and communicating the new ‘community police’ role, mandate and messages to ‘community’ and its ‘stakeholders’, members and representatives. Their core emphasis, in fact, is on ‘communicating’ ‘community police’ and in employing ‘communications’ as the central police tool and intervention in their work. ‘Communicators’ typically seem to consider arrests, law enforcement or other formal legal interventions more as an undue interruption of their main ‘work’ agenda than anything else, and invoke such measures rarely and rather hesitantly. In circumstances of conflict, disorder or ‘crime’, they primarily rely on ‘communication’ as a way to either resolve pending conflicts where possible, or to ‘talk problems away’. As an illustration, one of the ‘communicator teams’ was repeatedly pointed to a bar/restaurant which allegedly allowed some parts of its facility to be used by prostitutes to solicit and service clients. While, presumably, the ‘enforcer teams’ would have set up observation or teamed up with the Plainclothes Unit to do an enforcement sting to deal with the matter, the ‘communicator team’ repeatedly went and talked to
the restaurant owner and manager, asked them to look into the matter, and negotiated with them to advise their staff of the need to prevent such incidents in the future. In the conversation, they mentioned the possibility of eventually using law enforcement “if things don’t improve”, but did not give the impression to the researcher that they were ever seriously considering it. Equally, in encountering prostitutes, their predominant means of handling the situation was to ‘talk’ them into leaving the area, or just to check out their personal data and records without taking any further formal action against them. They also considered ‘community’ meetings or ‘community’ activities - hated and despised as a ‘waste of time’ by many other teams - as an integral and essential part of their ‘community police’ work, since this was predominantly seen “as an opportunity to stay in touch with people, get input on what’s going on and give them some feedback on our work” [Field notes].

From such a general perspective, ‘community police’ frontline work as observed in 99 Division, in its diverse and discretionary work modes and approaches is not significantly different from regular or traditional police patrol work (Bayley 1994, Ericson 1982, Reiss 1971). In fact, one of the CRU constables, when asked what ‘community policing’ looked like in work practice, suggested that “everything the police do can be and is community policing. You just give it a new touch, a new name, emphasize the communications aspect. But in terms of what we do, it is the same kind of work, the same kind of tools, with a few minor differences in appearance and how we communicate around it” [Field notes]. Nevertheless, the reality of ‘community police’ work, as defined by the comprehensive list of tasks to be fulfilled by CRU officers while on duty, for a considerable part consists of activities and things that systematically prevent the officer from what s/he - at least in the much proclaimed theory of ‘community police’ work - is celebrated and expected to do: Being in the ‘community’, ‘patrolling the beat’ and ‘preventing and solving problems’.

It is instructive to see how many of the CRU officer teams’ work observed resembles the “typical day” of such a ‘community police’ officer in an “ethnically mixed working class neighborhood of a major U.S. city”, as described by Bayley (1994:148ff). The predominant characteristics of the officer’s work agenda as presented are that most of his police work activities are tasks that are self-initiated or ‘coincidentally’ encountered, fall predominantly into the realm of ‘social’ contacts or inquiries, deal with a few public nuisance and disorder ‘problems’, and that he primarily uses regulatory law or other public administration resources (i.e., works or health

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department) rather than law enforcement as his central techniques of intervention (ibid.). The ‘community police’ officer described in Bayley’s case study clearly and centrally acts as a ‘social’ or ‘community’ rather than a ‘law enforcement’ agent. The examples of three summarized work shift itineraries of three different officer teams observed in 99 Division’s CRU instructively describe the basically different ‘working styles’ described above, and should help to further illustrate the points made with regard to the diversity, ambiguity and inconsistency of ‘community police’ work in practice.

Example I: Officers I and U, morning shift.

700hrs - 800hrs: Paperwork at the station, including preparation of court papers, course materials
800hrs: Plan to go out, but I gets a phone call, and then talks to sergeant
825hrs: Leave station on foot; discussion on what matters to attend to. The choice is between meeting with a teacher at an elementary school since some of her kids want to dress up as ‘police officers’ for Halloween, and who called the station asking for officers to talk to the class. Officer U deemed this important for “the police’s responsibility in role-modeling”. The other pending matter is a meeting with a local hospital which has a mental health unit, where the division brings a lot of its mental health cases. In a recent meeting, the division and hospital officials decided that the transfer of patients from police to hospital could be improved, and Officer U decided to follow up on the issue with admission staff at the hospital
900hrs The officers meet over breakfast at a local restaurant with the CRU’s staff sergeant and the traffic sergeant to discuss how traffic enforcement could be effectively incorporated into some local prostitution enforcement initiatives.
1030 - 1200hrs The officers talk to hospital emergency admission staff and managers about issues around the admission of mental health patients by police
1200 - 1215hrs Departure gets delayed because one of the officers goes to use the hospital washroom, and drops a bullet cartridge into the toilet bowl, which needs to be recovered
1230 - 1300hrs Officers arrive at and examine a local park where they plan to set up a community station on the coming weekend for a ‘community presence’ and visibility initiative. They talk to the operations manager of the park facilities about the plans. On the way back to the station, a man with a liquor store bag and an unstable walk crosses the red light right in front of the officers. Officer U stops him and asks him if he is color-blind, and urges him to be careful next time.
1330 -1400hrs The officers have lunch at the station, gather some paperwork, check messages, do phone calls, and get back on the road.

1400-1430hrs Shortly outside the station on a sidewalk, they encounter a mentally disturbed, drunk and screaming man who is about to lose his pants. The officer ask him where he lives and prepare to take him back to his hostel, when a staff member from one of the nearby boarding houses appears and takes over.

1430hrs The officers split up. Officer U proceeds to the elementary school, officer I goes to a press conference on a community safety report that he co-produced. They end their work day.

Example II: Officers M and A, evening shift

1700 - 1800hrs The officers do court and investigation paperwork in the station.

1800hrs Officers leave the station on foot.

1830 - 1900hrs The officers walk by a couple of bars and restaurants at what they call a ‘drug dealing hot-spot’, look in through windows. Also talk to a man that one of the officers arrested a few times before, and ask him if he is “behaving himself” and if he “has any information”. They go to a nearby location of an apartment building whose residents had reported drug dealing and use activity on the premises, and signed a ‘trespass letter’ [an authorization that allows police to enforce provincial trespassing law on private property] with the police. The officers search the outside part of the premises, but do not find anything.

1900-1930hrs The officers go into one of the prominent strip-bars in the neighborhood, to “do liquor license check”. They talk to bouncer, owner, and some of the strippers who seem to know them.

1930 - 2000hrs Not far from the strip bar, the officers enter an apartment building (40 units) which had had some drug dealing going on inside the premises leading to raids and arrests by the drug squad. The officers now have a trespass letter and a key to the building, and go in for a check. On the way out of the building, one of the officers discovers a male sitting in a stairway on the other side of the fence. They suspect he is using or dealing drugs. The officers go to check him out, search him, and complete a 208 [person identification] form on him, and find an empty crack pipe in one of his pockets. The radio check reveals that he has numerous drug convictions. He says that he was waiting for a friend who wanted to sell him crack. He does not know his friend’s name, but that he lives in the building that the officers just searched, and he mentions an
apartment number. Officer M is suspicious of the information provided and tells him “not to bullshit us because we remember faces”, and then sends him away, telling him to “get out of the division”.

2000 - 2045hrs The officers go back into the apartment building and look for the apartment number given to them. They hear a TV inside the apartment, and they think they detect traces of crack on the hallway floor. They knock on the door, but nobody opens. They hide in the stairway for a while, but they decide to pass this matter on to the plainclothes unit.

2045 - 2100hrs The officers go into a couple of local pubs and chat with the owners for a while, and look for obvious cases of minors drinking and other liquor violations.

2100 - 2115hrs They attend to a local resident conveniently on the way to their next destination who has written a letter to the division commander complaining about drug dealers at night on the street. He gives the officers details about times, people and incidents. The officers assure him that they will be looking into the matter, and take some notes.

2115 - 2130hrs The officers go to the local hospital, use the washroom, flirt with the nurses, and make fun of mental health patients (“Do you walk to work or bring your lunch?”).

2130 - 2200hrs The officers go to a local donut store which is claimed to be a drug dealing hot-spot, and have coffee. They meet up with two other CRU officers, who are supposed to go on a ‘neighborhood walk’ with them at 2230hrs.

2200hrs On the way to the neighborhood walk meeting, the four officers encounter three males who they know from the ‘drug scene’. They ask them their reasons for being here on the street at night. They complete 208 forms on all of them. All of them have recent convictions, but one of them is wanted for a pending drug charge. The officers tell the other two “to piss off now and fast, out of the [99 Division] area”, and arrest the third man. The two other officers take him back to the station.

2230 - 2345hrs The officers are on the walkabout with the some 15 people strong ‘neighborhood group’. They walk through streets, parks and alleys, looking for drug dealers, hookers, signs of trouble. Officer A on the way through the park checks out a man who is drinking something out of a concealed bottle, and advises him “not to drink in the park”. Walking up one of the prominent street prostitution strips, the officers see a transvestite hooker getting into a car. Officer A stops the car, checks the owner’s papers, and tells him not to partake in prostitution in the area, and that he would lay a criminal ‘communicating for the purpose of prostitution’ charge
the next time. Then the officer completes a 208 form with the transvestite prostitute, and writes her a ticket for not wearing a seat-belt in the car. He explains later that this is “faster and may be more severe than what she’d get for a communicate charge in court”.

2345 - 0020hrs On the way back to the station, the officers chat with two drug outreach workers, and a few minutes later with a female police officer who poses as a hooker on the side of the street as part of an undercover sting operation. They then see a presumed prostitute getting into a car just up the street, and stop the vehicle. They check the driver’s paper, get the woman out of the car, but only warn and send her and the driver off separately, later elaborating that ‘we could likely not have done anything anyway, and it was getting dinner time’.

0020 - 0100hrs The officers go to a local restaurant for dinner

0100 - 0200hrs At the station, the two officers meet up with the two other officers who had arrested the man previously. They go out for another round of patrol, starting with another ‘liquor license check’ at the strip bar. On the way out of the bar, the officers see three persons in a dark parking lot who they believe to be dealing drugs. They pursue and catch up with them on a street corner. They are two males and one female. One of the males is the guy pulled out of the stairway earlier in the day. The officers complete 208 forms on them, and send them off. The woman appears to be under the influence of drugs, and her 208 information cannot be confirmed by the radio room. The officers search her, and find an empty crack pipe in her sweater. They tell her that they don’t believe the personal information she gave them, and that they would charge her with obstruction of justice if this was not correct. She starts crying, and repeats her personal information over and over again, and provides a phone number of family where this could be confirmed. The officers call in a cruiser to pretend that they are about to arrest her. They even put her into the car to “cook her for a while”. But she sticks to her story, and they eventually send her off telling her to “take a hike out of the division” [it later turns out that she lied and was wanted for a pending charge]. The officers rush to the station in order to end their shift in time.

Example III: Officers D and N (on bikes), morning shift

700hrs The officers leave the station to patrol alleys and lane-ways in the East end of the division (‘while the hookers and dealers are still out there in the early morning hours’)

720hrs The officers encounter three black males who they know from previous encounters in front of a small park that is known as a ‘popular drug dealing area’. They ask the men about
reasons for being there. The officers check the men’s pockets, but do not find anything suspicious. They complete 208 forms on two of the three men, both of whom have criminal records and one of them is awaiting sentencing for drug charges. They send them off and warn them not to be found again by them with drugs.

7.45hrs The officers pass by a fast food establishment in a social housing area known as a drug dealing hotspot, and circle around a few times and then take a close look at a group of people in front of the food store. Then they proceed to two other men standing together. They start completing 208 forms on both of them individually. When they realize that they do not live in the housing project, they tell them that they “are in violation of a trespass law”. All of a sudden, Officer N starts a shuffle with the suspect s/he is investigating, grabs him by the throat, and screams at him to “spit it out”. Officer D runs over and kicks the man repeatedly, until the man spits out a plastic bag with approximately half a dozen ‘dime bags’ of marijuana which he apparently tried to swallow. The officers arrest the man on drug charges and take him to the station.

0800 - 1130hrs The officers process the arrest at the station.

1130 - 1200hrs The officers go out again, and head to a convenience store for lunch. Upon arrival, however, the owner comes out and suggest that he just saw two men doing a drug deal behind the building. The officers check around for a while, but don’t find anything. They then sit down and have their lunch break.

1200 - 1230hrs Just in front of the officer, when bicycling on a main road, two cars have a minor collision when one of them is changing lanes. Both drivers get out and start arguing, and the officers step in but finally convince the drivers to sort out the damage between themselves. They are relieved, since they “hate doing traffic stuff”. Just around the corner, the officers find a courier van parked in the middle of a busy intersection. Officer D is about to write a ticket because “this kind of stuff pisses me off”, when the driver appears and asks him not to because he is leaving instantly.

1230 - 1300hrs The officers get notice on the radio about observation of a drug deal going on in a taxi cab just around the corner. The cab coincidentally stops at a gas station within sight, and the officers rush up. They pull a man from the back seat, handcuff, search and arrest him. They pull a small bag of marijuana out of one of his pockets, and find some crack on the floor of the cab, and arrest him for the possession of the drugs. The officers hand off the man over to a division cruiser
that has pulled up.

1300 - 1400hrs The officers get another radio call for assistance on a larger drug arrest in a nearby park. They rush there on their bikes, where six other officers are about to close in on 4 young males. The men try to run away, but the officers seize them all, trying to prevent them from swallowing drugs by kicking most of them. They find some drugs on one of them, a young man whom they had arrested for drug dealing before. They complete '208' forms on all four men; two of them have criminal records and histories of drug offenses. The officers eventually let everybody go except for the one who was found in possession of the drugs. They arrest him. All officers proceed to the station to process the arrest, which takes them until the end of their work day.

Organizational constraints of 'community police' work

Besides the documented basic variability of 'community police' work patterns, the staffing and resource realities in 99 Division made 'community policing', in terms of practical operations, a fairly un-balanced and sporadic event in most parts of the division. With the research division geographically being divided up into some ten neighborhoods that were assigned 'community police' coverage by at least one CRU team, in terms of theoretical operational constraints these circumstances meant that 'community police' presence, even just on paper, would be the exception rather than the norm in most of these areas. From a different perspective, on any given (24 hr) day, the division’s CRU had approximately 30 neighborhood/time units in which to provide 'community policing'. However, even just within the theoretical limits of resource availability, a maximum of 6 teams were on duty per neighborhood/day. In practice, the CRU’s operating shift schedule at the time of research was divided into a morning (0700 - 1700 hrs) and an evening shift (1700 - 0300hrs), with the division for the remainder of the night being left without any 'community policing' coverage. While about half of the identified neighborhoods in the division would have two teams assigned from the different platoons each so that they would have consistent CRU team coverage every day, other neighborhoods just had one team, or no team at all assigned to them. Since teams would work the '8 on, 6 off'-schedule (meaning in practice that they would be on shift from Thursday to Thursday, and then be off until they report back to work the following Thursday) and alternate their shifts, these neighborhoods policed by one CRU team only would have CRU coverage for one shift week, and then be without any coverage for every other week. In addition, in the shift week that they would have a CRU team
present and on duty, this team would only be assigned to the area either in the morning or in the evening shift. Thus, in operational realities, ‘community police’ does not predominantly present itself as a police function that is consistently and reliably ‘there’ in the ‘neighborhoods’ the division is responsible for (as, for example, is the Emergency Response function) but appears more of an occasional ‘add on’ or ‘complementary’ policing service under conditions heavily constrained by its organizational realities.

A CRU officer refers to this situation and its operational implications from his/her point of view:

The other frustration I have is that the [X area] is probably one of the busiest areas in [99 Division], but there are only 2 officers given to that neighborhood. And ever since I’ve been on the foot patrol, I’ve said that we need more officers to patrol that area. I work 8 [days] on, 6 [days] off. And after 8 days of going up there, and arresting people, dealing with people, letting the criminals know that we are up there, but when we are gone, the criminals are like, hey, no officers around here. So I often requested that we need guys to work the area when we are gone. That never happened. [C11]

These practical parameters of the ‘community police’ work situation examined already clearly impose considerable limitations on when local areas are actually in receipt of ‘community policing’ services, and when not. Already at that stage, they might reinforce the notion that ‘community policing’ is provided as an ‘add-on service’ in addition to ‘emergency response’ and other elementary police services which are provided round the clock, and seven days a week. These observations underline the general ‘add on’ characteristics and organizational parameters of ‘community policing’ resources and efforts described in the Chapter 4. However, these planning and resource based limitations are further aggravated through other practical constraints. In interviews as well as through observation, many of the CRU officers made it clear that they in no way feel obliged to limit their ‘community police’ work in terms of patrol, investigations, special projects, etc., to only the neighborhoods to which they were formally assigned. Some officers said that “we walk through there for a couple of hours and see if things are calm” and then went elsewhere or teamed up with another team, others would prefer to go and work “more exciting” areas than their assigned turf. The officers on bicycles would hardly ever limit themselves to their assigned ‘beats’ but pretty much cover the whole division, or spots that “seem to be in need of our attention”, and come back into their ‘home beats’ only sporadically; with the particular advantage, of course, that they were able to cross through the entire division in 20 minutes or
less. Other CRU teams on foot would be fearful in terms of safety to go into their 'neighborhoods' without at least one extra team coming along, especially at nighttime. In fact, the majority of officers indicated that they spend no more than 20 - 25% of their regular patrol time in 'their' assigned 'neighborhoods' [Fieldnotes]. These practical work issues, obviously, further impact on the type of coverage, and its distribution, in practice provided by the division's 'community policing' efforts to individual local areas and 'neighborhoods'.

But while the actual availability and presence of 'community police' officers for their 'neighborhoods' in the division is substantially limited by organizational and resource parameters, it is further curtailed considerably by additional practical constraints (see also Bayley 1994). As mentioned in the previous chapter, some estimated 25% of a given CRU platoon strength are consistently absent or unavailable from regular, scheduled 'community police' duty due to formal and official leaves or other reasons. There is, however, a reality to regular, day-to-day 'community policing' work that otherwise shapes and further limits the officers' availability for practising the celebrated goals of patrolling the beat, prevention activities and 'problem solving' with the 'community' as implied by the nature of the officers' professional-institutional police environment.

As Table 1 below indicates, the 'community police' officers surveyed in 99 Division, according to their own assessment, from the total time that they actually report for work at the CRU (excluding leaves and other regular absences from the station), spend less than an average of 40% of their work time on 'community patrol' or walking the beat kinds of activities. The CRU officers, on average, indicate that they spend 26% of their work time on paperwork and internal duties (including the administrative duties associated with arrests and other formal investigations). 17% of the officers' time is preoccupied with actual law enforcement and/or arrest proceedings and activities on the street or elsewhere. Some 16% - the smallest of the actual 'community police' work categories explored - is devoted to meetings, contacts or consultations and other 'communications' efforts in the 'community' (the remaining 6% of their time is spent on what is called 'other activities', including errands, repair work, or work-outs, the last of which most officers consider an integral and legitimate element of their work-day).

These work profile data are to the greatest degree confirmed by the CRU sergeants' assessments of the types of categorized activities their platoon officers spend their shift time on, and the distribution of these work categories (see Table 2). The sergeants, on average, see their
officers spending 40% of their work time on patrol, and devoting roughly 20% to arrest activities. Paperwork and internal duties are seen as occupying some 19% of the CRU officers' average workload, while community liaison and contact activities stand at 13%.

TABLE 1: ‘Community Police' Work Profile, CRU Constables’ Own Estimates (in % of total work time; N = 15)

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street Patrol</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrest/Enforcement</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Contacts</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paperwork</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Duties</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Gym,Errands)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2: ‘Community Police’ Work Profile, CRU Sergeants’ Estimates (in % of total work time; N = 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street Patrol</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrest/Enforcement</td>
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<td>9.0</td>
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<td>Community Contacts</td>
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<td>Paperwork</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other (Gym,Errands)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The focus of 'community police' work

The operations and practices of 'community policing' observed in 99 Division's CRU, have fundamentally directed specific, concerted and substantial police attention towards petty street crime, deviance, and, in particular, public disorder phenomena as the core of their operational practices. 'Community police', with considerable vigour have assumed the perspective, mission and operational focus ascribed to them by the 'new realist order policing' framework. 'Community policing' has provided the police the grounds, resources, mission, logic and legitimacy to do 'street order policing'. In fact - spawned and informed by a number of factors that remain to be investigated - the 'community policing' implemented by the division under study observed displayed a strong broad and almost exclusive focus on a particular cluster of problems, all of which fall into the categories of 'public order', 'public peace' and 'public behavior'. More specifically, the largest bulk of the CRU's police work deals with matters and tasks that fall into the domains of illegal drug use and small dealing, prostitution, liquor violations, and, of lesser importance, vagrancy and panhandling.

All of the officers and sergeants surveyed in 99 Division's CRU - with one exception with regard to one item - when asked what the most important 'community police' focus items in their unit were, suggested that these were drugs, prostitution and liquor offences (not necessarily in this priority order). In practice, the great majority of the officers' diverse policing efforts and work time on the street - with the exception of other 'crime' incidents that would incidentally materialize in front of them, or a temporarily imposed focus on different issues as, for example, conducted through a multi-week group project on 'theft prevention' - concentrated on these matters, or rather the people that were actually or seemingly involved in these drug, prostitution or liquor offence phenomena. The CRU officers, generally, understood their job as a modified mode of 'street policing', and conceptualized their mandate as looking for, dealing with and somehow 'eliminating' the street disorder phenomena listed above that they would encounter in ample quantity within their jurisdiction's 'neighborhood' streets, back alleys and other public spaces. Considering these facts and circumstances, 'community policing' has apparently provided the operational basis in terms of focus, work approaches and policing instruments to even more explicitly focus on 'disorder' and 'public peace' issues, behaviors and select concerns which traditionally have been a core element of the public police's work.

An important aspect in understanding the evolution and nature of 'community policing'
models and operations is the concern with and focus on petty crime, nuisances and disorder in public places, and the unique operational flexibility of ‘community policing’ to attend to these matters as its core activity. One of the CRU officers explains how the operational strategy of ‘community policing’ claims to take the genuine ‘community’s’ safety and order concerns into consideration by looking into exactly these ‘street disorder’ phenomena at the core of its practices, and also outlines the new criminogenic logic behind ‘community policing’ as it was shared by most of the other officers:

[Community policing] is having the community identify what they perceive their problems to be. As police officers, we tend to see the big problems, like B&Es, robberies, and what the community say is that they just don’t like the transients, and the street people and the drunks passed out on the street. What we found is that by dealing with the problems on the smaller, or what we call the more insignificant level, like the transients and arresting the drunks instead of letting them roll around until they roll into traffic, we’ve stopped a lot of our crimes, because it is, again, a person who is dropped out in the afternoon, becomes very aggressive and fighting and robbing people in the evening. And it’s the transients just wandering around, they are the ones who tend to get involved, in shoplifting, in breaking into cars, which become big problems for us. So it is interesting to see how the community and the police see the same problem, just from different perspectives. One is a very subjective angle, which is the community, and we see it more objectively. [... Drug dealing, prostitution and drunkenness] are what the community has identified as being the major crimes. And the drug trafficking to the community means that there are drug dealers walking around everywhere and all the time, and it bothers them, because they cannot go to the store etcetera. Most of the community members say that they have not been really been bothered by the drug dealers per se, but just the whole notion that they are there bothers them and makes them feel unsafe. Same with the prostitutes. In and of itself, they don’t have a direct problem from the prostitutes that bothered them, but it is the vehicular traffic that went all hours of the night. The streets in the neighborhood are almost busier than [the city’s main] street all night long until 5 or 6 in the morning.

[C03]

Another CRU officer reasons that ‘community policing’ evolved as the result of substantially increased pressure on the police from locally and politically active and organized people concerned about street and disorder phenomena, combined with the economic realities pressuring the public police to achieve more with less resources.

I think community policing got a lot to do with political pressure. The people were finally fed up so they went to the politicians and the police and said, look, we are fed up with this, we gotta do something. Do something, whatever it is, do it. Whether it is hiring more officers or changing the way you do business, do it. Because we are sick of it, we are sick of what we are seeing in the streets everyday, we’ve lived here for 20 years, this is the worst it is ever been, blablabla. You gotta do things differently, and the ‘more-officer-option’ obviously did not happen. If it is more cost-efficient, I don’t know, but there gotta be something in there that is more cost-efficient somehow. Things don’t change radically the way we are going right now, unless it is going to save a buck down the line. It has to save money somehow. We are doing the same
amount of work, more demand, with less and less money and resources. It's like restructuring a big business. [C14]

Through the dynamics of organized 'community' interests, concerns and pressures on what 'community police' should do (see Chapter 7), and the internal and operational patterns of 'community police' work itself, 'community police' work has come to a rather narrow and specific definition on what constitutes the objects of its police work, focusing predominantly on 'disorder' and 'vice' phenomena in public places. Within these rather narrow operational limits it seems to have assumed, 'community police' practitioners, however, appear to be fully aware that there is 'lots more' out there than just street and disorder phenomena that the 'community police' could or should look into. 'Community police' work has come to focus on order issues in the streets and public places, facilitated by considerable social pressures to concentrate on these phenomena in combination with the 'community police's' newly and uniquely unhindered and unlimited - 'proactive' and 'preventative' - access to these environments and their populations, without having to rely on or wait for the occurrence of crime incidents or calls for assistance.

The majority of the CRU officers confirm this operational focus as witnessed in the observation research, as well as confirmed through the interview data. A few of the CRU officers, representatively for most of their colleagues, elaborate on the evolution and rationales behind this particular operational focus:

Drugs and prostitution are the two big problems in [neighborhood Z]. Those would certainly be identified by the police and the community. These are the most visible problems I shall say. I am sure there are a lot of other not so visible problems, domestic assaults and stuff, but behind closed doors, and that doesn't have that high a visibility and a public presence as does prostitution and drug dealing. But these problems are the major concerns of the community, and have been identified as such. And then, property values go down when prostitutes and drug dealers are standing on your street, and that makes it a concern, very much so. [C01]

A lot of problems are pointed out through the community, through radio calls and other ways. But we also go out and look for things as well, so it's, well, we know what the issues are, just from experience. And that experience has been gained through the community, through the radio calls, and that we are dealing with the same issues day in, day out. There is no doubt that the biggest issue in [neighbourhood X] is drugs. Now, that is not to say that there is nothing else happening there, but a lot of the other crimes, like thefts and robberies, stem from the drugs. [C15]

Hookers are the number one problem in our area, mostly the hookers, all seems to revolve around them. There was complaints around certain businesses letting the hookers in, we spoke to the businesses, it all
revolved around the hookers. Hookers have always been in this area, since I've been there. But it is only for the past two years or so that we are really battling them, since the community finally got upset and came out and said, it's enough now, these creatures have to go. With the CRU, we are now able to concentrate on just the one area, that has really helped us well. [...] Now we are hitting them hard, and try to clean them out. [...] We are now focussing very much on different problems than before. When you are in the cars, you do emergency calls all the time. The least thing on your mind is the hookers standing at the corner. But if you got the time to concentrate on the hooker at the corner, and if this is even a priority of your mandate, like for us, then you are trying to get rid of that problem. We are looking into problems on the street now that before we just couldn't do - now, that is what we are supposed and expected to do.

One officer instructively elaborates on the operational focus of CRU work by explaining from the ‘community police’ officer’s point of view how ‘rookies’ get properly and meaningfully introduced to the realities of ‘community police’ work:

When the recruits here in [99 division] start out in the CRU, they are kind of only dealing with one kind of policing. They'll get in there, they'll get to listen to what the communities have to say, their concerns, they'll get to react to the community, but most of the times, listening to their concerns is just dealing with the street problems. The kids will be exposed to the street problems most of the time, shoveling the druggies from the street all day long. The work in the CRU is basically dealing with street problems. The odd time, you will be asked to go into the schools, which is not for police work but to speak to kids and so on. But in [99 Division], the main concerns are, we'll go into a community meeting, they'll tell me, Officer O, I have this problem, deal with it. And these problems are usually to deal with street people - vagrants, hookers, and drug dealers. [C08]

But it is apparently not only an existing social pressure to attend to the public disorder phenomena of drugs, prostitution and liquor offenses that makes ‘community police’ work focus on these matters. Rather, the organizational set-up of ‘community police’ work, its resources, mandate and management have given it the long absent opportunity and basis to primarily, vigorously and persistently concentrate on these matters. This ability had long ago been taken away with the radio-driven, differently prioritized, externally regimented and distanced mode of ‘emergency response’ policing out of response cars. This opportunistic situation leading to the operational priorities described is, for example, characterized by the case of one of the CRU platoons which over a period of one full month exclusively worked on a ‘drug project’ around a local bar and donut store, doing observation and making arrests without being present or doing any other ‘community police’ work elsewhere in their ‘neighborhoods’. Such special assignments are usually the luxury of specialized police units, but the ‘project focus’ on drugs, the emphasized relevance to ‘community concerns’ and the ‘numbers’ produced as impressive ‘success indicators'
were prominently presented and cited by the CRU sergeants in ‘community meetings’, etc., as evidence for the CRU’s targeted ‘community police’ work activities focusing on the most prevalent local problems. The traditional ‘emergency response’ mode of policing with its previously superficial and ‘quick and dirty’ attention to street disorder phenomena that were considered more as a nuisance and hindrance against ‘real police work’ tasks, however, has not been replaced in 99 Division, but is now with its own practices and focus, complemented through the unique styles and effects of ‘community police’ work.

A few CRU officers further elaborate on the operational functions that the CRU exercises in its ‘community police’ work practice, and the integral role that it plays in the bigger ‘public policing’ scheme as a complement to the activities and foci of other police functions.

*Community policing definitely focusses on a different profile of problems and people. The guys in the cars usually concentrate on people inside buildings, who have phones, and call the police for assistance, whereas we really relate to the street level. That’s where our work is supposed to happen. Whatever happens on the street, we deal with. We keep the streets clean and proper, so to speak. Whatever happens inside is almost exclusively the territory of the guys in the cars, in terms of the problems as well as the people they are dealing with.* [C07]

*My idea of traditional policing is basically Emergency Response. Here [in the CRU], we are dealing with everyday problems that people have in their neighborhoods. We are definitely focussing on other problems and people. Dealing with the community, we get to find out their everyday problems, like, these people are loitering in front of my house, try and do something about it, whereas before, we would get a call that there is a hooker in front of somebody’s house, and we would get this call over and over again, and nothing would effectively be done. Now, if they say to us at these meetings that this is a constant problem, try and work on it, this is what we are doing. I guess that is how it is different.* [C08]

*I think the problems are different now. Like in this area, there has always been substance abuse. But this is one of high trafficking areas in the city, like with cocaine. I don’t think that we were focussing on this really. But when you are on patrol on bike or on foot, that’s the problem that seems to come up. When I go and speak to the people, it seems to be the same, the main problem all the time: the drug dealers out in front of their houses or business, in their alleyway, using their bathrooms. Or, the prostitution, and the drug dealers being related in that area. They are using the street, getting into people’s way, and either assaulting or impeding their life. In the cars, we were never able to look into these issues. I spent most of my career in a car, and unfortunately, you are tied to the radio, you go from call to call. And it’s mostly in response to something happening. But now we can work on these issues all the time, and nobody calls us away all the time.* [C12]

‘Community police’s’ key tools: Law enforcement, surveillance, and informal control

‘Community policing’ work has given rise to the development of a rather large and diverse ‘tool box’ for its particular tasks and foci. Traditional legal mechanisms are only a part of the
prevalent tools of 'community police' work, and formal interventions on the basis of criminal law constitute an even smaller share. In fact, the 'community police' work tool-box as observed in the research site consists of a wide assortment of legal and non-legal, formal and informal intervention mechanisms initiated and put into practice against perceived 'problems' and carriers of 'threats' to 'local safety' and order not only by the police, but also in conjunction with many of the police's local 'partners'. These operational tools of 'community police' work in their entirety, flexibility and combination present a broad and magnitudinal force and power of policing and control in this framework which need to be examined more closely.

To start with, the crucial basis of 'community police' work is provided by diverse and widespread mechanisms of 'local surveillance', in particular with those concentrating on the identified 'problem populations' in local public spaces. Most of the CRU officers' regular patrol work on the 'beat' - on foot or bicycle, and regardless of the different 'working types' observed - is at its basics devoted to persistently scanning streets, alleyways and other publicly accessible spaces, gathering information on incidents, events and people in these localities, and actively screening and monitoring 'suspicious elements'. It is apparent that most of the 'community police' officers go about their patrolling of public places with a particular image or pre-conception about anticipated problems, deviance or disorder in mind, which are to the largest part congruent with the primary set of 'street problems' (drugs, prostitution, liquor violations, public disorder phenomena) that have come to form the bulk of the 'community police' work observed. Other incidents do occur and are attended to by CRU officers, but in a less routinely, more accidental and less regimented manner. For example, CRU teams would occasionally attend a location of a theft, an accident, a suspected robbery or a fire in progress, but these things had either occurred right in front of their eyes, or the officers were called to the scene by radio, as occurred fairly regularly in order to provide back-up for other units.

Another key aspect of 'community police' officers’ local surveillance work is the build-up, maintenance and use of local, informal and low-key 'surveillance networks'. Most of the CRU officers observed created such surveillance or information networks in the local areas they were responsible for, usually with residents, small business or shopowners they had developed a special 'rapport' with, or representatives of the local school, agencies or organized groups that the police regularly deal with. In fact, what is often labeled by the CRU officers as casual 'community contacts' on the streets or in shops serves a primary surveillance and information function: The
chat with the residents in the yard or the owner of the bar commonly revolves around the question of how prevalently the prostitutes frequent the area, what time and place, if there were any ‘known faces’ among them, or if there is any new ‘disturbing elements’ in the area. Others, on an empirical basis, have argued that the “principal instrumental value” for neighborhood policing is “its ability to generate crime information [and the] production of criminal intelligence” (McConville and Shepherd 1992:141). They further elaborate that, therefore, “officers tend to concentrate upon information gathering. This can be undertaken by befriending people in the community, gaining their confidence, and waiting for useful material to be offered or inadvertently passed” (ibid.), leading to an effective facilitation of the role of “police collators” in the ‘community’ (Gordon 1984).

As an example, the owner of a small store just across from a small park in a ‘problem neighborhood’ which was frequented mostly by homeless drunks and some time ago had been made the subject of a clean-up operation by one of the CRU platoons, kept a ‘journal’ for ‘her’ CRU officers. This ‘journal’ which she would consult during visits from the officers listed which of the ‘usual suspects’ would be present in the area, at what time, and which local bar establishment they would procure their liquor from. Other small businesses would often ‘snitch’ on their neighbors (often competitors in the same line of business), claiming that they were doing illegal things (i.e., liquor license violations) and thus, in some instances, trying to destroy their legitimate operations. Many of these ‘leads’ would either be followed up by the officers instantly, or promised to be “looked into”. In these scenarios, the CRU officers would have new leads on which to act and carry out ‘community police’ work.

When patrolling the street, most CRU officers who were observed relied on pervasive and strategic surveillance and monitoring schemes - something McConville and Shepherd described as “aggressive patrolling” (1992) - for the purposes of their policing. These surveillance activities directed towards people and situations form the basis for a potential and gradual, albeit discretionary escalation into further control or punishment measures. When walking the street, for example, many officers would either greet any of their ‘intuitive suspects’ with an overdone “How are you doing on this fine day?” and wait for an inappropriate response, ask them directly about their reasons for being in this area, or proceed directly to do an information check on ‘known suspects’.

One of the key instruments for these monitoring purposes is a ‘Form 208’ or a so-called
‘contact sheet’ which officers complete upon contact with any ‘suspects’, and which plays a variety of roles in terms of the officers’ decision-making process on how to further proceed with the subject of investigation. The form asks for comprehensive and detailed personal information (including description of the person) as well as legal history and status (convictions, criminal record, pending charges, etc.). Upon collection of the information in an encounter with a ‘suspect’, the officer obtains verification and confirmation on the personal information collected via the police radio. The majority of people investigated, in practice, are unaware of the fact that the officer is required to have legitimate grounds to demand the information to complete the card, but there seems to be the dominant perception among people questioned that it is the refusal to provide the information that would render them suspicious. For many of the CRU officers observed, the ‘208’ form is their central ‘low threshold’ tool of local surveillance and control in patrol scenarios. A considerable share of them complete up to 20 or 25 such investigations each shift, while 5 such forms per shift seems to be an expected minimum for officers who have been out on patrol. The forms are collected and entered into the police force’s database, and the information compiled is accessible via police radio checks upon entry.

The most ‘fortunate’ outcome for an investigated ‘suspect’ in a routine street encounter with a CRU officer is when the radio room has no former entry on the person, which usually signals the end of the investigation, unless some obvious ‘deviant’ behavior has been displayed which the officer decides to further follow up on. The other possible scenario is that the radio room confirms some type of a record entry on the person, which may simply consist of the fact that a ‘208’ form had been completed on him/her previously. In fact, the majority of people encountered who were ‘checked out’ by ‘community police’ patrol in 99 Division had been ‘spoken to’ by police before in one form or another. Further aggravating factors are, of course, if the person investigated has a criminal record, a pending charge or recent conviction, and especially for one of the prevalent street crimes local ‘community police’ work concentrates on, especially when such an entry has occurred in 99 Division. Without further concerns being necessarily present, in the vast majority of instances such a ‘positive’ feedback on the person examined usually initiates a much closer scrutiny by the CRU officers, often including searches of clothes and body for drugs. Any entry for drug- or prostitution-related behavior, or arrests, charges or convictions with a person they were ‘checking out’, for instance, brought many of the CRU officers observed to the ‘natural’ conclusion that they were, in fact, dealing with a ‘hooker’
or a ‘drug dealer’. From the officers’ perspective these circumstances in many instances then seemed to require further investigative action, often resulting in a search, further intense questioning, ticketing, or eventually a charge or an arrest.

The other important function of completing the ‘208 form’ is that it provides the platform for an ‘attitude’ and ‘demeanour’ test of the suspect upon which the officer, separate or in conjunction with the actual information received via the form, bases his/her decision for further action. One of Bittner’s important contributions to police research is his finding that a police officer’s decision about proceedings vis-a-vis a suspect is informed and influenced not only by the ‘facts’ of the circumstances but by a multitude of ‘exogenous’ circumstances emerging from the officer, the suspect, the environment, and interactional values within these dimensions (Bittner 1970; see also Mastrofski, Worden and Snipes’s discussion on “legal and extralegal influences on arrest”, 1995:539ff). Equally important, a number of earlier police work field studies have shown that it is the suspect’s attitude and demeanour towards the officer, especially with regards to his/her demonstration of respect and deference towards the officer’s authority, that influences further discretionary decisions one way or another (Sykes and Clark 1975, Hagan 1985, Ericson 1982).

In fact, an integral element of the interactionist process in which police officers “take charge” of an incident or a suspect (Reiss and Bordua 1967) is by assessing his/her demeanour and behavior towards the police as a key factor informing the necessary forms of ‘justice’ to be initiated (Skolnick 1966). From detailed field study experience with juvenile suspects, Piliavin and Briar concluded that, besides the suspect’s record, his/her demeanour as well as his/her degree of “contriteness” were the most important variables in deciding their further fate, i.e. whether to arrest or not (Piliavin and Briar 1964). A further important factor in these interactionist processes is the demonstration of ‘deference’ towards the officer, which Sykes and Clark (1975) have demonstrated and developed into their “assymetrical status norm” hypothesis about police-suspect relations. This suggests that police require more deference from the suspect than they give, and that a suspect’s refusal to show such deference is often “viewed by the officer as a refusal to acknowledge the normal social obligations of all citizens and the officer’s symbolic status” (Hagan 1985:240). In such situations, more punitive responses taken towards the suspect may be the consequence.

The above discussed multiple and discretionary dynamics of ‘checking out’ suspects are
illustrated by the case of two CRU officers on patrol in the research site on a cold, early Sunday winter morning:

The officers walk up [A street], wonder about a couple of people passing by that time of day [7.30am] and temperature [minus 20C], and then decide to check out [B street]. A resident had called at 6.00 am that morning, complaining about 'crack heads in the entrance way of [A street] buildings'. The officers see a black man standing at the corner of [B and C streets], and hear a whistling sound when walking up there. The man keeps standing at the corner. [Officer Alpha] asks him what he is doing there, and why he was whistling. He says he was not whistling, and he is waiting for a friend, but does not know the name or the address of the friend. He says he lives currently at a local shelter. The story evidently does not make sense to the officers, and they ask him if he has anything to do with drugs, or if he has ever been arrested before. He mentions a cocaine arrest in 1989, and provides his driver’s license. They complete a 208 form, and radio the information for verification. They ask him if he has any drugs on him, or anything else he should not have. He denies it, and then starts complaining about “this being ridiculous, and harassment, and why he can’t just stand at the corner without doing anything.” [Officer Beta] tells him that he is “in a high crime area”, that there have been complaints, and he has a drug crime history, and they “simply have to suspect that he is a drug dealer”. His info comes back from the radio room with a number of previous offenses, including a theft under, failure to appear, and a few drug offences, some of them recent. They start searching him and discover an (empty) crack pipe on him up his sleeve. [Officer Beta] searches his clothes, and in between tells him that he is under arrest for the possession of cocaine. They do not find anything more, and eventually send him off, and tell him “that he should disappear right away from this area”, that they don’t want to see him there again, otherwise they will “investigate as long as it takes to arrest him”. He takes off towards [D street] and walks North. He swears heavily before they let him go, but calms down when he realizes that he can go. The officers discuss that they could have fully searched him, but did not do it since it was “borderline”, and too cold. The officers walk up [B street], look into some of the entrance ways and alleys, and are about to walk into a donut shop, when they see the same man again. He is angry and swears using foul and aggressive language, especially when he realizes that the officers do not like the fact that he has not left the area. They follow him down the street. When they catch up, [Officer Alpha] points
out to him that he was ordered to leave the area. The man now says that he is about to go to stay with a friend in a building on this street, and that this is where he is going. [Officer Alpha] tells him that he is now under arrest for possession of a narcotic, and that they are going to search him. They take him into an alley between two apartment buildings, and strip-search him for drugs, but don't find anything. He rants and swears about "harassment", and "fuckin' police". The officers do not find anything, and he tells them that he is going to his friend's place. The officers tell him that they will come with him in order to verify his personal information. He resists vehemently, but they insist that they want to see if he really lives there. He complains that there is security in the building and that he cannot walk in there with police. He punches different numbers into the keycode, but nobody answers, except one voice response who does not open the door for him. He starts swearing again at the officers. [Officer Alpha] now writes the man a ticket for trespassing. He tears it up and walks off. [Field notes]

The 'community police' officers observed also presented considerable sense of disillusionment and frustration with the existing criminal law, the criminal justice system, courts, judges and sentencing. There is a general attitude of the sort that "we are trying our best and working hard to do good police work, but we are constantly let down by the rest of the criminal justice system". Police officers are dominated by a belief system to the effect that "the laws and the courts work for the protection of the criminal and against the police" attitude [Field notes]. This, in combination with many operational factors, has made 'community police' work quite creative and innovative in terms of expanding the toolbox of policing, or finding substitutes for traditional 'law enforcement' instruments, in particular 'criminal law' instruments.

While most of the offenses focused on in the 'community police' street patrol activities are centrally regulated by criminal law statutes - illicit drugs, prostitution, public drunkenness, disorderly conduct - many officers have found less complex, 'lower threshold' and less appealable alternatives for control, sanctions and punishments of these behaviors and the people involved in them. The explicit enforcement of prostitution, drunkenness, vagrancy, panhandling and, to a lesser degree, drug offenses under the respective criminal statutes, in most instances, occurred in the context of special 'sting' operations or projects, or by CRU officers who 'specialized' in and focused on certain types of law enforcement (e.g., drug 'enforcer' teams). However, in explaining that the courts would rarely accept or punish simple charges for 'communicating for the purposes
of prostitution’ unless the prostitute or client has ‘communicated’ directly to an (undercover) officer (which has resulted in ‘undercover sweep’ enforcement strategies regularly implemented by the division’s Plainclothes Unit) or has a substantial criminal record, the CRU officers have created effective, fast and possibly more punitive ‘enforcement’ alternatives for their ‘community police’ work.

Many officers of 99 Division’s CRU, when suspecting a person to be a prostitute in a vehicle, resort to fining them under the Highway Traffic Act [HTA] for not wearing a seat-belt (an applicable scenario in most instances). This amounts to approximately a $100 fine (“more than they would get in court for an ordinary ‘communicating’ charge”), the processing of the ticket takes much less time than it would take to arrest and charge the person under the Criminal Code, and the ticket is difficult to appeal. CRU sergeants at various occasions expressed pride in the fact that they had found an ‘effective’ alternative to (extensive and labor intensive) undercover sting operations on street prostitution by regularly (and probably illegally and unconstitutionally) pretending to conduct spot checks under the banners of an ‘drinking and driving’ program (which allows police to stop cars randomly to see if drivers show signs of intoxication). They would then use these ‘spot-checks’ to deter ‘unwanted people’ from frequenting certain local areas, and at the same time to investigate drivers and passengers, do personal information checks, write tickets etc. One CRU officer indicated that one of his “favorite” street police work ‘tools’ was to write tickets for ‘jaywalking’, which in his/her experience often occurred when people were trying to move out of an area quickly upon sight of the police or for other reasons.

Based on similar police work rationales or objectives are the newly discovered and emphasized use of ‘trespassing laws’ widely used by ‘community police’ officers in their street policing work. These, simultaneously, serve as an enforcement and surveillance tool for CRU work while jointly utilizing police and civilian ‘policing’ resources for these purposes. Systematically, the Division’s CRU has collected signed ‘trespass law’ letters from dozens of residential property owners, apartment complexes, schools, small businesses, restaurants and even the social housing projects in the division area. These allow the ‘community police’ officers to enforce the (provincial) ‘Trespass to Property’ act against people who are found illegitimately on private property. The 99 CRU had literally canvassed their divisional area for such authorizations, and had compiled a binder full of them by the time of the research. The CRU officers reported that they rarely encountered any resistance to their requests for such authorizations in shops,
residences, businesses, and buildings. Those refusing to cooperate - some social service agencies, for example, who did not want to have police entering their premises - were usually seen as ‘siding with the crooks’. With many drug- or prostitution-involved persons clustering or hiding in alleyways, doorways or alcoves of private buildings, the CRU officers find themselves in the convenient position of being able to impose, or threaten to impose, a heavy fine on such ‘suspects’ for just stepping on private property. In some instances, officers also use the trespass statute quite aggressively as a main enforcement tool, and many ‘suspects’ are unaware of the law. One CRU officer proudly told of a local bank that complained about panhandlers on the sidewalk in front of their entrance. In absence of other effective means to deport and keep the panhandler from the (public) sidewalk, the ‘community police’ officer repeatedly ticketed panhandlers with the hefty ‘trespassing’ violation just for leaning against the wall of the bank building while sitting on the sidewalk.

A prime and instructive example of the effective combination of surveillance, informalism and low-threshold punitiveness as an alternative to formal criminal law is expressed in another street population ‘control’ device developed by 99 Division’s CRU together with local prosecutors. Through the combined efforts of 99 Division’s ‘community police’ sting operations on local street drug or prostitution offenders in their area on the one hand, and organized ‘community victim impact’ statements systematically testifying in court about the “destructive and harmful effects of these activities for safety, security and quality of life in their neighborhoods”, judges are urged by prosecutors to impose ‘custom made’ probation orders, instead of or in combination with regular sentences, on these offenders. As the result of hard negotiations and pressures within the coalition of the police, local politicians and organized ‘community’ representatives, these probation orders would usually stipulate that for a period of one or two years, the offender must not enter 99 Division’s geographical territory; for people who listed a home address within the division, the order would usually be that they may not be outside their homes unless they are on their way to public transport, shopping, or other explicitly defined basic necessities of life.

With large numbers of local ‘street offenders’ sentenced to such probation conditions through the massive drug and prostitution ‘stings’ implemented by the CRU and other divisional units, these ‘boundaries’ - as CRU officers would call them - allowed the ‘community police’ officers to take substantive action against ‘suspects’ without having to find them committing
another substantive ‘crime’. When encountering ‘disorder’ or ‘crime’ ‘suspects for “no good reason” on the street or in a public place, a police officer can use any violation of the ‘probation order’ to arrest them for a ‘breach of probation’ offence. Such a (criminal) offense would usually, when brought to court, entail substantial punishment.

The breadth of the effectiveness of these ‘community policing’ devices in terms of surveillance and control was further expanded through the fact that the CRU officers would systematically update their ‘community’ partners (in form of ‘neighborhood groups’) on the ‘probation order’ status of ‘known suspects’ and individuals frequently seen in their local areas. Since these people now did not need to be caught while committing another substantive criminal offense per se, but just needed to be present in the local area in order to make themselves subject to an arrest and a criminal charge under the probation statute, the CRU started to rely heavily on support from its local surveillance networks for this line of enforcement. Residents, shopowners, or other ‘local informers’ would call the CRU upon sight of a ‘boundary suspect’, and, in many instances, the ‘community police’ officer would arrest them on the grounds of breach of probation, bringing them before the courts, and usually remove them from the ‘neighborhood’ for a period of time. But even if a ‘suspect’ punished in such a way came back into the local area after a while, the probation order would still be in place, and the same process would possibly begin anew.

In other circumstances, the enforcement of municipal liquor licensing statutes, or, even a new municipal tobacco control law, were a preferred instrument by CRU officers to ‘put heat’ on bars, restaurants or other establishments that were seen as ‘catering’ to street people, drunks, hookers, and other ‘unwanted people’ in the area. Since it appeared to be quite common procedure for bars in the area to serve minors (knowingly or accidentally), or to break one or another provision of the complex and lengthy regulations in the provincial Liquor Licensing Act, these violations were seen as welcome ‘pressure points’ for ‘community police’ officers to aggressively patrol, control and penalize suspicious establishments. Numerous ‘neighborhood teams’ would have a number of bars or restaurants on their ‘black list’ that they would go and check out multiple times per shift, noticing all possible such violations, with the ultimate goal to eventually have enough grounds to request a revocation of the establishment’s liquor license, or even the closing of the business, through a complaint procedure through the provincial licensing board. As an example, one of the CRU teams persistently attempted to close down a bar.
establishment that they saw as a major ‘drug dealing haven’, and they considered the liquor act their best chance to accomplish this goal fast. Their efforts went as far as that they went out one day and bought a copy of the Liquor License Act in order to find the broadest possible grounds for legal action and prosecution against the bar. The establishment was, in fact, eventually closed down on the grounds of liquor license violations, and so were a number of others in the area. One other ‘disorder factor’ - a bar/grill within a social housing complex that was seen also as a major drug dealing nest - was, upon request from the CRU, put under pressure through the municipal health inspection and fire safety inspection offices for a lengthy period of time, which had been called onto the scene jointly by police and ‘neighborhood groups’. This establishment was also eventually closed due to the fact that the landlord refused to further deal with the massive load of ‘inspections’ and mandated improvements imposed on the property.

A final example of ‘informal’ control tools utilized by the local ‘community police’ officers applied to the numerous rooming houses and shelters (for welfare recipients and people with no fixed address) located in the area, many of which were understood and portrayed as the ‘origins’, ‘fortresses’ or ‘havens’ for drug dealers and prostitutes by CRU officers and ‘community safety group’ representatives alike. Both entities of interest jointly also discovered liquor, health and fire safety laws, as well as other violations under the ‘landlord and tenant’ or the ‘rooming house’ statutes as convenient and effective ‘pressure tools’ on landlords in order to deal with these ‘nuisances’, ‘disturbing elements’ and ‘threats to local safety’. The preferred and most effective mode of punitive intervention against ‘suspects’ living on such premises appeared to be to initiate an eviction process of the unwanted party through the landlord. This was in many instances easily accomplished simply by increased police presence in, and attention to, the building, business or rooming house, the announcement of larger ‘enforcement operations’ against such a place, or suggestions that the place would come under more intense scrutiny by police and other licensing bodies if the ‘unwanted’ elements or activities were not removed. Once served, these eviction notices were usually fast and effective in ridding individuals of their shelter and permanent addresses. The questions that remain unanswered, however, were whether the ‘suspects’ evicted a) left the area at all, or became a permanent rather than a partial ‘street person’, b) stopped being involved in the behaviors that they were pursued for (drugs, prostitution, etc.), and c) if the ‘local problem’ had actually become alleviated by the measures taken.

A CRU officer describes the elements, rationales and strategies behind the broad
'community police' work 'tool box' utilized by the officers in the CRU with regards to the 'hooker problem', relying on formal law enforcement as just one possible intervention in conjunction with numerous others:

*We have many tools to deal with the hookers. Once they are arrested for the 'communicate' charge, we release them on some sort of a bail, which imposes conditions with boundaries. And again, that's a strong tool we have against a prostitute who is not actually communicating to anybody. We can approach them, we can investigate them, and if they are on bail and within their boundaries, then this gives us the power of arrest. So, in that circumstance, we can remove the problem for a short time, until they get bail again, and again get more conditions, and hopefully probably breach them again. We can investigate and hassle them and put pressure on them, and that again would be proactive. And the, even just by us being there, they won't get any johns, and they can't work.* [C09]

Another CRU officer comments on the general role of 'discretion' around formal and informal interventions in these contexts, and how the different policing and control tools available are put to use by the 'community police' officers to deal with the 'problem':

*If we have a complaint in our neighborhood, my objective is to try and deal with it effectively. One thing I see brewing now is a hostel, and we've been having complaints from the person next door that people have been breaking into his place. My objective right now is to put a little heat on the area so that the guys know that we are watching them, and hit them hard if necessary. I'll be very visible there, and I'll run a 'zero tolerance' program there. A lot of those guys think that it is OK to just light up a joint. Where I would have looked the other way in other cases, I would now go and arrest them for it. When they are spitting on the sidewalk, I'll be on them for that. Just to move that crowd back into the hostel, and keep them effectively off the street. Or if I see them trespassing onto private property I'll arrest them, issue them a ticket, arrest them if I have to, search them. I'll just put constant heat on them. We can do that if we need to. We have that discretion.* [C08]

On the other hand, this observed but selective heavy reliance on informal or non-criminal means for local control and punishment - or the abstractly suggested "search for alternatives to the criminal law" (Goldstein 1987) in 'community policing' practices - does not appear at all to mean that 'community police' are less determined, vigorous or active law enforcers than the 'traditional police', or their patrol colleagues in the squad cars. With the exception of the 'community police' work of the few CRU officers who would be considered as 'communicators' according to the working type categories suggested above, the slogan of 'community policing' being 'soft' or 'warm and fuzzy' policing, in practice, reveals itself as a drastic myth with regards to the role of 'law enforcement' and 'arrest' activities exercised by the CRU officers. Quite to the contrary: the persistent street crime and disorder focus, the proximity to its policing objects in
local spaces, the less command-regimented work situation, and the ubiquitous ‘community’ demands on ‘community police’ to effectively ‘clean up’ their local areas of responsibility facilitate a strong emphasis on aggressive law enforcement and arrest as a form of ‘community police’ work intervention which many CRU officers use extensively. This was starkly confirmed by ‘enforcer’ and ‘floater’ work types with respect to their own work, but also by ‘communicators’ with respect to ‘community police’ work in the division in general.

In 1995, the division under study generated over one third of all prostitution charges, as well as over 20% of all drug offences enforced in all of the TCPF. The division is one of 17 divisions in the TCPF, and represents approximately 15% of the force’s total officer strength (TCPF Statistical Report 1995). At this point, it had been intended to examine the described ‘community police’ work changes, patterns and emphases as they would be reflected in the TCPF’s and division’s offence and arrest data. However, at the time of writing TCPF was not yet able to provide these data for the full period of research, and this important discussion needs to take place elsewhere.

But besides the observed dominant operational focus on arrests as a central and emphasized tool of policing, control and punishment, there is the sense of a remarkable helplessness or disorientation among the CRU officers with regards to what actual and meaningful alternatives there may be to ‘arresting the bad guys’. This may be taken as evidence for the claim that the predominant police culture simply sees ‘arrest’ and ‘law enforcement’ - the allegedly only “proper” and simultaneously “enjoyable” form of police work (McConville and Shepherd 1992:150) - as a component of ‘real’, effective and exciting police work (see Chapter 4), rendering even the vague consideration of alternatives as a ‘hard sell’, un-appealing and widely neglected option among most officers. Zhao and Thurman (1997), on the basis of a meta analysis of a number of surveys of police personnel and their perceptions and practices regarding ‘community policing’ issues, have recently underlined the persistent and central ‘crime control’ focus in ‘community policing’ environments in terms of ‘problem’ definition and operational approaches. They concluded that “regardless of the rate and type of serious crime that a police jurisdiction experiences, those persons charged with administering police functions will view protecting the public from crime in the streets as the agency’s top priority, with much less interest in deploying police personnel to provide other services” (Zhao and Thurmann 1997:353). Within the research contexts examined being characterized by the fact that CRU officers are given almost
infinite opportunities for intervention against perceived 'problem' people as well as a wide range of options and discretion to do so, 'community policing' may provide fertile grounds for most officers, as Mastrofski et al. have suggested, to "arrest more aggressively and selectively with less regard for legal considerations" (1995:557). The enforcement of the criminal law is one of many possible interventions and tools that can be put to work by the 'community police' officers when it appears strategically convenient. As well, it can be easily substituted by other means of control or punishment, or used as a 'background threat' when resorting to alternative interventions. The key point, however, is that the CRU officer has the enforcement at his/her disposal as a possible intervention when s/he wants and deems it appropriate.

A number of CRU officers, representatively for the majority of CRU officers spoken to and observed, contextualize these power, control and punishment options and resources within the practical realities of 'community police' work. They also clearly reject the claim that 'community police' work is 'soft' in the sense that it puts less of an emphasis on 'law enforcement' and 'arrest' work:

Certainly on foot, you are dealing with a lot more smaller problems than when you are in the cars. If you walk by a street vendor, or a grocery store fellow, if you are in a car, he probably won't have any contact with you, but when you are on foot, he will tell you about the panhandler or the drunk that are hanging around the front of the store that he would like removed. He would never think of calling the police for that, but if you happen to be there, and talking to him, he will certainly mention it to you. So it is certainly a different priority type of policing in the community. It is indeed much more about order issues in public space, things that are taking away from business, panhandlers, things like that. [C01]

The things that I and the guys go out with, the main things we are focussing on is drug dealers or the people using the drugs, but also other criminal activity going on in the area. But the majority of the things that we see is drug dealing, and the majority of that is crack cocaine. So just try and do heavy enforcement on that, if we can, we try and set up observations, try to arrest dealers and the buyers, if not, just through investigations, try and find somebody who has drugs on them, and try to arrest the drugs. If not, just go through the area, maybe, if you can't go and make an arrest, just keep moving them around, and deter them, so they will finally stay out of the area. [...] We definitely have not stopped doing arrests, quite to the contrary. We go out every day, and we make one or two arrests a day. [C13]

I've heard people say that arresting people is less important in community policing. I don't think so and I would never agree with it. You would only invite problems to grow. If the people who are out there committing criminal acts think that policing is getting softer, they are just going to increase what they are doing. They'd have a lot less of a chance of getting caught. I never agreed with it, but at no time did I ever go out there and think that I would become any softer in my police work. Quite to the contrary. We even work harder on it. We do arrest many people, the more, the better. For sure. If you don't arrest people, it leads to a lot of problems. Arrests lead to a lot of police investigation, last night for example. We started
out with what looked like a minor having a beer, and we investigate her, and it turned out going from a fail to comply to four charges. If we had not arrested her, she would have gotten away with four criminal offenses right there. Little things like that, all from a simple arrest.[C14]

Community policing is not soft policing, that’s bullshit. If you look at the people who are arrested at the station, and who arrests them. It’s the foot patrol. The guys in the cars hardly ever arrest anyone, so how could we say that we don’t do law enforcement? That’s a reputation, but it’s a completely false perception. I guess, when these coppers talk about working with the community, they think, oh, we are doing this, we’re going out with them raising money, or flipping burgers or whatever. Maybe some coppers have reasons to think that, but that’s not our thing. We talk to the community in response to complaints, well, tell us what you want done, like we will not do things like that. If they want us to do and look into things, we will do it, but it has to be police related. And the good thing about our neighborhood is that they don’t want us flipping hamburgers, they want us to kick ass. We totally rely on arrests for our work. My numbers of arrests have nothing but gone up higher, because I don’t have to do anything except that. [C07]

Well, my partner and I, we are ‘warm and fuzzy’ when it is time to do it, but when we are out on the street, we’re far from it. There is time to be like that, there is times to be understanding, more of a social kind, but when you’re dealing with a problem, it is good old fashioned kick ass policing. This whole thing about ‘soft policing’ is pretty much a myth. We probably use the law more so and harder than anybody else in the division. In other areas, where they don’t have a problem like we do, it may well be ‘warm and fuzzy’ policing all the time. But not here. [C08]

I’ve absolutely maintained my focus on arrests [in the CRU]. As a matter of fact, I arrest more people now than when I was in the cars. But that’s also because I am self-motivated, and so is my team. We go out there and do the arrests. Being on the foot, we don’t have to take those emergency calls, so we don’t have to write up a lot of reports and stuff, and we can put all our resources into arresting people. I made it my own personal thing that I am going to arrest people when I am on the foot patrol. That’s just the way I think it should be.[C11]

‘Problem solving’ from the ‘community police’ perspective

The above described conceptual ambiguity about the meaning and directions of ‘problem solving’ for ‘community police’ work naturally triggers the basic question how ‘problems’ identified and understood, and how ‘solutions’ are devised and put into action, in actual ‘community police’ practice. The central finding from the research data gathered in this study is that the vision of ‘community police’ work and their practical approaches to local crime and safety ‘problem’ phenomena have, upon closer examination, not significantly changed from the traditional ‘crime control’ practices. On the surface, ‘community police’ work has shifted from a philosophy that emphasizes the process of formal legal intervention and ‘law enforcement’ to one that is now driven by the overarching goal to eliminate crime and disorder ‘problems’, or phenomena that are constructed as such, from local ‘community’ areas with the wide ambit of
'tools' that are available to the 'community police' officers. 'Problems', in the real life contexts observed, however, are predominantly seen and understood as the people involved in the prevalent 'disorder' and 'safety' phenomena that constitute the core focus of 'community police' work in 99 Division - overwhelmingly in the context of suspected drug dealers, street prostitutes, homeless, vagrants and drunks, etc.

'Problem solving', in that context, however, in practice materializes on the side of the CRU officers' work as the staging, initiating and implementing of efforts towards 'making problem phenomena go away' or 'making problem people go away'. More specifically, these problem 'people' or 'phenomena' are to be eliminated from public corridors and other spaces colonized by 'community' that have been opened up to the joint social project of the elimination of local disorder, and to eradicate or remove problem symptoms from the local surfaces of public order concerns altogether. 'Problem solving', in 'community police' philosophy and practice, thus presents itself as 'problem symptom' or 'public order' appearance or 'cosmetics' work. To this extent, referring to the preferred medical analogies used elsewhere with respect to contemporary police work, the traditional patrol officer could be seen as the 'text-book' medical practitioner who did not much care about problem explanations or the outcomes of treatment procedures as long as s/he treated his/her 'patients' by the textbook procedures prescribed in his/her professional 'crime control' clinic. The 'community police' officer, however, has become the 'acute pain surgeon', or maybe even the 'acute plastic surgeon' of practical police work. It is not clear to the 'community police' officer where the patient's immense pain is coming from, it is not clear what the best and most promising long-term remedies or solutions are. The only thing that s/he is vigorously made aware of is that there are 'crime, 'disorder' and 'safety' pain symptoms that seem to be bothering the 'community patient' enormously, and these have - despite possibly enormous side effects of the treatment, the uncertainty of success, and risks for future and long-term treatment prospects - to be eliminated with all possible means available. Within this framework, the 'community police' officer's perspective on 'problems' is stunningly narrow in that it predominantly acts on the apparent presumption that, in order for 'disease problems' to be done away with, elimination of their 'symptoms' and 'carriers' - prostitutes, drug dealers, and drunks, etc. - will be the sufficient and effective way to proceed.

The central belief of the majority of CRU officers thus appeared to be that when the 'street problem' symptoms are removed from streets, public places or general visibility, the
'problem' is effectively dealt with or 'solved' - at least from a 'community police' work perspective. 'Community police' work has become broadly innovative in eliminating street deviants from 'community' spaces, and punishing them for their local presence with means other than traditional and formal legal interventions. However, the research data suggest its practitioners do not show much noticeable inclination or creativity for an understanding and conceptualization of 'problem solutions' at a level beyond punishment and/or strategic exclusion of its emphasized 'offenders' from local 'community' territories. Thus, while 'crime control' based and focused policing was rather narrowly focused on the process of its operations, 'community police' work has, it seems, become fundamentally focused on pragmatically pushing and removing 'problem symptoms' out of (local and public) areas colonized by 'community'. These approaches may seem paradigmatically different upon first glance, but they lose much of their distinction when thinking about the larger and long-term effects of these practical measures for the course and further evolution of problems of local disorder, safety and especially their wider implications.

By hoisting the bright symbolic banner of 'solving problems' - as opposed to simply dealing with or responding to problem incidents or symptoms - as their central work gospel, 'community police' have, of course, maneuvered themselves into a difficult corner which many have tried to keep or talk them out of before. Especially during the period of intense research into the socio-economic causes and correlates of crime starting in the 1970s, it became clear that "the police are held responsible for crime control, even though the causes of crime (social, economic, cultural and political) are clearly beyond their control" (Ericson 1982:10, see also Manning 1980, Bayley 1994). And while, as seen in this research study, "order maintenance proposals will be introduced and promoted with a promise that they will reduce crime, ... it is unlikely that they will do so", since the "causes of crime ... are matters over which the police have no control whatsoever" (Kelling 1985:315, see also Matthews 1992). Wisely, Goldstein recognized this significant and potentially threatening dilemma of contradictions between the ideology and practical effects of 'community police' work. He prophetically warned that the objective and goal of the police to 'solve problems' "may appear too open-ended", especially when it was expected that "police officers probe for the 'root problem' - which, carried to the extreme, could lead to such large social problems as poverty, racism, unemployment, and lack of education" (Goldstein 1987:18). While, although rather cryptically, he advocates that the police take measures to
improve wider socio-economic circumstances in instances where they can, he clearly insists that
the police should generally be not be burdened with these tasks and issues. Instead, he resorts to
the claim that at their bases, these matters are grander ‘social’ problems, while the police are only
called on, equipped and mandated to deal with ‘local’ and ‘community’ problems and their
symptoms (ibid.).

A couple of CRU officers, representatively for the majority of the officer sample, explain
how the ‘problem solving’ aspect of ‘community police’ work translates into the operational logic
of the elimination of local ‘problem symptoms’ using the available legal and non-legal tools of
criminal punishment, removal and social exclusion as core tools. The first example refers to the
local problem of a ‘crack house’:

*The problem solving aspects refers to how we are getting rid of that place. We are getting together with
people that are living there, management, people who manage the place and brainstorm. Do we want to
call them knocking at their doors at all different times of the day to let them know that the police are there,
do we want to start eviction proceedings, do the neighbors want to picket their door? We’ve seen that
happening in other hallways, so we brainstorm and try to get a plan of action together to effectively get
rid of these people once and for all. [C01]*

*I think the best proactive policing technique is to identify a problem area, like the [A public park], with
the drug dealers, and you just flood the area with police officers, with guys in uniform, and also
undercover guys, and let it be known, we know you guys are here, we’re going to be here looking at you.
We are going to make life really uncomfortable here, as many guys as possible are going to get arrested.
We put conditions on you, so you can’t come back and you breach bail if you do, and that will usually do
it. [C11]*

The following CRU officer illustrates how the ‘problem solving’ imagery, instead of
searching for broader, more non-criminal or non-legal, and possibly more long-term and durable
‘solutions’ to problems that the police are summoned for, has given ‘community police’ the
opportunity to do more of the punitive intervention work they have always done - just harder,
more variably and more persistently:

*A good example of problem solving is that we get a phone call from someone on a certain street, saying we
got that house across the street, that's got that guy living in it, it's a rooming house, he's running a crack-
house. It's just out of control. These people come in all the time, we can't get any sleep. They're urinating
in the stairwells. So we'll go in there, and we'll go there five, six, seven times a day. We'll kick in the door,
and we'll grab them, and throw them out in the snowbank. We'll give them a shove in the head or whatever,
and tell them, when you come back, we're going to be here five times today, and every time you are here,
you are going to get the same treatment. We do that for 3 days, and then they go away. So persistence is*
the most important thing, and you can do that only in the function that we are doing. And plus the people
get to know you. A lot of coppers will say, oh yeah, you better fuckin' do this, and then they don't follow
up, but they know us, and they know that we are going to do it every time we come back, so they say, fuck
it. I go somewhere else. [C07]

But even with the large variety of persistently punitive measures, the desired 'end result'
or 'solution' aimed for by 'community police' work is 'elimination' or 'exclusion' of the problem
behavior, phenomena and eventually its 'carrier' from local 'community' realms. Another officer
elaborates on this approach as the central mode of 'community police' work operations:

The hookers, on [Y street], that was a big problem, with the residents. What we did with them, we got all
letters for trespassing, because all the hookers were sitting on the front step, on the property, the schools,
at the stores, using the public phones, so using any property that we could, where they would hang out, we
would get trespass letters, so we were authorized to arrest them for trespassing. So, that would really help
to solve the problem, because every time you saw them, they'd be charged with trespass, until they finally
said, I can't afford these tickets anymore, and they would go elsewhere. And having the phone removed
where they used the phones. And getting boundaries for the ones arrested, so that they could not come
back to the area. If they are, they are arrested on the spot and held. We pulled the ground from under their
feet. And, as a hooker, if you are hassled all the time, why work here, you go elsewhere. You're never going
to get rid of them, you just move them. We moved them alright. [C06]

Similarly, the imagery of 'proactive policing' seems to materialize in practice simply in the
fact that 'community police' are now given the means and opportunity to 'hit harder', more
determinedly and persistently with traditional methods where the new 'problem indicators' of
disorder or public deviance appeared, instead of operating on the basis of a fundamentally revised
or re-thought 'police work' vision or approach. 'Proactive policing' in 'community policing'
environments thus, as the research data overwhelmingly suggest, presents itself as the logic,
legitimacy and operational framework to punish, coercively control, and exclude select street
behavior, phenomena and their carriers. This construction of 'community problems' and the
desired 'community policing' measures, provides the basis for the 'proactive' use of the heavy and
intrusive instruments of crime control - now even in (police based) amorphous anticipation of
crime and 'criminogenic' factors, and not only in response to actual crime incidents.

And, as the following CRU officers' statements suggest, the parameters of 'community
police' work provide the perfect practical environment to do vigorous, persistent, targeted and
punitive 'crime control' work against select 'street disorder' phenomena, problems and people.
Proactive policing is in a sense that people get to know you, drug dealers or drug addicts get to know you when they see you, and when they see you, they leave and they don’t come back, because they know you are going to be working for the next eight days. The bandits on the streets, I mean they don’t care at all about the cars. They'll be there, selling drugs when a cruiser goes by, they don’t give a shit, it's like a taxi goes by. They don’t care, because it is just a car, you know what I mean, they know, nobody will stop and get out of the car. Just going into bars, that are getting out of hand, and you lay some liquor licenses charges on them, or close the bars. Like we closed the bar at [A and B streets]. I mean, that corner at [A and B streets] was totally out of control. But we closed the bar down, and look at it now, it's quiet. We're just much better able to identify problem spots and hit them, and hit them, and hit them again, until they go away. [C07]

Proactive policing means to go and nip the problem in the bud before it happens. More or less. We see that all the time in our communities. If they see a problem with a bar, for example, they go and tell us all about it, and we'll be all over them. It happened at several occasions up at [A and B streets]. We didn't really have to wait for the community to tell us what's happening there, but that was the final trigger signal for us to step in. It happened with the [Z Bar]. The only way to make these problems disappear is to pull everybody's licenses in that corner and make it a ghost town. [...] It definitely prevents more major mishappenings and problems from developing. Shootings and stuff. If we keep the heat on, they may know that this is not the kind of place to go. [C08]

What proactive police work means to me, is, well, it's kind of like the saying that the best defense is a good offense. We try to identify where a problem area might occur, identify where it is, go in there, be ready for them, sort of be waiting for them when they arrive. It can be summed up in creating an environment where we can hit them hard, anytime, anywhere. Problem solving, traditionally, we would show up, we would write a report, and we would leave. If there was a problem at a certain address, let's say a domestic problem at that address, and we would get called back there all the time, and the woman does not want to charge the guy. In that case, maybe the way to solve the guys would be to just charge the guy, charge him and showcase the guy, and that might wake them up. The whole idea about problem-solving is digging a little deeper into the scenario, what is causing the problem, hitting it much harder, and make it not happening again so that we don’t come back here all the time. [C05]

This same CRU officer also explains how in his perspective ‘community police’ work has become “more intelligent policing”. This, in his/her view is happening not by broadening or reassessing its contexts, principal goals or fundamental understanding of ‘problems’ that the police are permanently dealing with, but by finding ways and strategies to practice harder, more strategic and punitive ‘crime control’ in the hope that it will be producing more of its desired effects:

[Community police work] does not put less emphasis on law enforcement and arrests, that is certainly not the case. What I would call it is more intelligent policing. We are not simply going out there like bloodhounds anymore and point us in the direction of the closest offense, so that we can deal with it. A lot of guys get job satisfaction just out of arresting people constantly, and not any problem gets solved. They see that as their responsibility to solve problems. It is a very limited view, I think, of what our job is. Police officers have to be a little more creative, they have to be a little more methodical, they have to have
more information. We have to more and more justify what we do, and why we do it. So we have to be a little, well, not that rushed to do it. But when it is time to do our enforcement, we come down as hard as we can. But the enforcement will be hopefully more effective when we are doing it. [...] The fact is that enforcement is considered one of the key priorities of community policing, you have to have it at the forefront. You have to make it clear that you are still arresting as many people as possible who are breaking the law. But as an overall philosophy, you are not going out there like a pit-bull going after the first drug dealer who comes around. You maybe sit back, take a good look at him, see who he is talking to, give them enough rope to hang themselves. In the past, guys will go out, see the usual crowd at the corner doing their drug thing, and at the first indication that there is a criminal offense going on, they’ll tackle it, arrest somebody, and then they are back in the station for four hours usually dealing with this. The only people who will have seen them are the people who have been there during the arrest. No one knows it’s happened, and the gap’s filled. [C05]

On the other hand, one CRU officer explains how in his/her perspective, there is a clear dividing line between ‘police’ and ‘social work’ which the ‘community police’ work imagery and emphases on ‘alternative solutions’ to problems have started to blur for many. Many of the officers surveyed appeared to feel hard pressed to protect themselves constantly from the expectation or assumption that they were doing ‘social work’. The officer quoted in the following elaborates from a ‘professional police officer’ point of view why and how police work must distance itself from ‘social work, as it was emphasized by a number of CRU officers. It seemed a point of great concern to them that these areas need to work with different instruments, mandates and objectives, and how the ‘police’, in fact, has no reason to get ‘involved’ with the ‘other side’s business’:

There is lots of pressure for community policing to be 'social work'. Like I said, we go out there and make arrests, and the supervisor comes to you telling you, making an arrest is not the thing, you don't have to go out there and make an arrest. You should go out there and go to the meetings, go to schools, and a lot of times you go out there and feel like a social worker. And I don't think that this is what we are. There is a need for social workers, and there is a need for police officers. Two different roles. Being a police officer, you are in a sense a social worker, but you have more responsibilities to go out there and do enforcement. If I turned into a social worker, I'd still have the crime, and it would run even more rampant, because there would not be any enforcement. So I think it is very important that you have the officers out there doing enforcement. And I think the community policing, the way they wanted it to go, the way they are trying to tell us what it is, they are trying to make us into social workers. And I don't agree with it. [C13]

The combined dynamics of ‘community police’ work’s focus on street order phenomena, the practical ‘insolvability’ of these problem phenomena by police interventions as suggested by the field data, and the vigorous approach of ‘community police’ to go after them with an expanded roster of ‘crime control’ methods has turned ‘community police’ work as observed
into a comprehensive operation of moving around 'street disorder' people, problems and symptoms. These pressures to 'move' are uncoordinated, fragmented but permanent - from one corner to the next, from street to street, from 'neighborhood' to 'neighborhood'. Besides the symbolic arrest of, and other legal intervention work against, 'street disorder' offenders - which in most cases has the effect of only temporarily making people disappear from local streets - most CRU officers actually go out and operate with the mindset that 'moving' people or 'problems' is all they can do, and that at best they may win some temporary and local victories, as the following officer quote illustrates. Obviously, most of these local victories occur at the cost of other localities, but this is interpreted as an 'undesired side effect' beyond the police's powers and nothing that they could constructively do anything about.

_Our policing is really just about moving problems out of your area and away from your streets. As long as the drug dealers and hookers are gone, you've pretty much done what you can. That's what the community is complaining about, and if you make them go away, you've done your job. We don't care where they go, and that can't really be our concern. That's for others to worry about. You see, it's so unique that area we are working in here. Because we got such a transient population, that they go and come all the time. We got so many hostels here, so many people addicted to drugs. I find that it is a battle that we're not gonna cap. The best we can do is move people on, and at best push them out of our boundaries. [...] I think there is areas where, even if you were out patrolling the streets 24 hours, you would never be able to eliminate the problem. A prime example is [C and D streets] area. If you don't have the police in great numbers walking up and down that street 24 hours a day, you will never be able to solve that problem. If you got that, you may have a better chance of doing it. But even then, this problem would be shifted somewhere else, for example down the street where there is not as much police presence. The [E neighborhood] is another example. There is a major problem in that area. 2 or 3 officers are not going to do it. You need maybe 20 that would be constantly patrolling that area, which might cap it a bit. The criminals out there aren't stupid. They also know exactly that at the most, we are out there 15 hours a day or so. Most of the stuff now happens early morning anyways, when there is only a handful of squad cars. [C08]

Two CRU officers, as examples typical for a large number of officers probed on these matters, explain how instead of 'solving problems', 'community police' work on the grand scheme has actually assumed the reality and practice of competing local forces. These forces - including neighboring TCPF divisions on either side of the battlefield - attempt to move the known 'problem' people and phenomena out of their own local and 'community' territories, with the inevitable effects of shoving them into each other's jurisdiction. They describe illustratively how 'community police' work has evolved into a complex project of ruling over and punitively controlling specific street populations by constructing, processing and institutionally colonizing them as the 'problem objects' of 'community policing', and maintaining them as such in a constant
cycle of monitoring, controlling, punishing and displacement. While these efforts may appear as (narrowly spatial or temporary) ‘victories’ or ‘solutions’ from select ‘community’ or police perspectives, there always, more or less, remain the same number of ‘apples’ or problems in the local equation. One local area’s victory seems to be the defeat of another, and the grand total of ‘problems’ remains pretty much unchanged. However, from the following CRU officers’ point of view, the much lauded ‘community policing’ initiatives do not appear as having thought through these wider implications since the ‘local’ efforts and effects are all that count in ‘community police’ work, and the system cannot afford to look deeper or further ahead.

Community policing, in many instances, is a territorial war. There is different forces who are trying to push problems into different directions. The winner gets rid of it, the loser has to start cleaning up and pushing back. Saw it happen with the drug dealers at [A and B streets], around the corner store there. That was a notorious corner for drug dealers, every night. [The neighbour Division] did a project in that area, and literally shoved them over to [A street], on our side. 99 Division attacked [B street] on our side, and shoved them back into [the neighbour division], and they just went back and forth. Like a ping-pong game. It was hilarious. 99 and [the neighbour division] were laughing about how they were going back and forth. If you look at these things from a divisional perspective, you have many successes. If you look at it from a [police force] point of view, the divisions are actually creating each others problems. That’s exactly what it is, but I’ve never seen anybody thinking about. I’ve just heard it laughed about a lot. Community policing is not structured, everybody is just out for the benefit of their own unit or own division. And a lot of the work happens against the other guy. I mean, it is clear, first you are concerned about your neighbourhood, then about the division. [88 division] is at the very end of the list in our work. As long as work is being done, that is the main thing. We got people calling all the time, as long as we can say we are doing something, that’s the main thing, and maybe we can report ‘mission accomplished’, at least for a while. I mean, what do you do? You can’t chase them around the world until they appear again at the other end. It’s the first time I’ve really thought about this. I heard the guys laugh about it many times.[C14]

So the whole thing has become a competition of local police resources. You push problems from one area into the next. If things go well, it’s the other division, but in most cases, it’s your own colleagues in the other neighborhoods. And you think the Chief and the deputies don’t know that? The whole Police Service knows that. A lot of the public does not know that, though. But that is simply the reality of it all. You’ll never get rid of prostitutes or drug dealers. But how many police officers would you hear saying what I just said? But that’s the game, and we have to carry on with it. I did not join the police force to be political. [C11]

The prostitution work is definitely a prime problem-solving project. That was identified to us as a major problem, so as a result of that, through the work of ourselves and the Plainclothes office, we did the sweeps, which were able to move the girls on. It was not really solving the problem, it was sort of moving the problem away for a while. We kind of solved it for our local area, for a short period of time. Because there is nothing in place right now that can obliterate the problem, there is no law, the problem is never going away. We can move it around a lot, and we do that, but it will be there - here or there. [...] But again, if we as officers went out of that neighborhood, or there was no other officers, the prostitution
problem would go back right to where it was. It is really just relocating the problem, and so it becomes somebody else’s worry. Our solution to the prostitution problem is just to move them to other neighborhoods. So now it is the [X neighborhood]’s and the [Y neighborhood]’s problem, and it is quite evidently so. If you drive around, they now got all the girls that used to be down here. It’s only a temporary solution. We can’t really do much, and we can never get rid of them. [C09]

The biggest demand from the community is of course to get rid of the drug dealers. [...] The community really thinks that we can get rid of all these people just like that. But we can’t. We would like to, but we can’t. They figure, ‘oh, now you are here, all the crime is going to go away. The problems are going to disappear’. It does not happen. It’s not possible. And that’s too bad, because you can see the frustration level in the community rising. Well, you know this prostitute has been here for three years, why can’t you do something about it. Of course, we are doing something about it, all the time, but you can’t make people disappear. Well then, then go, move it, move it out of our area. Well we’ve moved it many times, and it goes from one area to another one to the next, until it comes back. That’s all that’s been done. It’s just been moved around. If we are lucky, we chase it into [the neighbouring Division]. It’s unfair, but that’s the way it is. [C10]

This research has shown the predominant reality and nature of ‘community police’ operations in the research site to be pushing around, displacing and moving ‘problems’ rather then resolving or eliminating them. This assessment, of course, has major implications for the political project, the institution and the wider legitimacy of ‘community policing’ as implemented by the public police. In this scheme of things, there is now an almost indefinite, arbitrarily expandable list or pool of ‘community’, ‘disorder’ or ‘safety problems’ which have been captured or claimed as police matters via ‘community policing’ ideas and rhetoric. By monitoring, investigating, temporarily removing and pushing these ‘problems’ forward, backward and sideways, almost at institutional will, ‘community police’, on local, divisional or larger levels, has become its own best customer, supplier, or provider of things, issues and ‘problems’ to ‘police’. This complex ‘problem processing’ apparatus is constantly reproducing and reinforcing the ‘community police’s’ institutional role and legitimacy in these local contexts of crime, order and ‘quality of life’.

Pushing hookers from street to street, or drug dealers from one ‘neighborhood’ to the next, or even into the neighboring division (as it was the explicit goal of CRU officers in numerous instances noted), means that there is an abundance of ‘policeable’ problems or matters for ‘community police’ that do not disappear, but just get re-rooted, moved and re-shuffled. Rather, upon the substantial demands and emphasis of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ concerns and fears of public and ‘community’, they need constant attention, expertise, work, and intervention. These, so the impression is created in the ‘community policing’ settings observed, only the public police,
in their role or special ability as ‘community police’ can or are willing to provide. This kind of ‘community police’ work as examined and described, may well qualify as an institutional ‘self-service’ arrangement, invented and operated by the institution of ‘community police’. Implicitly, the question arises, of course, as to whether there is a genuine and fundamental operational or institutional interest on the side of ‘community police’ to make the ‘street’, ‘disorder’ and ‘safety’ problems that are being dealt with really and effectively disappear. The intended and much applauded ‘localization’ of policing matters, of course, has not only the effects of making policing more sensitive to local needs. It also entails the consequences that visions and objectives of ‘community police’ work have become narrowed to local boundaries. This, to a significant degree, means that the police as an organization and complex operation may be losing sight of the larger scale social, professional and institutional processes and effects that ‘community police’ work has beyond the local limits of the many small ‘safety’ and ‘quality of life’ worlds that it has created for itself.

But ‘community police’ workers and their institutions may not be interested in these at all. It may be the case, based on the observational and interactional research evidence presented, that one of the real and core processes and outcomes of ‘community policing’ is one of silently and in a self-directed manner ‘making’ - as much as effectively ‘solving’ - problems to be dealt with by ‘community police’. This wider process of problem ‘making’ for ‘community police’ includes the concrete identification and labeling of people, matters and behaviors predominantly in public places as ‘community police’ problems, offering police specific action and interventions that allow the claim that ‘something is being done’, promising some sort of ‘solution’, a spatial or temporal elimination, or rather displacement, of the problem symptom, and the repetition of the same cycle over and over again when problems re-appear in some form or another. These considerations lead us to a completely different understanding of how, despite its seeming operational ‘failures’, disillusionments and unsolvabilities of its ‘problem solving’ tasks, ‘community policing’ may actually work extremely well, successfully and effectively for the institutional interests - primarily the public police as ‘community police’. This idea of ‘community policing’ working for the police, but also for other select local and social interests involved in the ‘community policing’ scheme deserves further detailed attention.

**Officer perceptions of the effectiveness of ‘community police’ work**
When asked about the ‘effectiveness’ of ‘community policing’ as practised in their division, the majority of CRU officers could not point to significant or noticeable improvements in terms of crime prevalence, safety, or quality of life as related to disorder and security. While some CRU officers believed that the ‘harder’, ‘more intelligent’ and ‘persistent’ approach to local street crime and disorder will eventually ‘solve problems’ and make a difference compared to the traditional reactive policing approach, a closer look at the ‘larger picture’, reveals that most of them were fairly disillusioned and sombre about the effects of their work. Many CRU officers perceived themselves to be playing a ‘no win game’, that they are “chasing shadows” [C05], and that they are expected to accomplish impossible goals or ‘solutions’, or work on matters they are unable to deal with effectively in the long run. There is a strong tendency among many CRU officers to blame other parts of the criminal justice system for the ineffectiveness of their own work and efforts, but also the fact that under the ‘community policing’ idea, police are expected to deal with and completely resolve problems and challenges that are beyond their reach. Nevertheless, according to the majority of CRU officers interviewed much of ‘community police’ work in practice seems to be about re-assertion of the symbolic principle that the police ‘just can’t give up the fight’ although real ‘solutions’ do not seem to be at hand. A few officers elaborate on these professional-philosophical sentiments shared by the majority of their CRU colleagues.

Effectiveness of this kind of police work is very short term. We did a project in the summer, where we were arresting people for trafficking cocaine. There is supposed to be a pretty heavy sentence for trafficking cocaine, but most of them only got a few weeks, and are out again already. The same players are there, day after day after day. When we were arresting traffickers in a plainclothes function, as fast as we were arresting people and taking them into the station, others were moving on taking their spots. Like ants in an ant hill, there is just too many. It is very short term. I don’t know who you have to thank for that - the courts, I don’t know. I find it very short term. How you solve the problem, I have no idea. But you can’t quit attacking them, that is the main thing. [...] Plainclothes is the same thing. They don’t keep them in jail. They showcase them, they get a week, they are out again. They are asking for them to get boundaries now, which should keep them out of the area. With some of them it works, but it obviously just moves them into another area. And the boundaries only last for so long, what’s the long term effect? After a while, the case is dealt with, the boundaries are gone, and the hooker is back. Tough thing to deal with. And now, you might even have more, because somebody else filled their places. Whether it is old or new faces, the spots are filled. That is for sure. [...] This job, it is a big game. It is just a big game. You come to work, you play the game, by the rules, and you go home. And I’m not sure who wins mostly. But it’s very costly. And it does not end, it just goes round in circles. [C14]

[Consider the example of a] donut shop that is allowing crack dealers to come in and sell drugs. Other store owners in the area were concerned about it for quite a while, and I guess the problem solving approach to this is that we are going in and educating the people who are in the place and say, look, these
are the problem people, we have to do something about it, we can’t be here all the time. That and, of course, the increasing number of homeless people, who for some reasons gravitate to this area and are always a pest. That will never be resolved, the police can never solve that, that is a social problem. Basically, everyday, what we do is, we pick them up, and bring them into the station for a half day. Then they go out and it’s the same story all over. That will never get solved. The drug problem - many officers bring people in all the time, it doesn’t change anything. It’s just a cycle. [...] It’s like the old bandaid solution. You take a couple of people off the street, and store owner is like, oh, thank you very much, you took the vagrant away from the front of my store, that’s great, and then you go on your days off, and you come back and go to the store owner, and he says, oh, they’re back, it’s the same thing all over again. I guess if we had 100 more police officers even, it would not make any difference. I mean, when you are addicted to something, you are addicted to something. If you don’t get help, you’ll be getting right back all the time to get your drugs. It’s a global problem, and we’re trying put a few bandais on in the little area of the [A neighbourhood]. It’s just the nature of police work. If you let it get too frustrating, if you let it get too overwhelming, you can’t do your job. You can’t let something like this get too frustrating. We would have to question why we are doing this at all. It’s a problem, and this is what happens. But also, you can’t say, oh, they live here, I don’t. You have to get involved. You have to try your best, but somewhere in the middle. But you also have to educate people. The problems have been here for a long time. We do what we can, you do what you can as well. But it’s going to be here, you know, that’s for sure. [C10]

But here in the [A and B areas] it will be hard to ever get rid of the drug problem. And related to the drugs, stuff like theft and robberies. But if you tried to keep the drugs and the dealers away, you’d maybe keep these problems away too. Most of the other problems in the area are social problems or economical problems. Really, as a police officer, how should I solve any of these problems. I mean, I can’t give these people any more money than they have, I can’t really change any of these problems. Everyone knows that the main problem is drugs. [C15]

Rather, most of the CRU officers trying to answer the question of the ‘effectiveness of community police’ pointed to the fact that the police now was ‘more accepted and integrated in the community’, that ‘communications were a lot better and expanded’, and that there was again a ‘trust and confidence relationship from community to police’ on the basis of which the ‘community’ would approach, inform, and work with police on ‘community police’ matters. In short, ‘community police’ work, from the perspective of the officers, had succeeded in rendering its social environments more ‘policeable’, and it had effectively ‘re-socialized’ the police.

Some CRU officers illustrate and explain representatively for the majority of their colleagues sampled:

_I think the community is happier, I think there are people out there who are glad to believe that we are their tool. That’s just the way it’s been going. That’s a fact, and I think it does bother certain people, but I think most of them are happy. [...] I don’t think the safety situation has improved, I don’t think that crime has decreased. The community has better access to us, and some people now have a lot of power over us and can use us when they need the police. There is always going to be the problem, there is going to be the prostitution, there is going to be the drugs. It’s going to happen, and it is happening today. But when it happens, the morning after, they can call. And it won’t just be the sergeant and say we’ll drive by one the_
next few days. But now it is, yes ma'am, oh, your lane-way again? Well, we are going to set up a meeting. Really, you are? Well, that is great, I'll set things up. Now, something is going to be done, and an officer will be there. It does not matter that we can't do anything about the problem, but every officer would say, this is what you can do, this is what you should do. You should have a light here, you should do this and everything else. [C12]

I don't know. Honestly, I doubt that community policing has made a difference in the division. The one thing you have to understand is that 99 [division] has always been this kind of area, everybody from the city comes down here, and they always have come down here. So has it made a difference? I think what it has, it has made people much more aware. It has gotten people involved. Much more involved than before. It's kind of hard to answer. It has changed our relations with community quite a bit. But you have to see that the people that we meet with all the time have supported police anyway. So regardless if we walk the beat or drive in cars, the majority of people we meet have supported what we do, no matter what. We are preaching to the converted, almost. The people that we don't see or don't talk to, we will never get through. Never will. [C10]

The effects of community policing in the division - gee, I have never really thought about its impacts. It just has become a way of policing now, I guess. I just feel more comfortable in the community, when I go into the community, I know people, and they know me, they come up to me and speak to me. I know people, I can go in there. If something is going on, or if I need something, I know who I can go to and talk to. Whereas prior to that, I would not know where to start. Now I know who is in charge of management of the building, who is the security officer, who are the players, who are the residents that know things or may have leads. But I also know who will not talk to me, and who is causing the problems usually. It has just become a more comfortable and productive way of doing things, to go into a community knowing that you know it, knowing that people know you. I don't really think that crime or problems have substantially been reduced. But I don't think that we can expect that. If anything, some things, like drug dealing, may have increased. Some streets may be a bit cleaner, and more crime is going on in hiding. It has become more of an underground thing, in dark corners, alleyways, side streets, this type of thing. Less visible. But the main effect is more that people and the police feel more comfortable dealing with each other, that's the main thing. [C15]

I don't know if things have changed a lot. I think it has brought the community closer to the police. I mean, we have more time to stop and talk to people, as opposed to just driving by in the car. It's good that way. We've educated a lot of people in a lot of different ways, that I am sure that they would have never heard about if it was not for the foot patrol talking to people. Simple things, what to do about non-emergency matters, what they should tell us, what our concerns are. What to do when there are certain problems, whether it is a 911 call or a long term thing that should be dealt with by the CRU. Lot of things like that. In many ways, it's been better that way. Like I said, you are gonna have people talking to the police who never had contact with the police before, or would not have had contact with the police before if it had not been for that community policing thing. I think it is a good thing, in a small way. We have a lot of people here, and not many officers. So if they do come in contact, and it's positive, then all is a little bit better. [C14]
'Community police's' perspective on 'community'

The TCPF's 'community policing' blueprint based its projections and operational propositions on a rather ambiguous and un-critical concept of 'community'. Its 'community' imagery left most of the previously discussed social and empirical aspects and dynamics inherent to 'community' largely un-examined. To start with, it may serve as an interesting indication that the TCPF in its 'community policing' documents consistently chose to speak of "the community" rather than a possible plurality of 'communities' under its policing jurisdiction. It fundamentally referred to 'the community' that was to be involved and cooperated with in 'community police' work as an unambiguous, objective and static 'fact', prescribing, for example, that the "local police division be made responsible for the development and implementation of working partnerships with the community, its members and organizations as an essential element of effective problem-solving" (TCPF 1994:40). For these purposes, "members and groups from the community must be involved in the planning and goal-setting, not just the operation of these initiatives", while a "mutual understanding must develop between the police and the local community". As central pillars towards these objectives, the TCPF emphasized the goal of "community empowerment, or enabling a community to increase control over and improve safety and quality of life" as well as "community self-determination of problems and solutions" (ibid. 29).

While it was left rather unclear how 'the community' in the everyday matters and contexts of 'community policing' would be operationalized, practised or its potential social biases be remedied, an additional formal level of 'community involvement' for 'community police' work was proposed through the establishment of a "Community Police Liaison Committee" [CPLC]. Under "the guidance of the unit commander" the CPLC's function was to "participate in decisions [by] identifying community problems, prioritizing community problems, determining possible solutions to community problems (including the role that the community may play in resolving the problem) and measuring the success of the police/community response" (1994:115). It was stated
from the police's side that "police input is necessary at all levels, but should not dominate the committee's work". There were, however, cautious hints that the concept of a consensual, unambiguous and homogeneous 'community' - especially with regards to conflict-laden matters such as crime and policing - may be unlikely or difficult to accomplish in practice. The TCPF suggested that the CPLC should "represent as many aspects of the area served as possible by reflecting the demographic and socio-economic nature of the neighbourhoods. The age and ethnic backgrounds of the members of the committees must be as close as possible to the overall make-up of the divisions. They should include people with a variety of interests and policing concerns, including local residents and business people, school and health officials and members of religious and service organizations" (ibid. 39 and 115), and that "establishing representative committees ... presents an ongoing challenge" (39). The TCPF also recognized that CPLCs "are not a formal part of the divisions, and there is no consistent formula for the committees to follow. No guidelines exist surrounding the expectations of the committees and their members; no guidance is given about what their priorities and expectations should be. No standards exist whereby community-police committees can evaluate their efforts" (1993:39), but no explicit suggestions were made on how to remedy these gaps.

Given its extremely diverse and heterogeneous social, economic, cultural and ethnic profile, as well as the fact that it is the home to many transients or temporary 'community' members, the task of selecting and comprising 'community' representatives and committees for the policing jurisdiction of 99 Division would have been an extremely difficult task in theory. However, 99 Division, during the period over which 'community policing' was introduced neither appeared to have the organizational resources nor indicated any explicit intentions to actively develop or recruit individuals or forums that came close to meeting the ideal parameters outlined and quoted above. Rather, the division in its 'community police' work, in quite a taken-for-granted manner, started to rely on and cooperate with a number of neighbourhood and 'community' organization groups that had formed and evolved within the divisional boundaries over the past few years. All of these associations, as will be further elaborated on below, had crime, safety and policing as one of their concerns, and in most instances their inaugurating and principal focus and goal. About six or seven of such organizations existed in more or less developed form prior to the official initiation of 'community policing' in 99 Division, and an additional three or four were formed after its establishment, partly in response to or with active
support of the division’s Community Response Unit.

These issues remained largely un-debated within the police organization itself. Across the board, the CRU officers predominantly practised a habit of referral to ‘community’ and ‘community organizations’ or ‘neighbourhood groups’ interchangeably. As an instructive example, one of the division’s CRU sergeants prepared a ‘Community Profile’ on 99 Division for a national ‘community policing’ conference, listing and describing the division’s ten ‘community’ organizations by name and their core crime concerns and activities as the division’s actual ‘neighbourhoods’, its populations and policing concerns. One of them - a socially, economically, culturally and structurally highly diversified area featuring family residences, apartment buildings, small businesses, numerous social service agencies, social housing, abandoned houses and properties was described as “the area that houses a large number of renovated Victorian homes, attracts a number of middle class citizens, and small businesses. ... This area has been very successful in closing down several crack houses, one licensed restaurant, as well as obtaining court ordered restrictions on two area drop-in centres. [It] has a very effective ‘victim witness statement program’ presently being used in the criminal courts to assist in drugs and prostitution matters”.

It seemed an un-problematic and not-to-be questioned ‘given’ to the majority of CRU officers that the opinions, requests and initiatives of these ‘community organizations’ were presented and stood as being for ‘the community’ at large, and for the most part, this may have been out of sheer convenience: This ‘community’ or assembly of ‘communities’ existed and was ‘there’, it was keen and eager to get involved in crime and safety work with the police, and it was organized in structures that were amenable and adjustable to the organizational features and practices of police operations. Furthermore, these local organizations and initiatives boldly and clearly carried the label of ‘community’ which rendered them easily and effectively referable to as ‘community partners’ by the police in accordance with, at least symbolically, the standards that had been outlined in the TCPF’s ‘community policing’ blueprint.

One of the indicators of the ready and keen co-optation and acceptance of the existing ‘community’ organizations by the police as ‘the community’ is the way the division followed the TCPF’s requirement to divide up its overall jurisdiction into ‘neighbourhoods’ for the purposes of localized ‘community police’ services. Here, the division basically took the structures and ‘neighbourhood’ claims of the existing ten ‘community’ associations and organized its operational
neighbourhood' entities according to their claimed boundaries, and even their own chosen names. This, of course, had more than just organizational-geographical implications. It laid the foundations for the wider understanding of 'community', its 'problems', concerns and parameters in accordance with a perspective and a routine already established, practised and reinforced by the different respective community groups, but in addition now officially sanctioning them as 'community'. This approach, however, was also a fairly convenient one for the police, since explicit and tangible 'community' stakes were claimed, borders were drawn and a basic, 'policeable community' was organized and set in place for the symbolic project of 'community policing'. 'Community' became perfectly 'thinkable' and workable for divisional police purposes via the 'community' organizations, since 'it' existed in terms of organizational structures, real people and 'real' police-related concerns and thus provided the police with the principally needed opportunity and resource to act on, relate to and 'talk' 'community'. These empirical realities described in the research setting point to some fundamental problematics of the practical mobilization, selection and composition of 'community' within 'community policing' contexts. These are alluded to, for example, by Friedmann who in a taken-for-granted manner assumes that 'community policing' looks towards, deals with and emphasizes "cooperation with the 'responsive' element in society" (1992:101) which are described as those (not necessarily representative or balanced) "segments of the community that can respond and have the competency to do so" (Heywood in: ibid.).

The TCPF had defined 'community' for the purposes of 'community policing' as "everybody who lives, works and plays in the community". However, there was a considerable initial ambiguity, inconsistency and almost a sense of helplessness among CRU officers when explicitly asked who 'the community' and its members actually were, how to recognize them as such, and how these definitions were put into operational practice in their daily work. Some of the officers repeated the 'everybody who lives, works and plays in the area' definition provided in TCPF manuals, but then quickly hesitated or corrected themselves when it was pointed out in conversations that this may include prostitutes or drug dealers. Others limited 'community' membership to people who were in the area for 'legitimate' reasons, or the people who were 'productive' or even 'law-abiding' members of the community. However, despite these apparent potential discrepancies and inconsistencies, there was a strong confidence among all the officers that the police would have the means and ways to 'recognize' who is a legitimate and orderly
member of the ‘community’ and who is not, or an individual who does ‘harm’ versus ‘good’ to the ‘community’. Only a small minority of officers conceded that drawing these distinctions in a meaningful way may in itself be a difficult exercise.

The following quotes by CRU officers illustrate the volatility and ambiguity of the ‘community’ concept from the police perspective. At the same time they illustrate how the officers make ‘community’ ‘thinkable’ and ‘workable’ by constructing and imagining it from a police perspective. Their idea of ‘community’ features an ambiguity swinging from claims about a homogeneous group with collective interests to social clusters with differing and potentially conflicting agendas and approaches. However, there was also an implicit assumption among many officers that ‘community’ is in practice expressed in certain interests or people who naturally step forward, and who are usually the ones whose views are close to or in basic agreement with the police, their foci and their work. But whatever the scenario might be, the majority of the officers claim that the police have a clear sense and ability to figure out who the ‘community’ is, to identify ‘objectively’ what the ‘community’ wants, and when getting conflicting messages, to decide where the ‘community’ stands.

Some CRU officers elaborate on their predominant concept of, understanding of and practical mobilization and relationship with ‘community’ as it happens to materialize in their practical ‘police work’ contexts:

If we are doing our jobs and walking the beat, we can identify who members of the community are, who lives there, and who works there. It is about people who are there for a lawful purpose. The definition of the community should clearly exclude people who are there for an unlawful purpose, and decrease the quality of life in the area. The community in the [A neighbourhood] is about as homogeneous as you can get for [The City]. They are pretty much united in a common cause. That is another very positive factor for our work. But if you were to go across the street to the [B neighbourhood], you’d find a lot of conflicting groups. There is much conflict about who is to take credit, who is running the safety station, and it is all linked to politics. There is so many different ethnic groups with their own leaders, and their own prejudices and own concerns, that we might find that if we are enforcing the will of one community, we will be stepping on the toes of another community. So the fact that the community in some areas is splintered is a deterrent for us, because we might end up potentially pleasing one group and displeasing the other. [C05]

I would define community as somebody who is either living in the area, or involved in legitimate pursuits in the area. So if they take [public transportation] there to go to school or to work there, then fine, if they are a drug dealer or a prostitute who is travelling in from the outside into the area and their concern is that a citizen’s group keeps marching past, waving plaques in their face saying ‘say no to drugs’ and stuff, ‘toss the prostitutes out’, well then, their concern, I am sorry, I don’t have much sympathy for it. If it’s a
I don’t think that you can say that all communities are alike. When a community comes to us with a concern, it’s pretty much a good guess that their concerns are the same, because otherwise they would not have come together. We identified the leaders, the spokespeople of the community groups, the stakeholders. My sergeant is big on these buzzwords. I don’t want to say the more important people in the community, but the stakeholders, so that we would know where our starting point is. You identify the stakeholders, you get them involved, I mean, they are the leaders of their groups, and they go back to their people, almost like a union rep, so that is where most of our communication is happening. I can’t talk to 150 people intimately, but I can talk to one person intimately, and they can hopefully pass on my side of things. [...] Whenever there comes a group together, there is always one or two main people, and there is always a leader, and these are the people that we talk to, these are the people whose phone numbers we have, whenever they have a problem they call us. We talk to them, ten or twenty times a month or so. So that’s how we get the rapport with the community built up. [C03]

The majority of the CRU officers’ views were also dominated by the claim that they know concretely who ‘community’ is, and that they take all interests and possible conflicting agendas comprehensively, objectively and fairly into consideration when doing police work. Another CRU officer elaborated on who ‘community’ is, and who is not ‘community’ in the context of a conflict between a local residents’ organization and a social service agency. The officer’s illustrations are rather instructive in the sense that they help further understand the earlier suggested self-perception of the ‘community police’ as a ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ judge and ‘agent’ of ‘community’ and its internal tensions and dynamics. In these contexts, ‘community’ can then not be understood as being ‘naturally’ there and acted upon by the police, but ‘community’ in these ‘community police’ practices becomes constructed as the entity which more or less fits the worldview, agenda and operational realities of the police. Other sides or interests not fitting into these predetermined patterns, it seems, become disqualified or barred from these circles of power, influence or input by a combination of coincidence and default. The police become a normative and a political ‘creator’ of ‘community’:

I don’t think that anybody is being ignored by us, really. I mean, just the ordinary Joe Citizen in the community who does not want to get politically active in the [Z community] group does not get heard. But they speak for the community. They know what’s going on, what has to be done. I mean, if you are not a member of the [Z community group], which is a pretty politically active community, you are not getting an ear. The [Z group] represents a special breed of interests in the area. They represent the homeowners in the neighbourhood. The transient people that are living in the rooming houses and stuff are not represented by them. So in a way, if I think about it, there is two conflicting groups of interests in our
area. There is the actual [Z community], who is very right wing, and there is the people from the [A Church], the drop-in and the women’s shelter, and they are in totally conflicting worlds. But we are basically just dealing with the one side, because the left-wing community of the church will not cooperate with us. They feel we are barbarians who beat people, they don’t want to have anything to do with us. They’re not really part of the community we are dealing with. Once in a while, we have to listen to both sides and try to resolve some stuff. The one issue at the church was that the members of [Z community] had found out that we were not allowed to go into the church drop-in, which is a public place. So they called the bishop, and wanted to have a meeting, and so we heard both arguments, from the church and the community. They said that this is a place for homeless people, and should you be able as the police to walk into any home when you want? And our reply was, of course we don’t, that’s pushing it too much. But then the community complained and said that drug dealers would hang out outside, and as soon as they’d see the police, they would run inside, for protection, so that issue really never did get resolved. The people at the church just believed that we should not be able to go in. But they are not really stakeholders of the community. [C07]

Other CRU officers, however, from another perspective give testimony to the fact that the supposedly united, clear-cut and consensual ‘community’ in practical reality is a complex, volatile and conflictuous mix of interests, agendas and power dynamics. All of this complexity appears as an unmanageable task for the officer to balance, weigh and negotiate fairly and instead necessitates ‘pragmatic’ and ‘professional’ choices about who to talk to, deal with and relate to as ‘community’. The challenge for ‘community police’ work practice appears to pick the local interests and organized demands that seem appropriate, that present the least resistance to police structures and agendas and that can most convincingly be presented and defended as representative of ‘community’. The appropriateness, balancing and fairness of these selections, so it is portrayed in the view of the police officers, is facilitated and ensured by the ‘professional’ and ‘objective’ nature of the police perspective on their social environments. Some officers elaborate on their and their peers’ predominant views:

We are dealing with a business association as the major community in our area. They have meetings, and they tend to think that everybody is on their side, and listens to them and that the support is there. What I think they don’t realize is that they don’t get out and talk to people the way we talk to them. They think that we are all on the same line here, and this is what we want in our area. But there are some people in the area that don’t listen to them at all, that have their own way of thinking about issues, or have their own problems, and they want us to police their business or their little strip differently than with the others. So, in any area, they are all concerned about drugs, and drunks walking up and down the street, but also a lot of the stores have their own little agendas, they want us to be their own personal police. I mean, we try our best but we can’t be there for everybody, talk to everybody, look after everybody’s concerns the same way. But in every area you have little factions. Then, there is a lot of individuals who don’t want to be part of the big picture. You humour it. They just want to be left alone, but then they still want you to look after whatever their problems might be. So again, you always get the same old people out to these community meetings and the walks. The same people go to meetings, the same people go to walkabouts. [C10]
Community to me, ideally, is basically everybody who lives here or works here, or even just drives through the community on a day-to-day basis. The community that we are dealing with on a one-on-one basis and phone calls and stuff, I find them more of a spokesperson for the area. They obviously have their own opinions, and not everybody in the community agrees with them, but I find them to be the active front people, who come forward and path the way for others. They come forward and say what others would like to say. They are explicit spokespersons for the community. But I think they represent a little tiny chunk of the community. I think they are really only worried just about their own little area, and rightly so. They live there, and they have a business there, and they worry about a little circle around their place, and they want that dealt with. They want to tell the police exactly what the problems are and see that we can deal with them. And rightly so, I can’t see them worried about something that is 14 blocks from their own house. They are never there, they don’t live there and they don’t use that area. I find them to be a very tightly knit group in their area. [...] There is probably a lot of people out there who we don’t hear, or who have a problem with their homes or business and they just don’t come forward. Very well could be. I have spoken to a few people in the area about a problem, and said, we will see what we can do for you, and they seemed almost surprised. The odd one comes to you and says, ‘I know there is nothing you can do about this, but this is going on’. Well, thanks for letting us know, we will look into it. They are very surprised that you listen to them at all, and I get the feeling that they have never spoken to the police before, nor to any of the community groups. There is probably quite a few pockets of people who don’t know what is going on or who haven’t spoken to us. But often the quiet ones are the ones that don’t have problems or don’t want to have anything to do with the police. There is only so many things that you can do, anyway. [C14]

In the community, you only hear the people that get together, really. So you hear the voices, the concerns of a very small group of people, which don’t change, and who have been involved in this for a long time. They all basically seem to have the same concerns. So I don’t know if they really represent the voice of the community, but they seem to come together and operate under that assumption. They are probably somewhat representative and they are saying what the problems are and stuff, but I guess you can also look out there and say, I disagree, because I don’t have drug or prostitution problems, or they at least don’t bother me. You just have to look at some of these groups. For a community of 5000 residents or so, there is a group of 5 or six people talking about the problems. And it’s always the same people. That’s odd. And they are not elected. They are more like self-appointed. They have their own interests and hidden agendas, and they see that stuff as a stepping stone for themselves. A lot of them are homeowners. [C13]

Just looking at the CRU sergeants with respect to their perspectives on who ‘community’ is for the purposes of ‘community police’ work, how well they are being communicated with and understood, and where some of the biases of the police approach might lie, stark differences were observed. First, there are ‘consensus community’ believers among the sergeants who seem to assume basic homogeneity, agreement and consensus within the ‘community’ on policing matters. In case there is any deviant opinions or viewpoints, it is for ‘trivial’ reasons that can not be of too much concern to the police. There is also an assumption that by definition and because of their unique role, the police naturally and automatically identify and relate to the true ‘community’. But the police are also burdened with the task of creating and maintaining a practically workable ‘community’ - a ‘community’ that works for the police’s purposes and for the ends of ‘community
policing': This happens via the constant efforts of presenting, embodying and communicating an institution of police and police work that is 'social', in touch with 'community' and responsive to 'community' concerns and needs.

I think in most aspects, the community have the same concerns, there is basic consensus, and they are looking for the same solutions. There are some people that have certain concerns, and they have their own agendas how they would like to see things done. Some are quite a bit off the wall. But generally we are all on the same level. I was only at one meeting where people requested silly things to be done, to the extreme end. It was out of frustration. They have been dealing with things for too long, and they are at the end of the rope. So they were looking for silly solutions. [...] As far as communities within our neighborhoods go, since we have all the groups and the CPLC that meet and have representation from all areas, I think we have all the community voices and interests together. As far as very special interest groups go, maybe we have not brought them fully into the discussion yet, but as far as the communities go, I am sure that we have the full spectrum that is out there. [S02]

Store owners, residents, people who run the communities are the most important stakeholders, because they are obviously the ones that have the problems that they need our help for. The community organizations pretty much reflect a fair representation of their communities and their concerns. They are the community, that is where they come from, and they act for them. I don't think that there are any significant voices or interests out there that we are not taking properly into consideration, or pay attention to. I mean, you can always get the different groups, like Somali, or whatever, but we don't canvass them. If they want to canvass us to help them, then we will go and help them, but they have to approach us. If it happens, it happens. I mean, last year they had some soccer tournament, they called us, and we went up and watched. We are very eager to be involved with any kind of community events, but we are not magicians, we don't know where they are all happening. [S04]

The community I am dealing with for policing is represented by the CPLC. And they represent the individual communities, they bring their representation to that community. At that particular meeting, you have all the relevant communities, with the one exception. I am not always sure if the community organizations truly represent their entire communities. To give you an example, I think that the [A community] and the [B community] are truly representative. I also think that the [C community] is truly representative, because when you go to their meetings, there is an astonishing amount of people. And you are never going to get everybody to come out, because it is not their thing. But then you go to the [B community], where you have a business and a residential community. It all depends who is very active in the beginning. I am asked to go to a meeting there, and I find out that the residents are trying to form two committees. Identical, because the business community does not know what the residential community is doing. So what are you going to do? We will of course try to pull them together and to make them work in that area. [...] There are some groups or interests who claim that they are overheard or not listened to justly. At least they perceive it that way. We try to deal with everybody fairly. All of a sudden, a head pops out of the bushes from a direction we have not been looking. One would probably be in the area of the [A community], a rooming house. The [people of the A community] think it should go through them, and the [A community] itself is now thinking about splitting into North and South, but we have to pull them back because we can't deal with so many groups. So we got to pull them back and deal with what we've got. Maybe we'll have something from the Neighborhood Watch concept, and have a block captain. Brings the reports of the blocks to the main committee meeting, and then deals with us. They have to have some kind of structure. Who's the president, who's the chair. There is no structure to most of these things. They just
want to go there and yap. Well, we want to deal with a structured organization before I respond to what they say. [SOS]

But then there are also some voices among the CRU sergeants who seem considerably alert to the fact that the ‘community’ they are dealing with in most instances is a fairly subjective, selective and agenda-driven cluster of interests. They seemed to ‘acknowledge’ the fact that ‘community’ in practice is characterized by very specific demands and interests. They are organized and best capable of dealing with police in their predominant structures, with regards to the matters they are interested in dealing with, and in the ways in which the police prefer to deal with issues. In short, there is a ‘community’ that conveniently fits the pattern that the police have opened up and made available for ‘cooperation’ with the ‘outside’ within a fundamentally ‘police-centred’ framework of ‘community policing’:

You can work on community policing as long as you want, but you will never get to the true needs of the community, to the true problems. There is only so many people who want to even talk to and cooperate with the police. We are going to meetings all the time, and it is the same, small groups of people all the time, we have to keep that in our minds. We are listening to and hearing from the same people all the time. Very rarely is there a new person involved, that is something we should probably be quite cautious about. Is it public order issues, property interests or whatever - there is a mix in there. It matters on the actual area, and it matters on the group that is most vocal in the area. We are listening to local lobbyists, and there are different kinds of lobbyists. We are, of course trying to keep our neutrality, but some of these concerns are very enlightening, where you would think that the underworld or the gang activity would be a major problem, but it is not such a big concern. They would rather have lighted undergrounds. [...] What characterizes the active and prominent community group activists is that they have lots of time on their hands. And they do have an interest that if they can improve their area in terms of safety, they are probably going to improve the sale price of their homes, their values, property values will go up dramatically. We are right next to [The City's] downtown, and if they will ever manage to refurbish this area, their property values will double, and I think that is a big factor, if not the biggest one in their interest. Some people have lived here all their lives, and they are more interested in the communities themselves, and you can see the difference in their approaches. There is a lot of sub-political involvement, a lot of the people involved in the groups are affiliated with political parties, underneath the table more so than above, and a lot of them are trying to make their voices heard. They are lobbyists, they are meeting on a regular basis, they have a clear agenda of interests, and they are lobbying for certain things. And the better they are organized the stronger are they - just like in the real lobbying world. And we are already seeing it happening, in the sense that they are not accepting given power structures anymore. Some of them have gone past our unit commander to get certain action when they should not have from the deputy when it should not have happened that way. So our senior management will have to be trained on this as well, so that the local decision-makers deal with these things, not who ever has the most power and happens to be available. But that just shows the clout of some of the lobbyist’s groups, and that the squeakiest wheel gets the oil. [...] Some of the minorities are very much pushed into the background. You go to the CPLC meetings, and there is very few, basically no minorities there represented at all, and this is something that has to be realized by the senior officers. If you look around, most of our community leaders are white, running these groups. Are they representing the communities of the J community or the R
community? I doubt it. Are they representing a certain limited segment of the community? Probably. [S01]

From a policing standpoint, it is an important job for us to identify the community, and to identify the composition of the community. Who are the community leaders, how are they perceived in the community, we need to start there. What is core to them is the input that they have. This is part of the new skill set of community policing. To be able to identify all the community leaders and stakeholders, and put it all together. What emerges from that is a profile of the needs of the community. Now they are going out, identifying what is all out there. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the community, what are the safety and security concerns. Bringing all that knowledge together, ideally, is part of the community policing approach. What seems predominant in this area, what you hear about all the time, are drugs, hookers and pimps. But I am telling you - if you listen close enough, those three concerns are not the predominant concerns of many of the people in this community. These three issues are probably a big concern to just 25% of all people in this community. Part of the reason for that imbalance is the organization itself. We play to that game that is promoted by some key players in the field. We are still very much in the traditional mindset of the police. And the 75% of the community to whom prostitution and drugs are not such a big issue, they are not well organized, they are not aware of how they can communicate their concerns effectively, they are not as vocal, they work in isolation. Take it as an example: One of our neighborhood groups has 80 different ethno-cultural groups - that is 80 groups. They are very dispersed, they are not that well structured, they don’t have the resources to communicate their interests as others do so effectively. Consequently, they are unable to convey their concerns. But talking to some or even many of them, you get a very distinct picture. [...] The groups that are out there don’t really adequately represent the true composition of the neighborhoods and communities out there. What’s not known is what really the concerns and needs are that are out there. To date, we have not made an effort and we are not doing a very good job in finding out what all the needs and concerns are that exist in the community, and the question is if this is part of our job or not. We just take and work with what is brought to us, dropped right in front of us, and that is just a small part of the picture. What you would really need to do is, you need to identify and measure the needs of the different groups, and compare them, and act on them. And the way we are doing it right now, we are poorly and pathetically doing it, we are basically not doing it at all. [S03]

One of the key aspects of the ‘re-socialization’ of ‘community police’ is certainly the fact that ‘community police’ work provides the public police with the long-missed opportunity to sympathize, solidarize and cooperate with ‘social peers’ in the ‘community’, instead of only dealing with the ‘down-and-out’, marginalized and deviant elements of society. ‘Community police’ work allows and encourages its officers to associate with to people and interests to whom and to which they can relate and which mirror their own middle-class and conservative norms, concerns and values.

In fact, it has been argued that police officers’ image of themselves, their work and their perspective on the matters and people they are dealing with is reflexively shaped by a ‘middle class’ centricity or “order” which is “reflected in the activities they are taught to pursue, in the techniques they are taught to use in pursuit, and in their own identification with the values of middle class respectability”; in this mindset, their thinking and acting is reflexively shaped by
“what the powerful and respectable want” and at the “same time they see this as something they themselves support” (Ericson 1982:8f). Police, as this study’s field data also illustrate, tend to see the social world they work in as divided into a ‘rough’ and a ‘respectable’ cluster of people. Many of the CRU officers observed during ‘community police’ work on the streets had contact with what they perceived and presented to be two ‘classes’ or ‘types’ of people: ‘Respectables’ - ‘members’, ‘representatives’ and ‘stakeholders’ of the ‘community’ in the form of local store owners, residents, local activists, and so on - and ‘disorder’ or ‘scum’ people (as one of the CRU officers called them) that fell into one of the above listed ‘street problem’ categories (compare Shearing 1980). As such, the ‘respectable community’ is usually “associated with the white, middle-class, property-owning section of society living out a prosperous and law-abiding life” that the police see themselves leading, representing or striving for (McConville and Shepherd 1992:138f, see Reiner 1992). Other occupational-cultural research has shown that the police job generally attracts conservative and authoritarian personalities, often fostering illiberal and intolerant attitudes against socio-economic and ethnic minorities (Colman and Gorman 1982, McConville and Shepherd 1992).

As a good illustration of these perceptions of the social world surrounding the police, the following CRU officer is referring to a local conflict between a rooming house providing social services to homeless people, and a residents’ group that has launched vigorous opposition against the institution and the alleged harms caused for the ‘community’ by the hostel’s patrons:

One group, the social service groups, are saying, well, these [homeless] people are part of the community, and you have to be able to deal with them, whereas the [Z residents' group] say, well, we should not have to deal with them, or you people [the police] should be containing them and their problems more. I can sympathize, and I guess that has to do with the fact that I am more of right-winger, I can sympathize more with the residents groups, because I know how I’d feel if I was living in an area where there was a lot of vagrants sleeping and vomiting on your property, so I can feel kind of for the residents’ groups, I mean for the residents’ groups as opposed to the social groups. [C08]

Other CRU officers elaborate on how they personally, emphatically and professionally relate to the ‘community’ and its population they are dealing with in the context of their ‘community police’ work:

There really isn’t a raging crime problem in our current neighbourhood. The drug dealing is annoying, it is criminal, but it’s not like it’s a hellhole, it’s just by and large a nice area that’s slightly deteriorated. I
think that the community people there are fairly are similar in their outlook to myself. Similar socio-economic backgrounds, similar understandings of life. If I lived downtown, I would probably live in an area like this, and I think that this makes it an easy place to work, because my expectations are pretty much what the community expectations are. [...] I believe that community policing is really about messages that you want to hear from the police, and in the style that you are accustomed to. So when you hear somebody who looks kind of like you and talks like you, and making a presentation that makes sense to you, you tend to hear the message very clearly. Whereas when you hear somebody who has no commonality with you, you tend not to hear their message. I think that is the trick to the community officer, it is to be able to strip away those biases, and to be able to hear concerns coming out of the community, as if it was your own, as opposed to a drug dealer who complains that he does not feel safe here anymore - well, hell, then just leave. [C03]

In the day-to-day duties, we only used to deal with the usual problem population. There is the historic joke that only in [99 division], you would in most instances arrest your victim. You now come into contact with so many more normal people. We are now dealing with working people, who have legitimate complaints, instead of the career criminal who last week was punched out and is now calling us, because he was the subject of some retaliation thing. Even though that is a crime, and we would do that professionally. We make a lot of contacts in the small business world, in the community that can benefit anybody. If you have somebody as day-to-day as a citizen’s complaint and they are speaking to somebody in the community who says, oh yeah, I know [Officer Alpha], and in all my experience while he’s been on the foot patrol, he’s been a compassionate, caring and concerned officer, it can only serve to benefit you in that instance as well. It’s a credibility issue as well. [C04]

As a critical point, one CRU officer suggests that through ‘community police’ work, instead of the previous situation of separate and often conflicting agendas of interest, the principles, values and goals of mobilized ‘community’ and police, now appear to be reconciled and congruent for the largest part, and thus now even work to mutually reinforce each other.

‘Community’ interests seem to be the interests of the police, and police interests match the interests of the ‘community’:

What [the community groups] do is exactly what we are trying to have happen, to have the community work with us and offer resources, and one of the resources is to have the community available and to voice their concerns to the people who make the decisions, the judges, the politicians, I mean, if you have the police force going to the politicians saying, look, we got a problem with hookers and drug dealers, we need more money, well then they go ‘sorry, no more money in the budget’. But if you get your community saying that they have a problem with their community, and these are our problems, and the police come forth and say, these are our problems, and they are the same, somebody has to stop and say, hey, the people who are voting for us have community and safety concerns, we better do something about it. It’s not just the police, but it’s the people who live there. We are all in the same boat. [C02]

Finally, this celebrated joining and collaboration of interests and goals between ‘community’ and police in ‘community police’ work, as one of the CRU officers elaborated, supposedly even reflected itself in appearances and symbolism of figures and representation of the
two entities flowing and blurring into each other:

I think that policing is all about perceptions. Why do you think they gave us the cars with the lights on them? It made us look bigger. The uniform, it is an intimidation factor. The whole 'larger than life image' of the police officer, we are all supposed to be rough and tough and all that, but it's all bullshit baffling the brain. The real perception of who is actually working, who actually knows what they are doing, who's actually doing what it is they are supposed to be doing is probably pretty different from people's perceptions. The difference is that at one point, people wanted a police force that was all 6 foot 10, 300 pounds, white male and tough as nails with a heart of gold, but now the community is saying, no, we want a police force that is representative of ourselves, that looks like us, that we can talk to. Brought down to a community level, the people just want to know that if they have a trivial problem on their street they have someone to call, and they will get a response. Whereas, 20 or 30 years ago, what the community wanted was kick-ass police officers, and what you wanted in [99 Division] was real tough guys. I've been to a number of community meetings where they asked for more female officers, because there aren't many. And the community is saying: We want visible representation. [C03]

In this context, with a main objective of 'community police' work being to make local social entities more accessible, facilitative and cooperative for police work and to reintegrate the police in social life and processes, an essential role of the 'community police' officer becomes that of a communicator towards exactly these ends. Besides their core police functions 'community police' officers - quite congruent and in keeping with the ideal and image of the 'constable generalist' - generally appear, operate and correspond as a communicative figure constantly presenting the police as an entity and a function receptive to matters of wide social concern. In that role, they conversely make broad efforts to enlist social resources and dynamics for the wider goals and purposes of policing as a broad social activity. 'Community police' officers play that role in general, trivial, day-to-day contexts by staging and communicating the arbitrary role and persona of a 'constable' (a police officer in the 'traditional' sense) and a 'generalist' (a social figure, or a 'community' representative) simultaneously, complementing the professional and traditional police functions. In short, a significant role of the 'community officer' materializes out in the 'community', where one of the officer's main task is to communicate 'community', 'police' and 'community police' work in its symbolic and imagery essence.

Within these contexts, one of the CRU officers explains their crucial 'communicator' role within the realm of 'community police' work with respect to his/her particular environment:

I think so far I have been very successful, particularly in my dealing with the schools, and developing a rapport with the staff and the students in the school. Especially letting the kids see us as something else than the big bad police officer who takes you away if you do something wrong, and letting them
It's no secret that one of the big pushes for community policing was to try and make the public feel safer, to give them a feeling that they are safer. In a time that the force was downsizing due to fiscal reductions. It's a fact that we are running out there with a lot less officers than a few years ago. It's no secret that the force, knowing that we are losing all these front-line officers, wanted to give the public the perception that we are still as safely policed as in the past. And a big part of community policing is to have officers in uniform on foot or on bikes out there, so that people see them and get to know them, and feel safer. It is a perception, I agree with the part that it is good for the officers, the concept of getting out in the communities is good, good for the community, but I don't think that it is right in the sense that the public would be falsely informed, or it's rather a perception that they feel safer, whereas there is less and less out there. [C09]
"Community involvement" - the police perspective

As discussed above, the idea and imagery of "community policing" very much emphasizes the concept of "community involvement" in "community policing", calling for "cooperation" and "partnership" between, and input and "equal contributions" from "community" and the police to the tasks and objectives of local "community police" work. There has been much ambiguity, however, about the meaning of these concepts and slogans. Especially, it is rather unclear what actual role "community" would play in the schemes of local policing, to what extent the police would precisely concede and share power and elements of their "professional" role to "community", and how these roles would be practised jointly or "cooperatively" and on a basis of "equal partners".

"Community involvement" in the daily practices of 99 Division's "community police" work predominantly materializes in "community" functioning as a main local information and surveillance provider, a "resource" for "community police" support work, and a responsible entity - yet with clear and strict limits - for what the some of the CRU officers call police "legwork". The practices of "community police" are based on the recognition that "community police" work - and especially the focus on petty and "disorder" phenomena described above, but also all wider issues of local "safety", security and "quality of life" now projected as "community police" mandates - are based on the constant flow, provision and availability of local knowledge necessary for "community police" work. This knowledge includes, for instance, the whereabouts of drug dealers, hookers and drunks, newly arising safety concerns, in certain areas, buildings or local institutions, redesign plans of public spaces, licensing issues, and other "community" concerns which the police alone do not have and will never be able to sufficiently gather just by themselves. One of the key characteristics of these information processes between "community" and police is that they are predominantly uni-directional. Despite the "community police" being equipped with latest technological wizardry in terms of voice mail, cell phones, pagers, radios, the emphasized and predominantly practised information flow is from "community" to police. This uni-directional nature facilitates and retains the police's almost monopolistic discretion about consideration, prioritization and decision-making about information received, and bar "community" from participation in these important micro-processes of power.

"Community", in this operational context, has become recruited as a supplier of "raw material" for "community police" work, in that it constantly and in ample quantity feeds the information, leads, concerns and requests that the police receive, decide and act on, and
eventually dispose of in a ‘community police’ fashion. ‘Community’ is, therefore, the key provider of ‘policeable material’ in a local context of ‘community policing’, and, through its constant input, permanently emphasizes and reasserts the need for ‘community police’ and their work. Within these parameters, ‘community’ plays a twofold role in ‘community police’ work, one being a ‘functional’ and the other one a ‘legitimizing’ one. Its functional role is exercised in the provision of input and information to the police that they need and use to identify, focus on and go after their local police work tasks. The ‘community’s’ legitimizing function is a less tangible one, in that on an ongoing basis provides, presents and requests input, issues and action towards the ‘community police’ institution that re-assert and legitimize them as a key player and ‘stakeholder’ in local social affairs.

Some CRU officers explain from their perspective the new and actively instrumentalized role and ‘involvement’ of the ‘community’ for ‘community police’ work as seen by the majority of officers surveyed. Primarily, they elaborate on how ‘community’ are expected to act and are becoming utilized as a resource, facilitator and provider for information and ‘policing raw material’ passed on to ‘community police’ to be worked on - but all from the viewpoint of the ‘professional police’ at the core and centre of these processes:

Community policing is more working with the community, and the community helping us doing our job. The community helps identifying problem areas, problem people, identifying the people in the area that are causing the problems. We only seemed to have contact whenever there was an emergency problem, and people needed the police right away. Then you went and did your call. In community policing, this is more of a long term relationship with the community. [C06]

The new mandate for the community is to get together, identify problems in the community, to communicate is probably the number one thing, to communicate with all the members in the community, to gather information about problems and issues in the neighborhood that they bring forward to the police to look at, through meetings and else, so that we can work on these things and find solutions. [...] There needs to be open communication between the community and the police. Police can’t do everything by themselves, and obviously the community can’t do it either. The community is expected, I guess, to keep the police informed with respect to as what is happening in their neighborhood, what the problems are and what their concerns are. And the police are more responsible, more accountable to the public to inform them what they are doing. I guess it’s like so neither side are left out in the dark, and things seem to get solved quicker. [C09]

[In community policing] the community now has to be more involved. Again, a few years ago the expectation was that officers would drive their cars by, and then would look after stuff, but nobody really knew what ‘stuff’ was and nobody really wanted to know what they did. Now, the community has special concerns and issues, and it is up to the members of the community to bring those concerns and issues to
the forefront, and to the attention of the police. Because, it has been shown, we can drive by in our big cars, we don't see half the stuff. It's the people who live there that see what is going on. In part, because of the economic reality, the community members have to come forward as the experts. We can’t afford to do all the scans in the community to see what is going on there. Why don't we just go to the source and find out from them what is going on? [C03]

A CRU officer describes how ‘involvement’ of the ‘community’ is essentially a role of ‘policeable problem’ makers and providers, and how they are expected to organize themselves and function in that role in an effective and efficient manner to support the core role of police in ‘community policing’:

[The community] organizes themselves. I guess what they are doing, and should be doing is they are getting together. They are getting to know their neighborhood, they're getting to know their neighbors. They're forming an umbrella, so to speak, so they realize if there is a problem in the neighborhood, and they're rallying around it and they're doing something about it. And then, of course, they are eliciting our help to solve that problem, possibly along with other agencies. An example: I was at a meeting at a local community center the other day, and there were people from the community, residents from the community, [the Parks and Recreation department] were there, and it was about a problem in [Public Park A]. There were drug dealers and prostitutes hanging around, and people did not feel safe walking in the park, to even walk their dogs at night. So the community demanded some kind of a response, and of course they got it from both ourselves and [the Parks and Recreation department], and we were asked in our committee to do something about that problem, and hopefully next summer, we will alleviate that problem. [C01]

Another CRU officer elaborated on how ‘community involvement’, besides supplying information, and ‘raw material’ for ‘police work’, is seen as acting as a sort of invited and informed but yet distanced and ‘arm’s length’ ‘commentator’ on police matters in what s/he calls an “advisory role”. This suggested ‘community’ role is, however, seemingly far from a function that makes any fundamental decisions on what ‘policing’ is, how it is done and practised, or even alluding to the possibility of the police giving up or sharing power around the business of ‘police work’.

The community are asked to take a larger advisory role towards the work the police do. Obviously, I work days and nights, but I work 8 days on and 6 off, and while I am away on my days off, not only do I rely on speaking with the other officers when I get back, but I rely upon getting out into the community, and talking to the community people that I haven't seen in a week and finding out what is new. Have you had a problem with Johny since I spoke to him? Or did public works come by and fix that light, or whatever the problem is? Or even, is there anything new? Like, in one instance, other officers had a community station set up in one area for a while, and they were waving the flag in a very obvious fashion. Well, when you get out of the area for a week, after that you are relying on input from the community, OK, when we left, did the problem move right back in, and which of the drug dealers came back? [...] Their role shouldn't be understated. I think it is a very important role, because sometimes the police see things differently from
The research data collected suggest that it is a prevailing idea among the ‘community police’ officers that ‘community’ is perceived as a ‘responsibilized’ element of, and working for the core processes and objectives of ‘police work’, in that they play a role which facilitates and supports its actual tasks and operations. Such a conceptual trend towards the comprehensive and multi-functional ‘responsibilization’ of civilian individuals and ‘communities’ in the expanding social realm of police work has been pointed out elsewhere. O’Malley and Palmer summarize in their hypothesis of a proposed shift from a Keynesian to Post-Keynesian model of policing that “welfarist models of public dependency of police expertise are being displaced by more contractual neo-liberal imagery in which the consumers of police service appear as more agentive and interdependent, who relate to police in some respects as contractual partners, and who are increasingly attributed with knowledges of relevance to crime that are complementary to those of police expertise” (1994:2). This functional utilization of the new civilian ‘partners’ in and for professional police work is, in particular, characterized by an emphasis on the “role of individual responsibility both for the prevention of crime and for its commission, such that there is continual stress on the fact that individuals must take steps to ensure that they will not become crime victims, that they must provide police with information related to crime [and] that crime prevention should be based on a model of criminals acting on individual choice” (ibid., O’Malley 1992).

From the empirical field work and prevailing CRU officer perspective at the research site, ‘community’ is expected to do ‘legwork’ for police work. This, however, in practice can simultaneously mean that they are expected to do things themselves that are helpful to ‘community police’ work without trying to involve the police, and to keep things away from police that the police deem as to be too mundane, trivial, or a waste of time and efforts - all for the sake of making ‘community police’ work more effective and efficient. These principles and practices all seem to be part of a new ‘political economy’ of ‘community police’ work with respect to the ‘community’ role and its function about which the ‘community’ needs to be ‘educated’ about by the real professionals and experts in ‘community police’ work - the police.
Two CRU officers explain.

[Our goal is] to make them feel that they are significant people, that we are out there and working with them, we are interacting with them, and our goal is to help them as much as we can, but to eventually get them to the point where they are working as well, where they are working with us to keep this area safe and clean, rather than just them saying, oh, this is a police thing. Our goal is to educate these people, and say, wait, if I do something about my sidewalk or the laneway in the back, maybe I am helping out as well, I am making this area safer and less vulnerable, rather than the police doing everything for us. And this is to bring them the idea of community based policing. It is important that they become an active part of police work, so to speak. Not the real stuff, but legwork, kind of. You might as well get them to open their eyes, and get rid of this 'I don't want to get involved' attitude. They have to help us out, and that's a basic philosophy here. [...] The community, they have to look after their own place. They have to get involved. There is no two ways about it. They cannot rely on us for everything. If they are going to come for a meeting, and hammer on the table, as it has happened, like 'you guys don't do anything, look in my back alley, why can't you do something about that'. And the only answer to that is, well, it's your back alley. If there is garbage out there, look out there, clean up your area, see who's out there, let us know what is going on, give us what we need to step in as police, but don't assume that because we put a uniform on and walk up the street, that we know everything, you know. We may know a lot, but we don't know everything, we don't know many details, and we can't be everywhere. You have to talk to us, you have to let us know what's happening so that we can do something about it. If you don't, then this whole thing won't work.

[C10]

The community is being asked to take a little more responsibility in making their neighborhood safe. We often advise them to get together with each other, and if they have problems, to discuss them and see in which way they can be solved, solve the problems themselves if they can, whether it means looking out for each other, or getting us involved. They are asked to be more aware of what is going on, to keep their eyes and ears open, so they can relate it back to us with as much detail as possible. They provide us with the information with what is going on in the area, and we'll step in if it's necessary. They definitely identify problems for us. Not all of them, but they are really important. Otherwise we may overlook certain things, or not emphasize the control on certain problems so much as we do now, such as prostitution. They are pointing out major problems to us. [C08]

As other CRU officers suggest, 'community police' see the surveillance and information provider function as one of the central roles of 'community'. Their key function, according to the predominant understanding of the officers surveyed, is to provide as much quantity and quality of 'policeable information' as possible that the police then can act on upon in the exercise of their own discretion, professional assessment and rules.

The community's part is getting to know the officers in the area, getting to know each other, so they know who's who. Before this [community policing] all came about, nobody knew anybody, and now they all come out, they know everybody, they have get-togethers, so they find out who belongs in the neighborhood, who doesn't belong in the neighborhood. They are more or less the eyes and ears for us, letting us know, who the hookers are, who the pimps are, letting us know who is who in the neighborhood. That really helps, because by the time we see people, we don't know he's been running this girl or
whatever. So that has really helped us to identify a lot of people. They help us identify the problems and the people we are dealing with. You can’t do community policing without the community, if they are not there to do the leg-work for you. [C06]

Without going into the community and actively interacting with them every day, we would not be able to accomplish our job as much as we do now. Just the little things like, a theft that did occur, and you need to know from people, which way did the suspect go, what did he look like. If you don’t have that interaction, if you don’t start asking a lot of questions with a lot of people, if you are thinking, you don’t need anybody’s help, you are not going to accomplish anything. Crack-houses are another example. They are basically impossible for us to find without detailed information from the community. There are so many houses and apartments around where we are, and we have no way of knowing what is going on in there. We cannot police these things on a constant basis, but if somebody from the public tells you, well, there is traffic like crazy in and out of this place, then we can start zeroing in, and determine if this is a crack house. And we get involved constantly with security, and they tell us a lot what is going on, and give us all the background information. Without the interaction, it would be an impossible task to do our work. [C15]

The community’s responsibility is to report pertinent incidents to us. I mean, pertinent not as in their neighbor is painting their house pink but, you know, something that we can do something with. Crime. Reporting crime, and minor stuff that is relevant. I would expect them to watch out for their neighbors. Everybody should be outside more often, looking around. And this is what we need. We have a lady, an older lady at [A and B streets], she’s been there for years. She’s out there all the time with a flashlight at 2 or 3 in the morning. She does so, she’s looking, she’s always looking. She knows what’s going on. That’s what we need. So that just shows you, if this is your place, and these people don’t care, if they are just business people, and they just want to come home and close their door, they don’t care what happens, that’s fine I suppose. But it is only fine until their BMW gets broken into or they find a condom on their front lawn, and they come to us yelling and screaming. That’s when they come to the first neighborhood meeting, really mad. They should learn their lesson sooner and put in their share, and that is what we need to educate them towards. […] And we need the community for information. They are our eyes and ears. I want to know all about the new guy, the neighbor. The new guy who came upstairs, he seems to be letting in all the prostitutes. I think he is letting them use his place. Well, good, thanks for telling us. Now we will hang around there, and we will catch them going up the stairs. If you let us in, thanks for helping. Like [123 A street] - they gave us access keys. So all of a sudden we are doing a patrol up [B street], the guy we are following goes into [123 A street - a high-rise apartment building]. All of a sudden, coppers are walking out of the elevator in there. Oh my goodness, how did they get in here? What are they doing here? How come you are everywhere? How did you get in here? Buildings used to be hiding places. Now it’s part of the community. We are systematically closing down places to hide. We can be everywhere with the little steps of cooperation that we get. Just let us in, and we’ll make sure it gets safe. Every little bit is helpful. [C12]

One of the CRU officers elaborated on how these ‘support’ and ‘input’ roles, in his/her experience, are played quite well by the ‘community’. S/he hinted at what makes these efforts from the side of the ‘community’ good, valuable and effective from the ‘community police’ perspective.

The [A neighborhood group] is a pretty well organized group. Most of them are professional people. They
have been good in pointing to problems in the area. They have been helpful to me, quite often, like when there is a problem in [123 B street], it'd be pointed out to me by somebody in the group, which is good. That is a good thing about community policing. It is great to have the voice mail, because then they can call and leave messages, and say, there is problem here, or there is a guy living there doing this, and you don't have to get into a big discussion with them. That's helpful for our work. [C11]

But rather than looking and realizing what the police want 'community' to do and contribute to 'community police' work in order to understand the wider and practical meaning of 'community involvement' in 'community policing', the much more important aspect may be to examine what police do not want 'community' to do, and what they actively aim to exclude them from. On the basis of the field data, a number of significant empirical perspectives and practices come to the forefront that indicate the dramatic limitations to 'community involvement' in police work that have been imposed and are reinforced by the police. These boundaries imposed on the involvement of 'community' in 'community police' work are curtailing them to a symbolic role on one hand, and to a subordinate, facilitating and 'legwork' role on the other hand, all playing directly or indirectly into the establishment and reinforcement of what might best be called the ideological, institutional and operational hegemony of the police in 'community police' work. This hegemonical role of police in the thinking and working of 'community police' means for 'community' that they are allowed to talk, discuss, provide input and 'legwork' at the 'margins' or base levels of police work. However, they are allowed and expected to do so on the one hand only at the discretion of, within and limits set by the police, and on the other hand always under the implicit presumption that the 'real' police work belongs to, remains with and is done by the 'real' police as the entity at the core of 'community police' work.

This becomes clear in the bifurcated world-view observed with many CRU officers. From this perspective, 'community police' work consists of 'community work' and 'police work', both of which are fundamentally different and separate mindsets and activities, with the two entities being linked through an ascending hierarchy in terms of the relevance for the 'community police's' overall mandate and mission. The message is that, at the most important core of 'community police' work, the 'community police' officer is a traditional 'police officer' with the mission and instruments to do traditional police work according to the traditional principles and practices. Everything else becomes a subordinate, secondary or marginal activity or matter of concern, and should not interfere with this core 'police work' task and its mission, not even 'community work'.

Some CRU officers illustrate representatively for many of their colleagues this
hegemonical relationship between ‘police’ and ‘community’ tasks, roles and goals in ‘community police’ work settings.

I guess you are dealing with the people a lot more than you’ve ever dealt with them before. You are a lot more out there, that’s for sure. I think our time is taken away, though, from policing, from doing real policing, because we have to see, we have to meet with people, we have to talk to them, and our time is really taken away from doing real policing, which is what we are getting paid for. I don’t think that we are getting paid for meeting with people all the time. And if you look at our schedule, I mean, our week, every time there is 4 or 5 meetings, at least a couple of hours each, when we should be out in the street. It’s changed from the way we used to work, that’s for sure. We never met the public the way we are meeting them right now. Before, we were out there, doing a better job, and I think, we were doing what we were supposed to do. [...] There is a danger that this community stuff is taking over, that it’s getting too big. It’s clear that the community likes it. They like the thought of, ‘Jesus, we can tell the police what they should do or we can give them ideas’, which I think is good to a certain degree - you can’t go into the night totally blind and do whatever the hell you want to do. You have to talk to people once in a while, are we making a difference, are we helping out. But to get tied up like this all the time, is just ridiculous. I don’t think that this is what the [creators of community policing] envisioned. [C10]

I don’t believe in the meetings and all that other community stuff, and it’s getting way too much. [My partner] and I went to a walkabout a while ago in the [A neighborhood], and, I mean, it was nothing else but an old ladies’ club that wanted to go for walk every night, and they wanted two policemen to go with them. They had no clue what was going on, they were just chatting away while they were walking, it had nothing to do with policing the community. Just having a good chat, out for a good walk, I mean, that’s not what we are here for. I think it’s management’s job to stop that stuff, saying that their officers have more important things to do. [C07]

Another CRU officer makes the same points of distinction between ‘community’ and ‘police’ work. S/he illustrates in an example from the police perspective that despite all the ‘community talk’ and ‘stuff’, the heart of ‘community police’ work boils down to ‘policing’ done by the police. On that basis, its mission, the significance and proper practice of its ‘work’ can only be fully understood, decided on and done by the new and old policing ‘professionals’ and experts - the police themselves:

I don’t mind listening to the community and hearing what they think their problem is, because often it’s pretty close to what the problems really are. But then again, I feel that I am the one who is getting paid to be a police officer and to police the neighborhood, and I really know what’s best in that neighborhood in terms of how to go about and get things done. I like listening to what they have to say, and sometimes they come up with some really good suggestions, sometimes they come up with some really stupid suggestions, quite frankly, but I mean, that’s fine. Mostly, I already have a pretty good idea of what is going on, anyways. But I think what it comes right down to is that we as the police should determine how an area is policed. We can listen to the community, and try to help them out, like our group wanted spot checks, and the community van, but that by far were not the only problems and not the only ways of how to deal with that area and fix the problems. That’s still our job to decide. [...] Their priority problem were the
policed. And people see him, and come, and contact. We are not demanding that every\npremises and plying their trade. So that was the number one concern. And it was very effective to have\nblitzes and spot checks there. So that is what they were really harping on. They were not really concerned\nabout the [B park], which is, in my view, the much bigger problem in the whole scope of [A street],\nbecause this is where you have the extremely violent drug dealers with guns and knives. So in reality,\nsomebody could walk down [A street] and be upset by the traffic and the transvestites, but their personal\nsafety wouldn't really be threatened. But if they started going southbound, go through the [B Park], they\nare threatened, because there you have drug dealers and crack addicts. That is much more relevant for\npeople's safety, but the perception for the [A community] people was the transvestites. So that's why I say,\nwe are the professionals, we know where the real problems are. We can listen to their concerns and try to\naddress them, but when it comes right down to it, we are the ones to decide how an area is going to be\npoliced. [C11]

In general, there was a strong consensus among CRU officers about what makes 'good',\ndesirable and valuable 'community involvement' for 'community police' work. It pointed\nprimarily to a 'community' that was reliable, consistently and properly producing and supplying\n'policeable material' to the police, supporting their legitimacy, and not posing improper or\n'radical' demands on the police that would threaten to undermine their institutional hegemony or\nprofessional monopoly in 'community police' affairs. A couple of officers illustrate these points:

[The Z community group] plays their community role very well. They are very good. They are quite\norganized, they identify problems for us. They work real well. They are kind of a model community, if you\nwant to put it that way. They give us all the information that we need to do our work, and we more or less\ngive them what they want from us. But they also know that they are not our total lives, in other words, they\nare not demanding that every day, we go and walk around all their streets. In other words, they realize\nthat we have a job to do otherwise than all the time socially interacting with them. They don't always\ndemand that, they have one meeting a month where they would like to see us there. They don't need us\nthere every week to be interacting with them. So the [Z group] is definitely one of the best ones for us.\n[C08]

I see the community as being more involved with us, like they do through their meetings and one-on-one\ncontacts. I see the community calling us more on a one-on-one basis whenever there is a problem, as\nopposed to calling the radio room. So community involvement, taking charge of their own problems,\ndeciding what their problems are and how we can deal with them as opposed to just getting on the phone\nand saying 'I need the police here'. More involvement, give us some ideas, whether we use them or not. I\nmean, we are not going to sit here and have the community tell us what our jobs are. We are not going to\nsee something like 'this officer gotta come here and do this now'. It should be 'Here is my problem. Please\ncome, I think this is the way it could be dealt with'. And then we look at it, decide what we are going to do,\nand take it from there. So involvement is a key issue. [C15]

On the other hand, the research data suggested a considerable sense of concern, combined
with a sense of strong disagreement or anger among some CRU officers that ‘community’ is asking for and demanding too much involvement, power and participation rights from police. In addition, there is an impression among some CRU officers that ‘community’ has been conceded too much of all that already, and that these developments will endanger good, effective and quality ‘policing’, and thus need to be curtailed. In short, ‘community’ is seen and perceived by some officers as a real and worrisome threat to the traditional hegemony of ‘police’ in professional police work and affairs:

They are allowing the community to have too much say. Too much of a role in what we are doing. The way it stands right in some of the areas, if the community asks for police officers to attend a meeting, or to come here and do this or that, we have supervisors saying: priority, go and do this, do that in the community. The community wants this, wants that. So first of all, they should let us go out there and do our job, and if we can find time in our schedule to go and speak to the community, then OK, then we will go and speak to the community. But every time the community snaps their fingers and asks for something, I don’t think that we should respond. I just think they are giving the community too much power and too big of a voice. I mean, the community obviously deserves some kind of voice, we go out there and try to deal with their problems, but we are the ones who are hired as police officers, we are the ones who know what crime and the law is all about, we are the ones who are supposed to do the job. They should let us do the job the way we see fit, and to the best of our ability, and then the community comes next. [...] If you want to make community policing work, you have to let the officer go back to front-line policing, let them do their job. Let the guys focus on being a police officer, going out there and make arrests and stuff. Try to build up some respect and trust with the community. The force should say to the communities, we’ll listen to you, but we will only listen so much. You cannot have us change everything, if you want us to do something, we’ll think about, we will go and look at it. If we think it is a good idea, we will go with it. If we don’t think it is a good idea, we will not go with it. And they should not be afraid to go and say that to the community. A lot of times, they will go and say, oh yes, we’ll do that and do this. Or, they will have to just go and only pick the ‘yes man’ officers for the foot patrol. But they don’t have the pool of people to do that. So they will have to let officers do their job properly. [C13]

I see community policing as a valuable tool that can be used in policing but it is not a total answer. It is valuable as long as we are still calling the shots and the communities are not telling us what to do, coming on parade instead of the sergeant, and the community telling me what to do when I go to work. As long as it stays basically where it is at, and the police is still the police, there is no problem, and we can certainly make some use out of it. But we have to set clear limits about what the community’s business is in our work. As long as it is just part of the answer, and not the total thing. As long as they don’t come with the attitude that we are machines, saying I want this problem fixed, and I don’t care how you do it or what toll it takes on your actual police work, and you are here 24 hours a day and to solve our problems. [C08]

Another CRU officer finds an illustrative metaphor for the situation of the power struggle perceived by the police in the ‘community policing’ scenario examined with respect to the question of ‘who is in control’ in ‘community police’ work:
A major concern is the 'who's wagging the tail’ type of thing. The community groups have to be reminded how far they can go and they got to realize our position as well. It's good to have open lines of communication, and to get together to work on things. You can't have it begin to go the other way, where we are too under the thumb of the community groups, then we cannot function as we should. But that will just be an ongoing problem. We have to watch that with all the demands that they are imposing on us. A lot of officers already have a lot of problems with regards to the demands that they get, that they expect the officers to change shifts, and do this and do that whenever they call. We will do whatever we can to accommodate them, but it will eventually boil down to the question if the dog is wagging the tail or if the tail is wagging the dog. Who's the tail, who's the dog? [C09]
The evolution of the 'community' idea

Efforts to think 'community'
Socio-historic evolution of the 'community' concept
Social and economic dynamics behind 'community'
'Community' as the core of late modern society
'Community' in late modern crime and justice

'Community' in 'community policing': Who is it?

Constituting 'community' via the 'common enemy'

'Community' - responsibilized citizenship and new social agency

'Community': Attitudes, objectives and rationales

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'Community' of peculiar 'communities': The Community Police Liaison Committee [CPLC]

The evolution of the 'community' idea

Although much emphasis has been put on the 'community policing' concept, not much critical attention has been paid to the conceptual, empirical and social realities of the 'community' element in 'community policing'. This may be so for a variety of reasons. First, on a more abstract level, an encyclopaedic look at the 'community policing' terminology can be instructive, and may reveal some of the underlying assumptions. While 'policing' is semantically staged as an activity, a process, something that is 'happening' and being done within the 'community policing' term, 'community' is simply projected as a static object or a fact, as something that is just 'there', with a sort of taken-for-granted social truth in and of itself. 'Community policing' may, arguably, be the policing by, for or in the 'community' (Nelken 1985) - but it seems an undisputed and unproblematic fact that policing is the unambiguous object of the one and only 'community' that it refers and relates to.

And while some commentators - hesitantly, for the most part - refer to the ambiguity and social dynamics within 'community' concepts in 'community policing', it has largely remained as a critically under-examined entity in the discussion (with a few notable exceptions, among them Mastrofski 1988, Manning 1988, Ericson et al. 1993). Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, for example, identify 'community policing' as policing by and for "the community", materializing in a "community of interest based on a mutual geography, also said to not only “teach us values but to provide emotional support, a sense of identity, and the warmth that comes from belonging to a
group that cares about us” (1990:80ff). As another example, Friedman underlines the need to “analytically examine” conceptual and theoretical considerations of “recent attempts of the police to ‘work together’ with the community”. He then offers the reader five “logical options” of how the seemingly singular, static and objective entity of “the community” relates to the police, presenting the two as “mutually exclusive”, “completely overlapping”, the “police as completely incorporating the community”, the “community as completely incorporating the police” or the “two as partially overlapping” (Friedman 1992:136, for similar conceptual approaches see Bennett 1993, Kratcoski and Dukes 1995, Goldstein 1990).

This sort of conceptual naïveté with respect to the ‘community’ element in ‘community policing’ constitutes an interesting ‘fallback’ into earlier paradigms of theorizing and envisaging the ‘social’, reminding us of similar conceptual or theoretical assumptions before these later became the subject of (rather painful) theoretical and empirical deconstruction (see Rose 1994, Merton and Nisbet 1971). Conceptually, the presentation and use of the ‘community’ idea seems to suggest locale, entity and involvement of a new ‘social’ realm and body in its widest meaning informing, constituting and interacting with ‘policing’ activities. This new social entity of the ‘community’ is presented to us similar to the grand, overarching and consensual idea of ‘society’ as it was projected in the period of ‘positivist’ sociology and social theory, primarily in the earlier half of this century. There, largely based on Durkheim’s writing, the ‘social’ was seen as an objective and unambiguous “fact” independent of human perception and thinking, and imposing its ‘fact-like’ realities upon human behaviour. The ‘social’ was conceptualized not as a construct and product of human relations, interests and interactionist perceptions, but it was seen as constituting an independent, higher and dominant reality to human agency and processes. These “social facts” based in the ‘social world’ included a code of morality, a firm distinction of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ as well as the determinants of social interactions and dynamics, all of this constituting a “total [that] is not simply a sum of independent units, a collective total, but is itself a new fact sui generis, with its own unity, individuality and consequently its own nature - a nature, furthermore, dominantly social” (Durkheim 1951:46, see also 1950). In this context, it was assumed that social agents were constituted by and acting on unambiguous, solid and firm ‘social foundations’ beyond the control of human agency, and social inquiry or its sciences were challenged to find and “make discoverable” through adequate and sufficiently sophisticated research methods these “real social conditions” (Lemert 1967).
As we know, the later evolving paradigms of ‘conflict’-based social theory as well as the subsequently emerging streams of social constructionism and post-structural approaches to social ‘realities’ fundamentally challenged and deconstructed these concepts of objective, independent and given ‘social facts’. Basically, they ended up arguing that ‘social facts’ are a product of subjective, conflicting and human agency (see for example Gusfield 1988, Chambliss and Seidmann 1982). These developments and insights, of course, indirectly and eventually had major implications for thinking about police, the law, and its enforcement. While within the earlier ‘objectivist’ paradigm the state and its agents - foremostly the criminal justice system including the police - were understood as carriers, upholders and producers of ultimate, ‘firm’ and ‘objective’ social norms and facts, the crumbling of objectivist social theory suddenly meant that law-making and its enforcement, for example, were driven by and subject to subjectivist, conflicting and social constructionist processes and thus were themselves understood as active producers of ‘ambiguous’ and constructed social realities. Within these contexts, law and its enforcement, instead of being a matter of ‘social truth’ and ultimate virtue came to be seen as the product of political and social struggle. They were increasingly understood as means and mechanisms in a ‘social’ sphere that was created and maintained by its implicit conflicting forces (as can be instructively demonstrated, for example, when looking at a genealogy of drug laws in various jurisdictions, see for example Giffen, Lambert and Endicott 1991, Musto 1987).

This epistemological ‘crisis’ hit the area of police science on an empirical level with the outcomes of a large number of field studies into police work in the 1950s and 1960s that proposed and illustrated the subjective, discretionary and ‘political’ nature of police work on organizational and individual levels (see Reiss 1971, Skolnick 1966). Police men became identified as “street corner politicians” (Muir 1976), and the institution of the police itself and its work became increasingly understood as a crucial and central entity of ‘agency’ in the political and power project of the ‘state’ (Melossi 1990). Partly in response to the claims of being over-politicized and the fact that it traditionally had actively sought and acted on political support and power balances, the police, within these conflict models of state and society, and through emerging notions of ‘professionalism’ aimed to ostensibly withdraw themselves from the ‘political’ realm of social affairs. Instead, they aspired to retreat to a ‘distanced’ and ‘objectivist’ framework of just doing ‘professional’ but not ‘political’ police work (i.e. Reiner 1992, Kelling and Moore 1988). The public police’s explicit and active proclamations of and commitments to
'community policing' seem a radical departure from the police's previous deliberate efforts of distancing from social tensions, conflicts and dynamics towards a suddenly renewed involvement with 'community' as the core embodiment of the new celebrated social sphere. For a more thorough investigation of the realities of the social processes and dynamics as constituted and entailed by 'community' in 'community policing', we first need to take a look at the wider contexts of the meaning and role of the recently so appealing, celebrated and emphasized paradigm of the 'community' in the evolution of the social sphere, as well as in the more specific areas of crime and justice.

**Efforts to think 'community'**

Within the last couple of decades, or throughout what has been called 'late modern' or 'post-welfarist' times, the idea, imagery and rhetoric of 'community' has come to dominate social and political affairs in many spheres and aspects (O'Malley 1996). 'Community action', 'community-based programs', 'community justice', 'community values', and finally 'community policing' - 'community' seems to have become a core source and entity of social action, reform and progress in all sorts of terrains (Crawford 1995, Nelken 1985, Davis 1991). More than twenty years ago, Gusfield prophetically saw a 'community paradigm' looming on the horizon of social affairs (1975:xiv). And while, in most instances, it is not at all precisely clear what the 'community' imagery and terminology means and implies in these various fields and programmatic areas, references to it seem to appeal to a common set of core principles, values or social desires striven for in current social affairs, most of which are believed to have existed in the past and to have been lost with the progress of modernization (see Manning 1988, Ericson et al. 1993). This loss of virtues and values of the past, in combination with a fundamental confusion about the identity and idea of state and society, evolved into a movement of "growing popularity of community activism. This movement is based on the belief that the urgent need was for action with and by communities, not debate about them, for engagement with them, not analysis of them" (Jewkes and Murcott 1996:557).

There has been a long but not very conclusive debate on what 'community' is, what defines it, and especially what 'community' means within conditions of current late modern society. In fact, the concept of 'community' had been used in social philosophy as far back as the 14th century. It is largely the principles and values ascribed to 'community' in the great social
debates of the 18th and 19th century that are being revived and going through a form of renaissance in current discourses (Plant 1974). One of the simpler but hardly contestable insights is offered by Williams who remarked that ‘community’ is a “warmly pervasive word” that seems “never to be used unfavourably, and never to be given any positive opposing or distinguishing term” (1983:76). It is, indeed, a “word rich in symbolic power” (Cohen 1985). The “idealized community is something towards which we reach, embodying traditional spiritual wisdoms that emphasize reciprocal responsibilities people have for each other” (Boutilier, Cleverly and Labonte, forthcoming).

More empirical and positivistic efforts to define and characterize ‘community’ have largely sought to resort to a core set of identifiers or specifics marking more tangible ideas of ‘community’. Traditionally, it had been argued by many that ‘community’ is characterized by a shared sense of territory or space in which ‘community’ exists, forms and maintains itself. Second, there was the basic assumption of ‘community’ being spawned and constituted by a shared set of values, ideals or principles, and that therefore a natural sense of “social solidarity” and “belonging” was flowing out of these preconditions (Adams 1989). ‘Community’ was seen as the “aggregation of people who have something in common which distinguishes them in a significant way from members of other groups” (Jewkes and Murcott 1996:557). Or, in other words, it was projected as the romantic notion of “a group of people residing in a specific geographic area who have common values, cultural patterns and social problems, together with an awareness of belonging to a group that causes them to interact more intensely with one another than they would with outsiders in a similar context” (Agudelo 1983). ‘Community’ was seen as the ambiguous realm of “shared meanings, sentimental attachments, and interpersonal networks of recognition and reciprocity ... established among the proximate inhabitants of a common territory” (Davis 1991:12). On a similar basis, Cohen elaborated on his seminal cultural theory of ‘community’ by suggesting that “people become aware of other cultures when they stand at its boundaries: when they encounter other cultures, or when they become aware of other ways of doing things, or merely of contradictions to their own culture” (1985:69). As such, ‘community’ was seen as primarily being the product of the human processes of drawing and recognizing social and cultural borders and differences, recognizing, constituting and acting on the notion of ‘otherness’.

Contrary to and epistemologically fundamentally different from that positivistic and
empirical understanding of community came an explanation of ‘community’ that argued for its existence as a genuine product of “social construction”, thus presenting it as an authentic ‘social product’ (Cohen 1985, see Berger and Luhman 1966). Within this paradigm, it was suggested that ‘community’ is a concept that is powerfully and convincingly “thought of” on interactionist levels, allowing for the organization of social affairs, providing its social actors with a convincing “symbolic repository of meaning” (Cohen 1985:12). ‘Community’ within this framework came to be understood as an umbrella of symbols and meanings interactively used, maintained and altered by ‘members’, ‘speakers’ and ‘actors’ of ‘community’ in their ways of thinking, doing and talking social life and its more or less mundane affairs, also making possible a mutual social understanding and organization of social affairs and interaction.

Socio-historic evolution of the ‘community’ concept

The key conceptual understanding of the classic idea of ‘community’ is one that emerged over the course of modern times, suggesting the evolution and constitution of social relations between two binary paradigms, or the “dichotomy” of what Toennies has labelled as the ‘community’ versus the ‘society’ concepts (or ‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Gesellschaft’ as the original terms; see Gusfield 1975:1ff). In this basic conceptual framework of social relations later elaborated on by Durkheim, ‘community’ is characterized as the basic form of social relationship that is to be found in extended family or rural settings of pre- or early modern times. Its key denominators are all rooted in sentiment, tradition, common bonds and a shared basis of social identity. Social life is embedded in a natural “soil” of “working and living in a common place” and characterized by a “strong identification with the community, emotionalism, traditionalism, and holistic conceptions of other members of the community” (Lyon 1987). In addition, “human relationships are intimate [and] enduring, the culture of the community is relatively homogenous, the moral custodians ... are strong, their code clear and their injunctions well internalized, [with] community sentiments involving close and enduring loyalties to the place and people” (Bell and Newby 1972:23), all of which has been described as strong fundamental “social bonds” (Nisbet 1953).

In contrast, ‘society’ has conventionally been described as the “antithesis” or “opposite” concept to “community” (Lyon 1987, Martinez-Brawley 1990). ‘Society’, however, is not materializing in an abstract or static social context, but rather as the outcome of social evolution
as spawned and produced by the forces of industrialization, modernization, and urbanization. 'Gesellschaft' is seen as referring to the "large scale, impersonal and contractual ties" increasingly shaping evolving modern social conditions "at the expense of [community]" (Bell and Newby 1972:24). It is dominated by the fact that its social relations and "activities are restricted to a definite end and a definite means of obtaining it" (Toennies in: Martinez Brawley 1990:6). In 'society', the 'social' has become instrumentalized as a means to different modern ends like productivity or prosperity, and therefore 'Gesellschaft' is characterized by "little or no identification with the community, affective neutrality, legalism and segmental conceptions of other social beings"; its life is based on "rationality, as well as individualism and disengagement" that are thriving and expanding in the context of urban capitalism (Lyon 1987). In other words, 'society' is seen as a "deliberately formed association for rational achievement of mutual goals", while 'community' is seen as a "naturally developed form of organizations which have intrinsic and non-logical values to them" (Gusfield 1975:10). These paradigmatic social concepts, their evolution and tensions were similarly proposed in Durkheim's model of 'mechanical' versus 'organic' societies (1966), and Weber's (1930) elaborations on the "rationalization" process of communal medieval to individualistic, capitalistic Europe (see also Davis 1991).

This conceptual framework of modern society in the context of the past century being kept in a state of tension between these two "ideal types" (Weber) described spawned an abundance of social research and writing aiming to investigate these social models, their processes social outcomes in 'real life'. Path-breaking work, for example, was done by the 'Chicago School' and its urban-ecological sociology arguing that 'community' was following and based on a humanistic and "natural" basis and its emanating dynamics. It was conceived as a matter of "personal identity and feeling" and not so much "place and function", and thus could be more easily maintained and reinforced independent of spatial bounds (Martinez-Brawley 1990). 'Anomie theory' was revived and re-popularized as the hallmark explanation of 'social problems', arguing that the loss of 'community identity' and orientation through social dis-integration and disorganization caused social malaises like crime, addiction and further social and moral deterioration (Lyon 1987, Nisbet and Merton 1971). With the socio-economic dynamics emerging in the second half of the 20th century, it seemed evident that "mass society" had swallowed the "small town" and its community spirit, and 'community studies' became replaced by studies on the grand perspectives of 'society', including the mega-works by sociologists such as Parsons
(1951), Nisbet and Merton (1971), etc. In principle, it was suggested that the “magnitude, mobility, diversity and individualization” of modern urban environments have superseded the “intimacy, stability and homogeneity of the pre-modern village or clan”, concluding that “urban neighbourhoods no longer contain the primary bonds of kinship and sentiment that make community ... possible” (Davis 1991:4).

But it was particularly in the urban environments of the big and modern metropolitan centers where the struggles and tensions between ‘community’ and ‘societal’ values and practices seemed to be lived out and felt in the starkest and most evident ways. While urban life and its wider social dynamics had triggered many streams of urban sociology, it was the rapid and intense division of social roles, functions and identity, the meeting and mixing of most diverse cultural backgrounds, the rigorous limitations on space and the circumstances of the “city as a growth machine” that were seen as featuring a unique “political economy of place” in modern cities in which the basic struggles of modern society evolved (Logan and Molotch 1987). A Marxist-based school of analysis suggested that the urban environments, and specifically property, residence, and the distribution and usages of land, had become the key site of underlying class struggle by which modern society was dominated (Saunders 1978, Castells 1978).

But the rapid and extensive evolution and expansion of technology, mobility and the diversity of lifestyles within the past 25 years or so have dramatically altered the speed, nature and social organization of life in urban contexts. It was in the context of late modern urban society, characterized by a dominant sense of “placelessness” facilitated by high individual mobility, mass communication, diversification of lifestyles and so on, allegedly leading to the “weakening of the identity of places to the point where they not only look alike but feel alike and offer the same bland possibilities for experience” (Relph 1976) that ‘community’ based thinking and action of all sorts started to evolve and grow substantially over the past couple of decades (Smith 1984, Beck 1987). At the same time, there was a growing perception of the ‘state’ becoming increasingly distant, out of touch and ‘indifferent’ to specific urban social, economic and cultural realities, concerns and processes. Much of the urban ‘community’ action and initiatives in a wide field of social, political and economic issues were framed in a context of “neighbourhood” as a preferred form of ‘community’ leading to the “neighborhoodization of city life and politics” (Smith 1984:49). These developments in practice were played out by the prevalent and popular forms of locally organized home owners, civic associations and neighbourhood groups (Bridger 1996, 211
In most instances, such locally organized projects are aiming at local planning, housing, social services, local business development, environmental issues, and crime and safety issues initially, or concerns and topics which others have summarized as “threats to the physical and social well-being of their neighbourhoods” (Mesch and Schwirian 1996:468, see Hogan 1986 and especially Davis 1991 for a good overview). To an increasing extent, “neighbourhoods have become proactive and have attempted to control and shape their own destiny through both collective organization and social action (Mesch and Schwirian 1996:467; see also Heskin 1991, Logan and Rabrenovic 1990).

An increasing number of initiatives, programs and local forms of ‘social movements’ were launched under the banner or umbrella of ‘community’ or ‘neighbourhood’, in the context of late modern urban environments. However, as these are characterized by “a heterogeneity of values, the division of labor, the occupational structure, the media and governmental intrusion” (Lewis, Grant and Rosenbaum 1988:135) the central question was raised as to “whether communities or neighbourhoods could exist in the urban environment” at all (Smith 1984:52), and what aspects or factors would constitute or glue together their ‘communal’ identity, cause and interests. In fact, a substantial amount of literature aimed to trace and investigate the sense of ‘neighbourhood’ that such groups or initiatives claimed to share and act on, but did not produce very conclusive or convincing results. A comprehensive review of the then available literature by Keller (1968) came to the conclusion that neither social contact with neighbours, nor use of local facilities, nor subjectively defined neighbourhood boundaries, nor sentiments “result in established or consistent neighbourhoods” and therefore had to be seen as “unreliable indices for locating urban neighbourhoods” (Smith 1984:52). In fact, others had concluded that the “loss of community is a value as well as a fact” in late modern times, and that the loss of old-fashioned “community solidarity” and interests has rendered late modern urban citizens members of a “society of strangers” (Nelken 1995:256). It became much more established that ‘community’ was not the result of a basic value, interest or behavioural consensus among residents sharing local spaces but that ‘community’ feelings and identity were the product of the effective construction of a shared or collective image of ‘community’ launched and engrained around acceptable ‘community’ issues or processes (Suttles 1972). The driving forces or ‘agency’ behind such construction efforts was to be found in what Suttles called “internal” or “external agents”, including residents, local and other government officials, interest representatives, business people, etc., who proclaimed, called
and acted on 'community' as the central social entity for local, political and economic
development or agendas. Crenson's work on neighbourhood organizing, for example, suggests
that the effective construction and emergence of a sense of 'community' does not require a
political consensus or a personal solidarity among neighbours, and that there is hardly, if at all,
any link between a sense of "neighbourhood identity" and common norms or "neighborly
intimacy" (Crenson 1983:143f). Rather, it is proposed that the activities of "awareness of and
discussion of neighbourhood problems are the key factors that constitute a sense of
neighbourhood identity" and that, as numerous studies suggest, strong relationships exist
"between neighbourhood discourse (informal talk about neighbourhood problems) and heightened
neighbourhood identity" (Harrington 1992:178). Within this framework of the 'social
construction' of 'community', Hunter (1974) in a field study found that residents predominantly
utilized and instrumentalized symbols of 'community' when referring to or legitimizing it, and thus
effectively objectified a sense of 'community' as a form of organizing social relationships and
environments.

Social and economic realities behind 'community'

But the evolving wealth of 'community' research also increasingly indicated a strong
correlation between socio-economic factors and the characteristics, goals and outcomes of local
'community' initiatives. One perspective on 'neighbourhood' initiatives and underlying motives
for their establishment is that despite the possible loss of 'community identity', a common
denominator of 'neighbourhoods' is that "people still invest themselves, their fortunes, and their
futures in the domestic property" of the homes and places they live in, thus sharing "similar
economic and political interests" (Davis 1991:6f). On the basis of these socio-economic bonds
likely more than anything else, it is then suggested that these "common interests of property and
place provide a basis for collective action even in the most communally and productively denuded
locality", and that, in fact, many of the issues and concerns that 'community' has become
organized around have been directly or indirectly related to these contexts of material interests
(ibid.).

Neighbourhood organizations have been claimed to be "place specific, volunteer driven,
shaped by the direct participation of members, and defined by problem solving as their principal
reason for existence" (Mesch and Schwirian 1996:467, Florin and Wandersman 1990) and to
predominantly proceed on a paradigm of consensus, collective interest and all-encompassing participation. However, empirical research on such entities has shown a fundamentally different socio-economic reality in the life-world of neighbourhood action which underlined the “dangers of treating the community as an unanalysed abstraction” (Clarke 1987:385). Substantive evidence has been accumulated in considerable ‘community’ research efforts, suggesting that organized ‘neighbourhoods’ in most instances simply “do not represent the local constituency” (Smith 1984:50). In fact, there is an abundance of evidence that points to the “positive relationship among socioeconomic status, neighbourhood social organization, and residents’ participation in neighbourhood associations” (Mesch and Schirian 1996:480, see Sampson 1991, Haberle 1989 and Thomas 1986). These factors are proposed to furthermore influence the effectiveness and outcomes of organized local action, and are thus seen to be facilitating a structure of inequality in local social and political efforts rooted in a fundamental “bias towards wealthy and stable neighbourhoods” (ibid., Berry, Portney and Thomson 1993).

As has been shown in many case studies, participation in ‘community’ organization and initiatives is usually limited to a small number of people, usually “a self-selected fraction of the population” (Greer 1962, see Smith 1986). In fact, those who “participate in neighbourhood affairs have been shown to differ from other residents on measures of social and economic background, lifestyle and cultural values, degree of community attachment, satisfaction with the neighbourhood, and identification of problems and issues” (Smith 1986:50). In much stronger language, Nelken asserts that those “who come forward to represent the community are typically self-appointed or self-selected rather than democratically elected and are unrepresentative simply by the willingness to become involved [and] it is far from clear how they could or should represent their communities” (1985:255). There is considerable evidence that the participants in organized neighbourhood activities fall into a socio-economic-educational middle-class spectrum, have family in form of a partner and/or children, have resided in their particular locality for some time and are home owners (Greenberg, Rohe and Williams 1985).

A large variety of explanations have been offered for these consistent structural differences described in people’s participation in local ‘community’ organizing and action. Some have rationalized the distinct ‘middle class’ socio-economic and educational features of ‘neighbourhood activists’ with a basic need of resources to constructively partake in such activities or simply the time and ability to understand the complex political and bureaucratic features of the ‘system’ that.
has to be dealt with as the necessary basis of established social interaction; others have related it to corresponding material stakes or interests (Baum and Kingston 1984, Rosenbaum 1986, Hunter 1974). One of the key socio-economic characteristics that has been associated with ‘neighbourhood action’ is home-ownership. It has been reported that home owners partake much more prevalently in ‘informal neighbouring’ (mostly among equals), are more likely to participate in volunteer organizations and initiatives, feature higher social status, self-esteem and life satisfaction, and indicate a greater stake in social issues as well as increased local social interaction (Rohe and Stegman 1994, Baum and Kingston 1984). The US Department of Housing and Urban Development simplistically reasoned the logic behind these facts by alleging that people “who own property take better care of it. They invest in it. They become more concerned with the behaviour of those around them. They show heightened interest in property taxes, crime and drugs in the neighbourhood and the level and quality of government services. They may even vote regularly and become more engaged in the democratic process” (in: Rohe and Stegman 1994:152). Baum and Kingston suggest that “feelings such as pride of ownership may induce certain psychological orientations not related to economic concerns that foster or reinforce particular social attachments” (1984:163). Others, however, have suggested that it may not be the generic interest of protecting property value and related material interests that drives home owners into participation in neighbourhood action but that the high costs of the alternative of relocating and other troubles associated with such a step may be more significant in doing so, and distinguish neighbourhood activists from the ones that simply leave local areas that come to show unattractive or problematic features (Cox and McCarthy 1980).

And while ‘neighbourhood’ and ‘community’ initiatives tend to understand themselves as inherently, genuinely and deeply rooted in a natural sort of value and interest consensus and collectivity, but are, on the other hand, usually organized beyond systematically formal, democratic or accountable principles, these stratifying factors, of course, have put large question marks around the issue of ‘legitimacy’ of such entities (Crawford 1995, Beetham 1991). In many instances, the issue of legitimacy appears not to arise since the voluntary, informal and loose forms and procedures in which neighbourhood activism is staged and carried out do not facilitate such questions, queries and challenges to begin with. Rather, it has been established that in- and outsiders to organized ‘neighbourhood’ through “non-activity and failure to question the organization’s role, silently acquiesce to the legitimacy of the organization as the neighbourhood
representative”. Or, they simply become placed into a role of representation by “inducements” provided by internal or external “agencies in need of a neighbourhood contact” with whom to deal and communicate, and thus in such instances the “organization claims authority as the neighbourhood spokesperson by virtue of its recognition” by such agents (Smith 1984:51). Smith further concludes: “Hence, it often falls to the neighbourhood organization to identify both the community that it represents and the interests of that community. In the absence of any competing consensus for an alternative definition of the community and its interests, the definition given by the local organization is the only one available. Neighbourhood activists assume a certain power to define, for both insiders and outsiders alike, what the community is and what its interests are. The question of the legitimacy of this view may never be raised” (ibid.).

‘Community’ as the core of late modern society

However, the substantially increased popularity and prevalence of organized local ‘community’ interest and action as a key part of local political and social affairs in the past two decades or so cannot just be understood as the result of a heightened push or demand for such initiatives from ‘stakeholders’ in such enterprises, like civilians, citizens or residents. The emergence and expansion of these initiatives has also been triggered and facilitated by a recently evolving climate and context of government and social organization that has been described by a variety of terms. Some have titled it neo-conservative, neo-liberal or “advanced liberal” (Rose 1993, O’Malley 1992, 1996), some have spoken about in terms of post-welfare, late modern or post-modern contexts of state and society, and again some have referred to the framework of the “enterprise culture” (Heelas and Morris 1992) or even a “risk society” (Beck 1987, Ericson and Haggerty 1997). Whatever the appropriate term may be with respect to the characteristics, modes and directions of contemporary social and political affairs, these paradigms either in a congruent or complementary way bring forward a set of distinct themes that spawn a fertile ground for increased, activated and emphasized ‘neighbourhood’ and ‘community’ action as it has been increasingly observed. The core themes rationalizing, describing and legitimizing such initiatives may be, albeit rather simplistically, summarized by the somewhat slogansque categories of ‘localization’, ‘civic empowerment and individual responsibilization’, ‘marketization’, and ‘moralization’.

Late modern times (suggested to begin in about the late 1970s) have been characterized
with a strong sense of disillusionment and pessimism about the modern welfare state as it was traditionally known, largely emerging on two fronts (Gamble 1986, O'Malley 1996). First, increasing evidence was seen that the model of the ‘welfare state’, its central idea of government and the public sector as the monopoly source for providing ‘public goods’ - including social security, health, education, safety and justice - on the basis of a social contract was not working, and proved to be an ineffective and inefficient scheme (Heelas and Morris 1992, O'Malley 1996).

It was claimed that citizenship under the welfare state had “encouraged the passive consumption of state provision and undermined people’s confidence to direct their own lives [also] creating gradually extending networks of intrusive state power into civil society” (Levitas 1986:13). What had become known as the ‘nothing works’ phenomenon in the criminal justice area seemed to spread all across the traditional jurisdictions of the welfare state, with public debts and deficits skyrocketing, unemployment numbers rising, and health and education systems failing on principal measures of quality and equity. Furthermore, the welfare state idea appeared to prove fiscally impossible, conceptually unfeasible and socially indefensible, and gradually became ‘eroded’ as the core idea and as a practical concept guiding modern Western states and society.

But secondly, a parallel and certainly related phenomenon emerging was what may be called the increased alienation of state and citizens. It suggested that the civil subjects of state power felt increasingly that the ‘state’ and its executive agents and authorities - be it political decision-makers, bureaucracies, welfare planners, the justice system - were ‘out of touch’, too distanced and ‘out of sync’ with the demands, desires and attitudes of ‘ordinary’ citizens governed and directly affected by political decisions, laws, welfare policies and court decisions, etc.. The state became increasingly perceived as an abstract, unresponsive and disassociated entity in the distance, creating what some European cultures have termed as the recent phenomenon of ‘state fatigue’ of citizens as expressed in a high “degree of anti-institutionalism, in the sense of dissatisfaction with the way [state] institutions are operating” and subsequently pushing “political and economic power to the local level” via ‘populist movements and initiatives’ (Bellah in: Harrington 1986:100).

Within the wider contexts of an emerging neo-liberal concept of state and government, one of the key philosophical and practical remedies to this state of civic disillusionment seemed a broad ‘localization’ of state and politics, rooting ‘state’ again in and bringing it closer to, ‘the citizen’. Decentralization of decision-making, “local autonomy” and control, and “think globally,
act locally” became the ‘leitmotifs’ of reformed social and political action (Keat 1991:9) appealing to the idea of “populism” whose simple but ‘popular’ essential proposition was “ordinary people getting involved with others to collectively control their lives” (Reissman in: Harrington 1986:54).

As such, the new locally emerging social populism’s “great figure of opposition and rejection is the state” and is set in a “dynamic of opposition to the formalized and centralized power of the state”; it was, in fact, hoped and projected that populist movements and initiatives would “[do] what the state cannot” (Fitzpatrick 1992:200). As a consequence, over the last twenty years or so, Western societies have seen a massive proliferation of ‘community-based’ initiatives, programs and services, ranging from ‘community health centres’ to ‘community schools’ to community corrections’ and ‘justice centres’ to - ‘community policing’, all of which were proposing that their approaches and services were more sensitive to local needs and interests, in touch with and flexible enough to respond to local concerns, and more human, effective and efficient (see, e.g. Abel 1982, Matthews 1988). In other words, they were seen as “less routinized and more informal ... and more energetic, flexible and in touch with community needs” (Marx 1989:503).

These developments occurred within the context of a paradigmatic transformation of the ideology of ‘state’ and ‘government’ from a ‘welfarist’ or ‘Keynesian’, to a ‘neo-liberal’, ‘post-welfarist’ or ‘post-Keynesian’ model within that period, redefining what roles state, government and citizens are supposed to play, what means and objectives these social and governmental entities were given, and how they would relate to each other (see Belsey 1986, Levitas 1986). Some have described these developments simply as the establishment of a “new social order” (Belsey ibid.). This new social order was centrally to be built around the individual citizen instead of the state, and therefore, as Heelas and Morris (1992) further elaborate, to be founded on what they call the emerging social framework of the “enterprise culture”, “highly individualistic” at its ideological and functional social core. What matters is giving “individuals more and more choice over their own lives, providing more choice and more opportunity for every member of society - not just those who already have the means and the knowledge. The talk is of self reliance and self respect; of freedom from state control, of people drawing on their own resources to compete in the open market, using the wealth they create to take responsibility for - and so exercise accountability over - their educational, health, housing requirements, rather than relying on the offices and organs of the state” (ibid. 1, citing Baker and Howe). The new framework of state and government was dominated by the ideas of “economic liberalism, efficiency of markets, the liberty
of individuals and the non-interventionist state” (Keat 1991:1). The central credo was that much of the traditional welfare services or mandates of the state - which had supposedly created the infamous social “culture of dependency” (Keat 1991:4) - would be ‘privatized’, in the sense that they would either become the individual responsibility of the citizen without major involvement of the state (e.g., pension planning), or devolved to private or semi-private entities (e.g. privatized education or health care sectors). These shifts also implied, emphasized and relied on a ‘marketization’ of state, social and economic life. This conversion was to involve a fundamental “extension of the domain of the ‘free market’ together with an intensification of the competitive forces operating within that domain”, towards what was formerly known as the public sector. In the newly marketized public sector, its essential “goods and services [are now] becoming straightforwardly purchasable commodities” plainly suggesting the reconstruction of the state along the “lines suggested by the model of the commercial enterprise” (Keat 1991:2, Stanley 1990). The new individual values emphasized and built on were “initiative, energy, independence, boldness, self-reliance, a willingness to take risks and to accept responsibility” (Keat ibid. 3).

The emphasis of enterprise values and principles in the late modern state was predominantly constructed as valuable and beneficial to basic political values like authority and accountability, since it was “implying that the extension of the market domain is itself an extension of democracy, via the assimilation of ‘sovereign’ consumers to ‘sovereign’ citizens”. And while there were voices of concern suggesting that the market dynamics emphasized might undermine the “supposed equality of democratic citizens”, it was, to the contrary, reasoned that the “appeal of consumer society [was] taken to support, not the extension of the free market, but a shift towards more democratic forms of control over institutions that had previously been insufficiently responsive to those whom they supposedly served” (Keat 1991:13, see Plant 1984). ‘Liberty’ became the newly (re-)celebrated social and political value, means and objective and “liberty is primarily to be exercised by the self-interested consumer in the market place, including political, educational and medical ‘markets’. The consensus was to be replaced by a new individualism; a stress on competition; the sovereignty of the consumer; monetarist and supply side economic policies and a wholesale evaluation of government-directed attempts of egalitarian redistribution” (Heelas and Morris 1992:18f). It was the new ideology of the “morality of the market”, based on Hayek’s (1960) and others’ thinking that was seen to bring late modern society closer to its ultimate goals and values of property, fairness and equity in the sense that the ‘market’ is the
ultimate source bringing "good and is the great engine of civilization and progress" (Heelas and Morris 1992:20, see Morris 1990, Hayek 1960). The neo-liberal model of state and society was projected as being based "in economics and on ideas about individualism about markets", referring to "the integrating force of the market within society, producing order, justice, economic growth and constantly rising incomes, including those of the poorest ... [whereas] inequality is the inevitable (and beneficial) outcome of individual freedom and initiative" (Levitas 1986:3).

In particular, at its core the enterprise culture emphasized and built on the 'responsibilized self' or the 'enterprising individual' for all concepts of modern life. This 'new breed' of the late modern individual is "self reliant and non-dependent. They make their own decisions, rather than wanting or expecting others to make them; and they do take responsibility for their own lives, so that ... they do not assume that there is always someone else to blame or whose job it is to put things right. Their activities are oriented towards specific goals or objectives ...; and they are motivated to acquire whatever skills and resources are necessary to pursue these goals effectively. They see the world full of opportunities for making new things happen; they do not hang back and wait to see what others will do before committing themselves to action, and they regard problems as there to be solved and overcome" (Keat 1991:5f). The 'responsibilized self' would "exercise their freedom of choice as enterprising consumers rather than being permissive, and should serve as active citizens, contributing to the public good rather than being selfish". All these characteristics became subsumed under the concept of "active citizenship" (Morris and Heal 1992:2, see also Isin 1994 and Miller 1993) and divided the emerging neo-liberal society into two basic 'classes' - "producers and parasites" (Levitas 1986:9). Along similar lines, Dewar has drawn the fundamental distinction line between 'clients' and 'citizens': "Clients are dependent upon and controlled by their leaders. Clients are people who understand themselves in terms of their deficiencies and people who wait for others to act on their behalf. Citizens, on the other hand, are people who understand their own problems in their own terms. Citizens perceive their relationship to one another and they believe in their capacity to act. Good clients make bad citizens. Good citizens make strong communities" (Dewar in: Osborne and Gaebler 1993:52). This concept obviously incorporated the significantly broadened neo-liberal ideology of 'citizenship', conceptualizing it and the society that it spawns and facilitates as a "series of private spheres in which individuals, corporations and organizations must take responsibility for their own problems" (Crawford 1995:102).
This framework of a lean, ‘marketized’ and commodified ‘society’ spawned a new ideology and concept of what the state’s role in this context would be, what it would do and provide, how, and according to what principles. All of the paradigmatic changes and re-orientations in the role of the state are aptly summarized in a seminal credo on ‘reinventing government’, stating that the new forms of state run by “entrepreneurial governments promote competition between service providers. They empower citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy, into the community. They measure the performance of their agencies, focusing not on output but on outcomes. They are driven by their goals - their missions - not by their rules and regulations. They redefine the clients as customers and offer them choices ... . They prevent problems before they emerge, rather than simply offering services afterwards. They put their energies into earning money, not simply spending it. They decentralize authority, embracing participatory management. They prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic mechanisms. And they focus not simply on providing public services, but on catalysing all sectors - public, private and voluntary - into action to solve their community’s problems” (Osborne and Gaebler 1993:19f).

This emerging model of the state in the post-welfare era would thus centrally aim for a working system of government through a core “third sector” located somewhere between the traditional arenas of the ‘public’ and the ‘private’. It was projected to be made up of “organizations that are privately owned and controlled but that exist to meet public or social needs, not to accumulate private wealth; [it would] be best at performing tasks that generate little or no profit, demand compassion and commitment to individuals, require extensive trust on the part of customers or clients, need hands-on, personal attention and involve the enforcement of moral codes and individual responsibility of behaviour” (ibid. 46). This system or sector of government, however, would not be there to ‘provide’ or ‘secure’ services or citizens but utilize the genuine structure of “government for what it does best - raising resources and setting societal priorities through a democratic political process - while utilizing the private sector for what it does best - organizing the production of goods and services” (ibid. 30). The state within this paradigm of government, therefore, lost the central role as a “doer” (Drucker 1968), provider and distributor, but assumed the crucially different role of an ‘facilitator’, a ‘regulator’ or a ‘catalyst’ of processes, programs and services demanded and needed in social settings. The new state’s responsibility, mission and function became shifted from “rowing to steering” social affairs (Osborne and Gaebler 1993:30), redefining the role of the state to one of “market supporting
activities" (Crawford 1995:101, Gamble 1979). State and government in that framework would "empower citizens" to do what is necessary rather than telling and doing it for them (Crawford ibid.), and above all to the extent that "they can participate more fully in ... society" (Lewis et al. 1988:130).

As O'Malley aptly synthesizes, in the paradigm of "late modern statehood and citizenship, the dependent citizens" created by the welfare state had to be "made active, independent and responsible", based on the "classical liberal idea that markets are the environment of such subjects". These principles were couched in the central assumption that the "state itself should be shaped along market lines, and should be forced to compete in the market with respect to many of its activities", including the "operation and structure of most institutions, and the provision of most goods and services". This implied also that many sectors and services "formerly provided by the state should be turned over to private enterprises [and] the state ceases to be the directive core attracting to itself a monopoly of functions, and instead begins to shed or share many activities and responsibilities". These developments eventually are culminating in a "politically driven decentring of the state" and leading to a "carving up and dispersing of state empires, to mobilize a dependent population to act in its own interests, and to expose the torpid 'welfare' citizenry to the invigorating vicissitudes of risk" (all above paragraph: O'Malley 1996:367f). At the basis of these fundamental conversions there was the "recognition that the community has to be created, empowered, mobilized and made aware of its best interests" as the social foundation, power and organized mode of citizenry; as such, it is the core social entity which acts, initiates and takes charge in an environment of market, opportunity and risk regulated, facilitated and assisted by the state and its remaining but modified governing forces (O'Malley ibid., O'Malley and Palmer 1994).

But it was in that seemingly rational and functional paradigm of governing through market, enterprise and individualism that simultaneously a new "moral economy" (Heelas and Morris 1992:8) emerged. A number of key neo-liberal advocates have consistently "argued that a 'free society'" can only be based on a firm "moral and spiritual framework", or an adequate "high moral ground" in order to police, contain and keep in check the "market's worst tendencies" (Morris 1991:25). Some, including popular neo-liberal political leaders, have seen ideological redemption in a return to Christian values underlining the high principles of the "almighty, tolerance, moral absolutes and the work ethic" (ibid.) leading to what Griffiths has coined as
‘Christian Conservatism’. Morris summarizes this succinctly as follows: “[M]arkets operate in real communities and can only function on the basis of a number of already existing communal institutions, in the main widespread ownership of private property, the acceptance of the rule of law and positive but limited government control. Just as vital [...] are the underlying moral virtues of individual responsibility, community and trust. Markets are social relationships and communal institutions dependent upon trust and self-interest. The rejection of this communal trust impedes the operation of the market. [T]he part that ‘justice’ plays in the market, is not in terms of equality of distribution, but in ensuring the non-coercive operation of the economy. [...] [M]arkets not only require a moral foundation, but they also strengthen the moral dimensions of society by respecting individual freedom of choice and individual economic responsibility” (26f).

This mix of ideology and socio-political values has shaken up the traditionally “uneasy balance [between] individualism and communitarianism” (Thompson 1992) and forged the two entities into a new alliance of an almost religiously hailed and promoted kind of late modern “communitarianism”. This new model of ‘local collectivism’ was setting the moral and normative grounds that would make ‘individualism’ possible through the ‘community’ of ‘responsible citizens’, and thus produce the best of the supposedly contradictory worlds of ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’. This model of a religion-like ‘communitarianism’ is grounded in individual “responsibilities” towards decency, norms and good standards, rather than “rights” working against the proposed total and destructive loss of ‘community’, promoting “active citizenship” and a belief in “natural conservative values”, and setting its foundations in a deep and thorough “moral reconstruction ... shoring up our moral foundations” (Etzioni 1993:11ff). At its essential core, the “assumption of ‘economic man’ is now replaced by ‘communal man’” (Lewis et al. 136), suggesting a return to traditional ‘communal’ values. ‘Communal man’ is proposed to live in constant engagement with his/her fellow citizens and in a “world of mutual ties and mutual dependency, a world in which the government and the public realm in general are at best unimportant for securing order”. S/he sees “welfare improved through collective efforts” and this basis of communitarian “solidarity will lead to more political power for those in the community” (ibid.). It is diagnosed that many of our basic “moral traditions, social values and institutions have been challenged ... and that we live in a state of increasing moral confusion and social anarchy” as well as a “disinclination to lay moral claims [undermining] the daily, routine social underwriting of morality” (ibid. 12ff) - all of which require fundamental reform for the advancement of state and
The remedy to this late modern state of 'anomie' has been proposed by acknowledging the fact that "free individuals require a community", to be fostered by a revived focus on natural principles of "family values, community and morality", thus aiming to introduce the romanticized values of pre-urban 'Gemeinschaft' into late modern territories of 'Gesellschaft'. The enemies of the late modern moral fabric are, for example, alcohol and drugs, sexual deviance and excessive pleasures, crime and threats to safety, all of which present a list of late modern 'sins' or violations of neo-puritan values. Some even argued that the new 'moralism' came as the framework for a new class structure in late modern society replacing traditional socio-economic divisions. Instead, a close link is suggested between the paradigms of 'morality', 'safety' and 'crime' organizing late modern social affairs and legitimizing social intervention: "[T]here is a difference between the 'working poor', people who are struggling to support traditional family values, educate their children, strengthen their communities and improve their circumstances, and [...] the 'underclass'. Underclass life is characterized by wide-spread illegitimacy, able-bodied unemployment, drug abuse, prostitution, welfare dependency and crime [or] troublemakers - drug dealers, prostitutes, panhandlers, roving bands of adolescents and guys driving pickup trucks after midnight for no good reason" (Neely 1990:15f). Thus, in recognizing the reform tendencies of post-welfarist government, the conclusion is that "the best way to minimize the role of the state, especially its policing role, is to enhance community and its moral voice" (Etzioni 1993:44). This was to effectively occur by underlining the central and crucial role of responsibilized, empowered and moralized citizens through laws or other means possible to ensure the maintenance and enforcement of the new 'communal code' "expressing social and moral values and signalling conduct that the community considers proper or abhorrent" (ibid. 47). All this taken together was eventually to form the new 'triad of morality' on which the new model of state and society was to be based: "[I]ndividual conscience, the moral voice of the community, and the state" (ibid. 48).

'Community' in late modern crime and justice

The situation of a perceived decrease in the ability and willingness of 'state' institutions to provide for the 'welfare' of citizens, the claim of rising crime and fear of crime plus the emerging hypothesis that local decline, decay and disorder was the basis of the spiral leading to crime, violence and loss of safety especially in urban neighbourhoods, led to a dramatic wave of local,
‘community’ or ‘neighbourhood’ activities, programs and initiatives around crime and safety starting some 20 years ago (Ericson et al. 1993, Skogan 1990, Wilson and Kelling 1982). The predominant tenor underlying such initiatives was that “active and serious citizen involvement is essential if crime is to be substantially reduced. Out of necessity, the general public has been stimulated to assist undermanned, overtaxed and often non-community oriented police forces in the development of healthy and secure neighbourhoods” (Washnis 1976:1). It was at local or ‘community’ levels especially in urban settings where dramatic threat to safety, rising crime prevalence and increasing ‘fear of crime’ were discovered over the past two decades or so, and a need for action was emphasized. Numerous ‘community’ initiatives were formed and launched, but at the same time ‘community members’ were encouraged and supported by state and government to get involved and become active in ‘crime’ and ‘safety’ activities. One of the reasons for the successful and relatively uncontroversial proliferation of ‘community crime’ programs of various sorts was the fact that, as Skogan points out, the idea of local activism and involvement proved attractive to most sides of the political spectrum: It “emphasized voluntarism, had smaller budgetary implications and diverted attention from what some thought to be the root causes of crime [which] suited conservatives”, and at the same time it “promised to support organizing efforts in poor neighbourhoods and to provide money for established community organizations which suited many liberals” (1988:41). Simultaneously, the ‘community’ was discovered not only as a resource to effectively work against, but also a ‘victim’ of these local crime and ‘threat to safety’ phenomena (Roach 1997). It was argued that street crime and disorder negatively affected ‘community’ assets like safety and ‘quality of life’, and that the criminal justice system in the absence of the traditional individual victims had ignored their negative effects on the local collectivity. This perspective was used as a basic socio-political justification for the massive pressure towards ‘community’ crime and safety funds and initiatives, but also upon the police and the courts to enforce and punish ‘harms’ done to the ‘community’.

The general idea of the ‘community’ as a core “resource” as well as an agent to prevent and deter crime, to recognize and reduce criminogenic environments, to stage and carry out ‘social control’ and to provide material and knowledge assistance to help formal ‘crime’ agencies to deal with their challenges more effectively started to dominate discursive and programmatic frameworks (Hope 1995, Rosenbaum 1987). The overarching idea was that local crime and threats to safety carried a reality and causality of ‘place’, and that ‘community’ was the promising
location, perspective and resource to turn "dangerous places" into "safe places" (Reiss 1986:2). 'Communities' were now even seen as having "crime careers" (ibid.), determining via their socio-environmental parameters how individual develop and act, and how, in turn, individuals relate to and act towards them. The assumption was that the formal agents of the criminal justice system could not effectively and efficiently deal with crime and its origins on local levels, but that much of the work and efforts required to prevent it, or deal with it more expediently could and needed to be done by ordinary citizens, residents, neighbourhoods and their everyday, social resources, settings and interactions (Kelling and Coles 1996, Shapland and Vagg 1988, Rosenbaum 1986).

In order to successfully 'wage the local battle' against crime these local resources were to become active and engaged in looking for and identifying crime, safety and risk situations, watch, notice and observe, define and bring forward problems to and consult with the police. They were further expected to put into place and exercise forms of social control against criminal elements and behaviour, deal with the 'criminogenic' and crime causing local phenomena (graffiti, disorder, garbage, etc.) that were seen to be out of reach of the police, and to make clear and effective statements to the effect that in their area, crime and its carriers are looked out for and paid attention to (Shapland and Vagg 1988, Skogan 1990, Ericson and Haggerty 1997).

It also became clear that all these proposed local efforts would be put into place and exercised in a much more effective fashion when properly organized and coordinated, since most of them relied on organized, network and system type schemes and required a basic "institutional infrastructure" (Hope 1995:26). As a result, cities, towns and local 'neighbourhoods' became inundated with 'crime prevention programs', block and 'neighbourhood watches', 'safe neighbourhood programs', 'local crime councils', 'mobile patrols', and, of course, 'community policing' (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, O'Malley 1996, Carriere and Ericson 1989, Lurigio and Rosenbaum 1987), making late modern society enter the "heyday of community crime prevention" (Rosenbaum 1986:103). Much of these initiatives became, in fact, embedded in voluntary, informal and loosely structured local organizations (Lavrakas 1985, Rosenbaum 1986). By way of example, Ericson and Haggerty quote a 'Block Watch' pamphlet illustrating what 'community' is expected to do and accomplish: "[Block Watch] is to deter fear and incidence of crime ... through saturation, increase the identification and reporting of suspicious activities [and] provide neighbourhood cohesiveness [by] getting to know your neighbours. [It] requires an observant eye for an unusual activity and common sense precautions ... Crime prevention is not a series of
lectures but a part of daily life” (1997:156).

In a rudimentary way, local crime initiatives can be divided into and analyzed from a two-dimensional perspective, outlining different types of initiatives with different foci, directions and activities. First, there are two main categories of ‘community’ crime and safety initiatives that present a key difference in focus, with one of them engaging in and providing facilitative or supportive work and input to the ‘real’ crime and safety experts, the police and other agents or institutions of the criminal justice system. In this context, the local organizations and groups are seen as playing the much celebrated role of the “co-producers of public safety” by doing things and providing assistance that supposedly allow the police and other crime and safety agencies to do their ‘professional’ work in the area more effectively, comprehensively and efficiently (Bayley 1994). ‘Neighbourhood watch’ is a prime example for such activities, as these programs primarily aim at collecting information about people, situations and behaviours help the police to prevent, respond, investigate. Correspondingly, there is another category of ‘neighbourhood’ safety activities that are working more towards their own goals, objectives and ends in terms of safety, not directly aiming at or involving the police, or in many instances trying to achieve things that the police is seen as incapable, unwilling or unlikely to do or provide. ‘Neighbourhood walks’ or ‘safety patrols’ in many instances aim for their own deterrent, investigative and symbolic effects against intruders, outsiders, criminals and the disorderly (McConville and Shepherd 1992, Rosenbaum 1986).

On a second conceptual level, there are organizations and initiatives that aim at what has usually become labelled as ‘proactive’ or ‘preventative’, trying to protect and strengthen local environments from invasion and perpetration by whatever are identified as the prevalent threats to safety. ‘Safety audits’, ‘crime prevention’ courses, seminars and information systems, and so on occur within that framework. The concepts of understanding and creating ‘defensible spaces’, and local ‘target hardening’, applied to local arenas, captures most of such efforts (Newmann 1972, Cohen 1985). Correspondingly, some local or ‘community’ initiatives have evolved that are aiming to more or less ‘reactively’ deal with threats to safety or ‘criminal elements’, in what some have seen as legitimate “self help” initiatives (Back 1983). Others, however, have titled such efforts as ‘vigilantism’ or even “righteous slaughter” (Katz 1988) in which citizens are seen as “more likely to take the law into their own hands because the problems are perceived to be so terrible and the state is seen to be incapable of taking appropriate action” (Marx 1989:505).
Many of the police support the prevention type of activities focussing on an information gathering and provision ("natural surveillance"; Hope 1995) role to formal criminal justice agents, collecting and forwarding information on suspicious people, objects, behaviours - everything that seemed relevant in and by the community as the 'eyes and ears' role of the police. Other efforts aimed to expand, underline and strengthen what has become widely labelled as the resources and mechanics of 'informal social control' (Marx 1989:502) of neighbourhoods and 'community', through which organizations "hope to control crime and disorder by initiating and supporting activities that will enhance residents' feelings of efficacy about individual and collective action as well as increase their sense of personal responsibility for these actions; they hope to stimulate attempts to regulate social behaviour in the neighbourhood by enhancing residents' feeling of territoriality and willingness to intervene in suspicious circumstances, and they hope to facilitating neighbouring, social interaction, and mutual helpfulness to enhance solidarity and build commitment to the community", all under the basic assumption that the qualities of "efficacy, responsibility, territoriality, and commitment are undermined by the destabilizing forces of urbanization" (Skogan 1988:61).

This local crime prevention and control ideology was based on a strong belief in the three-decade old credo - most aptly presented by Jane Jacobs in a time when the police was just in the process of retreating from beat policing - that actual generic and fundamental power to prevent and control disorder and crime in urban settings lies with the people and their local and social structures of co-existence themselves, for which the role and the powers of the police can never substitute: "The first thing to understand is that the public peace - the sidewalk and street peace - of cities is not kept primarily by police, necessary as the police are. It is kept by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves. ... No number of police can enforce civilization where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down" (Jacobs 1962:41, see also Wilson and Kelling 1982). Translated into practical local efforts in the current 'disorder' and 'threats to local safety' scenarios described, the action recipe seemed fairly straight forward: 'Neighbourhood watchers' must be "alert for suspicious persons and activities, and they must be willing to either call the police or to challenge those up to no good. To do this effectively, they must know when and where to watch, and what is suspicious and what not" (Skogan 1988:62). Many of the measures and instruments of neighbourhood safety initiatives were processes and steps of trivial social life now understood and utilized as the
“preursors” and the actual mechanics of “informal social control”, initiated by concerned, responsibilized and activated local ‘community’ and citizens (Fisher 1977, Greenberg et al. 1985). The core intention with them was that “residents become more familiar with one another, exchange information, develop a sense of community, and define the range of community for which they feel responsible. They exert control by spreading norms about appropriate behaviour and teaching new residents how to behave; their sanctions are gossip, social exclusion and at most, embarrassing threats” (Skogan 1988:64f). Many of the recent ‘community crime’ initiatives examined have focused on what Marx calls “moral crusades” concerned with “alcoholics and drug addicts, drunk drivers and spouse abuse, and so on” (1989:504). Furthermore, in many instances, the primary focus has been on identifying and keeping ‘outsiders’, ‘suspects’, the disorderly, or in general “external enemies” out of ‘protected’ local territories (Skogan 1988:56).

However, empirical research into local crime control organizations and initiatives soon started to suggest some worrisome imbalances and disillusionments. First, research on the effectiveness of ‘community’ crime prevention and safety programs - besides the fact that the majority of evaluation studies presented methodologically insufficient frameworks and proceedings - raised serious doubts about whether these efforts in fact lowered the prevalence of crime and the likelihood of victimization rather than just ‘increasing awareness’, enlisting program approval or some form of material or symbolic participation (Rosenbaum 1986, Yin 1986, Lurigio and Rosenbaum 1987). Furthermore, most of such initiatives showed low levels of citizen involvement (most surveys indicate a participation rate of 10-15%). In areas where such programs had been successfully established, organizers had a hard time ensuring ongoing and consistent implementation of their programs, active participation highly fluctuated and in many instances faded out after a relatively short period of time (Rosenbaum 1987, Skogan 1990).

Secondly, ‘community’ crime and safety organizations and initiatives demonstrated significant marks of socio-economic stratification, as discussed for ‘community’ organizations in general above. The finding of a number of field studies looking at the social distribution of such organizations showed first of all that they are “least common where they appear to be the most needed - in low-income, heterogeneous, deteriorated, renting, high-turnover, high crime areas” (Skogan 1988:45, see also Hope 1995, Rosenbaum 1986). Poor and low-income areas generally tend to resist forms of local organizing, as do high income and upscale neighbourhoods, both of which do not tend to engage in high levels of social contact, interaction and cooperation among
parties - albeit for quite different reasons (Greenberg and Rohe 1983, Garofalo and McLeod 1986). Crawford has pointed to the “unrepresentative nature of ‘community representation’” within crime prevention settings. He concludes that “the least organized communities and groups within communities - those most politically and socially disadvantaged - are exactly those groups and communities with most experience of, and who are most affected by, crime and victimization” (Crawford 1994:510).

‘Community’ crime initiatives were seen as following the more broadly established general patterns of “those who participate in any kind of voluntary activity” (Hope 1995:44). They are characterized by highest prevalence in urban, homogenous, middle-class neighbourhoods, featuring a basic common idea of what the local ‘problems’ or ‘enemies’ are, a general familiarity with the ‘system’ of local government and public services and how to effectively deal with them, and a high level of home and property ownership (Rosenbaum 1986, Greenberg et al. 1985, Henig 1982, Crenson 1983). A large-scale assessment of over 500 American ‘neighbourhood watch’ programs indicated that residents living and being served in the program areas were “predominantly white, have middle or upper class incomes, are single-family home owners, and have lived in their current location for at least five years” (Rosenbaum 1986:114, see also Garofalo and McLeod 1985). Participation in such programs was generally also recognized as a “function of both inclination and opportunity” (Hope 1995:46). Such locally active social groups or clusters also tend to see ‘crime’ and ‘safety’ as a more highly prioritized problem for themselves than other issues (Podolevsky 1983, Skogan 1988). In summary, in terms of individual participation within local ‘community’ crime prevention initiatives, there is substantial evidence that it is correlated with “the same factors that stimulate general involvement in neighbourhood affairs”; namely, a socio-economic-educational status of ‘middle class’, family, home-ownership, a presence in the local area for a longer period of time, and “class-linked attitudes concerning personal and political efficacy, extent of political information, and civic-mindedness” (Skogan 1988:53; see Hope 1995, Greenberg et al, 1985, Lavrakas 1985).

On a level of social dynamics, organized ‘community’ crime and safety efforts in many instances have proven to be locally and socially “divisive rather than integrative” (Skogan 1988:47). It has been suggested that such settings produce a process and result of “collective polarization” of their group members’ feelings, attitudes and opinions entailing an “extremization from the group initial’s inclinations” regarding the perceived nature and symptoms of crime and
safety threats dealt with (Rosenbaum 1986:121, see for more details Moscovici and Doise 1974). One study, for example, showed how racist attitudes began to grow and become more extreme in a group comprised of racist individuals (Myers and Bishop 1970). On this basis, it was cautioned that crime prevention programs may support one biased side or perspective on problem issues or the other, and thus provide the socio-psychological grounds for and "intensify intergroup conflict". For example, "efforts to watch for suspicious strangers may become synonymous with watching for blacks or Hispanics" (Rosenbaum 1986:122, see DuBow and Emmons 1981). Many 'community' crime initiatives have been reported to polarize factions, interests and groups within the community, establish systems and structures of inclusion and exclusion and in many cases lead to the scenario that "one group's solution is going to become another group's problem" (Lewis and Salem 1986:90).

Consequently, it seems clear that 'community' in local crime and safety work is far from being an unanimous, objective, unchallenged and consensual concept. Rather, it is a highly dynamic, volatile and subjective matter of social power, interests and conflicts on many levels aiming to establish and carry out agendas, processes and the social construction of 'community' as a means as well as an end of 'policing' and 'social control' that has not yet been sufficiently understood.

'Community' in 'community policing': Who is it?

'Community' materializing in organized neighbourhood and its initiatives, as the above discussion has suggested, presents its own subjective and peculiar social characteristics, interests and dynamics. At first glance, an important aspect with considerable implications observed in the various local organizations presenting themselves and functioning as 'community' for the purpose of 'policing' in the research site, was the size and type of representation within these local entities. Although all of the 'community' associations observed root themselves in and claim to represent socio-geographic jurisdictions of roughly between 5,000 and 15,000 population each, the number of involved 'community' members or participants as reflected in the organizations' meetings and observed over about one year of research usually ranged in the neighbourhood of no more than between 10 and 50 people. This figure partly seemed to depend on the base size of the local jurisdiction covered, but also on the frequency of meetings held (with some of the associations meeting weekly, others only a few times a year), and on the degree of general openness and active
'outreach' with which the individual groups operated.

The majority of the more regular 'community' group meetings observed featured an audience of somewhere between 10 and 25 people. As an interesting indicator with respect to the practical mobilization of 'community', in most instances barely half of the individuals present at such gatherings were people who primarily lived or worked within the respective 'community's' geographic boundaries. Rather, the remaining half were there in some official or professional 'community' related function from inside or outside the claimed local boundaries. For instance, one of the larger 'community' associations within 99 Division meeting on a monthly basis would usually feature some 25 people gathering in the room. However, this assembly included, for example, 7 or 8 police officers, a representative of The City's planning department, a person from the local community centre, two property developers from outside the area presenting a proposal to develop a piece of commercial land in the area, a liquor license board representative, two local city councillors' representatives, two members from other 'community' organizations, and some expert speaking with regards to a 'community' safety program. This cluster of 'outsiders' or external officials participating in the 'community' meeting left the number of actual simple 'community' members at a level of below ten.

While the 'community' groups consistently claimed to be "open to and representative of everybody in the community", and to be considerate of the divisional area's diverse socio-ethnic make-up, the almost complete lack of visible ethnic minorities in such gatherings was a striking fact. Attendance in the meetings of the different local organizations generally appeared to be limited to home owners, or residents of apartments and cooperatives. In the instances of one or two organizations, two people from a mental health recovery institution would occasionally be present at the meetings, but not really interact or actively participate in the process of events. In most cases, the format and structure of the associations and their proceedings were not necessarily clear. All attendees and 'members' of 'community' were obviously people who had by their own volition and interest decided to come out and attend the groups, but the status of the organizations' leaders or speakers remained in the dark for the most part. In some instances, they appeared to be either appointed or had just fallen into such a role by mere convention, or assigned to their tasks and responsibilities as 'chair' or 'president' on an 'ad-hoc' basis. In one instance, the 'community' group had created a 'board of directors' by self appointment. This 'board', which consisted of 5 individuals, actually made decisions and launched initiatives more or less behind
closed doors outside the regular ‘community’ meetings, and would then at the regular monthly ‘community’ meetings inform attendees post-factum on what they had done, decided or initiated. Often, when certain critical issues came up in the ‘general’ meetings - e.g., whether to pressure the police into investigating a suspected crack house, or whether a petition should be made to the city with regards to a social service agency causing ‘problems’ in the area - these issues would then be referred to the ‘board’ for decision.

When asked about the make-up of the ‘community’ groups, specifically with regards to the people who not just attended meetings, but formed the decision-making ‘core’ of the ‘community’ groups - in most cases the people who have been with the organizations consistently for a while and formed the ‘active nucleus’ - one ‘community’ activist made the illustrative comment that s/he “hates to say that, but if people knew they would see that the emperor has no clothes” [Comm 13]. The various ‘community’ representatives interviewed elaborated that on average a range of six to fifteen people formed the actual ‘active core’ of their individual organizations. These were usually the ones who were identifying, driving and deciding on the key issues. All this occurred in a context of voluntary, self-appointed and un-elected as well as formally unaccountable organizations purporting to represent ‘community’ on behalf of residential populations in geographic areas which housed and were the primary life sphere of thousands of people. This pattern of skewed mobilization and incorporation of the evolving informal and selective ‘community’ groups for the purposes of ‘community policing’ starkly underlines a point that Crawford makes within the analytical framework of ‘local corporatism’. He argues that private, informal and selective organizations, which are organized, staged and communicating effectively, are actively made part of ‘public’ forums, processes and their outcomes over entities and interests that do not meet these preconditions. He suggests that “'included’ organizations are given a privileged ‘public’ status which grants them certain powers - including access to policy formation - while at the same time conferring on them responsibilities - in terms of the implementation of, and compliance with public policy. This is done to some degree on behalf of the state’s interests as opposed to the interests of the organization’s members. [...] Corporatism highlights an organization’s capacity both to represent its members’ interests and to discipline them as part of a negotiated interaction with other groups. This interaction focuses attention on the nature of the relationship between organized interest and the state. This is understood, however, not as a relationship in which the state merely directs the interest associations, nor is it
one in which state agencies are ‘captured’ by private interests” (Crawford 1994:502).

But beyond the general, sketchy overview on the make-up of ‘community’ as it presented itself in the various ‘community’ organization meetings, the sample of ‘community’ representatives as interviewed for the study provides a more detailed picture of the individual profiles of ‘community’ as it is encountered on the level of local organizations in 99 Division. Demographically, the study sample of ‘community’ representatives was equally divided within the larger age group of 35 - 55 years of age, with two outliers on each end of the spectrum. Half the sample was male, the other half female. With no exception, all the respondents were white, and no ethnic minorities were represented. Of the total sample, seven respondents were professionally employed, five were self-employed, and two were retired. There were no respondents who were unemployed at the time of interview. About half the respondents lived with a partner or somebody else, but only one had children that were living with them. Eleven of the respondents lived in single family dwellings (houses), while the remaining three lived in (privately owned) apartment buildings. In terms of their past residence in the neighbourhood, the sample presented an interesting divide into two main clusters: Five of the subjects had lived in their current neighbourhood for up to ten years, while the remaining nine had lived there for ten years or more; a few had actually been there for twenty years or more. About half of the people who were still engaged in some sort of employment not only lived in their current neighbourhood, but also worked in the local area.

TABLE 3: Socio-demographic indicators of ‘community’ sample (N=14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Counts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Male: 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>White: 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Employed: 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self employed: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retired: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How long lived in local area</td>
<td>under 5 yrs: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 to 10 yrs: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>over 10 yrs: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Also work in local area</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of dwelling</td>
<td>Social housing: 0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Apartment: 3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House: 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>How long active in neighbourhood</td>
<td>under 1 yr: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 to 3 yrs: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>over 3 yrs: 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These more detailed profile characteristics of the sample of ‘community’ representatives
were also largely reflected by the groups of people attending and participating in the various ‘community’ organizations’ meetings that were observed over the research period. They stand in stark contrast to some of the key socio-demographic characteristics documented for the populations in the individual ‘neighbourhoods’, and the division as a whole. An ‘Environmental Scan’ produced by the TCPF reports a total residential population of 55,000 for the division. However, THE CITY’s neighbourhood profile report estimates that “about 15,000 people stay in local hostels and shelters” in this area at any given time, and may thus constitute almost 20% of the estimated local population total of 70,000 people. TCPF’s Environmental Scan indicates the age profile of residents in 99 Division with 41% to be 35 years of age or younger, 34% between 35 and 59 years, and the remaining 23% over 58 years. Only 21% of the residential population was listed to be living in ‘houses’ or single family dwellings, while 19% were listed as living in ‘condominiums’ and ‘plexes’, 55% in ‘apartments’ (including all forms of social housing) and 5% in ‘others’. For ‘houses’, it actually suggests an “average size of household” of 2.8 for the division (TCPF 1993). However, The City’s ‘neighbourhood profile’ for the divisional area claimed that it had “higher unemployment rates” and “lower incomes” than The City’s average and that 37% of its residential population lived below “Canada’s unofficial poverty line”. The report also suggested that based on 1993 census figures, 27.4% of the divisional population were receiving some form of social assistance. It also indicates an extreme ethnic diversity for the population: primary school children in area schools “come from more than 78 different countries and speak more than 48 different languages” and women residing in the area who had “babies 1989-91 come from more than 96 different countries” (The City Public Health 1994).

This general overview of the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample of some of the ‘community’ organizations’ core members in contrast to those of the total local population, starkly confirms the conclusions of the relevant ‘community’ literature with respect to the unrepresentative character of people who tend to be attracted to and active in ‘neighbourhood’ activities (Skogan 1988, Rosenbaum 1986, Garofalo and McLeod 1985). Representatives active in organized ‘community’ for the purposes of ‘community policing’ in the research setting were predominantly white, socio-economically stable middle-class people, most of whom are homeowners with no minor dependents, and who have either just recently arrived in the neighbourhood or have been there for a considerable amount of time.

These unrepresentative characteristics of ‘active community’ were starkly reflected also in
how ‘community’ activists perceived themselves, their local ‘community’ environments and what makes up ‘community’ interests and concerns. In a standardized ‘victim impact statement’ address given in court in sentencing hearings for prostitutes or drug dealers arrested in the area, representatives of the local ‘community’ groups would usually open their remarks by describing their ‘community’ as “good, decent and prosperous, with Victorian homes of up to half a million dollar in value. However, the safety, wealth and quality of life in our community and its hard-working and law-abiding members has become undermined” by the scourges of prostitution and drug dealing [Fieldnotes].

One of the ‘community’ activists reflected on some of the socio-demographic biases that s/he seemed to observe within his local ‘community’ organization.

You get about 20 or so people who come to the meetings and come to some or all the walks. Most of them come from only three or four streets, all of them with single family dwellings. They are not representative at all. I would think this is odd, but I think it is a fact that people who are involved have not lived here for a long time. They just don’t want to accept the way things are here, and they are willing to fight. Most of the people have only lived here for a few years. On the other streets, people have been here for decades. Either they accept these details here, or it’s like, that’s just the way the community is. But I guess new people come in with expectations of what their community is supposed to be like, and if it isn’t they are going to do something about it. So many of them move again. I know that the people on the active streets are definitely in a different economic group. They drive bigger cars, they have bigger houses, and they have prettier things in their homes. People almost exclusively live in houses, but there is also a co-op. Most of the 12 or 15 people who regularly come out for the walks or go to the meetings come out of that local cluster. And they get involved in sort of pockets. It is kind of odd, isn’t it.[Comm10]

Another ‘community’ member explains the motivations for ‘community’ activism more from a personal perspective. ‘Community’, from this respondent’s perspective, is projected as the core site for socio-economic struggle, for a competition around social norms and hegemonical expectations that are imposed on ‘community’ spaces, a fact that seems particularly applicable and relevant in such socio-economically diverse, dense and heterogenous jurisdictions at the basis of 99 Division’s territory. Such conflict processes may especially be triggered in local areas when previously existing socio-economic balances are disrupted, for example when new classes of residents or owners enter a neighbourhood, and aim to bring the area up to their ‘standards’ by eliminating ‘disturbing’ elements in public sight or places. Then, the seemingly utilitarian effort of ‘neighbourhood safety’ becomes the local stage, or umbrella of legitimacy for basic socio-economic conflict. This situation may, on one hand, provide new perspectives on the practical
realities and consequences of contemporary urban ‘anomie’. However, it may also allude to the fundamentally important aspect that the predominantly utilitarian ‘texts’ of ‘community’, ‘safety’ and local ‘quality of life’ may carry dramatically conflict-laden, socially confrontational and exclusionary undercurrents or corresponding hidden ‘truths’ that deserve much more attention than has so far been given to these dynamics (see Nelken 1985, Crawford 1996). ‘Safety’ and ‘quality of life’ rhetoric, projects and initiatives, in essence, may have become the sites and veils for basic social conflict:

*We became active, as most people in the [Z neighborhood] did, because we made a financial investment in the neighborhood, we bought a house, or condo, or came in on a co-op, and we wanted to live downtown. That is where we want to live. And people came here, wanted to live here, and hoped that they could make things work for everyone. Not only ourselves, everybody in the neighborhood, to create a better quality of life. So you make a financial investment in a neighborhood because you want to be there. Not everybody wants to live in the suburbs, and we want to live downtown. But because we are here and we want to live here, we will not allow the neighborhood to get run down completely. It is a quality of life and safety issue. I started freaking out when I saw the hookers taking over the playground. And the children were terrified, and did not come anymore to the playground. That is when I started becoming active in the [Z community]. So I came to the [Z organization], and the people there told me, well, we work with the community, we work with the police, they come to the meetings and talk to us and tell us what we can do as citizens. Because I could not go and go after these people myself, I am terrified of them. And in working with them, we started to begin to hope that we could clean up the area, clean out the hookers, like other areas have, with the neighborhood walks and working with the police. The big park, that used to be a disaster. But the community was instrumental in getting things going there, getting the money to clean it all up. So with a lot of us, we can take it to the city and the councillors, and say, hey listen, there is a problem here, and we want you to start paying some attention here. We are a vocal part of the city. [...] We were very pragmatic in the beginning, we just wanted to get things cleaned up. There was not much ideology. Just to make things look better. Get the dealers and the hookers out, get better housing, more middle-class families and small businesses in. We go to the businesses, these are the dynamics, we are getting better, we want you to come in here. [Comm06]*

It is without a doubt that these samples of ‘community’ representatives constituting local ‘neighbourhood’ groups do not present a remotely fair reflection of the social, economic and ethnic profile of the divisional jurisdiction which is in fact one of the most diverse and spread out areas featured by The City’s metropolitan area. Such a rather subjective and selective representation of ‘community’ in its semi-formally organized forms and processes, may, of course, have crucial implications for the ‘politics of community policing’ - especially with regards to the targets, objectives and methods initiated by, advocated for and emerging from these ‘community’ forces. This is an issue that the discussion shall turn to next.
Constituting ‘community’ via the common ‘enemy’

When asking the surveyed ‘community’ activists what, in their view, had necessitated and triggered their ‘community’ organizing and action in the field of crime, safety and policing, an image of absolute consensus emerged with regard to the problem, threat or a ‘common enemy’ that was plaguing their ‘neighbourhood’. Without any exception, it was street prostitution and drug dealing in their local area that allegedly had brought their ‘community’ into decay, causing disorder and crime and generating a general disintegration of the positive aspects of local neighbourhood life. But upon a closer look, a couple of distinct themes emerge in the ‘community’ people’s accounts about the nature and causes of the perceived ‘crime’ and ‘safety’ problems in their area. First of all, hardly any of the respondents explicitly complained about ‘crime’, feeling threatened or having been victimized by major crime. Some refer to crime incidents that they have heard about from neighbours or “that happened to somebody up the street”. In cases where crime was seen as a local problem, it was predominantly interpreted as related to and explained by the increased presence, prevalence or visibility of the street prostitution and drug markets.

The central worry and concern among the ‘community’ activists, however, was a fear of, discomfort with and disapproval of what is probably best described as ‘disorder’ in local areas. This perception of ‘disorder’ includes all sorts of ‘nuisances’, violations of private space, discomfort, embarrassment, disrespect for moral standards in public places, as well as the perception that the people seen as being involved in street prostitution and drug dealing are unwanted, undesired and disturbing ‘elements’ in the local life sphere. These concerns brought forward by organized ‘community’ thus very much appealed to and were in accordance with the ‘order’ and ‘nuisance’ themes brought up in recent theorizing and proclamations about the scope and direction of local crime prevention and control, fitting predominant ‘community police’ imagery of local crime and safety ‘problems’ (Kelling and Coles 1996, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, Skogan 1990). In fact, most descriptions of the local ‘disorder problem’ provided by ‘community’ members were reminiscent of the images of an underclass ‘invasion’ or an ‘epidemic’ through which unwanted elements of prostitutes and drug dealers had come to be seen as entering and occupying realms of place, time and morals - ‘the community’ - that could under no circumstances be surrendered, but had to be claimed and protected against the ‘enemy’. These processes of social tensions led to a perception among ‘community’ members that
something fundamental was 'taken away' from people which at the same time symbolized threats to safety, security, and violations of standards of 'good and decent' living. All this presented the danger of crime, projecting an 'enemy' out there that was at the core of these threats, creating an 'us versus them' mentality, and called for ways to battle them as the only promising route towards local peace, order and redemption.

These narratives thus suggest a Durkheimian pattern of the crucial role and agency of a perceived, identifiable and agreed upon 'enemy' forming, providing identity to and reinforcing 'community' (Durkheim 1966, Nelken 1985). In other words, these locally focused processes of opposition, resistance and defence shape a 'community' that is determined by the "standards [drawing] the big division between the criminals and the rest of us" (Neely 1990:17). "Community' is constituted via the mechanisms that are put in place towards protecting the hegemonic "order of a community or neighbourhood by protecting its people and property from 'outside' forces ... placing law at the centre of community identity". Such developments are frequently observed in contexts in which "the official legal order is viewed as either too weak to protect a community from 'outsiders' or as lacking the necessary connections to the local community to effectively 'do the job’" (Harrington 1992:182).

Crawford instructs us about the fundamental role of the processes and outcomes of "unity", homogeneity and consensus as the fertile soil of 'community' particularly in the criminal justice field. In this framework "this quest ... poses serious problems, not only for the finely balanced tensions between the independence and interdependence of criminal justice agencies, but also for intra-communal relations. In relation to the latter, the ideology of 'unity' tends to silence very real intra-community conflicts by the dual processes of, first, excluding non-consensual voices and, secondly, through the working assumption that an homogeneity of interests actually exists". He refers to the fact that policing and its processes are "inherently grounded in social conflict: they involve the policing of, and interventions against, certain individuals, groups and people. Where intra-communal conflicts are not addressed, the construction of insider/outsider distinctions frequently emerge as a legitimating device. This polarization assists multi-agency forum participants in reinforcing notions of homogeneity. This it does by emphasizing the alien nature of 'outsiders' ... and the threat that they pose to the 'shared' values under attack. Consequently, much crime prevention thinking tends to assume a sort of 'us versus them' attitude" (Crawford 1994:505, see also Currie 1988).
On the other hand, it can also be shown quite explicitly how 'community' operationalizes and constitutes itself via the claiming of and colonization of local 'spaces' (Blomley 1994). ‘Community’ is staged via the claim of concern over and moral or ‘communal’ ownership over local space - backyards, streets, alleys, neighbourhoods - by imposing norms and standards on these properties, and configuring these spaces by efforts to include the ‘us’ (‘community’) and to exclude the ‘them’ (outsiders, disturbers and criminals, etc.). ‘Community’ may be understood as a process of colonization of local spaces that asserts and manifests itself via the claims and mechanics of access, property and territorial inclusion versus exclusion, thus exercising a local form of socio-geographic politics. As part of its socio-political strategies and effects on local levels, it makes effective ‘community’ work aim towards the evolving strategy of reclaiming or “taking back neighbourhoods” (Neely 1990) from the destructive ‘outsider’ elements, and asserts them as its ‘own’, fortressing and defending them against the projected destructive and disorderly forces.

A number of ‘community’ members elaborate on the strongly prevailing conceptions of allies and deviants, the social politics and conflict constellations of organized ‘community’ in the local research site.

_We have an invasion of crack dealers and prostitutes in our area. We do get one with the other, because most of our prostitutes are crack addicts. So they are out there, selling their wares, in order to survive. The other crime that we see around here is break and enter, of course related to the drugs. Both my neighbors have been broken into in the time frame that we have been here, so those are the big problems here. We even had a crack house just a couple of doors down the street. It went the entire winter before we realized it. Of course, in the winter you don’t realize that much what is going on. But then in the spring, we realized, God, they are everywhere. But we did not know the degree, and how intense it is. It is here all the time, round the clock when it comes to crack dealers, prostitutes and people who smoke crack [...] For us, because we had crack houses, what you were getting were transient people walking up and down the street, knocking at your door saying, is this the house to buy the crack? We would say no, and eventually we figured out what house it was, just down the street, and it was in and out, just constant. All the people that were hanging around. Then they took their business across the street. Right to the playground and the community center. And they would peddle their crack, the girls were doing their johns in the park, in between the children’s play equipment. So you have these people hanging around all the time, and if you ask them to leave, they call you all the names in the book. They are not afraid of us, the residents, because they know that we can’t really do anything, they are not afraid of the police, because they can’t do a lot to them either, because they can’t arrest them if they are not doing a buy through an undercover officer, so they are out there and in your officers’ faces, knowing that there is really nothing that you can effectively do. It’s seasonal in a sense. You see them more once the weather becomes nicer. So the problem becomes more prevalent once April rolls around, right through to December when the bitter cold arrives. Then we are also not so much paying attention as we should be. They are still out there, we just don’t see them as much. You find them in every nook and cranny, whether it is on the street or in the park, or around the_

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house where there is little alcoves, they are in there, doing their crack or the girls are selling their wares or whatever. Every nook and cranny around the neighborhood that is inviting to them. And it is a 24 hour thing. I can get up at 6am and look out my front window and there are girls working, and I go to bed at 11pm, and it's the same thing. I am awoken during the night to the yelling and screaming on the street, that is usually the johns and the girls who don't want to pay up, it gets very noisy, so it is 24 hours. You could go down the street at noon-hour at any day of the week and find girls hooking and dealers. [Comm07]

When I first moved into the area, I was aware that there were a lot of prostitutes around, but I did not know anything about drug dealing at all. But only about 2 or 3 years ago I started to notice the drug dealing in the Park. I started to notice that there were people hanging around in the Park all the time, there was money being exchanged, it was very blatant. [...] It's hard for me to say who the people are and where they come from. [A street] was always very busy with prostitutes. I never felt really unsafe, though. I used to walk home at night just by myself. Actually, I've never really felt unsafe in this area, and then once I got home to my own area, I never noticed any particular things. I did notice that there were prostitutes around, and one of the things that made me uncomfortable the odd time was men making gestures to me. It did not happen very often, once or twice. They just assumed that any woman on the street was for hire. That embarrassed me. But other than that, in the early years, there was not much more. Other than I did not like it very much. And then, later, I used to see prostitutes on [B street] early in the morning. [...] And then I realized, in the Park, you would always see people with their hoods up, the dreadlocks sticking out. You could not see the faces very well, and sort of sloppy clothes, and you'd see the women identified as prostitutes by the dresses and the behavior, and you would see them handing, what I assume the dealers, exchanging money and drugs. Sometimes, I would take visitors to the Park, and it would be very embarrassing, for the visitors I mean. But we never got threatened or attacked or anything. I just did not like the reputation, more of a nuisance. Friends of mine live outside the city, and read in the paper that I was living in an area called crack alley. I just did not like the whole circumstances. [Comm09]

The crime issue here is the ring of prostitution, drugs, pimping and then theft, related to drugs mostly. But I am not so worried about theft, though it is pretty prevalent around here, and you hear it happening at least once a month, somebody's car has been broken into. But the prostitution, drugs, pimping cycle is constant, ongoing. Non ending. It is there any time of day or night, when you walk out on the street, when you walk to the local store, they're there. The pimps are just behind them, the johns are circling all the time, and then the drug dealers are waiting in the wings to pick up on it. [...] When I came here, it was pretty bad already. It seemed to me, just after I moved in that on my street there were several prostitutes. And every other street around there, there were two or three street hookers, and there was unbelievable traffic. I couldn't figure out what was going on here. It was the johns circling around, that's what it was. [...] There is two or three things here that piss people off the most. One is the sex. Many of us agree around here that if the sex was somewhere else, things would be a lot better. But, I can go out in my backyard, and I found condoms, and I find drug paraphernalia as well. And a couple of times I even found it on the deck. Although you are not directly impacted in the sense that you were violated, the fact that somebody is on your property having sex bothers me the most. What I worry about a lot, even though I don't have kids, I can't believe how many crack pipes I pick up. And I think about the kids and I think, gee, what if they see all that stuff? And the traffic violations, and the occasional fights or the break and enter that happens as a result of that drug trade activity. Major nuisance factors, not directly impacting me personally. Making you just feel uncomfortable. I never used to think twice about going out later at night, now I do. It just bothers me. It certainly drops off during the winter, although it does not stop. [Comm11]
Traditionally, most people think of residential crime of break and enter, that sort of thing, but the biggest problem facing our neighborhood is crack cocaine, the dealing of it, and the offshoot business of it, street prostitution. Street prostitutes in our neighborhood are not working girls so to speak that come in, look great and make big money but when the guys get out of the hockey game they are doing blow jobs anywhere from $15 to 20, because that will buy their next little chunk of crack. And the crack dealers, by and large, don’t live in our neighborhood, they just come to our neighborhood and prey on the people that have become addicted. Most of the people that we have encountered are Jamaican, and don’t do drugs themselves, but just make amazing money with it. You can seem like a racist. You know all the dealers, you know what they look like, you even know some by name. Every day I encounter 3 to 5 crack deals a day, street prostitution about the same, and I am averaging 3 to 5 crack pipes in my backyard every day. So it’s insane. [...] The drop in centers are magnets for the crack dealers. So what happens, they have scouts that go and find them clients, then the dealer comes along with a client to our street, which is a quiet secluded residential street and makes the deal right in front of our home. And then the client who just bought the crack will go into our backyard where even a telephone pole would be a convenient place to hide behind to do the crack, to get a blow job or to defecate or urinate. Our back fence makes a wonderful couch for people to smoke crack, drink rice wine or have sex, so it’s open territory. You say to them, why don’t you deal that crack some where else, we are families here, we are trying to raise families here. I am usually told to fuck off. I am told, hey man, streets are public, it’s a free world, what do you want. It’s too much. When my parents come to visit, and there is guys doing crack and tell me to fuck off, that is awful. [Comm12]

Within a matter of a few months, this neighborhood became a zoo. We had an open, un-controlled situation with crack addicts, dealers, Johns, pimps, you name it, like an army had moved in here. We were just shocked, horrified, stunned. They would move in very quickly. We realized that there were hookers out on every street corner in the morning, picking up the morning coming-into-work traffic, they come out at noon to get the guys on the noon hour, then at five again, and then all night long. This was added to by drug dealers, guys with cell phones. We had noted suspicious people sitting suddenly on the porch steps of various houses. Young men, age 14 to 20, usually black, and watching the street. And all of a sudden they were on every corner, one or two black dudes. These were not gentlemen, these were not students, not working people, these were hanging out dudes on the corners with the cell phones, on the corner, and we very quickly we realized what was going on. We had all night long in the parking lots noise, arguments, fights, screaming. The dudes had taken up the streets, they were strolling up and down the street. As I would walk home at night, these would normally be quiet and peaceful, and all of a sudden in the middle of the street in the darkest corner, there were two guys hanging, waiting for customers. I would not be able to walk without being curb-crawled by some kind of guy in a car, rolling down his window, hi honey, kind of thing, just get in the car. My first reaction was utter embarrassment, how could they mistake me, and then fury, finally rage, how dare you, get out of my neighborhood. They were amazed, they thought who is this crazy lady, because everybody else in the area was a whore. And we became aware of the fact that they were not just whores, they were crack addicts. The whores that we used to have here would usually work out of the shadows, they were pretty aware of the fact that they were not exactly wanted around here, and they’d disappear pretty quickly. These would be hostile arrogant, they would be sitting on your doorstep. You would open the door and say, excuse me, do you live here? - What is it to you? - Well, I do and you don’t. - I can hang out on the sidewalk wherever I want. - Well, excuse, me, right now you are sitting on my sidewalk. And back and forth. And then you start talking to other people, and you realize that there is a collective level of rage and fear. What the hell is happening to our neighborhood. It was primarily the main streets, but slowly spreading into the side streets. Into the alleyways, it was spreading everywhere. And then we heard gunfire one night, and a constable had been shot in a battle with a drug dealer, 3am in the morning. We were down at the station, and the reality of the fact that we’re dealing with real weapons in our neighborhood gave us the creeps. [...] But we were not alone in this, and the [X neighborhood] was equally upset and angry and everything. They said, we gotta do something about this,
we have to take some action. By July, the dealers were entrenched here. This had become their neighborhood. It was like an army had taken over this place, it was all of a sudden us and them. People had not brought forward enough resistance. We had been far too polite, far too tolerant. And I think that is the reason why the scum elements as I call them were able to take over this neighborhood, because we did not repel them with any kind of resistance in the way that the [(upscale)]Y area would. [...] We found out only later that there had been a number of activities going on to push dealers and hookers out of other areas that had been notorious. The police had busted them, but rather than collapsing it and putting a lid on it and being able to put the people away, it was like a bubble that had exploded and it had simply spread, and they had gone everywhere. And many of them, obviously, retreated to our neighborhood and took root before we were fully aware of the scale of the problems that we were dealing with. [Comm14]

As a rather interesting phenomenon, a narrative emerged among many of the ‘community’ respondents that had lived there for longer periods of time suggesting that the local area had always been somewhat rough and rowdy, and that actually, street markets of prostitution and drugs had always been present and prevalent there. In fact, the powerfully constructive role of the tales of ‘community’ history or identity or “heritage narratives” in constituting ‘community’ has been illustratively documented, concluding that “communities are defined, in large part, by the stories people tell about them” (Bridger 1996:355). These heritage narratives “tell about how a community came to assume its present form [and] provide an overarching framework within which the meaning of contemporary events can be placed”. They present a “history of a community and its people” that can be recounted, referred to and reflexively called upon, and thus form the common symbolic basis for the shared meaning of ‘community’ in local interaction (Bridger 1996:355, Maines and Bridger 1992). In this context, ‘community’ is understood as being “not different from the story that is told about it”. In fact, ‘community’ is “constituted by a story of the community, of what it is and what it is doing, which is told, acted out, and received in a kind of self-reflective narration” (Carr 1986:149f).

Such ‘community heritage narratives’ were starkly prevalent and dominant among the local ‘community’ activists interviewed. In most cases, they consistently described the street deviance phenomena in their ‘neighbourhoods’ ‘back then’ as rather ‘peaceful’, as something a bit out of order but yet agreeable, something that was part of the ‘local picture’, all in all presenting an almost idyllic, romantic and unique characteristic for local life. This romantically presented past of the area featuring a peaceful co-existence of ‘decent residents’ even with local deviants in form of prostitutes, alcoholics and drug users - the image of a ‘lost community' - allegedly came to an end through one agreed upon villain, a factor that symbolically turned a romantic past into a ubiquitously intolerable, threatening and destructive present. This villain may have come to the
'community' - or rather may have spawned its projection, as what Nils Christie has described as a "suitable enemy" (1985): crack cocaine. Allegedly, as the narrative goes, the appearance of the drug on local scenes some ten years ago changed the local situation of public deviance from 'harmless bums' and 'boozers' to violent addicts, turned ordinary people into raving drug maniacs, caused wide-spread and aggressive prostitution, and generally caused the destructive and dangerous decay of the area. In the eyes of the 'community' activists, the local appearance and spread of crack cocaine and its claimed detrimental effects supposedly necessitated and generated the observed 'community' and its 'crime' and 'safety' activities as their natural and inevitable response. Some 'community' people describe the development of the common threat and enemy that necessitated, mobilized and critically fuelled the evolving 'community' action:

In about 1986, I read an article in the paper that said crack cocaine is coming, it's coming from the US. It is the drug, and it is so much cheaper than cocaine, it's easily available. Sure enough, six months later, everybody was on crack. In our neighborhood, it had not been uncommon to see the occasional rubbie, passed out because he was drunk. But everybody sort of knew them by name, and you would have a conversation with them when they were sober. Our neighborhood was a great mix, because it was everything from rubbies to millionaires. And the great effect of that was that nobody took themselves too seriously. I lived surrounded by rooming houses, every socio-economic status, race, religion, it was really wonderful. Crack sort of changed all that. The prostitutes became just the drapes. I know that sounds really awful, but crack just consumed them. It is the single most abused substance out there. I would give crack dealers life imprisonment, I think they can not serve enough time in jail. Because they give life sentence to the addicts, they give a life sentence to the residents in the neighborhood, so I think they should get life themselves. I became most conscious of it when we bought the house. Where I live, we are South of a major street, and the average house price is $30,000 less than just North of the street, the differences or the impact of the crack dealing are that drastic. South of [Z street] is considered the low income drug area. The irony is that, all of [The City] is a drug area. You can buy it everywhere, but the media paint our neighborhood in a bad light. Because of the main street they come in to buy their drugs here. So they just use it, and it's frustrating and it's cowardly, it is everything. [Comm12]

I've been in this place for about 18 years, and to begin with, there was a great deal of pride in the area, about the renovation of Victorian houses, the neighbors were all sort of very friendly, and so on. When I moved down from the [Y area], I thought, this area has been renovated as well, it is quite safe, and this is going to be a nice place, and it was for many years. There were a few rooming houses with alcoholics in them, but they were harmless, they weren't violent and we all lived quite happily together here. And then, about eight years ago, crack cocaine came on the scene. We did not know it, but up the road a couple of houses was a crack house. It was a rooming house, it had been very quiet for years, but all of a sudden there was a lot of traffic in and out, and a lot of people yelling, and one night we came home and there was yellow police tape across the front of our house and the neighbours', and apparently a man had been stabbed in the crack house, and he collapsed on the neighbour's lawn. And the police explained that it was a crack house, and we did not know what that was at the time. Ever since then, it has been a huge problem in the area. [...] Ever since [crack arrived] it has been the biggest problem in the area. There were hookers right in front of our door on the streets, they were turning tricks in the alleys, in cars, and along with them came the drug dealers. 100% of the hookers are crack addicted, I am sure. They are quite high out the
and violent. They scream and shout, foul language. So the issue of safety of people in the neighborhood came to be the number one problem, and with that we started to try to get prostitution and drug dealing off of our streets. The hookers and the dealers smoking crack happens in the alleys, and there has been many instances of people coming home trying to get into their garage, and there is a bunch of people sitting in there smoking crack. I rent a garage just north of here, and quite often I find crack pipes, condoms, needles, etc. in front of there. It is the biggest nuisance, a huge problem for us. [Comm05]

They say that we have a history here back from the 50s and 60s, that we always had drug dealing here and so on. [...] When I came here first some 15 years ago, there was winos and that sort of thing and a few street prostitutes on [O street], but they were usually high class prostitutes, high heels, this kind of thing. You never had the regular street girls in their regular street clothes hooked up, high on crack. That has changed dramatically over the past ten years. I think now that since 6 or seven years ago, since we had crack cocaine arrive in the neighborhoods and we had the problems of dealers slinking around in our neighborhoods, and the problems of young girls on the street. I think the reason for all of that is the crack, and then, on top of that, we have a proliferation of social service agencies and drop ins in our neighborhood. [...] They tend to act like magnets, and draw even more people into the neighborhood. And then, there always seems to be more of them than there is of us. It's a nightmare. [Comm04]

However, one of the 'community' respondents points to the fact that it may not just be the local environment and external influences that have changed the situation of 'crime' and 'safety', necessitating organized 'community' action and intervention. Rather, it was suggested that there had been a basic movement over the past few years that altered much of the socio-economic profile of the area, in combination with an influx of residents and business people that seemed to increasingly dislike or oppose the street phenomena of drugs and prostitution, and decided to 'clean up'. The local area had become a site of socio-economic change and conflict at the same time, much of which was materializing, projected on or carried out around the issues of street disorder and its symbolic carriers. Again, underlying the explicit and dominant texts and images of 'crime' and 'safety' seems to be a range of themes of local socio-economic conflict and transformation. They have become subordinated to the hegemonic presence of 'crime', 'order' and 'community' narratives.

We came together in the sense that this area did not usually have up-scale or better educated people, on an economic level, not until the apartment buildings, condos and co-ops came in. This used to be an area of rooming houses, labor families, not very wealthy people, and the prostitutes. And then the condos went up, and people started to buy the rooming houses along [K street], and turning them into townhouses and even offices, and it was then that the people who moved would not tolerate what the previous residents had just accepted as a historical fact. I do believe that the person who is living in this area is not the person who lived here ten years ago. Look at that building right over there, that great luxury condo. That was the traditional corner where the prostitutes always were. Now, they just would not tolerate that. So, in my mind, the reason for the rise of this 'community' group is because the people who moved in here in the last few years don't want shouting and screaming in front of their windows at 3 in the morning. And they

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don't want eggs thrown around. And they feel that they have the right to tell the police what they want, which 10 years ago would have never been done. In the condos, it is a lot of professionals, retired professionals who live there. My financial advisor lives over there. Also, lawyers, artists and so on. [C08]

But it was not only the rather elusive, impersonal and stereotypical ‘prostitute’, ‘drug dealer’ or ‘loiterer’ on local streets that was identified as the source and cause of local problems ‘spawning’ the mobilization of ‘community’ and its order aspirations. Most of the ‘community’ spokespeople also identified another central institutional reason within the area and their local boundaries that was seen as a key ‘ally’ or facilitator of the disorderly people who they had come to focus on as ‘enemy’, who, they claimed, literally attracted, bred, and kept ‘the enemy’ alive, and thus became an inherent part of the ‘enemy’ projection itself. Their focus and blame was directed on the ‘social service agencies’ in the area who, it was claimed, attracted the local street deviants through their prevalence and ready accessibility as well as their poor institutional ideology, management and wrongful incentives towards ‘disorder people’ and ‘criminals’. On that basis, the social service institutions were seen as a major reason why disorder, crime and threats to safety thrived and expanded in the area. With the central focus and the narrative of the ‘community’ activists on the social service agencies as a predominant ‘cause’ behind the crime and safety problems of drugs and prostitution in the area, a further instructive example is set for how ‘community’ constitutes itself by identifying an ‘enemy’ within its own boundaries, polarizing and bifurcating interests, objectives and standpoints to an ‘us-versus-them’ scheme. ‘Community’ becomes the product of a narrative construction of adversaries and opposing stories, claims and interests, carried by its real-life symbols of ‘pro’ and ‘con’ - good, decent people searching for order and safety on one side, and the causes, bulwarks and facilitators of disorder, unsafety and crime on the other side.

The following lengthy excerpt comes from a petition paper written by a coalition of local ‘community’ organizations as an “overview on our neighbourhood and problems with the X social service agency”. It was sent to police, city officials, politicians and the media as a ‘backgrounder’ on the organizations’ pressures on city officials to cut off funding to the social service agency. The document impressively illustrates the ambiguities and social conflict dynamics behind the claim of ‘community’ and its representative ‘authorship’ as a product of the rather arbitrary social and representation processes behind its particular interests and agenda. It also shows how ‘community’ operationalizes itself as powerful and subjective claims over, or the colonization of
local facts, spaces and norms, and individual behaviour along dichotomous lines of ‘right and wrong’, ‘legitimate and illegitimate’, and ‘inclusion and exclusion’. ‘Community’ is constructed via the pervasive juxtaposition of claimed properties of ‘good’, ‘decent’, ‘ordinary’ and ‘suffering from others’ versus the characteristics of ‘outsiders’, ‘deviants’ and ‘disruption’. Punitive, disciplinary, invasive and corrective measures against such ‘deviance’ in response to the claims made are presented as naturally justified and legitimised by the allegedly utilitarian, consensually normative and seemingly ‘common sensical’ reasoning and rational banners of ‘community’.

The neighbourhood ... embraces people of every imaginable race, religion and economic status [and] nicely celebrates the diverse group of people that live [here]. People make their homes in an equally varied manner. Many own or rent .... [and] there is also a thriving business community of people working from a store front or working from their home. People in other neighbourhoods would perhaps not be as tolerant of each others’ way of life as we are. Our neighbourhood, by virtue of its diversity, has accepted a long history of alternative lifestyles. Approximately six years ago, crack cocaine invaded our neighbourhood and created with it a massive street prostitution business. Break-ins and vandalism soared. Crack houses opened up. The occasional alcoholic sleeping on a park bench was replaced by intimidating groups of people that threatened the quality of life of all who lived here. [Our organisations] were formed to specifically address neighbourhood problems with street prostitution and crack cocaine dealing. These two areas were seen as catalysts to existing problems of neighbourhood safety and quality of life. [...] There is a very large social service network in our immediate neighbourhood. [...] As [this city] grew, the agencies grew, but they stayed here rather than expanding throughout the city. Clients now travel into the neighbourhood for the benefits being offered. [We have pressured for a funding moratorium for] two dysfunctional drop-in facilities that are managed with total disregard to local residents. [We are left] with no other option but to approach them using a method where we would be taken seriously. We asked government that their funding be restricted until they meet some basic and decent level of good operation that any good neighbour would regard as obvious.

As explicit ‘community’ problems resulting from the social service agency, the following list is provided by the ‘community’ document':

[The agency and its management] refuse to impose or enforce the most basic rules of behaviour on the people they offer shelter to. They deny any responsibility for how their clientele conduct themselves in the neighbourhood. This lack of structure is translated into a total disregard for the local residents [...]. They don’t care how our quality of life is affected. [...] The people that deal drugs in the neighbourhood hang out in the places that tolerate them. Scouts on the facility sidewalk attract clients and then they bring the dealers out of the [Agency] to make the deal. Local residents have become very adept at recognising the dealers because they work openly in broad daylight. To see them fed and supported while they support from the pain of others is vile. That the same people leave the [Agency] and conduct business on the surrounding sidewalk is extremely intimidating to locals who must walk by them. It is equally frightening for school children attempting to go to the Catholic school nearby. [This] holds equally true for the street prostitution trade. In between tricks, pimps and prostitutes alike can grab a meal or a nap at the [Agency], wherein they can return to work the street again. With their basic need provided for by others, they can use their profits on crack cocaine. Girls have been seen to pick up tricks as they walk out of the
[X Agency]. It should not be acceptable in any neighbourhood that local residents and especially school children should have to navigate through this on a 7 day a week basis. [...] Regardless, it seems incredible that a facility should be allowed to operate above the law and be supported as generously as it is by public funding. [...] there is a very real problem whereby people with outstanding warrants or those being investigated by the police, are welcome and sheltered by the [X Agency]. One of the worst problems facing local residents and people visiting our neighbourhood is the feeling of intimidation felt as one walks or drives by the [X Agency]. The reason is that the staff and management allow their clients to hang out at the front of the centre and even beyond that, on the [...] sidewalk. It forces the neighbours into a confrontational situation as they attempt to make their way home or conduct their business. [...] How can a policy of total disregard for your neighbourhood, residents or local business be condoned? Another annoying policy is that the [X Agency] allows people to carry coffee away from their property. The cups and other garbage are thrown in the street and sidewalk. For years, neighbours to the [X Agency] have been strewn throughout the corner [of A and B streets]. There should be some basic rules for people to live by. We teach children to respect their neighbours and friends. Should not people that benefit from the [X Agency] have to conduct themselves like adults and follow a simple rule such as ‘Put your garbage in the garbage can’. To deny people some structure is to put them on a level of animals. [...] It has been obvious to anyone who lives in our neighbourhood that the people who make policy at the [X agency] do not have to live here on a 24 hour a day basis. They do not have to raise and educate children next to an agency that holds zero regard for those with a vested interest in the community. People who have taken the plunge and made the serious commitment to living here are regarded as enemies in the eyes of the facility. Yet the director and the board can shut the door at night and go home to another neighbourhood where a drop-in like the [X Agency] would never be tolerated. Furthermore, they have no idea what goes on a day-to-day level. [...] In the winter we must by law keep our sidewalks clear of ice. That is being a good neighbour. Why doesn’t the [X Agency] make use of their own staff and clients to clean up the mess they create on a daily basis. Certainly the people living next to the [X Agency] would appreciate an end to the siege of trash being waged on their property each day.

The ‘community’ organizations then in their paper listed the following “requirements” to the “problem” social service agency X as remedies to the problems lamented. In the context of their petition, city and oversight officials are requested to agree to these conditions as prerequisites for approval of further funding to the agency:

- Letters of Trespass should be filed with [99 Division]
- [99 Division’s] foot patrol should be made welcome to drop in daily to help the staff ensure the safety of the centre and its clientele.
- Zero tolerance to all criminal activities (including drug dealing and prostitution) outside as well as inside the centre’s surrounding premises
- Police Drug Dogs to survey premises on a once-a-month basis, unannounced, in order to help staff deter drugs from being concealed and consumed at the centre
- The Centre’s policy of being a ‘safe haven for people wanted by the law’ will cease
- Staff to wear T-shirts with large ‘STAFF’ printed front and back, so they may be immediately recognizable to the clients, residents and visitors
- Staff to monitor and discourage clients hanging out around the surrounding sidewalks of the centre
- Those not abiding by the rules of the centre will be banned from the premises.
- All clients to be issued a Photo ID Participation card for the Centre
- organize daily volunteer clean up crews, to pick up trash (including condoms and drug paraphernalia)
around the Centre from the sidewalks on [A and B] streets and in the back lane way as a good will gesture to the neighbourhood in which they spend their days.
- To reduce the feeling of intimidation experienced by local residents, staff should prevent clients from hanging out around the front of the centre, including the front yard, the front steps and fencing belonging to neighbourhood properties.
- In order to respond to the needs of clients, staff will direct drug addicted clients immediately to a facility which operates in a non-drug infested neighbourhood.

‘Community’ activists further elaborate on the ‘social service’ problem as it relates to the ‘neighbourhood crime and safety’ problem from a point of view that appeared to be shared by the majority of the ‘community’ sample. It presents ‘social service’ providers as a root cause of the local ‘street disorder’ problems. The ‘problem’ is presented as the accumulation and product of a vicious cycle, which all of them would like to see go away, and the enforcement of law and order is their main focus of hope for effectively doing so. However, these comments give a first indication that the perceptions of ‘crime’ and disorder in the local area in their basic origins must really be traced back to social issues and causes, rather than classical legal or criminal matters:

Most of the dealers do not live here. They come here to deal their drugs. They come from the suburbs, most of them. The question is, do the crack addicted hookers bring the dealers, or do the dealers bring the hookers. It’s one of these chicken and egg things, but the area is some sort of a magnet for that whole population. One of the other key reasons, of course, are the social service agencies that are magnets for these people. We have within a four block area seven social service agencies that have drop-ins, and many other agencies more. There are five of them that are major problems. There is just too much concentration of them in one area. There is one main one, where the hookers clean themselves up and get fed, and then they go outside and turn tricks right in front of the place. There are others, on the drug side, because of the congregation where the dealers hang out all the time, and the dealing goes on both inside and outside. Recently, at one of these agencies, the dealers made deals and smoked crack right in front of the place. The social service agencies are magnets for these people, because they get fed there and they get clothes, and that keeps the hookers in the area which seems to bring the dealers. Many of the dealers are pimps. In many instances of the agencies, the hookers come out with food and give it to the pimps. That’s what keeps them here. Then, of course, the legitimate clients who are not concerned with crime, of course, also become victims, like the neighbors. One of the weekend drop-ins that used to be on our street and moved away tries to come back. That is something we are trying to prevent, because they have always been a huge problem in terms of noise, garbage, foul language, food in people’s yards and so on. That’s a source of conflict. We try to help them to find a space, but not in this area. We suggested that they find a place for the east, the west, the north and one central. So that again, it is not all concentrated here. [Comm05]

We never had that kind of drug problem before. But it’s gotten worse and worse, especially with all the places in the neighborhood that are letting all these people in, like the drop-ins. All the services that cater to these people and have an excuse to be here. With them being here, you can never eliminate the problem, because these are their clients, and they have an interest for them to be here. It almost feels like they are taking over and we are being pushed out. [...] To me, these social services are just adding to the problems, let’s not feel sorry for these people, get them out of the neighborhood and help them if you can. The
shelters are a perfect example. They go so far in helping somebody, and then they think she is going to be cured? You can’t even cure an alcoholic in just a few weeks. And you don’t put an alcoholic back into the bar. And where do they go? They go back into the area, because the services are here. You are not helping a person by having people hang around their old friends and pimps, and the tracks in the first place. Our neighborhood is a dumping ground for the scum. That’s the reason. The city and the politicians have decided that this is where our problem people go. It’s a sort of an urban ghetto. The mayor has even admitted it. And I’ve read it. The city’s usually concentrate their welfare people somewhere in the city, so they don’t have to worry about and the whole city is not gangling up on them.[C06]

[This drug and prostitution] problem has always been here, people would come here and look for prostitution and drugs here, because this was always the place where you could find them. They come looking for them because it’s always been in the area. But the real problem is the density here. [...] A lot of it is just the density, and especially the density of low income people. We are surrounded with them, especially the ones in rooming houses and, of course, the ones on welfare and in social housing. Their way of life has always been to live on welfare, and they are not going to change it. Some of these people, it is much easier to sell a little bit of crack on the side and make a hundred bucks. [Comm07]

It’s not a coincidence that all these problems are here, and you can get into all kinds of conspiracy theories, that certain politicians have made it their goal to dump as much social ills here as possible. And that all the crime problems are related to the social housing. It may not be that social housing and crime are directly connected. But it is the concentration of the social housing and social services here that causes the problems. It’s the density. We need to loosen that up, and get a healthy mix of people. It’s the concentration of people on welfare and unemployed that causes the tensions. The other thing is that social service agencies don’t necessarily solve problems. They follow a demand, and come where the people are that want to use their services, and they stay and expand if they can. So they are a social problem industry in a sense, and they attract customers. So we have the social services here, and all the people who want to use them come here, because this is where the agencies are. [...] So the social services need to find locations outside of that area. It is overkill. The people here can even shop around for food and clothes that they like, because there is such a variety of providers concentrated in this area. If they don’t like macaroni and cheese for lunch, they just have to go around the corner. It has made me very cynical, verging on being right wing. These agencies have a responsibility to make the community healthy, and they are not living up to that at the moment. Not at all. [Comm08]

I think that most of the problem has to do with the socio-economic status of the people, and the place where we live. I happen to live in a tiny pocket of reasonably well-to-do people, and of course we are surrounded by social housing, people on welfare, rooming houses and social service clients. So this is a place for girls, who have grown up in poverty, and the johns and the drug dealers know where to come. [...] It is a fact that our ward has the highest concentration of social services, and social housing related to that, in Canada. Why that is? I don’t know. I think it happens to be because in the 50s they decided to dump it all down here. It was a big mistake. And more projects followed in the sixties. And you are talking 50,000 people or so just in the two big projects. And the problem with social services is, they go where the problem people are. So you get your drop-ins, the medical centers, etc., the concentration of the homeless, the welfare people, the hookers, the dealers - it is a chain effect. [Comm11]

‘Community’ - responsibility ‘citizenship’ and new social agency

Within the contexts of the above discussed particular profile of ‘community’ activists
engaging in the local crime and safety ‘battle’, and their joint constitutive focus on the ‘common enemy’ as forces of public disorder, some more relevant practical processes towards the ‘building’ and ‘acting’ of ‘community’ could be detected. Seemingly almost trivial, a number of ‘community’ respondents pointed out that participation in informal and voluntary ‘community activism’ in many instances occurs as a rather ad-hoc pragmatic and often self-centred exercise by people who suddenly discover a sort of street ‘problem’ or nuisance - for example, prostitution activity, drug dealing, drug paraphernalia - affecting them within their immediate vicinity or environment. These notions, again, emphasize the central dynamics of the control over local ‘spaces’ in the mobilization and constitution of ‘community’. The primary and pragmatic motivation for people to get ‘community active’ is to achieve the removal or elimination of disorder or ‘problem’ phenomena, which primarily materialized in attempts to ‘exclude’ the carriers of ‘problems’ - prostitutes, drug dealers, drunks - from local spaces claimed and colonized by individual ‘community’ stakeholders. This approach thus nicely overlaps with the local police’s idea and approach to ‘solving’ street problems (see Chapter 5). As soon as this pragmatic goal is accomplished, the motivation and enthusiasm - except for a few hard core activists and believers - for people to further participate in and contribute in most instances seems to fade quickly, to the point where they become basically ‘de-activated’. To a critical extent, explicit and active ‘community’ in specific practical contexts thus critically hinges on the practical, identifiable and projectable existence of an enemy, problem or deviant.

Some ‘community’ activists elaborate on these issues:

The people really active in our community organization are the people who are most impacted by the problems. So if there was a rooming house in the neighborhood that had become a crack house, the neighbors showed up at the meetings of the [Y neighborhood group]. Out of the woodwork. We never recruited. They just showed up. The first group of people that got together was a group of people that had a bunch of hookers in front of their houses, and they could not stand the noise and traffic and nuisances anymore. The original founders sent out flyers to residents calling a community meeting. And we decided to form the organization. We decided to meet once a week, and that was the best thing we ever did, because people started to realize, every week, there was a bunch of community people meeting at the school, discussing the issues. So if a hooker started harassing them on their streets, they would show up. But in turn, whenever a specific local problem would get resolved, let’s say the crack house got taken out, we would lose 75% if not all of the people that had been affected by that specific thing. They were back in their homes, in peace, and their lives were comfortable again. Recruiting never happened, they were all driven to the organization, on an emergency need basis, so to speak. [Comm08]

The organization’s core is very small compared to the size of the neighborhood. However, we do have a
good response if at any time we need to call on the neighborhood to go to court. So we have good support and cooperation. But we find that people do come to the [Y community group] with a problem, like they have a crack house next door, they don’t know what to do, and so they come. We point them the way what to do about it. When the problem is dealt with, then in most cases they disappear again. But we can always call on them. That is the sort of fluid situation. We have a sort of hard core who does most of the work. What keeps the core together, we’ve had quite a few successes. [...] Actually, the [Y community] started because of a problem on [Y street] which 2 people wanted to do something about. That is how it all started. [Comm02]

We had a lot more people who came out when we had more who had serious problems right at their doorsteps. When the problems started to go away, many people did not come anymore, and people were thinking, oh, it’s not on my doorstep anymore, I got a life, and I can’t spend all that time with these meetings. We decided that we would continue to stay on top of things rather than crawl back into our holes again. But when we need people to come out, we call on them and they do come out in great numbers, so we have the support when we need it. So we have a small active core and a large passive support core. We all believe in what we are doing, and we feel that we have to keep the momentum up, because if we relax, it will come back again. We will continue to exist as long as there is problems on the streets. [Comm05]

There was also substantial testimony, however, among the ‘community’ activists to the fact that the local coming-together, organizing and action around the ‘crime and safety’ problem, and the joint identifying of problems, cooperation and ‘successful’ interventions had spawned and established ‘social bonds’ - or the perception of ‘community’ - among a selected crowd of local people that had previously not existed. From a more conceptual perspective, instead of ‘crime’ and ‘disorder’ being identified by and responded to by a normative ‘social community’ in these local spheres, it appears that ‘crime and disorder’ as described within the late modern urban context has become the grounds, the powerful creator or the agency of a sort of late modern social ‘community’. It constitutes an agency of ‘community’ in a sense of building social relations, networks and the sharing of a basic feeling of bonding around the concrete and tangible issues of crime, safety and disorder that have been effectively mobilized; all of which seemed to had been lost some time ago. Local ‘crime’ and ‘safety’ processes and structures thus may suddenly re-build ‘social community’ that may have been missing in a time characterized by a “death of the social” (Rose 1994). However, they seem to build a distinct type of ‘community’ that seems to be fundamentally determined by its very own peculiar characteristics, dynamics and perspectives on who ‘community’ is, what it stands for and how it ‘works’. Instead of ‘social community’ defining and responding to crime and order, it appears in the practical contexts examined that the ‘crime and order community’ is defining, shaping and determining ‘social
community’, and is therefore the source and agency behind late modern processes of “making up of communities” (Ericson and Haggerty 1997) or the “enabling” or “facilitating of communities” (Davis, Lurigio and Rosenbaum 1992:141ff).

Some ‘community’ activists elaborate on their particular local ‘social’ world that has been created and shaped through the agency of local crime, disorder and ‘quality of life’ work.

In our organization, we have a core group of about ten, who come out to all our meetings and run our business so to speak, and then we have a computer list of all our allies in the neighborhood, which lists what kinds of support activities they are available for. So when we have a problem, we got all the names, we got all the numbers and then we just blitz the neighborhood, and get all the people together. People who are keen and determined. Also, what may even be the most important thing, we all like each other. We found out that since we’ve been doing this, we met so many people in the neighborhood. You can’t even go and buy milk at the corner store without being at least half an hour, because either you meet people from the [Z community group], or you meet people who want to know, oh, what is happening with this rooming house, what is happening with that. So it really knit the neighborhood together, there is a real social effect to all this. And we hardly ever socialized before, but we have added social components to our work, like the garden tour or the Christmas lights program. We are trying to boost the neighborhood in the best way we can, and get people out to meet each other. We’ve all become really close. [Comm04]

We have an active core of ten, twelve people or so. But we would not [go for a neighborhood] walk under ten, it’s the safety aspect. And honestly, when we did not go for the walks, we missed each other. It is a social thing. And you almost feel guilty when you don’t go out and walk. In the meetings, we average 20 - 25 people. And then we sent the walk schedule out to the neighborhood. The active people are just very community oriented people. Now that we’ve gotten to know each other, we care about each other and the neighborhood. And it’s a standard complaint among us, well, I would really like to stay home tonight. But then, some people have been victimized by these people, break ins and stuff. We just don’t like them to invade our territories. That is the most important thing. It’s a situation of, who is going to win this battle, this is what it boils down to. We know now that if we give up, they will win. [Comm06]

We are very sensitive to the fact that we live in a socially mixed area, and historically we’ve always had the drunks who would wonder along, and they would lean against your fence, and move on, you would get the odd panhandler, and our general approach was to say, they are not as lucky as we are, and it’s rude and impolite to interfere, we are very tolerant, and this sort of thing. So there was a concept here of keeping your own counsel, and the problem will go away, and we will co-exist in some way. We knew our immediate neighbors, but there was not a real need to know people in the neighborhood. You’d keep your own hours, that sort of thing. So you knew some neighbors but not the general neighborhood. [...] But when the drug dealers and the prostitutes were just swamping us, and the police wouldn’t do anything about it, we started our own street patrols. We went out on the streets in groups, realizing that we could hassle these people. We did not realize how dangerous that could be, we were just that goddamn mad. OK, if you don’t do anything, we will goddamn do it ourselves. [...] We had a public meeting about street crime, and that’s how we met one of the CRU sergeants, and we went to some of the [X neighborhood group] meetings. We had some good guidance from them on how to organize the neighborhood. So we began to get names, phone and fax numbers from people, building a community network, and many of us would joke about the ironic circumstances under which we had the opportunity to finally meet and socialize, and do what we should have done a long time ago, here in the community. And everybody said,
hey, this is really great that we are getting to know each other, even though the reason for us meeting is the fact that we want to find out who is and who is not us. [Comm14]

One of the ‘community’ respondents even explicitly underlines the general building of ‘community’ as a central entity of particular social bonds and norms as the most important ‘success’ that the entirety of local safety, crime and policing activities had produced. S/he does so by emphasizing the fundamental and wider social momentum and implications of the seemingly specific and narrow ‘crime’ aspects observed. The force and power of ‘community’ building emerging from the pragmatic and goal-oriented practices and processes of ‘community’ activism against the perceived street crime and disorder problems is even lauded as providing the incentives and basis to overcome basic social or ideological differences that in most instances would keep people from forming social bonds. The local life worlds of crime, disorder and safety as reflected in the described organized ‘community’ settings thus seem to carry a rather powerful potential of ‘social agency’ which has largely been neglected by many examinations so far.

There is a core of about 20 people who were involved from the very beginning who somehow get an awful lot of personal growth, sense of community, empowerment, satisfaction, a whole raft of things, a certain amount of community spirit out of our efforts. And a bond has occurred between the people on that basis, real friendships, and those are really essential to the ongoing core groups. There are major differences in politics, attitudes, ideologies, but that does not matter in most aspects, because we just focus on the community aspects, so we manage to shape consensus in some form or another. [...] So, the most important accomplishment of or community organization was developing a sense of community, over every other success we had. And I don’t even think that it had been on our initial agenda. It has become part of the agenda in that we devote some time to developing the social and economic side of the community with certain efforts, but the majority of that has occurred while we were doing all the other things. Coming out to community meetings, going to city hall protesting and speaking on issues, getting out 280 people to the committee of adjustment to prevent the renewal of a rooming house license. Now, I can walk down the street, and I can say hello to a whole lot of people. That is the really powerful accomplishment. And not only the people who live in the area, but also the ones who come here and work, the police, some of the agencies, the politicians. There is a larger number of people who are now empowered in that they know what they can do about issues that bother them, how to contact city hall, how the system functions, how the police functions and what to do to get their attention, and so on. They know much more about the community, instead of just their own lives, their job and their little piece of property they own, which is really where it was some ten years ago without knowing who their neighbors are. Whereas now, I can now communicate with every person, and I know quite a bit about them. I can go down the block and communicate with people. And the important thing is that our community organization got that communication going on a broader scale. People come out on an issue, and after the issue, there is this familiarity, this acknowledgment of each other, and in doing that I think we have made it safer for everybody, by the fact that I now know everybody on this block, because now, if I see somebody going over the fence, I now know if it is a legitimate person or not. Hey, you, what are you doing going over that fence? Do you live here? No, you don’t, because I do, and I happen to know the people who live here because I know them all, and you are not one of them. And that has kind of happened to all of us. So in a
sense, I want to thank the hookers. Because they brought us together, and I would not have any kind of communicating relationship with the police in any shape or form if it had not been for the hookers. [...] The biggest thing for us to work on is the community relations, because I think that is the strongest point around which the community can grow in good health, by being aware of each other, not being in each others lives, just by being looking out for each other, community relationships, and further strengthening that, so when issues come up that we know who to talk to. You need to keep introducing yourself, finding ways of bringing each other into each others presence. And preferably, more so around issues that are rather community building than conflict. And as I said, that is the best thing about what has happened here in the last few years. Because of the crisis that we faced together, we have been forced to communicate and work together. And now what I want to do, continue that introduction and keep that community momentum, that spirit alive and well, and involve ourselves in each others lives. Dealing with crisis, and really bad problems, that forced us to communicate and work on the problems. The real challenge now is to continue the communication when things are better. [Comm08]

‘Community’: Attitudes, rationales and objectives

There was an overwhelming consensus among the local ‘community’ representatives that their central objective within the operational framework of their ‘community’ organizations was to effectively and pragmatically “remove the street problems from the neighbourhood”, to “get the hookers and dealers out of our neighbourhoods and out of our hair”, or to simply “clean up the area from the scum”. Many of them conceded that it would be impossible for their resources, but also secondary to their overall goals, to address the root causes of the issues they were dealing with. Some reflected on the issue and pointed out that this basic pragmatic and consensual focus of ‘community’ on effectively removing problems from ‘community’ spaces - very similar to the police’s exclusionary and spatial idea and approach of ‘problem solving’ - was the only way that made it actually possible to unite a wide spectrum of people, opinions and ideologies within their locally organized groups. These groups covered, as one of them stated, “from extreme left-wing to extreme right wing”. A couple of the ‘community’ groups had actually ventured even into drafting more strategic and ideologically informed positions and strategies to dealing with issues street drug trade or prostitution (ranging from plans of ‘decriminalization’ or ‘red light districts’) in their areas. However, in many instances such proposals ran into considerable ideological and political dissonances and disagreement from local and political stakeholders, as a result of which most of them eventually decided to “stay away from the political stuff” and to just “concentrate on pragmatically cleaning up our area” [Fieldnotes, Interview data].

A more thorough investigation of the causalities and possibly valid ‘solutions’ for the crime and disorder problems perceived in the area, interestingly, produced answers in two main directions or clusters among the ‘community’ activists surveyed. Most striking, however, within
these responses, was the notion that none of those suggested approaches really saw or emphasized the police as the appropriate institution, or ‘policing’ and its coercive mechanism as the necessary, promising or long-term strategy to resolve the prevalent problem issues described in the local area. A majority of the respondents saw the fundamental issue and root causes to the perceived problems in their areas predominantly as “social matters”, urban structures and socio-economic environments and opportunities or issues of “social planning”. “Real solutions”, so the tenor of perspectives, would have to be addressed within these realms. People also predominantly pointed to the enormous density of people, the enormous socio-economic discrepancies concentrated in a relatively small space, the substantial clustering of low-income and welfare dependent people in the local area, the ghettoisation of welfare populations within more prosperous, middle class residential neighbourhoods, the high level of transiency in the area, and simply insufficient and bad infrastructure and urban planning.

The other cluster of responses from ‘community’ representatives expressed a strong sense of frustration and disillusionment with the ‘system’, as encompassing the ‘social’ as well as the ‘criminal justice’ systems. It was, often cynically, suggested that the ‘system’ of government and public administration in these sectors, as specifically operationalized through law enforcement, courts and corrections, was ineffective and inappropriate in many instances to deal especially with the problem people and phenomena with which the ‘community’ folk saw themselves confronted with. Hookers and dealers were seen to “get arrested and convicted the one day, and they are back on the street the next”, and that the system “really doesn’t help them to stop their addiction or change their lifestyles”. Most of the respondents saw a desperate need for drastic changes in these sectors, but overall presented utterly disillusioned, embittered and often hopeless perspectives. Some of them were not clear on what most appropriate and effective reforms or changes to these malfunctions would be, but the majority of the respondents who were offering concrete measures suggested that ‘tougher laws and tougher sentences were needed’, although it was rarely clear what their functional objectives and expectations were through such proposed changes. Some argued for the need for a “real deterrent effect on these hookers and the dealers” through tougher laws and enforcement, others simplistically expected that longer sentences would keep dealers and hookers off the street for a longer period of time. A few of the ‘community’ respondents mentioned a need for drastically increased police presence and availability, and more policing in their areas, but it was not consistently clear what this was supposed to accomplish in
practice. Some emphasized the need for simply more police presence and visibility in the local areas, which was hoped to have a “deterrent effect”, but also explicitly symbolize that “the neighbourhood fights back” and that “the community and the police have come together and are jointly cleaning up” [Fieldnotes].

Most of the respondents, however, conceded that they did not really see the police as capable of ‘solving’ the problem phenomena they saw themselves confronted with, but that they perceived them as rather ‘powerless’ and inadequate to deal with the fundamental nature, the scope and the dimensions of the issues at stake. At best, as one resident put it, police were seen as a “bandaid solution”, but they seemed to be the only one available at the moment to “do something” [Fieldnotes]. Some respondents painted the police as their very last ray of hope, in the sense that when every possible social or institutional effort has failed to deal with issues of conflicting interest or claims for public resources, norms or space, the police are used as the last resort. Especially in their new ‘community police’ role in late modern urban environments dominated by socio-economic struggles and discrepancies within densely and diversely populated spaces, the police seem to carry the symbolic role of the public institution that may be ‘doing something’, while a sense of frustration or disillusionment about the genuine public or social sectors or institutions that should become active or take charge of the issues dominates the ‘community’ people’s minds. In the contexts of late modern urban realities, so the research data suggest, ‘social problems’ in the framework of ‘community policing’ become increasingly congruent with ‘policing problems’; or, from another perspective, ‘social problems’ come to be mediated, carried out and resolved via ‘policing’ as an increasingly ‘social’ affair and enterprise.

Most ‘community’ representatives, as some of them elaborate on below, are in agreement their disillusionment with the ‘system’ as well as on the wider social basis and implications of the issues and problems tackled by ‘community policing’’s’ resources and measures.

The problems here in our area are really social problems. They are clearly social things. I have no idea how you could ever really solve them. Legalization would not help much either, I think. As far as drugs are concerned, I don’t think that we will ever legalize certain types of drugs. I think it is more of a planning issue for cities. If they were better planned, you would not have these things going on. Like, housing, the distribution of populations, infrastructure planning, that sort of stuff. For the time being, I would put a much stronger police presence in the area. By being there, they would discourage these activities from taking place. Hookers and drug dealers would not be there, they would not be able to make money. People would be afraid to do that sort of stuff because of the consequences. The other part is that they would go somewhere else. That may be a solution for now, and I’ve heard about it working. They don’t even have to
make many arrests. The main thing is the police presence. For instance, there is the spot checks that we are setting up in the area, this weekend actually. They are stopping everybody going through, just looking for minor traffic violations and stuff. That will be very effective, because most people will see it, although there might just be a handful of people picking up a prostitute. But they will not do that when the police are there, and they will likely not come back. [Comm10]

There is a real segregation going on at the moment. A way to alleviate the problem a bit would be to spread the social services evenly across the whole city. But it's not going to happen, because the rest of the city does not want these people in their neighborhood, and they won't let them in. They will always keep sending them back down here. And they will never allow the service facilities to be developed elsewhere that we have down here. And when it comes to the police, I don't think that all of this is really a police issue, it is all more of a social and political issue. That's how it should be dealt with. Not with the police. It's not the police's problem. But they are not touching it. Until the politicians would be willing to say, hey, maybe we should get some of this stuff out of the neighborhood, nothing will change. And we will just need the police to do what they have been doing. If it's here, it will just stay. Just on my way here, I passed three of the regulars. They've been here for five years. They break into a car, go to jail for a few weeks, and come back. What can you do? The police are just a band-aid kind of fix. [Comm06]

In an ideal world, you would not have the housing projects that we have here, you would have the people mixed in with the rest of the community. Generally, the neighbors should not be aware of who is on welfare and who is not. They should not be identified as being on welfare, then they would not be as likely to get involved in criminal activities because they would be more part of their community and it would not be so easy to prey on them, whereas right now they are just sitting there waiting to be exploited. I think that when people are dealing drugs, the penalty has to be more. I think our laws and penalties on paper are sufficient, but there is something wrong between the officer arresting them, and when they are sentenced in court. Something goes wrong in our system. They don't get the sentences that they should. The people who are more on the fringe, the basically decent people who get sucked into doing bad things would probably not get as involved as readily, so you can eliminate these people because they'd be looking at the penalties, and you'd be looking more at hard core criminals, and you'd have a much better chance of catching them. And you would lock them up, you'd lock them up for a long time. Whether or not you think that marijuana should be legalized, at this point it isn't. And the people who are dealing it on the street are not dealing it exclusively to adults, a lot of times they are dealing with a lot of young people. The police should arrest these people and get them off the street, and the courts have to deal with them properly. The police can only take it so far. If I was police officer, I'd be extremely frustrated, because it is like the parent who wants to discipline their child. You can't spank them, you can't hit their hand, you're not to allowed to do any of these things, so how do you discipline your child? So, more has to be done on the community side. Like making our judges sentence people, putting the full measure of the law into effect so that we are getting people off the street. [Comm01]

Ideally, we would need more policing and to give the police the tools that they need to deal with all that stuff, which includes relaxing the laws. Which brings me into the area of the courts and the judges, which don't give strict enough sentences, so there is no deterrent for the criminals. Especially the hookers, when they go to court they know that they are to get one day. The dealers, initially they were getting one month at the maximum. But then, when you think about it, I think our problems are really beyond the police. They are really problems with the law, and the tools that are given to the police. And I think we have to lobby to change that. [Comm05]

But it was the combination of the sense of frustration and disillusionment about the
supposed inappropriateness and ineffectiveness of the 'system' among the 'community' representatives together with the realization that 'something needs to be done' and the fact that 'organized community' would carry considerable clout upon relevant decision-makers that characterized the philosophy behind most respondents' activism. These attitudes and approaches may present a compelling practical example of the nature and scope of the projected 'responsibilized citizenship' and 'third sector government' discussed earlier. One of the 'community' respondents explained how the initial social bond in the 'neighbourhood' organization s/he was affiliated with was partly based on and facilitated by the collective "anger and frustration about the system" that people were sharing and expressing. There was no visible effort spared on the side of the 'community' activists to emphasize that organized 'community' in the terms they were practising it was perceived as quite powerful by local politicians and institutions of executive power. They were described as managing to exercise considerable pressure on these entities through formal and informal channels by "shaking up the system", thus getting "things moving and happening" that they would have never expected to see had individuals acted or raised these issues just by themselves [Fieldnotes].

In turn, the local politicians observed and informally spoken with appeared to take the 'community' organizations rather seriously, seemingly aware of the fact that these locally organized groups usually formed a fairly consensual and united viewpoint and verdict on politicians and decision-makers, focusing on the issue of how 'cooperative' and 'supportive' of their causes and interests they were perceived to be. On the other hand, it was recognized by the politicians that these groups were potentially able to wield considerable clout in shaping local opinions about politicians, their agendas and accomplishments. What also appeared to make the 'community' groups further attractive to local politicians as a target of their attention and activism was that they offered them a convenient and comprehensive grasp of what the 'community' groups were looking for in terms of programs, initiatives and objectives, and what steps on their part would make a rather positive impression on the groups' (fairly homogenous and middle-class) members. They also seemed to recognize the considerable 'multiplication' potential of the 'neighbourhood' groups, through which they could spread their image, news and general public relations quite effectively and efficiently. This perceived collective clout of the 'community' groups - albeit their representativeness in considerable doubt - and their impact on local decision-makers in turn led to a sense of 'community empowerment' among the 'community' activists,
signalling and triggering the impression among them that “things can get done, and we have ways to do them”. One of the ‘community’ activists, for example, happily reported that now, s/he does “not have to feel depressed” anymore when s/he “sees hookers or something else that is wrong in the neighbourhood”, because s/he “knows that there is the ‘community’ that will take care of it” [Comm08]. Another activist stated plainly that “all this community activism, it is just a combination of people really being fed up with the system, and realizing the rights and powers they can have when they work together” [Comm13]. All in all, the ‘community’ activists seem to embody and very much rely on practising the propositions of what elsewhere has been described as ‘responsibilized citizenship’ in neo-liberal contexts: identifying problems, emphasizing conservative norms and values, taking initiatives, getting active and involved in a pragmatic fashion, proposing and pushing for solutions rather than waiting for them to be made, challenging the state, public institutions and the carriers of power in terms of rights and accountability, and demanding to be treated as a ‘consumer’ rather than as a silent subject of state power.

The following ‘community’ representatives provide first-hand accounts on these issues:

*Our residents’ association was formed a few years ago, specifically to deal with the problems of drug dealing and street prostitution. It’s tremendously empowering to have a neighbourhood that is under siege to get together, thrash out some ideas to solve the problem, and to do it, and have some good results from it. [...] The residents’ association has given us a lot of power politically. So the local politicians that used to blow us off and tried to make our neighbourhood into this social welfare Mecca start to take us seriously. Now that we are getting powerful as a residents association, the politicians have to realize that they have to listen to what the people want, and that there are huge problems here that need solving. [...] The cooperation with the councillors has gotten better over the years. They see us as more powerful, so they are taking us more seriously now than they used to. We are getting better cooperation. Our city councillor is a die hard [member of the local socialist party], so she is pro social service agencies, but she’s come through our lobbying to realize that enough is enough. As a result, we formed a very good relationship with her, and for the most part she has been receptive and supportive. In the instance of the roaming house, she spoke out against it, which was one of the things that threw it in our court. When she saw the response of the community, we organized the community, she realized that it was important to the community that she support them, so she supported us. And that is the way it works. When we can get enough people together, she understands that is a community issue, and she throws her support behind us. [Comm12]*

*The reason why the community is getting involved is because people are getting sick and tired of what is going on their streets, without the police and the system doing anything about it. That’s the biggest part. We are tired of being bullied by the dealers out there who are taking over our streets and our back yards. A lot of people are just getting tired. The system does not work. And going to meetings, often until it comes out of your ears, you hear stuff like, well, we don’t need to change the prostitution laws because they don’t have prostitution problems in Saskatchewan. So they don’t change the laws. But this is the big city, and we have a hell of a lot of prostitution problems. We need people to make laws that work for cities. But nobody*
Another ‘community’ activist elaborated in detail on the origins and forces behind the establishment and mobilization of ‘community’ spawned by threats to local ‘safety’, ‘order’ and ‘quality of life’. S/he also explained in this first hand account and perspective what ‘community’ activism is all about, what its goals and objectives are, and what it takes within the contexts examined to ‘make it happen’:

Thirty years ago, proposals had been made to change the laws to allow the police better enforcement of drugs and prostitution, and nothing has ever happened since. It’s just a passing of the buck, all the time. The governments don’t understand the problem, the city does not, and the police have great problems understanding it, so the only thing that remains is what we can do ourselves. No one is going to help us, we have to help ourselves on this, and we have to organize ourselves and do something. We came up with that on our own that this was what we needed. We basically invented community policing for ourselves. A year ago, we had a meeting with city councillors, public housing, security, the hospital, we did our own security audits, we went up and down the laneways with clipboards, made notes about every missing light bulb and everything, broken fence where people could climb over. We met about every single thing where our problems were. We went to the owners of these fences and said can you fix this or that, they all said, hey, yes, great idea, because they were equally stymied that nobody else cared, and it would not do any good to fix it because everything else was broken, or would get broken again. So everybody sprung to life as soon as they saw that other people were acting, and we got superb cooperation all along the lines, from everywhere, because people were realizing the problem, and every common voice was saying, let’s do something. And we did. [...] We still need the right laws, and we still need much greater awareness about the rights of the community. We have been working on the community witness program, because the courts, they don’t give a damn. They figured, we don’t care, nothing can be done anyway, so what is the point of giving them jail, they move to another neighborhood and will be replaced by another one anyway. So you’re up against huge obstacles in the criminal justice system. Our community witness program says, we will go to court, we will all show up there, we will indicate the impacts that the dealing and the hookers have on the neighborhood, saying that there is one major victim in all of this, the community, us. I always hear that garbage how these are victimless crimes, and we are saying goddamn’ wrong. The community is the victim in this. It is not a private consenting adult rumble. It is making a mess out of everything, and we pay for it. We got the cooperation of the crown and the division, we have a list of people to go to court when they bring in the cases, they call, and we are there. And we give statements on behalf of the community, and that had a big impact on the judges. Last year we were able to get six months boundaries on people. We had a way to get around all of the law crap, that is as a condition of bail we’d persuade the judge that as a condition of bail they were simply barred from this area. Period. So this year, because it worked so well, we went for the whole thing. One year boundaries, and the whole division. And we are getting it. We set a precedent, we are getting a lot of people to court, and one of the crowns tells us that we are not getting called as often because people will now rather plead guilty to a charge rather than take a trial with the community in attendance, because we are now getting reputation for accomplishing more severe sentences. So we are doing what we can to evade the law, to work around them. With them, they won’t let us do that, but we will do this and they can’t stop us, so we are coming up with our own thing. Because I don’t believe that the laws on the books will change in our lifetime. And the good thing is, once this person is barred via boundaries, this allows the officer to pick them up when they see them hanging out in the area, and charge them with violation of their bail at least which is a greater charge. That gives us a working way at least, towards an indictable offense. [...] There is a great need for communities to
stand up and act, as the complete gridlock and inability to act of the state and the bureaucracy becomes more and more apparent to more and more people, but I think we are very much ahead of the curve in doing what we are doing because there is no clear concept or theory behind it at the moment. Other than a very visceral response to invasion of one’s territory, one’s home. Like, violations of things that you knew ever since you went to kindergarten, like you don’t take other people’s toys away and don’t step on their feet. And everything that [The City] ever was is suddenly in disarray, and everybody is saying it is not my fault. So excuse me, this is driven by a lot of anger and frustration, but we have not even seen the first glimmers of all of that in terms of community empowerment. Community desperation is probably a better term. [...] We’ve changed our tactics quite a bit. We have more people active now, we are making better use of people’s professional skills, rather than going to the powers that be and say do something, we now come to them with specific requests. This is what we want you to do, and this is the way to do and get it. And this is the standard on which we’re going to measure this. And reminding them, not too politely sometimes, that we are paying for and employing them, and it is their job to respond to these things. So there is a redress of power, if you wish, maybe returning it to where ever it started out once and where it should have been all along, also taking the accountability issue seriously. It is just astounding how you go to all these meetings, everybody agrees, they are so sympathetic, dadada, they nod wisely, and at the end of the meeting, and all you get is a paper trail, a lot of people shrugging, we can’t do anything. [...] Everybody who comes to the meetings is angry, that seems to be the major driving force. Everybody who comes to the meetings comes with a load of anger and frustration to dump. It is almost like psychoanalysis, collectively cathartic. That is how we bring people in here, and frustration drives most of them. [...] The politicians were supportive and helpful to a point, but not enough to satisfy people here. Most of them had a personal ideology and attitude about social services and the presence of public housing and all that thing, evidently the more the merrier, and every attack of social service provider systems or the people they house or the standards they set in their buildings or the neighborhood is seen as an attack on decency itself. And they are used to dealing with people coming and saying, please do something. And it leaves them to waffle away with whatever they want. And from the onset, we have taken the approach, now here is what we want done, you are either going to do these things or we will find someone else who will. We have made that very clear that this is how we are going to judge the thing. If this stuff is getting solved. This is having an effect. There was a large hearing on problems we had with rooming houses, the [A and B community] groups addressed the problem, they went to the city to stop the zoning, they developed the political expertise, and this time we used our network of people, the community witness program, the associations and everything, the CPLC sent their people for the zoning hearing, many bodies. We needed a lot of people for that to make a big impression, and we got 300 people out there and filled the entire second floor of city hall for this thing. The chairman was just flabbergasted, adjourned to the chambers, and we filled that entire chamber with people, opposing the rezoning. And the poor committee took one look at this thing and rejected the request. But not before our politicians leapt into the fray to say, we will speak on behalf of these people. Now they had not said one word in support of our position on this issue in public before, and counting the house, they suddenly realized which side their bread was buttered on, so leaped to the foreground and put on their show. The committee had never seen in this area a united view opposed against these developments. When these other rooming houses came up, we knew which way to go, and how to persist, and we were using all this as a precedence case. We work together as the associations, put pressure on the politicians, this what we need to do. A network operation. We are continually on the ball. This has turned into almost a second full time job for a good number of people. [...] Somebody is doing this, that and the other thing, and we get involved on the basis of our network. We all work together on these things. We are making a lot of progress, a lot of changes are happening. [Comm14]

‘Community’: Claims of representativeness and legitimization

Despite the obvious sparse, selective and subjective representation of local populations in
through the 'community' groups, there was an almost astonishing sense and confidence expressed among the members of the 'community' associations that they actually and fairly "represented the community out there". A couple of people saw proof and testimony to that claim in the fact that the 'neighbourhood' organizations "don't exclude anybody", since theirs had "even two people from the rooming houses coming to our meeting" on a regular basis. None of the 'community' activists considered or described themselves explicitly as a selective or special interest group with a very particular agenda that may be standing in clear or fundamental competition with or directed against other local groups' agendas, ideologies or perspectives on life, norms and behaviour in local spaces.

Equally interesting in terms of legitimizing the observed claims and activities under the banner of 'community', there appeared a perception and insistence among 'community' people that there existed no, hardly any or only irrelevant opposition or resistance to the goals and practices the 'community' groups stood, called and acted for. One of the main forms of reasoning with respect to these claims was that "there is no opposition because we have never seen or heard any". Others found that if there was any opposition or conflicting perspective on things, it was more or less the 'other side's problem' and challenge to do something, since the existing 'community' entities at least had taken the initiative and done something which seemed to be sufficient justification to act and speak on behalf of 'community'. Some of the 'community' respondents saw some slight, occasional and spotty resistance to their 'community' activities, but rationalized it as something that "has to be expected in these circumstances". Most of them were, however, assuming that in the end, people anyway "would be happy with the end results" of what the 'community groups' were doing and fighting for [Fieldnotes].

If any substantial opposition and resistance to the observed 'community' activities was sensed by their protagonists, it was usually rooted back to the social service providers and agencies, who were seen as a main cause and facilitator of local disorder and crime problems, and understood as a major 'problem' themselves in the area. On that basis, they were depicted as having a vested interest in maintaining the status quo of 'local problems' as they were, so their opposition to 'community' goals and practices was reasoned as discountable, irrelevant and illegitimate by the 'community' members. In reference to the fact that the 'community' groups only consisted of small numbers of active participants and provided rather selective perspectives on the local issues at stake, the predominant claim of the 'community' activists was that while
there may be a somewhat limited 'active core', their organizations had strong 'passive support'. This was seen as materializing in the form of large pools of people they could call on for support and assistance around specific tasks or just for ideological support, people who would show up to high-profile meetings around important issues, and who would come along to events with 'stakeholders', officials or the courts when 'bodies' were needed and the 'community' needed to be symbolized in mass strength. There was a consistent indifference among 'community' activists towards the fact that their 'neighbourhood' groups by definition and practice tended to appeal to their likes and the people who more or less fit into their patterns and agreed with their objectives and approaches, not conceding much room for differing perspectives or opinions to be raised or represented.

None of the 'community' organizations observed were organized in a formalized or principled pluralistic-democratic way promoting the broadest possible support or participation base, differences of opinion or a constructive conflict process aiming for basic values of accountability. Rather, their predominant operational objectives were to find operational consensus and a workable homogeneity of opinions and interests. On the basis of their 'voluntary' constitution, processes of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' played a major role of maintaining, reproducing and reinforcing an apparent homogeneity and consistency of the predominant perspectives within the organizations' parameters. A number of 'community' group meetings were observed where individual outsiders would sporadically show up and criticize the groups' approaches to prostitution, that they were 'vigilante' and tried to 'bash' social service providers. In all of these instances, the predominant response to these people was a recommendation to "leave if you don't like what we are doing here, nobody asks you to agree or work with us" [Fieldnotes]. In other instances, such comments were seen as 'disruptive and counterproductive' to what the group was doing, and were usually abruptly cut off.

Again, Crawford has insightfully elaborated on these observed processes of representativeness and legitimization within local corporatist 'community' settings pointing to the crucial roles of the "social processes of inclusion" as well as the "exclusion of certain interests", producing a "process of 'social closure' as opposed to pluralistic competition. ... This raises the issue of the implications for those interests which are not incorporated or cannot be effectively organized. Exclusion is not so much a consequence of corporatism as an essential element of its operation" (1994:509, see also Steinert 1995, Fischer and Poland in press). Further elaborating on
the construction of homogeneity and consensus within such ‘community’ contexts, Crawford suggests that their “representatives tend to be drawn from very specific and limited interests within a locality. They work within highly undemocratic networks of special interest. Inclusion may have more to do with personal relations with key agency personnel, noted activism or previous ‘good’ service in other fields of ‘voluntary’ community work, rather than any notion of representativeness. Such networks are largely self-perpetuating and self-justifying. Inclusion ... is also bound up with powerful agency definitions of the ‘respected’ and the ‘respectable’.

‘Troublesome’ groups are marginalized, ignored or overlooked. This is frequently justified on the ground that multi-agency is about consensus building” (1994:510).

‘Community’ group members elaborate on the themes of representativeness, resistance and the observed hegemony of selected and homogenous approaches and perspectives in their ‘community’ groups:

*There is maybe a few people who are suspicious of what we are doing here [in this local community safety office]. Some poke their head in, or they’ve seen me in the elevators and asked, what are you doing in here? But, generally, people are interested, they think it’s great and I’ve explained very carefully, it is not a 911 office, and the police won’t be here all the time, but they will be coming and going, and there will be things happening out of this office. I would say that people are very pleased about it. Anybody who’s not pleased about it probably has some reason to avoid me, or the police. I’ve noticed that the activity of the youth in the lobby is greatly diminished. And it does not take a whole lot to make some of the tenants a little leery. Resistance, there will be some resistance. If you worked in the community, and you know some of the possibilities, you can almost write the script, what is going to be said, and by who. But we have not felt it yet. [Comm01]*

*There may be a small active core, but the rest of the community passively supports us. Many of them come out for the specific issues, and are there when we need them. We had about 150 people come out for the Garden Tour. Then, of course, there is a different group of people concerned about the plans to tear down the school. Then again there is a different contingent of people who are worried about the business of the drop-ins being brought back to [Z street]. Whereas the people on [Y street] have their own issues. So when things come up, people on these streets become more active. And we, the core group, have our own people on each of these streets. But it is mostly the police, the councillors and us directing things. [...] I don’t think that there is any resistance within the community to what we do. Because we even found that when we put flyers out, we had some people in the rooming houses support us. We have never seen any outspoken resistance. Whereas before we just put flyers in the houses where we knew people. But we have changed that. Sometimes there are one or two supporters of a particular social service agency, but it is easy enough for us to ignore them. So we don’t really see major resistance. [Comm04]*

*I don’t think that we have active opposition. Passive, maybe. Non-participatory. Where people, rather than participate in things they don’t like, will simply not participate, and hope that it does not get very far, or does not accomplish what it is supposed to do. So that is maybe the only kind of opposition. And I could be wrong, but even the people who don’t particularly like the methods or the approaches, or the verbal*
content, all pretty much support the end results. So they may not have been comfortable with the people that were working on things or the process, but were quite happy with the end goal. But now that we don't have hookers everywhere anymore, they love it. [Comm08]

If there is any resistance to what we are doing, then people just don't come out and say it. I haven't seen or encountered any resistance. We have a very positive response from people, the ones who actively participate as well as the ones who are more passive. If there is resistance, it is well hidden. And I don't think that there really is any. We have solid support, active and passive. There is thousands of people in the neighborhood, and there is only 20 or 30 people walking, so there is lots of passive support. But I never had anybody tell me, we don't want you to do what you are doing. [Comm10]

The major resistance to what we do comes from the social service agencies. There is quite a difference between perception and the truth though. There seems to be a perception from the social service agencies that we want to shut them down. That is not true. There is, however, an over-intensification of social services and drop ins in this area, so we have asked the city to not fund anymore. [...] I don't know of any resistance in the ordinary community here. They are either passively or actively supportive of what we do. [Comm05]

'Community' of peculiar 'communities': The Community Police Liaison Committee [CPLC]

The 'Community Police Liaison Committee', designated by the TCPF's 'community policing' blueprint to be the 'official' and 'formal' forum for 'community' to be represented and cooperation between 'community' and police to be enacted, fundamentally reflected and reinforced the dynamics, biases and stratifications of the local crime and order 'community' entities documented above. In essence, the CPLC presented itself as a multiplication of the social, attitudinal and processual characteristics behind the 'community' entities it represented at a higher level.

The CPLC meetings in the research area were held once a month, and usually attracted 12-15 'community' representatives of the local organizations depicted, plus 5 or 6 other local officials, including assistants to the local councillors, community centre officials, a school trustee, etc., plus a usual police representation of 5 to 8 officers. The division commander usually took it upon himself to be representing his unit at the meetings, and frequently brought his second in command as well as a variable pool of sergeants and constables from the CRU.

The day-to-day CPLC structure and proceedings (agenda setting, chair, minutes etc.), by wish of the unit commander (and in apparent keeping with the official police blueprint's credo), were officially left with the 'community', although the role and the interactive dynamics of these
meetings upon a closer look predominantly appeared to facilitate and further a police-centered scheme, and the hegemonical position and role of the police in ‘community policing’ affairs (see Chapter 7). The ‘community’ in the CPLC, as alluded to above, consisted exclusively of representatives or envoys of the ten or so local ‘community’ organization gathered around crime, safety and policing affairs, and predominantly the ones who were perceived as the leaders and driving forces within their groups. It thus presented a selective ‘representation of the unrepresentative’ described above. In practical terms, the CPLC gatherings usually presented a rather homogeneous image of middle-class appearances and attitudes within an all-white group of people between the ages of 40 and 60, usually professional home-owners, primarily concerned with street prostitution, drug dealing, drunkenness and more vigorous and effective police approaches to ‘eliminating’ these problem phenomena.

There was no identifiable evidence of the police having made any efforts to recruit any representatives or attendees from beyond the local organizations to the CPLC meetings, and even if they had wished they would have likely felt very much challenged to select systematic, fair and efficacious ways to do so. Quite to the contrary, the ‘community’ organizations readily existed and offered themselves in structure, were keen to play the ‘community’ role, and the organizational structure of the CPLC was quickly adjusted to reflect the habits and practices of the local organizations. This was done, for example, by meeting in a sequence and time slots agreeable to the individual groups’ schedules and even rotating between the meeting locations of the different local groups. In focusing on, recruiting from and responding to the ‘community’ organizations within the relevant area, the CPLC naturally reinforced the social, economic and political structures and dynamics of the groups themselves outlined above. In practice, the ‘community’ organizations were rendered an organizational but also political funnel for who went to, spoke and made their case at the CPLC, and were in return spoken to and addressed by the police. The reinforcement, but also the taken-for-granted nature of these selective inclusion/exclusion dynamics, is aptly reflected in the approach of one of the civilians who repeatedly chaired the CPLC meetings. In the course of the round of introductions of attendees, when encountering a face or a name that she appeared not to be familiar with, s/he would ask: “And what community organization are you representing?” The CPLC thus quickly assumed and carried a sort of corporate culture and nature, and at this superficial alleged to operate by strict democratic principles in that the CPLC was seen by its ‘members’ - the parties and representatives
who had successfully included themselves into the CPLC framework - as the forum to which their local interests and issues would be brought, represented and responded to. The key issue is, however, that the fundamental basis and the constitution of that representation was fuelled and staffed by platforms of dubious local representativeness, and thus allowed the CPLC forum to stage democratic and representative proceedings in an environment that was constituted and determined by highly un-democratic processes, variables and processes. Exclusion of conflicting people and interests, the silencing of dissenting viewpoints and the organizational manufacturing of consent and agreement were key mechanisms of operations of the CPLC, which supposed to represent ‘the community’ for community policing purposes in the division under study.

The circumstances and dynamics of the CPLC and its ‘membership’, as its ‘envoys’ would prefer to call themselves, naturally raise the issue of equity and power dynamics of ‘access’ and ‘information’ within ‘community policing’ settings. All relevant proceedings with respect to the CPLC were handled through, by and within the CPLC, and then funnelled back and forth within the different local ‘community’ organizations, the police and the respective contacts there. Schedules, decisions about time and place of gatherings, agendas, meeting preparation, input, requests and feedback were all matters exclusively dealt with within the ‘membership’ of the CPLC, and their respective ‘community’ organization base. These processes in their evolving synergetic effects formed a system that in quite subtle but effective ways ‘excluded’ other or ‘included’ certain interests, concerns and representation from ‘community policing’ affairs at the CPLC level. It is not easy to predict what would have happened if a ‘non organized’ local resident or stakeholder representing fundamentally unconventional interests had sought to participate in the CPLC. In fact, for example, the social service provider sectors, although explicitly considered a relevant and sizable institutional factor and variable in the safety and policing issues at stake within the local ‘community policing’ setting was nowhere present at the CPLC table. There was no evidence of efforts to include them into the process. Instead, local social service providers consistently were the objects of ‘community policing’ talk and plans within the CPLC setting.

The described volatility and stratification of the CPLC assembly, which on the grand scale presented itself to be in a basic consensus on what the local ‘crime and safety’ problems were, what its roots and causes were, and that ‘better’ and ’more’ ‘policing’ was the way to improve things, may also be aptly illustrated by an incident triggered by a representative from one of the large social housing projects in the area. The representative, a young black woman - thus a
‘deviant’ within the group by more than one standard - was in basic disagreement with the role the police played in the local area, how they dealt with minority people on the streets, and how the CPLC was structured around a ‘police agenda’, all of which she raised explicitly in one meeting. In an open letter about her perspective on the CPLC published by a local ‘community’ paper, she writes:

“Imagine walking into a room with twenty people who directly oppose all your thoughts and views. The CPLC has been running for almost a year. It includes some communities in [99] division, but there are very significant communities missing. There are no representatives from [X, Y, Z] and many more communities. The absence that disturbs me the most is the absence from the homeless community. I guess what disturbs me the most about it is the fact that so many members of the CPLC are willing to say unjust things about the homeless when the homeless are not present. [...] The CPLC is also missing almost every minority group in [99] division. [...] When the turn comes for [our] community residents to voice concerns and how we want them dealt with, the people from other communities make it very clear that they are ‘uncomfortable’ with our issues. For example, the other communities want the police to deal with the drug trade with making more arrests. The [residents of the A community] actually want to prevent the drug trade by placing more rehabilitation centres in the community, however this is too progressive for those who just want the drug users and dealers locked in jail and the key thrown away. [...] The CPLC has been meeting since June of 1995, unfortunately there has not been much accomplished. Sometimes I find myself wondering why I bother to attend these meetings, but them I am reminded that [the A community] needs representation as all those other communities do.” (June 1996)

Her comments were met with stark disapproval and disagreement, and triggered considerable tension between her alleged ‘camp’ and the rest of the CPLC ‘members’. The solution to the tension was soon found, however, in the context of wider institutional efforts to reduce a long-standing history of conflict between local police and the multi-ethnic population in the social housing complex by the decision that this particular ‘community’ needed its ‘own’ CPLC. From then on, separate meetings between the [X community] and the police were arranged, and the ‘real CPLC’ met in its traditional homogeneous and predictably consensual fashion, although there were frequent comments to the extent that “the [X community] does not even bother to show up here to the meetings, why should we be concerned with what they think” [Fieldnotes].

Generally, it may have been an interesting experiment to poll people “living, working and playing” (TCPF 1994) in the area of the local division to find out if they knew about the CPLC or its dealings, and how accessible or representative of their own interest they felt it was. In fact, the vast majority of people talked to informally within the boundaries of the division did not even know what the acronym stood for, that such a forum existed and what its mandate and activities
were.
Perceptions of 'traditional' police and their work

Crime and safety effects of 'community policing': Temporary, spatial, ambivalent

The real effects of 'community policing': A 're-socialized police', 'policeable communities'

Police - 'community' interactions: Platforms staging a 'social' and 'account-able' police

Perceptions of 'traditional' police and their work

In assessing the local and professional role, approaches and impact of their local police force prior to the explicit proclamation and introduction of 'community policing', there was consensus among the 'community' representatives about two main issues. First, on a general level, the police were seen as presenting themselves and acting as being principally 'disinterested' and not at all involved in or attentive to 'social' issues in the area. However, at the same time, they were seen as understanding and asserting themselves as a distant and secluded 'crime' agency, and exclusively dealing with 'crime' and 'law enforcement' in a 'professional' manner. This also led to the perception among the 'community' sample that the police, prior to the ascent of 'community policing', had been generally indifferent about public disorder issues, and specifically did not seem to want to bother with 'petty' matters like prostitution, vagrants or public drunkenness, or the small-scale drug dealing scene per se. These issues, as perceived by the 'community' activists, were explained and simply accepted by police as natural factors and phenomena inherent to the local area, and not as relevant in terms of the severity of the problem or a sufficient priority for the police to become involved. They also did not seem to be inclined to involve or consult the 'community' in their communications, decision-making processes or operations.

The predominant response to complaints on issues like drunkenness, street prostitution or drug dealing brought forward to the police by 'community' people would principally be dismissed or ignored by them as 'petty', a 'waste of time' or 'nothing we can do anything about'. From the 'community' perspective, the police did not seem to acknowledge that these issues were part of their mandate, how they could be addressed, or were willing to look for 'alternative solutions'. In some instances, 'community' respondents reported that the police appeared that they simply did not want to be bothered with these matters. They usually argued that prostitution, drunkenness and drug dealing were simply 'there' as a fact in the area and part of its 'natural fabric' which
residents had to accept. A frequent recommendation by local officers to residents who complained about street ‘problem’ phenomena of such kinds and wanted to have them eliminated from their lives by the police was that they should ‘move away’. In short, the traditional local police of the ‘past’ was understood by and presented itself to the ‘community’ people surveyed as a ‘professional’ crime institution not concerned with social or issues they considered ‘non-crime’ or not to be crime-relevant, and the predominant approach was to legitimize their (in-)action or dis-engagement around these issues on the basis of their professional logic, ideology and self-understanding.

Some ‘community’ activists comment on the sample’s predominant perceptions of the attitudes and the image of the ‘pre-community policing’ police:

*Before community policing came in, the police were around. There has always been criminal activities going on in our neighborhood, and the police have been around. But most of what they did was patrolling. They never talked to people. [...] I think for a long period of time, the police were just getting into their cruisers and were not interacting with the community anymore. They were not getting involved with community. There were only a couple of community contact officers, but the big bulk of the other officers were not involved with the community. And nine times out of ten when they were meeting with people in the community, they were arresting them. And the next time you saw [person X] walking down the street, he was still somebody they saw as an offender who they had arrested a while ago. So the only people the officer could name were the ones he had arrested before. That makes for alienation. [Comm01]*

*The traditional police response was, oh well, the neighborhood - the officers of course all lived out in [suburb of The City] or whatever. One of them told me, I would not let my girlfriend walk around down here, or I would not live down here myself. That was pretty well the attitude. They did not worry about prostitutes or drug dealers. Another thing that they said was, oh, what can we really do when we see a hooker or a drug dealer, because we don’t have the law that allows us just to arrest them. And that was true, they did not have much support from the legal side and they did not get bugged by us, so they said, oh, it’s just the neighborhood. And then, of course, things didn’t really get drastically bad until six years ago or so, and then everybody in the community came out and said we can’t tolerate this any longer, we need to clean this up. [Comm04]*

*The traditional response by the police used to be ‘you chose to move here, it is your problem’. Traditionally this has been an area with certain problems on the streets for the past 75 years, and unfortunately you have a lot of officers in the division who really did not care. I mean, the officers would do their crime work, like when you had a break and enter, they would come here, but if they saw people on the street dealing dope or hookers, they would just drive on by. They just really did not care. ‘You live here, that is your problem’ was the attitude. And we still have many officers who say that. But we got a lot who don’t say that anymore. You still tried to call them and say hey, what can we do about this. And the odd time they would come by and talk to you, but they would always tell you the same story, well, we can’t do anything. It was taken as a given. You live in this neighbourhood, you have to live with it. If you don’t like it, why don’t you move to [suburb of The City]. Prostitution or street drugs were never a priority for them. They did not even bother. [Comm07]*
Until the new commander came in, the police’s response to prostitution and drug dealing was simply no response. The only response that we could get was, when we called the general number, they may send a car around. And I guess that we realized this problem when we had the street directions changed, and we were told that the police would be enforcing it and try to discourage the sex trade taking place, and we realized there was just no, absolutely no response. I mean, as far as meetings were concerned where we wanted to discuss these issues, you would maybe get the commander to a meeting, and he would have to leave after a few minutes because they were doing some undercover thing. But, I would say, zero response. [Comm10]

One of the ‘community’ respondents confirms the prior assessments of a locally and socially disinterested, disengaged and distanced police of the ‘past’. S/he furthermore suggests that ‘police’ was perceived basically as not being an element of ‘social life’ and processes of the local area, that the police simply were not visible, or seen as an integral player or interested ‘stakeholder’ in the local social environment:

The police response was fairly poor, if not non-existent. There was no meetings with the police. I never saw any police around here, never saw a cop. When my neighbors told me that they had called the police because of a break-in or something, if they came around at all, they came around a couple of hours after the fact, and I don’t think they were very serious about our matters of concern. Oh, somebody broke into your home, well, that happens, you live in downtown [of the city where research was conducted], that’s unfortunate. Almost an attitude, oh, you chose to live downtown, these are the consequences, too bad. So when I moved in here, I had to realize that policing down here was not serious, and hardly existed. Their approach to prostitution and drugs was tolerance and acceptance. In fact, the few officers that I spoke to, they were like, well, it’s downtown, that is part of the story. If you don’t like it, you really should move. You know. [Comm11]

Another ‘community’ activist elaborated on the largely unsuccessful efforts and processes of how, prior to ‘community policing’ the ‘community’ forces made painstaking efforts to render the police interested and involved in the seeming ‘non-policing’ matters that were obviously a concern to ‘community’ but not to the police as it stood and acted then:

At first the police did not want to know anything about us, or the street problems we were dealing with. ‘We can’t do anything about this, the laws are written that way, dadadadada’. There was all the usual mumbojumbo. The usual rhetoric from the police, they did not want to know anything about it. But we made it their problem. We attempted to bring them in, they did not want to come in, so we made them come in. Through a tactic which happened to work very effectively. We mobilized the local people in that the organization was propelled by the people who were most impacted by what was happening on the streets. Because people were not feeling safe, they were feeling that they were losing their community, that it was not their community anymore. And they had no intention of moving. So people did, but the majority did not want to. It was our community. [...] Police were pretty much ignoring the problem. They always said, there
is nothing we can do. But we said, you can talk to the hookers, and while you are talking to the hookers, they can't be doing any business, and eventually, if that happens often enough, they will decide to go somewhere else because they depend on doing business. Well, we don't have the personnel to do that, always was the backup response. And initially, I think they were as confused about the issue of how to deal with the drugs as we were, because we did not know how the operations functioned. We were finding it in rooming houses, in restaurants, on street corners, in bars, in back yards and alleys, all of a sudden, it was embedded everywhere. And the police were really confused about how to deal with it, and the politicians had no idea. How do you as a community respond to drugs? We did not know it at that time and neither did the police. [Comm08]

Crime and safety effects of ‘community policing’: Temporary, spatial, ambivalent

The ‘community’ activists surveyed in this study presented considerable differences in their assessment of the effects of ‘community policing’ efforts on the general crime and safety situation in their area, and in examination of its effects on the predominant ‘community’ street problems of prostitution, drug dealing and other forms of disorder. None of the ‘community’ respondents in an explicit fashion actually stated that problems had been consistently or fundamentally ‘solved’ or eliminated since ‘community policing’ had been introduced with the local police division. The majority of respondents pointed, at best, to locally specific, temporary or ambivalent improvements. Some pointed out that, due to the intensified ‘community policing’ efforts, there was a somewhat lesser prevalence of prostitution or drug dealing on their streets. However, in the majority of cases, ‘community’ people suggested that such alleviation in their local ‘crime’ and ‘safety’ situation was usually temporary in the sense that the drug dealers and prostitutes would usually leave the area after some form of more intense police action in form of a ‘blitz’ or a ‘sweep’. Then, so it was suggested frequently, things after a shorter or longer while would go back to ‘normal’ again. Others elaborated that the policing efforts had made their particular street or ‘neighbourhood’ area much quieter and less frequented, but that at the same time they were able to witness that the dealer or prostitution ‘scene’ had moved to or materialized just around the next corner, across the street or back in the alleyways. Such comments, in many instances, thus indicated a clear displacement effect of ‘community policing’ efforts on the lamented ‘disorder’ phenomena, rather than a true solution of the problems. Other ‘community’ respondents also pointed to the seasonal fluctuations in terms of the observed prevalence of street disorder. One of them proposed that “the elements are our best police force” in that cold temperatures in the winter season usually reduced ‘street problem’ prevalence considerably.

A few ‘community’ respondents expressed hope that further, more determined and more
long-term ‘community policing’ efforts would further reduce the prevalence of street problems targeted. The majority of them, however, did not expect such a full scale ‘problem solution’, but rather conceded the more likely scenario that these street phenomena were deeply embedded and engrained in the area, and could not effectively be further dismantled or reduced by the police. Rather, their hopeful assessment of the situation was that the police would be able to ‘manage’ and ‘control’ what ‘disorder’ forces and activities were present and active in the area, and drive for or utilize their resources, at least, for local or temporary changes. Many of the ‘community’ respondents, in fact, understood the role of their ‘community’ organizations as making concentrated and cooperative efforts to ensure that exactly such pointed or specific approaches or interventions on the side of the police would occur to their ‘community’s’ benefit, its specific agenda and interests (and not so much to the benefit, for example, of the neighbouring ‘community’ area - an effect which might just increase their own ‘problems’). There was also ambiguity among the ‘community’ respondents in terms of how they perceived changes over time with respect to the chance of them becoming victimized by a crime in their local area. About half the sample stated that this chance, in their view, had declined somewhat over the past year; the remainder felt that it had stayed the same.

Some ‘community’ respondents representatively elaborate on these issues.

A lot of things have changed in the last three years. I would say that the prostitution problem probably has gone down in this area. Crack dealing is up, it is more prevalent, more obvious, they are more blatant. They will just do it, stand right in front of you, and carry out a deal. The other problem that I would say is big is break-ins of cars and residences. In my opinion, that is related to the drugs. They need the money to buy the drugs. [...] I think, overall, things are getting bad again. We had some successes in closing down some of the bad spots, and the police were quite instrumental in doing that, like closing the bars down. But things are starting to heat up again. And the problem might be that they don't know what the answer is anymore. They are running out of ideas, but of course they are not admitting that. But they look very frustrated and disillusioned to me. The commander recently said at one of the meetings, 'I am not saying that we are going to see the end of this completely, but what I am saying is that the quality of life down here will be very, very different'. But he said that it can't be cleaned up completely. You see, when you got places like the [A area] and the [B area] which are a magnet for these people, most of whom are from out of town, it is a massive problem. I mean, one of the objectives should be to just keep the problems within the territories of these housing projects. [Comm03]

The number of prostitution or drug problems may have changed a bit here and there, but I think that it just gets pushed from one place to another. When one group complains, they push it out of their area, and it just goes to another corner. So overall, I don't think that the problem has shrunk in size, it just has become fragmented and pushed around. And I don't think that the police are really able to do anything or solve it. If we got more officers, maybe it could get a bit better. Community policing is a good idea, but
they don't have enough men or the concept to even make a dent. Again, it is a social service, a social planning problem. There is too much reason for outsiders to hang out here, and that is for the government to resolve. If you don't live or belong here, get out, and stay out. If one of us gets shot, maybe one of them will wake up finally. And this is our main complaint: Why do we have to do this sort of thing, why do we have to get ourselves in such danger, why do we have to be community police and clean up the crime that is actually the police and the government's job? But you would need at least 200 more officers to clean up the area. [Comm06]

What has gotten better in the last few weeks, we have seen less dealers in this immediate area, because we have made it a safer and brighter area. There is also more normal people out there. Unfortunately, we can't do anything about the hookers. That seems to be an unsolvable problem for both the police and us, all across the division. But we have seen less dealers. I am not sure where they have gone. Probably just down the street. They are still out there somewhere. We had this one dealer, we used to call him [Alpha]. We had not seen him for the longest time. But a few days ago, who crossed the street right in front of my eyes - [Alpha]. So he's back, but he's not dealing in the park. So our efforts have worked at least to a certain extent. [...] The police do their hooker sweeps once in a while, where they clean everything up, or rather move everybody away for a week or ten days, and then after the ten days, everybody is back, and everything starts from scratch. And then they say, well, we can't do sweeps all the time. Well, they don't do any good if you don't keep doing them. It is like computer skills, you have to keep working on them, otherwise you lose them. It is simple logic. You have to keep it at it, otherwise it is going to come back. Then, the idea was, let's clean up the area before the summer comes. That was fine, but once it was over, everything was back to the same old after ten days. The bad guys know what they were doing. They are not stupid. So it works for the time being. So if you don't have the police out there, visible, massively, all the time, they are going to come back. And they do. [Comm07]

I would say the quality of life has improved somewhat, it still got a long, long way to go. The problems are not as bad anymore, but they still exist. For example, our streets were overrun by prostitutes, and now you may only see five or six on a good day. Before, women were afraid to walk after 6 at night. Now women can go out again at night without being propositioned all the time. All these people try to be inconspicuous in their activities, and they start running as soon as they see us or the police coming. But on a broader scale, if we put a blitz on them and try to improve the situation, and we shift them. They might go over to the [Y neighbourhood], or South to [Z area] or to the [V area]. You know, when you really put a push on them, the other associations get mad at you, because you have shifted the problem into their streets, alleys and backyards. Then you say, well, is it solving the problem, probably not, but you enjoy the peace while you get it. Has it driven them into the backyards and lots, no, I don't think so. They were always there anyway. You just haven't noticed them that much. [Comm12]

In this context of their perceptions of the local 'crime' and 'safety' situation and its changes in the wake of 'community policing' in their areas, a couple of 'community' respondents pointed to an interesting issue that might aptly be called the 'iatrogenic effects' of 'community policing' efforts and its institutional and social environments. These people directed attention to the possibility that it may not be so much that the nature or prevalence of 'crime' or 'safety' problems had increased or decreased through 'community policing'. Rather, it was suggested that all the information, discussions, meetings and activities around 'crime' and 'safety' 'community'
people were now exposed to, engaged and involved in, in fact, made them know, think about and fear crime and threats to safety and security that they previously were rather indifferent to, unaware of or not much concerned about. In other words, for these respondents ‘community policing’ and all the wealth of related activities, meetings and discussions presented a basic constitutive ‘criminogenic’ effect on people, in that ‘crime’ themes, thoughts and talk became a part of their lives and the proclaimed reassuring, comforting and fear-reducing effects of ‘community policing’ may be considerably undermined in this way. ‘Community policing’ and all the local and social activities around it may ‘produce’ as much crime and safety concerns as they prevent and eliminate in the social and symbolic world, especially on the levels of perception, awareness and interaction (see also Bennett 1989, for similar conclusions).

The following ‘community’ people’s comments reflect on these processes pointed to by a number of their peers:

_I think in the short time that I have been involved, I think it works, to a certain extent at least. We’ve seen a bit of a drop in the prevalence of some problems and nuisances, break-ins, prostitution and the drug trade has definitely decreased. This community in general, and other communities, seem to like it. [...] The prevalence of crime in general, I am not sure if that has changed here. I am not too worried about that anyway. I don’t think that I am less fearful, or that the chances of me getting robbed are significantly lower than before. Although, I don’t have a great fear of that anyway. It probably hasn’t changed. Not for me. I think it has gotten worse for most of my neighbors, but I think this is a subjective thing. The reason is that, when you get involved with police activity, and most people are to a much higher degree than before, you find that you get more information. People are more informed about crime and all that is going on, some people feel better as a result, others just start to panic and get all the more worried. People now have more of a web, you hear about more incidents that you never heard about before. I mean, they happened all along, but you just never heard about them. So I think, in general, many people think it’s getting worse._ [Comm11]

_When I first moved into the area, I was aware that supposedly there were a lot of prostitutes around here, but I did not know anything about drug dealing at all. And it’s only that I got involved with the community group that I became very aware of the other problems, the drug dealing. So I think I got involved more because I wanted to be a good neighbor and community member, and when people called to see if I was interested in doing something, I got to know more about it. I think I’ve been aware that there was prostitution, but only about 2 or 3 years ago I started to notice the drug dealing in the Park._ [Comm09]

There were also considerable differences between the ‘community’ respondents’ perceptions with regards to the actual operational activities and strategies of the ‘community police’ officers, the work they actually engaged in and the officers’ ‘problem’ and work focus in the local areas of assignment. The majority of the ‘community’ people pointed out that they saw
their ‘community’ officers only sporadically, infrequently and inconsistently. Some reported sightings once or twice a week, others said that they frequently go for a month or two without seeing them. The majority did not feel in a position to precisely estimate how much time ‘their’ ‘community police’ officers actually spent in the local area; some thought they spent all of their work day doing work in the area, others thought that they “only came by” their local assignment area once or twice a day. There was a strong impression, however, that the CRU officers spent considerably more attention on street or ‘disorder’ problems like drug dealing, prostitution, vagrants, drunks, than had the division’s patrol officers prior to the existence of the CRU, or than did their colleagues in the squad cars. However, the ‘community’ residents felt unable to assert or confirm if these street or disorder issues constituted the main focus of the ‘community police’ officers’ work, or what else the ‘community police’ work priorities were in operational reality.

In fact, the ‘community’ sample, to a large extent, felt rather uninformed and in informational limbo about what the CRU officers - who were aggressively portrayed by the division as ‘the community’s officers’ - were actually working and spending their time on. ‘Community’ people also seemed to be unclear about what approaches or strategies the ‘community police’ officers put into place to deal with the above mentioned ‘street and disorder problem’ phenomena or people. Some perceived them to be active and concentrating on arresting people involved in these issues - as in the form of prostitution sweeps - while others saw the officers primarily talking to, investigating and warning the disorderly, and trying to pragmatically move them out of the area. There seemed a general consensus among the ‘community’ respondents that the ‘community police’ work, in its perceived spotty appearance, primarily aimed at removing or ‘pushing’ street problem people out of the local areas, although the real and long-term effects of these efforts were frequently called into question. There was, however, also a strong sense of scepticism among many ‘community’ respondents with regards to the understanding of the new ‘community policing’ concept and its principles as it had become ubiquitously proclaimed via the division’s CRU, the ways and practices in which it was actually translated into local police work, and the overall coherence, coordination and consistency of ‘community police’ work as provided by the local division.

In the following quotes, ‘community’ representatives elaborate on their perceptions of differences between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ police, as well as on the discrepancies they perceived between the ‘talk’ of ‘community police’ and ‘action’.
The biggest change with police here in the last couple of years, and that may just be my ignorance, the visibility of the foot patrol. As I said I had never seen a cop here, and my biggest joke was, we should put a donut shop here to see some cops. Now I see them all the time. My neighbours see them all the time. I chat with them. Big difference. But I think the foot patrol is the big difference, they come to our meetings. They are definitely more responsive than even a year ago. Even a year ago, it was the typical police attitude where they said, yeah call it in, call it in, we need to know, the same old verbiage over and over again. Now that seems a bit different. Now they write it down, they ask you more questions, they will follow up, you actually see some results, like they shut down two crack houses which we think is just unbelievable. I never thought in my wildest dreams I could say to a cop, there is a crack house over there, and within one month’s time, the people are evicted. [...] So there is a big difference, [99 Division] taking us seriously now. Before, they did not take us seriously, but now I think they actually listen to what we have to say. [...] From what they tell us and what we see, all they really do is to try and annoy people. People that they think are involved in activities that are not to the benefit of our community. They annoy the prostitutes, the pimps, the dealers and the johns. They have done many hookers sweeps with undercover officers, where they come into our community and arrest everybody, it seems. What good that does, I don’t know, but it is annoying to the people. And the only tool that we’ve seen that works is annoying the hell out of people. I think they have to focus on annoying people, because they can’t arrest people, because the vast majority they can’t arrest at all. I mean we pointed out thousands of hookers at the corner, or people with drug paraphernalia on them to the police. But of course, the law does not make that illegal technically, so they can’t arrest them. So they have to do something else. They annoy them. It’s pure annoyance. That is what I see them doing. It is reasonably effective, I mean not to the extent that we would like to see, but definitely a noticeable difference. You could not move when I first moved here, and now you sort of have to look for it. And it’s gone more to the daytime. [...] But I think they still do mostly what they think they should do and how they think they should do it. However, the portion of information from us that they take into account in their policing is much greater than it used to be. Before, it was more like, I will listen what you have to say because this is what the commander told me to do, and now they really take it into consideration. So their attitude has changed, and when we are at the meetings and we ask them questions, they have to respond in a reasonable time frame and with legitimate answers, and in most instances they do. [...] But I don’t think that there is a clear or consistent concept of what community policing is with the officers in the division. It obviously takes a long time for the necessary cultural change to happen in the organization. And community policing has only been around a for a few years, and it has really only been seriously looked at when the new commander came in. The previous chief just talked about it, but he wasn’t serious about it. So now, it is going to take a while to sink in. I think most of the officers and sergeants are serious about it, either that or just repeating the verbiage. But the people we deal with in the CRU, they really seem to believe it. But when you get to the rest of the police in the division, it is a real mix. We have been dealing with a few other officers, some on foot, some on the cars, where we get some of the old answers. And it pisses me off, there is this one new guy, who says this is just the way things are, and there is nothing we can do. Well, wrong answer. Wrong answer. Even if you really can’t do anything about, this is the wrong answer. Because if you are with a community organization, you should at least give the impression that you care. And although that is a platitude, there is nothing worse than being at a meeting and giving the impression that things look gloomy. Everybody knows that the officers in the cars, that is the group that you will have the biggest problems with. It is a different breed of cops, it is unbelievable. We had more negative encounters with cops in cars, it is incredible. We go on the walks, we stop and try to talk to them, they have no time for us. One of them actually told us, don’t you have anything to do with your lives, another one swore at us, get the fuck away, it is none of your business what I am doing here. Just unbelievable. They do not think that they have to interact with the public, in any sense. We are trying to acknowledge to the police that we are here, and most times they don’t slow down, they don’t acknowledge us at all. Even the police themselves will tell you, the cops in cars are a problem. The majority of our interactions with them have been bad. [...] I used to have a very negative view of the police, and it is slowly being changed now since I’ve lived here, mostly through the two officers and the sergeant that I am

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dealing with here. They follow up, at least these do. I almost saw our two foot officers as social workers. The new ones however, they are cops. It is very clear to you that they think they are cops, and do not want to do anything that is not cop-related. Whereas officers [Alpha and Beta], they had meetings with [the owner of a local bar], and talked to neighbours, and took unconventional approaches. Everybody knew them. It was almost like a 50s movie, where the cop is at the core of the community. The other guys want to do police work, and police work only, and will tell you immediately, can’t do anything about this, can’t do anything about that. Prostitution is not illegal. They are giving the wrong answers. If that continues, we will have to back out, and they don’t need to come to our meetings anymore. We got a good relationship with the police now, and we don’t want to mess it up by one stupid team of cops. It may lead to a breakdown of relations. The way we see to get around that is, there is a new community sergeant, real eager beaver who wants to do good community police work. He has committed to giving us another cop who is as good as our previous ones, and we will see if that is the case. And maybe it will bring the others on board. If it doesn’t, we are going to have a problem.

They say they are working on the drugs and prostitution, they say they are, but I am not sure. I mean, it is better, but I am not sure if the police is the reason or what it is. They got the [X bar] closed down, there is less drug dealing in the park, you see officers on foot and on bikes occasionally. People contact the police a lot more and tell what is going on, at least some of us. But I specifically have no precise idea what our officers are working on or what they do all day. They don’t tell us much. We have asked them to tell us more, and we are trying to work on that, you know, what the ongoing concerns and projects are, but we haven’t found out much. We met them for breakfast a couple of times. Our big concern is always, you don’t communicate with us. We call you, you don’t call us back. It has improved a bit, they try at least. I think they have an awful lot of un-learning to do, from the times when they did not tell the community what they do. The years and years of having no contact with the community, to suddenly being buddies with the community. Boy, that’s a big change, and I am not sure if it’s going so well. Just think of the selection criteria a few years back. They were very different, and these are the officers that we are dealing with now. They were selected for their ability to enforce the law, and not for their social skills, I guess.

They do a lot of patrolling, it seems. They do the spot-checks, they are trying to use the mobile units. Otherwise, they just walk around the neighbourhood. I think they mostly rely on their presence, talk to people, investigate them maybe, and try to talk them or softly coerce them out of the neighbourhood. They don’t make too many arrests, as far as I can tell. I know that last night, they made an arrest. They mostly try to just get hookers and dealers out of the area. They also closed down a couple of drug dealing establishments. They closed down the [Y establishment], and I don’t know how they did it. The other one was the I bar, and that got closed because they had not paid their rent, so they convinced the landlord to kick them out. But I am not sure how the police worked all that out. [...] The police don’t know what community policing means and what it is all about, I think. The commander does, and a few officers do, maybe. I think it is seen by them as sort of an extension of customer service, talking to people about problems in the community. They used to do that, but with the cars, and the urban sprawl and all that stuff, that got lost. And they looked at the downtown and just saw it as the place where the scum and the problem people concentrate, and you just try and contain it there. That’s how the police understands it, and that is how they’ve been trained. But all that has changed, at least on the community side. There is different people now living downtown. So community policing should be working with the community, to sit down with them and figure out what the concerns are, to actually sit down and listen to them and see what they want, and implement the solutions. I don’t think that there is much magic to community policing. It is nothing more than what they should be doing as their job, which is, they are policing various communities in the downtown area. Why don’t you go into the community, figure out what the problems are, and listen to the suggestions of how to deal with them? It is basically just a popular name for good police work. [...] Limiting my comments to the two officers we have and one of the sergeants, they are pretty good, I know that they are trying their best. I would not fail them, I mean they are doing some stuff.
I would probably give them a D plus. I think that would be fair. There is absolutely no structure in the organization. Like, I work in a client oriented business. There is a reception, there is voice mail, somebody takes a message, calls are returned. There is a basic structure. We work with people on things, we listen to people. That is not there with the police, it is not there from the people who are supposed to be organizing the CRU office. I mean, it is just not possible that there isn’t anybody responsible for six days. All these things. They took us up to show us the radio room the other day. I mean, why? You feel like a little child when they show you their toys. That is not what you want them to be doing. Or, we have a breakfast, and they give us a pin. That’s not really what we want. We want to work with them and solve the problems we have in the neighbourhood, that’s what we want to do. They go on courses all the time, but they have not been able to organize or structure a way to work and do policing with their neighbourhoods. They can go and decide, this week we will do a sweep on [Z street]. They do that excellently. But they can’t figure out that when a neighbourhood has a continuing problem, this is what the problem is, this is what the neighbours want, these are means and ways that we will put in place to deal with things, and coordinate the resources and assistance that they get from the community. There is no structure, and we get the feeling that everything gets lost. No way of really contacting or organizing. It wouldn’t be that hard to do, but it isn’t set up. The problem is, the police for the longest time was just their own master, they decided by themselves what was important and what to do about things. That mindset has not changed. They just don’t know what to do. They don’t have a concept. You’d have to put in a framework, and get new people. You need people who are able to coordinate and organize things. This has a long way to go, if it ever happens. [Comm10]

Another ‘community’ resident elaborated in detail on perceptions of ‘community policing’ being a predominantly inconsistent, incoherent and uncoordinated organizational and operational enterprise. The ‘community police’ work to some of the ‘community’ people surveyed appeared not to be providing much clarity in terms of what its overall approaches and strategies should look like in theory and practice. This perceived state of ambiguity and confusion also led one of the respondents to the conclusion that instead of one large coherent organizational and operational strategy, ‘community policing’ appears as a sporadic, accidental and uncoordinated assembly of police work, isolated initiatives and response ‘fragments’ that obviously do not trigger much confidence with their ‘community’ ‘customers’ and subjects:

We keep the police informed all the time. We call them. It is nothing unusual that all the [X people] call them as often as three or four times a week. I call them as often as every day over a longer period of time. I just call them until they call me back. An example. On Saturday, I am walking to the grocery store across the street. I see two hookers sitting in the alcove which we stare off across the street constantly. We have taken their pictures. As we are walking up. We are being verbally abused and physically threatened. So we thought, that is enough, we go and phone the radio room. But because it is priority response, you are all the way down in terms of priority of your car. It ends up that at the end of the day, an officer calls me back and leaves me a message saying that I called about a hooker problem. Well I did not call about a hooker problem. I called about abuse and threats. But he did not leave me his name, not the batch number or anything. Now who am I supposed to call back and speak about that? So I call the staff sergeant who says, ‘oh yeah, sorry about that’. So we call all the time, and I know for a fact that a lot of people do, but the response is lousy, it is unstructured, not organized, and certainly not effective. And then, most of the time,
you get the same song. I call it the ‘tap-dance’. ‘Well, we can only do this, this and this. Limited time and resources, but please call and tell us, everything, all the time’. Well, I can call until I am blue in the face, but what is it good for if they can’t come and deal with it. And they can’t. I mean, you can have the hookers sitting right on [Y street], and they drive right on by. They could care less. And it’s gotten to the point where it is very frustrating. Though I want to work with them, it would be nice sometimes if just once in a while when you really have something happening. It can’t be that every single car is busy all the time. I mean - short staffed all the time? That can’t be.[...] They don’t arrest hookers. They just talk to them and try to move them out. They can’t arrest them unless they catch them right in the act, and that occurs only in the rarest of instances. And because the dealers know who they are, this is virtually impossible. What they can do about the hookers, they can move them on, and in some instances give them a fine or arrest the ones that have boundaries, then they can do more. But to tell you the truth, I don’t exactly know what they do with their days. They talk to people, they may investigate things, whatever. They tell you that when they make arrests they are in the office doing paperwork for half a day.[...] There is many sides of community policing that are a big secret, especially what they do and work all the time, unless they come to your meeting, or they come to your house to discuss something I can honestly say that I don’t see them. I don’t see two teams that are fully working our area, there is no way that this is happening. They are probably here occasionally, but there is no way that there are two teams assigned to this neighborhood full time. Where would they be all the time? But then, they also have so much other administrative stuff to do that they could probably keep themselves busy with that all day. Like, I don’t understand how you can even think to run a CRU office without somebody doing the paperwork and organizing them. That is insane. There is nobody. So if you don’t get to the person directly that you want to call, you won’t get anywhere. Because nobody picks up for the next person. Like when the officers go on their days off. ‘Sorry, but we won’t be here for the next 7 days’. - ‘Well, who is going to work on my problems?’ - ‘I don’t know, I just know that I won’t be here for the next week. I guess your problem has to wait. Call 911 if it gets bad’. [...] I guess there has been some change in that the sergeants and staff seem to be a little bit more responsive to the community. They come to meetings, they talk to you, they are friendly. I just don’t know if we are getting good or better policing out of all this, I find it hard to believe. Because one of the biggest problems that I see is that you got the CRU and then the rest of the division. They are like night and day, one does not talk to the other. So if there is in fact a problem, OK, the CRU knows about, but they don’t tell the guys in the cars. So you don’t have a total or coherent program here, you have fragments. That’s not going to work. I am sure the guys in the cars are catching bad guys and stuff, but they don’t talk to each other it seems. It can’t be that I happen to talk to an officer in the car, and he has never heard about drug dealing going on in my park. Why do I have to explain this to him? It’s been explained to the CRU for the last two years. Shouldn’t there be some communication internally? [Comm06]

The real effects of ‘community police’: ‘Policeable communities’, a ‘re-socialized police’

However, in light of the fact of the divided judgments expressed by the ‘community’ representatives about the actual work, impact and cohesion of ‘community police’ work activities in their local areas, a rather different but fundamentally important line of ‘success’ or ‘effectiveness’ of ‘community policing’ was pointed out. There was much reference to and a sense of consensus within the ‘community’ sample about the fact that the big change and difference brought by ‘community police’ work was that the local division’s CRU and its officers now provided ‘community’ with a more available, approachable and accessible element of police in an institutional, operational and social sense. The ‘community police’ officers in contemporary
contexts seemed interested in communicating with the ‘community’ about the crime and safety concerns they had, offering their advice, responses or action instead of brushing things off or ignoring them as they used to. They were perceived by the ‘community’ people as finally “doing something” about the specific street and ‘disorder’ matters that bothered most of these particular residents, communicating and appearing to be ‘concerned about problem issues’ and were thus seen as finally “taking ownership” in the local area and its pressing issues of concern.

Some described the ‘community’ police as now presenting themselves and acting as local and social “stakeholders”. ‘Community’ respondents portrayed them as now being a “part of the community” or as being “interested in the community”, as expressed by their presence, their visibility, and the fact that “you can approach them and talk to them”. The police, via the CRU officers, were now perceived as being friendly, involved and caring, somebody that the “community can trust”, engaged and interested in all kinds of local and social issues, as opposed to an alien, cool and disinterested authoritative institution “out of touch with community needs” [Fieldnotes]. It is quite notable, however, how strictly most of the respondents distinguish this ‘new police’ to be limited to the ‘community police’ institutional unit and its personnel, and explicitly not to the remaining other parts of the police division. Nevertheless, the symbolic emergence of ‘community police’ in the divisional context, although limited to the specific and narrow element of the institution carrying the ‘community policing’ banner, has built an organizational bridge, a mutual identification and an operational and symbolic link between select local social entities and the police that had not existed before.

The police are now taken to be ‘human’, to be ‘personable’, to be ‘friends’. Some ‘community’ people suggested that there was a sense now that “we understand the police and the police understand us”, that “we help the police in their work and they help us with our concerns” [Comm06]. Thus, a perception evolved among ‘community’ representatives of a pragmatic ‘partnership’ between ‘community’ and police that some of them even interpreted as both sides now being ‘peers’ or ‘equals’ jointly engaged in the projects and challenges of ‘community’ protection or building. Other ‘community’ people suggested that the ‘community’ folk and environments strongly but comfortably were reminding the ‘community police’ officers of their own private lives, aspirations and concerns, and thus made it easier and more appealing for them to identify with ‘community’, its people and its goals. As the research data suggest, in the organizational, operational and symbolic constructs of ‘community policing’ the ‘community’
perceived and feels that it is being taken seriously, listened to, responded to, and cared for and that their concerns are being given the police attention they need and expect. In turn, they are willing to provide the ‘friendly’ police with leads, support, information, and ‘legwork’. The ‘community police’, it appears from the majority of statements, have won the ‘community’s’ respect, and most respondents are under the impression that this is a bilateral effect. ‘Community’ reckons that as they respect the police, the police have in turn come to respect them and take seriously, their values, concerns and objectives around local crime, disorder and ‘quality of life’.

In short, in spite of the above mentioned shortcomings and lack of consistent or clear functional effects of ‘community police’ work, there is substantial evidence that ‘community policing’ has effectively created - at least in the form of organized social entities of ‘community’ - a ‘policiable social world’ for its own purposes. In turn, the police have successfully ‘re-socialized’ themselves; they have re-established themselves as an integral, central ‘social’ element in the local ‘community’ talk, action, self-understanding and symbolism.

The following ‘community’ activists describe these issues from their points of view:

I think there is a big difference in what the officers do now, and how they work the streets. I think they are recognizing that there are people out there they can work with, rather than it is ‘us against the entire population’. I think it is no longer an ‘us versus them’ mentality. The other big difference is that they had come from a very militaristic attitude towards much more of a rapport and cooperation with the community. I think they put much more of a human face to how they are policing us now. The cops are out of the cars now. That has made a big difference. They are handpicked, who’s out of the car, for certain reasons. There is a difference like day and night. They get out, and they seem more approachable. They speak to you, a lot of them know us by names, we have their cards. I see them today a lot like they used to be when I was growing up in the UK. We knew them, we talked to them, they were friends. [...] In community policing, they are reaching out as much as possible to involve the people who live in the Division. They have made a substantial effort to do this, and that their policing should be primarily done for the people who are scared of things and concerned about things going on down here, like the dealers and the hookers. And they’ve been quite successful to a great extent. The officers have been encouraged to go out on the beat, make themselves known, go into businesses. And that is what they are doing. Of course, they are not all community minded. There is still a lot of the old school, and officers who don’t have any time for community policing. But the ones that are dealing with us, they are very open. They come to our meetings, at least once a month, and as far as we can say they are as open as they can be. And for the most part, we are able to get in touch with them. You can even get in touch with the commander - now that is unheard of down here. A couple of years ago, it would have to be something terribly important to be able to get in touch with the unit commander. But you can call him and talk to him. Or any of the other supervisors. [...] I look to them more as being stakeholders, rather than somebody who is here just eight hours a day or five days a week, and then goes away. I look to them that this is part of their life, part of them. So what goes on around here affects them as it affects us. They care more about what is happening. They take a more active role, an ownership kind of role. I want them to take ownership in the community. They have made different promises. Before, it would be ‘leave us alone, and we will take care of the problem for you’, now some of the promises are ‘we want to work with you, we want to involve you, we
want to care about what is happening in the community, we are part of the community’. [Comm02]

We now have the foot patrol and the guys on bikes who do a lot of patrolling in teams. Their idea is to show the toughs, the drug dealers, that they are there. It is a demonstration of 'presence', this is what the foot patrol is mainly for. They can’t really run after criminals. But they are there in the neighborhood, they make us feel good. The residents and the store owners see them. The dry-cleaning guy said the other day, oh, have you seen all these cops. They frisked somebody when they walked by the cleaners, and people were, oh, this is great. We’ve had all kinds of cops that were introduced at our meetings, and we write all their names down, we know them all. And when we phone, we never call 911, because it is never an emergency, it is just all these annoying things, little nuisances. So, then we know who to ask for, they have voice mail now, and they promise to get back to you. So you don’t have to deal with the sergeant at the desk anymore who says, oh, well, you know, this neighborhood. And you got nowhere. We don’t deal with the ordinary cop anymore. You just ask for community response. So they come out, they take information, and the neighbors are loving it. The main differences are presence and visibility, and they are much more available and accessible. They are also much more personable, and I think they have been told to be more friendly and caring. We are also getting a lot of younger cops who have a different attitude. They are keen to work in the neighborhood, they know the problems, they want to speak to us, where the hotspots are. They don’t have that cynical attitude that the older cops have, oh well, what can you do. [...] The police and the community meet and work together as often as possible, and the cooperation evolves from there, so when a problem issue comes up, we can sit together and say, what can we do. And the cops say, you can help by doing this, and we would say, you can help by doing that. When we had that prostitution problem with that one hooker who had boundaries but kept coming back in, we stuck our heads together and solved it jointly. It’s hard to tell what problems will be in the future, but we need to keep this new contact, so when new things come up. [...] The commander] is a very diplomatic, well-spoken, educated man. A different kind of cop. Like the community response guys, they are a different breed of police officers. Nice to talk to, they speak well, they are charming. We don’t want to speak to the regular guys anymore, we just want the CRU officers. They have been chosen for that work. [Comm04]

We now understand the police’s problems and how they think, and appreciate that. We had a very negative attitude towards the police before, because we thought they weren’t doing their job. Especially when it came to responses. [...] As far as having the CRU police, that was a big step for the police in the right direction, because when they were in the cars before, they had a big attitude, and we’ve said that right to the police. [...] The police now look at us as people. I think a lot of it is that they used to see us as part of the riffraff around the neighborhood, they never had an opportunity other than the situation of an emergency call. People in this area, which is obviously a low income neighborhood, were always very hesitant about making contact with the police. Years ago, when the police walked the beat, I remember them walking the street and stopping and saying hello and all that kind of stuff. But then all that, that type of policing, completely disappeared. I would say, since the foot patrol came in, them coming to our meetings, and we don’t have a meeting without them. They always come in, give a report, tell us what they are doing, what they are doing about things, that opened a lot of people’s eyes. Now they also talk to you. The only time before when you would call the police would be in an emergency. You would only talk to them if something had happened that affected you directly, if they even showed up. And it was like, here we are, what is your problem, dadada, good bye, and we would not even know their name. Now it’s like, ‘our names are [Officers Alpha and Beta], we are here as your foot patrol, what can we do for you, any problems in the neighborhood, if yes, please let us know, and we will get back to you.’ And you would have a face, a name and a contact. And it opened the doors all around for the whole station. [...] It’s very good compared to how it was. People don’t hate police anymore. As I said, I grew up in this area, and it is almost incredible to see police say hi to people, and to actually talk to people on the street. It is amusing. 180 degrees change. The problem now is with the cars. But overall, the police has become much more
approachable and accessible. You look at cars now and see if you know them, and wave or say hello. They toot the horns. They are part of the community now, and the more you do with them, the more that becomes reinforced. Like any sort of community. The more visible you are, the more responsive and integrated you are. [Comm06]

The community relationship with the police, it's now kind of like when you go to a bank, and you open an account and they hold your cheques for a while until they get to know you. The police have been amazing in our neighbourhood, they have been very forthcoming. Once a month, we have our safety meeting where we invite the police and the politicians to talk with us. The police come to know you personally. You sort of hold them accountable when they know you. When you're house is broken into, they are not breaking into [250 X street], but they are breaking into [Gamma's] house. Getting the police to come to the meetings has been really good. They have been very forthcoming about their phone numbers and other ways to contact them. They say, if you have a problem, phone me, this is my number. So I must have at least 30 different phone numbers for officers in my neighbourhood, and they know me and I know them. So it works really well, and it is very empowering. [...] I think for the most part the goals of the police and ours are neck and neck. They are supportive of all our activities, I would say. They even have a more compassionate view of the people. Our community groups' goals are pretty much the same, and we work hand in hand. I guess in a sense we are, I don't want to say pawns, but we are a really great source of information for the police. We have, for example, a really great relationship with the guy who runs the drug squad, and I can phone him up at any time, or page him and tell about a hot spot that is happening, and he will either investigate or pursue it. That is one of the many good new things. [...] The idea essentially was basically to take it back to the old days where you would know the cop on the beat because he was the Irish fellow that lived up the street, he walked his beat, and everybody knew him. That is just what they wanted. Our two neighbourhood officers are fabulous, and they do exactly that. They ride their bikes, everybody knows them, they stop and we talk on the street, they are just great guys. You come to know all the officers, and they come to know you, and what is great is that it makes a great symbiotic relationship. We help them and they help us, that is the way it works. [...] It is harder to get to know the guys in the cars. The police are more visible on a social level. They play ball, they come out to charity and stuff. So I think that is the main thing. They are trying to be more visible. [Comm12]

What is different about policing now? We now have people! People that we can contact directly, and there is a two way flow of information on all kinds of matters, that is totally different. We are now looking at things differently, looking at minor things, looking at structural things, trying to maintain order here rather than waiting for something to break loose and then letting them leap on it. There is, at the bottom of all of this, a perception that maintaining order is the police's job. It is up to them to see first what a problem is, or what might become one, and nip it in the bud. Traditionally, that has been and should be the police's thinking. You realize how far away from all that the 911 system had gone. The 911 system only works when you have a larger context where everything is under control, nothing ever happens and nothing has to be done, and the only thing you have to worry about is Mrs McCarthy's heart attack. Then that is fine. But urban realities are different. So we turn to what was even before the modern police, the nightwatchman, the twelve o'clock and all is well model. The watchman who walks the rounds, in walled cities, all the residents were walled in and the doors closed at five o'clock, and anyone else was on the outside and that was it. So I figure there is a return to fundamental practical realities on that. [...] The police now responds to the problems, which is a fabulous change. When I call in the description of some new hangers on the street, I usually don't see them again. I don't know what happened to them, but they are gone. Specifically, we have intensive contact with the plainclothes unit, about particularly obnoxious hookers here. We also have some who are dealers, disguised as hookers. So we call, dadadada, this is what is going on, these are the people, and we can be confident now that things get taken care of. [...] I've always been impressed with the dedication of the officers in [99 Division]. I have seen many young
officers come in, shiny eyes, believing in the thing that they were doing, determined to make the world a better place but many of them disappear again after a while, and I wonder, what turns them off of that, why do they give up? So maybe all this means a little more optimism for them too, and they sense that there is a possibility to make progress, some inroads against the scum they are dealing with every day? That we can take an edge off some that cynicism. Maybe a sense that things can change. Putting the police on the beat is a new thing, obviously, and everyone gets very possessive about their officers, and maybe hold the officers personally accountable to what is going on in the area, and that may be is a good thing too. [...] They are putting a lot more time and resources into this now, and it is a lot better, although we have miles to go yet. They have come a long way, and I think the patrol enjoys it more, it is a bit more of a challenge. And the other thing is, we are no longer just anonymous civilians. We are partners, members of the community along with them, fellow conspirators if you will, in the art of keeping the place nice. We are dealing more on an equal basis with things, and it used to be that you felt when you commented as a civilian, the reply was, ‘don’t say, do anything, don’t get involved. We are the professionals, you stay out of this’. And now there is more mutual respect, we do know what is going on around here because we happen to live here. We have a great idea, and they have a need for our information. Their respect for us as partners has grown, because they now understand that we are not as dumb as we look, and we see a lot that is going on. And I think there is also more of a desire to protect people who they know from things, because it may remind them of their home, their wife and their little kids who they want to keep as safe as possible. The sense used to be that there is a bad world out there, but they are leaving that far and safely behind themselves when they go to their homes and wives. So they also wanted us to be that way, ordinary, oblivious to anything they might see on the street, and I think this little illusion has been taken away, but then again because we are welcoming of them, communicative, helpful, supportive, kind of thing. So I have the feeling that we are looked at more as partners, human beings, equals. [Comm14]

One of the ‘community’ respondents, however, points to concerns that some of the relations between police and locals presenting themselves as ‘community’ in the local ‘community policing’ contexts have almost become too ‘social’, close and intimate. In essence, s/he is concerned the social entity of ‘community’ and the organizational entity of ‘police’, through the observed intense interactive dynamics of ‘community policing’, are losing the sense of a relationship of professional cooperation:

We have two major areas the we focus on in the [X neighbourhood] group. Policing and community development. Development is a big issue right now. Right now, things are pretty tight and good with the police. We have our walks and meetings, and things are going OK. We always want to increase our level of involvement and activities with the police, but the police have to be willing and forthcoming. They appear to be at the moment, and it is almost to the point where it is getting too social. Which bothers me a bit, because some of the people on our executive board have gotten incredibly social with the police. And then you get people like me, who don’t want to be social with them at all. We’re business partners, that’s how I see it, we should have a professional relationship, not more and not less, and let’s keep it that way. Do the private stuff on your own time, we are here for a reason. There is only so far we should go with that, and there is a point where it is no longer business. And if something goes wrong, or if there is a difference in opinion, this is very difficult to sort out in these schmoozy kind of constellations, and that is what I worry about a lot. When you get so chummy chummy, and they drop the ball on you, then you are screwed. So I try to make it a point not getting too involved. [Comm11]

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Others, however, argue that the broad and active ‘social’ role of the police that has been initiated and re-established via the ‘community policing’ framework is in need of further expansion. In essence, some ‘community’ representatives are proposing that the ‘community police’ should distance themselves even further from the boundaries of the enforcement of externally defined law and order, towards the role of a locally powerful, social agent setting local standards and norms of law and order, defining ‘community’ issues and legitimacy, developing social policy, remedies and control in all sorts of areas now increasingly embraced by ‘community’ and its broad umbrella of ‘crime’ and ‘safety’ and ‘quality of life’ concerns. In other words, they express a push for the police under its ‘community policing’ banner to become an ultimate social normative, constitutive and executive agency as part of a regime of local governance with a reach and sphere of power un-precedented and surpassed by none, but as requested, carried and legitimized by the processes and powers of constructed ‘community’: The conceptual and material basis for ‘community’ is a wide, deep and pervasive scheme of ‘order’, and the force and power for its definition, maintenance and enforcement envisaged at its core is ‘community police’.

The following ‘community’ representatives elaborate:

A lot more needs to be done in community policing. The police have to rethink the way in which policing occurs, the philosophy and the spirit of policing. They need to learn to communicate again and have dialogue with their users, the community. That needs to be continued to be worked on. It has been started, but it needs a lot more work. There is still a lot of officers that do not know or understand how to relate to a community like ours. That you need to find who the leaders and stakeholders are, that you need to get involved in community affairs, in social affairs at a much broader and deeper level. The police need to be making social policy, almost being political. How you deal with the problem people, the problem agencies, and solve problems there. Or how you prevent problems in a broad sense. Like at the [C social service agency]. How you set up policy to prevent problems from evolving, that are of course to the benefit of the police, but also the agency. Get the police past that concept that they are a force by themselves just concerned with traditional police issues, that they don’t have any allies, and that allies are not important. It’s so important that the police work with the community on all sorts of things that are relevant to community health and safety, and that they find ways that do things different and accomplish more that still allow us to be within the law and the profession, be more creative. They need to end their institutional isolation, and realize that they are and need to be a part of the community, and all aspects of it.

[Comm08]

I would like to see the police’s input at a much earlier stage which to them still is an anathema, which is at the political level. They traditionally take the view, ‘tell us what to do, give us the law and we will do it well’. I would want to see it more in the other direction and hear from them at the policy level, in all sorts of areas, what are the problems and how can they be dealt with. A case in point are the drop-in centers, 7 of them in our area, and we are fighting this on a door-by-door, budget-by-budget basis, trying to get this reduced, and the police are just sitting on the sidelines as they must or feel that they must. But I would like
their statements and input into all this, what are the problems and the inadequacies of the situation in an area that has 7 drop-in centers. What happens, what does it bring you, how much is too much? Where is the line, how many should be there without it getting disruptive etcetera etcetera. The police know better than anybody, and we need their involvement long term, much earlier in the process, more central. We need the police's involvement at the planning level, and not just to pick up the pieces after everyone else's plans have proven flawed. Make their expertise more widely available at the decision-making level. That's what we need from community policing in the future. [Comm14]

**Police - 'community' interactions: Platforms staging a 'social' and 'account-able' police**

A large and important part of the 'community-police partnership' in which the 'community' and the police were to cooperate within the settings examined to identify local crime and safety problems, and to devise solution strategies occurred in the various regular meetings between police and 'community'. These happened either within the parameters of one individual 'community' organization's meeting with 'community police' staff, or within the larger framework of the CPLC. But while the 'community policing' discourses and imagery that informed these local practices presented an impression of the two entities being equal and balanced 'partners' in these structures and exercises (see Chapters 6 and 7), these 'cooperative' encounters and processes upon closer examination presented a fundamentally different picture. In fact, it will be the central argument here that the two entities play two very different and distinct roles in the evolving spectacle of interaction and cooperation between 'community' and police in the 'community policing' framework, each of which is relevant and important for the analysis of the emerging scheme of power, rule and the maintenance of the 'community policing' idea.

'Community policing' schemes and processes are providing for a 'partnership' that is probably quite different from the one envisaged in official 'community policing' texts and elsewhere.

Essentially, the key role of 'community' as observed in this interaction process is multi-dimensional, with its different functions presenting considerable overlap: 'Community' in the observed 'community policing' settings operates as a basic information provider to the police, and it offers its 'legwork' services in the form of information and the policing or social control measures which it undertakes itself (see also below). However, primarily it works as a 'broker' or a 'catalyst' turning local issues, concerns, events and realities into 'raw material' for policing purposes couched within the large life world of 'community' safety, health or local crime and ready made for 'community police' to respond to or react on. In other words, the processes, practices and resources of 'community' become the central, and at the same time uni-lateral, producer and provider of an almost indefinite supply of 'policeable material'. All of this is directed
toward the police, underlining the police as the primary and key institution shaping, deciding on and doing ‘community policing’, and reinforcing policing as a concept and practice thought, defined and done by the police in its specific shapes, forms and realities as the way to deal with local crime and safety concerns.

The police’s role in this setting, on the other hand, is significantly different. The substantial and constant flow of ‘policeable’ information and raw material towards the police in ‘community policing’ settings confirms the police’s position at the core of a considerable and diverse local ‘crime-production-complex’, producing an ongoing wealth of crime and safety issues, and featuring a large number of ‘stakeholders’, ‘partners’ and agents all concerned with such matters in the local context. In responding and reacting to the matters and information brought to them, the police’s primary function is to select from, defer, control and delegate these matters and the processes they entail. Out of the pieces of ‘raw material’ for policing delivered to them, the police professionally pick and choose the issues, events and proceedings that are appealing to their concerns and views on ‘police matters’ which they will engage with, while rejecting or delegating others that they - for whatever reason - decide not to get involved with. In doing this, ‘community police’ delegate crime and safety work to others, while at the same time being kept abreast of a broad wealth of trivial order, safety and quality of life issues, and being kept in demand as the ultimate experts on these matters. In other words, ‘community police’ play the role of managing and controlling a local crime and safety network featuring a multitude of related, connected and subordinate players, resources or ‘leg-workers’ providing ‘policeable’ raw material or being instrumentalized for ‘community police’ work. These contexts provide the ‘community police’ the opportunity to maintain and reinforce their position at the core of a local crime and safety network which concentrically rotates and operates around them, most of which issues and players they control closely in these functions or have at least the necessary access to if desired.

Second, the various settings of ‘community’-police interaction in ‘community policing’ contexts provide a constant and convenient opportunity for the police’s schemes and strategies of ‘account ability’ - a most celebrated concept in the age of ‘community policing’ - in a sense documented by Ericson (1982). In effect, he recognized ‘accountability’ as the institutional and procedural ‘ability to provide account’ for what local crime and safety issues and situations are like, what the police do about them, why they do it, and why their action is the best or best possible action to be taken under the circumstances. Within the framework of ‘account ability’, it
is argued that institutional provisions, networks and mechanisms of 'accountability' - including laws, rules and regulations, oversight or control bodies and processes - do not primarily render institutional actors like the police effectively responsible for what they do. Rather, they provide the stages, environments and resources to the police that allow them to construct meaningful, coherent and credible accounts of decisions, actions and results, while protecting and enhancing the autonomy of the police over policing matters, decisions and proceedings. Thus 'accountability' is much more of an event that enables the police to attach a professional and institutional meaning, sense and unique necessity to things - crime, police behaviour, safety perceptions, and so on - rather than holding institutions responsible, or initiating retributive or corrective consequences or repercussions when basic standards or expectations are violated (McMahon 1988, Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Ericson 1982, McBarnet 1981). In the many 'community'-police encounters that are labelled as 'accountability' events and frameworks, the police - confronted with a constant supply of crime and safety problems to be dealt with, policed and solved on the basis of their proclaimed status as crime and safety 'professionals' - play out and reinforce their role as the ultimate 'community policing' experts. It is this unique function, institutional role and professional expertise in local, informal and personal contexts that continuously allows them to state and justify why 'things' are the way they are, what they will do about the hooker problem on X street, why a 'sweep' is the best response to the problem, provide the enforcement numbers that prove their efforts 'effective', but at the same time explain on that basis that certain 'disorder problems' cannot be eliminated for now, that they will not be going after prostitutes in certain areas for operational reasons, or why the number of CRU officers needs to be cut in half for the next few months in some 'neighbourhoods'.

In short, these settings provide the unique setting for the police to officially and regularly explain and analyse how 'things are', why they 'are that way', what 'the police do' and why exactly what they do is necessary, good and effective. These conceptual framings of 'community policing' providing a rich and critical multitude of 'accountability' settings for the police shall be explained and illustrated by three case studies of different 'community - police' meetings in separate local settings.

Most of the 'community' groups holding meetings on crime safety and policing issues within 99 Division usually structured their meetings around an issue or a 'problem' agenda, which in many practical instances consists of half a dozen to a dozen 'problem sites' or 'items' to be
discussed. The proceedings and the atmosphere of these meetings tended to differ dramatically, depending on whether police were present at the meeting or not. In instances where the police were present, the discussion and proceedings were usually directed and structured towards the police, providing them a neutral role that the police appear to naturally claim and assume wherever they go (over the course of the research period, the police had asked ‘community’ groups to put the ‘police business’ at the beginning of their meetings, so that ‘officers would not have to sit and listen to stuff that is totally irrelevant to their police work, and they can go back on the street’).

Case Study 1: Meeting of the X ‘Community Group’

The first police-‘community’ meeting convened by the X ‘community group’ starts with a discussion of the pending decentralization of the drug enforcement squad within TCPF from a district to a divisional level, with some ‘community’ people being worried about the frequency and the quality of drug enforcement in their area after such a change. The divisional officers present do not want to comment on the issue, since ‘no decisions have been made yet’, but promise that the ‘community’ will be the ‘first to hear as soon as a decision has been made’. One of them states that they will have ‘the same if not better drug enforcement after the changes as they do have now’.

One of the ‘invited guests’ at the meeting is an official from a boarding house within the local ‘neighbourhood’ boundaries, who is also representing his institution at an ongoing inquiry called by the local bishop to deal with illicit drug use and related problems, especially with regard to how these relate to social service institutions. This social service representative, upon replying to a list of complaints about drugs and prostitution problems on his agency’s premises from ‘community’ people present, eventually and with their strong support requests occasional ‘police presence’ at his institution. As one of the CRU officers illustrates, this is seen as a necessary, good and long overdue step since they ‘see an increasing number of cases where drunks come on, and the drug dealers follow them, and try to pry money off them and the other residents’. After a brief explanation by one of the attending officers about how the local divisions for CRU assignment purposes had just become divided up into individual ‘neighbourhoods’ reflecting ‘natural community lines’, the officer suggests that these concerns would be forwarded to the officers responsible for the particular ‘neighbourhood’, who ‘will check in with you in the next
few days'.

As the next item, the representative of The City's planning department attending the meeting brings his relevant 'news' to the table, which consist of two main issues. One of them is that an abandoned large Victorian building in the area, which had been a major concern to the 'community' group since it became the alleged home and refuge of drunks, homeless and drug dealers who were apparently repeatedly setting fires within the structures, had been bought by a private investor who intended to renovate the building. The second item referred to the fact that an out-of-business night club on one of the major streets in the local area had been bought by a consortium of investors, intending to refit and reopen it. The police and the 'community' people discuss potential problems for the area, like 'parking, noise, after hours drinking, all the problem stuff you get with a night club' and decide that the new owners should be invited to the next meeting so that they could be heard out about the situation and their concerns. The city planner promises to make further investigations with respect to the proposed plans for the zoning and the use of the property.

Then, one of the association's board members elaborates on the planned 'neighbourhood beautification campaign' launched by the organization, in which people are called upon to clean up their properties and various convoys go out to clean up alleys, laneways, parks etc. The attending residents are encouraged by one of the 'community' organization's 'board members' to 'watch out for people who do not keep their properties clean, and bring them to the attention of the city if they do not comply', and to 'go into the businesses and ask them to have their windows cleaned'.

Following that issue, a 'community' activist brings up the issue of a plan to send 'dear john letters' to 'johns who are circling the area looking for prostitutes'. The idea is that the 'community' would provide descriptions and license plate numbers of suspected 'prostitution service buyers' seen in the area to the police, who would then send out letters to the car owner's homes (in the hope that it would be opened or read by another family member). This letter would indicate that they have been seen looking for prostitution commodities in the area, outlining the illegality and negative effects of it all, and hopefully achieve a deterrent effect. The police officers present at the meeting suggest that they 'generally support the idea', but that the 'technicalities of it all have to be dealt with by the community and the responsible authorities, and when all this is sorted out, the police can come on board'.

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As the next point, another representative of one of the major church-based social service providers - with whom the ‘community group’ traditionally had rather strained relations but who seems to be present at the meeting as an obvious sign of good-will as well as in response to the funding pressures that had been put on the social service providers by the ‘community’ group elaborates on his institution’s efforts to ‘prevent and deal with drug dealing’ inside the social service institution. He furthermore addresses their planned efforts to deal with the problem of their clients crowding and causing disorder and garbage on the sidewalks in front of the place. He outlines plans by the institution that have designated a new space on their property as a gathering and smoking area for their clients, and he asks for the ‘good will’ support of the police and the ‘community’ to gradually get people to move over there. A couple of the ‘community’ s' most vocal speakers accuse the social service agency of ‘tolerating drug dealing inside, not doing anything about it, and not calling the police when drug crimes are committed’. The police officers, however, emphasize that ‘the best way to deal with the situation is for them to go in regularly and unannounced, to do checks, and for the agency to call when things are happening’. Aside from that, they suggest that the best they can do is ‘sign a trespass letter so we can go and arrest people on the property who are not supposed to be there’.

The discussion then turns to the matter of a ‘massage parlour’ in the area, which some ‘community people’ claim is being used for drug dealing, and the evidence cited is that ‘there is light on in there at night’. The police reply that they are aware of the location, that it is under observation, and ‘evidence is being collected and action will be taken as soon as we know what situation we are looking at’. They ask people to keep them informed if they see or hear any more about the site. Next item discussed is a local bar and restaurant, predominantly used by a regular crowd of older people on welfare, and, according to the ‘community’, a main hangout spot for drunks, drug dealers and hookers. The ‘community’ has brought the matter to the attention of the municipal liquor licensing commission, and the police report that they are ‘aware of the drug dealers’ and that they are ‘keeping an eye on the premises, but no charges have been laid’.

Then, two ‘community’ spokespeople point to a residential address in the local neighbourhood that they suspect to be a ‘crack house’, since there is ‘constant traffic in and out of the house, some of the dealers hang out in front of it, it’s going on day and night, mostly young black guys’. The police take notes, state that they have not been aware of a problem there, that they ‘will look into it’ and ask that ‘further information’ be provided to them. The next item is
another bar establishment on one of the major streets in the area identified by the ‘community’ as a ‘bedroom of illegal activity’, and the police confirm that they ‘just laid a liquor citation’ and are ‘considering further moves’ but they cannot ‘provide details for operational reasons’. The next focus is on a social housing apartment complex, which the ‘community’ residents again see as a ‘drug dealing and crime hotspot’ that they think should be monitored and tackled more vigorously by the police. The police comment that this is ‘a social housing complex, and thus part of the public housing authority’s jurisdiction’. The police state that they have ‘pressured public housing authority to put a permanent security guard in the building, since most of the problems arise from outsiders coming into the building’. However, since recently, the police have ‘keys into the building and a trespass letter for the property’ so that they can go in and investigate if necessary, and ‘people should keep them posted what’s going on there’. Then, a ‘community member’ reports on a fast food shop that allegedly just applied for a liquor license. As it had supposedly been investigated via the police and personal contacts with the liquor licensing authority, the owner has ‘numerous liquor convictions and pending charges’, and the ‘community will do everything with the support of the police to prevent a liquor license from being issued’ by making efforts that both entities will make a submission to the licensing authority.

The next item refers to another social service agency, a shelter for the homeless, which is allegedly used by ‘dozens of hookers and drug dealers’. The ‘community’ people claim that there have been ‘a number of major incidents, including shootings’, and that there are ‘urinating and screaming prostitutes on the premises 24 hours a day’. A complaint is made by a ‘community’ person that ‘these places get millions of dollars in funding, they are never full, and they still can’t keep order and make lives miserable for everyone in the neighbourhood’. The police confirm that they ‘are having an eye on the property, that they have in fact arrested a few people for various offenses, including drugs and prostitution, but that it is difficult to proceed on the property without the support of the agency’. They argue that these issues are primarily ‘property management’ issues, but that in a joint effort with the local ‘community organization’ they have called in the city which has ‘conducted a health and safety inspection of the place a couple of weeks ago which came back with 55 items which are now separately followed up on’.

Subsequently, one of the ‘community’ activists claims that she ‘has been complaining to and calling the police about hookers on her street for the past few months, but that things have gotten worse, and the police don’t seem to be doing anything about it’. The officers present reply that
they were 'short in men in the plainclothes unit for a couple of months', but that they 'just conducted a big sweep in another neighbourhood which may have pushed some of the hookers down. Numbers were good'. They then report that the CRU is 'planning another sweep soon which should further clean up the area' but they 'cannot provide any information on where and when'. They ask the 'community' to keep 'reporting all relevant incidents, things you see and hear', and they 'will do what we can'.

The 'problem' discussion list at the 'X community' meeting is finally concluded by attention to another church based social service provider, who allegedly has and allows 'major drug dealing on its premises'. They had been 'approached and warned' by the 'community' but 'none of the issues have been dealt with, and it is getting time for a police investigation'. The police officers present take note of the matter, and suggest that they will 'report this to the drug squad' but believe that 'the foot patrol has an eye on the place and investigates people there on a regular basis' and even believe that 'a few arrests have been made recently so things should be better soon'.

Case Study 2: Meeting of the Y 'Community' Group

In a regular meeting of the 'Y community group', the 'community police' in attendance provide an 'account' of the 'problems out there, what we are doing, how effective we have been and what makes our work difficult', as one of the sergeants puts it. In the 'situation report' provided by one of the CRU sergeants focusing on 'plainclothes matters', he points to one of the local social service agencies 'as a major cause of problems in terms of them feeding and sheltering drug dealers and hookers'. He underlines that the main problem for the police is that they 'do not have proper access to the facility' since the agency 'does not want to have them on the premises without specific reasons', and they have not provided them with a trespass letter. He then points to the fact that allegedly 'street prostitution has been the worst problem since April' in the area but that the division is conducting 'ongoing plainclothes sweeps which are very successful'. As evidence for the success of the police operations, he cites '225 liquor and prostitution offenders, and over 400 charges since the beginning of the year, and 68 charges just in the past week'. He concludes that they are seeing a 'noticeable difference on the streets, and many of the communities have commended us the for our work saying that this is the quietest summer they had in years'. He states that the 'goal is to remove the prostitution trade off the public streets',
but that the police is obviously 'hampered by the court system' in their efforts. Still he assesses their enforcement and court strategy as 'very successful'. However, he elaborates that the police, in conjunction with the 'community' and the 'community witness program' now ask for 'boundaries' for the hookers which makes it 'much easier to arrest them when they are back in the area and bring them before the courts again faster, which makes things even more successful, and pushes them out of the area, which makes the whole operation obviously effective and cost-efficient'. He also points to the city's new john school, which is 'all booked up until next year, and there are no repeat offenders yet, so it is obviously very effective'. The officer then mentions that the CRU and the plainclothes units will 'hopefully have additional officers soon, which will make things even better for you people in the community'.

Another CRU sergeant of 99 Division then elaborates that a rooming house just discovered as a problem spot is 'housing hookers, drug dealers, addicts' and is 'put under observation by the foot patrol, and we will probably make some arrests soon'. He then reports on the division's 'alcohol sting project' by which 'the paddy wagon is being used to scoop up the drunks off the street, and we are putting them into the cells over night for their own and the community's safety'. He explains that the divisional traffic unit has been 'effectively integrated into the CRU which is a great step for the community because it is now used to enforce traffic laws against morality offenses, especially the prostitution and john traffic through spot checks and traffic law enforcement'. One of the attending drug enforcement officers then further elaborates on ongoing drug enforcement projects, conceding that he 'understands the public frustrations about the situation, but they are doing the best they can but that the area will probably never be cleaned up completely since it has been a drug, prostitution and booze area for the past 100 years, thus a more reality based approach is needed'. The force simply 'does not have the resources, the manpower, the money and the equipment to do it all but we are doing the best we can by concentrating on the hotspots'. However, he underlines that the 'most important thing for these efforts to be working is that community residents consistently communicate their concerns, and that they document incidents, occurrences and suspects well, and get all the information to the division, so that they can follow up on it'.

Another one of the divisional CRU sergeants then elaborates on the Unit's 'very successful drug sweep over the summer: We had 80 bodies and laid 126 charges, so we got a number of bodies and also a lot of middlemen out of the area'. He reports that 'they tried to keep
the foot patrol on the streets as much as possible, but that a few unforeseen incidents took CRU officers away from the foot patrol and into the emergency response platoons as well as into a few major investigations and an undercover project against theft from autos, which had been brought forward as a major concern by the community’. He acknowledges that the ‘community has not seen their officers a lot recently but they have been working undercover for most of the time which is to the benefit of the community, and they will be back soon in uniform’. He underlines that ‘crack cocaine is the real and the biggest problem here in the area, it is the real pimp of all the prostitutes you see out on the street’, but he has his ‘best men working in this area, and they are producing phenomenal arrest numbers’. He then reflects that the ‘phone in the CRU has been ringing constantly, a lot of people have been calling, but even if we don’t get back to everybody right away, people should keep calling and reporting all the concerns they have, and if it’s a police issue, and the resources are there, we will look into it’.

He then goes on to visit a few specific items. He first elaborates on a bar establishment in the local area that had been cited by ‘community’ people as a problem spot, reporting that ‘undercover officers have made a couple of illegal liquor buys in the establishment, charges are pending and an investigation into their liquor license has been initiated which should eventually solve the problem’. In another bar, ‘community’ members apparently had observed ‘partying late at night, suspecting liquor violations’. The police ‘visited and examined the place but there is a new owner on the premise who welcomes the presence of the police, and we will have to wait and see but we will certainly keep on monitoring the place’. He asks ‘the community to keep a good eye on the place’ and keep the police ‘updated’. The sergeant then reports on another bar and liquor venue whose ‘license we have just taken away temporarily as a warning sign for them and other problem premises’. He predicts that they know that if ‘they step over the line one more time we will close them down’, and asks the ‘community to collect all possible evidence about problems and disturbances emerging from that establishment, since we may later need all that in court’. The officer then finally confirms that he just had received reports about another local commercial premise that is ‘used for drug dealing and people have been seen smoking crack on the premises, and that the officers will investigate as soon as they can’, and ‘update the community as soon as there is any concrete information’.

Case Study 3: ‘CPLC’ meeting

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The 'CPLC' meetings in 99 Division occur once a month, and are usually hosted on a rotation basis by one of the 'community organizations' within the division's area, in a facility owned or provided by them. The attendees or 'members' of the CPLC, as they usually refer to themselves, are exclusively envoys or 'representatives' of the local 'community organizations'. The CPLC minutes prepared for and handed out to 'members' duly note that "representatives of the following organizations were present at the .... CPLC meeting". There are approximately 15 people present at the CPLC table, with each of the 'community' organizations represented by one or two of their 'members'. The particular meeting observed also had in attendance the assistant to one of the local councillors, a public housing authority security supervisor for the local area, and a representative of a local community centre. 99 Division is represented by the unit commander, the CRU's staff sergeant and another CRU sergeant. As usual, the meeting is organized in a sort of 'council' setting that is - despite it formally being chaired by a 'community' person - in practice centred around and interactively directed toward the police. The largest part of the CPLC meetings were usually taken up by individual 'community's' representatives giving 'reports' on crime and safety situations, developments and issues in their local areas.

These individual 'community' reports would then usually be replied to by comments or 'expert' feedback from the police, while the police at the end of the meeting, as a sort of 'climax' of the assembly event, would give a crime and safety 'situation report' on the division, their ongoing 'community police' work and police developments. Many of the police's remarks appeared to be couched in an air of secrecy or privileged confidentiality, as if they were sharing knowledge and expertise with their 'community' allies that was actually to be kept confidential or limited to their professional use. As an interesting characteristic of these meetings, the individual 'community' reports in terms of settings and semantics would predominantly be addressed to the police, with most of the crime or safety aspects discussed being constructed around the police's response or action in the particular incidents (or the lack thereof). These were then usually followed by an 'explanation' or 'justification' by the police on what the 'real problem' was, what the 'necessary' response, considerations and limitations on the matter were, and why 'things happened the way they did'. In short, these interactional encounters between police and 'community' within the CPLC settings primarily provided the stage for 'community' to render themselves 'policeable' to the police, while at the same time providing the platform for the police to present itself 'account able' to 'community'.
After the round of introductions, the CPLC meeting is opened by the representative of a newly formed 'community' group that has assembled because of the 'massive onslaught of prostitutes and drug dealers in the area'. The group, according to its representative, plans to 'restore peace and safety in the area, and reclaim the neighbourhood from the dealers and the hookers'. The introduction of the new 'neighbourhood' group triggers the comment by one of the other 'CPLC members' that 'maybe we are slowly dealing with too many groups here, and should look into merging some'. This comment is picked up by the police, arguing that 'there cannot be indefinite number of new groups and fragmentation', and that the police 'only have limited time to deal with groups and go to meetings'. The [A group] representative noted that 'the group had canvassed the residences in their area prior to the last meeting, and we had a good turnout in the last meeting'. They could already 'note positive changes from their community work, including increased lighting, and the closing off of areas that secluded drug and prostitution activities'. He also announces that the group will start regular bi-weekly neighbourhood walks, to which police presence is requested from the division, which the police in turn promise to provide 'pending availability of officers'.

The [B group] reports that 'things have been quiet' in the area over the past couple of weeks, and that the 'community safety office has been set up'. Their speaker reports an 'assault incident in the community centre' by a group of males, in which a woman and a staff member were assaulted. The police were apparently called but did not lay any charges. One of the divisional sergeants present explains how in such incidents the police need full compliance of the victims in order to lay charges, or need proper evidence to press charges, which had not happened in this particular instance, and that these 'situations are very difficult to handle by the officer at the scene if not all the necessary information about the incident is readily provided. This is why the officer in this case was probably right not to lay any charges'.

The next 'community' representative reports on an assault incident 'between a hooker and a pimp on the street late at night' upon which a resident called the CRU 'but got the voice mail, no police ever showed up and we never heard back from you'. She also reports that she tried to call one of the 'CRU sergeant a couple of weeks prior, and his voice mail stated that it was [the previous month]'. Furthermore, she complains that 'whenever she calls the CRU office, she gets voice mail and nobody calls back'. The CRU sergeant explain that 'in case of an assault or any violent crime or crime in progress, people must call 911'. The CRU officers are 'mostly out on the
road, as they should be, and therefore the voice mail is a good thing, and that they will make sure that people get responses from the officers on a reliable basis. But it cannot be guaranteed that responses will come instantly'.

The [C group] representative reports that their ‘area has been relatively quiet lately, that they had lots of hookers and dealers in the warmer weather but that the police sweeps and the cold have cleared up much of it for now’. She points to a ‘new problem location at the [Z restaurant], with dealing going on in there all the time’. She further brings attention to a ‘stabbing incident’ at a local community centre, to which the police reply that they ‘responded and laid charges, and that follow-up is underway at the community centre to implement security and preventative measures’. She then refers to an upcoming ‘community improvement workshop’ hosted by her ‘community organization’ to which several local organizations have been invited, including the police, in order to make suggestions on how to improve the area, so that ‘people will come to the area for positive reasons’.

The [D community] representative reports the ‘ongoing problem of drug dealers coming to houses in the area especially in early morning hours when police are not around, and using the doorways and entrance ways for crack dealing’. He outlines that the doors of the buildings can not be locked because they are used as half-way houses for recovering mental health patients, and ‘they tried to put in extra light and fences, but nothing helps, since the crack heads all know that you can just walk right into the building’. He asks for more police attention to the area and the buildings, and one of the sergeants promises to relay the matter to the ‘neighbourhood team responsible for the area, but they are off this week. But we will leave them a note so they can get in touch as soon as they are back’. The representative of the [E neighbourhood] area reports that his ‘neighbourhood is in the process of organizing itself to deal with the problems they have and prevent a further spread of problems’. His reason for attending the ‘CPLC meeting is to get an idea what other groups are doing’, and that he has met already with the head of one of the ‘other neighbourhood groups, the councillor’s office and the CRU sergeant’.

The representative of the [F group] cheerfully reports that his area has been ‘very quiet lately thanks to the good police work’. The only problem in the area seems to be that a couple of properties in the area are beginning to be ‘developed by an owner of poor reputation for shoddy rooming houses’. However, he confidently emphasizes that his ‘community organization is investigating and will hopefully stop the problem with the help of the councillor’s office’. This
pending 'problem' is also being commented on by the [C community] representative who states that her group is trying to 'force a rooming house owner in her area to move some doors to prevent dealers and hookers from walking in and out freely'. The owner apparently has so far refused to do so, and she queries the police and others present at the meeting if she can have the owner's license suspended through the licensing commission via a 'community safety audit'. The police and other 'CPLC members' seem sceptical, but agree that 'it may be worth a try'.

The [D community group] representative further reports that it has been 'very quiet' in their area lately, but that they are 'continuing the walks, although no problems have been identified'. The only noticeable matter is 'heavy early morning traffic' which 'may be connected to the sex trade' asking for the 'traffic unit to patrol and stop people more often'. The representative from the [C group] reports about the 'usual problems at the [X school], with the dealing on the premises round the clock'. A meeting has been requested and 'set with the school board to address the issue, but there has been very little interest from the school principals'. The group vigorously requests the foot patrol to go and patrol the school grounds more often. She also mentions a recent confirmation from the 'city councillor's office that lights will be installed and sheds be moved at the school'. She then complains about a vacant public housing authority building in her area that is 'used by street people for parties during the night, and they stole the stove and the fridge out of it'. She saw the 'public housing authority looking into it, but they haven't done anything about it'. The incidents have allegedly also been reported to the police, but also without success. The CRU sergeant in response points out that 'this is a public housing authority matter', and the attending public housing authority officer takes note of the incident, commenting that he had 'not been aware of the issue'. The [C community group] goes on to report they have 'resumed the neighbourhood walks, walking three times a week'. They have noticed that 'S street has been very busy with the usual hookers and pimps, and another sweep would be good'. Besides, they are 'taking note of the incident, problem and 'usual suspects' in their neighbourhood including the people on boundaries, reporting everything to the CRU as usual'.

The representative of the [G group] reports that there has been 'much vandalism in the local public housing buildings recently, which is a security issue more so than a police issue', and that 'safety audits will be completed in the housing complex together with police'. The representative is currently 'compiling a list of people in the division who are willing to go to court
to present community witness statements for bail hearings on drug and prostitution offenders caught in the area. The objective is to get harsher sentences and ‘boundary’ probation orders not allowing the convicted back into the local area. The call for attendance for ‘community’ people will come at ‘short notice from the police, and people must be available on 24 hours or less notice’. She then underlines that they have been ‘working very closely with the police both on and off duty for their community safety centres, community meetings, a ‘community party’ and a new problem restaurant in the area’.

The public housing authority officer reports that his organization is proceeding with the suggestion from the ‘community’ to install a basketball court on a vacant property in the area, but that ‘proper security precautions’ must be put in place first. His office was also notified about ‘lighting problems on one of the properties that will be fixed soon’. The city councillor’s office reports that ‘one of the notorious bar establishments on [Y street] has put its liquor license up for renewal with the [provincial liquor license board], and that the CPLC may want to provide a collective community submission’. It is also noted that the police’s horse patrols are ‘very much in demand by the community, and they should be shared and put into use around the division as much as possible and available’. The councillor’s assistant then explains that ‘there is a plan to issue 300 new cab licenses in the city which will likely bring additional concerns and problems with regards the importing of drugs and prostitution by the cabs’. She emphasizes, with the assistance of police, that ‘anyone witnessing suspicious activity in a cab or by a cab driver can file a report with the cab company or the licensing commission and that pre-prepared forms for such reports are available from her’. It is finally noted that the metropolitan licensing authority is investigating the [Z restaurant], an establishment that the ‘CPLC has identified repeatedly as a core location of drug dealing in the area’. The outcome of the matter, she implies, supposedly ‘depends on the political will of the licensing authorities but also the determination of the police and the ‘community’ involved in putting the pressure on to bring this matter to an end’. Members of the CPLC are encouraged to call the Commission officer (a regular at many of the community group meetings) and provide ‘community input’ in such a direction.

Finally, the police open their ‘situation report’ by replying that the ‘cabs are well known problem carriers bringing drugs and prostitutes into the division area, and that the traffic unit is watching them where and when they can. They have laid quite a few charges over the past few months.’ In a related matter, a coffee shop at [M and N streets] - a well known cab hub and
meeting place - has been 'identified more so than before as a drug dealing spot. Effective action has been launched by the CRU and other units. Three arrests have been made recently, and talks are underway with the store's management to improve the situation by putting safeguards into place including taking phones out, locking the washrooms and putting security cameras in, and all in all better scrutinizing the clientele'. One 'community' member adds that 'police sweeps in the area have resulted in northward movement of drug dealing activity to a seniors building, where intimidation results in use of seniors' living quarters as a base for illegal activity'. The CRU sergeant replies that 'this could be the case' but that 'we are on the ball up there, and we are putting pressure on them from different sides now, so they eventually don't have any places to go'.

The CRU staff sergeant reports that a new location for the divisional station house has to be found, and that the division wants 'community involvement and input on the location and the design of the new facility'. The division had arranged a visiting tour with community (in form of CPLC) members to a few 'modern police stations in the city' and will arrange for a second tour. The sergeant then announces that the 'majority of the CRU staff has been temporarily converted into target policing' for a period of a month or two, 'targeting areas and establishments that have been identified as known drug dealing sites'. (The reasons for and forces behind this initiative - e.g. whether this strategy is requested by 'community' or a police initiative - remain unclear). The emphasis of the 'project' is said to be 'on enforcement and arresting drug dealers and prostitutes who would then get boundaries in court, so that it would be easier later to arrest them when they come back to the area for breaking the boundary orders'.

The CRU sergeant then 'confidentially' names a few of the 'known establishments' that are being targeted, and announces that this will 'significantly reduce the number of uniformed officers in the neighbourhood areas and their visibility' for the coming weeks, since these 'operations are using undercover strategies. He characterizes the side effect of less uniformed officers on the street as 'unfortunate but targeted action against these establishments had to be taken because things were getting out of hand, so all of this in the end is to the benefit of the community'. In addition, the plainclothes officers are reported to be currently doing 'drug observation and pick ups gathering evidence so that warrants can be obtained and arrests be made later in the year which will make our work much more effective and the community's lives more pleasant in the summer'. He also informs the 'community' people gathered at the meeting that a
number of CRU officers have been seconded ‘to a homicide investigation which will further reduce the availability and visibility of CRU officers in the neighbourhood for a while’. He suggests that officers will make themselves available on a ‘best possible basis’ to attend neighbourhood walks etc. ‘but no promises can be made under the given circumstances’. He then outlines that the CRU had been ‘promised more officers for the spring which should have increased the unit strength’ but that it was not sure ‘at this point in time if these new officers will materialize’. The division as a whole still expects some additional staff, but at the same time, ‘[another police service] is recruiting experienced and seasoned officers with CRU experience, which likely reduce our numbers’. He hopes to have the ‘best possible strength of officers out there until the early summer months, but then reduced officer presence and visibility needs to be expected again due to vacation time’.
'COMMUNITY POLICING'S' OTHER SIDE: POLICING BY 'COMMUNITY'

Policing by 'community': Relevant paradigms of policing, control and justice

Private policing
Social control
Informal justice
Governmentality

Local policing and control by 'community'

Over the past twenty years or so, the monolithic model of 'policing' as a primary form of negative state power exercised via the law and its enforcement - as it, for example underlies Bittner’s central theory of the police as the unique state agency to legitimately use coercive force (Bittner 1970) - has been challenged from various sides, and to various ends (Melossi 1990, Scheerer and Hess 1997, Shearing 1992). This traditional model of the state-based police was rooted in an "authoritarian state thesis in which state is seen as an essentially unified and functional apparatus, exercising forms of power which are authoritative, negative and repressive" (Matthews 1995:56). In fact, there appears at this point not much conceptual consensus at all about whether a 'state' exists and, if it does exist, what it looks like, what its boundaries and its power sources and mechanisms are (Melossi 1990).

On the other hand, over the past two decades, much of the socio-legal understanding of 'power' and 'control' exercised through functions of the state - traditionally at the heart and basis of 'government' as the executive centre behind policing as for example via the fundamental concept of the 'nation state' (see Reiner 1992) - has been challenged as well. While the traditional-classical conceptions of state and its power rested, as for example outlined in Machiavelli’s 'Prince', in the ability to impose negative, coercive or punitive power upon the people or the public, the understandings of power and mechanisms of 'government' have taken different directions. More recent models and theories of 'power' conceptualizing such processes to be internal rather than external; positive, preventative and constructive rather than reactive, negative and punitive; and embedded in more trivial and subtle processes of 'social order' rather than limited to explicit forces of state control (Melossi 1990). Some core themes and frameworks
of challenges to the traditional model of the state-centred policing ‘monolith’, and their implications for practices of power and government seem to be particularly relevant to the examination of ‘policing’ and ‘control’ in contemporary ‘community policing’ contexts. In short, these are ideas about private policing, informal justice, social control and the recently emerging notion of ‘governmentality’.

Private policing

A couple of decades ago, it was the ‘discovery’ of ‘private policing’ (Spitzer and Scull 1977, Shearing and Stenning 1983) that put the first fundamental question marks behind the classical model of the ‘monopoly’ of state police, its policing legitimacy and power mechanisms. The growing appreciation of the rapidly growing numbers of private police agents in uniforms who looked very similar to the ‘real police’ and who were doing very similar things, but were yet so different challenged the predominant picture of who ‘police’ are, what the bases of their work, powers and intervention are, and what essentially constituted, described and distinguished ‘policing’ from other ‘state’ activities (Bayley 1994, Shearing 1992). While the classical models of police assumed that the state and its notion of public order constituted the central and unique basis of power and legitimacy for policing via the law and its enforcement, the emerging phenomenon of private policing suggested a basic commodification, decentralization and marketization of ‘policing’ principles, practices and goals. These included, among others, the control and management of ‘safety’, ‘order’ and ‘knowledge’ with respect to people and places as key processes and aspects from a policing paradigm that was increasingly aiming for surveillance, discipline and knowledge rather than punishment and force (Nogala 1995, Spitzer and Scull 1977). Values essential to traditional policing, which were assumed to be unique to the state, became of increasing interest to corporate, economic and private entities, which started to pursue these via ‘private policing’ efforts. Some scholars pointed - to the conclusion that “policing must nowadays be understood more broadly as quintessentially about order, and the myriad ways in which it can be established and maintained. At this point of our understanding, it is perhaps trite to say ... that ‘police’ are no longer simply large men in sombre uniforms who run around trying to catch criminals” (Shearing and Stenning 1987:10).

This new appreciation of the growth of private policing threw into disarray the traditional idea of ‘policing’ being about an essential ‘public order’ (or a “public peace”; see Keeton 1975)
being imposed on and maintained in the public sphere. First of all, private policing challenged its paradigm in that it challenged the assumed clear-cut existence and validity of the entity of the 'public' as well as the public/private dichotomy it was built on. Secondly, this challenge arose by the fact that private policing explicitly originated and operated in non-public spheres towards the production of a multitude of 'orders' - as opposed to 'the public order'. It had to be recognized that (in an age of broad and rapid 'privatization' efforts of public jurisdictions, services and properties, almost all of which had been traditional state functions and jurisdictions) an increasing number of non-public spheres and jurisdictions were interested and involved in setting up their own schemes of 'order' implemented and exercised by 'private police' (Nogala 1995). The paradigm of 'public order' as 'the order of, in and for the public realm', and implying the "exclusive responsibility" for its definition and maintenance in the hands of the 'state' and its powers became turned into the fundamentally different concept of “order defined in terms of a multiplicity of private peaces” (Shearing and Stenning 1987:11). These were to be established by a multitude of non-public entities and their 'governments' (Macauley 1986). The evolving idea of the state was that of an entity “encapsulating” and synthesizing the infinite number of private peace realms (see Shearing 1992, Bayley 1985, Keeton 1975). Such a concept and understanding of order as the accumulation of 'private orders' had existed prior to the establishment of modern nation-state governments and state-based police agencies ‘enforcing the public peace’. It had only been actively dismantled with the rise of modern state and government (Johnston 1992). Framed within these fundamental and paradigmatically challenging contexts of the state encapsulating a multitude of private orders was the proposition that ‘private policing’ in fact announced and symbolized “relinquishing the state’s monopoly on the use of legitimate force by handing over the exercise of coercive power to non-state agencies” (Matthews 1995:57). This meant an all-out challenge to the concept of the nation-state, based on the traditional assumption that “the state is the public authority and all other authorities operating within its territory are subordinate to it” (Hogenboom 1991:20, also Sheptycki 1995, South 1995).

It was, however, very much unclear as to what social or legal standards and principles such emerging 'private orders' were to be subjected to, regulated and controlled by - for instance, with respect to such issues as discrimination, access, exclusion/inclusion, discretionary processes, all of which have been see as possibly “leading to arbitrariness, inequality and dependency and failing to meet the most basic requirements of justice” (Adler and Asquith 1981:11). Furthermore,
it had to be questioned what sorts of accountability structures were in place in such private order systems in contrast to the idea of 'public' order and police in which the "state [had] progressively accepted responsibility for maintaining public order [and] in which responsibility for the maintenance of order is made consistent with the source of its definition" (Shearing and Stenning 1987:12). Emphasizing claims of 'private' property, market principles and specific policing needs and their effects as part of a 'product', 'service' or 'customer expectation', private policing assumed a multitude of appearances in its diversity of methods and objectives that public policing had aimed to avoid in favour of an emphasis on principles of consistency, equality and uniformity (Nogala 1995). Nevertheless, while much of the earlier theorizing about 'private policing' had built on and further fuelled the assumptions of clear-cut dichotomies - like state versus civility, public versus private, coercion versus compliance - many of these binarily opposed constructs were increasingly being questioned. Illustratively, the "so-called privatization debate became very confused and rather directionless, and seemed to become increasingly constructed around purely ideological divisions" (Matthews 1995:56). It was also recognized, however, that 'private' and 'public' spheres were predominantly a construct of social, political and governmental powers and dynamics. Shifts in these conceptualization of these domains had to be recognized as the spawning grounds for distinct mechanisms of 'policing' and control in these areas, as illustrated in the changing 'domain' of the control of family or sexual affairs in recent times (Rose 1989). But essentially, it soon also became clear that privatization or commodification developments of policing inevitably bore deep social and political implications. These included the fact that the meaning of public space, services and safety, and their accessibility and availability were recognized as being distributed rather unevenly across class lines (Fischer and Poland in press).

Moreover, the emerging phenomenon of 'private policing' also illustrated the fact that much of effective 'policing' work happened without the negative powers of law and punishment at hand - resources not readily available to private order schemes and their agents. Instead of reactive responses to 'crime' incidents, law enforcement, and apprehension and punishment of offenders or 'criminals', private order schemes predominantly rely on prevention, surveillance, behavioural regulation, environmental design and 'soft control' in establishing and maintaining their particular orders (Scheerer and Hess 1997, Shearing and Stenning 1983, Fischer and Poland in press). In particular, the availability, gathering, networking and use of 'information' or relevant safety and security 'knowledges' became apparent as a key tool, commodity and resource of
alternative forms of policing (Ericson 1995, Ericson and Haggerty 1997). While the phenomenon of private policing was initially interpreted as ‘just one more corporate strategy’ to increase profits and control undesirable contingencies of market places, it was the fundamental erosion of unambiguously public jurisdictions as well as the increasing emphasis and commodification of security, safety, crime prevention etc. in all spheres and walks of life that made the relevance of its processes and dynamics impressively clear. Instead of ‘public order’ just being imposed on social subjects by the state, often severely limiting basic liberties and freedoms, ‘private orders’ as brought forward via private policing efforts increasingly emphasized individualism and commodified values as constituting key elements of citizens’ and social life responsibilities and ideals. All of this happened in a social and symbolic environment increasingly shaped by ‘risk’, and seen as ‘enriching’ freedoms and social qualities rather than constraining them (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, O’Malley 1996). Images and mechanisms of private order and security were “produced and consumed to make people feel safe, free from doubt, care, anxiety and apprehension” (Spitzer in Nogala 1995:251).

Social control

The conceptual themes and developments gradually discovered in the substantive area of ‘private policing’ at the same time reflected, fuelled and confirmed a wider conceptual evolution of the theorizing of social control paradigms during that time. Largely based on their historic examination of continental penology, it was the writing of Foucault and Cohen over the past two decades that argued that the nature, modes and directions of social control had shifted from state-centred, negative, punitive and repressive to socially dispersed, positive, subtle, regulatory and disciplinary outside and blurring the traditional jurisdiction, power centres and borderlines of the ‘state’ (Foucault 1977, Cohen 1985, Melossi 1990, Nelken 1989). As such, these developments produced a “widening the net and thinning the mesh” of social control (Cohen 1985). Foucault’s central thesis was that the state as the ‘sovereign’ behind conventional power and control had dissolved, dispersed and faded into an infinite and ubiquitous network of sites and processes of discipline and control via strategies of ‘micro-powers’. There, power is exercised not “by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, and not by punishment but by control” (Foucault 1977).

At the heart of the process of the dismantling of the ‘sovereign state’ stood the erosion of
its core power source and tool, what some have described as the “expulsion of law from
modernity” (Hunt 1993:268). These processes have led to a structure of a “diffusion of power”
and consequently the exercise of “power without a sovereign” (ibid., see also Melossi 1990),
overturning and revising the model of state control being “synonymous with social control”
(Matthews 1995:60). However, this hypothesis of a fundamental shift in schemes of ‘social
control’ entailed a basic debate about the question of whether these suggested dynamics meant a
fundamental dispersal and expansion, or just a shift “within the total apparatus of social control”
(Bottoms in Nelken 1989:49). As the results of these dispersal processes around the centres and
powers of control it was proposed that “instead of a monolith of power, or coherent structure of
oppression, we may equally envisage an increasing diversification and pluralization of the circuits
of power, and an ever-increasing recognition and encouragement of individualization” (Stenson
1991:14). It was again particularly Foucault’s work that emphasized the shift from absolute and
punitive concepts and apparatuses of power to the governing schemes of a ‘power/knowledge
nexus’, emphasizing the control, regulation, shaping and knowledge about individuals and their
behaviour as ‘subjects’. In his view, the nexus of power and knowledge materializes in that it
“characterizes, classifies, hierarchizes, disqualifies” in the making and control of ‘subjects’ via the
“intrusiveness and the penetration of ‘control’ into all aspects of personal and social life”
(Matthews 1995:60). Social control became increasingly synonymous with the idea of a
“government of the subject” or the “conduct of conduct” as an “activity aiming to shape, guide or
affect the conduct” of subjects (Stenson 1993:378).

Subsequently, and due to this emerging dispersal of social control and power in everyday
practice, it became “increasingly difficult to tell where the official system of crime control ends
and ordinary life in the ‘family’ and the ‘community’ begins” (Cohen 1979, see Nelken 1989).
Rather, social control mechanisms were now seen as actively “dispersed into the community, they
penetrate even deeper into the social fabric, touching more and more people. The control machine
sucks in its prey. New categories and sub-categories of deviance and control are constantly being
created. Agencies concerned with these new forms of deviance are marking out their own
territories of jurisdiction, competence and referral, and produce their own ‘scientific’
knowledges” (Hogenboom 1991:20, see Cohen 1985, van Beijerse 1995). Key to these
processes was the fact that ‘power’ became recognized as occurring in increasingly more
productive, positive and even utilitarian schemes via processes and structures of regulation,
compliance, standardization, and normalization, omni-present and integrated with social, civil and seemingly trivial every-day affairs. These included sectors from banking to health to education all the way to the organization of work and pleasure at McDonald’s and Disneyland or, more specifically in the criminal justice sector, the diversion, re-socializing and distant disciplining of offenders interpreted as new sites of dispersed and transformed modes of ‘control’ (Scheerer and Hess 1997, Gilliom 1994, Shearing and Stenning 1983, Ritzer 1996). It was the “permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance” looking, gazing and seeing “everything constantly” relevant to these processes that came to constitute a central part of late modern power (Foucault 1977:214) spawning its “punishing and punishable universality” (Hunt 1993). These ubiquitous and diversified processes of “socialization” and the “construction of conformity by means of discipline” were observed to occur via the utilization of ‘productive’ and ‘positive’ mechanisms of ordering individuals, collectivities or social settings (Scheerer and Hess 1997). This was seen, for example, as materializing through routinization, standardization, environmental designs, individual and social modelling, processes of exclusion and inclusion, etc. establishing a pervasive realm of social control via local and specific ‘social discipline’ regimes. It was the tools and tactics of social discipline in its ‘non-threatening’ and positive guises (see Melossi 1990) in which the realities of late modern social control could be identified.

The wider mechanisms and anticipated effects and benefits of these evolving schemes of social control, as mentioned before, were to become instrumentalized and integrated at the core of ‘community policing’ programatics and strategies (i.e., Trojanowicz and Bucqeroux, Moore 1992, Skolnick and Bayley 1986). First of all, it was argued that ‘social order’ in the local sphere was the direct product of informal, civil and local social control processes outside formal structures of state law and control, and as such essential to the possible initiation and success of anticipated ‘community policing’ dynamics. A functioning ‘local control apparatus’ was seen as the necessary and fertile grounds for ‘community policing’ to work effectively. This was seen especially with respect to the police’s role building on its structures and dynamics as related to local understandings of order, self-ordering processes, information gathering, etc. Local order was to be re-rooted in the philosophy and mechanics of Jane Jacobs’ proposition that “the public peace - the sidewalk and street peace - of cities is not kept primarily by the police... . It is kept by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary control and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves. No amount of police can enforce civilization

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where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down" (1961). 'Order', 'safety' and 'security' in 'community policing' contexts came to be presented as an accumulation of 'private peaces' in local settings, while, leaving ambivalently open the definition and decision-making process what would constitute and characterize order.

At the same time, via the 'community' and its 'empowerment' and 'participation' symbolism, the executive authorities of the state - primarily the police - actively solicited a colonization of local social arenas as jurisdictions dominated by non-state forces for defining and shaping 'order' concepts and realization schemes that were clearly located outside the state. The social construct and organization of 'community', in all its ambiguity, was to decide and define what was right and wrong, who was 'good' and who was 'bad', who belonged 'inside' and 'outside' of local spheres, whether it was drugs, prostitutes, abandoned cars, vagrants or graffiti causing and representing 'disorder' in the 'community'. It was furthermore to initiate appropriate and effective formal and/or informal intervention against these 'disorder' phenomena. As a matter of fact, "informal community controls" were seen as more basic, fundamental and new ends (instead of mere means) towards which state powers and resources should invest their efforts and were therefore seen as "more important than official ones." Where the community structures have crumbled, official intervention should be directed towards bolstering community controls" (Stenson 1991:22).

Neighbourhood watch, safety audits, local safety information networks, community crime prevention councils etc. (Shapland and Vagg 1988, McConville and Shepherd 1992) were the central platforms activated for the constant reproduction and furthering of local order concepts. They were established for the initiation and strengthening of informal social control mechanisms aiming towards the "development through revived community institutions of a sense of control of crime and security deriving from an understanding that collective resources, formal and informal, are directed at those kinds of conduct which are held to be most offensive" (Clarke 1987:387). There, an almost infinite multitude of activities, strategies and resources was proposed, including the environmental re-design of local streets, properties and places that would allow easy identification of outsiders and make the penetration by 'foreign' elements more difficult, and neighbour networks that would instantly recognize 'strange', 'suspect' and 'undesired' elements. Active participation of 'community members' in local order 'work' emerged by recognizing, looking for and pointing out means of correction of disorder signs and symbols ranging from
garbage on the sidewalks to ‘crack houses’. These processes of ‘order maintenance’ were to occur primarily via social and informal resources. These social and informal processes, however, always had the reserve possibility and leverage to resort to more formal and punitive means (i.e., law enforcement and the police) if necessary as they were inherent to its “priority on a fluid order maintenance [operating] in the discretionary space between the law and the norm” (Stenson 1993:384).

All these seemingly late modern propositions and emphases on informal local control mechanisms were, however, not so new after all, but had, in one way or another, already formed the core of pre-modern ‘policing’ (Johnston 1992, South 1995). As such, they could still be recognized through all sorts of ‘social order’ schemes in modern local spheres. Elias and Scotson provide an exemplary description of the social structure and order mechanisms of a small industrial British town featuring an ‘established’ and a more working class rooted ‘problem population’ at the middle of this century, instructively outlining ‘community’ processes as a site and mechanism of effective informal social control: “[T]he two zones offered to children were very different. The ‘village’ had well established communal standards. The fact that they were relatively uniform and were shared by many families made it easier for youngsters to live up to them and the well developed networks of social control made it more difficult for them to slip up. On the ‘estate’, it was left almost entirely to the individual family to provide standards of conduct for their own children, and the standards of one family were often not the same as those of its neighbours. The fact that they lacked communal reinforcement, the customs and norms of different families in the same neighbourhood differed widely, and that youngsters of one family did openly what was strictly forbidden to those of another, made the growing up process for young people on the estate much more difficult than for people in the village and made disturbances much more likely. Closely knit communities such as the village were better able than the estate to provide the adult control of children which is one of the conditions of the growth of a stable self-control. When both parents went to work, relatives or neighbours were always ready to look after the children. On the estate they often had to be left to their own resources. If village children played in the street, they were among neighbours whom they knew, and who knew them quite well: their parents could always be sure that some neighbours would warn their children if they were about to hurt themselves or each other, or to damage people’s property. An adult who was annoyed by children would simply call out to them using one or the other standard phrases
for such an occasion, such as ‘stop it or I’ll tell your mum!’, and that was usually enough.” (1965:106f).

In a radically different but equally instructive setting, Baumgartner has described how “middle class adults” in a New York City suburb “exercise social control against their friends, neighbours and acquaintances not by confrontational, aggressive and punitive measures”; rather, the social control mechanisms that he describes materialize by “unusually restrained responses to grievances” or subtle, indirect, corrective methods of “social organization” or ordering of their relationships. Much of the suburban “social organization” and control of “barking dogs, rambunctious children, untended yards, perceived insults and encroachments, and a variety of other annoyances and offenses” occurred via the claim and colonization of spaces and attendant privacy, the ability of residents to “restrict many of their dealings to those whom they feel compatible with” and strategies of “avoidance, conciliatory approaches, and secret complaints to official agents of social control” (Baumgartner 1984:80ff).

Similarly, ‘community policing’ postulated ‘community’ as the constitutive site of local self-ordering and self-government. All this was to be built on the elementary “concern with producing docile and obedient bodies” or rather “reflective, self-regulating citizens” (Stenson 1993:384) based on the (historical continental) idea of the self-governing, autonomous, civilized and responsible “citoyen” (see Nogala 1995:247, also O’Malley and Palmer 1994). The “citoyen” was seen to act as a form of a local “auxiliary police agent” (South 1995:136), with the police and its formal intervention resources considered as just one - and probably usually last - resource for ‘ordering’ if all other efforts had failed. In contemporary contexts of ‘community policing’, these propositions seem to suggest that “mounting disorder seems to mirror the declining strength of informal social control in communities caught in the cycle of decline, [and] efforts to reinvigorate those informal processes might succeed in reversing the trend” via “neighbourhood social activity, informal cooperative action, trust in one’s neighbours, participation in local activities, and even self-help” (Skogan 1990:169).

‘Community’ was seen to “provide an infinite source of standards and legitimations”, laying claim to an “infinite disciplinary domain where power can respond to such vast and expansive imperatives as the ‘potential’ for ‘disorder’, ‘control’, ‘precriminal’ and ‘problematic’ activities”, and so on (Fitzpatrick 1992:206). As an example, Skogan cites the following recipe for possible “self help cures for community ills”: “The most important element of community
crime prevention appears to be to bring about social interaction, whereby residents of the community maintain a degree of familiarity with each other. Such interaction and familiarity should ... make it possible to detect strangers in the community [and it] suggest that such interactions may lead to a cohesive neighbourhood. The basic philosophy of community crime prevention is that social interaction and citizen familiarity can play an important role in preventing, detecting and reporting criminal behaviour” (Mukherjee and Wilson in: Skogan 1990:170).

In sophisticated and broadly active ‘community order’ contexts, as described by Kelling and Coles, the organized, focused and effective apparatus of local and ‘citizen’s’ social control via activated ‘community’ bonds, structures and mechanisms at the heart and basis of ‘community policing’ looks like the following; all this is illustrated in detail by the example of a Baltimore neighbourhood in which such ‘community ordering’ processes had been (re-)ignited:

“One priority was community decay, especially abandoned housing. The state had provided the neighbourhood group with a small fund for boarding up vacant houses, erecting fences, improving lighting, and making other minor improvements to the neighbourhood. Citizens themselves boarded up abandoned houses, fenced off or closed walkways between houses where drug dealers could flee or hide, cleaned up trash in the neighbourhood, turned vacant lots into gardens [and] pursued nuisance abatement cases against six drug houses. Residents [were helped to] identify irresponsible landlords and take legal action against them. To reclaim their streets, neighbourhood residents conducted numerous vigils and street demonstrations (vigils took their spirits from the season - during Christmas holidays, for example, as carolling) and held ten neighbourhood picnics. The neighbourhood association ... concentrated on cleaning public spaces. A private drug-treatment program supported neighbourhood efforts by providing access to a treatment program for local youths addicted to drugs, and residents provided a Christmas dinner for drug-treatment participants who had helped clean the neighbourhood. ... [P]roblems associated with ‘homelessness’ - aggressive panhandling, litter and crime - had become so serious that the private business sector became involved in attempts to restore order. [P]olice trained Public Safety Guides to patrol the area, serving as the ‘eyes and ears’ looking out for the safety of the members of the public. The guides ... are trained to report suspicious behaviour, intervene in the behaviour of persons obstructing pedestrian or vehicular traffic or intimidating other citizens, ask them to move along, or call the police if necessary. They also answer questions and give directions and information to anyone who approaches them on the streets. In addition to the safety guides,
uniformed ‘clean sweep ambassadors’ sweep and clean sidewalks, weed tree wells and clear graffiti.” (Kelling and Coles 1996:197ff).

Informal justice

Some time between the early 1960s and late 1970s, observers witnessed the ascent of interest in a phenomenon in the criminal justice arena that aimed to address a number of the fundamental issues appealed to in the ‘community empowerment, participation and control’ idea contained in the recent ‘community policing’ idea and imagery. This was the conceptual umbrella described as ‘community’, popular or ‘informal justice’ (Matthews 1988, Abel 1982, Tomasic and Feely 1982). A brief look at its core tenets, its socio-legal implications and its history as analyzed by observers and critics is instructive for the purpose of the wider discussion of ‘state’ and control, and the general interaction and evolution of these issues.

The goals and objectives behind the establishment of ‘informal justice’ structures and procedures emerging then - in the form of ‘community courts’, mediation centres, citizen dispute resolution programs, and so on, utilizing ‘non-punitive’ and ‘positive’ strategies of mediation, arbitration, conciliation and reparation, etc. - were multifold (Auerbach 1983, Merry 1982). These more “informal forms of dispute processing” would, so it was claimed by their advocates, provide a greater level of “community involvement, ... participation and access to justice while overcoming some of the major deficiencies of the formal legal process”. In turn, they promised to “strengthen social bonds, repair social relations and ultimately help to re-establish social cohesion” (Matthews 1988:1ff) and “counteract a state of anomie, isolation, alienation, and fear in a community by facilitating communication between people” that was in many instances characterized by hostility, conflict and social distance (Merry 1982:187). It was hoped that such localized and informalized processes would be “more accessible, efficient, flexible” and accountable thus allowing for a “democratization of justice” and that they would benefit “not only the victim and the offender but also the wider community” (Auerbach 1983:96ff). At their core was the philosophy that the law was an ultimately pluralistic entity, and that the effectiveness of informal procedures would lie in their use of compliance and conformity as response mechanism to conflicts producing “therapeutic, conciliatory and non-coercive” effects (Merry 1982:173). The perceived need for such reforms, of course, had also arisen out of a “deepening crisis of legality” which in Western systems was increasingly seen as a system of “class-based agencies serving the
rich and oppressing the poor”, featuring a basic “lack of equality before the law, restricted access to legal forums and representation, and an adversarial system ... producing either winners or losers” (Matthews 1988:4). The aims of the emerging programs of informal justice were to increase ‘popular’ and ‘community’ participation, access to justice, and facilitate the advancement of de-professionalization, decentralization and delegalization (Harrington 1992). It was to adopt strategies of more “informal and inclusive forms of regulation ... within the boundaries of conventional institutions” (Matthews 1988:6). Its proponents argued for a maximization of “community participation” as the key to a “distribution of justice” that should aim for the eventual “transferring of the overall judicial system to the people” (Longmire 1981:25).

But after a period of a decade or so of studying a wide array of informal justice schemes and their effects, an initially cautious sense of concern, and eventually broad critical pessimism arose among observers with respect to the reform potentials, effects and wider social implications of ‘informal justice’ schemes. It was observed that during the time of the rise of informal justice, the population of legal and paralegal professionals and the size of the legal apparatus in general had grown substantially (Abel 1982:295f). Legal proceedings, processes and decision-making had “increased [in] opacity and complexity” (Matthews 1988:9). Even more so, they had spawned a “proliferation of local agencies penetrating deep into the heart of society and personal life”.

Critical attention was also focused “on the ideological role of the central notion of community” which, where thoroughly examined, did not appear as the “consensual and harmonious entities” that had been projected. Instead they were “often conflict ridden areas in which ‘community courts’ might just as readily serve to exacerbate as to reduce conflict” (ibid., see also Nelken 1985, Scull 1982). Furthermore, it was suggested that rather than reducing the legal ambit via informal alternatives, these structures “resulted in the simultaneous expansion of both formal and informal processes” (Matthews 1988:10). These dynamics were seen as having the essential effects of fostering a “combined process of bifurcation, rationalization and expansion” within the legal system as well as a “formalizing of the informal” (ibid.).

It was especially Abel’s work which documented that informal justice agencies or institutions were particularly able behind a veil and rhetoric of ‘neutrality’ to produce ‘alternatives’ and resolutions that reinforced existing socio-economic and power inequalities (Abel 1982, Auerbach 1983). At the same time, the superficial structures and appearances of informal justice were seen as the fundamental grounds and resources to legitimize the functions, principles
and outcomes of the formal justice system and its agents. This, it was argued, on the one hand happened by fostering impressions of empowerment and participation, but in practice re-
legitimized fundamental social gaps and conflicts, the divisive functions and legitimacy of formal
justice institutions and their processes. Their main underlying effect was to complement and reinforce the “judicial system ... according to the principles of substantive law” in its values,
structuring dynamics and forces of social ordering and thus protected, facilitated and furthered a
hegemony of formal state law, its structures, biases and effects (Auerbach 1983:99, see
Harrington 1992, Fitzpatrick 1992). In Abel’s words, “informalism is a mechanism by which the
state extends its control so as to manage capital accumulation and defuse resistance that it
engenders. Its objects are not randomly distributed but rather are concentrated within the
dominated categories of contemporary capitalism: workers, the poor, ethnic minorities and
women” (1982:9). The informal justice system was judged as “neither alternative nor resistant to
formal systems of control as contained or incorporated within state power”. Rather, it was seen as
“providing a subordinated vehicle for its expansion” and therefore facilitating an even more
pervasive penetration of social spheres by the concerns, dynamics and ordering effects of
legalism”, as for example occurring in family disputes via the reassertion and reinforcement of
“patriarchal and middle class values” (Fitzpatrick 1988:180) but also by rendering the
“disadvantaged more accessible to the state” (Abel 1982:258).

Informal justice was interpreted as the “expansion” of structures, mechanisms and reaches
of the “informal state” by “incorporating citizens into the social order through a decentralized
state institution, embedded in the ordinary processes of social life” (Hofrichter 1987:110). In
other words, informal justice became understood strategy and mechanism based in the formal
legal system to extend state-based social control on more behaviour and more deeply into ‘social’,
‘private’, local and familial spheres with a particularly strong impact on lower classes. For these
purposes, it was using the realms of interpersonal and minor infractions to constitute “an
administrative-technocratic rationale for judicial intervention to maintain public order”
(Harrington 1985:170). These processes were seen to link the powers and effects of formal and
informal social control in that they “involved a heavy reliance on referrals and authority from the
official criminal justice system on the one side and yet they claimed to derive their main support
and credibility from the ‘community’ on the other” while at the same time maintaining a
“peculiarly depoliticized” status and atmosphere (Matthews 1988:15). The linked power
interdependencies dominated by the ordering forces of formal state justice, for example, were recognized in that "elements of coercion are subtly entering into the process via the back door in the form of court referrals, continuations of cases in court, and even 'reminders' by mediators that if the disputants cannot reach an agreement, the case will return to court" (Merry 1982:179).

As a number of studies suggested, most informal justice programs succeeded in resolving only a part of the cases referred to them, in many instances not more than 40 - 60% (Harrington 1985, Abel 1982). Auerbach's overall assessment of the effects of informal justice was most stunning, suggesting that it "managed to combine some of the worst features of legality and informality. [It] encouraged the extension of state legal control into urban neighbourhoods, bringing private disputes under official scrutiny ... [d]ispensed with due process safeguards, making rights even more precarious than they were in court" always offering the opportunity to "present the result as a fair compromise" while persistently neglecting the fact that "compromise only is an equitable solution between equals; between unequals, it inevitably reproduces inequality" (Auerbach 1983:136). Henry's work pointed out the relevance of informal justice for understanding the implications of the interactions of legal orders as sites of power through their role as "links, relays and alliances" (Rose in: Fitzpatrick 1988:181). His central argument was that "formal law and private justice are integrally related. Each is mutually interdependent upon the other [while retaining] a semi-autonomous" nature (Henry 1983:vii). However, at its fundamental core and reality, state law "penetrates deeply into the rules, values, forms and procedures of private justice" (Fitzpatrick 1988:181).

Within that context, it was suggested that "informal justice might be located" in a "hybrid sphere which links the state and civil society [constituting] a new matrix of relations which involves a new process of 'governmentalization'; a sphere "which, although ultimately regulated by the state, does not derive solely from the state" (Matthews 1988:18).

'Governmentality'

A key result, however, of the widening and dispersion of social control theories offered by Foucault, Cohen and others was an increasing conceptual dissatisfaction among critics with the concepts' theoretical implications. These were, in essence, suggesting the possibility of social control being infinitely dispersed and omnipresent while 'state' or 'government' would gradually fade out and eventually disappear completely. Essentially, such critiques were challenging the
proposed polarizations and dichotomies that underlay the social control concepts as conceptual ‘dead-end streets’ when pushed to the extreme. However, in a subsequent wave of “auto-critiques” of the social control concept by Foucault, Cohen and others, important conceptual revisions were brought forward that allowed a further and constructive advancement of the theoretical grounds broken, much of which came to be summarized under the idea of ‘governmentality’ (see Gordon 1991).

Within the ‘governmentality’ paradigm, it was suggested that the key conceptual focus must not be on aiming to recognize or distinguish ‘state’ or ‘state power’ from ‘the social’ or ‘the market’, or punitive from regulatory control, but to acknowledge that one was linked, facilitated and interacted with and materialized via the other. The challenge was to study precisely and account for “agents, places, purposes, methods, targets, outcomes” of the ‘government’ of subjects, things and affairs (Matthews 1995:62, see Cohen 1989, Shearing 1995). The ‘government of things’ was to be conceptualized as the exercise of power understood as “action on others’ actions”, acting “upon and through an open set of practical and ethical possibilities” - however, not “as a fixed and closed regime, but rather an endless and open strategic game” (Gordon 1991:5). The dichotomized focus on recognizing and identifying the ‘state’ versus ‘non-state’ territories of control was replaced by a recognition of the need “to move beyond simple state-market dichotomies and to analyse the problematics of governmentality”. These were not so much to focus on the issue of whether a particular provision “is public or private” but it was seen much more “constructive to analyse the specific ways in which political power is exercised [by examining its] programs, the modes of rationality, morality and knowledge which guide and inform political choices, and to examine its strategies and techniques of political organization, the formulation of alliances and the multiplicity of agencies and institutions which are involved in the art of government” (Matthews 1995:62, see Rose and Miller 1992). In other words, it was suggested that through a framework of governmentality, it was not the state and state power, or the extension of state and state power as suggested in private policing and elsewhere that were the core of evolving ‘control’ apparatuses and processes. Rather, attention was drawn to the fact that the ‘state’ and its related power materialized in certain dispersed, local and specific settings through a combination of knowledges, control resources and mechanisms. As such, the state did not necessarily appear in ‘state’ form and clothing, but via the locally enabling and enlisting of diverse concrete and social entities and resources - e.g., ‘community’ - to ‘govern’ themselves
and others.

In essence, the underlying presumptions of ‘governmentality’ were founded on efforts towards a debunking of previous state-centrist models of social control; equally they proposed a deconstruction of the reductionist, functional, unitary and individualistic nature and presence of the ‘state’ (see Foucault 1991) and the idea of it as an integrated and “workable whole” (O’Malley 1991:173) or equally a ‘cold monster’. Instead, its advocates were emphasizing the presupposition that state and control materialized via the governmentality regimes, coalitions, mechanisms and sites in a wide and often labile, inconsistent and contradictory wealth of local and specific settings (ibid.).

Rose has argued that these contexts have led to the evolution of a new ‘social’ sphere in terms of how it is being governed, and participates in the activities of government. With respect to new forms and effects of ‘government’ as they especially emerge in neo-liberal contexts, he suggests that these “techniques [were] not so much a process in which a central State extended its tentacles throughout society, but the invention of various ‘rules for rule’ that sought to transform the State into a centre that could programme - shape guide, direct, channel, control - events and persons distant from it. Persons and activities were to be governed through society, that is to say, through acting upon them in relation to a social norm, and constituting their experiences and evaluations in a social form” (Rose 1993:39f). Within the parameters of late modern societies he suggests that these “technologies of rule” had spawned a uniquely ‘governmentalized social sphere’ which is seen as aiming to “de-governmentalize the State and de-statize practices of government, to detach the substantive authority of expertise from the apparatuses of political rule, relocating experts within a market governed by the rationalities of competition, accountability and consumer demand. It does not seek to govern through ‘society’, but through the regulated choices of individual citizens, now construed as subjects of choices and aspirations of self-actualization and self-fulfilment”, producing a new “relation between the responsible individual and their self-governing community”. One observes the “detaching of the centre from the various regulatory technologies ... and the adoption instead of a form of government through the shaping powers and wills of autonomous entities: enterprises, organizations, communities [and other] quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations taking on regulatory functions [and the] provision of previously public utilities [claiming] that they operate according to an apolitical agenda”. These developments are said to lead to a “reconfiguration of political power shaped and
programmed by political authorities, new mechanisms are linked to link the calculations and actions as a heterogenous array of organizations into political objectives, governing them ‘at a distance’ through the instrumentalization of a regulated autonomy”, or, for example, “a variety of micro-moral domains or ‘communities’” (Rose 1996:41ff, see also Fitzpatrick 1988:197f). In more simple terms, the concept of ‘governmentality’ proposed that the key focus of state, government and power needed to be on the processes, mechanisms and effects of social entities, more specifically, the analysis needed to be on the sites and processes that assumed, transformed and acted out roles of control and power - or ‘government’ - in daily, local and social life, as well as their cooperation with more formal state agents and resources.

O’Malley has built on these assumptions by suggesting that ‘governmentality’ structures and resources in particular materialize where various local or specific agents, resources or knowledges of such governmental power meet, intersect, collaborate. This occurs, for example, in settings that he describes as ‘legal networks’. As a consequence, he concludes that sites of governmentality are usually “traversed by a variety of state and non-state legal agencies”, and that sites of ‘governmentality’ are shaped and created by the factors of “what legal agencies intersect in that context, how these orders are mobilized and how they interact” (1991:172). His conclusion is thus that an appropriate way to study sites and mechanisms of governmentality is examining the “systematization of legal powers - of the formation, operation, transcendence and dissolution of networks of legal and social control”. It is this framework of local and dispersed ‘legal networks’ as critical sites of ‘governmentality’ that may present a most helpful tool of analysis in examining the control and order efforts and practices of organized ‘community’ in ‘community policing’. Conversely, it is precisely the emerging ‘community’ practices and operation schemes in these settings, with their diverse control, order and punishment resources and ‘collaborators’, that may point us to new forms and procedures of ‘state’ and ‘power’ that have been largely neglected so far.

Again, emphasizing the decentralized nature of ‘governmental’ structures, it was suggested that phenomena of local sites of power via ‘legal networks’ might reconcile the dilemma of observing “state expansionary processes ... but without implying any necessary centre (in the state or elsewhere) from which expansion grows”. These processes may “involve state centred expansion, but equally may involve networks that form and operate entirely within civil society, or even expansion ‘into’ state sphere by autonomous private legal orders and their
knowledges”, (O'Malley 1991:172ff) as they, for example, materialize in “relatively autonomous and self-regulating spheres outside the ‘political’ sphere of the state” or via “action or rule at a distance” (Stenson 1993:377). They may be “conflictual and contradictory as well as cooperative and synthetic” (O'Malley ibid.), eventually suggesting “not the penetration of state control into civil society in ingenious disguises, but a re-arrangement of forces involving some strategic displacement of state agencies and their traditional enforcement practices by privatized forms” (ibid. 186). These, so it may be concluded on these conceptual grounds, do not result in government out of and via an existing state, but in producing state and control via the specific and local multitudes of practical ability, resources, sites and mechanism of ‘governing’.

Local policing and control by ‘community’

The local ‘community’ organizations in the research setting put into place and initiated a multitude of activities, resources and strategies to work towards local ‘order’ commensurate with their perceptions of ‘problems’, their causes and effective ‘solutions’. Many of these are reflective and illustrative of the conceptual issues of state, power, control, and ‘government’ raised above. Many of the steps or measures in these practical ‘community’ settings observed appeared as minor, subtle, trivial and small-scale. Others were characterized as a linking of minor or locally specific initiatives, resources or knowledges, pointing to the fact that ‘order’ and ‘control’ in contexts described above is rarely a spectacular, dramatic or explosive event. There will, likely, never be movies made about ‘community control’ or ‘crime prevention’ as there are many about law enforcement, police arrests and prisons.

Nevertheless, the unspectacular but persistent, the small-scale and trivial but ubiquitous and finely grained, and the far-reaching and widely connected network of emerging ‘community ordering’ processes on the basis of their particular order agendas and conceptions demonstrates a ‘power dynamic’ quite different from one exemplified by the traditional state and its police force. They are thus reflective of Foucault’s notion proposing that ‘state’ and ‘power’ are materializing not as explicit, visible and coherent entities, but as the sum of its small, fine and diversified elements (Foucault 1979). The recognition of the state power, appeal and implications may thus require a more attentive and sensitive eye, an opportunity for which shall be given in the following empirical illustrations.

A key activity by organized ‘community’ as part of their ‘community policing’ work in the
local research setting was what people referred to as 'neighborhood' or 'safety' walks. A group of 8 to 12 people would go out onto streets, parks and alleyways, 'patrolling' their neighbourhood, either actively looking for 'deviants' and 'outsiders', or scanning for safety problems and deficits, hiding spots etc. Some of the groups would actually engage in such walks up to 4 or 5 times a week, and distribute monthly 'walk schedules' to their members. These walks would serve a variety of functions. First of all, they were an important vehicle and activity symbolizing 'community' in public space, in that they would link a local territory with a mission, an ideological meaning and a 'community' identity which was, in more practical terms, a 'community' proclaimed on the basis of their stance against drugs, prostitution and other 'disorderly' behavior in public spaces.

But second, these outings also served a key knowledge and information gathering function, producing data or information that would serve as 'policeable raw material' for police as well as for the 'community' themselves. Broken street lights, suspicious people in alleyways or back lanes, high-traffic apartments or dwellings, abandoned cars, unfenced properties, and so on, all became 'disorder' or 'safety' matters to be noticed, investigated in a 'safety' and 'security' context, documented and further communicated as 'problems' within the parameters of 'community policing'. Many of the 'neighborhood walk' groups would turn their outdoor operations into semi-formal 'safety audits', meticulously documenting issues, problems, suspects, 'unsafe spots'. Such 'audits' were actually encouraged by police and local councillors, who had even developed forms and held workshops on how to conduct these 'safety audit' exercises properly, how to compile 'relevant' information, and what to do with it upon collection. As such, these 'safety walks' and activities can be understood as a relevant extension of the surveillance and information gathering processes into local and particularly 'community' sites that were initially discovered within operational frameworks of private policing. The 'community policing' setting features such efforts as an end in itself - e.g., the intervention basis for 'community' to establish local 'order' - as well as means for wider projects of control - e.g., to provide the public police with the grounds to investigate, proceed and take action against 'problem' issues with their own 'policing' tools.

But such 'policing by community' activities were not only restricted to local knowledge building via surveillance, but in some instances assumed a more active 'ordering' reality, and thus feature examples of substantive local 'social control' activities at work. Other groups, in a rather
vigilant fashion, had made it their goal to actually engage themselves in activities to ‘push’ drug dealers, prostitutes and pimps out of the area, very much in accordance with the police’s predominant ‘problem solving operations’ objectives of ‘removing problem people’ from the local area. ‘Community’ groups would aim to do so by either trying to ‘stare down’ suspected ‘disorder’ people, drawing attention to them by their mere presence, ‘talk them’ out of the area, or use more or less legitimate threats. Some ‘community’ groups ‘patrolled’ their areas with dogs, flashlights and video cameras, videotaping ‘suspicious elements’, literally ‘searching’ for ‘unwanted elements’ in their area, eager to confront and push them out. One of the local ‘community groups’ reported that they “had been out numerous times over the past few weeks, and we just did not see any hookers or dealers, so we just went up into the neighboring area and did our patrols there” [Comm07]. These activities became, in some instances, even a considerable concern to the police, obviously fearing an incident or encounter getting out of hand. Some officers also worried about the possibility that in case of an ‘accident’ the police would be associated as being close to or endorsing such ‘vigilante’ crusades [Field notes]. As a consequence, in the instances of a couple of the ‘community’ groups doing their ‘neighborhood walks’ the accompanying police would mostly be busy trying to restrain the ‘community’ activists armed with dogs and flashlights, trying to keep them aware of the ‘legal limits’ of their efforts. Some encounters between ‘community’ groups and street deviants ended in arguments or even physical confrontations which occurred the substantial dismay of the police. In one instance, one of the more aggressive ‘community patrollers’ and his wife were attacked in their own backyard after they had tried to ‘hose down’ a suspected drug dealer on the sidewalk, who in turn jumped their fence, broke a window and applied severe injuries to both people.

Generally, the ‘community’ activists presented themselves as being on a round-the-clock mission with regards to their own ‘order’ activities, regardless of time and place. They would focus on the ‘cleansing’ of their local area of drugs, prostitutes, vagrants and all other ‘problem elements’, again underlining the Foucauldian notion of the un-remitting, continuous and omni-present nature of surveillance and control at work within the local contexts observed which the ‘state’, in the form of the police, would have never been able to exercise by itself. Most of the ‘community’ activists reported a wide array of innovative individual or collective, formal or informal, reactive of preventative efforts to either get or keep ‘disorder elements’ out of the ‘community’ territories. The underlying philosophy and logic for the ‘community’ activists
seemed to be to see and understand every inch, every instance and every sign of the known ‘disorder’ phenomena as an indicator of much worse to come if things are not ‘stopped or taken care of now’, necessitating immediate, adaptive and effective rectification. ‘Community’ work, thus, metaphorically speaking evolved into an ubiquitous, round-the-clock, constant and microscopic project of ‘fixing broken windows’, in which ‘community’ ordering efforts are as good - or possibly better - and as effective as anybody else’s. These local interventions undertaken by ‘community’ people were dominated by the dogmatic belief that it was the successful multitude and diversity of their little efforts that would eventually ‘fix the community building’.

A couple of ‘community activists describe their ‘policing’ efforts, their predominant strategies and effects, and the rationales they see behind all of this:

We have accomplished some quite tangible results. And I think the main success is that there are now, as an effect of our efforts, fewer locations where [the prostitutes and drug dealers] can work out of. There is a bar just around the corner from here. Lost its license, courtesy of us, closed - one less place to deal drugs out of. They tried to set up shop in a couple of other bars around here. With us waiting in the wings, ready to make their lives difficult, do you think the owners want to lose their licenses as well? Coincidentally, they started to become quite vigilant in terms of screening their patrons, keeping the criminals out. So the kind of dealing that we used to have here, if it happened, it is very much nipped in the bud by the owners, because they know that the police goes in very regularly, they are now even welcome in these places now, so there is a major change in attitude. There used to be a lot of rooming houses in the area where crack houses used to be set up. If we hear about it, we, the community, nip it in the bud, right away. There are very few places where crack cocaine can as easily be had, fewer places for the drug dealers to work out of. And the prostitution is reduced dramatically, because we won’t allow it to happen anymore. When I see a hooker working, if it is a new hooker, I simply walk up to her and say, Are you working this strip? I live here, I know all the people who live on this block, and I happen to know that all of them don’t want you to work here. So could you please leave, and find another place to work. And I don’t mean just another block away, but ten or twelve blocks away, or even further. We really don’t want you working here. And we usually never see them back. For the regulars, I get on the phone [with 99 Division], hi [Officer Alpha], there is [Prostitute Z] working out front. I thought she had boundaries on her? Bye, click. An hour later, [Z] is gone. Or: Hi, there is a hooker, I don’t know her name, but this is what she looks like, this is what she is wearing, and she is working. An hour later, she is gone. All of a sudden, we can take charge of the kinds of illegal activities going on on the street. I am still looking forward to the day when we can do the same thing with the drug dealers. We are not there yet. Legally, it is harder nut to crack but we are working on it. [Comm08]

When we are out on neighborhood patrol, the prime objective is annoyance. We try to annoy the prostitutes and the johns. Some of us are more aggressive than others. We kept a good group together over the years. You get people who just want to go out and walk and look around, and then you get people, like me, who, when I see a John picking up a prostitute, and we’re in the vicinity, I will go over and talk to him, while he is in the process, and tell him, do you know what you are doing, do you know it is illegal, we have just written down your license plate, blablabla. Most times they will leave. There is a handful of us who do that, others don’t want to get involved in this. We found out earlier that just walking up to them and just looking at them, it annoys them a lot. We usually circle around them and walk them out of the
community, which gives somebody else the problem unfortunately, but that is just the way it is. I find that we need to be a little more aggressive, and clearly verbalize our concerns towards the johns and the prostitutes. And we've had a variety of encounters out of such scenarios, where they start chatting with us, I gotta eat and live, etc., to the point where they have been throwing bottles and rocks at you. Most of them get really pissed off, they rave and swear at us, but at least they leave eventually. In half the cases we can walk them out of the community. Some of them know the community much better than we do, and hide. We had one incident that was a bit nasty last week. We took her picture. And then she came over with her boyfriend, who actually physically assaulted a few people. So we had to call the police. They had the common sense to get out of the area before the police arrived. I had some concerns about my safety, and my property and that sort of stuff, but then I said to myself, you know, if I think like this, and all others think like this, then we have already lost. So, I have insurance, and if I do nothing, I am going to live in an area where this runs rampant, I will never be able to sell my house, I'll be stuck here forever.[Comm11]

We have become very adept in closing down crack houses. We've had quite a few successes. A crack house can open up almost instantly, you just need one person in the house to allow it to happen, and within a day, the whole thing explodes. So as soon as we identify a crack house, the surrounding neighbors start keeping log sheets and record everything that happens. Prostitutes that start to visit, people throwing stones against windows. You'll see the dealers coming and going, so you keep log sheets for about a week, and that gives the police the evidence they need for going in and making busts. The other thing you do is, you have absentee landlords, so you find out who the landlord is, and if he is not around, you get in touch with his insurance agency, because if the property is used as a crack house, it is not insured, and they usually want nothing to do with it. So we have different techniques of dealing with crack houses, and we can usually do it within a month. It's very successful, and we've helped other organizations use it. Another effort, confronting the dealers. It is a bit dangerous, but confronting them, it needs to be done. We call them 'crackroaches', they want nothing to do with you, so we make it uncomfortable for them, and they go away. We used to have rallies where we would go to the two major corners in the neighborhood, and we'd get everybody together on Saturday night with signs saying, 'Drugs kill communities' and 'Crack Dealers, Go Away', and we would stand at the corners where they normally do business, and it would drive them crazy, because they lose business at that corner for the night. They went to another corner, of course, but the point is that they knew that we did not like what they were doing, and we wanted them out of our area. [Comm12]

But it was not only within these specific 'self-policing' efforts that these 'community' structures had built up a rather effective, broad and thinly meshed, and ongoing information gathering and surveillance network. 'Community members' everyday life, activities and places had been turned into an ubiquitous, ongoing, and deep reaching surveillance operation. These aspirations had deeply engraved and incorporated a 'social project' of 'community order' work into local lives and settings very similar to the processes described by some social control analysts. For most 'community' people examined, it seemed that sitting in the living room, working in the yard, going shopping or driving in and out of the area, even the hosting of 'garden' or 'Christmas tours' had become a 'gazing, looking and noticing' or 'eyes and ears' operation, with a constant focus on local deviance, surveillance and order maintenance with not insignificant implications. Between the various 'community' organizations and their 'members', many 'neighbourhood'
areas were, in infrastructural and spatial terms, completely ‘networked’ for such local surveillance purposes. It was guaranteed in many instances that at the point where one ‘neighbour’ s’ reach of looking, noticing or ‘knowing’ of drug dealers, prostitutes, vagrants, drunks, problem bars or crackhouses ended, another one’s terrain would start and the efforts would be systematically continued there.

Second, other than police, ‘community’ surveillance was an ongoing, round-the-clock, continuous project - workdays as well as Sundays and holidays. It is a scheme that transcends time and space in its local context, and out of these realities it launched its meticulously informed and locally grounded responses. ‘Community’ has been effective in developing and realizing an information network on local safety, disorder and crime matters in terms discussed in previous sections. This has primarily been possible by fostering a ‘community’ of safety and disorder ‘knowledges’ readily available for subsequent, more formal or punitive interventions by police or other authoritative agencies, therefore suggesting a unique ‘power-knowledge’ nexus for the purposes of order and policing in local settings. In numerous instances, such ‘community’ information gathering processes were precisely standardized and guided. For example, most ‘community’ groups’ members kept so-called ‘incident’ sheets on suspicious items, behaviour or people in their areas that they would collect, complete and further communicate. Dozens of such ‘surveillance’ reports were exchanged between ‘community’, police and other agencies, often on a weekly basis. One particular one, for example, was designed to collect most specific information on taxicabs and their drivers who were suspected of transporting drugs, drug dealers and prostitutes in and out of the area, laying the information grounds for more formal investigations by police or other local authorities (see Appendices).

Many ‘community’ members explicitly outlined that they had quickly learned that ‘information’ was one of the most important resources to trigger police arrests, investigation of suspicious bars or the closure of crack houses, again underlining the practical relevance of the organization of relevant ‘knowledges’ for the purposes of local policing especially in realms outside the police. As one of the ‘community’ activists claimed to have learned, it

"does not help you if you call up the police or the liquor board and say: It’s been a couple of times that I have seen crack dealers going in and out of that place. You need to be able to say, on such and such a date and time, I saw two men, age approximately so and so, description, clothing, walking into that place with drugs in their hands, and they came out with money in their pockets" [Comm04].

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A number of 'community' respondents pointed out that in order to initiate an effective intervention by police against a suspected prostitute, a dwelling or a rooming house, they would first collect information in a rigorous and concerted manner over a period of a couple of weeks, and approach the police or other relevant agencies then with the collection of their so-called 'logs'.

It was primarily in the various network or collaborative settings between 'community' and other local order resources or agents that individual action, information and resources became most apparent and effective in terms of their local 'policing' or control impact. These processes may help to understand the practical materialization of 'legal-social networks' and other combined resources theorized above as key elements of state, power and control within local settings. Many of the organized 'community' people had established individual communication lines with CRU officers who they would contact instantly and directly about 'incidents' or 'suspects'. 'Community' meetings, as discussed, often played the crucial role of linking and connecting such information within the 'community'. There, the crucial processes of communicating and information from 'community' to police would take place; information most of which, as many CRU officers underlined, they "would have never had if the community would not collect and convey it to us". It is the "legwork" of problem observations, descriptions, notifications, information calls about prostitutes, drug dealers, crack houses, drunks, suspicious elements in laneways, abandoned cars, etc., in local areas that kept 'community police' in constant supply of 'policeable raw material'. It allowed them to base, initiate and legitimize their 'professional responses' on an infinite multitude of 'local problems'. This 'raw material', however, only becomes meaningful to the police and thus 'policeable' in that it is structured according to police rules and characteristics by providing 'policeable' information like, names, descriptions, license plate numbers and unambiguous reference to offenses or suspicions of such kind.

The legal networking function between 'community' and police becomes instructively clear in another example, the so-called 'community witness program' co-designed by the police and 'community activists'. The program was established on the premise that when drug dealers, pimps or prostitutes were arrested in one of the local areas and faced trial or a sentencing hearing, the division's prosecutor would contact the respective local 'community' organization in whose boundaries the perpetrator had been active. The 'community' contact in this area would then, on
notice of often 24 hours or less, organize a group of people to go to court as "community witnesses" for the purpose of providing "community impact statements" for the prosecution.

The "community" people's appearance in court, in their own assessment, would therefore serve two functions. First, the "community" filling the court room - in many instances, 20, 30 or 40 "community members" would show up for such events, often numerous times per month on weekday mornings - would symbolize to the judge, the prosecutor and the court as a whole that "the community cares, and that the court and the judge cannot ignore the fact that the community is the main victim in these cases" [Field notes]. In fact, these efforts also underline the relevance of networked cooperation among "community" groups, since they would notify each other about such court dates, and members of several groups would regularly show up for the "other group's offenders" and their "community" appearances in court.

Second, it become regular procedure upon the initiative of the police and a few local prosecutors that "community members" would be asked to make submissions to the court in these contexts in the form of so called "community impact statements". There, one or two pre-selected "community" spokespeople would get up for the prosecution and, in colourful terms, recite the "detrimental effects that the drug dealing or street prostitution had on their "community" as they are expressed in loss of safety, crime, noise, needles and condoms, blemished reputation, loss of property values", etc.. On that basis, they would "ask the court to take these destructive, harmful and frightening impacts of the offender's behaviour and crimes on the community" into consideration [Fieldnotes]. In a number of instances, as reported by CRU officers, substantially harsher sentences in terms of longer imprisonment or higher fines than usual were the consequences for offenders. However, it was in particular these "victim impact statements" that led the police and the prosecution to the development of the "boundary probation" idea, in which the court - in lieu of or in addition to a regular sentence in the form of imprisonment or a fine - would order the convicted person to stay out of the area of the division as part of their explicit probation conditions (or only to go on a direct way in or out of the area or to and from facilities necessary for daily life, in case they lived within the area).

It was within these contexts that the power of the cooperative networking, or the peculiar "local power/knowledge" nexus between the interdependent entities of "community" and police became utterly obvious. The potential breach of these "boundary probation" conditions by a convicted "disorder" offender - as in crossing the boundaries into the division - now gave the
police a much more powerful tool of enforcement. Many local officers were also consciously aware of the fact that many judges would see a ‘breach of probation’ offense as a much more serious incident than a simple ‘prostitution’ or ‘drug possession’ offense. Many CRU officers, in fact, admitted that in some instances they aimed intentionally to get such ‘probation orders’ over a ‘regular’ conviction, since it would give them much more effective leeway to deal with the convicted person later. These strategies corresponded well with ‘community officers’ primary focus on surveillance and investigation work in regular patrol activities directed towards street people. There, a suspect’s record would become apparent via simple person investigations, and could be used as effective ‘leverage’ for further action or ‘evidence’ towards arrests (see Chapter 5). Subsequent to the imposition of such probation orders on a certain offender, it would be not an irregular procedure that CRU officers went and informed organized ‘community’ groups in a meeting or more informal settings about the convicted person and the specification of the probation condition. In many instances, the description or name of the persons were either already known to, or were made known to, the ‘community’. They would then be encouraged by the police to specifically look for these individuals within their local areas, and instantly report any sightings to the police. The police would then, in turn, put considerable efforts into re-arresting such probation offenders, either with the effect that they had constant and repeated grounds to investigate and lay severe charges against them, or that they would use their substantial leverage to make them effectively disappear from the area. Numerous local prostitutes, drug dealers and other offenders had been ‘put away for quite some time’ on the basis of these cooperative proceedings, according to both ‘community’ and police respondents.

Many of the local ‘community’ associations also gradually discovered that the police and their operational tools were not always the most effective, fastest or efficient means in dealing with or eliminating unwanted people, activities or facilities from their local areas. Rather, they learned that a large variety of effective enforcement, punishment and control resources were available to them via settings outside the criminal law and police operations. These, primarily, fell under the wide umbrella of regulatory controls, laws and agencies within municipal jurisdictions. As such, the resort to and utilization of these regulatory resources and mechanisms of control by ‘community’ entities illustrates nicely the similarities pointed out earlier with regards to developments of ‘informal justice’ replacing more formal and punitive interventions of state and the law with more compliance-oriented and administrative intervention schemes. Especially, they
seem to exemplify their prevailing tendency to take effect against traditionally marginalized, powerless and non-mainstream populations and ‘disorderly’ behaviours, and effectively strengthen and reinforce the structures and directions of formal and traditional policing and control.

For example, the various ‘community’ bodies discovered the municipal liquor license regulations, inspections, license granting and renewal process and enforcement as a key tool to effectively proceed against ‘suspicious’ bars suspected of drug dealing and so on, and to ‘eliminate’ them from local areas. Again, in many ‘community’ settings, their activists would keep ‘logs’ or information accounts on suspicious incidents, and would subsequently contact the municipal liquor license authority. The agency’s commissioner responsible for the local area became a regular at many ‘community’ meetings, casually known and contacted by many ‘community activists’, and consistently being informed about new developments, ‘problem sites’ and related initiatives. When sufficient information was gathered on a new ‘problem bar’, the ‘community’ groups would make a submission to the liquor licensing office requesting an inspection, a reconsideration or temporary suspension of the license, usually by proceeding to unambiguously present themselves as the ‘community’. In fact, numerous bar and restaurant establishments in the local area had their liquor licenses suspended temporarily, lost them altogether or had to close their business as an effect of such ‘community’ proceedings around business or liquor licensing. These types of interventions were also frequently used or initiated by the police themselves in order to go after ‘problem spots’. The ‘community’ would regularly make submissions to the liquor license authorities also in the cases of regular new license or renewal applications from local establishments. These, by statute, contain a provision for ‘community’ impact assessment and input, and the ‘community’ groups’ submissions would be formulated depending on their judgment as to whether in their view the establishment was good for the area, the reputation and the community, or not.

Similar relationships of local control were built up between ‘community groups’ and the municipal licensing office responsible for taxi licenses, rooming houses, hostels, and social service agencies. With respect to rooming houses or social service agencies that had been identified as ‘unwanted’ or ‘improper’ elements in a particular local area, health and safety inspections via municipal or provincial authorities were discovered as effective tools towards either closing or ‘annoying’ facilities, or assuring compliance of some sort. In some instances, ‘community’ members would first inconspicuously ‘visit’ facilities and take notice of possible or suspected
deficiencies or violations of health, safety or construction standards. Subsequently, they would prepare detailed reports and send them to the respective licensing or inspection offices. There were numerous instances within the 99 Division jurisdiction where detailed inspections by the local health authorities or the fire department resulted in the temporary or indefinite closing of a variety of hostels, restaurants or other facilities in the area. A quite effective tool of informal control developed by one ‘community’ group was to investigate the insurance provider or even the mortgage providers of buildings, hostels or properties that were suspected to be ‘crack houses’. The ‘community’ would inform them about the alleged illegal activities on the property focussed on, which usually would lead to a thorough examination of the situation by the insurance or mortgage provider, and frequently an outright cancellation of the respective contracts.

In the case of a few social service agencies that had been identified as particularly ‘problematic’ and ‘in violation of community standards’ by ‘community’ groups, massive campaigns of letters, complaints, inspections and submissions about ‘illegal behaviour or standards’ on the agency’s property had led to situations where the government authorities would hold back funding for the institution, pending the condition of successful negotiations and compliance with ‘community’ and their requests. ‘Community’ in these contexts was, again, exclusively represented by the respective local ‘community’ organizations and their ‘members’. In one such scenario, negotiations failed in the first round, bringing the social service agency into a situation of potentially complete loss of operational funding for the coming year. In these particular instances, it was then the local police that were called into the negotiations as a ‘mediator’ between the two parties - with a dubious status of impartiality considering the above presented dynamics of ‘community policing’.

It was, however, the offices and resources of local councillors and politicians that played a crucially important role within these local ‘community’ information, surveillance and control networks and practices in the research setting. The emerging links or ‘network’ between police, ‘community’ and local councillors with their different resources and knowledges but intersecting agendas for the purposes of local order instructively illustrate the combined, ambivalent and semi-formal nature of processes and effects of ‘government’ at local levels. None of these, however, have been theorized, captured or made accountable yet in their systematic entirety. Usually attending ‘community’ meetings, the councillors or their assistants would inform local ‘community’ organizations and police at the same time about any sort of municipal license
applications and renewals, building permits and request, property purchases, rezoning applications, development plans, social service provider budgets, etc., in the area, and do so in many instances before they became official and generally available knowledge. They would provide the ‘community’ groups with names, contacts, dates and numbers for information gathering, petitions, meetings, and assist in or actively prepare submissions, appeals, requests on licensing, zoning, and municipal enforcement matters described, and thus played a significant role in facilitating the local knowledge and surveillance processes described above. All of this was happening under the clear awareness of the councillors and their offices that by successful ‘cooperation’ with the ‘community’ groups, a not insignificant number of people, as voters, could be reached and convinced of the politicians’ engagement and commitment to ‘safety’ and ‘crime’ issues. Their presence in ‘community’ meetings provided the interactive basis to discuss strategies, initiatives and tactics for individual or joint ‘action plans’ towards ‘disorder problems’, places and issues.

In one instance, one of the ‘community’ organizations exercised considerable pressure on one of their councillors to prevent the sale of a couple of buildings to a bidder who was suspected of planning to convert the dwellings into new rooming house facilities - a development the organization wanted to prevent under any circumstances. The councillor’s office provided names of landlords, property owners, zoning and license information, mortgage and insurance information on places, people and properties ‘investigated’ by ‘community’, and put pressure on ‘deviant’ establishments or social service agencies to ‘comply’ with ‘community standards’. Councillors’ offices, in another example, after a lengthy period of vigorous pressuring by a few ‘community’ groups, had local streets turned into one way streets, installed bicycle lanes between street and parking lanes, removed street car stop shelters upon pressure of the ‘community’ in order to eliminate prostitution traffic. They therefore actively participated and were a critical component in policing and ordering processes towards the multi-dimensional, social entity of ‘community’ as a life world shaped by crime, safety and order concerns. Councillors, furthermore, consulted with ‘community’ stakeholders on their preferences for the redesign of parks and public property, fencing in buildings and putting in lights on school properties, parks etc., themselves exercised pressure on licensing agencies, were in regular contact with many ‘community’ activists as well as the police. It was one of the local councillors who started organizing and conducting ‘safety audits’ in the local area, developing and collecting ‘audit sheets’ and initiating ‘safety
improvements’ in form of lights, fences, walkway redesigns etc.

Two ‘community’ activists explain the role and significance of cooperation with the local politicians, their powers and resources in establishing an effective and dense regime of local safety, order and control as envisaged by the ‘community’ organizations:

*Our councillor is very helpful. He helps us to get through red tape, he will help us to get things done. In many instances, he can't do things himself, but he will direct us, through his staff. If you have a problem with the rooming house, you can call him, and they will say, OK, this is what you can do. Call these people, talk to them, and this will get things going at the licensing commission. We have major parking problems at S street, which allow hookers to work the streets unhindered. So we went to him, help us. So his office limited parking and put in bike lanes, which was supposed to stop the hooker traffic. So he opens doors and shows the way. They also inform us about things happening and give us critical information, often before we or others would know. Because we have been around and organized for so long, we have a contact almost in every government office. We usually get prompt replies and a response. [Comm07]*

*The cooperation with the councillors has gotten quite good over the years. They see us as more powerful, so they are taking us more seriously now than before. Our city councillor has an excellent assistant, and her assistant is at least as powerful and important for the community as the councillor herself. Because she is the research and executive arm, they have so many facts and pieces of information that are most helpful to our community work. She knows both sides of the coin, and gives us a lot of relevant information. Say for a example, I am worried with a crack problem at a certain place, there can be certain extenuating circumstances that we don’t know about. So as soon as we find out about from the assistant, it gives us a different route to follow or different resources to use. You're coming at a problem much more from the knowledge and information angle, and that is the most important thing in all of our work. The more facts you have the better. [Comm12]*

One of the local councillors, for example, developed the habit of sending regular ‘reports’ on local ‘safety’ and order issues, including the councillor's initiatives or recommendations on these matters to various ‘community’ groups and the CPLC. One of them stated the following:

*"Further complaints re drug dealing at [123 and 321 A street]. Open dealing in the doorways and on the property. What strategy is in place? Is the division working together with [public housing authority’s] Security? A coffee shop at [B and C streets] seems to be a hangout for some of these dealers. ... We continue to get break-ins in cars in the [D area]. The [E Grill] has applied for a liquor license renewal - we are working with [the Z community group] on this. ... As a follow-up to my last report, I hope the Committee has sent a letter supporting revoking the license of the [F restaurant] to the Licensing Commission".*

A few months later, the councillor offers the follow-up:

*"City council approved today a motion asking the Licensing Commission to rescind the license of the [F restaurant], an infamous location where drug dealing occurs. The police had*
been concentrating efforts and had laid numerous charges, they prepared a report including community impact statements... In addition, City staff prepared a report on zoning and health and safety infractions which will also be submitted to Licensing.”

Furthermore, the councillor underlines the councilor office’s role as a ‘community safety’ information and initiative ‘brokerage’ mobilizing players, resources and activities:

“Residents and businesses in the [A, B and E streets] area are holding a meeting this week co-sponsored by me and to which the police have been invited. Concerns around laneways shared by commercial and residential users in the [D area] continue.... Significant drug dealing, using and some street prostitution is occurring in the laneways and streets bordering [E street]. Work continues with the ... residents on similar problems for their streets and the private commercial lane serving [E street] stores. Also, residents in the [D and E area] met last week on a number of items, many of them involving safety. The increasing number of car break-ins and vandalism aggravated everything. They decided to explore setting up a [Z residents’ association], which if it were to be created could help knit together all these initiatives”.

The real dynamics and effects of the combined ‘micro-power’ between ‘community’ and local politicians in policing activities against neighbourhood ‘disorder’ become evident in the exemplary case of the [Z community] group which for a long period of time had identified a particular rooming house as a ‘thorn’ in their neighbourhood. Their complaint was that the rooming house is frequented by drug dealers and prostitutes, and that these activities were allowed and tolerated by the owner of the building, all of which was documented by ‘numerous log sheets and incident reports’. On these grounds, the ‘community’ group had requested the owner to come to one of their regular meetings to ‘discuss the matter’, ‘set him straight’ and ‘tell him what is going to happen if he does not comply with community standards’. The ‘community’ meeting - in which ‘community’ was represented by six ‘members’ of the local organization - was also attended by the city councillor. However, the rooming house owner did not show up at the arranged time. The group members saw themselves confirmed in their suspicion that ‘the guy obviously does not care about the community’. Their initial reaction was that as the next strategy, ‘we need to overwhelm him with negative stuff and official complaints to all possible places’ which they hoped would lead to an injunction by the city ‘to require him to hire a social worker who screens people and only lets the proper ones in’. Apparently, the group had accomplished such a measure in another instance of a ‘problem rooming house’ some time back. For the case
that the rooming house owner did not comply, it was proposed that, "we have to see that he gets shut down". The city councillor, who supposedly heard about this particular issue for the first time, asked the 'community' to fax all the information about the 'problem rooming house' to her office which would then 'forward it to an inspector with the licensing commission'. The 'community' and the councillor in the meantime also agreed to arrange to request a building inspector into the rooming house, on the basis of the claim that 'rooming house residents are supposedly using open heaters in the rooms, that there is not enough bathrooms in the building according to the standards, and that there is raccoons in the roof'. They suspected that all of these issues taken together, properly investigated and enforced by the various authorities 'should be enough stuff to shut this place down'.

In the midst of this discussion, to everybody's surprise, the rooming house owner, showed up at the meeting. In a sort of 'inquisition' setting, 'community members' started to accuse the owner of 'running a prostitution hotel', that 'his house is inhabited by crack dealers', that 'he does not care about the facility, the community, or the safety and security of community residents who are very concerned', and that his facility is a 'crime and danger factor in the community making decent people's lives miserable'. One of the 'community members' then went on to read him the 'procurement' section of the Criminal Code's prostitution section saying that a landlord is 'liable and punishable if he knows that prostitution is going on in his house and he does not do anything about it'. The 'community' activists further instructed the landlord that he has 'responsibilities as a landlord and that his responsibility is to the community which he has widely neglected, and he must either get on track or lose his right to operate his facility'. Somewhat to the surprise of the assembly of 'community' people, the rooming house owner stated that he will be 'happy to see the building inspector come in', and that he was even 'willing to cooperate with the police and the community'. He asserted that 'he would like to throw out a lot of people but that the law does not allow him to do so' and that they 'could even sue him if he tried to do that'. As an alternative, the 'community', with the approval of the local councillor, made the suggestion that he should convert his rooming house into a 'nice single family dwelling or apartment building', that the community and the councillor's office 'would give him all their support he needs clearing bureaucratic hurdles', and that such a step would solve the problems once and for all.

In the meantime, the 'community' demanded that the rooming house owner 'throws out the bad people, the crooks, the hookers and the dealers' like rooming houses 'used to do in the
good old days’, and that he establishes a system to ‘thoroughly screen all people coming in and out of the facility’. The ‘community’ also requested him to sign a ‘trespass letter’ with the police so that they are able to enter and enforce the ‘trespass act’ on his property any time. The owner, after some hesitation, seemed willing to comply with the request. As a sign of ‘cooperation’ of the apparently increasingly worried rooming house owner in light of the obviously mounting pressures on him, he invited the ‘community’ to come and ‘inspect the building so that they can see what is going on there. I will even let you into people’s rooms although that is illegal’. Finally, the councillor staunchly reminded the owner that ‘he has to run his rooming house properly, which means only keeping and letting proper people in; otherwise, we will have to make sure that the authorities come down hard on you. There are lots of rules and regulations to be enforced in your case’. The councillor further underlined that he has to ‘take the community seriously and that they are not putting up with this stuff any longer’. He was encouraged to ‘consider the possibility of a conversion of the building, and you can see where the support would be coming from’. The councillor, once more, requested a thorough screening of people, and made it quite clear that the owner would ‘face tremendous pressures when the facility comes up for re-licensing’. If he does not comply with the requests made, the councillor promises that ‘your rooming house will be shut down soon’.

In another ‘community’ meeting, a strategy was developed with regards to a ‘problem bar’ that had been taken over by a new owner who the ‘community’ suspected of ‘being involved in drug dealing’. Some of the ‘community’ people inconspicuously had gone into and investigated the bar a few times, and the new owner had supposedly indicated to one of them that he did not intend to apply for a liquor license. However, a few days ago the ‘community’ received notice from one of their personal contacts at the licensing commission that an application for a liquor license had been submitted. The five ‘community’ people present at the meeting agreed that ‘the community does not need another sleazy bar’ and that ‘the three that are there are three too many’. It was decided that they would submit a deposition to the licensing commission strongly opposing the license, and that they would request the police also to submit such a statement. Furthermore, they decided to request via their city councillor to ‘make it mandatory via by-law in the area that every liquor license or renewal will automatically require the approval of the community’, on behalf of which they obviously saw themselves as acting.

The discussion then shifted to a local social service agency and shelter identified as a
'problem site' in terms of its patrons gathering on the sidewalk, noise, suspected drug dealers and prostitutes in the facility and on the property. As its first intervention, the 'community' had requested the agency to erect 'a fence around the property to keep the garbage and the people inside', and to sign a 'trespass letter' with the police so that they could enter the property and the building. The agency initially refused the requests. The 'community' group's intention now was to collect as much evidence as possible against 'misbehaviour on the premises and breach of violations and make a submission to licensing commission and the city so we can block the funding, which will eventually make them pretty compliant'. The 'community' group also gathered its results on the owner of a larger building site in the local area close to residences of some of the 'community members' who allegedly had plans to set up a rooming house on the property. They decided to use the councillor's office to get information about the planned use of the property, licenses, zoning etc., and also to use a contact in the financial business to get information about the mortgage on the property, in order to be able to start to obstruct these plans through these various 'informal' avenues.

A number of 'community' activists in their own terms describe the resources, strategies and effects of the 'networking' efforts between organized 'community', municipal officials and the police to tackle local 'disorder' and 'problems'. They elaborate on how these efforts are becoming effective especially in their concerted cooperative settings and approaches of networking local authorities, resources and sites of 'ordering power', and by systematically linking the crucial resources of 'information' and ordering with subsequent intervention mechanisms. In short, they describe their own very effective 'power/knowledge' nexus of local control.

_We do our neighborhood walks periodically. They keep us and the police up to date where problem spots are, and make it visible in the community that we are looking out. We have victim impact statements with the crowns on file. They just have to call us up, like, we want somebody who lives at [A and B streets], or [C and D streets] for a court case tomorrow, can you come out, and we will, we are scattered throughout. We have provided the liquor licensing commission with the blank community impact statements, and we will go to court when they need us. We work on little projects with the division, when they do local sweeps, we call them and let them know when places are active, and when people are around that they are looking for, where people are going and stuff, where they are hiding. Whatever information they wish from us, we give it to them willingly. We work with them at the drop of the head if they want us to. We've taken out phone booths and shelters. We had fences put in to cut off properties from the streets, so that the dealers and the hookers don't go in. Or we put in lights to make places safer. We do a lot of little things._

[Comm07]

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What we are trying to do is to aid the police, and they come and we tell them there is such and such a problem here, we have meetings with them. For example, such and such a rooming house is a crack house, and we help to collect information for them then to have the power just to go in there and clean it out. As the community, we are pretty strong collectively, we can bring in a lot of people when it comes to certain issues, for example, when we had the issue of the X building that some guys wanted to turn into a rooming house. A lot of people from our streets went out to the committee of adjustment, and when we were having problems at [a local social service agency], all the people came out. And then our leaders, in each of our committees, try to work with these groups. And particularly, we worked with the city councillors, they’ve been really good. We kept pressuring them, and they realized that we are the voters, we are the people in their ward, and they have to help us, because you can do something but not everything on your own. You can get a crowd out, but if we can let the councillors and the police know that we are not going away, then we can get their help, and the city’s lawyers, etc. [...] Last summer, and hopefully it will happen again this year, we were going to court a lot with the community witness program, and we have a letter into the prosecutor officers at 99 Division, and so do all the other community groups. They have their special officer who prepares the prosecution who works closely with us. We know him, he knows us, he briefs the prosecuting attorney about the neighborhood, how the neighbors are having a really bad problem with prostitution and drug dealing, and then the prosecutor can make a plea to the judge, this person has been arrested 55,000 times, that it is an extremely bad thing for the neighborhood, if you are not planning on giving him any days in jail, at least put the boundaries on for a year or two. So if they get caught back in the area again, they have broken the probation, and the judges don’t like that. The fact that they are drug dealers is not that important at this point, it is that they have broken this judges probation. And then, hopefully they will get six months or a year, or whatever. So that is what we are trying to do. We take a whole crowd with us, and make a real impression on the court. And we’ve had judges and justices of the peace saying, oh, thank you very much, we didn’t realize that there was a problem. [...] So we’ve been very successful there. We have also been working with city councillors on notorious landlords who own ten or twelve rooming houses. They don’t scrutinize who comes in, and then we end up with weak people who tend to let in drug dealers or prostitutes, and then nobody there on the site supervises these things, and it just escalates from there. We’ve been working on that, with the rooming house commissioner. And of course, we need to have 99 Division with us who confirm what we are seeing going on around drug activity, we are keeping all these logs. Then they go in on our suggestion, and they hope that they can catch somebody in the act, and we can have all that information to go to the rooming houses commissioner. Our and the police’s work go pretty much hand in hand. [...] We are great believers in logs. We keep logs on basically everything that is going on, and we make sure that as many people as possible do the same. So if there is something going on, we keep logsheets, that will say the date, and the time, and the activity, and what the people looked like, so that when we go to the rooming house commissioner, we’ve got it all written down, and we won’t just say, oh, this happens every day, because he would say, this is not good enough. Instead, we have all the precise information there. Or with 99 Division, when we report a drug dealer, and they say, what does he look like, we can say, oh, just a minute, and look it up in the logs. Or descriptions of hookers on the streets. We often compare these with the books the police have on hookers. Because otherwise, although we meet every week, you tend to forget things. And we feed all that information routinely to the police, who, I think, rely on that stuff quite a bit. We do quite a bit of legwork for them, but also mainly because it is a cause we aim for. Right now, the city lawyers are asking us to keep an eye on the rooming houses that are under scrutiny, because the city is trying to get that landlord, and we are keeping an eye on him. But if we need the information for the police, we got the logs. [Comm04]

As one of the first community initiatives in the area, we were changing the street directions, which cut down the traffic a lot. In the wintertime, we would rally and do walkabouts in the area with the neighbors, and the police. We would do that in the main problem areas, and other areas wanted to form their own groups, and they formed similar organizations. So we were not in a vacuum anymore, they all came out,
and we had a lot of people at these corners with the rallies. So we constantly joined forces, and would expand our boundaries. Different groups would come in. We started to all get together, and go on their walks, and they came on ours and we supported one another. And it was a good feeling that we had support, and all that happened very quickly. We kept logs and things. Neighbors who lived besides a crack house, or saw hookers on the street all the time. We would phone the police, and then keep logs on things. Time, day, description of person and what they were doing. It took us a while that we needed the undercover officers from the drug squad to help us clean up, which was not a division thing. So we invited those officers to the meetings. What those officers asked us to do was to keep the logs, so if they went in to make an undercover buy in a crack house they had all this documented for weeks in advance, so when they went to court they were able to tell the judges that this was not just one instance of somebody doing it, but a repeat thing. Same with the hookers. We would keep logs, we would phone the plainclothes unit. So we began to know how to call the right people, not just leave a message with the desk. [...] And then, a while ago, the local [member of the provincial parliament] started the ‘community witness program’. We would get calls from the police officers when they were going to court for the trial or the sentencing, and we would go along and fill the courtroom. And once again, it was not just us, but the other groups would come along to our cases, and we would go to theirs. We were all supporting one another, and we would get deputations to the judge what it is like living in an area, with the needles and condoms in front of the garage, the noise, the violence, etc., and asked the judge to give stiffer sentences. And we were quite successful. [...] We have developed quite a few investigative skills, but it is all things that we slowly acquired. If you see a criminal activity, and every time when I say a criminal activity I mean drugs or prostitution because you don’t see much else here, we keep notes, we watch, we keep logs, and of course, we know the right people to call at the police station rather than just the desk. It is important to know who to get because you may need to call a certain sergeant, but you don’t know if he is on shift or not, in or not, morning or late shift. So it turns out that we know all of the sergeants who are there, we know their names and schedules, and the staff sergeant who is supposed to coordinate things. So for example, just north of [Z street], in a car port, is a van. It has been there for a long time, and just a month ago, we observed hookers turning tricks in there and we also saw people smoking drugs. So what we did for a while, we took notes of the situation, what was happening there over the last few weeks, and we called the police. What they did is they traced the plate, and they found out that the van belongs to somebody in [a suburb of the city where research was conducted], and they are trying to get it towed. At the same time, our foot officers came over and investigated, talked to some people who the van belonged to, and they took away a hooker and a guy. And then it started again a couple of days ago. So we started calling again, and let them know what is going on, and they will look into it. It is because of the relationship that we developed with them that we are able to do these things. [Comm05]

A further preferred strategy of local ‘community’ activists toward making ‘their community a safer place’ as observed in the research setting may be seen as falling under the umbrella of what others have called “target hardening” (Cohen 1985) or “creating defensible spaces” (Newman 1972) with respect to local public spaces. The overarching philosophy of such efforts by organized ‘community’ seemed to be to make, on the one hand, the local territories of public streets, places and alleyways less ‘penetrable’ or accessible to ‘outsiders’. On the other hand, their efforts were directed towards creating a local environment in which each ‘stranger’ or ‘strange behaviour’ would be identified more easily and instantly, where there would be no places to ‘hide’ from local powers of ‘order’ and ‘control’. This evolved almost to the degree where just
‘being’ in a public place without a good or ‘orderly’ reason may be seen as a suspicious activity. Many ‘community’ groups, in practice, effectively worked towards the fencing in of properties, private, commercial as well as public buildings, warding or walling off private properties which were increasingly becoming sites toward which ‘disorder’ was to be funnelled and contained due to the considerable ‘control’ and ‘elimination’ efforts going on in public spaces. Numerous private dwellings erected fences during the research period, and ‘community’ groups pressured school boards and the city authorities to do the same around their properties, parks, even playgrounds. One of the local ‘community’ groups pressured government officials vigorously to erect a fence around an empty and unused public building. The request was eventually granted - until a few months later when the police reported in a ‘community’ meeting that they were “chasing drug dealers” towards the building who then slipped through the fence and the police could not continue the pursuit.

Even the architectural and botanical redesign of a central and large green park in the area - negotiated between the city’s officials, police and local ‘community’ groups - was dominated by the principal planning questions and tasks to eliminate and not allow anymore ‘hiding places for dealers and hookers’. One of the demands guiding the discussions was that ‘all corners of the park must by accessible to police on bikes and in cruisers without hindrance’. To that extent, the park design planning committee suggested not to put any ground shrubs or bushes into the park, but only trees in reasonable distance from each other, pruned clear up to 8ft height. Some months prior, the city - upon pressure from a councillor and ‘community’ - had installed batteries of neon lighting in the park that illuminated the site like a sports arena at night for the sake of visibility and surveillance of this potential ‘problem’ site.

One ‘community’ group led a fierce battle against the proposed redesign plans for a public school in the local area. The school building in the existing design had physically separated the single-house dwelling, middle class residential street (on which many ‘community members’ lived) area from one of the ‘rough’ main streets. It so functioned as a ‘natural’ wall of the residential area especially from one of the large social housing projects on the other side of the street, and also separating the school’s play and sports area from the residential area. The re-design plans for the school drafted by an outside designer proposed to turn the school building by 90 degrees and thus provide a broadly open access corridor between the residential ‘community’ area, and the street and the social housing area behind it. In a meeting with planners, school board and city
officials, the ‘community’ representatives vigorously tried to stop these plans from going ahead. They made their case by underlining that the ‘school re-design is not only a student but also a community safety and quality of life issue’. The proposed plans would ‘totally disrupt the residential lives of the many people who work, live and recover here in our community’, and that the current plans raised considerable ‘safety issues since in the current design the police have great visibility on and access to the school grounds from the main street, which they would not have with the new design’. This was seen as a ‘great threat for the children’s safety with all the prostitutes and drug dealers in the area’.

The ‘community’ people, however, ignored the comments of the planners who pointed out that in the current design, the school grounds are openly accessible to the ‘rough’ main street, and that there have been numerous incidents of illegitimate people entering the school grounds, or children running into traffic. This situation, according to the planners, may be effectively remedied by the plans for the new building since they proposed to erect a physical barrier between the school grounds and the major street rather than the (likely safer) residential area. However, in the new design, so the ‘community’ people argued in response, ‘drug dealers and hookers could hide in the bushes on the side of the school facing the residential street, the police would never see them, and we could not walk or sleep comfortably anymore’. According to their argument, it would be a guaranteed scenario that these open spaces ‘would be abused for sex trade, drugs, noise, sleeping homeless people at night, during off-school periods, in the summer’. They continued requesting that ‘for reasons of the safety, security and quality of life of the residential community the school cannot be redesigned according to the plans proposed’.

Further efforts were made to render public spaces and facilities less available or convenient to use or colonize. All of these efforts occurred under the apparent rationale that such measures would reduce the criminogenic appeal and grounds of public environments. Under these assumptions, numerous public bus and street car shelters as well as public phones in the area became successively removed via the concerted pressure of ‘community’ groups and city councillors on the local telephone and public transportation authorities. The claim was that the facilities were used by drug dealers to arrange and conduct drug deals, and their absence would make the area ‘less attractive for dealers’ and put their activities ‘more into the open’ and make them ‘better recognizable for both community and the police’.

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CHPT. 10: CONCLUSION

This study aimed to explore the wider social and professional realities, implications and effects of 'community policing'. At the core of the investigation stood the question of how the increasingly popular 'idea' of 'community police' in a practical setting translates into concrete police identity, structures and operations. It was also designed to investigate how the rather abstract concept of 'community' as the key social and functional platform materializes within these new frameworks, and how these two entities relate to and collaborate with each other in constituting a symbolic and operational framework of 'community policing'. On the basis of the presented study, the following empirical and more abstract conclusions emerge as central findings.

The organizational reality of 'community policing' within the police force examined in this research is dominated by properties of marginality and ambiguity. While in this case study the umbrella of 'community policing' appears to have been used as a political tool to indicate the arrival of 'new and better' policing by new leaders on both the force and divisional level, 'community policing' was implemented as an addition to traditional police structures and functions rather than as a comprehensive reform of them. The creation and assignment of a separate and isolated segment of police resources ('CRU') to be and do 'community policing' showed a bifurcating effect within the organization under study. Internally, the CRU appeared at times detached and isolated from the 'real' police organization, and was seen by many officers as not doing 'real police' work, or being the 'spoiled darlings' of the commander. On the other hand, through its close and active involvement with social and 'community' stakeholders and interests, the CRU became the division's anchor and shield - or 'bridgehead' - for all social, 'community', accountability, etc. concerns and issues. It thus constituted a bulwark function for the traditional parts of the police organization in that it protected them from outside 'reform' or 'social' pressures. This may suggest that 'community policing' can essentially be understood as a tactical strategy against fundamental police reform. This relates further to the observed organizational marginality of 'community policing' which in terms of resources and functions internally tended to be seen as secondary or peripheral to traditional police functions. 'Community policing' largely happens at the 'organizational mercy' of traditional functions and resources, which for example is illustrated by the fact that CRU officers were frequently pulled out to supplement traditional police (eg, emergency response) functions, but never the other way round.
In terms of professional culture and values, ‘community policing’ appears dominated by traditional tenets. Most CRU supervisors and officers are still driven by a coercive ‘control and arrest’ culture even in their celebrated ‘problem solving’ context, and alternative solutions to ‘problems’ are not only the exception, but often shunned and ridiculed. This situation is further described by much ambiguity in the area of leadership in ‘community police’ work, which materializes predominantly as a form of ‘laissez-faire’ management as long as officers engage in activities that can be labelled as ‘community’ concerns. Many CRU officers, however, complain about a lack of guidance from their supervisors on what issues they should tackle and how to do this in the new ‘community police’ work paradigm. This sense of confusion also becomes visible in the fact that most of them have no sense of how their work will be evaluated. Finally, ‘community policing’ inside the police organization is confronted with considerable organizational resistance. This, on the one hand, arises out of the fact that ‘community police’ work in its broad approach gets involved in many areas which used to be the sole ‘property’ of specialized units (eg, prostitution, drug, liquor enforcement), and thus challenges long-established turfs. Secondly, there is widespread sense in the organization as a whole that ‘community policing’, in terms of its principles and work reality as projected onto the CRU, is not about ‘real police’ work, and thus enjoys low or no respect by many rank and file officers in the organization’s environment, pushing it further into a marginal role.

The idea of ‘community policing’ involves claims of fundamental changes with regards to how the police understand their role and tasks, and how they approach and go about them, with an ends-, safety- and analytical-oriented ‘problem solving’ perspective becoming the guiding paradigm. In the context of this study, however, ‘community police’ work almost exclusively materialized as aggressive and persistent street or public order work, focusing on the control of disorder phenomena in public spaces, largely in the form of prostitution, drug dealing, liquor offenses and loitering, etc. While it may be suggested that this is a coincidence, in the wider socio-political context in which ‘community policing’ materializes it seems more appropriate to suggest that ‘community policing’ provides a framework that calls and allows for the police to vigorously concentrate on public order work that had been relatively neglected over the past couple of decades. ‘Problem solving’ in the ‘community police’ work in the force under study was primarily translated into the vigorous and rather reactive elimination of problem phenomena or symptoms from the local area of responsibility, eg. prostitutes, small-scale drug dealers, drunks, etc.. In that
context, 'community police' work was set into practice as persistent efforts towards the purification of problematized public spaces claimed by 'community'.

These 'problem elimination' efforts were set into practice by a widely diverse toolbox which the 'community police' officers have at their discretion, and which are used with different preferences by representatives of the different typologies of CRU officers' work styles that have been introduced and discussed above. One predominant way of 'problem solving' for many officers is a vigorous, aggressive law enforcement and arrest strategy, for which the 'community police' work mandate, work environment and chosen targets provide them with a welcoming and constructive context. 'Solving' the 'problem', for example, of street prostitution in a neighborhood typically happened by 'hammering them with arrests'. Thus, it is not the type of target or approach used in police work that has changed in 'community police' work, but rather its labels.

However, a wide variety of other strategies are put into place for the purposes of the control of local spaces. Many officers effectively exercised their coercive control efforts upon 'disorder' people in public spaces via the use non-criminal law enforcement, or other informal or 'low-threshold' legal proceedings. The broad-scale implementation of personal information checks ('208' forms), the control and enforcement of probation orders or the massive enforcement of traffic, health and liquor control laws and regulations against the selected 'disorder' target groups in lieu of, or in addition to, conventional law enforcement clearly illustrates the breadth of 'work tools' available and used in 'community police' work. These observations already allude to the fact that much 'community police' work and the local control it produces can effectively happen without much formal law enforcement. Related to this diversity of control, an important component of the 'community police' officer's work materializes in his/her constant surveillance efforts. These are partly conducted by the police themselves, partly with the help of 'community' and provide the officer with a detailed and broad knowledge about 'problems', their histories and contexts in their local work areas. On the basis of this broad and detailed knowledge and intervention base formed jointly by police and 'community' resources, the variety of control and enforcement schemes are being put to work quite effectively, as the example of the enforcement of 'boundaries' for prostitution through probation orders demonstrates.

In this context, this study also provides valuable insights into how the much celebrated 'community involvement' happens from the police perspective. In practice, 'community' is
essentially perceived by the police as a facilitative and supportive resource and element for 'community police' work which remains fundamentally police-centred in terms of perceptions and operations. 'Community' are supposed to provide information, 'policeable raw material', legitimacy and thus essentially 'leg work' to the police, who in turn see themselves at the centre of 'community policing'. The police see themselves as the ones who know what the real problems and issues are, as the ones who select and do the 'real police work'. In fact, in the current framework of 'community policing', the police are the entity which hold and exercise the crucial power over the critical areas of decision-making on what 'community police' work is all about, what it focuses on and how it is to be done. This suggests an effective 'hegemony' of the police in the 'community policing' scheme.

An important insight of this study concerns how the fluent and ambiguous entity of 'community' materializes in the 'community policing' context. In the current socio-political environment of the 'lean state' and 'responsibilized citizens', 'community' for the purposes of 'community policing' in the research site presented itself as the entity of a highly selective and rather unrepresentative spectrum of interests and stakeholders present and active in the local environment. The 'community' representatives' common denominator was that they agreed on 'disorder' people and phenomena (prostitution, drug dealers, social service clients, etc.) in public places being the essential 'community' problems, and that the 'solution' was to eliminate them from the local area - primarily by utilizing the police. These particular 'community' interests and ideas were highly selective and distinct in a local social environment that featured great ethnic, socio-economic and political diversity. However, what distinguished these 'community' participants from others not involved in 'community policing' was that they had effectively organized themselves into so-called 'community' groups who were readily presenting themselves and acting as 'the community', effectively staging homogeneity and consensus by the fact that they constituted themselves in a self-selective, self-appointed and exclusionary manner.

It is a striking feature of the 'community policing' practices in the research site that there were no visible efforts on the side of the police to actively go out and assemble any forms of more representative 'community' forum or body for 'community' involvement. Rather, it seems that the police were in dire need of any 'community' entities, voices or stakeholders for the framework of 'community policing', and they easily resorted to the 'community' groups and flagholders which already existed and voiced their interests and concerns louder than anybody else. These groups,
however, appeared far from presenting a cross-section of the broad social spectrum of the population who live and work in the divisional jurisdiction. While the ‘community’ stakeholders interviewed presented themselves as rather homogeneously white, middle-class, employed or self-employed, native English speakers and as property owners, the majority of people living and working in the division do not fall into these categories.

What furthermore seemed to unite and shape the perspectives of the self-declared ‘community’ stakeholders was the fact that they agreed on a common idea of the ‘enemy’, citing street disorder people and phenomena on the one hand, but on the other hand referring to the social service institutions ‘catering’ and ‘nurturing’ these ‘problem people’. In light of insufficient, ineffective and reduced public service efforts to deal with these local ‘problems’ (as they were understood by the ‘community’ stakeholders), they perceived themselves as called upon and most justified to represent, act and speak as ‘the community’, to push the police and other stakeholders towards ‘action’, and to take matters into their own hands where possible. The vast majority of self-appointed ‘community’ stakeholders did not appear to have any doubts about their ‘legitimacy’ or ‘representativeness’ of ‘community’ interests. This probably reflects the fact that they rarely heard or saw any opposition or resistance, or if there was any, conflicting views could very well organize their own ‘community’ interests. All these observations point to the critically constructed and constituted nature of ‘community’ in the social reality of ‘community policing’ practice which, underneath the ‘surface’ of consensus appears to be dominated by fundamental social conflict. These social dynamics have been neglected in most discussions of ‘community policing’, and urgently require more thoughtful attention.

The ‘community’ stakeholders examined furthermore presented two most interesting and enlightening further insights with regards to the nature and effects of ‘community police’ work as it was implemented in the division under study. First of all, while many of them vigorously pushed for more police involvement and action with regards to the people and problems that they saw at the heart of the ‘community’ decay they lamented, most of them, upon further questioning, conceded or suggested that these matters were essentially not law enforcement or police issues, but rather ‘social matters’ that needed to be addressed by appropriate measures in the social realm. Secondly, when queried about the effectiveness of the ‘community police’ work that had been going on in their local areas for some time, the ‘community’ stakeholders predominantly suggested that these effects were of a temporary, spatial or ambiguous nature. Some of them saw
prostitutes or drunks disappearing for a while, but then new faces appeared or old faces returned, and this was often said to have made things worse because it drew new ‘problems’ to the area. Others observed that police essentially moved ‘problems’ around from one area to the next, and thus mostly engaged in problem ‘displacement’ rather than ‘solving’.

Finally, this study has also presented substantial empirical evidence that ‘community’ is responsible for putting into practice a considerable range of its own ‘policing’ activities which cannot be overlooked when trying to grasp the full range of local control through which ‘community policing’ materializes. While a considerable part of these efforts flows into providing information and surveillance which are fed directly into the ‘community police’s’ work, the field work has also demonstrated that organized ‘community’ have developed and put into practice a considerable range of their own control mechanisms which are all contributing to the effects of a grand scheme of local ordering towards newly proclaimed ‘community’ norms and standards. These efforts extend to the target-hardening of private, public, and other mass-private spaces colonized by ‘community’, and which are effectively re-arranged around the predominant objectives of identifying, targeting and excluding the emphasized ‘problem’ people and/or phenomena. The spatial re-design of one of the public parks or the negotiations around the construction plans for a public school in the local area provided instructive examples of these efforts. Boarding, fencing and gating become ubiquitous activities of ‘community’ border-drawing activities or, in other words, separating the good from the bad, the legitimate from the illegitimate, the included from the excluded. These efforts of spatial control had the further effect of making public spaces as inhospitable as possible for the ones who most depend on them (eg, through removal of public phones, or street car stops). On the other hand, the aggressive colonization, claiming and bordering of ‘community spaces’ rendered the remaining public spaces (streets, alleyways, etc.) an effective ‘ghetto’ or last resort for the excluded and ‘undesirable’ elements.

A wide range of other social or civil resources were mobilized by the ‘community’ entities for the purposes of local ordering. Via the claim of ‘community’ interests and representation, ‘community’ groups collaborated with a variety of public and non-public actors towards effectively ‘ordering’ local environments. For example, the proactive utilization and enforcement of health, fire and safety bylaws and standards, or zoning, licensing and funding decisions as triggered or influenced by ‘community’ members facilitating a comprehensive inclusion/exclusion regime toward ‘desired’ or ‘undesired’ elements in the ‘community’ (in forms of business,
hospitality establishments, social service providers, welfare hostel owners, etc.) in joint fashion with city councillors or metropolitan offices underlines the relevance of the trivial, everyday-life social ordering and control efforts forming an integral part of ‘community policing’ as a ‘local order’ project.

On a broader and more abstract level, this study offers a number of fundamental and significant conclusions and implications with regards to the meaning and study of ‘community policing’. However, these thoughts should be introduced with a comment regarding the generalizability of the study’s findings presented here. This study underlines the premise that the nature, foci and effects of ‘community policing’ materialize in real-life contexts, and can only be identified and examined there. ‘Community policing’ may very well look and work elsewhere in very different fashions compared to the ones described here. However, the truth may yet be a bit more complex. It may very well be the case - and it is strongly speculated here that it likely is - that it is the particular types of local social and political constellations encountered in this study - characterized by high socio-economic diversity, gentrification, etc. - that provide a fertile ground for ‘community policing’ to evolve as a mode of governing these conflict terrains. It may, after all, not be pure coincidence that of The City’s police force’s dozen or so divisions, only three or four were (at the time of this research) actively engaging in ‘community policing’ efforts. All of these divisions featured high levels of street disorder phenomena and socioeconomic discrepancies in urban contexts such as have been described for the research site, with organized residents’ and business groups loudly demanding action. Thus, ‘community policing’s veil of utilitarian neutrality may be more deceiving than commonly assumed, and it may be an umbrella for much more blatant and biased involvement of the police in late modern social conflicts played out in local terrains than typically imagined.

Probably the key finding of this study concerns the effects or the ‘success’ of ‘community policing’. Most of the ‘community’ representatives, many CRU officers in this study, and the general ‘community policing’ literature point to the undemonstrable, meagre or ambivalent effectiveness of ‘community policing’ efforts on a functional level, e.g. with regards to reducing crime rates and incidents, significantly increasing and exerting a lasting influence on people’s perception of safety or fear of crime, or the reduction of the demand for conventional police services. On this premise, this study suggest that the huge and fundamentally more important success of ‘community policing’ lies elsewhere and materializes in two fundamentally different
directions. 'Community policing', as it evolved in the study context, has effectively 're-socialized' the police as an ultimately social agent and institution, and it has spawned a process through which local social matters and environments are predominantly conceptualized and dealt with as 'policeable' issues and spaces.

As is also illustrated in the comments of many of the 'community' representatives, the police in the research site prior to the launch of 'community policing' were seen as a disinterested, detached and coolly distant institution which did not seem to care about, and was not perceived as being involved in many of the local social or 'community' issues and concerns materializing around safety and order. With the advent of 'community policing', the police come to be seen as engaged and involved in these 'community' issues and matters since they are the ones who are perceived as visibly and actively taking charge with regards to these matters. The 'community' stakeholders are describing the CRU officers as friends, peers, partners and 'community' members. Through the strategy of 'community policing', the police thus are effectively dealing with the legitimacy, credibility and social isolation crisis that has plagued them for the past decade at least, and through their expanding role as a key 'community' stakeholder they are being increasingly 're-socialized', re-rooted and considered as a crucially important player in the broad spectrum of local social and 'community' affairs. This notion also again underlines the crucial importance of the 'bridgehead' function of the CRU between the traditional police apparatus and the 'social environment' in which the police operate.

The second point concerning the creation of 'policeable' spaces and issues is related to this, and reflects some of Albritton's ideas on 'community policing' as a 'social technique' (1995). In the framework and practical environment of 'community policing', we have increasingly come to think about local, social and other practical matters of everyday life as 'policeable' issues as they relate to crime prevention, safety, order, 'community health', and other perspectives that directly or indirectly involve the police as a central agent. Equally, this study has shown that local spaces are being constituted, defined and negotiated with predominant considerations to these 'policeable' aspects, as they are generally implied when 'community' concerns or interests state their claims with regards to local spaces. For example, the discussions of and claims over local parks, alleyways or playgrounds as 'community spaces' usually implied challenges to safety and crime, made assumptions about who should be included and excluded with regards to these considerations, and made these matters in part at least a task for police input or action. This
framework for thinking about everyday life of local and social affairs, in terms of risk, crime and safety concerns has spawned a process in which the social world becomes thought of, understood and ordered as a 'policeable' world. This, naturally, implies and emphasizes a central role and presence of the police in all of these matters, and has considerable consequences for the practical governmental power of the police as a social agent.

One of the astounding insights evolving from this field study was, in fact, to see the almost infinite number and range of local issues and projects the 'community police' were involved in, many of which at first sight did not seem to have anything to do with police work (e.g. as a mediator in a funding dispute between a local social service agency and a 'community' group). The key implication of these developments, however, may lie in the fact that in the contexts of 'community policing' the police are evolving into an institution of local power, involvement and influence that is surpassed or controlled by none. The other important consideration is that in the way these 'policeable' issues are conceptualized, what their foci are, and the 'effectiveness' with which the police are operating with regards to the 'community police' work they do, the world of 'policeable' issues and spaces is not a shrinking but an ever growing and expanding one. In fact, the tactics of chasing prostitutes from one neighbourhood to the next or imposing probation boundary schemes on offenders guarantee an ever increasing future demand for police presence, involvement and intervention. Via 'community policing', the police themselves are therefore the key power creating and maintaining an ever expanding 'policeable local world' which understands and needs them at the centre of its social affairs. This is the real 'success story' of 'community policing', and it is, first and foremost, a success story for the police.

Another key finding which emerges out of this study is that 'community policing' as it has been observed in practice materializes in its structural and practical reality as a scheme which is dominated by a fundamental 'hegemony' of the police. Generally, 'community policing' is still fundamentally conceptualized as a form of policing which is defined and done by the police, and is thus conceived of as a police-centered concept. These notions set bold question marks behind the celebrated themes and terms of 'community involvement', partnerships, joint decision-making, accountability, etc., and the predominant sense of ambiguity becomes clear in many aspects of this study. For example, it was starkly underlined by the majority of officers sampled that they understood 'community involvement' as a form of facilitative, supportive and responsibilized 'legwork' entity role, working for, upon the demands of and defined by the interests of the police.
These constellations became, for example, instructively clear in the ‘community’ meetings in which police participated. Rather than being encounters of equal power and joint decision-making of balanced entities (of police and ‘community’), these were spectacles in which the police explained to the ‘community’ what the crime situations and ‘problems’ were, what they were doing and not doing about them, and why these decisions were the right or the necessary ones from the ‘policing expert’ perspective of the police, while simultaneously demanding that the ‘community’ continue playing their ‘legwork’ role. In short, these encounters were platforms for and effective reinforcement and reproduction of the hegemonically central and powerful role of the police in ‘community policing’.

On the other hand, the ‘community police’ representatives interviewed were equally clear on the fact that nowhere do they see the need, the possibility or necessity that ‘community’ should challenge or participate in core decisions about the definition of policing matters and its objectives, the control over resources (eg, budget issues) or strategies on how to address policing ‘problems’. It seems that only if police came to share their monopoly with regards to control over these central power aspects of ‘policing’, would partnerships, joint decision-making or ‘community-based’ forms of policing be given a theoretical chance to evolve. ‘Community policing’ thus materializes as a conceptual and practical scheme in which the peripheral agent of ‘community’ works for and reinforces the central role and position of the police.

These circumstances, naturally, also raise questions with regards to the potential for reform of the police, or rather of policing as it is currently understood and practised. This study suggests that even in an environment of progressive or reformist symbolism or intentions around the nature, organization and objectives of policing as expressed in the ‘community policing’ idea, the traditional values and practices with regards to the professional culture, self-understanding, organization and work of the police persist and prevail. Another way of putting this may be that there is a given reality to the culture, organization and practice of police as it exists and is structured today which can not be fundamentally revised or reformed from outside, but seems to require deeper interventions. From a different perspective, an effective reform of ‘policing’ seems to require fundamental changes to the position, role and power which the police occupy in contemporary policing schemes. These changes could, for example, address the taken-for-granted centrality of the public police in public policing schemes (eg, by making them one among a larger number of equal players or competitors for the design or implementation of ‘safety’ projects),
work via budgetary and resource distribution powers for policing projects to be located outside the police (through which the police have to compete for resources with other potential players), or simply by re-conceptualizing the task of 'policing' as 'safety' projects in which the institution or the particular approach and tools of the public police are just one of a range of possible options.

The project of 'community policing' as it materialized between the entities and practices of police and 'community' observed in this study essentially presents itself as a new and powerful mode of local government, order and control. The reach and effects of these efforts are severe, deep and intrusive with regards to critical aspects of great numbers of people's lives upon which they are played out. Two key points warrant some consideration here. 'Community policing' as it has been examined, observed and understood via the this study's perspective may well emerge as and put into practice a form of local 'governance' that has been proposed in theory by a number of contemporary writers (see Shearing 1995, O'Malley 1996). In this context, it needs emphasizing as a key finding of this study that the rather pervasive and considerable order, control and governmental effects of the 'community policing' efforts described materialize particularly as an effective joint strategy or project launched between police and 'community' resources and efforts at various levels and of various kinds. The joining of police and 'community' resources and strategies into an effective regime of local order and control under the 'community policing' umbrella described above has not been described for the Canadian context or elsewhere in such detail. It is the joint and complementary effects of the many and diverse, and by themselves seemingly trivial, micro-powers of policing, order and control presented in this setting which in their entirety render 'community policing' into such a powerful operation or project.

In fact, what makes 'community policing' as a project of 'governance' so difficult to examine and assess in its entirety and breadth and beyond the central role of the police is that its position, nature and mode of 'power' is hard to grasp and locate since it is so subtly and widely dispersed. The 'community police's' persistent completion of personal identification forms, their preoccupations with prostitutes or drunks, or 'community's' efforts towards fencing in properties, actively participating in land zoning hearings or reporting 'disorderly people' to the police do not sound or look like revolutionary or overwhelming schemes of power, government or control. But the broad and joint effects of the comprehensive interplay of these many diverse and dispersed efforts produce a powerful regime of local order which is surprisingly systematic and persistent.
Again, the 'boundary probation order' scheme for prostitution offenders presents an impressive example of how the strategic combination of seemingly trivial efforts of order can lead to a rather pervasive and coercive scheme of local control. 'Community policing' may thus be an impressive example of new forms of state power which have lost their centralized location and uni-lateral direction - or what Foucault described as the new 'monster' of the intangible state without a sovereign, and Melossi as the Leviathan 'without a head'.

There are other critical implications of the way this scheme of local government materializes. As described on the basis of the field data collected in the process of this study, 'community policing's' essential practices and efforts are constituted in a multitude of locally-based informal, ad-hoc, selective and market-based entities, coalitions and strategies towards ordering local spheres and issues which had traditionally been seen as issues and responsibilities of the (modern welfare) 'state'. While it has been recognized for some time that in current late modern neo-liberal contexts there has been a 'hollowing out' of the state in favour of supranational and global structures and processes (see Sheptycki 1995, 1996), there may be an equivalent development at local levels. 'Community policing' may indicate and epitomize a 'hollowing out' of the state in favour of neo-liberal modes of local government.

However, these informalized schemes and practices of local control and government as observed in this study setting of 'community policing' also raise some critical questions with respect to basic principles of democracy, state action, public accountability and constitutional rights. The selective, self-appointed and self-justifying and largely unaccountable schemes of 'community' that have formed in the framework of 'community policing', challenge and neglect basic principles of democracy, representation and accountability. Instead, they are mobilized on the basis of and seem to confirm structures and processes which Crawford and others have termed as "local corporatism". This framework suggests that local government within 'market' schemes is increasingly formed and dominated by effectively organized and operationalized selective interests and knowledges, establishing effective alliances between state and non-state resources. These local corporate structures are often based on "very specific and limited interests [and] work within highly undemocratic networks of special interests" that are "largely self-perpetuating and self-justifying" (Crawford 1994:510), are capable of avoiding formal accountability structures, but claim and assume quasi-state or quasi-public status. These biases are made possible through voids in power and function left by the crumbling structures of the interventionist state, and which are
being seized by non-state actors and interests. As the core effects of these developments, we see a "fragmentation of state power" (Cawson 1982:41) as well as the fact that via the "increasing privatization and ‘voluntarization’ in areas of crime control ... the line between state and civil society becomes virtually impossible to draw" (Crawford 1994:502f). In short, under the described "veil of ‘community’ we are witnessing the emergence of new forms of local governance” which may strategically overlook and even silence fundamental democratic processes (Crawford 1994:511).

In conclusion, this study has shown that ‘community policing’ is about much more than just a change of police tactics, or public interest in police operations. Rather, it has crucial implication for the government of issues, subjects and power in local contexts in late modern times, and in that framework raises challenging questions with regards to the state, power, social conflict, democracy and civil rights. While this study in its rather exploratory fashion has pointed to a number of emerging crucial issues and developments, more substantial research is needed to grasp a better understanding of the meaning of ‘community policing’ in contemporary society.
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Quarterly, 5, 323-395.


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<th>POLICE CONTACTED Y _ N _</th>
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<th>SIGNATURE</th>
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APPENDIX II
TAXI CAB OCCURRENCE REPORT

By Fax:

Dear [Name]

As a resident of ..., I would like to bring to your attention the following information regarding a taxi/cab/limousine incident and would appreciate hearing from you what action(s) you are taking.

Date Observed (1996): _________________  Time (a.m./p.m.): _________________

Metro Licence #: __________________________________________________________
(printed on cab or a white plate)

Licence Plate #: __________________________________________________________

Exact Location: ___________________________________________________________

Name of Cab Co.: _________________________________________________________

Description of Infraction: _________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________________

(This may be going the wrong way on a one-way street, blocking intersections or traffic lanes, U-turns in a no U-turn zone, picking up prostitutes, picking up dealers, etc.)

Sincerely,

Name: _________________________________________________________________

Signature: ______________________________________________________________

Address: ______________________________________________________________

Telephone #: ___________________________________________________________

cc: Cab Co. Name ________________________________________________________

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APPENDIX III
'TRESPASS LETTER' FORM

OFFICER IN CHARGE
 . DIVISION
     POLICE SERVICE

TRESPASS TO PROPERTY ACT (R.S.O.) CHAPTER 511

On the behalf of the property owners at ______________________ I will authorize the Police to act as
situated at ______________________ I will authorize the Police to act as
out agents to enforce the provisions of the Trespass to Property Act. The Police
Service is hereby authorized to remove and charge persons breaching the said Act.

Property Agent (print name) ______________________

Property Agent (sign name) ______________________

Telephone number ______________________