Publishing Culture in Eighteenth-Century Japan: The Case of the Edo Publisher Tsutaya Jûzaburô (1751-97)

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
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ABSTRACT

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During the ideological program of the Senior Councillor Matsudaira Sadanobu of the Tokugawa bakufu government, Tsutaya Jûzaburô's aggressive publishing venture found itself on a collision course with Sadanobu's book censorship policy. The result was the confiscation of half of Tsutaya's wealth. This thesis explores the social background leading to this conflict and proposes to examine this conflict not in the context of ideology, but rather in that of a social metamorphosis. In this context, Tsutaya and Sadanobu were in fact inseparable in the creation of the reality of eighteenth-century Edo. The author concludes that Tsutaya as a social figure should not be viewed as an ideological antagonist of Sadanobu, thus making Tsutaya an illegitimate citizen of the Edo bakufu and Sadanobu an illegitimate citizen of the Edo townspeople world; rather, Tsutaya's success and his eventual failure were genealogically linked to the political tradition of his counterpart.
# Table of Contents

I Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

II The Yoshiwara Years
   1. The Early Life of Tsutaya Jûzaburô ................................................................. 13
   2. The Road to Tôriabura-chô ........................................................................... 22

III The Bakufu’s Political Tradition
   1. The Bakufu’s Role in the Publishing Culture of Edo Japan ......................... 48
   2. The Bakuhan Political Tradition .................................................................. 53
   3. The Bakufu’s Edo City Administration ........................................................... 65

IV The Horizontal and Vertical Cliques
   1. The Edo Publishers’ Association .................................................................. 93

V Conclusion
   1. Business Ventures and Political Reforms ..................................................... 114

Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 125
Glossary ......................................................................................................................... 135
Publishing Culture in Eighteenth-Century Japan:
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I Introduction

To all his friends, Tsutaya Jûzaburô (1751-97) was more than a shrewd businessman. True, his publishing ventures were mostly aggressive in nature, but they were so not because Tsutaya was a calculated opportunist seeking for the greatest of wealth; rather, his passion for and curiosity about the infinite possibilities in life constantly urged him to value new ideas and expressions in the arts. In his relatively short life span, Tsutaya had rescued numerous artists and novelists from obscurity and eventually brought them to the centre of the Japanese world of letters. Novelists such as Santô Kyôden (1761-1816), Koikawa Harumachi (1744-1789), Hôseidô Kisanji (1735-1813), and Kyokutei (Takizawa) Bakin (1767-1848) were the bestselling writers of their time; while ukiyo-e woodblock-print artists such as Utamarô and Sharaku were not only famous among their contemporaries, they are also well-known among Western connoisseurs of art today. At the centre of these novelists and artists was their publisher Tsutaya Jûzaburô. But why Tsutaya? How did he become such an exceptional citizen of the ever expanding townspeople sector of the capital city of Edo? Most importantly, how was Tsutaya’s rise to prominence in both the world of arts and the world of business related to the metamorphosis of the society in which he lived?
In 1793, Tsutaya asked his friend Ôta Nampo (a.k.a. Yomono Akara, 1749-1823), a kyôka poet and popular novelist, to compose an epitaph for his deceased mother. In a beautiful and lucid style of classical Chinese, Nampo wrote the following words complimenting Tsutaya’s remarkable business achievement and acknowledging its debt to his deceased mother:

I told him [Tsutaya] that although I often saw people who entered into the pleasure district when they were bankrupt, I have never seen a person [like him] who was able to establish a business after leaving the district. His unswerving determination is enough evidence [for me] to appreciate the teaching of his deceased mother.¹

Clearly, Tsutaya, like many of those artists and novelists he befriended and patronized, was himself an obscure figure in the first place. According to Nampo, Tsutaya grew up in the pleasure district in Edo. He later moved away from the district and established a bookstore at a place called Tôriabura Street. These successive changes in Tsutaya’s life, Nampo said, had as their guiding force the teaching of Tsutaya’s mother, Hirose Tsuyo. Essentially, Nampo was saying that had it not for Tsuyo’s moral teaching, Tsutaya’s life might have been ruined in the pleasure quarter.

The moral overtone in Nampo’s epitaph is discernible, and it is expected from this type of traditional Chinese epigraphic writing. However, Nampo’s frank description of the pleasure district as a place of depravity comes to be a surprise to us for we know that, as great connoisseurs of the then fashionable risqué literature, both Tsutaya and Ôta Nampo would not

have subscribed so unreservedly to the Confucian moral interpretation of the pleasure district. In other words, why did Nampo characterize Tsutaya’s business success as though it was a triumph in a struggle to distance himself from the disreputable pleasure district?

In the early decades of the seventeenth century, the newly established Tokugawa bakufu or tent government was worried about the fact that prostitution houses that had been scattered in the city of Edo might have contributed to social instability. Although Japan was finally united by the Tokugawa military family, the extent of the unification was not highly centralized. After the decisive battle of Sekigahara in 1600, most of the warrior families who had once been opposed to the Tokugawa family were not eradicated; they only pledged allegiance to the victorious Tokugawa Ieyasu; and their domains, though some might have been reduced in size, were largely still under their commands. The peace that ensued after the battle of Sekigahara could very well have been temporary. Those warriors who lost their masters called rōnin could potentially plot a revolt against the Tokugawa bakufu. Clandestine prostitution houses therefore were ideal hideaways for the rōnin.

The leaders of the Tokugawa bakufu government were well aware of this problem. Their solution was not to eradicate all prostitution houses because they believed that such an extreme measure would have caused even more social instability. The solution they adopted was to institutionalize prostitution by restricting it in a designated area. This way, they could easily impose their administrative authority over the trade of prostitution. In 1614, according to Shōji Katsutomi, his sixth generation great-grandfather Shōji Jin’emon (1575-1644) and several other proprietors of prostitution houses
presented a petition letter to Ieyasu for permission to create the Yoshiwara pleasure quarter. The petition claimed that "the concentration of the existing brothels in one regular place" would allow brothel proprietors to have "enquires ... made about persons who may be found loafing in the prostitute quarter" and to report them "should they discover any suspicious characters." The official permission was granted four years later, and the measures suggested by Jin’emon were all adopted.

The Yoshiwara was therefore at the very beginning a place under bakufu surveillance. An officially recognized post called the keisei-machi nanushi or the Headman of the Pleasure Quarter Ward was immediately established; and Shôji Jin’emon, the supposed founder of the Yoshiwara, naturally assumed the post. Like many other bakufu official posts, keisei-machi nanushi was basically a hereditary post. It had direct access to the Office of the Edo Commissioners or Magistrates (Edo machibugyô sho). In many respects, just like the Edo machibugyô sho, it served both military and civil functions during its early existence. In other words, not only was it responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Yoshiwara, it was also responsible for detecting any potential anti-bakufu proponents who went into hiding in the Yoshiwara. For example, according to Cecilia Segawa Seigle, whose book on the Yoshiwara is the most recent study of this institution in English, rumours ran during the late Edo period about the policing role played by the Yoshiwara and, in particular, the keisei-machi nanushi. In 1651, after

\[2\] J. E. De Becker, The Nightless City or the History of the Yoshiwara Yûkwaku (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1971).

\[4\] This passage was included in the official history of the Yoshiwara entitled Dôbô goen written by Shôji Katsutomi. See the original text of the Dôbô goen in the Ensei jisshu, vol. 5 (Tokyo: Chûo kôron sha, 1980), 185-228
a failed attempt to assassinate one of the Senior Councillors (rōjū) of the bakufu; Yui Shōsetsu and Marubashi Chūya, leaders of a group of rōnin, were arrested. In particular, Marubashi’s arrest was rumoured to have taken place in the Yoshiwara: “One extremely unreliable account of the late Edo period says that Marubashi was caught at the Yoshiwara bordello known as Ôbishiya by the son of Shōji Jin’emon, Shōji Jisaburô.” Even if the rumour was unfounded, the very presence of such a rumour shows that the policing role of the Yoshiwara in its early existence was no doubt well recognized by the average citizen of Edo.

However, such a policing role was becoming less and less significant as the Tokugawa bakufu survived into the eighteenth century. The last decade of the seventeenth century, one that roughly coincided with the Genroku era (1688-1703), was characterized by peace and material prosperity. The cultural centre that corresponded to this unprecedented period of euphoria was still the Kamigata region (i.e. Kyoto and Osaka). In many ways, the glory of the Genroku era was a re-evaluation of traditional Heian aesthetic sensibilities. The famous popular novelist Ihara Saikaku produced his masterpiece Kōshoku ichidai otoko (The man who loves love) by parodying the Heian classic Genji monogatari (The tale of Genji). Then, from the eighteenth century onward, the cultural centre of Japan gradually shifted to Edo, a phenomenon often referred to by historians as bun ‘un tōzen (the eastward movement of cultural fortune). The reason for this shift was related to the functional change of the

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city of Edo. Now, Edo was no longer simply the site of military headquarters. In fact, in his essay “The Castle Town and Japan’s Modern Urbanization,” John Whitney Hall, pioneer of Japanese institutional history, describes the evolution of Edo from a highly alert military centre to a stable and expanded civil administrative centre. More importantly, the social stability in Edo, made possible by the increasingly sophisticated bakufu civil administrative machinery, had a positive impact on the creativity of the Edo civilians.

Accordingly, the Yoshiwara, subject to such a social evolution, also exhibited its role as a fountainhead of artistic creativity. Yet, at the same time, such a creative energy was inevitably constrained by the moralistic nature of the very civil administrative machinery that had first allowed it. Beginning from the mid-eighteenth century, as the bakufu government gradually found itself less capable of resolving a series of financial crises caused by a general decline in natural resources, bad crops, and other ill-advised drastic economic policies such as re-coinage; the bakufu tended to reduce these complex economic problems into a simple problem of an overall increase in extravagance among the townspeople (chōnin). The solution the bakufu adopted was, naturally, to limit spending among the townspeople by issuing sumptuary edicts. Moreover, these edicts, in admonishing the townspeople for overspending, were all charged with a moralistic tone. The Yoshiwara pleasure district, being perceived as the centre of wealth dissipation and moral degradation, was the easiest target; any artistic production that found its

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inspiration in the life of the Yoshiwara was deemed dangerous to the public morality by the bakufu.

Artistic pursuit in late-eighteenth-century Edo thus had to operate facing two opposing forces that had their single origin in the emergence of a new social order in the city. On the one hand, the expanding townspeople sector in Edo led to a wealth of subject matter in the arts hitherto unseen in the past. The affluence achieved by the residents in this sector also provided a solid base of consumers capable of appreciating these new artistic creations. On the other hand, the increase in the complexity of the city structure and the burgeoning of money economy in it had become for the bakufu a perplexing source of social crises. The bakufu's solution was based on an ideology that had outlived its usefulness. Neo-Confucianism had been instrumental in legitimizing the military regime for its founder Tokugawa Ieyasu. Now, his successors believed that such an ideology might have been a solution to the social crises they were facing. Such a belief became the very shaping force influencing the direction of, if not restraining, the artistic creativity in Edo.

As a patron of artistic pursuit in late-eighteenth-century Edo, Tsutaya Jûzaburô was also subject to the two opposing social forces described above. Therefore, when his friend Ôta Nampo described his career as a process of moving away from the Yoshiwara pleasure district to a more affluent locale of the town, the description carried far more than a physical meaning. It was actually a vivid portrayal of how social advancement took place in the townspeople sector of Edo. Although the Yoshiwara served almost as a salon for many potential artists and men of letters, it was after all a highly restricted and tabooed social institution. Physically, it was a walled-in structure with only one opening, the great gate. Socially, it was a constant scapegoat for any
social problem that might have arisen in the city of Edo. Tsutaya’s success, as we will see later, had its origin in this institution. And, indeed, his continued success as a publisher also relied heavily on the creativity generated in this institution. Yet, to become a socially respected person, Tsutaya had to break away from the image of depravity often associated with the very institution that had fostered his success. This is not to say that Tsutaya would have been less respected by his peers had he ever chosen to assume only the role of a connoisseur of the pleasure world, living a life of extravagance and dying a death of indulgence in the Yoshiwara. However, Tsutaya the businessman had almost no choice but to understand that, in order to succeed financially in the chōnin world, he had to accept, however reluctantly, the ideal social order envisaged by the bakufu government. In the late eighteenth century, the government, headed by the austere Chief Senior Councillor (rōjū shuseki) Matsudaira Sadanobu, believed that the guiding principle of the ideal social order was to be found in Confucian morality. Therefore, to be a legitimate citizen in the eyes of the bakufu, Tsutaya had to pretend that he too was a faithful follower of this political ideology.

In 1791 Tsutaya proved himself to be the opposite; he was in fact a rebel against this ideology. He was found guilty of publishing three risqué and satirical novels (sharebon) written by Santō Kyōden. Although the books all had prefaces or postscripts stating that they were intended to convey moral teachings by exposing the ills of the pleasure quarter, the contents of these books reveal that the author had no intention of keeping his promise. For example, one of these three novels by Kyōden entitled Nishiki no ura (the other side of the brocade) had the following words in its preface: "[This is] a book describing what a brothel is like in the light of day—and that’s a far cry
from its glamorous appearance at night. However, when one reads the work, the moral overtone is simply missing. In studying this incident, Koike Tôgorô suggests that "it was neither the contents nor the works themselves that were really the problem. For the politicians of the day, who were directing life under the reforms, all that was necessary was to make a victim of Kyôden, the leader of the literary world, and so create something of a sensation in that literary world and among contemporary readers." Naturally, along with Kyôden, Tsutaya was also a scapegoat in the bakufu's attempt to demonstrate to the public what its ideal social order should be.

Although it is tempting to suggest that, in the above book censorship incident, Tsutaya was involved in a struggle of ideology, one should be cautious of reading too much into the incident. After all, Tsutaya was not a thinker. On the other hand, no one can deny that a conflict in power is revealed in this incident. Therefore, one must first ask: What kind of power was being held by Tsutaya?

Of course, the bakufu policy of social segregation prevented any person without a warrior background to obtain a government post; in other words, townspeople and farmers were theoretically excluded from participating in any governmental affair. However, the bakufu government did not rely solely on the warrior to run the country. Within the peasantry, the so-called goni-gumi (Five-family-groups) were established as the basic administrative units. These units were in turn supervised by the more powerful peasant families called Village Headmen (shôya), who assumed the role of local administrative

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7 Cited by Kornicki in "Nishiki no Ura." 162.
authorities. Similarly, the administration of townspeople affairs was largely left to the hands of the townspeople themselves. One of the communication channels established between the townspeople and the central government was the *machibugyō sho*. This arrangement is seen in the administration of the Yoshiwara pleasure quarter, where daily affairs were dealt with by the *keisei-machi nanushi*, who had the responsibility of reporting any abnormal occurring within the pleasure district to the *machibugyō sho* and who was constantly kept abreast of *bakufu* policies by receiving edicts and ordinances from the *machibugyō sho*. Similarly, in an effort to monitor the activities of the publishers in Edo, the *machibugyō sho*, from the early eighteenth century onward, officially recognized the Publishers’ Association (*shomotsuya nakama*). Within the Association, two representatives called *gyōji* were elected to play a role comparable to that of a *keisei-machi nanushi*.

At the time of the censorship incident, Tsutaya has already established himself as an important member of the Publishers’ Association. At its early stages, the Publishers’ Association did not easily admit new members. The reason is obvious. As an officially recognized institution, its members could easily monopolize or at least dominate the publication market in Edo. The fewer the members the greater the market share for each individual member. No doubt, the *bakufu* was also hoping to see a closed market structure instead

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8 The other one was the post of *Edo machidoshiyori* or Edo towns elders, which was filled by the descendants of the three important Kansai merchant families that had assisted Ieyasu in his unifying campaign.

9 The Booksellers’ Association was variously called the *shomotsuya nakama, shomotsu ton’ya nakama, shorn nakama* and etc. The term Publishers’ Association is used for the sake of convenience. It should be reminded that while some members of the Association only sold books, other members both sold and published books.
of an open one. In general, such a closed structure enhanced the bakufu's ability to regulate the private business sector in Edo. In return for the business advantages that were favoured them, all members of the associations of various trades were obliged to respond to and even carry out the social policies of the bakufu. In a way, these members were given the role of governing a portion of the Edo townspeople sector. Tsutaya Jûzaburô, as a prominent member of the Publishers' Association, was also given this role.

Obviously, in the 1791 censorship incident, Tsutaya's reckless publication venture broke the agreement that had been established between the members of the Publishers' Association and the bakufu. The question is: How should we make of Tsutaya's incident? Again, the incident could easily be interpreted as an ideological conflict or even a class struggle: The conservative Neo-Confucian ideology of the bakufu leaders was challenged by the subversive and rebellious spirit of the Edo chônin. But such a bipolar socio-cultural classification does not completely explain the "Tsutaya" before the incident. That is to say, are we fully satisfied with attributing his success in the business world in his early years solely to his chônin spirit? What constituted the chônin spirit after all? Was it simply subversion and rebellion? Nishiyama Matsunosuke in his Edo chônin no kenkyû (Studies of the Edo townspeople) has given us the most comprehensive definition of such a spirit. He did so by describing the various characteristics that were possessed by a typical Edokko (Son of Edo):

(1) Compared to people living in other parts of the country, an Edokko was proud to be living under the same roof with the Tokugawa shogunal family.
(2) Living in a great metropolis operating under a money economy, an Edokko was naturally very generous.
(3) An Edokko, being fostered in a high chônin lifestyle, was active in various cultural pursuits.
(4) An Edokko developed a sense of belonging to the locale he was living, identifying himself as a resident of Edo or Nihombashi and etc.
(5) An Edokko had developed a rebellious attitude called iki or hari.¹⁰

All five of these characteristics seem to have applied well to Tsutaya. In particular, the fifth characteristic was what eventually got him into trouble with the bakufu. However, the first characteristic is equally, if not more, significant in understanding the success story of Tsutaya. Just as an Edokko knew that his being a legitimate citizen of the Tokugawa regime would bring him social pride, the young and ambitious Tsutaya knew that gaining political legitimacy for his business operation—as a member of the officially recognized Publishers’ Association—would guarantee him social prestige and financial success as well.

In describing Tsutaya’s road to success, the present thesis hopes to demonstrate to the reader that a bipolar socio-cultural classification of all the citizens in Edo might not always be valid. Of course, the Tokugawa bakufu had from the very beginning of its rule insisted upon a ruler-ruled classification of its people, making sure that the warrior class was always the ruler while the chônin class was always the ruled. However, this study will show that an affluent citizen in the Edo chônin sector such as Tsutaya had to inherit both the liberal and reactionary chônin spirit and the conservative political tradition of the Tokugawa bakufu.

II The Yoshiwara Years

1. The Early Life of Tsutaya Jûzaburô

According to Matsuki Hiroshi, among the many sources dealing with the life of Tsutaya Jûzaburô, the two most reliable ones are Ishikawa Masamochi’s “Kitagawa Kari (or Karamaru) boketsumei” (The epitaph of Kitagawa Kari) and Ôta Nampo’s “Jitsubo kenshô no hibun” (The epitaph of Tsutaya’s mother). Until they were lost during the Second World War, the two epitaphs were housed in the Shôbô-ji monastery in Asakusa. Luckily, their contents were recorded verbatim in 1906 in the March edition of the journal Kôchô by a person only known to us by his pen-name Shiwa Sanjin.\(^{11}\) Although we may never be able to verify the authenticity of the epitaphs, Shiwa’s discovery was recently partly confirmed by Konta Yôzô, who found that the “Kitagawa Kari boketsumei” had been separately recorded by an Edo person Hara Nensai in the Shishi bikô.\(^{12}\)

In the introduction, we have read part of the epitaph of Tsutaya’s mother written by Ôta Nampo. Now, let us read the whole inscription:

\(^{11}\) Only six issues of the journal Kôchô were ever published, and they were all published in 1906. Shiwa’s article appeared in the second issue which was reprinted in Kôchô (Tokyo: Yumani shobô, 1976), issue no. 2, 4-11.

\(^{12}\) I am paraphrasing Matsuki, 12-3.
Hirose was the mother of [the owner of] the Kôshodô bookstore. Her personal name was Tsuyo, a native of Edo. She married Maruyama of the Owari province, giving birth to Karamaru. When he was young, Karamaru assumed the family name of Kitagawa, [and later] he was known as Tsutaya Jûzaburô. His resident was near the [great] gate of the pleasure quarter. In the ninth month of the third year of Temmei (1783), he moved to the eastern part of the city, and, on Tôriabura Street, he opened a bookstore. He engaged in [business] competition and published [many] delightful books that became popular. Edo people who had a taste for legend and romance (haishi) all praised Kôshodô. On the twenty-sixth day of the tenth month of the fourth year of Kansei (1792), Hirose died of illness and was buried at the Shôbô-ji temple in Yamatani to the north of the [Edo] castle. In the second month of the next year, Karamaru came to see me and said, "I was separated from my mother when I was seven. Because later we were re-united, I am what I am now. I hope that I may pay homage to my mother for her hard work by having a few words inscribed on her tombstone." I then told him [Tsutaya] that although I often saw people who entered into the pleasure district when they were bankrupt, I have never seen a person [like him] who was able to establish a business after leaving the district. His unswerving determination is enough evidence [for me] to appreciate the teaching of his deceased mother. The inscription says: "In nine hundred works of fiction can be found the virtue of a mother." Written by Nampo in the early Spring of the ox year of Kansei (1792).13

Many questions arise from reading this epitaph. What did Tsutaya’s parents do for living? Why did Tsutaya assume the last name Kitagawa? And, most importantly, what made it possible for him to move away from the pleasure district and eventually establish a successful bookstore in an obviously more affluent part of the town?

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13 Matsuki, 40; Shiwa Sanji, "Tsutaya Jûzaburô," in Köchô no. 2. 4-5.
Unfortunately, some of these questions may never be answered. There are simply not enough biographical materials on Tsutaya written by his contemporaries. The only other record that partially answers these questions is the “Kitagawa Kari boketsumei.” This epitaph of Tsutaya was written by another friend of his named Ishikawa Masamochi (1753-1830) probably not long after the death of Tsutaya in 1797. In the latter part of the epitaph, Ishikawa wrote:

My abode being ten miles (ri) away from [Tsutaya], when I learnt of the news of his death, my heart was beating heavily, and I was shocked. Wasn’t such a news heartbreaking? Alas! I am a criminal in this world. I will live out the rest of my life in memory of the kindness and understanding he had shown me.\(^{14}\)

Ishikawa was one of the four superstar kyōka poets in the Temmei era (1781-1788; known by his pen-name Yadoya no Meshimori). Occasionally, he also participated in Tsutaya’s publishing project, serving as an editor. In an incident unclear to us, Ishikawa was banished from Edo in the year 1791. In 1797, the year Tsutaya died, he was still serving his sentence, as he said, at a place ten ri-miles away from Edo. But physical distance did not deter him from paying his last homage to a true friend.

Ishikawa obviously knew his friend very well for in his epitaph are biographical details missing in Nampo’s writing:

Kitagawa Karamaru’s original surname was Maruyama. He was referred to as Tsutaya Jūzaburō. His father was Jūsuke, and his mother was Hirose. He was born on the seventh day of the first month of the third year of Kan’en (1751) in the Yoshiwara district. As a child, he was raised by a Mr. Kitagawa. [Tsutaya] was ambitious and talented. He was not a fastidious person; he treated people with trust. He used to have a bookstore near the

\(^{14}\) Matsuki. 39.
[great] gate of the [Yoshiwara] pleasure quarter. Later, he moved to [Tôri]abura Street. Then, he asked his parents to come to live with him, and he supported them until they both passed away. Karamaru regained the property in the pleasure quarter. He emulated the ideal of Tao Zhu.15 His ingenious thought and shrewd calculation were unsurpassed by his peers. He then became a great merchant. ...16

Reading both pieces together, we can conclude that Tsutaya’s early life was intimately linked to the Yoshiwara pleasure quarter. Before he moved to Tôriabura Street, his resident was located just outside the Yoshiwara, more specifically, the Shin-Yoshiwara. Are we safe to say that Tsutaya’s childhood was spent in and out of the Yoshiwara? Also, since he was adopted when he was seven, one wonders whether his adopted parents were related to the pleasure district. The specific circumstances of the adoption are not clear. But since both Tsutaya’s parents lived to see their son open a bookstore on Tôriabura Street, the adoption had nothing to do with the death of his parents. Konta Yôzô suggests that the adoption took place because Tsutaya’s parents were divorced, but this suggestion remains a conjecture.17 The only clue we have concerning the circumstances of this adoption is that his adopted father was a Kitagawa. Who was this man? and how was he related to Tsutaya’s parents?

We know that Tsutaya took the surname Kitagawa when he was adopted. According to the general Tokugawa custom, young chônin boys were often sent to some shops for training. They served as apprentices (detchi) first, and the more talented among them would work their way up to

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15 Tao Zhu was the sobriquet of Fan Li who was one of the richest men in Chinese history.
16 Matsuki. 39.
become managers (bantō). Some bantō might be permitted to open a branch shop with the same shop name, a process known as norenwake (dividing the cloth bearing a shop logo). A few might even inherit the owner's shop by marrying the daughter of the owner when he did not have a son. Therefore, the young Tsutaya was probably sent to the shop owned by Kitagawa and eventually adopted Kitagawa's shop name of Tsutaya. Again, unfortunately, we are not sure about the identity of this Kitagawa. Kitagawa, some say, might have been a prostitution house proprietor or a teahouse owner (chaya) in the Yoshiwara. Indeed, there were several proprietors with the shop name of Tsutaya. For example, at that time, there was a proprietor named Tsutaya Rihei with his teahouse located at Yoshiwara Naka-no-chō.18 Here, one might even suggest that Tsutaya's mother was acquainted with this Kitagawa probably because she was a retired courtesan of some sort. However, no real evidence can help us make such a claim. Similarly, we do not know anything about Maruyama, Tsutaya's real father, except that he had come to Edo from the province of Owari.

Amidst all these uncertainties, one thing is certain: Tsutaya's career began with his opening a bookstore near the great gate of the Yoshiwara. Moreover, we know exactly the circumstances under which it took place. All this information comes from the two earliest books Tsutaya sold. They were two different editions of the so-called Yoshiwara saiken. From around the Jōkyō era (1684-8), Yoshiwara saiken or information guidebooks on the Yoshiwara appeared. The content of these guidebooks consists of the names of various teahouses, assignation houses, and courtesans in the Yoshiwara.

presented in a map-like format. The specific *Yoshiwara saiken* that concern us here are the *Kono fumi tsuki* and *Saiken a-a o-Edo*, published by Urokogataya in the second and third year of An'ei (1773 and 1774) respectively. In particular, it is the latter which provides us with the information we need to know about the early career of Tsutaya Jûzaburô. The colophon of the *Saiken a-a o-Edo* has the following revealing line: “Inspected *saiken* [,] distributed and sold [by] Tsutaya Jûzaburô [who resides at] the left-hand-side of Shin-Yoshiwara Gojûken Street.”19 Assuming that the *Kono fumi tsuki* was also sold in a similar manner, we can say that, at the age of twenty-three, Tsutaya started his career not as a publisher per se but as a distributor. Apparently, he was somehow able to gain the trust of the established publisher Urokogataya and began distributing and selling the Urokogataya edition *saiken* at a bookstore that might have resembled a kiosk or a newspaper stand of our time.

But even before we try to find out how Tsutaya was able to foster such a good relationship with Urokogataya, we ought to wonder how this young townsman acquired a bookstore in the first place. Using some unknown sources, the scholar Mukai Nobuo in one of his short essays on the *Yoshiwara saiken* stated that initially Tsutaya was able to borrow a shop owned by his patron teahouse proprietor Tsutaya Jirôbei and later moved his business to another shop on the same street owned by an Iedaya Hambei.20 Although Mukai’s statement is not supported by any hard evidence, I consider the

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19 The term *aratame* or “inspected” had the connotation of being “authorized” by the Publishers’ Association. Matsuki. 18; Konta. *Edo no hon’ya san.* 112.

scenario he described highly probable. Assuming the family name of Tsutaya necessarily entitled the young Maruyama Karamaru to some help from his adopted father. In this case, the help was a good personal connection, or perhaps even a financial endorsement, that enabled him to acquire a place for his business operation. Tsutaya Jirôbei, if such a person existed, might have been Karamaru's adopted father himself or a relative of his adopted father.21 Unfortunately, no extant documents indicate that Tsutaya's adopted father indeed played a significant role in his early career.

However, Nampo’s writing did acknowledge that Tsutaya’s mother was a key figure to his success. According to Nampo, Tsutaya’s success was due to his mother’s “teaching” (ikyô). But in what way? The language of the epitaph suggests that the teaching was a moral one; however, we should never entirely exclude the possibility that the term “teaching” could in fact mean a practical assistance. If indeed Hirose Tsuyo was an ex-courtesan with good connection with the proprietors in the Yoshiwara, Nampo would have concealed such a fact out of respect for Tsutaya and his deceased mother. Also, during the Edo period, occupational lineage was an important element in defining a social being; therefore, had Tsuyo been a daughter of a merchant or an artisan, Nampo would have mentioned it. Moreover, since Tsuyo gave birth to Tsutaya in the Yoshiwara district, there is no doubt that she knew the people living in the district. When Tsutaya said he wanted to thank his mother’s “hard work” (kyûrô), he might have implied her mother’s role as a go-between and not just her “moral encouragement.”

21 Mukai speculates that Tsutaya Jirôbei was Jûzaburô’s stepbrother. Also known as Nozawa (Tsutaya) Jirôkichi. Jirôbei was very active as a teahouse proprietor in the Yoshiwara. Mukai, part 2, 7.
So far, although we must admit that our effort to reconstruct Tsutaya Jûzaburô’s childhood years has left us more questions than when we began our inquiry into his life, we must be content with our success in reconstructing the social environment in which he was raised. True, it is not possible for us to say for sure whether some of the “facts” presented to us are really that reliable or whether some of the conjectures we have raised do indeed represent the truth. Yet, these half-proven facts and conjectures all point to an indisputable conclusion; that is, Tsutaya’s success owed its foundation to the Yoshiwara pleasure quarter. Urokogataya trusted the young Tsutaya, it is easy to see, because of the simple fact that Tsutaya knew the product he was selling. While young salespeople nowadays might take a day or two to familiarize themselves with a new product before they become confident about their ability to persuade their customers to buy it; Tsutaya, spending his whole childhood in and out of the Yoshiwara, was certainly overqualified for selling a product that functioned to teach people how to get around in the Yoshiwara. Of course, as we can imagine, even being an “insider” of the Yoshiwara did not necessarily guarantee a good salesman of things Yoshiwara. But Tsutaya was more than just an “insider.” When he entrusted Tsutaya with the distributing rights of his Yoshiwara saiken, Urokogataya must have seen in Tsutaya, as Ishikawa also did later, the carefree and spirited qualities that came to epitomize the Yoshiwara pleasure world. In the eyes of the shrewd Urokogataya, the young man named Tsutaya Jûzaburô was a more authentic product of the Yoshiwara than the saiken he sold.

Another very important implication of this conclusion is that the Yoshiwara, as a social institution, was contributing to the overall social growth of Edo. This was a development not in the least expected by the
bakufu government when it officially sanctioned the construction of the district. Initially, the building of the Yoshiwara was part of an effort to curb social displacement. The bakufu wanted to make sure that, by concentrating the trade of prostitution in a designated and isolated area, no displaced citizens in Edo could take advantage of its many scattered prostitution houses as hideaways. Such a policy of social compartmentalization, the bakufu officials genuinely believed, was only an expedient solution to the problem of social instability. However, as peace finally became a social reality, the Yoshiwara had already become such an established social institution that dismantling it was simply impossible. Just half a century after the establishment of the Tokugawa bakufu, the Yoshiwara district, once a deserted swamp land, had physically become the centre of the townspeople sector of Edo. The bakufu's attitude toward this social development is evident in its decision to order the Yoshiwara be moved further away from the heartland of the townspeople sector. In the tenth month of the second year of Meireki (late 1656), the machibugyō sho issued an edict ordering the relocation of the Yoshiwara while at the same time promising financial compensation.²² The proprietors in the Yoshiwara accepted the terms presented to them by the bakufu and prepared building the Shin-Yoshiwara or New-Yoshiwara pleasure quarter at a new location north of the original location.²³ The relocation process was further accelerated when the original Yoshiwara was consumed by a 1657 fire that broke out just after the Edo citizens had had their New Year celebration. In any case, the bakufu's effort to marginalize the Yoshiwara was obvious.

²² For a translation of the terms for relocation issued by the Edo machibugyō, see Seigle. 49.
²³ The Shin-Yoshiwara was often referred to simply as the Yoshiwara.
However, the effort was ephemeral. The social expansion of the city of Edo quickly reached the Shin-Yoshiwara quarter at Asakusa, making obsolete the bakufu’s policy of physically isolating what it considered a place of depravity. Instead of being a secluded area, the Shin-Yoshiwara had constant interactions with the core of the townspeople world. The case of Tsutaya Juzaburô, in particular, attests to this social reality. According to both Nampo and Ishikawa, their friend Tsutaya was not to stay in the Yoshiwara district for long: “In the ninth month of the third year of Temmei (1783), he moved to the eastern part of the city, and, on Tôriabura Street, he opened a bookstore.”24 Tôriabura Street was one of the several streets at the centre of the Edo townspeople world where the most prominent bookstores were located. And, ironically, the very location of these streets was once the location of the original Yoshiwara pleasure district. Therefore, although the Yoshiwara pleasure quarter was relocated, its very “spirit” continued to haunt the place where its physical form had once occupied in the past.

2. The Road to Tôriabura-chô

In 1783, at the age of thirty-four, Tsutaya entered the established booksellers’ community in Edo, and, in a short period of time, became one of its most charismatic members. His apparent ease to climb up the social ladder should not surprise us. The vibrant and sincere personality he exhibited in his friendship with Nampo and Ishikawa and in his ability to gain trust from Urokogataya was undoubtedly the very quality that guaranteed his business

24 Matsuki. 40.
success. However, personality was not the only factor that contributed to his success. Obviously, if personality should ever be made a factor conducive to a person’s success, it has to be understood in its social context. In Tsutaya’s case, we are able to ascertain the importance of his upbringing in the Yoshiwara pleasure district to his success in the business world. First, such an upbringing served to shape his personality. Second, his mastery of the spirit of the Yoshiwara, made possible by his personality, gave him a chance to engage in the business of selling Yoshiwara guidebooks and eventually allowed him to become a publisher himself. Here, we touch upon the significance of the social context of Tsutaya’s success, that is, his Yoshiwara upbringing. However, we are yet to explain our observation that the Yoshiwara was an institution capable of providing a condition for social advancement. In other words, what made the Yoshiwara a place of opportunity for social advancement?

The explanation, though very complex in its many manifestations, is rather simple, namely, the phenomenon of bun’un tōzen (the eastward movement of cultural fortune). This important cultural phenomenon affected the career of Tsutaya precisely because it affected the role of the Yoshiwara in the Edo townspeople world. In describing Tsutaya’s success story, we can speak of a two-leveled influence of this phenomenon. First, on the social level, we will examine how the Yoshiwara was able to contribute to the initial formation of this cultural phenomenon and how this institution was in turn affected by this very same phenomenon. Second, on the personal level, we will find out how Tsutaya took advantage of the many social changes caused by this phenomenon.
The underlying assumption of the *bun'un tōzen* phenomenon was that the cultural centre of Japan in the early Tokugawa period was still the Kamigata region (Kyoto and Osaka). Ever since Emperor Kammu (r. 781-806) moved the capital of Japan to Heian in the last decade of the eighth century, Heian (renamed as Kyoto in 1185) has been the centre of Japanese high culture. The imperial aristocracy, though losing much of its political influence over time, remained a source of this culture for several hundred years. But gradually the imperial aristocracy could no longer claim its exclusive rights to this culture. By the end of the sixteenth century, successive ruling warrior families, the Buddhist monastic order, and great merchant houses, had participated in a series of re-interpretations of this culture, adding elements that reflected the social changes of Japan. When Tokugawa Ieyasu took over the country in the beginning of the seventeenth century, Kyoto culture was no longer synonymous with aristocratic culture. Elite townspeople were equally active, if not more so, in the creative pursuit at Kyoto. Consequently, at the beginning of the Tokugawa rule, not only was Kyoto culture not on the decline, it had strengthened itself considerably by incorporating many non-aristocratic ingredients.

Given the fact that Kyoto was experiencing another wave of cultural renaissance at the beginning of the Tokugawa rule, the shift of cultural gravity from Kyoto to Edo in just one century is somewhat surprising to us. However, such a response of ours is based on an assumption that the innovative culture in Edo was replacing the traditional culture in Kyoto. Yet, this assumption is only partially true. *Bun'un tōzen*, though signifying a shift of cultural gravity from central to eastern Japan and from the traditional to the innovative, does not preclude a continuity between the two cultural centres. In fact, cultural
continuity seems to have been a major characteristic of the bun'un tōzen phenomenon.

The process of this eastward movement of cultural gravity from Kyoto and Osaka to Edo actually began with a reassertion of the traditional cultural heritage of Kyoto. Such a reassertion is best seen in the publishing culture of Japan. The first fifty years of the Tokugawa rule witnessed a period when classical works, hitherto available mainly in a limited number of handwritten copies to the cultural elite, were made accessible to the public in printed form by the professional publishers in Kyoto. These professional publishers of chōnin origins, most scholars agree, began to appear during the Kan’ei era (1624-44).25 They differed from their predecessors, namely, the aristocratic cultural elite, the monasteries, the bakufu governments, and even the elite Kyoto townspeople, because their publishing activities were operating within a competitive market.26 To maximize their profit, their products not only had to appeal to the elite but also to the general townspeople population. An important work often quoted by scholars of Japanese publishing culture to illustrate the composition of the early Kyoto publishers is the Kyō habutae.27 Published in the second year of Jōkyō (1685), this local gazetteer lists the names of many publishers and their respective specialization. It seems that these publishers were carefully dividing among themselves into different specialized shops so as to cater to different consumer groups. Generally

26 By elite Kyoto townspeople. I mean people like Ogata Kōrin (1658-1716) who treated elegantly decorated and illustrated books as art items in their own right. See David Chibbet, The History of Japanese Printing and Book Illustration (Tokyo and New York: Kodansha International, 1977) for a description of the artistic achievements of these early Tokugawa elite townspeople.
speaking, the division was a four-fold one: (1) kasho-jo narabi e-zōshi (poetry and picture books), (2) kara hon'ya (Chinese books), (3) shomotsu hon'ya (books of knowledge), (4) jōruri hon'ya (puppet theatre chanting manuals). Shomotsu hon'ya or bookstores specializing in books of knowledge were further subdivided into ten different shops: poetry, the Lotus Sutra, Confucian medical texts, Ansaisho (books on warrior customs?), books on Zen Buddhism, books on Shingon Buddhism, books on the Ikkō Buddhist sect, and texts of nō drama (utaihon). Bookstores belonging to the first category were publishing and selling Japanese classics such as the Genji monogatari, Nihon shoki, Man'yōshū, and Makura no sōshi. Some works might even be published with illustrations. For example, in the six-volume Sōeki shoseki mokuroku taizen (the great collection of book catalogues, expanded version) compiled by the publisher Kawachiya Rihei in the ninth year of Genroku (1696), we often find titles such as Genji monogatari e-iri (Illustrated tale of Genji). In order to increase readership, the publishers of Japanese classics were willing to make an extra effort to include attractive illustrations in their reprinted classics. The second category included those publishers who specialized in Chinese books. The subject matter of these books covered from Confucian classics to historical works. Both types of publishers, in making classical works in Japanese and Chinese more accessible to the general public, were contributing to the rejuvenation of Japanese traditional culture in seventeenth-century Japan.

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28 The number of shops for each category is 3, 3, 10, and 3 respectively.
29 Suwa, "Tsutaya no kisetsu," part 1, 72-3.
30 Konta, Edo no hon'ya san, 12-3.
However, the rejuvenation of Japanese traditional culture, having escaped from the patronage of the cultural elite, had to adjust itself to the taste of the commoners. As we can see from the proportion of the bookstores dealing with different types of book, compared with the bookstores selling reprinted classics, there were more bookstores publishing and selling non-traditional works. In other words, while at Kyoto a genuine revival of traditional culture was in the making because of the availability of classics in printed form, a significant number of readers were more interested in practical books and books of enjoyment. The bookstores of the third and fourth categories were catching on to this trend, providing a variety of books that either contained practical information\textsuperscript{31} or assisted people in the enjoyment of the theatre. Obviously, the major problem encountered by the rejuvenation of Japanese traditional culture was to address the existence of a reading public that was less elitist.

This problem was eventually resolved by a major innovation, namely, the \textit{kana-zōshi} (or books printed with the \textit{kana} script). Since the \textit{kana} script is a set of phonetic alphabets which could easily be mastered by an average Japanese, any book printed with the \textit{kana} script guaranteed its readership among the commoners. The effect of this simple innovation thus made a book more marketable in the \textit{chônin} world. Owing to this innovation, Kyoto was able to maintain its role as the publishing and cultural centre of Japan for almost a century until the rise of Saikaku’s \textit{ukiyo-zōshi} (books of the floating world). In the meantime, Kyoto continued to dominate the cultural production in all of Japan. For example, according to the \textit{Kaitei-Nihon shōsetsu shomoku}

\textsuperscript{31} This may have contributed to the \textit{jitsugaku} (practical learning) tradition of the late Tokugawa period.
nempyō, of a sample containing 143 titles of kana-zōshi published in the Tokugawa period, 65 of them were published by Kyoto publishers, 42 by Edo publishers, 7 by Osaka publishers, and 29 by publishers of unknown area. Even though the sample may be too small to warrant accuracy, it is still a fairly good indication of Kyoto’s dominance in the publication of the kana-zōshi. Indeed, according to the Shōtoku 5 (1715) edition of the Sōeki shoseki mokuroku taizen, the number of bookstores in Kyoto continued to increase, reaching about two hundred by the end of the Genroku era (1688-1703). In comparison, the total number of bookstores in Japan in the same period of time was about four hundred.

As I have mentioned in the introduction, the Osaka merchant-writer Ihara Saikaku (1642-93; pen-name of Hirayama Tōgo) was mostly responsible for re-evaluating and, ultimately, rejuvenating traditional Japanese culture, bringing it from the pristine world of idealism into the reality of this world, the so-called floating world or ukiyo. As the translator of Saikaku’s Kōshoku ichidai onna (the woman who loves love), Ivan Morris comments on the genre of ukiyo-zōshi:

This was a new bourgeois literature written mainly for the amusement and instruction of townsfolk in the large commercial centres and describing them and the world they inhabited. This is not to suggest that Genroku fiction was devoid of pre-Tokugawa influences. The court romances of the eleventh century, and

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32 Suwa, “Tsutaya no kisetsu,” part 1, 73.
33 Here, I am paraphrasing Suwa, “Tsutaya no kisetsu,” part 1, 73.
34 Scholars have agreed that the major characteristic of Saikaku’s œuvres is realism. For example, see Howard S. Hibbett, “Saikaku as a Realist.” HJAS 15 (1952): 408-18; or Richard Lane, “Saikaku and the Japanese Novel of Realism.” Japan Quarterly 4 (1957): 178-88.
especially the narrative literature of the thirteenth century, frequently find an echo in the writing of Saikaku.\textsuperscript{35}

Here, we can see that Saikaku's \textit{ukiyo-zôshi} was almost an amalgamation of the traditional and the innovative. To be sure, the Heian prose tradition, as noted by Morris in a later passage, no longer found its way in the language of Saikaku's novel; however, Saikaku was well aware of this tradition.\textsuperscript{36} He fashioned his book \textit{Kôshoku ichidai otoko} on the basis of parodying the Heian classic \textit{Genji monogatari}: "The fifty-four episodes clearly correspond in number to the fifty-four books of the great eleventh-century novel, \textit{The Tale of Genji}, and [the protagonist of \textit{Kôshoku ichidai otoko}] Yonosuke himself may be regarded as the counterpart in a bourgeois society of 'Genji the Shinning One,' the beau ideal of an aristocratic age."\textsuperscript{37} Saikaku therefore successfully and intentionally misread the Heian tradition. In so doing, he created a new literary world that had as its basis the world of the townspeople of which he was an exemplary member.

While being instrumental in re-evaluating the traditional, the rise of the \textit{ukiyo-zôshi} also ended the dominance of aristocratic tradition in the world of letters. A new tradition that found its inspiration in the life of the townspeople world was emerging ever since the Genroku era; and Kyoto, the capital of Japanese traditional culture, was quickly responding to this change. Though Osaka was the birthplace of the \textit{ukiyo-zôshi}, Kyoto was determined to assume the role as the major dispenser of this genre. Noma Kôshin, in 1954,

\textsuperscript{36} Morris. 12.
\textsuperscript{37} Morris. \textit{trans.}, \textit{The Life of an Amorous Woman}. 24.
published in the journal *Kokugo kokubun* an article in four parts entitled “Ukiyo-zôshi nempyô” (the chronology of *ukiyo-zôshi*), in which he arrived at the following table of statistics.\(^{38}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tenna era (1681-1683)</th>
<th>Jôkyô era (1684-1687)</th>
<th>Genroku era (1688-1703)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>12 titles (54%)</td>
<td>35 (42%)</td>
<td>80 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>6 (27%)</td>
<td>23 (28%)</td>
<td>51 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
<td>25 (30%)</td>
<td>46 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the last two decades of the seventeenth century, Kyoto was consistently more active than the other two major cities in publishing *ukiyo-zôshi*. This trend continued mainly because of one publishing house in Tokyo, namely, the Hachimonjiya.\(^{39}\) The Hachimonjiya was founded by an Ando Hachizaemon, who was often referred to as Hachimonjiya Jishô (d. 1745). Being an *ukiyo-zôshi* writer himself, Jishô had two advantages. First, having been making a living by writing *ukiyo-zôshi*, he understood the market demand for the novels written in this genre during the Genroku era. Second, he was himself a genuine connoisseur of this genre who was able to recognize the very best *ukiyo-zôshi* writers of his time. Indeed, he discovered the talented *ukiyo-zôshi* writer Ejima Kiseki.\(^{40}\) Consequently, from the Genroku era to the Meiwa era (1761-72), *Hachimonjiya-bon* or books published by the Hachimonjiya became a synonym for *ukiyo-zôshi* and *yakusha hyôbanki* (guide books on the

\(^{38}\) Suwa. “Tsutaya no kisetsu.” part 1, 73.

\(^{39}\) The suffix “ya” means “house.” By convention, a publisher was referred to by the name of his publishing house.

\(^{40}\) Kiseki's novelistic art has been thoroughly discussed by Howard Hibbett in his *The Floating World in Japanese Fiction* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).
kabuki actors). The death of Jishô’s successor Hachimonjiya Zuishô in 1766, however, ended this dominance. The Hachimonjiya abandoned the ukiyo-zôshi genre and redirected its focus to publishing haikai poetry.

Therefore, just a few decades before Tsutaya Jûzaburô sold his first Yoshiwara guidebook in 1773, the Kamigata publishing world was still enjoying a commanding lead in its creative production. How do we explain the sudden rise of Edo as a publishing centre during Tsutaya’s lifetime? First of all, the prosperity of the Kamigata publishers like Hachimonjiya was sustained by their willingness to explore new literary genres that sought to capture the tastes of the increasingly wealthy townspeople in the Kamigata region. As we have seen in our previous discussion, from reprinted classics through kana-zôshi to ukiyo-zôshi, the Kamigata publishers were always seeking new ways to increase readership. These publishers were certainly aware that, much like their fellow Kamigata townspeople, their counterparts in Edo were also getting quite wealthy. It is therefore not hard to imagine that some of the established Kyoto publishers would want to venture into the promising publishing market of Edo. After all, with its townspeople’s population reaching half a million entering into the eighteenth century, Edo provided these Kyoto publishers with a broad consumer base. The statistics in the Jôkyô 4 (1687) Edo gazetteer Edo kanoko reveals the effort of these Kyoto publishers. Of the twenty-five contemporary Edo bookstores listed in this gazetteer, sixteen were branch shops (demise) of already established Kyoto’s bookstores. Of course, we must be careful not to assume that all

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42 Suwa. “Tsutaya no kisetsu.” *Tsutaya no kisetsu.* part 1, 74.
the branch shops were operated by the family members of some Kyoto publishing houses. Some Kyoto publishers could very well have hired native Edo townsmen to operate their “branch shops.” Moreover, the relationship between a main shop and its branch shop was not necessarily a formal and contractual one. But the relationship was definitely mutually beneficial in that the Edo “branch shop” was promised a constant supply of new products from Kyoto in exchange for its role as a local distributor. In any case, as early as the last decades of the seventeenth century, there was an ongoing process of commercial transplantation between the Kamigata region and Edo.

It is certainly true that the bun’un tôzen phenomenon took its impetus from this process of commercial transplantation; indeed, one way of looking at the phenomenon might be to view it as an inevitable consequence of an influx of publishing capital from the Kamigata region to Edo. However, commercial transplantation should not be confused with cultural transplantation. In fact, as ironic as it may sound, for Edo to establish itself as a publishing and cultural centre, it had to resist the very force of commercial transplantation exerted by the Kamigata publishers. The Kamigata publishers had been successful in dominating the cultural scene of Japan throughout the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries because they were always relentless in discovering the changing tastes of the Kamigata townspeople. The success of kana-zôshi and ukiyo-zôshi as popular literary genres was a testimony to the intimate relationship fostered between artistic production and the chônin reading public. As we can imagine, the reading public in Edo was very different from that of the Kamigata region; thus, an entirely different

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44 A contemporary dry goods shop Mitsui was operated by brothers who headed different branch shops.
relationship between artistic production and the chōnin reading public was necessary for Edo. In other words, what the Edo publishing world really inherited from the Kamigata publishers was the chōnin-directed mode of cultural production developed by these publishers rather than their publishing capital.

The native Edo publishers, responding to their powerful Kamigata challengers, were quick to recognize the importance of the chōnin-directed mode of cultural production. This especially brought a great deal of excitement and hope for the newly rising publishers in Edo. Basically they had been denied the samurai readership because it was monopolized by the so-called goyō shoshi (officially authorized publishers). For example, ever since the establishment of the Tokugawa bakufu, the famous goyō shoshi Suharaya held the exclusive rights to publishing bukan or learning manuals for the warrior. On the other hand, the townspeople portion of the Edo readership was not seriously exploited until the Kamigata cultural impact. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the Edo publishers have been responding to the business competition from their Kamigata counterparts in an ongoing struggle to get a greater share of the townspeople readership in Edo. The Edo publishers succeeded in such a struggle by putting forward a series of popular books with contents comparable to those of the Kamigata kana-zōshi and ukiyo-zōshi. Collectively, they were known as the kusa-zōshi. For example, the akahon (books with red covers), being a type of the kusa-zōshi, reached its popularity among the Edo chōnin during the Kyōhō era (1716-36) for its simple storylines and attractive illustrations. But the final success of the Edo publishers came about with the appearance of several other types of kusa-zōshi such as the kibyōshi (yellow covers), sharebon (books of wit), and
ninjōbon (books of emotions) because they contained original stories written by Edo chōnin writers. That is to say, when the Edo townspeople had the ability to write their own stories, much like what Saikaku had done for Osaka and Kiseki for Kyoto, the Edo publishing world immediately acquired a new life independent of the Kamigata cultural world. The eastward movement of cultural fortune in Japan was completed when the native Edo publishers finally recognized that they, not their Kyoto counterparts, had to get a good grasp of the very source of cultural production in Edo, namely, its townspeople writers.

The contribution of the Yoshiwara pleasure quarter is self-evident when we can see that it was an ideal place for nurturing future artists and literary celebrities. The Yoshiwara particularly appealed to the more eccentric among these men of letters because they found more freedom in this socially isolated institution. Because it was supposedly isolated from the rest of Edo society, the Yoshiwara was allowed a certain degree of freedom by the bakufu government. As long as this freedom was "contained" in the Yoshiwara and as long as it was not conducive to any rebellious sentiment, the bakufu policy toward the place was one of tolerance. Outside the Yoshiwara, the story was quite different. Throughout the Edo period, sumptuary edicts were repeatedly issued by the bakufu in an effort to make the Edo townspeople conform to an ideal social order based on frugality and moral conservatism. The fact that they were issued repeatedly meant that they were not at all very effective; in fact, a peculiar chōnin spirit or ethos, characterized by its outlandishness and unconventionality, was taking roots in the townspeople world. The educated townspeople, particularly the artists and the writers, were prone to this chōnin ethos; and most of them found it a source of creativity. Instead of publicly displaying this ethos, they gathered in the Yoshiwara and enjoyed the
accompaniment of those fellow townsmen who also identified themselves with this chōnin ethos. The Yoshiwara thus became a place of cultural exchange for these men of letters.

The more aggressive Edo publishers knew that the best way to acquire new publishing material was to go directly into the Yoshiwara and get acquainted with the men of letters who frequented the place. Incidentally, the Urokogataya, headed at one time by Tsutaya’s boss Urokogataya Magobei, was one such publisher. The Urokogataya was a traditional Edo publishing house that had begun its business operation from the late 1650s. From the very beginning, the Urokogataya had to compete with the branch shops of various Kamigata publishing houses. By the time of Magobei, the general strategy for the Urokogataya to react to the challenges posed by these outsider publishing houses was to secure the rights to publication of the works of famous Edo writers and artists. In order to achieve this goal, the Urokogataya gradually began to foster a close relationship with the people in the Yoshiwara, hoping that business connections could be established through them. For example, when we examine what the Urokogataya had published over the years, we discover that most of the books it published were authored by famous Edo novelists and artists who were frequent guests of the Yoshiwara: Hishikawa Moronobu (1625?-94) in the late seventeenth century.

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45 There were two distinct golden periods for the Urokogataya publishing house, the first being that of its founder Sanzaemon while the second being that of Magobei. Sanzaemon opened his bookstore on Odemma Street, Third Section, and his business was an immediate success that lasted from the Manji era (1658-61) to the Genroku era (1688-1703). Magobei, probably Sanzaemon’s grandson, continued the glorious tradition of the house between the Kyōhō era (1716-35) and the Temmei era (1781-88). See Yayoshi Mitsunaga, ed., Mikan shiryō ni yoru Nihon shuppan bunka, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Yumani shobō, 1989). 128.
and Koikawa Harumachi and Hôseidô Kisanji in the late eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{46} The success of the first period was largely owing to the genius of Urokogataya Sanzaemon, the founder of the Urokogataya publishing house. What Sanzaemon's genius had accomplished, however, was more than business success; his achievement in fact acquired a historic significance in the cultural and art history of Japan. Hishikawa Moronobu, it is generally agreed, was "the artist who started the ukiyo-e tradition of print-making."\textsuperscript{47} More importantly, one of the major themes he was working on was the Yoshiwara pleasure world; he produced such famous works as the series \textit{Yoshiwara no karada} (Representations of the Yoshiwara, album-sized sheets, 1678) and the \textit{Bijin-e tsukushi} (the Ultimate Pictures of Beauty, picture book or e-hon, 1683). The latter, in particular, was published by Urokogataya Sanzaemon.\textsuperscript{48}

Even more so than his grandfather Sanzaemon, Magobei knew very well the importance of making business connection in the Yoshiwara, his discovering the talented Tsutaya Jûzaburô being a good example. Among many other things, the fact that Urokogataya Magobei was able to monopolize eventually the publishing rights to the \textit{Yoshiwara saiken} was solid proof of his ability to foster intimate relationship with the people in the Yoshiwara. Matsuki Hiroshi summarizes Magobei's success in the following words:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{46} Not all of these novelists and artists were born in Edo. For example, Moronobu was born in the province of Awa and moved to Edo around the Kambun era (1661-73). Asai Ryôi was born near Osaka. However, except Asai Ryôi, who lived in Kyoto most of his life, all of them spent their productive life in Edo and considered themselves Edokko or Sons of Edo. For a list of the major Urokogataya publication, see Mitsunaga, vol. 4. 130-42.
\textsuperscript{48} Yayoshi. vol. 4. 133.
\end{quote}
According to the research of Mukai Nobuo, the oldest *Yoshiwara saiken* that is extant today dates back to around the Jōkyō era (1684-88). After the mid-Kyôhô era (about 1725), the publication of the *Yoshiwara saiken* began to boom, and [the number of] publishers who followed suit increased. Those names who are recognizable as publishers of the *Yoshiwara saiken* are Urokogataya Magobei, Tsuruya Kiemon, Sagamiya Heisuke, Mimonjiya Matashirô, Yamamoto Kyûzaemon, and others. However, from Gemmon 3 (1738) onward, only two *saiken* publishers were still operating, namely, Urokogataya and Yamamoto. They each published twice annually in the spring and autumn. Eventually, in Hôreki 8 (1758), even Yamamoto had to give up [his share] with the publication of his very last *saiken*. From then on, the [publication of the] *Yoshiwara saiken* was monopolized by Urokogataya Magobei.\(^{49}\)

In the early decades of the eighteenth century, publishing in Edo was undoubtedly a highly competitive business. Whenever a new product such as the *Yoshiwara saiken* became in vogue among the reading public, various publishers would immediately pursue the publication of it. Strangely enough, not all publishers were equally successful. But why? What was the decisive factor that contributed to Urokogataya Magobei’s eventual dominance of the publication of the *Yoshiwara saiken*? Since different publishers could produce their own versions of the *Yoshiwara saiken*, the problem of copyrights was not the reason. In fact, according to Mukai’s description, when the *Yoshiwara saiken* was first introduced to the public, different publishers put out different versions of the product. What was so special about the Urokogataya version *saiken*? For one thing, some of Magobei’s competitors were branch shops of Kyoto publishing houses, for example, the Tsuruya and the Yamamoto were both *demise* of their Kyoto main shops. These outsider publishers might not

\(^{49}\) Matsuki, 18-9.
have had a good connection with the Yoshiwara. Another fact we know for sure was that, from the year 1773, the Urokogataya version *saiken* was conveniently sold to the Yoshiwara customers just outside the quarter by a Yoshiwara expert named Tsutaya Jûzaburô. We can certainly extrapolate from this fact and assume that a similar business practice must have been followed by Magobei for some time. In other words, Magobei’s business success had to do with his intimate connection with the Yoshiwara and its people.

By now, it should be clear that the significance of the Yoshiwara as a social institution was its role as a physical setting for creating a distinct Edo *chônin* solidarity. The advent in Edo of Kamigata business competition and cultural challenges not only prompted an economic response by the Edo townspeople, it also helped these people define their own cultural identity, namely, as unconventional and rebellious *Edokko*. Such was the larger social condition in which Tsutaya Jûzaburô, an *Edokko* living near the Yoshiwara, was able to succeed both as a cultural hero and a businessman.

Indeed, the personal favouritism shown to Tsutaya by the established publisher Urokogataya Magobei is only intelligible in the context of this larger social condition. We can slightly detect in the relationship between the two men the emerging Edo socio-cultural tradition that was based on personality and temperament rather than blood ties. Unlike Magobei who inherited a business fortune from his family, Tsutaya began his career with almost nothing. As a child of seven, he had to be sent away from his beloved mother to be someone else’s adopted son. The adoption clearly was arranged based on financial consideration. Although it was common for a rich merchant family to send its heir away to be trained in someone else’s shop during his
childhood, I do not think it was so in the case of Tsutaya. As we can sense from what Tsutaya told his friend Ôta Nampo when his mother just passed away, life must have been rough for the young Tsutaya to be separated from his mother. “Because later we [my mother and I] were re-united,” Tsutaya told Nampo, “I am what I am now.” As we have discussed before, instead of financial support, Tsutaya’s mother had helped her son through her personal relations with the dwellers and guests of the Yoshiwara. And among the many Yoshiwara guests, Magobei was clearly impressed by the talent of the young Tsutaya. Beginning from 1773, he let Tsutaya sell his version of the *Yoshiwara saiken*. Then, just one year after this, in the seventh month of An’ei 3 (1774), remarkably enough, Tsutaya was allowed to publish his first book, the *Hitome sembon*. The book belongs to the genre of *yûjo hyôbanki* (Record of popular courtesans) whose general purpose was to critique the merits and demerits of the various courtesans in the pleasure quarter. This particular *hyôbanki*, though making an association between famous courtesans and different styles of flower arrangement, does not really make any critique. It was more or less intended as a souvenir for courtesans and tea house proprietors to give out to their customers. Because the book was basically printed as a special order by the Yoshiwara courtesans and proprietors, it was not subject to any commercial competition. Consequently, the publication of such a book did not carry much business risk. In addition, the illustrator of this book was the native *ukiyo-e* artist Kitao Shigemasa (1739-1820), whose fame further guaranteed the success of the book. All this was only possible

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50 Matsuki. 40.
because of Magobei's "back-up." More importantly, it was Magobei's personal "back-up," as well as "back-up" directed from one Edokko to his fellow Edokko.

As the Edokko themselves were fostering their own socio-cultural solidarity, the tension between the Edokko and their Kamigata counterparts escalated. In the area of book publishing, disputes over the copyrights on certain works became a constant source of conflict between the publishing houses of the two cultural centres. Ironically, Tsutaya's eventual rise to become a publisher owed in large part to a copyright dispute that involved the Urokogataya publishing house. The Urokogataya had been very aggressive ever since it was founded by Sanzaemon. For instance, in the late seventeenth century when Edo writers were yet to surpass their Kamigata counterparts, Sanzaemon would find ways to publish many Kamigata works. One way would be to republish famous works by Kamigata writers. Looking through the titles published by Sanzaemon, we see that the name of the famous kana- zōshi writer Asai Ryōi appears several times. Considered the most prolific kana-zōshi writer of his time, Ryōi took Kyoto as the centre of his literary activities partly because the Kyoto publishing world was dominating the publication of the kana-zōshi. But he also seems to have known Edo well. Incidentally, he was the first person to have written a guidebook to Edo, which was published as the Edo meisho ki in Kyoto in 1622. This

52 Matsuki, 20.
54 The "guidebook" genre first appeared in Kyoto. Moreover, "the first of the proper guidebooks to Kyoto was the Kyō warabe (The Kyoto youth), written in 1658 by a physician, Nakagawa Kiun... Following the example of Kyoto, a guidebook to Edo, Asai Ryōi's Edo meisho ki, was published in Kyoto in 1662." Donald H. Shively, "Popular Culture," in John W. Hall, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 4
guidebook must have made him quite popular among the Edo readers, and Sanzaemon had every reason to capitalize on the fame of Ryōi by publishing his works in Edo. Of course, by looking at the titles of these works, we really do not know whether they were published with Ryōi’s permission. Another way to publish well-known works by Kamigata writers was to make an illustrated versions of their works. The Yamato no kongen in two fascicles was an extensively abridged and illustrated version of Saikaku’s Kōshoku ichidai otoko published by Sanzaemon in the early 1680s. Since the original was published in the Kamigata region in 1682, Sanzaemon wasted no time in introducing a new Kamigata work to the Edo public. Again, we do not know whether he had infringed any copyright or not.

Sanzaemon’s successor Magobei, however, was reluctantly drawn into a copyright dispute. In the fifth month of the fourth year of An’ei (1775), one of Magobei’s clerks (tedai) Tokubei carelessly “republished” a work without the permission of the original Osaka publishers, Kashiwabaraya Yozaemon and Murakami Ibei. The trial seems to have lasted for two years. The punishment for Tokubei was confiscation of his wealth and property (kessho) and banishment (tsuihō). According to the Tokugawa custom, Tokubei’s boss Magobei was also implicated for Tokubei’s wrong-doing, a practice called renza. As a result, Magobei was slightly fined. But the damage was far


55 For example, the Urokogataya version of Ryōi’s Kanninki was published in Kambun 11 (1670) while the original version was published in Manji 2 (1659).

56 Hishikawa Moronobu was the illustrator. Yayoshi, vol. 4, 133.

57 Matsuki says the copyright dispute began in the fourth year of An’ei (1775), and according to Yayoshi, the verdict came in the sixth year of An’ei (1777). See Matsuki, 28 and Yayoshi, vol. 4, 142 respectively.

58 The fine was 200 momme of silver, which was not much for an established publisher like Magobei. See
more extensive than a fine; the usual business operation was disrupted by the dispute. In particular, the distraught Urokogataya could not issue the autumn 1775 edition of the *Yoshiwara saiken*. Instead, Tsutaya and some other publishers were quick to seize this business opportunity by publishing their own versions of the *saiken*. When the Urokogataya resumed publishing its *saiken* in the spring of next year (1776), Tsutaya was allowed to continue publishing his version of the *saiken*. From this time onward, the Urokogataya and Tsutaya versions of the *Yoshiwara saiken* appeared together.

Magobei basically did not mind giving Tsutaya half of the share of the *Yoshiwara saiken* market partly because his major publishing venture was the *kusa-zōshi*. By the time of the copyright dispute, he was exploring various styles of this literary form: from the *akahon* of the early eighteenth century to the *kurohon* and *aohon* of the 1740s to early 1770s, Magobei was as vigorous as his Kamigata predecessors in discovering new literary formats that appealed to the Edo townspeople readership. Because the simple storylines offered by these early styles of the *kusa-zōshi* could not fulfil the needs of the increasingly sophisticated Edo reading public, Magobei had to develop a new style to keep up with the changing taste of his readers. It is somewhat ironic to see that, the development of such a new style had to come about at the time when Magobei was facing the copyright dispute. In 1775, Koikawa Harumachi, a member of Magobei's own team of writers, invented the *kibyōshi* style in his *Kinkin sensei eigai no yume* (The flowering dreams of Mr. Kinkin or Gold). The *kibyōshi*, like its earlier *kusa-zōshi* relatives, focuses on the combined effect of storyline and illustration, but it differs from

Yayoshi, vol. 4. 142-3. For example, during the late eighteenth century, the manuscript fee was usually one momme of silver per sheet.
other kusa-zōshi in how it presents a story. A kibyōshi storyline is always witty and possesses the much admired chōnin spirit of tsū, which literally means having a penetrating understanding. Such an understanding began with a cultivation of the connoisseurship of the fashionable in the world of chōnin, and ended with a genuine appreciation of the solidarity of the members belonging to this world. The two decisions Magobei made around the year 1775, that is, bringing Tsutaya closer to the publisher circle and supporting Harumachi’s latest innovation in the novelistic art, were more than those of a businessman. These decisions could only be made because Urokogataya Magobei was himself a man of tsū.

Just as Magobei seemed to be in his way to a business recovery with the publication of various works written in the kibyōshi style in the late 1770s, he was mysteriously fading away from the Edo publishing world by the year 1780. In the late 1770s, with the help of his intimate writer-friends such as Koikawa Harumachi and Hōseidō Kisanji, Magobei effortlessly dominated the publication of the kibyōshi. According to the Haishi teiyō (Outlines of legends), we have the following table.59

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>The total number of kibyōshi titles published in Edo</th>
<th>The number of kibyōshi titles published by the Urokogataya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An'ei 5 (1776)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An'ei 6 (1777)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An'ei 7 (1778)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An'ei 8 (1779)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An'ei 9 (1780)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How do we explain the sudden drop in the number of titles published by the Urokogataya? First of all, it is safe to rule out the possibility of a betrayal by

59 Matsuki. 29.
his writer-friends; Harumachi and Kisanji had no reason to turn their backs against their long-time friend Magobei especially when Magobei had been so supportive of them when they first published their kibyōshi works. Strangely enough, although the Urokogataya had been a prominent publishing house for a century, the exact reason for its downfall was never explicitly recorded. One obscure essay written in the tenth year of An’ei (1781) by Ôta Nampo may provide the only clue to explaining Urokogataya’s downfall. In this essay, Nampo recounted the hapless story of a townsman named Urokoya Masabei [or Seibei], a name uncannily resembling that of the then owner of the Urokogataya publishing house, Urokogataya Magobei. According to the interpretation of Konta Yôzô, the story reveals the following facts:

Based on Nampo’s Kikujusô, for years, Urokogataya had been frequently going in and out [of the residents] of daimyô and hatamoto [or the bannermen of the bakufu]. A steward of a certain [samurai] family was given to a lifestyle of pleasure and indulgence, and, [in order to continue such a lifestyle], he pawned the treasures of his master. The person who served as a middle-man for his pawning acts was Urokogataya. For this incident, Magobei probably received a sentence of exile. When the Kikujusô came out in the tenth year of An’ei (or the first year of Temmei, 1781), Magobei was probably not yet allowed to return back to his [home at] Ôdemmachô.\(^6\)

Konta’s reconstruction of what happened to Magobei is highly probable. First of all, unless he was actually involved in something as drastic as causing the loss of wealth to a ruling samurai family as in this case; as an established, resilient, and creative publisher, Magobei could not have been totally erased from the Edo publishing world. Second, Nampo’s account could be quite

\(^6\) Quoted by Matsuki. 30-1.
reliable if we can establish a connection between the story and the truth. In fact, from the mid-eighteenth century, social critique or satire had become a major literary expression for the townspeople writers; therefore, the content in Nampo’s essay was probably not totally unfounded. Moreover, Nampo’s credibility was enhanced by the fact that he himself was both a frequent participant of the Edo literary world and a retainer of a samurai family. An incident involving both the chōnin and the buke (samurai family) such as the above could hardly escape his notice.

In any case, Tsutaya seems to have benefited from Magobei’s downfall. A catalog of the books published by Tsutaya Jūzaburō reveals that both Harumachi and Kisanji were writing new works for his publishing house around the year of An’ei 9 (1780), the year the Urokogataya ceased to publish any new kibyōshi work. Then, in the Temmei era (1781-88), there was an explosion of the number of literary works published by the Tsutaya. While old friends such as Harumachi and Kisanji continued to have their new works published by the Tsutaya publishing house; new friends such as Yomo Sanjin or Yomo no Akara (two other pen-names of Ôta Nampo), Santô Kyôden, Yadoya no Meshimori (i.e. Ishikawa Masamochi), Tôrai Sanna (pen-name of Izumiya Genzô of bushi origin, 1744-1810, follower of Nampo’s school of kyôka poetry), and the famous ukiyo-e print-artist Utamarô all entrusted the publication of their works to the Tsutaya.61 More importantly, Tsutaya himself was setting up his new publishing house in the year 1783 at the Tôriabura-chô, which was just several blocks away from what used to be the location of the Urokogataya at the Ôdemma-chô. The fall of the Urokogataya

61 A catalog of books published by the Tsutaya is included in Yayoshi. vol. 3. 183-200.
and the rise of the Tsutaya within the time frame of a few years were no coincidences. The transformation of Tsutaya from a petty bookseller near the Yoshiwara to a fully-fledged publisher at the centre of the townspeople world clearly owed much to Magobei’s business legacy. The more specific question of how Tsutaya took over the entire team of writers from Magobei might never be answered for lack of sources. Yet, the fact that it was the young and rather inexperienced Tsutaya, and not other established and wealthy booksellers, who emerged as a successor to Magobei by taking over his team of writers is a clear indication of the importance of human relations and friendship for surviving in the publishing world of late-eighteenth-century Edo.

In summary, the discontinuity of the eastward movement of cultural fortune (bun’un tôzen) was crucial to the initial success of Tsutaya’s career. The earliest response by the Edo townspeople to the cultural impact from the Kamigata region in the late-seventeenth century was one of imitation. Gradually, around the mid-eighteenth century, the very same impact prompted the Edo townspeople to affirm their fellow citizens as equally legitimate creators of culture as their Kamigata predecessors. Because of this attitude, the phenomenon of bun’un tôzen that had begun and sustained itself with a cultural continuity between the Kamigata region and Edo ended in defiance of this continuity. Instead of seeking creative energy from the past, the Edo men of letters started to find their inspiration in the present reality, whose totality was to be found in the life of the Edo townspeople itself. Consequently, the destruction of the temporal continuity from the Kamigata region was replaced by the spatial continuity established among the people living in the townspeople sector of Edo. And the term Edokko, sons of a physical location called Edo, was obviously a more concrete expression for describing this
spatial continuity, a continuity that signified, above all, the solidarity of all *Edokko*. Such a spatial continuity became even more powerful a force in the Edo commercial world than wealth and blood ties. In the case of Tsutaya Jûzaburô, business inheritance was based on neither wealth nor blood ties; it was based on his ability to become a genuine *Edokko*. 
III The Bakufu’s Political Tradition

1. The Bakufu’s Role in the Publishing Culture of Edo Japan

So far, we have seen that the cultural phenomenon of *bun’un tōzen* had caused in eighteenth-century Edo the gradual formation of a distinct townspeople solidarity, which eventually helped Tsutaya with his early publishing career. But we are yet to explain the underlying force that made this phenomenon possible. In other words, we cannot claim to have found the very root of Tsutaya’s success if we cannot explain the source of this cultural phenomenon.

Until recently, Japanese scholars working on the publishing culture of Edo Japan had been viewing the rise of Edo as a publishing centre in terms of a flow of capital to the broadening consumer base of Edo. In the last chapter, using their scholarship, I have basically followed this line of argument, in which the most significant contribution to the success of an Edo publisher like Tsutaya is understood to be determined by a strong relationship between the production and consumption of literary or artistic creation. As the townspeople readership in Edo became more sophisticated, any publisher

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who could control the production of new literary or artistic styles could virtually dominate a huge portion of the Edo consumer base. The failure of the Kyoto subsidiary publishing houses in Edo was obviously attributable to their failure to introduce to the Edo reading public new literary and artistic products. On the other hand, Edo publishers such the Urokogataya consistently generated a variety of new publications, most of which catering to the changing taste of their readers, because they were controlling the network of writers and artists in Edo. Consequently, the simple explanation for the rise of Edo as a publishing centre is that Edo had become an independent cultural centre and that its townspeople were controlling both the cultural consumption and production in it.

This line of argument is basically correct. But the danger of it is its insistence on viewing the publishing culture in Edo more or less as a literary or artistic phenomenon. In particular, situating the publishing culture of Edo purely in the context of the bun 'un tôzen phenomenon does not totally account for the success story of an Edo publisher like Tsutaya. It is true that Tsutaya's rise to become a prominent publisher was closely related to his chônin spirit and his personal charm; however, how do we explain the fact that he was at the same time gaining his position in the Edo publishing world at the expense of his fellow townsman Urokogataya Magobei? As we begin to reflect upon the rise of the Tsutaya and the fall of the Urokogataya, we immediately notice that the townspeople sector of Edo, though excelling culturally, was in fact constantly subjected to the socio-political control of the samurai class. First of all, the Shin-Yoshiwara was never intended as a salon by the bakufu government, and Tsutaya was never expected to rise from his humble origins. Second, if Nampo's essay did indeed reflect, if not recount, the truth about the
fall of Magobei, Magobei’s eventual downfall was caused by his business involvement with the samurai class. It might be conjectured that the longevity of the Urokogataya’s business operation was not only due to its many creative publishing projects but also to its intimate dealings with the samurai class. All this actually suggests that there might not have been a clear demarcation between the living spaces between the ruling samurai class and the merchant class. In fact, one might be required to view the publishing culture of Edo not only as a series of literary or artistic events but also as a series of socio-political events.

Of course, one might argue that the studies of book censorship of the Tokugawa period, pioneered by scholars like Miyatake Gaikotsu, have already been treating the publishing culture of Edo Japan as a political problem. However, because the censorship approach presupposes an antagonistic relationship between the bakufu government and the more creative Edo publishers, it often makes a clear-cut conclusion that the political intervention of the bakufu was stifling the creative energy found in the townspeople world. Perhaps the more problematic result of this censorship approach is how it easily lends itself to a study of the ideological conflict between the political and cultural institutions of Edo Japan. In other words, the townspeople world had been denied its freedom to develop a truly open and competitive market economy because the bakufu constantly issued restrictive edicts to control such a development.

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However, the bakufu’s ideological control might not have always yielded negative results. For instance, one of the major breakthroughs in the studies of the institutional history of Edo Japan in the West was undeniably Donald H. Shively’s recognition of the positive role of the bakufu government’s controlling policy in the development of the kabuki theatre in his essay “Bakufu versus Kabuki.” He argued that the high artistic achievement of the kabuki theatre was resulted from the bakufu’s consistent yet often ineffective policy to restrict the on-stage behaviour of a kabuki actor. First, women and young boys were prohibited to act in the theatre lest they be involved in prostitution or other licentious activities. Then, male actors playing female roles (onnagata) were ordered to shave their foreheads such that they would less resemble real women. However, these and many other restrictions eventually effected an evolution in the dramaturgy of the kabuki, forcing it to appeal to its audience not just with sensational and good-looking actors but with its stylized and intense emotionality. We immediately suspect that Shively’s approach to the dramatic culture of Edo Japan might also apply to our study of the development of the publishing culture of the same period.

Indeed, the latest scholarship in Japan on the publishing culture of the Tokugawa period has already adopted an institutional approach. For example, Yamaguchi Kayoko in the November 1995 issue of the journal Rekishi hyōron (Historical criticism) proposes to understand the Osaka publishing world in the context of the socio-political institution of the Publishers’ Association.

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Her conclusion in fact rejects the common view that the bakufu's censorship control was solely responsible for impeding the growth of an open bookselling market in Tokugawa Japan. Instead, she has proved that the root of the problem was institutional as well. She points out that the Publishers' Association in Osaka, which was sanctioned by the bakufu, was a highly restrictive and protective socio-political institution that was dominated and controlled by a few publishers who actually had control over the copyrights on books. Booksellers who did not possess these copyrights had to be content to play the secondary role of distributors (aratame-nin) and renters (kashi hon'ya) and were not allowed to participate in the decision-making in the Publishers' Association. However, for the creation of an open and competitive bookselling market, such a participation was crucial and necessary. Consequently, rather than the bakufu censorship program itself, the early dominance of a few copyright-holding publishers in the Osaka Publishers' Association became the decisive factor limiting the growth of an open and competitive bookselling market. Therefore, the bakufu's role in the publishing industry in Osaka was more than ideological; by sanctioning the socio-political institution of the Osaka Publishers' Association, the bakufu's involvement in the Osaka publishing industry was

67 Yamaguchi. 57-8.
also an institutional one. It is only natural that we try to understand the Edo publishing world with a similar institutional approach.

2. The Bakuhan Political Tradition

Exactly how the Tokugawa bakufu and its socio-political institutions affected the publishing culture of Edo Japan? The more obvious answer is that the decision of the bakufu government to make Edo its permanent political capital was ultimately responsible for Edo's rise as a major cultural and, consequently, publishing centre. In other words, the very source of the bun 'un tōzen phenomenon, in which Edo gradually developed its own distinct culture independent of its Kamigata predecessors, was the simple fact that Edo was made the capital of Japan. This fact, being so obvious and indisputable, is easily taken for granted; and its many implications are often not carefully examined. It seems that a deeper understanding of the publishing culture of Edo is possible if one can go beyond this simple fact. In particular, the question of "how" Edo was made the capital city of Japan should provide us with some insights into the publishing culture of Edo.

When Tokugawa Ieyasu finally unified the country in 1600, Edo has been the site of his military headquarters for a decade. But except for its military function, Edo did not seem to be a promising capital city for the newly founded bakufu government. In fact, at that time, Edo, once a fishing village and still scarcely populated, could hardly be called a city; neither was it

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68 In 1590, when he was still one of many Sengoku daimyō, Tokugawa Ieyasu was "ordered" by Toyotomi Hideyoshi to abandon his original domains located along the southern coast of the main island of Japan in exchange for the domains east of his original domains on the Kantō plain.
comparable in culture to the ancient capital city of Kyoto nor in wealth to the commercial towns of Sakai and Osaka. Yet, despite its many unfavourable characteristics, Edo was eventually chosen as the capital of the Tokugawa regime by Ieyasu. There were of course many reasons for the choice. For example, Edo was close to the fertile Kantō Plain which conveniently served as a solid economic base for the bakufu government. Also, Edo was a potentially good centre of transportation, connecting to the northeastern and southern regions of Japan by sea and to the cultural and commercial centres of the Kamigata region by land. But the most important consideration had to be a strategic one. Ieyasu knew that the regime he had newly founded was not really that powerful both economically and militarily; it could easily crumble if the tozama daimyō or outsider domain leaders who had been his enemies before 1600 and temporarily pledged allegiance to him in 1600 were to unite and fight against his government. Also, in the early decades of the Tokugawa rule, Japan was yet to be pacified completely. The rival Toyotomi force in the Osaka Castle was yet to be eliminated, and the Christian influences in the western provinces were not totally eradicated. All these problems required military intervention, and Edo naturally should retain its military alertness. Clearly, to subdue militarily every single domain was not a realistic option for the pragmatic Ieyasu. For the time being, the safest option would be to strengthen what he had already set in place. Since Edo has been serving as his military centre for a decade, Ieyasu was sure of both its offensive and

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defensive abilities; and staying in Edo would buy him time to secure his political control over those domain leaders hostile to his regime.

The early growth of Edo was consequently dictated by Ieyasu’s consideration for the balance of military and economic powers between his bakufu government and the domain leaders (daimyō). Of course, Edo was never poised to become another capital for a centralized regime such as Chang’an of Tang China or even Nara of eighth-century Japan; nevertheless, it was to be recognized as the political centre of Japan from 1600 onward. Such a recognition was required of all daimyō although they were allowed to maintain their autonomy within their domains (han). Essentially, a distinction between the private and the public was made, and the well-being of the latter had to take priority over the former in all circumstances. Therefore, all daimyō were responsible for the physical growth of Edo. Indeed, they were required to provide either corvée or construction materials for the renovation and expansion of the Edo Castle. For Ieyasu, the whole construction project served several purposes. First, it reduced the economic strength of various daimyō. Second, it strengthened the military defensive ability of the Edo Castle. Third, it demonstrated to these daimyō that the Tokugawa bakufu was a politically legitimate regime. More importantly, all these were achieved without a direct military confrontation between the bakufu and the han.

In addition to castle construction, another very important daimyō’s public responsibility that also contributed to the physical and economic growth of Edo was the system of alternate attendance (sankin kōtai). It started out as informal visits of less trusted tozama daimyō to the shogunal capital to pledge their loyalty to the shogun. Gradually, as more rumours of tozama daimyō organizing rebellious plots against the bakufu were reported to its leaders, the
practice became codified and universalized in the 1630s. The system demanded that all domain leaders set up residences in Edo, in which their spouses were kept as semi-hostages. The domain leaders themselves had to commute back and forth between Edo and their domains every other year or within some other designated time period, depending on where their domains were located. Moreover, they had to carry a certain number of retainers in their procession according to the size of their domains. The system clearly accelerated the physical growth of Edo as hundreds of residences were built surrounding the Edo Chiyoda Castle. At the same time, it also benefited the economic growth of Edo. Virtually all industries that had anything to do with the construction of residences immediately experienced a business boom. Also, because the daimyō spouses and retainers living in Edo were themselves potential consumers, Edo experienced a sudden expansion of its consumer base that in turn prompted a corresponding increase in the supply of daily necessities and even luxury items in the area. No doubt, the early physical and economic growth of Edo was an inevitable outcome of Ieyasu’s general policy to seek a balance of power between the bakufu and the han.

After the death of Ieyasu in 1616, the general policy of maintaining a balance of power between the central and local governments was never abandoned by his successors. In fact, it continued to serve as the basis for political control throughout the Tokugawa rule. Consequently, the growth of Edo, the capital of the Tokugawa rule, also continued to be dictated by the same policy. By now, it should be clear that a true understanding of the growth of Edo is possible if we can understand the way this policy operated.

Modern scholars of Tokugawa history refer to the mature and systematized form of this policy as the bakuhan-taisei (the system of the
*bakufu* and the *han*), clearly in an effort to indicate the symbiotic relationship between the *bakufu* central government and the *han* local governments.\(^70\) In this system, political power was not an absolute entity. Although the *bakufu* was understood as the only legitimate central government, it could not exert absolute control over the local domain leaders. In fact, the *bakufu* could not directly interfere with the local administration of any domain, a policy which was true even of the *tozama daimyō*. On the other hand, while a certain degree of autonomy was retained by these leaders, they had a moral obligation to the *bakufu* government. Public duties such as providing corvée and materials for the construction of Edo Castle and the alternate attendance system were actual examples of how this moral obligation was fulfilled. In many instances, the *bakufu* had shown a high degree of intolerance towards those *han* leaders who, inadvertently or not, exhibited behaviours that seemed to challenge the moral authority of the *bakufu* government.

Clearly, the *bakuhanshō* system was not achieved by direct military confrontation; instead, the domain leaders’ moral obligation to the *bakufu* was crucial in realizing this balance. True, throughout the early decades of its rule, the *bakufu* consistently tried to reduce the size of many domains and even managed to abolish quite a number of them under some strange pretexts, but it never attempted to bring all domains under its direct rule.\(^71\) The balance of

\(^70\) When Western scholars first observed the *bakuhanshō*, they could not help but try to find common grounds between this system and European feudalism. As might be expected, despite some similarities, many subtle differences did exist between the two systems. However, at the same, many scholars felt that many valuable lessons had been learnt by seeing their differences. Consult Joseph R. Strayer’s “The Tokugawa Period and Japanese Feudalism” and John W. Hall’s “Feudalism in Japan—A Reassessment,” both in John W. Hall and Marius B. Jansen, eds., *Studies in the Institutional History*, 3-51.

\(^71\) Some of these pretexts included insanity of a domain leader, renovation of his castle, and the lack of an
power between the bakufu and the local domains continued to operate at the level of moral obligation. Basically, a moral obligation was something that was imposed on the domain leaders and that was fulfilled by their observing bakufu regulations. These regulations, however, were never very elaborate and, in most instances, were only meant to remedy whatever problems that had arisen at the time. The most important set of bakufu regulation was the buke shohatto (Laws governing the military households). The buke shohatto was a set of behaviour codes based on the Confucian ideals of loyalty, frugality and decorum. But apart from asking the military families to fulfil these ideals in various ways such as leading a simple lifestyle and contributing labour and material resources to public construction projects (fushin yaku); the buke shohatto never explicitly instructed the daimyō how to rule their domains except by saying that they "should select officials with a capacity for public administration." That is to say, the purpose of the buke shohatto was to subject the domain leaders to the moral authority instead of the direct administrative control of the bakufu government.

Now, we need to ask the question: What really was meant by moral authority? When we examine the so-called challenges to the bakufu’s moral authority, they were all related to the concept of social order. Any behaviour

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For example, the duty of providing labour and material resources for the construction of the Edo castle and that of performing the sankin kōtai were actual examples of how this moral obligation was fulfilled.

The buke shohatto was first promulgated by Tokugawa Hidetada in 1616, and it underwent several revisions in the decades following its first promulgation. A translation of the buke shohatto can be found in Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore De Bary, and Donald Keene, compilers, Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University, 1964), 326-9.

Tsunoda, De Bary, and Keene, 329.
that could cause social instability might be labelled as violating the moral authority of the bakufu. Generally speaking, in the first century of the Tokugawa period, social order was intimately related to the balance of various military powers; therefore, the bakufu was particularly sensitive to any action that would upset this balance. Half of the content in the 1615 version of the buke shohatto particularly addressed this problem of military imbalance:

- Offenders against the law should not be harboured or hidden in any domain.
- Great lords (daimyō), the lesser lords, and officials should immediately expel from their domains any among their retainers or henchmen who have been charged with treason or murder.
- Henceforth no outsider, none but the inhabitants of a particular domain, shall be permitted to reside in that domain.
- Whenever it is intended to make repairs on a castle of one of the feudal domains, the [shogunate] authorities should be notified. The construction of any new castles is to be halted and stringently prohibited.
- Immediate report should be made of innovations which are being planned or of factional conspiracies being formed in neighbouring domains.
- Do not enter into marriage privately [i.e., without notifying the shogunate authorities].
- Visits of the daimyō to the capital are to be in accordance with regulations.\(^{75}\)

The last item listed above is the famous sankin kōtai or alternate attendance system, which obviously sought to restrict the daimyō's attempts to stage a rebellion against the bakufu government by keeping their spouses as semi-hostages in Edo. That the purpose of the rest of the above items was to maintain a military balance between the bakufu and the han is also self-\(^{75}\)en

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\(^{75}\) An English translation of the 1615 version of the buke shohatto in thirteen articles is found in Tsunoda. De Bary, and Keene. 327-8.
evident. All these items were actually enforceable. In fact, all of them had been used constantly by the bakufu as pretexts for han abolition and daimyô transfers. For example, "the daimyô of Uwajima, Nobeoka, Ushiku, and Odawara ... lost their han, the first two for harbouring criminals and the others for having contracted unauthorized marriages."

By the end of the seventeenth century, the bakufu finally managed to achieve military stability; however, at the same time, it began to experience a series of fiscal crises that were, in Conrad Totman's words, brought about by various "forms of resource depletion":

By the end of the Genroku, Japan's environmental situation had changed considerably from that of a century earlier. Very little of the remaining woodland could be opened to cultivation. Few additional dry fields could feasibly be converted to paddy culture. Forest production had dropped sharply from its heyday early in the century. And gold and silver mines were largely exhausted.

With all these ecological and technological limitations, the country reached a state of stagnation in its overall production entering into the eighteenth century. Rice production in particular was insufficient for the whole population because of periodic episodes of bad crops. The resultant problem

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76 Between 1600 and 1650, a total of 105 daimyô families were abolished, accounting for 1.15 millions koku of annually rice production. Sixteen families were reduced (310,000 koku). Clearly, the early policy of abolition was vigorously carried out by the bakufu. Daimyô transfers meant redistributing the domains of hostile daimyô to other pro-bakufu daimyô so as not to allow anti-bakufu daimyô to be located near each other.

77 Hall, Cambridge History, vol. 4, 194. Also, in addition to the buke shohatto, the three shimpan daimyô or the three related families (gosanke), the bakufu appointed Kyoto deputy (Kyoto shoshidai) and Osaka castle keeper (Osaka jôdai), located in strategically advantageous areas, all served to maintain a balance of military powers between central and local governments.

78 Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993), 235.
of famine created incidents of social instability that ranged from actual peasant revolts (hyakushō ikki) to vandalism in the cities (toshi uchikowashi). The latter had to do with the greedy privileged rice merchants raising the price of rice in times of famine. Consequently, the major threats to the moral authority of the bakufu government from the early eighteenth century was mostly economic rather than military in origin. Until the very end of the Tokugawa regime, the bakufu never completely resolved all these economic problems, and some scholars even tend to believe that some of the solutions devised by the bakufu in fact aggravated, rather than remedied, the existing economic problems. One reason for having such an unsuccessful result with solving economic problems was the bakufu's tendency to understand these complex economic problems in terms of a simple theory of supply and demand. For the bakufu, all economic problems necessarily stemmed from an imbalance between supply and demand. In particular, most bakufu advisers such as Arai Hakuseki and Ogyū Sorai believed that the problems were worsened when members of the non-productive samurai class, especially the bakufu's own vassals, were leading too extravagant a lifestyle. Accordingly, the solution to all these economic problems was simply observing frugality.

It seems that, over the years, the bakufu had developed a rather static way of dealing with problems of social instability. In the seventeenth century, when military imbalance was the root of social instability, the bakufu consistently tried in various measures to diffuse any possible concentration of

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military power in the name of protecting its moral authority. The enforcement of the buke shohatto, in particular, revealed the general bakufu policy that to interfere with the han was justifiable whenever those regulations publicly announced as essential to maintaining the moral authority of the bakufu were violated. For example, when a han entered into a marriage relationship with another han without the permission of the bakufu, such a marriage would be deemed a violation to the bakufu's moral authority. In reality, the rule was designed to prevent local military alliances; yet, it was enforced as if it was simply because, acting without the permission of the bakufu, the han leaders had shown signs of not wanting to respect the moral authority of the bakufu. This general policy, first formulated by Ieyasu, gradually gave rise to the more systematized form of the bakuhan-taisei. In the eighteenth century, although the problem of social instability shifted from military imbalance to economic crises, the bakufu continued to resolve their various problems within the framework of the bakuhan-taisei, in which moral authority was equated with political authority. The only difference was, instead of preventing military alliances among daimyō, the bakufu attempted to prevent overspending within each daimyō's domain. Again, the bakufu was reluctant to plainly speak of its policy of frugality as a pragmatic remedy for the fiscal problems that had plagued the bakufu. Instead, the bakufu labelled the domains that did not adopt a policy of frugality as morally disrespectful toward the bakufu.

The concept of moral authority or, literally, public outlook (kōgi) clearly drew on the distinction between the public and the private for exercising political power. First of all, the moral authority of the bakufu rested on the fact that the bakufu itself was a public, rather than a private, institution. In addition, although the han was a private institution, its private
interests always had to yield to the public interests of the bakufu. It is easy to see that, theoretically, the bakufu’s control of the han could be strengthened by expanding the public realm. In reality, however, the expansion could only go so far as not to affect the local autonomy of the han. Creating a centralized state, i.e., making all of Japan public, was simply out of the question for the bakufu. In the seventeenth century, when the major objective of the bakufu was military balance, the expansion of the public realm was rather easy to achieve. Using various excuses, the bakufu extinguished quite a number of the domains, and the lands thus obtained were converted into part of the bakufu’s own domain or redistributed to its own vassals. In the eighteenth century, however, when the major objective of the bakufu was economic recovery, the bakufu had a hard time expanding the public realm because the “public realm” in question was not a physical territory from which the bakufu could convert into a public land but a market share that had to be privately owned. The public nature of the bakufu prevented it from directly getting involved in the private financial activities of the daimyō. Had the bakufu been dealing directly with business, it would have made itself a private rather than a public institution. Consequently, the bakufu would have lost the basis for its moral authority. In order to maintain this moral authority, the bakufu had to remain a regulator rather than become a direct participant of the Tokugawa commercial world even though it had become in the eighteenth century a rather lucrative world.

It was within the aforementioned limitation that the bakufu had to solve a series of economic problems from the eighteenth century onward. Essentially, just as it had done in the previous century for maintaining military stability, the bakufu continued to issue and enforce regulations for maintaining
economic stability. But when these regulations were directed to the domain leaders, the result was less than satisfactory because the bakufu could not find an appropriate way to enforce them in the local domains. Indeed, in Harold Bolitho's words, "han were known to ignore bakufu instructions if they believed their interests required them to do so." In the seventeenth century, the bakufu could, in the extreme, abolish the domain that had violated bakufu regulations; and the punishment, though creating a number of masterless samurai, usually temporarily settled the problem of military instability. In contrast, in the eighteenth century, the abolition of the domain in question would have created regional political instability that would further aggravate the problem of economic instability in the region. Consequently, in maintaining economic stability in the han, the bakufu had no choice but to rely on how successful the han leaders themselves governed their own domains. On the other hand, decision-making in han politics was never entirely a local affair. The bakufu never failed to make its political and, at the same time, its moral authority felt in the han. By issuing exhortatory or even admonitory edicts to the han, the bakufu made clear what it expected from them. For example, in 1732, while pursuing an economic policy of frugality, the eighth shogun Yoshimune admonished the domain leader (han-shu) of the shimpan Owari han Tokugawa Muneharu for leading an extravagant lifestyle. In the end, though certainly not the most efficacious way of solving economic

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81 Sometimes, the bakufu even relied on the economic strength of the daimyo. For example, according to Harold Bolitho, in the early eighteenth century, "instead of confiscation, or impositions, we find the Bakufu actually borrowing a large sum of money from the daimyo of Kaga." Treasures among Men: The Fudai Daimyo in Tokugawa Japan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1974). 188.
problems, the *bakufu*’ exhortatory edicts, as opposed to the more stringent clauses in the *buke shohatto*, were rather constructive because they recognized that the well-being of all the domains was crucial to the overall economic stability of the country.

From the beginning of the eighteenth century, although the *bakufu*’s regulatory edicts might have become ineffective in the *han*, they were still very effective when applied to the institutions in the *bakufu*’s own territories. The *bakufu* certainly recognized this fact, and naturally initiated its economic reforms within these territories. There were at least two advantages for this shift of the *bakufu*’s attention from the *han* to its own domain. First, the simple fact that the institutions in the *bakufu*’s own territories were all under its direct jurisdiction guaranteed the ease with which a *bakufu* economic policy was conveyed to the public. Second, because the *bakufu*’s territories were scattered all over the country and included all major commercial cities, any *bakufu* edict enacted in the *bakufu* territories could generally create a national impact or at least serve as a guideline for domain leaders to follow suit. Of course, among the many territories in the *bakufu* own domain, the best place for any edict to be enacted and enforced so that it would carry national significance was Edo, the capital city of the Tokugawa *bakufu*. Consequently, the success and failure of any *bakufu* economic reform can be understood in terms of how the *bakufu* regulated the economy of Edo.

3. *The Bakufu*’s Edo City Administration

Exactly how Edo was changed by the various eighteenth-century economic reform movements? We have discussed earlier that Edo was
transformed from a fishing village to an increasingly wealthy and urbanized area by leyasu’s decision to make it the capital of his newly founded regime. We have also discussed at length how the physical and economic growth of Edo was continued when, after the death of leyasu, the bakufu maintained a consistent bakuhan policy of power balance between the central and local governments. Now, entering into the eighteenth century, Edo was suddenly faced with a new role that had nothing to do with military balance. Instead, it had to respond to a series of new economic problems that continued to plague the country. What sort of transformation did Edo go through when the bakufu finally decided that it wanted to make Edo a model of how economy should be run in the rest of the country? If we can answer this question, we will be able to find out the way Edo grew in the eighteenth century.

Since Edo was not a han, it did not enjoy as much autonomy as a han did; therefore, should we expect more stringent control be placed on the local administration of Edo? To answer this question, we will focus on how the economic reforms in the eighteenth century were carried out by the bakufu. The first reform movement intended to alleviate the suffering caused by the emerging economic crisis in Tokugawa Japan was the Kyôhô Reforms led by the eighth shogun Yoshimune (r. 1716-45). But exactly what did Yoshimune do? In particular, what changes did he bring to Edo? First of all, it is generally accepted that, “although the economic consequences of the Kyôhô Reforms were complex and subtle, it should be remembered that the guiding motive behind them was simple and direct: The shogunate was seeking to regulate the economy more closely.”

were aimed at tighter regulation of the economy. However, though promising tighter economic regulation, Yoshimune's economic policy was not a radical one. In the case of Edo, although Yoshimune knew that the townspeople in Edo were becoming very wealthy, and sometimes even at the expense of the bakufu's own vassals, he would never consider a fusion of the two groups. Members of the ruling warrior (shi) class were still forbidden to marry wealthy townspeople (chônin) into their class. In fact, throughout his reform movement, Yoshimune never altered the basic social organization that was based on a segregation of these two classes. The distinction between the ruler and the ruled would always be kept. Physically, the segregation was achieved by forcing the two classes to live in different parts of the city, the samurai to the west of the Edo Castle and the chônin to the east of it.

In general, the samurai and the chônin were subject to two different sets of administrative control. The samurai could be further divided into two types: all daimyô (shimpan, fudai, and tozama) and their own vassals and the bakufu's own vassals (hatamoto and gokenin). As we have discussed before, the former were not strictly under the jurisdiction of the bakufu, and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy within their domains; but they were also closely watched by the bakufu and by each other. While all daimyô exercised their political power at the local level in their domains, some fudai daimyô were allowed to participate politically at the central level in the bakufu. These

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83 Shimpan daimyô were initially three related families (Owari, Kii, and Mito) of the Tokugawa family: the fudai daimyô came from those families who had assisted leyasu in his unification campaign; and the tozama were families who pledged allegiance to leyasu only after 1600. Hatamoto (bannermen) and gokenin (housemen) were two types of lower ranking samurai who served in the Tokugawa shogunal household.
fudai daimyô actually staffed the highest posts in the bakufu government. For example, the four or five Senior Councillors (rōjû), the top political advisers to the shogun, were always chosen from among the fudai daimyô.84 They and the offices under them were all responsible for matters concerning the nation as a whole. Members of another type of the samurai class, namely, the hatamoto (or Bannermen) and the gokenin (or Housemen), also staffed the bakufu government. They held various offices in the bakufu central bureaucracy that were all headed by a single post called the wakadoshiyori (Junior Councillors). The four or five wakadoshiyori were chosen from among the lesser fudai daimyô. The wakadoshiyori and the offices under them, in contrast to offices under the rōjû, were responsible for affairs within the shogunal family. The rōjû and the wakadoshiyori were responsible to the shogun separately and did not interfere with each other’s responsibilities. Of course, all samurai would eventually be under the administrative control of either of these two posts.

Then, what kind of administrative control was imposed on the townspeople sector in Edo? Essentially, the bakufu adopted a policy in which local autonomy was allowed to the townspeople; namely, the day-to-day operation of the whole townspeople sector was run by the townspeople themselves. The top post of the townspeople administrators was the machidoshiyori or Town Elder. From the 1650s, regular appointments of town elders (machidoshiyori) were made by the bakufu, and they were mostly wealthy and bakufu-chartered merchants.85 The town elders were responsible

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84 With a few exceptional cases. For example, Tanuma Okitsugu became a rōjû although he was not a fudai daimyô.

85 The number of machidoshiyori varied. It was fixed at 20 in 1650s and changed to 10 in 1669. Nakai
for a number of duties, but basically they were all related to townspeople affairs and the communications of these affairs to the bakufu. The line of communication between the townspeople and the bakufu's central authority was established by these town elders receiving bakufu edicts and returning them with their opinions attached. This way, the bakufu could receive feedback from the townspeople while conveying its policy to them. The intermediary bakufu office between the bakufu central bureaucracy and the town elders was the Edo City Magistrate Office (Edo machibugyō sho). The post of the machibugyō was staffed by two hatamoto who fulfilled their duties in alternate months. Various functions, all basically pertaining to maintaining the social stability of the townspeople sector, were served by the machibugyō. Although the main bulk of civil matters were still the responsibilities of the machidoshiyori, the machibugyō did sometimes extend its control to civil affairs when they were related to matters of social stability.

In Yoshimune's reforms, the role of the machibugyō was elevated for the simple reason that the shogun himself believed that a greater social stability within the townspeople sector was the first step toward economic stability. After all, the townspeople, not the samurai, were the ones who were engaged in commercial and mercantile activities. In other words, the townspeople were the major players in the national economy of Edo Japan. Then, it is not surprising to see that any incident of social disorder within the

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Nobuhiko and James L. McClain, 534.

86 The peasantry, being the very source of economic production, was also subject to a greater degree of control in the Kyôhô Reforms. This was achieved by making the bakufu appointed local tax collectors (gundai, daikan) more responsible to the central government. A new post called kanjô gimmiyaku (comptroller of finance) overseeing these tax collectors was created for this purpose.
Edo townspeople sector could have produced irrevocable damage to the overall economic strength of the country. Yoshimune was well aware of all this, and he knew that social stability in the townspeople sector might hold the key to the beginning of an economic recovery for his regime. To achieve this social stability, he focused on two tasks: one institutional, the other ideological. Interestingly, both tasks were made possible by transforming the role of the *Edo machibugyô*.

Institutionally, until the very beginning of the Kyōhō Reforms, the *bakufu* had constant problems with the local administration of the Edo townspeople sector. A *bakufu* notice or *obure* issued to the Edo city on the twenty-seventh day of the third month of 1716 reveals the nature of these problems:

> Ever since the beginning of the early-modern age, there have been people who requested help [from the government] in matters other than official business or lawsuit. Some expressed their wish to be officially sanctioned [merchants]; some expressed their wish to present views on behalf of the *bakufu*; and some came for official help for various people while other came [wanting to have] duties officially bestowed on them. The number of people who presented these types of request for various matters to the *bakufu* offices here [in Edo] or other provinces increased annually. Recently, although there were people who fulfilled their promises as stated in their requests, some never kept their words and accomplished nothing at all, whether it be for the *bakufu* or for other people. Indeed, among these requests, many turned out to be improper; moreover, there were requests that had become the very source disturbing the social custom. In general, as one becomes officially recognized, regardless of what [area of things he is dealing with], there is time when he is required to select those fellows who are experts in that area. Such a person might, in addition to the specifications asked for by the *bakufu* (*kōgi*), presents his own ideas and makes his own choices. However, from now on, it is
considered a law-violating crime for a person from the below to carry out requested matters when there are no specifications asked for by the bakufu. While this order should be enforced with the utmost attention, any request hitherto presented to the various local offices should not be considered.\footnote{The obure is preserved in the Shōhō jiroku and is quoted verbatim by Tsukamoto Akira in his "Toshi kōzō no tenkai." Iwanami kōza Nihon tsūshi, vol. 14, 74.}

Obviously, the problems in the local administration of the Edo townspeople sector had to do with the abuse of privileged status. According to the edict, more and more townspeople tried to obtain a privileged status from the bakufu through the local offices (including the machibugyō sho). As we can imagine, the reason for the increase in the number of applicants for a privileged status was the simple fact that such a privileged status eventually guaranteed business advantages for those successful applicants. The bakufu might have begun such a policy of granting privileged status to the more prominent townspeople for the sake of encouraging the economic growth of the Edo townspeople sector. However, the economic activities in the sector had gradually become increasingly more difficult for the bakufu to regulate. This difficulty was essentially due to the fact that many townspeople, even after they had obtained their privileged status, did not always fulfil what they had promised the bakufu.

Yoshimune’s institutional reform of the Edo townspeople sector was clearly intended to increase the bakufu’s administrative control over the Edo townspeople sector. The Yoshimune government achieved this goal by reorganizing the townspeople sector into fewer functional units that would directly report to the machibugyō. This reorganization could be illustrated by Yoshimune’s newly enacted fire-fighting policy in the Edo townspeople sector.
sector. Forty-seven fire-fighting precincts were mapped out in Edo, and within each precinct were gathered thirty firefighters. The thirty firefighters were organized into a brigade headed by a ward elder or town elder. All the precincts were in turn supervised by six to nine fire superintendents who reported to the machibugyô. "The main thrust of this administrative reorganization was to restrict the number of ward elders while expanding the scope of their jurisdiction and strengthening their powers."88 Clearly, this administrative reorganization was designed to stabilize the Edo townspeople sector. More interestingly, however, was the fact that, during this reorganization, the role of the machibugyô was greatly enriched. In the first century of its existence, the machibugyô was more concerned with matters of law enforcement, serving as the judicial and police authority in the Edo townspeople sector. But ever since the Kyôhô Reforms, it had expanded its administrative power and become an office that was more responsive to the actual local affairs within the Edo chônin sector.89

This enriched role of the machibugyô was confirmed by Tsukamoto Akira’s observation that, from the year 1719 (Kyôhô 4), incidents of the Edo machibugyô inquiring about townspeople affairs became more frequent.90 The significance of this development, however, is not the fact that it occurred but how it occurred. First of all, we should note that the machibugyô’s inquiries were directed at the Town Headmen Annual Representatives (nemban

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88 Nakai and McClain. 577.
89 Of course, throughout the Edo period, the Edo machibugyô always had the judicial, policing, and administrative powers over the townspeople sector of Edo. What I am pointing out here is that beginning from the Kyôhô Reforms, the office gradually shifted its focus to the latter.
90 In average, ten cases annually. Tsukamoto Akira. 72.
*nanushi*, who were officially recognized in the fourth year of Hôei (1707). As we have learnt, throughout the Edo period, the town elders (*machidoshiyori*) were usually the ones to communicate with the *machibugyô*. In the above case, however, the *machibugyô* bypassed the *machidoshiyori* and directly contacted with the *nemban nanushi*. Why did this happen? and how did the *nemban nanushi* appear in the first place? In any case, the appearance of the *nemban nanushi* itself has already told us much about the development of the townspeople administration in the late-seventeenth-century Edo. Among other things, it clearly signaled that a reorganization process in the townspeople sector had already taken place decades before Yoshimune’s reforms. But how did it happen?

The Edo townspeople sector was composed of the taxable unit of *iemochi* (Home-owner), and, in order to manage this sector, the *bakufu* assigned some of the *iemochi* the duty (*chô-yaku*) of overseeing the day-to-day operation of this sector. In Kyoto and Osaka, within each ward (*chô*), individual *iemochi* would be asked to fulfil such a duty in turn, and, because the duty was considered a public responsibility, essentially no stipends were attached to it. In contrast, the duty was hereditary in Edo, and a stipend (*kyûkin* or *yakukin*) was attached to it. Moreover, the *iemochi* in Edo serving this duty, now called the Headmen or *nanushi*, were sometimes managing more than one ward. These *nanushi*, in turn, reported to the *machidoshiyori*. In the second half of the seventeenth century, as more houses were bought up by the more wealthy merchants, sometimes one could not even find an *iemochi* within a ward. Consequently, in the late seventeenth century, the number of *nanushi*, who should be selected among the *iemochi*, decreased drastically. The result was the creation of a class of powerful local
administrators called the *shihai nanushi* or Ruling Headmen, who would individually administer several wards. Once again, in 1707, the power of these *shihai nanushi* was further centralized in the officially recognized *nemban nanushi*, who were annually elected from among the *shihai nanushi*. Finally, in the sixth month of 1722, at the mature stage of the Kyôhô Reforms, the 263 *nanushi* at that time was organized into seventeen groups, an effort clearly designed to increase the efficiency of the *bakufu*’s control of the town.91

Our observation of the pre-Kyôhô reorganization of the townspeople sector can at least lead to two conclusions. The first conclusion, which is also the more obvious one, is the realization that the urban policy of the Kyôhô Reforms essentially built on the foundation of the natural administrative evolution of the Edo townspeople sector, and that this evolution was moving toward a greater centralization of administrative power into the hands of a few local administrators. The second, and more important, conclusion is that during the Kyôhô Reforms, by encouraging and officially sanctioning such centralization within the townspeople sector, the *bakufu*’s communication with the townspeople sector became more direct and efficient because it could participate in *chônin* affairs by contacting with just a handful of powerful *chônin* administrators. Namely, the *machibugyô* could gain a direct access to *chônin* affairs by dealing with the few *nemban nanushi* and *machidoshiyori*.

Now, we should proceed to the ideological dimension of the Kyôhô Reforms. It turned out that this dimension was intimately tied to the *bakufu*’s institutional reform of the *chônin* sector. To explain this tie, we can speak of

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91 This paragraph is an extensive paraphrase of Tsukamoto Akira. 71.
the reform movement at two levels. At the local level of the townspeople sector, Yoshimune not only reinforced the centralization of administrative power within this sector, he also expanded the role of the machibugyō to take full advantage of this centralization, establishing, in the end, an efficient communication network between the machibugyō and the powerful chōnin administrators. At the central level, Yoshimune, in a similar manner, sought to gain more direct control of the machibugyō. Usually, the Edo machibugyō were directly under the administrative control of the Senior Councillors (rōjū). Yoshimune, however, did not follow this established political arrangement; instead, he made sure that the Edo machibugyō could find ways to gain a better access to the shogun himself. To achieve this, he began by hiring a capable and trusted hatamoto for the machibugyō post. It was done despite the fact that Ôoka Echizen-no-kami Tadasuke, the man he hired for the post in the second month of Kyôhô 2 (1717), did not have the qualified stipend status. Yoshimune resolved this problem by augmenting the stipend of Ôoka temporarily during his tenure as the machibugyō to meet the requirement. This practice of promoting capable men even when they did not have the necessary hereditary status was later systematized as the tashidaka-sei in 1723.92 Second, Yoshimune seems to have been able to communicate with the machibugyō through his personal pages (sobashū, goyō toritsugi) instead of the rōjū. When we read the Kyôhô sen’yō ruishû, the Edo machibugyō’s official records of the Kyôhô era, we discover that Ôoka Echizen-no-kami and Nakayama Izumo-no-kami, the two Edo machibugyō of the time, did not always send their official paperwork to the rōjū; instead, especially during the first few years of Yoshimune’s reign, they often sent their official paperwork

to Yoshimune’s personal page Arima Hyōgo-no-kami Ujinori. Together, these local and central institutional reforms clearly served an ideological purpose: They helped facilitate a greater flow of Yoshimune’s political authority to the townspeople. In addition, the role of the machibugyō as distributor and enforcer of bakufu regulatory edicts was crucial to the success of this flow of political authority. In sum, Yoshimune had made the machibugyō a conduit through which his political authority was conveyed to the townspeople.

Many examples can be cited to illustrate how the machibugyō fulfilled such a role. However, what ultimately concerns us here is to understand such a role of the machibugyō in the area of publishing regulation. The single most important document concerning this area was a bakufu edict issued in the eleventh month of the seventh year of Kyōhō (1722). Of course, decades before this edict, the bakufu has been carrying a consistent policy of prohibiting all “indecent” publications. Throughout the Tokugawa period, the term “indecent” was variously interpreted by the bakufu. Generally speaking, we can see a parallel development between how indecency and moral authority were defined by the bakufu. In the early seventeenth century, just as moral authority was equated with achieving a military stability in the country, indecency in a book was often taken to be ideas that might eventually upset this military stability. When we can see that the major military threat to Ieyasu’s newly founded regime were those western daimyō who not only were devout Christians but also avid students of Western military technologies, we

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should not be surprised to see that the earliest Tokugawa book-banning policy was mostly applied to books related to the Christian religion and Western military technologies. Then, from the late seventeenth century, the bakufu began to have other concerns as well. Books that encouraged a lifestyle of indulgence or that questioned the political legitimacy of the Tokugawa family also began to worry the bakufu. For example, the edict issued sometime in the Kambun era (1661-72) by the Edo machibugyō Watanabe Ōsumi-no-kami to the print-block maker (hangiya) Jinshirō clearly went beyond banning Christian and military books:

Regardless of
-Military books (gunsho)
-Poetry (kasho)
-Calendar{s (koyomi)
-Amorous books (kōshoku-bon)
-[Books about] rumours (uwasa-goto) and people’s good and evil (zennaku)
or other kinds, if someone orders [to have you make the print-blocks of] a suspicious publication, you should report [the incident] to the office [of the machibugyō], and then follow step-by-step the instructions of the office.

In this edict, the bakufu did not target Christian books as a specific banned item. This might have been attributed to the simple fact that both the Christian religious and military influences in western Japan had been greatly reduced by that time. The more obvious reason for not including Christian books as a

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95 Konta Yōzō. Nihon no hon’ya san. 65. In the fifth month of Kambun 13 (1673), the machibugyō reissued the same edict but included not only hangiya but also the townspeople in general as its audience.
banned item in this edict was that the edict itself was addressed to a different audience this time. While the bakufu's early policy to censor Christian books was directed at books imported from China through Nagasaki and carried out by the Nagasaki bugyō (governor of Nagasaki) and his Book Examiner (shomotsu aratame), the present edict was targeted at the publishing world in Edo. The difference in audience reveals a general shift of focus of the bakufu's ideological program. The Nagasaki censorship project was designed to prevent any militarily powerful daimyō challengers to the newly founded bakufu from using Christianity as a legitimizing ideology. In contrast, when the Kambun edict was issued, military instability was no longer a major social problem to the bakufu, and the focus of the edict was shifted from a concern for national military and political instability to a more local problem of social instability within the Edo townspeople sector. The bakufu in the late seventeenth century noticed a growing tendency among the Edo townspeople to criticize the government through satirical literature and outlandish behaviour.\footnote{The most extreme case of the latter was exhibited by a group of rebellious townspeople (and also some samurai) called kabukimono.} The banning of amorous books and books of rumours clearly was the bakufu reaction against this tendency. Here, the bakufu's moral authority was challenged not by military threat but by civil disobedience. Again, we have established a parallel between how the bakufu defined its moral authority and the meaning of indecency in a publication. Having made such a connection, however, I should stress that there was really not a clear demarcation between the "military" and "civil" stages of the bakufu rule. Similarly, although it is easy to distinguish the "military" and "civil" stages of how the bakufu regulated publication, one should not readily accept this
superficial distinction without gaining a deeper understanding of how the transition between the "military" to the "civil" was achieved.

The reading of the Kyôhô 7 (1722)/11 edict would eventually shows us how this transition was achieved. For this purpose, I am using two different versions of the edict to reconstruct the way it was communicated and transmitted to various parties involved. One thing we should clarify here is that the Kyôhô 7/11 edict is actually composed of two separate but related edicts; since they can be read as a whole, maybe it is more convenient to label them as part one and two of the same edict. Because the Kyôhô 7 edict set the basic tone for the publishing regulation policy in late-Tokugawa Japan, it is often quoted by scholars working on Edo publishing history. Yet, on many occasions, only the main body of the edict is quoted, and it is not always presented in its context. Particularly, the process by which the edict was communicated to the townspeople is not always clearly presented. Of course, we know that the edict was issued by the Edo machibugyô to the townspeople. But in what way? This is the question I want to answer in my reading of the edict. The first version of the edict I am using includes both part one and two. It is included in a 1993 reprint of the four-volume handwritten manuscript of the Migumi shomotsu ton'ya sho-kitei (Various regulations and controls of the Three-Groups of the Book Wholesalers' Association). The manuscript, compiled by leaders of the late-Tokugawa booksellers, has been in the library of Waseda University for many years and became only recently available to the public in printed form. The second version I am using only has part two of the edict, but it is important because, as part of the official machibugyô records (Kyôhô sen'yo ruishû), this version has included many revealing official instructions indicating the process by
which the edict was transmitted to various offices. Now, let us read the entire Migumi shomotsu version of the Kyôhô 7/11 edict first:

[Part One]
Collectively signed registry of official regulations recording what has been instructed in the eleventh month of the seventh year of the Kyôhô era (1722/11)
-From now on, all newly published materials, whether they be Confucian classics, Buddhist scriptures, Shinto texts, medical books or poetry, should not be mixed in with peculiarly indecent (midari) and heretic opinions [that deviate from] their usual contents.
-Until now, many hitherto published materials, including such a thing called the kôshoku-bon [i.e. amorous stories], were to the detriment of public morality [or social custom, fûzoku]. They should carefully be inspected and be banned [from the public].
-There were cases in which people’s family stories and things about their ancestry were distorted, presented in newly published books, then spread to the public. If the above cases were to be found, the complaint filed by their descendants would be investigated without fail.
-Regardless of their contents, from now on, any new book should bear in its colophon the real name(s) of the author(s) and the publisher(s).
-From now on, publishing materials about the Tokugawa family and, needless to say, its founder Ieyasu (Gongen-sama) would all be banned. When it is inevitable that a small portion of a publication must contain such materials, [the publisher] should apply through the office of the [Edo] machibugyô for a permit.
According to the [regulations stated] above, from now on, any newly published work has to go through an inspection before it can be sold. Whoever disobeys the above regulations should be reported to the office of the machibugyô. Having been in mutual contact for many years, the various publishers and wholesalers surely could take care of [i.e. inspect and censor] each other. The Publishers’ Association (nakama) would pay attention to and investigate about whether someone is breaking the law.

Year of the tiger, 11th month

[Part Two]
Among all the books published so far, more and more appeared to use fraudulent era and author names. It appears that there is a discrepancy between the time period of the era name stated and the real date, and that between the [name of the] actual author and a name used in the past. You [machidoshiyori] should instruct [the Publishers’ Association] to record in writing, upon inspection, as in the following, the degree of discrepancy as stated above and the title of a work.

what book which volume etc.

(In vermilion) Being thus stated, the above principle should certainly be abided by and notified to all townspeople without exception.

The year of the tiger, 11th month [from the machibugyô to the machidoshiyori]

(In vermilion) Concerning the above edict, while firmly accepting it and acknowledging your reply, you should not only inform it to the people who are engaged in the business of publishing books in the town and the print-block makers, you should also inform the house owners (iemochi) and the tenants (tanagari), so that they obey the rule. If there are those who disregard the rule, a promissory note bearing a collective signature of the town [headmen?] is presented to the [authority] for considering what should be done later.

Kyôhô 7
The year of the tiger, 11/8
The machibugyô sho
If there is anything unclear in the above edict, you should obtain more information by visiting the Naraya [i.e. the machidoshiyori] office.

11/8
All members of the Publishers’ Association should agree with and abide by the above edict.97

The Kyôhô sen’yô ruishû version of the edict includes only part two:

Among all the book published so far, ...[same as the above]

We [the machibugyô] presented the above to Arima Hyôgo-no-kami on Kyôhô 7 (1722)/6/2.

Arima Hyôgo-no-kami returned the above note to us [the machibugyô] on 1722/10/22, and asked that we pass down [to the machidoshiyori] the instruction that, from now on, in dealing with discrepancy as stated in the note, [the machidoshiyori] should record the discrepancy in the record book.

At an internal meeting among officials in the machibugyô sho on 1722/11/6, a copy of the above kakitsuke note was sent to the machidoshiyori Naraya Ichiemon, and, on the next (seventh) day, three copies from the machibugyô were sent to the monthly rôjû Andô Tsushima-no-kami.98

What can we learn from the Kyôhô 7 (1722) edict? Even a cursory reading of the edict will remind us of its unwitting similarity to the buke shohatto though the former was addressed to the townspeople while the latter the warrior class; in short, the didacticism in both documents is unmistakable. In addition, in both cases, didacticism was used to reinforce the moral authority of the bakufu over the ruled. In the buke shohatto, moral authority was expressed as a moral right of the bakufu to be militarily stronger than every single domain. Thus, domain leaders were obliged to renovate the Edo Castle while being prevented from freely repairing their own castles. Also, all private political alliances among domain leaders, such as in the form of political marriage, were considered a threat to the moral authority of the bakufu. In a similar manner, the bakufu in the Kyôhô 7 edict repeatedly stressed its moral right to decide how knowledge should be dispensed to and

98 Kyôhô sen'yô ruishû, 211.
consumed by the public. In this edict, Yoshimune particularly clarified what his predecessors meant by “books about rumours and people’s good and evil.” No books should criticize and question the moral right of the samurai class to be the ruling elite of the country; although not explicitly stated in the edict, we know that the bakufu meant that no samurai members should ever be made the object of political satire. This restriction of course extended to the head of all samurai members; namely, the Tokugawa family and its founder Ieyasu. In both the buke shohatto and the Kyōhō 7 publishing regulation edict, the underlying goal of the bakufu was remarkably consistent in reminding the ruled (the han and the chônin) that any acts, whether military threat or civil disobedience, that even remotely questioned the validity of the ruler-rulled social stratification would be considered a challenge to the moral authority of the bakufu.

Admittedly, the buke shohatto and the Kyōhō 7 edict both served an ideological purpose; however, to characterize these documents as purely a result of a consistent bakufu ideological program would oversimplify the true intent with which the bakufu issued these documents. In carefully reading the two documents together, we find that their similarity was more than their singular obsession with linking moral authority to political legitimacy. These documents were also meant to initiate institutional changes that would in turn reinforce this linkage. Behind the moralistic language of the buke shohatto was a clear attempt on the part of the bakufu to define a new institutional arrangement between the central and local governments. By granting local autonomy to the various local domains, the bakufu received in exchange its status as a legitimate public institution, and the domain leaders were obliged to become an integral part of the creation of the bakufu government. In the
process of visiting the bakufu capital every other year according to the sankin kōtai system, contributing to the renovation of the Edo castle, or fulfilling some other public duties, the domain leaders not only acknowledged the moral authority of the bakufu but also had to make institutional adjustments to their local government in order to carry out all these duties. For example, various new official posts had to be created for these duties: the fushin yaku for public construction and the Edo rusui yaku for keeping residences in Edo.

Similarly, the Kyôhô 7 edict initiated an institutional change in the townspeople sector. To illustrate this point, I go to part two of the edict. In this part of the edict, the bakufu addressed its dislike for those writers who used fraudulent publication dates and pen-names when publishing works that satirized the government. While being transmitted down to the public, the prohibition edict went through different offices. For the sake of clarity, I would present this process in a table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyôhô 7 (1722)/6/2</td>
<td>Ōoka Echizen-no-kami (Edo machibugyō)</td>
<td>Arima Hyōgo-no-kami (Yoshimune's sobashi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyôhô 7/10/22</td>
<td>Arima Hyōgo-no-kami</td>
<td>Edo machibugyō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyôhô 7/11/6</td>
<td>Edo machibugyō</td>
<td>Naraya Ichimori (Edo machidoshiyori)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyôhô 7/11/7</td>
<td>Edo machibugyō</td>
<td>Andō Tsushima-no-kami (rōjū member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyôhô 7/11/8</td>
<td>Edo machibugyō or Edo machidoshiyori</td>
<td>namushi (headmen), then iemochi (house owners) and tanagari (house tenants)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table is almost self-explanatory. One particular point I should emphasize is the fact that the machibugyô Ôoka Tadasuke could bypass the rōjû and communicate directly with Yoshimune’s sobashû Arima Ujinori. Moreover, because Arima Ujinori, as Yoshimune’s close adviser, had direct access to the shogun; the machibugyô became functionally a post directly under the shogun. In reading this edict, we can see that Yoshimune actually created a more effective channel for conveying his political will to the townspeople world. The political influence of the rōjû was thus reduced. For example, the rōjû Andô Shigeyuki was only notified of the edict one day after it had been relayed to the machidoshiyori.

What is ultimately revealed in the Kyôhô 7 edict was a crucial point in the institutional evolution of the bakufu government. This evolution, which began in the late-seventeenth century and continued throughout the eighteenth century, was characterized by a tendency to create shorter and more efficient political channels. I have already discussed this tendency earlier as a two-level process: The shogun and the machibugyô were closely connected at the central level while the machibugyô and the townspeople were closely connected at the local level. The mechanism of this evolutionary process at the central level had been discussed extensively by Conrad Totman and became the major theme of his Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1600-1843. Moreover, he used the term “vertical cliques” to describe the various parties that formed the newly evolved efficient political groups. The shogun, in attempting to gain greater control of the central government, would delegate more power to his personal advisers than he was usually allowed. The events subsequent to the Kyôhô Reforms certainly attested to an increasing tendency toward such a political practice. The so-called Tanuma period was an
example of this kind. The humble origins of Tanuma Okitsugu (1719-88) did not prevent him from dominating the shogunal court. His political career began as a page (koshô) of the ninth shogun Ieshige (r. 1745-60). Then, with the personal patronage of the tenth shogun Ieharu, he rose to the post of Grand Chamberlain (sobayônin) and finally to that of Senior Councillor (rójû). Tanuma’s political success was unprecedented for, before Tanuma, nobody had ever assumed the post of rójû without a daimyô status. It seems that the two immediate successors to Yoshimune, in strengthening their own vertical cliques, had contributed to the further development of the institutional reforms initiated by Yoshimune.

Unfortunately, the success in the Tanuma years of developing a more efficient institutional machinery both in the bakufu and the townspeople sector did not last long. The major problem was that the very nature of this machinery, i.e., its reliance on a few persons for political control, easily lent itself to various kinds of abuse. At the central level, Tanuma allowed personal relationship and even money to interfere with the selection process of officials. Moreover, this practice was carried out often at the expense of those political families that had hitherto been relying on their status quo for political power. The fudai daimyô, warrior families designated by Ieyasu as the core participants of the shogunal court, were witnessing their diminishing political influences in apprehension. As expected, Tanuma’s political practice was bound to be challenged; indeed, he was eventually ousted and, at the same time, accused of corruption, by this very group. At the local level, Tanuma’s reliance on a few townsmen for controlling the townspeople sector had caused a general increase in its autonomy, which in turn made possible a general atmosphere of liberalism within the sector. In various forms, this liberal
atmosphere began to challenge the legitimacy of the bakufu. One particular form that concerns us was literature. Certainly, writers whose works were highly critical of the government and society at large had appeared even in Yoshimune’s days; yet, under Tanuma’s liberal policy, they gained the necessary social freedom to thrive and to succeed in the literary market of Edo. The rise of Tsutaya’s many literary friends and the popularity of their works owed much to this laissez faire policy. Again, the more conservative members of the ruling class, especially the fudai daimyō, found this social freedom intolerable and eventually blamed the recurrences of the many economic problems of the country on this freedom and the person who allowed it, namely, Tanuma Okitsugu.

In the year 1787, Matsudaira Sadanobu (1758-1826), determined to tackle the many recurrent economic problems in the country by reversing this liberal tendency, replaced Tanuma as the rōjū shuseki and initiated a conservative reform movement called the Kansei Reforms. Sadonobu’s rise to power was not a coincidence. His qualification as a replacement for Tanuma was more than his training in Confucian morality, which was obviously required for an anti-liberal reform, or his success in managing the economy of his own domain. Perhaps more important than all these achievements was his unique pedigree as a grandson of that great reformer Yoshimune, a pedigree that would symbolically suggest the bakufu’s commitment to return to the central ideology of the Yoshimune Reforms; namely, a strong linkage between economic reforms and the bakufu’s moral authority. This moral authority was believed to have declined considerably during the Tanuma administration, and such a decline was interpreted, however wrongfully, as a major cause of the recurrent economic problems in the late eighteenth century. To re-establish its
moral authority, the bakufu issued various sumptuary edicts that were charged with Confucian morality. As far as publishing regulation was concerned, a similar approach was adopted. Addressing the problem of the increasing number of newly published “indecent materials,” Sadanobu basically reiterated the moral concern that was central in Yoshimune’s Kyôhô 7 edict.

In the fifth month of Kansei 2 (1790), Sadanobu issued the following notice (machibure) to the Edo townspeople:

... newly published books are to be regarded as strictly undesirable if they are depraved or a medley of unorthodox ideas, but not if they contain the conventional sort of plots. Although they have been published in the past, amorous books are not good for public morality and must therefore be carefully inspected and banned. Also, books and new publications of all kinds must henceforward give the real names of the author and the publisher in the colophon. These matters were dealt with in legislation during the Kyôhô era, but attention was slackened: undesirable books have been written and permission has been given for their publication. Year after year, people have applied themselves to useless tasks, including even picture books for children, and have obtained large fees for their products. Since this is thoroughly wasteful, the rules laid down in the past are to be observed more strictly and attention is to be paid to the following points:
- There have been books since times long past and no more are necessary, so there ought to be no more new books. If the necessity does arise, inquiries must be made at the City Commissioner’s office (machibugyô sho) and his instructions followed.
- Recently some wicked children’s books have appeared which are ostensibly set in ancient times; henceforward these are to be regarded as undesirable...
- Nobody may make baseless rumors into kana books (kana-zôshi) and lend them to anyone who will pay the fee...
- No book may be put on sale if the author is not known.

These are the rules, and booksellers are henceforward to take part in the investigations and to inform the City
Commissioner’s office at once should any books be put on sale in contravention of the law. It is to be regarded as the fault both of the person responsible and of the guild (nakama) if anything is overlooked or not investigated. If any banned books make their way in from the provinces, they are to be submitted to the City Commissioner’s Office and his instructions are to be followed.99

The similarity between the Kansei 2/5 edict and the Kyôhô 7/11 edict is striking. Noticeably, both use a language that is highly moralistic and indicative of an underlying ideological concern of the bakufu. Furthermore, an attempt to exercise ideological control over the townspeople, in this case the publishers, using institutional devices is evident in both edicts. More precisely, both edicts stress the importance of maintaining an institutional organization at the local level for ideological control. This organization, consisting of the Edo machibugyô, the machidoshiyori, the ton’ya nakama (guild association), and other powerful townspeople, in fact constituted a vertical clique in the townspeople sector with which the moral messages of the bakufu could be conveyed more efficiently. Having observed these points of similarity in the two edicts, we should realize that they did not necessarily produce the same result. In fact, while such a similarity suggests a genealogical linkage between the Kansei Reforms and Yoshimune’s Kyôhô Reforms, it also reveals Sadanobu’s inability to find his own solution to the economic problems of his time. That is to say, for Yoshimune, the emphasis on creating a local institution more responsive to the ideological demands of the bakufu actually yielded some very impressive results. In contrast, for

Sadanobu, the very same emphasis seemed like a desperate effort to rescue the bakufu's already weakening central control. Isao Soranaka aptly describes the ultimate failure of the Kansei Reforms as stemming "from the Bakufu's inability as a central authority to redirect established economic interests into a Bakufu-oriented economy." Moreover, this inability was coupled with the bakufu's reluctance to abandon its often ineffective ideological program. Consequently, throughout the eighteenth century, the bakufu found itself increasingly less capable of controlling and directing the institutional growth at the local level using the concept of moral authority.

Of course, we know that in the Tokugawa period the practice of using moral authority for political control originated from Ieyasu. In the first century of its rule, the Tokugawa bakufu gradually developed a political arrangement of power balance between the local domains and itself for maintaining peace. This policy of power balance eventually helped the economic and physical growth of Edo. Beginning from the second half of the seventeenth century, this early policy was finally made into a well-defined bakuhan system, and the stability that ensued further guaranteed the steady growth of Edo. But the influence of the bakuhan political tradition on the growth of Edo was more profound than bringing about a stable political climate to the dwellers in Edo. It is true that the term bakuhan-taisei should strictly apply to the description of the political relationship between the bakufu government and the local domains (han); however, such a political relationship was not only found between the bakufu and the han, but it also seems to have manifested itself in other areas of the bakufu's civil administration. In particular, when we

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examine the bakufu’s civil administration of the Edo townspeople sector, we can also identify a similar political relationship between the bakufu government and the Edo townspeople sector.

While the bakufu’s political relationship with the townspeople sector of Edo was remarkably similar to that with the local han, a similar problem of local control was experienced in both relationships. From the eighteenth century onward, in order to solve the economic problems that faced the country, the bakufu turned its attention from the unmanageable han to the more manageable local administrative structures of its own domain. But such a shift did not mean that the bakufu was introducing a new way of local control. In dealing with the Edo townspeople sector, the bakufu tried to retain the basic balance between moral authority and local autonomy, the two elements that were central to the bakuhan system. The Kyôhô reforms in many respects epitomized the very best effort on the part of the bakufu government to find solutions to economic problems within the framework of the bakuhan system. Yoshimune was able to maintain a delicate balance between moral authority and local autonomy by initiating a series of institutional reforms in the townspeople sector, hoping that more efficient institutional channels established at the local level could help convey the bakufu’s moral authority. Ironically, by the time of Matsudaira Sadanobu, as the townspeople sector had grown more autonomous because of institutional reforms, such a balance became increasingly difficult to maintain. Though realizing this problem, Sadanobu did not find a new solution. Instead, he continued to pursue an ideological program that could not sustain itself.

In conclusion, the bakuhan political tradition influenced the publishing culture in Edo in much the same way it affected the growth of Edo city. In
other words, the influence was physical and economic as well as institutional. Physically, Edo gradually transformed itself to become one of the three great metropolises (santo) of the country after it had been made the capital city of the Tokugawa regime in 1600. This physical growth in turn caused an economic growth, a growth that was possible because the increase in population in Edo not only expanded the consumer base but also created a corresponding power of supply in Edo. Here, it should be remembered that the underlying force that generated this physical and economic growth was the bakuhan system. With this growth, Edo became a lucrative market for various trades, one of which being book publishing. The burgeoning Edo market naturally attracted many publishers, and the result was an influx of publishing capital into Edo in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Beginning from the eighteenth century, the influence of the bakuhan political tradition on the publishers in Edo became institutional in nature. The publishers in Edo were responding to a series of institutional reforms initiated by Yoshimune and his successors. In particular, the institution of the Publishers' Association (shomotsuya nakama), first recognized by the bakufu during the Kyōhō Reforms, was to shape the publishing culture in Edo. In fulfilling the role of conveying the bakufu's moral authority to the publishers in the Edo townspeople sector, the Publishers' Association introduced the element of ideological control to the publishing culture in Edo. Like the machidoshiyori or other powerful town administrators, the representatives (gyōji) of this Association became members of the vertical clique of the bakufu's townspeople administration, and the publication of books in Edo was to be dictated by this vertical clique.
IV The Horizontal and Vertical Cliques

1. The Edo Publishers’ Association

So far, we have learned that although the so-called chōnin spirit was crucial to the success of the Edo publishers, such a spirit alone might not guarantee their long-term success in the publishing market of Edo. The growth of this market, and of Edo in general, we have also learned, was shaped by a rather conservative political tradition of the bakufu government. This tradition, which could be traced back to the early formation of the bakuhansystem, relied on ideology for local control. In the eighteenth century, institutional reforms were also employed for strengthening this control. In particular, the institution of the Publishers’ Association was created for tightening ideological control over the Edo publishers. Having described all this development, should we simply conclude that the conservative political tradition of the bakufu government and the townspeople spirit possessed by innovative Edo publishers like Urokogataya and Tsutaya were two antagonistic entities? Does it mean that the latter was always subject to the ideological restraint of the former? If not, how can we reconcile the two tendencies? The rest of this thesis will answer these questions.

One significant observation that would allow us to answer all these questions is the fact that the institutional reforms in eighteenth-century Japan
were not completely bakufu-directed phenomena. The institutional changes initiated by Yoshimune were mostly built on the foundation of the natural institutional evolution at the local level. Yoshimune and his successors were never able to exercise absolute control over local socio-political institutions. This inability to establish absolute local control was a major characteristic of the bakuhan system, in which a certain degree of autonomy had to be granted to local socio-political institutions in exchange for their respect for the moral authority of the bakufu. The local socio-political institution of the Publishers' Association also maintained a certain degree of autonomy and did not always act as a transmitter of bakufu ideology. As noted by Miyamoto Mataji, the pioneer scholar on early modern Japanese Shareholders' Associations (kabunakama), an association not only had an obligation to enforce bakufu regulatory edicts, but also had a self-serving interest in creating a closed business environment for its members. The Publishers' Association, for example, had a more practical purpose of limiting access to the bookselling market than carrying book censorship alone.

It was in fact this practical purpose of the Publishers' Association that eventually allows us to see that the publishing culture in Edo was both a legacy of the bakuhan political tradition and a result of the townspeople spirit. It is undeniable that the early impetus for the creation of the Edo Publishers' Association was to protect the private business interests of those already established publishers who wanted to monopolize the bookselling market in Edo. However, one should also note that the creation of such an association was not possible without the bakufu's sanction. This sanction was finally

granted by Yoshimune when he decided to create a vertical clique in the townspeople sector, of which the Publishers’ Association would become an integral part. In the Kyôhô 7/11 edict, he expressed his hope that such an association would serve an ideological purpose by exercising book censorship. This function of the Association as a political institution, however, did not exclude its larger function as an economic/cultural institution. After all, the Publishers’ Association itself consisted of publishers who were themselves businessmen and connoisseurs of the arts. Therefore, in addition to considering the members of the Association as constituting a political (vertical) clique, we may in fact speak of these members as forming an economic/cultural (horizontal) clique. While the term vertical clique is used to remind us of the role of the Association as a transmitter of the bakufu political will, the term horizontal clique is used to signify the solidarity of the members in the Association. Very early on in this thesis, we have seen that, throughout the eighteenth century, the Edo publishers gradually fostered among themselves a chônin solidarity and called themselves Edokko or sons of Edo. In the end, I have also used the term “spatial continuity,” a term similar to the term “horizontal clique,” to describe the nature of this solidarity.

Having raised the possibility of viewing the Publishers’ Association as constituting a horizontal clique, we then have to find the proof of this claim. The fact that genuine Edokko like Urokogataya and Tsutaya were themselves also members of the Association was obviously not a sufficient proof. Among many things, it did not explain how the Association helped create a horizontal clique in the Edo townspeople sector. In other words, a good proof would have to show that the Association indeed played a significant role in creating this horizontal clique. In chapter two of the present thesis, we have traced the
creation process of this horizontal clique. At the same time, we have also concluded that the most important element in this process was how the Edo publishers were able to find ways to discontinue the cultural influence and financial dominance from the Kamigata region. In other words, the creation of a cultural (horizontal) clique in the Edo chônin world was achieved at the final stage of the so-called bun'un tôzen (eastward movement of cultural fortune) phenomenon. Obviously, the task for us here is to show that the Publishers' Association did contribute to the formation of the final stage of the bun'un tôzen phenomenon.

Just like the bun'un tôzen phenomenon itself, the early formation and official recognition of the Edo Publishers' Association were intimately related to the physical, economic, and institutional growth of the city of Edo. Even before the Kyôhô Reforms when the Publishers' Association (shomotsuya nakama) was officially recognized by the bakufu, an informal publishers' association seems to have existed. The Kyôhô 7/11 edict in particular indicates that the bakufu already knew of this association: “Having been in mutual contact for many years, the various publishers and wholesalers surely could take care of [i.e. inspect and censor] each other.”

In the early decades of the Tokugawa period, however, merchants were strictly prohibited from privately forming protective business associations. The only exceptions were those merchants who worked for the bakufu government known as the goyô shônin. In the late seventeenth century, the bakufu reversed its early policy, and began to encourage the formation of business associations in various trades. It is rather obvious that the underlying drive of this reversion
of policy was the bakufu’s recognition of the importance of controlling the physical and economic growth of the major cities and towns by regulating their social institutions. In the merchant sector, the institution of business associations was the most natural target of the bakufu’s regulatory policy. In the area of book publishing, we can observe a similar trend. In the early decades of the seventeenth century, the bakufu only allowed the so-called goyô shoshi or bakufu-sanctioned publishers to form their own business association because the bakufu considered this association a natural extension of its polity. The goyô shoshi, after all, basically catered to the needs of the ruling warrior class by publishing warrior guidebooks, manuals of nô-drama, and etc. However, the expansion of the townspeople readership in Edo, which corresponded to the physical and economic growth of the Edo city, demanded the publication of books that would interest the increasingly affluent Edo townspeople who could easily afford them. The book market in Edo was no longer dominated by the goyô shoshi alone; those private publishers who put out books that fulfilled the townspeople readership became equally powerful a force in this market. To protect their business interests, these private publishers gradually came to a mutual business agreement that sought to maximize profit and ensure business stability. Recognizing this trend, Yoshimune decided to make sure that his bakufu would be the one to oversee the activities of these private publishers; the Kyôhô 7/11 edict was intended to achieve this goal.

The similarity between the development of the Publishers’ Association and that of the bun ’un tôzen phenomenon went beyond this superficial level.

103 Interestingly, the goyô shoshi themselves were among the first to try to gain the townspeople readership by publishing popular books.
Apart from the fact that the physical, economic, and institutional growth of Edo had served as their basis, they also resembled each other in that their early phases were both characterized by a Kamigata influence. We have discussed at great length this influence in the *bun'un tôzen* phenomenon, but can we also find this influence in the Edo Publishers’ Association? The answer is positive. The Kamigata influence on the Association was a natural consequence of the early dominance of Kamigata publishers in Edo. By the time of the Kyôhô Reforms, the Kamigata publishers and their branch shops (*demise*) in Edo continued to hold the exclusive rights to the publication of works written by creative *chônin* writers, who were at that time mostly of Kamigata origins. Such rights not only guaranteed their success among the Edo *chônin* readers, who had grown addicted to these works, but also ensured their dominant role in the Edo publishing world. In fact, the Kamigata influence was so powerful that, at the time when the Edo Publishers’ Association was first officially recognized, the two publishers chosen to be the Representatives of the Association both had Kamigata connection. Yorozuya Seibei of the Matsuba-ken bookstore, being one of them, held the rights to selling in Edo two literary formats that had orginated in the Kamigata region: the *Saikaku-bon* (i.e. *kôshoku-bon*) from Osaka and the *Hachimonjiya-bon* from Kyoto.\(^{104}\) Kogawa Hikokurô, being the other one, owned a branch shop (*demise*) of the Kyoto publisher Ibaragi Tazaemon of the Yanagie-ken bookstore. Because the Edo Publishers’ Association was headed by two people who had strong Kamigata connection, it was difficult for the Association to become an institution independent of Kamigata influence.

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\(^{104}\) The *Hachimonjiya-bon*, as I have already mentioned earlier, was a generic name for the *ukiyo-zôshi* and *yakusha hyôbanki*. 
Moreover, the expected favouritism shown by the two gyôji to their Kamigata patrons further prevented the Association from serving the interests of the native Edo publishers. With their bakufu-sanctioned authority to inspect all newly written works to be published in Edo and to issue permits for publication to these works, the gyôji could easily limit the number of publications that were written by Edo writers. Consequently, between the seventh year of the Kyôhô era (1722) and the early Hôreki era (1751-63), when Yorozuya and Kogawa were serving as gyôji, the Edo publishing world was unable to rid itself of the dominance of Kamigata influence.105

The Kamigata influence on the Edo publishing world met its first challenge in the year 1750 (Kan’en 3) in a copyright dispute. The publication in question was the *Chuci Wang Yi zhu* (Soji Ō Itsu chû in Japanese, the *Poetry of the Chu Region Annotated by Wang Yi*). The person who had the original copyright on this book was the Kyoto publisher Nakamura Jirôbei. After a similar version of the same book was published in Edo by an Edo publisher named Maekawa Rokuzaemon, Nakamura filed a complaint in the second month of 1750 to the Edo Publishers’ Association protesting Maekawa’s business malpractice. In the third month of the same year, the complaint was read in a general association assembly (sô-nakama yoriai). The decision was quickly made in favour of the plaintiff as the Association was citing the general rule it had received from the bakufu several decades ago in the third month of the twelfth year of the Kyôhô era (1727):

... Just like in the previous instructions to the Association, pirated edition (*jûhan*) and imitated edition (*ruihan*) [of a book] are strictly prohibited. In the case of publishing a new and similar version of a book, a permit (*wariin*) that refers [this new version]

to the copyright (motohan) [on the original book] should be obtained. In the case of changing the title [of the original book], the original title should be included [in the new version]. ... 106

By definition, what Maekawa published was an imitated edition (ruihan). According to the rule set forth in the 1727 document, Maekawa clearly infringed the copyright on Nakamura’s original publication; as a result, the Nakamura case was quickly settled. However, the question of how to define copyright infringement was not. The native Edo publishers in the Edo Publishers’ Association, collectively known as the Minami gumi or the South Group, proposed to redefine the meaning of copyright infringement. The members of the Minami gumi believed that the present definition of copyright infringement was too strict. In their opinion, publishing imitated editions (ruihan) should not be considered a copyright infringement. This proposal was debated heatedly during the association assembly between the Minami gumi and its supporters and the rest of the Association members. By the end of the assembly session, no consensus could be reached between the two sides. So, the Association decided to bring the matter to the attention of the machibugyō sho for a final settlement. 107

The Minami gumi, on the twenty-eighth day of the third month in 1750, presented a petition letter to the machibugyō sho that eventually revealed the reason for its involvement in the Maekawa copyright dispute. In this letter, the Minami gumi accused the Association of granting too much privilege to the Kamigata demise and those publishers who had an inside connection

106 This document is given in Konta. Edo no hon’ya san. 81.
107 Edo no hon’ya san. 81.
(naien) [with the gyōji] by purposefully misinterpreting the existing rule on copyright infringement:

Books like the *Hyakunin isshu* and the *Setsuyō shū* are published in different types. If their authors are writing them using their own invented formats or using different methods of annotation, though they might be [labelled as] books of imitation (*ruisho*), they really do not infringe any copyright. Even in the Kamigata region, every year, the publication of imitation books (*nitahon*) similar to these is considerable in number. Here in Edo, maybe the rules of the Association should also not consider books of imitation as an infringement of copyright. However, the Tōri-chō and Naka-dōri Groups, always getting their own way, recognize only the Kyoto formats and disregard any suggestion by the native [Edo] shops (*jimise*).\(^{108}\)

Here, in a rather overt manner, the *Minami gumi* showed its resentment at the excessive Kamigata influence in the Edo Publishers’ Association. This influence was represented by the two dominant groups in the Association; namely, the Tōri-chō *gumi* and the Naka-dōri *gumi*. These two groups were formed at the time when the Edo Publishers’ Association was first recognized by the *bakufu* in 1722 to designate the two distinct physical locations in the Edo *chōnin* sector where the bookstores of established publishers had gathered.\(^{109}\) Though some members of these two early groups were native Edo publishers, the majority of them were Kamigata *demise*. It was only in the twelfth year of Kyōhō (1727) that nine of the native Edo publishers in the

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\(^{108}\) The *Hyakunin isshu* is a collection of poetry while the *Setsuyō shū* is a type of dictionary. *Edo no hon’ya san*, 82.

Naka-dōri gumi branched out to form the Minami gumi. Therefore, at the early stages of the Edo Publishers' Association, the members of the Minami gumi were less powerful than those publishers who had Kamigata connection. According to the petition letter, it seems that by the year 1750 the Tōri-chō gumi and the Naka-dōri gumi were still influential in the Association. This influence is best seen in their ability to exercise a double standard in matters of copyright infringement between the native Edo publishers and their Kamigata counterparts. The native members of the Association were not at all protected. Instead, the concern of the Association was always placed on finding a bridge between the Kamigata and Edo publishing centres. The 1750 debate, together with the petition letter, represented one of the very first attempts on the part of the Minami gumi to challenge the Kamigata dominance in the Association that had persisted for three decades.

While it is obvious that the Association had not been serving its native Edo publishers well; the petition letter itself, nonetheless, is a strong indication of the rising influence of the native Edo publishers. This rising influence can also be seen in the way the 1750 debate on copyright infringement was carried out. Although there were in total only sixteen members in the Minami gumi, in comparison to a total of forty-one members in the Tōri-chō gumi and the Naka-dōri gumi, sixteen of the latter two groups were in support of the Minami gumi. In other words, a majority of the members in the Association actually agreed with the Minami gumi's proposal to redefine the meaning of copyright infringement. Unfortunately, even with a considerable number of

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110 *Edo no hon 'yan san*, 80.
111 Thirty-two members supported the Minami gumi proposal while only twenty-five members opposed it. See *Edo no hon 'ya san*, 82.
supporters from the Association, the Minami gumi eventually lost the case. In reality, however, the Minami gumi was not hurt by losing this case. In fact, one of the reasons that the Tori-machi and Naka-dōri groups were using to counter the charge that the Association had been granting too much privilege to the Kamigata demise was the simple fact that the native Edo publishers (jimise) at that time were publishing as many as fifty to sixty new titles every year. That is to say, the native Edo publishers themselves were beginning to establish their own control over the literary and artistic production in Edo. The Tori-chō and Naka-dōri groups might have been right in saying that the native Edo publishers really did not need to publish any imitation work to sustain themselves.\(^{112}\) The fact that the Minami gumi lost the case might not necessarily be taken as a set back for the native Edo publishers; the very same fact could instead be interpreted as a first step toward their eventual triumph in the Edo publishing world.

Indeed, the 1750 copyright debate provided the first indication of the emerging role of the Edo Publishers' Association as an important physical setting where native Edo publishers began to foster their own solidarity. In particular, the Minami gumi itself was an institutional manifestation of this Edo chōnin solidarity. Maekawa Rokusemon, the Edo publisher accused of infringing the copyright on the Chuci Wang Yi zhu, was himself a member of the Minami gumi. When he became involved in the 1750 copyright dispute, all his fellow members in the Minami gumi stood up for him. Among these members, the one that deserves our special mention was Urokogataya

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\(^{112}\) This argument was used by the Kamigata publishers who were asked by the gyōji of the Edo Publishers' Association, i.e. Kogawa Hikokurō and Yorozuya Seibe to help out the Tori-chō and Naka-dōri groups.
Magojirō.¹¹³ Urokogataya Magojirō was none other than Urokogataya Magobei. Magobei’s success in the Edo publishing world, as we have discussed earlier, was due to his ability to surround himself with a network of talented chōnin friends. We have also discussed the important role of the Yoshiwara pleasure quarter in creating this network: Writers and artists who worked with Magobei were all frequent guests of the Yoshiwara, and his protégé Tsutaya Jūzaburō was himself a one-time resident of the Yoshiwara district. In the end, the Yoshiwara is described as an important physical setting for the creation of chōnin solidarity. Yet, as we can see now, although the Yoshiwara was crucial to the creation of this solidarity, it was not the sole physical setting for this chōnin solidarity to express itself. The kabuki theatre, we know, was another one. But perhaps less apparent is our discovery that the Edo Publishers’ Association was also an important institution in which the Edo townspeople could express their solidarity. In our example, this solidarity was expressed when Magobei and other Minami gumi members were speaking out for Maekawa and, at the same time, for themselves.

About one decade after the 1750 copyright dispute, the Minami gumi finally seems to have accomplished what it set out to do; namely, to transform the Edo Publishers’ Association from a Kamigata-dominated institution into an institution that gave more business protection to the native Edo publishers. In the fifth month of Hôreki 12 (1762), the Association issued a set of comprehensive rules that have been agreed upon by all its members:

Articles of Agreement for the Three Groups of the Book-wholesalers’ Association:
- In the seventh year of the Kyôhô era (1722), when the

¹¹³ A list of all sixteen members of the Minami gumi in the Kan’en era (1748-50) is included in Edo no hon’yan san. 88.
honourable Ôoka Echizen-no-kami was in his tenure [as the *Edo machibugyô*], he had instructed us that from that time onward, we, members of the Book-wholesalers’ Association [a.k.a. the Publishers’ Association], should make it a principle to investigate carefully all newly published books. [Since then] the representatives of the Association (*gyôji*) have gathered to carry out their task of investigation. Several years have passed, and we never neglected this task. This time, the Three Groups agree to lay down the following stipulations:

The Rules
1. The *bakufu* in previous years had given us a set of stipulations, by which we would abide to the utmost. In accordance with these already established stipulations, publishing (*kaihan*), selling, or buying books on *bakufu* laws (*gohatto*) is strictly prohibited.
2. [Anyone] abiding by the rule agreed upon by the Three Groups of the Publishers’ Association is forbidden to publish pirated editions (*jiuhan*) [of any book], and to publish, sell, and buy those books that have infringed copyrights (*motohan*).
3. [The *bakufu*] has in the past prohibited changing the titles of already published books. The selling and buying of anything that does not have a permit issued by the representatives of the Three Groups in charge are all prohibited. Of course, when one is selling a new publication, he should sell it after the Three Groups of the Association have recorded it in their registry.
4. The selling and buying of books that had once been banned (*zeppan*) by the *bakufu* or that had offended the Association should never be allowed.
5. From now on, when someone wants to publish a brand new book, regardless of what type of book it is, he should bring in the manuscript [of the book to the Association] for an investigation. To receive an authorization [for publication], the applicant should present the manuscript to the Annual Representative (*nemban gyôji*). Then, from the Annual Representative, the manuscript is circulated around to be read in turn by other lower-ranking [representatives]. An investigation is carried out in the presence of all the representatives of the Three Groups, and those works that have not made any offense should be recorded in the [Association’s] registry and be permitted for publication. Especially, in cases when the manuscript is a clean-up version
and when corrections have been made to it ... any corrections added to the original manuscript should be presented. When a clean-up version (kiyogaki) is indeed presented, the [approval] seal should not be given. If the preface and postscript are not in conformity, or when they do not correspond to the body of the text, an investigation should be performed.

6. When authorized manuscripts have been published as books, they are submitted for [another] investigation. After the the re-investigation has been completed in the presence of the representatives in charge, a certified permit should be issued [to the owners of the re-investigated books]. The permit should be certified by the representatives in charge at the time [of the re-investigation].

7. For haikai poetry, rubbings of carved inscriptions, model copies and materials of this type, their print-blocks (hangi) should be inspected, and authorization [for publication] is then given.

8. When a subsequent edition of a work is not expanded or revised, the authorization for publication should be given to the print-block [of the work]. When expansion or revision is made, the manuscript should be brought in, and the authorization for publication is given to it. In the case of pictures and one-sheet-prints, if revision is to be made to them, the changes should be minor, and the manuscript itself should not be altered. Moreover, if the size of the picture is changed or somethings special are added to or taken away from the picture, the manuscript should be brought in, and the authorization [for publishing it] be issued.

9. [Anyone] who wants to receive an authorization for publishing a work should have the manuscript and print-block of that work submitted to the regular Annual Representative during the set months. If there is a conflict, a preliminary inspection (shitami) is carried out in advance so that there is no delay of meeting for authorizing [new publication] in the set months. Also, if the applicants are late submitting a work for authorization, or in a month when a controversial book has to be discussed, the representatives in charge should be prepared to commit to resolve the matter, decide what is good or bad, and assist the Annual Representative [for making a final decision].

10. There have been occasions on which a person who is not a member of the Association of the Three Groups is publishing a
new work. He finds patronage in the Association, puts the name of the patron in the colophon [of the book he is publishing], and receives the authorization and permit for the manuscript and the copyright on the book. After all these, he himself sells the book to the public though he is not a member of the Association. This [practice] causes confusion. From now on, after the authorization for publication is issued, a guarantor, who is a member of the Association, should be the one to sell the work to the public. If someone has difficulty finding a guarantor, he should not be allowed to put the name of his patron in the colophon or receive an authorization for publication.

11. If a layman (shirōto; i.e. non-member) has in his possession the copyright on a work and wants to sell it, he has to find a person in the Association who would sell it for him and who would obtain an authorization for publishing the work. In this case, [the Association] should find out all the details concerning the origins of the work and carry an investigation on it.

12. After they have obtained the publication authorization and permits for the new books they possess through application to the Association, the subsidiary booksellers from Kyoto and Osaka would sell them to the public and record them in their own private registry. This practice causes confusion. From now on, after the authorization for publication is issued, a guarantor, who is a member of the Association, should be the one to sell the work to the public. If someone has difficulty finding a guarantor, he should not be allowed to receive an authorization for publication.

13. From now on, for those new books that have come from Kyoto and Osaka, if they have been sold in the past by [Kyoto and Osaka] subsidiary booksellers without having been investigated by the Edo Publishers’ Association and if they find their way into Edo while they have been promised to be sold in some Kamigata shops, not a single volume should be sold [in Edo]. Selling books that do not have a permit and that have been sent to Edo as packages of new books without notifying the Annual Representative is strictly forbidden.

14. In the past, subsidiary book-trading merchants from Kyoto and Osaka were carefully abiding by the bakufu law and adopting a business practice that was approved by the Association. Recently, without being authorized, they traded books with
people outside of the Association. This was a misconduct. The
[Kamigata subsidiary merchants] should be informed by their
host publishers (yadomoto) of the rule that, from now on, such a
behaviour should not happen again. If, when the above has been
said, there were still those who disobey the rule, the [host
publishers], in respecting the Association, should not trade with
these subsidiary merchants.

15. There would be four meetings annually for the investigation
of newly published works in the third, sixth, ninth, and twelfth
month. After deliberation, permission for publication can be
issued.

16. After the manuscript of a book has been inspected, it is
recorded in the registry. Within the ten-year-limitation after the
manuscript is first registered, the publisher is allowed to publish
and make blocks from the manuscript. After ten years, [the name
of] the manuscript can be erased from the registry of the Three-
Groups. However, at that time, if the applicant wants to replace
it with a new manuscript, upon inspection, the name [of the new
manuscript] will be recorded in the registry in place of the old
one.

Collectively, the above articles have been agreed upon by all
members of the Three-Groups of the Association (migumi
nakama). They are not to be violated; they are to be strictly
observed. If there are those who disobey them, they should be
reported to the authority (i.e. the bakufu). For the record, joint
signature [or seal] is given to acknowledge the aforementioned.

Hōreki 12 (1762), fifth month

Signed by all members of the Three Groups of the Publishers’
Association (shomotsu ton ‘ya migumi)\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{114} This translation is based on the version preserved in the \textit{Ruishū sen'yō}, in Yayoshi Mitsunaga, ed., \textit{Mikan shiryō ni yoru Nihon shuppan bunka}, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Yumani shobō, 1988). 471-4. The expanded
version of the same document issued in the fifth month of Kansei 11 (1788) can be found in \textit{Migumi shomotsu ton ‘ya sho-kitei}, in Yayoshi Mitsunaga, ed., \textit{Mikan shiryō ni yoru Nihon shuppan bunkai}, vol. 8 (Tokyo: Yumani shobō, 1993). 233-6. The original document did not have numbering, but for the sake of
discussion, I am numbering the articles in the document.
This rather lengthy document, apart from reiterating the moral concern of the Kyōhō 7/11 edict, reveals at least two important developments in the Edo Publishers' Association during the 1750s and 60s. First, it reveals that the Association was becoming, or at least trying to be, less influenced by the Kamigata publishing world. In particular, the Association seems to have yielded finally to its native Edo members in matters of copyright infringement. For example, Article 2 warned against publishing pirated editions (jūhan) but not imitated editions (ruihan), indicating that the Association was taking a more liberal stance on the publication of books of imitation. This attitude of the Association was in sharp contrast with that of its earlier existence during the Maekawa copyright dispute when a highly pro-Kamigata tendency was permeating the Association. The change in attitude of the Association is apparent when we read Articles 12, 13, and 14 of this document; their common goal of reducing Kamigata influence in the Association is unmistakable. These articles state that if any book were to be sold in Edo, they would have to be sold through the licensed members of the Association. Obviously, such a measure was intended to prevent unauthorized Kamigata publishers from privately selling their own publications in Edo.

The second important development in the Edo Publishers' Association was its larger scheme for monopolizing the Edo bookselling market. This scheme did not just apply to those unauthorized Kamigata publishers who wanted to get a share of the Edo market. Article 10, for example, had a broader objective of preventing any non-member from publishing any new work even if he possessed its copyright. The only way he could "legally" publish a new work was by asking an Association member to publish it for
him. According to this article, many non-members had in fact been publishing their own works. Once a non-member had legally obtained the publication permit for his book, he would try to publish it on his own without the knowledge of its legal publisher, who was a member of the Association. When it was enforced with any conviction, Article 10 could hamper the development of an open and competitive bookselling market in Edo. Not only would all the publishers in Edo be subject to the control of the Association, but anyone involved in a trade related to book-publishing also would be indirectly affected. Writers, artists, book distributors or subsidiary booksellers (yoriko), book renters (kashi hon'ya), wood-block carvers (hangiya), and etc. would all have to obey the authority of the Association if they wanted to earn a living. Consequently, the Association, and its gyôji in particular, became increasingly powerful in the bookselling market in Edo.

Although the native Edo publishers were able to transform the Edo Publishers' Association into an institution that was more protective towards its chônin members, the very protective and, at times, closed structure they created eventually became detrimental to the genuine expression of their chônin spirit. The dilemma of the Edo Publishers' Association thus came from its inability to escape from the conservative bakuhan political tradition. It is true that creative native Edo publishers such as Urokogataya all benefited from this institution; once they had been admitted to this institution, they were given the exclusive rights to publishing any books in Edo. Moreover, such rights meant that if any Edo writer wanted to have his work published, he would have to seek the patronage of these privileged Association members, thus making them powerful social figures. This unique position of the Association members therefore partly explained the relative ease with which
Urokogataya Magobei and other Association members could befriend talented writers and artists in Edo.

In a sense, the institution of the Association was instrumental in "refining" the chônin spirit because it confined the spirit within small circles of chônin men of letters by restricting the number of licensed publishers in Edo. The human network that centred on Urokogataya Magobei was an example. It could not extend itself beyond the set boundary of the Edo Publishers' Association; the relationship between Magobei and his team of writers, though possessing a liberal characteristic, was constantly subject to bakufu regulation. Certainly, Magobei's human network was not in the least comparable to its seventeenth-century predecessors, which included the extremely divisive social groups called kabukimono. Emphasizing chivalry, encouraging outlandish behaviour, and cultivating subversive sentiment; the chônin spirit as it was advocated by the kabukimono was crude and unrestrained. Yet, both types of network eventually met the same fate; namely, they could both easily perish under the bakufu's consistent policy to uphold and protect its moral authority. The kabukimono were eradicated by the bakufu in the name of curbing social unrest; and the once prominent member of the Association Urokogataya Magobei suddenly disappeared from the Edo publishing world in 1780 because, as we have speculated before, he was caught behaving improperly when dealing with some members of the warrior class. Thus, Magobei's demise was a vivid reminder of the precarious position in which a member of the Edo Publishers' Association had to find himself constantly. While being granted by the bakufu the status of privileged merchants, they were at the same time obliged to demonstrate to the authority that they were exemplary citizens of the bakufu government. One of the
obligations demanded from them was to observe the rule of social segregation. Magobei eventually paid the price for crossing the class boundary between the ruler and the ruled. About half a century before the demise of Magobei, in 1728 Mitsui Takafusa (1684-1748), a prominent Kyoto dry-goods merchant, finished composing a collection of family precepts (kakun) entitled the Chônin kôken roku, in which he pointed out with real examples that the most common cause of a merchant's financial failure was lending money to the daimyô. Though not lending money to the daimyô, Magobei was nonetheless involved in an incident in which a daimyô had lost his wealth. In both cases, the risk with which a privileged merchant had to carry when dealing with the ruling samurai class is obvious.

The Edo Publishers' Association thus functioned, in a somewhat contradictory manner, both as a physical setting for fostering the Edo chônin solidarity and that for exercising the bakufu's political control over its townspeople citizens. In our terminology, members of the Association constituted both a horizontal clique and a vertical clique. Both were possible because of a general social development in the city of Edo. Physical, economic, and institutional growth in the city in the late-eighteenth-century culminated in the creation of a highly distinct mode of social existence for the townspeople living in it. Calling themselves Edokko, these townspeople had developed their own cultural identity as proud sons of the capital city. Equally, if not more, creative and affluent, they no longer felt dwarfed by their Kamigata counterparts. At the same time, their new-found pride was restrained by their very existence as citizens in the bakufu's capital. They

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were constantly reminded of their obligation to respect the moral authority of the bakufu government. Moreover, the need to respect this authority was further strengthened by the townspeople’s own involvement in the political system of the bakufu. The dilemma was that, like the Edo chōnin spirit, the development of the bakufu’s political system, which was rooted in the bakuhans tradition, was brought about by the same process of physical, economic, and institutional growth of the city. As a member of the Edo Publishers’ Association, Magobei had no choice but to live with this dilemma, which both gave him business advantages and led to his personal downfall.
V Conclusion

1. Business Ventures and Political Reforms

After he had been admitted to the Edo Publishers' Association in 1783, Tsutaya Jûzaburô, like his predecessor Urokogataya Magobei, was immediately confronted by the dilemma inherent in the Association. The business advantages afforded to him by the Association were not without their price. Above all, Tsutaya had to remember that the Association was not only a cultural but also a political institution. As a member of this political institution, Tsutaya was expected to recognize and to fulfil his political role as a transmitter of the bakufu's moral authority. Unfortunately, Tsutaya was too genuine an Edokko to be bothered by this responsibility. Moreover, the Tanuma liberal social policy during the 1780s must have further encouraged his carefree attitude. After all, the reason he could quickly excel in the Edo publishing world was his ability to develop his own network of artists and writers. This network was so powerful that it eventually overshadowed that of Magobei's.

With his growing confidence, Tsutaya began to venture into the dangerous territory of underestimating the bakufu's conviction to enforce its book-censorship laws. Although by the 1780s the Kyôhô 7/11 edict and its subsequent versions had lost much of their urgency and validity among the Edo chônin readers, who had grown extremely fond of those books that could
amuse them with social satire and shock them with sexually explicit subject matter, it was simply wrong to mistake this lack of urgency and validity for an ultimate decline of the tendency of moral conservatism in the bakufu government. What Tsutaya did not foresee was the imminent revival in the early 1790s of the bakufu’s conservative political tradition. The austere reformer Matsudaira Sadanobu, leader of this revival, was convinced that the bakufu needed to reverse its course to the conservative social policy of the Kyôhô era in order to survive the economic crises of his time. In his vigorous reform movement, Sadanobu was determined to enforce book-censorship laws because he viewed the satirical and risqué books published by the Edo publishers as a threat to the moral authority of the bakufu. One method he employed to achieve his goal was to remind the Edo Publishers’ Association of its political role. For this purpose, he issued an edict to the Association in the twenty-seventh day of the tenth month of Kansei 2 (1790):

Instructions for the guild-representatives of book-wholesalers.

Although strict instructions have been given in the past concerning books, obscene publications have begun to appear again. Whatever the circumstances, the guild-representative is to make his inspection. Depravity and anything injurious to public morality are, of course, undesirable, even in picture-books or illustrated books. . . . Furthermore, a complaint must be lodged with all haste against anybody who does not undergo the guild-representative’s inspection. And in the case of an inspection carried out without due care, or of somebody having avoided an inspection, the guild-representative is to take the blame.

Attention is to be paid to the above. Although such rules were of course laid down in the Kyôhô era, they are now to be issued again in the form of a command. . . .

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As a member of the Edo Publishers' Association, Tsutaya was supposed to obey these instructions. However, as has been mentioned in the introduction, Tsutaya was severely punished for not obeying these instructions.

This thesis will conclude with a brief account of how the Edo Publishers' Association contributed to the rise and fall of Tsutaya Jûzaburô. It is hoped that the account will reinforce our central theme that the publishing culture in eighteen-century Edo was dictated not only by the liberal and reactionary chônin spirit but also by the conservative political tradition of the Tokugawa bakufu.

We have concluded previously that Tsutaya Jûzaburô was able to inherit Magobei's business legacy not only because he had fostered a close friendship with Magobei's team of artists and writers, but also because he was able to become a member of the Edo Publishers' Association himself. Now, I should elaborate on the importance of achieving both of these objectives in Tsutaya's success story. After Magobei had been dismissed from the Edo Publishers' Association in 1780, the exclusive share of publication (han-kabu) of the Yoshiwara saiken he had possessed was not directly passed down to his protégé Tsutaya. Instead, the han-kabu was given to Nishimuraya Yohachi, Magobei's adopted grandson. Obviously, this transfer of kabu took place partly because Yohachi was a relative of Magobei's. But the main reason that Yohachi, as opposed to Tsutaya, should have inherited Magobei's kabu was the fact that Yohachi was himself a member of the Edo Publishers' Association. Such a membership made him a legitimate shareholder of any

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117 The dismissal might have been temporary, but Urokogataya himself never recovered from this setback.
types of publication in Edo. Moreover, Yohachi also belonged to the Guild for Publishers of Native Books (jihon ton'ya), an organization that was composed of publishers of entertaining books or Soft Books (yawarabon) written by native writers. Because the Yoshiwara saiken was classified as a type of entertaining book, the publication right to it naturally fell into the hands of Yohachi, a member of the jihon ton'ya.

However, just three years after Yohachi had obtained the Yoshiwara saiken's kabu from Magobei, Tsutaya was somehow able to monopolize the publication of the Yoshiwara saiken all by himself. According to Mukai Nobuo, Tsutaya took over Yohachi's share of the Yoshiwara saiken in the spring of 1783. When he published his spring 1783 edition of the Yoshiwara saiken, Tsutaya was using the title Goyō no matsu, which had once been the trademark title of the Yohachi edition of the Yoshiwara saiken. Moreover, after 1786, when Tsutaya was publishing his saiken, he simply titled it Shin-Yoshiwara saiken or Yoshiwara saiken. Clearly, such a practice was possible because Tsutaya had already monopolized the publication of the Yoshiwara saiken by that time; in other words, because he was the only person publishing the Yoshiwara saiken, he did not need to call his product anything other than its generic name.118

But how did Tsutaya achieve all this? The Tsutaya edition of the Yoshiwara saiken itself was superior to the Yohachi edition both in many ways. Ever since he was allowed to publish his version of the saiken, Tsutaya had made an innovative change to the dimension of his product, expanding it from the usual 15.7 cm x 11 cm version to the new 19 cm x 13 cm version,

thus making his product more handsome than other versions. In addition, because Tsutaya was acquainted with many Yoshiwara experts who were also great illustrators and great writers, he was able to enhance the attractiveness of his production both in content and in design. However, what eventually allowed Tsutaya to monopolize the publication of the *Yoshiwara saiken* was his being admitted to the Edo Publishers' Association. It was only after he had acquired the membership of the Publishers' Association and that of the *jihon ton'ya* in 1783 that he was able to monopolize the publication of the *Yoshiwara saiken* entirely by himself. In the ninth month of the same year, he also purchased a bookstore on Tōriabura Street which was located at the centre of the Edo publishing world, thus effectively connecting himself to other members of the Association.

While Tsutaya's success story began with his relying on his position as a member of the Edo Publishers' Association to monopolize the publication of the *Yoshiwara saiken*, it ended with his ignoring the political responsibility that accompanied his membership. His reluctance to accept the political role imposed on him, however, did not mean that Tsutaya was a passive person who tried to stay away from the bureaucratic influence of the Association. Instead, he actively tried to transform the Association from a bureaucracy into a physical setting in which the *chônin* spirit could be expressed. Indeed, throughout his career, Tsutaya continued to gain prominence in both the *chônin* world of letters and the Publishers' Association by fostering friendship with artists, writers, and his fellow publishers. While this business strategy is well-known among people studying Tsutaya, the impact of it is often

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119 Matsuki, 21.
underestimated. Tsutaya’s business strategy is always thought to have been based on friendship that was fostered in the private chônin sector such as the Yoshiwara. Moreover, the private nature of this sector is often seen as a contrast to the public nature of the bakufu’s political sphere. However, when we examine the extent of Tsutaya’s friendship network, we will be amazed by how it actually reached the public sector of the bakufu.

One way we can test the extent of the influence of Tsutaya’s friendship network is by seeing how the bakufu government actually reacted to Tsutaya’s business strategy. This reaction is seen in the Kansei 2/10/27 edict we have read earlier in this chapter. Issued by the Sadanobu government, the edict was addressed to a specific audience for a specific purpose: the representatives of book-wholesalers in the Edo Publishers’ Association were ordered to observe strictly their inspection duty. However, was enforcing book-censorship laws the only purpose of this instruction? This question, though very simple, cannot be answered if we do not know the circumstances under which this instruction was issued. Fortunately, the Ruishû sen’yô, a collection of the records of the machibugyô sho, provides us with the context in which the Kansei 2/10/27 edict was transmitted to the townspeople sector:

- Although strict instructions . . . [as in before]
  . . . in the form of a command . . .
  Kansei 2 (1790), year of the dog, 10th month, kusa-zôshi bookstores (kusa-zôshi-ya)
  Collectively, seals of twenty people
  [A reiteration of the Kyôhô 7/11 edict]
  The above has been instructed to the representatives (gyôji) at the office of the honourable Kawachi-no-kami [the machibugyô in charge] on the twenty-seventh day of the tenth month of the second year of Kansei.
  [The following also] has been instructed on Kansei 2/10/27 at the office of the honourable Hatsugano Kawachi-no-kami:
-While all of these people [referring to kusa-zôshi-ya] have been engaging in the selling of products such as kusa-zôshi and one-sheet-picture (ichimai-e), no Association representatives had been elected [among them] in the past. The two existing gyôji [of the Publishers’ Association] should control the business operation [of these people]. The above [instruction] is respectfully received, just as it has been mentioned, on the twenty-seventh day of the tenth month of Kansei 2, [by] [names of the twenty kusa-zôshi-ya, including Urokogataya Magobei, Tsuruya Kiemon, Nishimuraya Yohachi, Tsutaya Jûzaburô, etc.]

When it is read in its context, the Kansei 2/10 edict reveals that it actually had a larger and more specific goal than enforcing book-censorship laws. Specifically, it was intended to subject a particular group of booksellers, namely, the kusa-zôshi-ya, to the censorship control of the Publishers’ Association. In a way, the edict was redundant. The twenty kusa-zôshi-ya were themselves members of the Publishers’ Association; therefore, they were supposed to have already been under the censorship control of the Association’s gyôji. Yet, according to this edict, by the time it was issued, the Association’s gyôji had not been overseeing the activities of the kusa-zôshi-ya. In other words, the kusa-zôshi-ya had shown signs of becoming less dependent on the Publishers’ Association when they conducted their business.

The implication of the Kansei 2/10 edict is that the kusa-zôshi-ya had, to a certain degree, succeeded in transforming a portion of the Publishers’ Association from a public into a private realm. These publishers of popular books had shifted the centre of their business operation away from the bureaucratic structure of the Publishers’ Association to their own network of

\[120\] Ruishû sen’yo, 474-5.
talented townspeople. In this connection, Tsutaya's friendship with his fellow townspeople, though originating in the private sector of the Edo chōnin sector, was able to extend itself to the public sector of the bakufu's political machinery, namely, the Edo Publishers' Association. This friendship also served to disengage, however temporarily, the trade of book publishing from the conservative political tradition of the bakufu government. Obviously, Tsutaya eventually failed to sustain his project when Sadanobu reasserted the political role of the Edo Publishers' Association. As a result, publishers of kusa-zōshi, including Tsutaya, were forced to organize into an association called the nishiki-e jihon ton’ya nakama or the Guild Association of Brocade Pictures and Native Books. This association was to replace the existing organization of jihon ton’ya, making the latter more responsive to the bakufu's political control. Consequently, the creation of the jihon nakama meant that the more liberal publishers like Tsutaya were, however unwillingly, once again situated in the conservative political tradition of the bakufu.

In conclusion, Tsutaya's eventual downfall was attributable to his failure to form an publishing network that could survive independently of the bakufu's political control. The incident that led to his downfall involved the chōnin popular novelist Santō Kyōden (1761-1816). When he heard that Kyōden had written three interesting risqué novels (sharebon), Tsutaya immediately decided to publish them all. Since the decision was made in the year 1791, just a few months after he had put his seal on the Kansei 2 (1790)/10 edict, he was in a way openly disregarding the content of the edict. His aggressive and rather reckless business practice was indicative of his consistent attempt to rid of his publishing ventures the public characteristic that was imposed on them by the Publishers' Association; he wanted them to
be private commercial activities shared by his business friends. Unfortunately, Tsutaya was to succumb to the bakufu’s book-censorship laws. Let us read the record of inquiry (gimmisho) for the Kyôden Censorship Incident:

The said person [i.e., Kyôden], while living with his father Denzaemon, took to making a living by drawing what are commonly called ukiyo-e and selling them to publishers. About five or six years ago he suddenly started writing kusa-zôshi and yomihon [books for easy reading]; these he sold for a fee, having come to an arrangement with the same publishers. That spring he planned to write some new books, and since early last year he has been writing them one after another: a yomihon titled Shikake bunko, and two others titled Nishiki no ura and Shôgi kinuburui. Of these three books, Shikake bunko combines the subject of pleasure in the eating houses of Fukagawa in this city with the Soga monogatari story, which has long been the theme of kabuki plays and kyôgen; thus contemporary scenes are depicted through figures from the past. Nishiki no ura tells of the love between Yûgiri, a courtesan of Kanzaki in Sesshû, and Izamaemon, a chônin; this has long been the subject of jôruri books. And Shôgi kinuburui sets another jôruri-book story, that of the love between Umegawa, a courtesan of Shinnmachi in Osaka, and a chônin called Chûbei, in the surroundings of present-day Shin-Yoshiwara.

During the seventh month [of 1790], he sold these three books to a kusa-zôshi wholesaler, Jûzaburô of Tôrîabura-machi, with whom he had had dealings before. After some discussion, he handed the books over. . . . An edict was issued in the eleventh month of the same year, and it reads as follows . . . .

Once he knew of this [new censorship law], he hurriedly told Jûzaburô that although the three books he had given him had to be inspected by the gyôji and the gyôji’s instructions then followed, the books were all about courtesans and depravity, and so it was pointless to ask the gyôji to inspect them. Since they could not be put on sale, Jûzaburô took copies of the three books, for which the blocks had been ready before the above-mentioned edict was issued, and on the twentieth day of the twelfth month he took them to the gyôji of the kusa-zôshi wholesalers, who duly inspected them. Jûzaburô was informed that there was no
objection to the books being sold, and that all three could thus be on sale. They have been on sale from the beginning of the year. Then there was the summons, and he was told there was to be an inspection.

... So, although strict instructions concerning books have been given in the past, in particular the edicts of last year, he disregarded them and wrote depraved books which he then sold to Jûzaburô.

Having undergone an inquiry on this depravity, he has confessed that he made an unpardonable mistake. He is therefore to be handcuffed for fifty days.\(^{121}\)

In addition to Kyôden, several people were punished in this incident. Kyôden’s father was reprimanded; Tsutaya lost half of his wealth (shinshô hangen kessho); the two gyôji who gave their consent to the publication of the three books were sent into exile. What these people constituted was a group of townspeople friends that valued their solidarity more than their obligation to the moral authority of the bakufu. And it was exactly this townspeople friendship that the bakufu was worried about. Especially, the involvement of the two gyôji in this incident is a good indication of how influential Tsutaya was at the time. He was able to persuade these gyôji to ignore their duty, which has been repeatedly announced to them in various edicts by the bakufu. In fact, the Kansei 2/10, which was specifically issued to them just one year ago, did stress on the importance of carefully carrying out their inspection duty. Of course, even a powerful figure like Tsutaya, a member of the townspeople’s cultural/horizontal clique, had to succumb to the political

In many ways, Tsutaya’s last words echoed the dilemma of his existence and that of the socio-political institution of which he was a member: 

... In the autumn of the year of hinoetatsu (1794), [Tsutaya] became seriously ill and was getting worst month by month. On the sixth day of the fifth month in the year of hinotomi of the Kansei era (1795), he told people that he would die at noon sharp. He then settled some unfinished family business and bid farewell to his wife and daughter. When it finally reached noon, he laughed and said, “Why hasn’t I heard the sound of wooden clappers on the stage? [The show] must have been late!” After these words, he never said anything again. He died at dusk. He was forty-eight. ... 

Even in his dead-bed, Tsutaya did not lose his characteristic confidence. He was sure that he would die at noon sharp just as he had been sure that the Kyôden books he published would not cause him any trouble. When he knew his prediction was wrong, he began to mock himself jokingly. “The show must have been late!” How he longed for the chromatically undisciplined and emotionally liberated world of the kabuki theatre which always begins with the sound of wooden clappers. This world had proven itself to be partly reality and partly illusion for him; in the end, like the kabuki theatre he loved so much, Tsutaya’s business ventures could go only as far as the conservative social milieu of his time would allow them. Meanwhile, stubbornly, he waited to enter this world in silence, but it was not until dusk that his dream would finally be fulfilled.

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122 Ishikawa Masamochi’s “Kitagawa Kari boketsumei,” in Matsuki. 39.
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Ansaisho 安斎書
aohon 青本
Arai Hakuseki (1657-1725) 新井白石
aratame-nin 改人
Arima Hyōgo-no-kami Ujinori 有馬兵庫頭氏倫
Asai Ryōi (d. 1691) 浅井了意
Asakusa 浅草
bakuhan-taisei 幕藩体制
bantō 番頭
Bijin-e tsukushi (1683) 美人絵つくし
bukan 武鑑
buke shohatto 武家諸法度
bun'un tōzen 文運東漸
Chang'an 長安
chaya 茶屋
chō 町
chō-yaku 町役
chōnin 町人
Chuci Wang Yi zhu 楚辭王逸註
daikan 代官
demise 出店
Denzaemon 伝左衛門
Detchi 丁稚
Dôbô goen (1720) 洞房語園
e-hon 絵本
Edo 江戸
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haikai 俳言詠

haishi 種史

Haishi teiyô 種史提要

han 江

han-kabu 板株

han-shū 江主

hangiya 板木屋

Hara Nensai 原念齋

hari 張り

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hyakushō ikki 百姓一権

Ibaragi Tazaemon 茨木多左衛門

ichimai-e 壱枚絵

Iedaya Hambei 家田屋半兵衛
iemochi 家持
Ihara Saikaku (1642-93) 井原西鶴
iki 萌
ikyō 遺教
Ishikawa Masamochi (1753-1830) 石川啄望
Izumiya Genzō 和泉屋源蔵
Jimise 地店
Jinshirō 甚四郎
Jitsubo kenshō no hibun (1792) 実母顕彰の碑文
Jitsugaku 実学
Jórari hon'ya 浄瑠璃本屋
Jūhan 重板
Kabu-nakama 株仲間
Kabuki 歌舞伎
Kabukimono 歌舞伎者
Kaihan 開板
Kaitei-Nihon shōsetsu shomotsu nempyō 改訂日本小説書物年表
Kakitsuke 書付
Kakun 家訓
Kamigata 上方
Kana-zōshi 仮名草紙
Kanjō gimmiyaku 勘定吟味役
Kanninki (1659) 堪忍記
Kansei Reforms 寛政改革
Kantō 関東
kara hon'ya 唐本屋
Karamaru (Kari) *柯理
kashi hon'ya 貸本屋
Kashiwabaraya Yozaemon 柏原屋与左衛門
kasho 歌書
kashojo narabi e-zōshi 歌書所並画草紙
keisei-machi nanushi 備極町名主
kessho 所
kibyōshi 黄表紙
Kikujusō (1781) 菊寿草
Kinkin sensei eigai no yume (1775) 金毘先生榮花夢
Kitagawa Karamaru (Kari) boketsumei (1797-8?) 北川*柯理墓誌銘
Kitao Shigemasa (1739-1820) 北尾重政
kiyogaki 清書
Kogawa Hikokurō 小川彦九郎
kōgi 公儀
Koikawa Harumachi (1744-89) 恋川春町
Kokugo kokubun 国語国文
Kono fumi tsuki (1773) 今野觀王盤
koshō 小姓
Kōshodō 耕書堂
Kōshoku ichidai onnai (1686) 好色一代女
Kōshoku ichidai otoko (1682) 好色一代男
kōshoku-bon 好色本
koyomi 厠
kuge 公家
Kumazawa Banzan (1619-91) 熊沢蕃山
kurohon 黒本
kusa-zôshi 草双紙
kusa-zôshi-ya 草双紙屋
Kyô habutae (1685) 京羽二重
Kyô warabe (1658) 京童
kyôgen 狂言
Kyôhô Reforms 享保改革
Kyôhô sen 'yô ruishû 享保撰要類集
kyôka 狂歌
Kyokutei (Takizawa) Bakin (1767-1848) 曲亭（濱沢）馬琴
kyûkin 給金
kyûrō 司事
machidoshiyori 町年寄
Maekawa Rokuzaemon 前川六左衛門
Makura no sôshi (1002) 枕草紙
Man 'yôshû 万葉集
Marubashi Chûya 丸橋忠也
Maruyama Jûsuke 丸山重助
Matsubara-ken 松原軒
Matsudaira Sadanobu (1758-1826) 松平定信
midari 猿り
Migumi shomotsu ton 'ya sho-kitei 三組書物問屋諸規定
Mimonjiya Matashirô 三文字屋亦四郎
Minami gumi 南組
motohan 元板
Murakami Ibei 村上伊兵衛
Nagasaki bugyō 長崎奉行
naien 内縁
Naka-dōri gumi 中通組
Naka-no-chō 中乃町
Nakagawa Kiun 中川喜雲
nakama 仲間
Nakamura Jirōbei 中村次郎兵衛
Nakayama Izumo-no-kami Tokiharu 中山出雲守時春
nanushi 名主
Nara 奈良
Naraya Ichimon 奈良屋市衛門
nemban gyōji 年番行事
nemban nanushi 年番名主
Nihon shoki (720) 日本書紀
ninjōbon 人情本
Nishiki no ura (1791) 錦之裏
nishiki-e jihon ton'ya nakama 錦絵地本問屋仲間
Nishimuraya Yohachi 西村屋与八
nitahon 似た本
nò 能
norenwake 暖簾分け
Nozaki (Tsutaya) Jirōkichi or Jirōbei 野崎（萬屋）次郎吉 or 次郎兵衛
Ôbishiya 大菱屋
Ôdemma-chō 大伝馬町
Ôoka Echizen-no-kami Tadasuke (1677-1751) 大岡越前守忠相
Ôta Nampo (1749-1823) 大田南観
obure 御触れ
Ogata Kôrin (1658-1716) 尾形光琳
Ogyû Sorai (1666-1728) 萩生徂徕
onnagata 女形
renza 連座
ri 里
rōjû shuseki 老中首席
rônin 浪人
ruihan 類板
ruisho 類書
Sagamiya Heisuke 相模屋平介
Saiken a-a o-Edo (1774) 細見鳴呼御江戸
Sakai 塩
sankin kôtai 参勤交代
santo 三都
Santô Kyôden (1761-1816) 山東京伝
Sengoku daimyô 戦国大名
Setsuyô shû 節用集
Sharaku 写楽
sharebon 酒落本
shi-nô-kô-shô 士農工商
shihai nanushi 支配名主
Shikake bunko (1791) 仕懸文庫
shimpan daimyô 親藩大名
shinshô hangen kessho 身上半減聞所
shirōto 素人
Shishi bikō 史氏備考
shitami 下見
Shōbō-ji 正法寺
Shōgi kinuburui (1791) 妃妓絵図
Shōhō jiroku 正室事録
Shōji Jin'emon (1575-1644) 庄司甚衛門
Shōji Jisaburō 庄司
Shōji Katsutomi (Dōsai) 庄司勝富（道恕斋）
Shōji Matazaemon 庄司又左衛門
shomotsu aratame 書物改
shomotsu hon'ya migumi 書物本屋三組
shorin nakama 書林仲間
shōya 庄屋
sō-nakama yoriai 懐仲間寄合
sobashū 側衆
sobayónin 側用人
Sōeki shoseki mokuroku taizen (1696) 増益書籍目録大全
Soga monogatari (1394) ソガ物語
Soji Ō Itsu chū, see Chuci Wang Yi Zhu
Tanagari 店借り
Tang 唐
Tanuma Okitsugu (1719-88) 田沼意次
Tao Zhu 陶朱, see Fan Li
tashidaka-sei 足高制
tedai 手代
Tokubei 徳兵衛
Tokugawa Ieharu (tenth shogun, r. 1760-86) 徳川家治
Tokugawa Ieshige (ninth shogun, r. 1745-60) 徳川家重
Tokugawa Ieyasu (first shogun, r. 1603-05) 徳川家康
Tokugawa Muneharu 徳川宗春
Tokugawa Yoshimune (eighth shogun, r. 1716-45) 徳川吉宗
Tôrai Sanna 唐来参和
Tôri-chô gumi 通町組
Tôriabura-chô 通油町
toshi uchikowashi 都市打毁し
Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-98) 豊臣秀吉
tozama daimyô 外様大名
tsû 通
tsuihô 追放
Tsuruya Kiemon 鶴屋喜右衛門
Tsutaya Jirôbei 鈴屋次郎兵衛
Tsutaya Jûzaburô (1751-97) 鈴屋三郎
Tsutaya Rihei 鈴屋利兵衛
ukiyo 浮世
ukiyo-zôshi 浮世草紙
Ukiyo-zôshi nempyô 浮世草紙年表
Urokogataya Magobei 鎌形屋孫兵衛
Urokogataya Magojirô 鎌形屋孫次郎
Urokogataya Sanzaemon 鎌形屋三左衛門
Urokoya Masabei or Seibei うろこや政兵衛
utaihon 諏本
Utamaro (1753-1806) 歌麿
uwasa-goto 諏事
wariin 割印
Watanabe Ōsumi-no-kami Han’emon Amisada 渡辺大隅守半衛門盛政
Yadoya no Meshimori 宿屋飯盛, see Ishikawa Masamochi
yakukin 役金
yakusha hyōbanki 役者評判記
Yamamoto Kyūzaemon 山本九左衛門
Yamato-e no kongen (1680s) 大和絵のこんげん
Yanagie-ken 柳枝軒
yomihon 読本
Yomono Akara 四方赤良, see Ōta Nampo
Yonosuke 世之介
yoriko 世利子
Yorozuya Seibei 万屋清兵衛
Yoshiwara 吉原
Yoshiwara no karada (1678) 吉原の体
Yoshiwara saiken 吉原細見
Yoshiwara yuisho 吉原由緒
Yui Shōsetsu (1605-51) 由井正雪
yūjo hyōbanki 遊女評判記
zennaku or zen’aku 善悪
zeppan 絶板
Zoku enseki jishu 諏燕石十種