AQUINAS AND SIGER
IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY- MONOPSYCHISM CONTROVERSY

by

Jaekyung Lee

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Philosophy
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Aquinas and Siger
in the Thirteenth Century-Monopsychism Controversy

Doctor of Philosophy, 2000
Jaekyung Lee
Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto

My thesis examines Aquinas’s philosophical psychology in the context of his controversy with Siger of Brabant. Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with the central thesis of Aquinas’s argument against the Averroist doctrine of the intellect, which he often expresses by the claim, *intellectus est forma corporis*. This claim is fundamental to Aquinas’s philosophical psychology insofar as it relates not only to his solution to the tension between the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body and the intellect’s immateriality, but also to his alternative to the Averroist interpretation that the intellect cannot be the form of the body. I argue that this claim cannot be an adequate alternative to the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle since it is not compatible with Aquinas’s insistence that the intellect cannot use any bodily organ, nor exist in any part of the body. Furthermore, the thesis of organlessness commits Aquinas to an intellect-body dualism since he postulates the existence of the intellect independently of the body in the human being.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the question of whether Aquinas has an adequate alternative to Siger’s critique that the intellect cannot be a power of the human soul which is the substantial form of the body. Some contemporary Thomists have argued that Aquinas’s position is not vulnerable to the Sigerian
critique at all by appealing to his claim that the human soul is a subsistent form. However, I maintain that the human soul’s subsistence cannot be upheld insofar as Aquinas insists that the human soul is essentially the form of the body, and its nature is incomplete without the body. For nothing in the nature of the human soul as the form of the body provides a ground for showing that it can perform its proper operation without the body and thus can be subsistent. Consequently, Aquinas does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the possibility that the human soul can possess the intellect as its power. This leads us to conclude that the difficulties raised by Siger cannot be resolved by Aquinas’s position.
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Abbreviations

AVERROES

LC Averrois Cordubensis commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros (Crawford edition)

SIGER OF BRABANT

QIII DA Quaestiones in tertium de anima (Bazán edition)
DAI De anima intellectiva (Bazán edition)
QLC Quaestiones super librum de causis (Marlasca edition)

THOMAS AQUINAS

CT Compendium theologiae (Leonine V. 42)
DEE De ente et essentia (Leonine V. 43)
DUI De unitate intellectus (Keeler edition)
In DA Sentencia Libri De anima (Leonine V. 45, 1): For convenience, I have included the references to the Marietti edition in parentheses.
In PA Expositio Libri Posteriorum (Leonine edition)
In Sent Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (Lethielleux)
QDA Quaestiones disputatae de anima (Leonine, V. 44, 1)
QDP Quaestiones disputatae de potentia (Marietti, 1953)
QDSC Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis (Marietti, 1953)
QDV Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (Marietti, 1964)
QQ Quaestiones quodlibetales (Marietti, 1956)
SCG Summa contra gentiles (Marietti, 1961 - 67)
ST Summa theologiae (Ottawa edition)

All English translations are mine, with the following exceptions:


I have also used Deborah Black’s unpublished English translation for chapter 3 of the DAI.
Introduction

My aim in this thesis is to examine Aquinas's philosophical psychology in the context of his controversy with Siger of Brabant, who has been often regarded as a leading Latin “Averroist” in the thirteenth century.

As is well-known, the ultimate reason for this controversy is Aristotle's treatment of the intellect (nous) which has been recognized as one of the most perplexing aspects of his philosophical psychology. Aristotle's general approach to soul-body relationships does not seem to allow for the possibility of any part of the soul being separable from the body insofar as the soul is defined as the “form” or “actuality” of the body in De anima 2.1, and this definition applies universally to every kind of soul.\(^1\) The relationship between soul and body is the same as that between form and matter. Soul and body are, therefore, one in the way that form and matter are one.\(^2\) On this definition, he also claims that “the soul, or parts of it if by its nature it has parts, cannot be separated from the body.”\(^3\) In line with this claim, we should expect the intellect to be realized in an appropriate kind of matter, and therefore to exist within a living body insofar as it

\(^1\) Aristotle, *De anima*, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1981), 2.1, 412a20 - 21: “... the soul must be a substance as the form of a natural body potential with life....”; 2.1, 412a27 - 28: “... the soul is the first actuality of a natural body with the potentiality of having life....”; 2.1, 412b5 - 6: “... the first actuality of a natural body which has organs....” Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of the *De anima* are from Apostle’s.

\(^2\) Ibid., 2.1, 412b6 - 9.

\(^3\) Ibid., 2.1, 413a4 - 5.
is described as "the part of the soul with which the soul knows and judges rightly." 

Yet Aristotle seems to be unwilling to draw that inference in his discussion of the intellect in *De anima* 3 (and elsewhere in the work), since his remarks about the intellect consistently postulate the existence of a type of intellectual activity wholly independently of the body. In *De anima* 3.4, he holds that since the intellect, unlike the other perceptual faculties, is able to think all things, it cannot be mixed with the body or require any bodily organ for its activity. For such a material realization would hinder and distort its ability to think. The intellect, then, must be separable from the body in order to perform its proper activity. Furthermore, in *De anima* 3.5, where he distinguishes "active" or "productive" intellect from "passive" intellect, Aristotle holds that the active intellect is capable of existing without the body.

Aristotle’s account of the intellect seems to be incompatible with his definition of the soul given in *De anima* 2.1. If this definition applies only to faculties or parts using bodily organs, then the intellect will fall outside the purview of the definition and thus will not be a constituent of the soul. If the intellect is immaterial, and thus is separable from the body, this also appears to contradict his insistence on human thinking’s dependence on imagination, since

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5 *Ibid.*, 3.4, 429a14 - 29; 429b4 - 5.
7 *Ibid.*, 1.1, 403a8 - 10; 3.7, 431a14 - 17; 431b7 - 10; 3.8, 432a8 - 14.
imagination requires perception, and both the faculties are directly dependent upon bodily organs, and thus are inseparable from the body. The ambiguity of Aristotle's own position on the intellect had been the subject of debate since antiquity and has given rise to several different interpretations.

Siger, a master in the Arts Faculty of the University of Paris during the 1260's and 1270's, adopted the Averroist view of the intellect and proposed it as a correct interpretation of Aristotle.\(^8\) This view was first formulated by the Arabic philosopher Averroes who was highly regarded as an interpreter of Aristotle and thus was called "the Commentator." Averroes read Aristotle's position as claiming that the intellect is an independently existing substance that is separated in its existence from the human body and thus from the individual, and hence is one and the same for all human beings. Siger's Averroism was a target of the Condemnation in 1270 since his position effectively deprived humans of any individual intellective powers, and hence seemed to threaten the Christian belief in individual immortality and punishment in the afterlife. In the same year, Aquinas reacted with his treatise *De unitate intellectus* which was directed primarily against Siger and other Latin Averroists. In accusing Siger's Averroism of being an indefensible reading of Aristotle and of being philosophically untenable, Aquinas argues that the intellect is a power of the human soul, which is the substantial form of the body. In this context, I will be concerned with how

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Aquinas interprets Aristotle against the Averroist reading, and whether or not Aquinas has an adequate alternative to Siger’s position.

The thesis divides into two parts. Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with the central thesis of Aquinas’s argument against the Averroist doctrine of the intellect, which he often expresses by the claim, *intellectus est forma corporis*, “the intellect is the form of the body.” Chapter 1 addresses the questions of what Aquinas means by the claim that “the intellect is the form of the body”, and what are his grounds for it. This claim is fundamental to Aquinas’s philosophical psychology since it closely relates not only to his interpretation of Aristotle’s position, but also to his attacks against the Averroist account of the intellect. However, this claim is quite subtle, and so there has been a debate between two contemporary scholars concerning this question. I will offer an interpretation that differs from theirs by arguing that both of them fail to explain Aquinas’s genuine intention.

Chapter 2 is concerned with the question of whether or not Aquinas’s claim that “the intellect is the form of the body” can be a correct solution to the tension between the definition of the soul as the form of the body and the intellect’s immateriality within Aristotle’s account of soul. That is to say, can this claim be an adequate alternative to the Averroist interpretation that the intellect cannot be the form of the body? I will offer a negative answer to the question by showing that Aquinas’s account of the intellect is inconsistent.

Chapters 3 and 4 address the question of whether the intellect can be a power of the human soul if it is not the actuality of the body. This question is one
of the ultimate sources of the controversy between Aquinas and Siger. Chapter 3 discusses what Siger’s Averroist views of the intellect are and how his views undergo transformations through the entire course of his career. My special emphasis will be on the question of how Siger was insistent on criticizing Aquinas’s own position. As most scholars correctly point out, Siger completely rejected the unicity of the intellect in his last work, the *Quaestiones super librum de causis*, after the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier in 1270 condemned thirteen propositions which included several pertaining to Siger’s view of the intellect. It is also widely acknowledged that although he did not become a convert to Thomism, Siger was led to reconsider his position under Aquinas’s influence. Nevertheless, the issue of to what extent Siger’s views evolved under Aquinas’s reaction is controversial, and I offer an interpretation that differs markedly from one common in the literature. In doing so, I will argue that even in his *Quaestiones super librum de causis* Siger consistently opposed the Thomistic position that the intellect is a power of the human soul which is the substantial form of the body.

Finally, the last chapter is devoted to the question of whether the difficulties raised by Siger could be resolved by Aquinas’s own position that the intellect is a power of the human soul. Some contemporary Thomists have argued that Aquinas’s position is not vulnerable to the Sigerian critique at all by appealing to his claim that the human soul is a subsistent form. It cannot be denied that this claim is indeed essential to Aquinas’s philosophical psychology as well as to his rejoinder to Siger. I will offer a detailed explanation of how
Aquinas attempts to harmonize the conception of the human soul as the form of the body with its subsistence. I will argue that his attempt is not successful. It will lead to the conclusion that Aquinas does not have an adequate alternative to Siger's position.
Chapter One: Aquinas on Intellect as a Form of the Body

My aim in this chapter is to clarify some aspects of Aquinas's account of the intellect-body relationship which seem to me often neglected or misunderstood. Aquinas's account can be understood only in the context of his more general theory of the human soul, and more precisely, has its basis in Aristotle's theory of the soul as the form or actuality of the body. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of his overriding claims is formulated as follows: *anima intellectiva est forma corporis* (henceforth AFC), "the intellective soul is the form of the [human] body." A difficulty is raised by the central thesis of Aquinas's argument against the Averroistic doctrine of the intellect, which he often expresses by the phrase, *intellectus est forma corporis* (henceforth IFC), "the intellect is the form of the body."¹ For IFC seems to contradict his insistence that the intellective power is not the actuality of any part of the body insofar as it is a part of the soul which performs its activity without a bodily organ.

The problem becomes more complex when Aquinas sometimes uses two different claims, IFC and AFC, without demarcating them, and thus seems to assume the identity thesis, which considers "intellect" and "intellective soul" as equivalent terms. Are "intellect" and "intellective soul" synonymous in Aquinas's terminology? No doubt, the intellective soul is typically a synonym for the human soul (*anima humana*), the rational soul (*anima rationalis*). However, the intellect

¹ ST 1.76.1c; QDSC 2c. Cf. Aquinas uses the term "id quo intelligimus" instead of "intellectus" in the following texts. DUI 1.11; 3.63; 3.80.
cannot be synonymous with the intellective soul because the intellect is a part or power of the [intellective] soul, distinct from the sensitive and nutritive parts of the soul. Apart from this terminological problem, the identity thesis seems inconsistent with positions Aquinas takes elsewhere regarding the relationship between the essence of soul and its powers.

I will begin by setting out an inconsistency in Aquinas's account which is concerned with identifying two main claims, AFC and IFC. My discussion will focus on two questions. One is how we should understand Aquinas's tendency to identify the intellect with the intellective soul, a tendency which is found in his attacks against the Averroistic doctrine of the unicity of the intellect. The other is concerned with IFC. What does Aquinas mean by this claim, and what are his grounds for it?

Interestingly, there have been recent attempts to show that the inconsistency is merely apparent. I will show the misinterpretations to which Aquinas's own account is open by reviewing a debate among two contemporary readers, Édouard-Henri Wéber² and Bernardo Carlos Bazán³ on this matter. Despite their fundamentally different views, there is at least some agreement

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between Wéber and Bazán about Aquinas's account of the intellect-body relationship; what is meant by “intellect” in IFC is “intellective soul” and what is meant by “form” is “substantial form.” However, I will argue that IFC is intended to give Aquinas’s own exegesis of Aristotle against the Averroistic interpretation that the intellective power cannot be the form of the body. Thus, I will show that when IFC is properly understood, the intellect in question should be read as the intellective power. If my interpretation is correct, the difficulties raised by IFC still remain. Thus, the following chapters will deal with the question of whether Aquinas’s views on human nature and the human intellect are ultimately consistent.

1. Problems with Aquinas’s Account of the Intellect-Body Relationship

As is well-known, Aquinas’s account of the intellect-body relationship is closely related to his objections against the Averroistic view that the intellect is a separate substance apart from individual human souls and one and the same for all human beings. The bedrock upon which Aquinas’s recurrent counter-

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arguments are dependent is the most basic of psychological facts, which he
generally expresses by the phrase *hic homo (singularis) intelligit*, "this (individual)
human being understands" - a fact that remains inexplicable, in Aquinas's view, if
the substantial form of a human being does not include the intellect, the principle
of this activity of understanding.\(^5\) It is significant to note that Aquinas deals with
the Averroistic positions on the nature of the intellect by dividing them into two
parts - separation and unicity. For example, after dealing with the separation of
the intellect in q. 76, a. 1 of the *Prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas
turns to consider its unicity in the second article.\(^6\) I will focus on Aquinas's
arguments against the separation of the intellect, which includes a seemingly
problematic expression of IFC. One of these arguments is found in *Summa
theologiae* 1. 76. 1, where Aquinas considers the question, “Whether the
intellectual principle is united to the body as its form.” In the course of offering an
affirmative answer to this question, he presents the following argument in
support of IFC.

We must assert that (A) the intellect which is the principle of
intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that
whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which
the act is attributed. . . . The reason for this is that nothing

\(^5\) Cf. ST 1.76.1; DUI 3.62, 63, 65 and 66; CT 85; In DA 3.1, 275 - 305 (3.7.690).

\(^6\) See also QDA 2 (“Whether the human soul is separate from its body in existence”) and QDA 3 (“Whether the possible intellect or the intellective soul is one for all human beings”). I believe that Aquinas’s objection against the unicity of the intellect is simply precluded by his objection against its separation. See ST 1.76.2. Aquinas’s point is that if the intellect is a part or power of the individual soul, which is the substantial form of an individual human being, the doctrine of the unicity cannot be upheld. For as an accident, the intellect can be individuated by its subject, the human soul which is individuated in relation to matter. For Aquinas’s argument for the individuation of the intellect, see
chapter 2, section 3.
acts except so far as it is in act; and so, a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore (B) this principle by which primarily we understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body.\footnote{7} First of all, Aquinas's argument is difficult to understand because of IFC in (A). He accepts the basic Aristotelian view that the human soul as the form of the body is necessarily united to the body, and hence it is the actuality of the body. As a consequence, the soul necessarily exists in the whole body, and in each of its parts.\footnote{8} Similarly, if the intellect were the form of the body, then it would also have to be the actuality of the body and hence exist in the body and in all of its parts. However, this would contradict Aquinas's account of the nature of the intellectual power, since he insists that the intellect is not the actuality of any bodily organ and thus cannot be in any part of the body: “Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely,\footnote{7} ST 1.76.1c: “Dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui operatio attribuatur. . . . Et huius ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu; unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima; anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis.” Cf. QDSC2c; DII 1.10 - 11; 3.62.\footnote{8} ST 1.76.8c; SCG 2.72; QDA 10; QDSC 4.}
the intellect and the will; and hence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body."^9

The problem becomes more complex in (B) where he seems to identify IFC with AFC, so that the intellect and the intellective soul become equivalent terms.\(^{10}\) It is beyond doubt that the intellective soul or rational soul is a term which has been used as another name for the human soul by Aquinas and other medieval philosophers. Since the human soul can perform the act of understanding which the souls of animals or of plants cannot, there has been a tendency to call it the intellective soul or the rational soul in order to distinguish it from the sensitive soul of an animal or the vegetative soul of a plant. Here, \textit{rational} is the differentia of the human species in the genus \textit{animal}.\(^{11}\) This tendency can be explained by Aquinas’s basic Aristotelian view that the powers of the soul are hierarchically ordered, each higher power virtually containing the powers below it. Each animate creature contains only one soul, and exercises all its functions in virtue of that soul. An animal, for example, possesses a sensitive soul, but exercises the lower functions of nutrition and reproduction in virtue of its single sensitive soul. Similarly, each human being has only one soul, the intellective soul, so she must exercise all her functions, including intellection,

\footnotesize

\(^{9}\) ST 1.76.8 ad 3: \"[P]otentiarum animae quaedam sunt in ea secundum quod excedit totam corporis capacitatem, scilicet intellectus et voluntas; unde huiusmodi potentiae in nulla parte corporis esse dicuntur.\" Cf. ST 1.76.1 ad 2 and 3.

\(^{10}\) Cf. This tendency is also found in QDA 3, where Aquinas raises the question of whether the possible intellect or the intellective soul is one for all.

through that intellective soul. Although the term “intellective soul” is commonly used as a synonym for “human soul,” it is hard to see how “intellect” and “intellective soul” can be used as equivalent terms. For the intellect as distinct from nutritive or sensitive part is the cognitive faculty distinctive of the intellective soul. That is to say, it is the part or power of the soul which performs the act of understanding in Aristotle’s De anima.

This terminological problem may not be that simple, because Aquinas’s identity thesis seems inconsistent with positions he takes elsewhere. First, to have a correct assessment of Aquinas’s identity thesis, it is essential to be clear about what he himself says regarding the relationship between the soul and its powers. In fact, the question of whether the soul is identical with its powers was raised on many occasions throughout Aquinas’s career: Do the human vital activities issue directly from the soul or through powers in some way distinct from the soul? It is worth noting here that the question is closely related to central tenets of Aquinas’s metaphysics such as the act-potency theory and the distinction between existence and essence, although it is properly a psychological question.

12 ST 1.76.1c; 1.76.3.

13 Aristotle, De anima, 3.4, 429a10 - 11.


15 ST 1.54.3; 1.77.1; 1.79.1; QDA 12; QDSC 11; In Sent, 3.4.2; QQ 10.5.
In dealing with the question with respect to the powers of the soul in general, namely, whether the essence of the soul is its power, Aquinas believes that a positive answer would lead us to the absurd conclusion that the creature is equal to God.

First. because, since potency and its act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a potency and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of substance, the potency which is said in relation to that act cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance, for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own substance. Therefore the divine potency or power which is the principle of His operation is the divine essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul or of any creature. . . .

According to the framework of Aquinas's creationist metaphysics, while God is absolutely simple, created beings are complex. They are affected by a certain ontological complexity because they are created. Here, the complexity is that of the composition of a thing's existence with its essence. What is meant by God's total simplicity is that only in God is his existence identical with his essence. In God by reason of his total simplicity his operation must be his substance. In the creature the operation of a substance must be really distinct from the substance itself. Aquinas's point is that no creature can act immediately, that is to say,

\[16\] ST 1.77.1: "Primo, quia cum potentia et actus dividant ens et quodlibet genus entis, oportet quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus. Et ideo si actus non est in genere substantiae, potentia quae dicitur ad illum actum, non potest esse in genere substantiae. Operatio autem animae non est in genere substantiae; sed in solo Deo, cuius operatio est eius substantiae. Unde Dei potentia, quae est operationis principium, est ipsa Dei essentia. Quod non potest esse verum neque in anima, neque in aliqua creatura. . . ."
without the medium of its powers, and hence the soul is really distinct from its powers in every creature.\(^{17}\)

In holding that the powers of the soul, as distinct from the essence of the soul, are the immediate principles of operation, Aquinas has in mind Aristotle’s distinction between different grades of actuality: possessing knowledge without exercising it (as in the case of someone asleep), and actually exercising knowledge.\(^{18}\) So, Aquinas states, “the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, with further relation to the second act.”\(^{19}\) The soul is the first principle of the operations of a living thing. It is not, however, the immediate principle of operation. Every operation is the act of some power, as, for example, seeing is the act of the power of sight, and understanding is the act of the intellective power. The operations cannot be the acts of the soul itself because the soul is essentially an actuality, not a potency; it is the act which makes the body a living thing. If its operations were the immediate acts of the soul, then every living thing would perform all of its operations necessarily, since the soul is by its essence always in act. Hence, operations do not issue immediately from the soul but through its powers distinct from the essence of the soul.\(^{20}\)

\(^{17}\) Cf. Sent. 1.7.1.1 ad 2. The distinction is described as real: "[l]nter essential and talem operationem cadit virtus media differens ab utroque, in creaturis etiam realiter. . . ."

\(^{18}\) Aristotle, De anima, 2.1, 412a10, a22; Cf. 2.5.

\(^{19}\) ST 1.77.1c: "... ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinatus ad actum secundum."

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
Having considered the powers of the soul in general, Aquinas continues with the question of whether the intellect is a power of the soul.\textsuperscript{21} Here, he strongly denies the identification between the soul and the intellect. Once again, in arguing that in every creature its operation is distinct from its substance by appealing to the notion of the parallel of the act of existing to operation, he formulates the principle that as essence is to existence, so a power is to an operation. He means by this that what is true of the relation of a substance to its existence is true of the relation of a substance to its operation. Since a thing's existence is distinct from its essence in creatures, it follows that the same is true of operation relative to a thing's essence from which the operation proceeds. Therefore, Aquinas puts forward that just as we distinguish existence from operation in every creature, so we distinguish essence from power in every creature. In other words, if the power were not distinct from the essence of the soul, its operation would have to be identical with its existence.

To sum up, the soul is distinct from the powers of the soul on Aquinas's account. The human vital activities do not issue directly from the soul but through its powers distinct from the soul. At this point, if the human soul is the only substantial form of a human being, and the powers of the soul are distinct from the soul, then it is evident that its powers cannot be substantial forms. Aquinas himself, in contrasting and comparing the properties of substantial forms and accidental forms, maintains that the powers of the soul, as distinct from the soul,

\textsuperscript{21} ST 1.79.1c. Cf. ST 1.54.3.
must be accidents, more specifically accidents in the second species of quality.\textsuperscript{22}

If the soul is distinct from its powers on Aquinas's account, how can we explain his identity thesis in (B)? In recent literature, Ralph McInerny has argued that the terminological problem could be resolved by Aquinas's adherence to the Aristotelian view that "soul" is not a divided genus but a hierarchical one, so that each species of soul is denominated by its highest power.\textsuperscript{23} Despite his insistence on the distinction between the intellect and the intellectual soul, Aquinas reluctantly recognizes the possibility that the intellectual soul might be denominated by its highest power, the intellect: "for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power."\textsuperscript{24} That is why he sometimes calls the intellectual soul "intellect or mind."\textsuperscript{25} However, I believe that

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 1.77.1 ad 5; 1.79.1c. Aquinas describes the powers of the soul as properties (\textit{propria}) to show that they possess a special characteristic different from other accidents. For a detailed account of this notion, see chapter 2, section 1.

\textsuperscript{23} Ralph McInerny, \textit{Aquinas against the Averroists: On There Being Only One Intellect} (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1993), 206: "How, then, can Thomas identify soul and intellect? It is a \textit{façon de parler}. Just as the sensitive soul is sometimes called sense, so the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, named from its chief power."

\textsuperscript{24} ST 1.79.1 ad 1: "\.\.\. denominatur enim anima sensitiva nomine principalioris suae potentiae, quae est sensus. Et similiter anima intellectiva quandoque nominatur nomine intellectus, quasi a principalior, sua virtute.\.\.\."

\textsuperscript{25} Cf. ST 1.75.2c: "Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens.\.\.\." Kretzmann explains that this terminology is a result of Aquinas's tendency to use these terms \textit{very broadly}. See N. Kretzmann, "Philosophy of Mind," 149 n. 1; 150 n. 8; Cf. John Marenbon, \textit{Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350): An Introduction} (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 122: "In each man there is an 'intellectual soul' (\textit{anima intellectiva}; here, and throughout this discussion, Aquinas uses 'intellect' and 'intellectual' in the weak sense).\.\.\."
the difficulty raised by the identity thesis in (B) cannot be resolved or even diminished by McInerny's interpretation that the intellect in IFC must be read as the human soul. For this would distort Aquinas’s intention in (A) and (B). As I mentioned above, this article is concerned with refuting the Averroist view that the intellective power is a separate substance. Thus, if the intellect in IFC should be considered as the human soul, then this would make Aquinas’s intention purposeless since Averroes has never argued the separability of the human soul.

2. A Debate between Bazán and Wéber

As I have already noted, Aquinas’s IFC seems to be inconsistent with his view that the intellect cannot be the actuality of the body. Furthermore, the IFC-AFC compatibility cannot be upheld given his adherence to the distinction between the soul and its powers. How can Aquinas’s two seemingly incompatible claims be reconciled?

Recently, there have been attempts to show that the inconsistency is merely apparent. In this section, I will show some of the misinterpretations to which Aquinas’s account is liable by examining the debate between Bernardo Carlos Bazán and Édouard-Henri Wéber on this matter. In his book *La controverse de 1270 à l'Université de Paris et son retentissement sur la pensée de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Wéber maintains that the inconsistency is a result of Aquinas’s doctrinal development, arguing that a philosophical dialogue between Siger of Brabant and Aquinas caused Aquinas to modify his own view of human
nature. Wéber's contention is that Aquinas asserts the distinction between the essence of the soul and its powers in his earlier works, including the *Commentary on the Sentences*, *De veritate*, and *Summa theologiae* (1.77 & 79), which are dated before the debate with Siger. However, Aquinas modifies his fundamental views on the intellect, abandoning the distinction between the soul and its powers under the pressure of Siger's objection that a power cannot be simpler than the essence from which it derives. In support of his interpretation, Wéber points out that Aquinas's new notion of the intellect is found in his later works, where a new counter-argument which has IFC as its conclusion recurs: “we must assert that the intellect, which is the principle of the intellectual operation, is the form of the body.” Wéber concludes therefore that “Aquinas is finally led to the notion of the intellect as the substantial form of the body, that is to say, as the soul, without limitation,” abandoning the previous notion of the intellect as an accidental faculty of the soul on the distinction between the essence of the soul and its powers.

According to Wéber, Aquinas's identity thesis is found in the *De unitate intellectus*, *Summa contra gentiles* Bk. 2, and *Summa theologiae* 1. 76. 1 (and

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26 E.-H. Wéber *La controverse de 1270 à l'Université de Paris et son retentissement sur la pensée de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, 15 - 25.


28 DUI 1.11 and 27; In DA 3.1.275 - 305 (3.7.690); SCG 2.56 - 90 esp. 59, 60, 70, 73 and 98; ST 1.76.1; CT 85, 87, 88; ST 1.76.1c; 3.9.1c.

29 ST 1.76.1. Cf. SCG 2.59; DUI 3.80.

30 E.-H. Wéber, *La controverse de 1270 à l'Université de Paris et son retentissement sur la pensée de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, 126.
the *Secunda secundae,* which Wéber himself dates from Aquinas's stay in Paris, from 1268 to 1272. Recognizing that most historians would not agree with his own chronology, Wéber assumes that *Summa contra gentiles* Bk. 2 might have been revised and completed at Paris around 1270, although it had been largely elaborated in Italy before 1269. That is to say, starting around 1267 - 68 at Italy, Aquinas did not complete writing the work until his debate with Siger at Paris in 1270. However, Wéber himself admits a difficulty in providing chronological evidence for the claim that *Summa theologiae* 1.76.1 dates later than *Summa theologiae* 1.77. and 79 which he considers as Aquinas's earlier texts.31

By contrast, Bazán argues that it is incorrect to consider Aquinas’s inconsistency to be the result of doctrinal development, rejecting Wéber’s interpretation that Aquinas transformed his view of the distinction under the pressure of Siger’s arguments.32 For Bazán believes that there are a number of texts where Aquinas speaks of the intellect as a power of the soul on the basis of the distinction between the soul and its powers even after 1270. How then can we account for Aquinas’s tendency to identify the intellect with the intellective soul? Bazán answers that there is a genuine resolution for this tension once we

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understand correctly Aquinas’s terminology.\textsuperscript{33} According to Averroes and Siger, the terms, “intellect”, “rational soul”, and “intellective soul” are equivalent. It is this equivalence that leads the Averroists to affirm the separation and the unicity of the intellective soul in the course of interpreting Aristotle’s obscure positions on the intellect. According to Bazán, the separation and unicity of the intellect leads the Averroists to hold that the individual human being has no intellective soul of her own. Consequently, the individual’s own human soul is only a highly sophisticated sensitive soul which has among its operative powers the imagination and the cogitative faculty. For this reason, the intellect or intellective soul is an immaterial substance, united operationally with the individual, without forming a substantial union with the individual.\textsuperscript{34} On this view, Bazán argues:

It is very important to consider this equivalence of the terms because it constitutes the context in which Aquinas formulated his response to Siger. It is extremely important to ask if, in speaking of the intellect as the form of the body, Aquinas renounces his doctrine of the distinction between the soul and its powers, or if he just follows his adversary in his way of speaking.\textsuperscript{35}

What does Aquinas intend to say when he employs IFC? For what reason does Aquinas introduce this ambivalence of the term “intellectus”? Bazán answers:

\textsuperscript{33} B. Bazán, “Le dialogue entre Siger de Brabant et Thomas d’Aquin,” 69 - 78.


\textsuperscript{35} B. Bazán, “Le dialogue entre Siger de Brabant et Thomas d’Aquin,” 70.
Aquinas notes that what he considers as the form of the body and calls "anima intellectiva" is considered by Averroes as a substantial reality separated from the individual and is called normally "intellectus". To fight against his adversary, Aquinas adopts his [Averroes's] terminology and Aquinas's formula, "anima intellectiva est actus corporis" becomes "intellectus (possibilis) est actus corporis".  

According to Bazán, the term "intellectus" covers two things in Aquinas's terminology: the operative power distinct from the soul, and the intellective soul itself called "intellectus" according to the adversary's terminology. Bazán concludes therefore that the inconsistency is resolved if we recognize that IFC is only a result of the adoption of the Averroists' terminology.

I agree with Bazán that there was not any doctrinal modification or development concerning the relationship between the soul and its powers in Aquinas. For Aquinas's insistence on the distinction between the soul and its powers is consistent until the end of his career. An explicit example of this insistence occurs in the later works where Wéber believes Aquinas puts forward the identity thesis after having abandoned the distinction. On the basis of the distinction between the soul and its powers, Aquinas offers a counter-argument against the Averroist claim: the fact that the intellective soul is the substantial form of the body prevents the intellect from being separate from the body.

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36 Ibid., 85.

37 Ibid., 70. See also his "Précisions sur la doctrine de l'influence selon Thomas d'Aquin," 1068.
For in the soul two things must be taken into consideration: its essence, and its power. Through its essence the soul gives being to such and such a body; by its power it performs its proper operations. Accordingly, if a psychic operation is carried out by means of a bodily organ, then the power of the soul which is the principle of that operation must be the act of that part of the body whereby such an operation must be the act of that part of the body whereby such an operation is performed; thus, sight is the act of the eye. But, if the soul's operation is not effected by means of a bodily organ, then its power will not be the act of a body. And this is what it is meant by saying that the intellect is separate; nor does separateness in this sense prevent the substance of the soul of which the intellect is a power (namely, the intellective soul) from being the act of the body, as the form which gives being to such a body.  

In respect of its essence, the soul is the act of the body and thus is not separate from the body. In respect of its power, the intellect is separate in the sense that its operations are carried out without a bodily organ. No doubt, his reply is based on the doctrine of the distinction between the soul and its powers.

According to Wéber, one of Aquinas's major reasons for modifying his views on the intellect is Siger's objection: Aquinas's view that the intellect is a power of the human soul breaches the principle that a power cannot be simpler than the essence from which it derives, since the human soul is the act of the

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38 SCG 2.69.1464: "Est enim in anima considerare et ipsius essentiam, et potentiam eius. Secundum essentiam quidem suam dat esse tali corpori: secundum potentiam vero operationes proprias efficit. Si igitur operatio animae per organum corporale completur, oportet quod potentia animae quae est illius operationis principium, sit actus illius partis corporis per quam operatio eius completur: sicut visus est actus oculis. Si autem operatio eius non compleatur per organum corporale, potentia eius non erit actus alicuius corporis. Et per hoc dicitur intellectus esse separatus: non quin substantia animae cuius est potentia intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, sit corporis actus ut forma dans talis corporis esse.". See also ST 1.76.1 ad 1 and 2; DUI 3.83.
body while the intellect is not the act of any bodily organ. In dealing with Siger's objection, however, Aquinas argues that his account is not open to this objection.

But if it be objected against this that a power of the soul cannot be more immaterial or more simple than the soul's essence, the reasoning would proceed soundly if the essence of the human soul were the form of matter in such a way that it would not exist through its own act of existing, but through the act of existing of the composite, as is true of other forms, which of themselves have neither the act of existing nor an operation apart from their union with matter; and on the account they are said to be immersed in matter. But the human soul exists by its own act of existing, in which matter in some way shares [though] not wholly comprising it, since the dignity of this form is greater than the capacity of matter; nothing therefore prevents the soul from having some operation or power that matter cannot reach.

Aquinas does not disagree with the principle on which Siger's objection rests, since Aquinas recognizes that this objection could hold good in the case of all material forms except the human soul. Unlike other material forms, the human soul is a subsistent form which does not depend on the body for its own existence. Thus, he concludes that since the soul is an immaterial subsistent

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39 QII IDA 7; DAI 3; QLC 26. For a detailed discussion of this critique, see chapter 3.

40 DUI 3.84: "Si autem contra hoc obiiciatur, quod potentia animae non potest esse immaterialior aut simplicior quam eius essentia: optime quidem procederet ratio si essentia humanae animae sic esset forma materiae, quod non per esse suum esse, sed per esse compositi, sicut est de aliis formis, quae secundum se nec esse nec operationem habent prae ter communicationem materiae, quae propter hoc materiae immersae dicuntur. Anima autem humana, quia secundum suum esse est, cui aliqualiter communicat materia non totaliter comprehendens ipsam, eo quod maior est dignitas huius formae quam capacitatis materiae; nihil prohibet quin habeat aliquam operationem vel virtutem ad quam materia non attingit." See also ST 1.76.1 ad 4; SCG 2.69.1463, 1365.
form, there is no reason why it cannot have an immaterial power. This argument clearly shows that Aquinas does not abandon the distinction even in his reply to Siger’s objection. More importantly, Aquinas believes that Siger’s objection is not valid since he fails to see the peculiar character of the human soul.

3. Terminological Solution

In the preceding section, I’ve agreed with Bazán that it is a mistake to interpret Aquinas’s identity thesis as a result of doctrinal development. Furthermore, in my opinion, Bazán has succeeded in establishing that Aquinas’s identity thesis is just a result of the adoption of his opponents’ terminology. Although Bazán provides textual evidence that on Averroes’s terminology the intellect and the rational or intellective soul are equivalent, it would be less clear than the evidence in Siger’s texts.\textsuperscript{41} This terminology is found on numerous occasions in Siger’s two texts, \textit{Quaestiones in tertium de anima} and \textit{De anima intellectiva}.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{41} B. Bazán, “Le dialogue entre Siger de Brabant et Thomas d’Aquin,” 85 n. 84. It seems to be unclear that Averroes explicitly equates these two terms, although Bazán offers two texts of Averroes as evidence. The terminology of \textit{anima intellectiva} is not found in Averroes himself while the texts of Averroes cited by Bazán contain the terms \textit{anima rationalis} and \textit{anima in nobis} respectively. Cf. LC 3.385.55; 18.439.72.

Siger divides his *Quaestiones in tertium de anima* into four sections: (1) the difference between the intellect and other parts of the soul; (2) the nature of the intellect itself; (3) the relation between the intellect and human bodies; (4) the operative powers of the intellect. Concerning his last section, he writes: “The fourth is about the powers of the intellect, namely, about the possible and the agent intellect, how they are different from each other and what they are.” In general, the term “intellect” is used as a common designation for the possible and the agent intellect in the sense that the intellect consists of the two parts. In Siger’s discussion of a series of questions about the intellect in itself, however, this term is used as an equivalent term for the rational soul which he describes as something possessing the possible and the agent intellect insofar as both intellect and rational soul are separate substances outside of the individual human being.

That the two terms “intellective soul” and “intellect” are interchangeable in Siger’s terminology is also made clear in his discussion of the unicity of the intellect, where he defends not only the unicity of the intellect but also that of the intellective soul. In q. 9 of the *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*, Siger’s account of the unicity of the intellect is offered in dealing with the question, “Whether the

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43 QIII DA 1.6 - 8: “Quartum est de virtutibus intellectus, scilicet de intellectu possibili et agente, qualiter differant inter se et quid sint.”

44 *Ibid.*, 13.44.29 - 32: “Sicut enim anima rationalis, prout nobis copulatur, duplicem habet partem, scilicet intellectum agentem et possibilem, sic et ipsa separata vel considerata prout est substantia separata, in se habet intellectum possibililem et agentem”; 14.51.52 - 5: “... licet anima rationalis per suam substantiam agat, tamen virtus eius recipiens intelligibilia, scilicet possibilis intellectus, et virtus eius, scilicet intellectus agens, causans intellecta. ...”
intellect is one among all." The same defense is given in q. 7 of the De anima intellectiva, where Siger attempts to defend the unicity of the intellective soul. In considering the question of whether the intellective soul is multiplied by the multiplication of human bodies, Siger uses the two terms interchangeably.

But the intellective soul has the being apart from the quantified and continuous and is not itself quantified or continuous as the Philosopher proves in De anima I. . . . Therefore, since the intellect has the being apart from the quantified and continuous and is not itself quantified and continuous . . . .”[Italics mine.]45

Nonetheless, it would be hard to infer from Siger’s terminology that Aquinas’s identity thesis in Summa theologiae 1.76.1 or Quaestiones de anima q. 3 is a result of his adopting Siger’s terminology, since Siger’s earlier text, Quaestiones in tertium de anima (1269 - 70) was written after Aquinas’s texts.46 Thus, one might doubt whether my agreement with Bazán’s thesis is justified if there is not enough evidence for Averroes’s equation of the two terms. I believe, however, that there might be enough reason for Aquinas to believe that Averroes equated “the intellect” with “the intellective soul,” even if Averroes did not really do so.

45 DAI, 7, 104, l. 71- 80: “Sed anima intellectiva habet esse abstractum a quanto et continuo, non quanta nec continua, sicut probat PHILOSOPHUS primo De anima. . . . Cum igitur intellectus habeat esse abstractum a quanto et continuo, non quantus nec continuus. . . . “

Aquinas's reason for calling the human soul the intellective soul is that the human soul has an intellect which is not possessed by vegetative or sensitive souls. Insofar as one admits the fact that the intellect is a power of the intellective soul, namely, the human soul which performs the act of understanding, the intellect cannot be identical with the intellective soul. On the other hand, Aquinas seems to take Averroes's position to be that if the intellect is not a power of the soul, and thus is a separate substance, then the intellective soul possessing the intellective power cannot be the form of the body but a separate substance. That is why Aquinas accuses Averroes of holding that a human being derives his specific nature from the passive intellect or cogitative power, rather than from the possible intellect.\footnote{Cf. SCG 2.60; QDSC 9.} Likewise, it would be natural to infer the unicity of the intellective soul from that of the intellect if one assumes that both intellect and intellective soul are separate substances.\footnote{In QDA 3 Aquinas raises the question of "Whether the possible intellect or the intellective soul is one for all human beings."} I think Aquinas believes that for Averroes both of them are indeed separate substances. For this reason, Aquinas often uses the two terms without demarcating them in his polemics against the Averroist account of the intellect.

Of course, if Bazán's interpretation is wholly correct, the difficulties raised by Aquinas's account might be completely resolved: (1) the inconsistency raised by Aquinas's identity thesis can be explained by the interpretation that the thesis
is just a result of adopting his opponents' terminology; (2) IFC would not raise any problem if the intellect should be read as the intellective soul.

In my opinion, Bazán's defense seems to be sufficient to provide a correct answer to the first question raised at the outset: how can we understand Aquinas's tendency to identify the intellect with the intellective soul which is found in his attacks against the Averroistic doctrine of the intellect? I doubt, however, that (2) accurately represents Aquinas's intention. For there are obvious reasons for distrusting an exposition that has Aquinas holding, as Bazán holds, that the intellect in IFC is nothing other than the intellective soul. Bazán's conclusion is not different from Mclnerny's that I have already rejected, although Bazán correctly explains the reason why Aquinas uses the terms "intellect" and "intellective soul" interchangeably in his polemics against the Averroists.

First, after proving that the intellect (by which humans understand) is the form of the body against the Averroist interpretation that it cannot be the form of the body, Aquinas quotes Aristotle's remark that this "by which humans understand" principle is the possible intellect which is discussed in De anima 3.4. Here is how Aquinas puts that claim:

But lest anyone say that that by which we understand does not mean here the possible intellect, but something different, clearly this is excluded by what Aristotle says in III De anima, when speaking of the intellect: "I speak moreover of the intellect by which the soul thinks and understands." 49

49 DUI 1.11: "Sed ne aliquis dicat, quod id quo intelligimus non dicit hic intellectum possibilem, sed aliquid aliud, manifeste hoc excluditur per id quod Aristoteles in III De Anima dicit, de intellectus possibiliti loquens: «Dico autem intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima». See also DUI 1.12. To ascertain that the intellect in question refers to the intellective power, Aquinas continues to explain as follows: "Cum enim animam in communi diffinivisset, incipit distinguere potentias eius; et dicit quod «potentiae animae
Clearly, what Aristotle refers to in *De anima* 3.4 is not the soul but the intellect as a part or power of the soul. Second, in his refutation of the Averroist view that the intellect is a separate substance, Aquinas also states that the possible intellect as the form of the individual must be an intellective power: "the possible intellect itself, which is the understanding power, must be formally in this human being in order that this human being may understand" (my emphasis).\(^50\) I suggest therefore that the intellect in question should be considered the intellective power. On the basis of this exposition of Aquinas's central thesis, IFC, I can reply to objections that my exposition is almost certain to generate.

One might wonder why the term "that by which we understand" should refer to the intellect.\(^51\) Aquinas's use of this term does not seem to be compatible with the different descriptions given to the soul and the intellect by Aristotle in the *De anima*. According to Aristotle, the soul is "that by which we primarily live, sense and understand."\(^52\) By contrast, the intellect is defined as "a

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\(^{50}\) QDSC 2c: "[O]portet ipsum intellectum possibilem, qui est potentia intelligens, formaliter inesse huic homini ad hoc quod hic homo intelligat." Cf. SCG 2.76.1577: "Oportet igitur quod principia quibus attribuuntur hae actiones, scilicet intellectus possibilis et agens, sint virtutes quaedam in nobis formaliter existentes."

\(^{51}\) DUI 1.11; 3.62, 80; SCG 2.59.1364.

\(^{52}\) Aristotle, *De anima*, 2.1, 414a12 - 3.
part or power of the soul by which the soul understands." At this point, one might suppose that Aquinas’s phrase “that by which we understand” refers to the soul. How then can we explain Aquinas’s use of the phrase, “that by which we understand”, which is synonymous with the intellect? To see how this question should be answered, two further questions need to be raised: (1) does Aquinas transform Aristotle’s definition of the intellect as “a power or part of the soul by which the soul understands” into “that by which humans understand?”; (2) If so, why does Aquinas adopt such a definition? Considering these questions will put us on the right track for interpreting Aquinas’s account.

According to Wéber, Aquinas transforms Aristotle’s definition of the intellect as “a power or part of the soul by which the soul understands” into “that by which we [humans] understand” to support his doctrinal development thesis. However, it is not hard to falsify Wéber’s view if we consider that Aquinas uses the two expressions, namely, “that by which we understand” and “the power of the soul by which the soul understands” interchangeably in many places. Aquinas sometimes quotes Aristotle’s definition of the intellect as “that by which the soul understands” without altering it. In some places, he refers “that by which we understand” to the intellect. Furthermore, Aquinas writes, “the

53 Ibid., 3.4, 429a10.

54 E.-H. Wéber La controverse de 1270 à l’Université de Paris et son retentissement sur la pensée de S. Thomas d’Aquino, 149. On the contrary, Bazán’s answer seems to be in the negative.

55 SCG 2.73.1504; 2.62.1409, 1411; DUI 4.87.

56 DUI 1.11; 3.62, 80; SCG 2.59.1364.
possible intellect, according to Aristotle, is that whereby the soul and man understand." From these we can infer that Aquinas does not transform Aristotle's definition of the intellect as Wéber argues. Why then does Aquinas apply "that by which we understand" to the intellect? That is, what are his grounds for identifying the two phrases? Aquinas himself provides an explanation of why the expression "that by which we understand" is applied to the intellect.

[I]t is clear that this human being understands. For if that is denied, then the person who states this opinion understands nothing and is not to be listened to: however if he understands, it is necessary that he understands formally through something. However, this is the possible intellect about which the Philosopher says: "But I say that the intellect is that by which the soul understands and forms opinions." Therefore the possible intellect is that by which this man understands formally.58

The reason that the intellect can be described as "that by which we understand" is that the intellect as a power of the soul must be the power or form of the individual human being in order for understanding to be attributed to the individual. If my reasoning is correct, there is no incompatibility between "that by which we understand" and the intellect.

57 SCG 2.73.1493, 1524.

58 In DA 3.1.282 - 90 (3.7.690): "Manifestum est enim quod hic homo intelligit: si enim hoc negetur, tunc dicens hanc opinionem non intelligit aliquid nec est audiendus. Si autem intelligit, oportet quod aliquo, formaliter loquendo, intelligat; hoc autem est intellectus possibilis, de quo Philosophus dicit: «Dico autem intellectum quo intelligit et opinatur anima»; intellectus igitur possibilis est quo hic homo, formaliter loquendo, intelligit."
However, there still remains a problem. Aquinas often identifies the intellect as “that by which we primarily (primo) understand” instead of “that by which we understand.” Is it possible to understand this term “that by which we primarily understand” as the intellect? One might suppose that that by which a thing primarily acts should be the substantial form of the thing on the assumption that the word “primarily” has the same function as the phrase “first actuality” in Aristotle’s first definition of the soul. As Aquinas himself explains, Aristotle calls the soul the first actuality of the body to distinguish the soul from its operations, which are the second or final actualities. At this point, it seems to be hard to avoid the conclusion that if “that by which primarily we understand” is the substantial form of man, then the intellect should be identical with the soul which is the substantial form.

To understand Aquinas’s use of this phrase properly, we should first consider how he uses it elsewhere. In pointing out a difficulty facing those who claim the unicity of the intellect, Aquinas maintains,

[The operation called understanding flows from the possible intellect as from the first principle through which we]

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59 ST 1.76.1c; DII 3.62.

60 Cf. N. Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 149 n.6: “Actus is an important technical term for Aquinas and other medieval philosophers. It means both action and actuality, in a way that may be clarified by such observations as these: A thing acts only if and only to the extent to which it actually and not just potentially exists and is a thing of such and such a sort. Consequently, whatever it is in virtue of which the thing acts in a certain way = that in virtue of which it actually is a thing of that certain (appropriate) sort. Therefore, that in virtue of which primarily the thing acts (primary intrinsic source or first principle of its characteristic action ) = the substantial form of the thing.”
understand, just as the operation of sensing flows from a sense power.\textsuperscript{61}

Here he explicitly refers this phrase to the intellective power by contrast with the sense power through which we sense. Why then does Aquinas apply this phrase to the intellect? We can find a clue to solve this problem in his counter-argument against the unicity of the intellect.

\textit{[T]he intellect has primacy among all the other things which pertain to man, for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service.}\textsuperscript{62}

\textit{[T]he possible intellect is a part of man. And it is the most noble and most formal thing in him.}\textsuperscript{63}

Obviously, this account is based on Aquinas's basic Aristotelian view that the human soul is a hierarchical genus, so that each species of soul is denominated by its highest power. Commenting on Aristotle's remark that "man is the intellect,"\textsuperscript{64} Aquinas also takes it to be that the intellect is what is preeminent in a human being.\textsuperscript{65} The crucial point is that the intellective power is primary among all the powers of the soul which a human being possesses. On this view, I think

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{61} QDA 3.235 - 38: "Manifestum enim est quod hec operatio que est intelligere egreditur ab intellectu possibili sicut a primo principio per quod intelligimus, sicut hec operatio sentire egreditur a potentia sensitiua."
  \item \textsuperscript{62} ST 1.76.2c: "[I]ntellectus inter cetera quae ad hominem pertinent, principalitatem habet; obediunt enim vires sensitivae intellectui, et ei deserviunt."
  \item \textsuperscript{63} SCG 2.60.1373: "[I]ntellectus possibilis est aliqua pars hominis. Et est dignissimum et formalissimum in ipso."
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Aristotle, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, 9.4, 1166a16.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} QDA 12 ad 13; DUI 3.77.
\end{itemize}
that there are some reasons to believe that Aquinas himself intends the phrase, "that by which we primarily understand" to describe the intellect. He argues that if the most important power in the individual, the intellect, is a separate substance outside the individual, the human being cannot be placed in a different species from brute animals, since it is through his intellectual operation that the human being surpasses all other animals.66 The reason that Aquinas describes the intellect as "that by which we primarily understand" is that it is primary among the powers of the human soul, and hence the most important agent in man.67 A further clarification can be made once we recognize that there is a difference between the notion of "first principle" as applied to the soul, and "first principle" as applied to the intellect. When considering Aristotle's definition of the soul as that by which we primarily sense, move, and understand, Aquinas attempts to show that the soul is the ultimate intrinsic source or explanation of all these vital operations including understanding, sensation, and local movement. By describing the soul as the first principle, Aquinas means that all the powers of man are rooted in the soul. It is because of the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations. On the other hand, the soul in turn has its parts or powers: the vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, and intellective powers. By describing the intellect as the first principle by which we understand, Aquinas means that it is the most important of the powers of the individual, and the principle which distinguishes humans from other animals.

66 ST 1.76.1c.

67 Cf. DII 4.89.
Aquinas does anticipate the objection that the phrase "that by which we
(primarily) understand" cannot be applied to the intellect as a power, given
Aristotle's account of the soul. In dealing with the question of why Aristotle says
that the soul is that by which we primarily understand although the intellective
power is that by which we understand, Aquinas answers:

[That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the
substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first
principle of action, but not the proximate principle. In this
sense the Philosopher says that the soul is that whereby we
understand and sense.]\(^{68}\)

The intellective power is the proximate, and the most important, principle by
which the soul and hence the human being himself operates. The soul as the
first principle of operation is, in contrast, the ultimate source of all of the
operations of the soul's powers.

Finally, another objection might be raised if one misinterprets Aquinas's
argument from the nature of the human species.

The nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the
proper operation of man as man is to understand, for it is in
this that he surpasses all animals... Man must therefore
derive his species from that which is the principle of this
operation. But the species of each thing is derived from its
proper form. It follows that the intellectual principle is the
proper form of man.\(^{69}\)

\(^{68}\) ST 1.77.1 ad 4: "[Q]uod forma accidentalis est actionis principium, habet a forma
substantiali. Et idea forma substantialis est primum actionis principium, sed non
proximum."

\(^{69}\) Ibid., 1.76.1c: "Natura enim uniuscuiusque rei ex eius operatione ostenditur. Propria
autem operatio hominis inquantum est homo, est intelligere; per hanc enim omnia alia
transcendit. . . . Oportet ergo quod homo secundum illud speciem sortiatur, quod est
huius operationis principium. Sortitur autem unumquodque speciem per propriam
This argument is offered as a defense of Aquinas's claim that understanding is attributed to the individual only insofar as the intellect is the form of the body. Thus it seems to be sufficient to support my claim that the principle of intellectual operation as the form of the body refers to the intellective power. Indeed, Aquinas himself identifies this principle as the intellective power. However, a difficulty might arise since it is hard to see what Aquinas means by saying that the principle of intellectual operation is what gives the individual his specific nature. One might object that the intellectual principle in question is the intellective soul as the substantial form insofar as the substantial difference is derived from the substantial form. Of course, Aquinas denies neither the fact that human specific rationality is given by the substantial form, nor the fact that the intellective soul is the principle of a substantial difference. Accordingly, the substantial difference is not derived from the intellective power but rather from the intellective soul. Why then does Aquinas hold here that the substantial difference is derived from the intellect? My interpretation gains credibility from Aquinas's discussion of the relation between the soul and its powers.

formam. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectivum principium sit propria hominis forma." Cf. SCG 2.60.1371; 2.73.1502.

70 DUI 3.80.

71 According to Wéber, Aquinas’s argument for the nature of the human species shows that the intellect in question is the substantial form of the human being. See *La controverse de 1270 à l'Université de Paris et son retentissement sur la pensée de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, 138.

72 QDA 12 ad 8: "[S]ensibile et rationale, secundum quod sunt differentie essentiales, non sumuntur a sensu et intellectu, set ab anima sensitiua et intellectiuia."
Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents, nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences.\textsuperscript{73}

According to Aquinas, we do not have any direct knowledge of the substantial forms or essential principles of things.\textsuperscript{74} Nevertheless, they can be known to us, but only through accidents. This explanation offers conclusive reasons for Aquinas’s claim that the substantial difference is derived from the intellect. On this view, Aquinas points out that the proper operation of a human being, which distinguishes humans from all the other animals, is understanding. It leads him to conclude that since the principle of a thing’s proper operation is its form, the intellect must be the form of human beings.

4. Why is the Intellect the Form of the Body?

We have already noted that the difficulty raised by Aquinas’s identity thesis is considerably diminished once we follow Bazán’s claim that the thesis is just a result of the adoption of the Averroistic terminology. Nevertheless, his

\textsuperscript{73} ST 1.77.1 ad 7: “[R]ationale et sensibile, prout sunt differentiae, non sumuntur a potentiiis sensus et rationis; sed ab ipsa anima sensitiva et rationali. Quia tamen formae substantialis, quae secundum se sunt nobis ignotae, innotescunt per accidentia; nihil prohibet interdum accidentia loco differentiarum substantialum poni.” See also QDSC 11 ad 3; SCG 3.56; In DA 2.6.173 - 90 (2.6.308).

\textsuperscript{74} In Sent 2.3.1.6 Solut; DEE 5.379.72 - 81; ST 1.29.1 ad 3.
defense is only partly successful in that he fails to explain what Aquinas really means by IFC. To be fully successful, I believe that the intellect in question should be considered as the intellective power. In the remainder of this chapter, I will attempt to answer the second question raised at the outset: What does Aquinas mean by IFC, and what are his grounds for it?

First, it is important to note the background to Aquinas’s question of whether or not the intellect is the form of the body. This problem originates from the ambiguity of Aristotle’s own position which had been the subject of debate since antiquity and has given rise to several different interpretations. Aristotle’s general conception of the relationship between the soul and the body does not allow for the possibility of any part of the soul being separable from the body insofar as the soul is defined as the form of the body and this definition applies universally to every kind of soul.\(^75\) However, despite the claim that on this definition the soul is inseparable from the body, Aristotle allows for the possibility that if some part of the soul is not the actuality of the body, then that part might be separable from the body.\(^76\) He then says that “with regard to the intellect or the speculative faculty it is not evident; but this seems to be a different genus of soul, and [perhaps] it alone can be separated [from the body], just as that which is eternal [can be separated] from that which is destructible.”\(^77\) In the discussion of the intellect in the *De anima* 3, Aristotle seems to postulate a special status for

\(^75\) Aristotle, *De anima*, 2.1.412a20 - 2.

\(^76\) *Ibid.*, 2.1, 413a4 - 7. Cf. 1.1, 403a10.

it, exempting it from material embodiments. His remarks about the intellect are based on the dissimilarities between intellection and sensation. Since the intellect, unlike the sensitive faculties, is able to think all things, it cannot be mixed with the body or require any bodily organ for its activity. For such a material realization would hinder and distort its capacity to think. The intellect then must be separable from the body.78

Can the intellect be defined as the form of the body if the intellect has no bodily organ, and is essentially separable from the human body? The ultimate reason for the controversy between Aquinas and the Averroists lies in the very incompatibility between the Aristotelian definition of the soul and the immateriality of the intellect. In this context, Aquinas attempts to consider the question of whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form in the face of the Averroist interpretation that the intellect’s immateriality prevents it from being the form of the body.

In general, Averroes accepts Aristotle’s definition of the soul and presents it as follows: "The soul is the first perfection of a natural organic body."79 In using the term “perfection” instead of “form or actuality”, Averroes explains that “perfection” is the “end and completion” of what is perfected. To say that A perfects B is the same to say that A cannot be separated from B. Accordingly, to


79 *LC* 2.7, 138.14 -5: "... anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis organici." Cf. 2.5, 134.9 - 135.17: "... anima est substantia secundum formam ... quia substantia que est secundum formam est perfectio corporis habentis formam ... necesse est ut anima sit perfectio talis corporis, idest perfectio corporis naturalis habentis vitam in potentia, secundum quod perficitur per animam."
say that the soul is the perfection or form of the body is the same as to say that it exists in a body as in its subject and thus it is inseparable from the body. At this point, Averroes does not admit the possibility that a certain part of the soul is separable from the body, or is not the perfection of the body, since it is his contention that if a certain part of the soul is separable from the body, it cannot be a part of the soul. This line of reasoning is made clear in Averroes's discussion of Aristotle's remark that the intellect is a different kind of soul. Averroes clearly affirms that since the intellect could perform its activity without dependence on the body, it is obvious that it is not a soul.

And he [Aristotle] said: "But the intellect and the speculative power, etc." That is, it has not yet been made clear whether the intellect in act, and the power which is perfected through the intellect in act, is the soul or not, as it has been made clear about other principles, since that power does not seem to use a corporeal instrument in its activity like the other powers of the soul use. And likewise it is not clear from the above-mentioned discussion whether [the intellect] is a perfection or not. For everything in which is clear or will be clear that it is perfected in the way that a form is perfected through matter is necessarily soul.

According to Averroes, the question of whether or not the intellect is a power of the human soul depends on whether it uses a bodily organ as other powers do. If

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80 *Ibid.*, 2.22, 161.16 - 18: “Perfectio enim est finis et complementum perfecti; finis autem non separatur a finito; under necesse est ut ille partes anime sint non abstracte.”

81 *Ibid.*, 2.21, 160.9 -19 “Et dixit: *Intellectus autem et virtus speculativa*, etc. Idest, intellectus autem in actu, et virtus que perficitur per intellectum in actu, adhuc non est declaratum utrum sit anima aut non, sicut est declaratum de alis principiis, cum ista virtus non videatur ut in sua actione instrumento corporali sicut alie virtutes anime utuntur. Et ideo non fuit manifestum ex predicto semone utrum sit perfectio aut non. Omne enim in quo manifestatur aut manifestabitur quod perficitur secundum quod forme perficiuntur per materias necessario est anima.”
the intellect does not have any bodily organ, then it cannot be a part or power of the human soul. If the intellect is not a power of the soul, it necessarily leads to the conclusion that the definition of the soul as the form of the body cannot be applied to the intellect. Consequently, the intellect cannot be literally and strictly the form of the body. Rather, it is a single substance totally separate from the body and thus entirely separate from the individual human being on Averroes's view.

In the first chapter of the *De unitate intellectus*, Aquinas attempts to give a detailed account of the question of whether or not Aristotle intended to exclude the intellect from the soul. On the basis of an analysis of *De anima* 2.1 - 2, Aquinas argues that the definition of the soul in these chapters is intended to apply to all souls, and that there is no question in Aristotle's text of the exclusion of the intellect from the soul. In doing so, Aquinas denies the Averroist interpretation that the intellect is not a part of the soul, and thus the definition of the soul as the form of the body does not apply univocally to the intellect:

And he [Aristotle] says this is not yet clear, yet he shows what is apparent on this point at first glance when he adds: “But it seems to be another genus of soul.” This should not be understood as the Commentator and his followers wrongly teach, that this was said for this reason that the intellect is used equivocally of soul, or that the above-mentioned definition cannot be applied to it.  

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82 DUI 1.8: “Et quamvis dicat hoc adhuc non esse manifestum, tamen quid circa hoc prima fronte appareat manifestat subdens: «Sed videtur genus alterum animae esse». Quod non est intelligendum, sicut Commentator et sectatores eius perverse exponunt, ideo dictum esse quia intellectus aequivoce dicatur anima, vel quod praedicta definitio sibi aptari non possit.” SCG 2.61. Cf. DUI 1.5.
It is therefore Aquinas's contention that the intellect is included under the
definition of the soul. What is his argument for showing that this contention can
be justified? First of all, it is important to note Aquinas's interpretation that
Aristotle offers two approaches to defining soul: the first one identifying the soul
as the form or actuality of the body; the second one designating soul as the
source of vital activities in living things or "that by which we first live, move,
sense, and understand." In accordance with the definition of the soul as the
form of the body, Aristotle identifies different faculties of soul according to the
different activities which can be distinguished in living beings: nutrition,
perception, locomotion, and intellection. Insofar as such activities in living things
naturally imply life (vita), Aquinas presents Aristotle's second definition of the
soul as "the first principle of life." Thus, the soul is the first principle, the ultimate
principle of all of a living thing's vital activities. On this view, Aquinas explains
that Aristotle attempts to solve the difficulty raised by the first definition as "form
of a natural body that potentially has life" by introducing the new definition of the
soul as "that by which we first live, move, sense and understand." An obvious
consequence of the first definition is that although the soul itself is not separable
from the body, some parts of the soul might be separable from the body. On

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83 DUI 1.5: "Adhuc autem manifestius apparat ex sequentibus quod sub hac
generalitate definitionis etiam intellectus includitur. . . ."

84 On this subject, see James Doig, "Toward Understanding Aquinas' Com. in De
Anima: A Comparative Study of Aquinas and Averroes on the Definition of the Soul (De

85 Cf. ST 1.75.1.
Aquinas's view, the first definition is so incomplete that it can only be completed by a detailed study of each part or power of the soul which is connected with his analysis of the second definition of the soul. He writes:

He [Aristotle] begins demonstrating the definition of the soul given above, in the way mentioned, namely, through effects. And he uses this argument. That which is the first principle of life is the actuality and form of living bodies; but the soul is the first principle of life for things that are alive; therefore it is the actuality and form of a living body. Clearly, this is a posterior demonstration. It is because the soul is the form of a living body that it is the principle of the activities of life, and not vice versa.86

Here, Aquinas uses the second definition of the soul as the effect which is needed to demonstrate the existence of a cause (the soul as the form of the body) in a demonstratio quia on the assumption that all vital activities are to be used as a means of understanding their source, the soul. Since all vital activities in the living thing are the effects of the soul, they lead us to understand their cause, the soul.

On this view, Aquinas believes that if one proves that intellection belongs to the individual human being, then intellection must be an effect of the human soul as the form of the body. As is well known, he takes it as a datum of experience that intellection belongs to one of vital activities in the individual

86 In DA 2.3.106 - 16 (2.3.253): "[l]incipit demonstrare diffinitionem anime superius positam modo predicto, sclipicet per effectum. Et utitur tali demonstratione: illud quod est primum principium uiuendi est uiuentium corporum actus et forma; set anima est primum principium uiuendi hiis que uiuunt; ergo est corporis uiuentis actus et forma; manifestum est autem quod hec demonstratio est ex posteriori: ex eo enim quod anima est forma corporis uiuentis, est principium operum uiute, et non e conyerso." Cf. DVI 3.61.
human being by appealing to the principle, *hic homo intelligit*. If that is the case, the intellect, the immediate principle of intellection, should be a part or power of the human soul which is the ultimate source of all vital activities in the human being. If the intellect is a power of the human soul, then it would not be excluded from the definition of the soul and then can be defined as the form of the body.

This line of reasoning is summarized in the first chapter of the *De unitate intellectus*.

(1) With this point secured, that the soul is specified by the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, and motive [powers], he [Aristotle] wishes to show next that as regards all those parts, the soul is united to the body not as a sailor to a ship, but as a form. And thus, what the common meaning of soul is, which has been treated above in a general way, will have been established.

(2) Now he proves this through the operations of the soul as follows: it is certainly clear that that by which something first operates is the form of the thing operating. . . .

(3) From this he develops his arguments as follows: "The soul is the first principle by which we live (this he says because of the vegetative power), by which we sense (because of the sensitive power), by which we are moved (because of the motive power), and by which we understand (because of the intellective power); and he concludes: "Wherefore the soul will undoubtedly be a certain definable form and species, but not as matter and as subject." Clearly therefore, that which he had said above, that the soul is the act of a physical body, he here concludes not only of the vegetative, sensitive and motive [powers], but also of the intellective [power].

(4) Therefore what Aristotle meant was that that by which we understand is the form of a physical body.  

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87 Dei 1.10 - 11: "Hoc ergo habito quod anima determinatur vegetativo, sensitivo, intellectivo et motu, vult ostendere consequenter quod quantum ad omnes istas partes, anima unitur corpori non sicut nauta navi, sed sicut forma. Et sic certificatum erit quid sit anima in communi, quod supra figuraliter tantum dictum est. Hoc autem probat per operationes anime sic: manifestum est enim quod illud quo primo aliquid operatur est forma operantis. . . . Ex hoc procedit sic: «Anima est primum quo vivimus (quod dicit propter vegetativum), quo sentimus (propter sensitivum), et movemur (propter motivum), et intelligimus (propter intellectivum»; et concludit: «Quare ratio quaedam utique erit et
(1) clearly shows Aquinas's intention to prove that the intellect is under the general definition of the soul and thus with regards to all powers of the soul including the intellect, the soul must be the form of the body. Then, in (2) he assumes that IFC can be demonstrated through an analysis of vital operations based on the definition that the soul is the first principle of life. (3) represents Aquinas's conviction that "the soul is the form of the body" is demonstrated from "the soul is the first principle of life." Insofar as the human soul is the first principle, the ultimate intrinsic source of all vital operations in the individual, and intellection belongs to the individual, then the intellective power must be the form of the body. Aquinas therefore concludes in (4) that the intellect is the form of the body. Accordingly, the intellect in question cannot be the intellective soul in IFC. Rather, it must be read as the intellective power since IFC is intended to deny the Averroist interpretation that the intellective power cannot be the form of the body.

Instead of IFC, Aquinas sometimes uses expressions such as "the intellect must be united to us formally," "the intellect formally inheres in man," or "the intellect is the form of man." In these expressions, the reference to the individual is made in place of the body in IFC. What is the relationship between

species, sed non ut materia et ut subjectum». Manifeste ergo quod supra dixerat, animam esse actum corporis physici, hic concludit non solum de sнесенio, vegetativo et motivo, sed etiam de intellectivo. Fuit ergo sententia Aristotelis quod id quo intelligimus sit forma corporis physici."
the expressions "the intellect is the form of the body" and "the intellect is the form of the individual?" What are Aquinas's grounds for the latter claim?

Before answering these questions, it is worth comparing the two definitions of the soul given by Aquinas. The first definition makes reference to a body or organ. However, such reference has been eliminated from the second definition which makes reference to a living thing. Thus, we should be careful to note the difference between a living thing and a body. What is meant by a body in Aristotle's first definition of the soul is not the composite composed of body and soul but only the body, a constituent of the composite. Conversely, a living thing in the second definition means the composite which has a soul as its constituent. We can infer from this that Aquinas's expression "the intellect is the form of the individual" is a consequence of his analyzing the second definition of the soul which is concerned with several vital activities in the composite. On the other hand, IFC is intended to show that the intellect falls under the first definition of the soul.

If intellection belongs to the individual human being, then the principle of intellection, the intellect, must be the form of the individual human being, since no operation belongs to any given thing except through some form which exists in the thing itself. On this view, Aquinas uses the expression "the intellect is the form of the individual" as a premise in his arguments which have IFC as their conclusion:

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88 Cf. In DA 2.1.223 - 35 (2.1.222).
It seems to be clear that some substance [the intellect] must be the form of the human body. For it is evident that understanding belongs to this individual human being as Socrates or Plato. Now no operation belongs to any given thing except through some form which exists in the thing itself, either a substantial or an accidental form. . . . Therefore, the principle of this operation which is understanding must be formally in this human being. . . . It is necessary to say, therefore, . . . that some kind of substance is the form of the human body.”

Here Aquinas derives IFC from “the intellect is the form of the individual” on the assumption that the difficulty raised from the first definition of the soul is resolved through analyzing the second definition of the soul: The intellect is the form of the human body if it is the form of the individual. That is to say, if the principle of intellection falls under the second definition of the soul, then it must be under the first definition of the soul.

In addition to its role as a premise, the expression “the intellect is the form of the individual” plays an important role as an independent conclusion in Aquinas’s counter-arguments against the Averroist view of the intellect, which he takes to be that the intellect is not a part of the individual’s metaphysical constitution. In *Summa contra gentiles* 2, 59, where he attempts to show against

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the Averroists that the human possible intellect is not a separate substance,

Aquinas argues:

[That by which a thing operates must be its form. For nothing acts except so far as it is in act; and nothing is in act except by its form. And that is why Aristotle proves that the soul is a form, from the fact that an animal lives and senses through its soul. Now, man understands, and this by his intellect alone: and therefore Aristotle, when inquiring into the principle by which we understand, explains to us the nature of the possible intellect. Consequently, the possible intellect must be united to us formally. . . .]

What does then Aquinas mean by the intellect in the expression, “the intellect is the form of the individual?” Both Bazán and Wéber believe that the intellect in this expression as well as in IFC must be read as the intellective soul which possesses all the powers including the intellective power, and thus is the substantial form of the body. However, the following passage is sufficient to show that their interpretation is incorrect.

[No thing operates except by virtue of a power formally in it. Hence, Aristotle in De anima II shows that the thing whereby we live and sense is a form and an act. Now, both actions - of the agent intellect and of the possible intellect as well - are proper to man, since man abstracts from phantasms, and receives in his mind things actually intelligible. For, indeed, we should not have become aware of these actions had we not experienced them in ourselves. It follows that the principles to which we ascribe these actions, namely, the possible and

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90 SCG 2.59.1364: “Id quo aliquid operatur, oportet esse formam eius: nihil enim agit secundum quod est actu; actu autem non est aliquid nisi per id quod est forma eius; unde et ARISTOTELES probat animam esse formam, per hoc quod animal per animam vivit et sentit. Homo autem intelligent, et non nisi per intellectum: unde et ARISTOTELES, inquirens de principio quo intelligimus, tradit nobis naturam intellectus possibilis. Oportet igitur intellectum possibilem formaliter uniri nobis. . . ."
agent intellects, must be powers formally existing in us. [Italics mine.]\(^91\)

The structure of this passage is similar to that of the passage in *Summa contra gentiles* 2. 59. However, Aquinas clearly says that the two intellects in question are powers existing in the individual.

The claim that the intellect in question refers to the intellective power offers evidence for distrusting an exposition that has Aquinas holding that it must be the intellective soul as substantial form. In comparing and contrasting the substantial form and accidental form, Aquinas argues that whatever is formally united to another thing is united to it either in the manner of a substantial form or in the manner of an accidental form.\(^92\) This means that there are two possible ways in which any operation belongs to any given thing through its form. One is a union by means of a substantial form, and the other is a union by means of an accidental form. Hence, there might be two ways in which an operation such as understanding belongs to the human being through a form: a union by means of a substantial form, or a union by means of an accidental form. The substantial

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\(^92\) QDSC 2c: “Nulla autem operatio convenit alicui nisi per aliquam formam in ipso existentem, vel substantialem vel accidentalem; quia nihil agit aut operatur nisi secundum quot est actu. Est autem unumquodque actu per formam aliquam vel substantialem vel accidentaalem, cum forma sit actu.”
form is united to matter, while the accidental form is united to its subject. It is impossible for the intellect to be a substantial form because of Aquinas's insistence that the essence of a human being must be distinct from her powers. Therefore, the remaining alternative is the accidental union which happens when the accidental form is united to its subject. What is the subject of the intellective power? In discussing whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject, Aquinas explains that the intellectual power has the soul as its subject since the intellectual operation is performed without a bodily organ. Other powers and operations, however, do have their subject in the soul rather in the composite of body and soul. At this point, it is evident that the intellect is united to its subject, the soul, as its accidental form. A further clarification might be made if we note how Aquinas's notion of property (proprium) is applied to the powers of the soul. Noting that a subject is related in diverse manners to different kinds of accidents, Aquinas describes the powers of the soul as properties in order to show that despite their accidental characters, they are related in a determinate way to the essence of the soul. Here what Aquinas means by calling them "properties" is that the powers of the soul are a peculiar and special kind of accident which necessarily inhere in their subject. The outlines of this analysis can be seen in the following passage in his discussion of

\[93\] ST 1.77.5c.

\[94\] Ibid., 1.77.1 ad 5; 1.77.6c; QDSC 11; QDA 12. In chapter 2, I will provide a detailed explanation of it.
the possible and the agent intellect as residing in the essence of the soul in the

Compendium theologiae.

If they [the possible and the agent intellect] are united to man in the manner of an accidental form, neither of them, evidently, can be an accident of the body. Besides, the fact that their operations are performed without a bodily organ. . . . shows that each of them is an accident of the soul. But there is only one soul in one man. Therefore the agent intellect and the possible intellect must inhere in the one essence of the soul.\(^9\)

Aquinas’s point is that the intellective powers inhere in the soul because intellection does not involve the body. It leads him to conclude that the intellective powers are united to the individual as accidental forms. I believe, therefore, that the intellect in IFC or in the phrase “the intellect is the form of the individual” cannot be the intellective soul and thus cannot be the substantial form of the body. Yet his reasoning here seems to be inconclusive. Aquinas explains that while the substantial form is united to matter, the accidental form is united to a subject. Accordingly, the intellect as the accidental form is united to its subject, the human soul. Why then does Aquinas argue that the intellect is united to the individual as well as to the soul? This question will be examined in chapter 2.

In this chapter I began by setting out an inconsistency in Aquinas’s two claims, IFC and AFC. I have suggested that this inconsistency is considerably

\(^9\) CT 1.87.111a11 - 9: “Si uero uniantur homini per modum forme accidentalis, manifestum est quod neutrum eorum potest esse accidens corporis, ex hoc quod operationes eorum sunt absque organo corporali . . . sequitur quod uterque eorum sit accidens anime. Non est autem in uno homine nisi anima una; oportet igitur quod intellectus agens et possibilis in una essentia anime conueniant.”
diminished once we follow Bazán's exposition that the inconsistency is just a result of adopting the Averroistic terminology. In my opinion, Bazán's main idea is essentially correct. I doubt, however, whether it is sufficient to explain correctly what Aquinas means by IFC and what his grounds are for it. To be fully successful, I believe that the intellect in question should be considered as an intellective power since IFC is intended to show that the text of Aristotle does not permit the Averroist interpretation that the intellective power cannot be the form of the body. If my reasoning is correct, the difficulty raised by IFC still remains. How does Aquinas reconcile IFC with his insistence that the intellect is not the actuality of the body? Averroes's main reason for denying IFC is that the intellect is separable from the body. If that is the case, does Aquinas's IFC entail the intellect's inseparability from the body?
Chapter Two: Aquinas on the Ontological Status of the Intellect

In the preceding chapter, I attempted to clarify some obscure aspects of Aquinas's account of the intellect-body relationship which are related to his use of the phrase, "the intellect is the form of the body" (IFC). In doing so, I argued that the intellect in IFC must be read as the intellective power since IFC is intended to show that the text of Aristotle does not permit the Averroist interpretation that the intellective power cannot be the form of the body. If my reasoning is correct, IFC is nothing other than the claim that the general definition of the soul as the form of the body can be applied to the intellective power.

This chapter is intended to assess Aquinas's argument for IFC. Can IFC be a correct solution to the tension between the definition of the soul as the form of the body and the intellect's immateriality within Aristotle's account of the soul? Can it be an adequate alternative to the Averroist interpretation that the intellect cannot be the form of the body? To answer these questions, it is necessary to note the reason why the Averroists deny the possibility that the intellect might be the form of the body. The reason for their denial is that the intellect is separable from the body. It cannot be denied that the soul is inseparable from the body insofar as it is defined as the form of the body. However, Aristotle leaves it open that if some part of the soul is not the actuality of the body, then that part might be separable from the body. In this context, the Averroists argue that if the intellect is not the actuality of the body, and is essentially separable from the
body, then it cannot be the form of the body. Therefore, Aquinas must argue that the intellect is inseparable from the body in order to show that IFC is an adequate alternative to the Averroist interpretation.

Before assessing Aquinas’s argument for IFC, it is necessary to clarify two problems associated with it. The first one is that IFC is closely related to Aquinas’s claim that the intellect is a power of the human soul and thus necessarily inheres in its subject, the human soul. As I explained in chapter 1, the intellect as a power of the soul should be considered as an accident on the basis of Aquinas’s theory of the distinction between the soul and its powers. However, if we note that accidents are defined by Aquinas as what can be present or absent without the corruption of their subject\(^1\), one might doubt how the intellective power can necessarily inhere in the human soul. Thus, I will examine how Aquinas shows that despite their accidental character, the powers of the soul are related in a determinate way to the essence of the soul.

The second problem to be clarified is Aquinas’s phrase “the intellect is the form of the individual or is united to the individual as its form.” As I argued in the preceding chapter, besides playing the role of a premise in most of the arguments which have IFC as their conclusion, this phrase is sometimes used for an independent conclusion in Aquinas’s counter-argument against the Averroist view, which he takes to be that the intellect is an independently existing substance that is separated in its existence from the human body and thus from the individual. However, this phrase seems to be inconsistent with Aquinas’s

\(^1\) SCG 2.81.1623.
claim that understanding is the proper activity of the human soul alone and thus the subject of the intellect is not the composite but the human soul, since this claim would lead to the conclusion that the intellect cannot be united to the composite. Therefore, we should examine the reason why Aquinas argues that the intellect is united to the individual as its form.

Finally and most importantly, I will argue that IFC poses some difficulties for Aquinas's theory in two respects. First, I will show that to uphold IFC would be tantamount to a claim that Aquinas cannot accept: the intellect necessarily exists in the body. IFC is not a correct solution to Aristotle's problem insofar as Aquinas fails to show that the intellect is inseparable from the body. Second, I will maintain that this failure commits Aquinas to some form of dualism, which I call "an intellect-body dualism" since he does postulate the existence of the intellect independently of the body within an individual human being.

1. The Notion of the Intellect as Property

Can it be said that if the intellect is a part or power of the soul, then it is necessarily inseparable from the soul? As I argued in chapter 1, the intellect as a power of the soul should be considered as an accidental form or accident on the basis of Aquinas's theory of the distinction between the soul and its powers. For the soul is only one substantial form\(^2\) and therefore the intellective power distinct

\(^2\) ST 1.76.4; QDSC 3; QDA 9.
from the soul must be an accidental form of it. This claim might be an embarrassment to those who fear that the intellect is being considered as an accident. In general, accidents cannot be said to exist through themselves, but only as attributes of something else: a size is always the size of something, and a color can only exist as an attribute of a body, etc. Aquinas himself defines accidents as that which can be present or absent without entailing the corruption of their subject. It means that they can change while the subject to which they belong remains. If that is the case, it seems to be hard to apply this characteristic of accidents to the intellect which must be inseparable from its subject, the soul.

To understand how Aquinas’s notion of accidents can be applied to the intellect, we must come to grips with how he defines the accident or accidental form in contrast to the substance or substantial form. To begin with, he contrasts substance with accident with respect to their respective modes of existence. A substance, he says, is a thing to whose quiddity it belongs not to exist in something else. In contrast, he considers the accident to be a thing to which it belongs to exist in something else, i.e., in a substance. A similar account is also found in his distinction between substantial forms and accidental forms.

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3 *Ibid.*, 1.77.1 ad 3: “Unde sic se habet forma accidentalis activa ad formam substantialem agentis, ut calor ad formam ignis, sicut se habet potentia animae ad animam.” See also ST 1.77.6c.

4 In Sent 4.12.1.1.1 ad 2: “... per se existere non est definitio substantiae... Sed definitio vel quasi definitio substantiae est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse vel debitur non in alio.” Cf. SCG 1.25; QQ 9.5.

5 *Ibid*: “Et similiiter esse in subjecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debitur esse in alio.” Cf. ST 1.3.5 ad 1; In DA 2.1.59 - 83 (2.1.213); QQ 9.5 ad 2.
Substantial forms make a thing to be absolutely, he says, whereas accidental forms make a thing to be such:

The substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that accidental form does not make a thing to be absolutely, but to be such, as heat does not make a thing to be absolutely, but only to be hot. . . . But the substantial form gives being absolutely. . . .

The substantial form is that which makes a thing to be what it is, and without which that thing could not exist. Accidents are forms that a thing could do without, and they may come and go while the substance remains. This line of reasoning immediately leads us to raise the question: if the powers of the soul are in the category of accident, can they come and go? To put it more precisely, can the intellect be separate from the soul without the corruption of the soul? An affirmative answer would contradict Aquinas's IFC, which assumes that the intellect is inseparable from its subject, the soul. Furthermore, it would be incompatible with his insistence that the intellect must remain in the soul even after the destruction of the body.  

Aquinas attempts to defend the intellect's inseparability from the soul through his observation that a subject is related in diverse fashions to different

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6 ST 1.76.4c: "[F]orma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentalis differt, quia forma accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale; sicut calor facit suum subjectum non simpliciter esse, sed esse calidum. . . . Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter. . . ." Cf. ST 1.77.6c.

7 Ibid., 1.77.8c: "Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad subjectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. Et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneat in anima, corpore destructo."
kinds of accidents.⁸ It is clear that an accident is neither the essence of a thing, nor a part of the essence, but something over and above the essence itself.⁹ From this he infers that whatever is present in a thing apart from its essence must be caused either by that thing’s essential constituent principles or by some external agent.¹⁰ In order to remove the possibility that the powers of the soul are in the category of the accidents which are caused by an external agent and which thus might not be present in their subject, Aquinas puts them in the division of accidents which have their original cause in their subject. He observes that there are three genera of accidents in this division. First, there are proper accidents which are caused by the principles of the species. In illustration he cites man’s capacity to laugh. Wherever human beings are found, this capacity or accidental property must be also present.

Other accidents are caused by principles of the individual, and these are of two kinds. First, there are inseparable accidents which have a permanent cause in their subject. This is true of “masculine,” “feminine” and other accidents of this kind. Accidents of this kind, while not present in every member of that

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⁸ A clear summary of Aquinas’s position on this relation as it appears in several works spanning the entire course of his career is given by John Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on Substance as a Cause of Proper Accidents,” in Jan P. Beckmann et al., eds., Philosophie im Mittelalter: Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 201 - 12.

⁹ QDSC 11c; QDV 21.1 ad 10.

¹⁰ ST 1.3.4c: "Primo quidem, quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius, oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia propria consequentia speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem et causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo exeriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod esse illius rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exeriori, vel a principiis essentialibus eiusdem."
same species, must be realized wherever the given individual is realized.\(^{11}\)

Second, there are separable accidents which do not have a permanent cause in
their subject. Aquinas notes by the example of "sitting" or "walking" that these
separable accidents may or may not be present in their subject.\(^{12}\)

Aquinas emphasizes by his distinction among the three categories of
accidents that the proper accidents as well as the inseparable accidents are
*necessarily* and *always* inseparable from their subject, while the separable
accidents may happen not to be in the subject.\(^{13}\) A woman is not always sitting.
She is not necessarily walking. Separable accidents of this kind come and go
because their subject can continue to exist without them, at least for a time. On
the other hand, she cannot be a human without necessarily and always having
the ability to laugh. She cannot be an individual without being female.

\(^{11}\) QDA 12 ad 7.

\(^{12}\) It is important to note that this three-fold division is not exhaustive since it does not
contain the accidents that are caused by an extrinsic agent. For Aquinas's discussion of
the extrinsically caused accidents, see In Sent 2.1.2.4 ad 2.

\(^{13}\) In PA 1.14: "Si enim aliquod accidens ex necessitate et semper insit subiecto, oportet
quod causam habeat in subiecto, qua posita, non possit accidens non esse. Quod
quidem contingit dupliciter: uno modo quando ex principiis speciei accidens causatur, et
tale accidens dicitur per se passio vel proprium; alio modo quando accidens causatur ex
principiis individui, et hoc est accidens inseparabile. Omne autem accidens quod
causatur ex principiis subjecti, si debeat diffiniri, oportet quod subiectum ponatur in sua
diffinitione: nam unumquodque diffinitur ex propriis principiis; et si oportet omne
accidens quod ex necessitate inest subiecto, esse accidents per se." Cf. QDP 5.4 ad 3:
"... per se enim accidentia ex necessitate suis substantiis insunt; unde et nihil prohibet
ea in perpetuum inesse. Sed accidentia quae per accidens insunt subjectis, nullo modo
in perpetuum durant secundum naturam."
After distinguishing three kinds of accidents, Aquinas explains that there is a necessary connection between the essence of the species and the proper accidents:

Now it is a common feature of all accidents that they do not belong to the essence of a thing and consequently are not included in a thing's definition. Hence we understand what a thing is without understanding any of its accidents. But a species cannot be understood as existing without those accidents which result from a principle of the species; however, a species can be understood apart from the accidents that belong to the individual, even inseparable accidents. But not only the species but even the individual can be understood apart from the separable accidents.  

Then he concludes that the powers of the soul are the proper accidents. Hence, what the soul is can be understood without its powers; but the soul cannot exist without these accidents. Aquinas supports this point by appealing to his notion of two operations of the intellect: in the first operation of the intellect, namely, simple apprehension, the essence of the soul can be understood without understanding its powers. However, this is not the case with the second operation of the intellect, namely, judgment, because the soul cannot exist without the proper accidents, namely, its powers.  

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14 QDA 12 ad 7: "Est autem commune omni accidenti quod non sit de essentia rei; et ita non cadit in diffinitione rei. Vnde de re intelligimus quid est absque hoc quod intelligamus aliiquid accidentium eius. Set species non potest intelligi esse sine accidentibus que consequuntur principium speciei; potest tamen intelligi esse sine accidentibus individuii, etiam potest non solum species, et etiam individuum, etiam inseparabilibus. Sine separabilibus uero esse potest non solum species, set etiam individuum." See also QDSC 11 ad 7. Cf. QDSC 3 ad 14.

15 QDSC 11 ad 7: "... dicendum quod duplex est operatio intellectus. ... Una qua intelligit quod quid est, et tali operatione intellectus potest intelligi essentia rei et sine
When dealing with proper accidents, those which must be found wherever a given kind of being or substantial essence is realized, Aquinas often speaks of these as flowing from the essence of their subject.\textsuperscript{16} For this reason, the powers of the soul are natural or essential properties although they are not the essential parts of the soul.\textsuperscript{17} This leads him to defend his own position that the powers of the soul, as accidents, are not separate from the soul insofar they are proper accidents.

There may still exist some doubt about whether Aquinas's notion of the proper accident applied to the powers of the soul is compatible with the dichotomy between substance and accident. On the one hand, whatever does not belong to the substance is an accident. Thus, if the powers of the soul are something else besides the essence of the soul, it is evident that they are its accidents. On the other hand, it seems that they are something intermediate between a substance and an accident insofar as the powers of the soul, while they are not essential parts, are caused by the essential principles of the species.\textsuperscript{18} Following Aristotle, Aquinas replies to this objection by distinguishing

\begin{quote}
proprio et sine accidente, cum neutrum eorum ingredintur. \ldots Alia est operatio intellectus componentis et dividentis. \ldots Hac vero operatione intellectus non potest intelligi substantia sine proprio. \ldots Sic igitur potest intelligi prima operatione intellectus essentia animae, ut scilicet intelligatur quod quid est absque potentiiis; non autem secunda operatione, ita scilicet quod intelligatur non habere potentias. Cf. QDA 12 ad 7: \\
\ldots unde intelligitur sine eis quid est anima; non autem sine eis esse est possibile neque intelligibile."
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. ST 1.77.6c.

\textsuperscript{17} QDSC 11 ad 5. Cf. QDSC 11c; QDA 19 ad 5; ST 1.77.1 ad 5.

\textsuperscript{18} QDSC 11 obj. 3 and 4.
between predicable and predicamental accidents. Here, it is important to note
the two aspects of the Aristotelian notion of accident. Aristotle explains that "a
property is something which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet
belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is a
property of man to be capable of learning grammar." But the ability to learn
grammar, like any other ability to do something, is a predicamental accident
belonging to the second division of the Aristotelian category of quality.
Nevertheless, property is distinct from accident in the Topics. This contrast offers
a clue to Aquinas's solution that something such as the powers of the soul could
be a predicamental accident and at the same time a predicable property.

On the basis of this account, Aquinas replies to the objection that the
powers of the soul, insofar as they are properties, cannot be accidents: it is true
in one sense, but false in another because the term "accident" has two
meanings. First, an accident is that which is other than substance, and in this
sense it comprises the nine categories of things. When accident is understood
in this way, there is no intermediate between substance and accident since they
divide all being contradictorily. They must necessarily be categorical accidents
which are really distinct from the substance. Second, there is the accident which
is one of the four predicables of Aristotle or the five predicables of Porphyry.
Aquinas says that the term "accident" in this sense does not signify the

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19 Aristotle, Topics, 1.5, 102a18-20.

20 QDSC 11c.

21 Porphyry, Isagoge, IV.
categories, "but the accidental relationship of a predicate to a subject, or the
relationship of a universal to those things which are included under the
universal." Taking accident in this sense, there is something intermediate
between substance and accident, that is, between a substantial and an
accidental predicate, and this is a property.

A property is like a substantial predicate, inasmuch as it is
casted by the essential principles of a species; and
consequently a property is demonstrated as belonging to a
subject through a definition that signifies the essence. But it is
like an accidental predicate in this sense, that it is neither the
essence of a thing, nor a part of the essence, but something
outside of the essence itself. Whereas it differs from an
accidental predicate because an accidental predicate is not
casted by the essential principles of a species, but it accrues
to an individual thing as a property accrues to a species, yet
sometimes separably, and sometimes inseparably.23

Accordingly, the powers of the soul must be accidents in the first sense insofar
as they are predicamental accidents in the second species of quality. However,
they are not accidents in the second sense because they do not have an
accidental relationship to the subject. Rather, they are a sort of intermediate
between the essence of the soul and accident in the second sense insofar as
they have a necessary relationship to the soul. According to Aquinas, properties

22 QDSC 11c: "... sed habitudinem accidentalem praedicati ad subiectum, vel
communis ad ea quae sub communi continentur."

23 Ibid: "Quod quidem convenit cum substantiali praedicato, in quantum causatur ex
principiis essentialibus speciei; et ideo per definitionem significantem essentiam
demonstratur proprietas de subiecto. Cum accidentalis vero praedicato convenit in hoc
quod nec est essentia rei, nec pars essentiae, sed aliquid praeter ipsam. Differt autem
ab accidentalis praedicato, quia accidentalis praedicatum non causatur ex principiis
essentialibus speciei, sed accidit individuo sicut proprium speciei; quandoque tamen
separabiliter, quandoque inseparabiliter."
are similar to substantial predicates in that they are caused by substantial predicates; they agree with accidental predicates insofar as they are not of the essence of the thing. Here, his account is a little bit complex. He states that a property, like a substantial predicate, is caused by the essential principle of the subject. This point seems to contain some difficulty. Is the property caused by this principle in the same way in which a substantial predicate is? At least it is clear that the property is not the same as the substantial predicate since it is neither the essence nor a part of the essence. That is to say, like any other categorical accident, it does not enter into the quiddity expressed by the definition. In general, he observes that there are two ways in which the predicate may be attributed to a subject: through substantial predication or through accidental predication. If one may suppose that this two-fold division is exhaustive, it would be hard to understand his claim that a property is an intermediate between the substantial predicate and the accidental predicate. Is the property one of the substantial predicates or not?

Following Aristotle, Aquinas maintains that there are two kinds of substantial predication in which a predicate may be attributed per se to a subject. The first mode of per se predication occurs when the predicate falls within the definition of the subject. In the proposition, “Man is an animal,” the predicate is said to be predicated per se of man, because the predicate pertains to the form or essence and consequently to the definition of the subject. The

\[\text{Aristotle, } \text{Metaphysics, 5, 1022a24 - 36; Posterior Analytics, 1, 734a34 - b5.}\]

second mode of per se predication occurs when the subject appears in the
definition of the predicate.

Per se is said in two ways. In one way, when the predicate of
a proposition falls within the definition of the subject, e.g.,
'man is an animal'; for animal enters into the definition of
man. And since that which falls within the definition of
anything is in some way the cause of it, in cases such as
these the predicate is said to be the cause of the subject. In
another way, on the contrary, when the subject of the
proposition falls within the definition of the predicate, as when
it is said that a nose is snub, or a number is even; for
snubness is nothing but a quality of a nose, and evenness of
a number which can be halved; and in these cases the
subject is a cause of the predicate.\textsuperscript{26}

A proper subject is included in the definition of an accident because the being of
the accident depends upon that subject. This means that the notion of a
property, that is, a necessary characteristic, cannot be understood without that of
its subject. For this reason, the second mode of per se predication is that in
which the subject is included in the definition of a predicate which is its proper
accident.

In the first mode of per se predication, the predicate is the species, genus,
or specific difference of the subject. In the second mode, it is a proper accident
or property. On this view, we can distinguish substantial predicates from

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid:} "Per se autem dicitur dupliciter. Vno enim modo dicitur propositio per se cuius
praedicatum cadit in deffinitione subiecti, sicut ista: Homo est animal, animal enim cadit
in deffinitione hominis; et quia id quod est in deffinitione alicuius est aliquo modo causa
eius, in hiis que sic per se dicuntur predicatum est causa subiecti. Alio modo dicitur
propositio per se, cuius e contrario subjectum ponitur in deffinitione predicati, sicut si
dicatur: Nasus est simus, uel: Numerus est par; simum enim nihil aliud est quam nasus
curus, et par nihil aliud est quam numerus, medietatem habens; et in istis subjectum
est causa praedicati."
properties by noting that the former are predicates in the first mode of per se predication, whereas the latter are predicates in the second mode of per se predication. Thus, what Aquinas means by saying that the property is something intermediate between the substantial predicate and accidental predicate is clear.

In sum, we have seen that Aquinas holds that although the intellect is in the category of accident, it is the peculiar kind of accident he calls a property (or proper accident). This is sufficient to show that the intellect is not separable from the soul since properties are accidents which always and necessarily inhere in their subject. Furthermore, the notion of property would not contradict the dichotomy between substance and accident if we note Aquinas's claim that the powers of the soul could be predicamental accidents and at the same time predicable properties.

2. The Relationship between the Intellect and the Individual

As I noted in the preceding section, Aquinas believes that if the intellect is a power of the human soul, then it must be inseparable from its subject, the soul. The next question before us is this: if the intellect is a power of the human soul, then does it follow that it is united to the composite of soul and body as its form? This question is concerned with assessing Aquinas's phrase "the intellect is united to the individual." To assess this phrase properly, we should first consider his account of the relation between the powers of the soul and their subject. In discussing the difference between substantial and accidental forms, Aquinas
holds that the accidental form exists for the sake of the completeness of the
subject whereas matter exists for the sake of the substantial form. He also
writes:

\[\text{Every form, whether substantial or accidental, is united to matter or to a subject. For each individual thing is one according as it is a being. Now, each individual thing is actually a being through a form, whether in the case of actual substantial being or in the case of actual accidental being. And hence every form is an act, and consequently it is the reason for the unity whereby a given thing is one.}\]

Accordingly, matter exists for the sake of the human soul in the case of a human
being. This leads Aquinas to hold that the soul as the substantial form is united
to the human body or matter. On the other hand, the intellect as the accidental
form is united to its subject. What is the subject of the intellect? Is it possible for
the intellect to be united to the individual (the composite of body and soul) as its
subject? He seems to suggest the impossibility of the intellect being united to the
individual as its subject in considering the question “Whether all the powers of
the soul are in the soul as their subject.” Following Aristotle’s view that “the
thing to which an action belongs is the thing to which the corresponding power

\[\text{27 ST 1.77.6c: "[M]ateria est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso forma accidentalis est propter complexionem subjecti." See also SCG 3.75.}\]

\[\text{28 QDSC 3c: "Omnis . . . forma sive substantialis sive accidentalis, unitur materiae vel subjecto. Unumquodque enim secundum hoc est unum, secundum quod est ens. Est autem unumquodque ens actu per formam, sive secundum esse substantiale, sive secundum esse accidentale: unde omnis forma est actus; et per consequens est ratio unitatis, qua aliquid est unum."}\]

\[\text{29 ST 1.77.5.}\]
Aquinas argues that the subject of a power is necessarily the subject of its operation. On this view, the material powers are united to the composite insofar as they require a bodily organ and thus have as their subject, not the soul, but the composite of body and soul. On the other hand, the intellect is present in the soul as its subject because understanding is performed without the use of any bodily organ. If understanding is the proper activity of the soul and cannot belong to the body, it seems that the intellect cannot be united to the composite.

That understanding cannot be an activity of the composite, but one of the human soul alone on Aquinas's account is also made clear in q. 50 of Summa contra gentiles Bk. 2, where he argues that the human soul is not a hylemorphic composite composed of matter and form but a simple form. He holds that while the activity of a hylemorphic composite belongs to only that composite, the

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30 Aristotle, De Somno, 1, 454a7 - 8.

31 ST 1.77.5c. In replying to the first objection in this same article, Aquinas holds that even these material powers are attributed to the soul as to their principle: “Dicendum quod omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, non sicut subjecti, sed sicut principii, quia per animam coniunctum habet quod per tales operationes operati possit.”

32 The soul is the subject of the intellect which is an immaterial power, but the subject of the vegetative and sensitive powers is not the soul but the composite. How can both the soul and the composite be the subject? What is the primary condition for being a subject? Aquinas realizes that there is an obvious objection to describing the soul as something subsistent. He admits that the composite of soul and body is indeed something “in its own right” but suggests that in a weak sense of the phrase a thing can be in its own right and yet be part of something else: a hand, for example, is an identifiable entity in its own right but also part of the human body. See ST 1.75.2 ad 1: “. . . hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo, pro quocumque subsistente; alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inherentiam accidentis et formae materialis; secundo modo, excludit imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo sed non secundo modo.”
activity of a simple form belongs to that form alone since “to act belongs to that which exists, and existence belongs to the composite through its form, so that the composite also acts through its form.” Thus, to say, according to Aquinas, that the activity of intellection is the activity of the composite leads to the absurd conclusion that the human soul is composed of matter and form.

Aquinas's claim that the subject of the intellect is the soul alone is based on his insistence on a fundamental distinction between understanding and sensation. All activities of sensation involve some type of accompanying physical alteration in a sense organ. Thus, sensation depends for its occurrence upon the body, not upon the soul alone. For this reason, he holds that sensation necessarily demands a subject composed of body and soul. By contrast, understanding is carried out without a bodily organ and thus is an activity of the soul alone. This leads Aquinas to hold that the very subject of the intellect is not the composite but the soul alone. This distinction is also found in his account of the classification of accidents. The psychosomatic operations such as “walking” and “seeing” are placed among the separable accidents which may or may not be present in their subject. On the other hand, the psychic operations such as understanding are placed among the proper accidents which are inseparable and necessary for the species. Moreover, he holds that human cognitive

33 SCG 2.50.1262: “. . . eius enim est agere cuius est esse; esse autem est compositi per formam agit; unde et compositum per formam agit.”

34 QDA 12 ad 7.
powers are sharply divided; the organic sense powers and the non-organic intellective power.

Now it [our soul] possesses two cognitive powers. One is the act of a corporeal organ. And it is connatural to it to cognize things insofar as they are in individual matter, hence sense cognizes only the singular. But the other cognitive power is the intellect, which is not the act of any corporeal organ. Therefore it is connatural to us through the intellect to cognize natures which have being only in individual matter; not indeed as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the consideration of the intellect. Hence it follows that through the intellect we can cognize these things in a universal way; and this is beyond the power of sense.\footnote{ST 1.12.4c: "Quae tamen habet duas virtutes cognoscitivas. Unam, quae est actus alicuius corporei organi. Et huic connaturale est cognoscere res secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, unde sensus on cognoscit nisi singularia. Alia vero virtus cognoscivita eius est intellectus, qui non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae quidem non habent esse nisi in materia individuali; non tamen secundum quod sunt in materia individualis, sed secundum quod abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem intellectus. Under secundum intellectum possumus cognoscere huiusmodi re in univerali; quod est supra facultatem sensus." See also In DA 2.12.71 - 9 (2.12.377).}

These sharply divided cognitive powers can be differentiated only by reference to their objects and operations: while the objects of understanding are universals, the objects of sensation are particulars; while a material power does not perform its activities without a bodily organ, an immaterial power can perform its activities without a bodily organ. Thus, the difference between sense and intellect is ultimately the difference between sensation and understanding. Aquinas's insistence on the difference between understanding and sensation seems to be incompatible with his claim that the intellect is united to the individual.
In fact, Aquinas anticipates this objection that since understanding is a proper activity of the human soul, the intellect cannot be united to the individual as its form. His response is as follows:

It must be said that understanding is an activity of the human soul, inasmuch as the soul transcends its relation to corporeal matter and consequently understanding does not come about through any corporeal organ. Yet it can be said that the composite, that is, a human being understands, inasmuch as the soul, which is its formal part, has this proper activity, just as the activity of any part is attributed to the whole; for the human being sees with his eye, walks with his foot, and similarly understands through his soul.\textsuperscript{36}

Aquinas does not deny that the immaterial activity of understanding must have as its \textit{immediate} subject an immaterial human soul since it cannot be directly an activity of the composite substance. Nevertheless, if understanding belongs to the human soul which is a part of the individual, then ultimately what the activity of understanding belongs to is the composite which is performing the activity since every activity of a part is also attributable to the composite. Accordingly, if walking is an activity which strictly speaking can only belong to the legs, then we

\textsuperscript{36} QDSC 2 ad 2: "[D]ecendum quod intelligere est operatio animae humanae secundum quod superexcedit proportionem materiae corporalis, et idio non fit per aliquod organum corporale. Potest tamem dici, quod ipsum coniunctum, id est homo, intelligit, in quantum anima, quae est pars eius formalis, habet hanc operationem propriam, sicut operatio cuiuslibet partis attribuitur toti; homo enim videt oculo, ambulat pede, et similiter intelligit per animam." Cf. QDV 2.6 ad 3: "[N]on enim, proprie loquendo, sensus aut intellectus cognoscunt, sed homo per utrumque"; ST 1.75.2 ad 2: "Unde et operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim quod homo videt per oculum, et palpat per manum, aliter quam calidum calefacit proprie loquendo. Potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per animam"; In DA 1.10.132 - 34 (1.10.152): "... sic fortassis melius est dicere quod anima non miseretur neque addiscit, neque intelligit, sed homo per animam. ..." A similar account is found in Aristotle, \textit{De anima} 1.4, 408b13 - 15: "Surely it would be better to say not that the soul pities or learns or thinks but that a man does so with the soul."
also have to say that for this reason when the legs of a man walk, then the whole person is walking. So, if the soul does perform the activity of understanding, and if the soul alone can do it, then, as long as the soul is a part of the whole human being, the whole human being is denominated by this activity. The above passage indicates that despite the radical difference between the intellect and the senses, Aquinas is committed to the view that intellect and sense are both powers of one and the same substance and that sensation and understanding likewise are performed by the same person. It is only concrete, hylemorphic composites that can properly be said to perform operations. They have their principles of operation, by which they perform those operations, and which are instrumental in performing those actions, but the actions are properly attributed only to the suppositum, and not to the principles of operations. So, Aquinas says: “Actions belong to suppositums and wholes, and properly speaking, not to parts and forms and powers; for we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a human being with his hand.”

In this context, we can understand what is meant by Aquinas’s phrase, “the intellect is united to the individual as its form.” This phrase is intended to refute the Averroist view of the intellect, which he takes to be that the intellect is an independently existing substance that is separate in its existence from the individual. In most of the texts in which the phrase is used, Aquinas tends to appeals to the most basic of psychological facts, *hic homo intelligit*, to support

37 ST 2-2.58.2c: “Actiones autem sunt suppositorum et totorum, non autem, proprie loquendo, partium et formarum, seu potentialarum; non enim proprie dicitur quod manus percutiat, sed homo per manum.”
the contention that the activity of understanding belongs to the individual human knower composed of body and soul: understanding belongs to this individual human being; but no operation belongs to any given thing except through some form which exists in the thing itself; hence the principle of understanding must be united to the individual as a form. According to Aquinas, the Averroist account fails to explain the fact that the individual human being understands since the individual human being possesses, as part of her metaphysical constitutions, her own formal principle of intellection. Thus, he says:

Now if the possible intellect were a separate substance, it would be impossible that a human being should understand by means of it. For if a substance performs a given operation, it is not possible for that operation to belong to any other substance than the one performing it.

Aquinas’s point is that if the intellective power itself is outside the individual, then the individual human being cannot be the very subject of the activity of intellection. Nevertheless, he does not deny that understanding is the proper activity of the human soul and thus the intellect is a power of the human soul, since he believes that if the intellect is a part of the individual soul, which is the

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38 QDSC 2c: “Manifestum est enim quod huic homini singulari, ut Socrati vel Platoni, convent intelligere. Nulla autem operatio convenit alicui nisi per aliquam formam in ipso existentem . . . quia nihil agit aut operatur nisi secundum quod est actu. Est autem unumquodque actu per formam aliquam . . . cum forma sit actu. . . . Oportet igitur principium huius operationis quod est intelligere, formaliter inesse huic homini.” See also In DA 3.1.282 - 305; QDA 2c.

39 QDA 2.221 - 24: “Si autem intellectus possibilis esset substantia separata, impossible esset quod eo intelligeret homo. Non enim est possibile quod si aliqua substantia operatur aliquam operationem uel actionem, quod illa operatio sit alterius substantie ab ea diuere.”
form of that individual human being, then it is the form of the individual or united to the individual.\textsuperscript{40}

3. An Intellect-Body Dualism

As I argued in the preceding chapter, Aquinas's phrase (1) "the intellect is the form of the \textit{individual}" is sometimes used as a premise in his arguments which have the phrase (2) "the intellect is the form of the \textit{body} (IFC)" as their conclusion: "It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that it is in some way united to the body of Socrates."\textsuperscript{41} Insofar as IFC is an answer to the question of whether or not the intellect is separable from the body, one can easily paraphrase the two phrases as follows: "the intellect is not separate from the \textit{individual}" and "the intellect is not separate from the \textit{body}.” At this point, it is worth noting that the two phrases cannot be used interchangeably if we assume that the intellect, while being separate from the body, could exist in the soul alone even though it is not separate from the individual. Thus, we must raise the question of whether his inference from (1) to (2) is valid.

Aquinas clearly describes IFC as his own solution to the problem caused by the ambiguity of Aristotle's position on the intellect: whether the definition of

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid.}, 2.324 - 27: “... et tamen eo intelligit homo formaliter in quantum fundatur in essentia anime humane, que est hominis forma.”

\textsuperscript{41} ST 1.76.1c: “Relinquitur ergo quod intellectus quo Socrates intelligit, est aliqua pars Socratis; ita quod intellectus aliquo modo corpori Socratis uniatur.” See also QDSC 2c.
the soul as the form of the body can be applied to the intellect. IFC is also a consequence of Aquinas's counter-argument against the Averroist interpretation that the intellect is separable from the body and thus the definition cannot be applied univocally to the intellect. If that is the case, Aquinas must argue that the intellect is not separable from the body in order to show that IFC is a successful interpretation of Aristotle against the Averroist reading.

Recently, some contemporary Thomists have argued that Aquinas's account of the unity of the human person based on his notion of the soul as the form of the body offers the promise of avoiding some of the problems of substance dualism without lapsing into materialist reductionism. We might characterize a substantial dualist as one who holds that each of us is, at least as we exist on this earth, a composite being made of two distinct substances, an immaterial mind or soul and a material body. Since a "substance" generally refers to something that can exist independently, substance dualism claims that souls are immaterial entities capable of existing independently of the body. Aquinas rejects a central tenet of dualism of this sort by holding that the soul and the body are related as form and matter, and that the form and its matter are


somehow one: “body and soul are not two actually existing substances; rather, the two of them together constitute one actually existing substance.” Thus, the soul is not separate from the body at least in this life. IFC might be understood in this context. If the intellect is the form of the body, then it will not be separable from the body. However, if the intellect is separable from the body, then the definition of the soul as the form of the body used to overcome dualism cannot be applied to the intellect, and this will commit Aquinas to an intellect-body dualism, since he does postulate the existence of the intellect independently of the body within an individual human being.

To have a correct understanding of IFC, it is important to compare and contrast it with the principle that the soul is united to the human body. What is the ontological status of the soul in Aquinas’s account of the soul as the form of the body? What does he mean by saying that it is not separable from the body? It is clear that the soul as the substantial form exists in the body. More precisely, he says,

If the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole.45

44 SCG 2.69.1461: “Non . . . corpus et anima sunt duae substantiae actu existentes, sed eis duobus fit una substantia actu existens. . . .”

45 ST 1.76.8c: “Sed quia anima unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto, et in qualibet parte corporis. Non enim est forma corporis accidentalis, sed substantialis. Substantialis autem forma non solum est perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis.”
Without the soul, the hand or eye of a human being is no more a real or living hand or eye than the dead body is a real human being. Thus, the soul is located wherever the body is, while the body is alive. How then does Aquinas explain the ontological status of the intellect? Does he argue that the intellect exists in the body as the soul does? Aquinas's account of the location of the intellect is found in his discussion of whether the whole soul is in each part of the body. He explains that the wholeness of a thing might be considered in three ways: (1) according to quantity; (2) according to species or essence; (3) according to power. First, considered with regard to the wholeness of quantity, the whole soul

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46 According to Anton Pegis, what Aquinas means by saying that the soul is in the body is that it occupies the body spatially. See St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Toronto: PIMS, 1978), 144. According to Eleonore Stump, it means that the soul has a spatial location. See "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," 512. As Aquinas himself notes, the idea that the immaterial has a spatial location or occupies the body spatially is not a common opinion in the medieval tradition. Nevertheless, he does not deny the possibility that the immaterial human soul might exist wherever its body exists in considering whether an angel is in a place in ST 1.52.1c: "... anima enim est in corpore ut continens, et non ut contenta." Cf. ST 1.8.1 ad 2.

Some might doubt whether it is appropriate to say that the immaterial human soul has a spatial location or occupies the body spatially since only three-dimensional bodies are located in space. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, for example, argue that it is logically impossible for the immaterial soul to have such a spatial location. See Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz, "Are Souls Unintelligible," in James E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 5, (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1991), 184 - 5: "It is not possible for a spiritual substance to be spatially extended, and it is a necessary truth that whatever is spatially extended is physical. . . . But, even if there could be an unextended spiritual substance occupying a point of space, it would not be a purely spiritual being. That is, it would not be wholly outside of the physical world, inasmuch as it would occupy a point of space. When traditional Western theism affirms the existence of God, angels, etc., it is affirming the existence of purely spiritual beings, and this is what we mean by the term 'soul' or 'spirit.' For the foregoing reasons, we regard unlocatedness as a logically necessary condition of being a soul. . . ." I believe that this objection would not affect seriously Aquinas's account of spatial location since he claims that the human soul is an unusual substantial form. It exists in matter, but it can also exist without it; unlike other substantial forms, it is not immersed in matter. It lies in the realm of substantial forms that are entirely dependent on matter and the realm of pure immaterial substances that do not exist in matter at all. See QDA 1; SCG 2.68.
is not entirely in each part of the body, for quantity cannot be attributed to the
soul which is simple.47 However, the second kind of wholeness does properly
belong to the soul; and the soul is whole in each part of the body and in the
whole body according to essence, just as whiteness is entirely in each part of a
completely white thing.

Does Aquinas hold that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the
body? As mentioned before, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence
of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul is in each part of the body, we might
assume that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body. However, he
strongly denies this assumption.

Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it
exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely, the intellect
and the will; and hence these powers are not said to be in any
part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and
body; wherefore each of these powers need not be wherever
the soul is, but only in that part of the body which is adapted
to the operation of such a power.48

Considered just with regard to wholeness of operation, the whole soul is not in
each part of the body. Of course, the operations of the soul are localized in
various parts of the body, as, for example, sight is localized in the eyes.

47 For his argument for the soul’s simplicity, see ST 1.75.5.

48 ST 1.76.8 ad 4: “[P]otentiarum animae quaedam sunt in ea secundum quod excedit
totam corporis capacitatem, scilicet intellectus et voluntas; unde huiusmodi potentiae in
nulla parte corporis esse dicuntur. Aliae vero potentiae sunt communes animae et
corpori; unde talium potentiarum non oportet quod quaelibet sit in quocumque est
anima, sed solum in illa parte corporis quae est proportionata ad talis potentiae
operationem.”
However, some powers, such as intellect and will, are not localized in any particular organ of the body. Consequently, the intellect cannot exist where the body is.

To sum up, in respect of its essence, the human soul is located wherever the body is since it is the form of the body. On the other hand, every power of the soul does not exist where the body is: the intellect is not located in any part of the body. To say that the human soul is the form of the body entails the claim that it exists in the body and thus is not separable from the body. If that is the case, Aquinas's conviction that the intellect does not exist in the body at all does not entail the claim that the intellect is the form of the body.

It cannot be denied that Aquinas, like Aristotle, connects the questions: (1) whether the soul is separable from the body and (2) whether it is the form of the body. Something's being the form of the body is sufficient for its not being separable, since he infers the non-separability of some parts of the soul from their being the form of some bodily part. At this point, to say that the intellect is the form of the body is tantamount to the claim that the intellect is present in the body or inseparable from the body. We may infer from this that if the intellect cannot be present in the body, then it cannot be the form of the body. Thus, this leads us to conclude that IFC is flatly incompatible with Aquinas's own position and he fails in applying the definition of the soul to the intellect.

The question before us is how Aquinas steers between these two poles: how, that is, the intellect can exist in the individual, and yet not exist in the body. In other words, if we say that the human possesses her own intellect, where can
we find it in the individual? He explicitly denies the possibility of the intellect being present in the body insofar as the intellect does not use any bodily organ. What then would be his remaining alternative? The intellect must exist in the human soul, while it does not exist in the body. The claim that the intellect has no bodily organ and thus does not exist in any part of the body at all can be taken as evidence that Aquinas believes that an individual intellect actually exists independently of the body. As a result, it commits Aquinas to some form of dualism, which I call 'an intellect-body dualism' since he does postulate the existence of the intellect independently of the body. If the intellect has no bodily organ, then it is not only distinct but ultimately separate from the body.

There is another text which supports my interpretation that for Aquinas the intellect, while not separate from the individual, is separate from the body.

Having shown that the soul is the act of the whole body, its parts being the acts of the body's parts, and granted that an act or form cannot be separated from that which is actual and has form, we can certainly conclude that no soul can be separate from its body, at least certain parts of the soul cannot be separated, if the soul can be said to have parts. For obviously some parts of the soul are nothing but the acts of parts of the body; as we have seen in the case of sight, that it is the act of the eye. On the other hand, certain parts of the soul may well be separable from the body, since they are not the act of any corporeal part. . . .

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49 In DA 2.2.142 - 52 (2.2.242): "Quia enim ostensum est quod anima est actus tocius corporis, et partes sunt actus parciurn, actus autem et forma non separatur ab eo cuuis est actus uel forma, manifestum est quod anima non potest separari a corpore uel ipsa tota uel aliqua partes eius, si nata est aliquo modo habere partes: Manifestum est enim quod aliqua partes anime sunt actus aliquarum parciurn corporis, sicut dictum est quod uisus est actus oculi. Set secundum quasdam partes nihil prohibet animam separari, quia quedam partes anime nullius corporis actus sunt. . . ."
This passage fits very well with my line of reasoning. Only if the soul is the act of the body, will it be inseparable from the body. Likewise, sight must exist in the body because it is the act of a part of the body. Thus, one easily comes to think that if the intellect is not the act of any part of the body, it will be separable from the body. In many places, Aquinas himself holds that the intellect cannot be the act of any part of the body. To assume that the intellect does not use any bodily organ of its own and thus is not the act of any part of the body leads necessarily to the claim that it is separable from the body. Thus, this claim is inconsistent with IFC. However, if my reasoning is correct, how can we understand Aquinas’s claim that the intellect is inseparable from the body in his refutation of the Averroistic position? In fact, he does uphold that the intellect is not separable from the body in the process of refuting of the Averroistic position. When commenting on Aristotle’s problematic expression, “what is sensory does not exist without the body, but the intellect is separate,” Aquinas describes the Averroistic position as an utterly indefensible one which falls into the error of regarding the intellective power as entirely separated from the body. In doing so, he identifies the expression “the intellect which is separate from the body” with the expression “one of the separate substances.” What he attempts to refute is not the intellect’s separability from the body but its separability from the individual. He then continues to argue:

50 Aristotle, De anima, 3.4, 429b5.

51 In DA 3.1.277 - 81 (3.7.689): “Set horum occasione uerborum quidam in tantum decepti sunt ut ponerent intellectum possibilem secundum esse a corpore separatum, sicut una de substanciis separatis. Quod quidem omnino impossible est.”
But it is impossible for that whereby anything formally acts to be separate from it in being. This is because nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Therefore anything operates formally through the agent, if the former is in this way in act with the latter. But anything does not co-exist with the agent in act, if the former is separate in existence from the latter. Hence it is impossible that that whereby anything formally acts is separate in existence from an agent. . . .

Once again, this passage represents Aquinas’s objection against the view that the agent responsible for understanding does not belong to the individual but rather to a separate substance. However, he is not arguing that the intellect is not separable from the body. Rather, he means that the intellect is something present in the individual. What he means by saying that the intellect is a part or power of the soul which is the form of the body is that it is something present in the individual. Nonetheless, if the intellect is not the act of any bodily organ, then it exists independently of the body. Thus, Aquinas is holding that the intellect is separable from the body, while it is not separable from the individual.

Another clarification might be made if we look at the following passage in which Aquinas attempts to interpret what Aristotle means by separateness: “The intellect is separate, inasmuch as it is not the act of an organ; but it is not separate inasmuch as it is a part or power of the soul which is the act of the

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52 *Ibid.*, 3.1.294 - 300 (3.7.690): “. . . set inpossibile est id quo aliquid formaliter operatur separari ab eo secundum esse; quod ideo est quia nichil agit nisi secundum quod est actu; sic igitur aliquid formaliter aliquo operatur sicut eo fit actu; non autem fit aliquid aliquo uns actu si sit separatum ab eo secundum esse; unde inpossibile est quod illud quo aliquid agit formaliter sit separatum ab eo secundum esse. . . .”
This passage, I believe, offers adequate support for my claim that Aquinas holds that the intellect is separable from the body, whereas it is not separable from the individual.

Furthermore, my exposition can be supported by Aquinas's argument for the individuation of the intellect against the objection that something that is separated from the body cannot be multiplied through bodies. In this argument, Aquinas does not hold that the intellect is present in the body or inseparable from the body. Instead, he shows that the intellect can be individuated only if it is a power of the soul:

> Although the possible intellect is separate from the body with respect to the intellect's operation, the intellect is still a power of the soul which is the act of the body.  

> [S]ince the intellect is a power or faculty of the human soul, it is multiplied according to the multiplication of the very substance of the soul. . . .

How then can Aquinas uphold the individuation of the intellect? The Averroists' reason for defending the unicity of the intellect lies in the philosophical impossibility of an immaterial form being able to be multiplied numerically within

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53 DUI 2.42: "Est enim separatus, in quantum non est actus organi; non separatus vero, in quantum est pars sive potentia animae que est actus corporis. . . ." See also SCG 2.69.1468b: "Quod autem per hoc quod ARISTOTELES dicit intellectum esse *immixtum vel separatum*, non intendat excludere ipsum esse partem sive potentiam animae quae est forma totius corporis. . . ."; ST 1.76.1 ad 1: "Sic ergo Philosophus dicit in III De An. quod "intellectus est separatus", quia non est virtus alicuius organi corporalis."

54 QDA 3 ad 16: "[L]icet intellectus possibilis sit separatus a corpore quantum ad operationem, tamen est potentia anime, que est actus corporis."

the same species. That is to say, since the intellect is an immaterial form, and matter is the principle of individuation, there can be only one intellect for all human beings. Aquinas does not disagree with the Averroists in that he considers matter as the principle of the individuation in the case of material substances: "if it is the nature of some form to be participated in by another in such a way that it is the actuality of some matter, that [form] can be individuated and multiplied through relation to matter." Thus, Aquinas upholds the individuation of the human soul through its relation to matter since the human soul is the actuality of the body. How does he explain the individuation of the intellect which is not the actuality of the body? It is important to note Aquinas's contention that the individuation of accidents is taken from the subject in which they exist. Accidents such as quantity and color, which exist in the composite of matter and form, are individuated by the composite. On the other hand, the intellect which does not exist in the composite but only in the human soul, is individuated by the soul. Aquinas therefore argues:

"The intellect is a power of the soul which is the act of the body. In many bodies, therefore, there are many souls, and in

56 DsI 5.103: "[S]i aliqua forma nata est participari ab aliquo, ita quod sit actus alicuius materiae, illa potest individuari et multipicari per comparationem ad materiam." Against the Aristotelian background, Aquinas allows for the possibility that immaterial forms can be individuated by themselves. See Joseph Owens, "Thomas Aquinas," in J. Gracia ed., Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation (1150-1650) (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 175 - 81.

57 Aquinas is careful to note that the human soul is individuated by matter, but not in the same way that material forms are individuated by matter. For the human soul, as a subsistent form, remains an individual when it is separated from the body. Cf. in Sent 1.8.5 2 ad 6; DDE 5.378.59 - 379.68.

58 ST 1.29.1c; 1.39.3c; 3.77.2c; In Sent 1.9.1.1c; QDP 9.1 ad 8.
many souls there are many intellective powers which are called intellects. . . \textsuperscript{59}

Aquinas upholds the individuation of the human soul since it is the form or actuality of the body. However, the reason for the individuation of the intellect is not that it is the form or actuality of the body, but that it is a power of the human soul. This point is sufficient to support my exposition that for Aquinas the intellect cannot be the form of the body.

Of course, Aquinas anticipates my objection that since the intellect is not the act of the body, it cannot be united to the body:

It must be said that the intellect is not said to be the act of any part of the body, inasmuch as it is a power that does not make use of an organ. Nevertheless, the soul's very substance is united to the body as a form. \textsuperscript{60}

It [the human soul] is separate according to its intellectual power, because an intellectual power is not a power of a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, as can the act of seeing. But it exists in matter in so far as the soul itself to which this power belongs, is the form of the body. . . \textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59} D\textsc{i} 5.103: "[I]ntellectus est virtus animae quae est actus corporis. In multis igitur corporibus sunt multae animae, et in multis animabus sunt multae virtutes intellectuales quae vocantur intellectus. . . ."

\textsuperscript{60} Q\textsc{dsc} 2 ad 13: "[I]ntellectus non dicitur esse actus partis alieuius corporis, in quantum est potentia non utens organo, ipsa tamen substantia animae unitur corpori ut forma."

\textsuperscript{61} S\textsc{t} 1.76.1 ad 1: "Separata quidem est secundum virtutem intellectivam, quai virtus intellectiva non est virtus aliueius organi corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi; intelligere enim est actus qui non potest exerceri per organum corporale, sicut exerceri visio. Sed in materia est, in quantum ipsa anima cuius est haec virtus, est corporia forma. . . ." See also D\textsc{ii} 2.30: "Forma ergo hominis est in materia, et separata: in materia quidem, secundum esse quod dat corpori, (sic enim est terminus generationis); separata autem secundum virtutem quae est propria homini, scil. secundum intellectum.
His reply is rather unsatisfactory for it is not intended to show directly that the intellect is united to the body. Instead, he repeats the previous claim that the intellect is united to the body because the soul to which the intellect belongs is united to the body.

Moreover, my claim that for Aquinas the intellect is actually separate from the body seems to contradict his insistence that we cannot think without phantasms. Some might object to my claim that Aquinas’s strict adherence to the Aristotelian principle of the dependence of thought upon images exonerates him of dualism. As is well known, some of the most central principles of his theory of cognition are based on this principle: “it is impossible for our intellect in the present state of life, in which it is conjoined to a corruptible body, to understand anything in actuality, except by turning towards images.”

Is his account of the intellect’s dependence on phantasms able to falsify my interpretation that the intellect is spatially separable from the body?

In fact, Aquinas sometimes attempts to defend the intellect’s inseparability from the body on the basis of his insistence on the intellect’s dependence on the phantasms in his refutation of the Averroist view:

[[If the possible intellect had being separate from the body, it would know substances that are separate from matter, rather than sensible forms, because such substances are more

Non est ergo impossibile, quod aliqua forma sit in materia, et virtus eius sit separata, sicut expositum est de intellectu. . . ."

62 ST 1.84.7c: “. . . quod impossible est intellectum secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata.” Cf. ST 1.85.1 ad 5.
intelligible and more conformed to the intellect. But it cannot
know substances that are altogether separate from matter,
because there are not phantasms of them; and this intellect
"in no case understands without a phantasm," as Aristotle
says in *De anima* III, because the phantasms are to it "as
sensible objects to the senses," without which objects the
sense power is inoperative. Therefore, the possible intellect is
not a substance *separate from the body in being*. [Italics
mine.]\(^{63}\)

According to Aquinas, the proper objects of the human intellect are the essences
of material things. That is why the human intellect can have no full-fledged
cognition of separated substances which are altogether separate from matter,
and so do not need phantasms. On this view, he concludes that the intellect is
not separable from the body in its being since intellection involves intellect's
recourse to phantasms which depend on bodily senses.\(^{64}\) Aquinas also upholds
the intellect's ontological inseparability by appealing to the compatibility between
existence and operation: if the intellect is inseparable from the body for its
operation, then it must be inseparable from the body for its existence:

> [T]hings separate in being also have separate operations. . . .
> But the operation of the possible intellect requires the body,
> for Aristotle says in *De anima* III that the intellect can act by
> itself, namely, it can understand, when it has been actuated
> by a species abstracted from phantasms - which have no

\(^{63}\) SCG 2.60.1387: "Si sit secundum esse a corpore separatus, magis intelligen
tabantias quae sunt a materia separatae quam formas sensibles: quia sunt magis
intelligibiles, et magis ei conformes. Non potest autem intelligere substantias omnino a
materia separatas, quia eorum non sunt aliqua phantasmata: hic autem intellectus
nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit, ut ARISTOTELES dicit, in III de Anima; sunt
enim ei phantasmata sicut sensibilia sensui, sine quibus sensus non sentit. Non est
igitur substantia a corpore separata secundum esse."

\(^{64}\) SCG 2.60. 1386: "Sed operatio intellectus possibilis completur per organa corporea, in
quibus necesse est esse phantasmata. Natura igitur intellectum possibilem corporeis
univit organis. Non est igitur secundum esse a corpore separatus."
existence apart from the body. Therefore, the possible intellect is not altogether separate from the body.\(^{65}\)

Can the intellect's ontological inseparability be upheld on Aquinas's adherence to the Aristotelian dictum that the intellect is dependent on phantasms? I do not think that an affirmative answer can be offered within Aquinas's theory since his adherence does not entail that the intellect is not separable from the body in its existence. Rather, it is intended to show how the intellect can interact with the body although it is separable from the body. To begin with, it is important to note Aquinas's account of the relationship between the intellect and the imagination. Aquinas explains:

> The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its organ of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to sight.\(^{66}\)

It cannot be denied that human cognition depends ultimately on sensory cognition insofar as its proper objects are the quiddities of material things. So the human intellect does depend for its data on the operations of the bodily organs of other cognitive powers. Nevertheless, in performing its proper activities, the intellect does not use any body at all or any part of the body in the direct way in

\(^{65}\) SCG 2.60.1385: "Quaecumque sunt separata secundum esse, habent etiam separatas operationes. . . . Operatio autem intellectus possibilis indiget corpore: dicit enim PHILOSOPHUS, in III de Anima, quod intellectus potest agere per seipsum, scilicet intelligere, quando est factus in actu per speciem a phantasmatisbus abstractam, quae non sunt sine corpore. Igítur intellectus possibilis non est omnino a corpore separatus."

\(^{66}\) ST 1.75.2 ad 3: "[C]orpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed rationes objecti; phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum." Cf. QDA 1 ad 11.
which visual cognition uses eyes. On this view, Aquinas stresses that although the intellect by its nature requires both the phantasm and the imagination, it depends upon the phantasm provided by the body only as an object of cognition, that is, a partial cause of the intelligible object, and not as an underlying subject required for its own existence. Thus, it is not hard to see that the intellect's dependence on phantasms does not entail that the intellect exists in the body.

It is also worth noting that for the relation between the intellect and the imagination, especially in the intellect's knowledge of particulars, Aquinas frequently uses the terms "union" or "conjunction" which were found in Averroes's theory of conjunction to show that although the intellect is spatially separate from the individual, it is conjoined or united to her in the operation of understanding.

Our intellect . . . has some knowledge of the singular according to a certain conjunction of the intellect to the imagination.

It [The agent intellect] illuminates phantasms inasmuch as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part.

67 Cf. The phantasm is identified as the materia causae of the intelligible object in ST 1.84.6c: "Secundum hoc ergo ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmatum non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae."

68 Although "conjunction" is a general term used in Averroes's discussion of the intellect's relation to the individual, it is also a technical term in his and other Islamic philosophers's writings describing the capacity of the material intellect to know the agent intellect. For a detailed discussion of this term, see Deborah L. Black, "Conjunction and the Identity of Knower and Known in Averroes," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1999): 159 - 84.

69 QDV 2.6c: "Inquantum ergo intellectus noster . . . habet quamdam cognitonom de singuari secundum continuationem quamdam intellectus ad imaginationem."
The mind has contact with singulars by reason of something else insofar as it has continuity with the sensitive powers which have particulars for their object.\textsuperscript{71}

Here, the union or conjunction or contact is not concerned with showing that the intellect is not spatially separable from the body or powers in the body. Rather, it is concerned with how two powers can interact although they are separable.

Aquinas's account of what is the nature of a power-contact (\textit{contactus virtutis}) between the intellect and the body is made clear in \textit{Summa contra gentiles} 2, 56, where Aquinas takes up and assesses the applicability of various mode of union in considering the question of how the soul as form can be united to the body.\textsuperscript{72} Because one of the two ingredients in the sort of union Aquinas is looking for must be corporeal, he begins his survey by considering mixture and contact. Aquinas explains that the two cannot be united with a body by being mixed together with it or literally in contact with it because the soul's immateriality rules out the possibility of its being united with a body in such modes of union in which both ingredients are corporeal. Then, Aquinas considers the possibility that the soul can be united with a body by being in power-contact which is quite

\textsuperscript{70} ST 1.85.1 ad 4: "Illuminantur quidem quia sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectum efficitur virtuosior."

\textsuperscript{71} QDV 10.5c: "Sed tamen mens per accidens singularibus se immiscet, inquantum continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa particularia versantur."

\textsuperscript{72} For a detailed analysis of this chapter, see Norman Kretzmann, \textit{The Metaphysics of Creation}, 270 - 94.
different from contact properly so-called.\textsuperscript{73} This power-contact turns out to be an unsatisfactory mode of union between soul and body after Aquinas's detailed analysis. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that it offers some explanation of the kind of contact between the intellect and the body although Aquinas does not explicitly describe this contact as allowing the possibility that the immaterial intellect can act on the material body.\textsuperscript{74}

Aquinas explains the power-contact by virtue of the agent-patient relationship.

\emph{[]}If attention is given to activity and passivity, it will be found that certain things touch other and are not themselves touched, while certain things are themselves touched and touch nothing else. For indeed, the heavenly bodies touch elemental bodies in this way, inasmuch as they alter them, but they are not touched by the elemental bodies, since they are not acted upon by them.\textsuperscript{75}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{73} Cf. ST 1.75.1 ad 3: "Dicendum quod est duplex contactus, quantitatis et virtutis. Primo modo, corpus non tangitur nisi a corpore. Secundo modo, corpus potest tangi a re incorporea quae movet corpus."
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{74} Cf. Norman Kretzmann, \textit{The Metaphysics of Creation}, 285 - 86: "It may seem strange that Aquinas argues at length regarding power contact as a possible mode of union between an intellective substance and a body, and then, as soon as he concludes that it is so, begins backing away from it as not fully satisfactory because the union it can support doesn't result in something that is unconditionally one. But again, I think that one explanation for this surprising transition may well be that he knows that he will need the unity of power contact too, once he establishes \textit{unconditional} unity in the result by some other means."
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{75} SCG 2.56.1317: "[S]i attendatur ad actionem et passionem, inventeuntur aliqua esse tangentia tantum et aliqua tacta tantum: corpora enim caelestia tangunt quidem hoc modo elementaria corpora, inquantum ea alterant: non autem tanguntur ab eis, quia ab eis non patiuntur."
\end{quote}
To illustrate this point, Aquinas uses an example taken from Aristotle’s *De generatione et corruptione*: “we say that a person in sorrow touches us.”\(^{76}\) A person in sorrow touches us without literally coming into contact with us, and in a way that makes him only touching and us only touched. It is also helpful to mention Kretzmann’s sun-and-stone example to understand Aquinas’s purposes: the sun touches the stone insofar as the sun alters the stone, but the sun is not touched by the stone, because in that relationship the stone does not act on the sun.\(^{77}\) This power-contact offers an answer to the question of how the immaterial intellect can act on the material body. According to Aquinas, the material cannot act on the immaterial since the material is inferior to the immaterial, and the lower cannot act on the higher.\(^{78}\) However, the union between intellect and body by way of this power-contact is sufficient to explain how, despite its immateriality, the intellect can act on the body without corporeally touching the body.

Having explained this mode of union, Aquinas argues that this mode of touching is an operational union and is not appropriate for the mode of union between soul and body, which is a spatial or substantial union. For two ingredients to be united ontologically or to be *an unqualified one* requires that one of them has the character of substantial form and the other of matter, and two ingredient together constitute one actually existing substance. However, Aquinas holds that a power contact between intellect and body does not satisfy a

\(^{76}\) Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione*, 1.6, 323a32 - 3.

\(^{77}\) Norman Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Creation*, 280.

\(^{78}\) ST 1.84.6c.
condition for being a substantial union: "Now, things united by contact of this kind are not unqualifiedly one. For they are one with respect to acting and being acted upon, but this is not to be unqualifiedly one."\(^{79}\)

What is meant by Aquinas's claim that the soul is united to the body as its form is that the soul is ontologically inseparable from the body, and the two of them together constitute one actually existing substance. If this kind of substantial union cannot be applied to the intellect-body relation, it is proper to say that for Aquinas the intellect is spatially separate from the body, although they can interact.

Thus far, I have argued that IFC must be described as Aquinas's solution to clarify the ambiguity of Aristotle's position on the intellect. At this point, IFC is nothing other than Aquinas's affirmative answer to the question of whether or not the definition of the soul as the form of the body is applied to the intellect. However, to suppose IFC would be tantamount to a claim that he cannot accept: the intellect necessarily exists in the body. Consequently, it would follow that the intellect is separable from the body. For this reason, I believe that Aquinas's IFC cannot be an adequate alternative to the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle.

It is also my contention that if the intellect is immaterial and thus separable from the body, this commits Aquinas to an intellect-body dualism.

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\(^{79}\) SCG 2.56.1319a: "Sic igitur substantia intellectualis potest corpori uniri per contactum virtutis. Quae autem uniuntur secundum talem contactum, non sunt unum simpliciter. Sunt enim unum in agendo et patiendo: quod non est esse unum simpliciter. Sic enim dicitur unum quomodo et ens." Cf. In Sent 3.27.1.1 ad 5: "[D]icendum quo unio est duplex: Quaedam quae facit unum secundum quid, sicut unio congregatorum se superficialiter tangentium... Alla est unio quae facit unum simpliciter, sicut unio continuorum et formae et materiae..."
Although he sometimes attempts to defend the inseparability of the intellect from the body by appealing to the principle that human thinking cannot be carried out without phantasms, his defense does not succeed in showing that the intellect is not ontologically separable from the body. Rather, it is intended to show how the intellect can interact with the body or that it is operationally inseparable from the body.
I've argued thus far that Aquinas's solution to resolve the ambiguity of Aristotle's own position on the intellect poses some difficulties in two respects. First, there is some inconsistency between the claim IFC ("the intellect is the form of the body") and his insistence that the intellect does not use any organ in its act of understanding. Aquinas takes IFC to mean that the intellect is not altogether separate from the body. However, his thesis of organlessness is nothing other than a strong rejection of the possibility that the intellect might exist in the body. The second problem IFC poses for Aquinas's theory is its threat to the unity of the human being. If the intellect is incorporeal and thus separate from the body, this commits Aquinas to an intellect-body dualism. Thus, I argued that Aquinas's IFC cannot be an adequate alternative to the Averroistic interpretation that the intellect cannot be the form of the body.

If IFC cannot be upheld within Aquinas's theory, can it be said that he has adequately resolved the difficulties raised by the Averroists? The Averroists' rejection of IFC entails that the intellect is not a power of the human soul. Can it be said that the intellect is a power of the human soul although it is ontologically separable from the body? In the remaining chapters, I will deal with the controversy between Aquinas and one of the Latin Averroists, Siger of Brabant, regarding the interpretation of Aristotle. Siger was not convinced by Aquinas's position that the intellect is a power of the human soul which is the substantial
form of the body. I will try to determine whether Aquinas has an adequate alternative to Siger's position. Recently, there has been much dispute about the controversy between Aquinas and Siger.\(^1\) Most of the literature tends to focus on how much Aquinas influenced Siger or to what extent Siger's views evolved under Aquinas's influence. Presumably, this tendency shows that most commentators presuppose Aquinas's *philosophical* victory over Siger in the controversy. It seems indisputable as a *historical* fact that Aquinas was victorious over Siger whose Averroism was condemned in 1270. Nevertheless, I do not think that an affirmative answer could be so easily offered to the question of whether Aquinas was *philosophically* victorious over Siger. For this purpose, I will show that despite his strong rejection of Averroism in his later work, Siger remained insistent on rejecting Aquinas's main position on the intellect, which is

fundamental both to Aquinas’s philosophical psychology as well as to his polemics against the Averroists. Thus I will focus on Siger’s critique of Aquinas rather than on the modification or evolution of Siger’s position. To do so, I will show in chapter 3 that Siger is insistent on criticizing Aquinas’s position throughout his entire career. In doing so, I offer an interpretation that differs from one common in the literature. It has been widely alleged that despite his initial critique, Siger finally adopts the Thomistic position that the intellective soul possessing the intellect is the substantial form of the body, in his late work, the *Quaestiones super librum de causis*. However, I will argue that Siger never adopted this position. Then, I will argue in chapter 4 that Aquinas’s replies to Siger’s critique are not successful.

In dealing with Siger, I will use two approaches. First, I will offer a brief overview of his philosophical psychology in the context of his debate with Aquinas. I will focus on two major positions of the Averroists, including Siger, which Aquinas singles out for attack: the denial that the intellective soul in which the intellect is rooted is the substantial form of the human body; and the doctrine that the intellect is one for all human beings and therefore not multiplied according to the number of existing human beings. Second, special attention will be directed to how Siger criticizes consistently the Thomistic distinction between the soul and its powers throughout his entire career.
1. Quaestiones in tertium de anima

Siger's best known reason for being called a Latin Averroist\(^2\) and thus becoming a target of Aquinas is his early defense of the separation and unicity of the intellect in the *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*, which Bazán dates to the 1269 - 70 academic year, shortly before Aquinas's *De unitate intellectus*.\(^3\)

For his defense of the separability of the intellect, Siger invokes the authority of Averroes who argues for the immateriality of the intellect within an Aristotelian framework. In the *De anima*, Aristotle attempted to show that intellection transcends material conditions and this involves the activity of an intellective power that is unmixed with or separate from matter.\(^4\) In this context, Siger's argument is based on the observation that the intellect can receive all material forms and this can only occur if it is not mixed with all such forms. Since every bodily organ of a sense power must, in virtue of its materiality, be incapable of receiving certain sorts of material forms, it follows that the intellect, given its capacity for receiving all material forms, not only cannot be a body but

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\(^2\) Sometimes referred to as Latin Averroism, a philosophical movement developed in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris in the 1260s and 1270s might be described as Heterodox Aristotelianism or Radical Aristotelianism. Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, *Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1980), 1 - 2.


\(^4\) Aristotle, *De anima* 3.4, 429a18 - b22.
also cannot be a power in a body.⁵ Siger also argues for the immateriality of the intellect on the assumption that the two kinds of human cognition differ in the ranges of objects to which they have access: while the intellect has cognition of universals, senses have cognition of particulars only. In doing so, he takes it as a datum of experience that we receive universal and immaterial forms in ourselves. Since no material sense power can cognize universals, the reception of universals involves a certain operation of the intellect. To the extent that the objects of universal cognition are immaterial, so too is immateriality a corresponding feature of the intellect.⁶ Hence, Siger concludes that the intellect not only cannot use any bodily organ in performing its activity but also cannot have any material characteristics.

Siger derives the separability of the intellect from its immateriality since, unlike Aquinas, he does not allow for the possibility that the intellect, as separable from the body, might exist in the human soul and thus in the individual human being. That is why Siger holds that the intellect is not rooted in the same substance as the vegetative and sensitive parts, which are rooted in a material form. Consequently, the individual human being does not possess her personal

⁵ QIIIDA 9, 26.28 - 30: “Ex his praenotatis concluditur quod intellectus, <cum> sit immaterialis, in eius natura non est quod multiplicetur secundum numerum.” Cf. QIIIDA 9, 27.52 - 5: “Et ideo arguit Averroes quod, si intellectus multiplicaretur secundum multiplicationem hominum individuorum, esset virtus in corpore.” Cf. For Averroes’s argument for the immateriality of the intellect, see his LC 3.4, 385.62 - 386.105.

⁶ Ibid., 12.70 - 13.77: “Virtute autem quadam existente in nobis experimur in nobis acceptionem formae communis praedicabilis quae, inquam, non scitur ut propria cuiuslibet, sed ut communis omnibus suis singularis. Hanc autem acceptionem non possumus experiri a forma materiali, sed experimur eam a forma immateriali. Est igitur aliqua forma immaterialis in nobis; sed non alia nisi intelligibilis. Quare intellectus est immaterialis.”
intellect as well as her own intellective soul which includes the intellect. The human soul is only a sensitive soul which is a material form.  

The immaterial and separable characteristic of the intellect lead Siger to deny that the intellective soul in which the intellect is rooted is the substantial form of the body. In considering the question "whether the intellect is a perfection of the body with respect to substance," Siger argues that those who wish to offer an affirmative reply and to defend the substantial union of the intellective soul and the body will have difficulty when they attempt to support Aristotle's authentic position on the immaterial status of the intellect. Even though Siger here does not explicitly cite Aquinas, it seems to be clear that Siger has Aquinas in mind as an adversary. As I noted earlier, Aquinas argues that even though the intellect performs its operation without a bodily organ, the intellective soul in which the intellect has its basis can still be the substantial form of the body. Siger brings in a famous critique which he would raise insistently throughout his entire career.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Ibid.}, 1, 2.26 - 32: "Virtus radicata in forma immateriali non est eadem cum virtute radicata in forma materiali. Hoc est planum. Sed intellectus est virtus radicata in forma immateriali. Probatio, quoniam tertio De anima dicitur quod intellectus simplex est et immaterialis et impermixtus. Vegetativum sicut sensitivum radicantur in eadem substantia <materia>. Ergo intellectivum non radicatur in eadem substantia cum vegetativo et sensitivo."
  \item \textit{Ibid.}, 7, 22.16 - 8: "Si enim intellectus esset perfectio corporis per substantiam suam, operatio eius proportionaretur <corpori>, quod est contra ARISTOTELEM."
  \item Cf. B. Bazán, "Le dialogue entre Siger de Brabant et Thomas d'Aquin," 65. Bazán points out that the principle (\textit{potentia animae non potest esse simplicior quam eius essentia}) on which Siger's critique is based had already been found in one of Aquinas's earlier works, in Sent 2.17.2.1 obj. 2: "[I]mpossible est quod principium sit materialius quam principiatum, quia principium oportet esse simplicius. Sed, sicut ab omnibus conceditur, aliquae sunt potentiae animae rationale quae non sunt actus corporis cuiusdam, nec organis affixeae, cuius principium et radix est ipsa essentia animae. Ergo
\end{itemize}
The power from which an operation flows is not simpler than its substance; therefore if the intellect perfected the body through its substance, its operation could not take place except in the body; whence in operating it would be necessary to make use of the body, since the power from which the operation flows is not simpler than its substance, for the act which is the act of the body through its substance is an organic act.¹⁰

Now the principle on which Siger's critique is dependent is *operatio sequitur formam*: all activities are determined according to the form of the substance from which they proceed.¹¹ At this point, Siger believes that Aquinas's position is on the horns of a dilemma. If Aquinas argues that the intellective soul is united to the body, all its powers including the intellect would have to act through bodily organs. On the other hand, if Aquinas wants to say that the intellect performs its activity without a bodily organ, then the intellective soul itself must be separate from the body. Consequently, Siger does not accept any possibility that the intellective soul is united to the body and at the same time has a power that performs its proper operation without a bodily organ.

Having rejected Aquinas's solution that the intellect is united to the body with respect to substance, Siger holds that the intellect is united to the body by

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¹⁰ QIII DA 7, 23.18 - 23: "[P]otentia a qua egreditur operatio non est simplicior sua substantia; si igitur intellectus per suam substantiam perficiat corpus, eius operatio non potest esse nisi in corpore; quare in operando necessario utetur corpore, cum potentia, a qua egreditur operatio, non sit simplicior sua substantia, nam actus, qui per substantiam suam est actus corporis, est actus organicus."

its power of operation: "the intellect perfects the body not through its substance but through its power."12 This operative union is twofold: the intellect is present in the body as the principle of understanding and as the mover of the body.13

Thus, I say that the intellect is not in a certain part of the body with respect to the act itself, which is to understand. But the act of understanding is in the body because the intellect is in a certain part, not using some part of it as an instrument or organ itself but because it communicates with the operation through some part, namely, with the imagination. But according to other operation the intellect is in the body, that is, the intellect is moving the body or the mover in the body. Thus the intellect is in a certain part because it moves a certain part per accidens, but it moves the whole per se.14

How then does Siger reconcile the individuality of actual human thinking with the unicity of the intellect? Following Averroes15, Siger appeals to the basic Aristotelian dictum that actual thinking is dependent upon the concomitant

12 QIIIDA 7, 23.38–9: "Intellectus perficit corpus, non per suam substantiam, sed per suam potentiam."

13 Ibid., 8, 25.16 - 20: "Si vero dicatur quod intellectus est perfectio corporis non secundum substantiam suam, sed secundum suam potestatem, tunc diceretur quod intellectus est in corpore, et exponatur alio modo hoc esse, scilicet quod intellectus est in corpore, scilicet operans in corpore, et hoc potest esse dupliciter, scilicet intelligens vel movens."

14 Ibid., 8, 25.20 - 28: "Tunc dico quod intellectus non est in qualibet parte corporis quantum ad istum actum qui est intelligere. Sed ideo est intelligens in corpore quod est intellectus in aliqua parte, non utens tanquam instrumento vel organo ipso, sed propter hoc quod communicat cum operante per illam partem, scilicet cum phantasia. Secundum autem aliam operationem intellectus est in corpore, id est intellectus est mover corpus vel motor in corpore. Sic est intellectus in qualibet parte eo quod movet quamlibet partem per accidens, totum autem movet per se."

15 LC 3.5, 404.501 - 405.527.
activity of imagination. Thus, Siger argues that even though the individual has no intellectual principle of her own, thought can be attributed to her in virtue of the link between her images and the separate, single intellect.

To understand correctly his solution, it is worth noting Siger's account of the difference between the senses and the intellect in their relations to the individual. It is because the sense is conjoined with us taken as individual human beings that the objects of sensation are in us. By contrast, it is because the intelligible objects are conjoined with us that the intellect is also conjoined with us. These intelligible objects are present in each of us because of imaginative intentions which are produced by our imagination. Thus, Siger concludes that the intellect is diversified through the different intentions present in the imagination of different human beings insofar as the intellect needs our images to exercise its activities. Siger's idea that the intellect is united with the body only through phantasms is indeed the reason for his being called a Latin Averroist because it

16 Aristotle, *De anima*, 3. 7. 432 a16 - 17; 432 b2; 3. 8. 432 a3 - 10.

17 Quo IIDA 9, 28.67 - 70:

18 *Ibid.*, 9, 28.64 - 76: “Nota ergo quod intellectus et sensus copulantur nobiscum in actu, sed diversimodo. Sensus enim copulatur nobis per partem eius quae est materia. Sed intellectus copulatur nobis per partem eius quae est forma. Unde, quia sensus copulatur nobis, ideo sensata copulantur nobis. Non sic de intellectu, sed e converso: non enim per hoc quod intellectus copulatur nobis, ideo intellecta copulantur nobis, sed quia intellecta copulantur nobis. Unde nota quod, sicut intellectus, quantum est de natura sua, est in potentia ad intentiones imaginatas (sic enim in potentia <est> ad hoc, ut copuletur nobis), per hoc quod copulatur actu intentionibus imaginatis, cum se haberet in potentia ad illas, per hoc copulatur nobis in actu. Et propter hoc, cum huiusmodi intentiones imaginatae numerentur secundum hominum numerationem, ideo per intentiones imaginatas intellectus numeratur in nobis.”
is not so different from Averroes’ solution based on the notion of a double subject of cognition.¹⁹

Another reason why Siger is a target of Aquinas is his defense of the unicity of the intellect. The immaterial status of the intellect leads Siger to deny that each individual human being possesses her own intellect since the human intellect cannot be more than one without matter, which is the principle of individuation within a species. That is to say, Siger is an advocate of the impossibility of an immaterial form being able to be multiplied numerically in the

¹⁹ LC 3.5, 399.370 - 401-423; 404.501 - 405.527. According to Averroes’s notion of a double subject of cognition, actual intelligibles (intellecta in actu), like the objects of all the other perceptual faculties of the soul, have two subjects, a subject of existence, and a subject of truth. The subject of existence is the recipient cognitive power which makes the form known into a form which exists, and the subject of truth is the thing by which the thing known is measured and to which it refers. In sensation, the subject of existence is the form existing in the sense organ, and the subject of truth is the sensible object existing in the soul. In intellecction, the subject of existence is the material intellect itself, and the subject of truth is the imaginative intentions which link thought to the extra-mental world. On the basis of this double subject of cognition, Averroes attempts to reconcile the individuality of actual human thinking with the unicity of the material intellect itself. Although the individual has no intellectual principle of her own, intellecction will be individuated so long as at least one component of the intelligible is conjoined to the individual. And Averroes argues that thought can be attributed to the individual in virtue of the link between her images and the separate, single material intellect since imaginative intentions belong to the individual and thus must be individuated. For a detailed discussion of the double subject, see Deborah Black, “Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Aquinas’s Critique of Averroes’s Psychology,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993): 363 - 66; Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, 289 - 92.

Although Siger relies heavily on Averroes in explaining how thinking can be attributed to the individual, Siger is less clear than his master. Siger has much difficulty in explaining how our images can serve as a bond between ourselves and the intellect, since they cease to be images once they become intelligible species in the intellect. For a discussion of Siger’s inconsistent position, see Bernardo C. Bazán, “Intellectum Speculativum: Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant on the intelligible Object,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 441 - 45; F. Van Steenberghen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism, 39 - 42.
same species. He thus concludes that the human intellect is only one for all individual human beings.20

Siger's Averroism provoked an enormous reaction. In 1270 the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, condemned thirteen propositions which included several pertaining to Siger's view of the intellect, and excommunicated all who would knowingly defend or teach them.21 In the same year, Aquinas reacted with his treatise De unitate intellectus, which is directed primarily against Siger. Aquinas holds that the Averroist doctrine of the unicity of the intellect is not only contrary to Aristotle's own conception but also philosophically and exegetically untenable. In doing so, Aquinas singled out what he considered to be the two fundamental errors of Siger's interpretation of Aristotle: the view that the intellect cannot be a power of the human soul; and the view that the intellect is one for all human beings. In his response to the first error, Aquinas takes Aristotle's intention to be that the intellect is a power of the intellective soul, which is a substantial form of the body. Aquinas believes that the second error, the unicity of the intellect, is simply precluded by his response to the first error. For the Averroists, the immateriality of the intellect prevents it from being a power of the human soul as well as a power in the human body. Consequently, they cannot

20 QIIIIDA 9, 25.7 - 26.8: "Quod sit unus intellectus in omnibus videtur. Nulla forma immaterialis, una in specie, est multiplicata secundum numerum." Cf. QIIIIDA 9, 26.29 - 30: "[I]ntellectus, <cum> sit immaterialis, in eius natura non est quod multiplicetur secundum numerum."

uphold the individuation of the intellect insofar as the intellect is immaterial and the principle of individuation is matter. By contrast, Aquinas believes that, despite its immateriality, the intellect can be individuated only if it is an accident or power of the human soul on the basis of the principle that the individuation of accidents is taken from the subject in which they are. The human soul is individuated by its ontological relationship with the body insofar as it is the actuality or form of the body. Accordingly, the intellect must be individuated by the soul in which the intellect exists.\textsuperscript{22}

More importantly, the inability of the doctrine of the unicity of the intellect to account for the most basic psychological facts indicating that this individual human being understands (\textit{hic singularis homo intelligit}) is a central part of Aquinas’s philosophical refutation of this doctrine in his \textit{De unitate intellectus}: he charges that the Averroist position cannot explain the fact that individuals are the very subjects of those acts of intellection that make them essentially rational beings.\textsuperscript{23}

2. \textit{De anima intellectiva}

Siger's first reply to Aquinas's challenge was his now lost \textit{De intellectu}, probably written in 1270 before Stephen Tempier's condemnation. We have some knowledge of this work through quotations in the works of the Renaissance

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. Chapter 2, section 3.

\textsuperscript{23} DUI 3.62.
philosopher, Agostino Nifo. Insofar as we can judge from the excerpts and references given by Nifo, in this work Siger does not seem to have given up the key Averroistic doctrines of his earlier work.²⁴

Siger's next reply was *De anima intellectiva* (1273-4), where he attempts to respond to the various types of criticisms he had received. To begin with, it should be pointed out that there has been a shift of focus between the *Quaestiones in tertium de anima* and this work: Averroes's authority is more prominent in the earlier work, whereas Siger is careful to downplay Averroes's influence in favor of Aristotle in the *De anima intellectiva*. Averroes himself, the "Commentator", is cited only on two occasions.²⁵ In the Prologue to this work Siger is careful to make explicit that he will state only Aristotle's position, and not his own.²⁶ It is important to note that Siger's opening remarks are very similar to those of Aquinas in the *De unitate intellectus* where he wishes to make his case only on philosophical and exegetical grounds. As Aquinas explains in the Prologue, it is not his intention to argue that the Averroistic position contradicts the truth of the Christian faith. Rather, Aquinas's intention is to show that this

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²⁵ DAI, Prol., 70.9: "Unde, et sicut dicit COMMENTATOR super prologum *De anima*, hanc quaestionem semper «debemus ponere in directo oculorum nostrorum»; 4, 97.54: "... dicendum est secundum expositionem COMMENTATORIS et forte intentionem ARISTOTELIS secundum praedicta, quod anima separatur ab hoc corpore sit quod manet. . . ."

²⁶ Ibid., Prol. 70.11 - 15: "Ed ideo, exposcentibus amicis, eorum desiderio pro modulo nostrae possibilitatis satisfacere cupientes, quid circa praedicta sentiendum sit secundum documenta philosophorum probatorum, non aliquid ex nobis asserentes, praesenti tractatu proponimus declarare."
position is not a genuine Aristotelian interpretation. This leads us to infer that Siger's *De anima intellectiva* is a direct response to Aquinas and his *De unitate intellectus*, where he has a similar intention to challenge Siger not through 'the teachings of faith' but on purely philosophical grounds.27

Siger's response to the Thomistic account of the intellective soul as the substantial form of the body is found in chapter 3, where he raises the question, "How the intellective soul is the perfection and form of the body." He attempts to offer his own solution on the basis of the Aristotelian principle that the soul can only be known through its operations:

But understanding is in a certain way united to matter, and in a certain way separated. For unless understanding were united to matter in a certain way, it would not be true to say that the human being himself understands. Understanding is also in a certain way separate from matter, since it is not in a corporeal organ, as seeing is in the eye, as the Philosopher says. Therefore, the intellective soul is in a certain way united to the body and in a certain way separate from it.28

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27 DII 1.2: "Nec id nunc agendum est ut positionem praedictam in hoc ostendamus esse erroneam quod repugnat veritati fidei Christianae. . . . Intendimus autem ostendere positionem praedictam non minus contra philosophiae principia esse, quia contra fidei documenta. Et quia quibusdam (ut dicunt) in hac materia verba Latinorum non sapiunt, sed Peripateticorum verba sectari se dicunt, quorum libros nunquam in hac materia viderunt, nisi Aristotelis qui fuit sectae peripateticae institutor; ostendemus primo positionem praedictam eius verbis et sententiae repugnare omnino." Cf. DII 5.124: "Haec igitur sunt quae in destructionem praedicti erroris conscripsimus, non per documenta fidei, sed per ipsorum philosophorum rationes et dicta."

28 DAI 3, 80.67 - 73: "Intelligere autem est quodammodo unitum materiae et quodammodo separatum. Nisi enim intelligere esset unitum aliquo modo as materiam, non esset verum dicere quod homo ipse intelligit. Intelligere etiam aliquo modo est separatum a materia, cum non sit in organo corporeo, ut videre in coulo, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS. Anima igitur intellectiva aliquo modo est unita corpori et aliquo modo separata ab eo."
The above passage alludes to Aquinas’s “hic homo intelligit” objection and the need to attribute understanding to the individual in some way. Nevertheless, Siger is still unwilling to accept Aquinas’s solution that the intellective soul in which the intellect is rooted must be the substantial form of the body. Considering how the intellective soul is both separate from the body and united to the body, Siger notes that outstanding men in philosophy, Albert and Aquinas, hold (A) that the substance of the intellective soul is united to the body and gives being to it, but (B) that the power of the intellective soul is separate from the body because it does not use a bodily organ in performing intellection. After presenting their arguments for this position, Siger criticizes both of their positions for missing Aristotle’s intention and for failing to establish their conclusions.

Siger’s critique that Aquinas’s position based on the distinction between the soul and its powers is not genuinely Aristotelian is supported by a series of five arguments which show that that (A) and (B) are not compatible. Once again, Siger appeals to the principle on which his initial critique in the Quaestiones in tertium de anima was dependent: “the power cannot be more immaterial than the substance.” He thus argues that “it is not possible for any

29 Ibid., 3, 81.79 - 82: “[D]icunt praeicipui viri in philosophia ALBERTUS et THOMAS quod substantia animae intellectiva unita est corpore dans esse eidem, sed potentia animae intellectiva separata est a corpore, cum per organum corporeum non operetur.”
substance to be united to matter, and for the power of that substance to be separate from matter.\textsuperscript{30}

In fact, Aquinas was aware of Siger's initial critique based on the principle that a power cannot be more immaterial than its substance in the \textit{Quaestiones in tertium de anima}. Aquinas attempted to reply to the difficulty raised by Siger in the \textit{De unitate intellectus} through emphasizing the unique character of the human soul. The gist of Aquinas's reply is this: since the human soul is a subsistent form and thus is not immersed into matter, it is not impossible for the human soul to possess an immaterial intellect.\textsuperscript{31} Presumably, Aquinas believed that his response to Siger's critique was satisfactory. Judging from his insistent refutation in the \textit{De anima intellectiva}, however, Siger was not satisfied with Aquinas's response. Siger asserts that Aquinas's position based on the distinction between the soul and its powers would necessitate attributing understanding to matter rather than to the human being, since the operation could not be separated from the substance:

\begin{quote}
If the human being were to understand because the substance of the intellective soul gives being to matter or body, not only could the operation of understanding be attributed to the human being, but also to the body, which is false, and which the Philosopher denies.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, 3, 82.101 - 2: "Non contingit substantiam aliquam esse unitam materiae et potentiam illius substantiae esse separatam a materia."

\textsuperscript{31} Cf. \textit{DUI} 3.83 - 4. In chapter 4, I will offer a detailed account of the peculiar character of the human soul in Aquinas's philosophical psychology.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{DAI} 3, 82.13 - 6: "Si homo intelligeret quia substantia animae intellectivae daret esse materiae aut corpori, non solum homini posset attribui operatio intelligendi, sed et corpori, quod falsum est et negat PHILOSOPHUS."
The reason that Siger gives for the unacceptability of the intellective soul as the substantial form of the body is that the material character of the intellective soul as the giver of being to the body is not compatible with the immaterial character of the intellect. If one assumes that the form gives being to the body, it would follow that that form cannot be the principle of any operation that does not exist in the body. Consequently, this would lead to the non-Aristotelian conclusion that understanding exists in or is exercised by the body. Thus Siger believes that the principle of an operation which does not exist in the body cannot in any strict sense also be the substantial form through which the body exists. To avoid Aquinas's error of making understanding exist in the body, Siger must deny the possibility that the intellective soul could exist in a material subject. Siger thus takes Aristotle's intention to be that "the intellect is separate from body in its being, and not united to it as the shape is united to the wax." 33 Furthermore, Siger criticizes Aquinas's position for failing to establish Aristotle's intention: "his argument only asked how a material composite, such as a human being, would understand if the intellective soul were separate from matter and from body in its being." 34

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33 Ibid., 3, 84.57 - 9: "Dicendum est igitur aliter secundum intentionem PHILOSOPHI, quod anima intellectiva in essendo est a corpore separata, non ei unita ut figura cerae. . . ."

34 Ibid., 3, 84.49 - 51: "THOMAS etiam intentum non arguit, sed solum quaerit eius ratio quomodo compositum materiale intelligeret, ut homo, si amima intellectiva in essendo sit separata a materia et corpore."
But if the intellective soul is separate from the body in its being, in what way is it united to the body? Siger holds that the intellective soul is united to the body in its operation by appealing to the basic Aristotelian principle that the human soul cannot think without its dependence on phantasms. He then says: "the intellective soul and the body are one in operation, because they cooperate in a single task." In doing so, Siger is careful to note that the intellect depends on the body as an object rather than as a subject in which understanding exists. That is to say, the intellect cannot use any bodily organ in performing intellection. However, the body serves as the object for the activity of intellection since phantasms are related to intellect in the same way that colors are related to sight as objects. Thus far, Siger's solution seems to be similar to his earlier position in the *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*.

Siger acknowledges that his operative union is a target for Aquinas's critique based on the principle, *hic homo intelligit*. According to Aquinas's critique, so long as the intellect is not a part or form of the individual human being, the Averroist attempt to link the intellect to the individual by means of her phantasms is not sufficient for attributing understanding to the individual. Before his response to this charge, Siger presents two implausible solutions: that understanding can be attributed to the individual human being (1) because

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36 *Ibid.*, 3, 85.69 - 72: "[E]t cum intellectus dependeat ex corpore quia dependet ex phantasmate in intelligendo, non dependet ex eo sicut ex suiecto in quo sit intelligere, sed sicut ex obiecto, cum phantasmata sint intellectui sicut sensibilia sensui."
"understanding is in the body," or (2) "because phantasms are in the body."³⁷
Siger seems to identify (2) as his earlier position which Aquinas had already refuted in the De unitate intellectus. At this point, Siger feels that his initial solution based on the Averroist theory of conjunction is not enough to avoid Aquinas’s critique.³⁸ Nevertheless, he does not accept Aquinas’s position. For (1) is the error which Siger believes results from Aquinas’s insistence on the intellective soul being the form of the body.

After pointing out the implausibility of his old thesis as well as that of Aquinas’s solution, Siger holds that understanding must be attributed to the individual human being. According to Siger, the requirement that the intellect be part of the individual is properly met by his theory that the intellect, though existing separately from the body, operates in union with the body. That is to say, understanding can be attributed to the individual insofar as she operates through the separate, single intellect, which is one of her parts. How then does a separate intellect operate as a part of the individual? Siger appeals to his new conception of "an intrinsic agent (operans intrinsecum.)"

[For the intellect in understanding is an agent intrinsic to a body through its nature; but the operations of intrinsic agents - be they motions or operations without motion - are attributed to the composite of the intrinsic agent and that in which it

³⁷ Ibid., 3, 85.76 - 9: “Ex apparat iam ex dictis qualiter non solum intellectui, sed etiam homini attribuatur intelligere. Hoc enim non est quia intelligere est in corpore. . . .”

³⁸ Another sign of Siger’s modification of the earlier view appears in DAI 3, 85.72 - 75: “Et est attendendum quod, cum illa quae habent opus commune non qualitercumque se habentia illud exerceant, quod intellectus per naturam suam unitus est et applicatus corpori, natus intelligere ex eius phantasmatibus.”
operates intrinsically in this way; indeed, even among philosophers, intrinsic movers, or agents operating within other things, are called their forms and perfections.\textsuperscript{39}

His point is that it is the very nature of the separate intellect to operate within the human body.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, understanding can be attributed to the individual since the operations of intrinsic agents, which are parts of the composites in which they operate, are to be attributed to their composite. To make clear his claim that an intrinsic agent is a part of the individual human, Siger gives an example: we say that the human being himself sees, although vision is in the eye alone and not in the other parts of the human being, like the foot. Similarly, the human being understands, although the activity of intellection is only in the intellect and not in his body. The human being understands through one of his parts just as he sees through one of his parts. Although the manner of union between his seeing part and his other parts is different from the manner of union between his understanding part and his other parts, the important fact remains that the union of the intellect with the body as something operating within the body is sufficient

\textsuperscript{39} DAI 3, 85.80 - 5: "[Q]uia intellectus in intelligendo est operans intrinsecum ad corpus per suam naturam, operationes autem intrinsecorum operantium, sive sint motus, sive sint operationes sine motus, attribuuntur compositis ex intrinseco operanti et eo ad quod sic intrinsece operatur, immo etiam apud philosophos intrinseci motores, vel intrinsece ad aliquia operantes, formae et perfectiones eorum appellantur."

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 3, 85.72 - 5: "Et est attendendum quod, cum illa quae habent opus commune non qualitercumque se habentia illud exerceant, quod intellectus per naturam suam unitus est et applicatus corpori, natus intelligere ex eius phantasmatis"; 3, 87.15 - 6: "[C]um intellectus intelligendo sit operans sine motu, est operans in operando unite se habens ad corpus per suam naturam."
to guarantee that what belongs to the intellect as a part belongs to the whole human being, although only through that part.  

One might wonder why Siger claims that the intellect can be called a “form” insofar as it is an intrinsic agent in relation to matter. Siger anticipates an objection that this claim would be self-contradictory. As I explained above, his critique of Aquinas’s position is based on the assumption that if a form gives being to a material subject, then that form cannot play its role as the principle of an operation without existing in the material subject. This assumption leads Siger to conclude that the principle of an operation is ontologically separate from the body. At this point, this conclusion implies that, in his view, the intellective soul cannot be called the form of the body. Siger replies that an intrinsic agent within matter can be called a “form” in a broad sense since the term “form” has diverse meanings. To illustrate this point, Siger gives the example of the heavenly bodies: the heavenly bodies are said to move themselves because another part of them is moved by an intrinsic mover. Thus, though the intellect subsists in

41 Ibid., 3, 85.90 - 86.101: “Unde considerandum quod hominem ipsum dicimus videre, cum tamen visio est in solo oculo et non sit in aliis partibus hominis, ut in pede; nec est verum dicere pedem videre; et nisi oculus in quo solo est visio unionem haberet ad alias partes, non esset attribuere cuidam toti ex oculo et partibus aliis videre. Sic et homo intelligit, cum tamen intelligere sit in solo intellectu et non in corpore; unde nec corpus intelligit quamquam corpus sentiat; homo autem ipse intelligit secundum partem, sicut videt secundum partem. Modus tamen unionis partis videntis ad alias partes in toto vidente alius est quam modus unionis partis intelligentis ad alias partes in toto intelligente. Sufficiens tamen est unio ad hoc ut quod parti inest, per partem toti attribuaturo; et quid sit modus unionis iam visum est.”

42 Ibid., 3, 86.7 - 11: “[D]icendum est quod cum dicitur: «aliquid agit per suam formam», extensive debet accipi forma, ut et intrinsecum operans ad materiam forma dicatur. Unde et ipsa corpora caelestia dicuntur movere se propter hoc quod altera pars eorum movetur ab intrinseco movente.”
itself, it is like a true form both because that which operates intrinsic to a body is not spatially separate from the body, and also because the operation of such an intrinsic agent denominates the whole composite.\(^4^3\)

Siger's basic idea of an operative union in this work does not differ significantly from his Averroism in the *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*. However, he does modify his earlier position somewhat under Aquinas's influence. According to Siger's new thesis, the intellective soul belongs to the category of form insofar as it is an intrinsic agent (*operans intrinsecum*) within the body and thus constitutes a part of the human individual. There are two meanings of "perfection or form of the body", namely, a perfection which is united in existence to the body and an agent which operates within the body.

Thus, the intellective soul can be called a form of the body in the same way that the sailor is the form of his ship, whereas the vegetative and sensitive souls are united in existence to the body. The intellective soul is not distant in place or in subject from the human body for which it serves as form. This new conception of the union of the intellective soul and the body allows Siger to elaborate a new conception of the human being, which is different from the earlier one. In the *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*, Siger's point is that the human is determined to his species by the sensitive soul, while the principle of intellection belongs to a separate substance, the intellective soul. In the *De anima intellectiva*, however,

he holds that the human soul is determined to its species by the intellective soul since intellection is the human specific difference and results from the intellective soul.44

In the *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*, Siger's account of the unicity of the intellective soul is a necessary result of his rejection of the view that the intellective soul is the substantial form of the body. We can infer from this that Siger would have no doubt about the unicity of the intellective soul since he insists on the separability of the intellective soul from the body in the *De anima intellectiva*. However, Siger proposes a controversial position on this issue in chapter 7, where he raises the question, “Whether the intellective soul is multiplied by the multiplication of human bodies.” In the beginning, he says that he is examining this question only insofar as it is within the province of philosophy and can be understood by relying on human reason and experience. He is seeking to determine the meaning of the philosophers rather than the truth, since he is proceeding philosophically. He adds that it is certain according to the revealed truth that intellective souls are multiplied by the multiplication of individual human bodies. But certain philosophers have defended the opposite view and their position seems to follow from the way of philosophy.45

44 Cf. Z. Kuksewicz, *De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Pleisance*, 40 - 43.

45 DAI 7, 101.4 - 12: “Circa septimum prius positorum, videlicet utrum anima intellectiva multiplicetur multiplicatione corporum humanorum, diligentier considerandum, quantum pertinet ad philosophum, et ut ratione humana et experientia comprehendi potest, quaerendo intentionem philosophorum in hoc magis quam veritatem, cum philosophice procedamus. Certum est enim secundum veritatem quae mentiri non potest, quod animae intellectivae multiplicatur multiplicatione corporum humanorum. Tamen ALIQUI PHILOSOPHI contrarium senserunt, et per viam philosophiae contrarium videtur.”
Siger then presents a series of arguments for the unicity of the intellective soul. Clearly, the denial of the intellective soul as the substantial form of the body implies its unicity. In other words, if the intellective soul, although operationally united to the body, is ontologically separate from it, then it should be considered as a single unique substance. Siger takes this line of reasoning: the intellective soul is an immaterial substance; any immaterial substance is numerically one with respect to species; therefore, the intellective soul must be numerically one with respect to species.

A nature which is separate from matter in its being is not multiplied with the multiplication of matter. But the intellective soul, according to the Philosopher, has being which is separate from matter. . . . Therefore, it should not be multiplied either by the multiplication of matter or by the multiplication of human bodies.46

After offering a series of additional arguments for the unicity of the intellective soul, Siger acknowledges that powerful arguments can also be advanced for the opposite position which supports the multiplicity of the intellective soul.47 He is also aware of the difficulties that his defense of the unicity of the intellective soul poses with respect to Christian doctrine, and concludes:


47 Siger presents two arguments for the multiplicity of intellect: if the intellect were one for all human beings, when one human being had cognition, all other human beings would have the same cognition; if the intellect were one for all human beings, then it would always be filled with species and thus there would be no need for the agent intellect. *Ibid.*, 7, 107.42 - 108.78.
Therefore, because of these difficulties and certain other matters, I say that I myself have been in doubt for a long time as to what should be held in the light of reason about this matter and what the Philosopher thought about this matter. In such doubt one must hold fast to the faith, which surpasses all human reasoning.48

Siger’s discussion in this chapter might be divided into two parts: (1) If the intellect is immaterial, and matter is the principle of individuation, then there can only be one intellect on Aristotelian grounds; (2) he accepts the multiplication of the intellective souls on the strength of revelation.49 Does Siger’s acceptance on the strength of revelation entail that he adopts an undecided position concerning what natural reason can establish about this issue? Some commentators have wished to offer an affirmative answer by emphasizing the fact that Siger has doubts about what Aristotle really held on this point.50 Presumably, their interpretation reflects their tendency to consider this work as taking a middle position between an earlier radical Averroism, proposed in the Quaestiones in

48 Ibid., 7, 108.83 - 87: “Et ideo dico propter difficultatem praemissorum et quorumdam aliorum, quod mihi dubium fuit a longo tempore quid via rationis naturalis in praedicto problemate sit tenendum, et quid senserit PHILOSOPHUS de dicta quaestione; et in tali dubio fidei adhaerendum est, qua omnem rationem humanam superat.”

49 There has been dispute about whether Siger’s acceptance on the strength of revelation is a result of efforts on his part to avoid censure, or whether it is an honest expression of his own position. For example, Siger’s protests of loyalty to the faith are discounted by Mandonnet, who believes that Siger did not abandon his main Averroistic views in the De anima intellectiva. See his Siger de Brabant et l’avéroisme latin au XIe siècle, 2 vols. (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’université, 1908 - 11), 1: 132 - 36. On the other hand, Siger’s sincerity is defended by F. Van Steenberghe, Maître Siger de Brabant, 364 - 70.

tertium de anima, and a subsequent complete adjustment to the opinion of Aquinas found in the Quaestiones super librum de causis. They assume that Siger feels his position is difficult to defend on philosophical grounds. I believe that such an interpretation is untenable for two reasons.

First, this interpretation fails to understand correctly Siger’s intention in the De anima intellectiva. The work is a direct response to Aquinas’s De unitate intellectus, in which he intends to treat the Averroist position only as a philosopher and thus to solve the problem in Aristotle’s own terms. Aquinas does not wish to show that the Averroists contradict the truth of the Christian faith since that is evident to everyone. Siger is careful to point out that he is just an expositor since some of the views he expounded had been condemned as heretical. He often identifies philosophy with the exegesis of philosophical texts, especially Aristotle’s. Thus, Siger’s task is to reveal Aristotle’s intentions as a philosopher. As the professed expositor of Aristotle, Siger argues that he is a better interpreter than Aquinas who criticizes that Siger’s position is contrary to Aristotle’s own conception and philosophically untenable. On this view, Siger takes Aristotle’s intention to require that the intellective soul be ontologically separate from the body. It is natural to infer from this that Siger never hesitates


53 See above, n. 27.
in insisting on the unicity of the intellective soul as a philosopher or a expositor of Aristotle.

Second, it should be pointed out that Siger’s affirmation of the multiplication of the intellective soul on the strength of revelation does not necessarily entail his rejection of the unicity of the intellect on philosophical grounds. He is interested only in reconstructing Aristotle’s own arguments in a coherent manner, regardless of whether the conclusions come into conflict with Christian teachings. Of course, he concedes that Aristotle’s position might be opposed to what Christians hold on the grounds of religious faith. He makes it clear that faith is always to be followed where it seems to contradict natural reason; although he is a philosopher and expositor of Aristotle, his preference is always for the view of the holy catholic faith. In this regard, Siger does not hold a double truth theory: although the unicity of the intellect is necessarily true from Aristotelian principles, it is false on the side of faith. This means that we should not consider Siger’s argument from the Thomistic perspective. For Siger, unlike Aquinas, does not have any wish to harmonize faith with natural reason.54

54 Cf. A. Maurer, “Between Reason and Faith: Siger of Brabant and Pomponazzi on the Magic Arts,” 151: “We must add that he [Siger] did not oppose Aristotle’s heterodox teaching as a philosopher and on the level of rational thought. True, he is insistent on pointing out the limitations under which the philosopher works, and he even gives a reason in favour of the doctrine of faith as opposed to Aristotle; but the main direction of reason, in his view, is that taken by Aristotle and his commentator Averroes.” See also his “Siger of Brabant on Fables and Falsehoods in Religion,” 174: “In Christian circles must one not distinguish between human and divine authority, as well as between human and divine law? Siger would no doubt reply that he was only doing the work of a philosopher, which is to pursue natural truths by natural means; what transcends reason and nature is not within the scope of philosophy but of faith and theology.”
Surprisingly, this attitude is found even in Siger’s discussion of the union of the intellective soul to the body, where he strongly rejects substantial union.

We say that the Philosopher held this concerning the union of the intellective soul to the body - preferring, however, the belief of the holy faith, if the Philosopher’s opinion are contrary to this, as we do in all other matters whatsoever.\textsuperscript{55}

Thus, it would not be plausible to infer from Siger’s expressions of doubt about Aristotle’s position that he adopts an undecided position concerning what philosophers can establish about this matter.

In general, I do not disagree with the view that Siger was impressed by some of the Thomistic objections to his position and that he modified some aspects of his views. Nevertheless, it is my contention that there is no hint of any new orientation closer to the Thomistic views that the individual human being possesses her own intellect, and that the intellective soul is the substantial form of the body.

3. \textit{Quaestiones super librum de causis}

Siger’s final recorded position is found in his \textit{Quaestiones super librum de causis} (1275 - 76), where he seems to deny his Averroistic position on the unicity of the intellect. As I’ve argued, his denial in the \textit{De anima intellectiva} is not on

\textsuperscript{55} DAI 3, 88.50 - 4: “Hoc dicimus sensisse PHILOSOPHUM de unione animae intellectivae ad corpus; senstiam tamen sanctae fidei catholicae, si contraria huic sit sententiae PHILOSOPHI, praeferre volentes, sicut in alii quibuscumque.”
purely philosophical grounds, but only on the strength of revelation, where his main aim is to interpret Aristotle correctly. In this later work, however, Siger strongly argues that even on philosophical grounds the intellect is multiplied numerically in individual human beings. He now finds the Averroistic doctrine both heretical and irrational in itself.\(^{56}\)

To understand Siger's new account of the relationship between the intellective soul and the body, it is first necessary to examine his discussion in q. 26. The question raised here is the same as that raised in the earlier texts: "Whether the human soul is impressed (impressa) in the body as form and perfection." In his response, Siger begins by presenting Aquinas's solution based on the distinction between the soul and its powers.

Certain people wish [to claim] that the substance of the intellective soul is the form of the human, but the power of the intellective soul is separate, [and that it is] not the perfection of matter and does not possess an organ.\(^{57}\)

This solution still does not satisfy Siger who remains insistent on refuting the Thomistic position based on the distinction between the soul and its powers. Once again, the bedrock on which Siger's charge is dependent is his recurrent principle that a power cannot be more immaterial than its substance. On his view, if the substance of the intellective soul were the form and the perfection of

\(^{56}\) QLC 27, 112.147 - 48: "Sed ista positio in fide haeretica, et irrationalis etiam sic apparat."

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 26, 105.65 - 7: "Quidam volunt quod substantia animae intellectivae sit hominis forma, potentia tamen animae intellectivae sit separata, non materiae perfectio nec organum habens."
matter, the intellect could not be separate from matter. For no power can exceed the ontological character of the substance which carries it. On the other hand, if the power were separate from matter, the substance in which this power is rooted could not be the form of matter.\(^5\) In sum, there is a proportionality between the substance and its powers, so that the two cannot be dissociated.

After offering several counter-arguments against Aquinas's position, Siger explicitly expresses his unwillingness to adopt Aquinas's position as follows: "It should be said that the intellective soul is the perfection and form of the body, but not in such fashion that its power is separate." That is to say, it is impossible that the intellective soul possesses material powers using bodily organs, and one of its powers, the intellect does not use any bodily organ. What then is Siger's solution? Despite his rejection of Aquinas's position, Siger does not refute the concept of the intellective soul as the form of the body, since he argues that the intellect as well as the intellective soul are the form of the body: "since its substance is the act and perfection of its matter, so too is its power."\(^6\)

Is Siger then essentially adopting some form of materialism when speaking of the intellect as the act and perfection of the body? Of course not. In contrasting sensation with understanding, he does not abandon the view that the

\(^5\) *Ibid.*, 26, 105.72 - 6: "Cum enim intellectiva anima sit hominis forma et perfectio, sicut rei veritas est, non potest esse potentia et operatio separata. Materia enim, quae est ens per aliquam formam, potest operari et operatur potentia et operatione illius formae."

\(^6\) *Ibid.*, 26, 106.106 - 9: "Ideo aliter dicendum est, quod anima intellectiva est corporis perfectio et forma, non sic tamem quod potentia eius sit separata, immo cum eius substantia sit actus et perfectio ipsius materiae sic etiam et eius potentia."
intellect cannot directly use any bodily organ in performing its activities. For this reason, he argues that the intellect is subsistent in its own right.\(^6^0\)

To elaborate on his claim that both the substance and power of the intellective soul are the act and perfection of matter, Siger attempts to distinguish the intellective soul as a form of the body from ordinary material forms such as the vegetative and sensitive souls. He explains that if the intellective soul is the form of the body, it can only be so in a different way from the vegetative and sensitive souls. The latter do not subsist in their own right and are dependent upon matter in their being. The intellective soul, by contrast, subsists in its own right and does not depend upon matter for its existence. In brief, both the intellective soul and the intellective power are the perfection and form of the body, and yet each subsists in its own right.\(^6^1\) This could be misleading if one confuses it with Aquinas's seemingly similar claim. What does Aquinas mean by arguing that the intellective soul is a subsistent form? First, the intellective soul is the \textit{substantial} form of the body since it performs its activities through material powers using bodily organs.\(^6^2\) Consequently, the intellective soul needs the body


\(^{61}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 26, 106.115 - 22: "Sed est attendendum quod anima intellectiva est corporis perfectio et forma, non sic tamen sicut vegetativa et sensitiva. Anima enim intellectiva sic corpus perficit quod et per se subsistit in suo esse non dependens a materia, de potentia materiae non educta. Vegetativum autem et sensitivum sic sunt materiae perfectiones quod per se non subsistunt et in suo esse dependent a materia, cum de potentia materiae educantur per generationem compositi, per transmutationem materiae ad sum actum et perfectionem."

\(^{62}\) SCG 2.68.1459: "Quia . . . ipsum intelligere animae humanae indiget potentiis quae per quaedam organa corporalia operantur, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso declaratur quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad compleandam speciem humanam."
as its organ or instrument. Even though the intellective soul has the body as its subject, it does not mean that it entirely depends for its existence on the body since it has its own being and thus has the ability to exist apart from the body. Hence, Aquinas argues that the intellective soul has its own being, and nevertheless it shares that being with the body.63

By contrast, Siger’s claim that the intellective soul is the form of the body does not entail that it exists in the body as its subject and possesses material powers using bodily organs. For he cannot admit the possibility that the substance of the intellective soul might have such an ontological relationship with the body insofar as its power, the intellect, cannot use any bodily organ in its activity. However, Siger holds that the human soul exists in the body as its subject. We can infer from this that the intellective soul is not identical with the human soul in this work. Hence, Siger here still does not abandon the earlier position of the De anima intellectiva: there are two meanings of form or perfection of the body, a perfection which is united in existence to the body and a perfection which is united in operation to the body. That is to say, the human soul possessing material powers is united in existence to the body, and thus depends for its existence on the body, whereas the intellective soul possessing an immaterial intellective power is united in operation to the body, but exists independently of the body.

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63 QDA 1 ad 1: "... licet anima habeat esse completum, non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur, tum quia illud idem esse quod est anime communicatur corpori ut sit unum esse totius compositi. ..."; ST 1.76.1 ad 5. See also chapter 4, section 1.
It has been widely claimed that the difference between Aquinas and Siger in this work is rather verbal than real. Some commentators, such as Van Steenberghen and Mahoney, argue that Siger’s position here is close to Aquinas’s with respect to the two fundamental issues in their controversy. According to their interpretation, Siger accepts both the view that the intellective soul in which the intellect is rooted is the substantial form of the body and that each individual human being has her own intellect, despite his continued insistence on rejecting Aquinas’s distinction between the soul and its powers.

Of course, there is, I believe, some evidence that Siger criticizes Averroes’s doctrine of the unicity of the intellect by using Aquinas’s own words. It also seems that in this work Siger seriously modifies his conception of the intellect under the influence of Aquinas. Nevertheless, I do not think it is correct to infer from Siger’s description of the soul as the form of the body that he considers the intellective soul to be the substantial form of the body, as Aquinas does. Here, it is helpful to recall Aquinas’s account of how the intellective soul is the substantial form of the body.

But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form of the body.

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According to Aquinas, the soul is the substantial form of the body if and only if it exists in or perfects the whole body, and each part thereof. Does Siger apply this requirement to his conception of the intellectual soul as the form of the body? Kuksewicz argues that the following passage could provide textual evidence for believing that Siger’s conception of the intellectual soul is that it is the substantial form of the body, even though Siger does not explicitly offer the same explanation as Aquinas.\(^\text{67}\)

The form totally circumscribed by matter, not subsisting on its own, which is not able to exist on its own, is extended according to the extension of matter; yet the form which does not depend upon matter and material quantity with respect to its being is indivisible, nevertheless perfecting matter everywhere, \textit{inherent} in matter by reason of perfection. [Italics mine.]\(^\text{68}\)

According to Kuksewicz, to say that the intellectual soul inheres in the body is the same as saying that it exists in the body. However, there are plenty of passages in the \textit{Quaestiones super librum de causis} which call Kuksewicz’s interpretation

\(^{66}\) ST 1.76.8c: “Sed quia anima unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto, et in qualibet parte corporis. Non enim est forma corporis accidentalis, sed substantialis. Substantialis autem forma non solum est perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis.”

\(^{67}\) Z. Kuksewicz, \textit{De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance}, 52.

\(^{68}\) QLC 26, 107.143 - 8: “[F]orma totaliter comprehensa a materia, non per se subsistence, quae per se esse non valet, extenditur secundum extensionem materie; forma tamen quae in suo esse non dependet ex materia et quantitate materie indivisibilis est, materiam nihilominus undique perficiens, ubique eidem in ratione perfectionis inhaerens.”
into question. First, Siger does not accept Aquinas’s view that the intellective soul is united to matter in such a way that it exists in matter:

To posit understanding to be common to body and soul because the substance which is the first principle of its understanding is united to matter, just as that to which it belongs is in matter in this way, is to say that understanding is a perfection of matter. However, this is not true: for understanding does not have the organ in which it exists.\footnote{\emph{Ibid.}, 26, 105.77 - 81: ‘Ponere intelligere commune corpori et animae quia substantia quae primum principium est illius intelligere sit unita materiae sicut cuius est, sic in materia, est dicere quod intelligere materiae sit perfectio. Hoc autem non est verum: non enim habet intelligere organum in quo sit.’}

Here, Siger repeats his claim that if the intellective soul has to be united to the body so as to exist in the body, this would fail to safeguard the immateriality of the intellect and its operation. For to say that the intellective soul exists in the body entails the absurd claim that it uses a bodily organ in understanding. Thus, this claim is nothing other than Siger’s recurrent unwillingness to accept Aquinas’s account of the intellective soul as the substantial form of the body.

Second, according to Siger, there is a proportionality between a substance and its powers, so that the two cannot be dissociated. This leads him to argue that both the intellect and the intellective soul are the form of the body and subsistent in their own right. If we assume that the intellective soul is the substantial form of the body and thus exists in the body, then it follows that the intellect exists in the body. However, Siger would never accept the claim that the intellect exists in the body.
Third, to safeguard the immaterial character of the intellect in the Aristotelian framework, Siger is careful to explain the relationship between the intellect and the body by making a distinction between two cases: the intellect might have the body as (1) its subject and (2) as its object. (1) means that the intellect directly uses a bodily organ in its activity and has an ontological relationship with the body. On other hand, (2) means that the intellect depends on the body for its data, that is, it uses phantasms in its activity. On this distinction, Siger argues in many places that the relationship between the intellect and the body cannot be explained by (1) but only by (2). Aquinas totally agrees that the intellect does not use an organ in understanding and thus cannot be located in any part of the body.\(^70\) However, the distinction between the soul and its powers leads Aquinas to hold that the intellective soul, unlike its intellective power, has the body as its subject insofar as it is a substantial form of the body and thus exists in the body: the being (esse) of the intellective soul as a substantial form has the body as its underlying subject. That is why the soul’s act of understanding requires the phantasms.\(^71\) Thus, according to Aquinas, the intellective soul has the body as its subject, even though it does not depend on the body absolutely for its existence. However, that is not the case with the

\(^{70}\) Cf. ST 1.76.8c.

\(^{71}\) Cf. SCG 2.81.1625a: “Esse quidem animae humanae dum est corpori unita, esti sit absolutum a corpore non dependens, tamen stramentum quoddam ipsius et subiectum ipsum recipiens est corpus. Unde et consequenter operatio propria eius, quae est intelligere, etsi non dependeat a corpore quasi per organum corporale exercita, habet tamem obiectum in corpore, scilicet phantasma.” Cf. ST 1.12.11c: “Anima autem nostra, quandiu in hac vita vivimus, habet esse in material corporali.”
intellect since it cannot have the body as its subject but only as its object. On the other hand, the following passage is enough to show that for Siger, even the intellective soul does not depend on the body as its subject.

It should be said that the action and power of the intellect itself are not completely separate from matter, since Aristotle says that understanding is common to body and soul, although understanding is the perfection of matter not in such a way that it needs the body as a subject, that is, as that in which it has being: so too, although the intellective substance is the perfection of matter, it is nonetheless subsistent in its own right and does not need matter in its being.72

Once again, Siger appeals to the proportionality thesis. The reasoning is that if the intellect is not dependent on the body for its subject of cognition, it is also necessary to say that the intellective soul is not dependent on the body for its subject.

Finally, it should be pointed out that for Aquinas the intellective soul is identified as a human being's single substantial form, informing all its powers. He holds that the soul by its nature must possess material powers which can only be exercised through bodily organs. Thus, it follows from the soul's very nature that it must be united to the human body as its substantial form, the intellective soul:

\[ \text{[I]n order to perform its proper operation, the soul needs to be actualized by intelligible forms, acquiring them from external things through its sense powers. And since the operation of a} \]

72 QLC 26, 107.143 - 8: "[D]icendum quod actio ipsius intellectus et potentia non sunt penitus separata a materia, cum dicat ARISTOTELES intelligere esse commune corpori et animae, quamquam intelligere non sit hoc modo perfectio materiae quod egeat corpore subjecto tanquam eo in quo esse habeat: et sic etiam substantia intellectiva, quamquam perfectio materiae sit, per se tamen subsistens in suo esse non eget materia."
sense takes place through a bodily organ, it is appropriate for the soul, according to the very condition of its nature, to be united to the body. . . .

At this point, the condition for the intellective soul to be the substantial form of the human body on Aquinas’s account is that it must possess material powers. However, in contrasting the intellective soul with material forms such as the vegetative and sensitive souls, Siger does not allow for the possibility that the intellective soul might possess material powers since they must be located in a material form.

If the intellective soul is not the substantial form of the body, and the intellect is not a power of the human soul, how does Siger defend the individuation of the intellect in the Quaestiones super librum de causis? As I explained above, Siger refutes the Averroist doctrine of the unicity of the intellect on philosophical grounds in this work. One might wonder how my interpretation can be compatible with Siger’s refutation.

First of all, it is worth noting how Siger assesses Averroes’s view that there is only one intellect for all human beings. Once again, Siger presents

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73 QDA 7.314 - 21: "... unde ad propriam operationem indiget ut fiat in actu formarum intelligibilium, acquirendo eas per sensitivas potentias a rebus exterioribus. Et cum operatio sensus sit per organum corporale, ex ipsa conditio sua naturae competit ei quod corpori uniatur et quod sit pars speciei humanae, non habens in se speciem completam." Cf. ST. 1.76.5c.

74 QLC 26, 106.116 - 22: "Anima enim intellectiva sic corpus perficit quod et per se subsistit in suo esse non dependens a materia, de potentia materiae non educta. Vegetativum autem et sensitivum sic sunt materiae perfectiones quod per se non subsistent et in suo esse dependent a materia, cum de potentia materiae educantur per generationem compositi, per transmutationem materiae ad suum actum et perfectionem."
Averroes's view by virtue of the distinction between (A) the intellect's dependence on the body from the side of its subject and (B) its dependence from the side of its object. Averroes does not accept (A) since the intellect does not use any bodily organ in its activity and have the being through matter. That is why Averroes upholds the unicity of the intellect: if one denies (A), then it is necessary to uphold the unicity of the intellect since the intellect is immaterial and the principle of individuation is matter. On the other hand, Averroes does accept (B) on his adherence to the basic Aristotelian dictum that the intellect is dependent upon the imagination. Consequently, Averroes cannot explain the individuality of actual human thinking by virtue of the individuation of the intellect but rather by virtue of diversity of the intelligible species caused by phantasms in different individual human beings.\(^{75}\)

Having presented Averroes's account of unicity, Siger pronounces it both heretical and irrational. Siger then holds that since the intellect is the form of the body, it must be individuated and multiplied according to the multiplication of human bodies.\(^{76}\) According to Siger, Averroes's account of unicity is a consequence of denying the possibility that the intellect might have an ontological relationship with the body. Does then Siger's rejection of unicity entail the claim that the intellect has the body as a subject? Of course not. For it is his

\(^{75}\) Ibid., 27, 111.114 - 69

\(^{76}\) Ibid., 27, 112.148 - 52: "Intellecutu enim existente form corporis, sicut vult ARISTOTELES universaliter de anima, satis planum est qualiter oportet intellectum numerari et multiplicari multiplicatione humanorum corporum; sed qualitercumque hoc quis ponat, apparent intellectum non posse unum esse numero hominum omnium."
conviction that the intellect cannot exist in the body as its subject since it does not use any bodily organ in performing its activity.

How is Siger's denial of the Averroist doctrine related to his view that the intellect is the form of the body? His argument is based on the claim that if there were only one intellect for all human beings, then when the intellect is united with one body as its form, it could not simultaneously be united with other bodies. For it could not simultaneously have cognition of different objects and be actually perfected by different intelligible species at one and the same time. Then, Siger takes it as a datum of experience that different individual human beings have cognition of different objects at one and the same time. However, this fact cannot be explained if there is only one intellect for all human beings. Hence, Siger concludes that the intellect must be individuated and multiplied numerically.77 This argument is further evidence for the view that Siger seriously modifies his position under Aquinas's similar critique since Aquinas holds in his De unitate intellectus that the Averroist doctrine of the unicity of the intellect cannot explain the fact that different individual human beings can think of different things at one and the same time.78 Furthermore, Siger agrees with Aquinas that the human soul must be individuated and multiplied since it has an ontological relationship with the body or matter and the principle of the individuation is matter.79

77 Ibid., 27, 112.152 - 113.180.

78 Cf. DVI 4.

79 QLC 27, 114.216 - 22: "Animae enim humanae habent esse in unione ad corpora, et ideo multiplicatio earum per comparationem ad corpora habet fieri. . . ."
If the intellect is still immaterial, and the principle of individuation is matter, how can the intellect be individuated? Does Siger have in mind Aquinas’s argument for the individuation of the intellect? For Aquinas, the intellect can be individuated since it is an accident or power of the human soul on the assumption that the individuation of accidents is taken from the subjects in which they exist. Insofar as the human soul has being which it communicates with the body, it must be individuated. If the intellect is an accident of the human soul, then, it must be also individuated by the soul in which the intellect exists. It is clear that Siger cannot accept the Thomistic argument since the intellect is not a power of the human soul. Siger does not give a satisfactory account of how the intellect can be individuated, although he strongly refutes the Averroist doctrine of the unicity of the intellect. Rather, he repeats the claim that the intellect must be individuated in order to explain the evident fact that different individual human beings have cognition of different objects at one and the same time.

To sum up, in his Quaestiones in tertium De anima, Siger defends the unicity of the intellect, through adhering strictly to the Averroistic view. In his De anima intellectiva, after much discussion he gives up his initial defense not on purely philosophical grounds, but only on the strength of revelation. In his final work, his Quaestiones super librum de causis, he strongly argues on philosophical grounds that the intellect is multiplied as are human beings themselves. Despite his eventual abandonment of the Averroistic doctrine of the unicity of the intellect, Siger still rejects the claim that the intellective soul can be

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80 See chapter 2, section 3.
the substantial form of the body. This insistence is directly related to his critique of Aquinas's position that the intellect is a power of the intellective soul.
Could the ambiguities of Aristotle's own position on the intellect or the difficulties raised by Siger be resolved by Aquinas's position that the intellective soul in which the immaterial intellective power is rooted is the substantial form of the body? Despite his serious modification and rejection of Averroism under the pressure of Aquinas's influence, Siger consistently opposed Aquinas's claim that the intellect is a power of the human soul. My discussion in this chapter will focus on whether Aquinas's position can be defended against Siger's critique, or whether Aquinas's defense can be constructed from his works. Some might doubt whether the reference to Aquinas's “defense” against Siger is appropriate chronologically since Siger's *De anima intellectiva* is usually placed in 1273 - 74, the very year of Aquinas's death, and the *Quaestiones super librum de causis* even later in 1275 - 76. Even in reality, then, Aquinas cannot have responded to Siger's challenging position and his continued rejection of the essence-power disportionality because he died at about the same time or after Siger's composition of the relevant works. Furthermore, as most historians point out, it seems hardly probable that Aquinas had read Siger's *Quaestiones in tertium de anima* before writing one of his later works, the *De unitate intellectus*. Nevertheless, it is not implausible that Aquinas could have known Siger's critique through the reportationes of a student. Furthermore, Aquinas clearly deals with the same objection as made by Siger in the *De unitate intellectus* even though
Siger is not named. I think, therefore, that the references to Aquinas's "defense" against Siger are not inappropriate.

The gist of Siger's critique is this: Aquinas's view that the intellect is a power of the human soul breaches the principle that no power can be more immaterial than its substance. On Aquinas's account, the intellective power is an effect of the essence of the soul because all the powers of the soul flow from its essence. Thus, the soul must be equally if not more immaterial than the intellect. However, Siger argues that Aquinas's view would lead to a self-contradictory conclusion that the intellect would be more immaterial than the soul, since the soul is the act of the body whereas the intellect performs its operation without any bodily organ. For this reason, Siger cannot accept Aquinas's position that the immaterial intellect can be a power of the human soul.

Some Thomists have argued that Aquinas's position is not vulnerable to Siger's critique.¹ Van Steenberghen, for example, writes:

Cette critique prouve simplement que Siger n'a pas compris la position de Thomas d'Aquin; celui-ci a toujours soutenu le principle invoqué par Siger, car c'est un aspect essentiel de la doctrine des puissances d'opération; agere sequitur formam: cet adage bien connu signifie précisément que l'agir est mesuré par la forme ou par l'essence du sujet, et qu'il ne saurait donc dépasser en perfection la perfection du sujet; jamais S. Thomas n'a imaginé que l'activité intellectuelle pouvait être d'un niveau supérieur à celui de l'âme qui en est le principe. C'est justement la qualité spirituelle de l'intellection qui permet d'affirmer que l'âme humaine n'est pas une forme substantielle ordinaire, mais une forme

Van Steenberghen argues that the very principle on which Siger's critique is based is one that Aquinas also accepts: Aquinas agrees with Siger that the human soul is more immaterial than the intellect. Consequently, Aquinas never allows for the possibility that the intellect might be more immaterial than the human soul. Thus, Siger's criticism is based on a misreading of Aquinas. Furthermore, Van Steenberghen maintains that Siger's critique is not valid since he does not understand correctly Aquinas's claim that the human soul is an unusual substantial form, which is meant to establish that it is a subsistent form.²

It cannot be denied that the peculiar character of the human soul is indeed an important aspect of Aquinas's philosophical psychology as well as his rejoinder to Siger. I will first offer an explanation of Aquinas's claim that the human soul is a subsistent form. I will then argue that Aquinas's position, even though it is based on the peculiar character of the human soul, is still vulnerable to Siger's critique. To do so, I will deal with the question of whether or not the

² F. Van Steenberghen, Maître Siger de Brabant, 359.

³ A similar interpretation is made by B. Bazán, “Le dialogue entre Siger de Brabant et Thomas d’Aquin,” 90: “Si l’on pense que Thomas a considéré l’âme comme simple forme substantialle, dans l’optique de la seule Physique d’Aristote, on doit partager les vues de Siger. Mais nous avons vu que l’Aquinate n’a jamais considéré l’âme comme simple «forme hylémorphique». Son status ontologique est celui d’une forme de la matière qui n’est pas forme matérielle, mais forme subsistante. Siger . . . ne semble pas s’être aperçu de la différence radicale qui sépare l’âme intellective des autre formes substantielles, liées à la matière dans l’acte même d’être.”
human soul can have the ability to operate without the body. In fact, Aquinas would offer an affirmative answer since this ability is a foundation for his claim that the human soul is a subsistent form. However, I will argue that such an affirmative answer would be incompatible with his account of the nature of the human soul. For insofar as the human soul is essentially the form of the body, the ability to operate without the body is not appropriate to its nature. Finally, I will deal with Aquinas's replies to Siger's charge based on the principle that the power cannot be more immaterial than the substance. I will argue that his replies are not convincing since they beg the question.

1. The Peculiar Character of the Human Soul: Both a Form of the Body and This Particular Thing

As Van Steenberghen points out,⁴ Siger's critique of Aquinas's position is based on the principle "operatio sequitur formam," which stays strictly within the Aristotelian methodology that the nature of the soul or substance should be understood through its powers or operations.⁵ Siger argues that since the intellective power can perform its activity without a bodily organ, the intellective soul in which this power is rooted cannot be ontologically united to the body. That is to say, the immateriality of the intellect entails that the intellective soul cannot be the substantial form of the body, although it is a substance or agent which is united in operation to the body. By contrast, the human soul is the act of

⁴ F. Van Steenberghen, Maître Siger de Brabant, 359.

⁵ Aristotle, De anima, 2.4, 415a14-23.
the body and thus every operation of the soul must be performed by means of the body. Consequently, since every power of the human soul is the act of a bodily organ, the intellective power cannot belong to the human soul, which Siger calls a material form in the sense that it has neither an act of existing nor a proper operation apart from its union with the body.

In fact, following the same Aristotelian methodology Aquinas does not disagree with Siger that the intellective power and its operation are immaterial. Their agreement ends here; Aquinas argues that the intellective soul in which the immaterial power is rooted can still be united in existence to the body. To understand his argument, it is necessary to examine how Aquinas reconciles two seemingly contradictory characteristics of the soul: that it is immaterial and thus subsistent; and that it is the substantial form of the body.

For this purpose, I will first provide Aquinas’s argument for the immateriality of the human soul in *Summa theologiae* 1.75.2, where he raises a question of whether the human soul is something subsistent. This article is concerned with showing that the human soul has two important characteristics; immateriality and subsistence. More precisely, the subsistence of the soul is derived from its immateriality.

(A) *The principle of intellectual operation*, which we call the soul of the human being, is a certain incorporeal and subsistent principle. For it is clear that (B) through the intellect the human being can cognize the natures of all corporeal

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things. Now whatever can cognize certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which would be in it naturally would impede the cognition of other things; just as we see that a sick man's tongue, which is infected by a feverish and bitter humor, is not able to perceive anything sweet, but everything seems to be bitter to it. Therefore, if (C) the intellectual principle had within itself the nature of any body, it would be unable to cognize all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. And likewise it is impossible for it to understand through a bodily organ, since the determinate nature of that organ would impede cognition of all bodies. . . . Therefore, (D) the intellectual principle, which is called the mind or the intellect, has in itself an operation in which the body does not share. But nothing can operate in itself unless it subsists in itself. For nothing can operate but what is actual, and so a thing operates according as it is; for this reason we do not say that heat heats, but that something hot heats. We must conclude, therefore, that (E) the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.7

The reply to the article is difficult to understand because of Aquinas's very broad use of expressions such as "the human soul," "intellect," and "mind." In Aquinas's terminology, mind (mens) is typically a synonym for intellect, which is usually his

7 ST 1.75.2c: "[Q]uod est principium intellectualis operationis, quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium incorporeum est subsistens. Manifestum est enim quod homon per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliquam, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura; quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter, impediret cognitionem aliorum; sicut videmus quod lingua infirma quae infecta est cholerico et amaro humor, non potest pericpere aliquid dulce, sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectualum haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere. . . . Ipsum igitur intellectualum principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu; unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est. Propert quod non dicimus quod calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse alicuius incorporeum est subsistens."
name for the distinctive cognitive power of the human soul.\(^8\) Despite this difference, Aquinas seems to identify the intellect or mind with the human soul in (D) and (E). Furthermore, another difficulty arises in Aquinas's use of phrases such as "the principle of intellectual operation" or "the intellectual principle" in (A), (C), and (D). He defines a power as "a thing's principle of operation".\(^9\) However, he does not deny the possibility that the soul, distinct from its powers, might be also called a principle of operation since the soul is the ultimate source of all of a living thing's vital activities: "That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action, but not the proximate principle.\(^{10}\) In Aquinas's terminology, then, the phrase "principle of operation" might be applied to both the intellect and the human soul, even though the intellect is the immediate or proximate principle of operation while the human soul is the first principle of operation. As the title of this article as well as the first sentence explicitly show, however, his aim is to prove the immateriality and subsistence of the human soul. Thus, "the intellect or mind" in the last sentence (E) should be understood as an alternative expression for "the human soul." On this reading, the expressions "the principle of intellectual operation" or "the intellectual principle" should also be considered as referring to the human soul in (A) and (D). Otherwise, the claim that the intellect

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\(^8\) Cf. N. Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Creation*, 233 n. 18.

\(^9\) QDA 12.123 - 27: "... sciemendum est quod potentia nihil aliud est quam principium operationis alicuius, siue sit actio siue passio; non quidem principium quod est subiectum agens aut patiens, set id quo agens agit aut patiens patitur. . . ."
is something subsistent would be flatly incompatible with Aquinas's insistence on the distinction between the soul and its powers: the intellect cannot be subsistent since it is a power of the soul and thus an accidental form.¹¹ As I’ve explained in chapter 1, Aquinas’s tendency to identify the intellective soul with the intellect can be seen in part as the result of his adopting the Averroists’ terminology in the texts directly written for purpose of refuting them.¹² However, the identification of human soul and the intellect cannot be fully explained by this interpretation because the intellect cannot be identical with the human soul in the Averroists’ terminology. Rather, it must be explained by Aquinas’s basic Aristotelian view that the soul is a hierarchical genus, not a divided one, so that each species of soul is denominated by its highest power. If that is the case, the identification of human soul and intellect presupposes the possibility that the human soul might be called by the name of its highest power, the intellect.

In the first part of the reply, Aquinas offers the argument familiar from Aristotle, which is meant to establish that the operation of understanding can only be explained by an immaterial principle whose proper operation is wholly independent of the body. Aquinas’s argument too is based on two claims: (1) that through the intellect a human being can have cognition of the natures of all corporeal things; and (2) that any power that can have cognition of something

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¹⁰ ST 1.77.1 ad 4: “. . . hoc ipsum quod forma accidentalis est actionis principium, habet a forma substantialis. Et ideo forma substantialis est primum actionis principium, sed non proximum.”

¹¹ ST 1.77.1c. Cf. QDA 1 ad 9.

¹² Cf. Chapter 1, sections 2 and 3.
cannot actually possess that thing prior to cognition, since that would impede its apprehension of it. Since any normal bodily organ of cognition must, simply in virtue of its corporeality, be incapable of cognizing some corporeal objects, it follows, given the universal capacity of intellection, that the intellect not only cannot have any corporeal nature of its own but also cannot directly use any bodily organ in performing its activity. Here, we should be careful to note that the terms “intellect” and “the intellectual principle” in (B) and (C) refer to the intellective power rather than the human soul. Aquinas believes that the question of whether or not the human soul is immaterial depends on whether or not the intellect is immaterial. That is to say, if the intellect were immaterial, it would follow that the human soul is immaterial. However, one might doubt the validity of Aquinas’s strategy to derive the immateriality of the human soul from that of the intellect without assuming the identity of the human soul and the intellect, a view which he has already rejected. Aquinas holds that the human soul is the ultimate source of all human activities. Thus, it is clear that the human soul possesses material powers which perform their vegetative or sensitive activities by means of a bodily organ. If that is the case, there must be a missing premise in Aquinas’s inference that if the intellect is immaterial, then the human soul is immaterial: namely that the human soul is immaterial if it has at least one operation or one power which has nothing in common with the body.\(^{13}\) On this reading, Aquinas’s argument might be reformulated as follows:

\(^{13}\) ST 1.75.3c; 1.77.5c.
(a) If the human soul has at least one immaterial power and one immaterial operation, then the human soul will be immaterial.

(b) The human soul has one immaterial power and one immaterial operation.

(c) Therefore, the human soul is immaterial.

In the second part of the reply, Aquinas attempts to derive the subsistence of the human soul from its immateriality. He believes that if a hylemorphic composite does not have any immaterial operation, then its act of existence belongs directly to the composite of matter and form. But if it has some immaterial operation, then its formal component must possess existence independently from its material component. On this view, Aquinas argues that if the intellective soul operates independently of matter, it must exist independently of matter. The principle upon which this inference is dependent is "operatio sequitur esse." To know whether anything is subsistent, we must examine the operations that proceed from it. For operation and being are convertible, and thus the mode of operation manifests the mode of existing, although being may be ontologically prior to operation.

According to Aquinas, anything is called subsistent if it exists in itself and not in another as its subject. Thus, the human soul's subsistence establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for its existing apart from the body. At this

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14 QDP 9.1c; ST 1.29.2c.
point, subsistence plays a very important role in Aquinas's theory because it is
the foundation for his claim that the human soul is incorruptible. The difficulty the
subsistence thesis poses for Aquinas's theory is that it threatens the basic
Aristotelian picture of human nature which upholds the unity of the human being.
Aquinas explicitly rejects any attempt to identify the human being with the human
soul by appealing to Aristotle's view that the soul is the substantial form of the
body.\(^{15}\) Nevertheless, the subsistence thesis does not seem to demand the
union of body and soul. Aquinas recognizes that there is an obvious objection to
describing the human soul as something subsistent: “That which is subsistent is
said to be \textit{this particular thing}. Now \textit{this particular thing} is not the soul but a
composite of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent.”\(^{16}\)
Aquinas considers the term “\textit{this particular thing}” to signify an individual in the
genus of substance, which he in turn identifies as Aristotle's primary
substance.\(^ {17}\) Of course, Aquinas does not intend to reject the view that the
composite of body and soul is indeed something subsistent.\(^ {18}\) What then is
meant by saying that the human soul is something subsistent? Aquinas replies:

\(^{15}\) SCG 2.57; ST 1.75.4.

\(^{16}\) ST 1.75.2 obj. 1: “Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima autem non est
hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et corpore. Ergo anima non est aliquid
subsistens.”

\(^ {17}\) Aristotle, \textit{Categories}, 5, 3b10 - 23.

\(^ {18}\) In his discussion of the definition of “person (persona)”, Aquinas makes clear that the
human soul cannot be called an individual substance or a \textit{hypostasis}. See ST 1.29.1 ad
5: “Dicendum quod anima est pars humanae speciei; et ideo, licet sit separata, quia
tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis, non potest dici substantia individua quae est
hypostasis vel substantia prima; sicut nec manus, nec quaecumque alia partium
hominis. Et sic non competit ei neque definitio oersonae, neque nomen.”
This particular thing can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called this particular thing in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, since the human soul is a part of human nature, it can be called this particular thing in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for this sense the composite of body and soul is said to be this particular thing.¹⁹

Aquinas's point is this: to say that anything is this particular thing means (1) in a weak sense that the thing in question does not inhere in another in the sense of inhering in the other in the manner of an accident or material form; (2) in a strong sense it means that the thing is not only not inherent but also not by its nature a part of something which is complete in a specific nature. A hand, for instance, does not inhere in anything in the way that an accident or material form does. However, it cannot be said to be complete in a specific nature because it is only a part of the human body. Thus, the hand satisfies (1) but not (2) and so counts as this particular thing only broadly speaking. Likewise, Aquinas observes that the human soul does not possess in itself a complete specific nature and is a part of the human composite which is indeed this particular thing. However, since

¹⁹ ST 1.75.2 ad 1: "Dicendum quod hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo, pro quocumque subsistente; alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inhaerentiam accidentis et forma materialis; secundo mod, excludit imperfectionionem partis. Unde manus posser dici hoc aliquid primo modo sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cun anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo; sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid."
the human soul possess at least the first of the characteristics of this particular thing, it can be called to be this particular thing only broadly speaking.

Does Aquinas's hand example in this reply give a sufficient explanation for showing that despite its incomplete specific nature, the human soul can be called to be subsistent? If the soul is subsistent in only the broad sense that a hand is subsistent, then this establishes nothing about the soul's ability to exist apart from the body, since a hand cannot exist as a hand apart from the body. The two senses of "subsistent" here thus seem insufficient to show that there is such a thing as something that is both incomplete in a specific nature and able to exist independently of the whole composite of which it is a part. Furthermore, Aquinas's claim that the human soul is the substantial form of the body seems to be inconsistent with his subsistence thesis since while anything is called subsistent if it exists in itself and not in another as its subject, the human soul as the substantial form of the body does not exist in itself but exists in another, that is to say, in the body as its subject.²⁰

How does Aquinas harmonize the conception of the human soul as the form of the body with his subsistence thesis? A detailed answer may be found in the first question of the Quaestiones de anima, where he raises the question "Can the human soul be both a form and this particular thing?"²¹ This particular thing has two requirements: Something is an individual in the genus of

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²⁰ QDP 9.1c; ST 1.29.2c.

²¹ For a detailed discussion of this subject, See B. Bazán, "The Human Soul: Form and Substance. Thomas Aquinas's Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism," 95 - 126.
substance, strictly speaking, if and only if (1) “it can subsist on its own” and so is not in something else as its subject; and (2) it is something complete in some species and genus of substance. Here, it is worth noting that Aquinas’s description of the first requirement is slightly modified: anything is called this particular thing even if it only has a potentiality to subsist on its own rather than only if it actually subsists on its own. Thus, the meaning of subsistence is not flatly compatible with the claim that the soul is the form of the body since it is Aquinas’s contention that although the human soul does not actually subsist in the embodied state, it will eventually become subsistent after the death of the body.

Following the principle that a thing’s mode of existence can be known by its proper operation, Aquinas derives the human soul’s subsistence from its proper operation, intellection, in which the body does not share. That is to say, if the human soul is able to operate per se, it must also be able to exist per se. Thus, the human soul possesses an independent or complete per se act of existing which is not dependent on its body. On this view, Aquinas argues that the human soul, unlike other material forms, does not exist simply as a result of

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22 QDA 1.197 - 200: “Individuum autem in genere substantie non solum habet ut per se possit subsistere, set quod sit aliquid completum in aliqua specie et genere substantie.” See also In DA 2.1.108 - 14 (2.1.215): “... anima autem rationalis quantum ad aliquid potest dici hoc aliquid, secundum hoc quod potest esse per se subsistens, set quia non habet speciem completam set magis est pars speciei, non omnino competit ei quod sit hoc aliquid.”
its composition with matter; rather it has its own act of existing and nevertheless shares its act of existing with the body.\footnote{Ibid., 1 ad 1: "... licet anima habeat esse cornpletum, non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur, tum quia illud idem esse quod est anime communicatur corpori ut sit unum esse totius compositi. ..." See also ST 1.76.1 ad 5.}

How can the human soul be the form of the body while remaining subsistent? It is very important to note that Aquinas's answer is based on a distinction between intellection considered as such and our concrete activities of intellection. Intellection as such is not an operation that is carried out through the body. However, our concrete activities of intellection are the joint activities of two kinds of powers, the immaterial intellect and material senses. In order to show that these concrete activities require the body, Aquinas holds that the human soul is not complete in nature by appealing to the principle that the nature of the soul can be known through its proper operation.

But insofar as the soul by nature acquires its immaterial cognition from material things, it is clear that the fulfillment of its species cannot be achieved without union with the body. For a thing is not complete in nature unless it possesses those things which are necessary for the proper operation of its species.\footnote{Ibid., 1.331 - 35: "In quantum uero immaterialem cognitionem ex materiali nata est acquirere, manifestum est quod complementum sue speciei esse non potest absque corporis unione. Non enim aliquid completum est in specie nisi habeat ea quae requiruntur ad propriam operationem speciei."}

Our concrete activities of intellection involve sensation, which is necessarily material in its organs and operations, since the proper objects of human intellection are the quiddities of material things. That is to say, insofar as
immaterial forms are beyond the grasp of human cognition in this life and thus human intellection depends ultimately on sensation, the human soul is not able to perform intellection without turning to phantasms which cannot exist apart from the body. Furthermore, Aquinas explains that in order to get its access to phantasms, the human soul needs sense powers which cannot perform their activities without bodily organs:

[S]ince the human soul’s act of understanding needs powers - namely imagination and sense - which function through bodily organ, this itself shows that the soul is naturally united to the body in order to complete the human species.

The fact that the human soul cannot perform its proper operation without the body reveals that it cannot retain its nature without the body. Accordingly, Aquinas concludes that it is proper to the soul, according to the very condition of its nature, to be united to the body which could be the fitting organ of sense.

25 Cf. ST 1.84.7: “Intellectus autem humani, qui est conjunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens. . . .”

26 SCG 2.68.1459: “Quia . . . ipsum intelligere animae humanae indiget potentiis quae per quaedam organa corporalicia operantur, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso declaratur quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad compleundam speciem humanam.”

27 QDA 7.311 - 21: “. . . unde ad proprium operationem indiget ut fiat in actu formarum intelligibilium, acquirendo eas per sensitivas potentias a rebus exterioribus. Et cum operatio sensus sit per organum corporale, ex ipsa conditio sua nature competit ei quod corpori uniatur et quod sit pars speciei humane, non habens in se speciem completam.” Cf. ST 1.76.5c: “. . . unde oportuit quod anima intellectiva non solum haberet virtutem intelligendi, sed etiam virtutem sentiendi. Actio autem sensus non fit sine corpore instrumento. Oportuit igitur animam intellectivam corpori uni, quod possit esse conveniens organum sensus.”
That is why the soul has the body as its subject although it does not depend on the body for its existence.\textsuperscript{28}

To sum up, Aquinas argues that the soul is a subsistent form by drawing a distinction between intellection considered as such and our concrete activities of human intellection. The reason for arguing the subsistence of the human soul is that intellection considered as such does not require any body. On the other hand, he argues that the soul is united to the body since our concrete activities of human intellection require the joint activities of two kinds of powers and thus require the body.\textsuperscript{29} To put it differently, since the human soul possesses an intellect which performs intellection without using any bodily organ, it must be immaterial and subsistent. On the other hand, since the human soul possesses sense powers which performs its activities through bodily organs, it must be united to the body. This character of the human soul makes it very special among created beings. The human soul is different from material forms in that it possesses an operation which can occur without the body. On the other hand, the human soul is different from the separate substances since it possesses sense powers using bodily organs and cannot perform its proper operation

\textsuperscript{28} SCG 2.81.1624: "Esse quidem animae humanae dum est corpori unita, esti sit absolutum a corpore non dependens, tamen stramentum quoddam ipsius et subiectum ipsum recipients est corpus."

\textsuperscript{29} In QDA q. 8, Aquinas explicitly states that the union of soul and body is a consequence of the soul’s nature rather than its cause. See QDA 8.199 - 206: "Si igitur propter hoc anima humana unibilis est corpori, quia indiget accipere species intelligibiles a rebus mediante sensu, necessarium est quod corpus, cui anima rationalis unitur, tale sit ut possit esse aptissimum ad representandum species sensibiles ex quibus intellectu species intelligibiles resulent. Sic igitur oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur esse optime dispositum ad sentiendum."
without depending on phantasms.\textsuperscript{30} This special character of the human soul is described by Aquinas through the horizon metaphor which depicts a boundary between material forms and separate substances: "the human soul is established on the borderline between corporeal and separated substances."\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{30} On the other hand, to show its intermediate status, Aquinas sometimes holds that the human soul is located at the highest in the order of material forms and at the lowest in the separated substances. QDA 9.275 - 76: "... anima rationalis sit perfectissima formarum materialium..."; In QDSC 5, where he deals with the question of whether there is any created spiritual substance that is not united to the body, Aquinas argues that the human soul is located at the lowest in the order of spiritual substances which also includes God and angels. For a detailed discussion of the immateriality of spiritual substances, see Mark Jordan, "The Order of Lights: Aquinas on Immateriality as Hierarchy," \textit{Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association} 52 (1978): 112 - 20.

\textsuperscript{31} QDA 1.337 - 41: "Sic igitur anima humana in quantum unitur corpori ut forma et tamen habet esse eleatum supra corpus, non dependens ab eo, manifestum est quod ipsa est in confinio corporalium et separatiarum substantiarum constituta;" SCG 2.68.1453: "Et inde est quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quasi quidam horizon et confinium corporeorum et incorporeorum, inquantum est substantia incorporea, corporis tamen forma." But in SCG 2.81.1625, Aquinas's intention in using the metaphor is slightly different: When it is separated from the body, the human soul reaches up to what is highest (\textit{recedens ab infimo appropinquat ad summum}.) Aquinas also applies the horizon metaphor to the human being and all of the powers of the soul except the intellective soul. For his use of this metaphor applied to the human being, see In Sent 3. Prol: "Homo enim est quasi horizon et confinum spiritualis et corporalis naturae, ut quasi medium inter utrasque, utrasque bonitates participet et corporales et spiritualles." For a more detailed discussion of this metaphor applied to the human being, see G. Verbeke, "Man as a 'Frontier' according to Aquinas," in G. Verbeke and O. Verhelst, eds., \textit{Aquinas and Problems of His Time} (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1976), 195 - 99. Aquinas uses this metaphor to depict the duality of powers in the soul in ST 1.77.2c, where he notes that one of the reasons for the multiplicity of powers in the human soul is its intermediate status: "Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum; videlicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et ideo concurrent in ipsa virtutes utramque creaturarum."
2. Can the Human Soul Have an Immaterial Intellect?

In the preceding section, I explained the two important characteristics of the human soul in Aquinas's philosophical psychology, immateriality and subsistence. What is meant by his claim that the human soul is immaterial? Clearly, this claim cannot mean that the human soul does not have matter as its integral part, since no form has matter as its integral part and thus this claim would not distinguish the human soul from any other form.\(^{32}\) Rather, it means that the human soul possesses the ability to perform its proper operation without the body. What is meant by his claim that the human soul is subsistent? This claim cannot mean that it actually exists apart from matter in this life insofar as the human soul is not a separate substance. Rather it means that the human soul possesses its own act of existing which it shares with body. Thus, although it does not actually exist apart from the body, it will be able to exist apart from the body after the death of the body as separate substances do.

In this regard, it cannot be denied that the human soul's ability to operate without the body plays an important role in Aquinas's philosophical psychology since it is a foundation for his claim that human soul is subsistent and incorruptible: if the human soul possesses the ability to operate without the body, then it must possess the ability to exist without the body; if the human soul is

\(^{32}\) To claim that the human soul does not have matter as its integral part is the same as to say that the human soul is simple. Aquinas's argument for the human soul's simplicity is intended to refute the doctrine of universal hylemorphism which holds that all beings, except God alone, are composed in some way from matter and form. However, Aquinas sometimes use simplicity and immateriality interchangeably. Cf. SCG 2.50.
able to exist without the body, then it will actually exist without the body after the
death of the body.

In this section, I will raise the question of whether or not the ability to
operate without the body is appropriate to the nature of the human soul on
Aquinas's account. To put it differently, the question is whether the human soul
can have the intellect as its power, since to say that the human soul possesses
the ability to operate without the body is the same as to claim that it possesses
the intellective power. Siger would offer a negative answer since he believes that
the human soul is essentially the form of the body and cannot have an
immaterial intellect as its power.

First of all, it is worth noting that both Aquinas and Siger attempt to
examine the nature of the soul on the basis of the Aristotelian methodology that
the nature of the soul cannot be known except through its operations.
Nonetheless, their applications of this principle are fundamentally different. For
Aquinas, the immaterial status of the human soul is established by the claim that
the soul possesses the ability to perform an activity without using any bodily
organ. For Siger, by contrast, the human soul is not immaterial. Rather, the
material status of the human soul is shown from its operations which cannot take
place without bodily organs. Siger's point is that if one accepts Aristotle's
definition that the human soul is by its nature the act of the body, it is necessary
to hold that every activity of the soul is carried out by means of a bodily organ
and every power of the soul must be the act of some part of the body. However,
the intellective power performs its activity without using any bodily organ. The
immateriality of the intellect leads Siger to conclude that it is not a power of the human soul. Consequently, the human soul possessing the material operations and powers is ontologically different from the intellective soul possessing only an immaterial operation and power. That is why Siger does not accept the Thomistic claim that the human soul is immaterial and subsistent. His counter-argument might be summarized as follows:

(1) If any formal element in a hylemorphic substance is the actuality of matter and thus exists in matter (or is inseparable from matter), then that form is a material form.

What Siger means by a “material form” is that this form cannot perform its proper operation without matter and totally depends on matter for its existence.

(2) The human soul is the actuality of matter and thus exists in matter.

(3) Therefore, the human soul is a material form.

Does Aquinas accept this line of reasoning? First, it is obvious that he would find the minor premise true on his account of the human soul as

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33 Aquinas presents the Sigerian critique as follows: “Amplius omne illud cuius esse est in materia, oportet esse materiale. Sed si substantia intellectualis est forma corporis, oportet quod esse eius sit in materia corporali: non enim esse formae est praeter esse materiae. Sequitur igitur quod substantia intellectualis non sit immaterialis (SCG 2.56.1323).”
substantial form, which holds that since the soul is united to the body as its substantial form, it must necessarily be in the whole body and in each part thereof.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, Aquinas writes:

\begin{quote}
The soul is the actuality of an organic body. . . . As regards its essence, in accordance with which it is the form of the body, the soul is, therefore, in the whole body. . . .\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

Our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter.\textsuperscript{36}

However, Aquinas does not find the Averroistic reasoning valid because he takes the major premise to be false. He does not believe that whatever is inseparable from matter must be a material form because an exception can be made in the case of the human soul:

[F]rom the fact that the intellectual substance [the human soul] is in matter it does not follow that it is a material form, because that soul is not present in matter in the sense of being embedded in it or wholly enveloped by it. . . .\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} ST 1.76.8c.

\textsuperscript{35} SCG 2.72.1483: “Anima . . . est actus corporis organici. . . . Est igitur in toto corpore, . . . secundum suam essentiam, secundum quam est forma corporis. Cf. ST 1.76.1 ad 1: “Sed in materia est, in quantum ipsa anima cuius est haec virtus, est corporis forma. . . .” Aquinas also argues that since the soul is the actuality or form of the body, it must be inseparable from the body. See In DA 2.2.142 - 52 (2.2.242).

\textsuperscript{36} ST 1.12.11c: “Anima autem nostra, quanidiu in hac vita vivimus, habet esse in materiali corporali.”

\textsuperscript{37} SCG 2.69.1463: “Non autem oportet substantia intellectualis esse formam materialem, quamvis esse eius sit in materia. . . . Non enim est in materia sicut materiae immersa, vel a materia totaliter comprehensa. . . .”
What is most interesting here is that Aquinas's insistence on the immateriality of the human soul is expressed in a partial negative proposition: the human soul is not wholly material. His frequent use of this expression is made in a wide variety of works including his direct response to the Averroists.\(^{38}\)

What is Aquinas's reason for holding that the human is not wholly material? It is because one of the soul's operations is immaterial: "the human soul is not a form totally circumscribed by matter, as is clear from the fact that one of the soul's operations is beyond matter."\(^{39}\) The reason for upholding the immateriality of the human soul is the same as the reason for the claim that it is not wholly material. When Aquinas says that one of the soul's operations is immaterial, he seems to leave open the possibility that the other operations might not transcend matter and thus be material. In fact, Aquinas concedes that the human soul can perform one immaterial operation, but requires the body to perform all the rest.

At this point, one might object that Aquinas's argument for the immateriality of the human soul does not seem to stay strictly within the Aristotelian methodology that requires that the nature of the soul be understood through its powers or operations. For it would be possible to hold that the human

\(^{38}\) ST 1.76.1 ad 4: "Dicendum quod humana anima non est forma in materia corporali immersa, vel ab ea totaliter comprehensa, propter suam perfectionem"; QDA 1 ad 5: "[Q]uiam anima humana non est forma a materia totaliter comprehensa"; QDSC 2c: "[O]portet quod esse animae humanae superexcedat materiam corporalem, et non sit totaliter comprehensum ab ipsa, sed tamem aliquo modo attingatur ab ea."

\(^{39}\) QDA 1 ad 5: "[A]nimae humanae non est forma a materia totaliter comprehensa, quod patet ex hoc quod aliqua eius operatio est supra materiam."
soul is in a certain sense material insofar as some operations of the human soul are carried out through bodily organs. How is it possible that the human soul can be immaterial although it possesses some powers which perform their activities through bodily organs? This objection does not seem to be fatal to Aquinas's argument if we note his view that there is only one substantial form, the intellective soul, in each human being, and that the powers of the soul are hierarchically ordered. For this reason, he sometimes holds that the intellective soul is denominated by its highest power, the intellective power. Accordingly, if there is only one substantial form whose highest power is immaterial, then that form must be immaterial in virtue of that power. Hence, it would not be impossible to infer something about the nature of the human soul from the nature of the highest power, given the unicity of substantial form.

At this point, Aquinas's argument for the immateriality of the human soul can be summarized as follows: he derives the immateriality of the human soul from its highest power which performs its proper operation without the body by appealing to the principle "operatio sequitur formam," which means that a thing's nature can be known from its mode of proper operation. Next, the subsistence thesis is based on the principle, "operatio sequitur esse," which means that a

40 QDSC 3c; ST 1.76.1c; 1.76.4c.

41 ST 1.79.1 ad 1.

42 Cf. SCG 2.73.1493: "Propria enim operati cuiuslibet rei consequitur et demonstrat speciem ipsius"; ST 1.76.1c: "Natura enim uniuscuiusque rei ex eius operatione ostenditur"; ST 1.89.1c.
thing's mode of existence can be known from its mode of proper operation.\textsuperscript{43} If
the highest power of the human soul can perform its proper operation without the
body, the soul can exist independently of the body. At this point, it would seem
natural to infer that since both a thing's mode of existence and its nature can be
known from its mode of proper operation, that thing's nature can also be known
from its mode of existence. In fact, Aquinas concedes that there is a
proportionality among operation, existence, and nature: "a thing's operation
manifests its substance and its being, since a thing operates inasmuch as it is a
being, and its proper operation follows upon its proper nature."\textsuperscript{44} Thus, if
anything can operate independently of the body, then it should be complete with
respect to both nature and existence apart from the body; conversely if anything
cannot operate independently of the body, then it should be incomplete with
respect to both existence and nature without the body.

Aquinas's subsistence thesis means that the human soul has a complete
mode of existence. Does he then infer that it has a complete nature from its
having a complete mode of existence? The reason for the claim that the human
soul has a complete mode of existence is that its highest power can perform its
proper operation without the body. It would thus seem natural to infer that if the
human soul possess this immaterial power, then it must have a complete nature

\textsuperscript{43} ST 1.75.2c. Cf. QDA 1.245 - 46: "Et quia unumquodque agit secundum quod est
actu. . ."; QDSC 2c: "Et quia esse rei proportionatur eius operationi . . . cum
unumquodque operetur secundum quod est ens"; see also SCG 2.47.1239.

\textsuperscript{44} SCG 2.79.1600: "[O]peratio enim rei demonstrat substantiam et esse ipsius: quia
unumquod que operatur secundum quod est ens, et propria operatio rei sequitur
propriam ipsius naturam." Cf. SCG 2.68.1454; ST 1.89.1c.
without depending on the body, even though it requires the body to perform all
the other material operations. However, Aquinas is not willing to draw that
inference:

[Although the soul has a complete existence . . . still it does
not possess a complete nature, but the body is joined to it for
the completion of its nature.]

To be consistent, Aquinas must argue that if the human soul has the ability to
operate without the body, then it must have a complete nature as well as a
complete mode of existence. However, the proportionality thesis seems to be
incompatible with the claim that the human soul is a subsistent form, since this
claim allows that one and the same thing might be complete with respect to
being, yet incomplete with respect to nature. Is it possible to say that the
human soul is the form of the body and at the same time subsistent?

The origin of this incompatibility seems to lie in Aquinas's account of what
the human soul's proper operation is. On the one hand, he seems to argue that
the human soul has a complete mode of existence since it can perform its proper
operation without using any bodily organ. On the other hand, he seems to hold
that the human soul has an incomplete nature since it cannot perform its proper
operation without using any bodily organ. Thus, Aquinas's claim that the human

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45 QDA 1 ad 1: "[L]icet anima habeat esse completum . . . non tamen habet speciem
completam sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei."

46 A similar charge that Aquinas is inconsistent is made by G. Coulter, "Aquinas on the
Identity of Mind and Substantial Form," *Proceedings of the American Catholic
soul is a subsistent form seems to presuppose the contradictory claim that the human soul can perform its proper operation without the body and at the same time cannot perform its proper operation without the body.

It is clear that intellection is the proper operation of the human soul on Aquinas's account. Can it be then said that the human soul does not require the body in performing its activity of intellection if its mode of proper operation is a consequence of its nature? As Aquinas himself argues, those who wish to offer an affirmative reply will have the absurd conclusion that the separate substances and human souls belong to a single species. By appealing to the principle that since a thing's proper operation indicates its nature, a thing's nature can be known through its proper operation, he writes:

Now, understanding is the proper operation of the separate substance and of the intellective soul. But these two have an utterly different mode of understanding; the soul understands by receiving from phantasms; the separate substance does not, since it has no corporeal organs - which are the necessary loci of phantasms.47

Here, Aquinas does not deny that intellection is proper to both separate substances and intellective souls. Nevertheless, their modes of intellection are fundamentally different since the separate substances do not have any bodily organs and their activities of intellection do not involve sensation and

47 SCG 2.94.1805: "Ex propria operatione rei percipitur species eius: operatio enim demonstrat virtutem, quae indicat essentiam. Propria autem operatio substantiae separatae et animae intellectivae est intelligere. Est autem omnino alius modus intelligendi substantiae separatae et animae: nam anima intelligit a phantasmatisbus accipiendo; non autem substantia separata, cum non habeat organo corporea, in quibus oportet esse phantasmata."
imagination, whereas the human soul's nature is not complete without the body and thus it cannot carry out intellection without turning to phantasms, and without material powers through which phantasms are prepared for abstraction. Hence, Aquinas concludes that the human soul and the separate substances are not of the same species. Because of their different modes of proper operation, the human soul and the separate substances have different modes of being and nature. That is to say, while the separate substances have complete natures and do not share their existence with any body, the human soul cannot retain its nature without the body and shares its existence with the body. 48

To sum up, the fact that the separate substances can perform intellection without the body entails that they have complete natures. By contrast, the human soul's incomplete nature is shown by its mode of proper operation, intellection, which cannot be carried out without the body. If my reasoning is correct, the ability to operate without the body is not appropriate to the nature of the human soul insofar as Aquinas upholds that the soul is by nature the form of the body. It is my contention that every operation of the human soul is carried out through the body on Aquinas's account. First, it is no doubt that sensation requires the body: "the soul senses nothing without the body, because the action of sensation

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48 SCG 2.94.1803: "Unaquaeque res habet proprium esse secundum rationem suae speciei: quorum enim est diversa ration essendi, horum est diversa species. Esse autem animae humanae et substantiae separatae non est unius rationis : nam in esse substantiae separatae non potest communicare corpus, sicut potest communicare in esse animae humanae, quae secundum esse unitur igitur humana differt specie a substantantiis separatis."
cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ.\textsuperscript{49} Furthermore, Aquinas says that even the human soul's intellection requires the body since it requires the material powers through which phantasms are prepared. Some might object to my claim that every operation of the soul is carried out through the body. For Aquinas repeatedly holds that intellection as such is not an operation that is carried out through the body. Of course, I recognize that the intellective power as such can perform intellection without using a bodily organ. However, Aquinas argues that the human soul's nature is not complete without the body, and that it cannot perform intellection without using bodily organs even though the intellect can perform such an immaterial operation. Thus, my objection is not concerned with how the intellect can perform an immaterial operation. Rather, it is how the human soul, incomplete in nature, can have such an immaterial power or immaterial operation if the human soul's proper operation is a consequence of its nature.

In fact, Aquinas anticipates this kind of objection that the human soul cannot have any ability to operate without the body given his account of the nature of the human soul. In dealing the objection that since the human soul cannot have its proper operation without the body, it cannot be subsistent, he replies:

The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its organ, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a

\textsuperscript{49} ST 1.77.5 ad 3: "... [anima] nihil sentit sine corpore, quia actio sentiendi non potest procedere ab anima nisi per organum corporale."
dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent...⁵⁰

Once again, Aquinas’s point is that intellection as such is not an operation that is carried out through a bodily organ. That is to say, the intellect does not directly use any bodily organ in performing its activity even though it does depend for its data, phantasms, on the operation of bodily organs of material powers. Clearly, Aquinas’s reply here presupposes that the intellect is a power of the human soul. However, note that the human soul has to use bodily organs in performing intellection even though the intellect’s activity of intellection does not require any bodily organ. I do not find that Aquinas’s reply is convincing. Furthermore, it would be helpful to contrast the intellect and the human soul with respect to their relationships with the body. According to Aquinas, the intellect does not require the body for its subject or instrument, but only for its object. This means that the intellect cannot directly use any bodily organ in its activity and thus have any ontological relationship with the body. Accordingly, it is ontologically separable from the body. Nevertheless, the body shares in the activity of intellection from the side of object, for phantasms are related to the intellect in the same way that colors are related to sight.⁵¹ However, this is not the case with the human soul.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 1.75.2 ad 3: “Dicendum quod corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione objecti; phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum. Sic autem indigere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsistentem...” See also QDA 1 ad 11: “[I]ntelligere est propria operatio anime si consideretur principium a quo egreditur operatio. Non enim egreditur ab anima mediante organo corporali, sicut usio mediante oculo. Communicat tamen in ea corpus ex parte objecti, nam fantasmata, que sunt objecta intellectus, sine corporeis organis esse non possunt.”

⁵¹ Cf. In DA 1.2.46 - 81 (1.2.19 - 20).
The human soul cannot retain its nature without the body. Aquinas infers from the very nature of the human soul that it shares its existence with the body. Accordingly, the human soul has a natural tendency to exist in the body, and is not ontologically separable from the body. In addition, the human soul’s mode of proper operation is a consequence of its nature. The human soul needs the body for its organic activities even in performing intellection since it cannot perform intellection without material powers using bodily organs. That is why Aquinas holds that the human soul exists in the body as its subject, even though the intellect does not have the body as its subject. If that is the case, it would be hard to accept Aquinas’s presupposition that the intellect is a power of the human soul.

For Aquinas, the question of whether the human soul is immaterial or subsistent depends on whether or not it possess the ability to operate without the body. If this ability is not appropriate to the nature of the human soul, then it would be impossible to infer from this ability the soul's immateriality and subsistence. If my reasoning is correct, Aquinas's argument for the incorruptibility of the human soul is also open to criticism. If the human soul without the body cannot have natural cognition of anything, then this would lead to the conclusion that no operation can remain in the soul if it is separated from the body, and thus there is no reason to believe other than that the soul will cease to exist after the death of the body. In replying to this kind of objection, Aquinas holds that the objection is false since the operations such as intellection and volition that are not exercised through bodily organs do remain after the
death of the body. That is to say, immaterial powers such as will and intellect will remain in the soul even though material powers will be destroyed after the death of the body. However, Aquinas must answer to the question of whether such operations or powers are appropriate to the nature of the human soul. If the human soul cannot by its nature carry out intellection without turning to phantasms and thus without using bodily organs, how can it perform its activities in separation from the body? To solve this difficulty, Aquinas appeals to the principle that the mode of operation in every agent follows from the mode of its being. He answers that the mode of operation belonging to an embodied soul is altogether different from that belonging to a separated soul, because the former cannot perform its proper operation without the body, while the latter can perform without the body. Thus, the soul, as united to the body and as separated from it, has different modes of being because a thing's mode of operation follows its mode of being, even though its nature remains the same.

The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of being, has a mode of understanding by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding by turning to pure intelligibles, as is proper to

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52 SCG 2.81; ST 1.89.1c; QDA 15. There seems to be a textual development in the arguments given by Aquinas at different stages in his life. In SCG 2.81, he explains that when the human soul is separated from the body, it can perform its own operation apart from the body as separate substances do. For the human soul will enjoy another mode of being with a correspondingly more perfect mode of cognition, which is more conformable with the soul's nature. Yet, in ST 1.89.1, Aquinas apparently contradicts the earlier position in SCG by asserting that the separated soul's operations are less perfect than those of the embodied soul and are even against its nature because it is not proper to the human soul to perform its own operation apart from the body. For a detailed discussion of this subject, see Anton C. Pegis, "The Separated Soul and its Nature in St. Thomas," in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274 - 1974: Commemorative Studies, 2 vols. (Toronto: PIMS, 1974), 1: 131 - 57.
other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasms, as it is for it to be joined to the body. But to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it. That is why it is united to the body in order that it may have a mode of being and operation suitable to its nature.\(^53\)

On this view, Aquinas concludes that the separated soul is capable of some minimal intellecuction analogous to the knowledge of pure spirits. Such a mode of operation without the body is, however, above and beyond the soul's nature. The last sentence in this passage thus shows the inconsistency of Aquinas's claim that the human soul is complete with respect to existence, yet is incomplete with respect to nature. Here, he argues that the embodied mode of being and operation is natural to the soul. That is to say, the human soul's dependence on the body for its proper operation and its union with the body for its existence are natural to the soul. On the other hand, the ability to operate without the body is something beyond the nature of the soul. Intellecuction as such takes place in a state that is against the human soul's nature.\(^54\) Accordingly, nothing in the

\(^{53}\) ST 1.89.1c: "Animae igitur secundum illum modum essendi quo corpori est unita, competit modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata corporum, quae in corporeis organis sunt; cum autem fuerit a corpore separata, competit ei modus intelligendi per conversionem ad ea quae sunt intelligibilia simpliciter, sicut et aliis substantiis separatis. Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse separatam a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam. Ed ideo ad hoc initi corpori, ut sic operetur secundum naturam suam."

\(^{54}\) Cf. SCG 4.79: "Manifestum est . . . quod anima corpori naturaliter unitur: est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse." [Italics mine.]
nature of the soul provides a ground for demonstrating that the human soul can possess an intellect which can perform intellecction without the body.

3. Aquinas's Reply to Siger's Critique

In this section, I will examine whether Aquinas has an adequate alternative to Siger's critique that the intellect cannot be a power of the human soul which is the substantial form of the body.

Following Aristotle in De anima 3.4, Siger does not disagree with Aquinas that if the intellect can have cognition of the nature of all bodies, then it not only cannot have any corporeal nature of its own but also cannot directly use any bodily organ in performing its activity. Furthermore, their agreement is found in the reasoning that our ability for receiving immaterial and universal forms entails the immateriality of the intellect. Since they take it as a datum of experience that we have cognition of immaterial universals, it follows that there must be a corresponding immaterial power.55

Despite their initial agreement, Siger's and Aquinas's views are fundamentally different with respect to the ontological status of the intellect. Siger cannot find any reasons for admitting the possibility that the immaterial intellect might be a metaphysical constituent of a human being and thus a power of the human soul. Insofar as the human soul, as the act of matter, has the

55 For Aquinas's argument, see QDV 10.8; QDA 14. For Siger's argument, see QIIIDA q. 4.
natural tendency to exist in matter, it cannot perform its proper operation without a bodily organ. Thus, the immaterial power cannot have its basis in the human soul.

How is it possible that the soul is the act of the body, and a power of the soul is not the act of the body? This question was a source of the controversy between Aquinas and Siger. Siger’s objection against Aquinas’s view is based on the principle that no power can be more immaterial than its substance. According to Siger, the intellect cannot be more immaterial than the intellective soul on Aquinas’s account of the distinction between the essence of the soul and its powers, which asserts that all the powers of the soul flow from its essence and are effects of the soul, as a cause. However, Siger argues that if the intellect is a power of the human soul, this would breach the principle that no power can be more immaterial than its substance, since the intellect cannot be the act of the body, while the human soul is the act of the body.

In several places, Aquinas deals with the objection which shows the impossibility that the embodied soul might possess an immaterial intellect. First of all, the following argument in the De unitate intellectus is the contemporary Thomists’ favorite evidence, through which they argue for Aquinas’s philosophical victory over Siger.56 It is clear that Aquinas has Siger in mind as an unnamed adversary.

But if it be objected against this that a power of the soul cannot be more immaterial or more simple than the soul's essence, the reasoning would proceed soundly if the essence of the human soul were the form of matter in such a way that it would not exist through its own act of existing, but through the act of existing of the composite, as is true of other forms which of themselves have neither the act of existing nor an operation apart from their union with matter; and on that account they are said be to immersed in matter. But the human soul exists by its own act of existing, in which matter in some way shares [though] not wholly comprising it, since the dignity of this form is greater than the capacity of matter; nothing therefore prevents the soul from having some operation or power that matter cannot reach.\footnote{Du\'i 3.84: \textquotedblright Si autem contra hoc obiiciatur, quod potentia animae non potest esse immaterialior aut simplicior quam eius essentia: optime quidem procederet ratio si essentia humanae animae sic esset forma materiae, quod non per esse suum esse, sed per esse compositi, sicut est de aliis formis, quae secundum se nec esse nec operationem habent praeter communicationem materiae, quae propter hoc materiae immersae dicuntur. Anima autem humana, quia secundum suum esse est, cui aliquid alter communicat materia non totaliter comprehendens ipsam, eo quod maior est dignitas huius formae quam capacitas materiae; nihil prohibet quin habeat aliquam operationem vel virtutem ad quam materia non attingit.	extquotedblleft}}
valid since it fails to see the peculiar character of the human soul. Aquinas’s
defense might be reformulated as follows:

(1) If the intellective soul is a subsistent form, then it can have an immaterial
power.

(2) The intellective soul is a subsistent form.

(3) Therefore, the intellective soul can have an immaterial power.

The soundness of the argument seems to hinge on whether or not the
intellective soul is a subsistent form. However, the question of whether the
intellective soul is a subsistent form depends on whether it possesses an
immaterial power: the unusual character of human soul as a subsistent form
cannot be proved until it is shown that the human soul has an intellective power.
At this point, one proposition in the argument is defended by reference to the
other, and the second is defended by reference to the first. Thus, Aquinas’s
defense commits the fallacy of begging the question since the conclusion (3) is
itself required as a premise to support the truth of one of the premises (2) being
advanced to justify the conclusion.

A similar argument is found in Quaestiones de anima q. 2, where Aquinas
replies to the objection that if the intellect cannot be the act of the body, the
intellective soul in which the intellect is rooted cannot be united to the body as its form:

\[ \text{[N]o effect is simpler than its cause. Now a power of the soul is an effect of its essence because all the powers of the soul flow from its essence. Therefore no power of the soul is simpler than its essence. If, then, the intellect cannot be the act of the body . . . neither can the intellective soul be united to the body as its form.}^{58} \]

This objection is based on the principle on which Siger's critique rests: a power cannot be more immaterial than its substance. Thus, the objection runs that insofar as the human soul is by its nature the form of the body, it cannot have an immaterial power. Aquinas replies:

\[ \text{[T]he possible intellect belongs to the human soul inasmuch as the soul is elevated beyond corporeal matter. Consequently, from the fact that the possible intellect is not the act of any organ, it does not wholly exceed the essence of the soul, but rather is supreme in the soul.}^{59} \]

According to Aquinas, the reason why the human soul possesses an immaterial possible intellect is that "the soul is elevated beyond corporeal matter." What is meant by soul's elevation beyond corporeal matter is that it is not a material form immersed into matter. His reply here is not different from one in the De unitate

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{58} QDA 2 obj. 4: "Effectus non est simplicior sua causa. Sed potentia anime est effectus essentie eius, quia omnes potentie fluunt ab essentia eius. Nulla ergo potentie anime est simplicior essentia eius. Si ergo intellectus non potest actus corporis . . . neque animae intellectiua poterit uniri corpori ut forma."}^{58} \]

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 2 ad 4: "[I]ntellectus possibilis consequitur animam humanam in quantum supra materiam corporalem elevatur. Vnde per hoc quod non est actus alicuius organi non excedit totaliter essentiam anime, set est supremum in ipsa."}^{59} \]
**intellectus**, which argues that the human soul can possess the intellect since it is a subsistent form and thus is not immersed into matter. The question to be answered by Aquinas is how the human soul can possess the immaterial intellect. However, his answer is not persuasive since he holds that the human soul can possess the intellect only if the former possesses the latter.

Finally, another similar argument is found in Aquinas’s reply to an objection in *Quaestiones de spiritualibus creaturis* q. 11, where he tries to defend the distinction between the soul and its powers, showing that the powers of the soul must flow from the essence of the soul. The objection runs that the distinction thesis cannot be upheld since this would lead to an absurd conclusion that an effect (the intellective power) is more immaterial than a cause (the essence of the soul): the intellective power is not the actuality of the body, while the essence of the soul is the actuality of the body. This objection implies that it is impossible for the intellect to be a power of the human soul. Aquinas’s reply is as follows:

> [l]t should be said that it follows from this that a power which is not an act of the body flows from the essence of the soul because the essence of the soul transcends the limitation of the body. . . . Hence it does not follow that a power is more immaterial than the essence; but from the immaterial nature of the essence there follows the immaterial nature of the power.60

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60 *QDSC* 11, ad 12: “Dicendum quod ex hoc contingit quod ab essentia animae aliqua potentia fluent quae non est actus corporis, quia essentia animae excedit corporis proportionem. . . . Unde non sequitur quod potentia est immaterialior quam essentia; sed ex immaterialitate essentia sequitur immaterialitas potentiae.”
Aquinas does defend the position that the intellect can be a power of the human soul since the essence of the human soul must itself be immaterial, and thus the intellect is not more immaterial than the essence of the human soul. However, note that the essence of the human soul is immaterial if the soul has an immaterial power. At this point, his reply might be paraphrased as follows: the intellect can be a power of the human soul if the human soul has the intellect as its power. Once again, his argument is circular.

In this chapter, I’ve dealt with the question of whether Aquinas has an adequate reply to Siger’s objection that the intellect cannot be a power of the human soul. Aquinas argues that the human soul can have the intellect as its power on the basis of his claim that it is subsistent. However, I argued that the human soul’s subsistence cannot be upheld insofar as he insists that the human soul is essentially the form of the body, and its nature is incomplete without the body. For nothing in the nature of the human soul as the form of the body provides a ground for showing that it can perform its proper operation without the body and thus can be subsistent. Therefore, I believe that Aquinas’s position is still vulnerable to Siger’s critique.
Conclusion

In this thesis I have approached Aquinas's philosophical psychology not just by examining his interpretation of Aristotle's obscure position on the intellect, but also by asking whether Aquinas has an adequate alternative to Siger's position.

Can the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body be applied to the intellect if the intellect is immaterial and thus is separable from the body? This question was a source of the controversy between Aquinas and the Averroists regarding the intellect. According to the Averroist interpretation, if the intellect is immaterial and is separable from the body, it will fall outside the purview of the definition and will not be a part or power of the soul. Furthermore, the intellect must be a separate substance apart from the individual, and one and the same for all human beings. By contrast, Aquinas argues that the text of Aristotle does not permit the Averroist interpretation. Accordingly, his IFC ("the intellect is the form of the body") is nothing other than the claim that the intellect is a power of the human soul and is included under the definition of the soul. However, IFC is not compatible with Aquinas's insistence that the intellect cannot use any bodily organ for its activity, nor exist in any part of the body, since he takes IFC to mean that the intellect is not altogether separate from the body. It is therefore my contention that IFC is not an adequate alternative to the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle insofar as Aquinas fails to show that the intellect is inseparable from the body.
I've also pointed out that there are some difficulties in Aquinas's account of the relationship between the intellect and the body. In refuting the Averroist view that the intellect is a separate substance apart from the individual, Aquinas argues that the intellect is a part of the individual's ontological constitution, since the Averroist view cannot account for the fact that individual human knowers are the very subjects of those activities of intellection that make them essentially rational beings. Furthermore, since this view does not provide an argument for the continued existence of the individual human soul after the death of the body, it will threaten the Christian belief in individual immortality and punishment in the afterlife. Where then does Aquinas locate the intellect in the individual composed of body and soul, if he holds that the individual possesses her own intellect? He explicitly denies the possibility of the intellect existing in the body in order to safeguard his view that the intellect does not use any bodily organ for its activity. What then would be his remaining alternative? The intellect must exist in the human soul alone while it does not exist in the body. The claim that the intellect has no bodily organ and thus does not exist in any part of the body at all can be taken as evidence that for Aquinas the personal intellect actually exists independently of the body. As a result, it commits Aquinas to an intellect-body dualism since he does postulate the existence of the intellect independently of the body in the human being. Although Aquinas sometimes attempts to defend the inseparability of the intellect from the body by appealing to the principle that human thinking cannot be carried out without phantasms, his defense does not succeed in showing that the intellect is not ontologically separable from the body.
Rather, it is intended to show how the intellect can interact with the body even though it exists independently of the body.

How can the intellect, even though it is not the actuality or form of the body, be a power of the human soul on Aquinas's account? As I've argued, despite his serious modification and rejection of Averroism under the pressure of Aquinas's influence, Siger consistently opposed Aquinas's position that the intellect is a power of the human soul which is the substantial form of the body. Aquinas believes that his position is not open to Siger's critique since the human soul is a very peculiar substantial form of the body, namely, a subsistent form. It cannot be denied that the peculiar nature of the human soul is indeed an important aspect of Aquinas's own philosophical psychology as well as of his rejoinder to Siger's critique. So, I discussed whether the conception of the human soul as the form of the body can be reconciled with its subsistence on Aquinas's account. The subsistence of the human soul can be upheld only if it possesses the ability to operate without the body. For Aquinas holds that if the human soul possesses the ability to operate without the body, then it must possess the ability to exist without the body. However, I argued that the ability to operate without the body is something beyond or against the nature of the human soul, given Aquinas's account of the human soul as the form of the body. Consequently, Aquinas does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the possibility that the human soul can possess the intellect as its power. This leads us to conclude that the difficulties raised by Siger cannot be resolved by Aquinas's position. Of course, this does not mean that Siger's position is a more tenable
and defensible interpretation of Aristotle than that offered by Aquinas. However, we would not easily offer an affirmative answer to the question of whether Aquinas was philosophically victorious over Siger. Finally, it is my contention that Aquinas does not have an appropriate resolution for the tension between the definition of the soul as the form of the body and the intellect's immateriality.
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