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WHO CAN BE A CITIZEN?:
DECODING THE "LAW OF THE LAND" IN CONTEMPORARY MANITOBA POLITICS

by

Sheila Dawn Gill

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education
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University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT

Who can be a citizen?:
Decoding the “law of the land” in contemporary Manitoba politics.

Master of Arts, 1999
Sheila D. Gill
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This thesis decodes key aspects of the “law of the land” operating in contemporary Manitoban society. Focusing on ‘white’ elite political performances of the official national story, I contend that (a gendered, classed, heterosexed) racism underwrites the shifting and disparate instances of what and who a Canadian citizen can be, both in the letter of the law, and in the diverse lived realities of the 1990s. Combining discourse analysis with tools of critical geography, my work speaks back to the decreed unspeakability of racism in Manitoba’s Legislature. I contend that the 1995 prohibition on the use of the word “racist” in the House is consistent with the amnesic context of (post)colonial Canadian society and its celebrated 'anti-racist' nationalism. In response to the extremity of systemic violence experienced by First Nations peoples in the Canadian past and present, my analysis gives priority to the ordering of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations in Manitoba.
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* * *

I offer this, with my dream of a more equitable future for us all, to my beautiful Godsons

Mark and Joshua.
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Order, please. I am requesting the honourable member for The Pas to please withdraw the words complained of....

I am requesting the honourable member for The Pas to withdraw the words complained of.

If the honourable member does not respond in the manner I have requested, I will be compelled, regrettably, to name him.

If the honourable member for The Pas does not withdraw the words complained of, I will have no alternative and will have to name him.

If the honourable member for The Pas does not withdraw the words complained of, I, regrettably, will have no alternative and will have to name him.

I have requested, directed and instructed the member to withdraw. I, therefore, have no alternative but to name Oscar Lathlin for disregarding the authority of the Chair.

--Louise Dacquay, Speaker of the House, November 1, 1995

In its claim to universality and objectivity, the law effaces the being of legal agents, of principals and their principles. It effaces agency itself and so veils different agents’ pleasures and sufferings, which are often causally, if silently linked. In commanding anonymously, the law hides those issuing command, just as it denies the violence it may perpetrate upon those commanded.

--David Goldberg, Racist Culture, 1993
I grew up in Winnipeg in the 1970s, in a largely white, mostly working and lower-middle class suburban neighbourhood. I fondly remember one of the cherished holiday pleasures my family shared at Christmastime. Everyone packed into the old car, burdened by heavy snowboots, scarves and parkas, and we would drive downtown to see the gorgeous display of lights strung all along Portage Avenue: past Eaton’s with its festive window dressings, and past the Hudson’s Bay Company store, decorated like a tiered cake with a ribbon of sparkling evergreens planted along the curve of its awnings. The lights adored block after block of Portage Avenue, from Main Street and continuing on westward through the central downtown core. Arching overhead, they bathed the dark winter streets in dazzling light and colour, and made home merry in the midst of a prairie winter.

I did not give this memory much thought until many years later, when an Ojibway woman shared a perspective with me that deeply altered the meanings I attributed to the Christmas lights of my childhood. To her the annual holiday spectacle in Manitoba’s southern capital spoke glaringly, yet in a code unreadable to me, of the effects of exploitative northern development carried out by Manitoba Hydro. With its mega hydro-electric projects of the 1960s and 70s waterways were dramatically altered, resulting in the flooding of her homeland and countless other northern communities and territories. These calculated disasters led to community dislocations, the destruction and irrevocable alteration of Aboriginal lives, cultures, economies, and long-stewarded ecosystems. The impact of dammed rivers combined with already damning effects of generations of imperial and colonial practices, including the Indian Act, and countless other violent racist acts accomplished within varying degrees of Euro-Canadian un/consciousness.

I could never again look at those Christmas lights in the same way. Something I was not yet able to articulate struck home with me. It was perhaps due to a deep
conviction of the *innocence* of the simple pleasures I had enjoyed growing up, that this particular contradiction of our contemporary experiences--mine and the First Nations woman--cut so deeply into my heart. Increasingly I wondered what further questions had gone unasked, or asked but remained unanswered in the course of my 'normal' life, growing up a racially unmarked Canadian in Manitoba. How, for example, was it possible for me, for 'us' white people, to continue to claim and *to consume*, both literally and figuratively, the lives of other communities for the expansion of our own (southern, urban, predominantly white European) collective power and privilege? Where did 'our' sense of entitlement come from? Although I had previously questioned social injustices, especially those outside of my home, for me a profound and radical contestability of my 'Canadian' homeplace and my privileged sense of belonging in it came into focus with this Aboriginal woman's critical reflection. Beyond a detached observation of the 'wrongness', of an apparent moral void framing other people's actions in a distant colonial past, at that moment in the present I knew that *somehow* my 'innocent' pleasures and her (their, others') sufferings were, in fact, *dependent upon one another*.

Indeed, what may appear as naivete to some readers is what I have come to recognize as a hallmark of the 'normalized' non-Native, most often 'white' consciousness in Canada. This is the consciousness produced by pedagogic practices embedded throughout social sites, in our schools, our media, our churches, mainstream community spaces, and within our political practices. This list of educational sites is not exhaustive. The very fabric of our beings, the rhythm of our days, our talk, our friendships (including the ones which never form), all teach us who we are, and how we are to know one another. Simply stated, 'home' is not and never has been the same 'safe' place for everyone. More to the point, my formative childhood experiences and even the 'wholeness' of my self (as I came to know myself and others through those experiences) depended upon *not knowing* marginal experiences such as those conveyed by the Ojibway woman from the north. For
indeed, as I grew up it never would have occurred to me as a white person—and it wasn’t supposed to—that I might somehow be complicit in a complex of white supremacist, even genocidal practices. Although “specific practices are by definition racist only when they activate existing structural racial inequality in the system,” as Philomena Essed explains, the structures of racism themselves “do not exist external to agents—they are made by agents...” (1991, 39).

In the preface to her insightful critical work, *Woman, Native, Other*, Trinh Minh-ha writes:

As our elder Lao Tzu used to say, knowing ignorance is strength, ignoring knowledge is sickness; if one is sick of sickness, then one is no longer sick. For a variation, I would say knowledge for knowledge’s sake is sickness. Let her who is sick with sickness pass on the story, a gift unasked for like a huge bag of moonlight. (1989, 2)

The old/new prism of reflection offered by Trinh helps me to open up what begins with a personal story, and in the course of this thesis, unfolds in the form of three interrelated projects. Since I have been living and studying away from the place I am grateful to call ‘home’, against geographic odds I have endeavoured to continue exploring and attempting to recognize the limits to my/hegemonic knowing about that homeplace. I am strengthened in this task by rigorous critical thinkers, mentors, friends and theoretical frameworks new to me. Increasingly “sick of sickness,” in my thesis writing I work to similarly challenge other ‘post-colonials’ who in the deceptive midst of the ‘information age’ live the malady of (intended or unintended) not knowing, especially when knowing means acknowledging our own power and complicity in the perpetuation of inequitable, racist systems. Of the research work itself, I demand that it represent something more than knowledge production for the sake of knowledge production. First and foremost this work is about real persons and real lives in a real place for which I care deeply. The epistemological site of the personal story that I begin with, therefore, is the place to which theory returns: a call to myself, and to other
racially dominant citizens to re-read the stories which constitute our senses of self. Theory has not allowed me to remain emotionally or spiritually detached from the effects of the violence it helps me to uncover. I would hope by sharing my story of the political moment I foreground, that this experience of making links of feeling, remains not mine alone.

This is a love letter home. It is about 'the people'--the polis of which I am a part--and is, therefore, ardently political. I am never outside of the history, the places, people and relations that have made me, nor outside of the (white) body through which a racist society confers privilege on me. These conditions constitute my limits and my strengths as a theorist of social relations within a localized Canadian nationalism. More reason still that the work which follows be understood as both a challenge (transitive and intransitive), and as a kind of love letter from and to the places we Canadians variously call 'home'. In William Blake's poetic terms, "opposition is true friendship" (1982). This is a particularly inspiring idea for those who seek to creatively re-envision the world, respecting its complexities while attempting to perceive beyond limiting binaries of 'heaven' and 'hell'.

The story of race-privilege that I decode and disrupt is in many ways "a gift unasked for." In return, I engage in a never complete process: I pass on these unwanted gifts, in the form of an interrogation of racialized privilege as it is constructed at an elite provincial political site. In my story, what Trinh calls a "huge bag of moonlight," I call borrowed light. This is the power drawn fraudulently and forcibly from 'other' sources and from 'othered' sites, by a dominant EuroCanadian society. I refer here to power both as something readily-observable or material (as suggested in my story about Manitoba Hydro and the Christmas lights), and as an imagined or symbolic force (like an 'innocent', race-neutral 'self'-knowing). Power and its asymmetrical distributions in postcolonial society are at the heart of this work's questioning. Yet as I discovered at the site of my own 'innocent' childhood pleasure, and as Trinh astutely notes, "the heart of the matter is always somewhere else than where it is supposed to
be” (1989, 1). The degree to which personal, identity-deep investments shape status quo relations, and their imbricated public political discourse, is the matter at the heart of the analysis which follows.

Coursing throughout the analytical work of this project is a sometimes explicit, more often implied, dream of a mode of being somehow less invested, less ‘plugged into’ power dominant networks. This vision of post-postcolonial ontological change does not intend itself to be “the result of an accumulation of knowledge and experience but [rather] the term of an ongoing unsettling process [italics mine]” (Trinh 1989, 40). This unsettling is a radical calling into question of the very terms through which the stubbornly ‘white’ settler nation constructs itself into the present, and of the identities we dominant Canadians inhabit as part of making ourselves feel unshakably at home in ‘our’ home land.
Notes to Preface

1 See Razack (1998) on the uneven and unsafe terrains that oppressed groups face when they try to tell their stories for social change in courtrooms and classrooms. See also Monture-Angus’ piece, “Flint Woman: Surviving the Contradictions in Academia,” in Thunder in My Soul (1995). There she contrasts the gulf between ‘white’ and racial/cultural minority students’ experiences in the university classroom. She writes: “In my more than ten years as a student and my five years as a professor, I have never experienced the classroom as a safe place” (67).
"i lose track of the land"

—Kateri Damm, in my heart is a stray bullet, 1993
CHAPTER ONE

The Unspeakability of Racism in Manitoba's Legislature

I heard the comment 'racist' from both members in question. Regrettably I did not draw attention to the House when the first member uttered the word. It is dangerously unparliamentary.
--Louise Dacquay, Speaker of the House May 29, 1995

The rules of the House apply equally to all members of the House and the privileges of the House apply equally to all members of the House. If this member for The Pas wants to be able to be treated as an equal, then he ought to treat others as equals and not make the kind of discriminatory, inflammatory and irresponsible allegations that he made in the House last evening....
--Hon. Gary Filmon May 30, 1995

1. official stories and the "law of the land"

On May 29, 1995, a Cree Opposition Member of Manitoba's Legislative Assembly used the word "racist" in a critique of government policy and programs that affect Aboriginal Manitobans. In this Fifth Day of Throne Speech Debate the objects of Mr. Lathlin's critique were diverse, including treaty and criminal justice issues, and the endemic problem of child poverty. Summing up his misgivings regarding the "attitude" of the provincial government, the Member for The Pas maintained that many of the people he represents are "beginning to talk about racism as being central to the policies coming from this Premier and his government" (216).¹

Subsequent to MLA Lathlin's address Premier Filmon took the floor. The Filmon Tories had only recently resumed power for a third consecutive term in office, following an April 1995 election victory. On May 29 the Premier was evidently prepared to celebrate his party's recent success at the polls. Yet when met with what he calls Lathlin's "reprehensible diatribe," the Premier clearly felt compelled to present a lengthy rebuttal, much of it apparently improvised. At the mid-point of his impassioned defense Mr. Filmon went so far as to insist that people in The Pas regard Oscar Lathlin as the racist (222). At this juncture, the Leader of the Opposition Mr. Gary Doer appealed to the Speaker on a Point of Order.²
Returning with a ruling on June 7, 1995, Louise Dacquay demanded the withdrawal of the offending "unparliamentary language" used by both Mr. Lathlin and Premier Filmon. The Speaker made no attempt to distinguish between their respective usages of the problematic word. Both men complied with the ruling, Premier Filmon fully accepting the decision and expressing regret at having "responded in kind [italics mine] to the comments that were made by the member opposite" (953). Oscar Lathlin also withdrew his statements, and respectfully acknowledged "a lot of difficulty" in doing what the Speaker asked him to do. Lathlin concluded by maintaining that he "did not call the First Minister directly to his face a racist" (954). He insisted that he would continue to speak to his constituents; he "will continue to do [his] job here as an MLA for The Pas whose riding consists of over 50 percent of aboriginal [sic] people" (954).³

Five months later the Member for The Pas questioned the Minister of Natural Resources regarding a fisheries policy. MLA Lathlin challenged the terms of reference which he argued allowed twelve fishermen from the Gimli area (at the southern end of Lake Winnipeg) to have "full run of Lake Winnipeg, to completely monopolize, have full control of Lake Winnipeg," while eighty percent of the fishermen in Manitoba are aboriginal [sic] people" (October 11, 1995, 3789). Lathlin asked the Minister if he considered the policy "fair, discriminatory, or racist?" (3789). While minimal substantive objections were registered to this query, Hansard records the Speaker's intervention on a now predictable 'disorder'. She asked the honourable member "to rephrase his question and withdraw the word 'racist'" (3789). The issue was forestalled, however, when Opposition House Leader Steve Ashton raised a Point of Order.⁴ Maintaining her stand against "strong language" in the House, the Speaker promised to take the matter under advisement (3790).

On November 1, 1995 Louise Dacquay delivered the following ruling, which remains in effect to this day:

My preference ... is that the word "racist" not be used in this House. I
accept the point made by the opposition House leader that it should be possible, for example, for a member of this Chamber to refer to apartheid in South Africa as a racist policy, and I will not rule that out of order when used in a similar context when members are speaking of governments and parties outside of this province. However, I will rule out of order any use of the word "racist" when it is used in this House to describe members of this House, another party represented in this Legislature, or a government of this province, current or past. I will rule it out of order if there is reference to a specific member of this Chamber or if there is a reference to the policies of a government or a political party. Therefore, I must ask the honourable member for The Pas (Mr. Lathlin) to withdraw without modification or qualification the word which he used on October 11. (4447)

Oscar Lathlin ultimately refused to withdraw his October 11 statement, resisting repeated demands from the Speaker (see the litany cited at the outset of this thesis). Faced with non-compliance, the Government House Leader (The Honourable Jim Ernst) moved that the member for The Pas be suspended from the service of the House for the remainder of the sitting day (4449). The "non-debatable" motion was upheld by a majority of twenty-nine to nineteen, and Oscar Lathlin was summarily expelled from the House (4450).

At the time of this ruling Opposition members argued the issue in terms of a fundamental question of free speech. MLA for Thompson Steve Ashton raised this concern within the context of a Matter of Privilege. In the British Parliamentary tradition "privilege" refers to freedoms that are recognized as critical to the task of representing one's constituency, unimpeded before the House. Drawing on Beauchesne's Citation 24, Ashton noted that "privilege, though part of the law of the land, is to a certain extent an exemption from the ordinary law [italics mine]. The distinctive mark of privilege is its ancillary character" (November 1, 1995, 4451). For
example, parliamentary freedoms include the right to speak freely in the House while remaining immune to charges of libel. Yet in the case of Mr. Lathlin's verbal infraction, the Speaker's ruling determined the word "racist" to be (almost) unequivocally "unparliamentary;" Louise Dacquay located it outside the sanctuary of privileged exemption. She recognized a problem of disorderly language, not one of (not-so)universal free speech. And in the name of 'universal' order a body marked by race and racism was radically suppressed, excised, and evicted. Governed by such an ambivalent "law of the land," just who in Manitoba is free to speak? Perhaps more important, whose version(s) of truth will be tolerated in the provincial space of political speech-making?

The official version of the national story is that there is no racism in Canada. My focused analysis of elite political discourse in Manitoba bears out this assertion. Central to my concerns in this thesis are encoded disciplines of silencing and of rendering invisible: practices which underwrite the Canadian national story and its core fiction of race-blind innocence. A hegemonic rhetorical mode of nationalism tells of Canadians who are a kind and generous people, living in a hospitable nation envied as "the most egalitarian and democratic country in the entire world" (Premier Filmon May 29, 1995, 220). Whether explicit or tacit, in order that this narration remain cohesive, demands are made of marginalized members of society for whom Canada may not always (or often) be experienced as "the Number 1 place in the world in which to live" (Filmon 1995, 223).

This thesis poses a national question--"who can be a citizen?"--and seeks answers in a provincial, rather than federal, political sphere. I take a cue from Razack, who maintains that in order to strategize ways to disrupt apparently seamless official myths, we will need to learn "to recognize the everyday ways in which dominance is enacted" at specific social sites (1999b, 4). That is, we must continue to make the links between local performances of dominance and the broader narratives and institutions that these "regimes of truth" (Foucault 1972/1984), including the provincial
political, support and depend on. As Razack posits in her discussion of a Nova Scotia Court of Appeal case (where the admissibility of Canadian racism to legal decision-making is at issue), "[i]f the official story is that there is no racism in Canada, then those who insist otherwise do not belong [italics mine]..." (1999a, 283).

2. the problem: violence that cannot be named

We must know the places of invasion in our histories and in ourselves so that we may illumine the paths of those who cannot see or who do not know. Because our pain is a 'part of this land,' we are also the Uncomfortable Mirrors to Canadian society.

--Emma LaRocque, Metis poet and scholar, Winnipeg July 1990

This thesis is concerned with the problem of racism, particularly in its consolidation and normalization of elite and white group dominance in the contemporary Canadian social order. Racism underwrites the shifting and disparate instances of what and who a Canadian citizen can be, both in the letter of the law, and in the diverse lived realities of the 1990s. The subject who cannot 'be' is the colonized subject. These are racialized persons and groups including those whom Emma LaRocque describes as "the Uncomfortable Mirrors to Canadian society" (1990, xxvii).

Citizenship and discourses of nationalism are all about power: who will hold it, with whom it can be shared, and under what terms and coercions these arrangements remain tenable for stakeholders in the status quo. What becomes key to my analysis is the tendency of a rhetoric of power to "all too easily [produce] an illusion of benevolence when deployed in an imperial setting" (Said 1993, xvii). Mohawk legal scholar Patricia Monture-Angus tells us that in (post-)imperial Canada "[l]aw is often the mop used to clean up the mess" (1995, 68). In this thesis I contend that a highly-normalized nationalist political discourse articulates--and in part constitutes--a broad regime of 'cleansing': a process of social dis/ordering at once related to the law yet not explicitly juridical. A "law of the land" implicitly legislates ontological limits and
enables (or disables) the emergence of specific citizen identities in Canada. Otherwise stated, the production and circulation of nationalist discourse regulates truth-making in the public sphere. By extension, public sphere "talk" implicates and contributes to the structuring of private worlds. White elite political narration mops up the "messes" that betray violence. Violence is innate to a continuity of asymmetrical imperial and colonial relations in this country, and to the imbricated racialized identities that come into being within these relations. Thus, the currency of racialized nationalism in the Canadian present speaks to a complacent investment, and an uninterrupted complicity of a white-majority society. It also attests to the ongoing rejection by political leaders of equitable alternatives to raced (gendered and classed) systems of dominance in contemporary processes of Canadian nation-building.

My data effectively reveals (and by another reading could virtually conceal) this problem of ongoing violence that must remain not only concealed, but for the most part, blind to itself. Statements about racial dominance and the inferences such assertions make regarding "being Canadian" are commonly seen as highly implausible—if not virulently offensive—to a great majority of Canadians. As I argue in the work which follows, pervasive racism simply cannot be named as long as non-Native, especially 'white' Canadians remain deeply-invested in identities that are in fact premised upon material and symbolic race privilege, those 'invisible' properties inherent to their unquestioned, rightful and ultimately benevolent expressions of 'Canadianness'. Indeed, if the pervasive presence of racism at the very heart of a dominant Canadian self-concept was already generally acknowledged, and more importantly, systematically rejected in macro-institutional structures and micro practices of mainstream Canada, then the work of this thesis would be redundant. Unfortunately, such is not the case. As I write in the spring of 1999, every day events surface that illustrate the ongoing reinscription and normalization of racist practice in Canada. These aggressions are frequently masked to the eyes of the racial majority, encoded and intertwined with automatic disclaimers (usually by white persons) of "no
harm intended."

In "Who Can Be A Citizen?" I foreground the traumatic coexistence of endemic racism and its enforced unspeakability within the political, social and cultural bounds of liberal democracy as practiced in Canada. In the 1990s scholars and activists alike have recognized and decried disturbing retrenchments of (post-)imperial/colonial racisms in this 'anti-racist' country. Writing from British Columbia in 1995, Canadian anthropologist Dara Culhane describes a current domestic context "of right-wing populism, neo-conservative elitism, and the (re)emergence of virulent forms of racism throughout Canada, [where] even the hard won, limited gains achieved by Aboriginal Peoples in recent decades, like those made by marginalized and disempowered sectors of the non-Aboriginal population, are threatened" (156 notes omitted). Critical race theorist Sherene Razack focuses on the outer parameters of Canada's domestic scene, in "Making Canada white: Law and the policing of bodies of colour in the 1990s." There she scrutinizes a "new" era of immigrant and refugee regulation, one characterized by the tacit (as opposed to overt) establishment of a racialized structure of citizenship (1999b).

While the hegemonic Canadian imagination is imbued with a frequently tacit racism, it is also possessing of a limited racial self-awareness. Feminist educational theorist Leslie Roman addresses such troubling contradictions within the "redemption discourses" of liberalism's declared multicultural, anti-racist and postcolonial pedagogies (1997). For example, Roman argues that the liberal (white) desire to know the racialized or "multicultural" 'other' may very well encode "the desire not to know the stories of (white) complicity with various forms of colonial and neocolonial oppressions" (275). Similarly, Carol Schick's Saskatchewan-based investigation into the education and training of 'anti-racist' teachers problematizes the place of racial innocence within liberal humanist discourses, which themselves simultaneously bear latent white race privilege. Schick concludes that "the complex forms in which racism exists in Canada require new and equally complex means of addressing the
production of racism if anti-racist activity is to have any efficacy" (1998, 1).

Racism's "complexities" can provide effective critical focus for anti-racist research in liberal-democratic Canada. However, it is important to note that work such as done by Roman, Schick, and myself in this current project, uncovers "complexities" that emerge in large part from our perspective as racial insiders--as 'white' scholars unravelling obscuring processes of white denial--and far less from minority groups' experiences or analyses, located as they are on the receiving end of racism. Racialized peoples themselves continue to speak directly about ongoing violences of racism in Canada. For instance, Micmac scholar Marie Battiste is unequivocal in her critique of Canadian racism in the form of "cognitive imperialism," enforced as she argues through compulsory literacy and assimilationist Aboriginal education (1986, 1997). In Thunder in My Soul Patricia Monture-Angus delivers her forceful critique of, among other things, an all-too-common discourse (recalling Roman's "redemption") whereby Aboriginal People (and people of colour) are labelled as "disadvantaged" (1995). When looking beyond a strictly materialistic yardstick, she explains, it is difficult for her to understand how her experience is one of disadvantage. Monture-Angus suggests that the designation of "disadvantaged" carries more than damaging ethnocentric and materialist value judgements; the term provides "a nice, soft, comfortable word to describe dispossession, to describe a situation of force whereby our very existence, our histories, are erased continuously right before our eyes. Words like disadvantage conceal racism"(1995, 14).

To speak the unspeakable remains a "complex" task from the distanced and frequently distorted perspective of society's racial 'inside'. Yet an acute awareness of the risks faced by would-be allies to the anti-racist cause--including the risks of slipping into (white) "redemption" mode--could quite possibly serve as a kind of methodological guide for racially-dominant researchers and activists. Practically speaking, to avoid reinscribing the marginalization of Aboriginal voices (and other 'outsided' racial minority perspectives), scholars like myself must take care not to
conceal (or to forget) the fact that our work speaks to racism through our own ignorance (our *not*-knowing) of it; while our scholarship addresses itself to the *specific* 'innocence' of mainstream (especially 'white') Canadians. In order to speak the unspeakable—in particular, to name violences of which we ourselves are not the direct target—it is thus important to develop something like a "contrapuntal" reading practice for interrogating the hegemonic social world (Said 1994).9

In *Culture and Imperialism* Edward Said describes an analytical approach in which "we look back at the cultural archive [and] we begin to reread it not univocally but contrapuntally, with a simultaneous awareness of both the metropolitan history that is narrated and of *those other histories* [italics mine] against which (and together with which) the dominating discourse acts" (1994, 51). In the context of my provincial discourse analysis, a "contrapuntal" reading takes shape through a dynamic interplay between contemporary hegemonic 'truth', and a pro-active, non-defensive attentiveness to 'truths' and experiences articulated from typically, *systemically* deauthorized persons and sites.

Like Lauren Berlant who interrogates the "privatization" of American citizenship, I read the discourses of Canadian nationalism not as negligible whitenoise, but rather, "as powerful language, not as 'mere' fiction or fantasy but as violence and desire that have material effects" (1997, 13). Monture-Angus writes: "I may no longer live in a situation of overt violence but I still live with the knowledge that overt violence surrounds me....I have begun to understand that I am still battered—intellectually and spiritually battered" (1995, 70). The fact remains that the worlds and experiences described by Patricia Monture-Angus, or by Oscar Lathlin on behalf of his constituents, are not mine. At the same time it is simply not the case that these worlds are entirely separate, not touching or untouched by my own, as the reflections of my Preface suggest. Throughout this thesis I too name racism and from my perspective understand it to be material and spiritual violence. The violences I address in political language are rooted in and mutually productive of disparate yet 'normal' everyday
Canadian contexts, characterizing both marginalized and mainstream communities. "Violence" speaks to the unfair use of force, whether overt or implicit; to injurious treatment or actions; to the vehemence of denials; and to the distortions and misrepresentations that contribute to situations of inequity in our communities, and in our nation.

The silencing of Oscar Lathlin as I demonstrate in subsequent chapters was accomplished in part through the exuberant and self-congratulatory terms of a localized nationalist discourse. Indeed, cleansed through nationalist discourse, inequitable circumstances are celebrated in political and cultural mainstreams as advancements for all people concerned. In 1995 members of Manitoba's political elite performed what Berlant would describe as one in a series of "moments of oppressive optimism in normal national culture" (1997, 13). Her work suggests a methodology which I adopt. I am keenly interested in looking at these moments of optimism, "to see what kinds of domination are being imagined as forms of social good; what kinds of utopian desires are being tapped and translated into conservative worldviews;....what it might take to make linked kinds of knowledge, power, and experience no longer seem separate" (13). I turn in the following section to more carefully define the moment of 'Manitoban' optimism that lies at the heart of my inquiry.

3. who can be a citizen?

When an Ojibway says 'niwii-debwe', that means he is going to tell 'what is right as he knows it'. A standard expression is 'I don't know if what I tell you is the truth, I can only tell you what I know.


Two retrospective observations frame the problematic that I construct from key Legislative events of 1995. In the first place, I observe the naming of racism, and then the deafening silencing of that assertion. With a neat excision of the divisive concept of racism from the House, the smooth horizon of Manitoba's political discourse appears to have been more or less restored. Related headlines appearing in the
Winnipeg Free Press read as follows: "Filmon, Lathlin trade insults", on May 31, 1995 (Samyn, B1), and on November 2 the headline on A4 read "Speaker boots out MLA" (Samyn). With relatively unremarkable versions of the events circulating—the first reduced to the level of personal disagreement, the second revolving around a parliamentary technicality—little impact ultimately registered on white, mainstream Manitoba. (Since I was a resident of Winnipeg in 1995, I include myself in this grouping.) Coverage of the events fizzled out quickly, the exception being an arguably related article that appeared a few weeks after Lathlin was "booted out." A Winnipeg Free Press headline of November 29 read: “Lathlin sued for defaulting on loan” (Kuxhaus, A6). With Mr. Lathlin’s financial woes gaining currency in popular discourse, hints of a more general disreputability were added to the public’s knowledge of a Cree MLA’s Legislative misdemeanours.

The second observation surfaced when I dug up the relevant 1995 debates recorded in Hansard. When I studied these texts (nearly three years after the events had taken place) I gained a sense of very real moments of crisis in these conflicts, notwithstanding the debates’ superficial confinement to matters of language. Contrary to the low key impact felt by the white majority public (a lack of awareness which I had shared), during the debates in question political elite tempers flared. Behind the House walls core principles of liberal democracy were forced from realms of abstraction into embodied disciplinary practice. Pinned as arguments were on an apparently volatile word, taut contradictions surfaced between (selective) ‘free’ speech and the maintenance of a particular order necessary for a particular ‘common good’. During the powderkeg moment of crisis ignited by the words "racist" and "racism," people on all sides of the debate in the House knew—whether the public was conscious of it or not—that a great deal more than decorum was at issue. What was at stake was less a matter of language, and more a matter of privilege: highly invested white race privilege.

The issue of privilege brings me to the heart of my research, and to the crux of
I9

my debate with the concealed stakes and strategic ambivalences of Canadian citizenship. For as the state legally transforms the 'enemy within' (and select 'aliens' admitted from without) into its citizens, it institutionalizes the disavowal of racialized violence, disenfranchisement, subjugation and exploitation—all through the promise of freedom in the political sphere (Lowe 1996, 5). The stories I am interested in tracking, therefore, are those unofficial ones which show us where universalizing categories leak and bleed their many failed promises. To this investigative end I address the following questions:

1. how is the 'nation' imagined as it figures in this particular, sub-national context, at the level of provincial political talk?;
2. within the broader imagining of the nation-space, how is the 'citizen' of this locality (Manitoba) and nationality (Canadian) represented at this site?; and
3. what social and material orderings—affects and effects—produce and result from the ongoing hegemony of these representations?

My analytical method is informed by a poststructuralist understanding of the discursively produced subject. In other words, I am concerned with how subjects—both socially dominant and subordinate—are constituted through the complex discourses in question, and with how these subjects come to know one another. More closely, I wish to highlight conditions that selectively enable and constrain modes of knowledge production and subject formation, and which simultaneously conceal the will to power inherent in these practices. For this site I propose the concept of the "law of the land" to gather loosely an emerging vocabulary of locality-contingent epistemological conditions. With respect to subject formation, I seek to identify conditions for the production of a new kind of subject—for a new way of knowing ourselves and thus, a new and non-oppressive way of being citizens.

My reading narrates vertically into a composite political crisis moment. In this moment elite actors seek to suppress the emergence and critique of radical, foundational contradictions within the nation's official story of equality and optimism.
Contradictions are effectively backlit by both the critical gaps, and the "huge stabilities" (Threadgold 1998) that constitute a EuroCanadian narrative tradition of homogenizing nationalistic discourse. Like Teun van Dijk, in these analyses I am not interested in showing or proving whether individuals are racist [but am] more generally interested in the properties of [the dominant group's] text and talk about other ethnic or racial groups...[and in] the social systems, processes, activities and cognitions involved in the reproduction (and the challenge) of racism. (1993, 65)

I consider the Legislative crisis moment to be a rich site for decoding underlying "laws of the land" in Manitoba--the discursive properties, and the terms of belonging, that elite political actors labour to restore.

Fraser and Gordon (after the work of Raymond Williams 1976), acknowledge that the terms used to describe social life are also active forces shaping it. A crucial element of politics, then, is the struggle to define social reality and to interpret people's inchoate aspirations and needs (Fraser 1990). Particular words and expressions often become focal in such struggles, functioning as keywords, sites at which the meaning of social experience is negotiated and contested.

(1994, 310)

Evidenced in samples of Hansard debate, Manitoba's political elite deploy a modernized, raced, classed, gendered and heterosexed white settler rhetoric of privilege in which landscape discourse plays a significant role. Simply put, elite political "talk" about the land selectively constructs history, a sense of belonging in a specifically imagined (practiced and produced) place, and an uncontested 'innocent' identity for a hegemonic non-Aboriginal citizen. Putatively 'colour-blind' racialized discourse figures prominently in these ongoing contestations of meaning, 'anti-racist' selfhood, and place-making.

Kay Anderson contends that the making of Canada "in its symbolic dimension

...
entailed representational practices that were deeply saturated with race and gender concepts, and [that] by highlighting their collusion, we further refine the identities and subjectivities out of which a dominant imagined geography of nation grew" (1996, 201). Following Anderson in her localized study of the discursive construction of Vancouver's Chinatown (1991), I recognize a range of nationalist representational processes to be in action on the provincial scale. Yet in response to both the limited scope of this project, and to the dominant contours of oppression surfacing within the Manitoba Hansard data, I maintain a privileged (but still not exclusive) focus on the racialized aspects of a dominant, and dominating, Canadian imagination. Racialized knowledge becomes my entry point into a complex discursive mesh contained within the nation/citizen conceptual pairing. There I am able to spotlight other interweaving discourses that construct gender, class, ability and sexuality--themselves ambivalent and interdependent categories of social in/exclusion. I see these discourses as highly mobile epistemological resources that permit variable conceptualizations and orderings of who and what is to be valued in Canadian society, and for consolidating power in specific, decidedly unequal, bodies and zones of articulation. And while Teun van Dijk makes important observations regarding the remarkable homogeneity of the prevailing political discourse of race in the West (1993, 114), I am equally concerned with sighting the specific, heterogeneous, and place-rooted articulations bound up in the particular, localized identities and communities that racialized discourse simultaneously constructs, unifies, destructs, and divides.

Notwithstanding the degrees of intentionality behind the moves of socially dominant subjects, their performances can be analyzed to show complicity in a continuity of profoundly inequitable social relations. In my discussion of a postcolonial landscape, I focus primarily on elements of a nationalist discourse that relate to two dramatic and consistent features of the "law of the land" in Manitoba's political space, namely: the perpetuated historic disenfranchisement and subordination of First Nations peoples; and the reassertion of a carefully policed and purified white identity,
as the non-negotiable prerequisite for full and secure Canadian citizenship. I do not claim that First Nations peoples are the only collectivity racialized (or otherwise marginalized) in discourse and processes of Canadian nation-building. However, recalling Lisa Lowe's incisive Asian American critique of U.S. citizenship, I do maintain that this kind of analysis "contributes to our general understanding of race as a contradictory site of struggle for cultural, economic, as well as political membership" in Canada (1993, ix).

A commitment to a 'vertical' reading of a moment demands that my analytical work perform a radical recontextualization of the elite political performances in question. The reading of a moment is not the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather "a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, and saying" (Foucault 1984, 46). The vertical (localized, cultural-symbolic) and simultaneously lateral networking (critical historical, critical geographical) aspects of my critique of citizenship recall Foucault's "possible transgressions" in the complementary modes of "archaeology" and "genealogy" (1976/1992). In "What is Enlightenment?" Foucault writes:

This criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological--and not transcendental--in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or
Indeed, Foucault's explorations of "discursivity" inspire the questions I pose; the way I conceptualize the citizen as an object of inquiry; and the manner in which I uncover possible responses to my concerns.

In Chapter Two I lay bare a theoretical framework that equips this potentially transgressive reading at my site, one which allows me to go methodologically against the grain of political disavowal. My primary data is selected from Hansard texts (official, recorded debates). I recognize Hansard as one of several textual relics of legislative performance, ritually constructed finds which cannot be read in isolation, nor as the 'whole' or 'complete' archival congealments of 'objective' legislative truth.14 I also draw on select print media and a small number of public documents relevant to my arguments, and referred to (directly or indirectly) in the text of the debates themselves. On the theoretical side of research design, a range of conceptual borrowings attest to the irreducible nature of subjectivity, myth-making, and lived-ideology. These inhabited 'realities' effectively blur modernist disciplinary lines (Roman 1997, 270). Critical race, literary, and feminist postcolonial theorizing contribute to my thinking, as do elements of discourse analysis, queer theory, feminist materialism and critical geography. The research is first and foremost problem-centred. While I intend conceptual consistency within my postructuralist arguments, the main objective is the elucidation of a terrain muddied by the very 'normalcy' of its concepts, by the dailyness of its concealments.

In Chapter Three I emphasize a reading of the nation as problematic narration (Bhabha 1990). I turn analytical energies on a revealing debate sample which features an intervention by the provincial Premier. My ear is tuned to identifying key rhetorical moves made by this elite actor: moves that work to stabilize the hegemonic narration, the subjects it centres, and those whom it objectifies. In the "True North Strong and Free" (Shields 1991) I understand such political talk to be asymmetrically-powered social interaction (van Dijk 1997). Political talk shapes conditions for 'truth',

*think* [italics mine]. (1984, 46)
identity, and divergent imaginings of the nation-space. In her discussion of Pakeha high country landscape discourse, anthropologist Michele Dominy builds a case to authenticate not dissimilar white settler assertions of native status (1995). While Dominy takes a somewhat dehistoricized, relativist view of such talk (seeing it as part of a natural process of white indigenizing in postcolonial New Zealand), I insist that we in Canada, and in white settler societies in general, cannot **ethically** indulge in the luxury of such legitimating projects. Far from shared, the histories and unequal legacies of the colonial encounter imply life and death realities for today's racialized 'citizens'. Their experiences are in fact radically related to the securing of 'white' talk in the social and political contexts of the present.

In Chapter Four I extend the problem of discourse as (violating, often violent) language/narrative act to selectively invisibilized realms of **spatial** truth-making. This discussion is intended to plumb the same textual landscape traversed in Chapter Three, this time mirroring back to elite narrative some of the submerged spatial (pre)conditions of a racialized nationalist grammar. I contend that spatial relations in and of themselves constitute (not totalizing) conditions of possibility for dominant mythologies and subjectivities. For example, self-making narrations that describe imperial-style adventures in mythic northern landscapes, obscure yet depend heavily upon uneven economic, political and social forces (i.e., waves of colonization, military or police presence, the power of money and intrusive economic development). These forces **literally** enable the gender, race and class privileged their unimpeded 'history-making' access. Premier Filmon's selective narration of Manitoba's North serves as my central case in point. By pushing beyond an unhelpful binary of distinct 'imagined' and 'material' nation-spaces--for they continually inform one another--I suggest that Manitoba's landscape discourse encodes powerful, productive interrelations of symbolic and spatial affects and effects. These systems embody structures of receptivity, conditions of knowing and being for bodies in the provincial social world.

Clayton Dumont, in an argument for the analytical and political utility of
poststructuralism in affirmative action struggles, reminds us that "Foucault sought to elucidate specific domains of language (discourses) that produce the normalcy of these subjects that their users claim only to describe....Foucault understands the subject as a location where competing powers have always sought to inscribe their preferred narrations" (1998, 223). Inspired throughout by Foucauldian conceptions of the discursively produced subject and effects of power, the practice emerging from my research hints at what could be called a "critical ontology of ourselves" (1984, 50). The whole of this project may in fact be considered collectively as early notes toward a "critical ontology" of what it means to be a (white) Manitoban.

Chapter Five permits brief summary reflections on the implications of the preceding discursive analyses. These reflections suggest aspects of a 'being-deep' mode of resistant political, theoretical and pedagogic practice. Here I also gesture to directly-related political story, unearthed in early 1999 and revealing 'democratic' subterfuge during the provincial elections of April 1995. The symmetries of injustice spanning this approximately five-year retrospective period have been discouraging to witness, yet have spurred me on to address rigorously these social and political issues which concern the homeplace for which I care so deeply. Ultimately, I seek to engage those, who like me, cannot arrive at radical social critique (or equitable social practices) by trusting only the knowing of our own bodies, beings, memories and lived experiences.

4. (differently) imagined community

Benedict Anderson observes in Imagined Communities that there is a general imperative by which "the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (1991, 7). A critical question to pose, however, is, who is doing the imagining? Jeannette Armstrong speaks to the disempowerment of First North American Native Peoples in a 1990 address to the Saskatchewan Writers Guild. She calls on members (especially writers) of the dominant society to imagine
finding out that the dominating culture will not tolerate any real cultural participation and that cultural supremacy forms the basis of the government process and that systemic racism is a tool to maintain their kind of totalitarianism. And all the while, imagine that this is presented under the guise of 'equal rights' and under the banner of banishing bigotry on an individual basis through law. (1997, 240)

Armstrong asks non-Aboriginals to somehow comprehend the violent contradictions at the heart of First Nations' experiences in this society. She demands nothing less than an ongoing auto-resistance project, working against the limits of white group experiences; against the practiced limits of one's own mind, body, and imagination. From my non-Aboriginal, 'white' perspective, these are the intentions and the contra-dictions (the speaking against) on which I build my analysis.

As a white woman born in Canada, myself only partially aware of racism and its effects, and only partially aware of the ways in which I benefit and am complicit in a system that privileges my whiteness, I see the enduring, dramatic resistance of the 'average' Canadian to knowledge of past and present issues of race and racism as a contemporary social problem of dire significance. Racist culture achieves decidedly ambivalent community-building success. Racism simultaneously (differentially, violently) constructs and destroys, unifies and divides persons and communities that are both the objects and subjects of its imagined destiny. Disenfranchised, dominated groups and identities are thus divided not only from access to political voice, social and material security, but also from opportunities to contribute themselves fully as productive agents of truly equitable social well-being (Ovid Mercredi and Mary Ellen Turpel 1993). In Canada such a state still only exists in redemptive dominant fantasies, and in utopian political talk.

This work gestures in a modest manner toward what I see as a vast and urgent need, that of epistemic decolonization. Because the effects of embedded racialized knowledge are the lived, multiple violences done to the social, physical, emotional,
and spiritual well-being of specific communities and individuals, this work begins, and if successful will return repeatedly, to the local life and death imperatives of the post colonial site that informs my will to know. Put simply, the presence of racism in Manitoban society produces suffering for specific marked bodies, most frequently those of First Nations peoples. It also profoundly dehumanizes ‘white’ citizens whose identities depend so much (regardless of conscious intention) on the containment of that suffering ‘elsewhere’ and ‘outside’ of themselves.16

Anthropologist Beverly Gartrell asserts that in the resistance work of Aboriginal peoples, "their major base of power is the need...of modern democratic capitalist states to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes not of the colonized, but of the majority in the encapsulating state" (cited in Culhane 1995, 148). In Gartrell's view, the political power First Peoples might access in the wake of hegemonic face-saving remains "tenuous and fluctuating, for it is based on ideologies themselves changing, and it depends on the receptivity of some audience-elements in the wider society willing to listen to the message being sent by the dominated group" (148). My research emerges from just such a perception of power relations and openings for change. Like Culhane, I see the contemporary political-cultural context as one that makes "the tasks of ideological critique and public education particularly important to the struggles of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, and therefore of particular concern to non-Aboriginal allies" (1995, 148). Underlying my macro-theoretical and political interests, therefore, is a practical concern about the marginalizing impact of oppressive racialized discourses on oppositional political practices in my home province. I am also interested in the pedagogic potential of these same discursive sites, insofar as their (and our own) oppressive dependencies might be laid bare--and gradually relinquished--through critical, ethical, educational critique.

"We need the system to change," Jeannette Armstrong urges. "Those in the system can and will remain complacent until moved to think, and to understand how critical change is needed at this time for us all" (1998, 242). I am intent on entering
into the role of productive ally with the community's (and the nation's) greatest stakeholders in equitable social change. I reason that I am ethically obliged to work on improving conditions for alternative understandings within dominant society. Strategically speaking, by scavenging hegemonic (white) identity crises, critical scholars can pinpoint sites with the educational and political capacity to induce epistemic ruptures. These ruptures of 'truth' might further weaken already-leaking identity enclosures that deny an equitable plurality of human(e) (co)existence in Canada.

The following analysis reveals violences muted and denied by official stories. As politically-invested knowledge production it endeavours to cut through the investments of innocence, and to translate to 'white' sensibilities a "law of the land" that continues to define itself in racist terms. An accountable process of acknowledging who can, in lived terms, be a citizen in Canada, is itself a pedagogy. This pedagogy demands nothing less than a radical awareness of how we come to be the people (so many of us) so surely think we are.
Notes to Chapter One

1 This and all subsequent Hansard quotations are from *Manitoba Legislative Assembly: Debates and Proceedings* (Province of Manitoba 1995). Throughout this thesis I generally cite the name of the speaker and the date of their intervention, not repeating the (1995) publication date of the recorded proceedings. This modification represents a slight departure from the Chicago "Author-Date" style used in all other cases, with the additional exception of newspaper citations. There I include article titles in parenthetical (author-date) citations, when they are not accommodated within the text itself.

2 Excerpts from Appendix A of the *Rules, orders and forms of proceeding of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba* define a Point of Order as "questions raised with the view of calling attention to any departure from the Standing Orders or the customary modes of proceeding in debate or in the conduct of legislative business" (Province of Manitoba, Electronic document. Accessed June 15, 1999). A Point of Order "may be raised at any time by any Member, whether the Member has previously spoken or not. (Beauchesne, 6 ed., p. 96, citation 316)." With respect to "unparliamentary" words, these "may be brought to the attention of the House either by the Speaker or by any Member. When the question is raised by a Member it must be as a point of order and not as a question of privilege. (Beauchesne, 6 Ed., p.142, citation 485 (1))." Concerning 'order', Rule 5 (1) provides "that the Speaker shall preserve order and decorum and enforce the Rules and shall decide all questions of order, subject to an appeal to the House. Rule 5 (2) states that - In explaining a Point of Order the Speaker shall state the Rule or authority applicable to the case."

3 The term 'Aboriginal' appears capitalized in the work of First Nations theorists and writers whom I have encountered. Interestingly it appears quite consistently in lower case in texts of EuroCanadian origin (i.e., in Hansard, in mainstream print media). As a sign of respect for peoples who claim the proper noun 'Aboriginal', as a part of their cultural and political identification, I too capitalize the term throughout this thesis (but leave quoted passages in their original form).

4 Ashton requested that the Speaker consider the differences between policies and individuals when charges of racism are being laid (3789). In terms of precedent, Leader of The Opposition (Gary Doer) noted that in June the question of "racist" immigration policies—a statement regarding policies issued by the federal government—was not ruled out of order. At the same time, Doer maintained that the case of charges against individuals has had a consistent history of being deemed a breach of parliamentary language (3790).

5 The northern electoral division of Thompson borders constituencies of The Pas to the South, Rupertsland to the Northeast, and Flin Flon to the Northwest.

6 Appendix B of *Rules, orders and forms of proceeding of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba* defines a Matter of Privilege in terms of "so-called 'questions of privilege' on matters which should be dealt with as a personal explanation or correction, either in the debates or the proceedings of the House" (Province of Manitoba, Electronic document. Accessed June 15, 1999). When a matter of privilege arises it shall be taken into consideration immediately. Furthermore, a question of privilege "ought rarely to come up in the Legislature. It should be dealt with by a motion giving the House power to impose a reparation or apply a remedy." Privileges of the House are distinguished from those accorded to Members individually: "Willful disobedience to Orders and Rules of Parliament in the exercise of its constitutional functions; [and cases of] insults and obstructions during debate are breaches of the privileges of the House. Libels upon Members and aspersions upon them in relation to Parliament and interference of any kind with their official duties are breaches of the privileges of the Members." An interesting qualification concludes the preceding definition: "a dispute arising between two Members as to allegations of facts does not fulfill the conditions of parliamentary privilege [italics mine]."

7 In "Truth and Power" Foucault states that "Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it" (1972/1984, 74).

8 See Chapter Two for a discussion regarding elite discourse analysis and my use of Teun van Dijk's term "text and talk" (1993).
9 Said tells us that he derives the naming of his reading practice from the counterpoint of Western classical music, in which "various themes play off one another, with only a provisional privilege being given to any particular one; yet in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order, an organized interplay that derives from the themes, not from a rigorous melodic or formal principle outside the work" (1994, 51). While I do not seek to develop at length in this thesis a theory pertaining to the application of "contrapuntal" reading to white scholars' analyses of racism, parallels do exist between what I suggest methodologically, and what Said effects with his invigorated approach to comparative literature. Simply put, in the case of political discourse analysis I am concerned with escaping a univocal (hegemonic) reading of events (and of status quo social relations) through an attunement to the multivocality of resistance suppressed (and oftentimes co-opted) within the official story. (Such attentiveness to multivocality must also apply to relations between differently-located knowledge producers in the academy.) Said observes an "organized interplay that derives from the themes" within literary works, "not from a rigorous melodic or formal principle outside the work" (1994, 51). Similarly, I find the terms of political, public cultural narrations to be organized from within the political-discursive system; (racial dominance, for example) to be encoded within broader social (including spatial) discourses; and most significantly, to be embodied within the very identities of the nation's discursive subjects (and objects).

10 For Berlant "privatized" citizenship reflects a Reaganite view whereby the intimacy of citizenship becomes "something scarce and sacred, private and proper, and only for members of families" (1997, 3). In this ideology the core context of politics becomes the sphere of (white, heterosexual, financially-secure) private life (3).

11 Opposition concern over the Speaker’s attendance at Filmon government caucus meetings brought minor (and somewhat negative) media attention to Louise Dacquay in the Fall of 1997. The occasion allowed for the brief resurfacing of the 1995 story regarding her ruling on the word “racism.” Since I was studying in Toronto at the time, any glimpse of ‘regional’ affairs on national news was of interest to me. Of more than mild interest, this news from home came to catalyze the present thesis.

12 Trinh writes: "Despite our desperate, eternal attempt to separate, contain, and mend, categories always leak" (1989, 94).

13 In "Truth and Power" Foucault defines ‘genealogy’ in historical terms:

One has to dispense with the constituent subject itself, that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history. (1972/1984, 59)

See also his description of genealogical method in "Two Lectures" (1976/1992).

14 As examinations of Hansard reveal, only that which is heard, acknowledged to be heard, or capable of being heard by those compiling the record, will achieve the status of a textual, archival, verified speech event.

15 My thanks to George Dei for course 1982S ("Indigenous knowledges and decolonization: Pedagogical implications") and for his theorizing on processes of decolonization within the academy.

16 In Black Looks bell hooks questions the value of “a construction of political solidarity that is rooted in a narrative of shared victimization” (1992, 13). Such a politic, she fears, "not only only acts to recenter whites, [but] it risks obscuring the particular ways racist domination impacts on the lives of marginalized groups" (13). I agree with hooks in terms of the very real risks posed by anti-racist discourses of ‘shared pain’. However, what I ask for, and in fact propose in my work, is a construction of political solidarity that keeps acknowledgement of the violations of racist (and interrelated forms of) domination at the pedagogical forefront. In the current social context that privileging must remain constant. However, the impact of such an educational and political commitment ‘to know’ necessarily brings pain (of shame, for example) and loss (of identity foundations) to dominant subjects. Without the force of that pain I do not know how identity-deep change will come about. To call for drastic shifts in dominant persons’ feeling capacities need not (and must not) be tantamount to prescribing ‘shared’ feelings of victimization with those directly oppressed by racism and its violences.
CHAPTER TWO

Dominant Discourses vs. Heterogeneous Zones: Social Order as a "War by Other Means"

The real political task in a society such as ours...is to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them.

--Foucault in Soja, Postmodern Geographies

Introduction

In the parliamentary discourse of Western political elites, rhetorical and argumentative strategies can be analyzed in terms of their instrumentality in ongoing narrations of nationhood and citizenship-definition, and as part of the related work of high-profile 'self'-making. Canadian political discourse proves no exception to this rule. Read through a hybrid historical-spatial lens, sensitive to the truth-making imperatives of heteropatriarchy, colonialism, Euroimperialism, and now late (or transnational) capitalism, it is impossible to disregard the inextricable weft of racialized knowledge in past and present weavings of our nation-building heritage.

In this chapter I unpack a layered, multidisciplinary conceptual framework which responds to the complexities of my postcolonial site. In the discussion which follows, I itemize the primary conceptual tools that I draw from a variety of sources, and in some cases modify considerably. While I describe a framework that I assemble to 'decode' data at my site, I underline the (perhaps obvious) fact that the site of analysis is itself already a product of analysis, even in its elaboration and introduction--in what I choose to include, and, by error or design, to omit. In other words, this chapter is as much a (admittedly limited) genealogical exploration of Canadian nationalist imaginings, here in its 'macro' discursivity, as it is a theoretical road map for the somewhat more 'micro' (localized) analyses to come.

In the first of a series of eleven lectures delivered at The College de France in the winter of 1976, Foucault defines "genealogy" as "the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of...local discursivitities, the subjected knowledges which were thus
released would be brought into play" (1976/1992, 85). That is, an "archaeology" of local discursivities (such as I perform at the Manitoba site) operates as the method by which local analyses (knowledges) are unearthed. At the same time, archaeology's "organically dependent" and "complementary" tool of analysis is genealogical research (Stoler 1995, 60). Genealogy constitutes the "tactics" through which local knowledges can enter into a broader field of analysis, (or as Foucault expresses it elsewhere) a critical "grid of intelligibility" (Foucault cited in Stoler 1995, 56). An overview of my method, as discussed in this chapter, sees sections one and four (and to some extent, section five) addressing the genealogical aspects of the research design, while sections two, three, and five account for the more local, archaeological approach carried out on Manitoba-based political discourse. As a whole this chapter attempts to restate the problem that I identify in Chapter One: namely, the ongoing violences of racism and their liberal democratic occlusion as critical to the ontology of the Canadian nation. In this instance I construct the problematic more explicitly within a critical framework and vocabulary proper to Foucauldian poststructuralism.

The task of the first section of this chapter is to elaborate how I understand power, particularly as it is conceived and exercised within the rights-based, juridical-political frameworks of Western societies. I begin this discussion by drawing on Foucault's work in "Two Lectures" (1976/1992). In an inversion of Clausewitz's assertion that war is politics continued by other means, Foucault hypothesizes that "power is war, a war continued by other means" (1976/1992, 90). This approach to the analysis of power supports the contention I make throughout this thesis: that contemporary nationalist discourse--an extension of political power--is itself a form of warfare, a postcolonial war continued by means other than those (sometimes) more explicit forms of violence that were practiced in the early days of Canadian nation-building. In "Two Lectures" Foucault sketches a broad genealogy of power for the West. Tracking a "theory of right" from medieval times through to the present day, he
posits that the "discourse and techniques of right" have functioned to conceal the both latent and brutal "fact of domination" (1976/1992, 95). Building on this genealogy of power, I turn to a "genealogy of racisms" which interprets racism not as effect, but as a tactic of nation-state forms of domination (Stoler 1995, 59).

In section two I elaborate my research design in conceptual terms. I attempt to outline the intersection of genealogical and archaeological methods implicit in my local reading of Manitoba's provincial political discourse. This localized study of power is intended to decode the investments of nationalist discourse, as the terms by which methods of (specifically racist) subjugation are instigated in Canada. Section two concludes with a gloss on the concept of 'discourse' itself, as it applies to the methodology--and to the data--that shapes my work. I specify an idiosyncratic use of two discursive categories: 'rhetorical-discursive' and 'material-discursive'. These fluid categories are important to the complementary and mutually reflexive data analyses of Chapters Three and Four.

Section three defines my focus on the nation as an entity perceivable in terms of a rhetorical-textual, or narrative, project. Within that meaning-making project are what I consider to be problematic epistemological dependencies: part of a kind of discursive 'arsenal of innocence' for dominant subject formation. Hegemonic truth-making strategies are by no means limited to performances in official political settings. However, in this thesis I maintain focus on parliamentary performances of the 'nation'. I argue that this public-institutional site and its elite political actors wield disproportionate--and traceable--social influence, in part through high profile epistemic productions and reproductions embedded in political "text and talk" (van Dijk 1993, 65). This influence, relating to access to both symbolic and material resources, can be read in micro-orderings of official language; in imbricated socio-material relations 'outside' the site of official enunciation; and most important to my argument, in the very formation of the (speaking/silenced) subjects and objects of nationalism.
Indeed, epistemological dependencies have long found powerful form in the shape of ontological imperatives, coded and naturalized as they are within apparently rootless national traditions.

In the fourth stage of discussion I plumb more deeply the rhetorical-discursive aggressions of the nation. I expose a structure of domination concealed and latent at the very heart of the nation formation. Drawing on a number of theorists of postcoloniality I sketch a heterogeneous zone of interaction first produced by imperial and colonial contact, and the identities formed within these asymmetrical relations. With the help of Toni Morrison, Edward Said and Marcia Crosby I point to the racialized grammars of imperialism: Africanism, Orientalism, and Indianism. I suggest that these raced modes of ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge (re)production are threads inextricably woven into the interdependent “range of power-differentiated regimes out of which colonial relations have been organized into the present” (Kay Anderson 1996, 198).

The fifth leg in my theoretical journey constitutes a response to the style of discourse I encounter at my site, and to my wish for a "radical recontextualization" (Berlant 1997, 14) of the elite actors' enunciations. With a view to expanding landscape discourse analysis beyond the interpretive parameters of 'rhetorical' or 'narrative' strategizing, I consider what a spatial analysis can contribute to understanding conditions of receptivity, utterability--and ultimately limitations on identity and knowing--within (and within range of) Manitoba's legislature. Lefebvre's "trialectics of spatiality" (specifically as re-mapped by critical geographer, Edward Soja), assist in a productive blurring of distinctions between what we deem to be observed (perceived) in the material world, to be 'imagined' (conceived), and what phenomena we consider to be 'lived' or experienced. These theoretical openings help to mediate some of my questionings around ontology, and support my assertions about the lived ontological imperatives instituted in part by a localized and racist
nationalist discourse in Manitoba.

1. a "thematics of power" according to Foucault

In the second of his "Two Lectures" (delivered on January 14, 1976) Foucault names sovereignty as the central problem of the 'rules of right' in the West. In the first lecture, he defines 'sovereignty' as a theoretical construction, "essentially based on the idea that the constitution of political power obeys the model of a legal transaction involving a contractual type of exchange..." (1976/1992, 88). In this formulation, power is conceptualized as "an original right that is given up [by individuals] in the establishment of sovereignty..." (91). Within the context of my thesis, the 'problem' of sovereignty has two aspects. In a theoretical sense, sovereignty is a conceptual obstacle one must overcome in order to avoid a simple economistic understanding of power in liberal democratic societies (Foucault 1976/1992, 89). From the political perspective of the elite actors at my research site, the coherence of a legal code of 'right'--which serves to legitimate the "law of the land" in Manitoba--remains an ongoing problem for the maintenance of status quo social relations. It is this liberal-democratic code, the honouring of its sovereign rules and apparatuses of 'right', which contributes to the silencing of a racial minority member of the House in 1995.

Foucault traces key shifts and recuperations in the discourse of right, beginning with the role played by legal thought in Medieval times. He contends that it is "in response to the demands of royal power, for its profit and to serve as its instrument or justification, that the juridical edifice of our own society has been developed" (1976/1992, 94). Succinctly put, the legal concept of 'right' in the West begins, and as Foucault will argue ends, with a need to legitimate (in the eyes of the majority) the King's right: the inalienable right of the Sovereign to sovereign power. What Foucault terms the "juridical-political" theory of sovereignty, once referred to mechanisms of power effective under the feudal monarchies, and later served "as instrument and
even as justification for the construction of the large scale administrative monarchies" (103). A significant genealogical shift occurs, however, at the time of the wars of religion and later, when the theory of sovereignty and right becomes a weapon: one "which has been utilized...either to limit or else to re-inforce royal power....It functions both in the hands of artistocrats and in the hands of parliamentarians" (103). In short, the theory of sovereignty and its discourse of right constituted "the major instrument of political and theoretical struggle around systems of power of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (103).

By the eighteenth century it is this same theory of sovereignty which reappears, reactivated in the tradition of Roman Law and distilled in the philosophies of thinkers like Rousseau and Hobbes. In this epoch the legal edifice of 'right' is directed toward the construction of an alternative model of power and polis, that of parliamentary democracy (103). At the moment of the (French) Revolution the legal edifice of right escapes from the control of the monarch, and in effect turns 'sovereign' power against the Sovereign. Yet as Foucault suggests, what remains consistent is the fact that "it is always the limits of this [same] sovereign power that are put in question, its prerogatives (official or hereditary rights) that are challenged" (94). In other words, Foucault believes that whether the monarch is dominant or diminished, the King remains the central personage in the whole legal edifice of the West (94). (The monarch retains discursive life in liberal democracy, even when distributions of power have been radically decentred.) Likewise, sovereignty persists as the central problem of right in Western societies, even when sovereignty is democratized by parliaments. What endures is the essential function of the discourse and techniques of right, which has always been "to efface the domination intrinsic to power in order to present the latter at the level of appearance under two different aspects: on the one hand, as the legitimate rights of sovereignty, and on the other, as the legal obligation to obey it" (95).
Within the context of modernity, therefore, two limits are seen to define the arena in which power is exercised. From the nineteenth century up to our own day, there exists a legislative code, an order and a *discourse* of 'public right' "whose principle of articulation is the social body [to replace that of the King] and the delegative status of each citizen [democratized sovereignty]" (Foucault 1976/1992, 106). At the same time, the "democratization of sovereignty was fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion" (105). Otherwise stated, a theory of collective sovereignty (of 'right'), such as articulated in modern parliamentary democracy, depends *for its terms of endorsement* upon "a closely linked grid of disciplinary [material] coercions whose purpose is in fact to assure the cohesion of this same social body" (106). The relations of domination Foucault describes here are no longer those of the Sovereign prevailing over his subjects, but "that of his subjects *in their mutual relations* [italics mine]" (96). Now when one considers power at its multiple points of application, it is "not the uniform edifice of sovereignty, but the multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and function within the social organism" (96).

Foucault insists that the limits which define the parameters of modern power are "so heterogeneous that they cannot possibly be reduced to each other" (106). This problem of irreducibility is critical, for in the debate data that I analyze it is precisely this incommensurability of ('real', 'material') racist forms of subjugation, and an apparently abstract Canadian socio-legal code, which *technically* stymies MLA Lathlin's attempts at rupturing hegemonic 'truth'. For the purposes of my argument, however, I am concerned with the goal evidently common to both a code of law and a discourse of disciplinary coercion, of normalization. While often heterogeneous in their applications, in their sourcings and distributions of power, these discursive limits of modernity (a code of 'right' and mechanisms of disciplinary order) achieve kindred affects and effects of exclusion with respect to race and the social body. To reiterate,
according to Foucault 'right' should be viewed "not in terms of a legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates" (96).

To build on this broad genealogy of power in the West, I turn now to a "genealogy of racisms." Ann Laura Stoler's work on some of the lesser-known lectures from the 1976 College de France series provides significant insights into a thematics of power that is articulated and operationalized, by what Foucault calls a "war of the races" discourse (1995, 55-94). Stoler's discussion focuses primarily on aspects of the lectures which track the changing discourse of race, from the seventeenth through to the twentieth century (55). While my borrowings from her (and from Foucault's) arguments are limited, they do allow me to pick up where Foucault leaves off in "Two Lectures." There race remains absent from the Foucauldian take on the discursive limits of power in modernity, that is, from his critique of the role of a code of 'right' in state systems of domination.

According to Stoler's reading, a basic assumption of the argument Foucault forwards in the later lectures is that "the discourse of nation [derives] from a more basic discourse on the war of races" (1995, 93). Foucault contends that the idea of "war as the 'uninterrupted weft of history' appears in the specific form of a war of races, a binary conception of the social body that will provide the 'matrix within which all the forms of social war will be sought afterwards'" (Stoler 1995, 66). This 'new' paradigmatic discourse appears early in the seventeenth century, articulating class conflicts at the time of the English bourgeois revolution, and then again at the end of the century with the opposition of the French aristocracy to the absolutist monarchy (65). By the nineteenth-century, the revolutionary or "decentred" discourse of revolution has been "recentred"--now coded into the terms of a normalizing and centralizing power (Stoler 1995, 66). This terminal point in Foucault's genealogy of racisms finds the mythic discourse of warring "races" (feudal contestations between bloodlines, revolutionary struggles between classes) resolving itself into one of
biologized "race." Pacified within a discourse of nationhood, in Foucault's reading the mechanisms of an internal racism become those of "constant purification' which will be one of the fundamental dimensions of social normalization" (67). Racism emerges as a normalized tactic, and no mere effect, of nation-state power.

Significant with respect to my reading of the "law of the land" in postcolonial Manitoba is the paradoxical nature of what Foucault terms, this "first 'historico-political discourse about society'” (Stoler 1995, 65). In the seventeenth century it is "a discourse that interrogates law and sees its formation as the consequence of massacres, conquests, and domination, not as the embodiment of natural rights [italics mine]" (65) The 'new' war of races discourse speaks back in a revolutionary manner to “that quintessential unitary discourse that has shaped our understanding of power since the middle ages: namely the discourse of sovereignty in which the fact of domination is hidden in a language of legitimate rights” (65). Consider this interpretation of the liberal democratic edifice alongside the (late twentieth-century) observation made by Lee Maracle, writer, activist and member of the Stoh:lo nation: “Laws are constructed by the occupying force to facilitate the suppression of any resistance from the dominated people.....The laws of this country [Canada] are unequal, force upholds them and justice is foreign to their very formulation" (1996, 93).

A corollary to the "war of the races" discourse is its capacity to 'speak back' to the unitary discourse of 'right,' yet at the same time to remain attached to (dependent upon) a language of rights. Stoler writes: "its truth claims are made to specific rights and by specific holders of them; the rights of a family (to property), of a class (to privilege), of a race (to rule)." (1995, 65). Compare this theoretical assertion with the insightful words of Chief Allan Ross of Norway House, in his address to The Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba. Chief Ross describes a postcolonial "war of the races" wherein 'universal' juridical and political structures serve to sanction and uphold a decidedly racialized disequilibrium of forces:
Anyone in the justice system knows that Lady Justice is not blind in the case of Aboriginal people. She has one eye open. She has one eye open for us and dispenses justice unevenly and often very harshly. Her garment is rent. She does not give us equality. She gives us subjugation. She makes us second class citizens in our own land.

(Province of Manitoba 1991a, 6)

A critical feature of the "war of the races" discourse is its imminent flexibility, its reversibility. The homogeneity of the discourse "[makes] it possible, with a particular set of concepts, to play different games," to take opposing sides within a battle whose 'revolutionary' terms shift over time (Foucault in Stoler 1995, 61).

Stoler's critical engagement with Foucault's genealogy raises some important concerns, particularly with his failure to explore more closely the relationship between nation, citizenship and race (93). Moreover, his historiography is so constrained by European boundaries (contrary to Stoler's, and my own theoretical scope) that his analyses are confined to a selective range of racisms and to restricted genealogies of their formation. Nevertheless, Foucault's argument for the derivation of the discourse of the nation, from the more basic discourse on the "war of the races," remains evocative. It serves to locate relations of violence within the nation-formation itself. In this theorization violence and dominance are uncovered in the discursive strata layered beneath the level of particular (identifiable, partisan) political ideologies. The vision of a national society "saturated with the relations of war" (Stoler 1995, 65) permits the critical centring of issues of violence, notwithstanding aggressive discursive overcodings in the language of democratic sovereignty, 'equality' and individual rights.

Stoler's remedial postcolonial framework for the "war of the races" discourse is important in that it institutes needed shifts and subtleties in Foucault's analysis. She writes:
the discourse of the nation, as much recent work has shown, did not obliterate the binary conception of society, but rather replaced it with a finer set of gradated exclusions in which cultural competencies continued to distinguish those who were echte Dutch, pure-blood French, and truly English. *The discourse of race was not on parallel track with the discourse of the nation but part of it* [italics mine]; the latter was saturated with a hierarchy of moralities, prescriptions for conduct and bourgeois civilities that kept a racial politics of exclusion at its core. Racism has not only derived from an 'excess' of biopower as Foucault claimed, but, as Balibar argues, from an 'excess' of nationalism. (93)

Further to state racism, Stoler maintains that it has “never been gender-neutral in the management of sexuality; gender prescriptions for motherhood and manliness, as well as gendered assessments of perversion and subversion are part of the scaffolding on which the intimate technologies of racist policies rest” (93). In fact, “nationalist discourses were [and are] predicated on exclusionary cultural principles that did more than divide the middle class from the poor. They marked out those whose claims to property rights, citizenship, and public relief were worthy of recognition and whose were not” (8).

To summarize, only those persons who (in historical, political, cultural and economic practice) can claim a full and uncontested set of privileges are secure as the nation's 'true' citizens, the *subjects* obliquely named in the legitimating discourse of liberal democracy. The partial disciplinary and normalizing technologies of citizenship's endorsement, however, remain both invisible to, and intimately bound up in, the legal edifice that would conceal violences at the heart of nation-making. To return to the terms of Foucault's first lecture, it is clear that the war-like phenomenon of "civil peace" requires critical examination at local sites, particularly where leaders define themselves both in liberal-humanist terms, and as inheritors of a proud

2. discourse "cuts into the form of things": a localized study of power

The design of this thesis involves a localized observation of tensions between the discursive limits of modernity described by Foucault, in order that aspects of an inequitable social order in Canada might be more clearly perceived as a "war by other means." Within the context of modernity's ambivalence, Foucault suggests that what is needed is a study of power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is completely invested in its real and effective practices. What is needed is a study of power in its external visage, at the point where it is in direct and immediate relationship with that which we can provisionally call its object, its target, its field of application, there—that is to say—where it installs itself and produces its real effects. (1976/1992, 97)

My research design takes its cue from this methodological precaution. I focus on the 'hows' of white elite political power at a moment when it comes in direct and immediate relationship with its racialized 'object'--a Cree man who would become in that moment a speaking, meaning-making subject. By mapping the "law of the land" outward from moments of Oscar Lathlin's resistance and his silencing in the provincial legislature, I attempt to make visible the investments of the dominant national story, and of dominant social subjects, in "real and effective practices" of racism across a provincial social field of application. This 'field' ultimately includes the bodies and minds of all Manitobans, where power "installs itself and produces its real effects."4

I am concerned with points of cleavage within the Canadian national narration, as these come into relief during epistemic crisis. Tensions emerge between apparently neutral dominant discourses proper to the nation, and uneven, unequal zones (the dis/order of lives, experiences, places) that these discourses attempt to code over, sometimes violently to conceal. On the level of EuroCanadian identity, the
now almost archetypal postcolonial event that catalyses profound crisis is one which is capable of producing cracks in white citizens' conviction of their own innocence. An event of this nature exposes racially-dominant Canadians to calls for accountability from those afflicted by the uneven terms of that institutionalized innocence. Dominant Canadians are called to account for the decidedly inequitable state of things in "our home and native land."

Building an Asian American critique of U.S. citizenship, Lisa Lowe writes: "[i]f the law is the apparatus that binds and seals the universality of the political body of the nation, then the 'immigrant', produced by the law as margin and threat to that symbolic whole, is precisely a generative site for the critique of that universality" (1996, 8).

Immigration has been an historically significant factor in the evolution of Canadian society, and the province of Manitoba represents no exception to that history. However, while changing transnational flows of migrants continue to be a force influencing the contours of Canadian society, I argue that it is also crucial that we attend critically to the production of a long-standing (pre- and post-national) "internal enemy," racialized and thus opposed to the unmarked body politic (Foucault cited in Stoler 1995, 59). In contemporary Manitoba, social relations between the (primarily 'white') non-Native dominant society and First Nations peoples remain the most salient relations characterized by race. In this sense Manitoba is not unlike Saskatchewan and Alberta, or other less populous, more rural regions of the country. In terms of numbers, a province like Manitoba is less visibly influenced by most recent waves of immigration such as those reconfiguring Canada's sizable urban centres, namely Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal.

Of course, the potential invisibility of First Nations people in these 'metropolitan' Canadian locations is also telling. Recently, an educated white woman told me how she "agreed" with the premise of my thesis (as she understood it); she too had observed racism against First Nations people "when visiting northern Ontario." My
point here is that the saliency of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations in Manitoba speaks to the contemporary demographic, and not to the finite containment of a specific racism in a particular region. Indeed, the fact that white citizens in high density, southern urban areas cannot conceive of racism against First Nations people, as a precondition for their social spaces existing as they now know them, only attests to the near-totalizing effects of racist violence enacted at earlier stages in the history of EuroCanadian settlement.

Given that compulsory national stories cut into the form of citizenship as a lived and living category, I am interested in the ‘hows’ of discursive reproduction for the abstract identity category of ‘citizen’. In terms of narrative, I ask how the dominant story manages to resist rupture. At the same time, I question the ways in which particular understandings and practices of ‘place’ simultaneously distort and ‘disappear’ oppositional voices, and (re)legitimize hegemonic authority. To explore how the unspeakability of racism is secured in the contemporary Manitoba legislative context, my method consists of mapping what happens when a marginalized citizen endeavours to tell another, very different story about the province (and by extension, about the nation). Oscar Lathlin speaks from racialized First Nations experience, rooted in a marginal northern Manitoba site. He represents his own experience and, as he claims, that of a number of his constituents. I track those key contextual conditions/productions which alternatively support or distress elite attempts at hegemonic reordering: moves which try to set limits on Oscar Lathlin’s mainstream audibility, and on his capacity for coherent critique.

It is important that I underline here my methodological intention with respect to drawing on statements made by Opposition Member Lathlin. In this discussion I am not relying on the ‘truth’ articulated by Mr. Lathlin as a benchmark for measuring the ‘untruths’ forwarded by the Members of the Government. Benedict Anderson makes a useful analytical distinction which I adapt for my site: “Communities are to be
distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style [italics mine] in which they are imagined" (1991, 6). I extend this principle to analysis of divergent discourses. While taking into account profoundly inequitable power relations in mainstream society, and the very real, very violent realities of racism in Manitoba (and in Canada), I acknowledge that one must also see oppositional discourses as open to interrogation, especially regarding the particular silences and erasures that their regimes enact or repeat. In this sense both the racially marginal voice of Lathlin, and the 'anti-racist' rights-claims of his (predominantly 'white') fellow (New Democrat) Opposition party members, can be opened up to productive critique.

However, considering my subject position as a white woman from Manitoba's urban South, and in view of the limited scope of the present project, I do not problematize Oscar Lathlin's rhetoric. I use the boundaries of his audibility in the House as a means of reflecting on the nature of sociopolitical 'truth' as it is conceived (and contested) by the racially dominant narrators. It is the dominant narration, after all, with which I myself can most closely be visibly and culturally identified. Those are the official stories that have consistently sought to define my social and political subjectivity, and presumed to speak to my interests as a more or less 'unmarked' homogeneous Manitoba citizen. Without pretending to appropriate (or to fully comprehend) any racial minority viewpoint or "subjugated knowledge" (Foucault 1976/1992, 81), I am nevertheless profoundly influenced by experiences and theory that are articulated from non-dominant spaces and bodies, and increasingly from the perspectives of Aboriginal peoples in this country.

Before concluding this conceptual elaboration of my research design, I take one final detour to clarify my recurring use of the postructuralist term 'discourse'. Feminist sociolinguist Terry Threadgold discusses pivotal theoretical openings, as well as imprecisions in Foucault's fluctuating conceptualizations of the term. She contends that Foucault's work has implications for what linguists or semioticians might call the
'discursive' and the 'non-discursive' (that is, where the discursive refers to a non-discursive 'content' that exists prior to its naming). The relations between discursive and non-discursive, in Foucault's conception, "can only be mapped across the whole adjacent field of other concepts, objects and subjects, all of which are statements [italics mine] that constitute a system of values which characterize 'their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange, their possibility of transformation'" (1998, 64 notes omitted). This understanding of relations between discursive and non-discursive is congruous with my central methodological assertion: that in order to know who a citizen can be in Canada, the terms of the rule of law cannot be read in isolation, not without mapping across the whole contiguous field of other matters, other terms and (con)textual orderings.

Threadgold goes further to explore Foucault's rewriting of (what she calls) the relations between content and expression. She draws on Deleuze's adjustment of Foucault's terms, where Deleuze reads the "visible" and "articulable" as co-extensive (1998, 65). Threadgold explains that these two forms are "heterogeneous, anisomorphic; but they exist in mutual presupposition. Their relationship is characterized by what Foucault calls "'a whole series of crisscrossings'," a mutual grappling and capture in which discourse 'cuts into the form of things'" (1998, 65 notes omitted). This last interpretation I find most helpful in my analysis. In my work I understand the 'rhetorical' and the 'material' as theoretically distinguishable, but always blurred, related modalities of action; both 'text' and 'context' are powerful statement fields. (Note the parallel here with the irreducible, yet theoretically distinguishable discursive limits of modernity, as outlined by Foucault in section one, above. A liberal democratic discourse of 'right' can be characterized as rhetorical, while that of disciplinary coercions, of normalization, is more 'material' in its applications.) For methodological clarity I designate 'rhetorical-discursive' and 'material-discursive' fields, while I generally resist firm distinctions between the two.
As the data reveals, rigid binary distinctions serve to prevent the naming of violence as such, even after blood has been let, and threatens to burst the seams of sealed categories of accountability.

3. political "text and talk": the rhetorical-discursive exercise of power

citizen, ... [L. civitas, E. city] A native or naturalized, as opposed to alien, member of a state or nation, owing allegiance to its government and entitled to its protection; an inhabitant of a city or town, esp. one entitled to its privileges or franchises....

--The Living Webster Dictionary

I begin this work on a micro level, with a struggle over language--over a single word--in a moment of parliamentary crisis. From there I trace orderings, disciplines, inclusions and exclusions that support a particular kind of resolution to this crisis. I read these traces across what I call 'rhetorical-discursive' and 'material-discursive' fields. My starting point for text-based data analysis consists of select assumptions drawn from theories of discourse analysis.

Teun van Dijk's concept of "text and talk" helps me to concretely define the data, namely the selections of transcribed debate gathered from official Hansard format. Rooted in a tradition of social (as opposed to 'abstract') discourse analysis, van Dijk's work on parliamentary discourse supposes an important sensitivity to genre. For example, he notes the blurred nature of 'formal' genres of oral discourse, such as exemplified by speeches in the House. Speeches in parliamentary debate contexts consist of written, preformulated "text" put into performance, along with less common moments of spontaneous, ad hoc "talk," resulting in combinations of monologue and dialogue, written and spoken parts, at any given moment more or less spontaneous, and I add, more or less conscious interventions (1995, 66; 1997, 4).

Further to genre, parliamentarians know that their talk is 'for the record' (although I note in Chapter Three how chance or strategic slippages in recording practices might affect what utterances are in fact preserved). For example, during the
November 1, 1995 debate over the propriety of the word "racist," Liberal MLA Kevin Lamoureux (who supports the Speaker’s November ruling on "unparliamentary language") insists that he “[does] not want to send the wrong message to the public” (4458). As van Dijk notes, parliamentarians do not speak merely to argue for or against a policy, a bill, or other political activities, they also make official statements that reflect party positions, which are to be inserted into the records and which may be quoted in the news media. That is, their contributions, which occasionally are even changed in the final version of the records, are those for which they may be held politically and morally responsible. (1995, 66)

In other words, monitoring and control of oneself and of others is a crucial feature of parliamentary text and talk, particularly in debate over matters highly sensitive to a given public.

Matters of discursive control lead me to consider briefly the question of consensus-production. Arguing in general terms, Chilton and Schaffner suggest in "Discourse and Politics" that "democracies and totalitarian regimes can be thought of in terms of their characteristic means of the control of discourse. From city states to large modern states the organization of the political 'conversation' defines the nature of the polity" (1997, 215-16). I share van Dijk’s particular interest in this ‘polity’. His work focuses not on explicit right-wing racism, but on “the much more subtle and indirect forms of ethnic and racial dominance as they are reproduced by elites operating with the framework of the consensus [italics mine]” (1995, 59). van Dijk considers this elite control of discourse within consensus to imply that the political elites are involved in the reproduction of systems of ethnic or racial dominance (59).

The term ‘consensus’ is usually suggestive of shared opinions and beliefs. In my introduction I make reference to the troubling conditions of receptivity evident in Manitoba in 1995. One might say that the majority of 'white' Manitobans remained
‘consensually’ unaware or untroubled by the silencing of Oscar Lathlin, and if they were aware of these events, it is unlikely that many people were cognizant of the implications (and disturbing historical echoes) of that silencing. For my purposes I consider this ‘consensus’ within a more general concern for the exercise of power. Consensus-measurement, then, becomes something like taking the temperature of a society that is itself a complex set of conditions (materialized, imagined, lived) for the production or repression of belief/knowing. In “The Subject and Power” the exercise of power is articulated as

a total structure of actions brought to bear on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions on actions. (Foucault 1982, 220)

Within this formulation, one can interrogate the complicity of liberal democracy--and of its agents--within broader structures of domination. (Liberal democracy provides the individual with a limited agency via enfranchisement, which in effect, allows for the activation of power over her or himself as a subject capable of action.) Although necessarily limited in scope, the cross-referential, narrative and spatial analyses of Chapters Three and Four discern a style of racial dominance proper to Manitoba. These emerge as "a set of actions on actions" which are not totalizing, yet carry the force of apparent consensus: of storied time (history) and of occupied postcolonial space.

I read discourse as action and interaction in society. Chilton and Schaffner note that the concept of ‘speech acts’ is “central to political discourse analysis, because it dissolves the everyday notion that language and action are separate” (1997, 216). In the ‘language as action' theorization, discourse itself is conceived of as a power resource, always imbued with the potential to enact abuses of that power (van Dijk
In *Elite Discourse and Racism* van Dijk is concerned with the specific power violations of race-based oppression (1993). His analysis of Western politicians' "text and talk" reveals a "general strategy of positive self-presentation [that] discursively enables and legitimizes the general strategy of negative other-presentation, while at the same time expressing, especially among elites, a self-image as moral leaders in society" (1995, 283).

Like van Dijk, I maintain focus on the characteristic argumentative moves of elites in the "text and talk" of parliamentary discourse (1995, 51). Political elite 'moves' set limits and terms of debate around matters of race and privilege. But while I take up van Dijk's general argument about elites' reproduction of racism through positive/negative subject representations, which are re/activated in political-rhetorical performances, I gesture more emphatically to the intra-discursivity of epistemic strategies (what van Dijk calls underlying "cognitive processes...knowledge and belief structures" 1995, 28). In other words, I am concerned not only with the formation and reproduction of *relations* of dominance by means of, and within, discursive *representations* of social identities. Following Foucault I go further to problematize the subjectivities of these relations, and the imbricated knowings of these subjects, as themselves unstable matters of discourse. "The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle" (Foucault 1976/1992, 98). In sum, knowledges and subjectivities are contingent, both constituted by and constitutive of asymmetrical social relations.
What I mean is this: in a society such as ours, but basically any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse.

--Foucault, "Two Lectures"

While I begin my research by attending to a word outlawed in Manitoba's parliamentary "text and talk" relations, I consider political discourse within a larger (and a somewhat more literary) context of political discourse as nation-narration. Students of postcoloniality owe the evocative phrase 'narrating the nation' to Homi K. Bhabha. In his introduction to Nation and Narration he points to the political 'rationality' of the nation and to its emergence as a powerful historical idea in the west. Characteristically modern in its apparent rootlessness, the birth of the 'nation' was accompanied by an obscuring of its origins in traditions of political thought and literary language (1990, 1-2). Bhabha writes:

The address to nation as narration stresses the insistence of political power and cultural authority in what Derrida describes as the 'irreducible excess of the syntactic over the semantic.' What emerges as an effect of such 'incomplete signification' is a turning of boundaries and limits into the in-between spaces through which the meanings of cultural and political authority are negotiated.... (4)

In this thesis nationalist narrations in performance become the 'in-between' site of analytical choice: the select locus of an exploration interested in making linkages between rhetorical-discursive control, political power, cultural, and more deeply, epistemic, authority.

I contend that Louise Dacquay's November 1st (1995) ruling speaks vividly to an "irreducible excess of the syntactic over the semantic." It is a case where political-cultural content (meaning, the matter of 'racism') has shown itself to be
incongruous with political-juridical (universal, liberal democratic) form. An unwelcome matter is summarily excised by the bloodless force of order (parliamentary technicality and the normative force of 'decorum'). Excesses of the parliamentary order betray Mr. Lathlin's liminal, racialized status, as they are played out between bodies and perspectives decidedly unequal in practice. So too do the rhetorical excesses of nationalism betray citizenship's "in-between" quality. Citizenship is not a static, homogeneous reality, but a contingent and processual one, forever an incomplete signification. It is "continually being produced out of a political, rhetorical, and economic struggle over who will count as 'the people' and how social membership will be measured and valued" (Berlant 1997, 9). At the same time, this political struggle is a moment poised somewhere between the status of spectacle, and of 'everyday' enactments and reinscriptions of racism (Essed, 1991). The disciplining of Oscar Lathlin operates as a moment of public education, what Razack calls "a lesson in lines to be crossed and not crossed" (1999a, 282). Drawing on Toni Morrison's discussion of the O.J. Simpson trial, Razack perceives such trials to be constructing a national narrative, "an agreed upon public truth," or alternatively, an "official story" (1999a, 282-83).

The site of enunciation I privilege calls into play a blur of 'official' discursive regimes, bringing both tacit and explicit ontological imperatives with them. Key to my analysis is the shared investment of these regimes in the forceful discursive production of abstract citizens conceived of as unitary, cohesive, and homogeneous: a subjectivity representing a dislocated agency at the surface of the (national) social body. I wish to further explore the discursive means by which a not-so-abstract agency (of a predominantly 'white' elite) strives to ensure hegemonic subject cohesion, so necessary for continued white elite dominance in Canada.

To review, the constellation of more or less generic discourses activated by nationalism demands a priori a "horizontal comradeship" (to recall Benedict
Anderson’s phrase cited in Chapter One). At the Canadian site—and across much of the globe’s nationalized expanse—discourses of nationhood merge seamlessly with the legacy of assumptions borne by liberal democratic discourse. In this framework members of the nation-state are enfranchised legally and politically through the concept of the abstract citizen. Citizenship’s original status, however, was premised explicitly upon a property- or identity-based condition of political legitimacy (Berlant 1997, 264). With race, class and gender-sexuality markers formally (and informally) structuring worthiness for citizenship in earlier political times, today rhetorical continuities of these inequitable distinctions persist more subtly (and sometimes less so) in nationalist discourse. Likewise, contemporary lived (or ‘material’) experiences of a diverse Canadian citizenry can suggest substantive or subtle discontinuity with the past, while at the same time serving only to reconfigure past forms of oppressive practice.

Lowe’s Asian American critique of contemporary U.S. citizenship exhibits strong resonances with the Canadian case. She infuses a Marxist reading with an awareness of race and gender, stating that "in the United States, not only class, but also the historically sedimented particularities of race, national origin, locality, and embodiment remain largely invisible within the political sphere" (1996, 2). Enacting a kind of alienation of political agency from one’s located, contingent experience of the polis, liberal democratic systems (such as Canada inherited from Britain) split the subject off “from the unrepresentable histories of situated embodiment that contradict the abstract form of citizenship” (Lowe 1996, 2). Yet how unusual--or alternatively, how necessary--it is that a "white settler society" (Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995, 96) like Canada so smoothly loses track of its own, race-privileged political history. Stasiulis and Jhappan remind us that Canada (in company with sister ‘white settler’ states New Zealand and Australia) has always enjoyed a very particular kind of ‘postcoloniality’. For “although Canada (and the other so-called ‘white dominions’)


shared with the so-called 'dependent colonies' a peripheral position in the international political economy prior to the twentieth century, as a cultural, social and political entity, it was a chip off the metropolitan block" (1995, 97). By virtue of its 'whiteness' Canada was bestowed by Britain with the gifts of liberal democratic government (97).11 This act of British 'generosity' supports Benedict Anderson's contention that “official nationalism' was from the start a conscious, self-protective policy, intimately linked to the preservation of imperial-dynastic interests" (1991, 159). From the outset, 'our' nation's proud path towards political autonomy was quite explicitly a matter and purchase of white supremacy.

Notwithstanding an explicitly racialized political history, Canada and its iconic citizens achieve themselves in part through ongoing affirmation of their racial innocence. This affirmation of 'self' does not occur in isolation, but within what Mary Louise Pratt calls 'contact zone' relations. A "contact zone" is a social space "where disparate cultures meet, clash and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination--like colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe today" (1992, 4). I adopt Pratt's 'contact' perspective for its emphasis on "how subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other" (7). A contact zone interpretation "treats the relations among colonizers and colonized...not in terms of separateness or apartheid, but in terms of copresence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, often within radically asymmetrical relations of power" (7 notes omitted). Since the social syntax of the contact zone is predicated upon relational, 'I am this because you are that' distinctions, its grammar emerges as a locality-contingent complex of race, class, sexuality-gender, distinctions: Foucault's set of actions upon possible (and near-impossibilized) actions. And because the nation imagines and makes itself in part through narrative processes, it has fallen to cultural and literary theorists to vividly demonstrate the presence of those grand narratives or 'regimes of truth' that have
violently structured so many imperial and national relations into the present, including the Canadian.

Here I step back for a moment from the imagined community of the nation, in order to read discourses of nation-building across the vast contact zone field of imperial and colonial (self-) intelligibility. I am concerned with identifying the specific racialized grammars of ‘Orientalism’, ‘Africanism’ and ‘Indianism’. For a general understanding of how these kinds of raced systems operate, I look to Edward Said’s path breaking critical work, _Orientalism_ (1979). Said’s assessment of the sheer scope of Orientalism informs my perceptions of relational and racialized identity formation at the Manitoba site.

Orientalism operates as “the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity ‘the Orient’ is in question” (1979, 3). Said contends that “without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage--and even produce--the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period.” Indicative not only of “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’,” Orientalism also imposes limits on action (2, 3). As a discursive system, it constitutes a (symbolic, rhetorical and material) set of actions on actions. An illustration of this systematicity is the presence of a racialized grammar of imperial identities, at the same time instituted within (and occupied by means of) a racialized global geography. Historically speaking, this geography-making brought with it violent material effects (genocide, subjugation, assimilation), carried out in the name of places that existed coherently, as ‘other’ to all things ‘European’, even if only in the lived imaginings of the white imperial traveler, and in the dreams of colonial settlers who followed close on the heels of conquest.
Imperial truth regimes of 'Africanism' and 'Indianism' are also indispensable to a critical understanding of the figurative and literal re/making of what Morrison calls "the architecture of a new white man" (1992, 15). Morrison's critical study of the estranged racial poetics of ('white') American Literature probes the very heart of the "sycophancy of white identity" as revealed in classic American texts. A reflexive fabrication, the "dark, abiding, signing Africanist presence" (5) gives shape and form to a submerged project of whiteness seeking articulacy. Morrison observes that national literatures (and their writers) "do seem to end up describing and inscribing what is really on the national mind" (14). She sees both the representations of history and those of literature to be providing commentary on the transformations of racial concepts in the U.S. By her estimation "literature has an additional concern and subject matter: the private imagination interacting with the external world it inhabits" (65-66).

Yet as I intend to demonstrate in the following chapter, it is not the exclusive purview of the literary to reveal traces of a "private imagination interacting with the external world." Just as a false mysticism of art can divide its critics from politically- (and power) sensitive analyses of literature (such as demonstrated in Morrison's insightful project), a rigid public/private dichotomy can divide interrogations of the 'rational' public world of politics from its intimately implicated private realms of imagination, desire and self-knowing (identity). Private desire courses through 'public' discourse. Politics is, after all, as much about the actual people who martial power in public terms, as it is about the collective 'polis' political leaders supposedly represent.

I contend that moments of slippage in national and localized public-political narration reveal the excesses of an acutely racialized private imagination in Manitoba. The racialized grammar of 'Indianism' seeps vividly out of this discourse in crisis. Speech samples from Premier Gary Filmon in debate dramatically reveal epistemological (and ontological) investments in what Canadian art theorist Marcia
Crosby describes as a composite, singular 'Imaginary Indian' who functioned [and continues to operate] as a peripheral but necessary component of Europe's history in North America--the negative space of the 'positive' force of colonialist hegemony. Together, the 'Indian' and the Euro-Canadian made up a fictive but nevertheless documented historical whole. (1991, 269)

Attesting to the very contemporary place of Indianism in Canada, Manitoba Metis writer Emma LaRocque provides an illustration of 'everyday' Indianism. She tells of receiving a rejection slip from a Winnipeg poetry magazine that read, "'Not Indian enough'" (1990, xix). LaRocque was also informed by the editor of "a major literary journal" that her poems were "not authentic because they played too much with words" (1990, xix).

Systemic overdetermination in Indianist terms, of Native people as members of a racialized local grouping, can be demonstrated through an analysis of parliamentary elite discourse. Indianism underwrites Louise Dacquay's ruling and its related demands, which in one sense add up to an ironic rejection of Oscar Lathlin: not so much for the fact of being a Native person, but for not being 'Indian' enough. Not 'Indian' enough to remain silent on matters of race, and clearly not 'Indian' enough to provide the comforts of innocence to 'white' citizen-subjects.

5. the "law of the land": the material-discursive nation and a critical case for space

We are...always historical-social-spatial beings, actively participating individually and collectively in the construction/production--the 'becoming'--of histories, geographies, societies.

--Soja, *Thirdspace*

In his speech of May 30, 1995, Premier Gary Filmon enthuses, "[o]ur vision is to make this province the best place anywhere, to live, to work, to invest and to raise a family" (225). If one considers society to be "an entity saturated with the relations of
"war" (Stoler 1995, 65) one can read in 'our' Manitoba vision an implied iconic citizen at odds with its implied enemies. This "citizenship is colonized within heterosexuality" (Alexander 1997, 66); within specific (gendered) constructions of masculinity and femininity; within transnational capitalist class relations (including one's dis/ability to perform 'self'-realizing work within specific, competitive socio-economic constraints); within race; and within socio-spatial orderings, including urban/rural or metropole/margin oppositions--"the geographic distributions of 'unfreedoms' that imperial labor systems enforced" (Stoler 1995, 53). An expression for the collective impact(s) of these interwoven discourses is contained in the evocative notion of "'internal frontiers' of national communities, frontiers that were secured through--and sometimes in collision with--the boundaries of race" (Stoler 1995, 7).

The post-colonial prairie setting, once a rugged frontier within the Dominion, is infused in the present with the tense and shifting requirements of Canada's "internal frontiers." In Manitoba's contact zone, landscape discourse emerges as part of a political discursive arsenal in this ongoing "war by other means." Concepts specific to Chapter Three's reading of landscape discourse will be outlined there, yet I think it important at this juncture to detail the somewhat idiosyncratic meanings that I intend for the "law of the land." My inspiration for the use of the phrase comes from its citation in legislative debate, called up from Beauchesne in an Opposition MLA's attempt to argue for Oscar Lathlin's freedom of speech. According to Citation 24 from the 'bible' of parliament, (parliamentary) "privilege ...[is] part of the law of the land" (November 1, 1995, 4451).

In my analysis I use spatial terminology like 'land' and 'landscape' in overlapping physical, and what I term provisionally, 'metaphysical' senses. For example, the "law of the land" can refer to the political landscape as it is conceived and micro-mapped through the tropes of Canadian parliamentary democracy, within the highly symbolic space of the Manitoba Legislature. Premier Gary Filmon's
response to the Throne Speech in May of 1995 commences, for example, with an address to "the members of this Assembly, the men and women of our province who represent every square inch of this great province" (May 31, 1995, 218). The 'landscape' in question may also be that territory which is mytho-poetically and mytho-politically invoked. It is called up both as territory frozen in time—for use in sanitized historical dramas—and it carries imaginative currency for the present. The land can be layed out as an uncontested physical resource, and perceived as a commodified place to penetrate with masculinist capitalist development. Finally, the "law of the land" in my usage can refer to a geography of actual human bodies—the violations acted upon and resistances shown by those bodies—in 'real' time and socioeconomic space. I refer here to the human landscape outside the circumscription of the House walls.

In my early attempts to name the kinds of meanings I find layered in the Manitoba debate samples, I tried to blur the emerging strata of signification with terms like 'metaphysical'. I was attempting to name a space where idea and identity, abstract belief and imagination, in effect meet and mutually interpenetrate material, lived, tangible, and 'felt' realities. To my mind, the lived contours of the data were coming into conflict with the binary demands of Western thinking: where space and time, history and geography, mind and matter occupy tidy, discrete analytic categories. 'Metaphysical', after all, means 'after' or 'going beyond' the physical or material, which I did not wish to actually 'go beyond', but rather, to understand more complexly as shaping the lived.

Happily, more recent encounters with the work of critical geographer Edward Soja, and with his reworkings of Henri Lefebvre's The Production of Space (1991), have provided me with a different means of interrogating binary formulations like 'mind' and 'matter,' and 'text' and 'context'. As the analytic explorations of Chapter Four demonstrate, I allow my reading to shift somewhat, from privileging the orderings of political language (as in Chapter Three), to give space and its technologies
interpretive priority. In his combination “Preface and Postscript” to *Postmodern Geographies* Soja calls for “the reassertion of a critical spatial perspective in contemporary social theory and analysis” (1989, 1). Making a complaint common to critical geographers, he describes a longstanding hegemony of knowledge production, in which “time and history have occupied a privileged position in the practical and theoretical consciousness of Western Marxism and critical social science” (1989, 1). While history has reigned as “the great variable container for a critical interpretation of social life and practice,” Soja asserts that “[t]oday, it may be space more than time that hides consequences from us, the ‘making of geography’ more than the ‘making of history’ that provides the most revealing tactical and theoretical world” (Soja 1989, 1).

Understanding how history constructs itself and social relations, as the sole route to practical political and theoretical insight, has prevented social scientists from seeing the production of space as a rich realm of analysis. Without discounting the force of the text (and “talk”) as a site of public education and social re/ordering, I follow Soja’s lead and also see the text “as a map, a geography of simultaneous relations and meanings that are tied together by a spatial rather than a temporal logic” (1989, 1). Moreover, I give space what Soja specifies as an “ontological priority” (1989, 119). People come to know themselves and others, in part, through their relation to place. The inverse is also true; they come to ‘know’ and to construct places in relation to their concepts of ‘self’ and others. In my analysis of Canadian citizenship, I use critical geography to find other ways to say something about some of the salient ways dominant subjects come to know and to represent themselves--and each other--at my research site. Faced with an interesting mirroring (or appropriation?) of the stereotype of Aboriginal people and their indigenous identification with the land, I have felt compelled to seek out different kinds of theory to help me account for the prominent place land and landscape discourse occupy in an elite, non-Aboriginal subject’s
narration of himself and of 'quintessential' Canadianness.

A first step in this theoretical modification has been to take social space not as an homogeneous container in which history simply 'happens', but to interrogate spatialities as I do the normalized order of language. Space is neither an affect nor simply a given. Soja details the critical attack Lefebvre wages on such reductionism in spatial thinking. Lefebvre's conception of "social space" breaks down rigid subject-object dualities, where space is seen either as an entirely mental product (subjective), or as something purely naturalistic (objective), mechanistic, or empirical. And with respect to uneven social relations, as Goldberg tells it, new fields of interpretation open up to the critical eye once "the natural and built environments...as well as their modes of representation are [understood to be] made in and [to] reify the image and architecture" (Goldberg 1993, 185-6) of inequitable power distributions. At the same time, the "rationalities of social space--its modes of definition, maintenance, distribution, experience, reproduction, and transformation--are at once fundamental influences upon [italics mine] the social relations of power" (Goldberg 1993, 185).

A method inspired by critical geography attends to spatial practice. The spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space (Soja 1996, 66). Spatial practices reveal material modes of knowledge/power production that exercise themselves within and between social groupings. The traditional focus of all spatial disciplines (for example, traditional geography, surveying, or civil engineering), the spatial practice of a society can be described as "the process of producing the material form of social spatiality" (66).17 (Soja tells us that Lefebvre devotes a whole paragraph to detail "modem" spatial practice as it emerges under capitalism.) This materialized space is depicted "as both medium and outcome of human activity, behaviour, and experience" (66). Empirical and socially produced, what Lefebvre terms perceived space is defined as "directly sensible and open, within limits, to accurate measurement and description" (66). This is the first register of a "trialectics of
It is the second spatial register, however, the *representational* spatial modality, that Lefebvre postulates as "the dominant space in any society, 'a storehouse of epistemological power" (Soja 1996, 67). This "conceived" space tends "towards a system of verbal (and therefore intellectually worked out) signs', again referring to language, [rhetorical] discourse, texts, logos: the written and spoken word" (67). This is the register that most accurately characterizes the Manitoba Legislative space. It is imbued with the force of a particular kind of spatial hegemony. It exerts controlling powers over *representations of space*, and by extension, over the *spatial practices* that order and discipline other sites within the provincial domain. Indeed, for Manitoba's early Legislators, the 'new' Legislative Building (referring to the current structure completed in 1920), even in its outward form

provided Manitobans with links to the great traditions of Western civilization, particularly those of the British Empire....[E]nrobbed with sculpture and murals [it] constituted a visible declaration that what was best and most respected in Western civilization was honored on the Canadian prairies. Thus, the building served as a *rallying point* [italics mine], a spiritual and aesthetic ideal to which prairie citizens might aspire. (Baker 1986, 7)

In Lefebvre's theorizing, the mental spaces of representation, like the juridical-political space of the House, become the "'dominating' spaces of regulatory and 'ruly' discourse" (Soja 1996, 67). These spaces thus house "representations of power and ideology, of control and surveillance" (67), notions I develop in the mutually-reflexive data analyses of rhetorical-discursive and material-discursive orders (in Chapters Three and Four, respectively).

Summarizing the spatial registers discussed to this point, we find Lefebvre laying out "moments of social space" in their inter-relations, moments which ultimately
emerge as a dynamic trialectics of spatiality (Soja 1996, 65). The third ‘field’ of human spatiality is added to the trialectic, outlined below:

1. Spatial Practice (perceived space);
2. Representations of Space (conceived space); and finally,
3. Spaces of Representation (lived space).

This third modality is one which Lefebvre theorizes as both distinct from the other two spaces (conceived and perceived), and as simultaneously encompassing them.

In Lefebvre's first sense, as a distinct concept lived space "is the dominated--and hence passively experienced...or subjected--space which the imagination (verbal but especially non-verbal) seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays...physical space, making symbolic use of its objects'..." (67). Lefebvre's third spatial term leads me to the question of 'material-discursive' analyses, most evident in Chapter Four of this thesis ("Disciplines of Place: The Legislature and Manitoba's 'Other Spaces'"). There my goal is to enhance the visibility of strategically invisibilized spaces of representation in Manitoba. With racial, but also gender and class oppression in mind, I call these Manitoba's "other spaces" (after Foucault 1986). "Here then is space as directly lived," writes Soja, embodied space "with all its intractability intact, a space that stretches across the images and symbols that accompany it, the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users'" (67). Spaces of representation combine "the real and the imagined, things and thought on equal terms," or at least one mode is not privileged over the other a priori (68). Here we find not only the spatial representations of power (to some degree captured in the 'physical', in spatial practices), but also "the imposing and operational power of spatial representations [italics mine]" (68). This is the space (Soja's "Thirdspace") where symbols and myth gain life, take and make new and old meanings. And faced with this "imposing and operational power" of the written and spoken word, of spatial representations, we return to matters of hegemonic force: to the discursive space of the Legislature and the rule of orderly parliamentary language.
According to *The Production of Space* (1991), lived spaces of representation are "the terrain for the generation of 'counterspaces', spaces of resistance to the dominant order arising precisely from their subordinate, peripheral or marginalized positioning" (Lefebvre in Soja 1996, 68). Exploration of the third spatial register (of 'lived space') can become part of an expanded epistemological practice. Both Lefebvre and Soja imagine it as a critical practice (and a location) for those who would decipher *and actively transform* the societies we live in. Therefore, in a second sense Lefebvre intends that social ('lived') space be understood not only as "a transcending composite of all spaces" (Soja 1996, 62). It is also a way of counteracting an over-privileging of historicality and sociality (the social production of time, and of being-in-the-world) in the ontological philosophy of the West (71). Thus viewed as a field of limitations and of resistant possibilities, of retrenchments and active opposition, critical evocations of lived space at local sites can shed light on subject formation and embodiment--on the inequitable 'realities' we Canadians re/create and inhabit daily as social and political beings.

**Conclusion**

Members of First Nations communities, citizen, immigrant and refugee persons of colour, women, gays and lesbians,18 the growing ranks of the poor and the homeless, and persons with disabilities--all persons marked by shifting, frequently overlapping 'outsider' identifications--are made vulnerable by highly conditional terms of social, political, and economic belonging in Canada. Yet the imperative remains to imagine this nation as "a deep, horizontal comradeship" (B. Anderson 1991). I have decoded and outlined in this chapter some of the broad discursive lines I see undergirding the comradeship of Canadian nationalism. Lisa Lowe suggests that the national institutionalization of unity can be read as "the measure of the nation's condition of heterogeneity" (Lowe 1996, 9). To Lowe's formulation, I would add that the excesses of that institutionalization are observable in its violences, reflecting and
producing heterogeneity in terms of uneven power relationships; and revealing the stubborn will of a 'white' elite to dominate through the coercive terms of universality. Characterized here as a "war by other means," I have traced some of the major architectonics of contemporary Canadian citizenship.

Dominant discursive regimes in Canada demand not only an homogeneous imagining, but also appropriate performances of the nation by those who inhabit the lived spaces of our national community. In the subsequent chapters I ask 'what happens?' when the necessary story of "horizontal comradeship" cannot be told; when subordinate actors refuse to perform supporting roles with decorum. We turn now in Chapter Three to focus on truth-management tactics that come to the fore when oppositional voices interrupt, and when they threaten to rupture hegemonic storylines. Chapter Four then investigates the simultaneous 'hows' of concealment: the social-spatial practices of truth-making that serve to obscure matters of privilege at the heart of narrative contestations. Read together, these complementary analyses are concerned with revealing hidden consequences. At high-stakes moments of crisis, who is permitted to belong to this place 'we' Manitobans call 'home'? 
Notes to Chapter Two


2 While my analysis in this work emphasizes the saliency of race/culture in a nationalist/provincial "structure of domination," I ascribe to the non-additive paradigm of Black feminist thought. Hill Collins writes:
   Instead of starting with gender and then adding in other variables such as age, sexual orientation, race, social class, and religion, Black feminist thought sees these distinctive systems of oppression as being part of one overarching structure of domination [notes omitted]. Viewing relations of domination for Black women for any given sociohistorical context as being structured via a system of interlocking race, class, and gender oppression expands the focus of analysis from merely describing the similarities and differences distinguishing these systems of oppression and focuses greater attention on how they interconnect. Assuming that each system needs the others in order to function [italics mine] creates a distinct theoretical stance that stimulates the rethinking of basic social science concepts. (1990, 222.)

The basic social (and political) concept that I question--citizenship--is problematized in my work primarily in terms of race and racism, but not without an awareness of the way in which a specific kind of white subject (i.e., male, able-bodied, economically secure, publicly heterosexual) asserts itself through the terms of a coercive 'universality'.

3 The phrase "thematics of power" appears in Foucault's "Afterword: The Subject and Power" (1982, 217). Asking, among other things, Foucault's 'how' of power explores "What happens when individuals exert (as they say) power over others?" (217).

4 In reference to indigenous peoples facing cultural (and other forms) of imperialism, George Dei states: "There is a psychological damage to the self/collective that calls for decolonizing minds" (1998, 8). I extend this assertion to refer as well to the minds of the the colonizers, both past and present. The minds of those who perpetrate racist domination (knowingly and unknowingly) are, as Toni Morrison implies, 'hobbled' (1992, 13). This does not imply a condition equivalent to that suffered by so many colonized/dominated/oppressed peoples. Nevertheless, the condition of the dominator is a mental or 'psychic' product of relations of colonization, and does require a process of 'decolonization' which necessarily addresses the particular power-location the subject has occupied in the (post)colonial system.

5 The symbolic place of immigration in the localized national story is evident in Premier Filmon's May 29th, 1995 address during the Throne Speech debate (224). Immigrants in this telling operate as unequivocally positive (purely abstract) provincial signifiers; they are the proverbial 'candles on the cake' when Manitoba celebrates its 125 birthday in 1995. Premier Filmon remarks:
   On May 12, we celebrated Manitoba's 125th birthday. One of the events was a citizenship court that welcomed 125 Manitobans as new Canadians. I believe that everyone in this Chamber who was here for that event, and many were, saw once again that although the world has changed dramatically, especially over the last decade or so, our nation still remains one of the most desirable and attractive places in which to live. It is a magnet for people coming from all areas of the world, people who want to seek their opportunity for economic opportunity, for education, for freedom and for life in a democratic environment that is, as I said, more egalitarian and more democratic than perhaps any other nation in the world. We still have a tremendous sense of compassion and caring and community spirit. (224)

6 Jeannette Armstrong tells us that she "must remind [herself] of is that the dominating culture's reality is that it seeks to affirm itself continuously [italics mine]" (1998, 241).

7 I acknowledge here that multiple (more 'micro') levels and dimensions of discourse can be analyzed, as accounted for in theories of style, interaction analysis, poetics, semiotics, and in the cognitive and social psychology of text and talk, to name but a few related disciplines and sub-disciplines taking 'discourse' as analytical object. Considering my broad, genealogical emphasis on the irreducibilities of language, knowledge, power, experience and subjectivity, a detailed technical discourse analysis clearly remains beyond the scope of the present work.
Following the Speaker's ruling, the Government House Leader Jim Ernst asks the Speaker if "the matter of the motion and the carrying out of its content...should be concluded before the honourable member for Thompson (Mr. Ashton) raises his point of privilege [italics mine]" (November 1, 1995, 4451). With this euphemistic query Ernst delicately enforces Mr. Lathlin's literal, material removal from the house.

For limited example, consider dates of enfranchisement for women in Canada. White women gained the federal vote in 1918. As Ruth Roach Pierson notes, however, once enfranchised themselves "white Canadian or Newfoundland women of British stock, with rare exceptions, acquiesced in the withholding of the franchise, regardless of sex, from Chinese and East Indian Canadians until 1947 and from Japanese Canadians until 1949 as well as from native Canadians until 1960" (in Light and Roach Pierson 1990, 344). To this day inmates (of both genders) of Canadian prisons retain no right of vote, a tradition perhaps worth reconsidering in light of the highly racialized Canadian prison population.

To illustrate, consider the assimilationist practice of legislating First Nations children to attend residential schools. This system for the removal of children from Aboriginal families and communities was superseded by social service interventions collectively and retrospectively described as the "Sixties Scoop" (Patrick Johnston in York 1990, 219). Geoffrey York describes how the seizure of Indian children for out-of-province and out-of-country adoptions "began to escalate just as the residential schools were winding down in the 1960s" (1990, 214-15). Following a (Manitoba) provincial inquiry held in 1982, family court judge Edwin Kimelman concurred with Aboriginal leaders, saying he could state unequivocally that "cultural genocide [had] been taking place in a systematic, routine manner" (in York 1990, 214). In more recent years it would seem that the justice system and its removal and containment of Aboriginal youth has picked up where residential schooling and child welfare agencies have left off (see my related discussion in Chapter Four).

According to The Manitoba Legislative Building Guide, the Mace (which must always be present in the House when legislation is being debated or voted upon), "signifies that the Legislative Assembly draws its power from the people and its executive authority from the Crown" (undated, 12).


In Enforcing Normalcy Lennard Davis discusses gradations of value that are socially determined and assigned to the disabled body (1995, 131). (Take, for instance, the itemizing and assignments of value to still-intact body parts in the logic of life insurance plans.) Lennard explains that "the concept of disabled seems to be an absolute rather than a gradient one. One is either disabled or not" (1995, 131). Importantly, "value is tied to the ability to earn money. If one's body is productive, it is not disabled" (131). Stating a maxim which reveals the interlocking nature of ability, sexuality, gender, class and race, he writes: "[w]omen and men with disabilities are seen as less attractive, less able to marry and be involved in domestic production" (131).

See McClintock (1995, 1-4) for a vivid colonial-era illustration of the inter-relations between a (heterosexual) male gender/reproductive order, white economic order, and the global political order of empire.

Michael Keith and Steve Pile's collection, Place and The Politics of Identity (1993) provides a good introduction to the problem of history's hegemony in social theory, as perceived by 'critical' geographers.

Lefebvre terms these twin illusions, respectively, the "illusion of transparency" and the "realistic illusion" or "illusion of opacity" (Soja 1996, 63-64). In the case of the latter, objective 'things' have greater reality than 'thoughts' (64).

Lefebvre's "perceived space" (the realm of spatial practice) is the ground for what Soja theorizes as 'Firstspace'. Soja's theoretical extensions and developments of 'Thirdspace,' which attempt to go beyond Lefebvre's core arguments, are outside the scope of my limited discussion of spatial-theory and methodology.

I acknowledge that by using the terms 'gay' and 'lesbian' I am unintentionally eliding other identities that (in theory, lived, and political practice) level important critiques at a heterosexual/homosexual-lesbian identity binary (for example bisexual and transgender identifying persons). While my knowledge of literature addressing these issues is still greatly limited, I am influenced by Bruce Pratt (1995), Feinberg (1993; 1996), and Halberstam (1998).
In "Afterword: The Subject and Power" Foucault writes:

The little question what happens?, although flat and empirical, once it is scrutinized is seen to avoid accusing a metaphysics or an ontology of power of being fraudulent [i.e., 'all power is bad']; rather it attempts a critical investigation into the thematics of power. 'How' not in the sense of 'How does it manifest itself?,' but 'By what means is it exercised?' and 'What happens when individuals exert (as they say) power over others?' (1982, 217)
An exposed ice surface often displays a dull, undifferentiated façade. The intricate crystalline structure can be revealed, however, by pouring a warm liquid over the ice.

—Thomas Wharton in Saul, *Reflections of a Siamese Twin*
CHAPTER THREE


tOrderly Language:
NATION, NARRATION AND UNIDENTIFIED MATTERS OF PRIVILEGE

"Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time
and only fully realize their horizons in the mind's eye. Such an
image of the nation—or narration—might seem impossibly
romantic and excessively metaphorical, but it is from those
traditions of political thought and literary language that the nation
emerges as a powerful historical idea in the west. An idea whose
cultural compulsion lies in the impossible unity of the nation as a
symbolic force."

—Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration

Introduction

In 1995 Manitoba celebrated the 125th anniversary of its entrance into
Confederation. In 1995, as in 1999 when I write, much was being contested, both in
(what some may misconstrue as purely abstract) political terms, and on painfully
material 'life and death' levels. At the heart of these contestations is the paradoxical
"presence of the unfree within the heart of the democratic process" (Morrison 1993,
48). Foundational to the over-arching and multi-layered Manitoba story is its now-
apocryphal, stifled genesis: the subjugated presence of First Nations' voices, bodies
and communities. Yet with increasing frequency, gaps and fissures in the official
mythic edifice are appearing and growing ever wider--forced open by the
strengthening resistance of these communities (and other marginalized groups)
against powerful systems of othering, silencing and invisibilizing. At the same time
these interlocking systems of oppression (Hill Collins 1990, 222) continue to
legitimate, reinforce and give moral absolution to the un/disrupted reproduction of a
specific, privileged 'white' identity, and its political, social, cultural, economic-- and
ultimately epistemological--order of dominance.

Steve Ashton, Opposition Member for Thompson, stated in the House on May
30, 1995, "there is...a growing gap in this province...because I hear from many First
Nations people [about] the alienation...a growing alienation, a growing sense of
frustration at the poverty, at the fact of being ignored, and indeed, in many cases, and
let us be up front about this, about racism, because it is a fact" (237). The goal of this chapter is to address the 'fact' of racism in Manitoba, and more accurately, to begin bridging the epistemic gap that is instituted by its vehement denial. The analytical terms of my address speak to the narrative order through which political actors (and other iconic Canadians) are empowered to wage this ongoing "war by other means." I argue that nationalist narrative plays an instrumental role in the production and maintenance of dramatic socioeconomic (lived, 'material') chasms between Native and non-Native communities, notwithstanding the formal 'equality' of their shared citizenship. At the same time nationalist narrative reflects and repeats (it re-performs) a 'psychic' split, that effectively insulates Manitoba's majority non-Native population from an ethically-inspired awareness of their complicity in violent systems of race-based oppression.

In *Culture and Imperialism* Edward Said reminds us that the "main battle in imperialism is over land...who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now plans its future--these issues were [and I argue, still are] reflected, contested, and even for a time decided in narrative" (1994, xii-xiii). I begin, therefore, by taking in the lay of the (post)imperial and (post)colonial landscape. I focus on the "conversionary use of imagined realities:" (Cook-Lyn 1996) in Canadian and Manitoba-based political truth-making practice. To a limited extent I wish to illuminate the rhetorical and narrative contexts in which diverse subjects' personal stories--and more broadly, national histories of racial privilege--can be understood and their meanings reversed, in order to deflect critical attacks on a collective 'white' (un)conscious. Indeed, discursive conditions for the denial of race privilege are ripe, when the de facto terms of citizenship in Canada mean for many people "acceding to a political fiction of equal rights that is generated through the denial of history, a denial that reproduces the omission of history as the ontology of the nation [italics mine]" (Lowe 1996, 27).

In the second stage of discussion I go farther to uncover the heart of the
Manitoba event which sees the reversal of charges of racism onto the person of a Cree MLA, and eventually results in the silencing and eviction of that same MLA and his "unparliamentary" tongue. In an effort to bring life to the linguistic trauma of Lathlin's silencing I attempt to get beyond a merely metaphorical sense of his eviction. To suggest the extent of an ongoing, psyche-deep denial that is required by 'innocent' dominant subjects, I contrast contemporary 'white' fantasy with vivid evidence of racism's violence in the present. These are the matters which must be vigorously disavowed at my site. I then contrast fantasies of 'white' identity coherence with brief reference to nightmares of dissolution. By drawing on Fanon's general observation regarding the adverse ontological effects of colonialism on a racialized colonial-subject, I consider from another angle the impact of official Canadian nationalism on Manitoba's First Nations people. Finally, a November 1995 housing crisis on a northern Manitoba reserve serves as a kind of amplified embodiment and stark materialization of these matters of epistemic and ontological eviction. In light of this incident the simultaneous maintenance and denial of white privilege become more painfully apparent.

Section three, "Decoding a Local Mythography," opens on the substantive heart of my thesis. There I foreground debate samples from Hansard which feature the (then and current) Premier's rebuttal to Oscar Lathlin's expansive critique of the provincial government's "attitude" toward its First Nations citizens. My task is to analyze the emerging landscape discourse and its potent space-myths which give the narration its naturalized currency. I draw on Pratt's study *Imperial Eyes* (1992) to locate Filmon's rhetoric within a larger tradition of imperial travel narration. Geographer Rob Shields assists with the explicitly Canadian content. His critical elaboration of a dominant space-myth (what he terms "The True North Strong and Free") helps me to expose elements of a specifically Canadian mythic topography.

I understand constructions of an 'imaginary' North to operate as a critical element within a discursive arsenal of white settler innocence. A hegemonic
mythography of the Canadian North contributes to the combined erasure and fixing of images of the First Nations people who actually inhabit Northern and near-North spaces. Read within a broader tradition of EuroCanadian landscape discourse, Premier Filmon's "text and talk" can be seen to tame the mythic 'Indian', who ends up "neatly contained within the institutional glass case, carefully locked away as a repository for the unthinkable or unspeakable parts of those who created it" (Crosby 1991, 341). I argue that it is less the foreboding Canadian landscape—that in and of itself induces "wilderness disorders" (Enns 1998)—which must be brought under narrative control, and more the problem of a disordered (even haunted) white settler consciousness.

In the final section of this chapter I travel with an impassioned Premier, as he elaborates an autobiographical version of the Canadian myth of origin. I ask if the style of his imaginings—rhetorical defense strategies not uncommon to 'the common' Canadian—are not symptoms of cultural trauma at the ambivalent heart of 'Canadianness'. Rather than seeing dominant mythic imaginings as inevitable 'wilderness disorders', characteristic of a quintessential Canadian condition, I trace a more troubling (and evitable) etiology. Working with the spectacular 1995 example of the O.J. Simpson criminal trial, Shoshanna Felman argues the "absolutely fundamental relation of the law to the larger phenomenon of cultural or collective trauma" (1997, 741). While the raced crisis in the Manitoba Legislature that same year is decidedly less than spectacular, I assert the critical relation of its underlying "law of the land" to a suppressed, very concrete national trauma, and to "the concrete reality of a traumatic gap" (Felman 1997, 774) in Canada's (psycho-) social fabric. And it is to nationalism's staple therapeutic response, to which we now turn.
1. history, or the "conversionary use of imagined realities"

Madam Speaker, this is indeed a historic time in the Manitoba Legislature and indeed in the province as a whole, because we are 125 years old this year, and throughout all of those years and long before, Manitobans have worked, they have achieved, they have made sacrifices so that their children would be left with a legacy upon which they could build a solid future.

--Premier Filmon, May 29, 1995

When situating analysis in postcolonial Canada, one enters an asymmetrical discursive field of radically opposed 'facts', stories and histories. Within the "contact zone" racialized nationalist discourse exhibits a remarkable adaptability and protean reversibility. In the 1976 Lectures Foucault challenges the supposed independence of so-called 'disqualified' knowledges, including the once-oppositional "war of the races" discourse (discussed in Chapter Two). He questioned "how these oppositional histories resurface within the very unitary discourses they opposed [italics mine]" (Stoler 1995, 63). The capacity for reversibility (or 'conversion') in Canadian nationalist narrations is key to my task of tracking what it is that must be forgotten in the making, and in the ongoing remaking, of a contemporary Canadian social order.

One hundred and twenty-five years after Manitoba entered Confederation a mobile nationalist discourse can be seen recuperating the violent imperial and colonial past, precisely in order to accomplish a stunning conversion of that same historical evidence. In the example of an 'anniversary' anecdote circulated by Canadian Press, the erasure of past state racism is achieved (somewhat ironically) through the representational fixing of a racialized opposition figure at the hegemonic heart of a nationalist myth of origin. Louis Riel, formerly a state-executed 'traitor'. is heroized as a provincial founder. As a kind of core sample representing the historiographic 'normative' in Canada's mid-1990s, this example drawn from national media effectively contextualizes the revisionary strategies I focus on later in a close reading of Premier Filmon's provincial oratory.

On June 30, 1995, Canadian Press reported that Joseph Riel was on hand in Ottawa for "a ceremonial unveiling of banners" to mark the historic occasion of
Manitoba's one hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary ("Riel would have been proud," 30 June 1995). The 37-year-old accountant, resident of Winnipeg and great grand-nephew of the famed Metis leader, "told a crowd near Parliament Hill that Canadians should be proud of their heritage and encouraged by the promise of a progressive future." Wearing "historic Metis dress" Riel comments that the revolutionary Louis would be "very proud to see what Canada has evolved into today....He'd be very pleased and proud because what he stood for was a united people." The story concludes with a brief historical addendum that blithely recalls the source of Louis Riel's claim to Canadian fame: "Louis Riel, who had objected to the transfer of the Hudson Bay Company lands to Canada, was hanged in 1885 after leading the Northwest Rebellion to secure better treatment for his people." Considering this unabashed mainstream image-conversion of Riel—from allegedly-psychotic Metis traitor to honoured Canadian nation-builder—it is not difficult to appreciate "historiography as a political force, ...history writing as a political act, [and] historical narrative as a tool of the state and [potentially] as a subversive weapon against it" (Stoler 1995, 62).

Dakotah writer Elizabeth Cook-Lyn makes analogous observations in her critique of the work of American mid-Western literary giant, Wallace Stegner. Echoing Oscar Lathlin's critique of the "attitude" of Manitoba's provincial government, Cook-Lyn calls for "a shift in attitude concerning the history and literature of the region called the West" (1996, 30). She writes:

The invasion of North America by European peoples has been portrayed as a benign movement directed by God, a movement of moral courage and physical endurance, a victory for all humanity. As the face of Europe (as well as Asia and Africa) changes at the close of the twentieth century this portrayal of colonialism and its impact on the unfortunate Indians who possessed the continent for thousands of years before the birth of America, seems to go unchallenged either in politics or letters by most
Considering the resistance met by Oscar Lathlin in his attempt to challenge an official postcolonial story, it becomes clear (as I will demonstrate in sections two to four, below) that imagined realities enshrined in cultural forms must be actively defended and (re)produced through epistemic performances of an overtly political nature. The epistemic stakes in these contestations are by no means purely symbolic. To state a point to which I will return repeatedly, the investments of dominant subjects in purificatory nationalist imaginings are deeper than ideological: they are identity-deep. They are ontological, and they are lived. Storytelling—'literary', 'political', 'historical', or otherwise—institutes identities and bears lived effects for bodies that are complicit or implicated (even negated) in their telling. As Cook-Lyn warns,

> unless someone comes forward to say that Western history did not stop in 1890 [as Stegner suggested, with the triumph of colonialism], Indians will forever be exempted from Descartes’s admonition concerning humanity: ‘I think, therefore, I am’. Worse yet, fraudulent public policy toward Indians has been and is even now imposed through the conversionary use of imagined realities. (30)

To summarize, I mean to argue that realities imagined by hegemonic minds, and at my site put into official public circulation by political actors, aggressively maintain discursive chasms between the semiotic economy of rehabilitated (‘imagined’) Indians, and those far less benign images of First Nations communities who are actively engaged in oppositional struggle and political resistance. Across this abyss of meaning-making it is the orderly language of official stories which seeks to prevail. To better evoke the highly inequitable realities that conversionary official narrations would subsume at the local site, in the remainder of this section I sketch some of the social, political and economic tensions that characterized Manitoba in 1995.

From high atop Parliament Hill Winnipeg accountant Joseph Riel called
Canadians "to be encouraged by the promise of a progressive future." Yet in the Spring of 1995 the National Council of Welfare released a report that lent Manitoba the dubious distinction of child poverty capital of Canada.¹ Later that year, Winnipeg Free Press editorialist Frances Russell described a 16.5 percent rise in provincial unemployment rates between 1988 and 1994 ("Mounting Cost of Free Trade," 29 November 1999, A8). She concedes that employment in Manitoba did grow during that period, by just 0.6 per cent, adding that the minimum wage went up from five dollars per hour in 1994 to $5.40.² Situating Manitoba’s economic decline within the "progressive future" of continental free trade, Russell reports that “the province’s trade imbalance with the U.S. deteriorated every year since its signing. Between 1988 and 1994, Manitoba’s trade deficit with the Americans almost tripled, from $485 billion to $1.3 billion” (A8). Moreover, Manitoba’s exports to the third trade partner, Mexico, “fell by over twenty per cent while imports grew by forty-seven percent in the first six months of 1995” (A8).

With a sagging economy dominating mainstream discourse, 1995 was also a year strongly intonated by spectacular crimes of violence, both revealing and concealing issues of race. Most sensational perhaps was the minute-by-minute television coverage of the O.J. Simpson trial flooding over the forty-ninth parallel.³ Meanwhile, here in Canada a national Commission of Inquiry began its work making official ‘sense’ of the shocking events of "The Somalia Affair," which included the torture, rape and murder of a Somali teen at the hands of members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.

Closer to home, local issues heavily inflected by race and racism continued to be sidelined from mainstream concern. Four years after the Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry was released (1991a; 1991b), the provincial government had yet to take any concrete action on racism in the justice system. In his controversial May 29 address to the House, Oscar Lathlin criticized this inaction, primarily
Because the report was intended to correct the many inequities that exist in the justice system as it relates to Aboriginal people. Out of the 293 recommendations that were contained in the AJI report, 101 of those recommendations were strictly provincially based. In other words, 101 recommendations could have been implemented without even worrying about federal jurisdiction.

Other contentious matters involving First Nations communities and the province included the “unilateral action of the provincial government in designating two million acres of land under the so-called Endangered Spaces Program” (Mr. Gary Doer, Leader of the Opposition October 11, 1995, 3785-6). Lacking adequate consultation processes, this move was seen to disregard (and to potentially jeopardize) treaty land entitlement negotiations, as did provincial agreements made with U.S. forestry giant Louisiana Pacific. In the latter case, Environment Canada, Indian Affairs Minister Ron Irwin, The Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and Forestry Canada joined the Manitoba Future Forest Alliance in raising a litany of concerns about a new waferboard plant in Swan River. An October 24 Environment Department letter to the province outlined “several concerns about the impact of Louisiana Pacific’s operation on migratory birds and soil quality as well as the release of herbicides into the ecosystem” (“Forestry plan sets off alarm,” 1995). And on November 29, in response to yet another resource-management/ treaty land issue, members of the Mathias Colomb First Nation blocked logging trains from leaving a Repap Industries cutting area, about 30 kilometres north of Pukatawagan (in Oscar Lathlin’s constituency of The Pas). Chief Ralph Caribou was quoted as saying “his people would block the logging operations because no environmental assessment had been done. ‘The area is part of our traditional territory....It contains sacred grounds and it’s all untouched wilderness’” (“Band blocks logging trains,” 1995).

In light of these few contextualizing stories, I want to demonstrate that in the hegemonic Manitoba mind issues concerning First Nations peoples are by and large
inconceivable as ‘race’ issues. On the level of more or less conscious political narration, a number of ‘conversionary’ strategies come into play. For example, frequently neo-conservative economic development discourses code over asymmetrical, raced and classed social relations by pitting provincial ‘progress’ against anachronized voices of tradition. Tracey Lindberg maintains that

Aboriginal peoples’ concerns are often viewed as ‘not current.’ We know the importance of past and present. In many respects, this view is not unlike the general perception of treaty agreements and claims. Very few people understand why we are so concerned about ancient pieces of paper. It is not history. It is current. It is respectful to try to understand how the past is carefully interwoven with the present. (1997, 312)

In a related rhetorical strategy the continued impoverishment and low employment rates of First Nations communities in the North and mid-North are deployed as evidence (as causal factors) to support neo-conservative arguments for specific kinds of development initiatives. (History has shown that ‘northern’ development too often favours the drain of wealth and resources southward, benefiting predominantly non-Aboriginal sectors of the population.) At the same time, racialized representations of poverty serve to socially contain and to minimize political accountability (and political fallout) for widespread economic inequalities, which impact (albeit differentially) both Native and non-Native citizens.

During the 1995 provincial election campaign Tory candidate Shirley Render spoke to the issue of child poverty at an all-candidates meeting in Winnipeg. She explained that “when people come into the city from the reserves, they are not well-trained and they go on welfare” (Canadian Press “Tory apologizes for ‘stating fact’: contentious child-poverty remarks irk Natives,” 15 April 1995, A13). Following outcry from government critics and Aboriginal spokespersons alike, she delivered a public apology the following day: “My comment was simply a stating of fact, and I apologize if anyone took it as racist” (A13). Relevant here is Pete Hudson’s observation regarding
the obscured critical issue of access to training and post secondary education for First Nations students in Canada:

the colonial relationship still pertains....[R]esponsibility and control are retained by the provincial and federal government....There has never been a long term national or even province-wide strategy initiated by either of the senior levels of government based on a serious analysis of the barriers to participation so deeply rooted in post contact history. The reasons for this avoidance of the issue are not difficult to find in the historic desire to limit the costs of reparations to aboriginal [sic] people.

(1997, 166)

Under scrutiny the avowed colour blindness that supports Shirley Render's claim to innocence "begins to look less like formal logic [the simple presentation of 'facts'] and more like a language to support deeply held beliefs about the inferiority of people of colour" (Razack 1999a, 285). Razack argues that an insistence on formal equality—a concept which institutes compulsory colour blindness—comes to evince "a determined making of oneself as innocent, as outside history" (284). It reveals "a wilful forgetting or...will not to know" (284).

Questions of intentionality aside, imbued with the authority of 'truth' dominant narrations serve to exceptionalise and to privatize suffering into the exclusive purview of (a) specific marked group(s). Take a local example related to The City of Winnipeg's "Community and Race Relations Committee." In an appendix to the Committee's September 5, 1996 minutes, the responsibilities of the "Community and Aboriginal Affairs Sub-Committee" include a commitment "[to] work with Aboriginal peoples to find solutions to social, economic and educational problems that may have been the cause of racism and discrimination...[italics mine]" (1996). The decontextualised, dehistoricized 'white' Canadian view, to which both Lindberg and Razack allude, thus remains steadily anesthetized and distanced from evidence of dramatic and racialized socio-structural inequities.
Detachment from critical awareness is further facilitated by a narrow understanding of the "everyday" realities of racism (Essed 1991). Daily assaults on minority identities are woven into the normalizing fabric of EuroCanadian social and institutional practices, and these dynamics generally escape both the awareness and the understanding of racially dominant citizen-subjects. As a case in point, Oscar Lathlin attempts to draw a correlation between constituency concerns about discriminatory provincial governance, and the way he himself sometimes feels in the space of the Legislature (in essence, his "everyday" workplace). On May 29 he says:

I have great difficulty in disagreeing with those comments, with those assessments and with those conclusions by our people [about racism informing the attitude of the provincial government]. I am going to give you reasons why I have great difficulty in disagreeing with those assertions by our people. You see I even feel that way here in this Chamber from time to time. I am right here in this Chamber. I observe what goes on in this Chamber. I listen and I assess. I listen to the way questions are being handled by government ministers. I am feeling that way, and I know that I am close to the situation, it makes me think very hard when my people who are not even in this Chamber to see what is going on, who are not close to the situation as I am are beginning to talk about racism as being central to the policies coming from this Premier and his government, Madam Speaker. (216)

Articulated as an epistemic impossibility in the terms of Louise Dacquay's November 1st ruling, the existence of racism is imaginable only in certain explicit incarnations, like in the extreme case of the Holocaust or of the 'anomalous' South African apartheid regime.

In *Reflections of a Siamese Twin: Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century* (1997), well known Canadian intellectual John Raulston Saul discusses the concept of 'race' as it was used in the nineteenth century: "[i]t was shorthand for nationalism
and national interests" (5). According to Saul, the "catastrophes that these assumptions would lead to in the twentieth century were still unknown" (5). During colonialism's peak in Western Canada, to whom, I wonder, were the catastrophes of racialized thinking still "unknown"? Clearly Saul is not taking into account the violent place of racism in British imperialism, and in (profoundly raced) Canadian nation-building and colonial practices. He continues:

Sensible, responsible people in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries knew that this sort of mystification of mythologies [equating 'race' with 'nation'] was dangerous, but didn't know how catastrophic it could be. Once that became clear, between the 1930s and the end of the Second World War, no room was left for naivete on the subject of race. Those who continue to use the nineteenth-century formulae, or modern versions of them, do not deserve the respect which an attempt to understand their specific case would imply. (5-6)

Confined to instances of the fascist extreme, or occurring in times and places other than our own, at the end of the twentieth century the official 'fact' remains: racism can only exist as something 'outside' the pure Canadian body politic.

2. membership: a matter of (ontological) privilege

I have my own views as to what I believe and they do not encompass racism, and if I am collectively accused, as opposed to individually accused, then I find that offensive, and I find that, quite frankly, a breach of my privilege as a member of the House.

--Jim Ernst, Deputy Premier November 1, 1995

Jim Ernst's November 1st statement in the House (above) embodies on a personal level a hegemonic set of national assumptions that fix racism as the forgotten, but never-absent term. The necessary absence of 'race' as a concept translates into a putatively race-blind citizen-ontology. In the colonial schema, Fanon insists, "[o]ntology--once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside--does not permit us to understand the being of the black man" (1967/1992, 220). As
Fanon saw, the black man in the colonial context can only exist in subjugated relation to the oppressor. That is, his being is constrained to a function of the white man's self-making. In "The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism," Homi Bhabha restates and reformulates Fanon's problem: "'Wherever he goes,' Fanon despairs, 'the negro remains a negro'--his race becomes the ineradicable sign of negative difference in colonial discourse. For the stereotype impedes the circulation and articulation of the signifier of 'race' as anything other than its fixity as racism" (1990, 80). With respect to the postcolonial discursive order in force in contemporary EuroCanada, the existence of 'race' (non-whiteness) as legitimate difference must be consistently disavowed, since 'the racial' stands as mere negation and degeneration of 'the non-racial'. As such, 'race' is rendered indistinguishable from 'racism', and from the (often unselfconscious) matter of supremacist power that 'white' minds and identities depend so heavily upon for the maintenance of status quo social relations (Bhabha 1990, 80).

I wish to detour briefly here to explore Fanon (and Bhabha's) argument in the localized Manitoba context. To my mind it is telling that Manitoba Metis playwright Ian Ross gives his most abused (yet fantastically resilient) Aboriginal character the name 'Nigger', in his Governor General Award winning play fareWel (1996). Set on the fictional Partridge Crop Reserve (located "somewhere in Manitoba's Interlake"), Ross's brilliant comic-tragedy elucidates matters of postcolonial oppression in Canada from a complex of First Nations' perspectives. His notes on the character of 'Nigger' tell us that it is "[d]ifficult to discern his age, anywhere from 40-70" and that he has "[l]ived a hard life, but survives" (1996, 8). In the latter half of the play 'Nigger' (whose real name is Sheldon Traverse) is hit by a truck, and presumed to be lying dead in a ditch. Prior to the play's conclusion he makes a shocking, Lazarus-like entrance, and soon after explains the penalty entailed in his own stubborn survival:

You know, that's just like my life. Always almost. I was almost a good man. This is what people on this reserve thought of me. I was almost a
good man. That time I got sick. That time I got 'monia in my heart and I almost died. People said I was a good man. Not the time I was Manitoba fiddle champ in 1972. Or that time that cop car hit me and I shared my ten thousand bucks with everybody. Or that time I brought this reserve its first TV for *Hockey Night in Canada*. They never said I was a good man those times. I was almost, but I wasn't. 'Cause I didn't die. I got better.

(Ross 1996/1997, 86-87)

Always 'almost a good man' but never a good man because he never actually dies (*he never completely vanishes*), Sheldon/Nigger remains fixed as the "ineradicable sign of negative difference" in Canadian (post)colonial discourse. Ross's characterization has embodied the lose/lose game, the non-ontology available to raced bodies in the colonial social order. And it is in this limited epistemic matrix that MLA Lathlin must attempt to 'make sense' when he addresses the House at the outset of Manitoba's Thirty-Six legislature.

Following a victory in the April 25th provincial election, the Manitoba Progressive Conservatives launched into their third consecutive term of office. On the fifth day of debate following the Throne Speech, Oscar Lathlin brought with him greetings from the people of “the riding of The Pas, the town of The Pas, Opaskwayak Cree Nation, Grand Rapids, Easterville, Moose Lake, Cross Lake, Norway House, Cormorant and Wanless” (May 29, 1995, 212). Comprised of over fifty percent Aboriginal people, the constituency falls into the loose geographical distinction of ‘near North’ territory. (The Town of The Pas, for example, is located 630 kilometres north of the City of Winnipeg.) Lathlin’s critique of the government bears special meaning when one considers his identity as an Aboriginal man and former band chief. He is not only a democratic representative for the people of his constituency, but to the mainstream gaze he likely is (he metonymically stands in for a homogenized, stereotyped version of) Aboriginal people. Lathlin begins by saying he wants to focus his comments “on the attitude of this government, the First Minister and his
government as it relates to the Aboriginal people of this province” (215).

According to Hansard not a beat is missed as the Honourable Gary Filmon, representing the affluent Winnipeg riding of Tuxedo, takes the floor following Lathlin’s relatively brief intervention (four page-lengths in total). The Premier opens by describing the 'pleasure' and 'honor' that he feels upon addressing the Throne Speech, and more personally,

a sense of exhilaration. I feel a sense of history, a sense of great privilege to be able to be here to represent the people of my constituency and indeed people throughout this great province of ours. I also feel a renewed sense of commitment to our democracy, to the parliamentary democratic system in which we live in Manitoba and across Canada.

(217)

While Premier Filmon makes an exhilarated presentation of his emotional self at the outset of his speech, at its midpoint (and it totals almost twelve pages in Hansard), he is reduced to a much less decorous rhetorical breakdown. At that later juncture Mr. Filmon defensively charges that Mr. Lathlin is himself a racist:

I think that an individual like him, and I might say that I could be as vicious and as mean as he is by saying that I have heard oftentimes from people in his constituency in The Pas that they regard him as a racist. I could say that because that is the way he treats people in his area. I am told he has one way of--[interjection]. (222)

These comments triggered a Point of Order in defense of Mr. Lathlin (by Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Gary Doer), and a second Point of Order (by Mr. Ashton) regarding another remark the Premier was alleged to have made from his seat to Lathlin (“you are a racist”). The Speaker maintains that she did not hear the words, and indicates that she will peruse Hansard and report back to the House with a ruling (222).

In his book on William Faulkner, James Snead contends that racial divisions "show their flaws best in written form” (cited in Morrison 1992, 66). Building on
Snead's analysis, Toni Morrison discusses some of the common linguistic strategies employed by white fiction writers "to engage the serious consequences of blacks' [presence in texts]" (67). I shift from the analytical context of American Africanism to that of Indianism in Canada, and find that Premier Filmon's recourse to insult recalls Morrison's sixth linguistic strategy, in which the text (here, moments of extempore talk) performs "[p]atterns of explosive, disjointed, repetitive language" (69). Consider another example:

That is the kind of rhetoric we get, the kind of lip service we get from people who try and say that they are doing things for the aboriginal people or the people of those communities, but we get a lot of rhetoric and we get a lot of lip service and we do not get any particular action to solve the real needs and the real challenges of the people of those communities, Madam Speaker. (221)

The patterns in the preceding speech samples suggest "a loss of control in the text that is attributed to the objects of its attention rather than to the text's own dynamics" (69). I venture that the object of the text's attention at this moment is not a specific person (Lathlin), but a more abstract enemy internal to the House, and by extension, internal to the nation.

Focusing on a comparable scene of anxiety and struggle for discursive control, Razack discusses a Supreme Court Judge's reaction to a call for contextualized judging, in which race (and racism) would matter. In *R.D.S. v. Her Majesty the Queen* Chief Justice Lamer insisted that "people of colour have no monopoly on racial stereotyping" (Razack 1999a, 9). To illustrate the dangers of substituting personal knowledge or "experience" for "evidence" Lamer provided an example of the Chinese as "tremendous gamblers" (later qualifying his statement as a "hypothetical") (9-10). Razack observes that:

[a]n uneasiness accompanies this heavy insistence on formal equality, an undertone of emotion, nothing empirically provable, but something
that is present nonetheless in the frequent interruptions, analogies and wild hypotheticals the dissenting judges put to the defense lawyers. Is this the unease that comes from knowing that once race is taken into account, and the stereotypes come tumbling down, what is left is the awesome fact of white supremacy? (19-11)

Premier Filmon also takes emphatic recourse in formal equality when faced with the dissolution of stereotypes. After indicating that his government had "just put water into the houses in Lac Brochet [a reserve in northern Manitoba]," he asserts that they "will continue to deal equally and fairly with all people in this province regardless of their race, regardless of their colour and regardless of their circumstances" (223). He concludes somewhat cryptically, "We will make all of the available services available to them as we have in the past" (223).

I contend that the fervent nature of Premier Filmon's reaction is in fact a sign of his fight for the cohesion of the "Imaginary Indian", which (as further analysis will illustrate) he attempts to invoke throughout his speech, particularly with scenes of contentment such as suggested by the Lac Brochet example. Like Deputy Minister Jim Ernst, whom I quote at the outset of this section, Filmon claims his privilege to disavow racism. The sequence of reactions is clear. When MLA Lathlin names the attitudes and policies of the current government as being discriminatory towards Aboriginal peoples, shattering histories of violence are made to reappear. Not surprisingly, those identities which depend upon the omission of histories capable of remembering racist violations (for example, Premier Filmon's identity, that of the iconic Canadian citizen, and the collective 'honourable' identity of the 'House' itself), are the same identities deeply threatened with the disintegration of their own, historically-achieved ontological wholeness.

However, as one observes in the Manitoba performance of nationalism, when matters of privilege are threatened, an array of technical and rhetorical strategies are quickly mobilized to restore order. The Speaker of the House gave her reading of the
first incident of Lathlin’s “unparliamentary language” on June 7, 1995. She demanded the withdrawal of the offending statements made by Mr. Lathlin and by Premier Filmon. Framed by principles of formal equality, her ruling on decorum allowed for no differentiation in their respective usage of the term ‘racist’. With respect to her more conclusive November ruling, the MLA’s disciplining and punishment were followed by lengthy debate over the nature of the ‘racist’ issue itself. Opinions divided along party (and to some extent racial, geographical, and class) lines. Was Lathlin’s taboo use of the words “racist” and “racism” merely a question of “unparliamentary language” (technically speaking, a “Point of Order”)? Or was it a much more fundamental problem of “freedom of speech,” technically speaking, a “Matter of Privilege”? Mr. Ashton argued cogently in terms of the latter problematic. On the second day of debate over this issue he insisted that “it is important in particular [italics mine] for First Nations Manitobans to be able to come to this Legislature and talk, yes, about such issues as racism and racist policies” (November 2, 1995, 4471).8

In fact, on October 10, 1995, the galleries of the House were filled with First Nations Manitobans.9 There were so many unofficial visitors that Speaker Dacquay felt compelled to outline in considerable detail “the practices of this House which apply to members of the public while in the galleries. In short, they are not to interfere in any way in the proceedings of the House” (3736). The people of Pukatawagan attended the Legislature to push for solutions to the critical housing shortage in their reserve community. According to Michael Smith of Windspeaker, the housing crisis had an average of 10 to 12 people sharing a residence. Lack of housing in Pukatawagan is seen as a major factor contributing to the spread of tuberculosis and other disease in the community. Social and health conditions are further aggravated by substandard drinking water (contaminated by a botched Indian Affairs sewage project), and by the legacy of a fuel spill that “contaminated about one third of reserve land with cancer-causing agents” (“Tent city preferable to living in poor housing,” December 1995, 3). The spill was caused by a former hydro diesel generating station.
During Oral Questions Gerard Jennissen (MLA for Flin Flon) asked the Premier:

Given that the people of Pukatawagan are also residents and citizens of Manitoba, given that the people of Pukatawagan, like residents of other reserves, want work, not handouts, can this Premier make it a priority of his government to have financing of projects on reserves made easier, so that these communities can take action on issues such as housing and infrastructure? (October 10, 1995, 3733-34)

The Premier's response is characteristically evasive with respect to this issue: “[a]gain, Madam Speaker, I point out that this is a federal issue, total federal jurisdiction. If he really wants to solve the problem rather than grandstand here in the House, he ought to approach the federal government” (3734). Long-defined and racialized internal frontiers are neither traveled through, nor their borders challenged, unless land or other resources (symbolic or material) are to be extracted for the 'public good'. And while internal, domestic borders colonize racialized spaces, they simultaneously define strange and ambivalent forms of alien citizenship for First Nations people in Manitoba. Of course, I am not describing anything new. Here Premier Filmon only reinscribes and reauthorizes the overdetermined identities instituted by, among other colonizing practices, the Indian Act.

In an era of increasingly "privatized citizenship" the people of Pukatawagan and their public claims of homelessness emerge as profoundly disruptive to the ordered terms of the national dream. Although Lauren Berlant situates her analysis of citizenship in Reaganite and post-Reaganite America, many parallels can be drawn with transnational Manitoba in the 1990s. Berlant problematizes the rise in the United States of a popular form of political optimism, in which private fortune is fused to that of the nation. This dream

promises that if you invest your energies in work and [nuclear, heterosexual] family-making, the nation will secure the broader social and
economic conditions in which your labour can gain value and your life can be lived with dignity. It is a story that [is intended to address] the fear of being stuck or reduced to a type, a redemptive story pinning its hope on class mobility. Yet this promise is voiced in the language of unconflicted personhood [italics mine]: to be American, in this view, would be to inhabit a secure space liberated from identities and structures that seem to constrain what a person can do in history. (1997, 4)

Poised next to a Manitoban version of a similar dream, notwithstanding formal Canadian ‘multiculturalism’, the Pukatawagan community comes to represent a troubling enemy opposed to the progressive goal of making Manitoba “the best place anywhere, to live, to work, to invest and to raise a family” (Filmon, May 29, 1995, 225). The housing needs of a collective--defining themselves as a ‘nation’--are incongruous within the dominant economic, social, and political paradigm. Citizenship is based on the individual and his or her set of individual rights. Group identity and shared rights claims identify the protestors as the province’s internal enemies, marked with decidedly conflicted personhood and thus divided from full citizenship.

Considering the minority status of Aboriginal Peoples within the Canadian liberal-democratic nation state, strategies for political struggle are limited. The principal options for resistance and transformation are: practices of daily life on the land; kin-keeping, maintaining, rebuilding and building rural and urban communities; political negotiations with governments; litigation in courts; civil disobedience.... Aboriginal peoples in Canada have little access to material sanctions such as the withdrawal of their labour or mobilization on the strength of their numbers. (Culhane 1995, 148)

The epistemic conditions for the reception of oppositional political gestures by First Nations people are no less problematic. Because traditional peoples resist the
erasures of assimilationist tactics that are read as normative, the rights claims of the Pukatwagan residents, for example, can gain only an obstructed access to the symbolic or epistemic resources which might impact upon mainstream minds. Their concerns remain well outside the constructed boundaries of any individual (white) citizen's responsibility or conscience, including those of the majority in the House.

Presumably in response to their unfavourable reception in the Legislature, protesters from Pukatawagan changed tactics. Issues deemed private and familial, or relegated to the colonial-era concerns of the paternal federal government, were shifted to the level of public spectacle. By late November of 1995, thirty people from the Pukatawagan reserve were going into their thirtieth day camped out in teepees at the Forks of the Red and the Assiniboine rivers in the centre of Winnipeg. Extending back to pre-contact and early colonial times, this site was an important gathering place for First Nations peoples of the region. In 1995, located only minutes away from the provincial legislature, the group (composed of primarily women and children) occupied a snow-covered public space in a highly visible form of protest. Considerable media coverage of the moving spectacle had the effect of shifting the concerns of the Mathias Colomb Cree into the public and political eye. History-book images of a teepee village transplanted into Winnipeg's downtown made suppertime news programs; descendants of European settlers were shown that the Indians and their claims would not be vanishing any time soon.14

When one disengages the ancillary notion of 'privilege' from its specific and disembodied parliamentary (democratic) symbolism, and then firmly reconnects it to its roots in liberal humanist or 'Enlightenment' thought (and its bloodstained mortgage in imperialist Canadian history), it becomes quite clear that white privilege is the crucial matter at hand. Whether one speaks of a muzzled Cree MLA, or of dispossessed Aboriginal women and children camped out in the snow, in the words of David Goldberg,

[e]rased in the name of a universality that has no place for them, the
subjects of real political economy are denied and silenced, ontologically and epistemologically and morally evicted. The universal claims of Western knowledge, then, colonial or postcolonial, turn necessarily upon the deafening suppression of its various racialized Others into silence.

(1993, 167)

The spectacle of Pukatawagan's 'evicted' women and children gives substance to the matters of privilege that orderly political language works so assiduously to conceal. These are the stakes in which the law of the land invests itself. Considering both the affirming and the negating ontological effects borne by official nationalism, it would seem that ambivalences inherent in racialized citizenship are at the same time cause and effect of a decidedly disordered psychic reality. I attend closely in the following sections to the narrative performance of a political actor, who is engaged in what I read as public and a personal identity (or psychic) crisis. Potent space-myths are deployed to disavow national disorder (section three), while a travel narration from the Premier's youth reasserts (hegemonic) memory, identity and incontestable membership for the iconic citizen (section four).

3. decoding nationalist geographies: a localized space-myth of origin

A hero sets out from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man.

--Campbell cited in Shields, Places on the Margin

In this third stage of discussion I focus primarily on a space-myth evidenced in Premier Filmon's May 29 speech to the House. Since nationalist 'mythologics' (Williams 1996, 3) are generated from a site of political, social, and economic power, they constitute significant landmarks within Manitoba's epistemic territory. While my attention is to landscape narration, I assign to space "an ontological priority, an essential connection between spatiality and being" (Soja 1989, 119). Persons who can (in practice and/or in the letter of the law) claim a full and uncontested set of
privileges are also the subjects of discourse that defines the nation's spaces. Those othered beings who inhabit claimed spaces must be subsumed by place, or by being placed in suitable supporting roles. Apparitions of bodies on the hegemonized landscape--especially vocal bodies who claim to be “still Manitobans whether they live in Winnipeg or First Nations communities” (Cree MLA Eric Robinson, October 10, 1995, 3734)—remain a matter of considerable consternation for the ‘white’ political elite, as much in the provincial anniversary year of 1995 as in the colonial ‘glory days’ of 1870.

Early in his speech the Premier calls up the familiar tropes of democracy, including rights and responsibilities, and the core ethos of trust, dedication, hard work and commitment (218). As van Dijk notes, “most contemporary Western politicians, including most conservative ones, define themselves as heirs to the values of the Enlightenment, as proponents of racial and ethnic tolerance, as champions of equal rights, and as opponents of colonialism and racism” (1993, 52). Notwithstanding his collegial words of introduction, Mr. Filmon is quick (as are most politicians) to draw lines of distinction within the House: “I can say to you that...there is no weak link on this side of the House” (218). The interior mapping—the implied internal frontiers of ‘this side’ and ‘that side’—emerges as a regular feature of the speech’s conceptual vocabulary. Yet prior to concluding the series of welcoming remarks and invocations, the Premier seeks to universalize and to downplay the significance of these divided territories that he articulated into being only moments earlier:

I have often said that we may be separated by chasms in terms of our philosophical outlook on life, but we all as human beings have the same goals and objectives [italics mine], that is, to serve the people of the province, those who elected us and those with whom we come in contact throughout the province. (219)

Important here is the discursive authority that the political elite voice claims for itself. In postcolonial territory a mobile political discourse draws lines and simultaneously
erases them; it unites ‘society’ and divides its ‘true’ citizens from its enemies; it constructs and destructs possibilities for diverse identities, all the while glossing over the practice with democratic-rhetorical sleight of hand. Beneath the imperative of ‘sameness’, one perceives “the discursive production of unsuitable participants in the body politic, and how the maintenance of such internal exclusions was [and is] codified as [a] necessary and noble [pursuit] to ensure the well-being and very survival of the social body by a protective state” (Stoler 1995, 62).

After making proud reference to the province’s 125th anniversary, Mr. Filmon narrates a nationalist myth of origin and paints a provincialized ‘first contact’ scene:

Many a Manitoban arrived in our communities with little more than the clothing upon their backs. That is the history of so much of the settlement of this province. They appreciated all that a country like Canada could offer to people. No matter what their background, no matter what it was that they believed in, no matter what it was that they were seeking, Canada had so much to offer. (219-20)

Filmon goes on to discuss the inspiration of these settlers,

[who] came, most of the time, just with a personal dream [italics mine], to make a life and a nation built upon hard work, effort that they would put forward but joining a nation that really stood for equality and democracy. I have always said that I believe this is the most egalitarian and democratic country in the entire world. (220)

We gain here only hints of those aggressively subordinated narratives, structured by historically real raced, classed and gendered realities that made this settlement process more than just an innocent and homogeneous ‘white wave’. Analysis of settlement, which was arguably the major form of imperial travel, “requires an awareness of the dark side of travel itself, that is, those movements and uprootings that colonization’s violence demanded and within which racial formations are constructed” (Grewal 1996, 4).
Recalling Pratt's definition, a "contact' perspective emphasizes how subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other...in terms of co-presence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, within radically asymmetrical relations of power" (1992, 7). Filmon's imperial oratory sketches instrumental Aboriginal subjects, people who emerge in the historical narration more as extensions of the landscape than as agents, communities, or members of a First Nation. I quote the 'contact' passage in its entirety for its quite remarkable conversionary accomplishment:

[the settlers] were, of course, welcomed by our aboriginal brothers and sisters who shared all the bounties of this great and beautiful land with them when they arrived. In many cases, in welcoming them, they protected them from the harsh climate, from all of the challenges, unforeseen challenges that might otherwise have made them perish. But they were welcomed; they were in many ways encircled by the knowledge and the familiarity with the land that our aboriginal brothers and sisters had. They certainly were, I think, grateful to the aboriginals for the manner in which they allowed them to survive in an otherwise inhospitable environment.

(220)

In the first sentence note not only the naturalizing effect of the legitimating "of course", but the inference of the complete impossibility that there be anything other than a warm welcome for the settlers. In the closed loop of this contact zone narrative, it is literally unthinkable that these naturally generous people had any reason (or capacity) to question or contest the aims of their conquerors: "[d]ifferences that fall outside the paradigms are inaccessible to the discourse or can be expressed only as absences and lacks" (Pratt 1992, 42).

Another striking asymmetry which is excluded by the discursive enclosure is the stark "difference between equal and unequal exchange" (83). However, a form of reciprocity--what Pratt terms the "ideology of capitalism" (83)--does indeed occur,
since "all the bounties of this great and beautiful land," hospitality, protection and survival knowledge are exchanged (Filmon "thinks", he is not sure) for the colonists' "gratitude". Even in such a highly cleansed and abbreviated account, the imagined reciprocity, which is so essential for salving narrative anxiety and fissures in white bourgeois psychic unity, breaks down. Moreover, the notion of the First Nation's "familiarity" with the land neutralizes any potent sense of property ownership, the meanings of which could not help but carry certain ethical weight in so strongly a capitalist-informed discourse as that of Filmon's Progressive Conservative government.

Finally, and indeed most obvious, the narrative itself begins as does history, geography, culture, and (modern) time itself: with the arrival of the white settlers. Echoing Cook-Lyn's critique of Wallace Stegner's myth-making fiction, I see Premier Filmon's political narrative practice epitomizing "the pervasive attitude of white midwesterners whose ancestors marched into a moral void and then created through sheer will the morality that allowed them, much the same way that the contemporary white Dutch South Africans marched into South Africa proclaiming Pretoria, to convince the world that 'this is my country'" (1996, 33). Evidently the desire to reduce indigenous inhabitants to mere traces on the landscape remains an imperial temptation that dies hard. As Said recounts, the Imperial Eye centres colonial/settler consciousness as the sole authority in its narratives, histories, travel tales and explorations. This same consciousness sought to order meanings of "exotic geographies and peoples" (1993, xxii). Above all, "your sense of power scarcely imagined that those 'natives' who appeared either subservient or sullenly uncooperative were ever going to be capable of finally making you give up India or Algeria. Or of saying anything that might perhaps contradict, challenge, or otherwise disrupt the prevailing discourse" (xxi).

Another sign of narrative strategies hard at work in this passage is the combination of obligatory contact zone hospitality with a contrasting (and arguably
quintessentially Canadian) topos of the *harsh climate*. "Rousseauian noble savagery and sensibilité abound" in the generally inhospitable frontier environment that Filmon describes (Pratt 1992, 89). In his *Places on the Margin*, geographer Rob Shields takes up "space-myth" meanings of a strikingly-similar imagined frontier (1991, 62). In a chapter entitled "The True North Strong and Free" (which borrows a phrase from the national anthem), Shields argues convincingly that "the concepts harnessed to the physical datum of the 'North'—truth, purity, freedom, power—serve in the establishment of a particular 'social specialization' as an order of the world and cosmos; a specification of priorities and threats, friends and foes" (164). His analysis bears considerable relevance to my focus on the instrumentality of landscape in provincial political discourse. Manitoba's Precambrian Shield country and its vast mid-north expanses serve as potent "True North" epistemic resources.

Rob Shields foregrounds the cultural production of "an imaginary zone: a frontier, a wilderness, an empty 'space' which, seen from Southern Canada is white, blank" (1991, 165). Building up a survey of textual evidence of this 'space-myth' he quotes literary critic William Shields. In the latter Shields' work there is a discussion of portrayals of the north in late nineteenth-century Canadian and American literature, depictions which he suggests are difficult to cleanly distinguish along national lines. William Shields describes the tendency of (American) texts of that era to dwell upon "the North's unforgiving character. The region, in many instances, was ascribed *a basic sentience*; it was transformed into a *malevolent, brooding force possessed of a multitude of wiles and powers* [italics mine] that it frequently utilized to discomfit or destroy the unwary. Man...assumed the role of interloper; it became his task to conquer the North, or, at the very least, to prevent it from conquering him" (cited in R. Shields 1991, 187). Even if one attributes this persistent anthropomorphizing of the landscape to a tradition of nineteenth-century literary romanticism (indulged in by critics and writers alike), from a 'contact zone' perspective it is difficult to read these landscape
discourses and not see the anxieties of the human relations. Productive links can be made here between Shields' "white, blank" imagined empty space, and Toni Morrison's reading of comparable "images of blinding whiteness [which] seem to function as both antidote for and meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness--a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing" (1990, 33). Compare Morrison's characterisation of American "fear and longing" with Luste's observation cited in Shields: "'One could argue that this dichotomy of love and fear for our wilderness surroundings is still with us: that it is the heart of the Canadian psyche'' (1991, 174 notes omitted). Premier Filmon's brief rhetorical tableau is a scene of subtle, romantic dichotomy. Mysterious "unforeseen challenges" of a "harsh" and "inhospitable environment" blur with "the bounties of this great and beautiful land" into which the colonists are so warmly welcomed. Brave New World anxieties and ambiguities are coded alternatively as climatic and geographic terrors, and as aestheticized edenic wonders.

I wish to look more closely at two key themes circulating within this "True North Strong and Free" system of signification, as defined by Shields and performed by Mr. Filmon: the "theosophical" North (Lacombe cited in Shields 1991, 190) and the North as a hostile wilderness. In the first case, perhaps best exemplified by the work of Group of Seven painter Lawren Harris, Canada's North "had a spiritual value as a source of culture. It was a liminal zone, roughly equivalent to the biblical desert, where redemption was achieved through struggle and communion with the elements" (Shields 1991, 190). (This positive theme can be read as a Judeo-Christian or pantheistic take on the traditional masculinist Greek 'quest' narration.) In the case of the north as inhospitable environment, a more fearful specialization "takes a region as a symbol for mental and social states and then attributes causal power to the region itself" (184). When pushed to its psychological extreme (even to the point of naming a wilderness-induced 'syndrome' as one literary critic has done19) the distinguishing
feature of a Canadian Weltanschauung becomes a negative response to nature which has historically back-dropped the Canadian sense of self (Shields 1991, 185).

Shields provides a more contemporary illustration of the "True North Strong and Free' as ambivalent spatial mythology when he cites celebrated Ontario author, Margaret Atwood. Unlike the nineteenth century text, hers reveals an awareness of (the/a) North American body--albeit phantasmic--in relation to the landscape:

"It's not only geographical space, it's space related to body image. When we face south, as we often do, our conscious mind may be directed down there...but the north is at the back of our minds, always. There's something, not someone, looking over our shoulders; there's a chill at the nape of the neck [italics mine]. The north focuses our anxieties. Turning to face north, face 'the north,' we enter our own unconscious. Always in retrospect, the journey north has the quality of a dream." (cited in Shields 1991, 167)

Whose "body image" is Atwood (subconsciously) concerned with? How is Atwood so sure that it is "something," not someone, looking over her shoulder? (Or should I ask, what is invested in this supposedly natural fact--this taken-for-granted belief?) And recalling the conversionary capacities of postcolonial history discussed earlier, why is the journey north "always" held at the safe (and frequently anachronizing) distance of retrospect?20 Here discursive erasure is accomplished within varying degrees of consciousness, even surreallyistically, in the terms and perceived best interests of a 'white' hegemonic imagination. From the perspective of imperial expansionist desires, Pratt observes a "strange, highly attenuated kind of narrative that seems to do everything possible to minimize the human presence" (1992, 59).

In Fear and Temptation: The Image of the Indigene in Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Literatures, Terry Goldie describes textual conflation of the (racialized) human and the 'natural' in terms of the use of the 'indigene' "to present the possibility of nature in a human form" (1989, 19). With respect to examples of
narrative practice discussed by Shields, and repeated in Premier Gary Filmon's 'first contact' narration, I want to suggest that attributes of the natural world serve in hegemonic Canadian texts to rhetorically encode and submerge the presence of the very real, perhaps not-so-welcoming indigene. Narrative erasure of First Nations populations through tactical landscape discourse is part of an ongoing imperial project: the task of suppressing the dominant group's bad-dream memories/awareness of violent, historical material practices, known intimately to subordinated groups as genocide, assimilation and racism.

4. political therapy in performance: imperial travel as ontological discourse

It is clear that the Premier's May 29 'first contact' narration fits smoothly into a long tradition of colonial-historical and nationalist myth-making. In light of my interest in the embodiment of nationalist imaginings in terms of the formation of actual subjects, I turn now to Mr. Filmon's personal, autobiographical version of a Canadian myth of origin. I argue that Filmon performs here what Pratt calls 'anti-conquest' narration, referring to "the strategies of representation whereby European bourgeois subjects seek to secure their innocence in the same moment as they assert European hegemony" (1992, 7). In her historical study of imperial travel writing, in which she analyses texts from the mid-eighteenth to the twentieth century, Pratt foregrounds "the interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters" (1992, 7). I address here what I read as a literally improvisational sample of oration, through which the Premier tries to humanize the more generic contact zone story he began with, and in the telling, to recuperate his own identity as a subject free of racial prejudice. His discursive detour is a pivotal move in a rhetoric of defense waged against the critique of Oscar Lathlin.

As with his first rhetorical move, again Filmon's performance can be read within a framework of nationalist social specialization. Shields' thesis regarding the
ideological "True North" presumes an official social mythology to be overlaying the palimpsest of personal images and experiences of 'southern' (and for Shields, 'central') Canadians (1991, 165). The following passage marks the shift in discursive gears, and directly relates the transition to Lathlin's remarks: "I was interested in the comments of the member for The Pas as he talked just prior to my opportunity here tonight because it reminded me of my opportunities to spend time in the North and get to know, on a personal basis and on a friendly basis, many of our aboriginal people as I worked in the North in the summer of 1961 on the Nelson River" (220). A civil engineer by training, the Premier relates how he worked with a Manitoba Hydro survey crew that was preparing for the development of several hydroelectric projects on the Nelson River:

We were, of all things, camped near what was then called Bladder Rapids. I am not sure that it is not flooded out now by one of the projects that was constructed. It was a fascinating summer because, prior to 1989, it was the summer in which we had the greatest forest fires in the history of the province, and they made literally an inferno of much of that area of northern Manitoba. As we stayed in our campsite in tents on the shore of the Nelson River, I might say that I marveled at the ingenuity and the self-sufficiency of the aboriginals who were part of the survey crew in which we were working. (220)

The narrative scaffolding of this segment of his speech is wholly constituted through innocent encounters with nature and its 'indigenous' subjects, yet the subtext is always the inevitable conversion of the natural environment into the progressive terms of extensive Northern development. Many textual features previously discussed are reinforced here, namely the inhospitable (but beautiful, unsullied) landscape, settler endurance and fortitude, and the aid of noble savages.

Following the evocation of an extraordinary, transformative time and place (the protagonist was "fascinated," history was made, he "marveled" at sights), the narrator
goes on to describe at considerable length relationships built on reciprocity. Filmon, the humble greenhorn of the story, is taught to use an axe to cut line as they surveyed through the area. In the beginning he was unable to chop trees like "they" did, so "[t]hey nicknamed [him] 'the beaver' because at the end of it when the tree fell it looked as though a beaver had chewed it rather than an individual had cut line" (220). In time, however, he becomes "pretty adept at the use of the axe...just as they did, and [could] just about keep up along the way" (220). Providing a surprising amount of detail, the Premier describes the instruction he received from "the aboriginals" in choosing camp sites, and in the storage and preservation of meat. Before being forced to move camp due to the spread of rampant forest fires, Filmon is also taught how to use a canoe in rapids. "Some members opposite have seen me operate a canoe. As a matter of fact, it was part of our commercials in 1990. They taught us these things" (220). He concludes by explaining that, in return, 'we' "taught them ultimately during the summer to use the transit and the level and the instruments of survey that we had, and it was a very good relationship, I might say, Madam Speaker" (220). While space does not permit the inclusion of more text samples, Premier Filmon does provide further elaboration to these travels of his youth. He charts routes from Cross Lake to the Grand Rapids forebay, from Cedar Lake to Brochet: "Now, Brochet was something that was almost mythical [italics mine] to me, because those of you who are my age or a little older, that was the one weather station in the North that used to give us temperatures when I was growing up" (221).

A number of features of this talk are striking. Set squarely within a broad tradition of imperial travel literature, Filmon's story is true to its genre. The myriad of path-clearing (conquest, colonial, mercantile, state, security) forces and power relations that make Filmon's penetration at this site in 1961 possible, as part of a Manitoba Hydro crew no less, are obscured. And while the main character is genuinely interested and involved in his surroundings, the story is self-referential: all about self-discovery and the consolidation (and political commodification) of an
individual subject (Smyth 1998, 35). Pratt notes that when "he does appear [in the landscape], the self-effacing protagonist of the anti-conquest [italics mine] is often surrounded by an aura not of authority, but of innocence and vulnerability" (1992, 56). Filmon opts to portray himself in adolescent terms, a tactic evident in textual self-depictions of eighteenth-century naturalist heroes (Pratt 1992, 56). Within a contemporary imperial context of relational subject-formation, one riven to this day with power asymmetries, I contend with Pratt that the conspicuous innocence of the protagonist-traveller gains meaning in relation to an assumed, yet fiercely suppressed, guilt of conquest (57).

My second observation highlights 'going native' or 'indigenizing,' an imperial practice implied by the obvious and acquisitive admiration Filmon has for (select) aspects of the people and culture he has encountered. Goldie argues that by penetrating the land and/or incorporating racial/cultural 'others' through appropriation of their symbols, white settlers indigenize themselves. "Through the indigene the white character gains soul and potential to become of the land" (Goldie 1989, 16). With reference to Gone Indian (1973), a novel by respected Alberta writer and poet Robert Kroetsch, Goldie qualifies this process of transformation. The indigene is acquired, but the white is never abandoned. Gone Indian captures the process of racial cross-dressing in its reference to Grey Owl as the "finest Indian of them all" (Kroetsch cited in Goldie 1989, 215). Those elements which are deemed desirable and useful to the European--like specific survival skills, or the graceful prowess of canoeing-- enter a fetishistic economy. Proposed by Freud as a non-repressive form of knowledge, fetishism "allows for the possibility of simultaneously embracing two contradictory beliefs, one official and one secret, one archaic and one progressive, one that allows the myth of origins, the other that articulates difference and division. Its knowledge-value lies in its orientation as a defense towards external reality [italics mine]" (Bhabha 1990, 84). Thus Premier Filmon can strategically deploy indigenized representations of himself as an able canoeist, yet he may exercise in equal measure
the privilege to not know 'for sure' if Bladder Rapids (see citation above) is "flooded out now by one of the projects that was constructed."

Finally, the quite intimate nature of Filmon's autobiographic telling (while not naive with respect to its strategic import in the Throne speech debate) further attests to the degree to which the debate crisis between Gary Filmon and Oscar Lathlin is experienced on an intensely personal level by the Premier. In his desire for an innocent memory/depiction of himself at that time of over thirty years ago--a memory to fortify his innocence in the present--the fairly obvious relations of power that structure his travels are blatantly elided. Instead, he draws on cliches of friendship and cooperation, and in an almost ludicrous image for the literal-minded, the Premier describes being in Grand Rapids the following year (1962), where he worked "hand in hand, side by side" with Aboriginal people while developing hydroelectric projects there. In 1966 he was again up North, studying possible alternatives to the Churchill River diversion as part of his Master's thesis work (221-22). Indeed his former intimacy with the region led him (as provincial Premier) and his government to

[take] it upon [themselves] to sign an agreement to open up a new negotiation with...the people in the Grand Rapids forebay for the damages that were done, damages for which this administration and indeed the government of Manitoba had no further obligation, because those obligations had been signed off by the people of the various communities in the Grand Rapids forebay. Yet we took it upon ourselves to compensate them to a greater extent than they had been back in the '60s. (221)

Fantastically enough, the hero is able to enter the narration innocently in the 1960s to participate in extensive engineering surveys of northern waterways; he escapes implication throughout the 1970s when the planned flooding took place under the (NDP) Schreyer administration, and under the authority of the infamous "Manitoba Hydro Act" (1970); and in the 1990s he re-emerges "with the power to bestow boons
on his fellow man" (see Campbell quotation at the outset of section three).

In fact, Filmon’s personal fantasy dovetails perfectly with a foundational provincial fantasy, embodied in the gilt figure of The Golden Boy. One of Manitoba’s best known symbols, the figure measures 4.9 metres (16 feet) from toe to torch tip, and is captured in mid-stride atop the dome of the Legislative Building. The current Manitoba Legislative Building Guide describes the statue as being:

Similar to messengers in Greek mythology, since he bears a message of coming prosperity for all Manitobans. Facing the North, he sees the province’s bright future as linked to Manitoba’s bountiful resources: mining, fishing, forestry, fur, and hydroelectricity. A sheaf of golden wheat representing the well-earned fruits of labour rests in his left arm while in his right hand he holds high a torch, representing a call to Manitoba’s youth to join him in his eternal pursuit of a more prosperous future.

(undated, 8)

In what Leslie Roman appropriately terms "redemption discourses," fantasy emerges as a constituent part of the act of historical—and, I add, imbricated autobiographical—representation and identification (1997, 272). Embedded and embodied within instrumental and highly political nationalist myth-making practices, the notion of fantasy helps to account for that which is "less a 'matter of wilful exploitation or distortion' than 'an inherent part of consciousness' or 'a wakeful state of mind'" (Roman 1997, 272 notes omitted).

Discursive redemption notwithstanding, matters of systemic violence and dis/privilege remain. The devastating impacts of flooding on Manitoba’s north and mid-north continues to be felt by communities disregarded in the development process. Speaking to what is believed to be the first protest of its kind in Canada, in July of 1999 Fox Lake Chief Mike Lawrenchuk told the Winnipeg Free Press, "'Since Manitoba Hydro came here to benefit from our resources, we have lived a life of mostly misery and despair'" ("Fox Lake band members refuse to accept federal treaty

Drawing on Inderpal Grewal, I see travel operating in the Premier's text and talk as more than a trope, whether conceived of as travel in memory/mind, or as literal travel in physical space. In Home and Harem, Grewal argues that “travel is a metaphor that...became an ontological discourse [italics mine] central to the relations between different forms of alterity, between nationalisms, women, races, and classes” (1996, 4). Significantly, it is while the Premier's narration visits the "mythic" place of Brochet, that Hansard records an interjection apparently made by Mr. Lathlin. His therapeutic journey obstructed, Gary Filmon urges his listeners to grasp the significance of these stories, what these stories mean to him and ought to mean to his fellow members in the House. He insists on the authority and authenticity of his personal history, asserting that “the fact of the matter is that I think we are all affected by the experiences that we have. We are all affected by the ways in which we go through life, and they impact, I think, upon the obligations that we feel and the goals and objectives that we set for ourselves when we are in public life” (222). Yet at the same time, Premier Filmon publicly recoils from the ‘truth’ of experiences articulated from bodies, minds, and social locations dramatically different from his own. Before he retreats entirely into the territory of insult, stating that Lathlin is regarded as a racist, Gary Filmon concedes that he finds it, “quite honestly, reprehensible to listen to the diatribe that was put forth today by the member for The Pas” (222). Within the postcolonial limits of both 'official' historical and private-personal imagination, the forms of alterity available to Aboriginal persons are limited. Confined to the
dis/ordered epistemic territory of Manitoba’s Legislature, a racialized subject is either a noble savage, or simply, a savage. And in the "contact zone" savagery has long held up as reasonable cause for disciplinary action.

I must add that there is no doubt in my mind as to the sincerity of Mr. Filmon’s offended sensibilities during those defensive moments in the House. His are sentiments shared by many of his colleagues. Indeed, these identity-anxious hurts are familiar to most ‘white’ persons I know, including myself, when we are faced with the brutality of racism, and our own complicity in producing those experiences in the lives of others. Patricia Monture-Angus writes critically and forcefully against these discourses of pain that are made mobile, strategically reversible:

When are those of you who inflict racism, who appropriate pain, who speak with no knowledge or respect when you ought to listen and accept, going to take hard looks at yourself instead of at me. How can you continue to look at me to carry what is your responsibility? And when I speak and the brutality of my experience hurts you, you hide behind your hurt. You point the finger at me and you claim I hurt you. I will not carry your responsibility any more. Your pain is unfortunate. But do not look at me to soften it. Look to yourself. (1995, 21)

The extent to which denial is passionately exhibited in this political crisis suggests that we take seriously “the idea that the defensiveness of individuals is not unrelated to institutional defensiveness and its systemic effects” (Roman 1997, 360). Moreover, in response to unwanted pain and the real political threat of ruptured innocence, Premier Filmon’s rhetorical performance offers a kind of retrograde therapy for a radically and racially divided society. Here localized nationalist discourse aggressively enforces a "denial that reproduces the omission of history as the ontology of the nation" (Lowe 1996, 27). Otherwise stated, a postcolonial form of warfare continues by means of reproducing iconic citizens, who by design remain deeply invested in, and for this reason compulsively re-enact, "a forgotten chain of
cultural wounds" (Felman 1997, 741).

Conclusion

To address the 'fact' of racism in Manitoba this chapter explored a variety of rhetorical-discursive means by which the official Canadian story resists rupture. Orderly language maintains chasms (epistemic, economic, social, political, and ontological) which obscure relations between Native and non-Native communities in the province. I take steps to contextualize the silencing of Oscar Lathlin, a disturbing re-enactment of other silencing practices shaping Canadian history since conquest. Take for example Celia Haig-Brown's description of a routine measure enacted on children in the Alberni Indian Residential School in the 1920s. Sewing needles were pushed through the tongues of the language offenders: the children who did not limit themselves to speaking proper English (1988, 15-16).

In drawing the above parallel, I contend that to aggressively separate out and legislate what can be perceived and named as 'violence' from what must remain concealed--all from the exclusive perspective of a consensual dominant society--is a violent racist practice. Aboriginal law student Tracey Lindberg protests: "This is my personhood, and we are dismembering it. Its main organs are taken out: the facts, the issues, and the ratio" (1997, 318). In the following chapter I go further to make more explicit linkages between the violences of racism, narrative contestations and the simultaneous 'hows' of concealment entailed in social-spatial practices of truth-making. Obscuring matters of privilege at the heart of Canadian citizenship, hegemonic orderings of place institute concrete traumas upon the identities of the inhabitants of Manitoba's 'othered' spaces.
Notes to Chapter Three

1 See for example, "Child-poverty rates highest in Manitoba" (Winnipeg Free Press, 6 April 1995, B4).
2 1999 has seen the issue of Manitoba's minimum wage gaining some long-awaited political attention. In January the Filmon government announced a minimum wage increase to $6 an hour, going into effect on April 1, 1999. However, the Filmon government ignored several key recommendations made earlier this year by the Minimum Wage Review Board (including calls for another wage hike in the fall of 1999 to $6.25, and for the institution of an annual review process). Board chairman Jack McJannet wrote "that low-wage earners are having a difficult time surviving and ... people working full-time at minimum wage are taking home only $625 per month" (Naime "PCs ignored minimum-wage plea," Winnipeg Free Press 25 January 1999, A3). Naime notes that before the 1999 hike only Newfoundland had a lower minimum wage than Manitoba ($5.25 an hour).
3 In the introduction to River road: Essays on Manitoba and Prairie History, prominent Manitoba historian, Gerald Friesen, writes:
   During the many months that the [O.J. Simpson] trial unfolded, one heard in prairie people's chats over tea and coffee and beer considerable detail about the trial. However, during these same months, the federal government introduced policy changes that, in the longer term, will revolutionise the grain economy, the health system, postsecondary education, unemployment insurance, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, country-wide transportation systems, and perhaps even the national pension plan. About these matters I heard relatively little. One must conclude that local awareness of local realities is under siege. (1995, ix).
4 The Swan River constituency is located South of The Pas electoral division, while bordering Saskatchewan to the West, The Interlake to the East, and Dauphin to the South.
5 While First Nations people do not commonly identify themselves as 'people of colour', from the (hegemonic) perspective of the racial majority such blurring ('white/non-white'), I maintain, is not unusual.
6 By no means does an historical (or contemporary) awareness of class-oppression bring with it a sensitivity to issues of race-oppression. Audrey Mehler, producer and director of Prairie Fire, a documentary on the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike, was surprised to learn in the course of her research about the discrimination faced by the immigrants of that time, who were mostly from Eastern Europe. "We [Canadians] don't think of ourselves as a racist or violent society," she tells a Toronto Star reporter. "I think most of us feel pretty lucky to be in Canada where it's safe and free, and multicultural and multi-ethnic groups can co-exist."
   Carefully applying spatial and temporal limitations to racism's coordinates, she adds, "[a]t that time, at that place, there was a lot of racial animosity, all-out hatred. People weren't ashamed of it. It was blatant" (Lu "80 years later," Toronto Star 20 June 1999, C5, C3).
7 In the play's Winnipeg premiere 'Nigger' was very dark-skinned: apparently the result of grime, sun-exposure and racial origin. Lome Cardinal's portrayal of 'Sheldon Traverse' evoked a moving combination of abjection and compassion, with intermittent glimpses of the 'Trickster' (fareWel premiered on March 7, 1996, at Prairie Theatre Exchange, Winnipeg, Canada, and was directed by Libby Mason.)
8 Emphasis Ashton's, based on a video recording of the "Matters of Privilege" debate.
9 On October 11 Mr. Lathlin claims that "70 homeless residents of Pukatawagan...were at the Legislature yesterday asking for assistance from whomever would listen to them" (3795).
10 The Flin Flon constituency borders The Pas to its South, Thompson and the vast Rupertsland tidings to the East, and The Northwest Territories to the North.
11 In Berlant's estimation, the "privatization of citizenship" ushered in with the Reagan era has involved the control of "an intricate set of relations between economic, racial, and sex processes" (1997, 3).
In a 1998 Winnipeg-based study of how second generation Filipinas develop a sense of belonging in Canadian society, Loreli Buenaventura notes that the City of Winnipeg constructs its identity predominantly on the multicultural nature of its population (1998, 41). Every August, the City hosts the two-week festival known as "Folklorama," the largest multicultural celebration in the world. Multiculturalism in Winnipeg is a big business, attracting over twenty thousand tourists from across Canada and the United States annually (42 notes omitted). Buenaventura, herself a former Winnipegger, writes: "Simply put, multiculturalism is about both the creation of cultural diversity and the containment of cultural difference" (41). While peripheral to my discussion, the presence of such an elaborate, popular, and economically viable expression of multiculturalism in Manitoba does present a formidable obstacle to the kind of critique I wage against Canadian citizenship and liberal democratic nationalist discourse.

This brief statement encodes a wealth of information about the ideal Manitoban. Not only does this Manitoban work (and I insist that paid work is implied), but now this citizen has generated sufficient surplus capital to invest (when "invest" is read in literal terms). As well, the frequent return to "family" as the social building block in abstract nationalist discourse is reinforced by the Premier with personal reference to his status as a parent, and more recently, grandparent (i.e., May 29, 1995, 219). See Elizabeth Carlyle's interesting examination of Gary Filmon's conscious (and cautious) image construction throughout his political career (1997). She examines the Filmon persona as represented in mainstream media sources and concludes that the Premier emerges...as the epitome of the stereotypical able-bodied, upper middle class, white, masculine male (92). Carlyle suggests that when Filmon mobilizes these identities, "he chooses the safety and totalizing simplicity of whiteness over the riddled and unsure terrain of difference" (92). Notwithstanding his upbringing in the working-class neighbourhoods of north-end Winnipeg, his mother the daughter of Ukrainian immigrants, and a less than 'macho' image characterizing his early political career, Filmon the elder relies astutely on "the unspoken power of whiteness to silence dissent, because he can...afford to be disembodied, and because in the current balance of power, it works" (92).

Debbie Wise Harris discusses the events of the "Oka Crisis" in Kanawake and Kanesatake in terms of mainstream media representations of the crisis. Convinced that coverage of the events helped to initiate a shift in hegemonic conceptions regarding First Nations peoples in this country, Wise Harris views the media visibility of the Mohawk women in particular as the ideological "wrench" that disrupted the (patriarchal/racist) preferred meanings produced in news-discourse: "a 'crisis' situation was played out in the public sphere making it impossible for the media to ignore" (1991, 19).

This passage from Campbell (1956) indirectly. His source is James (1985, 9-10).

Quoting bell hooks, Smyth insists that the valorization of travel as liberating assumes a mobility that is dependent on power and choice;..."Travel is not a word that can be easily evoked to talk about the Middle Passage, the Trail of Tears, the landing of Chinese immigrants at Ellis Island, the forced relocation of Japanese-Americans, the plight of the homeless" (1998, 50 notes omitted).

Pratt includes the notion of the 'colonial frontier' in her conception of the contact zone, but the two terms are not interchangeable (1992, 4).

For further discussion of arctic/northern mythologies, and for specific references to Harris' contribution, see Grant (1998).

McGregor (1985) borrows the title of the first Canadian novel (John Richardson's Wacousta, written in 1832) to coin the phrase "Wacousta syndrome" (in Shields 1991, 185).

Shelagh Grant writes: "In the spring of 1991, Margaret Atwood stood before an audience at Oxford University to explain the myths and the 'imaginative mystique' of the northern wilderness, but her final words gave vent to concerns about global warming, environmental degradation and pollution....Perhaps it was unintentional, a leftover from perceptions of another age, but Atwood made no mention of those most affected by arctic pollution—the Inuit" (1998, 35).

In its narrative trajectory from a youthful innocence of thirty years ago, to the wisdom of the older, experienced man-turned-Premier, this narrative parallels Carlyle's discussion of the making of Filmon's political identity. She argues that mobilizations of masculinity play a major role in Filmon's 'white' identity: "Describing a sort of initiation-rite progression within the hyper-masculine, competitive, aggressive, public world of politics, media accounts of Filmon's career move from images of weakness and inexperience to positions of strength and control" (1997, 90).
Born Archibald Stansfeld Belaney, Sept 18, 1888, in Sussex County, England, "Archie" immigrated to Canada on March 29, 1906, wanting "to live in the wilderness, near the Indians" (all references to "Virtual Saskatchewan." Electronic source, visited 16 August 1999). Belaney eventually realized his dream to 'go native', living in northern Ontario and briefly in Quebec, working for a time in Manitoba's Riding Mountain National Park, and later at Prince Albert National Park (1931-38). He learned to trap, canoe and survive in the wilderness 'Indian style'. In 1910 he married an Ojibwa woman, Angele Egwuna (although he later married, divorced and took common law partners while remaining legally married to Angele). Between 1931 and 1937 he wrote and published five books (in Canada, Britain, and the United States), numerous magazine articles and several documentary films, all which supported his self-construction as an authentic 'Indian', and led to his great popularity in Canada and abroad. Recommended Grey Owl biographies include From the Land of the Shadows, by Donald B. Smith (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990), and Devil in Deerskins. My Life with Grey Owl, by former wife Anahareo (Toronto: New Press, 1972).

In 1999 as I write, a church-led inquiry is being conducted into Manitoba Hydro flood damage affecting First Nations communities. Doug Naime reported that inquiry members were "taken aback by the apparent hostility of the [provincial] minister [of Northern Affairs, David Newman]..." when he addressed the inquiry at Cross Lake ("Newman goes on the attack at Cross Lake," Winnipeg Free Press 26 June 1999, A3). To the credit of the provincial government, no federal officials even attended the hearing. Cross Lake (located in the constituency of The Pas) has been waiting 22 years for the implementation of The Northern Flood Agreement, which was signed in 1977 to compensate five northern bands. The province shares responsibility with the federal government for the agreement's implementation. On June 24, 1999 Cross Lake's problems were tragically illustrated by three suicide attempts, one of which resulted in the death of a 26-year-old man (A3).

Although occupying a traditional land base in the Gillam area, The Fox Lake Cree did not have reserve status when many people were evicted from their homes to make way for Hydro dams on the Nelson River in the 1960s.

The textual and video evidence, in my opinion, does not reflect hostility on the part of Oscar Lathlin, but rather, a critique leveled in direct and substantial terms. The phenomenon of 'reverse racism' is a troubling one. Even if the 'diatribe' was delivered in an aggressive manner, it is important not to forget that "the hostility of the [minority] group is the result of [oppressive] actions, and while hostility and racial anger are unhappy facts wherever they are found, there is certainly a distinction to be made between the ideological hostility of the oppressor and the experience-based hostility of those who have been oppressed" (Fish 1994, 61).

Tory MLA Jim Ernst found Lathlin's use of the word 'racist' "highly offensive": "because I have my own views as to what I believe and they do not encompass racism, and if I am collectively accused, as opposed to individually accused, then I find that offensive, and I find that, quite frankly, a breach of my privilege as a member of the House" (Nov. 1, 1995, 4461). Liberal MLA Kevin Lamoureux said it "hurts [him] greatly to believe that [he] would be in favour of trying to say or to limit an individual's rights and freedoms..." (4458).
CHAPTER FOUR

Disciplines of Place: The Legislature and Manitoba's "Other Spaces"

[T]he First Minister was deeply offended by the notion that aboriginal [sic] people have a rightful place in this province....When it is for his own convenience and the government's convenience, that is the only time that he says, 'I have jurisdiction.' Other times he tells aboriginal people to go live in the bush and not bother him.

--Oscar Lathlin, May 29, 1995

Introduction

In the preceding chapter I demonstrated rhetorical moves by which a dominant Canadian mythology resists the disordering and rupture threatened by voices of a racialized opposition. Elite political "text and talk" about the land emerges in a moment of crisis as a key rhetorical feature of hegemonic narrative resilience in Manitoba. Articulated from the Legislature, this site-specific provincial telling of the national story serves to (re)produce and (re)centre innocent identities, hegemonic constructions of homeplace, and universal ways of knowing that make possible a particular kind of Manitoba, and a particular kind of Manitoban. The membership of this community is defined within a specific set of raced (classed, gendered, and heterosexed) social relations that claim demarcated political space--a simultaneously material, imagined, and lived space situated within the broader context of a Canadian national project.

In this chapter I revisit the 1995 "text and talk" but take a different theoretical tack. Here I explore ways in which spatial relations in and of themselves constitute conditions of possibility for dominant mythologies. Dominant myths, in turn, give rise to and sustain these spatial relations. Recall for a moment Said's axiom about the centrality of land in the battles and narratives of imperialism (see Chapter Three, introduction). The current task is to interrogate more overtly the telling centrality of battles, of a "war by other means" which is encoded in spatial productions and strategic erasures of contemporary "contact zone" relations. I concur with Anne
McClintock for whom it is critical "not to read the contradictions of colonial discourse as a matter of textuality alone" (1995, 16). She contends that what Spivak calls "the planned epistemic violence of the imperialist project," was also, all too often, backed up by the planned institutional violence of armies and law courts, prisons and state machinery. The power of guns, whips and shackles, while always implicated in discourse and representation, is not reducible to the "violence of the letter". If colonial texts reveal fissures and contradictions, the colonials themselves all too often succeeded in settling matters of indecision with a violent excess of militarised masculinity. (1995, 16)

While I do not disregard the important discontinuities between colonial and imperial practices of the past, and instrumental Canadian nationalism(s) of the present, I am deeply concerned with "the intimate--if often conflictual--relations between textual and institutional power" (McClintock 1995, 16). A continuity of subjugating force extends today even to what typically can be agreed upon as violent/violating actions. In the apparatuses of democratic social 'cohesion' are racisms past and present, woven into sets of complex social relations that produce normalized 'Canadian' space.

I gather below an abbreviated catalogue of simultaneous (and highly symmetrical) practices of closure/exclusion that emerge from the order of discourse analysed in Chapter Three: the transnational eviction of the word/concept "racism" from the House (from Manitoba's imagined borders to the remove of South Africa); the literal (bodily), disciplinary removal of a Cree MLA from the House; the dislocation of the virtually homeless Mathias Colomb Cree of Pukatawagan (forced from the periphractic space of the reserve1 to the public place of petition and media spectacle on the Legislative grounds); the (silenced) containment in the House gallery of these same racialized bodies; the unilateral action of the provincial government in enclosing two million acres of land under the "Endangered Spaces Program" (with evident disregard for unresolved treaty land entitlement negotiations); the containment of
racialized child poverty within representations of First Nations communities and spaces; the underlying spatial assertion of the parliamentary process itself, whereby MLAs are seen to represent "every square inch of this province" in the constrained space of the House; and the narrative harnessing of racialized Northern spaces as tropes in Premier Filmon's ordered autobiographical construction of personal and political authority.

With rhetorical-discursive representations of space central to the analysis of Chapter Three, here I am concerned with shifting attention to those racialized spatial practices that mirror (and are mirrored by) the dominant conceptual order of the Legislature. I wish to consider a loose grouping of spatial technologies and spatial effects that I term 'disciplines of place'. These practices operate in constant and oftentimes violent tension with the lived spaces (that is, the bodies) that they seek to order. The first section of this chapter, therefore, briefly expands upon the "case for space" in critical social theory, as initiated in Chapter Two.

In section two I theorise the Legislature as a social site with a particular kind of spatial hegemony. Within the broad mode of spatial thinking afforded by Lefebvre's "trialectics of spatiality," I introduce Foucault's more specific concept of the "heterotopia." In his 1967 lecture Of Other Spaces Foucault briefly articulates a contemporary sensibility of space. His (still apposite) paradigm for space as a "network of linked sites" proves instrumental to my analysis of the Manitoba Legislature and its racialized hinterland sites. As a "heterotopic" site the Legislature exerts controlling powers over representations of space, and by extension, over spatial practices that order other locales within the provincial domain.

The material-discursive analyses which follow in sections three and four illuminate some of the subjugated lived spaces that undergird the language and law-based architecture of liberal democratic, white settler privilege. I explore a practice of vertical reading and lateral mapping, here referred to as "superimposing" de-linked sites. By reconnecting instrumental, institutional representations of space embedded
in political discourse, to partially knowable, lived spaces 'outsided' (marginalized, de-authorized, made abject or invisible) by political text and talk, “the materiality of racialized relations--of relations between knowledge and power, rationality and exclusions, identity, opportunity, and availability--" come more clearly into focus (Goldberg 1993, 187). Otherwise stated, the violating terms of endorsement for a universalising discourse of citizenship--at once unitary, homogeneous and univocal--can be understood as the set of consequences that remain hidden from 'us': the non-Aboriginal, and majority non-racialized citizens of Canada.

1. disciplines of place

So, Madam Speaker, today is not a happy day. No one, I think, enjoyed the proceedings that occurred this afternoon, but, at the same time, we are the lawmakers of this province. If we cannot obey the laws, how on Earth are we going to expect the public out there to obey the laws? I mean, let us face it. In a democratic process, in a democratic society, laws are only effective because the public want to obey them, not because they have to obey them.

--Deputy Premier Jim Ernst, November 1, 1995

In Chapter Three I foreground dominant rhetorical and narrative practices in political "text and talk." The elite 'moves' I trace there relate to silencing processes (which are by no means merely repressive). Epistemic productions that are infused with Indianism and a EuroNorthAmerican worldview that universalises 'truth' are observed to foreclose on, and to distort conditions for, mainstream reception of First Nations' political expression. Asserting a point that I have neglected to make overt, Emma LaRocque reminds us that "[i]n contrast to the inane stereotype of the Indian as soundless, we know from the vast storehouse of [First Nations] oral traditions that Aboriginal peoples were peoples of words....The issue is not that Native peoples were ever wordless but that, in Canada, their words were literally and politically negated" (1990, xv). By the same token, First Nations people have never disappeared from the land. In contemporary Canada they continue to assert themselves as "not vanishing" (Chrystos cited in LaRocque 1990, xxvii). Stated in spatial terms, racialized eviction in
Manitoba is graphically evident in the dependence of dominant (non-Native, usually white) citizen's 'innocent' experiences of homeplace and of self, upon the ongoing dispossession of First Nations peoples. The issue is that Native peoples have been literally, economically, culturally and politically *evicted* in Canada. And it is not without caution that I employ the term 'eviction'. Recalling Monture-Angus' rejection of the euphemistic phrase 'disadvantaged' (see Chapter One, section two), 'eviction' in my usage denotes violent subjugating practices, and it is *not* intended to conceal racism.

Spatial analysis allows me to loosely group (material, symbolic) *spatial practices* of eviction, alongside imbricated *narrative processes* of silencing. Yet to read spatial relations is to in fact map *heterogeneous* zones. Spatial relations are organised within and across diverse, although irreducible spatial registers: lived social space contains all other real and imagined spaces simultaneously. "In different ways...so too do spatial practices and representations of space..." (Soja 1996, 69). Speaking through the data, when I discuss the removal of an offending word (something 'mental,' 'imagined' and 'symbolic') from political space, I mean to argue that this representational eviction cannot be wholly separated from (or simply equated to) the spatial (and physical, concrete) practice which evicted the man who spoke the word. The eviction of the word means something 'bigger than' the man; yet the removal of the racialized body makes clear the scope and *actionability* of a larger conceptual order, which is endorsed by a regime of *material coercions*. (A return to Foucault's "set of actions on actions".) Symbolic (linguistic and bodily) evictions ought not to be read apart from material, historical evictions of First Nations bodies: for example, practices which cleared First Nations traditional territories for white settlement. Nor should a 'symbolic' act on a racialized subject (like the eviction of Oscar Lathlin) be interpreted without a radical awareness of the range of alienating spatial practices *of the present*. Un/conscious systemic racism as a tactic of contemporary nation-building is visible in a myriad of raced social, political and economic exclusions that impact heavily upon the lives of First Nations people.
In the Manitoba provincial debate data racialized 'outsiding' operates textually and subtextually, and with varying degrees of un/consciousness. As Michael Keith and Steve Pile put it, "[p]olitics is invariably about closure; it is about the moments at which boundaries become, symbolically, Berlin Walls. These politics hermetically seal these boundaries, creating spaces of closure; on one side 'the goodies' and on the other 'the baddies.' An eternal struggle between Good and Evil..." (1993, 222). Here we are reminded of Foucault's "war of the races" discourse. Not a discourse that detaches itself from the language of rights, it is one whose truth claims are made "to specific rights and by specific holders of them" (Stoler 1995, 65). These rights speak to property, to privilege, to power (over racialized, classed, and gendered others), and to the 'normalizing' imperatives of constant social purification.

While I readily observe these and other home-grown technologies of 'purification' at work within the data, it is somewhat less evident how one might effectively integrate this seemingly diverse summary of observations into coherent, politically useful arguments. In the introduction to Postmodern Geographies Soja offers a description of the terrain one faces if one attempts to embrace a "spatial hermeneutic":

The sequential flow is...frequently side-tracked to take coincident account of simultaneities, lateral mappings that make it possible to enter the narration at almost any point without losing track of the general objective to create more critically revealing ways of looking at the combination of time and space, history and geography, period and region, sequence and simultaneity. (1989, 2)

In the subsequent sections of this chapter I elaborate and operationalize a localized "spatial hermeneutic." There my method bears some obvious relation to what Said (1993) intends by a "contrapuntal" perspective.2 I read spatial practices in opposition to keynotes hit by the dominant, unifying discourse, that is by design "linear and subsuming" (Said 1993, xxv). I extend attention to 'othered' heterogeneous zones on
the outside of the symbolic power centre. Such oscillations move between (shifting) Manitoba margins and centre, tracking nomadically from site to linked site.

I will focus in some detail on the violence that remains both latent and concealed in Manitoba's uneven social-spatial relations in sections three and four of this chapter. As I illustrate in the preceding chapter, taken holistically as an object of inquiry the symmetries and asymmetries of power relations in the "contact zone"—spatial and otherwise—reveal the stuff postcolonial citizenship is made of. At this juncture, however, I recognize that my practice of cataloguing spatial relations across spatial registers, as a means of linking the 'insides' and 'outsides' of political discourse, does not suffice for building an acutely power sensitive space analysis. It is important to remember that ultimately I am building a reading and a critique of the ways in which a dominant personhood is dependent upon, and produced through, inequitable social relations with subjugated 'outsiders'. With a power-sensitive means of theorizing disciplined, ordered intraspatial relations which position centre and marginal sites, could hegemonic (and especially 'elite') Manitobans be brought to acknowledge accountability for intimately linked events that nevertheless seem to belong to other people, other times, and other places distant from them? For a needed analytical turn, I look to Foucault's 1967 lecture Of Other Spaces (1986).

2. siting relations: the Legislature as heterotopia

If laws had to be enforced constantly, we would have to have one police person for every citizen to ensure the law was in fact enforced. From time to time, if the police person did not want to obey the laws, then we would have to have another police person for that police person. So the essence of a democratic society is that we have laws because we want to obey those laws, and certainly we in this Chamber need to set that example.

--Deputy Premier, Jim Ernst, November 1, 1995

With characteristic analytical breadth, Foucault opens his talk with a brief spatial history of Western World cosmologies. He describes the nature of mediaeval space as a hierarchic ensemble of places: "[s]acred places and profane places; protected places and open, exposed places; urban places and rural places" (1986, 22).
Foucault suggests that this mediaeval space of "emplacement" was opened up by Galileo in the seventeenth century and that the scandal of Galileo's work lay "not so much in his discovery, or rediscovery, that the earth revolved around the sun, but in his constitution of an infinite, and infinitely open [italics mine] space" (23). The radically open vision of Galileo aligns itself smoothly with the era of imperial expansion, providing a spatial logic for the making of the contemporary postcolonial world.

Foucault notes a significant shift, however, in that "[o]ur epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of relations among sites" (1986, 23). 'Siting' comes to surpass the localisation of mediaeval times and the subsequent era of expansionism. Today, Foucault believes "[w]e are at a moment...when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein" (22). The accuracy of his observation seems to have heightened with the passage of over thirty years. (I think of supercessions within the world of my lifetime, of the electric by the electronic; of land travel by air; of audio and video communications by the 'World Wide Web', and so on.) Importantly, the site defines itself "by relations of proximity between points or elements" (23), and the human site or living space, when viewed as a problematic, becomes not simply [a matter] of knowing whether there will be enough space for men [sic] in the world—a problem that is certainly quite important—but also that of knowing what relations of propinquity, what type of storage, circulation, marking, and classification of human elements [italics mine] should be adopted in a given situation in order to achieve a given end.

(23)

Although highly abstract, Foucault's twentieth-century formulation of space is suggestive when read in the context of the Canadian nation state, where territories extended throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and into the twentieth with the acquisition of more peripheral regions; where borders have been struggled over and then inscribed and policed; and where ambitious energies
have necessarily turned inward to face domestic challenges of nation-maintenance and development. Hence, the relentless task of controlling one's 'internal enemies' remains a real problem for the imagined community's continuity. But how does one site manage to make and discipline another? Spatially speaking, what characterises the relations between a spectacular centred site like the Manitoba Legislature and its constitutive outside spaces?

Keeping questions of power in the foreground, Foucault takes a special theoretical interest in two types of social sites. Each has "the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralise, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate [italics mine], mirror, or reflect" (1986, 24). In contrast with utopias, Foucault is most concerned with those real places that are formed in the founding of a society (24). For him, these places are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. Because these places are absolutely different from all the sites that they reflect and speak about, [they are called], by way of contrast to utopias, heterotopias. (24)

Six principles loosely describe the heterotopia, the first being that there is probably not a single society in the world that fails to constitute them (24). My interest in the concept stems from the remarkable resonance of heterotopic principles when they are read through the Legislative site. In condensed fashion below, I will reproduce Foucault's description of heterotopic features, while making cursory translations into the Manitoba site.

The second principle of the heterotopia states that as a society's history unfolds, it can make an existing heterotopia take on new and often very different functions; "for each heterotopia has a precise and determined function within a society and the same
heterotopia can, according to the synchrony of the culture in which it occurs, have one function or another" (1986, 24). Foucault uses the example of the cemetery, tracking a discernible shift in its meaning between the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: a shift corresponding with its literal displacement from the city centre (next to the church), outward to the suburbs. It is only at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Foucault surmises, when a belief in the soul and the resurrection of bodies has weakened, that more attention must be given to the dead body, "which is ultimately the only trace of our existence in the world and in language" (25). Individual coffins, graves, and marked tombstones become the normative across social classes, in a departure from the anonymity of the eighteenth-century charnel house, and from a time when tombs were reserved for the nobility. The meaning of death, therefore, and of the space death claims is observed to have rearticulated itself as part of a rise in secularism and individualism. Previously the body found its place to dissolve, more or less quietly, into its immortality. Subsequently, everyone "has a right to her or his own little box for her or his own little personal decay" (25). The heterotopic space of the cemetery remains concerned with death's meanings, but its practical functions shift with society's changing epistemic needs.

In the case of the provincial power centre, its function relates to the harnessing and distribution of political power (as it circulates outward from the national metropole(s), and from 'regional' metropole to its peripheries). Who gets the lion's share of that power is a matter of constant liberal 'democratic' negotiation. In his strident opposition to Dacquay's November 1st ruling, Opposition MLA Steve Ashton surveys the variability of 'democracies' practised throughout British-Canadian parliamentary history. He remarks upon the apparent flexibilities of citizenship discourse in the Canadian House of Commons: "could not members of that House have said it was a racist policy or [the] government was racist when there were the internment[s] of Ukrainian-Canadians in the First World War, the removal of civil rights of Japanese Canadians in the Second World War?" (November 1, 1995, 4454).
Ashton goes on to note more recent shifts in democracy's membership, when evolving meanings of Canadian citizenship eventually moved to officially include Aboriginal people with federal suffrage for First Nations citizens granted in 1960. While the heterotopic concerns remain relatively stable (concern for boundaries, power consolidation and maintenance), as history has unfolded heterotopic Legislative spaces in Canada have necessarily assumed new and (apparently different) political tactics, or functions.3

The third principle is helpful in theorizing the spatiality of representational democracy. "The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible" (25). This axiom recalls the parliamentary paradox I remarked upon earlier, whereby every single inch of the province is spoken for by an elected individual. Honourable Member Ashton quotes Beauchesne's Citation 24: "[p]arliamentary privilege is the sum of the peculiar rights enjoyed by each House collectively as a constituent part of the High Court of Parliament, and by Members of each House individually, without which they could not discharge their functions and which exceed those possessed by other bodies or individuals [italics mine]" (4451). The disproportionate degree of power (over something or someone) that is conferred by a rights-based parliamentary discourse serves to reframe Lindberg's concern for "the facts, the issues, and the ratio" (see Chapter Three), when radically different personhoods are necessarily absorbed into democracy's homogenising equations. The intrinsically problematic nature of this design (the conceptual, representational design for political voice and presence as it is practised, materialised, and embodied in the House) will become key to my analysis. I return in section three to explore 'at ground level' this foundational phenomenon of asymmetrically positioned, radically incompatible sites, and more importantly, to demonstrate the heterotopic necessity of their forced 'compatibility', their forced reducibility.

According to Foucault's fourth principle, "Heterotopias are most often linked to
slices in time— which is to say that they open onto what might be termed...

heterochronies. The heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men [sic] arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time" (1986, 26). Narrative analyses in Chapter Three demonstrated the shared investment of provincial parliamentary discourse and nationalist narratives of origin in an absolute break with traditional time, supposedly instantiated by the imperial-colonial project. Yet as Cook-Lyn argues, Western history (and Western time) did not stop (1996, 30), nor did a brave, New World time 'start' with the triumph of colonialism. Nevertheless, the idea of accumulating everything, of establishing a sort of general archive, the will to enclose in one place all times, all epochs, all forms, all tastes, the idea of constituting a place that is itself outside of time and inaccessible to its ravages, the project of organising in this way a sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile place, this whole idea belongs to our modernity. (Foucault 1986, 26)

Foucault's privileged examples proper to western culture of the nineteenth century are the museum and the library. I add to these the imagined/real/symbolic sites of Canadian Legislative buildings (including the House of Parliament in Ottawa). Erected when its political formation had achieved a degree of material certainty; fashioned architecturally to spatially dominate a landscape; and blending both imported and (modified) indigenous symbolism; the Manitoba Legislature is quintessentially a place where one's imagining of the province into the future need never stop, and where its continuity with the past appears incontestable, purely organic.

The Legislature itself is constructed principally with Tyndall limestone, an indigenous material quarried at Garson, 50 kilometres northeast of Winnipeg. The Manitoba Legislative Building Guide notes that this "beautifully mottled stone contains embedded fossils of invertebrates and vegetation, providing subtle reminders of the semi-tropical sea that extended over much is what is now Manitoba 450 to 500 million
years ago" [italics mine] (undated, 4). Situated on the Assiniboine river only minutes from the forks of the Assiniboine and the storied Red River, the Legislative Buildings seize the landscape's natural dynamism, and refashion important settings of Aboriginal 'pre history'. The official Guide (produced in particular for tourists) sites the buildings in place and time as follows: "The Assiniboine River, once a highway for Aboriginal peoples, explorers, fur traders, and steamboats, traces the grounds' southern boundary. Osborne Street, Kennedy Street, and Broadway, highways for more modern travellers [italics mine], border the grounds on the remaining three sides" (undated, 5). Notable features of the main Legislative building include a pediment flanked by twin sphinxes and superseded by a dome, at the base of which four groups of figures rest, representing Agriculture, Art, Industry, and Science. The dome is in turn crowned with the landmark statue of 'The Golden Boy.' Gazing northward, holding his torch aloft and bearing a sheaf of wheat, this Enlightenment figure fuses potent old world symbolism with new world place, configuring an imposing 'indigenous' symbolism of (capitalist economic) identity. Through agricultural production, administration, and as a transportation hub for grain (most significantly wheat)--leading a trend which shaped the entire prairie region--Manitoba distinguished itself in its early years as "bread basket to the world." 

Gazing upon Legislative inner space, the eye meets the majestic Grand Staircase. Honed of "Italian brown-veined carerra marble, reputed to be the finest building marble in the world" (undated, 9), at its foot the staircase is framed by two enormous life-size North American bison. (Both the Bison and The Golden Boy are the work of French sculptor Georges Gardet, of Paris.) Fractured symbolic of a devastated Plains Indian economy, the now extinct bison serve as provincial logo (on pins, flags, and letterhead), and here in the Legislative building as bronzed sentries to a spectacular EuroCanadian space. A series of 39 steps climbs to The Rotunda, an antechamber at the head of the staircase, providing a formal approach to the Legislative Chamber.
I decode this public cultural, architectural symbolism within a grid of capitalist accumulation, and read the spectacular imperial visibility and ornate solidity of the Legislative site to be functioning as part of the legacy of Victorian spatial management. Interestingly, art historian Marilyn Baker recounts that Frank W. Simon, one of the pair of architects selected through an Empire-wide competition to design the 'new' Legislative Buildings, included in his impressive credentials work on the First International Industrial Exhibition at Edinburgh in 1886 (1986, 39). McClintock describes how Victorian metropolitan space in general became "reordered as a space for the exhibition of imperial spectacle and the reinvention of race" (1995, 16). I wish to compare briefly 'The House' with its micro-analogue of the Victorian family household. Indeed, the most prominent statue on the Legislative Grounds in Winnipeg is one of Queen Victoria herself, seated at the front (north) entrance of the building on a bronzed throne, wearing her crown and holding the orb and sceptre.

McClintock discusses how the parlour of Victorian middle-class homes marked the threshold of private and public, and as liminal zone the parlour "also became the domestic space for the display of commodity fetishism. [It] served to conspicuously display the family's 'best' household commodities: use value was consciously converted to exhibition value [italics mine]" (1995, 162). However, in a paradox that McClintock terms "the labour of leisure," lower-middle-class houses made "anxious exhibition of 'good' silver, 'good' china and 'clean' furniture...[which] barely cloaked the shabbiness, overwork and anxiety that lay concealed behind the commodity spectacle of female leisure and male buying power" (162). On a grander scale, yet in a not dissimilar mode of exhibition, the 'captured' bison (massive bronze statuary) speak volumes within the gleaming heterotopic syntax of a newly ordered world, while at the same time serving to conceal its highly inequitable social order. Commodification here is perhaps more emphatically epistemic than economic. To borrow Said's phraseology, public "[c]ulture conceived in this way can become a protective enclosure: check your politics at the door before you enter it" (1993, xiv).
Questions of gatekeeping bring us to Foucault's fifth principle: 

_Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates and makes them impenetrable._ In general, the heterotopic site is not freely accessible like a public place. Either the entry is compulsory, as in the case of entering a barracks or a prison, or else the individual has to submit to rites and purifications. To get in one must have a certain permission and make certain gestures. (1986, 26).

The account of Oscar Lathlin's November 1st eviction effectively illuminates the decidedly ambivalent nature of the Legislature as 'public' space. Strict codes of behaviour constitute a performative or ritual order which, when transgressed, leads to disciplinary measures; when respected, is predicated upon self-discipline, and for some, drastic self-negation.

Sometimes the enclosing technology of the Legislative site implements a discourse of protection. Liberal MLA Kevin Lamoureux, in the debate regarding the ruling on "unparliamentary language," expresses concern "about the children that are out there, the future generations and so forth, [because] there has to be some sort of decorum that applies" (November 1, 1995, 4459). The Lamoureux example also reveals a concern for larger cultural traditions (those of the 'non-racist' society 'out there' that the House represents). The continuity of a decorous national culture--extending into a limitless future--is perceived to be vulnerable to Lathlin's 'very strong' words. Therefore, rites, purifications, and purgations must be faithfully observed. Such concepts recall those sacred spaces of medieval emplacement, subsumed by other spatial orders but never entirely eradicated. In fact, the opening ceremonies enacted at the outset of the Legislative session explicitly marry rites of church and state, of cathedral and parade square, all in a manner occasionally reminiscent of Arthurian times.6

Yet pageantry alone cannot preserve an enforced, homogenising order. Processes of abjection are also required to maintain the purity of the body politic. MLA
Gord Mackintosh rose on a Point of Order on November 1 to inform the Speaker that "[d]uring the remarks of the honourable member for The Pas, the member for Portage la Prairie (Mr. Pallister) was heard to say from his seat, 'this is bullshit'" (4449). The Speaker indicated that she had heard no off-the-record or on-the-record comments during Lathlin's speech. Even after the ruling had achieved its erasure of the word "racist," the anxious purgation of the 'impure' from the body politic appeared to remain incomplete. (Lathlin had yet to be physically expelled from the Chamber.) According to McClintock's reading of Kristeva, "the expelled abject haunts the subject as its inner constitutive boundary; that which is repudiated forms the self's internal limit. The abject is 'something rejected from which one does not part'" (1995, 71 notes omitted). The concept of abjection is appropriate here; the unconfirmed (and unclaimed) scatology imports something substantially more violent, more visceral than mere verbal disorder, while the alleged "unparliamentary" language of the racialized opposition clearly transgressed boundaries which are 'neutral' only in the letter of the law. The heterotopic enforcements of the "law of the land" therefore, are not by nature peaceful, nor are they 'universal' in their enactments of disciplinary gatekeeping gestures.

The sixth and final principle articulated in Foucault's lecture notes describes heterotopias as having a function in relation to all the space that remains: [e]ither their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory.... [Foucault's somewhat problematic example is "those famous brothels of which we are now deprived."] Or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled [italics mine]. This latter type would be the heterotopia, not of illusion, but of compensation, and I wonder if certain colonies have not functioned somewhat in this manner. (1986, 27)
The postcolonial Legislature functions specifically as a heterotopia of compensation. Consider the weighty, ordered grandeur of the building's spatial exhibition, housing the perfected social visions (of past, present and future) for which political talk is best known. This compensatory site functions in relation to all the 'real,' disordered and 'messy' provincial spaces that lay outside of it. It serves as ordering counterbalance to those heterogeneous zones which are by design rendered incompatible with the heterotopia itself.

In light of my concerns regarding lived citizenship in Manitoba, it becomes clear for whom heterotopic compensation is organised. To return to elements of Premier Filmon's speech analysed in Chapter Three, I use Foucault's formulation to site peripheral 'real' spaces like Cross Lake, the Grand Rapids forebay, Cedar Lake and Brochet: on the distant peripheries of metropolitan, urban-based power. These lived places (and their bodies, wrenched into social-spatial relations with the 'outside') are forcefully aligned to the heterotopic power grid through the symbolic orderings of political narrative, and no less by means of acquisitive material-discursive technologies. Chief Esau Turner of the Swampy Cree Tribal Council described the Grand Rapids and Saskatchewan River Power projects when addressing The Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba:

[H]uge changes have been imposed on native people....Economic activity has come into our area which has changed our way of life, but has rarely given us a substitute in terms of jobs and ownership of that economic activity. Lost, too, in the changes were many traditions and values that kept our culture strong and our communities united. The taking of land, the imposition of another economic system and replacement of our social systems with systems of laws and government from outside meant the decline in local customs, local responsibility and local ways of life.

(Province of Manitoba, 1991, 83)

Neo-colonization of marginal zones (i.e., the remote control of northern/rural
resources, communities, political and even familial arrangements) makes possible the consolidation of power—especially racialized power—in the polis. Urban power, as Goldberg observes in "'Polluting the Body Politic': Race and Urban Location," is a microcosm of the strengths and weaknesses of state" (1993, 185). Viewed as heterotopia of compensation, therefore, the Manitoba Legislative space is a critical social and political stronghold: both concealing and exhibiting the matters of privilege which undergird the liberal democratic nation.

I wish to conclude this section with illustrative samples from an Act of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly. "The Manitoba Hydro Act" makes explicit the spatial networks and the racialized order of social relations which are constructed in part from the heterotopic site of the Manitoba Legislature. Passed in 1970, this piece of legislation gives broad powers to the Manitoba Hydro-Electric Board (Manitoba Hydro) to provide electric power throughout the province. Almost all of the power generated by the crown corporation (established in 1949) is generated on the Nelson River in Northern Manitoba (Canadian Electricity Association 1995). I wish to demonstrate how "The Hydro Act" employs juridical discourse to extend social control outward and over its "other spaces," particularly racialized northern space.

To reintroduce Lefebvre's terms to my material-discursive analysis, the Legislature is primarily concerned with martiailing control over representations of space (conceived space). It is simultaneously a 'real' physical place embodying a concrete spatial practice (perceived space), which I have argued is explicitly emblematic of imperial power in (post)colonial Canada. Here we find echoes of Said's maxim cited in Chapter Three, where he asserts that the "main battle" in imperialism is over land, and that to a certain extent this battle is waged within the terms of narrative. Control over the domain of representation (specifically, over political discourse and/as lawmakers) legitimises the enforcement and reproduction of networks of spatial practices. These practices impact directly upon linked sites outside the Legislature, and affect the contours of lived space in Manitoba: determining (not-
totalizing, but dominating) conditions of possibility for bodies and lives lived in the spaces of representation.

The 'power' circulating through the network of relations instantiated by "The Manitoba Hydro Act" is both figurative and literal--political, tangible, economic--recalling the personal story with which I began this thesis. Even a limited spatial analysis of sites brought into relation through the Act demonstrates the biased nature of the relations between metropole and margins. Article 9 significantly designates the principal offices of the corporation to be "within the metropolitan area as defined in The Metropolitan Winnipeg Act" (4).10 The (rural, northern) margins that serve as resource-base sites to this urban (southern) centre are at the same time fully exposed and penetrated under highly partial terms. Article 15 establishes the "Powers of the corporation", whereby the corporation may,

for temporary purposes, and with or without the consent of the owner, enter, remain upon, take possession of, and use, any property, real or personal, and erect, make, or place thereon any structure, installation, or excavation, and flood and overflow any land,11 and accumulate and store water thereon; acquire by purchase, lease, licence, or otherwise, and hold, develop, construct, use, maintain, repair, operate, and improve, and sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of, any property, including, without limitation, land and works, in each case upon such terms and conditions as the board deems proper; contract with Her Majesty in right of Canada, or in right of any province of Canada or with any person, for the use of any property, including land, for the erection of works of any kind; enter into agreements and do all things proper or necessary for the due exercise of the powers mentioned in this section. (Article 15.2 d,e,f,g 1970, 6)

Although likely 'normative' by legal estimate, "The Manitoba Hydro Act" institutes a sweeping and prejudicial system of opening and closing that renders the locus of
control impenetrable, explicitly recalling Foucault's fifth heterotopic principle. And while the margins are discursively produced as infinitely penetrable places, the hegemonic centre backs itself up with the punitive arm of the law: fines and possible imprisonment await persons who violate any provision of the Act. Thus the law of the democratic land immobilises its racialized subjects of the peripheries; marginal social spaces effectively bleed 'power' southwards in a non-reciprocal macro-economic (and macro-political) relationship which literally makes the metropole and its citizens in the process. Indeed, the capital-intensive nature of the electric power industry makes it a significant cash cow for many Canadian provinces.

Meanwhile, the corporate body that makes itself within this grid of relations is linked in some specific ways to the 'body politic' as it stands, spatially condensed in the bodies of the Legislature. Article 8 overrides "The Legislative Assembly Act" and permits a member of the Legislative Assembly, "who may also be a member of the Executive Council," to be a member of the board (1970, 4). This individual "may accept from the corporation salary or renumeration under this Act; and he does not thereby vacate or forfeit his seat, or incur any of the penalties imposed by the Legislative Assembly Act for sitting and voting as a member of the Legislative Assembly" (4). A final article on board definition clarifies the limits of its accountability:

Neither the chairman of the board nor any officer, member, or employee of the corporation, nor anyone acting under the instructions of any of them or under the authority of this Act or the regulations is personally liable for any loss or damage suffered by any person by reason of anything in good faith done, caused, permitted, or authorised to be done, or omitted to be done, by him or them, pursuant to, or in exercise of, or supposed exercise of, the powers given by this Act or the regulations.

(Article 13 1970, 5)

While I do not propose a legal or even quasi-legal analysis of the Hydro Act text, I think it important to take account of these specific and 'legitimate' methods by which spatial
practices of closure and of effective eviction secure themselves. Political and legal language re-makes the landscape through an Act which operates as a point of transfer. By moving the power of 'legitimated' racial (class and gender) privilege outward from the heterotopic site of 'official' articulation in the provincial Legislature, through the disciplinary grids of public institutions (which are seen to benefit the majority of citizens), a disembodied 'universal' will circulates with impunity in a network devoid of accountability.

The Legislative heterotopia functions as a compensatory (material/ symbolic/ performed) site for a society that constructs its ontology not only on the omission of history, but also upon the coding and concealment of inequitable power relations via the naturalising terms of social spatialization. Compensation exists for those citizens privileged by the wish-fulfilling, frequently violent 'messes' that they would rather not see or hear about. Consider for a moment questions of 'liability' and 'accountability.' In both cases dominant bodies escape their import, their own identities frequently held secure behind the troubling and omnipresent shield of 'good faith', a principle defensively deployed in Legislative and legal discourse. 'Good faith' surfaces time and time again as an epistemic lynch pin in the construction and enactment of violating, and often violent civic in/actions. In heterotopic relation to the social and political centre, Manitoba's commodified "other spaces" absorb and contain the harmful affects and effects of race (economic class and gender) privilege in action, while they give literal and symbolic sustenance to the national (and deeply personal) dreams of innocent 'white' subjects (Razack 1999b).

3. superimposing de-linked sites

'Blessed are you who suffer anything for the sake of Justice.'
--inscription on a mural panel in Manitoba's Legislative Chamber

The Commissioners of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba recognize that Manitoba is a society where few people have had the opportunity to learn about their
fellow citizens of Aboriginal background (Province of Manitoba, 1991, Vol.1, 49). However, as with all societies, Manitobans do not know themselves or one another inside a void. What Foucault calls "relations of propinquity" are never purely organic, not wholly attributable to a landscape's 'objective' logic, nor to 'natural' social groupings. This assertion is supported by the observation that while we do not live inside a void, we do "live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another" (Foucault 1986, 23). How do these delineated sites come into being, such that they can be experienced as separate and distanced from one another?

Pushing beyond Foucault's abstract formulation, how do dominant discourses manage to spatially resist racialized oppositional 'superimpositions' of counter-sites on dominant sites, of counter-knowings (such as Oscar Lathlin's critique) on hegemonic 'truth'? How, practically speaking, does such willed 'irreducibility' endure when elites insist that the homogeneous rules and privileges of the House--mirroring citizenship principles of the nation we imagine--"apply equally to all members" (Premier Filmon May 30, 1995, 235)? In other words, in the spatial grammar of heterotopic political relations, what spaces can speak (or be spoken for, and by whom), before anyone has even taken the floor for debate?

Some of the answers to these questions lie--apparently disconnected--within and beneath the text of the debates central to my analysis. For example, Premier Filmon himself acknowledged philosophical "chasms" within the House (May 29, 1995, 219). But in the Premier's talk these "chasms" (referring to party politics) remained practically and symbolically incommensurate with huge alienations experienced outside House walls, between persons and within communities "who elected us [MLAs] and those with whom we come in contact throughout the province" (May 29, 1995, 219). If the conditions of defensive distancing were not naturalised and camouflaged as merely "philosophical" differences, might the housing concerns of the Pukatawagan protesters have been more readily admitted in the Chamber?
Perhaps not. Arguing in terms of the official national story, Lathlin reminds the First Minister that Aboriginal people do have a rightful place in the province: "[t]hey have a right to approach this government and the Premier" (May 29, 1995, 215). But who, in actuality, comes into contact with whom in Manitoba?

Even Gary Filmon, provincial leader for a third consecutive term, travels back to experiences over thirty years old when trying to demonstrate his affinity and respect for Manitoba’s First Nation’s peoples. Meanwhile, in 1995, the Aboriginal protesters from Pukatawagan do not gain access to the Premier. Protesters from the contemporary northlands ended up literally outside of the House, reduced to squatting on the grounds of the provincial Legislature. Samira Kawash suggests that "[t]he corporeality of what is excluded from the public is...[in fact] the counterpart to the abstraction of the public subject. It is as body—as a material, fleshy, needy body that demands place and sustenance—that the homeless body lives its nonexistence" (1998, 329). While not homeless in the urban sense of the term, the Pukatawagan women and children emerge "as the corporeal mark of the constitutive outside of the realm of the public, a product of the same spatial and economic processes that work to secure a place for the public subject" (Kawash 1998, 329)—the ‘true’ citizen of Manitoba.

As citizens benefiting from racial dominance, ‘our’ interpretations of political discourse must be infused with "epistemic humility" (Narayan 1988). I am referring again to an awareness of the limitations of our own lived experiences. We need, therefore, to begin finding means of superimposing borrowed, partial knowings from ‘othered’ spaces, upon our own constrained, frequently hegemonic sense of ‘truth’. With this goal in mind, in these final stages of analysis, I will re-admit a critical, sidelined theme that Oscar Lathlin forwarded in his May 29, 1995 intervention to the Throne Speech Debate. I attend to matters contained in Lathlin’s brief reference to the Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, as a means of materialising explicit examples of often drastic contradictions that characterise relations between the Legislature (as symbolic, instrumental centre) and its necessary, subjugated sites
on the (literal or imagined) peripheries. These inequitable relations make visible a contact zone palimpsest that is traceable beyond the 'elite' realm, colouring both spectacular and everyday relations between the majority non-Native population and a racialized First Nations minority.

Mapping laterally out from textual references, I visit sites (and sights) of a dramatic racialized 'justice' buried beneath the detritus of political talk. I use the two stages of my composite political moment to group two vertical readings. Both readings maintain the Legislature as interpretive focal point. First I concentrate on spaces occluded by the May debate, and in this manner connect the Legislature to some of Manitoba's "other spaces." Included here are glimpses of Manitoba's contemporary carceral spaces. I subsequently perform a similar analysis on the November 1st event of Lathlin's eviction, in section four. There I force political forgetting into painful remembrance of a violent event that occurred in The Pas in 1971, and which was revisited sixteen years later by an inquiry into apparent systemic racism in Manitoba's justice system. Finally, in a summary 'placescript' I return to the matter of Louise Dacquay's ruling. I superimpose the abjected space of South Africa onto the imagined community of Manitoba: a place that would be purified of its complicity in North American modes of racist practice. The places of discipline--and the disciplines latent in the production of racialized places and identities--lend tangible meaning to Soja's conviction, which I share: namely that space perhaps more than time "hides the consequences" from us (1989, 1)

The Legislature: May, 1995

On May 30 Honourable Member Lathlin rose on a Matter of Privilege, ultimately moving that the member for Tuxedo (Mr. Filmon) be asked to withdraw and apologise for comments concerning himself (Lathlin) made the day previous. In the context of this Matter of Privilege, Lathlin restates the major points from his Throne Speech Debate critique. He offers these statements in order to substantiate the allegedly 'unparliamentary' claims he made regarding racism in the government's policies and
attitude toward Aboriginal people. One of the themes he reiterates concerns the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry:

I said last evening that I could go on and on. I mentioned the AJI—293 recommendations, 101 of which do not need federal government authority. One hundred and one recommendations of the AJI are strictly provincial. The provincial government could have gone ahead and implemented some, if not all, of the 101 recommendations in the AJI.

(233)

Lathlin also refers to the AJI when he describes the role he took as Chief of The Pas Band, when the Inquiry hearings were being held in The Town of the Pas (October, 1988) and on The Pas Reserve (January, 1989). In his rebuttal, however, the Premier chooses to focus almost exclusively on defending a broad range of government cutbacks critiqued by Lathlin.15 He also completely disregards references to the AJI's 101 provincial recommendations, and closes with assertions about his government's strong track record in working "with the people of the North, with people of all backgrounds" (235). What 'real' sites are effectively subsumed by this discursive sidelining of the AJI?


Its recommendations published in 1991,16 the mandate of the landmark Inquiry had been "to examine the relationship between Aboriginal people and the justice system, and to suggest ways it might be improved" (Province of Manitoba 1991a, 2). The Commission established a number of juridically unorthodox, informal methodologies, which enabled them to effectively gather First Nations communities' perceptions regarding the justice system and its dealings with Aboriginal people. A significant feature of their approach was their commitment to hearing directly from Aboriginal people. This commitment led the Inquiry to visit over 36 Aboriginal communities, approximately 20 of which were accessible only by winter roads and air travel (5). In addition, they held hearings in seven other (majority non-Native)
Manitoba communities, including extensive hearings in the City of Winnipeg, and in five provincial correctional institutions (5). Appendix III of the Commissioners' report lists hearing dates and locations, including places like Cross Lake, Grand Rapids, Norway House, Brochet-Barren Lands, Lac Brochet-North Lands, Pukatawagan, The Town of The Pas, The Pas Reserve, Shamattawa, Tadoule Lake and Stony Mountain Institution (1991a, 765-767). The authorisation of these spaces in the essentially epistemological work of the Inquiry is important. The Inquiry created an institutional space for a critical process of oppositional, situated knowledge production. At the community hearings alone the Commissioners heard presentations from approximately 1,000 people.

The collective knowledge of these subjugated lived spaces reflects highly inequitable raced social relations in the province, relations which are frequently obscured in dominant political narratives. The AJI hearing testimonies and submissions, coupled with statistical analyses commissioned by the Inquiry, evoke a "law of the land" dramatic in its systemic racism. For example, in 1989 the Manitoba Department of Justice told the Inquiry that 47% of the Headingley jail population was Aboriginal, while at the Portage jail for women 67% of all admissions were women of Aboriginal descent (1991a, 10). In fact, that same year 55% of the total provincial jail population was Aboriginal (10). An overview of the federal picture was provided by the superintendent of Stony Mountain federal penitentiary. There the percentage of Aboriginal inmates had climbed from 22% and 33% in 1965 and 1984, respectively, up to an even 40% in 1989 (9-10). In fact, by 1989 the Aboriginal population of all provincial correctional institutions was at 57%, while the combined Aboriginal population of both federal and provincial institutions was 56% (101). In 1991 Aboriginal people represented only 11.8% of the residents of Manitoba (8).17 Commissioners Hamilton and Sinclair summarize: "Aboriginal people, depending on their age and sex, are present in the jails up to five times more than their presence in the general population. Moreover, 'the full extent of the problem is not known because
statistics underestimate the extent of Aboriginal representation in the ... correctional system" (1991a, 102 notes omitted).

There exist radical, yet forcibly suppressed contradictions within the EuroCanadian view of the equalising 'scales of justice'. Grand Chief David Courchene speaks to the Aboriginal perspective:

[T]he overwhelming evidence coming before you from our people is that the fairness and equity of the Canadian justice system do not apply to us. In relation to Canadian First Nations, the system is profoundly unbalanced. More often than not, we do not experience, nor do we see, justice being done; nor do our families and neighbours; nor did our parents and grandparents. This Inquiry cannot fail to note, like a sinew, or thread, linking the testimony of our people, not so much anger as profound disillusion; a hardening, a depending, and increasing, loss of respect for the Canadian justice system. (1991a, 12)

Significantly, when Oscar Lathlin speaks in May of 1995 to the legitimacy of his use of the term 'racist' to describe such systemic inequities, Mr. Filmon fails to address matters related to Manitoba's Justice System. He evades accountability for his own government's withholding of attention, and withholding of energies from action geared toward gradual redress of these issues.

If a sinew links the testimonies of Aboriginal people--disillusioned and many even brutalised by the justice system--lines of power link the heterotopic site of the Legislature to Manitoba's carceral spaces, and to multiple other sites, including First Nations communities where the injustices of systemic racism have been experienced first hand. By bringing the spaces of the AJI back into political coherence, we are able to partially comprehend a web connecting the provincial political centre (and the southern, urban centre of Winnipeg) to sites all over the province, a great many of them the northern communities adversely affected (and even forcibly relocated) by the reach of the powers of the Hydro Act discussed earlier. Going one step further, if we
spatialize and link the sites from which the elite speakers speak, it is revealing to note, as did Oscar Lathlin (May 30, 1995, 234), that Premier Filmon is the member for Tuxedo. Known as one of the most affluent Winnipeg neighbourhoods, the residents of Tuxedo are (modestly) reported to have median household incomes of $40,000 "and over" (Manitoba Bureau of Statistics 1990, 23). The Deputy Premier, Jim Ernst, represents Tuxedo's neighbour to the west, the constituency of Charleswood. Charleswood also reports median earnings in the $40,000 and up bracket. Compare these numbers (themselves products of what I consider to be largely inadequate statistical work-ups18) with the median household income in Lathlin's riding of The Pas, listed between $21,000 and 26,000 (1990, 22). No income figures are available for the residents of Headingley jail, located outside Winnipeg's perimeter highway, about fifteen minutes west of Charleswood on the Trans Canada highway. Thus mapped, lines of contact between the space(s) of elite speech; the representational orderings of the Legislative site; and othered spaces produced in part through material, embodied disciplinary practices, begin to evidence their asymmetrical economies. Thus mapped, gaps between diverse provincial sites and their different kinds of 'citizens' shrink. Formerly 'legitimate' identity enclosures (i.e., 'citizen' vs. 'criminal') leak signs of their politically-willed separations, and their dependence upon a racist episteme.

Before leaving the May debates there is a final link to be made, again related to places of discipline and to the social production of 'inside' and 'outside' spaces. While Lathlin's language is under trial by parliamentary process, and while issues of racism in Manitoba's justice system are consistently sidelined, in May of 1995 construction began on a $400,000, 4.7 metre high fence around the Agassiz Youth Centre in Winnipeg. Justice Minister Rosemary Vodrey told The Winnipeg Free Press that "she [was] sending wayward youths a message by erecting the fence as part of the boot-camp initiatives announced the year previous" (Quattrin, May 31, 1995, B4).19 She states: "The message is: It's not a hotel, it's not a holiday." Vodrey notes that the
fence will cost $200,000, while another $200,000 will cover landscaping and additional security measures which she refused to describe (B4).

Critics of Vodrey's project maintain that politics—not protection of the public—is the reason taxpayers are footing the bill for the fence around the Youth Centre. Len Kaminski, a University of Manitoba social worker, asks "How can they justify spending money on this when in the meantime the north-end YMCA, which has proactive and positive programs, is being allowed to close?" (in Quattrin 1995). On May 31 a coalition of church and Aboriginal groups held a news conference at the steps of the Legislative Building. United Church representative on the Interfaith Committee on Youth Justice, Bev Ward, shares her interpretation of the government's decision: "The message is that we'll just push you away....It's my understanding that that's why they're there--[youth have] already been pushed away." Indeed, growing fears about inner-city gangs and gang violence have been politically mobilised in the 1990s to galvanise the Manitoba public's attitudes around youth justice issues, and reactionary 'get tough' approaches. In his insightful discussion of race and urban location, David Goldberg observes that the localisation of crime serves a double end: "It magnifies the image of racialized criminality, and it confines the overwhelming proportion of crimes involving the racially marginalised to racially marginal space" (1993, 197). At the extreme end of this process is the real and symbolic disciplining of society's 'enemies' in carceral spaces, including the high-walled space of Manitoba's Agassiz Centre.

According to the AJI, while adult Aboriginal people are grossly over-represented in the adult justice system, even higher proportions of young Aboriginal people are in the youth justice system.20 As of October 1, 1990, "Aboriginal youth accounted for 64% of the inmates at the Manitoba Youth Centre and 78% of the inmates of the Agassiz Youth Centre" (1991a, 549). Bail and Pretrial Detention figures paint a more detailed picture of a highly raced and gendered 'justice':

Only 16% of non-Aboriginal youth spent more than 28 days in custody.

For Aboriginal youth this figure was more than double: 34% of Aboriginal
youth spend more than 28 days in pretrial detention. It is shocking to learn that more than 90% of female young offenders held on remand were Aboriginal. Half of the male young offenders held on remand were Aboriginal. (1991a, 561)

My discussion of youth justice here remains admittedly no more than cursory. I am concerned with the (uneven at best, abusive at worst) relations between marginal spaces with little or no audible voice and selective visibility (as functional spectacle), and the dominant political site which generates representations of its ('our') 'enemies'. Issues of youth justice and its related/productive spatial practices must be considered with an appreciation of the role that 'place' plays in fashioning identity, in this case in the production of marginalised identities (Goldberg 1993, 186). Moreover, the concealments of 'time' and the productions of 'space' prove themselves to be never really divisible. The spatial-material transformation of a people's youth into a community's (or a nation's) 'internal enemies' constitutes a measurable geography of violence, as well as an ongoing historical theft of that people's self-determined future. Unfree spaces behind high fences emerge as critical ontological counter-sites for a dominant society that needs to expel (to abjectify) whatever 'bullshit' it finds threatening to its race, gender and class-privileged order.

4. superimposing de-linked sites II

We find, Madam Speaker, every so often an inventive new creation, and when some of those inventive new creations come along, it is necessary to provide for their limited or excluded use in this Chamber as the case may be....

--Deputy Premier Jim Ernst, November 1, 1995

The Legislature: November, 1995

According to Goldberg spatial constraints "are limitations on the people inhabiting that space. These delimitations extend discipline over inhabitants and visitors by monitoring them without having to bother about the intraspatial disciplinary relations between them [italics mine]" (1993, 197). In Manitoba, only when crises
ensue does the matter (and the reordering, reinscription) of these raced relations receive (usually negative) attention. Now moving to re-read November of 1995, I will map some final linkages between Legislative discourse and some of the lived spaces forcibly concealed by its omissions and excisions. The task at hand remains the same: to bother a great deal about the intraspatial disciplinary relations between these asymmetrically powered sites.

On November 1 the Speaker of the House excised the word "racist" from parliamentary vocabulary. Recall that exceptions to this rule permit the word's usage "when members are speaking of governments and parties outside [italics mine] of this province" (4447). Two interpretations can be inferred, both highly problematic. Either racism actually exists only outside Manitoba's borders, or, it can only be named when it occurs outside Manitoba's borders. Recall, as well, that MLA Lathlin's refusal to withdraw the words complained of led to his expulsion from the House for the remainder of that sitting day.

Concurrent with the Legislative language crisis, 800 kilometres to the north Justine Osbome of Norway House First Nation (in the electoral division of The Pas), accompanied by members of a women's wellness circle, prepared for an 800 kilometre March for Justice which would begin on November 13, and culminate weeks later on the steps of the Legislative Building in Winnipeg. The five-day march was in protest of the upcoming full parole of Dwayne Archie Johnston (on November 17, 1995). Johnston (a white man) was found guilty of manslaughter in the 1971 death of Helen Betty Osbome, Justine's eldest daughter. Johnston was sentenced in 1987 to ten years in jail, sixteen years after the crime was committed.

The December issue of Windspeaker describes an emotional scene at the legislature on November 17, where about 200 supporters joined the 70-year-old Osbome. "[S]upported on both sides by her children and fellow marchers, [Osbome] broke down and cried while addressing the crowd. People, some weeping openly, stood in respect while she composed herself" ("March held to keep killer behind bars,"
1995, 32). The marchers urged the government to use its influence to convince the parole board to deny Johnston an early release. However, a spokesperson for the National Parole Board explained to *Windspeaker* correspondent Michael Smith that intervener status is not usually granted at hearings: "we have to put aside those kinds of emotional considerations and deal strictly with the likelihood of somebody committing a new offence" (32).

Smith goes on to report that Manitoba’s Justice Minister, Rosemary Vodrey, did indeed write to the parole board on October 23 in support of Osborne's petition. In fact, Deputy Minister Jim Ernst goes on record claiming that the government and the people of Manitoba supported Osborne's group in their desire to see justice done in this case (Smith 1995, 32). On the other hand, Grand Chief of the Manitoba Keewatinowi Okimakanak George Muswaggon tells *Windspeaker* that attention must be brought to the broader context from which Justine Osborne spoke. He calls for the province to take action to reform the justice system as it relates to Aboriginal people. He decries the province’s apparent unwillingness to make the sweeping changes called for in the long-shelved *Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry*. After all, the Osborne murder was one of two wrongful Aboriginal deaths that had catalysed the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry in the first place.23

**The Pas, MB: November, 1971**

Early in the morning of a cold November 13, 1971, Helen Betty Osborne was abducted and brutally murdered near The Pas Manitoba. Originally from Norway House Indian Reserve, she had been attending high school in The Town of The Pas. She was 19 years old when she was killed.

While walking along Third Street in The Pas in the early hours of that Saturday morning, Osborne was accosted by four men looking for an Indian girl to 'party' with (1991b, 98). The men were Dwayne Archie Johnston, James Houghton, Lee Colgan and Norman Manger. Betty Osborne was in no way willing to comply, yet she was forced into their car, assaulted, and taken to a cabin at Clearwater Lake. The details of
the violence that followed are difficult to recount, yet respect for the sufferings Helen Betty underwent warrant it:

At the cabin she was pulled from the car and beaten by Johnston while the others stood watching and drinking wine they had stolen earlier. Osborne continued to struggle and scream and, because her assailants were afraid they might be heard, she was forced back into the car and driven further from town to a pump house next to the lake. At least some of her clothing was removed by her assailants in the car. At the pump house she was once more taken from the car by one or more of her assailants and the beatings continued. Her clothes, those which had not been removed earlier, were taken from her. Wearing only her winter boots, she was viciously beaten, and stabbed, apparently with a screwdriver, more than 50 times. Her face was smashed beyond recognition. The evidence suggests that two people then dragged her body into the bush. Her clothes were hidden. The four men left, returned to The Pas and went their separate ways. (1991b, 2)

Months later officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police determined that four young white men were involved in the death. Yet it was not until December of 1987, more than 16 years later, that Johnston was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. James Houghton was eventually acquitted, Lee Colgan received immunity for testifying against Houghton and Johnston, while Norman Manger was never charged.

In their introduction to the report regarding the death of Betty Osborne, Commissioners Hamilton and Sinclair indicate that their mandate as a judicial inquiry had entitled them to hear evidence that criminal proceedings are typically precluded from hearing (1991b, 4). Their tasks included scrutiny of details surrounding the murder, the investigation, the crown and defence lawyers, and the jury. I turn very briefly now to key observations they make about the role of racism (historic and
contemporary) in the murder itself, and to some of their comments on the place of racism as an ingrained dynamic of the place where the brutal event occurred.

Betty was the eldest of 12 children, born in the remote Cree community of Norway House, on the northern end of Lake Winnipeg. Because she wanted to become a teacher, the lack of educational opportunities on reserve obliged her to leave Norway House after grade eight. Here we see the legacy of historical racism, embedded in policies and practices of the Indian Act, and lived by First Nations people. The fact is that in Manitoba in 1971 even the smallest communities--Aboriginal communities excepted--had their own schools. Yet, in 1971 the federal government still maintained a policy of moving Aboriginal children to larger, non-Native, communities to be educated (92). Therefore, in 1969 at the age of 17 Betty Osborne left her community and went to the Guy Hill Residential school situated at Clearwater Lake. Located 29 kilometres from the town of The Pas, Guy Hill was run by the Roman Catholic Church. (While the students were all Native, none of the teachers were.) Two years later, in September of 1971 Osborne moved into The Pas to attend high school. The Department of Indian Affairs arranged room and board for her in the home of William and Patricia Benson in their home on Lathlin Avenue. Testimony from fellow students and friends at the Inquiry suggested that her "relationship with the white community of The Pas was distant and typical of that of most Aboriginal people, even those who had spent all their lives there" (7).

The area Betty Osborne moved to in 1971 had historically been a gathering place for Aboriginal people. Prior to the arrival of Europeans, the area around The Pas had been continuously inhabited by First Nations for at least 5,000 years (6). The name of the region reflects its Aboriginal history as well as its geography. The Pas is thought to have derived from the Cree word W'passkwayaw, meaning "like a wooded narrows" (6). By 1971, however, the Aboriginal population was contained in The Pas Indian Reserve, consisting of 17 parcels of land in and around the site of the (primarily non-Aboriginal) town of The Pas.25 The Saskatchewan River separates the town of
The Pas from the Indian Reserve, yet as the AJI reports, separations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities were more than geographical in 1971. The community was divided along colour lines, with few Aboriginal people being employed in the town. "It is easy to conclude that the town of The Pas deliberately had excluded Aboriginal people from its midst, yet it depended on them as customers and consumers" (7).

Perhaps more readily evident than the lack of communication between these groups, split as they were by racialized living spaces and a general sense of mutual estrangement, were racialized micro-spatial practices: "at the movie theatre, each group sat on its own side; in at least one of the bars, Indians were not allowed to sit in certain areas; and in the school lunch-room, the two groups, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, ate apart" (7). Annaliese Dumas, a friend of Osborne's who testified at the Inquiry, indicated that even with the families where Aboriginal students were boarded (the intent being to give them a home environment) there was separation: "It was a rule for us, I guess, not to be anywhere other than our bedroom and the kitchen..." (7).

Hamilton and Sinclair argue that racism is a behaviour which is determined by considerations based on race. The separateness they observe as normative in The Pas of 1971 (and the attitudes that the Report maintains still exist today to a considerable extent) should be considered racism. "Sometimes this racism is not overt but is, rather, ingrained in the subconscious or in the patterns of behaviour of the community, beyond the awareness of those who practice it" (7). To further substantiate their claims they discuss the general atmosphere of prejudice and bigotry against Aboriginal people prevailing at the time of the murder. Apparently accepted practices included the overt: sexual harassment of Aboriginal women by non-Aboriginal men, seemingly with impunity; assaults of Aboriginal by non-Aboriginal males; and gang fights between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal men attributed to racial hatred (90). Setting events within this context of racist and sexist violations and violence, the Report is unequivocal in its insistence on the place of gendered racism in
the death of Betty Osborne. They are convinced that her murder was a racist and sexist act (52):

It is clear that Betty Osborne would not have been killed if she had not been Aboriginal. The four men who took her to her death from the streets of The Pas that night had gone looking for an Aboriginal girl with whom to "party." They found Betty Osborne. When she refused to party she was driven out of town and murdered. Those who abducted her showed a total lack of regard for her person or her rights as an individual. Those who stood by while the physical assault took place, while sexual advances were made and while she was being beaten to death showed their own racism, sexism and indifference. Those who knew the story and remained silent must share their guilt. (98)

The question of silence remains a 'curious' issue for the Inquiry's Commissioners. The Report asks, why was there no outcry from the general population to bring the four perpetrators to justice? (96). Chief of The Pas Band, Oscar Lathlin, felt that Betty Osborne's status as an outsider contributed to the community's silence (96). Rebecca Ross, friend of Osborne, wondered if gender played a role, not only in the silence of the white community, but also in the silence of her own people (52). The opinion of the Inquiry is that "the separation of the two communities in The Pas had a negative effect on the investigation" (96). They suggest that the separation fed a lack of concern, even indifference, for the Aboriginal peoples on the part of the non-Native community in town (96).

**Manitoba and South Africa: a transnational superimposition**

The Pas of 1971 and the racist violences which occurred in that time and location are both specific and yet, they are not exceptional. The Pas cannot be analysed in isolation, mired as it is in several hundred years of postcolonial contacts, conquests, nation- and community-building practices. The question must be asked again: how, within this broader national and international historical context, can the
rest of Manitoba (or the rest of the nation, for that matter) consider itself exempt from
the racist inflections of post-imperial, postcolonial history? More to my point, how is it
that the elites of Manitoba's Legislature can be so sure that their House, and their
province, are in no way connected to the realities which the AJI so carefully
documents?

It would seem that a radical, forced psychic split is required for this extreme
distancing. The complex discursive managements I have been discussing--spatial,
verbal, textual, epistemological, ontological--blur and combine to secure such
fractures. For surely the MLAs in May of 1995 did not fail to hear Oscar Lathlin
introduce into the House some of Manitoba's 'other spaces' when he addressed the
Honourable members. From the outset he brought greetings "from the good people of
the riding of The Pas, the town of The Pas, Opaskwayak Cree Nation, Grand Rapids,
Easterville, Moose Lake, Cross Lake, Norway House, Cormorant and Wanless" (May
29, 1995, 212). Would it be going too far to suggest that Lathlin's silencing through
parliamentary law, and the eviction of the concept 'racist' from any possible, or any
authoritative political worldview in Manitoba, served to silence yet again a long-dead
Cree girl? How can her death and her relatively short life achieve even partial
coherence and dignity within the EuroCanadian mainstream, constricted as
hegemonic thinking is by such a violently racialized grammar?

Goldberg's contemplations on racialized space bear considerable relevance to
my interest in Manitoba, both past and present: "It is not just that the limits of our
language limit our thoughts; the world we find ourselves in is one we have helped to
create, and this places constraints upon how we think the world anew" (1993, 204). In
other words, existing conditions made a complicit silence possible in The Pas of
almost thirty years ago. While explanations exist (for example, the case of potential
informants fearing harm if they spoke out), the complicity of those who remained silent
after the murder of Betty Osborne, or of those who did not cry out for justice in her
name, can be argued both in terms of intentional action/inaction, and in terms of
ignorance lived within varying degrees of un/consciousness.

I believe that this observation can be extended to the present, to decode the reactions of racially dominant persons who are faced with minority perspectives that name both 'everyday' (Essed 1991) and systemic racism. Many times I have heard EuroCanadian enthusiase about the fairness of Canadian society, particularly in comparison with the United States where 'we' view racism to be commonplace. In the November ruling of "unparliamentary language" there is the stunning example of a transnational eviction of racism. So epistemically naturalised is Africanism, that Louise Dacquay (un/self consciously) deploys its familiar symbolism in order to purify the heterotopic site of the Legislature. She offers South Africa as the definitive example of a place Manitobans can trust for confirmation of the existence of racism, and at the same time feel secure that the distant nation will promise to rigidly contain it. The essentially backward nature of the dark continent explains away South Africa's 'rare' and 'extreme' case of white on black racism. In this manner, white racism can be coded as something attributable to the degenerate effects of a highly racialized, thus anachronized, space.26 And because heterotopic logic postulates all other sites as a function of the heterotopia itself, the maintenance of an essential purity in the parliamentary language of the House can be thought to purge and to protect the grammatic whole of the body politic.

Nevertheless, Kristeva's notion of "abjection" (discussed in section two, above) conceptualises how the subject is never entirely free of the expelled abject. That which is repudiated "haunts the subject as its inner constitutive boundary" and forms "the self's internal limit" (McClintock 1995, 71). In Racist Culture Goldberg does a revealing assessment of such "inner constitutive boundaries" in their material, spatial forms (1993). In his words, he examines "the institutional implications of racialized discourse and racist expression for the spatial location and consequent marginalization of groups of people constituted as races" (1993, 187). The basic premise of Goldberg's argument in "Polluting the Body Politic": Race and Urban
The category of space is discursively produced and ordered. Just as spatial distinctions like 'West' and 'East' are racialized in their conception and application, so racial categories have been variously spatialized more or less since their inception into continental divides, national localities, and geographic regions. Racisms become institutionally normalised in and through spatial configuration, just as social space is made to seem natural, a given, by being conceived and defined in racial terms. Thus, at the limit, apartheid space--so abnormal and seemingly unnatural--will be shown to be the logical implication of racialized space throughout the legacy, colonial and postcolonial, of the West's hidden hand (of Reason). (185)

While I do not place Manitoba "at the limit," my analysis up to this point does strongly suggest a difference in degree and method, rather than one in kind, between the 'bantustans' of South Africa and the reserve system as lived in Manitoba; between the gated white communities of Johannesburg, and the lush green lawns of neighbourhoods such as Tuxedo, or of the upper middle class, suburban 'lifestyle communities' like Winnipeg's Linden Woods.

Troubling for the hegemonic subject is the very real, very material haunting of the expelled abject in the very orderings of our own lived spaces. Likewise disordering are oppositional political-narrative impositions and superimpositions that link purposely de-linked sites. In 1995 few Canadian politicians would fail to remember the high profile statements made by Black South African Archbishop, Desmond Tutu, in the interest of Canadian First Nations rights. Tutu made headlines across Canada in the summer of 1990 when he visited an Ojibwa reserve and wrote a letter to Prime Minister Mulroney calling for action (Globe and Mail "Tutu to take up native problems with Mulroney," 15 August, A4; Globe and Mail "Tutu upholds native struggle," 13 August, A7). First Nations leaders in Canada and activists from Black
South Africa have a growing history of collaboration, based on sharing and comparing strategies related to land claims and self-government issues. In March of 1996 Canadian chiefs, including representatives from Manitoba, visited South Africa (Winnipeg Free Press "Solidarity from the struggles," 14 February, A7). In April of that year, Phil Fontaine (former Grand Chief for the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, and current National Chief for the Assembly of First Nations) was profiled in The Globe and Mail, discussing elements of the dismantling of apartheid, as a model for Canadian Natives ("South African power shifts," 2 April, A14). These political connections offer only a few of the "lateral mappings" (to recall Soja's term) by which one can glimpse a transnational network of linked sites, which are not necessarily reducible ('equal') to one another, but by all means inter-relate in meaningful ways. Their inter-relations become more clear when we attend to the consequences (identity-deep investments) which hegemonic spatial technologies too effectively can obscure.

Indeed, here we have come full circle, back to the question I posed at the outset of this section. Who actually comes into contact with whom in Manitoba? While the epistemic, social and cultural chasms that divide us may be great, the resistant oppositional voices of contemporary political arenas (mainstream and otherwise, imagined as geographic, cultural or socioeconomic) make resolute ignorance or outright denial of First Nations people's concerns--particularly by a non-Native political elite--a complicitous act of aggression. And taking into account the ways in which Manitoba still is a society where few non-Aboriginal people have the opportunity to learn from their fellow citizens of Aboriginal background, how will the excision of the word 'racism' from official public political talk remedy these gaps in our knowing of one another? Quite clearly, it will not. Echoing Goldberg, the enforced limits of political language limit our thoughts and political action. Unless we protest the silencing, the world we find ourselves in is one we have helped to create, and this places constraints upon how we think the world, ourselves, and each other, anew.
Conclusion

The analysis of social relations in this chapter emphasized the perspective of spatial practices (material-discursive relations), while recognizing their practical irreducibility from a dynamic trialectic (including spatial representations, and space as lived/embodied phenomenon). Focussing on the spatial nature of the Legislative site I have posed a simple question: what does this place already mean, even before anyone has spoken in it? In exploring key heterotopic relations between the Legislature and some of its 'outsided' spaces, I have attempted to further demonstrate the materiality of racialized relations which are effectively dematerialised in much coded political "text and talk" (van Dijk 1993). Most important, by choosing to address the problem of racism's 'unspeakability' within a framework of critical geography, I have been able to investigate ways in which 'material-discursive' relations support (and are in themselves) the constitution and consolidation of conditions that remain critical to the imagining--and to the living--of dominant EuroCanadian mythologies.

By working up sketches of some of Manitoba's "other spaces" I have sought to explore the provincial phenomenon of asymmetrically positioned, radically incompatible sites: the material-discursive web of relations linking the heterotopic Legislature and heterogeneous zones of lived citizenship. Embedded in text and talk, spatial relations evidence practices of eviction. These practices enable the making of the nation and its citizenship of white race-based privilege. Spatial relations in Manitoba frequently serve to erase and to obscure racist violence, and First Nations' experiences of that violence, sustaining epistemic conditions that impact upon the capacity of Aboriginal people to gain mainstream political support for resistance and equitable social change.
Notes to Chapter Four

1 I understand Goldberg’s use of the uncommon term ‘periphrastic’ to designate spaces that are, by design, ‘peripheral’. To illustrate, for Goldberg the “idea of project housing is in principle periphrastic for it contrasts sharply with the prevailing norm and surrounding practice of housing throughout the extension of ‘the West’. This norm and the practices it generates are best characterized as possessive individualist home ownership” (1993, 198-99).

2 See Chapter One for my discussion of Said’s, and my own, “contrapuntal” reading practice.

3 In 1870 when Manitoba entered Confederation Aboriginal people who were living within the boundaries of the “postage stamp province” had the right to vote if they were ‘householders’, meaning ‘master or chief of a household’ (Province of Manitoba 1991, 78). The historical review provided in the AJI Report (1991a) tells us that following the 1885 uprising in what is now Saskatchewan, Prime Minister MacDonald passed the federal franchise law of 1885, disqualifying “Indians in Manitoba, British Columbia, Keewatin and the North-West Territories, and any Indian on any reserve elsewhere in Canada who is not in possession and occupation of a separate and distinct tract of land in such reserve, and whose improvements on such separate tract are not of the value of at least one hundred and fifty dollars...” (1991a, 78 notes omitted). Following suit, “in 1886 the Manitoba government revised its Election Act to disqualify Indians or persons of Indian blood receiving an annuity from the Crown” (78). In 1931 those Aboriginals who had served in British or Canadian armed forces (or in the forces of a British ally during the Great War) were once again awarded the vote. It was only in 1952 when Manitoba returned the (provincial) franchise to all Aboriginal people in the province.

4 See Chapter Three, section four, for a brief description of this statue. For a detailed discussion of the elaborate architecture, statuary and murals of the building refer to Baker (1986).

5 For background and discussion regarding the formation of a ‘prairie’ regional identity, I recommend Gerald Friesen’s essay in River Road, “The Prairies as Region: The Contemporary Meaning of an Old Idea” (1996, 165-182).

6 The opening ceremonies of the 35th Legislature occurred on May 23, 1995. Hansard records the proceedings, excerpts of which I reproduce here:

The Mace then made obeisance before the Lieutenant-Governor and preceded His Honour along the east side of the Chamber to the bar of the House, accompanied by the Premier and the aides. (1)

The civil aide advanced from the position he had taken on the west side of the Chamber and, after the usual obeisance on each step, handed the Lieutenant Governor the Speech from the Throne. The civil aide then retired, step by step, backwards and took up his position on the west side of the Chamber. (3)

The following figures accompanied His Honour (the Governor General, Queen’s Representative), in procession from the reception room to the Legislative Chamber:

The civil aide on the right;
the military aide on the left;
the officer escort;
the members of the Executive Council;
the Premier; and then
the Lieutenant Governor. (1)
Premier Filmon closes his May 29 speech in glowing terms:

We believe that we will create a Manitoba in which people can feel safe in their homes, in their neighbourhoods, in their communities, on their school grounds. We believe that we will continue to have a high quality and accessible health care system that is fair to all who need it....[The balanced budget] will allow us to provide all the services that people depend upon and indeed the kind of healthy economy that they are looking for. Madam Speaker, I ask all members of the Legislature to join with me and my colleagues in supporting this throne speech. It is the way for the future [italics mine]. It is the positive, optimistic outlook that we believe is necessary and important to the future of Manitoba. (May 29, 1995, 229).

Recall Baker's description of the Legislative Building as a "rallying point" for prairie citizens, and as a social, cultural and aesthetic ideal to which they might aspire (cited in my Chapter Two, from Baker 1986, 7).

Manitoba Hydro's own website reports that about 99 per cent of the electricity generated in Manitoba is from self-renewing water energy" (1999). In the early 1960s Manitoba Hydro's power planners directed their attention [from the Winnipeg River] northwards to the Saskatchewan River and completed Grand Rapids Generating Station in 1968. But the principal interest lay in the tremendous potential of the Nelson River's water system further north. Kelsey, the first generating station on the Nelson River, was built in 1960 to supply the International Nickel company's mining and smelting operations in Thompson. It was Kettle Generating Station, completed in 1974, that was the start of major plans to harness the Nelson for the growing electricity needs. Since that time, three more generating stations—Jenpeg, Long Spruce, and Limestone—have been added to Manitoba Hydro's power system. (1999)

Soja writes: "Discourses on the sociality and historicality of human life continued to acknowledge that social and political processes took place in cities, but this was seen as an unavoidable coincidence rather than a consequential relation or determination" (Soja 1996, 236).

'Land' is defined by the Act (Article 2.e) as "real property of whatsoever nature or kind and included tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances, leaseholds, and any estate, term, easement, right or interest in, to, over, under or affecting land, including rights-of-way, and waters, water rights, water powers, and water privileges..." (1970, 1).

Article 57 ("Offences and penalties") states:

Every person who violates any provision of this Act, or who neglects or refuses to comply with any order, regulation, or direction of the board, is guilty of an offence and is liable, on summary conviction, where a penalty is not otherwise provided herein, if a person, to a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, and in default of payment of the fine, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or if a corporation, to a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars. (1970, 29)

The Canadian Electricity Association reports that in 1995 "provincial electric utilities owned about 83 percent of Canada's total installed generating capacity and produced about 79 percent of total generated electricity" (1995). Canada is the world's fifth largest producer of hydro electricity, with a net revenue in 1997 of $1,163,401,000 (Canadian Electricity Association 1999). Manitoba Hydro is the fourth largest electrical utility in Canada (Manitoba Hydro 1999).

I quote here from Baker (1986, 108) a translation of the Latin inscription, 'Si quid patrimini propter Justitian beati', which appears emblazoned on the mural panel located above the the Speaker's chair in the House.
Premier Filmon went to some length to clarify the nature of the cuts, stating that while funding was withdrawn from the three Aboriginal organizations to which Lathlin refers (Manitoba Keewatinowi Okimakanak [MKO, an umbrella organization for twenty-six First Nations in the Northern Manitoba], the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs and the Indian and Metis Friendship Centres), funding was in fact withdrawn from more than fifty Manitoba agencies and organizations, all primarily advocacy organizations. Moreover, Filmon contended that it was a broad-based policy decision of his government to remove funding from all primarily advocacy organizations (May 30, 1995, 235). His rebuttal categorically de-links policy pragmatics and material implications of funding cuts, from a typically (and strategically) abstract conceptualization of racism. The Premier insists: "It was not racist, but it was in fact fiscal policy of the government of Manitoba....There were reductions in funding throughout government, not a racist policy, not a discriminatory policy" (235). Ironically, it would be inaccurate to analyse these cuts without an integrative or interlocking race analysis, for indeed, a variety of marginalized groups lost out when the government targeted 'advocacy'. Manitoba women's groups, poverty and disability organizations—their identity politics masking multiply overlapping constituent 'categories' (including visible minority and First Nations persons)—all lost critical resources in 1995.

16 Cited in Appendix II of the AJI Report, Bill 28 is designated as "an Act to establish and validate the public inquiry into the administration of justice and Aboriginal people" (1991a, 759).

17 Compare prison statistics with welfare rates for Manitoba's Aboriginal population, rates which rank among the highest in Canada, at close to 85% for reserve residents (1991a, 9). Note as well that 63% of Status Indians in Manitoba live on reserves, which is "one of the highest proportions of on-reserve residencies in Canada" (8).

18 To my knowledge the April 1990 publication (Detailed Statistical Profiles ) remains the most recent source available, yet it relies on data collected during the 1986 Census. Furthermore, the electoral profiles incorporate a minimum of detail. The graph summarizing median household incomes for Winnipeg sets an upper category at "$40,000 and over" (Chart 6B 1990, 23), while the province-wide chart sets the upper end of the range at only "$30,000 and over" (Chart 6A 1990, 22). I suggest that this format responds in some measure to the fact that economic disparities become even more obvious in the full provincial context.

19 Compare the tone implied by the popular term 'boot camp', with that of Samyn's Free Press headline from November 2, 1995: "Speaker boots out MLA" (A4).

20 The Young Offenders Act was passed by Parliament in 1982, and came into effect in 1984. Hamilton and Sinclair write:

[despite the increased standardization that was brought about by the Act, provinces have been left with wide discretion to determine how the Act will be implemented and administered] (italics mine). Each province, including Manitoba, decides which court will hear young offenders' cases, which facilities will be designated for the purposes of providing pre-trial detention and custody, which facilities are 'open' or 'secure', which officials will perform the various duties that must be performed under the Act, and whether key programs, such as alternative measures and youth justice committees, will be established. (1991a, 556)

In a related note, it is unlikely that the extent of provincial jurisdiction over young offenders will diminish in the near future, particularly in view of proposed changes to the Act. In May of 1998 Anne McLellan, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, released the federal government's proposed strategy for youth justice 'renewal'. A key proposal includes replacing the Young Offenders Act with "a new youth criminal justice act that will put public protection first and that will command respect, foster values such as accountability and responsibility, and make it clear that criminal behaviour will lead to meaningful consequences..." (Department of Justice Canada 1999).
21 A dramatic case-in-point is currently evolving with the landmark criminal trial of dozens of alleged members of the gang known as the Manitoba Warriors. The spectacular trial will be the first test of new federal criminal conspiracy legislation. Beginning in September of 1999 at the province's costly new high-security courthouse in Winnipeg, it is expected to be one of the longest court cases in Canadian history (Samyn et al. "Is $6-M gang court Toews' only option?" 19 February 1999; Romaniuk "Warriors set to go in dock for huge trial," 7 September 1999). For the better part of a year images of the predominantly Aboriginal Warriors membership have circulated in the media (i.e., McKie "Toews builds court for gangs," 4 February 1999). Free Press Columnist Gordon Sinclair Jr. wonders why the Warriors are being targeted in lieu of the more sophisticated (and warring) gang, Quebec's Rock Machine, or the Hells Angels, or even Manitoba's Los Bravos ("Are the Manitoba Warriors province's legal patsies?" 22 February 1999). He concurs with the Warriors' defence counsel, which maintains that "the Manitoba Warriors were targeted because they're a relatively unsophisticated gang. In other words, easier pickin's [sic]" (Sinclair 1999).

22 As defined briefly in note 16 above, Manitoba Keewatinowi Okimakanak works with twenty-six member First Nations, Tribal Councils within Manitoba, and it is affiliated with the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs and the Assembly of First Nations. The MKO website includes a mission statement, indicating that the organization is an administrative body in Northern Manitoba, "setup and devised to generally maintain, strengthen, enhance, lobby for, and defend the interests and rights of those First Nation peoples within its jurisdiction" (for further information see MKO, Inc. online).

23 Coupled with the Osborne murder was the March 9, 1988 death of J.J Harper; both deaths were pivotal to the passage of the Act to establish the AJI. Harper was a member of the Wasagamack Indian Band, and served as executive director of the Island Lake Tribal Council. He was known more generally as a leader in Manitoba's Aboriginal community. Harper died from a gunshot wound caused by the firearm of Const. Robert Andrew Cross of the Winnipeg Police Department (1991b, 1). Thirty-seven years old at the time of his death, Harper was married and had three children (5).

24 Throughout this section my source for information surrounding the death of Helen Betty Osborne is Volume 2 of the AJI Report (1991b).

25 Consistent with the effects of Euro-Canadian settlement practices throughout our colonial history, to this day The Pas Band claims that it has not received its full entitlement of reserve land owed by the government as per Treaty 5, signed in 1876. Controversy still also surrounds the sale of 500 acres of reserve land in 1906, land that now makes up a major portion of the (majority non-Native) town site (Report 1991b, 6).

26 McClintock discusses a Victorian "poetics of degeneracy," which by midcentury maintained the view that certain races in certain places were seen to be "originally, naturally and inevitably degenerate. Freedom itself came to be defined as an unnatural zone for Africans" (1995, 49). Similarly, 'racism' finds its 'natural' zone in the imagined South Africa of Louise Dacquay's ruling. See also Watney (1990) for an insightful discussion of representations of AIDS: of discourses which racialize and contain the disease to a seemingly 'inevitable' African geography.

27 In July of 1996 a South African fact-finding delegation visited Manitoba to learn about aboriginal land rights. Canadian Press described the tour as the latest "in a long series of visits between Canada and South Africa involving treatment of native people" ("South African delegation visits Manitoba reserves," 4 July 1996). Allan Torbitt, an official with the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, observed an "historical irony" in that representatives of South Africa's white minority regime had come to Canada in the 1930s and 1940s. That tour was apparently intended to help them design their country's system of apartheid (Canadian Press 4 July 1996).

28 Goldberg describes how the white residents of one wealthy Johannesburg suburb "have literally walled themselves in; all access to the suburb is strictly controlled and patrolled" (1993, 194). The phenomenon of so-called 'gated communities' is gaining popularity throughout North America, but what Goldberg calls "the informalities of private preference schemes" remain the more salient factors at work in Canadian spatial (race) segregation. For example, the 'planned' or preferred 'lifestyle' community tends to physically distance itself and its occupants from the city-proper. These developments feature housing designs geared to higher income (usually white, nuclear) families, uniform landscaping with privacy walls (minus the gates), and they depend heavily upon access by car (de-emphasizing public transportation).
CHAPTER FIVE

Notes toward a critical ontology of being a Manitoban

I... feel a renewed sense of commitment to our democracy, to the parliamentary democratic system in which we live in Manitoba and across Canada.  
--Premier Filmon, May 29, 1995

On May 29, 1995, MLA Oscar Lathlin told the House he wished “to focus [his] comments on the attitude of [the] government, the First Minister (Mr. Filmon) and his government as it relates to the aboriginal people of this province” (215). Lathlin stated that he and “the aboriginal people of this province know and others know that there is contempt on the part of the Premier and his government. There is a total lack of respect for aboriginal people, and, of course, there is a total lack of understanding on the part of the First Minister and his government as far as aboriginal people are concerned” (215).

While the Opposition Member for The Pas faced charges of “unparliamentary” language in the House, Elections Manitoba was busy investigating allegations of vote tampering in the April 1995 provincial election. Even though their investigation concluded in September of 1995--citing insufficient evidence to lay charges--nearly three years later witnesses went to the press with information that (along with much pressure from the Opposition) forced the calling of a public inquiry in June 1998. For thirty-seven days between November 1998 and February 1999 Retired Justice Alfred Monnin heard testimony revolving around a vote-rigging scheme and its subsequent coverups. In March of 1999 Monnin released his 69-page report, concluding that election laws were breached, investigators stonewalled and many lies told (Kuxhaus “So many ‘liars’,” 30 March, A1). In a failed attempt to siphon votes from the New Democrats the Conservative party had funded three Aboriginal candidates to run as independents,1 in the Interlake, Swan River and Dauphin ridings.2 It was confirmed beyond doubt that one of the candidates was explicitly induced to run. Legislature Reporter David Kuxhaus quotes directly from Monnin's report: "In all my years on the
Bench I never encountered as many liars in one proceeding as I did during this inquiry" (30 March 1999).

Although appalled at the ethical void characterising Manitoba's political scene, Monnin and his report left Manitobans with no legal recourse for the contempt exhibited by so many of their high-profile public servants, political and business leaders (Russell "Monnin provides no remedy," 31 March 1999). According to the "Manitoba Elections Act" no one could have been prosecuted for breaking 1995 election laws, because the statute of limitations for the offences had already expired. Moreover, according to University of Winnipeg political scientist Allen Mills, Monnin's written report ended up "going completely against all that [he] said, which is that there was [sic] some nasty things done, unethical things done, all by people who are members of the Conservative party....But somehow the party as some kind of abstract entity gets off [italics mine]" (Kuxhaus 30 March 1999). Editorialist Frances Russell observed: "[Monnin] invited Manitobans to view the Conservative party as an innocent victim of the election buying plot" (Russell 31 March 1999).

Similarly 'forgiving' judgments were reached in August by Vancouver lawyer Leonard Doust. Doust conducted the out-of-province review of Monnin's report that was commissioned by Manitoba's Justice Department. In his 28-page report Doust concluded that "[t]he accused have already been made to suffer far worse punishment than any sentence a court would be likely to impose" (Nairne "Top Tories escape charges," 13 August 1999). In other words, even though the prosecutor felt there was a likelihood that two high-ranking Tories would be convicted of obstructing justice, he contended that it would not be in the "public interest" to make them suffer beyond the loss of their jobs and the public embarrassment they endured as a result of the Monnin Inquiry. Commenting on Doust's review, Deputy attorney general Bruce McFarlane confirmed that the Manitoba Justice Department accepted the findings and considers the case closed: "'There was no special treatment here,' [McFarlane] said. A professional judgment call was made" (Nairne 13 August 1999).
The inquiry left the provincial citizenry with many troubling questions. *Free Press* columnist Gordon Sinclair Junior wrote: "How is it possible that the premier didn't know about the scheme? How is it possible that four of his closest confidants [sic] and friends knew—as did at least three other high-ranking party members— but The Boss didn't?" ("What doesn't Filmon know, and why not?" 1 March 1999). Indeed, how was it possible for the Premier not to know, when it was Taras Sokolyk, Gary Filmon's chief of staff, who admitted to funnelling funds to induce and to support three Aboriginal candidates; when it was Sokolyk who engineered a cover-up as incriminating information began leaking out in the summer of 1998 (Kuxhaus "Tory bombshell expected," 11 January 1999; Kuxhaus and Nairme "Filmon's friends linked to scandal," 12 January 1999; Kuxhaus "Cashed cheques tied to PCs," 14 January 1999; Howard "Mapping the vortex around Gary Filmon," 15 January 1999)? And it was none other than the *highest-ranked civil servant in the province*, Secretary of the Treasury Board Julian Benson, who assisted in the vote-rigging cover-up by making an inducement cheque "disappear" (Kuxhaus "Inquiry shifts gears," 28 January 1999).4

Nearly four years after the first vote-tampering allegations surfaced, and on the eve of a critically important Tory convention, Premier Filmon finally spoke to his electorate's concerns, issuing a formal apology to Manitobans for the conduct of his party during the 1995 election campaign (Nairme "I'm sorry: Filmon," 26 February 1999). Apologies notwithstanding, powerful white men purchased marginalized First Nations 'citizens' and (in a twist on the tamed cigar store Indian of frontier days) used them as hollow political decoys. The bid by high ranking Conservatives to drain off First Nations votes emerged as a most literal—and most racist—representational ploy. A conversation with Tory campaign manager Allan Aitken, recounted to the Inquiry by Isaac Sinclair (member of the Little Saskatchewan First Nation band council), summarizes the attitude within the party: "the reserve votes were a 'lost cause' anyway" (Russell "Two worlds meet at inquiry," 18 January 1999).5
At the heart of Oscar Lathlin’s "unparliamentary" critique was a concern for the government’s "attitude" toward Aboriginal people. We recall from Chapter Three Elizabeth Cook-Lyn’s comparable call for a "shift in attitude" concerning the racist historiography of the West. The attitude of blatant cynicism revealed in the story of Manitoba’s ballot box scandal (not to mention the disturbing fact that the controversy has not reemerged as a significant election issue in the September 1999 election race) could alone be the subject of lengthy analysis. Yet in effect, the same matters of non-negotiable innocence; of a stubbornly-guarded privilege not to know; and more generally, the profound problem of racist violence inherent in the hegemonic Canadian attitude, are all features of the same local, postcolonial topography of consciousness which I have begun to map in the current project.

This thesis has sought to decode key aspects of the “law of the land” operating in contemporary Manitoban society and in its official stories. My decoding work speaks back to the decreed unspeakability of racism in Manitoba’s Legislature. The official 1995 prohibition on the use of the word “racist” in the provincial House is consistent with the amnesic context of postcolonial Canadian society and its celebrated ‘anti-racist’ nationalism. In Canada’s liberal democracy, national and imbricated personal identities are equipped to resist and to deauthorize critiques from the non-white social margins—particularly from those who would name white innocence as being the ontological project central to the production and maintenance of white privilege in this nation.

My analytical method is informed by a poststructuralist understanding of the discursively produced subject. By focussing on the terms of nationalist discourse and on the (narrative, historiographic, social, spatial, epistemic and psychic) conditions which support, and can in themselves constitute, “redemptive” fantasies (Roman 1997), I have argued that elite “text and talk” (van Dijk 1993) about the land contributes to the enforced hegemony of raced citizenship in Canada. In response to
the extremity of systemic violence experienced by First Nations peoples in Manitoba, and in the Canadian past and present; and as a challenge to the indifference with which a majority of non-Native persons currently respond to these inequitable circumstances; my analysis has given priority to the ordering of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations through and within provincial political discourse. At the same time, I have sought to deconstruct localized racist practice without isolating it from broader interlocking systems of (post)imperial/colonial oppression. Naturalised through embodied, lived ‘realities’, these are the radically uneven terms--and the everyday “war by other means”--through which the nation's citizens come to know themselves and one another, and within which Canadian citizenship encodes its ontology of critical omission.

Implications for pedagogy cut to the quick of the liberal democratic heart. Poststructuralist theorizing on identity-formation in this thesis calls into question every actual social practice we engage in, demanding new ways of reading our ‘realities’ and our selves within normalised social relations and normalised social spaces. In other words, communities need a commitment to processes that call not only for understanding the contingency of meaning and ‘truth’, but also for gaining accountability with respect to violences done to those groups who have been historically (and are in actuality) disenfranchised from sites of meaning-making power. These needs are pressing when lack of critical, ethical self-awareness emerges so blatantly in the talk of political leaders: elites who legislate discursive conditions that help frame how we elaborate and conceptualize, live and institutionalize our local, national and even global (co)existence. Nationalist epistemic paradigms include an oftentimes obdurate vision that informs how, what, and ultimately who we educate ourselves and our children to become, resolving who can and who cannot be a Canadian citizen. Partial and power-brokered ways of knowing--of imaginatively possessing the world, ourselves, and one another--need to shift dramatically, as must the embodied effects of these processes.
Grewal suggests that in the postcolonial world, what Pratt describes as "contact zones" are in fact everywhere, and are "contained in particular discursive spaces that embody and control the narratives of encounters with difference" (1996, 4). Moving beyond (or alternatively, deeper within the bodies of) Manitoba's provincial Legislature, I have come to understand colonized minds, spirits and bodies within the Canadian landscape as themselves zones of contact and obligatory identity contestation. Here my thesis comes full circle, back to the epistemic site of the personal story that my Preface began with. Personal identity--within and beyond 'logic', embodied site of memory, belief, feeling and knowing--this is the place to which theory returns, in a call to myself and to other racially dominant citizens to re-read the stories that constitute our senses of self.

In contemporary Canadian society, hegemonic hearts and identities necessarily come into direct contact with others' pain--including the sufferings associated with dominant "regimes of truth" that interweave racisms past and present. Although unfortunate, the pain of the hearer, and more critically of the listener, is necessary for reviving a dominant consciousness long-anaesthetised beyond accountability, and beyond the creative space of humility. Without losing the capacity to embrace 'being' in places and communities for which we are grateful, how can we become accountable for contingent, trauma-inducing white dependencies that continually violate others' wholeness in order to secure our own?

Describing the terms of an "ongoing unsettling process" Trinh Minh-ha yearns for theory that breathes with poiesis--with a creative capacity to make anew, to go beyond a solely negating critique. Such a practice would allow "each part of the body to become infused with consciousness [,][bringing] a new awareness of life into previously forgotten, silenced, or deadened areas of the body" (1989, 40). What might that kind of process imply for the social body of Manitoba, with its forcibly silenced voices and subjugated, marginalized spaces? What might it mean for the "imagined community" of the nation?
In “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault writes of a “critical ontology of ourselves” which I find evocative. For him, as a method it has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them [italics mine]. (1984, 50)

In the spirit of Foucault’s critical ontology, I call for further analysis of the ontological limits that we impose on others, invest in uncritically, and recognize to be imposed upon ourselves. This practice is in and of itself a pedagogy, addressed in particular to those of us in dominant bodies and subject locations, for whom the luxury of turning others’ pain on and off remains a matter of our own distinct and dishonourable privilege. 
Notes to Chapter Five

1 In 1995 Darryl Sutherland was 26 years old, living with his mother on the Peguis reserve and receiving welfare. He was given nearly five thousand dollars and a rental car to run in the Interlake. (After public disclosures by a disgruntled Tory in 1998, Sutherland came forward of his own accord, his admission spurring on the formation of the Monnin Inquiry.) Nelson Contois was induced to stand in Swan River, on record having received $294 (just under the legal limit for reporting campaign donations). His 22-year-old daughter, Carey Contois, was living at home on welfare, a single mother of two children. She sought election in the Dauphin riding, and also received a cheque for $294.

2 Free Press writer Frances Russell points out that "[o]ne seat in Manitoba elections can mean the difference between minority and majority. Three seats can be the difference between victory and defeat" ("Crucial chat just a blur," 13 January 1999).

3 Deputy attorney-general McFarlane "was unable to recall another case where someone avoided criminal charges in Manitoba because they had been embarrassed by publicity surrounding an alleged offence" (Globe and Mail "Two key Filmon aides duck vote-rigging trial," 13 August 1999, A7).

4 Prior to his 'resignation' Benson was responsible for the province's $5.8 billion budget. Kuxhaus reports that he was a member of the premier's inner circle, "serving as the point man on the privatization of [Manitoba Telephone System] and efforts to save the Winnipeg Jets" (Kuxhaus "I've paid a big price: Benson," 4 February 1999, ). Benson has not faced criminal charges (for obstructing justice), nor has he been charged for violating Election Act regulations, or for his clear violation of the Civil Service Act (Russell "Benson's advice: Don't ask," 3 February 1999; Hirst "Murky morality in power," 6 February 1999).

5 Toni Morrison's reflection in Playing in the Dark is exceedingly applicable:

   [expensively kept, economically unsound, a spurious and useless political asset in election campaigns, racism is as healthy today as it was during the Enlightenment. It seems that it has a utility far beyond economy, beyond the sequestering of classes from one another, and has assumed a metaphorical life so completely embedded in daily discourse that it is perhaps more necessary and more on display than ever before. (1992, 63).

6 Premier Filmon maintained throughout the Monnin Inquiry (which in turn supported his assertion) that he was "completely unaware" of the vote-splitting scheme (Winnipeg Free Press "98 was best, worst of times for Filmon," 4 January 1999, A4).

7 My reflections have benefitted from Razack's discussion of Trinh in "The gaze from the other side," in Looking white people in the eye (1998, 53-55).

8 With Monture's "Flint Woman" in mind (in Thunder in my soul , 1995), Lindberg comments on such (gendered and raced) privilege: "We are always Aboriginal. We are always women. We are not allowed the luxury of turning our pain on and off [italics mine]" (1997, 331).
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