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CONSTRUCTING COLONIAL Hegemony in the Somaliland Protectorate, 1941-1960

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Ph.D.
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"Constructing Colonial Hegemony in
in the Somaliland Protectorate, 1941-1960:
The Cultural Politics of Mass Education."
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is about the structure of colonial cultural hegemony in British Somaliland in the late colonial period, 1941-1960. The narrative takes 1941 as its starting point because that date marks a radical discontinuity in the activities of the British administration. In August 1940, Italy invaded and occupied Somaliland. Seven months later, the British re-conquered the territory, and began "a new historic chapter in the history of British Somaliland." The military administration ended the policy of care and maintenance that was in force in the territory in the early colonial period, and introduced a new policy of "social development, welfare services and education" under which "administration and social services (were extended) throughout the Protectorate: the old days of the coast administration based on Berbera had gone for ever."  

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2 PRO, INF 1/567/339, The Deputy Principle Information Officer, Hargeisa, to the Principle Information Officer, East African Command, 4 July 1944.

3 I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p.132. Lewis's work deals with the colonial histories of both (British) Somaliland and (Italian) Somalia. Because the two countries formed a federation in 1 July 1960 called "Somali Republic". This focus of this thesis is on Somaliland.
The policy of social and economic development was established within the framework of mass education, which linked different aspects of colonial social and economic development: formal and informal education, public health, political reform, and community development. All were considered as inseparable aspects of the "one programme of mass education." This thesis analyses that one programme of mass education. It argues that mass education played a central role in the construction and reinforcement of colonial cultural hegemony in Somaliland in the era of decolonisation.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about the structure of colonial cultural hegemony in the Somaliland Protectorate in the late colonial period, 1941-1960. The narrative takes 1941 as its starting point because that date marks a radical discontinuity in the activities of the British administration in Somaliland. In August 1940 Italy invaded and occupied Somaliland. Seven months later, the British re-conquered the territory, and began "a new historic chapter in the history of British Somaliland." The military administration ended the policy of care and maintenance that was in force in the territory in the early colonial period, and applied a new policy of "social development, welfare services and education," under which "administration and social services (were extended) throughout the Protectorate: the old days of the coast administration based on Berbera had gone for ever."

The expansion of services was established within the framework of "mass education" which linked different aspects of social and economic development: formal and informal education, public health, political reform, and community development. All were considered as

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2 PRO, INF 1/567/339, The Deputy Principle Information Officer, Hargeisa, to the Principle Information Officer, East African Command, 4 July 1944.

3 I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1988), p.132. Lewis's work deals with the colonial histories of both (British) Somaliland, and (Italian) Somalia, albeit in different sections. The two countries formed a federation in 1 July 1960 called "Somali Republic". This thesis is focused only on Somaliland.
"inseparable and mutually-supporting parts of one programme of mass education." These different policies undertaken within the framework of mass education were organized by various colonial officers besides the district commissioners: veterinarians, agronomists, soil engineers, technical experts, forestry specialists, film-makers, nurses, medical doctors, and teachers, who spearheaded the "Second Colonial Occupation" of Somaliland in the post-1941 period. These officers were responsible for the various cultural and educational institutions established within the framework of mass education: formal and informal schools, hospitals, clinics, community development projects, newspapers, radio broadcasts, film shows, community centres, and local government bodies. Through these heterogenous institutions they exercised "persuasive means, the quotidian processes of hegemony--very often creative, inventive, interesting, and above all executive."\(^6\)

Antonio Gramsci defined hegemony as moral, intellectual and political leadership based on persuasion and consent rather than on coercion.\(^7\) Institutions of coercion--the army, the police--are always in place to protect the interests of the dominant class. But in modern societies civil institutions--the media, schools, hospitals, clinics, families--play a more central role in the

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processes of social control. These institutions are used by the dominant class to elicit consent from the dominated classes through persuasion. The key role in social control is, therefore, played by cultural institutions, and not by coercive institutions. The civil institutions are essentially educational and disciplinary institutions: they diffuse the world view of the dominant class throughout the society and discipline the population. For Gramsci then there is always an intrinsic connection between knowledge and power, culture and hegemony. "Every relationship of "hegemony"," he argued, "is necessarily an educational relationship," and "every educational relationship is a political relationship." That is the key insight of Gramsci that I use in this thesis, since the colonial administration in Somaliland in the late colonial period never deviated from an ideology of instruction.

Such an ideology permeated all the civil institutions established within the framework of mass education. Their objective was to disseminate western modernity, that is, western ideas, values, and norms, and win over the cooperation and consent of the people. That objective was expressed by various colonial officers throughout the late colonial period. In 1941 Captain A. C. A Wright stated that the Somali must be taught the "habits of obedience" and inculcated with "a

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degree of social discipline" through the expansion of medical, social and judicial services.\textsuperscript{11} And in 1943 Colonel F. R. W. Jameson, the Chief of Civil Affairs of the East African Command, stated that medical, educational and other services must be expanded in Somaliland. Such services, he stated, are "as desirable from a political point of view, as from a humane one." He added, if we fail to expand such services, "we are neglecting to avail ourselves of one of the most powerful sources of popularising the Government, and identifying the administration with the people's welfare."\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Mass Education}

Mass education was formulated in the 1943 report of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, \textit{Mass Education in African Society}.\textsuperscript{13} The report defined the objectives of mass education as "(1) the improvement of the health and living conditions of the people; (2) the improvement of their well-being in the economic sphere; (3) the development of political institutions and political power until the day arrives when the people can become effectively self-governing."\textsuperscript{14} The "curriculum' of mass education" was comprehensive and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[14] Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, \textit{Mass Education}, p.4.
\end{footnotes}
interventionist. It covered economic, cultural, social, political, and even familial aspects of development, and leisure. It covered, to be more exact, the "improvement in health and agriculture and rural economics...the building up of strong units of local government, sound family and social life, and those recreational and leisure-time activities without which no people can long survive."15 Moreover, mass education addressed such typical problems in the colonies as "ignorance of a particular agricultural technique or system; the decay of local crafts and industries; prodigal waste of forest resources; sub-health due to diseases or malnutrition; a high infantile mortality rate; juvenile delinquency; ignorance of the value and use of money."16 The aim of mass education was the regulation, supervision, and control of all aspects of society, from economic production to family life, from local political organizations to leisure time. And in almost all aspects, the state of the economy, or family life, or traditional leisure time activities, were demonized in order to justify the interventionist aims of mass education. All of these activities are, the Committee insisted, "an inseparable and mutually-supporting parts of one programme of mass education."17

The object of that "one programme" of mass education was "the training of the whole community."18 The Committee maintained that all institutions must essentially function as educational institutions and must use visual aids such as posters, films, film strips, photographs,

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15 Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, Mass Education, p.17.
16 Ibid.,p.17.
17 Ibid.,p.6.
18 Ibid.,p.6.
plays, as well as non visual aids such as radio broadcasts, lectures, discussions, as well as local
government bodies and the class room, to educate the whole community. Radio broadcasting, for
instance, was described by the Committee as "an instrument not only, and perhaps not even
primarily, for entertainment, but rather for the enlightenment and education of the more
backward sections of the population and for their instruction in public health and agriculture
etc."19 The cinema was also described as the "most popular and most powerful of all visual aids."
The cinema "can cater for large audiences, an unlimited number of copies of a film can be
produced, and colonial peoples are as much attracted by it as any others."20 These techniques
were considered as the best means "to facilitate the spread of ideas," practices and values.21 The
spectrum of issues that mass education dealt with were, as such then, very wide and very
comprehensive. Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, defined mass education in a
circular despatch to all African Governors and "others" in 1948 as

"a movement designed to promote better living for the whole community, with the
active participation and, if possible, on the initiative of the community....Mass
education embraces all forms of betterment. It includes the whole range of
development activities in the districts...; in the field of agriculture by securing the
adoption of better methods of soil conservation, better methods of farming and
better care of livestock; in the field of health by promoting better sanitation and
water supplies, proper measures of hygiene and infant mortality welfare; and in
the field of education by spreading literacy and adult education as well as by the
extension of the improvement of schools for children. Mass education must

19 Ibid., p.38.
20 Ibid., p.40, p.41, respectively.
21 Ibid., p.41.
Although mass education had obvious utilitarian aims, it also had political object, mainly, to control and guide the "explosive temper" of "mass consciousness." The Committee argued that mass consciousness in the Colonial Empire had changed drastically during the Second World War. "So marked is the change," the Committee stated, "that a mass consciousness seems to have developed which actually exaggerates the responsibility of groups or individuals, especially those in authority." The Committee pointed to the "political aspirations which have emerged in some parts of the Colonial Empire in vigorous form and are spreading to over far wider areas." The political aspirations of nationalists and the "explosive temper" of mass consciousness, the Committee maintained, "can only be controlled and guided by wisely directed mass education with particular stress on the development of social and civic responsibility."

This thesis is divided into four parts which consist of nine chapters. Part one consists of two introductory chapters; part two of four empirical chapters that develop the central argument of the thesis; part three of two chapters that deal with resistance to colonial hegemony; and part four of one concluding chapter. Chapter two briefly analyses the historical background of Somaliland. It focuses mainly on the early colonial period. Its central argument is that colonial

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23 Ibid., p.8.

24 Ibid., p.7.
conquest and rule played a decisive role in the decline of the "mode of life"\textsuperscript{25} of the people of Somaliland and the development of uneven development. The factors that played a key role in that process were colonial pacification wars, the formation of borders, and the rise of anti-colonial nationalist movements. These factors precipitated the decline of the population, the degradation of the environment, and the increase in rural poverty. The deterioration in the "daily life"\textsuperscript{26} of the people in the early colonial period, the chapter concludes, made the people vulnerable to colonial influences and domination in the late colonial period.

The construction and reinforcement of colonial hegemony were effected through mass education, which formed a network of power relations. That network is analyzed in chapters three, four, five and six. Chapter three deals with formal and informal education. It argues that the aim of formal and informal education was cultural conversion and the creation of power relations advantageous to the administration. As early as 1909, Sir Rudolph Slatin, the Civil-Inspector of the Sudan, called for the cultural conversion, or as he put it, the "civiliz(ing)" of the Somali people through English education. "(i)t is said," he wrote, "that government did not open English schools because there is not possibility of employing persons who are educated in English." But, he insisted, "the English language should be taught not merely to enable persons to get public employment but as one of the means of civilizing the people...for they will receive an education which will enlighten them on many things and which in some way or another, fit...

\textsuperscript{25} I have borrowed the term from I. M. Lewis, \textit{A Modern History of Somalia}, p.7. He discusses the social institutions, culture, and environment, within the framework of the concept of mode of life.

them for a decent living; besides there are many subordinate posts in the service which they may fairly be expected to fill with advantage to government.\(^{27}\) English education, then, was viewed as a way of both culturally converting the Somali, and of creating social and cultural conditions—that is, power relations—advantageous to the colonial administration. Power and education, or power and knowledge, directly implied one other. Such "power-knowledge relations"\(^{28}\) will be analyzed in chapter three within the framework of "education for citizenship"\(^{29}\) with particular emphasis on how instruction and supervision in the formal and informal schools led to the creation of a new governing class, and reinforced colonial cultural hegemony.

"All true education," wrote the Advisory Committee on Education for the Colonies, "is education for citizenship."\(^{30}\) The foundation of citizenship must be "sound character training", and in particular, the inculcation of self-reliance and responsibility in the students inside and outside the classroom, and technical training. The primary agent in the moulding of the character of the students must be the teacher, since it was only the teacher who maintained constant and daily contact with the students. Thus the moulding of the character of the students was considered as "primarily a matter of close and constant contact between the pupils and the right

\(^{27}\) PRO, C.O.537/44, Report on Sir Wingate's Special Mission to Somaliland, 1909. (Sir Rudolph was a member of Sir Wingate's delegation.)


\(^{30}\) Ibid., p.3.
kind of teacher." "We become like that which we admire"; and the teacher's business is to win
his pupils' admiration so that they set themselves to follow his example."31

Other British officers, such as medical doctors, nurses, agricultural extension workers,
soil engineers, and technicians, also participated in the processes of cultural conversion and the
winning of the admiration and confidence of the pupils. They lectured to the students in the
schools on various issues: public health, technical improvements, the need for the increase of
productivity, the necessity of cooperation with the colonial administration, the progress the
protectorate achieved under colonial rule and the programmes the administration initiated to
develop even further the country. These officers acted, and were indeed expected to act, like
teachers and mentors to the students and to the general public through their daily contact. In such
contact, the teachers and colonial experts were encouraged to present the best side of western
civilization, and in particular the best side of western modernity and culture. "Western
civilization," the committee insisted, "should present to the Colonial peoples its best side."32

The issue of western civilization and culture, as such then, was central to the whole
programme of education for citizenship. It was accepted that western culture attracted and
repelled Somali students and the general public some times in equal measure. The rejection of
western culture was a result of the "strain which its (west's) intrusive culture is imposing upon
their ancient social and economic system."33 Since that was the case, the best side of that

31 Ibid., p.18.
32 Ibid., p.8.
33 Ibid.
"intrusive culture" must be presented to the people in the formal and informal schools. But that was not all. The object, after all, of education for citizenship was not merely to present the best side of western culture, but also to reinforce and propagate that culture, its values, practices, and ideas in the colonies. The propagation of western culture in African societies, the committee insisted, can be accomplished only if that "alien culture" was accepted by an elite trained in the schools. An "alien culture," the committee argued, "can be most successfully propagated by grafting (it) into a vigorous native stock." The object, hence, of education for citizenship was manifold: to disseminate western ideas, practices, and values; to present the best side of western culture; to graft western culture into an elite educated in the schools; to win the confidence of the students in both the formal and informal schools; and to transform the students in the formal students into committed "soldiers of modernity." Through these varied activities, education for citizenship established "one of the most powerful techniques of hegemony: the (training and) cooption of an upper stratum of natives."

The object of education for citizenship was not merely the training and cooption of an elite, but was also concerned with the dissemination of skills, practical information, and ideas directly and indirectly among adults in the rural and urban areas. Informal education was the

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34 Ibid., p.7.


main means through which practices and information was disseminated to the general public. In the urban centres, the object was to improve the writing and comprehension skills of government workers and the commercial elite, to educate the masses about public health, and to disseminate "correct news, fresh ideas and instruction." In the rural areas, in contrast, the object was not the dissemination of literacy, but the dissemination of practical information whose main aim was the improvement of tribal life: how to improve the production of skins and hides, how to preserve water, how to increase agricultural production, how to prevent soil erosion, how to limit deforestation. In both the rural and urban areas, the administration adopted "modern methods" of communication for the dissemination of practical information, ideas, and news: wireless programmes, mobile cinema, posters, community centres, and informal adult education classes. Education for citizenship, in sum, targeted the whole population, and established "regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population."

Such bio-politics was extended further throughout the social body through public health programmes: clinics, hospitals, surveys, medical controls and propaganda (which will be analyzed in chapter four). Such policies were begun in the early colonial period, albeit in small scale, and particularly in the post-Sayyid period. The establishment of medical institutions and controls were forced upon the administration in that period by the decline in the health of the

37 PRO, W.O.32/13261, Military Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.
38 Lord Rennell of Rodd, British Military Administration, p.479.
population. Indeed, the unhealthiest period in the history of Somaliland was between the 1890s and 1930s. The introduction of colonial diseases such as cholera, smallpox, influenza, relapsing fever, tuberculosis, and venereal diseases, were facilitated by various factors such as the movement of colonial armies and refugees, the integration of the country into other regions of the British empire, the increase in communication between Somaliland and other regions of the empire, the development of efficient systems of transportation which quickly carried diseases from other regions of the empire to Somaliland, and the growth of urban centres in the country. The decline in health caused by the introduction of colonial diseases was exacerbated even more by the decline in the environment and the increase in pauperism, which physically weakened the people and made them vulnerable to the new diseases.

The administration gradually expanded medical services in the late colonial period in order to establish a bio-politics of the population within the general framework of mass education. Such politics was "exercised at the level of life...and the large-scale phenomena of population." The object of the bio-politics of colonial medicine were manifold. First, to maintain a healthy population whose productivity can make the protectorate profitable. A "political economy of population," in essence, was a central aspect of public health. Second, to


41 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, p.137.

produce "special knowledge and analyses" about the population: its sexual habits, dwelling places, diet, life-style, wealth, birth rate, death rate, diseases that afflicted them, and the best preventive and curative strategies in the control of diseases. Third, to control those groups deemed central to the spread of diseases. And so certain groups and spaces were targeted as privileged fields of knowledge and control: urban spaces, prostitutes, juvenile delinquents, the urban poor, the unemployed, Qat (a mild stimulant consumed socially), the dwellings of urbanites, coffee houses, shops, stores, and bath houses. Various medical discourse focused on investigating such spaces, which often presented a bleak picture of the health of the society, and in particular, that of the urbanites. Consequently, they always called for and recommended the passing of laws and ordinances to control and discipline certain groups, supervise certain areas, and in general, for the increase of the surveillance of the population. Finally, colonial medicine was used as a way of popularising, and the increasing the confidence of the people in, western "cultural capital." Through these varied activities, the chapter maintains, medical institutions were established within the dominating framework of mass education that produced "relations of domination and effects of hegemony." 

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43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., p.105.


46 Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, p.141.
Such relations of hegemony were further reinforced through political reform whose primary objective was to "create a new governing class," different from the traditional political elite in training, education, and ideology. This is analyzed in chapter five. The chapter maintains that a new governing class was created, trained, and empowered by the colonial administration in the late colonial period. That class, however, was not moulded from whole new cloth. Rather the core of the new class was drawn from the young and pro-reform urbanites who were either traders, or government servants, or junior civil servants, or graduates from the schools in the 1920s and 1930s. This pro-reform group was augmented by the new elite trained in the late colonial period who were also reformist. The elite were associated with the government through the gradual "Somalisation" of the civil service, and through the various political institutions established within the framework of mass education in which they were involved, such as the Protectorate Advisory Council, Township and District Committee, Local Government Councils, Educational Committees, Community Development organizations, Community Centres, Legislative Council, and Executive Council. These official institutions brought the pro-reform elite under strict government supervision. The 1945 military administration report insisted that "very close European supervision will long be necessary if the educated Somali is to be induced to subordinate his personal...aspirations to the good of the community as a whole." These institutions brought not only the elite under close European supervision, but also the "country

47 PRO, C.O.537/3618, Chief Secretary, "Note on British Somaliland," June 1948.

under closer administrative control. Indeed, these institutions led "in effect (to) a continuation of direct rule at the lowest level" of the society, and established one of the most powerful forms of colonial hegemony: the cooption of the elite, and the control of the general population through colonial institutions and with the collaboration of the elite.

Such relations of domination were further extended and reinforced through community development, which was also involved in establishing a bio-politics of, and regulatory controls over, the population. Chapter six deals with that aspect of mass education. The object of community development was the improvement of the "economic well-being" of the people of Somaliland. Other aspects of mass education—educational services, public health, political reform—had the object of improving the economy and productivity of the people. But the economic aspects of community development as distinct from other aspects of mass education, had very specific aims that were both utilitarian and political. The principle aim was, first, the "reduction of the protectorate's dependence on imported foodstuffs by agricultural extension and an expansion of exports by increasing the utilisation of the natural resources of the country, particularly animal products," natural resources such as crude oil and other minerals, fisheries,

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51 Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, Mass Education, p.4.

and the establishment of secondary industries. Second, the preservation of tribal life and tribal economy. Third, the involvement of the people in community development, while at the same time directing it "on lines consistent with its (government's) overall development policy," and above all to "educate (the) people to want the things that the colonial government wants them to want." The government used persuasive means to make the people "want" what the "government wants them to want." District Teams played a key and decisive role in that process, for they acted "more and more as the guide(s) and mentor(s) and the teachers of technique and skill," and persuaded the people through direct and indirect contact to "want", support, and accept government policies, and by extension, the moral-political leadership of the government in the development of the country.

The two most important effects of community development were, first, the construction and reinforcement of colonial hegemony, and second, the exacerbation of uneven development. The development of uneven development took place in the early colonial period well before the establishment of community development policies. The characteristic of uneven development was the decline in the rural economy, and the growth of the urban economy. Although

55 Ibid., p.333.
56 R. N. Ablett, "Community Development in the Former Somaliland Protectorate," Corona (April 1961), p.139. (District Teams consisted of British officers from different department who cooperated and coordinated community development programs.)
community development had the object of preserving the rural economy and life, nevertheless, it exacerbated the decline of the rural economy by concentrating services and development projects in the urban centres. Besides the construction and reinforcement of hegemony, therefore, the other most important effect of colonial rule in Somaliland was the development of uneven development. These two themes are central to this thesis.

But as with any hegemony, colonial cultural hegemony in Somaliland was incomplete. The imperial system and idea, after all, had very persistent enemies in Somaliland.\(^58\) Such enmity to the imperial idea was reflected in the "notable record of resistance to the blessing and liabilities of western civilization" in Somaliland.\(^59\) Though outright resistance to the blessings and liabilities of western civilization declined to some extent in the late colonial period, as indicated by the receptiveness of the people towards mass education, nevertheless, resistance to colonial rule itself never completely faded. Such resistance was led, for instance, by the elite (chapter seven) who articulated the "revolt of the East against European superiority"\(^60\) through speeches, political and cultural organizations, political parties, and newspapers and pamphlets.

But too often anti-colonial nationalism and resistance was represented in the historiography of Somaliland and Africa in general, in an undifferentiated and narrow way. It

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\(^60\) PRO, C.O.537/7641, A Note on Native Societies in Somaliland, 27 June 1947.
was represented as a "sort of spiritual biography of the (African) elite."\textsuperscript{61} The main figure in this historiographic tradition is J. F. Ade Ajayi.\textsuperscript{62} Ajayi insists rather narrowly that nationalism in Africa had only one source: the western educated elite, and the institutions, laws, policies, and attitudes introduced by colonial rule. But such an interpretation "fails to acknowledge, far less interpret, the contributions made by the people \textit{on their own}, that is, \textit{independently of the elite} to the making and development of...nationalism."\textsuperscript{63} Such interpretation fails to take into account the "mass articulation"\textsuperscript{64} of nationalism independently of the elite and elite organizations. For "parallel to the domain of elite politics there existed throughout the colonial period another domain of...politics in which the principle actors were not the dominant groups of the indigenous society or the colonial authorities but the subaltern classes and groups constituting the mass of the labouring population and the intermediate strata in town and country—that is, the people."\textsuperscript{65}

Chapter eight deals with the resistance of the subaltern groups in Somaliland and attempts to rescue their activities from the "enormous condescension of posterity."\textsuperscript{66} It focuses on the


\textsuperscript{63} Ranajit Guha, "On Some Aspects," p.39. (Italics his.)

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p.40.

contributions of soldiers, poets, and other liminal figures to the articulation of Somali nationalism, and resistance to colonial rule. The final chapter (nine) concludes the thesis, and Appendix A elucidates the diplomatic aspects of decolonisation.

**Historiography**

The dominant theme in the modern historiography of Somaliland is resistance and nationalism. The event that made nationalism such a compelling topic in the history of Somaliland was the long anti-colonial struggle organized and led by Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan from 1899 to 1920, and the large number of imaginative, powerful, and outstanding anti-colonial poems he composed. Aside from the struggle itself or the poetry he composed, however, what attracted historians to nationalism was the uncompromising and well-developed national consciousness that allowed the Sayyid to organize a national resistance movement at the turn of this century.

The Acting Commissioner of Somaliland in 1905, H. E. S. Cordeaux, wondered after reflecting on the "lack of cohesion" among the Somalis due to "inter-tribal dissensions," "(h)ow, then, did the Mullah (Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan) succeed in arming and organising them into such a formidable fighting force."67 Drake-Brockman, the Principal Medical Officer of Somaliland from 1904 to 1915, also marvelled, "(i)t is interesting to consider how it was that this comparatively unknown man (Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan) so quickly taught his

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67 PRO, C.O.879/87, Acting Commissioner Cordeaux to Mr. Lyttelton, 23 August 1905.
followers, springing from so many different tribes who had been at war with each other, to combine for so many years and defy the British government. The Sayyid's movement in the first nine years of this century even split families as Sir Geoffrey Archer, the Governor of Somaliland from 1914 to 1922, pointed out. Often members of the Sayyid's army would taunt their cousins, brothers and close relatives who were fighting on the British side "for fighting under Christian officers against their co-religionists" and kin. In essence what fascinated colonial writers was the ability of Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan to unify the "tribesmen" who, it was assumed, lacked cohesion. In the end, colonial writers condemned Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan as an "oriental despot", and as a religious fanatic and hypocrite. He was, as Dr. Rutherford stated, a "religious imposer and a sensuous profligate of the worst type--ambitious, cruel, merciless, and altogether undependable, but of undoubted quality." It was through "these undesirable qualities that he has raised himself to power, collected around him a number of equally undesirable followers who have nothing to lose and everything to gain."
Under the "cloke (sic) of religion" he "aims at making himself the eventual ruler of Somaliland." Unable to accept that Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan was a "(c)hief of his

71 Ibid.
tribe and leader of his own people and working in his own country" against colonial rule, as Sir Frederick Banbury argued in the Parliamentary debate,72 others such as Dr. Rutherford, and Angus Hamilton, M. McNeil and Douglas Jardine,73 represented the Sayyid, despite their admiration for his poetry and courage, as an oriental despot and a religious hypocrite.

Post-colonial historiography, however, was more sympathetic to the Sayyid.74 To argue that Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan "used religion merely as a cloak to advance his own personal aggrandizement is to make a cheap and shallow assessment which the facts do not warrant."75 What must be stressed rather was his patriotism, and religious sensibilities. He felt that "Christian colonization"76 of his country threatened the "ancient belief in Islam"77 of the

72 Ibid.


75 I. M. Lewis, Modern History, p.81.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.
Somali people. That formed a central theme in the Sayyid's discourses, whether his poetry, letters, or other writings. In one letter to a Somali leader he put forth the following query: "(w)hat do you say about a Moslem country occupied by a strongly-armed party of Christians, and what should be thought of those Moslems, and in what repute should they be held, namely, those Moslems who love that country, counting it their native country?" He answered the question thus:

the paying of taxes and duties, and the building of buildings in a country taken by infidels, is an evil deed and a mistake. That which it is lawful for Moslems to do in this matter, is to resist the occupiers of the country, and the neighbouring peoples should agree with them in such a case, and should assist them if they have no sufficient power of their own.78

The central concern of the Sayyid, then, was not only the defence of Islam, but also the protection of the "native land" against foreign, Christian domination. His war cry was the British "must go out of my country in one hour," as he put it in one letter.79 Another equally important theme in the Sayyid's poetry was the Somali identity, which for him precluded the acceptance of, or compromise with, foreign domination and rule. To the end, he refused to meet with British officer and negotiators, simply because he refused to accept the notion that the English had any right what so ever to negotiate over his land and its future. The grammar of Somali nationalism, therefore, was not "dialectically engendered" by the census, map, museum, as Benedict Anderson argued80--that is, by the colonial state, but was engendered by the cultural, religious, national,

78 PRO, W.O.106/23, "Translation of a Letter by the Mullah Mohamed Abdillah Hassan, to Sulaiman Saleh, of the Gadwein, about December 1910."


and linguistic unity of the Somali people; a unity not formed under colonial rule but which preceded it. It was that cultural unity that allowed the Sayyid to arm and organize the people into a formidable force and to defy colonial rule for so long. The Sayyid, in sum, asserted no "foundational fictions" in order to articulate Somali nationalism.

Post-colonial historiography, moreover, addressed nationalism in the late colonial period. The key factors in the rise of late colonial nationalism were the Second World War, the spread of education, and the rise of an educated and secular elite. I. M. Lewis asserted that the objections of Muslims to "infidel rule," the "disruptions which accompanied the East African campaign", and the spread of education, travel, mass media such as the radio and newspapers," acted as the "common spur to nationalism" in the late colonial period, and made decolonisation inevitable. Abdi Ismail Samatar made the same point. He stated, "(t)he indignation of the past, the upheavals of the East African campaigns, the defeat of their oppressors, and the growing awareness of the world at large created a classically fertile ground for the emergence of nationalist movements." Moreover, the rise of a small elite of government workers and traders accelerated the development of modern, party-based nationalism. Both Lewis and Samatar, above all, privileged the role which the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty played in nationalism. Under the

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83 Abdi Ismail Samatar, The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, p.76.

84 Ibid.
treaty the Haud and the Reserved Area was transferred to Ethiopian control. According to Lewis, the treaty changed "political life" in the country, and led to decolonisation. Similarly, Samatar argued that the treaty "deliver(ed) the message home and propel(led) the petite bourgeoisie into the centre of the nationalist movement." But the historiography is too sanguine about late colonial nationalism, and represents it as uniform, and undifferentiated, while in reality it was enshrouded with contradictions, and was in the end, rather tame and ineffective, as is argued in chapter seven in this thesis.

If a consensus existed with respect to resistance, nationalism, and decolonisation, there was very little agreement with respect to the economic impact of colonial rule on Somaliland. W. K. Durrill argued in an essay, "Atrocious Misery: The African Origins of Famine in Northern Somalia, 1839-1884," that the frequent recurrence of droughts, and the commoditization of the pastoral economy in the nineteenth century, reduced the people to "atrocious misery." Colonial rule, as such then, had little negative impact on the economy, since the origins of famines, economic problems, droughts, and misery, was "African" rather than colonial. I. M. Lewis also argued that the economic impact of colonial rule was minimal. Because the country was poor, harsh, dry, and lacked any exploitable resources, colonial rule had little effect on the economy.

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86 Abdi Ismail Samatar, The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884-1986 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), p.78. (The "northern Somalia" the work deals with is Somaliland.)

The people remained nomads, and eked out a sparse and meagre living from the dry and semi-desert region they inhabited for over two thousand years. Moreover, the traditional egalitarian political structure and kinship values remained unchanged. Overall "(t)here has been no general local industrial revolution and correspondingly little large-scale urbanization." If colonial rule had any impact on the economy, it "naturally developed commerce and stimulated the domestic economy as well as export trade." Nevertheless, the structure of the economy remained unchanged. Colonial rule, in other words, developed the economy, but did not underdevelop it, or tie it too closely to the international capitalist market. The incorporation of the economy of Somaliland into the international market took place in the post-colonial period.

In contrast to Lewis's argument, neo-Marxist scholars such as Abdi Samatar, Ahmed Samatar, Charles Cheshekter and Dan Aronson stressed the incorporation of the economy of Somaliland into the international market, class formation, and the development of underdevelopment during the colonial period. Abdi Samatar's work, for instance, covers the

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89 Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, p.268.

90 Lewis, Blood and Bone, p.121.

pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial history of the economy of Somaliland, and attempts to "retheorize the nature of...economic (under)development, (and) locate the social forces that form the principle constraints to development." The central argument of the work is that the pre-colonial economy in which pastoral production was "originally geared for domestic use, has been commoditized (during the colonial period)," and "blown asunder by its incorporation into the world capitalist market." Consequently, the hitherto "primitive" pastoral production that was based on use-value, and "geared for domestic use," was transformed "into peripheral capitalist" economy. The establishment of the colonial administration, and the emergence of a clearly differentiated class system--the pastoralists and peasants on the one hand, and the merchant capitalist on the other--were the key factors that transformed the hitherto egalitarian social relations. The administration facilitated the processes of exchange in the market and encouraged the export of commodities to the outside world, while the merchant capitalists expropriated the surplus generated by the what he called "propertied labour," i.e. pastoralists and peasants. This exploitative process became even more marked in the post-colonial period. In that period, the export of commodities to the international market increased dramatically, and the merchant class not only appropriated more of the surplus generated by the pastoralists and peasants, but also


92 Abdi Samatar, State and Rural, p.3.

93 Ibid.,p.154.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.,pp.155-156.
used the state as a "cash cow" and milked it for private gain. Foreign aid only intensified that process. It reinforced the underdevelopment of the economy and the accumulation strategies of the merchant class that dominated the economy and the state. Samatar, in sum, calls the transformation of the economy of Somaliland from one geared to local use, to one geared to export, the long transition to underdevelopment—a transition from an egalitarian economy to a capitalist one. Unlike Durrill and Lewis, therefore, he locates the origins of the current problems of Somaliland within the context of the transition spawned by colonial rule.

Although the neo-Marxist tradition adds considerably to our understanding of Somaliland's history, it nevertheless focuses too narrowly on the incorporation of the economy of the country into the international market, the rise of merchant capital, and the development of underdevelopment. Merchant capital, for instance, did not just appear during the colonial era, for the country had trading relations with various parts of the world since the ancient era, which were conducted through local merchant capital. Besides, the neo-Marxists ignore the more important transformations within the country with respect to the changes in relations between town and country, the decline of the environment, the rise in rural poverty, the growth of the towns. In sum, uneven development—rural decline and urban growth—rather than the development of underdevelopment, or the development of commerce, was the main effect of colonial rule.

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96 Ibid., p.159.
This thesis focuses on that neglected aspect of the history of Somaliland, as well as on the construction and reinforcement of colonial hegemony. It maintains, first, that during the early colonial period the mode of life of the people declined. The period was defined by ecological degradation, rural immiseration, and population decline. Second, the decline of the mode of life took place within the general framework of uneven development, that is, rural decline and urban growth. Third, uneven development made the people vulnerable to colonial cultural influences and domination. Fourth, colonial cultural influences were effected through civil institutions established within the framework of mass education. The thesis focuses in particular on the role that such civil institutions as hospitals and clinics, formal and informal schools, political institutions, and community development projects, played in reinforcing colonial cultural hegemony in the era of decolonisation.¹⁸

Dagmar Engels' and Shula Marks', Contesting Colonial Hegemony, for instance, examines the relationship between the "state and society in a colonial setting, focusing on three

areas—education, public heath and policing and the law,” and the way these institutions functioned as a means through which the colonial administration "exercise(d) power not through fear of physical punishment but by nurturing the bodies and inculcating loyalty in the minds of subjects." They maintain that the "hegemonic discourses" of colonialism—education, good administration, public health and other cultural institutions—were intent on disciplining, and eliciting the consent of, the subject peoples. In other words, the object of the colonial cultural and disciplinary institutions was not to repress the subject peoples, but to make them more productive and more responsive to colonial rule. This thesis similarly delineates how the cultural institutions established within the framework of "mass education" won over the consent, loyalty, and cooperation of the public, and reinforced colonial cultural hegemony.

In sum, the construction of colonial cultural hegemony was effected through heterogenous means, and mainly civil institutions established within the general framework of mass education: clinics and hospitals, formal and informal schools, community development projects, community centres, local government institutions, radio broadcasts, newspapers, posters, photographs, film strips, and mobile cinema and camel units. These cultural and educational institutions, informed by an ideology of instruction, expanded educational and cultural activities inside and outside the schools, in the rural and urban areas. They

99 Dagmar Engels and Shula Marks (eds.), Contesting Colonial Hegemony, p.2.
100 Ibid., p.7.
101 Ibid.
102 PRO, C.O.830/5, Education Department Annual Report, 1950.
disseminated ideas, practices and values; controlled, disciplined and guided mass consciousness; convinced the population that mass education would bring them the benefits of western civilization; stimulated the desire of the people for western cultural capital; increased the "degree of cultural colonization"\(^{103}\) of the society; made the people "more cooperative than ever before and...conscious of the attempts that ...(were) being made to improve health and education in the territory"\(^{104}\); and reinforced colonial cultural domination and "direct rule at the lowest level"\(^{105}\) of the society.


\(^{105}\) PRO, C.O.537/7207, Note on the Political Future of the Somaliland Protectorate, by T. C. Jerrom, 6 May 1950.
CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE AND RURAL POVERTY

The ecology of Somaliland has been treated ahistorically in the literature on the country. I. M. Lewis in his classic work, A Pastoral Democracy, states simply that on the "whole the environment is not promising," without historically analyzing how the environment came to be so bleak. In his more recent work, Blood and Bone, I. M. Lewis refers to the "arid environment" of the country, and then cites a 1992 report by Save the Children entitled "A Survey of Rural Somaliland." Moreover, Abdi Samatar, a geographer by training, simply restates Lewis's argument about the ecology of Somaliland. His discussion of the climate and ecology is so brief and ahistorical. "Climatologically," he wrote, the country "is semi-arid," without telling us why and how it came to be so.

The argument put forth in this chapter, in contrast, is historically grounded. The contention is that ecology cannot be viewed as a constant, but as something that changes and is subject always to historical forces. It is variable or changeable because it is above all else a

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"social space." It is social space because it is the site of, first, social relations of reproduction, that is, relations between the sexes and age groups within the family; and second, relations of production, that is, the division of labour, and "its organization in the form of hierarchical social functions." As such then, the ecology of the country was always dependent on how the people used it. In other words, ecology as social space, is the "outcome of a process," a social process. It is, and never was, independent of the way the social relations of production and reproduction organized it. Hence, particular attention will be paid below to the ecology of the country and how it was socially used in the pre-colonial period. The discussion will then focus on how the ecology of the country was transformed in the early colonial period through particular social and political practices.

Geographically, Somaliland is located in the northeastern corner of the Horn of Africa. It is bounded in the north by the Gulf of Aden, in the south by Ethiopia, in the east by Somalia, and in the west by Djibouti. (Map 1) The total area of Somaliland is 68,000 square miles. The country has four ecological zones: the maritime plain, the Golis range, the interior plateau, and the Haud. (Figure 1)

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5 Ibid., p.32.
6 Ibid., p.110.
7 Appendix B.
8 Appendix C.
The Haud, which is located in the south of the country, is a paradoxical place. In the rainy seasons, the undulating plains of the Haud are lush, green, beautiful, and full of livestock, people, and small trading posts, while in the dry season it is waterless, quiet and deadly. It receives rain during the northeast and southwest monsoons, that is, between March and June (summer), and September and December (spring). In those two seasons, the Haud becomes lush, and alternates between woodlands and open plains covered with grass, specially dareemo (chrysopogon aucheri) which even in the driest weather never seems to wither, and many other varieties of grass.\(^9\) It is a very important part of the country, for during the rainy seasons the pastoralists of Somaliland congregate on it, and totally abandon the interior plateau. The camels and the sheep of the pastoralists remain there in those seasons without being watered, because they feed on the soft and wet pastures.\(^10\) In the dry seasons, the Haud, particularly the deep Haud, is totally abandoned, because of the lack of water and wells. The few wells that exist there are at the least four days journey apart.\(^11\) In the dry seasons, therefore, the Haud is impassable. Richard Burton almost died of thirst in the deep Haud in 1854 in his journey from Harar to Berbera, and was haunted by the "demon of thirst." For twenty days, he wrote, "we did not taste water, the sun

\[^9\text{Ralph E. Drake-Brockman,} \textit{British Somaliland} \text{(London: Hurst \& Blackett Ltd., 1912), p.237.}\]

\[^10\text{Sir Geofffrey Archer,} \textit{Personal and Historical Memoir of and East African Administrator} \text{(London: Oliver \& Boyd Ltd., 1963), p.55. Sir Geoffrey was the Governor of Somaliland from 1914 to 1922.}\]

\[^11\text{Angus Hamilton,} \textit{Somaliland} \text{(London: Hutchinson and Company, 1911), p.29.}\]
parched our brains, the mirage mocked us at every turn, and the effect was a species of monomania."

Further north of the Haud is the interior plateau which rises 2,500-7,000 above sea level. It too receives rain during the northeast and southwest monsoons. But it receives more rain than the Haud, and consequently the vegetation is more varied than in the Haud. It alternates between open woodlands, hills, mountains, dry river beds, and wide valleys—the Ban Cade, Ain, Karamaan, Solweine, Aroori, and many more—covered with cedars, galool (acacia bussei), daib (juniperus procera), mimosa, tamarisk, wild fig, several species of aloe, sugsug (acacia etbacia), gob (zizyphus mauritana), lebi (delonix elata), redab (albizzia anthelmintica), and many varieties of grass such as dareemo (chrysopogon aucheri), dihe (sporobolus spp), and gugangub (eragrotis haranesis). The scenery in the plateau, thus, changes continuously: from mountain such as Bur Dab, to large open pastures with grass as tall as a man, to dense bush, and forest areas. Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan in a poem he composed in 1903 mentioned the various giant trees that impeded one of his journeys in the plateau. He said:

"There was a thicket of xagar trees,
There were jaleefan and qurac, and the cutting jinow,
The close-growing galool, and the sarmaan
With its pods that whistle in the wind,
The swinging and recoiling jimbac,

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13 Angus Hamilton, Somaliland, p.22.
The intertwining jiiq trees,
The jiic shrub and the siiq wild fig,
The stinging jillab nettles,
The shrivelled jowdheer gum tree,
The jirme with its thorn,
The jiiqjiiq with its prickles,
The jeeri and yooco flame tree,
The qaroon, the jaaful and the seerin..."

Drake-Brockman also stressed the beauty of the interior plateau, and the abundance of wild life. He wrote about the elephants, lions, leopards, soemerring's gazelle, beisa, dik-dik, quaint hornbills, the babblers and brilliant starlings, the larks, the sweet notes of the nightingale, the tall cedars, the wooded valleys and plains covered with grass, and concluded tongue-in-cheek, "If this is a desert, it is a pleasant one."16

Further north of the interior plateau is the Golis range, which is 4,000-7,000 ft above sea level, and for three hundred miles runs parallel to the coastal plain. The highest peak, Surad, reaches 8,000 ft above sea level. Other mountain peaks such as Ceransid (mist carrier), the Ayl mountains, and Daalo—all located in the Erigavo district—reach 6,500 ft above sea level. The range overall is covered with "Grass, box trees, acacia, a variety of flowering aloes with crimson and golden blossoms, gum, myrrh, and frankincense trees," as well the fig tree, galool, dhebi, daib, gob, cedar, and lebi. And "almost everywhere the giant euphorbia lends an artificial and stage-like effect to the scene."17 Drake-Brockman similarly characterized the range as "a parklike

16 Drake-Brockman, British Somaliland, p.238.
country."\textsuperscript{18} He described Mirso, a mountain peak that is about 5,000 ft above sea level as
enshrouded year round with mists in the afternoon. Mirso, he wrote, is covered with dense cedar
and boxwood forest, and at the peak he found a variety of large trees and an open green sward.
"We feel," he added, "almost inclined to rub our eyes and wonder if we are really in
Somaliland!"\textsuperscript{19} Others refer to the range as the "mist-belt."\textsuperscript{20} And Margaret Laurence spoke of
her house in Sheikh as the "house in the clouds." "We walked," she wrote, "to explore our
territory, and found that the early clouds swept so low that we were actually walking through
them. They billowed around us like cloaks or gusts of smoke, and I was amazed that such a thing
was possible, to walk in the clouds."\textsuperscript{21} She also found the Malol mountain, near Sheikh, as cool,
always covered with mists and the euphorbia and candelabra trees that "were curiously filled
with shadows," and thick, soft green grass around which grew mauve flowers.\textsuperscript{22}

The Somali poet, Hajji Adan (Afqalooc), commented on the beauty of the mountain
range, and in particular the Daalo mountain, which gives us an inkling as to the nature of the
mountain range in the pre-colonial period before deforestation set in. Hajji Adan (Afqalooc), one
of the "old poets," described Daalo in a poem he composed sometime early this century:

\textsuperscript{18} Drake-Brockman, \textit{British Somaliland}, p.227.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.,p.228.
\textsuperscript{21} Margaret Laurence, \textit{The Prophet's Camel Bell} (1963, repr., Toronto: McClelland and
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.,60.
It is a place with ravine pass, water and black mountains;  
Of its rocks, some are marble and some are other stones;  
It has a hundred valleys where berries grow.  
Its aspects and its beauty make you think it must be Lebanon,  
Its weather and its air resemble those of Mosul in Iraq.  
When you climb the topmost peak of Surad  
Whatever moves across the sea appears to you as if in a mirror,  
A cannon fired from there has a range of thousands of lengths.  
You will see there the place where Arraweelo\(^{23}\) encamped, the  
wealth of Geylweyte;\(^{24}\)  
Remains of past ages, objects which people used to gather together,  
Monuments and mounds so large you could take them for houses,  
Places where treasures were hidden, which beguile and bewilder,  
Dead cities and caves with carved walls, amazing to those who pass near.  
Wandering around Daalo one is in a state of trance;  
The morning rain falls even in the midst of the dry jilaal season,  
A cloud lowering its feet, and the highest tree-tops reaching upwards for a mile  
Clash with each other like sea-waves and sailing ships.  
Of the plants there each has its own hue, its own blossom, its own leaves;  
They smell so sweet that you will think someone has sprinkled rosewater around,  
Or that you have entered a bridal hut, or that you are at the celebrations of the Prophet's birthday;  
The scent of musk spreads from the thick herbage and the springing grass.  
There are birds each singing in its own way and each taking up a different tune;  
Each varies in its colour, and their number is as many as a million;  
You might mistake their noises and cries for a schoolmaster and his class.

\(^{23}\) A pre-Islamic Somali queen that castrated men at birth. Her grave is in the Erigavo district. Women place flowers and cloth on her grave, while men throw stones at it.

\(^{24}\) A pre-colonial Somali big man from the Erigavo district often referred to in the oral traditions.
The pigeon entertains you, and the many doves;  
When the go-away bird, that solitary grazer, pick berries  
at night,  
When the nightingale makes his music and the bustard  
offers you amusement,  
When the honey-guide bird tell you where there is to be  
found,  
When you hear the clamour of frogs and the voice of the  
peacock,  
When the sky-lark calls out to you from far away,  
You argue with yourself, for you cannot bear to go to  
any other place.²⁵

The range, furthermore, is cris-crossed by springs and small sweet-water streams that often drain into the sea. Lt Cruttendon found in the mountains southeast of Berbera one hundred springs.²⁶

But most of the rain water the range receives throughout the year is drained into the plateau, and irrigates the large plains and valleys of the interior.

Beyond the range to the north, is the maritime plain: a dry, hot, humid, parched strip of land, that receives less than five inches of rain per annum. It is an area destitute of grass, trees except for a few scattered thorn bushes, and is forbidding in all aspects.²⁷ "It will be realised," wrote Jardine, "that the general impression of Somaliland as an arid desert is derived from the narrow coastal strip; and that the traveller inland soon finds himself in a country that seems

²⁵ Hajji Adan (Afqalooc), "Black Mountains," quoted in Faarax M. J. Cawl, Ignorance is the Enemy of Love tran. by B. W. Andrzzejewski (London: Zed Press, 1982), pp.2-3. (This should surprise no one since Somali poetry is naturalistic.)


²⁷ Douglas Jardine, Mad Mullah, p.17.
almost beautiful and luxuriant.\textsuperscript{28} Sir Geoffrey Archer made a similar argument. He stated that Somaliland, despite its reputation as a semi-desert, is "nothing of the kind." He added, "It is a country possessed of mountain-chains and high plateaux, of open grass plains, and of sweet-scented mimosas and flowering aloes in profusion.\textsuperscript{29}

A testament to the richness of the ecology of the land was the wild beasts and big game that lived in the countryside. Major Swayne who travelled through Somaliland seventeen times between 1884 and 1893, stated that the country was "one of the best and most accessible of hunting grounds to be found at present anywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{30}" His narrative is essentially about the big game that fell to his gun. In 1899 the Consul-General of Somaliland, J.H. Sadler, made a list of the live animals, skins, and horns that sportsmen-naturalists exported from the country: lion, leopard, cheetah, zebra, wild ass, oryx, kudu, hartebeest, water-buck, hyenas, foxes, smaller mammals, large kudu, gazelle and other deer, rhinoceros, and elephants.\textsuperscript{31} Other travellers such as Lt. Cruttendon also commented on the vast big game that thrived in the interior: elephants, lions, leopards, white rhinoceros, hyenas, wolves, jackals, ostriches, wild ass, white antelope, the "sagarro" or dik-dik, koodoo, scimitar horned antelope, cheetah, oryx, a variety of deer species, gazelle, jerboas, squirrels, and toucan. He also mentioned a variety of

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p.18.

\textsuperscript{29} Sir Geoffrey Archer, \textit{Personal and Historical}, p.54.


\textsuperscript{31} PRO, 78/5031, Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Sadler, the Consul-General of the Somali Coast Protectorate, to Her Majesty's Principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 5 December 1899.
birds, large and small. Sir Geoffrey Archer called Somaliland the "Mecca, the magnet of attraction, for the sportsman-naturalist from Britain and the Continent." After mentioning the big game that attracted sportsmen-naturalists, he added, "But, transcending all, is the wonderful wealth of Bird Life." He wrote a four volume work on bird life in Somaliland in which he showed the vast varieties of birds, and the richness of the ecology that sustained them.

This rich ecology of the country allowed the people to practice a dynamic and diverse mode of life in the pre-colonial era organized within the matrix of a particular mode of production—an agro-pastoral and commercial mode of production. In other words, the northern Somali country then was not a pure pastoral society. As Khazanov pointed out, a pure pastoral society is a historical fiction, for the nomad always traded with the "outside world," and often farmed or did other things to supplement his income and diet. The heterogenous mode of production that people practised created a "mosaic" of exchange spaces without a dominant

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33 Sir Geoffrey Archer, Personal and Historical Memoirs, p.55.
34 Ibid.,p.56.
centre. The lack of a dominant commercial centre, and the absence of a dominant class that appropriated the means of production, prevented the emergence of a state. And so the society remained acephalous. Its axiomatic social and political basis were filial relationships—kinship. But that was not all. Social and political relationships were also based on relations of affiliation, that is, on marriage, religious orders, poetry, and commercial alliance.

Agro-pastoralism and commerce, then, was the dominant mode of production. Of course pastoralism was an important aspect of the social relations of production. The great majority of the people herded four food animals: camels, sheep, goats, and cattle, and two burden animals: donkeys and horses. As nomads they did not merely wander from one grazing ground to another, but rather used a very effective rotating system for pasturing their stock: away from the interior plateau during the rainy seasons, and towards the plateau during the dry seasons. Thus, during the summer and spring seasons, they moved their herds to the Haud. The availability of wet, soft grass, and natural water reservoirs made the watering of the herds unnecessary. Besides, camels—their most important herd—needed no watering at all throughout the rainy seasons. In the dry seasons, the pastoralists abandoned the Haud, because of the lack of permanent wells, and moved their stock to the interior plateau. The stock, moreover, was divided into two in the dry seasons: the camel stock, and the sheep, goat, and cattle stock. The camel stock was pastured in areas further away from the hamlet and the wells by the men, because camels could go without water for one month in the dry season. The sheep, cattle, horses, donkeys, and goats, in contrast, were

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38 I. M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society.
herded near wells by the women, because of their frequent need for water. The main sexual division of labour in the society, then, was most clearly evident in the way the people organized the herding of their stock, and particularly during the dry seasons.

This "pulsatory" and organized system—away from the interior plateau and the permanent wells in the rainy seasons, and then towards the wells and plateau in the dry seasons—of pasturing in the pre-colonial period, protected the environment from over grazing, and preserved the soil from erosion. John Hunt stated, in the pre-colonial era "the balance was naturally adjusted to preserve the soil on which the nomadic tribes grazed their stock." The people protected the environment not only through the pulsatory system, but also by proscribing the cutting of trees. Thus a Somali proverb says: "Wiiq sakaaro, wararac damal, iyo way sokeeye, midna ma hadho" (The cry of the dik-dik, the crashing sound of the Damal tree, and the moan of the blood relative, always haunt you.) The cutting of a large tree then was almost tantamount to killing a blood relative, or the small and beautiful dik-dik for which the Somali always had a soft spot. And the "gob" tree is often referred to in everyday discourse and in poetry as "lama garaacaan" (that which is not cut down or hit with an ax). The balance maintained through the pulsatory system of pasturing, and by refraining from cutting large trees, preserved the environment. No wonder then that European travellers in the nineteenth century, and


administrators in the early decades of this century, found the environment of the country rich and well balanced. The balanced and favourable environment allowed the people to maintain large herds of stock without damaging the ecology. Lt. Cruttendon stated that the number of sheep, goats, and camels in the interior are "perfectly incredible, fully realizing the account given of the flocks and herds of the patriarchs of old, for many of the elders of these tribes own each more than 1500 she-camels, and their sheep are innumerable."\(^{42}\)

Besides livestock, the pastoralists produced skins and hides, ghee, honey, and ostrich feathers. The production of ostrich feathers was the specialization of Midagans—a lower caste people, who usually captured them young, tamed them, and then harvested their feathers.\(^{43}\) They also hunted elephants, rhinoceros, lions, leopards, cheetah, and other animals whose skin had export value. They, moreover, collected guano and pearls.

Equally important in the mode of life of the people in the pre-colonial period was agriculture. This system was practised in the mountain range and in the interior plateau. People maintained herds of goats, cattle, sheep, and camels, while at the same time, they cultivated either sorghum or gum trees. Sorghum was cultivated in the plateau by mainly religious settlements. Such settlements occurred on the average about seventy miles apart in the nineteenth century.\(^{44}\) Hargeisa, as Major Swayne put it, may be taken as the type of them all.\(^{45}\) It was

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\(^{42}\) Lt. Cruttendon, "Memoir on the Western or Edoor Tribes," p.54.

\(^{43}\) Ralph Drake-Brockman, *British Somaliland*, p.268.

\(^{44}\) Major H. C. Swayne, *Seventeen Trips*, p.4.

\(^{45}\) Ibid.,p.7.
founded in the 1870s by Sheikh Madar, as an agricultural settlement. Major Swayne visited the settlement in the 1880s. At the time of his visit, the settlement consisted of a few hundred huts, surrounded by mat fence, and two square miles of sorghum cultivation. The town was a refuge for the blind, the elderly, the crippled, the orphans, and the destitute. About four hundred people were employed by Sheikh Madar to work in the sorghum fields. Other travellers in the nineteenth century also came across sorghum cultivation in the interior plateau. Lt. Richard Burton also came across a plantation near Zeila where various vegetables and fruits were cultivated, such as cucumber, water melon, and egg-plants. Sorghum was also cultivated in the eastern valleys of the mountain range. Speke saw a sorghum cultivation in the Jidali valley in the eastern mountain range of Somaliland, in which the stalks grew luxuriantly and reached nine feet. In that area, the people used either Persian-type ducts that drew water from the permanent streams, or a system whereby water was drawn from wells through the Asiatic weighted pole on a fulcrum which poured water into irrigation channels. The production of sorghum by religious settlements and agro-pastoralists in the plateau and the mountain range was, however, less important than the production of livestock, and frankincense, myrrh, and gum.

46 Ibid., p.7.
47 Ibid., p.96.
50 John Hunt, General Survey, p.112.
The production of frankincense, myrrh, and gum was confined to the high mountain range, because the climate of the mist belt was conducive to the planting and growth of the gum trees. It was these products that made the northern Somali country famous among the ancients. The gum plantations were privately owned and cultivated by families. Lt. Cruttendon stated,

"The traveller in the (northern) Somali country is struck with the appearance of boundary-lines dividing the hills into portions. These landmarks have existed for centuries, and serve to denote the limits of each family's gum-trees."

He added, the gum "trees are regularly cultivated like coffee, and, naturally, the produce increased seven-fold." According to S. B. Miles, each plantation was called "Hijje" and was "clearly defined and marked out; the trees in it being strictly respected by the other members of the tribe." Each family, moreover, "plant and propagate saplings in their fields." The gum plantations were harvested only once each year between May and September, that is, during the heavy rainy season. The trees were cut with a special knife called "Mingafe" at many points.

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52 Lt. C. J. Cruttendon, "Memoir on the Western or Edoor Tribes, Inhabiting the Somali Coast," p.73.

53 Ibid., p.73.


55 Ibid., p.65.

56 Ibid., p.65.
with special care, and the gum which the trees exuded were collected fifteen days later, after which, throughout the harvesting season, the operation was repeated. The people of the mist belt produced a variety of gum products through cultivation.

All of these products of the country: livestock, skins and hides, myrrh, frankincense, gum, ostrich feathers, guano, pearls, ivory, rhinoceros horn, butter and wax, were exported through the coastal towns since ancient times. Commerce, in other words, functioned as an important aspect of the mode of life of the people of the northern Somali country in the pre-colonial era. And a class of traders involved in the exportation of commodities to the Indian Ocean market always existed in the country. That class became well established in the nineteenth century, and articulated and defended its interests.

Henry Salt observed in 1810 that all the valuable commodities exchanged in Aden were products of the northern Somali country, or brought through the northern Somali coastal towns and chiefly through Berbera. Richard Burton described it as the meeting place of commerce in Eastern Africa. Its exports included gum, frankincense, coffee, pearl, gold, civet, ivory, rhinoceros horn, guano, butter and wax, livestock, and hides and skins. These commodities were

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58 Ralph E. Brake-Brockman, *British Somaliland*, p.239.


60 Richard Burton, *First Footsteps*, vol.2, p.78.
exported to Mocha, Aden, India, Persia, and England. Some of the products of the country, such as hides and skins, even reached the American market. The skin of the Somali black-headed sheep was considered as the best in the world. They were used in the manufacture of gloves in factories in New York and Philadelphia in the nineteenth century. The imports consisted of dates, sugar, tobacco, oil, cotton goods, and metal goods, to mention a few. During the fair season, Berbera was "a perfect Babel in confusion as in languages," as people from the Yemen, Persia, Arabia, India, and Ethiopia congregated in the town. The economy of the Somali coastal towns was so dynamic and productive in the nineteenth century, that Aden was "in effect little more than an adjunct to the Berbera fair," and almost eighty percent of the revenue of the Aden British Protectorate was imposed on commodities from Berbera.

A key role was played by a commercial class of Somalis in the trade of the coastal towns. This commercial class were not mere brokers for foreign traders, but were involved in buying and selling of commodities in the Somali ports and in foreign ports in India, Arabia, and Persia. A typical member of this class in the nineteenth century was Shermarke Ali Salah. He was born in Berbera at the beginning of the nineteenth century, became captain of a Somali owned boat, a


62 Ralph E. Drake-Brockman, British Somaliland, p.268.


resident of Mocha, and the governor of Zeila. Burton saw ten boats owned by Shermarke in the Zeila port in 1854, two of which were "large trading boats which convey yearly, about 300 tons of coffee and other goods," to Bombay.\(^{65}\) He also owned substantial real estate in both Zeila and Berbera. Somali traders used their boats effectively, as they excluded Arab traders from the transport aspect of the business by what Henry Salt called a "navigation act." They carried their own cargo on their "frail bark of fifty tons... boldly across the Gulf at seasons when the Arab fears even to creep along the coast of Hijaz."\(^ {66}\) That strong and direct commercial intercourse between the northern Somali ports and the outside world, created very large and important Somali population in, for instance, Aden, Mocha, and England in the nineteenth century.\(^ {67}\) The Somali population in Aden, for instance, consisted of traders, brokers, dockworkers, and policemen. Somali traders were even instrumental in the establishment of the Ma'alla town in Aden. They were the first to land their stock and other goods at the beaches of Ma'alla, and built their own town close to the new port. The government in 1855 recognized the new town and port, and built a new pier.\(^ {68}\)

\(^{65}\) Richard Burton, *First Footsteps*, vol.1, p.16, n.2.


The Somali traders were conscious of their interests, and protected and articulated that interest. During the Egyptian occupation of the Somali coastal towns of Bulhar, Zeila and Berbera from 1870 to 1884, Somali traders often came in conflict with Egyptian governors. Most often the taxation policies of the Egyptian military administrators were the source of conflict. In 1874, for example, the Egyptian governor raised taxes on all exports and imports; imposed grazing dues per head on livestock earmarked for exports; levied fees for health certificates given to every person who entered the towns even though no doctor examined those given the certificate; and charged a tax on everything sold in the towns. The taxation policies of the Egyptians caused the 1875 recession on the Somali coast and in Aden, as Somali traders simply refused to use the Egyptian controlled ports. The recession caused inflation in prices in Aden.

But they did not merely reduce exports as a protest against the taxation policies of the Egyptians, they also campaigned against the taxation policies. In 1879, for instance, one hundred Somali traders met in Berbera with Brigadier-General Francis Loch, the Political Resident at Aden, and complained to him about the taxation policies of the administration. They threatened to abandon Berbera and reduce exports to Aden.

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69 PRO, F.O.78/3188, Political Resident, Aden, to the Consul-General, Major-General Stanton, Cairo, 22 February 1875; PRO, F.O.78/3191, Political Resident, Aden, to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, 3 December 1875.

70 Ibid.

71 PRO, F.O.78/3193, Francis Loch, Political Resident, Aden, to India Government, 22 September 1879; PRO, F.O.78/3189, Captain Woodehouse to Major General Goodfellow, 21 September 1876.
In sum, the diverse and dynamic mode of life of the northern Somali country in the pre-colonial period was based on rural production and urban commerce. The urban economy was dependent on rural production. As the Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan stated in one poem:

The provisions and the clothes which keep people busy
in towns
Bustling and trading, are merely lifeless wealth brought
in from outside.
If the town is cut off from the interior, the Angel of Death
soon comes to it on his errands.72

The towns were also dependent on the countryside politically, and culturally. For the politics of the society was controlled by tribal elders and leaders who resided in the countryside. Even the merchants were essentially rural people, who participated in the "mosaic" exchange and cultural system that existed in the country, and tied together in an organic manner town and country. The most famous political figures in the nineteenth century were, according to the oral traditions, Ibrahim Indha Aare, Abyan Digaale Weled Baas, Hirsi Amaan, Wiil Waal, Af Hakame, Ali Duulane.73 Ismail Mire, the Somali poet, referred to some of them in a poem he composed in 1925.74 These men were strictly speaking "big men"75 who gained authority over people within

72 Quoted in Faarax M. J. Cawl, Ignorance is the Enemy of Love, p.6.
73 Only Abyan Weled Baas was a trader. His main commercial interests were in Aden.
74 Ismail Mire, "The Folly of Pride," in B. W. Andrzewski and I. M. Lewis, Somali Poetry, pp.104-107. Andrzejewski and Lewis translated the title of the poem to "The Rewards of Success." But the appropriate title is the "The Folly of Pride." The refrain of the poem is "Ragow kibirka waa labu kufaa, taanta la ogaado" (Oh men, pride brings disaster; let it be remembered." And he referred to specific men whose pride led to their down fall.
their tribal groups. The source of their power was their wealth in livestock, the strength of their personality, ability to lead men in battle, and their strict observance of the pastoral ethic--hospitality, piety, and generosity. This mode of domination corresponded to the economy of the system, and was made and remade "through personal interaction." Burton stated that the "apparatus of rule" in the northern Somali country, was dominated by the elder who was "always superior to his fellows in wealth...sometimes in talent and eloquence, and in deliberations." In some areas, the rich elders had powers over the population they dominated that approximated "feudal conditions." For instance, "The Gerad or Chief of the Wersangeli maintains through his large holdings of "gum plantations" an economic sway over his tribesmen which approximates feudal conditions." Bartle Frere made a similar point. He wrote that in the interior and the coastal towns, "municipal affairs are generally managed by a kind of corporation of (rich) elders." But the power of the big men in reality never extended beyond their own tribal group. Wiil Waal's power, for example, never extended beyond the Ogadeen tribal group, in the Ogadeen country, although he is well remembered throughout the Somali country for his power


77 Ibid., p.130.


as well as for his wit. Indha Aare is also remembered widely. But his power too never extended beyond his tribal group. Any big man who attempted to do so, would have invited an inter-tribal war, and his own fall. Ismail Mire's poem, after all, did not celebrate the power of big men, but related the folly of their greed and fall from grace. For Ismail Mire the key reason for their fall from grace was their pride and greed for more power. The central organizing principle of the society, therefore, was the tribal group, or the segmentary lineage system, which on the one hand created the social context for the emergence of big men, and on the other hand limited their power.

The salient feature of the segmentary lineage system was patrilineal descent (tol). The system consisted of dia-paying groups, primary lineages, clans and clan-families. The largest clan families in the northern Somali country were the Isaaq, the Dir, and the Darood. In the pre-colonial period, however, the clan-families rarely acted as a united corporate groups, since they were often scattered and had very different interests.

The most important aspect of the lineage system, therefore, was the "dia-paying group" or "mag wadaag." It was a coalition of families that traced descent from a common ancestor from four to eight generations. They shared the payment of blood-money, and common defence. They were united in this common approach to outsiders not merely by common descent but also by

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82 I. M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, p.20.
common law (heer). The mag-wadaag, then, defined "the basic jural and political status of the individual." The society, in short, was one based on affinal ties.

But affinal ties did not exhaust the relationships that individuals cultivated. Marriage, religious orders, commercial and political associations, and poetry, were means through which individuals created relations of affiliation that transcended affinal ties. Such relationships were important in that they allowed the person to maintain a self distinct from the dia-paying group. Somali poetry, for example, gives us an insight into the complex relationship between self and other. The poem "My Future Wife" was a private reflection on the sensual, as well as an attempt to establish relations of affiliation among agnatically unrelated individuals. The poet said:

It is in my mind that she whom I would marry
   is the (daughter of) the head of the
   Guleds.
Her color is chocolate, and her hands are like drops
   of rain,
Her ankles are round, her skirt is pleated,
Her steps are not those of a fool, she walks
daintily.
She is after the fashion of an angel, a
   virgin full of skill,
Never yet have I seen the place of your parents...
Last night, for half a night, in my heart I
dreamed of you.
I will give your aged mother a loading camel,
And to your brother one day I may present a
   pure bay pony.
I will flatter your father with a herd of camels.
Lets take our place, and come to my people. 84

83 Ibid, p.21.

The poet attempts to win over the heart of the woman he dreamed about. But his audience is also the family of his beloved: her mother, father, and brother whom he never met. And he asks her to come not only to him but to his people: his family, and his dia-paying group. In the poem, then, the poet strove to create relations of affiliation among unrelated individuals.\footnote{Michael E. Meeker, \textit{The Pastoral Son and the Spirit of Patriarchy: Religion, Society and Person Among East African Stock Keepers} (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), p.152.} Poetry was also used a form through relationships of friendship were established among men and among women. The winning of friends and allies, wrote B. W. Andrzejewski, was always an "unceasing pre-occupation of every" individual. And poetry was the best medium through which friendship was created and cemented.\footnote{B. W. Andrzejewski, "Poetry in Somali Society," \textit{New Society}, p.24.} Thus Ugaas Nur attempted to strengthen his alliance with Wiil-Waal through a short verse. He said:

\begin{quote}
If your knees are afflicted with pain
   I also limp.
If you wear the white cloth of mourning
   I, too, cover it over my body.
And if you loose power
   Mine is also weakened.\footnote{Musa H. I. Galaal, "A Collection of Somali Literature Mainly From Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan," (Manuscript, n.d.).}
\end{quote}

Poetry had other roles in the society, besides the winning of friends and alliances, and the creation of relations of affiliation. It was also a powerful force in tribal conflicts, and in tribal reconciliation; in the dissemination of Islamic theology, and in the veneration of saints.\footnote{B. W. Andrzejewski, "The Veneration of Sufi Saints and its Impact on the Oral Literature of the Somali People and on their Literature in Arabic," \textit{African Language Studies}, vol.15 (1974), pp.15-54.}
The northern Somali society in the pre-colonial era, in short, was a dynamic and productive society that had old and well established roots in the land,\textsuperscript{89} and a network of relationships based on affinal and non-affinal ties. All of these gave the people "an ethnological and political claim to racial individualism that would seem to be at least as good as our own, while there is no reason to suppose that their love of independence and liberty is any less than that of the Americans or ourselves."\textsuperscript{90} Burton referred to the people as a "fierce and turbulent race of Republicans," with very developed national consciousness as Somalis.\textsuperscript{91} The society, moreover, practised a diverse mode of life, protected the environment, established relations based on affinal as well non-affinal ties, and created the social context for the production of a refined and rich poetic tradition as well as for the emergence of big men. The British conquered this society in the late nineteenth century, and precipitated events that led to the decline of the mode of life of the people. Before I discuss the political and social context of the decline of the mode of life of the people, I will briefly in the following section examine the conquest of the northern Somali country and the formation of the Somaliland Protectorate in 1887.

\textbf{Colonial Conquest}

\textsuperscript{89} I have not discussed the origins of the Somali people, since that would have made this chapter too long. Suffice it to say that the Somali people had a long and well-established presence in the Horn of Africa that pre-dated the fourteenth century.

\textsuperscript{90} PRO, C.O.1015/672, "British Somaliland and Its Tribes, January 1945."

\textsuperscript{91} Richard Burton, \textit{First Footsteps}, vol.1, p.122.
According to I. M. Lewis the British conquered the northern Somali country in the late nineteenth century in order to preserve order in the country after the hasty Egyptian withdrawal from the country in 1884, and in order to safeguard the Aden garrison's sources of meat supplies.\textsuperscript{92} Hence, Great Britain's interest in the northern Somali country was not "imperial" but rather "utilitarian," according to Lewis.\textsuperscript{93} Her interests were "utilitarian," because they were "always limited and secondary."\textsuperscript{94} This interpretation ignores two things. First of all, the Aden garrison's meat requirement was minuscule. In 1899 the garrison consumed 1,100 cattle and 6,000 sheep.\textsuperscript{95} The British could have secured that small amount of meat from any Arabian country or from India or from the Sudan. As one report put it, "If we only want food supplies from the coast, we can still get them without asserting by force our right to the whole of the Protectorate as delimited with Italy."\textsuperscript{96} The report continued, "we might retire altogether, making a treaty with Abyssinia that live stock shall be exported free, that imports and exports from Zeila and Berbera shall not be charged more than at present, and that the ports shall not be given to any other European Power without our leave."\textsuperscript{97} Second, the argument ignores the role of culture and


\textsuperscript{93}Ibid., p.41.

\textsuperscript{94}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{95} PRO, F.O.78/5031, Consul-General, Somali Coast protectorate, to Her Majesty's Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, 22 November 1899.

\textsuperscript{96} India Office Records L/P&S/18/B74, Somali Protectorate, 1896.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
cultural representation in the conquest of the northern Somali country. After all, the interaction of the British and the northern Somali people began in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and not in 1884. Moreover, British travellers, naval officers, and naturalists produced a vast literature on the country. That literature consistently called for the conquest, and administration of the country. In other words, British interests were created by British imperial culture which acted "dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales"\(^{98}\) to make inevitable the conquest of the northern Somali country.

The political and cultural contact between the British and the people of Somaliland preceded by more than half a century the formal declaration of the formation of the Somaliland Protectorate in 1887. That contact began in April 1825. In that year, the Brig Mary Anne, a British merchant ship, visited Berbera. Suspicious of the motives of the British merchant ship, the people of the town attacked it. They burned the ship, killed two crew members and wounded the captain. In response, the East India Company sent a naval expedition against the town. The city was bombarded, and blockaded for two years in order to force the people to pay indemnity and sign a treaty that recognized British rights to visit and trade in the town. In 6 February 1827, the people of the town relented, agreed to British demands, and signed a treaty that recognized British rights to trade at any port under the authority of the Sheikhs of the Habr Awal tribe. The treaty also gave the Habr Awal tribe elders the right to trade freely in any port under British jurisdiction. They also paid an indemnity of \(\$15,000\) (Spanish).\(^{99}\) From that date onwards, the

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\(^{99}\) PRO, F.O.78/3188.
contact between the British and the people of the northern Somali coastal towns continued to increase in complexity.

In the period between the 1840s and the late 1870s, British exploration of the northern Somali country increased gradually. It was started by Lt. C. J. Cruttendon in 1848. In 1854, Richard Burton visited the country. He returned in 1855, but his second visit ended in disaster, as the people of the town became suspicious of his intention. On 19 April 1855, Burton's camp was attacked by 350 Somalis. They killed Lt. Stroyan, wounded Burton, and captured Lt. Speke. Lt. Speke's captors asked him "what business the Frank (i.e. British) had in their country." Again the British blockaded the port and called for the signing of another treaty. On 7 November 1856 a treaty was signed by the British and the leaders of the town that recognized the rights of the British to trade in the town, stipulated the ending of the slave trade, and the establishment of an agent to look after British interests in the town. And on October 1866, Brigadier Coghlan, political resident at Aden, signed treaties with the leaders of such Somali towns as Mait, Unkor, Karin, and Ain Terad which called for the ending of the slave trade through the ports.  

In 1870, the Egyptians occupied the northern Somali ports of Berber, Zeila, and Bulhar, and the interior town of Harar. The British initially objected to the Egyptian occupation of the

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100 Richard Burton, *First Footsteps*, vol.2, p.104. The people of the northern Somali country understood the connection between exploration and conquest. Lt. Speke was refused entry into the interior at Las Korey in 1854. The people held a meeting as to whether to admit him into the interior or not. "The voice of the multitude was as usual contra, fearing to admit a wolf into the fold." *(Ibid, vol.2, p.116.)*

101 PRO, F.O.78/3189, Confidential: Egyptian Claims to Sovereignty Over the Somali Coast, no.1, 1870-1874, Appendix A. This document contains all the treaties signed by the British and Somali elders between 1840 and 1866.
towns, but in the end relented, fearing the more dangerous prospect of either Turkish or French occupation of the coast. The Egyptian occupation lasted until 1884. They were forced out by financial difficulties, as well as by the Arabi and Mahdi rebellions. After which the British signed a new set of treaties with elders in the main coastal towns, under which they pledged to never sell, cede, or give away any part of the territory of the northern Somali people, and to protect and respect their rights. Immediately after, the occupation of Zeila, Berbera, and Bulhar took place. Three years later, the formation of the Somaliland Protectorate was proclaimed.

"The European power," wrote Douglas Jardine, "that deliberately...acquire(s) new territories...earnestly seeks, and invariably finds, some high and noble motive to cloak the baser issue." Great Britain's conquest and colonisation of Somaliland was not any different. Travellers, naturalists, naval officers, administrators (of Aden and India) justified the conquest in terms of the need to educate and discipline the Somali; or in terms of ending the slave trade; or in terms of the needs of meat of the Aden garrison and the need to exploit the wealth of the interior. Lt. Cruttendon, for example, "earnestly hoped that English enterprise will open this (Somali) trade before long." And W. D. Cooley hoped that English conquest of the ancient land of the northern Somali people will once again make the country a "cultivated garden."

102 PRO, F.O.78/3857, Brigadier-General Blair, Aden Resident, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Bombay, 26 December 1884.
Burton, moreover, gave three reasons for the occupation of the country. First, the importance of the wealth of the towns and the interior, and the fact that other powers were covetous of the country, mainly France, Italy, and Turkey. If we refuse to occupy the country, he warned, another European country will colonize it without hesitation. Second, the importance of the trade of the Somali country, the lack of chiefs, and the continuous petty feuds, forces us to "provide against such contingencies" by occupation. Occupation of the country, in other words, was viewed a necessary step for the imposition of law and order. Third, the country is not a stranger to foreign occupation, since it was "occupied in turn by the Furs (i.e. Persians), the Arabs, the Turks, the Gallas, and the Somal." Its future is likely, he added, to be as varied as its past. His argument then highlighted the availability of the country for conquest, rule, and domination. He had a ready answer for sceptics about the need for, and necessity of, the occupation of the Somali country. He stated that peace "is the dream of the wise," while war is the "history of man." Britain did not win "ground in both hemispheres" through peace, he insisted, but through war. But above all, expansion is necessary to the survival of the white race. "The facts of history," he wrote, "prove nothing more conclusively than this: a race either increases or diminishes." And "The children of Time, like the sire, cannot stand still." Similar arguments were put forth by British naval officers in the 1880s, in the era of the European scramble over Africa. In that period, the British conquest was called for, and justified on the ground, that it was necessary for

107 Ibid., p.xxx-xxxi.
the "maintenance of order, freedom of trade, and suppression of the slave trade."\(^{108}\) It was also justified on educational grounds. Since the northern Somali had no conception of government, and were always involved in petty feuds, colonial conquest would be "the only safe way of arranging for the autonomy of the Somal" and begin the "task of educating the Somal in self-government."\(^{109}\)

British officers, then, viewed themselves as "philanthropic invaders," to use Winston Churchill's term.\(^{110}\) Churchill defined imperial philanthropy in the following terms:

> What enterprise that an enlightened community may attempt is more noble and more profitable than the reclamation from barbarism of fertile regions and large populations? To give peace to warring tribes, to administer justice where all was violence, to strike the chains of the slave, to draw the richness from the soil, to plant the seeds of commerce and learning, to increase in whole peoples their capacities for pleasure and diminish their chances of pain—what more beautiful ideal or more valuable reward can inspire human effort?\(^{111}\)

It was that "beautiful ideal" that inspired the conquest of the northern Somali country in the late nineteenth century. It was the ideal of the civilizing mission. It was a mission that Churchill characterized as virtuous, invigorating, and profitable.\(^{112}\)

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\(^{108}\) PRO, F.O.78/3726, The Earl of Kimberley to the Viceroy of India, May 1884.

\(^{109}\) PRO, F.O.78/3726, Memorandum: from Major F. M. Hunter to Earl of Kimberley, June 1884.


\(^{111}\) Ibid.

\(^{112}\) Ibid.
Decline of Mode of Life

Colonial conquest ushered in a period of extreme violence, and political and social instability. It led to the rise in rural poverty, population decline, and the degradation of the environment. If Somaliland was a prosperous and park-like country in the pre-colonial period, it became by the 1940's a poor, dry, wind swept place. Two key factors played a central role in that process: the creation of borders and the development of a politics of extreme violence.

After the proclamation of the Somaliland Protectorate in 1887, Great Britain began negotiations over the delimitation of the borders of Somaliland with Italy, Ethiopia, and France. The delimitation treaties with Italy and France had no direct effect on the people of Somaliland. But the 1897 treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia had an immediate impact on the mode of life of the people of Somaliland. The treaty accepted Ethiopian claims of suzerainty over the Haud which was a very important region for pastoralists. The Ethiopian government did not close the Haud to the pastoralists of Somaliland, since the treaty recognized their right to graze their stock in the area, but made life difficult for them. The Ethiopian government imposed heavy taxes on them, and often raided and looted their stock. In sum, the actions of the Ethiopian government made the Haud an insecure area for pastoralists. Consequently, the pastoralists avoided the deep Haud, and grazed their stock on the northern part of the Haud and on the

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113 I discuss the impact of the spread of contagious diseases in chapter four, and the impact of the decline in productivity and in the export value of commodities in chapter six.

114 PRO, W.O.106/21, Swayne to Dr. Harrington, 5 April 1905. (I discuss this issue a little more below.)
interior plateau. That created overcrowded conditions on the northern Haud and the plateau, and led to overgrazing.

The problems of the pastoralists of Somaliland were exacerbated by the rise of Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan—the Somali nationalist, mystic, and poet—who began in 1899 a campaign of resistance against the British, and unleashed a period of extreme violence in Somaliland. The story of the Sayyid's rise in 1899 and fall in 1920, is often treated in the literature as the story of the development of Somali nationalism. The literature completely avoids the question as to how the life-world of the people was affected by the Sayyid's movement. The literature thus reduces the period from 1899 to 1920 to a sort of a private-history or a biography of the Sayyid: his struggles against colonial and Christian domination, military tactics, and poetry.

Although the Sayyid was a great nationalist who never wavered in his opposition to the British, and articulated with imagination the deep national consciousness of the Somali people—a consciousness based on the cultural, linguistic, and religious unity of the people—nevertheless,


116 See chapter one for a brief discussion of the historical origins of the Somali national consciousness. I argued in chapter one that Somali national consciousness was not imagined or engendered by any feverish colonial imagination.
his movement played a crucial role in the decline of the mode of life of the people of Somaliland, inflaming tribal war and hatred between the Isaaq and the Darood, and in the deterioration of the environment. Ironically that made the Sayyid--particularly after 1910--as unpopular as the British administration. Major-General Rudolph Slatin, the Civil-Inspector of the Sudan, and a member of the 1909 mission to Somaliland, pointed out the unpopularity of the administration, and its failure to gain the cooperation and sympathy of the people.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the poetic combat between the Sayyid and Isaaq pastoralists, some of which I refer to below, demonstrate the unpopularity of the Sayyid and his dervish movement. Since the story of the Sayyid's rise and fall has been told and retold so many times, I will present briefly the contours of the story, and then analyze the various ways that the Sayyid's movement contributed to the degradation of the mode of life of the people of Somaliland.

From 1900 to 1920 the history of Somaliland was largely a history of, on the one hand, a conflict between the British and the Sayyid, and on the other, between the Sayyid and the Isaaq pastoralists. That history had very humble origins. A soldier in the employ of the British lost a gun, which he claimed was stolen by the Sayyid. The Vice-Consul, H. E. S. Cordeaux, wrote in March 1899 to the Sayyid and asked him "if the rifle is with you it must be returned to Berbera immediately."¹¹⁸ The Sayyid's answer was curt: "Oh, man I have not stolen anything from thee nor from anyone else. Seek thy object from whom who has stolen of thee, and serve whom thou

¹¹⁷ PRO, 537/44, Slatin to Wingate, 1909.

¹¹⁸ PRO, W.O.106/18, Vice-Consul Cordeaux to Haji Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, 29 March 1899.
pleaseth."\textsuperscript{119} In August the Sayyid went to Burao, declared a jihad against the British, asked for public support, and wrote a letter to J. H. Sadler, the Consul-General of the Somaliland Protectorate, in which he accused him of oppressing the oppressing the people, and concluded, "Now choose for yourself; if you want war we accept it, if you want peace pay the fine."\textsuperscript{120} The Consul-General chose war. He wrote Aden and the imperial government for reinforcements. "I am convinced," he opined, "of the necessity of driving back this pest by force of arms."\textsuperscript{121}

Shortly thereafter, the expeditionary period in Somaliland began in earnest. It lasted from 1901 to 1905. In that period, four Anglo-Ethiopian expeditions were organized against the Sayyid. The first three expeditions were unsuccessful. But the fourth expedition decisively destroyed the Sayyid's dervish army at Jidballe. The Sayyid consequently was compelled to seek the protection of the Italians. From 1905 to 1907, he remained at Illig, Majertania, northeastern Somalia. In 1907, however, he bolted from Illig, and returned to Somaliland. The main reason was that he became short of livestock.\textsuperscript{122} His own poem, "A Land of Drought," supports that conclusion. He complained that while he was in the Haud and the plateau, he had camels, "abundance of wealth," huts filled with silk and fine cloth, but since he moved to the Doodi plain in Majertania, his camels perished, and he became poor. He stated,

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} PRO, W.O.106/18, Haji Muhammad Abdullah to Vice-Consul Cordeaux.
\item \textsuperscript{120} PRO, F.O.78/5031, Inclosure no.1, Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan to Consul-General, 1 September 1899.
\item \textsuperscript{121} PRO, F.O.78/5031, Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury, 23 September 1899.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Sir Geoffrey Archer, \textit{Personal and Historical}, p.63.
\end{itemize}
This is a place without one patch of ground
Where the wild game herd could graze
It is a place where beasts must pluck
Small mouthfuls here and there of scrub and straw
It is a place of no abiding use.123

Besides, the Sayyid never abandoned the idea of becoming the master of the whole of Somaliland.124

Ironically, Winston Churchill, the Secretary of state for the Colonies, visited Somaliland the same year the Sayyid returned to it from Illig. Churchill made it clear that the British government would not become involved in the organization of yet more expeditions against the Sayyid, and squander millions more in vain interference in Somaliland.125 The imperial government thus did nothing from 1907 to 1909. But in 1909 it sent a mission to Somaliland whose mandate was to assess the prospects for peace with the Sayyid, and present to the imperial government final recommendation about what strategies to adopt towards Somaliland. The mission recommended a coastal concentration policy, and the evacuation of the interior. The object of the strategy was to strike two birds with one stone: on the one hand cut British expenditure, on the other use the Isaaq pastoralists as a "buffer" against the Sayyid.126 The administration, in essence, transferred the burden of the war to the Isaaq pastoralists. Both Major-General Rudolph Slatin, the Civil-Inspector of the Sudan, who was a member of the

126 PRO, W.O.106/22, Acting Commissioner to Secretary of State, 27 June 1913.
mission, and Colonel William Manning, the commander of the Somaliland Field Forces, made clear their intention to transfer the war to the Isaaq. Colonel William Manning stated that the only way the "dormant virility" of the Isaaq could be rekindled was through a "little rough usage from the Dervishes", i.e., the Sayyid's forces. And Major-General Rudolph Slatin recommended to General Reginald Wingate, the head of the mission and the Governor of the Sudan, that we withdraw to the coast, and let the nomadic tribes (the Isaaq) of Somaliland "stew in their own juice." The administration and the mission were intent on demonstrating to the Isaaq pastoralists who hitherto refused to cooperate with the British against the Sayyid, "by its very absence the real value of British administration." The British distributed arms, ammunition, ponies, and mules to the Isaaq, and on 26 March 1910 evacuated the interior.

Immediately after the British evacuation, the Sayyid established "an empire" in the interior, and gave the Isaaq pastoralists, as Sir William Manning was hoping, very rough treatment. He attacked their settlements, killed thousands of men, and looted their stock. The civil war between the Sayyid and the Isaaq pastoralists was characterized by Douglas Jardine as a "holocaust." "In this holocaust," he wrote, "it is estimated that no less than one-third of

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127 Douglas jardine, Mad Mullah, p.194.

128 PRO, C.O.537/44, Slatin to Wingate, 1909.

129 PRO, W.O.106/22, Byatt to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 August 1911.

the...population of Somaliland perished between 1910 and 1912. A famine and small pox epidemic exacerbated the demographic disaster. Moreover, the war in the interior brought trade in the coastal towns to a halt, and Somali and alien traders complained to the government about their unsold goods lying in the warehouses, and pleaded with the government to stabilize the situation in the interior. The administration, consequently, felt compelled to do something to protect the interests of the traders, and formed in 1912 the Somaliland Camel Corps, a small mobile force, whose responsibility was to secure the trade routes: Burao-Berbera, and the Hargeisa-Berbera roads.

On 8 August 1913, R. C. Corfield, the commander of the Somaliland Camel Corps, heard of a dervish raiding party near Burao. Corfield, eager to leave his mark in the war against the Sayyid, pursued the dervish force. He met them at Dul-Madobe, a hill-top southeast of Burao. A bloody engagement followed in which the Camel Corps were decimated, and Corfield killed. The negative publicity attracted by the horrible defeat inflicted on the corps, forced the government to modify its coastal concentration policy, and re-occupy the main interior towns close to Berbera, that is, Hargeisa and Burao. But the administration refrained from waging any systematic campaign against the Sayyid. Rather, it continued to use the Isaaq pastoralists as a

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132 PRO, W.O.106/23, "Memorandum By the Commissioner on the Political Situation in Somaliland", 12 April 1912.

buffer against the Sayyid. Once the First World War ended, however, the imperial government decided to use the full weight of the empire against the Sayyid in 1920. Using combined air, sea, and land forces, the Sayyid's army, weakened by the civil war, was dispersed and his forts destroyed. The Sayyid escaped to Imay, a town in southern Ethiopia. The Isaaq poet, Ali Jama Haabiil, noted the occasion gleefully in a short verse. He said:

It is just to mock a person who used to be harsh to you.  
So all of you look, as the priest runs for his    
life like the wind.                      

The poem expresses exaltation over the fall and defeat over the Sayyid. It is a strange reaction that the literature on the Sayyid is silent about. It shows the unpopularity of the Sayyid in Somaliland. And it was not only the Isaaq who were happy that the "priest" is finally gone with the wind. The Dhulbahanta poet, Ali Adan Dhuux also expressed great relief that the Sayyid was finally defeated. What then made the Sayyid so despised by the people since he was otherwise admired for his powerful and imaginative poetry, and his lack of sympathy for Europeans?

There were three main factors that made the Sayyid unpopular from 1910 onwards. First, according to Sheikh Jamaac Cumar Ciise the "dervishes (Sayyid's forces) believed that camels and horses were not the private possession of anybody, but were the common property of all."

The Sayyid consequently looted the stock of the pastoralists without compunction. As Ismail Mire, the dervish general stated in an interview, "(t)he mullah's men would ride up to a herdsman

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134 Sheikh Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Diwaanka Gabayaddii Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xasan (Mogadishu: Wakaalada Madbacada Qaranka, 1974), p.39. (Translation is mine.)
and say, "Join me and my brother and bring all your sheep and goats and camels," and if he agreed, they let him come and, if he did not, they killed him and took the stock."135 Second, the Sayyid, unlike all the pre-colonial "big men" attempted to establish his own government and even "empire" over the whole people. His "empire" and system of rule was, in addition, very autocratic. He insisted that he be called "Father" and that all his followers give up their wealth and labour to him and to the cause. But such a system was completely alien to the ethic of the people of Somaliland. And as we have seen above although the society produced "big men", nevertheless, they were never allowed to attain autocratic powers, and even if they achieved such power, they were opposed until their power was destroyed. Third, the Sayyid's autocratic rule, his looting of the stock of the pastoralists, and the general violence that his movement unleashed on the society, made him extremely unpopular—as unpopular as the British administration. His unpopularity outlived him. As Saadia Touval asserted the Sayyid's "religious fanaticism, his despotic rule over his followers, and his bloody massacres of his fellow Somalis have not been forgotten."136

The Sayyid began the tradition, so to speak, of looting the wealth of the pastoralists in 1900. In that year, he attacked Isaaq pastoralists, and carried off 2,000 camels. The pastoralists responded by moving their stock from the Haud to the interior plateau. Consequently, the plateau "became perilously overcrowded."137 This pattern continued throughout the period of struggle

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135 Diana Fearson, "Ismail," Corona (June 1952), p.239.
137 I. M. Lewis, Modern History, p.72.
between the Sayyid and the British. It led to over-grazing in the plateau, environmental degradation, and the recurrence of severe droughts. But it was not only the Sayyid who looted the wealth of the pastoralists. The British and the Ethiopians did the same. The first British expeditionary force attacked Isaaq pastoralists in the Solweyne plain south of Burao, and carried off "three thousand and five hundred camels and a quantity of other stock."\(^{138}\)

The Ethiopians, moreover, did the same thing in the 1890s and during the expeditionary period. In 1893 Sir Horace Walope, Under-Secretary of State for India, referred to the "oppressive proceeding of the Abyssinians in regard to the levy of a daily tribute of sheep on the Yunis Jibriil section of the Jibriil Abokor tribe (Isaaq), and also to the repeated devastation of the Ogaden country by the Abyssinians."\(^{139}\) Brigadier-General J. Jopp, the Political Resident at Aden, also referred to "Abyssinians incursions...for raiding purposes and levy of tribute" on Somali pastoralists whether Ogadeen or Isaaq.\(^{140}\) E. J. Sadler, the administrator of the protectorate, reported that Somali tribes pay "1,000 sheep a year, more or less, and that the number was not fixed, but fluctuating and arbitrary."\(^{141}\) Captain R. B. Cobbold who accompanied the first Ethiopian expeditionary force in 1901, furthermore, reported "(t)he horrible looting of

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\(^{139}\) PRO, F.O.844/2, Sir Horace Walope to Foreign Office, 11 January 1893.

\(^{140}\) PRO, F.O.844/4, Brigadier-General J. Jopp to Secretary to Government of Bombay, 9 September 1983.

\(^{141}\) PRO, W.O.106/21, E. J. Sadler to Dr. Harrington, 5 April 1905.
the friendly villages." He stated that they carried off at the least 2,000 camels, and reduced a whole tribe to destitution.\textsuperscript{142}

The perpetual state of warfare between 1901 and 1904, and the continuous raiding of stock by the expeditionary forces, as Brigadier-General Swayne reported, devastated the flocks of the people.\textsuperscript{143} The situation improved from 1905 to 1907, while the Sayyid was at Illig. But once he returned to Somaliland in 1907, he began looting the pastoralists. He had to refill his empty coffers. Besides, he made extravagant promises to his own paternal tribe, the Ogadeen, whose support he badly needed. He promised them:

\begin{quote}
Weapons, possessions, property, livestock, and gifts without end, Whatever you expect from me, you will receive. Come to me! You will be drenched in God's munificence.\textsuperscript{144}
\end{quote}

The Sayyid filled his empty and desolate corrals, with the wealth, possessions, property, and livestock of the pastoralists of Somaliland. The Sayyid often mentioned the looting of the camels of the pastoralists in his own poetry. In one poem, for instance, he asks the dervishes:

\begin{quote}
Who will lead a war party, and attack Rer Dalal kill all the men of Rer Subeyr
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{144} B. W. Andrzejewski and I. M. Lewis, Somali Poetry, p.102.
and take their stock
Who believes in God and Islam
and will join the war party.\textsuperscript{145}

In another poem he related the looting of the stock of a settlement, and the execution of all the
men. He spoke to one person whom the dervishes killed. He said:

If yesterday you were brought
winds, dust, and death.
If the wealth of your kinsmen were taken.
If your settlement was razed to the ground.
And the men were repeatedly stabbed with spears.
If Your elder sons were given to the birds of prey...
What would you say tonight?
Or would you plead for mercy,
As it is the custom of the low-caste?\textsuperscript{146}

The most famous stock loot of the Sayyid was called "Geel Daboolane" (literally the covered
stock). The Dervishes looted it from the Isaaq (the Habr Younis clan family) in about 1908. An
attempt was made by the Habr Younis elders and jurists to recover the camels from the Sayyid
through negotiations. The Sayyid responded with a poem in which he refused to return the looted
stock, and even boasted:

"...I killed your blind and elders.
Your scholars and poor are weak.
It is I who took everything from your people."\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{145} Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan, "Daraawiishta Saalixiya," in Sheikh Cumar Ciise,

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.,pp.182-183.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.,p.178. (Translation is mine.)
After the British evacuated the interior in 1910, and concentrated its forces on the coastal towns, the situation in the interior became even worse. The Sayyid immediately began attacking the pastoralists, in particular the Isaaq and the Dhulbahanta. The Sayyid boasted in one poem about an attack on a Dhulbahanta settlement, and the execution of all the men, except Ali Adan (Ali Dhuux), who, as the Sayyid related, escaped with fear to Aden. He mentioned the names of the elders of the Dhulbahanta clan who were killed by the dervish war party. The result was a major demographic catastrophe between 1910 and 1913. Douglas Jardine described it as a "holocaust." "In this holocaust," he wrote, "it is estimated that no less than one-third of the...population of Somaliland perished." In the Somali oral traditions that period is well known as "Harrama Cune" (the unhallowed time).

The Isaaq poet, Ali Jama Haabiil, related the extreme violence that the Sayyid unleashed not only against the Isaaq but also against the Dhulbahanta. He denounced the Sayyid--"crazed priest" as he liked to call him--for killing people, for looting their stock, for living well while starving everyone else, and for other immoral propensities unbecoming of a self-proclaimed man of God. To add insult to injury, he called him an "Italian." that is, an "infidel." He said:

A crazed priest has descended upon us from the plains of Nogaal.
He has improvised us from stock and wealth.
People used to help a man on a journey, and not loot him.

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But the Sayyid gorges himself with their dates and meat.
Is that veritable Italian a Mahdi, for this is strange.
Of women, he owns seventy and the number of those
he has divorced is far greater.
He has slit the throats of a thousand pious men
like sheep.
He enriched himself with the wealth of the weak and orphans.
Is that veritable Italian a Mahdi, for this is strange.
You (Dhulbahanta) thought that the horrible massacre
of the Isaaq would bring you heavenly bliss.
But look now, you who have suspected us
of cohorting with the infidels!
Now you may lick the tears and blood from the cheeks
of your bereaved women.
And move on to your death, for the sound you hear
is that of the other world.
Is that veritable Italian a Mahdi, for this is strange.\footnote{Cited in Abdi Sheikh-Abdi, \textit{Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920)} (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1993), pp.52-53.}

The period, then, was one defined by violence directed by the Sayyid against the Isaaq, tribal
hatred between the Isaaq and the Darood, destitution, and demographic decline. The poet's
reference to the Dhulbahanta was significant, since the war between the Isaaq and the Sayyid
increased the suspicions and antagonism between the Isaaq and the Dhulbahanta on the one hand,
and the Isaaq and the Ogadeen on the other. The civil war, thus, created a new tradition of
coalition between the large clan-families which never existed in the pre-colonial period.

The re-occupation of the interior by the administration in 1912 neither ended the war, nor
relieved the pressure on the pastures of the plateau. To the contrary. Both the Somaliland Camel
Corps and the Sayyid's dervishes increased the pressure on the people. The Somaliland Camel
Corps regularly undertook punitive measures against pastoralists in which they killed men and
carried off camels, cattle, sheep, and horses. In 1912, for example, H. A. Byatt, the Governor of the territory, imposed a fine on a dia-paying group. Corfield, the commander of the Somaliland Camel Corps, forcefully collected the fine. He encircled the settlement, killed thirty-eight men, and carried off 1,282 camels, 11,300 sheep, 170 cows, 17 donkeys, 6 horses and 16 rifles. He collected a fine from the Habr Jeclo clan family in a similar fashion in 1913. The Camel Corps "made a rapid decent upon them and drove off with more than the amount of stock required to meet their liabilities."  

Meanwhile, the Sayyid also increased the pressure on the pastoralists. He raided pastoralists, looted their stock, and killed hundreds if not thousands of men. Ismail Mire, the dervish general, and an accomplished poet and stylist, recorded the tragic events in the post-Harrama Cune period in a poem. He was forced to reflect on the events of the period because one old woman accused him of untold crimes. He said:

All night, oh Mohamed, I was awake.
Sleep abandoned me, my dear,
    as I thought about what the woman said.
You destroyed my world she said.
She said you attacked my homestead.
She said you made me homeless and took my burden-camel.
She said you killed my sons.
She said you forced me to live in hunger in many rainy seasons.
She said you slaughtered the brave.
Let me recite a poem about her curse....
The dead that lay at the plains that Good (the Sayyid) attacked.
The bones that were scattered everywhere one travelled.

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151 PRO, W.O.106/22, R. C. Corfield to His Majesty's Commissioner, 26 December 1912.

152 PRO, W.O.106/22, Byatt, Commissioner of Somaliland, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 April 1913.
The she-camels looted from the Ogadeen.
The wealth swiftly taken from the Isaaq.
The poverty that forced young men to aimlessly roam about.
The hunger that weakened the aristocrat.
The people that dispersed hither and thither.
The noisy areoplanes and all that moved in the sky.
The houses destroyed and the walls that fell.
All of the death and tragedy that beset the people...
I was not the only one responsible for it,
as death visited all.\(^\text{153}\)

Another dervish, Sheikh Ismail Axmed, who returned to his settlement in the Erigavo district after the defeat of the Sayyid, and who was also accused of participating in an unjust and violent movement, responded by composing a poem in which he, like Ismail Mire, retold the tragic story of the dervish attacks and blamed them all on the Sayyid. He said:

...Did I encourage the priest to hate the world?
He travelled to Mecca for religion,
He was sent, but did I bring him back?
Did I slip him through the port of Berbera?
Did I sent him a boat to travel over the sea?
He came with aggression, but was I responsible for what de did?
...Did I ask him to settle in Jidali and the areas he cordoned off?
Did I built for him forts at Docmo and Nugaal?
Did I construct the walls he placed one on top the other?
Did I show the way to his raiding forces?
Did I loot the camels of the men who were settled here?\(^\text{154}\)

Both Ismail Mire and Sheikh Ismail Axmed make reference to the Sayyid's raids, looting of camels, and the destruction of the world of the pastoralists. Ismail Mire's poem is more detailed,

\(^{153}\)  Sheikh Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Diiwaankii Gabayadii, pp.xi-xii. (Translation mine.)

\(^{154}\)  Sheikh Ismail Axmed, "Ma Anaa?" in Suugaan: Dugsiga Sare, Fasalka Labaad (Mogadishu: Harunta Harumarinta Manaahijta, n.d.), pp.45-46. (Translation is mine.)
and represents the violence of the period more graphically. He mentions some of the major battle
grounds—Beerdhiga, Xargaga, Ruuga, to mention a few—between the Sayyid and the Isaaq, the
destroyed houses, the swiftly looted camels from the Isaaq and the Ogadeen, the young men and
wealthy aristocrat reduced to poverty and hunger, the displaced people who moved hither and
thither homeless and without even a burden-camel, and the tragedy that beset the people of
Somaliland in the period from 1913 to 1920, and more generally, from 1900 to 1920. The
Dervish wars, according to Jardine, "involved, directly or indirectly, the untimely destruction of,
perhaps, 200,000 lives."155

Moreover, the environment was badly damaged as people congregated in the plateau and
avoided the Haud in the rainy seasons. The Sayyid himself complained in one poem, as if he
missed the easy loot, "The large camel herds graze no more, in the lush Haud."156 The Haud was
abandoned because he controlled almost half of the country. He established posts at various
points in the Nogaal and Ain valleys: Galadi, Damot, Elmaddu, Urgai, Odergoeh, and built forts
throughout the southern and eastern parts of the country: Jidali, Docmo, Surad, Badan,
Gulburiburi, and Talex.157 His biggest fort, Talex, was located at the southeastern edge of
Somaliland. The location of the fort, and the post at Ain, made it impossible for the pastoralists
to move their stock to the Haud during the rainy seasons. The pastoralists, thus, concentrated
their stock on the plateau. Consequently, the environment was badly damaged, the plateau

156 Ibid., p.23. (translation is mine.)
became shorn of pasture, trees felled, and erosion set in. As one report stated, the war and the disturbances had profound negative impact on the economy and ecology:

Trade with the coastal towns was disrupted and did lasting damage to the economy of the Protectorate, for it encouraged the use by Ethiopian exporters of the newly opened Franco-Ethiopian railway. This permanently weakened the position of Berbera and Zeila as the traditional outlets for the products of the Ethiopian hinterland. Serious damage was also caused in the grazing areas, because seasonal migrations of people and stock were disorganized and overgrazing in certain areas led to soil erosion on a large scale from which they never fully recovered. ¹⁵⁸

The rise in the population of the towns, which became refuge for victims of the Sayyid's raids, also increased the felling of trees for the construction of temporary houses, or for firewood. The 1905 colonial report referred to the emergence of a "small industry"--the charcoal making industry, which was "confined to the Isa Musa (Isaaq) who make the best quality from the "galol" and "Korat" wood." The report added, "The fuel, sold at 6 annas per 28 lbs., is also used in the local coffee shops."¹⁵⁹ The emergence of this "small industry" exacerbated the deterioration of the environment and accelerated soil erosion. The various droughts that afflicted country: 1910-1913, 1918, 1924, 1927-1930, 1933-1934, also increased soil erosion and the deterioration of the environment.

Ismail Mire composed a poem during the 1924 drought about the deterioration of the ecology of Somaliland. He said:


O Hoopoe, when you shed your tears,
Crying for the rains of spring
And spurning the lightest wink of sleep
Just because your craw is empty,
Do you imagine that you, and you alone
Are scorched by this drought?
No, a great disaster has befallen
All God's servants, everyone of them...
There are men, once rich with milch-beasts,
Who are now too weak to rise at the assembly-ground.
Young men drift to the villages, loitering, looking about
In the shops there are dates, and guard must be kept
For they would take those dates and run
But for the fear of the tin-roofed jail.
The ostrich hen no longer stirs,
Nor half the asses of the wilderness.
In vain do the brawny-shouldered oryx bucks
Strive to raise themselves up from the ground
Those solitary grazers sink down in the burnt scrubland.
A scant few gazelles among garanuug and deero survive
But for the Sakaaro and her fawns there is no chance...
The Kudu is slaughtered, his flesh cut up for meat
Even by nobly-born men and soldiers in full array.
Never does the lion of the rocks now roar on Toomo plain
And the leopards that once were killers of goats
Have perished themselves at the hands of hunters...
Gone are the burden camels, gone are all the short-horned cattle
Sheep and goats, fattened for slaughter, are scarcely to be seen
The skin flask from which the ghee was served
Is shrivelled and musty from disuse...
You see around you on the ground--
They are the bones of hyenas, bones of vulture...
In the vale that used to yield grazing
No beast now bellows...

As the poem clearly and imaginatively shows, the ecology of the country changed
dramatically by 1924. The wild animals, the livestock, the strong camels, the sheep fattened for

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slaughter, the short-horned cattle were all gone or reduced greatly in number, victims of the
burned land, the empty vale, and the desiccated plateau. Ismail Mire observed also the poverty
that affected men hitherto rich in livestock who became so weak because of hunger that they
were unable to "raise themselves up from the ground," and the drift of destitute young men to the
towns. Indeed from 1910 onwards, the drift of the poor to the towns compelled the
administration to establish a permanent camp for the elderly poor at Berbera, and to open each
year relief camps for drought victims in various places.  

In the 1930s the degradation of the environment continued, particularly after the Italian
conquest of Ethiopia in 1935. Although the Italians encouraged trade between Somaliland and
Ethiopia, they nevertheless, discouraged the trans-frontier migrations of the pastoralists, and
attempted in cooperation with the British to fix the residence of the pastoralists for administrative
purposes in Somaliland, Somalia, and Ethiopia.  

In many occasions, also "Italian Somali troops
looted stock from British Somalis." Consequently, pastoralists kept their stock in the plateau,
which only exacerbated the degradation of the environment. By 1938, the ecology of the country
reached as one report observed a critical and serious position. The report stated that "When one
considers that Somaliland is mainly a pastoral country with at least ninety percent of the people
dependent on stock, and when one sees the scarcity of grazing, one realises the gravity of the

161 See Chapter Four. The camps were organized by the Medical department.

August 1938.

situation." The report added that "With an area of 68,000 square miles...(and) with huge tracts bare and desiccated, the position is serious." The report blamed the desiccation of the grazing areas on "accelerated erosion."  

If in 1848, Lt. Cruttendon observed a beautiful country inhabited by a prosperous people who herded large flock of camels, goats, and sheep; in 1943, Colonel Jameson, Chief of Civil Affairs Staff, East African Command, witnessed a dry, wind-swept country inhabited by people who led a precarious mode of life. In his tour of the country, Colonel Jameson was amazed at the level of desertification that took place in Somaliland. He wrote, "What was reported to have been...park-like land fifty years ago is now just a barren, dusty, wind-swept waste, across which the stock go for about three days march to water at the wells, and then return to the nearest grazing."  

He added the British "had an active share in the spoiling of the country by extensive clearing of bush to provide field of fire, zaribas, and temporary buildings during the Mullah campaigns, and the ground has never recovered."  

He pointed out that Burao which was reported fifty years ago as "being a beautiful area of grass, bush, and trees; and the most attractive place between Berbera and Webi shebelli" has become a wasteland, a place where during the greater part of the day the atmosphere is laden with dust and is most unpleasant and harmful. At Ain, he saw, a plain that was "desolate, ugly, and dispiriting." And the road from

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166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
Burao to Erigavo was replete with the "stumps of dead trees—the grave yard monuments of a once wooded area."\(^{168}\) John Hunt, furthermore, mentioned some of the dead forests in the country, and the erosion of the soil that made the recovery of the pasture areas impossible. He maintained the cause of the dead forests were erosion caused by over grazing; lessening of rainfall and increase in droughts; tree cutting, and charcoal burning as the urban centres became more populated.\(^{169}\) He stated that in the pre-colonial period, the "balance was naturally adjusted to preserve the soil on which the nomadic tribes grazed their stock." "Development and invention," he added, "have upset this balance."\(^{170}\) More than development or invention, however, it was the creation of borders, the wars of pacification, the concentration of the pastoralists in the plateau throughout the first forty years of this century as a result of the closure of the Haad and the rise in insecurity, the lessening of rainfall, soil erosion, and tree cutting, that disturbed the balance of the ecology of Somaliland, led to the death of forests, and transformed the countryside into a desolate, dry, wasteland.

In conclusion, all of these developments played a key role in the decline of the daily life of the people by the 1940s. Colonial reports, such as the 1945 report on pauperism,\(^{171}\) and the

\(^{168}\) Ibid.


\(^{170}\) Ibid., p.105.

various reports by G. T. Fisher, the Governor of Somaliland from 1943 to 1948, noted the increase in destitution in the rural and urban areas, the degradation of the environment, and the recurrence of droughts. The 1945 report on pauperism stated that when a drought occurred "a great number of people were rendered rapidly destitute." Margaret Laurence mentioned the large number of beggars and half-starved men and women at Hargeisa in 1952. And Ali Hammal, the Somali sailor and poet, opined upon his return to Burao in the late 1940s, "Poverty has a tree to shade under/ in the plains of Bancawl." The poverty he symbolically portrayed as a tree was the poverty of a land shorn of grass, trees, and forests, and the material poverty of the pastoralists whose daily life which hitherto depended on a rich and beautiful ecology was weakened during the early colonial period.

The decline in the daily life forced the people to entertain, and in principle welcome, the mass education policies of the government in the late colonial period. Colonial officers could not explain the cause of the "change of heart," as they often put it, of the people towards the government. T. C. Jerrom, the Secretary to the Government, stated that even though the administration was extremely unpopular with the people in the early colonial period, and that the people maintained a "notable record of resistance to the blessings and liabilities" of western

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174 Margaret Laurence, Prophet's Camel Bell, p.35.

civilization, in the post-war period they became anxious for social and economic development, and eager to embrace western ideas. He explained the transformation in the attitude of the people towards the government's programmes as a new phenomenon brought about by the 1939-1945 war, and the contact of the people with East African soldiers, telegraph operators, and clerks, who brought Somalilanders to a sudden realization of their backwardness. The 1948 and 1949 colonial reports made a similar explanation. Moreover, I. M. Lewis and Abdi Samatar argued that the change in the people's attitude towards the government and its programmes was instigated by the war which unleashed modernist trends, and strengthened the petite bourgeoisie. These arguments over stress the role of the war in the transformation of the people's attitude towards the government and its mass education programmes. They ignore the more important role played by the changes in the mode of life of the people. It was, in fact, the frailty and exhaustion of the mode of life of the people which became increasingly incapable of sustaining them, or of fulfilling their aspiration, and began to be "replaced by other modes of life"-such as work in the urban service sector, and government service--that forced the people


177 Ibid.


to entertain, and in principle, welcome the mass education policies of the administration which stressed the protection of the environment, education, and community development. The various aspects of mass education are discussed in the following four chapters.
CHAPTER THREE
"EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP": THE CONSTRUCTION AND REINFORCEMENT OF COLONIAL HEGEMONY

In 1884 Major F. M. Hunter called for the occupation of the northern Somali country. He argued the northern Somali people are wild, violent, uncivilized, without institutions of government, therefore, we must occupy their country for it is the "only safe way of arranging for the autonomy of the Somal" and begin the "task of educating the Somal in self-government."\(^1\) The moment of imperialism in Somaliland was "the moment of education."\(^2\)

The British administration, however, was unable to successfully establish western educational institution in Somaliland in the early colonial period, 1884 to 1939. The resistance of the Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan from 1898 to 1920, and the refusal of the people to pay taxes in order to finance educational and other services, were the two main causes of the failure of the administration to establish western schools. Despite the resistance and reluctance of the public to finance educational services, the administration and the Catholic Mission of Somaliland, attempted at various moments to establish western schools. The aim and scope of the schools established by the administration and the Catholic Mission of Somaliland were limited. Their object was to produce a small number of clerks, telegraph operators, interpreters, and agricultural scouts. Even at this early period, the education programmes of the administration

\(^1\) PRO, C.O.78/3726, Major Hunter "Memorandum" to the Earl of Kimberely, June 1884.

stressed the dissemination of social and economic information rather than literary knowledge, that is, vocational education.

The Catholic Mission opened the first elementary school in the territory in 1892 in Berbera. The mission opened another school in Shimbiriris—an interior mission station thirty miles distant from Berbera—in 1895. While the Berbera school was for boys only, the interior station school was for both boys and girls. Also in Berbera, the mother Superior and two sisters attached to the mission trained a few poor and abandoned girls each year. The mission schools taught their pupils the basics of writing and reading in English, literacy in the vernacular, Christian theology, as well as brick-making and laying, carpentry and agriculture. By 1909, the interior mission had 110 Somali boys and girls, three Christian Somali families with five children, three Muslim families with six children, four deserted women with six children and two nuns and two Franciscan Fathers. The mission also took care of all the poor who came to the station as long as they attended religious instruction and as long as they worked in the farm that the mission established. Father Irenée was responsible for the "school in the jungle" and taught the students how to use the various agricultural implements, carpentry, brick-making and laying, and the methods of setting trap for wild animals, while Father Stephen was responsible for making the students literate in English and Somali. He translated all the ordinary hymns, prayers, daily devotions and the whole of the New Testament into the vernacular, and published in 1898 a dictionary of the Somali language. The mission did "astonishing things" in a short space of time.³

³ The Catholic Fireside, 1 May 1909.

It acquired large properties, invented a script for the Somali language, established schools, and
converted a number of Somalis. It sent, moreover, each year from 1892 to 1910 its brightest students for further studies to the Aden Catholic schools. In 1910 the mission was closed. In that year, the government adopted a policy of coastal concentration and abandoned the interior to Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan. The graduates of the school in the jungle did not leave the country, but became valuable employees of the administration and worked as civil servants, interpreters, and telegraph operators.

In the meantime, the administration opened the first state-run elementary schools in Berbera, Zeila and Bulhar in 1898. The average number of students in each school was 43.87, according to Consul-General Sadler’s report. About half the students were the children of expatriates working for the administration. The medium of instruction in the schools was Arabic, and the curriculum consisted of reading and writing in Arabic and English, arithmetic, and gardening. The Zeila and Bulhar schools were closed in 1910 due to the decline in the trade and population of the towns. The Berbera school thus remained the only government controlled school in operation in the country from 1910 to 1920.

In the post-Sayyid period, however, the administration took initiatives in 1920, 1927, 1935 and 1938 to expand educational and other services. Every Governor in the interwar years from Sir Geoffrey Archer to Arthur Lawrence took specific initiatives to expand educational, economic, and medical services in the country.

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4 PRO, C.O.879/103, Reverend Doctor Clark, Bishop and Vicar Apostolic of Arabia and Somaliland to General Sir W. Manning, 14 April 1910.

5 PRO, F.O.844/6, General Administrative Report of the Somali Coast Protectorate: Consul-General Sadler to the Marques of salisbury, 1899.
In 1920, Sir Geoffrey Archer decided that there was a need for the expansion of educational services in the country and the creation of a few individuals to fill government posts and take on some limited responsibility within the civil service. His plan was to create a limited number of schools with a vocational bias. He reasoned, "As so many countries in the East have learned to their cost, a literary education with no assured prospect of future employment is a danger rather than a blessing." Douglas Jardine was more blunt. He stated that the planned schools had the "dual object of moulding the character of the future tribal chiefs and of replacing Indians with Somalis in the subordinate posts of Government Departments, thus providing useful and lucrative employment for the natives of the country and effecting a considerable saving in the salary bill of the Protectorate Government." The idea, he maintained, was to establish schools where "character-training is given the most prominent part in the educational system." He added that the Government was aware of the "manifold dangers that must attend the creation of a literate class among a highly intelligent and quick-witted race such as the Somalis." Hence, the stress placed on character-training and vocational education.

The model schools for the administration were the vernacular schools in the Sudan. Sir Geoffrey Archer visited the Sudan in 1920 in order to observe how the vernacular schools and Gordon College functioned and how the Sudan Stock Tax worked. He then invited Eric Hussey, the Assistant Master and Educational Inspector at Gordon College to visit Somaliland and advise

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the administration about how to establish a similar school system in the Protectorate. Hussey's "enthusiasm, his breadth of vision, and his knowledge about native education in Muslim countries" apparently impressed the Governor of Somaliland.8 Before Hussey's visit, the Governor met with Akils--Government paid tribal representatives--and explained to them his scheme and the impending visit of Hussey. The Akils expressed their support for the Governor's plan. The Governor, confident that his scheme would work and banking so much on his own reputation as the slayer of the Sayyid, then called Hussey to visit the territory. He arranged public meetings in both Hargeisa and Burao in which Hussey explained his native education scheme.

Hussey recommended the establishment of six elementary schools in the main towns and one intermediate school at Sheikh. He recommended, furthermore, that the medium of instruction in the elementary schools should be in the vernacular and English in the intermediate school. The curriculum of the schools, he suggested, should stress vocational education in technical subjects, agriculture, animal husbandry and character training. As Sir Geoffrey Archer related, "The Wadads (religious figures) glowered, and watched and listened to him and his proposals with ever-increasing suspicion. I was soon warned that the next thing would be a hostile demonstration or a country-wide riot, and I had to drop the whole project."9 The Governor then simply sent six boys to the Gordon College in the Sudan with full scholarship and a promise for Government jobs when they returned. These six were the first group of Somalilanders the Government sent to the Sudan for studies.

8 Sir Geoffrey Archer, Personal, p.134.
9 Ibid.
Gerald Summers, the Governor of the Protectorate from the 1922 to 1925 was even more concerned about the establishment of educational and "other" services in the country. For him such services as schools, hospitals, clinics, the intensification of face-to-face and day-to-day contact between British officers and the people served a political purpose, that is, the disciplining of the people.\textsuperscript{10} Gerald Summer's plan was devised within the general framework of the recommendations put forth by the first Committee on Education for the Colonies. The first Committee was established in 1923 by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Devonshire. It was called at the time, the Advisory Committee on Native Education in Tropical Africa. Its Chairman was W. Ormsby-Gore, the parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies. The most recognizable member of the Committee was Sir Frederick Lugard. The Committee produced a report in 1925 entitled "Education Policy in Tropical Africa."

The most important recommendation of the report called for the "adaptation of education to native life", the expansion of public health and other services, the encouragement of agriculture, and the necessity of involving the whole community in educational development lest a breach developed between "good tribal traditions" and modern traditions. The central argument of the report, though, was the need to adapt education to native life, "mentality, aptitudes, occupations and traditions."\textsuperscript{11} It was geared towards making the individual more "efficient in his or her condition of life, whatever it may be, and to promote the advancement of the community

\textsuperscript{10} Oxford University, Rhodes House Library, Mss. Afr. 905, Sir Gerald Summers, "Memorandum on the Political Affairs in the Somaliland Protectorate" 1924.

\textsuperscript{11} Advisory Committee on Native Education in British Tropical Africa, "Education Policy in Tropical Africa," 1924-1925 cmd.2374, vol.xxi.27.
as a whole through the improvement of health, the training of the people in the management of
their own affairs, and the inculcation of true ideals of citizenship and service."\textsuperscript{12} Gerald Summers
too stressed the "tactical extension of medical treatment and other means". But he was more
direct than the Advisory Committee in explaining the political dimension of the policy. Such
policy was to establish a "far better relationship...between the British Administration and the
people."\textsuperscript{13} He opened the first modern hospital in the territory in Berbera in 1925, and many
other clinics in Burao, Hargeisa and Erigavo.

His replacement, Harold Kittermaster, the Governor of Somaliland from 1926 to 1931,
attempted to implement his policies, and the recommendations of the Advisory Committee. For
Harold Kittermaster the "first line for any development appeared to be scheme of education."\textsuperscript{14} In
1927 he toured the whole country and everywhere held durbars in order to gauge the attitude of
the people towards the establishment of western schools. Everywhere his audiences expressed
support for his ideas and plans. Yet every time the Governor stated that the schools must be
financed by the people, his audience rejected his suggestion out of hand. He could not reconcile
the admirable attitude of parents towards education and their refusal to finance the schooling of
their children through taxation.\textsuperscript{15} The Governor then cynically suggested that he would create

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Sir Gerald Summers, "Memorandum".
\item \textsuperscript{14} Harold Kittermaster, "The Development of the Somalis," \textit{Journal of the African Society},
vol. 31 (1932), p.235.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Harold Kittermaster, "British Somaliland," \textit{Journal of the African Society}, vol.xxvii,
no.cviii (1928), p.335.
\end{itemize}
reform schools financed by the government. But this suggestion offended his audience, for they were unwilling to send their children to reform schools where their children would be treated as abnormal. Kittermaster admitted that he made the suggestion less to secure results than to pacify critics of the Government such as Sheikh Omar Farah, the founder of the Somali Islamic Association and a campaigner for the speedy expansion of education services.\footnote{16} Kittermaster finally settled on a scheme under which the administration gave small grants-in-aid to Koranic private schools that taught secular subjects, kept attendance records, and allowed medical officers to periodically examine the health of the pupils and the hygiene of the schools.

Kittermaster also encouraged agriculture in the country. He hoped that agriculture would break what he called the "camel-complex" of the people of Somaliland and assist in the evolution of a more static society and hence more easily controlled population.

Arthur Lawrence who governed the territory from 1932 to 1939, also attempted to expand educational and medical services, and improve the economic infrastructure of the country. He placed more emphasis, however, on the expansion of educational services. He resubmitted Hussey's scheme in 1935 to the Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, and to a local Commission on Education in Somaliland with Somali members. Both the Sub-Committee and the local Commission approved the Governor's plan. The Governor was convinced that the administration must provide educational services to the people of the territory in order to discipline and mould the character and politics of the new generation of tribal leaders.

and civil servants. In 1938, the Governor appointed R. E. Ellison—the former Assistant Master and Educational Inspector at Gordon College who visited Somaliland in 1920—as the Director of Education in the Protectorate.

Ellison's mandate was to establish six elementary schools and one intermediate school. The object was to produce a select few that would become "useful" members of the society and "lead public opinion in the right direction of good government, friendship and peace." The curriculum of the elementary schools consisted of religious instruction, reading and writing in Arabic, English, and Somali, arithmetic, an elementary knowledge of geography, history, hygiene, stock raising, agriculture and handiwork. The curriculum of the intermediate school was equally tilted towards vocational education. Immediately after his appointment, Ellison began preparing textbooks written in Somali for the elementary schools. Ellison and his Somali collaborators on the project simply used the Somali script as it was developed by the missionaries. Ellison also attempted to tighten the regulations under which Koranic schools received grants-in-aid. He suggested higher standards of training for the teachers of the Koranic schools in both secular and religious subjects. Ellison's plan was to open the first school at Berbera as an experiment and once the experiment worked to open four other schools at Burao, Erigavo, Hargeisa, and Zeila; and then to open an intermediate school at Sheikh.  

The opening of the Berbera school in 1938 went without any problems. The response of the public was enthusiastic. In fact the competition for the limited number of seats in the school

17 PRO, C.O.830/3, Education Department Annual Report, 1938.
18 Ibid.
was intense. A few Sheikhs fulminated against the use of the Roman script in the writing of Somali and its use in the school. But their objections were not heeded by the public. Indeed Ellison pulled off a coup by recruiting a well respected theologian affiliated with the oldest and most prestigious sect—the Kadiriya—to teach the Koran and the Hadith at the school.¹⁹

In Burao, in contrast, Ellison's plan was greeted with scepticism and opposition. The main factor that inflamed opposition was Ellison's plan to use the vernacular as the medium of instruction in the schools, and the writing of the vernacular in the Roman script. It was "upon this rock that the newly-launched vessel unexpectedly sank."²⁰ The religious scholars of Burao argued more vehemently than their brethren at Berbera that the Roman script must not be used in the writing of Somali. They insisted that if Somali "was going to be written at all, it must be written in Arabic characters," since, "Somali was a Moslem language."²¹

Unable to convince Ellison to change his plan, the religious scholars of Burao declared that "the proposals of the Education Department were merely a subterfuge to introduce the Christian religion" into the country.²² They even declared Ellison as a Christian priest who wants to convert Somali children indirectly through the schools. Their argument was "sufficiently effective to induce the people of Burao to stone the Director (Ellison) and Mr. Mohamoud

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¹⁹ PRO, C.O.830/4, Education Department Annual Report, 1939.


²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.
Ahmed in May 1939. Ellison and Mohamoud Ahmed Ali—the assistant to Ellison and one of the students sent to the Sudan in 1921 by Sir Geoffrey Archer—were rescued by a group of police officers who felt compelled to shoot into the crowd, killing three and wounding scores of others. By 1939, then, the administration was able to establish only one school in the whole territory. Consequently the yearly expenditure on education throughout the early colonial period never exceeded £500, except in 1939, when the expenditure reached £1,714.

The various initiatives of the administration and other voluntary organizations such as the Berbera Catholic Mission, were not in vain. For the various schools opened by the mission and the government at Berbera produced a small cadre of middlemen: clerks, messengers, interpreters, agents, telegraph operators, and assistants who played an important role in the administration of the territory in the early as well as late colonial periods. This cadre of middlemen were augmented by a substantial number of Somalis trained in the Aden schools. Edward Alpers pointed out that as early as the late nineteenth century, a substantial percentage of students in the Aden schools were Somalis from Somaliland. Thus in 1899, about 27.3% of the student body in the Aden schools were Somali. And in the early colonial period in Somaliland

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
many of the children of merchants from Berbera were sent to Aden for schooling. Abdi Gahayr, a Somali poet, recorded that tradition in a short verse. He stated:

Rag kale ciyaalkuu dhaluu
Cadan u dhoofshaaye
Ciidagale niman geel lahayn
Waa cirka u tuure

Other men send their children
To Aden for schooling.
As for the Ciidagalle
If he does not own camels
Then he is lost in this world.

Colonel Jameson referred to the small elite of government workers trained either locally or in Aden as a "healthy material on which we can built on." He stated that this small elite are "strongly in favour of education and other reforms." The various educational initiatives of the administration in the early colonial period, then, produced a cooperative and collaborating elite, albeit a small one.

Expansion of Formal Educational Services, 1941-1960: Description

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29 A clan group within the Isaaq clan family.
31 Ibid.
After Great Britain reconquered Somaliland from Italy in 1941, the first governor, General A. R. Chater (1941-1943), quickly began expanding educational services. Elementary schools were opened at Burao, Berbera, Las Anod, Sheikh, Hargeisa, and Borama without any opposition. Governor G. T. Fisher (1943-1948) intensified the process of the expansion of educational services. He complained bitterly that the territory lacked a sufficient number of Somali subordinate staff literate in English to "understand or communicate order, good sense, or correct information to the people of the country." Consequently, he called for the immediate expansion of formal and informal educational services. He maintained that since the great majority of the people of Somaliland are illiterate in English, the administration must communicate with the public in their language and use the radio, films, posters, lectures in order to convey to the public "as quickly as possible, correct news, fresh ideas and instruction, and the directions of the Government." He thus called for the immediate establishment of new elementary, intermediate and vocational schools in order to produce a staff for the administration literate in English, and to improve the level of craftsmanship in the country.

Two developments made the expansion of educational services during the Second World War and in the postwar period possible. First, the "attitude of the indigenous population towards

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32 Lord Rennell of Rodd, *British Military Administration*, p.479.
33 PRO, W.O.32/13261, Military Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.
34 PRO, W.O.32/13261, Military Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.
35 Ibid.
education" drastically changed during the war and in the post-war period in favour of the expansion of educational services. Urbanites also expressed enthusiastic support for the expansion of educational services. The "change of heart" of the people towards western education was due to the decline of the mode of life of the people in the early colonial, as pointed out in chapter two. The frailty and exhaustion of the traditional mode of life which became increasingly incapable of sustaining the people, or fulfilling their aspirations, and began to be "replaced by other modes of life"—such as commerce, employment in the public and private spheres—forced the people to entertain, and in principle, welcome the educational policies of the administration. Although the administration feared opposition from the more radical theologians, such opposition never materialized.

Second, the administration was able to expand educational services because of the available Colonial Development and Welfare funds, and the enthusiastic support of the coalition government during the war, and the Labour government in the post-war period. There was a continuity in British policies towards the Empire from 1940 to 1960, despite the differences in the parties that held power at Westminster. After all, the 1940 Colonial Development and

36 Lord Rennel of Rodd, British Military Administration, p.479.
38 Ibid.
Welfare Act was passed by the coalition government headed by Winston Churchill. The Labour government then renewed the act in 1945. And in 1943, the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies produced its report, *Mass Education in African Society* in 1943. This report shaped the policies of the labour government towards the colonial empire in Africa, and the Conservative post-Labour governments continued to follow the same policies until 1960. There was a continuity in the colonial policies of Britain in Somaliland throughout the late colonial period.

The administration wasted no time in taking full advantage of the responsiveness of the people towards the expansion of educational services and the willingness of London to fund the programmes. In 1942, three elementary schools were opened at Berbera, Hargeisa and Burao. The Burao and Hargeisa schools were built by volunteers and cost very little. The Hargeisa school cost only £19. At the end of the 1943 school year the Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera schools had 38, 26 and 35 pupils respectively. The medium of instruction in the schools was Arabic. The reading material for the schools was scarce to say the least owing to the hasty manner in which the schools were organized. Each school had only one Arabic and one English Reader. The rest of the daily lessons were typed in Hargeisa and sent by mail to the schools in the other two towns and delivered by hand to the Hargeisa school. In the same year two other schools were opened at Borama and Sheikh by private individuals through public prescription. Both schools remained under the control of local authorities. The administration also opened a Nursing school at Hargeisa in 1943. Moreover, the administration made specific efforts to

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41 PRO, C.O.830/5, Education Department Annual Report, 1950.
"improve the standard of education in the Koranic schools, which are mainly financed by private subscriptions... (and) grants-in-aid from Government funds."\(^{42}\)

In October 1943 Christopher Cox, the Secretary to the Colonial Advisory Committee on Education for the Colonies and A. T. Lacey, the Director of Education for Kenya visited the Protectorate. Immediately after Cox's visit, a long-term plan for the expansion of educational services was drawn up. The plan called for the replacement of the existing three schools and the building of new district schools in all the main towns; the establishment of an elementary boarding school at Sheikh for students from rural areas; the continuation of grants-in-aid for Koranic schools that taught secular subjects and fulfilled other requirements; and the opening of an intermediate school at Sheikh. The plan made no provisions for female education or for secondary education.\(^{43}\)

In the meantime, the lack of institutions for females was addressed by Mohamoud Ahmed Ali, the first Somali inspector of elementary and Koranic schools. Mohamoud Ahmed Ali discussed the matter with the Director of the Department of Education, C. V. R. Bell and his wife, Jane Bell. Jane Bell agreed with both men that female education ought to be started in the Protectorate sooner rather than later. And she decided to play a role in its beginnings. Apparently all three were convinced that all roads to female education went, so to speak, through the Burao Nadi (Burao Club), the most progressive men's club in the country as Jane Bell described it.

\(^{42}\) Lord Rennell of Rodd, *British Military Administration*, p.480.

\(^{43}\) PRO, W.O.32/10862, Annual Report on the Administration of British Somaliland for the Year ending 31 December 1943.
Mohamoud Ahmed Ali then arranged for a meeting between Jane Bell and members of the Burao Nadi. Jane Bell addressed the meeting and Mohamoud Ahmed Ali translated her words. She told the "silent and attentive audience" that she and Mohamoud Ahmed Ali had given the matter of female education much thought and that they agreed that the most important thing that girls should learn was "good behaviour, obedience, modesty"; second, the girls should be given "thorough instruction in the Qoran"; third, that girls' education should focus on "making better wives and mothers"; and finally, that academic education was of secondary importance. Upon finishing her speech, an elder stood up, turned to her with a "benevolent and paternal smile" and stated that the kind of education that she suggested was the most appropriate one and the one that they wanted for their daughters. And so the first school for females was opened at Burao in 1944 at the Burao Nadi (Burao Club), and Jane Bell opened another school for girls at Sheikh in 1945. Other schools for females were opened subsequently at Berbera and Hargeisa.

By 1948, the 1943 plan was completely implemented. Eight elementary schools were opened in all the main towns in 1946; an elementary boarding school and an intermediate school were opened at Sheikh in 1944; and in 1946, the administration sent another group of students to Gordon College for secondary school studies. By 1948, about 433 boys attended the eight elementary schools; 156 the intermediate school; 54 females attended the four female elementary schools at Burao, Hargeisa, Berbera and Sheikh; and the government extended grants to twenty-

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45 Ibid.
five approved Koranic schools with a total enrolment of 800 students and one Koranic school for girls with seven students. The 1948 Education Ordinance, moreover, required the registration of all schools teaching secular subjects and all teachers and all schools that received government grants, the closing of all unsatisfactory schools, the appointment of Local Education Committees, and the payment of school fees in the boarding schools.46

In 1949-1950, the administration asked for and received £22,500 from the Colonial Development and Welfare funds for the further expansion of educational services. The funds were used to open a new intermediate school at Borama in 1950, a secondary school at Sheikh in 1953, a trades school at Hargeisa in 1952, a workshop accommodation for the Sheikh Intermediate school, a Vocational Training Centre for clerks and teachers at Hargeisa in 1952 and the appointment of two European female teachers for the Girl's school at Burao.47

By 1956, there were 39 government aided Koranic schools for boys with a total enrolment of 1,339, and six government aided Koranic schools for females with a total enrolment of 142; 18 boys elementary schools with a student body of 1,021 and 4 elementary schools for girls; two intermediate schools for boys and one boarding intermediate school for females at Burao; a Trades school, a Nursing school, a Vocational training Centre and a Secondary school. Moreover, in 1955 the government sent 33 students abroad to Egypt, Sudan, Cyprus, England

46 PRO, C.O.830/5, Education Department Annual Report, 1950.
47 PRO, C.O.830/7, Education Department Annual Report, 1954.
and Beirut for courses in medical sciences, accounting, carpentry, technical studies, administrative studies, forestry, plumbing and theology.  

In 1956 the administration committed itself even more fully to the rapid expansion of educational services. In that year, the administration submitted to the Colonial Office a three year programme. The programme envisaged no change whatsoever in the structure of the educational programme. It only made provisions for the expansion of the system. After the proposals were submitted to the Colonial Office, Sir Christopher Cox, the Educational Advisor to the Colonial Office toured the Protectorate in October-November 1956 in order to examine and discuss the programme with the administration. Sir Christopher Cox approved the plan, and in 1957 the Colonial Office allocated £619,707 from Colonial Development and Welfare funds for its implementation. The plan called specifically for the opening of 22 new elementary schools for boys and four new elementary schools for females; the expansion of the Sheikh Secondary school and an increase in the number of students admitted each year from 15 to 50; the building of a boarding facility for the Hargeisa Trades school and a new Teacher Training Centre at Hargeisa; and increase in the number of scholarships offered to intermediate school graduates; the opening of new libraries and book stores in the main towns; and the formation of a new Adult Education post and a Regional Educational Office for the Erigavo district.

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49 Ibid., p.7.

50 Ibid.
By 1959, the structure of the formal educational system had expanded dramatically.

There were 40 elementary schools with a total enrolment of 2,333 pupils; 140 government aided Koranic schools with a total enrolment of 3,500; 15 elementary schools controlled and financed by local authorities with a total enrolment of 1,380; several vocational schools; eight intermediate schools and two secondary schools--one at Sheikh, the other at Borama.51

The expenditure on formal educational services increased gradually throughout the late colonial period.

4.1: Expenditure on Education, 1942-1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Govt. Expenditure in £</th>
<th>Expenditure on Education in £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>137,834</td>
<td>2,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>594,130</td>
<td>14,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>545,357</td>
<td>18,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,197,004</td>
<td>82,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,715,683</td>
<td>94,0467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2,390,757</td>
<td>116,221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The primary and most immediate object of the various schools established by the administration in the late colonial period was to produce a sufficient number of clerks, agricultural demonstrators, veterinary specialists, teachers, medical dressers, nurses, blacksmiths, mechanics, carpenters, masons, bricklayers, and electricians "to supply but not exceed the requirement of the territory." School curriculum consequently stressed vocational, rather than literary, education. Indeed literary education was considered pernicious. As early as 1920, Sir Geoffrey Archer warned against such education for Somalis. He considered literary education "a danger rather than a blessing." And Douglas Jardine insisted in 1926 that any schools established in the country must focus only on "moulding the character of the future tribal chiefs." He argued that character training must be given the "most prominent part in the educational

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53 Sir Geoffrey Archer, Personal and Historical, p.143.
system."

As late as 1959 a secret report warned against the danger of literary education, and its subversive effects. The report stated,

"if the aim of building schools in the Interior is carried out this, also, over a period of time, could result in subversive indoctrination of the pupils. This will, of course, depend on the teachers and there is no evidence to suggest that such a plan is considered at the moment."

In the late colonial period, therefore, the object was not to spread literary education, or even schooling widely throughout the country, but to produce a competent class of technicians. Such competent class was to form the core of the new elite—the "new governing class." Almost all the formal schools, then, except the pre-elementary schools and the Sheikh Secondary School (Figure 1) stressed vocational education.

The prop of the schooling system (Figure 1) were the Koranic schools. Only students who finished such schools were admitted into the formal government schools. These schools were used as a prop to the modern schooling system because they taught secular subjects such as arithmetic and geography, as well as Arabic, Koran, and Hadith. Since the medium of instruction of the elementary schools was Arabic, the Koranic schools played a useful role in that they produced pupils already literate in the medium of instruction of the elementary schools. The Koranic schools were, therefore, not destroyed or undercut, but were absorbed into the circuit of colonial authority and educational system. They were made, in other words, into a productive part of the government controlled educational system.

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Those who were recommended by their Koranic teachers, and then passed a reading test of the Koran were accepted to the elementary schools. The curriculum of the boys' elementary schools consisted of arithmetic, Arabic, English (except in the first year), geography (except in first year), art, gardening, physical education and handiwork. The curriculum of the Girls' Elementary schools consisted of English, Arabic, arithmetic and the "domestic arts—to keep the houses clean and tidy, prepare suitable food for the family, to wash and mend clothing so that it should last longer and thereby save money, to make clothes and knit, to care for the children, and to nurse sick people in their own homes... (and) personal hygiene."  

If vocational training was stressed in the elementary schools, it was also stressed in the first intermediate schools for males only at Sheikh and Borama. Instruction in the Sheikh intermediate school consisted of civics (all the students were also given a tour of the political institutions in the capital at grade seven), science, carpentry, metal work, commerce, woodwork, bookbinding, arts and crafts, building instruction, technical drawing, elementary mechanics and electricity. Although the school had three streams—general education, technical education, and commercial education—which required that students begin specialization in the 5th grade, most were enrolled in the technical stream. The Department of Education strengthened the technical stream in 1950, by first creating a furniture making business in the school that produced furniture for the market and for science and art classes; and second, by awarding only Technical

56 Jane Bell, "Early Days," p. 111.

57 The curriculum of schools later established at Dayaha, Beer, and Odweina, were also biased towards vocational education. The Borama and Sheikh curriculum was, therefore, paradigmatic.
Scholarships to the Aden Technical College to those who graduated from the technical stream. In essence, the awarding of technical scholarships and the establishment of a furniture business increased the status of the technical stream in the eyes of the students as the Department of Education hoped. Moreover, the Borama intermediate school had only two streams: veterinary and agriculture. The curriculum for the Girl's Intermediate school at Burao, furthermore, consisted of English, Arabic, arithmetic, typing, hygiene and the domestic arts.

The curriculum of the Hargeisa trades school, the Hargeisa nursing school, the Hargeisa vocational training centre also were biased towards vocational education. The schools produced carpenters, joiners, electricians, masons, bricklayers, blacksmiths, nurses, dressers, teachers, accountants and clerks. The Intermediate schools also produced mainly agricultural scouts, mechanics, electricians, carpenters, clerks, and administrators. Only the curriculum of the Sheikh and Amud Secondary schools consisted of instruction in liberal education: English, geography, history, science, Arabic, religion, mathematics, physical education and woodwork.

Even though the primary and immediate object of the schools were to produce a competent class of technicians, teachers, nurses, to supply the needs of the protectorate, they also aimed at moulding the character of the students and culturally converting them. Cultural conversion and character training, in other words, were equally important objectives of the formal schools. Female education, for instance, centred on teaching the girls "good behaviour, obedience, modesty", and to make them "better wives and mothers." Academic training was even considered secondary to character training in female schools. By the same token, schools

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58 Jane Bell, "Early Days," p.111.
for boys stressed the instilling of good behaviour and obedience. Various institutions in the schools such as the Boy Scouts, a system of committees, prefects and house masters, regular visits to government institutions, teacher's clubs, Kadi Sports Clubs (Judge's sports clubs), competitive sports between the schools, physical education, and religious education (Koranic studies was also included in the elementary, Intermediate, and Secondary, schools because to "impart academic knowledge without implanting, at the same time, a firm religious belief is in every way unsatisfactory."\(^59\)) played a role in moulding the character of the children.

These institutions functioned as a "character factory" that produced a "serviceable citizen" for the protectorate.\(^60\) They thus acted as "agencies of social control, designed to monitor the conduct" of the students, and "shape it into a form acceptable"\(^61\) to the protectorate administration. As Ahmed Yusuf Dualeh pointed out, the discipline in the schools system was strict. The students were required to be neat, to behave well in the school and in public, to refrain from smoking, and visiting prostitutes. One student, according to an informant, was expelled from school for contracting gonorrhoea. Students who contracted such diseases were identified not by accident, but through regular medical check up. Students (in the boarding schools), thus, were continuously inspected and placed under surveillance during the day time, and even in the middle of the night. Teachers woke up the students in the middle of the night, and then searched

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\(^{59}\) PRO, C.O.830/7, 15804, Education Department Annual Report, 1954.


\(^{61}\) Ibid.
their luggage for cigarettes, or knives. The students then were placed under "careful and constant supervision to ensure continuity of purpose" through heterogenous means: through their involvement in the various committees, Boy Scouts, and constant inspection performed by (besides teachers) prefects and house masters who played the typical role of prefects in the English Public School system.

The students were brought under "careful and constant supervision" not only through the classroom, the school committees, boy scouts, and medical and physical inspection, but also through their involvement in sports, and physical training. The physical health of the students was constantly checked, and in 1951 a Medical History sheet was formally introduced into the schools under which the health of each student was continuously monitored. Moreover, students were encouraged to become involved in sports—soccer, field hockey, basketball, cricket, and golf. The most popular sport was soccer, and annual inter-school competitions were held. The Elementary inter-schools Cup in 1949 and 1950 was, for instance, won by Burao. Furthermore, students were given regular exercises, which formed part of the syllabus of all the schools. Somali teachers were given special lessons in sports in order to impress upon them "appreciation of the value of the subject." In addition, the formation of house committees, and inter-school

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64 Department of Education Annual Report, 1950.
65 Ibid.
sport competitions were designed to "take the place of the traditional tribal rivalries of the interior."\textsuperscript{67} The building up of "traditions in the schools"\textsuperscript{68} was also designed to play a similar role.

The Boy Scouts were, in addition, a crucial system of supervising the behaviour of the pupils, moulding their character, instilling in them habits of obedience and civil responsibility, and making them into a serviceable functionaries of the administration. The Boy Scouts were organized in all the schools and towns. It was mainly run by British teachers. Nonetheless, the department of education was anxious to transform the Boy Scout movement into one under the control of indigenous teachers. The problem was that Somali teachers were unimpressed with the movement. Most were themselves from the rural areas, and could not see the benefit of a system of training of character which stressed rural norms and ruggedness. To them modernity was about leaving as a wide a gap as possible between the students and rural norms, life, and culture. P. H. C. Badham, the Director of Education, stated "there can be little continuity of activity and progress if the Boy Scout Movement is to continue to rely on European leadership" in the protectorate. And so he appointed a Somali teacher to be sent to the United Kingdom to "undergo training...as a Scoutmaster,"\textsuperscript{69} in order to foster an indigenous leadership for the movement.

The students were, in essence, placed under careful and constant supervision, that is, under a disciplinary regime, and subjected to a "whole micro-penalty of time (lateness, absences,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} PRO, C.O.830/6/15713, Education Department Annual Report, 1951.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body ('incorrect' attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity, indecency). They were brought, in sum, under an "apparatus of uninterrupted examination": in the classroom and outside the classroom, in the dorms and in the playing field, during the day and at night. The object was not only to train them to become the new governing class of the future, but to discipline them, form their character, to measure and judge them, to influence their mind, and to, above all, graft through them western culture and modernity onto the society.

The schools were successful in producing a coopted upper stratum of natives—a new governing class. The new class accepted the project and idea of modernity: a "profound faith in rational thought; a commitment to and belief in universal principles of social organization (encompassing religion, government, and economic organization); an intolerance and suspicion of religious experience and modes of explanation; and a deep conviction that the European traditions of science, technology, art and government are demonstrably superior to all others." In accepting the project and idea of modernity, they became committed soldiers of modernity. Their cultural conversion to western modernity, so to speak, was a result of the fact that they

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71 Ibid., p.186.
72 See chapter five for the role the new elite played in the administration of the country, and chapter seven for a discussion of the "modernizing resistance" of the elite.
underwent the "moral and intellectual hegemony of foreign intellectuals," teachers, and administrators, and felt "more closely related to foreign intellectuals than to 'domestic' ones." Indeed, the new soldiers of modernity used their moral and intellectual dependence as a mark of privilege, or to put it in other terms, as the "theodicy of (their) own privilege." Western education allowed them to make a direct connection between the qualifications "and the cultural capital they have inherited," and their own competence and privilege.

B. W. Andrejewski, Sheikh Jama Cumar Ciise, Salaan Carrabey, and Haji Cabdullahi Muuse, to take few exemplary figures, noted with alarm the cultural conversion and intellectual dependence of the new elite. B. W. Andrejewski argued that the schools produced a class of people more often than not hostile and contemptuous of Somali traditions. Since the curriculum of the schools was "inspired almost entirely by the British," the new elite "knew a great deal about the cultures their expatriate teachers brought to them and very little about their own." But they were not merely ignorant, but contemptuous, of Somali traditions. They even assumed that "their mother tongue was inadequate" to express the idea of modernity and science, and thus "inherently inferior to the foreign languages (whether Arabic or English) they learned" in the schools. Even Somali poetry—that venerable poetic tradition—was imagined by the "more naive among them" to be aesthetically inferior to the foreign poetic traditions they learned in the


76 Ibid.
schools. They were, in sum, so "alienated from their own cultural background" that they
developed a contempt for Somali traditions, culture and poetry, and "imitated...foreign styles of
life" and ideas.  

For Andrejewski this whole process reflected the cultural conversion of the
students--i.e., the new elite trained in the formal school--and the "cultural colonizations" of
Somaliland. Sheikh Jama Cumar Ciise, moreover, stressed the processes of "colonization of
thought" through the various modern educational institutions established in the country. The
"colonization of thought," or simply cultural conversion, he argued, is pernicious because it "endures," and because it made the elite dependent on foreign intellectual traditions.

But the problem, of course, went beyond a mere dependence on foreign intellectual
traditions. The problem, as the poets, more than the historians correctly surmised it, was the
sundering of the traditional "moral and intellectual unity of the nation."  

Salaan Carrabey compared in one poem he composed in the late 1940s, the tradition which he represented, and that of the foreigner which the new educated class represented. In essence, he touched upon the
sundering of the traditional moral-intellectual unity of the nation during the late colonial period. He said:

77  B. W. Andrejewski, "The Survival of the National Culture in Somalia During and After the
Colonial Era," in The Decolonization of Africa: Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa (Paris: The
during the colonial period.)

78  Ibid.,p.108.

79  Sheikh Jama Cumar Ciise, Tarikh al-Sumal fi 'l-usur al-wusta wa 'l-haditha (Cairo:
p.108.

La'da xarafke, laankiyo ba'daan,
Lawyer ku ahaaye.
Nin Awowgii loox ugu dhigoo,
Liil gashaan ahaye.
Lekture frenji niman baa akhriya,
Laawis iyo beene,
Oo weliba laasima intay lib isku moodane.
Anse waxan ku laaqimahayaa,
Tix ay ku luuqshaane.

I am a lawyer in the L and B of the alphabet.
I am a man whose grandfather taught him on a wooden board,
And trained him in the fine points of poetry.
In contrast, the lectures of the whiteman and his lies,
Is being read by some men.
Who accept it, and then consider themselves superior to the rest.
As for me, I will compose a short verse
That they might sing.

The poet portrayed, in essence, the sundering of the moral and intellectual unity of the nation,
and the emergence of a gulf between the new western educated class and the traditional people,
between those taught by their grandfathers and those taught by the "frenji" (whiteman). For him
that gulf was a reflection of the cultural conversion of the new elite to foreign intellectual
traditions.

Haji Abdullahi Muuse, similarly, reflected upon the cultural conversion of the new elite,
their abandonment of the traditional life and culture, and the sundering of the moral-intellectual
unity of the Somali people. Unlike Salaan Carrabey—who was angry about the sundering of the
moral-intellectual unity of the nation—Haji Abdullahi Muuse was resigned to the conversion of
the elite. Perhaps his resignation was a reflection of the fact that by the time he composed the
sometime in the late 1950s educational services expanded dramatically, and the public enthusiastically supported it. He said:

Duqeydi dhamaataye tolow, dirirka yaa eegi?
dab-shidkii haduu galo ayaa, dhuxulihii daadin?
Ayaa daaha laantii ku xidhi, qudhac intuu diiro?
Degmo tuhun ma guurtee ayaa, sahanka loo dooran?
Reerkoo yagleel degay ayaa, guri u soo deyri?
Hangooolkiyo degsaarkii ayaa, gudin u soo daabi?
Hadii geelu deyr dhalo ayaa, doobiga u qaadan?
Dugaagiyo qaniiinkiyo ayaa, daabka ka ilaalin?
Al-Madar duug ma reebtee tolow, dumarka yaa guursan?
Tolow yaa dadkoodi wax siin, gacal ma doonaane?
Tolow deynka yaa bixin gashiga, kama dambeeyaane?
Tolow yaa u daalacan kitaab, diina cid u sheegi?
Annun baa iska daalee naftabe, uma dadaalaane.

The old generation is dying, who will examine the stars?
If they show it is time for lighting the fire, who will throw the hot coal?
And tie a branch with a piece of cloth?
A settlement does not migrate on rumour, who will be chosen to explore new pasture areas?
And when the family hurriedly decamps, who will built the carrel for the livestock?
Who will prepare the axe for the manufacture of the Hansool and Dhegsaar?
If the camels give birth in the spring, who will milk them?
Who will protect them from wild animals, diseases, and the daab?
Since students (new elite) leave no heritage, who will marry our daughters?
Who will give alms to the poor, since they do not need kin?
Who will pay blood-money, since they do not respect the tradition of the payment of debt?
Who will read the Koran, and tell the people about Islam?
I am only tiring myself, since they do not struggle for their life.  

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The "life" that the new elite—the almadar, the new soldiers of modernity—do not struggle for, according to the poet, was the traditional life, and the traditional intellectual heritage of the nation. The poem, as such then, was imbued with a spirit of resignation. It complains about the elite's cultural conversion, their abandonment, ignorance, and contempt, for traditional culture, cosmology, and customs, and the overall sundering of the moral-intellectual unity of the nation. Every single line of the poem—except the last line—asks a question about an important aspect of Somali culture and life. And in each, the poet implies, the new soldiers of modernity—the almadar—are ignorant of, or unconcerned about, very crucial aspects of Somali culture. It is a poem, in sum, about the cultural conversion of the new educated elite, and the gulf that emerged between the modernity they represented and the traditions of the old society.

But, of course, the most important aspect of cultural conversion of the elite, was the various ways that the new educated elite disseminated among the general public western ideas, practices, and values. They were the advocates of modernity, rather than merely its privileged beneficiaries. As advocates of modernity, they played "double role."82 On the one hand, the transmission and dissemination of modern ideas, practices, and values to the general public. On the other, the transmission of news about different issues and the possible reactions of the public to the colonial administrators. In playing a double role in the society, the new soldiers of modernity propagated the "intrusive culture" of Great Britain in Somaliland. The new elite played a key role in that process, first, as students, and second, as civil servants.

While still at school, the new elite took their civic responsibilities very seriously, and, in particular, their responsibilities as educators. They considered western secular education as the only way through which Somali society could be developed. They expressed those views through drama written in English, Arabic, and Somali, but mostly written and staged in Somali. Somali teachers played a key role in the writing and staging of the various plays. Most often they collaborated with students with poetic talent, and sometimes wrote complete plays on their own. The most persistent teacher in this regard was Yusuf Haji Adan. (He was sent to the Sudan in 1921 by Governor Goeffrey Archer, and became in 1951 Assistant Inspector of Schools.) He wrote many plays. The plays focused on various themes: the importance of education, the danger of infectious diseases, the evil of tribalism, the importance of economic development. The theme most often repeated in the plays, however, was the importance of western education, which was viewed, of course, as the gateway to modernity, to western modernity.

The most popular play was written by Yusuf Haji Adan at Sheikh sometime in the late 1940s. It was called "Hamal" (porter). It was about a poor man who had two sons. One son was obedient and always eager to listen to his parents; the other was recalcitrant. The recalcitrant one refused to listen to his parents and go to school. The obedient one, in contrast, listened to his parents, went to school, and became an excellent student. He was then sent abroad, earned a degree. When he came back he became an important person. The other in turn became a porter (hamal.) The moral of the drama was that education—western education—was a means through which to improve one's station in life, and by extension, play a role in the development and improvement of the society. The destiny of the particular life reflected upon, and affected, the
future of the whole nation. This drama was acted by students at the Sheikh Intermediate School. The play was popular at the school, and the Sheikh township where students staged it. It was then decided to show the drama throughout the main towns during the summer when the schools were closed. According Ahmed Yusuf Dualeh, the drama was well received in all the towns. Indeed, tickets for the drama were sold out everywhere. In some towns, it had to be replayed again and again. It was a play about obedience, hard work, and cultural conversion. Almost all the plays written by the students and teachers repeated that theme. Even such play as "Qays iyo Lyla" (Qays and Leyla), a love story, was interwoven with a theme whose main import was the progressive role of western education.

The cultural conversion and modernist tendencies of the students was articulated not only through plays, or magazines--such the "Voice of the Girls" which was published by female students at the Burao Girls' School--but also through the Somali Students Association. The association was founded by students with the encouragement of teachers in the 1959. The association held its first convention on 11 November 1959 at the Amud Secondary School, in Amud, north of Borama. The students who attended the convention discussed various issues: how to "eliminate illiteracy...(and) the virus of tribalism which leads to divisions and backwardness, and how to disseminate knowledge and progressive consciousness, and lead the public to the path of righteousness." After a discussion which lasted a few days, they agreed on:

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84 "Somali Students Association," Al-Liwa, 27 November 1959. (Translation is mine. The newspaper was written in Arabic.)
"1- the unification of the students and to work for their own good and for the good of their country; 2- to inform the student about his/her responsibilities; 3- elimination of illiteracy; 4- to fight tribalism and tribal feeling; 5- the liberation of the Somali woman; 6- to fight bad customs; 7- to popularize the importance of exercise; 8- to revive the heritage of the country and to strengthen the good customs of the land; 9- to contact students from all over the world; 10- to extend a helping hand to the public in the solution of crisis and to cooperate with foreign aid organizations in helping (poor) children and orphans." The ideology of the association was modernist, and consciously so. It reflected, or rather was a testament to, the cultural conversion of the new elite. Their main object was the cultural conversion of the whole society: the elimination of bad customs and tribalism, the dissemination of knowledge, skills, ideas, and practices, and of course, the cooperation with foreign agencies. The aim, in essence, was to culturally convert, develop, modernise, and improve the society through the dissemination of education, and modern western ideas and techniques.

The new educated elite were serious about their new mission. They did not merely disseminate it through plays, and the student organizations they formed, but also practically expounded and popularized them once they joined the civil service. Since the period of training in the schools was short, the students quickly joined the civil service. Most students finished three years of elementary school, and three years of intermediate school, or three years of post-elementary vocational schools such as the Hargeisa Trade School, or the Hargeisa Vocational Centre, or the Nursing School, or the Borama Teacher's Training Centre. The average period of

85 Ibid.
training, in other words, was about six years. For instance, in 1951, 35 students sat for the Intermediate Leave Examination. All passed. Ten were awarded scholarships and sent overseas—mainly to the Aden Technical College (two years), and the Bahr Al-Ruda Secondary School (two years) in the Sudan. Three went into private trading. The other twenty-two graduates joined government departments: five the Agriculture and Veterinary Services; five the Clerical Services; four the Public Works Department; four the Department of Education; two the Police Department; one the Medical department; and one the Meteorological Service.\textsuperscript{86} Perhaps the various ways the new elite joined the civil service, can be illustrated with particular examples:

Yusuf Ismail Samantar, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Siilaanyo), and Ahmed Abdillahi Jama.

Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Siilaanyo), was born in 1937 at Burao. He graduated from the Sheikh Elementary School in 1951, and the Amud Intermediate School in 1957. He then joined the Information Office in 1957. He was a correspondent for the English edition of "War Somali Sidhii"—a weekly newspaper published by the Information Office.\textsuperscript{87} Yusuf Ismail Samantar, moreover, was born June 1920 in Hargeisa. He finished his elementary school studies at the Berbera elementary school in Berbera in 1936, and then went for further (intermediate and secondary) studies to the Sudan from 1936 to 1944. Upon finishing his studies, Samantar returned to the country and became, from 1944 to 1948, a teacher in the Burao elementary school. From 1948 to 1953 he was the director of the Sheikh Intermediate School. He was then sent abroad for further studies, where from 1953-1955 he earned a teaching certificate from the

\textsuperscript{86} PRO, C.O.830/6, Department of Education Annual Report, 1951.

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Africa Biographien} (Hanover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschen, Gmbh, 1970).
Institute of Education, Southampton University in England. From 1956 to 1958 he was the headmaster of the Teacher's Training School in Borama. In 1958 he joined the Somali National League, and in 1959 the Pan-Somali Movement. Furthermore, Ahmed Abdilleh Jama was born in Aden in January 1922. He finished high school studies in Aden in 1947, and became a teacher in Somaliland from 1947 to 1954. In 1955, he ran for the Hargeisa Local Government Council, and won. At the same time he worked for the government as Liaison Officer in various capacities. From 1956 to 1959, he became assistant to the District Commissioner of Hargeisa, and the District Commissioner of Hargeisa from 1959 to 1960.

These examples illustrate one point: the quick way in which school graduates were absorbed into the civil service. As civil servants--as teachers, journalists, agricultural extension workers, forestry officers, technicians, local government representatives, liaison officers, clerks, assistant district commissioners--the school graduates supported, and became the most credible advocates of the mass education policies of the administration. Through their public roles, they disseminated western ideas, practices, and values amongst the general public. They thus acted as committed soldiers of modernity--committed in particular to the popularization of mass education. They accepted the utility and usefulness of the idea and culture of modernity as the only means through which the lives of the people can be improved, and the country developed. The formal educational system, in sum, produced a new elite--a new governing class--committed to modernity, and to the cultural, economic, and social transformation of the society. This was a

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88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
class that, as Salaan Carrabey put it, accepted with pride the "lectures of the whiteman," and used that as a theodicy of their own privilege. In doing so, and in playing a crucial role in the administration of the country⁹⁰, and in the dissemination of western ideas, practices, and values, they became complicit in the processes through which colonial cultural hegemony was constructed and reinforced in Somaliland in the late colonial period.

Informal Education: the production of Soldiers of modernity and the "Dissemination of Truth"

"Education for citizenship" was concerned not only with the creation of a new elite—a new governing class, but also with the dissemination of skills, practical information, and ideas directly and indirectly among adults in the towns and the rural areas. Informal education, or adult education, then, as distinct from formal education, had both a rural and urban dimensions. In the urban centres, the object was to improve the writing and comprehension skills of government workers and the commercial elite, to educate the urban mass about public hygiene, and to disseminate "correct news, fresh ideas and instruction."⁹¹ In the rural areas, in contrast, the object was not the dissemination of literacy and the building of schools. For it was assumed that the "provision of orthodox static schools for nomadic people can only serve to accelerate the drift to

⁹⁰ Chapter five.
⁹¹ PRO, W.O.32/13261, Military Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.
the towns, and break down the economy on which a pastoral people must continue to rely. 92

Even though the administration was well aware that the traditional nomadic economy had declined, and was replaced by "other modes of life", nevertheless, the administration believed that the traditional life must be protected and preserved as much as possible.

"It is unlikely," one report stated, "that any great change can take place in the life of the people and the majority will probably always remain dependent on their flocks." The report added, "The aim of the government has been to uphold all that is good in tribal life and to aim at improving economic conditions which in turn will improve tribal welfare." 93 It was that policy that made necessary the limiting of orthodox schools in the interior. Besides, since employment opportunities in the urban centres were limited, the government was anxious to limit the drift of nomads to the towns, for both social and political reasons. Socially, the object was to improve tribal life. Politically, the object was to prevent the drift of nomads to the towns. The government feared the political implications of the "consequent widespread unemployment, frustration and poverty" 94 in the towns. Informal education in the rural areas, as result, focused on addressing the question of "how best to provide the right type of facilities for the migratory peoples of the interior." 95

94 PRO, C.O.830/7, Annual Education Department Report, 1953.
In both urban and rural areas, "modern methods"\(^96\) were adopted for the dissemination of practical information: wireless programmes, mobile cinema, posters, community centres, and informal adult education classes. The object of these modern methods of communication was the dissemination of "as quickly as possible, correct news, fresh ideas and instruction, and the directions of the Government"\(^97\) to the great majority of the public in the rural and urban areas. These modern methods of communication quickly led to "a big increase in activities of an educational or cultural nature outside the schools."\(^98\) In these cultural activities "The line of demarcation between "Information" and "Education" (was) often not clearly drawn,"\(^99\) because the object of the Information Office, which was responsible for educational activities outside the schools, focused on the dissemination of practical information on how to improve rural productivity, the literacy of government workers, the book keeping skills of the commercial elite and their general sophistication. Aside from the dissemination of practical information, the various cultural activities of the information department were also involved in the "dissemination of truth."\(^100\) "The right type of film," (or poster or radio broadcast or lecture at the community centres) the colonial cinema report stated, "would help to promote goodwill between governors

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96 Lord Rennell of Rodd, *British Military Administration*, p.479.
97 PRO, W.O.32/13261, Military Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.
99 Ibid.
and governed and can be a means of combating swiftly and efficiently subversive propaganda by the dissemination of truth."\textsuperscript{101}

The first issue that adult education in the towns addressed was the improvement of the literacy level of government workers. Classes were opened at Sheikh for Koranic teachers, semi-literate government employees who worked as clerks, time-keepers, store-keepers, dressers and office messengers. They were given instruction in elementary English, arithmetic and commercial and administrative subjects. Few of the more successful graduates of the classes were hired to teach adult education classes at Sheikh, and in the formal elementary schools. In addition, three to four week courses on civics, English, arithmetic, and other specialized subjects were taught by teachers from the department of education and specialists from the various departments to post-office workers, warders, midwives, Tribal Aid Workers, forestry and agriculture scouts and apprentices of the various departments. The aim of the courses was to improve reading and writing skills in English of the junior employees of the government as well as their understanding of, for example, simple medical aid to Tribal Aid Workers, to give forestry scouts some basic comprehension of how their functions fit in with the general aims of mass education as well as to provide them with some essential technical background to their work, to improve the craftsmanship of apprentices of the Public Works Department, to give agricultural demonstrators some basic knowledge about agricultural techniques of production, soil conservation, and tree planting.\textsuperscript{102} Short courses were also given to members of the commercial

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{102} PRO, C.O.830/7, Education Department Annual Report, 1954.
class, and the general public of the towns. These programmes were informal and popular. The February 1951 issue of "Dawn"\textsuperscript{103}, for instance, reported the long line of applicants for adult education classes in Zeila, which attracted the old and young, women and men. The Information Office and the Department of Education mobilized the resources of such clubs as the Old Boy's Association in Hargeisa, the Nadi in Burao, the Teacher's Club in Sheikh and many other local clubs in the main towns to help in the teaching responsibilities of the evening and continuation classes for commercial agents and traders. The aim of the courses was to improve their reading and writing skills in English, their accounting and book-keeping skills, and general sophistication. Gradually adult education for government workers, and the commercial elite, was made more comprehensive and offered up to G.C.E. standard.\textsuperscript{104}

The increase in informal activities of educational and cultural nature in the towns had a surprising effect. It augmented the ranks of the new elite. Adult education programmes in the towns, in other words, not only improved the general competence of government workers and the commercial elite, but also increased the ranks of the new soldiers of modernity. Two exemplary cases can be taken as paradigmatic of the various ways that adult education augmented the ranks of the new elite: Muusa X. I. Galaal, and Jama Mohamed Ghalib. Muusa Galaal was born in 1914 in the interior of Burao. As a teenager, he moved to Aden, where he worked in a variety of odd jobs. During the Second World War he travelled to Kenya, and joined the Somaliland Forces

\textsuperscript{103} "Dawn" was a monthly journal published by the Information Office. It was mainly concerned with educational issues whether formal or informal.

under British command. At Kenya, he attended adult education classes in the Jeane school in Nairobi. After Somaliland was reconquered by the British in 1941, Galaal returned to Somaliland. He attended a training course for government workers held at Sheikh. After he finished the course, he was hired as an elementary school teacher. He became a headmaster of a school, then became the director of adult education, journalist for Radio Hargeisa, historian, poet, and the founder of written Somali.105

Another important figure who studied at the adult education schools and then joined the new governing class--the new soldiers of modernity--was Jama Mohamed Ghalib. He was born between 1931 and 1933 in the interior of Hargeisa. He moved to Hargeisa in 1947 as an orphan. At Hargeisa, he worked at a tailors' shop owned by his cousin, a man called Mohamed Haji Hirad. But he failed as a tailor. He was always afraid that he might "cut someone's new cloth into pieces" or "spoil the material."106 He then "found another interest."107 He enroled in an adult education programme organized by the Somali Youth League in Hargeisa. He joined the lowest class--the class for beginners of English. His rudimentary understanding of English allowed him to find a job with the Department of Public Works as "office boy" in 1948.108 He also caddied on


107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.
a golf course for a British officer.\textsuperscript{109} He then joined adult education classes organized by the government in 1950. He enrolled in a class taught by Yusuf Ismail Samatar, the headmaster of an elementary school in Hargeisa. Most of those who attended the class were "underprivileged."\textsuperscript{110}

In 1952, he took a test, passed it, and was hired as a clerk for the police. He continued his quest for education through adult education programmes, for, as he put it, he was "too aware of" of his "lack of education and continued self-directed studies."\textsuperscript{111} In 1954, the Deputy Commissioner of the Police called him to office and gave him an exam. He asked him to write a letter requesting transfer to Burao. He wrote "scribbles"\textsuperscript{112} which the Deputy Commissioner was satisfied with. He was then offered the opportunity to join the police force as sub-inspector. But before assuming his new job, he was sent for a six month training in the Police Training School in Mandera. He became formally a policeman in 1955. The following year, he enrolled in adult education classes organized for government workers at Sheikh by the Department of Education. After finishing the course, he took the Intermediate Leaving School Examination, and passed. The following year he was sent to the Vocational Training Centre at Sheikh where he studied law. And in 1957 he was appointed as the station officer of the police force in Berbera. The following year he was sent for a six month training course at the Metropolitan Police Training

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.,p.7.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.,p.8.
School at Hendon, England. Upon his return the same year, he became a prosecutor in the office of the Attorney General.

The roles that Muusa Galaal and Jama Ghalib played were different. One became a teacher and an intellectual of high calibre, the other became a policeman and then a prosecutor. Both became prominent members of the new elite in the late colonial period, and played important roles in the post-colonial politics of the country. There were of course hundreds of others who enrolled in adult education classes in the main towns, and then joined the civil service, as teachers, clerks, policemen, journalists, and businessmen, and thus, became members of the new elite. All became involved in the dissemination of western education, and modern western practices among the general public. They acted, in essence, as soldiers of modernity.

The administration, and in particular, the Information Service, was not satisfied with just training government workers, the commercial elite, and the general public through the informal schools, but also organized other cultural activities in the urban centres whose main object was to further the education and knowledge of the urbanites, and in particular, the elite. Captain G. E. Schluster argued that since the great majority of the people are illiterate in English and since the small western educated elite—the new soldiers of modernity—wielded tremendous influence over the population, then the literature that the elite reads must be carefully selected and should always be of good quality and on various topics.\(^{113}\) Some of the pamphlets and books requested by the Service in 1945 and later distributed in the urban communities had the following titles:

\(^{113}\) PRO, INF 1/567/339, Captain G. E. Schulster, Information Office, to General Production Division, Ministry of Information, 26 April 1945.

Most of the literature intended for the perusal of the elite in the urban centres was distributed through the community centres. The community centres were favoured as points of distribution of journals, newspapers, pamphlets, and books, because they were patronized by the elite, and because they "successfully fulfilled the Government's object which was to expand the facilities for the dissemination of news and other cultural activities."\(^{115}\) The community centres were supplied, moreover, with elaborate radio sets, furniture, books, magazines, newspapers, posters and photographs, and used them as site for showing films and newsreels. The Community Centres were also sites in which government officers from the various departments held discussions and debates on mass education projects. In all of these discussions, the elite

\(^{114}\) PRO, INF 1/567, G. E. Schulster to Civil Affairs Branch, Headquarters, East African Command, 24 April 1945.

were often encouraged to participate, and to present their own views. Such discussions were even held in the premises of local clubs and associations.

Furthermore, nomadic education was given particular attention. The object of nomadic education was not the spread of literacy, or schooling—whether formal or informal—but rather the establishment of "right type of facilities for the migratory peoples of the interior," in order to improve tribal life. The focus, thus, was on the dissemination of useful and practical information: how to improve native industries, protect the environment, conserve soil, store water, and prevent diseases. Such practical information was disseminated through modern methods of communication: radio Hargeisa broadcasts, posters, plays, films and lectures given by Mobile Cinema units, Mobile Camel Units and Tribal Aid Units organized by the Information Service. These educational and cultural activities on the one hand, disseminated ideas and practices about how to improve productivity and public health in the rural areas, and on the other, convinced, or attempted to convince, the population that the British connection was worth maintaining, that their welfare was the concern of the colonial administration, that their cooperation would ease the difficulties of the administration in modernizing the society, and that mass education would bring them the benefits of western civilization. In other words, they performed both a propaganda role and a practical role. In both cases, the techniques for the dissemination of propaganda and practical information were heterogenous: films, radio broadcasts, posters, film strips, lectures on

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117 PRO, INF 1/567/339, The Deputy Principal Information Officer to the Principal Information Officer, East African Command, 4 July 1944.
the radio, and plays. G. T. Fisher regarded these techniques as "not just a matter of entertainment, but of the highest political and administrative importance."\textsuperscript{118} He argued that since the nomadic population are illiterate in English, oral and visual mediums were the best ways to convey government policies to them. He made sure that the Information Officer, the Director of Education, the Deputy-Director of Military Intelligence and directors of the other departments cooperated and put forth consistent policies and propaganda.\textsuperscript{119} The burden of informal education in the rural and urban areas, though, rested with the Information Office. The main responsibilities of the office were: publication of newspapers, broadcasting services, cinema shows, community centres, evening and continuation classes.\textsuperscript{120} The office, in essence, was responsible for "modern methods" of communicating with, and educating, the public.

The most important tool of the Information Service was Radio Hargeisa. The radio was acquired in 1942. The radio became quickly very popular. One report noted the "growing popularity and prestige of the broadcasting services."\textsuperscript{121} The Information Service was anxious to take advantage of the popularity of the medium. Consequently, it established in all the towns radio diffusion sets that were similar to public address systems. The sets allowed the District Commissioner to control what the people heard and listened to, although by the 1950s, many

\textsuperscript{118} PRO, W.O.32/13261, Military Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.

\textsuperscript{119} PRO, INF 1/567/339.

\textsuperscript{120} PRO, C.O.830/7, Education Department Annual Report, 1953.

\textsuperscript{121} PRO, C.O.830/7/15804, Somaliland Protectorate Annual Review of the Development Plan, 1953.
people had acquired private sets in the main towns and thus became independent of the radio sets controlled by the district commissioners. In the small villages, the Information Office distributed radio sets to local elders and authorities. Moreover, the Office issued radio sets in a specially constructed boxes and carried on camel back to the rural constabulary, and to all the boarding schools where the students "regularly listened in."

The programmes of Radio Hargeisa consisted of world and local news; talks on education, health, hygiene, agriculture, soil erosion, conservation of forestry and wild life, animal husbandry, locust control, the improvement of such local industries as the skins and hides and gum industries; and local histories and mythologies. Lectures and discussions on the radio were presented by officials of the various departments, religious figures and local traders. The radio broadcasted government notices, poetry, songs, town council meetings, and the proceedings of the Protectorate Advisory Council. It also broadcasted pre-taped English B.B.C. programmes. Special programmes on the week ending 16 August 1953, for instance, were on the following topics: "Your Health: the Prevention and Treatment of T.B." by Aden Ismail, B.M.E.; "International News Talk" by Yusuf Abdi Atteyeh; "Amusing Tales" by Mohamed Dogor; "My Experiences" by Ahmed Abdullahi who recounted his wartime adventures on a merchant navy;

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122 PRO, INF 1/567/339, From Civil Affairs Branch, East African Command, to Civil Affairs Director, War Office, 11 December 1943.


124 PRO, C.O.830/7, Education Department Annual Report, 1953.
"Unforgettable Names in Somali History: The Life of the Late Shermarke Ali, the Governor of Zeila" by a local historian; "Questions and Answers," a programme in which school boys competed in answering questions put to them by Sayyid Abdurahman Seyid Ali, a teacher; "Famous Somali Poets" by Omar Hussein; and reports on agriculture and animal husbandry. Important broadcasts were usually transcribed and then published in the "Somaliland News Letter" during the era of the British Military Administration and in "War Somali Sidiihi" and "Dawn" during the post British Military Administration period. As the hours of broadcasting increased, more and more programmes were devoted to "education for the masses and the schools." Films also played an important role in the education of the masses. Films had both a propaganda and practical messages. The Information Service made newsreels of Town Council meetings, Protectorate Advisory Council sessions, the opening of new hospitals and schools, the visits of dignitaries and all the main events of each year and then showed them throughout the territory on Mobile Cinema Units. The Service also made four films each year in the 1950s, on various topics "both for entertainment and instruction." In addition, it borrowed films on

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125 War Somali Sidiihi, no.31, 16 August 1953.
126 PRO, INF 1/567/339, Notes on Discussion at the Ministry of Information, 5 December 1944: Appendix H: Information and Broadcasting Services in Somaliland.
127 PRO, C.O.830/7, Education Department Annual Report, 1954.
agriculture, hygiene, the control of diseases, conservation and animal husbandry intended for "uneducated" Asian audiences and showed them throughout the territory on mobile cinema.\textsuperscript{129}

Mobile Camel Units, furthermore, were organized by the Information Office. These units roamed the rural areas. They were equipped with radio sets, and visual aids such as films, newsreels, film strips or what one officer called "magical lantern"\textsuperscript{130}, posters and showed them to the rural population. Occasionally the Mobile Units used drama to get across information to their audiences more directly and efficiently.\textsuperscript{131} The Mobile Camel Unit also advised the people about the prices of commodities, the danger that diseases such T.B. and venereal diseases posed to them and the best methods to use in the production of hides and skins, frankincense and jowari. Moreover, posters on soil erosion, agricultural production and other topics were designed in Somaliland and then printed in Asmara. Other posters acquired from London were mainly concerned with scoring propaganda points. They were on such topics as "Expulsion from the North Africa," "The 50 Facts Series," other war posters and the King's Message Poster which had the King's head at the top and blank space at the bottom left for the Information Officer to print

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{129} PRO, INF 1/567/339, Notes on the Report of Mr. F. R. Stephen Regarding his Visit to British Somaliland, 11 July 1944.
\item \textsuperscript{130} INF 1/567, Civil Affairs Branch, East African Command to Civil Affairs Director, War Office, London, 11 December 1943.
\item \textsuperscript{131} PRO, C.O.830/6, Education Department Annual Report, 1951.
\end{itemize}
whatever message he deemed necessary in the local language. Posters were considered as the best means of taking news and information directly to the illiterate rural population.

All of the heterogenous techniques of informal education in the rural and urban areas, disseminated social and economic information to the public. The object was the improvement of tribal and urban life. For example, one issue (no.31, 15 August 1953) of the "War Somali Sidhiii" discussed in various articles mass education and community development. The issue included an article written by an officer from the Prison Department, the opening address of the Governor to the Protectorate Advisory Council, a policy statement on mass education written by the Secretary to the Government, short articles on the objectives of the Department of Health, Education, Agriculture, Veterinary Services, and Education, the price of commodities, a poem translated by Margaret Laurence entitled "Pride," and a joke about an East European teacher who asked one boy to give him an example of a "reactionary," the boy answered, the sun. When the teacher asked him to explain, the boy answered because the sun begins in the East and then goes over to the West.

The title of the article written by one officer from the prison department was simply, "The Prison Department." The article first very briefly traced the development of the prison service in the country and then proceeded to paint the role of the service in very bright colours. Its argument was that the role of the service was an educational one and not a coercive one. It stated

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132 PRO, INF 1/567, General Production Division, Ministry of Information, 11 December 1944.

133 PRO, INF 1/567/339, Captain G. E. Schulster, Information Office, Hargeisa, to General production Division, Ministry of Information, 26 April 1945.
that although the people view the prisons as places where the dredges of the society are dumped into for varying periods of confinement by magistrates, nothing can be further from the truth. Prisons are not solely about punishment. True, criminals are deprived of their liberty for a time. But at the same time, they are made to work and to conform to a certain rigid routine. As such then, punishment is the least important aspect of imprisonment. For when a criminal is sent to a prison, the staff are "given the opportunity of teaching that man another way of life than that which he had led hitherto." Moreover, the hard work (i.e. corvee labour) he is forced to do "helps to preserve him in good health and, coupled with the regular and plentiful food, not infrequently sends him away from the prison stronger and healthier than when he entered." In addition, the habits of work instilled show him that he can "earn a living outside if he really wishes to do so." Indeed, many prisoners are helped in their subsequent life particularly if they had been willing and able to learn a trade at one of the prison industries. The article, in sum, portrayed the prisons as educational institutions.

The importance of informal adult classes, the press, community centres, mobile cinema shows, radio broadcasts, posters, plays, lectures and talks on various issues--i.e., the "modern methods" of communication--can not be underestimated. They formed, after all, the "ideological material" of informal adult education. The various "modern methods" of communication were indeed the most dynamic aspect of the ideological material of the dominant and hegemonic colonial system. They were dynamic and important, because they influenced public opinion, and shaped "mass consciousness." "Everything that influences or may influence public opinion..."}

134 Antonio Gramsci, Further Selections, p.155.
directly or indirectly belongs to it (i.e. the ideological material of the society): libraries, schools, groups and clubs of different kinds, right up to architecture, street lay-out and street names.135 All played a key role in influencing public opinion, in augmenting the ranks of the elite, in disseminating fresh news and ideas, practices, and values, and in stimulating the public's desire for, and confidence in, western modernity and cultural capital. These processes created, as such then, hegemonic power relations advantageous to the colonial regime, as Sir Rudolph Slatin hoped.136 "Every relationship of 'hegemony' is," after all, "necessarily an educational relationship,"137 and "every educational relationship is a political relationship."138

The civil institutions established within the framework of education for citizenship, in conclusion, played a key role in forming a complex "power-knowledge relations" that culturally converted and coopted a small upper stratum of the natives, and created power relations advantageous to the colonial administration. The civil institutions and the heterogenous modern methods of communication deployed during the "Second Colonial Occupation" of Somaliland--films, formal and informal schools and their textbooks, radio broadcasts, libraries, newspapers, literature, plays, mobile cinema, posters, photographs, lectures, community centres--expanded cultural and educational activities inside and outside the schools, in the urban and rural communities, produced a sufficient number of technically trained government staff literate in

135 Ibid.
136 See above, p.1.
137 Ibid., p.157.
138 Antonio Gramsci, Quaderno del cacere.
English, disseminated social and economic information, stimulated the desire of the people for western cultural capital, produced effects of hegemony, and won the cooperation of the people of Somaliland. The 1949 colonial report stated that the people of Somaliland "are more cooperative than ever before" because they were "conscious of the attempts that...(were) being made to improve health and education in the territory."\textsuperscript{139}

CHAPTER FOUR
The Hegemonic Effects of Public Health

The unhealthiest period in the history of Somaliland was between the 1890s and 1930s. During that period colonial diseases such as smallpox, influenza, cholera, relapsing fever, tuberculosis, and venereal diseases repeatedly swept the country. The key factors in the spread of colonial diseases were colonial conquest, the intensified interaction between Somaliland and the regions of the British Empire, the movement of armies, the wars of conquest and pacification, and the dislocation of people. These factors contributed to the introduction of new diseases in an unprecedented scale, and in the disturbance of the relative tolerance the people of Somaliland acquired for local strains of malaria, smallpox, and other diseases.¹

The northern Somali country was not a "virgin soil"² for epidemics in the pre-colonial era, because there existed a well-established and ancient cultural and commercial contact with some of the world's most potent sources of plagues—Arabia, India, and Ethiopia. Three factors, nevertheless, acted as a shield against the spread of contagious diseases into the interior plateau where the great majority of the people lived: the lack of large urban centres with large permanent population, and the temporal and spatial limitation on the contact with the outside world.


Temporally, the contact with the outside world was limited to the fair season from October to March. This was the season in which Berbera became the centre of commerce. Although other ports such as Hiis, Mait, Las Korey, Zeila, and Shalcow were also centres of trade during the fair season, their trade was very limited, and was overshadowed by that of Berbera. More often than not, these minor trading centres functioned as ports of exports and imports for petty Somali traders, and thus had little international connections. Berbera was, therefore, the most likely source of epidemics for the northern Somali country. But the limited and seasonal contact with the outside world acted as a shield against the spread of contagious diseases, except in rare occasions. And even when a contagious disease appeared in Berbera, its spread into the interior plateau was hindered by the unbroken chain of mountains that ran parallel to the coastal strip for three hundred miles, which made travel for sick persons extremely tedious and impossible. The slow mode of travel made the spread of contagious diseases from the coast also very unlikely. By the same token, the deep Haud and the slow mode of transportation acted as a screen against the penetration of contagions from Ethiopia into the interior plateau. Finally, the northern Somali country lacked large urban centres with large permanent population that could act as a source of infectious diseases. Berbera's population reached over 20,000 in the trading season, but quickly declined once the fair ended. Contagious diseases in the northern Somali country were thus rare. The historical evidence supports that argument.

No European traveller of the northern Somali country reported a single plague from 1833 to 1887. Dr Frederick Forbes was the exception. He noted in passing a disease that killed hundreds of people in Berbera in 1832. He neither characterized the disease as an "epidemic,"
nor attempted to name the disease. His evidence for the occurrence of the epidemic was the large number of graves in the town. Neither Lt. C. J. Cruttendon, Richard Burton, Captain S. B. Miles, Captain F. M. Hunter, H. M. Abad, Colonel E. V. Stace, nor Captain Robert Moreby, to name a few, reported a single plague in the country. Lt. C. J. Cruttendon who visited the country twice in 1848, and went inland, never mentioned or reported any plagues. He stated rather that the population of the country was not only healthy but also "very great." Richard Burton, moreover, who visited the country in 1856, and stayed in the interior for six months, did not report a single epidemic in the Somali country. He stated that smallpox occasionally killed hundreds of people in Ethiopia, but he did not observe the disease in the northern Somali country. He only reported the prevalence of chicken pox, and the rare incidence of consumption. He stated that the Somali people suffered from few and simple maladies, and added that he had seen old people "hale and strong, preserving their powers... in spite of eighty or ninety years." Captain S. B. Miles who visited the country in 1872 also did not report a single epidemic. He stated that the people were "troubled with very few diseases, and have little need of medicine; they have a remedy for ulcers, and know how to heal spear-wounds quickly by applying

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powdered bark of the kurraa, which is a powerful styptic."6 And captain F. M. Hunter who signed treaties with Somali elders in 1884 that paved the way for British conquest, and later became the first consul of the Somali coast Protectorate, never mentioned in all his reports a single outbreak of smallpox, or other contagious diseases.

Once the relative isolation of the people of the interior of Somaliland ceased, however, the decimation of the population began. Colonial conquest, the massive movement of troops and refugees, and political instability, were the central factor in the breaking of the relative isolation of the people, and the spread of colonial diseases in the early colonial period. Smallpox epidemics ravaged the country in 1899, 1901, 1904-1905, 1910-1912, 1919-1920, and 1935-1936; influenza in 1918; cholera in 1892 and 1899; malaria, relapsing fever, tuberculosis and venereal diseases in the 1920s and 1930s.

The first plague recorded in Somaliland during the early colonial period, broke out in 1892. It was a cholera epidemic. The disease was introduced into the country by Ethiopian expeditionary forces, which raided Somali pastoralists as far as the northern Haud, and carried off stock. The cholera epidemic that broke out in the aftermath of the Ethiopian raids, killed hundreds of people. Many of those whose property was looted also died of starvation.7 Another Ethiopian expedition in 1899 reached close to Hargeisa, and forced Sheikh Madar, the founder of the town, to evacuate the settlement. But the damage was already done. Refugees infected with

7 PRO, F.O.403/177, Stace to Baring, 12 April 1892.
smallpox entered the town, and from there the disease spread quickly, and reached Berbera where 2,000 people died of the disease. Probably more people died in the interior, though the military report gave no figures.

During the 1904-1905 British expedition against the Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan, moreover, a smallpox epidemic swept the country. The disease was introduced into the country by imperial forces mobilized from India, Aden, and East Africa. The disease affected most adversely the refugees of the conflict who moved to the towns. According to Dr. Drake-Brockman, the "highest mortality has occurred amongst the destitute fugitives (from the war between the Sayyid and the British expeditionary forces), who had been in too weak a condition to withstand the attack and consequently a very large number succumbed both at Berbera and in the interior." He treated 1,630 cases in Berbera of which 800 died, that is, fifty percent. An even larger number probably died in the interior, as the report indicated.

The worst smallpox epidemic ravaged the country in 1910-1912. The social conditions for the unchecked spread of the disease was created by the political instability that rocked the country from 1910 to 1913. The epidemic was most severe in the south-east region of the Protectorate, and decimated both the dervishes and the pastoralists. Even the baboons

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9 PRO, W.O.106/18, Dr. Drake-Brockman to the Commissioner, 14 November 1905.

10 Ibid.

11 PRO, W.O.106/22, Byatt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 October 1911.
contracted the disease, and were often found dead near wells with all the symptoms of the disease, thus spreading the disease even further. Dr. Drake-Brockman treated 4,447 cases in Berbera alone, of which 1,609 died. In the interior, refugees reported "heavy mortality" due to the disease. Almost one-third of the population, as Douglas Jardine pointed out, died as a result of gun shot wounds, the spear, hunger, and smallpox infection. Douglas Jardine characterized the high toll in deaths as a "holocaust."  

The First World War and the final campaign against the Sayyid in 1920, furthermore, were instrumental in the outbreak of influenza and smallpox epidemics. The influenza pandemic affected the whole world, and was swiftly carried around the world by the movement of armies and peoples. It reached Somaliland in November 1918. Fifty percent of the population were infected, and about five percent died of the disease. And in 1919 the mobilization of large imperial forces from India, Arabia, and East Africa against the Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan, introduced smallpox into the country. About 354 people died in all the medical stations, and probably more people died in the interior.

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16 Military Report on British Somaliland, 1925.

17 Ibid.
The incidence of smallpox fell dramatically in the 1920s. The ending of the movement of armies and refugees across the imperial frontiers, was the main reason for the decline of the incidence of smallpox in that period. The incidence of the disease in Protectorate, however, rose again in the 1930's.

Table 4.1
Number of Smallpox Cases, 1930-1937

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Great Britain. Colonial Office. Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Somaliland, 1930-1937 (London: HMSO, 1932-1938). (The number of cases reported were those treated in the hospitals. There were probably a substantial number of cases never reported or treated in the hospitals.)

As Table 4.1 shows, the incidence of the disease was most pronounced in 1935-1936. The rise in the incidence of the disease was due to the unsettled political conditions in Ethiopia. In 1935, Ethiopia was invaded, and conquered, by Italy. Ethiopian refugees of the Italian war of conquest moved into Somaliland and reintroduced the vector of the disease. The disease was most
prevalent in centres that functioned as havens for refugees from Ethiopia, such as the refugee
camp established at Manjaseh, twenty-five miles south of Berbera, as well as Berbera,
Hargeisa, and Burao. Once the Italian conquest of Ethiopia was completed, and the movement of
armies and refugees ceased, the incidence of the disease in Somaliland came to a sudden end.
Thus in 1937, as Table 4.1 shows, only one case of smallpox was reported in the whole
Protectorate.

Meanwhile, other diseases such as tuberculosis, venereal diseases, and relapsing fever
spread in Burao, Hargeisa, and Berbera in the 1920s and 1930s. All were colonial diseases.
Relapsing fever was first diagnosed in 1913 by Dr. Drake-Brockman. And by the 1920s, the
disease became well-established in Burao, Hargeisa, and Odweina. Tuberculosis and venereal
diseases also spread in the towns and particularly among the "starving pauper element" from 1910
and onwards. Syphilis was so prevalent among this class that it was feared it might "menace the
physique of the next generation." Furthermore, malaria epidemics were reported in 1931, 1932,
1933, 1934, 1935, and 1936. The most severe epidemic took place in 1935-1936 in the Ain and
Nogal areas.

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18 The camp was under the medical supervision of Dr. G. L. L. Gurney of the Bible


20 Ibid.

People of Somaliland, 1931-1936.
Colonial conquest, in short, burdened the people of Somaliland with numerous contagious diseases such as cholera, smallpox, tuberculosis, syphilis, relapsing fever, influenza, and malaria, which played a crucial role in the decline of the population of the country in the early colonial period. In 1910-1913 alone one-third of the population of the country perished; and in 1918-1919, five percent of the population died of influenza. Between 1900 and 1920 alone, 200,000 people died. Douglas Jardine maintained that the main cause was the violence caused by the struggle between the Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan forces and the administration. That struggle "involved, directly or indirectly, the untimely destruction of, perhaps, 200,000 lives."\(^{22}\) The degradation of the environment and the rise in poverty, moreover, weakened the health of the population and made them vulnerable to the colonial diseases.

The Medical Campaigns, 1920-1939

The administration did little about the spread of contagious diseases from 1890 to 1920. The war against the Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan made any investment in hospitals and clinics, or the undertaking of campaigns of control of diseases, impossible in that period. There were only three clinics at Sheikh, Zeila, and Berbera, that served primarily soldiers. Medical expenditure in this period averaged about Rs.1,254 a year.\(^{23}\)

\(^{22}\) Douglas Jardine, *The Mad Mullah*, p.315. (See also chapter two.)

\(^{23}\) PRO, F.O.78/5030/12426, Local Auditor, Somali Coast Protectorate, 1899.
In the post-Sayyid period, however, the administration expanded medical services for utilitarian and political reasons. The administration was anxious, first, to control the spread of diseases and improve the health of the people; second, to "develop the resources of the country" and raise surplus revenue; third, to neutralize the anti-colonial legacy of the Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan; and fourth, to make the people responsive to colonial rule through cultural and educational institutions, and not through a "demonstration of (naked) power." As Sir Gerald Summers, the Governor of Somaliland from 1922 to 1924, put it, "(t)hough by nature the Somalis are very unresponsive, there is no reason to conclude that by the progress of administration and the personal contact of British officers with the people themselves...and by the extension of medical treatment and other means, a far better relationship may not be established between the British administration and the people than exists at present." In sum, colonial medicine had the object of imposing "regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the

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26 Sir Gerald Summers, "Memorandum on Political Affairs in the Somaliland Protectorate," 1924.

27 Ibid.
population," a politics in which the health, the productivity, the disciplining, and the controlling of the population were intertwined.

The first modern hospital was opened at Berbera in 1925 with great fanfare. Less sophisticated hospitals were also opened at Hargeisa and Borama in 1925. And in 1928 a new hospital was built at Erigavo; in 1929 a new lunatic asylum and a leprosarium was opened at Berbera; in 1930 a ward for tuberculosis patients was added to the Hargeisa hospital; in 1932 a ward for female patients was added to the Borama hospital; and in 1935 the leprosarium at Berbera was expanded. Moreover, venereal disease clinics were added to all the hospitals in all the main towns from 1925 to 1930. In the post-Sayyid period, therefore, medical expenditure increased dramatically as the following table shows.

Table 4.2
Comparative Expenditure, 1927-1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Protectorate Expenditure. (£)</th>
<th>Medical Dept. Expenditure. (£)</th>
<th>% of Medical to Protectorate Expenditure.</th>
<th>Total Patients.</th>
<th>Cost per Patient. Pence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


29 The historiography that explores the connection between empire and medicine is rich, see David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); David Arnold, "Touching the Body: Perspectives on the Indian Plague," in Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Spivak (eds), Selected Subaltern Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.391-426; Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Roy Macleod and Milton Lewis (eds), Disease, Medicine, and Empire: Perspectives on Western Medicine and European Expansion (London: Routledge, 1988).
The first medical issue the public health department addressed in the post-Sayyid period was venereal diseases, particularly syphilis. The disease, as Table 4.3 shows, affected very few people in the urban centres. Nonetheless, the medical department was anxious to stop the spread of the disease, and to, at the same time, use its intervention against the disease as a way of imposing controls and surveillance over the pauper class in the towns. The politics of power and knowledge were deeply intertwined in the campaigns waged against venereal diseases in the post-Sayyid period.

Table 4.3  
Syphilis Cases, 1920-1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
<th>Congenital</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRO, C.O.830/2/15504, Appendix XI: "Syphilis in British Somaliland, 1930."

So interested was the medical department in gaining the latest methods of classifying and controlling venereal diseases, that Major Keene, the V.D. advisor to the East African Protectorates, was invited to visit Somaliland in 1923. Major Keene stayed in Somaliland for one month--16 September to 16 October 1923--and toured clinics in Odweina, Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera. He advised the department on how to classify the disease, and recommended the widespread use of N.A.B. injections as a remedy against syphilis. The department then supplied all the clinics and hospitals with N.A.B. injections, and publicized in all the towns the dangers of the disease--the announcements stressed the inherent danger of impotency--and the effectiveness of the N.A.B. injections. The injections were not free. Each injection cost Rs.10. The N.A.B. injections were fortunately effective against the disease, and consequently became "very popular."

Even people who were not infected with the disease began beseeching clinics and

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30 PRO, C.O.830/2/15504, "Syphilis in British Somaliland, 1930", Appendix XI.
hospitals for the magical bullet against the disease.\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, an old Arab charlatan who practised in Berbera, and used to advise his patients to wash in the sea, and then lie buried in the hot sand-dunes, left the country to Arabia, for the lack of practice.\textsuperscript{32}

The campaign was successful in reducing the incidence of the disease. By 1928 there were only 333 syphilis cases. The incidence of the disease rose between 1929 and 1930. The main cause was the drought of 1928-1930, which broke down the custom of poor women of "remaining chaste and gave a new lease of life to V.D."\textsuperscript{33} In 1930, the number of syphilis cases rose to 520 cases. But by 1935, the incidence of the disease declined yet again as a result of a renewed campaign against the disease. In that year there were only 434 cases of syphilis, and 183 gonorrhoea cases.\textsuperscript{34} The sharp decline in the disease in the late 1920s was duly noted by the department. According to the 1930 report on syphilis, "The successful treatment of syphilis has been very useful propaganda and brings patients for other troubles."\textsuperscript{35} As Table 4.2 shows, the number of patients that consulted clinics and hospitals steadily increased from 1927 onwards. That testified to the rising confidence in western medicine among the people. It was that confidence of the people in western medicine that allowed the medical department to introduce

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item "Syphilis in British Somaliland, 1930." (Italics mine.)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
legislation in 1935 and 1936 that gave the medical staff more powers, and to undertake draconian measures in eradicating relapsing fever in 1924 and 1936.

Relapsing fever was not a deadly disease. The mortality rate for people infected with the disease was 0.6%.\(^\text{36}\) It was nonetheless a debilitating disease with such symptoms as severe headaches, vomiting, profuse sweating, and constipation. Though not deadly, the disease nevertheless weakened the immune system and made infected people vulnerable to other diseases. The disease was first diagnosed in 1913 by Dr. Drake-Brockman.\(^\text{37}\) The centre of the disease was Burao. In 1919, there were 109 relapsing fever cases. The incidence of the disease fell to 64 cases in 1920. But in the following year the number of cases infected with the disease rose again to 113, and then reached epidemic proportions in 1923-1924. The number of cases in the town rose to 500 in 1933; 843 in 1935; 618 in 1936; and 981 in 1937.\(^\text{38}\) The number of infected cases in Hargeisa, and Odweina in those year were also high.\(^\text{39}\)

The medical department took draconian measures in 1924 and 1936 to eradicate the disease. The medical staff convinced the population of Burao that the vector of the disease could only be eradicated if their settlement was burned down to the ground. The people of the town


\(^{39}\) Ibid; PRO, 830/2, Annual Medical and Sanitary Report for the Somaliland Protectorate, 1932.
accepted the arguments of the medical staff. Apparently, the success of the campaign against V.D., gave the medical staff scientific and moral authority. The staff burned down Burao in 1924, and re-established the township in another area, which the medical staff clearly organized and planned. The medical staff also convinced the people of Odweina that the only solution to relapsing fever was the destruction of the whole town. Odweina was also burned down in 1924, and the settlement established in a new area under the supervision and planning of the medical staff. The incidence of the disease declined in both towns as a result of the destruction of the old settlements, so much so that only one case of relapsing fever was reported in Burao in 1927. But since the vector of the disease was not local, but followed the highways of commerce from Ethiopia into Somaliland, the incidence of the disease began to increase after 1928, and reached epidemic level in 1936. The medical staff again recommended the burning down of a substantial part of Burao. Again the people of Burao, confident that the medical staff had special insight into the origins of the disease, acquiesced to the recommendations of the staff.40 Although the incidence of the disease fell after 1937 to 324 cases, from 618 cases in 193641, it rose again in 1938, and reached epidemic levels in Burao, Hargeisa, and Odweina in the 1940s.42


42 See following section.
Meanwhile the department undertook extensive campaigns against both smallpox and malaria. The department stationed a mobile staff at the border with Ethiopia as early as 1920 that identified individuals infected with smallpox and quarantined them. The department also vaccinated all the people of the interior as they entered the large townships in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1931, for instance, the "disease was stamped out early in the year" through a very energetic vaccination and segregation campaign. And in 1935-1936 the department undertook a widespread campaign of vaccination and segregation in the main towns. In 1936 alone 8,337 vaccinations were performed in Burao, Hargeisa and Borama. By 1937 only one case of smallpox was reported. The department, moreover, passed two laws in 1935 and 1936 that gave the medical staff the power to detain infected cases until they were clinically cured and "rendered ineffective," to "educate the native" population on public health, and to distribute quinine more energetically.

The energetic distribution of quinine was made necessary by the continuous malaria epidemics that affected the population in the 1930s, and the fact that the people of the interior were resistant to accepting medical advice. As P. Granville Edge, the Principle Medical Officer sarcastically put it, they have not yet "learned that quinine will cure the disease much more

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effectively than the prayers of a mullah or a Koranic amulet strung around the neck.\textsuperscript{47} The most serious epidemic occurred in 1935-1936, and is well-known in the oral tradition as "Duumo Laaye" (death by malaria). It was most severe in the Ain and Nogaal areas in the Erigavo district. The department played a crucial role in controlling the epidemic, for in that year medical officers and an army contingent were posted in the interior owing to the unsettled political situation in Ethiopia. And so the medical staff were able to deal with the outbreak of the malaria epidemic without delay.\textsuperscript{48} Another epidemic occurred in 1936 which the medical staff was able to control. The medical staff also continuously and routinely treated wells, standing water, and drainage in the rural and urban areas.\textsuperscript{49} Medical officers not only attended to the sick, distributed quinine, treated wells, but also educated the "natives" about public health and preventive measures against the spread of malaria and other diseases.

One of the main central issues that concerned medical and political officers in the towns was sanitation. Sanitation in the main towns in Somaliland was under the control of district officers, while medical officers assisted with technical advice and routine inspections, since there was a shortage of medical and sanitary staff. Only Berbera had one Indian sanitary officer. The other towns were inspected by nurses and doctors that worked in the main hospitals. The sanitation system of the towns was in essence undeveloped. Even the European quarters in all the

\textsuperscript{47} P. Granville Edge, "Somaliland Protectorate, 1936," p.535.


\textsuperscript{49} P. Granville Edge, "Somaliland Protectorate, 1936," p.535.
towns, except Berbera, used the bucket system for the disposal of sewage. Moreover, the towns lacked pit-latrines, and so the medical staff established defecation areas outside the towns. Water supplies were also not developed in the towns. Pumps were nevertheless established in Burao, Sheikh, Hargeisa, and Berbera by 1936. These services, however, were only for Europeans. The native population drew its water supplies from wells. Although the sanitary system was weak, the medical staff still managed to inspect the townships, play a role in town-planning in Burao and Odweina, detain cases considered a health hazard to the public, set defecating boundaries outside the towns, and to disseminate ideas to the public about safe methods of disposing of garbage, conserving water in their homes, preventing venereal diseases and tuberculosis. The district commissioners played a key role in that process. Major Rayne who was the district commissioner of Zeila in the early 1920s, stated that every morning

"I wander through the streets and note that the sweepers are doing their work in keeping the town clean. If the environment of a house are found to be in a filthy state--this happens seldom--I just say: 'Tell the owner to come to the office.' This means that he is "for it" later on the day. We do not argue about such matters in the street.""51

Moreover, the department called in 1936 for "intensive propaganda"52 in educating the public about these issues. The medical staff performed that intensive propaganda in the relief camps more successfully, for they maintained daily contact with the inmates. The department


52 PRO, C.O.830/3, Somaliland Protectorate Annual Medical and Sanitary Report, 1936. (Italics mine.)
established a permanent camp for the elderly poor and orphans at Berbera in 1930. But the first relief camp was opened at Bulhar in 1927 and closed in 1930. The camp was opened in response to the severe drought that affected the country in that period. Other relief camps were organized by the department in 1933, 1934, and 1936. In all the camps, the medical staff always gave the inmates public health education lectures, vaccinated them against smallpox and other diseases. In 1929, for instance, all the inmates at the Bulahar relief camp were inoculated against smallpox.

Overall, the medical campaigns against, malaria, venereal diseases, and relapsing fever; public health inspection of the towns, the treatment of wells, the organization of relief camps for paupers, and public health propaganda, reinforced the dependence of the public on western medicine and other western cultural institutions, and increased the control and surveillance of the population. This process was further intensified in the late colonial period, as a result of the dramatic expansion of medical services within the framework of mass education.

The Expansion of Services, 1941-1960

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Immediately after the reoccupation of Somaliland in 1941, the administration began rebuilding the district hospitals and clinics in Burao, Berbera, Erigavo, Borama, Zeilah, and Hargeisa, because public health was considered as "the first essentials to the progress," and administration of the country. G. T. Fisher, the Governor of Somaliland from 1943 to 1948, stressed in particular the political and administrative role of colonial medicine. He stated that "(h)giene and public health are an important part of the administration of the country." It was, moreover, considered of utmost importance in "popularising the Government, and identifying the administration with the people's welfare." Public health in the late colonial period was, as such then, deeply involved in a biopolitics of the population: in increasing the health and productivity of the people, in supervising and controlling them, and in winning their confidence and cooperation.

By 1943, the reconstruction of the district hospitals was complete; a maternity and child welfare clinic was opened at Burao; and a school for civil dressers, sanitary workers, and nurses was started at Hargeisa. By 1945, hygiene services was begun in Berbera, Hargeisa, and Burao. Three years later, construction of new hospitals was begun in Las Anod, Burao, Berbera,

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57 PRO, W.O.32/13261, Military Governor's Note; Appendix B: Medical Policy, November 1944.


Hargeisa, and district dispensaries opened at Hargeisa. In 1949 new dispensaries were also opened at Odweina, Darburuk, Ainabo, Sheikh; and new wards added to the Burao (120 beds), Borama (three new 22-bed wards), and Las Anod (45 beds) hospitals. A venereal disease wing for women was also added to the Ruth Fisher Clinic at Hargeisa in 1949, as well as to the Burao maternity and child welfare clinic. The department also established an ambulance service that picked up sick cases in the interior and brought them to the main hospitals. By 1951, all the main hospitals had experienced surgeons. In addition, a new hospital for T.B. patients was opened at Hargeisa hospital in 1954. And in 1958, tuberculosis wards were added to the Burao, Hargeisa, Berbera, Borama, and Gabileh hospitals. By then dispensaries were also opened at Mandera, Abdulkadir, Gabileh, Las Korey, Zeilah, Hiis, Mait, Hudin, Tugwajalleh, Adadleh. The expenditure on the services, which was financed through Colonial Development and Welfare funds, consequently expanded as Table 4.4 shows.

Table 4.4
Medical Expenditure 1943-1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Protectorate Expenditure (£)</th>
<th>Public Health Expenditure (£)</th>
<th># Who Visited Hospitals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13,754</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,408,409</td>
<td>105,822</td>
<td>117,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,715,683</td>
<td>114,878</td>
<td>112,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2,176,777</td>
<td>130,742</td>
<td>118,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2,390,757</td>
<td>143,481</td>
<td>141,461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: PRO, W.O.32/9606, Minute, January 1944; PRO, C.O.830/5, Somaliland Protectorate Annual Medical and Sanitary Report, 1948; Colonial Office. Colonial Office Annual Reports on
The expansion of services was not necessitated by an increase in the incidence of epidemics, or the rise of mortality. To the contrary, the incidence of epidemics fell substantially in the late colonial period, and the population of the country increased. The 1945 report on pauperism noted in passing the "increase in (the) population" of the country.\(^6^0\) The 1948 colonial report, moreover, stated that "(b)efore the war the population was estimated at about 350,000. More recently it had been put at 700,000."\(^6^1\) The 1950 survey also maintained that the population of the country increased dramatically during, and in the post-war, period. The survey estimated the population to be about 640,000.\(^6^2\) The 1951 survey, furthermore, estimated that the population of the country increased from 350,000 before to 640,000 during the war and post-war, period.\(^6^3\) There is therefore a clear and substantial evidence for the two-fold increase of the population in the late colonial period. That was not accidental, but was due to the decline in the incidence of epidemics, and the ending of colonial wars and political instability.

\(^6^0\) Oxford University, Rhodes House Library, 751.14.S.2/1945, "Report of Committee Enquiring into Pauperism in British Somaliland."


Not a single cholera epidemic took place in the late colonial period. An influenza epidemic occurred in late 1957 and tapered off in early 1958. Smallpox, moreover, occurred only twice: in 1943 and 1959. The 1943 smallpox epidemic swept the country from April to December; but it was most severe in April and May when 470 people fell sick due to the disease. In November only 121 people got sick, and in December 61 people. Overall, 1,125 people were infected with the disease. The 1959 smallpox epidemic followed the rail road from Ethiopia into Djibouti in September, and reached Somaliland in November. It affected only 90 people at Borama, and nine at Hargeisa. Moreover, neither respiratory diseases, nor venereal diseases, reached epidemic levels during the late colonial period. The number of tuberculosis cases never exceeded 800, and venereal disease cases never exceeded 5,000 except in 1946 when 5,308 cases were reported. In 1958, the number of venereal disease cases reported were 4,303, and in 1959, the number of venereal disease cases reported were 4,429. The most common diseases in the towns were digestive complaints, conjunctivitis, tropical ulcers, non-tuberculosis respiratory diseases, lacerated wounds, malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery, while the most common medical

67 PRO, C.O.830/5, Somaliland Annual Medical and Sanitary Report, 1946.
problems in the interior were the occasional malaria epidemics in the wet season, and coryza, bronchitis, and pneumonia in the cold season. The ending of political instability in Somaliland, colonial wars, and the movement of armies and refugees across the frontiers were the key factors in the decline of epidemics.

"Propaganda and Administrative Action," 1941-1960

Despite the decline of epidemics in the country, the public health department expanded medical services in the urban and rural areas—more so in the former than the later areas, because urban spaces were represented by medical and sanitary discourses as pathogenic, and urbanites as thoroughly sick, unhealthy, and even immoral. Such representations and discourses which used the "language of truth, discipline, rationality, utilitarian value, and knowledge," functioned as a "sort of general recipe for the exercise of power over" people, and more specifically over urbanites. The urban centres were viewed as "medicalisable objects" because of the


concentration of population in a limited area, and thus considered as the most dangerous source of disease for the population. The towns were represented as the site of high infant mortality, malaria epidemics, venereal diseases, relapsing fever, and tuberculosis. Moreover, the filthy and unhygienic habits of the population of the towns, their use of drugs like Qat—a mild stimulant, prostitution, juvenile delinquency, the insanitary conditions of the towns, the break-down of the family, were viewed as the source of both diseases and political problems. Such medical discourses on urban morbidity led to the passing of various ordinances, to the expansion of the police force, and the "placing under surveillance of a whole range of urban developments, constructions and institutions."\textsuperscript{74} The 1946 medical and sanitary report insisted that what was required was undertaking of "intensive propaganda and administrative action,"\textsuperscript{75} against urban morbidity, and urban social problems.

The key medical discourses that portrayed urban centres as pathogenic were the 1944 medical policy statement, the 1945 report on pauperism, the 1946 and 1948 medical reports, and the 1956 report on tuberculosis, to mention few exemplary cases. These discourses necessitated the passing of ordinances in 1947, 1948, 1949 against juvenile delinquency, prostitution, Qat importation and consumption, and the expansion of public health education and medical services. And so "(m)edicine, as a technique of health even more than as service to the sick or an art of cures, assume(d) an increasingly important place in the administrative system and the machinery

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} PRO, C.O.830/5, Somaliland Medical and Sanitary Report, 1946.
of power." Indeed, medical measures were "administrative as much as medical in their presentation," so much so that "the medical officer became indistinguishable from the administrator in the eyes of the African community."  

The 1944 medical policy statement was perhaps the only medical report that did not exaggerate the incidence of diseases in the urban areas. The statement maintained that the Somali is generally healthy. Neither venereal diseases nor tuberculosis nor leprosy are common in the country. The nomadic life in the open country had been a protection against the spread of these diseases. But the presence of Somali and East African soldiers in the protectorate, and the return of Somali troops on leave, "may alter this in the future." There are already women infected with venereal diseases in every town where troops are stationed. Thereafter, medical reports presented a less sanguine picture of the disease environment in the urban centres.

The 1945 report on pauperism stressed the increase of the pauper population of the towns. The report called attention in particular to the large number of juvenile delinquents in the towns. The report maintained that three factors increased the drift of juveniles to the towns. First, deterioration of the environment in the interior reduced many people to poverty. Parents consequently encouraged their children to move to the towns as a result of the insufficiency in stock and milk. Second, the old custom of helping out poor relatives declined, so that a poor man and his children received little help, if any, from relatives. Third, parental control over children

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76  Michel Foucault, _Power/Knowledge_, p.176.

77  Megan Vaughan, _Curing Their Ills_, p.43.

became less strict. The increase in poverty loosened the hold of parents over their children, and so children felt free to move to the towns where there were opportunities of employment and adventure. The overall effect of the increase in the juvenile population in the towns, the report continued, was the rise in crime, prostitution, and diseases.  

The 1946 medical report stressed the high rate of infant mortality (Table 4.5) due to diseases that were caused by the slum conditions in the towns.

### Table 4.5
**Infant Mortality and Fertility Rate**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Still births</td>
<td>91 per 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality, i.e. deaths</td>
<td>73 per 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under 1 year of age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality under 5 years of</td>
<td>236 per 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility rate, i.e. average</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of children per mother</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 45 years of age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRO, C.O.830/5, Somaliland Annual Medical and Sanitary Report, 1946.

The main causes of infant mortality, the report maintained, were respiratory diseases (25%), malaria (34%), and diarrhoea and dysentery (17%). Other diseases, furthermore, spread because of the unhygienic habits of urbanites accustomed from time immemorial to "promiscuous defecation," and their poorly lighted and ventilated homes that lacked "in sanitary convenience."

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80 PRO, C.O.830/5, Somaliland Annual Medical and Sanitary Report, 1946.
The "insanitary conditions" in the towns thus played a central role in the spread of respiratory diseases, diarrhoea and dysentery. Yet the "squalor" in which the urbanites were supposed to live in was highly exaggerated. Dr. Leslie Housden, an officer to the Ministry of Health and an honourary medical officer for Save the Children, argued in 1950, that there are of course "untidy, dirty people in every community, but during visits made both by day and night, the gurigis (huts) and small compounds surrounding each (in both Hargeisa and Berbera) were clean and tidy as were passages between them." Moreover, "(s)igns of the use of these passages for defecation were very scarce, and it seems that the people use the open spaces a little away from their settlements." In general, there "were no unsavoury smells" except for that of the "half-cured camel skins, smoking fires and ghee" which can be "unpleasant and clinging." Overall, the urbanites, and even the "poorest" and most "wretched", lived in a "commendably clean" areas, although "(p)overty and the habits of collecting old iron gives a false appearance of 'squalor'." Dr. Housden, thus, contested the dominant discourse on the urbanites and urban poor, for which he was roundly criticised. The critique of Dr. Housden was inevitable, since medical discourses

81 Ibid.


83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

obeyed an internal logic of their own which represented the towns as dirty, unsanitary, and pathogenic, and so required and even beseeched control.

The 1948 medical report, for instance, stated that the bad standard in housing in the towns which "increased very greatly in size since the reoccupation" in 1941 had led to "difficult social problem(s)."\(^87\) It led to unhealthy slum conditions, the drift of young women and men into the towns, the rise in crime, vagabondage, prostitution, infant mortality and venereal diseases.\(^88\) And even earlier the 1946 medical report maintained that the number of venereal diseases in the towns had increased. The "immediate cause of the rise of V.D. in recent years has been the great increase in prostitution" and Qat consumption. It is a disease of the towns, the report added, "where prostitutes and vagabond youths congregate."\(^89\) Medical discourse, in sum, made a direct connection between the expansion of the towns, the bad and insanitary habits of urbanites, and the spread of various diseases in the towns.

The public health department consequently took specific educational and administrative action against the spread of venereal diseases, the decline in public hygiene, the rise in the pauper population and prostitution. In 1947-1949, ordinances were passed against juvenile delinquency (the 1947 Control of Young Person's Ordinance), prostitution (the 1948 Segregation and Rehabilitation of Prostitutes Ordinance), Qat (the 1949 Qat ordinance), and vagrancy. These

\(^87\) PRO, C.O.830/5, Somaliland Annual Medical and Sanitary Report, 1948.


\(^89\) Ibid.
administrative actions promulgated particular disciplinary institutions, such as a wing for juvenile delinquents in Mandera Central Prison, an approved school in Hargeisa, criminal investigation and finger-printing bureau, an intelligence and security agency, research and medical campaigns against relapsing fever and tuberculosis, and a sanitary staff. All of these disciplinary institutions increased the surveillance capabilities of the medical staff and the administration over the urbanites.

The first issue the public health department addressed during the war was public hygiene in the main towns--Berbera, Hargeisa, and Burao. The department divided the towns into areas, and detailed town-sweepers and inspectors to each area with responsibility for its cleanliness. The sanitary staff stationed empty drums for refuse collection at street corners. The drums were regularly emptied into a sanitary lorry operated by a group of town-sweepers. The sanitary staff also patrolled the town daily and inspected abattoirs, public latrines, rubbish disposal areas and incinerators, restaurants, tea-shops, bath-houses, treated wells against malaria, and imposed a "dry hour" every Saturday morning in the towns in order to prevent mosquito breeding. They demanded that all water containers be laid on their side outside each house and business every Saturday. In order to ensure that no water was concealed in contravention of the dry hour rule, inspectors entered every house and examined it thoroughly.90 The sanitary staff also "act(ed) as the eyes and ears of the Medical Officer or of the D.C."91 The sanitary staff as such then not only


maintained the "cleanliness" of the towns, but also maintained a system that allowed the district commissioner to keep an eye on the people.

This system of perpetual surveillance over the people was intensified in the post-war period. The public health department extended that system to all the towns, and even gazetted small settlements as townships in order to bring them under the sanitary control of the department. Pit latrines were built, refuse collection organized, new markets established, a permanent sanitary staff hired for each town, water pipes laid in the main towns, the food-hygiene standard of coffee houses and restaurants kept under watch. By 1958 all the main towns were reorganized into various types of residential, commercial, green zones, stock routes, and master maps produced that specified each zone.

Moreover, the public health department increased the surveillance over juveniles through the 1947 Control of Young Person's Ordinance. The ordinance called for the establishment of an approved school and a more effective system of probation for young offenders and juvenile delinquents. Other social and cultural institutions were also encouraged to take part in the disciplining and control of juveniles. Guidance was given to juveniles, for instance, by district commissioners through the Town Committees. The Kadi Sports Club also played a role in the disciplining of juveniles. It was felt that sports and the training and discipline it demanded, would help form the character of the children. The Kadi Sports Clubs (Judge's Sports Clubs) was

92 Somaliland Protectorate. Medical Department. "Medical Department Annual Report, 1958."
93 Ibid.
opened in many towns and other townships were encouraged to open similar clubs. All of these institutions guided, trained, and disciplined youngsters.

In 1949 yet another ordinance was passed that prohibited vagrancy, and called more specifically for the establishment of a juvenile wing in the Mandera Central Prison and an approved school for juveniles. The school and the juvenile wing were opened in 1950. The school was built with Colonial Development and Welfare funds and a contribution from Save the Children. (The school was managed by the Save the Children, but was supervised by the director of the department of public health.) The school instructed the children in practical education: carpentry, brick-laying, basket-weaving, tailoring, gardening. The children were also given literacy lessons in English. In the prison, moreover, juveniles were given instruction in literacy and practical education. Two teachers appointed to the prison were responsible for their education as well as for the education of the older prisoners. These two institutions, as well as such informal institutions as Judge's sports clubs, township committees, subjected the children to what Michel Foucault called "micro-penalty" that regulated the youngsters behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), use of time (absences, lateness, interruptions of task), diligence in learning (lack of attention or of zeal), and use of the body (incorrect attitude, lack of cleanliness, irregular gestures). These institutions and the discipline, supervision and assistance they

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94 Ibid.


extended to juveniles, were a "real help" in the control of juvenile delinquency, according to the Superintendent of Police of Hargeisa.97 Thus in 1951 only 65 juveniles were convicted of various crimes throughout the territory.98

Furthermore, the public health department intensified surveillance over the sexual activities and habits of the towns-people. There was a limitation to this process since family welfare was "very much a private and personal matter."99 Nevertheless, the department scrutinized the sexual habits of the urbanites through its medical research and control campaign against venereal diseases. The 1944 report of the special treatment centre stated that the number of venereal diseases in the whole country were mere 46 cases of gonorrhoea, 25 cases of syphilis, 1 case of latent syphilis, and 38 cases of syphilis among Italian prisoners.100 The 1945 report of the centre noted a slight increase in venereal diseases. The number of venereal diseases cases reached 466 cases.101 But one year later, 5,308 venereal disease cases were reported, of which 2,929 were syphilis, and 1,800 gonorrhoea. Most, according to the 1946 medical report, were newly acquired infections.102 The report place the blame on the spread of venereal diseases on

98 Ibid.
100 PRO, W.O.222/1902, R. M. C. Tyner, "Quarterly Report" of the Special Treatment Centre, Station Hospital, Mandera, British Somaliland, 1944.
101 PRO, W.O.222/1902, R. M. C. Tyner, "Quarterly Report," of the Special Treatment Centre, Station Hospital, Mandera, 2 January 1945.
102 PRO, C.O.830/5, Somaliland Annual Medical and Sanitary Report, 1946.
the "evil of prostitution" and the immoral and irresponsible behaviour of juvenile delinquents. The report stated the great majority of the people who were attracted by the "glitter" of the towns, were unable to find employment, and so young men drifted into vagabondage and crime, and young women into prostitution.103

The administration then passed in 1949 the Segregation and Rehabilitation Ordinance. Two problems, however, made the segregation and treatment of prostitutes very difficult, particularly in Hargeisa. The public health department, first of all, lacked the proper institutions to detain and rehabilitate prostitutes. The only disciplinary institution in the protectorate capable of performing such a task was the prison for women at Berbera. But that institution did not have the staff or the space to rehabilitate prostitutes. Second, prostitutes lived in the hut sections of the main towns which were "difficult to police,"104 because the hut sections in all the towns, and particularly at Hargeisa, expanded very rapidly between 1945 and 1949. In 1945 Hargeisa consisted of 255 buildings—mostly wattle and daub structures.105 The hut section was so small that the 1945 report on pauperism neglected to even mention it. Four years later Hargeisa consisted of 706 permanent houses, 555 wattle and daub structure, and 5,435 huts.106 Hargeisa's population in 1949, in addition, was 32,000, yet over 26,000 people lived in the hut section.107

103 PRO, C.O.830/5, Somaliland Annual Medical and Sanitary Report, 1948.

104 PRO, C.O.537/3618, "Future of Somaliland: Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Secretary of State's Room on Friday, 17th December 1948."

105 "Report of Committee Enquiring into Pauperism in British Somaliland."


107 Ibid.
The hut section was never planned or organized by either the public health department or district administration.\(^{108}\) So, Governor G. T. Fisher called for the reconstruction of the town "in lines"\(^{109}\) in 1948 in order to make it easier for the police to detain prostitutes. The attempt to reconstruct the slum failed because the residents of the area first refused to cooperate with the medical staff and the district administration; and once the police were called in to evict them, women and children stoned the police while the men conveniently watched the drama from the sidelines.\(^{110}\)

The failure of the enforcement of the ordinance against prostitution and the reconstruction in lines of the hut section in Hargeisa, made the public health department determined to fight prostitution in another front—that of Qat. The 1945 report on pauperism and the 1946 medical report included Qat among one of the sources of medical problems in the towns.

The 1945 report on pauperism maintained that Qat use had many deleterious effects, such as, "(n)eglect of family ties, indolence, inclination to stay in the towns, incapacity for work, deterioration in health, political agitation, and the expenditure of large sums of money of about £5,000-10,000 sent out of country into Ethiopia."\(^{111}\) The use of Qat by juveniles was in particular

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\(^{108}\) Burao was redesigned after the town was burned by the medical department in 1924; and Berbera was planned after it was gutted down by an accidental fire in 1900.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.

\(^{110}\) Ibid. The hut section was gradually destroyed not by the district administration by economic forces. The price of land was rising in the late 1940s, and by 1953 there was a "feverish land grabbing" in Hargeisa and the other towns, and land enclosure in the rural areas particularly in the Hargeisa and Borama environs. (Chapter five.) By 1958, the medical department was able to reorganize all the towns.

\(^{111}\) Ibid.
portrayed as the source of medical and political scandal in the towns. Juvenile use of Qat, the report stated, represented a "serious problem," for this "idle class (was)...responsible for a large proportion of crime and the originating of idle talk, rumours, and consequent political trouble."\textsuperscript{112}

Others such as Dr. D. A. Baird, the director of the department of public health, and the Governor of Aden, pointed to specific medical problems caused by Qat consumption and addiction. Dr. Baird focused on optic neuritis—an eye disease, which, according to him, occurred only among Qat addicts. He diagnosed the disease in a teenager and his father. He characterized both as Qat addicts, and concluded that there was no other possible source for the condition, except Qat.\textsuperscript{113}

The Acting Governor of Aden, moreover, visited the territory in 1953, and advised the medical staff about the possible medical problems that Qat could cause. He stated that haemorrhoids, and physical weakness, are some of the health problems the drug caused. He wrote,

\begin{quote}
As the addiction becomes rooted and his (Qat addict's) appetite grows less there is a tendency for his physique to deteriorate. This need not necessarily mean that he becomes thin and scraggy because I have seen a number of addicts who are to all intents and purposes physically well clad but on closer examination it is found that is largely fat.\textsuperscript{114}
\end{quote}

Qat use by prostitutes and their customers, furthermore, was viewed as a major factor in the spread of syphilis and other diseases. Qat use, then, was viewed as causing political, economic, and health problems.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Dr. D. A. Baird, "A Case of Optic Neuritis in a Qat Addict," \textit{The East African Medical Journal}, vol.29, no.8 (August 1952).
\textsuperscript{114} PRO, C.O.1015/767, Acting Governor, Aden, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 1953.
Qat importation was then banned in 1949. In order to give more resources to the police in interdicting the smuggling of Qat and apprehending Qat users, the administration expanded the police force, established a criminal investigation, finger-printing, and photographing bureau, and an intelligence and security service. These greatly enhanced the efficiency of the police force. Moreover, the administration confiscated all trucks caught importing the drug, and sentenced to a prison term without the option of a fine any one caught possessing it. The expanded police force, and the strict adherence to the regulations and laws promulgated against Qat made the importation and use of the drug "unprofitable and unsafe" by 1951. (Table 4.6 shows the decline of the number of people convicted for violating the Qat ordinance, and the bundles imported into the country.) During the same period juvenile delinquency and juvenile use of the drug declined as well.

Table 4.6
Violations Against Qat Ordinances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reported</th>
<th>Convicted</th>
<th>Quantity Seized (Aqaar)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>3,054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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116 Ibid.

117 "Aqaar" is a small bundle of Qat.
But the effectiveness of the controls over Qat and prostitution was transitory, for neither the expanded police force, nor the control of Qat, led to the decline of prostitution. Prostitution probably increased as more and more young women moved to the towns, and as the consumption of Qat increased, most probably as a result of the very controls designed to end its use. If in 1945, the value of Qat imported into the country was £5,000-10,000, by 1958, the quantity of Qat imported was 1,009,616 lbs, valued at £252,403; and in 1959, the quantity imported was 961,058 lbs valued at £222,054.\(^{118}\) All that the administrative actions of the public health department essentially achieved then was to increase the surveillance, policing, and control of the urbanites. The newly established intelligence and security service, the criminal investigation and fingerprinting bureau, the expanded police force, only enhanced the surveillance powers of the administration over the people.

By the same token, the various research and eradication campaigns against relapsing fever, tuberculosis, malaria, and the vaccination campaigns against smallpox, yellow fever, cholera, and diphtheria; the organization of relief camps; and the public health education campaigns, also broadened the surveillance and control of the population. The medical campaigns against malaria, and relapsing fever, and the research campaign against tuberculosis, for instance, involved authoritarian medical interventions into peoples homes, and examination of people's bodies.

The 1946 medical report included relapsing fever among some of the diseases of the towns. The increase in traffic between Ethiopia and Somaliland during the war, because of the British campaigns of conquest in East Africa, re-introduced relapsing fever into the country. Thus by 1946 the number of cases reported in Burao alone was 488. (Table 4.7 and Figure 4.1)\textsuperscript{119} But as Table 4.7 and Figure 4.1 show, the incidence of the disease was declining, because the opening of the Harar-Djibouti rail road in 1946 reduced substantially the traffic between Somaliland and Ethiopia. Thus the disease was dying a natural death. But the medical staff was not interested in the social and economic etiology of the disease, or in the natural decline of the disease, because the staff viewed the towns as pathogenic despite the evidence. And so the medical department waged an interventionist, and objectifying spraying campaign against the disease in 1949 and 1950.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Incidence of Relapsing Fever}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Number of Cases in Burao & Number of Cases in the whole country \\
\hline
1946 & 488 & 625 \\
1947 & 313 & 445 \\
1948 & 179 & 250 \\
1949 & 85 & 216 \\
1950 & 33 & 265 \\
1951 & 4 & 54 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{119} For all figure see Appendix B.
The spraying campaigns were systematic. They involved the entry into and search of all houses, cafes, mosques, shops, and restaurants. The object was first to determine the number of ticks found in each place, and then to systematically eradicate the tick through spraying. Dust was removed from each premise, spread upon a well-lighted smooth surface, and then the ticks were counted. Satisfied that the agent of the disease was prevalent in each town, every single building was sprayed with gammexane P.520 in three consecutive months. The first spraying of Hargeisa commenced on 28 November and was completed on 21 December 1950. The second spraying commenced on 22 January and completed 17 February 1951. Odweina was sprayed in March and May 1952. Burao was sprayed three consecutive months: December 1949, January 1950, and February 1950. The first campaign in Burao was a large-scale operation. The staff ensured that they covered the whole township whether the permanent houses, the mud-brick houses, or the huts. Each team marked each building it sprayed with a chalk in order not to miss any dwelling. The third spraying was "carried out even though no ticks could be found in dwellings in searches done during the second campaign."^{120}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ticks Found</th>
<th>Eradicated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8

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Although the spraying campaigns had nothing to do with the decline of the disease, which was already on the wane, as Lovett pointed out\(^\text{121}\), nevertheless, the people of Burao, particularly coffee shop, and restaurant owners were "loud in their praises and insisted that tick bites had ceased after the first spraying."\(^\text{122}\) The medical department thus took full credit for the decline of the disease, while at the same time using extremely interventionist techniques to fight a disease that was already on the wane. The campaign, in other words, only enhanced the popularity of colonial medicine, and intensified the surveillance of the population.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., p.161.

\(^{122}\) Ibid., p.161.
Similarly, the medical staff used an equally interventionist and objectifying procedures in its 1954 research campaign on tuberculosis. As Table 4.5 shows, the medical department believed that infant mortality rate in the towns was too high, and assumed that 25% of infants died of respiratory diseases. No distinction was made in the 1946 medical report between tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases. But in 1954 the medical department undertook with the cooperation of the World Health Organization, an extensive survey in order to figure out the extent of the spread of tuberculosis.  

The survey team visited only urban centres: Burao, Borama, Amud, Erigavo, Gabileh, Mait, Hargeisa, and Berbera. But the team systematically surveyed only Burao and Berbera. In Burao, for instance, each street chosen for examination was marked, and every household in each street chosen for examination was given a number and painted with a sign at its entrance. Every effort was made to include both sectors of the town: the hut section, and the permanent houses section. (Figure 4.2) During the medical examination, the whole town was brought to a halt. Women were brought from the market, men from work, and children from school. In each household, the full name, age, sex, status of each individual in the family, and the total number of individuals in each household was registered. Each individual whether young or old, was made to cough as vigorously as possible and then spit into a plastic box. The plastic box was then placed in a jar, and transported to the District Hospital where each sputum was examined with a microscope. The people's cooperation with the survey team was more than satisfactory.

123 World Health Organization. Tuberculosis Research Office. Tuberculosis Survey of the Somalilands (Copenhagen, 1956)
According to the team, 95% of the people selected for the survey in Berbera, and 91% of the people selected for the survey in Burao, attended the examination. The survey team concluded that in both towns the rate of infection among all age groups was very high. (Figure 4.3 and Table 4.9)

**Table 4.9**

**Percentage of All Age Groups That Tested Positive in Burao**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age-group</th>
<th>% that tested positive for T.B.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4 years</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 years</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 years</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 years and over</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Health Organization. Tuberculosis Research Office. *Tuberculosis Survey of the Somalilands* (Copenhagen, 1956). Tabulated from Figure 4.3.

The rate of infection among all age-groups for Berbera, the survey team also concluded was similar to that of Burao. (Figure 4.3) The team then projected those findings for the whole country (Figure 4.4), even though the rural population was not even surveyed.

The methodology of the survey team was deeply flawed. First, the survey team did not re-test those whose sputum showed acid-fast bacilli with x-ray. Rather, they were satisfied with the microscopic test of the sputum. Second, the sputum was examined after three weeks, rather than one week. After one week, many other micro-organisms grow in the sputum other than tubercula
bacilli. Third, the sputum was not appropriately transported nor kept in a cool environment. The jars were transported from the survey areas to the hospital in cars without refrigerators. All of these problems were pointed out by the survey team. Yet the problems were lightly dismissed. The team insisted that if the conditions were more favourable, they would have detected "an even higher number of positive sputa."124

But the reality of the incidence of tuberculosis in the country belied the hyperbolic conclusions of the survey team. The number of cases reported and treated in 1954 and 1955 were 386 cases and 740 cases respectively.125 In 1958, moreover, there were only 808 tuberculosis cases.126 There was, therefore, a discrepancy between the conclusions of the tuberculosis survey report, and the actual cases reported throughout the late colonial period. Nonetheless, the medical department was able as a result of the inflated statistics it produced with the help of the World Health Organization, to expand medical services. The department was given a Colonial Development and Welfare Grant of £114,962 in 1958 for the purpose of expanding facilities for the treatment of T.B. patients.127

The survey shows a familiar process whereby the department of public health deployed the most "objectifying of medical procedures" in which the people were subjected to "mass

124 Ibid., p.30.
126 British Somaliland. Medical Department. "Medical Department Annual Report, 1958."
127 Ibid.
The survey involved the marking of homes, the registration of the names, age, and status within the family of every person subjected to medical examination, the mobilization of the people from schools, work, and markets, and made to cough vigorously into jars. Overall, the people were subjected to colonial surveillance, observation and examination.

The medical department did not confine its "mass treatment" and surveillance activities to the urban centres, but extended it to the rural areas as well. It maintained dispensaries in the rural areas, organized relief camps for droughts victims, and undertook medical control campaigns against malaria in 1951, 1957, and 1958.

The most severe malaria epidemic in the late colonial period took place in May and August 1951. Several thousand cases of malaria were treated in hospitals, of which about 2% died. The medical department distributed 1,754,000 tablets of quinine bi-sulphate in both the rural and urban areas, and treated wells and natural reservoirs. In 1957, moreover, the public health department treated 310 buildings and 2,763 mat-huts against malaria in the Haud. Similarly, the public health department organized an extensive treatment campaign against malaria in 1958 in the Haud in which 310 buildings and 3,763 mat-huts were treated with D.D.T. In the same year, the medical staff organized, with the help of three officers from the World Health Organization, a survey of the breeding areas of the vector of malaria in the Haud.

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128 Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Illness, p.52.
130 Ibid.
and in the mountain escarpment. The people were reluctant to cooperate fully with the survey team and show them all their wells and watering places in the mountain escarpment. They were unwilling to expose themselves to the constant intervention and surveillance of medical institutions and the medical staff. Despite the lack of full cooperation of some "elements" the survey team was able to map the majority of anopheles breeding places in the Haud and mountain escarpment. The medical staff then regularly treated the tanks and homes against malaria up to the end of the colonial period, and advised the people of the Haud on how to prevent the spread of the disease. In the towns, the medical and sanitary staff made regular weekly house to house searches for mosquito breeding places, and treated all breeding places with D.D.T.  

The medical department, furthermore, organizing relief camps for drought victims in 1950, and 1956. In March 1956 a relief camp was opened at Abdul-Kadir in the Hargeisa district. The number of inmates rose rapidly from 400 in March to 700 in August 1956. The most extensive relief effort, however, was undertaken by the medical department in 1950-1951. A severe drought known in the oral traditions as "Seega-case" (the season of Red Winds), affected the eastern region of the protectorate in 1950. The department organized relief camps in 1950 in Berbera, Burao, Garadag, El-Afwein, Erigavo, and Baran. The camps cared mostly for 10,000 children, women, and elderly, of which 1,000 died of malnutrition. The men were recruited as

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coolies for the government. The department spent £80,000 on the camps, while Somalis contributed £2,000 and other items such as cooking utensils and blankets. The medical staff not only cared for the inmates of the camps, but also gave them instructions in hygiene. The camps were all closed in 1951, for the Somali "rarely likes to live on relief...and as soon as the conditions improve he leaves the camps to start again his nomadic life with the help of relatives." The first camp to be closed was at Erigavo. Before the "inmates dispersed they expressed their gratitude to the Government, a possibly unique event for these people."

Meanwhile, the public health department waged an intensive and well organized public health education campaign throughout the late colonial period in the rural and urban areas. Health education disseminated ideas and practices on the prevention of diseases, the improvement of infant welfare, urban and rural sanitation, school health, water supplies, and food hygiene in the home and in the restaurants and tea-shops. As one colonial report put it, the department regularly "arranges propaganda talks and health education to prevent diseases and raise the standard of general health of the people." The cultural institutions that played a key role in the public health education were radio Hargeisa, community centres, film shows, the main newspaper--"War Somali Sidiihi," and booklets. Radio Hargeisa regularly held talks on such

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135 Ibid.


topics as the "Your Health," and "How to Prevent T.B." And in 1958 the department produced a booklet entitled, "Healthy Living." The booklet was made available in all the bookshops, and in all the community centres. It was even used as a reader in adult education classes in all the towns. A member of the health department, moreover, attended all Local Council meetings, in which he encouraged improvements in hygiene and sanitation. In 1958, furthermore, the department produced with the cooperation of the Information Service, a short propaganda film on tuberculosis. The medical department provided the script and actors from the Somali staff, and the Information Service filmed it.

Other films on the prevention of tuberculosis that were produced elsewhere were also shown throughout the territory. A commentary in the vernacular was added to the films during the showing by a Somali who read from a prepared script. The medical department and the Information Service also produced in cooperation other films on public hygiene, the dangers of venereal diseases, the preservation of water, and other topics. Most were instructional films. The Community centres were, moreover, used by the department. Film shows, regular discussions and debates on public health were held in those centres in all the main towns. These centres were

138 "Medical Department Annual Report, 1958."

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.
"very popular" and were patronized by the public. In the hospitals and clinics, moreover, "Instruction in simple hygienic principles" were given.

In conclusion, the radio broadcasts, film shows, lectures in community centres, posters and plays, the research and medical campaigns and the public hygiene system established institutions of control and surveillance, and shaped forms of consciousness and unconsciousness that reinforced colonial authority, and colonial cultural hegemony. As Table 4.1 and 4.2 show the number of people who visited clinics and hospitals increased each year from 1927 to 1959. That was due to the growing "confidence in and desire for western medicine." That growing confidence and desire for western medicine was reflected not only in the number of people who visited medical institutions, but also in the cooperation with the often objectifying procedures of medical and research campaigns of the public health department. The people fully cooperated with the medical staff, often praised their work, and expressed gratitude for assistance. The people, for instance, cooperated with the objectifying campaigns against relapsing fever, venereal diseases, tuberculosis, juvenile delinquency, the "dry-hour" rule, accepted the continuous entry into their homes of the medical staff in order to treat malaria, or relapsing fever, or research the incidence of tuberculosis, and expressed gratitude for the organization of relief centres. In 1924,

the public health department even succeeded in convincing the people of Burao and Odweina that their settlements must be burned down in order to eradicate relapsing fever. The people of these towns accepted similar recommendations from the medical staff in 1936. Moreover, in the 1920s the people fully cooperated with the medical campaign against venereal diseases, which won over the confidence of the people in colonial medicine. H. Neild characterized the people's expression of gratitude to the medical staff as a "unique event." But there was nothing that was unique about it. There was an on-going process whereby colonial medical institutions won over the confidence of the people. The first modern clinic in Hargeisa, according to Lord Rennell of Rodd, "rapidly won over the confidence of the local Somali women and resulted in nearly 30,000 attendance during the first ten months (of 1944) and over 50,000 the following year."^{145}

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145 Lord Rennell of Rodd, *British Military Administration*, p.479.
CHAPTER FIVE
POLITICAL REFORM, THE CREATION OF A NEW GOVERNING CLASS, AND THE REINFORCEMENT OF "EUROPEAN SUPERVISION"

Throughout the early colonial period, Somaliland was administered directly. Indirect rule which A. E. Afigbo defined as "total conquest through (indigenous) institutional control"¹ was never practised for three reasons. First, the administration was unable from 1900 to 1920 to win over the cooperation of the "men of proven influence and authority among the sections (dia-paying groups),"² or as the Commissioner put it in another document, "the right type of Somali, namely the men of property."³ Second, the Aqils (tribal representatives) that existed were without influence, credibility, and power among the tribesmen in the interior and the towns. Third, no inter-tribal cohesion existed among the various dia-paying groups in the early decades of colonial rule. These three factors made it impossible for the administration, as Captain A. C. A. Wright

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³ PRO, C.O.879/98, "Somaliland: Note by the Commissioner on Mr. Churchill's Confidential Minute, 28 December 1907."
put it, to "build up society on tribal basis." There was an historical basis for the lack of inter-tribal cohesion, the ineffectiveness of the Aqils, and the refusal of the men of property and influence to cooperate with the administration.

First, the men of "proven influence and authority" were hostile to colonial rule, and they always refused not only to cooperate with the administration, but even to keep contact with it. As John Hunt put it, the "true leaders" of the society—rich merchants, leaders in battle, men wise in the organization of the nomadic society, skilful public orator—never maintained "direct contact with" the administration, because throughout the early colonial period, they remained opposed to colonial rule.

Second, there was no inter-tribal cohesion amongst the sections in the clans and clan families. Such a combination or cohesion was not part of the traditional political culture of the people. Indeed, the basis of cooperation, cohesion or combination was the dia-paying group, which was the most stable political unit in the society, and defined agnation which determined the "political and jural status of the individual," to use the words of I. M. Lewis. As B. W. Andrejewski and Musa H. I. Galaal put it, "(i)n practice lineages and clans related by common descent often fight and it is only when such ties of descent are very close (i.e those of the dia-

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paying group) that the ideals of loyalty and non-aggression are really enforced." The basis of interaction and cohesion, in sum, was not the clan or clan family, but the dia-paying group, as well as other relationships based on affiliation: marriage, political and commercial interests, and religion. The administration, then, could not create inter-tribal cohesion because it never existed in the society. There existed only tribal (dia-paying group) cohesion, and other relationships that transcended filial ties.

Third, the Aqils were weak and ineffective, because the system itself was "was not founded on Somali custom." The Aqil system was established by the Egyptians during the 1870s and early 1880s when they occupied the coastal towns of Bulhar, Zeila, and Bulhar, and the interior town of Harar. It was the Egyptians who appointed "tribal representatives who are still described as Aqils." They did so without any consultations with the people. The creation of the Aqil system was politically motivated. The Egyptians introduced it "with the...intention of undermining the inconvenient and then considerable power of tribal chiefs (i.e. big men)."

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8 I have discussed this issue in chapter two.


10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

The weakening of the power of the big men ironically "rendered the...introduction of indirect administration extremely difficult."\textsuperscript{13} The Aqils were incapable of displacing the already weakened traditional leaders in the interior, or establishing their own credibility with the people, despite the support of the administration. Indeed, the Aqils remained peripheral to both the internal politics of the pastoral society and to the administrative structure of the country. The big men, although weakened by the imposition of colonial rule, and the creation of the Aqil system, nevertheless, maintained considerable power among their people. "In practice," stated one report, "the conduct of affairs (of the tribes remained) in the hands of the wealthiest and most powerful elder."\textsuperscript{14} In contrast, the Aqil or Sultan had very little influence over the conduct of tribal affairs. They were "listened to or not as suit(ed) the convenience of their tribesmen."\textsuperscript{15} The tribesmen in fact used the government appointed Aqils only when they wanted to demonstrate the unity of the clan on a "particular subject on which they wished to approach the Government."\textsuperscript{16}

But at the beginning of British colonial rule in the late nineteenth century, and in the first two decades of the century, British officers often assumed that there was inter-tribal cohesion and that the Aqils were the true representatives of the people. They tried strenuously to use the Aqils

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
as a means of indirectly influencing the people not so much for establishing indirect rule, but for turning the people against the Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan.

The Aqils, however, were unable to organize the tribes, and convince the people to oppose the Sayyid and support the government. The people, for instance, refused to raise a tribal levy until the post 1910 period. And even those who fought on the side of the British in the pre-1910 period often deserted at the first opportunity once an engagement began. Not only did the tribesmen refuse to follow the lead of the government paid Aqils, but they also used institutions established by the government to win over their cooperation for their own private gain. Captain H. E. S. Cordeaux, a member of the Somaliland Forces, stated that the "The tribes in the interior no longer look with dislike and mistrust on the military posts established in their midst, rather the reverse. Many of these have now become trading centres, from which (they)...derive considerable profit." 

The failure of the Aqils to organize the people against the Sayyid puzzled British officers. They assumed that since the society was tribal, the Aqils must have full authority to mobilize the people. They often thought of the authority system in the society as a mysterious "hidden authority" that needs to be unveiled. But they were unable to unveil it, because there was no hidden authority. In the end they assumed that the tribal system was undermined by what

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17 I will discuss the significance of 1910 in the second section.

18 PRO, W.O.106/19, "Memorandum by Captain Cordeaux on the General Effect of the Operations and the Present Political Situation, 24 May 1904."

19 PRO, C.O.1015/560, "Minute by Mr. E. P. S. Shirely, 1953."
Commissioner H. E. S. Cordeaux (1906-1910) called the processes of "detribalization" unleashed by colonial rule. Commissioner Cordeaux argued,

The existence of a higher authority naturally led to appeals against the chief's decision which, where contrary to modern ideas of justice and morality, it was necessary to reverse. So that in course of time not only tribal sections but individuals became accustomed to refer their complaints and disputes direct to the British courts, instead of through their tribal chiefs. The latter have thus become nonentities and they now exercise little more than a patriarchal influence which rarely extends beyond their own family circle.

Cordeaux's solution was simple enough: "We must therefore endeavour to arrest the process of detribalisation by restoring the influence and authority of the tribal chiefs and Headmen, and by working through them towards the settlement of individual and tribal differences." Lt. General Egerton also stated that although the dia-paying groups "still preserve their tribal organization," there was no inter-tribal cohesion among the clans and clan-families. He added, that "it is probable that by our own encouragement of this system, and by working entirely through the Headmen or Akils, this tribal system will become...more deeply rooted than it had been hitherto." But the key was the formation of cohesion among the clans and clan families. "What is required," he wrote, "is to establish inter-tribal cohesion." Cordeaux made specific proposals

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21 Ibid. (Emphasis mine.)

22 PRO, W.O.106/19, "Memorandum by Lt. General Egerton on the Situation in Somaliland, 14 June 1904."

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.
for the formation of inter-tribal cohesion, and the strengthening of the power of the Aqils. He proposed the creation of tribal militia and a civil tribal organization, in order to establish inter-tribal cohesion among the friendly tribes, and strengthen the power, prestige and influence of the Aqils.

The tribal militia, Cordeaux maintained, would "strengthen its (i.e. each tribal sections') constituent parts, and then...bind the whole together by the common tie of mutual interest." In other words," he wrote,

we must endeavour first to re-unite the various sections and sub-sections into tribes, and then combine the tribes by a strong but elastic form of organisation...I venture to think that this twofold object can only be attained by a tribal militia, raised, organised, and controlled by Political Officers." The tribal militia was to be "organized in such a manner as to arouse the 'esprit de corps' of the tribes." The militia, then, was considered as a "political body." Lt. Colonel Hornby insisted that

At present the tribal elders have neither the power nor the capacity to initiate or carry on an organisation of this nature (militia), and the tribal feeling is not sufficiently strong to induce individuals to forsake their interests...The

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25 PRO, 879/87, Acting Commissioner H. E. S. Cordeaux to Mr. Lyttelton, 23 August 1905.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
organisation must therefore be initiated by us, and we must continue to watch over its initial stages.\(^{29}\)

This would create, he continued, a "certain amount of cohesion and discipline" among the tribes.\(^{30}\) But parallel to this political body, there must grow a "civil organisation of the tribe."\(^{31}\)

The object of this civil organisation was the formation of a "regular tribal council for each main tribe, consisting of the elders of the different sub-divisions, and presided over by the Sultan or the Chief of the tribe, by whom all tribal affairs will be discussed and decided."\(^{32}\) "Great care," the Commissioner added, must be taken that only "men of proved influence and authority amongst the sections" are included in the regular tribal council.\(^{33}\)

Neither the tribal council, nor the tribal militia, succeeded in creating inter-tribal cohesion. Rather, the policies forced the government to "drift, quite unwillingly, from a Protectorate into a certain sort of (colonial) Administration."\(^{34}\) In this system of colonial administration, as Sir Rudolph Slatin, the Civil-Inspector of the Sudan, put it, a "closer supervision of nomad tribes" was exercised.\(^{35}\)


\(^{30}\) Ibid.

\(^{31}\) PRO, C.O.879/87, Acting Commissioner H. E. S. Cordeaux to Mr. Lyttelton, 23 August 1905.


\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.
The central figure that supervised the nomad tribes during the early colonial period was the district commissioner,\(^{36}\) who acted as the "primary agent of the construction and maintenance of domination."\(^{37}\) Although by the 1920s the administration realized that the Aqils are not men of influence among the rural population, nevertheless, the government incorporated them into the administrative structure of the territory, albeit at an insignificant level. The key legislation that formally incorporated the Aqils into the administrative structure of the territory was the 1921 Aqil Court Ordinance. The ordinance recognised "certain elders of wealth and importance" in each district who represented certain tribal sections, as Aqils.\(^{38}\) The role of the Aqils was to act as judges in district Native Courts. The kinds of cases they could preside over in the Native Courts were strictly re-defined and limited in the 1928 Proclamation. The Proclamation specified that native courts could hear only disputes over bride-price, minor wounds, insult, and petty theft. The Proclamation also appointed Aqils as native advisors to the district commissioners in the District Courts. The responsibilities of the Aqils were thus circumscribed because they were regarded "with grave suspicion."\(^{39}\) Consequently, all the important cases whether criminal or civil came under the jurisdiction of district courts, presided over by the district commissioner. The district commissioner thus became "a tribal Sultan wielding arbitrary powers according to

\(^{36}\) In the first two decades of the century the functions of the district commissioner was performed by "political officers" most of whom were army officers.


what he thought was a reasonable compromise between local ideas of customary right and his own European ideas of moral justice."\textsuperscript{40} Indeed the "entire machinery of administration became personal in nature,"\textsuperscript{41} since the district commissioner was not only the final judge of all cases, but also oversaw the police force and directed all investigations. He was "all but king of his domain"\textsuperscript{42} as Margery Perham put it. "The Hakim Sahib" (i.e. district commissioner of Hargeisa), she wrote,

was all but king of his domain, judge in every case, and agent of all duties of Government, from counselling of chieftains to the lowest acts of poor relief or postal service. The heterogeneous procession came on (to his court)--burglary in an Arab store, payment of fine to the Government in camels, financial assessment of a wound, a hen-pecked husband's application for divorce, the changing of money-order, the registration of rifle, the question of an unpaid dowry...a religious controversy outside the mosque.\textsuperscript{43}

A district officer, Major H. Rayne, described the myriad roles of the office of the "Hakim Sahib" in the following terms:

The D.C.'s office combines the work of treasury, court-house, post office, administration, tax collection, and every other public work of the town and the district. It keeps an eye on trade, customs, shipping...police, prisons, political and other situations...In addition he (district officer) takes interest in social matters,

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
and may even, besides being sole guardian and presiding angel of the "Poor Fund," be called upon to assume the duties of food controller. 44

In sum, then, the "form of government had been almost entirely direct," in the early colonial period. 45

The Creation of a "New Governing Class" and Direct Administration, 1944-1960

After the British re-occupation of Somaliland in 1941, the "question of Indirect administration through tribal or other Somali Leaders occupied the attention" of the government. 46 Certain experiments were made in 1943 and 1944 to see whether the "tribal and sectional" leaders could implement a grazing control policy. 47 But the experiment failed. The tribal and sectional leaders that the administration used in the experiment were the Aqils. But the Aqils had no influence among the rural population. They were viewed as government agents but not as the spokesmen of the people, 48 and so they failed to implement the grazing control policy of the administration. Once the experiment failed, the administration abandoned any hope of


45 PRO, C.O.537/7207, Gerald Reece to Sir Philip Mitchell, 22 March 1951.

46 PRO, C.O.537/3618/15363, Chief Secretary, "Notes on British Somaliland, June 1948."

47 Ibid.

establishing indirect rule through the Aqils. The administration turned its attention to finding "other Somali leaders"\textsuperscript{49} to play a role in indirect administration of the society. It was considered that for an indirect rule to function there must be "(1) Some authority invested with natural powers of leadership; and (2) A class that has the necessary education and training to carry out an administrative policy acceptable to World opinion and modern requirements."\textsuperscript{50} Neither, it was concluded, existed in Somaliland.

The administration then decided to "create a new governing class" with the necessary education and training.\textsuperscript{51} This class was not to be created from a whole new cloth, however. The experiences of the administration from 1943 to 1948 apparently indicated that the "only Somalis who have real influence with their tribes are Government Servants, and a few traders with a rudimentary education or a local reputation for possessing such knowledge."\textsuperscript{52} This was the class that Colonel Jameson, the Chief of Civil Staff in the East African Command, ordained for leadership in 1943. He dismissed the Aqils as corrupt. He specifically pointed to the Aqils of Burao whom he described as a "by-word for bribery, corruption, and intrigue." He added, "(t)hey depend for their livelihood on promoting personal and tribal discord, for the settlement of which they extract large fees."\textsuperscript{53} He referred to a letter an Aqil wrote to some one in Aden which a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[49] "Notes on British Somaliland, June 1948."
\item[50] Ibid.
\item[51] Ibid.
\item[52] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
district commissioner had shown him. The Aqil urged his client to send more money, "because, I must let you know, justice is a matter of commerce." The "younger Somali population", in contrast, was described by colonel Jameson as progressive and in "favour of education and other reforms." They were committed soldiers of modernity. It was this "healthy material" that the administration decided to train and incorporate into the government. That "healthy material" comprised of a "middling sort of people", or what had been labelled as "classe moyenne": the "relatively small-scale entrepreneurs, traders, (and) the less exalted ranks of the salariat." The political influence of this middling sort in the society was anything but significant in the early colonial period, and even in the early 1940s. But the administration was determined to turn it into a class with influence and authority—a new governing class, and to administer the society through that class.

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54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.


57 Thomas Hodgkin, "The African Middle Class," Corona, (March 1956), p.86. The rise of the so-called middle class in Africa was discussed in the conference organized by the International Institute of Differing Civilizations in London in 1955. The proceedings of the conference were published in Development d'une classe moyenne dans les pays tropicaux et sub-tropicaux (Bruxelles, 1956). (I discuss the emergence of the middling sort also in chapter seven. The discussion in that chapter centres on how the government encouraged the emergence of the middling sort of people, and the formation of centralized markets within the general framework of community development.)
The main avenues through which the administration decided to "train this class" of government servants and traders with rudimentary education or a reputation for possessing such an education, and incorporate it into the government, were the bureaucracy--through gradual "Somalisation", and local political institutions such as Subordinate Courts, Local Government Councils, Township and District Committees, Protectorate Advisory Council, Legislative Council, and Executive Council. Through these institutions, the administration moulded the government servants, local traders, and school graduates into a new elite or class with influence among the population, brought the elite under "very close European supervision," and "the country under closer administrative control." Constitutional reform, in essence, led "in effect (to) a continuation of direct rule at the lowest level" of the society, and the establishment of "one of the most powerful techniques of hegemony: the cooption of an upper stratum of natives." "Somalisation" programmes, as such then, were undertaken not as part of a "planned decolonisation," but as part of a planned reinforcement of colonial rule and colonial cultural hegemony. The object of mass education, after all, was to guide and control the "explosive

58 "Notes on British Somaliland, June 1948."


temper\textsuperscript{64} of mass consciousness, to discipline the population and make them responsive to colonial rule. Besides, the imperial government decided in 1949, 1954, and 1956 to keep Somaliland for the foreseeable future under colonial rule.

In 1949 the British Labour Cabinet discussed constitutional development in small territories, such as the Somaliland Protectorate and twenty four other small territories. The Cabinet decided that unlike large territories with the potential to build viable economies and achieve independence, or small territories likely to form federations and thus have the potential of forming viable economies and achieve independence some time in the future, territories like Somaliland must remain for the foreseeable future dependent on, and under the control of, Great Britain.\textsuperscript{65} Another Cabinet discussion on constitutional development in Somaliland and other small colonial territories, reached the same decision in 1954. It was decided that territories such as Somaliland "are never likely to achieve full independence."\textsuperscript{66} The same decision was yet again reached in 1956.\textsuperscript{67} Lord Lloyd, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, who visited Somaliland in 1956 in fact refused to even discuss with Somali politicians, elders, and civil


\textsuperscript{65} PRO, CAB 129/33/2, CP (49) 62, Creech Jones, Memorandum on Constitutional Development in Smaller Colonial Territories, 10 March 1949.

\textsuperscript{66} PRO, CAB 129/71, C(54)307, "Commonwealth Membership": Cabinet Memorandum by Lord Swinton, 11 October 1954.

\textsuperscript{67} PRO, CAB, 134/1203, CA(0)10, Lennox-Boyd, Memorandum on Small Colonial Territories, 27 September 1956.
servants the possibility of setting a date for the granting of independence to Somaliland. Simply put, the British had no intention of granting Somaliland independence for the foreseeable future. As late as 1959, the administration with the agreement of the colonial office, discussed the formation of "full internal self-government" for Somaliland in 1965, but not full independence. The decision reached in 1949, was re-affirmed in 1956, and re-asserted in 1959. Those decisions had an impact on constitutional development and reform in the country. It made inevitable the slow and deliberate establishment of political institutions with no executive power at the national level, and the creation of a new governing class.

From 1944 to 1950, the administration developed in a leisurely manner various institutions: Subordinate Courts, Protectorate Advisory Council, and local authorities in the townships and districts. All of these institutions established from 1944 to 1950 within the framework of constitutional reform were designed to incorporate government servants and traders and school graduates into the government, and associate them all the more strongly with the policies and plans of the administration. These institutions also functioned as a way in which the new elite met together, associated with one another, and defined themselves as the future leaders and educators of the society. The first institution established was the subordinate courts.

The need for the formation of subordinate courts was discussed by Governor G. T. Fisher in 1943. Since the administration was undertaking an extensive policy of economic and social development in the territory within the framework of mass education, G. T. Fisher felt the need

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68 PRO, CAB 129/82, (CP)(56)80, Report by Lord Llyod on his Visit to Somaliland, May 1956.
for a collaborationist or at least a cooperative group of Somali leaders who could explain
government policy to the public. But the only large group of Somalis willing to cooperate with
the administration were the Aqils. G. T. Fisher, unfortunately, was anything but impressed with
them. He stated that they are generally corrupt and unpopular, and the district commissioners in
1943 "reported unfavourably on them."\textsuperscript{69} He added, "the existence of such a body, that is known
to be corrupt, as part of the machinery of Government cannot fail to bring the Administration
into disrepute, and so weaken constituted authority."\textsuperscript{70} He suggested two things. First, the use
more frequently of Jawarbadars—unpaid representatives of certain sections, as a means of
influencing the public in the interior. The Jawarbadars, he stated, are in general more satisfactory
than the Aqils. "Perhaps," he added, "this is so because they owe nothing to the government, and
realize that they depend for their livelihood on the straight-forward dealing with the tribes."\textsuperscript{71}
Second, the formation of a properly paid and appointed body of Somali magistrates to take over
the court function of the Aqils in the towns. That, he hoped, would marginalize the Aqils, and at
the same time, bring new people with good reputation and learning into the service of the
government.\textsuperscript{72} In the meantime, Fisher stated, casualties among the Aqils were not to be
replaced.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{69} PRO, C.O.32/10862, Annual Report on the Administration of British Somaliland, 1943.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{73} Annual Report on the Administration of the Somaliland Protectorate, 1943.
The first Subordinate Courts were established in 1944 under the Subordinate Courts Ordinance. The ordinance gave the Governor the power to establish through a warrant an "infinite variety" of subordinate courts.\textsuperscript{74} The ordinance, in other words, allowed the governor to establish new subordinate courts, and permit the functioning of Kadi and Aqil courts where the new courts did not exist yet. The first two subordinate courts were established through warrant by the Governor in 1944. The courts were presided over by educated Somalis, or individuals who had a local reputation for possessing knowledge. They were at the least capable of recording the proceedings of the court in either Arabic or English.\textsuperscript{75} The courts took over most of the cases traditionally dealt with by Aqil courts: civil cases, and criminal cases such as theft, assault, and affray.\textsuperscript{76} All other civil and criminal cases were judged in the District Courts presided over by the district commissioner, except cases concerned with family law which were decided in Kadi courts.\textsuperscript{77} By 1953 there were 24 subordinate courts in the territory. These courts were spread out in the territory, and arrangements were made for the courts to intermittently travel among nomadic people in the interior, as the Attorney-General pointed out in 1959.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{74} PRO, C.O.830/4, British Military Administration Report, 1945.


\textsuperscript{77} J. N. Anderson, "Islamic Law in African Colonies," \textit{Corona}, (July 1951),pp.262-266. (He discussed Somaliland, Zanzibar, Kenya, Uganda, and Aden.)

\textsuperscript{78} "Protectorate Advisory Council: A Summary of Motions and Questions Dealt with in the 20th and Final Session of the Council," \textit{The Somaliland News}, no.35 (28 September 1959).
In 1953 the Subordinate Courts were given "greater and wider powers," while at the same time "a great deal more professional supervision and guidance" was imposed on them. In the towns, in particular, Governor Gerald Reece argued, there was an urgent need to replace the "traditional unofficial settlements" and laws (Somali "Heer") under which Somalis resolved disputes, with a "more formal system" which the subordinate courts should perform. Such a change should be "systematically guided and controlled to suit the needs of these developing communities." Besides, the extension of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts would enable district administrators to "devote more time to constructive work among the people rather than be burdened with cases of petty nature in their capacities as magistrates" of District Courts. By 1954, no reference was made in colonial reports to Aqil courts. The Subordinate Courts dealt with all issues other than murder, manslaughter, forgery, and robbery—dealt with in the district courts, and family law—dealt with in Kadi courts. There were overall six Kadi courts in the territory, one in each district. The new judicial institutions ever so gently and gradually excluded the Aqils from the political arena and from political influence, and created a new crop of Somali jurists with education and influence.

79 PRO, C.O.1015/246/16634, "His Excellency's Opening Address," War Somali Sidihi, (1953). (The address was to the Protectorate Advisory Council.)

80 PRO, C.O.1015/363, Governor of Somaliland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 May 1953.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.
Another institution which gradually weakened the influence of the Aqils, and created a new crop of "national" leaders, was the Protectorate Advisory Council. The council was established in 1946. It was an institution through which the administration selected the "healthy material" in the country, trained them in financial and political responsibility, influenced them to support and even popularise the mass education policies of the administration, and kept them under European supervision. In the 13th session of the council held at Hargeisa in 1953, the Chief Secretary, E. P. S. Shirley, told members of the council that the British were in Somaliland to educate them. "We are here to teach," he told his audience. And added, "If you do not want to learn it is you who lose. You must acquire as much knowledge as you can so that you are able to run your country when the time comes."83

The founder of the council, Governor G. T. Fisher, viewed it also as a training ground for the new "healthy material" the government selected for future leadership. For him the council was an experiment through which the government gauged the "sincerity and ability" of council members and how far the people were ready in assuming responsibility in the management of their own affairs.84 Gerald Reece also viewed it in the same terms, and even warned against giving the council legislative powers, or even the appearance of such power. He stated in 1952, "It must be remembered that if the Advisory Council is given too much of a legislative appearance, then the new constitutional advances proposed though real, will have the appearance

83 PRO, C.O.1015/246, "Chief Secretary Addresses the Council," War Somali Sidhii, (September 1953).

84 Lord Rennell of Rodd, British Military Administration of the Occupied Territories in Africa During the Years, 1941-1947 (London: HMSO, 1948), p.484.
of not being advances but retrograde steps, for the detailed consideration of legislation under the new constitution is to be reserved to a much smaller body (i.e. legislative council) with a European official majority and even then to a limited series of subjects—the "unreserved subjects".85

Between 1946 and 1959, the Protectorate Advisory Council held twenty sessions. The sessions were rotated from town to town, and from district to district. The first session was held at Sheikh, in the Berbera district, from 2nd to 9th July, 1946. The session was, as Lord Rennell of Rodd put it, the "first step in...associating the Somalis with the government."86 Among those who participated in the session were the Aqils and Sultans of all the districts, and representatives from the civil service, the commercial class, the religious community, the Arab and Indian communities. Overall, forty eight Somalis participated in the proceedings of the session. The session was chaired by the Governor. The Vice-Chairman was the Secretary to the Government. Other colonial officers who participated in the session were the Commissioner of Native Affairs, the Legal Secretary, and the Director of the Medical Department.87

The first session dealt with various social and economic issues central to the mass education policies of the administration: the development of agriculture and enterprises such as fishing, the expansion of medical services, the control of destitute children, the preservation of grazing areas, and the establishment of native councils in the towns and districts. All the sessions

85 PRO, C.O.1015/560, Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 March 1952.
86 Lord Rennell of Rodd, British Military Administration, p.484.
87 Ibid.,p.483.
thereafter dealt similarly with mass education policies, and only rarely with politically sensitive issues. The 12th session of the council which was held at Burao in 1952, and the 13th session which was held at Hargeisa in 1953, dealt with the replacement of the Indian Code and Somali traditional law (Heer) with British laws, as well as the preservation of pastures, the control of tuberculosis and malaria, the ending of the burning of live trees for charcoal, the expansion of agriculture, the increase of overseas scholarships for Somali students, and the encouragement of local trade. The Somali members of the council agreed with the government about the importance of all the issues discussed in the session, except the imposition of British laws. Many felt that under the new law "no member of the public could escape falling into the clutches of the Police." One member, Mr. Omer Horreh (Erigavo district), stated that under the new laws "every member of the public would be in gaol within five years."88

The council, then, did not always act as a rubber-stamp for the government, but challenged the administration on crucial issues. The administration, though, usually avoided raising sensitive question in the council. For example, the administration never discussed the decolonisation of the territory. And oddly, most council members never raised the issue, except in the 1953 session. In that session Haji Ibrahim Osman (Hargeisa district) lamely asked E. P. S. Shirely, the Chief Secretary, whether the "government was willing to train the Somali for independence and whether the government could give a date when it would be granted." The Chief Secretary answered that traditionally the British never gave specific dates about when it

intended to grant independence to a colonial territory. "It all depended," he added, "on the ability of the people concerned and the amount of progress they achieved. It was not possible to say when a people would be fit to govern themselves—it all depended on how soon they grew up and learnt things."^{89}

The council maintained its focus throughout its lifetime on growing up and learning "things" from the British and in popularising mass education policies. The last session of the council, for instance, dealt with the following issues which were central to the mass education policies of the administration: the establishment of a livestock marketing board to find new markets for the country's livestock and improve the industry; the relaxation of government control over sugar imports; a reconsideration of the way the Business Profits Tax is collected; the creation of assistant local authorities for all dia-paying groups; the control of the burning of living trees for the production of charcoal and the banning of the transportation of charcoal by motor lorries into the towns; and the encouragement of self-help schemes in the districts.\(^{90}\)

The delegates to the protectorate council meetings did not just merely discuss issues and then disperse. Rather the government organized social gatherings and film shows through which they met British officers, and socialized informally. During the 1953 meeting at Hargeisa, the Secretary to the Government, Shirley entertained all the delegates to tea. Moreover, the delegates attended special film shows organized by the Information Office. They viewed short newsreels

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\(^{89}\) Ibid.

made by the Information Office about the development projects the administration had begun in the country, and a long film about the coronation of Her Majesty. The delegates, furthermore, took part in special broadcasts in Radio Hargeisa in which they discussed and explained the issues the meeting considered.\(^91\) The radio, in addition, broadcast a "running commentary" on all the sessions of the council.

The Protectorate Advisory Council which was essentially a "national" council, also spawned another important set of institutions that functioned at the township and district levels. The formation of these institutions—the Township Councils (or Local Government Councils) and the Districts Councils—were initially discussed in the first Protectorate Advisory Council session held in 1946. The object of such native councils, the Protectorate Advisory Council agreed, were "(i) to help the members learn something about the running of the country, (ii) to help make the people of the country fit to accept some responsibility for their own affairs."\(^92\) These councils were formally enshrined into law under the 1950 Local Authority Ordinance. The Information Office characterized the policy as "the most prominent landmark in the history of Somaliland,"\(^93\)

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a policy that indicated the determination of the administration to "help Somalis to achieve self-
government by suitable stages."\textsuperscript{94}

The functions of the Local Government Councils, and the District Committees, were at
first limited to an advisory role. Their main responsibility was to discuss matters related to mass
education programmes such as grazing control, the improvement of public health, and to provide
services of common interest in the towns and the districts.\textsuperscript{95} They had, therefore, no executive or
financial powers.\textsuperscript{96} It was hoped, nonetheless, that rural and urban native authority figures with
credibility among the masses would emerge from the councils.\textsuperscript{97} And that Somalis will gain
experience that would prepare them for "legislative functions in the same way as Town Councils
or County Councils in England have served as excellent training schools for many men who later
became distinguished members of Parliament."\textsuperscript{98}

At first district officers attempted to allow the residents of each town and district to
appoint representatives of their choice to the councils. But opposition to the formation of local
authorities in the towns in 1950, particularly in Burao, made such a process impossible. As
Governor Gerald Reece put it, the measure "met with a good deal of opposition from the

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid. (Emphasis mine.)

\textsuperscript{95} Colonial Office. \textit{An Economic Survey}, p.124.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{97} R. S. Hudson, "Some Preliminary Notes on the Problems Relating to the Constitutional
Development of the Somaliland Protectorate-March 1952."

\textsuperscript{98} Information Office, "New Notes," July-September, 1951.
people."\textsuperscript{99} This totally shocked the administration. It was impossible for the Governor and other colonial officers to understand why Somalis would refuse to participate in government sanctioned councils if prior to 1950, similar councils functioned in the towns.

Both the 1948 and 1949 colonial office reports, for instance, mentioned the existence of Town Committees in all the main towns.\textsuperscript{100} Such committees, the 1949 colonial office report stated, functioned as advisory councils at the township level, and advised and assisted the District Commissioner in "his administration of the townships."\textsuperscript{101} They assumed that the formal creation of the local authorities under law somehow conflicted with "some mysterious form of tribal organization" and authority in the towns and the districts.\textsuperscript{102} Immediately after the resistance began to take place in 1950, the administration sent the Commissioner for Native Affairs, E. P. Carrel, to the Sudan, in order to study how the local authorities functioned in that country, and how the idea was sold to the people. Upon his return from his visit to the Sudan, Carrel proposed the strengthening of the tribal council or "tribal shir", and the transformation of the local authorities into "instruments" of the tribal shir. Such a system would "enhance the power and prestige of...tribal leaders."\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{99} PRO, C.O.1015/560, Governor Reece to Mr. J. E. Marnham, 6 August 1953.


\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p.35.

\textsuperscript{102} PRO, C.O.1015/560, Governor Reece to Mr. J. E. Marnham, 6 August 1953.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
But district officers, and the "classe moyenne" opposed the idea proposed by Carrel. The traders and civil servants were, as Colonel Jameson pointed, supporters of all modern reforms. Their support of such reforms was interested, so to speak. They viewed the formation of the local authority system as one that would give them some power and authority within the matrix of the colonial system. They thus opposed making local authorities a system that functioned as an instrument of tribal elders. They insisted that council members should be appointed (or elected) not on the basis of tribe but on the basis of ability and above all education.\textsuperscript{104} The district officers, moreover, rejected Carrel's suggestion because they had nothing but contempt for the so-called tribal leaders—i.e. Aqils, who maintained constant contact with the administration. They maintained that the Aqils and Sultans are not the "true leaders" of the rural population, and that, as John Hunt, a former district officer of the Erigavo District stated, the "true leaders" of the people, and more specifically, of the dia-paying groups, never maintained contact with the government, and if so, only sporadically.\textsuperscript{105} Governor Reece then asked for the appointment of an anthropologist of the "right type" to study the culture and social structure of the people to "improve our knowledge of social anthropology and Somali custom."\textsuperscript{106} Even Evans-Pritchard was recruited in finding such an anthropologist.\textsuperscript{107}


\textsuperscript{106} PRO, C.O. 1015/560, Governor Reece to Mr. J. E. Marnham, 6 August 1953.

\textsuperscript{107} PRO, 1015/560, R. S. Hudson to Professor E. P. Pritchard, 16 May 1952.
But district officers did not wait for the appointment of an anthropologist to study social custom. Rather, they appointed individuals to the advisory bodies at both the district and township levels. They invariably chose the leading figures in each town and district: Jawarbadars, merchants, Sultans, civil servants. They also appointed themselves as the chairmen of the councils. The inclusion of what R. S. Hudson called the "tribal shir" or dia-paying representatives--the Jawarbadars--who had, unlike the Aqils, standing among their communities in the rural areas, had the object of "wield(ing) together the indigenous authority of the sub-tribal shirs and the authority of the district commissioner."

The new Local Government Councils were first formed within the framework of the 1950 ordinance in Hargeisa and Berbera in 1952, and then extended to Burao, Erigavo, Ain, Las Anod, Gabileh, Arabsiyo, Tog Wajaale, and other towns and villages. Although the responsibilities of the councils were first confined to discussing and educating the public about the need for grazing areas, and acting as advisory bodies to the district commissioners and other government officials about issues relating to each station, by 1952 the responsibilities of the councils was increased. They were given responsibility for the collection of township revenue: zariba (market) dues, trade licenses, and land rents. As an incentive to the councils, they were allowed to retain 55% of the annual revenue to be set aside as a reserve against an emergency.

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108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 PRO, C.O.1015/264, Financial Secretary, "Future Organization of Town Councils in Somaliland, 3/7/1952."
By 1953 and 1954, elections for local government council seats were held in Berbera and Hargeisa, respectively. The vote was restricted to the classe moyenne in the towns, even though some of the councils had authority not merely over town but also over country. The vote was restricted to males over 25 years of age who had been residents of each town for at least one year, paid house tax, had a valid trading license and a valid motor vehicle license, paid land rent, or received a wage of no less than Sh.150/- per month for at least a year. These restrictions made the commercial class and the civil servants, the only people with the right and privilege to run for council seats, and vote for candidates. It made them a privileged group with power at both the township, and district levels. Indeed after 1953 only members of local government councils were appointed to the Protectorate Advisory Council. That made council members a privileged group with influence at the township, district and national levels.

The power of the "classe moyenne" at the township level was cemented further through their involvement in the community centres, and clubs such as the Burao Nadi (Burao Club), Hargeisa Old Boys Association, and the Sheikh Teachers Club, and through adult education programmes. The administration, for instance, gave a grant of Sh.400/- to the Hargeisa Old Boys Association in 1954 in order to increase its activities in the adult education programme. The Burao Nadi, moreover, held adult education classes within its own premises, and was a pioneer in female education in the early 1940s. The new elite, then, took itself very seriously as leaders and teachers of the masses. They even effectively imposed taxation through the local government

councils--a house tax and a business profits tax, something which the administration was never able to do in the early colonial period. Through these cultural and political centres, they exercised influence over the people, and disseminated the mass education policies and ideas of the administration. They often discussed on the radio, and in the community centres and clubs the mass education policies of the government. They focused on the improvement of public health and literacy, and the protection of grazing, among other issues. On 6 September 1953, for example,

a large crowd which had gathered outside the Burao Nadi to listen to Radio Somali (Radio Hargeisa) remained to hear a lecture by Haji Ahmed (a trader). He explained the scheme (grazing area protection) and spoke of the evils of the system of making charcoal from live trees. His views were supported by speakers who followed him, including Mr. Abokor Haji Farah, Sheikh Hassan Awad Au Abdi, and Ahmed Sheikh Musa. Haji Ahmed emphasised that Somaliland's wealth was in its pastures. These pastures were being destroyed by cutting and destruction of live trees.\footnote{\textit{Charcoal Now Being Made From Dead Wood},\textit{ War Somali Sidiihi}, no.20, October 10, 1953.}

Similar discussions were held at community centres in Berbera and other townships by members of the township councils.\footnote{Ibid.} Members of the District Councils--which consisted of members of the various township and local government councils in each district--also focused on the same issues: the protection of grazing and forests, the development of agriculture, and public health. Such discussions were also held within the premises of the British Council which opened branches in the main towns--first Hargeisa, then Burao and Berebera. Members of these councils were often invited to speak on issues such as the protection of the environment and the
improvement of public health and literacy on Radio Hargeisa. The radio had a programme called "Hargeisa Today" in which reporters went to the town and interviewed important figures in the councils whether the Protectorate Advisory Council, or the local government council, or district council, about various issues that concerned the town and the country. The regular activities of the councils in all the towns were also reported by the radio, and often filmed by the Information Office. Such short films, or newsreels, were then shown throughout the territory on mobile cinema units.

All of these institutions that the administration established between 1945 and 1950, established a powerful technique of hegemony: "the cooption of an upper stratum of natives." They succeeded in empowering the "classe moyenne" while at the same time bringing them under close European supervision, and the country under close administrative control. These processes were intensified from 1951 onwards.

In 1951 Gerald Reece suggested to the colonial office the formation of a legislative council composed of the Governor as the chairman, eleven British officers, and ten Somalis (two nominated by the government and eight elected by the Protectorate Advisory Council). Such a council with a majority of British officers would, he suggested, control unaided services--social, economic, and government services, as distinct from aided services--administration, law and order, and public works which would be under the control of the Secretariat. The colonial

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114 Terry Eagleton, *Heathcliff*, p.32.
115 PRO, C.O.1015/560, Governor of Somaliland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 May 1951.
office approved the scheme in principle,\textsuperscript{116} while the Treasury Department insisted that the promulgation of the new scheme should await until 1954-55. The Governor's plan was to create a small council with "European official majority" with jurisdiction over "a limited series of subjects"--the "unreserved subjects"--the unaided services.\textsuperscript{117} The object, according to Gerald Reece, was to gradually "educate local politicians up to a sense of financial responsibility."\textsuperscript{118}

Hence he called for the creation of a "double budget system" to replace the existing deficit grant system which gave Somali politicians no incentive to create local revenue.

The Governor's proposal on the double budget system called for the financing of 90% of aided services through grants-in-aid, and 10% from local revenue, while all unaided services would be financed through local revenue.\textsuperscript{119} The Governor even called for creating a ceiling for the grants-in-aid given to the territory. He maintained that grants-in-aid from 1953 to 1956 should not exceed £625,000 a year, and that 50% of local revenue in excess of £425,000 should be devoted to reducing grants-in-aid.\textsuperscript{120} The political and financial proposals were, in sum, considered as complementary, in that they gave some limited authority to the proposed legislative council which would function as a training ground for local politicians in financial

\textsuperscript{116} PRO, C.O.1015/560, Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Somaliland, 11 February 1952.

\textsuperscript{117} PRO, C.O.1015/560, Governor of Somaliland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 March 1952.

\textsuperscript{118} PRO, C.O.1015/560, "Note on Meeting on Somaliland Financial Proposals," April 1953.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
responsibility, train them in the art of government, and by the same token, bring them under European supervision and control. This process was to proceed very slowly and in "suitable stages." After all, the divided budget system itself "envisaged a necessarily slow tempo of political advance." The adoption of such a strategy of slow tempo in political reform was deliberate. The object was always to prolong colonial rule over the country as the 1949, 1954 and 1956 decisions clearly testify to, and to keep the initiative in the hands of the government. As late as 1958, N. P. Carrick-Allen, the Attorney General, stated that the process of political reform must be set and dictated by the administration. The government then will be "more obviously in control and can deliver pleasant little constitutional advances to a delighted Somali public at convenient political intervals." 

Little progress was made as planned in the formation of the legislative council. The plan, after all, was to wait until 1954-1955 when financial reforms were complete and the administration had a better idea on how to separate the aided from unaided services, and how the later services could be financed through local revenue. Coincidentally, the period from 1954 to 1955 turned out to be an eventful one in Somaliland. In 29 November 1954 the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement was signed. Under the agreement, Great Britain formally returned the administration and control of the Haud and the Reserved Area to Ethiopia. Shortly thereafter, the Somali people

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121 Ibid.


as a whole "took action to protest against the handover."\textsuperscript{124} Spontaneous demonstrations took place in all the main towns in the country. And in 1955, the National United Front, an organisation--not a party--was formed to campaign for the return of the Haud and Reserved Area to Somaliland. This organisation which was co-founded and dominated by Michael Mariano, wrote petitions to the British government and the World Court, and sent delegations to London and New York pleading for the return of the territories to Somaliland.

In the post-colonial literature on Somaliland 1954, is often viewed as a watershed. I. M. Lewis argued that the transfer of the Haud and the Reserved Area stimulated a "new nationalist fervour" in Somaliland.\textsuperscript{125} Abdi Samatar made the same point albeit with a little more hyperbole. He stated that the transfer of the Haud and the Reserved Area propelled the "petite bourgeoisie into the centre of the nationalist movement."\textsuperscript{126} For the "petite bourgeoisie" the Haud and the Reserved Area became the issue around which it mobilized the nationalist movement and the people.\textsuperscript{127} The issue in reality did little for the so-called nationalist cause. First, although the public as a whole protested against the transfer, the "public spiritedness"\textsuperscript{128} and cooperation of the people with the government on mass education hardly changed. This was "indicated by the


\textsuperscript{126} Abdi Ismail Samatar, \textit{State and Rural Transformation}, p.78.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Colonial Office Reports on the Somaliland Protectorate 1954 and 1955}, p.4.
willingness of many towns and villages which contributed material, labour and money towards such communal services as schools, sheep-dips and roads." Second, the National United Front remained an organisation with an office only in Hargeisa, and which only wrote petitions but which organized no anti-government action, or strikes. Its sole mandate was to campaign for the return of the Haud and Reserved Area to Somaliland. The dominant figure in the organisation, Michael Mariano, was no rebel or extreme nationalist. Third, the Somali National League, the only political party in the country with a following, became politically irrelevant in 1955, as a result of the Habr Jeclo and Habr Younis "civil war." The "civil war" continued throughout the year, and the administration was powerless to end it because of the complete lack of cooperation from the two clans in apprehending those who started the war and committed murder. The "civil war" was resolved in 1956 without British mediation. Only then, and only after Mohamed Jama Urdoh was exiled in 1957 for anti-government activities, and the leadership of the party was totally changed in 1959, was the Somali National League able to function again as a national party.

The transfer of the Haud and the Reserved Area, nonetheless, created a strong resentment among the people, and particularly, among the rural population. The 1955-1956 drought was

129 Ibid.
130 Ibid. (The two clans are members of the Isaaq clan-family.)
131 Ibid.
132 PRO, C.O.830/11, "Executive Council. Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Executive Council Held at Government House on Tuesday, 16th July, at 9 a.m. 1957."
133 I discuss the tribal politics of the nationalist parties in chapter seven.
partly a result of the failure of the spring rains, and partly due to the "aggressive attitude of the Ethiopian" government towards the pastoralists in the Haud. That forced the pastoralists to concentrate their stock in the interior plateau which led quickly to the depletion of grazing.\textsuperscript{134} The "condition of the nomadic population" consequently became "difficult in the extreme."\textsuperscript{135} The resentment against the government and the 1954 agreement, therefore, was deeply felt by the rural population who of course viewed it within the context of their economic difficulties rather than within the framework of any nationalist revival or fervour.

In order to divert the attention of the public and the elite—which was divided anyway as a result of the "civil war"—the administration produced in February 1955 an Order in Council signed by Her Majesty. The Order in Council provided for the transformation of the Protectorate Advisory Council into a Legislative Council.\textsuperscript{136} A White Paper which was published in 1955 announced the arrangements made for the creation of the legislative council and formation of a system of divided budget.\textsuperscript{137} The process was accelerated by the visit of Lord Lloyd, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in May 1956. In the policy statement for the Protectorate that Lord Lloyd read to the public on Radio Hargeisa (with translation), he stated that within the next twelve months a legislative council would be formed. But he refused to set any date for the independence of the Protectorate, since the British Cabinet, as already indicated,

\textsuperscript{134} PRO, C.O.1015/1153, Governor to Colonial Office, 22 December 1956.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
decided in 1949, 1954 and 1956 not to grant the territory independence for the foreseeable future. He insisted that Her Majesty's Government "is not...laying down a definite time-table for political advances and indeed it is believed that responsible Somalis themselves would not wish this to be done."\(^{138}\) In a secret report he suggested and encouraged the acceleration of political reform in the "hope of divert(ing) their thoughts as far as possible into other fields, such as political advance and development."\(^{139}\)

The administration formed the Legislative Council in May 1957. The council was convened first on 21 May. It consisted of a majority of official members and a minority of unofficial Somali members nominated for one year only. In addition to the Governor, Sir Theodore Pike, who presided as president, the council included four ex-officio members: the Attorney General, the Financial Secretary, the Chief Secretary to the Government; five nominated official members: the Commissioner of Native Affairs, the Director of Medical Services, the Director of Public Works, the Director of Education, the Director of Natural Resources; and six unofficial Somali members: Abdulla Haji Farah, Ahmed Haji Dualeh, Jama Mohamed, Jirdeh Hussein, Michael Mariano, and Haji Yusuf Iman.\(^{140}\) Sir Theodore Pike stated in the inaugural address to the council that the legislative body was established in order to introduce Somaliland "into the great and growing tradition of parliamentary democracy."


\(^{140}\) PRO, C.O.1015/1374, War Somali Sidiihii, no.115 (1-6-1957).
object of this new development was to teach the Somali members of the council and the public about that great tradition and about financial responsibility. "We are here," he concluded, "to teach and help."141

The same day (Tuesday, 21 May 1957) the government announced the formation of an Executive Council. The council replaced the Secretariat through which hitherto the Governor ruled the territory. The executive council consisted of the Governor as President of the council and five other members: the Chief Secretary to the government, the Commissioner for Somali Affairs, the Director of Medical Services, the Attorney-General, and the Financial Secretary. The senior magistrate of the Protectorate Court—the highest court in the country, and the Commissioner of the Police also regularly attended the meetings of the council.

In September and November 1957, the executive council reached three decisions. First, in September it brought the legislative council under the firm direction and control of the executive council. The executive council decided that any motion that the legislative council was to debate must be first submitted to the executive council, and if the motion was rejected, then the motion could not be debated in the legislative council.142 Second, it gave authority to the legislative council to control unaided services, as Gerald Reece envisioned in 1951. Third, it formed a commission to investigate how to make the appointed members of the legislative council more representative.143 The Commission to Investigate Constitutional Advance consisted of the

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141 Ibid.


143 PRO, C.O.830/11, "Executive Council. Minutes of the 18th Meeting of the Executive Council Held at Government House on Wednesday, 27 November 1957 at 9 a.m."
chairman, Mr. N. P. Carrick-Allan, the Attorney-General, two official representatives: Mr. E. M. Wilson and N. L. Thomas, and two Somali representatives: Mr. Michael Mariano and Mohamoud Haji Ahmed Ali.

The object of the commission was to make recommendations to the executive council about the next stage of constitutional advancement, that is, on how to make the unofficial members of the legislative council more representative. The commission held public hearings on the issue. From the beginning it was assumed that the only way that the unofficial members could be made more representative was through elections. But the question was: how to organize the elections, who should have the vote, how to register voters in the rural areas, and how many unofficial members are to be elected? The commission published its report in June 1958. It recommended the election of twelve Somali members on the basis of universal male suffrage. The vote was to take place not through the secret ballot but through public acclamation. The Governor then went on an official visit to London whereby he discussed with the Secretary of State for the Colonies constitutional development in the territory. Upon his return to Somaliland, the administration set up a schedule for the granting of self-government, not independence, in 1965 to the territory. The time-table, according to the Chief Secretary, was as follows:

(a) In 1959 the membership of the Legislative Council both official and unofficial would be increased and shadow ministers would be appointed from the unofficial members.
(b) In 1959 a constitutional commissioner or adviser would be appointed to assist us in preparing for the next major revision of the constitution in 1962.
(c) In 1962 a ministerial system retaining official members in the Council of Ministers in the ex officio seats would be established and the Legislative Council would be given an unofficial majority.
(d) Between 1962 and 1964 the ex officio ministers would withdraw from Legislative Council and the Council of Ministers.
(e) In 1965 His Excellency would withdraw from the Council of Ministers; full cabinet government would be introduced with the Prime Minister presiding in the Council of Ministers and a Speaker presiding over the Legislative Council.\textsuperscript{144}

The Financial Secretary made the same point in a memorandum he prepared for the Governor before his official visit to London in 1958. In 1965, the Financial Secretary stated, Somaliland will reach "Full internal self-government."\textsuperscript{145} He insisted that self-government in the territory could be achieved only slowly and through suitable stages. He added, "By this means I hope that we should be able to educate the people of the Protectorate to see that this government and also H. M. G. in the United Kingdom, far from dragging their feet in the matter of political advance...are in fact determined to press on just as fast as the economy of the country, the political education of the Somali leaders and the wishes of the Somali people allow."\textsuperscript{146}

The Governor then presented to the legislative council a bill which provided for the holding of elections of thirteen members for the Legislative Council on March 1959. Before the elections were held, the Secretary of State for the Colonies visited Somaliland on February 1959. In his policy statement, he stated that the pace of constitutional development would be accelerated, and at the end of 1960, a legislative council with an elected unofficial majority would be established. He added that a ministerial system would also be established under which Somali members of the legislative council would be added to the executive council. He stated

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{144} PRO, C.O.830/17/15920, Constitutional Progress: Memorandum by the Acting Chief Secretary, P. Carrel, 23 May 1958.
\item \textsuperscript{145} PRO, C.O.830/18/15920, Financial Secretary, "Financial Arrangement and Constitutional Advances," May 1958.
\item \textsuperscript{146} Ibid. (Emphasis mine.)
\end{itemize}
that all these developments will lead to "early self-government", not to independence.\textsuperscript{147} Self-government essentially implied not full independence, but the granting of powers to legislate on all issues except external affairs and defence.\textsuperscript{148}

As scheduled, elections were held for the legislative council in March 1959. The number of contested seats were in total 13. A fourteenth member, Hersi Madal, was appointed by the governor. But the Somali members of the legislative council were a minority, since the council had twenty one official (British) members. Moreover, only official members were as usual included in the executive council. In February 1960, the administration held, as promised by Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, yet another election for the council. Thirty one Somali members were elected to the council. The Somali members thus became the official majority. But of course all the bills considered by the council were first submitted to and approved or disapproved by the executive council. Five Somali members of the legislative council were then added as ministers to the executive council. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal was appointed to the Ministry of Local Government, Ahmed Haji Dualeh to the Ministry of Natural Resources, Ali Gerad Jama to the Ministry of Communications and Works, Haji Ibrahim Nur to the Ministry of Social Services, and Yusuf Ismail Samatar was appointed not as minister but as


Assistant Minister. The object was to train them in the art of government. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal was also given the post of Leader of Government Business in the Legislative Council. He was thus groomed as the future leader of the protectorate. The ministries of defence and external affairs in the executive council remained under the control of P. Carrel and J. F. Bartle respectively. J. F. Bartle also remained as the Secretary to the government, and of course the council still had a majority of official members as it included the head of the various departments.

This was deliberate, since the administration planned to always present pleasant little constitutional advances to a delighted Somali public, and since it was the administration's policy anyway to grant internal self-government to the territory no earlier than 1965. This was to coincide with the "Somalisation" of the civil service, and the effective completion of all the community development programmes by 1965.

In 1958 the administration set up a commission to examine the processes of Somalisation of the civil service. The creation of a cadre of trained, disciplined, and educated elite, that is, of a new governing class, to take over the government sometime in the future was of course a central aspect of the ideology of colonialism in Somaliland. As early as 1884, Captain F. M. Hunter stated that colonial rule was the "only possible way of arranging for the autonomy of the Somal,"

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149 PRO, F.O.371/146966, Sir D. Hall to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 February 1960.

150 PRO, C.O.830/24, Executive Council. Minutes of a Meeting of the Executive Council Held at 9 a.m. on Tuesday, 1 March 1960 at Government House.

151 I discuss community development in the following chapter.
and "begin the task of educating the Somal in self-government." The training of Somalis for self-governement and for taking over the civil service then was always already an ideology central to colonial rule, and must not be viewed as part of a "planned decolonization" in the late colonial period. If anything, its aim was to reinforce colonial cultural hegemony.

The commission found that despite the "rapid increase in the rate of Somalisation," that nevertheless, the process could only be completed no earlier than the mid 1960s. A staffing forecast (Table 5.1) included in the report of the commission stated that in the Super scale, A/B scale, and C scale in all the departments—that is the senior staff—no Somali will be ready to fill such positions in March 1960.

### Table 5.1
Senior Service Posts: Staffing Forecast for 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPT.</th>
<th>As At 31 March 1959</th>
<th>As At 31 March 1959</th>
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PRO, F.O.78/3726, Memorandum: Captain F. M. Hunter to Earl of Kimberley, June 1884.
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</table>
Even the clerical service, the commission stated, could only be Somalised in the mid 1960s.\footnote{PRO, C.O.830/19, "Somalisation. Clerical Service," 1959.} Public health, as all other departments, had very Somali staff at the top level. The report on the Somalisation of the service stated that there were no qualified Somalis to take over from expatriate doctors, nurses, administrators, store keepers. There were only a few Somali training abroad in 1959, as doctors and administrators, even though the nursing school produced few Somali nurses and dressers. The earliest--Ali Sheikh Ibrahim--was to return in August 1961. The others were to return between 1964 and 1967. The only Somali training as a dentist, for instance, was to graduate in 1966. Moreover, there were no Somalis who were trained or training as laboratory technicians.\footnote{PRO, C.O.830/19, "Somalisation. Health Department," 1959.} Even in the junior service, there were few Somalis qualified to take
over. The schools were Somalised at the elementary level since the medium of instruction was Arabic. But the trade schools, the intermediate schools for males and females, and the secondary schools were not yet staffed by Somalis, and the earliest Somalis could take over all teaching responsibilities in the trades schools was the mid 1960s. And the secondary schools were to be fully Somalised only in 1967.  

The statistics used authenticated the argument of the administration that financial, constitutional, and Somalisation programmes for the preparation of the country for internal self-government could be effectively completed no earlier than the mid 1960s. The statistics used by the commission was as such then "political arithmetic." Such self-authenticating statistical thinking, as Ian Hacking argued, was always "developed for purposes of social control."  

The processes of "Somalisation" of the civil service, the legislative council, and the establishment of various political institutions gave the administration power and influence over the society and over the elite. The society was directly administered, and the elite coopted. The very processes of Somalisation reinforced the supervision of the administration over the elite, and over in particular, candidates for both political office and government jobs. In order to speed up the "Somalisation" of the civil service, for instance, "assistant" posts were created in many departments so "that Somalis can acquire the experience for higher office." But before the

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157 Ibid., p.6.
"assistant" was chosen, the "history of every individual" candidate was examined. Moreover, the history of every individual chosen as a member of the legislative council and the executive council was examined thoroughly. The administration then often chose the weakest and most malleable of the lot. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Igal who was given the post of Minister for Local Government and the Leader of Government Business in the Legislative Council was not chosen accidentally. One report produced by the Office of Intelligence and Security on the leading personalities of the territory described Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal as follows:

Born about 1926. Formerly a merchant. Educated Government schools in protectorate and U.K. Speaks and writes English. Speaks Arabic...Elected Vice President of S.N.L. branch Berbera, June 1959...Secretary General of S.N.L. April 1959...Essentially a weak character influenced by the last person to whom he speaks. Inherited considerable means. Much now spent on political affairs. Drinks.

Michael J. Mariano, M.B.E., who was considered a major force in the nationalist struggle was also described in the following terms:


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158 PRO, C.O.830/20/15989, Commission on Somalisation Report, "Preparation for Somalisation."
159 PRO, C.O.1015/1936/16830, "Leading Personalities": Office of Intelligence and Security to the Local Intelligence Committee, 1959.
160 Ibid.
Hersi Madadal, moreover, was described as follows:

Nominated member of legislative council for Hargeisa. Born about 1910. Trader in Hargeisa. Member of S.N.L. Very inconspicuous.\textsuperscript{161}

Most members of the civil service, the legislative and executive councils were similar to the three figures referred to above. They were all members of the "classe moyenne": small-scale traders, former members of the less exalted ranks of the salariat, with low level education. They were invariably educated in government schools in the protectorate, the Sudan, Aden, and in the United Kingdom. But only one—Ahmed Haji Dualeh who was appointed to the executive council in 1960—had a university degree. The rest had either intermediate and secondary school certificates, or diplomas. All were reformist, and pro-western. They were committed soldiers of modernity, and as such, were completely supportive of the mass education programmes and policies of the administration, and popularized the policy through the various roles they played in the towns—as members of the Local Government Councils and local clubs; in the districts—as members of District Committees; and on the national level—as members of the Protectorate Advisory Council, the Legislative Council, the Executive Council, and the civil service. They formed a very small oligarchy—a "new governing class"—largely drawn from the local population by a few administrators.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.

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UMI
CHAPTER SIX
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
REINFORCEMENT OF COLONIAL HEGEMONY

The economy of Somaliland grew and expanded modestly in the late 1880s and 1890s.

The British colonial administration simply lifted all the restrictions and taxes that the Egyptians imposed on the trade of Bulhar, Berbera, and Zeila during their era of control over the ports from 1870 to 1884. The annulment of restrictions boosted trade. The trade of the main ports of Somaliland—Berbera, Bulhar and Zeila—increased by 58% from 1885 to 1890. The trade of Zeila, for instance, increased from £64,000 in 1885 to £315,022 in 1890-91; and almost every year from 1885 to 1900, exports exceeded imports.

Table 6.1
Value of Trade of Zeila (£) from 1889-94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports (£)</th>
<th>Exports (£)</th>
<th>Total (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889-90</td>
<td>80,778</td>
<td>142,149</td>
<td>222,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-91</td>
<td>104,313</td>
<td>210,708</td>
<td>315,022</td>
</tr>
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<td>1891-92</td>
<td>101,598</td>
<td>151,721</td>
<td>253,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892-93</td>
<td>94,680</td>
<td>132,145</td>
<td>226,825</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 See Chapter Two. The restrictions that the Egyptians imposed on trade created recessionary conditions in 1874 and thereafter, as pointed out in chapter two.

The value of the trade of Berbera and Bulhar, moreover, increased from Rs.24,46,823 (£143,342) in 1885 to Rs.34,00,799 (£200,047) in 1890, to £445,607 in 1892-93 (Table 6.2). The overall value of the trade of the coastal towns of Berbera-Bulhar and Zeila increased more than three-fold, from a total of £264,047 in 1885 to £705,875 in 1892-93, to £751,266 in 1893-94.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Berbera &amp; Bulhar</th>
<th>Zeila</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Increase in £</th>
<th>Decrease in £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893-94</td>
<td>227,741</td>
<td>132,366</td>
<td>360,107</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892-93</td>
<td>254,501</td>
<td>120,446</td>
<td>374,947</td>
<td>11,920</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2
Value of Trade of Three Somali Ports, 1892-94

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\(^3\) Ibid.
The economy of the three main ports expanded even further from 1898-1900. In 1898-1899 the value of trade of the three main ports reached £805,031, and rose more slightly to £844,878 in 1899-1900. Furthermore, the trade of what used to be called the "non-flag" ports—Heis, Las Korey, Mait, Shallow, Karin, Hashow, Raguda, Ainterad—increased from 1885 to 1900. Thus the actual value trade of the Somaliland ports was much higher for the years from 1885 to 1900 than the figure quoted above.

The growth of the economy, made Somaliland in the 1890s the only territory in East Africa that paid its expenditure "from local revenue, without any financial aid or contribution from the British or Indian exchequer," and even managed to produce surplus revenue. Moreover, the economic boom made the towns—particularly Berbera—dynamic centres of commerce and culture. Berbera attracted all kinds of people—the ambitious trader, the pauper, the poet, and the theologian—all eager to make a quick fortune. Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan lived in Berbera in the mid-1890s. Unlike the majority of the population of the town, however, he

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grand Total</th>
<th>751,266</th>
<th>705,875</th>
<th>45,391</th>
<th>--</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


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5 PRO, F.O.844/6, J. Hayes Sadler, "Statement Of Value of Trade to Aden from the Flag and Non-Flag Ports of the Protectorate," 6 August 1899.

"inveighed against the luxury of the age." But he found the townspeople a "somewhat bored and unsympathetic" audience, more interested in the participating in the dynamic life and commerce of the town than in supporting him. The Sayyid, in the end, exacted revenge against his erstwhile bored and unsympathetic audience. For in 1899 he ceased to preach in Berbera against the luxury of the age and the British colonial administration, moved to the interior—where he found a more sympathetic audience—and declared war (Jihad) against the "infidels."

The struggle between the Sayyid and the British which lasted for twenty-one years, brought about a general trade depression, completely devastated the economy of the territory, reduced the towns into ghostly places, steadily weakened the purchasing power of the population, and increased poverty throughout the territory. The decline in the volume and value of trade from 1900 to 1920 was steep and devastating. For instance, the fall in the value of trade of the main ports—Zeila, Berbera and Bulhar—from 1899 to 1903 was almost 50%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports (£)</th>
<th>Exports (£)</th>
<th>Total (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899-1900</td>
<td>452,503</td>
<td>392,375</td>
<td>844,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-01</td>
<td>393,957</td>
<td>362,021</td>
<td>755,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-02</td>
<td>355,174</td>
<td>348,920</td>
<td>704,094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 Ibid.
9 I have discussed the various ways that the struggle improvised the people in chapter two.
The "continual depression of trade consequent (to) the unsettled state in the interior," affected all the ports whether flag or non-flag ports. Thus the economic state of Heis and Karin which were "within the recently disturbed area...indicate a greater tendency to sink below rather than rise above their former prosperity." And Zeila, which was affected by both the war and the establishment of the railway between Harar and Djibouti experienced a steep decline in trade and economy. The report predicted correctly that the Zeila trade with Ethiopia will continue to decline "until a time will arrive when the Zeila trade with Harar will practically cease." The following table shows the steady decline in the value of trade of Berbera, Bulhar, Zeila, Karin, and Heis from 1902 to 1905.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>1902-03</th>
<th>1903-04</th>
<th>1904-05</th>
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<tr>
<td>Zeila--</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports:</td>
<td>70,700</td>
<td>84,700</td>
<td>65,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports:</td>
<td>92,500</td>
<td>75,100</td>
<td>62,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berbera &amp; Bulhar--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.
"From these statistics (Table 6.4)," the 1904-05 report concluded, "it is apparent that the merchandise...brought into the country declined 6 percent at Berbera, 45 percent at Bulhar, 51 percent at Karin, and 48 percent at Heis, and though the export percentage at Berbera was 6 (percent) greater, shipments from the other three ports decreased 1 percent, 24 percent, and 15 percent respectively." Berbera was the exception as the report noted, because as the capital of the protectorate, the expenditure of the government on public works, and provisions for the war against the Sayyid stimulated its economy, or at least kept it afloat. Still, though, the total trade (export and import) of Berbera declined. If in 1893-94 the total trade of Berbera and Bulhar was £464,377, the value of that trade declined (by £124,877) to £339,500 in 1904-05.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} Compare Table 6.2 and Table 6.4.
The 1905-06 report on Somaliland, moreover, noted the further decline in the "purchasing power of the people" due to poverty. That poverty "led to a diminution of 12 percent in the value of imports," and the "dramatic decrease in the trade of Zeila," and all other ports. The report added that the "poverty of the people" led to the decline in the importation and purchase of such commodities as rice, flour, tea, sugar, and dates. The report also noted the rise in the incidence of crime against property in Berbera. Such an increase in crime, the report stated, was "not unnormal." It was "due to the growth in the population of the town, consequent on a large influx of "miskeens," or destitute persons, at the end of the military expeditions against the Mullah." 

In 1907, furthermore, the total imports of the country from Aden decreased by Rs.7,42,148, or 8.02%, while exports to Aden—the principle market of goods from Somaliland—decreased by Rs.18,61,694 or 22.65%. And by 1908 the total value of exports fell by more than 60% from their 1900 level. Thus if in 1900 the total value of exports was £392,375 (Table 6.3), the total value of exports reached a low level of £158,469 in 1908. The 1910-1911 colonial report, what is more, stated that the importation of dates, sugar, tea, cotton, silk, building materials, beads, drugs, jute bags, tobacco, and earthen glassware, which depended on the "general prosperity of the country" declined because of the "disturbed condition in the interior."

16 Ibid.
The decline in the importation of sugar and tea, for instance, reflected the "winding up of a large number of coffee shops in the interior" as a result of the disturbances. Overall, the net decrease in the value of trade in 1910-1911 was £567,806. And even when goods were imported, they often remained unsold in the coastal towns.

Thus in 1913, thirty-nine traders from Berbera—Indians, Arabs, Jews, Banians, and Somalis, wrote a memorial to the Governor of the territory "drawing attention to the adverse effect of the present state of affairs upon trade, complaining that their goods are lying unsaleable in the warehouses, and asking the government...(to) give consideration to the matter." Thereafter, the traders stopped importing expensive luxury goods and other necessary goods to the territory. That only intensified the decline of trade in the territory. The 1915-1916 report, for instance, referred to the decline of such imports as cotton goods, silk, flour, rice, cereals, and petroleum. The First World War exacerbated the situation, since economic regulations imposed on Bombay and Aden restricted the exportation of certain items. The 1918-19 report, in addition, noted the further reduction of both exports and imports. It made reference in particular to the "falling off in the quantity of livestock exported to Aden," and to the reduction in the

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 PRO, W.O.106/23, "Memorandum By the Commissioner on the Political Situation in Somaliland," 1913.
"exportation of hides and skins, gums and resin due to general trade depression." Overall, the disturbances in the interior from 1900 to 1920 "exhausted and improvised" the people, reduced trade, and permanently damaged the ecology of the country. As one report asserted:

Trade with the coastal towns was disrupted and did lasting damage to the economy of the Protectorate, for it encouraged the use by Ethiopian exporters of the newly opened Franco-Ethiopian railway. This permanently weakened the position of Berbera and Zeila as the traditional outlets for the products of the rich Ethiopian hinterland. Serious damage was also caused in the grazing areas, because seasonal migrations of people and stock were disorganized and overgrazing in certain areas led to soil erosion on a large scale from which they have never fully recovered."

Uneven Development, 1920-1939

During the post-Sayyid period, the economy of the country, and the mode of life of the people, continued to deteriorate. The main factors that brought about a further decline in the mode of life of the people, were the recurrence of severe droughts and famines, the deterioration of the ecology of the country, the decline in the price of locally produced commodities, and an overall trade depression. All of these factors produced a "satanic geography" characterized by

25 Ibid. (Emphasis mine.)
soil erosion on a "large scale," and poverty. Such were the concrete manifestations of colonial rule in Somaliland in the early colonial period.

The most serious droughts in the 1920s took place in 1924 and 1927-1930. The two droughts brought about a "general trade depression." The 1924 drought killed off a large number of stock throughout the protectorate, and transformed a large number of people from independent producers to paupers. Another drought affected the whole country in 1927. This drought lasted until 1930. The drought was exacerbated by a plague of locusts that descended on the country in July-August 1928, "stripping trees, denuding pasture and destroying all standing crops." At least 80% of the stock of the country perished. The drastic depletion in the livestock of the people, Isabel Boothman argued, "had greatly deprived the Somali of his major source of purchasing power." The reduction in the purchasing power of the people, created severe famine and poverty, and forced the administration to open relief centres for Somalis. The largest relief centre was opened at Bulhar, west of Berbera, in 1927. It was closed in 1930. Yet another drought swept the country in 1933. This drought lasted until the middle of 1934. It affected most severely the people of the Berbera and Erigavo districts. Because of the severity of the drought, the administration opened relief camps at Erigavo, Badhan, and Berbera. The daily average


31 Ibid.,p.27.

number of inmates in the camp at Badhan was about 2,500-3,000, while the average number of inmates in the camp at Berbera was 6,000.33 The camps were closed in the middle of 1934.

The frequent droughts, the reduction in the people's purchasing power, and the rise in poverty, undermined the traditional mode of life, and the traditional belief and confidence of the people in livestock as a profitable form of wealth, and rural life as sustainable form of life. A key factor in the loss of confidence of the people in the traditional mode of life was the fall in the exchange value of locally produced commodities. For instance, the price of all the staple commodities in the country such as cattle, locally produced wheat, camels, horses, sheep, and goats, declined from 1905 to 1938.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staple</th>
<th>1905 Rs.</th>
<th>1925 £ s. d.</th>
<th>1931 £ s. d.</th>
<th>1938 £ s. d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle, per head</td>
<td>25 Rs.</td>
<td>2 5 -</td>
<td>2 8 -</td>
<td>1 19 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep per head</td>
<td>7-8 Rs.</td>
<td>- 15 -</td>
<td>- 9 -</td>
<td>- 9 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats per head</td>
<td>7-8 Rs.</td>
<td>- 10 -</td>
<td>- 6 -</td>
<td>- 7 10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses per head</td>
<td>100-150 Rs.</td>
<td>6 - -</td>
<td>15 - -</td>
<td>6 18 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camels per head</td>
<td>40 Rs.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat per bushel</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>- 6 -</td>
<td>- 6 -</td>
<td>- 4 1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decline in the price of locally produced commodities depressed the value of exports, and reduced the volume of imports. Imports declined because the purchasing power of the people decreased. In other words, the poverty of the people made it impossible for them to buy imported expensive goods. Moreover, exports declined because the droughts reduced livestock and the wealth of the people. There was, in sum, very little to export.

Table 6.6
Value of Imports and Exports (in Rupees), 1927-1935

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports (Rs.)</th>
<th>Exports (Rs.)</th>
<th>Total (Rs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>57,21,663</td>
<td>48,89,120</td>
<td>106,10,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>82,52,443</td>
<td>75,26,270</td>
<td>157,77,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>62,75,587</td>
<td>31,84,893</td>
<td>94,60,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>49,27,166</td>
<td>33,47,095</td>
<td>82,74,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>41,35,139</td>
<td>26,74,352</td>
<td>68,09,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>40,77,827</td>
<td>21,42,032</td>
<td>62,19,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>37,88,671</td>
<td>19,54,166</td>
<td>57,42,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>35,80,851</td>
<td>18,32,395</td>
<td>54,13,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>36,27,046</td>
<td>16,99,461</td>
<td>53,26,507</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total value of exports declined almost 50% between 1927 and 1931, except in 1928 when the value of both imports and exports increased. The reason was simple: on the one hand the drought killed so many livestock that a large number of skins and hides were available for export; and on the other, the drought necessitated the importation of essential goods—rice, dates, sugar, tea, and cotton goods. 34 Although exports declined in 1929, still a substantial number of skins were exported "probably taken from the beds and moveable houses of those who had lost all their livestock." 35 Thereafter both imports and exports declined. Thus exports declined from Rs.75,26,270 in 1927 to Rs.16,99,461 in 1935, and imports fell from Rs.82,52,443 in 1928 to 36,27,046 in 1935. In essence, a "general trade depression" set in the country from 1927 to 1935 that exhausted the traditional mode of life, and which consequently began to be gradually "replaced by other modes of life" 36: urban life, an intensive form of cultivation, employment in the towns or overseas, and commerce.

Intensive cultivation was one of the new "modes of life" the people who lost all of their livestock in the western and eastern districts began practising in the 1920s. The 1925 military report stated that "Cultivation of Jowari (millet) is on the increase in the southeast of the

protectorate; it is also grown round...tarikhas (religious orders)." The report added that fresh vegetables were grown in all the district headquarters for the township markets. Cultivation also increased in the western districts of Hargeisa and Borama in the 1920s. Harold Kittermaster, the Governor of Somaliland from 1928 to 1931, stated that agriculture was "enjoying quite a boom" in the western districts, and pointed out the fact that thousands of acres had come under cultivation.

By 1931 more than 80,000 acres of land was under cultivation in the Hargeisa district alone. And by 1935 cultivation was practised in the Borama and Hargeisa districts in a strip of land about 80 miles long and ranging in width from two to fifteen miles. Most of the cultivation whether in the eastern or western districts took place within the framework of "peasant proprietorship." Hence most of the agricultural land was parcelled between peasants who owned small plots that ranged in size from one acre to fifteen acres. The crops that peasants produced were sorghum, maize, barley, wheat, and gram. By 1931 maize was being cultivated "on larger scale than in previous years, and there has been a noticeable increase in the number of


41 Ibid.
requests for imported seed that has been tried out under local conditions." Production of sorghum also increased from 1931 to 1933.

Table 6.7
Production of Sorghum and Maize, 1931 and 1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>130,012 lbs</td>
<td>733,171 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>26,182 lbs</td>
<td>10,536</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, the production of gum, frankincense, and myrrh for the international market intensified in the 1930s. Gum plantation owners hired "pickers" who because of "their poverty" could not refuse the work and the low wages, and who collected the gum for the plantations owners during the harvesting season, and planted new gum trees as well.

Furthermore, many young men left the country to find employment in Ethiopia, Aden, and England. Others moved to the townships in search of "opportunities of employment or

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42 Ibid., p.8.


Most became labourers, dock workers, servants, porters, soldiers, or acquired skills and became truck drivers, assistants to truck drivers, mechanics, cooks, bakers, blacksmiths, and carpenters. At least six hundred workers were employed in the "conduct and maintenance of vehicles" in 1937. Others worked for merchants, butchers, bakers, tea-shop and restaurant owners. Women also moved to the towns and sold wood, vegetables and other commodities in the zariba (market), or became prostitutes. Moreover, the decline in the traditional mode of life compelled many stock owners to sell their stock and re-invest their capital in motor vehicles, and commerce. Even the low caste groups—the Midgo, Yibir, and Tumals, began moving to the towns. The growth of the towns created opportunities for low caste groups to escape their traditional servile roles in the interior. Most became either government workers—sweepers, cleaners—or shoemakers, blacksmiths, barbers.


46 For wages paid to such workers see PRO, C.O.607/38, Blue Books, 1938: "Persons in Employment and Average Rates of Wages."


The drift to the towns of all kinds of people—young men and women, poor elders, and rich pastoralists who reinvested their capital in commerce—modestly increased the population of the towns. In 1918, Hargeisa and Burao, the two largest towns in the interior, had a population that never exceeded 8,000. Most were either traders, government soldiers and functionaries, or paupers who escaped the disturbances in the interior. The settlements, insisted Douglas Jardine, could not be called permanent townships. By 1936, the population of Burao reached 15,000 inhabitants. The population of Hargeisa also increased to the same degree. And Berbera, the most cosmopolitan of the towns, acquired a permanent (not seasonal) population of about 20,000. The townships thus became permanent settlements with a permanent population—labourers, government employees, paupers, and a small merchant class—characterized by a new "spirit of cohesion," that signified the "new way of life (that) developed" in the townships.

One of the factors that pulled young men and women, and rich stock owners to the towns in the mid-1930s besides the decline in the rural economy, was the improvement in the economy of the towns, stimulated by external trade with Ethiopia. The Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 "created a large if temporary market for all the main classes of goods regularly imported into the protectorate which became a channel of supply for the frontier areas in which considerable

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shortage of most goods was being felt. Somali traders quickly imported goods and re-exported them to Ethiopia. The following table clearly shows the increase in the volume of trade from 1935 to 1938.

Table 6.8
Value of Imports and Exports, 1934-38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
<th>1934 (£)</th>
<th>1935 (£)</th>
<th>1936 (£)</th>
<th>1937 (£)</th>
<th>1938 (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grey Sheetings</td>
<td>9,588</td>
<td>12,470</td>
<td>16,602</td>
<td>15,316</td>
<td>18,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White long Cloth</td>
<td>17,958</td>
<td>23,727</td>
<td>40,199</td>
<td>40,960</td>
<td>35,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>37,438</td>
<td>38,751</td>
<td>44,349</td>
<td>59,962</td>
<td>63,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>17,179</td>
<td>17,612</td>
<td>17,680</td>
<td>31,640</td>
<td>41,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>82,342</td>
<td>67,716</td>
<td>80,681</td>
<td>114,333</td>
<td>160,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>104,545</td>
<td>111,752</td>
<td>225,679</td>
<td>273,000</td>
<td>230,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Transit</td>
<td>47,400</td>
<td>53,463</td>
<td>19,782</td>
<td>150,230</td>
<td>177,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total IMPORTS</td>
<td>316,450</td>
<td>325,491</td>
<td>445,017</td>
<td>685,441</td>
<td>728,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>25,346</td>
<td>29,538</td>
<td>36,636</td>
<td>44,815</td>
<td>43,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>10,426</td>
<td>8,946</td>
<td>12,131</td>
<td>13,608</td>
<td>14,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skins (sheep and Goats)</td>
<td>81,903</td>
<td>55,330</td>
<td>109,345</td>
<td>163,009</td>
<td>92,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>2,385</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>2,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guano</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>1,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gum</td>
<td>6,494</td>
<td>11,345</td>
<td>12,092</td>
<td>17,609</td>
<td>16,198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expansion of trade, was stimulated by imports which were then re-exported to Ethiopia, and not by exports of domestic products. The sudden and dramatic improvement in the economy of the towns created not a middle class, but a "middling sort of people": traders, shopkeepers, mechanics, drivers, blacksmiths, leather-workers. The most important sector of the "middling sort of people" were the traders who became "comparatively wealthy." As one report put it,

When Jigjiga was first occupied (by the Italians), every small trader who could obtain goods and the wherewithal to transport them, rushed to Jigjiga and sold them to the troops at enormous profits...there is still a great deal being exported and small traders, who were poor before, are now comparatively rich. Many people, who never thought of trading previously, are now taking caravans over the border and doing very well."

The new "comparatively rich" elite as well as the lower middling sort re-invested their wealth in commerce, real estate, and motor vehicles. In 1931, for instance, there were only 36

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commercial cars in the country, but by 1936 there were 312 commercial cars; and in 1937 alone, 247 motor vehicles were imported.57 The large number of commercial cars imported "opened up the remote parts of the districts" for commerce,58 and integrated the rural economy into the economy of the urban centres. In effect, the pre-colonial market system which was a "mosaic"59 of exchange spaces, became less so. The "mosaic" market system in which the differentiation between town and country was minimal and insignificant, was replaced by a centralized market system based in, and dominated by, few urban centres: Burao, Berbera, and Hargeisa, through which the powerful traders exploited the rural economy. Thus Burao, for instance, became in the 1930s the central market for livestock. Exchange relations, in sum, became centralized and systematic. The differentiation between town and country, and the dominance of the former over the latter, was spatially symbolized by, on the one hand the growth in the investment of the merchant class in buildings, warehouses, and homes, and on the other by the deterioration of the ecology of the countryside. The boom in construction in the towns increased dramatically the price of land. As one report put it, "The demand for building plots in Hargeisa town which was one of the signs of prosperity during 1936, continued during 1937, and many plots were sold at high prices."60

58  Ibid.,p.29.
60  Ibid.,p.30.
The gradual break-down of the traditional mode of life—the decline in the confidence of the people in livestock as a profitable form of wealth and rural life as a sustainable form of life, the frequency of droughts, the reduction in the purchasing power and wealth of the people—led to the gradual replacement of the traditional mode with "other modes of life"—urban life, commerce, wage labour, intensive forms of cultivation, and prostitution. The break-down of the traditional mode of life, and the formation of other forms of life, in sum, led to "uneven development": the decline of rural life and urban development; the break-down of the traditional "mosaic" market relations and the emergence of a centralized and systematic market relations. Specific colonial policies, both wittingly and unwittingly, played a decisive role in the development of uneven development.

Government Policies and Uneven Development, 1900-1939

The administration did very little from 1900 to 1920 to shore up the rural economy, and improve the living standard of the people. If anything, the administration's war policies from 1900 to 1920 contributed decisively to the decline of the "daily life" of the people of Somaliland. Moreover, the administration as a result of the dramatic increase in military expenditure, decided to curtail civil expenditure from 1900 to 1920. Victor Cavendish of the Treasury pointed to the inflation in military expenditure from 1900 to 1905. He stated that in

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61 Neil Smith, *Uneven Development*.
62 See chapter two.
1902-1905 alone military expenditure reached £2,783,600.\textsuperscript{63} He thus suggested the administration of the territory "upon the simplest lines."\textsuperscript{64} In essence, civil expenditure was severely curtailed because of the "special military situation existing in Somaliland."\textsuperscript{65} In the post-Sayyid period, however, the administration attempted to "develop the resources of the country."\textsuperscript{66} The objective behind such a policy was to neutralize the anti-colonial legacy of the Sayyid,\textsuperscript{67} raise surplus revenue, and make the Somalilander responsive to, and recognize the legitimacy of, the colonial government.

Sir Gerald Summers, the Governor of the territory from 1922 to 1924, stated that "it is idle at present to look for any excessive affection or goodwill on the part of the people towards the government."\textsuperscript{68} He added the administration can change that, not merely through a "demonstration of power," but through the development of the resources of the country, and the establishment of various cultural institutions. "Though by nature," he argued, "the Somalis are


\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{67} Patrick Kakwenzire, "Resistance, Revenue and Development in Northern Somalia," \textit{International Journal of African Historical Studies}, vol.19, no.4 (1986), p.669. (The "northern Somalia" Kakwenzire is discussing is "Somaliland." More often than not, he talks about "Somalia". He is totally unaware of the difference between "Somalia" and "Somaliland" during the colonial period.)

\textsuperscript{68} Sir Gerlad Summers, "Memorandum on Political Affairs in the Somaliland Protectorate," 1924.
very unresponsive, there is no reason to conclude that by the progress of administration and the personal contact of British officers with the people themselves, as apart from the Akils and Elders only, and by the tactful extension of medical treatment and other means, a far better relationship may not be established between the British Administration and the people than exists at present."

But the Imperial Treasury insisted that the administration must raise revenue through direct taxation before any grants-in-aid were given to the territory for economic development. Consequently, the administration decided to impose a stock tax on the people in 1920. But a "serious riot" in Hargeisa against the stock tax forced the government to drop the taxation policy and the schemes of development. The administration then reintroduced the stock tax in 1922. This time, the government solicited the support of the "leading men" (i.e. Aqils) of the country. In Burao, the people responded by demonstrating not only against the administration, and the stock tax, but also against the Aqils. Captain Gibb, the District Commissioner of Burao, was then killed while attempting to explain to the multitude the benefits of the taxation scheme. The whole proposal was then dropped. But the administration attempted to collect the tax in Hargeisa in July 1922. It "soon became evident that the opposition would be so strong that even

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69 Ibid.


71 Ibid.

72 See chapter five for the role of Aqils in the society and the administration of the country.
if the tax were collected the cost of collection would be more than the amount gained." The administration then dropped the taxation scheme, and merely increased customs duties and zariba (market) due from 7% to 15%.

In the late 1920s, the administration undertook various development projects without even considering imposing taxes to pay for the expenses. But the object of development was redefined. While Gerald Summers stressed in the early 1920s the need for winning over the confidence and support of the people through the establishment of various cultural institutions, the Governors of the country in the late 1920s and 1930s focused on maintaining law and order by force, and even used tribal discord as a basis for the "extension of administration." Harold Kittermaster referred to in 1928 to the yearly extension of the "range of effective administration" over the territory. Kittermaster also played a key role in the redefinition of development policies. For him, the object of development--administrative or otherwise--was to transform tribal life and tribal economy. As he put it, the object of development should be to "change the characteristics of the people and their mode of life." That could only be achieved, he insisted, if the "camel-complex" of the Somali--the confidence of the Somali in livestock as a satisfactory form of wealth and pastoral life as a sustainable form of life--was undermined and

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73 Sir Gerald Summers, "Momorandum on Political Affairs in the Somaliland Protectorate," 1924.


75 Ibid., p.332.

76 Ibid.
destroyed. The object of development, in other words, was the breaking down of the "supremacy" of the camel "an economic unit." He argued that agriculture, and mineral extraction industries—he pointed out to the discovery of oil, coal, and mica in areas close to Berbera—"offers a more hopeful line of development than camels," and can transform Somaliland "into a more static society."

The administration failed to interest British syndicates to exploit the oil and coal resources of the country, because Somaliland had a "very bad reputation to live down to owing to the activities of the Mad Mullah." Nevertheless, the administration set out from 1928 to 1939 to change the characteristics and mode of life of the people by encouraging commerce, urban development, and agricultural expansion. All of these modes of life are characteristic of "static" societies. The administration placed especial emphasis on, and encouraged, agricultural expansion through demonstration and advice, and took quick steps to "supervise and control" cultivation. The administration also surveyed the "land under cultivation," and built new wells

79 Ibid.,p.334.
80 Ibid.,p.333.
81 PRO, C.O.830/2, Annual Veterinary and Agricultural Report, 1935.
and irrigation systems through "administrative action." All of these activities of the administration encouraged agricultural expansion, and led to the rise in agricultural productivity (Table 6.7).

But agricultural expansion only exacerbated the environmental problems of the country. Besides, it did not improve the purchasing power of farmers. As already indicated, the price of locally produced agricultural products (wheat) decreased from 1925 onwards (Table 6.5). Moreover, the "indiscriminate cutting down of timber" and bush in clearing for farms, led to soil erosion, and the further deterioration of the environment. This was clearly noted by Colonel Jameson in his tour of Somaliland in 1943. He stated that agricultural land, which diminished as a result of soil erosion, indiscriminate cutting of trees and bush, and the overall deterioration of the environment, was "ruined for posterity by bad agricultural practices" in the early colonial period. But the administration was more interested in breaking the "supremacy" of the camel as an economic unit than in protecting the environment.

The administration, moreover, exacerbated further the environmental problems of the country unwittingly in the late 1930s by attempting, in cooperation with the Italian administration of Ethiopia, to control the movement of the pastoralists for administrative

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purposes. The Italian administration of Ethiopia even allowed the looting of the stock of the pastoralists from Somaliland by their own soldiers. Although neither the Italian nor the British administration were able to control the movement of the pastoralists, nevertheless, the various restriction which the Italians imposed on the pastoralists, and the looting of the stock of the pastoralists by Italian soldiers, led to the break-down of the pulsatory and organized seasonal movement of the pastoralists. That forced the pastoralists to concentrate their stock in the interior plateau, and led to over-grazing, and the further deterioration and decline of the environment.

The administration, in addition, encouraged commerce, and urban development. The administration took full advantage of the improvement of the economy of the urban centres as a result of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1935, and supported the merchant class in their bid to expand their activities both inside and outside the country. To stimulate commerce, the administration improved the infrastructure of Somaliland. These were justified on "utilitarian" grounds. In 1938 alone the administration estimated the amount to be spent on roads from £50,000 to £100,000. It also cooperated with the Italian administration of Ethiopia from 1935 to 1938 in the improvement of infrastructure between Somaliland and Ethiopia. In 1937, for instance, the administration hired 500 workers (coolies) to improve the Togwajaale-Berbera road "which was undertaken to carry the Italian transit traffic." The administration also improved the

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Burao-Erigavo, Burao-Berbera, Burao Hargeisa, Erigavo-Badhan roads. The improvements in the infrastructure of both Somaliland and Ethiopia, encouraged the merchant class to expand their commercial activities, to re-invest their capital in motor vehicles, and to penetrate more effectively the internal market.

Uneven development--urban development, and rural poverty--in other words, was the concrete manifestation of colonial rule, and colonial policies, in the early colonial period. This process was intensified further in the late colonial period through various ways by community development, a new "policy of social and material development," which though utilitarian, had also a political dimension: the reinforcement of colonial controls over the society, the disciplining of the common man, and the establishment of hegemonic relations over the people.

**Community Development and Colonial Control, 1941-1960**

The primary aim of community development was to reduce imports, increase exports, involve the public in development projects, preserve tribal life, educate the people to "want, and hence support community development projects, and inculcate a "degree of social discipline in the common man." The new policy was established within the general framework of mass education. It focused on six broad questions. First, "(h)ow to enable native interests to participate

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91 Captain A. C. A. Wright, "The Inter-Action of Various Systems of Law."
to an increased degree in the trading enterprise of their country, with especial reference to the import trade; second, "(h)ow to improve the quality and marketing facilities of the present limited range of export commodities with a view to obtaining a greater return to the produce"; third, "(h)ow to increase the range of export commodities by a greater exploitation of the natural resources of the country, which, while admittedly limited, nevertheless, appear to offer scope in a number of directions"; fourth, how to encourage "local native industry to enable the people where possible to produce commodities which at present they import from outside"; fifth, how to protect the environment; and sixth, how "to establish such relations with these difficult people as to make such a programme feasible."

The objectives of the administration, in essence, were to reduce the territory's dependence on imported foodstuffs by agricultural extension, and to expand exports by the utilization and improvement of the local industries: animal husbandry, aromatic and other agricultural products, skin products, spinning and weaving, rope-making, mother-of-pearl, and soap manufacturing. The focus, however, remained on livestock, livestock products, fisheries, and agriculture. The administration used various methods in effecting community development. It used the "direct approach, such as personal contacts by trade officers," fisheries officers, forestry officers, veterinary officers, agricultural officers, and indirect methods such as "radio propaganda,

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92 PRO, W.O.32/13261, Military Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.
94 Ibid.
demonstrations and trading centres," mobile cinema, posters, and plays. Radio propaganda was in particular considered as the best means of disseminating ideas and techniques because of the "growing popularity and prestige of the broadcasting services." The ambitious nature of the community development programmes increased expenditure.

Table 6.9
Expenditure 1937, 1948-1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ordinary Expenditure £</th>
<th>Extra-ordinary Expenditure £</th>
<th>C. D. W. £</th>
<th>Gross Expenditure £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>166,201</td>
<td>45,353</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>211,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>214,242</td>
<td>12,914</td>
<td>9,222</td>
<td>236,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>807,401</td>
<td>269,948</td>
<td>41,086</td>
<td>1,118,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>937,804</td>
<td>100,006</td>
<td>55,545</td>
<td>1,093,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>984,441</td>
<td>113,006</td>
<td>115,562</td>
<td>1,213,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>887,349</td>
<td>144,769</td>
<td>195,534</td>
<td>1,227,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>894,735</td>
<td>152,935</td>
<td>119,493</td>
<td>1,167,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,152,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,1974,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,408,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,715,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,176,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,390,757</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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95 Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.

Each year more than sixty percent of all expenditure was earmarked for community development.97

The department of agriculture and veterinary services was directly responsible for "community development among adult groups"98 in the rural areas. But the "development officer"--first appointed in 1951--as well as the Colonial Development Corporation, played a key role in community development. They coordinated the various community development projects with other departments: public health, education, and public works. In other words, the activities of the various departments were formed into combined operations and teams which functioned as district and regional community development agencies.99 The "general policy" of the department of agriculture and veterinary services--which played the central role in community development--was "to encourage the growing of food, grass and natural products without upsetting the balance of nature."100 The 1951 report of the department listed the following objectives: to institute a system of grazing control and to restore the degenerating pastures, prevent the erosion of farm

100 PRO, C.O.830/6/15713, Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture and Veterinary Services, 1951.
lands, increase by all means necessary agricultural production and improve marketing arrangements for such products, improve the health of livestock, encourage the production of dates and the fishing industry, utilize forest areas for firewood, assist the gum industry, encourage the hides and skins industries, investigate the possibility of large-scale irrigation, assist the Colonial Development Corporation, and train and employ as many Somalis as possible.  

The department allocated £277,940 in 1951 for these projects. The first issue which the department addressed was the protection and regeneration of the pastures of the country. In 1942 the administration invited D. C. Edwards—a staff member of the forestry department in Kenya—to visit the country, and assess the condition of the pasture of the territory. His report, "A Survey of the Grazing Areas of British Somaliland," decried the decline of the ecology of the country. He suggested the appointment of geographers to systematically survey the countryside. In 1943, Major P. E. Glover, and H. B. Gilliland, were appointed to investigate the pasture conditions in the country. The surveyors proposed the creation of reserve areas in order to protect the grazing areas from over use and over pasturing, and in order to control tribal migrations. The object as H. E. Gilliland put it, was to identify tribal migrations which were "not

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101 Ibid.

as random as might be supposed" 103 and then impose restrictions on the use of certain areas during the year. The idea, he insisted, was to formulate a "planned itinerary" 104 for the pastoralists. No matter where the tribesmen may pasture his stock, Gilliard concluded, they "would always be on an area whose development was planned." 105 The "planned itinerary" of the pastoralists would then make it easier for district commissioners to govern them. The grazing control policy was as such then explicitly involved in the "government" of the nomadic population.

The need for reserve areas, and administrative control over pastoralists, was reinforced by John Hunt's 1944-1950 survey. Hunt argued that in the pre-colonial period pastoralists protected the environment through their system of seasonal migration. "Development and invention," he added, "have upset that balance." 106 He insisted that at the least twelve areas be closed off, and that the "protection of scanty soil (of the country) must be a part of every developmental programme, whether it be agriculture, the cutting of roads, increased use of motor vehicles in watering stock, or any other new factor which is bound to upset the nicely adjusted balance of soil productivity" 107 in the country. The administration took Hunt's argument very seriously. "We here all feel," opined Gerald Reece, the governor of Somaliland from 1948 to 1953,

104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., p.57.
107 Ibid.
"that the reserve proposal is based on a very elementary principle. In every race the prudent parent tries to instil in his children the necessity for saving, and surely the principle is the same here."\(^{108}\)

The policy in the end was justified not only politically—as an essential part of the governing and administering of the nomads—but also racially—as the responsibility of the "prudent" race which must impose controls over "his children." Although the administration considered grazing control and soil conservation as central to the development of the country, it never attempted to impose grazing control by force or compulsion.\(^{109}\) Rather, it aimed to persuade the people themselves through various propaganda methods.

Through persuasion, the district commissioner of Erigavo, Scawin, succeeded in creating a reserve area that consisted of 3,000 square miles in the district in 1951. His accomplishment was due to the cooperation of the people, who were convinced that reserves were necessary. In some areas in the district, such as Midhishi, the people themselves requested the creation of a reserve area. According to the commissioner's reports, the closure was nearly 100% effective.\(^{110}\)

Encouraged by the success in the Erigavo district, the administration proposed in 1953 the creation of reserve areas throughout the country. The policy met with success in all the districts except Burao. And even at Burao resistance to grazing control was articulated by the urban

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\(^{110}\) PRO, C.O.830/6/15713, Annual Report of the Department of Agricultural and Veterinary Services, 1951.
population in 1957, and not in 1953, when the grazing control system was imposed with the consent of the people. Besides, the rural population never raised a hand against the policy. And it was always the reaction of the rural population that worried the administration. Despite the resistance in Burao, grazing control was on the whole successfully implemented in all the other districts. Mape 6.1 and the following table indicates the reserve areas, which functioned as a means of controlling and administering the pastoralists, and as a means of protecting the land against over-grazing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Area (sq. m.)</th>
<th>Time of Closure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borama</td>
<td>Zeila Plain</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>8 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borama</td>
<td>Dih Gudban</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
<td>Ogo Barri</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burao</td>
<td>Aroreh Plain</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burao</td>
<td>Ban Awl</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burao</td>
<td>Ain</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Anod</td>
<td>Las Adar</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erigavo</td>
<td>Hubera</td>
<td>1,250*</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRO, C.O.830/19/15985, Proposed Areas for Closure, 1953.

* As well as the 3,000 square miles already closed off in 1951.

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The forestry officer supervised the reserved areas, and even attempted in various places to regenerate the trees, shrubs, and the soil. And the department trained Somalis as forestry guards. Courses were given on the subject of forestry intermittently. The object of the courses was to give the forestry guards some understanding of how "their work fits in with the general progress of the country and to provide an elementary technical background to their work."\textsuperscript{112}

The department also established in 1947 an innovative programme--Yemeni demonstration farms--in order to encourage agriculture. This was consistent with the government's policy of operating industries in order to prove to the public the "wisdom" of its policies.\textsuperscript{113} The object was to encourage Somalis to use Yemeni farming and irrigation methods. The demonstration farms used artificial earth-banks which consisted of stones, soil, trees, and bush, to slow down and canalize the water to the farms. The department established such farms at Daba-Cadaadeed, Hagal, Bawn, Boqol Jirreh, Bulhar, Hargeisa, Borama, Dobowein, Berbera, and Gebiley. An irrigation officer, Mr. Jones, was appointed in 1950 whose sole responsibility was to expand the new irrigation methods. He used various instructional tools--the cinema, demonstration, posters, and the radio--to convey to the people the new method of preserving water. He organized Agricultural Committees in all districts, moreover, to persuade people about the benefits of the new irrigation method, and succeeded in constructing about 150 miles of earth

\textsuperscript{113} Military Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.
banks by 1958 which increased "interest in arable agriculture" and stimulated agricultural production.

At Bawn—a farming settlement north-west of Borama, for instance, the irrigation officer and the Agricultural District Committee were able to successfully solicit the cooperation of the people in the building of earth-banks. As R. N. Ablett put it,

The work consisted of making conservation barriers of cut aloes, trash and stones along contours in order to slow down the flow of water during rainstorms and thereby increase water penetration. The aloes soon took root, so that these barriers became "live wash-stop." Within a comparatively short time after the beginning of the rains, the effectiveness of the people's community effort was obvious to them. It was not long before the idea was copied in other parts of the District.

The self-help groups, added Ablett, formed themselves into "community societies, each based in a village," and spread to various farming localities where cooperative efforts were undertaken for bunding and other work. "Hardly a week goes by," he concluded, "without a new community society being formed somewhere or other." These community development societies which were organized and directed by British officers performed useful and practical works, but they also had important political functions: to discipline and increase day to day supervision over the common man, and to "educate (the) people to want the things the colonial government wants them to want." They thus intensified the quotidian processes of hegemony "very often

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115 R. N. Ablett, "Community Development in the Former Somaliland Protectorate," p.139.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid., p.141.

creative, inventive, interesting, and above all executive." Almost all the other aspects of community development whether agricultural programmes, fisheries, animal husbandry, trade played similar roles.

Community development encouraged farming not only by establishing community development societies, and "live wash-stops", but also initiated programmes in which loans were extended to all of those interested in becoming farmers. In the Erigavo district, for example, a total of Sh.7,000 in loans were made to new farmers in 1951. Each farmer was extended a loan of Sh.150. The department also established date farms in an attempt to encourage the production of dates, and trained Somalis on a "wide selection of subjects connected" to agricultural sciences.

The 1948 colonial office report stated that even though agricultural production per acre was small, nevertheless, "locally grown cereals have made an important contribution to the economy of the country." The economic contribution made by the agriculture sector was a result of the dramatic increase in farming in the late colonial period. In 1951, 1,682 new farms were registered with the department of agriculture and veterinary services. Most were in Hargeisa (1,000) and Borama (305). The numbers, however, were misleading, since many of the "farmers


120 Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture and Veterinary Services, 1951.


strongly objected to the registration of their gardens." Consequently, the attempt to systematically register farms, particularly in Borama, was "temporarily abandoned." Overall, a "real and beneficial land-hunger" irresistibly increased the number of farms. By 1954, about 154,000 acres were under cultivation in the western districts of Borama and Hargeisa alone, and vegetable gardens flourished in all the towns. And by 1957 a "feverish land grabbing" or a closure movement took place in the country as a whole, and in the western districts in particular. As the Chief Secretary put it, the enclosure movement was due in part "to a desire to produce more food... but the almost hysterical nature of grabbing is due to the fear that if a piece of land is not cleared and/or enclosed some one else will do so."

The development of the fishing industry was, moreover, a top priority of the administration. In 1946 a Fisheries Survey was produced; in 1950 a fisheries officer was appointed; and in 1951, Dr. Hickling, the Fisheries Advisor to the Colonial Office, visited the protectorate. Dr. Hickling recommended the expansion and encouragement of the fishing industry. He maintained that the fishing industry would have a good market in the Gulf of Aden, Ethiopia, Europe, and the United States. There was already a "small commercial cannery" in the

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123 Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture and Veterinary Services, 1951.

124 Ibid.


126 PRO, C.O.830/15, Memorandum by the Honourable the Acting Chief Secretary, 9 August 1957.

127 Ibid.
The protectorate which produced tunny, and which if "produced in large quantities" would find buyers in the international market.\footnote{Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture and Veterinary Services, 1951.} Even the local market for fish was increasing in both Berbera and Hargeisa at the end of 1951. A Somali merchant bought fish directly from fishermen and then sent it packed in ice to his Hargeisa shop, from where "distribution to all communities (was)...made."\footnote{Ibid.} The administration, moreover, acquired an eight ton, twenty-eight feet long fishing boat—the "Steadfast"—which increased the supply of fish in the local market, and also acted as an "essential reconnaissance" tool for the discovery of the good areas for fishing along the coast of Somaliland.

The improvement of the animal husbandry industry, furthermore, was given a special emphasis, since the great majority of the rural population were pastoralists, and since the main exports of the country were livestock and livestock products. But as the 1951 agricultural and veterinary report stated, the Somali had "less to learn than might be expected"\footnote{Ibid.} about animal husbandry. Veterinary officers, nonetheless, instructed the nomads about how to protect the environment. They also emphasised the prevention and cure of animal diseases "in order to make more animals available for internal use and export."\footnote{"Policy Statement," War Somali Sidihii (1953).} And so veterinary officers stressed the treatment of livestock against various diseases such as trypanosomiasis, skin diseases,
ectoparasites, goat viruses, and rabies. The department even waged a campaign of poisoning against pie-dogs, jackals, and hyenas which were the source of a rabies breakout in 1951.

The department also built sheep dips throughout the country, and vaccinated animals against various diseases such as anthrax. The department, in addition, built artificial shallow ponds in places where the grazing was not fully utilized.\textsuperscript{132} "The project as originally conceived," wrote Margaret Laurence, "was to have provided a chain of reservoirs to catch and hold water along most of the southern boundary of the Protectorate."\textsuperscript{133} And in 1957 an extensive colonial development and welfare scheme was started for the development of water supplies in the rural areas.\textsuperscript{134} The Rural Water Supply section of the department of public works augmented the number of water tanks in the southern border of the territory, first begun in 1951, as Margaret Laurence pointed out. By 1958, the "permanent inhabitants of the villages along the boundary (with Ethiopia) soon realised the commercial value of conserving water (by building cement water tanks) and there are now several hundred of these tanks" each capable of holding 10,000 gallons of water.\textsuperscript{135} Veterinary officers and the "development officer" also encouraged traders to penetrate the rural economy, and to buy livestock direct from the primary producers. The Advisory Development Board which had British and Somali members acted as the means

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Margaret Laurence, \textit{The Prophet's Camel Bell} (1963, repr., Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), p.139. (Her husband, C. J. Martin, was responsible for the construction of water reservoirs in the Haud.)
\item \textsuperscript{134} \textit{Annual Report on the Somaliland Protectorate, 1956 and 1957}, p.37.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Colonial Office. \textit{Annual Report of the Medical Department}, 1958.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
through which the administration urged traders to expand their activities in the interior. All of these activities popularised the department, and veterinary officers were "met at every place by demands for more and more antypol, more rinderpest vaccination, more poison for vermin, more staff to carry out these benefits." The department, what is more, used propaganda and demonstration in the improvement of the skin and hides industry. A specialist in this industry—Mr. Carline—was appointed in 1951. His main concern was to instruct Somalis in modern flaying and dying methods in the production of skins and hides, and to encourage the use of pesticides during storage. The new method stressed the production of "cased-skins in which the belly-fold has been pulled outwards and the udder or scrotal areas and the naval have been excised prior to drying." The object was "to reduce the amount of demerstes (skin disease) damage." The officer continuously travelled the countryside on "instructional tours." He used mobile cinema, lectures, demonstrations, and posters to instruct the people about the new methods for the flaying and dying of skins. He succeeded in persuading the people to adopt the new flaying and dying methods. The 1951 agriculture and veterinary report stated that in all the "larger stations" skins were prepared under the new method, and that "an excellent start has been made in winning the confidence of all

136 See, PRO, C.O.830/25.

137 Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture and Veterinary Services, 1951.

138 Ibid.

sections of the community that deal in skins."\(^{140}\) Mr. Carline also encouraged traders to "employ mobile skin buyers operating in the interior of the country and dealing direct with the primary producers."\(^{141}\) The Development Advisory Board played an important role in persuading the traders to be more aggressive in buying goods direct from producers. In cooperation with the Colonial Development Corporation, in addition, Mr. Carline sent samples of camel skins to England in order to ascertain the "economics of this trade" overseas, and particularly in the United Kingdom.

Meanwhile, the various government initiatives that targeted the animal husbandry industry, and propelled merchant capital to more effectively penetrate the local market, succeeded in stimulating the export of livestock and livestock products during the war and thereafter.

### Table 6.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan-Dec 1943</th>
<th>Jan-Dec 1942</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skins</td>
<td>1,866,698</td>
<td>1,182,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camel and Cattle</td>
<td>21,695</td>
<td>19,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep and Goats</td>
<td>245,932</td>
<td>276,292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{140}\) Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture and Veterinary Services, 1951.

\(^{141}\) Annual Review of the Development Plan, 1953.
The number of livestock exported in 1942-1943, was much higher than the number of livestock exported in any year in the early colonial period. (Compare Table 6.8 and Table 6.12.) To a great extent, the sharp rise in the number of livestock exported in 1942 and 1943, was not surprising since during 1940-1941, livestock was not exported at all due to the Italian occupation of the country, and the British blockade of the Somaliland ports. Nevertheless, the rise in livestock exports became a trend that continued throughout the late colonial period. From 1944 to 1946, the number of sheep and goats exported slightly declined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of Livestock and Skins and Hides Exported, 1944-1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1944</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,791,979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRO, C.O.830/5/15713, 1946.

But from 1947 to 1951, the export of livestock and livestock products increased in quantity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of Livestock and Stock Products Exported, 1947-1951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1947</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides and Skins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
And from 1956 to 1959, the number of sheep, goat, hides and skins exported increased even more dramatically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Live-stock</th>
<th>109,194</th>
<th>113,861</th>
<th>135,915</th>
<th>119,610</th>
<th>137,755</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


The various community development projects, in sum, succeeded in stimulating exports of local industries, and in particular, of the animal husbandry industry. Thus by 1959, more than 400,000 sheep and goats were exported from the country. In reality an even larger quantity of local primary products were smuggled out of the country and exported from Djibouti, or from small ports in the Makhir coast which were officially closed and which had no customs officers, such as Shallcow, Karin and Raguda. For example, the sharp drop in the exports of hides and skins in 1949 (Table 6.13), was due in part to the fact that a "certain number of skins have been

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**Table 6.14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of livestock and Stock Products Exported, 1956-1959</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goat Skins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep Skins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

smuggled out of the territory. Exports of other products increased as well. The 1952 annual trade report, for instance, mentioned such other exports as intestines, bones, cattle, camels, meat preserved in ghee (muqmad), fruits, vegetables, firewood, lumber, guano, iron steel scrap, tallow, rope, manufactured articles, aromatic products, ghee, mother-of-pearl, salt, fish, jowari, and maize. Most of the fish was exported to Somalia, Dijibouti, and Saudi Arabia; jowari and maize was exported to Dijibouti; iron steel scrap to Aden. The overall value of exports of imports increased from £712,234 in 1942 to £6,433,303 in 1959.

The administration also sought to increase the involvement of Somali traders in the import business which during the war was taken over by the government and foreign concerns. During the war, necessities were strictly rationed throughout the colonial empire, and Somaliland received its quota of supplies (Table 6.15) through Middle East Supply Control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Quota</th>
<th>Dec. 1943</th>
<th>Dec. 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>100 Tons</td>
<td>500 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>200 Tons</td>
<td>420 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>18 Tons</td>
<td>37 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>5 Tons</td>
<td>8 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey Sheeting</td>
<td>67 Bales</td>
<td>93 Bales</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


143 PRO, C.O.830/6, Annual Trade Report of Somaliland Protectorate, 1952.

The government then resold the commodities to local traders. In 1943, the government made a net profit of £55,000 from the sale of food.\footnote{Annual Report on the Administration of British Somaliland, 1943.} In the post-war period, the government continued to maintain control over imports. Its object was to control inflation, and to create centralized markets.\footnote{The creation of a centralized markets was the ambition of the administration in the 1930's, as discussed above. The idea was to concentrate capital in the markets, encourage merchants to penetrate the rural economy, and increase exports.} It used four means in effecting such a policy.

First, the government closed all the ports except Zeila and Berbera. All imports, which the government acquired through the Middle East Supply Control during the war, came only through these ports, and mostly through Berbera, because of its excellent harbour, its central geographical location, and its proximity to Hargeisa—the capital of the country. Second, in the post-1944 period, imports were not acquired through the Middle East Supply Control, but through merchants who were given contracts to import only essential commodities. The administration organized the control-release system of imports in cooperation with the colonial government in Aden. A merchant in Aden was given a contract in each quarter of each year to import certain commodity or commodities. The commodities were then redistributed to merchants. Third, the government demanded that all those who would redistribute imported goods in the country to acquire a license. Fourth, in order to ensure that "only serious and
responsible people engage in trade,"\textsuperscript{147} the government imposed high fees for the acquisition of the trading license. All of these restrictions succeeded in concentrating capital in the towns. But they also reduced the involvement of Somali traders in the import business. Thus in 1944 out of sixty registered importers, only thirty-five were Somali.\textsuperscript{148}

The administration attempted to remedy that situation and "enable native interests to participate to an increased degree in the trading enterprise of their country, with especial reference to the import trade."\textsuperscript{149} Despite the intentions of the administration to increase the involvement of the Somali traders in the import business, the government pussyfooted on the issue. The administration was simply unwilling to end its controls over the import business for three reasons. First, it gained authority over a growing sector of the economy, and even entered the transport business. Second, it was anxious to establish central markets that would make possible the increase of exports. Third, it succeeded in increasing Britain's share of the trade of the country from 23.3\% in 1938 to 37\% in 1956\textsuperscript{150} through the control-release system. All of these interests gave the administration a stake in maintaining its control over the import trade, price setting policies, and transport. As a member of the Protectorate Advisory Council complained in 1953,

\textsuperscript{147} PRO, C.O.830/4, Military Administration Report, 1945.

\textsuperscript{148} Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.

"It seem(s)...that the trading activities of the country were being steadily taken over by the government. Government transport had replaced civilian transport for the carriage of government stores and personnel; order were placed with agents in the U.K. instead of through local traders. And the Trades and Supplies Officer was no longer stationed in Berbera--where the big commercial interests were centred."\textsuperscript{151}

But the administration was not interested in merely increasing productivity, or taking over commercial interests, but also in gaining the consent, and cooperation, of the elite and the masses. It sought to establish relations of cooperation with the people in order to make community development feasible,\textsuperscript{152} and in order to popularise colonial rule and produce hegemonic effects. This was of course a central aspect of mass education.\textsuperscript{153} The main institutions that played a key role in soliciting the active support of the people were the district teams, and local community development organizations. The district teams consisted of members of the various departments, which functioned as Regional Development Agencies and District Community Development Agencies.\textsuperscript{154} The district and regional teams also used the radio, mobile cinema, posters, plays, to win over the active cooperation of the people, and disseminate ideas and practices on how to improve the skins industry, expand agricultural production, regenerate and protect grazing and forest area, prevent soil erosion and the spread of stock

\textsuperscript{151} "Encouragement of Local Trade," War Somali Sidiihii (1953).

\textsuperscript{152} Note on Economic and Financial Policy in British Somaliland, 1950.

\textsuperscript{153} "Community Development," Corona, (March 1949). (Unsigned article.)

\textsuperscript{154} R. N. Ablett, "Community Development in the Former Somaliland," p.141.
diseases, and build earth-banks. The teams thus acted as mentors, guides, and teachers of technique and skills.\textsuperscript{155}

All of these activities on the one hand succeeded in winning the confidence and cooperation of the people and popularised the government, and on the other intensified the quotidian processes of colonial controls over the society--over the migration patterns of pastoralists, over the productivity and method of production of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, over the import trade, over the transport trade, and over the trading community through the licensing system--and increased the production of local industries. In sum, they used "persuasive means, the quotidian processes of hegemony--very often creative, inventive, interesting, and above all executive."\textsuperscript{156}

\textbf{Community Development and Uneven Development, 1941-1960}

Community development intensified the quotidian processes of control over the people, popularised the government, and stimulated economic growth. Both exports and imports increased dramatically. But economic growth benefited the urban commercial elite rather than the rural population, and led to urban growth and rural decline. First, community development made the people vulnerable to the exigencies and ravages of the market place, as it facilitated the conquest of merchant capital over rural resources. Second, the rural economy, and the purchasing

\textsuperscript{155} Policy Statement, July 1953.

power of the rural population, were weakened by inflation induced by the control-release system of imports (Table 6.11). Third, the cost of living in the rural areas increased dramatically while the purchasing power of rural producers declined. Fourth, various natural disasters—the droughts of 1934, 1948, 1950-1951, 1956, and 1959—weakened the rural economy, reduced the purchasing power of the rural population, and increased pauperism.

Government controls over the import business created inflationary conditions in the rural economy, and reduced the purchasing power of the rural population. As pointed out above, the government during the war and in the post-1944 period, controlled the import trade through the control-release system. In the post-1944 period, traders bought the commodities at controlled prices, which they were expected to sell at controlled prices set by the government. The government, in essence, established price controls over commerce in the country. The government made the system public in order to discourage merchants from over charging consumers in the towns and the interior. The government even encouraged people to report on any merchant who sold above the controlled price. But the system became "ineffective owing to the lack of cooperation of the consumer in coming forward with information." The traders ignored the controlled prices, and sold commodities at the highest possible price. Since during the war commodities were scarce and often limited (Table 6.15), the powerful traders made huge profits, and essentially, fomented inflation in the rural economy. Consequently, "normal trade" in the interior of all the districts, came to a halt. In the Erigavo district, for instance, normal trade

"became practically non-existent," and as a result prices increased dramatically. As the report on pauperism put it, sufficient food supplies were not available in the coastal areas of Erigavo "at reasonable price for the rationing of the gum collectors." The reduction in the available commodities as Table 6.12 so graphically illustrates, led to an "increase (in) the controlled price of most of our commodities during the first six months of the year (1943)," and to the rise in the cost of living in both the rural and urban areas.

On 26 August 1942, a cost of living indices for the towns (A) and the rural areas (B) was compiled which was fixed at 100 for each. Within four months these "indices rose to 115 and in January 1943 index "A" had advanced to 126 while index "B" to as much as 131." The report added that "(t)hese advances were due to the increases in the controlled prices of both rice and cloth, which became necessary as the result of similar increases in Aden." By the end of 1943, "index "A" had increased to 148 and index "B" to 146." 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
The upward movement of the cost of living in the rural and urban areas was a reflection of the sharp "increase in the prices of rice, flour, ghee, clothing,"¹⁶² sugar, dates, tea, and other imported commodities during the war.

Table 6.17
Price of Imported Commodities, 1942 and 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Average Price in 1943 in E.A. Shillings</th>
<th>Average Price in 1942 in E.A. Shillings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>Kilo</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour-- Ethiopia:</td>
<td>Kilo</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada:</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India:</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aust.:</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa:</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁶² Ibid.
The trend in the rise of the price of imported goods continued throughout the late colonial period. In most cases, the rise in the price of imported commodities were more 100%. As the following table indicates, the price of flour, sugar, dates, soap, cotton goods, kerosene, tea, and coffee increased dramatically.

### Table 6.18
Average Price of Articles in £, 1939-1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s. d.</td>
<td>s. d.</td>
<td>s. d.</td>
<td>s. d.</td>
<td>s. d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour, per lb.</td>
<td>- 1/2</td>
<td>- 8</td>
<td>- 9</td>
<td>- 9</td>
<td>- 9 1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar per lb.</td>
<td>- 2</td>
<td>- 2 1/2</td>
<td>- 9</td>
<td>1 0</td>
<td>1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea per lb.</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td>1 7 1/2</td>
<td>3 0</td>
<td>3 8</td>
<td>5 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee per Ib.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice per Ib.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates per Ib.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap per Ib.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Long Cloth</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloth per 10 Yd.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene per</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The rise in the price of imported goods, and in the cost of living of the rural population, reduced the purchasing power of the local producers. If in the early colonial period "people from the interior could bring to the town, and sell, a sheep, and with the proceeds buy and take back with them a reasonable quantity of such things as cloth, sugar, dates, or cereal," in the late colonial period the sale of a sheep, or a skin, could not afford them the purchase of anything at all.

The decline in the purchasing power of the rural population was further weakened by the decline in the price of primary products. Hence, although exports increased (Table 6.12, Table 6.13, Table 6.14, Table 6.15), the total value of exports did not increase proportionally (Table 6.16). For instance, at the beginning of the war, the price of skins completely collapsed. The skin trade revived in 1944, and thereafter. But the price of the commodity never recovered its pre-war level. If in the pre-war period the price of one sheep skin—"the world's most famous"—was

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163 Ibid.
Sh.3.0,164 in 1942 sheep skin fetched Sh.0.3 or 0.4. In late 1943, the price of sheep skin rose slightly to Sh.0.39, and continued to revive in 1944. Still, the price of skins rose only to "approximately two shillings for a first rate quality skin."165

The price of livestock, in addition, declined. But the decline in the price of livestock was chequered one. During the war the price of livestock increased to about three times their pre-war level.166 But such increase in the value of livestock were not sustained. By 1956, the price of livestock was declining. The governor, Theodore Pike, referred in 1956 to the "low prices of primary local products,"167 and mainly livestock--the backbone of the economy. The main reason for the decline in the price of stock were the frequent droughts (discussed below) that often forced the people to sell their commodities below the market value. What is more, the surplus capital created as a result of the rise in the export of livestock, skins and hides, accrued not to the primary producer but to local and Adenase traders. "Practically all the entire profits" from exports of livestock, livestock products and aromatic products, as one report put it, accrued to "few local merchants, and merchants in Aden."168

Furthermore, the frequent droughts that plagued the country in 1943, 1948, 1950-51, 1956, and 1959, reduced the purchasing power of the rural population, reduced many people to

164 PRO, W.O.32/13261, Military Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.
165 Ibid.
166 "Report of Committee Enquiring into Pauperism in British Somaliland."
167 PRO, C.O.1015/1153, Governor to Colonial Office, 22 December 1956.
168 "Report of Committee Enquiring into Pauperism in British Somaliland."
destitution, and increased the number of paupers. During the 1943 drought at least 60% of the sheep, goats, and cattle stock, and 10% of the camel stock which included a large population of calves, perished. (Hence the decline of livestock exports between 1944 and 1946 (Table 6.13).) The drought affected the whole country, but most adversely the Borama-Zeila area. It created famine conditions which were aggravated by the scarcity and high cost of imported food, especially Jowari (millet). The scarcity of Jowari which was the "staple diet of the western tribes, who have not got the same resources of stock as those living in other parts of the country" led to extreme famine conditions in Borama-Zeila area. The government responded by organizing relief measures "on an extensive scale in the Borama-Zeila district to starving people." In one day, the government distributed grain to over twenty thousand people in Borama. Milk, vitamins, and food were also distributed in the hospitals at Borama and Zeila to children who suffered from malnutrition and incipient starvation. The government also organized relief measures on small scale in Burao and Berbera.

In 1948, moreover, a drought caused "heavy stock losses" and "great distress" to the people. The government was forced yet again to distribute food to "many people" at a camp near Berbera. And in 1950, a severe drought well known in the Somali traditions as "Siiga Case" (The season of red winds) afflicted the country. The mortality rate of the stock was very high:

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170 Ibid.

about 80% of the stock had been lost.\textsuperscript{172} The drought created "tragic circumstances" and reduced many people to "destitution."\textsuperscript{173} The administration opened relief camps at Erigavo, Burao, Buran, Berbera, and El Afweyn where over 10,000 women and children were given "nourishment and clothing." The government spent in 1950 about £80,000 on relief measures.\textsuperscript{174}

In 1954, in addition, the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement was signed. The agreement transferred control of the Haud and the Reserved Area, which during the war was under British control, to Ethiopia. As a result, pastoralists concentrated their stock in the interior plateau, and the pastures were quickly exhausted. The exhaustion of the pastures made the 1956 drought very severe. The drought caused "heavy mortality among the sheep and goats and those that remained were too weak to breed for several months."\textsuperscript{175} And though mortality among the camel stock was not very high, nevertheless, they were "too weak to breed in the spring." Consequently, the people experienced "acute distress" which was caused by the reduction of milk supplies which became "virtually non-existent," the rise in the price of grain and other imports, and the fall in the "prices of primary local products."\textsuperscript{176} Finally, in March 1959 a drought affected most of the country, and most severely the Hargeisa district, where water became scarce. The government

\textsuperscript{172} Isabel M. Boothman, "A Historical Survey of the Incidence of Drought in Northern Somalia," p.27.


\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{175} PRO, C.O.1015/1153, Governor to Colonial Office, 22 December 1956.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
responded by transporting water to many areas in its own trucks, and by hiring privately owned trucks to deliver water to needy areas.\footnote{177}

As a result of the various droughts, the soil became thin and the "land lost its vegetational recovery and capacity to support human and animal life."\footnote{178} H. B. Gilliland also stated that overgrazing and "wind erosion" was leading to the deterioration of the environment.\footnote{179} The loss of vegetation was exacerbated by the intensive exploitation of forests by the charcoal industry, and the bad agricultural practices of farmers. The charcoal industry was the concern of people "who had lost their livestock" and who then "resorted to making charcoal by burning live trees and smuggling the charcoal over the border into Ethiopia and Djibouti where it fetched high prices."\footnote{180} The bad agricultural practices of farmers, who indiscriminately cut trees in order to clear the land for cultivation, or who simply cleared the land in order to make a claim over it, led further to the deterioration of the ecology of the country, and reduced the vegetational recovery of the land.


\footnote{178} Annual Report of the Administration of British Somaliland, 1943.


\footnote{180} R. N. Ablett, "Community Development in the Former British Somaliland," p.139.
The rise in the cost of living, the decline in the price of locally produced commodities, the inability of primary producers to profit from their own labour, and the frequent occurrence of droughts created "acute distress" among the rural population, weakened the rural economy, and increased the number of the poor. The report on pauperism stated that each drought rendered "great numbers of people...rapidly destitute." More often than not, new paupers abandoned the rural areas and moved to the towns. What made their migration inevitable was not merely their poverty, but also the decline of the traditional custom of helping out poor relatives, which was known as "Goyn" (literally the giving of a share of one's stock to a poor kin.) If in the pre-colonial and early colonial periods, the rich stock owner was essentially a "wealthy capitalist owning what (was)...in effect a communal herd," then in the late colonial period the rich stock owner became a "wealthy capitalist" owning what was in effect a private herd unavailable for communal redistribution. They even began increasingly, as they did in the 1930s, to sell their stock, and reinvest their wealth in commerce in the towns. The dramatic changes in the economy and customs of the rural population, in sum, forced paupers to move to the town. In essence, the migration of people from the interior to the towns was a reflection of the decline of "tribal nomadism" as John Hunt put it, which was increasing replaced "by other modes of life."

181 Governor to Colonial Office, 22 December 1956.
182 "Report of Committee Enquiring into Pauperism in British Somaliland."
183 "Report of Committee Enquiring into Pauperism in British Somaliland."
The other modes of life that increasingly replaced "tribal nomadism" were commerce, urban life, wage labour, and migration overseas. The most important new development though was commerce in the urban centres, which expanded dramatically in the late colonial period. Two factors played a key role in the spatial expansion of the towns, and the growth of the urban economy. First, the government made heavy capital investments in the towns. Second, the towns became centralized markets, and financial centres.

The administration made heavy capital investment in public works of various sorts in the towns such as offices, hospitals, schools, training centres, piped water, electricity, libraries, stores, roads, a modern harbour at Berbera, houses, prisons, custom houses, police stations, barracks, garages, courts, armour houses, to mention a few. As chapters three, four, and five made clear, after all, most services—medical, educational, and administrative—were concentrated in the towns. Such investments were made in most towns, but more particularly, in the main towns—Hargeisa, Berbera, and Burao.

The administration also transformed the towns into centralized markets. The control-release system of imports made them centralized markets of exchange, which they never were in the pre-colonial period, and hardly in the early colonial period. Although the "powerful traders,"186 as John Hunt described them, often complained about the role played by the administration in the import and transport businesses, nevertheless, they made large profits during the late colonial period, as a result of the control-release system itself. They then re-invested their profits not in the rural economy, but in the towns: in warehouses, hotels,

186 John Hunt, General Survey, p.121.
restaurants, teas-shops, retail shops, and houses. The investment of the rich stock owners in the urban economy also boosted the commerce of the urban centres. The administration, what is more, extended loans to the commercial elite from the Revolving Loans Fund established in March 1958 in cooperation between the Treasury and the American International Cooperation Association. The funds were established in order to enable the elite to increase "output and productivity in the industrial and agricultural fields."\(^{187}\) The funds loaned to the elite in 1958—£20,000—allowed them to penetrate more effectively the rural economy, and to invest in the towns. All of these activities made the towns important and central markets, and augmented the wealth of the commercial elite, so much so that "(t)he main monetary wealth of the territory (became) concentrated in the hands of the merchants in the towns," and in Hargeisa most of all, which had the "largest circulation of money in the country...and the greatest opportunity of employment."\(^{188}\)

The investment of both the administration and the "powerful traders" in the towns led to the growth of the population of the towns—as more and more paupers migrated in search of employment—and the spatial expansion of the urban centres.

\[\text{Table 6.19}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Town & 1945 & 1949 \\
\hline
Berbera & 798 & 1,905 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}\]


\(^{188}\) Report of Committee Enquiring into Pauperism in British Somaliland.
The expansion of the towns continued from 1949 onwards. In 1953, for instance, a bidding war for land in Hargeisa took place that inflated the price of land. Some plots were sold for over Sh.15,000. The cheapest plots were sold for Sh.9,000. Those who were waging the bidding war for land in Hargeisa were the traders and "men who earned their money abroad." The 1956-57 report, moreover, referred to the "rapid expansion of Burao township." The population of the towns also increased dramatically. The population of Hargeisa, for instance, reached 40,000 in 1948, while that of Berbera reached 20,000. The population of Burao also

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190 Ibid. (Aden, and England mainly.)


increased to the same extent. The population of the towns, in addition, became a permanent one. The 1953 policy statement referred to the development of a marked division of the people into two classes, "permanent townspeople, and the rural population."

Community development, in sum, intensified the processes of uneven development that began in the early colonial period. Moreover, community development reinforced colonial control over the rural and urban population. It allowed the administration to control a substantial and very important aspect of the economy of the country, and organize and supervise the movement of the pastoralists through the reserve grazing system which brought about a situation whereby the pastoralists were always in an area "whose development was planned" as H. B. Gilliand put it. Furthermore, community development and propaganda on the one hand increased productivity, and on the other won over the confidence and active cooperation of the public whether the rural population or the urban elite. All of these community development activities undertaken within the general framework of mass education reinforced colonial rule and colonial cultural hegemony.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONTESTING COLONIAL HEGEMONY: THE ELITE

In the post-Sayyid period, an elite emerged in Somaliland that was completely different in make-up, social background, and ideology from the traditional elite. The basis of power of the old elite over their followers was traditional political culture, that is, traditional nomadic humanism. As discussed in chapter two, the power of the elite—"big men"—over followers was based on poetic talent, oratory, wealth in livestock, strength of personality, ability to lead men in battle and in judicial deliberations, and strict observance of the pastoral ethic—hospitality, piety, and generosity. They were an "organic" elite—organic to the culture, and economy of the society. Their power, thus, was made and remade constantly "through personal interaction."¹ In the post-Sayyid period, however, a new elite gradually emerged whose power was based not on the traditional political culture, but on urban wealth, western education, and association with the colonial regime—that is, government employment and service. The power of the new elite was thus based on abstractions that were far removed from nomadic humanism or nomadic economy. There was, in short, a radical discontinuity in the nature of the old (organic) elite and new (inorganic) elite.

The bulk of the elite emerged in the towns—Hargeisa, Berbera, Burao, as discussed in chapter six, in the 1930s. They consisted of a "middling sort of people"—traders, entrepreneurs, government workers and servants. Only a very small percent of the middling sort of people were

"comparatively rich."² The majority were, therefore, people who were either on the margins of the new class in terms of wealth, or just well-off, i.e., people who owned small retail shops, or teas-shops, or restaurants, or bath-houses, or motor vehicles. A substantial number of the new middling sort of people in towns were rich livestock owners who lost confidence in the traditional economy, sold their livestock, and re-invested the proceeds from the sale in the towns: in commerce, in motor vehicles, and real estate.³ The growth of the towns, and the emergence of a "comparatively rich" core as well as a large number of entrepreneurs, created a new "spirit of cohesion amongst the town-dwelling Somalis"⁴ defined by a commonality of interests, upbringing, and even education. Such a new spirit of cohesion among the town-dwellers, and particularly among the elite, in other words, reflected the "new way of life (that) developed"⁵ in the urban centres.

Often the most politically active and prominent of the new elite were those who worked for the government. They were better educated than the merchants, or were viewed simply as having political (i.e. government) experience, such as Ressalder Major Musa Farah, Ressalder Haroun Ali, Mohamoud Ahmed Ali, Yusuf Haji Adan, and Haji Farah Oomaar. Ressalder Major Musa Farah (well known as Ina Igarre), worked for the administration for most of his life. He

³ Ibid.,p.29.
⁴ Ibid.
began as a constable in the Aden Police in 1884, and by 1916 was the Chief Native Assistant in the whole protectorate. He was "utilized both in a Political and Military capacity."6 In 1916 Commissioner G. F. Archer recommended him as "the most distinguished, courageous and loyal native official which it has been my privilege to meet during fifteen years service in Africa."7

Another very prominent figure was Haji Farah Oomaar. Haji Farah Oomaar was born in Aden, finished his high school studies there, went for further studies to India, and joined the colonial civil service during the First World War. He resigned from the civil service in 1921 in order to pursue commercial interests. He quickly became a "wealthy merchant."8 He also quickly became active in the protectorate. He was "one of the small elite...to play an active role and had plenty of time for politics."9 He pressed the government to begin the reconstruction of the country in the 1920s. At first the government welcomed his enthusiastic support for the modernization of the society. For Oomaar's arguments and government plans dovetailed.

The administration itself planned to establish various civil institutions—medical, educational, and political—and devised many economic development plans. The aim of the government in focusing its attention after the defeat of the Sayyid on the development and modernization of the country, was to weaken the anti-colonial legacy of the Sayyid, make the

6  India Record Office: L/MIL/7/14634, "Testimonial Presented by General Swayne to Ressalder Major Musa Farah on the 16th June 1905."

7  India Record Office: L/MIL/7/14634, Archer to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2 March 1916.


9  Ibid.
territory more self-sustaining and profitable, win over the confidence of the people, and establish a "far better relationship" between the people and the British administration, as Sir Gerald Summers stated in 1924.\textsuperscript{10} The government attempted to finance the development projects by raising taxes. This was forced on the government by the Imperial Treasury. The Treasury insisted that before any financing was approved for development projects, local sources of revenue must be found, that is, taxation must be imposed on the local population. The government then imposed stock tax on the people in 1920. The government, however, quickly abandoned the taxation plan as a result of the opposition of the people.\textsuperscript{11}

Once the government dropped its ambitious development plans, Haji Farah Oomaar's enthusiastic support for the modernization of the society became an embarrassment, rather than an asset, for the administration. The government then exiled Haji Farah Oomaar to Aden. At Aden he became "more active."\textsuperscript{12} In 1927, he established in Aden the Somali Islamic Association. The association, however, "was not a political club."\textsuperscript{13} The main objective of the organization, therefore, was neither the overthrow of the colonial regime, nor the establishment of an Islamic state. The main objective of the organization was to force the British administration

\textsuperscript{10} Oxford University, Rhodes House Library, MSS.AFR.S.905, "Memorandum on Political Affairs in the Somaliland Protectorate" Compiled from Various Reports by the Office of Intelligence and Security, Hargeisa, November 1952.

\textsuperscript{11} See chapter six.

\textsuperscript{12} Mohamed Sh. I. Hujaleh, \textit{All in the Family}, p.9.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
and the colonial office to modernize the society, develop its economic resources, and establish western schools.

There was nothing surprising about the modernist tendencies and programmes of the Somali Islamic Association. According to Albert Hourani, throughout the Muslim world as early as the nineteenth century, there arose what he called "Islamic modernists."¹⁴ Such modernists accepted the validity and importance of western education, ideas of statecraft, science, technology, and principles of economic organization. They even resolved any contradictions between Islamic traditions and European modernity. "Islam" they believed, "was not only compatible with reason, progress and social solidarity, the bases of modern civilization; if properly interpreted, it positively enjoined them."¹⁵ "Islamic modernists" in Somaliland in the early colonial period who subscribed to similar ideas, were not, therefore, anti-imperialists. They attempted rather to "emulate modern European ways to modernize the society according to what was perceived as European advancement,"¹⁶ traditions, and attitudes. The Islamic modernists, as such then, were men who reached for their pen, rather than for their knife, when they heard talk of western culture. They accepted western modernity—western scientific thought, principles of economic organization, and the superiority of European traditions of statecraft, technology, art, and government—as valid and universal experience that must, and could be, applied to

¹⁵ Ibid.
Somaliland. They accepted, in essence, the hegemonic values and ideas of the colonizer: development, modernization, education, and progress.

The Somali Islamic Association, therefore, was not, as Ahmed Samatar awkwardly argued, the "resuscitator of Somali nationalism." Its main object rather was to transform and modernize Somaliland, and to use the colonial administration as the principle agent of that transformation. The main focus of the organization was to change the policies of what Hajji Farah Oomaar derisively called the "deaf government" of Somaliland. Hajji Oomaar often complained that the purpose of the "deaf government" was "to have no ideas and spend no money" on the territory. He used to send his despatches and critiques of the colonial administration to his agent at Aden, Mr Ismail ("Telephone"), who then relayed the despatches to British papers and members of the British Parliament.

He returned to Somaliland impulsively in 1930. The government arrested, persecuted, and then sentenced him to exile in Socotra, an island in the Indian Ocean. He remained in the island until 1947. His activities, however, were not in vain. He inspired the small elite, or middling sort of people of the towns, to organize various associations in the country in the 1930s. The

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18 PRO, C.O.538/38/46038; PRO, C.O.535/100/5886.


20 Ibid.
object of those organizations, however, was not to "resuscitate" Somali nationalism, but to force
the "deaf government" to improve services, and to "encourage modern education and progress." 21

The first association to emerge in Somaliland was organized by "rich elders" in 1930. 22 It
was called "Jam-iyat Abdirahman Awal" (Association of Abdirahman Awal). It was a tribal
organization (Habr Awal, Isaaq). Among the most important figures in the organization was
Sheikh Yusuf Sheikh Madar—the son of Sheikh Madar: the Founder of Hargeisa; Sheikh Ibrahim
Sheikh Omer Sheikh Madar—the grandson of the Founder of Hargeisa; Ismail Aw Ali (Jirdeh)—
the "Aide de Camp" of the Governor of Somaliland; and Jirdeh Hussein—the richest trader of the
country. The name of the organization was changed a year later to "Al-Jamiyat Al-Ishaqiyeh wa
Manyeleeha" (The Society for Isaaqs and Those Who Conciliate with Them). 23 The main object
of the organization was to improve services in the country. Other organizations were thereafter
established in quick succession: the Hadiyat al-Rahman (Gift of God) (1933), the Khayria
(Blessed Association) (1933), Somali National Society (1935), Jamciyat Al-Itihad Al-Somali Al-
Islami (1936), Somali Officials Union (1937), and the Burao Nadi (Burao Club) (1937). These
organizations, as Mohamed Sh. I. Hujaleh put it, were "not political clubs." A colonial office
report made the same point. It characterized them as "non-political." 24 They were non-political

21 John W. Johnson, Heellooy, Heelleellooy: The Development of the Genre Heello in
22 Mohamed Sh. I. Hujaleh, All in the Family, p.10.
23 Ibid.,p.11.
24 Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Somaliland, 1937,
p.29.
because they were neither nationalist, nor Pan-Somali, nor anti-government. Those who founded them acted more as soldiers of modernity, than as soldiers of nationalism, for they were interested in modernizing the society, and using the colonial government as the principle agent of that process.

The "deaf government", however, remained deaf to the arguments of the new elite. The administration was determined to govern the territory at a minimal cost, and even when it attempted to expand educational services in 1920, 1921, 1930, and 1938, quickly bailed out once the general public expressed opposition to the programme. Moreover, the new elite were unable to win over the confidence of the general public. The rural folk, and the subaltern groups in the towns, referred to them as "Kabacad" (White Shoe, or more exactly, Whiteman's Shoe), a derogatory characterization that signified their extreme imitation of, association with, and subservience to, the white administrators. It was as if the rural folk sensed and understood clearly not merely the cooption of the elite, but also their intellectual dependence on foreign traditions. They were even referred to as "Nasraani" (infidel), because of their close association with the British administrators, and for expressing and advocating the hegemonic values of the colonial rulers. The new elite, then, found itself between a rock and a hard place, so to speak. On the one hand the "deaf government" remained deaf to their enthusiastic support for development and modernization, and on the other hand the people ignored, and often scorned, them.

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26 Ibid.
The efforts of the various associations, clubs, and societies were, nevertheless, not in vain, for they were successful in carving out a new "public sphere," which Jurgen Habermas defined as "the sphere of private people come together as a public." They came together as a public within the limited social matrix of the towns and the various non-political societies and associations they established in the 1930s. It was a public, thus, limited to the townsmen, and the better sort of townsmen, so to speak. (The public sphere in the rural areas in the early colonial period, as discussed in chapter five, was still dominated by the traditional political elite.) It was a public which consisted of "rich elders", government workers, and few educated folks trained in government schools in Aden, Sudan, or Somaliland and thus literate in English and Arabic. It was for the most part a reading public, or at the least had such a reputation.

It was a public unified by common interests in the "new way of life that developed" in the towns. They frequented regularly the new town centres: the large number of coffee shops, restaurants, and "mafrash" (a place where Qat (Catha edulis forsk)—a mild stimulant—was consumed). Qat was a drug with a long history in the Horn of Africa. But hitherto, it was mainly consumed by clerics while reciting the Quran and the Hadith. In the 1930s, however, it


28 Ibid., p.27.

became increasingly the drug of choice of the new elite, because it afforded them the opportunity to talk together informally for long hours about social, political, and personal matters. Qat importation into Hargeisa and Borama alone increased from 1,250 bundles (Marduuf) in 1931 to 3,435 bundles in 1936.30

The Ascendancy of An Elite, 1941-1960

If the public sphere dominated by the "middling sort of people" in the early colonial period was limited to the towns and to a very small number of men, in the late colonial period that public sphere expanded dramatically. This was made possible by four factors. First, the towns grew and so did the permanent population of the towns. Second, commercial activities, and the wealth of the elite, increased.31 Third, the government was determined in the late colonial period to expand services within the framework of mass education, as discussed in chapter three, four, five, and six. Fourth, the government needed in order to expand services, a cooperative elite that could play a "double role."32 One the one hand, to transmit ideas, fresh news, and instruction from the colonial government to the people. On the other hand, to transmit to the government news and information about the reactions of the people towards mass education.


31 See chapter six.

G. T. Fisher complained in 1944 that Somaliland is a country "where there is no written language, and where practically none of the inhabitants have learned to speak, let alone read or write, English."\textsuperscript{33} Only a few are literate. But the majority of the literate class "had a very rudimentary knowledge of Arabic."\textsuperscript{34} The Governor, however, saw a "disadvantage" in that. He reasoned that "with a people as backward as are the Somalis, knowledge of Arabic carries with it a certain odium of religion or superstitious sanctity, which, those who acquire it are not slow to turn to their own personal and financial advantage."\textsuperscript{35} He added, "For these and other political and nationalistic reasons, the Military Governor is opposed to the spread of Arabic beyond what is necessary for the legitimate requirements of a Moslem people."\textsuperscript{36} He concluded "what is required in this country" was a Somali "subordinate staff to understand or communicate order, good sense, or correct information" in English, and then to orally convey to the people "as quickly and efficiently as possible" such "correct news, fresh ideas and instructions."\textsuperscript{37}

But as the Governor quickly found out that there was indeed a small, well trained, and reformist elite who were more than willing to play the double role assigned to them. Colonel F. R. W. Jameson discovered, so to speak, this elite in 1943 while touring the country. He stated that in fact there existed a "younger Somali population...strongly in favour of education and other

\textsuperscript{33} PRO, W.O.32/13261, Military Governor's Note on Somaliland, November 1944.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
reforms." He characterized this educated group as a "healthy material on which we can build." He was referring to the elite that cooperated with the administration, had "plenty of time for politics", called for the modernization of the society, and the establishment of modern services in the 1930s—the "Kabacad" of the subaltern and the rural folk.

As discussed in chapter five, the elite were incorporated into the governing structures of the country in the late colonial period through the various institutions the administration established within the framework of mass education, such as the Protectorate Advisory Council, Legislative Council, Executive Council, Community Development Committees in the districts and regions, Township and District Committees, Local Government Councils, Community Centres, to mention a few. The object of the administration was not only to use the elite to play double role in the governing of the country and the schemes of development, but to also transform the elite into a "new governing class." The "creation" of the new governing class, was not left to chance, however. The administration was anxious to supervise that process. As the 1945 Military Report put it, "very close European supervision will long be necessary if the educated Somali is to be induced to subordinate his personal and tribal aspirations to the good of the community as a whole."

39 Ibid.
40 PRO, C.O.537/3618/15363, Chief Secretary, "Notes in British Somaliland, June 1948."
The elite were incorporated into the governing structures of the society through persuasion. They were anxious to participate in the development and modernization of the country. After all, this was what the elite were demanding from the government in the 1930s. But if in the 1930s, the government was "deaf" to their demands, in the 1940s and 1950s, it was responsive to their demands. Indeed, the concerns of the elite and the government dovetailed in the late colonial period.

The willingness of the elite—the "healthy material"—to participate in the development and modernization of the country was articulated clearly by a petition written by Mohamoud Jama Urdoh, the former Secretary General of the Somali National League (S.N.L.), in 1948. The petition stated that the people of Somaliland, and other Somali territories, are not yet ready for independence. "We do not make," it announced, "any wild claims that we are capable of standing on our feet at this moment, for we know we are not." Since we are incapable of standing on our feet, "we do ask for...assistance in the task of learning to do so."42 The petition called for the continuation of British rule over the country, and the expansion of British private and public investment in trade, education, health, and economic development. The petition called in particular for the acceleration of economic development and modernization. The stress was placed, above all, on the expansion of exports, and development of secondary industries such as leather manufacturing, tanning, meat and fish canning, and date production. "Indeed," the petition concluded, "for many years to come we shall have to depend on outside capital for the

42 PRO, C.O.537/3621, Mohamoud Jama Urdoh, "Somali National League Representing the Somali People in British, French, Ethiopian, and Former Italian Territories, 1948."
gradual economic and industrial development of the country and for the raising of the standard of living of the people."\textsuperscript{43}

As I. M. Lewis pointed out the main concern of the S.N.L. and other nationalist organizations was "to cooperate with the British Government, or with any other body concerned to improve the welfare of the Somali people."\textsuperscript{44} The elite then supported government reforms, and cooperated with the colonial regime in the administration and development of the country. They did so not through coercion but through persuasion. The administration, in essence, established firmly in the late colonial period "one of the most powerful techniques of hegemony: the cooption (through persuasion) of an upper stratum of natives."\textsuperscript{45} It was not by accident that the S.N.L. was described by one report as a "sober society."\textsuperscript{46} By 1951 the elite were "accepted more or less as part of the government,"\textsuperscript{47} and by 1953 were considered as "responsible,"\textsuperscript{48} because they were responsive to, and supportive of, colonial mass education policies.

\textbf{The Elite and Nationalism, 1941-1954}

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Terry Eagleton, \textit{Heathcliff}, p.32.
\textsuperscript{46} PRO, C.O.537/3621, "Commentary on the Memorandum," 1948.
\textsuperscript{47} PRO, C.O.537/7207, Gerald Reece to Sir Philip Mitchell, 22 March 1951.
The elite acted "responsibly" and cooperated with the regime, because they were committed to the modernization and development of the country. But they also contested colonial hegemony, and articulated the "revolt of the East against European supremacy." As with any hegemony, after all, colonial hegemony in British Somaliland was incomplete. For, if to the colonial administrator the native's ontological difference allowed him to assert colonial rule, this difference was also what made his "own foreignness embarrassingly obvious," and the effective "naturalization" of colonial rule impossible. Thus, the white administrators' own inability to naturalize his rule, made the elite's contestation of colonial rule--however much they cooperated with it--inevitable.

Their contestation of colonial rule and hegemony was, nevertheless, ineffective. First, elite resistance was a modernizing resistance. The elite were more concerned about the development of the country than about overthrowing colonial rule. More often than not, they reached for their pen rather for a knife when they heard talk of western culture. The elite, in other words, waged no "heroic" action against the colonial regime. Second, elite resistance was weakened from 1941 to 1954 by the people's opposition to the Pan-Somali ideology of elite organizations. Third, the inability of the elite to defend the interests of the people, and win back the disputed territories transferred to Ethiopian control under the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, made nationalist parties profoundly unpopular in the post 1957 period. Fourth, elite nationalist parties were rendered ineffective by tribal antagonism, jealousies, and civil wars. These four factors reduced patriotic nationalism into an empty slogan, and made elite resistance ineffective.

49 Terry Eagleton, Heathcliff, p.241.
Elite resistance was expressed mainly through the politics of identity and difference. On the one hand, the elite stressed the ontological difference between colonizer and colonized, and on the other the common identity of the imagined Somali community, which formed a "homogenous entity", defined by a "strong national and cultural roots of their own, far stronger and firmer than the weedy growths introduced to us through foreign conquest." The petitions give us an insight into the politics of identity of the elite. But that is not all. The petitions also give us an insight into the convergence or overlap between local and international politics. The petitions were written in the 1940s, a period in which the Great Powers were haggling over the disposition of the Italian East African Empire. In 1941, Great Britain conquered the East African Empire, and thus controlled all the area inhabited by Somalis throughout the Horn of Africa. The British were convinced that only through the formation of "Greater Somalia" under British control could all the problems of the Horn of Africa be solved: the control of the migration of the Somali pastoralist, the training of the Somali people for self-government, and the settlement of the "artificial" boundaries that divided the Somali people. Lord Moyne, the Cabinet member resident in Cairo, argued in 1943 that it is "desirable to secure the union of the whole Somali


population under one administration"—preferably, of course, British—for the resolution of various issues. An inter-departmental committee recommended prompt action to bring all the Somali population under one (British) administration. But the War Cabinet argued that such action should await the outcome of final peace settlement in the Horn of Africa.  

In the meantime, the British waged a fierce campaign for the creation of "Greater Somalia" in the international arena, and within the Somali territories, and in particular in Somalia. The focus on Somalia was made necessary by the large number of Italians who owned plantations, had various commercial interests in the country, opposed the continuation of British rule over the country, and the formation of Greater Somalia. In order to inflame Somali nationalism, and anti-Italian feelings in Somalia, the British encouraged the expression of Pan-Somali sentiments and the formation of Pan-Somali parties and associations. Indeed, the British administration of Somalia created the first Pan-Somali party in all the Somali territories: Somali Youth League (S.Y.L.). It was a British officer with the full support of the colonial administration of Somalia who founded the S.Y.L. in Mogadisho, Somalia, in 1943. He named the organization, arranged the first meetings, selected those who would lead it, and wrote its constitution. He made the central tenet of the league the formation of "Greater Somalia." It was a


British officer, then, "who set the idea of the Somali Youth League in motion." A British diplomat, A. C. Kendall, even boasted that it was the British administration of Somalia, that popularised the idea of Greater Somalia among Somalis, and encouraged Somali nationalists in Somalia to make claims over all territories inhabited by Somalis. Of course, A. C. Kendall was exaggerating. As I. M. Lewis pointed out, British policies with respect to "Greater Somalia" helped "foster the concept of Somali federation" but did not invent the idea of the unity of the Somali people. Nonetheless, the British encouraged the expression of Pan-Somali ideas; and did so not as a "benevolent onlooker" but as an interested party.

The Soviet Union, Italy, Ethiopia, France, and the United States, however, opposed the formation of "Greater Somalia." Such opposition forced Great Britain to finally drop the plan in 1949. Frustrated, the British Foreign Secretary, maintained that the day he killed the Greater Somalia plan was a day of "very considerable progress." But by then a "very considerable progress" was made by the idea of "Greater Somalia" in both Somaliland and Somalia. Indeed,

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62 Quoted in PRO, C.O.1015/684, Mr. Gorell Barnes, 1956.
British support for the nationalist movement in Somalia, spurred the elite in Somaliland to form "various societies with nationalistic aims" between 1945 and 1948. Even the Somali National Society which was formed in 1935 was transformed into a political party in 1945: the Somali National League (S.N.L.). The "programmes of all the national parties" and societies in the country focused in the 1940s not so much on independence but on the formation of Greater Somalia under British control.

But, ironically, it was the elite's single-minded focus on Pan-Somalism that made nationalist parties unpopular in Somaliland from 1945 to 1954. As one colonial report put it, the extreme obsession of elite organizations, such as the S.N.L.—the "most influential"—on the "project of a greater Somaliland to include Somalia and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya" led to the decline of "local interest in these societies" and parties by 1948. Unlike the elite, "others, probably the majority (of the people of Somaliland), see in this (Greater Somalia) a plot to subordinate the interests and the dignity of the Isaakia (Isaak) Somalis of the Protectorate to those of the Darod (Darood) and other tribes of Somalia." The report concluded, "I think that British Somalis are generally opposed to a Greater Somalia."

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64 I. M. Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, p.270.


66 PRO, C.O.537/3641, "Somali National Societies": Military Governor, Hargeisa, to Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Nairobi, 10 July 1947.

67 Ibid.
The fear of Darood domination, or more exactly, tribal jealousy, was central to the opposition of the public to the programme and plan of Greater Somalia. The elite of Somaliland was not immune from such fear or jealousy. Indeed, the formation of the S.N.L. in 1945 was precipitated by two things: Pan-Somali nationalist fervour, and tribal jealousy and fear of the S.Y.L.--a predominantly Darood organization. As one report put it, "Fear of its (S.Y.L.) dominance and consequently the dominance of the Darod (Darood) spurred the formation of the Somali National League, a society predominantly Isahaq (Isaaq) and originally founded as a Nadi, a Moslem brotherhood." But it was not just tribal jealousy and fear that doomed Pan-nationalist parties in Somaliland, for the opposition of the traders in Somaliland also played a role in making Pan-Somalism an unpopular ideology and programme. The traders felt that they had "few interests" in Somalia, and "fear(ed) that an amalgamation of territories would disturb their trade connections with Aden and the Arabian ports, and be diverted to Mogadishu."

Such opposition—from the trading class and from the general public—to Pan-Somalism, and to the idea of Greater Somalia, was expressed openly in June 1947. A "large gathering of Isaakia tribesmen at Hargeisa" denounced the Pan-Somali programme of the S.N.L. and S.Y.L. as a "treacherous attempt to East Africanise British Somaliland," subject the interests of the Isaaq to that of the Darood in Italian Somalia, and divert trade to Mogadisho. Immediately after,

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68 Oxford University, Rhodes House Library, MSS.AFR.S.905, Office of the Director of Intelligence and Security, "Political Affairs in the Somaliland Protectorate," November 1952.


70 PRO, C.O.537/7641, A Note in Native Societies in the Somalilands, 27 June 1947.
a new organization was formed: the United Brethren Society (U.S.B.). The U.S.B. was anti-Greater Somalia. That was probably the only thing that united its members. Its main objective was to preserve Somaliland as a political entity, and to prevent its absorption by Somalia. The society was so popular that by late June "many (members) of the Somali National League have already transferred" to the new organization.\(^1\) Because of the popularity of the U.S.B., the government assumed that the new "society is likely to become the most powerful political group in British Somaliland."\(^2\) The S.N.L. reacted quickly to the decline of its popularity and toned down its Pan-nationalist rhetoric. Not only that, the Central Committee of the S.N.L. dismissed Mohamoud Jama Urdoh from his post as the Secretary-General of the organization in August 1947 for his pro-Greater Somalia ideas, and for supporting a "proposed goodwill mission to Somalia."\(^3\)

Consequently, from 1947 to 1954, the main nationalist organizations in Somaliland became politically marginal as they lost mass support to the U.S.B. By 1948 Gerald Reece described the S.N.L. as consisting of a small group of "articulate" young men with "mature ideas,"\(^4\) but with no mass support. He described the political climate of Somaliland as "calm."\(^5\)

\(^1\) Ibid.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) PRO, C.O.537/3621, "Extract From British Somaliland Monthly Political Intelligence Report for August 1947." (Urdoh, nonetheless, remained active in the organization until 1957.)

\(^4\) PRO, C.O.537/3618, "Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Secretary of the State's Room at 11.40 A.M. on Thursday, 30 November 1948."

\(^5\) Ibid.
By 1952, the S.N.L. was confined to Burao, and its membership became even smaller. They were described by an intelligence report as a small "stable element" with good "ideals", presumably because they were pro-government, and responsible.\footnote{Office of the Director of Intelligence and Security, "Political Affairs in the Somaliland Protectorate," November 1952.} The only political organization with popular support was the U.S.B. But the U.S.B. was a very conservative society. Its two main objective were, first, to fight and weaken Pan-Somali nationalism, and second, to play a role in the development and modernization of the society. The leaders of the society, in other words, acted and functioned as anti-Pan-Somalists, and as committed soldiers of modernity. They did not attempt to take any political action against the colonial regime. They viewed it rather as an important agent and ally in the development and modernization of the society. The "calm" political climate of Somaliland in 1948--to which Gerald Reece referred--was thus due to the decline in the popularity of the major Pan-nationalist parties, and the unwillingness of the U.S.B. to challenge and contest colonial hegemony.

\textbf{The Elite and Nationalism, 1954-1957}

The fortunes of the nationalist organizations, and in particular those with pan-Somali leanings, such as the S.N.L. and the S.Y.L., brightened in 1954. A "great calamity" which took place in 1954 turned out to be the elite's "greatest blessing."\footnote{"Michael Mariano Broadcasts," \textit{Africa Digest}, vol.111, no.7 (March-April 1956), p.11.} That great calamity was the 1954
Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty under which 25,000 square miles of the territory of Somaliland—the Haud and the Reserved Area—was transferred to Ethiopian control. This event, according to I. M. Lewis, "changed the whole course of political life and led eventually to full independence." The event indeed transformed political life in the country, but it did not lead to full independence. By 1957—as will be discussed below—elite organizations became politically fragmented, and tribally divided, and hence, too weak to wage any effective campaign against colonial rule.

After the transfer of the Haud and the Reserved Area to Ethiopia under the 1954 Treaty, the "Somali public as a whole took action to protest against the handover." The transfer of the disputed territories became a "national issue" which was expressed most forcefully by spontaneous demonstration throughout the protectorate, and by the formation of a new national organization in 1954: The National United Front For Retaining Reserve Area and Haud (N.U.F.R.R.H.). The object of the organization as its name plainly hints at, was the recovery, and the retaining, of the disputed region. It quickly won popular support throughout the territory. The N.U.F. was so popular it "more or less absorbed the Somali Youth League and the Somali

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81 It was an organization, not a party. Hence forth it will be referred to as N.U.F.—the short and more widely known acronym. The N.U.F. became a registered party in 1958.
National League."\(^{82}\) It also absorbed the U.S.B., which in fact completely disappeared thereafter. The organization also attracted a mass following from the rural population. The rural political elite, for instance, supported, and even joined the N.U.F. As Lord Lloyd, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, pointed out, the organization consisted of heterogenous factions united only by the loss of land to Ethiopia:

tribal leaders whose main concern is the restoration of the Haud and the Reserved Area and to whom political advance is on the whole subsidiary. There are the extremists whose main preoccupation like that of the Somali Youth League, is the earliest possible independence regardless of their readiness for it and, finally there are the moderates of whom Michael Mariano is leader, who although just as anxious for independence as the extremists, would probably if left to themselves be rather more reasonable about the method of achieving it and the pace at which it can be achieved.\(^{83}\)

The N.U.F. campaigned for the return of the Haud and the Reserved Area in Somaliland, and abroad. In March 1955, for instance, a delegation which consisted of Michael Mariano, Abokor Haji Farah, and Abdi Dahir went to Mogadisho in order to win the support and cooperation of the nationalist groups in Somalia. And in May 1955, another delegation, visited London and New York. The delegation consisted of two traditional Sultans, and two western educated moderate politicians: Michael Mariano, Abdirahman Ali (Dubeh), Sultan Abdillahi Sultan Deria, and Sultan Bihi Fooley. In their tour of London and New York, they articulated the grievances of the people of Somaliland with respect to the disputed territories, and even raised the issue of the independence of Somaliland.

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In one news conference in London, Michael Mariano, the spokesman of the group, summarized the concerns of the delegation. He stated that since the transfer of the territories we became "guests in our own house" in the Haud and the Reserved Area. He complained most bitterly of course about British role in the whole fiasco. "Our land," he protested, "had been handed (by Great Britain) to Ethiopia on a plate." The group did not just complain. They also asked the British government to make firm commitment for the independence of Somaliland, and association between Somalia and Somaliland. (This was the first time that the nationalist elite in Somaliland called for the independence of Somaliland. Only the S.Y.L. called for such a programme in the pre-1954 period. But the S.Y.L. had little influence in the country.) They, moreover, made veiled threats of violence if their demands were not given due consideration. The "present conditions," stated Michael Mariano, "were the best way to ensure that the people would be demoralized, and to make ripe field for agitators and violence." The group, however, were unable to convince the British government to change its policies with respect to the disputed territories, or the United Nations to hear to its case, or refer the case to the International Court of Justice.

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86 The British government did in fact attempt to return the Haud and the Reserved Area to Somaliland in 1956, as I will discuss in some detail in the last section of chapter eight. But the attempt failed. Ethiopia with the full support of the United States was unwilling to give up the land.
The failure of the delegation to win any concessions from Great Britain was of course humiliating and disheartening to them. But once they returned to Somaliland they talked less about their failure to win back the Haud and Reserved Area, and more about the positive aspects of the whole fiasco. For instance, Michael Mariano, in a speech broadcasted on Radio Hargeisa in March 1956, stated:

"We Somalis know that we are one people. Yet we are divided into several portions as you all know. When Mr. Abokor Haji Farah, Abdi Dahir and I went to Somalia last July to discuss with the leaders of all political parties the grievance of the Somali people regarding the Haud and Reserved Area, it was brought home to us that the interests of the people of the Somaliland Protectorate and that of our brothers of Somalia was one and that we could join hand in a common front...We Somalis should note carefully the decisive lesson which Somalia teaches us. It is that a Government can be established (at the time there was a Legislative Council in Somalia and the date of independence was already set for 1 July 1960) only on a sound foundation of nationalism which subordinates party and tribal loyalties for the common good." \(^{87}\)

He then added that the loss of the Haud and the Reserved Area, though a "great calamity", might turn out to be "our greatest blessing." "It has been the cause," he stated, "of a great political awakening amongst the tribes living in the Protectorate and of those living in disputed territories." It was because of the loss of territories that the people of the country "has acted on a national level" for the first time since the war. \(^{88}\)

The 1954 Treaty without question changed "political life" in the country. It acted as spur to "national action" and created a mass following for the elite. But such support was dependent

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\(^{87}\) "Mr. Mariano Broadcasts," *Africa Digest* vol.111, no.7 (March-April 1956), p.11.

\(^{88}\) Ibid.
on the elite actually defending the interests of the people by recovering the disputed territories. But by 1957, it became clear to the public that the elite were incapable of winning back the disputed territories. Consequently, elite support declined dramatically. As I. M. Lewis pointed out, "When feelings against Ethiopia (and Great Britain) were most bitter the movement received widespread support, but when it failed to obtain the return of the disputed region much S.Y.L. and S.N.L. support was lost."89

The decline in the popularity of the nationalist parties and organizations, alarmed the elite. They responded quickly by organizing a conference in Hargeisa in July 1957. The object of the conference was to formulate new nationalist policies and solutions that might captivate the imagination of the people, and win over their support. The conference was attended by all the nationalist groups and societies in the country. It was not a pleasant conference, however. Indeed, it marked the end of elite cooperation and collaboration. Much of the blame for the failure to win back the disputed region was placed on the shoulders of the N.U.F. It was openly accused of failing to "return the 'Haud and Reserved Area' to the protectorate."90 Many of the delegates, moreover, felt that the N.U.F. concentrated rather narrowly on the disputed territories, and should have also campaigned for the independence of the country.91 In other words, delegated called for the expansion of the objectives of the nationalist movement, i.e., for the recovery of the lost

89 I. M. Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, p.278.
90 Mohamed Sh. I. Hujaleh, All in the Family, p.16.
territories and for "constitutional development and future independence for the protectorate."92

The delegates, in the end, agreed on a four-point policy: "Recovery of the Reserved Area and the Haud; unification of the Somalis; independence within a Commonwealth; and peace between the tribes."93

Although the elite agreed on a common policy, nevertheless, both the S.Y.L., and the S.N.L., withdrew from the N.U.F. The cooperation of the elite and the parties came, thus, to a sudden end. Elite cooperation, in essence, was short-lived.94 It lasted from 1954 to 1957--the period in which the popularity of nationalist organizations was at its highest. Thereafter, each party and association pursued the policies agreed upon in the conference in its own partisan fashion. Consequently, elite organizations began to savagely attack, and oppose, one other. The failure to win back the Haud and the Reserved Area, and the decline in the popularity of nationalist organizations, precipitated the breakdown of elite cooperation and solidarity. That breakdown was further aggravated by the competition among the parties for seats in, and control over, municipal and national institutions: the Legislative Council (1958, 1959, and 1960), Local Government Councils (in which usually fifteen members were elected in each district headquarters), and various other municipal institutions such as Township and District Committees, and Education Committees.

92 Mohamed Sh. I. Hujaleh, All in the Family, p.16.


94 Mohamed Sh. I. Hujaleh, All in the Family, p.16.
The competition and antagonism between the nationalist parties was neither based, nor driven, by deep ideological differences. The elite, after all, agreed on a common policy in 1957. Moreover, they cooperated with the administration in the development of the society. They acted often as the best and most credible advocates of mass education. The combination of the decline of popular support for the nationalist parties, the competition among the parties for seats in various national and municipal institutions, and the complete lack of any ideological differences that distinguished one party from another, brought to the fore what had been the unconscious of Somali politics throughout the twentieth century—tribal antagonism.95

The spark, though, that brought such politics to the open in the late colonial period was not the breakdown of elite cooperation in 1957, but the 1954 and 1955 tribal civil wars. The first major tribal civil war in the late colonial period, erupted between the Habr Jeclo (Isaaq) and Dhulbahante (Darood) in late 1954. The civil war created what one Somali writer called an "unhappy feeling in the Ain Valley (Erigavo District)."96 The immediate cause of the war was camel rustling perpetrated by the famous Dhulbahante warrior, Ali Guun. The camel rustling perpetrated by Ali Guun was however a bloody affair. In the first few engagements, 21 men of

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95 See chapter two and five for a discussion on the various ways that tribal identity and solidarity became hardened in Somaliland during the early colonial period.

the Habr Jeclo and 14 men of the Dhulbahante were killed. That inflamed tribal feelings on both sides, and precipitated an all-out tribal conflict between the Habr Jeclo and the Dhulbahante.

The death of Ali Guun, the Dhulbahabante war leader, in Ban Cade, a plain between Garadag and Hudun--an event vengefully noted in a poem by the great Somali poet Digaale Jama (Dabadhige)--turned the tide against the Dhulbahante. Soon the actual war was fought in an area further south of Las Anod. A Habr Jeclo poet noted the geography of the war. He said:

Dadku kala laf weyne sane,
Hadaan laayey Hagar Aadan (Dhulbahante).
Oo xero Garaad kula legdemay,
Libin miyey siigtay?

People are not equal in strength,
If I killed the men (of the tribe of ) Hagar Aadan.
And fought them in the carrels of their Sultan,
Have I missed victory?

The most famous poem about the war was composed by Yawleh (Habr Younis, Isaaq).

The object of his poem, more than anything else, was to salt the wounds of the Dhulbahante. He said:

Mudo aan dhaweyn baa
Nugaal muran ka taagnaaye.
Ay qoloba qolo maaganayd,
Inay muquunshaane.
Hayeeshee Habr Jeclaa mulkiday
Maaxdii Caynaba eh.
Military cadhoodaa
Laf'buu malow ka siyiayee.
Maroodigaba soo jeesigaan

\[97\] Ibid.

\[98\] Ahmed Hassan (Caanoole), "Interview", August 1995, Toronto, Canada. (Translation is mine.)
Maaro loo heline.
Ma Mariniiskii baa idin helay,
Ayda Miranaayey?

For a long time
There were arguments in the Nugaal (Valley).
And each tribe was planning to force out (from
the Nugaal) the other tribe.
Nevertheless, it is Habr Jeclo that
Owns now the sweat waters of Ainabo.
An angry military
Usually crushes bones.
Once the elephant turns around
No one can stop him.
Have you (Dhulbahante) met
The marines (i.e., Habr Jeclo) that were roaming the jungle?99

Immediately after the settlement of the conflict between the Dhulbahante and the Habr
Jeclo, yet another civil war erupted between the Habr Jeclo (Isaaq) and Habr Younis (Isaaq). The
conflict started over a "trivial matter." An

"argument over a very trivial matter, between two young men of the Habr Yunis
(Habr Younis) and Habr Toljaala (Habr Jeclo) tribes led to a fight which resulted
in what might be described as civil war between these two powerful tribes. This
war continued through the year and resulted in a great many deaths. An
unfortunate aspect of the whole affair was that the police were relatively
powerless to solve these murders because of complete lack of co-operation from
the public."100

The civil war started in January 1955 at Dumbereleh, a plain south of Burao. Yawleh, the Habr
Youinis poet, then composed another poem for the occasion, in which he scolded the Habr Jeclo.
He said:

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99 Ibid.
100 Great Britain. Colonial Office. Annual Colonial Office Reports on the Somaliland
Ma maroodi baan Habr Jeclooy
Idinla meel joogey?
Ma mooyaan idin tumay
Gun waa loo mashxaradaaye?

Oh, you the Habr Jeclo, did I equate you
With the powerful elephant?
Did I play a wooden vessel for you
Its easy to mislead the low-caste with lullabies?^{101}

The Habr Jeclo-Habr Younis civil war was a bloody affair. Yawleh, a young poet of incomparable talent, was killed in the conflict. This made the conflict even more bitter, for in the traditional Somali warfare practices, the life of poets were always spared, and most often poets were not even allowed to participate in actual combat. Those who killed him, did so because of his characterization of the Habr Jeclo as "gun" (low-caste). But the bitterness of the civil war transcended the death of Yawleh, for about 250 people were killed in the war in the short period it lasted.^{102} The war was finally settled in Burao peacefully by the elders of the two clan-families.

The rift created by the Habr Jeclo-Habr Younis, and Habr Jeclo-Dhulbahante, civil wars, weakened the solidarity of the nationalist movement. Some of the nationalist figures, such as the powerful merchant Ahmed Haji Abdullahi "Hashiish" even divorced his Habr Younis wife. Others (i.e., Habr Younis) responded in kind, and divorced their Habr Jeclo wives. The divorcing of wives took place in the towns, and not in the interior. Most of those who divorced their wives were important figures in the towns. This reflected the bitter feelings the war aroused even in the

^{101} Ahmed Hassan (Caanoole), "Interview," August 1995, Toronto, Canada.

urban centres. The war, after all, was fought not only in the interior but in Burao as well. The weapon of choice in the town, however, was the stone rather than the rifle or the spear.

The civil wars reduced patriotic nationalism into an empty slogan. Agnation, to use I. M. Lewis's words, became "more important than party solidarity." The breakdown of elite solidarity in 1957, thus, must be viewed within this context. It was not just their inability to win back the Haud and the Reserved Area, and the decline of their popular base that precipitated the fragmentation of the elite along tribal lines. The 1954 and 1955 civil wars played a crucial role in that process. The elite of course called for the ending of tribal conflicts during the 1957 conference. Indeed, one of the four policies they agreed upon was the creation of tribal peace in the interior. They also formed a peace committee with members from all the districts to work for peace among the tribes. The committee was elected for two years. But the committee never reconvened. It died a quiet death.

It died quietly because members of the committee had no idea how to create tribal peace in the interior. After all, they could not even create tribal peace among themselves. The elite simply was unable to resolve the contradiction between modernity and tradition, national sentiment and tribal feeling, party affiliation and tribal filiation, and appear somehow on the other side. Their failure was both personal and ideological. It was personal because even though they acted as soldiers of modernity anxious to develop, modernize, and improve the society

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through rational forms of managements and techniques, they also acted as tribal representatives. Indeed, they sought to marginalize the traditional political elite in order to become the representatives of tribal interests in the urban centres. As Saadia Touval pointed out, most of the "Westernized Somalis" opposed tribalism, and yet were not oblivious to their tribal connections. "They cannot be, since their political career depend essentially on the hard core of support they can generate "at home"--among their own tribe." Ideologically, moreover, they failed to resolve the contradiction between modernity and tradition. They wasted their effort--almost deliberately--on attacking traditional law (Heer) as the source of tribal conflicts in the rural and urban areas.

The role of traditional law in tribal conflicts was widely debated in the country--in the Legislative Council, Protectorate Advisory Council, Community Centres, Radio Hargeisa, and in the cafes. It was the elite that dominated the debate. It was indeed the elite that formulated the questions around which the debate revolved. The elite debated the issue not as something that reflected the impasse between modernity and tradition, but as something that confronted them from the outside, as an issue of law. They debated the issue, consequently, as one that was about

105 Their journey from soldiers of modernity to warlords in the post-colonial period was begun during this period, i.e., the late colonial period. I will write in the near future a work titled: "Soldiers of Modernity to Warlords: The Elite and the Decline of Civil Society in Somalia."

106 See chapter five. They, for instance, objected to government plans to include tribal representatives in the Local Government Councils on the grounds that all representation must be based on competence: education and bureaucratic experience. That made them necessarily tribal representatives in the Local Government Councils. Indeed those who contested such seats appealed to voters on tribal basis.

107 Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, p.86.
the contradiction between traditional Somali law (Heer) which recognized tribal responsibility in the payment of blood-money (mag) and individual responsibility in the payment of wound (qaan), and modern colonial law which recognized only individual responsibility.

Such an understanding of the issue was of course naive. For colonial law itself recognized and respected, to a great extent, traditional law. Indeed, colonial law, like traditional law, recognized tribal responsibility. The Collective Punishment Ordinance, after all, remained in the statute books of the protectorate until the day of independence. Colonial law, then, like tribal law recognized both tribal and individual responsibility. The courts persecuted people as individuals when they committed minor crimes, and sometimes when they committed murder. But when murder was committed within the context of tribal war and conflict, colonial law recognized, like traditional law, tribal responsibility.

The issue was debated as early as 1953 on Radio Hargeisa by Haji Khalif Hassan and Yusuf Meygag Samatar. The title of their topic was "The Payment of Dia and Wound Compensation." It was also debated in 1955 in length at the Protectorate Advisory Council. The impetus for the lengthy discussion of the issue in 1955 were the two civil wars that took place in 1954 and 1955. Mr. Omer Horreh (Erigavo) argued that the people of the Erigavo town were "unanimous in their wish that the collective payment of dia (blood money) and wound compensation as governed by Somali custom should be abolished." Traditional law, he insisted, was condemned by the Islamic Sharia (law). Besides, he added, traditional law is "bad for public peace because it encourages murder and other acts of violence." It does so, he maintained,

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108 *War Somali Sidiiji*, no.18 (September 1953).
because any crime committed by an individual would be shared by all "members of the tribe and for his act (i.e., the criminal) he would have to pay a fine which might be as little as 8 annas." We must, he stated, place "responsibility on the wrongdoer and not on the tribe as a whole." He concluded that if the traditional law was abolished "there would be fewer murders." Mr. Omer Horreh's argument and motion was endorsed by 24 members of the council—a "small majority"—and rejected by 19 members.109

The Legislative Council, in addition, discussed the issue in 1958. The Honourable (unofficial) member of the Council, Ahmed Haji Dualeh, proposed the abolition of Somali Xeer under which "every Somali is compelled to take part in the payment of blood money"111 after crimes had been committed. The official members of the Council abstained from voting, but were in general sympathetic to the motion. The motion was passed by the unofficial members. (The motion, though, was non-binding since it was passed by the non-official members, i.e., the Somali members of the Council.) Another motion with radical pretensions was proposed by the Honourable (unofficial) member of the Council, Michael Mariano. The motion proposed the enactment of a law to enable anyone who wished "to break away from the injurious custom of paying or receiving blood money in respect of dia or wound compensation to do so." The motion

109 "Lengthy Discussion on Somali 'Her'". War Somali Sidiihi (1955).

110 Ibid. (Since the Council was an advisory council, and not a legislative one, its vote was not binding on the government.)

was defeated because the official (majority) members rejected it. The Commissioner of Native Affairs, Mr. P. Carrel, characterized the motion as "premature."\footnote{Ibid.}

The issue was also raised in the Executive Council in 1959 by the Honourable Member of the Council, Ahmed Haji Dualeh. He put forth a motion proposing the abolition of Somali "tribal Her" (Heer). The motion was debated within the framework of the contradiction between the government's need to maintain the Collective Punishment Ordinance which disregarded individual responsibility, and recognized only tribal responsibility, and the elite's demand that the law must recognize only individual responsibility. The Council was unable, however, to resolve the issue. After an intense debate, it supported "the Government's policy of endeavouring to persecute individuals responsible for criminal acts." But added "that in the present circumstances and for use in the last resort, the Collective punishment Ordinance should continue in force."\footnote{PRO, C.O.830/13, Executive Council. Abolition of Somali Heer, 1959.}

The debate was of course in vain. It was not tribal law, that was responsible for tribal wars, and conflicts. It was rather actual conflicts over land and wells in the rural areas, and political power in the urban centres, that was the cause of tribal conflicts. The elite were of course deeply involved in that process. If they acted as soldiers of modernity opposed to tribalism because it hindered "a rational approach to economic and social problems,"\footnote{Saadia Touval, \textit{Somali Nationalism}, p.85.} they also acted as tribal representatives and leaders. Such impasse in the actual practices of the elite was manifested clearly and unambiguously by the formation of two tribally based parties: the Hizbu'
Allah (Party of God) which was formed in 1957, and the United Somali Party which was established in 1959. The first party became an organization "mainly confined to the Habr Yunis (Habr Younis)." Its formation was a reflection of the tensions between the Habr Jeclo and Habr Younis as a result of the 1955 civil war, and the split of the elite at the 1957 conference.

The second party was based on an alliance between the Dhulbahante (Darood), Wersangeli (Darood), and the Gedabursi (Dir). It was formed as a result of "'dudmo' (anger), and "real-politik"." The 1954 civil war between the Habr Jeclo and Dhulbahante played a crucial role in the formation of the party. It was a party of the non-Isaaq. Its object was to form a coalition of non-Isaaq's and to win seats in the various institutions established by the government. Even the N.U.F. became identified as a clan organization (Habr Jeclo) in the post-1957 period, after the S.N.L. and S.Y.L. withdrew from the coalition, and after it was registered as a party in 1958. Meanwhile, the S.N.L. became a purely Habr Younis party from 1955 to 1958. It was only after Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (Habr Awal) became the General Secretary of the party in 1958, that it was able to attract non-Habr Younis support. Such a development became possible only after the Habr Younis political leaders met at Laan-Mulaaxo in late 1957, and decided to create cross-tribal alliance. It was only then that Egal was invited to participate in the S.N.L.

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The transformation of the established parties into narrow tribal parties, and the founding of new tribally based parties, exposed the impasse between modernity and tradition. But more importantly, it reduced the effectiveness, mass following, and political power of the elite and elite organizations. Party allegiance and affiliation were replaced and displaced by agnatic relations and loyalty. Indeed, party affiliation itself reflected tribal filiation. Consequently, patriotic nationalism became from 1955 to 1959, in the words of I. M. Lewis, an "empty slogan."

The elite often fanned the flames of tribal antagonism in their attempts to win seats in the various political institutions established by the government in the late colonial period. The weekly magazine, "Al-Liwa", pointed out that the leaders of the nationalist organization often wilfully "planted in the hearts of their party followers deep hatred" for others\(^{118}\), i.e., for other parties and tribal groups, since the parties were essentially tribal organizations. Barud Abdi, a Hargeisa merchant, made a similar point. He told a journalist from "Al-Liwa" that he never joined any of the parties, because the leaders of the parties were guilty of sowing the seeds of hatred among the people. They created conflict in the society--among the young, old, and women.\(^{119}\) And Ibrahim Dualeh, a resident of Aden, wondered what was the use of calling for the unity of all Somali territories, when the elite were busy dividing the people of Somaliland. He particularly condemned the manipulation of tribal feeling and hatred by the elite for narrow sectional political ends.\(^{120}\)

\(^{118}\) "Hargeisa Talk," Al-Liwa, 8 April 1960. (The journal was written in Arabic. All translations are mine.)


\(^{120}\) "Letter to the Editor," Al-Liwa, 27 November 1959.
The reduction of patriotic nationalism into an empty slogan had a profound impact on the ability of the elite to contest colonial hegemony. The elite, to be sure, organized the occasional noisy demonstration, usually but not always, when there was a British delegation in the country. But such demonstrations always attracted very few people, and the police were always able to handle them with ease. The nationalist parties were simply unable to mobilize a large segment of the townspeople or the rural public on any issue.

The S.N.L., for instance, called for a boycott of the first elections held in 1959 for the Legislative Council. The S.N.L. objected to the fact that within the new elected council the official majority (16) would remain British, while an official minority (14) would remain Somali. The party attempted to enforce its policy by using "gangs and hooligans actively and continuously encouraged by the Somali National League leaders." The public of course was neither intimidated nor swayed by the rhetoric and violent tactics of the S.N.L. The registration for the election were high, and so were the turn out for the elections. The election passed without incident. The S.N.L. consequently ended up with no representatives in the Legislative Council. All the seats were won by the N.U.F. Their attempt thereafter to portray the Legislative Council


122 Ibid.


124 PRO, C.O.830/12, "Executive Council. Minutes of the 31st Meeting of Executive Council Held at 9 a.m. on Friday, 19 December 1959, at Government House."

as a non-representative body because there were no S.N.L. members in the council, was met with derision. "Al-Liwa" characterized such arguments as a reflection of the "lack of politeness" of the membership, and leadership, of the S.N.L. The S.N.L. learned its lesson rather very well, and never again called for a boycott of any election.

Neither did it call for any major action against the government. Nor did the N.U.F. organize any memorable anti-government activities in the post-1957 period. If anything, the so-called nationalist parties cooperated more closely with the administration with respect to the development of the country. They acted as willing and enthusiastic soldiers of modernity. They also focused on winning seats in the various political institutions established by the government. The elite indeed failed even to organize any activities against a very visible and convenient symbol of the British Empire: the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester who visited Somaliland in 19-24 November 1958. The elite rather than boycotting the various functions organized for the Duke and the Duchess, or organizing demonstrations to protest colonial rule, enthusiastically welcomed the Duke and Duchess. They were present in all the official functions prepared for them by the government, such as the welcoming ceremony at the Hargeisa airport—which the Duke officially opened; and the Durbar arranged for their honour at Hargeisa. About 2,000 guests, mostly the elite and few tribal representatives, were present at the Durbar. Neither did they organize any demonstrations or any sort of anti-government or anti-British activities when

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the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, visited the country in February 1959. They rather held amicable talks with him, and patiently waited for him to explain British plans for Somaliland. The talks in the end led nowhere. Allan-Boyd, represented to them the official British position. He "promised that the Protectorate would achieve ministerial government before 1960 and that thereafter such steps as were necessary would be taken to early self-government." He did not promise independence. (It was only during the June 1960 London Constitutional Conference that the British formally declared their intention to grant Somaliland its independence on 26 June 1960, a development that completely surprised the Somaliland delegation.)

In conclusion, the elite and nationalist organizations did not so much fail to contest colonial hegemony, but rather failed to contest it effectively. Their own self-appointed role as soldiers of modernity, and their aggressive modernism and eagerness to play a role in the development and modernization of the country, made them dependent on the administration. The elite, after all, reached for their pen rather than a knife when they heard talk of western culture. That made elite resistance a modernizing resistance. Moreover, it made the elite complicit in the processes in which the colonial administration reinforced colonial hegemony. Furthermore, the palpable contradiction between modernity and tradition, national sentiment and tribal feeling,

128 Ibid. For his policy statement and effect, see chapter eight.

129 There was, as discussed in chapter five, a difference between self-government and independence.

130 See Appendix A.
party affiliation and tribal filiation, politically weakened the elite, created divisions within their 
ranks, reduced their mass following and their ability of mobilize the public, and diminished the 
power of patriotic nationalism. The political and ideological weaknesses of the elite and elite 
nationalist organizations, in short, made the elite unable to effectively contest colonial hegemony 
and rule.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONTESTING COLONIAL HEGEMONY: THE SUBALTERN

It would be rash to argue for the formation of two distinct classes—the elite and the subaltern—in the towns in Somaliland in the late colonial period. Class, after all, is not a "thing," as E.P. Thompson pointed out. Class does not exist as a thing, or as a category, or as a structure, and without question. "it" does not "have an ideal interest or consciousness, or lie as a patient on the Adjustor's table." The discussion of the subaltern in this section merely uses class as a useful, or productive concept that gives us an insight into the often fluid "historical relationships...embodied in real people and in a real (urban) context." The historical relationships of the urbanites can be handled in terms of economy—i.e., in terms of the disparity of income, status, and living standard among the urbanites; and in "cultural terms: embodied in

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1 I borrowed the idea from the subaltern school. See Gayatri Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography," in Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Spivak (eds), Selected Subaltern Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). See also, Ranajit Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India." He critiques the elitism of the historiography of India, and in particular the "prejudice that the making of the Indian nation and the development of the consciousness—nationalism—which informed this process were exclusively or predominantly elite achievements." (Ibid.,p.37.)


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.
tradition, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms." In the end, "class is a cultural as much as an economic formation." The emergence of an elite and the subaltern in the urban centres, then, can be viewed within the framework of class formation—a formation that was as much cultural as economic.

In terms of culture, the subaltern at first modified, and then transformed, the politics of the "public sphere" in the towns. If in the 1930s, the propertied and educated dominated the public sphere, and even constituted the only body of "private people who came together as a public," in the 1940s the subaltern modified the structure of the public sphere by inserting themselves rather rudely into the crevices of the already constituted body of the public sphere. Education and property was not any more the only criteria for joining the public discussions of issues related to the future of the nation. Mohamed Haji Ismail "Barkhad Cas", a typical subaltern, made clear in a short verse (heello) his intention of participating in public discussions despite his lack of property or (western) education. He said:

Aliwa, Qarni, iyo Akhbaarsida
Waxan ahay tii afaraynaysay oo
Ayaan kasta tayda waa la arkaa.
Aduun bixi iyo ishtiraak ma la hoo
Qof walbow sidaa ogsoonow.

5 Ibid., p.9.
6 Ibid., p.12.
7 Jurgan Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). (See chapter seven for a discussion of the emergence of the public sphere dominated by the propertied and educated, i.e., the better sort of folk in the towns in the 1930s.)
8 Ibid., p.27.
Al-Liwa, Horn (Horn of Africa), and Al-Akhbar (The News)\textsuperscript{9}

I am the one that makes them four\textsuperscript{10}

Everyday my (newspaper) is read (by the public).
And they do not pay money or sign contract
Every one should keep that in mind.

The subaltern used various methods to make its voice heard in the society. They used resistance poetry, as well as violence, demonstrations, and rebellions, to participate in the public sphere, challenge and contest colonial rule, and to articulate the Somali national sentiment and the resentment or "ressentiment"\textsuperscript{11} of the people towards colonial rule. Although the responses of the subaltern towards colonial rule was heterogenous, and thus fragmented by nature, nevertheless, there was a continuity among the various resistance acts they undertook, whether the 1944 mutiny, the 1945 rebellion, or the poetic combat they waged against colonial rule. The underlying political issue of subaltern activities was their ressentiment towards colonial rule.

\textbf{The 1944 Somaliland Camel Corps Mutiny}

In late March 1944, the British East African Command decided to transfer the Somaliland Camel Corps to Kenya for a brief period of training. The object was to formally mechanize the

\textsuperscript{9} The three main papers of the country.

\textsuperscript{10} I.e., fourth newspaper.

regiment, and if necessary, to send it to war. The corps, however, refused to comply with the order. That refusal was the basis of the mutiny. They wrote a missive to the commanding officer of the Somaliland Camel Corps, Lt. Colonel A. A. B. Harris-Rivett, in which they stated three conditions under which they would obey the order to leave to Kenya. First, that they must be given the status of Asians once they leave the country, so that they can receive services, promotions, ration, and uniforms allotted specifically to Asians, which were denied to Africans. To be exact, they asked for "Rules and Regulations of Asiatics, Dress, Rations, Accommodation and promotions etc." Second, that they be treated with respect since the Camel Corps was an "old regular regiment." Third, that they be allowed to appoint an agent who will make sure that their families receive their remittances on time. On 9 May the commander of the corps wrote back to the soldiers. On 28 May, the soldiers asked Michael Mariano, the clerk of the district commissioner, to translate the letter their commander wrote to them, since the letter was written in English, and none of the soldiers could read or write English.

Before agreeing to meet the soldiers, Mariano informed the district commissioner about the letter and the request of the soldiers. The district commissioner did not object to his involvement in the dispute at that superficial level. Mariano, nonetheless, insisted that other "prominent members" of the community in Burao become involved in the issue. On 2 June, five senior members of the corps, four prominent civilians of the town, and Ahmed Sheikh Abdi—the clerk-interpreter of the corps, met at the house of Mariano for the reading of the letter. Before

12 W.O.32/10863, From R.S.M. Burreh Gualid, to Officer Commanding Somaliland Camel Corps, 1st April 1944.
reading the letter to the gathered men, Michael Mariano requested the senior members of the corps to swear on the Quran (Holy Book) that they would "listen to reason (and that they) had no ulterior motive in coming to this meeting."\(^{13}\)

The letter the commander wrote to the soldiers dismissed their demands for Asian status. He told them that Somalis are Africans and not Asians. Hence, they will not be given such status, and by extension, services, promotions, ration, and uniforms allotted to Asians. He added that since the Somalis "are an unknown people to most British people and have not fought for us all over the world like the Indians, Arabs...and West Africans," they can not be given any privileges. The British army, he added, was large, and "special rules cannot be made for everyone." As for family remittances, there are special rules that must be followed. He assured them, nonetheless, that he would take "the greatest trouble to see that remittance(s) get delivered regularly."\(^{14}\) After the translation of the letter to the representatives of the corps ended, a brief discussion ensued. The representatives of the corps told Mariano and the others present in the meeting that "there was nothing to which they could object" in the letter.\(^{15}\)

But that was an understatement, for on the following day--3 June--members of the corps held a "mass meeting"\(^{16}\) at a religious site--the tomb of a sheikh--a short distance from Burao.

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\(^{13}\) W.O.32/10863, "15th Witness-Michael Joseph Mariano."

\(^{14}\) W.O.32/10863, From Officer Commanding the Somaliland Camel Corps to R.S.M. Burreh Gualid, 9 May 1944.

\(^{15}\) W.O.32/10863, "15th Witness--Michael Joseph Mariano."

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
The "religious aspect of it (meeting) was merely a cloak for a political meeting at which grievances" were discussed with respect to such subjects as: "1. Asian and African status. 2. Gratituties after the war. 3. Treatment already due to Somalis who had fought the Italians. 4. Family remittances and clothing." When they finished the discussion, they resolved that they would not go to Kenya "unless they had received definite guarantee that they would be given better conditions of service." They took a religious oath to "remain united in these matters."

They then marched in unison in what the commander of the corps called a "public demonstration" from the tomb to the centre of the town, meanwhile singing the praises of the prophet. After the demonstration ended, the soldiers returned to the barracks without incident.

On the morning of 4 June, however, many people who were alarmed by the meeting of the askaris, the decision they reached, and the public demonstration they held, among whom was Sjt. Musa Galaal— at the time an educational officer attached to the corps—called for a meeting between the senior members of the corps and prominent members of the Burao community. The object of the meeting was to persuade the soldiers to moderate their position, and to obey the order given to them by the East African Command. So on the evening of 4 June, a meeting was held between ten "important merchants of the town" and representatives of the askaris.

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17 W.O.32/10863, "1st Witness-Lt.Colonel A. A. B. Harris-Rivett."
18 W.O.32/10863, "(13th Witness-Captain C. N. Halse, Superintendent of Police, Burao."
19 W.O.32/10863, "11th Witness-Sub-Inspector Mohamed Hallah of the Somaliland Police Force."
20 Ibid.
21 W.O.32/10863, "13th Witness—Sjt. Musa Galaal."
meeting was presided over by Michael Mariano. The civilian leaders listened to the grievances of the soldiers which centred on their demand for better services. The civilians, however, dismissed their complaints. They advised them to behave like soldiers and desist from "holding mass meetings and insubordination" which, they reminded them, would destroy their reputation. They advised them, furthermore, to return to work "without any conditions" and to control "their men as they should do, and to keep their officers informed of any developments." To mollify the soldiers, they promised the representatives of the soldiers, that they will "take the matter up with the commanding officer" of the corps.

But the soldiers were not mollified. On the morning of the fifth, the soldiers held a mass meeting at a mess in the barracks, in which they discussed their concerns. They decided to defy order and not to go to Kenya unless their demands were met. They then sent a message to the commanding officer requesting an interview. The commanding officer parried that they should appoint a representative to present formally their grievances. They ignored his suggestion, after which nothing further was heard from them. They decided to rebel on that evening—the 5th of June. The decision reached by the corps was leaked to Major W. R. Whaley by Mohamed Rageh, a member of the corps. But Rageh misled Major Whaley about the exact date of the rebellion. He told Major Whaley not to issue arms to the soldiers the next day, because there will be trouble,

22 W.O.32/10863, "'15th Witness-Michael Joseph Mariano."
23 W.O.32/10863, "'13th Witness—Sjt. Musa Galaal."
24 Ibid.
25 W.O.32/10863, "2nd Witness-Captain T. C. Larson, Adjutant of the S.C.C."
and that even though all the men were not involved in the planning of such trouble, nonetheless, "there were a few whose example might spread to the others." Major Whaley decided to pass the information to the commanding officer of the corps. But it was too late. The first bullets were fired just as he was passing the information to the commander of the corps a few minutes after 8 p.m. on 5 June.

At that moment, "massed rioting broke out" within the compound of the camel corps,

"several guards deserted their posts, armours and stores were broken into by force, rifles, automatics and ammunition were looted, as well as stores... (by) Somali soldiers and civilians. There was much firing into the air and general noise and confusion. Civilians at once joined in with the soldiers. There was no casualties from firing." Sir William Platt added, "If bloodshed had once started, it is impossible to know, with the heat of the Somali temperament, where it might have ended, and with what results, not only in the Protectorate but outside, making as it would admirable propaganda for use by our enemies against the British Empire." The commander of the corps and the other British officers simply did nothing, hence the absence of bloodshed. They only secured the civilian section of the town where Europeans lived, which the rebels never even approached. By 5 a.m. the "massed rioting" - the mutiny -- died out, and the barracks were under the control of British officers and loyal

26 W.O.32/10863, "17th Witness-Major W. R. Whaley, Rhodesia Regt."

27 Ibid.


29 Ibid.
members of the corps. But the barracks were empty. The rebels simply deserted in mass. On 6 June a Court of Inquiry was convened by the Commander of the Northern Sub Area of the East African Command.

According to Sjt. Musa Galaal, the first shots were fired just when he was about to begin teaching an evening class few minutes after 8 p.m. He went outside and saw about fifty men entering one armoury through a broken door, and seizing rifles and ammunition. He then went to another armoury, and drew a rifle and ammunition for himself, and stood guard on the door. Quickly other soldiers appeared, broke the door, and looted it. He testified that he did not shoot at the looters, because he "had no orders to do so." The men realized that he will not shoot, and "took no notice" of him. Unlike Sjt. Musa Galaal, though, the majority of the soldiers were involved in the rebellion, and the "guards generally offered no resistance and joined in" the rioting. Hence, the majority of the soldiers were implicated in the mutiny. And even the few that remained in the barracks were considered as guilty of rebellion. G. T. Fisher stated categorically that "no part of the Corps...can be said to be reliable; especially those who are ostensibly loyal, and who stayed in their barracks." Those who stayed in the barracks--mostly senior members of the force--were the "chief instigators of the trouble." It was exactly such men,

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30 W.O.32/10863, "Details of S.C.C Askaris Absent 7/6/44."
31 The President of the Court was Lt.Colonel L. M. Kerr, and its members were Captain P. L. Mathews, and Captain D. Childs-Clarke. W.O.32/10863, "Convening Order," 6 June 1944.
32 W.O.32/10863, "13th Witness-Sjt. Musa Galaal."
33 W.O.32/10863, From GOC. in C. East Africa to War Office, 25 June 1944.
34 W.O.32/10863, G. T. Fisher, "Burao Disturbances." (Emphasis his.)
Fisher insisted, who "secured most of the loot, and almost certainly the majority of the rifles."

They organized the rebellion, yet they "pose before us as steady and loyal troops." The mutiny, then, implicated the whole force. It also implicated the civilian population.

The civilian population appeared in large numbers on the scene of the rioting rather quickly, and participated in the firing of rifles and in the looting of equipment, arms, ammunition, clothes, uniforms, and rations such as rice, sugar, tea, butter, and salt. The civilians who participated in the mutiny, "many women amongst them" then quickly went "out into the country," so that by 5 a.m. the town was quiet and deserted. According to Sjt. Galaal the civilians simply took advantage of the confusion and looted the stores, while the askaris took the rifles and ammunition. But Sir William Platt strongly disagreed with such analysis. For him, the civilians and the soldiers consorted in a "premeditated and planned" rebellion. He stated,

The civil population of Burao were concerned, together with the soldiers, not only in execution, but in premeditation and planning. The rapidity with which events occurred and the rapidity and numbers in which civilians appeared on the scene make no other conclusion possible."

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35 Ibid.

36 W.O.32/10863, "Statement of Clothing, Equipment. etc. Missing from "C" Squadron Stores as At 6 June 44 and Recovered Since 6 June 44."

37 W.O.32/10863, "1st Witness, Lt.Colonel A. A. B. Harris-Rivett."


39 Ibid.
But not all the civilians were compromised by the mutiny. Both G. T. Fisher and Michael Mariano made what was tantamount to a class analysis of the mutiny, and the role of the civilians in it. According to Michael Mariano, the "effect of the riot on the people of Burao" was to divide the public into two classes:

A. The respectable community of Burao consider the incident to be a disgraceful action on the part of the S.C.C. They have endeavoured to assist the D.C. to calm down any possible reaction of the people of the interior and in the town;
B. The less responsible Somali civilians in Burao town think that the S.C.C. were justified in acting as they did.40

The division of the community between the "respectable" and the "less responsible," between, that is, the elite and the subaltern, was also made by G. T. Fisher. Fisher stated that the "whole corps and the worst elements in the country" colluded in a "studied act of rebellion," while the "leaders and Aqils are expectantly looking now for the government for a lead; and they will not understand or appreciate any compromise" with the rebels.41 In another report, Fisher noted that the "Akils and others (elite) are at present assisting government in bringing in the deserters (rebels) from the Corps, and mobilising public opinion against their tactics."42 The elite also collaborated with the government in the "recovery of arms and Government property stolen during the Camel Corps disturbances."43

40 W.O.32/10863, "15th Witness-Michael Joseph Mariano."
41 W.O.32/10863, G. T. Fisher, "Burao Disturbances."
42 W.O.32/10863, G. T. Fisher, "Note by the Military Governor on Disturbances Amongst Troops and General Political Conditions in British Somaliland," 11 June 1944.
The Court of Inquiry concluded that the cause of the mutiny was the dissatisfaction of the corps in the "withholding of Asian status from Somali troops serving outside Somaliland," and the lack of discipline among the corps. It also concluded that the mutiny was spontaneous rather than planned. This was a surprising opinion. The whole evidence collected by the Court pointed in the other direction. Besides, as Ranajit Guha stated, the subaltern never undertakes to turn "things upside down" in a "state of absent-mindedness." Subaltern insurgency, in other words, was hardly ever "spontaneous and unpremeditated" for the subaltern simply could not afford to be so careless. The corps were not any different. Indeed, they planned the mutiny. As Sir William Platt stated, the mutiny was "premeditated and planned," or as Fisher put it, the mutiny was a "studied act of rebellion."

Fisher, moreover, disputed the Court's finding that the cause of the rebellion was the denial of Asian status to Somali troops serving outside Somaliland. He maintained that "the grounds of the mutiny" was not the denial of Asian status, but rather "a refusal to leave the country." He quoted a rebel who told him that the corps were "quite prepared to fight in Somaliland if called upon so, but not to serve outside the country." The corps, Fisher explained, simply did not "consider it to be an honour and a privilege to be a soldier of the King." That

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44 W.O.32/10863, "Opinion of the Court."

45 Ranajit Guha, "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency," in Ranajit Guha and Gyatri Spivak (eds), Selected Subaltern Studies, p.45.


47 Ibid.
sense of "honour" never developed among the corps as it was "understood elsewhere in the Empire."\textsuperscript{48} If anything, as Fisher put it, the corps were always a "hot bed of trouble and intrigue since 1922."\textsuperscript{49} And even those members of the corps who served outside the country, were not immune from such an attitude. "Disaffection," wrote Fisher, "have been prevalent for the last three years amongst various Somalis units; and they have been associated with apparently trivial complaints, such as objections to certain types of clothing, and rations; and refusals to perform different kinds of fatigue duties."\textsuperscript{50}

Sir William Platt made the same point about Somali soldiers serving outside the country. He stated that they have been involved in protests of various kinds such as "refusal to obey order, sit-down strikes, shouting, desertion with weapons, untrustworthiness as guards, collusive theft, occasional stone throwing and drawing of knives, but little physical violence."\textsuperscript{51} These activities reflected not merely the corps' refusal to accept and internalize the hegemonic notion of service and "honour" for the British King, but also the deep antipathy of the corps towards British rule, and British institutions. The refusal of the corps to serve outside the country was, as such then, the main cause of the mutiny.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} W.O.32/10863, G. T. Fisher, "Note by the Military Governor on Disturbances Amongst Troops and General Political Conditions in British Somaliland," 11 June 1944.

\textsuperscript{51} W.O.32/10863, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, East African Command, "Report on Somaliland Camel Corps."
Although the cause of the revolt was the refusal of the soldiers to serve outside the country, nevertheless, the spirit of the revolt was engendered by what Fisher called a "general wave of indignation in the country"\(^{52}\) against colonial rule, which led to the "renewal of national feeling."\(^{53}\) The "general feeling of discontent in the country,"\(^{54}\) in short, moulded the spirit of revolt that propelled the soldiers to undertake in a planned and premeditated fashion an "act of defiance against (colonial)....authority."\(^{55}\) Nationalism was, in other words, the "underlying political issue of this disturbance."\(^{56}\) Subaltern nationalism, moreover, inspired other acts of revolt and defiance against British authority, such as the 1945 Sheikh Bashir rebellion.

**The 1945 Sheikh Bashir Rebellion**

Sheikh Bashir was born in Taleh, the headquarters of the Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan, sometime between 1913 and 1920.\(^{57}\) He was, according to Lord Rennel of Rodd, a

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\(^{52}\) W.O.32/10863, G. T. Fisher, "Burao Disturbances."


\(^{54}\) Ibid.

\(^{55}\) W.O.32/10863, G. T. Fisher, "Burao Disturbances."

\(^{56}\) W.O.32/10863, "10th Witness-Major F. J. Chambers."

\(^{57}\) Farah Mohamed Jama "Cawl", *Garbaduubkii Gumeysiga* (Mogadisho: Madbacada Qaranka, 1978), p.139. (Taleh was established by the Sayyid in 1913. It was destroyed by the British in 1920.)
nephew of the Sayyid. Before 1945, he was known for his militant views, and anti-colonial attitude. One day, according to a well known story, he challenged sheikhs who were fulminating against the British to actually do something about it. The exchange between Sheikh Bashir and the priests was passed over into history in a poem composed by Yasin Ahmed Haji Nur, "Muruq Baa Dagaal Gala" (Muscle Partakes in War):

Sheikh Bashir ka daalaco.
Wadaadii dikriyayee
daasada uu dhex keenee
ku daloosha uu yidhi
diinkay akhriyayeen
wax kastay du-dubiyaan
markay diisi waayeen
waa kii budh doontee
dam-dagiigan kaga dhigay.
Dulucdeedu waxay tahay
muruq baa dagaal gala.  

58 Lord Rennell of Rodd, British Military Administration, p.481.

59 Yasin Ahmed Haji Nur, "Muruq Baa Dagaal Gala," January 1980, Hargeisa, Cassette. (The poem was part of the famous series of poem called Deelleey.) Translation is mine.
Sheikh Bashir, though a religious figure, believed in action, in the importance of muscle, rather than in religious chants, as the only possible means of liberating the country from British control. But he had to wait for an opportune time to express in action his ressentiment towards colonial rule.

In 1944 and 1945, a plague of locusts devastated the country. The government responded with an energetic campaign of locust control. The Locus Control Department "set poisoned bait for young hoppers" throughout the country. The people, however, "resented" the poisoned bait, because they "attribute(ed) loses of stock to the poison--in some cases with justification, due to careless laying of the bait--and disorders resulted." Bait-dumps were burned and employees of the Locust Control Department attacked. Moreover, "serious riots at El Afweina in the Erigavo District" took place, and "unruly excited mobs" demonstrated against the locust control programme in Hargeisa and Borama in June 1945, upon which the police "had to open fire." Consequently, "The sparks of trouble spread and violent demonstrations were staged throughout the Protectorate," as far east as Erigavo, and as far west as Zeila.

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62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Lord Rennell of Rodd, *British Military Administration*, p.481.

65 Ibid.
In the interior of the Guban area of the Zeila district, during the height of the anti-locust disturbances, pastoralists "were all prepared to take up their spears and massacre every locust officer in the area."\textsuperscript{66} The district commissioner of Zeila, visited the area in which the rebellion was most pronounced in the district, in order to explain to the people why the government undertook the anti-locust campaign. Upon his arrival in the area, he held a meeting with the pastoralists. But the meeting ended in discord. The pastoralists wanted the immediate cessation of the locust control campaign, and the district commissioner was unwilling to take such action. The pastoralists threatened him, but he remained unmoved. Once the district commissioner went to his camp, the pastoralists "made up their mind to kill him." At dawn, they attacked his camp. But just before the attack commenced, the district commissioner slipped out of the camp, and escaped in the direction of Zeila. The pastoralists entered his camp, but could not find him. Furious that they were "cheated of a victim", they "burned the tents, slashed his clothes and even speared his bush hat."\textsuperscript{67} They then quickly followed him, and caught up with him in a tea shop on the road to Zeila. "It was too late for prolonged talk," and the District Commissioner, corned in an isolated area, and facing men committed to kill him, improvised in order to save his life. He told his hostile audience: "If this locust poison does not kill a man, will you believe it won't kill your camels?" They were intrigued. And so the commissioner "scooped up a handful of the poisoned bran and ate it himself." Curious, they waited for the effect. Nothing happened. He did not die; and so they dispersed, convinced by the demonstration that the poison bait was not so

\textsuperscript{66} Margaret Laurence, \textit{Prophet's Camel Bell}, p.241.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p.242.
harmful after all. In other areas, however, the district commissioners were neither that daring, nor that imaginative. And so, the disturbances continued.

This "widespread revolt" which affected the country from Zeila to El Afweyn to Erigavo, created the social conditions for the outbreak of the Sheikh Bashir rebellion. He simply "utilised" the revolt of the public and the people's resentment towards a particular colonial policy, "as a weapon with which to challenge the authority of the Government." But he was not content with demonstrations. His object rather was to organize a "general uprising" against colonial rule, as he informed his followers in Erigavo. His plan was to begin the revolt in Burao, his home town: first, to attack and sack the administrative offices, then to attack the prison and free the arrested demonstrators, and to kill the district commissioner, and other officers. His hope was that his action would precipitate a general uprising.

On the 2nd of July, a group of about twenty armed men led by Sheikh Bashir "opened fire on the police guard mounted over administrative offices." They then attacked the prison which was at the "time overcrowded with prisoners arrested for previous demonstrations." A prisoner was killed in the shootings. "Almost simultaneously a move was made against the District Commissioner's house, where both he and his wife were in residence." There "can be doubt that

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68 Ibid. (As Laurence pointed out, Matthew was one of the few district commissioner in Somaliland who spoke Somali fluently.)

69 Lord Rennell of Rodd, British Military Administration, p.481.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., p.482.

72 Ibid., p.481.
It was the intention of the band was to kill the District Commissioner." The attempt on the life of the commissioner failed. Instead his guard was killed.

They made the "attack...suddenly and swiftly and the whole gang succeeded in making good its escape" to Bur Dhab, a strategic mountain, south-east of Burao, in which the Sayyid established many forts and strongholds. But instead of disappearing into the chain of mountains which Bur Dhab consists of, and waging a war of movement against the colonial administration, Sheikh Bashir's small unit established itself in a fort, ready to defend itself. The government mobilized a police force, and easily found Sheikh Bashir and his group behind their fortifications. A "brisk action followed" in which Sheikh Bashir and his second-in-command, were killed. A third rebel was wounded and captured. The rest fled and dispersed.

Meanwhile, "the revolt spread to Erigavo." Before he was killed, Sheikh Bashir sent a message to religious figures in Erigavo and informed them that the "time was ripe for a general uprising." They heeded his advice, and mobilized a substantial number of people in Erigavo. The administration reacted quickly and severely. The administration sent reinforcements to the town, and in two "local actions", the police opened fire on "mobs armed with rifles and spears,

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73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., p. 482.
75 Ibid.
(and) arrests of minor religious leaders were made.76 After the revolt in Erigavo was quelled, "trouble rapidly subsided."77

But the government was not finished with the rebels. It insisted on the capture and arrest of the followers of Sheikh Bashir. In order to force the people to identify and handover the escaped rebels associated with Sheikh Bashir, the government invoked the Collective Punishment Ordinance, under which it impounded about 6,000 camels owned by the Habr Jeclo. (The Habr Jeclo was targeted because Sheikh Bashir was a member of that tribe.) The government made the return of the livestock dependent on the arrest of the escaped rebels. The government's draconian measure was supported by the "better elements among the people (who) cooperated loyally with the government."78 They even asked the government to "be assessed for compensation to cover the cost of the operations, the loss of Government stores, and considerable expenditure on transport."79 They managed to collect about £8,000 from the people, which they paid the government as a compensation. With their help, moreover, the escaped rebels were arrested. The rebels were then transported to Saad-ud-Din island, off the coast of Somaliland.

The cooperation of the elite, however, was almost derailed by the government's inhumane and humiliating treatment of Sheikh Bashir's body. The treatment of Sheikh Bashir had been

76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
79 Lord Rennell of Rodd, British Military Administration, p.482.
recorded, and given over to history, so to speak, in a poem composed by Adan Ahmed Af-Qdooc in July 1944. He said:

Duhur baa Bashir lagu shanaqay, daar agtiina ah ehe,
Dahriga iyo laabtay rasaas, kaga daloosheene,
Isaga oo dem iyo dhiig leh, oo maro ku duu-duuban,
Dacsad iyo ahaaniyo cag baa, loogu sii daraye.
Dakii uu nebcaa iyo kufirga, daawasho yimide,
Meydkii oo Daahir ahayn, markii debedda loo tuuray,
Ee aaska loo diiday, waad wada dul joogteene.
*  
Dar kaloo ciyaar lagu dilay iyo, dawgal baa jirey e,
Oo aanyay deero deero u hirdiyin, dadab galkoodiiye.
Ma duugoobin Qaybdiid, lafuhu waana duhanayaane.
Da'dii u ahaa baa Faarax, jeelka loo diraye.
Imminkuu siduu dawri yahay, debedda meeraaye.
Loo diid dakii uu dhaliyo, duunyaduu dhaqaye.
Dad oo idil soo eri, ninkii daalinka ahaaye.
*  
Ingriis wuxuu dooni jirey, reer India diidy,
Daarihii Banjaab iyo ka kace, dahabkii hoos yiile,
Daymada hadeeray indhuhu, dib u jaleecaane.
Damaashaadku waa Mohamed Ali, loo dabaal degay e.
Waa duubeey Franciis, dhulkii Suuriyuu degey e.
Daristii Lubnaan iyo ka kace, degelkii Beyruute.
*  
Dekedaha maraakiib shixnadan, baa ka soo degeye,
Daadxoorta oo idil, halkanaa lala damcaayaaye,
Halka daawad xeradeedu tahay, gaaladaa degiye,
Nin dayrudi iyo gaadhi laa, beer idiin dirane,
Durgufkiina soo hadhay, waxaan donayuu garane.80

Sheikh Bashir was hanged in day-light, at a house
near you,
With bullets, they made holes on his chest,
While his body was covered with blood,
They also kicked him, and insulted him.
Worst the people whom he hated and the infidels, came

to watch him.
When the unwashed body was thrown outside,
And refused burial, you were all around him.

There were others killed playfully,
About which nothing was done.
The body of Qayb-diid\textsuperscript{81} is still warm, and
his bones are still wet.
Though an old man, Farah\textsuperscript{82} was sent to jail.
And now he roams the outside world.
They refused him rights over his family and wealth.
The unjust man (British) are punishing everybody.

What the English always wanted, the people of India refused.
The houses of Bunjab and the gold that they contained has been
denied to them (British).
Now they look back at them with nostalgia.
The celebration are for Muhammad Ali (Egypt).
And the French are leaving Syria that they conquered.
They withdrew from Beirut, and Lebanon.

Many ships will arrive at (our) ports,
They will bring here (Somaliland) those thrown out
by the stream of shit.\textsuperscript{83}
The place were you pasture Daawad (she-camel), the infidels
will settle,
A man on a car and an airplane, will force you
to work on his farms,
The few who survive that, will then know what I want (today).

The administration imprisoned Adan Ahmed "Af Qalooc" for composing the poem, and
for calling on the people to continue the rebellion, and to avenge Sheikh Bashir and "others killed
playfully" by the British. But if the administration was afraid that the poem would re-ignite the

\textsuperscript{81} I have not been able to identify this figure.

\textsuperscript{82} The reference is to Haji Farah Oomaar. See chapter seven, section one.

\textsuperscript{83} The reference is to settlers. "Daad Xoor" is the dirt carried by floods.
rebellion, it was sadly mistaken. The rebellion was a spent force. No poem however powerful could have re-ignited it. The poem, nonetheless, was important in that it articulated the ressentiment towards colonial authority, and insurgent consciousness and nationalism, of the subaltern, and the masses. What the poet "wanted", after all, was nothing less than the avenging of Sheikh Bashir, Qay-bdiid, and Xaji Farah Oomaar, and the overthrow of the colonial regime. He exhorted the people to rise like other colonized peoples in India, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, where nationalist movements forced the colonizers to abandon their empire. He also warned them that unless they overthrow the colonial administration, their land will be taken over by men "riding airplanes and cars", and they will be reduced to farm-hands who work in plantations owned by "infidels" in the very plains "Daawad" is pastured.

The reference to settlers was not an argument which Adan Af-Qalooc invented out of thin air. To the contrary. There was a well established discourse of suspicion and fear about European settlers taking over the land, as they have done in other parts of Africa. As late as 1953, the Governor of Somaliland, Sir Gerald Reece was forced to address the issue in his speech to the Protectorate Advisory Council. He accused the "fitna-makers" (trouble-makers), of fomenting opposition to the administration, by falsely informing the public that their land will be taken over by whites, and they will be turned into "slaves." "(W)e do not want," he reassured his audience, "to take over your land from you, or your customs." Adan Af-Qalooc's warning, then, was based on actual discourses of suspicion often voiced and articulated by the subaltern—the "fitna-

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makers." The poet used that discourse of suspicion in order to inflame the nationalism and anti-colonial ressentiment of the people. Adan Af-Qalooc spent few months in prison, and by the time he was released, the rebellion passed into history. But the discontent, indignation, and ressentiment of the people towards colonial rule that inspired the mutiny, the Sheikh Bashir rebellion, and Adan Af-Qalooc's poem, was anything but a spent force. Other subaltern poets articulated it within the traditions of classical and modern Somali poetry. The focus on the following sections, however, will be on modern poetry, a poetry which was invented in the late colonial period by the subaltern of the towns.

**Resistance Poetry: The Invention of the Belwo and Heello**

Subaltern poets played a crucial role in the anti-colonial nationalist movement. As Mohamed Ibrahim Warsame "Hadrawi" maintained in his poem, "The Poet":

Hubka lagu dagaal galaly
murti baa halbawiyo
u ahayd hogaanoo
Soomali hurudday
hoobey ku kicisoo...
dhagax iyo hangool iyo
heellaa xoraysoo
Wallee hoobalkaan jirin
libi sooma hoyateen.\(^5\)

The weapons which were used in the war (against colonialism) poetry was the heart and the leadership.

\(^5\) Mohamed Ibrahim Warsame "Hadrawi", *Hal-Karaan* (Oslo, Norway: GCS AS, 1993), pp.141-142. (Following translation is mine.)
A sleeping Somali people
she (poetry) aroused with hoobeey (rythm)...
Stones and the hangool\(^\text{86}\) and
the heello liberated them.
By God without the poet
victory would have been impossible.

Adan Af-Qalooc's classical poem was part of the "weapons used in the war" against
colonialism. So was the "heello". The 1940s was a period in which a dynamic "artistic activity"\(^\text{87}\)
spearheaded by the subaltern poets developed in the expanding towns. It was the subaltern who
played the key role in the development of artistic activities in the towns, and to be more exact, in
the invention of the belwo and heello,\(^\text{88}\) that is, modern poetry.

The belwo was the newest addition to the family of miniature poetry: wiglo, dhaanto, and
hirwo. What made the belwo and its family-sisters different from classical poetry was that the
belwo was composed in a miniature form; in other words, the belwo, unlike the classical poem,
was a short verse. The belwo could be just one line, or two lines, and never more than four lines.
Moreover, the common theme of the belwo was private, individual love. Classical poetry also
dealt with love. But the difference was that while classical poetry dealt with various topics, the
belwo dealt only with private, individual love. The belwo, furthermore, had a particular and

\(^{86}\) A stick about a yard long forked at one end, and hooked at the other end.


\(^{88}\) Ibid., ch.2.
unique melody to which it was sung, and which differentiated it from the wiglo, dhaanto, and hirwo.99

The belwo was invented, popularized, supported, and originated in the "society of the town-dweller,"90 or to be exact, in a particular section of the society of the town-dweller: lorry drivers, mechanics, paupers, dock workers, coolies, skilled artisans, that is, the subaltern. Indeed, the founder of the genre was a lorry driver from Borama, a man called Cabdi Deeqsi. Cabdi Deeqsi was born and bred in Borama. In the early 1940s, he found employment as a truck driver for Haji Hirsi, a Borama merchant. In 1943, the truck he was driving broke down in a place near Zeila. He then composed out of frustration the first belwo. He said:

Belwooy, hooy belwooy,
Waxa i belweeyey mooyaane,
Waxa i balweeyey baabuur.

Balwooy, hooy balwooy,
I am unaware of what is bothering me;
It is the lorry that is bothering me.91

The belwo was born. Upon arrival at Zeila, he recited the composition in public, and quickly won the admiration of the public, but a particular sector of the public--other lorry drivers, urban poor, and causal workers. The elite, in contrast, frowned upon the new singing tradition brought to Zeila by Cabdi Deeqsi. Nonetheless, other poets followed his footsteps and "began to

99 Ibid.
90 Ibid., p.16.
91 John W. Johnson, Heellooy, p.53. (I modified his translation slightly.)
compose in the new genre." But the opposition of the elite of the town, forced Cabdi Deeqsi to leave Zeila quickly, and to return to Borama while the truck was fixed. He never found out, however, whether the truck was repaired or not, for he became a professional artist. In Borama, his new invention gained approbation from the subaltern—his natural, so to speak, audience—and condemnation from the elite. But he and his followers were oblivious to the opposition of the notables of the town. They continued to compose new songs (belwo), and managed to make ends meet from their singing. They even formed a troupe which consisted of a "company of artists" which included female dancers and singers such as the notable poetess, Khadija Ciye, later well-known as Khadija "Belwo", and others such as Ibrahim Ciye, Aw Saad, Maryan, Xuseen Hadi, Xuseen Aare, Badloob, Dabshid, and Farah Suufi. Meanwhile, the troupe gained the admiration and support of some of the notables of the town, such as Haji Ahmed Naaleeye, Beergeel, and Barre, who supported the troupe financially. By 1946, the troupe was touring other towns, such as Hargeisa, Berbera, Jig-Jiga, and Burao. Everywhere it was successful in attracting attention, and admirers, and of course, in incurring the wrath of the elite.

Cabdi Deeqsi's invented new genre took hold in Hargeisa rather quickly but not without resistance. But the artists of Hargeisa could weather the criticism, and even flourish in the town, simply because Hargeisa had few advantages over Borama and Zeila. At the time Hargeisa was the centre of commerce and development of the country. It had the "largest circulation of money

92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
in the country...and the largest opportunity for employment." Moreover, Hargeisa was the most populated town in the country, and a large percentage of that population consisted of adult paupers, causal workers, and a "large surplus adolescent population," who formed the bulk of the supportive public of the new poetry. Hargeisa, in addition, had a radio station. Radio broadcasts were in the vernacular, since the government was anxious to communicate with the people orally in their language. And so programming was for the most part controlled by Somalis. In the radio a group called "Radio Hargeisa Artists" evolved which composed numerous belwo--such as Luul, Damaq, Higsad, Olol, Raaxiye, Beer Dillashe, Madiix, Leyla, Jalaaliye--and performed them on the air, and often life. Radio Hargeisa, then, became "one of the major devices for the spatial spread of modern poetry." Hargeisa artists--and in particular, Radio Hargeisa Artists--did not just popularize the belwo, they also modified it. First, they lengthened it by tacking one belwo to another. But gradually they transcended the belwo, and invented a new genre: the heello. The heello, unlike the belwo, was a long poem that dealt with love as well as other themes. It was capable of developing a theme to a greater extent than the "miniature and mega-miniature poems." In addition, the heello used a refrain, sung by a chorus, or repeated by the singer. But the refrain

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95 Ibid.
96 John W. Johnson, Heelmooy, p.49.
97 Ibid., p.16.
98 Ibid., p.17.
was not a set, similar to that used in the belwo; rather it was a refrain organic to each song and which often signalled the theme of the song. Finally, the heello used strict alliteration rules--like classical poetry--for the whole composition.99

The pioneer in the modification of the belwo and the invention of the heello was Abdullahi Qarshe. Qarshe was born in Tanganyika in 1924. In 1931 his family him sent to Aden for schooling. He finished intermediate school in 1944, and in 1945 moved to Somaliland where he found employment with the British Military Administration as a clerk. Three years later he set the first heello--composed by Yusuf Haji Adan, a teacher/poet--to music, and performed it life on radio Hargeisa.100 The title of the song was "Ka Kacaay" (Arise):

Wake up! Arise!
We were destroyed earlier.
Wake up! Arise!
Wake up! Arise!
Kooralay101 was burned.
Wake up! Arise!
A thousand of our generation were killed.
Wake up! Arise!
The infidels increased (in number).
wake up! Arise!
Christian churches were built.
Wake up! Arise!
Kama-kama came to govern us.102

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99 Ibid. (The development and sophistication of the heello continued through the 1950s and 1960s whence the heello, as Johnson put it, albeit with slight exaggeration, "was to rival traditional poems and raise the value of modern poetry to such an extent that the heello would replace the gabay in urban and elite societies." (Ibid,p.78.))

100 Ibid.,p.76.

101 The place where Sheikh Bashir was killed in 1945. (See section two of this chapter.)
Wake up! Arise!
Wake up! Arise!
He burned Kenya! 103
Wake up! Arise!
Wake up! Arise!
Four dogs.
Have met for us. 104
God who is Greater than they,
Will force them out (of our land).
Wake up! Arise!
Wake up! Arise!
Death is inevitable. 105
Wake up! Arise! 106

"Arise"—the first heello performed life on Radio Hargeisa—was political, and "ultrapartiotic." 107

Thereafter, nationalist "politics permeated the new poetry," particularly, after the signing of the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement.

102 Kama-kama (stutterer) was the nickname of Gerald Reece. He apparently stuttered, or at the least hesitated in his speech. The poem was composed in 1948 when Gerald Reece became the first civilian governor of the country in the post-British Military Administration period.

103 Gerald Reece was the district commissioner in the northern frontier district in Kenya in the 1920's, an area predominantly inhabited by Somalis. The allusion was to his presumably oppressive rule over Somalis in Kenya. The implicit warning was that he would do in Somaliland what he did in Kenya.

104 Four Power Commission that discussed the future of Italian Somalia.

105 An allusion to the Somali saying; "Waari mayside, war ha kaa hadho" (You won't live for ever, so you might as well leave heritage for posterity).

106 Quoted in John W. Johnson, Heellooy, p.79.

107 Ibid., p.77.

108 John Johnson, Heellooy, p.78.
"Poetic Combat" Against Colonial Rule

In 29 November 1954, the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement was signed under which one-third, or about 25,000 square miles—the Haud and the Reserved Area—of the territory of Somaliland was transferred to Ethiopian control. Consequently, the "former mood of quiescent acceptance of British Administration began to give place to increasingly urgent demands for fuller autonomy." Although the impact of the agreement can not be gainsaid, nevertheless, resistance to colonial rule in Somaliland did not begin in 1954. There had never been in Somaliland a "mood of acquiescent acceptance" to British rule. As already indicated, resistance to colonial rule took many forms such as the Somaliland Camel Corps Mutiny, the Sheikh Bashir rebellion, and the formation of various nationalist organizations and clubs in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Such acts testify to the continuity of resistance to colonial rule up to 1954. The agreement, nonetheless, was crucial in that it intensified the resentment of the masses towards colonial rule, and sharpened their nationalist sentiment.

Subaltern poets, artists, playwrights, and activists, such as Ali Sugule, Abdullahi Qarshe, Mohamed Ahmed Haji Ismail "Barkhad Cas", Yusuf Haji Adan, Abdullahi "Timacade", Hussein Aw Farah, and members of the Brothers of Hargeisa troupe, articulated the militant nationalism and popular anti-colonial consciousness of the public in numerous ultrapatriotic poems, such as,

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109 See chapter seven for a discussion of the political impact of the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement.

to mention a few, "Ka Kacaay" (Arise), "Inta Arligiyo" (While the Land), "Dhulkayaga" (Our Land), "Gartaa Naqa" (Judge that Issue), "Hadhuub" (Milk Vessel), "May Hoorin Hogoshi Dayreed" (The Spring Rain is Yet to Come), "Aan Ooyee Albaabka ii Xidha" (Close the Door so I Can Weep), "Ayaa Ila Ganbiya Guumeysiga" (Who Will Help Me Overthrow the Colonizer), "Qoloba Calankeeedu Waa Cayn" (Each Nation's Flag is Unique), "Gobanimo" (Independence), "Jowhara Luula" (a woman's name used in the poem as an allegory for the nation), "Hayaay" (Help), "Hayaan" (Journey).

Through modern (as well as classical poetry), the subaltern waged a "poetic combat" against colonial rule. The three central themes in the poetic combat of the modern poetry were love, death, and ressentiment: ressentiment towards colonial rule, love and self-sacrificing death for land and liberty. These themes and emotions were expressed in various guises and styles in classical and modern poetry, for instance, as a personal tragedy, where the poet "strips himself naked to study the history of his body" and to dissect the "heart of his people." Modern poetry was, as such then, allegorical, "where the telling of the individual story and the individual experience cannot but ultimately involve the whole laborious telling of the collectivity itself."


112 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), p.211.

113 Frederick Jameson, "Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism," cited in Homi K. Bhabha, "DissemiNation," in Homi K. Bhabha (ed), Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990), p.292. (Not all poetry composed in the late colonial period was an allegory of the nation. Thousands of classical poems were composed which had nothing to do with the nation, nationalism, or colonial rule. For a useful criticism of the idea that all third world literature is an allegory of the nation, see ....)
Within a week of the signing of the agreement, the Brothers of Hargeisa, produced a play entitled, "Ayaa Ila Ganbiya Gumeystaha" (Who Will Help Me Overthrow the Colonizer). The play was written by Ali Sugule. The song that was "the heart of the play," as Ali Sugule put it, was also entitled "Who Will Help Me Overthrow the Colonizer." The poet said:

Gayigan jirey gaalku ma lahayn  
Gandataday oo caradeeni way gedmatay  
Gabaabsi weeye oo galbataye  
Aan gaadhnee ma loo gurmadey....  
Gaashaan qaad xaqiisa lama gudbo  
Gadhkiyo wadnaha ina kala go'an  
Guul darro waa inakaa gacmaha madhan.  
Garaad isma dhaano gaalada  
Gugeenuna waa gudboonyahay  
Guul darro waa inakaa gacmaha madhan.  
Godobtii nin qirtay oo ku gawracay  
Gashigii diidan oo aan wax kaaga gudbeyn  
Gadaangadayaa gardaranaa.  
Ayaa guulahay gargaaraa?  
Ayaa garanaaaya gobanimo?  
Ayaa ila ganbiya gumeystaha?\(^{114}\)

Thus old land (Haud and Reserve Area) was never owned by the infidel (British).  
Our country is destroyed and parcelled out  
It is now small and taken over (by others)  
To recover it, we have to mobilize....  
The rights of a free man who can fight cannot be denied  
Yet our head and heart is severed  
Defeated we are empty-handed.  
We are equal with the infidels in intelligence.  
As well as in age (i.e., civilization and culture).  
Yet defeated we are empty-handed.  
A man who killed you and confessed guilt  
Yet refuses to pay blood money, and without anything separating him from you  
How arrogant.

\(^{114}\) Ali Sugule, "Xus iyo Xasuus."
Who seeks God's blessing?
Who loves liberty?
Who will Help Me overthrow the colonizer?

The beginning intention\textsuperscript{115} of the poem was "This old land" parcelled out by the British. It was a poem whose main import was to exhort the people towards a collective response of resistance to colonial rule. That call was articulated within a religious as well as a nationalist framework: on the one hand the love of "God's blessing" which meant essentially a holy war; on the other the love of "liberty", and the Somali people's equality in intelligence, civilization, and culture, with the "infidels." The poem, then, articulated the ressentiment of the people towards colonial rule and the partition of the land, asserted the equality of the Somali people with their oppressors, and called for the overthrow of the colonizer through holy war.

The poem was performed live on radio Hargeisa by Mohamed Ahmed "Kuluc". The arrangements for the performance was made by Abdullahi Qarshe who worked at the station. The district administration reacted harshly to the broadcast, and arrested Abdullahi Qarshe, the singer, and the musicians. They were released only after the song was broadcasted on the Somali programme of Radio Cairo. The administration was apparently not eager to transform the singers into national martyrs, and the song into a national slogan.\textsuperscript{116} Neither the poets, nor the singers and musicians, however, were intimidated. More often than not they directly attacked in verse the colonial administration. Sometimes, though, they used "sarbeeb" (symbolic language), as Ali


\textsuperscript{116} Ali Sugule, "Xus iyo Xasuus."
Sugule stated, to hide their message from the censors at Radio Hargeisa.\textsuperscript{117} The message was often expressed in terms of love. Thus a great many of modern poetry used against colonial rule were love poems. To use Barbara Harlow's words, "resistance poems can be read as love poems and vice versa, collapsing categories (nation/woman) and elaborating new strategies of expression"\textsuperscript{118} that could elude the censor, and mobilize public opinion for holy war. For instance, "Jowhara Luula", a song composed by Hussein Aw Farah in 1955, used symbolic language, and in particular, the language of the lover, to hide the implicit political message, a message which the public easily decoded, but the censor at Radio Hargeisa could not.\textsuperscript{119} The poet said:

\begin{quote}
Illeyn jaahil, jin iyo xoog ma lahoo intaan jiifay, waax ma lay jarayoo jabayoo, jilibis jeebka lay geliyoo jidhkaygii is galay, jidhiidhicaanoo jidboodayoo, dood jid dheer u maroo jirdahaan magansaday, imay jalino afkay iga soo jufeyeen.

jowhara luulaay,
jiidhka igu yaaleey,
Alla ma joogee
ma jeex dhan baa i maqan?

Jiidaal ma tawana, naf jeelaniyoo jeerooy hesho, sheyga ay jeceshahay Aroor walba, way jarmaadaayoo jidiinkaa i enegay, jirkoo da'ayoo anoon jidibkayga, soofaynoon jihaad gelin, jaalhay ka hadhoo jidbaadkaygu ma uu jiro.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Barbara Harlow, \textit{Resistance Literature}, p.44.
\textsuperscript{119} John W. Johnson, \textit{Heeloooy}, p.93.
The poet is a lover. His love, however, is unrequited. He is suffering because his beloved was betrothed, so to speak, to another man. He feels lost, shattered, shrivelled, and betrayed. The tree "trunk"--the elite--under which he sought solace and protection, meanwhile, attempted to "shut" him up and to silence the lover, instead of fighting for the lost land. But he is a lover not content to wallow in private self-pity. Rather he is ready to sharpen his "axe", and join his friends in a "Holy War" against those who took his beloved. Otherwise, his "deep sorrow" is but false. A War for the land: that was the message of the love song. There were many other love songs whose message was war for liberty, such as "Wiillo".

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120 Quoted in John W. Johnson, Heeloooy, pp.89-91.
"Wiillo," composed by Hussein Aw Farah in 1956, used symbolic language to hide its political message from the administration and the censor at Radio Hargeisa. The poet said:

Wiillooy waxan ahay wadaad lug la' oo
Wiillooy welinimo ku soo degay e
Wiillooy adna weer cad soo xidho.
Wiillooy waalidkaa war kuuma hayee
Wiillooy wacadkii ha beenayn.
Wiillooy adna weer cad soo xidho.
Wiillooy Warsamaa ku weheshanayee
Wiillooy hays cuniin waraabaha.
Wiillooy adna weer cad soo xidho.
Wiillooy fule waran ma qaabilo
Wiillooy wadnaaagu yuu baqan....
Wiillooy waxan kaa wacdiyayaa
Wiillooy wadhi inay ku raacaalyee
Wiillooy adna weer cad soo xidho.

O Wiillo\(^{121}\) I am a priest without one leg\(^{122}\)
O Wiillo I appeared in this world with otherworldly powers
O Wiillo wear the white vestment of mourning.\(^{123}\)
O Wiillo your parents are unaware of your danger\(^{124}\)
O Wiillo do not break the promise\(^{125}\) (we made)
O wiillo wear the white vestment of mourning.
O Wiillo Warsame\(^{126}\) keeps you company
O Wiillo do not allow the hyena\(^{127}\) to devour you.

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\(^{121}\) A panegyric name, derived from the Somali word "wiil" (boy), and means "The Girl-Who-Is-As-Honourable-Strong-Intelligent-as-a-Man." (Ibid., p.102, note 32.)

\(^{122}\) Missing leg signified the missing land.

\(^{123}\) Somalis wear a white cloth when in mourning. White colour, in other words, is a symbol of death in Somali culture.

\(^{124}\) Here the poet critiques the elite who are unaware of the travail of the people of the land. A similar criticism was made by Hussein Aw Farah in his poem, "Jowhara Luula."

\(^{125}\) The promise, presumably, of love and marriage.

\(^{126}\) Warsame is a Somali name. In the poem it functioned as a symbol of the British administration. Ibid, p.102, note 39.
O Wiillo wear the white vestment of mourning.
O Wiillo a coward does not face the spear
O Wiillo you heart must not fear
O Wiillo wear the white vestment of mourning.
O Wiillo I advice you against
O Wiillo of shame (by compromising yourself).
O Wiillo wear the white vestment of mourning.\(^{128}\)

"Wiillo" is a love poem, in which the woman addressed is an allegory for the people, while the "priest with one leg", and with special "otherworldly powers," was an allegory for the subaltern activists and poets who were willing, unlike her "parents" (i.e., the elite), to "face the spear." It is on the one hand a poem of mourning, of loss, of danger. The refrain of the poem is, after all, "O Wiillo wear the white vestment of mourning." On the other it is a hopeful poem in which the priest commits himself to avenge her, to uphold the "promise" they made, and to "face the spear" for her. But it is not only the on-legged priest who prepares to face the spear, she too must face the spear like a brave woman. The promise of betrothal and struggle was the promise of freedom.

Not all modern poetry, however, used "sarbeeb" (symbolic language) in the poetic combat waged against colonial rule. Poetic combat was more often than not waged in a direct fashion by the subaltern poets. A good example is "Hayaan" (Journey) composed by Ali Sugule in 1957. He began with a clear attack on the "horor" (predator, i.e., colonizer), and "gumeyste" (colonizer):

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\(^{127}\) The hyena was a symbol of the British administration in modern nationalist poetry. (Ibid., p.102, note 41.)

\(^{128}\) Ibid., pp.93-94. (Translation is his. I made minor adjustments in the translation.)
Hadaanan qaylo dheer hayaay odhan
Hororka celiyaay ku heelayn.
Hadaanan gumeyste waan la hudmee
Hanaqa iyo goyn halbawlaha.

If I don't make a call that can be heard everywhere
(by all the Somali people).
And sing, stop the predator (i.e., British).
Since I have suffered under the colonizer
If I don't cut off his heart and life.

In the first stanza of the poem, the poet committed himself in plain language to the
overthrow of the colonizer and to cut off his heart and life, i.e., end colonial rule as quickly as
possible. In the last stanza, he commits himself to the unification of all the Somali territories
under colonial rule through war:

Hadaanan shantu waa isku hidee
Hiilkiyo isku raacin hoodaba.
Hadaanan rabi baa haggajin karee
Hadhuub iyo siin hubka is wada.

Since all five\textsuperscript{129} share the same heritage
If I don't unify them through cooperation.
Since (ultimately only) God can help them all
If I don't assist them with wealth and arms.\textsuperscript{130}

The poet called for the unification of Somali people because they "share a common heritage,"
i.e., common language, culture, religion, and land. The shared culture of the Somali people, was
for the poet, the basis of the Somali nation and nationalism. His commitment was to unify the
Somali nation through holy war and cooperation. As such, the poet asserted his commitment for

\textsuperscript{129} Somaliland, Somalia, Djibouti, N.F.D., and Haud.

\textsuperscript{130} Cali Sugule, "Xus iyo Xasuus."
the struggle against colonial rule, and used the poem as a vehicle for identifying the whole Somali population as a group, as a people, as a nation, unified by a common culture, heritage, language, and history. The assertion of unity, was the assertion of the nation; the commitment to the struggle, was a commitment to nationalism, and in particular, to Pan-Somali nationalism.

By 1957, however, the nationalist movement in Somaliland—whether subaltern or elite—was in deep trouble. First, the elite failed to recover the disputed territories. Second, the cooperation between the elite and elite organizations came to an end as a result of their failure to recover the disputed territories. Third, the 1954-1955 civil wars finally came home to roost in the towns, so to speak, and led to the decline in public support for elite parties and organizations. The hitherto insurgent nationalist consciousness of the public was thereby displaced by tribal divisions, which the elite inflamed and manipulated for their own narrow political ends. Consequently, subaltern resistance became fragmented, and lost political momentum.

The subaltern poets did not merely watch helplessly the dissipation of the energy of grassroots revolt and insurgency. They attempted to reconstitute, so to speak, the political energy of the people. They composed various modern and classical poems, and staged many plays whose main import and message was the recovery of the spirit of revolt. According to Ali Sugule, subaltern poets composed poetry from 1957 onwards whose object was to "unify the people divided by parties" and tribal loyalties. In 1957, for instance, Ahmed Haji Ismail "Barkhad Cas" wrote "Dhalintii Wadankaanu Nahay" (We are the Youth of the Land), Ismail Sh.

131 See chapter seven for more detail.

132 Ali Sugule, "Xus iyo Xasuus."
Ahmed "Cagaf-Cagaf" wrote "Dhulkayaga" (Our Land), and Yusuf Haji Adan composed "Motherland's Liberation", in order to revive the spirit of revolt of the people, and to redirect the attention of the public away from tribal politics and antagonisms, towards national unity and anti-colonial resistance. And so they expressed in the poems --whether modern or classical--a profound self-sacrificing love for the nation, rather than for a party, or a tribe. Yusuf Haji Adan, for instance, said:

For the sake of a camel looted
ten of your compatriots you murder
yet, you throw no stone
for your motherland's liberation. 133

And Mohamed Haji Ismail "Barkhad Cas" stated that he and his fellow young men and women of the country have decided to die for the country, for the motherland, and not for either looted camels, or a party, or a tribe. He said:

Dhalintii wadankiyo dhulkaanu nahay
Dhabood iyo dhidig wax meel dhiganoo
Inaan dhimano iyo inaanu dhacsano
Maantanay waxba nooga dhaxayn.

We are the youth of the land
Female and male we have reached a decision
To die or to recover (our lost liberty)
Today we have no other choice. 134

Benedict Anderson argued that the biography of the nation is always structured by death:

exemplary suicides, poignant martyrdoms, executions, wars, holocausts. The death of martyrs are


134 Ali Sugule, "Xus iyo Xasuus." (Translation is mine.)
always, according to nationalists, what made the nation. It is always, moreover, what is most feverishly remembered, or if it suits the purpose of the nation, forgotten. The two poems discussed above, similarly, focused on death: on either an aimless death that must be forgotten and never repeated, or a more useful and promising death: the death for the nation, the self-sacrificing death of the youth for land and liberty. Ismail Sh. Ahmed "Cagaf-Cagaf" wrote his poem, "Dhulkayaga" (Our Land) in the same vein. He said:

Our country, our country,
We will die for our country.
The youth and children,
The elders who waited a long time
We are united for it;
We are all united for it.
We will die for our country.
Our country, our country,
We will die for our country.
That we would spill blood,
That we would kill for it.
We swear, we swear.
We will die for our country.
Our country, our country,
We will die for our country.
It is our birth place,
And we are its brave children.
Difficulty and hardship,
Difficulty and hardship,
We will protect from our country.
Our country, our country,
We will die for our country.
One who is not proud of it is crazy,
And deaf as well, and deaf as well.
We will die for our country.
Our country, our country,

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We will die for our country.\(^\text{136}\)

Another poem composed in November 1958 by Mohamed Haji Ismail "Barkhad Cas", "Aan Ooyee Albaabka li Xidha" (Close the Door So I Can Weep), used the theme of death as a way of exhorting the people to arise and overthrow the colonial regime. The story he tells, however, is his own personal story and his own symbolic death through which he retells the misfortune of the collectivity. He said:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Awowgey ninkii indhaha tiray} \\
\text{Ninkii aabahay adoonsaday} \\
\text{Ninkii anigana i iibsaday} \\
\text{Ninkii ifka igu aduun tirey} \\
\text{Iidaan li'i baa ishaa i biddee} \\
\text{Hadaan ogohoon ka aarsan kareyn} \\
\text{Hadaan Adanow unuunka jarayn} \\
\text{Ninkaa araggiisa uurkaan ka nebcee} \\
\text{Aan ooyee albaabka ii xidha.} \\
\text{Isagoo Iglan jooga buu i diloo} \\
\text{Ushuu soo fidshay baa i iimaysoo} \\
\text{Waa taa aramidu i oofa tirtaye} \\
\text{Asaag li'i baa ishaa i biddee} \\
\text{Ninkaa aragiisa uurkaan ka nebcee} \\
\text{Aan ooyee albaabka ii xidha.} \\
\text{Araladii ka samroo adduun ma hayee} \\
\text{Hadii la ilaashay afkaygii} \\
\text{Hadaanan ikhtiyaar aqoontay hadlayn} \\
\text{Hadaanan erey qudha shirkaa odhanayn} \\
\text{Ninkaa aragisaa uurkaan ka nebcee} \\
\text{Aan ooyee albaabka ii xidha.} \\
\text{Wixii arineen Ilahay jecleyn} \\
\text{Hadaanan adimada ku oolin karayn} \\
\text{Aayadaha Qur'aanka wada aragtoo} \\
\text{Udgoonena yidhi indhaha ka qarshee} \\
\text{Ninkaa aragiisa uurkaan ka nebcee} \\
\text{Aan ooyee albaabka ii xidha....} \\
\text{Waa kaa Ingriis iihda hayee}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{136}\) Quoted in John W. Johnson, *Heeleooy*, pp.81-82. Translation is his.
Idina u dabaal degayee adhiyahow
Ayyan nina odha Soomaalan ahee
Orodoo magacana ka iibsada. 137

The man who blinded my grandfather
The man who subjugated my father
The man who bought me
The man who made me a pauper in this world
It is for the lack of nutrition that I look like this (haggardly)
If I know all that yet I cannot avenge myself
If my dear Adan I cannot cut off his head
I hate that man's sight from the heart
Close the door so I can weep.
While he was in England he killed me
The cane he stretched (from England) made me an invalid
Its effects had broken my ribs
It is the death of my generation (killed by the English)
that made me look like this
I hate that man's sight from the heart
Close the door so I can weep.
I have given up on this land and I don't have wealth
If they are watching what I am saying
If I cannot speak my mind freely
If I cannot say a single word to that meeting
I hate that man's sight from the heart
Close the door for me so I can weep.
Something that unsightly to God
If I cannot clean it with my feet
You have heard the Quran
And the Prophet said you must not look at it
I hate that man's sight from the heart
Close the door so I can weep....
The English are roaring (like a lion)
And you, like sheep, celebrate for them
None of you should say I am a Somali
And must as well sell your (Somali) name
to him (the English).

137 Ibid., pp. 88-89. (Translation below is mine.)
The beginning intention of the poem is personal and genealogical: the "blinding" of his grandfather; the subjugation of his father; and his own pauperism, haggardliness, emaciated body, kinlessness, poverty, hopelessness, and "death" under colonial rule. The familial experience was the basis of his ressentiment towards colonial rule which was again and again expressed in the refrain of the poem: "I hate that man's sight/Close the door so I can weep."

If the poet's familial story is an allegory of the nation, the "man" is also an allegory of the colonial system and imperial idea. The "man" subjugated the poet: "While he was in England he killed me/The cane he stretched (from England) made me an invalid/Its effects had broken my ribs." The "man", then, is not merely the actual administrators of the territory, but the whole colonial system directed from England. For the poet, the struggle is, therefore, a national one: one directed against the British colonial empire. The basis of that struggle is the Somali national identity constituted on the one hand by Islamic culture—the Quran (Muslim Holy Book) and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, and on the other by the common language, mythology, and traditions that the people shared. For the poet, that culture enjoins the people to "cleanse", that is, overthrow, that which is "unsightly" to the nation, i.e., that which violates the Somali national identity, and the sovereignty of the nation. War for liberation, in sum, was the main message of the poem. The people, however, instead of defending their identity and rights, cheer on the roaring lion like "sheep". So disappointed is the poet, that he insists that the people must never call themselves "Somali": "None of you should say I am a Somali." The "Somali" identity was for the poet a political stance, a stance against the "man" and against colonial rule.
Death and love—self-sacrificing death and love for liberty and nation—were the twin themes of resistance poetry to colonial rule. The object of the poetic combat the subaltern poets waged against colonial rule was to foment mass action and mass revolt, to make, as Gerald Reece feared, the "country untenable." Gerald Reece feared a "clash with Somali nationalism", a nationalism, as argued in this chapter, that was articulated in a militant fashion by the subaltern. Gerald Reece stated with apprehension that "There are about two million Somalis but they might be quite an embarrassment to the nations concerned," that is, to nations that control Somali territories. Gerald Reece's fear of mass nationalism of the "two million Somalis" was what the subaltern poets were striving to mobilize and harness against colonial rule. They wanted the country to become "untenable," to recover the lost territories, and to undermine the authority, influence, and power of the colonial administration.

The poetic combat that subaltern poets waged against colonial rule and colonial hegemony was not an isolated resistance. It took place within the general framework of subaltern resistance: the revolt against the anti-locust programme of the government, the Sheikh Bashir rebellion, and the Somaliland Camel Corps Mutiny. These mass actions, though fragmented, and though unsuccessful in overthrowing the colonial regime, nevertheless, articulated rural and urban radicalism, and the militant anti-colonial nationalist sentiment of the Somali folk. Such resistance played a key role in the processes of decolonization. The fear of mass revolt was, indeed, a key factor in forcing the imperial government to formally grant Somaliland its

138 PRO, C.O.537/7207, Gerald Reece to Sir Philip Mitchell, 22 March 1951.

139 Ibid.
independence in 26 June 1960. But there were other factors, as the following concluding chapter maintains, which made it necessary for the imperial government to decolonize the society.
CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION: MASS EDUCATION AND COLONIAL HEGEMONY

This thesis delineated the various ways that during the era of decolonisation the British administration constructed and reinforced colonial cultural hegemony in the Somaliland Protectorate. The argument appears at first sight to be paradoxical. But there is nothing paradoxical about it. After all, throughout the British colonial empire, the power of colonial administrations and states were "expanding at the very time that the pressure for decolonisation was reaching its height."¹ The impetus behind the expansion of the powers of colonial states and administrations were many.

First and foremost, the British were anxious to hang on to their empire as long as possible. The traditional argument² that the British empire and the imperial idea were weakened by the Second World War and the emergence of the two anti-colonial world powers--(the former) Soviet Union and the United States--and consequently the British were anxious to decolonise their empire, had been recently challenged.³ P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins argued that although

Great Britain was weakened by the war, and even though the pressures on the empire from within and without intensified in the post-war period, nonetheless, Great Britain still had wide ranging ambitions as a great power, and had the financial resources to still play a role in the world. Indeed, Great Britain's role in the world stage increased in the post-war period through its domination of the financial markets. Thus, the decolonization of the empire was not a foregone conclusion. Second, the British were eager not merely to hold on to their empire, but to prove to the world that the colonial empire was beneficial to the colonized peoples and societies. Hence, the extension of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1945. The act was passed by the British Parliament in 1940. At the time the main object of the act was to make the resources of the colonies available for the British war effort. But in the post-1945 period, the Colonial Development and Welfare programmes were used for other objectives. One, to make the sterling area competitive with the dollar area. Two, to develop the resources of the colonies in order to integrate their economies even more closely to that of Great Britain. Three, to develop the colonies in order to weaken the anti-colonial propaganda of nationalists, and the socialist countries. Four, to construct and reinforce colonial hegemony. In sum, development and the construction of hegemony were deeply intertwined in imperial policies in the post-war period.

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The construction and reinforcement of hegemony in the colonies in the post-war period had been characterised as the "Second Colonial Occupation." Such occupation was spearheaded not by political officers, administrators, and soldiers, but by veterinarians, agronomists, soil engineers, technical experts, forestry specialists, film-makers, nurses, medical doctors, anthropologists, researchers, and teachers. The "White-Man-as expert," in other words, spearheaded the second colonial occupation. The increased role in the colonies of the "White-Man-as expert", took place within the framework of a single policy and programme: "mass education", a policy articulated and formulated in 1943 by the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies.

Mass education had three overarching objectives: "(1) the improvement of the health and living conditions of the people; (2) the improvement of their well-being in the economic sphere; (3) the development of political institutions and political power until the day arrives when the people can become effectively self-governing." The policy stressed formal and informal education, or education for citizenship, public health, political reform, and community
development, which had been discussed in four empirical chapters in this thesis. These programmes were utilitarian. But they also had specific cultural and political objective, which the committee defined as the control of the "explosive temper" of mass consciousness. Mass consciousness, the committee maintained, "can only be controlled and guided by wisely directed mass education with particular stress on the development of social and civic responsibility."\(^{10}\)

The "development of social and civic responsibility" essentially meant the development of relations of hegemony based on persuasion and consent rather than on coercion. Institutions of coercion, such as the army and police, were not ignored. They were always ready to suppress resistance and other acts of deviance. But the main emphasis of the imperial government and the local administration was on using civic institutions to bring about a relations based on hegemony rather than on pure naked violence. Civic responsibility was to be brought about, therefore, through the establishment of civic and cultural institutions within the framework of mass education. Its main object was to reconcile the people with colonial rule, to develop a new class of educated Somalis that could collaborate with the administration and transmit western modernity to the public, to extend services to the general public which would popularise the colonial administration, to make the territory economically viable, and to develop political and civic institutions through which the people could articulate their demands or frustrations in a civil and responsible manner. Colonel F. R. W. Jameson, the Chief of Civil Affairs of the East African Command, argued in 1943 that medical, educational, civic institutions, and other

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\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 7.
services must be expanded in Somaliland, for they are "as desirable from a political point of view, as from a humane one." He added, if we fail to expand such services, "we are neglecting to avail ourselves of one of the most powerful sources of popularising the Government, and identifying the administration with the people's welfare." The identification of the administration with the people's welfare was taken so seriously by colonial officers that Governor Gerald Reece insisted

at one time most of the people in the country thought the government was an enemy which must be suspected and opposed, but now most sensible people realise that the government is their own government and that the British do in fact intend to make a Somali government as soon as it is possible to do so. Therefore the government is not like a foreign enemy but it is something belonging to the country and to the Somali people which the people must not oppose. They must help to make it better.12

The ambition of the government, therefore, was to transform itself into "something belonging to the country and to the Somali people." The administration failed in achieving such a lofty objective. The ontological difference between the Somali and the British administrator made the foreignness of the administration "embarrassingly obvious"13 and made impossible the

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naturalization of colonial rule. As with any hegemony, then, colonial cultural hegemony in Somaliland was incomplete.\textsuperscript{14}

The administration, nonetheless, established "one of the most powerful techniques of hegemony: the cooption of an upper stratum of natives,"\textsuperscript{15} through formal and informal schooling, and modern political institutions, as discussed in chapters three and five. Gerald Reece's "sensible people" were in fact the elite, who cooperated and collaborated with the colonial regime, and who often acted as the most important advocates of mass education in their various capacities as members of the Protectorate Advisory Council, Local Government Councils, Education Committees, Community Centres, Community Development organizations, Civil Service, Legislative Council, and Executive Council.

This "sensible people" though coopted, nevertheless, resisted colonial rule. Their resistance, however, was ideologically weak and politically ineffective. Ideologically, elite resistance was weak because the elite accepted the idea and culture of (European) modernity. Anne Godlewaska defined modernity as a "profound faith in rational (scientific) thought; a commitment to and belief in universal principles of social organization (encompassing religion, government, and economic organization); an intolerance and suspicion of religious experience and modes of explanation; and a deep conviction that European traditions of science, technology,

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p.81.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p.32.
art and government are demonstrably superior to all other."\footnote{16} Central to this process, she added, was the "ascendency of the centralized, rationalized and controlling state."\footnote{17} If in Europe, the central source of the idea and culture of modernity were the enlightenment, the development of capitalist forms of production, and the rise of the bourgeoisie state, in Somaliland, the source of the idea and culture of modernity was mass education, and the centralized and bureaucratic administration that mass education spawned in the late colonial period.

The acceptance of the elite of the idea and culture of modernity made elite resistance, ironically, a modernizing resistance. E. J. Hobsbawm argued that "Elite resistance to the west remained a westernizing resistance even when it opposed westernization on grounds of religion, morality, ideology or political pragmatism."\footnote{18} The elite, then, supported the mass education programmes of the administration, because they were anxious to introduce the idea and practices of western modernity—education, medicine, technology, art, government—to the country which they viewed, like the colonial administrators and colonial experts, as backward, underdeveloped, and poor. Hence, they supported the idea of producing a "climate of opinion in which the confidence in the findings of science will grow,"\footnote{19} help the "battle for production"\footnote{20} in

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agriculture, fisheries, and pastoralism, and reinforce controls over the explosive temper of mass consciousness with which the elite was as uncomfortable with, and fearful of, as were the administrators of the protectorate. The aggressive modernism of the elite, in short, made them deeply complicit in the process through which colonial cultural hegemony was constructed and reinforced in Somaliland in the late colonial period.

Politically, moreover, the elite were weak. Their weakness was a reflection of the palpable contradictions between modernity and tradition, national sentiment and tribal feeling, affiliation and filiation. These contradictions divided the elite and nationalist organizations, and rendered them without a consistent public support or mass following. That made the elite even more dependent on the administration and the various official political institutions in which they participated. In sum, the political and ideological weaknesses of the elite made elite contestation of colonial hegemony ineffective. Moreover, since the elite became more and more dependent on official political institutions, the administration was able to coopt the elite even more effectively, and thus reinforce colonial hegemony.

If the elite collaborated with the colonial regime actively, the subaltern poets, playwrights, and activities waged a fierce resistance against colonial hegemony, as discussed in chapter eight. Though not against modernism, the subaltern were against western modernity. For

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20 Ibid.

21 I have borrowed the idea of filiation and affiliation from Edward W. Said, The World, the Text and the critic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
the subaltern, the "basic problem was modernity not modernism." The subaltern poets, for instance, eagerly adapted new forms of expression, such as the drama, or modern musical instruments, literacy and other mechanical forms of reproduction. By the same token, they were opposed to the wholesale adoption of western modernity: systems of government, art, technology, life-style, values, beliefs. In the end, though, subaltern poets, playwrights, and activists, were unable to mobilize the masses against the colonial regime, or convince them to view western modernity as a foreign system unsuited to the peculiar conditions of Somaliland.

The main reason the people were unwilling to heed the call of the poets and activities in the late colonial period, was that the traditional mode of life declined, as discussed in chapter two, and referred to throughout the thesis. The decline of the environment, the recurrence of droughts, the increase in pauperism, the fall in the value of local products, and the rise in the cost of living, forced the masses, and in particular the pastoralists, to entertain, and in principle welcome, the mass education policies of the administration. The attractiveness of mass education programmes to them was obvious. The programmes stressed the protection of the environment, the dissemination of new ideas and practices, education, and community development. If the pastoralists maintained in the early colonial period a "notable record of resistance to the blessings and liabilities" of western civilization, in the late colonial period they became anxious for social and economic development, and eager to embrace western ideas.\(^{23}\) The decline in the traditional


mode of life, in sum, made the pastoralists vulnerable to western cultural influence and domination.
APPENDIX A
FORMAL (POLITICAL) DECOLONIZATION

In 1949, the British Imperial Cabinet discussed constitutional development in small territories. The Cabinet decided that unlike large territories with the potential to build viable economies and achieve independence, or small territories likely to form federations and thus capable of achieving self-government and independence sometime in the future, small territories, such as the Somaliland protectorate and twenty-four other territories, must remain for the foreseeable future dependent on, and under the control of, Great Britain. The same decision was yet again reached by the Cabinet in 1954. It was decided that territories such as Somaliland "are never likely to achieve full independence." Another Cabinet discussion on colonial territories in 1956 reached the same conclusion. Lord Lloyd, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, who visited Somaliland in 1956, even refused to discuss with the political elite of the country

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1 PRO, CAB 129/33/2, CP (49) 62, Constitutional Development in Smaller Colonial Territories, a Cabinet Memorandum by Creech Jones, 10 March 1949.


3 PRO, CAB 134/1203, (CP) (0) (56) 10, Small Colonial Territories, Cabinet Memorandum by Lennox-Boyd, 27 September 1956.

4 For a discussion of the visit, see below.
the possibility of granting independence to Somaliland.\(^5\) For him such a proposition was impractical and far fetched. Even as late as May 1958, and despite various internal and external pressures, the administration set up a schedule for the granting of "Full self-government", not independence, to the territory in 1965.\(^6\) Simply put it, the British Imperial Cabinet had no intention of granting independence to Somaliland for the foreseeable future.

The British Imperial Cabinet, however, abruptly reversed its position on Somaliland in 1959. Various factors—both internal and external—played a key role in the reversal of Cabinet policy: first, the approaching independence of the Trustee Territory of (Italian) Somalia (July 1960); Second, the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement under which the Haud and the Reserved Area were transferred to Ethiopian control; and third, long-term British strategic, economic, and political interests in Somaliland, and the Horn of Africa in general.

The 1949 United Nations resolution to return Somalia to Italian control as a Trustee Territory\(^7\) with a firm date of independence (1 July 1960) undermined British interests and policies in Somaliland and, in general, in the Horn of Africa. First, the resolution marked the formal defeat of Lord Bevin's Greater Somalia plan. Second, it set a bad precedent for

\(^5\) PRO, CAB 129/82, (CP) (56)80, Report by Lord Lloyd On His Visit to Somaliland, May 1956.

\(^6\) PRO, C.O.830/17/15920, Constitutional Progress: Memorandum by the Acting Chief Secretary, P. Carrell, 23 May 1958. (For a discussion of the schedule see chapter five.) See also PRO, 830/18/15920, Financial Secretary, "Financial Arrangements and Constitutional Advances," May 1958.

\(^7\) See chapter seven for a discussion of Lord Bevin's Greater Somalia plan, its failure, and the return of Somalia to Italian trusteeship for a limited period—from 1950 to 1960.
Somaliland which the Cabinet had decided, after the Greater Somalia plan failed, to maintain under British influence and control for the foreseeable future.

Even more damaging to British interests and policies in Somaliland was the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement. The agreement, as discussed in chapters seven and eight, sharpened the nationalism and the resentment of the people towards colonial rule. It was the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, that rescued the elite from political oblivion, and mobilized the masses. The agreement, for instance, made possible the unity of the elite and the formation of the National United Front in 1955, whose sole mandate was to campaign for the return of the Haud and the Reserved Area to Somaliland. The National United Front focused its campaign on the international arena: on the World Court and the United Nations Organization. The strong feelings generated by the agreement and the plan of the National United Front to take the issue to international arbitration worried British policy makers at the highest level.

Lord Lloyd, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, was dispatched in 1956 to Somaliland in order to assess the situation for the Cabinet. His report was anything but comforting. He stated that the issue had galvanized public opinion and made the leadership of the National United Front determined to take the issue to the World Court at The Hague, and the United Nations. He added that the leadership of the NUF was confident that they could win the case in international institutions. Although he called their plans over-optimistic, he nevertheless appreciated and worried about the problems and embarrassments such a strategy could cause
Great Britain in its relation with Ethiopia and the United States. A. T. Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in addition, worried about the examination in the International Court and the United nations of British-Ethiopian agreements and treaties which Somaliland would inherit if it became independent and maintained its independence.

Great Britain attempted to resolve both issues—the problems created by the 1949 U.N. resolution and the 1954 agreement—diplomatically in 1956. First, Selwyn Lloyd, the Secretary of State for foreign affairs, attempted to convince the Italians to postpone the independence of the Trusteeship Territory of Somalia to a later and unspecified date. The idea was to negate the bad precedent that the U.N. resolution set for Somaliland. Although Italy was receptive to the idea of extending its hold over Somalia, the problem became how to rescind the 1949 U.N. resolution and gain the approval of the General Assembly. Both Great Britain and Italy in the end recoiled from the negative fallout of the debate in the general assembly on the motion of the extension of Italian Trusteeship over Somalia. Second, Great Britain sought to convince Ethiopia to return the Reserved Area and the Haud to Somaliland. Two incentives were offered to Ethiopia: (i) £5 million in gold and (ii) either a corridor to the Gulf of Aden through a small strip in western Somaliland, or a corridor to the Indian Ocean through a small strip in the Northern Frontier.

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8 PRO, CAB 129/82, (CP) (56) 80 Report by Lord Lloyd on his Visit to Somaliland, May 1956.

9 PRO, CAB 129/82, (CP) (56) 180, Somaliland Protectorate and the Horn of Africa, Cabinet Memorandum by Lennox-Boyd, 1956.

10 PRO, CAB 129/81, (CP) (56) 130 Somalia: Cabinet Memorandum by Selwyn Lloyd on the Prospects of Extending Italian Trusteeship, 29 May 1956.
District. The idea was to entice Ethiopia to give up the Haud and the Reserved Area in exchange for an Ethiopian foothold in either the Gulf of Aden or the Indian Ocean plus cash. The Ethiopians rejected the Northern Frontier District out of hand, but discussed the corridor through western Somaliland and even produced a map that specified the area they wanted. In the end though the negotiations stalled and failed to produce any significant results.

The failure of the diplomatic overture of the British was complicated by the conclusions reached by the Cabinet and the British Chief of Staff with respect to the importance of Somaliland. The Cabinet came to the conclusion in discussions with the Chiefs of Staff that Somaliland was of great strategic value to western defence in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, and in the containment of communism. The Cabinet also came to the conclusion that the oil potential and mineral resources of Somaliland were significant enough to warrant exploitation. The dilemma that faced the Cabinet was how to maintain western influence over Somaliland in the future, establish bases there, exploit its oil resources, and at the same time resolve the issue of the disputed territories with Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{11} When the diplomatic manoeuvres failed to resolve the main problems that faced the cabinet, new avenues were explored.

Two strategies were followed. First, Selwyn Lloyd suggested the diversion of the attention of the leaders of the N.U.F. and the Somali National League (S.N.L.) with other issues such as political reform.\textsuperscript{12} The second and more ingenious strategy was proposed by Lennox-

\textsuperscript{11} PRO, CAB 129/80, CP (56) 84, The Horn of Africa: Joint Cabinet Memorandum by Selwyn Lloyd and Lennox-Boyd on Security Problems, 25 March 1956; PRO, CAB 19/81, CP (56) 109, Strategic Importance of Somaliland: Cabinet Memorandum by Chiefs of Staff, 1 May 1956.

\textsuperscript{12} Chapter five.
Boyd who simply delved into British diplomatic archives and suggested the creation of a federation between Somaliland and Somalia. He revived, in other words, the idea of Greater Somalia to resolve the problems created by the 1954 agreement.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, Greater Somalia would be brought under western influence—in fact he proposed a joint British, Italian and American concert over "Greater Somalia", and even considered impolitic to exclude Ethiopia from such a concert—its resources would be exploited by western powers, and bases would be established there.\textsuperscript{14} The rationale behind the proposal was that if Greater Somalia was formed, Somaliland disappeared as an independent state, and the Anglo-Somali treaties were abrogated,\textsuperscript{15} then the problem of the Anglo-Ethiopian treaties could be side-stepped at the least in the near future, even though it was clearly recognized that such a policy would create in the future an explosive situation, or as Margery Perham put it, a "promising brew"\textsuperscript{16} in the region.

Lennox-Boyd's proposal, which the Cabinet accepted, necessitated the granting of independence to Somaliland in 1960 to coincide with the date of independence of the Trusteeship Territory. The process of granting independence to Somaliland was managed at three discreet stages. First, Lennox-Boyd, went on tour of the country in February 1959 and made a prepared statement, which he publicly read, and which was broadcasted on Radio Hargeisa. He stated that

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\textsuperscript{13} PRO, CAB 129/82, CP (56) 180, Somaliland Protectorate and the Horn of Africa: Cabinet Memorandum by Lennox-Boyd Advocating the Creation of Greater Somalia, 25 July 1956.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} See below on the abrogation of the Anglo-Somali treaties.

\textsuperscript{16} "The Horn of Africa," \textit{Corona} (June 1958).
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Her Majesty's Government "thought it right to pay special regard to the fact that the neighbouring territory of Somalia is due to become independent" and thus proceed with constitutional development in the protectorate at a "faster rate." He promised that the new Governor, Sir Douglas Hall, would begin constitutional development immediately and that by 1960 there would be an elected Legislative Council with an official majority of natives possessing executive responsibilities. Thereafter, Her Majesty's Government would take all the necessary steps that would lead to internal "self-government" for the protectorate. He concluded, with rather exaggerated solemnity, that her Majesty's Government "is aware of the desire expressed by many Somalis in the protectorate that there should be a closer association between this territory and Somalia" and that Her Majesty's Government would "arrange for negotiations of a suitable nature" for the formation of the association.\(^{17}\) The effect of the statement on elite opinion was analyzed by the Local Intelligence Committee. The committee predicted that the elite would applaud the statement and that they will claim credit for forcing the British government to grant internal self-government to the territory.\(^{18}\) Neither Lennox-Boyd, nor the Local Intelligence Committee, nor the Governor, begrudged the elite their symbolic victory.\(^{19}\)


\(^{18}\) PRO, C.O. 830/19, Constitutional Reform—Assessment of Probable Reactions to Secretary of State's Speech: Memorandum by the Local Intelligence Committee, 2 February 1959.

\(^{19}\) Sir, Douglas Hall "Somaliland's Last Year as a Protectorate," *African Affairs*, vol. 60 (January 1961).
Second, on 2 May 1960, the imperial government invited leaders of Somaliland to a constitutional conference in London. The Somaliland delegation was led by Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, the Leader of Government Business in the Legislative Council, Minister of Local Government, and the President of the Somali National League (S.N.L.), and Sir Douglas Hall, the Governor of the territory. A delegation from Somalia was also present in the conference. But the Somalia delegation were observers, and not participants, in the conference. During the conference, the Somaliland delegation pressed "for their country's independence, to be followed at once by secession from the Commonwealth and union with its larger neighbour."20 They were surprised by how quickly the British government acceded to their demands. Indeed, their call for the independence of Somaliland was already conceded by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Macleod, in a statement he made to the "Times" on 5 May.21 That decision was formally submitted to the conference on 6 May by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The decision called for the independence of Somaliland on 25 June, and then the formation of a union between Somaliland and Somalia on 1 July 1960.22 The imperial government, however, insisted on one stipulation before formally agreeing to the independence of Somaliland: the abrogation of the 1884 and 1886 Anglo-Somalia treaties,23 under which Great Britain agreed never to cede any Somali territory to any other power. I. M. Lewis noted the British insistence on this stipulation


21 Ibid.

22 PRO, F.O.371/146967, "Secret" by E. B. Boothby, 6 May 1960.

23 For a brief discussion of the treaties see chapter two.
with wonder. He wrote, "What is of particular interest here is that the British government should have felt it appropriate and necessary to make this stipulation: earlier British governments had shown little scruple in acting unilaterally against the intention and content of these same treaties." But the British government had to make this stipulation, and insist in particular that a "Council of Elders" abrogate the treaties, because those treaties were violated by the Anglo-Ethiopian treaties, and in particular, the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement. The Somaliland delegation agreed to the stipulation.

On 12 May, the conference ended with the signing of a report by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, which formally specified the date of independence of Somaliland (25 June 1960), and its union with Somalia (1 July 1960). On 19 May, the Somaliland delegation returned to Hargeisa. They were met at the airport by about 3,000 people, and ninety vehicles followed them to the town. In addition, about 10,000 people lined the streets of the town. They were described as "one of the most cheerful and peaceful crowds ever seen in Hargeisa."

Third, a conference was arranged between delegates from Somaliland and Somalia in Mogadisho at the end of May, as Lennox-Boyd promised in his February 1959 statement. The conference lasted for sixteen days. The Somalia delegation was headed by Adan Abdulla Osman,

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25 Ibid.


and the Somaliland delegation was led by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. At the end of the conference the delegations signed a joint communiqué which said "Somalia and the Somaliland Protectorate shall be united on July 1, 1960."  

Neither Somaliland nor Somalia were prepared for union. Indeed the leaders of the two territories had confused ideas about what the association between the two territories entailed, or whether it was desirable. The issue was discussed in both Somaliland and Somalia. As late as February 1960, for instance, the leaders of the Somali National League (S.N.L.) and the United Somali Party (U.S.P.) agreed to amalgamate their parties on the condition that the demands for independence were halted. The stipulation was insisted upon by the leaders of U.S.P. in "order to put a brake on what they might fear would be overhasty demands for independence by the Somali National League." The leader of the S.N.L., Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, accepted the condition. The elite of Somaliland, as such then, had no plans for either independence or union as late as February 1959. Lennox-Boyd's February announcement, however, changed the programme of the elite, and forced them to become committed to independence, and to consider the issue of the association with Somalia.

In Somalia, the date of independence was already set. Hence, no notable political struggle for, or debate on, independence took place. The main issue that the political elite debated was whether the two territories should unite and under what conditions. The leader of the

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government, and the president of the Somali Youth League, Abdullahi Issa, expressed throughout 1959 a "lukewarm approach towards the future association of the two territories." He was not completely opposed to the idea, but his support was lukewarm at best. Abdullahi Issa never changed his attitude towards the union. He even repressed and persecuted "pro-Islamic and pro-nationalist elements" in the country, and in particular, the Greater Somalia League, which was led by Haji Mohamed Hussein. The leader of the Greater Somalia League was committed to Greater Somalia. The break out of riots in Mogadisho in 2 March 1960, and attacks against Italian residents, led to the overthrow of Abdullahi Issa. He was replaced by Adan Abdulla Osman, a committed Pan-Somalist.

In Somaliland, the idea of Greater of Somalia became unpopular between 1947 to 1954, as discussed in chapter seven. The idea, however, was redeemed politically as a result of the 1954 agreement. Thereafter, the idea became politically popular. But not universally so. Moreover, no one thought systematically about the issue: what it entailed, and what sort of compromises between the two territories would be necessary for bringing the union into fruition. The issue was in fact hardly debated at all. Even Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, had what P. Carrel, the Secretary to the Government, termed an "imprecise" thinking on the subject of union. He wanted, Carrel stated, to form a "Supreme Council" which would govern the two territories for at the


least five years. Both territories would have equal members in the Council, and the Legislative Councils of the two territories would not be amalgamated, but would function as two separate governing bodies for the two regions. "During this limited period the new constitution for the united stage would be framed."³²

In the end, though, the process of creating "Greater Somalia" followed the schedule set up, and devised by, Lennox-Boyd. And Egal, with his typical "imprecise" thinking on the union, and on virtually everything else, was simply carried on by events. Somaliland became independent on 26 June 1960, and just four days later formed the desired union with Somalia. Greater Somalia was finally created by the British, albeit a smaller version than the one Lord Bevin campaigned for in the 1940s. It was much less than a union, however. As H. F. T. Smith put it the "union" marked the total "absorption of Somaliland by Somalia."³³

³² PRO, F.O.371/146966, Sir D. Hall to Secretary of State, 13 April 1960.
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Figure 4.1

Graph showing incidence of relapsing fever for the whole country and for Burao
Figure 4.2
Percentage of persons reacting positive to T.B. tests
Figure 4.3

Street map of Burao town. Areas selected for T. B3 survey are hatched in the hut (in the southern part) section and house section.