HUNGARIAN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS
A SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

By

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Sociology
University of Toronto

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The primary goal of this socio-historical analysis is to provide a thorough account of Hungarian church-state relations. Beginning with a broad investigation of sociologists' failure to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for studying church-state relations, the study suggests that this is due to a preoccupation with definitional difficulties and the processes of secularization and globalization. Following this, a review of relevant literature is undertaken in order to generate a set of analytical questions, which are applied in a case study of Hungarian church-state relations from 896 C. E. to the present day.

Subsequent chapters discuss these relations in four distinct historical periods in which the shifting balance of power between the sacred and the secular is a central issue of both political and religious importance. Special attention is devoted to the significant intertwining of church and state during the Communist era, a situation fundamentally at odds with official government ideology and policy. An attempt is also made to explore post-Communist church-state relations in an effort to formulate some tentative predictions for the future. In this context, particular emphasis is placed upon the pivotal role of the middle class in the reconstruction of civil society and the crucial importance of the churches in a dangerous period of increasing nationalist rhetoric.

A Hungarian case study suggests the need to modify two important sociological accounts of different aspects of church-state relations. David Martin's explanation (1978) of the
role of established churches within societies under external threat is adjusted to fit the denominationally mixed character of Hungarian society. Similarly, Mary Gautier’s analysis (1998) of the respective roles of church and state elites in the restructuring of civil society is reformulated on the basis of Hungarian evidence.
Acknowledgment

Writing this dissertation has been not only a great challenge but also a time of experiencing the unselfish support of many people. The completion of this work would have been impossible without the patience, realism, and detailed advice of my thesis supervisor, Professor Roger O'Toole. He was aided by Professors John H. Simpson and Irving M. Zeitlin. Together, they formed an ideal committee. I am grateful to all of them for their encouragement to pursue a socio-historical analysis, and for believing in the merits of this project.

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Introduction

The primary goal of this socio-historical analysis is to provide a thorough account of Hungarian church-state relations. The entanglement of church and state is not uncommon in Europe. Even in the early 1980s, there were eleven established churches in the so-called Western half of Europe, arguably the most secular corner of the world. While Hungary does not have an officially established church, a demonstration of the intertwining of church and state would not be a sensational discovery. The proposition, however, that these two institutions “needed each other” even during the Communist era demands a comprehensive explanation to sociologists and other concerned scholars. Thus, one of the aims of the analysis of Hungarian church-state relations is to investigate the circumstances which led to the intertwining of state and church under the Communist regime. Based on this inquiry, another aim of this study is to analyze the post-Communist church-state relations with the hope of establishing some tentative predictions for the future.

Although the importance of analyzing church-state relations has been constantly emphasized in the sociological literature since the mid 1980s we do not have a contemporary comprehensive theory accounting for church-state relations. The only macro-sociological theory focusing on church-state relations, developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, relies on models that originate from early Christianity. The presentation and evaluation of these models along with an investigation of why we lack more recent theories are the tasks of the first chapter. In the absence of more recent
theoretical guidance and models, the creation of an analytical tool for the investigation is also necessary in this chapter. The establishment of this tool — a set of analytical questions resulting from reflection on the literature — is perhaps as important a goal of this work as the provision of a thorough account of the Hungarian church-state relations.

The following chapters discuss these relations in four periods, which are determined partly by historical developments, and partly by sociological considerations. According to Robertson (1987a), church-state relations become sociologically and politically important issues when the state is, or attempts to be, a consciously secular state. In light of the recently established theocracies, Robertson’s claim may need further elaboration. Nevertheless, the Hungarian attempts at reducing the power of the churches in the nineteenth century naturally signal the beginning of a new era in church-state relations. Thus the first epoch analyzed is the period from the Hungarians’ conversion to Christianity to the Compromise (Ausgleich or Kiegyezés) with the Habsburgs in 1867 marking the reestablishment of a more or less independent “nation-state” with significant liberal forces. The second period encompasses the time from the Compromise to the end of World War II. Although, in the late nineteenth century, Hungarian liberals initiated numerous efforts to modernize church-state relations, the entanglement remained as tight as before and perhaps even became stronger. The most significant event contributing to the continued symbiosis of church and state was the loss of territories and population as a consequence of World War I. The third, or Communist, period saw again drastic attempts at separation, but in the final analysis, even the Communists had to note their dependence on the churches. The fourth, or post-Communist, epoch has thus far demonstrated tendencies toward both separation and fusion of church and state. In the
concluding part of this work, I not only summarize the character of Hungarian church-state relations but also try to formulate several cautious predictions for the future.

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1 The investigation of church and state in a particular society is important because it directs our “attention to a range of larger cultural issues from which our attention [would otherwise stray]” (Demerath and Williams 1984: 10). It is also important because the building of a comprehensive model of church-state relations requires a “series of preliminary studies based on thorough research into each individual case” (Laszlo 1973: 16). As it becomes evident in the next chapter, I am aware of the many issues complicating the creation of such a model. Nevertheless, the present work intends to be such a “preliminary study” that will contribute to the building of a comprehensive model if it becomes possible in the future.

2 In Andorra, Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Norway, Scotland, and Sweden (Tomka 1992: 131).


Chapter I. Analytical Questions

The review of the sociological literature studying church-state relations reveals several reasons why we lack a comprehensive theory accounting for the developments of contemporary church-state relations. Three primary reasons might be distinguished: (1) the dominance of the so-called secularization paradigm, and (2) definitional ambiguities enhanced by (3) the complexities of globalization. While the first problem, i.e. the rigidity of the secularization paradigm, seems to give way as more flexible interpretations of secularization have been developed or the process has been questioned, the other two remain unresolved challenges to an attempt at constructing a theory of church-state relations. Consequently, a brief discussion of these reasons can, at best, only delineate a set of analytical questions, which, in turn, are applied to the Hungarian case.

The Study of Church-State Relations and the Secularization Paradigm

The relation of religion and state, let alone that of church and state, was ignored by sociologists for several decades because in their theoretical preoccupation they focused on the increasing differentiation of social institutions, including religion and state. Institutional differentiation or specialization was the core of practically all of the theories within the secularization paradigm, which meant the increasing separation of church and state. But even before secularization became the dominant theme for sociologists of
religion, only one researcher, Luigi Sturzo (1962), studied the relations of church and
state on a macro-sociological level. However, his theory had little impact on others. The
relative indifference toward Sturzo’s work might be explained by the fact that his only
contribution to the study of the church-state models was the introduction of a new model
which, being mystical in nature, was not appealing to 1960s sociologists.

For Sturzo, church-state relations are diarchic in nature. He senses a motion toward
rationality, which displays itself in a cyclic movement of organizations between
polarization and unification. He claims that sometimes we can find that a given society is
crystallized around a multiplicity of centers. From this stage, however, these centers tend
to polarize and duality comes into existence. If both components of this duality have
some power and authority, we speak of diarchy. State and church are the two poles in the
society, the focal points of the organizational and the mystical. According to Sturzo, the
former is attempting to preserve the status quo, the latter is trying to change it in the hope
of a better future. The expression of the mystical is essentially the church and not the
state, but the roles are sometimes reversed.

Sturzo distinguishes five traditional diarchies:, caesaropapism, theocracy, Latin
organization, which was also called the two-swords or two powers model,
jurisdictionalism, and confessionalism. Caesaropapism refers to the situation in which
the “authority of the State becomes an effective, normal and centralizing authority in the
Church, though from outside, while the authority of the Church shares directly, though in
a non-autonomous and often subordinate form, in the exercise of secular power” (1962 : 47).
The best example is the Byzantine Church from which the different Orthodox
Churches are derived. In theocracy, the roles are changed between church and state in
that the authority of the church becomes decisive. The Islamic Republics of Iran and Afghanistan might serve as contemporary embodiment of this type of diarchy.

The church in the *Latin diarchy* relies on and asks for help from the civil power. The church also grants the state some rights to interfere in its life, yet the church "nearly always react[s] vigorously against any effective dependence, or reassert[s] her independence, as the case might be" (1962 : 48). This is the diarchy of Roman Catholicism essentially up to the Reformation.

*Jurisdictionalism* is characteristic of the relations of state and church in the 18th century. It means that the church and the state expect "reciprocal juridical positions, to be held by each both in defence of its autonomy and in assertion of a right to intervene in the sphere of the other" (1962 : 321). It differs from caesaropapism and theocratic systems inasmuch as in these two there is a systematic confusion and absorption to the advantage of either the state or the church, while in jurisdictionalism there is a coordination with clear-cut domains of competence and division of activities. Usually it was the states that called for jurisdictionalism, therefore, jurisdictionalism is often identified with Gallicanism and regalism. When the church did so, it was called Curialism.

Sturzo does not define *confessionalism* in his *Church and State* but this seems to refer to the Reformation and *cuius regio eius religio* principle, formulated in the Augsburg treaty in 1555. It was basically a political compromise to end the wars between the different Christian confessions, each promoted by different cities and princes. It meant the unlimited superposition of state, its complete power even in the internal life of the reformed churches. The prince became the head of the church. Though it was essentially
a form of caesaropapism, it might also be called individualist, “inasmuch as [it was] based on free inquiry” (1962:198).

These were the traditional diarchies held by the church. However, Sturzo sees a new kind of diarchy, which manifested itself in the above-mentioned confessional type. The individual diarchy is common today, for the diarchic power of the church is expressed mainly as a spiritual power over the individual believer, and no longer as an authoritative and juridical form over the state. Thus we can continue speaking of diarchy of church and state as a duality of powers because the church “maintains her religious power over the faithful, which, expressed in the form of teaching and public precepts, continues to have an influence on society”\(^3\). But this is not the end. Sturzo foresees a new diarchy, a mystical one in nature, forming itself in the collective consciousness. He cannot see yet what it will look like, but nevertheless, he ventures to say that it will be in the ethico-social sphere where “Church and State will find again their rhythm of social duality and spiritual unification” (1962:563).

Sturzo’s traditional church-state models originate in Christianity, but they have gained universality and are included in practically all other typologies\(^4\). Furthermore, a view somewhat similar to his so-called individual diarchy is held by Luckmann\(^5\). Finally, in his mystical diarchy, and even more so in his general approach to sociology, we can hear the echo of the French mystic, Teilhard de Chardin\(^6\). Given Sturzo’s ‘mystical approach’, we cannot be surprised that the succeeding generation of sociologists, immersed in the secularization debate, did not pay much attention to Sturzo and his church-state relations.
However, the return of religion into public life\textsuperscript{7} in the 1980s made sociologists reconsider their views on secularization\textsuperscript{8}. A number of solid empirical studies have been produced since then, many of which "have of necessity been preoccupied with the task of developing a descriptive empirical base; others have been devoted to questions of practical, legal, and ecclesiastical concern. Consequently, the literature in this area continues to lack rigorous theoretical systematization" (Wuthnow 1988 : 497). Due to other complexities, to be discussed below, the possibility of formulating a comprehensive theory seems now even further from our grasp. However, reflection on the models used by Sturzo provides us with some initial questions, which can be used in the investigation of the Hungarian case. The first is whether, and to what extent, the Latin form of diarchy, or the two-powers model, can be applied to medieval Hungarian church-state relations. The second question is whether a new diarchy or model would be more appropriate to describe those relations after the Compromise. Finally, the question must also be raised whether and to what extent we can talk about Sturzo's so-called individual diarchy in the Communist regime and post-Communist era.

While the secularization thesis is much debated today, one of the classic works in this field has an undoubtedly important relevance to church-state relations. Although in his general theory\textsuperscript{9}, Martin does not question the empirically well-documented processes of secularization occurring in Christian industrial societies, he nevertheless points out that these processes vary by culture and historical circumstance. According to his fundamental distinction, the fate and form of secularity in any society "depends on whether a nation's revolution is an act which divides internally or unites against something external" (1978 : 16). In the latter case, "Catholicism (or Orthodoxy) has
stood in for the state under conditions of external domination or external threat” (1978: 55). As a consequence, the advance of secularization is hindered in these societies. While Poland, Malta, and Eire are Catholic incarnates, Rumania is an instance of the Orthodox case. Reflecting on Hungarian church-state relations of the interwar period I intend to demonstrate that under certain circumstances Martin’s fundamental distinction might be applied to societies that have mixed denominational population.

“Definitional Problems” in the Study of Church-State Relations

Church-state relations must be placed in the broader context of religion and politics. However, complexities and ambiguities of the definitions of both the “religious” and the “political” domains create difficulties. Hardships arise immediately when sociologists face the task of defining religion. The problem might be avoided by focusing exclusively on the relationship between the state and the “politically recognized” religious bodies. This approach would, however, exclude the significant influence of civil religion on church-state relations.

Civil religion, according to Hammond, “is any set of beliefs and rituals, related to the past, present, and/or future of a people (‘nation’) which are understood in some transcendental fashion” (1976: 171). McGuire (1987) notes that civil religion may be a general type of nationalism. She distinguishes priestly and prophetic versions of civil religion where the former celebrates the greatness of a nation, its superiority and
achievements, and the latter points out the offenses of the nation against the idealizations for which it stands. She also identifies two processes in which religion in general, and civil religion in particular, can play decisive roles. The first is state building, which refers to the establishment of a utilitarian, authoritative organization for governing a country’s external and internal affairs. Nation building, on the other hand, refers to attempts at creating a country’s sense of identity and solidarity as a people. Finally, McGuire distinguishes four types of civil religion in terms of its relationship with the public and private sphere, with the state, and with the churches. The first is the American model where “civil religion is differentiated from both the state and church (i.e., as particular religions). ... [It is] appropriate to the public sphere, and particular religions apply to the private sphere” (1987:163). The second model is the superficially secular form of nationalism typified by the former U.S.S.R. In this form, civil religion and state were linked but differentiated from specific religions which, in turn, were completely privatized. In the other two forms, church, as the institution of a particular religion, and state are not differentiated. Either the church sponsors the state or the state sponsors the church. These are less prominent cases of civil religion because they are intimately connected with a particular religion.

Two details must be discussed here which complicate further the investigation of church-state relations. The first is the impossibility of defining properly what a “church” is. McGuire’s third and fourth forms of civil religion illustrate the difficulty of separating church and state in certain cases. Casanova (1994), using a different approach, also questions the possibility of providing a definition of a church. He notes that the definition of a church, as used by sociologists following Weber and Troeltsch, was based
on the specific historical circumstances of the imperial Roman church established by Constantine and Licinius’s famous Edict of Milan in 313 A.D. However, this typology is in tension with the “phenomenological-doctrinal self-definition of the relevant collective actors who constitute the church as an ecclesiastical institution” (1994: 70). Casanova points out that the sociologists’ ideal type of church is also in tension with the “historically changing reality of national churches, particularly the changing structural location of the church in relation to state and society” (1994: 70). These are the reasons why I avoid the formal definition of a church in this study. While, for want of a better solution, “church” refers to the already mentioned politically recognized “religious institutions”⁴, it also includes the complexities of civil religion affecting the “churches”.

The other complicating detail is connected to McGuire’s first type of civil religion, the civil religion of the United States. This form of civil religion is appropriate to the public sphere, but particular religions remain in the private sphere due to the non-establishment and non-interference clauses of the First Amendment to the American Constitution. While the American Constitution emphasizes the government’s non-interference it does not provide precise guidelines for the “separation of church and state”, which, in turn, leads to at least four possible interpretations. A strict separationist reading of the Constitution rejects not only any government support, but also any government regulation of religion. The benevolent separationist reading, which is based either on historical tradition and ‘original intent’ or on the functionalist view that religion fulfills positive roles in society, rejects government regulations but demands government support of religion. The secularist approach, being suspicious of the negative functions of religion, favors government regulation and denies government support. Finally, the statist

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reading, even when it accepts formal separation, favors both government support and regulation of religion\(^\text{15}\). The different possible interpretations of the separation of church and state create conflicts in emerging democracies, especially in former Communist societies where the “American model” is portrayed by many as the example to be followed\(^\text{16}\).

Wuthnow (1988) provides further guidelines for the investigation of the impact of civil religion on church-state relations. Civil religion, according to him, can be considered “an instance of incomplete differentiation between religion and the state” (1988:497). As a consequence, we must investigate whether particular religious organizations benefit by having this form of access to the state or whether civil religion forces them to compromise. Another question is whether the state gains benefits from having access to religious arguments or whether it would function more effectively were it a purely secular institution. Finally, he notes that studies on civil religion have so far focused on matters of symbolism\(^\text{17}\), ignoring the institutional structure of the state and religion. Attention should be given to “the ways in which organizational constraints, resources, interest groups, and social cleavages affect the relations between religion and the state” (1988:497). These effects must be analyzed on two levels. “At the societal level, the state becomes a relevant consideration chiefly as an element of the resource environment. At the institutional level, specific alliances and other forms of interaction between religious organizations and political organizations can be examined” (1988:497).

Reflection on the different aspects of civil religion raises the following analytical questions. First, we have to establish whether we can talk about any form of Hungarian civil religion. Furthermore, what sort of religion, if any, played a role in the Hungarian
state building? Did the same religion also play a role in the process of nation building? Did another religion participate or perhaps completely replace it during that process? What kind of religious symbols, if any, were used in nation building? What forms of civil religion emerged in relationship with the Hungarian public and private sphere, with the state, and with the Hungarian churches? When were the priestly and prophetic versions of civil religion used? Were the different interpretations of the separation of church and state debated in Hungarian society? If they were, what were the consequences of the debate? What kind of relationships among the different denominations resulted from the emergence of civil religion? Did the existence of a civil religion benefit the state? If it did, under what circumstances did it do so? What kind of governments tried to establish their conduct on a strictly secular base? How successful were their attempts? To what extent did the churches rely on state resources? And finally, what alliances and interactions can be identified between Hungarian religious and political organizations?

Complexities in the political context of church-state relations also create ambiguities. One of these ambiguities is rooted in the “identity crisis” of the state, and especially that of the so-called welfare states of the industrialized world. The state, in Hall’s (1994) definition, is a set of institutions the most important of which is that of the means of violence and coercion. The system of domination remains prominent even in liberal theories characterized by a laissez-faire conception of the state. Furthermore, these institutions are located within a geographically bounded territory, where the “state monopolizes rule-making” (Hall 1994 : 642). Hall also notes, that statehood is more often an aspiration than an actual achievement. However, as Bottomore explains
(1993), in modern societies an "antithesis" developed between the "state as a system of domination and the state as a welfare system" (1993:52). From the point of view of the present study, the more important fact is that the welfare state took upon itself the traditional activities of religious organizations. This might be viewed as further erosion of religious institutions in modern societies. How did the churches react to this development?

Generally speaking, "religious organizations have supported the laissez-faire conception of the state, at least in matters where religion is concerned, perhaps largely because the long history of religio-political conflicts has generated norms favoring religious tolerance and some degree of separation between church and state" (Wuthnow 1988:499). At the same time, religious organizations of all creeds have tried to forge coalitions with various governmental agencies. The churches have also expanded their use of the legal system in order to promote various moral crusades, such as campaigns against abortion, racial segregation, and pornography, and lobbying for gender equality or prayer in the schools. Although it is questionable whether we can talk about Communist "welfare states" in terms of Western standards, it is a fact that these states also replaced the churches in education, health care, and the social security system, and practically reduced the public influence of the churches to nil. Yet, even in these societies, the churches regained their political influence to a certain extent, as many analysts have noted. In other words, despite the differentiating effects of secularization, whether it was forced or "natural", the churches returned to the public life. How was it possible? The answer lies in the complex relationship between the civil society, the state, and the churches.
It is beyond the limits of this work even to delineate the main thrusts of the contemporary debate on civil society. Consequently, the focus of the present work must be directed toward those studies that investigate the relationship between the state, churches, and civil society. For the purpose of this study, Cohen and Arato offer the most suitable definition of civil society. Unlike previous definitions, which posited civil society between isolated individuals and the "almighty state," especially the welfare state, Cohen and Arato elaborate a tripartite schema. For them, civil society is "a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication" (1992: ix). The analysis of the relationship of civil society with both the state and economy also has significant consequences for church-state relations, which have been most thoroughly explored by Casanova (1994, 1996).

Casanova's work (1994) is a partly theoretical and partly typological exercise based on two traditions, comparative sociology of religions and theories of the public sphere and civil society. The central thesis of his book "is that we are witnessing the 'deprivatization' of religion in the modern world" (1994: 5). According to Casanova, deprivatization is "the fact that religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them" (1994: 5). Casanova does not "share the view that secularization was, or is, a myth. The core of the theory of secularization, the thesis of the differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, remains valid" (1994: 6). Consequently, his task is to demonstrate how religious
institutions, in spite of the emancipation of politics from religion, can influence the public realm. Casanova claims that religion may enter the social arena for three reasons without being intrinsically incompatible with differentiated modern structures. The first of these scenarios is when religious organizations protect not only their own freedom, but all other freedoms and rights. The second is when the churches contest the “value-free”, i.e. amoral, solutions of secular, and functionally differentiated spheres. Finally, they can also defend the traditional life-world from state penetration by starting and forming public discursive ethics. “In the first instance religion would serve in the very constitution of a liberal political and social order. In the second and third instances religion would serve to show, question, and contest the very 'limits' of the liberal political and social order” (1994: 58).

Casanova also claims that paradoxically, when the democratization process has succeeded, there is a built-in pressure toward the privatization of religion that comes from four sources. The first is a general trend toward the demobilization and privatization of civil society as “political society and its forms of representation and mediation by professional political elites become institutionalized” (1994: 222). The second source, in the case of the Catholic Church, is the directives of the Vatican “to tame and control the public interventions of national Catholic churches and ‘progressive’ Catholic groups, to restrain and regain control of the process of aggiornamento from above” (1994: 222). At the same time, the Catholic Church faces competition from other religions and secular worldviews. Finally, the Catholic Church will have to learn to live with cultural pluralism both outside and inside. It has to justify its position on whatever issue “through open, public, rational discourse in the public sphere of civil society ... and has to let all
the faithful participate in the constant elaboration and reformulation of its normative teachings and allow for different practical judgments as to how to interpret those normative teachings in concrete circumstances” (1994: 223). Although Casanova focused on the Catholic Church, we might say that with the exception of the second source of privatization, i.e. Vatican directives, the other sources could be applied to other religions as well.

Casanova’s mainly theoretical work was partially tested empirically and developed further by Regnerus and Smith (1998). By analyzing the data of the 1996 Religious Identity and Influence Survey, conducted in the USA, they found that while “evangelicals and fundamentalists ‘go public’ for Casanova’s third reason …: to resist state (and we would add popular culture) penetration of the traditional lifeworld”24, the activism of Catholics and ‘mainline’ Protestants is less evident on this front. They are also forced to conclude that their data is unable to affirm whether Catholic and liberal Protestant activism accords with Casanova’s second reason, i.e. bringing moral and ethical considerations to bear on secular spheres of life. They also suggest that practising Catholics and liberal Protestants are not inactive although “the extent of their activism is lower than that of evangelicals and arises less from religiously inspired reasons than it does among evangelicals” (1998: 1365). Finally, they find Casanova’s first reason too vague and almost inapplicable to the study of modern religious movement. Reflecting on empirical results and historical circumstances, Regnerus and Smith further developed Casanova’s work by pointing out the selective nature of deprivatization. For them, “privatization and deprivatization are lagged, and varying, responses by religious traditions to periodic unsettling eras. … [Furthermore,] it is historically evident that not
only is deprivatization a selective phenomenon among religious groups, but that religious
groups have distinctly different purposes and goals for their periodic deprivatization.
There is less variation in means: religious traditions seldom use force or employ

The ways in which Casanova and Regnerus and Smith account for the participation of
religion in public life highlight the peculiar position of religious organizations in civil
society. On the one hand, they can be the nurturing sources of a civil society. On the
other hand, once democracy is (re)established, they become only one of the many sources
contributing to civil society. They have to redefine their position toward the state, other
religions, and other institutions of the public sphere. However, the position of religious
organizations in larger society also affects their relations with the state. Minority
religions with limited resources are likely to favor relatively strict separation between
church and state. Religious organizations with the significant resources to dominate the
religious market, like the Southern Baptist Convention in the southern states of the USA,
also tend to support policies of government noninterference25. “The groups most likely to
support government intervention, other things being equal, therefore, are those in the
middle – groups having enough resources to entertain hopes of being successful in
relations with the state, yet lacking the resources needed to win over their competition in
strictly open religious competition” (Wuthnow 1988 : 500).

Complexities and ambiguities in the relations between contemporary states, religious
organizations, and civil society, as discussed above, raise several important analytical
questions with regard to Hungarian church-state relations. The first is whether, and to
what extent, we can talk about the return of the Hungarian churches to the public life. If
we can, when did this return occur? For what reasons did religion reenter the Hungarian social arena? Was there any sign of selective deprivatization in the return of the churches to the public life? What changes did the return of religion into public life induce in the Hungarian church-state relations? Can we see signs of pressure toward the privatization of religion, as Casanova predicted? How do the Hungarian churches deal, especially after four decades of religious oppression, with religious competition and cultural pluralism? And finally, what kind of church-state relations can be expected given the position of Hungarian religious organizations in the larger society?

Church-State Relations in the Context of Globalization

Contemporary church-state relations are complicated not only by the positions of churches in a particular society but also by the dilemmas of globalization. Globalization, the process by which the world is more and more becoming a ‘single place’

creates complications by relativizing the “four major dimensions of global-human condition: societies; individuals; the system of societies; and (in the generic sense) mankind”

The process of relativization manifests itself in the simultaneous ‘particularization of universalism’, which refers to the rendering of the world as a single place, and the ‘universalization of particularism’, the globalized expectation that societies should have distinct identities. Thus individuals as well as national societies may turn to religion when they feel a need for identity formation. Although a national society, as Robertson explains (1989), is state-centered and state-run it is not a nation state. Robertson’s
intention is to incorporate not only Gesellschaft but also Gemeinschaft in one term because, as he argues, not only individuals and societies but also ethnic groups and other collectivities “are, so to say, called upon to declare their identities. ... Given the historical significance of religion as the primal source of political legitimation (and delegitimation), it is not at all surprising that it plays a large part in the new circumstance and that, moreover, religious traditions themselves will be constrained to ‘place themselves and their heritage somehow’” (1989: 19).

Thus while religion may serve as a source of identity, religion is also obliged to ‘identify’ itself. If there is no unquestioned identity, if the identity of both the church and the state is questioned, how can we analyze their relationship? Beyer (1994), by combining Robertson’s cultural-political relativizations with Luhmann’s discussion of differentiation, provides us with a framework for the ways in which religious leaders may react to the challenges of globalization.

For Luhmann, globalization is almost an unintentional product of the functional differentiation of systems, such as economics, politics, science, etc. Differentiated systems achieve more and more effective communication and, consequently, better solutions to the problems emerging within their competence. However, as Beyer points out, “precisely because the differentiated functional systems concentrate on specialized means of communication and not on the total lives of the people that carry them, they leave a great deal of social communication underdetermined, if not unaffected” (1994: 99). This is what Beyer calls the ‘residual’ problem of globalizing systems. Religion, on the other hand, with its general applicability to the whole of human life, can and does assist in the solution of problems which arise in overspecialized systems but cannot be
solved by their own differentiated means. Religion can thus gain public influence by becoming a cultural resource for other systems.\textsuperscript{29}  

Luhmann offers two useful distinctions for the analysis of the possible role of religion in this process. His first distinction is between function and performance. The former, in the case of religion, is a pure communication involving the transcendent. The function of the "religious system" of a society is the basis on which religious institutions claim autonomy. Religious performance, by contrast, occurs when religion is applied to problems emerging in other systems but not solved there. Luhman's other distinction applies to Robertson's cultural – political relativism. Even in the twentieth century, outsiders and Satan were essential to the cohesion – and thus the identity – of a specific society. As a result of globalization, however, the 'outsider' has become one's neighbour. As Beyer notes, Satan is dead, but God is not (1994: 85). As a consequence, in the absence of Satan, God still can be loved but it is difficult to fear him. According to Beyer (1994: 86), religious professionals are now faced with the dilemma of whether to address the contemporary problem of religious influence with the reassertion of devil or by abandoning him. In the conservative option, the reality of the devil is confirmed while the liberal approach is the acquiescence to his dissolution. Beyer claims that "regardless of which option is taken, public influence for religion will be found in the direction of religious performance" (1994: 86). He also adds that in an increasingly global society the liberal approach might be seen as the trend of the future, but "the conservative option is in fact the one that is making religion most visible in today's world" (1994: 90). A conservative approach is more apparent because it is less ecumenical and consequently more violent than the liberal option. Similarly, leaders who have a conservative attitude
in a Luhmannian sense want legal support for religious influence and, at the same time, they also "supply religion as a cultural resource for the political and legal systems." The result of both the liberal and the conservative options is the increased presence of churches in public life with probable influences on the church-state relations of a particular society.

Another consequence of globalization may also enhance the presence of religious leaders in public life. Huntington (1996) argues that we are witnessing the division of the world along civilizational lines resulting in an "inter-civilizational global system". This system would consist of a Hindu civilization with India at its core, an Orthodox civilization whose center state would be Russia, a Confucian civilization located mostly in China, a Japanese civilization in Japan, an Islamic civilization with no core state, and a Western civilization. As Simpson (forthcoming) notes, "[i]nternational conflicts and wars will tend to occur along civilizational fault lines with core states leading and/or abating inter-civilizational hostilities." Religious leaders, understandably, might have a significant role both in inducing and solving these conflicts.

When one reflects on the effects of globalization, the following questions must be raised in the analysis of the Hungarian church-state relations. Does the Hungarian government turn to religion when the definition of the country's or its own identity is questioned and relativized by globalization? If it does, which churches are used as references? Although Robertson does not reflect on it, the possibility of a competition among different churches as to which one is most suitable to represent the identity of a particular national society might arise. Do the Hungarian churches remain in their own "function" or do they try to 'perform' in other differentiated systems of the society? Does the Hungarian government
expect the churches to 'perform' in other systems than their own? Do the Hungarian church leaders prefer the liberal or the conservative option? Do the churches' conservative claims result in the legal support of the Hungarian government? And finally, is there any sign of inducing tension or negotiating in international conflict on the part of Hungarian religious leaders?

Summary: The Analytical Questions

Although a comprehensive theory about contemporary church-state relations is impossible because of many complexities and ambiguities, the questions emerging from the discussion of the relevant sociological theories provide a ground on which the socio-historical investigation of the Hungarian church-state relations can be based. These questions encompass six different aspects of church-state relations. The first aspect is necessarily historical. To discuss church-state relationships without providing a historical context would prove impossible. The question of which traditional model corresponds to Hungarian church-state relations under the examined period will be a recurring element in this work. The second set of questions analyzes the processes of state building and nation building. These processes are rooted in, and must be discussed in, their historical context. Nevertheless, they constitute a separate component because they are both ongoing processes, especially in an increasingly global system. The third set of analytical questions considers the effects of civil religion on church-state relations. Civil religion is also connected to the history of a nation, and it can become an essential
part of the nation building process. However, the investigation of the relationships between civil religion, the public and private spheres, the state, and the churches adds a distinct focus, which occurs neither in the traditional models nor in the account of state and nation building.

The fourth set of questions constitute a structural analysis, where the position of churches in the larger society (which leads to their different reliance on state resources) is discussed in conjunction with the debate on and the actual practice of the separation of church and state. The fifth component of the investigation looks at the privatization and deprivatization of religion – in other words, the decline and growth of the role of religious institutions in public life. The final aspect of the study analyzes the effects of globalization on church-state relations in terms of identity, function vs. performance, and conservative vs. liberal approaches.

Each set of questions, like a different optical filter, focuses on the church-state relations of the "same national society". In the following investigation, all of the relevant filters together will be applied to the historical periods or epochs of the national society. It must be noted that some of the "component-filters" can be used only for a specific epoch of the national society. Nation building, for instance, emerged only relatively recently, not only in the Hungarian case, but also in the case of other nations. Similarly, since we cannot talk about Hungarian civil society proper before the Compromise and under the Communist regime, the discussion of the fourth and fifth sets of questions, i.e. the structural analysis and examination of selective deprivatization, would be broken and spasmodic. Thus, with the analytical questions in hand, I turn to the historical
examination of Hungarian church-state relations, divided into four periods, as discussed in the Introduction.


2 See also Manent’s (1994 : 13-20) insightful discussion, which explains why feudal monarchy, leading necessarily to absolutism, became the “host” of this diarchy. There is an inherent contradiction in Catholic doctrines on the role of political authorities. According to Catholic teaching, all authority is from God, but – as Jesus said: “render unto Caesar what Caesar’s” – political authority enjoys certain independence from the Church. Only the social and political arrangements of feudal monarchy – in contrast with those of the ancient city states or those of an empire – made possible the political authority’s simultaneous independence from and subordination to the Church.

3 Sturzo (1962 : 548). The social teachings of Roman Catholicism, such as Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, Pope Pius XI’s Quadragesimo Anna and the Gaudium et Spes of Vatican II can be seen as excellent examples of “public precepts”. It would also be interesting to see Sturzo’s comment on Casanova’s (1994) “public religions”. Sturzo might argue that Casanova’s description of religion entering the public realm fits very well with his “individual diarchy”.

4 See Mitra (1991), Pelinka (1992), Simpson (1992), and Marre as discussed in Balogh (1994). Large-scale categorizations of church-state relations can be based, for example, on the impact of religion on politics (Wallis and Bruce 1985, Ayman Al-Yassini 1986), or on the degree of separation (Seeber 1994). For a discussion of church-state relations under different forms of civil religion, see McGuire (1987). The probable reason of universality is that these models “exhaust the range of possibilities” (Simpson forthcoming) of the “necessarily triadic relationships” (Mitra 1991 : 757) of church, state and society. Caesaropapism and theocracy represent the two extreme positions of the interpenetration of church and state, and the other diarchies are attempts at the separation of these institutions.

5 Luckmann (1967: 97-101) views church religiosity as one of the many manifestations of an emerging, institutionally unspecified social form of religion, which, due to its connection with traditional Christian values, still occupies a special and significant place.

6 Sturzo was called the “sociologist Chardin”. With regard to Sturzo’s general sociology, see for example his The True Life. Sociology of the Supernatural (1943), or Timasheff (1962). Sturzo’s sociology, including his theory of church and state, was unquestionably influenced by Teilhard de Chardin’s The Phenomenon of Man (1955).


8 Berger, in a somewhat self-critical mood declares that what he “and most other sociologists of religion wrote in the 1960s about secularization was a mistake. Our underlying argument was that ... [w]ith modernity comes more secularization. ... There was some evidence for it. But I think it’s [sic] basically wrong. Most of the world today is certainly not secular.” (“Epistemological modesty: An interview with Peter Berger” in The Christian Century, October 29, 1997. On the emergence of a possible new paradigm in the sociology of religion see for example Warner (1993, 1996, 1997), Hadden (1995) and Lechner (1997).

9 As he admits, his work is “less a complete statement of a general theory than a specification of its components” (1978 : 1). According to Lyon, Martin’s theory “simply limits what can be said about secularity” (1996 : 19). While in his later works Martin himself doubts some aspects of the secularization thesis (1991, 1993), Giorgi (1992) empirically confirms three fundamental theses of Martin’s general theory.

10 Wuthnow (1988:496), for example, analyzes what amounts to church-state relations under the title of “Religion and the State”.

25
The discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this work, but for a thorough analysis see, for example, O’Toole (1984) or Beckford (1990), and Lambert (1991). The common denominator of their conclusions is that the problem of defining religion is insoluble. Weber (1963) and Geertz (1968) probably foresaw this stumbling block when they suggested that a definition of religion should take place only at the end of a study, if at all. Hervieu-Léger (1987) also questions the necessity of a definition. Her reason is that the nature of the problem in general requires not only sociological investigation but philosophical, or more precisely epistemological, as well.

Political recognition in this approach would mean not only the churches whose existence is legally permitted, but also those, whose functioning is simply tolerated, is questioned or even forbidden. As we will see below, these possibilities were harsh realities in the Hungarian church-state relations, and not only in the Communist era.

McGuire basis her categorization on Hammond’s four “dimensions of civil religion” (1980: 44). The reason I use her categories is that, unlike Hammond, she provides historical examples for the different constellations of those dimensions. It is interesting to note that Bellah did not categorize the different forms of civil religion.

C.f. footnote # 12.


C.f. for example Tomka (1992) or Paczolay (1995). Obviously, a further source of confusion and conflict is the different and changing approaches of churches to the issue of separation. While Murray (1960) discusses the Catholics’ standpoint on church-state separation, Sanders (1964) exposes the approaches of the mainline Protestant churches. On the changing approaches of churches toward society see Casanova (1994).

Wuthnow does not provide a list of possible symbols, but based on McGuire’s discussion of civil religion (1987:158-64) such a list would include public ceremonies, sacred objects, e.g. the flag, national shrines, myths, images, and heroes or “saints”.

This question gains special significance in Gautier’s study (1998) where she compares the effects of the location of church elites on the restoration of civil society in the former Communist societies, particularly in Poland, East Germany, and Hungary.

See McGuire’s distinction (1987) between the processes of state building and nation building. For a detailed discussion of the different state theories, see Knuttilla (1987).

The best known example is the support given to the Solidarity Movement by the Polish Catholic Church. But churches played a crucial role in the nurturing of civil society in other former Communist countries, as Robertson (1989), Cipkowskii (1991), Casanova (1994), Hadden (1995) and many others observe.

C.f. for example the comprehensive work of Cohen and Arato (1992), the chapters in Hann and Dunn (1996) or Wuthnow’s study (1996). See also Ignatieff (1995) and Greely (1997a, 1997b).

We must keep in mind that “the civil was classically opposed to the religious” (Hann 1996:6); and that the idea of civil society originated with the Enlightenment which promoted the endorsement of no particular religion and the separation of church and state (Ignatieff 1995).

See for example Berger and Neuhaus (1977).


Except, of course, in theocracies.

As Robertson “defined” globalization (1987a : 43).

The quotation is from Robertson (1989: 11), but for a more detailed and theory-oriented discussion of possible relativizations see Robertson and Chirico (1985).
The presentation of Luhmann's contribution to the discussion of globalization is beyond the scope of this work, but for a concise summary of his work with a special focus on the possible role of religion see Beyer (1994).

The compatibility of Beyer's approach with that of Casanova (1994) is perhaps the most visible here. While Beyer highlights how religion can be influential in the public life Casanova emphasizes in which areas religion can play such a role.


Western civilization would have a consortium of core states: Germany, France, United Kingdom and the United States.

The questions are collected and organized according to the different aspects of church-state relations covered in the Appendix.

Robertson's terminology (1989) is used again for at least two reasons. It would be a grave mistake to consider nation-states as monolithic or unchanging. Simply a change in the geographic boundaries leads to significant modifications in the examined church-state relations, as we will see in the Hungarian case. Furthermore, the discussion of globalization and civil society underlines the importance of the investigation of the relationship of NGOs, ethnic groups and other collective entities to religious organizations. In other words, even within lasting geographical boundaries a change in the power-relationship of these players results in different church-state relations.
Chapter II. From the Conquest to the Hungarians’ Compromise with the Habsburgs (c. 896 - 1867)

The Carpathian Basin, which serves as the locus of this narrative, is a relatively closed geographic unit in Central-Eastern Europe. The arc of the Carpathians, arising at the Danube near Vienna and rejoining the river again at the Iron Gate, surrounds the basin on the northern, eastern and southern sides. The flat and open center of the surrounded area, called Plainland (Alföld), is broken only by a few rivers, of which the Theiss (Tisza) is the most important. The Highlands (Felvidék), located north of the Plainland, correspond to contemporary Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. Transylvania (Erdély), east of the Plain, is a high plateau, while the rolling hills of the Transdanubian region (Dunántúl) stretch from the Danube to the foothills of the Austrian Alps. Crossing the river Drava, we enter the historical region of Southland (Délvidék), today’s Croatia and Slavonia.

The Hungarians, or Magyars, entered the Carpathian Basin toward the end of the ninth century after a long journey. In 1235, the Hungarian Dominican friar, Julianus, set out with three brethren to find Magna Hungaria, the great land of the ancestors. At that time, it was common knowledge that the Hungarians, members of a culture based on a common language, had split in two between the fourth and eight century; the smaller group came to the West, while the larger remained in the Steppes of the East. Julianus actually found a people whose language he could clearly understand beyond the Volga, in the territory of today’s Bashkiria. It is certain that the wandering Hungarians spent a long period of time on the Western side of the Volga along the middle reaches of the
Don, above the sea of Azov. This area was called Levédia after one of the Hungarian chiefs.

Like the belief system of the other peoples of the Steppes, the Hungarians’ faith consisted of animism, the veneration of totem animals, and most of all, shamanism, “a definite grade of the cult of the spirit” (Diószegi 1968: 8). According to this belief, the spirits knew everything because being bodiless they could go anywhere. However, only the táltos, the Hungarian shaman, had the unique capability of communicating with the spirits of living and deceased creatures, and objects. The information gained in a voluntary ecstasy enabled the táltos to be the Hungarians’ clairvoyant, healer of humans and animals, advisor, and regös, who preserved the Hungarians’ cultural heritage (Fehér n.d.). From among the usual tasks of Siberian shamans perhaps the only function not performed by the táltos was the role of a psychopomp, the escort of the soul of the deceased to the domain of the dead.

We do not know exactly what political influence, if any, the táltos had over the chiefs. From the records of the political role of shamans among Turks and Mongols, however, we might conclude that the members of the táltos-aristocracy were simply “officials” in the court of a Hungarian chief (Dienes 1985). They even had to tolerate the permanent presence of other religious experts, including Christian priests, whose only “task” was to raise the grandeur and pomp of the chief. The chiefs did not fear the “spiritual power” of the shamans. Teb-tenggeri was the first-shaman when Temudjin was elected the khan of the Mongols in the early thirteenth century. Teb-tenggeri had to confirm that the election of Temudjin, who soon became well known in Europe as Ghengis Khan, was not against the wish of the Eternal Sky. Teb-tenggeri declared that the gods were satisfied with
Ghengis, but the newly elected chief, upon discovering the conspiracy inspired by the first-shaman, ordered the execution of Teb-tenggeri. When, after three days, the corpse of the shaman mysteriously disappeared from the burial-hut, Ghengis simply announced that even the Eternal Sky did not like the company of such a traitorous person.

In Levédia, however, the Hungarians encountered three types of monotheism, which co-existed peacefully (Fejér 1851). In the Khazar Kaganate, Eastern Christianity had a bishopric, and Islam was widespread. The most interesting fact, however, is that the elite circles of Khazars converted to Judaism, even though the territory lacked any significant Jewish ethnic groups. The probable explanation is that the Khazar nobles wanted political alignment neither with Christians nor with Muslims who both had formidable military powers in the region. Among the Kabars, the people who left Levédia with the Hungarians, “were certainly Mohammedans and also Jews in all probability; and possibly a very small part of the Hungarians and Kabars may have been Christians” (Lázár 1989: 33). Püspöki goes somewhat further and argues that the Hungarians took over the denominational system of the Khazars, in that the elite were Jewish, the merchants Muslims, and the rank-and-file either pagan or Christian. He also states that the same structure was found around 950 A.D., and in the early Hungarian state formation.

However, Püspöki does not explain why the Hungarian leaders would have converted to Judaism. It is very unlikely that Árpád (c. 886-907) and his fellow chiefs were of the Jewish faith, but it is certain that Christianity, Islam, and Judaism were not unknown to the conquering Hungarians.

It is not known exactly when the Hungarians moved from Levédia to Etelkőz, an area along the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Bug, and the Siret. But from the *Gesta*
Hungarorum\textsuperscript{13} we know that by the end of the ninth century, the seven Hungarian tribes\textsuperscript{14}, under Árpád’s leadership, moved to, and practically conquered, the Carpathian basin. From here they launched their stormy, marauding raids on wealthy European cities in today’s Czech, German, Italian, and French territories, and in the Balkans for roughly a century. Various European rulers and aspiring rulers also hired the Hungarians as mercenaries against their rivals. That was the time when the prayer “From the Arrows of the Hungarians, save us, Lord” was introduced to the Litany of the Catholic Church.

Here, in this inquiry into Hungarian church-state relationships, we must certainly raise the question why the nomadic Hungarians converted to Christianity in a relatively short period of time. Another question to be answered is why they chose the Roman rite over Eastern Christianity. This is all the more intriguing; given that they knew Eastern Christianity from Levédia, and some of them were probably of that faith. Furthermore, the caesaropapist church-state arrangements of Orthodoxy would have been more suitable to the Hungarians whose chiefs, as we have seen in the fate of Teb-Tenggeri, did not fear the power of shamans. Finally, the initial arrangements of church and state must also be analyzed, because they had significant consequences for the future.

\textbf{The Hungarians’ Conversion to Christianity}

From the middle of the tenth century, the European rulers recognized that by constantly ravaging each other’s domains through the use of Hungarian mercenaries, they were all
harming themselves. By that time, they had also learned the techniques of Hungarian warfare, and had, in consequence, defeated them in several battles, perhaps most severely at Augsburg in 955. Nevertheless, the Hungarians still represented a formidable military force, which discouraged the invasion of their territory. From their several defeats, the Hungarian leaders also realized that continuing raids would lead to self-destruction. Taksony\textsuperscript{15} and his son, Géza (972-977), perceived that “security would no longer be provided by mobile manpower but by walls and the producers and valuable goods they protected” (Lázár 1989 : 54). Hence, it was in the interest of both the European and the Hungarian leaders to tame the restless and nomadic Hungarians by having them settle down in a defined territory and by incorporating them in Christendom through the activities of missionaries.

In converting the Hungarians, the missionaries\textsuperscript{16} were able to turn to local traditions for support because in the fourth century, Christianity had had episcopal seats in the Roman province of Pannonia, a territory that later became Western Hungary\textsuperscript{17}. In addition, after the fall of the Avar Empire (796), Charlemagne, the Holy Roman Emperor, promoted the Christianization of Eastern Europe. While the Greek Orthodox rite had earlier advanced primarily east of the Danube\textsuperscript{18}, Géza, and then Stephen himself, adamantly supported conversion to the rival Roman Church.
Balázs and Szélényi (1989) suggest that the preference for Rome can be explained by the Orthodox faith of the two main chiefs who opposed Stephen. However, their rebellion took place only in the second half of Stephen’s reign when Rome’s supremacy was already established. In other words, the different denominational adherence of these chiefs would not, in itself, explain why Stephen’s father, Géza, preferred Rome to Constantinople. A more adequate explanation of Géza’s and Stephen’s choice comprises at least two components. In the absence of significant military power, politicians of Byzantium skillfully used the principle of *divide et impera* in their relationships with the Turkish and Slavic nations. Thus, the Bulgarian-Turks lost their domain in the region of lower Danube shortly before the Hungarians’ settlement in the Carpathian Basin. An alliance with Constantinople would have led to a similar fate for the Hungarian embryonic state (Szekfű n.d. : 28). The other reason for choosing Rome was Hungary’s relatively favorable bargaining position in relation to the papacy, which was feuding with the German emperors. The Hungarian ruler “extracted from the Pope concessions that had been granted to few occidental monarchs. Thus in the course of negotiations that preceded his conversion, the future king of Hungary and his successors were given ‘apostolic rights’ which included, among others, the right of veto over all ecclesiastical appointments, and the right of refusing to promulgate any of the papal bulls” (Janos 1982: 12). A further consequence of the “apostolic kingship” was the practice of investiture, i.e. the dependence of bishops on the king who had nominated them, and could remove them – if he so wished. Another component of the bargain was that the pope had
absolutely no right over the ecclesiastical estates. Thus, under these favorable circumstances, Géza and Stephen were able to establish a virtual "state-church" with the blessing of Rome.

The Earliest Arrangements of Church and State

The Hungarian feudal state came into existence under the rule of King Stephen I (997-1038) who also established ten bishoprics in his domain. In fact, these ten dioceses provided the territorial bases for Stephen's public administration. The boundaries of the chief-deaneries, five in each diocese, were at the same time the boundaries of counties.

Stephen established not only dioceses but also monasteries of which the most famous became Pannonhalma. The king donated large estates to these monasteries and bishoprics from the confiscated territories of the chiefs who had resisted conversion but had been defeated by Stephen. The significance of these donations lay in the creation of private ownership, because until then, land was the common property of the free, i.e. arms-bearing, members of the clans. Similarly, German knights and Hungarians who had fought on Stephen's side received land from the king. These persons became the ancestors of the nobility whose task, along with their ecclesiastical counterparts, was to provide the king with armed forces and military assistance.

Following Stephen's order, every group of ten villages was required to build a church. He donated the church land, provided the priest with animals, firewood, chalices, and
liturgical vestments; the bishop had to send only a priest with the liturgical books. In his legislation, Stephen also established laws favorable to the church, thus proving his devotion to Christianity in general and to Rome in particular. Stephen sent Astrik, a Benedictine who later became the archbishop of Kalocsa, to request a crown from the Pope. A crown from the Pope would have meant not only the acknowledgment of Stephen's rule but would also have signaled his independence from both Byzantium and the German Emperor. Pope Sylvester II granted Stephen's wish and the latter was crowned in 1000 AD. This type of exchange between the church and the state was to remain an underlying pattern for church-state relations throughout the history of Hungary, even under the Communist regime. The state provided the church with financial and material means while the church, in return, legitimized the state.

Hungary, later the "protecting bastion of Christianity" against the Turks, was usually considered a faithful and obedient "son" of Rome. In fact, the Hungarian kings practiced investiture so openly even after the Gregorian reforms and the Concordat of Worms in 1122 that Thomas Becket, the Archbishop of Canterbury, referred to the Hungarian practice as a negative example in his letter to Pope Alexander III in 1168. Furthermore, an appeal to Rome was forbidden in twelfth century Hungary; and it was not uncommon that papal legates were forbidden to enter the country. King Stephen III practiced investiture so arbitrarily that Lukács Báńfy, archbishop of Esztergom, excommunicated him. Only a papal legate could solve the delicate situation by convincing the king to withdraw his anti-canonical orders. The practice of investiture continued up to the fifteenth century. Even the Hungarians' favorite king, Mathias (+1490), the son of János Hunyadi who won a decisive victory over the Turks in 1456 and who became legendary
for his righteousness, threatened the Holy See that he would leave Catholicism if Rome did not accept his nominees. According to András and Morel (1983a), the continued practice of investiture was partly due to the continuing presence and influence of Eastern Christianity with its “caesaropapist” disposition.

If the royal influence over the church was this significant, in what sense, if any, can we speak about the “Latin diarchy” or the “two swords model” in medieval Hungary? The church in this diarchy, as we have seen in the previous chapter, relied on the state for help. It also granted the state some rights to interfere in its affairs, yet the church “nearly always reacted vigorously against any effective dependence, or reasserted her independence, as the case might be” (Sturzo 1962: 48). What were the means by which Roman Catholicism reasserted its rights and independence in Hungary at this time?

Hungarian historians generally underline the Hungarian kings’ power and downplay or completely ignore the influence of the church. At most, they note that the Hungarian kings, in exchange for their right of “divine kingship”, supported the Catholic Church lavishly23. Only Lederer (1949) analyzes the means by which the church established its interests over the king and Hungarian society. The anti-clerical attitude of Lederer’s Marxist study is unquestionable24, but precisely this attitude enables her to point out those circumstances that empowered the church to protect its rights and independence.

According to her, the Catholic Church had both legal and economic means at its disposal in its struggle with the Hungarian kings.

The source of power in the Middle Ages was the land whose cultivation was the task of serfs. Since the nomad Hungarians were herdsmen who did not want to settle down and
till the soil, one of the reasons for their attacks on the neighboring nations was to obtain slaves. In 954, for example, the marauding Hungarians enslaved one thousand families from the land of a certain Liudolf. The mostly foreign ecclesiastical leaders of eleventh century Hungary, however, set the slaves free but turned them into serfs on their estates. The wealth of the hierarchy was increased not only by the greater productivity of the serfs but also by the better technical expertise originating with monks from the Western countries. Thus, while the lands of the lay nobility in the first half of the twelfth century were still cultivated by slaves, the ecclesiastical lands in the 1230s were already well-organized feudal estates providing the hierarchy with greater wealth. The greater economic prosperity of the ecclesiastical estates must have remained characteristic in the following centuries because the first Hungarian cities, providing shelter and markets for artisans, emerged in the diocesan centers. The church also had a monopoly on the salt-trade until the middle of the thirteenth century.

Apart from its wealth, the church also had legal means to establish its interests. The church had an “ideological weapon” in its hands: excommunication. Its effectiveness, however, varied. The Christian kings, like the heathen Hungarian chiefs, were usually not afraid of spiritual threats. The Hungarian king, Ladislaus IV, the Cuman (1272-1290), for example, was excommunicated until the end of his life because he did not obey the decrees of the Council of Buda. However, the burghers of Buda, and the members of the rebellious butchers’ guild in Esztergom abandoned their demands when the archbishop of Esztergom threatened them with excommunication. Besides excommunication, the church had other legal means at its disposal. The bishops, ex officio, were members of the Royal Council. Although the king was not obliged to
follow the advice of this council, its influence was unquestionable. Furthermore, the bureaucrats of the royal chancellery\textsuperscript{27} were also priests. Literacy was the privilege of the clergy, more precisely the privilege of the higher clergy and some monks, because neither the nobility nor the lower clergy knew the alphabet. Thus the formulators of laws were also priests, so-called \textit{magisters}, educated at the University of Paris under the supervision of the pope. The influence of these \textit{magisters} in the chancellery was so high that the Hungarian nobles once rebelled against their predominance and power\textsuperscript{28}. Furthermore, the knowledge of the Bible was definitely an advantage to the priests in an age when a quotation from the Scriptures was legally binding at the courts\textsuperscript{29}. Finally, the bishoprics and monasteries had the right to administer justice to the serfs in their own territories.

Equipped with these means, the church was able not only to reestablish its endangered or curtailed interests, but occasionally also to exercise its power over the king. An example of the former was the \textit{Aurea Bulla} charter, issued by Andrew II in 1222, which forbade the collection of the ecclesiastical tax ("\textit{tized}" or "tithe") in money and also centralized the salt-storing houses of the churches. However, five out of the seven copies of the charter 'mysteriously' remained with the church, and ultimately, all of the seven disappeared. Furthermore, a new charter issued in 1231 did not contain the regulations hindering the interests of the churches. Finally, the so-called Bereg-agreement of 1233 dictated by Jakab, papal legate, and bishop of Praenest, again provided the church with advantageous concessions in the salt-trade. What is more, the king was obliged to pay 10,000 marks to the church in compensation for the losses of previous years. It is interesting to note that the papal legate also wanted the Jews to be marked by a special sign and separated from the rest of society because they represented competition to the
church in the salt-trade. However, this suggestion remained only an unfulfilled wish of the legate.

The church’s authority over the king is, for example, illustrated by the case of King Béla III (1173-1196), who did not have the courage to arrest the conspiring Boleszló, bishop of Vác. What is more, the king had to explain in a letter to Pope Ince III that he entered the treasury of the bishop, because he suspected that the evidence of conspiracy was hidden there. Bishop Boleszló and his fellow bishops and the chief abbots continued to ignore the king. Consequently, the pope interfered not only in the donations of ecclesiastical estates, but also in the internal affairs of the country, in spite of the chief-seigniorial right of the king originating from the title of apostolic kingship. The pope ordered Prince Andrew to refrain from rebelling against his brother; and also ordered the bishops to excommunicate everybody who helped Andrew. Since the prince did not become a king for more than ten years, so many persons were excommunicated that the bishop of Csanád asked the pope in a letter to allow at least the people on their deathbed to return to the Catholic Church.

Although the power of the papacy declined in the thirteenth century, the independence of the church in Hungary did not diminish. Ironically, this was due to the Tatar (Mongol) invasion (1241), which left Hungary in complete devastation. In rebuilding the country, King Béla IV (1235-1270) gave special privileges to the nobility, including the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Thus, for example, the archbishop of Esztergom in 1262 received the privileges of administering justice, and of receiving not only a tenth of the royal taxes, but also a tenth of the income of the royal mint. Furthermore, the lands of those who committed high treason subsequently became the property of the archdiocese.
Finally, the population of the archdiocese was exempt from general public work. Thus it is safe to say that the term of Latin diarchy adequately describes Hungarian church-state relations at the establishment of the Hungarian state and in the following centuries. However, a proper understanding of medieval church-state relations in the Carpathian Basin requires further analysis of the country’s religious and political development.

The Church and the Development of the Hungarian State from the Reign of the Árpád Dynasty to the Turkish Occupation

Religious intolerance was not characteristic of Hungarians. As we have seen, representatives of different religions were likely to be resident in the courts of the Hungarian chiefs. Although Stephen forced the conversion of Hungarians to Christianity, occasionally even at the point of a sword, remnants of paganism survived for centuries, almost to the present day. Duels, as the form of establishing justice, were practiced frequently up to the end of the fifteenth century even in cases where ecclesiastical persons or institutions were involved in court cases. Obviously, monks and priests did not fight; rather they hired people to duel in their places. Transylvanian Szeklers had to publicly swear to the sun, moon or the stars in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, because in the occupying Habsburgs’ view the Szeklers still worshipped these celestial bodies. One of Stephen’s successors, King Ladislaus (1077-1095), instead of persecuting paganism, started a “campaign of canonization” in 1083. It raised, among others, Stephen, his son, Emeric, and Bishop Gerard, the martyr tutor of Emeric, into
sainthood. The canonizations served a twofold purpose. Apart from issuing mild warning to the remnants of paganism, they also certified the presence of the nation and the dynasty of Árpád in Christian Europe. Another example of religious tolerance was that although Géza and Stephen favored Rome over Constantinople, they tolerated Greek Orthodox priests and monasteries in their domain. Stephen himself established an Orthodox monastery for nuns to serve the Greek princess chosen as wife for his son, Emeric. Greek Orthodox monasteries existed even during the thirteenth century in Hungary.

A large Ishmaelite population in the twelfth century provides further evidence of the Hungarians’ religious tolerance. They were able to practice their Islamic faith “in comparative freedom and were obliged to serve the king only in case of war and even then only against a non-Mohammedan enemy” (Lázár 1989: 76). Similarly, as Püspöki noted, the Jews had privileges from the time of Árpád to King Béla IV (1235-1270); and only the Anjou period (1301-1395) introduced to Hungary the medieval version of anti-Semitism and persecution. Until then, the Hungarian leaders had tried to moderate the contemporary European attitude toward Jews. Finally, Hungarians proudly point out that Ladislaus I’s successor, Coloman (1095-1116), nicknamed the Book Lover (Beaucer) issued a decree in which he stated, contrary to the views of contemporary European rulers, that witches did not exist. Reality is somewhat less glorious because what Coloman actually stated in the famous Section 57 of his statute-book was that “De strigis ver, quae non sunt, nulla questio fiat”. This sentence is usually translated as ‘in the case of witches, who do not exist, no investigation should be conducted’, but as Balázs and Szélényi point out, Coloman referred not to all kinds of witches, but only to
"striga who could assume different shapes and forms, the persecution of whom was general at this time" (1989: 39).

While different religions – and even some witches – existed peacefully in the Carpathian Basin under the reign of the House of Árpád, the primacy and dominance of Roman Catholicism was unquestionable. Whereas the position of the church seemed stable, even after the decline of papal power, the crown, representing the state, became the source of much disagreement not only regarding who should wear it but also about what it symbolized. The monarchy of the Árpáds was hereditary; and originally, the crown was regarded as the king’s personal property. The so-called state was simply an appendix to the royal household, including even the annual national assemblies, the gathering of thousands of freemen at the camp of Rákos. This assembly was divided from the earliest time into two sections: the freemen and lesser nobles were separated from the magnates. The latter deliberated and then submitted their decisions for the approval of the former. This division became formalized later when the Parliament act of 1608 transformed the National Assembly into a bicameral Diet consisting of the Magnates’ Table (Felsőház) and the Lower Table (Alsóház).

When the dynasty of Árpád died out in 1301, the monarchy became elective resulting in reciprocity and equality in the power relations between king and estates. The crown was no longer the personal property of the king, but was seen to belong to the nation. The theory of the divine right to rule was also replaced by a new doctrine, clearly formulated later in the *Tripartium Corpus Juris* of Stephen Verböczy. According to the new doctrine, the king and the estates were equal partners in a Corporation of the Holy Crown. While the king created the estates by issuing letters patent, the estates appointed
the king by election or confirmation. The actual legislation was debated and enacted by
the National Assembly within which the estates had the power of the purse, although the
king could exercise an unconditional veto over all the decisions of the estates. In this
arrangement, the crown became the symbol of the nation; and it became a "legal entity"
itself. The nation — meaning the nobility — gave the crown, the symbol and source of all
power, to the king. Despite the declared equality of the monarch and the estates in the
Corporation of the Holy Crown, the balance of power gradually shifted toward the estates
because they embodied the nation.

The advance of the nobility at the expense of the monarch was partly due to another legal
innovation affecting private property. Stephen's donation of land created private
property in the form of non-hereditary fiefs and royal property, the latter administered by
royal servitors (servientes regis). The hereditary property rights and privileges of the
magnates, royal servitors and freemen — in one word, the lay nobility — were not
recognized until King Andrew II (1205-1235) issued the above-mentioned Aurea Bulla
charter in 1222. In 1351, a second Aurea Bulla confirmed the hereditary property rights
and privileges of the nobility, and established the Act of Aviticity (ősiség). Under this
act, landed property could neither be sold nor mortgaged. Hence, all transactions
involving land were technically long-term leases, resulting in numerous and interminable
lawsuits with significant social consequences. Thus, like everywhere else in Europe, land
became the foundation of wealth and power in medieval Hungary. The Church, from the
time of Stephen I on, took its due share from this source of power. Due to the landed
property of the Church, ecclesiastical representatives were present in the National
Assemblies both in the Magnates' Table — all the bishops — and the Lower Table — a

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number of abbots and canons representing the lower clergy. The *Tripartium Corpus Juris* of Stephen Verböczy significantly affected the nobility as well as other classes of medieval Hungarian society with serious consequences for the fate of the country in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It also shaped the specific alliances in church-state relationships. A brief presentation of Hungarian medieval social structure is, therefore, necessary at this point of our discussion.

### The Hungarian Medieval Social Structure

Although the unity and the indivisibility of the first estate, the *nobility*, were emphasized by both the *Aurea Bulla* and the Tripartite Code of Verböczy, differences in wealth, power and legal prerogatives divided it into two separate classes: the aristocracy or the magnates and the common nobility. The ancestors of the 108 aristocratic clans, of which 62 lived in Transylvania, were the tenants-in-chief and principal vassals of the kings, whereas the members of the common nobility were descendents of onetime royal servitors. The number of these servitors was quite substantial to begin with, but it increased even further during the centuries when Hungarian kings and later the Transylvanian princes granted exemptions and immunities, sometimes to the inhabitants of entire villages in order to staff the kings' and princes' armies. Their number in 1787 was 389,146, but they owned only about twenty percent of the enfeefed parishes of the country, while the aristocrats possessed forty percent. This difference in wealth was further accentuated by the fact that only one-fifth of the common nobility actually had
landed property. The members of this essentially middle-class element started referring to themselves in the nineteenth century as the gentry. Having no landed property, the members of the remaining part of the common nobility supported themselves as small freeholders, tenants and employees of other nobles, or as petty public servants. With a decline in the necessity for military service, the rights, such as tax exemption, and the status of these common nobles also diminished. However, they survived as a distinguishable juridical entity whose members could replenish and refresh the ranks of the upper stratum of Hungarian nobility through intermarriage.

From the point of view of our analysis, it is even more important that these “differences in wealth, status, and privilege between the two major strata of the nobility were further accentuated by differences in religion and nationality. On the one hand, the aristocracy (with the exception of the Transylvanians) was throughout its history a polyglot entity, which maintained a record of stout adherence to the religious tenets of Catholicism. On the other hand, the common nobility never lost its original Magyar character, and in time became closely associated with the Calvinist branch of Protestantism” (Janos 1982 : 19). These differences also manifested themselves in political views. While the common nobility portrayed itself as the patriotic defender of the Hungarian nation and its public liberties, the aristocracy identified itself with Christian universalism in the service of a European dynasty.

The second estate, the clergy of the established church, fully shared the status and the privileges of the nobility, as was customary in Catholic Europe. The Church had the right of taxation and jurisdiction over a vast array of religious and temporal matters including the administration of family law. The significant landholdings of the Catholic
Church, its monopoly over education, and its vigorous participation in the administration and defense of the country reinforced these legal privileges. These privileges of the Catholic Church in Hungary, however, weakened significantly in the sixteenth century for several reasons, which we will consider shortly.

The third estate consisted of burghers or townspeople, the overwhelming majority of whom were Germans. They came from Lower Saxony at the request of the Hungarian kings in the thirteenth century. Most of the cities established by these Germans banned Rumanians, Slovaks and even Hungarians from residency by explicit provisions in their charters. Consequently, their ethnic character was preserved for centuries. As Janos (1982) notes, the words "Saxon" and urban resident were virtually synonymous in Transylvania as late as 1848. In Hungary proper, a few "pure" Hungarian cities developed especially during the Turkish occupation (1526 – 1686), such as Debrecen, Kecskemét and Komárom. Originally, residents of the medieval cities were legally regarded as royal servants, and thus exempted from the jurisdiction of the nobility. In later centuries, the cities were granted a variety of new rights, among them the right of self-government and parliamentary representation.

Below the burghers, but above the serfs or "common people", was a semi-privileged group whose members were neither nobles nor serfs. They were exempted from the tutelage of feudal overlords and were legal owners of freeholds, but they did not enjoy the personal freedoms and privileges of the nobility. These people lived in the so-called free-districts established by the crown at different times. While the burghers were exempted from military service in exchange for taxation, and the nobility was exempted from taxation in exchange for military service, the inhabitants of the free districts carried
both burdens. Due to this inequality, coupled with the inhabitants' warlike character, these free districts became, not surprisingly, hotbeds of rebellion against the feudal social system. The great uprising of serfs in the Jazyg-Cuman district of the Alföld under the leadership of a Szekler officer, György Dózsa, in 1514 had a serious consequence for the fate of the country in the form of the Turkish occupation. This was also the time when the Reformation reached Hungary. These events unquestionably weakened the Catholic Church, affected the Hungarian state, and consequently, altered the country's church-state relationships.

The Church-State Relationship of Hungary under Turkish Occupation

Hungarian kings were involved in the wars against the Turks from the time of Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387-1437). Sigismund lost both of his battles against Sultan Mohammed II, but the territory of Hungary was not yet endangered. Under Sigismund's successor, however, Turkish troops advanced to Nándorfehérvár, today's Belgrade. Its defender, János Hunyadi, gained a decisive victory on July 22, 1456. Hungarians proudly boast that the pealing of bells at noon in Christian churches throughout the world, in accordance with a decree of Pope Callixtus, is a reminder of Hunyadi’s victory. Reality is somewhat sobering for at least two reasons. The pope had actually given instructions on June 29 to ring the bells as a prayer for the favorable outcome of the battle. Furthermore, the victory was partly due to the fact that Mohammed reserved his naval troops to defend the domains he had gained from the pope. In part, however, the
victory was due to Hunyadi’s new policy, the recruitment of common people who fought as courageously as the mercenaries and the nobility. Had the Hungarians followed Hunyadi’s example, they might also have stopped the Turks seventy years later at the battle of Mohács (1526). One of the reasons for this important military defeat is connected to Hungary’s church-state relations.

The son of a Hungarian wheelwright serf, Tamás Bakócz (1442-1521), cardinal of Esztergom, and titular Patriarch of Constantinople (1507), had great expectations for his election to the papal throne. Instead, Cardinal Giovanni de Medici was elected pope as Leo X (1513-1521). Pope Leo X asked Bakócz to return to Hungary as papal legate to organize a crusade against the Turks in 1514. The aforementioned Szekler lieutenant, György Dózsa, a member of the semi-privileged strata, became the leader of the Hungarian crusaders who were recruited mostly from among the serfs by priests and monks. However, Dózsa and his army turned against the Hungarian nobility and weakened the country by burning the fields and massacring thousands. Bakócz immediately withdrew the call for crusade, excommunicated Dózsa, and the army of the nobility brutally suppressed the uprising. Reflecting on this bloody event, the nobility decided to stop the armament of common people. In the absence of significant military power⁴⁶, the Hungarians lost the battle at Mohács, and thus Ottoman troops occupied a large territory within Hungary for more than 150 years.

After the defeat at Mohács, the country was divided into three parts with decisive consequences, especially with respect to religion. The western and northern regions became a part of the Habsburg Empire. The middle part, a triangle shaped territory, whose peak extended far beyond the capital city, and included the Alföld (Great Plain),
the eastern half of Transdanubia, and the lower tip of Transylvania, was absorbed by the
Ottoman Empire. The remaining part of Transylvania emerged as an independent
principality protecting and nurturing future Hungarian national aspirations\(^47\). It was
Cardinal György Martinuzzi who established the political organization of Transylvania in
1541 by taking the son of the Hungarian King János Zápolyai to Transylvania. As the
regent of the child king, he became the ruler of Transylvania.

Meanwhile, the sixteenth century religious Reformation begun in Germany by Martin
Luther very quickly affected the religious life of Hungarians. Due partly to the influence
of Johann Honter (1498-1549), the founder of the Lutheran national church of the
German Saxons, the Transylvanian territory soon developed an overwhelmingly
Protestant character. With the exception of the Rumanians, all the various ethnic groups
in Transylvania followed the Saxons and converted to Protestantism\(^48\). Another probable
reason for the stormy advance of Protestantism was the possibility offered to converted
Hungarian nobles of expropriating the estates of the Catholic Church. While the Catholic
Hermann (1973 : 215) emphasizes this motive by claiming that it was a general practice,
the Protestant Bucsay (1985 : 38) belittles it. According to the latter, the nobility had
been able to expropriate ecclesiastical estates for a shorter or longer period of time well
before Luther’s protest simply by courting the king. After the defeat at Mohács,
however, this practice of the nobility became somewhat easier, because six out of the
twelve bishops died on the battlefield\(^49\); and many ecclesiastical sees remained vacant for
several years. In any case, Protestantism spread quickly also in the north-western part of
Transdanubia where the German mercenaries serving in the border-fortresses were the
main mediators of the new faith. By the middle of the sixteenth century, Protestantism
had become well established in the whole country. The only force that could have stopped it would have been the resistance of the nobility, but probably because of the tempting ecclesiastical large estates, we know about no significant opposition\textsuperscript{50}. Initially, the converted Hungarians professed Lutheranism, but later they turned to the Zwinglian form of Protestantism\textsuperscript{51}. Such an advance of Protestantism was not without tensions\textsuperscript{52}, which will be discussed later.

Since the attitude toward religion in the territory under Turkish rule was “relaxed”, as long as the taxes were paid, Franciscan and Jesuit priests as well as Protestant ministers were able to work openly. However, the Turks “favored” the Protestants because the head of the Catholics, the pope, tried to pursue a constant war against them. Another reason for the Turks’ preference was the difference in church-state relationships in the two denominations. The hierarchical organization of the Catholic church was not only a link between the Hungarian Catholics under Turkish occupation and those in the so-called Hungarian kingdom, which was practically under Habsburg rule, but it was also the foundation of the Hungarian political and national cohesion. As Hermann (1973) explains, the Hungarian kings continued to appoint bishops for the territories under Turkish rule. While the appointed bishops, disobeying even papal orders, refused to take up formal residence in their own dioceses, they maintained contact with their faithful, if for no other reason than collecting the ecclesiastical tax. However, these bishops were able to practice their privileges and political rights in the Hungarian kingdom, i.e. by participating in the parliament, and thus preserving the idea of political unity. Obviously, the Turks ‘favored’ the Protestants, whose ecclesiastical organization was significantly less centralized than that of the Catholics and was more independent of the king.
While the Turks preferred Protestantism, this preference did not protect the Protestant ministers from suffering in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Many were tortured, imprisoned, and even executed. However, the Turks protected them against the few Catholic priests and licenciats who took pastoral care of their faithful. This was the time of public religious debates among the different denominations, but mostly between Protestants and Catholics. The Turks allowed these debates in which they openly supported the Protestants with their authority. Furthermore, some pashas not only permitted the construction of new Protestant churches but occasionally they brought Protestant preachers for the Hungarians. Obviously, the pashas’ interest lay not in the promotion of the ‘new faith’ but in encouraging their Hungarian subjects to remain under their rule.

However, it would be a grave mistake to explain the spread of Protestantism simply and exclusively by social and political circumstances and ignore the spiritual factor. One of the reasons for the quick and general spread of Protestantism in Hungary under the Turks was the population’s spiritual hunger. The acceptance of Protestantism was further facilitated by the coincidence of the shortage of Catholic priests and the teaching of the new faith. While Rome insisted on the necessity of the church and priests as intermediaries between the individual and God, the Protestant theory of sole fide was perhaps particularly attractive to the Hungarians in occupied territory. They probably interpreted their sufferings and the flight of the Catholic clergy from the occupied territories as God’s guidance to the new faith.

The Turkish occupation resulted in several other arrangements with consequences for later church-state relations. The still existent connections between Hungarian, German
and Dutch Protestants, for example, were established at this time, because Hungarian and German (Szász) Protestant students had to travel to Germany and the Netherlands. This practice was so general that in Wittenberg, for example, the Coetus Hungaricus, a self-governing community of the Hungarian students, functioned throughout the second half of the sixteenth century.

The flourishing of the so-called ‘peasant cities’ of the Alföld occurred also under the Turkish occupation. These mostly Protestant cities – Kecskemét, Nagykőrös, Cegléd, Jászberény, Mezőtúr – became the sources of a middle-strata because they enjoyed relative peace and achieved considerable prosperity providing thus “inexhaustible financial and moral sources to Hungarian [nationalism]” (Szekfű n.d. : 92-93). Finally, a large Sephardic Jewish community, which had settled following Turkish occupation, also flourished in the city of Buda.

Analyzing Hungarian church-state relations in the era of the Turkish occupation, we can say that only one relation seemed to be stable and constant, namely the unremitting hostility of the papacy towards the Turks. All the other relations between the political and ecclesiastical powers were complicated and mercurial. Alliances shifted constantly in accord with rapidly changing interests. Thus, for example, due to political circumstances, Pope Clement VII was forced to acknowledge the claims of both János Zápolyai (1526 – 1540) and the Habsburg Ferdinand (1526 – 1564) to the Hungarian throne. However, when Zápolyai allied himself with the Turks, the pope excommunicated Zápolyai, to the delight of Ferdinand. Despite the papal excommunication, Zápolyai remained Catholic throughout his life. Cardinal György Martinuzzi, the regent of Transylvania, and Antal Verancsics, prépost of Buda, provide
an example of the divisions among the Catholic hierarchy in Hungary. While the former offered Transylvania to Ferdinand in return for an alliance against the Turks, the latter wanted to protect the independence of Transylvania because he sensed that Rome would have liked to rely on it against the Habsburg dynasty.

As we have seen, the Turks generally favored the Protestants, but this did not prevent them from exhibiting an occasional preference for Catholics. We do not know exactly why they declared a Franciscan priest and not the Protestant minister the winner in a dispute on Christian religious truth in Szeged. However, we know that in 1673, the Protestant cities promised a large amount of money to the pasha of Buda for the imprisonment of Catholic priests and military officers loyal to the Catholic king. When the Protestants did not pay, the pasha set his prisoners free and informed the Hungarian government about the Protestants' conspiracy.

Another Lutheran conspiracy became known at the end of 1673. More than 350 Protestant ministers were accused, but 237 were set free when they promised to stop their ministerial activity. However, the others were imprisoned; and forty of them were sent to the galleys. Some of them died on their way to the seas, others escaped, but thirty actually became galley slaves. The cruel fate of the Hungarian Protestant ministers raised concern throughout Europe. A successful movement was organized in Switzerland to collect enough money for the redemption of the slave ministers. However, the Jesuits convinced the regent of Nople, where the ministers were sold into slavery, to turn down the Swiss offer. Hungarian Protestants, through the aforementioned good connections with their Dutch brethren, asked the predominantly Protestant Netherlands to intercede for the Hungarian ministers with the Habsburgs. The Dutch government promptly
initiated some repressive measures against its Catholic minority who, in turn, persuaded the government in Vienna to set the Hungarian ministers free. Apart from the decline in the Habsburgs' and Rome's prestige, another consequence of this incident was the allocation of the collected Swiss money to a fund for enabling Hungarian Protestant students to study at foreign universities.

The papal state, however, remained practically alone in its struggle against Islam for the second part of the sixteenth and the greater part of the seventeenth century. Even such a forcefully Catholic king as King Philip II of Spain made peace with the Turks. The reign of Philip II was a good example of monarchical absolutism, which came to prevail in much of Western Europe by the sixteenth century. Absolutism in France resulted, among other things, in the 'Gallican Articles' confirmed by the National Council of Paris (1682). These articles declared that the pope had neither direct nor indirect power (potestas delegata) over the temporal and civil issues of a country; he could neither dethrone a ruler nor absolve subjects from their allegiance to the ruler. Furthermore, as the articles declared, the pope was under the authority of the universal council and was even bound by the traditional customs of the French church. Finally the pope's decisions were to be regarded as 'infallible' only when accorded the sanction of the universal church.

The Hungarian Primate Szelepcsényi attacked the Gallican Articles at once – on October 24, 1682 – in a pastoral letter, which was recognized internationally. Bossuet, the "father of Gallicanism", criticized Szelepcsényi's letter immediately, but the Parliament of Paris forbade the circulation of the letter only somewhat later on June 23, 1683. While some
professors of the Sorbonne denounced the parliament’s decision and resigned, the university, as a whole, condemned Szelepcsényi.

The victory of French absolutism in itself could not account for the establishment of the Holy League by Austria, Poland, Russia and Venice⁶⁹ on May 5, 1684 aiming — among other things — at the liberation of Hungary from the Turks. The real reason for this decision was the realization that if France were able to forge an alliance with the Ottoman Empire it could conquer Central Europe. As a preventive measure, the aforementioned powers turned against the Turks. Their victory at the battle at Zenta in 1697 meant the end of the Turkish occupation of Hungary, but at the same time, Hungary became, for all practical purposes, a colony of the Habsburg Empire. Under the rule of Emperor Leopold I (1657 – 1705), Hungary was forced to provide a third of the imperial budget. However, Leopold’s decree of 1701, abolishing religious freedom, i.e. the rights of Protestants, was perhaps as intolerable in Hungarians’ eyes as the financial burden. To appreciate the significance of Leopold’s decree we have to discuss briefly the vigorous struggle of Protestants and Catholics, which had continued uninterrupted during the Turkish occupation.

In Transylvania, despite the official declaration of religious freedom⁷⁰, Catholics were subject to discrimination under the rule of Protestant princes. On the other hand, the armed Counter-Reformation begun by Ferenc Forgách⁷¹ at the end of the sixteenth century in the so-called Hungarian kingdom resulted not only in the reoccupation of the churches but also in the expulsion of Protestant preachers and teachers from the cities. The Protestants requested at the Parliament of Pozsony (Bratislava), which took place in March and April of 1604, the right to practice their religion freely. Chief-Prince Mathias,
who ruled *de facto* in place of the insane King Rudolf (1576 – 1608), dissolved the Parliament before discussing the Protestants’ request and other religious issues. Without consulting the Hungarian nobles, he also persuaded Rudolf to issue a law – the 22\textsuperscript{nd} article – prohibiting the discussion of religious issues at future parliamentary sessions. These measures and other discontents led to Bocskay’s revolt against the Habsburgs.

Bocskay’s successful insurrection resulted in the Vienna Treaty signed on June 23, 1606. Among other issues, this treaty contained the withdrawal of the 22\textsuperscript{nd} article, and endorsed the public or constitutional acceptance of Protestants, i.e. Lutheran and Reformed Church members. It provided religious freedom for aristocrats, nobles, free royal cities, royal peasant cities, and soldiers of the frontier fortresses. Thus the king essentially gave up the right of “*cuius regid*”, to which he was entitled in the royal cities and peasant cities. In practice, it meant that instead of the king, the local magistrate now decided the religion of the settlement.

The Protestants gained more rights and independence in the so-called “*antecoronationalis articuli*” in 1608 when Chief-Prince Mathias was elected king\textsuperscript{72} in place of Rudolf who had finally abdicated. The villages also gained the freedom of religion. Those bishops whose dioceses were under Turkish occupation were excluded from the royal council, and the king had to propose two Catholic and two Protestant candidates for the post of nádor, the palatine\textsuperscript{73} of Hungary. Finally, the Protestants were no longer obliged to pay the ecclesiastical tax (tithe) to the local Catholic pastor.

Meanwhile the kings continued appointing bishops to the Catholic dioceses under Turkish occupation (*in partibus infidelium*). These bishops were *ex officio* in the upper
house of the Parliament; and they supported the Catholic Habsburgs vis-à-vis the
Protestants. As a consequence of these appointments and the success of the Counter
Reformation, Catholics held a majority in all parliaments from the 1630s onwards.
However, due probably to the Protestants’ strong advocates (the representatives of the
Transylvanian principality) the succeeding parliaments confirmed the rights of
Protestants.

Although at the battle of St. Gotthard (1664), Montecuccoli defeated the Turks, the
following Peace of Vasvár (Eisenburg) was very humiliating for both Hungary and the
Habsburgs. Hungary’s division was reaffirmed, and Austria had to make tribute
payments to the Turks. The humiliating treaty turned even the Catholic Hungarian
against the Habsburgs. Besides the treaty, the cruel persecution of Protestants, the
executions and galley slavery all added to the generally felt discontent, and resulted in
several uprisings. Thus in 1669, the Magnates of the Hungarian nobility conspired to
revolt, but were discovered and their leaders were executed on April 30, 1670. This plot
was followed in 1678 by the “Kuruc uprising” led by the Protestant Imre Thökőly (1656-
1705).

The Habsburgs were unable to suppress the uprising, and thus made a truce with
Thökőly, which was followed by a treaty and parliament in 1681 in Sopron. While
reaffirming the religious laws introduced in 1606 and 1608, this treaty also introduced
certain restrictions on the Protestants’ religious freedom in the Western part of Hungary.
In the Western counties, while the Protestants were permitted to practice their faith
privately they were allowed to have a minister, teacher, and church only in two cities of
each county. The names of these cities were listed in the articles of the Sopron Treaty,
hence the cities became known as the “articular places” (*artikuláris helyek*).

Furthermore, the nobility were empowered to act according to the “*cuius regio*” principle in these counties. While in the larger frontier cities and the free royal cities Protestant church property was not restored to its original owners, expropriated church members were nevertheless allowed to build new churches.

All in all, despite the restrictions, Hungarian Protestantism enjoyed considerable freedom and was able to exercise various rights. Compared to the bloody Counter Reformation of Austria, Hungarian religious conflict was considerably less brutal. Nevertheless, certain memorable events in this religious warfare must be mentioned briefly because of their significant consequences to the national feelings of Hungarians.

In 1670, the Habsburgs launched an anti-Protestant campaign. As Acsády (1883) noted, the persecution of Protestants was actually directed against the Hungarian nobility, especially the common nobility. The Habsburgs’ goal was to accuse as many nobles as possible in order to confiscate their goods and land. General Cobb, the “Wolf”, for example ordered the leaders of Zemplén county on October 14, 1677 to expel within ten days even the wives and children of the so-called “rebels”. King Leopold issued a similar order on July 19, 1679. The intention of the Habsburgs was probably the weakening of the Hungarian nobility, the mere existence of which represented a threat to their plan of colonizing Hungary. The fact that the Hungarian nobility in general, and the common nobility in particular, survived was mainly due to the Protestant Transylvanian princes who generously donated noble titles, although, mostly without land. A consequence of the Habsburg policy was that Hungarian national feelings became closely linked to Protestantism because the adherents of this faith offered greater resistance to the
Habsburgs and consequently suffered more than the Catholics. Thus, Leopold’s decree of 1701 abolishing religious freedom in the reunited Hungarian kingdom and Transylvanian principality was not a completely new policy on the part of the Habsburgs. Nevertheless, it was felt by the Hungarians as a threat to both their religious and national freedom.

**Church-State Relations under the Rule of the Habsburg Dynasty until the Compromise (1694 – 1867)**

The Habsburgs’ oppressive measures, not surprisingly, evoked the resistance of the Hungarians, led by Ferenc Rákóczi II. Although he himself was a devout Catholic and the members of his inner circle were predominantly Catholic, nine-tenths of his army consisted of Protestants who expected him to restore their religious freedom and rights. However, the uprising (1703-1711) was suppressed – Rákóczi died in exile in 1735 – and nothing hindered the absolutist rule of the Catholic Habsburgs for the rest of the eighteenth century. Ironically, absolutism also resulted in the remedy of the Protestants’ rights as we will see later.

The Habsburgs, along with the Hungarian large landowners, encouraged foreigners, mostly Germans, Southern and Northern Slavs, Slovaks, Carpatho-Ukrainians and Rumanians, to settle in the depopulated regions. The Sephardic Jews fled with the Turks, but Ashkenazis from Moravia, Vienna, Ukraine, and Galicia replaced them.
This new religious minority became the leading promoter and the chief beneficiary of the emerging process of modernization. The privileges of these ‘foreigners’, and their relative wealth and status coupled with their particular religio-political institutions later became the fertile ground of ethnic tensions. The significance and different effects of these religio-political institutions will be compared and discussed later.

The Habsburgs continued their policy of religious intolerance. By introducing a Catholic form of oath in 1731, Emperor Charles III (1711-1740) excluded Protestants, for all practical purposes, from holding public office. Charles III was raised in Spain. Apart from Spanish etiquette, he also brought with him his desire to rule according to the constitution. He was a devout Catholic, sometimes participating in the Mass several times a day, but his guiding principle in religious matters was the law. However, when the estates trusted him with decisions on religious matters, his Catholicism, coupled with absolutism, gained the upper hand. His decree in 1731 (Carolina Resolutio) required not only that a Catholic oath be taken by public officials and lawyers, but also enforced the Protestants’ obligation to pay the surplice-fee (stola) to the Catholic priests in the “non-articular places” (nem artikuláris helyek), i.e. where they could not practice the Protestant faith openly. Serfs were allowed to convert from Catholicism to Protestantism only with royal permission. He also ordered that Protestant ministers had to use the Catholic liturgy at baptism, and that Catholic marriage tribunals should deal with the Protestants’ cases too. In these cases, however, the tribunals had to apply Protestant principles. Mixed marriages between Catholics and Protestants were to be solemnized by Catholic priests, and hefty fines were introduced for those Catholics who wanted to return to Protestantism. Finally, the Emperor’s decree also prescribed that both the Reformed and
the Lutheran churches should be subject to four supervisors, who could undertake their duties only with royal confirmation. One of the tasks of these supervisors was to oversee the moral life of the Protestant ministers. The Carolina Resolutio remained the basic law regulating Hungarian Protestant life for the next fifty years.

Charles’ daughter, Maria Theresa (1740-1780), greatly expanded the organization of the Catholic Church through the foundation of five new bishoprics. While she was less than clear-sighted in religious matters, her practicality tended to mitigate her extremism and therefore she partially withdrew her own restrictive decrees regarding the Jews. During her reign, however, the Jews were compelled to change their traditional names to German family names.

Like her father, Maria Theresa envisioned “one nation with one religion”, the religion in question undoubtedly being Catholicism. However, in a similar manner to her father, she wished to achieve her goal within the constitutional framework, and consequently, religious tolerance was a necessary evil in her eyes. While she did not use unlawful means against the Protestants she did not allow them to gain strength either. As she instructed the crown prince, the Habsburgs wanted “neither persecution nor tolerance.”

In 1760, Maria Theresa established a cabinet council (államtanács). Its executive branch was the governing council, in which the committee on religion consisted exclusively of the members of the Catholic hierarchy. The decisions of the governing council were always contrary to the interests of the Protestants. For example, in 1751, Maria Theresa ordered the general restriction of studies abroad, which would have especially grave repercussions for the Protestants. Only students of noble origins were allowed to apply for passports, but in each case the Empress herself decided whether the passport was
issued. The censorship became so severe that one of the returning theologians waited for six years, and another student for eleven years, in vain, to receive their books from the censors. In 1768, Maria Theresa, who had originally intended to forbid mixed marriages entirely, ordered that the non-Catholic partner in a marriage must consent to raise the children in the Catholic faith. Although this order was not published openly, the priests and bishops were instructed to proceed accordingly. In light of this marriage policy and the fact that Protestants were more severely punished than their Catholic spouses whenever its provisions were infringed, it is no wonder that they hated the governing council.

Despite the restrictive measures of Maria Theresa against the Protestants, Hungarian Catholics fared little better in the latter half of the eighteenth century than the Protestants. The explanation for the relative weakness of the Catholic Church contains at least three components: "Febronianism", a new theory of church-state relations; Maria Theresa's decrees regulating the life of Hungarian Catholicism; and finally the actions of her son, Joseph II.

Justinus Febronius, whose real name was John Nicholas Hontheim, auxiliary bishop of Trier, was under the influence of Gallicanism and Jansenism. He published his De statu Ecclesiae et legítima potestate Romani Pontificis in 1763 with the aim of facilitating the return of Protestants to the Catholic Church. According to him, the reunion would become a reality if the ancient constitution of the church were reestablished. The chief obstacle to such reestablishment was an overextended papal power. For Hontheim, the pope was simply primus inter pares in the bishops' council and he had no special legal authority (primatus jurisdictionis) apart from the right of a chief inspector (primatus
Hontheim divided papal rights into essential, nonessential and usurped categories. The pope had only one essential right, namely the right to convene and chair synods, and see that their decrees were observed. Nonessential papal rights consisted of the establishment of bishoprics, the confirmation and removal of elected bishops, and the canonization of saints. Usurped rights were the claim to papal infallibility, intervention in bishops’ and rulers’ jurisdictions, and the alteration of promulgated laws at the pope’s wish or pleasure. Finally, Hontheim claimed, to the delight of absolutist rulers, that the Church was not a perfect society, and thus implicitly suggested that the territorial churches were subject to their local governments.

Febronianism influenced both Maria Theresa and her son, who was co-regent from 1765. While some of the former’s decrees regulating the life of Catholicism were beneficial to the Church, others were definitely contrary to its interests. Following Febronian principles, she used without scruple the right of *jus placeti*, i.e. the refusal of the promulgation of papal decrees. She announced neither the decree in 1764 condemning Hontheim’s *De statu Ecclesiae*, nor the list of ecclesiastical punishments issued in 1768, nor the dissolution of the Jesuit Order in 1773. She also left the seats of several bishoprics vacant for years in order to channel the revenues of the ecclesiastical estates into the chancellery. But probably the greatest blow to the Catholic Church was that she delegated the duty of ecclesiastical censorship to her chancellor, Van Swieten Gerhard, a free-thinking deist and hedonist, and to her court-advisor, Greiner, a freemason. Under this peculiar censorship, the writings of several Jesuits were condemned while publications that promoted Gallicanism, Febronianism, and deism were granted the approval of the censors. As Hermann noted, the church in the era of Enlightened
Despotism was neither above, nor next to, but definitely under the state simply as one of its executive offices (1973: 367).

When Pope Pius VI declared Maria Theresa’s son, Emperor Joseph II, the “best Catholic” he undoubtedly referred to his exemplary moral life and spiritual devotion, and not to his church-policy, which was unquestionably absolutist. During his ten-year rule (1780-1790), he issued 6,206 decrees concerning religious life in his empire. Earning the nickname of “Sacristan Brother” from Frederick II, the Prussian king, Joseph II regulated even such minor details as how many chairs, knives, forks, and spoons a pastor might possess, or how many candles could be lit during the Mass. He decreed that each church might have only two altars, regulated the form of public blessings and the order of processions, and forbade pilgrimages. He also regulated how many and what kind of dishes might be served at the marriage reception of a peasant family. Some of his orders were ignored, especially in the remote areas of his empire, and others created such upheaval that he soon withdrew them. Nonetheless many traditional religious customs disappeared under his reign.

His more important religio-political decisions included the dissolution of the contemplative religious orders and some of the teaching orders. He also forbade the members of religious orders to keep contact with their superiors residing in another country. He simply ordered them to ignore those sections in their constitutions, which related to the role of general superiors. From the estates of the dissolved orders he established the so-called Religion-Fund for financing, among other things, his organization of new parishes. He ordered Austrian and Hungarian students to leave the famous Collegium Germanicum-Hungaricum and moved them from Rome to Pavia.
He also forbade the bishops to turn to Rome for advice and guidance. Furthermore, he had them delete the paragraphs of the Breviaries that discussed the victory of Pope Gregory VII over Henry IV in Canossa. In light of these measures, it is not surprising that he followed his mother’s practice in using the *jus placeti*. Thus, for instance, he forbade the publication of the papal decree condemning Jansenism. When the Hungarian Primate Batthyány objected to this practice and asked the emperor to imprison for life any priest proclaiming Jansenist views, Joseph II calmly turned down the request and encouraged the priests involved to emigrate to other countries.

Another of his measures was the amalgamation of diocesan seminaries into two “general seminaries”. All the bishops and religious orders were required to send their candidates to these seminaries in which, needless to say, the Emperor had also prescribed who could teach and what they could teach. Furthermore, with his decree on marriage in 1783, he repealed the appropriate sections of Catholic canon law.

Toward the end of his life he realized that, despite his good intentions, his painstakingly meticulous regulations had made the life of his subjects miserable. On his deathbed, he withdrew all of his orders, with the exception of three laws. The three laws that he kept in effect were his famous decree of religious tolerance (*edictum tolerantiale*) issued in 1781, the decree that alleviated the life of the serfs, and the one that regulated the parishes. The *edictum tolerantiale*, the most important decree from the point of view of this study, guaranteed the free practice of Protestant faith in any settlement where at least a hundred families were of that faith. They were even allowed to build churches, although without towers and the entrance of the church was not allowed to open directly onto the street. Later, however, he eased the architectural restrictions and decreased the
required number of families. The Protestants were also allowed to hold public office. In Transylvania, not only the Protestants but also the Orthodox were able to practice their faith – though in their case, the requirement of a minimum hundred families remained in effect. He also allowed Protestants to settle in Croatia and the area of Bánát, a region north of today’s Voivodina, thus breaking with his mother’s policy, which restricted Protestant settlement in certain regions.

The era ending in the rule of Emperor Joseph II witnessed a change which had significant relevance to church-state relations, namely the rise of the laity’s role in the governance of the Protestant churches. This change, occurring mainly in the eighteenth century, had four roots. While the members of the Catholic hierarchy, as we have noted several times, were ex officio in the Upper House of the Parliament, the Protestant nobility represented effectively the interests of the Reformed, Lutheran and the Unitarian churches. A second reason was that, as a result of the Counter Reformation, the Protestants had lost their majority in most of the city-councils, and thus they were deprived of financial support from the cities. Compensating this loss, the Protestant churches started establishing presbyteriums, the self-governing and supporting bodies of the local religious communities. This process was facilitated by the example of the centralizing attempts of the absolutist government. Following the example of the government, the Protestant churches also established their own bureaucracy. The bureaucrats were, however, recruited from the laity and not from the clergy. Finally, foreign examples also contributed to the growth of the laity’s importance, such as when Hungarian Protestant students studying abroad witnessed the presbyterian ecclesiology of other Protestant
churches. These students, upon their return to Hungary, criticized the still episcopal organizations of the Hungarian Protestant churches.

Despite the withdrawal of practically all of King Joseph II’s decrees regulating religious life, the following three Habsburgs88 ruled in a true spirit of Josephinism89. All initiatives to weaken absolutism, for instance at the national synod in Pozsony (Bratislava), which opened on September 8, 1822, were doomed from the beginning. Apart from the “iron cage” of bureaucracy the lack of a visionary and energetic hierarchy also contributed to the preservation of the status quo until 1848.

Reflection on the various measures implemented by the absolutist Habsburgs raises the important question of whether it is possible to regard the Latin diarchy as operative under their rule. The defining criteria of the Latin diarchy or the two powers model, if it existed, ought to have insured the rights of the Church against the secular rulers. However, as we have seen, the Catholic Church was practically at the mercy of its political rulers from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. Hermann (1973), as we have noted, declared that the Catholic Church only existed under the state, as an office of the royal household90. We have also seen that Gallicanism influenced the policies of Habsburgs. For Sturzo (1962), Gallicanism is a subtype of jurisdictionalism, which means that the church and the state accept reciprocal juridical positions. It differs from cesaropapism and theocratic systems inasmuch as these two feature a systematic confusion and absorption to the advantage of either the state or the church, while in jurisdictionalism there is a coordination with clear-cut domains of competence and a division of activities. Thus, Gallicanism, in Sturzo’s categorization, is a particular constellation of church-state relationships in which the state called for jurisdictionalism.
However, in the Habsburgs' case\textsuperscript{91}, especially, as we have seen, in the practice of Josephinism, it is impossible to talk about "clear-cut domains of competence and division of activities", because the all-pervasiveness of the state was evident. Thus the question must be reformulated: To what extent does caesaropapism, in Sturzo's use of the term, characterize Hungarian church-state relations in this era?

Caesaropapism, in this sense, is a situation in which the "authority of the State becomes an effective, normal and centralizing authority in the Church, though from outside, while the authority of the Church shares directly, though in a non-autonomous and often subordinate form, in the exercise of secular power" (1962: 47). The Byzantine Church from which the different Orthodox Churches are derived is the typical example of caesaropapism. Indeed, the absolutist state became an effective and especially a centralizing authority in not only religious matters, but all aspects of life. Emperor Joseph II's detailed regulations left no doubt that he intended to control even such minor details as what the peasants may eat at a wedding reception let alone what the pastor may do in the church. However, Sturzo does not explain how the church shares directly in the "secular power" of the state\textsuperscript{92}.

Ullman's (1967) brief historical overview of caesaropapism may provide us with some better guidelines. According to him, caesaropapism entered the sphere of politics with the publication of \textit{Henoticon}\textsuperscript{93} (482) in which Emperor Zeno unilaterally and in disregard of the Council of Chalcedon ordained the faith for his subjects in Byzantium. Furthermore, in Ullman's view, caesaropapism reached its highest point in the government of Justinius I, the ruler of Byzantium between 527 and 565, who acted to all intents and purposes as 'king and priest', or we might add, as pope. As Fortescue (1998b)
noted, Justinius I conceived of himself as “supreme head on earth in matters ecclesiastical as well as in the State”. The Habsburg absolutist rulers did not intend to become popes, but they did act similarly to Emperor Zeno. We might recall the unscrupulous use of *jus placeti* both by Maria Theresa and her son in the cases of heretical teachings. Furthermore, Joseph II’s disregard of the appropriate canons on marriage and his incursions into doctrinal matters indicate the extent of imperial interference in the spiritual realm. Therefore, it seems justifiable to describe Hungarian church-state relations under the Habsburgs as a form of caesaropapism. In light of this observation, it also seems reasonable to discuss, as Ullman (1967) does, Gallicanism, Febronianism and Josephinism as particular manifestations of caesaropapism.

The stormy events of European revolutions in 1848 swept away the “fossilized” arrangements of Hungarian church-state relations along with much else. However, the particular church-state relations of the ethnic minorities, or rather the lack of these relations, must also be taken into account in order to have a proper understanding of the significance of 1848 – 1849 in Hungarian history. As we have seen, after the expulsion of the Turks, the Habsburgs encouraged the settlement of Germans in the unpopulated territories of the country with the intention of Germanizing Hungary. Re-population by German and Slav settlers occurred through the foundation of village communities *without* the establishment of a higher ecclesiastical or political organization. Consequently, these small and dispersed communities of ethnic minorities did not hinder the process by which Hungarian nationalism gathered strength under the Habsburgs’ oppressive rule.

After the liberation of Hungary from Turkish rule at the end of the seventeenth century, Serbs also fled from the Turks to the southern part of Hungary in 1690. However, unlike
the German and Slav settlers, the Serb refugees, about two hundred thousand in number, came to Hungary under the leadership of their religious leader, Arzen Csejnojevics, Patriarch of Ipek. Due to their commercial privileges, i.e. exemptions from different taxes, granted by Leopold I., they soon became prosperous. According to Hermann⁹⁵, their ecclesiastical organization became stronger through the appointment of other patriarchs; and within a few decades, they were able to compete with the ecclesiastical organization of the Catholics. While the German and Slav settlers became “Hungarian” in their national spirit, the Serbs, due to their religious organization, always retained their political and national distinctiveness. Thus the Habsburgs were able to exploit the Serbs’ national resentment against the Hungarians when the latter besieged Vienna in the autumn of 1848.

Hungary’s Revolution in 1848-1949 brought about serious consequences for church-state relations, but the roots of these changes must be located in the so-called Reform Era beginning in the mid 1820s. Rising Hungarian nationalism was a counter-reaction to the Habsburgs’ absolutist rule. The liberal ideas of Voltaire and other freethinkers lent themselves to the Hungarians’ national aspirations. However, the political activity of liberalism manifested itself, among other ways, in anti-clericalism and the fight for the emancipation of Jews⁹⁶. Anti-clericalism made the traditionally more ‘nationalist’, i.e. more ‘Magyar’, Protestants the natural allies of the liberals and those who sought the national independence of Hungary⁹⁷. Although Catholics, including seminarians and ordained priests, also participated in the fight for freedom, the hierarchy, especially János Scitovszky, then bishop of Pécs, was rather conservative and cautious. The revolutionary
events led to the establishment of a national government in personal union with the Habsburg dynasty as represented by the deputy – or Palatine – Archduke Stephan.

The new government, apart from emancipating the peasants and abolishing the privileges of the nobility also issued the so-called Religion Bill of 1848. In it, they proclaimed the full equality and parity among all the “lawfully received” denominations, which also meant the disestablishment of Roman Catholicism as a state religion. Paradoxically, however, this did not mean the separation of church and state, because the new government financed the religious and educational needs of these denominations. The original intention of the liberal Louis Kossuth was to give nothing to the churches. However, he came to realize that such a measure would have turned the sympathies of the whole clergy toward Vienna. Besides, the new politicians realized their need for the assistance of the Church in the legitimization of the state. Therefore, the head of the new government retained its chief-seigniorial right over the Catholic Church. The liberal-minded and anti-clerical attitude of the new government revealed itself openly when the Catholic hierarchy, to counter their losses, applied for the autonomy of the church. Kossuth replied to them in a cynical tone that apart from abolishing celibacy, in which he would support the clergy wholeheartedly, he could do nothing for Catholics because they still enjoyed more rights and privileges than the other denominations. Thus the Catholics’ hope of achieving autonomy from the state evaporated, and the uneasy alliance between church and state continued.

When the Royal Commissioner, Lamberg, was assassinated in Pest in September 1848, Vienna demanded the dissolution of the Hungarian Parliament. Since this demand was not carried out, Francis Joseph, the new emperor, simply abolished Hungary’s
constitution. This prompted the Hungarians to declare the dethronement of the Habsburgs, to the special delight of the Protestants\textsuperscript{103}. The emerging bitter struggle between Austria and Hungary ended in the defeat and brutal repression of Hungarians.

During the period of repression, the Catholic Church was the only institution that could and actually did preserve Hungarian nationalism. Bishop Scitovszky, who had opposed insurrection and especially the dethronement of the Habsburgs, now took upon himself the national cause. He intervened on behalf of those who were imprisoned and especially those condemned to death. He led pilgrimages under national flags and he used the occasion of the consecration of the Basilica of Esztergom to discuss constitutional questions with the Hungarian nobility present. At the procession on St. Stephen’s day, when the crowd sang the Szózat\textsuperscript{104}, even the Protestants acclaimed him. It was also Religio, the only publication of the Catholic clergy, which alone nurtured and sustained the Hungarian national spirit. As Bartakovics, archbishop of Eger wrote in 1855, without the Religio, there would be no Hungarian literacy, because the other literary institutions “did not even dare move” and the Hungarian schools were Germanized.

Although the military dictatorship, led by the Austrian Field-Marshall Haynau\textsuperscript{105}, and its punitive sanctions caused much suffering to Hungarian Catholicism, it also paved the way to the abolition of Josephinism. Vienna started negotiations with Rome on a concordat in 1852, and it was debated whether the concordat should include Hungary. Some Austrian politicians argued that the Austrian ruler, as Hungarian king, had such special rights over the church that it would have been unfortunate to lose them in a Concordat. The Hungarians also disliked the idea because they anticipated that it would entail new financial burdens. However, the young Francis Joseph envisioned a unified
monarchy in which only a common Concordat was suitable. The Concordat was finally signed in 1855, reinstating Catholicism to its former pre-eminent stature. At the same time, the Concordat abolished the *jus placeti*, reestablished the rights of bishops to communicate with Rome, and allowed them to run their dioceses and the seminaries and to establish parishes without governmental interference. The Concordat also guaranteed the Catholic education of youth and limited the state to the supervision of the civic aspects of marriages\textsuperscript{106}. The emperor promised to protect the Church and to supervise the observation of religious precepts. Although the right to nominate bishops remained with the emperor, he was obliged to seek the opinion of the archbishop of the given diocese. Furthermore, the concordat also guaranteed the freedom of religious orders to communicate with their superiors in Rome and to regulate their activity without governmental obstructions.

While the Hungarian clergy viewed the Concordat as unconstitutional\textsuperscript{107}, its overall effects were beneficial for Hungarian Catholicism, because it lifted the obstacles of absolutism. Thus the free development of the Church was secured, and even the liberal governments ruling after the Compromise could not reestablish the various bureaucratic obstacles to the churches’ work. However, before turning to the discussion of Hungarian church-state relations following the Compromise, it seems useful for us to take stock in the form of a brief summary and reflection on the relevant analytical questions.
Summary

In this brief overview of Hungarian church-state relations we have followed the Hungarians from their ancient homeland to the concordat of 1855, which delineated the respective roles of church and state not only in Austria but also in Hungary. We have seen that had the pagan Hungarians failed to convert to Christianity and conduct a peaceful life, the Western Christian rulers would in all probability have subjugated them. The Hungarians’ desire to be independent of both the Germans and Byzantium and their favorable bargaining position vis-à-vis the papacy help explain why their leaders favored Rome over Constantinople in their conversion. We have also analyzed how the Catholic Church, despite the frequent interference of the Hungarian kings, was able to protect its interests through the economic and ideological means at its disposal. Thus, as we have established, it is justifiable to speak about a Latin diarchy in Hungary from the eleventh century up to the Turkish occupation. Due to the Hungarians’ conversion to Rome and the universal power of the Church, the role of Roman Catholicism in the Hungarian state-building process is unquestionable.

The Turkish occupation along with the success of the Reformation in Hungary changed the country’s church-state relationships dramatically. While the contact between Catholics under Turkish occupation and their bishops in the territory under Habsburg rule helped to maintain the desire for political unity, the mainly Protestant and more or less independent Transylvanian principality also preserved and nurtured Hungarian identity and nationalism. The greater resistance and sufferings of the Protestants under the
absolutist rule of the Habsburgs also reinforced their stronger national identification. The strengthening tie between Hungarian nationalism and Protestantism is particularly apparent when the generally conservative and pro-Habsburg attitude of the Catholic hierarchy is contrasted with the Protestants’ energetic efforts for change during the Reform Era. Thus, while the crucial role of Catholicism in the state-building process is undeniable, the dominance of Hungarian Protestantism in the nation-building process is also well established.

The question of whether Latin diarchy was operative under the Habsburgs’ absolutist rule was also analyzed. In light of the unscrupulous use of *jus placeti*, the disregard of the appropriate canons on marriage and other incursions into doctrinal matters, we concluded that Hungarian church-state relationships of that era are best characterized by caesaropapism. It was also noted that not only Josephinism but also Gallicanism and Febronianism are particular manifestations of caesaropapism.

Although during the period from the Hungarians’ conquest to the late 1860s we cannot talk about a civil religion as it was defined in the previous chapter, the birth of symbols, shrines, and heroes mentioned later with awe and reverence obviously took place in this era. From the ancient homeland, the Hungarians brought their totemic animal, the *turul*, a falcon-like bird. Ópusztaszer, where according to legend Árpád and his chiefs divided the territory of the new homeland among themselves, became a national shrine. St. Stephen’s measures to convert the Hungarians to Christianity and to establish the Hungarian state earned him an unshakable place in the Hungarian pantheon. The fact that his right hand had remained intact in his sarcophagus was interpreted later to mean that Hungary should follow his example and guidance. His crown, through its political
significance, became the symbol of the country and thus the source of all legal power.
The crown was also pictured on the national flag, the original colors of which were red,
representing power, and white, the color of loyalty. The first record of the Hungarian tricolor is from 1618, the time of King Mathias II, when green, the symbol of hope, was added to the original colors. The successful resistance of János Hunyadi against the Turks in the fifteenth century later created the image of Hungary as the “protecting bastion” of both Christianity and Western Europe. However, the significance and thus the creation of national symbols became – understandably – characteristic of the Reform Era when the desire for independence from the Habsburgs reached its zenith. The national anthem and the aforementioned Szózat originate in this era. The defeat of the struggle for independence in 1848 - 1849 also created some symbols. The thirteen generals of the Hungarian army executed at Arad by Austrian Field-Marshall Haynau on October 6, 1849 later became revered. Ironically, Haynau’s beer-party after the execution also provided the Hungarians with a negative national custom: the prohibition of clinking beer-mugs.

As it was noted, the role of civil religion with its constituting elements became most significant in the church-state relationships of the interwar period. However, a proper understanding of that period is impossible without a thorough examination of the so-called liberal era (1867 – 1918), which will be presented in the first part of the next chapter.

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1 Some general information on Hungary is presented in the Appendix.
2 Some prospective readers might point out the differences between the two adjectives, “Magyar” and “Hungarian”. It would be less ambiguous to refer to “Magyars” as an ethnic entity while the use of “Hungarian” would denote the legal entity. However, it is impossible to make these distinctions always crystal clear because they overlapped in the minds of the “Magyars”. Furthermore, this distinction would also be burdensome and unconventional for English-speaking readers. Therefore, while geographically specified, the term “Hungarian” will refer to Magyars living anywhere.
In fact, Julianus went again to “Magna Hungaria” in 1237 in order to persuade the relatives to relocate to the Carpathian Basin, but the Mongolians had already swept them away.

5 The Hungarians called it rejtezik, meaning to conceal oneself. C.f. also Mircea Eliade (1974).


7 None of my sources (Diószegi 1967, 1968; Fehér n.d.; Kuhár 1936) mention this function, although Dienes (1985) states that the táltos had to accompany the soul of a sacrificed animal to make sure that it achieved its proper destination. Otherwise, all the elements of shamanism found in the life of pagan Hungarians at the Conquest were also found in the worldview of the Siberian peoples related to the Hungarians (Diószegi 1967).


10 “A magyarság zsidó hagyományai” (The Jewish traditions of Hungarians.) in Napoló (a Trans-Danubian weekly), January 24, 1997, p. 7. The politically motivated article by Éva Toldi is probably a reaction against the sporadic anti-Semitic manifestations in today’s Hungary. Ms. Toldi conducted an interview with Péter Püspöki-Nagy at the occasion of his presentation at a conference entitled “The 1100 year Living-together” organized by the Holocaust Memorial Foundation.

Even if they did, their conversion must have been only nominal; and they most probably honored both Jehovah and the gods of the Hungarians. This would not have been uncommon among the Hungarians. Géza, the father of the Hungarian’s first king, Stephen, was baptized, but it did not prevent him from participating in pagan rituals. When confronted by Christian priests, he told them that he was rich enough to serve two Lords.

12 “Kőz” means an area between two rivers.

13 Simon Kézai, a Hungarian chronicler, wrote his work about 1283.

14 The names of these tribes, Nyék, Megyer, Kürt-gyarmat, Tarján, Jenő, Kér, and Keszi, have been preserved in the names of Hungarian settlements.

15 Árpád’s great-grandson, 955 - c. 972.

16 In the 970s, Bishop Pilgrim of Passau, and after him, St. Adalbert, a Benedictine from Prague, played a decisive role in the Christianization of the Hungarians. The monks of Monte Cassino, Ravenna and Cluny followed them.

17 In Savaria, today’s Szombathely, and in Sopiane, today’s Pécs.

18 According to Székfű (n.d.:28), several Hungarian tribal chiefs were baptized in Constantinople.


21 Investiture was the practice whereby secular rulers formally presented to prelates the symbols of their various ecclesiastical offices.

22 The discussion on the practice of investiture is based on Erdő (1991).

23 C.f. for example Székfű (n.d.)

24 We must keep in mind that 1949, the year of the publication of her article, was the beginning of the Stalinist period in Hungary. The Századok, the scientific journal of Hungarian historians, opened not only with a full-page photo of Stalin, but also with a laudatory article describing Stalin as the “friend and teacher” of all historians.
The discussion of the economic and legal means of the church is based on Lederer’s study. An obvious exception was the German King Henry IV who demonstrated his penance at Canossa in 1077. However, Pope Gregory VII excommunicated him again in 1080, but the Anti-Pope Clement III crowned him emperor on March 31, 1084. The royal chancellery was established under the reign of Béla III (1173-1196).

Lederer (1949:86) refers to István Hajnal’s work, Irrástörténet az írásbeliség felüjülásának korában (The History of Writing at the time of the Renew of Literacy), published in 1921 in Budapest.

Lederer refers to p. 25 of Engels’ Német parasztháborúk (German Peasant Wars) Budapest: Szikra, 1949.

Turkish troops occupied Hungary after the battle of Mohács (1526).

More will be said about these frontier guards on the Eastern border of Transylvania in the discussion of medieval Hungarian society. They constituted one of the semi-privileged groups between the burgers and the serfs.

Whether the Transylvanians were really pagans is less relevant if we take into consideration that General Mihály Mikes, himself a Transylvanian, considered it important to report the Habsburgs’ practice to Ferenc Rákóczi II (Thaly 1875). A present day example was provided by A Halottlátó, a popular documentary in the late 1970s, depicting a Hungarian woman who, like the táltos, could see, and communicate with, the deceased persons.

After the extinction of the Árpád dynasty, the Hungarians elected their kings from the Neapolitan branch of the fleur-de-lys House of Anjou.

C.f. footnote 10.

Himself a consecrated bishop who could not be crowned until he received dispensation from the church.

The camp of Rákos was located near the royal court of Buda, but on the other side of Danube, just outside the then fishing village of Pest. In the depiction of the early Hungarian state, I rely mostly on the works of Szekfű (n.d.) and Janos (1982).

In his work, which became the basis of Hungarian legislation for centuries, Verbőczy, commissioned by the estates between 1514 and 1517, issued a collection of noble rights and privileges.

C.f. Table 1. in the Appendix.

Wuthnow’s (1988) emphasis on the importance of the examination of these alliances is discussed in the previous chapter.

In the discussion of the medieval social structure, I rely on Janos’ work (1982).

C.f. Table 1. in the Appendix.

Although it should be noted that the landed property of the Church was far smaller than that of the aristocracy. C.f. Table 1. in the Appendix.

Their number in 1787 was 498,000 (Janos 1982: 20).

The Transylvanian Szeklers defended the eastern marches from the time of the Conquest. The Jazyg and Cuman (Jász-Kun) tribes were settled down in the Alföld in the thirteenth century. The Transylvanian prince Bocskai settled the Hajdús, a group of freebooters of martial inclination, around the city of Débrecent in the sixteenth century. Finally, the Habsburgs gave similar rights to the Serbian, Rumanian and Croatian inhabitants of Croatia and Banat in the eighteenth century.

Apart from King Louis II Jagiello’s (1516-1526) small retinue, Pál Tömör, Archbishop of Kalocsa, a former captain, and his army faced the Turks alone because the army of the nobility, led by János
Zápolyai, ‘did not arrive’ in time. Zápolyai’s “reluctance” to enter the battle is explained by his – fulfilled – expectation of the death of the king, and his subsequent election to the Hungarian throne.

47 C.f. Map 2 in the Appendix

48 The Protestant nobles attempted to convert, unsuccessfully, the Orthodox Rumanians to Protestantism. However, the translations of the Bible into the Rumanian language, financed by the Hungarian Protestant nobility, became the roots of the Rumanian literary language. C.f. Szekfű n.d.:98.


50 Although Miklós Oláh, archbishop of Esztergom, expelled the Protestant preachers and schoolmasters from three hundred villages of his estates in 1559 his efforts were rather exceptional. He himself knew that real success cannot be achieved by violence, therefore, he established a theological faculty and had the catechism of Canisius translated into Hungarian. C.f. Hermann (1973), especially p. 221 ff.

51 C.f. Hermann (1973) especially 216-218

52 According to Molnár (1914), the first royal order against Protestants was issued on March 9, 1524, but in Bucsay’s (1985 : 18) view, it was in 1523.

53 While the Franciscans – who earned their Hungarian nickname, ‘friends’ (barát) under the Turkish occupation, because for all practical purposes, they were the only ones among the Catholic clergy who remained with the people – had 70 monasteries with 1500 monks at the beginning of the sixteenth century, they had only five monasteries with thirty ‘friends’ by the end of the century. There were only 300 Catholic priests, including the Franciscans, in the whole country. C.f. Bucsay (1985 : 82).

54 They were lay persons, who led the Catholic liturgy at the end of the sixteenth and in the seventeenth centuries in Hungarian parishes without priests. They were nicknamed “half-priests”; and were most probably forerunners of the contemporary practice of lay leadership in liturgy in those countries and areas where the shortage of Catholic priests requires similar services.

55 Calvinists debated with Lutherans; and both of them argued against Unitarians.

56 C.f. Hermann (1973) p. 227


58 These connections proved to be essential for the Protestants under the Communist regime.


60 The residents of these cities were actually wealthy farmers who provided the different fighting parties with food.

61 For a detailed discussion of all diplomatic efforts see Bátky’s (n.d.) work on the Thousand-Year Relationship of Hungary and the Holy See. This work was “published” only in two lavishly illustrated copies. One of them was given to Pope John Paul II when he visited Hungary in 1991. I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to bishop Gyalai who allowed me to study the other copy.

62 From Ferdinand on, the Habsburgs claimed not only to be the Emperors of Austria but also the Kings of Hungary – or Queen in Maria Theresa’s case.

63 According to Bucsay (1985 : 110), the period between 1671 and 1681 was a decade of mourning (gyászsévítés) for the Hungarian Protestants.

64 This number is given by the Catholic Hermann (1973), but the Protestant Bucsay (1985 : 115) mentions more than 700 accused persons.

65 C.f. Kropf (1898) and Bucsay (1985).


67 Twenty four – or twenty six, in Bucsay’s (1985 : 116) account – were still alive.

79
Bátky (n.d.: 98) notes that István Báthory, prince of Transylvania (1571-76) and king of Poland (1575-86) was the only Christian ruler who cooperated with the pope. Peace between the Ottoman Empire and Spain began after the Turks regained control over Djerba on September 13, 1574 and lasted until the 1590s.

After all, the other European rulers also favored absolutism.

In 1568, the Torda Treaty — today's Turda in Rumania — was the first European declaration of the equality of religions and of guaranteed free religious practice.

He became the bishop of Veszprém in 1587, and was archbishop of Esztergom from 1697 to 1616.

The acceptance of the Protestants' request was the precondition of the coronation of Mathias II, hence the name of the articles.

The nádor was an official of the monarch's household, in particular of his court of law.

The Catholics had similar restrictions in the chiefly Protestant Transylvania.

A "Roman Catholic magnate, Count George Festetics became the founder of the Reformed Secondary School at Csurgó in 1794" (Révész et al. 1927: 67). However, probably the Catholic baron Antal Baldácsy gave the greatest acknowledgment to the Protestants' merit in preserving Hungarian national feelings when he bequeathed all his property, including his estates, to the Hungarian Protestant churches in 1876.

By 1720 the Magyars numbered only some 35 percent of the total population. By 1780 the figure had risen to nearly 40 percent, but the periphery, although it contained islands of Magyar population, was still largely non-Magyar. Moreover, as a result of this ethnic colonization, the population of Hungary grew to nine million by the end of the 18th century, more than double the country's population in 1720.

The arrival of the Ashkenazis marked the fourth Jewish wave of immigrants to Hungary. According to Varga (1992) Jews lived there already in the third century. While the second wave immigrated in the 11th century, the third, Sephardic, wave arrived with the Turks. In his estimate, the Hungarian Jewish population in 1910 was over 911,000.

They were involved mostly in commercial and financial enterprises (Lázár 1989: 120).

If not stated otherwise, the discussion of absolutism is based on Hermann's work (1973).


Among her beneficial decrees were the establishment of new dioceses and the reformation of theological and high school education. Her Ratio Studiorum was the first in Europe.

It means that he issued about two decrees each day.

The Cathedral of St. Stephen in Vienna was an exception.

He, for instance, ordered the villages to keep coffins of different sizes, which were to be used during the wake for the deceased. The corpse was then laid in the tomb without the coffin, and covered with lime.

Hermann (1973) does not discuss why Joseph II moved the students to Pavia. However, as Reese (1989) explains, studies completed in Rome not only enhance a priest's loyalty to the Vatican but also his chances to become a bishop. Thus, the Collegium Germanicum-Hungaricum was the alma mater of many famous members of the Catholic hierarchy in Austria, Germany and Hungary. Joseph II probably wanted to eliminate Rome's influence by moving the students to Pavia, which was at that time a part of his empire.


Leopold II (1790-1792), Francis I (1792-1835) and Ferdinand V (1835-1848).
According to Hermann (1973), Francis I once said that if walking were decreed a punishable offence, he would observe this decree without hesitation.

According to Lauchert (1999), Joseph II successfully transformed the Catholic Church in his empire into a national church.

King Louis XIV proclaimed the independence of politics and religion from each other but he also declared that in case of conflict the decision was in the hands of the 'nation-state'. Furthermore, his interpretation - *L'État c'est moi* - left no doubt about his rule. C.f. Bozsáky (1992) or Degert (1996).

To complicate the issue further, neither the online edition of the *Catholic Encyclopedia* (1996) nor the *Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion* include an entry on caesaropapism. In the latter, the closest entry to caesaropapism is 'state church', under which the Greek Orthodox Church is mentioned. State church is defined as an arrangement "when a state system grants a privileged monopoly position to a specific religious institution. [However,] the political system retains some control over the church, especially through the appointments made to higher offices and the granting of material resources. The church, in turn, provides legitimization to the political system by stressing mutual bonds of loyalty and solidarity and common obligations of obedience to the civic authorities" (Riis 1998: 714). The Habsburgs intended to provide the Catholic Church with a privileged position; and, as we have seen, the rulers definitely retained some control. However, in Riis' account, the types of state church range from tribal religion through established churches and civil religion to theocracy. Theocracy is the opposite of caesaropapism; and the established churches, according to Riis, "maintain a higher degree of autonomy in relation to the state than do state churches" (ibid.), which is definitely not applicable to the Hungarian case in the absolutist era.

*Henoticum* is the name of Emperor Zeno’s unsuccessful law by which he tried to conciliate Catholics and Monophysites. It satisfied neither of them and brought about the first great schism between Rome and Constantinople. C.f. Fortescue (1998a).

The other absolutist rulers also used the *jus placeti*. It is interesting to note that the politicians of the Reform Era did not want to abolish the right of *jus placeti*. They only wanted to oblige the ruler to inform the Hungarian Parliament what papal decree he withheld. C.f. Hermann 1973: 420.


C.f. Péter (1997: 9)

This, however, did not mean that Hungarian Catholics were not represented among the Liberals or that they were less interested in the fate of their nation. In fact, from the time of Counter Reformation, we probably find an equal number of Catholics and Protestants who nurtured Hungarian nationalism. Cardinal Péter Pázmány is the best ‘Catholic example’. C.f. also Péter (1989).

This term might sound strange to English speaking readers, but this is the best translation of the Latin *recepta religio*. Both Laszlo (1973) and Péter (1989) use the term of “received religions” about which more will be said in the next chapter in connection with the liberal legislation of 1895.


He became first the Minister of Finance of the new government, then the leader of the Committee of National Defense, and finally regent of Hungary.

Unlike the Catholic Church, the Orthodox received autonomy from the government. Autonomy would have meant financial independence from the state and the abolishing of chief-seigniorial rights.


As Bucsay noted (1985: 183), the majority of Protestants rejoiced wholeheartedly over the dethronement.

The *Százat* is an anthem-like national song from the so-called Reform Era of Hungary, written by MihályVörösmarty (1800-1855) in 1836 and tuned by Béni Egressy (1814-1851) in 1840.
"During the revolutions of 1848-49, he campaigned in Italy, where he marred his undoubted military abilities by the inordinately severe repression of a rising in Brescia. Hence his nickname, 'the hyena of Brescia'. Moving to Hungary in command of an army corps in 1849, Haynau again ... used what many thought was undue harshness. He retired in 1850 and toured Europe, but his reputation was such that he was exposed to mob violence during his visits to London in 1850 and Brussels in 1852" (Encyclopædia Britannica CD 99, multimedia edition).

The role of the Catholic Church in both education and marriage will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

As they argued, a concordat was usually tied with a secular state and not with a Catholic country.
Chapter III. Hungarian Church-State Relations from the Compromise to the end of World War II (1867-1945)

The period between 1867 and 1945 witnessed a dramatic change in both the intellectual atmosphere and political attitude of state elites towards the Catholic Church. Militant anti-clericalism, which culminated in the liberal legislation of 1895\(^1\), gave way in the interwar period to the appreciation and exaltation of Christianity, particularly of Catholicism. Significantly, all of this happened without the liberal legal framework for the regulation of religion ever changing.

The political and economic consequences of the defeat in the war of 1866 with Prussia necessitated the constitutional reorganization of the Habsburg Empire. Territorially, the Habsburgs could expand only toward the Balkans, however, the subjugated yet rebellious Hungarians stood in their way. Abandoning his claim on Hungary as simply an Austrian province, Francis Joseph considered his negotiations with the Hungarian politicians, most of all with the “sage of the nation”, Ferenc Deák, as a purely dynastic affair, and he excluded non-Hungarians from the discussion. An agreement was reached on February 17, 1867, which became known as the Compromise (*Ausgleich* or *Kiegyezés*). In restoring the Hungarian constitution, the Compromise established a dual state, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, with joint control of foreign and military affairs, a joint Ministry of Finance, and customs union. The Compromise was ratified solely by the Hungarian nation and the ruling Habsburg dynasty, and did not require the consent of other sections of the empire, thus nurturing ethnic tensions between the Hungarians and
the various other ethnic groups and ‘nations’ of the empire. Although the Compromise provided a certain sense of revenge to the Hungarian nation for the repression of its struggle for freedom in 1848 it did not bring greater political freedom to its individuals. As Macartney (1956) noted, the “exercise of political rights was actually more restricted after 1867 than before it: in 1848, 6.7 per cent of the total population had possessed the franchise, and in 1874 only 5 percent. In 1910 the figure was still only 8 per cent” (1956: 11). In other words, by signing the Compromise, Hungary sowed not only the seeds of ethnic tensions but also its own subjects’ discontent. The signs of general dissatisfaction surfaced only much later, however, and Hungarians commonly referred to the period between the Compromise and World War I as the “happy years of peace”.

After the Compromise, political Catholicism was particularly unpopular. As we have seen, the majority of the Catholic politicians, especially the hierarchy who were ex officio in the Upper House of parliament, had opposed the reform movements and the dethronement of the Habsburgs. Their attitude was neither forgotten nor forgiven. The émigrés, who returned to Hungary after a general amnesty was issued at the occasion of Compromise, were particularly anti-clerical. The majority of these émigrés had become freemasons during their stay in Italy, where they had frequented the circles of Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour, and had even fought against the papacy on the side of the emerging Italian nation state. These radicals objected to the fact that Francis Joseph’s coronation was held in a church. They immediately demanded the separation of church and state, the dissolution of religious orders, and the introduction of civil marriage with the option of divorce.
Meanwhile, the Holy See would have preferred that its relationship with the Hungarian state had continued to rest on the Concordat established with Austria in 1855, which had been incorporated in the Hungarian Corpus Juris. The Hungarian bishops, however, resisted this plan. For them, the Concordat was, first of all, unconstitutional and its attitude was anti-Hungarian. They also noticed that the Concordat was not observed in Austria. Indeed, Austria had declared it void after the proclamation of papal infallibility in 1870, arguing that one of the partners to the Concordat, the papacy, had changed.

Under these circumstances, the need for Catholic autonomy – the abolition of the chief-seigniorial right of the ruler and the financial independence of the church from the state – surfaced again. At this time, a lay person, Baron Eötvös outlined a plan for ecclesial autonomy, but the hierarchy had a different agenda. The latter, like baron Eötvös, wanted independence from the government, but unlike Eötvös, the bishops did not want the participation of laity in the governance of the church. The hierarchy argued that the first step should be the proper arrangement of the chief-seigniorial right originating from St. Stephen’s title as apostolic king. Second, they demanded the proper administration of the autonomy of all religions. Then, and only then, would they be willing to include the laity in minor positions of the church’s leadership. Practically, the hierarchy wanted the independence of churches from the Minister of Cult and Education, whose countersignature was necessary for the nomination of bishops. Furthermore, their blueprint for church autonomy included the autonomy of the Catholic Church in all educational and financial matters.

The hierarchy was itself divided on the issue of Catholic autonomy. Some bishops did not like the idea of autonomy partly because they suspected that it would result in an
ecclesial organization strongly resembling that of the Protestant church, and partly because the radicals, mainly the returned émigrés and the liberal circles around them, enthusiastically supported the idea. Indeed, the radicals demanded the abolition of celibacy and the declaration of autonomy even without the Hungarian bishops' approval. They also criticized the rules for electing the representatives who would discuss autonomy, because the priests, unlike the laity, were supposed to write their names on the ballots and cast them in a closed envelope. The radicals rather successfully urged the population to boycott the vote. In Buda, for instance, only fifty-three people showed up; twenty-two out of them came only to lodge protest against the procedure and left without casting their ballots. Despite the low turnout the procedure went on, but it became increasingly clear that nobody seriously wanted Catholic autonomy. The Vatican — with its centralizing efforts, which culminated in the dogma of papal infallibility — would not have accepted the autonomy of the Hungarian Church as the politicians requested it. But the government did not want it either because the politicians wanted to keep their right to supervise the Catholic Fund for education and ecclesiastical matters. Francis Joseph, as King of Hungary, in his turn, did not want to give up chief-seigniorial rights; and he did not want to give way to the radicals' demands either. As we have seen, some of the bishops were against autonomy from the start, and after many meetings with no results, the hierarchy in general lost interest in the question of autonomy. Finally, the bishops asked the government to shelve the issue of autonomy, which was then left out of future parliamentary debates. In 1880, however, the king established a committee of fifteen persons, both ecclesiastical and lay, to oversee the Catholic Fund for educational and
ecclesiastical matters. In 1876, the Catholic schools came under the supervision of school-inspectors while the Protestant high schools received autonomy in 1883.

After the proclamation of papal infallibility, the Hungarian government intended to reestablish the *jus placeti*, because they wanted to prevent the Hungarian clergy from promulgating this dogma. Francis Joseph agreed, but only reluctantly, because he foresaw that it would be largely ineffective. Thus, beginning August 10, 1870, what was legally forbidden in one part of the empire – i.e. the promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility in Hungary – was legally accepted and practiced in the other. However, as Francis Joseph anticipated, the Hungarian bishops easily found means of informing their priests and faithful about the new dogma.

The reinstitution of *jus placeti* to prevent the promulgation of papal infallibility created some political debate, because the *jus placeti* was contrary to the principle of a free press and the right to free speech. Deák, the “father” of Compromise, argued in a famous speech to the parliament that although the ideal solution would be the separation of church and state as it was arranged in the United States, that type of arrangement was impossible in Hungary because of ambiguous laws and particular European historical circumstances. The relationship between church and state must therefore be thoroughly regulated. Although the question of *jus placeti* came up several times in the following years it was not legally regulated and – more importantly – it was never practiced.

The liberal theologians of the Hungarian Protestant churches explicitly stated that a “Hungarian is a liberal and a patriot by birth, in other words, he or she is a Protestant.” One of the implications of this statement was that if the government introduced a liberal
educational system it would save the populace from the influence of both Roman Catholicism and the strengthening leftist political movements. In other words, if the state guided the school system according to liberal principles then it would exercise more influence on the populace than the denominational educational system, including Protestant institutions. Consequently, it would be better to give all the denominational schools to the state. This train of thought was summarized in another slogan: “We are first and foremost Hungarians, and only after that we are Protestants or Catholics”\(^8\). Thus the Protestants openly supported the governments established by liberal parties. It is no wonder, then, that Protestants were over-represented in the leading political positions.

This fact also explains why under the rule of the liberal Koloman Tisza (1875-1889), himself a Calvinist, whose government lasted longer than any other post-Compromise administration\(^9\), Protestantism spread in all directions, received active support from the government and inflicted further damage upon the Catholic Church. The revision of the constitution of the Upper House in 1885 excluded Catholic auxiliary bishops from membership, with the exception of the auxiliary bishops of Nándorfehérvár, today's Belgrade, and Knin (Tinin), while the highest clerical and lay dignitaries of the Protestant churches became members of the Upper House.

During these years\(^10\), Prince Bismarck fought the so-called *Kulturkampf* in the freshly united German nation-state. In general agreement with the German liberals and conservatives\(^11\), he maintained that the stability and political unity of Germany depended unconditionally on unity of religion, language, and education. On this ground, they proclaimed the Catholic minority a foreign element in the new empire; which must be either assimilated or exterminated. The Hungarian liberals, following the *Zeitgeist*, also
launched an attack on the Catholic Church, but unlike their German counterparts who waged almost total war against the Catholics\textsuperscript{12}, the Hungarian *Kulturkampf* was fought on only two issues: education and civil marriage.

Article LIII of Law XLVIII, issued in 1868, triggered the Hungarian *Kulturkampf*. This law, introducing and regulating general education, guaranteed the right of the churches to establish schools, but at the same time, it gave the right to the local government to decide whether it wanted a public school or a denominational institution. The result was the "secularization" of many Catholic schools. This article also regulated the religion of children born in denominationally mixed marriages. According to the law, children were obliged to follow the creed of the parent of the same sex, that is boys were to follow their father’s religion, girls their mother’s. This regulation was to be enforced even after the death of the parent. For example, after the death of a Protestant father, a Catholic mother could not bring up her minor children in the Catholic Faith if they legally belonged to the Protestant confession. It was also decreed that, when one of the parents changed his or her denomination, the child could not follow this change unless he or she was under seven years of age.

These enactments led to a bitter ecclesiastico-political struggle. Although the principle was clear, its execution created complications requiring further regulations. Thus, on February 26, 1890, the Minister of Cult and Education, count Albin Csáky, signed a new law, which became known in Hungary as the *elkeresztelési rendelet*\textsuperscript{13}, which declared that the baptism of a child could take place in either the mother’s or the father’s denomination. However, after baptism, the priest or minister had to inform the ecclesiastical representative of the legally established denomination of the child. Neither
the Catholic nor the Protestant clergy observed the new legislation fully, but the resistance of the Catholic clergy was more visible. In several counties, they sent orders back to the public officials stating that they were allowed to accept such orders only from their ecclesiastical superiors. The government tried to pursue the Hungarian clergy by asking the Vatican’s intervention and affirmation – following Bismarck’s tactics used in the German Kulturkampf – but Pope Leo XIII declared Csáky’s law unacceptable for Catholics, because it ‘forced the Catholic clergy to spread heresy’. Consequently, the Catholic clergy did not obey the new legislation, and the government launched a series of trials and fined law-breaking Catholic priests.

Csáky’s legislation had several consequences. The first was a sharpening antagonism between the Catholic and Protestant clergy. While the Protestant ministers also disobeyed the order, the government fined Catholic priests almost exclusively. A second consequence was the mobilization of the Catholics, who realized that they had no voice without appropriate representation. They started to found Catholic circles, which, in turn, planned the organization of the national meetings of Catholics (országos katolikus nagyülések) and the establishment of a Catholic political party.

Catholic agitation for the modification of Article LIII of 1868, and for the repeal of the Csáky decree, was not successful. Meanwhile the liberals furthered the introduction of the free exercise of religion, obligatory civil marriage, and civil registration. These proposals became law under the premiership of Alexander Wekerle (1892-1895). In 1893 the ecclesiastical bills were laid before the parliament, and after long debates, having been rejected once by the Upper House, they became law in 1894 and took effect on October 1, 1895. Articles XXXI and XXXIII of 1894 contained enactments regarding
marriage and registration. Civil marriage became compulsory, and government recognition was only given to civil registration. Article XXXII of 1894 enabled parents to enter into an agreement before the registrar as to the religion of their children. Registrars were appointed by the minister of the interior and were responsible to him. Parish priests were not allowed to hold this office. The Hungarian Catholic bishops protested against these laws and sent a memorandum to Francis Joseph requesting him not to sanction them, but their petition was in vain. Article XLII of 1895 gave official recognition to the Jewish religion, and provided the legal option of belonging to no confession at all.

Finally, article XLIII of 1895 mentions a "form of legal classification of religions". The first category consisted of the legally "received churches" – recepta religio\(^\text{15}\) – the Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Churches, the Jewish communities\(^\text{16}\), the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the Unitarians\(^\text{17}\). The second or so-called "recognized" churches contained most of the smaller denominations, including the Baptists from 1905, and the Muslims from 1916. The Minister of Cult and Education granted recognition to religious groups and associations provided certain requirements were met. Both the recognized and received churches enjoyed official protection by law – severe punishments were provided for disturbing religious services and outdoor processions, for desecrating churches and holy objects, and for insulting clergymen in sacred buildings or during outdoor services. However, only the "received religions" had a claim on state subvention and only they could collect their ecclesiastical taxes with the aid of the government. "Furthermore, ex officio representation in national and local government was reserved exclusively for the representatives of the ‘received’ religions" (Laszlo 1973: 26). The
religions in the "tolerated" category included the Adventists, the Methodists, the Millenialists, the Mormons, and the Nazarenes\(^{18}\). Finally, a fourth group consisted of those religions that were banned, namely the Jehovah's Witnesses, the different Pentecostal movements, and the Nazarenes from 1939\(^{19}\). It is important to note that while this categorization remained in force until the end of World War II, Hungarian law nowhere precisely defined these categories – article XLIII of 1895 only mentions them – but they were acknowledged as the products of customary or unwritten law\(^{20}\).

The preparation of these laws, which began in the autumn of 1892, was the source of many confrontations. In an encyclical of September 2, 1893, the pope encouraged the Hungarian bishops to prevent the introduction of civil registers. The encyclical induced the radicals' mockery, and they compared the effectiveness of the pope's letter to that of "holy water". Even the "hermit of Turin", Louis Kossuth, sided with the liberals, and declared the behavior of compliant Catholic clergy traitorous, because they accepted guidance from a "foreign power", i.e. the papacy. All the Protestant parliamentary delegates, with the exception of Miklós Zay, also supported the liberal legislation. In his speech, Zay said that the issue at stake was not the interest of Rome, Vienna, or that of the clergy, but rather the religious attitudes and feelings of the Hungarian people. At the end of his speech, he asked why the Protestants were silent in the "Honored House", upon which Pál Zelenka, the superintendent of the Lutherans, replied that they were promoting the legislation because otherwise they would have to support the "powerful Catholic Church".

The legislative debates reinforced the Catholics' intention to establish a Catholic party. They realized that they could not rely on the Catholic members of the parliament who
were sitting in different parties because obligatory party interests did not allow them to represent the interests of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, among the members of the Liberal Party, there were several priests who openly argued against the Church’s position. The necessity of a Catholic party was recognized at the national meeting of Catholics in 1894 in Székesfehérvár; and the People’s Party (Néppárt) was officially founded on January 28, 1895 under the presidency of Count Nándor Zichy. Among the rural press organs of the party were the popular Fejérmegyei Napló and the Esztergom. The latter was founded by Ottokár Prohászka whose name later became inseparably bound to the Christian-national idea, the civil-religion of Hungary between the two wars.

After the 1896 elections, the People’s Party won only seventeen seats in the Parliament but in 1906 they supplied thirty-three delegates. The novelty of the People’s Party lay not only in its representation of the interests of the Catholics – fighting for their autonomy, the revision of the anti-Catholic legislation, and free Catholic education – but also in a concern for social issues. Its representatives demanded favorable credit arrangements for smallholders and craftsmen, the establishment of minimal wages and cooperatives, the regulation of the relationship between employers and employees and a just taxation system. Their concern for other ethnic groups living in the Hungarian kingdom was also a new item on the political agenda: the party wanted to do everything in its power for them so long as they did not endanger the unity of the Hungarian government.

It is worth noting that the People’s Party won its support mostly in the Hungarian and German districts of the Dunántúl, and in the Hungarian and Slovak districts of the Felvidék, but they were rarely able to win any mandate in the Alföld. The probable
explanation is that the program of the People’s Party appealed mainly to craftsmen and workers but not to the agrarian proletariat\textsuperscript{21}. As Szekfű\textsuperscript{22} noted, the “marrow” of land reform was missing from the program, thereby significantly reducing its potential support in rural areas. This was the time of mass emigration of poverty-stricken peasants to the United States and Canada, and also of the foundation and strengthening of the Social Democratic Party\textsuperscript{23}. Due to the agitation of the party and the establishment of unions throughout the country, during the May 1\textsuperscript{st} celebration in 1890, 30,000 workers demonstrated on the streets of Pest. Noting the urgency for the “re-Catholicization” of workers, Sándor Giesswein, a canon attached to the cathedral of Győr, established the first Christian-Socialist organization in 1898. The National Association of Christian-Socialist Organizations had a membership of 20,000 in 1905, which raised the suspicions, not only of the government and the capitalists but even of the hierarchy. Giesswein’s hope that the People’s Party would slowly assimilate, or accept wholeheartedly, the principles of Christian-Socialism remained unfulfilled. The People’s Party remained for the most of its existence in opposition to the government in power – with the exception of the years 1906-1910 – and it gradually forgot about its social program, which it could have put into practice only if it had become the governing party. Its place among the opposition also frequently entailed criticism of the monarchy. This antagonized Pope Pius X, and even several of its own members, including the president, János Zichy\textsuperscript{24}, who accordingly resigned from the party with several others in 1904.

Despite the generally ineffective political influence of the People’s Party, it had unquestionable success in preventing the emergence of irredentism\textsuperscript{25} among the German minority of Hungary. Their success with the Slovaks was rather short lived. The
People’s Party and the Slovak political organizations agreed in 1895 that the Slovaks would not nominate candidates against the People’s Party in the elections. The People’s Party, in exchange, ran several Slovak candidates in 1896, none of whom were elected. For all practical purposes, this meant the end of the co-operation.

The credibility of the concern for the ethnic minorities expressed by the People’s Party weakened further when, in 1907, their coalition government introduced a law regulating the language of education. The law did not hinder the establishment of denominational or other schools, but it denied governmental subsidies if the school did not teach Hungarian language according to legal prescription. As a consequence, all of the schools that found it impossible to survive without governmental support inevitably became Hungarian schools. Thus, for example, the poor Slovak and the generally thrifty German schools applied for governmental subsidy, but not so the Serbs and Rumanians whose ecclesiastical organizations were rich enough to support their own schools. This meant that while the large German communities gave up their schools, the ‘dwarf’ local Serb or Rumanian communities kept operating theirs independently. Another consequence was that the Serbs and Rumanians launched anti-Hungarian propaganda abroad because of these Magyarization measures.

The Rumanians and also the Russians felt discriminated against in the establishment of the Hungarian Eastern Catholic diocese in 1912. The Rumanians even tried to assassinate the first bishop of the Hungarian Eastern Catholics, István Miklósy in Debrecen on February 23, 1914. These and other similar events indicated the tensions between the ethnic minorities and the ruling Austrian and Hungarian elites, and
undoubtedly contributed to the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after World War I.

After the laws enacted in 1895, no further issues created major tensions between church and state. After the acceptance of obligatory civil marriage, even Catholics and Protestants were at peace with each other. The authority of the Catholic Church, at least in outward appearance, was unchanged. The bishops were still, *ex officio*, members of the Upper House. Whenever they visited the parishes in their dioceses, the public authorities welcomed them ceremoniously. They even escorted the bishops at confirmations. The ceremonies of the state, especially the celebrations of the millennial anniversary of the Conquest of Hungary in 1896, were held in Catholic churches. Similarly, representatives of the state were present at the major feasts of the Catholic Church. Chief-Prince Frederick represented King Francis Joseph, and four other members of the government participated along with Prime Minister Kálmán Szél (1899 – 1903) in Esztergom at the 900th anniversary of the Hungarians’ conversion to Christianity on August 14-15, 1900. The Primate took the opportunity to remind his audience in his homily that although Hungarians had taken the country by the sword they could keep it only with the help of the cross. However, the outer appearance of harmonious mutual cooperation concealed inner weakness and dependence on the part of the Catholic Church. In its memorandum of 1893, the Bishops’ Conference informed Pope Leo XIII succinctly and clearly that Catholicism in Hungary was not a state church any more. It was, at most, the “ruling religion”. Furthermore, as the bishops explained, since the chief-seigniorial rights of Francis Joseph, as king of Hungary, were exercised through the Ministry of Cult and Education, the Church was more dependent on the state than were the other
denominations. While this arrangement gave the state certain religious legitimation, the freedom of the Catholic Church was severely curtailed.

One of the reasons for the relative peace between Protestants and Catholics, and probably the most important one, was that the Protestants shared the glory with the Catholics, especially at the millennial celebrations of the Conquest. As we have noted, even Catholics acknowledged the significant role played by Protestants in the nation’s independence. The Protestants were highly aware of their importance and proclaimed it openly:

Hungarian Protestantism was the stronghold whose function was to hold in check from behind, the mighty Roman Catholic giant of the Habsburg Empire. ... For a long time the issues were divided thus: to be Protestant meant to be Hungarian and to be Roman Catholic meant to be German, or more precisely, to be Protestant meant to stand for the rights of the nation and liberty, to be Roman Catholic meant to stand for denationalization and the betrayal of liberty. ... Another service which Protestantism rendered in the history of Hungary, beside helping to save the nation’s independence and individuality, is found in its great contribution to the upholding of Hungary’s modern state-life.²⁷

Despite, or perhaps because of, the relative peace between state and churches, the tension between the churches and the wider society grew significantly. In principle, mushrooming radical organizations, such as free masonry and social democracy, opposed religion in general. However, due to the Protestants’ privileged political position, their press organs attacked the Catholic Church exclusively. The Social Democratic Party had a membership of 23,603 in 126 organizations in 1899. The freemasons, on the other hand, had strategically and ideologically important institutions in their hands, such as the Association of the Social Sciences and its periodical, the Huzsadik Század (Twentieth
Century), and a daily, Világ (World). They also became the dominant element in the National Association of High-School Teachers.

Due to rapid industrialization, which occurred mostly in and around Budapest, this was also the time of a great migration from the rural areas to the capital. While the population of Budapest in 1870 was 280,000, by the turn of the century it had reached 733,000. Since Budapest dictated, for all practical purposes, the “tempo of life” in the country, control of the municipal government of the capital was a political issue of national significance. Although more than half a million of the city’s inhabitants were Catholic, their spiritual needs could not be satisfied properly because the members of the city council, almost exclusively freemasons, would not give permission for the establishment of new parishes. Under these circumstances, where even the nomination of a pastor required the ‘blessing’ of the magistrate, it is a small wonder that Catholicism did not become extinct in Budapest. Catholicism, however, not only survived, but, indeed, experienced a considerable revival, due in large measure to the influx of religious orders that established their communities in the capital. Besides the Jesuits, who organized the Sodalities of Mary, incorporating all strata of the society, the Carmelites, the Lazarites and the Dominicans came to Budapest.

Budapest also became the political center of Catholicism, hosting among other meetings the increasingly popular and significant national meeting of Catholics. Speakers at these meetings discussed almost every burning social and political problem, with the notable exception of what were perhaps the two most important questions, those of land reform and the progress of Marxism. Blindness to these issues was one of the reasons why after
World War I, following the Russian example, it was possible for a communist dictatorship under the leadership of Béla Kun to be established.

Before discussing the church-state relations of the interwar period a brief analysis of the post-Compromise era seems to be necessary. On the one hand, the post-Compromise era, as we have seen, was characterized by the political dominance of the Hungarian liberals one of whose proclaimed aims was the separation of church and state. On the other hand, as we have also noted, the intertwining of church and state remained strong or was even strengthened. This apparent contradiction requires a closer investigation.

The main goal of Hungarian liberalism was national independence. Its ideology also included strong elements of anti-clericalism and philo-Semitism, but excluded the equality, let alone the independence of ethnic minorities. The smaller churches, frequently the churches of ethnic minorities, were seen as a threat to Hungarian national interests, just as the Catholics were perceived in Bismarck's Germany. Consequently, the "equalization" and emancipation of these churches were not of interest to the liberals nor – due to the liberals' political success in the post-Compromise era – to the government.

At the same time, the absence of a strong entrepreneurial stratum or a middle class increased the power of the government. Despite the flourishing of several peasant-cities and their wealthy 'burgers' under the Turks, constant wars prevented the development of a stable entrepreneurial stratum and bourgeoisie. Furthermore, as Szekfú (n.d.: 164) noted, anti-Habsburg feelings induced the Hungarian nobility to protect its right to tax-exemption. Wealthy Hungarians' contributions in the form of taxes and tolls would have been essential to the Habsburgs in the creation of a centralized, absolutist government.
The exemption was based upon the exclusive duty of the Hungarian nobility to perform military service in the case of war. The Habsburgs introduced conscription in the early nineteenth century, which obliterated the basis for the nobility’s claim for tax-exemption. However, the Hungarian aristocrats resisted any attempt to abolish their right to tax exemption. As a response to the Hungarian nobility’s resistance, the Habsburg policy of commerce and industrialization protected the emergent tax-paying bourgeoisie of Austria by hindering the establishment of factories and the development of commerce in Hungary, which could have competed with the Austrians. As Kollowrat, the president of the Imperial Commercial Council, argued, the owners of these Hungarian factories would be nobles who did not contribute through their taxes to the Habsburg central government. This policy remained in effect until 1848 when the tax-exemption of the Hungarian nobility was finally abolished. Thus, despite the efforts of Count Széchenyi to enlarge the number of those with ‘bourgeois virtues’, the basis for a middle class was prevented from developing properly in Hungary.

Apart from a weak middle class, another reason for the development of a dominant state was that the interpretation of legal presumption (presumptio juris) in civil law strengthened the government and its institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, the presumptio juris protected individuals and their organizations. In a conflict between state officials and the citizens or their groups, the burden was on the bureaucrats to prove that the law authorized the measures they applied in the disputed case. In the Habsburg Monarchy, however, the burden of proof fell upon the citizens. They had to prove that the law explicitly protected the citizens’ interest and not that of the bureaucrats, and ultimately the interest of the state. This interpretation gave
extraordinary power to the state and its officials. Obviously, the liberals used the opportunities provided by this interpretation to their advantage in Hungary. Instead of giving autonomy to the churches, especially to the Catholic Church with its politically significant international center, the liberals effectively controlled the churches by dividing them into the categories of received, recognized, tolerated, and prohibited churches. While only the received churches had legal rights, the Hungarian interpretation of *presumptio juris* effectively curtailed even these rights and, for all practical purposes, made all the churches dependent on the benevolence of state officials.

Furthermore, it was in the interests of the members of the existing middle class, consisting mainly of state bureaucrats and the gentry\(^1\), to preserve the *status quo*. As Janos (1982) notes, capitalism originated in the core area\(^2\) of Europe with a class of agrarian entrepreneurs and merchants who, in their historical moment of success, wanted to be free to pursue their affairs without any outside protection or interference. The result was a doctrine, liberalism, built around the idea of personal freedom and the emancipation of the individual from the authority of the state. After the Compromise, the development of Hungarian entrepreneurial activity was not hindered. However, according to Janos (1982) those members of the existing middle class who ventured into this activity and the new entrepreneurial strata experienced more pressures and hardships than their Western European counterparts\(^3\), and were unable to develop into a prosperous, cohesive middle class. Thus, in the “European periphery” or at least in Hungary, a “twisted liberalism” became the ideology of the weak middle class desperately searching for alternatives to economic entrepreneurship. While this class was ready to dispense with its feudal privileges because they impeded its search for
alternatives, it had no interest in weakening the modern state, but rather wanted to strengthen it. For members of the traditional middle class the state provided protection against the vagaries of the market, and, as a last resort, provided the bankrupt landowner with “security of employment in its bureaucracy and political institutions” (Janos 1982: 65). This situation reinforced the intertwining of church and state. “Once an administrative system was created, its members were under pressure to justify themselves. Partly in an attempt to do so and partly in blind imitation of foreign examples, they began to introduce, interpret, and enforce literally thousands of new regulations concerning sanitation, licenses, housing, transportation, and economic transactions of all kinds” (Janos 1982: 96). The regulation of religious institutions, especially under the particular interpretation of the presumptio juris, provided the bureaucrats with ideal and safe opportunities for administrative activity. Even officials with weak imaginations could receive some ‘historical inspiration’ from the meticulous measures of Joseph II.

New powers of taxation and regulation gave local administrators and their superiors in Budapest considerable leverage over the semi-literate class of peasant smallholders. In Western Europe and North America, this bureaucratic leverage was successfully resisted by powerful classes of urban and rural entrepreneurs. But in Hungary, “where the entrepreneurial class was mostly foreign and still in an embryonic state, administrative leverage was quickly transformed into political leverage through pressure put on the electorate to cast ballots for candidates favored by the bureaucracy” (Janos 1982: 97).

Thus the weak middle class could not and probably would not have wanted to provide the churches with significant financial support had they been able. The largest denomination,
the Catholic Church, relied completely on the state, because its so-called Religion and Education Funds were under the supervision of the Ministry of Cult and Education. However, the other churches, too, became increasingly dependent on the government’s financial support mainly through its supervision of the denominational schools.

For several years after the Compromise, the non-Catholic churches remained relatively free of financial dependence on governmental subvention. However, this subvention increased rapidly from 1892 onward. By 1908, the government had pledged to pay yearly the equivalent of 600,000 US dollars to the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. The amounts granted to the other churches had also been increased. The Rumanian Orthodox Church, for instance, received an annual 100,000 crowns (the equivalent of 20,000 US dollars) for the administrative expenses of its metropolitan see, and another 1,220,000 crowns for the salary supplement (kongrua) of its clergy. From 1909, the government also contributed to the kongrua of the Catholic clergy. The financial support of the denominational schools figured even larger in the state budget. Religious instruction was obligatory in all schools; and while the teachers were trained and appointed by the churches, the schools – and thus ultimately the state – provided their salaries. In 1914, the government granted 21.5 million crowns to the denominational schools mostly as a supplement to teacher’s salaries. Thus, instead of fighting for the independence and the equality of all the churches, it was in the interest of the received and, to a lesser extent, the recognized churches to maintain the status quo. This situation also induced the other smaller denominations to try and achieve, with little success, at least a recognized status rather than seeking the emancipation of the churches from the
state. Thus, despite the secularist climate of the liberal era, the intertwining of church and state was not only maintained, but also strengthened in this period.

The term, intertwining, should be stressed, because the dependence of the churches on the state did not mean caesaropapist subordination, as was the case under the rule of the absolutist Habsburgs. While the churches relied on governmental subsidies, the government needed the legitimation that the churches could provide. Significant social changes were taking place in Hungarian society – changes which were not acknowledged by the political elite. As we have noted, the church leaders did not pay attention to these changes either, but they possessed the ideological means to calm the masses. The anniversaries of the Conquest and the conversion to Christianity provided the opportunity to highlight the importance of religion and the observation of religious regulations. On these occasions, as we have seen from their speeches, both Catholics and Protestants enumerated the benefits of religion for the whole nation. Furthermore, despite the reintroduction of *jus placeti*, the churches were still able to realize their interests even contrary to the wishes of the state. Interestingly, this ability of the churches was partly due to the processes of democratization and the realization of basic human rights and freedoms. As we have seen, the reintroduction of *jus placeti* raised concerns about freedom of the press and free speech. Partly, however, the power of the Catholic Church was also due to the centralizing efforts of Vatican. After the fall of the Papal States, Catholicism experienced a period of organizational reform and an inner spiritual renewal. Governments, including the Hungarian state, were no longer able to nominate a candidate for higher ecclesiastical office simply on the merit of his political achievements. The strengthening of papal leadership was further enhanced by the new Canon introduced in
1918. It is little known that a Hungarian clergyman, the Benedictine Jusztinián Serédi, took the lion’s share in this reformulation of ecclesiastical laws. Obedience to canon laws became most important in the nomination of a bishop or other higher ecclesiastical dignitary. Ironically, Hungarian politicians had to face this new reality almost immediately at the nomination of the new Primate. Despite the resistance of the Hungarian government, Serédi succeeded to this office in December of 1927. Thus it is reasonable to state that Hungarian church-state relationships again seemed to assume the form of the Latin diarchy.

The statements of both Catholic and Protestant ecclesiastical leaders at the celebrations of the different national anniversaries also represented what McGuire (1987) calls the “priestly” version of civil religion, which asserts the greatness of a nation, its superiority and achievements. Hungarian nationalism began to emerge in the early nineteenth century during the Reform Era and manifested itself forcefully after the Compromise, remaining characteristic of the interwar period. However, the cataclysm of World War I and its aftermath provided political and ecclesiastical leaders with many opportunities to turn the priestly version of civil religion into a “prophetic” version by pointing out the offenses of the nation against the ideals and values for which it stood. Ironically, this cataclysm too further reinforced the intertwining of church and state.
At the end of World War I, on October 31, 1918, the anti-clerical Count Károlyi seized power, and proclaimed Hungary a republic⁴¹. The Hungarian Catholic bishops feared that the new government, a coalition of the Károlyi Party or the Bourgeois Radicals and the Social Democrats, would lay claim to the chief-seigniorial rights over the Church. To prevent this, the Catholic Bishops' Conference declared its intention on November 20, 1918, to bring about the independence and autonomy of the Church from the state as soon as possible. They also declared their support for land reform; and offered more than a million hold of land⁴² to the new government for this purpose. The bishops’ fears were not without foundation. Instead of the separation of state and church, the Károlyi government would have preferred the Vatican to recognize the transfer of the chief-seigniorial rights of Hungarian kings to the new head of state. In other words, the government wished to ensure the continued influence of the state over the Catholic Church. Meanwhile, Czech legions occupied Felvidék, Rumanian troops invaded Transylvania, and Serbs seized the southern part of Hungary. When the victorious allies, Britain and France, known as the Entente, sanctioned the occupation of Hungary on March 20, 1919, Count Károlyi resigned and handed power over to Béla Kun⁴³ who established the Hungarian Soviet Republic. While Kun’s government officially declared the principles of freedom of conscience and the separation of church and state it was also explicit about its desire to eradicate religion. Its “dictatorship of the proletariat” forbade the churches any participation in public life, disbanded the Christian Social People’s Party and abolished all religious associations and movements. Finally, Kun’s
government established the ominously named Office for the Liquidation of Religious Matters for the purpose of eradicating the schools, press organs, and publishing houses, and confiscating all real and movable property of the churches. The dictatorship of the proletariat, or the "Red Terror" lasted for 133 days at the end of which Béla Kun, with "tears in his voice"44 and some state treasures in his luggage, escaped to Austria. Shadow counterrevolutionary governments had already formed themselves in Vienna and Szeged; and pressed the Entente to entrust them with the new government. The Entente insisted on the formation of a provisional regime including democratic elements that would be required to hold elections on a wide, secret suffrage. Under the presidency of Károly Huszár a new government (November 24 – March 15, 1920) was formed; elections for a single house— in which the bishops were not included as ex officio members— were held in January 192045. The new Parliament promptly declared null and void all measures enacted by the Károlyi and Kun regimes as well as the legislation embodying the Compromise of 1867. At the same time, retaliation against the atrocities committed by the Communists created a new wave of bloodshed, the "White Terror", which took its name from the white crane feather on the field-caps of counterrevolutionary troops.

While the monarchy was abolished in Austria, it was restored in Hungary, but its permanent reinstatement was predicated on the resolution of the differences between the nation and the dynasty, an issue that divided Hungarians. In the interim, Admiral Miklós Horthy, who had organized the counterrevolutionary armed forces, was elected regent as provisional head of state on March 1, 1920. Horthy's status, as regent but not king, created some debate with regard to the chief-seigniorial rights over the church, because
some politicians wanted to invest these rights on Horthy too. However, Prince Primate Csernoch informed the leading politicians that the new Canon Law intended to abolish all local privileges; and there was little chance that the Holy See would transfer the chief-seigniorial rights from an apostolic king to a regent elected for only a temporary period.

In addition, Horthy was Protestant. When Csernoch intimated that a settlement of the chief-seigniorial right in conflict with the new Canon would create a serious crisis with the Vatican, he achieved the result he desired. Csernoch's warning came at a time when Hungary needed all possible foreign support and when the government was engaged in the process of establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Thus, the politicians dropped their request for the chief-seigniorial right, although they stated in the preamble to the legislation regulating the jurisdiction of the regent that this right did not cease to exist, but that its exercise was suspended.

After the election of the regent, the Huszár government resigned; and a coalition government, composed of the two main parties in the Parliament, the Christian National Union and the Smallholders, took office under Sándor Simonyi-Semitadam on March 15, 1920. The humiliating peace treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920, left Hungary with only 35,893 square miles of the 125,641 square miles that had constituted the lands of the Hungarian crown. The new states of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia all took large fragments, while others went to Austria and even to Poland and Italy. Of its pre-war population of 20,866,447, Hungary was left with only 7,615,117. Of the 10,050,575 persons whose mother tongue was Hungarian, no fewer than 3,219,579 now found themselves residents in the "successor states". While the homes of some of these people – for instance, the Szeklers – had been in the most remote corners of historic
Hungary, many were living immediately across the new frontiers. In addition, the treaty required Hungary to pay an unspecified sum in reparations, and limited its armed forces to 35,000, to be used exclusively for the maintenance of internal order and frontier defense. The treaty also decreased, or practically erased – for geographical reasons\textsuperscript{47} – the number of Orthodox, Eastern Catholic, and Unitarian believers in the Hungarian state (Fogarasi 1936).

Although the liberal legislation enacted in the last decade of the nineteenth century remained in effect, the prestige of the Catholic Church increased tremendously for at least two reasons. The Catholic priests and the reinvigorated Catholic press\textsuperscript{48}, changing from the priestly to the prophetic version of civil religion, were quick to point out the offenses of the nation against the Christian ideals for which it presumably stood\textsuperscript{49}. The Catholics, in general agreement with public opinion, blamed the Communists, the majority of whom were Jews, for the misery which had fallen on Hungary. Under the reign of Kun, himself the son of a rural Jewish clerk, the directorate of Budapest, for instance, was composed entirely of Jews\textsuperscript{50}. However, the Catholics also pointed out that the rise of the Jews and the Communists was the result of the liberal policies endorsed by the Protestants\textsuperscript{51}. The Protestants kept a low profile indeed in the following decades. The stagnation of Protestantism was acknowledged even by one of its own leading newspapers, the \textit{Református Élet} (Calvinist Life), which stated that "it is Catholicism that has acquired a Protestant spirit in this country. And Protestantism has taken over the rigidity and immobility of the Catholics"\textsuperscript{52}.

The second reason for the rise of Catholic prestige was the government’s realization that it needed the churches, most of all the largest religious body, the Catholic Church, both
for its own legitimation and for the reestablishment of moral order and education. Károly Huszár assured ecclesiastical leaders in a circular letter, issued on August 18, 1920, that the restitution of ecclesiastical properties and foundations vested in the churches would be concluded by the end of that month. Furthermore, Huszár pointed out that the churches were expected to contribute to the rebuilding of the country, because “moral regeneration can be achieved only with the harmonious cooperation of the clergy and the teaching staff of the nation. Let every pulpit and every teacher’s desk in the schools be a strong and invincible fortress of patriotism, of the religious-moral view of the world, and of the sanctity of family life and property.” The circular closed with a request from the Minister of Religion and Education for the “kind and effective support and the complete confidence” of the church leaders.

The recognition of the mutual dependence of the Catholic Church and the new order is best exemplified by an exchange of letters between Horthy and the Hungarian Prince Primate, Csernoch. “The Hungarian Catholic Church supports”, Csernoch wrote to the regent, “with all its traditional loyalty and its great moral power, the legally constituted supreme governmental power as embodied in Your Highness, bears an affectionate attachment to the exalted person of Your Highness, and requests with confidence the efficacious protection of Your Highness”. In his reply, Horthy expressed his confidence that “the religious and moral basis, which the Church led by Your Eminence has always faithfully fostered, is the sole foundation of the reconstruction of our country”.

The mutual support that church and state provided to each other in the following decades was to prove that the customary formulas of courtesy in the letters were by no means
empty formalities. The state provided legal protection for the received and recognized churches and lavish support for the received churches. The 1920s, for instance, saw the revitalization of Catholicism in Budapest. Under the Wolff Party\textsuperscript{57}, the capital launched a program of building new Catholic churches and rectories. To finance this project, “the municipal assembly appropriated an annual sum of 1,000,000 pengős. Estimating the construction costs of one church at approximately 400,000 to 500,000 pengős, the program called for the construction of two churches each year in the hope that within four or five years the need for additional churches thus be met”\textsuperscript{58}. The Protestants, through moderate land reform, were also supported. Each of their bishops received 500-hold-estates; and their teachers and ministers were provided with smaller estates\textsuperscript{59}.

Apart from the moral and religious education of the masses, the churches supported the counterrevolutionary state by legitimizing it – by resisting the Habsburg dynasty’s claim to the Hungarian throne, and by endorsing the interwar governments’ efforts to revise the Trianon Treaty. The first “visit” of King Charles\textsuperscript{60} in March 1921 and his sudden return in October raised the question of the status of the monarchy because on the second “visit” he tried to overthrow the government with a handful of loyalists. He suffered a decisive military defeat at Budaőrs, in the vicinity of the capital, and was confined to the Benedictine monastery of Tihany. There Prince Primate Csernoch visited him and convinced him to obey the order of the Entente, to leave the country and to abandon all future claims on the Hungarian throne. Thereupon the government, several of whose members were legitimist, i.e. loyal to King Charles, resigned, and a new government was formed under the conservative Count István Bethlen. He persuaded the Parliament to
accept the franchise enacted in 1918 as still legally in force, which reduced the number of voters and abolished secret ballot in rural districts.

Although the social problems of Hungary originated mostly in the semi-feudal political system, the delay in implementing significant land reform, the lack of democracy in public life, and the country’s dependence on foreign investors, the interwar governments invariably used the Trianon Treaty as the scapegoat for the misery of the country. Revision of the treaty was generally desired and the churches did their utmost to keep this desire alive. We have already seen how the government and the Catholic Church ‘courted each other’, so here attention will be devoted to the standpoint of the Protestant churches on Trianon.

Let it suffice here to state the conviction that such dismemberment of Hungary was more than a crime, it was a blunder. The Peace-Treaty was dictated by the same evil feelings, which ran high in the Great War. Its aim was revenge, not reconciliation. ... But one thing the Hungarian people know for certain: God must have some purpose even with the Peace-Treaty ... [Hungarians] put their trust in justice alone. And daily rises as a song in their soul the verse of the Psalmist, -- ‘He that goeth forth and weepeth, bearing precious seed, shall doubtless come again with rejoicing, bringing his sheaves with him’ (Ps. 126.) (Révész et. al 1927 : 218).

The Protestants’ trust in God was rewarded indeed in that “Providence ordered two outstanding Protestant men to the head of the state: Horthy as the Regent and Count Bethlen as the Prime Minister”61.

As we have noted, while the liberal legislation of the regulation of religious life enacted in the 1890s remained in effect62 the political and cultural attitude toward religion was completely reversed in the years following World War I. As Count Kuno Klebelsberg, the Minister of Religion and Education of the Bethlen government explained:
The governmental theory of the nineteenth century undoubtedly overestimated the strength of the State. The fashionable opinion during those years was that, while in earlier times the cooperation of the Churches was needed, with the progress of civilization all this had become unnecessary and today the State could maintain as a moral unity the peoples encompassed within its framework through the penal code and the police on the one hand and through its cultural and social policies on the other. The revolutions that followed the World War did not prove this doctrine right and for this reason nationalist cultural policy in Hungary cannot renounce the cooperation of our historical Churches and extends its support to them.\(^\text{63}\)

The “nationalist cultural policy” to which Count Klebelsberg referred was the so-called “Christian-national” idea based mainly on the works of Ottokár Prohászka\(^\text{64}\), who became the Catholic Bishop of Székesfehérvár in 1905 and the president of the Christian National Union. Prohászka saw the way out of the country’s misery to be the establishment of Christian democracy and the strengthening the bourgeoisie, the middle class\(^\text{65}\) – as Széchenyi had planned in the early eighteenth century. Through his writings and sermons, he became so popular that Horthy asked him to form a government. Though being a bishop, he could not accept the Prime Ministership, Prohászka declared himself a candidate and then was elected as representative of Székesfehérvár. Until that time, the submission of a bishop of the Catholic Church to an electoral contest was not only unheard of Hungary, but also probably in the whole world. His electoral victory, needless to say, further increased his prestige.

In Prohászka’s view, the nation was not a racial, linguistic, or genealogical association, but rather a cultural unit integrated by Christianity since the time of Saint Stephen. This concept of the nation, especially when coupled with and enhanced by the tragic consequences of the Trianon Treaty, led not surprisingly to a societal demonstration and re-affirmation of religiosity. The notion of the unity of religious and social culture became the backbone of this period (often termed Horthy’s “neo-baroque” era) and was
formulated in what became known as the “Christian Course”. This essentially involved an intention to infuse Christian principles into every aspect of social, economic, and political life. At celebrations like the memorial year of 1930, dedicated to Saint Stephen’s son, Saint Emerich, political and ecclesiastical leaders, Protestants included, participated together in the parliamentary pageantry when a memorial plaque was ceremonially unveiled. Similarly, the 1938 Eucharistic World Congress, commemorating the 900th anniversary of King Stephen's death, organized together by state and church, was accompanied by mass processions. Even Admiral Horthy, Hungary’s Protestant regent, marched along with his Catholic wife, who held rosary beads in her hands, at the procession of the Eucharist. However, this cultural and political unity manifested itself mainly at public demonstrations and only rarely on the level of politicians’ personal convictions. As Ottokár Prohászka, disillusioned with politics, noted in his diary, “Those men are not Christians. It is true that they accept Christianity in principle, in theory, but they do not profess it by their deeds”. He had to recognize that his “Christian Course [was] without Christianity” and “behind the Christian national program there was no Christian nation”.

The pompous processions coupled with empty slogans and the apparent failure of the “Christian Course” alarmed other clergy who turned their attention to the burning and urgent problems of their time. However, it must also be noted that the clergy, who started to organize Hungarian society, especially the lower classes, could not continue their activity for long without a general societal acceptance under the “umbrella of the Christian Course”. Whereas Giesswein’s National Association of Christian-Socialist Organizations and other movements organized at the end of the nineteenth century raised
the suspicions of both the government and the hierarchy, the different Catholic associations of workers established in the interwar period received the blessing of both the political and ecclesiastical authorities. Thus, for example, following the model of the Belgian-French Jeunesse Ouvrière Chretienne (JOC), the organization of Hungarian JOC began in 1935. The Hungarian JOC actually built upon and extended the program of the National Association of Young Catholic Tradesmen (KIOE), which had originally been established for apprentices. JOC was rather successful in Hungary. By 1942 it had 7,000 members in 120 cities and smaller communities and published its own newspaper, the Magyar Munkásifjú (Hungarian Working Youth). Another movement organizing workers was the Parish Workers’ Groups (EMSZO), which focused its activity under the direction of Actio Catholica on the parishes in the factory districts of the capital. Its congress, held in May 1938, attracted some 25,000 workers. The EMSZO also published its own newspaper, the Új Rend (New Order).

The activities of Catholic organizers were not confined to the working class. In fact, the organization of the intelligentsia began earlier. The association of Catholic university students, the Foederatio Americana, directed by Elemér Schwartz, a university professor and member of the Cistercian Order, was established in 1921. The aim of this association was similar to that propounded by Széchenyi in the Reform Era, but with a Catholic undertone. It sought the formation of a middle class, which would profess its Catholic faith courageously and would not be ashamed of Christian ideals concerning the family and society.

As Laszlo (1973 : 291) noted, the most burning issue in Hungary was not the poor condition of the industrial workers but the delay of significant land reform. One of the
reasons the Kun regime had failed was that it had alienated the peasantry by nationalizing the land instead of distributing it among the land-hungry peasants and agrarian proletariat. The governments of the interwar period launched several attempts at land reform, all very modest and cautious, which inevitably failed to solve the problem. It is important to note that church leaders did not oppose these reforms and some of them, like Bishop Gyula Glattfelder of Csanád, even criticized the governments for not going far enough.\textsuperscript{74}

The redistribution of land in itself would not have been enough. A young Jesuit, Jenő Kerkai, noticed that everyone neglected the proper education of agrarian youth. What is more, the Social Democrats on December 21, 1921, in a deal with the Bethlen government, gave up their right to represent and organize the agrarian proletariat.\textsuperscript{75} Put simply, the peasants were completely abandoned. Therefore, the National Council of Catholic Agrarian Youth Associations (KALOT), established in 1935 by Fr. Kerkai and two unemployed intellectuals and begun in a farmhouse, intended to organize and aid peasant youth. Since the aim of KALOT was the improvement of the human being in every aspect of life, its programs aimed at deepening religiosity by organizing lectures, retreats, and pilgrimages as well as propagating practical economic knowledge\textsuperscript{76} through the establishment of so-called “people’s colleges”. These colleges not only presented lectures on various agricultural topics and the technicalities of business dealings but also organized leadership seminars on the social and political circumstances of the peasantry in order to prepare peasant youth for active participation in public life.

The success of KALOT was formidable. Its 20 people’s colleges and its 500,000 members\textsuperscript{77} represented half of all Hungarian villages. A sibling organization for women,
KALÁSZ, was subsequently organized, and the Protestant denominations followed the Catholics, by establishing their own colleges. Thus began the formation of a Hungarian peasant elite, a crucial element in the creation of a new middle class.

It was a promising beginning. No one could doubt that the KALOT possessed great political potential. Its general congress in 1939 attracted some 20,000 members who maintained impressive discipline, which amazed the city dwellers. "It finally became obvious that agrarian youth was politically also a force to be reckoned with, which, especially in the confused and chaotic world of Hungarian politics that would exist after the war, could be utilized as a trump card. This was the reason why keen-scented politicians closed in around it and why there was hardly a public function [held by the KALOT] at which there were no ministers and heads of government courting it."79

The fate of Hungary did not let KALOT bear fruit. Although it survived World War II and for a while even the Soviet invaders showed interest in and benevolence toward the movement, the end was near. The membership of the KALOT provided the backbone for the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Néppárt), which was rather successful after the war. Only by threat and fraudulent means were the Communists able to dismantle this party. An organization, which raised and maintained the consciousness, the political awareness, and the Christian character of the Hungarian peasantry was obviously not in the interests of the Communists returning from Moscow, so they banned the KALOT and its sibling organizations in 1946.

Hungary became a formal military ally of Germany in 1941, thus assuming a degree of culpability, which is still hotly debated, in the extermination of its Jewish citizens. It is

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not known exactly how many Jews were deported from Hungary, and killed in the Nazi concentration camps but it is generally estimated that approximately half of the Jewish population perished⁸⁴. The scope and purpose of this study does not allow a detailed discussion of what the churches, especially the Catholic Church, did and should have done in order to save the Jewish population of the country. However, since this question was part and parcel of the Hungarian church-state relationships of the era under discussion, and since it significantly affected later developments in both church and state, a brief summary is necessary.

As noted earlier, Jews, settling in Hungary after the Turkish occupation, constituted the main entrepreneurial stratum. We have also seen that the liberals supported their political emancipation. As a consequence, Jews not only became influential in public life, but also were over-represented in such favorable positions as lawyer and physician, and their proportion was even higher among the future leaders of the country. While, according to the census of 1910, the Jews constituted only five percent of the Hungarian population, 34 percent of university students were Jewish in the academic year of 1917/1918. We have also seen that the predominance of Jews reached its zenith under the so-called Dictatorship of the Proletariat. According to the half-Jewish Oscar Jászi, the editor of the *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century), the periodical of the Associations of the Social Sciences, “whom it would be difficult to accuse of anti-Semitism – ninety-five percent of Communist leaders came from the ranks of the Jews”⁸⁵. Thus, although the *numerus clausus* – Article III of Law XXV of 1920, the much criticized anti-Semitic law of the Horthy era – actually did not contain the word “Jew”, it was clear who it intended to proportionately exclude from higher education⁸⁶.
Although the Imrédy government (1938-1939) introduced a largely token "Jewish Law", limiting the activity of Jews in business and the professions, it nevertheless pinned its hopes on the West. When the Munich crisis\(^7\) broke in September 1938, Imrédy and his foreign minister, Kánya, while presenting Hungary's claims on Czechoslovakia, limited their claims to what they hoped would be acceptable to the Western powers, the support of which the two Hungarian politicians made every effort to obtain. Turned down by the West, the Hungarian leaders turned to Germany and Italy, which, under the "First Vienna Award" of November 2, 1938, gave Hungary the fringe of southern Slovakia populated by ethnic Hungarians. Imrédy, disillusioned with the West, dismissed Kánya for the pro-Axis Count István Csáky and sought to recover Hitler's favour by introducing a more far-reaching Jewish Law. Through the irony of history, Imrédy's enemies secured his resignation in February 1939 by unearthing documents allegedly showing a Jewish strain in his own ancestry. Despite the severity of the second Jewish Law, the deportation of Jews did not begin until the occupation of Hungary by German troops in 1944.

Although Canon Sándor Giesswein protested against the *numerus clausus* that denied the equality of Hungarian citizens, the church leaders generally welcomed it. Prohászka, for example, gave energetic support to the *numerus clausus*, "because he regarded the limitation of the admission of Jews to the universities as a sine qua non condition for the preservation and rehabilitation of the Christian intelligentsia and middle class of Hungary" (Laszlo 1973: 166). The hierarchy was less than enthusiastic about the first and the second Jewish Laws, but the bishops did not raise any opposition in the hope that apart from restrictions in the cultural and economic spheres nothing more serious would happen to the Jewish population of Hungary. However, when the deportation of the Jews
in rural areas began under the Sztójay government (March 22 – August 29, 1944), the bishops of both the Catholic and the Reformed Churches wrote condemnatory pastoral letters, intended to be read from the pulpits in July 1944. The government dissuaded the bishops from this act of public disapproval. The Prime Minister wrote to Bishop Ravasz of the Reformed Church suggesting that if the churches insisted on reading out the protesting letters then “the government must decide for itself whether it accept an open war with the Churches … or it resign, paving the way for the coming into power of the Arrow-Cross Party (Nazi Party), whose coming into power, Hungary being under German occupation, might be taken for granted”\textsuperscript{88}. The life of the Jews of the capital, approximately a quarter million people, was at stake. The churches agreed to forego the public protest if the government stopped the deportation. The deportation stopped indeed; and the Jewry of Budapest was saved\textsuperscript{89}.

Thus, the churches can be both accused of involvement in the persecution of Jews and praised for their role in the protection of the Jewish population. As László Endre, the ringleader of the persecution of the Jews in Hungary reported to the Council of Ministers: “We have to state, openly, that as far as aid to Jews is concerned, the priests and clergymen of all ranks of the Christian Churches unfortunately stand in the first row. Protection and intervention has never been on so high a scale as today. The assistance rendered the Jews by Christian priests and clergymen goes under the name of Christian and neighborly love”\textsuperscript{90}.

The end of the war meant not only taking stock of the enormous human loss, but for Hungary as well as the other Eastern European nations attempting to do so under conditions in which “the flame of independence … was blown out” (Macartney and
Palmer 1962: 450). When, under the protection of the Red Army, the Communists started to shape Hungary’s life, including church-state relationships, the protection of Jews by the clergy and the role of religious organizations in the land reforms and the education of the peasantry were forgotten or distorted by the government ideologists. However, before turning to the Communist period, a brief summary and reflection on the relevant analytical questions seems appropriate.

Summary and Analysis

The Hungarian Kulturkampf – the result of which was the liberal legislation of 1895 – shaped Hungarian church-state relations from the Compromise to the end of World War I. Despite the reign of the liberals, church and state remained intertwined because the smaller churches, frequently the churches of national minorities, were seen as a threat to Hungarian national interests, and consequently, governmental control over them seemed to be a necessary measure of precaution. Furthermore, the particular interpretation of legal presumption (preemptio juris) and the absence of a strong middle class contributed to the financial and legal dependence of the churches on the state.

While the post-Compromise era demonstrated unmistakable anti-clericalism, the interwar period witnessed the rehabilitation of religion in general and Catholicism in particular. The reason for this change was the shock created by the Trianon Treaty and the tremendous losses of Hungary’s territory and population. The Trianon Treaty and the
brief Communist dictatorship of Béla Kun, led mostly by Jews, were blamed by many Hungarians for all of the country’s troubles. The churches, first and foremost the Catholic Church, were quick to point out that the rise of the Jews and the Communists was the result of the liberal policy of antebellum Hungary. As a counter-reaction to liberalism, the interwar period emerged as a “neo-baroque era”, in which the representatives of the churches and the state marched together in national public demonstrations of religiosity. It would be a mistake though to see only the neo-baroque exterior, the façade of the so-called “Christian Course”, which was only superficially Christian, because this era also produced some original and promising initiatives in the building of a new middle class. Of course, World War II and the expanding Soviet Empire brought these initiatives to an abrupt and tragic end.

In this chapter we have discussed the circumstances under which both priestly and prophetic versions of civil religion manifested themselves. We have also identified which of Sturzo’s diarchies is applicable to Hungarian church-state relationships in this historical period. We must also, however, focus on another theoretical issue: the applicability of Martin’s (1978) fundamental distinction as presented in his typology of secularization. According to Martin, the fate and form of secularity in any society “depends on whether a nation’s revolution is an act which divides internally or unites against something external” (1978 : 16). In the latter case, “Catholicism (or Orthodoxy) has stood in for the state under conditions of external domination or external threat” (Martin 1978 : 55). Clearly, many Hungarians considered the territorial and population losses resulting from the Trianon Treaty a manifestation of external domination that imposed heavy burdens on the citizens of a truncated country through punitive
reparations. They also believed that it threatened the national identity of millions of Hungarians in the so-called successor states. As we have seen, the Catholic Church offered significant assistance and support to the interwar Hungarian governments as did the Protestant Churches. Thus the question of what made this "ecumenical" support possible must be investigated.

From the foregoing analysis of this era we can reason with great certitude that a necessary condition of the collective support offered to the state by the different denominations is that all of them be recognized generally by the society as contributors to the establishment of the nation state. The answer to the question of whether this condition is a necessary and/or sufficient condition requires more consideration and research. Given the complexity of the issue, however, it is most probable that societal acknowledgment of the contribution of the different denominations to the establishment of the nation state is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition. The Jews, for instance, contributed significantly to the wealth of the Hungarian state through their entrepreneurial activity. However, the prominent role played by some Jews in the Red Terror brought upon the Hungarians by the Kun regime and the hidden or overt anti-Semitic policy of the interwar governments make it difficult to investigate whether the Jews supported the broad policies of the Hungarian state after World War I\(^1\). As we shall see, the Communists used the unresolved tension between the Jewish population and wider Hungarian society to their own advantage.

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1 The Protestants considered this liberal legislation as their own victory over the Catholic Church.
2 In the account of historical events between the Compromise and the end of World War I, if I do not state otherwise, I rely on Hermann (1973).
It might be useful to remind the reader that after the battle of Mohács (1526), the Habsburgs claimed not only to be the Emperors of Austria but also the Kings — or Queen in Maria Theresa’s case — of Hungary. While Francis Joseph became the Emperor of Austria in 1848 he was entitled to receive the Hungarian crown, but due to the suspension of the Hungarian Constitution, it was not possible for his coronation to take place until after the Compromise in 1867.

See the discussion on the Concordat in the previous chapter.

By ambiguous laws, Deák referred to the unregulated practice of the *jus placeti*. Under particular European historical circumstances, he included the intertwining of governmental institutions and the interests of religion and the general existence of state-religions on the European continent up to the nineteenth century. C.f. Ferenczi (1904 : 390).

Only a royal reproof was sent in 1871 to Jekelfalussy, bishop of Székesfehérvár, who officially published the dogma, and György Schopper, bishop of Rosnayó was reprimanded by Treffort, Minister of Cult and Education, for sending a copy of the dogma to his diocesan priests. C.f. also Ferenczi (1904 : 388).


Ibid. my translation.


The *Kulturkampf* was actually waged with great vehemence from 1871 to 1877; but from 1878 to 1891 it gradually calmed down. On the discussion of the *Kulturkampf* see also Spahn’s (1998) detailed discussion.

In Germany, the Protestants were considered the “Conservatives”. C.f. Spahn (1998).

Bismarck’s famous law, the *Sperrgesetz*, for example, withheld all state payments from the Catholic bishops to force them or their representatives to comply with Bismarck’s intentions. “Another law of the *Landtag* closed all monasteries in Prussia, and expelled from Prussian territory all members of religious orders, with the exception of those who cared for the sick” (Spahn 1998), but even these orders were variously restricted. Finally, on June 20, 1875, the Germans also confiscated all the property of the Church, and “turned over its administration to lay trustees to be elected by the members of each parish” (ibid). Although the Hungarian Liberals also suggested these measures, they were never realized.

The *Catholic Encyclopedia* — see Aldásy (1997) — translated this decree into English as “baptism away from the other side”. The name of the decree referred to the practice of both the Catholic priests and Protestant ministers who tried to increase the membership of their denomination by baptizing and — more importantly — registering those children who, according to the legal regulations, did not belong to that denomination. In German, it was called *Wegtaufung*.

In the spring of 1871, for example, Bismarck ‘strongly suggested’ that Rome should censure the Catholic Centre Party for its antagonistic attitude in the *Landtag*. The Holy See gave a friendly answer, but on the “representation of prominent members of the Centre, notably of Bishop Ketteler, Rome refused to further influence the Catholic party” (Spahn 1998).

The term originates in Transylvanian terminology where during the sixteenth century the Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Unitarians were admitted and legally “received” by the prince and the estates.

Although Jewish emancipation was already enacted in 1849 and the Compromise reaffirmed it the reception of the Jewish religion suffered repeated delays. The main reason was “that the feuding factions of the various congregations were unable to accept a common ecclesiastical constitution, nor could they agree on the creation of a national organ for all Jews living in Hungary … Finally three autonomous branches of the Mosaic faith were separately received” (Laszlo 1973 : 25, footnote # 11).

In Hungary proper, i.e. without Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia, the Vienna Treaty assured the free exercise of the Lutherans and Calvinists in 1606, after Bocskai’s successful revolt. The Eastern Orthodox Church was “received” in 1791 and the Unitarians in 1848.
The Nazarenes belonged to this category only until 1939 when they were banned, because they refused military service.


By agrarian proletariat I refer to the zsellérek, people employed in agriculture, but who did not own any land.

It is mentioned in Hermann (1973 : 473).

The General Workers’ Association was founded in 1869 and functioned as General Party of the Workers (GPW) from 1880. The GPW transformed itself into the Hungarian Social Democratic Party in 1890

He was the nephew of the founder, Count Zichy.

Irredentism was a policy, directed toward the incorporation of Hungary, or at least part of it, within Austria and/or Germany.

Probably they considered the establishment of the diocese another measure of Magyarization.


We know very little about the female orders, especially in Budapest. However, they experienced a significant growth at the end of the nineteenth century. While in 1877 only 993 nuns lived in Hungary in 82 monasteries, in 1895, their number reached 3,141 in 283 monasteries (Engelmann 1969 : 191). It is reasonable to think that a significant portion of the new monasteries was established in the capital.

According to Engelmann’s list (1969), in 1943, only 11 of 39 female orders did not have a community in Budapest.

Count Széchenyi earned his nickname ‘the greatest Hungarian’ during the Reform Era by his efforts at modernization. Among his many projects were the establishment of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the National Theater and the building of the first bridge between Pest and Buda. He even smuggled a gas-lamp from England for which, under the contemporary British laws, he could have been executed.

In the discussion of the presumptio juris, I rely on Péter (1997).

The population of Hungary in 1805 was 8,700,000 (Szekfű n.d. : 164) of which only 3,400 were state bureaucrats and 5,500 were bureaucrats on the county level. In Hungary, the descendents of the common nobility were called “the gentry”.

Janos bases his analysis on Wallerstein’s (1974) theory of a world-system.

The hardships of Hungarian entrepreneurs originated not only from Habsburg protective measures and the competition of foreign investors backed by advanced technology, but also from Hungarian feudal laws “that prevented non-noble manufacturers from owning the property on which their factories were built” (Janos 1982 : 67).

Only the poor, non-Catholic churches received a rather moderate subvention (Laszlo 1973).

C.f. Laszlo (1973 : 27, footnote #21). About seventy percent (69.88) went to the Reformed Church and thirty (30.12) to the Lutheran Church.

Before the Compromise, churches almost exclusively provided primary and secondary education. However, the Magyarization policy of the government – as discussed in connection with the education of Hungarian language – changed the proportion considerably. In 1914, 69.5 percent of the primary schools were denominational, 20.7 percent public and 8.4 percent communal. “Of the fifty teachers’ colleges for men, thirty were run by denominations and twenty by the state. … In 1914 there were 131 denominational [high schools] for boys as against 98 non-denominational” (Laszlo 1973 : 29).

C.f. Laszlo (1973 : 30).
The reason for the reluctance towards land reform was probably the fact that the Catholic Church and the aristocratic leaders of the People’s Party were the biggest landowners in the country. Similarly, the Protestant churches did not show any interest in the improvement of the poor. The Protestant leadership was firmly controlled by “the landowning gentry who often showed less social awareness than did the members of the high aristocracy. The alarming spread of radical sects among the agrarian proletariat was the clearest demonstration of the failure of the traditional churches” (Laszlo 1973 : 74).

For McGuire, as we have seen, civil religion may be a general type of nationalism. C.f. the discussion on civil religion in the first chapter.

The mixture of the priestly and prophetic versions was to a certain extent characteristic of the Reform Era. The national anthem, for instance, begins with the description of the richness of the country and the greatness of Hungarian history up to the reign of King Mathias I. Then it notes that because of the sins of the Hungarians God flew into a passion. However, Trianon provided much more reason to scorn the nation than to praise it, and thus, the prophetic version of civil religion, especially in the form of reminders to the nation of the grave consequences it experienced when it turned away from Catholicism in favor of Communism, became more dominant.

If not stated otherwise, in the account of the historical events of this period I rely on Laszlo (1973).

One hectare is 0.58 hectare.

The irony of history was that the government of Károlyi in February 1919 had imprisoned Kun. Kun had received training in Moscow in revolutionary tactics and returned to Hungary in November 1918. He started a Communist newspaper and founded the Hungarian Communist Party on December 20, 1918. While imprisoned, Kun was allowed to continue directing Hungary’s Communist Party from his cell. His extensive propaganda combined social agitation with promises that, if given power, he would secure Soviet aid against the Rumanian forces then occupying parts of Hungary. On March 20, 1919, Kun was released by Károlyi.

Laszlo (1973 : 129), in footnote 27, refers to Bohm’s Im Kreuzfeuer. Bohm successfully asked the Socialist Chancellor of Austria, Karl Renner, to grant political asylum to Kun and his associates.

In 1926, the Parliament became bicameral again. In contrast to the old House of Magnates, membership in the new Upper House, with few exceptions, was not based on the privilege of birth. “Instead, members were those a) who held certain high offices, b) who were elected representatives of various professional and other corporate groups, or c) who had been appointed by the Regent to be members of the Upper House” (Laszlo 1973 : 214). As Laszlo (1973 : 215) notes, 47 out of the 365 members of the Upper House were ecclesiastical representatives in 1940. In 1926, the corresponding numbers were 33 of the 244 members.

Data is from the 1910 census.

C.f. Map 3. Another consequence of Trianon was that only three out of twenty-one Catholic dioceses remained entirely in Hungary.

The Central Press Agency, organized as a stock company, the plan of the so-called ‘newspaper priests’, the Jesuit Béla Bangha, Ferenc Biró and the Dominican Konrád Böhle, became finally realized in September 1919. As Laszlo (1973 : 268-269) enumerated, before the German occupation in 1944, Hungarian Catholicism possessed two dailies, 18 weekly newspapers, 25 monthly journals, and 3 quarterly reviews, with a total circulation of approximately 1.5 million copies.

For example, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Hungary was considered to be the “bastion of Christianity”.


Laszlo (1973 : 282) quotes Nyisztor’s Az Actio Catholica tíz évé (The Ten Years of Actio Catholica). It is worth noting that only the Catholics and the Baptists had a positive balance of converts between 1920 and 1936 (Fogarasi 1936).
52 Quoted in Béla Balázs (1950 : 387).

54 Ibid. Note also how Prime Minister Bethlen greeted Prince Primate Csernoch at the occasion of the latter’s golden jubilee of priesthood in 1924: “The cooperation in the fulfillment of the functions of church and state, the moral and physical powers, so to speak, has never been more necessary since the establishment of Hungary than now” (Balázs 1954 : 360, in my translation).

55 Laszlo (1973 : 192) refers to the Archives of the Prince Primate, Esztergom, Cat. B. 469/1920.

56 Ibid.

57 After the death of the founder in 1936, the municipal party lost its Catholic character.


60 Charles, I as Austrian emperor, IV as Hungarian king, ruled between 1916-1918.


62 Abolition of the laws would have revived the Kulturkampf of the late nineteenth century, increasing tension between Catholics and Protestants, which was the last thing the interwar governments needed. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church could hardly hope for more than it already enjoyed in a secular state with a religiously mixed population. Thus the establishment of a Concordat with the Holy See, suggested by a Jesuit, was promptly turned down by the Catholic hierarchy (Laszlo 1973 : 213).

63 Laszlo (1973 : 194) quotes from a book, Jöijetek harmincas évek (Come, Years of Thirties) Budapest, 1930, p. 19. Note the exclusive treatment of the “historical”, i.e. the received churches.

64 The first political party, which used the slogan “Christian-national”, was the Christian Socialist People’s Party in its publication, the Szegedi Új Nemzedék (The New Generation of Szeged). However, other parties took over the slogan, because it emphasized the Christian-national ideal as opposed to the liberals’ cosmopolitanism and the communists’ materialism.

65 Gergely (1977 : 18) notes that Prohászka wanted to tie the Catholic Church to the middle class, and thus save it.

66 The term “Christian Course” refers to a complex phenomenon. Most Hungarians today use this term pejoratively, for two reasons. The primary explanation is that in their misleading propaganda, the Communists presented Prohászka’s political views as the ideological foundation of the whole interwar period, which “marched” toward Fascism. The second reason is that post-Communist liberals, building on this biased view, use every opportunity to protest the public presence of the historical churches, which, according to these liberals, would create “ipso facto” another “Christian Course”. In my view, an objective analysis of the “Christian Course” is one of the most important tasks of Hungarian historians and sociologists of religion. Historians should contrast Prohászka’s original views with the Communists’ and liberals’ presentations, and all three with what actually happened in the interwar period. This task is unquestionably beyond the limits of the present work. However, all efforts are made to expose the actual events as objectively as possible. Furthermore, some aspects of the Communist and liberal views will be discussed in the following chapters. Finally, in connection with Prohászka’s original views, we might quote what he wrote on “real Christianity in practice” in the pastoral letter of the Hungarian Catholic Bishops’ Conference issued after the fall of the Kádár regime. In this document, Prohászka urged Hungarians to vote for politicians who would “realize Christian principles in every aspects of life … including economics and public life” (presented in Gergely 1984 : 323, my translation). However, I would like to emphasize again that the present discussion of “Christian Course” is, necessarily, incomplete. Since the presentation of the actual events is part and parcel of this work, the use of the term “Christian Course” will be confined to these events.

67 St. Emerich was presented to the Hungarian youth as the example of chastity. In a hunt, he was deadly wounded by a wild boar. His widow informed Emerich’s family that they had lived in a so-called “Joseph marriage”, i.e. without having a sexual life.

127


70 Ibid.

71 Information on the Christian - national idea is taken from Dr. Imre András SJ.’s “The Historical, political, social, and economic background of the life of the servant of God, István Kaszap”. The present author translated the manuscript into English for the canonization process.

72 Let us not forget that in this era, in 1931, Pope Pius XI issued the famous encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, supporting the workers’ cause and commemorating Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum.

73 Actio Catholica was – under the control of bishops – the coordinating center of Catholic, non-political and non-economic social organizations. C.f. Gergely (1984 : 24) and the pastoral letter of the Hungarian Catholic Bishops’ Conference on Actio Catholica in Gergely (1984 : 332-334).


75 This agreement became known as the Bethlen-Peyer pact named after the leaders of the government and the Social Democratic Party. C.f. András (1995 : 11).

76 Courses were offered on the organization of producers’ and marketing co-operatives, and model farms were also established. The enterprises of the KALOT included plant nurseries, woodworking shops, a pastry factory, a retail store selling textiles, and a printing shop.


78 The Protestants’ youth movement, the Soli Deo Gloria, established in the late 1930s, must be mentioned here. This movement was concerned with the social questions of the country, and its main concern was the agrarian question. The people’s colleges of the Protestants, despite the insistence on their strictly Protestant character and foreign examples resembled undoubtedly the colleges of the KALOT.

79 Laszlo (1973 : 280-281) quotes Nyisztor’s Ötven esztendő (Fifty Years).

80 The Arrow Cross Party, the Hungarian Nazis, disbanded it because of the active involvement of KALOT members in the rescue of Jews, but the movement reorganized itself after the war.

81 In sharp contrast with Cardinal Mindszenty’s attitude, the leaders of the KALOT, especially the other Jesuit, Töödtöm Nagy, began negotiations with the Soviet military leadership.

82 The KALOT was revived after the fall of Communism, although its vitality cannot be compared to that of the organization in the interwar period.

83 Obviously, cultural and economic alliance with Germany antedated the military alliance of 1941 when the Hungarians not only permitted the transit of Nazi forces against Yugoslavia but also participated in the attack.

84 According to Stark (1993), the Hungarian Jewish population in 1941 numbered 480,000 of which only 185,000 survived in Hungary, and another 85,000 returned from the concentration camps.


86 It would be an interesting and challenging task to analyze to what extent we can consider this law the “forerunner” of the job equity legislation of Canada.

87 The result of the Münich crisis was a settlement reached by Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy that permitted German annexation of the Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia.


89 This is not to deny the significance of other efforts, such as the protest of foreign powers, including the papacy, and the threat of Allied Powers.

90 Laszlo (1973 : 405-406).
Obviously, the Jews would not have endorsed anti-Semitic measures. However, archival research might shed some light on how the Jews reacted to the Trianon Treaty and whether the government asked for the support of the Jews as a religious community. Most Jews, having a middle class existence in Hungary, probably considered themselves loyal Hungarian citizens.
Chapter IV. Church-State Relations under Communism

Although analysts differ in their periodization of church-state relations in the Communist regime they all agree that there was a turning point in the attitude of the Hungarian Communists toward religion in the 1960s (Detre 1979, Andras - Morel 1983b, Tomka 1991a, Pungur n. d.). The end of cruel oppression and the beginning of the reevaluation of religion was marked by a partial agreement signed by the Vatican and Hungary in 1964. While the magnitude of change in the Communists' attitude was far smaller than the change in political and intellectual attitudes toward the Catholic Church shortly after World War I, it nonetheless had significant consequences not only for church-state relationships but also for the whole Communist system.

Church-State Relations under the Oppressive Years

In 1948, delegates of the Communist Parties under Soviet occupation came together in Karlovy Vary to discuss their policy on religious matters. Perhaps as a result, the Hungarian Communists began a comprehensive and well-planned offensive on the Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran Churches in the same year. The compliance, cooperation and endorsement of these churches were essential to the Communists, who had seized power either by rigged elections, or by threats and trickery. They needed sympathetic or manipulable church leaders in order to provide some degree of religious
legitimation for their policies. Since none of the heads of the historical churches were willing to cooperate they had to be removed. Thus, Bishop Ravasz of the Reformed Church was replaced; while Bishop Ordass of the Lutheran Church, and Cardinal Mindszenty, the head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, were arrested and sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The Communists then negotiated their first agreement, which was signed by the leaders of the Reformed Church on October 7, 1948. With the Lutherans, however, they did not reach an agreement until two months after Bishop Ordass’ arrest, on December 14, 1948. In these agreements the churches guaranteed their support for, and cooperation with, the new political leadership while the state, in its turn, guaranteed free religious practice and returned a few nationalized secondary schools and seminaries to ecclesiastical control. As punishment for their delayed obedience, the Lutherans, however, were not permitted to regain control of any secondary schools$^3$.

The Catholics proved to be even more stubborn. The authority of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference made resistance possible even after Mindszenty’s arrest. Since the new Constitution, enshrined on August 18, 1949, declared the separation of church and state, a law was enacted replacing compulsory religious classes with voluntary registration. Parents who enrolled their children in such classes were harassed at their workplace, however, and the children received similar treatment at school.

In the summer of 1950, the “Catholic Priests for Peace Movement” was established by the state. A confidential directive, issued by the Party on June 14, 1950, stated that the peace movement was to be used to encourage confrontation of the lower clergy with the hierarchy (Gergely 1985 : 91). At the same time, thousands of monks and nuns were arrested and deported$^4$. This forced Archbishop József Grósz to initiate negotiations
with the state, which resulted in an agreement in late August. The bishops promised their support while the state decreed a restricted framework of ecclesiastical and pastoral functioning. This framework allowed the church to reopen eight secondary schools, and four religious orders received permission to staff and run these institutions.

The trials of the Catholic Church, and those of the other denominations, however, did not cease after this agreement. Archbishop Grösz was arrested in 1951, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. This year marked the beginning of the so-called “priest-trials”, which included not only Catholic priests and members of religious orders but also the ministers and leaders of other denominations. Another means of control over the churches was introduced in 1951, the State Office for Church Affaires (SOCA). In Andras and Morel’s description, “state officials (‘bishops with moustaches’) were placed in every chancery, where they opened the bishops’ mail, checked on their visitors, and were in possession of the diocesan seal” (1983a:22). The SOCA, the secret police, and the pliant church leaders constituted a threefold controlling and oppressive system over the churches⁵, especially the three biggest churches⁶.

The fate of the Jewish communities, as religious organizations, was similar to that of the other historical churches. They signed an agreement with the state on December 7, 1948. Two years later, the neologue, status quo, and orthodox Jewish traditions gave up their independence, and united, obviously under governmental pressure⁷. A law, issued in 1946, established a “Foundation for Jewish Reconstruction”, however, the SOCA dismantled this foundation and created a “Foundation for National Reconstruction”⁸.
The smaller denominations\(^9\) represented a very small part of the population, and as we have seen, suffered discrimination both before and during World War II. In order to prevent further discrimination, they formed the Alliance of Free Churches in 1945. In fact, the Communist era opened with a grandiose gift to these small churches: the Communist Parliament\(^{10}\) accepted them as equal with other churches by invalidating the categorization of religions established in 1895\(^{11}\). As a consequence, however, the Alliance of Free Churches lost its independence\(^{12}\), and was subjected the same state control experienced by the larger churches. The only 'difference' was that these churches were not forced to sign any agreement.

Strangely enough, the darkest Stalinist years created probably the most exotic and puzzling Hungarian religious institution, the "Buddhist Mission". Hungarian intellectual interest in Buddhism goes back at least to Alexander Kőrösi Csoma (1784 - 1842) who collected and edited the first English-Tibetan dictionary. In 1890 a Buddhist community was established in Nagybánya (today's Baia Mare in Rumania) which published two kätés (treatises) on Buddhism. The origin of the Buddhist Mission, however, seems to be entirely independent of such predecessors.

Ernő Hetényi, who became in 1953 the first president of the *Buddhist Mission Arya Maitrea Mandala Church*, was affiliated with the famous Department of Inner Asian Studies established by Lajos Ligeti in 1949 at the Lóránt Eötvös University. How could somebody assume leadership of a new religion approved by the Communist government\(^{13}\) in those years? There is no better apparent explanation than that which claims that the 'founder' of this cult was the leader of the Hungarian Communists, Mátyszás Rákosi himself, who wished to provide a striking example of religious tolerance.
and freedom. However, this in itself would not explain why only Buddhism was
favoured when, for example, a Muslim community might have been established with far
greater credibility\textsuperscript{14}. The most probable, and unfortunately the least testable, explanation
is that Rákosi’s Mongol wife influenced this bizarre creation\textsuperscript{15}.

There is little or no direct evidence that the churches contributed to the outbreak of the
uprising against Communism which began on October 23, 1956. However, according to
Pungur (n.d.), the meeting of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches in
the mountain resort of Galyatető in the summer of 1956, “somehow [sic] paved the way
toward the revolution” (n.d.: 91). In 1956, an underground Renewal Movement within
the Protestant churches issued a Hungarian \textit{Kairos}, a Statement of Faith, which was
circulated among the delegates at the Galyatető conference. The nature, context, and the
character of this statement were comparable to the first \textit{Kairos}\textsuperscript{16}, the famous Barmen
Declaration, drafted by Karl Barth against the Nazi regime in 1934.

During the 13 days of revolution, however, most of the church leaders were very
cautious. Bishop Ravasz of the Reformed Church, Bishop Ordass, reinstated as bishop of
the Lutheran Church, and Archbishop Grösz, reelected as President of the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference, broadcast radio messages in which they called upon people to be
sober, mature, calm, and to stay away from the street-fights.

Not so Cardinal Mindszenty who was liberated from prison on October 31 by a panzer
unit. He immediately resumed the leadership of the Catholic Church, suppressed the
Priests for Peace Movement, and suspended eleven of its leaders. In his radio speech on
November 3, Mindszenty made it clear that he wanted to continue from where he was
interrupted by his imprisonment. He demanded the restoration of private property, free elections on a multi-party basis, and the punishment of the Communists (Mindszenty 1974). The next day the revolution was crushed by Soviet troops, and Cardinal Mindszenty took refuge at the Embassy of the United States in Budapest, where he remained in internal exile for 15 years. At the same time, János Kádár became the leader of the new-old Communists17, and announced a radical break with the past.

Kádár’s regime was later characterized as “goulash-Communism” or the “happiest barrack in the camp”, but it began with a swift and cruel suppression of the revolution. The second wave of Communist terror after World War II involved not only the detention, imprisonment, and torture of ecclesiastics, but even their execution. However, both the state and the churches soon felt the need to ease the tension. On the one hand, the state abolished SOCA in December 1956, although it was to be reestablished three years later under a new leadership with a less intrusive policy. On the other hand, archbishop Grósz, as the leader of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference, organized a movement, called Opus Pacis, which was for all practical purposes the continuation of the Priests for Peace Movement, since the leaders of the two movements were practically identical. Similarly, the bishops of the Protestant churches who had resigned during, or shortly before, the revolution were reinstated.

A process of consolidation began, although it had a dual face18. While the persecution of religion continued until 1964, the possibility of compromise began to emerge.

Obviously, this rapprochement would mainly serve the interests of the church leaders who, by now, realized that Communism was likely to persist for an indefinite period of time. On the other hand, the Communists had come to the realization that religion would
not die out soon either. Once again, they realized their need for the collaboration and endorsement of the churches, and the leaders of the historical churches were ready, though in different degrees, to offer their support. While Bishop Bartha of the Reformed Church developed the "Theology of Service"\textsuperscript{19}, the Lutheran Bishop Zoltán Káldy invented the "Theology of Diaconia". The practical consequence of both these "theologies" was the same: siding with the Communists. The Communists, in their turn, allowed the "propagation of these theologies"\textsuperscript{20}, and made sure that the severe Western criticism of these ideologies\textsuperscript{21} remained practically unheard in Hungary.

For the Catholic Church, however, such accommodation was not so simple. The highly centralized transnational organization of the Catholic Church, with its leadership in the Vatican, remained the main obstacle in the creation of a local, national Catholic Church, similar to a Russian State-Orthodox type of organization, or the Communist-created National Church in China. The necessity of negotiating with the Vatican presented the Hungarian Communists with a major problem. They were not sure whether Moscow would approve their initiatives because Moscow alone had the right to negotiate with the Vatican. They also had the disadvantage of being untrained in diplomacy\textsuperscript{22}. Therefore, they welcomed both John XXIII's opening to the East, and Paul VI's special emissary, Archbishop Agostino Casaroli who started negotiations to improve the relationship between the Holy See and Hungary.

In 1964, the Janus-face of the Kádár regime was clearly exhibited. While negotiations with the Vatican were well advanced, the last wave of terror against religion was unleashed. Several priests were accused of "having orchestrated" a conspiracy against the people's democracy by educating youth in their homes. Proving their charges, the
Communists even displayed the confiscated typewriters of the priests. Fortunately, however, 1964 proved to be the final year of systematic Communist religious oppression.

**The Reevaluation of Religion**

The negotiations between the Vatican and Hungary resulted in a so-called partial agreement, signed on September 15, 1964. As a consequence, new Catholic bishops were appointed and a section of the Pontifical Hungarian Institute in Rome was returned from state possession to the jurisdiction of the Bishops' Conference. In an attached protocol, the remaining unresolved problems and delicate issues were listed. Apart from the case of detained or suspended monks and priests, the status of Cardinal Mindszenty was probably the most sensitive question.

The agreement caused considerable confusion not only among priests and laity but also among Communists. Those priests who participated actively in the *Opus Pacis*, and its forerunner, the Priests for Peace Movement, welcomed the occasion with satisfaction and a sense of justification. The majority of priests, who were unable to reconcile their Christian conviction with Marxism felt discredited and even betrayed. At the same time, some Communists, who still retained a certain degree of religiosity, felt that the agreement achieved peace between the Hungarian state and the Catholic Church, allowing the fulfillment of religious obligations and religious education. Hard-liners,
however, promptly indicated that such assumptions were erroneous. In a statement intended for the Hungarian Bishops' Conference, SOCA declared that "the agreement did not signify the beginning of a new era but rather a sanctioning of both what already exists and its continued existence in the future". In summary, the nomination of new bishops and the return of the Pontifical Hungarian Institute were matters for negotiation; but opportunities for pastoral care of the laity remained restricted and unimproved. Given that it seemed likely to cause so much uncertainty on both sides, why did the Vatican and the Hungarian government sign the document?

In the case of the Vatican, the answer lies in its "pastorally motivated policy". According to Catholic teaching, the dispensation of sacraments necessary for salvation is reserved for priests who can be ordained only by bishops. Consequently, "without bishops no priests, without priests no sacraments, without them no eternal salvation. The installation of bishops is therefore 'indispensable for the survival of the church, at least in the long run'". The nomination of five new bishops resulting from the agreement reduced the average age of the Hungarian bishops from 68 to 65. Furthermore, the promotion of Bishop Hamvas to the archbishopric of Kalocsa meant the replacement of the "former vicar capitular Imre Várkonyi, one of the leading figures in the Priests for Peace Movement". Obviously, the Vatican, along with the Hungarian government and the United States, wanted to solve the "Mindszenty question", but this issue was dropped from the negotiations probably because of its political complexity.

Apart from a wish to resolve the "Mindszenty question", and the desire for the cooperation and compliance of the biggest church of the country, the Hungarian state's willingness to negotiate might be explained by the key slogan of the decade: "national
Kádár’s famous twisting of a biblical phrase at the end of 1961 resulted in the party slogan “he who is not against us is with us”. The Communists had already realized that religious life was not simply a dying anachronism. They also sensed that religion might have a certain positive role in the establishment of the national consensus, and consequently, its potential disappearance was even looked upon with regret. Thus, the agreement signified that the Catholic Church and the Hungarian Communists realized that they were “historically dependent” on each other (Andras-Morel 1983b, Tomka 1976).

This interdependence, needless to say, existed in a situation of unbalanced power in which the Hungarian Communists had the upper hand. It is also understandable that the Communists’ negotiations with the Vatican were not welcomed by everyone in the Communist Bloc. Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria criticized the agreement of 1964 while Moscow showed cautious interest in the Hungarians’ endeavor. Evidently, the agreement between the Vatican and the Hungarian People’s Republic was an experiment, although more for the Communists than the Catholic Church. Imre Miklós, the head of SOCA, even published an article in the Soviet Nauka i Religia journal summarizing why the negotiations with the Vatican were worthwhile.

Kádár’s ‘liberal’ Communism achieved a certain level of political and economic stabilization in the 1960s and 1970s, but signs of moral and economic difficulty were also becoming apparent. The Communists’ aim was complete control over the socialization of youth, but they failed in the formation of what they called the “socialist new man”. The three main features of such a person would have been a positive attitude toward work, both mental and physical, the ability and willingness to replace old ethical value
systems with new socialist categories, and the manifestation of socialist internationalism which, for all practical purposes, meant the unconditional acceptance of the Soviet Union's leadership.

In sharp contrast to these expectations, Hungarian youth showed an almost exclusive interest in white-collar jobs, even low-paid jobs, and while a prerequisite of socialist internationalism, the disappearance of national pride, seemed to be well advanced, there was no supporting evidence for a positive attitude toward the Soviet Union among the country's youth. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, it became also apparent that only a minority of Hungarian youth embraced Marxist values as guidelines in their daily lives while the majority did not even know about the existence of Marxist ethics. Czákó (1973) aptly summarized the situation when he stated that Hungarians "fall to the floor between two chairs", because the fight against Christian ideology had started earlier than the introduction of, and consequently, the possibility of, internalizing socialist ethics. The official political reevaluation of religion went so far that in 1977, Imre Miklós saw a chance for the faithful to take a stand on public issues, not only by presenting their own religious views, but also "through constructive criticism, to aid in the success of the efforts directed toward national progress". The failure to create the "socialist new man", which resulted in the disorientation of the youth and the reevaluation of religion, and the fact that Kádár's regime 'rested' on the presence of the Red Army, explain why a Soviet type of civil religion did not develop in Hungary. In this form of civil religion, a superficially secular nationalism, state and civil religion were linked, but differentiated from specific religions, which in turn, were completely privatized. Hungarians, especially the youth, were most uninclined to 'worship' the
Commdsttat te^\textsuperscript{42}. Although Hungarian Communists, following the Soviet example, enforced the personal cult of Rákosi during his rule, it did not have a deep and long-lasting effect on Hungarian society\textsuperscript{43}.

Imre Miklós, who assumed the leadership of SOCA in 1971, was essentially adapting to a new political reality. SOCA received its directives from the government and the Communist Party’s “Department for Propagation and Persuasion”, the party’s ideological mouthpiece, although the influence of the government was negligible in the 1960s. Imre Miklós held the position of “state secretary” but was not allowed to attend the sessions of the cabinet. Nevertheless, his nomination to the presidency of SOCA coincided with the beginning of a new era in Hungarian church-state relationships.

In 1971, after fifteen years of internal exile, Cardinal Mindszenty finally left the American embassy, to the relief of all concerned parties, and settled in Vienna. His departure allowed improvement of both Hungarian-Vatican and Hungarian-American relations. He refused to resign, so Pope Paul VI had to remove him as archbishop of Esztergom and Prince Primate of Hungary\textsuperscript{44} on February 5, 1974. His successor, László Lékai, became Miklós’ ecclesiastical counterpart. These two persons established such a close and productive working relationship (under the watchful eyes of the Party and the Vatican) that it was later considered by political analysts to be one of the two principal successes of the Vatican’s Ostpolitik\textsuperscript{45}. As a result, the Hungarian Catholic Church was enabled to expand its religious instruction of youth, to begin extension courses in theology for the laity, and to establish a retreat center. The Hungarian Bishops’ Conference reciprocated by supporting and endorsing government policy, for example, by seeking the return of St. Stephen’s Crown, the visible symbol of political legitimacy,
from the United States. The bishops also bore the responsibility of silencing ecclesiastical dissidents, among whom Fr. Bulányi was the best known.

The membership of Fr. Bulányi’s “Bokor” (Bush) movement, established in 1945 in anticipation of the Communist persecution of organized faith, never reached above 3,000 people. However, the Communists were afraid of it for at least two reasons. The members of the base communities of Bokor criticized the co-opted Catholic hierarchy, especially after the agreement of 1964, and, furthermore, they advocated conscientious objection and avoidance of military service. Although refusal of military service remained an isolated phenomenon in Hungarian society, the Communists probably feared its increase as the precursor of an advancing democratization process. In 1975, Hungary signed the Helsinki Accord, guaranteeing basic human rights, including the right to alternative military service. At the same time, Hungary had, in relative terms, the smallest younger generation and the greatest number of single child families in the world, portending future manpower shortages and other socioeconomic problems. As a consequence of the failure to form the “new socialist man”, a large stratum of the Hungarian youth were uncertain about their attitude toward the competing worldviews of Marxism and Christianity. From 1978 on, however, a growing interest in religion was observable in Hungarian society, especially among urban, educated youth (Tomka 1995a).

The Communists were in a delicate situation. While, as we have seen, they needed the active support of religious people in order to establish national consensus, and to “build Socialism”, when youth turned toward religion, they were likely to criticize their collaborating church-leaders and boycott military service. Furthermore, the Communist
government had tied its hands by signing internationally binding documents guaranteeing religious rights\textsuperscript{51}.

The easiest solution for the Communists was to delegate the problem to church-leaders by urging them to discipline their subjects. Thus, Cardinal Lékai, with the help of SOCA\textsuperscript{52}, tried to discredit Fr. Bulányi and his movement on theological grounds\textsuperscript{53}. Although Pope John Paul II invited Fr. Bulányi and his followers to submit to the guidance of the local bishops if they wanted to be a genuine base community, an unequivocal condemnation never came from Rome. Nevertheless, in 1983 the Hungarian Bishops’ Conference suspended Fr. Bulányi from his right to celebrate mass publicly, and eight priests associated with him were removed from their parishes.

In a notorious case, the leader of the Hungarian Orthodox Church attempted to solve his problem with a ‘dissident’ priest, whose ‘monstrous’ sin was his desire to become a monk, by following the pattern established in Fr. Bulányi’s case\textsuperscript{54}. In spite of all the repressive measures, dissident movements also occurred in other churches. For example, in 1974, the Evangelical Brethren split from the Methodists, while the Christian Advent Community separated from the Seventh Day Adventists in 1975, due to dissatisfaction with the political stance of original denominations.

On the surface, however, the relationship between the churches and the government was good, and became even better. Due to its loyalty to the state and the need to respond to growing moral and economic problems, the Catholic Church, for instance, received more and more small favors. However, it was a schizophrenic situation for both state and church. Although the Society of Jesus, the Jesuit Order, for instance, was officially
banned, several Jesuit priests were allowed to receive special education in Rome and, upon their return, to run a retreat house. When Cardinal Lékai was asked how he would explain this situation his reply was characteristic of the era: “This is like Hungarian grammar. Writing is different from speaking”\textsuperscript{55}. In a similar vein, when it became clear that the social and health care system of the country was inadequate, the restoration of traditional orders of medical sisters\textsuperscript{56} was deemed unacceptable, but the foundation of a new order presented no problem. Only insiders knew that the new order, the Society of Hungary’s Patroness, was financially supported by the Sisters of the Sacred Heart\textsuperscript{57}, and indeed, most of the members of the former were recruited from the latter. Furthermore, religious education, confined in the 1960s to schools, was allowed to take place also in the churches, and later even in parish rectories on the condition that SOCA might supervise it. But according to Mr. Miklós, the office did not enforce its right. Another example of this policy was that the leaders of religious orders, whose headquarters were in Rome, were not formally able to carry out their regular supervisory visits as prescribed by ecclesiastical law, but when the declared purpose of their travel was simply a “friendly visit” they were welcome. Similarly, when the Hare Krishna movement launched its Hungarian mission in the late 1980s, the only constraint upon their leader was the requirement that he wear a wig on his shaved head during his stay in the country\textsuperscript{58}. Finally, Hungarian soldiers who wanted to attend religious service had to exchange their uniforms for civilian dress\textsuperscript{59}.

The ideological heritage and the restrictions of the 1950s and 1960s proved burdensome even for the Communists, so that following Gorbachev’s announcement of \textit{glasnost} and \textit{perestroika} in the Soviet Union hints of fundamental change immediately began to
materialize in Hungary as well. In the following analysis, the chief foci of attention will be on the role of religion in Hungarian society's transition to post-Communism, and on the extent to which the peculiar character of church-state relationships shaped this transition. The significance of the latter is examined in terms of the conceptual model of church-state relationships in the totalitarian societies of Central Europe presented by Gautier (1998). Although two other models, more precisely theoretical considerations, will also be discussed, Gautier's model deserves special attention because it singles out Hungarian church-state relationships as a unique manifestation of her theory.

Gautier's Conceptual Model

In a recent article, Mary L. Gautier examines the church-state relationships of "East Germany, Poland and Hungary to demonstrate how church elites influenced the development or retardation of civil society during the years of Soviet domination" (1998: 290). Following Tocqueville's analysis, she argues that religion has an effect on democratic societies on several levels. First, the church, as an institution of civil society, "has a direct influence through the generalized support of the regime by the religious elite - the clergy" (1998: 292). Second, the churches influence the "political order indirectly through the religious values shared and promoted by individual religious believers acting in society" (ibid). Finally, religion also has an influence on the intellect "by setting ground rules which confine intellectual debate within parameters of moderation and reason" (1998: 293). The first influence works on the institutional level whereas the
other two have effects on the individual level. By analyzing the aforementioned three Central European societies, Gautier then argues that “church support for democratic reforms emerged where the separation of roles between church elites and state elites was sufficiently well-defined to allow for the gradual restoration of civil society by the church – at both the institutional and individual level” (1998: 293). Based on these considerations, she proposes her conceptual model. In Communist societies, like East Germany and Poland, where church elites were excluded by state elites from legitimate participation in the state,

the churches worked actively to re-create and extend civil society in opposition to the regime ... But in Communist societies in which church elites maintained a legitimate official role in society (such as Hungary), either through cooperation with state elites or through co-optation by state elites, church elites became popularly identified with the state and were therefore not identified as potential leaders by democratic reform movements61.

My intention is to correct Gautier’s model by indicating and analyzing the consequences of the fact that the elite of a church is rarely, if ever, the entire clergy. At least in the Hungarian case, but most probably in all other Communist countries, the clergy was divided. As we have seen, the Catholic Priests for Peace Movement was an institution designed to create confrontation between the lower clergy and the hierarchy62, the latter constituting an undoubted ecclesiastical elite. While Gautier is right in suggesting that the governmental involvement of a church elite – meaning the hierarchy – in a Communist society made this elite’s leadership in the recreation of civil society unlikely, it does not mean that the church, or churches, could not and did not contribute to this reconstruction. I intend to support my claim not only by providing a deeper analysis of the Hungarian events, but also by a comparison with Romania63 where the ‘active
involvement of the church-elite's in the regime was apparently a necessary condition for the role of the church in the democratization process. Furthermore, before embarking on a detailed analysis of the Hungarian and Rumanian transitions, I discuss two other theories in connection with the possible or actual role of religion in the Central European transitions. Finally, a brief overview of the different approaches of the Communists toward religion also seems necessary. It is suggested that both these theories and comparisons provide a useful corrective to Gautier's model by highlighting the complexity of the problem under investigation and contrasting this complexity with Gautier's reductionism.

Alternative Theories

The core of Gautier's model is basically an application of one of the necessary conditions for the use of religion in revolutions, as presented by Robinson (1987). For Robinson, a preponderantly religious world view among revolutionary classes, a theology at variance with the existing social order, and a clergy closely associated with revolutionary classes "are each necessary, and together they constitute a sufficient condition to insure that religion will, to some degree, be used as a revolutionary tool" (1987: 53). Furthermore, Robinson examines three other variables: whether the revolutionary classes are united in a single religion, whether their religion is different from that of the dominant classes, and whether alternative organizational structures are lacking. These variables, however, are "neither necessary nor sufficient, but if present they increase the degree to which religion
will be used in the revolution” (ibid.). Gautier’s conceptual model is in practice an
application of Robinson’s third variable, the association of the clergy with the class
promoting reforms. Obviously, there are different degrees of association between the
clergy and the people who want changes. Robinson mentions contemporary Latin
American Catholic leaders and parish priests in contact with the poor or the Iranian
clergymen living a simple life among the poor as examples of close association. The pre-
Castro Cuban Catholic Church, on the other hand, represents the other extreme where
more than half of the agricultural workers claimed never to have seen a priest before and
during the revolution and only 7.8 percent admitted having any dealings with a priest.67
Anticipating Gautier’s conceptual model, Robinson notes that the Cuban “clergy allied
itself with the Batista regime, and the Church came to be seen by the masses as a major
bulwark of the status quo” (1978: 58). The Cuban example, however, highlights the
weakness of Gautier’s model. Whereas in Cuba, as in the rest of Latin America up to the
1960s, the hierarchy and practically the entire clergy dissociated itself from the lower
classes and the strata promoting revolution, we have already seen that the Hungarian
clergy was divided. Is it possible, we must then ask, that religious communities, without
the active involvement of the hierarchy, may facilitate and support deep social changes?
In Tomka’s (1991b) view, the answer is in the affirmative.

Miklós Tomka (1991b) examines the role of religion in the transition to post-
Communism in Central Europe, notably in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
Analyzing the applicability of the theory of secularization, he concludes that “it is quite
unjustified to talk of secularization in these countries.”68 In a short historical overview,
Tomka points out that in a supreme irony, religiosity increased in the early Communist
years because people “used religion and the church as the background for their dissent and autonomous community relationships” (1991b: 95). For Tomka, this is clearly antisecularization. The era following the Communist seizure of power, when the resistance of society was broken by sheer force, “has nothing to do with secularization either, since it is not marked by institutional differentiation but by disintegration” (1991b: 96). As Tomka explains, religion was not “displaced by other emancipating subsystems taking over its previous sphere of competence, … [rather] all autonomous social systems of values, morality and ways [were] shaken” (1991b: 96). Having abolished private property, the Communists established a comprehensive social security system but with such low efficiency that it could demand neither social legitimacy nor meet reasonable expectations. Because the very subsistence of Hungarians was often in doubt, stealing from the state became a routine and socially ‘acceptable’ practice. Later, the destruction of intermediate organizations between individuals and the state and preventive measures against their reestablishment created an atomized ‘society’ where the individual might or might not have personal morals but the development of genuine social values was impossible. For Tomka, this stage was the “genesis of anomie”; and the whole “Communist system that prevailed in Central Europe might be regarded as the institutionalization of anomie” (1991b: 96). However, a third phase, the regeneration of the society, began in the 1970s when, as we have seen, the youth, being dissatisfied with the prevailing anomie and searching for order, turned to religion in increasing numbers. According to Tomka, they did so because the “religious communities continued to provide the counter-pole to anomie, and formed the basis of social reconstruction – long before any kind of political opposition group” (1991b: 97). Tomka notes that the
regeneration of society was a complex procedure in which the existence and work of religious communities represented a powerful element, but, as he adds, one of the first consequences of such regeneration was religious revival. In other words, social reconstruction and religious revival reinforced each other. Another consequence was the renaissance of public life which led to the decentralization of the Communist system, the “strengthening of ideological tolerance and a certain degree of pluralism … It should be repeated, however, that in the whole process religion is more a cause than an effect” (1991b: 97). Thus, in contrast with Gautier, Tomka asserts that religious communities, even in Hungary, played a crucial role in the formation of civil society. While Tomka does not provide any documentary evidence71 our analysis will suggest that Hungarian events – and in their own way Rumanian events – support his theory. First, however, we must turn our attention to different approaches of the Communists to religion.

Comparison of Church-State Relationships in Communist Countries

For the most part, sociologists of religion have not paid much attention to the different approaches of specific Communist countries toward the control of religion. Regardless of national context, they have tended to treat the Socialist camp as more or less monolithic. Only David Martin (1978) provided a comprehensive analysis of the religious life of several Communist nations under the category of “secular monopoly”72. This overall treatment has a certain justification73, but the investigation of differences as well as similarities also has considerable merit. Apart from providing insights into the
different roles that religion played in the transition to post-Communism it helps explain the different positions religion and its institutions have occupied in specific national contexts since the fall of Communism.

Based on the works of political analysts and concerned theologians, three ‘subcategories’ can be distinguished within the Communists’ approach toward religion: (a) an outright assault on religion, (b) containment of religion through administrative measures, and (c) coexistence and limited accommodation. As we shall see, all of the Communist countries began with an outright assault, but only a few ‘reached’ the third type. The Eastern and Central European countries under Soviet occupation shared several historical, cultural, and religious similarities. Most of these nations had suffered many centuries of foreign domination, and consequently, only a few had experience of religious or political freedom. With the exception of East Germany and Albania, the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches were dominant in these countries, and often closely aligned with the state. Not surprisingly, nationalism and religion were closely linked. Apart from the fundamentally hostile attitude of Marxism-Leninism toward religion in countries under Soviet rule, these similarities also contributed to the outright assault on religion, which began in each country in 1948. The details of this assault in the Hungarian context have been presented earlier in our discussion.

Most of the Communist countries changed their approach toward religion in the 1960s, but Albania continued and even increased its intolerance toward religion. In 1967, Albania became the first country to constitutionally mandate the suppression of all religious beliefs and practices. From 1979 on, any religious activity was punishable by imprisonment without trial. While the complete prohibition of all religious activities
remained characteristic only of Albania, in some other countries, entire denominations were banned, such as the Eastern Catholic Church in Rumania and the Ukraine, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. This approach also included the confiscation of church property, and the murder, imprisonment or exile of ecclesiastics and lay leaders. Persistent atheistic indoctrination, anti-religious propaganda and active discrimination in education and employment against believers enhanced these measures.

The total prohibition of religion in Albania had a tremendously important consequence for the possibilities for religious institutions in the process of transition from Communism. Unlike in most other Communist countries, notably in Poland, East Germany, Rumania, and Hungary, the 2,200 closed Albanian mosques, churches, and other religious buildings simply could not provide meeting places for the emerging opposition. The banning of the Eastern Catholic Church in several countries also had a severe impact on its post-Communist situation. The churches of the Eastern Catholics had been commandeered practically everywhere by Orthodox congregations who were reluctant to return the buildings to their original owners after the fall of Communism. The prolonged legal procedures, which ensued, hindered the revival of the Eastern Catholics both in Rumania and the Ukraine.

The general religious policy of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, the most typical strategy in the Soviet bloc, was containment through administrative measures. Although hard-liners in the Communist parties wanted to eliminate religion ruthlessly and instantly, pragmatists pointed out that since religion was a deeply rooted historical, cultural, social, and political force it must be tolerated
temporarily, but within firmly defined boundaries. This policy included the
governmental registration of all religious groups, the prohibition of religious education in
schools and at home, and the banning of charitable activities, and most or all religious
publications, as well as religious orders and parish associations. The few allowable
religious activities were subverted through state control or co-optation. Those who
opposed these strict measures were deemed to be “anti-state”, fined, imprisoned, harassed
and beaten. As with the first approach, these controls were reinforced by intensive
atheistic and anti-religious propaganda and by discrimination against believers.

The most dramatic consequences of strict and detailed regulations will be seen shortly in
the discussion of the Rumanian revolution. A less climactic, but equally significant
outgrowth of this policy for containing religious activities was the inability of the church
leaders appointed during the Communist era to assume genuine leadership positions after
the fall of Communism. They were accustomed to following the orders of the Party
rather than leading their flock.

Policies toward religion and the churches in the German Democratic Republic, Poland,
and Yugoslavia exemplified the third model characterized by coexistence and limited
accommodation. The distinctive feature of this model was that religion was viewed as
having a potentially positive role in the establishment of national interests.
Consequently, religious organizations were relatively free to manage their internal life,
and they also had a certain degree of freedom in forming religious associations and
engaging in public expressions of faith. Thus, religious orders and charitable
organizations were allowed to function, bishops and other ecclesiastical dignitaries were
chosen and seminaries were run without significant state control. In a similar vein, large
scale religious gatherings and church-run secondary schools were allowed to function. In Poland, even a church-controlled university was allowed to operate. Contacts with co-religionists abroad were also authorized. Yet the churches still experienced certain restrictions, for example the prohibition of church-affiliated parish schools, government imposed limits on printing materials, and a ban on religious broadcasting. Atheistic propaganda and discrimination against believers also furthered these restrictive measures. A well-known outcome of this policy was the significant role of the Catholic Church in the establishment of the Polish Solidarity movement. The strong position of the church, however, determined its somewhat intransigent attitude not only under the Communist regime but also in various political and cultural confrontations of the post-Communist era.  

Although Communist governments used a combination of these approaches, specific regimes tended broadly to exemplify one or other of these models. The only exception was Hungary. Following the American bishops, Hungary’s approach may be considered a hybrid of the second and third models. The Hungarian situation differed from the second model in that a limited number of Catholic religious orders were permitted to operate eight secondary schools, episcopal sees were subject to less rigid state interference, and religious programs were broadcast on state radio every Sunday. At the same time, Hungary suffered from more severe restrictions on religious instruction than was typically the case in countries approximating the third model. What were the consequences of these differences in the separate transitions of Hungary and Rumania?
In contrast to the euphoric German events, the Czechoslovakian “velvet revolution”, or the bloody Rumanian experience, the Hungarian transformation was a “quiet revolution”. As one reporter said, it just happened. It was indeed quiet because Hungary’s revolution was spearheaded by the so-called Reform Communists, led by Imre Pozsgai. When he was asked why the Communist Party started not only to negotiate with the emerging opposition, but also to take active steps towards the transformation to post-Communism, he explained: “Because there is no other way. Old style Communist principles have led to a dead-end in Eastern Europe wherever they were tried. Now the main difficulty of the democratic transition is a peaceful dismantling of the old structures of the party-state”.

The emphasis on a peaceful transformation was not accidental. The greatest anti-Communist uprising, and following it, the bloodiest repression, occurred in Hungary in 1956. Hungarians had no wish to relive such an experience. However, in 1989, the Soviet Communist leadership, struggling with inner reforms, had neither the ability nor the intention to intervene. Another reason for its peaceful transition was Hungary’s relative wealth within the Communist bloc. Kádár’s “goulash Communism” resulted not only in a failure to create the “Socialist new man”, but also in an openness toward Western political and economic ideas and practices. Hungarians probably had the greatest opportunity of any citizens of Soviet satellite states to travel to Western countries, and many became well-trained in entrepreneurial and business activities. The
Communist cadres were probably in the best position to send their children to Western universities where they learned business-related subjects instead of humanities. Neither the Hungarian people nor the Communists wanted to risk this relative wealth.

Thus, we can understand why the Party started to loosen its grip on society. Kádár was replaced as the first secretary of the Communist Party in May 1988 by Károly Grósz who was then demoted in June 1989. The Central Committee of the Party established a "collective quartet of leadership", which, under the leadership of Grósz, promised to continue the spirit of reform. The emerging opposition seized the opportunity and presented its demand for a freely elected parliament whose first task would be the creation of a new constitution. The Communists agreed in the hope, as Pozsgay put it, that they would have a leadership role in the transitory process and also in the new government. It might be added, in a cynical tone, that the Party's dramatically shrinking membership left the Communists no other choice.

Meanwhile, thousands of East German tourists began to shape history not only in Hungary, but also in the divided Germany. During the summer of 1989 six thousand East Germans had already managed to escape from Hungary to Austria under the willfully averted eyes of the Hungarian border-guards. Another three thousand "Ossies" declared their refusal to return to East Germany putting the Hungarian government in a delicate diplomatic situation. The Hungarian Communists finally took the bold step of allowing the East Germans to travel to West Germany, thereby reinforcing their reformist and democratic attitude. At its last Congress, held in October 1989, the Communist Party gave itself a new name and condemned the 1956 Soviet invasion. The Workers Militia,
the Party’s private army, was also disbanded. A date was set for the first free elections since 1945, and the opposition parties were legalized.

The groundbreaking role of religion, as proposed by Tomka’s (1991b) theory, can be detected most clearly in the formation of the opposition. Szandor Lezsák, a prominent member of the political opposition, explained how the germs of social solidarity, in Tomka’s words, the “counter-pole to anomie”, developed in religious groups.

Looking back, it seems incredible and ridiculous that we had to hide so many little things from those in power. ... But in the religious groups [on the parish level] there was an inner resistance, which unintentionally developed, strengthened and prepared communities for the transformation of the social system. In the parish groups there was a hidden public life. Grassroot connections existed in them, which encouraged and made possible the publication of religious samizdat literature or the organization of caritative actions.

The communities of the Catholic parishes or other denominational institutions might appear to have resembled the Latin American “Liberation Theology” and “base communities” (CEBs). However, as Pungur notes, there was a big difference. While the Latin American movements viewed Marxism as a vehicle of change, the Eastern Europeans wanted to change, or even destroy, the systems, which ruled in the name of Marxism. A better “common denominator” of the Latin American and Eastern European “base communities” was perhaps the trust and resulting solidarity necessary for any effort to implement social change.

As Lezsák mentioned, the original intention of these groups was simply to transform their local community, not the whole society. But these groups also collected and nurtured those who became the transformers of the whole system. Intellectual circles and religious-social organizations were developed, such as the Áron Márton Publishing
House, named after the legendary Transylvanian bishop who was imprisoned by the Romanian Communists, the Association of Large Families where ninety percent of the membership was Christian, and the Association of Retired Persons. These new organizations found protection and legalization through Imre Pozsgay. After a career in the provincial Party organization, he became the minister of culture, but was demoted in 1982 to head the Patriotic Front, a small, meaningless Communist-controlled umbrella organization. His political maneuvering as the head of the Patriotic Front made it possible for him to gain control over various associations and organizations, which had previously fallen under the jurisdiction of different ministries, and ultimately the Communist Party. These intermediary organizations, which emerged from and were nurtured by religious groups, finally received protection from a reform Communist, and became the seed-bed of political opposition.

In September 1987, the first political formation emerged from this seed-bed: the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). Sándor Lezsák organized a meeting of 170 people in Lakitelek in his own courtyard under a huge military tent. Other meetings were also planned at other locations, but Lakitelek became well known as the ‘alma mater’ of the opposition. Having seen the success of the first ‘Lakitelek tent meeting’, Lezsák organized other meetings in the next year.

In September 1988, and the following weeks until October 22, the tent was there [in the courtyard] every weekend; and the opposition circles of the country’s different regions were invited there. ... On September 3, 1988, and the following few days alone arrived 1,000 - 1,200 people. I had to live with the danger that among them were informers, provokers and even careerists who wanted to repaint their resumes; and the churches helped me here a lot. ... When I was asked to 'bless' a new local organization of the MDF, I asked the local pastor’s or minister’s opinion whether the organizers and leaders-to-be were reliable persons. Most probably we could
empirically prove that where I received a priest’s opinion we established a good local organization of the MDF.

According to Lezsák the MDF was also the first political force of the country which “practised” a multi-party system. It was the MDF, which hosted several members of the other opposition parties, such as the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), and the Smallholders’ Party, which emerged later. It must also be mentioned, to acknowledge Gautier’s depiction of the hierarchy of the Hungarian churches, that the ecclesiastical leadership both in the Catholic and the Reformed Churches kept its distance from these manifestations of political opposition. It was a breakthrough when in 1988 archbishop Dankó, in a radio broadcast, expressed his support for those seminarians who studied the life of Cardinal Mindszenty. It was only in April 1989 that the Catholic hierarchy convened the leaders of the banned religious orders and asked them to start reorganizing themselves. Although the 34/1950 law, which banned the orders in Hungary, was still formally in effect, the Communists promised that they would not hinder their revival. The government of that time argued that the question of religious orders was strictly an internal affair of the church, and according to the recently enacted law of assembly, the orders had the right to reorganize themselves.

The reticent behavior of some of the Catholic leaders with regard to political opposition received a post facto justification when the local organizations of the KDNP ordered parish priests to collect the necessary amount of “recommending notes” from the population. These notes were the prerequisites for any party to participate in an election. The priests “obeyed”, and collected an enormous number of notes from which the KDNP erroneously concluded that they had a great deal of support from the population. They were astonished subsequently when they barely received the minimum five percent of the
vote, which was required to become a parliamentary party. Other parties also wanted to exploit the churches, and ordered ecumenical services at their campaign meetings. In a rare common communiqué, the leaders of the historical churches, in turn, ordered their priests and ministers to reject such requests and to stay away from religious services organized by political parties

In general, the Reformed Church was more politically active. However, a tiny but powerful group within the leadership was extremely loyal to the Communists, and thus opposed any changes. Consequently, anti-Communist members of the Reformed Church had to fight on two fronts: within the Church against their own hierarchy, and on the political level supporting the opposition.

On the political front, the Renewal Movement [of the Reformed Church] contributed something special to a rather chaotic election campaign... In those decisive times the Movement published its 'Ten Theses' on how the campaign should be run from an evangelical point of view. The publication was inspirational and served as a spiritual guidebook to the democratic elections — and proved to be influential

In fact, seven ministers of the Reformed Church, mostly members of the MDF, were elected as representatives in the new parliament

The elections took place on March 25, 1990. The Hungarian Democratic Forum won 43 percent of the vote, and the Free Democrats, a liberal party, came in second with 24 percent. The hope of the Reformed Communists for a major role in the new government was obliterated as they received less than eight percent of the vote. József Antall, the head of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, declared that he wanted to be the Prime Minister of fifteen million Hungarians. His words were undoubtedly influenced by the Rumanian events at the end of 1989.

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The Churches and the Rumanian Revolution

Rumania's social circumstances, including church-state relations, were significantly different from the Hungarian situation from the late 1960s onward. Unlike in Hungary and other Communist countries, no de-Stalinization process ever occurred in Rumania. Thus, Nikolai Ceausescu, the General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party, captivated by Hitler's "charisma" and vision of *ein Volk, ein Vaterland, ein Führer*, believing unquestionably in Stalinism, and unchecked by others, became an Orwellian Big Brother.97

Ceausescu distanced himself and Rumania from the Soviet Union in 1968 by condemning the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. This action won him not only the admiration but also the financial support of Western nations. Rumanians experienced a certain, although very limited, rise in their level of comfort. The relative wealth of the people and the approval of Western nations strengthened Ceausescu's position and, unfortunately, his belief that without him none of this would have happened. Since the second half of the 1970s, he gradually became the "light of the epoch", the "Genius of the Carpathians", and the "saviour of the nation" in an era which he modestly called the "Golden Age" of Rumania. However, in Ceausescu's "golden age", food and fuel were rationed; and cooking was possible only at night, as there was no gas during the day. Newspapers, radio, and television broadcasts were heavily censored. While the factories
lacked raw materials, energy supplies, and markets for their products, employees were forced to work on Sundays.

The engine of Ceausescu's dictatorship and the explanation for its longevity was the feared Securitate, which effectively suppressed all sources of independent social life. The organizers of street demonstrations and strikes vanished, as did outspoken critics. "A thorough and all pervasive police terror thwarted any attempt to launch democratic movements. ... There was no institution that could ensure a nonviolent transition from this dictatorship to a softer version of communism. A full-scale revolution was necessary to change the system.

Under the terror of the regime and the mistrust created by the omnipresence of the Securitate it was not easy to organize and to begin a revolution. By analyzing the events of the revolution, some political observers noted that experts in organizing mass demonstrations must have been present guiding the people. Regardless of whether foreign agents were waiting to support and guide the Rumanian events, the question remains: How did a terrified and atomized populace gather the courage to revolt? The underground opposition hoped that a Rumanian celebrity, the gymnast Nadia Comaneci, would trigger an uprising. She defected from Rumania and asked for political asylum in the United States. In one of her first interviews shortly after her escape, she said that the "Army is with us", which was intended to motivate the Rumanians. But the words of a privileged sport star in freedom and safety were not sufficient inspiration. In the underground opposition's next plan, churches became the location, and the upcoming religious festivities of Christmas and New Year, the occasions to start the uprising.
The events at Temesvár proved that these plans were well founded. They even occurred somewhat earlier due to the activity of László Tőkés.

László Tőkés was a minister of the Hungarian Reformed Church in Rumania. In 1986, he became assistant pastor of the Temesvár community, which consisted mainly of elderly women. For him, this post was an ecclesiastical exile. As he explained, “none of the services that were part of the normal life of Reformed Churches were held at all. There was no catechism, no confirmation class, and no Bible group”103. The main task of his superior, Pastor Peuker, a well-known informer for the Securitate, was to spy on him. After Peuker’s sudden death, Tőkés managed to reinvigate the congregation. Within two years, the membership doubled to 5,000, and the income of the congregation rose from 250,000 to 600,000 lei. Apart from Tőkés’ popularity among the youth, the Securitate’s biggest problem was that worshippers attended the services of the outspoken critic of the regime from all over Transylvania each Sunday. Apart from criticizing his own co-opted church-leaders, Tőkés also raised his voice against the demolition of the rural villages. The Securitate was also infuriated by an interview with Tőkés broadcast on Hungarian television and received also in Western Rumania. On August 20, 1989, his bishop ordered him to vacate his apartment by December 15 because he was relieved of his duties. Tőkés appealed the bishop’s decision, but meanwhile both he and an architect who was working on the restoration of the church building received threatening telephone calls. The architect refused to abandon the project, and his body was found in a park in September 1989. In November, four ‘thugs’ broke into Tőkés’ home, beat him, and cut his face with a knife. Since Tőkés’ appeal failed, he received a court eviction order at the beginning of December. At the next service, Tőkés explained to his congregation that his
eviction would be inevitable, but also illegal because the pastor’s apartment was considered to be the property of the local church and its members. He asked his congregation to “come next Friday and be witnesses of what will happen. Come, be peaceful, but be witnesses”\textsuperscript{104}.

On the morning of December 15th, about thirty members of the congregation, mostly elderly, gathered around Tőkés’ residence. However, by the end of the day Lajos Varga, a member of Tőkés’ congregation, observed that

the crowd numbered over a thousand; more Rumanians than Hungarians and many more than our own congregation. There were many Baptists ... with whom our church had close ties. I recognized a number from the Pentecostal Church; earlier in the week I’d mentioned to their leader, a colleague of mine at work, what was going to happen on Friday, and had asked him to urge his congregation to come and support us. And they had come. And many more besides\textsuperscript{105}.

Nothing happened on December 15th, but at three o’clock in the morning the following day, the \textit{Securitate} attacked the building, beat Tőkés, and took him and his wife to a distant village. “By the following day, masses of students and workers joined the pastor’s followers in the streets of [Temesvár]. ... In a matter of hours, rioting spread through the city”\textsuperscript{106}. The \textit{Securitate} confronted the demonstrators, and a three-day fight began, which resulted in the death of about seven thousand people. Ceausescu, in response to the Temesvár rioting, scheduled a demonstration of support for the regime on December 21st in Bucharest. This ended in a short, but bloody \textit{coup d’etat} and the execution of Ceausescu and his wife on Christmas Day.

Tomka’s description of institutionalized anomie in the Communist bloc was probably most applicable in Rumania. The forced hypocrisy of personality and social relations
created a climate in which an entire population was spiritually dying\textsuperscript{107}. Politicians, and even members of the \textit{Securitate}, realized that this situation must be changed, but institutionalized fear and distrust, in other words, lack of solidarity, paralyzed the country. We have seen that because of the extent of the tyranny, violent revolution appeared to offer the only means of changing the political situation. As we have also noted, the underground political opposition recognized that only religion could induce the degree of solidarity necessary for a successful uprising. It was, therefore, not accidental that religion, through Tökö’s personality, triggered the Rumanian revolution.

While it is important not to attribute more influence to this courageous Hungarian minister than is appropriate, it is worth investigating why, apart from his personal charisma, he and his congregation became the triggering instruments of the Rumanian revolution. The answer lies in the particular context of Rumanian church-state relations and in the minority status of the two million Hungarians living in Rumania. Under the Ceausescu regime, it was neither forgotten nor forgiven that Transylvania had once belonged to Hungary. Therefore, the oppressive measures taken against minorities in order to establish \textit{“ein Volk, ein Vaterland”}\textsuperscript{108} were administered most rigorously and cruelly against Hungarians, the largest minority in Rumania. This vigorous oppression, however, created a situation within the Hungarian community which Martin characterized as uniting \textit{“against something external”}\textsuperscript{109}. In such a situation, Martin and later Giorgi\textsuperscript{110} maintained, religion plays a crucial role in preserving and strengthening the national or ethnic identity. Religion created solidarity not only among the Hungarians\textsuperscript{111}, but in their case it was accentuated by their ethnic minority status.
The Roman Catholic Church in Rumania draws its membership mainly from the Hungarian minority. Since the Hungarian Catholics were the most resistant to Ceausescu's regime, we have to examine why the triggering event came from the Hungarian Reformed Church and not from the Catholic Church. Rumania's church-state relations under the Ceausescu regime remained on the level of the second model, discussed earlier: they were characterized by containment through administrative measures. While Rumania banned the Eastern Catholic Church whose membership was almost entirely Rumanian112 and strictly controlled the legally recognized denominations, the Roman Catholic Church with its overwhelmingly Hungarian membership was simply tolerated and unrecognized. This "toleration" meant more persecution in the 1950s and 1960s, but ironically, more freedom from the 1970s on.

The firm resistance to persecution of the Roman Catholic bishops, led by the legendary Bishop Áron Mártont113, raised the reputation and trustworthiness of the Catholic hierarchy not only among Catholics, but also among Protestants. Furthermore, Bishop Áron Mártont was despised, but also respected by the Securitate. When the secret police interrogated priests and tried to blackmail them, the priests would tell the officers that they would report everything to the bishop, forcing the Securitate to abandon their plans. The unity resulting from the Catholic priests' trust in their hierarchy was in sharp contrast to the division between the ministers and their leaders in the Protestant denominations. The legal recognition of non-Catholic churches as practised in Rumania's model of church-state relations (containment through administrative measures) caused the legitimization of increased state control over these organizations, including the
nomination of a manipulable hierarchy. This unquestionably served Ceausescu's interests by sowing divisions within the Protestant community.

Thus, the Catholic communities were harassed somewhat less than those of other denominations, and could even, to a certain extent, resist the state authorities without being condemned by their own hierarchy. This was not so in the case of Tökés and his congregation. Every religious group induced solidarity, but Tökés' congregation had the extra inducement of being a threatened minority group without the support of its own ecclesiastical leaders. Under these circumstances, Tökés' charismatic and rebellious personality was bound to provoke a reaction. Given the historical situation, this confrontation was also likely to trigger a social avalanche.

**Summary and Analysis**

In this chapter, we have attempted to trace the Hungarian Communists' changing attitude toward religion. Through the analysis of key historical events we have seen that, despite their attempt to establish a completely secular state, the Communists were forced to admit that they needed the assistance and support of the churches. We have also explained why a Soviet type of civil religion failed to develop in Hungary. Finally, the role of religion in the transition from Communism was examined.

The analysis of the role of religion in the transition enables us to comment on Regnerus and Smith's (1998) observation. As we have seen in the first chapter, they found
Casanova's (1994) first reason for religious organizations’ entry into the public realm – to protect not only their own freedom, but all other freedoms and rights – too vague and almost inapplicable to the study of modern religious movements. Unfortunately, they did not explain why this notion is too vague for investigation, although their assessment probably reflects the hardships they encountered in their own empirical investigation. The present socio-historical analysis demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, the churches do indeed care for human freedom and inspire struggle to establish these rights.

The foregoing analysis also enables us to correct Gautier’s (1998) claim that religious organizations were able to contribute to the reestablishment of civil society only where the ecclesiastical elites were not co-opted by the Communists. The churches, as we have seen, contributed actively and significantly to the restoration of civil society both in Hungary and Rumania despite – or in Tökés’ case as a consequence of – church elites’ involvement in these Communist regimes. This is not to say that Gautier’s model is completely misleading. As we have noted, in both the Hungarian and Rumanian cases, the co-optation of the hierarchy ipso facto excluded them from active participation in the reconstruction of civil society. However, as we have also seen in the case of the Catholic Church in Transylvania, resistance to the regime and thus exclusion from participation in the Communist state does not necessarily identify the church elite as potential leaders of democratic movements either – as Gautier’s model would suggest. Although the underground opposition in Rumania selected the churches as the ideal location, and the upcoming religious festivities of Christmas and New Year as the most appropriate occasions, for starting the uprising, they did not choose the Catholic Church or its hierarchy exclusively. Thus, the particular relationship between a certain church and the
state also has a significant impact on the subsequent involvement of the church – and not only its elite – in the process of transition.

How then should we correct Gautier’s conceptual model? She was unquestionably right in maintaining that through their official role in Communist society, church elites became identified with the state and thus forfeited a role as potential leaders of democratic reform movements. However, the church elites’ close association with the state elite did not necessarily mean that the churches, including the lower clergy and the faithful, could not and did not contribute significantly to the reconstruction of civil society in the Hungarian case. Had Gautier paid closer attention to the literature she reviewed she would have probably noticed that, in her analysis of Hungarian events, she focused only on one level where religion can influence politics. Describing only the institutional level, she ignored the individual level. However, as we have seen in Tocqueville’s observation, religion can influence politics on both the institutional and the individual levels. And this is precisely where Tomka’s theoretical account fits in. The emphasis on the formation of face-to-face relationships in religious communities and on the resulting communal and social life highlights the ability of religion to induce those social values and an accompanying sense of solidarity which are essential for the creation of civil society. Furthermore, reflecting on both the Hungarian and Rumanian events, we can safely reason that the capacity of religion – or at least of Christianity – to induce the values essential for social life remains alive even if the hierarchy is co-opted by the regime. In light of the particular social circumstances of Rumania under the Ceausescu regime we can even suggest that the ability of religion to induce solidarity may be preserved and enhanced even under severe hardships.  

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The events in Rumania support Robinson’s observation that the probability of religion’s use as an inspirational source for revolutionary changes increases if alternative organizational structures are not available. As we have seen, the underground opposition turned to the churches only after Comaneci’s ‘inspirational interview’ failed. The comparison of Tökés and Comaneci also provides further support for Robinson’s claim that close association with the people is essential for the impetus towards change. While Comaneci’s interview, aired from the other side of the world, had no effect, Tökés’ plea from the pulpit was much more ‘inspiring’. A similar observation can be made in the context of the less severe circumstances of Hungary. In selecting leaders of the local organizations of the MDF, Lezsák, as we have seen, relied on priests’ and ministers’ opinions because they were in closer association with the people.

Thus, Gautier’s observation that church elites are not potential leaders of the democratization process if they are closely associated with the state elites seems tenable, provided we identify the church elite with the hierarchy instead of with the entire clergy. However, the rest of her model also requires correction. Churches can and do participate in the reconstruction of civil society even if their hierarchy is compromised by its contact with state elites, because religious organizations can influence politics not only at the institutional but also at the individual level. Thus, while Tomka’s theory has provided a general account of the role of religion in the process of transition, Robinson’s insights along with a comparison of the Communists’ different approaches to religion have demonstrated how complex the influence of religion can be. While a part of Gautier’s model can be saved, therefore, her reductionism is untenable.
Before turning our attention to the church-state relations of post-Communist Hungary, another issue must be raised. The Hungarian Communists, like the earlier liberals, were committed to the separation of church and state, but only in their formal declarations. Like the liberals, the Communists also wanted to, and actually did, maintain control over the churches. They, similarly to the liberals, retained the anachronous chief-seigniorial rights over the churches.\textsuperscript{115}

There were, however, two differences. First, while the Communists declared and waged war openly on all religious beliefs and practices, the liberals fought against only one: the Roman Catholic Church. The other difference was that the liberals did not require the help of the churches. It is the irony of history that the head of the State Office for Church Affairs, whose original mandate was to control and ultimately abolish religion, was eventually forced to convey the Communists’ request for the churches’ support and assistance in the building of Communism.

Despite the aforementioned differences, the nature of Communist control over the churches suggests that Hungarian church-state relations under the Communist regime resembled those of the Josephinist era.\textsuperscript{116} The question must be raised, therefore, to what extent we can identify the church-state relations of the Communist period with the Josephinist form of caesaropapism.

The Communists did not go so far as to prescribe the menu for wedding receptions, however, they did supervise practically every aspect of religious life. While the number of candles lit during the mass was not regulated, the bishops were obliged to have candle-lit dinners in their \textit{aula} in the 1950s. Furthermore, they were required to employ a
chauffeur to drive their similarly prescribed Mercedes. Any small change, even the repair of a church roof, required the approval of SOCA.

However, from these examples and the brief historical overview of this chapter we can also see the difference between the church-state relations of the Communist era and those of Habsburg absolutism. While Joseph II simply wanted to regulate the details of the religious life of his subjects, the Communists regulated religious life in order to make it unattractive and in order to facilitate their ultimate aim of annihilating it completely. The bishops were obliged to maintain an aristocratic lifestyle in order to make it easier for the Communists to accuse the Catholic Church and its leaders of exploiting the working people. Parents who enrolled their children in religious education suffered discrimination as did the children who received such education. New churches were not allowed to be built and neither were older buildings allowed to be renovated. The means by which the Communists hindered the pastoral work of the clergy and the religious practices of the faithful could be used indefinitely in a process of attrition, which was calculated to undermine religious commitment. Their approach toward religion was definitely not the approach of Joseph II, himself a devout Catholic, who regulated the religious life of his subjects in the hope of making their life more rational, in the practical sense of the word.

Thus, it is safe to say that the Communists’ church policy cannot be identified with Josephinist type of caesaropapism. Can it be likened to any form of caesaropapism? Probably not, because as we have seen in Sturzo’s definition, in caesaropapism, the “authority of the Church shares directly, though in a non-autonomous and often subordinate form, in the exercise of secular power” (1962:47). Neither the Catholic
Church, nor any church for that matter, shared any power with the Communist state either
directly or indirectly.

The question then remains whether the Hungarian church-state relationships of the
Communist era can be identified with any of the traditional diarchies as enumerated by
Sturzo. The answer is in the negative, because in all the other forms – the Latin diarchy,
theocracy, the individual diarchy, and the 'mystical diarchy' – the churches would have
had at least some power and opportunity to assert their interests. It is true that through
their international connections, the churches were able to assert such interests – but only
to a limited extent. Especially during the thaw in the Cold War, the Hungarian
Communists were so eager to seek financial and material support from the West, that
they even helped Western religious charitable organizations in their work. A co-worker
in the Catholic charitable organization Europaischer Hilfsfonds117 informed me that there
was a time when he provided the Hungarian State Office for Church Affairs with toner
for their photocopying machines. Obviously, this dependency on Western technology
and financial support necessitated a certain level of religious tolerance which was astutely
exploited by the churches. If the Communists attempted to block the plans of the
churches, the religious communities were able and willing to turn to their 'advocates
abroad'. Thus, for example, the Pope, Queen Elizabeth II, and the Dutch Minister of
Foreign Affairs supported the appeal of the Christian Advent Community for legal status.
However, essential and helpful as they were, it would be a grave mistake to overestimate
the effectiveness of the international connections of the churches.

Of course, Sturzo might argue that, in retrospect, the Communist period was only a
relatively short interlude in the continuation of a Latin diarchy. For him, as we have
seen, the church “nearly always reacted vigorously against any effective dependence, or reasserted her independence, as the case might be” (1962: 48). Whether the church or churches would prove capable of reasserting their independence in the post-Communist period is the subject of the next chapter.

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* It should be noted that the Történeti Intézet (Institute for History) in Hungary opened after the completion of my work. I would expect any subsequent information gathered from its archives to confirm my findings.

1 In my estimation, the publication must have been around 1993 or 1994.

2 Interview with Dr. Imre András, the director of the Hungarian Institute for Sociology of Religion. He remembered reading about the Karlovy Vary meeting but could not provide references. Imre Miklós, the head of the State Office for Church Affairs could neither confirm, nor refute András’ claim. I had interviews with both persons in the Fall of 1996.


4 Actually, the arrests and deportations happened in two stages. First, in May, 1,000 members of religious orders were deported, then in August another 2,500.

5 Detailed discussions of the deeds of SOCA, and the consequent sufferings of the different ecclesiastics are described by Elmer (1994), Havasy (1990), Lénard (1994), Mindszenty (1974), G. Németh (1991), A. Németh (1991), and can be found in Hetényi’s books (1994, 1996). Hetényi intends to publish all the available information on his subject in five volumes.

6 According to the 1949 census, 70.5% of the population belonged to the Catholic faith, 21.9% to the Reformed Church, 5.2% to the Lutheran Church, and 1.5% to the Jewish Communities. Only 0.1% declared themselves “non-denominational”, and 0.7% were unknown, or belonged to other religions. C.f. Tomka (1994a: 17).


8 Interview with Gusztáv Zoltai, the managing director of the Alliance of Hungarian Jewish Communities (MAZSIHISZ).

9 In alphabetical order they are: Ancient Apostolic Church, Assembly of the Living God, Baptists, Bulgarian Orthodox, Christian Brethren, Church of God, Evangelical Brethren, Evangelical Pentecostal Community, Free Christian Congregation, Hungarian Orthodox Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Methodists, Mormons, Nazarene Congregation, Rumanian Orthodox, Serbian Orthodox, Seventh Day Adventists, and the Unitarians.

10 In the 1945 elections, the Communists had gained only 70 seats out of the 409, but managed to get 4 ministerial positions. In 1947, however, they dismantled the ruling Smallholder Party by ‘proving’ the Smallholders’ betrayal in show-trials.

11 The new system was issued in Law XXXIII of 1947.

12 In 1947, it was reorganized under the supervision of the state, and received a new name, the Council of Free Churches.

13 While the government made sure that the membership of the Buddhist Mission did not extend over three thousand people, Hetényi received financial support and, more importantly, was allowed to travel abroad representing the Hungarians at conferences. His unquestioned merit was shown by the translation of
several Buddhist texts. He has not been available for interviews since the fall of Communism. A list of the interviewed persons with the date and location of the interviews is provided in the Appendix.

14 As we have seen, followers of Islam lived in Hungary in the twelfth century. Furthermore, Islam became again an accepted religion in 1916, because during World War I Turkey and Hungary were allies, and Bosnia with its significant Muslim population belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

15 Interviews with Zoltán Nagy, president of the Community of Healing Buddha, István Brez-Gruber, manager of the Karma Dechen Ösel Ling Tibetan Buddhist Community, and József Horváth, manager of the Buddhist Mission. Ernő Hetényi was not available for interview.

16 Kairos, a Greek word, means the moment of grace and opportunity, the favourable time in which God issues a challenge to decisive action. A Kairos can be a situation when Christians must move from “both/and” to “either/or”. Thus Karl Barth stated that it was not possible to support Hitler and claim the name of Christian. C.f. McAfee Brown (1990).

17 The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party replaced the disintegrated Hungarian Working People’s Party led by Rákosi.

18 Lázár also notices that the “Kádár period ... was deeply contradictory and two-sided” (1989 : 219).

19 The forerunner of this “theology” was the “Theology of the Narrow Way” which legitimised and wholeheartedly supported the Communist leadership in the early fifties.

20 See, for example, the German edition of Ottlyk’s work (1982), which was originally published in Hungarian in 1976.

21 The criticism was delivered by Karl Barth (reported by Pungur n.d.), and Vilmos Vajta (1987).

22 Imre Mikkói, the retired head of SOCA admitted in the interview I conducted on November 14, 1996, that he learned a lot from the politicians of the Vatican.

23 Although several priests and their lay associates were sentenced even as late as 1973.

24 The parties did not call it an “agreement”, but rather a “document with attached protocol”. Nevertheless, it became known as “the” agreement.


27 Stehle (1981 : 8) quotes here Cardinal Casaroli, then the Vatican’s Secretary of State or “foreign minister”.

28 In spite of the fact that he was 74 years old and sick.


30 C.f. Stehle (1981), especially chapter X.

31 After the 1956 revolution, Communists realized that the monopoly of Marxism-Leninism was an illusion, at least in Hungary. Consequently, they would need the help of “dissidents” in order to establish social order, hence the “national consensus”.


33 Imre Mikkói, in my interview with him, assumed that the reason for Czechoslovakia’s and Rumania’s criticism was the presence of Hungarian minorities in their territories, although he did not explain how the agreement might have affected these minorities.
34 Nauka i Religia (Science and Religion) 1981/4. Imre András SJ., the director of the Hungarian Institute for Sociology of Religion, nicknamed as Imre Miklós "official opposition in exile", also noted that the agreement "is obviously an experiment whose result will be taken into consideration ... in other parts of Communist Europe" (Andras - Morel 1983b : 86).

35 C.f Medyesy (1980).

36 While no sexism is intended in this work, the translator's usage of exclusive language is retained (Medyesy 1980). The Hungarian language does not distinguish between male and female in third person singular.

37 The Communists took every opportunity to point out the tragic consequences of Hungarian nationalism, which, according to them, led to the terror of the Hungarian Nazis, the Arrow-Cross Party.

38 While Marxist ethics was considered a behavioral ethics (Banffy 1976), and 31 and 24 percent of high-school and university students respectively had knowledge about it, only 14 percent used Marxist ethical values in their lives (Medyesy 1980).


40 "A New Era for Hungary's Church?" in Andras - Morel (1983b) Pp. 224 - 237; the quotation is on p. 233. Mr. Miklós, the head of SOCA, also mentioned the important role of religion, the "servicing of moral norms".

41 C.f. the discussion on civil religion in the theoretical chapter, and also McGuire (1987).

42 Tomka (1998 : 185) also notes that Hungarians identified themselves with neither the party nor the state.

43 Unlike Stalin, who was not only the first secretary of the Communist Party, but also held the office of Prime Minister for twelve years (1941 - 1953), Rákosi, while recognized as the 'party boss' from 1940 - 1956, was Prime Minister only for a short period of time from August 14, 1952 to July 4, 1953. For a discussion of why people under the influence of Orthodox Christianity, especially the Russians, are more susceptible to accept personality cult and the toleration of tyrants see Janos (1982 : 51-52) and Zsolnai (1993).

44 A primate is a bishop holding an honorary position over all bishops and archbishops of a country. Hungary's Primate was also a prince of the Holy Roman Empire, which meant that he was the first public authority after the king. Hungary did not have a king from 1919 on, only a regent, Admiral Horthy, as we have seen in the previous chapter. Thus it was a title without real power though Cardinal Mindszenty acted as if it still conveyed significant authority. He died in Vienna on May 6, 1975.

45 According to Hanson (1987), the other success was Yugoslavia.

46 The crown has been the symbol of political legitimacy since the time of Saint Stephen. The request of the Hungarian bishops, supported by the U. S. Bishops' Conference, allowed the Carter Administration to ignore the criticism of anti-Communist Hungarian-American émigrés, especially those who fled in 1956. The crown was finally returned to Hungary on January 6, 1978.

47 C.f Máte-Tóth (1995, 1996). I also conducted an interview with Dr. Máte-Tóth who has been a Bokor member.


49 According to Daróczy, quoted by Medyesy (1980), while 45.5 percent of high-school students considered themselves definitely atheist, and only 8.7 percent believers, another 45.5 percent were uncertain on this question.

50 The "building of Socialism" was another slogan, referring to the first stage of Communist heaven advocated by Marxism-Leninism.

51 The effect of these documents on the civil movement in the Communist bloc has not been thoroughly analyzed. It is assumed, however, that the Helsinki Accords catalyzed the democratization process by
giving signatory states the power and "duty to monitor each other's performance in the area of human rights" (Bourdeaux 1992: 11).

52 It became clear later that several of Fr. Bulányi's works had been manipulated by SOCA before they were sent to Rome.


54 Based on my interviews with József Kalota, the vicar of the Hungarian Orthodox Exarchate and Gábor Pikó, the "dissident" priest.

55 Personal interview with Fr. J. Hegyjí SJ who was the provincial of the Hungarian Jesuits in exile. Cardinal Lékai's reply was well known among Hungarians.

56 Such as the Sisters of St. Vincent. The semi-official excuse was that the headquarters of these sisters were in Rome while the leaders of a new order would be under the supervision of a Hungarian bishop and, ultimately, SOCA.

57 Sr. Elizabeth, the founder of St. Elizabeth Home Society of Hamilton (Ontario, Canada), funded the new order's mother house. Hungarians nicknamed the new order "Nicolites", referring to Mr. Imre Miklós (Miklós in Latin is Nicolaus) whose initiative and supervision of the new order was well known.

58 Personal interview with Krisztina Danku, the movement's spokesperson.

59 It was the present author's personal experience in 1984.

60 Alexis de Tocqueville Democracy in America (1969).


62 It is puzzling why Gautier does not notice the impossibility of identifying the church elite with the entire clergy when she herself discusses the division of the Hungarian clergy by contrasting Fr. Bulányi and Cardinal Lékai (1998: 313-314). For a sociological analysis of the ancient political practice of divide et impera see, for example, Simmel's discussion on triads (1950) and its business-application in Burt (1992).

63 It has always been debated where Central Europe ends and the Balkans begin. Gautier, as we have seen, confines her model to Central Europe, which, for her, presumably includes only the three examined countries. Thus she might object to my including Rumania. Even if we excluded Rumania, however, the fact that the churches were involved in recreating civil society in Hungary questions Gautier's model. Furthermore, the Hungarian minority in Rumania, and especially the role of the Hungarian minority in the Rumanian transition, underlines the importance of the comparison.

64 Although an involvement of the church-elite in the regime was by no means the sufficient condition. By "active involvement", like Gautier, I mean the co-optation of the hierarchy by the state.


66 C.f. Tomka (1991b)

67 Robinson (1978: 58) refers to Crahán's study.

68 Tomka (1991b: 95). In another article analyzing secularization and the preservation of the sacred under the Communist regime, Tomka (1998) "feels justified" to talk about secularization, although he notes its contradiction.

69 Tomka (1996) calls it totálkaritatízmus, a "system of total charity".

70 C.f., for example, Tocqueville (1969) or Berger and Neuhaus (1977). In the Hungarian case, these organizations were mostly religious organizations, such as the National Association of Young Catholic Agrarian Men (KALOT) and its sibling organizations mentioned in the previous chapter. The organization of friendly gatherings with a purpose of self-education was persecuted even in the early 1970s.
The main goal of his article is to examine whether the sociological theory of secularization, as presented by Dobbelacere (1981), Fenn (1978) and Martin (1978) or anomie, as discussed by Merton (1957) is more appropriate in describing the life of the three Central European societies under Communism.

Martin focuses on Russia and Poland, and discusses other countries only if "the evidence they offer differs markedly enough to warrant a query or an explanation ... [or] special developments have occurred in them" (1978 : 209). Although all of the former Communist countries are mentioned, only Yugoslavia and Hungary met his criteria.

Even in the late seventies, information on religion in the Communist countries was scarce. Furthermore, a general pattern of religious intolerance remained evident.

Here I rely heavily on the U.S. bishops' "A Word of Solidarity, A Call for Justice: A Statement on Religious Freedom in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union" approved during their November 14-17, 1988 meeting in Washington, furthermore, on Beeson (1982) and Bociurkiw and Strong (1975). For the categorization, see Simon (1975 : 190-91) and especially Beeson (1982 : 48-49) which were also taken over by the U.S. bishops. An insightful categorization of the ways in which church leaders and politicians intended to deal with the tyrant Communists is provided by Kwitny (1997 : 242-244).

While in East Germany the Protestants were in majority, Islam predominated in Albania.

Especially the close alignment of state and church resulting from the intertwining of religion and nationalism, as demonstrated, for instance, in the Hungarian Christian-national idea of the interwar period.

C.f. Tomka (1995b) and Barker (1998 : 200)


On March 19, 1989, Hungary signed the 1951 UN Convention declaring that no refugees should be returned against their will to a country where their life or liberty would be threatened. This was in contradiction to a treaty signed by Hungary and East Germany in the 1970s.

Although during his visit to the St. Elizabeth Church of Hungary, (Toronto, ON) in 1990, Pozsgai spoke about his religious upbringing, it is impossible to detect how much influence it had on him and his thinking.

My interview with Sandor Lezsák was conducted on December 2, 1996. If no other reference is given the information comes from this interview. Concerning the communities, Andorka (1996 : 177) also notes that one of the motives for turning to religion after 1978 was the existence of communities in the churches.


Levine and Stoll (1997) complain that the Latin American "base communities" are short of trust. I presume that the main problem is not the lack of trust, but the lack of the other circumstances necessary for a successful social movement.

To use a sociological language, these organizations are intermediary institutions.

Information given by Sándor Keresztes, a founding member of the Christian Democratic People’s Party, and former Hungarian ambassador to the Vatican.

Lakitelek, where Lezsák was employed as a teacher, is a village in the Southern part of Hungary between the Danube and Tisza rivers.

Oszkár Egervári, the president of the Christian Advent Community, informed me in an interview that they also planned such a meeting. Sándor Lezsák confirmed the existence of these other initiatives.
The Christian Democratic People’s Party is the legal successor of the Christian Democratic Party, and the Smallholders’ Party is the legal successor of the party with the same name that was forced to form a coalition government with the Communists in 1947.

According to Lezsák, this happened not only in 1990 but also in 1994.


Cf. Pungur (n.d.: 179).

Lezsák admits that the “Protestants”, i.e. the members of the Reformed Church, were much more practical in organizing the election campaign than the Catholics.

His statement was an obvious reference to the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries and overseas.


Even a birthday party, where more than ten people came together, needed the Securitate’s approval.


See, for example, Ottó Oltványi - T. Oltványi (1990) and László Tőkés (1990). Both books speculate about the possible role of CIA and KGB agents. The Ceausescus were convinced that foreign agents started the uprising. For an account of the actual events see also G. Galloway and B. Wylie (1991); Engelbrecht Boese (1990); and H. Vastag, G. Mandics and M. Engelman, M. (1992).

For an excellent discussion of the atomized Rumanian society, see David A. Kideckel (1993).

See Oltványi and Oltványi, (1990: 27-36) – the chapter entitled “A CIA és a KGB együtt” (The CIA and the KGB together).

Cf. Tőkés (1990: 84).


Tőkés (1990: 15).


See, for example, Kideckel, (1993: 122). While nobody could trust anybody under the surveillance of the Securitate, Rumanians were forced by Ceausescu’s regime to pretend to be happy.

As noted earlier, Ceausescu was obsessed with Hitler, and he dreamed of a Magna Rumania. See Cipkowskí (1991).}


See Varga’s testimony quoted above on the support which Tőkés’ congregation received from the Rumanian Baptists and Pentecostals.

Eastern Catholics were “Rumanianized”, i.e. forced to “convert” to the Rumanian Orthodox Church.

Due to the bodyguard the Szeklers organized to protect their bishop administering Confirmation, the Communists’ attempt to arrest Bishop Márton failed several times. Finally, they kidnapped him on June 21, 1949 (Szalay: 1955). He spent more than five years in prison, and even after his release, he was under house arrest for three more years.
It is regrettable that we know very little about the Albanian events. An analysis with a focus on the role of religion in the Albanian transition, if there was any, might provide further possibilities for observations on the consequences of the constitutionally declared atheism of a state.

While the Communists tried to abolish all remnants of feudalism, they explicitly referred to the chief-seigniorial rights in the preamble of decree 22 of 1957 (Hollós 1977: 380).

This view has been generally held by Hungarians. Although Dr. Imre András S.J., director of the Hungarian Institute for Sociology of Religion, did not write on this subject he mentioned it several times in his public presentations and in personal discussions with the present author. However, Korzenszky (1999) explicitly mentions it.

On the work of the Europäischer Hilfsfonds and other international charitable organizations see Wilschowitz (1993a, 1993b) and Della Cava (1993, 1997). The co-worker was Prelate Géza Valentiny.
Chapter V. Church and State in the Post-Communist Period

(1990 – 1999)

The countless factors influencing the complex relationships of religion and politics in post-Communist societies led some social scientists and former politicians into despair. Reflecting on the growing number of registered denominations in Hungary, Imre Miklós, the retired head of the State Office for Church Affairs (SOCA), threw up his arms and exclaimed, “It’s nonsense what is going on here”. Observing the different and often contradictory trends, Pankhurst (1994) took recourse in a so-called “garbage-can model” to account for the state of religion in the former Soviet Union and other former Communist countries. The indisputable contradictions and confusion in the religious life of post-Communist societies obstruct the analyst’s view and render the formulation of broad propositions extremely difficult. Hadden (1995) concludes that attempting to forecast the shape of religious revival in countries and republics that were formally in the orbit of the Soviet Empire is virtually impossible. The different approaches of Communists to religion and the various proposals to rebuild the former Communist societies have created endless variations in the possible relationships between church and state.

In considering Hungarian views on the relationship between church and state, two major political positions might be noted: the opinion of those who consider the public role of churches beneficial, and the opinion of those who consider the presence of the churches in public life particularly undesirable. These two opinions manifested themselves
distinctly in the different policies of the three post-Communist Hungarian governments. At the same time, ecclesiastical elites demonstrated a cautious stand towards politics. Despite this stand and the existence of powerful opposition to the public role of religion, the characteristic Hungarian intertwining of church and state has continued in the last decade. Probably the best – and perhaps the only feasible – way to account for this situation is to scrutinize election campaigns with a focus on political parties’ attitudes and actions towards the churches. However, this must be done within the broad social and cultural context of post-Communist Hungarian society. The issue must also be examined by a return to the analytical questions posed in the first chapter.


We have seen in the previous chapter how, in their campaigns, the different political parties attempted to exploit the churches prior to the 1990 elections. This attempt and the Catholic bishops’ general ignorance of the plans of these parties are the main reasons for the passivity of the Catholic Church in the 1990 elections. In a widely discussed article, Bishop Gyulai asked the parties to reveal what “was up their sleeve”. Several of the parties responded by pointing out that they had already made their programs public. Before the election, the Hungarian Bishops’ Conference published a pastoral letter in which Catholics were urged to vote. They also warned the faithful not to be misled by those who professed atheist or libertarian views, or by those who promised a “future without crosses”. As a result of the elections, the MDF, led by József Antall, established
a coalition with two other parties professing Christian-national values: the Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP). During the next four years, the new government unmistakably demonstrated its preference for the historical Christian Churches over the smaller denominations, but this bias was not immediately evident for three reasons. Firstly, the historical churches were widely held in high esteem. Secondly, there was a broadly held expectation that, in a time of serious social and cultural crisis, these churches would participate actively in the reestablishment of a smoothly functioning society. Finally, the public presence of the few new denominations was initially not as visible as it became by the middle of the Antall government’s term.

The relatively high esteem of the historical churches stemmed from the religious revival of the final period of Communism experienced not only by Hungary, but also by several other former Communist countries. In agreement with Pankhurst (1994), Tomka points out that it was “a general experience in Eastern and Central Europe that compared to the public opinion prevailing five, 10 or more years ago, surprisingly many people considered themselves religious, and their number [was] growing” (1995b: 17).

According to Tomka, not only the proportion of religious persons grew, but so did “church-oriented religiosity”. While in 1978, 44.3 percent of the Hungarian population considered themselves religious, and only 8.1 percent lived, self-reportedly, according to the teachings of the churches, the respective numbers were 76.8 percent and 19 percent in 1993. Furthermore, the growth in number of religious persons gained momentum after 1988, the year when the Hungarian Communists started their reforms. Whereas from 1978 to 1988, the growth of the portion of religious persons was 13.7 percent, between
1988 and 1993 it was 18.7 percent. The growth of church oriented religiosity in the same
time periods was 4.2 percent and 6.7 percent respectively.

In light of the growing interest in religion, the high esteem in which the churches were
held is probably less surprising than it might appear at first glance. In 1989 and 1990,
churches had the highest prestige of any social institutions, surpassing all other economic,
political and cultural organizations and movements. According to a survey taken in the
spring of 1991, 59.4 percent of the population held that churches helped in the realization
of democracy; 83.8 percent expected the churches to take part in solving moral questions,
79.9 percent in reducing social problems, and 38 percent in making decisions on political
matters. Other manifestations of the high level of trust in churches included the fact that
in 1991 four out of five people said they would give the churches back the hospitals and
other institutions of the health care system, which had been nationalized by the
Communists. Furthermore, 88.6 percent would return the church libraries and
clubhouses. All in all, half of the Hungarian population (52 percent) would have returned
everything that the churches wanted to reclaim, and even those buildings, which they did
not reclaim. Another third of the population would return those institutions, which would
serve religious functions.

Trust in the churches was high, but so was the magnitude of the social problems which
the churches were invited to solve. The earthly paradise, which the Communists
promised to achieve through the nationalization of private property, offered at best a
moderate satisfaction of physical needs. Although the level of real income almost
quadrupled from 1950 to 1978, the price that Hungarians paid for it was enormous in
terms of their physical and mental well being. Furthermore, this measure decreased by
twelve percent from 1978 to 1989. The sad truth is that since the fall of Communism real
income has declined even further\(^{11}\).

Poverty, whose mere existence was denied and its discussion forbidden under the Kádár
regime, became apparent in the last years of Communism. From 1982 to 1992, the
poverty line increased from 1,900 Ft to 9,500 Ft. In the same period, the proportion of the
population living below the poverty line increased from 10 percent to 25 percent. The
two main causes of the growth of poverty were inflation and real unemployment\(^{12}\),
unknown to Hungarians until the fall of Communism.

One of the reasons why the level of income, and correspondingly the standard of living,
was able to increase under Communism until the 1970s was that Hungary received
substantial loans from Western nations. The other reason was the tremendous amount of
time Hungarians spent at second and third jobs. We have to keep in mind that in
Hungary, as previously mentioned, there was no real unemployment; and workers had to
spend about eight hours per day\(^{13}\) in their main job. However, in 1986 and 1987, on
average, less than two thirds of the time spent at work was spent at the main workplace.
One of the consequences of all this time spent at work was exhaustion. This, coupled
with the unsatisfactory health care system and other factors which will be discussed
shortly, caused the life expectancy of Hungarian men to decline from 1965 to 1994 when
it started to increase again\(^{14}\).

By the late 1960s, it became evident that the Communist countries were incapable of
creating a "paradise on earth". Furthermore, their standard of living would likely never
equal that of the Western countries. Therefore, as Andorka (1996 : 32) points out, Soviet
philosophers and sociologists ‘rediscovered’ the notion of life style in the sense of “quality of life”. The tacit purpose of this was to demonstrate that despite lower living standards the Communist way of life was qualitatively superior to that of the capitalist countries. However, all that the statistics showed was that long working hours determined the Hungarian life style. One of the consequences was a lack of time for cultural and social activities. As we have seen, the Communists destroyed the intermediary organizations that would normally have provided opportunities for socializing. In the Kádár regime, the few and iron-handedly censored cultural products were subsidized and consequently extremely cheap. However, due to work related fatigue, even attendance at theaters, museums, and movies declined in the 1980s. Since the fall of Communism, the cultural market has been in complete chaos, because government subsidy has been substantially reduced.

Another area where the Communists wanted to prove the supremacy of their life style was education. From the time of their takeover in 1948 to the 1970s, they gave priority to the development of general education. Elementary education was extended from six years to eight, and the number of students in high schools, colleges, and universities steadily increased. In the 1970s, however, the Communists introduced a \textit{numerus clausus} for secondary and university education. They reasoned that the overproduction of intellectuals would lead to their unemployment, which, in turn, would create political tension. Most probably, the Western European student revolts of 1968 prompted this policy. In terms of the proportion of the population with higher education in the 1980s, Hungary was one of the least educated nations among the developed (OECD) countries, as a result of the \textit{numerus clausus} for secondary and university education. Thus,
Hungarians were not free to improve themselves through education and, consequently, as Andorka (1996: 23) noted, the chance for upward social mobility under Communism was no better than in capitalist countries. After the fall of Communism, one of the first steps of the Antall government was to remove the *numerus clausus*.

Long working hours also caused a deterioration in Hungarian social relations. According to the 1982 European Value Study, among the surveyed European nations, Hungarians wanted to spend the least time with their friends. In the same survey, Hungary had the highest proportion of persons, 85 percent, who responded “no” to the question of whether there was anything other than their family for which they would sacrifice themselves. However, life inside the family was not happy either. Generally, Hungarians received no emotional support from their close family and relatives. As noted in the previous chapter, in relative terms, Hungarians had the smallest younger generation and greatest number of single child families in the world. The short time that Hungarian parents could spend with their family, together with work related fatigue and stress, the unsupportive atmosphere of the home, and the inadequacy of the Communist educational system, created a downward spiral in which the younger generations lost their orientation. The result was a “dull and passive endurance” or, in more sociological terms, a devastating anomie. Three indicators show the high level of anomie in Hungarian society: the suicide rate, alcoholism, and the erosion of mental health.

The Hungarian suicide rate has been high since the end of the nineteenth century, and the highest in the world since the 1960s. The peak of the suicide rate in the inter-war period occurred in the early 1930s, but it was still only three-quarters of the number that Hungary attained under the Communist regime. The suicide rate of 17.7 per one hundred thousand
people grew steadily from 1954 to 1984, when it reached 45.9. This rate was fifty percent higher than the second highest rate, recorded in Sweden. However, the Hungarian suicide rate\textsuperscript{20} has been declining since 1988, the year when changes were made to the leadership of the Communist party. While the decreasing rate is good news for Hungarians, it is less encouraging that the number of older persons committing suicide has been over represented both under Communism and since\textsuperscript{21}. This sad indicator of the neglect of seniors is a sign of the indifference, apathy, and lack of compassion in the whole society.

Hungary is unquestionably one of those countries where alcoholism is widespread. The consumption of large quantities of alcohol and a high number of alcohol-related problems has been characteristic of Hungary for centuries. However, it is a fact that both consumption and its related problems multiplied under the Communist regime. While the per capita consumption of alcohol per annum in the mid 1930s was 5.5 liters\textsuperscript{22}, it grew from the second half of the 1950s until 1980 when it peaked at 11.7 liters. The number of persons who died from cirrhosis of the liver, the most frequently used indicator of alcohol-related problems, was 7.4 per one hundred thousand people in the second half of the 1930s. In the early 1950s, the number dropped to between 5 and 6, but then it grew rapidly. In 1991, it reached 56.9, ten times higher than in the 1950s. While consumption has declined 8 to 9 percent since the fall of Communism, cirrhosis of the liver has continued to increase\textsuperscript{23}.

The third indicator of anomie is the high level of mental health problems. As early as 1978, Hungarian sociologists asked questions examining anomie-related symptoms and fortunately, the same questions were repeated in 1990 and 1994. Comparing the answers,
we can conclude that the feeling of powerlessness, meaninglessness, and alienation from oneself grew rapidly and reached a high level by the time of the fall of Communism. Due to the short period of time elapsed since 1990, we cannot see unequivocal changes in the answers given in 1994. However, it is a sad fact that the number of patients with severe depression grew from 2.9 percent in 1988 to 7.1 percent in 1995 (Kopp-Skrabski 1997). Again, the situation among the elderly is worse; every fifth person over 70 had severe depression in 1995. At the same time, ten percent of those under 30 use drugs to cope with boredom. There are no exact data on the number of drug-addicted Hungarians, but since the fall of Communism, Hungary has “evolved” from a drug-transit country to one of drug distribution.

All of the indicators discussed above belong to the Mertonian “retreatist” type of anomic behavior. As we have seen, these problems were rather severe under Communism, and have for the most part continued to be problematic since 1990. However, one manifestation of Merton’s innovation type of anomie, criminal activity, definitely remained at a low level under Communism, which was undoubtedly due to significant police control. Since the fall of Communism, however, criminality has been increasing rapidly. Not only the introduction of democracy into the justice system, but also the opening up of international borders has helped to create a more favorable climate for criminality.

Kopp and Skrabski (1997) also observe that a significant proportion of Hungarians, 46 percent of men and 55 percent of women, have a so-called “external-control attitude” which is partly responsible for the high level of depression. This attitude reflects fatalism, a belief that individuals are helplessly exposed to external factors; and it is
beyond their ability to change their situation. Emerging from a totalitarian and authoritarian society, the high level of this attitude is not accidental. While the totalitarian Communist society completely prevented the individual from directing his or her own life, the authoritarian\textsuperscript{26} society opened up a small life-world where people had some limited control over their lives. But even in this situation, there remained a constant concern that the authorities would interfere and demolish what the individual had accomplished with great sacrifice\textsuperscript{27}.

To summarize, the Antall government had to face a population struggling with increasing poverty, declining life expectancy, crumbling cultural institutions, a relatively low level of education, a high rate of suicide and alcoholism, a growing rate of criminality, and an unsatisfactory level of mental health. In light of the Christian ideology of the political parties constituting the coalition, the high prestige of the churches, and the fact that religious institutions provided the "counter-pole to anomie", it is not surprising that the Antall government supported the churches and asked for their help in tackling these burning social issues. It is even less surprising that the churches, emerging from forty years of oppression, joyfully and enthusiastically accepted both the moral appreciation and financial support of the government.

The moral appreciation of the churches can best be seen in the speech of Ferenc Mádl, Minister of Culture and Education in the Antall cabinet. He stated that the government regarded the participation of the churches in the moral renewal of society as extremely important. This renewal entailed a religious role in education, resolution of welfare problems, and preservation of the national identity. Last, but not least, he also
acknowledged that the churches had a great role in determining how governments were judged both in the country and abroad28.

The Antall government was well aware of the fact that neither the legal nor the financial circumstances of the churches were sufficiently strong to allow them to fulfill the roles the cabinet expected from them. Although the Communists had formally declared the separation of church and state in the 1949 Constitution29, the succeeding regulations and actions of the Communists created a situation in which the State Office for Church Affairs (SOCA), for all practical purposes, effectively controlled all aspects of religious life. It was the Decree14 of 1989 that annihilated the necessity of state approval when filling ecclesiastical positions. More importantly, the same decree abolished the SOCA. The modification of the Constitution on October 23, 1989, again declared the separation of church and state as a necessity, given the basic human right to freedom of conscience.

A peculiarity of the Hungarian Constitution is that it also declares the right to be non-religious or atheist. The detailed regulations of the constitutionally guaranteed rights were laid down in Law IV of 1990.30

The preamble to this law acknowledges that the Hungarian churches, denominations, and religious organizations are especially important institutions for conveying values and creating communities in society. Apart from their religious ministry, they also contribute to the country's life by fulfilling cultural, educational, and social welfare needs as well as nurturing the national identity. Thus, the legal regulations are coupled with a positive evaluation of the churches. In other words, this is a “benevolent” reading of the principle of separation, in contrast to a “strict” separationist version (Casanova 1994). This interpretation is based, according to Casanova (1994), either on historical tradition and
original intent or on an essentially functionalist approach, i.e. religion fulfills certain positive roles in society. The strict separationist interpretation rejects not only any government support, but also any government regulation. The benevolent approach, on the other hand, rejects state regulation but supports religious institutions. In light of the Communists' oppressive measures as discussed in the previous chapter, it is important to note that the modification of the Constitution and the legislation of Law IV of 1990 were, in fact, completed by the last Communist government. However, the implementation of this legislation, which required further legal regulations, became the task of the post-Communist governments.

The benevolent attitude, as described above, became the fundamental principle of the Antall government’s church policy. In certain areas, much was expected from the churches both by the government and by individuals, but the religious organizations lacked the infrastructure, financial means, and, last but not least, the human resources to meet these expectations satisfactorily. The government could only help in the provision of the infrastructure by guaranteeing the return of some nationalized buildings to the churches. According to Law XXXII of 1991, the churches would receive back only those buildings that were required for the practice of their religious activities, and the functioning of religious orders or the Protestant communities of deacons and deaconesses, as well as whatever was necessary for the educational, social welfare, and cultural activities organized by the religious communities. The churches would not be granted the return of any of their lands. In cases where nationalized buildings were strategically necessary for secular activities, the churches would receive compensation or another building. The law also stipulated that the process of returning the required
buildings would take place over a ten-year period. Finally, for disputed buildings, the Antall cabinet established a committee whose responsibility was to mediate, and in the final analysis, arbitrate between churches and local governments.

Obviously, there were disputed cases, but, for several reasons, there were relatively few. The churches did not request the return of all of their buildings, because they knew that they could not afford to operate them given their limited financial and human resources. For the same reason, in many cases, local governments were eager to return the buildings, which were badly in need of repair. Finally, in several cases, either the churches or the institutions occupying the reclaimed property of the churches received another building in exchange. The Jesuits, for example, received the Communist Party’s holiday resort, including Kádár’s private villa instead of their confiscated retreat house which now houses army and military intelligence offices.

Reflecting on the benevolent measures of the government, the political opposition, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), the Socialists (MSZP), and the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) protested. Especially after the lavish celebrations of Pope John Paul II’s visit, the opposition accused the government of reestablishing the so-called “Christian Course” of the interwar period. This accusation was, for all practical purposes, a tactic in the campaign of the political opposition to discredit the ruling coalition. Nevertheless, there were indications of similarities between the cultural and political tone of the interwar period and that of the early 1990s.

To begin with, both eras followed Communist periods of hostility to religion. The post-Communist governments, in both cases, asked the support of the churches in the
rebuilding of Hungarian society. Furthermore, in Mádl’s speech, we can discover echoes of Klebelsberg’s evaluation of the relationship between church and state. Although the Antall government did not launch a church-building project, nonetheless it provided the churches with significant financial support from the state budget. Finally, the Antall government, like its interwar predecessors, supported the churches in the hope of their reciprocal help. This was especially the case with regard to the Catholic Church, whose longstanding intentions of redressing the provisions of the Trianon Treaty provided support and legitimizing for state diplomacy. This expectation of the government became evident at the reorganization of the Hungarian Catholic dioceses, which took place during the time of the Antall administration.

The new borders of Hungary, as established at the Trianon Treaty in 1920, not only reduced the country’s territory and population, but also cut through eleven Catholic ecclesiastical dioceses. The centers of some dioceses fell into the successor states. Moreover, while the episcopal seats of three archdioceses and three dioceses remained in Hungary, the larger part of their territories were ceded to neighboring countries. The archdiocese of Zagreb, and the dioceses of Zeng, Bosnia, Transylvania, Szepes, Nyitra, and Besztercebánya found themselves, as a result of the treaty, located completely in the successor states. Only three of the 21 dioceses remained entirely in Hungary. Thus the peace treaty created an abnormal situation in the life of the Hungarian Catholic Church. Several dioceses became enormously oversized while others were reduced to tiny fragments in which pastoral work had to be undertaken without episcopal supervision. A generation later, Hungary’s inner migration, induced by Communist industrialization plans, worsened the situation. While large cities were built to house the new employees,
the regime did not allow the building of churches or facilitate the provision of care for the pastoral needs of the residents. Thus, the reorganization of diocesan borders was long overdue, but could not occur until after the fall of Communism. Finally, at the end of May 1993, through a decree issued by Pope John Paul II, the belated reorganization occurred.

The Hungarians in Transylvania, especially the members of their clergy, quietly expressed their regret over this restructuring. The former Hungarian dioceses now in Rumania were reluctant to reorganize their territories and redraw their boundaries. The pope’s decree also provoked discontent in Hungary itself. This involved members of the clergy as well as representatives of the various pro-Christian parties. Indeed, in defense of their concerns, Prime Minister József Antall had personally asked the pope to postpone the diocesan reorganization. The reason for the dissatisfaction was that the reorganization would eliminate a major source of legitimation for “reclaiming” the former territories. Hungarians, both in Hungary and Transylvania, felt that by adjusting the diocesan borders to fit the reality of the political borders, Rome had “sanctified and consecrated” Trianon.

On the one hand, as we have seen, there was an abnormal, anomalous situation: the torn apart and extraterritorial dioceses. On the other hand, Catholic politicians in and out of Hungary were anxious to maintain this anomalous situation. This appeared all the more absurd since the same politicians and clergy also wanted both Hungary and Rumania, including Transylvania, to join the European Community sooner rather than later. In this context, reclaiming Transylvania and other former Hungarian territories would have been counterproductive because Hungary would hinder its own acceptance by the European
federation by manifesting an overt nationalism. It would also be unnecessary, because once these countries entered the federation, their borders would, to some degree, ‘evaporate’.

This seemingly illogical behavior of the Hungarian politicians is a good example of cognitive dissonance, a theoretical term introduced by the social psychologist Leon Festinger (1957). His definition of cognitive dissonance refers to a “motivational tension”41, resulting from the “existence of nonfitting relations among cognitions” (1957:3). Clearly, territorial revision and joining the European Union are “nonfitting intents”. According to Festinger, one of the sources of dissonance is a choice between alternatives if the alternatives are about equal in attractiveness and if they involve different sets of consequences. Frankly, Hungarian politicians and especially the Hungarian clergy had no alternative. While reorganization of the diocesan borders was long overdue the rearrangement of national borders was impossible. In light of the promising development of Hungary’s future membership in the European Union the Hungarian politicians did not even consider the reexamination of Trianon42. The question then remains: If there was no alternative, what was so attractive in the old diocesan borders? This is where Weber’s verstehende sociology can be an appropriate technique of theoretical analysis. Verstehen sociology means not only a simple understanding of the mainly historical circumstances but also a sympathetic intuition, an involvement with the values, purposes, and motives of the actors43.

My suggestion is that what motivated politicians and church-leaders both in Hungary and Transylvania in the preservation of the old diocesan borders was a fear of the loss of identity. Both Hungarians and Rumanians want to join the European Union. The
Hungarians do not care if Transylvania, the Western part of today’s Rumania, joins the Union as a part of Rumania and not Hungary, because membership in the union would mean the absorption or evaporation of national borders — but not the diocesan borders. The ability to point to these old borders, and thus the corresponding ecclesiastical organization, would have preserved for Hungarians something of Hungary, and more importantly, of “Greater Hungary”. Reorganization of the dioceses meant the destruction of a crucial “piece in the Hungarian identity kit”, which could have been imported into the European Union. The abstract principle that cultural or other identity continues after the borders fall within the union, is no practical guarantee of Hungarian cultural integrity. Indeed, restrictions on the use of the Hungarian language both in Rumania and Slovakia project another cultural loss for them. Furthermore, they also fear that in the European Union, Hungarians, whether from Hungary or from the neighboring states, would simply be unskilled workers, which is not a boosting element in any identity kit⁴⁴. These fears of cultural assimilation and diminishing self-esteem explain the political importance that Hungarians attribute to the preservation of anything that is historically related to Hungary and Hungarians.

_Cuius regio, eius religio_ was one of the policies propounded at Augsburg in 1555. _Cuius regio_, even if only symbolic, _eius identitas_ is probably a key notion motivating today’s Eastern and Central Europeans⁴⁵. It is by no means only Hungarians who want to cling symbolically to their territories within the European Union. In the spring of 1998, the Hungarian churches organized a conference on the consequences of Hungary’s, Poland’s, and the Czech Republic’s NATO membership. Political and ecclesiastic representatives of the neighboring countries were also invited; and the Slovak participants expressed
their dissatisfaction with the fact that the Hungarians were unwilling to discuss and reexamine the Trianon Treaty. When they were told that this was not an issue for the Hungarians anymore, because in a united Europe national borders would cease to exist, the Slovaks became even more annoyed\textsuperscript{46}. Probably, for them, the continued territorial dispute served and would have continued to serve as a vital piece of their own identity in the future.

Apart from the similarity of the historical periods, the similar evaluations given by ministers responsible for education, and the similarity in government support of the churches given in the hope of reciprocated help, there was one more ‘resemblance’ between the ‘anticipated Christian Course’ of the 1990s and the Christian Course of the interwar period. Had the Christian Course been reestablished in Antall’s Hungary it would have lacked committed Christians as it did during the Horthy regime. However, this similarity also highlights one of the differences in the historical and social contexts of the two eras. While Prohászka, as we have seen, complained about the lack of committed Christian faith of the politicians in the early 1920s he would have probably complained about the lack of energetic Christian faith in the majority of Hungarians\textsuperscript{47} in the 1990s. Despite the religious revival, Hungarian Christianity was rather passive. The reasons for this passivity mostly originated in the Communists’ anti-religious and oppressive policy, which, in turn, created significant changes in the demographic features of religious activity. These features can be summarized in five points and two significant consequences.

The first point is that although the majority of Hungarians consider themselves religious, only a fraction of the population, between 13 and 15 percent\textsuperscript{48}, follows the teachings of a
church. This means that the majority of the religious population believes “without belonging”\textsuperscript{49}, in other words, they have “privatized” their religiosity. Whereas it is hard to describe precisely what constitutes the main dimensions of Hungarians’ privatized religiosity, we have much more reliable information on those who follow the teachings of the churches.

The remaining four points indicate that those who observe the regulations and guidelines of the churches are essentially less educated, older, rural, and poor people\textsuperscript{50}. The proportion of non-religious and atheist Hungarians who did not finish elementary school equals only one fifth of the church-oriented population with the same education. In a similar vein, only 1.4 percent of the people who follow the teaching of a church have a college or university degree, whereas 5.1 percent of the non-religious and atheists hold such degrees. This fact can largely be explained by the Communists’ discrimination against religious students and by the \textit{numerus clausus} of the Communist regime.

It is interesting to note that the generation of the pre-Communist era, in other words those who had finished high school by 1948, did not abandon religion. Less than two percent are non-religious and the percentage of atheists in this group is extremely low. The proportion of retired persons among church-oriented Hungarians is remarkably high, around fifty percent. At the same time, the proportion of church-oriented religious persons who completed secondary education by 1988, the last year of the Kádár regime, is less than one percent. These facts mean that this kind of institutionalized religiosity will face a dramatic decline in the near future, a transformation which will be felt more intensively in the countryside than in urban centers. About half of the Hungarians who

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follow the teachings of a church live in rural areas, whereas two thirds of the Hungarian population reside in the capital and other cities.

The age composition of religious adherents along with their lower level of education also explains why church-oriented persons are poor. The national average monthly net income in 1995 was between 15,000 and 20,000 Ft. While one fifth (22.2 percent) of the population had a higher monthly net income, the proportion of “churched” Hungarians earning a higher than average income was less than ten percent.

The first consequence of these demographic features is that the people who follow the teachings of the churches are, not surprisingly, rather passive. The rural environment helped preserve ‘traditional’, i.e. pre-Communist, religiosity. This form of religiosity does not demand the active and creative participation of the laity in religious organizations, let alone in the formation of the religious life of the nation. This type of religiosity might be characterized as ‘service oriented’, deferential and obedient. The faithful are dutifully present at religious services and the celebration of rites de passages. They follow the guidance of the priests or ministers, by no means exclusively in religious matters, but they are not keenly interested in the concerns and problems of their local church-community. Only 40 percent of the church-oriented persons say that they are “very interested” or simply “interested” in what is going on at the meetings of the local parish council. At the same time, one third are “not interested” or “not interested at all”; and about a quarter (24.2 percent) express indifference. Among those who are religious according to “their own way”, 71 percent were “not interested” or “not interested at all”, and 16 percent were indifferent.
This lack of interest is apparently not the result of priests’ or ministers’ unapproachability. Eighty two percent of the “churched” Hungarians feel that they can easily or very easily talk with the priest; about half (56 percent) of those who are religious according to “their own way”, respond similarly. It is also noteworthy that almost a third of the atheists (27 percent) feel that they can easily or very easily have access to religious professionals. According to the people responding to the questions, the lay leaders of the local church organizations are also easily approachable. The great majority of the members of the local church organizations feel that the priests or ministers let the members take part in decision-making processes. Only 13 percent think that the priests or ministers make decisions arbitrarily. The great proportion of those unable to answer (35 percent) is another indicator of lack of interest. However, probably the greatest sign of passivity is that only 9 percent of the membership would be willing to accept any position in the lay leadership of local organizations.

At a first glance, we might conclude that religious Hungarians are satisfied not only with the lay and ecclesiastical leadership of the churches, but also with political leaders’ attitudes and policies toward the churches. Reflecting on the results of the survey conducted for the Hungarian Catholic Bishops’ Conference (HCBC), Tomka (1997) notes that, surprisingly, those who think that the different political institutions support the churches, rather than try to hinder them, constitute a majority. However, closer analysis reveals that more than half of the population either does not know whether a given organization supports or opposes the churches, or simply believes that the attitudes of the organization are neutral toward the churches. What is even more remarkable is that, without exception, the proportion of the ignorant “churched” Hungarians is significantly
higher than the national average\textsuperscript{55}. This fact is less surprising if we consider that the less educated and mostly elderly population is over-represented among those who follow the teachings of a church. They are less able to follow the rapid social changes and political maneuvers of post-Communist Hungary than the younger and better educated generations.

However, these characteristics of church-oriented Hungarians have a further serious consequence for the social position of the churches, namely that those who want to further revive or reform the churches have the difficult task of motivating a rather passive and ignorant community whose members face a dramatic decline in the near future. As if it were not enough that the majority of Hungarians are religious without belonging and acting in accord with\textsuperscript{56} the teaching of the churches, even the few who consider themselves church-oriented are reluctant and unmotivated to act in and for the churches. Whether this is peculiar to Hungary or whether it is also true of other former Communist nations, or even other countries, requires further research. It is probably safe to state that this is characteristic of all of the former Communist countries, but it may also be suggested that it is a global phenomenon\textsuperscript{57}. However, it is without question that the churches, in terms of “churched” membership, are in a minority position in Hungarian society.

All in all, even if the fears of the political opposition had been well founded, the realization of a second Christian Course would not have been easy in the absence of energetic Christians. There were other factors that indicated the impossibility of a Christian Course. First of all, as we have seen, the Christian Course of the 1920s was “prepared” by the “white terror” of the Horthy regime, which was “accepted” by the
population because of the general anti-Communist feeling of that era. Although the
Communists were not popular in the early 1990s either, a “white terror” against them was
out of question. We must keep in mind that the Communists themselves initiated the
democratic reforms in the late 1980s in the hope of preserving significant power for
themselves for the future. Although they lost the 1990 elections, they became a
parliamentary party. Furthermore, they were able to hold their positions in most of the
local governments. As a consequence of their continued parliamentary presence and
dominance in the local governmental organizations, Communists, many of whom
committed crimes against humanity, especially in the suppression of the 1956 uprising,
are still unpunished58.

Another factor contributing to the impossibility of a new Christian Course was the
ecclesiastical leaders’ cautious stance towards politics. Although they welcomed the
moral and financial support of the Antall government, the post-Communist hierarchy did
not eulogize the politicians to the same extent as their predecessors had done in the
1920s. Apart from their ignorance or confusion concerning the plans of the different
political parties, evident in our earlier discussion of Bishop Gyulai’s letter, their fear of
the return of the Communist hard-liners also made them cautious about exalting the new
social system and its leaders59. The irony of history provided them with some
“justification” in that the Pope’s Hungarian visit coincided with the Soviet Communist
hard-liners’ – unsuccessful – coup d’etat against Gorbachev60.

In addition to the absence of an anti-Communist terror, and a eulogizing hierarchy, the
1990s also lacked an inspiring religious ideology. There was no genuine revival of the
Christian-national idea, which, as the civil religion of the Horthy era, united the truncated
country against its enemies under the banners of the churches. First and foremost among these enemies of course were Communists. Although the Catholics republished Prohászka’s works, the basic texts of Christian-national ideology, Hungarian society remained highly polarized especially in its attitude towards the public role of the churches.

As we indicated earlier, the churches were highly esteemed by Hungarians during, and shortly after, the transition to post-Communism. Their great prestige, however, deteriorated significantly between 1991 and 1994 in such a way that according to a well-publicized view none of the other cultural or political institutions had had a more dramatic fall. However, Tomka (1997) suggests that while it is true that the prestige of churches declined, this fact requires a more detailed analysis. First of all, due to the euphoria that accompanied the many rapid changes, Hungarians expected a great deal from the churches, even in areas in which the religious institutions had little or no influence or competence. Popular expectations were so inflated that disillusionment was inevitable. The prestige level of the churches “normalized”, i.e. simply returned to the level of 1989 and not to an earlier period. Finally, as Tomka notes, even after this decline, esteem for the churches in 1994 was still higher than that of the two most important political organizations: the parliament and the government.

Their high prestige, however, does not entail an unequivocal approval of the churches’ possible or real presence in politics. For example, in 1995, while about half of the population (47.6%) agreed that the churches deserved a general role in public life, less than a third (29.1%) thought that the churches should play a role in politics. Thus, while there is a general agreement among Hungarians that the churches have a legitimate
public role in post-Communist society, the prevailing sentiment is that this role should be apolitical.

By comparing public opinion gauged during several different time-periods of post-Communism we can also establish that apart from the general acceptance of churches in public life, an opposing tendency is also observable. In 1991, three quarters of the population welcomed, and only 7.6 percent found disquieting, the growing number of institutions run by the churches\textsuperscript{65}. Two years later, nearly two thirds of Hungarians (60.9 percent) felt that the public role of the churches was appropriate. At the same time, the proportion of those who found the public role of the churches either too great or unsatisfactory was basically equal, 16.5 and 16.7 percent, respectively. Thus, generally, in 1993 Hungarians wanted neither to increase nor reduce the presence of churches in public life, but the ratio of those opposing the public presence of churches grew. It must also be added that, in 1995, even in those areas where a small or significant majority of the population welcomed the contribution of the churches, those who absolutely opposed the presence of religious organizations constituted a greater proportion than those who wholeheartedly supported them\textsuperscript{66}. Thus, the polarization of the society with regard to the public role of the churches persisted.

A similar process among church-oriented Hungarians was also observable. Whereas in 1991, it was exceptionally rare for them to oppose the expansion and the intensification of religious organizations, in 1995, about one fifth of these people opposed further expansion\textsuperscript{67}. Tomka (1997) attributes this opposition to the wounding of Christian identity, an interpretation, which, in light of the Communist measures taken against religion, may certainly have some truth to it. However, apart from this, such opposition
to religious expansion could also be, at least partially, the result of a healthy process, involving the strengthening of civil society. Casanova notes that once the democratization process has succeeded “there is a built-in pressure toward the privatization of religion” (1994: 222). One of the reasons for this is the process of differentiation. The more or less undifferentiated sphere of religion hosting and nurturing other forces along with its own believers under the Communist era starts to release these political and cultural elements in a democratic climate. Although it has been questioned whether the Communist elite in Hungarian social and political life has been replaced significantly (Higley 1996) or that life has improved for the better part of the society (Ferge 1996, Andorka 1996b), it is indisputable that Hungary has become a democratic society. It has also been noted that the number of civil organizations has multiplied almost exponentially in Hungary since the late 1980s. Thus, we should not be surprised that significant numbers of people, including religious persons, oppose a process of “de-differentiation”, i.e. the further expansion of religious organizations.

Nevertheless, most Hungarians assume that churches are actively present in public life; and with the exception of their role in high schools and caring for refugees they even expect a significantly greater contribution from them in the future. Both Tomka (1997) and Tamás (1997) note, however, that in most cases, higher expectations regarding the churches do not entail a significant decline in what is expected of the state. In other words, as Tomka concludes, the population prefers the decentralization of the fulfillment of different tasks in public life (1997: 146).

An analysis of where Hungarians want minimal influence of the churches could be very consequential for the church-state relations of the future. We can conclude that
Hungarians would prefer the churches to have only a small influence on both their individual and communal lives. They do not want the churches to have a decisive say in any level of education or the organization of communal life. It is readily understandable that most people should consider the churches incompetent in the area of ecology, but it is less clear why they do not want to see them around childbirth or hospital beds. This fact, however, demonstrates that Hungarians want to conduct their private lives without the supervision of the churches.

The extent of the social division occasioned by contrary views on the public presence of the churches, especially the enmity between liberals and Catholics on the issue of education, can be seen in the disputed case of a school in Dabas-Sári. Since the parties with a Christian and national attitude were in ruling positions at the national level, the two other political forces distinguishable in the Antall era, the Socialists and liberals, usually supported each other. Consequently, when the Catholic parish in Dabas-Sári reclaimed the elementary school, which primarily served the children of the local Slovak minority, Hungarian political and public life was divided into two camps.

The reason for confrontation in Dabas-Sári lay not in the shortage of elementary schools, but in the fact that the teaching of the Slovak language took place in the reclaimed school. The constitutionally guaranteed right to be non-religious was exploited by the opponents of religious schools. They argued that Slovak parents who did not want their children to receive religious education had no alternative because the teaching in the other two schools was conducted exclusively in Hungarian. On June 30, 1993, the local government of Dabas-Sári voted to return the school to the Catholic Church. The church,
in its turn, guaranteed that the rights of ideologically neutral or atheist parents would be upheld.

However, this was not enough for the opponents of church involvement in education who, refraining neither from fraud nor violence, manipulated the survey conducted among the parents. The supporters of the Catholic school received threatening letters; their cars and homes were vandalized, and in one case a supporter was even knocked down by brute force. Due to the excessive media coverage, the case went to the Constitutional Court, whose decision was to divide the institution into both a Catholic and a public school. Vandalism continued even after the legal decision. Signs and religious symbols were destroyed, and flowers were uprooted in the gardens of the Catholic section. Even the wall, which separated the Catholic teacher’s room from the public teacher’s room, was broken down. Although the event in Dabas-Sári was not repeated elsewhere, at least not with the same intensity, it exemplified very well Tamás’ claim (1997: 41) that the opponents to the public presence of the churches, especially in the field of education, were much more determined than its supporters.

Another blow to the historical churches and to the government, which relied on these churches, came from an anti-cult campaign, which backfired. Géza Németh, a former minister of the Reformed Church, established the “Helping Friend Community” in October of 1991, which turned out to be the beginning of an anti-cult campaign. The original intention of the “Helping Friend” was to mediate in conflicts between parents and their children, even if grown-up, who became members of ‘sects’. As Barker (1998) notes, there are at least four reasons why the historical churches were less attractive than the new denominations. The leaders of the historical churches were not only viewed as
collaborators with the Communists, but they were also inexperienced in leadership. In contrast, the new denominations, coming mostly from abroad, seemed to have inexhaustible financial and other resources, whereas the wealth of the historical churches had been confiscated. Therefore, the energy of the historical churches was divided between pastoral work and the restoration of their property. Finally, we must not forget that generations of Hungarians had been subjected to unrelenting anti-religious socialization, which was directed mostly against the historical churches. Not surprisingly, the new denominations fared better in religious ‘competition’ than the historical churches. It is also understandable that several leaders of the historical churches and the government tried to stop the unparalleled growth of new denominations.

In the plan of the Helping Friend the first step was a press campaign, which turned out to be effective because of its shock value. The tragic stories of several families, or rather of the parents of those families, were published in ten newspapers. This precipitated an avalanche of complaints from other parents about the suspicious behavior of their children. On October 3, 1992, the community organized a conference with a guest speaker, Ursula Zopfer, “scientific co-worker” of the German “Community of Parents Against Sects”. This conference was covered not only by newspapers but also by the two daily news channels of the television. About a week later, on October 11, Németh sent a petition to two ministers of the Antall government and the Catholic and Reformed Churches urging the “organized education of the youth [about the dangers of the sects]”. He also wanted to mobilize the police and establish a government office where parents could complain about the sects. Finally, he promoted not only the banning of “destructive sects”, but also the “deprogramming” of their victims. His campaign was so
effective that in 1993, the Antall government suspended the financial support of four so-called "destructive sects": the Jehovah Witnesses, the Church of Scientology, the Hare Krishna Movement, and the Unification Church. A member of the parliament, Zsolt Semjén, also proposed – unsuccessfully – a modification of the law defining the criteria for establishing a church. The new proposal would have permitted only those religious communities that either had more than ten thousand members or were over one hundred years old. These measures demonstrated that the Antall cabinet definitely favored the historical churches.

Due to the well-prepared press campaign, there was practically no national protest against parliament’s decision. However, hostile and critical messages from all over the world jammed the fax machines of the Prime Minister’s Office. The international pressure became so acute that the following year the government abandoned the distinction between “destructive” and favored religious organizations. In retrospect, the whole anti-cult campaign seems to have been engineered by special interests rather than reflecting significant concern on the part of “average” Hungarians. Indeed, the next stage of the anti-cult campaign, a series of lectures on sects and cults, organized by the Kossuth Club, were cancelled because of lack of interest. To summarize, the failure to mobilize Hungarians against the new denominations demonstrated not only the divided society and the more determined opposition to the historical churches but also Hungarians’ passivity and relative lack of interest in religious issues.

As we have observed, the Catholic Church and the Reformed Churches provided Hungary with national and cultural identity in the interwar period. We have also seen that the Antall government also counted on the support of the churches in the
revitalization and preservation of national identity — even to the extent of abandoning the long-needed reorganization of the diocesan borders. However, even the apparently inextricable connection between the historical churches and Hungarian culture was questioned during the Antall government. Rabbi György Landeszmann, in a debate on “Who is Hungarian”, argued that without the Jews, Hungarians would still be herding their stocks in “gatyai”. Needless to say, such a claim reopened the “Jewish question” in Hungarian society. According to Andorka (1996), it was in the interest of the Communists to maintain and strengthen anti-Semitism in Hungary. They forbade the discussion of anti-Semitism, which tended to keep it alive on an emotional level. The Communists made use of this tension by applying the principle of divide et impera.

Before and after World War II, Hungarian cultural life was characterized by a debate between the “urbanites” and the “populists”. Jews were over-represented in the former, and for many Hungarians this led to a simplified view of the debate between Jews and Hungarians. Although Landeszmann emigrated rather quickly to Israel, his unfortunate claim was interpreted as evidence of a 'competition' between Christians and Jews regarding which religion more appropriately represents the national and cultural identity of Hungarians.

All in all, despite the high prestige of the churches at the beginning of the 1990s, the policy of the coalition representing Christian values and supporting the historical churches was rather unpopular. By the end of the tenure of the Antall government, the ecclesiastical leaders were in no doubt of the rising popularity of the former Communists, now organized in the Socialist Party. Old ladies, for example, spontaneously initiated prayers in churches for the recovery of the leader of the Socialist Party, Gyula Horn who
was injured in a car accident. The campaign before the 1994 elections was characterized alternately by mutual courting and insulting. While the party leaders sought the support of the Catholic Church, the Church also attempted to ensure its continued prosperity regardless of the outcome of the elections. The hierarchy of the historical churches was unquestionably delighted by the benevolent attitude of the Antall government, but when the leader of the MDF claimed bluntly that they had the support of the churches, the Catholic Church distanced itself from the statement. Meanwhile, the “rank and file” of both churches and parties insulted each other through the mass media, particularly the newspapers. Supporters of the opposition parties found the politics of the Antall government hateful, hypocritical, vengeful, greedy, careerist, blasphemous, and provocative. The supporters of the ruling coalition offered ceaseless reminders that liberal parties promote amorality and that the Communists, now members of the Socialist Party, were longtime foes and oppressors of the churches. Overall, the media were undoubtedly in favor of the opposition. As Bishop Gyulai pointed out, the leaders of all the parties visited him, but the television reported only the visits of the leaders of the two liberal parties. Furthermore, even in those reported visits, the reporters interviewed only the party leaders and not the bishop.

The Hungarian Catholic hierarchy issued a pastoral letter on April 21, stating that it was their followers’ right and obligation to vote according to the teaching of the church. Although they did not indicate directly what party to vote for, they reminded the people in broad terms that there were parties advocating Christian values and supporting the churches while other political organizations did not. Priests and ministers, however, gave more direct and straightforward guidance to the faithful from the pulpit, urging them to
prevent the former Communists from returning to power. It was a bitter experience for the clergy to realize that their flocks were not listening to them. The Socialist Party won the 1994 election overwhelmingly, by gaining 54 percent of the vote. It established a coalition with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a liberal party, and assumed the reins of government.

Despite the ineffectiveness of the priests’ words, the parliamentary elections of 1994 indicated something consequential. Bishop Endre Gyulai published a “reader for the elections”. This was a collection of comments made by the members of Hungarian parliament on issues sensitive to the Church, notably the protection of unborn lives, religious education, and the return of ecclesiastical properties nationalized by the Communists. Although the reader did not do what Gyulai had intended it to, it could be considered the first indication of the hierarchy’s 'acknowledgment' that its believers were adults, capable of making their own decisions on political matters.


Unlike the approach of its predecessor, the stance of the Horn government towards religion and churches was based on a strict separationist reading of the constitution. However, it is possible to interpret the new government’s policy of church-state separation as a cover for activities hostile to organized religion. The legally regulated and guaranteed return of ecclesiastical properties was delayed for a year, the salaries of those
teaching religion in schools were not paid by the government, and the churches received less financial support for the social services which they provided than did governmental institutions. The smaller churches, which did not have any property to be returned to them, and could not teach religion in schools because of their small membership, welcomed the Horn cabinet's 'anti-historical-church' attitude. However, the smaller churches soon became disappointed because of what they perceived as the moral nihilism of the coalition.

The Horn government further alienated itself from the historical churches, and most of all from the Catholic Church, by introducing new legislation, which intended to make governmental financial support unnecessary by allowing citizens to channel a certain amount of their income tax to the churches. The historical churches, traditionally entrusted with several social tasks, viewed this measure as tantamount to religious discrimination and persecution, because their membership is notably old, poor and unlikely to pay high rates of income tax. In 1997, sensing the dissatisfaction of the Catholic Church, the governing coalition signed an agreement with the Vatican, guaranteeing favorable financial support for the Catholic Church. However, when the Hungarian Catholic Bishops' Conference (HCBC) named its members to the committee charged with the task of working out the necessary changes in the legislation, the Horn cabinet halted the implementation of the agreement by failing to nominate anybody for this task.

At the same time, the political parties traditionally associated with Christian and national values continued to decline in popularity. The Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), originally a liberal party, noticed that the majority of Hungarians, while tired of religious slogans, did not subscribe wholeheartedly to cosmopolitan liberalism, and wanted to uphold a certain level of morality and protect national identity. The party, reflecting on these
needs, changed its policy and its name. With a program of strengthening the middle class, the FIDESZ-MPP soon emerged as the only organization likely to challenge the ruling Socialist Party with some hope of success in the 1998 elections.

In 1996, Archbishop Seregély, the president of HCBC, pointed out the widening social differences, and the poverty of half of the Hungarian population, as results of the “perverse liberal system.” The Catholic Church provided not only harsh words but also a lengthy document on the country’s social and economic situation. This statement, addressed to believers and all benevolent Hungarians, analyzed the country’s social, medical, economic, political, and cultural situation, highlighted the burning issues of social justice, and asserted the church’s solidarity with the poor. The Hungarian Catholic Church, which is usually criticized for its slowness, was the first and so far the only religious organization in Central-Eastern Europe to publish such a comprehensive study. The purpose of this pastoral letter was twofold: the Church wanted to take a stand without commitment to any political party, and it also wanted to give a comprehensive analysis of the country’s situation. It was successful on both counts. The major party in the coalition, the Socialists, admitted that the Party could have written the document in the same spirit, and, unsurprisingly, the opposition parties and different NGOs welcomed its appearance. A new party, the Hungarian Democratic People’s Party (MDNP) stated that its program was partly based upon the document of the HCBC. Another indication of the effectiveness of the study was the nation-wide discussion, which surrounded its publication. It is impossible to gauge to what extent the bishops’ letter contributed to the fall of the Social-Liberal Coalition. Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that the letter
opened a “public and collective self-reflection”, thus illustrating one aspect of Casanova’s theory of the role of public religions in modern societies.\textsuperscript{102}

The HCBC, obviously, did not mention party preferences in its 1996 document, and neither did the bishops in their pastoral letter preceding the 1998 elections. The letter was supposed to be read out in churches on April 19, 1998. However, \textit{Népszabadság}, the daily newspaper of the ruling Socialist Party, had published the letter in its entirety more than a week earlier, on April 10. The bishops were surprised, but not intimidated, because the content and tone of the letter were very cautious. As one of the commentators noted, basing a decision exclusively on the letter, one could vote for any party.\textsuperscript{103} However, the letter contained one strategically significant point. Apart from pointing out that lack of participation might help those parties to which one was opposed and encouraging Catholics to vote for parties that supported Christian values,\textsuperscript{104} the bishops also warned their faithful not to vote for parties that would have no chance of receiving the five percent vote necessary to become a parliamentary party.

Other Christian publications, a weekly newspaper and a bimonthly periodical, were less neutral and explained that fragmented votes for the smaller parties would assist the Socialists. Two days before the publication of the HCBC’s letter, Gyula Horn asked the bishops to remain neutral in the campaign, and objected to the explicit guidelines provided by the Christian publications and several leaflets distributed in churches.\textsuperscript{105} A number of journalists pointed out that it was the right of the Catholic bishops and other religious dignitaries, as the leaders of intermediary organizations, to provide their faithful with guidelines.\textsuperscript{106} Indeed, the Calvinist Church issued a similar letter, making the same strategic point. Interestingly, the ecclesiastical leaders’ recommendation that people vote
only for stronger candidates was especially harmful to the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP). The HCBC distanced itself from the KDNP not only for strategic reasons, but also for political and ideological ones.

In the first round of the elections, the Socialist Party received the most votes, but the FIDESZ-MPP was a close second. The leadership of the third party, the Smallholders Party (FKGP), then urged its membership to vote for the FIDESZ-MPP in the second round. With the support of the FKGP, the FIDESZ-MPP, led by Victor Orbán, won the election, to the satisfaction of the ecclesiastical leaders. Neither the KDNP nor the MDNP received enough votes to become a parliamentary party. The only person who would not accept the results was Gyula Horn, the leader of the Socialist Party. He claimed repeatedly that his party lost the elections because of the priests’ “instructions” from the pulpit. Apparently, he forgot that his party had won the 1994 elections contrary to the priests’ ‘instructions’ from the same pulpit.

The Orbán Government (1998 – present)

The “Yuppie Prime Minister”, as Viktor Orbán was nicknamed during his visit to the US, immediately surprised Hungarians at his inauguration. The father of three, who in 1990 had proudly shown off his liberal, anti-religious views by telling journalists that he had not even bought a Christmas tree for his children, unexpectedly but clearly and loudly asked for the help of God after taking the prescribed oath of office. Reflecting on
developments in church-state relationships during the Orbán cabinet’s first year, the leaders of the historical churches might justifiably have concluded that the new Prime Minister was indeed generous toward their churches. Developments in church-state relations under the Orbán government are best discussed in terms of two themes. The first and more specific theme involves the reintroduction of certain elements of the 'Christian Course', although in a moderate and very cautious way by a new conservative bloc of centre-right political forces. The second broad and overarching theme is that of globalization, a process which exerts an increasingly significant impact on the specific content of evolving Hungarian church-state relations.

A Moderate 'Christian Course'

On taking office, Prime Minister Orbán announced immediately that political continuity with the Antall government, and not with the Horn government, would be visible “in the goals, principles and persons” of his government. He also urged the leaders of the Hungarian diplomatic corps to represent abroad the government’s political and ideological values, which were defined as “Christian, Christian-conservative and conservative-liberal”. József Hámori, Minister of Culture, also emphasized the government’s commitment to the “establishment of a Christian and civic Hungary and drawing the society closer to the churches”. The representation of Christian values by the new government and its diplomatic corps definitely constituted an element similar to the policy of the Christian Course in the interwar period.
The present government’s commitment to Christianity, as it is represented by the historical churches, can be seen in its intent to work out a new framework for the cooperation of the government and the historical churches, in the support these churches receive, and in their privileged protection, as manifested in proposed restrictions on the registration of new churches. The first step in working out this framework has been the abolition of negative discrimination against the churches so that, for example, the churches now receive the same financial support for their provision of social services as public institutions do. Similarly, the new government provides funding for educational institutions run by the churches. The second step has been the modification of Hungarian laws to harmonize them with the agreement reached between the Vatican and the Horn government.

The Orbán government has not only cleared the legal obstacles to financial support, but has also established a contract of annuity with the Catholic Church along lines originally agreed by the Horn government. As we have noted, under the Horn government it became clear that the return of the ecclesiastical estates would not be possible by 2001, which was the original deadline in Law XXXII of 1991. The Horn cabinet extended the return of properties to 2011, but even this deadline seemed to be too optimistic. The contract of annuity has provided funds for rehabilitation and compensation for property unlikely to be returned by the revised deadline of 2011. In the case of the Catholic Church, 1,149 properties were listed at a value of 42 billion Fts (about $182 million US). The Catholic Church will receive an annuity of 2.3 billion Fts for its properties in 1999, the sum of which is guaranteed to increase yearly according to inflation "until the end of times."
The third step in the framework for the cooperation of the government and the historical churches has been the "final solution of the return of the ecclesiastical real estates". When it became clear that the return of the ecclesiastical properties would be impossible within the legally established time frame, the Horn cabinet modified the law in December 1997. The new legislation of the Horn government requested the churches to prepare a new list by January 15, 1998, after which no further property could be reclaimed. According to this list, the Catholic Church alone claims the return of 800 additional real estate properties. Zsolt Semjén, deputy state secretary responsible for church relations in the Ministry of National Cultural Heritage, estimated the annual budget for the return of ecclesiastical properties until 2011 as 5-6 billion Fts, which "in all probability, should not be an unbearable burden". With regard to the aforementioned measures, it is evident that the Orbán government complies with the benevolent reading of the constitutional separation of church and state.

Another sign of the government's dedication to Christianity, as the historical churches represent it, can be seen in the proposed restrictions on the registration of new churches. We have discussed the reasons Hungarians, especially young people, have turned away from the historical churches since the heyday of Communism. These churches now face a new threat in the form of increased religious competition. Since the fall of Communism, new legislation regulating religious life in Hungary, enacted in the "last days of the old Communists", has facilitated the establishment of new denominations whether they originate from abroad (usually from the United States) or have broken away from existing Hungarian denominations. Present Hungarian law calls all churches, denominations, and other religious organizations "churches". A church can be registered at a court either in a county or in the capital when it fulfills the following
requirements: (a) the church has 100 establishing members, (b) those persons accept the statutes of the church, (c) they elect their representative and executive organs, and finally (d) the religious activity is in accord with the country’s Constitution and other laws. At least three difficulties arise from this legislation which must be taken into account here.

The first problem that arises from this legal formula is that the law does not define what counts as religious activity. This law recreates the all-inclusive nature of functional definitions of religion extending “to some phenomena that substantivists identify as nonreligion: ideologies, ethos, value systems, world views, interpersonal relations, leisure activities, voluntary associations, and so on” (McGuire 1987: 9). Indeed, groups that by common consent would not, in ordinary language, be considered religious have registered themselves as religions for financial privileges. In the early 1990s, for example, a hundred prostitutes established the short-lived “Church of the Priestesses of Venus” in Szeged, a large city on the border of Yugoslavia. Similarly, the most prominent Hungarian Buddhist leaders believe that the Csan Buddhist Community is a martial art school rather than a Buddhist community and that the financial assistance of the state is simply being appropriated by the leader of this community. The second problem is that if a church registers at a county court, it will probably go undetected for government purposes, because the list of registered churches, published by the Office of the Prime Minister (MEH), contains only those registered in the capital, Budapest. The third problem is that the churches are not obliged to register. According to one estimate, at least 150 religious groups formed between 1990 and 1996, mostly in the Tiszántúl, the Eastern part of Hungary, and the Duna-Tisza Köze, an area between the Danube and the
Tisza rivers. However, only 22 have been registered, probably because the others were not able to reach the required membership, but as registration is not obligatory this cannot be assumed.

However, most of the churches need financial assistance from the government, and this requires registration. Thus, apart from the probability of the existence of many unregistered churches, the number of registered denominations has grown constantly since the fall of Communism. While their number in 1990 was only 35, it had reached 94 by the middle of 1999\textsuperscript{125}. Although the unsuccessful anti-cult campaign of Géza Németh and the liberal attitude of the Horn government 'put the public to sleep' regarding the issue of new religious organizations, concern about the activity of the new denominations has been raised again as the millennium approaches. The Blikk\textsuperscript{126}, for example, recently informed the public that Necronomicon, a book of demon-summoning texts, written by an insane prisoner about 730 A. D. and put on the index by Pope Gregory IX in 1232, had been republished in Hungary in 1997. While the book is forbidden by most of the churches and the states, a member of parliament belonging to the FIDESZ-MPP supported its publication in Hungary. In response, Bishop Gyulai warned potential readers that the book is, for all practical purposes, satanic in intent and possible consequences. In his Report to the European Council, another member of parliament, the Socialist Gyula Hegyi, asserts strongly that there are "sects in Hungary that are involved in dealing with drugs, weapons, child-prostitution, and other destructive activity"\textsuperscript{127}.

Witnessing the growing number of new denominations, and perceiving potential danger from this source, in January 1999, Zsolt Semjén\textsuperscript{128} revived and reintroduced his proposal for restricting the registration of churches. According to his plan, a requirement of
registration would be either a minimum century-long presence of the religious group in Hungary or a membership of at least 10,000. This time Semjén was also able to refer to the legal guidelines of the European Union, which recommend that member states give most careful consideration when granting religious organizations the status of officially recognized religious institutions entitled to beneficial tax exemptions and legal protections. Furthermore, in justified cases the states should withdraw this status from groups that practice secret or criminal activities\textsuperscript{129}. These guidelines were formulated following the tragic death of sixteen persons in Vercors, France, on December 23, 1995\textsuperscript{130}. But Semjén could also plausibly refer to the allegedly criminal activity of the Church of Scientology in Germany in justification of his more restrictive policy.

Whether or not a new law will be enacted and, if so, how soon this will occur is, at this time, simply a matter of conjecture. It is interesting, however, to consider some of the reactions to the proposal. Not surprisingly, the historical churches, notably the Catholic and the Reformed Churches and the Jewish Communities have supported it absolutely. Although the leaders of the Unitarian Church consider any interference of the state with religion as contrary to the traditions of their church, they do acknowledge that the current situation encourages abuse of legal regulations. Understandably, the smaller churches have been less sympathetic to legislative change, although some of their representatives have also acknowledged and condemned the practice of establishing churches in order to receive tax exemption\textsuperscript{131}. Furthermore, the Alliance of Free Democrats, the junior party in the coalition of the Horn government, considers the modification of the law unnecessary, citing the arrangements of church and state in the United States as the exemplar Hungarians should follow. The attachment of the SZDSZ to the American
model is all the more interesting if we recall that it was the SZDSZ that promoted and enacted the legislation for financing the churches in a manner similar to the Italian model\textsuperscript{132}.

Leaders of the Faith Church (Hír Gyülekezete) have also criticized the new proposal, because, according to them, it would completely annihilate the freedom of religious association. In their view, the present legal means at the disposal of the government are enough to prevent any abuse committed under the guise of religious activity. In retrospect, the stand of the Faith Church has probably been influenced by its own questionable conduct. A short description of the Faith Church must, therefore, be included here because this organization is now the fourth biggest denomination of the country. It is known as the most progressive new church and is credited with significant political influence. It has also been involved in some well-publicized scandals\textsuperscript{133}.

The Faith Church began as a circle of seven friends, whose leader, Sándor Németh, once studied for the Catholic priesthood. What distinguished him from other seminarians was twofold. Firstly, he exhibited an attraction toward Israel and the Jewish people\textsuperscript{134}. Secondly, through his Protestant acquaintances he developed closed contacts with the charismatic movement. This Protestant influence and his dissatisfaction with the passivity of established Christianity in Hungary originating from the submission to the Communist state were probably the reasons he left the Catholic seminary in 1978. He and his friends did not remain with the charismatic Protestants, but many people from the charismatic Nazarenes\textsuperscript{135} joined them. The membership of the Faith Church, which Németh founded in 1979, grew rapidly. By the end of 1996 it had 35,000 active members nation-wide. It established its own theological academy and organized its own
charitable institution: the Network of the Donors of the Faith Church (HAH). More importantly, it did not consider politics as something utterly evil. Its members documented the harassment they had experienced under the Communist regime and sent this information to foreign human rights organizations. This brought them closer to the emerging political opposition. The Faith Church helped found the Network of Free Initiatives in the mid-1980s, the precursor to the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a liberal party in governing position with the Socialist Party between 1994 and 1998. The Faith Church promoted a strict separationist view on the relationship of church and state.

The kinship between the SZDSZ and the Faith Church took its toll on both, but probably more so on the SZDSZ. It was common knowledge that the Faith Church significantly helped the party in its election campaigns. However, the Faith Church was not completely satisfied with the actions of the SZDSZ in the governing coalition, because the financial scandals of the coalition indirectly eroded the reputation of the church. Sándor Németh despised the intertwining of church and state in the established churches, and this view seemed to be widely endorsed by the members of his congregation. According to some journalists, Iván Pető, the leader of the SZDSZ, had to resign in 1997 because of Németh’s pressure.

Apart from political difficulties, the troubles of the Faith Church originated mainly from Németh’s attraction to the Jewish people and the charismatic movement, sentiments which also became characteristic of his congregation. Their philo-Semitism and antagonism toward the historical churches became evident in the establishment of their military chaplaincy. Although their strong belief in and devotion to Jesus would
normally have affiliated them with the Protestant churches, they insisted on being placed under the aegis of the leading Jewish Rabbi in the army\textsuperscript{139}. Many Hungarians became convinced that the Faith Church was sponsored financially by the Jews when 2,500 of its members traveled to Israel for a convention, "the greatest number of Hungarians to arrive in Jerusalem at one time since the Crusades"\textsuperscript{140}. For "average" Hungarians, such an expensive trip was only explicable in terms of special financial favours from Hungarian Jewry or the State of Israel. All in all, while anti-Semitism is not dominant in Hungary, overt philo-Semitism is not 'fashionable' either. In this regard, the Faith Church is definitely not in the mainstream of Hungarian public opinion.

The charismatic movement is not as alien to Hungarians as philo-Semitism because the Christian historical churches also participate in it in varying degree. However, there is a difference between the practices of the "mainline" charismatic movement and those of the Faith Church. The practices of the latter, which are commonly known as the Toronto Blessing\textsuperscript{141}, make the Faith Church especially attractive to some, and extremely repulsive to others. The signs of the Toronto Blessing include "various physical and emotional manifestations ... uncontrollable laughter, 'drunkenness' in the Spirit, intense weeping, falling to the floor, physical convulsions or jerks, pogoing and bouncing, shouting and roaring, visions, prophetic words and announcements, often accompanied with physical demonstrations"\textsuperscript{142}. While for some\textsuperscript{143}, these are the signs of the Holy Spirit, others leave the room disappointed and outraged, seeing in such behavior simply the results of social and psychological manipulation. The question here is: Why do many Hungarians find the "Toronto Blessing" so appealing?

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Apart from the presence of mystery and the spiritual reassurance of ecstatic experience, the Toronto Blessing has another seductive feature. While the first two waves of the charismatic movement were almost exclusively attractive to the poor and uneducated, the "Third Wave", including the Toronto Blessing, is also fashionable for the middle class. The majority of the middle class who have joined the Third Wave have done their share of "church shopping" and have found the movement particularly attractive for two reasons. Apart from a faith that could be acted out through experience, "with the notion of continued individual development [this movement] has managed to tap the middle-class culture attributes of self-advancement" (Hunt 1995:265).

Indeed, the Faith Church in Hungary has come to be known as the church of the new entrepreneurial class. However, before the fall of Communism, this church was the home of women between the age of 15 and 25, mostly students in high school and post-secondary education. Its male membership was mostly drawn from those between 20-30 years of age employed in such marginal jobs, as selling books and janitorial work (Horváth 1995:328). Thus, in the Hungarian case, the Faith Church did not recruit its membership from the middle class, but acted as an agent of social mobility. It helped its marginalized membership to become entrepreneurs. This help came partly from an "elective affinity" somewhat similar to that Weber (1958) observed functioning between the early capitalist entrepreneurial spirit and the Protestant ethic. Although the 'doctrinal' teaching of the Faith Church lacks the characteristic Calvinist salvation anxiety, its members are convinced that God cares for them, but they have to do their share too. The other motivating factors might be simply coincidental: the recency of the reintroduction of entrepreneurial activity in Hungary and the rather young, highly
educated membership. Being a new religious group, the Faith Church originally lacked charities supporting its own needy members. However, many of them were highly trained, were presented with appropriate opportunities, and were encouraged by their church to start new businesses. The successful entrepreneurs who belonged to the church increasingly employed the less fortunate members and lobbied for each other in political and financial contexts. Thus, the 8.5 million Ft subsidy they received from the government in 1996 constituted only 5-10 percent of their operational budget, the rest came from the members’ tithe.\textsuperscript{148}

Since the Faith Church, as noted earlier, is part of the Pentecostal movement, it is not surprising that several aspects of its career in Hungary resemble that of Pentecostalism in Latin America. Like the Faith Church in Hungary, the different Pentecostal movements appeal, although not exclusively, to the poor, and set many of them on a path of upward mobility. Martin’s (1990) observation on the essential condition of Pentecostalism’s success in Latin America is also applicable, to a considerable extent, to the Hungarian case. He notes that the “spread of evangelical Christianity in Latin America is contingent upon the breakdown of the organic unity of [Catholicism] and national identity, and the general deregulation of religion” (1990 : 13). While Catholicism in Hungary did not have such a hegemonic power as it did in Latin America and had no monopoly on the formation of Hungarian identity, the Communists’ total control regulated religion generally. Thus the dynamic growth of the Faith Church could begin, and did indeed, only after the fall of Communism.

There is, however, a difference between the development of Pentecostalism in Latin America and that of the Faith Church in Hungary. Martin not only establishes a “close
genetic connection between Methodism, as the second wave of Protestantism, and Pentecostalism as the third” (1990: 27), he also notes that what Methodism did to the English society and to the United States in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the same as what Pentecostalism does today to Latin America. Methodism was egalitarian in nature, which, along with other features, helped prepare its members to assist the transformation to, and to participate actively in, democracy. While the Faith Church, as we have noted, contributed to the fall of Communism, its present practices hinder the members’ free participation in public life, by keeping them dependent on their leader.

Although Németh’s position seems unshakable for the time being, this situation, and consequently the further developments of Pentecostalism in Hungary, might change in the future. The authoritarian style of Sándor Németh has alienated some members, and more than eight hundred have left. A former member, László Bartus (1999), has recently described the Faith Church as “a danger to the public”, the violations of human rights in the church as “numbing”, and the authoritative practices as “laughable”. Bartus, as the editor of the Faith Church’s newspapers, the Hit Info (Information of the Faith [Church]) and later the Hetek (Weeks), once belonged to the inner core of the Faith Church, but gradually became critical of and estranged from its leadership. Sándor Németh and his loyal followers pressured Bartus to remain faithful to their church. As a result of constant harassment and molestation, Bartus first became intimidated then clinically depressed. After a tormenting inner struggle, and several months of hospitalization and incapacitation, he finally decided to leave. “As of today”, wrote Bartus in a letter to Németh, “I no longer consider myself a member of the Faith Church. The church’s authority has ceased to apply to me. I stand before you as a member of the Hungarian
Republic equal in rights with you. As such, I can decide whether or not I want to meet you. I do not\textsuperscript{153}.

Bartus’ reference to his citizenship in the Hungarian Republic and his plan to turn to the Human Rights Committee of the Parliament (1999 : 269) had the Faith Church continued to harass him, were grist to Semjén’s mill. Shortly after the publication of Bartus’ book, Semjén claimed that society has a right to protect its citizens from destructive groups\textsuperscript{154}. Following Bartus’ revealing public account of the Faith Church, other accusations also surfaced. Several investigations were launched into alleged financial abuses perpetrated by the church during the Horn administration, in which the SZDSZ had been the junior party\textsuperscript{155}. In addition to financial malfeasance, Németh was also accused of racist exhortations. He had apparently declared that Arabs are primarily terrorists, and only secondarily are they human beings\textsuperscript{156}. He had also urged the members of the Faith Church to burn books that were “not sympathetic to him”, which qualified as a crime of inciting hatred against a community\textsuperscript{157}. If all of this were not enough, Péter Hack, a leader of the Faith Church and the deputy leader of the SZDSZ in the Parliament, declared his belief in the causal connection between demons and sickness\textsuperscript{158}, although the publication, which reported this, did not mention whether Hack was familiar with the Necronomicon. In light of the many embarrassing revelations concerning the Faith Church and the apparently increasing public hostility to its activities, it seems all the more probable that Semjén’s proposed change in the legislation concerning religious funding will succeed, to the delight of the historical churches.

In addition to the government’s claim to embrace and represent Christian values, the new framework for cooperation between the government and the historical churches and the
proposed restrictions on the registration of new churches, the Orbán cabinet’s acknowledgment of Christianity’s presence in education also represents a cautious revival of the Christian Course of the interwar period. The Prime Minister has stated forthrightly his view that Christian upbringing and education are crucial elements in the creation of a democratic citizenry. In this vein, he has commented that the country expects the schools to provide not only education but also an ‘education in a certain spirit’\textsuperscript{159}. The cautious emphasis on Christian values in education undoubtedly indicates the government’s acute awareness that most Hungarians do not want the churches to have a significant role in this sphere. The majority of them expect the schools to convey scientific knowledge to their children, and only ten percent considers an emphasis on moral education important\textsuperscript{160}.

The historical churches, or more precisely, the Orbán government’s expectations of the historical churches, also provide some similarities to the Christian Course of the interwar period. Like the governments between the two world wars, the Orbán government also counts on the churches to represent Hungary’s interests abroad, and what is more, to aid in the representation of the interests of ‘Greater Hungary’. When the Rumanian Orthodox Church invited Pope John Paul II for an ecumenical visit, Hungarians expected the pope to visit not only the Orthodox in Bucharest, but also the Catholics, the majority of whom are Hungarian. They expected him to visit either the center of the largest Catholic diocese, Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia), or Csiksomlyó, a traditional Hungarian shrine in Transylvania. The wishes of Hungarians were unfulfilled. When it became evident that the pope would visit neither Gyulafehérvár nor Csiksomlyó, the Hungarian Catholic Bishops’ Conference issued a press communiqué. While emphasizing that they
did not intend to interfere with the inner life of other churches, the bishops clearly felt the
need to publicly express solidarity with their brethren in Transylvania\textsuperscript{161}.

Another area where the government welcomes the support of the historical churches is in
the campaign to secure Hungary’s integration with the European Union. Delegates of the
Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Churches, together with those of the Jewish
communities were invited to visit Brussels in February of 1999. Semjén explained that,
in sharp contrast to Orthodoxy, the Hungarian historical churches are the living proof that
Hungary belongs culturally to Western Europe and not to the East\textsuperscript{162}. Their existence is
thus a potent political symbol of which the Orbán government is well aware.

Hungarian church leaders and Christian politicians seem to be key players in the march
toward expanded European integration. Apart from the strategic significance of the
country’s geographical position between Eastern and Western Europe, the initiative of
Asztrik Várszegi, the arch abbot of Pannonhalma, was crucial in this respect. When
Alexii II, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russians, stayed in Hungary between March 3
and 6, 1994, he visited Pannonhalma. A new climate of mutual respect created a friendly
atmosphere\textsuperscript{163} that motivated Várszegi to invite Alexii II to the millennial anniversary of
Pannonhalma celebrated in 1996. Since Pope John Paul II was also invited, Várszegi’s
plan was to bring the two church leaders together on ‘neutral ground’. While the pope and
Alexii II himself were ready for this historic meeting, the Russian Synod did not consent
to it.

However, Várszegi’s plan inspired the Rumanian government to exploit the pope’s
readiness to enhance ecumenism between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Although the
Rumanian Orthodox Church was reluctant to invite the pope\textsuperscript{164}, the Rumanian government's insistence – and its pressure on the Orthodox Church – bore fruit. As we have seen, the pope's ecumenical visit to Rumania created some dissatisfaction among Hungarians, but it enhanced Rumania's chances of being admitted to the European Union. Meanwhile, the Patriarch of Constantinople also visited Hungary, where he invited Zsolt Semjén, the deputy state secretary responsible for church-state relations, to visit him in Constantinople\textsuperscript{165}. Since this invitation had implications for both the Russian Patriarch and the Holy See, the Hungarian politician was 'cordially invited' to Moscow and the Vatican as well. Given Eastern European countries' interest in an expanded European Community and the potential role of ecclesiastical leaders in further European integration, we may safely predict that this situation will also affect Hungarian church-state relationships by increasing the presence of religious leaders in public life.

Furthermore, the interaction between Arch Abbot Várszegi and the Russian patriarch, or the maneuvers of Bucharest, Moscow, Constantinople, the Holy See, and the Hungarian diplomat, support the assumption that religious leaders can and do play a significant and delicate role in shaping international relations in an "inter-civilizational global system"\textsuperscript{166}. From this point of view, Hungarian church leaders and politicians are again in a strategic position between Orthodoxy and Western Christianity. With this issue, however, we have already touched upon the overarching theme of globalization\textsuperscript{167}. 

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Globalization and Hungarian Church-State Relations

Apart from the role of ecclesiastical leaders in an “inter-civilizational global system” four more issues must be discussed here, which all, to a varying extent, contribute to the intertwining of church and state. The first is whether the church leaders confine their activities to religious problems or also become involved in unsolved problems that emerge in other spheres of the society, such as the economy or the polity. In discussing the social and cultural context of post-Communist Hungarian society, we have listed the many urgent tasks for which the assistance of the churches is invited. It has also been noted that the historical churches are potent political symbols that can be, and actually are, used in Hungary’s aspiration for membership in the European Community. All in all, there is a rather general expectation on the part of politicians that the churches be involved in public life.

The second problem is the identity of societies, which is constantly relativized in the process of globalization. Relativization, as Robertson (1989) explains, manifests itself in the simultaneous ‘particularization of universalism’, referring to the rendering of the world as a single place, and the ‘universalization of particularism’, or the globalized expectation that societies should have distinct identities. Hungarian political circles seem to be divided on this issue. In sharp contrast to the Socialist-Liberal coalition of the Horn government, the Antall and Orban governments accorded great importance to the preservation of the national identity. They requested the help of the historical churches in the preservation and revitalization of the Hungarian national spirit. As we have
demonstrated in the foregoing analysis, some elements of the general policy of these governments might be seen as a cautious application of a 'Christian Course'\textsuperscript{171}. We have reason to suppose that the leaders of the historical churches are satisfied with this policy. For example, they unanimously supported the proposal for new legislation severing the requirements for registering new churches. In its famous pastoral letter issued in 1996, the Catholic Bishops' Conference also urged its faithful and every "Hungarian with good will" to reestablish the healthy "self-esteem of the nation"\textsuperscript{172}. Furthermore, the pastoral letter of the Catholic bishops before the 1998 elections recommended voting for those parties that planned to protect "Hungarian culture"\textsuperscript{173}. The mutual support of the historical churches and the parties advocating Christian-national values appears likely to increase in the future due to the desire for a uniting of center-right political forces\textsuperscript{174}. The basis for this union would be the principles of Christian democracy\textsuperscript{175} and a policy of preserving and strengthening the national identity in which, as we have seen, the churches are expected to play a decisive role.

Although my third point, the role of mass media, is only indirectly related to globalization, it will serve as an 'introduction' to the fourth issue, the problem of ecumenism. Furthermore, a reflection on the media will warn us to use Beyer's (1994) characterization of church leaders only with special caution. According to Beyer, outsiders and Satan have long been essential to the cohesion, and thus the identity, of a specific society even in the twentieth century. However, he notes that while "God is still in heaven ... the visage of the devil is becoming increasingly indistinct"\textsuperscript{176}. As a consequence, in the absence of Satan, God still can be loved but it is difficult to fear him. Thus, in Beyer's view, religious professionals are now faced with the dilemma of

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whether to address contemporary problems by reasserting or denying the Devil’s existence. In the conservative option, the reality of the Devil is reaffirmed while the liberal approach involves “the acquiescence in his dissolution” (1994: 86). Furthermore, in Beyer’s view, leaders with a conservative attitude demand legal support for religious influence and, at the same time, they also “supply religion as a cultural resource for the political and legal systems” (1994: 94).

While such a distinction between “conservative” and “liberal” orientations of religious professionals may be useful in a general comparative context and may accurately depict some specific national realities, it appears rather ill-suited to the Hungarian case. In the Hungarian media, one of the two most frequently interviewed prelates, Arch Abbot Várszegi, is labeled as the “liberal” bishop, the other, bishop Gyulai, as the “conservative” prelate. Since neither of them questions the existence of Devil177, the origin of their different labels clearly lies somewhere else. Várszegi’s association with young Christian intellectuals (who dared to criticize the Church) and his practice of distancing himself from all political parties equally (while being open to each of them) earned him the nickname of the “Liberal Bishop”178. Although Bishop Gyulai was also equally distanced from all political parties, at least in his public statements, several newspapers tried to portray him as a “conservative” or “right wing” bishop. The event that prompted the journalists to portray him in such a manner was his comment on the extreme right Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), which became a parliamentary party after the 1998 elections. The party and especially its leader, István Csurka, became known for addressing openly the tension created by the unresolved anti-Semitic feelings of Hungarians. Bishop Gyulai did not consider MIÉP as an “extreme [right] party,
although its representatives might sometimes word their opinion in stronger terms than other politicians. He thus became the 'favorite bishop' of the parties with Christian and nationalist views although he did not intend to be “the conservative prelate” and was explicit many times on the political neutrality of the church that he represents. While in his view Hungarians have to protect their culture and traditions he has never gone as far as, for example, Bishop Barkev Martirosian, the head of the Ngorno Karabagh diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church, who considers religious pluralism and the intrusion of foreign religions the most dangerous threat to his fatherland. Bishop Gyulai noted that the Hungarian churches do not turn to the politicians while supplying religious beliefs for political purposes, as Beyer describes conservative church leaders doing, but, rather, it is the politicians who turn to the churches in the hope of receiving legitimation. It is the government or, more precisely, those governments established by parties promoting Christian-national values and their press organs that try to exploit the historical heritage of the Christian churches. Zsolt Semjén, the aforementioned deputy state secretary responsible for church relations in the Ministry of National Cultural Heritage, also noted that in the case of both Várszegi and Gyulai the press assigned them different ‘political labels’, without substantiated evidence of significant difference between the two bishops.

The final point highlighted by globalization is the question of ecumenism. In his description of “liberal” and “conservative” church leaders, Beyer (1994: 90) claims that the conservative option makes religion most visible because it is less ecumenical and consequently more violent than the liberal option. With regard to ecumenism, it is safe to characterize the Hungarian historical churches as rather conservative. As Watson
(1999) noted, the historical churches “are anxious to elaborate a type of ecumenism that draws the line at non-traditional movements. As late as 1996, the Protestant Ecumenical Studies Center was publishing works delineating the limits of ecumenical dialogue with ‘cults’\textsuperscript{185}. Similarly, the revival meeting of messianic Jews held at the Budapest Sports Arena, which was attended mostly by members of the philo-Semitic Faith Church, attracted the hostile attention of Üj Élet (New Life), a Jewish weekly, which, sensing a conspiracy, called it a “Holocaust by other means”\textsuperscript{186}.

This division between the new religious movements\textsuperscript{187} and the older denominations has a serious consequence for the country’s church-state relations. The churches’ financial reliance on the state enables the political parties to use this tension for their own purposes. Before the 1998 elections, for example, the Horn cabinet enacted a regulation providing the smaller churches with 300 million Ft\textsuperscript{188}. This regulation was looked upon by many as only one of the Socialist-Liberal coalition’s several attempts to weaken further the historical churches\textsuperscript{189}. Although the Horn government lost the elections, the regulation obliged the new government to allocate the money to the smaller denominations. Meanwhile, as we have noted, the Antall and Orbán governments favored the historical churches. Thus the tension between the churches increases and the particular alliances of parties and denominations seems likely to be further strengthened in such circumstances.
Summary and Analysis

We closed the previous chapter with the question of whether the Communist period was only a relatively short interlude in the continuation of a Latin diarchy, as Sturzo might argue. According to him, as we have seen, in a Latin diarchy, the church “nearly always reacted vigorously against any effective dependence, or reasserted her independence, as the case might be” (1962: 48). The present chapter has attempted to depict the decisive events in the relationship between church and state in post-Communist Hungarian society up to the present day. Church and state are legally separated; and perhaps for the first time in history, governments no longer interfere effectively with the inner life of Hungarian churches. The reorganization of the Hungarian diocesan borders, despite the wishes of the Hungarian government, is probably the best example of the autonomy of the church. In this way, we can indeed talk about the independence of the Catholic Church and other churches. We have also seen that the churches, most of all the historical churches, depend financially on the state. This is also part and parcel of the Latin organization, where, as described in the first chapter, the church relies on and asks for help from the civil power, a fact which partly accounts for the continued intertwining of church and state. Thus, it is safe to characterize Hungarian church-state relations in terms of the Latin model.

If we can talk safely about a Latin diarchy between church and state in post-Communist Hungary, then the question of to what extent we can apply Sturzo’s so-called individual diarchy in the post-Communist era is far more problematic. In this form, the diarchic
power of the church would be expressed mainly as a spiritual power over the individual believer. We would be able to speak of diarchy of church and state as a duality of powers because the church would maintain its religious power over the hearts and minds of faithful, and thus exert significant informal influence on society. However, as our discussion of the social and cultural context of post-Communist Hungary indicates, while the majority of Hungarians respect the churches and welcome them in certain areas of public life, they do not expect the religious institutions to guide them in their private and communal life. Sturzo might argue that without the proper religious instruction of at least two generations, the churches must be glad to have any influence at all on Hungarians, and thus the individual diarchy is still to come.

The selective acceptance of the churches’ presence in public life is evidence of the process of the “privatization” of religion, which a number of scholars perceive as typifying contemporary religiosity\(^\text{190}\). As Casanova (1994) indicates, this privatization is part of a general trend toward the demobilization and privatization of civil society as “political society and its forms of representation and mediation by professional political elites become institutionalized” (1994: 222). Another source of privatization, according to Casanova, is the challenge posed by the rising number of new religious movements, a situation that generally enforces competition among religious organizations. The anticult campaign of the late Géza Németh and the attempts of Zsolt Semjén, currently the understate secretary of the Ministry for National Culture and Heritage, to make requirements for establishing new churches more difficult prove that the historical churches are not ready for free competition on the religious market.
The historical churches' approval of Semjén's efforts lends support to Wuthnow's observation that the churches most likely to support government intervention are those which "entertain hopes of being successful in relations with the state, yet [are] lacking the resources needed to win over their competition in strictly open religious competition" (Wuthnow 1988: 500). As suggested earlier, the historical churches were 'successful' not only in their dealings with the Antall and Orbán governments, which applied the benevolent reading of the separation of church and state, but also in confronting the Horn cabinet's policy of strict separation. Although generally hostile towards the historical churches, toward the end of its tenure the Socialist-Liberal coalition felt the need to sign an agreement with the Vatican in which generous financial support was promised to the Catholic Church. The pastoral letter of the Hungarian Catholic Bishops' Conference in 1996 supplied another demonstration of the influence of the Catholic Church and contributed decisively to the fall of the Socialist-Liberal coalition. This letter may be interpreted as evidence of what Casanova terms the "deprivatization of religion" in its challenge to the "value-free" solutions of secular and functionally differentiated spheres of society, most notably that of the state (1994: 58). At the same time, reflection on the Protestant churches' more energetic involvement in the 1990 elections and on the Catholic Church's concern for social justice supports Regnerus and Smith's (1998) theory concerning the selective nature of deprivatization.

Globalization — through the "universalization of particularism", as Robertson formulated the globalized expectation that societies should have distinct identities — poses another challenge to the historical Christian churches in the form of creating new competition for the representation of, or contribution to, the identity of the nation. However, it is not only
the new religious movements that challenge the traditional Christian churches. Rabbi
Landeszmann’s assertion of the indispensability of the Jewish contribution to Hungarian
life and the open philo-Semitism of the Faith Church indicate that the religious
denomination representing the Hungarian nation is no longer taken for granted.

Meanwhile, the geographic location of Hungary between Western Christianity and
Orthodoxy and the country’s serious economic, medical, and cultural problems reinforce
the presence of religion in public life. This presence, however, is not uncontested, a
situation which is partly due to the sensation-mongering of the different political parties’
press organs. A rather weak ecumenical spirit, excluding the new religious movements,
creates a division between the traditional and new religious organizations that can be, and
actually is, exploited by the political parties. However, the strengthening of the central-
right political forces, generally associated with Christian and national values, will
probably increase the public role of religion. The next chapter, in the form of concluding
comments, risks some further predictions concerning Hungarian church-state relations. It
also offers some suggestions.

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1 A loose translation of the Hungarian “Az nem állapot, ami most itt van”. My interview with Mr. Mikiós
took place on November 13, 1996.

2 With regard to the many factors, Pankhurst suggests the need to “throw [them] all in the garbage can,
because there are too many [of them] that have an influence on [religion]” (1994: 77).

3 C.f. the list of analytical questions in the Appendix. The most relevant questions investigate whether we
can talk about Sturzo’s individual diarchy (question #3), how the separation of church and state is
interpreted (#9), what the role of religion in public life is (#14-17), how the different churches deal with
religious competition and cultural pluralism (#18), and which churches represent best the Hungarian
identity (#20-21).

4 A loose translation of “mi van a sisakrostélyuk mögőt?”

5 The article was published by Népszabadság on January 3, 1990. But, apparently, it had been published
earlier by others because the National Smallholders and the Civic Party replied to it on January 2, 1990 in
the Délmagyarország, a regional weekly, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum on January 3 in the
Magyar Nemzet, a political daily.
It has grown since 1978, as was noted in the previous chapter.

By “church-oriented religiosity” he means those persons who are religious according to the teaching of the church. Davie (1994) refers to these persons as “churched” people. However, Finke and Stark (1992) note that the term “unchurched” is frequently used to describe “a lack of religious activity ... when all that is lacking is a preferred brand of religious activity” (1992: 4).


C.f. Tomka (1991c: 43-44). He does not specify “religious functions”, but most probably he meant, apart from churches, the retreat houses and the houses of religious orders.


Hidden unemployment, in the form of workers producing work of practically no value in their main job, was widespread.

Workers in agriculture, for example, had to spend much more, sometimes even 12 hours.

Interestingly, women’s life expectancy has grown constantly since 1931.


Andorka (1996: 30).


C.f. Sorokin’s pseudo-ideational mentality in his cultural analysis (1957: 29). Sorokin’s general theory might be outdated, but the description of this mentality appears highly appropriate to the former Communist societies.

In the previous chapter we noted how religion provided a counter-pole to anomie (Tomka 1991b).

In 1992 it was 38.7 in one hundred thousand persons.


Measured in absolute alcohol. Alcohol consumption declined somewhat in the early fifties.

In 1992, it was 70.5 per one hundred thousand persons. The explanation is twofold. The number of persons who die from liver cirrhosis actually reflect alcohol consumption over a long period of time, roughly the previous ten years. Another reason is that, since 1990, the measurement of alcohol consumption has become more difficult, due to the higher influx of foreign tourists.


C.f. also Fromm (1941) and Adorno et al. (1950).

In a totalitarian regime, the power of the state is extended over all spheres of political, economic, and cultural life. In an authoritarian system, the state strictly controls the political sphere and largely, but not absolutely, the cultural sphere, while the economy enjoys relative autonomy (Varga 1995:244, note 1.). A shift from totalitarian to authoritarian system occurred in Hungary with the introduction of the so-called “new economic mechanism” in 1968.

Andorka (1996:143-144).


As we have seen, the XLIII/1895 law on religion guaranteed a limited religious freedom, but it did not proclaim the separation of church and state.
A brief discussion of the legal background of the preparation and an evaluation of the new constitution and the Law IV of 1990 are given by Péter (1997). He notes that, in the first version of the law, the state wanted to maintain its right to veto the nomination of Catholic bishops, but Cardinal Paskai, the Primate of Hungary, informed Miklós Németh, the Prime Minister, and Kálmán Kulcsár, Minister of Justice, that the Vatican would not accept such a request. Another peculiarity of the legislation, according to Péter, is that while the Constitution declares the separation of church and state, the law “did not separate completely the church and state. The churches have never requested such separation in Hungary” (1997: 30, in my translation).

The return of a hospital to the Order of St. Vincent and the return of a building housing the famous Bibó College, the gathering place of reform minded intellectuals, to the Order of St. Ursula were notable controversial cases.

The pope’s visit from August 16 to 20, 1991 received extensive media coverage.

C.f. Map 3 in the Appendix.

These were the episcopal seats of the dioceses of Csanád, Nagyvárad, Szatmár, Kassa, and Rozsnyó.

The archdioceses of Esztergom, Kalocsa and Eger.

The dioceses of Győr, Szombathely and Pécs.

The dioceses of Székesfehérvár, Veszprém, and Vác.

Information provided by Sándor Leszák.

I have to use quotation marks because, as we will see, they do not really want to reclaim the territories.

It is interesting to note that the Vatican did not hurry in readjusting the diocesan borders after the Trianon Treaty. This policy received some justification, when in the late 1930s, some territories were returned to Hungary.

It is Wicklund and Brehm’s term (1976:2).

At least not in the early 1990s. The situation became somewhat different after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.


A somewhat similar argument about the connection between adherence to national churches and individual and national identity is made by Eileen Barker (1998 : 205-206). My chain of thought was developed independently from that of Barker; and presented first in 1998 at the 14th Annual Conference of the GSC in Toronto.

Information from Fr. L. Marosfalvy S.J., one of the participants of the conference.

Anticipating the question to what extent we can speak about committed or energetic Christianity in the majority of Hungarians in the interwar period let us recall the different Christian social movements, such as the KALOT, the KALASZ, EMSZO, etc. as discussed in the previous chapter.

According to Tomka (C.f. Table 2), this proportion is 14-19 percent, but others (Zulehner-Denz 1993, Tamás 1997 or Gereben 1997) are more cautious.


C.f. Table 3a-d. I am grateful to Dr. Tomka and Dr. Horányi for providing me with the data base of the survey “The Hungarians’ Expectations of the Churches in Today’s Hungary”, commissioned by the Hungarian Bishops’ Conference (HCBC) in 1995.
51 According to the survey conducted for the HCBC, it was 16,084 Ft. The approximate exchange rate between US$ and HUF was 1 to 200. C.f. the general information on Hungary and Hungarians in the Appendix.

52 Ninety one percent of the church oriented Hungarians are members of their local church organization. The survey conducted for the HCBC, unfortunately, did not ask for religious affiliation (Tamás 1997:19). It is possible that the remaining “churched” persons are Protestants where membership is not necessarily required.

53 While 62 percent of the “churched” Hungarians and 43 percent of the “unchurched” religious persons have easy access to the lay leaders, 36 percent of the atheists feel they do as well. Interestingly, the proportions of those in the “don’t know” category were 11, 14, and 28 percent respectively.

54 C.f. Table 16. in Tomka (1997). The frequently hostile attitude of the political and cultural organizations of the second post-Communist government towards the churches will be discussed later.

55 C.f. Table 4.

56 Rodney Stark (1997:11) is explicit about what is implicit in Davie's work on Religion in Britain since 1945 (1994).

57 Davie quotes Beckford's observation that “virtually all voluntary associations have been finding it difficult in the last few decades to attract and recruit new members” (1994:194). Part of the reason for this difficulty might be the inertia of the majority of the membership.

58 Legal processes were started against those who ordered troops to fire upon the unarmed demonstrators in 1956, but the procedures were halted for years. Ironically, Gyula Horn, the second Prime Minister of the post-Communist era, was also accused of participating in the armed suppression of a peaceful demonstration, but his files 'mysteriously disappeared' from the military archives.

59 In an interview, the Arch Abbot of Pannonhalma, Asztrik Várszegi, informed me that a prominent member of the Bishops' Conference had warned his colleagues in May 1990, that the hard-liners would return to power during the autumn of that year.

60 Gorbachev and his family were briefly held under house arrest from August 19 to 21, 1991.

61 On the basis of empirical investigations, Körösényi (1996) concludes that three main political forces could be distinguished in the first post-Communist parliamentary period: the Christian-national parties, the Liberals, and the Socialists.


63 In 1985, both the government and the parliament were held in higher esteem than the churches (Tomka 1997 : 130).

64 Throughout the discussion of the public role of the churches in the Hungarian post-Communist society of 1990s, if not stated otherwise, the source of my data is the data base of the survey “The Hungarians' Expectations of the Churches in Today’s Hungary”.

65 Data and evaluation is from Tomka (1997:132-136).


68 C.f. Although Andorka (1996b) points out the growing poverty of Hungarians he also states unequivocally the democratic nature of the Hungarian society (1996).

69 Probably the most well-known civil institution in Hungary is the Central European University, founded and funded by George Soros. On the growing number of civil initiatives see, e.g. Miszlivetz (1997:28), Lomax (1997:52), Cox - Vas (1995:169-70), and Kollar (1997:24).
Only 6.3 - 10.3 percent of Hungarians have direct experience with institutions run by churches, such as elementary and high schools, hospitals, old age homes, cultural institutions, youth clubs, and institutions for the poor. This fact also means, as Tamás points out (1997:48), that most people's opinion of the activities of the churches is based on stereotypes or the information given by the mostly anti-church media.

C.f. Tables 5 and 6.

Neither Tomka nor Tamás notes the Hungarians' higher anticipations from the civil society. C.f. especially Table 5.

C.f. Table 6. By "minimal influence" I mean those areas where less than ten percent of the population expect the churches to be *primarily* responsible of a task in the future. The level of ten percent was used by Tamás (1997:44) in a different context, namely in the decision of who is supporting or opposing strongly the churches.

The proportion of Hungarians expecting the churches to contribute in these areas in the future was close to the ten percent marking the "minimal influence".

Dabas-Sári is a small town near Budapest. The documentation as well as a Christian interpretation of the events in Dabas-Sári can be found in Stomán's book (1994) and two chapters deal with Dabas-Sári in Korzenszky's diary (n.d.). Korzenszky was a commissioner in the Ministry for Culture and Education. It is noteworthy that there is no published liberal interpretation. The reason for the lack of such publication might be that the liberals considered the outcome of the 'Dabas-Sári case' as a victory over the Catholic Church.

Dabas-Sári had three elementary schools.

According to Korzenszky (n.d.:198), the Slovak language was only an excuse for the Communists and liberals to start a campaign against the Catholic schools.

The reason might be that very few educational institutions were reclaimed by, and even fewer were actually returned to, the churches. Even if all the reclaimed schools had been returned, only 8 percent of all the educational institutions would now be run by religious organizations. In 1994, these institutions, in fact, constituted only 4 percent. C.f. Table 7.


Korzenszky (n.d.: 248) mentions that while the number of students participating in the religious education of the historical churches grew 25 percent between 1991 and 1993 the number of the students of the Hit Gyülekezete (Faith Church) multiplied 15 times in the same period.

Beckford's (1985) flexible conceptual framework, developed to study new religious movements (NRMs) in confrontation with society and thus with the state, would offer itself as an analytical tool for the investigation of the anti-cult campaign. In this framework, a "basic distinction is made between those relationships which link members of NRMs to one another and those which exist between the collectivity of members and non-members" (1985 : 77). However, the framework's failure to incorporate the particular social and cultural context of the society – as discussed above in connection with the Hungarian case – renders it unserviceable here. Following the framework, one is supposed to find at least a partial explanation of why these NRMs were labeled destructive. However, it is impossible to find any common denominator in the completely different external and internal relationships of these religious organizations. It is more probable that the government, in its concern for the historical churches, chose simply those groups that had earlier been involved in controversies in other countries.

Interview with Krisztina Danka, the spokesperson of the Hare Krishna Movement on October 24, 1996.

In Barker's (1998) words, it is possible that in the former Communist countries, "there has been less brand loyalty to the Churches as religious bodies, than to them as bearers of an historical memory that is tied to a particular territorial area – in fact or in myth" (1998 : 206).

*Gaty* is the name of the traditional loose pants of poor Hungarians from the time of Conquest. The debate took place in February 1993, and was covered, for example, by *Heti Magyarország*. 

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Obviously, this 'competition' did not manifest itself on official or institutional levels. However, an old joke about changing the name of the capital from Budapest to Judapest resurfaced in the early 1990s, describing rather well the feelings of some Hungarians.

The leaders of the opposition parties, generally unfriendly to the Church, visited several ecclesiastical leaders who welcomed them. C.f. Esti Hírlap, a political daily, February 17; Magyar Hírlap, a political daily, March 5. Gyula Horn, the leader of the Socialist Party, "offered peace" to the Church on the occasion of the celebration of Easter of 1994. As reported by the Magyar Hírlap on March 31.

In an interview, the chief editor of the Egyészformó, a Catholic periodical independent of the hierarchy, compared the attitude of the church leaders to that of a woman who "flirts" with all of her courtiers by saying whoever wins would be welcome. C.f. 168 óra, a political weekly, April 12, 1994.


C.f. Népszabadság, February 18 and HVG, a generally moderate weekly, dealing with economics, February 12, 1994. The opposition also wanted to "kick in the stomach" those members of the KDNP who, allegedly, collected the recommendation notes in the churches. C.f. Kurir, a daily, March 13, and Pest hírlap, March 14-15.

On April 24, the Új ember, a Catholic weekly, sharply criticized the Socialist leader's 'peace offer.'

C.f. Pest megyei Hírlap, a regional weekly, March 23.

Journalists, even before the 1998 elections, reminded their readers of how the priests and ministers were trying to influence the election result. In a personal interview, Sándor Lezsák, leader of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, also confirmed this practice. When they lost the 1994 elections, Lezsák traveled across Hungary by bicycle, and discussed the situation of the country with ordinary people. Priests and ministers told him how humiliating it was for them to notice the ineffectiveness of their attempts at persuasion.

Gyulai's document, entitled "Nézz vissza és dönts!" (Reflect and decide) was criticized by a lay Catholic, Máté-Tóth (C.f. 168 óra, April 12, 1994). He claimed that Gyulai campaigned for the Antall government because in his diocesan pastoral letter, Gyulai mentioned 9 points, dealing with religion, politics and economics, for consideration, but in the document he collected material only for 3 of those points. While Gyulai was probably in favour of the Antall government - after the first round, when the weakness of the parties representing Christian values became clear, Gyulai tried, unsuccessfully, to convince the Bishops' Conference to issue a second pastoral letter - Máté-Tóth's claim in itself would need further evidence. As a bishop, Gyulai was, first and most of all, responsible for religious issues.

The government stated that paying the teachers of religion was the task of the local governments, which, in their turn, simply pointed out that they had no available fund. While the cabinet resumed negotiations on the return of ecclesiastical property after a year, its policy of discrimination against church schools remained effective throughout its term of office.

Some of these facts were in sharp contrast with their campaign promises, where they envisioned the faster return of ecclesiastical properties and the equal support of ecclesiastical institutions providing social services. C.f. Dunántúli napló, a regional weekly, April 19, 1994.

Personal interview with Attila Fabián, president of the Evangelical Pentecostal Fellowship on October 31, 1996. According to him the "moral nihilism legalized by this coalition is disillusioning."

Cosmopolitan liberalism was associated with the minor party of the coalition, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), whose popularity dropped dramatically. (See also the following paragraph.) The protection of morals and national values was probably a natural reaction to the moral nihilism and cosmopolitanism of the coalition.

It added "Hungarian Civic Party" (MPP) to its original name.

A brief news story in the Új Magyarország, a Hungarian daily (November 21, 1996), which was based on an interview with Seregély in the French La Croix.
The social-pastoral letter, entitled "A More Just and More Brotherly World!", was published in the Fall of 1996. Lay persons, renowned social scientists, such as Miklós Tomka, and economists participated in the formulation of the document.

Their other example was the German CDU (Magyar Nemzet, a daily, November 28, 1998). The MDNP splintered from the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) in 1996.


C.f. Sándor Révész’s article in the daily Népszava on April 16, 1998.

These values included the protection of life from conception to natural death, securing the lives of large families, and protecting Christian morality and Hungarian culture.

The weekly was the Keresztény Új Élet, and the journal was the Távlatok (published by the Jesuits). The bishops distanced themselves from the weekly (see the daily Magyar Hírlap’s article on April 16, 1998), but not from the periodical. The leaflets were distributed in Sopron, a city on the western border of the country, and in Zugló, a district of the capital.

C.f. Révész’s article in Népszava on April 16, 1998 and Ottó Neumann’s in the daily Magyar Hírlap on April 20.

C.f. Révész’s above mentioned article. The KDNP, under the leadership of György Giczó, moved toward a policy of extreme nationalism.

C.f. the press review of the Prime Minister’s Office on January 19, 1999 at www.hungary.com/bla/.

In this discussion, I follow the events of church-state relationships until July 1999.

Orbán, born on May 31, 1963, is probably the youngest prime minister in the world.

I must remind the readers that the use of the term “Christian Course” is confined to the actual events of the interwar period and not to Pohászka’s original views or the Communist or liberal “versions”. See the discussion on “Christian course” in Chapter 3.

It is so overarching, indeed, that the separate discussion of globalization might seem to be somewhat arbitrary and artificial. However, the significance of this issue requires such a procedure.

In Magyar Hírlap, July 30, 1998, p. 3. Since the discussion of the church-policy of the Orbán government is based mostly on press reviews, a brief summary of the most significant Hungarian press organs is presented in the Appendix. Quotations from the articles are in my translation.

Ibid.

In Napi Magyarország, June 14, 1999, p. 3.

C.f. the interview with Zsolt Semjén, deputy state secretary, in Új Ember, a Catholic weekly on April 25, 1999.

A loose translation of Zsolt Semjén’s words in Új Ember on January 17, 1999.

Despite the facts that in 1999 only 1,1 billion Ft was provided (C.f. the press review of the Prime Minister’s Office on February 24, 1999, at www.hungary.com/bla/) – as opposed to the required 5 billion Ft – and that the negotiations with the Vatican slowed down (C.f. Magyar Hírlap, July 30, 1999, p.3).

C.f. youth’s critical attitude toward the co-opted hierarchy of the historical churches, as discussed in the previous chapter. See also Barker (1998) as discussed in this chapter.


The term "church" is applied to every religious institution, regardless of whether the organization under consideration is a historical church or a free church. While I apologize to those who would object to being called a "church", for the sake of simplicity, this legal language is used here.

County courts are not obliged to inform MEH on the registration of religious bodies.

A telephone-interview with Mihály Gulyás, leader of the “Shalom Open Bible Churches”, a Protestant denomination, on December 2, 1996. He did not support his estimate with substantial evidence.

Compiled from the publications of the MEH, and furthermore, from László Tóth-Soma’s working document of the legal representatives of the churches. Mr. Tóth-Soma is a member of the Research Group for the Applied Studies of Religion – Information Center of Religions, University of Szeged. According to another estimate, the number of denominations was between 220 and 250, but only 77 were registered. C.f. the article of Demokratia, entitled “A századvég legjobb befektetése (The Best Investment at the End of the Century) on December 24, 1998.

The tabloid published the article, entitled “Kosztolányi Dénes” on its second page on June 21, 1999.

C.f. the article, entitled “Jelentés” (Report), in Népszabadság, published on June 21, 1999, p. 4.

He is the same person who proposed the tightening of the requirements for registering a new church under the Antall cabinet.


The people, who died in a “ritual murder-suicide … were members of the Order of the Solar Temple, a group founded by the Belgian Luc Jouret. The group mixed elements of Christianity, astrology, and medieval legends about the Knights Templar. In late 1994 Jouret and fifty-two fellow Templars died in mass immolation in Switzerland and Quebec.” C.f. “Notes on Church-State Affairs” in the Journal of Church and State, 38, 2 (Spring 1996): 445. The group allegedly had links to international arms-trafficking and money-laundering (Encyclopaedia Britannica 99 CD, multimedia edition).


Ibid. Semjén pointed out that Hungary wants to join the European Union and not the United States.

Beckford’s (1985) framework, criticized for failing to incorporate cultural and social context in connection with the analysis of Géza Németh’s anti-cult campaign, is not serviceable here either. The significant transformations resulting from the fall of Communism and the different approaches of the post-Communist governments to church-state relations are crucial to understanding the development of the Faith Church, as we will see shortly. However, the framework, in its present form, cannot take into account these factors.

As a consequence, he attended the rabbinic seminary of Budapest, as an auditing student. The information on the Faith Church is based on my interviews with Csaba Králl, the chief editor of the HIT INFO, a magazine of the Faith Church, and Péter Morvai, church- and public relations director of the Faith Church, and furthermore, on the special section of the Jerusalem Post’s January 15, 1996 edition, entitled “From Budapest to Jerusalem, Central European Convention of Faith Church and German Charismatic Congregations”. See also Horváth (1995).

Nazarenes, members of a Protestant denomination stemming from the 19th-century Holiness movement, have been in Hungary since 1839. The Faith Church “seduced” many members not only from the Nazarenes, but also from other denominations, which did not encourage their members’ charismatic practices, as discussed shortly.

Although according to Bartus (1999), this view has become “less strict” since the establishment of their own theological academy whose operation would be impossible without the financial support of the government.

“A Hit Gyülekezete nem akar politikai hatalmat” (The Faith Church does not Want Political Power) by Gábor Czene in Népszabadság, on March 7, 1997, p. 9. See also György Varga Domokos’ writing in the Demokrata, a political weekly (1997/19).

This request was not fulfilled. C.f. Zsolt Szűle’s article “Isten szolgálatában” (In the Service of God) in Magyar Fórum, a political weekly, December 26, 1996, p. 3.

Németh boasted in his interview to the Jerusalem Post, January 15, 1996.

For a brief description of the Toronto Blessing see, for example, Hunt (1995), or Chevreau (1995) for a longer account.


According to Hunt (1995:263), the “Third Wave” had about 277 million followers in 1987, or 17.5 percent of the world’s Christians. The Jerusalem Post’s special edition (January 15, 1996, p. 7.) talks about 400 million.


This allegation, however, has not been validated yet through “empirical” observations. While the opponents of the Faith Church refer lovingly to the rich and famous members of the church (see for example György Varga Domokos’ writing in the Demokrata, a political weekly, 1997/19), the leaders of the church maintain that their members are not better off than other Hungarians. C.f., for example, Czene’s interview with Sándor Németh in Népszabadság, the political daily of the Hungarian Socialist Party, March 7, 1997, p. 9. See also Table 9 in the Appendix, which indicates a poor membership. The issue undoubtedly needs further research.

It would be too early to talk about the distinctive doctrines of the Faith Church because they have not been formulated yet. One characteristic, although not indigenous, element is the ‘prosperity gospel’, as Martin (1995b: 30) called it, or the positive image of humans and the consequent emphasis on self-acceptance (Horváth 1995).

The Faith Church established its own Circle of Entrepreneurs (Vállalkozói Kör).

C.f. Horváth (1995:337), and my interview with Péter Morvai and Csaba Králl. The issue of tithe is highly controversial. While outsiders claim that the members of the Faith Church have to provide a proof of their income and pay a tithe to the church Morvai and Králl denied it. The “outsiders” include Bartus (1999) and a professor at the University of Agricultural Sciences, Gödöllő, whose colleague, a member of the Faith Church, went to the financial office of the university in order to obtain the proof of his income. The office manager informed the professor in question what his colleague had requested.


Unlike the Methodists, who emphasized the direct relationship between the individual and God — thus helping develop the individual’s conscience and making conscientious, but free, decisions — and the unnecessary mediation, Németh claims that only those sins are forgiven that he himself forgives. On this, and other dictatorial practices of Németh, see Bartus (1999).


C.f. the chapter in Bartus’ book (1999 : 237-246), entitled “Napóleon disznó kutyái” (The Dogs of the Pig ‘Napoleon’) where he describes Németh’s practices and compares them to those of the pig, named Napoleon, in Orwell’s famous Animal Farm.

The present author’s translation of Bartus’ writing (1999 : 268).


C.f. the articles of Magyar Nézet and Népszava on March 1, 1999, which discussed Orbán’s speech at the meeting of the Pro Patria Összefogás a Kereszténydemokráciáért Egyesület, an association for Christian democracy.


C.f. Népszabadság, March 18, 1999, p. 4. Shortly after the bishops’ communiqué, Viktor Orbán sent a letter to Cardinal Sodano, the Vatican’s Secretary of State, requesting the pope to extend his visit to the Transylvanian territory. He added that if it proved impossible, the pope, in a gesture to the Hungarians living in Rumania, should transfer the four Transylvanian dioceses under the jurisdiction of Gyulafehértvár. In spite of the fact that the Hungarian faithful of these dioceses constitute the majority of Rumaia’s Catholics, these dioceses are currently under the jurisdiction of the archdiocese of Bucharest. If Gyulafehértvár became an archdiocese it would strengthen the national pride of Hungarians in Rumania. It would probably also create closer connections with the Catholic Church in Hungary. (See Magyar Nézet, April 7, 1999, p. 4.)

The Hungarian historical churches embrace more than 9 million people, even if only nominally. C.f. Napi Magyarország, February 2, 1999, p. 4; and my interviews with Zsolt Semjén in April 1999.

On the visit of Patriarch Alexii II in Pannonhalma, see Korzenszky (n.d.: 311-313).

In a characteristically elusive answer of a politician, Semjén told me that the patriarch invited him, because by being able to read a Greek text Semjén made a great impression on the patriarch.

C.f. the short discussion of Huntington’s (1996) view on a world system divided along the lines of Orthodox, Hindu, Confucian, Japanese, Islam, and Western civilizations as presented in the first chapter. It was also noted that international wars and conflicts would occur along “civilizational fault lines”. Religious leaders of the different civilizations, understandably, might have a significant role both in inducing and solving these conflicts.

It was noted earlier that the separate discussion of globalization might seem arbitrary. Some issues discussed earlier will be mentioned again. This procedure, however, will demonstrate not only the overarching nature but also the reinforcing effects of globalization.

In Beyer’s (1994) terminology, whether they “function” in their own sphere or “perform” in other spheres.

In spite of the fact that a significant portion of Hungarians want the churches to have significant influence neither in their private life nor in the organization of communal life. It must also be noted that although the Horn government did not have an “amicable” relationship with the historical churches, it also acknowledged and expected the positive contribution of the churches.

The cosmopolitan attitude of the second post-Communist government was noted in the discussion of the church-state relations under the Horn cabinet.

In light of the persisting antagonism between liberalism and the Christian-national idea resulting from the disputes of the interwar era, it is, of course, readily understandable why the Socialist-Liberal government opposed the Christian-national idea.
It must, however, be noted that they locate the healthy “self-esteem of the nation” between the extremes of racism and cosmopolitanism (C.f. point 97 in the pastoral letter on p. 61).

It is interesting to note that this point was present neither in their pastoral letter issued before the 1990 nor in that before the 1994 elections.

The first parties uniting would be the MDF, the MDNP and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Alliance (MKDSZ), a splinter from the KDNP, but even the FIDESZ-MPP and the FKGP are being considered for membership in this union through special agreements. C.f. Magyar Nemzet, March 4, 1999, p. 4; Napi Magyarország, April 6, 1999, p. 4; Népszabadság, June 25, 1999, p.4; Népszava, August 2, 1999, p.6; Magyar Hírlap August 6, 1999, p. 4; Népszava, August 9, 1999, p. 1.


Beyer (1994 : 86). He means that it is more difficult to find outsiders (and label them as “Satan”), because, as a result of globalization, we all have become “neighbours”.

The present author is in good relationship with both of them.

My interview with bishop Várszegi took place on April 25, 1999, in Pannonhalma.

C.f. the article entitled “Gyulai püspök” (Bishop Gyulai,) in Népszabadság on May 14, 1998 (p. 5, in my translation). According to László Kövér, vice president of FIDESZ-MPP and the minister responsible for the secret services, there are people both in the coalition and the opposition whose interest is to maintain anti-Semitism and the tension resulting from it. He also added that it would be unfortunate to leave the discussion of these issues to the extreme right. C.f. Magyar Nemzet, a political daily, June 18, 1999, p. 1.

He was probably the most explicit on this issue in Magyar Nemzet, March 10, 1994, p. 7-8.

C.f. Új Ember, a Catholic weekly, February 27, 1994.

He is quoted in Barker (1998 : 204).

Bishop Gyulai said – in my translation – that “the political parties tie themselves to the church and not the other way around.” Magyar Hírlap, April 2, 1994.

Dr. Mikiłósházy, Catholic bishop of Hungarians in exile, in one of our frequent discussions noted that ecumenism among Hungarian denominations in Hungary is very weak. The main reason, according to him, is that the churches now concentrate their energies on their inner revival. C.f. also Barker’s (1998 : 199-200) study mentioned in connection with the anti-cult campaign of Géza Németh. Barker elaborates the reasons why the established churches of the former Communist countries were in a weak position in competing with new religious movements. Understandably, such a position of the once powerful established churches would inspire intolerance rather than ecumenical dialogue.

C.f. Daniel Watson’s “Church, State and Religious Innovation in the New Hungary”, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, in Lennoxville, Quebec, June 9-12, 1999. I quote this part of his paper with his permission. Unfortunately, Watson’s paper defines neither cults nor traditional religious movements. But by new religious movements, Watson appears to mean all the churches apart from the historical churches, i.e. the Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran Churches, and the Jewish Communities. While he talks about “minority” religions (1999 : 3), he also contrasts the historical churches with the Faith Church, which, being the fourth largest denomination in the country, is hardly a “minority religion”.

Watson refers to the Új Élet’s August 1, 1998 issue, p. 1.

By new religious movements I simply refer to those religious organizations that were established in Hungary after the fall of Communistism.

The equivalent of about US$ 1,250,000.00.
On the Horn cabinet’s technique of *divide et impera*, see for example, Tőkéczki László’s article, “A történelmi egyházak és a szekták” (The Historical Churches and the Sects) in *Új Magyarország*, August 27, 1996.

Bibby’s (1987, 1993) theory of “fragmented or unknown gods” and Luckman’s (1967) theory of “invisible religiosity” are probably the most illustrious examples of “privatized religion”, but see also Wilson (1969, 1976, 1985), Fenn (1978) and Berger (1967).
Conclusion

This study began with an investigation of why sociologists have not developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for studying church-state relationships. I suggested that the preoccupation with secularization, definitional difficulties, and the effects of globalization are the main reasons for the lack of such a theory. A review of the literature resulted, however, in a set of analytical questions, which I applied in a case study to Hungarian church-state relationships since 896 AD. My study of the Hungarian case suggested the need to modify two sociological accounts of different aspects of church-state relationships. Martin’s (1978) theory that under external threat a church can stand in for the government was expanded to denominationally mixed societies. Gautier’s reductionistic theory (1998), which “allows” the churches to participate in the restructuring of civil society only if church elites are not co-opted by state elites, was corrected.

My analysis of Hungarian history with its focus on church-state relationships followed the story of two intertwined institutions. As described in my account, the Catholic Church and the Hungarian state depended on each other. This mutual dependence began with St. Stephen, was consolidated under the reign of the Árpád dynasty, and continued in the sixteenth and seventeenth century in so far that the state needed the Church for the preservation of political linkages with Hungarians resident in Turkish-occupied territory.

This mutual dependence was less obvious under Habsburg absolutist rule where the church existed “under” the state. However, even absolute monarchs needed the
endorsement of a church. Particular historical circumstances – the loyalty of the Catholic hierarchy to the Habsburgs, the chief-seigniorial rights of the Hungarian kings and the rebellious character of the Hungarian Protestants – made the Catholic Church the natural ally of the Habsburgs. The mutual dependence of church and state became most tangible in the interwar period (1918 – 1939), where the consequences of the Trianon Treaty forced the governments to ask for the support of the churches – particularly the Catholic Church.

The only period when the state did not require the explicit support of the Catholic Church was the liberal era between the Compromise and World War I (1867 – 1914). This was the case for two reasons. Because of the existence of the penal code and police on the one hand, and the cultural and social policies of the nation state on the other, the liberals viewed the further cooperation of church and state as unnecessary. In sociological terms, differentiation and state expansion made the public role of religion look redundant. Moreover, the liberals enjoyed the support and legitimization of the Protestant churches, as described earlier. Nonetheless, the governments of the liberal era did not want to establish a strict separation of church and state, because the special privileges given to St. Stephen and reclaimed by his successors gave the rulers extraordinary powers over the Catholic Church. As we have also seen in the analysis, further reasons why the liberals did not want to change the status quo included their nationalist approach, their dependence on the state for financial security, and their advantageous position resulting from the particular interpretation of the legal maxim of presumptio juris.

The Hungarian Communists were formally committed to the rigid separation of church and state, but they were “far from practicing what they preached”. As the liberals had
done before them, the Communists wanted to, and actually did maintain control over the churches. However, they also needed the churches for the establishment of national consensus. Finally, we have also seen that the entanglement of church and state has continued since the fall of Communism. The churches were invited to help deal with increasing poverty, declining life expectancy, crumbling cultural institutions, relatively low levels of education, high levels of suicide and alcoholism, the growing rate of criminality, and an unsatisfactory level of mental health. But they were also called upon to contribute to the reestablishment of national identity.

The churches’ dependence on the state is more obvious than the state’s reliance on the churches. From the time of St. Stephen, the Catholic Church and later on the other churches needed the financial help and legal protection of the state. This reliance originated undoubtedly in the Latin diarchy. However, since the second half of the nineteenth century, the lack of a strong middle class, and consequently, the lack of financial support that could have made governmental support unnecessary, also contributed to the continued dependence of churches on the state.

The complexity of church – state relationships, as we have seen both in the literature reviewed and in the Hungarian case, renders difficult not only the construction of a comprehensive theory but also any long-term predictions. However, the aforementioned middle class – or the lack of it – might serve as a guiding line in our efforts to peer into the future. According to Andorka (1996), the history of Hungary in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been a sequence of failed attempts at modernization.

"Unfavorable international political circumstances and the lack of a strong middle class are to blame for the failure of each attempt"."
Probably the best known affirmation of the importance of a strong middle class⁵ is Alexis de Tocqueville's ([1860] 1969) analysis of American democracy. We have also noted that Count Széchenyi attempted to increase the number of Hungarians with “bourgeois”, i.e. middle class, virtues as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. During the interwar period, while Prohászka, in his theoretical formulation of a “Christian Course”, envisaged the Church strongly represented within the middle class, the leaders of KALOT and its sibling organizations actually started to lay the foundation of a strong middle class. Similarly, as we have noted in the previous chapter, the FIDESZ-MPP won the 1998 parliamentary elections with a plan of strengthening the middle class.

Reflection on the history of medieval Hungary reveals thatHungarians cannot blame “unfavorable international political circumstances” alone for their lack of a strong middle class. As we have noted in Chapter 3, the Hungarian nobility’s shortsighted protection of its right to tax-exemption hindered decisively the development of a Hungarian entrepreneurial class⁶. All in all, up to the present day, Hungary has failed to develop a really strong middle class. But what exactly does the existence of a strong middle class entail in a society? Furthermore, how is it likely to influence church – state relationships?

According to Aristotle, a strong middle class is the best guarantee of the stability of a society⁷. A strong middle class does not ensure a conflict-free society, but rather prevents it from falling into or remaining for a long period of time in a state unfavorable to the majority of its population. According to Aristotle, there are three sections in every society: the very badly off, the very well off, and those in between. Applying his philosophical principle, that virtue is a mean between two extremes, he concludes that the
members of a middle class with moderate income are disposed to "mean" conduct. We can expect them to behave fairly because they are

most easily obedient to reason, and following reason is just what is difficult both for the exceedingly rich, handsome, strong and well-born, and for their opposites the extremely poor, the weak, and those grossly deprived of honour. ... It is the middle citizens in a state who are the most secure ... [and] where the middle element is large, there least of all arise factions and divisions among the citizens.8

How can we apply this general view to church – state relationships? In contrast to the wall of separation erected by Jefferson and Madison, the sages of the Far East advocated keeping an appropriate distance between oneself and both the church and the state. According to them, fire, government, and the guru (representing the church) can all be harmful if they are too close, but utterly useless when they are too far apart.

Consequently, these things are best kept at a middle distance9. Following Aristotle's observation, the middle class, being "the most easily obedient to reason", is in the best position to find and maintain this middle distance. In other words, the establishment of the 'proper distance'10 among citizens, state and churches is more problematic in societies without a large middle class11. I am not suggesting that the presence of a strong middle class eradicates any and all kinds of tension among church, state and society. On the contrary, a strong middle class is the best guarantee of healthy interaction, including confrontations, among these players. A large middle class mitigates against the possibility that any of the players may acquire overwhelming power, and so makes possible the peaceful coexistence of potentially rival fractions. A good example of this latter possibility is the so-called "Catholic pillar" in Belgium and the Netherlands. The prosperous middle classes in these countries made possible the establishment of separate
legal and health systems for Catholics and Protestants, avoiding a cultural and legal strife that would have caused internal tension\textsuperscript{12}.

This balance is not specific to a particular form of church-state relations; it can be achieved under different arrangements if a strong middle class controls them. Several societies with established religions\textsuperscript{13}, for example the Scandinavian countries, demonstrate church-state relations which are as well balanced\textsuperscript{14} as those of the United States. While the trend in the Scandinavian countries may be toward the disestablishment of religion, these examples serve to demonstrate that an appropriate balance among church, state and society in the presence of a strong middle class is possible under different arrangements of church and state. However, it is also safe to suggest that in the absence of a large middle class the establishment of the appropriate distance between society, church and state is rather difficult – as, for example, the Hungarian case has demonstrated.

A brief discussion of the nature of the ‘appropriate distance’ between church, state and society seems necessary at this point. A precise formulation is unfeasible for a number of reasons, including the fact that a precise definition of “church” is impossible. Thus, for example, in certain forms of civil religion, it is difficult to distinguish and separate church and state adequately while a sociological ideal-typical “church”, based on the ancient Roman Catholic Church, might well prove to be in tension with both the self-definition of collective actors constituting a “church” and the changing structural location of a “church” in relation to state and society\textsuperscript{15}. The same difficulties would also resurface in any attempt at defining the appropriate distance between church, state, and society.

Another difficulty arises from the necessarily dynamic nature of this relationship.
Finally, as noted in the previous paragraph, the establishment of appropriate distance is possible under many different arrangements. In other words, there can be many different ‘appropriate distances’.

Although formal definition of such appropriate distance seems impossible, further analysis of the possibilities is one of the most urgent tasks of sociologists of religion – at least in Hungary, and probably also more generally in Central and Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{16}. Sociological study of the arrangements of church and state is a vital foundation for effective solutions to the burning social problems at present being experienced in this region\textsuperscript{17}.

After these clarifications and considerations we can apply Aristotle’s theory of the middle class to the Hungarian church – state relations of the future. It seems reasonable to suggest that, with the strengthening of the Hungarian middle class, governmental financial support of the churches would become less necessary. Or, at least, it would create smaller or no tensions among those who object to the presence of churches in public life and those who welcome them. Thus, the possibility of another confrontation, such as occurred in the elementary school of Dabas-Sári, would diminish.

It is also possible that the historical churches will request the continuation of the policy of annuity\textsuperscript{18} in compensation for the properties confiscated by the Communists, as well as the continuation of the government’s regulation of new church registration. The strengthening of economic security, as Inglehart (1997) observes, decreases the willingness to obey traditional authorities, including religious ones. This turning away from the historical churches would undoubtedly enhance the chances of the already active
new religious movements, which, in turn, might reinforce the historical churches' approval of the government’s measures to control new religious movements. This chain of events would support Wuthnow’s (1988) claim that “groups most likely to support government intervention, other things being equal ... are ... groups having enough resources to entertain hopes of being successful in relations with the state, yet lacking the resources needed to win over their competition in strictly open religious competition” (1988 : 500). Needless to say, such an arrangement would maintain at least a certain degree of entanglement between the historical churches and the state.

Despite the fact that among the former Communist countries Hungary has one of the strongest economies and probably the most westernized financial system, it is still far from having a large, secure, and vital middle class that could effectively influence public life. According to Utasi (1997 : 165), currently only one fifth of the population enjoys financial and intellectual circumstances that enables it to feel responsible for public life. At the same time, as a consequence of rapid social changes, the existing middle class still lacks a sense of security. As Inglehart (1997) points out, “under conditions of insecurity people seek strong authority; this is part of a worldview that also embraces ethnocentrism, traditional gender roles, and traditional religious norms” (1997 : 47). As noted in the previous chapter, Hungarians do not want the churches and their moral teachings to have a strong influence on their life. However, the planning of a new law restricting the registration of new churches intends to protect, if not traditional religious norms, the traditional religious organizations.

Favoring the traditional Hungarian churches, in itself, would not be a reason for much concern outside minority churches and new religious movements. However, when such a
proposal is coupled with rising ethnocentrism and manifestations of authoritarian tendencies, we should pay closer attention to it. As we have noted, one of the effects of globalization is the strengthening of nationalism (Robertson 1989). In the Hungarian case, the parliamentary success of the extreme right Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) undeniably demonstrates growing ethnocentric feelings. The possible implications of this ethnocentrism for the country’s church-state relationships become clearer if we recall that the center-right parties request the help of the historical Christian churches to revive the Hungarian national identity. At the same time, the authoritarian attitude of some of these parties is well known in Hungary. Under these conditions – legally protected and financially supported by the government – the traditional Hungarian churches might feel obliged in the future to endorse a nationalist policy that is directed against other ethnic or religious minorities, as happened in the interwar era. Jews would be probably again the main targets of such a policy.

The possibility of anti-Semitism cannot, unfortunately, be confined to the historical Christian churches. As it was noted recently, “most, if not all, neo-pagan beliefs are identical to the esotericism that promoted fascism in German society during the 1920s and 1930s. . . . [A] significant number of key figures in the German neo-pagan movement, which is the term they themselves use, are, or were, Nazis who never repudiated national socialism”22. One might argue that although neo-pagan ideas can be found at the core of Fascism, they take a different meaning and directions in a well functioning democratic society. Unfortunately, Hungary still lacks the strong middle class that would guarantee a well functioning democracy. Meanwhile, the number of neo-pagan movements in Hungary is on the rise23.
Fortunately, although it might also be a prelude of a tragedy, the governing coalition’s present policy of invigorating the middle class counts on the continued and probably strengthening presence of Jews in public life. As László Kövér, the vice president of FIDESZ-MPP and the minister supervising the secret services, has noted on more than one occasion, “the establishment of a civilized and strong middle class without the cultural, financial and media support of Hungarian Jews is impossible or has little chance”\textsuperscript{24}. Although the long-range purpose of creating a strong middle class is to establish a peaceful balance among the different forces of society, the growing presence of Jews in the foreseeable future might create more tension in the country and especially in its church-state relations. Since the income of Hungarian Jews is already considerably higher than that of other Hungarians\textsuperscript{25}, the significant number of Jews in the financial and media elite might provide another source of discontent for Hungarians and fuel the fire of anti-Semitism. As we can recall, a similar situation in the interwar period resulted in the first anti-Semitic law, which introduced the \textit{numerus clausus}.

In sum, while even with the strengthening of the Hungarian middle-class the continued entanglement of church and state seems certain, the danger of rising anti-Semitism is also clear. However, reflecting on the history of Hungarian church-state relationships we can also suggest that the churches, and not only the historical churches, might well be able to contribute to the prevention of another period of state sponsored anti-Semitic terror. As they did in the interwar period, they might advance the strengthening of an educated and tolerant middle class. Indeed, the KALOT and KALÁSZ are reestablished, although their present effectiveness cannot be compared with that of their earlier incarnations. Social changes, especially the declining number of agriculturally related jobs, explain in
great part why these movements are less effective than they were in the interwar period. There is still another area where the churches might play a decisive and important role in the empowerment of a developing middle class; and that involves their experience in intellectual training. This activity might include not only the teaching of necessary skills for participation in public life but also the inculcation of a fundamental social sensitivity or sense of social solidarity that is indispensable in preventing the persecution of any group. As our discussion of the interwar period and the Communist era suggests, neither the teaching of public skills nor the inducement of solidarity requires expensive educational facilities or large infrastructure. Both training in public skills and the formation of solidarity can be encouraged by unemployed intellectuals in a farmhouse or by a small group of people in a parish building who aim for nothing more than improving their own community life. Only time will tell whether and which religious communities\textsuperscript{26} will prove willing and able to live up to this task.

\textsuperscript{1} In the late 17th and the 18th centuries, absolute monarchs, such as Louis XIV of France, continued to profit from the divine-right of kings, originating from the Pauline doctrine that all authority is from God, even though many of them no longer had any truly religious belief in it. C.f. Encyclopaedia Britannica 99 CD multimedia edition.

\textsuperscript{2} C.f. the summary and the subsequent critique of this view by Count Kuno Klebelsberg, the Minister of Religion and Education of the Bethlen government, as quoted in the analysis of the interwar era.

\textsuperscript{3} The smaller churches, frequently the churches of ethnic minorities, were seen as a threat to Hungarian national interests.

\textsuperscript{4} My translation of Andorka's (1996 : 6) formulation.

\textsuperscript{5} Apart from Aristotle's theoretical discussion in his \textit{Politics}, which will be discussed shortly.

\textsuperscript{6} Similarly, reflecting on the international price of wheat and the amount of wheat that Hungary exported, Janos (1982) claims that many landowners could have become successful entrepreneurs. However, as a consequence of their hereditary property rights and privileges, originating from the Act of Aviticity (\textit{őriség}), they were not motivated to do so.

\textsuperscript{7} C.f. Aristotle's \textit{Politics}, book IV. chapter xi.

\textsuperscript{8} Quotations are from paragraphs 1295b1 – 1296a7 of Aristotle's \textit{Politics}, book IV. chapter xi. Probably the closest empirical evidence supporting Aristotle's view on the importance of a large middle class is Inglehart's (1997) analysis of the changes of values and beliefs of 43 societies. Inglehart's focus is not on middle class \textit{per se}, but rather on the stability and longevity of democracy. He notes that industrialization
might be viewed as the “prime mover” toward democracy. “With rising levels of economic development, cultural patterns emerge that are increasingly supportive of democracy, making mass publics more likely to want democracy, and more skillful at getting it” (1997 : 215).

9 C.f. One Minute Wisdom by Anthony de Mello (1988, New York: Image Books – Doubleday, p. 139). Casanova (1994), in a more scientific language, pointed out the ways in which the churches may enter the public arena to reestablish the balance, or middle distance, if this “necessarily triadic relationship” between church, state, and the citizens (Mitra 1991 : 757) is broken. Casanova also listed the mechanisms that enforce the churches to withdraw once democracy is (re)established.

10 A detailed discussion of this “proper distance” follows shortly.

11 It is probably clear that I do not equate the middle class with civic society, in which the individuals have both rights and duties, and all are equally subject to the law (Peter 1997). A strong middle class presupposes the existence of a civic society, but a civic society does not necessarily create a large middle class.

12 C.f. Helleman (1988a, 1988b) and Billiet and Dobbelare (1986).

13 A list of countries with official religion or with specially recognized religion(s) is in Table 8. in the Appendix.

14 Probably the stability of democracy is also a good indicator of well-balanced church-state relations.

15 Casanova’s (1994) analysis demonstrates this essentially dynamic nature of church, state, and society. He points out how churches might enter into public life in order to (re)establish or improve democracy in a given society, but he also lists the reasons why the churches undergo a process of privatization after the (re)establishment of democratic institutions.

16 For a recent discussion of the similar problems of church-state relations in the Baltic states see Hoppenbrouwers (1999). See also Barker (1998) and Pankhurst (1994).

17 A guiding principle for politicians in establishing the appropriate distance among church, state and society might be the least governmental involvement that simultaneously assures individual liberty and protects basic human rights. The task of sociologists would be to lay out the different possibilities for establishing such arrangements and to predict their likely consequences.

18 This policy was established, as we noted, under the Orbán government.

19 This is, however, not to say that an appropriate distance between state, church and society is possible only in the absence of any governmental support. In Neuenburg canton in Switzerland, the government pays the Lutheran, Catholic, and Ancient-Catholic Churches an annuity of 200,000 Francs because these churches embody the Christian traditions of the government (Rusterholz 1993). Similarly, Austria pays an annuity to the Catholic Church and, while guaranteeing religious freedom, regulates – rather severely – the requirements of the governmental registration of new religions (Balogh 1994 and the “Notes” of the 1998 Summer (3) issue of Journal of Church and State, p. 711-712).


21 In an interview, the sociologist Tamás Kolosi, president of Tárki – a research institute for the study of society – and a member of the advisory council of the prime minister, noted that the etatis attitude of the minor parties in the coalition led by the FIDESZ-MPP has a stronger effect on the government than might be expected from the proportions of these parties in the coalition. C.f Magyar Nemzet, July 28, 1999, p. 6.


23 The following numbers are simply guesses based on the names of the registered churches. While in 1996 only one registered church appeared to belong to the neo-pagan movement, the so-called “Hungarian
Religion”, in 1999 there were eight broadly neo-pagan churches: the Ecclesiastical Organization of Voice of Silence, the Church of Esoteric Views, the Celtic Wicca Church, the Cosmos Universal Love Church, the Hungarian Association of Witches, the Ancient Hungarian Táltos (Shaman) Church, the Church of Universe, and the Hungarian Religion.


25 C.f. Table 9 in the Appendix.

26 Reflecting on the United States, Wuthnow (1996) notes that “people may be going to church as often as in the past but doing so without developing personal relationships with other members. ... This is why the small-group movement is becoming so important” (p. 35, italics added).
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Appendix

Analytical Questions

General Information on Hungary and Hungarians in the World

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Interviews with the Leaders of Registered Churches

Other Interviews

The Most Frequently Reviewed Hungarian Dailies
Analytical Questions

The presentation of analytical questions occurs in two steps. First, all the questions are listed here in the same order as they were raised in connection with the different theories. Second, they are placed into groups. Mostly, they remained in the same order, but several theories dealt with structural issues, which necessitated the creation of an independent category addressing “structural analysis”. Obviously, several questions might have been grouped under more than one category. These questions are also shown in parentheses.

The Questions Raised after the Discussion of Theoretical Issues:

1. To what extent can the Latin form of diarchy, or the two-powers model, be applied to medieval Hungarian church-state relations?

2. Would a new diarchy or model be more appropriate to describe those relations after the Compromise?

3. To what extent can we talk about Sturzo’s so-called individual diarchy in the Communist regime and post-Communist era?

4. Can Martin’s fundamental distinction be applied to a particular society even if the society in question has a mixed denominational population?

5. What sort of religion, if any, played a role in Hungarian state building?

6. Did the same religion also play a role in the process of nation building, or did another religion participate or perhaps completely replace it in that process? What kind of religious symbols, if any, were used in that process?

7. What form of civil religion emerged in relationship to the Hungarian public and private spheres, to the state, and to the Hungarian churches?

8. When were the priestly and prophetic versions of civil religion used?

9. Were the different interpretations of the separation of church and state debated in Hungarian society? If yes, what were the consequences of the debate?

10. What kind of relationship among the different denominations resulted from the emergence of civil religion?

11. Did the existence of a civil religion benefit the state? If yes, under what circumstances?

12. What kind of governments tried to establish their conduct on a strictly secular base? How successful were their attempts?

13. To what extent did the churches rely on state resources?

14. What kind of alliances and interactions can be identified between Hungarian religious and political organizations?

15. To what extent can we talk about the return of Hungarian churches to public life? If we can, when did this return occur? For what reasons did religion re-enter the Hungarian social arena? Was there any sign of selective deprivatization in the return of the churches to public life?
16. What changes did the return of religion into public life induce in Hungarian church-state relations?
17. Can we see the signs of pressure toward the privatization of religion, as Casanova predicted?
18. How do the Hungarian churches deal, especially after four decades of religious oppression, with religious competition and cultural pluralism?
19. What kind of church-state relations can be expected from the position of Hungarian religious organizations in the larger society?
20. Do Hungarian governments turn to religion when establishing the country's or their own identity? If yes, which churches are used as references?
21. The possibility of competition among the different churches raises the question of which one is most suitable to represent the identity of a particular national society. Do we find examples of this 'competition' among the Hungarian denominations?
22. Do Hungarian churches function purely within their traditionally "religious" realm or do they try to extend their activities into other differentiated systems of the society? Do Hungarian governments expect the churches to expand into other subsystems of society?

The Categorization of the Analytical Questions
I. Historical Background: traditional models: No: 1-4 (5)
II. State- and Nation building: No: 5-6.
III. Civil Religion: 7-8, 10-12 (6)
IV. Structural Analysis: 9, 13,19
V. Privatization, Deprivatization: 14-18
VI. Identity, Globalization: 20-22 (18)
General Information on Hungary and Hungarians in the World

Territory and Population

Throughout most of the past eleven centuries, Hungary occupied the Carpathian Basin, or the entire Middle Danube Basin.

Present Area: 93,000 km², (1 percent of Europe’s territory)
Main Geographical Units: Dunántúl (Transdanubia), Felfől, Alföld (Great Plain).
Largest Cities:
Budapest, (1,947,000); Debrecen (213,297); Miskolc (194,033); Szeged (176,135); Pécs (170,023); Győr (129,598).

Population: 10,140,000 (at the end of 1997), urbanites: 63 %
Official Language: Hungarian (Magyar)
Political System: Republic (since 1990)
Territorial Administration System: 19 counties + capital

Occupational Structure of the Population:
- Agriculture: 18.4%
- Industry: 37.4%
- Other: 44.2%

Currency: Forint, 1 $US = 204.14 Ft (January 1, 1998); 1$US = 240.75 (Oct. 5, 1999)
(Source: Historical Currency Table at www.oanda.com/consertor/cc-table)
National and Ethnic Minorities:
Germans (200-220,000); Slovaks (110,000); Croatians (80,000); Rumanians (25,000);
Poles (10-15,000); Greeks (6,000); Serbs (5,000); Slovenes (5,000); Armenians (3,000);
Bulgarians (2,500); Romas (600,000).

Hungarians in the World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the Carpathian Basin:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10,140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>420,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,360,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Western Europe and Other Parts of the World</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benelux States</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian States</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European States</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel*</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,390,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of Hungarians in the world: 14,750,000

* Hungarian speakers

Source: (if not stated otherwise) Fakten über Ungarn 1993; Ungarn in der Weiten Welt.
(Facts about Hungary 1993; Hungary in the World.) Aussenministerium, Budapest.
Map 1. Route Followed by the Hungarian Conquerors to the Carpathian Basin. Source: Lázár (1989: 24-25)
Map 2.

*Hungary in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century.*

Source: Lázár (1989: 104-105)
Map 3.

Hungary and the Hungarian Catholic Dioceses before and after Trianon

Source: Andras and Morel (1983a)
Tables

Table 1.

*Distribution of the Fiefs of 27 Hungarian Counties, 1784-1787*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Owner</th>
<th>Number of Fiefs</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,581</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnates</td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td>40.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>12.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury (Crown)</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>6.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Nobility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Holdings</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>22.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Holdings</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>17.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Janos (1982: 18)

* Parishes held in fief by royal free cities, foundations, and other legal entities endowed with noble rights.
Table 2.
Distribution of the Adult Population of Hungary among the Different Types of Religiosity and non-religiosity between 1978 and 1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year, month</th>
<th>I AM RELIGIOUS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>according to the teaching of churches</td>
<td>I Cannot decide whether I am religious or not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tomka (1995b)
Table 3.a.
Hungarians' Level of Education in the Different Religious and Non-Religious Categories in 1995 (%)

(N: 1000; missing: 8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>no education</th>
<th>unfinished elementary</th>
<th>elementary</th>
<th>trade school</th>
<th>finished high-school</th>
<th>finished college</th>
<th>finished university</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>religious according to the teaching of the churches</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious according to his or her own way I cannot decide whether I am religious or not</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not religious</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have different beliefs, I am definitely not religious*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not applicable</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In Hungarian surveys, this category refers to atheists.
Table 3.b.

Hungarians' Age Distribution in the Different Religious and Non-Religious Categories in 1995 (%)

(N: 1000; missing: 8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>- 20</th>
<th>21-27</th>
<th>28-50</th>
<th>51-65</th>
<th>66-70</th>
<th>71+</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious according to the teaching of the churches</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious according to his or her own way</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I cannot decide whether I am religious or not</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not religious</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have different beliefs, I am definitely not religious*</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not applicable</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In Hungarian surveys, this category refers to atheists.
Table 3.c.
The Distribution of Hungarians' Settlement-Types in the Different Religious and Non-Religious Categories in 1995 (%)

(N: 1000; missing: 8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Budapest (capital)</th>
<th>cities</th>
<th>villages, farms</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>religious according to the teaching of the churches</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious according to his or her own way</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I cannot decide whether I am religious or not</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not religious</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have different beliefs, I am definitely not religious*</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not applicable</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In Hungarian surveys, this category refers to atheists.
Table 3.d.
The Distribution of Hungarians’ Monthly Net Income** in the Different Religious and Non-Religious Categories in 1995 (%)

(N: 1000, missing: 49)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>no income</th>
<th>4-100</th>
<th>101-150</th>
<th>151-200</th>
<th>201-300</th>
<th>301-500</th>
<th>501 -</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>religious according to the teaching of the churches</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious according to his or her own way</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I cannot decide whether I am religious or not</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not religious</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have different beliefs, I am definitely not religious*</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not applicable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In Hungarian surveys, this category refers to atheists.

** In 100 Forints (1 US$ = 175 HunFt)

Source: Data base of the “Expectations from the Churches in Today’s Hungary” survey conducted by the Hungarian Scientific Academy’s Research Center for Social Conflict (TARKI) for the Hungarian Catholic Bishops’ Conference.
Table 4.
The Proportion of Hungarians in General and “Churched” Hungarians in Particular Who Do Not Know Whether a Given Political or Cultural Organization Supports or Opposes the Churches in 1995 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governments</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (MSZP)*</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party (SZDSZ)*</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Forum (MDF)+</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholders’ Party (FKGP)+</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Dem. Party (KDNP)+</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Democrats (FIDESZ)^</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership of the Radio</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership of the Television</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepzabadsag#</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uj Magyarorszag##</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
* Parties of the ruling government advocating cosmopolitan values
+ Opposition parties advocating Christian and national values
^ A liberal party orienting toward Christian and national values
# A daily newspaper of the Socialist Party
## A daily newspaper of the opposition
Table 5.
The Proportion of Hungarians According to Whom the Following Social Tasks Are Presently, and Should Be in the Future, Fulfilled by the Different Institutions (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>Civil Society*</th>
<th>Fulfilled by</th>
<th>State</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Education</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Elderly at Home</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Elderly in Old Age Homes</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Pregnants and Young Mothers</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for the Poor</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Refugees</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in Hospitals</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage Counseling</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing Local Communities</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecology</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Alcoholics and Drug Addicts</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Hungarian Formulation is “The Task should be Fulfilled by Social and Individual Initiatives”.

Source: Database of the Survey “The Hungarians’ Expectations of the Churches in Today’s Hungary” conducted for the HCBC.
Table 6.
The Proportion of Hungarians According to Whom the Following Social Tasks Are Presently, and Should Be in the Future, fulfilled Primarily by the Different Institutions (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>Civil Society*</th>
<th>Fulfilled Primarily by Churches</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Education</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Elderly at Home</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Elderly in Old Age Homes</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Pregnants and Young Mothers</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for the Poor</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Refugees</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in Hospitals</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage Counseling</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing Local Communities</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecology</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Alcoholics and Drug Addicts</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Hungarian Formulation is “The Task should be Fulfilled by Social and Individual Initiatives”

Source: Database of the Survey “The Hungarians’ Expectations of the Churches in Today’s Hungary” conducted for the HCBC.
Table 7.

The Number of Different Educational Institutions Run by Churches, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary School</th>
<th>High School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SION**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logos Foundation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Including five trade schools
**Evangelical Pentecostal Community

Source: Compiled from the Magyarorszagi egyhazak, felekezetek, vallasi kozosseg, 1995 - 96.
(Hungarian Churches, Denominations, and Religious Communities, 1995-96). Published by the Office of the Prime Minister.
Table 8.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Countries with Official Religion</th>
<th>Countries with Religion in Special Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>25: (see the list of these countries below)</td>
<td>1: Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholicism</td>
<td>6: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Malta, Monaco, Peru</td>
<td>6: Andorra, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Haiti, Paraguay, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>1: Greece</td>
<td>4: Armenia, Bulgaria, Finland, and the Serb Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>4: Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>3: Bhutan, Cambodia, Thailand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of England, Church of Scotland</td>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Christianity”</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Monotheism”</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled from the data published by the Encyclopaedia Britannica 99 CD, multimedia edition.

The list of countries where Islam is the official religion: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
Table 9.
The Amount of Donations the Churches* Received from the Income Tax** of their Membership in 1999.+

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Churches</th>
<th>Number of Donors</th>
<th>Sum of Donation (HUF)</th>
<th>Average Donation (HUF)**</th>
<th>Rank Order of Average Donation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>309,541</td>
<td>834,219,199</td>
<td>2,695</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformed</td>
<td>100,572</td>
<td>286,811,437</td>
<td>2,852</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>28,927</td>
<td>90,916,773</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith Church</td>
<td>8,774</td>
<td>17,688,282</td>
<td>2,016</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRISHNA</td>
<td>5,673</td>
<td>15,665,308</td>
<td>2,761</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Communities</td>
<td>5,088</td>
<td>29,802,675</td>
<td>5,857</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah’s Witnesses</td>
<td>4,865</td>
<td>7,501,321</td>
<td>1,541</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>3,148</td>
<td>8,928,623</td>
<td>2,836</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karma Dences Ozel</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>7,637,877</td>
<td>3,713</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitarian</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>7,311,030</td>
<td>4,549</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source; compiled from the data published by the political daily of the Socialist Party, Nepszabadsag, September 17, 1999.

* Only the first ten churches, which were supported by the most donors.
** Hungarians are allowed to channel one percent of their income tax to a church or a public fund named by the government. In 1999, this public fund was the fund created for the support of the millennial festivities.
*** From the average donations we can derive the average income tax of the members, because the average donation is one percent of the average income tax of the supporting members of the denomination.

+ In 1999, about 490,000 Hungarians donated HUF 1,365 million to 73 churches. In 1998, 461,000 Hungarians donated HUF 1,001 million to 56 religious organizations. It was a surprise that the KRISHNA movement received five times as much as they did in 1998, thus surpassing the Jewish Communities, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Baptists, the Karma Dences Ozel Ling Buddhist Community, and the Unitarians in terms of number of donors.
## Interviews with the Leaders of Registered Churches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered Churches</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Interviewed Person(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DATE</strong></td>
<td><strong>LOCATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>NAME</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Community</td>
<td>Sept. 26, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ORTHODOX CHURCHES</strong></td>
<td><strong>DATE</strong></td>
<td><strong>LOCATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian Orthodox</td>
<td>Apr. 14, 1997</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Orthodox</td>
<td>Nov. 28, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Exarchate</td>
<td>Oct. 10, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian Orthodox</td>
<td>Nov. 5, 1996</td>
<td>mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Orthodox</td>
<td>no reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITARIAN</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 18, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLASSIC CHRISTIAN CHURCHES</strong></td>
<td><strong>DATE</strong></td>
<td><strong>LOCATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Day Adventist</td>
<td>Nov. 14, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Day A. Reform Movement</td>
<td>Oct. 26, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of God’s Assembly</td>
<td>Nov. 5, 1996</td>
<td>letter mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly of Late Rain</td>
<td>refused</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptists</td>
<td>Oct. 18, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brethren Assemblies</td>
<td>Oct. 31, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of God</td>
<td>Oct. 11, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Pentecostal</td>
<td>Oct. 31, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Christian Fellowship</td>
<td>Oct. 28, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Evangelical Church</td>
<td>Nov. 13, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living God Assembly</td>
<td>no reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>Oct. 17, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormons</td>
<td>Apr. 4, 1997</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazarenes</td>
<td>Oct. 29, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Apostolic Church</td>
<td>Nov. 5, 1996</td>
<td>Kobanya, Bp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Christian Apostolic Church</td>
<td>Oct. 15, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
<td>Oct. 22, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NEW CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS**

<p>| AGAPE | Nov. 12, 1996 | Budapest | Istvan Perjesi, Sandor Olah | president, presbyter |
| Bible Speaks Church | Oct. 23, 1996 | Budapest | Brian D. Lange | pastor, manager |
| Christian Advent Community | Nov. 11, 1996 | Budapest | Oszkar Egervari | president |
| Evangelical Brethren | Nov. 21, 1996 | letter | Tibor Ivanyi | president |
| Faith Church | Nov 29, 1996 | Budapest | Peter Morvai, Csaba Krall | public relations, chief editor |
| Int’l Church of Budapest | Oct. 21, 1996 | Budapest | Glen Howard | pastor |
| Living Word Church | Febr. 13, 1997 | Budapest | Imre Fekete, Balazs Horvath | president, secretary |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Contact Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Contact Person</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rosicrucians</td>
<td>Oct. 10, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Tamas Kovacs</td>
<td>member of board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalom Open Bible</td>
<td>Nov. 21, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Mihaly Gulyas</td>
<td>senior pastor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transylvanian Congregation</td>
<td>Nov. 13, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Istvan Zalatmayer Gyongyi Bako</td>
<td>senior pastor secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification Church</td>
<td>Febr. 16, 1997</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Robert Grancz</td>
<td>secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l New Pentecostal</td>
<td>no reply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panthocatholics</td>
<td>refusai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal Prayer Group</td>
<td>no reply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stretch Out Your Arm</td>
<td>refused</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Mission</td>
<td>no reply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NON-CHRISTIAN BELIEVERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BUDDHISTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly of Healing Buddha</td>
<td>Oct. 22, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Zoltan Nagy</td>
<td>manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist Mission</td>
<td>Nov. 12, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Jozsef Horvath (Dr)</td>
<td>president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate of Doctrine</td>
<td>Oct. 11, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Pal Farkas</td>
<td>rector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karma Decsen Ozel Ling</td>
<td>Nov. 8, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Istvan Becz-Gruber</td>
<td>manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karma Kagyu</td>
<td>Nov. 15, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Katalin Devenyi</td>
<td>manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Csan Buddhist</td>
<td>no reply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIME Tenzin</td>
<td>no reply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HINDU</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OM VISHWA GURU</td>
<td>Oct. 31, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Ervin Nagy Karoly Kovacs</td>
<td>president first secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRISHNA MOVEMENT</td>
<td>Oct. 24, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Krisztina Danka</td>
<td>spoke person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLAMIC SOCIETY</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 10, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Zoltan Bolek</td>
<td>president</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PARARELIGIOUS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>HUNGARIAN FAITH</td>
<td>Nov. 30, 1996</td>
<td>telephone</td>
<td>Mrs. A. Kovacs (Dr)</td>
<td>manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIENTOLOGY</td>
<td>Nov. 6, 1996</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Peter Karpai</td>
<td>secretary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Explanation:**
- mail: the interviewed person returned the filled-out questionnaire by mail
- letter: sent a letter with some information
- telephone: the interview was conducted by telephone
- no reply: no reply received
- refused: the interview, in any form, was refused

**Method of Contacting the Registered Churches:**
1. The list and addresses of the registered churches were obtained from the Magyarországi Egyházak felkerület, vallási közösségek 1995-96 (Hungarian Churches, Denominations, Religious Associations 1995-96), published by the Office of the Prime Minister.
2. A letter was sent to the churches on September 15, 1996, explaining who I was and asking for an interview. 22 churches responded to this letter.
3. A follow-up letter was sent to the non-responding churches on October 16, 1996, repeating my request for an interview. 13 churches responded to the second letter.
4. Between November 8 and 13, 1996, I telephoned the non-responding churches of which 9 were reached.
5. Contact with the Mormons was made accidentally. Although they did not reply to any of my letters, probably because the American "elders" did not understand Hungarian, they were cooperative when I asked one of the "elders" on the street in Budapest. The interview with them was conducted at their home.
Other Interviews

September 16, 1996, Dr. Hegyi, János S.J., former superior of Hungarian Jesuits in exile (Leányfalu)
October 2, 1996, Valentiny, Géza, prelate, co-worker of Europaisches Hilfsfonds, (Vienna)
October 2-4, 1996, Dr. András, Imre S.J., director of the Hungarian Institute for Sociology of Religion (Vienna)
October 27, 1996, Kovács, K. Zoltán, former editor of Radio Free Europe (Budapest)
November 13, 1996, Miklós, Imre, retired head of the State Office for Church Affairs (Budapest)
November 21, 1996, Huzsvár, László, bishop of Bánát – Nagybecskerek (Leányfalu)
December 2, 1996, Lezsák, Sándor, organizer of the political opposition in the late 1980s, former president of the Hungarian Democratic Forum Party (Budapest)
March 6, 1997, Keresztes, Sándor, president of the Christian Democratic People’s Party, former ambassador to the Vatican (Budapest)
May 6, 1997, Dr. Márton, József, historian (Gyulaféhér – Alba Julia)
May 7, 1997, Lestyán, Sándor, vicar of the Transylvanian Diocese (Gyulaféhér – Alba Julia)
April 21, 1999, Dr. Semjén, Zsolt, deputy state secretary (Budapest)
April 25, 1999, Bishop Várszegi, Asztrik OSB, chief abbot of Pannonhalma (Pannonhalma)

Dr. Máté-Tóth, András, former member of Fr. Bulányi’s Bokor Movement, author, head of the Research Group of Religious Studies, József Attila University, Szeged (audio tape)

Dr. Miklósházy, Attila S.J. Bishop of Hungarians in Exile. As Bishop Miklósházy’s formal secretary, the present author had the chance to talk with him several times.
The Most Frequently Reviewed Hungarian Dailies

Loyal to the Orban Government:
Magyar Nemzet (with a circulation of 142,000 copies)
Napi Magyarország (64,000)

In Opposition to the Orban Government
Népszabadság (816,000)
Népszava (194,000)
Magyar Hirlap (153,000)

Other Dailies:
Mai Nap (428,000)
Blikk (386,000)
Nemzeti Sport (304,000)
Express (166,000)
Magyar Nemzet (142,000)

Although the circulation of the Hungarian Socialist Party’s Népszabadság has decreased by 23,000 copies since 1998, it is still the most popular daily. Meanwhile, the circulation of the Napi Magyarország increased by 30 percent. The increase of the circulation of all of the Hungarian dailies from 1998 to 1999 was 10 percent.

(Source: Szonda Ipsos, a polling agent, June 1999)