France, the Allies and Franco's Spain, 1943-1948

by

David Andrew Messenger

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of History of the University of Toronto

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Abstract
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David Andrew Messenger
Graduate Department of History, University of Toronto

The end of the Second World War in Europe meant that the appearance of new security arrangements coincided with the arrival of transformed states. Emerging from the collaborationist Vichy era, rebuilding from the devastation of war, and facing the development of the Western bloc behind the United States and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain, France was one such country. The question of relations with Franco's Spain engaged the various forces that in the aftermath of the Liberation were in the process of rebuilding France as a democracy at home and as a power with influence and prestige abroad.

Prominent Government officials argued that maintaining relations with Spain would be beneficial for France's own economic reconstruction and its re-emergence as an equal western ally. By contrast, those who were determined anti-fascists, particularly those from left-wing organizations of the internal Resistance, were set on developing a new policy fashioned by the experience of defeating fascism in war. They were opposed to any sort of diplomatic or economic relationship with Franco's Spain. Over the course of 1944-1945, these two visions competed, until the Government attempted to reconcile them in a new policy, from 1946 to 1948.

Chapter One examines the wartime relations of the French government-in-exile with Spain. Chapter Two is a study of the Resistance position from Liberation in August, 1944 through 1945. Chapters Three and Four focus on the Government's various attempts to create a policy which appeased domestic opinion while not isolating France from its western Allies, initiatives which resulted in the closure of the Franco-Spanish border. Finally, Chapter Five assesses French relations with the Spanish opposition and the 1948 decision to end sanctions against Spain.

The experience of war and resistance did not offer the French one single legacy. Rather, different visions of France and its role in postwar Europe competed. The effort to reconcile domestic and international concerns, however, faced even greater constraints imposed by the onset of the Cold War and by France's position within the Western Alliance. The history of French relations with Franco's Spain in this period highlights the narrow boundaries within which policy could be made in postwar Europe.
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For my Grandfathers, Maurice O. Messenger and John W. Murray, who passed onto me, at an early age, one of the greatest gifts I have known: a love of reading and writing history, most especially the history of their time, the Twentieth Century.

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Any errors or misinterpretations are, of course, completely my own.
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**Introduction**

Upon leaving Barcelona in the midst of the Spanish Civil War, George Orwell found it impossible to abandon the spell of the city or the time. ‘We thought, talked, dreamed incessantly of Spain,’ he wrote of the time he and his wife spent in Banyuls, France immediately after fleeing over the Pyrenees.¹ Spain and its civil war did indeed captivate many, whether they saw it as ‘the last great cause’, a dress rehearsal for the world war which followed or the first open battle of the twentieth century conflict fought between capitalism and communism.² The influence of the conflict, and its various interpretations, lasted well beyond the victory of General Francisco Franco’s Nationalist forces in 1939. The ‘Spanish question’ was revived in the aftermath of the Second World War. Influenced by a heavy dose of nostalgia connected to the initial conflict of 1936-1939, further shaped by the seminal conflict of a generation between 1939 and 1945, and imbued with a dynamic of its own, the ‘Spanish question’ of the early postwar era engaged politicians, bureaucrats and the public as it had a decade earlier.

This was especially so in the France of the Fourth Republic. The end of the Second World War meant that the emergence of new European security arrangements coincided with the arrival of transformed states. Emerging from the collaborationist Vichy era, rebuilding from the devastation of war and occupation, and facing the development of a new western bloc behind the United States and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain, France was also in the

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midst of its own political redefinition. Led by the wartime Resistance leader Charles de Gaulle, in coalition with a number of non-Gaullist resistance groups, the French political scene was at a moment Jean-Pierre Rioux has described as ‘unique’ in the nation’s history, for ‘the Right had collapsed with Vichy, and the Left, invested with all the moral authority of the Resistance, was now the natural spokesman for the national interest.’ The same Left that had been engaged with the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s had another opportunity to consider the role of General Franco’s semi-fascist regime in the world order.

During the latter part of the 1930s, France, like most of Europe, was enmeshed in a polarization that has been described as ‘the politics of either/or’. One of the consequences of such a cleavage was the formation of the Popular Front coalition of Communists, Radicals and Socialists, and its election to government under Léon Blum in June, 1936. Just as the Government was coming into office, the Spanish Civil War broke out. The Spanish Republic, also governed by a Popular Front coalition, requested French military assistance in the form of arms shipments in order to defend itself against a rightist military uprising that soon had the support of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Blum reluctantly refused, and France instead promoted a policy of foreign non-intervention in the conflict. The reluctance of France’s primary ally, Great Britain, to get involved in the conflict significantly influenced Blum’s decision, yet the decisive factor in the decision not to aid Spain’s Second Republic was the fear that such support would lead the collapse of his government and perhaps even a similar

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civil war between left and right within France, although now it is clear such a threat was exaggerated.\(^5\) While Blum’s decision may have saved his government for the short term, it did not end the division within France. That division was complicated by the fact that the French Left, committed to the struggle of Republican Spain, was infuriated with the Blum government for having abandoned the front line in the democratic battle against fascism. The sense of resentment did not die, nor did the Left’s conviction that the fate of Republican Spain was an essential element of the fight against fascism. After the end of the Popular Front in France, Blum himself mulled over the missed opportunities for confronting fascism that had existed in Spain.\(^6\) Popular leftist disappointment persisted beyond the war itself. As the Civil War ended, the Spanish film maker Luis Buñuel remembered that ‘in contrast to the French Government, that consistently refused to intervene in favour of the Republic...the French people, and, in particular, the workers...gave us their considerable assistance.’\(^7\)

With the onset of world war and the collapse of France in June, 1940, the Spanish


case, as an example of "the class war played out on an international scale," was still relevant to the internal politics of France. The Right, seemingly, had triumphed across the continent. Within France, the Right not only collaborated with the German occupier, but more importantly responded to the debates of the 1930s with its own 'National Revolution'-'revenge against the Popular Front more than accommodation to some Nazi blueprint.'

Spain, now under the authoritarian regime of Franco, drew the attention of many of Vichy's political leaders. The ideologues of the new regime were even more attracted to the Spanish state. Drawing parallels between Vichy, Fascist Italy and Francoist Spain, a French Foreign Ministry memo in July, 1940 contended that a Mediterranean coalition built upon 'Latin and Christian solidarity' was a possible branch of the new order in Europe which could flourish. Colonial competition between the two states was one factor which worked against such an alliance, and much of Franco-Spanish relations during the war consisted of rhetoric rather than policy. Yet the ideological attraction was always there, built upon the polarization of the 1930s and the legacy of the Civil War.

Given the history of Franco-Spanish relations since 1936, it was not surprising that in

10 This included the chief of state of the new French state, Marshal Philippe Pétain, for many of the generals now in power in Spain, including Franco, had been his allies in the Moroccan colonial wars of the 1920s and he was predisposed to share, in general terms, their political views about democracy. Matthieu Séguéla. Pétain-Franco: les secrets d'une alliance (Paris, 1992) 18-23.
11 Séguéla, Pétain-Franco, 62.
the early post-Second World War era the French Resistance was drawn anew to the case of Spain. The war had been fought against fascism and Nazism, and as such it was a conflict in which ‘a total reordering of the globe was at stake from the very beginning.’

Yet Francisco Franco and his regime, which included the fascist-like Falange party, remained in power while Hitler and Mussolini— who had put Franco in power— as well as numerous other leaders of fascist- and semi-fascist regimes had been defeated. Moreover, from within and without, French democrats had defended democracy and they had remade it in their own nation. They and their Allies had defeated the Vichy state and its authoritarian basis in order to reconstruct the Republic, and a ‘myth of national renewal, originating in national resistance’ became a part of the emerging political orthodoxy.

The myth of a nation in resistance generated by wartime experiences, the ‘resistancialist myth’ as first described by Henri Rousso, and the ideals which flowed from such an image, would have relevance for both domestic and international politics, and for the intermingling of the two.

The renewal of democracy within France created a unique situation, for ‘ordinary people thought about the social contract and had an opportunity to renegotiate it.’ Having lived through the experience of occupation, collaboration and resistance, the public as well as

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governmental and Resistance leaders all played a role in the process of legitimizing the new regime. For the renewed democracy, the question of justice was central. Not only must the Republic be reestablished, but collaborators must be purged, traitors punished and reforms implemented to prevent such national exploitation in the future. The Resistance vision for justice and renewal, described most clearly in the Conseil National de la Résistance Charter of March, 1944, had a powerful appeal to the public in the days and months following French Liberation. The experience of defeat and occupation had led France and its citizens to conclude that a reformed democracy, one based upon the concept of justice, was necessary for national reconstruction. If that was the lesson of the Second World War experience, one which was part of a global ideological conflict, then could not the lessons of wartime France be relevant for other nations? Could not a renewed France contribute to the emergence of a renewed Europe grounded in the principles of democracy and justice? In a parallel to the universalistic tone of Republicanism in the 1790s, the impact of domestic experience on international policy was profound for many who emerged from the Resistance experience in 1944.

The Resistance was a varied movement, ideologically and otherwise, but some generalizations can be made about their views and their interpretation of France and the world which was to emerge from war. General aspirations rather than specific plans were the norm during the war, but nonetheless these goals defined how the Resistance believed France should be shaped. First and foremost, the Resistance was Republican, committed to

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democratic government, but a certain kind of democracy, one in which public life was ethical. This was in response not only to the authoritarianism of Vichy, but also to the perceived weakness of the Third Republic. Political machination and careerism were seen to be the abiding preoccupations of Third Republican politicians, and as the prime source of that regime's debility.\textsuperscript{18} The new Republic must build democratic justice rather than worry about parliamentary and elite opinion, as Blum had in his decision not to aid Republican Spain. Renovation of French democracy meant the replacement of political elites who had dominated the Third Republic with constitutional reform, giving a greater role to the people and promoting a moralization of French politics which favoured civic spirit over individual or factional interest.\textsuperscript{19} The Spanish case fit comfortably into such a framework of political analysis. Those who were democrats should support Spanish Republicans in their efforts to remove General Franco and restore Republicanism in Iberia just as the French had removed Marshal Pétain. A democratic world system, built through the triumph of the democracies over fascism in war, would facilitate the expansion of Republican justice. Moreover, if French democrats removed elite decision-makers and had the opportunity, in a moral political arena, to express such sentiment and respond to the demands of the popular will, then their desire would prevail.

In reality, however, the Resistance did not inherit a clean slate on Spain with the removal of Vichy and the liberation of France from German occupation, and thus they had no


\textsuperscript{19} Shennan, \textit{Rethinking France}, 40-41.
tabula rasa upon which to inscribe a new, morally-based, chapter in French-Spanish relations. Non-Vichy France had had diplomatic contact with Franco’s Spain since November, 1942. Such relations first developed under the auspices of the breakaway Vichy colonies in North Africa, the French High Commission of Algiers, and later under the North African-Free France union led by General Charles de Gaulle and the Comité Français de Libération Nationale (CFLN) over which he presided. Entering the postwar era, de Gaulle was willing to continue diplomatic relations with Spain. In contrast to the parties and organizations of the internal Resistance, de Gaulle had a different conception of how best to remake France. Rather than emphasize democracy and morality, the General advocated the concept of *grandeur* as the basis upon which to rebuild the nation. National unity and national greatness were always the ‘imperatives’ of Gaullist resistance.\(^{20}\) France’s reputation amongst its Allies and its international position in the world were to determine policy.\(^{21}\) Foreign policy, therefore, could not always be made on the basis of morality and justice. The measurements of power had to be given significance. Thus, the value of the French Empire to the national movement was made clear, especially after the merger with Giraud’s supporters led to the creation of the CFLN in Algiers.\(^{22}\) In North Africa, preservation of the Empire required, in the minds of de Gaulle’s aides, communication and diplomatic contact with the other colonial power in the region, Spain. Spanish colonial territory abutted Resistance territory in North Africa, and France and Spain were both parties to agreements concerning


\(^{22}\) Shennan, *Rethinking France*, 67.
the governance of Morocco. Trade between North Africa and the Spanish mainland was significant, and necessary in order to allow the CFLN to continue to raise armies and contribute to the Allied war effort. These and other reasons to be examined brought non-Vichy France and the Franco regime into contact with one another in the midst of war.

Naturally there was much that the internal Resistance and the CFLN agreed upon, most importantly on the necessity to renovate and renew the Republic. Yet with reference to policy-making toward Spain, the divergent nature of a Resistance grounded in democracy and liberation and a Gaullist one based on grandeur would come into conflict. The dynamic of these competing visions reveal much about the transition from war to peace in the Fourth Republic. Despite being united in the war, the different Resistance organizations had different plans for the postwar renewal of France in the international system. The Spanish case brought these to the surface. For those who had conducted foreign policy from Algiers during the war, first under the High Commission and then under de Gaulle and the CFLN, and who moved to Paris as the Provisional Government, the quest for postwar grandeur imposed certain needs upon France. In the formation of foreign policy, France had to assess its strengths and weaknesses, seek solutions necessary for its own reconstruction and conduct political and economic diplomacy as these needs dictated. The importance of expert and professional analysis from bureaucrats who had steered non-Vichy France through the war was accepted. In contrast, as already explained, the Resistance believed that its grassroots struggle for the Republic gave it the right to formulate a policy based on the principles of the Resistance experience, namely democracy and socialism. These principles should not only be

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23 Shennan, Rethinking France, 68.
embraced in France, through the vote, but also promulgated abroad. In the postwar era, the Resistance organizations and political parties of the centre-left would carry forward this message.

Further complicating the formation of French policy was the existence, in Spain, of another policy born in war, that of France’s American and British allies. The strategic requirements of these states, especially with the gradual emergence of the Cold War, led them to gradually accept Franco’s regime as the best guarantee of stability in the Iberian Peninsula. France could not ignore the policies and decisions made by its Allies. Yet these two countries had also fought the war against fascism, for democracy, and expressed sentiments similar to those espoused by the French Resistance. Just as in France, the requirements of strategy and the ideals of democracy competed. The Quai d’Orsay was constantly aware of alliance politics in the formulation of policy and sought to craft solutions to the Spanish question from within the alliance. As for the Resistance, they too followed developments in Great Britain and the United States when considering the options for France in Spain.

Historians have paid considerable attention to the development of the West’s policy toward General Francisco Franco and his regime in the initial postwar period. The exploration began through the study of Spain’s strategic role in the Cold War.24 Recently, two important collections of essays examining Spain’s relations with Western and other Great

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Powers have been published. Works which have focused on the specific issue of Spanish-Allied relations after the war have also made significant contributions, particularly in delineating the emergence of American leadership over British in Western diplomacy toward Madrid, a process which culminated in the Hispano-American agreement to allow U.S. military bases on Spanish soil which was signed in 1953. Yet there has been little work examining in particular the French role in ‘the Spanish Question’ of the early postwar period.

France’s transition from war to postwar was not straightforward, and this was

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especially true in the realm of foreign policy. Some excellent studies of the Fourth Republic's foreign policy have recently appeared which assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the French position in the world, and especially in Europe.  

Naturally concerned with the Franco-German and Franco-American relationships, these new accounts have varied from Young's reassertion that France was a weak ally drawn into the Western alliance somewhat unwillingly to Hitchcock's argument that French officials, accepting their weaknesses but also acknowledging their strengths, made foreign policy with the intent of pursuing a national strategy of recovery, economically, politically and diplomatically- one which proved to be successful in the first ten years of the Fourth Republic.

This study of Franco-Spanish relations draws upon these insights, but also qualifies them by demonstrating both the strengths and the limits of Hitchcock's thesis. It will show that from the middle of the Second World War, relations between non-Vichy France and Francoist Spain were initiated by the French with the needs of wartime recognition and postwar reconstruction in mind. In this sense, the emergence of the Franco-Spanish relationship for policy-makers, first in Algiers, then in Paris, was a part of need for recovery, politically and economically. The attraction of Spain for these officials was not ideological,

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but rather derived from a calculation of the national interests of France which could be nourished through a relationship with Spain. In forging a policy which recognized French strengths and weaknesses, these officials also attempted to reconcile their goals with those of the Resistance and the French Left, who sought to export Republican ideology. However, the position of France in the Cold War, as a secondary power within the Western Alliance, meant that Spanish policy, as developed by the French Left and the Quai d’Orsay, had to be abandoned. The constraints imposed upon France by the Cold War and international politics in the Spanish case highlight the fact that while French policy could be innovative, there were limits to what the politicians and policy makers of the Fourth Republic could do in the international arena.

The issue of France’s diplomatic recovery was of great significance to Foreign Ministry officials who developed policy toward Spain. Having established a working relationship with the Franco regime due to the support of the United States and Great Britain, these officials in the postwar period sought to define Franco-Spanish relations through the framework of the Western Alliance. Such a perspective served to place Spain within the context of other issues, offering both opportunity and imposing constraint as the international system moved toward the bipolar division of the Cold War.

While the idea of national recovery was uppermost in the minds of French officials, they had to grapple with the fact that in liberated France it was not they alone who made foreign policy. The Resistance vision of renewed Republic implied a new type of politics, and this had its consequences for Spanish policy, in particular because the Spanish issue had already, in the 1930s, served as a catalyst for the debate between ‘new politics’ and ‘old
diplomacy'. The domestic debate over Spain was powerful, for it drew upon France’s own wartime experience of fascism, authoritarianism and liberation. It forced French officials to alter their preferred policy on engagement with the Franco regime, and it forced France’s American and British allies to reconsider the strength of the French government at crucial moments in 1946.

The entrance of the Resistance into the debate over Spain after 1944, this work will argue, fundamentally shaped the course of French-Spanish relations until the point when the divisions of the Cold War and the implications for alliance policy imposed their weight, in 1948. With that imposition, the Spanish issue was subsumed and France had to fall in line with the positions of its Western Allies which had come to accept the Franco regime as a bulwark against Communism and a necessary part of Western European defense. The force of a wider conflict not only meant a loss of influence for those who sought to promote the Resistance vision for neo-Wilsonian international politics. It also meant that the effort of the French Foreign Ministry to shape alliance policy toward Franco in a way that accommodated both domestic and strategic concerns also ended in failure. While most definitely set upon pursuing a policy which allowed for national recovery, European influence and international prestige, the Quai d’Orsay was not always as successful within the alliance as Hitchcock has argued. Rather, the assertion of bipolarity in the European and international system gradually limited France’s ability to influence its Allies on issues such as Spain. In 1946, with the tensions of the postwar slowly emerging, the Spanish question and the French effort to reconcile a Resistance vision and the pursuit of grandeur compelled American and British officials to respond. By 1948, with the East-West divide clearly marked, France had no
options other than to accept the Franco regime as its Allies had.

In attempting to assess the problem of Spain in the development of the Fourth Republic and its foreign policy, this work adopts a chronological structure. Chapter One of the dissertation examines the wartime experience of non-Vichy France in Spain, and the emergence of the CFLN as a partner to its British and American allies in the implementation of policy toward General Franco. Chapter Two is a study of the Resistance view of Spanish policy from the Liberation in August, 1944 through 1945, and the response of the Provisional Government to that view during those years. Chapters Three and Four focus on the Government’s efforts, in 1946, to forge a policy which reconciled domestic opinion while not isolating France from the Spanish policies of its Western Allies, initiatives which were largely unsuccessful and resulted in the closure of the Franco-Spanish border between February, 1946 and February, 1948. Chapter Five assess French relations with the anti-Francoist opposition and the 1948 decision to end unilateral sanctions against Spain.

From the middle of the Second World War, when the tide turned in favour of the Allies and the Liberation of France first seemed apparent, France was in the midst of renewal and redefinition, a process with both national and international aspects. The importance of the Spanish case in that process has been neglected. The Government of Charles de Gaulle and the bureaucrats of the Quai d’Orsay hoped to build on the relationship with Spain established during the war. The Resistance did not, and sought to make the Spanish question a test case for France’s commitment to democratic policy-making and democratic promotion, for the triumph of the ‘new politics’ over the ‘old diplomacy’. While the Foreign Ministry did work with its American and British allies in the effort to shape western policy toward Spain,
the Resistance and its supporters heralded Spanish Republican refugees in France as model democrats awaiting liberation, a liberation that France, due to its own wartime experience, could help provide.29

An examination of the conflict over France’s Spanish policy reveals the nature of the postwar transition inside France. The experience of war and resistance did not offer the French one single legacy. Rather, different visions of France and its role in Europe emerged, and competed, and the ensuing debate imposed constraints and limitations upon the construction of French policy in the mid- to late- 1940s. The uniqueness of France’s transition from war to Cold War is made apparent through an examination of the Spanish case.

Chapter 1

The Agents of Non-Vichy France in Spain, 1942-1944

On 8 November 1942, a new stage of the Second World War was launched following the landing of 100,000 American troops in French North Africa. In the context of the war’s military history, Operation ‘TORCH’, as the landing was called, represented the moment at which, ‘the Allies had clearly seized the initiative.’ However, Operation ‘TORCH’ also brought about consequences that were neither expected nor planned. The most significant of these was the decision of the German Government on 11 November 1942 to move its troops into Vichy territory in southern France, hitherto unoccupied as befit a collaborationist but formally independent regime. As a result of the Nazi incursion, thousands of French citizens sought refuge across the Pyrenees in Spain. Their arrival in Spain began a new era in Franco-Spanish relations, one that would outlive the war and carry over into the postwar period. The flood of French refugees into Spain led to the creation of relations between the French governments-in-exile based in North Africa and the Spanish regime of General Francisco Franco. French officials placed a high level of importance upon the Spanish relationship as part of their effort to restore Republican France as a great power amongst the Western Allies.

The success of Allied operations in North Africa was as much political as military. It had required Spain, officially non-belligerent but certainly pro-Axis, to remain outside of the

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1Weinberg, A World at Arms, 362.
2Paxton, Vichy France, 480.
3Catala, Les relations franco-espagnoles, 235.
conflict despite a military landing just across from its shore and next door to its territory in Morocco: and, it had depended on limited resistance from the French African Army, officially part of the collaborationist Vichy regime. The Allies had prepared the ground politically for both scenarios to unfold as desired, and perhaps over-prepared, for the likelihood of either Spanish entry into war or North African resistance was minimal. In Spain, General Francisco Franco increasingly hedged his bets over the outcome of the war and recognized the need to seek greater rapprochement with the Allies. In North Africa, the Allied invasion led to the formation of an alternative French regime in North Africa. First under the leadership of Admiral François Darlan, and then General Henri Giraud, the French High Commission became a partner of the Allies, and in particular the United States. North African officials, until the complete German occupation of France, had been representatives of Vichy, a regime which continued, after TORCH, to have full relations with Madrid based

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5 For more on the impact of TORCH and subsequent wartime developments on Franco and his ministers, see Denis Smyth, ‘Franco and the Allies in the Second World War’ in Balfour and Preston, eds, *Spain and the Great Powers*, 204.; Javier Tussell, *Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial: Entre el Eje y la Neutralidad* (Madrid, 1995) pp. 357-367; Preston, *Franco*, 482-505 reveals the dual nature of Franco’s policy: his personal desire for Axis victory continued well into 1943 alongside a realization that he had to deal with the Allies more openly.
upon common religious, cultural and political views. Yet the Second World War was marked by any number of wartime alliances of convenience, as well as great ideological divisions. What brought non-Vichy officials and Franco into contact with one another was the French refugee crisis of 1943. The arrival in Spain of the French refugees engaged not only the Spanish, but also the Germans, the Allies and the two administrative entities that existed on French territory in 1943: the Vichy regime under German occupation and the High Commission for French North Africa in Algiers. Later, the Free France resistance leader, General Charles de Gaulle, would also have representatives in Spain. The success of ‘TORCH’ placed France and Spain at the centre of the Mediterranean conflict, and engaged the two states in a number of complex relationships. This chapter will examine the relationship between the agents of non-Vichy France, first from North Africa and later from de Gaulle’s Comité Française de la Libération Nationale (CFLN), and the Spanish regime of General Franco. In Madrid, non-Vichy France had the opportunity to begin the process of re-establishing France as a great diplomatic power, of restoring what General de Gaulle would later call France’s grandeur. The deepening of the non-Vichy relationship with Spain well before the end of the war contributed to the desire, after the Liberation of France, to maintain relations with Franco’s regime.

The large number of French evadees in Spain, and their reasons for fleeing France, directly involved them in the middle of the diplomatic and military concerns of the Second

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6 For extensive treatment of the Vichy-Spanish relationship, see Catala, Les relations franco-espagnols and Séguéla, Pétain-Franco.

7 Catala, Les relations franco-espagnols, 235.
World War. The human flood was led at first by a great number of military officers, unable to agree to continued service under Vichy when France was occupied. Generally, they were of pro-Vichy but anti-German sentiment, and wished to join the war against Nazi Germany in order to repel the occupier from France. After February, 1943, this elite was joined by a larger mass of French citizenry fleeing the German imposition of forced labour in the form of the Service de Travail Obligatoire (STO). In their passage over the mountains, they followed escaped prisoners of war, downed Allied airmen, Jews, Poles and other foreigners who had been crossing into Spain via some sixty escape routes run by British intelligence agencies and local resistance groups since 1940. Most hoped to reach North Africa, where the French High Commission in Algiers had come into being as an entity distinct from Vichy and was reorganizing its army to join the Allied war effort. Most evadees, whether of military background or not, hoped to join this army. Unlike previous wartime migrations to Spain, the overwhelming majority of French did not consider themselves refugees, but rather potential soldiers in the crusade to liberate France from German occupation. Braving severe weather, dangerous mountain passes, and German border units, the majority made it into

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8 Belot, Aux frontières, 33-42.


10 Some of the evadees were Gaullists, but they were a minority in the first half of 1943. One Gaullist estimated that only 20% of the internees he met were true Gaullists. Cited in Belot, Aux frontières, 613.

11 Belot, Aux frontières, 612.
Spanish territory. At least 8000 French were in Spain by March, 1943 and by January, 1944 it was estimated that 16 000 French had entered Spain from France. Some made it as far as Barcelona or Madrid, but most were stopped and interrogated by Spanish authorities and then either shipped to prisons, or, more likely, to the crowded and unsanitary refugee camp in north Castile, Miranda del Ebro. Initially these refugees sought transit from metropolitan Spain to Spanish Morocco and then to French North Africa. Spanish officials were overwhelmed by the number of those who sought such passage, and decided to restrict severely the distribution of transit visas to Spanish Morocco. The Spanish worked quickly to shut down the relatively easy passage of French men of mobilization age from Spanish to French Morocco and French representatives in Spanish Morocco were so informed on 14 January 1943. The result was that the majority of refugees had to remain in increasingly crowded camps of internment inside Franco’s Spain.

12 By March, 1943 Belot estimates that ‘at least’ 3170 Germans were placed on the Pyrenean border, and by August they had more or less completely replaced any French frontier guards in the region. Arrests in the border area averaged 600 evadees per month. Belot, Aux frontières, 77, 80, 129.


14 Approximately one-third of the French refugees, generally women and those younger than 18, were permitted to live in supervised pensions, free to move around but required to check in with the police once per week. In camps and prisons, anywhere from 9 000-10 000 French refugees were interned between March and September 1943. The camp at Miranda del Ebro, designed for 1500, held 3300 refugees in August, 1943, of which 2309 were French. Belot, Aux frontières, 246, 292.

Officials in North Africa were drawn to the plight of their fellow citizens. After the Spanish ban on transit to Africa, the French Consul in Tetuan, Spanish Morocco, Achille Clarac, urged authorities in Algiers to create a competent organization in Madrid that would distribute funds for food and clothing to French refugees in the camps and prisons, help refugees with visa applications, and negotiate with Spain for the authority to transfer refugees from Spain to French North Africa. The purpose of such assistance were more than humanitarian. Indeed, it was above all the military significance of the refugee movement that drew the attention of North African authorities to the refugee crisis in Spain. Seeking to establish themselves as an alternative French government to Vichy and the Fighting French, primarily through the involvement of the French North African Army in the Allied war effort, military officials aligned with Darlan immediately encouraged Algiers to develop plans for refugee relief and transfer out of Spain. The Foreign Relations Secretariat of French North Africa circulated a memo to political and military leaders on 15 January 1943 that emphasized the importance of the refugee movement and the need for immediate action.

As circumstances had it, the High Commission already had representation in Madrid. Immediately following the German occupation of France, Lt. Col. Pierre Malaise, Air Attaché at Vichy's Embassy in Madrid, fled to North Africa to join Admiral Darlan, and then

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16 French Consulate, Tetuan to General Nogues, (Rabat), 14 January 1943. MAE Série Guerre. 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 813.

17 Admiral Delaye (Gibraltar) to General Bergerel (Algiers), 18 December 1942. MAE, Série Guerre 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 749.

returned to the Spanish capital in early December. Malaise himself fit the profile of many of the military officers who entered Spain in the refugee flood. He was part of a Vichy Embassy that, outside of Ambassador François Piétri, was dominated by a strongly anti-German and anglophile staff. Malaise was chief among them, especially due to his affiliation with the Service des Renseignements de l’Air (SR Air) which, although part of the Vichy regime, managed a clandestine intelligence network which cooperated with the British. During 1940 and 1941, Embassy officials such as Jacques Pigeonneau, Armand du Chayla, André Rivoire, Naval Attaché Jean Boutron and Malaise helped coordinate the ‘Alibi’ network which monitored German activities in Spain, passed information between Spain and France, and had ties to British intelligence. The overwhelming presence of French Secret Service veterans like Malaise, many previously involved with the right-wing ‘Cagoule’ in the 1930s, made the Madrid Embassy part of a very particular ‘fringe’ that existed within Vichy France: content with Vichy, anti-Gaullist and anti-Communist, but also anglophile and anti-German. With the emergence of a non-Gaullist, conservative and anti-German French regime in Algiers, people like Malaise were quick to move from hidden to open dissidence against Vichy. He was joined in November, 1942 by commercial attaché (and head of the Moroccan-based Office Chérifien des Phosphates) André Pettit, naval attaché Admiral Delaye and financial attaché La Tour de la Pin. The majority of the Embassy remained with Piétri, but with the exception of the Ambassador himself and press attaché Adalbert Laffon, the remaining staff

19 Belot, Aux frontières, 144, 148-164. Piétri claimed that after resigning Malaise told him that while he supported the Allies in the war, his goals for France were ‘plainly in accord with those of Vichy’s leaders.’ Piétri to Laval, 4 March 1943. MAE Papiers d’Agents-Archives Privées (PAAP) François Piétri, 15.
were also considered to be pro-Allied.20

By 5 December 1942, Malaise was back in Madrid with two goals: first, to encourage the French missions in Madrid and Lisbon to rally behind Darlan21; and second, to establish an official representation with the Iberian governments that would give Algiers status: in particular, the status to facilitate the movement of refugees from Spain to North Africa.22 Yet Malaise's diplomatic acceptance in Spain, one that allowed him to operate his self-described 'hidden' mission to rescue French refugees23, came only with the sustenance of the United States Embassy. The American decision to support the North African regime, first under Admiral Darlan and then under General Henri Giraud after Darlan's assassination on 24 December 1942, developed out of America's general policy toward France. The most significant aspect of this policy was the anti-Gaullist approach taken by the Roosevelt Administration. Prior to the launch of Operation 'TORCH', the United States, in contrast to De Gaulle's British hosts, had maintained relations with Vichy France. This only changed when strategy required the Americans to enter the European theatre in Vichy territory, in North Africa. The North African High Commission which came into being following

20 Belot, Aux frontières, 192.


22 Admiral Delaye to General Bergerel, 18 December 1942. MAE, Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 749.

‘TORCH’ was installed through American action. As a result, anti-Gaullist currents remained, and U.S. recognition of French sovereignty moved from Vichy to Algiers. In Spain, it was up to Ambassador Carlton J.H. Hayes to implement in practice the Roosevelt Administration’s support for North African officials. The American Embassy named Malaise an Attaché of their Embassy and liaison to Darlan until such time as the North African administration could have its own representation and such an arrangement was accepted by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Count Jordana, on 15 December 1942.

Appointing Malaise as Attaché in the U.S. Embassy with responsibility for acting as a liaison between the Embassy and the North African regime was a significant sign of support on the part of the United States. What Malaise needed most of all, however, was American assistance in his efforts to convince the Spanish Government to grant North African officials, and not Vichy representatives, competency over French refugees. As Hayes recalled in his memoirs, U.S. efforts to create a ‘modus vivendi’ between Algiers and Spain on the refugee

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25 American opinions on the matter grew out of the history of U.S.-Vichy relations prior to Operation TORCH, for the United States maintained relations with Pétain and his North African generals until the Allied landings. The mindset of American policymakers toward Vichy, and toward de Gaulle, is best encapsulated in the words of William Langer: ‘Nothing could be more unjust than to condemn all those who were connected with the Vichy regime or to club them all together as collaborationists and traitors. Until November, 1942, at least, the vast majority of patriotic Frenchmen felt that they could serve best by staying in France. It was most unfortunate that the Fighting French were unwilling to recognize this.’ William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York, 1947) 387.

question would serve two purposes. It would, in the long run, undermine the influence of the Vichy regime while in the short-term it would ease friction between the Spanish and French zones in Morocco, right next door to Allied military operations in North Africa. While the refugee question was immediately seen in Algiers as one with potential military benefits, in Washington it was simultaneously seen as part of the American policy to develop a viable non-Gaullist France in North Africa following TORCH. Indeed, Hayes wrote that the American Embassy was ‘prompted by more than humanitarian motives’ in the refugee crisis.

In a 14 January 1943 memorandum to Jordana, Hayes argued that Vichy France under German occupation could not be considered a free entity in control of its own sovereignty; only French North Africa met this criterion and as such must be given ‘at least official relations’ with Spain even if Madrid had to maintain recognition of Vichy for other reasons. The refugee question became a major point which Hayes used to argue for North African competence. As the full extent of the French migration into Spain became clear, Hayes wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that it was, ‘absolutely essential from both political and military point of view [that] we give adequate relief to these Allies of ours who cannot be expected to look to Vichy for relief.’ By the end of January, Hayes reported that not only

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28 Hayes, Wartime Mission, 114.

29 Carlton Hayes to General Jordana, 14 January 1943 Copied by Hayes to Tarbe de Saint-Hardouin, 15 January 1943. MAE, Série Guerre 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1275.

had he sponsored Malaise, but that his Embassy was financially supporting 1500-2000
refugees at a cost of $10 000 per week. The reasons for this support were directly connected
to the political and military strategy pursued by the United States through the ‘TORCH’
operation: to take a lead in the military campaign and to strengthen the Giraudist regime as a
political entity in the future. Hayes constantly stressed to Washington the connection between
the French refugees and American strategy, concluding that ‘I cannot over-emphasize relation
of this whole problem to our war effort and desirability of not requiring the British to bear the
principal burden for relieving French especially since North African campaign (sic) under our
direction.’31 By taking in Malaise in Spain and providing financial support for refugee
transfers, the United States Embassy in Madrid not only aided the transfer of potential troops
to North Africa, but also sought to give the North African authorities something of a
diplomatic status which could be built upon.

Just as the Americans early on were aware of the political implications of the refugee
crisis, so too were the British, for as British Ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare recalled in his
memoirs, ‘the work of relief and evacuation was so inextricably connected...[with] the high
politics of our battle with the Germans.’32 The question of France had complicated the Anglo-
American relationship earlier in the war, and stark differences of opinion remained, most
notably between the U.S. desire to work with Vichy, and later French North Africa, and the
British decision to support Charles de Gaulle and the Free French from 1940. Spain similarly
had proved somewhat divisive, and in September 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt and

31 Hayes to Hull, 28 January 1943. FRUS 1943, vol I.
Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided to put aside their differences on France and Spain by allowing the British to take the lead in formulating policy towards Spain and the Americans direct policy vis-a-vis North Africa. Yet the refugee crisis, and the swift American decision to foster a North African-Spanish relationship complicated that agreement. As early as 20 November 1942, just nine days after the complete German occupation of France, the British Consul in Barcelona, Harold Farquhar, reported that he was unclear concerning the position Great Britain adopted toward French refugees. While his government officially supported De Gaulle’s Free France, most of the French refugees of military age sought British assistance in their effort to get to North Africa and fight for Gen. Giraud, not de Gaulle.

The Foreign Office delicately instructed Farquhar to encourage all French to rally to de Gaulle, financially support those who did, and pass all others over to the Americans. There was only one exception to this rule: those considered to be of ‘high military value’ (primarily officers) who desired affiliation with Giraud could be assisted by the British Embassy in their efforts to get to North Africa via Gibraltar. This policy was articulated formally by the Foreign Office on 19 December 1942 after an inquiry from H. Freeman Matthews at the American Embassy in London. The reality of the situation on the ground in Spain, however,

33 Hurstfield, America and the French Nation, 165-6.
34 Farquhar to Foreign Office, 20 November 1942. Public Record Office (henceforth PRO), FO 371/32699/15751.
35 Foreign Office to Farquhar, 9 December 1942. PRO FO 371/32699/15276.
was different. On 29 November 1942, Hoare wrote of the French refugee crisis and expressed his belief that ‘we should not be thought unequal to the occasion.’ He went on to argue that the de Gaulle vs. Giraud question was one to be resolved later and that in the meantime Free French funds in British possession should be used to aid all French refugees. The greater Allied cause, and the desire to maintain Anglo-American unity in Madrid, meant that Great Britain, in Hoare’s view, had to temper its anti-Algiers position, at least for a time. Until the Americans and Malaise were more organized, Hoare argued, ‘we alone of the Allied governments had an organisation capable of dealing with the many problems created’ by the refugees’ arrival.

The Foreign Office allowed Hoare to follow a more general strategy on refugee aid on 3 December on the condition that other Allied governments shared in the costs of refugee assistance. Six days later, as already mentioned, London sent more subtle directions to Farquhar in Barcelona indicating that non-Gaullists should only be helped with American money. Hoare’s thinking developed throughout December, still along the lines of a more general policy of refugee aid. After a trip to Barcelona, he wrote that the refugee situation was of increasing urgency and believed that Hayes and the American Embassy ‘did not seem to realize the urgency or complication of the problem.’ In North Africa, the Political and Economic Advisory Council to Allied Headquarters agreed that until de Gaulle and Giraud

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37 Hoare to Foreign Office, 29 November 1942. PRO FO 371/32699/W16114.

38 Templewood, Ambassador on Special Mission, p.226.

39 Foreign Office to Hoare, 3 December 1942. PRO FO 371/32699/W16114.

40 Hoare to Foreign Office, 19 December 1942. PRO FO 371/32700/W17164.
had resolved their differences, the British and American Embassies in Madrid had to come to 'some arrangement' that served the needs of all French refugees.\textsuperscript{41} By an agreement made between the two Embassies at the end of January 1943, Britain was only allowed to send certain types of French refugees from Gibraltar to London to join De Gaulle while all others were to be sent to North Africa under U.S. auspices. Hoare emphasized his desire to 'avoid possible friction with Col. Malaise and the United States Embassy' as a major reason for agreeing to the deal.\textsuperscript{42} The Foreign Office objected strongly to Hoare's actions: 'Fighting French and French North African Forces remain, at least for the present, separate and in view of our commitments to General de Gaulle French Nationals reaching British territory must be allowed to join Fighting French Forces if they wish.'\textsuperscript{43} Yet with both Hoare and the Allied Headquarters in Algiers fearful of alienating the U.S. Embassy, London did not press the point. Although the British Embassy continued to lend money to the French mission for refugee relief, and the continued to protest conditions in refugee camps to the Spanish government\textsuperscript{44}, for the most part Hoare's agreement limited British involvement in French

\textsuperscript{41} Minutes of Meeting, 30 January 1943, Political and Economic Council. PRO FO 660/56.

\textsuperscript{42} Hoare to Foreign Office, 31 January 1943. PRO, FO 371/34737/C11568.

\textsuperscript{43} Foreign Office to Hoare, 4 February 1943. PRO, FO 371/34737/C11568.

\textsuperscript{44} For Hoare's protests made between December 1942 and September 1943, see Spain. Archivo General, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de España (henceforth MAEE), Archivo Renovado, R 2182/6-7.
refugee relief to support for those French refugees who declared themselves 'Canadians'.

American and French North African competence for refugee relief became real by the end of January when money began to arrive from Algiers and Washington. The French North African administration provided Col. Malaise with money for refugee aid and transport out of Spain. Giraud's administration authorized 25 million francs for Malaise's work, with 75% earmarked for refugee transfer out of Spain, 20% for operations in Lisbon and 5% for operations with the British out of Gibraltar. With a growing financial organization, political success seemed to come for the Americans and Malaise. On 15 February 1943, Spanish Foreign Minister General Jordana indicated to Hayes that Spain considered France a non-belligerent in the war and that the Spanish Red Cross would aid the American, British and French representatives in assisting refugees while they were inside Spanish territory. In addition, the Spanish Government would, as quickly as possible, allow these refugees to continue their journey through Spain to North Africa. Jordana's indication that Spain would take a benevolent view towards French refugees opened the door to negotiations about

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45 As there was no Canadian mission in Spain, Canadian refugees in Spain- almost all downed Allied airmen- came under the responsibility of the British Embassy. Hoare estimated that 500 of the 1000 ‘Canadians’ at Miranda in February 1943 were French. Hoare to Foreign Office, 2 February 1943. PRO FO 371/34737/C1300/9141. By the end of March, the French High Commission in Algiers estimated 4000 French refugees were declared as ‘Canadians’. Note, 25 March 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 813. By May, 1943, Belot estimates that a total of 2125 French refugees were being aided by British money, although the cancellation of funding for the ‘Canadians’ came soon after and by July only 374 were still supported by Britain. See Belot, Aux frontières, 604, 626.


47 Hayes to Hull, 15 February 1943. FRUS 1943, vol 1.
facilitating the transport of refugees from Spain to North Africa.

From the beginning of the Malaise mission in Madrid, economics was seen by the French to be the primary basis with which to build a relationship with Franco’s Spain. The addition of André Pettit to the Malaise team was a crucial first step, for Pettit had been Vichy’s Commercial Councillor, and was named by Rabat as the Madrid representative of the Office Chérifien des Phosphates shortly after his declaration of support for Admiral Darlan.

In Algiers, the High Commission believed that the economic leverage of the phosphates trade in North Africa would be of assistance when negotiating a solution to the problem of refugee transfer. The Spanish Government recognized the importance of this trade as well. As early as 10 December 1942, Malaise was informed by the Spanish Minister of Air, General Vigón, that he was permitted to stay in Madrid. The Spaniards later indicated to Malaise that this decision, and indeed the sum of their interest in the new North African regime, were both primarily related to the phosphates trade; what they sought from Malaise and Pettit was a ‘discreet’ commercial representation in Madrid. Through non-diplomatic channels, discussions in French Morocco for a phosphates deal were launched by Spain in mid-

48 The North African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Jacques Tarbé de Saint-Hardouin, called Moroccan phosphates ‘at the moment the most effective instrument of political pressure’ that the new regime had in Spain. Tarbé de Saint-Hardouin to External Commerce Secretariat, 9 January 1943. MAE Série Guerre 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1067. See also note, Secretariat des Relations Extérieures, 15 January 1943. MAE Série Guerre 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 813.


50 Malaise to Col. Ronin, 13 December 1942. MAE Série Guerre 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF/Espagne, 1275.
December, 1942. Indeed, via less official talks in Rabat held in the first six months of 1943, ad hoc shipments of phosphates from French Morocco proceeded, based on the continuation of previous Vichy-Spanish agreements, which worked out to nearly 450,000 tons of phosphates annually.

Yet Spanish acceptance of North African and American roles in refugee relief and trade, under the impulse of economic self-interest, did not mean that Franco recognized Giraud’s High Commission as the sovereign entity of France. Fears of alienating the Vichy Government, with which Spain had full diplomatic relations, and above all the German Government, which quite rightly saw the North African regime as a creation of the Allies, meant that any relationship with Algiers that suggested formal recognition was inconceivable. Franco, of course, remained sympathetic to the Axis cause but followed a policy from late 1942 that sought to achieve benefits for Spain from both sides. The need for French Moroccan phosphates and the desire to maintain good relations with Algiers in Morocco

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52 For some details about separate exchanges run through French Morocco, see Algiers-Morocco telegrams, 7 & 27 May 1943 and General Nogues to Giraud, 5 June 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1067. See also DG Política Económica to Sangrónez, 31 October 1944. MAEE Archivo Renovado, R2071/10.

required Spain to deal with General Giraud. Such a policy, however, did not come without its own constraints imposed by the nature of Spain’s previously established relationships. Spanish Undersecretary of State José Pan de Soraluce stated as much to French North African officials in February, when he stated that pressure from the German Embassy influenced Spanish policy choices vis-a-vis Algiers. Most notable, of course, was the fact that the Germans, since the occupation of France, had troops on Spain’s Pyrenean border, although it is now quite clear that Germany, bogged down in Russia, never intended to move these forces into Spain. Spain’s position toward the existence of French North Africa combined the maintenance of official relations with Vichy and consideration toward Nazi Germany while simultaneously gaining benefits in negotiations with Algiers. This was a fairly easy approach for the Franco regime to take as long as phosphates shipments flowed and Malaise was housed in the United States Embassy. Pragmatism, more than a desire to grant French North Africa any sort of status, motivated the Franco regime to work with Malaise and his American supporters on the question of French refugees and North African trade. Pragmatism served both its immediate needs as well as his political goals.

What Madrid sought was a way to reconcile a solution to refugee and trade dilemmas caused by the emergence of Giraud’s administration with its legal recognition of Vichy as the French Government. However, the French hoped that increasing economic ties, combined with talks concerning the refugee question, would allow North Africa to obtain, ‘a

54 Clarac to Saint-Hardouin, 28 February 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Algérie-CFLN-GPRF, 1275.

55 Norman J.W. Goda. Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa and the Path toward America (College Statton, TX, 1998) 197; Preston, Franco, 482.
recognition in fact of French Africa, a step preceding the necessary 'de jure' recognition. Yet beyond negotiating for short-term deliveries of phosphates, Spain was reluctant to strike any longer term economic deal with French North Africa. Solving the refugee problem without repudiating Spanish recognition of Vichy proved easier due to the work of Pierre Malaise. Upon returning to Madrid in December, 1942, Malaise had tried to convince his former boss, Vichy Ambassador François Piétri, to rally to Darlan, and brought a letter to Piétri from the Admiral. The Ambassador, a conservative French defeatist, a loyal ally of Pétain, and someone who truly believed that the Germans would win the war, refused. In mid-December, Malaise and Piétri came to what amounted to a ‘non-aggression’ pact: Piétri would not push for Malaise’s expulsion if Malaise did not involve himself in any attempt to turn the French colony in Spain toward the Darlan-Giraud regime. Piétri believed that Vichy had to maintain contact with some in North Africa, perhaps in the Moroccan administration if not in Algiers, for he knew that Spain was intent on trading for phosphates with whomever ruled there. The question was one of Vichy’s status, not only in Spain, but in the international arena in the aftermath of German occupation.

Despite this gentlemens’ agreement, however, Piétri was not content to hand over all responsibility to Malaise and the nascent Algiers mission regarding the question of refugees.

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58 Catala, Les relations franco-espagnols, 243.

59 Piétri to Vichy, 5 December 1942, 19 December 1942. MAE PAAP François Piétri, 15.
On 5 January 1943, Piétri complained to the Spanish Foreign Ministry that Spanish-North African relations were ‘on the margin of regular Franco-Spanish relations’ and he requested that Spanish authorities cease to recognize Malaise as a diplomatic agent. At the same time, Vichy organized a refugee section of its own. Led by three individuals, Colonel Buot de l’Epine (Military attaché), Renaud Sivan (First Secretary) and Mgr. André Boyer-Mas (Ecclesiastical attaché), all of whom would defect to join Malaise in March, 1943, this section began visiting French refugees at the Miranda del Ebro camp in early January.

Within a few weeks, however, the political sentiments of Piétri’s agents became clear. By the end of January, Boyer-Mas, in his capacity as a representative of the Vichy Government, had negotiated a system of refugee relief which saw American, French North African and (limited) Vichy money for refugee aid given to the Spanish Red Cross; the transfer of refugees, when negotiated with the U.S. Embassy in February, was similarly arranged through the Spanish Red Cross. In actual fact, Boyer-Mas was working closely with Malaise and the U.S. Embassy throughout this period. In Malaise’s words, his work as Vichy’s liaison to the Spanish Red Cross was an ‘indispensable fiction’ necessary to allow Spain to reconcile its recognition of Vichy with the practical arrangements it was negotiating

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60 Piétri to Spanish Foreign Ministry, 5 January 1943. MAEE Archivo Renovado, R 2167/140. Also in MAE PAAP François Piétri, 15.

61 In his memoirs, Piétri claimed he always knew the three agents were Giraudists. François Piétri, Mes années d’Espagne: 1940-1948 (Paris, 1954) 195.

with Malaise. In his memoirs, François Piétri made the claim that it was the Vichy Embassy which took the lead in organizing refugee aid. In actual fact, he and his officials only put up a token fight, in essence allowing Malaise and Boyer-Mas to take over.

By March, what was happening unofficially became official when Boyer-Mas left the Vichy Embassy and declared his support for Giraud on 23 March 1943. The day before his resignation, 22 March 1943, Boyer-Mas received a letter from French High Commission for Foreign Affairs Secretary Jacques Tarbé de Saint-Hardouin charging him with the mission of refugee relief. That same day Boyer-Mas and the Spanish Red Cross agreed that he would continue as French liaison to the Spanish Red Cross, and on 25 March 1943, General Giraud, in a letter addressed to the Spanish Red Cross, also agreed to this arrangement. Rather seamlessly, then, Boyer-Mas moved from one French Government to another without changing jobs. Soon after his confirmation by Giraud, he was able to establish a separate office for the French liaison service, thanks to the donation of a house from the Duquesa de Lecera at 21, calle de San Bernardo. This service established agents in most of the key refugee centres, run by a staff of 20 in Madrid. In addition to refugee relief, Boyer-Mas allowed Malaise to use the Red Cross liaison service in order to establish French secret

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63 Malaise to Algiers. 15 February 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 813.

64 Piétri, Mes années, 202.

65 Piétri and Malaise actually met 25 January 1943 in order to agree to a common position on French refugees that each took in meetings with the Spanish Red Cross, meetings which established the system of support described (although Piétri did not write about this arrangement in his note). Piétri to Laval, 4 March 1943. MAE PAAP François Piétri, 15.

66 Belot, Aux frontières, 224-235.
services inside Spain. From here, connections to French Resistance networks and military reconnaissance in occupied France were effected. \(^{67}\)

It was through the separate offices of Boyer-Mas and Malaise that the first Spain-North Africa direct transfer of French refugees was negotiated on 15 February, along with the agreement that all French refugees would be considered non-belligerent and that the Spanish Red Cross would turn over refugees to the French mission in preparation for their movement to North Africa. \(^{68}\) The stage was set for a direct transfer of 1500 refugees from Cadiz to Casablanca on a French North African boat. \(^{69}\) The first departure of refugees aboard the French ship Gouverneur-General Lepine was scheduled for the night of 9-10 March, 1943. On 6 March, Boyer-Mas was called to see General Jordana and informed that no French North African boat could enter or leave a Spanish port, and that the refugees would only be granted entry visas to Portugal if the Portuguese agreed. Very quickly Malaise was able to report that this Spanish about-face had been precipitated by an intervention by German Ambassador von Moltke on orders from Berlin. \(^{70}\) Hayes reported to Washington that while von Moltke had threatened to torpedo the refugee ships and linked the transfer to problems Germany was having with its labour mobilization plans inside occupied France, the outburst

\(^{67}\) Belot, Aux frontières, 235-239.


\(^{69}\) Malaise to Foreign Relations Secretariat, 15 February 1943. MAE, Série Guerre 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 813.

\(^{70}\) Malaise to Giraud, 7 March 1943. MAE, Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 813.
had to be considered. 'only a part of [the] general diplomatic offensive to bring Spain into the war on [the] Axis side or exact other military concessions from Spain.'\(^1\) The U.S. Ambassador also concluded that the decision to cancel refugee transfers came at a moment in which pro-German and pro-Allied members of the Spanish Government were in fierce debate over the direction of Spanish foreign policy.\(^2\)

Like the Americans, French officials assessed the Spanish Foreign Ministry as a place ‘where we can count on friends’ and concluded that it was the Interior Ministry and the Police, which were markedly pro-German, that were primarily behind the decision to break the agreement on refugee transfer.\(^3\) Hayes preferred quiet diplomacy toward Foreign Minister Jordana rather than protest. The American Ambassador took the lead and met with Jordana. The Foreign Minister suggested Malaise make a deal with Portugal regarding the 1500 French refugees stuck in Cadiz; Spain would grant the refugees visas to enter Portugal and from there they could travel to North Africa. In making this suggestion, Jordana claimed that there was ‘no change in Spain's basic policy' of helping the evadees leave, but that the issue was ‘ways and means’.\(^4\) Hayes travelled to Lisbon and unofficially coordinated his request to the Portuguese Government for support with a similar request from the Spanish Ambassador, Nicolás Franco (the Caudillo’s brother), who had been instructed by Jordana to

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\(^1\) Hayes to Hull, 6 March 1943. FRUS 1943, vol. 1.

\(^2\) Clarac to Jacques Tarbe de Saint-Hardouin, 22 March 1943. MAE Série Guerre 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1275.

\(^3\) Note, Secretariat aux Relations Exterieures, 25 March 1943. MAE, Série Guerre 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 813.

\(^4\) Hayes to Hull, 8 March 1943. FRUS 1943 vol 1.
request support in a similar manner. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon managed to get Portuguese cooperation to deal with the immediate situation. At the Spanish Foreign Ministry, Pan de Soraluce confirmed on 10 March 1943 that Spain would continue to allow refugees bound for North Africa to leave Spain; in practice, visas which originally had been issued for Spain-to-North Africa transit were altered to permit transit between Spain and Portugal only, and from there the North African authority ferried refugees to Casablanca.

The cancellation of direct refugee transfer from Spain to North Africa caused major organizational headaches for French officials by adding Portugal to the refugee transfer route. By the end of March, an ‘instant photograph’ of the situation revealed that there were 6260 refugees (not counting the 1265 at Cadiz) identified as French in camps and supervised pensions: 800 French declared as Americans; and 4000 French declared as Canadians in camps and pensions and thus dependent on British financial support. With 100-200 crossing the Pyrenean border, the situation was getting worse for refugees, for clandestine exit from Spain was expensive and dangerous, and thus open only to a very few. Since the burden of cost increasingly fell to the cash-poor Algiers government, the result was a desperate situation for refugees and administrators. The movement of evadees from Spain to Portugal and on to North Africa did not actually get underway mid-April, and by 2 May, 750 of the

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75 Clarac to Saint-Hardouin, 22 March 1943. MAE Série Guerre 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1275.

76 Clarac to Saint-Hardouin, 22 March 1943. MAE Série Guerre 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1275.

Cadiz refugees arrived in Casablanca.78

The impact of Nazi pressure on the Spanish Government was very short-lived in terms of general Spanish policy toward Algiers. The relationship between the Spanish regime of General Francisco Franco and the French High Commission in North Africa under General Henri Giraud began as a result of the military potential of the evaders as perceived by officials in Algiers. The initial impulse for relations, however, were soon overtaken by a sense that broader benefits could be produced in the diplomatic sphere. Ultimately, even the need for evaders to contribute to the building of the North African Army became simply one part of North Africa’s attempt to have Algiers accepted as the entity which best represented France.

Spain was one of the only places in the world where Giraud had anything even reassembling a diplomatic mission, and thus it was of the highest importance in furthering his claim for legitimacy. On 22 January, a friend of Malaise’s in the External Relations Secretariat wrote him of the support his mission had amongst North African officials:

‘Courage, my dear friend- you occupy the only active platform and all our means are behind you.’79 Beyond refugees, then, Algiers saw relations with Madrid as a step in establishing the North African High Commission as a legitimate contender for French sovereignty. Those who directed the foreign policy of Algiers were former Vichy officials, opposed to De

78 The success of the Portuguese route was significantly aided by a North African offer to increase the flow of phosphates to Portugal made on 20 May 1943. De Marcel to Saint-Hardouin. 22 May 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 814.

Gaulle’s claim to be the nation’s resistance. Their greatest disdain, however, was for their former government. They believed that Vichy had been a legitimate French state, but that increasingly its subservience to Nazi Germany had changed this. Thus, in Madrid, where De Gaulle had no representatives, the focus of the Malaise Mission became opposing Piétri, who was identified as a close associate of Vichy Prime Minister and Germanophile Pierre Laval. Moreover, there existed fears that the Franco regime had expansionist aims in French Morocco and as a result it was deemed necessary to do everything to ensure that Spain looked upon the French North African administration with ‘benevolent neutrality.’

The United States was very supportive of a expanded Algiers-Madrid relationship for these same reasons: the growth of such relations served to legitimize the existence of Giraud’s ‘Third France’, between Vichy and de Gaulle. From the start, the United States suggested that Malaise pursue all aspects of a relationship with Spain at once: provisional recognition by the Franco regime, liberation of all French refugees, recognition of North African passports, commercial negotiations. By 14 January 1943, the U.S. Ambassador formally requested that the Spanish Government end relations with Vichy and deal with Giraud’s administration in North Africa. This was, of course, impossible. Yet already at the end of December, 1942, Pan de Soraluce made it clear to an official of the French Consulate


81 Saint-Hardouin to General Giraud, 30 December 1942. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1275.

82 Carlton Hayes to General Jordana, 14 January 1943 Copied by Hayes to Tarbe de Saint-Hardouin, 15 January 1943. MAE, Série Guerre 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF/Espagne, 1275.
in Tetuan that Spain had no objections to an official Algiers delegation which would deal with more than refugees. By February, Carlton Hayes increasingly let Malaise take a greater role in dealings with Spain, with his Embassy in a more supportive role. Further evolution of the North African-Spanish relationship was pursued by Algiers in February when Achille Clarac, the French Consul-General in Tetuan was authorized to go to Madrid and negotiate a broader relationship with Franco’s Spain.

Clarac went to Spain in order to assess Malaise’s work to date and meet Spanish officials to discuss a permanent relationship, which would permit Malaise and his mission to take on some diplomatic privileges, such as immunity and the right to communicate with Algiers via diplomatic courier and coded telegram. Clarac told Spanish officials that Giraud was the ‘leader of French interests’ at least until the end of the war, and the French strongly desired ‘the most cordial and consistent’ relations with General Franco and his government. He emphasized to Pan de Soraluce the commonality of political interests in Morocco, the existence of a Spanish community in the French Oran, the need for commercial relations, and the refugee situation in Spain as issues which required a close Franco-Spanish relationship in order to be managed successfully. As proof of Giraud’s sincerity, and as evidence of the respect Giraud gave Franco and his regime, Clarac underlined that since coming to power


84 Hayes to Hull, 28 February 1943. FRUS 1943 vol 1.

85 Foreign Affairs Secretariat to Clarac, 4 February 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1275.
after Operation TORCH, the North African administration had refused to authorize the formation of Republican organizations among Spanish refugees in North Africa and was in negotiations with Mexico in the hopes that 'red refugees' could be shipped to Latin America.86

The arguments which Clarac presented to Spanish Foreign Ministry officials, namely Pan de Soraluce, Commercial Affairs representative Taberna, and Political Director Baraibar, were not refuted. Instead, Spanish officials emphasized the fact that German pressure was the sole impediment to their developing further relations with Giraud's administration, with Pan de Soraluce noting that the presence of German troops on the Pyrenees required Spain to be 'prudent' in order to avoid any chance of German invasion or occupation.87 In the midst of Clarac's visit, on 6 March, came the news that the Germans had pressured Spain to cancel the direct shipment of refugees from Spanish ports to North Africa. This measure was accompanied by the Spanish seizure of the Cherifian Post Office in Tetuan, an act which, like Spain's occupation of Tangier in 1940, violated arrangements in Morocco to which both

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86 Clarac Report, 22 March 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1275. Spanish exiles had been sought by both the United States and Great Britain to be used in case the need for future operations in Spain arose. However, as the Allied strategy toward Franco developed, these plans were dismissed, with one exception. In the aftermath of TORCH, Donald Downes, an American OSS (Office of Strategic Services) agent in North Africa, recruited Spanish exiles from French North African internment camps and in June, 1943 he launched Operation 'Banana', without the knowledge of the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, in which teams of Spanish exiles were landed in Malaga and Cadiz to conduct intelligence gathering and prepare for guerrilla warfare. Most of the agents were arrested and executed, and the Spanish Foreign Ministry protested strongly to Hayes, who was infuriated. See Richard Harris Smith. OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, 1972) 74-82.

Spain and France were parties. Nonetheless, on 11 March, Pan de Soraluce indicated to Clarac that Spain would concede to the French North African mission some of what it desired. Spain would allow the opening of an independent French North Africa mission with some, but not all, diplomatic privileges.\(^8\) Later, in April, the Spanish Government informed Malaise that while it wished to continue the phosphates trade negotiated in Morocco, it could not sign a full commercial accord with the North African authority, since such an agreement would amount to *de facto* recognition.\(^9\)

Ultimately, Algiers needed Spain to recognize that a relationship with North Africa was desired for more than reasons of short-term expediency. At the end of March Clarac emphasized to Algiers as Hayes had to him in Madrid, that the internal and external policy of Franco’s regime was undergoing a ‘decisive crisis.’ If the result was a reorientation of policy more favourable to the Allies, then the North African High Commission would benefit. Until such time, however, Clarac urged that the representatives in Spain conduct themselves with the utmost discretion.\(^10\) Piétri, observing the Spanish situation from his Embassy, also concluded that benefits Malaise and his mission had won, which taken together amounted to something close to *de jure* recognition of the Algiers regime, were in large part a

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\(^8\) Clarac to Saint-Hardouin, 12 March 1943. *MAE* Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1275.


consequence of Spain's own foreign policy crisis.\textsuperscript{91}

While watching internal events closely, North African officials in Madrid continued to strengthen their own position within the diplomatic community of the Spanish capital. Shortly after Achille Clarac reached agreement with the Franco Government on a sort of diplomatic status for French North Africa, Malaise achieved his greatest diplomatic success. The effort to create a more permanent mission for the French High Commission in Spain received a significant boost on 23 March 1943, when the majority of Piétri's Embassy abandoned Vichy and rallied to General Giraud by joining Malaise's mission. Efforts to win over Vichy officials to North Africa on the part of Pierre Malaise and Admiral Delaye, Giraud's representative in Gibraltar, began in December, 1942, immediately upon Malaise's arrival at the U.S. Embassy. The initial focus was on Boyer-Mas, who effectively began to work with Malaise well in advance of his formal resignation from Piétri's Embassy. On 23 March, military attaché Col. Bout de l'Épine, financial attaché Comte Largentaye, First Secretary Renaud Sivan, councillor René Lamarle, and Roger Drouin, a Vichy bureaucrat who had been posted to the Madrid Embassy since February, joined Boyer-Mas in abandoning Vichy. All Consulate-General officials at Barcelona, Bilbao, and Malaga also resigned and began to represent Giraud. Moreover, Malaise indicated that the Consulate-Generals at Palma de Mallorca and Alicante, while losing no one to resignation, were actually staffed by pro-Giraud and pro-Allied individuals and thus were in effect working for Algiers.\textsuperscript{92} Even the Institutes Français in Madrid and Barcelona declared themselves 'rallied'...  

\textsuperscript{91}Piétri to Laval, 17 April 1943. MAE PAAP François Piétri, 15.

\textsuperscript{92}Belot, Aux frontières, 196.
to Giraud at the end of March. Though he had long known his Embassy to be anti-German, Piétri was overwhelmed, declaring the resignations "a stampede." He was left with two advisers at the Madrid Embassy, and Vichy named replacement Consuls-General in Barcelona, Bilbao and Malaga. He was now, in the words of one Algiers official, a "phantom ambassador at the head of a rump embassy."

Yet, the successes of Malaise, and Clarac before him, were only truly crowned when Spain decided to move toward de facto recognition of Giraud’s administration. The Allied victory in Tunisia in April, 1943 went a long way toward resolving Spanish foreign policy’s internal debate, and the reorientation toward the Allies begun with TORCH continued to the benefit of French North Africa. The Spanish Foreign Ministry’s head of European section, Señor Campusano, told a French official that an ‘important modification’ in the Spanish attitude toward North Africa would emerge for two reasons: first, as a result of Allied success and, second, due to common economic and colonial interests of the two states. The organizing principle of Spanish foreign policy throughout the war was to maximize self-interest. In terms of the Franco regime’s approach to the war, the clear victory of the Allies in North Africa confirmed the direction of Spanish policy advocated by Franco himself in the aftermath of TORCH, namely that the survival and success of the regime in the changing


95 This quote, which Belot thinks is from Admiral Delaye, is cited in Belot, *Aux frontières*, 201.

international situation required a prudent *rapprochement* with the Allies. In terms of its relationship with French North Africa, the need for phosphates, good relations with French Morocco and the necessity of moving French refugees out of Iberia had all required Spain to adopt a pragmatic approach since November, 1942. The general tone of Spanish policy toward Algiers was made more official with Campusano’s statement. By the end of May, the Spanish Foreign Ministry conceded diplomatic passports, and rights for diplomatic codes and couriers to the Giraudist mission, and prepared themselves to name a representative to Algiers. Moreover, the French Mission left the American Embassy to establish its own offices at 21, calle San Bernardo. While on paper Spanish rules for French refugees remained harsh, Boyer-Mas indicated that the authorities implemented them with ‘an elasticity which aids us profitably.’ On 16 May 1943, General Henri Giraud wrote personably to General Franco, thanking him for ‘the chivalrous spirit with which the Spanish Government has authorised the departure of many hundred French, living witnesses to the despair of their homeland.’ He also acknowledged that such action was, ‘the best expression of the sympathy that Spain has always shown to stricken peoples.’

Spanish assistance contributed not only to the successful movement of refugees, but

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100 General Henri Giraud to General Francisco Franco de Bahamonde, 16 May 1943. *MAE* Série Guerre 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1275.
also to their inclusion in the rebuilt North African Army. The French force that came under Giraud’s command was substantially manned by many of the men who had fled Vichy France via Spain. For example, the arrival in Casablanca of two boats of evadees on 30 June 1943 included 57 active and reserve officers and 812 infantry troops; on 22 August, 54 active officers, 71 reserve officers, 522 infantry troops, 221 air troops and officers and 50 naval troops and officers; on 25 September, 50 active officers, 49 reserve officers, 142 active troops, 234 reserve troops and 190 non-military men ready to enroll.101

Thus, by the spring of 1943, the Secretariat des Relations Extérieures in Algiers was able to record that a sea change had taken place in Spain’s relations with French North Africa. The reason was clear: the evolution of French North Africa’s relations with Spain had corresponded to changes in the Spanish attitude brought on by Allied progress in the war. Thus, ‘surprised’ by the rapid success of the Allies in North Africa and the emergence of Darlan, Francoist Spain adopted a more accommodating attitude toward non-Vichy France from the start. The influx of French refugees and Spain’s need for North African phosphates further fostered a Spanish willingness to approach Giraud, despite constant German pressure to the contrary. Finally, the full support of the Allied Embassies for a stronger French mission, the resignation of most of the Vichy embassy and the placement of the Giraudist mission on a more diplomatic footing had contributed to what was, in essence, ‘de facto’ recognition by Spain of the French North African High Commission.102

101 Bernard to General Devinck, Chief of General Staff, 30 June; 29 August; 25 September 1943. Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (henceforth SHAT), 5 P 20.

The diplomatic and political consolidation of the Malaise mission in Spain was further advanced by the impending conclusion of the division between France’s non-Vichy entities. The Free French did not have a mission in Madrid, although one of their agents, Robert Mitchell (operating under the pseudonym ‘Morton’) arrived at the British Embassy in Spain in February, 1943. Mitchell’s role, however, was primarily to organize Gaullist intelligence operations from Spain into occupied France (the Bureau Central des Renseignements et Action, or BCRA), and secondarily to assist with evadees who declared their support for de Gaulle.\(^{103}\) The Mitchell mission, which did compete for refugee loyalty, never sought any sort of diplomatic presence. As early as March, 1943, when Giraud and de Gaulle were engaged in talks that ultimately led to the union of the two non-Vichy French forces, the suggestion that the French mission act as a joint representative for both groups was more or less accepted by the leaderships of both organizations.\(^{104}\) Indeed, while in Madrid the Mitchell mission presented the occasional impediment to Malaise’s actions, in Gibraltar both Gaullist and Giraudist mission, alike in that they were concerned primarily with refugees, cooperated successfully.\(^{105}\)

The formation of the Comité Française de Libération Nationale (CFLN), which united the forces of Charles de Gaulle’s Free France and General Henri Giraud’s French

\(^{103}\) Catala, Les relations franco-espagnols, 238.

\(^{104}\) Rumbold Minute, 22 March 1943. PRO FO 371/36253/Z3609.

\(^{105}\) The Giraudist Mission in Gibraltar and the British Governor there, General Mason-MacFarlane, both felt that Mitchell’s antagonistic approach toward non-Gaullist evadees was ‘disruptive’, in contrast to the attitude of Captain Leyet in Gibraltar. Delaye to Giraud, 17 April 1943, SHAT 5 P 20. For Leyet’s relations with the Giraud Mission in Gibraltar, see the dispatches of Lt-Col. Allais, ‘Mission Navale de Gibraltar’, SHAT 5 P 20.
North African High Commission, only further solidified the emerging Franco-Spanish relationship. The merger was an ‘uneasy’ one, and soon enough de Gaulle had moved in many of his supporters to key positions, first nudging Giraud over to run the Army, and then off the Committee altogether in April, 1944. Yet the quest for legitimacy of the new body amongst the Allies and neutrals, and the continued existence of North Africa as the centre of government, made continuity with Giraud’s Spanish policy not only necessary but desirable. As René Massigli replaced Jacques Tarbé de Saint-Hardouin as head of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat in Algiers, and a Spanish Representative, Sangroniz, arrived in Algiers, relations moved forward. Admittedly, German and Vichy pressure still influenced some Spanish decisions. Such was the case of the Spanish rejection of Armand du Chayla as the new French head of mission to replace Malaise. In addition, there were some problems getting Gaullists and Giraudists to work together, particularly in the intelligence operations based at the French mission. The refugee relief effort, however, continued without delay. Between 15 April and 15 June, some 4000 French refugees left Spain for North Africa, but since November, they had been entering from Metropolitan France at a rate of 200 per day. By July, with refugee relief clearly under the direction of Boyer-Mas, the CFLN was fully


108 For the SR-BCRA intelligence conflict, see Belot, *Aux frontières*, 573-578.

engaged in refugee relief and transport, with representatives in the most of the major cities and provinces of Spain (there were 5 representatives in Catalonia, 2 in Aragon, 3 in Castile, 4 in the northwest and 3 in the south).\textsuperscript{110}

With refugee relief on a more stable footing and diplomatic status developing, what remained to be settled by North African and CFLN officials by the spring of 1943 was the economic relationship with Franco's Spain. Officials in Madrid sought to expand France's position in Madrid and move toward a potential postwar relationship with Spain, in whatever governing form that country adopted. The primary means of developing such a relationship was economic. And, in order to deal economically with Franco's Spain in 1943 and 1944, non-Vichy France would have to rely on the Allies, just as they had to in order to resolve the refugee crisis and achieve a separate diplomatic status. The French North African authority, therefore, requested that the United States and Great Britain allow it to enter into the economic arrangements jointly negotiated with Franco by the Allies.\textsuperscript{111}

The economic question, however, provoked strong opposition by the British Embassy. The request of April, 1943 to include the French North African authority in Allied economic warfare policy came after a winter of British concern about Giraud and his economic plans in Spain. As Malaise worked diligently in December, 1942 and January, 1943 to establish his position in Madrid and gain competency on the refugee question, the British were content. As soon as Achille Clarac arrived in Madrid in February, in order to negotiate a broader North

\textsuperscript{110} Boyer-Mas to Massigli, 7 July 1943. MAE Série Guerre 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 815.

\textsuperscript{111} Undersecretary of External Commerce to French Missions Madrid and Lisbon, 8 April 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1067.
African-Spanish relationship, the question of economics became of concern to the British. The arrival of the Clarac mission revealed not only Spain’s interest in maintaining a relationship with North Africa, but also the division between the Americans and British over how such a relationship was to develop in the tense atmosphere of wartime Madrid. The position of the United States Administration toward Giraud was maintained. Achille Clarac concluded that the support of the United States Embassy had been crucial to his success, as it had to Malaise’s success with regard to the French refugees. The British, however, were not as welcoming. There was, as usual, the question of Giraud versus de Gaulle, which meant that there was no agreement from Hoare about a Giraudist role in Spain except on the refugee question. More important was the British belief that the potential of French North African-Spanish trade might undermine general Allied strategy toward the Franco regime. Hoare wrote to London that if the Giraud administration was to solely concern itself with refugees, Clarac’s mission ‘would be useful’ but that in the inevitable event that Spain asked for economic concessions in return for dealing with Giraud then such agreements ‘might gravely embarrass Anglo-American plans’. At the Foreign Office, Horace A. Rumbold agreed and outlined the primary strategic problem posed by Clarac’s visit:

When Malaise established his mission he showed signs of wanting to use the economic lever to obtain formal recognition from the Spanish Govt. and M. Clarac seems to have the same ideas. We want to prevent such a process both because the bargaining counters they might try to use might conflict with our engagement with

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113 Rumbold Minute, 13 February 1943. PRO FO 371/36253/Z2022.

Spain of Nov. 8th... We can’t stop him from going to Madrid, and I think all we can tell Sir S. Hoare is to discourage him, in concert with his U.S. colleague if possible, from trying to add to the status or increase the responsibility of the North African mission.  

The agreements of 8 November 1942, referred to by both Hoare and Rumbold, formed the basis of Allied policy toward Franco Spain in the aftermath of ‘TORCH’. On the morning of 8 November 1942, messages from Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt were delivered to General Franco by Hoare and his American counterpart, Carlton Hayes. Both messages stated that the operations in North Africa were not directed against Spain, Spanish territory or Spanish interests in Iberia or in North Africa. Spain’s apparent desire to stay out of the war was recognized and respected by both Allies. The British message went further, and promised that Anglo-Spanish trade would not be disrupted by the course of the war.

The British decision to continue trade with Franco had been an important tool in Britain’s effort since 1940 to keep Spain officially neutral and indeed to lessen any practical assistance the Spanish could give Nazi Germany under the pretext of ‘benevolent neutrality’. By 1943, both Britain and the United States benefited not only from the fact that Franco remained outside of the global conflict, but also because Spain had become an

115 Rumbold Minute, 13 February 1943. PRO FO 371/36253/Z2022.
117 Denis Smyth. Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival: British Policy and Franco’s Spain, 1940-1941 (Cambridge, 1986), 4-5. Smyth underlines that in 1940 and 1941, with Britain in a fragile positions, it was the ‘negative’ aspect of the policy, i.e. not blockading Spanish ports, rather than a ‘positive’ one of economic assistance, which prevailed.
important supplier of wartime resources such as iron ore, pyrites and wolfram.\textsuperscript{118} The overriding goal of trade, however, continued to be the lessening of German influence in Spain and the prevention of enemy acquisition of war material. In order to prevent German purchases of wolfram, stop German smuggling of goods from Iberia, and limit German access to monetary and other facilities in Spain, Malcolm Thompson of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare wrote that the Allies ‘require both the cooperation of the Spanish Government, which we can only obtain by providing motives of self-interest, and ample purchasing power which we can only obtain by the provision of goods.’\textsuperscript{119} As one historian has observed, ‘the paramount Allied objective was to make Spain economically dependent...and by this means they intended to control Spanish sales to Germany.’\textsuperscript{120}

With the Allied occupation of French North Africa, it was not only continued trade that was envisaged, but an increase in trade through the availability, now, of North African products.\textsuperscript{121} Economic arrangements with Spain were both a lever and a liability in the Allied relationship with Spain, a particularly fragile position for the Allies to occupy. The British were fearful that forcing Spain to add Clarac and North African goods to the would threaten

\textsuperscript{118} Woodward, \textit{British Foreign Policy}, 14.


\textsuperscript{120} James W. Cortada. \textit{United States-Spanish Relations, Wolfram and World War II} (Barcelona, 1971), 16-17.

the balance that had been achieved.\textsuperscript{122} The Allied policy was that trade in the Iberian Peninsula was to be managed and conducted by Great Britain and the United States, in order to serve the 'triple purpose' of lessening Hispano-German ties, denying Germany essential wartime commodities, and acquiring exactly those products for use by the Allies themselves.\textsuperscript{123} In the minds of policy-makers in London, this meant that they and American officials alone would hold 'controlling influence' in any economic negotiations between Allied states and the Franco Government. In short, Anglo-American economic, political and strategic requirements would be the basis for any economic arrangements made. A French Mission was acceptable in Madrid only so long as it conformed to the general economic program designed by the Allies and did not seek to negotiate its own arrangements.\textsuperscript{124}

The United States, however, supported Clarac's desire for increased trade as part of the growing Giraudist-Francoist relationship. This was one of many issues within Allied-Spanish trade where the United States and Great Britain disagreed.\textsuperscript{125} H. Freeman Matthews of the U.S. Embassy responded that the State Department found the British, 'far from helpful', especially since it was unreasonable to negotiate trade arrangements with Spain for French North African products without a representative of Giraud, and the Americans urged

\textsuperscript{122} See Hoare note and FO comments, 19 March 1943. \textit{PRO} FO 371/36253/Z3609.

\textsuperscript{123} W.N. Medlicott. \textit{The Economic Blockade} vol. II (London, 1959), 547.

\textsuperscript{124} Hoare to Foreign Office, 3 April 1943. \textit{PRO} FO 371/36254/Z4238.

\textsuperscript{125} Denis Smyth underlines the fact that American resentment of Franco's pro-Axis position led them to view trade 'as an occasion for coercion rather than an opportunity for courtship.' On a number of occasions from late 1941 until mid-1944 the British had to intervene to dissuade U.S. officials from imposing economic sanctions against Spain. Smyth, 'Franco and the Allies' in Balfour and Preston, eds., \textit{Spain and the Great Powers}, 186-187.
the British to come on side, especially since the Spanish Government indicated it was prepared to deal with Giraud.126

What ultimately resolved the Anglo-American conflict was the higher objective of Allied policy in Spain. The first half of 1943 was a crucial period in the history of Spain’s attitude to the war, and Allied diplomats were well aware of this fact. Since ‘TORCH’, Carlton Hayes wrote in January, 1943, Spain’s relations with the Allies ‘have steadily improved. [and] our guarantees have been accepted.’127 Yet it was equally clear that the German influence was still strong in Franco’s Spain, as the March cancellations of the French refugee transfer agreements indicated. From Algiers, Harold Macmillan, Britain’s Resident Minister, argued that the French question in Madrid must be subsumed in the general Spanish question. In other words, if the diplomatic success of TORCH vis-a-vis Spain was the joint Anglo-American promise to respect Spain’s neutrality, then Spain would only continue to move toward the Allies because of Anglo-American cooperation in Madrid. As a result, Macmillan concluded, the United States and Britain had to agree upon a concerted policy regarding Clarac.128 By April, a common approach had been worked out, and the British agreed to support a French bureau as long as Malaise and Pettit were replaced by

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127 Hayes to Hull, 15 January 1943. FRUS 1943, vol. II, 596. There was still Anglo-American disagreement throughout 1943 about exactly how much to press Franco to limit/curtail German influence and German activity in Spain. The British were more hesitant to exert pressure. See Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 13-19.

128 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 14 March 1943. PRO FO 371/36253/Z3609.
diplomats of higher rank.\textsuperscript{129} Clarac himself recognized that any future French negotiations in Madrid had to be conducted within the framework of Allied-Spanish economic arrangements.\textsuperscript{130} France, through the North African authority and then the CFLN, now became a participant in Allied economic warfare policy in Spain.

The means with which the Allies conducted economic warfare in Spain were diverse. They included the purchase of wolfram and other minerals, and of other Spanish goods, in exchange for selling to Spain cotton, sugar, and other products. They also negotiated trade credits. The British Government controlled trade through the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (UKCC) while the Americans used a similar company, the United States Commercial Corporation (USCC) and relied on private trading companies. The coordination of all these activities was achieved through the mechanism of a ‘Joint Committee’ which did not make firm trade treaties with Spain, but rather negotiated a series of ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ with Franco.\textsuperscript{131}

The agreement to allow France and French officials to enter into such a structure in order to coordinate economic and political policy did not quell British concerns about French involvement. As early as 11 April 1943, a British official in Rabat, Morocco sought to exert his control over French trade by organizing the monthly shipments of the Office Chérifien des

\textsuperscript{129} Speaight Minute, 13 April 1943. PRO FO 371/36254/Z4327. For British complaints about the French North African mission, see Hoare to Foreign Office, 3 April 1943. PRO FO 371/36254/Z4238.

\textsuperscript{130} Yencken to Strang, 12 April 1943. PRO FO 371/36255/Z4890 and Rumbold Minute, 23 April 1943. PRO FO 371/36255/Z4915.

Phosphates to Spain. The ability of the French to supply Spain with phosphates and other products from North Africa naturally fit into the Allied system of coordination. Yet it also threatened it. The fear, as one British official put it, was that the French ‘should not be blinded, by narrow commercial considerations of price, either to the more important economic issues at stake or to the very heavy sacrifices being made by the U.S.A. and U.K. in pursuance of politico-economic aims in the Peninsula.’ More than commercial interest was at stake, however, for as Clarac admitted, joining the ‘Joint Committee’ system, while necessary to gain Allied support and achieve concessions from the Spanish Government, also deprived France of its ability to link a trade agreement with its own desire for Spanish recognition.

In early May, Walton Butterworth of the U.S. Embassy and Eric Wyndham of the British Embassy left Madrid for Algiers in order to negotiate a common Allied position on trade and integrate the French mission in Madrid into the Joint Committee. An agreement was reached 16 May 1943. French officials accepted the framework under which the Joint Committee had been operating. No signed or permanent agreements with Spain would be reached, for trade was under constant negotiation; in Algiers, representatives of all three states would meet to coordinate trade between North Africa and Spain. The French Resident-

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134 Clarac to Algiers, 27 April 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1067.
General in Rabat, General Noguès, expressed some concern that the agreement would interrupt the short-term agreements French Morocco had made with Spain dealing with phosphates. In practice, however, the French moved fairly easily into the Allied economic structure in Madrid. André Pettit was replaced by Roger Drouin as the primary French economic adviser in Madrid. Drouin took a seat on the Joint Committee at the end of May. By 9 June 1943, just as Giraud merged his North African administration with de Gaulle’s Fighting France, Drouin reached an arrangement with the Spanish Foreign Ministry Economics Director, Taberna, and the Institute of Foreign Currency president Huete. Through verbal agreement, a peseta account was opened at the Institute for French North Africa, shipping schedules were agreed to, and phosphates trade deals were made. All agreements were approved by the Joint Committee in advance of any meetings with Spanish officials, and arrangements to create a French Commercial Office which would work with the UKCC and USCC proceeded. In addition, the American, British and French missions in Madrid created a separate sub-committee to discuss North African-Spanish trade in particular. André Audrain was appointed head of the Office Commercial français en

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136 Drouin to Massigli, 7 July 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1067.

137 Minutes of the First Meeting of this sub-committee, dated 1 June 1943, and subsequent meetings, found in MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1067. A detailed collection of minutes for the French North African Trade Committee of 1944 are found in PRO FO 371/42199.
Espagne in August, 1943.\textsuperscript{138} France was now a full member of the Allied economic warfare program in Spain. By the end of August, an informal accord which allowed Spain to purchase 360,000 tonnes of phosphates by 1 January 1944 in return for machinery and textile products was negotiated by Algiers.\textsuperscript{139}

The growing Franco-Spanish relationship produced further results. The conclusion to the crisis of French refugees on Spanish soil was apparent by October 1943, when the direct transfer of refugees from Spain to North Africa finally began. By the end of 1943, the number of French evadees in Spain was minimal, with over 8,000 moving to North Africa on French ships between mid-October and December alone.\textsuperscript{140} Malaise was replaced by the Gaullist Jacques Truelle in October, 1943.\textsuperscript{141} The appointment of Truelle as CFLN Minister Plenipotentiary in Madrid completed the process begun with the refugee crisis and continued through diplomatic and economic arrangements. As a result, the CFLN was accepted by the United States and Great Britain as an ally in the diplomatic activities of ‘neutral’ Madrid, a fact duly noted by Foreign Affairs Commissioner René Massigli to the full CFLN in


\textsuperscript{139} Massigli to Puaux, 2 September 1943. \textit{MAE} Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1067.

\textsuperscript{140} Boyer-Mas to Massigli, 7 December 1943. \textit{MAE} Série Guerre 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF/Espagne, 817.

\textsuperscript{141} Malaise proved an impediment to Truelle at first, for he took on an anti-Gaullist attitude of great conviction and exploited his connections to American intelligence. He refused to leave Madrid until February, 1944. Malaise also managed to get seriously injured in a car accident during this time, but recovered enough to continue pestering Truelle. For ‘l’affaire Malaise’, see Truelle to Massigli, 6 January 1944. \textit{MAE} Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 749. See also Belot, 575-587.
Inter-Allied relations in Spain, however necessary for non-Vichy France, were never easy. The structure of the Joint Committee system and the close cooperation of the UKCC and USCC created an overwhelming impression of Anglo-American dominance. Although a participant, the CFLN did not have complete freedom in its economic policies with Franco’s Spain. Spanish efforts to achieve maximum benefit for themselves underlined the situation of the French Mission in Madrid. In autumn 1943, Spain attempted to make an agreement concerning North African phosphates outside of the Allied system. The new Spanish economics negotiator for the Foreign Ministry, Demetrio Carceller, demanded a one-year phosphates agreement for 1944, a deal that violated the short-term arrangements desired by the Anglo-Americans in order to use economics as a tool to pressure the Franco regime politically and diplomatically. As talks continued with the French, Carceller made a long-term agreement a sine qua non of continued Hispano-North African trade. The French response was to cancel further phosphates deliveries as a protest; the Spanish needed French phosphates more than North Africa required Spanish goods. Defiantly, the French argued

142 Massigli to CFLN, 13 November 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1275.

143 One example of the close relationship between the two companies was the fact that they co-managed a single peseta account at the Institute of Foreign Currency in Madrid, while the French had their own separate account. See Halifax to Hull, 3 March 1944. PRO FO 371/39789/ C3344.

144 Massigli to Truelle, 8 October 1943. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1067.

that their North African textile needs were met by British and American trade, and
furthermore that Spanish prices were far too high. Such an argument contradicted the
rationale behind Allied trade with Spain, for considerations of price and market value were
never the primary factors behind Allied trade with Spain. Rather, trade with Spain was
political, motivated by a desire to pre-empt possible German acquisition of products and
material that could be used in the war. Regardless of price or the fact that the French could
acquire similar goods elsewhere, or that such threats might produce a more favourable
agreement with Spain, France, under the Joint Economic Committee, had to trade with Spain
in order to prevent Spanish resources from getting into German hands. Certainly there was
some room for negotiation and manoeuvre, and the British Government recognized the
‘undesirability of annoying the French’. Yet ultimately the fear was that any alternative
agreement reached with France might give Franco the impression that he could bypass Allied
structures such as the Joint Economic Committee and thus avoid Allied pressure on other
issues such as the wolfram trade with Nazi Germany.

While there is no question but that France, through its 16 May 1943 agreement with
Great Britain and the United States, agreed to and accepted the importance of economic
warfare goals in Spain, French officials still chafed at the limited space which they had to
manoeuvre in any economic negotiation with the Franco regime. Most of the resentment

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146 British Consul, Algiers to Madrid Embassy, 6 January 1944. PRO FO 371/ 42199/ Z375.

147 British Consul, Algiers, to Madrid Embassy, 6 January 1944. PRO FO 371/ 42199/ Z375.

148 Minute by J.P. Cowell, 11 January 1944. PRO 371/ 42199/ Z500.
emanated from the Commissariat for Production and Commerce in Algiers. However, the political operatives of the CFLN, especially those in Madrid, were able to reassert France's adherence to the Allied economic system in wartime Spain. Roger Drouin reaffirmed his commitment to achieve the approval of the Joint Committee before beginning any negotiation with Spain, and he informed British officials that if it were not for the Allied Embassies, the French Mission would have no standing at all in Madrid. Jacques Truelle echoed his subordinate. The economic question, he contended, was not to be conceived of on the basis of pure commercial advantage, but was of fundamental political importance. Non-Vichy France had obtained significant benefit from its relationship with Franco's Spain, and the potential for greater returns in economic and other areas was promising. All of its gains, however, had only come due to its role as an Allied nation in war. The CFLN, Truelle reminded Algiers, had to plan and implement policy toward Spain with this fact constantly in mind. 'It would be grave,' he wrote, 'to put ourselves in a position in which we were deprived...of the always effective and generous support offered and given by the Embassies of our two friends.'

Réné Massigli made it clear to his Algiers colleagues that policy in Spain was to be

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150 Hoare to Foreign Office, 15 January 1944. PRO FO 371/42199/ Z643.

made through Allied consultation. Ultimately the Spanish accepted this as they had other Allied demands concerning trade. With Truelle and Drouin firmly in charge, the CFLN Mission in Madrid continued throughout 1944 to build a relationship with Spain as a member of the United Nations. By April, 1944, a more permanent arrangement with Spain was reached on phosphates and other trade and, while Truelle indicated that the difficulty of implementing Allied economic warfare policy in Spain was not over, the agreement did represent another step in non-Vichy France's effort to be accepted in Madrid as a sovereign power. As a member of the Joint Committee, France was kept informed of the Anglo-American oil embargo against Spain implemented in the first half of 1944, in order to restrict Hispano-German wolfram trade, eliminate German espionage from Tangier, and remove the Blue Division from fighting alongside Nazi troops in the Soviet Union. The French accord of April came only after Spain had shown its willingness to negotiate with the Allies, and foreshadowed the Spanish agreement with the United States and Great Britain on wolfram, which was signed 2 May 1944.

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152 Mendes-France, Finances Commissioner, to Diethelm, Production and Commerce Commissioner, 3 February 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1068.

153 Minutes of the Allied Meeting on Iberian Affairs, 8 March 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1068.

154 Truelle to Algiers, 3 April 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1069. The terms of the accord were for the balance of 1944, but were reviewed by the CFLN and Spain every four months, in order that any adjustments necessitated by Allied economic warfare policy could be imposed. The terms of the trade agreement are found in Diethelm to Drouin, 18 April 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1069.

155 Truelle to Massigli, 19 May 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1068. See also Truelle reports on negotiations from January-April 1944 in MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1274.
With the restoration of stable French North African trade with Spain, non-Vichy France had truly emerged from the shadow of François Piétri’s Embassy and made a place for itself in wartime Spain. The Spanish decision in March 1944 to pass over its trusteeship of German interests in North Africa to the International Red Cross, was, for Spanish representative in Algiers José Antonio Sangréiz, equivalent to Franco’s de facto recognition of the CFLN as the legitimate government of France.\(^{156}\) The CFLN’s role on the Joint Committee similarly won increased respect in Madrid, and France soon joined the United States and Great Britain in making diplomatic protests throughout 1944 and 1945 in order to press Spain to expel German agents from Spanish territory, uncover German property assets, and turn over such property to the Allies.\(^{157}\) The integration of the CFLN into Allied policy toward Spain began the process of French thinking regarding its postwar policy toward General Franco. Issues such as the restoration of international status for the Spanish-occupied city of Tangier were not only of interest to France, but to the Allied powers and their visions for postwar settlement.\(^{158}\) France was now an Allied power in Spain, and was prepared to take

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\(^{156}\) Truelle to Massigli, 8 March 1944. Sangréiz repeated this statement to the French Consul in Tangier Lavastre. Lavastre to Massigli, 11 March 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1944/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1276.

\(^{157}\) For the initiation of France into such procedures, see Vienot to Massigli, 19 March 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1944/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1274. For one example of French protest, this one involved in the recovery of German property, part of the Allied SAFEHAVEN program, see Truelle to Lequerica, 7 May 1945. MAEE Archivo Renovado, R 2193/ 18. The best account of SAFEHAVEN, including its implementation in Spain, is William Z. Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II (Washington, 1997).

\(^{158}\) Massigli to Truelle, Vienot. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1944/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1274.
its place in the future construction of policy.

The primary motivation behind continuing relations with Spain was national self-interest. The Mission of Jacques Truelle in Madrid, aided now by the new Commercial Councillor, Jean Hugues, looked forward to planning a program of French purchases in Spain based on the need to rebuild Metropolitan France, and hoped to move from short-term buying toward a full Franco-Spanish commercial agreement.\textsuperscript{159} Politically, the transformation of the Franco-Spanish relationship from one of wartime contingency to one which resembled a state of postwar near-normalcy was underway. Truelle wrote:

\begin{quote}
The French Government cannot do otherwise than to continue the policy which it decided to adopt with regard to Spain, the day when a Mission, under the auspices of the Red Cross, was established in Madrid and in Algiers a Spanish Mission was set up as a Consulate for the representation of Spanish interests in all of the French Empire. Today, the Spanish Government has informed us of its intention to go further along the road to recognition. Will we compromise ourselves in pursuing this evolution? [If we think so] it will become impossible to count any further on Spain, one of the only countries capable of assisting us in our reconstruction.\textsuperscript{160}
\end{quote}

In Paris, the same conclusion had already been reached, for the European section of the CFLN’s Foreign Affaires Secretariat wrote to the newly appointed Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, Jean Chauvel, on 25 August that, ‘for however uncertain the duration of the present regime in Spain is, it is not a question for us to refuse to resume relations.’ The memorandum concluded that, ‘it is right to acknowledge that the Provisional Government

\textsuperscript{159} Hugues to Diethelm, 18 August 1944. \textit{MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF}, 1069.

\textsuperscript{160} Truelle to Chauvel, 28 September 1944. \textit{MAE Série Z/Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne}, 2.
welcomes without reticence, but with firmness, the openings that have been made."¹⁶¹

The very question of who ruled France, Vichy authorities or non-Vichy entities, was fundamental to the question of Franco-Spanish relations during the Second World War. In order to assist French refugees fleeing over the Pyrenees with the hope of returning in the clothes of liberators, French North Africa became involved in negotiations with Franco’s Spain. In order to further develop Algiers’ claim to represent true French sovereignty, these relations were expanded to include trade and diplomatic exchange. Diplomatic relations with Madrid gave Algiers the opportunity to start the long march toward renewed Republican grandeur in international politics. At all points, the support of non-Vichy France’s Anglo-American allies was essential. Yet the question of ‘who ruled France?’ had not completely been answered. The representatives of Algiers, whether in the name of General Giraud or General de Gaulle, were members of an elite, with ties to the military and the Third Republic state, who had broken from Vichy. They were only part of the French Resistance. The larger internal Resistance, and the mass of the French public, had been unable, under German occupation, to play a role in the formation of non-Vichy France’s emerging international policy. The Spanish issue, as it had in the 1930s, would serve as a lightning rod for those on the Left not directly involved in the formation of policy. The next stage of Franco-Spanish relations, as Jacques Truelle predicted in conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister, would be ‘decisive’."¹⁶²

¹⁶¹Foreign Affairs Commissariat, Europe to Chauvel, 25 August 1944. MAE Série Z/Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.

¹⁶²Truelle to Algiers, 24 August 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1277.
Chapter 2

The Consequences of Liberation:

The Resistance, the Quai d’Orsay and Franco in a New France

With the return of democracy to France, a new era in Franco-Spanish relations began. The policy-making environment of wartime Spain had been far from straightforward, for both Allied and Axis states. For the French, the complexities of Spain were further compounded by the presence of competing French missions, one representing Vichy and one Algiers. Yet once the liberation of France transformed the CFLN into the Gouvernement Provisional de la République Française (GPRF), the sole and undisputed holder of French sovereignty, the situation was not necessarily simplified. The revival of French democracy opened up Spanish policy not only to those who had guided the CFLN’s diplomatic efforts in war, but also to those involved in the internal French Resistance, political parties and activists, and broader public opinion. What was at stake was fundamental, for the debate concerning French policy toward Spain was really about France. How was France to be remade in the aftermath of the Liberation? And who was to remake it? What principles and ideas would serve as possible answers to both these questions? The Spanish question, as it had earlier in the 1930s, was a catalyst for, and focus of, these crucial debates.

Those who claimed an interest in Spanish policy were diverse. Spanish Republican refugees who had fought alongside French citizens in the Liberation agitated for support in their effort to free Spain from oppression in a similar fashion. French Resistance activists supported these efforts, and those involved in the political process, whether in movements
such as the *Mouvement de Libération Nationale* (MLN) or in parties such as the French Communist Party (PCF), sought an end to French diplomatic relations with ‘Fascist’ Spain. Drawing on the themes of Resistance and Democracy, charged with the idealistic spirit of the Resistance, these activists were prominent in the French press and achieved significant public support for their positions. In their minds, the war had been fought to liberate France and other European nations from fascism and to replace fascism and Nazism with democracy. In Spain there remained a government with ties, direct and indirect, to the Axis states, and France was compelled, they argued, to change this. Moreover, it was not only the aim of the Resistance to remake France as a supporter of democracy, but to make policy within France by democratic means. In contrast to both the Vichy regime and the Third Republic and, for that matter, Algiers during the Second World War, the Resistance demanded that policy-making be taken out of the hands of the traditional French elite. The Spanish question became inextricably linked to the broader political debate over how France was to be remade in the aftermath of war, occupation and collaboration. What was at stake in the Resistance claim to forge a new foreign policy was the question of how a truly renewed French Republic was to conduct itself in the world.

The Government of Charles de Gaulle sought to renew France, and in particular a France active in the international system, on the basis of *grandeur*. In the quest for influence in the process to remake Europe, France first had to rebuild itself. There was, amongst bureaucrats and leading politicians, a commitment to what William I. Hitchcock has called, a ‘national strategy of recovery’.¹ French representatives in Madrid and Foreign Ministry

¹ Hitchcock, *France Restored*, 2.
officials in Paris saw Spain as an important provider of economic goods needed for France's reconstruction. A second part of recovery was to work with France's Anglo-American allies in order to help shape the new international order and achieve benefits for themselves as well. Foreign Ministry officials, like their counterparts in the Foreign Office and the State Department, did not see any benefit to intervening in the Iberian Peninsula against Franco.

The new Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, and his advisers in the French Foreign Ministry, the Quai d'Orsay, were cognizant of the desire amongst parties, organizations and individuals to make foreign policy in the national image. While they shared such sentiments, having themselves come through similar experiences in the Resistance, they were equally committed to making foreign policy in the national interest, which involved assessments of cost and benefit not only ideologically, but also economically and strategically, including due consideration of the views of France's Allies concerning Spain. The complexity of making foreign policy in a democracy, especially one imbued with the idealism and hope of liberated France, was a substantial challenge from the start. This chapter will assess the emergence, over the course of 1945, of a profound division over Spanish policy in France.

The very first challenge to France's wartime policy of maintaining relations with Spain came not from a French source, but a Spanish one. While Spanish immigrants and refugees had come to France throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, it was the Spanish Civil War that truly inaugurated the era of Spanish political refugees seeking haven in neighbouring France. The large scale flight of Republicans from Spain followed the course of military events in the Spanish Civil War: after the Basque campaign in the autumn 1936, after the victory in the Asturias region by Franco's Nationalist troops in the summer of 1937.
and after the end of the Aragon campaign in April 1938. By mid-June 1938, it has been estimated that between 40,000 and 45,000 Spanish Republican refugees were in France. In January and February, 1939, however, the situation changed completely with the fall of Catalonia to Nationalist troops and the realization that Franco was going to win the war. By mid-February, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that some 350,000 Spanish refugees were inside France: the total by the end of the Civil War in March was 450,000.

These Republican refugees were to experience a variety of difficult circumstances over the next few years. Most were housed in harsh internment camps upon their arrival. After the start of war in September 1939, France shifted from a policy of internment to one more constructive: Spanish refugees became employed in the armaments industry or else joined the French military and fought alongside regular French soldiers against the German Army in May and June, 1940. The arrival of the Vichy government under Marshall Philippe Pétain raised the spectre of forced repatriation as Francoist Spain and Vichy France began to develop close relations, symbolized by the Franco-Pétain summit at Montpellier in February 1941. While prominent Republican leaders were sent back to Spain to face imprisonment and death, both the Vichy and German authorities saw the Spanish refugees as a potential

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3 Pike, *Vae Victis!*, 26-27, 57.


5 Pike, *Vae Victis!*, 106.
workforce, and most were organized into work groups or sent to German forced labour
camps. The number of Spaniards sent into forced labour in Nazi Germany’s Todt
Organization within occupied France was close to 15 000, and over 30 000 were deported to
Germany, either to be employed in forced labour or interned in concentration camps.\(^6\) Far
more were forced to work in Vichy, and by the end of 1940, some 220 000 Spaniards were
absorbed into French and German work programs combined.\(^7\) Most likely, some 25 000
Spaniards died in such captivity over the course of the war.\(^8\)

As France collapsed and was occupied, numerous Spanish Republicans joined the
French Resistance in a variety of ways. The leadership was initially taken up by the Spanish
Communist Party (PCE) who, under orders from Moscow to reconstruct Popular Front-type
calitions against fascism, formed the Unión Nacional Española (UNE) in Grenoble in 1942.
This Communist-dominated alliance sought to unify all anti-Franco Spaniards and did have
the support of most of the Spanish guerilleros fighting for French Liberation.\(^9\) In May, 1944,
the French Resistance reorganized itself into the Comité de Libération National (CNL) and
all UNE guerillas were grouped together in six divisions through the Agrupación de
Guerilleros Españoles (AGE), based in the south-west with 4000 troops and part of the
French Resistance organization Franc Tireurs et Partisans - Main d’Oeuvre Immigrant

\(^6\) David Wingeate Pike, In the Service of Stalin: The Spanish Communists in Exile, 1939-

\(^7\) Stein, Beyond Death and Exile, 130.

\(^8\) Pike, Vae Victis!, 114.

\(^9\) Pike, In the Service of Stalin, 180-182.
Numerous other Spaniards simply joined French Resistance organizations and became veterans of the *Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur* (FFI). Many others were arrested and placed in concentration camps, or aided the Resistance in more subtle ways. Spanish forces liberated in whole or in part 49 cities, and the French Resistance leader Pierre Bertaux concluded that in the Pyrenean zone of France, Spanish fighters played 'a very important part - I believe, more and more, the most important part' in its Liberation.

The participation of Spaniards, particularly leftist Republicans, in the French Resistance was no surprise. They saw the struggle against Hitler as a necessary precursor to the renewed battle against Franco within Spain proper. In June 1944, the UNE newspaper *Reconquista de España* stated that first Spanish Republicans must work with the Allies and the FFI, and later the liberation of Spain would begin. Most of France was freed from German occupation in the period from June to August 1944. At the moment of liberation, Spanish guerillas in southwestern France turned their thoughts toward Spain. Their campaign for Republican Spain began at the Francoist consulates located in the major towns and cities of the southwest. By the end of August 1944, the Spanish Government reported that the Consul at Pau had been arrested and the Consulate occupied; the Consul at Toulouse had been assassinated and the Consulate occupied; similarly the Republican flag flew over the

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Spanish Consulate in Perpignan. Throughout August and September, many other properties owned or operated by the Spanish Government would be occupied by Republicans, including the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Paris. In December 1944, the Quai d'Orsay was able to conclude that of 15 Spanish consulates in France, only five were open, and only four had been completely untouched by Republican exiles. Meanwhile, arms that Spanish guerillas had used and stored in the fight for France's liberation now began to move closer to the Spanish border in the Pyrénées, an area that the Provisional Government did not yet completely control. In late September, it was reported that a group of Spanish guerillas had crossed the border into Spain near Puigcerda and stolen arms from the Spanish border patrol there. This was neither the first, nor the last, clandestine border crossing.

It was not until 1 October 1944 that the Commandement Militaire de la Frontière, a body created by French military intelligence to deal with the 'Pyrenean crisis', was able to report to the Foreign Ministry on the border situation in southwestern France. There existed, reported an officer attached to the division, 'a veritable Spanish Republican army' on the north side of the Pyrénéees which faced an increasingly reinforced Spanish Army to the south, consisting of anywhere from 20-30 000 men. They had trucks, armoured vehicles, rifles,

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14 French Embassy, London to MAE, 2 September 1944. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34. Pierre Bertaux disputed the claim that the Consul in Toulouse had been assassinated and later maintained that in fact he had left for the Spanish border with a French escort. Bertaux, Libération, 104.


handguns, mortars and canons as well. At least half of these forces were commanded by the UNE.\textsuperscript{17} A document by a guerrillero member put the actual number of Spanish maquis organized into 11 battalions throughout the southwest at 12 000.\textsuperscript{18} They faced an estimated 150 000 Spanish troops on the other side of the border.\textsuperscript{19} Yet the border crossings of the Republican guerillas continued. In the eastern area of the Pyrenees, there were reports that 20-40 armed men per day were crossing the border near Auzat and laying the groundwork for a revolt on the Spanish side. Numerous other incidents involving border crossings and skirmishes with Spanish troops were reported throughout September, October and November 1944.\textsuperscript{20}

The most significant incident to occur in the autumn of 1944 was the invasion by Spanish guerillas of the Val d’Aran on 19 October 1944. This valley juts northward into France west of Andorra and was separated from Spain by mountains that remained impassable in winter. The decision to invade, in the hopes of provoking a general uprising against Franco, was made by the leadership of the PCE in France.\textsuperscript{21} The night of 18-19

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Lt. Col. Richard, \textit{Commandement Militaire de la Frontière (Services Speciaux)} to MAE Europe, 1 October 1944. \textit{MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne}, 34.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Renaud Sivan, French Embassy Madrid to Georges Bidault, 14 October 1944. \textit{MAE}, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 34.
\item \textsuperscript{20} October and November, 1944 reports in \textit{MAE}, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 34.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Agudo, reproduced in Latapie, \textit{L’Affaire du Val d’Aran}, claims it was a Central Committee decision against the wishes of UNE military commanders. Pike agrees. David
\end{itemize}
October 1944. 3500-4000 members of seven UNE divisions crossed into the valley and, between 19 October and 28 October, some 7000 Spanish Republicans were in the Aran at various times fighting with forces from the Spanish Army. They retreated only when it was clear that the national revolution they hoped to provoke was not forthcoming.22

It was clear that the leadership of the UNE, as well as of many other Spanish Republican groups, viewed the reconquest of Spain as the next step, after French Liberation, in the war against fascism.23 However, that they were able to advance at all was due to the chaotic situation on the ground in liberated southwestern France. As France gradually became liberated over the course of August 1944, the various troops of the FFI were transformed on the spot into the army and border patrol of the GPRF; the majority of the regular French Army, itself composed mainly of Resistance fighters and the remnants of de Gaulle's North African army, was still fighting the Germans in eastern France and the Low Countries. In the

Wingeate Pike. Jours de Gloire, Jours de Honte: Le parti communiste d'Espagne en France depuis son arrivée en 1939 jusqu'à son départ en 1950 (Paris, 1984) 119-120. It is quite clear that the decision to invade was made without Moscow's approval and against the express wishes of French Communists involved with the Spanish guerrilleros, most notably André Marty. Geoffrey Swain. 'Stalin and Spain, 1944-1948' in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds., Spain in an International Context, 246-247.

22 For a detailed account of the Val d'Aran invasion and its political motivations, see Jean-Louis Dufour and Rolande Trempe, 'La France, Base Arrière d'une Reconquête Républicaine de l'Espagne: L'Affaire du Val d'Aran' in Sagnes and Caucanas, eds. Les Français et la Guerre d'Espagne, 261-284. See also Pike, Jours de Gloire, Jours de Honte, 119-132 and Daniel Arasa, Años 40: Los maquis y el PCE (Barcelona, 1984) 121-241. For an account by one of the best friends of the Spanish guerrilleros, FFI commander and Commandement Militaire de la Frontière agent Daniel Latapie, see his self-published account, including a description of his own efforts to dissuade the UNE from action the night before the invasion. Latapie, L'Affaire du Val d'Aran.

23 Agudo in Latapie, L'Affaire du Val d'Aran.
southwest, therefore, Spanish guerillas were a major component of the region's FFI forces. Despite objections from the Minister of War, André Diethelm, the regional military commander in the southwest, General Collet, had agreed with General Luis Fernandez of the UNE that some 7600 UNE troops should remain as part of the FFI in the short-term.24 As early as 2 September 1944, the Spanish Government had complained to the British Government about this situation.25 The reality, at least initially, was that in various parts of the Pyrenean region, the Government in Paris had little or no direct control of FFI troops, especially Spanish ones which now seemed intent on occupying consulates and preparing border incursions. Lt. Col. Richard of the Commandement Militaire de la Frontière admitted that in many regions France’s ability to control its own side of the Pyrenean border was ‘extremely weak’, and that the Government could not expect to impose its decisions on the Spanish maquis.26 In the eastern Pyrenees especially, Spanish guerillas generally outnumbered the French FFI soldiers: in the department of Pyrénées-Orientales, there were 1500 Spaniards and only 500-600 French amongst the FFI contingent as of 1 October 1944.27

Beyond a lack of control over their own borders, policy-makers in Paris were faced

24 Collet believed that demobilization of Spanish FFI forces would be easier in the future, and too difficult, at the time, given the large number of tasks which the FFI was expected to accomplish in the southwest over the autumn of 1944. Serreulles, Republican Commissioner Bayonne to Tixier, Minister of Interior, 20 November 1944. Archives Nationales de la France, Paris (hereafter AN) Série F1A/3346.


26 Lt Col Richard to MAE Europe, MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.

27 Lt Col Richard to MAE Europe, 1 October 1944. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.
with a variety of situations in which the French FFI forces and their commanders on the
ground in the Pyrenean region overlooked or actively supported the Spaniards’ actions. The
UNE and their armed guerrilleros provoked sympathy amongst many French in the
southwest who had fought with them in the Liberation of the region. In the middle of October
1944, the Montpellier Resistance newspaper Le Midi Libre reported that in April 1944 an
agreement between the UNE and the regional Mouvement de la Libération Nationale (MLN
Zone Sud) had been reached which committed both organisations to the same goal, the defeat
of international fascism. Moreover, it was reported each group would aid the other, the UNE
in the battle for French Liberation and the French in return giving the UNE ‘what assistance it
could’ for the battle against Franco inside Spain.28 The Quai d’Orsay’s closest representative
to the situation in southern France was Jean Coiffard, the French Consul in Barcelona. He
met with Col. Gilbert Carrel, the FFI Commander in Montpellier in early October 1944, who
confirmed the existence of this agreement and added that since the Spaniards had kept up
their half of the bargain, ‘It is impossible for us not to hold to the contracted agreement.’ He
added, ‘we will make all effort to liberate Spain.’29

The situation was more tense in the area of Toulouse. The strength of Communist and
other leftist elements in the Toulousian resistance and their placement in leadership positions
upon liberation gave the city a reputation amongst officials in Paris as ‘La République rouge

28 Coiffard to Truelle, 18 October 1944. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.
De Gaulle’s intelligence organization, the BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignements et Action),
had learned of this agreement in July, 1944. Note, 24 July 1944. AN 3 AG 2/ 371.

29 Coiffard to Truelle, 1 October 1944; Truelle to Bidault, 20 October 1944. MAE, Série
Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.
Spanish activists were part of this movement. The Resistance’s Radio Toulouse continued to broadcast Catalan language programs across the border well into the autumn of 1944, an activity which provoked complaints from British intelligence to the French Ambassador in London, René Massigli. Pierre Bertaux, de Gaulle’s Republican Commissioner in Toulouse immediately following Liberation, had forged many contacts with Spaniards during his Resistance days. He acknowledged not only their value, but their strength in the aftermath of Toulouse’s Liberation. As Commissioner, he took the opportunity on more than one occasion to help Spanish forces move their cache of arms to storage areas closer to the border. Working without the knowledge of Paris, Bertaux felt that such an arrangement was honourable, and it had the added benefit of eliminating any number of conflicts which could arise within Toulouse if he sought to antagonize the Spaniards. The Spanish Government charged that Republican exiles in Toulouse had occupied the Spanish Consulate there ‘with the accord’ of Bertaux in autumn 1944. Furthermore, the Spanish claimed that these exiles had also been assisted by the local FFI commander, Col. Ravenel.

Other veterans of the French Resistance in Toulouse and area did similar things.

The strongest French supporter of the UNE was the French Communist Party (PCF). Pierre Bertaux acknowledged that the Spanish Communist Party, and thus the UNE, was

31 Massigli, French Ambassador to Great Britain to MAE Europe, 24 October 1944. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.
32 Bertaux, Libération, 103.
funded almost entirely by the PCF. As indicated, the connection had been forged in the Resistance, when UNE guerrillas were part of the Communist FTP-MOI maquis. Notable French Communists such as André Marty worked closely with the UNE. Having said that, the UNE did not actually expect that French Communists would accompany them in any invasion of Spain, but it was understood that support, moral and otherwise, was necessary in order for the PCE and the UNE to carry out their plans for Spain’s liberation.

The situation in the southwest provoked a number of concerns in Paris and elsewhere, concerns that could affect not only Franco-Spanish relations, but also the Allied relationship and domestic politics as well. The Spanish Government was quick to emphasize the inactivity of local French authorities in ten different cities where Spanish Consulates were attacked and/or occupied, and an internal Foreign Ministry document stressed that the situation as a whole revealed ‘the peculiar way in which the French Government understands and applies traditional principles that have governed relations between our states and that have been universally accepted as part of international law.’ American and British military attachés in Madrid were concerned enough about the situation to discuss the possibility of regular Spanish forces crossing into France in pursuit of Spanish maquis. Jean Chauvel, the

34 Bertaux, Libération, 102.
35 Swain, ‘Stalin and Spain’, 246.
36 Agundo in Latapie, L’Affaire du Val d’Aran.
Quai d'Orsay's Political Director, wrote in November, 1944 that the British Government did not support Republican Spain, and that in light of the 'Pyrenean crisis' and the increasing demands of Republicans. French policy could be made only subject to careful attention to British views on all aspects of the Spanish issue.\(^{39}\)

In short, external considerations trumped internal pressures for the Quai d'Orsay. The principle that foreign policy should be made in light of national interest and alliance politics, as determined by Paris, was important for the Quai. Jean Coiffard was compelled to remind Carrel, the FFI commander in Montpellier, that it was the Foreign Ministry, and not the FFI, that made foreign policy.\(^{40}\) This was exactly the sort of attitude which the French Resistance believed it had fought to get rid of. Bertaux's opinion of the policy-makers in Paris was that they were 'ignorant, pretentious and finally useless' when it came to dealing with the Spanish situation.\(^{41}\) The Spanish case brought to the surface the very different visions for 'restored' France. The Resistance held that its experience, at the grassroots of Liberation, gave it the authority to remake the nation, and it would do so from the ground up, supporting democracy and practising it at the same time. Those who had spent the war in Algiers making policy, and perhaps Vichy before that, and who now sought to do the same from Paris, did not qualify as true résistants. In many cases, and this was certainly true of those who made policy on Spain, they were the same bureaucratic and political elites of the Third Republic which had


\(^{40}\) Coiffard to Truelle, 1 October 1944; Truelle to Bidault, 20 October 1944. *MAE*, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.

\(^{41}\) Bertaux, *Libération*, 104.
Republican Spain in the first place. The Spanish case brought all of these sentiments out in the open.

In the short term, an atmosphere of crisis in the southwest made it necessary for the Government to gain control of the border situation. As Foreign Ministry official Maurice Dejean put it, if France had no particular reason to support Franco, it equally had no reason to allow the establishment on its border a source of chronic troubles. On 6 September 1944, General Bertin of the French Army ordered all FFI troops to withdraw from the border line itself and established the principle that no Spanish troops (armed or not) should be in a fixed position within 40km of the border. In reality, this was impossible to enforce, especially in the many mountainous and isolated corners of the Pyrenees. Additionally, on orders from the Council of Ministers, French military intelligence created a special body under General Cailles in October 1944, the Commandement Militaire de la Frontière. The organization was given authority over Gendarmerie, FFI and Mobile Guard troops in order to facilitate the disarmament of Spanish guerilleros. Such power was warranted, stated the official decree, given the ‘state of siege’ that existed in southwestern France.


43 Lt Col Richard to MAE Europe, 1 October 1944. This action led to a complaint from the Ligue Française pour la défense de l’homme et du citoyen. Dr. Sicard de Plauzoles to Bidault, 6 November 1944. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 34.

44 Tixier to Republican Commissioners in Toulouse, Montpellier, Bordeaux, 8 October 1944. AN Série F1A/ 3346.

45 Decree of 14 October 1944 (Not printed in the Journal Officiel de la République Française). AN Série F1A/ 3346. Border control was returned to the Army by decrees of 8 and 9 January 1945. Diethelm (Minister of War) to Tixier, 28 January 1945. AN Série F1A/ 3346.
The Government, however, did not rely on local French forces alone. Whether through the *Commandement Militaire* or through the use of Spanish-based French officials, multiple contacts with Franco's Government were made in order to control the border situation. Lt. Col. Richard of the *Commandement Militaire*, who became known for his intelligence contacts with the Franco regime, had many meetings in San Sebastian with two Spanish military commanders, Cols. Ortega and Ibañez, as well as with the Civil Governor of Girona. These Spanish officials requested increased deployment of French troops along the border and even offered to sell Spanish sidearms to the French army; weapons that Richard noted were 'of superior quality to the arms parachuted in to us by the Americans.'

On 19 November 1944, French gendarmes joined Spanish police in Andorra to prevent that principality from becoming a centre of Republican resistance. Jean Coiffard in Barcelona met regularly with regional military commanders in order to pinpoint exact locations of Spanish Republican border crossings which he then forwarded to French authorities to enable them to intervene and disarm guerillas. Similarly, any increases in Spanish border fortifications were outlined to Coiffard in order that the French military not be alarmed. By the end of November, the Republican Commissioner in Bayonne could report that the

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46 Serreulles to Tixier, 20 November 1944. *AN* Série F1A/ 3346.


majority of Spanish FFI troops were out of the immediate border area and order had been restored along the frontier.\textsuperscript{50}

The crisis on the Pyrenean border, then, was a serious one which presented risks to the French Government that cannot be underestimated. First, the border situation threatened to compromise growing Franco-Spanish relations desired by the Government in Paris. Throughout 1944 and into 1945, the situation along the border would appear to Truelle to be the main stumbling block for a normalization of French-Spanish relations, and while clearly no admirer of Franco and his ‘military caste’, he came to regard the UNE and other Republican groups as ‘intellectual elites [who]...dispersed in exile have lost contact with the masses.’\textsuperscript{51} Lt. Col. Richard of the Commandement Militaire de la Frontière also stressed the threat to Franco-Spanish relations, but went further. Depending on the approach toward Spanish Republican exiles taken by French authorities, he wrote, the crisis in the southwest had the potential to become an issue in domestic politics. The powerful moral cause of the Republicans against the semi-fascist regime of General Franco risked dividing the already fragile coalition of the Provisional Government and the FFI; any resulting policy pursued by Paris, Richard concluded, would have to be ‘extremely subtle.’\textsuperscript{52} If the Spanish question indeed could act as catalyst for a division between Government and FFI troops in autumn, 1944, there was a greater concern in the longer term. The Spanish issue had the potential to

\textsuperscript{50} Serreulles to Tixier, 20 November 1944. \textit{AN} Série F1A/ 3346.


\textsuperscript{52} Lt. Col. Richard to MAE Europe, 1 October 1944. \textit{MAE}, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.
bring about a schism between the Government of Charles de Gaulle, which when in Algiers had developed relations with Franco’s Spain, and much of the internal Resistance, which had fought for the liberation of France alongside Spanish Republicans dedicated to overthrowing Franco.

All sides agreed that there was little chance of foreign military intervention against Franco or of foreign support for the guerrilleros. The failure of the Val d’Aran invasion indicated that the prospects for launching a revolt inside Spain were virtually nil. As David Wingeate Pike has observed, “it was a mistake to imagine that the Resistance in France could serve as a model for the Resistance in Spain, and that the Spanish people burned with a desire to rise against their oppressors.” With the exception of the PCF, most individuals, parties and movements associated with the French Resistance were far more comfortable, from September, 1944 onward, to rally around the call for a new Spanish government, without actively preparing or supporting an actual armed movement to facilitate such a change in regime. Indeed, after Val d’Aran, the majority of the Spanish Resistance in France chose to abandon the UNE and its emphasis on guerrilla tactics. On 23 October 1944, less than 2 months after the Liberation of Toulouse, the Socialists (and their trade union, the UGT), anarcho-syndicalists (and their trade union, the CNT) and the smaller left-of-centre Republican parties had left the UNE and formed the rival Junta Española de Liberación (JEL), also known in various places as the Agrupación Democrática Española. This group was quick to announce that it had no intention of becoming involved in French politics and

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53 Pike, In the Service of Stalin, 282.
that it opposed the preparation of any ‘reconquest’ of Spain from French territory.\textsuperscript{54} Local French officials found it easier to deal with the non-violent approach of the JEL/\textit{Agrupación} and expressed relief that the UNE militants were not the only Spanish exiles with whom they had to deal.\textsuperscript{55}

However, a rejection of Spanish liberation based on the French model did not imply that the Spanish issue was dormant for those who had been active in the Resistance, those politically involved in the emerging French political arena, and large parts of the general public. Indeed, while the military model of the French Resistance did not rally the French around the Spanish cause, its rhetoric- and especially its moral tone- was applied by various French militants for the Spanish case. In the long run, it was this political activism amongst French citizens on the question of relations with Franco’s Spain, and not the activities of Spanish Republican refugees, that posed the greatest threat to the desire of de Gaulle and the Quai d’Orsay’s to resume near normal relations with the Spanish regime.

While writing about the ‘Vichy Syndrome’, French historian Henri Rousso took time to comment on its cousin, the ‘resistancialist myth’.\textsuperscript{56} Constructed by both Gaullists and Communists in the period immediately after French Liberation, the myth was based upon the image of an entire nation opposed to Nazi occupation and Vichy collaboration. It entered into

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{54} Interior Ministry to MAE Europe, 23 October 1944. \textit{MAE}, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34. The JEL was linked to a similar organization in Mexico which ultimately hoped to form a Republican Government-in-exile.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Prefect of l’Aude to Bidault, 1 Decembere 1944. \textit{MAE}, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Henri Rousso. \textit{The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944} trans. Arthur Goldhammer. (Cambridge, MA, 1991) 18.
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political discourse through rhetoric and imagery which celebrated national moral choice, incited deep-rooted democratic impulses, and fuelled an idealistic cause. The pervasiveness of such language and symbolism in the aftermath of French Liberation seemed to harken the beginning of a ‘new politics’, one symbolized by centre-left coalition governments which conceived of political issues as ‘moral engagements’.57 The most visible expression of the ‘new society’ came in the proliferation of newspapers, most of which were created during the occupation and which, from 1944-45, took over the presses of those newspapers associated with Vichy.58 Until 1947, socialist and communist newspapers were over-represented, and the right was decidedly under-represented.59 A number of newspapers associated with non-party Resistance organizations also appeared. Through this medium, it seemed that the images and rhetoric of the ‘Resistance myth’ would manifest themselves in editorials and commentary that advocated political change and new policy directions. Yet despite the prevalence of the ‘Resistance myth’ and its imagery, both Rousso and Rioux argue that it did not change politics, citing, for instance, that efforts to create a new ‘Party of the Resistance’ failed.60 In Rousso’s words, ‘the postwar citizen clung to the reassuring image of a resisting France, but the desire for a return to normalcy and the wish to forget the exceptional circumstances of the


59 Novick, L’épuration, 203.

60 Rousso, Vichy Syndrome, 19; Rioux, Fourth Republic, 50-54. Novick cites another sign: most Resistance newspapers had disappeared by 1947, replaced by the traditional party organs. One exception was Combat, but Novick notes that its slogan, ‘From Resistance to Revolution’, was printed in increasingly smaller script. Novick, L’épuration, 205-206.
Occupation stood in the way of any real consecration of the Resistance.\textsuperscript{61} The issue of French relations with Spain, however, suggests otherwise. As in the 1930s, the divisions within Spain served to mobilize Western European opinion, particularly on the left. For activists emerging from the experience of Resistance in 1944-1945, another chance to salvage victory in the 'last great cause' seemed possible.

The Resistance groups which became involved in the French debate about diplomatic relations with Franco's Spain can be divided into three groups, none of whose members were necessarily exclusive. First, there were the non-party resistance organizations themselves. One example would be the \textit{Mouvement de Libération Nationale} (MLN), an alliance of regional and national Resistance groups formerly known as the \textit{Mouvement Unifié de Résistance} (MUR), represented in Paris by its daily newspaper \textit{Franc-Tireur} and by \textit{La République du Sud-Ouest} in the region of Toulouse. It also assisted the JEL with the publication of a French language newspaper dedicated to the Republican cause, \textit{l'Espagne Républicaine}. The second set of Resistance groups were the political parties: PCF, SFIO and the MRP, as well as Radicals and others. Finally, new associations concerned solely with the Spanish question sprung up, the most important of which was the \textit{Comité France-Espagne} (also known on the national level as the \textit{Association France-Espagne}), a multi-party pressure group organized at departmental and national levels.

In the international arena, the Resistance emphasized the principles of democratic policy-making and democratic goals. In contrast to de Gaulle's desire to return France to a place of 'grandeur' on the world stage, Resistance ideas of foreign policy viewed greatness

\textsuperscript{61} Rousso, \textit{Vichy Syndrome}, 19.
as a result of 'proclaiming democratic principles and international solidarity, and supporting all initiatives with the aim of applying these principles.'  

Moreover, France's own history reinforced recent experience and suggested the broad outline of a foreign policy based on principle. Writing in the Socialist *Populaire de Paris*, Charles Dumas argued thus:

because [France] has so suffered and because French civilization is made of moderation, wisdom, justice and humanity, and also revolutionary boldness, she can ask of others to sacrifice sovereignty, to renounce ambitions of dominance or national egotism, and tell them that humanity disturbed by an unparalleled storm is not able any longer to delay in these ruts...  

The leadership of the Quai d'Orsay was not opposed to such views about France's postwar role in the international sphere. Georges Bidault had also been the President of the *Conseil National de la Résistance* (CNR) during the war. At his first appearance before the Consultative National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission in November, 1944, Bidault spoke of his and the Government's desire to make foreign policy in conjunction with the Assembly. Moreover, the will of the Government was to make foreign policy. 'in the image of the nation....it is an old tradition for France to be the voice and the conscience of the world....France will be the advocate of the smaller peoples, the less populous nations; she will merit their confidence by the alliances she will make, following her immemorial tradition, for right and justice.'  

To apply such rhetoric to the Spanish case was easy enough. The war had been fought

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63 *Le Populaire de Paris*, 27 August 1944.

64 Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 20 November 1944. AN Série C/15274.
to liberate France and other European nations from fascism, to replace fascism and Nazism with democracy. In Spain there remained a government with ties, direct and indirect, to the Axis states. Within weeks of France’s own liberation, the press campaign to end the reign of Francisco Franco began. On 7 September 1944, *Combat*’s lead editorial reminded readers that, ‘this European war that began in Spain, eight years ago, cannot end without Spain.’ In *Le Populaire de Paris*, Marcel Bidoux wrote that as ‘the daughter of Italian fascism and German Nazism, [Spain] will fall with them.’ Franco’s fall, Bidoux hoped, would bring about a return of the Spanish Republic, the democratic regime he had usurped. Vincent Auriol, the French Socialist Deputy from Toulouse, spoke at the Congress of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) in Toulouse in September 1944 and stated that ‘my presence here...is equivalent to recognition of the Spanish Republic.’ After the war ended in Europe with the final defeat of Nazi Germany in May, 1945, the call to deal with Franco rose with renewed vigour. It was a ‘paradox’ that Franco continued to rule while his Fascist and Nazi patrons had been defeated. *La République du Sud-Ouest* wrote that the Franco regime was ‘a monstrous anachronism in a world liberated from fascism.’

Such calls for action against Spain were also evident amongst liberals and leftists in the United States and the United Kingdom. In January, 1945, a large demonstration in favour

65 *Combat*, 7 September 1944.
66 *Le Populaire de Paris*, 24 October 1944.
69 *La République du Sud Ouest*, 1 January 1946.
of a Republican Spain was held at Madison Square Garden in New York City, where the call went out that ‘Hitler must go, Franco must go!’ In Britain, the New Statesman advocated that the Labour Government, elected in July, 1945, work for ‘the restoration of Spanish democracy’, and Labour Party Chairman Harold Laski agreed.

In France, the Resistance and others interested in the Spanish case naturally used much of the same general rhetoric about democracy and anti-fascism as their colleagues in other countries. However, the real difference between French and Anglo-American anti-Franco activists was in the ability of the French to draw upon images and themes unique to France. Two points were stressed again and again in order to express the close association of the French Resistance and Republican Spain. First, the common history and heritage shared by the neighbouring states was emphasized. On one level, this was simply a call to Latin brotherhood. The more powerful appeal, however, was related to the Republican culture in both countries, and the fact that recent history in both states was dominated by successful attacks on these traditions. Indeed, here the image of the resistant nation, what now is referred to as the ‘Resistance myth’ in French historiography, was seen to be re-occurring in Spain. Second, there was a connection of indebtedness. Built initially on the residual guilt of the French Centre and Left at having ‘abandoned’ Republican Spain in the 1930s, this debt was expressed in the post-Liberation more prominently by homage to the many Spanish Republican exiles who had fought alongside French partisans in the liberation of France.

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sacrifice that demanded repayment on the part of the Resistance. It was through these appeals that the French Resistance made its mark on France’s postwar policy toward the Franco regime. For the Government could not ignore the strength of the message and the widespread support it gained. The claim made in France’s anti-Franco campaign was that the French Resistance and the Spanish Republican cause had a direct connection unshared by others; as a result, French policy had to be different—more aggressive toward Franco’s regime—than the policies of its Allies.

The first element of the anti-Franco campaign which was aimed to appeal directly to French citizens was the common Republican history of the two Latin states. The rhetoric and imagery associated with this aspect of the campaign consistently sought to portray the Franco regime in Spain as the close relative of the Vichy state which had only recently been removed from France. The logical conclusion of such an argument was that, just as Pétain and the Vichy regime represented an aberration of the French Republican state, so too was Franco’s government for the Spanish state. The subtext of this argument went further, and drew parallels with the essence of the ‘Resistance myth’. If Spain, like France, was naturally a Republican state, then the Spanish people, like the French, were quietly opposed to the regime and were simply awaiting the opportunity to greet the end of the regime with a return to Republican legitimacy as had so recently occurred in France. These arguments, which were designed to stress the French experience, and align the French ‘nation of résistants’ with the Spanish cause, were repeatedly apparent in the leftist and Resistance press from autumn 1944 through 1945 and 1946.

The means of making these particular points were varied. In Toulouse, the
Communist Voix du Midi simply stated that Franco's attitude in war, described as "neutral" collaboration... evoked the position of the 'Marshals.' In Franc-Tireur, Pétain was cast as the 'Franco of France' and Franco the 'Pétain of Spain'. Readers were reminded of the Marshal's stint as the Third Republic's Ambassador to Spain in 1939-1940, just prior to fall of France, and his 'spiritual ties' to the Caudillo; 'the same traits of political tartuffery, of bloody cunning, of pseudo-social weasel-facedness... the same absurd tendencies toward corporatism, supported by bands, falange, legion or milice.' In the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly, Alphonse Juge argued that continuing relations with Spain, and the acceptance of Spanish Consul-Generals and representatives in Paris, was nothing other than, 'the prolongation of the politics of Vichy.'

The Resistance drew parallels not only in the nature of the two regimes, Franco's and Pétain's, but also in their manner of coming to power. In essence, the claim was made that both France and Spain were Republics, by nature and popular will, and thus it was only due to outside pressures that the anti-Republican regimes of Vichy and Franco were brought to power. This assertion went to the heart of the 'Resistance myth', that France in fact was a nation of resisters who suffered under Pétain and his German allies, and that the Spanish people were in exactly the same situation. For the Franc-Tireur, both dictators had 'delivered their people to the enemy'. As France began the process of restoring its own democracy it

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72 Franc-Tireur, 12 January 1945.

73 Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 2 February 1945. AN Série C/15274.

74 Franc-Tireur, 12 January 1945.
continued to fight for the end of Hitlerian Germany, asserted the Communist *L’Etincelle* in Pau; the fight of the Spanish Republic was the same, and thus the defeat of the Nazi regime was the first stage in the restoration of the Spanish Republic and the renewal of Franco-Spanish friendship.\(^\text{75}\)

The most explicit use of the ‘allied Republics’ line of argument came in the Toulouse weekly *L’Espagne Républicaine*. This paper actually ran a column entitled ‘Parallels’ written by François Donnez, and his column in the initial issue, 30 June 1945, was entitled ‘Franco-Pétain: Blanc Bonnet ou Bonnet Blanc’ (‘Six of one and one half dozen of the other’). Donnez wrote that not only were Spain and France ‘two Latin sisters’ aligned by race and blood, but by ‘a series of calamities and trials’. ‘Franco, Pétain, two names which will remain coupled because they are the same and they evoke similar nightmares,’ Donnez wrote, recalling anti-Republican statements by both made in 1936.\(^\text{76}\)

Donnez also made a point in his column to remind voters, during the 1945 French elections, that no party represented Pétain’s policies, which demonstrated that he never represented the French people just as Franco did not represent the Spanish people.\(^\text{77}\) He was as imposed upon the Spanish nation as the ‘Resistance myth’ had Pétain imposed upon France. Other ‘Parallel’ columns were entitled ‘Two Republics to be Remade’ and ‘Francoists Equal Francophobes, Republicans equal Francophiles’.\(^\text{78}\) The conclusion meant to

\(^{75}\) *L’Etincelle*, 28 March 1945. Copy of paper in [MAEE Archivo Renovado, R 2223/ 2].

\(^{76}\) *L’Espagne Républicaine*, 30 June 1945.

\(^{77}\) *L’Espagne Républicaine*, 30 June 1945.

\(^{78}\) *L’Espagne Républicaine*, 18 August 1945, 8 December 1945.
be drawn from such use of the mirror image was clear. If Franco was Spain’s Pétain, then it was only a question of time before the Spanish people, like their French counterparts, rose up and reclaimed their nation as a Republic. Even papers like the Socialist *Le Populaire de Paris*, which preferred not to mention Pétain, and instead spoke of the Occupation as a German one alone, still insisted that it was wise not to forget the French experience of the wartime repression because it was the same as what continued in Spain under Franco and the Falange.79 The Spanish people, it insisted as the war in Asia came to an end, were ‘quasi-unanimously’ in favour of a Republic.80

The fact of Republican solidarity and historical experience led to the conclusion that the destinies of the two states were inextricably intertwined. Therefore, France was compelled to do all it could to support Republican Spain. This was the spirit behind the Constituent Assembly’s May and August, 1945 motions which called for diplomatic rupture with Spain. It was echoed in the press. Jean Cassou, a prominent intellectual and one of de Gaulle’s original appointees as Republican Commissioner in Toulouse until wounded during the Liberation, was also President of the *Association France-Espagne*. He wrote that France’s recent past, combined with its longstanding Republican tradition, meant that ‘at the moment when France emerges from its own humiliation, and recovers its shape, it understands that this shape will be unable to have all its significance if it does not correspond to the situation in other nations’ like Spain.81 In Toulouse, the *Association France-Espagne*’s local


81 *La République du Sud Ouest*, 26 December 1944.
committee celebrated the 14th anniversary of the Spanish Republic on 13-14 April 1945 by collecting a petition with thousands of signatures calling on General de Gaulle to rupture diplomatic relations with Spain and the renewal of the Republic. Albert Camus in *Combat* wrote that ‘passion [should] join reason and truth’ through the French acknowledgement of Spain’s Republican legitimacy, which was a first step in the construction of France’s post-Liberation foreign policy on the basis of international democracy.

If these themes of shared experience and common political history were persistent and consistent throughout 1945, they were overshadowed by the second element of the Resistance’s anti-Franco campaign: indebtedness. Debt extended back to the French experience of the Spanish Civil War. The 1936 decision of the Popular Front government not to aid the Spanish Republic, made in order to avoid replicating a similar division between left and right at home and to conform with the British position of non-intervention, worked to the benefit of Franco and against the Republic. Jean Cassou recalled that during the Civil War, while visiting the front, Spanish Republican President, Manuel Azaña, had exclaimed, ‘That is your front, your own front, Frenchman!’ Cassou, in December, 1944, acknowledged that now every French citizen understood that ‘it was us that Hitler attacked on the Madrid front.’

An editorialist in *Combat* confessed that ‘many of us, since 1938, have been unable

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83 *Combat*, 7-8 January 1945.


85 *La République du Sud Ouest*, 26 December 1944.
to think of this fraternal country without a secret shame...we must not recommit the same
errors.' At the end of 1945, in an interview with L'Espagne Républicaine, Albert Camus
said that, 'for nine years men of my generation have lived the life of Spain.' He concluded: 'It
is like a wound that will not close.'

These sentiments were of course shared by many on the left in Europe and elsewhere.
In France, however, there was a very different history in the aftermath of the Spanish Civil
War, namely the presence of Spanish Republican refugees in France and their involvement in
the Resistance during the Second World War. This was a debt to Spanish Republicans borne
by Liberated France alone. This unique situation would prove to form the basis of the most
effective anti-Franco propaganda used by the Resistance and the leftist political parties in
France. As early as mid-September, 1944, a press conference held by UNE leaders in
Toulouse prompted the MLN's La République du Sud Ouest to honour the Spanish maquis
for their 'service to France' and readers were reminded that, 'for them the battle is not
finished.' Reviewing France's non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War and the internment
of Spanish refugees in 1939, La Voix du Midi remarked with awe that after the defeat of
France the Spanish refugees 'rose, in the thousands, forgetting the past, without rifles' just as
the French people had, and 'with us, they fought, and they were killed when necessary, with
us.' François Donnez in L'Espagne Républicaine described Spanish participation in the

86 Combat, 7 September 1944.
87 L'Espagne Républicaine, 29 December 1945.
88 La République du Sud Ouest, 15 September 1944
89 La Voix du Midi, 6 September 1944.
Resistance as 'instinct, because they come from a people always taken with liberty and always oppressed; they joined with Frenchmen who wanted to reconquer their country and with [French] Republicans who wanted to reconquer their Republic.'

What did such a debt mean for France and how was it to be repaid? From Toulouse, the Communist daily *La Voix du Midi* reported that 'the hour of [Spanish] liberation will sound; the UNE asks the French people to give a fraternal hand and France gives its heart, knowing that its own liberation will not be definitive until the last Hitlerian has been chased off.' There was never any thought of military support, or active French intervention in Spain. From Paris, *Combat* editorialized:

We have no intention of intervening in Spain. We are also of the feeling that the Republicans must wait for the right moment to move with certainty. But we know that it will be necessary for Allied diplomatic pressure to guarantee the fall of Franco and to avoid the flow of the most generous blood in Europe.

Indeed, the various Spanish Republican groups active in France made it clear to French politicians that they did not seek any form of military intervention, but desired a diplomatic initiative. *L'Espagne Républicaine*, the official organ of the *Junta Española de Liberación* called for a French economic boycott of key Spanish exports such as oranges, pyrites and tungsten. In the face of arguments for continued trade with the Franco regime, the

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90 *L'Espagne Républicaine*, 18 August 1945.

91 *La Voix du Midi*, 15 September 1944.

92 *Combat*, 21 November 1944.

Resistance asserted that indebtedness superseded such concerns and required France to make a sacrifice as Spanish Republicans had done:

Witness to such sacrifice and courage cannot permit France to forget what it owes to the sons of free Spain. This debt engages our country with the Spanish Republic. It forces us to aid it in its rebirth. It does not permit us, under the egotistic pretext of immediate advantage, to contribute to the consolidation of the Francoist tyranny.  

The Quai d'Orsay's continued relations with Spain meant that the anti-Franco campaign evident amongst Resistance organizations and their press did not let up. While in the United States and Great Britain, Spain always attracted liberal and left opinion, Jill Edwards is quick to remind us that the Spanish Question was, in these countries, never more than a ‘side-show.’ By contrast, John Young has emphasized that in France left-wing politicians in the Constituent National Assembly saw the Spanish question ‘almost as the most vital question in foreign affairs.’ The primacy of the Spanish question was indeed a feature of the frequent meetings of the Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject of Spain came up at the very first session of the Committee at which Bidault appeared, in November, 1944. In February, 1945, relations with Spain were the subject of an intense debate. Florimond Bonte of the Communist Party stated outright that he and his colleagues believed the Government should immediately end diplomatic relations with Franco. Pierre

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96 Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance*, 78.

Cot recalled Spanish-German talks in 1940 about Francoist expansion into French Morocco, and gave his opinion that the policy of the Government, which had continued relations with Spain was 'in opposition to the sentiment of the Assembly'. Socialist Jules Moch was wary about opposing the Government while the war was still ongoing, but agreed fully with Cot's appraisal of the situation. In the end, a delegation of representatives was sent to see Bidault and express the views of the Commission. At the end of May, 1945, the Foreign Affairs Commission voted unanimously for a resolution which called for France to end diplomatic relations with Franco. Auriol, now Chair of the Committee, underlined that 'the goal of the Allied victory was to establish democracy in Europe. Therefore, fascism must disappear in Spain.' The resolution was renewed in August. Outside of the Assembly, other French officials affiliated with a variety of Resistance organizations spoke out on the Spanish question. In one case, the Sub-Prefect of Bayonne stated in January, 1945 that Nazi Germany was continuing the war against France by sending fascist agents over the Pyrenees from Spain, thus demonstrating Spain's continued commitment to fascism.

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98 Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 2 February 1945. AN Série C/15274.


100 Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 25 May 1945. AN, Série C/15274.

101 Le Populaire de Paris, 4 August 1945.

102 Spanish Consulate, Bayonne to Madrid, 4 January 1945. MAEE Archivo Renovado R 2223/1. This file includes reports from a number of Spanish Consulates concerning French anti-Franco activism including newspaper clippings from Combat, L'Etincelle (PCF, Pau) as well as news about the attendance of French representatives at Spanish Republican exile events, for
There was also practical evidence that these views, and the propaganda campaign ongoing in the French press, reflected, to some degree, the popular mood. In Toulouse, there were widespread protests in March and April 1945 when a new Spanish Consul-General arrived, including a rally that the local Communist press claimed attracted 25,000. Similar protests occurred in Pau, Perpignan and Bayonne. On 15 June, 1945 a train of Spaniards returning from labour service in Nazi Germany was attacked in Chambéry (Haute Savoie) when rumours circulated that the train actually held members of Franco’s Blue Division that had fought alongside Nazi troops in the Soviet Union. Most obviously this attack represented, at least partly, the mood of political activists toward Spain, and toward the French Government’s decision to continue diplomatic relations with Spain. More particularly, the incident underlined the importance of the Spanish question to a Resistance vision of France and French politics, even if in this case its retributive aspect was most prominent, for it was Resistance figures who were the main provocateurs in Chambéry.

example the anti-Franco speech of M. Albon, President of the Comité Departmental de Libération-Rhone-Alpes at a meeting of Spanish trade unions in exile (UGT-CNT) in Lyon in December 1944; another was the participation of Prefecture officials in the Nice Comité France-Espagne in February, 1945. MAEE R 2223/2.

103 La Voix du Midi, 24, 30, 31 March 1945, 6 April 1945; the anti-Consul campaign was also supported by the MRP organ in Toulouse, La Victoire, which reported the crowd as ‘large’ but did not give any numbers. La Victoire 26, 30 March 1945, 2 April 1945

104 In Perpignan 10,000 rallied outside the Spanish Consulate in late March. For reports from each of these protests, see MAEE Archivo Renovado R 2223/2.

105 Perry Biddiscombe has argued that the Chambéry incident was one example of the Resistance’s need for summary justice and violence, albeit with more complications since this attack, unlike others in post-Liberation France, directly involved a foreign state. Perry Biddiscombe, ‘The French Resistance and the Chambéry Incident of June 1945’ French History 11:4 (1997), 438-460.
These incidents only furthered the growth of the press campaign against Franco and increasingly led to criticism of the Government for not ending diplomatic relations with him and his regime. The leading newspaper of the MLN, *Franc-Tireur*, criticized the government’s decision to apologize to Spain after Chambèry, writing that ‘is this the spectacle that a France of the Resistance wants to show to the democratic world?’ Later, the paper published a picture of Franco, Pétain and Mussolini together with the caption, ‘has Franco forgotten that he is...Franco?...the Allies have also seemed to forget, and our Government almost as well.’ The Communist *Voix du Midi* called the Government’s agreement to allow the train to enter France an example of the ‘deplorable policy of flirting with Franco.’

The ideologically charged atmosphere of post-Liberation France led not only to a public questioning of policy, but also evoked an expression of concern over how policy was made, and who made it. The Resistance not only sought to propose the support of democracy in its foreign policy prescriptions, but it also desired a role in the formation of that policy. The ‘Resistance vision’ held that France was not be governed any longer by the bureaucratic elite, but by the people. Over the course of 1945, public anti-Franco sentiment had been demonstrated in Toulouse and Chambèry. On the question of Spain, the Resistance charged, the Quai d’Orsay was acting not as an instrument of the democratic will, but rather as an example of the Third Republic’s elitist politics.

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Indeed, there was never a point in 1945 at which the French Foreign Ministry moved beyond rhetoric in their criticism of Franco’s regime; nor did its officials acknowledge a new role for public opinion in formulating policy. It should not be assumed that elements in the Government or the Quai d’Orsay, or even in Anglo-American circles, were pro-Franco. Rather, the possibilities for Franco-Spanish relations, especially in the economic sphere, continued to attract the attention of policy-makers. The allure of Franco’s Spain was even stronger in light of two factors. First, the destruction of fascism in Europe made Franco’s position in the emerging postwar order vulnerable, since Spain had been more or less an ally of the defeated Axis states. This gave France a considerable advantage in any negotiations. Second, and perhaps more significant in the longer term, there was the Quai d’Orsay’s analysis of France’s real weakness at the start of reconstruction and, thus, its real need for Spain as a trading partner and a contributor to France’s own revival. These reasons continued to drive the Quai’s policy well past the end of the European conflict in May, 1945.

The European section of the CFLN’s foreign policy unit summarized the Spanish situation just prior to the return of General de Gaulle’s Government to Paris. They admitted that Spanish antagonism toward France during the war, expressed through the desire for colonial expansion, the occupation of the international city of Tangier, the general pro-German attitude of the regime and in other ways, had to be resolved before Franco-Spanish relations could be placed on a more secure footing. Yet Quai policymakers argued in August, 1944 that ‘it is not a question of us refusing to reprise such relations, [for] we have an interest in dealing with the Franco Government, more than any other, because it is in a delicate situation as a result of its policies followed since 1939.’ They predicted the anti-Franco
campaign of the leftist press that did indeed come, but this was welcomed as well, ‘for our negotiator will be able to use the pressure of opinion’ in talks with Francoist officials.109

At the same time, Hervé Alphand, Director of the Quai’s Economic section, organized a meeting with representatives of the Reconstruction and Finance Ministries. The high value of many Spanish products, especially pyrites, for France’s recovery was easily accepted.110 A short-term arrangement was reached in September, 1944, when the Spanish Government granted France 200 million pesetas of credit for the purchase of Spanish products; in return France had only to export to Spain phosphates from North Africa. France, in other words, was the primary beneficiary of the arrangement. By February, 1945, negotiations for a more permanent agreement were under way, and the Quai’s Economic division stressed to Bidault not only the commercial benefits of the deal, but also of the importance of Spain economically. In order to fully recover from the war, French industry required 40 000 tons per month of pyrites, and could only find 200 000 tons annually outside of Spain (from Portugal and Canada, at much greater cost). ‘Economic rupture with Spain,’ concluded the Economic section of the Quai, ‘will have grave effects in our country.’111

The position of France’s Allies was also a significant factor in the decision to build on


110 MAE Economic Affairs to Bidault, November 1944. AN 457 AP 101.

111 MAE Economic Affairs to Bidault, 8 February 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 92. This point was reiterated by the Economics section in July, 1945, when it argued that the impending Spanish industrialization could hold great benefits for France’s economy over the long-term— if political problems were resolved. MAE Economic Affairs to Falaize (Cabinet du Ministre), 17 July 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 1.
the relationship which emerged over the course of 1943 and 1944. Spain, wrote Foques-Duparc of the Quai d'Orsay, was dependent upon the Allies, and thus French relations with Spain must be decided within the context of France’s own position as an ally to Great Britain and the United States. Until the three western states reached an agreement amongst themselves on how to treat Spain, ‘the wisest counsel is no doubt not to engage the question of the future, [and] not to precipitate the development of a crisis for which the solution is not in place.’

However, Foques-Duparc did concede that no French citizen viewing Spain from the other side of Liberation ‘had any reason to favour the maintenance in power of a regime that was imposed, five years ago, only with the support of Italian tanks and German air planes, at the price of the expulsion and persecution of the liberal and democratic class which France counts as its true friends.’

Yet such sentiment could not be the only motivating factor behind policy. François Coulet, head of the Quai’s European Section, further addressed the points raised by his colleague. Writing in May, 1945, Coulet underlined two external factors to consider in French policy-making toward Spain, the second of which was most significant. The Spanish opposition was divided and, moreover, France’s western Allies had adopted not a position of antagonism toward Franco, but ‘a realistic attitude’. If France sought to do otherwise, to be the only western power without representation in Spain, its own economic and political interests there would be lost, and Washington and London would

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112 In addition, Foques-Duparc also highlighted the divisions amongst Spanish opposition groups as a reason for France taking on such a policy (See chapter 5). Note General by Foques-Duparc, 11 October 1944. MAE Série Z/ Europe, 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.

113 ‘Note Général’ by Foques-Duparc, 1 October 1944. MAE Série Z/ Europe, 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.
interpret the French action in light of alliance politics. If France chose a different policy than its Allies, was France a worthy ally to have? Coulet concluded that if France ended diplomatic relations with Spain, it would be interpreted in London and Washington that France was asserting 'its will to adopt in Spain an attitude opposed to the Anglo-Saxon policy of realism and prudence.'

National self-interest and alliance politics required France to continue developing its position in Iberia as it had been during the war, through diplomacy, economics and consultation with the western Allies. To continue relations with Spain, despite domestic criticism, was simply a question of realism. In a note to Bidault's Cabinet du Ministre, the European section of the Quai d'Orsay stressed that now:

> It is not the time, when the Americans and the British, without any preoccupation over the past attitude of General Franco's Government, deploy all their efforts to open in Spain new markets and secure certain provisions, to think ourselves able to break relations with a Spain that, according to our Commercial Councillor in Madrid, is disposed to send to France the primary materials necessary for the resumption of our industry.

There were other reasons, shared with the Americans and the British, why France attempted to improve relations with Spain. The position of General Franco within Spain, and the lack of a coherent opposition ready to replace him, was primary among these. When the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly passed the resolution which called for France to rupture diplomatic relations with Spain, Coulet prepared a document outlining the Quai's

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114 Coulet to Chauvel, 29 May 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.

objections to such a policy. He indicated that the intention of the French Government had long been to 'enter normal relations with Madrid.' Such a relationship, naturally, meant that France must observe, 'a strict policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Spain.' If Franco was close to collapsing and a new regime seemed apparent, then acting on the Committee's resolution would be wise, and in addition the French Government would gain the support of 'an important section of French public opinion.' This, however, was not the case at the end of the war.\textsuperscript{116}

France's American and British allies saw the Spanish situation through a similar lense. The two Allies consulted on the Spanish question at the end of the war, and agreed that the continuation of Franco's regime was incompatible with the emerging world order. However, they also believed that the question of the type of government Spain had was best decided by the Spanish people alone, and thus they proposed no intervention in the affairs of Spain. Fear of a renewed civil war was an integral part of this analysis.\textsuperscript{117} Another open conflict in Spain, as in the 1930s, would lead to foreign intervention and the leading state to intervene was bound to be the Soviet Union. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin did not want to give the Soviets an opportunity wither to insure a Communist regime in Spain or, at the least, influence Spanish events through the participation of the Spanish Communists in a Republican coalition fighting a war.\textsuperscript{118} Other reasons, primarily strategic and economic, also

\textsuperscript{116} Coulet to Chauvel, 29 May 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.

\textsuperscript{117} Department of State to British Embassy, Washington, 6 April 1945. FRUS, 1945, V, 672-673.

\textsuperscript{118} Florentino Portero, 'Spain, Britain and the Cold War' in Balfour and Preston, eds., Spain and the Great Powers, 218.
provided a basis for continuing relations with Spain.\textsuperscript{119} The Allied position provided many lessons for France, for France alone could not topple Franco.\textsuperscript{120} Allied policy and national self-interest constantly reinforced each other as the European section of the Quai d’Orsay analysed France’s options in Spain:

The Franco regime might last much longer than we generally think. It is necessary to take account of the example of the American government and the British government, in our relations with Spain, if we wish not to risk not only an economic rupture which will have grave repercussions on the reconstruction of our country but equally the loss of [economic] positions that will be taken up by others and will be difficult to recover later on, even if under a republican government disposed in our favour.\textsuperscript{121}

Due to self-interest and alliance concerns, then, French policy in 1945 mirrored that of its Anglo-American allies. As noted, there was agreement that the Franco regime was not worthy of support on any ideological basis. The liberal and left-wing of each of the three western states reinforced this message. Yet there was also a reluctance to precipitate a Spanish crisis or renewed civil war and a fear of communist resurgence, so economic and diplomatic contact continued, and indeed flourished in the period immediately after the war, building, in all three cases, on relations established during the conflict. Rather than following the lead of the French Resistance, the Allied position was one of moral condemnation without political or economic sanction. Thus, in 1945, the Allied Governments adopted anti-

\textsuperscript{119} See Liedtke, Embracing a Dictatorship 8-9; Edwards, Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 47-53.

\textsuperscript{120} ‘Note Général, Relations Franco-Espagnols’, 1 December 1945. MAE Série Z/Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 82.

Franco rhetoric similar to that of the Resistance, but diplomatically moved toward a position of substantive engagement with the Spanish regime.

The British and American governments had publicly criticized Franco’s ideology and his ties to Germany during the war through two notable statements. The first, in April, 1945, came at the San Francisco conference which founded the United Nations. Both powers, as well as France, supported a Mexican resolution that kept Spain out of the new organization. The second came at the Potsdam Conference of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in August, 1945. The essence of western policy was revealed at Potsdam when the Anglo-Americans rejected Stalin’s proposal for a joint diplomatic rupture with Spain and proposed instead a simple statement of moral condemnation. Clearly there was a distaste for Franco amongst the Allies. Indeed, private displays of anti-Franco sentiment were evident before the public declarations at San Francisco and Potsdam. As early as January, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, writing in response to a letter from General Franco, stated that, ‘His Majesty’s Government cannot overlook...past actions of the Spanish Government.’ On the American side, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was firmer than his British counterpart, writing to newly appointed Ambassador Norman Armour that:

Most certainly we do not forget Spain’s official position with and assistance to our


Axis enemies at a time when the fortunes of war were less favourable to us...the form of government in Spain and the policies pursued by that Government are quite properly the concern of the Spanish people. I should be lacking in candour, however, if I did not tell you that I can see no place in the community of nations for governments founded on fascist principles.125

In practice, displeasure with the nature of the Franco regime and a desire to see democratic change was expressed by U.S. and British officials in private and discreet meetings with a variety of ministers and officials in Madrid.126 Despite public declarations and private complaints, however, it was the desire for a brighter future, driven, as noted, by strategy and economics, which dominated policy. In the same letter of January, 1945 to General Franco described above, Churchill tempered his criticism of the regime with the articulation of his hope, 'to see all barriers removed which stand in the way of closer Anglo-Spanish relations.'127 There was no change in either country when Harry Truman succeeded Roosevelt in April, 1945 or when Clement Attlee and the Labour Party replaced the Churchill War Cabinet in July, 1945.128 The United States, over the course of 1945, made significant

125 Roosevelt to Armour, 10 March 1945. FRUS 1945, V, 667-668.


127 Churchill to Franco, 15 January 1945. PRO, FO 425/ 423/ 32642.

128 Despite no official change in policy, Truman personally was strongly opposed to the existence of the Franco regime, largely due to its attacks on Freemasonry, and Truman was a lifelong mason. See Edwards, Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question. 42-44. As for Attlee, he had supported ‘Arms for Spain’ during the Civil War, but only after initially defending the policy of non-intervention. See Kenneth Harris. Attlee (London, 1982) 127-128, 158.
economic inroads in Spanish telecommunications, automotive, mining and airfield industries, a 'veritable colonization' of the Spanish economy, according to one French observer.129 In October, 1945 the British Government’s Board of Trade concluded that the United Kingdom had led the way in resuming trade relations with Spain and that there remained ‘many opportunities’ for British manufacturers in the recovering Spanish market.130 Added to economic factors were military ones, such as the geostrategic importance of Spain to Mediterranean defence in any future European conflict, and thus the need for a friendly regime in case military planners needed to move forces to the area.131

The French Government acted no differently when making policy on Spain. Public criticism of the Franco regime was combined with quiet diplomacy which sought to place Franco-Spanish relations on a firmer footing following the end of the war. At San Francisco, France voted with the Anglo-Americans against Spanish entry into the United Nations. While at the United Nations conference, Georges Bidault met with two prominent Spanish Republican leaders affiliated with the Junta Española de Liberación, Idalecio Prieto and Diego Martínez Barrio. The Foreign Minister spoke of his support for their cause but refused

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them permission to base the political activities of the JEL in France. Meanwhile, as early as February 1945 Jean Chauvel, Secretary-General of the Quai d'Orsay, met the Spanish representative Sangroníz in Paris and communicated his belief that the future for relations between the two states was bright on both the commercial and political fronts. What Qasim Ahmad has written with reference to Great Britain applied equally to France in the early postwar period, for the policy of both states, and the United States, was a 'juxtaposition of a hostile statement with what seemed a friendly diplomatic gesture.'

Diplomatic amity resulted from a number of agreements reached between Republican France and Francoist Spain over the course of 1945. One of the most significant agreements reached was the decision of Spain, made in talks led by the United States, to force an end to Pierre Laval's exile in Spain. For the French, an extremely important event was the Spanish agreement to permit the transfer of some 60 000 French citizens in North Africa, organized by the French General Staff, across Spain to France in return for allowing 1500 Spaniards from Germany to cross French territory (some of whom were on the Chambéry train). In conjunction with Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, France negotiated the

132 Bidault was furious with Prieto and Martínez Barrio when they claimed to the press that the French Foreign Minister had said he recognized the legitimacy of the Republic in exile at the meeting. Bidault to French Embassies, Madrid and Mexico, 15 June 1945. AN 457 AP 100.

133 'Note Général' by Chauvel. 19 February 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.

134 Ahmad, 'Britain and the Isolation of Franco' in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds., Spain in an International Context, 220.

135 Filliol to Bidault, 6 April 1945; Truelle to Dejean, 14 April 1945; Coulet to Truelle, 11 May 1945. AN 457 AP 101.
retreat from Tangier of the Spanish Army and the restoration of that city to its previous international status.\textsuperscript{136}

The difficulty of each individual negotiation concerned French representatives in Madrid.\textsuperscript{137} Spanish reaction to the anti-Franco propaganda of the French press, and especially to the activities of Spanish Republican exiles, was highly critical of the French Government and at times implied that the French could not even govern their own territory. Spanish protests were effective tools in strengthening the Franco Government’s position in any negotiation with France. Protests on the part of the Spanish Foreign Ministry were not all for bargaining purposes, for Spanish Consul-Generals and their colleagues in France were legitimately scared of being attacked and even killed. In Pau, Spanish Consul-General German Burriel wrote that the situation was ‘frankly delicate’ because, while French authorities assured him of the rights Spain had to have a Consulate free to operate, they did little to protect the building and provide security for those inside.\textsuperscript{138} Local French authorities and FFI units were often implicated by the Spanish Government in failing to defend their consulates from occupation and attack, even if not sanctioning such actions. The Spanish Government stressed that this was not only a violation of international law, but evidence of a ‘policy of bad neighbourliness pursued by the French Government in its relations with

\textsuperscript{136} In this negotiation, held in Paris is August and September, 1945, the French and the British allied against the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in their support for granting Spain a continued role in the administration of Tangiers. See Note, ‘Participation de l’Espagne à l’administration international de Tanger’ by MAE Africa-Levant, 28 August 1945. MAE Série Nations Unies et Organisations internationales/ Secretariat des Conférences/ 1945-1949, 108.

\textsuperscript{137} Hardion to Paris, 21 September 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.

\textsuperscript{138} Burriel to Madrid, 8 February 1945. MAEE Archivo Renovado R 2154/ 8.
Spain.  

However, the Franco Government was well aware also that the situation inside France weakened the bargaining position of de Gaulle’s representatives, and thus gave Spain something of an advantage in negotiation despite the fact that the end of the war and the defeat of the Axis should have weakened Spain’s international position. In February, 1945 Truelle observed that the activity of Spanish Republicans, the attitude of the French press and the relative ease with which Franco was able to deal with the United States and Great Britain meant that, vis-a-vis France, Spain judged itself to be, ‘in [a] better position compared to the period immediately after the Liberation.’

The most typical Spanish protests were note verbales sent to the Quai d’Orsay or to the French Mission in Madrid when news of an attack on a Consulate came, or when press criticism of the Franco Government had been particularly harsh. At times, however, the Spanish Government pursued a more aggressive policy with France. The importance of trade to French policy-makers was all the leverage that Spain needed. While many of the Consulate occupations were resolved by December, 1944, in that month a group of Spanish Republican businessmen occupied the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Paris. They argued that the Chamber was not a government organization, but an association of Spanish businessmen in Paris, and thus that they and not the Franco Government ran the building. This provoked an

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140 Truelle to MAE Europe, 3 February 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.

141 Numerous examples can be found in MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 3.
immediate complaint from the Spanish Consulate in Paris (Embassy status had not yet been given) to the Quai d'Orsay. Police and Interior Ministry officials attempted to negotiate with those occupying the building, but by January 1945 there had been no resolution to the situation. At this point, the Spanish Government took its first aggressive step and threatened to close the French Chambers of Commerce in Madrid and in Barcelona: in the opinion of Jacques Truelle, the threat was entirely serious: 'if we wish to avoid grave consequences for commercial relations between our two states and the protection of significant French interests in Spain, we must rapidly find a solution to the situation in question....' This warning prompted Bidault to write directly to the Interior Minister, the Socialist Adrien Tixier, in order to expedite the evacuation of the building. The occupation eventually ended on 16 January 1945, but the French Government closed the building down rather than hand it over to Spanish officials, for they agreed with the Republican businessmen that the property was not owned by the Spanish Government.

When Spanish Republican businessmen proceeded to open a separate 'Republican Chamber of Commerce', the Spanish Government again acted, not only requesting that the Republican Chamber not be allowed to operate, but demanding that the original building be turned over to Spain so that its 'official' nature would once again be recognized and in order

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143 Truelle to MAE, 28 December 1944. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 5.

144 Bidault to Tixier, 6 January 1945. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 5.

that trade relations between the two countries not be interrupted. This warning was reiterated to Truelle in Madrid by the Spanish Foreign Ministry's Economics Officer, who underlined that while current French-Spanish agreements, such as the pyrite trade, would not be affected, the beginning of talks for a commercial treaty between France and Spain would be postponed until the Chamber of Commerce had Spanish-appointed officials in the building. Very shortly thereafter France conceded and the French Foreign Ministry gave the keys to the building to Spanish representatives in Paris.

The French made other arrangements with Spain. French officials made efforts to control the border as a first step in ending the crisis caused by Spanish Republican activity in southwestern France. In February 1945, on the orders of General de Gaulle, the French Government banned Spanish language newspapers from being printed inside France, a measure which forced the JEL exile group to produce their newspaper, L'Espagne Républicaine, in French. All of these acts were meant to make negotiations with Spain easier. The Quai d'Orsay persisted in their pursuit to reach long-term agreements with the Franco Government. They achieved what they had long sought from Spain with the signature


148 Jean Peyrade, Situation de la presse dans la région de Toulouse (20 aout 1944– 1er octobre 1947) (Paris, 1976) 25. In June, 1945, the new French Minister in Madrid Bernard Hardion (he replaced Jacques Truelle upon the latter's death) spoke to Bidault in Paris about the need to keep the exiled Spanish press shut down; he later met with Spanish Embassy chargé Tomás Suñer and reported that 50 tonnes of newsprint destined for Spanish clandestine publications had been seized by the French Government. Suñer to Madrid, 11 July 1945. MAEEArchivo Renovado, R 2223/5.
of the Franco-Spanish commercial treaty in September, 1945, an agreement which reaffirmed the processes and procedures of the 1940 trade accord between Franco and the Third Republic as the best way to organize Franco-Spanish trading relations for the future.\(^{149}\)

Maurice Dejean, who had been involved in the final negotiations, held that such arrangements with Spain did not ‘give any political advantage’ to the Francoist regime; instead, it was France that received economic and other advantages, and the French Government welcomed this, especially as the only other option was to ‘leave the field open to our competitors like Great Britain and the United States.’\(^{150}\) In short, competition further encouraged the unity of positions amongst the Western powers’ policies toward Spain.

Having set policy toward Spain in 1945 as one which paralleled that of its Allies, the Quai d’Orsay, however, could not neglect the need to reconcile that policy with the growing importance of anti-Franco sentiment within the French political arena. On one hand, Bidault and the Quai d’Orsay ignored the May and August 1945 resolutions of the National Assembly which called for a diplomatic break with Spain, and a Foreign Ministry official dismissed such proposals, stating to an American official that they were simply ‘electoral manoeuvres’ on the part of the Left and that France’s position remained unchanged: ‘it is

\(^{149}\) For a text of the agreement, see ‘Procès-verbaux de la Commission Mixte, Saint-Sebastian’, 15 September 1945 MAE Papiers d’Agents-Archives Privées (PAAP) Maurice Dejean. 62. See also Note on the Commercial Treaty, MAE Economic Affairs to Bidault, 10 January 1946. AN 457 AP 101.

\(^{150}\) Dejean to Bidault, 23 November 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.
preferable to continue the status quo.\textsuperscript{151} Publicly, Bidault sought to soothe anti-Franco sentiment by insisting that it was only the precarious position of France in the postwar world, not its lack of morality, that led it to seek ties to General Franco. This was an effort to appease domestic critics used by the Foreign Minister more than once. In 1944, he had argued that the French Government would do all it could to support, ‘and prepare’ for Spain’s postwar future: only the contingencies of wartime, he stated, required France to maintain relations with Franco.\textsuperscript{152} By June, 1945, Bidault had rephrased his argument to suggest that the needs of reconstruction demanded a Franco-Spanish relationship.\textsuperscript{153} Other members of Bidault’s \textit{Mouvement Républicain Populaire} (MRP) Party, like Maurice Schumann, agreed that France had little choice to do otherwise, given the weakness of the Spanish Republican movement and the benefits of trade.\textsuperscript{154}

Yet from the moment of the Liberation and the rise of Spanish Republican activism in southwestern France, Bidault, the French Government and the Foreign Ministry had been aware of the need to respond to anti-Francoist sentiment in a more meaningful way. There was no intent to respond to calls for an end to diplomatic relations with Spain. On the

\textsuperscript{151} Caffrey to Secretary of State, 4 August 1945. \textit{National Archives and Records Administration}, College Park, MD (hereafter \textit{NARA}) RG 59, State Department Central Files, 751.52/8-445. Similar information was given to the British Government following the passage of the Commission’s first motion in May, 1945. Minute by Derrick Hoyer-Millar, 28 May 1945. \textit{PRO} FO 371/ 49634/ Z6366.

\textsuperscript{152} Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 20 November, 1944. \textit{AN} Série C/ 15274.

\textsuperscript{153} Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 21 June 1945. \textit{AN} Série C/ 15274.

\textsuperscript{154} Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 19 January 1945. \textit{AN} Série C/ 15274.
contrary, making concessions to the anti-Francoist rhetoric of the Resistance was motivated primarily by the desire to limit protest to such a level as to allow the continuation of Franco-Spanish relations on a gradual path toward normalization. The situation that was created by the activities of Spanish Republicans and French activists in France, wrote French representative to Spain Jacques Truelle, ran the risk of compromising French economic and other advantages sought in Spain; he thus asked Paris to find ‘an acceptable modus vivendi’ with the anti-Francoists which would allow France and Spain to continue to resolve important differences and make economic and other arrangements. The activism of the Resistance constrained the Gaullist government and forced it to respond. Therefore, while diplomatic negotiations and arrangements proceeded and Assembly resolutions were ignored, a parallel policy of conciliation toward the Spanish exiles, the Resistance and the French Left was also implemented.

The Quai d’Orsay, in the immediate aftermath of Liberation, sought to dissuade Spanish refugees from supporting the guerilla activity of the UNE in order to preserve their desire for a beneficial Franco-Spanish relationship. The most important initiative in the attempt to reconcile Spanish exiles was the French Government’s pursuit of international protection and aid for Spanish refugees in France. In the midst of the Pyrenean crisis, October 1944, Bidault wrote to Interior Minister Adrien Tixier with the idea that the French

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155 Truelle to Chauvel, 1 March 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.

156 In one case, the Quai d’Orsay even provided an automobile to one Parisian-based member of the UNE, Julio Hernandez, who opposed plans for armed guerilla attacks on Spain. He was sent to Toulouse in an effort to moderate the views of his UNE colleagues. Note, 29 September 1944. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.
Government grant Spanish Republican refugees a statute of protection that would give them work status and aid inside France without raising protests from the Spanish government.\textsuperscript{157} Furthermore, Bidault’s plan included international protection for these refugees; with international support, the cost to the French Government would be minimal and the Spanish Government would have less ground on which to protest.

The sole mechanism for international protection of refugees that existed in 1944 and 1945 was the League of Nations, still (barely) alive. The 1920 and 1928 Geneva Accords on refugees had placed White Russian and Armenian refugees under the protection of the League of Nations. Within France, offices that distributed aid and identity papers were set up in France, and run by the League with some French Government input. In 1936, the system was extended to refugees from the Saar. These refugees were classified separately from others for their governments had refused, for political reasons, to recognize them as citizens. Thus without any form of national protection or identity, the League had to step in. They were commonly known as ‘Nansen’ refugees, after Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian who had established the League program. Bidault’s proposal for Spanish Republican refugees would establish a similar program run by the League’s High Commission on Refugees, with a committee composed of French Government representatives and representatives from various Spanish Republican groups. The High Commission on Refugees, and its Commissioner, Sir Herbert Emerson, required the approval of League’s Control Commission, which ran its affairs, in order to proceed. Its meetings had been suspended, however, and the League of Nations by 1944-1945 was a skeleton body being run out of the British Foreign Office. René

\textsuperscript{157} Bidault to Tixier, 16 October 1944. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.
Massigli, now the French Ambassador in London, would thus be in charge of getting the League, and the British, to agree to such a program.

The rationale for this strange proposition was purely political, for its intent was to defuse the simmering crisis with Spanish guerrilleros, answer the calls across France for recognition of the Spanish Republican cause and explain it all away to the Franco Government as simply a procedure required under the League’s refugee rules. Emerson stated that in making such a proposal, ‘the de Gaulle government was most anxious to avoid conflicts with the Franco Government, and it was thought that the measure now envisaged would facilitate the disarming of the Spanish refugees and their re-integration into the French economy.’\textsuperscript{158} The former President of the Spanish Republic, Juan Negrín, welcomed the French policy initiative not as an effort to end Republican activity, but as a way to encourage unity amongst various groups.\textsuperscript{159} Such an initiative not only responded to the activity of Spanish Republican exiles, but soothed French Resistance and leftist opinion which was stirred to anti-Franco activism in part due to feelings of debt toward these refugees. The British Ambassador in Paris, Alfred Duff Cooper, confirmed that, ‘de Gaulle has no wish to quarrel with the present Spanish administration but he has his own public opinion to consider.’\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{158} Emerson Minute, December 1944. Excerpted in Paul Mason Minute, 3 January 1945. PRO FO 371/51143/WR20.

\textsuperscript{159} For an account of Nansen refugees, see Michael Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1985) 51-121 and Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford, 1995) 102-122. For Negrín’s reaction, Massigli to Bidault, 12 December 1944. MAE, Série Z, Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.

\textsuperscript{160} Duff Cooper to London, 7 January 1945. PRO FO 371/51143/WR64.
The views of the British were not only important because they administered the League, but most of all because they funded it. Their fear was that Spain would protest the action of the League and the entire Spanish issue would explode internationally. Thus, they would only support the French initiative if France consulted with General Franco and received, in essence, his blessing.\textsuperscript{161} The French Government attempted to ensure the British that the Spanish Consulate had raised no fundamental objections to the plan when it was discussed by French and Spanish officials at the end of January, 1945.\textsuperscript{162} A memorandum concerning that meeting can be found in the archives of the Spanish Foreign Ministry. An official from the Quai d'Orsay told the Spanish diplomat Lojendio, that the French Government faced 'an internal security problem' in the form of Spanish refugees, sought to resolve the situation through the refugee statute as designed by the League, and wished no conflict with Spain.\textsuperscript{163} The British, however, were not convinced, and rejected the proposal in April 1945, stating 'we...have not been able to satisfy ourselves that the Spanish Government have formally disinterested themselves in the fate of these refugees.'\textsuperscript{164}

Even before the British rejection, another way to achieve the same ends had been suggested by the League of Nations Secretary-General, Kuhlmann. He recommended to

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\textsuperscript{161} Minute by Paul Mason, 9 January 1945, Memo by Mason 18 January 1945, Minute by Ian Hundew, 26 January 1945, Memos by Mason, 5, 15, 20 February 1945. PRO FO 371/51143/ WR 64/ 220/ 444/ 510/ 603.
\textsuperscript{162} MAE to Massigli, 22 February 1945. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.
\textsuperscript{163} Memo by Lojendio, 6 February 1945. MAEE, Archivo Renovado R 2223/ 9.
\end{flushright}
Massigli that France approach the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGC), a body of Allied states revived in 1943 primarily to deal with the refugee situation caused by the war in Eastern Europe. It was not only British opposition to use of the League that Kuhlmann feared. In addition, he believed that once Spanish refugees used the League then the Polish Lublin government or others would attempt to do the same and thus cause any number of international problems. In April, 1945, the British stated that on principle they did not oppose the IGC option, primarily because this money would be distributed through private charitable organizations already working with Spanish refugees in France (as they had been since the Civil War era). In June 1945 the French statute of March 1945 was given international status through the IGC.

The Spanish Government protested mildly after the French Government issued its decree, but no action against France was ever taken as a result of the refugee statute. Through the Office central des réfugiés espagnoles (OCRE), the refugee program would distribute roughly 200,000 francs per month amongst three organizations, and by February 1946 the Sûreté Nationale declared that the crisis atmosphere of the months after Liberation had passed and that 250,000 of the 304,000 Spanish refugees in France had to now be considered ‘apolitical’ or, at the very least, content to settle in France for the foreseeable future.

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165 Massigli to MAE, 7 February 1945. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 34.

166 Paul Mason Minutes, 5, 13, 18 April 1945. PRO FO 371/51143/WR891.

167 Mateu to Bidault, 25 April 1945. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 35. The French Statute prompted more than a protest from Mateu, for he encouraged his own government to respond not by protest, but rather by taking the initiative to put in place a comprehensive system for the repatriation of Spanish political exiles. Mateu to Madrid, 2 March 1945. MAEE Archivo Renovado R 22234/12.
A second aspect of conciliation also concerned Spanish Republicans. The question of France's obligation to those Spaniards who had helped liberate it was an important part of the domestic anti-Franco campaign. One of the most direct ways in which the French Resistance repaid the debt was through its involvement in the cases of Spanish Republicans who had been part of the French Resistance, had subsequently returned clandestinely to Spain, had been arrested and who were now facing death sentences there. The Comité France-Espagne, in fact, had been formed in Toulouse, in 1944, with one of its primary activities defined as pressuring French and Allied governments to do all they could in order to prevent executions of Spanish Republicans. Their President, Jean Cassou, often would organize public petitions signed by a number of influential personalities which opposed the imposition and execution of death sentences inside Spain and urged French and Allied intervention. As particular cases emerged other groups responded. For example, in September, 1945, FFI veterans Santiago Alvarez and Zapirain were given death sentences in Spain, and both SFIO and the Conseil National de la Résistance made requests to the Quai d'Orsay to intervene with the Franco government and demand commutation. The Quai agreed to these requests.

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168 Sûreté Nationale to MAE, 28 February 1946. MAE, Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 37. For an account of the OCRE, see Dreyfus-Armand, L'Exil, 186-190, 200-205.

169 La République du Sud Ouest, 8 December 1944. See also Comité France-Espagne in Agen to President Charles de Gaulle, 1 December 1945. AN Série F1A/ 3303 (extrait).

170 See, for example, the Toulousian resolution sent to President de Gaulle in April, 1945. La Voix du Midi 6 April 1945, La Victoire 10 April 1945. Editors from every newspaper in Toulouse signed this petition.

171 Le Populaire de Paris, 15 September 1945.
The first notable intervention sparked by public outcry, which was ultimately unsuccessful, came in April, 1945, in the case of José Vitini, a former FFI commander.  

However, by autumn, French interventions, often accompanied by Anglo-American ones as well, had considerable success in having death sentences for Spanish maquis commuting. The majority of French notes to Spain concerning prisoners were for Spanish citizens who had been involved militarily in the French Resistance during the Second World War. As of 9 January 1946, the Ministry had intervened with the Franco Government in at least 62 cases. The motives for such interventions were on one level humanitarian, triggered for Quai d’Orsay officials by the same sense of debt to Spanish fighters as articulated by the Resistance. Bidault himself met at least once with representatives of the Association France-Espagne to discuss cases, and called the question of Spanish Republican death sentences one of his Ministry’s ‘most passionate’ issues. However, on another level, the Quai also saw political advantage to such intervention in light of domestic criticism of its continued relations with the Franco regime. In short, it was argued that only political engagement with Spain, not an end to diplomatic relations, allowed French interventions to succeed.

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172 MAE to Hardion, 29 April 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 35.


which responded to the concerns of the Resistance.\footnote{In a February, 1946 document, the European Section argued that a rupture in diplomatic relations with Spain would prohibit French involvement in such interventions and thus further threaten the lives of those political prisoners facing execution. ‘Note: Consequences d’un rupture’, MAE Europe, 21. February 1946. \textit{MAE Série Z} / Europe 1944-1949 / Espagne, 67.} Conciliation, then, was a Quai strategy not only designed to deal with Spanish Republican refugees, but one which ultimately sought to deal with internal criticism of its approach to General Franco’s regime.

Despite efforts to appease domestic opinion and Spanish Republican exiles, the situation did not improve for the Government. Indeed, upon news of trade negotiations between France and Spain underway in San Sebastian in August, and with Spain prepared to join Allied talks on the international status of the city of Tangier, the press increasingly condemned France for acting as a willing participant in the Allied ‘double game’ with Spain: rhetorical condemnation but working relations.\footnote{\textit{Franc-Tireur}, 7 September 1945.} The British Embassy in Paris reported to London that the left wing press in France was ‘furious’ over the trade agreement.\footnote{Holman to London, 25 September 1945. \textit{PRO FO 371 / 49634 / Z11156}.} The Constituent Assembly election of 21 October 1945, which saw the position of the French Communist Party strengthen, created the impression amongst Spanish Republican exiles, their French allies, and the Spanish Government itself, that the pressure for an end to diplomatic relations with Spain would ultimately be answered.\footnote{Luis de Vinals, Spanish Consul Toulouse, to Madrid, 20 November 1945. \textit{MAEE Archivo Renovado R 2223 / 7}. This report noted that Toulouse’s Commissioner of the Republic, Pierre Bertaux, had called a press conference just after the election to state his belief that the installation of a Republican government in Spain was needed more than ever. A similar trend toward more intensity in the anti-Francoist campaign of the press and Resistance groups was observed by Spanish Consulates in Algeria and French Morocco. 19 September 1945 report}
told Spanish Foreign Minister Martín Artajo that anti-Spanish hostility in France could be overcome, but Artajo was pessimistic in light of French opinion. The French Government, recalled Jean Chauvel in his memoirs, could not escape the fact that 'the Spanish Civil War left its traces within French public opinion to the extent that any Spanish issue...reawakened strong and contradictory emotions.' The Resistance and the Left had pressed the Government and received some results, but they continued to argue that diplomatic rupture and sanction against Franco’s regime was the only policy a Republican regime in Paris could adopt toward Madrid.

In December, 1945, in a speech made at St. Etienne, covered only by his party’s newspaper, L’Aube, Foreign Minister Georges Bidault expressed his frustration at being unable to reconcile his Ministry’s realism toward Spain with the passion demonstrated by the French Resistance in support of their Spanish Republican comrades. The emotions which the Spanish issue aroused, said Bidault, were ‘useless’. He went on:

It cannot be believed that a few declarations in the press or some wishes more or less energetically formulated will suffice to change the state of affairs and obtain the results desired. What I want to say to you is that with this approach, permanent and at times vehement suspicion is directed on the government of the Republic...there are better things to do than light a fire under the trees in the hope of ripening the fruit more quickly.

The opinion of the foreign policy maker, however, had to co-exist with that of the politician.

marked ‘Secret’. MAEE R 2223/ 7.

180 Hardion to Paris, 7 November 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.


182 L’Aube 11 December 1945.
On the Spanish issue, Bidault was frustrated, but not yet finished, with his attempt to reconcile the opinions of the Quai d’Orsay and the nation.
Chapter 3

Reconciling Home and Abroad: The Quai d’Orsay and French Policy toward Spain, 1946

Since the Liberation of France in August, 1944, the question of diplomatic relations with Spain had grown in importance. Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and his advisers in the Quai d’Orsay were increasingly forced to defend their own desire to continue political and economic relations with the regime of General Francisco Franco. Their critics, from the press, the political parties and broader Resistance organizations, attacked France’s ‘realism’ as nothing more than a betrayal of the ‘new politics’ grounded in democracy and ideology that the Resistance experience had bequeathed to the emerging Fourth Republic. By the end of 1945, the importance of the Spanish question within the political realm, and particularly within the coalition government of General Charles de Gaulle, demanded action on the part of the Foreign Minister. In the year to come, Bidault would struggle to reconcile his and his Ministry’s desire to deal with Spain with the hopes of his critics that Franco could be removed with the help of France.

The political framework of post-war France required that policy be developed in light of French interests as defined not only by the Quai d’Orsay but by a coalition government, the spectrum of opinion within the Constituent National Assembly, the numerous pressure groups that had a keen interest in Spain and Spanish policy, and by the larger force of public opinion. Anti-Franco rhetoric, mass protests and border incidents involving Spanish guerilleros based in south-western France over the course of 1944-1945 had reinforced this fact. The October, 1945 elections strengthened those political parties most associated with an
aggressive anti-Spanish policy, notably the Communists. Indeed, the agreement between Charles De Gaulle, the Socialist SFIO, Communist PCF and Christian Democratic MRP of 21 November 1945 that formed the basis for a new 'government of national unity' included a clause guaranteeing a reconsideration of France's relations with Spain. Beyond the governing parties, other groups within the National Assembly had reason to re-open the file on Spain. In late November, Emmanuel d' Astier de la Vigérie of the Mouvement unifié de la Résistance (MUR) proposed a new discussion on the possibility of diplomatic rupture with Spain in light of the recent elections, the formation of a new coalition, and the fact that Foreign Minister Georges Bidault had ignored the earlier May and August Foreign Affairs Committee motions on the matter. By December, the Spanish question became a subject of discussion at the Council of Ministers.

It was evident that sooner or later, a policy on Spain that was more appealing to the parties and the Resistance would have to emerge. The question of Francisco Franco's Spain had played a direct role in the creation of the coalition government. The fragility of the governing coalition, and the prominence of various officials of the SFIO, PCF and MRP parties in the Spanish debate, reinforced that sense amongst foreign policy elites that action was needed before the issue threatened other aspects of the government policy.

1 Gerbet, Le relevement, 117.

2 Brundu, 'L'Espagne franquiste', 170; Reference to d' Astier de la Vigérie's initiative by Gilbert de Chambrun (who had supported it) in France. Journal Officiel de la République Française (hereafter JO), 16 January 1946.

In a series of analyses written in early December, 1945 by the European Section of the Quai d’Orsay, an effort was made to assess the relationship between the Provisional Government of the Republic and its authoritarian neighbour to the south. This exercise produced what was, in effect, a defense of the Quai’s policy to date. Since the Liberation, France had been content to ally itself with Great Britain and the United States in their approach to Spain’s government under General Francisco Franco. Like the Anglo-Americans, French officials acknowledged that the Franco regime was incompatible with the emerging democratic order in the west, and that the Generalissimo had clearly favoured the Axis powers for most of the war. For these reasons, France agreed with its western allies that the regime should be morally condemned and excluded from the United Nations. Despite the defeat of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, however, Franco remained in power, and was essentially unchallenged at home. Since the end of the war in Europe, the French Mission in Madrid, under Jacques Truelle and then Bernard Hardion, had renewed commercial relations with Spain, defended French citizens living in Spain, and intervened for the commutation of death sentences in the cases of numerous Spanish political prisoners, most notably those who had served in the French Resistance.\(^4\) As Britain and the United States were similarly pursuing political and economic advantage within Spain and rhetorical condemnation without, there was little reason for France to act differently.\(^5\) Therefore, ‘official’ France had consistently concluded that sanctions against the Franco regime, as demanded by many of the


Resistance organizations. would be meaningless. Within the French Foreign Ministry's European Section, its Economic Department and amongst French diplomats in Madrid, moreover. there remained a belief that continued diplomatic and economic relations with Spain were in the national interest.⁶

The dedication of the Madrid Mission and the European and Economic Sections of the Quai d'Orsay to the policy as outlined above, even in the face of what had been growing criticism since Liberation, made it impossible to consider a flip-flop on French policy toward Spain. Faced with the desire of the Council of Ministers to become involved in policy-making, officials at the Quai d'Orsay decided to engage in a very precise project which sought to balance their interests, as defined by the existing policy, with those expressed by the domestic political parties, their ministers and deputies, and the broader public. From the point of view of the European Section, a change to its position on Spain had to address three concerns. First, a new policy had to respond to the domestic antagonism towards the continuation of Franco in power, an antagonism that expressed itself through demands for a more aggressive policy than the current Allied moral condemnation of Spain. Second, it had to accept the fact that in order to encourage a change of regime, only a concerted western policy, in conjunction with Great Britain and the United States, had any chance of success.

As the Ministry's European section concluded, it was advisable 'not to risk the

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⁶ MAE Europe to Bidault, 3 December 1945. MAE. Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82. Indeed, the U.S. Embassy in Madrid received a report in September, 1945 from a 'dependable' source inside the Spanish Government that certain French officials had suggested that France's entire Spanish policy could be 'reoriented' toward greater cooperation if Spain turned to France instead of the United States for economic, industrial and technical assistance. Armour to Secretary of State, 13 September 1945. NARA, RG 59, State Department Central Files, 751.52/9-1345.
inconveniences of rupture since it could only have a decisive influence on the evolution of the situation in Spain if it was accompanied by a similar measure on the part of the United States and Great Britain.\(^7\) Third, and related to the second concern, the policy could not hurt France disproportionately as compared to its Anglo-American competitors in the Spanish economy. As Chauvel emphasized to American Ambassador Jefferson Caffrey, the Quai d'Orsay desired an outcome which reconciled domestic political exigencies and international realities.\(^8\)

So, on 12 December 1945, the French Foreign Ministry approached the British and American Embassies in Paris with a *Note verbale* which proposed opening a tripartite discussion on the possibility of a change of policy toward Spain. The French note to London and Washington emphasized the growing public dissatisfaction with Franco's actions and attitude during the war. Furthermore, it noted that such reaction was particularly strong in France. Yet at the same time, as the European sections's earlier analysis had stressed, Franco was in a fundamentally strong position, and the risk for France to act alone was great. The note, thus, proposed that only one avenue of action was open if the intention was in fact to topple Franco: a joint diplomatic rupture with Spain on the part of France, Great Britain and the United States. The French were willing to consider this or other options immediately, and requested a tripartite meeting of foreign ministers or high officials.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Note Generale, 1 December 1945. *MAE* Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 82.

\(^8\) Caffrey to Byrnes, 15 December 1945. *NARA* RG 59, State Department Central Files, 751.52/12-1545.

Commission of the Assembly, Georges Bidault reinforced the cautious tone of the French Note. 'The policy of the French government,' he said, 'is a bit of a policy of attentisme... It is from the French Government and myself that came the proposition of rupture with Franco. We will see what the other [powers] do.' An internal memo prepared for Bidault confirms that the French hopes were exactly as he expressed: the possibility of a rupture or other sanction was accepted, but only if the other western powers agreed: the note of 12 December, was therefore 'a polling' of France's allies.

The detail and extent of study that went into the Spanish question in December, 1945 provides the historian with a rare insight into the status of France in international politics and the direction of French foreign policy in the immediate postwar period. John Young has emphasized that under General de Gaulle, the quest for great power status, grandeur, often led French officials to overextend their diplomatic and other resources, thereby undermining other policy goals and revealing a profound French weakness. Yet, as William I. Hitchcock has argued, with reference to German policy in 1947, at their best French officials understood that a confession of their own limitations would result in a fair hearing from the United States and Great Britain, a hearing that could give French policy-makers an opportunity to influence

translation can be found in FRUS, 1945, V, 698-9.

10 Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 12 December 1945. AN Série C/15286.


12 Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 95.
decisions rather than be isolated from them.¹³ The course of policy-making on Spain in 1946, the pursuit of a policy balanced between the demands of domestic opinion and the realism of the Quai d’Orsay and France’s allies, was one such attempt to forge a creative policy out of constraints imposed from within.

In London, and especially in Washington, it seemed that domestic criticism of the emerging Western policy on Spain existed as it did in France. The end of 1945 thus appeared a promising time for the French Note verbale to arrive. Organizations such as the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee and Friends of the Spanish Republic, trade union confederations like the AFL-CIO, and periodicals like Nation were all active in promoting the cause of Spanish Republicanism.¹⁴ In an article published in France in August, British Labour Party Chairman Harold Laski wrote that Labour was committed to ending Franco’s rule in Spain, even though British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in Parliament repeated the traditional British warning against intervention.¹⁵ Similarly in the United States, anti-Francoist sentiments were prominent among elected officials such as Congressman John Coffee of Washington.¹⁶ Most significantly, there were signs from the United States that the State Department was fundamentally dissatisfied with the current situation of ‘non-intervention’. Officials were reported to be engaged in a debate about how best to proceed in order to

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¹³ Hitchcock, France Restored, 80-81.

¹⁴ Portero, Franco aislado, 128-132.

¹⁵ Bullock, Ernest Bevin, 163.

¹⁶ Portero, Franco aislado, 128.
encourage a change in regime. Twice in the last quarter of 1945, there were reports from both French and British sources that the United States was considering delivering an ultimatum to Franco. Indeed, in Madrid, retiring U.S. Ambassador Norman Armour met with Foreign Minister Martín Artajo and spoke of ways to force Franco’s resignation to a military or civilian junta. Suggestions of a growing distance between the United States and the Franco regime were further developed on 8 December 1945, when the U.S. confirmed that it would replace Armour with a representative at the rank of Chargé d’Affaires. The downgrade in rank of the Madrid appointment implied a less than normal diplomatic relationship, and one which was deteriorating.

The French initiative of 12 December thus drew upon what seemed to be a growing international and domestic consensus that action had to be taken against Franco and his regime. Rumours of all sorts flew around the Embassies of Madrid, including one which suggested that that the Spanish issue could be raised at the upcoming Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) meeting in Moscow. James Dunn of the State Department’s European division was initially in favour of considering the possibility of a diplomatic breach, although British Chargé d’Affaires Douglas Howard told Bernard Hardion in Madrid that the British,

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17 Mallet to Foreign Office, 6 October 1945. DBPO, Series I, V, 13ii(c).
19 Armour to State Department, 1 December 1945. FRUS 1945, V, 695-697.
20 Bonnet to MAE, 8 December 1945. MAE Série Z/Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 80.
while critical of France, still believed in a ‘policy of presence’ in Spain.22 These reactions conformed to recent precedent, and the context of inter-alliance debate was one in which Quai officials were content to work. They did not consider anti-Francoism to be a vital part of the construction of postwar French international policy. For them, the issue of diplomatic rupture or sanction against Spain was solely one which could be pursued within the confines of the Anglo-American-French relationship. Not surprisingly, this was not the interpretation of many within France who had been involved in the Spanish question for some time. Communist and Socialist members of the government who had promoted a more aggressive policy interpreted the origins of the French initiative differently, and saw the 12 December note as a demonstration of France’s unique role as a western leader, autonomous from the Anglo-Americans.23 Within the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly, a motion was passed on 19 December that encouraged the French Government to ‘prepare and realize’ its own diplomatic rupture, regardless of the Allied response.24 Jean Chauvel, for one, felt that if any risk was inherent in the Quai’s strategy, it was not that France would abandon its Allies over Spain because of different priorities, but rather that domestic and party opinion inside France would not diminish in its expression of anti-Francoist attitudes and could in turn reject the Quai’s pursuit of a balance between internal politics and external

22 For Dunn’s response, Bonnet to MAE, 19 December 1945. For Howard’s, Hardion to MAE, 15 December 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 66.


alliance. The Foreign Affairs Commission motion suggested that this could be the case. Albert Camus expressed his opinion that it was not a time for the 'realists' to reign, but rather that France, aligned with Spanish Republicans, had a task to 'show to the Americans especially, to the English and to all other realists of any country that the only order in Spain is...the Republican order.' When the Foreign Ministry continued economic trade with Spain, and then refused an entry visa to Republican Government-in-exile leader José Giral, the Resistance and party press was left to ask, 'What game is the Quai d'Orsay playing?' Only in more moderate papers such as Le Monde and Le Figaro, and in the MRP's own paper, l'Aube, was there cautious support for the Government, and a belief that Anglo-American support was necessary; in other words, support for the French proposal exactly as Bidault cast it.

The sense that France finally would act, and that France could act with or without its western Allies, also permeated the Spanish Republican exile community. One of Giral's ministers in France, Nicolau d'Olwer, stated that the anti-Franco campaign of newspapers like Franc-Tireur had been largely responsible for the Government action, and he concluded that the Spanish people were now counting on France to follow through with its threat of

25 Chauvel's fear of domestic opinion is cited in Dulphy, 'La politique de la France', 125.

26 L'Espagne Républicaine, 29 December 1945.

27 Franc-Tireur, 5 January 1946. See also Le Populaire de Paris, 4 January 1946 for criticism of economic relations, in particular the shipment of potatoes to Spain.

28 For example, L'Aube, 18 December 1945. For the 'realist' attitude of Le Figaro and Le Monde, see Antonio Bechelloni, 'Italiens et Espagnols dans la presse française de septembre 1944 à décembre 1946' in Milza and Peschanski, eds. Exils et Migrations, 290.
The Spanish Socialists (PSOE) also welcomed the government initiative, and attributed it to the Socialist and Communist gains in the October elections. Furthermore, the PSOE urged its members inside France to press their local and Departmental SFIO sections to ensure that the French Government would move forward and ultimately break diplomatic relations with Franco.

British and American responses to the French note of 12 December 1945 were in line with France's initial impressions and again conformed to precedent. The British Foreign Office was quite content with the current policy of rhetorical condemnation and political non-intervention, and opposed the idea of consultation as suggested by France. Non-intervention had the support of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who in August, 1945 spoke in the House of Commons about his dislike of the Franco regime while reaffirming his and his Government's desire to avoid renewed civil war in Spain. British policy rejected any sort of military, political or economic sanction. Despite agitation by Harold Laski and others on the Labour Left, and despite Prime Minister Clement Attlee's own anti-Francoist views, held during the Civil War and after, the Cabinet supported the position of Bevin and his Foreign Office advisors. For example, in October, 1945, the Cabinet agreed to support Bevin's recommendation to ban only the trade of weapons and semi-military equipment with Spain.

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29 *Franc-Tireur*, 18 December 1945.


32 For Attlee's views, see Portero, 'Spain, Britain and the Cold War' in Balfour and Preston, eds., *Spain and the Great Powers*, 211-218.
and not enforce a broader ban on all equipment which could later be converted to military use.\textsuperscript{33} Douglas Howard of the British Embassy in Madrid, approached French representative Bernard Hardion and stated that the issue was not one of replacing Franco but rather one of altering the regime and its political system to conform more closely with Western ideas.\textsuperscript{34}

The fear of renewed civil war in Spain, and the potential for a Communist victory and thus Soviet influence over the western Mediterranean, dominated British thinking and coloured British reaction to the French note. Ambassador Sir Victor Mallet wrote on 3 December 1945 that while it was 'idiotic to attempt to prophesy exactly how and when Franco will disappear' it was clear that 'no new regime wants to be born of a fresh insurrection and blood bath.' He continued, ‘There has been enough killing for one generation, even in bloodthirsty Spain; and thus it is that fear of this operates so strongly in favour of not disturbing the dreary status quo.'\textsuperscript{35} As 1945 came to an end, the left-wing of the Labour Party continued to hound Bevin about Spain, but he and the Foreign Office remained confident that British Mediterranean interests required tolerance, if not overt support, for the current regime, in order to maintain a regional balance of power and continued peace.\textsuperscript{36}

In their response to the French note, the British underlined that they were not convinced that rupture would lead to a replacement of Franco by a 'solid, representative and


\textsuperscript{34} Hardion to MAE, Direction d'Europe, 15 December 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 66.

\textsuperscript{35} Mallet to Bevin, 3 December 1945. PRO, FO 425/423 34176.

\textsuperscript{36} Bullock, Ernest Bevin, 164.
stable regime’. In fact, they argued that there was a ‘serious danger that civil disorder would then break out in Spain, in view of the absence of any alternative administration which could at once assume power’. Worse, the British feared that the bulk of the moderate Spanish population, fearful of renewed civil war, would rally behind Franco. The Foreign Office believed that the course towards evolution should be allowed to ‘develop spontaneously without external interference.’ For this reason, the British rejected Bidault’s suggestion for a consultation among the three Western allies and preferred to continue as things were.

The United States was more receptive to the French idea of holding a discussion among the three powers. While the State Department continued to share the concerns of the British regarding a renewal of civil conflict in Spain, they also believed that the West could move beyond the current policy of moral condemnation. The French proposal for a meeting of high officials to discuss the Spanish question gave United States policy-makers an opportunity to consider their options. The fact that United States policy toward Franco’s Spain was in flux before the arrival of the French note was evident with the decision by Washington not to replace its Ambassador in Madrid with another official of equivalent status. In the aftermath of receiving the French note, evidence that the American government was willing to seriously consider moving in the general direction which the French proposed was provided by Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, who informed the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, Francisco de Cárdenas, of the following:

37 Attlee to Duff Cooper, 21 December 1945. DBPO Series I, V, 104.

38 Portero, ‘Spain, Britain and the Cold War’ in Balfour and Preston, eds., Spain and the Great Powers, 218.
...official relations between the two Governments were bad, and as they were becoming increasingly worse and were not even remaining in the same state but deteriorating progressively, I saw no other outcome of such a progressive deterioration than the final rupture of diplomatic relations....

Again, on 20 December 1945, Dunn told Fernando de los Ríos, the Foreign Minister of the Spanish Republican Government-in-exile, that the United States welcomed the French initiative and that the U.S. was prepared to discuss 'every aspect' of the question with France and Great Britain, including the possibility of diplomatic rupture.

The central American position on the Spanish question, as originally articulated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in March, 1945, had relied on the politics of pressure, not direct intervention. However, it did not dismiss the possibility of sanctions of some sort against the regime and, under President Truman, this approach remained predominant. In response to the French note of 12 December, the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Jefferson Caffrey, was instructed to emphasize that the American policy was, for the moment, consistent with Roosevelt’s letter to Armour and that the U.S. welcomed tripartite consultations amongst the Western Allies as those, ‘most directly interested’ in Spain.

While there was no question of military intervention, the elements of what constituted ostracism were under debate within the State Department.

The United States was equally aware, however, of the need to coordinate its action

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41 Acheson to Caffrey, 22 December 1945. FRUS 1945, V, 706-707.
with the British before any meeting with the French occurred. Coordination had been the basis of both American and British policy-making on Spain since 1940, and this was not about to change. Aware of the British hesitation regarding any new approach to Spain, John Hickerson of the State Department’s Office of European Affairs informed British Ambassador in Washington Lord Halifax that the United States did not, in fact, contemplate diplomatic rupture with Spain, but did seek a tripartite meeting, if only to coordinate policy and ensure that the French Government ‘did not jump guns’.42 At the same time, cognizance of British opposition to France’s proposed meeting did not mean that the U.S. was prepared to stand pat. For instance, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, who was given the task of working out with the British a common position vis-a-vis France, was a firm believer in extending Roosevelt’s policy to include more coercive measures against Spain, possibly including sanctions of some sort. The Undersecretary of State sought to manage the transition to a more ‘positive’, or aggressive policy on Spain that went beyond rhetorical condemnation but stayed within the bounds on non-intervention.43

On 18 January 1946, Acheson met with British Embassy official John Balfour in Washington to discuss the issue of coordination. He stressed that the French initiative, combined with the support it had received in the French press and public opinion, ‘reinforced the thesis which he himself entertained, that it now devolved upon our three governments, if possible acting in concert, to have made some positive new movement in relation to the


43 Halifax to Foreign Office, 19 January 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 18i. Halifax reported that Acheson’s position was in contrast to his subordinates in the Office of European Affairs, John Hickerson and Paul Culbertson, who agreed with the British viewpoint.
Spanish problem." Balfour expressed the British belief that things in Spain should be left to develop on their own, and that therefore no meeting of the three Western powers should occur. If views had to be exchanged, they should be done through diplomatic channels only. Acheson disagreed, for he ‘did not feel that we could go on indefinitely with mere statements of our dislike for Franco but that we would be obliged to take some action.’ He proposed a meeting of the three foreign ministers that would result in a statement on Spain. Such a statement would repeat the moral condemnation of General Franco’s regime, as the earlier San Francisco and Potsdam declarations had, but might also encourage the Spanish people to take measures themselves for change. Acheson concluded by stating that such a step would ‘give heart’ to opposition elements within Spain; would meet the demands of growing pressure for action on Spain from pressure groups within the United States; and would help move the French Government away from a formal rupture of diplomatic relations while addressing the similar concerns of public opinion there. The question of sanctions did not even arise, as Acheson was searching for a workable policy, not merely an aggressive one.

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44 Halifax to Foreign Office, 19 January 1946. DBPO, Series I, VII, 18i.

45 Acheson to Byrnes, 18 January 1946. FRUS 1946, V, 1030-1031.

46 Halifax to Foreign Office, 19 January 1946. DBPO, Series I, VII, 18i.

47 Portero argues that only British pressure held back the United States from agreeing to France’s proposal to discuss diplomatic rupture. Portero, ‘Spain, Britain and the Cold War’ in Balfour and Preston, eds., Spain and the Great Powers, 218. Edwards agrees that the British felt the need to restrain both the French and the Americans. Edwards, Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 65. Indeed, as the December, 1945 Conference of Foreign Ministers approached, even the Soviet Union believed that the United States ‘was increasingly hostile’ toward Franco and was considering possible policy changes. Swain, ‘Stalin and Spain’ in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds., Spain in an International Context, 252.
The Acheson proposal foreshadowed the March 1946 Tripartite Statement on Spain, although, as will be seen, this document did not achieve the results he envisaged.

Acheson's concern with French opinion, as expressed to Balfour, came only a day after the conclusion of a remarkable three-day debate in the French Constituent Assembly which clearly revealed the current atmosphere of the French political arena with regard to Spain. The motion under discussion in the Assembly emerged from the all-party Commission on Foreign Affairs. It congratulated the Government on the December initiative and called for a break of diplomatic relations with Francoist Spain. The leading speakers for each of the main political movements - Daniel Mayer (SFIO), André Marty (PCF), Gilbert de Chambrun (Resistance parties) and Charles D'Aragon (MRP) - all had proven records of support for the Spanish Republican cause.48

Daniel Mayer opened the debate on Spain for the Socialist Party, and argued that France should take further initiative on the Spanish question and give asylum to Spanish democrats.49 André Marty reviewed Franco's position during the Second World War, spoke of the continued tolerance for former Nazis and Vichy collaborators living in Spain, and complained about the constant presence inside France of Francoist spies. Casting his argument as one of French national security, Marty stated, 'It is clear that Franco, enemy of France before the war, during the war and after the war, remains and will remain the enemy

48 Indeed, Chambrun and d'Aragon were leading members of the Association France-Espagne's parliamentary caucus. 'Terreur Sur l'Espagne' Report of the Association France-Espagne, 8 June 1947. Institut Français d'Histoire Sociale, Paris, Fonds Lamberet, 14 AS 599 (38).

49 JQ, 15 January 1946.
of France, both him and his regime.' He then concluded with a challenge, for he asked how France should treat such an enemy. In answer to his own question, Marty criticized earlier inaction and the French-Spanish commercial treaty of September 1945, but welcomed the Government's December initiative and urged France to continue to lead on the Spanish issue by ending diplomatic and commercial relations with Francoist Spain. Fellow Communist deputy Jacques Duclos echoed Marty's comments and criticism. He called on France to live up to its democratic heritage, and attacked Bidault's approach to date, stating that the Spanish issue was the Foreign Minister's 'worst file' ('C'est la pire des choses dans votre métier'). He concluded with his hope that the motion on the floor brought with it an opportunity for change. Only Georges Bidault's own party, the Christian Democratic MRP, offered a straightforward defense of the Foreign Ministry's approach. Deputy Charles D'Aragon began his speech by casting the Government's note to the United States and Great Britain as a direct consequence of the unanimous motion of the Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission that called for rupture. He cast Bidault as a leader of French opinion against Spain, conveniently overlooking the fact that Bidault had felt confident enough to ignore such motions in May and August 1945. The sole dissent against action on the Spanish issue came from Jules Ramarony and Andre Mutter of the right-wing Parti Républicain de la Liberté (PRL).

50 JO, 16 January 1946.

51 JO, 17 January 1946.

52 Mutter expressed his position by simply stating, 'We are not in Spain.' JO, 17 January 1946. In the 1930s, Mutter had been a member of Colonel de la Roque's Parti Social Français but had been a major figure amongst right-wingers in the Resistance. For more on Mutter and the PRL, see Joseph Algazy, La tentation néo-fasciste en France, 1944-1965 (Paris, 1984) 67 and especially Richard Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 1945-1951 (Cambridge, 1995) 116-121.
The debate in the Constituent National Assembly seemed to give credence to the Quai’s fears that pressure for a more confrontational policy toward General Franco might endanger its efforts to pursue a balanced policy which took account of both public and alliance opinion. While all speakers praised the Government’s initiative of 12 December 1945, they also attacked Georges Bidault and the French Foreign Ministry for their attempts in 1945 to maintain a relationship with the Spanish Government. Resistance deputy Gilbert de Chambrun was typical, for he criticized the Quai d’Orsay for not taking any action prior to December, especially as in the course of various election campaigns the majority of members in the Assembly had been moved by public opinion to take a stand against Franco. He went on to criticize the very bases of Western policy thus far—the fear of renewed disorder within Spain, the fear of division amongst anti-Franco Spaniards, and the fear that Franco would benefit from defending his country against external intervention. It was clear, concluded de Chambrun, that only by taking ‘principled positions with perfect confidence that our country can recover its radiance in the world and the means of French grandeur to which we attach great importance...and it is through this that our country can permit the great Spanish nation to reclaim the course to its proper destiny, one that conforms with the interests of France and of humanity.’

Gilbert de Chambrun’s speech reinforced the tone of the debate that the Spanish question had taken since Liberation in August, 1944. What was at stake was nothing less than the construction of French international policy, the idea of the French state in the world, in

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53 JO, 16 January 1946.

54 JO, 16 January 1946.
the aftermath of conquest, occupation, resistance, invasion and liberation. De Chambrun and his colleagues from the Resistance and the Left saw grandeur for France not as a partner among Great Power dealmakers, but as state which rejected the ‘realism’ of the emerging international order in favour of a policy based on ideals. Charles de Gaulle and his Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, saw themselves as seeking international status in 1945 for a weakened yet important power. In conjunction with the United States and Great Britain, France had the possibility of influencing the course of western policy. Yet in order to influence, one had to be at the table. The French Note of December, 1945 was an attempt by Bidault to appease domestic critics while at the same time maintaining a common allied position on Spain. In actual fact, it provoked an even greater intensity of debate within France concerning Francoist Spain.

The French Government did realize some victories of its own in the parliamentary debate. Despite rampant criticism of Bidault’s Spanish policy, and an emerging consensus that France should act on its own, the French Government had won a significant victory prior to the debate that reinforced the direction of its ongoing policy discussions with Great Britain and the United States. The motion on the floor had developed from Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigée’s proposal in the Foreign Affairs Commission which had called upon the Government to ‘prepare and carry out’ a break in diplomatic relations with Spain. The implication of d’Astier’s initial motion was clear- the Commission was in fact calling for action on the part of France regardless of what came of discussions with the other western allies. Thus, France might have to break off relations with Spain unilaterally if the motion were carried. This outcome would be entirely unpalatable to the Quai d’Orsay, whose policy
was, above all, based on coordination with the Allies and balance between domestic and alliance concerns. The Council of Ministers, in January, 1946, supported the Quai's position. Most significant in their support were the Communist ministers. In fact, they had played a key role in managing the Assembly debate by using their parliamentary power to moderate the phrasing of the motion under debate. Within the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly, the original motion called for France to 'prepare and carry out the severance of diplomatic relations' with Franco's Spain. By the time the motion appeared on the floor of the Assembly, it resolved that France only 'prepare' for a diplomatic rupture. Bidault was able, for a time at least, to separate the Communist ministers from the rhetoric of their supporters, and their party propaganda. The issue of Spain was not yet so important as to risk the break-up of the coalition government; on that point, Bidault and the other Council ministers agreed.

Bidault spoke to the motion on 17 January. To great applause, he stated that France would not forget Franco's attitude during the Civil War and World War; that France was indebted to the many Spanish Republican exiles who had fought for its liberation; and that the Government, the Assembly and the nation were united in the effort to see the Spanish people again free. However, he quickly moved on, justifying the approach of the Foreign Ministry to date. He believed that he and his advisors had gone a long way toward compromise with the parties and public opinion through their note, and desired an acknowledgment, on the part of the Assembly, that they accepted this. He claimed that

55 Caffrey to Byrnes, 18 January 1946. NARA RG 59, State Department Central Files, 751.52/1-1846.
France, through its note to Washington and London, had gone further than any other country in pressing the Spanish issue in accordance with the rhetoric of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. Yet he argued against going further still without Allied support and participation; an isolated action, he claimed, would not lead to significant change in Spain and would, in fact, go against the spirit of Yalta Declaration which had specifically called for joint Allied action.\footnote{\textit{JO}, 17 January 1946.} This was, in essence, an articulation of the Quai d’Orsay’s reasoning for the December initiative, and for a policy based on reconciling the power of domestic emotion with the requirements of France’s international situation and alliance obligations. Georges Bidault concluded with an earnest and emphatic plea: ‘Give me a good domestic politics, and I will give you a good foreign policy.’\footnote{\textit{JO}, 17 January 1946.}

The Constituent National Assembly later that day, 17 January 1946, unanimously passed a motion congratulating the Government on its December note to the United States and Great Britain and asking the Government to ‘prepare for’ the rupture of diplomatic relations with Franco’s Spain.\footnote{\textit{JO}, 17 January 1946.} Foreign Ministry officials in Paris were pleased that the Assembly did not yet force France to break off diplomatic relations with Spain on its own; the Government could ‘prepare’ for rupture through continued consultation with the United States and Great Britain. Quai d’Orsay officials were quick to point out to the U.S. Embassy that France’s policy had not changed. France, they maintained, continued to seek a tripartite solution. They emphasized that even the French Communist Party understood this policy and

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\footnote{\textit{JO}, 17 January 1946.}

\footnote{\textit{JO}, 17 January 1946.}

\footnote{\textit{JO}, 17 January 1946.}
they did not foresee any change in party tactics that would cause Communist deputies to exert immediate pressure upon Bidault or the Council of Ministers for a change. In the United Nations General Assembly a few days later, Bidault demonstrated exactly that point by voting, alongside his Western allies, for a declaration which reiterated the San Francisco ban on Spanish membership in the United Nations, and called upon member states to take the spirit of this action into consideration when formulating policy toward Spain. In his speech to the General Assembly, Bidault would only concede that French policy was different from that of its Allies to the extent that the existence of the Franco dictatorship in Spain was a ‘matter of deeper and keener regret for France’ than for any other state.

Evidence was abundant, however, that the optimism of Quai d’Orsay officials was misplaced. While it was true that Communist ministers within the Government had accepted Bidault’s compromise plan since December, the expansion of the anti-Franco campaign in the press and amongst the public since the French note suggested that the issue of relations with the Generalísimo was not going to become a simple one any time soon. In its coverage of the parliamentary debate, the Socialist newspaper *Le Populaire de Paris* editorialized that France need not concern itself with Great Power alignment, but rather that it should align itself with ‘its great liberal and democratic traditions and the thought of these most noble sentiments.’ Moreover, the Communist daily *L’Humanité* had been running a series of articles in the

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59 Caffrey to Washington, 5 February 1946. NARA RG 59, State Department Central Files, 751.52/2-546.


weeks leading up to the debate concerning the implementation of the Franco-Spanish commercial treaty, providing readers with frequent reports about potato deliveries to Spain.\(^{62}\) Only Bidault’s own party paper, *l’Aube*, defended the Minister’s ‘excellent formula’ of not mixing internal and foreign policy.\(^{63}\)

In his speech 17 January, Bidault could not limit his comments to a mere defense of the Foreign Ministry’s note to Great Britain and the United States. Specifically referring to Communist criticism of the Government’s trade agreement with Spain, he defended the latter instrument, claiming it to be a continuation of pre-war agreements, and a necessary part of France’s own reconstruction. Furthermore, he went into detail about potato and other deliveries made to Spain. This only prompted shouts and jeers from the Communist benches.\(^{64}\) While PCF Ministers supported the Government initiative on Spain, clearly there was support within the party for a more aggressive policy. Bidault’s comments implied that a policy based on emotion and ideology alone was not a choice preferred by his Ministry, which felt confident following the Assembly debate. However, the response to his speech, and the general strength of the anti-Franco campaign in the press, foreshadowed the potential which emotion and ideology had concerning the Spanish question.

There were fears that the French Constituent National Assembly’s motion would not help the Allies in Madrid. British Ambassador Sir Victor Mallet complained to Bernard Hardion that the strength of support for the motion could only produce a ‘stiffening’ of


\(^{63}\) *L’Aube*, 18 January 1946.

\(^{64}\) IO 17 January 1946.
Francoism within Spain, not any political liberalization. Whether the population regarded the French motion as another expression of historic French anti-Spanish sentiment or as a Communist-inspired attack on Spain, Mallet claimed the result would be growing support for Franco as a defender of the nation. Of greater concern, however, were Allied fears of what might occur in France. An observer of the Assembly debate, U.S. Embassy official Gordon Wright, noted that Bidault’s comments on trade with Spain were received ‘coolly’ by the Communists and Socialists. From the Foreign Office in London, R. Sloan recorded on 24 January that the very fact that all political parties in France seemed to agree on the need for a harder line on Spain meant that the outlook for future policy was ‘dangerous.’

Indeed, events soon conspired against the carefully calculated approach of the Foreign Minister. French public and party opinion simply was not as patient as the Quai d’Orsay and the Minister would have liked. Although the French Assembly had passed a motion which supported the government’s policy, pressure from the Left, Spanish Republicans and others only intensified from the end of January and into the month of February, 1946. The resignation of Charles de Gaulle from the head of the French Government on 20 January 1946 complicated matters and his government gave way to a coalition government of the MRP, PCF and SFIO under Socialist Félix Gouin. The issue of Franco Spain’s played a direct

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66 Mallet to Foreign Office, 21 January 1946. PRO FO 371/ 60349/ Z666.

67 Wright to Office of European Affairs, 19 January 1946. NARA RG 59 State Department Central Files: France, 751.00/1-1946.

68 Sloan Minute, 24 January 1946. PRO FO 371/ 60421/ z698.
role in the formation of this government, as the accord of the three parties clearly stated their intention to implement the resolutions of the National Assembly on Spain hitherto ignored by the Quai d'Orsay, resolutions which called for an end to diplomatic relations. The noted historian of the Fourth Republic Georgette Elgey highlights the significance of the coalition accord for France's foreign policy, for instead of analyzing issues in light of international realism, they were now conceived of in terms of 'moral engagements'. The question of relations with an ideologically semi-fascist Spain was primary in any such principled reformulation of diplomatic priorities. Moreover, the Spanish Socialist trade union confederation in exile, the UGT, took advantage of the change in government and approached the umbrella group for French labour, the Communist-dominated Conféderation Generale de Travail (CGT), on 25 January 1946. The UGT requested a renewed effort on the part of the CGT to work for a French break in diplomatic relations with Franco’s Spain, which the CGT

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69 This aspect of the accord was given great publicity in the Communist press, especially in Toulouse and the southwest, where it was reported that the agreement called for the implementation of all measures already passed by the Constituent National Assembly and not yet enforced, ‘notably those relative to relations with the Government of Franco.’ Le Voix du Midi, 25 January 1946. See also Jacques Dalloz, Georges Bidault: Biographie Politique (Paris, 1992) 129. The new government saw an increase in Communist ministers from 5 to 6, almost saw the exit of the MRP from the tripartite coalition, and coincided with a deeply divisive debate within SFIO about whether or not the party should move away from the MRP and become closer to the Communist Party. See B.D. Graham, Choice and Democratic Order: The French Socialist Party, 1937-1950 (Cambridge, 1994) 287-314.

70 Elgey, La République des Illusions, 106. It is interesting to note that at the time, the lack of French action on previous motions seemed to give assurance to many outside France that this agreement would not alter French policy. Commenting on the three-party statement on Spain, the Paris correspondent of The Times wrote that it was ‘a threat many expect will not be carried out.’ The Times, 25 January 1946.
agreed to do, in addition to aiding the clandestine efforts of the UGT inside Spain.\textsuperscript{71}

The fear that the proposed meeting of Western powers would not arrive in time to appease the French parties increasingly worried Georges Bidault after the departure of Charles de Gaulle. Bidault told the British Foreign Secretary on 1 February that domestic pressure could force France to unilaterally break off relations with Spain at any time. France's Spanish policy, he told Bevin, was predicated on the hope that a coordinated tripartite gesture would assuage the 'impatience' of the French people for unilateral action, and he asked for a positive sign from Britain that a meeting of the three Western allies could be held soon.\textsuperscript{72} Officials in the Spanish Government told American officials that an increased role for parties of the left in the new French Government concerned them, but that they hoped Bidault's continued presence would temper in practice the anti-Francoism of those who called for a formal break.\textsuperscript{73}

It was not the General's departure, however, that emboldened the French Left and Centre to demand more from Bidault. Rather, it was the death sentence imposed by Spain on 12 captured Spanish guerilla leaders, one of whom was Cristino García, who had played a major role in the French Resistance. García was a veteran of the Republican side in the

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textit{Le Voix du Midi}, 26 January 1946.
\item Butterworth to Washington, 30 January 1946. \textit{NARA RG 59 State Department Central Files}, 751.52/1-3046.
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Spanish Civil War who had joined the *Mouvement d'Ouvriers Immigrés* (MOI), a section of the French Communist resistance organization *Francs Tireurs et Partisans* (FTP) during World War II. He soon rose to become a commander of a group of Spanish partisans (*guerrilleros*) in the Departments of the Gard, Lozère and the Ardeche, and organized a major prison break in Nîmes in February 1944. At the moment of French Liberation, he was named a commander of the * Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur* (FFI). From there, García quickly moved to join Spanish *guerrilleros* in France making clandestine border-crossings into Spain. It was on one of these missions, while allegedly robbing a bank in Madrid, that García was arrested. His death sentence, imposed at the end of January 1946, was met with a public outcry inside France. Both the *Association France-Espagne* and the Young Socialists of the Gard brought the García case to the attention of the Foreign Ministry, which intervened in Madrid on more than one occasion seeking commutation of the death sentence imposed by the Spanish courts. García was not the first Spaniard with FFI ties to be executed in Spain despite French intervention. In the growing anti-Franco mood of the French Assembly and public, however, his execution on 21 February 1946 was a catalyst for an outpouring of public opinion that made the Spanish issue, arguably, the most important in France for a number of weeks.

The García case first came to the public’s attention due primarily to the efforts of the Communist Party, for Garcia was a member of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). The

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PCF’s main organ, L’Humanité, was the major force in organizing opinion concerning the García case. From 31 January until 10-11 March 1946, there was not one issue that did not have a front-page story about Spain, and the majority of these dealt with the García case. The Communist organ reminded its readers that García, ‘a Spanish patriot, is equally, we know, a soldier in the liberation of our own country’, a man who embodied the comprehensive ‘spirit of sacrifice required in the antifascist war for democracy.’ The newspaper reported in detail the vast number of CGT sections, local PCF cadres and other groups which held meetings and passed resolutions calling for Government intervention in the García case and diplomatic rupture and trade sanctions against Spain. Other groups were also involved, most notably the multi-party Association France-Espagne which distributed 500 000 pamphlets concerning García.

Once García was executed, the call for action became almost universal. The pressure to take a diplomatic initiative against Franco out of debt to Garcia was now elevated because his execution was seen as a sign of Franco’s defiance toward France and its ideals. ‘It is the last card’, wrote Charles Dumas in Le Populaire de Paris. In Franc-Tireur, the event of García’s execution was used once again to cast the Spanish question in terms of its parallels to the fight for French liberation, most especially in terms of the debt owed by France to

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76 L’Humanité, 2 February 1946.

77 See, for example, L’Humanité, 3/4, 7, 8, 10/11, 16 February 1946.


79 Le Populaire de Paris, 23 February 1946.
Spanish Republicans involved in that battle:

‘It is our fault’ that Franco remained in power; ‘Have we forgotten that fascism exists at our border?’: ‘Was it not against all fascisms that Cristino García and thousands of our Spanish brothers fought with us on our soil? Did they not fall beside us, as at the Eysses prisons, under the same Nazi bullets, for France? And today will we disown their sacrifice, their blood and their martyrdom because the fight against fascism has moved to the other side of the Pyrenees? No, thank you!’\footnote{Franc-Tireur, 26 February 1946.}

Reaction to the news of García’s death sentence was particularly strong in the southwest of France, and, as they had nationally, the Communist Party took the lead in calling for a diplomatic breach with Franco’s Spain.\textit{La Voix du Midi} exclaimed that ‘France must avenge this affront...it is an act of defiance against the civilized world. It is before anything a slap in the fact to France, who especially intervened for these artists of its own liberation.’\footnote{La Voix du Midi, 23 February 1946.}

Editorialist Georges Fournial criticized the ‘two-faced policy’ of the Allies, who morally condemned Franco’s actions whilst continuing to trade with him. He went on to express support for a speech that André Marty had given in Toulouse, in which the latter repeated a theme which he had first articulated in the Assembly debate, namely that France’s national security was at risk as long as Franco, or even a monarchist replacement, was in power.\footnote{Le Voix du Midi, 12 February 1946.} In Sète, Spanish Republican exiles and the CGT, PCF and SFIO protested the García execution in front of the Spanish Consulate-General on 27 February. The building was occupied, and the Consul fled. Similarly in Auch, Spanish Republican exiles involved in a protest
sponsored by French leftist parties attacked the home of the Spanish Vice Consul.\textsuperscript{83} The veterans of the FTP in the region of Haute-Garonne sent an immediate telegram to the new Prime Minister, the Socialist Félix Gouin, urging him to ‘obtain without delay a rupture of diplomatic relations with Franco, the assassin.’\textsuperscript{84} Also in Toulouse, the leadership of the Spanish UGT in exile held meetings with regional and national leaders of the CGT.\textsuperscript{85} The execution of García was greeted with angry calls for diplomatic rupture by not only local organizations of the Communist Party, Resistance veterans, the Union des Syndicats de la Haute-Garonne and the local Comité France-Espagne, but by a crowd of 40 000 that gathered in protest at Toulouse’s Place de la Capitole the evening of 25 February.\textsuperscript{86} Two days later, in Tarbes, another 5000 gathered to protest.\textsuperscript{87} Instructions were issued to police in the Midi to take extra measures in protecting Spanish Consulates and Consul-Generals.\textsuperscript{88}

The Quai d’Orsay was equally stunned by the Franco regime’s sentencing of García and his compatriots. Neither was it complacent about the matter. Bernard Hardion believed that part of the Western imperative in Madrid was to foster conditions for political


\textsuperscript{84} Le Voix du Midi, 26 January 1946.

\textsuperscript{85} Le Voix du Midi, 30 January 1946.

\textsuperscript{86} Le Voix du Midi, 23, 25, 26 February 1946.

\textsuperscript{87} Le Voix du Midi, 28 February 1946.

\textsuperscript{88} MAE Europe to Hardion, 28 February 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 84.
liberalization in Spain not only by promoting economic ties, but by trying to influence the conduct of the regime and its attitude toward its opponents. In December, the Quai d’Orsay had argued that such efforts required France to maintain a diplomatic dialogue with Spain. In the García case, Hardion presented a strong argument for the suspension of García’s death sentence as a necessary step for Spain to take, emphasizing the condemned man’s heroic record in the French Resistance record and warning of emotion which would be aroused in France by his execution.\textsuperscript{89} But his efforts were futile.

The mood of the public, Resistance groups and political parties made it impossible for Communist and Socialist ministers in the Council to continue to support Bidault’s cautious efforts toward Great Britain and the United States vis-a-vis Spain. While the García execution acted as a catalyst, both SFIO and PCF were in the midst of an important transition concerning their role in Governments. Twice in late 1945, the PCF had proposed a Socialist-Communist joint effort in elections, and a large number of Socialists, led by Guy Mollet, were interested in the potential of aligning not only with the PCF, but with various Resistance movements like the MLN as well.\textsuperscript{90} Many on the Left were frustrated with acting alongside de Gaulle and the MRP, who did not seem to be losing ground in elections such as that of October, 1945, despite consistently strong results by the PCF. In January, 1946, the Communist party reaffirmed its desire of moving SFIO away from the MRP and in position

\textsuperscript{89} Hardion’s García despatches can be found in \textit{MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne}, 37.

\textsuperscript{90} See, for example, B.D. Graham’s account of the debate between August 1945 and June 1946. Graham, \textit{Choice and Democratic Order}, 267-309.
for a potential coalition without the centre-right.\textsuperscript{91}

With de Gaulle in office, neither party’s ministers pressed Bidault on Spain, especially after his December note to Great Britain and the United States, which did go some way in appeasing them. After the departure of de Gaulle on 20 January, a greater opportunity to affect policy-making was found, and the debate within the Socialist party about how far left to go developed even further. In February, Mollet publicly called for SFIO to return to fundamental principles.\textsuperscript{92} Important elements within both parties, therefore, were inclined to push the Government and its policy further to the left than had previously been done. The Spanish issue was current, and García’s execution gave it a momentum that both parties were in a position to exploit. The best evidence of this was the joint rally at the Vélodrome d’Hiver held by the PCF and SFIO on 26 February 1946 which drew 30-50 000 people.\textsuperscript{93} The two parties, \textit{l’Humanité} claimed, were united by their joint desire to represent the French conscience, defend French security and defeat the right in France and Europe. All of these views meant that the Government had to move beyond the stance it had already taken toward Spain.\textsuperscript{94} By the end of the month, divisions over Spain between SFIO and the MRP, which had firmly supported Bidault’s position, were apparent in the Assembly and in the Council of

\textsuperscript{91} Courtois and Lazar, \textit{Histoire du parti communiste}, 224.

\textsuperscript{92} Graham, \textit{Choice and Democratic Order}, 297.

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{L’Humanité} and \textit{Le Populaire de Paris}, 27 February 1946 cite crowds of 50 000. \textit{The Times}, 27 February 1946 claimed 30 000.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{L’Humanité}, 27 February 1946.
The new President, Félix Gouin, took a public position on Spain in the absence of any comment to the press by his foreign minister. The President made public the nature of France’s diplomatic interventions in the García case, and he noted the many letters the Government had received urging intervention which indeed had prompted the Government decision to intervene. Gouin repeated the themes long cherished by the Resistance when it came to Spain, for his words gave expression of a sense of indebtedness as well as to a hope that the true democratic nature of the Spanish people would allow a better future. His decision to intervene publicly in the case, he stated, was due to ‘the gratitude of the French people’ toward García and his colleagues, ‘and the promise of a fruitful understanding with the Spanish people.’

The Constituent National Assembly, in light of García’s execution, voted on 22 February 1946 to condemn the death sentence and remind the government of the need to honour the Assembly’s earlier motion (of 17 January 1946) and ‘prepare for’ diplomatic rupture. Once the motion was brought to the floor, the speaker of the Assembly, Socialist Vincent Auriol, took the rather unusual step of speaking before the vote was taken:

I am sure that this will be voted for unanimously, because it translates the cry, not only of the French conscience, but of the universal conscience. I can attest that all that could be done was done to save the lives of these men who defended our homeland as well as the independence of the world. Nothing more could have altered the sentence. There remains the consolation that the blood of martyrs always hastens


96 *Le Populaire de Paris* and *L’Humanité*, 17 February 1946.
the triumph of liberty

Auriol’s comment drew great applause from the Left and Centre benches of the Assembly. The motion was then voted on, and passed unanimously with the exception of abstentions from André Mutter and other members of the PRL. Their abstentions brought jeers from most of the Assembly. When Mutter requested the right to speak in order to explain his abstention, anger erupted on the benches of the Left and Auriol adjourned the session, in order to ‘to prevent a clash.’

The direction in which France could head was provided by the Communist-dominated CGT. After García’s execution, the CGT and its affiliated unions announced that they would suspend all traffic and communications with Spain. The Postal and Telegraphic workers (affiliated with the CGT) began a 24-hour disruption of phone service to Spain on 23 February. Franc-Tireur claimed that ‘the immense majority’ of the French public felt as it did, and wanted diplomatic rupture and economic sanctions. Clearly the issue was not one that Bidault could manage any longer within the Council of Ministers.

Of course, the Quai d’Orsay and its officials were absolutely against the expressed

97 JO, 22 February 1946.
100 New York Times, 24 February 1946. For more on the Communist takeover of the CGT leadership over the course of 1944-1946 and in particular within the postal and communications section, see Michel Dreyfus, Histoire de la C.G.T. (Paris, 1995) 213-227; also Courtois and Lazar, Histoire du parti communiste, 226-227.
101 Franc-Tireur, 26 February 1946.
desire of the Constituent National Assembly and the governing parties to effect a diplomatic rupture with Spain, regardless of what the Anglo-Americans did. In a memorandum dated 21 February 1946, the consequences of a unilateral rupture were analyzed by the French Foreign Ministry’s European section. Of significant concern were the economic impacts of a rupture. Significant short-term effects included economic and trade losses that would be, ‘more prejudicial against France than Spain,’ especially as regards key products like pyrites, which France imported primarily from Spain.\textsuperscript{102} Moreover, in the Quai’s assessment, the long-term impact of a unilateral rupture was even graver. France might be permanently replaced as a supplier and trader in the Spanish market. As long as the Allies agreed on a common diplomatic policy toward Franco, there were opportunities to compete with one another economically. Indeed, in the Spanish market, France felt it had a legitimate position to defend and expand upon, for Spain was ‘one of the rare foreign markets where our position is still solid’, due to geographic and other factors. Political and economic advisers within the Quai concluded that the Americans and British, whatever their sympathy with Quai policy-makers, were not such loyal allies as to refrain from exploiting ‘the advantage that our voluntary withdrawal would offer them.’\textsuperscript{103}

There were political reasons for opposing the policy desired by the Assembly as well. Most importantly was the Foreign Ministry’s understanding of France’s power, or lack thereof. The Quai returned to its point of view that French sanctions alone could not topple


\textsuperscript{103} Note, ‘Consequences d’une rupture unilaterale de nos relations diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement Franco’ MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 67.
Franco. If a policy which aimed to force the collapse of the current regime in Spain was sought, British and American sanctions were also required. A unilateral French action could only consolidate Franco's internal position and weaken France's ability to interpret the Spanish scene. In what was an increasingly desperate plea for realism, the European section of the Quai d'Orsay, through its 21 February 1946 memorandum, acknowledged French weakness, but argued that only by accepting its limitations would France be in a position to influence both Spain and Allied Spanish policy. The Spanish case highlights the attitudes held by the Foreign Ministry in the early postwar era. An acceptance of France's weak international position by the Foreign Ministry required policymakers to pursue a strategy of recovery that was apolitical, one that sought economic and other benefits in the effort to rebuild French standing. Working within the Western alliance in order to influence decisions which would benefit France and its recovery was as crucial in Spain as William I. Hitchcock has argued it was in Germany. An isolated action, in a moment of passion, risked exposing France's weakness, not displaying its strength, within the Western alliance.

In response to the emotions expressed in the Assembly, Georges Bidault admitted his growing worries about the course of Spanish policy. On 25 February, he told British Ambassador, Duff Cooper, that the Quai's desire for a coordinated Allied policy faced the 'gravest difficulties.' The same day, the Foreign Minister told U.S. Ambassador Jefferson

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105 Hitchcock, France Restored, 2.

Caffrey that the continuing pressure by the French press and public opinion might very well force the Government to act alone. In a despatch to Washington, Caffrey expressed his confusion about the turn of events within France since the December note, underlining that hitherto even the Communist ministers in Government had been quite cognizant of the need to avoid an unilateral breach with Spain.\textsuperscript{107}

On 26 February, Bidault entered a meeting of the Council of Ministers and found his worst fears realized. Although details of Council of Ministers’ meetings remain sketchy, due to the absence of official minutes, one must assume that pressure for a diplomatic break with Franco came from all Council ministers except perhaps those from the MRP. Bidault recalled that he had to argue all he could in order to prevent a vote in favour of rupture, and that pressure came from all sides of the Council table.\textsuperscript{108} Prior to the crucial meeting, \textit{Combat} cited a statement from Gouin’s aide, Gaston Deferre, who indicated that ‘electoral anxiety’ was increasingly the main motivation behind policy, and the decision to make French intervention in the García case public, again for internal reasons, meant that ever greater steps had to be taken in order to avoid French embarrassment.\textsuperscript{109} Luckily for Bidault, his Secretary-General at the Quai d’Orsay had arrived at yet another compromise that could prevent a complete break with Spain. Jean Chauvel proposed that France close its border with Spain to

\textsuperscript{107} Caffrey to Secretary of State, 26 February 1946. \textit{NARA} RG 59, State Department Central Records, 751.52/2-2646.


\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Combat}, 23 February 1946. See the harsh reply of editorialist Oscar Rosenfeld to this charge in \textit{Le Populaire de Paris}, 24-25 February 1946.
all commercial and personal traffic and communications. The Council of Minsters adopted this proposal, and further added that France propose that the Spanish question be put on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council.

Since postal, communications and railways workers had already disrupted and limited traffic to Spain on CGT directives, the decision to close the Pyrenean border was hardly surprising. The Communist press in Toulouse claimed that the Government had acted only in response to ongoing CGT action, and thus suggested that it was the CGT and its political allies, the PCF, that forced a change in France’s Spanish policy. At the time, the decision was seen by American officials as exactly that, an end to Bidault’s position in the face of Communist pressure. However, the gesture resonated not only with Communists, but with other political parties and Resistance organizations, and it drew upon the general tone of the debate about Spain that had existed within France since the Liberation. The Spanish exile newspaper affiliated with the French MLN, L’Espagne Républicaine, argued that the French action, at great cost to its own economy, demonstrated ‘the application of the general principles of its glorious Revolution.’ France, wrote Georges Altman in Franc-Tireur, was the first country to act, and it acted through a ‘demonstration of its own grandeur, for it

110 Chauvel, Commentaire, II, 172.
111 Le Voix du Midi, 27 February 1946.
112 Butterworth to State Department, 27 February 1946. NARA RG 59, State Department Central Files, 751.52/2-2746; Caffrey to State Department, 1 March 1946. NARA RG 59, State Department Central Files, 751.52/3-146.
113 L’Espagne Républicaine, 9 March 1946.
always is the first against tyrants."\textsuperscript{114} As earlier noted, Bidault later revealed that Council’s desire to act was fairly unanimous, and it took all his efforts to avoid a diplomatic breach while at the same time gratifying the Council and the public with a gesture ‘sufficiently spectacular to satisfy their unchained passions.’\textsuperscript{115} Diplomatic rupture avoided and the Resistance call for action answered, the French Mission in Madrid remained.

France was not the only country to react to the García execution. In early February, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin warned Sir Victor Mallet that if Franco continued to defy world public opinion and not change the nature of his regime, then Parliament, in particular the Labour Party’s left wing, would increase its pressure on him to take action beyond moral condemnation.\textsuperscript{116} Indeed, the potential for a change in British policy seemed quite high when Prime Minister Clement Attlee, at a meeting of Cabinet on 25 February, drew attention to García’s execution, and the impact that it had and would have on public opinion worldwide but especially in France. The Minister of Health, the leftist Aneurin Bevan, argued that a Labour Government had to do something to give anti-Francoists ‘spiritual reinforcement’. The Cabinet agreed that Attlee should review Britain’s Spanish policy and consider ‘further steps’ in order to ‘expedite a change in the present political

\textsuperscript{114} Franc-Tiruer, 27 February 1946.

\textsuperscript{115} Bidault, D’une Résistance à l’Autre, 137.

\textsuperscript{116} Bevin to Mallet, 3 February 1946. PRO FO 800/504. Mallet indicated to the Head of the Spanish Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Cabinet, the Marques de Miraflores, that public opinion in Britain required political evolution in Spain and that without such evolution, Anglo-Spanish relations would only become ‘more difficult’. Notes of Conversation with Mallet, 4 February 1946. MAEE, Archivo Renovado, R 1372/ 22.
regime in Spain. The following day, the Parliamentary Group of the Labour Party adopted a resolution which sought to break British diplomatic relations with Spain.

Yet just as Britain appeared to be considering a move away from its strict interpretation of non-intervention, there appeared within the Truman Administration an argument against changing Spanish policy at all. Despite the fact that in December, 1945 the State Department appeared more willing than the British Foreign Office to consider France’s request for a meeting on Spain, it was in the emotional aftermath of the García execution that those who wished to abandon Franklin Roosevelt’s March, 1945 policy directive on Spain and not expand upon it- emerged most forcefully. They no longer agreed with the premise that Spain must be pressured into a gradual political evolution of the regime. As the French initiatives on Spain developed in early 1946, these policymakers in the United States began to view Spanish policy in light of the emerging conflict with the Soviet Union, and they deserted the anti-fascist perspective which had informed Roosevelt’s letter to the U.S. Embassy in Madrid in the spring of 1945. The development of Spanish policy thus became a part of the emerging East-West conflict in that Rooseveltian assumptions were replaced by Cold War perspectives. An important aspect of the American policy change on Spain was the role played, early in 1946, by the Chargé d’Affaires in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, George F. Kennan. On 3 February 1946, just after the French Assembly vote on Spain and prior to the García execution, Kennan, on his own initiative, wrote to Washington on the subject of

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117 CAB 128/ CM 18 (46), 26 February 1946.

France and Spain. He wrote again on 1 March, after García’s execution and the French Cabinet’s decision to raise the Spanish issue in the Security Council. In between, on 22 February, he would write the so-called ‘Long Telegram’, which had a seminal role in defining the Cold War mentality of American policy-makers through its argument that Soviet leaders, motivated by Communist ideology and traditional Russian insecurity, were entirely expansionist in their foreign policy and could not be trusted in any negotiation.119

With his two interventions on Spain, Kennan would play a significant role in moving anti-Communism and ‘proto-containment’ ideas to the forefront of American perspectives on Iberia. This, in turn, implied an abandonment of U.S. pressure for political democratization inside Spain and an acceptance of the Franco regime more or less on its own terms. Furthermore, his interventions strengthened the positions of those in the British Foreign Office and British Embassy in Madrid who had been trying to push the U.S. toward acceptance of the Spanish status quo. That Kennan should promote this line of thinking is not, of course, surprising. He was, after all, one of the fathers of the ‘Riga axioms’, and his Long Telegram helped push ideas that had been circulating amongst many to the forefront of the Truman Administration’s foreign policy.120 Though not invited to participate in the


120 Leffler, Specter, 53 and idem, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992) 108. The ‘Riga axioms’, as first defined by Daniel Yergin, were those ideas formed by the State Department’s Soviet experts based in Riga, Latvia in the 1920s and later refined by the Moscow Embassy in the 1930s (which included Kennan). They were based on a belief that because of the revolutionary nature of Communism, Soviet Union foreign policy would inevitably seek to expand Communism and thus conflict with American policy. Yergin calls the Long Telegram, ‘a classic restatement of the Riga axioms, indeed the most important such statement of those attitudes ever made.’ Daniel
formation of Spanish policy, Kennan outlined his ideas with particular reference to Spain and found considerable success.121

Kennan’s 3 February despatch considered Soviet attitudes toward Spain in light of, ‘interest shown by foreign Communists in mobilizing international pressure for overthrow of Franco Govt.’122 He reviewed Soviet policy in the Spanish Civil War and the use of the Spanish Blue Division against Soviet troops in World War II and he emphasized the strategic importance of Spain to Soviet expansion, both in Europe, especially France and Italy, and in Morocco and Latin America. At the same time he acknowledged the weakness of the Spanish Communists and contended that, in the short term, the Soviets relied not on direct intervention and the immediate establishment of a Communist regime in Spain but rather on ‘public opinion and government action in western countries to bring pressure for downfall of Franco regime.’ Kennan stated that the actions of Soviet diplomacy, such as pressing the U.S. and Britain for a section on Spain in the Potsdam Declaration, were matched by Soviet efforts to manipulate trade unions, local western communists, women’s groups, and others in mobilizing the west against Franco.123 His implication was clear: he saw the activities of French Communist unions, parties and the role of public opinion in France as part of this


121 The only other time Kennan had participated in a discussion of Spanish policy had been in 1944, when he opposed the idea of U.S. intervention against Franco in a debate with other State Department officials. See Anders Stephanson, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA, 1989) 306 fn 112.

122 Kennan to Secretary of State, 3 February 1946. FRUS 1946, V, 1033.

123 Kennan to Secretary of State, 3 February 1946. FRUS 1946, V, 1035-1036.
Soviet scheme to influence the west, and his emphasis on these factors represented his effort to focus American policy on the Soviet threat in Iberia, which he perceived to have been a subject hitherto ignored in State Department policymaking.

Kennan’s note would significantly affect the development of American and Allied policy toward Spain in 1946. In Madrid, American Chargé d’Affaires Walton Butterworth had believed since his appointment as head of mission in December, 1945 that there was little use in any sort of joint western action against Spain. Upon receiving Kennan’s analysis of Soviet goals in light of French initiatives, he was profoundly satisfied; he agreed with Kennan that the Spanish Communists did not pose a direct threat to Spain, but that disorder involving the Communists could threaten Spain and the West’s position there. Butterworth responded with some surprise to Kennan’s news that the Soviets took great interest in Spain, but he accepted it wholeheartedly- he found Kennan’s analysis of Potsdam Conference’s resolution on Spain as a Soviet success ‘noteworthy’, as he did Kennan’s idea that the Soviets hoped to use Spain as a base for extending their influence in other areas. Butterworth echoed Kennan’s conclusion that since Soviet interests were so contrary to American and British ones, western and Soviet approaches toward Spain had to be different. He argued that if the west desired a stable and liberal regime in Spain, achieved through a peaceful transition from Francoist rule, then it had to be understood that such a change would be slow and that democracy was a long way off. Butterworth clearly was abandoning the position of

124 Jill Edwards notes that it was circulated widely in the State Department as well as being passed on to Foreign Office officials. Edwards, Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 65-66.

Roosevelt, one that held out the prospect of increased pressure on Franco, and he was moving toward the British position of scrupulous non-intervention. He strongly advocated that the United States make no public statement, such as Acheson had proposed, about its desired long-term outcome in Spain but rather adopt a ‘ad hoc’ approach in the near future.\footnote{Butterworth to Secretary of State, 15 February 1946. \textit{FRUS} 1946, V, 1038-1042.}

On the question of Spain, as on containment generally, Kennan was not the first to advocate that the intent of Soviet policy should be a primary concern in the development of America’s international position. As early as 19 April 1945, a Joint Chiefs of Staff report stressed the geostrategic importance of Spain in any future war against ‘our most probable enemy’, concluding that ‘Spanish-United States military cooperation is of significant importance to the implementation of our immediate, middle-range, and long-range war plans’ and by November 1945 the military had already begun considering the possibility of installing U.S. bases on Spanish territory.\footnote{Cited in Liedtke, \textit{Embracing a Dictatorship}, 8.} Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated, Roosevelt’s legacy on Spain- which did not perceive Soviet Iberian policy as necessarily hostile to western aims- was initially fairly well entrenched. Even as late as the beginning of 1946, leadership on the Spanish question was assumed by Dean Acheson through his proposal for a tripartite statement, which sought to strengthen earlier Allied declarations on Spain at the United Nations and Potsdam through an appeal to the Spanish people to oppose General Franco. Moreover, Acheson was not a member of the ‘containment’ or ‘hard-line’
school until much later. Again, the French Ambassador in Washington, Henri Bonnet, concluded near the end of February 1946 that there still existed within the State Department a strong sentiment in favour of ousting Franco from power as soon as possible. Complete non-intervention, the idea that Franco and Spain should be left to their own devices, did not have as prominent an articulation until the exchange between Kennan and Butterworth.

If Kennan's despatch had a major effect on Butterworth and the Madrid Embassy, its impact was even greater on British officials, who finally saw evidence that their preferred policy might be agreed to by Washington. British officials in the United States, like the French diplomat Bonnet, had observed a strong anti-Franco element within the State Department and feared that Acheson or others might abandon them for a position closer to the French one. They had felt frustrated in their efforts to counter such possibilities. However, on 9 February officials at the American Embassy in Madrid showed Kennan's

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128 John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge, 1994) 269-275; Robert L. Beisner notes that as late as August 1946 Acheson's response to the criticism of Soviet broken agreements since Yalta made in a report for President Truman by Clark Clifford and George Elsey was 'mild'. Robert L. Beisner, 'Patterns of Peril: Dean Acheson Joins the Cold Warriors, 1945-46' Diplomatic History 20:3 (1996), 325. Acheson's most recent biographer notes that the Undersecretary had not perceived Kennan's 'Long Telegram' favourably and, on the question of Spain in particular, he had in 1945 complained that Britain's desire for strict non-intervention prohibited a more forceful American policy. James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State who Created the American World (New York, 1998) 150-151, 94.

129 Swain argues that Kennan's 3 February note 'put right' any differences the U.S. and Great Britain had over Spain. Swain, 'Stalin and Spain' in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds., Spain in an International Context, 253.

130 Halifax to Bevin, 28 January 1946. PRO FO 371/ 60349/ Z882.
telegram to their British counterparts. This was followed by a meeting between Butterworth and Mallet, at which the former emphasized his opposition to Acheson's proposed statement, primarily on the basis of Kennan’s argument, a critical position which Mallet enthusiastically endorsed, exclaiming, 'I wish I could memorize the Moscow telegram!' Meanwhile, Frank Roberts of the British Embassy in Moscow, whose own position was similar to that of Kennan in the Long Telegram, also entered the debate. Writing to Derrick Hoyer-Millar of the Western Department in London, Roberts wrote of Soviet interests in Spain as Kennan had, and specifically brought the French into the discussion by claiming that the French proposal to its Anglo-American allies which called for a discussion of Spanish policy was in fact the 'spearhead' of the Soviet plan to prevent the U.S. and the U.K. from fostering a gradual opening up of the Franco regime in Madrid.

Kennan’s involvement with Spain and particularly with the American response to French pressure for more action on Spain continued after the execution of Cristino García. On 1 March, Kennan indicated that the Soviet Union was closely watching the American and British reaction to the French initiatives. He made a direct reference to Part 4 of his Long

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134 Roberts to Hoyer-Millar, 14 February 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 18iii.
Telegram, the section which dealt with the implementation of Soviet policy on the 'unofficial or subterranean plane' and argued that the western response to proposals emanating, in his opinion, from the French Communists and other Soviet-directed groups, 'represents [a] test of efficiency of unofficial apparatus which they have created for influencing affairs in other countries'. He concluded thus:

It is not my intention here to suggest any course of action with respect to the Spanish problem or discourage any sort of action which our Govt may find warranted by American interests. In view, however, of the admitted difference in aims between Russia and our country with respect to Iberian Peninsula as a whole I would be much surprised if an attitude based squarely on American interests involved were to turn out to be identical with that put forward as recommended by Soviet pressure groups everywhere beginning with the French Communists.

From the British Embassy, Roberts sent a similar despatch on 2 March underlining the Soviet use of pressure groups to change western policy. This came after a meeting he had had with Soviet foreign policy adviser Ivan Maisky on the subject of Spain. He also indicated that he had consulted with Kennan on the subject and that Kennan was determined to ensure that American policy was 'framed entirely in accordance with American and British interests and not in response to any ideological interests.' Those in the European section of the State Department who were inclined to lean towards the British position of non-intervention now had another reason to support such a position. Increasingly, an appreciation of Soviet

135 Kennan to Secretary of State, 22 February 1946. FRUS 1946, VI, 703-706.
136 Kennan to Secretary of State, 1 March 1946. FRUS 1946, V, 1044-1045.
137 Edwards, Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 66.
intentions was a prominent part of American policy construction.139

Despite less than complete archival sources, there is little evidence that the Soviet Union was very active in fomenting any action against Spain and the regime of General Francisco.140 The Soviets were clearly opposed to the continuation of Franco in power, perceived the Spanish regime as a vestige of fascism, and had had no diplomatic relations with Spain since the Civil War. The use of the Spanish Blue Division troops alongside German forces in the Soviet Union during the war only reinforced existing opinion. However, Soviet policy on Spain was limited to diplomatic initiatives with its wartime allies. After the failure of the Spanish Communist invasion of the Val d’Aran, Stalin believed that the best way to proceed on Spain was to use the allied forums of the Conference of Foreign Ministers and the United Nations to make common policy. There was no intention of bringing the Communists to power in Spain as in the Civil War; rather, Stalin sought a united policy of ostracism. The Spanish case was important for Stalin, for it was ‘a test for the validity of the notion that the Second World War has ushered in a new era in international relations when a grand alliance of democratic powers had learnt to act in concert.’141 At the Potsdam Conference, Stalin pushed for action on Spain and was able only to convince his Allies to release a statement which paralleled the United Nations resolution of April, 1945. He also

139 See, for example, memorandum from Matthews to Cohen, 10 April 1946. NARA RG 59. State Department Lot Files: Office of European Affairs 1935-1947 (Matthews-Hickerson Files) ‘Spain’. Reprinted as Hiss to Stettinus in FRUS 1946, V, 12 April 1946, 1065-1069.

140 Swain, ‘Stalin and Spain’ in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds., Spain in an International Context, 245-264.

141 Swain, ‘Stalin and Spain’ in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds., Spain in an International Context, 250.
pushed for Soviet participation at the International Conference on Tangier, which was granted, but was unable at this conference to exclude Spain from the future international zone. In short, the Soviet Union was inclined to push for action against Spain only through diplomatic channels and only when the possibility presented itself in the international arena. It is unclear what role the Soviet Union or the Cominform had in the development of the PCF position on Spain, but it is unlikely that it was of defining significance. The PCF had supported Bidault and de Gaulle on the Spanish issue well into January, 1946, even moderating the resolution of diplomatic rupture passed at the time, as earlier noted. The move to a more aggressive position came only as a result of Cristino García's execution, and this was a response that transcended partisan politics in France and had to do with the influence of the Resistance on French politics as much as anything else. The response of the Soviet Union during this period was simply to indicate, via an article in Pravda, that it was interested in participating in any sort of international discussion such as those with Great Britain and the United States proposed by France.

The Soviet position on Spain was perhaps made clearer in terms of the Soviet attitude towards the Spanish Republican guerrilleros of the UNE like García. In conversation with the newly installed American Chargé d'Affaires Philip Bonsal, a Spanish Foreign Ministry official complained that the Soviet Military mission in Paris had not only made contact with and sent arms to Spanish Republican exiles, but did in fact control the actions of the French

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Communist party on the Spanish question. He went on to tell Bonsal that Soviet policy
toward Spain was conducted with the intent of launching armed revolution, and all actions
taken by the French Communists were done on orders from Moscow in order to facilitate the
violent penetration of Spain by the Spanish Communist guerrilleros.144 In fact, the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union as early as autumn, 1944 had opposed any Spanish
Communist plans for 'reconquest'. When the Val d'Aran invasion by UNE guerrilleros
occurred in October, 1944, Spanish and Soviet Communists based in Moscow had no idea of
its planning, and had not authorized it. Spanish Communist leaders in Moscow, led by la
Pasionaria, Dolores Ibarruri, were despatched to France immediately following the failed
attack in order to rein in renegade PCE leaders such as Jesús Monzón who had concocted the
plan.145 This contradicts the notion held by Kennan, Bevin and others in the West that the
Soviet Union had geopolitical designs on Spain the in aftermath of the Second World War.
Instead, Spanish Communists in France concentrated on being activists of the PCF alongside
maintaining their own organizations.146 The PCF, in turn, actively encouraged French
diplomatic rupture with General Franco's regime amongst its activists, but only pressed this
in Government after the García execution, in partnership with Socialist and other ministers.147

144 Bonsal to Washington, 8 March 1946. FRUS 1946 vol V., 1047-1048.
145 Pike, Jours de Gloire, 119-141.
146 Pike, Jours de Gloire, 154.
147 Swain notes that only after the Cold War clearly was underway did Stalin return to a
more aggressive policy, encouraging the guerilla activity of the Spanish Communists based in
France. Swain, 'Stalin and Spain' in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds., Spain in an International Context,
255-261.
Communist pressure on the French Government to isolate Franco’s Spain must be properly seen as a part of the general French debate about the direction of French foreign policy, its claim to promote and respond to democracy, and thus the vision that the Resistance had for France in the new world order.

Yet the efforts of the French Government to finally respond to a Resistance policy on Spain and appear firmer with General Franco than hitherto had been the case coincided with a growing belief in the United States, and a continued desire in Great Britain, that the Spanish status quo should be maintained. The ongoing debate in the United States about how far to go on Spain, the continued resilience of the British Foreign Office position of non-intervention, and thus the constraints imposed upon the French by the alliance are all evident in the Tripartite Statement on Spain, released on 4 March 1946. This document was representative of the state of western policy on Spain, and demonstrated the emerging boundaries to new initiatives in Spanish policy. For the French, the statement did not go as far as their own initiatives to close the Pyrenean border and raise the Spanish case at the UN Security Council did. For the Anglo-Americans, the statement was as far as they were ever going to go.

The idea of a joint statement, as noted earlier, was first proposed by Dean Acheson on 18 January 1946 in the aftermath of the French Assembly debate as a way to support the French desire, and also Acheson’s, to ‘go beyond’ the United Nations and Potsdam statements concerning Franco. The idea was placed on the diplomatic back burner until the execution of Cristino García. On 25 February, the United States first approached the French Ambassador in Washington, Henri Bonnet, with the suggestion of a Tripartite declaration,
and with a prepared text. Bidault agreed to the proposal almost immediately. In one respect, the statement achieved its goal, because for the first time the powers called on Spaniards to act in support of a ‘peaceful departure’ of Franco from power, the elimination of the Falange and the establishment of a provisional government. It asserted that these changes were necessary if Spain expected to conduct normal diplomatic relations with the three western states. The statement concluded by noting that the question of diplomatic rupture was still possible in light of events. The release of the statement, along with the American publication of the most extensive documentation demonstrating the extent of Franco’s relations with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, made it clear that Kennan’s views were not yet universal. The idea that any type of intervention, especially that which originated to some degree in French political circles, was Soviet-inspired and for Soviet purposes, had not yet taken hold completely.

However, the most significant aspect of the Tripartite Statement was in the second paragraph, where the intent of the three Governments not to intervene in Spanish internal affairs was underlined and their condemnation of any prospective violence or civil war was expressed. Furthermore, the future of Spain was clearly made the responsibility of the Spanish people alone. This was contained in the original American proposal which was

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agreed to by both Great Britain and the United States. Acheson, for all his expressed desire to "do more", could not come up with an exact policy prescription of how to carry that out, and the views of Kennan, Butterworth, Hickerson and others within the State Department did not support such initiatives. Furthermore, as Kennan's intervention demonstrated, Acheson's line of argument was beginning to lose support. In Great Britain, despite Attlee's desire to rethink British policy on Spain, and the continued presence of domestic criticism from within and without the Labour Party, the Government as a whole was firmly opposed to doing more, a point that was underlined by Foreign Office officials in London, Washington and Madrid, and by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. In spite of the García execution and French proposals developed from December, the Tripartite Statement was really a reiteration of Western policy as embodied in the Potsdam Declaration and elsewhere.

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153 On 4 March 1946, R. Sloan minuted: "It has hitherto seemed to me expedient to preserve the Anglo-US-French front and to make some concession to French feelings; hence the statement. But I think now we ought to consider again the dangers of such a policy...If she (France) is intent on gambling with her own interests- either for the 'beaux yeux of Moscow or simply through misdirected post-war exasperation, let her do so." PRO FO 371/ 60421/ z1998, 4 March 1946. Even before the release of the statement, British officials saw it more as a way to address domestic opinion in France and the United States rather than as a policy statement with new implications, and they worked hard to bring the wording of the statement in line with existing policy of strict non-intervention. See, for example, Foreign Office to Washington, 27 February 1946 and Mallet to Foreign Office, 27 February 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 18ii. See also Bevin to Cadogan, 24 March 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 26. For Bevin's comments to Cabinet, CAB 128/ CM (20) 46, 4 March 1946.

154 Paul Preston has argued that the impact of the declaration was negligible, and in fact called it 'milder than the Potsdam Declaration' because it essentially repeated the earlier statement but this time without Soviet participation. Preston, Franco, 554-555. Boris Liedtke also calls the statement 'a weak condemnation of Spain as a fascist regime.' Liedtke, Embracing a Dictatorship, 1.
The weakness of the Tripartite Statement was not lost on Spanish opposition groups who had seen in the early French initiative hopes for a more aggressive western policy. The Republican Government-in-exile of José Giral thanked the French Government for its efforts on behalf of Spain, but reaffirmed its belief that the only way for a ‘civil, diplomatic and peaceful’ solution to the Spanish problem was for the West to break relations with Franco and recognize the Giral Government as the only legitimate Spanish Government. In France, the exiled Spanish Socialist Party and UGT (both with members in the Giral Government) also acknowledged French efforts but maintained that more forceful action was required.\(^{155}\)

The Tripartite Statement was especially disappointing for the PSOE. They had welcomed the French note of December, had believed that the new Socialist-Communist dominated French coalition government would be more vigorous than de Gaulle’s Government in addressing the Spanish question, and thus had instructed its members living in France in December 1945 to become active in contacting their French Socialist and Communist local parties and deputies in order to pressure them for action in order to ensure just such an outcome.\(^{156}\)

The Spanish Government of General Franco also concluded that the Tripartite Statement represented a result far less severe outcome than earlier initiatives had led all to believe possible. Since France’s note to the United States and Great Britain in December, 1945, the Spanish Government had alternatively feared and attacked French policy. On 29 December 1945, just after the French note was made public, the Spanish Council of Ministers


\(^{156}\) *PSOE* Circular no. 32, 22 December 1945. *Fundación Pablo Iglesias* AE-102-1.
issued a statement attacking the 'new campaign of snares and slanders promoted against our Nation by extreme sectors of the foreign press, and [the Spanish Government] lamented the political sectarianism predominant in some countries that permits participation in this campaign, against the most elemental customs of international courtesy.'\textsuperscript{157} Yet in January, Foreign Minister Artajo spoke to Hardion and expressed great concern at the deterioration of Franco-Spanish relations, arguing that a healthy relationship was necessary not only for the two countries, but for Western Europe as well. He concluded that, 'only the Soviets will profit' from French policy aimed against Spain, and urged France to reconsider.\textsuperscript{158} Once the Spanish Government was convinced Great Britain and the United States would not follow France's lead, its response was firmer. Spain sealed the Spanish side of the Pyrenean frontier immediately, the night of 26 February, two days before the French planned to initiate their own border closure.\textsuperscript{159} Hardion was told in no uncertain terms that France would suffer more than Spain, for the Iberian nation would continue to trade with Britain, the United States, Italy, Switzerland and others.\textsuperscript{160}

In a formal note to the French Government, the Spanish Government argued that it was a victim of French, and especially French Communist reaction, reaction inspired by the


\textsuperscript{158} Hardion to MAE, 19 January 1946. \textit{MAE Série Z/} Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 66.

\textsuperscript{159} Coiffard to MAE, 27 February 1946. \textit{MAE Série Z/} Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 84.

\textsuperscript{160} Hardion to MAE, 27 February 1946. \textit{MAE Série Z/} Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 84.
Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{161} Franco was a great promoter of his regime as fervently anti-Communist since before the end of the Second World War, and he hoped to benefit from the resurgence of similar sentiments in the west.\textsuperscript{162} In the winter of 1946, anti-communism was developed as a strategy of response designed, in part, to separate France from its Allies, and reaffirm among United States and British policymakers fears of the instability that Communism could engineer in Spain. The weakness of the Tripartite Statement, which was symbolic of the French inability to move Anglo-American opinion substantially in the previous months, was followed immediately by Churchill’s Fulton, Missouri ‘Iron Curtain’ speech. Churchill’s characterization of the threat posed by local Communist parties in the west as one against ‘Christian civilization’, only added to an atmosphere which made people receptive to the Spanish argument.\textsuperscript{163}

Bidault, forced against his will to carry out an unilateral action against Spain, and unable to use the Tripartite Statement as an example of effective Western action to appease domestic critics, was not yet thwarted. In fact, he became more than ever committed to his original goals as defined in December, 1945. Despite the evidence that both Britain and the United States were approaching their limit in terms of policy change towards Spain, Bidault wished to continue his increasingly difficult attempt to construct a policy that both satisfied the expressed domestic desire to enforce sanctions against Spain and yet maintained a common Allied front toward the Franco regime. Even before the release of the Tripartite

\textsuperscript{161} Fernández, \textit{Franco y la URSS}, 37.

\textsuperscript{162} see Portero, \textit{Franco aislado}, 72-76.

\textsuperscript{163} Fernández, \textit{Franco y la URSS}, 37-38.
Statement, he understood that it was unlikely to represent a significant enough commitment on the part of the three powers to work in concert and effect real democratization in Spain. In short, he still needed an international gesture which would complement France’s closure of the Pyrenean border. Thus, on 26 February the Council of Ministers, in the same meeting that voted for border closure, proposed to make the newly established French policy of sanctions more universal. On 27 February, Bidault approached Britain, the U.S. and the Soviet Union with the suggestion that the Spanish question be placed on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council.\textsuperscript{164}

The decision to make the Security Council proposal was in part forced upon Bidault by the same pressures in the Council of Ministers that led to the decision to close the border. It was seized upon by the Quai d’Orsay because it allowed the basis of French policymaking on Spain since the war, that of international co-ordination instead of unilateral action, to be salvaged. Since it could no longer coordinate western policy behind closed doors, it sought to bring Britain and the U.S. to the French position through the forum of the United Nations. Given the inability of the French to move the western position on Spain much beyond the status quo of moral condemnation through alliance diplomacy, the decision to press on was ambitious, risky and, like Bidault’s earlier initiatives, taken by the Quai d’Orsay without great enthusiasm. Things would soon get worse.

Chapter 4

Desperation and Defeat: France and the Spanish Question at the United Nations, 1946

Moving the debate about Spain from an exchange of notes between the three western Allies to the forum of the United Nations Security Council was to prove a critical mistake for the French. American and British opposition to France’s continued insistence on pressing the Spanish issue could now be argued on numerous grounds, extending beyond geostrategic reasoning to include internal legal arguments as well. Moreover, the French decision to bring the Soviet Union into the discussion threatened to propel France into an alignment with the Soviet Union and against its western allies just as rising East-West tensions began to dominate international politics. However, what motivated the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, and his advisers in the Quai d’Orsay, was not the complexity of the international scene, but rather domestic concerns. Since the end of the Second World War, the Quai d’Orsay and the various elements which emerged from the internal French Resistance argued over how Franco was to be treated. The question was inextricably tied to a larger debate about Republican France’s role in the world. Was France to be driven by a desire to resume its place as a Western Ally and great power, as the Quai believed, or was the very idea of grandeur only to be found through the pursuit of an idealistic, if isolating, foreign policy? The broader public and, in particular, Resistance and left-wing parties and organizations demanded not only the removal of Franco, but also forced the Government to recognize that they, as the democratic force behind France’s renewal, had to have a say in the policy-making process. By 1946, the division over Spain had made itself apparent within the Council of Ministers. The Resistance argument implied that the
influence of their movement had to be decisive in the formation of policy. While the Foreign Ministry acknowledged the importance of the other side, it continued to remain committed to its own interpretation of the importance of the Spanish question to its own larger goals.

The move to the United Nations was yet another step in the Quai’s effort to work within its alliance with the United States and Great Britain while at the same time responding to domestic pressure to steer policy in a more overtly anti-Franco direction. On 27 February 1946, in a note to the governments of Great Britain, the United States and the USSR, France proposed that the subject of Spain be placed on the agenda of the Security Council. The first basis for the proposed discussion of Spain in the Security Council remained that of France’s initial December 1945 note to the Anglo-Americans, namely that as General Franco’s wartime policies became increasingly known, international public pressure for his removal grew. Moreover, the note stated that since that first French initiative, the situation had worsened for three reasons. First, Franco’s continued refusal to make any statement or gesture indicating that he intended to begin the process of reforming his regime; second, the presence of Francoist troops along the Pyrenean border had grown since the start of the new year; and finally, the execution of Cristino García and nine others despite French and international lobbying for a suspension of their death sentences.¹

As a result of these actions on the part of Spain, the French Government contended that the continued presence of Franco’s regime constituted ‘a real challenge both to the principles of international rights and democratic ideals, risks creating a situation jeopardizing peace and

This conclusion provided the second basis for the new French note, for it brought the United Nations into the discussion. Although not specifically mentioned, the reference to ‘peace and international security’ was an allusion to either article 35 and/or 39 of the United Nations Charter. These articles dealt with states and their potential threat to international security, and permitted the Security Council to examine the case of a state considered to be likely to represent such a threat (article 35) or the case of a state already considered to be such a threat (article 39). The French note sought to establish UN competence to debate Spain by recalling UN resolutions concerning the Franco regime already in force, most notably that of 8 February 1946 which had reaffirmed the exclusion of Spain from the international organization, an exclusion first articulated at the San Francisco conference. In short, because the Spanish issue was already on the UN agenda, France felt it was not unreasonable to ask the Security Council to consider a debate on Spain. Furthermore, the French government argued that because of legitimate Charter reasons, the Spanish question properly belonged on the agenda of the Security Council, the UN’s highest body and the only one that could consider international sanctions similar to those France had already imposed unilaterally.

In their note to the three governments, the French Foreign Ministry felt the need to account for their decision, for the first time, to include the Soviet Union in their Spanish policy-making efforts. To date, all French initiatives had been directed toward Great Britain and the United States. With the Security Council proposal, the Soviet Union was brought into the

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picture. That the Soviet Union was a Permanent Member of the Security Council, and thus had considerable influence in deciding which items went onto the agenda, was reason enough for the French to suggest to Moscow that the Spanish question be placed on the Security Council agenda. In addition, through a January editorial in the Communist Party newspaper Pravda, the Soviet Union had made it clear that it was interested in participating in whatever discussions on Spain France, Great Britain and the United States were going to have. The French note of 27 February implicitly acknowledged Soviet interest in its reference to the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, a document signed by the Big Three powers, which France claimed to be honouring in raising the Spanish question at the UN. In particular, the French drew attention to the clause in the Anglo-American-Soviet agreement that stated these three powers would ‘aid by common accord the peoples of the former Axis satellites to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.’ Such a specific reference, combined with the reasons for involving the Security Council, gave legitimacy to the French approach to the Soviet Union, which hitherto had not been part of France’s diplomatic campaign against Franco.

On one level, the risks of the new French initiative were similar to those that had existed with previous proposals for diplomatic rupture; namely, the chance that either one or both of the other western powers would refuse to consider any action beyond the status quo of moral condemnation. Yet on another level, through their invitation to the Soviets and the appeal to the United Nations, the French risked even more. There now existed the possibility that British and

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American policymakers would not only continue to prefer the status quo, but publicly separate themselves from the French for the first time. Since the end of the war, and certainly since the end of 1945, evidence of western disagreement about how to proceed in Spain had existed. For the most part, however, the discord was kept to the margins of international foreign policy, and acts like the Tripartite Statement of March, 1946 had successfully emphasized coordination instead of conflict. France, conforming to the thesis of William I. Hitchcock, preferred to work within the alliance in order to shape policy in such a way as served its purpose. Now, in the open forum of the Security Council, discrepancies amongst the allies had the potential to become evident to all. Furthermore, there was the larger risk that during such a public debate, France would not only appear to be separated from Great Britain and the United States, but aligned with the Soviet Union against its western allies. The United Nations proposal, therefore, was fraught with risk, and it was indeed ‘an extremely delicate political moment.’

For the most part, the French public welcomed the challenge. The press campaign in favour of a more aggressive French policy toward General Franco continued much as it had since Liberation. Georges Fournial, in the Communist daily La Voix du Midi wrote that forcing the Allies to agree to a firmer position on Spain via the Security Council would succeed if France maintained an ‘energetic attitude’. Franc-Tireur reported that having led by example with its

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7 For example, in Monaco, local party sections (SFIO, PCF, MRP, Radicals), trade unions and the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen gathered in March to rally in favour of the government initiative. Ligue des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, section Beausoleil/Monaco to Félix Gouin, President, 17 March 1946. MAE Serie Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 68

8 La Voix du Midi, 28 February 1946.
own border closure. France was in a position now to foster an international action against Spain.\footnote{Franc-Tireur, 6 March 1946.}

In the Socialist party organ, \textit{Le Populaire de Paris}, Oscar Rosenfeld wrote that the Tripartite Note had been merely a stage in the development of Western anti-Francoist policy; France’s border closure and the UN initiative provided the Allies with a logical end, and the persistence of the French Government to take on further leadership was not only admirable but necessary in the months to follow.\footnote{Le Populaire de Paris, 5 March 1946.} Georges Cogniot in \textit{L’Humanité} agreed.\footnote{L’Humanité, 5 March 1946.}

The French note of 27 February, quite different than previous French efforts due to the inclusion of the Soviet Union, suggests that either the Communist members of the government played an important role in its conception or that it was part of a larger campaign to facilitate greater French-Soviet co-operation on other matters, such as Germany, and thus contribute to the ‘policy of non-alignment’ favoured by Bidault as the best way to restore France’s international position.\footnote{Brundu, ‘L’Espagne franquiste’, 174.} However, there is no direct evidence to support these assumptions. In Madrid, Bernard Hardion was informed that the decision to approach the three powers with this note was made by the Council of Ministers the same day the frontier was closed, and as Bidault emphasized in his memoirs, pressure to act on Spain came from all sides of the Council table that day.\footnote{MAE to Hardion, 26 February 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 67. Bidault, \textit{D’une Résistance à l’Autre}, 137.} Italian historian Paola Brundu has acknowledged that the appeal to the USSR was just as likely to be
motivated by the same concerns that were behind the December, 1945 note to France's western allies. Bidault, caught in a difficult situation, was simply seeking another way to salvage his preferred policy of coordinated western action. Through the use of the United Nations and the appeal to the Soviets, he hoped to force the hand of the Anglo-Saxon powers in order to lessen the economic burden on France as a result of its unilateral action, and to resolve his domestic dilemma over Spain.¹⁴

The archival evidence supports the interpretation that the involvement of the Soviet Union was merely another tactic in pursuit of the Quai d'Orsay's original goal of a policy which reconciled domestic antagonism toward Franco with the maintenance of Allied unity on Spanish policy. If anything, Georges Bidault and his advisors were becoming more desperate in their attempt to extricate themselves from the isolation of being the only major state with economic sanctions against Franco. The quest for a policy which answered political pressure from parties and public opinion and the Quai d'Orsay's need for Allied unity continued, but at a greater risk of failure. At best, the French maintained some influence over their allies, although not decisive influence. The most hopeful expression of the reality of the situation was in *La République du Sud-Ouest* which concluded that 'the destiny of Spain is in play in London and Washington, but it is not impossible that France can still influence the game.'¹⁵ Publicly, of course, the risk of failure and the unwillingness of the Quai d'Orsay to take further action without its Allies was denied. In an appearance before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Constituent National Assembly, Bidault stated that if the United States and Great Britain refused to support the


¹⁵ *La République du Sud-Ouest*, 7 March 1946.
Security Council proposal, 'We alone will take the initiative.' Yet in an internal memo, the Quai d’Orsay’s Sécrétariat des Conférences, the body responsible for United Nations affairs, developed an argument that outlined the end sought through the Security Council proposal. The goal of the French initiative was not portrayed as anything more than salvaging France from its isolation on Spanish policy:

What goal does our request seek to achieve? And what practical conclusion do we want really to find in the Council? It must appear that the decision that we have made to close our borders and to break economic relations was not only a unilateral act, but in some way an international sanction taken in relation to the [Yalta] Declaration of 13 February 1945, and motivated at the present by the new evidence that the Government of General Franco did act, and continues to act... as a 'satellite of the Axis'. We must ask members of the Security Council to take equivalent economic sanctions.

Increasingly there was some public expression of support for the Quai’s need to find an Allied solution instead of continuing down the road of unilateral French action. As before, the official newspaper of the MRP supported to the letter the Government policy and congratulated Bidault on his tenacity, maintaining his desire to associate the United States and Great Britain with any French action. In Paris, François Mauriac, writing in the conservative daily Le Figaro, warned that France had to abandon its ‘personal policy’ and align with its Western Allies in a policy of Realpolitik that tolerated the Franco regime not on its record, but because it represented anti-Communism in a country of strategic importance. Most surprisingly, Combat abandoned

16 Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 27 February 1946. AN Série C/15286.

17 Note General, Secretariat des Conférences, 4 March 1946. MAE Série Z/Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 72.

18 L’Aube, 28 February 1946.

19 Le Figaro, 26 February 1946.
its calls for unilateral French action just before the border closure, and came to support the policy of the Foreign Minister. ‘France alone is not in a position to greatly intimidate Franco’, the editorialist wrote, and it was ‘curious foreign policy’ to allow internal politics guide diplomatic tactics any longer. It concluded that many on the French Centre and Left were ‘naive’ if they thought otherwise.20

While yearning to appease both Allies and internal critics did seem to drive French policy-making toward Spain in this period, there is also evidence that policymakers understood the risks inherent in the project, and anticipated that this proposal, like its earlier ones, would not result in success. Officials in the Foreign Ministry, never strong supporters of a policy of sanctions against Franco, seemed to have taken some lessons from the experience of January and February. There was an underlying acknowledgment that the potential for further developments was not great, and that the Tripartite Note most likely represented the extent that Great Britain, and increasingly the United States, were prepared to move vis-a-vis Spain. The Sécretariat des Conférences admitted that it was unlikely that either Great Britain or the United States would follow the French lead and impose economic sanctions on Spain. Thus, while purportedly attempting to make sanctions international, the French initiative actually had the potential to serve another end. If it was met with a western refusal to embark on a policy of sanction, the Sécretariat argued that:

We must in this case find an honourable retreat in a procedural solution that will consist of a renewed consideration of the question by the Four Powers... The reason for which the texts [are] invoked [i.e. the Yalta Declaration]...are that these texts emerged from conferences of the Great Powers. [The solution] would be to attach France’s name, whose presence, in the case of Spain, would not create great difficulties, [to future

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20 Combat, 23 February 1946.
statements on Spain] in concert with the Three.21

A decision to move consideration of the Spanish case to a forum of Great Powers, such as the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), would counter fears that use of the UN for such a debate could set a precedent for UN involvement in internal affairs, and would remove the issue from the public sphere of the world body, yet at the same time it would also allow France to claim to its domestic opinion that it was continuing to lead on the Spanish question. France believed that references to both the Yalta and Potsdam Declarations gave them a basis for moving the Spanish question off the UN agenda and back to a matter for the Great Powers alone to consider.22

One of the most interesting issues which reveals the Quai d’Orsay’s preparation for retreat was that of Spanish troops on the Pyrenean border. The French note of 27 February 1946 stressed that the Spanish case should be presented to the Security Council ‘as a situation, not a dispute.’23 This difference was important, for if the question was a dispute, the other party, Spain, even if not a United Nations member, would be permitted to appear in front of the Security Council, an outcome none of the three western powers wanted. Moreover, such an approach allowed France to claim that the Spanish issue was not a conflict between nations which threatened French security, but rather that the existence of the Franco regime was a threat to broader international peace and security.

21 Note General, Sécretariat des Conférences, 4 March 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 72.


23 Note Géneral, Secretariat des Conférences, 4 March 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 72. Italics are from the original.
Critics on the Left were stunned by this decision. Resistance and party propaganda on the Spanish issue had consistently portrayed opposition to Franco not only as a matter of principle, but also as one of security. The linkage of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco in the French press sought not only to draw ideological parallels, but historical ones, for these were the men that had attacked the French Republic. In March, 1946, as the Security Council proposal was being considered, *L'Humanité* printed detailed maps which showed extensive Spanish troop deployment along France’s border, highlighting not only the numbers of armed forces, but also the existence of German Nazis within them. The war was not really over, and the security of France was why international actions had to be taken, in the eyes of the PCF organ.\(^\text{24}\) In the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly, Edouard Herriot wondered why France had not chosen to stress the immediate crisis situation which the troops represented. Salomon Grumbach, the Chair of the Commission, concurred with Herriot’s implication that the absence of any reference to the Spanish military only weakened France’s argument.\(^\text{25}\) Grumbach met privately with Bidault to stress the military threat, and Bidault refused to move. The United States and Great Britain, he reported, did not believe that Spanish troop deployments represented a threat to international peace and France would not challenge Anglo-American judgment on that point. Bidault’s conclusion, as reported by Grumbach, emphasized not only that the troop issue was moot, but that retreat from a position of principle was not that far off. ‘The Government has done what was asked of it,’ Grumbach reported Bidault as saying, ‘and now we will wait to see what

\(^{24}\) *L’Humanité*, 15 March 1946,

\(^{25}\) Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 15 March 1946. **AN** Série C/15286.
The idea that Spanish troops on the Pyrenees represented a threat to French and international security infuriated the French Minister in Madrid, Bernard Hardion. Although the French Foreign Ministry indicated to the Americans and the British that this was not, in fact, the basis for their claim on Security Council competency, the publicity given to the issue in France did not go unnoticed. To counter the effect of such reports, Hardion met with his American and British colleagues, Philip Bonsal and Sir Victor Mallet, both of whom had sent their military attaches to the border region to investigate. Their conclusions, relayed to Paris by Hardion on 17 March 1946, indicated that the total number of troops in the border area was half that at the time the war ended. Furthermore, new units arriving were there in part to stop infiltrations from France but also because the end of winter marked the normal time of troop movements in Spain. Finally, no extra reservists had been called up by the Spanish government. Taken together, these troop deployments were not unusual and were ‘entirely defensive.’ Hardion told Mallet that he was completely occupied with ‘disabusing’ Paris of the notion that there was a serious chance of Spanish aggression or threat and that he ‘deplored’ the position that the French Government had taken with regard to Franco’s Spain. The frustration of officials with a policy that was

26 Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 20 March 1946. AN Série C/15286.


28 Mallet to Foreign Office, 16 March 1946. PRO FO 371/60421/Z2601.
deemed not to be working was becoming evident.

At this stage in the relationship between France and Spain, the complexity, and indeed confusion, of motivations and sentiments made French policy difficult to decipher. The long-standing hesitation of the Quai d’Orsay to advocate a policy of sanction, the search for domestic appeasement, Bidault’s desire to maintain concerted action, and the beginnings of retreat are all evident in the proposals made during March 1946. An approach toward Spain which combined practicality and principle appeared less and less possible. The argument has been made that in the aftermath of the García execution, France moved toward a ‘politics of intervention’. In actual fact, the time during which French calls for interventionist tactics dominated foreign policy planning was before the García execution, in the heady atmosphere of December 1945 to February 1946. There was a strong belief within the Quai d’Orsay that public opinion since that time had been constraining, not empowering. Difficulty with its allies and a reawakening of the Quai’s own reluctance to lead world opinion on the subject of Spain meant that, increasingly from March 1946, France was willing to consider an honourable retreat.

Unable to change much publicly, despite whatever intentions existed privately, the Quai d’Orsay and Bidault were not yet free from the difficulty which Spanish policy had produced. The French Security Council proposal coincided with the British decision that the Tripartite Statement represented the full extent of intervention they were prepared to undertake. Fear of renewed civil war inside Spain, and fear of communist success and Soviet influence in any

29 Anne Dulphy, ‘La politique de la France’, 129. Paola Brundu states that although France gave up the role as ‘motor’ against Spain in April, it was not until July 1946 that it would resume a policy of coordination with the western powers. Brundu, ‘L’Espagne franquiste’, 176-177.
Spanish conflict remained the primary factors behind the Foreign Office’s consideration of policy options in Spain. Indeed, the French Ambassador in London René Massigli reported that British policy toward Spain was motivated by anti-Communist and anti-Soviet motives which were increasingly dominating traditional British reasons for non-intervention. Like Kennan in the United States, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was, in 1946, even more fearful of proceeding within the UN because of his belief that the Soviet Union was ‘only too anxious to make trouble over Spain’ and that ‘by suggesting reference of the Spanish question to the Security Council the French are simply playing the Russian game.’

In light of this analysis, it was not surprising that economic sanctions such as proposed by France were quickly rejected. Derrick Hoyer-Millar, Counsellor in the Foreign Office’s Western Department, returned to long-standing arguments in his articulation of the British opposition to sanctions:

we should not apply any form of economic sanctions unless and until we are virtually certain that their imposition will bring about the almost immediate collapse of Franco and his replacement by a Government at the same time acceptable to the majority of Spaniards and to ourselves; and furthermore even in that event we should not impose economic sanctions unless we are convinced that this is the only way of getting rid of Franco....

Hoyer-Millar’s opposition to sanctions was supported by the Treasury and other departments concerned with trade and economic matters. Again, traditional reasons for non-intervention in

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30 Massigli to Jean Chauvel, 5 March 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 72.

31 Bevin to Duff Cooper, 2 March 1946. DBPO Series I, vol VII, 18.

32 Minute by Hoyer-Millar, 27 February 1946. DBPO Series I, vol VII, 26(a).
Spain complemented Bevin’s anti-Soviet stance. The decision against sanctions also developed from an ongoing economic approach to Spain typified by a Board of Trade survey of October, 1945 which indicated that Spain, due to its need to replace Germany as a trading partner, offered ‘special opportunities of trade development for United Kingdom manufactures’ in competition with countries such as Switzerland. Sanctions, they concluded, would harm Britain in the short-term as raw material and foodstuff deliveries would be lost, and opportunities such as the ongoing program to recover German assets in Spain would be compromised. Furthermore, sanctions on items such as oil would only be effective if a large number of countries participated, which was unlikely. In addition, there was the fear that the enforcement of sanctions would require British monitoring at Gibraltar and Portugal, which would stretch British resources and potentially harm relations with Portugal. Finally, there was a concern that sanctions applied against Spain would set a precedent and lead to calls for sanctions against Juan Péron’s similarly authoritarian Catholic regime in Argentina, where Britain also had important economic interests. For the British the decision was clearly against sanctions and diplomatic rupture.

The British position against any further initiative was reinforced on 15 March 1946 with a report from the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the British Chiefs of Staff. Its conclusion was that foreign pressure on Spain, such as the imposition of French sanctions and the issuance of the Tripartite Declaration, had only served to reinforce the position of General Franco in power, and that Franco had been able to exploit the population’s fear of renewed civil war and


34 Sir Oliver Harvey to Sir Victor Mallet, 8 March 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 26i(a).
Communist infiltration so as to represent himself as the only leader capable of defending Spain from foreign interference. The result was that there was little chance of any popular uprising, and absolutely no indication that the monarchist generals in the army planned to overthrow Franco in the near future. The French proposal to move the debate to the Security Council would serve no purpose other than as ‘an easy rally cry for Spanish nationalism and xenophobia’ which Franco would further exploit, and ‘even if considerable quantities of arms were sent into the country, economic sanctions would only make a rising likely if they were applied for a considerable time and on such a scale as to cut off wheat from all sources, including the Argentine, and to cause economic chaos and widespread hunger.’ Such devastation would only bring civil war, not regime transition, and foreign intervention, primarily Soviet, but potentially French as well. The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee supported a continuation of the current Anglo-American policy, one of quiet diplomatic pressure.35 As early as 2 March, Ernest Bevin informed Duff Cooper that he considered the French proposal ‘most ill-advised.’ Duff Cooper delivered Bevin’s objections to the Quai d’Orsay on 4 March.36

Within the Truman Administration, it appeared as if the French note received a better reception than in London, although the end result, rejection, was the same. From Washington, Ambassador Georges Bonnet informed the Foreign Ministry that State Department Director of the Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews, had told him the United States was ‘sympathetic’ to the French proposal, although Matthews’ own minutes of that meeting do not

35 ‘Possible Developments in the Situation in Spain: Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee’ J.I.C. (46) 23 (0), 15 March 1946. DBPO Series I, VII. 26ii.

indicate that any hint of support was given.\textsuperscript{37} In the end, the conclusion that there was no basis for moving to the Security Council was quickly reached. The American response was particularly focused on the use of the United Nations Charter by France to achieve certain ends. To Caffrey, the Secretary of State James Byrnes stated that ‘we do not understand how failure of Franco to give impression abroad that he was preparing evolution of internal regime brings [the] matter within [the] terms of charter.’ Similarly, on the subject of political executions like García’s, ‘deplorable as these may be, we do not understand how they can be considered as being likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.’ The troop movements of Franco’s army on the Pyrenean border were also not considered a threat.\textsuperscript{38} The American note was delivered to Bidault by Caffrey on 9 March 1946. Unlike the British note, it did not ask the French to abandon their proposal, but reaffirmed American opposition to Franco and declined association with the French initiative based on Charter issues.\textsuperscript{39}

Despite this more gracious response to France’s Security Council note, the growing role of anti-Communism was strong, and becoming stronger, within the American Administration. Bonnet reported that while there remained divisions within the State Department on the question of intervention in Spain, he could not neglect the growing belief within the United States that only the Soviets could benefit from a more interventionist policy towards Spain, and he


\textsuperscript{38} Byrnes to Caffrey, 8 March 1946. \textit{FRUS 1946}, vol V, 1048-1049.

emphasized that the question of Soviet policy had played ‘an important role’ in the final
decision. And, as noted earlier, it was George F. Kennan’s 1 March 1946 comment on the
Soviet Union, France and the Spanish issue that had featured prominently in both American and
British discussions. Therefore, as a result of both traditional positions of non-intervention and
developing viewpoints that placed the policy towards Spain in a broader international context,
both the United States and Great Britain rejected Bidault’s proposal to take the Spanish issue to
the United Nations Security Council. The Soviet Union, however, responded favourably to
Bidault’s proposal. The Soviets believed, like many French, that the UN might be just the
instrument to use in order to achieve a unified position against Franco. Yet in light of France’s
continued effort to maintain Allied coordination on the Spanish question and make an effort to
appease domestic pressure, this was the worst case scenario. Soviet support, in light of the
increased influence of anti-Communism vis-a-vis Spain in Britain and the United States,
foreshadowed defeat.

Georges Bidault was growing more and more frustrated with the course of France’s
Spanish policy and his inability to reconcile domestic pressure and alliance unity. He openly


42 Swain, ‘Stalin and Spain’ in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds., Spain in an International Context, 253.

43 Qasim Ahmad has written, ‘Real or imagined, the communist bogey served to justify further the refusal of the West to take or endorse precipitate actions against the Generalissimo.’ Ahmad, ‘Britain and the Isolation of Franco’ in Lietz and Dunthorn, eds., Spain in an International Context, 228.
displayed his attitude to both his American and British allies by stating that he personally did not support any further action on Spain, including the proposed move to place the issue on the Security Council agenda. He cast the policy decision almost entirely as an aspect of the French Government's domestic policy. In conversation with Duff Cooper, Bidault indicated his lack of enthusiasm for the project but concluded that Spain was not a matter on which he wished to oppose other ministers and thus threaten to break up the French Government. After the positive Soviet reply, Bidault confided to Caffrey that he was 'on the spot' over the way the whole thing had worked out.

The purpose of such frankness was to counteract Anglo-American suspicions that French policy was increasingly directed by the Communist Party and that Bidault was a weak figure within the government. It was hoped that France's Allies might have some sympathy for the position Bidault found himself in, and thus help create a 'way out' for the Quai d'Orsay. Other French officials followed Bidault's lead in attempting to portray the French government as one whose policy-making options were defined almost entirely by the passions of an entire population. In Washington, French Embassy official Armand Berard attempted with little success to convince an American newspaper reporter that the anti-Franco reaction in France was being misinterpreted in the U.S. as Communist-inspired, when in fact it was a much broader 'national reaction'. At the end of March, the French Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs,

44 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 4 March 1946. PRO FO 371/60421/Z2077.

45 Caffrey to Byrnes, 12 March 1946. NARA RG 59, State Department Central Files, 751.52/3-1246.

46 J.Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation to Frederick B. Lyon, Chief, Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, State Department, 14 March 1946. NARA RG 59, State
Schneiter, a member of the MRP like Bidault, met with U.S. Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson. He stated that while Bidault was unsatisfied with the fact that France now stood aligned with the Soviets over Spain, the Foreign Minister was under 'unrelenting' pressure domestically and Schneiter hoped that 'there would be a greater recognition...of the delicacy of M. Bidault’s present position in the French Government and that this recognition would take concrete form through the aligning of this government [the United States] with some of the foreign policies which M. Bidault is advocating.' Acheson expressed interest in this situation, but he promised nothing.

Such openness on the part of Bidault and his officials produced two distinct, and contradictory, responses from the Anglo-Americans. There did exist a real fear in London and Washington that the constraints of domestic politics the Foreign Minister complained about were real. There is evidence that this approach did elicit, at the least, some sympathy for Bidault and the Quai d'Orsay. Elements within both the Foreign Office and the State Department did acknowledge that the precariousness of postwar parliamentary politics had played a role in all of France’s efforts since December, 1945. In London, René Massigli gave newly-appointed Deputy Undersecretary of State Sir Oliver Harvey the distinct impression that he was also opposed to the Security Council plans, but explained at length the weak position of Bidault within the Government. There was a small group in the Foreign Office that found themselves

Department Central Records, 751.52/3-1446.

47 Memorandum of Conversation, 27 March 1946. NARA RG 59, State Department Central Records, 751.52/3-2746.

48 Oliver Harvey minute, 5 March 1946. PRO FO 371/ 60421/Z1998.
in a real bind, for they acknowledged that Bidault was ‘simply a victim of the unreasoning passions of powerful sections of the French public....’ Harvey even went so far as to ask Duff Cooper to assess the possibility of Bidault’s MRP being thrown out of the coalition government to be replaced by a Socialist-Communist *Front Populaire* that would begin its term by linking French policy on Spain closer to the Soviet position, and would in turn demand more action in the UN and elsewhere. However, frustration with Bidault and the Quai d’Orsay for their collective inability to ‘manage’ foreign policy properly was also evident. French behaviour, minuted Peter Garran on 5 March, gave the Spanish a ‘very strong case’ at ‘playing the injured innocent’. The next day, Derrick Hoyer-Millar went even further, chastising Bidault for being the ‘feeble creature that he is’, unable to control his own foreign policy. Bevin’s frustration with the French reflected that of his Foreign Office advisors, for he concluded, ‘We have impression that M. Bidault is so obsessed by his own domestic political difficulties that he is thinking merely of the day to day issues and shirking the long-term complications.’ American Secretary of State James Byrnes was equally unsympathetic, commenting that regardless of domestic politics, all three Governments were ‘on the spot’ due to French actions that ‘do not appear to have been thought through and which we regard as fundamentally contrary to the best interests of the three

49 Sloan minute, 6 March 1946. *PRO FO 371/ 60421/ z2077.*


51 Garran minute, 5 March 1946. *PRO FO 371/60421/Z2028.*

52 Bevin to Duff Cooper, 2 March 1946. *DBPO Series 1, VII, 18.*
governments...and particularly the French themselves.' By the middle of March, the *New York Times* reported that French diplomatic exchanges increasingly represented ‘an embarrassed effort to justify a policy in which the [French] Foreign Office does not believe.’

French efforts to appeal for sympathy did not change Anglo-American policy, but rather softened the blow when the Allies finally rejected France’s proposal to discuss Spain at the Security Council. When Byrnes made the decision to reject Bidault’s plan, he told Caffrey that while he desired the Ambassador to give Bidault a sense of Byrnes’ own personal anger with the French Government over Spain, how Caffrey chose to inform the French was left to him alone ‘in view of the internal political situation in France, particularly Bidault’s personal position....’

If anything, the emphasis the French placed on domestic constraints reinforced anti-Communist motivations that State Department officials used to reject France’s own proposals. The strategic role of both Spain and France in the developing Cold War became linked to France’s UN proposals. There was a real fear, at this point, that the Communists could come to power in France on their own, and that the PCF was a ‘powerful, disciplined, totalitarian political machine slavishly obedient to Moscow.’ On 22 March 1946, the head of the State Department’s French Desk, Warner, stopped in Madrid on his way to France. He met with José Maria Doussingue, the Political Director of the Spanish Foreign Ministry. Warner told Doussingue that

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both Great Britain and the United States believed France's policies toward Spain were increasingly under the influence of the PCF and its trade union, the CGT, despite Bidault's personal opposition to such a scenario. Warner expressed confidence that Bidault and the civil servants of the Foreign Ministry would ultimately prevail, but he emphasized the 'gravity' of current circumstances, and warned that Spain must be prepared for more public criticism of its regime. The visit was an effort to reassure the Spaniards that the West was not against them. The Spanish minutes of this meeting note with some surprise that Warner spoke of his 'admiration' for Spanish reconstruction efforts and emphasized that the U.S. official did not raise any complaints about Spanish internal politics, which was considered a first for someone from the State Department. Warner also met French minister Bernard Hardion and left him with the impression that 'the State Department judges the Spanish question more and more as part of the French problem.' He also reported that 'in order to find on our soil a pressure point necessary for Anglo-Saxon resistance against the Soviet Union, the American and British Governments are resigned to place their hostility to Franco momentarily aside....' Any move toward a Spanish regime that included Communists was seen as a victory for the French Communists and thus for the Soviet Union. This now became a far more important aspect of the U.S. analysis than it had been previously.

In the face of the Anglo-American rejection of the Security Council proposal, Bidault made further efforts to reconcile domestic and foreign policy concerns while at the same time

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57 Minutes of Meeting, 22 March 1946. MAEE Archivo Renovado, R 1372/22.

58 Hardion to MAE (Paris), 28 March 1946. MAE Série Z/Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 68.
extracting France from a public position of alignment with the Soviet Union alone on the question of Spain. On 12 March, France attempted to propose that a Security Council review of the Spanish case need not result in UN sanctions, but could in fact lead simply to a recommendation that the Four Powers (Britain, France, United States, Soviet Union) study the issue in the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) meetings. In preparation for this second proposal, François Coulet, head of the Quai’s European section, reiterated the fact that what France desired ideologically was a broad anti-Franco policy, one built on ‘practical and concrete’ measures instead of continued rhetoric. Most importantly, however, the real motivation for France’s appeal was found in Coulet’s conclusion. What France sought, in the end, was a decision by the Security Council either to take measures similar to France’s unilateral border closure or direct the CFM to consider a similar measure. In short, France’s unilateral isolation from its Allies, combined with continued domestic pressure, produced a continuing search for honourable retreat. With the possibility of such a retreat becoming less likely, however, the mood of desperation grew. Even as signals from London and Washington clearly were aimed at encouraging the French to end the discussion, France forged ahead, willing to risk public isolation from its western allies in order to avoid declaring to its public that the issue was dead.

Bidault’s second Security Council proposal of 12 March was quickly dismissed by the
two western powers. From London, it was increasingly clear to the French that the Labour Government was not going to budge. Frustration at the British Foreign Office was as strong as ever. In a note to Halifax, in Washington, Bevin chastised the French ‘anxiety...in the face of pressure from their public opinion to “do something” about Spain.’ He went on to conclude that French actions to date only strengthened Franco, appeared as Communist-inspired, and any further action was ‘unacceptable’ to Great Britain. Britain was prepared to discuss the issue with France and the United States, but only in order to reaffirm that policy would proceed on the established line. An agreement to meet was Bevin’s only concession. He, like the Americans, had concerns about France’s growing sense of isolation from the west. In April, British immobility was reiterated when Bevin strongly defended his Spanish policy at a general meeting of the Labour Party, where he stressed in particular the economic benefits Britain received from Spanish trade and his contention that all of France’s actions combined had only served to strengthen Franco’s position further. Even amongst American policymakers, some of whom continued to believe Franco should be removed, there was an unwillingness to carry on in the UN or elsewhere. Simply put, the Americans considered any number of other international


62 Bevin to Halifax, 30 March 1946. DBPO Series I, vol VII, 26iii. To French Ambassador René Massigli, Bevin underlined his dislike of Franco but argued the most effective way to change the Spanish regime was through non-intervention and quiet diplomacy. Massigli to MAE, 14 March 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 72.

problems much more urgent, and, in light of that fact and the resolution with which the British Foreign Office continued to reject all French proposals, what State Department officials desired most of all was the removal of the Spanish question from public and private discussions amongst the Allies, at least in the short term.64

With the rejection of France's 12 March note, Bidault decided to withdraw his recommendation that the Security Council discuss the Spanish question.65 Grasping at his final opportunity, namely the fact that the western powers had not officially asked him to stop discussing Spain, Bidault did not yet abandon his search for a policy option which fell short of a full retreat. France embraced the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) as the best place to hold the discussion on Spain. This option would allow talks to be held amongst the three western allies and the Soviet Union, just as France's Security Council initiative would have. Furthermore, behind the closed doors of four-power summitry, France hoped to find an easier ways to avoid 'becoming isolated with the USSR against an Anglo-Saxon coalition.'66 Foreign Ministry officials expressed the hope that within the less legal setting of the CFM, negotiations could proceed, deals could be struck, perhaps even by suggesting that the French might concede some Ruhr issues in return for joint action on Spain. Finally, discussions about the construction of an

64 Bonnet to MAE, 16 March 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 72.


alternative Spanish regime could be addressed. None of these opportunities would have been provided in a Security Council discussion. Bidault approached both Governments to propose joint talks with the Soviets on a range of subjects such as the possibility of imposing commodity-specific economic sanctions against Franco and the nature of an alternative regime in Spain. The British were completely opposed to involving the Soviet Union or having discussions on a topic such as the future Spanish regime. Thus the CFM format was rejected. The Anglo-Americans did agree, however, to a tripartite meeting on the subject. The French were back where they had begun in December, 1945.

Frustration, disappointment and anxiety with France’s increasingly desperate policy towards Spain was not only apparent within the two western Governments, but inside the Quai d’Orsay as well. Bidault’s evident frustration and opposition to the direction of French policy has already been noted. From London, René Massigli wondered whether or not the Quai had indeed lost control of its own policy:

Spanish policy has, in my mind, taken a bad turn. Communist action is a strong force at home; the Socialists, who only see fire, gallop ahead in order not to be passed by themselves...here [in London] they worry about the goal that all these manoeuvres aim for, and they are inclined to see, more and more in this affair, the hand of Russia. I do not know what to think. But appearances do not contradict this interpretation...this Spanish matter is so moving, it is so dominated at home by considerations of internal politics...Set

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69 Bevin to Duff Cooper, 30 March 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 26iii.

70 Bonnet to MAE, 8 April 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 72.
Massigli’s plea for guidance could not be answered by Paris. The French goal from December, 1945 had been to take advantage of an unique opportunity to construct a positive and united Allied policy which sought to alter Spain’s regime in a manner which domestic and Resistance opinion desired. In short, it was an attempt to combine rational alliance politics with domestic idealistic ideological visions. Furthermore, especially on the question of Spain, it was an opportunity particularly open to a France enlivened by the legacy of the Resistance, building its own democracy anew and wishing to see similar efforts south of the Pyrenees. Such a vision, however, was never really shared by the Quai d’Orsay, and, faced with opposition from its Anglo-American allies, French diplomatic efforts on the question of Spain came to resemble a policy based on desperation. Especially after the public mobilization around the execution of Cristino García and the closure of the French-Spanish border, where the Resistance links to Spanish democracy were closest, Georges Bidault and his advisors seemed motivated only by a desire to avoid both isolation from the Anglo-Americans and public embarrassment. The result was a policy which sought any sort of agreement on Spain to take home, instead of one constructed on rational assessments of both domestic opinion and alliance politics. In an appearance before the Foreign Affairs Commission at the end of March, Bidault expressed only a desire to leave the Spanish case alone, for he contrasted the material benefits lost by France through border closure with the moral benefits gained. ‘Politics,’ he concluded, ‘is justly the art

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of choosing between two inconveniences.\textsuperscript{72}

The end of French efforts to lead the Allies toward a new Spanish policy was not only apparent to Bernard Hardion in Madrid, but something which he actively sought. Hardion, already on record as opposed to most of the actions the Government in Paris had taken on Spain since January, furiously worked to oppose further French initiatives. While he acknowledged that the Tripartite Note had been received with ‘satisfaction’ by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to its lack of concrete measures against Spain, he believed that in and of itself the note was sufficient as an expression of policy and that nothing need follow it. Hardion underlined that while the Spanish external opposition might call for more economic sanctions, the mass of the population wanted the exit of Franco, but without the threat of civil war or a Communist regime. The Tripartite Note, Hardion argued, helped to solidify anti-Francoism without threatening intervention and chaos, and in the final analysis that was a worthy position to hold for the long-term.\textsuperscript{73}

In Paris, officials acknowledged Hardion’s reports but continued to work toward an Allied effort that went beyond the Tripartite Statement. Plans for a tripartite discussion on Spain proceeded, with a date of late April likely.\textsuperscript{74} Before this, however, French policy would again be steered off track by other events. As the French announced their decision to abandon the forum of the Security Council in pursuit of a Spanish policy, Poland decided to take up the cause within

\textsuperscript{72} Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 27 March 1946. AN Série C/ 15286.

\textsuperscript{73} Hardion to Bidault, 8 March 1946. MAE Serie Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 67.

\textsuperscript{74} Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 11 & 12 March 1946; Minute by Sir Oliver Harvey, 12 April 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 26iii.
the UN's highest body. This was not completely unexpected. On 18 March, in conversation with
Duff Cooper, Georges Bidault had expressed not only his fear of the 'unpleasant possibility' that
France and the Soviet Union would oppose the western allies on the question of Spain, but that
even if France abandoned their proposal, the Soviets could induce the Ukraine or Poland to raise
the issue.75 When news came of the Polish initiative, Bidault was exasperated:

Just at the moment where we received the note of Mr. Caffrey that informed us of our first positive result of our efforts in Washington and London, the Polish request to put the subject of Spain before the Security Council risks the emergence of an element of confusion likely to slow down the development of negotiations.76

In the initial days after the Polish motion to the Security Council became public, Great Britain and the United States continued to renew their promise to France that discussions on Spain should be held amongst the three allies, and talks were scheduled for London near the end of April.77 As the issue developed in the Security Council, however, talks were postponed, and there is no record of them ever taking place. Bidault's exasperation, therefore, was well founded.

The Polish decision to carry on where France had failed put the French in an extraordinarily delicate position. France's policy, from December, 1945 through to its own Security Council initiatives, had been based on promoting a more aggressive policy toward Spain.

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77 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 11 April 1946, 12 April 1946; Minute by Sir Oliver Harvey, 12 April 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 26iii.
only with the support and joint leadership of its two western allies, Great Britain and the United States. The UN debate that began in April, 1946 was significant because France emerged, on the surface, as 'the European power the most hostile to the Franco regime' within the United Nations. The reality, however, was that the public position France was forced to adopt did not reflect the underlying combination of complication and confusion behind French policy toward Franco’s Spain. The leadership of the Quai d’Orsay, from Bidault through to Hardion in Madrid, was extremely reluctant to have had France play the role of international moral crusader on its own. When they finally seemed to be moving closer to abandoning policies which placed France in an increasingly risky position within the western alliance, the Polish proposal forced them publicly to return to earlier ideological stances which Great Britain and the United States could not support.

By March, the Foreign Ministry sought room to prepare for a retreat from the burdens of ideological leadership. Domestic politics, however, imposed real and imagined constraints on French diplomats that meant even such a retreat had to conform to very specific conditions. By the end of March, the Foreign Ministry seemed willing to accept that, for a time, France’s unilateral sanction against Spain would stand, that domestic opinion and allied policy could not work in unison on Spain, and that the matter should only be discussed with the Anglo-Americans behind closed doors. The Polish initiative destroyed what little satisfaction Bidault had left, for in making policy toward Spain over the previous months not only a matter of allied exchange, but also of public record, Bidault would be unable to instruct the French delegation at the United

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Nations to do anything but support Poland. Henri Bonnet, temporary head of the French UN delegation, understood that France had no other option but to support Poland. If France opposed the Polish initiative, domestic criticism would be intense. Even though France had agreed to hold off on any Spanish initiatives until a meeting with the Americans and British took place, criticism of France over opposition to Poland would create a situation far worse, even 'an impression prejudicial to our interests.'

Bidault’s instructions to the French delegation emphasized the above points. If the issue of competence was raised, that is, the issue of whether or not the Security Council even had the right to examine the Spanish case, then France had to support the Polish motion in light of its own earlier initiatives, and similarly France had to argue that UN sanctions could be applied against Spain in the same manner that France had applied its own sanctions in closing the Pyrenean border. The Foreign Minister was not willing, however, to go much beyond this. He reminded the French delegates that throughout the entire affair, France’s policy had been solely in pursuit of a ‘tangible policy’ and therefore any action by the Security Council had to have the unanimous support of the five permanent members. Bidault wrote that, ‘under grave risk to the policy we ourselves defend, we cannot go further along the path that we have opened without the policy alignment of the other Great Powers.’ France had abandoned its leadership role yet Bidault could not completely walk away.

The response of Great Britain and the United States to news of the Polish initiative did

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79 Bonnet to MAE, 7 April 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 72.

not bode well for France. Britain's representative to the UN, Sir Alexander Cadogan, characterized the Security Council 'solely as a sounding board for mischievous propaganda' and the debate on the Spanish case, like the debates regarding Greece and Iran, was to him 'unreal.'\(^{81}\)

The United States took a strictly legal interpretation of the UN Charter that led to two positions, both of which meant opposition to the Polish motion. First, the United States did not believe that the Charter gave the Security Council rights to intervene in internal affairs, and that therefore actions like the Tripartite Statement represented the limits of non-intervention. Furthermore, as to Poland's other claim, that the Franco regime constituted a threat to international security, the Director of the State Department's Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews, maintained that the United States must argue that, 'We have no information indicating that Spain has threatened or is threatening the security of France or any other state.' He concluded, 'If the Spanish question is raised in the Security Council we feel that the U.S. Representative should not hesitate to state that in the view of the United States Government, based on our present evidence, the Council does not have jurisdiction.'\(^{82}\)

On 17 April 1946, the Polish delegate, Oskar Lange, introduced the issue of Spain onto the Security Council agenda and stated that the Franco regime, 'is the lone survivor of the Axis in a world of international peace and justice to which the United Nations is committed, a dangerous remnant of the enemies which they defeated at such tremendous cost of blood and

\(^{81}\) Cadogan to Bevin, 18 April 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 36.

\(^{82}\) H. Freeman Matthews to Acheson, Cohen and Bohlen, 21 March 1946. NARA Matthews-Hickerson Papers.
Lange's charges against Spain were based on four factors. The first two were historical, including Franco's involvement with the Axis powers during the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War. In addition, Lange argued that two postwar situations made Spain a threat that should concern the Security Council. The first was represented by recent troop movements along the Pyrenean border which, Lange argued, were part of 'the constant intrigues of the Franco regime against the French Republic.' Second, the harbouring of German agents and assets in Spain, including the hiding of German atomic scientists, made Spain a threat to international peace and security. Lange proposed that the Security Council declare Spain a threat to international peace and security under articles 34 and 39 of the Charter, and thus request all UN members maintaining diplomatic relations with Spain to break them, as per article 41.

Immediately following Lange's opening comments, Henri Bonnet spoke on behalf of France. Bonnet reviewed the international and inter-allied approach France had taken toward the question of Spain since December, and asserted that what France sought was not only another statement on Spain, but practical action by the international community similar to France's unilateral border closure. In comments aimed particularly at the United States and Great Britain, Bonnet supported Lange's proposed resolution by arguing that it was legitimate for the Security Council to consider the issue of Spain as one that was not about internal politics, but rather about


'international peace and security' as stated in Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter.\textsuperscript{86} In short, moving to the forum of the UN via the Polish motion, despite France’s previous failures, forced France to stick to its established policy. In this spirit, Bonnet concluded with a statement that was at once both an appeal to the ideologically dominated domestic opinion and a plea to the Security Council to end France's isolation:

Moral condemnations, however valuable, are no longer sufficient...[France] has given tangible proof of this attitude in the problem now before us: first, it welcomed the Spanish Republican Government to French territory; secondly, anticipating the measures which might be adopted by the Council, it severed economic and frontier relations with Spain in spite of the losses and damages involved.\textsuperscript{87}

Just as the French argument had not convinced the United States or Great Britain in inter-allied notes and talks, it was unable to do so within the forum of the Security Council. Sir Alexander Cadogan, speaking for Great Britain, not only rejected claims of competency for the Security Council to deal with the matter, but he also attacked the nature of the Polish charges. Cadogan claimed that Polish accusations against Spain were based primarily on Franco's early wartime policy, between 1940-1943, and that between 1943-1945, Franco had in fact aided the Allies in important ways. He further argued that Polish estimates of Spanish troop deployment along the Pyrenees were grossly exaggerated.\textsuperscript{88} Edward Stettinius concurred, and stated that the


United States Government could not agree with the Polish charges as presented.89 United States policy, however, differed from the British in one important aspect which suggested to the French that there was a still path open toward honourable retreat. The policy advocated by the United States allowed that while the United States stood against the Polish motion, there was no need, at this point, to dismiss the Spanish case from the Security Council agenda altogether. In reality, the United States did not want to vote at all on the Polish motion, for they were fearful of the propaganda value Spain and Franco could derive from a motion that would clearly be defeated by the United States and Great Britain. With Spain on the continuing agenda, the Security Council could appoint a sub-committee or refer matters to the General Assembly, which had already censured Spain, and thus send the message that 'the situation in Spain still continues to be of concern to the international community.'90 Officials at the State Department were not the only ones thinking along these lines, and on the second day of debate in New York, the Australian delegate Colonel Hodgson presented a resolution to create such a sub-committee in order to establish facts for the Security Council members before they considered possible resolutions or action.91 Bonnet welcomed the Australian proposal, seeing in it a 'compromise' that was ideal for France, for it clearly placed Spain on the Security Council agenda. Moreover, Bonnet observed, it seemed to be sufficient for the United States to accept the proposal in order to appease its own liberal opinion. An American move, Bonnet observed.


90 Byrnes to Stettinius, 12 April 1946. FRUS 1946 vol V, p. 1068.

might force Cadogan to abandon his 'completely negative attitude'. The Ambassador pledged to work on promoting the Australian resolution in order to ensure that France’s fear of another ‘divergence between the Great Powers on the Spanish situation’, would not come to pass.

Once again, subtle differences amongst the Anglo-Saxon powers regarding Spain gave France a glimmer of hope that their goal might be able to be realized. And once again, the differences between the United States and Great Britain were not as wide as France suspected. To the British, who strongly opposed the Australian motion, the United States argued that their aims were the same as Cadogan’s, namely to discourage any Security Council action on Spain. However, they argued, public and international tension over the Spanish question would not dissipate, and thus had to be addressed in a manner that the Sub-Committee could offer. Furthermore, the Americans argued that, if anything, the Committee could reveal information about the activity of French and Spanish Communists in France on the subject of Spain, which would be an advantage to the west. The British abstained from voting, and in London Sir Oliver Harvey wrote that any effort to remove Franco had been ‘completely wrecked by this policy of intervention’ on the part of France and other countries. On 29 April, after some re-writing of Hodgson’s initial resolution, the Security Council referred the Spanish question to a Sub-

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93 Bonnet (New York) to MAE, 26 April 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 72.


95 Harvey Minute, 24 April 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 42ii.
Committee that consisted of the Australian, Brazilian, Chinese, French and Polish delegates.96

The Sub-Committee, under the Chair of the Australian Evatt, set about its task by soliciting Security Council and other United Nations members to provide it with any information regarding the activities of the Spanish Government. Not surprisingly, the primary documentation was provided by the American, British and French governments. In addition, a presentation from José Giral, head of the Spanish Republican Government-in-exile, was heard. Nine questions posed by the Sub-Committee constituted the range of the enquiry. These were the nature of the Franco regime; the attitude of the regime towards the Axis during the Second World War; the extent of German involvement in Spain; the current military situation in Spain; the extent of military and war goods production ongoing in Spain; the persecution of Republicans and others for political reasons; the detention by Franco of non-Spanish nationals; pro-fascist and pro-Falangist activities outside Spain; and the international repercussions of the existence of the Franco regime.97

The Sub-Committee process left the French hopeful but not convinced that a solution to their dilemma existed. Exactly how to reach France’s desired conclusion, some kind of UN sanction that went beyond the Tripartite Declaration and ended France’s isolation on the question of sanctions, was unclear to the French themselves. Forced into the Security Council action after a reluctant acceptance of defeat, unable to speak freely for fear of alienating public opinion,


97 Bidault (Paris) to Parodi (New York), 24 May 1946. MAE Série Z/Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 73.
unable to pursue a sanctions option aggressively for fear of further eroding its alliance with Great Britain and the United States. French officials confined themselves to watching, listening and speculating as to how the Sub-Committee situation could give them the way out they had been seeking for so long. Initially the French delegation was hesitant about making its own submission to the Sub-Committee.\(^9^8\)

The French Foreign Ministry eventually decided that a contribution to the Sub-Committee based on the nine areas of concern had to be made, although the final French submission reflected the wait-and-see attitude adopted by Bonnet and his delegation in New York. No strong desire for a particular result in the Security Council was overtly visible. The French submission was prepared in large part by Bernard Hardion, French Minister in Madrid, who, as has been demonstrated, had long been reluctant to engage in the public anti-Franco stance taken by the Quai d'Orsay. In his report, Hardion was forceful enough in outlining his criticisms of the regime, while at the same time he drew attention to areas in which he believed France had benefitted from relations with Spain. For instance, in response to the question about Franco's attitude during the war, Hardion clearly demonstrated that for much of the war Spain had favoured the Axis, yet also underlined the beginnings of Spanish relations with Algiers and the Free French in early 1943. On the military question, Hardion refuted Poland's assertion that Spain had aided Nazi Germany in atomic research and while he admitted that Spanish troops and fortifications had increased along the Pyrenees since the guerrillero attacks of 1944-1945, he emphasized that the 'one cannot speak of serious fortifications' and that although 170,000 troops

\(^9^8\) Memorandum of Conversation with M. de la Tournelle, by C. Noyes, 16 May 1946. NARA RG 59, State Department Lot Files, Office of European Affairs, Records of the French Desk, 1941-1951.
were in the Pyrenean region, their orders and disposition were ‘entirely defensive.’ Even on the subject of political internees and executions, Hardion noted that while the situation was serious, it was in decline compared to the period immediately following the civil war in 1939. As a result, Hardion’s answer on the subject of repression was augmented by a report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris that detailed those cases of political prisoners which France had intervened in. These included those with ties to the French Resistance, such as Cristino García, as well as those who did not, such as 37 Spanish Socialists condemned in Alcalá de Henares in early 1946. As of May, 1946, France had intervened in 187 cases.

On the question of the wartime role of Franco’s Government, the United States provided information from its collection of captured German and Italian documents that had previously been released in March alongside the Tripartite Statement. Henri Bonnet observed that the opinion of the American delegate, Edward Stettinius, was at times closer to the French position than it was to British delegate Cadogan’s. If the U.S. delegate’s attitude was symbolic of a possible change in the American position, then Bonnet believed that there was a possibility that would ‘permit the Sub-Committee to move much more quickly toward satisfactory conclusions,’ such as the consideration of collective action on the part of the Security Council. Based on the


101 United States, Spain and the Axis.

102 Bonnet (New York) to Direction d’Europe (Paris), 7 May 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 73.
British submission to the Sub-Committee, however, this scenario seemed unlikely. The British delegation focused its efforts on refuting the Polish allegation that Spanish troops along the Pyrenees represented a threat to France and international peace. Within Spain, British Military Attaché Brigadier Torr had spent much of April assessing the frontier situation, as he had consistently since the end of the war. In an interview with the Spanish Army’s Chief of Staff, General García-Valiño, on 3 April 1946, Torr, ‘in strictest confidence’, was provided with exact figures on the Spanish Army’s frontier strength. In short, as Peter Garran noted in a Foreign Office minute, Cadogan had enough to ‘show that the Spanish army dispositions are purely defensive and to counter the exaggerated allegations’ made in New York. This was done, and Bonnet complained to Paris that the British delegate’s response to the Sub-Committee, the first received, was ‘completely founded on the opinions of the British Ambassador in Madrid’.103

While the Sub-Committee itself did not include any of the Permanent Members, it certainly had to be aware of their positions, as it wished to avoid seeing some of the first vetoes used when presenting its report. The Quai d’Orsay, through Hardion’s submission, had not

103 Fourteen divisions were in the border region, with one in reserve, totalling 165,000 troops, deployed in what García-Valiño termed a position that allowed for ‘active defence’, prepared to counter any infiltration from across the border, which he believed would occur on a significant scale only if the Communists won the French elections and Russia sent troops to France for such a purpose. Torr (Madrid) to Foreign Office (London). 3 April 1946. PRO FO 371/ 60422/ z3439. In addition, the Spanish Army arranged for a ‘goodwill tour’ of the border region for the military attachés of Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Chile and Argentina which took place between 1-18 May 1946. Col. Smith-Bingham (Madrid) to MI4, 21 May 1946. PRO FO 371/ 60423/ z5307.

104 Garran minute, 2 May 1946. PRO FO 371/ 60422/ z3957.

105 Bonnet (New York) to MAE (Paris), 7 May 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 73.
provided the new French representative to the United Nations, Alexandre Parodi, with a very strong mandate to act aggressively. By this stage the Quai d'Orsay probably preferred Parodi to be in such a position. While publicly France still appeared as a leader amongst nations concerned with the Spanish question, the opportunity for real French stewardship had ended in March when Bidault abandoned his own Security Council proposal. France's support of Poland's motion was, with few exceptions, not undertaken with enthusiasm. Within the Sub-Committee, France only hoped to avoid a situation that it appeared the British desired, namely the announcement of another statement of moral condemnation along the lines of the Tripartite Statement. The Quai d'Orsay hoped, at best, that the Sub-Committee might call for sanctions that paralleled the Pyrenean border closure. At the very least, they sought a motion that allowed France to retreat honourably from the Security Council by keeping the issue on the United Nations agenda and avoiding a conclusion of UN non-competence. Within the Sub-Committee, then, Parodi argued only for a recommendation in favour of some United Nations action, a position supported by the Polish representative Lange, while the Brazilian representative preferred a policy that corresponded more directly with the Tripartite Statement.\textsuperscript{106}

The final report ended up being a compromise fostered by the Australian chair, Dr. Evatt. It rejected the Polish assertion that Spain posed an immediate threat to peace under article 39 of the Charter. It did agree, however, that the activities of the Franco regime could, in the future, present a threat to peace as defined under article 34. Thus it proposed that the Security Council endorse the Tripartite Statement and encourage the General Assembly to pass a motion

\textsuperscript{106} Cadogan (New York) to Foreign Office (London), 1 June 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 52i.
recommending that all member states end diplomatic relations with Franco.\textsuperscript{107} Representing the two extreme points of view within the Committee, Poland reserved decision on the question of immediate threat and Brazil reserved decision on the idea of recommending action to the General Assembly. Sir Alexander Cadogan was angry, for he deemed the Sub-Committee report 'a put-up job by the Soviet Government' and he believed that the recommendations made 'were doing violence to the Charter.' \textsuperscript{108} Alexandre Parodi, however, was very satisfied with the result of this process. The UN delegate wrote to Bidault that the Sub-Committee had condemned the Franco regime, combined with the recommendation that the General Assembly act in calling for member states to end relations with Franco, constituted a 'happy result and the promise that such a result should pass the Security Council without great difficulty.' \textsuperscript{109} Cadogan's comment gave René Massigli in London some trepidation, and he emphasized to Paris that the British attitude towards Franco had not changed at all, and in fact was further solidified by the return of Peter Garran from Madrid and his news that Franco was growing stronger domestically in light of the international pressure.\textsuperscript{110} The United States wished to avoid any direct action on the part of the


\textsuperscript{110} Massigli to MAE, 7 June 1946. \textit{MAE} Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 74.
UN, but they also hoped that they would not have to use their Security Council veto to stop this. The Sub-Committee proposal seemed to allow them such an outcome.\textsuperscript{111} British officials, meanwhile, still detested the fact that the issue had appeared at the Security Council in the first place, but they conceded that the Sub-Committee’s report ‘might have been worse.’\textsuperscript{112} Both powers wished to get the issue off the Security Council agenda and pass it onto the General Assembly.

In New York, Parodi was willing to live with the limitations sought by the United States and Great Britain. As long as the Security Council did not explicitly instruct the General Assembly to abandon the option of calling for diplomatic rupture, or cut out the Sub-Committee’s recommendations from the text of the resolution, Parodi would be satisfied.\textsuperscript{113} France, finally, appeared to have the international solution it had been seeking, one that could be held up at home as an initiative that responded to domestic concerns as well as one that ended France’s isolated position of sanction enforcer vis-a-vis the Franco regime. Most significantly for the Foreign Ministry, it appeared to hold out the promise that France would no longer be divided from its western allies over the question of Spain. In an act that was both a demonstration of the relief felt by French officials and a reflection of their recent desperation over Spain, Parodi advised Jean Chauvel, Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, to extend

\textsuperscript{111} Bonnet (Washington) to MAE, 4 June and 6 June 1946. MAE Nations Unies et Organisations Internationales/ Sécrétariat des Conférences, 1945-1959, 194.

\textsuperscript{112} Foreign Office to UK Delegation, United Nations, 3 June 1946 and Bevin to Cadogan, 14 June 1946. DBPO Series I, VII, 52 and 52i.

a French apology to British and American officials he dealt with. Now that the end seemed near, he no doubt echoed the sentiments of many with in the Quai d'Orsay, in admitting that a fear of domestic backlash had blinded France to some very basic international realities. He wrote to Chauvel that the apology should be, in effect, a French admission that the UN route was not well chosen, combined with a final plea for support now that the Spanish problem finally seemed resolvable via adoption of the Sub-Committee report.114

Despite this apparent end to the debate, France's dilemma reappeared and would remained a concern for the rest of 1946. A United States motion which called for the Spanish question to be passed on to the General Assembly with the Sub-Committee conclusions and the phrase 'or alternatively such other action' attached to the recommendation for diplomatic rupture, was adopted as friendly by the Sub-Committee members but vetoed by the Soviet Union in a full Security Council vote.115 The Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, concluded that while the Sub-Committee drew the Council's attention to numerous documents which demonstrated the threat posed by Franco, it 'has not dared to draw the right conclusion from all the material it used.' Gromyko stated that Spain represented a threat under Article 39 and that the Security Council, under Article 41, had the right to call on member-states to end diplomatic relations with Franco without consulting the General Assembly.116 By this point in time, Soviet


leaders had abandoned any hope of finding unity with the U.S. and Britain on Spain and were simply hoping to further discredit the West.\textsuperscript{117} The Soviet veto did so by ensuring that the Spanish Question stayed on the Security Council agenda.

For the remainder of June, the Security Council scrambled in an effort to come up with a resolution to the dilemma created by the Soviet veto. In Paris, Georges Bidault had had great confidence in the aftermath of the Sub-Committee report that France's delicate conditions had been met. At one point, he even assured the Spanish delegation in Paris that Parodi would advocate a more moderate position in the Security Council than Bonnet had at the start of the Sub-Committee process.\textsuperscript{118} Yet the Soviet veto had only strengthened American and British desires to be finished with Spain, while France was again hamstrung due to its public position which advocated some form of UN action.\textsuperscript{119} In the aftermath of the Soviet veto, French policy in the Security Council seemed, finally, to unravel in the face of all its competing pressures.

\textsuperscript{117} Swain asserts that once Stalin concluded the West had failed in the attempt to forge a unified policy toward Franco, a gradual process began with the Soviet Union adopting a more and more confrontational approach toward both Franco and the West, one which ultimately included the first effort since the war to supply and support the guerrillero movements in Spain and southern France. Swain, 'Stalin and Spain' in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds., \textit{Spain in an International Context}, 255-261.


\textsuperscript{119} In London, René Massigli made enquiries at the Foreign Office about Anglo-French relations in the aftermath of the UN debate. The British response indicated the extent to which they had become fed up with the French; officials at the Foreign Office referred Massigli to the 1820 State Papers where Castlereagh wrote that Spaniards tolerated intervention in their affairs less than any other European nation, and detested French intervention above all. Massigli rebutted that the model of 1835, where liberal allies France and Britain intervened in Spain was a better example to follow. Clearly the existence of this debate demonstrated that France had lost significant respect. Massigli to Bidault, 1 July 1946. \textit{MAE} Serie Z/Europe 1944-1949/Espagne, 68.
During the month of June, Parodi's voting was inconsistent, at best, although he did not offer up any comment. He voted alongside Poland, Mexico and the Soviet Union, and against Britain and the United States, to break relations with Spain. Two days later, he voted alongside the U.S. and Great Britain, and against a Soviet veto, for an Australian proposal that would simply keep the Spanish question on the Security Council agenda. Later, he abstained on a Soviet resolution that would mandate that such reconsideration be undertaken by 1 September 1946. Eventually the main points of the Australian resolution were passed, after numerous Soviet vetoes, and the Spanish question was referred to the General Assembly while remaining on the Security Council agenda.

Domestic opinion would not accept a full retreat during 1946. While the extent of coverage in the French political press of the United Nations debate on Spain was nothing like the situation from December, 1945 through March, 1946, consideration of the Spanish question still produced passionate responses on the part of French politicians. At a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly in August, Gilbert de Chambrun argued that France's position on Spain, while admirable, still had to be augmented through a formal end of diplomatic relations with the Franco regime. Moreover, the Commission was so taken with a debate on how to proceed that they telephoned José Giral, leader of the Spanish Republican Government-in-exile, who lived in Paris at the time, and arranged for him to join the meeting that same day. Giral expressed his gratitude to France for its position of Spain and its economic

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sanctions but reiterated that 'there will not be a stable peace in the world as long as fascism remains in Spain.' In September, 1946, the Deputy from Biarritz, Guy Petit proposed a resolution in the National Assembly calling for a re-opening of the border due to the commercial damage it had caused France without any effect on Spain. This motion was harshly dealt with by the Commission and its rapporteur, Socialist Paul Rivet, who wrote that the policy, however unsuccessful to date, would ultimately prevail and that the 'honour of France' was at stake. In an appearance before the Commission the same month, Bidault assured the members of the Assembly that France continued its policy of isolation towards Franco and continued the attempt to win over Great Britain and the United States to the French position. In actual fact no new efforts were undertaken by the Quai d'Orsay. The Quai's position was not to initiate, but rather to fall back on the status quo until there was evidence of public and party opinion softening on Spain. Rather than seeking to shape Western policy to suit French goals, as they had set out to do, the French, at least when it came to Spain, had to admit that the constraints of their own polity had deprived them of any policy-making power. Jean Chauvel, Secretary-General of the Quai d'Orsay informed British officials that France did not wish to have talks of any kind on Spain, but that if a resolution condemning Franco came up on the floor of the General Assembly,

121 Procès-verbaux of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 7 August 1946. AN Série C/15308.


123 Caffrey to Byrnes, 11 September 1946. NARA RG 59, State Department Central Files, 751.52/9-1146.
France would be obliged to reaffirm its "known doctrinal position." In Madrid, Bernard Hardion indicated to Spanish Foreign Ministry Political Director de Erice that domestic pressures, combined with international pressures such as the continued American refusal to upgrade their diplomatic representative in Madrid to Ambassadorial status, meant that France would not adopt a position contradictory to general world opinion.

In December, the Spanish issue returned to the agenda of the United Nations, this time in the General Assembly. When the Spanish issue arose in the First Committee (Political and Security Questions) of the General Assembly, labour leader Léon Jouhaux of the CGT spoke on behalf of France, suggesting sanctions against the import of foodstuffs from Spain, which was quickly rejected. Jouhaux's position mirrored that of Parodi's in the Security Council Subcommittee. France desired UN action above all, but was prepared to go with any action short of a moral condemnation, whether that be the ideal goal of UN sanctions which would end France's isolation on that question or something less severe. Beyond Jouhaux's one initiative, however, France played an almost non-existent role in the General Assembly debate. Along with its

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124 Chauvel to Massigli, 26 October 1946. MAE PAAP Rene Massigli, 94.

125 Hardion (Madrid) to Direction d'Europe (Paris), 16 October 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe, 1944-1949/ Espagne, 74.


western allies and the Soviet Union. France on 12 December 1946 voted for a successful resolution which called for a continuation of the UN ban on Spanish membership and urged all member states to withdraw their Ambassadorial-level representatives from Madrid.\textsuperscript{128}

In a December note to Bidault summarizing Franco-Spanish relations, the Quai’s European section made an attempt to account for the year’s dilemmas on the Spanish question, and began with the acknowledgment that French action had failed and the policy that had been attempted was now ‘inoperable’. The blame for the direction taken, however, was not the Quai’s, but rather the ‘near unanimity of French opinion that demanded the departure of Franco and the closure of our Spanish border and the interruption of all commercial relations with the Madrid government in order to achieve this goal.’ Yet the value of the French attempt to coordinate policy with the Anglo-Americans was defended, and the Quai argued that if the U.S. and Britain had joined France, tripartite action would have had ‘a considerable effect, potentially engendering agitation and contributing to the eventual departure of Franco.’ Without such joint initiative, however, the Quai accepted the fact that an isolated French effort had been used by Franco to rally support behind him, and had thus contributed to the strengthening of his position, and weakened the already divided Spanish opposition.\textsuperscript{129} From this point on, there was no real option open to the French other than to wait for domestic opinion to change and then align France’s policy toward Spain with that of its western allies. In other words, to return to France’s


policy of 1945, one that combined moral condemnation with trade and other relations.

The Quai's year-end assessment concluded with an acknowledgment of 1946's key lesson: the United States and Great Britain had growing interests in Spain, economic and otherwise, and these permanent interests would not be risked, even if the Americans and British detested Franco.\textsuperscript{130} Fear of conflict, civil war, and the potential for Soviet-influenced Communist success in Spain, then, limited the Anglo-Americans to a policy of moral condemnation alone. The consequences of the Cold War not only impacted Anglo-American policy in Spain, but also led France's Allies to be increasingly wary when it came to considering policy initiatives that came from a French Government which included Communists. For the moment, France was nearly forced out of Spain unless the regime changed, and the British and Americans would not force any sort of regime change there that risked violence. On the subject of Spain, France was forced to remain an ally without real say or sway in inter-allied councils on this question. Indeed, by mid-1946 there was only one aspect of Spanish policy in which France was involved alongside its Allies: the relationship of the West to the Spanish opposition.

\textsuperscript{130} 'Note pour le ministre au sujet de l'éventualité d'une rupture des relations diplomatiques avec l'Espagne', 18 December 1946. \textit{MAE} Serie Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 69.
Chapter 5

France, the Allies and the Spanish Opposition

Since 1944, France had debated the question of diplomatic relations with Spain in the context of a larger discussion about the role of foreign policy in its postwar democracy. Part of the debate centered around the ideas of the French Resistance and the Left, insistent on the right to participate in the making of foreign policy not only because of their idealism, but also because of the role they had played in the war and the liberation of France. The French Foreign Ministry accepted the fact that in a democratic system, the popular will had a right not only to express itself, but also the right to affect policy. The closure of the French border with Spain in 1946, an unilateral sanction taken against the regime of General Franco, had been a direct consequence of the interaction between democracy and foreign policy making in the emerging Fourth Republic. However, if a democratic France claimed a role in policy-making which resulted in a ‘negative’ approach toward Spain, namely, denying it the privileges of normal diplomatic and economic contact, there still remained the question of exactly what other policies France could pursue in Spain after the Second World War. If the Franco regime was not acceptable in the new democratic Europe, what measures could Republican France take to promote the creation of an alternative regime which corresponded to the democratic values which the Resistance espoused?

The rhetoric of the French Resistance and the Left in the debate about Spain implied not only that a democratic state should listen to its people when making policy, but also made explicit the claim that such a state’s foreign policy should promote democracy outside of its
national boundaries. The power of renewed Republicanism harkened back to an earlier period, the 1790s, when the leaders of France’s revolutionary state were governed, in part, by their ‘conviction of the universal validity and absolute superiority of their principles.’ The power of such universalistic sentiment was not confined to the French Left or members of various Resistance organizations outside of government. The policy-makers of the Quai d’Orsay had themselves emerged from the Resistance, even if the majority had come from Algiers and not from the maquis. Having been drawn into a policy which imposed sanctions on Spain because of domestic opinion, the Quai d’Orsay progressed to consider the feasibility of an alternative Spanish regime. Thus, it naturally came into contact with the many elements of the Spanish opposition. Once they had become practical converts to the cause of the anti-Franco Spaniards, officials of the French Foreign Ministry were not themselves immune from making policy in the spirit of universalistic republicanism.

The French debate about Spanish Republicanism had more to do with French democracy than its participants allowed. The Spanish case served as a reflection of France’s experience in war and Resistance. This chapter will assess the relationship of the anti-Franco opposition and the French Left, and will also examine France’s most direct contribution to the efforts of the Spanish opposition movement to depose Franco, which came from the Government and the Quai d’Orsay in the year after the closure of the Pyrenean border. The same individuals whom the French Left and Resistance charged with preventing democracy, by continuing to deal with the Franco regime after the Second World War, were those who sought, after the Tripartite Statement of March, 1946, to make regime change in Spain

possible.

Despite the Nationalist victory in the Spanish Civil War, there was almost constant consideration of potential alternative regimes in Madrid during the period of the Second World War. In 1940, when the Iberian regime seemed to move closer to Nazi Germany under the rubric of 'non-belligerency' under Foreign Minister Ramón Serrano Suñer, the possibility of a Spanish entry into the war on the Axis side influenced the attitudes of some British policy-makers. In July, 1940 the British War Cabinet debated the viability of a government under former Republican President Juan Negrín, exiled in London. Such discussions irked Ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare who argued that the notion of dealing with the anti-Franco opposition undermined his very purpose in Madrid, which was to conduct strategic political and economic diplomacy. Since it was determined that a neutral, if not friendly, Spain was required for strategic reasons which would determine whether or not Great Britain could survive the initial German attack, the idea was dismissed. As long as Spain stayed out of the war, there was no chance, in the opinion of the Foreign Office and the Madrid Embassy, of British support for an alternative to Franco. Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax agreed, for they believed that such overtures to Negrín and the Spanish opposition only threatened the chances of a successful policy supporting Spain's neutrality.

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As the war progressed, however, it was clear to members of the Foreign Office that anti-Franco sentiment was growing amongst military generals and monarchists inside Spain. These groups opposed the pro-Axis direction of Suñer and his colleagues affiliated with the fascist-like Falange movement. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was prepared to consider the possibility that Franco might be removed from power by those in his government who felt that Spain’s relationship with Nazi Germany was too close.\(^5\) By June, 1942, in addition to the continued existence of the monarchist movement inside Spain, another factor arose which made it necessary to consider the possibility of Franco’s exit. The impending launch of Operation TORCH and the general development of the war, British officials feared, might lead to a German invasion of Spain. The Allied landings in North Africa might provoke such a response on the part of Germany not only for immediate strategic reasons, but also because it seemed unlikely that Spain would ever enter the war on the Axis side by itself. Eden thought that a German invasion of Iberia might serve as a catalyst for a military coup in Madrid, especially on the part of those generals who supported the monarchy. He argued that Britain had to be prepared for such a possibility, and accept it in light of the continuing strategic importance of a neutral Spain to Allied war efforts. Thus, Eden instructed Hoare to develop and maintain contact with monarchists and military leaders who could form such an alternative government in the case of a German invasion, and moreover to ‘give what support we can, subject to our own war needs.’\(^6\) Even after the removal of Suñer from the Spanish

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\(^5\) Stone, ‘The Degree of British Commitment’ in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds., Spain in an International Context, 199.

\(^6\) Eden to Hoare, 3 June 1942. Copied in Hoare to Eden, 19 April 1943. PRO FO 371/34819/C5712. Contacts with prominent Spanish generals which sought to influence Spanish
Foreign Ministry in September 1942, welcomed by the British who believed it simplified their task in Madrid, Eden’s instructions remained in place.⁷

Sir Samuel Hoare, like Eden, was also prepared for the possibility of a German invasion and its potential impact within Spain. Even as events progressed in 1943, when it appeared that the attitude of the Spanish Government was becoming increasingly favourable to the Allies, Hoare followed Eden’s June, 1942 directive.⁸ As long as Franco remained non-belligerent and/or German military forces stayed out of Spanish territory, Hoare reaffirmed the need not to upset the regime and he clearly understood that the future form of government in Spain was a matter for the Spanish people to decide. However, Hoare now believed that should events change course within Spain, Great Britain had to be prepared to play a role in facilitating regime transition. The most likely form of support would be to promote the return of the monarchy to Spain, not openly, but rather by assisting Don Juan, the Spanish pretender, in traveling from his Swiss exile to Madrid should the need arise.⁹ Such a dramatic change as a German invasion of Spain or Spanish entry into the war was more unlikely than ever before.¹⁰ Nonetheless, by mid-1943, the idea of Franco’s end was in the minds of those

policy in a fashion amenable to British interests had already been underway for some time through the buying off of these generals in return for their promise to keep Spain out of the war. See Denis Smyth, “Les chevaliers de Saint-George: la Grande-Bretagne et la corruption des généraux espagnols (1940-1942)” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains 162 (1991).


⁸ Hoare to Eden, 19 April 1943. PRO FO 371/34819/C5712.

⁹ Hoare to Eden, 19 April 1943. PRO FO 371/34819/C5712.

¹⁰ Eden to Hoare, 24 May 1943. PRO FO 371/34819/C5712.
preparing for the postwar.

American policy-makers were engaged in similar discussions as the British; they too considered the possibility of alternatives to Franco. There was a widespread belief that even if Allied policy during the war was built on preventing Spanish assistance from helping the Germans, in the postwar years a new policy would have to be adopted. The assumption was that if Hitler and Mussolini were defeated, all vestiges of fascism in Europe would fall from power, including the Franco regime in ‘neutral’ Spain. Given such thinking, it was only natural for the Allies to consider the next stage of Spanish political development. The earliest example on the American side came in a May, 1943 discussion of Spanish policy involving Secretary of State Cordell Hull, United States Commercial Corporation representative in Iberia, H.P. Walser, and Walton Butterworth, counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Madrid. In the meeting, Butterworth emphasized that the Church, the Army, and perhaps even the Caudillo himself believed that the monarchy was likeliest type of regime to follow Francoism without a renewal of civil war.¹¹

The French Mission in Madrid under Pierre Malaise was aware of British and American discussions about future governments in Spain. The French also followed reports of monarchist and opposition activity in Madrid.¹² Yet the North African mission in Spain arose out of wartime contingencies, and was consumed with the refugee crisis and the struggle to gain diplomatic and economic relations. Neither Malaise nor his superiors in Algiers spent much time planning for possible futures. Thus, the French did not really give

¹¹ Cited in Jill Edwards, Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 75.
¹² See MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1271.
any serious consideration to a Spanish regime without Franco. Only after the formation of the Comité Française de Libération Nationale (CFLN) in June, 1943 and the September appointment of Gaullist Jacques Truelle as the Committee’s representative in Madrid did this change. Drawing on Gaullist intelligence in occupied southwest France, and contacts made with Spanish Republican exiles there, CFLN member André Mounier prepared a report, in September 1943, entitled, ‘Spain, Republic or Monarchy?’ Mounier concluded that the Spanish regime was experiencing ‘rapid decomposition’ due to both internal and external factors. From within Spain, there was the separation between the pro-Allied public and the pro-Axis government. From without, the course of the war and the economic limitations imposed by Allied controlled trade was producing hardship and resentment. The result was a belief that Franco would not survive the war, but it was accompanied by a widespread anxiety about Spain’s future and the fear of renewed civil war. The Falange was aggressively trying to change itself from a pro-Nazi organization to an anti-Communist one, in a bid to maintain the regime, but because of its history, the organization was not trusted by the majority of Spaniards. The Republicans elicited widespread sympathy from the population, but were firmly opposed by the Army, the clergy and the middle classes and, thus, Spanish Republicanism implied conflict and not reconciliation. Therefore, the Army, clergy and nobility, whom preferred the monarchy as an alternative to Franco, gained the support of the middle classes and shopkeepers because it seemed that only a King could provide a smooth

transition after the collapse of Franco’s regime.\textsuperscript{14}

While Mounier spent most of his report analyzing the internal situation in Spain, he was also quick to emphasize the politics of France’s Allies regarding alternative regimes and their significance for French policy. In short, France could analyze the situation all it wanted, but only in conjunction with Great Britain and the United States could it affect change within Spain. On the subject of its relations with anti-Franco opposition movements, as in trade relations or refugee relief negotiations with General Franco, non-Vichy France acknowledged that its success in conducting diplomacy in wartime Spain was dependent upon its recognition and acceptance as one of the Allied states. Well aware of the various discussions that had occurred amongst American and British officials concerning alternative regimes, Mounier conceded that the Americans were naturally more pro-Republican and the British more pro-monarchy, but underlined that both Allies believed that the Spanish Army held the key to any future Spanish regime. In addition, the Allied consensus was that a renewed civil war must be avoided at all costs. Therefore, Mounier argued that there was ‘no doubt’ that the type of policy to be advocated by both the Allies and the Spanish Army was a gradual evolution in the politics of the current regime. Such a transition would be led, most likely, by the anti-Franco generals, but it was not impossible that an evolution might even be initiated by Franco himself.\textsuperscript{15} In any case, Mounier believed that France should prepare for the possibility of substantial postwar change in the political structure of the Spanish state, just as


its Allies were doing.

As a result of Allied and French thinking on the potential for change in Spain, the CFLN mission in Madrid under Jacques Truelle initiated contact with the leading generals of Franco’s Spain who likely would play a role in any political transition. The most notable of these was General Antonio Aranda, a longtime anti-Francoist within the Spanish Army.\footnote{The file in the French Foreign Ministry archives which details Truelle’s initial contacts with Aranda, between March and July of 1944, remains closed. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1272.} Despite the CFLN’s knowledge that numerous Spanish Republican exiles were fighting with the FFI in occupied France, Algiers made no effort to contact the Republican leadership in order to discuss Spain’s future. Rather, Spanish Republicans in France were primarily dealt with simply as members of the French Resistance.\footnote{See, for example, a CFLN report on Spanish maquis in the Perpignan region. CFLN Services de Renseignements to External Affairs Commissariat, 4 January 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1278.} Moreover, in French North Africa, where Spanish Republicans lived under CFLN rule, the priority of French officials was not to discuss Spanish political evolution with potential Republican leaders, but rather to ignore them in order to win favour with Franco’s representatives. In the words of External Affairs Commissioner René Massigli, French policy had to ensure that ‘no measure be taken by the authorities of the French National Committee of Liberation that would alienate us from the good will of the Spanish Government.’\footnote{Massigli to General Catroux, 22 October 1943. Massigli wrote in response to Catroux’s question about how to deal with the creation of a Spanish Republican political club in Oran, the ‘Casa de la Democratie’. The Casa’s formal application for recognition from the CFLN, in March, 1944, was rejected by Massigli. Massigli to Catroux, 9 March 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1278. A request for official recognition from the UNE based...} Concerning the Spanish Communists, the Police
Commissioner in Oran underlined that while they joined the PCF in organizing Resistance in North Africa and Metropolitan France, "they have not lost sight of the goal that they pursue: the fall of Franco and the re-establishment of the Spanish Republic." Such a goal threatened to undermine the CFLN’s policy toward Spain. Spanish Republican refugees, especially when organized into exiled political organizations, were a thorn in the side of the CFLN in light of its efforts to create and develop a diplomatic relationship with Franco’s Spain. They were not considered a potential alternative government.

As a result of this point of view, CFLN officials and Spanish Republican leaders made little contact, either in North Africa or in the Métropole. When the Liberation of France was followed by a surge in anti-Francoist activity amongst Spanish maquis in the southwest of France and the Pyrenean border region, the CFLN, installed in Paris as the Provisional French Government, was unprepared for the commitment to fight Franco which Spanish Republican exiles demanded. Furthermore, the decisions to curtail Spanish Republican takeovers of Francoist consulates in France and to limit guerrillero border raids across the Pyrenees were made not only out of a desire to control France’s own border region, but also due to a belief that relations with Francoist Spain were more important than adherence to a strict pro-Republican policy. The French Government did not want to risk Spanish

in Morocco was not even answered. UNE to Henri Frenay, Commissioner for Prisoners, Deportees and Refugees, 1 July 1944. MAE Série Guerre, 1939-1945/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1279.

19 Police Commissioner, Oran to Prefect, Oran, 14 March 1944. MAE Série Guerre/ Alger-CFLN-GPRF, 1278.

20 See chapter two.
antagonism by appearing to condone Spanish Republican aggression. An additional factor influencing France's initial policy toward the political exiles was that French officials, as well as their British colleagues, did not consider Spanish Republicans, as organized in the Union Nacional Española (UNE) or other organizations in autumn, 1944, to be a legitimate alternative to the regime of Francisco Franco.

Despite their claims to represent all of the Republican forces opposed to Franco, neither the UNE, nor its opponent, the Junta Española de Liberación (JEL), represented a true union of Republican groups. Such division was nothing more than a continuation of trends that had existed during the Civil War. The lack of unity amongst Spanish Republicans was crucial to Allied and French assessments of Spanish Republican exiles inside France. If the exile movement was not united, it was no threat to Franco and could not seriously be considered as an alternative to the existing Spanish regime. The British Consul in Barcelona, Harold Farquhar, sent his Vice-Consul, Dorchy, to Toulouse in late 1944. Dorchy reported that the overwhelming majority of Spanish exiles were moderate, and thus rejected the Communist-dominated UNE and its call for a 'reconquest' of Spanish territory.

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21 As early as 31 August 1944 Mariano Rubio, a Spanish Republican refugee, wrote to the Quai d'Orsay requesting a meeting between General de Gaulle and representatives from a number of Spanish Republican exile groups. The European section of the Quai responded that the 'delicate character' of Franco-Spanish relations necessitated 'much prudence'. No meeting was held, and MAE Europe held to this point of view well into 1945. MAE Europe to Cabinet du General de Gaulle, 4 September 1944. MAE Série Z/ Europe, 1944-1949/ Espagne, 34.

22 For a history of the most important, and most fundamental, divisions of the Civil War, see Ronald Fraser, 'The Popular Experience of War and Revolution' in Paul Preston, ed. Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1939 (London, 1984) 225-242.

23 Farquhar to Eden, 4 January 1945. PRO FO 371/ 49553/ Z161.
The October, 1944 formation of the JEL, which rejected the model of armed struggle in order to depose the Franco Government, supported such an interpretation. Sir Oliver Harvey, Assistant Acting Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office, commented thus: 'These Spanish exiles can be left to quarrel among themselves. Franco’s chief strength lies in the hopeless quarrels of his opposition. Much as one dislikes Franco, one can only despise these careerist exiles who cannot even unite in opposition.'

For the British, the question was not whether the 'active' Republican exiles in Spain could form an alternative government on their own, for it was clear that such a diverse group would only mount a serious challenge to Franco’s legitimacy if they were led by a prominent Republican like Juan Negrín or Indalecito Prieto, both of whom were living away from the mass of Republican exiles in France. The Spanish Republican movement in France was a threat only if the French Government decided to let such leaders enter the country. De Gaulle, Bidault and the French Government faced the decision whether or not to 'allow France to become a centre of anti-Franco intrigue.' The French Government, true to the positions taken prior to the uprisings, refused to allow either Prieto or Spanish Republican Cortes

24 A text of the founding document of the JEL, dated 23 October, 1944, Toulouse, can be found in the Spanish exile collection of the Municipal Library in Toulouse. The document was signed by representatives of the following political parties in exile: Republican Left, Republican Union, Federal Republican Party, Libertarian Movement, CNT, UGT, PSOE. It rejected the guerilla warfare approach of the UNE. Its goals were to coordinate exile activity with the intention to ultimately form a provisional Government. It was affiliated with similar JELs in Mexico and North Africa. Bibliothèque Municipale de Toulouse, Toulouse, Special Collections (Réserve), Res. D XX 832.

25 Minute by Sir Oliver Harvey, n.d., PRO FO 371/49553/Z161.

26 Minute by Frank Roberts, Foreign Office, 6 October 1944. PRO FO 371/39704/C13280.
President, Diego Martínez Barrio, into France in November, 1944. Consideration of the British position, and the acknowledgment that the birth of anything resembling an alternative regime would worsen France's existing relations with Franco, were cited as the motivations behind the decision.27 Moreover, as an internal French analysis of November, 1944 made clear, it was considered 'impossible' to unify the diverse groups which opposed Franco, and this was especially true of groups which shared a belief in Republicanism. A monarchical restoration would be difficult, but at least, in the opinion of one French official, it had a greater chance of success than a Republican one.28 Similar conclusions were forwarded to French representatives by the non-Republican opposition figures with whom France was already in contact, namely General Aranda and the leader of the anti-Franco right-wing, José Gil Robles, in exile in Lisbon. They rejected the UNE approach to Spanish political change and assured the French that, for the short-term, the Republican opposition in France did not represent a viable alternative to the existing Spanish government.29 Beyond the decree giving Republican refugees protection and status within France, and the creation of a Committee of representatives from each major Spanish political party in exile to assist in implementing this measure, contact between the French Government and Spanish Republican exiles was minimal, and concerned more with calming down the refugee community rather than

27 MAE Europe to Chauvel, 6 November 1944. MAE Série Z, Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 34.

28 Cruvillier to Bidault, November 1944. AN 457 AP 99.

29 For Aranda conversations, see Truelle to Bidault, 3 November 1944. MAE Série Z, Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 34. For Gil Robles, see British Embassy Lisbon to Foreign Office, 8 November 1944. PRO FO 371/ 39736/ C15806.
responding to its political wishes.30

Even more vocal French supporters of Republican Spain, the parties and organizations of the French Resistance, were dismayed by the lack of unity within the Spanish Republican movement and were frustrated with the impossibility of rallying around a clear Republican alternative to the Franco regime. The consequence of this was that, despite the rhetoric of the French Left and the Resistance concerning Spain31, there was in fact little contact between Spanish Republican groups exiled in France and their supposed French allies. Surprisingly, then, the Spanish question’s importance in French domestic politics had little to due with the activism of the Spanish exiles living in France. Support for democracy in a neighbouring state did not result from a series of contacts between Spanish exiles and their French supporters, but rather came from the French themselves. The virtues of a universalistic Republicanism were developed as a result of France’s own wartime experience, and the importance of the Spanish case to many on the left was a reflection of the significance of the Resistance vision for renewed France in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Division amongst Spanish Republicans was an important factor in the lack of coordination between French and Spanish Republicans. Jean Cassou, one of the leaders of the Resistance in the area of Toulouse wrote, in the summer of 1944, about the diversity of movements affiliated with the French Resistance but noted that it was unlikely that the French would ever experience the same degree of division as the Spanish Republicans had.

30 See chapter two.

31 See chapter two.
since the beginning of the Civil War. These divisions were not hidden from the French by Spanish organizations. For example, in Toulouse, the local SFIO organization inquired about the UNE, and was told by the PSOE in exile that the UNE was a Communist ‘facade’ more interested in killing PSOE members than really working for Spanish democracy. In fact, the correspondence between the PSOE executive in exile in Toulouse and the French Socialist Party. SFIO, between 1945 and 1947 contains a small number of documents, mostly formal greetings exchanged on the occasion of annual party conferences and PSOE letters warning of Spanish Communist influence in groups such as the UNE. Where contact existed between the French and Spanish socialists, it had far more to do with local arrangements than with the pursuit of common goals.

Yet in the initial throes of enthusiasm for anti-Franco action, in the months after France’s own liberation, the Resistance and party press attempted to overlook the divisions within Spanish Republicanism. Upon the creation of the JEL, the French Socialist organ Le Populaire de Paris neglected to mention the continued existence of the UNE and stated that despite the diversity of Spanish political parties-in-exile, ‘Spain is united for the overthrow of fascism.’ The French Communist daily in Toulouse, La Voix du Midi, on the other hand, did

32 Cassou to Emanuel d’Astier de la Vigérie, July 1944. Bibliothèque Municipale de Toulouse, Toulouse, Special Collections (Réserves), Res. B XX 557(2).


34 For example, there is far more correspondence between the PSOE executive and SFIO’s local Toulouse section than with SFIO’s national leaders. Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, AE-613-7.

35 Le Populaire de Paris, 17 November 1944.
not even mention the JEL, but stated that the UNE represented 'true Spain' united against Franco.\(^{36}\) When the UNE finally dissolved itself in the summer of 1945, and the JEL began steps to reconstitute itself as a government-in-exile, the French Resistance press expressed relief that this aspect of the Spanish question, which they had never understood, was over.\(^{37}\) The notion that there existed within France a unified Spanish Republican movement was but one example of the fact that the French conception of the Spanish question had far more to do with domestic French rhetoric and experience than actual contact and alliance with Spanish Republican exiles. There was a belief that the experience of Spanish exiles in the early postwar mirrored that of the French during the wartime occupation. Domestic interest in Spanish Republicanism was grounded in France's own 'Resistance myth', which interpreted wartime France as an entire nation united in resistance against the Vichy regime and German occupation.\(^{38}\)

While in general the anti-Franco French tended to overlook divisions amongst the Spanish Republican opposition, there were a few notable efforts on the part of the French Resistance to facilitate Spanish Republican unity. Here too, however, the belief that anti-fascism would by itself make up for other sorts of ideological, personal and organizational cleavages was apparent. The French confederation of labour, the CGT, strove to end the divisions which plagued the Spanish Resistance. When the split between the UNE and the JEL prompted a schism within the Spanish Socialist trade union, the UGT, the CGT

\(^{36}\) *La Voix du Midi*, 13 December 1944.


\(^{38}\) See chapter two.
attempted to mediate. In late 1944, a meeting chaired by CGT head Louis Saillant, who was also at the time President of the French Comité National de la Résistance (CNR), was held. Saillant, drawing upon his own Resistance experience, stated simply that the fight for a new Republica 'was not a question of organizations, but of antifascist militants. All the friends of democracy must be unified in order for fascism to subside.' Meetings between CGT and UNE officials were held on a number of occasions. At the end of 1945, after the formal dissolution of the UNE, Léon Jouhaux of the CGT attempted to negotiate an end to the UGT schism and was rebuffed by the anti-UNE majority of the UGT, in part because the CGT earlier had given offices to the UNE supporters within the UGT. By February 1946 and the execution of Cristino García, the CGT was making decisions about its Spanish policy without significant advice from the UGT in exile.

A similar effort to unite French and Spanish Republicans was in the national Association France-Espagne and its local Comités France-Espagne. However, the UGT and PSOE considered this simply another Communist front and refused to participate, depriving the organization of a significant number of Spanish exile members. At the UGT Assembly

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39 'Compte Rendu de la Réunion tenue à Paris par les Répresentants de la UGT et la CGT, fin 1944.' Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale et Contemporaine, Nanterre, Spanish Collection.

40 For Saillant's initial decision to support the UNE, see 'Compte Rendu...fin 1944', Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale et Contemporaine, Nanterre, Spanish Collection. For the UGT's anger over this, and its consequent effect on Jouhaux's effort in 1945, see UGT Circular No. 25, 6 December 1945. Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, AE-103-6.

41 See UGT Circular No. 10, December 1944. Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, AE 103-6 and UGT Executive Meetings, 14 December 1944, 29 May 1945. Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, AE-103-5. See also Jimeno, of the PSOE executive, to Vincent Auriol on this subject, 8 April 1946. Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, AE-613-7. The creation of the various Comités
in August 1945 the organization characterized the Comités France-Espagne as worthwhile only in that they gave French citizens a venue to express their opinions about Franco's Spain. While the executive included representatives from all political parties except the right-wing PRL, the Spanish Socialists were correct to consider this a French group. Its main contact with Spanish Republicans was through a monetary grant to help publish the JEL’s newspaper l'Espagne Républicaine in 1945-1946. Moreover, its view of the Spanish problem, even as late as 1947, was that Franco represented a threat to French security and that French Republicans shared with their Spanish brethren a ‘common heritage’ of democracy forged during the Spanish Civil War and the French Resistance. Again, themes constructed by the French themselves served to shape their interpretation of the Spanish problem.

The only true venue in which French and Spanish Republicans worked closely together was in the Communist Party. As one historian of the PCE in exile has put it, 'the success of the PCF was always a primordial interest of the PCE.' PCE members in exile immediately became members of the PCF, working on elections in return for PCF activism from 1944-45 was indeed led by the PCE in an effort to demonstrate that the UNE had widespread support from a number of French and Spanish figures. Pike, Jours de Gloire, Jours de Honte, 88.


44 Pike, Jours de Gloire, Jours de Honte, 154.
against Franco’s regime. Although there was contact between Spanish and French Socialists, it remained up to each Spaniard to decide if they would join SFIO; in that sense, the relationship between PCF and PCE was unique. Moreover, as Pierre Bertaux, de Gaulle’s Republican Commissioner in Toulouse has underlined, much of the money that enabled the PCE and the UNE to have offices in France, publish newspapers, and carry out its daily business came from the PCF. As has been shown, however, the influence of the PCE upon PCF policy was minimal, for while the French Communists publicly called for a breach in diplomatic relations with General Franco throughout the early postwar period, they did not force French action inside the French Council of Ministers until the death of Cristino García in early 1946, when they were joined by other parties and personalities who advocated the same sanctions.

Despite the rhetoric of Republican unity, and the existence within France of a significant number of Spanish Republican organizations, the anti-Franco campaign within France continued to be constructed largely by the French themselves. The French Government, even less committed in 1945 to a policy which sought the removal of General Franco from power, maintained its arms-length relationship with Spanish Republicans. Yet while the activists would remain largely separate from the Spanish Republicans they claimed to speak for, the Government would be drawn into a closer relationship with these exiles as its responded to domestic pressure to impose penalties upon the regime of General Franco. Despite its best efforts to reconcile internal anti-Francoism with an Allied policy of increasing engagement with Franco’s Spain, France was forced, by 1946, to close its border

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45 Bertaux, Libération, 102.
with Spain and promote international sanctions against the regime. As the Quai d’Orsay was forced to concede the Resistance claim to some involvement in the making of foreign policy—one grounded in the notion of a ‘new’ French democracy— it was also forced to grapple with the specific policy prescription proposed by the Resistance in relation to Spain: support for a democratic Spanish regime. Therefore, despite the relative lack of the French Resistance’s own engagement with the Spanish opposition, its influence over general French policy toward Spain forced the Foreign Ministry and French secret intelligence, the Deuxième Bureau, to consider in some depth the possibility of a viable alternative to Franco’s Government.

Two external developments helped to foster the Quai’s increasing involvement with the representatives of a future democratic Spain over the course of 1945. First, within the Spanish Republican community the emergence of the JEL as the dominant force over the UNE was significant. International support for the JEL was encouraged by the Mexican Government, which supported a JEL submission to the founding conference of the United Nations that recommended a ban on Spanish admission to the new body. Second, the growing expression of anti-Franco sentiments amongst France’s Allies, especially the United States, however slight, was significant. As already noted, the State Department’s firmness with Spain in the latter half of 1945 was one factor which encouraged the French to move forward with their proposal of December, 1945 to discuss the possibility of diplomatic rupture with Franco’s Spain. It similarly had a role in the French decision to expand contact with the Spanish opposition. It was at the founding conference of the UN, in the spring of 1945 at San Francisco, that these factors could first be seen to be slowly changing the French attitude
toward the Spanish opposition.

The failure of the Val d’Aran invasion and the inability of the UNE to unite the Spanish opposition led to the gradual recognition that the JEL had surpassed the UNE as the vehicle for Spanish Republicans in their quest to remove General Franco’s regime from power. A final attempt in early 1945 to unite the UNE and the JEL failed, and by mid-year the organizations of the UNE began to dissolve. The JEL, based in Mexico but with an important presence in France, prepared for the reconstitution of the Republican government as a government-in-exile. Such a task required the reunification of the JEL’s leadership in France, the nomination of government ministers, and international support from the democratic powers which had fought fascism in war just as the Spanish Republicans had.

At the San Francisco conference, the JEL presented the French with a detailed critique of Franco’s relationship to the Axis powers and thus his regime’s fundamental incompatibility with the emerging world order of the United Nations. In a meeting with Bidault, the JEL’s Indalecito Prieto and Diego Martínez Barrio requested French support for the JEL’s efforts to form a government-in-exile and asked that it be allowed to establish itself on French soil. Bidault supported the cause generally, but did not grant permission for a formal government-in-exile based in France, despite what Prieto later told the press. Bidault

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46 Pike, *Jours de Gloire, Jours de Honte*, 145-146.

47 *L’Espagne Républicaine*, 30 June 1945.


49 Bidault to French Embassies, Madrid and Mexico, 15 June 1945. *AN* 457 AP 100.
stressed that the meeting was of a private character, not an official one. He did not publicly change France’s policy toward Spain by voting to ban it from the UN. Rather, the policy of rhetorical condemnation and continued diplomacy was carried forward. The same was true of the United States and Great Britain. They both supported the resolution against Spanish admission to the UN. While the American delegation consisted of persons opposed to the motion, they acknowledged the need to support it in order to avoid the wrath of the anti-Franco press in the United States, and Harry S. Truman, the new President of the United States, who held anti-Francoist sentiments of his own, only further underlined the need to be cautious in public.50

On the surface, then, it appeared that French and Allied policy toward Spanish Republicans and the Franco regime remained unchanged. Rhetorical condemnation was raised to a new level in the atmosphere of the UN Conference, but diplomatic and other relations between all three Allies and Spain continued. However, a series of analyses undertaken by the French Foreign Ministry concerning the Spanish opposition, immediately following the conference, suggests that a gradual change in approach, if not in policy, was beginning. In short, the French Foreign Ministry began a process after San Francisco which ultimately allowed an official French relationship with the JEL to develop in order to be prepared for a future Spanish regime should General Franco’s disappear.

The Franco regime, a Foreign Ministry official wrote in a memorandum for Georges Bidault, ‘lacked roots within the country, and its situation was far from being solid and assured.’ On the opposition side, multiple divisions between extreme left, moderate left,

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50 Edwards, Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 41-44.
extreme right, moderate right, and the army were troublesome as well, and those revolutionary forces based in France were clearly insufficient to overthrow the government. If a leftist government was desired, it would take civil war and external support, a situation that would be ‘catastrophic not only for Spain but for all of Europe.’ However, a monarchical restoration might be able to rally moderate Republicans, the army and the ‘neutral masses’ around a single solution and lead to a peaceful transition to a more moderate Spanish regime. Moreover, although Great Britain and the United States had done little to foster a change in Spain’s political regime, it was evident that the incompatibility of Franco’s government with the Allied world order would soon change the Anglo-American attitude toward Franco. The report concluded that ‘the fall of General Franco is a certain fact, the only doubtful point being whether or not his regime will be liquified in blood and anarchy or through a formula of pacification and stability that will assure Spain a place in the reconstruction of the world.’

This memorandum was significant for a number of reasons. First, while it did not seek to change France’s policy in the sense of ending diplomatic and economic relations with Franco, which in the summer of 1945 were improving, it did acknowledge that France must be prepared for an end to the Franco regime and could in fact help, in a small way, to foster that end. Second, it argued that a similar approach to the Spanish question was likely to be adopted by both the United States and Great Britain. The timing of this memorandum, shortly after the San Francisco conference and the united western vote against Spanish admission to the UN, and amongst rumors of growing State Department antagonism against Franco, was

51 Memorandum for Bidault, 24 June 1945. AN 457 AP 99.
not coincidental. As in economic and diplomatic relations, France’s policy toward the Spanish opposition was made entirely within the context of its relationship to its Anglo-American Allies. Third, it maintained the earlier French perception that Republican division was too deep for a Republican restoration in Spain to be feasible, but it also argued that a moderate monarchical restoration, with some Republican support, was an option that could succeed and to which France could contribute.

Alliance politics concerning Spain also encouraged French thinking about an alternative regime. The British had long considered the monarchy as an appropriate option in Spain, and the Spanish pretender, Don Juan, was in fact a grandson of Queen Victoria. There were hesitations, however. The fear of civil war, which the French did not foresee in a monarchical restoration scenario, still predominated British consideration of any alternative to Franco. Don Juan himself was perceived as a bit of a wild card. Finally, the opposition of Labour Party elements to a Spanish monarchy had to be taken into consideration.52 In the United States, there had always been a sense that restoration was almost as incompatible with the post-war world as Franco.53 Yet, by the time of the San Francisco conference, France’s western allies were considering alternatives to Franco just as Paris was. The monarchical issue in particular had been revived when Don Juan released his Lausanne Manifesto in March, 1945, calling for monarchist unity and proclaiming his desire to serve as King of

52 Edwards, Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 77-78.

53 Edwards, Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 76-77.
Spain.\textsuperscript{54}

A potential French and Allied approach to the Spanish opposition was further developed over the summer of 1945. Amongst officials in the Quai d'Orsay, there was no question of replacing their policy of dealing with Franco with one of outright support for the opposition, for France was ‘not permitted the luxury of attacking Franco’ by ending diplomatic relations and breaking off commercial trade negotiations. Yet there was a belief that the Allies could trade with Franco and avoid internal intervention in Spanish affairs while simultaneously indicating to opposition figures ‘in a clear and definitive manner that Franco could not continue in his current position.’\textsuperscript{55} Such an approach drew upon the relations with Army generals and other moderate and right-wing anti-Francoists that France, and its Allies, had maintained since 1943. Indeed, the French Foreign Ministry believed that Gil Robles, with whom its Lisbon Embassy was in constant contact, could play an important role in bringing monarchists and the moderates together.\textsuperscript{56} Gradually, a union of anti-Francoists could widen to include the more leftist members of the JEL, whom French officials now knew. The coalition could also grow to include those from the non-Communist left inside Spain, who were united in the Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas (ANFD), led by the anarchist José Luque Argente, who had been in contact with monarchists

\textsuperscript{54} Stone, ‘The Degree of British Commitment to the Restoration of Democracy’ in Leitz and Dunthorn, eds. Spain in an International Context, 209.

\textsuperscript{55} Memorandum for Bidault, 13 July 1945. \textit{AN} 457 AP 99.

\textsuperscript{56} ‘Note sur l’Espagne’, 30 August 1945. \textit{AN} 457 AP 99.
in Madrid since late 1944. The seeds were planted which would lead France to encourage a broad-based alternative regime to Francisco Franco's in Spain. The French memoranda were not unique in the sense that they represented a new initiative. Rather, they built on relations already established, suggested a reinvigoration of contacts with the Spanish opposition that the western Allies were also considering, and gradually informed a French effort to bring more Republicans into the discussions, a direction indicated in the 1945 notes but which would not dominate French thinking until 1946.

Similar trends in thinking about Spain were apparent in the United States and Great Britain. Western disappointment at the lack of political and institutional reform in Franco's July, 1945 Fuero de los Españoles only heightened the sense that an alternative to Franco had to be found. The American Ambassador in Madrid, Norman Armour, told the new Spanish Foreign Minister Martin Artajo the following:

'Unless and until a substantial proportion of the Spanish people were given an opportunity freely to decide on the form of regime they desired, there could, I believed, be no final solution to the problem. We all, of course, realized their difficulties and no one wished to see Spain plunged again into civil war. It might be said that all of this was an internal matter, but as I saw it the time had come for them to decide how much an improvement in relations with the United States, Great Britain and other democratic countries meant to them....Given the increasing feeling of opposition in my country, I had serious misgivings as to whether it would be possible to maintain even the status quo unless something far more radical that what he had outlined were done to change the present character of the regime.'

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59 Memorandum by Norman Armour, 10 August 1945. FRUS 1945, V, 685.
An opportunity to act in such a way so as further to encourage the development of an alternative to the Government of General Franco came in August, 1945, when the JEL succeeded in reconstituting the Spanish Republican parliament, the Cortes, in Mexico and elected a government-in-exile under the leadership of José Giral Pereira. The new Foreign Minister, Fernando de los Ríos, immediately contacted the French Government requesting official recognition.60

There was absolutely no chance that France would consider official recognition and thus end its relations with the Franco Government. As emphasized earlier, relations with the Spanish opposition were made as a secondary strategy, preparing the ground for relations when Franco did in fact finally leave power. In general, the French Foreign Ministry did not consider Giral’s government to be representative of the opposition. It consisted of left republican and socialist parties, but had no ties to left socialists like Juan Negrín, no Communist involvement, and no contact with monarchists and moderate right-wingers like Gil Robles.61 The Quai d’Orsay’s European Director, François Coulet, stated that the exiles in Mexico ‘appeared to have completely lost touch with their own country’ and the more moderate opposition elements there.62 American and British sentiment was much the same.63

60 De los Ríos to Bidault, 31 August 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe, 1944-1949/ Espagne, 35.

61 Minute by Derrick Hoyer-Millar, 7 September 1945. PRO FO 371/ 49556/ Z10497.

62 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 29 November 1945. PRO FO 371/ 49557/ Z13136.

63 For an analysis of the American position by France, see Bonnet to MAE Europe, 21 September 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe, 1944-1949/ Espagne, 36. For the British, see Hoyer-
However, dissatisfaction with the Giral government did not mean that consideration of a Republican role in planning for an alternative Spanish regime was moot. On the contrary, the mood in Paris and Washington, and even London, promoted such thinking. The British were always more ambivalent in their approach to Republican exiles, but they too prepared for the eventuality of an alternative regime, and feared that public support for Giral's government would weaken the chances of moderate Republicans, the army and monarchists to form an alliance which could peacefully replace Franco. The United States was prepared to discuss with France the possibility of moving the Giral Government closer to such elements, if the French thought that at all possible. Here, then, was a role for France to play. France was best suited to maintain contact with the Giral Republicans, without granting it any sort of formal recognition. In the meantime, the construction of a more moderate alternative regime, believed by all three western powers to be the only real option to Franco, was attempted. Ultimately, perhaps elements in the Giral Government could be convinced that this was the way forward. France was willing to take on the task.

France decided that its best option was to keep the door open to Giral. This was the case for a number of reasons. First, a majority of the ministers in the Giral Government sought entry into France from Mexico in order to be closer to their exiled political parties.

Millar's minute, 7 September 1945. PRO FO 371/49556/ Z10497.

64 Minute by R. Sloan, 28 September 1945. PRO FO 371/49556/ Z11085.


66 Minute by Peter Garran, 1 December 1945. PRO FO 371/49557/ Z13136.
Even if the Giral Government itself could not be granted status to set up on French soil, due to public pressure it was necessary to allow these politicians entry as individuals. Bidault was hopeful that from such individual immigration, a more-or-less 'official' unofficial relationship between the Giral Government and the Quai d'Orsay could be established.67 Second, anti-Francoist sentiment amongst political parties, press and other organizations within France led to a strong expression of pro-Giral Government feeling that the Quai d'Orsay could not ignore. The French Socialist Party, a member of de Gaulle's coalition government, was a prominent supporter of the government-in-exile, amongst others.68 French republicanism led to French popular support for a Spanish Republican government-in-exile.69

There was some evidence from French secret intelligence sources that the Giral Government accepted that recognition from any of the Western Powers was not likely, especially given the membership of the Cabinet. They acknowledged that France was not going to break relations with Franco and recognize it, and they knew that any change in French policy in Spain depended upon a change in Allied policy, and in particular required British support.70 Yet Giral and his ministers were also aware of the growing importance of the Spanish question in French politics. Thus, they believed that a relationship with France,


68 Peter Garran minute, 1 December 1945. PRO FO 371/ 49557/ Z13136. Also Holman to Hoyer-Millar, 11 December 1945, reporting a conversation with François Coulot of the Quai d'Orsay. PRO FO 371/ 49558/ Z13651. For the press, see the Socialist organ Le Populaire de Paris, 25 August 1945. See also Combat, 7 August 1945.

69 For the 'Republican' connection in French anti-Franco rhetoric, see chapter 2.

70 MINERVE to MAE Europe, 12 November 1945. MAE Série Z/ Europe, 1944-1949/ Espagne, 36.
even an informal one which fell short of recognition, could serve to benefit the Spanish Republic if and when France adopted a more aggressive anti-Francoist policy. Thus a particular type of relationship between Giral and the Quai d'Orsay began to develop, one defined in a very precise way. The terms for such a relationship between France and the Spanish Republican government-in-exile were understood by both sides.

José Giral himself followed a number of his ministers into France in February, 1946. French claims that he entered the country merely as an individual, and not due to his status as the head of a Spanish Republican government-in-exile were rejected out of hand by the Spanish Government in Madrid.71 Shortly thereafter, Giral's Foreign Minister, de los Ríos, sat down with Bidault and his chef du Cabinet, Falaize, in order to discuss the possibility of de facto diplomatic immunity for Giral government ministers residing in France. He also proposed that his government participate in French and United Nations assistance toward Spanish Republican refugees through the establishment of consular-like offices on French territory.72 The legal division of the Foreign Ministry rejected both of these demands because there was no formal recognition of the Giral Government, and it was not common practice to grant immunity to a member of any government, recognized or not, who was not a member of the diplomatic service.73 Negotiations continued, however, and Giral officials modified their position, requesting only diplomatic privileges for a small mission similar to the one which

71 Hardion to MAE, 1 March 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 38.
the Lublin Polish government-in-exile had had in France in 1945. The desire of Bidault and the European section to maintain a connection to the Giral government as part of a broader Spanish strategy won out, not only in relation to a debate within the Foreign Ministry, but also against the opposition of French President Charles de Gaulle. Negotiations were concluded that allowed Giral, his foreign affairs adviser Miranda, and four other officials to be recognized as such a delegation, although without the usual diplomatic identity cards and automobile registration. A process was now in place to facilitate communications with Giral and encourage the development of his relations with a number of anti-Franco Spanish groups.

France’s decision to act as a bridge between the Giral Government and the Allies, and between the Giral Government and more moderate elements of the Spanish opposition, would not have been of any significance if there was not a belief, held by all parties, that an alternative regime which could prevent renewed civil war was likely to emerge. Although the JEL, Giral and other Republicans, on the one hand, and the monarchists, Don Juan, and the army on the other, had acted fairly independently from one another since 1944, there was evidence in autumn, 1945 that this was about to change. The non-Communist left, including

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74 Protocol Service, MAE to Coulet, 16 March 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 38. The French Government of Charles de Gaulle, throughout the war, recognized the Polish Government-in-exile in London as the legitimate Polish government, as did the U.S. and Britain. Meanwhile the Soviet Union recognized a government-in-exile, established in Lublin with its support. As part of the December, 1944 Franco-Soviet Pact, de Gaulle agreed to exchange representatives with the Lublin Poles while maintaining official recognition of the Polish government in London. See Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 31-34.

75 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 8 January 1946. PRO FO 371/60333/Z290.

Socialists and Anarchists which inside Spain were united in the Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas, the ANFD (whose representatives outside of Spain participated in the Giral Government), and moderate monarchists such as Gil Robles, had begun to meet in order to form a provisional government under Don Juan that would seek to replace Franco and hold a plebiscite to determine Spain’s political future.77 The British considered the rapprochement to be ‘growing steadily’; if this resulted in the actual formation of an alternative regime, Great Britain and its allies could act to ‘bring matters to a head and accelerate Franco’s departure’ through support for this alternative. Later, in January, 1946, the Foreign Office emphasized to Duff Cooper in Paris that Britain, along with its allies, should ‘encourage the Spaniards to set their own house in order’ when it came to thinking of an alternative regime to Franco’s.78 The Foreign Office expert on Spain, Peter Garran, was confident, as the British had been in the past, that any alternative involving Spanish monarchists would provide a greater chance of success than one based on Giral’s regime.79 There was no sign that the Giral Government itself was pursuing such a policy, yet there were elements within the government that believed a ‘democratic monarchy’ might have a better chance of success than Giral alone. Thus, Socialists such as Trifón Gómez and anarcho-syndicalists such as José Leiva continued to act within the government and maintain open lines of communication with their clandestine members in Spain that were involved in the ANFD.80

77 Hartmut Heine. La Oposición Política al Franquismo (Barcelona, 1983) 328.
78 Foreign Office to Duff Cooper, 13 January 1946. PRO FO 371/ 60333/ Z290.
80 Note to Bidault, 14 February 1946. AN 457 AP 99.
agreement between Republicans, monarchists and Spanish army generals seemed high. Whether or not the Giral Government was directly involved in such negotiations, if an agreement was reached they would inevitably be drawn into accepting it. The Foreign Office suggested that Britain, France and the United States best stay in touch with such developments in the case that they produced something workable.  

With Great Britain encouraging talks amongst various opposition groups in Madrid and France agreeing to diplomatic relations of a sort with Giral, it was necessary for the Allies to consult in order to further develop a policy toward Franco's potential successor regime. On 18 February 1946, the issue of the Spanish opposition was raised by Georges Bidault in a meeting with Ernest Bevin. While Bidault expressed his belief that a purely monarchist regime had little chance of survival in Spain, he also acknowledged that the Giral Government as constituted could only serve to be one part of the solution. Bevin picked up on this point and emphasized that the position taken by the Spanish Army and its influential anti-Franco generals would determine the future of an alternative regime. He thus proposed that the Allies think of the transition to a post-Franco regime as a two-stage process. The first stage consisted of Franco's removal and his replacement with a provisional government, presumably broadly-based. Only during the second stage would they consider whether the

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81 Derrick Hoyer-Millar minute, 13 December 1945. PRO PREM 8/353. For reports from a monarchist general, Varela, of the progress of talks with moderate Republicans in late 1945, see Mallet to Foreign Office, 19 December 1945. PRO FO 371/49629. By February, 1946, the Deputy Undersecretary of State, Sir Oliver Harvey, wrote that encouraging talks in Madrid between the ANFD, monarchists and generals was in line with Britain's policy of 'pressure, public and private, on Franco to go' and that Ambassador Victor Mallet should be instructed to 'press them most strongly to take immediate action to depose Franco.' Sir Oliver Harvey minute, 7 February 1946. DBPO Series I, vol. VII, 18ii.
new regime should be a monarchy or a republic. While it seemed that France was more inclined than Britain to deal with the Giral Government, a way forward which was acceptable to both Governments was clear.

The timing of these talks, and what followed, was of great significance. In essence, the Allies were slowly moving away from a strict interpretation of non-intervention in Spain at the same time that the Spanish issue was coming to dominate domestic French politics. As has been emphasized throughout this work, the main motivation of the Quai d'Orsay during this period was to attempt to reconcile the strong anti-Francoism of the French Resistance and left-wing parties with a workable Allied approach toward Spain. The question of diplomatic relations, economic sanctions and international action dominated the debate, within and without France. That debate was largely public. However, behind the scenes, the possibility that a transitional regime might appear in Spain was becoming more likely. Thus, while the British and American governments increasingly saw the Cold War influence their interpretations of the Spanish question, and resisted French pressure for a more aggressive Allied policy toward Franco, they simultaneously worked in conjunction with the French to facilitate, as much as possible, talks between various elements of the Spanish opposition.

The Tripartite Note of March, 1946 made explicit the hopes of the western Allies with regard to the creation of a broad-based anti-Franco coalition. The note emphasized Allied non-intervention in Spanish internal affairs while at the same time it called for the Spanish people to form a 'provisional government' which would prepare for elections that would

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82 Bevin to Duff Cooper, 22 February 1946. DBPO Series I, vol. VII, 18ii.
allow Spanish citizens to ‘define the type of government they desire.’ Both the Giral Government and Republicans within Spain considered the Allied statement to be less than ideal. Nonetheless, there was a realization on the part of the Republican Government-in-exile that it needed to expand its base of support. By the end of March, the Giral Government was joined by the Spanish Communist Party with the appointment of PCE member Santiago Carrillo to the Cabinet. The debate over Communist participation, which the government-in-exile, and in particular the Socialists, had engaged in for some time, was paralleled by a similar argument over its relationship with the Republicans of the ANFD inside Spain. In particular, the Giral Government was most concerned with the ANFD strategy of holding talks with moderate monarchists and generals. The very creation of the Republican government-in-exile in August, 1945 implied that Giral and his allies did not believe in the need for a transition government, but rather thought that a restoration of the Republic was possible following the fall of Franco. At the end of January, 1946, the PSOE and UGT executives met in Toulouse and officially rejected any regime that was not explicitly republican. However, after the release of the Tripartite Note, Giral began to send out word

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85 Heine, La Oposición, 185.


87 Borras, Políticas, 110. For the official PSOE-UGT statement on the potential of talks with Don Juan, see PSOE-UGT Joint Circular No. 28, 19 March 1946. Fundación Pablo Iglesias,
that he was willing to consider opening talks with the ANFD.\textsuperscript{88}

Within the Republican government, the anarcho-syndicalist movement organized in the political Spanish Libertarian Movement (MLE) and its sister trade union, the CNT, was the primary advocate of such a reconciliation. In March, the congress of the MLE-CNT in exile met in Toulouse and decided that rather than formulate its policy from France, it would submit to the authority of the clandestine movement in Spain, which was in favour of talks with moderates and monarchists.\textsuperscript{89} By May, 1946, the Secretary-General of the clandestine CNT, Vicente Santamaría, became the Secretary-General of the ANFD as well, and launched a new stage in the effort to unite the Spanish opposition. In France, the leading CNT minister within Giral's government, José Leiva, promoted a strategy which sought to link the Republican government-in-exile to the ANFD-monarchist talks which were occurring, on and off, within Spain. Leiva argued that reconciliation with the internal Spanish opposition was necessary and increasingly many Socialists in the Cabinet, led by Trifón Gómez, were convinced that this was indeed the case, and supported such a move.\textsuperscript{90}

As early as December, 1945, the French Foreign Ministry had believed that it could play a unique role in the Allied process of facilitating a broadly based alternative regime in Spain. That role was to bring the internal Spanish opposition movements into contact with

\textsuperscript{88} Heine, \textit{La Oposición}, 357.

\textsuperscript{89} Direction des Renseignements Généraux, 6e Section Report, 1 April 1946. \textit{MAE} Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 38.

\textsuperscript{90} Roger de Bercegol, French Embassy Madrid to MAE, 17 July 1946. \textit{MAE} Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 39.
the Republican government-in-exile of José Giral that had something near official status inside France. In the months following the Tripartite Statement, the need for exactly that type of mediator appeared. Over the course of the next year, France was drawn into various discussions amongst the anti-Franco Spanish opposition and, along with its Allies, actively sought to facilitate the creation of an alternative regime to that of General Francisco Franco's.

Santamaría contacted the French Mission in Madrid in April in order to outline the ANFD attempt to help form a transitional government in Spain. The ANFD sought not only to reach agreement with liberal monarchists and others in Spain, but also decided to increase its contacts with the Giral government, which it conceived of not as an alternative regime, but rather as the representative of the ANFD abroad. Santamaría requested French support in maintaining communication between the ANFD and its members within the Giral Government in Paris, primarily José Leiva of the CNT. The task was not easy, for Giral was still suspicious of the discussions being held in Spain and was fearful that the British were encouraging such talks in order to restore the monarchy. Throughout the summer, Giral wavered in his opinion about the ANFD, but by August he expressed his final rejection of the approach to unify internal and external groups. Even before this, however, the increasing support for talking with the ANFD and monarchists by Leiva and Socialists such as Trifón Gómez was well-known by the French and British, and thus Giral's stubborn rejection of

91 Note, 26 and 30 April 1946, AN 457 AP 99..

92 Giral expressed this view to a member of the French Embassy in Mexico in June, 1946. Legenissel to MAE, 14 June 1946, MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 39.

broadening his government only further weakened his position amongst the allies. As a result, the French Government increasingly sought contact with CNT and PSOE leaders who supported the ANFD approach.

From Santamaría’s initial contact in April developed a whole range of relationships between members of the internal opposition in Spain and the French Government. The primary contact was made by the French Mission in Madrid, with the knowledge and support of Bernard Hardion, and in particular by an unnamed member of the staff there. This official, referred to as ‘Monsieur X’ in documents amongst the papers of Georges Bidault, primarily dealt with CNT representatives in Madrid, most notably the Secretary-General of the CNT and ANFD, Santamaría. He also served as a conduit between CNT members inside Spain and those in France, often using the French diplomatic pouch to transmit Spanish opposition material back and forth between the capitals. Hardion made it regular practice to read this correspondence and report to Paris on developments within the ANFD camp. The CNT had made similar contacts with the British Embassy in Madrid, but the Secretary-General confided to ‘X’ that he trusted the French more in terms of their support for a strong

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94 Peter Garran minute, 15 July 1946. PRO FO 371/60336/7207. This was echoed by Derrick Hoyer-Millar, who wrote that the British, while supporting the formation of an alternative opposition regime in Spain, must make it clear that any discussion of Giral’s role in such a regime was a ‘non-starter’. Hoyer-Millar minute, 22 July 1946. DBPO Series I, vol. VII, 55.

95 Madrid Embassy to MAE, 17 May 1946. AN 457 AP 99.


97 These reports, Hardion to MAE, from spring, 1946 through to the end of the year, can be found in MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 39 and 40.
Republican role in any alternative Spanish regime. The most important contacts with the Spanish military were maintained by French secret intelligence agents.

The first meetings between Santamaría and the monarchist General Beigbeder (later joined by General Aranda) took place in May, 1946, with Hardion meeting Santamaría after each session. By mid-August, the Quai d'Orsay was able to inform Leiva that France supported a transition-type regime as outlined in the Tripartite Statement and that the participation of the ANFD in such a regime would be looked upon favourably by Paris. Moreover, France now concluded that there was no possibility for recognition of the Giral Government even if it expanded to include monarchists, the military and Catholic parties. Hardion reported to Paris that the strategies of the ANFD and Giral were as far apart as ever.

By August, 1946, both Hardion and the Quai d'Orsay had abandoned their original goal of bridging the gap between Giral and the internal opposition and opted instead to support the ANFD and the monarchists in the attempt to build an alternative Spanish government.

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98 Madrid Embassy to MAE, 17 May 1946. AN 457 AP 99.
99 Documentation Exterieure et Contre-Espionage to Bidault, 19 September 1946. AN 457 AP 99.
100 X to Bidault, ‘summer 1947’. AN 457 AP 99. See also Roger de Bercegol to MAE, 16 August 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 39. There is a good chance that de Bercegol, a member of Hardion 's' staff at the Madrid Mission, was ‘X’, but there is no definitive evidence for this informed guess.
The very broad lines of what an alternative regime would look like—three generals, four to seven monarchists and four to seven republicans—were agreed to by both sides by the end of August. As negotiations moved from a general framework to a more specific agreement, the French involvement increased. On 7 October 1946, Georges Bidault, acting in his capacity as Foreign Minister and President of the Republic, met for over an hour with Vicente Santamaría in Paris. The Secretary-General of the ANFD brought him up-to-date on discussions with Generals Beigbeder and Aranda, and Bidault encouraged him, saying: "I can do no better than to remind you of the words Napoleon III said to Cavour at Plombières: 'Make it so, but make it so quickly.'" The effort to 'make it so' was facilitated by Jean Chauvel, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry and Colonel Fourcaud of French Intelligence. They arranged for a meeting in Paris between Santamaría, Trifón Gómez, a representative of Don Juan's 'secretariat', Vegas Latapié, and Julio Lopez Oliván, an associate of Gil Robles.

During the month of October, 1946, Santamaría held a number of meetings in Paris and also traveled to London and Lisbon, home of Don Juan. He met with monarchists and internal opposition figures, Socialists, anarchists and members of other exiled political

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103 Heine, La Oposición, 363-364.

104 X to Bidault, 'summer 1947'. AN 457 AP 99. The original French phrase of Napoleon III's quote (as quoted by Bidault) is 'Faites, mais faites vite.'

105 X to Bidault, 'summer 1947'. AN 457 AP 99.

106 Heine, La Oposición, 364. For a record of Santamaría's initial meeting with Chauvel upon arriving in Paris, see 'Note d'un conversation', 4 October 1946. AN 457 AP 99. Santamaría emphasized to the Secretary-General of the Quai that the ANFD approach corresponded directly to the Allied Tripartite Statement on the subject of a transitional regime in Spain.
groups. Santamaría’s offices, travel and visas were all arranged by the French Government.\textsuperscript{107} Chauvel brought the British up to speed on France’s activities, although the British had been aware of it for some time.\textsuperscript{108} Chauvel informed British Embassy official Ashley Clarke that French intelligence in Spain had for months built up contacts with both monarchists and the CNT, and that the intention of the French Government was to ‘bring together inside Spain the various elements capable of bringing about a change of regime.’\textsuperscript{109} Moreover, Chauvel had personally taken charge of this effort, without the knowledge of the European section of the Quai d’Orsay or the French Council of Ministers, but with the approval in principle of Bidault.\textsuperscript{110} French facilitation efforts went further than any British attempt in terms of intervention in internal Spanish affairs, although Chauvel was quick to stress that his interpretation of how events might unfold was ‘pretty close’ to that of the Foreign Office—the French saw themselves only as a ‘honest broker’ in a process which the Spaniards themselves were in charge of.\textsuperscript{111}

An ANFD-Don Juan agreement in principle was reached at Estoril, Portugal in October, 1946.\textsuperscript{112} Bidault met with Santamaría to personally congratulate him, and the

\textsuperscript{107} Hardion to MAE, 1 November 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 40.
\textsuperscript{108} Hoyer-Millar to Sir Oliver Harvey, 1 October 1946. DBPO Series I. vol. VII, 77ii.
\textsuperscript{109} Clarke to Hoyer-Millar, 7 November 1946. PRO FO 371/60379/Z9587. Italics in original.
\textsuperscript{110} Clarke to Hoyer-Millar, 7 November 1946. PRO FO 371/60379/Z9587.
\textsuperscript{111} Clarke to Hoyer-Millar, 7 November 1946. PRO FO 371/60379/Z9587.
\textsuperscript{112} A copy of this agreement is in the French archives, ‘Texte de l’Accord signé à Lisbon’. MAE/ Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ 40.
American and British Governments were informed by France of the progress made.\footnote{113 X to Bidault, ‘summer 1947’. \textit{AN} 457 AP 99.}

However, the implementation of the agreement was delayed until Santamaría could sell it to all members of the Alliance. The delay was not without risks, as Leiva indicated, for there was a significant chance that the monarchists either would decide they were strong enough to go it alone, or that Franco might approach Don Juan and discuss the possibility of a more conservative restoration.\footnote{114 Hardion to MAE, 6 November 1946. \textit{MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne}, 40.} Indeed, such pessimism was well founded. The CNT, Socialists and Republican parties involved in the Alliance all disagreed with one aspect of the proposed pact, that which allowed Don Juan to reserve his right to act freely if the situation changed. In other words, if Franco agreed to a restoration then Don Juan could break the agreement without any further negotiation. Santamaría was told to renegotiate this aspect of the accord, which required not only new assent from Don Juan, but from the monarchist generals in Madrid as well.\footnote{115 Hardion to MAE, 15 November 1946. \textit{MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne}, 40.}

Such a mission was unlikely to succeed, to say the least. By the end of November, 1946, the ANFD came to the conclusion that it was impossible to reach an agreement with Don Juan, and Vicente Santamaría, in whom Bidault and Chauvel had invested their support, resigned from the organization.

Bernard Hardion did all he could in Madrid to get Santamaría to withdraw his resignation and sought to make contact with ANFD members in order to emphasize to them,
‘with force’ that the rejection of Santamaría was also an insult to France. Yet those who wanted to abandon any future talks with Don Juan and deal only with the generals in Madrid now held the upper hand within the ANFD. This faction was led by CNT members José Luque and Enrique Marco Nadal, the latter of whom was a Spaniard who had been involved in the French Resistance and whom French intelligence, ironically enough, had helped return to Spain clandestinely in October, 1945. Moreover, it was thought by ‘Monsieur X’ that both were under the influence of the British SIS in Madrid, and thus not inclined to support France’s involvement in the ANFD-monarchist negotiations. Hardion was now directly involved on behalf of France in the complex world of intrigue and division that marked the politics of the internal Spanish opposition. At Hardion’s request, ‘Monsieur X’ held two meetings with the new leadership of the CNT, most notably Enrique and José Luque, in order to ensure that negotiations did not completely break off with Don Juan. By 7 January 1947, however, negotiations had failed to move Don Juan away from the contentious point which allowed him to maintain his freedom of action, and the ANFD voted to break off talks with the monarchists. ‘Monsieur X’ blamed not only the various divisions amongst the Spanish

116 Hardion to MAE, 28 November 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 40. Hardion also met with the leading dissident monarchist in Spain, General Aranda, in order to encourage him to continue talks with the ANFD, which the latter duly promised he would do. Hardion to MAE, 6 December 1946. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 40.


opposition for the failure, but also the influence of the British and American intelligence services in Madrid, whom he thought preferred a purely monarchist alternative that did not involve any of the left-wing parties which made up the ANFD.121

What is most striking about the entire ANFD episode, from the French point of view, was the strength of democratic idealism inspiring those on the French side who were involved in the talks. Although forced to impose sanctions on Spain by the democratic vigour of the Resistance inside France, Bidault, Hardion and the Quai d’Orsay were not content to simply bide their time and await an opportunity to resume their preferred policy of trade and engagement with Franco’s Spain. Rather, it was the Quai d’Orsay and the French Government, not the parties of the Resistance, which moved away from the impractical rhetoric of Spanish Republicanism and actually sought to make a liberal alternative to Francoism possible. The vision of Resistance did matter in post-Liberation France, and the Spanish case demonstrates that even those advocating a return to Great Power grandeur were not immune to the rhetoric of universalistic democracy in the aftermath of Vichy.

Facilitating the creation of an alternative regime to General Franco’s had not been a primary focus of French policy-making prior to the border closure of February, 1946. Yet after they were forced by the French Left to close the Pyrenean border, the Quai d’Orsay more or less embraced the idea of assisting democratic Spain. They did so with the same strong impulse to make ‘practical’ policy with which they had earlier sought Anglo-American accord for sanctions against Spain. Unlike the domestic French supporters of the Spanish opposition, whose approach to the Giral Government was based more on rhetoric than reality,

the Quai d'Orsay had no qualms about abandoning the Republican government-in-exile when it was deemed insufficient as an alternative to Franco. Nonetheless, the ideal of universal Republicanism was as prevalent as was the impulse to forge a viable solution and achieve diplomatic success. 'Monsieur X' wrote as follows:

Concerning France, if we must regret the fact that our country was not, in the aftermath of V-E Day, in a position to take the initiative that would allow for the emergence of democracy in Spain, a diplomatic success which would re-establish our prestige in Europe...since the spring of 1946, despite accumulative obstacles and deep traps, and without compromising the French Mission [in Madrid] with the regime, the presence of Republican France amongst those Spaniards taken with the idea of liberty has been maintained, according to instructions received [from Paris]. France's position alongside the opposition in the storms of clandestinity...will not fail- we have all the right to think- to reveal its value, the day when fortune will change sides.  

Due to the influence of the new French President, Léon Blum, a relationship with the Republican government-in-exile was expanded in January, 1947. Lionel Vasse, the Quai d'Orsay official responsible for immigration, became the official French contact with the Spanish Republican Government-in-exile in Paris. Shortly thereafter, Giral resigned due to criticism of his foreign policy and his inability to deal with those anti-Franco elements within Spain. He was replaced by the Socialist Rodolfo Llopis, with whom Vasse continued to maintain contact.

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122 X to Bidault, 'summer 1947'. AN 457 AP 99.

123 Blum's personal interest in French-Giral relations was initially outlined in Foques-Duparc to Chalron, 23 December 1946. The change in approach to Giral came to fruition in Lapie to José Giral, 13 January 1947. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 40.


There was a brief revival of hope for a Spanish transitional regime shortly thereafter. In contrast to Giral, Llopis expressly backed the plan for a provisional government of Republicans within and without Spain. Talks in Paris between the Republican government-in-exile and the monarchist representative, Lopez Oliván, began. France encouraged these discussions, and went so far as to allow Llopis to meet with both French President Paul Ramadier and Georges Bidault in March, 1947. Moreover, within Spain, French intelligence continued to foster negotiations between ANFD representatives and those who supported Don Juan. Yet soon enough, the debate about whether or not to deal with the monarchists was revived within the Llopis Cabinet, most strongly by the Communist members who charged, correctly, that the CNT was more committed to the ANFD than the Llopis government in Paris. Monarchist demands that the Estoril accord of 1946 be the only basis upon which to proceed did little to promote an agreement. By the summer, the talks between the various factions of the Spanish opposition broke down, and the Quai d'Orsay

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128 Minute by Hogg, 20 May 1947. PRO FO 371/ 67876/ Z4980.

declared that 'the course of the Spanish question had led to yet another dead end.'\textsuperscript{130}

Surprisingly, the last French initiatives in the spring of 1947 coincided with a sense of renewed hope for an alternative Spanish government amongst officials in Washington and London. One would think that the emergence of the Truman Doctrine in the United States led to an interpretation of the Spanish question almost entirely in the context of the European dimension of the Cold War, giving credence to views that had begun to emerge within the State Department the year earlier. That was true, but not before the Anglo-Americans made a final effort with the anti-Franco Spaniards. American Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, the creator of the Tripartite Statement, was involved in the project to create a 'positive' Anglo-American policy in Spain.\textsuperscript{131} In April, 1947, the State Department communicated a proposal to the British Foreign Office which would guarantee Spain financial and economic assistance if a more liberal regime replaced Franco.\textsuperscript{132} In addition, the proposal suggested that the two allies could 'materially assist the efforts of the non-communist elements to compose their differences and to agree upon some interim regime' and make contact with Franco, in order to warn him, and the Army, in order to entice them to support a new government.\textsuperscript{133}

At the same time as Acheson sent his proposal to London, the new Minister of State in the British Cabinet, Hector McNeil, proposed that Britain, France and the United States


make another effort to approach all of the anti-Francoist groups, inside and outside Spain, as well as Franco, in order to form a new government. Upon the advice of former Ambassador to Spain Sir Victor Mallet and the Permanent Undersecretary of State, Sir Orme Sargent, Ernest Bevin ultimately dismissed the proposal as too dangerous to risk. Yet Anglo-American discussions about a different government in Spain carried on for some time. The American proposal was deemed part and parcel of Cold War strategy. The idea of giving Spain economic assistance coincided with a number of initiatives on the European economy and the question of recovery, initiatives which led to the Marshall Plan proposal in June, 1947. Spain was thus one country in the American strategy which sought economic and democratic growth as a part of Western security.

The proposal to grant aid to a more liberal Spanish regime ‘anticipated’ the Marshall Plan. The same Cold War framework which fostered that proposal was critical for the Spanish case. The State Department considered ‘political and economic support’ essential to the creation of ‘healthy political conditions’ in Spain. Yet Franco’s regime, incompatible with the rest of Western Europe’s democracies, ‘offer[ed] no prospect of long range stability.’ The potential threat of United Nations sanctions against Spain, which neither the

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United States nor Great Britain desired, made speedy resolution of the Spanish case important to the State Department. In short, if economic stability became part of the American strategy to build up Western Europe as an effective bulwark against Communism, then Spain could not be ignored. Yet if economic assistance was to be granted solely to democratic states, as the Marshall Plan would later imply, then Franco’s Spain could not receive such aid. In order to expedite their policy in Western Europe, then, the United States first sought to make a final effort to remove Franco and facilitate the creation of a more liberal government in Madrid. In other words, the American effort to revive efforts to facilitate the creation of an alternative Spanish regime were part and parcel of a broader strategy toward Western Europe necessitated by the Cold War.

Great Britain was drawn into the American discussions but Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin continued to resist any effort to rejuvenate the talks between monarchists and republicans. By July, 1947 he made it clear that British support for the anti-Franco opposition was limited to ‘passive encouragement.’ With no support, the Republican government-in-exile became even weaker with the resignation of Llopis in August, and the ANFD collapsed shortly thereafter. Only one initiative to revive republican-monarchist discussions was left, that of Indalecito Prieto, mandated by the PSOE in July, 1947. His mission led to a final ‘stir of encouragement’ in the autumn of 1947, when Prieto and Gil Robles met in London, a

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141 See Hardion to MAE Europe, 3 September 1947. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 42.
meeting facilitated by the Foreign Office, but no result came of this. By the autumn of 1947, the true death of the Western effort to support the construction of a broad-based anti-Franco government in Spain was finished. Amongst American officials, a consensus finally emerged that accepted the Franco regime as an anti-Communist stabilizer in the Western Mediterranean. In October, 1947, this was formalized by George F. Kennan, in a Policy Planning Staff paper which reached the following conclusion: 'instead of openly opposing the Franco regime, we should work from now toward the normalization of U.S.-Spanish relations, both political and economic.'

In Madrid, Bernard Hardion wrote to Paris that the effort to revive any talks amongst anti-Francoists was not worth the risk of Francoist reprisals, especially since the ideal of a democratic Spanish regime, the ideal that had motivated French democrats inside the Quai d'Orsay and within the larger French political system, was one which the Spaniards themselves 'have made a fiction.' Hardion was one of those democrats, who had performed admirably in his role as a mediator for the opposition talks in Madrid, just as he had vigorously opposed the executions of numerous Spanish Republicans such as Cristino García.

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142 Howard to Crosthwaite, 10 December 1947 for British analysis of these talks. PRO FO 371/67877A/ Z10788. For documents relating to the Prieto-Gil Robles talks, see the entire file: PRO FO 371/67908A. Dunthorn, 'The Prieto-Gil-Robles Meeting'.

143 Fernando Guirao, 'The United States, Franco and the Integration of Europe' in Francis Heiler and John Gillingham, eds. The United States and the Integration of Europe: Legacies of the Postwar Era (New York, 1996) 80.

144 PPS/12, 24 October 1947. FRUS 1947 vol. III, 1091.

Yet he was also a realist who had opposed the closure of the French border with Spain. With the hopes for a transitional regime over, Hardion took the lead in preparing for a reversion to the 1945 *status quo* in Franco-Spanish relations.

Indeed, the French Mission in Madrid had opposed the border closure of February, 1946 before it occurred and had not let up in its oppositions when the measure was implemented. By the summer of 1946, its dissent was articulated in a full in a paper submitted to Paris. The document emphasized that French suppliers and manufacturers who had had markets in Spain would be replaced by British and American firms and advocated an immediate resumption of individual traffic across the border and a gradual resumption of commercial traffic by autumn, 1946.  

In July, 1946 Hardion traveled to Paris to reaffirm his belief that the time to preserve and develop France’s economic interests in Spain was short. By August, Hardion was permitted to open negotiations with Spanish Foreign Minister, Martín Artajo, in order to lessen controls on the movement of individuals and families crossing the border. In return, France was allowed to participate in the Trusteeship Council which was charged with the dispersal of German assets in Spain.

As the failure to bring the various elements of the Spanish opposition together sunk in. Hardion and his colleagues in the European Section of the Foreign Ministry argued that

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maintaining France's policy of sanctions against General Franco served little purpose. Indeed, as the European section emphasized in a note to Bidault, the United States and Great Britain, by remaining active in Spain economically and otherwise, and by limiting their criticism of the regime to the rhetoric of the Tripartite Statement, had done more to encourage change than had the French policy of sanctions.¹⁴⁹

Most significant, however, was the domestic context of French foreign policy-making. By 1947, the Spanish issue was no longer the focus of national attention that it had been. Spain was no longer the touchstone for French democrats that it had been in 1936 and 1946. In the south-west, where anti-Franco sentiment had been strongest, Chambers of Commerce began to press the government to reopen the border to trade in response to economic losses suffered by the various businesses in the region.¹⁵⁰ In the same region, even left-wing opinion accepted that the cost to the French economy outweighed the gain for democratic policy-making. The local head of the CGT in the Basses-Pyrénées publicly criticized the policy of closure and the Prefect reported to Paris that with the exception of Communists and some Socialists the union leader spoke for most of the left in the area.¹⁵¹ By the summer, coverage of French involvement in the Spanish question in the Socialist organ *Le Populaire de Paris* was reduced to a report covering a press conference of the Paris


¹⁵⁰ See, for instance, a summary of the lobbying by the Chamber of Commerce of Perpignan over the first half of 1947 in Chamber of Commerce, Perpignan to Bidault, 12 June 1947. *MAE* Cabinet du Ministre/Bidault 1944-1948, 17.

Only the most committed activists and the Communist Party maintained their established positions on the Spanish question.

On 5 May 1947, Georges Bidault forwarded to the Premier, Paul Ramadier, a series of letters he had received from Chambers of Commerce, parliamentarians and other protesting the policy of closure; as has been noted, this was not an insignificant date, for it was the same day that the French Communist Party left the government. By the summer, the Foreign Minister was willing, for the first time, to speak openly in the National Assembly about the possibility of opening the border to commercial traffic. In September, French officials in Paris and Washington held talks with American officials prior to the U.N. General Assembly meeting, which once again considered the Spanish case. The Quai’s instructions to the French delegation were clear: the French delegation would abstain from voting on any anti-Franco measure, as Hardion, the U.S. and Great Britain had all requested. Negotiations

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152 *Le Populaire de Paris*, 1 July 1947.


155 Bidault testimony to the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly, 9 August and 13 September 1947. *AN* Série C/ 15332. At the second of these sessions, Bidault commented on the commercial losses of France by reminding the members of the Commission that ‘there are no fascist oranges, there are only oranges.’


157 MAE Europe to French Delegation, New York, 15 October 1947. *MAE* Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne 75. The only member of the French delegation to react against these order was Léon Jouhaux of the CGT, who gave interviews and circulated a proposed anti-Franco
with the Spanish government, directed by Jean Chauvel and Bernard Hardion, resulted in a reopening of the Pyrenean frontier in February. 1948 and by May, the September, 1945 trade agreement between the two states was restored. 158

For the West, the Spanish question was effectively over by 1948. The trends in international and European politics which had made acceptance of General Franco and his regime viable continued to develop. Certainly Spain remained an exception in Europe, and the United States did not seriously consider making Franco’s regime eligible for Marshall Plan economic aid. 159 Yet the process of increasing openness toward the Spanish regime began. In the United States, Ambassador José Lequerica orchestrated a Spanish Lobby in Congress which drew upon Catholics, Republicans and committed anti-communists. 160 The more the Cold War developed, the more important Spain became as a necessary strategic point in American military planning. The American rationale had changed from a focus on economic and democratic reconstruction issues which had defined the Marshall Plan program to a more overtly military definition of security (although the two were not mutually

resolution amongst the UN delegates. Bidault responded by informing Jouhaux that the instructions came not only from him, but from the Premier. Note, 1 October 1947, Parodi to Bidault, 18 October, Bidault to French delegation, 21 October 1947. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 75.

158 For the joint Franco-Spanish statement on the border re-opening, MAE Service d’Information et de Presse, 7 February 1948. MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 86. For the May, 1948 trade agreement, 1 May 1948, MAE Série Z/ Europe 1944-1949/ Espagne, 93.

159 Guirao, ‘The United States, Franco and Integration’ in Heiler and Gillingham, eds. The United States and the Integration of Europe. 95.

exclusive). By 1950, with the Korean War raging, the United Nations rescinded its December, 1946 resolution which had called upon all member states not to appoint Ambassadorial-level representatives to Madrid, and Great Britain and the United States immediately appointed Ambassadors to their Embassies. U.S. Department of Defense officials initiated discussions with the State Department concerning Spain’s military role in a potential war with the Soviet Union, which would primarily be to provide installations for U.S. forces. By 1951, President Truman authorized military talks with the Spaniards and by September, 1953, agreements which allowed U.S. access to Spanish military bases, military aid for the Spanish army, and economic assistance for Spain were signed.

French policy after 1948 continued to develop in accord with the direction set by the United States. Military issues were initially secondary to the French. Public opinion may have been willing to accept a renewal of trade, but overt military cooperation remained out of the question. This was true not only in France, but in a number of European states, and it led, in 1948, to French and European insistence that Spain not even be considered for admission to the Western European Union (WEU). Ultimately, however, the importance of Spain could not be denied. Quietly, where security issues of mutual interest existed, as in North Africa, French military officials pursued contacts and arrangements with the Spaniards.

161 Guirao, ‘The United States, Franco and Integration’ in Heiler and Gillingham, eds. The United States and the Integration of Europe, 95.


163 Marquina, España en la política, 154-157, 198.

164 Marquina, España en la política, 198.
strategic value of Spain was not overlooked, and due to North African colonial defense, it has been rightly argued that France’s strategic interests in Spain were greater than those of the United States.\textsuperscript{165}

The primary direction of Hispano-French relations, however, was economic and commercial. From 1948, the new Foreign Minister of France, Robert Schumann, wished above all to avoid any further political debate over Spain.\textsuperscript{166} Economic exchanges grew tremendously, with the May, 1948 commercial accord, renewed and expanded upon in June, 1949. Traditional cultural exchanges between the two states also were reinvigorated. Thus, just as the Americans were doing, the French slowly opened the door to Spain internationally, opposing Spanish exclusion from the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 and allowing Spain to participate in the technical organizations of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{167} The development of improved relations with General Franco’s regime did not come without consequences, and required France to grant Spain the occasional political favour. On 7 September 1950, the Spanish Communist Party in exile (PCE) and its sister party, the Catalan Unified Socialists (PSUC), were banned in France, and 288 Spanish communists were arrested and either deported or assigned designated residences by the French Government. Operation ‘Boléro-Paprika’ was inspired not only by growing anti-communism in the French Government and the Ministry of the Interior, but also by repeated Spanish complaints about the many activities of Spanish political refugees which were

\textsuperscript{165} Marquina, \textit{España en la política}, 184.

\textsuperscript{166} Portero, \textit{Franco aislado}, 323.

\textsuperscript{167} Dulphy, ‘La Politique de la France’, 138.
tolerated within France.\textsuperscript{168} By the end of the year, Bernard Hardion had been named a full ambassador in Madrid, ending the final French sanction against the regime of General Francisco Franco.

The experience of French relations with the various elements of the Spanish anti-Franco opposition illuminated many of the salient points concerning Franco-Spanish relations in general. First, on the part of the Left and those who emerged from the French Resistance, the Spanish question became part of the larger postwar debate about what a renewed France represented, not only at home, but abroad as well. The notion of a democratic foreign policy, made by the people for the purpose of exporting Republicanism beyond the Métropole, led to support for the Republicans of Spain who found themselves exiled in France. Yet the emphasis on comparisons with France’s wartime experience, and the ultimate triumph of the Resistance, meant that the French Left most often supported Spanish Republicanism without forming lasting and productive alliances with those Spaniards who opposed General Franco and his regime. The real importance of the Spanish question for the French Left was that it provided an opportunity to continue to campaign for the inclusion of a Resistance vision for France and its foreign policy, one that differed from the views espoused by the Gaullists.

The second aspect of French relations with the anti-Franco opposition which is relevant to this study was the fact that it was the Government and the Foreign Ministry, those in pursuit of a ‘practical policy’ rather than an overtly ideological one, who made the effort to encourage the elements of the anti-Franco opposition to organize themselves into a potential

alternative to Franco. Forced by public opinion to become more active in facilitating the creation of an alternative regime, the French Government did not back down, but rather sought a solution which could unite the most diverse elements of the Spanish opposition. In their pursuit of policy with regard to Franco’s successors, the Quai d’Orsay was not overly antagonistic to the arguments of the Resistance concerning the value of democracy. Yet as with earlier efforts to reconcile domestic idealism with international realities, France’s foreign policy-makers could not ignore alliance politics and realistic assessments of the weakness of Spanish Republicanism. As they had since 1945, these officials sought to develop a policy which had a chance of success, which would further France’s long term economic and political interests in Spain, would give France an important place alongside its American and British allies, as well as respond to domestic concerns.

The third and final aspect to examine is the fact that the French effort to make a real agreement with the Spanish opposition was a failure, as were most of the French policies toward Spain in the period after Liberation. In part the divisions of the anti-Franco Spaniards themselves were to blame for this. Surely a more important reason, however, was the emergence of the Cold War. There was considerable freedom of action for European states under the emerging hegemony of American Cold War leadership, and France was one country which did have success in defending its interests, and in shaping the alliance in order to preserve its interests.\textsuperscript{169} The bipolar international system, however, imposed limitations upon the degree and the extent to which even an alliance member as important as France

could act or influence others. In the case of the Spanish opposition, French efforts to reconcile both domestic opinion and the Quai d’Orsay’s interpretation of national interest and alliance goals coincided with a hardening of Anglo-American positions toward the Soviet Union. This had consequences for the alliance view of the Franco regime, consequences which meant that no one wanted to risk replacing Franco.

The Tripartite Statement of March, 1946, represented a microcosm of the Western Alliance’s approach toward Spain. Initiated as an American effort to respond to the importance of the Spanish question within France, it failed to do much of anything, in large part because its arrival came alongside the beginning of the imposition of the Cold War onto the Spanish question. Ironically enough, then, the Tripartite Statement of France, Great Britain and the United States represented the full extent of how far the British and the U.S. was prepared to go to encourage an alternative Spanish regime, while for the French, searching for policies beyond the imposition of sanctions, it was a starting point. Only when the internal discord of the Spanish opposition became impossible to overcome did the French accept that their Allies were no longer interested in treating Spain as anything but a bulwark against Communism. Gradually, after 1947, the French too adopted this position.


Conclusion

'This re-opening of the Pyrenean border is not, suffice to say, a striking event, there is no opportune moment to raise the curtain.'¹ That was the conclusion of Combat, the daily whose slogan was 'From Resistance to Revolution', in the days after the Pyrenean border between France and Spain was re-opened. The passion that had fueled much of the debate over French policy toward Francisco Franco's Spanish regime had dissipated; a mood of inevitability regarding the resumption of trading and other relations seemed to be pervasive. One of the editorialists at Combat reminded its readers of the surprising position that the newspaper had taken against the closure of the border in the midst of the public outcry over Franco's execution of anti-fascist guerilleros in early 1946. There would not be a need for any news or statements now, he wrote, if the French Government of that era had not aligned themselves with principles that the Great Powers had themselves already dismissed in favour of 'interests and strategy.'²

Combat's writer had hit upon the reasons why the Spanish question had faded in importance, for it had moved from being a test case on its own merits to being subsumed into the larger division of international politics known as the Cold War. Only one of the leftist/Resistance publications in France still spoke fervently of Spain, and even the Communist daily L'Humanité came to a similar conclusion. With a very different tone, Georges Cogniot wrote that the decision represented the 'resignation' of France to a role as a

¹ Combat, 11 February 1948.
² Combat, 8-9 February 1948.

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"satellite without protest [and] without honour." The immensity of the Cold War's ideological division limited the extent to which issues driven by earlier ideological principles could emerge as significant foreign policy debates. For the Fourth Republic, despite the best efforts of the Government to reconcile domestic opinion and alliance politics, this meant that the debate between wartime idealism and postwar realism, grounded in the French experience of war and Resistance, had to be pushed to the side.

Moreover, the threat inside Spain was easily recast not as one of lingering fascism but rather as one of latent Communism, and thus the Spanish question was easily interpreted by the United States and Great Britain from a Cold War perspective. If a Republican Spain was to emerge, the argument went, it was likely to be dominated by the Spanish Communist Party. Worse, if a Republican Spain did not immediately emerge, the threat of renewed civil war was high, and any conflict, it was feared, would draw the Soviet Union into Spain. After the last efforts of 1947 to encourage a transitional regime in Spain, the Americans and their British allies were unwilling to risk any chance of a Communist revival in Spain. There was precedent for this, for the argument has been made that British non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War was motivated by anti-Communism as much as anything else. An approach to the Spanish issue which advised 'Better Franco than Stalin' had even greater resonance in 1948 than earlier. By 1948, those who sat in the French Council of Ministers or

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3 *L'Humanité*, 7 February 1948.


the National Assembly as Socialists, Christian Democrats or Gaullists were willing to accept this fact. Those who made foreign policy in the Foreign Ministry, the Quai d’Orsay, agreed.

The Cold War attitude toward General Franco was even stronger amongst Anglo-American officials. Forged in the context of the Second World War, American and British policy toward Franco’s Spain after May, 1945 continued to include equal parts of rhetorical condemnation and diplomatic negotiation. In 1944 and 1945, condemnation was heightened as the Allied victory became inevitable. However, by 1947, and certainly after 1948, the emergence of the Cold War and its strategic consequences altered Western policy toward acceptance of the Franco regime as a bulwark against Communism and ultimately as an ally. Rather than serve as a venue for the implementation of a new, democratically-driven foreign policy, as the French Resistance demanded, Spain in the Cold War became a place where ‘old diplomacy’, prevalent in Western policy during the Civil War, resumed. Both in the United States and in the Soviet Union, the requirements of the emerging ‘national security state’ prioritized Cold War politics over all others. Stalin demanded that the French Communist Party serve the interests of the Soviet state instead of fostering a ‘Resistance vision’, while the Americans and British, set upon rebuilding Germany as a crucial part their strategy, reassured and pressured the French with plans for Western Union and closer alliance relations that resulted in a greater alignment of strategy and policy throughout Europe.

The editorial by Cogniot, however, recalled an earlier time, a time when the


ideologies of the war were very much at the heart of the debate over Spain. At an upcoming
Communist Party protest, he promised, a ‘multitude’ of workers and intellectuals would
come together and speak ‘in a voice so strong that the friendly peoples of Spain...will know
that they [represent] the true France.’\(^8\) The dedication of the French Resistance and Left to the
idea of a renewed France, one grounded in the democratic experience of wartime resistance,
had a significant impact upon the debate over policy toward Spain and led to the closure of
France’s border with Spain for two years, March 1946 to February 1948. Despite the failure
of the various forces of the Resistance to form one political party or articulate one clear
vision for renewing France, it was an influential force in the development of politics and
policy in the early years of the Fourth Republic. The basis for Resistance influence was the
concept of a ‘new politics’ grounded in Republican democracy and deemed viable in the
process of postwar reconstruction both at home and abroad. Renewed Republicanism
amongst the French Centre and Left led to an international policy which was, in a sense,
renewed Wilsonianism. The combination of self-determination, democratic morality and
international action was appealing not only to activists, but to the postwar public at large.
Through an extensive campaign of rhetoric and propaganda, the Resistance and Left and
Centre-Left parties were able to claim to speak for the majority of French citizens on the
issue of Spain, and thus promote a second claim in the Spanish debate, one that argued that in
a democracy, foreign policy must not be made by elites in Paris, but rather by the citizenry at
large. Linking the Spanish debate to the myth of France’s own wartime experience, and in
particular to the myth that occupied France was a nation of résistants, the Resistance and the

\(^8\) L’Humanité, 7 February 1948.
Centre-Left were able to argue that Republican France should promote an international policy which supported Republican and democratic institutions internationally. The case of Spanish Republicans, many of whom were exiled in France, was the most obvious one to support, especially due to the French debate about Spain that went back to the Civil War, and in light of the contribution to French liberation made by Spanish refugees.

In contrast to the Resistance, the elites of the Foreign Ministry, many of whom had been drawn into Spanish affairs due to the experience of the Madrid mission in war, constructed French policy toward Spain almost entirely from the point of view of national interest. At the heart of their assessment of national interest was a national strategy of recovery. Just as Hitchcock has argued with reference to French policy in Germany, the Quai d'Orsay did not pursue moral solutions in the challenge to rebuild and remake France..Initially the rationale for continuing relations with Spain was based on the economic benefits that France could gain there, as Spain offered France a legitimate ground on which to compete with its Allies economically, and also offered France many of the key products required for its reconstruction. As French policy was challenged on moral grounds by a variety of domestic forces, the Quai clung to its strategy, only willing to change it if an agreement could be reached which denied its Allies access to the products and benefits France had sought. Such a compromise proved impossible to find, and France suffered as a result. However, the tenacity with which French officials developed and defended a strategy of recovery over ideology was marked, and thus an examination of the Spanish case further supports the argument that the Fourth Republic sought to develop a realistic, and forward-

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9 Hitchcock, France Restored, 2.
looking foreign policy over a wide-range of international questions.

Both the Resistance and the Quai d'Orsay agreed that a renewed France had to be an influential power, perhaps even a great power, but what constituted greatness was in question, as an examination of the Spanish case reveals. A study of the Spanish question in France between 1943 and 1948 is a really an opportunity to examine the subject of France's transition from war to peace. The question of how to renew the French Republic was in real dispute during the mid- to late-1940s. Both the Quai d'Orsay and the Resistance had strong views on the matter. Was a Republican state meant to conduct policy on the basis of moral engagement alone, especially in the aftermath of a world conflict against fascism? Or was the real merit of a state's foreign policy to be found in a recognition of its strength and weakness within the international system and the subsequent application of policies which would rebuild its status? French policy toward Spain not only brought such division to the surface, but it demonstrated that in the early years of the Fourth Republic, the forces of democratic idealism and the advocates of grandeur confronted one another, challenged one another, and influenced one another constantly. The war had challenged the French state and the French nation to defend itself, to redefine itself, and to restore itself. The Liberation in and of itself did not end the challenge. The Fourth Republic, in its early years, was forced to confront anew the question of France's role in the world. While all accepted that France was a Republic, there was a debate between those who believed this implied a far-reaching ideological foreign policy and those that thought France must adjust to 'certain realities' in the aftermath of war. Only later, in the 1950s, would there emerge a third force which believed neither.
In the end, neither the international Republican idealism of the emerging Fourth Republic, nor the Quai’s policy of subtle influence, could survive the great power politics of the Cold War. Just as there is a striking parallel between the rhetoric of the Resistance over Spain in the 1940s and that of the French Left over the Civil War in the 1930s, there is a similarity in the final results. The political divisions of France in the late 1930s were so great that Léon Blum believed to support the Spanish Republic would cause the collapse of the Popular Front government and perhaps risk violent confrontation. Blum compromised rather than risk a battle between the masses and the political elites of the Third Republic. In the end the Popular Front was a policy of the centre made by the left, and was thus unable to triumph in an atmosphere dominated by increasingly polarized politics.¹⁰ By the late 1940s, the attempted revival of neo-Wilsonian foreign policy, driven in France by the renewal of Republicanism as defined by the Resistance, similarly became increasingly incompatible with the realities of the emerging international system.

The Cold War demanded conformity. The elite decision-makers of the Fourth Republic, in the face of public protest, understood this, even while they admitted their own sympathies for the Resistance vision. They had sought, in the early years of post-Liberation France, to shape Allied policy in such a way so as to allow for a compromise. Yet as the tensions of the East-West conflict grew, the need for conformity also increased, and thus lessened the likelihood that France could influence Western policy effectively toward Spain. Inevitably the politicians and policy-makers of the Fourth Republic were forced to accept

Franco and, as members of the Western Alliance first and foremost, they did so, for that membership was essential to their national strategy of recovery. Strategy, national interest and security, the new rhetoric of 'old diplomacy', took precedence over the creation of a 'new politics'.

The transition from war to peace in France was definitely shaped by the Cold War. The involvement of France in Allied policy implementation toward Spain complicated matters for the Americans and the British, and made the Spanish debate of greater importance to the Allies, for the domestic debate inside France over Spain raised the possibility that decisions made on Spain might influence the direction of the Fourth Republic’s politics, and thus affect the entire European policy of the Anglo-Americans. At the end of the day, however, the primacy of the concept of security, the need for clearly defined alliances, and the demand for Western strategic solidarity made it impossible for the Fourth Republic to do anything but accept Franco on the basis of his anti-Communist credentials.

Recognition must be given to the efforts of the French to remake their democracy and, in turn, to remake Europe, in the years after the Second World War. However, the Fourth Republic was not to renovate French foreign policy through the international export of renewed Republicanism. Nor was it to shape the policy of the Western alliance within Europe fundamentally on issues such as the role of Spain in the international system. Rather, it would constantly be divided between these impulses and the need for Western compliance. The failure of the Republican vision to win the debate over Spanish policy, and the failure of the Quai d’Orsay to build a bridge between the ideals of the Resistance and the realities of alliance politics, was symbolic of France’s internal tension between ‘new politics’ of moral
idealism and the traditional ‘old politics’ of *grandeur* and power. Their failures were representative of the causes that led to the Fourth Republic’s ultimate collapse. Indeed, the tension within France between idealism, *grandeur* and conformity would not dissipate with the end of the ‘Spanish Question’, for it plagued the Fourth Republic until its death in 1958. The effort to reconcile these tensions was made in the Spanish case, and, as Hitchcock has argued. French policy-makers did demonstrate a great deal of innovation in the formation of policy. However, any assessment of French success must be qualified. This work has argued that there were limits to France’s ability to develop a successful policy in Spain, limits imposed by the Cold War and by France’s position within the Western Alliance. The Fourth Republic and its politicians and officials, despite their best efforts, had to accept the conformity which the Cold War required. As it had earlier, the road to Madrid only highlighted the narrow boundaries within which policy could be made.
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