THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF 'DIFFERENCE' AND CAPITALIST RESTRUCTURING IN CANADA:
The Making of 'Migrant Workers' through the 1973 Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP)

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT

By utilizing the materialist method of institutional ethnography of Dorothy E. Smith, complemented by Michel Foucault's analysis of 'governmentality', I conduct a documentary analysis of Canadian House of Commons debates from 1969 to 1973, inclusive, to explore how the 1973 immigration program of indentured 'migrant worker' recruitment – the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) – was organized as a feature of 'globalization'. I examine immigration and globalization as socially organized processes that together produce a space in which people and capital move and meet.

Rather than taking a case-study approach to the study of 'migrant workers', I investigate the social organization of our knowledge of migrant workers and how this category is produced as a social phenomenon. My examination centres on an analysis of social practices and their ideological character to uncover the social relations that make certain state practices – and not others – imaginable and actionable.

I reveal the importance of racist and nationalist ideological state practices to the material organization of a competitive 'Canadian' labour market within a re-structured global capitalism and the resultant re-organization of notions of Canadian nationhood. I argue that socially organizing the 'foreign-ness' of a certain racialized group of workers within the nationalized Canadian labour market and neo-liberal policy shifts in trade and investment that allow for greater capital mobility are integrally related state practices.
I problematize the legitimacy of the 'migrant worker' category by examining the ideological character of repeated calls for 'order at the border' in the Canadian Parliament. I show that parliamentary discursive practices of producing certain people as 'problems' for 'Canadians' results not in the physical exclusion of those constructed as 'foreigners' but in their ideological and material differentiation from Canadians once living and working within Canadian society. I, thus, uncover how national state practices that organize social 'differences' within Canada also shape how the relations of ruling are accomplished during my period of study. I show that in the period under study, the racialization of Canadian immigration policy was shifted, in part, from the more explicit pre-1967 criteria of "preferred races and nationalities" to the 1973 'non-immigrant' category.
I wish to dedicate this work to the growing numbers of people displaced and refused a home by those who mark the borders.

It is offered in the spirit of struggle of those who know that life ought to be much more than this.

Finally, to those who have given me the great fortune of having numerous homes: my Bibi, Maya Devi Sharma, my Mama, Santosh Rani Sharma and my joyful comrades, Allison Christie Campbell and John Henry Moss
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This study would not have been possible to carry out without the assistance of a very large group of people. I would like to first acknowledge the tremendous help given to me by my supervisory committee: Dr. Roxana Ng, my senior supervisor, whose wisdom and clarity allowed me to explore new thoughts; Dr. Kari Dehli whose keen insights offered me exciting challenges; Dr. Sedef Arat-Koc whose understanding about the machinations of immigration policy-making were of great help; Dr. Kirin Mirchandani who generously gave me her time and knowledge; and last, but certainly not least, Dr. Robert Miles to whom I owe a great debt. His expertise on all aspects of my study helped me to sharpen my work. Of course, I alone bear responsibility for the results.

I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Dorothy Smith whose body of work is a major influence on my own. Courses taken with her during my time at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education helped me to re-think the importance of asking how the world is actually organized. I also am indebted to numerous political activists who provided me a space in which to develop my thoughts and re-formulate strategies for what needs to be done to make home much more than a memory for all people displaced by the workings of white, capitalist patriarchies. Sincere gratitude to and solidarity with all those I struggle alongside, in particular, Sunera Thobani, who is truly a comrade.

Finally I want to thank my family who, luckily for me, are a wonderful community of intellects, activists, nurturers and friends: my mother, Santosh Rani Sharma, without whom no place would be home; my partner, Allison Christie Campbell who made home feel joyful throughout the writing up of this study; John Henry Moss, whose caring provides me with a solid foundation; my brother, Paul Sharma, who tries to keep me true to my beliefs; my father Kesho Ram Sharma, whose bravery created a new home; and Beulah and Buster whose feline creativity is always a source of comfort.
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Chapter 1: An Essay in Refusal: Social Relations of Ruling and the Construction of ‘Migrant Workers’ in Canada

The necessity of reform mustn't be allowed to become a form of blackmail serving to limit, reduce or halt the exercise of criticism. Under no circumstances should one pay attention to those who tell one: 'Don't criticize, since you're not capable of carrying out a reform.' That's ministerial cabinet talk. Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this then is what needs to be done. ...Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't have to lay down the law for the law. It isn't a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed to what is.

Michel Foucault, Questions of Method

Introduction

The international migration of people displays the underlying unity of the supposedly separate political, economic and social spheres of human activity. For most of the 125 million people currently crossing national borders in their ongoing struggle for life, international migration has become necessary due to processes of displacement. Over the last thirty years, these processes have been further entrenched and there has been a doubling of international migration (United Nations Population Fund. 1993). Whether because of poverty, war, ecological devastation or persecution, people are moving to leave behind some form and level of coercion. However, for many, new coercive methods come into play in their act of movement. These shape practically every aspect of their lives in new places called home. And in this new home, coercive practices continue to shape the everyday experiences of most (im)migrants.

The growing movement of people is not a temporary phenomenon. It is a permanent situation. And it is precisely the persistence of this phenomenon that obliges us to demand a more just world. Indeed, present day migrations of people have deep historical roots that connect to past global movements of capital, ideologies and people. Indeed, these movements across space and time can be said to be one of the defining characteristics of the last 500 years. The three ships of Christopher Columbus that set sail in 1492 from European shores to the Americas established the passageways of colonialism, racism, sexism and (eventually) nationalism that
(most) people engaged in contemporary global movements must wend their ways through in the search of new forms of livelihood.

The significance of their voyages are important not only for their effects on those engaged in them but also for what they reveal about those who set the terms and conditions of their movement and subsequent stay. There is a dialectical play of material and ideological practices that shapes not only people's movement and settlement but also what we come to know of them, their very subjectivity, in the places they make home. This is even more important if they are not seen as being at home where they live. In a period when most national states (especially those of the global North) have responded to increased international migration by representing this movement as a national security threat, it is crucial that we uncover the social practices that render some people foreigners in spaces constructed as 'belonging' to the 'nation'.

Concepts of belonging and their corollary of not belonging are particularly important to an examination of movements of people. Such movements take place within a global framework of national states that alone are authorized to establish the parameters of people's mobility. Indeed, in today's world having control over the nation's borders is universally recognized as one of the key signs of national security. Conversely, losing control of these borders is tantamount to the destruction of the nation.

In this respect, it is vital that we recognize that borders are social constructions with tremendous consequences for the territorial, political, cultural, economic and psychic boundaries between different groupings of people. Borders are both physical and existential. They define terrestrial as well as ideological ground. In other words, the construction of the borders or boundaries of the nation-state effects people's legal-political 'rights' as well as the formation of people's consciousness of themselves and, importantly, of others. Nationalist practices aimed at 'protecting Our borders' organize the Self as 'insider' and the Other as 'outsider' and help to
naturalize the nation-state system. In addition, these practices profoundly shape both material reality as well as a particular ideological understanding of global relationships amongst people.

In this study, I examine how the process of state category construction is a key aspect of organizing global differences amongst people. These differences are tangible. A person’s ability to feed, clothe and shelter themselves, live in family or in isolation or even to decide where to live are shaped, in part, by differential placement in various state categories. My study investigates how state categories of immigration contribute to these tangible differences in experience. I centre my analysis of these processes on one particularly powerful Canadian state category – that of ‘migrant worker’. This is necessary, for most people (im)migrating to Canada arrive as migrant workers through the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) introduced on January 1, 1973 (see Table 1 on p.256).

When entering through the NIEAP, a migrant worker arrives with a temporary employment authorization that designates for her or him a specified employer, occupation, residence and term of employment (Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), 1994:1). All conditions of these ‘work visas’ must be met in order to remain in Canada. Permission from state officials in the immigration department is required prior to the alteration of any of these conditions. If permission is not obtained, immediate deportation from Canada is assured (Ibid.).

In other words, movement into Canada through this category renders people an unfree labour force in the country. People admitted as migrant workers are recruited to fill specific labour market requirements, are indentured to employers for the duration of their stay, are denied most legal protections and social services and are removed from the country when no longer necessary. Placement in the migrant worker category, then, organizes very tangible differences in experience from those positioned in state categories of ‘citizen’ or even ‘permanent resident’ (i.e. ‘landed’ immigrant).
These tangible differences, while essential to document, do not tell us, however, how placement in different state categories produces differences in experience. In fact, how do people come to be placed in different state categories in the first place? By troubling the state category of migrant worker and examining the processes that led to its production, I attempt to answer some of these questions. As is often the case, these questions lead to others. How are non-citizens created in a space that is said to be the terrain of citizens? How, in an otherwise ‘free’ labour market, are some people made unfree? How is it possible to indenture people to employers in Canada? Is it possible to indenture anybody in Canada or is it only specific groups that are made unfree? If the latter, what are the criteria for placement in different state categories of immigration?

Such questions point to the importance of examining the process of state category construction as being as much about identity formation – a process of constructing different human subjectivities - as about creating differences in material experiences. Indeed, these questions lead to the realization that material differences exist in a dialectical relationship to ideological practices. So-called ‘intangible’ differences shape our knowledge of people placed in different state categories. This knowledge is objectified. It is the kind of knowledge necessary for the realization of social relations of ruling. That is because the relationship between people in different categories becomes concealed. What we are left with is a seemingly natural classificatory order in which hierarchies make common sense.

Being a migrant worker in Canada, i.e. being indentured to an employer as a condition of entry and continued residence, comes to be known to citizens and permanent residents as legitimate. The supposed freedom of citizens and permanent residents, in turn, comes to be known as an indicator of their superior worth. These ideological practices work to devalue people made into migrant workers. In other words, ideological practices carry great material force (Marx, 1971: 122-3).
The significance of exploring how it is that ‘Canadians’ have come to know some people as migrant workers is of great import not only in relation to an investigation of the construction of state categories of immigration but to the very character of power during my period of study. Examining the social organization of migrant workers, then, has broader implications for our analysis of national state practices. What does the production of the state category of migrant workers tell us about the pattern of social relations in Canada? How are people ruled through the production of this category? Are people positioned within other categories complicit in the practices of ruling over migrant workers?

Investigating the production of the migrant worker category as common sensical leads to an examination of the relationship between national state practices and the social relations of ruling within Canadian society. It also leads to a re-thinking of the supposed separation of state from society. In this sense, examining the historic existence of negative dualities of power in Canada becomes crucial for a fuller understanding of the social process of organizing certain people as migrant workers. How are binary codes that lay deeply embedded within practices of colonialism, racism, sexism and nationalism significant to this course of action? I investigate the social divisions created by the operation of binary codes within state categories, e.g. citizen/migrant worker, that enable ruling practices to be perceived as something else – as practices of national security.

Notions of national security, as I will show, exist only within global relations of ruling. As the category of migrant worker relies on the category of citizen for its very meaning (and vice versa), nation states can only be imagined in a world divided by borders. Contemporary processes of globalization have done nothing to dislodge this relationship. In fact, my study will demonstrate that Canadian state practices have helped to constitute the latest period of globalization. We will discover that as state categories of immigration are ideological, so too are the dichotomies of imagined ‘national’ and ‘global’ spaces. I will show that in my period of
study, assertions of their discreteness, the marking of the borders between Us and Them, was a major component of how ruling relations were rationalized. The central metaphors of belonging and nation-ness at play at that time, were not merely xenophobic responses to processes of globalization, they were productive of these very actions.

**Organization of the Study**

The focal point for my study is the period from 1969 to 1973, inclusive. These five years were pivotal in many respects yet remain understudied in the literature on state practices, particularly in regards to immigration policy and practices of nation-building. I will show that during this period a significant restructuring of immigration practices took place - culminating with the introduction of the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) on January 1, 1973. Far-reaching changes to Canadian state practices on trade and investment also occurred during this time. Legislative changes put into place at this time were accompanied by the re-framing of ideological notions of who belonged and who did not to the Canadian nation. All of these developments were consequential for the organization of social relations in Canada, then and now. As such, a study into the how these state practices were organized to be actionable is timely and is expected to reveal much about how Canadian state practices were situated within the relations of ruling.

I embarked on this investigation through utilization of an aspect of the method of institutional ethnography as developed by Dorothy E. Smith (1987). This method was selected for it allows one to begin with the understanding that the social relations of ruling *are* put together through coordinated human activity. The method of institutional ethnography also provides me with the investigative tools to examine *how* they are put together. Use of Smith’s (1990) method has allowed me to show that the construction of the migrant worker category during this time was not a benign or supposedly natural classification process but an essential constituent of the relations of ruling at this time.
I started my investigation by conducting a documentary analysis of the discursive practices of parliamentarians engaged in debate in the Canadian House of Commons from 1969 to 1973. Although the NIEAP was introduced on January 1, 1973, I began by examining debates occurring prior to this time, for I believe it was important to contextualize the construction of the migrant worker category and relate it to other developments taking place. Parliamentary debates were chosen as my main site of investigation because they were seen as productive of both a material reality as well an ideological framework for knowing what constituted legitimate state practices in Canada at this time.

Conducting a documentary analysis of parliamentary debates, then, was not an exercise in finding a 'correct' interpretation of events. Rather, they were seen as constituents of the social relations existent in Canadian society and beyond (Smith, 1990:149). An analysis of the discursive practices of parliamentarians revealed at least some part of the social relations in which these practices were embedded and which they helped to organize (Ibid.). A documentary analysis of these debates, then, helped me to uncover the ideological practices that produced a certain kind of reality practical to the task of ruling in Canada during my period of study.

Having taken a social relational approach to the study of parliamentary debates at a time widely regarded as a beginning point of the latest period of globalization (Marchak, 1991; Urry, 1989, Lipietz, 1987, Frobel et al, 1977), I was able to uncover (some of) the relationships between ideological state practices, processes of globalization and the organization of ruling relations in Canada. By investigating how a particular 'common sense' was organized around what constituted legitimate Canadian state action during this time, through an analysis of parliamentary debates, I will show how the ideological re-framing of certain people as migrant workers was made possible through the organization of legitimacy for the differential treatment of people of colour in the Canadian labour market in order to help make Canada a more attractive site for capital investment.
A key aspect of this study entailed an expansion in the scope of analysis from an examination of 'the state' as a set of institutions or a discrete apparatus of ruling, to an investigation of state practices as a constituent, albeit a very powerful one, of social practices. In other words, state practices came to be seen as were emanating from within and throughout the existing social relations in Canada instead of standing apart from them. My focus of investigation was aimed at analyzing social practices and their ideological character in order to understand the social relations that made certain state practices – and not others – imaginable and eminently realizable.

I will show that by making visible those practices of parliamentarians through which migrant workers were constructed in Canada, it became possible to say something about social relations as they were organized within Canada. Indeed, uncovering that which ideological practices worked to conceal constitutes a major part of my examination of the social organization of the category migrant worker. Following from Marx, ideological practices were regarded as those that worked to conceal how human activities organized people’s lived experiences.

I will show that the discursive practices of parliamentarians through which certain people’s membership in particular state categories was normalized constituted an ideological practice. Parliamentary discursive strategies, then, were investigated as, what Michel Foucault (1991:75) called, a ‘regime of practices’ or the ‘places where what [was] said and what [was] done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted [met] and interconnect[ed]’. I will show that the regimes of practices of parliamentarians shaped what came to be seen as ‘problems’ as well as that which was represented as their reasonable ‘solution’.

I will argue that the possibility of constructing certain people as problems or certain pieces of legislation as solutions was made possible, in part, because of how social relations were organized in Canada. In other words, the organization of the migrant worker category did not occur within a newly constructed ideological environment (Miles, 1982:165). Rather, what was
possible to accomplish through state practices during my period of study was deeply informed by how social relations were historically organized in Canadian society.

I will show that the common sensical meaning of the migrant worker category was constructed, in part, through the processes of racialization embedded within social relations as organized in the space called ‘Canada’. A key way that these racialized social relations were structured in Canada was through the organization of differential access to and placement within categories of (im)migration. Importantly, such state practices organized a particular kind of common sense in regards to who belonged - and who did not - in the Canadian nation. My investigation of the construction of the migrant worker category, therefore, while demonstrating the tremendous power that state practices continued to exert at this time, perhaps more importantly will show the crucial importance of examining the ideological practices of parliamentarians that organized social ‘difference’ within Canada.

I will further argue that to examine how ruling relations were being restructured during my period of study, it was not enough to show that the migrant worker category organized certain people’s vulnerability and super-exploitation (Bakan and Stasiulis, 1996; Bolaria, 1992, Wall, 1992, Arat-Koc, 1992, 1989, Silvera, 1983). It was also insufficient to show how the production of this category organized the ‘attractiveness’ of Canada as a site of investment during a period of heightened international competition for capital (Sharma, 1995). Rather, I will show the necessity of an investigation into those practices that worked to organize the social legitimacy of categorizing certain people as migrant workers in Canada.

My study will show that the social organization of the state category of migrant worker fit into the socially organized realm of possibilities existing in Canada during the time of study. Of course, what was seen as imaginable was directly related to the material organization of a certain political economy. It was the interplay of these two realms of materiality and subjectivity, I will argue, that organized a common sense of hierarchical differences within the labour market.
(both in Canada and worldwide). The organization of differentials in wage levels and worker power, moreover, will be explained as an essential element in the current (as well as past) periods of globalization (Sharma, 1997; Storper and Walker, 1983).

In Chapter Three, Territories of State: Governing Globalization, I will both review and engage with a number of recent debates on state practices in order to expand my understanding of how practices of state-categorization were related to the process of globalization and how both were shaped by existing ruling relations. In this Chapter, I will discuss my interrogation of the utility of theories that contend that the power of national states has diminished and replaced as a result of processes of globalization (Brodie, 1996; Bakker, 1996; Teeple, 1995, Jessop, 1993; McBride and Shields, 1993; Watkins, 1992; McBride, 1992; Drache and Gertler, 1991; Pitelis, 1991; Cox, 1981; Fine and Harris, 1979). I will show that these theories do not adequately account for the fact that the construction of the state category of migrant worker wielded a tremendous amount of power. Moreover, they cannot address how the state's implementation of a migrant worker recruitment program not only shaped the social position of those so classified but how its very existence helped to bring about the kind of highly flexible labour force in Canada in demand by the owners of capital investments during this period of globalization.

I will also discuss my investigation of the usefulness of theories that propose that ruling relations only recently became global (Evans et al., 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Teeple, 1995; Cohen, 1994). This was an important part of my study, because, as I will show, the failure to examine the global nature of the nation-state system resulted in an Euro-centric approach of looking at processes of globalization. In particular, it centred the experiences of white males as indicative of how Others were positioned by such processes. This, I argue, profoundly affected whether people even saw the organization of a migrant workers program as being of any import.

I will argue that it was only by eclipsing the significance of the last five hundred (plus) years of the capitalist mode of production, patriarchal relations and racism throughout the globe
and the part that national state practices played in their expansion and entrenchment, that globalization could be seen by some as a relatively new phenomenon. By failing to examine the historically *global* scope of political, economic and cultural practices of ruling in Canada, the effects of Canadian state practices on contemporary processes of globalization remained hidden from view. This, I show, was perhaps most evident in theories that presupposed the existence of a 'sovereign' Canadian state at some time prior to this latest period of globalization (Clarke and Barlow, 1997; Action Canada Network, 1997).

In Chapter Three, I also discuss my questioning of state theories that presumed that individual state practices neatly reflected a group of people who were usually referred to as the nation or the citizenry. I will show that this was the case even when consideration was given to how state practices were constrained by the activities of, for instance, owners of transnational corporations (Barlow, 1993; Clarke, 1993; Pitelis, 1991; Dillon, 1991). I will show that this (usually unspoken) tendency arose from an uncritical assumption that nation-states were, if not primordial, certainly essential communities.

These assumptions have resulted in the absence of analysis on ideological notions of belonging (or social membership) in the nation-state and how these may have shaped either state practices or processes of globalization. Yet, as I will argue, nations, and therefore, its socially recognized members, were very much configured through the organization of social relations in ways that defined some and not Others as either *de jure* or *de facto* citizens. Nations, far from being natural, are socially and ideologically organized collectivities of people who exist in a particular time and space. Aptly worded by Benedict Anderson (1991), they are 'imagined communities'.

As a result of my critical engagement with current debates regarding state practices in an era of globalization, I am able to discern the importance of ideological processes of territorialization in shaping a particular kind of consciousness of nations and global processes.
The notion that there existed separate spheres of national and global activities, that these activities were oppositional and unrelated and, finally, that the existence of any kind of global space was 'new', deeply inform many theories of state. This realization assists in my investigation of state category construction, for I am able to examine the construction of the migrant worker category as one intimately related to historical as well as present processes of nation-building and state formation, as well as to processes of globalization.

I am, therefore, able to avoid reproducing two supposedly discrete, ideological spaces: the national one in which Canadians are said to exist and a global or foreign one that contains migrant workers. Indeed, I show that processes of territorialization helped to shape a common sense about the rationality of state practices during my period of study. In particular, I show how the social organization of an ideological unity amongst those represented as Canadians was an important part of how global relations of ruling were reproduced during my period of study.

I further demonstrate the importance of ideological practices to the formation of discrete Canadian and foreign identities and link this to the organization of legitimacy for state practices that were productive of ruling relations. I show that legitimacy – a major concern of people theorizing about how the state was situated within society – was organized through broader social relations in which the Canadian-Self and the foreign-Other was produced. I therefore examine how racist and nationalist practices helped to make common sense of the existence in Canada of people who were territorially but not ideologically a part of the Canadian nation - those categorized as migrant workers.

Using the analytical framework of examining the social organization of difference requires a Foucauldian shift away from investigations of the state as such to studies of governance. This, I will show, is especially useful in a study of the liberal form of ruling that exists in Canada. Because this form of governance is especially performative of the ideological construction of a 'civil society', i.e. the nation for whom the state is said to govern, I show that
what can discursively be produced by parliamentarians as occurring in the nation’s interests has powerful material as well as psychic consequences.

Notions that state practices represent the nation are particularly conducive to the social organization of difference for they help to conceal those coordinated human activities that result in Self-rule over Others. Portraying attacks against various socially differentiated groups of people as necessary for the sake of the ‘national interest’ highlight the way in which Canadian state practices attempted to gain consensus for a neoliberal shift in policy in the early 1970s. They also show the complicity of those in the dominant half of binary codes of power.

In Chapter Three, I show that state discursive practices organized through recourse to a racialized nationalism that organized territorialized notions of foreign capital, foreign workers and people considered foreigners inside Canada as a problem for We-Canadians were productive of policies that facilitated greater capital accumulation and mobility. Producing a labour force in which people differently categorized had widely varying and decidedly unequal experiences of work was one manifestation of this Self-rule. Indeed, I show that naturalizing the ideological notion that labour markets were national and jobs, at least the ‘good’ ones, were meant for Canadians facilitated the creation of socially organized differences between people in Canada and was a key part of organizing state categories of (im)migration.

In Chapter Four, *Marking the Boundaries of Freedom: Nation and State in the Organization of Unfree Labour*, I examine those Canadian state practices that helped to organize a category of people made to work within unfree employment relationships in labour markets generally seen as ‘free’. I show that such an investigation was useful for it shifted emphasis away from a more general discussion of national state practices to an examination of how such practices actually worked to socially organize differences in the labour market in Canada.

Looking at how conditions of unfreedom were re-produced in the period between 1969 and 1973 places the experiences of peoples of colour at the forefront of the material effect of
racist and nationalist ideologies. In particular, investigating the creation of unfree employment relations for those categorized as migrant workers shines a spotlight on how Canadian state policies on (im)migration shaped competition within world markets for labour power in the period under study. This further grounds my previous discussion on the significance of the power of national state practices in a period where some were only able to see its decline.

I show how state practices that created conditions of unfreedom for some were made (common) sense of through the ideological practices of racism and nationalism (with its associated legal framework of citizenship). I further show how the capacity of Canadian state practices to determine who will be free and who unfree within the labour market was contingent upon the existence and continual reproduction of intersecting social relations of ‘race’, class and nation.

I also examine how the co-existence of migrant workers, citizens and permanent residents was managed by parliamentarians so as not to be at odds with either the present organization of social relations in Canada or the liberal democratic framework of the Canadian nation state. I investigate how the social organization of differences centred on highly racialized notions of belonging (and conversely not-belonging) to a ‘First World’, capitalist nation-state worked to organize both the unfreedom of people rendered as Other in Canada as well as the social legitimacy of such practices.

In Chapter Five, *Globalization in the Interest of the ‘Nation’: The Parliamentary Production of a New Canadian Reality*, I show that to examine the construction of the migrant worker category in Canada, we need to place it within the global context of growing trade liberalization and the production of an international environment in which the power of investors was increased through the organization of increased capital mobility. In this Chapter, I begin a discussion of my documentary analysis of Canadian parliamentary debates in the years from 1969 to 1973. I show that substantial material and political aid was funneled by parliamentarians
through various apparatuses of the Canadian state to capital investors operating both within and outside of Canada's borders. I show that such practices helped to re-organize ruling relations to accommodate the changed set of circumstances associated with improvements in computer and transport technology and global shifts in production and assembly sites.

At the same time, I demonstrate how state discursive practices helped to re-organize people's consciousness by making the reproduction of certain ruling relations, such as nationalism, colonialism, racism and capitalism appear as natural. Thus, following an analysis of how shifting state practices made the material process of globalization possible, I show how such shifts were realized through parliamentary discursive practices of problem making. I examine how the organization of the problem or 'threat' of foreign competition through parliamentary debates was a key part of how common sense was made of the rapid and significant overhaul of Canadian state practices.

I further show that organizing the attraction and/or retention of capital investments in Canada as a major 'problem' was made possible, in part, by making foreigners, either foreign governments or more typically foreign workers, the problem facing Canadians as a nation. In other words, not only was the problem of securing the competitiveness and, therefore, profitability, of exporters operating in or outside of Canadian boundaries produced as a problem for We-Canadians but the problem of foreigners worked ideologically to conceal how state practices were re-organizing the relations of ruling to the detriment of most people in the country.

My analysis of parliamentary debates at this time will show that by making common sense of the organization of foreigners as Our collective problem, the Canadian nation itself was re-produced. Indeed, the discursive practice of constructing that which was foreign or Other and, therefore, that which was Canadian, was a substantial aspect of how state practices were able to restructure Canada as a continuing site for capital investment. In Chapter Five, thus, I highlight
the on-going importance of the Canadian nation-building project to the reproduction of ruling relations and show how the use of nationalist ideologies allowed parliamentarians (of all political parties) to make common sense of state practices that facilitated capital accumulation.

I also demonstrate that the contradictions emerging from offering increased support to capitalists while representing this as being to the benefit of Canadians was managed by parliamentarians through their reliance on nationalized negative dualities between Us-Canadians and foreigners. In Chapter Five, I therefore emphasize the indissociable play between the political economic framework in which parliamentary debates were situated and the organization of a particular consciousness around both ‘Canadian-ness’ and globalization.

A study of parliamentary discursive strategies that organized globalization demonstrates the importance of expanding the scope of political economy to include an analysis of ideological practices. I show that examining only one or the other in isolation cannot reveal how power was actually accomplished during my period of study. Moreover, I show that by exposing their links, we are able to better see that the importance of state practices to the realization of ruling relations did not decrease during this period of globalization but rather that these were a key part of how a restructuring of global ruling relations was possible.

In Chapter Six, Nowhere to Call Home: Racism and the Parliamentary Production of the ‘Immigration Problem’, I show how the social organization of racialized differences, through the debates and discursive structure of parliamentary debates in the House of Commons, actually helped to make sense of binary codes of Us and Them. By showing that the organization of the negative duality between Canadians and foreigners did not refer only to people physically inside or outside the Canadian nation. Instead, I show that during my period of study, certain people were discursively produced as the foreigners within Canada.

I show that the existence of a foreign presence in Canada was represented as resulting from what was constructed by parliamentarians as ‘weak’ immigration policies. I show how the
seemingly natural process of identifying the process of in-migration as creating a group of people identified as foreigners in Canada was a social process shaped by discursive practices of racism. This had ‘practical adequacy’ in the Canadian parliament (Sayer, 1979).

In this regard it is important to recall that the Canadian national state was formed through the process of French and British colonization of Indigenous societies and their lands. It was also formed through the very differential treatment of peoples subsequently (im)migrating to Canada. Thus, while the very process of making Canada – both materially and ideologically - occurred through movements of capital and people (as well as arms and diseases), it was the migration of only certain peoples that was problematized.

Throughout the period under study, the problem of immigration was racialized so that it was people of colour moving to Canada from the South who were produced as a foreign threat. By discursively linking immigrants with people of colour and then naming immigrants as a threat to national security (indeed, as responsible for unemployment, violence, crime, increasing state expenditures, negative changes to the ‘character’ of the Canadian nation as well as its supposed moral decline), parliamentarians helped to produce and naturalize racialized distinctions between people of colour and Canadians.

During the period under study, I show that parliamentary debates on immigration were a key discursive site in which the ongoing social project of Canadian nation-building was carried out. Indeed, I will show how the discourse on (im)migration helped to consolidate a particular vision of either a Canadian or a foreign identity by relying on racially organized social boundaries. In the process, the existential constitution of both those categorized as immigrants and as Canadians were re-organized. That is, neither term referred exclusively to legal categorizations of nationality and immigration status but each became a racialized signifier.

In particular, I show how parliamentary discursive strategies produced a problem concerning the removal of the ‘preferred nationalities and races’ criteria of immigration in 1967,
the year when Canadian immigration policies were changed to allow for the entry of people of colour as permanent residents. I will show that it was by re-framing the problem of immigration not as the entry of people of colour but their permanence that a moral panic was organized regarding a national border that was supposedly 'under siege' and 'out of control'. It was in this sense that immigration policy was constituted as a national security threat. The permanence of people of colour was represented as a threat to the security of the white (more specifically the English and French) identity of the Canadian nation.

Indeed, the oft-heard call to 'restore order' to the Canadian border was one of the key consequences of parliamentary discursive strategies on immigration. The borders produced as in need of protection from foreigners, I will show, were not just the physical borders separating the Canadian nation-state from others but also the material and ideological boundaries between Us and Them within the country. One manifestation of this was the re-organization of a racialized sense of entitlement in Canada. 'Good' jobs, social programs, minimum employment standards and protections were portrayed as belonging only to those who belonged in the Canadian nation. Parliamentary discursive practices, therefore, as I will show, did not produce a call for a prohibition of people of colour moving to Canada. What they did accomplish, I argue, was the rationalization or legitimation of the differential treatment of certain (im)migrants once they were in the country.

At the same time that a moral panic against the permanent presence of immigrants/people of colour was produced through the parliamentary debates, state practices on immigration were restructured to ensure a 'competitive' supply of workers for employers in the country, especially workers who could be made to work in jobs and live in conditions that Canadians and permanent residents could legally refuse. Parliamentary discursive practices that worked to organize a problem of both the immigrant/foreigner and the foreign worker abroad, helped to legitimize processes of globalization that strengthened employers and investors. In this sense, I argue that
through reference to the state’s ability to ensure ‘security’, even ‘prosperity’, for Canadians, parliamentarians worked to secure the state itself.

Taken together, Chapters Five and Six present the argument that during my period of study, both the material as well as the ideological boundaries of the Canadian nation were imbued with great import. The arguments I make in Chapter Five are supplemented by those made in Chapter Six to show how the production of a racialized, nationalist common sense was a crucial part of how the process of Other-ing was given material form during this time. Nationalist ideologies that supported capital accumulation relied upon racist ideologies to make common sense of the negative duality between Canadians who were said to exist in a national space and foreigners who existed outside of these ideological boundaries.

In Chapter Seven, Naming the Other: The Parliamentary Production of Migrant Workers in Canada, I further expand on my argument that the organization of the migrant worker category was made actionable through the social organization of difference between people of colour and Canadians as discursively produced by parliamentarians. Here, I show that once the problem of immigration was constructed as commonsensical through the creation of an ideological facticity and the association of people of colour as foreigners in the Canadian nation, subsequent state practices that targeted people seen as not belonging could also be produced as reasonable. I argue that the problematization of people of colour/immigrants as not belonging in Canada organized the ideological and material terrain in which the migrant worker category was rendered legitimate.

Indeed, I show that the regulatory and legislative changes made to immigration policy in 1972 and 1973 arose from this context. The revocation in November 1972 of the 1967 policy of allowing ‘visitors’ to apply for permanent residency from within the country became one of the cornerstones of a tougher, security stance in regards border control at this time. This change, presented as an attempt to ‘restore order’ to Canada’s immigration policy, came a scant few
weeks before the introduction of the NIEAP on January 1, 1973. Since those categorized as 'non-immigrants' officially fell into the broad category of visitors and not permanent residents (i.e. 'landed' immigrants), the new policy made it impossible for those categorized as migrant workers to apply for permanent residency status from within Canada.

These changes, I argue, are what allowed for the NIEAP to operate as a temporary and rotational workers recruitment program. I show that following the introduction of the NIEAP the numbers of people entering Canada, particularly from the global South, actually increased. However, soon after 1973, the majority of people were recruited as migrant workers and brought in as 'non-immigrants' on temporary employment authorizations (see Table 1 on p.256). Indeed, shortly following the introduction of the NIEAP, Canadian state practices successfully shifted immigration policy away from a policy of permanent (im)migrant settlement towards an increasing reliance upon unfree, temporary labour, i.e. migrant workers.

These immigration policy changes were produced through the parliamentary debates as necessary in order to clarify the 'obligations' of Canadians to those constructed as falling outside of the scope of the nation. I argue that the NIEAP was a 'border control' policy. Through it was created a new ideological category of admittance into Canadian immigration policy: the non-immigrant migrant worker whose sole purpose in entering and living in Canada was to work for a specified employer, in a specified occupation and in a specified location in the country – all on a temporary employment authorization that was renewable only at the behest of the employer and with the permission of an immigration department official. This program, then, organized the imposition of conditions of unfreedom upon what came to be the single largest group of people (im)migrating to Canada to work.

Further, in Chapter Seven, I show that following the reversal of the liberalization policies of the mid- to late-1960s, the racialized criteria of admittance in Canadian immigration policy was shifted from the pre-1967 categories of 'preferred races and nationalities' onto the new
category of migrant worker. The NIEAP helped to solve the discursively organized problem of the permanence of people of colour in Canada. Both numerically and proportionately from my period of study onwards, fewer and fewer people from the global South were admitted to Canada as ‘landed’ immigrants with the rights of permanent residency.

I show that to secure the legitimacy of the migrant worker category, parliamentarians relied on racist imagery. This was done, in part, by producing people of colour as the quintessential migrant worker in Canada. Indeed, almost without exception all discussion of migrant workers within the parliamentary debates centred on people from the South working in jobs that most Canadians shunned. Statistically, the racialization of the migrant worker category was reflected in the fact that approximately ninety percent of those people from the global South admitted as migrant workers were indentured to employers and occupations that most Canadian citizens found relatively unattractive (Sharma, 1995).

While racist ideologies were integral to the organization of legitimacy for the migrant worker category, the criteria for placement in this category were never explicitly racialized. I argue that this was an important aspect of the rationality of ruling during my period of study. By not making racialized criteria explicit but entrenching structures that produced racialized results, racism flourished in Canadian immigration policies at this time and since.

For example, I show that parliamentarians presented the NIEAP as simply working to meet the needs of both employers and unemployed Canadians, while showing no concern for the person transformed into a migrant worker. The only representations made regarding the people who worked as migrant workers in Canada was that they were satisfied, even grateful, to be working in the country. Yet, relying on a migrant workers program that mostly captured those people who had no other way of being able to move to Canada to secure a livelihood counted on past impoverishment of people of colour to continue to operate. It was precisely by failing to
account for disparities within the world market for labour power that parliamentarians were able to represent Canadian immigration policy as ‘non-discriminatory’.

Significantly, in contrast to the hue and cry about how immigrants (i.e. permanent residents) were ‘taking jobs’ ‘belonging’ to Canadians, there was little discussion by parliamentarians regarding the employment of migrant workers in Canada. This relative silence was organized, in part, through implementation of an ‘employment validation procedure’ within the NIEAP – one of the major innovations that distinguished the NIEAP from previous migrant worker recruitment programs. The NIEAP accomplished two of the main goals of immigration policy in this period under study: the organization of legitimacy for state actions regarding ‘border control’ and the provision of a highly competitive workforce for employers and investors in Canada.

Moreover, an investigation of the state discursive practices concerning the employment validation process illuminates the fact that while the problem of labour shortages was produced as a problem of a *quantitative* lack of workers, the actual reasons for such shortages was related to the *quality* of the working and living conditions offered by certain employers and/or certain geographical locations in Canada. Significantly, the problem of the quality of certain jobs and locations in Canada was ideologically re-framed as a problem of the freedom of Canadians and permanent residents with regard to their ability to refuse work.

This, I argue, concealed the political economy of the Canadian labour market and naturalized the racialized difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs in the country. Common sense was made of the notion that migrant workers worked in relatively unattractive jobs because they were happy to – not that they were indentured to their employers or not because they had few, if any options but to move to Canada in whatever way the state authorized.

Indeed, in Chapter Seven, I will show how the introduction of the NIEAP allowed for greater state involvement in shaping the supply of labour power in Canada during this time. In
the period under study, state practices on immigration were particularly concerned with shaping the price and power of workers available to employers in Canada. The NIEAP, in particular, I argue, allowed those in the state to take a much more targeted approach to managing the labour force vis-à-vis state immigration policy.

It was not coincidental that it was through the NIEAP that the Canadian state was able to exercise the greatest degree of coercion against workers in Canada. Rather, the NIEAP was organized - both materially and ideologically - to be a more direct aid to capital than was currently possible to achieve through the exploitation of people in state categories of citizen or permanent resident. By ideologically constructing the migrant worker category as a natural extension of the state's 'duty' to protect its citizens at the legitimated expense of Others, complaints of discrimination from people organized as migrant workers and represented as foreigners were avoided. Indeed, the NIEAP is a good example of how the Canadian nation-state continued to be presented as a liberal democracy so that if any discrimination occurs it is not a result of state practices, but just the working out of natural differences in the valorization of differentiated peoples.

Finally, the arguments I make in this chapter show how important both the political economy of the global capitalist system and the social organization of racialized notions of belonging to the Canadian nation were to the social organization of the labour market in Canada during the early 1970s. Indeed, I demonstrate that the two processes were inseparable. Together they worked to reinforce binary codes of negative duality that materialized inequality and injustice within the global system of nation-states. In particular, such binary codes organized the freedom of Canadians and the unfreedom of Others. I show that actions aimed at restructuring the labour market and re-organizing criteria of Canadian-ness together demonstrate the tremendous power of state practices in this period of globalization.
Summary

Since parliamentary debates were a constituent of social relations in Canada, my study sets out to investigate the practices of governing that discursively produced what came to be regarded as natural and 'necessary' state action – the categorization of certain people as migrant workers who could as a result of this categorization be indentured to employers as a condition of their entry and stay in the country. I undertook this study not only to understand the process by which the migrant worker category was formulated but also to understand the consequences of its formation for the broader pattern of social relations in Canada.

Through the method of institutional ethnography, with added attention paid to understanding social practices of governance, I uncover how the NIEAP produced people as migrant workers for the Canadian labour market, as well as how the operation of this category was an appropriate technology of governance in Canada. In analyzing how state discursive practices organized the unfreedom of people classified as migrant workers - and not as citizens or even as permanent residents – the parliamentary debates reveal a great deal about how legitimacy of and for state practices was organized during this time.

By studying the social organization of the migrant worker category through analysis of Canadian parliamentary debates, I am able to generate a holistic analysis of how national state practices organized global relations of ruling within the space occupied by 'Canada'. My analysis, then, is not contained within a narrow study of the effects of the NIEAP. Indeed, my study does not constitute a case study of this migrant workers recruitment program. Instead, I show how state practices governing (im)migration, including and especially those that discursively produced a social legitimacy for such actions, tell us a great deal of how social relations in Canada were organized in this period of profound change.

State practices on (im)migration were part of the organization of ruling relations that simultaneously restructured and reproduced racialized and nationalized notions of belonging and
entitlement in Canada. These shaped not only who was recognized as Canadian and who was rendered as Other within the country, but materially positioned people within particular areas of the labour market. The social organization of difference produced through state practices of category construction worked to organize the ‘flexible’ and ‘internationally competitive’ labour force for which capital investors ‘prowled the globe’.

My hope is that by uncovering how at least a segment of the relations of ruling were organized during my period of study, we are able to see how ruling is accomplished discursively as well as materially. This should go some way towards challenging and undoing human relations that organize the rule of some over Others. By troubling the category of migrant worker, I hope that we are able to talk about the complex relations of ruling in Canada and identify more clearly who rules without participating in or reproducing such unjust relations. My goal is to position us to be able to talk about the people made to work as migrant workers in Canada without normalizing their objectification and exploitation through state organized categories.
Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework and Methodology

To give some assistance in wearing away certain self-evidences and commonplaces about ... normality...: to bring it about, together with many others, that certain phrases can no longer be spoken so lightly, certain acts no longer, or at least no longer so unhesitatingly, performed; to contribute to changing certain things in people's ways of perceiving and doing things; to participate in this difficult displacement of forms of sensibility and thresholds of tolerance...

Michel Foucault, Questions of Method

Introduction

In this Chapter, I outline my research interests, the conceptual framework and the methods I employ in my study of the social organization of knowledge of people placed in the Canadian state category of 'migrant worker'. Canada's consolidated migrant worker recruitment program, the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP), was introduced on January 1, 1973. My period of study extends from 1969 to 1973, inclusive, so that I can examine some of the formative years of its construction. I am interested in investigating how the transformation of certain people into migrant workers restructured our world materially and conceptually in particular ways. I am especially concerned with what we came to know not only the identity of migrant workers, but also the world through this category.

I begin by troubling the category of migrant worker and seeing its production as an aspect of ideological state practices. The category of migrant worker is seen as an ideological one for it conceals rather than uncovers the social relations that coordinated its realization. An understanding of the political economy of this time period is essential to understanding the organization of this category and I map this out, in part, through statistical data collection. However, for the purposes of this study, I try to examine how the transformation of certain people into migrant workers not only restructured the labour market in Canada but also naturalized the experiences of injustice and inequality that people captured under it lived.

Certain technologies of ruling, or governing, were used to organize such knowledge about the category of migrant worker. In this study, I focus on examining the debates of the
Members of Parliament in the Canadian House of Commons as such a technology. By doing so, I open up an avenue of investigation that allows us to look at how the migrant worker category was put together in Parliament in such a way that legitimated the indenturing of certain groups of people rendered as Other within Canadian society. It is recognized that by legitimating the existence of people as migrant workers, parliamentarians participated in restructuring the relations of ruling both through discursively operating ideological practices of racism and nationalism historically in use in Canada.

**Conceptual Framework**

One course of action that served to organize the national state category 'non-immigrant' or 'migrant worker' was the discursive practices of those working in various institutions of the Canadian state. In this study, I examine how these discursive practices served to naturalize racist and nationalist ideologies embedded within the category of migrant worker and the implementation of the NIEAP. It will be shown that by examining the organization of the migrant worker category, we are able to analyze some of the processes of the latest period of 'globalization'. Such an investigation, it is hoped, will contribute to our understanding of how

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1 The term non-immigrant is the official way that people recruited to Canada under the NIEAP are classified by the immigration department. This classification falls under the broader one of 'visitor' under the 1976 Immigration Act. I place the term non-immigrant within quotations marks to signify that differentially classifying people into various state-formulated categories is not a straightforward 'technical' process but a political, economic and social one informed by an intersecting web of social relations and reproductive of these as well. I forego the placement of the term in quotation marks throughout the study but still wish to alert the reader to its socially organized character.

2 The term migrant worker is not a term officially used by the Canadian government to refer to people recruited under the NIEAP. However, it is a popularly recognized referent to those who are situated within national states as temporary, often indentured, workers. As with the term 'non-immigrant', I place the term migrant worker within quotations marks to signify that the process by which a person is made into a migrant worker in Canada is a political, economic and social practice informed by an intersecting web of social relations and reproductive of these as well. I forego the placement of the term in quotation marks throughout the study but still wish to alert the reader to its socially organized character.

3 I am placing the term globalization within single quotation marks to trouble it and have us thinking about both the social processes that bring about a globalization of ruling relations as well as examine the historical continuity of such relations. While I forego the quotation marks from herein, I wish to alert the reader to the problems of naturalizing it or treating it ahistorically.
the global restructuring of ‘ruling relations’ was both organized and legitimized through Canadian state practices during my period of study.

It is understood that state practices in Canada are comprised of a diverse range of activities, such as research, policy-making, program design and implementation and are engaged in by people working in various jurisdictions and levels of state apparatuses including the bureaucracy, police and military forces, community groups and members of Parliament. I have chosen to focus on the debates engaged in by parliamentarians within the House of Commons in order to investigate the particular state ideological practices that naturalized the category migrant worker.

These discursive practices have been chosen because parliamentary debates, while not synonymous with ruling relations or state power, are a form of construction of knowledge through state practices, a form particularly attentive to the performative aspects of state authority and power. Parliamentary debates do not merely re-enact existing social relations. They constitute a site where a certain kind of discursive practice is put together. They occupy an

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4 I am using the term ‘ruling relations’ or ‘relations of ruling’ in ways intended by Dorothy E. Smith (1987:3) who argues that this concept “...grasps power, organization, direction, and regulation as more pervasively structured than can be expressed in traditional concepts provided by the discourses of power.” In other words, practices of ruling cannot be reduced to one axis of power or to one specific group or individuals. Instead, ruling relations are understood as having been organized through multiple axes of power. In this study, I will show that an emphasis on ruling relations is particularly useful in studying ideological practices, for it stresses the materialist character of ideology.

5 I do not intend to enter into the debate about the nature of the state in capitalist (or other) societies. However, my understanding of state practices is developed from the way Karl Marx and Frederic Engels (1970:47-48) took up the issue of state powers, at least in the following comment: “The social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they appear in their own or other people’s imagination, but as they really are, i.e., as they operate, produce materially and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions, independent of their will.” Moreover, Roxana Ng’s treatment of state powers is also illuminating. She (1988:89) states that the state is not a monolith but “an embodiment of struggles between classes...which (a) legitimizes certain courses of action, thereby rendering other (alternate) forms of action illegitimate; and (b) organizes how people relate to one another” (also see Gordon’s discussion of Foucault’s concept of governmentality as multiple rather than monolithic, 1991:36).

6 The Canadian Parliament is made up of two, separate Houses, the House of Commons and the Senate. In the House of Commons Members of Parliament (MPs) are voted into office elected by eligible members of their electoral district. Senators, on the other hand, are appointed for life-long office by the Prime Minister. Members of either House can initiate legislation but this is predominantly done by MPs within the House of Commons. In order for legislation to be enacted, both Houses of Parliament must accept it by majority vote. After having been accepted in both Houses, new Acts of legislation must receive formal Royal Assent. From herein, I refer to people elected to the House of Commons as either parliamentarians or MPs.
important site within state apparatuses because they actively reshape, recreate and redefine social reality. Parliamentary debates have enormous power to shape the ways in which we talk and know about something. They also have great power in constructing and legitimizing state categories. Parliamentary debates, in other words, are consequential for action. For one thing, the discursive practices of parliamentarians get entered into the work process of state apparatuses.

While not always part of the formation of the specificity of state policy directives, parliamentary debates shape the discursive framework in which such policy is established. An analysis of the discursive practices of parliamentarians makes visible how ideological practices of ruling, in particular, are put together. Ideological discursive practices are understood as those that conceal the social relations that produce certain discourses and events as common-sensical and as actionable. Indeed, Adam Ashforth (1990:11) questions whether it would not be more useful for us to interpret public performances of this type “...less as instruments of ‘policy’ and ‘intelligence’ and more as symbolic rituals aiding in establishing and reproducing the power of modern states.” In the context of Canada’s liberal democracy, the performance of parliamentary rituals, particularly the Question Period where debate takes place between MPs, are especially productive of notions of ‘nation’ and ‘democracy’ – perhaps best captured in concepts of the ‘national interest’ or ‘common good’ - that legitimate the wielding of such power.

Parliamentary debates, in this sense, can be seen as a technology of liberal democratic forms of ruling that discursively reconstitutes the social process of restructuring ruling relations into a form that normalizes the exercise of state power (Foucault, 1991). As Kari Dehli (1993:87) points out, such discursive state practices have “consequences beyond the contexts in which they

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7 For a discussion of the importance of performance in reproducing social relations, refer to Butler and Scott. 1992.
8 I place the term ‘nation’ within quotation marks to signify its social rather than primordial organization. From now on, I forgo use of the quotation marks but will continue to trouble its unquestioning usage.
9 Although traditional political science approaches see MPs of the governing party but not the opposition parties as part of the government which is analyzed separately from other state apparatuses. I believe it is more fruitful to view the MPs of all political parties as participating in state activities, especially in discursive activities concerned with legitimizing state power (see Chapters Five, Six and Seven).
are written and read." The discursive practices of parliamentarians actively organize a particular frame for reading (and hearing) the debates whereby a certain kind of 'knowledge' helpful to the accomplishment of ruling is produced (Smith, 1990). Aside from performing national state power, then, parliamentary debates manage different tensions. Ideological practices are an essential part of how existing contradictions are managed. Part of the work done by such discourses, then, is to provide a framework in which people come to think about the issues parliamentarians selectively choose for debate.

Importantly, the application of state power, particularly in liberal democracies, such as Canada must also make 'common sense'¹⁰ to those who act in the name of the nation. Thus, I do not see parliamentarians as merely an instrument of some greater power or parliamentary debates as a smokescreen for certain state practices aimed at weakening and impoverishing (at least) certain groups of people. Rather, parliamentarians and their debates enact particular kinds of performances that help to (re)organize a common sense for restructuring ruling relations, including (but far from limited to) labour market re-organization. That is, parliamentarians speak about social life in Canada (to themselves and to a wider audience) in such a way that makes it possible to re-produce the relations of ruling and the state's location within them.

The framework for 'knowing' established by parliamentary debates connects up with the complex work of others within Canadian state apparatuses, such as bureaucrats who contribute to the research, design and implementation of legislation. Indeed, this is part of the significance of parliamentary discursive practices. This study, however, is not aimed at analyzing how people

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¹⁰ I am using the notion of common sense in ways similar to that of Roxana Ng. She points out that the notion of common sense allows us to make 'good sense' of the "...incoherent and at times contradictory assumptions and beliefs held by the mass of the population" (1993:52). She adds that "treating racism and sexism as 'common sense' draws attention to the norms and forms of action that have become ordinary ways of doing things, of which we have little consciousness" (1993:52). Ng's usage of the concept of common sense, flows out of the work of Antonio Gramsci (1971) who used the term to refer to notions that have become naturalized or normalized. Gramsci's (Ibid.) notion of hegemony included the insight that the daily operation of ruling relations actually helped to secure their legitimacy since human actions were formed within the context of such relations. He argued that when something is said to be common sensical, it is understood to have become a hegemonic worldview in a particular place and time (Ibid.).
working in various state institutions implement the migrant worker category. Rather, I examine the ideological character of parliamentary debates in order to understand the social relations that make certain state practices – and not others – imaginable, actionable and legitimate. This is an important avenue of research, for the practices that are seen to constitute reasonable or rational forms of governance tell us a great deal about the precise character of ruling relations. Such an investigation also shows us how the relations of ruling were re-produced through their restructuring in Canada during my period of study.

In examining the practices that organized the category migrant worker, I begin with the understanding that the construction and consequent use of the official state category of non-immigrant in 1973 was represented as a reasoned ‘solution’ to certain problems. Like Roxana Ng (1988), I do not treat these problems or their solutions as already existing - waiting to be discovered by some particularly insightful minister, bureaucrat or even researcher. Rather, I take the approach used by the Government Statisticians’ Collective (1974:138) who tell us that, “the methods and concepts developed and used for official [categories] and statistics are shaped by the sorts of policies powerful people in the state wish to consider and by the concerns which preoccupy them.” The organization of these problems and solutions, then, are seen to have emerged from the concerns of and the actions taken by parliamentarians who, themselves, were part of a complex of ruling relations (see Smith, 1987:3).

At the same time, it is important to recognize that even though state apparatuses (including but, again, not limited to parliamentarians) occupy an important location within societies organized as nation-states, the concerns of “powerful people in the state” during my period of study should not be seen as divorced from that society and the social relations of racism, nationalism and class. The appearance of certain problems or solutions at this time was not the result of isolated events that come into being through the force of their supposedly innate
logic (be it the ‘logic’ of capitalism or the ‘relations of race’\textsuperscript{11}). Rather, their production was a key constituent in the ruling relations that organized these problems as factual and their solutions as actionable (Smith, 1990).

The organization of the migrant worker category was a response that fit into the socially organized realm of possibilities existing in Canada during the time of study. In turn, parliamentary discursive practices constructed this category in distinct kind of ways. What was possible within parliamentary debates was itself organized through social relations. The organization and grouping of certain people as problems and the acceptance of this as common sensical, then, reflected not only the hegemony of those who ruled, but also constructed the terrain in which certain practices were made actionable. This realization allows for the understanding that the work of governing or ruling is not a singular, despotic enterprise but a complex organization of social relations in such a way that the practices of ruling themselves can be concealed.

Relations of ruling are therefore not seen as extraordinary phenomena located outside of the everyday world that we experience (Smith, 1990:16-18). If they often seem this way, Smith reminds us (1990:52), “that appearance is a product of the activity of real individuals and their material conditions.” This investigation, therefore, takes a social relational approach to the study of state practices, for it allows me to situate parliamentary debates within what Dorothy E. Smith (1990:150, also see Smith, 1981) calls a “social course of action.” Rather than seeing parliamentarians as a discrete part of the division of ruling practices, a social relational analysis

\textsuperscript{11} See Robert Miles’ \textit{Racism} (1989) and \textit{Racism after Race Relations} (1993) for a critique of ‘race relations’ paradigms that reify and therefore naturalize ideological concepts of ‘race’. Miles argues that the concept of ‘race’ is not an acceptable analytical term as it reifies the unscientific notion that there are separate and discrete ‘races’ of human beings. Moreover, the term ignores the historical process of racialization that shapes the realities of groups of people based upon their skin colour, culture, nationality, ethnicity, religion and their incorporation into capitalist social relations. Instead, it focuses on the physical and/or cultural characteristics of people as somehow accounting for their differential treatment. Throughout this study, my usage of the term ‘race’, while not remaining in quotation marks throughout, will be used with this understanding.
shows that their discursive practices were organized through the entire terrain of activities that produced people's world(s) and represented it to them.  

A social relational approach, then, attempts to uncover the material, historical and ideological connections of a particular way of organizing human societies to see how these informed the practices of parliamentarians and the discourses they produced. Through the use of such an approach, I examine how parliamentary discursive practices transformed people's actual lived experiences into state categories that were later to be taken up throughout other state apparatuses and practices.

I am especially concerned with investigating how the legitimacy of certain state practices is socially organized - particularly those that make the practices of state category construction appear as common sensical. This is a crucial aspect of ruling, because the maintenance of legitimacy, or what Foucault (see Gordon, 1991) calls a 'rationality' of governance, is an important part of ruling practices. During my period of study, people working as Members of the legislative Assembly of Ontario (MLA) regularly engaged in highly discursive practices that have resulted in significant changes to the social and political landscape in the province.

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12 A social relational approach begins with the understanding that people's activities are coordinated through a course of social actions. It allows for the understanding that such coordination connects people who are both known and unknown to each other. This approach is part of a materialist analysis, for it recognizes that the world as it is known and lived in by people is socially organized. A social relational analysis is also historical, for people's actions are understood as following from what has already been socially organized and projects this organization into the future (see Smith, 1981) for an expanded discussion about this approach.

13 This is important, for people categorized as 'migrant workers' are not entering what Robert Miles (1982:165) calls a "neutral ideological context" when arriving in Canada. In this respect, Avtar Brah (1996:245) points out that "...there can be change in meanings only because there are 'meanings' already in circulation." Yet, it is not that each discursive practice merely reflects back previous discourses but that each reference to past ways of organizing social relations works to create new differences. Laura Donaldson insightfully calls this context an ellipticism. She explains what she means by looking at the work of Aristotle whose: "...Rhetoric captures this ellipticism when it states that "the Enthymeme must consist of a few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself [sic] " (1.2). The way an enthymeme both depends upon and solicits the suppressed premise... the hidden proposition seems an incontestable one that they simply keep in mind, or en thumos as classical rhetoricians would say. However, this suppression en thumos illustrates perhaps the primary ideological manipulation performed by enthymes: based on a previous bias... it chooses a given circumstantial selection that attributes a certain property to a schema and thereby conceals other contradictory properties that are equally predictable... In other words just as a "practice" transforms material through time, a written practice (such as the enthymeme) exerts a continuously transformative effect upon the signifying material of language (1992:76-78). This gives an ever-changing character to social differences organized through relations of racism, class or gender and, indeed, contributes to their longevity. Ruling relations, then, instead of remaining fixed are constantly re-inscribed. These written practices do not simply express a deterministic base-superstructure process of social organization. Rather, they work through the privileging of points that fix only a partial meaning to discourses. An investigation of how the construction of these categories works to simultaneously differentiate and objectify those so classified captures this dynamic process.
Parliament (MPs) within the Canadian parliament were not minor actors in securing this rationality.

The actions that parliamentarians took derived from the contesting concerns that are a part of any struggle to (re)shape existing social relations. Their participation in the restructuring of ruling relations through public policy took these struggles into account. By this I do not mean that each piece of policy-making was a compromise with parliamentarians (and others working in the state) operating as mere arbiters of conflicting interests. Rather, the discursive practices of MPs worked to maintain ruling relations in such a way that (at least some of) those being ruled saw these practices as legitimate (Clark and Dear, 1984:59). According to Ashforth (1990:6) we can see “[s]chemes of legitimation” within parliamentarians’ discursive production of “explanations of the necessary, possible and desirable ends of State power.”

I, therefore, take as my starting point the fact that no human activity is separable from people’s consciousness of it. This approach is part of the method of investigation called “institutional ethnography” by Smith (1987:151-179). The investigative practice of botanizing or “finding out how people put the social together in their actual practices” is a key part of such an approach (Smith, 1995:1). Such a method begins from the epistemological standpoint that it is not social structures that shape people’s actions or consciousness but rather that people’s activities, including those that coordinate the material relations between people, are organized through human consciousness of Self, Other and the space they simultaneously occupy.

It is for this reason that paying attention to the social organization of concepts, categories and classificatory schemes is of key importance. While concepts themselves do not do anything, they do organize a particular way of thinking and acting that is regarded by the actors as either legitimate or not (Marx and Engels, 1969:18). Smith (1990:38) argues that “[t]he ideas, concepts, and categories in which the ordering of people’s activities becomes observable to us are embedded in and express social relations.” In this sense, the social organization of discourse and
knowledge can be said to be productive of such relations (Dehli, 1993:85). What constitutes legitimate differences based on differential, and usually unequal, category membership is itself integral to or a result of social processes.

Institutional ethnography is used precisely because it opens up an avenue of research where the making of common sense about certain social relations itself can be investigated as a social product. Since this method places ideological practices as an object of inquiry, it allows me to investigate how the immigration classificatory scheme of migrant worker, for instance, became a social category through the operation of certain institutional technologies, such as parliamentary debates. Investigating the social organization of ideological practices, such as state category making, then, is a practical way of investigating existent social relations.

Moreover, an institutional ethnography approach connects the social production of ideas with the conditions of people’s material experiences (Donaldson, 1992: 128). This is because ideologies, as Karl Marx and Frederic Engels discuss in their *German Ideology*, are not simply a set of certain thoughts or “phrases” but a method of organizing the material world (1969:18-19). Smith (1990:35) advances this work by arguing that “[i]deology names a kind of practice in thinking about society” whereby primacy is given to concepts over the social relations that arise in and from people’s activities. Thus, it is not only that people think a certain way about their lived experiences and those of others but that society is organized through ruling relations in such a way that brings forward only particular interpretations of these experiences while working to conceal others. Smith cogently argues that “[i]t is in this context that knowing what has been done and how it was done becomes a problem, and how we know it becomes a major research topic” (1990:57).

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14 In this sense, it is interesting to note that both the terms fiction and fact come from the same Latin root of “to make.”
Her method of institutional ethnography, then, is really a method of de-objectifying knowledge (as well as deconstructing ideological practices within the method of ethnography\textsuperscript{15}), for rather than taking the process of categorization for granted, it emphasizes the simultaneous interplay between ideological practices and social relations inherent in the social production of our knowledge of categories. This insight is very useful in analyzing how the legitimacy of state practices is organized, for it allows me to consider how that which becomes common sensical is an effect of the relations of ruling. So, if the activities of people come to be known as a migrant worker recruitment system, examining how this came to be helps us to uncover the social relations that underpin such social practices (Smith, 1990:46).

My investigation, therefore, takes into account how this period of restructuring served to reorganize the world conceptually and how this was a significant feature of how it was restructured materially as well. I pay special attention to the organization of common sense regarding 'virtual realities'\textsuperscript{16} during the period of study, for, again, what (some or certain) people came to regard as 'reasonable' governance was central to the organization of power in Canadian society at this time. Importantly, these virtual realities were textually mediated.\textsuperscript{17} In particular, the texts arising out of the work of day-to-day governing, such as Canadian parliamentary debates, are key components in the relations of ruling or what Monique Wittig identifies as "the material oppression of individuals by discourses" (cited in de Lauretis, 1986:7). This is because state-produced texts, in particular, are widely regarded as authorized institutional sources and

\textsuperscript{15} James Clifford points out that traditional ethnographic approaches tended to establish a privileged theory or explanation for investigating lived societies (1991:186). Such an ethnographical approach subsumed people's everyday lived experiences through such theorizing instead of placing these experiences at the forefront of inquiry. Smith's institutional ethnography approach does not replicate such a privileging of theory for it is aimed at uncovering how coordinated human activity actually organizes what we 'know' of people and our world.

\textsuperscript{16} Smith (1990:62) talks about the importance of objectifying discourses to the organization of virtual realities.

\textsuperscript{17} Smith (1987) points out that an important part of the work that text-mediated discourses, such as transcripts of Canadian parliamentary debates (Hansard), do is to replicate relations of ruling extralocally or beyond the local site in which the texts were produced. It can be argued that notions of nationhood are conveyed in this manner but that is the topic for another study.
because of that are incredibly powerful and widely commented upon by journalists, academics, lobbyists, pressure groups and so on.

Parliamentary discursive practices, however, not only reconstitute certain viewpoints as official discourse. They also contribute to the organization of new forms of discourse and new ways of 'knowing'. As Ashforth (1990:4) argues, state-produced texts "perform roles fundamental to the legitimation of States by serving to create a framework of knowledge which allows those who act in the name of the State to distinguish their roles and goals from those of Society."18

In this study, I show that this separation of state practices from 'civil society' was an important part of how parliamentary discursive practices served to rationalize or legitimize governance. Such texts, produced as they were through a liberal democratic framework of ruling, borrowed from the legitimacy of the global national state system that authorized those in the state to rule for 'the people'. Again, parliamentarians were specially located within this constellation of state authority, for they, perhaps even more so than others working within state apparatuses, were sanctioned as the 'representatives' of this nation.

Debates in parliament allowed MPs to discursively position themselves as acting in the 'national interest'. This served to (re)produce the common sensical character of the ideological dichotomy between state and society. Parliamentary debates, thus, were a particular form of performative discursive practice that, in part, produced both the state and the nation as imaginable (see Chapters Five, Six and Seven in this study). It is in part because of this public performative aspect that parliamentary debates constituted a major site where 'problem'-making occurred.

18 Ashforth is commenting on this in regards to state commissions of inquiry in certain Northern countries, however, I think his point also illuminates a similar process at work within the parliamentary debates in Canada.
Parliamentarians, by representing the identification of a problem as a natural and neutral one (if not politically neutral, at least neutral in respect to special ‘interests’) were able to discursively organize problems as if they existed for the ‘nation’ and not necessarily specific differentiated groups within (or without) it. The ideology of liberal democracy, then, established a relationship between parliamentarians and their (wide) audience that gave them certain powers in exchange for solutions to the problems as constructed.

Because of the significance of parliamentary discursive practices to the construction not only of the state but also of the nation, I show the importance of examining how certain, and not all, people came to be problematized. Naming some people as a problem was to legitimize, in the name of the common good, their subjection to Canadian state power (see Ashforth, 1990:17). In this sense, it can be said that there existed no rough equality amongst those who were ruled over in Canadian society. That is, the relations of ruling in Canada during this period did not render as the same all those who were oppressed and exploited. While this may be an obvious point, some scholars of restructuring processes in Canada (see Chapter Three) do not take it up.

I, therefore, take exception to the general (and generalizing) proposition found in Smith’s (1990, 1987) work that people participate in the relations of ruling and, hence, their own oppression or exploitation. Such notions are also found in Foucault’s concept of power and knowledge where he sees power as relational, localized and dispersed. Both Smith and Foucault see the subject position of power-holder as also dispersed and fragmented.19

19 I recognize that in their totality the works of Smith and Foucault (as well as Gramsci) are not necessarily compatible. A key issue in regards to synthesizing their works lies in the issue of whether or not discourse theory is compatible with (diverse) Marxist theories of ideology. However, Frank Wang (1998), among others (see Fraser, 1997:13) has demonstrated that the work of Smith and Foucault, while containing some significant tensions, can be used together to better understand the social organization of knowledge and relations of ruling, or governance. In particular, both Smith and Foucault see discourses not merely as linguistic statements but as social processes. Likewise, while there is disagreement on use of the term ideology, for both ideology or power produces subjectivities. Like Wang, then, I use these theorists’ work pragmatically rather than to resolve the debates between these two bodies of work. I utilize those aspects of Smith and Foucault’s work that facilitate my analysis of parliamentary debates and that allow me to look at ruling as social practices. In particular, I find that in both the work of Smith (1987) and Foucault (1978), there is attention paid to existent inequalities – inequalities manifesting themselves both materially and culturally. Both also understand discourses as not merely statements or language but
The idea that 'we all participate in the relations of ruling', while taking into account the intersectionality of power relations, does not account for the fact that power continues to be exercised by people in relation to Others who are acted upon. In this regard, the notion of 'participation' in ruling relations uses the realizations offered by analyses of intersecting power relations in such a way that power becomes intangible. In this regard, Frank Tsen-Yung Wang (1998:48) makes an important point when he argues that Smith, in asserting that “power is no longer something that can be possessed and thus distributed among classes,” blurs the distinction made by Marx regarding the 'source of oppression'. While her awareness of how power operates along multiple axes of oppression and exploitation is important, at the same time, it tends to abstract the workings of power from the wielders of it.

Also, the Foucauldian understanding that power is dispersed, while rightfully recognizing that power is more diffuse than dualistic concepts imply, does not make clear the differentials in experiences of domination and subordination. Although both Smith’s and Foucault’s insight that normalizing practices lie at the heart of the techniques of power are essential to any understanding of ruling or governing, it is equally important to recall that normalizing practices distinguish, separate and categorize populations within a hierarchy (Wang, 1998:44). Creating certain people as problems constitutes (at least part of) the subjectivity of those who are not problematized. Indeed, Dehli (1993:86) points out, “[t]he form and language of policy texts [and other texts as well] in modern capitalist states draw us into ways of reading, speaking and

as social practices through which subjectivity and subjugation are organized. For both, ideology (Smith, 1990) or power (Foucault, 1980) is productive of social phenomena as well as knowledge and its objectification, i.e. the production of "facticity" (Smith, 1990:70-71) or "truth" (see Gordon, 1991:8). Even though Foucault shuns use of the concept of ideology, his work on normalizing or disciplinary practices can be seen as being in sync with Smith’s emphasis on ideological practices, for both help to uncover the ways in which ruling or governing practices work to objectify people’s lived experiences and relationships with others. In other words, Smith and Foucault both see knowledge production as a social practice and this understanding lies at the center of their conception of "modern" power (Foucault, 1980) or ruling relations (Smith, 1987). Moreover, both recognize that institutional practices (either the textual practices of Smith, 1990 or the disciplinary practices of Foucault, 1995) work to legitimize certain discourses or knowledge while working to exclude alternative ones. Smith’s emphasis on textual practices and Foucault’s genealogical (i.e. examining the historical, political and economic circumstances that produce certain
thinking which are divorced from the everyday experiences of people whose lives or behaviour are constituted as policy problems.” Moreover, Dehli (1993:95, emphasis added) adds, “...practices of policy production and circulation establish, affirm or change different subject positions and their relation to each other.”

Hence, I argue that a more fruitful way of understanding ruling practices is to see how people, at various points, participate in the oppression of others and how these practices work to Other these same people. As privilege lies at the heart of this relationship, examining the complicity of those that parliamentarians reference as Canadians, rather than everyone’s participation in ruling relations is perhaps a better method of investigating state ideological discursive practices, such as parliamentary debates. This is because, as Laura Donaldson’s (1992:83) notes, the discursive organization of ‘difference’ that produced Canadians and migrant workers alike, for instance, “...impl[ies] participation not only in the discourse itself but also in the sociopolitical privilege it bestow upon its users.” Complicity is more useful because it takes the crucial difference of privilege into account in any study of the practices of ruling.

Using the framework of complicity rather than participation in ruling relations does not necessarily imply that all who are complicit benefit in the same ways. There remain hierarchical differences between those who are complicit in producing a common sense around the related categories of ‘citizen’ and migrant worker. However, utilizing the framework of complicity is important, for such an understanding allows us to see that it was both the conceptual and material reality organized by such practices that allowed those who centred themselves within normative activities that helped to define the Other as their antithesis.

discourses) approach, in my opinion, are compatible for they contribute to “making the familiar visible, unnatural and problematic” (Wang, 1998:60).

20 As with the categories migrant worker or non-immigrant, I am placing the category of ‘citizen’ within quotation marks both to signify that it too is socially organized and that its membership within any given nation is not a straightforward process but an ideological one that carries great material force. From herein, I forego the use of quotes around this category but continue to problematize it.
Those represented and recognized as Canadian citizens gained not only a privileged identity but also a privileged position within the relations of ruling. Indeed, the two are intimately related. It is in the dialectical relationship between material privilege and the ability to Self-define one's self in opposition to a disprivileged Other that allows for the achievement of legitimacy for the social practices of ruling over migrant workers. Roxana Ng et al. (1990) tell us that crucial to this process of organizing legitimacy of ruling practices is the social organization of 'difference'\textsuperscript{21} in part through the construction of discrete categories.

Categories come to take the place of our actual lived experiences so that differentiated categories of 'citizens' and 'migrant workers' seem perfectly 'natural'. State-produced categories of immigration and nationality, which are in reality socially organized differences, are often misrepresented as actual causes for these differences. In other words, ideologically naturalized differences are seen as the reason for - rather than the consequence of - the existence of unequal treatment between, for instance, 'citizens' and 'migrant workers'.

Smith (1990:144) calls this kind of knowledge 'objectified knowledge'. She argues that objectified knowledge is an essential constituent of ruling, for, as Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1978:48-49) points out, our knowledge of differences "excludes everything that makes up history." One way that the social reality of the ruling/ruled relationship is concealed is as a result of being objectified through the construction of oppositional categories. Himani Bannerji (1995:24) sees such an abstraction of social relations as emanating from the continuously violent process of differentiation which organizes sets of "...markers for identities of both the rulers and the ruled." David Goldberg further emphasizes the dialectic of inclusion/exclusion that serves to both unify as well as separate social subjects. He argues that the construction of a supposedly unified We and Them is organized through such a consciousness of difference (Goldberg, 1993:6-7).

\textsuperscript{21} I am placing the term difference within quotation marks to both signify its social organization as well as distinguish it from natural forms of diversity that exist within all living beings on the planet. From herein, I forego
In my study, I show that these social processes of organizing differences were a crucial aspect of how legitimacy for the category of migrant worker was constructed. This process of differentiation in Canada was rooted in the exchange abstraction or what Donaldson calls “...the particular mode of social interrelationship that evolves in a society based upon commodity exchange” (1992:120). The commodity exchange entailed the process of fetishizing not just things but relationships as well (Marx, 1977:163-177). Such a process was both material and ideological and, as Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1978) observes, reflective of the abstract conceptual mode of thinking that has so dominated Anglo-European epistemology.

A study of the social organization of the binary code of Canadian citizen/migrant worker through an analysis of parliamentary debates ultimately provides a way of connecting our understanding of how oppressive and exploitative social relations of racism, nationalism and class intersected with a political economy of difference. Furthermore, such a study illuminates how this political economy made common sense of ‘knowledge’ about who belonged and who did not to the Canadian nation during my period of study.  

It shows that those who positioned themselves as the dominant (and dominating) or first half of the dichotomous equation of Canadian citizen/migrant worker, including parliamentarians, were complicit in the ruling over of those placed in the latter half.

In this regard, Albert Memmi’s (1965) emphasis on examining the oppressors’ existential as well as material participation in the lives of the oppressed shows the importance of investigating the social organization of binary codes. So, while it is true that there were

22 Significantly, relations of gender are rendered largely invisible within the parliamentary debates. This is not to say that the Non-Immigration Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) is not gendered in its operation or design. Rather, it is to say that given the performative aspects of parliamentary debates, detailed policy decisions on design and implementation of legislation were rarely debated by parliamentarians in my period of study. Thus, while the implementation of the NIEAP certainly produced a gendered labour market for people recruited through it, it was state bureaucrats – and not parliamentarians – who assigned people recruited as migrant workers to meet the occupational 'shortages' of employers in Canada. For this reason, while I utilize a feminist analysis to my examination of the NIEAP, I do not discuss the discursive production of gendered relations through the parliamentary debates that organized the migrant worker category.
hierarchies between people represented as 'belonging' to the Canadian nation, I show that the negative dualities of Canadian citizen/migrant worker did establish clear demarcations of privilege and power between the two. It was the citizen-Self that set the frame of reference for the existence of both him/herSelf and the non-citizen-Other(s). The Other, then, was constituted through the social organization of difference (see Brah, 1996:105). Migrant workers were relationally positioned in opposition to Canadians. A person became a 'citizen' in opposition to non-citizens.23

The very ideas of what constituted normalcy and difference were formed within these binary structures of inequality. The socially constructed basis of the state-produced category of migrant worker was mystified through the ideologies of racism and nationalism that served to hold in place the alleged natural superiority/inferiority of differentiated groups of people. Such relations were also secured by mystifying people's knowledge of them. Here, again, parliamentary discursive practices worked to transform the complexity of social realities into an objectified, code-able realm. The unequal social relations that organized these differences were placed out of view.

By focussing my attention on the social organization of the migrant worker category, I am admittedly glossing over the differences within it as well as among other categories positioned in relation to it, such as Canadian citizen. However, while it is true that such simple dualities mask the complexities of power relations, investigating the social positioning of people on one or the Other side of the negative duality of Canadian citizen/migrant worker does help to uncover how the common sensical quality of the relations of ruling were organized during my period of study. In other words, the aim of studying binary codes of ruling is not to keep them in place but to help us gain a better understanding of the "social conditions of its formation, its

23 As Smith (1990: 33) said, "[k]nowing is always a relation between knower and known." So, those within the dominant half of the equation were also defined in reference to these dichotomous categories so that notions of
implication in the inscription of hierarchies, and its power to mobilise collectivities” (Brah, 1996:184).

In my study, I show that the power to categorize within the context of ruling relations became an exercise of power. Binary codes, then, operated not only as systems of categorization but also expressions of power. For one thing, binary codes informed parliamentarian’s ideas of who in the world was and was not entitled to certain things. Thus, it is crucial to recognize that while migrant workers were ideologically differentiated from Canadian citizens, the construction of binary codes was intimately connected to the establishment and reproduction of unequal social relations. Those placed in the former category were materially differentiated in relation to resources. This shows the “material force” that these ideological practices of differentiation had (Marx, 1971: 122-3). What came to be regarded as ‘normal’ was, in other words, an effect of the relations of ruling.

Moreover, while the racist and nationalist discourses organizing the migrant worker category during my period of study represented distinct ideological practices, they were a part of the already existing common sense around racialized, nationalized and classed notions of belonging in Canada. Thus, while it is important to recognize the various ways that racism and class play out for socially differentiated groups of people, it is perhaps more important to focus on how binary categories organize the social legitimacy for such differences.

I show how part of the way in which the legitimacy of the migrant worker category was organized in parliamentary debates was through the making of ‘We’ statements. Discourses employing the rhetoric of We suggested a mutuality that was non-existent (Donaldson, 1992: 80). Implicit in these We statements was the suggestion that a unified constituency was being
citizenship would be meaningless if no differentiation between Self and Other was to be made.

24 Ideologies of difference give social meaning, and not a small modicum of plausibility, to notions that actual differences exist - that there exist certain natural traits that cause people to be positioned within society in different, subordinate or superordinate ways. This is partly because people’s consciousness is shaped through the fact that there are tangible consequences stemming from placement in differently categorized groups.
spoken for. 'We' came to stand for the experiences not of a diverse group of people who all live in Canada, but of the dominant group. This is evident in the following example from Chapter Five, where I show that MPs consistently used We statements to rationalize particular state practices that organized ideological notions of belonging in Canada. For instance, MP Ian Arrol, in arguing in support of legislation to remove the 'right' of 'visitors' to Canada to apply for permanent resident status, states:

If we feel, as some have expressed today, that our duty is to the whole wide world, then let us remember New York and the dangers of opening one's doors completely to the disadvantaged who now form close to the majority population of that city. If... we were to take hordes of those who are unskilled and whose social conditioning is not that of the work ethic, we could be well on the way to reducing our own standard of living to the standards of those whom we sought to help. ...In our modern technological age our own development should come first, and then the people should be brought in remembering at all times that a nation's first responsibility is to its own people (Hansard, June 22, 1973:5028).

The reader of these discursive practices, by operating the historically racialized and nationalized binary codes of 'modern' and 'backwards', is interpellated as white through a series of We statements that have embedded within them Us and Them negative dualities. As Purvis and Hunt (1993) point out, such practices of interpellation produce both subjection and subjectivity so that the interpellation of certain groups as Us is part of how legitimacy for binary codes is organized and/or maintained. Embedded within notions of Us, then, is the assumption of membership in the rank of rulers, whether this is in fact the case or not. Smith talks about this process as the voicing of the 'father tongue' whereby social relations are organized in such a manner that the lived actualities of people's experiences are subdued to the discourses of ruling. We Statements are a part of this white, father tongue in Canada.

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25 I recognize that the term 'white' is a racialized category, hence, it is socially constructed and organized through a relational existence with those categorized as Other (Roediger, 1994). Throughout Canadian history, the social meaning of whiteness has shifted as social relations have been continuously re-organized. Being white, then, has changed over time so that some people previously excluded from the definition, such as the Irish, have subsequently been added - at least in most parts of the country (see Ignatiev, 1995 for a discussion of 'how the Irish became
Historically in Canada, material constructions of ideological differences between Indigenous peoples, white settlers and people of colour have served to secure the racialized and gendered meanings of ‘being Canadian’. Reference to Indigenous people and those from outside Northwestern Europe, most especially people of colour from the ‘Third World’, as the Other within Canada has produced the ideological construction of Canada as a white settler colony and an extension of the English and French nations (Abele and Stasiulis, 1989). This is evident in the long-standing myth of the two ‘founding’ English and French races (later re-named nations) enshrined within the British North America Act (BNA) of 1867, the founding legal text for the nation of Canada.

It is with an understanding of this historical framework of ‘Canadian-ness’ that I undertake an investigation into how inclusions and exclusions are organized by those working within the liberal democratic framework of the Canadian state. During my period of study, the legacy of colonialism whereby whites, particularly those seen as coming from England or France, were privileged and defined themselves as Canadian was utilized in the parliamentary debates to rationalize the social process of rendering people of colour as Others within Canada during my period of study. Indeed, recourse to these historical ways of organizing social relations in Canada gave meaning as well as legitimacy to the category of migrant worker. Such an examination helps to uncover the specific social organization of knowledge that transforms the world that people experience into a bureaucratic course of action that produces people as migrant workers.

In taking this methodological approach to investigating the organization of the category migrant workers and subsequently the relations of ruling, I do not start with trying to scrutinize the people that fall into the category migrant workers. Instead, I try and uncover how social

white” and Hyslop, 1999:418, for how the white working class did not become white but made itself white). Unfortunately, it is not the scope of this thesis to adequately deal with this issue.
relations are organized within Canadian society in such a way that allows parliamentarians to talk about certain people as migrant workers. As such, I begin my investigation by troubling the category itself. Throughout my study I ask the kinds of questions that aim to uncover how the work of parliamentarians helps to create what we come to know as social phenomena.

I do not intend to write a definitive study about migrant workers. That is, I do not undertake to do a sociology of migrant workers in Canada but a sociology of our knowledge of migrant workers in order to uncover the ideological practices that act as a material force in restructuring social relations in Canada and beyond during this period.26 This is possible through an examination of the discursive organization of concepts or categories, for they have embedded within them certain social practices. Discursive practices, in this way, can be said to be a form of imagining. Once a category (e.g. migrant worker) comes into play, the social relations it shapes enter into the issues and problems that the construction of this particular category was meant to address. By asking how people are included or excluded in any given category, we get a good idea of why certain peoples and not others are put in these categories.

This is more useful than simply examining the criteria by which mechanisms of exclusion operate. This is especially necessary in a political environment whereby exclusion is rarely organized through state practices that explicitly name exclusionary criteria, such as race or national origin by which people can belong or not belong to the Canadian nation. By troubling how people were excluded during my period of study, we get to the heart of the issue of exclusion rather than just compiling a list of the excluded.

My goal for this project is to have us see through the ideological categories that people who were made to work as indentured labour in Canada have been placed. By de-objectifying the people captured under the category of migrant worker, we can re-assess how classed, gendered

26 My focus on the social and discursive process of category construction is another reason for the selection of parliamentary debates as the main empirical site of investigation.
and racialized ways of knowing differentiated groups in Canadian society continued to be organized and put into operation despite the elimination of explicit racist or nationalist exclusionary methods in immigration legislation. Most importantly, by exposing the relations of ruling at work, we might be in a better position to challenge and work toward the elimination of oppressive and exploitative ways in which human relationships are structured. This is because uncovering how the relations of ruling are organized goes some way towards challenging and undoing those coordinated human activities that try to ensure the rule of some over others (Smith, 1987; Foucault, 1978).

Scope and Description of Study

I conducted a documentary analysis of Canadian parliamentary debates in the period proceeding, during and following the introduction of the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) on January 1, 1973. Specifically, I examined official transcripts of the debates of the Canadian House of Commons from January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1973 in which the following topics were discussed: trade, the Canadian economy, unemployment, labour conditions, manpower, foreign investment, external affairs, immigration and multiculturalism.

Although the purpose of this study is to examine the social organization of the migrant worker category at that time, I found it necessary to broaden the analysis of parliamentary debates to look at issues other than immigration. Debates on topics such as trade and investment, because they were productive of re-organized notions of nation, were also part of the discursive production of legitimacy for the migrant worker category in Canada. A key connecting point and metaphor shared by debates on immigration and on, for example, trade and investment was movement – the movement of either capital or people - and belonging. One of the other of these (and at times both) were a central organizing principle of these debates.
I chose this particular five-year period as the focus of my analysis in order to shed more light on how this period was much more than a period of liberalization of Canadian state practices on immigration policy and nation building. While some analysts have recognized this period as a significant one, this period has generally been seen as only a time of liberalization (Hawkins, 1974, see Satzewich, 1989 for a contrasting view). Attention has mostly been paid to the 1967 elimination of the ‘preferred races and nationalities’ criteria of admission to Canada (Boyd, 1996; Hawkins, 1974). This is perhaps best captured in the following quote by Freda Hawkins (1974: 144) where she states that “Canada officially abandoned racial discrimination in immigration in 1962.”

However, it was precisely during this period of liberalization that a significant retrenchment was made in Canadian immigration policy, culminating in the introduction of the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) on January 1, 1973 (see Chapter Seven for more detailed discussion of this point). Through this consolidated migrant workers recruitment program, conditions of unfreedom were imposed upon a growing number (and soon to be the majority) of people admitted to work in the labour market in Canada (see Table 1 on p.256). Moreover, during my period of study, there took place a racialization of (im)migration so that being an immigrant and being a person of colour became co-terminus. In other words, people of colour were represented as the foreigners within the Canadian nation. Parliamentary debates were an important part of how this was accomplished.

27 These are referred to as the Hansard and are cited as such throughout this study.
28 It was in 1962 that Section 31(2) of the Immigration Regulations were changed to allow for the entry to Canada as permanent residents. It was not until 1967 that people of colour were enabled to immigrate to Canada (see Satzewich, 1989b).
29 There have been many times when certain groups (im)migrating to Canada have been racialized in the past and represented as foreigners (see Bolaria and Li, 1988, Ujimoto, 1988). However, it is important to closely investigate each use of the ideologies of racism (and their intersection with ideologies of nationalism) to examine their relationship to the restructuring of the global political economy as well as to changes in the discursive representation of certain groups.
In this study, I show how shifts in immigration policy from permanent settler to temporary, indentured worker recruitment are integrally related to the far-reaching changes that took place in Canadian state policies on trade, investment and unemployment at this same time (see McBride, 1992 for a detailed discussion of Canadian state policies on unemployment). Making a connection between parliamentary discursive practices on migrant workers and the broader Canadian social formation is possible through an examination of the links between language and power.

The topic of my inquiry is therefore two-fold. By following Foucault's (1991: 75) advice that "...to recognize a discontinuity is never anything more than to register a problem that needs to be solved," my first task lies in investigating how the creation of the category of migrant worker was discursively legitimized through Canadian parliamentary debates as a rational resolution to certain problems. These problems – represented by parliamentarians as crises facing Canadians - were discursively organized through the interplay of material and ideological practices. I then examine how ruling relations were both restructured as well as re-conceptualized through these debates.

In this regard, Laura Donaldson (1992:72) notes that discourses can be seen as assuming an 'anaclitic' (literally, a leaning-up-against) relationship with their material bases (also see Silverman, 1984). Smith goes even further in recognizing that discourses are not merely statements. She states that "discourse too is material, in Marx's sense, of consisting of actual people and their activities as well as the material conditions of those activities" (Smith, 1998). In this sense, the parliamentary debates I looked at can be said to have been a part of the semiotic means in which the material world was produced at this time. Indeed, my study shows that parliamentary discursive practices did not only support the materiality of social relations but facilitated their production and reproduction (Ashforth, 1990).
Within this investigation, then, I found it important to look at the social courses of action that the category migrant worker or non-immigrant organized, particularly in relation to the restructuring of the Canadian labour market during my period of study. The migrant worker category is, in part (but not in its entirety), a labour market category. The category migrant worker filled a certain perceived shortage of workers within this market. Examining how parliamentarians represented labour shortages tells us about a disjuncture both in the reproduction of ruling relations as well as with how the introduction of the NIEAP was considered as part of the restructuring of the labour force available to investors/employers in Canada.

I also examine and try to synthesize three distinct bodies of work often conceptualized as disconnected in order to better comprehend three points: the process through which unfree waged labour supplies were created in Canada, how those working within unfree employment relations were situated within the labour market and how their use by employers contributed to the restructuring of this market. The present study argues for connections to be made between the re-organization of the world market for labour power, the imposition of conditions of unfreedom on migrant workers in Canada and the discursive practices of parliamentarians aimed at making Canadian territories more competitive within a global system of capitalism.

To supplement my documentary analysis of Canadian parliamentary debates, I examine existing literature regarding the character of changes during the period I am studying. I concentrate on the academic debates concerning the practices of capitalist nation-states during this period of restructuring globalization. This is done for two main reasons. First, to place the discursive practices of parliamentarians within the global framework in which they are situated. This allows me to better situate how the NIEAP was a component of global restructuring processes that was put into place, in part, by the work of parliamentarians. I study this body of work to situate the introduction of the NIEAP in the political economy from which it arose as a
solution to certain problems, thus, placing the social organization of these problems within a
global, historical context.

Secondly, I enter into the debate on ‘the state’ in order to further develop an analysis of
how the restructuring practices of people working within national state apparatuses, such as the
parliament have, in turn, restructured these very practices. I see this as an important piece of my
investigation, for in the process of restructuring Canadian state practices, the global system of
national states, as well as Canada’s position within it, has been restructured. Examining the
redesigned rationality of governance at this time exposes how the rulers rule through and within
the Canadian nation-state. Understanding this dialectic process of restructuring helps to reveal
the character of power during the period of study (and afterwards). In particular, I am able to
show that nationalist and racist practices were essential to the organization and legitimation of
globalization during my period of study.

This investigation, then, examines how the performance of a liberal democratic form of
governance in Canada by parliamentarians contributed to the social organization of various
differences within the country. In particular, I show that emphasis on ideological notions of
membership in the nation-state, or ‘nation-hood’, within the parliamentary debates was a central
part of the practices of restructuring ruling relations during this period of late capitalism in
Canada. I show that much of what is said to define liberal democracy, such as citizenship or
freedom, can be wiped out in a single legislative stroke if those who govern are successfully able
to construct and legitimize ideological categories of people produced as Other, such as migrant
workers.

An understanding of the global context in which the NIEAP is constructed as well as the
formation of a changed rationality of governance in Canada allows me to analyze the socially
organized differences within the category non-immigrant and how these served to shape common
sensical notions of who was represented as a migrant worker. To get at this, I examine the
differences between the kinds of work done by those within the non-immigrant category. I investigate how these differences were related to the social organization of classed or racialized differences in Canada and how they came to shape the claims that differentiated people within this category could make upon the state or employers. Importantly, these differences served to shape whether people within the non-immigrant category even came to be known as migrant workers in Canada. This gave further shape to the racialized, gendered and classed constitution of this social category.

Moreover, given that studies of Canadian immigration policies are mostly silent on the existence and workings of the NIEAP, I try to uncover how the social organization of various differences worked to render the use of people as migrant workers not only as unproblematic but also as invisible. This is significant, for since the introduction of the NIEAP in 1973, over two million people have been issued temporary employment authorizations (Sharma, 1995). Yet, investigations of the NIEAP are largely sketchy and fragmented into an investigation of particular groups of those living and working as migrant workers in Canada, particularly those working as domestic or farm workers (see Bakan and Stasiulis, 1996; Arat-Koc, 1992; Silvera, 1983 for a discussion of migrant domestic workers and Wall, 1992 for an investigation of migrant farm workers). Not enough work has been done to trouble the category of migrant worker itself and how it is an effect of (and effects) the social organization of difference in Canada.

This means that (white) Canadians' privileged position within racialized discourses (even when they may share a class position with people of colour) fails to be adequately theorized and as a result processes of domination, such as those that render some people as unfree within labour markets theorized as free, remain invisible. A focus on the effects of being placed within the migrant worker category, as Brah (1996:112) points out, then, may actually work to render
invisible the workings of such ideological and material processes, thereby hindering our understanding of the complex basis of inequalities in Canadian society.

Through the insights gleaned from analysis of parliamentary debates, I critically engage with this literature to try and make good sense of the organization of the migrant worker category in Canada. I show that the beginning period of the process of globalization began during my period of study and not later in the 1980s as supposed by many political economists studying Canadian public policy (Teeple, 1995; Bakker, 1996; Brodie, 1996; McBride and Shields, 1993; Marchak, 1991; Drache and Gertler, 1991). I also demonstrate how parliamentarians discursively (and through the passing of certain pieces of legislation) produced a restructured global space during my period of study.

Yet, to best understand the character of power during this time, it is also necessary to understand how it was that the category migrant worker, rather than some other, was organized in 1973. The second of my two interests in carrying out this study, therefore, lies in understanding how the decision to proceed with this particular response was shaped by existing social relations in Canada (and beyond). Thus, I examine how the construction of the category migrant worker was a response thought of as actionable, or rational, by those in parliament.

I show that the construction of the category of migrant worker was far from inevitable. Rather, it was understood as a response that fit into the socially organized realm of possibilities during the time that the NIEAP was introduced. It was the existence of a particular pattern of social relations, shaped by the indissociable play of material realities and ideological practices, that made the construction of the category of migrant worker and its organization of an unfree labour force possible in relation to changing labour market demands in Canada (and the world).

Through this investigation, I show that the category of migrant worker was discursively organized by parliamentarians as much more than either an immigration or a labour market category. Condensed within it were dominant notions of who could legitimately be a member of
the Canadian nation-state – and who could not. Membership in Canada, then, far from being a mere legal/juridical tally of who in Canada had citizenship status, requires an investigation into the ideological meaning of ‘Canadian-ness’ (Ng, 1988).

My investigation, therefore, includes paying attention to which groups of people parliamentarians discursively produced as a problem and who they were a problem for. This is one way in which complicity in the relations of ruling can be investigated. While not the focus of my study, I show that in the problem-making of certain people by MPs, a certain common discourse was authorized that was taken up by people coordinating their actions through various sites of the state apparatuses. This process was deeply informed by the relations of ruling and, in turn, went on to re-shape them in ways suitable for particular historical moments. Such discourses constituted the ground upon which the knowledge (or consciousness) required for power was both discursively produced and communicated.

As the problematization of certain groups has historically been tied to past as well as present organizations of social relations, understanding the connections that the NIEAP has to past ways of organizing Canadian society is, therefore, necessary as it is these encounters with the past that served to naturalize constructions of the migrant worker category during my period of study. As such, my investigation is informed by research into who has historically been used as indentured (or unfree) labour in Canada. I also examine the relationship between the use of certain people as unfree workers and notions of belonging (with its corollary of not belonging) to the imagined Canadian nation (see Chapter 4). I investigate the connection between employing people constructed as foreign to work as unfree migrant workers in Canada with nationalist, racist and sexist ideologies that work to construct who belongs and who is foreign.

Methods of Investigation

I employ four inter-related methods of investigation to understand how the category of ‘migrant labour’ is constructed as a ‘solution’ to particular problems in Canada during the period
of study and how the decision to proceed with this particular response - indeed, its very 'reasonable-ness' - is shaped by the historical formation and re-production of particular social relations in the country (and beyond). The main method, as extensively discussed above, is a documentary analysis of the textual practices of parliamentarians in Canada's House of Commons from the years 1969 to, and including, 1973.

This is supplemented by statistical data collection on those admitted under the non-immigrant category. I also collect statistical data on those admitted as permanent residents in order to make a comparison between the two groups and discern any shift taking place in how Canadian immigration policy recruits people for the labour market. I also use existing secondary sources, such as academic literature to conduct a historical survey of the social organization of difference in the Canadian labour market. In particular, I examine who has been used as unfree labour and how this may be connected to notions of who does and does not belong to the Canadian nation. Finally, I utilize supplemental interviews with key informants who are knowledgeable about the daily implementation of the NIEAP and how the category non-immigrant or migrant worker operates within the labour market.

i) Analysis of textual practices

Parliamentary debates taking place from January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1973 have been chosen as my main site of investigation. I examined thirty-six volumes of official transcripts of the Canadian House of Common Debates. From these transcripts, I selected those debates that fell under the headings I was most interested in examining further (trade, the Canadian economy, unemployment, labour conditions, manpower, foreign investment, external affairs, immigration and multiculturalism). These topics were given special attention for they dealt with issues of the movement of both capital and people, issues of which groups of people belonged or did not within the Canadian nation and general issues of policy re-formulation.
Notes taken from these transcribed debates were analyzed for what they tell about how state practices serve to organize both a material reality as well as a common sense regarding what constitutes legitimate social relations in Canada.

A documentary analysis helps me to uncover the ideological practices of parliamentarians that serve to produce a certain kind of reality practical to the task of ruling in Canada during my period of study. Consequently, the discursive practices of parliamentarians are not seen as indicative of only the singular characteristics of each Member of Parliament (MP) but are understood as being situated within social relations of ruling. This leads me to investigate parliamentary discursive practices as, what Michel Foucault (1991:75) calls, a "regime of practices" or the "places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect."

Conducting a documentary analysis of textual practices is useful in uncovering ideological discursive practices and the material realities shaped by them. As Smith states, "[t]extual practices are operative in the work of accomplishing the social relations in which texts occur (Smith, 1990: 125). I argue that the parliamentary debates I analyze are a constituent of the social relations that inform their production. Parliamentary debates are relational, because:

[it] is the reader who brings the text to life as meaning...The reader uses interpretive schemata in finding the sense of the text. These she has learned as a member of her society participating in determinate social relations. In analysis, therefore, we should be concerned to locate the controlling frameworks and interpretive schemata provided by the social relation that the text originally intended (was written to intend) (Smith, 1990: 153-54).

Thus, rather than analyze the parliamentary debates in search of some hidden meaning or their right interpretation, thereby assigning some intention to the discursive practices used by parliamentarians, the method of documentary analysis emphasizes the uncovering of the ideological practices that shape the production of certain events as facts. An examination of texts, therefore, constitutes a focus on discursive practices of producing particular accounts. This
allows me to look at ruling as practices. Investigating the use of language to express facts is one part of a textual analysis, for the organization of language is a way of organizing knowledge that is observable. Facts are specific forms of text-mediated knowledge.

However, while we usually talk about discourses as having meaning, it is equally important to see discourse as an action (Smith, 1995). Looking at how language enters into organizing the way people come to see events, then, becomes a way of uncovering the social relations that organize them (also see Foucault’s discussion of “eventalization,” 1991:76-9). Conducting a textual analysis provides us with a way of examining the organization of facticity (or the making of facts) as a social process.

This is because embedded in the discursive practices of parliamentarians, for instance, is what Smith (1995:2) calls ‘ideological codes’ that act as a set of instructions on how to put ‘events’ together. These instructions are part of the organizing frames within discursive practices. Again, Smith reminds us that such practices occur within the context of ruling relations. She states (1995:4) that “[t]he institutional frame controls the representations of people’s lives to fit the relevances and prejudgments of the institutional order.”

It is therefore critical that we recognize how the relations of ruling keep certain textual practices in place while simultaneously suppressing others. It is important to do so, because as in Foucault’s words, “…the phenomenon of the social body is the effect not of a consensus but of the materiality of power operating on the very bodies of individuals” (cited in Donaldson, 1992:125). This awareness helps us to resist seeing textual practices as simply part of an unmediated politics of meaning but rather as a practice of ruling. In this regard, the ways in which documents are generated are important for both the material that is contained and that which is omitted.

This process of inclusion and exclusion by the makers of documents is what Smith (1995:151) calls the ‘encoding process’ and is central to the facts created through their work.
Omitting the details of particular legislation or policy direction, as was typical in the parliamentary debates I analyzed, allows for the organization of legitimacy to be one of the main features of parliamentary debates. The facts organized through these debates were (often) subsequently taken for as a social reality. As Roxana Ng remarks, "...that [they were] invented out of the bureaucratic and ruling relations of Canadian society [becomes] eclipsed" (1988:35). In other words, the encoding process is a *ruling* technology that contains two axes.

First, this documentary reality is formed through what Foucault (1991:79) calls the process of 'codification' or 'prescription' or the organization of the numerous rules, procedures, regulations and so on that are developed from the discursive practices of those who do some of the job of governing. Secondly, this documentary reality is organized through the formulation of what Foucault calls true or false propositions where 'truth' is organized not in relation to true utterances but constitutes an ideological practice of concealing the social production of certain events as taken-for-granted facts (Gordon, 1991). What stands for an ideological facticity or truth is the interplay between the 'instructions' that put into place a framework for how things are to be done and the "production of true discourses which serve to found, justify and provide reasons and principles for these ways of doing things" (Foucault, 1991:79).

Discursive or textual practices, then, are seen as part of the practice of codifying, classifying and managing information in such a way that coordinates as well as conceals work processes central to the institutional activities of governing. Consequently, a key component of my investigation is examining how the legitimacy of organizing people into differential categories of immigration and citizenship was discursively produced in the parliamentary debates and how this process of category construction was part of the way that ruling relations are secured in Canadian society.

The making of categories did the work of transforming people into migrant workers or what Laura Donaldson (1992:124) calls 'discursive commodities' as well as commodities for the
Canadian labour market. Parliamentary debates were also part of the work of organizing common sense notions about those who were placed in categories constructed as oppositional to migrant workers - permanent residents and Canadian citizens. Knowledge about Canadian society and the larger world was formed through these negative dualities. Indeed, during my period of study, the migrant worker category, perhaps more than any other concept organized by parliamentary discursive practices, served to shape a common sense of who belonged to the Canadian nation and who did not. I show that acceptance of the oppositional categories of citizen/migrant worker served to shape the organization of difference within Canada where difference does not mean diversity but inequality.

A documentary analysis of these texts allowed me to connect the employment of people in unfree employment relationships with nationalist and racist ideologies that worked to construct who was Canadian and who was not and, therefore, who had the right to make certain claims (such as the right to work as free labour, access to social programs and services, employment standards protections and so on) and who did not. Examining the production of a rationality about insiders and outsider within Canada and how this categorization worked, in large part, through immigration policies, exposes how it was that the labour market in Canada was restructured through representations of certain people as a ‘foreign’ presence by parliamentarians.

In short, by conducting a documentary analysis, I show that embedded within categories, such as migrant worker (or non-immigrant) and within ideological discursive practices of parliamentarians are those very social relations that organize human societies and the relations of ruling (Smith, 1990:38). The category migrant worker, thus, can be seen as an allegory, that, as with other allegories “...prompts us to say of any cultural description not ‘this represents, or symbolizes, that’ but rather, ‘this is a (morally charged) story about that’” (Clifford, 1986:100).

A documentary analysis of textual practices reveals the link between migrant workers as
discursive commodities and the social organization of their difference in the Canadian labour market.

Naming someone a migrant worker is, therefore, more than simply describing his or her legal situation in Canada. In adapting Umberto Eco's argument about the process of making women into wives, when a person becomes a migrant worker his or her physical body is transformed into a sign that brings to mind a whole system of social restrictions, compulsions and differentiation (1976:26). The category migrant worker, through the consciousness of Self and Other which it provokes, is simultaneously organized by and goes on to organize social relations in Canadian society.

ii) Statistical data collection and analysis

To supplement my inquiry into how the social organization of a common sense around the category migrant worker was accomplished through the racialized and classed discursive practices of parliamentarians, I examine certain statistical data pertaining to the entry of people into Canada through different categories of immigration. An analysis of this data collection is necessary, for it demonstrates that ideological discursive practices do have material outcomes in relation to the labour market in Canada. While this examination is supplementary to my main focus, it is an important piece of any understanding of changes occurring in ruling relations within Canadian society as well as with how the labour market was restructured during my period of study.

Data used to compile these statistics came from several state departmental sources. I consulted existing collections of government data, most of which were unpublished, from the various departments responsible for immigration since 1969, namely, Manpower and Immigration Canada (MIC, created in 1966), later renamed Employment and Immigration Canada (EIC) and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC, created in 1993). I examine
comparable data on the numbers and percentage of people admitted to Canada as either non-immigrants or as permanent residents since the introduction of the NIEAP in 1973.

I also collated unpublished government statistics on the occupational location of migrant workers in Canada to see in which industries people were being employed. This was done to identify the precise social location of people who were recruited as migrant workers and forced to work in unfree employment relationships. I examined data on both the ‘sex’ and ‘country of citizenship’ of those categorized as migrant workers and compared this with the occupations of people admitted through the NIEAP.

An examination of these statistics reveals how the discursive practices of the state in regards to certain problems with immigration materialized into how differences within Canada were organized during this period of study. Although the ways in which the migrant worker category was put to work through the day-to-day operation of the NIEAP was not the main focus of my study, this statistical information on people recruited as migrant workers provided a useful context for examining how the NIEAP was a part of the restructuring of the labour market in Canada. These data allowed me to examine the material force of the social organization of difference accomplished by the construction of the category non-immigrant.

Thus, while it was not parliamentarians who made determinations of who worked where when recruited through the NIEAP, connecting the relationship between the discursive practices of MPs with how bureaucrats within the departments of ‘Manpower’ (now Human Resources Development) and Immigration assigned certain people to certain jobs demonstrates the materiality of ideological discourses of racism and nationalism. I found that there were significant differences in where people from the global North and South were situated as migrant workers within the labour market in Canada. I also found that while the gender of migrant workers was rendered invisible within the parliamentary debates, there were significant differences in where women and men worked as migrant workers in Canada.
Moreover, statistical information of how the NIEAP worked also allowed me to relate the materiality of the labour market to how racialized discursive practices of parliamentarians shaped a common sense of who came to be known as migrant workers in Canada. As Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1993:5) note in this regard, “...the notion of where and how the boundary is constructed is not only diverse, but is also contextual and relational... What is at stake are the processes by which criteria for identification emerge and are transformed.”

Examining who was represented as belonging in the category of migrant worker highlights the processes of racialization and gender construction embedded within the discursive practices of MPs and allows us to see how it is that the ideologies of nationalism, sexism and racism articulate to reproduce the relations of ruling. I show that the parliamentary discourse on migrant workers mainly represented them as men of colour engaged in stoop labour on farms in Canada. I further show that such a representation facilitated the legitimacy of the category.

(Im)migration statistics also showed how the introduction of the NIEAP in 1973 re-organized a major shift in how (im)migration to Canada took place. I show that shortly after 1973, the numbers of people recruited as migrant workers soon came to surpass those admitted as ‘landed’ immigrants (i.e. permanent residents), including people in the independent (those admitted through the ‘point system’), family and refugee sub-categories. This shift from permanent settler to temporary, unfree labour migration was even more remarkable when comparing people recruited to work as permanent residents with those recruited to work as non-immigrants.

Identifying the material effects produced by the organization of the category migrant worker, then, is important in gaining an understanding of how the NIEAP is organized as a solution to particular problems produced by parliamentarians. Understanding how differences are organized tells us much about the relations of ruling in Canada and how legitimacy is organized.
and points to at least some of the underlying gendered, racialized and classed characteristics of this ruling.

**iii) Interviews with Key Informants**

I interviewed three people working for the Canadian state. All had major positions within the department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and it is their holding of these positions that led me to select them as key informants. The interviews, which were held from May to June of 1998, were open-ended and related to the knowledge held by the key informants on the rationale as well as day-to-day operation of the NIEAP as understood by the interviewees.

The questions I asked were not aimed at discovering how the NIEAP 'really' worked. Rather, the interviews helped me to better understand how a particular kind of knowledge about people categorized as migrant workers was taken up by people in the state bureaucracy. These interviews were used as a backdrop to my documentary analysis of the parliamentary debates. Consequently, I do not quote directly from any of these three interviews in the body of my thesis. However, the three people whom I interviewed proved to be knowledgeable about both the appropriateness of the NIEAP with regards to the way 'things are done' in Canada as well as how the NIEAP facilitated the work of state bureaucrats in assisting employers in meeting with their labour needs. These interviews, thus, gave me insight into how the NIEAP operated as an unfree labour recruitment program.

Through my conversations with these informants, I found that the creation of the NIEAP and the category non-immigrant was organized through the work of a hierarchical layer of people working for the Canadian Department of Immigration, people in other Departments responsible for labour market policies and elected officials, particularly the Minister(s) responsible for employment and/or immigration.\(^\text{30}\) I was able to find out how various state departments and

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\(^{30}\) Unfortunately, due to regulations governing the public release of such documents, I was not able to gain access to confidential cabinet meeting discussion during the time the NIEAP was introduced.
offices coordinated their activities to the supplies and demands of changing labour markets, although this was not the main focus of my study. I also discovered that from the outset the NIEAP was driven, so to speak, by employers who often demanded from the state that people be admitted as 'migrant workers' to fill so-called temporary labour shortages.

Moreover, the interviews proved useful in uncovering the process of what Foucault calls 'self-regulation' whereby the people who did the day-to-day job of recruiting people as migrant workers and keeping them in their assigned 'place' in the labour market in Canada, also held in place certain ruling relations that the informants, themselves, were situated in. Through my interviews with them, I found that the informants' consciousness was shaped by the ideological practices of racism and nationalism that were also evident within the parliamentary debates.

All three key informants, by interpellating employers' demands as those that 'everyone' benefited from, situated their work in the nationalist, classed and racialized discourse of the 'national interest' evident in my analysis of parliamentary debates in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. My interviews with them afforded me insights into the kind of self-regulatory action that these jobs in the state bureaucracy produce. Further, they show how people's subjectivity is actually shaped by the discursive practices of capital and state power.

**Summary**

Part of the course of action that organized the national state category non-immigrant or migrant worker included the discursive practices of those sitting as Members of Parliament (MPs) in the House of Commons of the Canadian Parliament. An examination of how parliamentary debates were organized and how they contributed to the production of a racist and nationalist common sense concerning the category of migrant worker helps to uncover how ruling relations were both organized and legitimized within Canada during my period of study: from 1969 to 1973, inclusive.
The production of hierarchical social relations through ideologies of race and nation constitute the focus of this study. This does not preclude a recognition of the intersectionality of relations of power. Rather, examining the (re)production of racialized and nationalized ideological practices allows me to expose the crucial importance of both to the character of power during my period of study. Both are found to be an integral part of how the organization of difference was legitimated through the discursive practices of parliamentarians at this time. Such a focus allows me to demonstrate how the hierarchical organization of the capitalist labour market in Canada (as elsewhere) was normalized.

Analyzing the parliamentary debates of this period reveals how a common sense was organized in the parliamentary debates through the social organization of certain key problems that parliamentarians said were in urgent need of being addressed. These problems often corresponded with the stated need to restructure Canadian state practices in a number of areas. My investigation of the formation of these problems and solutions demonstrates the existence of a disjuncture in the reproduction of ruling relations and its identifying characteristics.

In this study, I show that central to how power was organized in Canadian society were the ways in which people’s coordinated activities were represented so as to conceal the social relations that shaped their actions. Through the conceptual framework and method of institutional ethnography developed by Smith with its emphasis on making ideological practices an object of inquiry, supplemented by Foucault’s analysis of power and knowledge, I investigate how the creation of a category of people named as migrant workers subsequently served to produce a rationality of a particular type of labour market in Canada that accorded with processes of globalization as they occurred in the years under study.

Through the analysis of the documentary practices of parliamentarians, analysis of statistical data gathered from various governmental sources, a historical survey of the existing literature on national state practices, globalization and the social organization of unfree labour
and, finally, interviews with several key informants who were knowledgeable about the formation and operationalization of the migrant worker category in the NIEAP, I uncover the social relations that allowed for the transformation of some people into migrant workers. This exposes an aspect of the character of power in Canada during this historical juncture and allows me to examine how the social practices that restructured our world materially and conceptually were concealed.

By problematizing, instead of normalizing, this state category, I show that the NIEAP was not introduced because it was either the most logical or most effective way of providing cheapened and weakened supplies of labour (although it certainly did accomplish that). Instead, it was implemented in response to the existing social relations in Canadian society at the time. Parliamentarians (and others) saw the NIEAP with its migrant worker category, rather than some other way of reorganizing the labour supply, as the most rational mechanism of securing rather than exposing the relations of ruling.

I believe that my study will make several important contributions to the scholarly as well as political work in a number of areas. It will contribute to the growing body of work aimed at developing a comprehensive and complex theory of difference in order to show how the dialectical interplay between material and ideological processes of state categorization are an integral part of the relations of ruling. This study will also advance our awareness of the current capitalist restructuring process by showing the significance of paying attention to the ideological character of state practices, particularly by looking at how the restructuring state practices were represented in the Canadian parliament. By highlighting the importance of re-framed ideologies of nationalism and racism to the production of new technologies of ruling within recent processes of globalization, this study will add to work highlighting the on-going significance of national-state practices in the very constitution of these processes.
By problematizing nationalist ideologies in the operation of ruling practices, this study will also help to undo the ideological notion that the employment of migrant workers in Canada consists of a foreign work force that exists in opposition to a Canadian one. By showing that the employment of people as migrant workers is very much a part of a restructured labour force in Canada that is made available to capital investors through state practices, I also hope to question common sense dichotomies between domestic and foreign labour markets. This study will, thus, contribute to work being done to understand the connections between processes of capital and human migrations during the period under study. Indeed, my contribution is to link global processes of ruling with the national state organization of immigration policies and with the creation of this particular category in Canada.

Moreover, this study will contribute to understanding the importance of ideological practices in the organization of either free or unfree labour markets. By examining the relational construction of freedom and unfreedom, my work will contribute to the awareness that the social organization of difference in Canada, through the work of racist and nationalist ideological practices, for instance, underpins both past and present capitalist restructuring processes. The dehistoricization and naturalization of these differences, I will show, has served to create a world market for labour power that is variously exploited by capitalists searching for ever cheaper and weaker supplies of labour power.
Chapter 3: Territories of State: Governing Globalization

"The state is a relationship between people which does not appear to be a relation between people, a social relation which exists in the form of something external to social relations. The different academic disciplines take these forms...as given and so contribute to their apparent solidity, and hence to the stability of capitalist society. To think scientifically is to criticise the disciplines, to dissolve these forms, to understand them as forms; [indeed] to act freely is to destroy these forms.

John Holloway, Global Capital and the National State

Introduction

During the period under study (1969-1973), I investigate the dialectic relationship between the restructuring of global relations of ruling and how this rule was secured within Canadian society. I choose this period, often regarded as the beginning point of the most recent phase of globalization, for it was a time of profound change in how the social relations of ruling were organized for women and men both in Canada and throughout the world. In particular, I examine the importance of intersecting ideological practices of nationalism and racism in securing the reproduction of these relations.

As in other periods of far-reaching changes, the restructuring of social relations alerts us to the existence of a disjuncture within relations of ruling. During the early 1970s, the prevailing organization of Canadian state practices in the roughly thirty-year period following WWII faced new developments in communications and transport technologies. Moreover, the growing strength of the students', women's and anti-colonial, anti-racist movements called into questions the stability of past social 'compromises' between organized labour, capitalists and the state in Northern countries (Sivanandan, 1980, Aglietta, 1979, Davis, 1974).

Amongst other things, together, these developments led to a global restructuring of how commodity production was carried out (Lipietz, 1987). Throughout the world, there was a growing emphasis on export-led 'development' (Ong, 1983, Tai-Li, 1983). Canadian state practices both shaped and responded to these phenomena. In this study, I argue that examination
of *how* the restructuring of ruling practices was accomplished tells us much about how power was wielded in this space and time.

In congruence with my methodological emphasis on analyzing social relations, I examine these practices not as actions that emanated from some pre-determined ‘role’ of the state. In the period I examine, state practices amounted to much more than a passive carrying out of some structural function or a manifestation of some Machiavellian plan where those working in state institutions acted as puppets for some greater power (even though, at times, both suppositions have seemed more than appropriate).

Within this investigation, I pay special attention to the social organization of state categories in relation to the restructuring of the labour market in Canada. I focus on the substantial changes taking place within Canadian immigration policy during this time. Specifically, I look at the construction of a new state category - the ‘non-immigrant’ category put into operation by the 1973 Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP). I examine how the organization of its legitimacy helped to organize a ‘common sense’ around the category of migrant worker.

The organization of such a common sense involved the racialization and nationalization of two discretely constructed groups - those known socially as either Canadians or as migrant workers. For the purposes of this study, racialization is understood as a process of signification where human beings are socially constituted as belonging to one or another ‘racial’ group. Racialization, then, is an ideological practice whereby social meaning is attached to actual or attributed physical characteristics or specific cultural, religious and linguistic histories and where these attributes as seen as constituting social difference.

Racialization is always an accompanying feature of practices of racism although not all processes of racialization constitute racist practices. For example, while both Canadians and migrant workers were racialized through the discursive practices of parliamentarians, practices
informed by racism were manifest in the organization of the migrant worker category alone. 

Racist practices, then, are understood as those that encompass both a particular ideology of the existence of separate and discrete ‘races’ and the set of practices, procedures and outcomes constituted through such ideologies in which certain people are privileged while others are left disadvantaged in various spheres of social life and where the collective identity of different groups is given either a superior or an inferior social position. Racialization signifies membership in a particular ‘race’ which is set apart from another one. Racism is the process through which hierarchies between these different ideological groupings of people are socially organized.

Nationalism and racism can and often do overlap. Each can often be seen as serving to define the parameters of the other. Nationalism and racism occupy a common terrain in that both advance the notion that there exists a natural division of the world’s population into separate and distinct categories (Miles, 1993:62). However, neither nationalism nor racism, while often related, is a derivative of the other. The ideology of nationalism specifies an ideal political and social organization of the world into national states as well as the constitution of an exclusively defined ‘imagined community’.

Historically, nationalism has advanced the view that occupation of a territory and the organization of some form of political representation for a particular, specified group of people was a natural, even progressive, form of organizing human societies. In this view was the idea that the national state was the political representation of the will of ‘the people’ who were defined within nationalist ideology as belonging to the nation for whom the state ruled. Nationalism, in the sense I use, then, is more than a chest thumping exercise of patriotism – it is an ideological practice of continuously defining territorial space as well as a particular social identity for a select group of people.
While it is not always necessary to identify and naturalize any particular nation by recourse to processes of racialization or to racist practices, my examination of the NIEAP shows the ideologies of nationalism and racism were *interdependent* in the period I study. The parameters of an imagined Canadian community was specified and legitimated by the articulation of racist and nationalist ideologies. In this sense, the boundary of the imagined Canadian nation was equally a boundary of 'race'. Racism and nationalism were mechanisms used by parliamentarians to effect and legitimate the allocation of jobs, social programs and so on to those who were known both formally as well as socially as citizens of the Canadian nation and to deny them to those who did not meet socially organized criteria of belonging.

Consequently, I do not see state practices as standing apart from the social relations of class, 'nation' or 'race' and their intersections. Instead, I treat state practices as a part of these relations. I argue that in the making, re-making, contesting and restructuring of these social relations, the state as well as the nation is re-figured. I selectively use the work of both Smith and Foucault to look at different ways of examining how state practices were related to the restructuring of ruling relations during my period of study.

While the empirical focus of my study is to analyze Canadian parliamentary discursive practices, in this Chapter, I critically engage with a number of recent debates on the political economy of state practices. This enhances my study of parliamentary debates, for it expands my understanding of how the processes of state-categorization and 'globalization' were related. As is often the case, the assumptions embedded within these discussions of state practices are more telling than some of the claims actually advanced. An examination of these debates raises a number of pertinent questions. I evaluate the usefulness of the, by now common, contention that the power of (what is most generally referred to simply as) *the state* has diminished as a result of the latest period of restructuring, or further globalization, of the relations of ruling.
Such an inquiry is particularly important for understanding the construction of the migrant worker category in Canada. The merits of various theoretical conclusions advanced through the debates of state practices are re-examined to see how useful each is to an analysis of increasing the use of unfree labour in Canada at this time. My main interest in the debate over whether national states have 'lost their power' lies in the need to account for the construction of the state category of migrant worker. The operation of this category wields tremendous and far-reaching power not only upon those categorized as such but also upon the restructuring of both the world and Canadian labour markets. Can this be accounted for in theories proposing the end of the nation state?

In exploring the debates on the practices of state, I also scrutinize an assumption that lies deeply embedded within some theories: the idea that only recently have social relations of ruling become global. This line of inquiry leads me to question why the global nature of the nation-state system remains unexamined in some studies on state practices, even when it is the authors' main intent to examine state practices within the context of globalization. I argue that this occurs with alarming consistency, because most theorists of state practices are working both with Eurocentric generalizations of the state and with ideological notions associated with what I call 'stateification'. This entails treating individual national state practices as discrete territorial institutions of power, which are isolated from larger historical processes that are global. I show that such approaches to analyzing globalization have led to a misreading of the global scope of political, economic and cultural practices of national states.

I show that these assumptions allow most state theorists to eclipse the global nature of ruling relations over the last five hundred (plus) years of Northern-based colonialism and imperialism. Hence, the period known as globalization is used by some to refer only to the developments of the last thirty or so years. I argue that it was because people in the South were defined as standing outside the 'centre' of such activities prior to this time that globalization can
be seen as a relatively new phenomenon. In the last thirty years, the importance of peoples in the South cannot as easily be dismissed as ‘peripheral’ to the operation of global ruling relations or seen as unrelated to the activities of people in the North.

I further set out to interrogate those theories of national state practices that see individual states as operating as autonomous social formations, albeit in an uneven and unequal way. I consider how such ideological practices stem from and further contribute to what I call the territorialization of people’s consciousness. In particular, I examine how these same notions organize a dichotomous view of a national space that is said to be at odds with an ‘international’ or ‘global’ one. Such an examination allows me to consider how the national space, in which nation states are said to operate, is socially organized and how this organization has historically taken place within a global framework of ruling relations.

That this global framework has informed national state practices since the beginning of the nation-state system leads me to investigate the importance of ideological notions of ‘nation-ness’ to state practices of restructuring. In this period of globalization, nationalism is found to be as important as ever in unifying a population around the legitimacy of ruling relations. This population, however, consists not of all those living within nationalized spaces. Rather, the ‘collectivity’ presumed to exist within national states is profoundly shaped through ideological constructions of Self and Other. The articulation of ‘race’, nation and class organize demarcated notions of ‘nation-ness’ where ongoing constructions of negative dualities (or binary codes) shape the relations of ruling and consequently the practices of national states.

One of the key analytical frameworks used throughout this chapter, then, is an examination of the social organization of difference. Importantly, as Avtar Brah (1996) points out, such an examination has been central to many debates within feminism, anti-racism, Marxism, lesbian and gay politics, psychoanalysis and post structuralism. However, an understanding of the social processes of organizing difference is still not widely used within
these analytic frameworks to study state practices. In particular, it has not entered the domain of political economy. Yet, how differences are constructed is central to the organization of state practices and, as such, should be a focal point in any investigation of them. Without such an examination, contesting the category of migrant worker remains an elusive goal.

Investigating state practices, in this sense, becomes much more than studying the set of actions taken by people within such institutions and trying to discern some truth about the state from them. In this respect, a Foucauldian shift is necessary where, in contrast to state theorists who try to determine some essential (or even non-essential) properties of some discrete spaced occupied by the state, the topic of study becomes the social practices of governance.

This shift alters the direction of study from an examination of some abstract (usually a generalized Northern) ‘state’ to an investigation of the social relations of ruling and allows me to examine state practices as they arise through the relations of ruling rather than as actions separated from them. With this altered focus, I am better able to examine how state practices help to organize both a Canadian-Self and a foreign-Other within the ideological space of Canada and the vital significance of these practices to the restructuring of ruling relations during my period of study.

To understand how the practices of governance are a part of social relations, I emphasize the methods of governance organized through liberal democratic doctrines, such as that used in Canada. Liberal styles of governance, as Marx and Engels (1969) and Foucault (1991) have shown, unlike previous historical domains of ruling, are particularly concerned with the ideological construction of civil society. The notion that state practices represent the will of ‘the people’ is conducive to the social organization of difference for it is effective in helping to conceal the coordinated activities that result in Self-rule over Others.

Ideological notions of civil society intersect nicely with ideological practices of nation-ness to organize a social space that simultaneously mythologizes a collectivity of Selves who
comprise the nation while organizing differences among the actual group of people living within national states. The social organization of an ideological unity of "being Canadian" is an important part of how ruling relations have been accomplished during this period of globalization. Indeed, the construction and continual reproduction of the nation for whom the state purportedly rules is found to be an integral constituent of governance in Canada.

The social regulation of "belonging" (and, therefore, not belonging) is consequently seen to be an essential component of ruling relations in Canada, not because this regulation might provide legitimacy for governmental actions, but because notions of belonging actually help to organize which state practices can be seen as legitimate. Legitimacy, a major concern of people theorizing about "the role of the state" or even governing practices, then, is seen as being socially organized through the operation of ruling relations.

Legitimacy is neither something created out of state practices in an attempt to mediate between conflicting views nor the cynical search for a way to "dupe the masses". Rather, governing practices themselves, as a part of social relations, are shaped by what is considered legitimate or common sensical. In a society like Canada where binary notions of Self dominate the construction of normative standards of conduct, including the conduct of government, legitimacy for the construction of human subjectivity and material conditions of existence make common sense.

The ideological practices that organize the nation articulate particularly well with the organization of a global system of states. The fusion of ideological notions of nation and state is unsurprising, for, together, they solidify the national state system for the supposed benefit of the Self. Looking at what constitutes legitimate state practices, then, helps to uncover the character of these relations.

The manifestation of racialized, nationalist practices can be found in the regulation of labour power within nationalized boundaries. The global system of national states establishes
nationalized labour markets, the disparities amongst which capitalists have historically profited by. Indeed, the ability for national states to control the characteristics of so-called ‘domestic’ labour supplies has played a large part in shaping competition within what can only be described as a world market for labour power (Potts, 1990).

Naturalizing the ideological notion that labour markets are bounded within national states has facilitated the creation of socially organized differences between groups of people within the Canadian labour market. By constructing certain people, like those categorized as migrant workers, as falling outside the ideological – but not territorial – boundaries of the nation, state practices are able to create a politically and economically cheapened and weakened labour supply. The organization of competition between workers, both globally and within nation-states, can be said to be one of the key reasons for both the formation of the nation-state system and the continued importance of state practices within this period of globalization.

Thus, I do more than review existing theories of state practices in the context of globalization. I use this literature to further help me answer my question of how it was possible to create an unfree work force within Canada during my period of study. By using this literature to see how the migrant worker category in Canada was discursively produced as legitimate, I am able to examine the importance of the social organization of difference to the study of political economy of state practices or of unfree labour (see Chapter Four). This is not to dismiss the importance of understanding the political economy of globalization but to better situate this political economy within the social relations of ruling, including those organized through state practices.

**Restructured State Practices: Loss of Power?**

One of the major debates in the literature examining changes in state practices during the latest restructuring of global ruling relations (1969 to present), revolves around the question of whether the state has lost or retained the ability to exercise sovereign power. Neither position, of
course, is monolithic and differences can be found between theorists holding similar perspectives. Moreover, some commonalities exist across these two ‘camps’ and these will be highlighted when it is appropriate to do so. However, by examining key differences within debates of state practices, I believe our understanding of the contemporary processes of restructuring will be sharpened.

On one side of the debate are those who maintain that since the late 1960s (or early 1970s) and as a result of globalization, the state has increasingly lost its power to shape domestic or national policy decisions. This loss of state sovereignty is said to comprise one of the two key changes taking place over the last thirty years. Evans et al (1998:9) have termed this the ‘strong globalization’ thesis (in contrast to the ‘national voluntarism’ thesis discussed below). This thesis is firmly rooted in the experiences of some large part of the population in the national states of the global North.

Nowhere is the supposed loss of state power more evident, we are told, than in the dismantling of social policies defining the Keynesian era in the Northern countries in the post-WWII era (Teeple, 1995). Indeed, changes to social welfare, regulatory and macro-economic policies of the Canadian state are key topics for many concerned with the effects of globalization (see Brodie, 1996; Bakker, 1996; Watkins, 1992; Drache and Gertler, 1991; McBride, 1992, McBride and Shields, 1993). Bob Jessop (1993), for instance, argues that in Canada the requirements of a restructured global capitalism has brought about a shift from the Keynesian welfare state (KWS) to what he calls a Schumpeterian workfare state (SWS).1 Shifts from Fordist to post-Fordist production methods and work organization along with increases in the internationalization of production, Jessop (Ibid:7-11) argues, have produced “...basic shifts in the regional forms of global and national economies.” He (Ibid:7, 9) concludes that a ‘hollowed-out state apparatus’, emphasizing labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness, provides
the best mode of regulation (or mode of representation) for a post-Fordist regime of accumulation (also see Aglietta, 1979, Lipietz, 1987).

Although Jessop insists that his argument concerning the hollow nature of national states does not mean that they have lost their power, his argument supposes exactly this. For instance, while he (Ibid:10) says that the state "remains crucial as an institutional site and discursive framework for political struggles" and that it "keeps much of its sovereignty," Jessop goes on to argue that this is "primarily as a juridical fiction reproduced through mutual recognition in the international political community" (Ibid, emphasis added). His point is that the post-Fordist state is simply a political tool that serves as a legitimation device for the operation of power (Ibid:7, 22). Because of globalization, Jessop contends, power has shifted away from the nation-state towards private holders of capital (Ibid.).

This type of argument portrays the nation-state as a victim to an increasingly global capitalist class. This position, or a variant of it, is widely shared by people working within such diverse paradigms as the mainstream (Vernon, 1981), Marxist (Teeple, 1995) and post-modernist (Magnusson and Walker, 1988) schools. What they have in common is a shared belief that there exists both a causal relationship as well as a structural inevitability to the ascendancy of transnational corporations (TNCs) and the decline of national state power (Evans et al, 1998:12).

An increase in the power held by those owning TNCs figures prominently in these accounts of lost state power and sovereignty (Pitelis, 1991). Not only are these two developments regarded as defining the era of globalization; they are seen as mutually hostile so that the rise of the TNC is said to have ushered in the process of what Tanya Basok (1996) calls "destatization." These theorists point to the rapid rise of global trading as evidence of the ascendancy of international capitalists over national states.

1 Schumpeter argued that the supply of innovation is central to capitalist growth dynamics.
Indeed, it is true that the global trade of commodities has increased fifteen-fold since the 1960s (Ruggiero, 1996:2). The international trade in goods and services now has a combined value of approximately six trillion dollars (US) (Ibid.). Furthermore, a growing proportion of the world’s labour force is now producing for international rather than ‘national’ markets (ILO, 1997:3-4). Over the last decade alone there has also been a five hundred percent increase in foreign direct investment (Ruggiero, 1996:2).

Some theorists conclude that because of these developments and their global character, the nation-state is doomed to disappear as an economic entity able to retain the nation’s sovereignty (Kindleberger, 1973; Vernon, 1981). The purported reason for this is the development of an international capital class that holds no loyalty to any one national state. While there is general agreement that national states have had their decision-making capacities overrun by TNCs, some theorists within this group contend that TNC’s continue to be wedded to certain nation-states.

Using concepts borrowed from classic theories of imperialism, Hymer (1979) concludes that the increasing bargaining power of TNCs threatens all states’ autonomy but asymmetrically so that the so-called ‘weak’ states of the ‘less developed countries’ (LDCs) are more negatively affected than the ‘strong’ states of the supposedly ‘developed countries’ (DCs). This position is a variant of the ‘strong globalization’ thesis. While there is at least a partial conflation between TNCs and the national states of ‘developed’ countries, it is still held that national states have lost their sovereign powers. Ironically, in a (usually unacknowledged) reversal of the view that TNCs have no national loyalties, this view has led some, like Rowthorn (1971) to focus on the connection between individual states and their TNCs and how stronger states produce stronger TNCs (also see Pitelis, 1991:142).

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2 In regards to the TNC, it was R.H. Coase (1937 in Pitelis) who set out to provide a theory for the existence of the firm. Along with national states, Coase saw firms as existing to correct market failures by reducing transaction costs and “internalizing the market” (as cited in Pitelis, 1996:135).
Embedded within either variant of the 'strong globalization' argument is the instrumentalist notion that individual national states, regardless of their alleged strength or weakness, now serve only to act as props for the rule of international capitalists. The owners of TNCs are seen as all-powerful manipulators who concede to the continued existence of the state (and various international extensions of it) in order to cushion their operations from public accountability and possible retaliation (Jessop, 1993; Fine and Harris, 1979). Contradictorily, then, the national states of developed countries are simultaneously seen as strong but at the same time merely props holding up capitalists based in 'their' territories.

Such a view leads to a kind of economism where the global capitalist economy is seen as operating under its own inherent dynamic of competition and accumulation. A key component of this economism is the tendency to reify national states so that a study of social relations is eschewed. Instead, an analysis is put forward that sees national states as actors, albeit acting as pawns, with the strong ones battering the weak ones into submission to suit the interests of their capitalists. Importantly, this view results in a conflation and consequent naturalization of the nation-state with the 'interests' of 'its members'.

The notion that the activities of TNCs result in their disloyalty and unaccountability to any one national state and 'its' people also produces two more troubling notions. One, that individual nation-states, prior to this period of globalization, had their own capitalists, i.e. the national capitalist class (Teeple, 1995) and two, that there is some natural relationship between the nation and the state (Evans et al, 1998).

The basis of the 'strong globalization' thesis is an ideological abstraction of social relations and their replacement with a personified global market that forces national states to redefine their practices (MacEachen and Gauthier, 1994:1). Robert Cox, for instance, talks about globalization as national economies adjusting to meet the imperatives of this global market

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3 This argument is most associated with 'dependency' and 'world systems' analyses (Frank, 1967; Amin, 1974).
Global trade relations, thus, are seen as having their own autonomous historical motive force. Thus, while the class relations of ‘late capitalism’ are purportedly one of the main foci of analysis within these approaches, such relations remain (largely) under-theorized and ultimately reified so that the social relations that form them are abstracted.

In contrast to this approach, there are theorists who argue that the decisions made by those working within national states have been an integral component of realigning ruling relations of which state practices remain a vital part. This has been called the ‘national voluntarism’ approach (see Evans et al., 1998). Here, there is more emphasis on the social relations of late capitalism. In this regard, Hugo Radice argues that shifts in state practices should not signal a crisis for the national state. Rather, he sees such shifts as “...a complex process of restructuring of the class relations of capitalism...” (1984:120). Radice adds (Ibid.) that the nation-state system has not been weakened but is only “…playing a different part in the social process.”

Changes in state practices, ranging from broad macro-economic policy to specific labour market and social welfare policies, and not their nullification, therefore, are seen as being important to the restructuring of the relations of ruling. Those taking this position argue that increased capital mobility has helped to intensify competition and necessitated new state practices. Where theorists taking this view disagree with the ‘strong globalization’ thesis is on the causality of this new reality.

In contrast to Jessop who argues that the Canadian state has become an empty shell of what it once was, it is argued that the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism in the early 1970s occurred with much assistance from Canadian state apparatuses. In this regard, William Carroll states:

[the Trudeau era of Liberal dominance in federal politics (1968-1984) began at the climax of Fordist regulation, embodied in Keynesian economic policies and the social-democratic rhetoric of the ‘Just Society’. But as the Bank of Canada adopted monetarist
policies in the 1970s and the federal government introduced deflationary wage controls, tentatively in 1975 and more comprehensively in the ‘6 and 5’ program of 1982-84, a drift toward neoliberalism set in (1989:87).

He adds:

[a]s elsewhere, these moves comprised a macroeconomic volte face, from state-supported valorization of productive capital around the mass worker-consumer, to a policy perspective that prioritized the restoration of ‘sound money’ so as to force ‘sound micro-economic reasoning upon the state and society as a whole’ (1989:87).

For those that espouse a ‘national voluntarism’ thesis, political decisions made in various departments of the state and not the structural imperatives of the global market were seen to cause shifts in state practices. It is argued that Canadian state practices did not lose their power to shape social policy so much as changed what these policies were (see Evans et al, 1998:14-18). For instance, during my period of study (1969 to 1973) the Canadian government established new mechanisms through which capital accumulation could continue to take place.

During my period of study, policy shifts point to a growing emphasis on ensuring two integrally related developments: the creation of a more internationally competitive environment for capital investment and the granting of incentives to encourage investors to place their capital in Canada. Shifts in state practices aimed at achieving these two goals are as important to understanding this period of restructuring as are capitalists’ shifts in accumulation strategies (i.e. the movement of production and service sites, shifts in investments, etc.). State practices, then, were part of bringing about an increasingly competitive environment.

These shifts in Canadian state practices had global consequences. This is partly due to the fact that Canada was not alone in establishing greater competition for investments. It is also because in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Canadian state developed new mechanisms to allow investors to establish their operations outside of Canada (see Chapter Five). Indeed, in the 1970s, investment capital was increasingly exported from Canada and during this time, Canadian
capital investments outside of Canada surpassed that which was brought into the country (Carroll, 1989:91).

Equally important to the restructuring of global ruling relations was the Canadian state’s support to international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The IMF, for instance, helped to universalize the trade and investment liberalization policies of the Northern states through enforcement of so-called structural adjustment policies designed to control the policies of national states in the global South (Tomlinson, 1991). The Canadian government played a key role in facilitating these types of polices (Ibid.).

What Canadian state practices supported were strategies that ensured the continued accumulation of capital. Now, as in the past, such strategies did not discount capitalists operating outside of the territory controlled by individual national states. What was new was that state policies helped to establish a global regime where the nationality of capital investment owners became less and less politically important. In Chapter Five, I show that there was a shift in the definition of national or Canadian capitalists from those with Canadian citizenship to anyone benefiting from Canadian state aid in their investments (whether operating in or outside of the country). These developments help to show that Canadian state practices have not been rendered powerless through processes of globalization. Rather, Canadian government policies, along with the policies of other governments, have been part of the restructuring of ruling relations.

A dismantling of the welfare state over the last twenty-five (or so) years, therefore, should not be equated with a loss of Canadian state power as some have argued (Evans et al., 1998; Brodie, 1996; Bakker, 1996; Watkins, 1992). The only way that these changes can be read as a reduction in state powers is by having a limited idea on what constitutes state practices. Moreover, such notions implicitly accept that state practices are constituted outside of ruling relations, or at least separate from capitalists’ power.
The notion that decreases in welfare programs result from weakened Canadian state sovereignty only makes sense if we accept that those in the Canadian state were, in the past, acting for 'the people' and would continue to do so if it were not for capitalists who had lost their national footing. Equating the abandonment of Keynesian-style policies with loss of state power, therefore, accepts the ideological proposition that the state does, indeed, act for 'its citizens'.

The dismantling of social welfare policies, however, is part of the state's practices. Indeed, as Standing (1989:1079) argues, the current restructuring of the Canadian labour market is:

characterized by a reduction of a firm's permanent labour force, flexible payment systems, the use of contract workers, temporary labour and out-sourcing through the use of homeworking, or sub-contracting to small informal enterprises that are not covered by labour or other regulations that bear the risks and uncertainties of fluctuating business.

The lack of state action regulating these employment practices and ensuring workers' minimum rights should be viewed as active state involvement in creating these practices. State practices that result in the weakening and/or cheapening of (at least some parts of) the working class in Canada also constitutes an exercise in state power.

Indeed, Canadian state practices have been tremendously powerful in shaping the experiences of people both inside and outside of the country. This is perhaps most evident in an investigation of immigration policies during this period of globalization. The continued exercise of state power is visible in the creation of the NIEAP in 1973. Through this migrant workers recruitment program, the Canadian state has been actively involved in facilitating the movement and regulation of labour. The regulation and intervention of state practices in the labour-import process has ensured that employers have been able to exact maximum benefits from this process.

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4 The notion that the state has lost its sovereignty as a result of 'globalization' is also Northern-centric, for it assumes that the experiences of (some) people in these Northern states are the prototypical experiences. This ignores the reality of most of the world's people who have lived without the supports of a welfare state or have, more
It is important, then, that we recognize that Canadian state practices have been part of shaping what we know as globalization.

Still, there are a number of problems in the ‘national voluntarism’ thesis that mars a full investigation of immigration policies. Namely, two assumptions embedded within some of these analyses cloud our analysis of the character of ruling relations during my period of study (and after). First, there is no recognition of how either state practices or those of capitalists have historically been part of a globalized arrangement. It is instead argued that the ascendancy of global processes is a relatively new phenomenon.

The term globalization, then, is not used historically but is meant to signify that only recently have people’s lives been organized through coordinated global activities. This is most obvious in relation to the growth of capitalists operating ‘transnationally’ but it is also discussed in regards to the establishment of international bodies regulating national state policies. These assumptions lead to the second misreading of state practices during my period of study - the assertion that national states (at least the generalized Northern state most base their theories on) while still powerful, have now lost their sovereignty.

This is evident in the argument advanced by Hirst and Thompson who, while able to separate the false association between state sovereignty and state power, continue to view the loss of state sovereignty as a recent phenomenon. They say:

Nation-states should be seen no longer as ‘governing’ powers, able to impose outcomes on all dimensions of policy within a given territory by their own authority, but as a loci from which forms of governance can be proposed, legitimated and monitored. Nation-states are now simply one class of powers and political agencies in a complex system of power from a world to local levels... (1996:190, emphasis added).

Thus, while there is disagreement between those holding either a ‘strong globalization’ or ‘national voluntarism’ theses on the main issue of concern, there is no questioning of whether
national states were indeed sovereign some point before globalization. The sharing of these assumptions by people who for all intents and purposes take divergent views on changes in state practices during globalization alerts us to the existence of a useful entry point of investigation in regards to Canadian state practices during my period of study.

I argue that in particular, it points to the importance of examining the ideological character of state practices. I now turn to examining these assumptions and how they organize the legitimacy of the nation state system. My reason for highlighting what I see as problems in both dominant theoretical positions is to point to how these assumptions affect our understanding of state practices that organized the category of migrant worker during my period of study.

The Global Arena of Capitalist and Nation-State Practices

It is true that national states cannot be said to be sovereign in this most recent period of globalization. However, in contrast to the ‘national voluntarism’ approach, I argue that nation-states have never been sovereign. Rather, concepts of national state sovereignty have always been, and are now, ideological. Indeed, accepting that national states were once sovereign entities results in a serious misunderstanding of the process of restructuring of ruling relations over the last three decades.

The nation-state system has not been predicated upon sovereignty, but upon its linkage to a global capitalist system and on the structural interdependence that individual national states have with each other. Regarding national states as sovereign belies the historical record of how state practices have been an integral part, not a simple by-product, of how capitalist social relations have been organized. In this sense the system of national states can be said to operate

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5 Indeed, national states are not simply states in a capitalist society but capitalist states (Holloway, 1994:28). However, in order not to replicate some of the more functionalist interpretations of the relationship between national states and capitalist social relations, it is imperative that we recognize that the state is what Marx called a “fetishized” and what Holloway (1994:27) calls a “rigidified” form of social relations. Thus, instead of assuming that all state practices function in the best interests of capitalists (themselves not homogenous in their ‘interests’) or that state practices will always result in the reproduction of the capitalism, it is better that we see that state practices are a part of the social relations existent in society.
ideologically to "...decompose the world into so many apparently autonomous units" (Holloway, 1994:31).

The inability of those holding either a 'strong globalization' or 'national voluntarism' position to recognize that notions of state sovereignty are in fact ideological stems from their acceptance of two inter-related dichotomies. First, both take 'the state' as the starting point of analysis; therefore, the space of the global is seen as simply the sum of national states. By being state-centric in their approach, they tend to leave intact the idea that the nation is the "right and proper subject of history" (Burton, 1997:231). Acceptance of this point leads to a second false dichotomy, one said to exist between purportedly discrete national and international (or a global) spaces which are theorized as being at odds with one another.

Evans et al (1998), for instance, analyze Canadian state practices within a nationalized framework. While they argue that decreases in welfare entitlements in Canada are not the sign of a weakened state but of a state willfully withdrawing from the provision of social services, their argument is framed by the notion that state sovereignty has been weakened as a result of globalization. They state:

The role of the nation-state is changing. There is a greater sharing of sovereignty among various bodies, the terms of which, however, have been brokered by the nation-state. ...But this does not suggest that this economy has succeeded in usurping domestic policy autonomy. In fact, deliberate pursuit of neo-liberal policy options have served to place added restriction around national sovereignty ...(1998:11)

This argument amounts to saying that the state, in the period of globalization, has given away its sovereignty or, at the very least, restricted its own field of policy options. Yet, to have voluntarily given up sovereignty, the Canadian state must have once held it. Even though the source of a weakened national sovereignty is seen as the neoliberal practices of the Canadian state, a strict boundary between national and international spaces is maintained. Between this 'space' a sort of zero-sum game is being waged between the nation and international capitalists.
It is for this reason that the extension of state protection to ‘foreign’ capitalists is considered to be one of the hallmarks of globalization in Canada. For example, Evans et al argue that some of the ways that the free market ethos of globalization has constrained Canadian government policy include the extension of national treatment for foreign firms which prohibits any kind of industrial or employment strategy based on favouring domestic firms, and opens new fields, such as services, to American corporations; prohibitions on use of the price system in energy to favour domestic interests over exports; inability to discriminate against American banks; recognition of the U.S.’s right to take “measures of equivalent effect” to compensate for losses caused by Canadian cultural policy; protection of “intellectual property rights”; weakening the state’s ability to set high health, safety, environmental and labour standards; and limits to the state’s ability to regulate foreign investment or establish public corporations (1998:16).

What has been constrained, willingly or not, they argue, is the ability for the Canadian state to set a ‘national’ economic agenda. Globalization, then, comes to mean the de-nationalization of public policy. The Canadian state purportedly finds itself constrained or restricted in its own sovereignty because of its treatment of foreign capital as if it were Canadian. State sovereignty, thus comes to be defined as the favouring of so-called national capitalists.

It is the ‘sovereignty’ of the nation, including its capitalists, then, that is the ontological subject for theorists working in either the ‘strong globalization’ or ‘national voluntarism’ paradigms. Evans et al (Ibid.:17), for instance, argue that the signing of two free trade agreements by the Canadian government in 1989 and 1994, which extended ‘national treatment’ rights in Canada to capitalists based in the US then Mexico, “are precisely about restricting or eliminating choice at the societal level.”

Society, by implication, is defined as existing at only the national level. It is even argued that “[d]emocratic governance is tied to communities (nation-states) which are capable of controlling policy decisions and political leaders” (Evans et al, 1998:19). Indeed, it is assumed that society and national state are co-terminus (Holloway, 1994:31). Within this ideological
framework, societal, i.e. national choices are seen as having been eclipsed when national capitalists are no longer accorded special treatment.

What is seen to be an alternative to globalization, with the 'new' powers this accords to the owners of TNCs, is a 'sovereign' Canadian national state. Those taking this perspective argue that to counter the power of international capitalists, often said to be situated within TNCs, it is necessary to bring national state policy under 'democratic' control. For them, this means placing the instruments of national economic policy, such as tariffs, exchange controls and direct interventions in industry and finance back in the hands of national state actors (Clarke and Barlow, 1997; Cohen, 1994; Dillon, 1991; 17).

This nationalist approach presumes that capitalists (at least those owning TNCs) and national state actors are two separate and antagonist groups. The former operates in a transnational or global space while the latter (usually futilely) defends national ground. Such an approach to processes of globalization de-links the relationship between capital and state power and reinforces the notion that the Canadian state is representative of 'the people'. In this way, hostility is organized against the international space, also theorized as foreign.

Consequently, Canadian state practices that aid in the accumulation strategies of a supposedly national capitalist class are thought of as a sign of democratic governance. What is missing from this argument is an analysis of social relations, particularly that of class exploitation. This is because the latter is conflated with nationalized, and often racialized, notions of foreign exploitation. A bipolarity is constructed that sees capital as either foreign or

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*The historical existence of the global empires, such as the British Empire over the last 500 years, makes claims that globalization is something new even more startling. Indeed, it can be argued that it is precisely because notions of such empires were centered on some (imagined) nation and consequently disassociated from capitalists operating through it, that claims for the newness of globalization or of transnational capitalist power are made common sensical.*
national. Capital is treated as if its owners could be convinced (through the proper state policies) to maintain attachment to particular nationalized spaces, thus, becoming Canadian.\(^7\)

However, much work has been done to show how the notion of "a self-contained West, that is, a national capitalism which only later became international, is a mere fiction" (Ruccio et al., 1991:35). In this respect, Radice argues that "...the particular contours of a given national economy, including the main directions of its state economic policies, are mainly determined by the way in which capital in a particular national economic space is integrated into the world economy" (Radice, 1984:118, emphasis added). Moreover, "...the history of capitalism suggests...that capitalist relations of production emerge in and on the basis of a world economy, 'within which statehood arises and consolidates itself'" (Radice, 1984:117; also see von Braunmuhl, 1978:167).

In other words, the social relations arising from a global system of capitalism have always shaped the so-called national economic policies of nation-states. Indeed, capital, constituted as it is through the circulation of money and commodities, historically and in its contemporary various forms, is not inherently tied to any political or geographical boundaries (McMichael and Myhre, 1991:92). Given this, it is important to view national states with their territorial delineation as always having been a part of global social relations, including those organized through capitalism, instead of set apart (and in opposition) to them.

In this sense, the national state can be seen as a "...territorial fragmentation of a society which extends throughout the world" (Holloway, 1994:32).\(^8\) Indeed, it can be argued that the

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\(^7\)The idea that capitalists can be considered national subjects is related to the making of the nation the sovereign ontological subject of history. As Burton (1997:234) points out, those who take such an approach "...tend to require that their historical subjects be national at heart."

\(^8\)From an examination of the existing literature on the creation of the nation-state system, Petras (1980) notes that "[p]rior to the 17th c., fixed borders between political communities did not exist" (1980:159, also see Prescott, 1965, 44-5). Petras adds that "...boundaries are essentially 'paper walls' created by the contractual relations among states" (Ibid.). It is argued that the nation-state system arose out of the efforts of individual capitalists, located in different geographical places, who sought the help of local political leaderships in their efforts to make profits and secure both labour markets and markets for their goods. As this competition grew, states became more consolidated and a national economy developed which were artificially enclosed so as to promote certain patterns of production and
entirety of the capitalist era has been the making of a global space (Habib, 1995; Said, 1993). As Vandana Shiva points out,

"[g]lobalization has occurred in three waves. The first wave was the colonization of America, Africa, Asia and Australia by European powers over 500 years. The second imposed a Western idea of "development" during the postcolonial era of the past five decades. The third wave of globalization, unleashed approximately five years ago, is known as the era of "free trade" (1997:103-04)."

Since this socially coordinated global space has always constituted the terrain of capitalists seeking investment opportunities, what is now called the transnationalization of capital should not be equated solely with the emergence of TNCs or the decline of the powers of national states. Instead, it is part of the operation of the capitalist social relations of exploitation which were and continue to be formed through material processes of piracy and ideological practices of nationalism and racism.

Throughout the last few centuries, then, both national states and capitalists have participated in the process of globalization. Over the centuries, a global expansion of ruling relations has necessitated an increase in the coordinating and organizing work done by various national states (Bina and Yaghmaian, 1991:125). In this sense, rather than a successive decline in national state powers, there has actually been what Picciotto calls a "...consolidation and extension of the national state" as relations of ruling have expanded (1991:53).

As in the past, national states have played a starring role in globalizing ruling relations. If we recognize that national states have always assisted in the accumulation strategies of capital, then we would see that the *power of the Canadian national state has actually grown*. This would
be a non-ideological analysis of state practices during globalization, for it would abandon the liberal notion that national states are co-terminus with community or society (Sharma, 2000, Pettman, 1997).

Of course, views that accept ideological concepts of national sovereignty or the beneficence of national capitalists, did not ‘fall from the sky’. Rather, the operation of the national state system has helped to organize a particular nationalized consciousness around the configuration of space. This is particularly evident in the period following WWII in Canada. The hegemony of Keynesian macro-economic theories during this time helped to organize a certain kind of knowledge regarding the existence of national economies by centering state practices around them.

Indeed, Radice maintains that Keynesianism was, in the first instance, “an economic theory of the national economy” (1984:121). Nigel Harris’ study of the ideological character of Keynesianism is also useful in understanding the continued appeal of notions of national economies, particularly for some critics of the processes of globalization. He argues that in the decades following WWII,

[t]he ideology of the managed economy...gave labour in the industrialized countries the illusion of control. It seemed that the national patch in principle could be controlled - full employment, rising real incomes and expanding welfare systems could all be attained by skillful direction of the State (1983:237).

The social relations organizing and organized by the ideological concept of the national economy, then, can be seen as producing a conceptual framework wherein the pursuit of the so-called interests of the nation through the state is seen as both a paramount objective as well as

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11 Indeed, Bina and Yaghmaian (1991) show that what is now called ‘globalization’ is not only a contemporary debate, but has been an ongoing one since (at least) the beginning of this century, particularly in the Marxist tradition.

12 Radice (ibid:122) adds that “[t]he national economy is privileged in Keynesian theory for the purely practical reason that the nation-state system defines geopolitical space with the necessary features convenient for the theory: a common currency, common laws, and shared institutions, both private and public, which provide the common sense to justify the attribution of homogeneity to ‘consumers’, ‘investors’, the ‘public sector’, etc.”

13 In this sense, it is also important to see the politics of import-substitution in the national states of the South as having contributed to the consolidation of the ideology of discrete and sovereign national economies.
something that is progressive. Indeed, for nationalist critics of globalization in Canada, defense of the national economy or the national interest have come to define the alternative to processes of globalization. For some, defense of the welfare state in Canada has become a defense of both the Canadian state and the nation on whose behalf it supposedly rules (ACN, 1997; Brodie, 1996, Cohen, 1994, ECEJ, 1993, Watkins, 1992). This is an aspect of how certain groups within Canadian society are complicit in the reproduction of ruling relations.

By taking a position that advocates state practices that are said to benefit the nation, the adoption of a nationalist political stance contributes to the objectification of the operation of ruling relations. This type of nationalist project can be said to be the predominant (or least most publicly visible) one on the Left in Canada (Action Canada Network (ACN), 1997; Barlow, 1993; Clarke, 1993). Jane Jenson argues that this should come as no surprise, for

[...]he paradigm which helped to stabilize the Fordist mode of regulation in Canada after World War II was organized around national identities. ... The social compromises and institutionalized relationships of the welfare state were rationalized in terms of the needs of the whole nation and of the federal system. Therefore, when the Fordist paradigm began to dissolve, it would do so around the issues of national existence and proper state forms (1989:84).

I argue that adherence to the welfare state as a national project was made rational through the employment of racist ideologies. This is because the nation for whom social compromises were supposedly negotiated in the post-WWII era was racialized. Indeed, Jonathan Hyslop (1999:403) argues that "the idea of the welfare state as belonging to a 'white' nation was there at the start." He (1999:401) adds that "welfarism enabled the formation of a...'national community' which attached the [white] working class to national racial symbols and state institutions." In this sense racialized ideologies of the nation can be said to be the axis on which state power revolved in the post-WWII period.

I argue that the connection between nation and state was not severed with the decimation of the welfare state in Canada following the late 1960s or early 1970s. Indeed, the fact that
notions of national sovereignty or national economies did not become obsolete along with the
economic models of Fordism or Keynesianism demonstrates the strength of the common sense
that racialized concepts of nation-ness organize.

The supposed self-sufficiency of the Canadian national economy throughout its history
(including the time when welfare programs were established) has been based on exploiting
differences organized first through French, British and then Canadian colonial and imperialist
activities, including wars. However, this reality is concealed through adherence to ideological
concepts purporting the naturalness of nationalized spaces, such as the national economy.
Indeed, the construction of nationalized spaces in which people are said to exist as a community
- like the idea that the existence of publicly funded social services in Canada came about solely
through the efforts of Canadians - have been socially organized through the framework of
nationalized spaces. Consequently, decreases in welfare state ‘entitlements’ since the late 1960s
in Canada have been represented (in the Canadian parliament, for instance) as the result of the
permanent settlement of Others, particularly people of colour, in the nation (see Thobani, 1998).

Rather than accepting such ideological interpretations of this period, it is more fruitful to
see the building of a welfare state in Canada following WWII not as resulting solely from the
actions of a sovereign and democratic Canadian nation-state and the efforts of its people but to
situate these developments both historically and globally. This period of so-called “…national
regulation…embodied a set of world historical relations (including a continuing supply of cheap
raw materials, especially oil, as well as the existence of labour reserves contiguous to
metropolitan regions)” that were based on a continuation of global relations of ruling
(McMichael and Myhre (1991:86), see also Shiva, 1997).

The development of welfare states throughout the North and the lack of such
developments in the South were not coincidental but a consequence of organizing global social
relations in such a way that the privileged position of the North in relation to the South was
This came about through the organization of a particular *style* of relation between the Canadian national state, capitalists and some of those living in Canada.

The construction of welfare states gave a great deal of common sensical credibility to the idea that the world was made up of various national economies in which it was up to Canadians to protect their own, discrete interests. The post-WWII period did not signify a break in the relationship between national states and global capital. Instead, this period, and the one that followed it, was/is characterized by an increasing fetishization of the nation-state. As Carole Boyce Davies (1994) poignantly states, the nation served as “the ideological alibi of the territorial state.”

In this sense, the setting of national boundaries or the building of an infrastructure that consolidated the reach of state authority within these boundaries was not the only process that organized the emergence of national states. *Instead, nation-building exercises are continuous and on-going.* Integral to this process is the continual decomposition of global social relations (Holloway, 1994:32). Proclamations of sovereignty are one way that national states decompose global social relations.

The assertion of national sovereignty, in this sense, has always been ideological. The production of ideological imaginings of space is part of the work that the nation-state system accomplishes. In this regard, Benedict Anderson’s (1991:77) observation that “...in world-historical terms bourgeoisies were the first classes to achieve solidarities on an essentially imagined basis” becomes even more important, for it highlights the continued importance of ideological practices in securing ruling relations through state practices.

In this regard, it is important to recall Von Braunmuhl’s (1978:176) argument that constructing the apparatus by which to territorially de-limit labour power is one of the two basic

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14 The myth that the welfare state in Canada was build by Canadians (or those represented as such) is a particularly dangerous one for (im)migrants from the South. Within this story, they are constructed as taking what rightfully belongs to Canadians.
principles of national state practices (the other being regulating and guaranteeing the conditions required to reproduce capitalist social relations). These two principles are not accomplished through separate state practices. We can see both converging in state practices concerning (im)migration and the effects on organizing social differences within the labour market in Canada (see Chapter 7).

**National Borders and the Regulation of Labour**

So far, I have been arguing that the space that people occupy transcends the ideological delineation of space as either national or international, for both these concepts are organized through the global framework of national states. A key aspect of national state practices is the establishment of mechanisms to limit and/or regulate people's movement both across and within national borders. This is a part of nation-building exercises (Basok, 1996: 139-140). The continual assertion of discrete national identities aids greatly in this effort, for it gives common sense validation to such a labour-regulatory regime.

This regime establishes a global system of nationalized labour markets that capitalists and their lack of spatial confinement are well positioned to exploit (Pitelis, 1991). Indeed, the control over the characteristics of labour supplies within nationally bounded territories, so-called domestic labour, and the competition this engenders can be said to be one of the key reasons why state institutions have been, and remain, so powerful. The existence of what McMichael and Myhre (1991: 85) call a global wage relation that helps to anchor transnational circuits in money, labour and commodities highlights the importance of the nationalization of capitalist labour markets.

State practices are partly organized through the global competition that the existence of differential wages and workers' power helps to organize. Such global competition is fostered through the existence of a nation-state system that has as one of its *raison d'être* the enforcement of closed or nationalized boundaries. While capital has been able to operate, relatively
unfettered, outside of the restrictions of a nationalized space, most aspects of the sale of people's labour power continues to be regulated by national states. State regulation of people's mobility across nation-state borders through national immigration policies have been a key element in the decomposing or nationalizing of what are in actuality world labour markets.

Immigration policies allow national states to tap into world markets for labour power that, in turn, affects the price as well as the strength of both those categorized as either (im)migrants or citizens in nationalized labour markets. Immigration policies, because they help to shape the characteristics of people's labour power, also assist national states in organizing the circumstances through which capital can be accumulated within the territories they control (Sassen, 1993; 1988). Indeed, the work that these policies do in the accumulation process helps to explain the tenor of most immigration policy changes in Canada during the early 1970s (Sharma, 2000b). These policies have mainly been about shaping the supply of labour in Canada to be more competitive with nationalized labour markets elsewhere.

My argument, therefore, stands in contrast to Evans et al (1998: 17) who argue that “so far, the most dramatic withdrawal of the federal government has been in the labour market policy area” (emphasis added). I argue that their claim assumes that only those labour market policies that are beneficial to Canadian workers constitute state activity. They do not include those labour market policies which undermine workers as part of state policies on the labour market. Their failure to recognize that immigration policies are part of the labour market policies of the Canadian state also shapes this assumption and, ultimately, hinders their analysis. These two misconceptions contribute to the ideological notion that those categorized as (im)migrants (particularly those falling into the migrant worker category) are part of a foreign labour force in Canada.

However, once we recognize that the Canadian state continues to be active in the arena of labour market policy and that immigration policies have great consequences for national labour
markets, it becomes evident that Canadian state practices shaping the labour market have not been simply abandoned but, rather, have changed. The key shift in state practices around immigration has been the imposition of greater restrictions upon (im)migrants once they enter Canada.

With the creation of the NIEAP, a comprehensive migrant workers program, in 1973, employers have been given easy and continual access to people who are made to work as unfree, indentured labour as a condition of their entry and stay in the country. Through the introduction of the NIEAP, Canadian state practices continue to help in the organization and regulation of a global labour market in order to shape its Canadian version.

One of the main reasons for this labour market shift, argue Storper and Walker, is that "[l]abour is, on average, the greatest variable cost of production...[and because of this] firms are becoming more, not less, exacting in their location decisions" (1983:3-4). While their emphasis is on the re-location of sites of production, the location of cheapened and weakened supplies of workers is just as important in decisions about where to invest (Sassen, 1988). Indeed, because of the existence of competition organized through globally differentiated wage scales, most national states have given greater emphasis to the procurement of whole new labour forces in order to entrench new, more restrictive conditions of employment within nationalized labour markets. National state immigration policies, now as in the past, have played a crucial part in this procurement.

However, it is important to recognize that the global political economy of capitalist labour markets and the construction of nationalized boundaries are both organized through ideological practices that work to consolidate the common sensical character of discrete national spaces. The fact that people's lives are always experienced *locally* is manipulated through ideological notions that national-states are co-terminus with community. Thus, while the shaping of localized experiences have been global for some centuries now, ideological notions of the
naturalness of nationalized boundaries help to shape people's common sense understanding of the idea that certain markets, such as labour and capital are nationalized and, more important, ought to be so.

Nationalized labour markets, then, are as much ideological boundaries between different 'imagined communities' of people as they are material boundaries between different national states. Ideological practices contribute greatly to the creation and restructuring of national labour markets where differently categorized people (migrant workers and citizens, for instance) can be treated in quite disparate terms by employers, the state and even other workers.

A key aspect of the making of nationalized labour markets has been the social organization of who belongs and who does not belong to specific nations (Hyslop, 1999). Notions of who belongs in the nation and who actually lives in the nation-state, however, have never neatly co-existed. Thus, I disagree with Benedict Anderson's (1991:16) conceptualization of nations as limited in spatial terms, where the Other (or foreigner) exists outside the space occupied by the citizen-Selves.

Definitions of belonging, with their connotations of membership in a collectivity, have not always referred to the physical absence of those who are constructed as foreigners. Belonging, rather than a demarcation of physical space, is an existential construct that shapes the definition of who has the right to claim the benefits of citizenship within the same space occupied by those rendered as foreign-Others. In Canada, notions of Other-ness have historically been shaped through racist and sexist ideologies (Bourgeault, 1992, Abele and Stasiulis, 1989, Ng, 1988).

As a result, throughout the history of the nation-state system, groups of people have simultaneously lived inside the nation while being constructed as foreigners to it. Indeed, in order to understand the full affect of notions of belonging, it is important to refute the notion that "[t]he fracturing of the political into national states means that every state has a specific
territorial definition and hence a specific relation to people within its territory...of whom it defines as "citizens", the rest as foreigners" (Holloway, 1994:33).

Instead, it is necessary to recognize that there is neither a historical nor a natural correlation between living inside of a particular nationalized boundary and being declared a citizen. Indeed, the granting or denial of citizenship status or the difference between formal and substantive citizenship rights in a given nation-state is organized through the ideological practices of racism and sexism that create citizens and foreigners within the same nationalized space.

During my period of study, immigration policy-making has been a key arena through which notions of belonging (or "being Canadian") have been organized. As I show later on in Chapter Six, throughout this period, there have been repeated calls to protect Canadian society from the negative influence of foreigners. Significantly, those classified as not belonging, mainly people from the global South, especially women, have not been simply turned away at the border. Instead, the categorizing of certain peoples as undesirable has historically facilitated their cheapening and weakening once inside the Canadian nation-state.

Indeed, in marked contrast to theorists who argue that during periods of economic decline, national states try to curtail immigration, there has been no such decline in Canada over the most recent period of globalization (see Petras, 1980:167). The numbers of people (im)migrating to Canada, especially those recruited to work, has increased – as has overall global migration – since the late 1960s (United Nations Population Fund, 1993). However, what has been restricted is the ability of most (im)migrants (now re-categorized as non-immigrants or migrant workers) to work as free wage workers with the same rights and entitlements as those classified as citizens or the more limited rights of permanent residents.

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15 Therefore, popular notions of "fortress North America" or "fortress Europe," need to be re-examined (Richmond, 1994). These notions do not organize a physical segregation of people but organize differential treatment for those residing within them (see Miles, 1993).
Greater restrictions have not been placed on the mobility of (im)migrants across national borders. Rather, greater restrictions have been placed on their conditions of existence inside such borders. The call to protect Canadian borders from foreigners has not worked to prevent the entry of those represented as such but to differentiate them within Canadian society. These calls, therefore, are ideological, for they do not work to actually prevent the entry of people rendered as foreigners but to conceal the exploitation of those constructed as not belonging within the space of the nation.

Ideological state practices organized through adherence to nationalized notions of belonging have been a part of the work the Canadian state has done to facilitate capital accumulation. Forcing those categorized by the state as migrant workers to work as indentured labour is of great benefit to employers in Canada and allows the Canadian national state to compete with other national states vying for capital investment. Importantly, such coordinated state practices ensure the continuation of a global wage relation. Indeed, Canadian state practices on immigration policy have played a key role in supporting the production of a globally flexible labour force that is made weaker and cheaper than those seen as members of the nation.

In this sense, Hymer's (1979) argument that there does not exist a better alternative "legitimising-controlling device to nationalism" becomes even more relevant, particularly for understanding changes in state practices shaping immigration policies. Consequently, I disagree with the argument presented by Tania Basok who maintains that...

...one can argue that in a world in which state sovereignty has been partially undermined by the mobility of national capital and pressures from supra-national institutions and domestic grassroots movements, the state becomes even more intrusive in those areas where its autonomy has not yet been eroded. While dismantling the barriers that limit the ability of capital to cross international borders, states have erected ever higher walls to prevent the mobility of labour (1996:136; also see Pooley, 1991:78).

The social organization of a foreign group of workers within the nationalized Canadian labour market and policy shifts designed to allow for the greater mobility for capital investment
are integrally related state practices. State practices have not become more coercive in the area of immigration and refugee policies as a result of its loss of autonomy in controlling the mobility of capital investments, as Basok argues. Rather, these two processes are linked to the restructuring work being done by the Canadian government in order to attract or retain capital investments. These can be seen in simultaneous restructuring of the policy arenas of trade, investment and in the supply and availability of workers in the labour market.

Immigration policy during the early 1970s, then, was aimed not so much at stopping immigration, but at re-regulating the terms of existence of the Other. Importantly, certain peoples living and working in Canada, such as migrant workers were constructed as a part, not of the Canadian collective, but of a hostile foreign presence. Differences in experience of the labour market in Canada between those categorized as citizens and those categorized as migrant workers result from the social process of organizing differences. The process whereby certain peoples' labour power is cheapened and weakened is a key consequence of this work. The social determination of who belongs points to the material force that ideological notions like nation and state sovereignty carry.

Social Organization of Difference

State practices are accomplished largely because of their normative authorization to rule for the nation. Nation-building practices constitute an important and continuous aspect of state practices that also contribute to ongoing processes of state formation (see Corrigan and Sayer, 1985). Herein lies the importance of notions of 'Canadian-ness' – the collective We - that nationalist practices work to operationalize. While we need to reformulate a state-centric approach to global relations of ruling, at the same time much more attention needs to be paid to how the re-organization of the nation in the nation-state was productive of processes of globalization. This is so that we can take into account how the national framework was itself
organized through imperialist practices (including discursive practices) (Burton, 1997; Stoler and Cooper, 1997:22; Miles, 1993:88; Said, 1993; Anderson, P., 1992).

French and later British colonialism lay the ground for the organization of the Canadian nation. As Benita Parry (1993) has argued, membership in the British Empire was not only political or economic but "entered the social fabric, the intellectual discourse and the life of the imagination." Following the loosening of formal colonial ties with Britain in 1867 ideological notions of the Canadian nation have continued to shape the criteria of membership in the Canadian collectivity and have operated to regulate who does and does not belong within this nationalized space. The importance of racist, sexist and class ideology in this regulatory process can be found when examining the Canadian nation-building project. Historically in Canada,

[t]he entities being regulated were in the first instance the characters of individuals...but the nation was also seen as held together by a common subjectivity, whose constant recreation at the individual level ensured the continued survival of the collectivity. The collectivity thus organized had very specific class, gender and racial[...]/ethnic characteristics... (Valverde, 1991:33).

The social organization of Canadian-ness also affected those who did not belong in the Canadian state – those that this state did not rule for. Thus, it is important to return to the fact that who We are, unlike the rhetoric of liberalism, does not - and in Canada, at least, has never - included all those within the territory the nation-state. Rather, the social organization of the normative category of We and those rendered as Other from it is an important, indeed constituent, part of how ruling relations are organized.

State practices figure prominently in the construction of such negative dualities. The ability to place people within state categories ultimately rests with the state and, arguably, is one of its greatest areas of power.¹⁶ State practices on immigration, in particular, have played a large part in regulating difference between Canadian and foreign identities and the lived experiences

¹⁶ Foucault alludes to this. Gordon (1991:10) argues, when he argues that "[p]olice [or policy] [as] a science of endless lists and classifications; there is a police [policy] of religion, of customs, of health, of foods, of highways, of
of those so categorized. As a result, these ideological processes have carried great material weight in shaping the terms of existence for differentiated groups within Canada. Differences between groups in Canada, rather than being primordial, have been socially organized. It is through an examination of how these differences have been socially organized that we can better understand the dialectic ideological and material processes of state practices concerning globalization.

Brah (1996:14-15) argues that there are four ways in which difference can be conceptualized: as experience; as social relation; as subjectivity and as identity. I concentrate on how the social organization of difference shapes social relations (while recognizing the interconnectedness of these four features of difference), for this gives me a way of analyzing state practices that borrow from and, in turn, reproduce, notions of who belongs to the Canadian nation.17

As Brah (1996:124) points out, “[t]he proclamation of a specific collective identity is a political process [whereby] the commonality that is evoked can be rendered meaningful only in articulation with a discourse of difference.” In this sense, immigration policy making in Canada can be seen as historically having produced identity as a social relation (Bannerji, 1995). Continual use of the metaphors of nation or the ‘Canadian way of life’ has helped to form definitions of both membership and non-membership in the Canadian nation. Criteria of membership have relied heavily upon racist ideology informed by French and then British colonization to differentiate between Us and Them. Throughout the history of Canadian immigration policy-making peoples from Europe (itself hierarchalized between Northwest and

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17 In Brah’s (1996:88) words, "...difference may be construed as a social relation constructed within systems of power underlying structures of class, racism, gender and sexuality, and so on. At this level of abstraction we are concerned with the ways in which our social position is circumscribed by the broad parameters set by the economic, political and cultural structures of a given society."
South and East) have been preferred over people of colour from Africa, Asia and the Americas (see Bolaria and Li, 1988).

Whether in the form of special head taxes for people (im)migrating from China (1886-1924), restrictions on the number of people, particularly women, from India (1908-1945), China (1886-1945) and Japan (1908-1945), the Chinese Immigration Act that banned the entry of people from China (1923 to 1947) to the setting up dichotomies between preferred and non-preferred races and nations until 1967, racialized membership in the Canadian collective has been reinforced so that people from the global South are seen as a particular danger to the ‘character’ of the nation (see Chapter Six).¹⁸ Significantly, such assertions, for the most part, did not work to keep foreigners out of Canada but to more closely regulate them once inside the country.

In this sense, immigration policy has worked as a population policy, for it helps to regulate social relations in such a way that the privilege of those Self-defined as belonging to the Canadian nation is ensured in relation to those regulated to exist outside of this Canadian collectivity - the foreigner/Other. Chapters Six and Seven of this study further demonstrate that the discourse around (im)migrants and (im)migration during my period of study is intimately about the inferiorized Other living within the same space occupied by Canadians. Indeed, during this time the very term immigrant came to stand in for people of colour from the global South. By proclaiming that the immigrant/foreigner/Other was the person of colour (im)migrating to Canada and that this was a social problem for Canadians, state practices helped to racialize this group and render it as different from Us.

Thus, immigration policy-making is ultimately a policy designed to reinforce negative dualities of difference in Canada. Socially organized differences reinforce the fetishization of

¹⁸ Historically, the concept of “character” has been a key organizer of racialized notions of belonging to the Canadian nation. As Valverde (1991:104) notes in her study, “Racial Purity. Sexual Purity. and Immigration
social relations that national boundaries represent. Indeed, national borders help to regulate belonging by acting "simultaneously as social relation, the everyday lived experience, and subjectivity/identity" (Brah, 1996:198). In this respect, Holloway’s (1994:32) argument that because the state is formed through assertions of national sovereignty that are constructed through the organization of differences between Us and Them, that "...the very existence of the state is racist" (and simultaneously sexist and classist) takes on greater significance.

Situating the organization of definitions of desirability or undesirability are not only constructed by ‘representative groups of the state’ as Petras maintains (1980:163). As discussed above, state practices do not occur in isolation from broader social relations; they are a part of the relations through which Canadian society is organized. The racist state system, then, needs to be seen as part of racist social relations in Canada. Indeed, the continued power that Canadian state practices wield is hinged on the ideological practices of nationalism, racism and sexism (to name three) that shape people’s imaginings of community membership within a global capitalist framework. To examine racist state practices, then, we need to investigate the social relations that give rise to its racism.

**Investigating Practices of Governance**

To more fully understand the organization of notions of Canadian-ness, it is important to shift our focus of analysis from an investigation centred on the state to the social practices of *governing* or *ruling*. Accounting for the social relations of racism through use of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony allows us to make this shift as does Michel Foucault’s term “governmentality” (or governmental rationality) which emphasizes governance as a *practice* (in

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Policy.,” “white people were seen as having more character, as a group, than Native people or people of colour; and among whites, people of British descent were regarded as having the most character.”

19 Gramsci (1971) understood hegemonic practices as those social activities that produced consent to the political and cultural dominance of the dominant classes in various aspects of lived experiences, including educational institutions, religion, town planning, etc. Hegemony then conceptualized the importance of ideologies in shaping material reality.
Burchell et al., 1991:1). Both are useful, for attention is paid to the organization of a certain way of thinking and acting directed at the regulation of the population.

With this shift, studying state practices becomes much more than studying how institutions of the state, such as the Canadian immigration department develop policies. Rather, the topic of study becomes the *social relations of governance*. Such a study of state practices entails an investigation of the *social relations* that state practices are organized through. Burchell *et al* recognize this in their discussion of government as "...not just a power needing to be tamed or an authority needing to be legitimized. It is an activity and an art which concerns all and which touches each" (1991:x).

By utilizing select (and adapted) insights offered by Gramsci, Smith and Foucault (even as their works are not always compatible in their assumptions and procedures), my investigation of ruling relations in Canada comes to include a re-evaluation of *who* rules (Brah, 1996:110). Foucault's notion of self-regulation is useful in this regard, for it focuses attention on how ideological practices shape how ruling is accomplished. In this regard, Gordon (1991:2-3) outlines how Foucault talks about governance:

> ...as an activity [that] could concern the relation between self and self, private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty.

However, I wish to adapt this insight to take into account how social relations *between Self and Other* are also important to the social processes of self-regulation within Canada. Self-regulation, as I use the term, stands for that set of practices that organize negative dualities of Self and the Other. I speak, therefore, of the Self's regulation of those rendered as Other. Recognizing the importance of the social process of rendering certain people as Other is

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20 I depart from a Foucauldian scheme of self-regulation here in order to show not only the importance of self-discipline as a method of social control but also the importance of ideological constructions of Self in practices of ruling and how a continuous regulation of the negative duality between Self and Other is consequential to the organization of social legitimacy for the category of migrant worker.
important to an analysis of power for it is this process that materializes *who* rules and *who* is ruled. This allows us to transcend narrow views of state practices that see them as either a relationship of dominance and submission or as the condensation of class conflict.21

It, therefore, becomes important to radically deconstruct the liberal rhetoric that defines the state as being of ‘all and each’. Instead of simply asserting that not all are equally served by state practices, it is more illuminating to understand that the ‘all’ for whom the state governs represents the collective We organized by the Self *by and for themSelves* in opposition to those who have been rendered as Other. Throughout the making of Canada, only those representing themSelves as white have been able to unproblematically assert their membership in the Canadian collective.22 Recognizing that Self-regulation is also about how those represented as Canadians regulate the existence of people rendered as Others sheds light on how racist ideologies secure the legitimacy of Canadian immigration (as well as other) policies and, in turn, ensure the power of national state practices.23

While most of those who participate in the process of Othering people of colour in (and outside of) Canada are also ruled over in a myriad of ways, it is important that we not discount their complicity in accomplishing oppressive practices. Rather, we need to further develop the challenge to universal, fixed notions such as women, race, class and so on (see Gilroy, 1987; Ng, 1989).

21 I argue that looking at state practices as a condensation of class conflict is problematic because it privileges nationalized spaces. In part, it assumes that class struggle is somehow contained within the nation-state and that the national government is the only place where class struggle is carried out.

22 It is important to note in this regard, that people in groups now unproblematically regarded as white have not always been so seen. This demonstrates the social character of notions of ‘race’ (see Miles, 1989; 1993). In particular, Jews from every part of Europe, people from Ireland, Southern and Eastern European have, at certain periods in the history of Canada, been rendered as Other in relation to Northwestern Europeans. Nonetheless, it is still correct to say that it has been those regarded as *white* who have had privileged access to benefits in Canada that those regarded as Other have not. This is true for a range of social benefits as well as *de jure* citizenship status in Canada (see Bourgcault, 1989).

23 Historically, as Roodiger (1991) has demonstrated, a sense of whiteness was integral to white working class identity (also see Hyslop, 1999). Consequently, non-whiteness also became a constituent of the identity of those workers defined as Other than this. Likewise, Valverde shows how the Canadian moral reform movement’s use and creation of symbols and language of purity, whiteness, and their essential link to morality were accomplished through the playing out of pre-existing social relations (1991:10). Racist practices were shaped and, in turn, helped to shape state practices in Canada in many areas, such as policies creating and then regulating ‘Indians’ and immigrants (see Abele and Stasiulis, 1989).
1988, Miles, 1989, 1993; Mohanty, 1991; Butler, 1992: 16; Bannerji, 1993). This is not only in order to focus on the meaning of such categories and what they include, exclude and authorize but also to see how they make common sense. The construction of certain people as Other in Canada is thinkable - possible - because of both the concentration and diffusion of power and the formation of subject identities that simultaneously are oppressed and are oppressive to those rendered as Others.

These insights are important to an examination of the organization of the category migrant worker. This category is actionable not because the state is a discrete entity or an instrument of one particular group's (e.g. whites) 'interests' but because state practices are a form of social relations in which certain people have been rendered as Other. This makes their oppression and exploitation appear as perfectly legitimate in a society organized through the racialized binary codes of Us and Them. Hence, because social relations in Canada are organized, in part, through racism and nationalism, both are an integral part of state practices in Canada. The related ideologies of racism and nationalism in Canada allows state practices to make sense to those people defined as belonging to the nation on whose behalf the state is said to rule for.

The Ideology of Civil Society

In Canada, philosophical adherence to the ideology of liberal democracy has helped both to conceal and concretize the common sensical character of the distinction between whom the state rules for and whom it rules over.24 Some have argued that the organization of a liberal

24 I acknowledge that by creating these two categories (groups ruled for and groups ruled over), I am glossing over differences within that group on whose behalf the state purportedly rules. Of course, people categorized as migrant workers are not the only group in Canada that is ruled over and whites are not a homogenous group and are also ruled over in other respects. Yet, I believe it is important to recognize differences in power between these two groups, specifically because it is these two groups who have been set up as binary opposites within the parliamentary debates I analyzed. For the purposes of my study, what is being foregrounded are the distinctions that were made between those who can claim membership (who are recognized as members) and those who cannot within the Canadian nation. These distinctions, I argue, are an important aspect of how certain practices of ruling organized through the state are legitimated, including practices of ruling that effect those seen as belonging to Canada.
democratic state helps to further naturalize and, therefore, abstract the work of governance (Marx, 1969, Foucault, 1991). Gordon (1991:32) argues that through liberal democratic forms of governance “[t]he transcendence of the law, of which the state is cast as the revocable custodian, is dissolved; law now becomes the historically relative emanation and expression of society.” Liberal styles of ruling, then, unlike previous historical domains of governance, are particularly concerned with the construction of a ‘civil society’ that has contained within it the related notions that the state both stands apart from society and that it rules for those who live within the territories it controls.

Concepts of civil society, in this respect, are ideological. They organize the myth that society (as embodied by the nation) makes the state which then governs for it as an objective, autonomous (even if this is only ‘relative’) force for its own common good (see Poulantzas, 1973 for a discussion about the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state). The construction of a civil or social sphere becomes a way to construct a separated realm that people occupy apart from those working within the state. Indeed, notions of civil society perhaps best exemplify what Gramsci (1971) saw as the underlying unity of political, economic, and ideological ruling-class domination. Through this unity, the relations of ruling are simultaneously consolidated and concealed. Seeing the state as a separate domain, then, is an effect of how power is organized and exercised in liberal democratic states.

However, by taking into account my previous discussion that social relations organized through racist ideology need to be accounted for, we can see how the creation of this social or civil sphere is not simply the process of separating ‘the people’ from the state. In this regard, I

25 Many different forms of state have been organized their actions around the notion of the collective or common good. Indeed, as Alexander d'Entreves (1967:221, as cited in Ashforth, 1990:15) has argued, such notions have been of key importance to the legitimation of state power. However, liberal democratic forms of governance perhaps more than others, have established various ways to act out the performance of state representatives acting in the nation’s collective interests, including debates between the people’s elected representatives.

26 Class is used here in its most general sense to refer to a “group.” Even in this usage, however, it is important to recognize that “groups are an expression of social relations” (Young, 1990:43).
take exception to Ashforth's (1990:15) point that 'the modern State' (i.e. liberal democracies of the Northern national states) is based on

the subordination of all people within a given territory to a compulsory system of rule, one of the most satisfactory claims to legitimacy that can be conceived in the interests of maintaining that rule (other than war-making against external enemies) is clearly the claim that it exists to further the welfare of all subject to it, that is – the Common Good (emphasis added).

Instead, I argue that notions of civil society have historically been inseparable from the organization of the nation-state system and have never been intended to include all those living within the Canadian nation-state. Rather, civil society is the ‘imagined community’ on whose behalf the state supposedly rules. State formation, in this respect, can be seen as reliant upon projects of nation-building. Key to the establishment of what the common good is said to entail, then, was identifying who constituted a member of the Canadian nation.

The enemy is not always external to the territories the state rules in. Indeed, it can even be said that responding to people represented as foreigners within the nation has been more a spur of nationalist activity that so-called external threats (see, Hyslop, 1999:405). In this respect, Avner Offer’s (1988:235) argument that racist practices are part of the liberal “virtues of democracy, civic equality and solidarity” take on greater relevance. Linking the ideologies or racism and nationalism with those of civil society, I argue, is a more precise way of understanding how the ideology of the common good works.

In this respect, we need to pay more careful attention to Kobena Mercer’s (1994) question: “Why the need for the nation?” However, as Burton (1997:234) points out, examining “who needs [the nation], who manufactures the ‘need’ for it, and whose interests it serves” may be an even more urgent, and fruitful, task. The same questions ought to be posed in regards to arguments for re-strengthening the state.

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2 I am indebted to Kari Dehli for this insight (personal conversation, February 15, 2000).
Investigating the liberal rights-based discourse is key to such an examination. This discourse presupposes that the state, in upholding the rights of citizens, is fulfilling its duty to the nation. What is hidden from view within this framework is that the denial of these supposed rights can be legitimized - is legitimized - when those whose rights are not being respected are socially organized as being non-members (either by de jure or de facto denial of citizenship status) of Canadian civil society. Ideological concepts of nation-ness are, therefore, a critical part of the genealogy of notions of the national interest and, as I will show, of the present period of globalization.

In a liberal state, the power that national state practices wield is a result of these being seen as flowing from public opinion. In this sense, Gordon's (Ibid.:35) argument that "[i]t is misleading to envisage the dimension of the social as the state's antagonist or its prey. In modern liberal societies the social is, characteristically, the field of governmental security considered in its widest sense" becomes even more important to consider. The existence of a group of people considering themselves part of the Canadian nation or Canadian civil society, because they do not consider themselves ruled over but ruled for, helps to secure the existence of the Canadian state.

Statements (in parliament, for instance) recalling the racialized We for whom the state rules reveal who it is that comes to be known as Canadian and who does not (see Chapters Six and Seven). This helps to show how within the historically racialized, gendered and classed project of nation-building in Canada, it has not only been state practices that have helped to govern Canadian society. White men and women within non-state organizations, such as organized Christian churches, organized labour movements and loose collectives of feminists have also been complicit in the formation and concretization of ruling relations of which they are a significant part (Valverde, 1991:25, Dutton, 1984, Bonacich, 1972).
Indeed, as Hyslop (1999:405) shows, an imperial white working class made itself through a common ideology of racism that was, in part, designed to secure access for themSelves to key and relatively privileged parts of nationalized labour markets throughout the global British Empire.\footnote{In this respect, the formation of a white (and masculinized) working class consciousness took place in a global space that transcended boundaries of nation. However, it is important to note that it was through national state intervention that such a consciousness was materialized within labour markets across the British Empire.} The development of racialized labour markets was a key consequence of such activities. In Canada, the imposition of racialized immigration polices was a key aspect of how labour market privilege was secured for white males (Dutton, 1984, see Ward, 1978).\footnote{Dutton (1984) further shows how employers often fought against immigration policies in Canada that threatened a ready supply of historically cheaper labour supplies (workers whose labour power was cheapened and weakened through the material force of colonialism and ideologies of racism, nationalism and sexism, see Sharma, 1997). Importantly, employers' opposition to restrictive immigration policies allowed whites in the working class in Canada to see their actions as anti-capitalist.}

Years of organized labour pressure culminated in state practices that differentiated between whites and people of colour immigrating to Canada. As with white feminists who argued for benefits of citizenship based on their being the “mothers of the white race,” white workers fought for labour protections on the basis that they were “racial partners in empire” (see Valverde, 1992; Hyslop, 1999:405). In the process, the rationality of ruling relations was also secured, for historically, these actions (and others) helped to foster a sense that the Canadian state ruled for whites over Others. In this regard, Valverde, through her research on moral reform in Canada from 1885 to 1925, shows that:

...by the 1880s both the federal and provincial states seem to have acquired an almost unshakeable legitimacy in the eyes of the educated Anglophone middle classes...and even as citizens agitated for changes in the personnel of the state, the structures themselves went largely unquestioned (1991:26).

I argue that by relying on the historical and ideological construction of notions of civil society for whom (rather than over whom) the state rules, Canadian state practices during my period of study (and after) have continued to organize a general racialized interest constructed...
around notions of Canadian-ness. It should come as no surprise, then, that both those on the political Right and Left argue that the solution to the insecurity wrought by processes of globalization is the strengthening of Canadian nation-state institutions and ‘citizens rights’. Even less surprisingly, perhaps, this discourse has worked to step up the racist, sexist and nationalist notions of entitlements foundational to the discourse of Canadian-ness (see Chapters Six and Seven).

In this respect, it is crucial that we recognize that like the nation, the state, too, is imagined. The existence of the state is an effect of how power is organized. This is not meant to say that the state does not exist, for this would be obviously ludicrous. It does mean, however, that what we consider as the state should not be separated from the social or civil sphere that the rest of us inhabit and the social relations of ruling which constitute it. In this sense, the notion of a civil society can be seen as an instrument and a rationality of governance. The notion that We rule becomes a form of governance, but one that helps to abstract ruling relations, including the abstraction of how those for whom the state purportedly rules are also ruled over. Through this work state practices help to enforce the social relations which reproduce governance.

Conclusion

In this chapter various theories of state and governance have been examined for their insight into the character of the relationship between state practices and the social relations of ruling. Through this examination it is clear that Canadian state institutions, rather than watching haplessly, have played a significant part in the restructuring and reproduction of the global relations of ruling. State practices have been active in bringing out changes in state regulations and legislation that have allowed for the increased mobility of both capital investments and people across nationalized borders. Indeed, nationalist ideological state practices have helped to secure those social relations often referred to as globalization.
The well-documented fact that large numbers of people living inside (and outside) of Canadian borders have experienced great instability as a result of the processes associated with globalization does not, in itself, point to a loss of national state power. State practices that result in increased poverty, for example, are not indicative of lost state power or sovereignty during the time that the reach of transnational corporations has grown. Rather, it is more useful to understand such practices as being a constituent of the social relations of ruling that restructured how capital accumulation is coordinated. Indeed, while poverty has increased over the last thirty years in Canada, there has been a concomitant increase in the wealth of a small number of people. Both developments can be accounted for when viewing state practices as a part of extant social relations rather than standing apart from them.

Through a critical dialogue with various state theorists, it has also been made apparent that the contemporary global framework of ruling relations is not a new historical development. Both the national state system, as well as the flow of capitalists' investments, have historically existed within a global environment. The assumption that during the particular phase of globalization between 1969 and 1973 there existed a zero sum relationship between a nationally bound state and an internationally mobile capital is, therefore, found to be false. Such an ahistorical viewpoint is based on the notion that in the immediately post-WWII period there existed a system of sovereign national states and a concomitant national capital class that has now been made transnational.

The existence of nationalized spaces, rather than hindering global process, has helped to abstract these globalized relations of ruling by decomposing them and imbuing them with a veneer of popular will so that national state practices are ideologically re-framed as the very embodiment of the desire of the nation. This is reflected in the work of those state theorists who analyze people as belonging to these nationalized spaces while international spaces are widely analyzed as the realm of capital.
In Canada, such ideological notions arise from a two-fold process. First, state practices rely heavily on the liberal ideology that the state is simultaneously the object and culmination of the will of the nation or civil society. Secondly, for some people concerned with deteriorating living standards in Canada, acceptance of the notion that only within nationalized spaces can people exist *in society* appears to be perfectly common sensical. Continual references by some scholars and political activists to the necessity of having the state protect the nation have contributed to the *production* of an international space that is conceptualized as foreign and threatening to Canadian society and Canadians. This explains the current popularity of the nationalist argument that in order to regain popular or democratic control over public policy-making, Canadian state sovereignty needs to be re-strengthened.

The power of these ideological concepts is evident in the fact that while some analysts focus their attention on ‘the state’, not enough attention has been paid to how notions of ‘nation-ness’ have helped to shape both the ideological and *material* process of restructuring global ruling relations. Consequently, not only are nationalist ideologies that have accompanied such shifts in state practices been left untroubled, they have even been lauded as necessary.

This too, has involved a two-fold process. First, because the global space has been portrayed as a relatively recent phenomenon, the ‘national’ space has easily been re-framed as a place (and a time) when We were secure and sovereign, i.e. Self-sufficient. Secondly, the legitimacy of state practices that worked to further promote global relations of ruling by rendering whatever was legitimated as foreign as *the* problem facing Us were secured through use of racist ideologies. Racist ideologies simultaneously reinforced highly exclusionary notions of belonging and brought to life, so to speak, both the collectivity that the Canadian nation was said to form, as well as the foreign threat.

Nationalist ideological practices gave material aid in helping to reinforce and reproduce globalized relations of ruling by abstracting the actual operation of these relations. Racialized
and classed relations that shape the configuration of each nation help to both organize inequalities while rendering these relations invisible within the operation of the global nation-state system. It is important, then, that we see the continued, even increased, assertion for the need of national state sovereignty as part of how these global ruling relations have been objectified or concealed over time.

To take a non-ideological perspective, one that uncovers rather than masks the operation of ruling relations, it becomes important to investigate the social organization of difference. Organizing differences between groups of people is a cornerstone of the ongoing importance of state power. Indeed, the organization of state categories that render Indigenous people, people from the South and women (among others, of course) as Others in Canada can be said to be one of the principal features of the global system of national states. A key founding doctrine of the Canadian national state is the institutionalization of racist, sexist and classist practices (see Holloway, 1994 for why this may have applicability to other national states as well).

Racist, sexist and classed notions or membership contribute to the ideological formation of identity and subjectivity that within the parameters of ruling relations form around binary codes of Self and Other. Significantly, the social organization of difference has not worked to keep those rendered as Other apart from those who belong to the nation but to inferiorize those who are O thered within the same spaces occupied by Canadians. This is readily apparent when examining the organization of the labour market and how immigration policies have helped in its restructuring (see Chapters Six and Seven).

Since only those Self-defined as members – and not Others - are presented as being entitled to the benefits of citizenship, the operation of social relations of racism, gender and class help to classify certain groups of people as Others/foreigners within the country. The social organization of differentiated access to legal protections and guarantees, thus, come to be imbued with the moral authority of the nation protecting itSelf. The recognized right for national states to
enforce universally established mechanisms to regulate people’s mobility across nationalized borders helps to legitimize state power used against those rendered as Other within the confines of nation-states.

The social organization of difference, embodied within state categories, shapes these exclusive (and exclusionary) claims of entitlement so the unfreedom of migrant workers is accepted as legitimate, even when this same treatment would be decried as manifestly unjust were it to be imposed upon those socially recognized as Canadian. It is apparent, then, that it is not the actual action taken - i.e. state practices that work to create and enforce conditions of indentured servitude - that make them legitimate or not. Rather, it is more important to investigate whom certain state practices affect.

For example, unfreedom, while seemingly illegitimate for Canadians can be organized as normal if it is a condition for those seen as not belonging to the nation in the first place (see Chapter Four). The social organization of the normative context in which the unfreedom of those categorized as migrant workers is legitimate, then, is important to investigate. This is because “norms not only define what the legitimate state looks like, they define other actors as legitimate or illegitimate and they define the normative context in which those actors can be heard” (Gurowitz, 1997:7).

The existence of differently categorized people within Canada, therefore, not only shapes people’s consciousness about who belongs, but has material effects as well. The process of rendering certain groups of people as Other secures their relative cheapness and weakness in relation to employers in the labour market in Canada. The global regime of nationalized labour markets, where relations of racism, class exploitation and sexism organize difference, then, is a key tool used in the search of greater opportunities for capital accumulation. This has become even more important in a period where capital mobility has increased, for almost without
exception individual national states have attempted to make their labour markets more competitive than others.

Significantly, it is the totality of those who are represented as members of the Canadian nation who are complicit in this process that renders those who have been Othered cheaper and weaker than their Canadian counterparts in the nationalized Canadian labour market. While it remains important not to reproduce notions of unitary power relations, such as those organized through racism, an examination of who belongs and who does not in the Canadian nation helps us to understand the character of power within a society that has been ideologically conceptualized as national rather than global in scope. Indeed, the intersectionality of racism, class and gender social relations helps to organize notions of nation-ness to begin with (see Thobani, 1998, Bourgeault, 1992).

Ideological practices of defining membership (i.e. Canadian-ness) help to organize relations of racism, sexism and class exploitation in particular ways that legitimize the creation of a migrant workers program in Canada whereby people of colour, for the most part, are relegated to the most unattractive segments of the labour market. Continual references to the Canadian nation and the protection of Canadians - and not Others - bring into play these relations of racism, class exploitation and sexism. Indeed, the migrant worker category effectively puts into operation these relations so that those classified as such are portrayed as legitimately being disentitled from the claims that membership (or citizenship) afford.

Thus, while notions of Canadian-ness continue to legitimize white rule over people of colour, other ruling relations are buttressed, including those social relations in which most whites, themselves, are oppressed and exploited. In fact, I argue that the exploitation of white workers and women in Canada hinges upon their common sense acceptance of the exploitation of those rendered as Other. Ideological practices that construct and reinforce notions of nation-
ness are, therefore, key to the construction of legitimacy of process of globalization in my period of study.

The organization of legitimacy is about the organization of the right kind of both Self and Other that is in sync with the operation of relations of ruling that rely on racist, sexist and nationalist practices to remain powerful. Seeing the practices of governance as far more than the production of conformity to legal and administrative rules but as regulation of difference helps to account for the tremendous legitimacy of the category migrant worker in Canada.

The social legitimacy of creating Others within the spaces controlled by national states has facilitated the production of a globally flexible labour force that faces the weakening and cheapening of their labour power upon crossing nationalized borders. This, of course, contributes to the ‘race to the bottom’ said to characterize this latest period of globalization. Legitimacy, then, is not organized through either a Machiavellian or puppeteer ‘state’ acting to rationalize state authority or the power of some unitary class, race or gender. Instead, like the state, legitimacy is organized through the simultaneous coordination of human activity and the social organization of differences so that certain state practices are perfectly legitimate.
Chapter 4: Marking the Boundaries of Freedom:
Nation and State in the Organization of Unfree Labour

In our legal and political system, words like “freedom” and “choice” are forms of currency. They function as the mediators by which we make all things equal, interchangeable. It is, therefore, not just what “freedom” means, but the relations it signals between each individual and the world. It is a word that levels difference.

Patricia Williams, *The Alchemy of Race and Rights*

Introduction

In this Chapter, I extend my previous engagement with theorists examining the relationship between national state practices and processes of globalization by further investigating the importance of ideological practices of governance. In particular, I look at how concepts of ‘freedom’ have been used to organize a category of people made to work in unfree employment relationships within labour markets generally seen as free. I survey the theoretical literature on the development of unfree employment relationships within countries in the global North to better understand the discursive practices of parliamentarians in Canada. This allows me to examine how they are a part of the dialectic process through which *certain* people’s labour power is organized as free while that of Others is made unfree.¹

I evaluate the claim of some political economists who argue that we can sufficiently account for the (re)introduction of unfree employment relationships through an analysis of economic processes, such as labour shortages or class conflicts. The necessity of looking at the political economy of the use of unfree labour is not in question. Instead, I argue that, we need to expand the scope of inquiry to also question how only *certain* groups of people were made unfree, namely those recruited through the immigration department under the state category of non-immigrant (or the popular term, migrant worker). I will show that the social organization of the category migrant workers in Canada was part of broader national state practices that

¹ It is not my intent to embark upon a comprehensive examination of the literature examining how conditions of unfreedom have or have not been a part of the historical or contemporary expansion of capitalist social relations (or
regulated the unfreedom of certain peoples through the social organization of difference in state categories of immigration between 1969 and 1973.

During this period, people categorized as migrant workers co-existed with those categorized as citizens or permanent residents who were able to work as free labour in the labour market in Canada. In this chapter, I try to understand how this co-existence was rendered unproblematic. I examine how the unfreedom of some – but not all - was socially legitimized by centering my investigation on the ideological practices of racism and nationalism (with its associated legal framework of citizenship) and their material effects upon people’s ability to maneuver in a nationalized labour market. I show that freedom and unfreedom are relational categories bound together in a negative duality by ruling relations.

I investigate how the social organization of differences between freedom and unfreedom was centred on notions of belonging (and conversely, not belonging). I also analyze how concepts of freedom, organized, in part, through discourses of liberal democracy, were able to conceal and, therefore, reproduce domination, oppression and exploitation. By examining the relationship between ideological concepts of nation and freedom, I am better able to see how these helped to organize the unfreedom of those categorized as migrant workers in Canada. As I will show, the negative dualities manifested through the binary codes of Self and Other organized through these ideologies affected not only Canadian state practices of restructuring global ruling relations but also how some scholars theorize about those who are rendered as unfree.

The Importance of Self in the Study of Others: Theories of Unfree Labour in the North

In Canada, the general lack of concern for the historical and ongoing importance of unfree forms of labour power is stark evidence of the Self-centredness apparent in racist
ideological practices. The notion that free wage labour represents the quintessential employment relationship within capitalism is not only historically incorrect, but the lack of attention given to people labouring as unfree workers shows a deep disregard for the experiences of Indigenous people and people of colour in the global capitalist economy (see Marx, 1977; Pentland, 1981).

Within the capitalist world market for labour power, Indigenous peoples and other people of colour have often been made to work as unfree labour. Attesting to this fact is the experience of indigenous peoples enslaved and indentured throughout the Americas over the last 500 (plus) years. Also, that of Africans kidnapped and made to work and live as slaves, Asians forced into "coolie" indentured servitude throughout the British Empire and the approximately one-third of all people currently migrating across national borders to work under conditions of unfreedom (Potts, 1990:7; Gardezi, 1995:2).

Yet, unfree employment relations have all too often been considered as 'peripheral' to the capitalist world economy. The experiences of white male (and, at times, white women) workers who have been able to work as free wage workers for at least the last century have dominated the attention of those studying capitalist political economy - both in its classical and Marxist formulations. The exploitation of people's labour power under unfree conditions has been seen by some as either a 'relic' of feudalism (Ruccio et al, 1991; Meillassoux, 1981:46; Pentland, 1981) or as a 'necessary anomaly' within otherwise capitalist social formations (Miles, 1987; see also Luxemburg, 1951). This centering of (mostly) white male experiences of the labour market in countries in the global North has contributed to concealing the significance of processes that render some people unfree.

Beginning with Karl Marx, who viewed the development of free wage labour as a defining feature of capitalist social relations, many theorists have argued that the emergence of free wage labour is an integral part of the historical emergence and, indeed, singularity of the
capitalist mode of production.² Marx, writing at a time when the trade in Asian peoples as
“coolie (indentured) labour” was growing,³ maintained that capital was able to

...arise only when the owner of the means of production and subsistence finds the
free worker available, on the market, as the seller of his [sic] own labour-power.
And this one historical pre-condition comprises a world’s history. Capital,
therefore, announces from the outset a new epoch in the process of social
production (1977:274).

Despite the historical record of the scope and extent of uses of people in unfree
conditions, throughout the formation of capitalist social relations, this approach continues to
inform some scholars’ analysis of the world market for labour power and subsequently, the
character of state practices during my period of study.⁴ For the most part, this is done through
failing to include the experiences of those working in unfree employment relationships within
the political economy of labour markets in late capitalism (McBride, 1992, Drache and Gertler,
1991, Kolko, 1988) or within analyses of immigration policies (Sassen, 1988, Layton-Henry,
1992). However, when explicitly addressed, some continue to argue that any relationship that

² Both Karl Marx (1977) and Max Weber (1927:277) viewed unfree labour as relatively uneconomical and
inefficient. It is assumed that as capitalist social relations are established and continue to expand, unfree forms of
labour power will be successively replaced by free wage labour. Again, because it is not my intention to provide a
comprehensive review of theories of free (and unfree) labour, I am unable to expand on the problematic nature of
these assumptions (for a better overview, see Sharma, 1995, 1996).
³ Lydia Potts (1990:67) writes that “[d]uring the 19th century and the first few decades of the 20th century: workers
from India, China, Japan and Java were despatched to every continent with the exception of Europe [sic].” Within
the space of less than a hundred years (1830-1920), it is estimated that anywhere from a minimum of 12 million up
to 37 million people from Asia were indentured through the coolie system of unfree labour (ibid.:73-4).
⁴ Both Paula Beiguelman (1978) and Robert Miles (1987) challenge the notion that unfree labour would be
eradicated with the further development of capitalism. Beiguelman (1978:76-77) moves away from the dichotomous
view that slavery and capitalism are antithetical by pointing out that “...empirically and historically colonial slavery
must be considered a constituent part of [capitalism]... it follows that a process of progressive purification is not
what happens since slavery does not represent a non-capitalist component... but, on the contrary, constitutes a
capitalist creation. Nor is it possible to speak, in this case, of the extension of the system to the periphery of the
capitalist world, since slavery turns out to be the form in which capitalism is realized in the colonial economy...”

Miles (1987), in his study of post-war Western Europe, finds that differing forms of unfree labour are in
existence. He argues that it is unfree wage labour that is highly significant for modern capitalism. He (1987:166-
167) maintains that “...the historical reproduction of the capitalist mode of production is not synonymous with the
progressive elimination of all forms of unfree labour in favour of free labour. Rather...there are circumstances in
which forms of unfree labour are reintroduced and reproduced to ensure the reproduction of the capitalist mode of
production” (emphasis added).
does not involve the direct selling and buying of free wage labour is non-capitalist (Ruccio et al (1991) 5

People forced to work under unfree conditions are seen as not only marginal to the societies where they work but the imposition of conditions of unfreedom upon them is interpreted as an indication of the ‘backwardness’ of the very people so classified. Meillassoux (1981) has been the most forthright in arguing that the people whose labour power is being bought under unfree conditions are themselves part of pre-capitalist social relations (also see, Pentland, 1981). Following from the conceptual framework of ‘articulated modes of production’ developed by Rosa Luxenburg (1951), 6 Meillassoux argues that migrant workers working in the capitalist economies of the North ought to be considered a part of pre-capitalist modes of production. In making this argument, he implies that individual migrant workers actually embody an entire mode of production and that they then transport with them into the countries of the North.

Thus, Meillassoux (1981) advances the ideological notion that wherever those who have been categorized as migrant workers work and whatever they do they, by virtue of the fact that they have been indentured to their employer, are a repository of pre-capitalist social formations. Such notions help to secure the process of rendering as Other those who are made unfree in the same society in which citizens live and work as free labour. Responsibility for their unfreedom seems to rest with them. Rather than examine the ways in which socially differentiated groups of workers face differential state regulations governing their employment relationships or

5 It is partly the unquestioned acceptance of this assumption that allows some to argue that the globalization of capitalist social relations is a ‘new’ phenomenon (Bina and Yaghmaian, 1991: 117).
6 Luxemburg’s theory of imperialism, in which she develops the idea of articulated modes of production, is a dualist one. She sees imperialism as a process by which the capitalist mode of production uses and continuously reproduces non-capitalist modes of production for its own benefit. For this reason, Luxemburg (1951:365) argues that, “since accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points without non-capitalist surroundings, we cannot gain a true picture of it by assuming the exclusive and absolute dominion of the capitalist mode of production.” She posits that the very process of capitalist accumulation rests upon the procurement of labour power from non-capitalist modes of production. Luxemburg argues that capitalism, in and of itself, is not able to produce or reproduce all of the labour power which it needs and, thus, essentially ‘raids’ non-capitalist social formations for labour power.
investigate the relationship between free and unfree workers, Meillassoux tends to categorize the
unfree worker him/herself as ‘pre-capitalist’.7

However, people themselves can not embody an entire mode of production, be it pre-
capitalist or capitalist. No single worker, or even group of workers, categorized as migrant
workers can transport with them an entire mode of production.8 Instead, a mode of production is
defined by the ways in which surplus is produced and controlled, or in Marx’s words, “the direct
relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers...” (as cited in
Bottomore et al., 1983:337). It is the lack of attention to capitalism as a set of social relations
and not merely an abstracted ‘economic system’, that has limited the study of the process by
which unfree wage labour is organized in Canada.

The Interdependency of Freedom and Unfreedom

David Goldberg has uncovered some of the ideological practices at work in
conceptualizing unfree migrant labour as distinctly pre-capitalist by linking it discursively to
notions of certain people being ‘pre-modern’. He states:

the self-conception of ‘modern man’ [sic] as free, productive, acquisitive, and literate
is not delimiting of racisms’ expressions but a framework for them. It forms the

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7 Such an approach is also evident in the work of Perry Anderson (1981) who views the expansion of free wage
labour as a process accompanying the development of capitalism. He argues that while unfree labour was
indispensable in the ‘early modern epoch’, it cannot be considered as a part of the capitalist mode of production. He
(1975:403) maintains that, “all modes of production in class societies prior to capitalism extract surplus labour from
the immediate producers by means of extra-economic coercion. Capitalism is the first mode of production in history
in which the means whereby the surplus is pumped out of the direct producer is ‘purely’ economic in form – the
wage contract: the equal exchange between free agents which reproduces, hourly and daily, inequality and
oppression.”

Along the same lines, Beiguelman (1978:76) has shown that others have normally regarded the abolition of
slavery in the U.S. as “a progressive purification of capitalism. Since capitalism is a system based on free [wage]
labour, slavery is sometimes considered to be a graft that commercial capitalism could originally tolerate, but which
had to be eliminated at a more advanced state.” Again, the notion of “purifying” capitalism by introducing free wage
labour implies that this form of labour power defines capitalism.

8 Can we seriously consider the proposition that a person arriving to Canada from a pre-capitalist economy (the term
‘pre-capitalist’ itself is often left undefined) is carrying with her a non-capitalist mode of producing and reproducing
her labour power while employed in Canada where production is organized by capitalist social relations?
Furthermore, to argue, as Meillassoux does, that the existence of unfree wage labour within the capitalist economies
of the North can be understood by recourse to the source country of migrant workers is not grounded in fact. Clearly
not all migrant workers come from countries that could be classified as pre-capitalist. Conversely, not all workers
from countries considered pre-capitalist work as unfree labour within Canada.
measure by which racialized groups are modern and deserving of incorporation, or premodern and to be excluded from the body politic (1993:108-9).

The discursive practice of racializing notions of modernity and, likewise, backwardness is found within the Canadian parliamentary debates concerning those that were categorized as migrant workers (see Chapter Seven).

The work of Philip Corrigan (1977) is of further use for deconstructing ideological notions of freedom. Corrigan maintains that the organization of people’s labour power through unfree employment relationships is a part of the most recent phase of capitalist re-organization. Corrigan (1977:441) argues that the exploitation of unfree labour power is not only a feature of an ‘early stage’ of capitalism or a ‘feudal relic’ appended onto capitalist economies when there are shortages of free wage labour but a pervasive and integral part of capitalist expansion itself. Thus, Corrigan (Ibid.) contends that “...the expansion of capitalism, in fact, hinges on the introduction on a very large scale of unfree forms of labour.”

Tom Brass (1988) provides a further critique of the idea that unfree labour owes its existence to labour shortages (see Pentland, 1981). Brass shows that often times, it is the surplus of workers that sets the parameters of state practices that help to organize unfree employment relationships. This is not to say that unfree labour is not used during times of labour shortages, but like Saskia Sassen (1988), he points to the double meaning of the notion of ‘shortages’ (1988:187). Brass expands on the idea that the term does not always refer to a quantitative or actual lack of workers but the shortage of a particular kind of work force, i.e. ‘cheap’, politically repressed and so on. Robert Miles expands on this insight by arguing,

the precondition for labour migration was a shortage of labour within the capitalist economies of Western Europe which could only be “solved” by recruitment within the various social formations by increasing wages to attract workers from other economic sectors. Such a solution would have obstructed the capital accumulation process, and so another source of labour power from outside these social formations was sought (1987:167).
This is an especially important point in regards to understanding the use of unfree workers during my period of study (see Chapter Seven). Brass adds that

[i]t is precisely in the combined circumstances of anti-union legislation, compulsory ‘training’/’retraining’ schemes for youth and the long-term unemployed, the replacement of welfare provision with workfare, cutbacks in the social wage, declining real wage levels, and the rising unemployment now occurring in the [Northern countries] that the linkage between an oversupply of workers and unfree relations becomes important. In short, this development challenges the assumption that the expansion and operation of the industrial reserve army necessarily leads to and takes the form of an extension of free wage labour (1988:186).

For Brass, the successive weakening of the whole of the working class facilitates the restructuring of economies in Northern national states. He argues that the re-imposition (or the continuation) of unfree forms of labour power should be seen within the context of the attempt by employers to secure (or increase) their profits and to further weaken the strength of workers. Brass states:

[t]he advantage of work force restructuring...where externally recruited labour is involved - permits them [employers] first to lower the cost of the local work force by importing unfree, more easily regulated, and thus cheaper foreign labour, and then in turn to lower the cost of the latter when the original foreign/local wage differential has been eliminated. In this way, conditions and payment of both components of the work force can be decreased continuously, and the level of productivity/profitability (or rate of exploitation) correspondingly maintained or increased (1988:188, emphasis added).

State practices are seen as important to the re-imposition of unfree employment relations. Corrigan argues that such impositions, in fact, make “...state control visible” (1977:444).

However, there is a tendency in the work of both Brass and Corrigan to naturalize the work of state practices in organizing differences between so-called ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ (or ‘external’) workers. Because their arguments are made within a framework of nation-states, they are able to take for granted that there already exists a group of people known as foreign workers. They therefore fail to investigate the social relations and practices that organize either the foreign-ness or the unfreedom of certain people within an otherwise free labour market. This is because
these authors tend to see the creation of conditions of unfreedom as resulting from the economic or political strategies of the bourgeoisie that state practices assist with.

This is evident in Brass’ assertion that it is the class struggle between labour and capital that shapes the use and scope of unfree labour (1988:186). It is also visible in Corrigan’s (1977:448) assertion that “migrants also serve political ends; lacking the most elementary ‘civil rights’, denied membership of a trade union - what better vanguard against the organized labour movement could be found?”

Yet, rather than accepting classificatory schemes that conceal the social organization of difference between citizens, permanent residents and migrant workers, it is important to investigate how the labour market in Canada is organized to produce and legitimize these differences. Indeed, because unfree employment relations are organized through immigration policy, it becomes even more important to uncover those ideological practices that distinguish between Canadian and foreign workers. After all, there exists only one labour market in Canada, a labour market in which differences between workers have been socially organized through classificatory schemes of racism, sexism and nationalism.

Hence, both the concepts of freedom and unfreedom need to be unpacked and the social relationships forming them exposed. The work of Immanuel Wallerstein is of some help here. He argues that slavery, debt bondage and other forms of unfree labour under capitalism can be viewed as ‘modes of labour control’ (Wallerstein, 1979:33). He asks whether capitalism should not be seen “as a system that combines within its economic arena some firms largely based on contractual wage-labour and some (even most) firms based on one variant or another of coerced or semi-coerced semi-wage labour?” (1976:1212). However, as is clear from the previous quote, within Wallerstein’s work, there is a tendency to see contractual wage-labour as uncoercive.

Here, the work of Orlando Patterson is of more use, for he sees all forms of exploiting another’s labour power as entailing some form of coercion. He maintains that
In the course of human history there have been two polar extremes in the idiomatic handling of the coercive aspect of power. One has been the tendency to acknowledge human force openly, then to humanize it by the use of various social strategies such as fictive kinship, [and] clientship... The other extreme has been the method of concealment, in which coercion is almost completely hidden or thoroughly denied. Indeed, it is even presented as the direct opposite of what it is, being interpreted as a kind of freedom (1991:39).

Likewise, Corrigan argues that we should understand that all enterprises under capitalism employ coercion against workers. It is only that “some are more brutal than others” (1977:452). These insights extend the work of Marx in this area - at least in the latter’s discussion of the fetishism of commodities. Marx provides us with the insight that the fetishism of commodities in the capitalist mode of production is a social process that acts as a ‘fantastic form’ to conceal the social relational aspects of power and exploitation. These are hidden from view through the ideological operation of the notion that relationships between people are, in fact, relationships between the inanimate objects that workers make and capitalists sell (1977:163-177). Indeed, Marx saw the concealment of the social relations that organize capitalism as part of how people’s coordinated activities continuously work to reproduce them.

However, Marx failed to expand his critique of bourgeois economists who make a fetish of the products of labour to the understanding of the commodification of labour power itself (1977:164). Instead, he returns to making strict distinctions between free and unfree labour, associating only the former with the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, he argues that only free labour is commodified,9 for only the relationship between free waged workers and their

9 Marx recognized that the concept of freedom for workers under capitalism was ideological since workers were not free in the literal sense that they could do anything they wanted. Rather, they were compelled to sell their labour power by having had their own means of production taken away and placed under the ownership and control of capitalists. Marx largely conceptualized the term freedom to mean that the previously visible use of coercion involved in exploiting labour power was concealed with the use of free wage workers. This is evident in the following statement by Marx (1977:272): “the owner of money must find the free worker available on the commodity-market; and this worker must be free in the double sense that as a free individual he [sic] can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that, on the other hand, he has no other commodity for sale, i.e. he is rid of them, he is free of all the objects needed for the realization of his labour-power.” In other words, Marx believed that free wage labour rested on the ability of a worker to “...decide whether, and to whom his or her labour power will be sold” (see Miles, 1987:25).
bosses are *abstracted* (also see Miles, 1987\(^1\)). Of course, the corollary to this is the notion that
the use of force in compelling people to work as unfree labour is not abstracted, is fully visible to
all and is, therefore, illegitimate within capitalist societies. Marx does not address the fact that,
throughout the history of capitalism it has been socially legitimate to have *certain* people work
under unfree labour within capitalist societies where labour market freedom is said to be the
normative employment relationship.

Robert Steinfeld’s work (1991) helps to address the absence of this understanding in
Marx’s work. Through a historical examination of employment relationships in both England
and the U.S. between 1350 and 1870, he investigates what he calls the ‘invention’ of free and
unfree labour power. Steinfeld sees its social organization as a part of the dynamic that
reproduced the capitalist mode of production. Steinfeld’s work helps to challenge the widely held
assumption that free wage labour constitutes the natural employment relationship within
capitalism. He also helps to blur the sharp distinctions made between free and unfree labour by
investigating how the modern *conception* of free labour, as used by Marx, emerged.

He argues that the gradual process of normalizing so-called free relations between
employer and employee was a *social* one. It was not merely an economic process fueled by the
supposed inexorable logic of the capitalist market place where it was determined that only the
free-wage proletariat could ‘efficiently’ produce commodities as Marx supposed (Steinfeld,

\(^1\) Miles also views modern forms of unfree wage labour as a pre-capitalist form of acquiring labour power, since he
does not regard it as fully commodified (1987:32). For Miles, what distinguishes slave labour from modern forms of
migrant contract labour is the partial commodification of the labour power of the latter. By this he means that while
migrant contract workers receive a wage, they do not have *mobility rights* within the labour market. Thus, Miles
(1987:32) argues that “the essential criterion for the category of unfree wage labour is found in the existence of
politico-legal restrictions on the operation of the labour market.” These restrictions are put into place by the state
and regulated by it. Miles further argues that unfree wage labour exists *alongside* free wage labour. For him, the
creation and existence of this form of acquiring labour power is an ‘articulation’ of capitalism with pre-capitalist
social formations. Miles’ notion that unfree wage labour is from pre-capitalist social formations hinges upon his
assumption that unfree wage workers in Western Europe are a part of the displaced peasantry in their home
countries. Susanne Paine (1974), however, has shown that workers from Turkey, for example, who are forced to
work as unfree wage workers in Western Europe come not from the peasantry but largely from the proletariat of
their country.
Steinfeld exposes the tautological nature of the argument that free labour is more economical and efficient than the exploitation of unfree labour power. He states that

[...] for centuries, all forms of labor operated under legal duties that obligated them to complete their contractual undertakings. In those circumstances, it is difficult to imagine what the proposition that free labor was more efficient than unfree labour could have meant. Only after the possibility of free labor in the modern sense had begun to emerge could that argument begin to be put forward (1991:112, emphasis added).

This insight is substantiated through an examination of the period of laissez-faire capitalism in England. Any supposed logic said to exist within the emergent capitalist system was not incompatible with the continuation of unfree forms of labour power in England. Indeed, Steinfeld writes about England in the eighteenth century, that

...not only did the old Tudor contract clauses continue to be enforced but the new market spirit moved Parliament to supplement the old clauses with new statutes aimed at stopping contract breaking [by workers] in certain increasingly commercialized sectors of the economy (1991:113, emphasis added).

These statutes remained in effect until 1875 when criminal sanctions for premature departure from a contracted place of employment were eliminated (Steinfeld, 1991:115, 160). Steinfeld adds that, indeed,

...far from being inconsistent with the logic of contractarian market individualism..., indentured servitude actually represented an expression of that logic: a private bargain between autonomous individuals in which one sold the legal right to his [sic] capacities for another for a term in exchange for a valuable consideration (Steinfeld, 1991:90-1).11

Unfree labour power, then, was no less natural within capitalist societies than was free labour. Indeed, free labour was socially organized through a process of struggle. In England and in North America, what came to be regarded as unfree labour was only thought to be involuntary when free labour emerged as its 'voluntary' and supposedly definitive opposite (Steinfeld, 1991:10). Seeing the free employment relationship as normative came about, not only by

11 Douglas Hay (1988:8) shows that there was an actual increase in the number of incarcerations of workers who broke their employment contracts in the 19th century - the heyday of laissez faire capitalism.
reference to those labour practices it was understood to include, but also by the institution of indentured labour by which it was contrasted. That is, it was not the eradication of unfree forms of labour that caused the emergence of free labour but the continued presence of unfree employment relationships that allowed for the imagination of free labour.

The process by which free labour was normalized, therefore, was not a natural extension of the expansion of capitalist social relations but was both relational and highly ideological. This can be seen in the ideological practices organized through theories of ‘possessive individualism’ in which it was asserted that freedom for waged workers meant possessing the ability to ‘choose’ who to sell one’s labour power to. C.B. Macpherson (1962:142), a historiographer of this theoretical paradigm, showed that its proponents argued that “what makes a man [sic] human is his freedom from other men. Man’s essence is freedom. Freedom is proprietorship of one’s own person and capacities.”

By viewing possession of the ability to employ one’s labour power through the framework of the market value of private property, the fetishizing of labour as a commodity was secured. By employing classic liberal tenets in which it was argued that under capitalism workers were free if they were able to choose their employer and choose to quit their employer, one’s own labour power came to be seen as something one owned. Labour power was made into a commodity. The social relationships that allowed for the exploitation of the productive capacities of one human being and the expropriation of the products of that labour by another was (at least partly) concealed through this commodification of labour and abstracted. It was this ideological process that held the ideological underpinnings of freedom in place.

Free labour, then, was socially organized through the ideological frame that it was a voluntary exchange between employee and employer that was compensated by payment of a

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12 This, of course, had its most tremendous impact upon women whose productive capacities were denied as they were considered to be mere re-producers of labour.
wage, even if that compensation was incomplete (see Marx, 1977: 333-338). The reality of unequal power relations was nicely (although not fully) concealed through the use of the notion of freedom. The basic exploitative relationship between employer and employee was not, therefore, *ruptured* with the emergence of the free employment relationship. Instead, the continuities were stronger than any changes *materially* experienced by the worker.

In this matter, Steinfeld states that

> on entering employment, for example, a worker’s labor still became the employer’s. While the relationship continued, the employer was legally entitled to command that labor as if it were his [sic] own. And in the same way that the fruits of his own labor were his, so too were the fruits of his employee’s labour (1991:156).

Without minimizing the extra political and economic coercion imposed upon those forced to work as unfree indentured labour, Steinfeld (1991:5) argues for the need to view free and unfree labour as two ways of “operationally defining a regime of property and contract in labour.”

I would go further and add that the relationship between free and unfree labour is dialectical in that one *relies* on the other for its very meaning. Together, the two co-exist within a world capitalist market for labour power. The difference between free and unfree labour is not that the latter is coerced and the former is not or that the coercion used to exploit free labour is not visible to those being exploited while the exploitation of people’s unfree labour *is*. While the exploitation of free labour power may very well be concealed through the operation of the ideology surrounding the concept of freedom (although not always), the exploitation of unfree labour *also* remains concealed in Canada through the operation of various ideological practices.

This is not a spontaneous or natural development but is socially organized. Despite the consciousness of some analysts and political activists, the actual existence of a category which renders some people’s labour unfree remains generally unquestioned. I now move on to examine how racist ideological practices shape the social legitimacy of using certain people as unfree labour through a migrant worker category.
Our Nation, Their Unfreedom

While uncovering the ideological foundations of notions of freedom is crucial to the project of examining the social organization of the Canadian state category of migrant workers, an investigation into the social organization of difference is also important. After all, while free employment relationships are understood as normal for some part of the population, unfree employment relationships are also seen to be quite natural for those who have been or can be rendered Others in Canadian society (see Chapter Seven). That is, within Canadian society, it is only the freedom of some and, likewise, the unfreedom of Others – and not all - that is socially legitimate. These two developments are related.

Wendy Brown (1995:6) points out that freedom is a relational concept rather than a ‘philosophical absolute’ or a ‘tangible entity’. As such, freedom, in so much as it exists for workers within capitalist labour markets, is not a state of being but exists in relation to who is thought of as unfree. Ideological concepts of freedom and unfreedom, then, have embedded within them a number of other ideological practices, such as nationalism (with its related notion of citizenship), racism and sexism (Sharma, 2000b, Williams, 1991). These intersecting ideological practices work to legitimize the unfreedom of people who have been defined as migrant workers. Indeed, I argue that the racialization of the category migrant workers, whereby people of colour are thought to epitomize both the foreign Other as well as the quintessential migrant worker within Canada, organizes the ‘common sensical’ quality of the existence of unfree employment relationships in Canada. These ideological practices have historically been a distinct part of the imagining of the Canadian nation and the nation-building project.

Assertions of the newly ‘freeborn’ Canadian man coming into prominence in the 19th century were made in stated contrast to the continued unfreedom of Indigenous (including the Metis) peoples, people of colour and, at times, white women recruited to work in certain
occupations like domestic labour (Bourkeault, 1989; Parr, 1990). Those who were made to labour in unfree employment relationships, although integral to the production and re-production of Canadian society, were constituted (in varying degrees) as being Outsiders to the nation. Being rendered as Other within Canadian society and working in unfree conditions, thus, became co-terminus.

Conditions of unfreedom for people oppressed and exploited through systems of colonialism, racism and sexism coexisted with the heralding of freedom the birthright of being white and (usually) male in Canada. Indeed, it can be said that the expansion of freedom to include white male workers contributed to the further strengthening of racialized and gendered understandings of who belonged and who didn’t belong in the nation (Hyslop, 1999). Those workers who were able to Self-define themselves as Canadian argued that they should have certain rights that those who were rendered as Other – as ‘not Canadian’ - did not enjoy. These arguments were, in fact, an integral part of the racist ideological process of Othering.

In struggling for their freedom white, (usually) male Canadians often made the argument that they should not have to work under the same conditions as the gendered and racialized Others (see Li, 1988; Chan, 1983; Warburton, 1981). The unfreedom of Indigenous people, of people from outside northwestern Europe, most especially those from China and India and, at times, white women as well as women of colour consolidated the view among white men that

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13 It is important, especially for feminists, to understand how white women who were made to work under unfree conditions were simultaneously oppressed and exploited through sexist practices but were, nonetheless, still imagined as an integral part of the ‘Canadian nation’. Thus, though they were considered as belonging to the men of the nation, their gender relations with white men were constructed within the framework of white Canadian nationalism. This helps to explain white feminist arguments for being included in the Canadian franchise in the early part of the 20th century for they were “mothers of the race” (see Valverde, 1992). Unfortunately, this is outside of the scope of my present study.

14 Indeed, the ‘coolie’ system of indenturing Asian workers (1830-1920) was initiated during the same time that white males began agitating for their right to be free wage workers and continued throughout the period that these rights were won. The time period that white males became free was, then, the same period that millions of Asians were brought into the international market for labour power as unfree indentured labourers working mainly in the colonies of Britain, including Canada (see Potts, 1990).
contractual servitude was involuntary labour. This was accomplished in such a way that allowed for the continued unfreedom of Others living in Canada.

Indeed, the privilege that white men enjoyed *vis a vis* the Other in the organization of social relations of production in Canada was *increased* through the invention of free labour, for, as discussed in Chapter Three, they were able to secure the most lucrative parts of the labour market in Canada for themselves (Dutton, 1984). Their failure to challenge the social differentiation of certain people into state categories that organized their unfreedom and super-exploitation was key to the development of Canada’s famed ‘high wage [white male] proletariat’ (see Panitch, 1981).

The violent ideological (as well as physical) attacks against those workers designated as Other had material effects in shaping the character of power in Canada and secured the reality that while unfree employment relations constituted the *typical* working experience for a large number of people and for *most* people of colour, it could still be proclaimed, without serious challenge, that free wage work was the ‘norm’ in Canada (see Pentland, 1981). This, in turn, further secured the racialized and gendered meanings of being Canadian-ness.

Concepts of freedom and the material practices organized through them operated ideologically to reproduce asymmetrical social relations by legitimizing the inequality organized through practices of colonialism, racism, nationalism and patriarchy. Indigenous people, people from the South and, at times, white women, continued to be constructed as *unfree* because they were denied full legal control over their own bodies and were considered as *rightfully* governed over not only by employers but also by those now designated as free. Notions of freedom and unfreedom, therefore, were integrally related to intersecting relations of racialized, classed and gendered domination and subordination in Canada.15

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15 In regards to the effects of the invention of free labour on gender relations, during the time that white male workers were generally employed under unfree conditions, their status changed when they married and became ‘heads’ of their own households. Men who were married and heads of their own households could not generally be
The organization of certain people's labour power as unfree in Canadian society cannot solely be explained through uni-dimensional notions of class conflict as discussed by Brass and Corrigan. The creation of conditions of unfreedom does not result exclusively from state practices designed to assure capitalists can cheapen and weaken the supply of labour. Nor do they arise solely out of state practices that attempt to handle the class conflict between capitalists and workers (also see Poulantzas, 1978). Instead, it is crucial that we recognize that such material practices are simultaneously organized through the ideological practices of racism (and sexism).

It is not simply a historical coincidence that when the free employment relationship emerged as the normal one it was reserved largely for white male adults in Canada (see Bourgeault, 1992). Nor is it a coincidence that those who continued to be unfree were Indigenous people, people (mainly) from the South and certain groups of women. Rather, as with the construction of the migrant worker category during my period of study, it was those people who could legitimately be categorized as Other that faced conditions of unfreedom.

The production of the common sensical idea that migrant workers are 'not like Us' in the Canadian parliamentary debates is an instance of the intersectionality of relations of racism, class exploitation and sexism. Here, as Stuart Hall (1980:328) points out, "things are related as much by their differences as through their similarities." Those categorized as migrant workers live and work within this intersectionality so that the conditions of unfreedom that bind them to specified employers are seen as socially legitimate. It is the social organization of difference that informs the organization of ruling relations in Canada and makes the transformation of people into migrant workers 'common sensical' and self-evident (or evident to Self). This is because the imposed racialized and nationalized social identity of bodies represented as migrant workers (in

considered another's indentured servant. Unmarried white men, however, could continue to be subjected to forced employment until the mid- to late-19th century (Steinfeld, 1991:59; 98). Women, regardless of whether they were
the imagination of parliamentarians, for instance) contributes to the legitimacy of their super-exploitation. After all, paying people of colour and women less, making them live and work in substandard conditions and indenturing them to their employers is part of how ruling relations are organized in Canada (see Sharma, 1994; Bannerji, 1993; Brand, 1993; Ng, 1988).

Canadian state practices that produce the category migrant worker do not need to be legitimized in the sense assumed by many state theorists. The coercion used to indenture migrant workers does not always need to be concealed. Moreover, the organization of this category is not simply a result of the Canadian state exercising its muscle in one area where it is still ‘sovereign’ (see Basok, 1996 and my discussion of this point in Chapter Three). The social organization of the category of migrant workers is not merely an attempt to gain legitimacy with an angry, racist mob in order to appease them on one hand while duping them into accepting other social policies that may be harmful to them. Finally, the creation of this category is not an attempt to restrict the actual numbers of (im)migrants entering Canada, particularly from the South (see Chapter Seven).\(^\text{16}\)

The process of categorizing people as migrant workers for the labour market in Canada has been seen as a legitimate one, because it works to reinforce racialized notions of Canadian-ness. The migrant worker category materializes the construction of some people as Other in Canada who actually do not have a right to make claims upon either Canadians or their government. That the category of migrant worker is accomplished through immigration policy.

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\(^{16}\) Of course, it goes without saying that employers benefit from the construction and designation of certain peoples as unfree. Part of the very definition of being a migrant worker, for instance, is having no choice (other than deportation) but to work for certain employers at particular kinds of work. Moreover, state practices that legalize the classification of some as unfree cheapens the labour power of those affected since both their opportunities and their ability to organize for collective action are severely curtailed. In Canada, much greater power is given to employers to exploit those categorized as migrant workers.
then, is no coincidence: forcing those who have already been constructed as foreigners to work in Canada as indentured workers only makes it that much easier to enforce.\textsuperscript{17}

The global system of nation-states that has helped to organize people’s labour on a world scale has, consequently, also worked to nationalize people’s consciousness about the world and various socially differentiated peoples’ places in it. According to Mustafa Koc,

\begin{quote}
[the notions of “nation” and “citizenship” introduced by the national state system have played important roles in defining membership... The notion of citizenship has complemented this process by separating the “foreigner” from the “member” as legal categories... Thus], the nation state has created a new platform of legitimacy for the negotiations among dominant social classes/groups in different geographic spaces... (1992:10-11).
\end{quote}

In this sense, an important activity of the system of national states is the territorial definition and delineation of coercion. Thus, in contrast to Holloway (1994:30) who argues that “[t]he destruction of personal bondage was also the destruction of geographical constraint,” it is clear that in present (as well as past) movements of people, the existence of unfree labour is not predicated on people’s spatial immobility but on exactly the opposite. Often times (though not always) it is people’s dependence on migration across national borders that places them in a situation where they can be named as foreigners and denied the same rights that citizens can lay claim to. Indeed, the export and import of people as a global labour commodity, especially in unfree forms, has been a key component in the structuring of inequality on a global level in this latest period of globalization (Sharma, 1997; Gardezi, 1995). In this sense, the process of emigration can be said to be “…a secular expression of [this global] inequality” (Petras, 1980:157).

\textsuperscript{17} Remembering that it is the global system of nation-states that organizes people as either citizens or (im)migrants, it is important to note that the imposition of unfree conditions upon those constructed as (im)migrants is part of a long historical trajectory. For instance, Richard Plender’s research shows that the first instance of permanent immigration control, England’s Alien Law of 1793, included the ability for the King to limit the spatial mobility of (im)migrants who could be forced to live in a specified district (1972:43). These laws, Petras argues, “…marked the decline of free movement and the establishment of the right of states to impose direct controls on alien immigration” (1980:166). It was during the earlier part of the twentieth century, however, when there was a marked increase in immigration legislation among nation-states. It was, for instance, at this time that the international system of passports was first developed (Ibid.).
It is important to highlight the ideological nature of this process of differentiation, because obviously not all those who are part of the international migration of labour are relegated to the ranks of unfree labour. While it is the social organization of differences between citizens and foreigners that enables those who are not Canadian nationals to be treated differentially, these differences are racialized, gendered and classed. Thus, only certain, not all, (im)migrants can be made to work as migrant workers. This process of racialization intersects with that of class organization, for it is those workers from the South who are recruited to work within so-called ‘unskilled’ or ‘low-skilled’ work that are recruited as migrant workers (see Chapter Seven).

Moreover, the imposition of binary classifications of membership or non-membership has not accomplished a ban on the entry of those defined as Other. Rather, the social organization of non-membership has meant that those so defined encounter a differential regulation of their labour power and a differentiated position in the Canadian labour market. This has made it possible to buy their labour power under very different — and always substandard — conditions in comparison to those defined as belonging. In short, constructing people as foreigners is not (necessarily or always) meant to exclude them from entering Canada. Often, restrictions imposed on those rendered as Other occurs once those classified as migrant workers are inside the Canadian border.¹⁸ Limits to workers’ movements, then, lies in the ability to restrict certain differentiated people mobility within nationalized labour markets.

Conclusion

National state practices are a constituent of ruling relations both globally and within the nationalized boundaries of Canada. A key element of national state practices during my period of study (1969 to and including 1973) was the materialization of negative dualities organized

¹⁸ This has been historically true in Canada. The legal entry of people from China, for instance, was first made possible only through an (im)migration system that admitted them as temporary, indentured (unfree) labour (Bolaria and Li, 1988).
through binary codes of Self and Other. During this time, this was most evident in the social organization of the category migrant worker. The differentiation and subordination of certain people, mainly from the South, forced to work under unfree conditions as a criteria of entry and continued residence in Canada was made possible by organizing as common sensical the notion that those represented as foreigners ought to be subordinated in Canadian society.

Thus, the process of differentiating migrant workers from Canadians or permanent residents was organized both through discursive and bureaucratic state practices that are constitutive of difference. It is important to note that what weakens migrant workers are not the supposed essential qualities of those so categorized but state-imposed restrictions that leave them with little possibility for collective action and cheapens the selling price of their labour in Canada. Thus, it can be said that the operation of the ideologies of nationalism and racism operate to meet the requirements of work organized through the reliance upon cheapened (and weakened) forms of labour power (see Ng, 1988).

The organization of a group of people as migrant workers and the conditions of unfreedom imposed upon them are understood as an integral feature of current restructuring strategies in Canada. However, the social organization of people as migrant workers in Canada did not occur simply through some supposedly objective response by those working in the Canadian state and their search for ways to cheapen the labour supply. Instead, the process by which the category of migrant worker was socially organized in Canada occurred through the indisaccociable interplay between material and ideological practices.

Unfortunately, some scholars who understand the importance of creating unfree working conditions for foreign workers' in the restructuring practices of the Northern national states do not connect the setting up of restrictive (im)migration policies with the broader social relations in ‘receiving’ countries. Instead, it is taken for granted that conditions of unfreedom are first
imposed upon (im)migrants. Thus, implicitly, the process of differentiating between citizens and migrant workers is understood as a natural process.

Not enough consideration has been given to how state policies are one of the concrete outcomes of intersecting social relations that include, but are not limited to, inter- as well as intra-class struggle (see Scokpol, 1980). It cannot be said to be mere coincidence that conditions of unfreedom have been imposed upon those recruited as migrant workers to Canada. Rather, the organization of this state category was secured through the articulation of distinct ideological processes and material responses within the re-organization of the Canadian work force.

As evidenced by the previous discussion, it becomes clear that in order to understand how the category migrant worker has been constructed and socially organized in Canada during the period 1973-1997, we need to examine a complex set of relationships and how they have been (re-)shaped by the restructuring of capital. We need to understand the links between the material conditions created by the global restructuring of capitalist social relations and how ideological practices shape this process of reproducing the material basis for social life. This is because what is being restructured is not simply ‘the economy’ (e.g. changes in employment practices, taxation policies and trade policies, etc.) but an entire way of organizing the social relations of doing capitalism (see Bannerji, 1995). These social relations do not stop at the employment relationship but encompass the way that competition and difference within a capitalist system is organized and reproduced.

In this regard, it is useful to refer to the work of Robert Miles (1982) who points out that the social process of categorizing groups of people in ways that construct hierarchical differences takes place at both the level of thought and at the level of action. These two levels are analytically distinct yet related. Miles (1982:3) says that “…events in the ‘real world’ are selected, appropriated, and analyzed by reference to a set of concepts.” Examining how certain
concepts make common sense shows us how ideological practices operate as a 'material force' (Marx, 1971: 122-3).

Practices that give primacy to concepts over social relations, Smith argues, are ideological for they render invisible the everyday lived experiences of people and transform them into objectified forms of knowledge where categories, such as migrant workers come to substitute for lived actualities (Smith, 1995:3). Ideological practices, thus, leave the social relations in which people’s experiences are embedded out of view and out of scope. Through the operationalization of these practices actual human activity and the social organization of consciousness are concealed.

Through claims of natural difference (between ‘sexes’, ‘races’, ‘nations’ and free or unfree persons, for instance), subjects are given social definition. Importantly, common sensical notions of ‘race’ or nation or gender or class not only reflect or rationalize already existing social relations, but also organize or order social relations of subordination and domination (Goldberg, 1993:45). That is, differences are not just a classificatory scheme, they also encode social formations and relations of ruling (Bannerji, 1995:30; also see Ng, 1988; Smith, 1990).

Miles provides a warning to those looking for simple linkages between ideological practices and material relations, however. He maintains that

[t]his ‘connection’ must not be interpreted in a mechanistic manner because although material production may prepare the terrain for particular ideological trends to be generated and reproduced, this can rarely, if ever, be a sufficient condition for their generation and reproduction (1982:103).

He adds:

[wh]at has become of much greater interest is not only the more general question of the way in which ideological (and political) relations are determined (or have their limits established...) by economic relations in the last instance, but also, and equally important, the way in which economic relations are themselves determined by ideological (and political) relations (1982:102).
The way to begin to investigate social relations within Canadian society, then, is through an awareness that consciousness of self as being in and of the world is not separate from the world as it is actively constructed by human beings (see Bannerji, 1995:18). Such an understanding allows for the realization that embedded within ideological practices and the categories they give form to are those very social relations that organize human societies (Smith, 1990:38).

In this regard, Derek Sayer argues that ideological practices must have some practical adequacy. That is

[if] like Marx we assume an internal relation between people's action in, and consciousness of the world, we imply that all consciousness, including ideology, possesses a minimum of what I will term practical adequacy. It must, in other words, allow men and women to conduct and make sense of their everyday activity... If ideological accounts of the world are false, then their falsity must be explained in terms of the nature of the experience which is capable of sustaining such illusions, illusions, moreover, which must be assumed to be practically adequate in the face of the experience of the knowing subject (1979:8).

In order for us to make good sense of the construction of migrant worker as a category in Canadian society during this latest period of capitalist restructuring, then, we need to account for changes not only in public policies or material conditions but also in the way that social relations in Canada are organized. We need to untangle how the category of migrant worker operates as an 'ideological narrative' (Smith, 1990:92). How does it become possible to deny a group of people organized as migrant workers the rights held by Canadians and permanent residents with little, if any, threat to the legitimacy of either the Canadian national state or this category?

To answer this question, we need to examine those social relations that help to organize the migrant worker category in such a way that it is not at odds with existing social relations, but reproduces them in (perhaps) different ways. In order to do this, we need to unpack those ideological practices that inform the construction of the category migrant worker. In particular, I
argue it is important to investigate the material force of *state* ideological practices, such as those of Members of Parliament in the Canadian House of Commons.
Introduction

In Canada, the construction of the category ‘migrant worker’ took place within a broad, international environment of increased competition for capital investment and in a global context of growing trade liberalization. A significant part of these developments was an increase in the mobility of both capital and people within the global system of national states. In this chapter, I discuss a documentary analysis of parliamentary debates during the period from 1969 to 1973 to show how parliamentary legislative and discursive practices regarding trade and investment policies contributed both materially and ideologically to the production of what has come to be known as globalization. I begin by outlining the restructuring of legislative practices in this area to provide the background necessary to examine the discursive practices used by parliamentarians to make ‘common sense’ of these changes.

I show that substantial material and political aid was organized through Canadian state practices for capital investors operating both within and outside of Canada. I examine some of these strategies, including the introduction of the Canadian Export Development Corporation that insured capital investments, tax breaks, capital grants and changes in regulations governing the sale of labour. My analysis will show that by restructuring key pieces of legislation shaping trade and investment, Canadian state practices not only responded to but facilitated a growth in international competition for capital investments.
I demonstrate how the constitution of globalization was accomplished not only through a restructuring of the global political economy but also through the legitimation of a different rationality of governance – one that while relying on historical practices of nationalism, worked to restructure these practices so that they made common sense. My documentary analysis of parliamentary debates captures a major discursive shift in parliamentary practices during the period of study. From 1969 to 1973, hegemonic views regarding trade and investment changed tremendously. I show that from 1969 to 1970, the supposed ‘nationality’ of capital investors was a central organizing framework for debates on capital investment. The notion that ‘Canada was for Canadian capitalists’ was often re-iterated in the House of Commons at this time. However, as the effects of the restructuring of state practices began to manifest themselves, a redefinition of who constituted a Canadian capitalist took place.

Following 1971, as the international competition for investments intensified, I document an expansion in the criteria for being a ‘Canadian’ capitalist. All capital investors in Canada, as well as all investors assisted by the Canadian state in their activities outside of the country, eventually came to be seen as Canadian. This view came to enjoy unanimous party support in the House. This, however, did not signal an end to the use of nationalist ideologies within parliamentary debates.

Following an analysis of how restructured state practices made the material process of globalization possible I move on to analyze how such shifts were accomplished through ideological practices of problem making. I show how the organization of the problem of foreign competition through parliamentary discursive practices was a key part of how common sense was made of this restructuring. My analysis further shows that in contrast to the expansion in the definition of ‘Canadian capitalist,’ there was no similar expansion in the definition of people

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1 Parliaments did not directly use the term ‘Canadian capitalist’. Rather, they talked about capitalists based in Canada as ‘Canadian exporters’ or as owning ‘Canadian businesses’. I use the term capitalist to show how parliamentarians, regardless of the terms they used, were discussing the restructuring of the relations of ruling.
either living outside of Canadian borders or (im)migrating to the country occurred as 'Canadian'. Instead, an expansion in the criteria of Canadian capitalist occurred in conjunction with the portrayal of workers outside of Canada as a foreign threat. Likewise, certain people (im)migrating to the country were constructed as the foreigners within the nation.

Constructing the legitimacy of making the attraction and/or retention of capital investments in Canada a central concern was made possible, in part, by constructing foreigners - either foreign national states or more likely foreign workers - as the problem facing the Canadian nation. By conflating the interests of capitalists with those of the 'imagined community' of Canadians, parliamentarians were, through the use of nationalist ideologies, able to abstract the on-going reproduction of ruling relations.

By making common sense of the construction of foreigners as Our collective problem, the Canadian nation itself was re-produced. In this sense, I show how parliamentarians, through their discursive portrayal of themselves as representatives of the people, re-enacted the nation and through this re-enactment, legitimated the performance of state power. Indeed, the discursive practice of constructing that which was Other and foreign and that, therefore, which was Canadian was a significant aspect of how state practices were able to situate Canada as a continuing site for capital investment.

In this Chapter, I highlight the on-going importance of the Canadian nation-building project to the (re)production of ruling relations. I show how the use of nationalist ideologies allowed parliamentarians of all political parties to make common sense of practices that facilitated capital accumulation. I argue that Canadian state practices that worked to restructure the global ruling relations for the continuing benefit of capitalists were integrally related to parliamentary ideological discursive practices relying on the historically constructed negative dualities between Us-Canadians and foreigners. I show that the strengthening of Canadian
nationalism through parliamentary discursive practices during this period actually facilitated processes of globalization.

A study of these links demonstrates the importance of expanding the scope of political economy to include an analysis of ideological practices. An examination of the relationship between material and ideological practices is necessary in order to reveal how ruling relations were actually put together through coordinated human activity during this time. A documentary analysis of parliamentary debates will be useful in this regard for it centers the production of these texts within a set of social relations. Rather than supervising, orchestrating or standing apart from these social relations the discursive practices of parliamentarians are shown to be part of their organization and (re)production. The discursive practices employed in the parliamentary debates are, therefore, a part of the relations of ruling in Canada. While parliamentary debates do not constitute the entirety of state practices, by examining how certain problems and solutions are organized through them, the social relations underlying their organization is uncovered.

Legislating Globalization

In this section, I examine how shifts in the way capitalism was done in Canada was organized through the discursive practices of parliamentarians. I highlight those parliamentary debates that helped to organize the ‘need’ to re-shape legislation within a quickly changing international environment in such a way that ensured the continued accumulation of capital - both in Canada and outside of its borders. The bringing in of new legislation during this period highlights the falseness of the contention that national state practices were/are most concerned with people inside their borders, including so-called national capitalists. Rather, through a documentary analysis of parliamentary debates, I show that the actions taken by parliamentarians were global in scope and reach. This is most evident in the documented shift in Canadian legislation that facilitated the movement towards export-driven capitalist activity.
This shift occurred in part through the restructuring of state legislative practices concerning trade and investment policy. During my period of study, the contours of the restructuring of such policies became evident immediately. In reporting to parliament the details of a 1969 meeting of trade ministers representing member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Jean-Luc Pepin, Canada’s Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce (a newly merged department), re-iterated the three priorities agreed upon by members of this powerful body of Northern nation-states. These were: the expansion of international trade, the simultaneous growth in both multinational corporations and the mobility of capital investments and, ‘relations with developing countries’ (Hansard, February 18, 1969: 5635-36).

In his comments to parliament, Pepin stated that the paramount work for the Northern states was to ensure the continued growth of capital investment by facilitating a global shift to export-led economic development. This was, in part, to account for the fact that increasingly mobile multinational (or transnational) corporations (MNCs or TNCs) held a dominant portion of the world’s capital investments. He further argued that such a shift in economic policy made sense for Canadians given the history of export-led development in Canada (Ibid.).

Pepin further emphasized the need to change national regulations and legislation to manage the growing concentration of capital investments and the growing mobility of capital. Indeed, the restructuring of state practices on trade and investment was identified as critical to the first goal. In an integrally related discussion, Pepin discussed ways to ensure the participation (willingly or not) of the relatively new national states of the South. Indeed, shifts in capital investments to the South, where labour power had historically been made both cheaper and weaker, was identified as necessary for the ongoing competitiveness of exporters.

Importantly, in a close interplay between response and provocation, Pepin put forward the argument that Canadian state practices needed to be either augmented or changed entirely to
ensure the profitability of capital investments. Within Canada, putting into place conditions to secure the profits of investors was identified as the solution to drops in the rate of growth of (officially measured) economic activity. It was reported in parliament that there had been a drop in the growth of such activity from 6.4 percent in 1966 to 3.1 percent in 1967 (Hansard, June 3, 1969:9463; 9467).

Significantly, Pepin also stated that Canadian state practices designed to ensure the accumulation of capital by capitalist operating outside of the nationalized boundaries of Canada were necessary as well. There was a simultaneous focus on attempts to maximize the profits of exporters operating in Canada as well as facilitating shifts in production sites to so-called developing countries. In this regard, Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in reporting on his meeting with other NATO and OECD representatives, stated:

[t]here was a full discussion of the Secretary General's proposals for the creation of a high-level group to assess current problems in international trade, to consider how these problems might be met, and to set out various options for their solution. The Secretary General's initiative was also aimed at maintaining the high degree of liberalization achieved in international trade and the prevention of backsliding. The initiative received very wide support... I made clear our intention to contribute to the work of the group and our expectation that it will pave the way for further progress in multilateral trade without infringing on the responsibilities and prerogatives of the GATT [General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs] (June 14, 1971:6650, emphasis added).

The restructuring of state practices in Canada varied as was even a bit incoherent at times. Beginning with the merger of the departments of trade and commerce into one powerful new ministry (Hansard. February 27, 1969: 6017), existing policies on aid to capitalists were enhanced. The latter strategy was evident in the increase of both the spending powers and scope of the Canada Export Development Corporation (CEDC). The CEDC was designed to financially assist private enterprises in the hopes of making ‘Canada’ ‘more competitive’. Assistance came in the form of insuring exports from capitalists operating in Canada to an initial limit of $750

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2 Bill C-183, Export Development Corporation: Measure to Provide Insurance Guarantees and Loans to Develop Trade, was first introduced on March 21, 1969. There was no debate at that time however.
million (later changed to $850 million). Investment insurance was granted regardless of whether their investments were financed through public or private funds (Hansard, April 14, 1969:7474).

The CEDC was a good example of how legislated changes in Canadian state practices helped to restructure the global economy towards export-led growth. Significantly, while one of the tasks assigned to the CEDC was to ensure the profitability of exports from Canada, especially those exported to developing countries, it was also designed to ensure that Canadian capitalists profited from the production of commodities in developing countries. In discussing this feature of the CEDC, Otto E. Lang, speaking for the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, stated:

The Export Development Corporation will be the focal point for the government's interest in the financing of exports and in the insurance of private investments abroad. In succession to the export Credits Insurance Corporation, it will administer new and expanded facilities for export credits, export credits insurance and guarantees, and will encourage and facilitate the provision of private financing for export. It will be charged with responsibility for the insurance of private Canadian investment in developing countries. This entirely new facility is being added in the belief that such investment can make a meaningful contribution to our international development effort and at the same time improve the competitive position of Canadian firms in world markets, and should therefore be facilitated (Hansard, April 14, 1969:7474).

Lang adds that these changes will permit:

Extension of lines of credit to foreign borrowers to finance purchase of goods and services in Canada - so-called buyers' credits which are being increasingly used in international trade [and]; Financing of a reasonable portion of local costs of projects where this is necessary to the winning of contracts by Canadian exporters (Ibid.:7475-76).

By insuring investors in the South for hundreds of millions of dollars against loss of profits, parliamentarians made the Canadian state liable for producing 'stability' for capital investments in these countries. Thus, political intervention in the policies of foreign states, especially those in the South, was included in the work that the CEDC was to perform. In this regard, Lang stated:

...insurance of investments in developing countries [is] to be offered to encourage participation by Canadian companies in business opportunities abroad where this will advance Canada's economic interests, especially, exports, and/or contribute to the recipient country's economic development. Finally, an entirely new facility is to be
established to insure Canadian investments in developing countries against loss due to war, insurrection or revolution, expropriation or confiscation and inability to transfer earnings or capital... (Ibid.:7477-78).

Through the legislation operationalizing the CEDC, the protection of private capital investments was made a national priority. The CEDC, then, was one mechanism by which global competition for investments through increased capital mobility was accomplished. This was done by providing both financial and political assistance to capitalist enterprises setting up outside of Canada. Lang explicitly recognized this in his acknowledgement that “foreign investment will stimulate the flow of private capital to developing countries” (Ibid.:7478).

Direct discussions were undertaken with those working in other national states as well as in representations to international coordinating bodies, such as the OECD, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to coordinate this on a global level. The following debate regarding tariff preferences for exports from the South perhaps best exemplifies how such state practices were internationally co-ordinated. MP C.M. Drury, Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated:

...there is a growing realization that to bridge the gap that separates the rich and poor countries the export earnings of the latter must increase substantially. One of the means that could facilitate achieving this objective is to provide the exports of these countries preferential access to world markets. ...At the UN [United Nations] Conference on Trade and Development in New Delhi last year there was unanimous agreement to attempt to establish a system of special tariff reductions that the industrialized countries would offer the developing countries (Hansard, November 14, 1969:817).

These changes facilitated the greater mobility of capital ventures by reducing high tariff barriers in the North to commodities produced in the South. Pushing for this change, then, was one of the ways that Canadian state practices ensured that shifts in production sites to the Southern countries would be profitable for Canadian capitalists. Such practices also ensured that strategies of import-substitution adopted almost universally by Southern national states in the post WWII period were abandoned in favour of export-led development (Mitter, 1986, Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983, Sivanandan, 1982).
MPs belonging to the main opposition party, the Progressive Conservatives (PCs), led by Robert Stanfield, supported this direction in state practices. Stanfield's promotion of an ever-greater role for the IMF in advancing trade liberalization, particularly in developing countries, acknowledged the global framework in which capitalist accumulation occurred and demonstrated how Canadian state practices were concerned with (and affected) not only national issues but international ones as well. He stated:

[c]ertainly we need arrangements for policing; we need arrangements for encouraging countries to follow appropriate domestic policies... but I submit in all seriousness that the machinery we have now still remains inadequate and that our own monetary stability can be threatened any time by developments abroad in virtually any part of the developing world. ...[I]t is in the interests of Canada to seek improved international arrangements for removing serious disequilibriums where they exist (Hansard, March 7, 1969:6345-46).

The development of certain new arrangements, such as de-linking Canadian currency from the international gold standard, helped in the restructuring of relationships between capitalists and people in the national states of both the North and South. These national states were a major facilitator of these changed relationships. National states in the much of the South restructured policies that facilitated the expansion of capitalism. Much of the rural economy was destroyed, rural to urban migrations within national states increased and people working within capitalist labour markets saw their labour power further cheapened and weakened (Tai-Li, 1983, Ong, 1983, Fernandez-Kelly, 1983).

In Canada, state practices restructured policies in order to try and match investment conditions existing outside of the country, particularly to compete with the countries in the South. Such state practices gave material form both to the growth in capital mobility and the practically unfettered movement and accumulation of capital. In other words, the Canadian state helped to establish the framework through which Canada needed to become more competitive.

At the same time, such policies helped to achieve one of the three stated priorities of the OECD: the continuation of colonial relationships whereby people in the South, despite having
severed formal colonial ties with Northern states, remained part of a global capitalist framework. This was done in part through the practices of those working in Southern national states that, for the most part, left intact the fundamental features of ruling relations, such as capitalist economies. Mainly, though, colonial relations were maintained through the work of capital investors who tied their investments in the South to the ability to exploit workers left cheapened and weakened by centuries of ruling relations (Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983). Indeed, the perpetuation of these colonial relationships was an integral part of the capital accumulation process, for it allowed for a global competition between nationalized labour markets, with workers in the Southern labour markets performing as a role model for the proverbial race to the bottom.

Importantly, there was solid support for this process of heightened global competition within parliament as evidenced by the all-party support in the House for the CEDC. Indeed, some MPs argued that direct capital grants to investors were not enough and encouraged the adoption of other aids to investors. Opposition MP AD Hales stated that, “[o]ne of their [exporters in Canada] greatest problems is the non-tariff barriers, for want of a better term, of other countries” (Hansard, April 14, 1969:7479). Included in his definition of non-tariff barriers were the higher wage levels and corporate tax levels found in Canada, especially in comparison with other national states. He stated:

Italian manufacturers paying low wages export their products to Canada and our local manufacturers have to compete against those products. The competition is severe, particularly in electrical appliances. The Department of National Revenues imposes corporation and income taxes on our manufacturers, taking up to fifty per cent of their income from them, while Italian manufacturers pay taxes of only five percent or ten percent and put the remainder of their money into research and development of their industries (Ibid.:7479-80).

The solution? Aside from committing state expenditures to the restructuring of ruling relations, MPs in the House made repeated suggestions for reductions in corporate and investment taxes to prevent Canada from “…quickly losing its favoured position in regard to
investment of international resource capital” (Hales. Hansard, May 6, 1970:6633). To make sure that Canadian businesses did not remain non-competitive, Hales, for one, encouraged the lowering of wages and corporate tax rates in Canada (Ibid.).

Indeed, cuts in corporate taxes became another major element of Canadian state practices aimed at ensuring capital accumulation. Such cuts were linked to the ability of the Canadian state to enact measures designed to attract and/or retain capital investments. Linking cuts in corporate taxes to capital investments, Finance Minister, E.J. Benson, noted with seeming pride that,

...[p]ersonal direct taxes grew from about twenty-one percent to twenty-seven percent of total revenues, while the relative importance of corporation and indirect taxes declined.

...There was also a most welcome development in the pattern of longer-term capital movements... (Hansard, June 3, 1969:9499).

Thus, while personal taxes grew, the share of state revenue paid by corporations declined. This trend continued so that by 1971, Benson proposed further substantial corporate tax reductions and brought down the corporate tax rate to ten percent (Hansard, October 14, 1971:8690). Alongside state guarantees that secured the stability of capital investments and reductions in the corporate share of taxes, Canadian state practices also established so-called ‘incentive grants’ for investors to establish their business operations in Canada. For instance, in 1971, one such incentive program alone re-allocated $80 million to private investors (Hansard, November 19, 1971:9715).

In summation, the restructuring of legislative practices in Canada concerning trade and investment was critical to the creation of the competitive environment of globalization. While the US national state led the restructuring of the terms of competition during my period of study, (1969 to 1973), parliamentarians supported the matching of each new US effort to attract capital investment through select programs. Such state practices were firmly supported by most
opposition MPs. The following statement by Robert L. Stanfield, leader of the PCs, is fairly typical of these responses:

...[i]n view of the emphasis that President Nixon placed today in his address to Congress upon the US entering a new era of international trading relationships and, as a part of this, the apparent intention to establish special trading corporations in the US with special taxing arrangements that will place them far beyond the competitive position of our corporations, has the government in mind specific measures to enable Canadian exporters to face the danger posed by this proposal? (September 9, 1971:7655).

During this period, then, Canadian state practices helped to ensure the global accumulation of capital. These were not limited to ensuring accumulation within the territories this state controlled. Instead, Canadian state practices restructured how capitalism was conducted globally as well as in Canada. At the same time, through the organization of competition between individual national states to attract capital investment, nation-state practices were restructured. It was recognized that in order to reproduce global ruling relations, there needed to be a restructuring of both national labour markets and the environment for investment in individual national states (see below for a discussion of how policies affecting working standards were discussed by parliamentarians).

Organizing a ‘New Reality’

Alongside shifts in state practices supporting an export-led global economy there was a concomitant shift in state ideological practices. In restructuring people’s material reality and the political economy through which this was organized, parliamentary discursive practices, by producing a common sense of these changes, helped to abstract people’s consciousness of themselves and the world they lived in. These ideological practices worked to conceal how state practices promoting processes of globalization would be detrimental to most people (in and
outside of Canada) and re-framed them as necessary for ‘Canadian prosperity’ (John Turner, Minister of Finance, Hansard, March 2, 1973: 1833).

The ability for parliamentary discursive practices to produce the common sense that globalization was of ultimate benefit to the Canadian nation rested on the construction of a zero-sum game between Us-Canadians and those rendered as the foreigner-Other. Consequently, in Canada, parliamentary discursive practices that worked to bring about globalization with its increased competition for capital investments rested on the performance of state practices as a nationalist response to foreigners. In the process of organizing a common sense around processes of globalization, there was a re-constitution of the ‘imagined community’ of Canadians on whose behalf state power was wielded.

A key part of how nationalist ideological practices were legitimized was through a three-fold process. First, the restructuring of both legislation and regulations in Canada to the benefit of investors was portrayed as a necessary solution to the ‘new reality’ of global competition for capital investments. Second, the definition of Canadian capitalist was expanded. Foreign investors were re-invented as Canadian as long as they either invested in Canada or received financial and/or political assistance from the Canadian state. Third, people working in foreign countries were produced as the problem that threatened the well being of Canadian workers. This was mainly done by omitting any discussion of the practices of investors who relied on the continued, although restructured, colonization of the South and naturalizing the cheapened and weakened reality of workers in the South. I will now examine how each of these ideological practices was made common sensical within the parliamentary debates of this period.

Throughout the period under study, the restructuring of the global capitalist economy, with its emphasis on policies facilitating export-driven economies, garnered little criticism from

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1 John Turner was to go on to lead the Liberal Party of Canada and, for a short time, become Prime Minister of Canada in 1983.
parliamentarians of any of the political parties represented in the House. Indeed, other than the question of who should own capitalist enterprises, ruling relations were left untroubled, even when the effects of such relations were acknowledged as having been negative for parts of the population in Canada.

Certain Canadian state practices, such as the introduction of the CEDC, that were designed to both attract capital investment in Canada as well as ensure that Canadian businesses did well abroad, were presented as “... an important step forward in adjusting our administrative structure to changing needs...” (Hansard, Lang, April 14, 1969:7478). Hence, even though the framework for a restructured global system of ruling was established, in part, through Canadian state practices, such moves were produced as a mere reaction to a new environment of international competition, thereby concealing the work of state practices in bringing about processes of globalization.

From the beginning of my period of study, the production of this new reality of international competition as a problem for a presumed and supposedly unified Canadian population was evident in the parliamentary debates. MPs offering support for the goal of expanding world trade, i.e. export-driven growth often did so with arguments that emphasized the necessity for state practices that facilitated the buying and selling of exports. For example, MP Allistair Gillespie, in supporting the expansion of the IMF’s lending powers (to supply capital to national states to buy imports and secure a market for capitalists’ exported commodities - increasing the indebtedness of borrower states in the process), argued for it not only on its own merit, but on the presumption that “this is the kind of world to which we must adjust ourselves. I do not think we will find easy or quick solutions...” (Hansard, March 7, 1969:6348).

The ideological framework of nationalism gave added legitimacy to such state practices. The use of nationalist ideologies simultaneously kept the discourse of necessity alive while re-
framing it as beneficial to Us-Canadians. Indeed, as with the supposed inevitability of export-driven economies, arguments for doing whatever was necessary to secure capital investments in Canada took place within the context of a ‘crisis’ existing for the nation. In the parliamentary debates, the idea was put forward that a global, zero-sum game now existed whereby individual ‘nations’ were in competition to lure and/or keep capital.

Thus, the introduction of the CEDC was framed as necessary in the face of foreign competition for Canadian firms. In introducing the legislation enacting the CEDC, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Otto Lang stated:

...a study commissioned by the Department of Trade and Commerce revealed clear evidence of an underlying problem and suggested that the facilities available to support the export and other international activities of Canadian companies were less flexible and adequate than those in other countries. Accordingly, in light of the importance of improved export performance to the Canadian economy on the one hand and the increased use of credit in international trade and intensification of foreign competition on the other, we concluded that new and expanded facilities were required to ensure that on as economical a basis as possible, consistent with the over-all needs of the economy and resources available, Canadian firms were backed by adequate and competitive financing facilities (Hansard, April 14, 1969:7474).

The ideological practice of representing aids to business as a nationalist activity both concealed the state’s role in producing this reality while securing the common sensical character of the restructuring of ruling relations. The continuation of the crisis of competition and, therefore, the urgency of the solution, was organized, in part, by discussing the ‘continued expansion and freedom of world trade’ as the main priority in all high-level meetings between representatives of the Canadian and other national states (Hansard, Prime Minister (PM) Trudeau, March 26, 1969:7127). By making this the key priority, the existence of increased competition for export markets and capital was further naturalized, for it was simultaneously portrayed as not only inevitable (instead of socially coordinated) but also as the paramount concern of Canadians.
In the debates, the need to be internationally competitive was identified by various MPs as the solution to the supposedly collective Canadian problem of how to manage (and perhaps even benefit) from a rapidly changing international environment. By 1969, the Minister of Finance, E.J. Benson, warned that Canada needed to counteract some negative trends in the global economy if We-Canadians were to avoid dire consequences. He set the stage for the urgent need for the Canadian state to take action to solve certain problems in the international arena by stating:

1968 brought a succession of international monetary and exchange crises, of a frequency and severity hitherto unknown in the postwar period... [I]t was also a year of social upheaval in many countries and of generalized nervousness about all currencies and about the adequacy of the international financial system (p.9500). (Hansard, June 3, 1969:9499).5

The problem of ‘foreign competition’ was raised as the problem facing Us while changes to Canadian state practices that facilitated some of the terms of this competitiveness were presented as the solution. This was done, as Herb Grey, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Finance did, by associating every expansion of industry and each gain in the profitability of exporters from Canada as a gain for Canadians.6 Increasing the attractiveness of Canada as a site for capital investments was presented as the key to ‘Our collective’ ability to avert disaster:

...Canada is a major trading nation and our prosperity depends on world trade to a degree equaled by few other countries in the world today. We have been a prime beneficiary of this rapid growth of world trade and have every interest in all measures that can facilitate the continued growth of world trade in the future... (Lang, Hansard, January 15, 1969:4343, emphasis added).

By conflating the interests of capitalists with that of the public, Minister Lang was able to further state:

1 Indeed, at all such meetings the top priority was how to discuss ways of increasing trade liberalization and decreasing regulations hampering the movement of capital (see Hansard, April 21, 1969: June 1, 1970:7519; December 1, 1970:1623).

5 There certainly were many ‘social upheavals’ in 1968, including student revolts in both Paris and Mexico City that radicalized many people of that generation (see Davis, 1974).

6 Such statements predate the 1980s discourse of the ‘trickle down’ effect, whereby the nation benefits from additional wealth being giving to capital investors (see Women’s Economic Agenda, 1988).
...I emphasized...that the government believes that stimulating exports is of tremendous advantage to our economy. That stimulation encourages maximum productivity in the face of competition we must meet if we are to compete with other producers in the world markets. It also brings about the advantage of an enlarged market (Hansard, April 14, 1969:7490, emphasis added).

He adds:

[O]f course we are aware that increasing exports will logically lead to the development of increased imports into Canada. But that does not frighten this government, Speaker. We believe that open trade and exchange of products between countries is of tremendous advantage to those participating in that trade (Ibid.:7490).

The use of nationalist discursive practices, even the adoption of some of the machismo of nationalist rhetoric to promote the restructuring of legislation on trade and investment is evident in the above statement. Instead of talking about how specific groupings of people - most obviously capital investment owners both inside and outside of Canada's boundaries - could profit from these investments, parliamentary discursive practices borrowed directly concepts such as 'our prosperity' from nationalist ideology. These discursive practices brought forth an imagery that capital investment was for the benefit of the nation.

Indeed, MPs in various parties consistently asserted that only increased trade liberalization would help ensure the prosperity of Canadians. The importance of linking aid to capitalists to aid to Canadians can be seen in Finance Minister, E.J. Benson's statement that "[i]f the corporation sector of the economy is weak and uncertain we cannot have a sustained growth in job opportunities" (Hansard, October 14, 1971:8690).

Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Otto Lang further produced a common sense between the link of expanded export trade and the growth of the well-being of Canadians. He presented state practices that assisted the owners of exports as in the 'national interest' of Canadians by stating:

...the government regards sustained and improved export performance as a basic element in maintaining and developing the sound growth in the Canadian economy which in turn is necessary if we are to have the capacity to develop our social programs, provincial or federal, to upgrade our education, medical, welfare and cultural standards, to afford the
investment required to narrow our regional disparities... (Hansard, April 14, 1969:7474, emphasis added).

This discursive strategy was part of the beginning of a by now well-established discourse on how increased support for business are good and necessary for the betterment of the whole of the Canadian populace (see McBride, 1992).

The Benefits of Membership

The employment of nationalist ideologies to legitimize shifting state practices that brought about globalization was not reliant solely upon generalized appeals to the national interest. Rather, recourse to the strong sense of entitlement that notions of Canadian-ness produced for that part of the population who met the historically delineated criteria of belonging to the Canadian nation was an essential component in how common sense was made of globalization by state ideological practices. The unchallenged idea that benefits accruing from activities in the Canadian nation were meant for the ‘members’ of that nation alone to enjoy is evidence of the strength of this sense of Canadian entitlement. This deep sense of entitlement affected not only ideas about who should own capital in the country but also who was entitled to jobs, social ‘rights’ and more.

The use of this nationalist sense of entitlement was found on all sides of one of the key debates in parliament during the earlier period of this study. This debate centred on whether capital investments in Canada should be made by Canadians alone or whether the investments of foreigners should also be sought out. This debate was deeply informed by notions that the nationality of capital investors was key to whether their activities were beneficial or harmful to Canadians.

In this debate, the notion of a unified Canadian public who collectively would either benefit or lose from such investments was left unquestioned. This signaled an overall acceptance of capitalist social relations by parliamentarians. Those either taking the position that only
Canadian capitalists should be able to invest in the country or arguing that all investments were beneficial helped to solidify the view that any threat to Canadians came not from the organization of relations of ruling but from foreigners - either foreign capitalists, foreign national states and/or foreign workers.

Moreover, despite their points of disagreement, parliamentarians holding either view discursively produced the idea that the Canadian national state was indeed the natural representative of the Canadian nation. Indeed, the ideological conflation of state practices with the nation was an important aspect of the work done by parliamentary debates on these topics regardless of the position taken. This is evident in the fact that parliamentarians taking either a ‘Canada for Canadian Capitalists’ perspective or a ‘all capitalists in Canada are Canadian’ one, argued that their view best served and protected Canadians.

**Canada for Canadian Capitalists**

The ‘Canada for Canadian Capitalists’ was a self-acknowledged nationalist position that held that Canadians were under threat from foreign capitalists who through their investments could control the political machinery of the state and, hence, Canadians. This position was taken most strongly by MPs of the New Democratic Party (NDP) but also from MPs representing the Quebec-based party, the Ralliement Creditiste who took a “Quebec for Quebeckers” point of view.

During the late 1960s, parliamentarians from these parties consistently made the case for state policies that favoured investors with Canadian nationality. This, they argued, would bring both prosperity and sovereignty to Canadians. For example, MP Bernard Dumont states:

> I have always wondered why this house does not pass legislation enabling Canadians to continue to hold fifty-one percent of the shares of Canadian companies and to restrict the percentage of other countries to a maximum of forty-nine percent. Thus, Canadians could have real control over their economy. ...I believe it is time to influence investment dealers

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1. This view was well encapsulated by Mel Watkins, the author of a state-commissioned report on foreign investment in Canada (as cited in Watkins, 1975).
to make them embrace a nationalism...so that Canada will become a great country from an economic point of view (Hansard, June 27, 1969:10731).

Using nationalist discursive practices of assuming a unified Canadian populace, this speaker is able to easily conflate the interests of capitalists with the interests of all people living and working in Canada. Indeed, all those advancing this particular nationalist ideology use this tactic. The following statement by T.C. (Tommy) Douglas is a typical example of how those in the NDP used it:

The fact is that at the present time more and more of our extraction industries are in the hands of foreign investors who have set up subsidiaries in this country purely for the purpose of supplying their parent companies with certain raw materials. ...Most serious of all, these companies are primarily concerned with getting raw material out of the country in its most primary state. ...[N]o other country in the world has so much of its economy owned and controlled outside its borders as has Canada. ...[W]e are rapidly reaching the point of no return, we are rapidly losing control of our economic affairs. Any person who studies history knows that inevitably political control always follows economic control (February 27, 1969: 6026-28, emphasis added).

A fundamental assumption of this argument was the notion that if Canadians owned industries operating in Canada, the operation of the economy would be in safe hands. Simultaneously, this argument sets up foreign capitalists, rather than capitalist social relations per se, as the problem facing Us. This argument presupposes that such profit-making activities as resource extraction occur not because this may be the most profitable venture capitalists can embark on in Canada but because the owners are foreigners.

This argument, thus, makes common sense of the ideological notion that Canadian capitalists would not embark on such projects but would produce value-added manufactured goods (and therefore employment in manufacturing) from these raw resources. Importantly, then, a binary opposition is established through such an argument which first of all (re)creates the notion that capitalists and their practices can be distinguished by nationality and secondly, that Our capitalists are preferable to Theirs.
Such an argument is taken even further by future NDP leader, MP David Lewis, who argues that without 'foreign domination' Canada could once again be a sovereign nation whose people control their own national policies. In this respect, he makes the following motion in the House:

That this house condemns the failure of the government to provide policies to prevent further takeovers of Canadian resources, industry and financial institutions by foreign corporations, thus increasing the danger of foreign domination of Canada's economy and culture to the point where Canada's political independence is threatened... I inscribed this motion on the order paper on my own behalf and on behalf of my colleagues because in our view the question of the foreign domination of our economy and the erosion of Canada's cultural development and political independence by foreigners is one of the two major problems facing the future of our country. I wish to make it clear at the outset that I am not speaking of a sterile, negative kind of nationalism that beats its breast and wants to build a wall around the nation of which we are proud citizens. I am speaking of a creative pride and of a determination to build in our society, Canada, our own system of values; I am speaking of our determination to establish our own goals and to have the collective freedom to work toward those goals without interference and without having our freedoms eroded from outside... (Hansard, May 29, 1969:9217, emphasis added).

This argument was made during a period of simultaneous declines in the level of employment, loss of consumer spending power and increases in corporate profits (McBride, 1992). By being most concerned with the nationality of those who own and control capital investments and not the social relations of capitalism, the political left in parliament helped to portray foreigners as the cause for the major problems facing Canadians. Despite Lewis' claim that his brand of nationalism was 'creative' and put in the service of building our 'collective freedom', such arguments actually helped to conceal the relations of ruling.8 This is because they insulated capitalists from blame for the many insecurities and deprivations that some people faced at this time. Instead blame was cast on those identified as foreigners - foreign capitalists, for the time being. At the same time, through these discursive practices the nation was re-invented.

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8 In a (most likely unintentional) display of irony, MPJ W. Monteith, in response to Lewis' comments states: "...What my hon. friends to the left of me usually forget is that if we had not had foreign capital invested in this country we would not have even got the fur trade started in the 17th century (Hansard, May 29, 1969:9225). His comment clearly indicates who the 'we' is in relation to Canadians - Europeans, namely the British and the French.
All Capitalists are Canadian

In contrast to this brand of nationalist perspective, the argument put forward by the governing Liberal party and supported, more or less, by the official opposition Progressive Conservative (PC) Party was that all capital investments made in Canada and even those investments made outside of Canada with the assistance of the Canadian state ought to be considered Canadian. For example, when discussing whose businesses were eligible for state-funded financial grants, a governing party MP stated, “the eligibility criteria are concerned with the nature of the firm’s business and prospects and not with the country of residence of its principal or owner” (Hansard, April 1, 1970:5878).

While the nationality of the investor was not the main focus, this was not an anti-nationalist position. Instead, the ideological framework for this approach centered on the already widely-used argument that only growing world trade in commodities produced for export would increase the prosperity of Canadians. The discursive organization of this solution rested upon nationalist ideological notions that posited that We must embrace any and all capitalists, despite their nationality and even despite where they invested, because We-Canadians were under threat from foreigners in other countries trying to lure away Our investors. These foreigners could be foreign national states in competition with Canada for capital investments or alternatively, they could be foreign workers, especially those in the South who were paid less and lived in a policy climate that had weakened labour and environmental protections.

Liberal and PC party MPs argued that the proper solution to the problem of foreign competition lay in the restructuring of Canadian state practices so that whatever was needed to ensure the investment of capital in Canada, regardless of the nationality of the owners. Having foreigners invest in Canada, then, was portrayed as good for Canadians but this discourse took place in the ideological context where foreigners in other countries were seen as Our collective enemies. Within these discursive practices, the contradiction of producing supposedly foreign
capitalists operating in Other countries as a problem while simultaneously encouraging so-called Canadian capitalists to operate abroad or to fund these foreign capitalists thereby turning them into Canadian ones was concealed by omitting any reference to it.

At the same time that trade liberalization was portrayed as being in the best interests of Canadians, however, parliamentary discursive practices were also attentive to other ideological devices that concealed state assistance to capitalists. The growing ideological discourse of ‘development’ in and ‘aid’ to the South helped to conceal how shifting Canadian state practices helped to reorganize colonial relations of capitalist profit from the domination of people in the South through the assistance of Northern national-states.

Canadian state practices designed to increase the profitability of capital mobility to the South, such as the CEDC, were portrayed as ‘assistance to developing countries’. Notably, this was done through recourse to racist and colonial ideologies relying on historical stereotypes of people in the South as being undeveloped and ‘violent’ and that only aid from Canada and the investments of capitalists would help them to ‘develop’ like Us. In this regard, MP G.W. Baldwin states:

[w]e take the position that we should do all we can, consistent with our obligations to our own people in Canada and to our other international commitments, to ensure that the countries to which the honourable gentleman referred [those in the South] do develop to a point at which they will be beyond the type of violence in evidence in developing countries in so many parts of the world, in the hope that in due course they will become Canada’s partners in trade and on the international scene (Ibid.:819).

Practices designed to give material and political aid to capital investors operating in the South were portrayed not only as in Our best interests but also as a benevolent gesture to the ‘undeveloped’ peoples of the South. Pre-empting any charge that such practices may be seen as imperialist, NDP MP Max Saltsman argued that this was not the intent behind Canadian state practices promoting capital mobility to the South and a shift towards export-led economies. He stated:
...Canadians do not wish to be imperialists. We do not want to join in the scramble for financial colonies. We do not need them. We have no interest in playing that kind of role in international affairs... We have been the major victims of this kind of economic imperialism, and we certainly would not wish to impose on others the kind of problems that have been imposed upon us (p.7481-82, emphasis added).

By fully conflating the interests of the nation with those of capital investors while erasing the colonial and imperialist foundations of the establishment of the Canadian national state, Saltsman helped to produce the ideological notion that contemporary Canadian state practices concerning the South were benevolent. These ideological practices facilitated the growing mobility of capital and the international competition for investments by making them common sensical.

**Competition as Foreign**

While both the Liberal and PC parties generally shared the view that all investors aided by the Canadian state should be considered Canadian capitalists, in the early part of my study (1969 to 1970), this view did not gain hegemonic status within the parliamentary debates. Indeed, during this period this position was not aggressively pursued. It was only when international competition between national states intensified that an expansion in the criteria of Canadian-ness for capitalists took place. Examining two events that took place in the first half of 1970 helps us to see how the 'all capitalists in Canada are Canadian' position became hegemonic.

A pivotal event that worked to solidify this position was the negotiations that started in January, 1970 to make Britain a member state of the European Common Market (ECM). In Canada, parliamentarians from every political party decried this turn of events. It was argued that British entry to the ECM would mean the end of sheltered market for products, such as grain, exported from Canada. The second event helping to solidify the shift in the criteria of Canadian-ness for capitalists was the proposal in the US Congress that exporters operating from within the
US be given a fifteen percent tax credit. This took place in May of 1970 and was designed to attract and/or retain capital investments to the US.

Unlike the Canadian state's introduction of the CEDC, which was similar in its goal to aid capital investors and increase investments in Canada, these two moves were portrayed as decidedly 'unfair'. Subsequent meetings between both Ministers and bureaucrats of the Canadian state with those of other states took place in an effort to mitigate the negative effects of both British and US state actions on exporters in Canada. Such meetings were portrayed in parliament as being in the collective national interest. Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, met with representatives of various ECM-member states to, in his words:

...make the Community and individual members aware that Canada intends to take increasing advantage of the enlarged EEC [European Economic Community] as a major market not only for our raw and semi-processed materials but for the finished products of our secondary industries (Hansard, December 9, 1970:1879).

Bravado aside, however, the Canadian state did consider these trade-related developments in the ECM as threats. These threats were presented as dangers to Canadians. Sharp continues by saying:

My third purpose was to impress upon those I visited the political as well as economic dangers inherent in any tendency toward trade polarization between the US and the EC [European Community]. At the NATO meeting I called attention to the impact of such a confrontation (between a growing EEC, a protectionist US and other third countries who may 'feel' injured by the EEC) on the solidarity of the Alliance and suggested that NATO governments should be thinking of how best they could contribute to the continuing dialogue needed to avert the dangers foreseen (Ibid.:1880).

Sharp argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance of Northern national states set up in the aftermath of WWII, might need to intervene in the 'protectionist' policies of the ECM and the US. The combination of making the profitability of exports from Canada a key priority and alluding to the possibility of war between national-states that were pursuing similar policies to keep and/or attract investors helped to produce the
ideological notion that ensuring unhindered access to the ECM for exporters from Canada was akin to ensuring national prosperity and security.

This was accomplished by talking about these businesses as if they were collectively Canadian, as in Sharp's statement that "Canada intends to take increasing advantage of the... EEC." Again, by making the shift from talking about capital investments as the private property of its owners to talking about the collective interests of Canadians, nationalist discursive practices of parliamentarians worked to organize the legitimacy of giving material aid to capitalists. Nationalist rhetoric combined with the idea that state representatives did, indeed, represent 'the people', produced the common sense that it was perfectly reasonable for those working in the Canadian state to act as the negotiators for business owners.

The fear that capital investors may not choose Canadian state territory to invest in fueled MPs demands to counter British and American actions by taking similar ones. One MP responding to the US proposal for $2.6 billion in tax credits to exporters, asked whether the Canadian state was going "...to make the same kind of move to aid Canadian exporters and thereby enable them to compete on even terms with US competitors in the world market?" (Hansard, May 12, 1970: 6846) Wording the question in this way concealed that the organizing of such international competition worked to the benefit of investors. Again, in the name of 'fairness', i.e. through use of phrases, such as 'even term' and through the use of nationalist ideologies, i.e. 'Canadian exporters' versus 'US competitors', aid to investors was established as a national interest.

Significantly, both the potential entry of Britain into the ECM and the US willingness to substantially cut taxes for exporters served to shore up support for the Canadian state doing whatever was necessary to attract and/or keep capital investment in Canada, even if the investors were foreign. By the end of 1970 there was a noticeable shift away from the position that investments in Canada should be reserved for Canadians (see Hansard, December 1, 1970: 1623).
Even T.C. Douglas, former leader of the NDP and generally a staunch holder of the opinion that ‘Canada was for Canadian capitalists’, viewed the US national state’s move to offer tax breaks to investors in return for their agreement to (re)locate to the US as harmful to Canadians. While earlier he had raised concerns about how the operation of US branch plants in Canada constituted a severe threat to the sovereignty of Canada and, hence, to Canadians, he now began to protest the possibility of these same branch plants leaving the country for the US (Hansard, December 9, 1970: 1881).

Having won over its most vocal critics, those espousing the ‘all capitalists in Canada are Canadian capitalists’ view clearly won. Parliamentary debates, then, is one way that consensus amongst rulers is negotiated. From early 1970 and onwards, with all party support secured, disputes over the nationality of investors declined noticeably in parliamentary debates. It was readily admitted, with little dissent, that there should be no distinctions made between Canadian and foreign owned firms operating in Canada. Practices to restructure trade and investment policies in favour of capitalists were rarely questioned from herein in regards to their overall efficacy. Assistance to anyone investing in either the production or purchase of commodities and services in Canada came to be portrayed as an aid to ‘Canadian businesses’.

The shift in definition of Canadian business was evident in this statement regarding assistance to capitalists through state-run export development programs. Jean-Luc Pepin, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, stated, “[w]e have taken the position that what we want is Canadian exports and Canadian industrial production, so we do not make a distinction in respect of who brings it about, it being in the interest of Canada” (Hansard, December 17, 1971: 10570-71).

By 1973, there was all-party agreement that a furthering of the scope of trade liberalization was good for Canada. This was well captured in the debate surrounding the inclusion of so-called ‘non-tariff measures’ in the seventh round of multilateral trade
negotiations conducted under GATT (see: Hansard, September 17, 1973). That the GATT was being used to manage growing trade liberalization was evident in the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Alastair Gillespie’s, evaluation that this round would bring about “more effective international discipline” upon those national states who did not see further trade liberalization as beneficial (Ibid.:6613). PC party MP Paul Hellyer, was in agreement with this direction. He stated: “[w]ith the philosophy of further liberalization of world trade this party is profoundly in accord (Ibid.:6613). Likewise, MP Edward Broadbent of the NDP stated, “[i]t is very important to see that non-tariff trading barriers are discussed as well as tariffs…” (Ibid.:6614).

Again, the dominance of this position should not be read to mean that nationalist ideological practices were eschewed in parliamentary discursive practices. Rather, while the meaning of Canadian capitalist was expanded to include all those operating in Canada, foreign countries with their ‘foreign workers’ were presented as the threat facing Canadians. Indeed, this strategy can be seen as a logical outcome of the fact that the debate concerned which capitalists should operate in Canada and not whether capitalist social relations should be accepted. Once international competition for investments heated up, the nationalist rhetoric of the ‘Canada for Canadian capitalists’ was simply co-opted to include all capitalists.

With the consolidation of this shift in criteria for Canadian capitalist, Canadian state practices now began to be even more aggressive at attempting to get capitalists to invest in Canada instead of in foreign countries. During 1970 and 1971, this was done through the practice of defining capitalists elsewhere as enjoying unfair advantages. Parliamentarians represented these practices not as intrinsically unfair but unfair because they were unavailable to the now re-defined Canadian capitalist. In one example, P.M. Mahoney, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Finance, talked about how ‘concessional financing’ was an unfair trading practice:
The term "concessional financing" describes the practice adopted by some foreign governments of guaranteeing loans to Canadian borrowers at interest rates lower than commercial rates prevailing in the lender’s home market in exchange for the borrower’s commitment to purchase goods from producers in the country of the lending government... The effect of such purchase commitments made by Canadian borrowers is to limit Canadian producers’ opportunities to supply the needs of the Canadian market. Therefore, the government has decided to take measures to mitigate injury caused to Canadian producers by concessional financing (Hansard, December 1, 1970:1643-44).

Jean-Luc Pepin, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, stated what the governing party intended to do to resolve this problem of foreign competition. He stated:

...consideration will be given to invoking the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Act in specific cases. Second, we are pursuing the matter in the OECD with a view to arriving at internationally agreed rules for the extension of government-assisted export credits between industrialized countries. [Third, by legislating that through the Regional Development Incentives Act provision, Canadian manufacturers be given first opportunity to supply needed supplies]. Fourth,...the Export Development Corporation will continue to match competitive financing offered by other countries to enable Canadian exporters who can compete in foreign markets to do so... (Ibid.7319-20).

Canadian state practices were restructured to nullify any advantages to capitalists offered by foreign national states. Those using concessional financing from foreign countries were charged with ‘dumping’. This penalized capitalists operating outside of Canada by restricting their products or placing extra tariffs on them when they entered Canadian territory. Parliamentarians also passed new legislation so that the conditions said to be working to attract investors to foreign countries were made available in Canada.

Making aid to capital investors one of the top priorities for Canadian state practices was made common sensical by parliamentarians and their unquestioning acceptance of this as a paramount goal. In response to a question from an Ontario MP concerned with a state-funded grant to two corporate giants, Aerovox Canada Ltd. and Union Carbide, designed to facilitate the movement of their operations from Ontario to two other provinces, John Roberts, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Regional Economic Expansion, responded by framing this action as necessary in the face of foreign competition and the threat of capital flight. He stated:
...The real question is not whether the capacity is to be created at Welland [Ontario] but whether this capacity is to be retained in Canada at all. Because of the low cost of extracting and processing the ore in South Africa there is a real danger that this operation might not continue in Canada for long. The fact of the matter is that were it not for the assistance offered by the Department of Regional Economic Expansion and the favourable hydro rates available in Quebec, these new installations would not be built in Canada at all...(Hansard, November 30, 1971:10038-39).

This comment represents as necessary Canadian state practices that facilitate competition between different areas - even within the territory of Canada. Through continuous use of terms, such as 'our' in reference to corporations, the link between capitalists' interests and the interests of Canadians was strengthened. Thus, while the definition of Canadian businesses was expanded to include foreign investors, the discourse of nationalism, with its built-in reference to the negative dualities between Us and Them, remained a significant part of how parliamentarians produced certain problems and solutions in this period of study. Discussion of the problem of foreign competition (largely) replaced the focus on the nationality of capital investors.9

Making (Common)Sense of the Foreign Menace

Regardless of which of the two previously outlined positions were taken (either 'foreigners are taking over Our country' or 'foreigners are taking away capital investment that We require to be prosperous') parliamentarians helped to produce a problem of foreigners. This helped to make antagonism between Canadians and foreigners appear quite common sensical. Through the strategy of talking of a peculiarly Canadian 'system of values' or 'culture', such views helped to contribute to a popular sense that there was, indeed, a common, national interest that Canadians shared.

9 Importantly, the governing party addressed the issue of foreign investment in Canada by establishing the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) to ensure that foreign investors who were taking over companies "over a certain size" "...demonstrate that the purchase will result in significant benefit to Canada" (Hansard, Minister Herb Gray. May 2, 1972:1828-29). However, FIRA was set up within the framework of encouraging greater capital investment into Canada. In this regard, Herb Gray, Minister of National Revenue, stated that "...foreign investment plays an important role in Canadian development...[there is] no disagreement that foreign investment should work in the interests of this country...we shall encourage international organizations to pursue the study of the multinational enterprise and foreign direct investment with a view to cooperative international action" (Ibid.). Significantly, these evaluations were only to be made on takeovers, not new investments in Canada.
A key part of how the shift in emphasis from the nationality of investors in Canada to the competition of foreign countries was accomplished was by re-directing hostility at workers classified as foreigners. Indeed, emphasis on foreign competition came to be centred on these foreign workers. The focus was ideologically shifted so that foreign competition became a competition between workers rather than between capitalists or even national states. This was especially pronounced in regard to workers in the South.

The international differentials in wage scales came to be regarded as unfair competition. Wage disparities between lower paid workers in the South and their higher paid counterparts in the North were ideologically re-framed so that rather than recognizing these differentials as socially organized through the relations of colonialism and the operation of racist and sexist practices, they were produced as yet another example of how Canadians were being victimized. Conversely, workers rendered as cheap labour were cast as the victimizers.

Following 1970, parliamentary discourse came to be centred on the issue of what the proper solution to this foreign competition was. Two positions came to the fore. Both began with the assumption that foreign workers were, indeed, Our collective problem. A growing number of MPs complained about the negative effects on Canadians arising from the import of goods made by low-waged workers outside of Canada. Thus, one solution was to penalize the products entering Canada made by people who came to be objectified as ‘cheap foreign labour’. Along with the inclusion of concessional financing, then, Canadian state practices shifted to include products made by cheap labour to the definition of actions that constituted dumping.

Demands for the restriction of imports from ‘low wage countries’ were made within the nationalist framework that such actions were necessary to prevent foreign workers from taking jobs away from Canadians. Significantly, agreement on this solution crossed class lines. For instance, one MP raised a concern expressed by both the Canadian Association of Chemical Producers and the International Garment Workers Union. Both wanted to know what
parliamentarians intended to do about the threat that increased imports from low wage countries posed to 'Canadian jobs' (Hansard, February 5, 1970:3238).10

Indeed, it was around the issue of who was entitled to work that the problem of foreigners was most vociferously organized. For instance, NDP MP Harold Winch argued:

...thousands are out of work there [Vancouver] because as a result of the severe winter logs are not available to meet the needs of the sawmills and processing plants. Yet ships are today loading unprocessed logs there to be exported to other countries [for processing]... The key to the Canadian economy lies in...seeing that Canadians are employed first before we export raw materials, that our manufacturers are assisted first (Hansard, April 14, 1969:7488, emphasis added).

Winch’s statement produced the ideological notion that ‘Our own people’ were being left unemployed because Our resources were being taken by foreigners to be processed by foreign workers. Importantly, such a notion went unchallenged in the House. This argument was firmly based on the notion of Canadian entitlement to these jobs and was ideologically framed within a nationalist argument. In arguing for Our-people-first policies, such a notion naturalized the rule of capitalists, this time Our capitalists.

A corollary to this argument centred on concerns over the movement of production and assembly sites to where labour power and other costs of production were cheaper than in Canada (see: Hansard, February 5, 1970). In this scenario, too, foreign workers were constructed as the problem facing Canadians and ‘Our prosperity’. In both cases, foreign workers were ideologically portrayed to be getting ‘Canadian jobs’. The combination of the production of notions that Canadians were first and foremost entitled to jobs and that investment sites should be located in Canada, helped to further entrench the ideological contention that while markets for commodities were global, labour markets remained national.

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Consequently, notions of national sovereignty were an important part of the ideological discursive practices employed in parliament to make common sense of the restructuring of ruling relations. This can be seen when, in a spectacular display of double standards, MPs of all political parties decried the imposition of tariffs on products made in while arguing for the imposition of similar tariffs on products entering Canada that they deemed to be produced through "unfair" means, i.e. lower production costs, cheap labour and so on.

For example, at the same time that charges of dumping were levied and higher tariffs placed on the import of textiles from Mexico, parliamentarians argued that tariffs on exports of agricultural products from Canada should be reduced (Hansard, December 5, 1969:1634; December 4, 1970:1759). Indeed, throughout my period of study, Canadian parliamentarians consistently asserted the sovereignty of the Canadian national state while simultaneously working to put into place practices that challenged or destroyed the sovereignty of others, thus showing the ideological dimension of the concept.

The second, though related, solution to the problem of foreign workers that was produced through parliamentary debates was to make Canadians more competitive with foreigners by simultaneously decreasing wages and weakening both minimum standard and collective bargaining structures in Canada. While not hegemonic, this position came to dominate the debates. By 1971, the concern over the dumping of products produced in low-wage countries soon shifted to actions designed to 'encourage' those businesses complaining about foreign imports, to change key parts of their operations. Thus, as mechanisms that helped to entrench an export-led economy were put into place through Canadian state practices, from 1971 onwards, parliamentarians argued that requests for "redress for cheaper imports from foreign countries" ought to be refused to ensure Our prosperity (Hansard, December 30, 1971:10857).\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} This was applied mainly to those industries, such as textiles, clothing and shoe manufacturing, that were considered to be 'sunset' industries (see Ng, 2000).
Manufacturers worried about being negatively affected by foreign competition were encouraged to find more competitive methods of manufacturing.

As in other countries, one of the greatest areas where employers had some flexibility was in the character of the labour supply they used. Making business internationally competitive, then, was in reality, a call to make workers competitive with those in other countries. The call to make Canadians internationally competitive was articulated by MPs largely belonging to either the governing or official opposition parties. Conservative MP Lincoln Alexander, for instance, firmly linked unemployment in Canada with the 'non-competitiveness' of business:

...[i]n light of the ever-increasing hardship encountered by our secondary manufacturing industries and their employees because of dumping [from low-wage countries], contrary to the terms of the GATT agreement, which is affecting jobs, job opportunities and contracts throughout Canada, will the minister advise what immediate steps will be implemented to strengthen the competitiveness of these industries and thus to ensure employment? (Hansard, May 13, 1970)

By making the link between dumping and the need to ‘strengthen the competitiveness’ of businesses in Canada, Alexander helped to affirm the notion that to respond to dumping, those conditions that existed in foreign countries, such as low wages, needed to be brought to Canada. This was presented as necessary for the prosperity (often linked with employment) of Canadians. The way for workers in the Canadian labour market to become ‘competitive’ was to accept reductions in wage levels and erosion of the protections available to them, including the ability to use collective bargaining.  

Indeed, already by 1969, discussions on the importance of wage and price controls in Canada had begun (see: Hansard, May 8, 1969:8465-66). A common sense was produced in

12 While further research is needed, it is possible that the emphasis on such supply-side policies came from attempts to prevent other national states from taking direct retaliatory measures against practices deemed as “subsidies” to employers. For instance, in a case much-discussed in the House, the US national state placed restrictions on the import of Michelin company tires into the US, because they claimed the company was subsidized by the Canadian state. These subsidies were said to constitute an unfair trading advantage to this company. The executive director of the US President's Council on International Economic Policy was reported to have said “...the President of the US intends to use every effort to discourage countries like Canada from subsidizing...export industries such as Michelin.” (see: Hansard, February 27, 1973:1688). Supply-side policies aimed at making workers cheaper in Canada may have been more difficult for other national states to attack.
parliament in which cuts to wage levels was represented as key to the competitive capacities of businesses in Canada. This is evident in the commissioning of research on comparative labour cost per unit of output by Minister of Finance Lloyd Benson. In 1969, speaking *within the context of decreasing business investments*, Benson discussed this report’s finding that since 1965, labour costs in Canada were consistently higher than in the US (Hansard, June 3, 1969:9492).  

He linked these higher wages to the winning of increased wage rates by unionized workers in Canada. He stated that: “...*[n]egotiated increases in average annual wage rates under major collective agreements (excluding construction) rose from 5.7 percent in 1965 to 8.7 percent in 1967, moderating only slightly to 8.1 percent in 1968*” (Ibid.:9489). Importantly, producing the problem of inflation allowed parliamentarians to make common sense of wage cuts in the name of the ‘Canadian interest’. Since higher wages were constructed as a problem, the natural solution was to decrease them. Finance Minister Benson, thus, stated:

>[w]e agree the time has now come to establish a yardstick against which to measure the reasonableness of wage and salary increases in relation to productivity and other relevant factors in an effort to end the relentless and damaging cost-price spiral which continues to plague the economy. Equally important is the fact that such guidelines would provide the Canadian public with a yardstick against which to judge the reasonableness of future wage and salary settlements in relation to the public interest...(Hansard, June 8, 1970:7818).

In this regard, Benson further stated:

...there is a considerable danger that a continuation of the current substantial increases in wages and salaries will seriously undermine the initial progress we have made in slowing down the rate of price increases. ...Dr. John Young, Chairman of the Prices and Incomes Commission, proposed to ministers that the federal and provincial governments join in supporting the adoption of guidelines to establish reasonable upper limits on wage and salary increases in present economic circumstances (Ibid:7818).

By identifying increases in workers’ wages as a major cause for the supposedly collective problem of inflation, parliamentary discursive practices produced the notion that workers

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13 Perhaps not coincidentally, it was in 1965 that the Canadian state began a review of its investment policies.
refusing to take pay cuts were working against the collective interests of Canadians. Thus, while material aid was given to capital investors, Finance Minister Benson urged “all Canadians to be modest in their demands on the economy, and not take more out of it than is being put in through increased productivity” (Hansard, July 11, 1969:11098). While this solution weakened the power of workers and challenged the so-called post-WW II compromise of increased wages for unionized workers for their compliance with state legislation limiting the powers of organized labour, it was presented as strengthening the nations ability to be internationally competitive (see Hansard, November 25, 1970:1461).

When trade union organizations, such as the Canadian Labour Congress, did not consent to being ‘modest in their demands’ for higher wages and other protections gained through collective bargaining, most parliamentarians presented this position as unpatriotic. The position of the unions was portrayed as signifying a lack of cooperation in the collective project of inflation-fighting necessary for the well-being of Canadians. For instance, Finance Minister Benson stated “...[w]e have been greatly disappointed that the leaders of organized labour have declined to join representatives of other sectors of the economy in helping to work out the terms of an agreed approach...” (Ibid.:7818).

Throughout much of the world, various national states responded with similar approaches. US President Nixon, for instance, imposed a wage freeze in the US in September of 1971 (see: Hansard, September 13, 1971:7743). Aside from showing how such so-called domestic public policies were not practices specific to any one nation-state but (practically) universally followed, these approaches also highlight how the restructuring of ruling relations at this time was centred around ensuring the existence of a certain type of relationship between

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Significantly, there had been no discussion of amendments to the original Corporations Act of 1934 until parliamentarians began this review process (see: Hansard, November 10, 1969:703).

In this they received the support of the chairperson of the Prices and Incomes Commission who in a statement to the Canadian Manufacturers Association said, there were “…only two means of fighting inflation, restrictions on salary increases and unemployment” (Hansard, May 7, 1970:6677).
employers and workers – one that gave employer's both greater control over workers and a larger profit margin. Indeed, a wide-range of shifts in Canadian state practices at this time can be attributed to the restructuring of the employment relationship.

Parliamentarians linked cuts in social welfare programs, wages and collective bargaining rights with the provision of jobs for Canadians, helping to produce a common sense around the need to cut back the scope and reach of the welfare state. This was apparent even in 1969 during the heyday of the Canadian welfare state. At this time PM Trudeau laid the groundwork for future cuts in state assistance to social programs. He stated:

There will be a definite program of expenditure cuts that will have to be discussed with the provinces in order that they realize that some of the important programs will have to be curtailed. It is a matter of cutting into expenditures and programs which are now in existence and which will have to be curtailed. If we want to make cuts everywhere except where farmers, fishermen, urban dwellers and old age pensioners are affected, it will be difficult to fight inflation; this is a perfect example of the vested interests in the opposition (Hansard, May 9, 1969:8515).

Thus, not only were these cuts, which had the effect of reducing options to paid employment, portrayed as necessary for the prosperity of the collective, opposition to them was tantamount to having 'vested' interests at stake rather than the national interests that the PM supposedly had in mind.

Within these varied but related solutions (giving financial and political aid to capital investors, limiting imports from foreign competitors' and constructing state practices aimed at making Canadians competitive) the discourse of Us-Canadians versus Them-foreigners became naturalized and concretized. In each scenario it was the 'foreigner' who represented the greatest threat to Canadians and their collective prosperity. Through this discourse the relations of ruling were more deeply abstracted. By continuously conflating the interests of business with the interests of some imagined group called Canadians, calls to assist investors were portrayed as being in the 'national interest'. Through such discursive and legislative practices, the imagined Canadian nation was continuously re-produced.
Conclusion

Through a documentary analysis of parliamentary debates on the topic of trade and investment policies, I have shown that the restructuring of ruling relations taking place from 1969 to 1973 was not organized through some inexorable force, such as technological advancements or the laws of capitalism. Rather, shifts in how ruling relations were to be accomplished were organized through coordinated human action in which the legislative and discursive practices of parliamentarians played a significant part. While legislation passed in parliament put into place some of the mechanisms of this latest period of globalization, parliamentary discursive practices were a key feature of how a common sense of this restructuring was constructed.

I have shown that changes to Canadian state legislation and regulations were restructured to facilitate the profitability of capital investments regardless of whether they were situated in Canada or in other national states. Indeed, such practices contributed to the growth in international competition for capital investments, particularly in regards to helping organize the expansion of international trade liberalization. From the introduction of the Canada Export Development Corporation, tax cuts and incentive grants for capital investors to solid support for increased capital mobility in international bodies, such as the OECD and the IMF, parliamentarians helped to construct the competitive terrain of globalization. In particular, these practices facilitated what has come to be known as the process of ‘re-colonization’ of peoples in the South and, as I show in Chapters Six and Seven, the reconstitution of relations of colonialism between whites and people of colour in Canada (see Ng, 1998; Shiva, 1997).

During this period, parliamentarians were responding as they always have – by organizing the legal terrain for the operation of capitalist ventures. In Canada, state practices were focussed on changing the balance of power between employers and workers. Reductions in real wage levels began to take place, as did cuts to social programs that offered alternatives
(however stingy) to paid employment (Teeple, 1995, McBride, 1992). The fact that the major beneficiaries of these state practices were corporations is evidenced by the growth in corporate profits during this same time. Between 1967 and 1968, corporate profits in Canada rose by 17.1 percent (Hansard, May 7, 1969:8417). At the end of 1973, John N. Turner, Minister of Finance, proudly reported that “...as a result of the additional cash flow given to manufacturers and processors this year, capital investment intentions expanding productive capacity and providing more jobs are running twenty percent over those of last year” (Hansard, November 15, 1973:7816). By the third fiscal quarter of 1973 corporate profits had risen by almost sixty percent from 1968 (Hansard, November 2, 1973:7476).

Parliamentarians’ use of ideological discursive practices constituted a significant aspect of how the materiality of ruling relations was accomplished. Nationalist ideologies were a consistent part of parliamentary discursive practices and helped to conceal how the state was involved in organizing what we know as globalization. The process of restructuring was ideologically re-framed as a national response to foreign threats. While there were differences between different articulations of Canadian nationalism, within the discourse of the parliamentary ‘Left’, ‘Centre’ and ‘Right’, ‘foreigners’ and not the social relations of capitalism became the central problem of the period.

Whether the problem was perceived as foreign capitalists operating inside Canadian spaces or as foreign national states who supposedly represented foreign workers intent on taking Our jobs, during this period of globalization, nationalist ideologies helped to conceal how the restructuring process was one of re-producing ruling relations under changed circumstances. Competition between various capitalists or various national-states intent on securing investments of capital in ‘their’ territories was ideologically re-cast as a competition between Us-Canadians and Them-foreigners.
My analysis of parliamentary debates shows how this antagonism was organized by simultaneously constituting ‘sameness’ as well as ‘differences’. A crucial aspect of socially organizing ‘sameness’ was to link the interests of capital investors with the ‘national interest’. This national interest was framed within the discourse of Canadian-ness. In discussing the purported necessity to transfer state funds to capital investors, reorganize national legislation and international agreements concerning capital mobility or reduce (differential) wages and benefits available to workers in Canada, the ‘imagined community’ of Canadians was emphasized as the ultimate, if not immediate, beneficiary. The restructuring of state practices was represented in parliament as ensuring the collective prosperity of Canadians.

The production of a common sense about the processes of globalization relied upon past organizations of ruling relations in Canada (and the relationship that those seen as Canadians had to the rest of the world, especially people in the South). By arguing that any insecurities faced by Canadians were the fault of foreigners, parliamentarians were able to tap into a deep reservoir of legitimacy organized by nationalist ideological practices. The organization of a common sense around the existence of supposedly distinct and separate national states along with the notion that the state represented the nation or civil society, worked to legitimate the ideological practice of organizing foreigners as Our problem. The legitimacy attached to national states (as compared with particular governments who come and go) helped to ensure that these ruling structures were maintained.

Indeed, a documentary analysis of parliamentary debates shows how those participating in parliamentary discursive practices never questioned their role in representing Canadians. The ideological hegemony of simultaneously setting state practices apart from society while conjoining the nation to the state was found within parliamentary debates as MPs from various political parties all vied to be the ‘true’ representative of Canadians. In other words, parliamentarians did not question whose interests they actually represented. Instead, all assumed
a unified, homogenous Canadian community whose collective interests they served. Thus, despite the political position taken on issues, parliamentary discursive practices were productive of the nation and helped to make common sense of the exercise of state power.
Chapter 6: Nowhere to Call Home:
Racism and the Parliamentary Production of the ‘Immigration Problem’

The overweening, defining event of the modern world is the mass movement of raced populations, beginning with the largest forced transfer of people in the history of the world: slavery. The consequences of which transfer have determined all the wars following it as well as the current ones being waged on every continent. The contemporary world’s work has become policing, halting, forming policy regarding and trying to administer the movement of people.

Nationhood - the very definition of citizenship - is constantly being demarcated and redemarcated in response to exiles, refugees, Gastarbeiter, immigrants, migrations, the displaced, the felling, and the besieged. The anxiety of belonging is entombed within the central metaphors in the discourse on globalism, transnationalism, nationalism, the break-up of federations, the rescheduling of alliances, and the fictions of sovereignty. Yet these figurations of nationhood and identity are frequently as raced themselves as the originating racial house that defined them. When they are not raced, they are...imaginary landscape, never inscape; Utopia, never home.

Toni Morrison, “Home”

Introduction

In this chapter, I investigate how the discursive structure of parliamentary debates in the House of Commons helped to socially organize ‘differences’ between those people named as ‘foreigners’ living and working within the Canadian ‘nation’ and those constituted as ‘Canadian’. Specifically, I examine, in detail, the parliamentary discursive practices used to debate Canadian immigration policy and document how a ‘common sense’ regarding the presence of immigrants in Canadian society was organized. Thus, while I analyze the debates dealing specifically with matters of policy-making, I also conduct a documentary analysis of how the category immigrant was discursively organized in Canada.

This is necessary because, as I show, an outstanding feature of parliamentary debates concerning immigration policy at this time was the discursive organization of immigrants as a ‘problem’ for Canadians and how this problem was translated into being a problem with foreigners. By linking the existence of a foreign presence in Canada with a weak immigration policy and associating the presence of immigrants with the lessening of the quality of life for Canadians, a common sense was organized that produced immigrants as foreigners residing
within the Canadian nation. The use of intersecting ideologies of nationalism and racism was critical to this process.

I document how throughout the period under study, the re-casting of the problem of foreigners as a problem of *immigration* was racialized. Parliamentary discursive practices related the problem of foreigners/immigrants to the removal of the 'preferred nationalities and races' policy in 1967 that enabled people of colour to enter Canada as permanent residents. This re-cast the problem of immigration as a problem of the entry of people of colour. In the process, the existential constitution of the category of people named as immigrants was, itself, organized. That is, the term immigrant no longer referred to legal categorizations of nationality and immigration status but became co-terminus with people of colour.

I also show how through the parliamentary debates, immigrants/people of colour were discursively produced as a 'national' security threat. They were also presented as being responsible for the existence of unemployment, violence, crime, increasing state expenditures, negative changes to the 'character' of the Canadian nation and its supposed moral decline. While these discursive practices were not always distinctive to the late 1960s and early 1970s, they did involve a re-articulation of these discourses with new meanings and implications. In particular, I argue that the production of these problems as a 'racial' problem caused by the immigration of people of colour created a moral panic about the permanent presence of people of colour in Canada, thereby legitimating increased restrictions upon them.

Parliamentary discursive practices pertaining to immigration policy or immigrants, thus, raised the spectre of Canadian borders being 'out of control'. The borders in apparent need of protection, I argue, were not only the physical borders that delineated the nation-state but also the material as well as ideological boundaries between Us and Them within Canada. Racist ideologies intersected with nationalist ones in the parliamentary debates to (re)make common sense of racialized criteria of belonging to the Canadian nation.
Importantly, these ideological state practices did not result in halting the immigration of people of colour to Canada. However, it did rationalize, or legitimize their differential treatment once inside the country. As I discuss in the following chapter (Chapter Seven), this was highly significant for the organization of legitimacy of the category migrant worker. Hierarchical social relations between those produced as Canadians and those rendered as the foreigners within the nation were (re-)organized as a result.

This was especially manifested in the re-organization of a racialized sense of entitlement in Canada. Jobs, social programs, minimum employment standards and protections, were all produced as belonging only to those who belonged in the Canadian nation. By consistently referring to immigrants/people of colour as embodying an encroachment on the entitlements of Canadians, the socially organized hostility towards the former group was naturalized. Indeed, through the parliamentary debates, Canadians, like their anti-thesis - immigrants/people of colour - were discursively re-imagined and both categories were racialized.

It can be said that during the period of study the material as well as the ideological boundaries of the Canadian nation were imbued with great import. This chapter follows, then, from the previous one where I argued that the process of Other-ing was a vital part of the restructuring of ruling relations. These arguments are expanded upon here to show how a racist common sense was a crucial part of how the process of constituting and problematizing foreigners was given form.

In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that parliamentary debates on trade and investment took place at the same time as the ones on immigration policy that I discuss in this chapter. Taken in conjunction, nationalist ideologies that supported capital accumulation relied upon racist ideologies to make common sense of the negative duality between Canadians and foreigners. Indeed, racist ideologies were a key part of how state practices were made common sense of at this time. Seen in juxtaposition with policies designed to increase the international
competitiveness of businesses in Canada, we see that while Canada's borders were opened wider for capital investors, they became increasingly restrictive for people of colour. However, what was being restricted was not the entry of people of colour but their access to certain jobs, programs and protections.

Simultaneously, both the dismantling of barriers to capital mobility and the strengthening of borders in favour of restrictions against the free movement of people once inside national-state borders were presented as important to the future of Canadians and Our prosperity. This shows the importance of notions of 'Canadian-ness' to the exercise of power in Canada in the period under study and demonstrates how the nation-building project was a critical part of the process of restructuring and reproducing relations of ruling.

The Historical Organization of 'Canadian-ness'

In order to proceed with this investigation, however, we need to take account of the historical formation of ideological practices, which concealed unequal social relations in Canada for they, in turn, helped to shape the current restructuring process in particular ways. The current operationalization of ideological processes, then, has an historical lineage. People categorized as migrant workers are not entering what Robert Miles (1982:165) calls a 'neutral ideological context' when they come to Canada in search of paid employment. Rather, the ideological practices operated by the category of migrant worker connect to already existing ones that allow for migrant workers to fit into Canadian society in such a way as to not to call the relations of ruling into serious disrepute.

As mentioned earlier, Canada is both a material organization of certain historically specific patterns of social relations and an ideological structure: one that is linked to the many myths of 'Western civilization' and shaped by the social organization of hierarchical difference between Self and Other. Throughout the history of Canadian nation-building, the Other has not only existed outside the borders of the state - in an(Other) nation. Instead, many people - most
obviously Indigenous peoples but also people from the South *within* Canada - have been rendered as Other in reference to the ‘Canadian-Self’. The *space* that Canada occupies is not only territorial but also ideological. As a result, part of the historical nation-building project of Canada has been the ideological construction of notions of Canadian-ness. Common sensical notions of Canadian-ness, then, are significant for any discussion of the contemporary meaning of Canadian citizenship and for understanding how the exploitation of a group of people categorized as migrant workers is legitimized.

The social process/practice of differentiation, where the construction of an Other who physically exists outside of the nation as well as the Others who exist *within* the nation has been an integral part of the relations of ruling in Canada. Being a ‘Canadian citizen’ has been integrally connected to the historically shaped identity of who, or which bodies, can be inscribed as Canadian and the differential rights that are accrued to these Canadians and those constructed as the ‘non-Canadian’ Other. The category of citizen, like migrant worker, then, conjures up specific images of particular bodies and in so doing profoundly shapes people’s relations to each other and to what has been called ‘the means of production and reproduction’.

Historically, ideas of Canadian-ness are lodged materially in the colonization of Indigenous societies and lands by France and Britain, the later transference of France’s colonial territory to Britain and the subsequent establishment of the Canadian nation-state as a dominion of Britain in 1867. As a result of these processes of colonization and the ongoing development of capitalist social relations, a hierarchy has been established (and continuously reproduced). Members of the British and French nations (however tumultuous their relationship is) have been positioned in a dominant position over both the Indigenous peoples as well as various Others. Canadian-ness has been reproduced through this framework which transposes the oppositional differences of the Self and Other onto the categories of citizen/non-citizen. Differences in Canada have been given social definition through the operation of these claims.
Throughout Canadian history, state policy makers have perpetuated Canadian identity as European or, in other words, white. Indeed, restrictions on entry based on national origin were established almost simultaneously with the creation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867. People from various European colonies or former colonies in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean - all constructed as falling decidedly outside the scope of 'Western civilization' - were denied equal entry into Canada. At times some groups, like people from China, were completely excluded (1923-1947) (Li, 1988). State laws on citizenship and immigration, thus, have helped to organize a hierarchical ordering of insiders and outsiders living and working within Canadian society and this ordering has been/is decidedly racialized as well as gendered.

Canada has come to be in relation to the colonization of Indigenous peoples and their lands, the privileging of white settlers and the subordination of people immigrating from the colonized South. The ongoing theft of Indigenous wealth has, in part, positioned Canada as a 'First World' state within the system of global capitalism. To this day, the bodies who are categorized de facto citizens or non-citizens in Canada depends very much upon the global inequalities organized by this system. Within this international configuration, Canadian identity (i.e. Canadian-ness) has been created and reproduced by the state through particular legislated inclusions and exclusions.

Notions of Canadian-ness have been very much connected to class formation in the development of white, capitalist patriarchy in Canada. Those recognized as Canadians have been seen as entitled to certain things ('good' jobs, political power, resources distributed by the state, (Hawkins, 1988:16). Discrimination was liberalized in the 1960s with the operation of a 'points' system. However, the opening-up of immigration policy in the 1960s did not eliminate discrimination as racialized, gendered and class inequality continued to structure who got in and under what conditions. While the 'points system', lauded as an objective form of admitting new immigrants, did do away with the racist construction of desirables/undesirables by eliminating the 'most-preferred-country' clause, it, nonetheless, transferred the racialized and gendered meanings of Canadian-ness into other categories, such as 'skills', education, the ability to speak one of the two official Canadian
capital, etc.) that Others have not. This sense of special entitlement has been ‘naturalized’ through a harking back to the imagined community of the Canadian nation with its ideological criteria of belonging. This ‘community’ is thought of as being responsible only for its own members - not Others who should supposedly rely on ‘their own people’.

These articulated projects of social differentiation have historically been supported by most of those people unproblematically recognized as Canadians. This is especially true for those in the white, male ruling class who have readily identified with such projects given that their very presence on Canadian territory and relative privilege in relation to all Others has been materialized through these same projects. However, it is also true of many women, workers, etc. seen to be Canadian (Locovetta and Valverde, 1992). Indeed, the organization of Canada as a ‘white settler colony’ has played a key ideological role in maintaining a certain amount of unity within the white colonizing population (Abele and Stasiulis, 1989).

Since Confederation in 1867, Canadian state practices have organized exclusion in successive changes to immigration legislation, regulations and annual quotas. Importantly, these policies not only reflect ideologies that help to legitimate unequal treatment but create the objective conditions for this discrimination to continue through the legislated denial of citizenship and political rights. Indeed, Canadian state practices have figured prominently in the creation and maintenance of the relationships between Us and Them. One of the results is that discrete communities have been constructed and have been differentially incorporated into the Canadian labour market (Creese, 1988). There has been, then, the formation of a highly segregated work force that racializes who does what work in Canada.

This highlights the way that white settlers, both men and women, are implicated in - and benefit from - the ongoing colonial project of Canadian nation-building. Canadian identity contra

languages and ‘adaptability’. Also, as Vic Satzewich rightly notes, "post-1962 migration did not...take place in an ideological climate denuded of the negative evaluations of certain ‘races’ " (Satzewich, 1989:93).
the racialized and gendered Other has had to be continuously (re)imagined. While there are obvious inequalities between these Canadians, they, nonetheless, share the same existential imagining and the same sense of entitlement to being Canadian that Others do not. Notions of their common-ness, indeed, help to reproduce the inequality faced by some within this grouping.

While these social relations of ruling have formed the very foundation of the Canadian nation-state, they have been concealed or abstracted by the practices organized through notions of citizenship. These have been constructed within the ideological framework of Canada as a white settler colony. That the nation is a unified subject with no internal but only external conflicts is presented and generally accepted (within parliament for example). This in turn helps to eclipse the fact that such notions of a 'national interest' or 'Canadian sovereignty' have been built on stolen land and entrenched racist inequalities.

Importantly, the ideological category of citizen has been, and continues to be, extremely important for the project of nation-building and the positioning of Canada within global capitalism. This is because the notion of citizenship is the glue that holds the nation-state together as a seemingly natural community authorized to exclude those rendered as Other. Creating non-citizens, an integral part of the process of making citizens, has helped to legitimize the unequal treatment of migrant workers who live and work in Canada while being treated differently in relation to the entitlement of certain rights made available largely for and by the citizen-Self.

Within this ideological framework, little room is left for the recognition that certain rights and entitlements have been gained by (some) people as a result of global relations of power and dominance or the concerns for legitimacy by capitalists who largely remain headquartered in the North. Such notions operate as ideological practices for they conceal the global relations of

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2While the post-WW II 'compromise' between capital, organized (white) labour and the states of the North has been jettisoned to a large extent as a result of post-Fordist ways of organizing production, there is still a great deal of attention paid by capitalists in securing approval for the changes underway as Northern states 'downsize' their
white, capitalist patriarchy that organize North/South inequalities and that shape which people
have the ability to realize their rights and entitlements within the world and within the North
itself. Obscured from view is the fact that contemporary notions of citizen and non-citizen in
particular substantially reproduce the colonizer/colonized binary code.

These processes are evident in my textual analysis of parliamentary debates before and
after the time the NIEAP was introduced in 1973. My investigation makes it clear that shaping
an ideological understanding of Canadian identity continued to be a significant part of the work
done by the discursive practices of parliamentarians. During my period of study, the importance
of re-shaping an identity that was still Canadian yet somehow ‘tolerant’ was key to maintaining
legitimacy for coercive state actions at this time. Important to this work are the ways in which
certain groups of people continued to be excluded from this definition of Canadian, yet how this
exclusion remained concealed through the organization of a false, ‘virtual reality’.

In the early 1960s, the Canadian state was being re-invented as a ‘humanitarian’,
‘compassionate’ society through the work of parliamentarians, such as then Prime Minister (PM)
Lester B. Pearson (ECEJ, 1993). During the period I investigated (1969 to 1973), the governing
party in parliament, the Liberal Party of Canada, under the leadership of Pierre E. Trudeau,
actually ran under the slogan of creating “the Just Society.” Indeed, it was one of the main
themes of the Speech from the Throne in 1968 (Hansard, January 29, 1969: 4901). Reference to
the making of this Just Society was constant throughout the parliamentary debates of this time.

The erasure of the colonial and racist foundations of Canada was also an important step
in the continuing representation of Canada as a tolerant society. The construction of Canadian-
ness during this period, then, is one where Canada was presented as having sprung from the
overthrowing of colonialism. This supposedly ‘anti-colonial’ struggle was said to have been led

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welfare programs to become more blatantly corporatist. Importantly, the people within the North that have faced the
brunt of this ‘downsizing’ have been those who have been constructed as the Others within - women and men who
by the two 'founding' English and French nations. The reality of Canada being founded on the
colonization of Indigenous peoples and lands by these same people is nowhere to be found in this
account. Canada then was produced as a previously colonized - not colonizing - state.

This virtual reality was presented in the House of Commons equally well by members of
all the political parties as is evident in the following quote from David Lewis, MP and future
leader of the New Democratic Party. He stated:

...[from all our contacts and all our reading we know Canada has a special place of
trust among the developing nations. We emerged as an independent nation almost a
century before them, but we also emerged out of colonial status. We have never [had]
an imperial goal or imperialistic intentions (Hansard, January 20, 1969, emphasis
added).

Such ideological statements organized as common sensical a particular reading of
Canadian-ness that obscured the continued substandard conditions under which most Indigenous
peoples continued to live in Canada - and removed any responsibility for this reality from the
English and French colonists and the later European immigrants. The work that these texts in
part did, then, was to have their readers (hearers and so on) understand that Canada (and, hence,
Canadians) bore no responsibility for the existence of oppressive and exploitative social
relations.\(^3\)

The Canadian nation-state was also represented within the parliamentary debates as
tolerant through the proclamation of a policy on multiculturalism in 1971. Significantly, PM
Trudeau, announced that such a policy would reflect (not create) the supposed non-hierarchical
social relations in Canada. He stated:

...It was the view of the royal commission, shared by the government and, I am sure, by
all Canadians, that there cannot be one cultural policy for Canadians of British and
French origin, another for the original peoples and yet a third for all others. For although
there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group

\(^3\)This is where the reader, her or himself, comes into what Smith (1990:177-196) calls 'text-reader conversations'.
This is also where various readers become differentiated according to their experiences of being a colonizer or being
colonized, being included in things Canadiana or being excluded.
take precedence over any other. No citizen or group of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly (Hansard, October 8, 1971:8545).

Notable for its use of the discourse of citizenship, Trudeau’s comments re-enforced the notion of the Just and tolerant Society. That this policy was, As Roxana Ng (1995:35) points out, “invented out of the bureaucratic and ruling relations of Canadian society” was concealed.

Also, throughout my period of study, constant references were made to the 1967 changes regarding removal of the ‘preferred races and nationalities’ criteria of entry and permanent residence. In particular, the bringing in of the ‘points system’ was represented in parliament as an objective, non-discriminatory means of immigrant selection. This is evident in the following statement by Allan J. MacEachen, Minister of Manpower and Immigration:

...our immigration policy is based on the principles of non-discrimination and universality. Honourable members will recall that in October 1967, immigration to Canada except in the case of sponsored dependants was placed on what has become known as the “point system”. Under this approach the normal practice is to admit all persons who achieve the required number of points, meet medical and security requirements, and have no criminal record. As honourable members know, points are based on such things as education, trade or professional training, knowledge of English and/or French, job demand in Canada, and so on (Immigration: Policy Applicable to Members of Armed Forces of Other Countries: May 22, 1969, p.8930).

Parliamentarians often used the existence of the points system as a way of deflecting possible criticisms that immigration policies, particularly the selection criteria, were still racist. Its existence was presented as incontrovertible evidence of the fairness of the system and proof of the tolerant nature of Canadians.

The Foreigners Within

At the same time that the myth of the tolerant Canadian was being discursively produced through the parliamentary debates, the Canadian nation was socially organized in contradiction to foreigners. Workers in foreign countries were produced as one of the greatest threats to the (relatively) high living standards of Canadians, especially people in the South. These workers were portrayed as intent on luring capital investors away from Canada (see Chapter Five).
However, within parliamentary discursive practices foreigners did not only reside outside of Canadian boundaries. Rather, certain groups of people living and working inside of Canadian borders were also conceptualized as foreigners.

During the period of study, it was people immigrating from the South who were rendered as the Others/foreigners within the Canadian nation. The articulation of racist and nationalist ideologies that helped in the production of the problem of people from the South in Canada was most evident in the parliamentary debates on Canadian immigration policies. Indeed, the discourse of immigration was one of the 'paramount arenas' through which questions about the nation were raised in Canada (and in other countries of the North, see Hall and Held, 1989).

These debates helped to make racist ideologies common sensical by organizing fundamental differences between Canadians and people from the South living in Canada. Ideological notions of Canadian-ness, then, imbricated racist and nationalist practices for they embodied ideas of who Canadians were and were not. Indeed, the use of racist ideologies in Canadian parliamentary debates gave corporeal form to nationalist ideologies that organized the negative duality between Canadians and foreigners.

Parliamentary discursive practices consistently racialized and objectified immigrants to Canada. Indeed, immigration policies were always addressed in relation to what was constructed as being in the best interests of the imagined Canadian community. Questions concerning the sex, nationality or 'country of origin' and 'racial origin' of immigrants were frequently asked in regards to other key issues that organized difference and antagonism between foreigners and Canadians, such as public spending, national security, criminal activity and entitlements in Canada. Notions that immigrants did not and should not have the same claims to the (private or public) resources that Canadians had informed these parliamentary debates.

Importantly, who became categorized as an immigrant was reliant upon ideological notions of belonging. Ideas of belonging in Canada did not rest on nationality but on 'sameness'
and difference. In other words, who could be Canadian depended on historically constructed and deeply racialized notions of Canadian-ness. Thus, ideas of assimilation and unassimilability shaped parliamentary discursive practices. The Minister of Manpower and Immigration made this evident by saying, "...we need more Americans in Canada because of their easy assimilation in this country" (Hansard, January 25, 1971:2710).

In examining those who were represented as being the same as Canadians, it is clear that those organized as 'similar' were those belonging to European or to white-settler societies, such as the US. During my period of study, there was never any question about whether these people should be welcomed (and encouraged) to (im)migrate to Canada. Despite the formal elimination of the 'most preferred races/nationalities' criteria of Canadian immigrant recruitment policy, then, Europeans and other whites were still constituted as 'preferred' people.

The process of racializing belonging in Canada within the parliamentary debates, then, was organized through ideological concepts that were not always explicitly stated but relied on racialized concepts of homogeneity so that references to people of various nationalities could produce the effect of racializing Canadian-ness. The preference for whites was made common sensical by continuous association with positive effects of immigration with whites and negative ones with people of colour.

This was apparent in the juxtaposition of two separate questions concerning two racialized groups of people, one Scottish and the Other so-called Gypsy. The first case concerned two men from Scotland, James and Alex Donald, and their families who had been living in Canada without legal documentation. MP G.W. Baldwin asked the Minister of Manpower and Immigration to legalize the stay of these two men and their families in Canada (Hansard, May 23, 1972:2456). Bryce Mackasey, the current Minister of Manpower and Immigration, responded to this request positively. He stated, "...I can think of nothing that would give me more pleasure
than nine more Scots in Canada as landed immigrants and future citizens, so I will personally intervene" (Ibid.). Consequently, the Donald families were allowed to stay, legally, in Canada.

Throughout the five years of parliamentary debates that I analyzed, this swift and joyful intervention by the Minister to aid undocumented immigrants was otherwise unheard of. Indeed, the Donald case stands in stark contrast with the following case where the people in question were "Gypsies", i.e. Romani peoples from Europe. In this case, MP Craig Stewart asked:

...It [the question] arises from the entry into Canada in late April of a group of gypsies [sic] from Europe. As these gypsies have victimized people in rural areas of western Canada - amounts as high as $6,000 are involved - will the minister order their deportation immediately so as to protect Canadian citizens? (Hansard, June 26, 1973:5059).

Robert K. Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, responded by stating that while there was, as yet, no proof of any wrongdoing on the part of the gypsies in question, he would "certainly pay very careful attention to the representations made by the honourable member" (Ibid.). The difference in both the discursive and physical treatment of the Donald families and these gypsies shows that the immigration of people to Canada was not in and of itself the problem. Rather, the problem was the entry and residence of certain peoples who could common sensically be portrayed as not belonging.

Indeed, from the end of 1969, there was a growing interest shown not in immigration policy per se but over who was coming to Canada. Through the parliamentary debates, a two-fold process of problem making took place. First of all, a problem of declining European immigration was persistently put together. Secondly, the problem of immigrants from the South was further entrenched in parliamentary discursive practices. In fact, the two problems were presented as being related so that declines in European immigrating to Canada were constructed
as resulting from the problem of immigration from the South. Both problems were presented as threats to Canadians.

The making of the first problem (declines in the numbers of people from Europe immigrating) is evident in the following announcement on immigration numbers for 1969. Allan J. MacEachen, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, stated:

While it is true that in absolute terms there has been an over-all decline, especially in immigrants from Europe, I can inform the House that for the year as a whole we can expect a total of some 165,000 arrivals, a decline from last year of about 10% (Hansard, December 16, 1969:2011).

By singling out decreases in immigration from Europe, the minister signaled the importance of this development, thus (re)producing the common sense assumption that Canadians had some special ties to people in this part of the world that they did not share with Others. Indeed, throughout his report MacEachen continued to emphasize the source country of immigrants. He paid particular attention to highlighting the decline in immigrants from Europe and related this decline to increases in number of people coming from the South. He stated both that “...the major variations in immigration from Europe include a decline of some 8,000 from Italy, 5,800 from the UK and 2,500 from France” (Ibid.:2012). At the same time he stated:

...In Asia and the Caribbean countries, on the other hand, the number of successful applications has continued to increase. ...This increase, coupled with the decrease in immigrants from European countries, is producing appreciable change in Canada’s immigration pattern... (Ibid.).

Yet, even though the numbers of people from the South emigrating to Canada were increasing, MacEachen went on to present his ‘solution’ to ‘factors discouraging immigration to Canada’. In doing so, he racialized the problem of decreasing numbers of immigrants and, therefore, the selection of immigrants. He stated:

I should mention that earlier this year we took various administrative steps which we hope will offset the external factors tending to discourage immigration to Canada. These steps include increased promotional activity, the sending of teams into the field to stimulate applications through personal interviews, easier assisted passage loans, and so on. ...[T]aking France as an example, while it is a fact that the approval rate has been low
and, conversely, the rejection rate relatively high, one of the reasons for this is that a very high proportion of applications came from non-nationals of France, many of them transitory or migratory workers with low skill and educational levels. Preliminary indications are that when non-nationals are abstracted, the refusal rate for French nationals approximates that of the UK (Ibid.).

In associating information about immigrant selection from France with the statement that the Canadian state is trying to encourage immigration, the Minister's comments produced a common sense about which immigrants ought to be so encouraged. Immigrants from France, ideologically produced as one of Canada's founding nations, were represented as welcome. At the same time, by presenting the rejection of immigrants who were supposedly 'transitory or migratory workers' (i.e. people largely from Algeria living in France as 'guest workers') in a positive light, a common sense was produced about which immigrants were not so welcome.

Parliamentary discursive practices throughout the period under study used the notion that with the opening up of Canadian immigration policy to the recruitment of people of colour as permanent residents contributed concretely to the drop in number of immigrants from Europe. Thus, at the same time that explicitly racist criteria for admission to Canada were eliminated, there was much discussion about how Canadian immigration policy was working against Europeans. For example, MP Andrew Brewin helped to produce the notion that the opening up of immigration policy resulted in it becoming too 'restrictive' to the entry of Europeans. He stated:

In the light of recent figures published by his department which show a continued and substantial decline in the number of immigrants admitted to Canada from Europe, will the government review its present regulations to see whether the decline does not indicate that the regulations are unduly restrictive (Hansard, June 12, 1969:10,038).

This statement is worth noting not for its uniqueness (many MPs questioned the drop in numbers of immigrants from Europe, see Hansard, December 4, 1969:1586) but because questions concerning the entry of non-European immigrants were rarely discussed in the same way, i.e. as that entry having been restricted.
Indeed, the growing numbers, as well as proportion, of people immigrating to Canada from the South was represented as a threat to both the present and the future Canadian nation. Interest over the ‘national origin’ of immigrants was founded on notions based on nationalist ideologies that portrayed immigrants of colour as causing the deterioration of the Canadian character and consequent demise of the nation. Such notions were produced as common sensical through their use in parliamentary discursive practices. This occurred, as shown above, by presenting decreases in immigrants from Europe as problematic but it was also done by directly problematizing immigrants from the South.

The following remarks, for example, point to how parliamentary debates produced a racialized common sense about people from the South as a problem for Canadians. MP Steven E. Paproski, in responding to the Minister’s report on immigration numbers for 1969, stated:

The Cape Breton mountain [referring to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Allan MacEachan] has laboured and brought forth a West Indian mouse. I would be the last person to criticize, on grounds of race or colour, an immigration policy that emphasized the bringing in of West Indian and Asiatic immigrants. But I do believe it is legitimate to criticize a policy that concentrates on immigrants who, by reason of climatic conditions in their country of origin and by reason of their standards of skill and training, inevitably pose great problems for everyone concerned with their relocation in a radically different, highly sophisticated, industrialized, urban society such as ours (Hansard, December 16, 1969:2013, emphasis added).

Paproski presented a highly racialized reading of the effects of immigration policy. Immigration policy at this time did not actively give legislative preferences to people from particular countries (as it did to northwestern European countries prior to 1967). However, Paproski, by stating that the Minister of Immigration ‘emphasized the bringing in of West Indian and Asiatic immigrants’, gave the impression that it did. This discursive practice, then, helped to portray Canadian immigration policy as biased against Europeans, therefore, strengthening the links between the two associated problems of less European and more immigrants of colour.

Reliance on pseudo-scientific racist explanations, i.e. climatic differences, for the differences between Canadians and people from the South, concretized the racialization of these
two problems. Racist ideologies organizing inherent differences between Canadian and societies in the South, i.e. the lack of skill, training, sophistication and urbaneness of people from the South were also used. Significantly, this was done not by talking about the lack of these qualities in people from the South but by focussing on the fact that Canadians allegedly possessed these qualities. The result was not only a racialization of climate, skill, training and life in industrialized, urban centres but also of Canadian-ness.

The discursive practices employed by Paproski in parliamentary debates, therefore, both relied upon and further helped to organize the difference between Canadians and people from the West Indies or Asia. Through the debates, these differences appeared as common sensical. In the process, Canadian immigration policy was portrayed as allowing in Third World people who, common sensically, could only pose a danger to the prosperity of Canadians.

Again, the discursive practices employed by Paproski show how this occurred. After his initial comments, he added:

It is of interest to recall the many recent stories in the press about Australia’s immigration policy [which was a Whites Only immigration policy until 1970: recall that Paproski is speaking in 1969]. If I recollect correctly, one story last week said that Americans were entering Australia as new settlers at the rate of 4,000 a month. Other stories tell of heavy emigration from Great Britain, the Low Countries, Germany and Scandinavia to Australia. The reason given is the expansionist policy of the present Australian government and the heavy accent on resource development and economic growth “down under.” Certainly any skilled European worker, professional man or person with capital to invest in a small enterprise would look twice at the Canada of today before deciding to come here permanently. We are being bypassed by the most desirable type of immigrant because Canada today presents a picture of a dormant economy, a country obsessed with social welfare and constitutional programs, where economic expansion is at a standstill and taxes are multiplying in increasingly burdensome tiers (Ibid.: 2013, emphasis added).

Making no mention of Australia’s racist Whites Only immigration policy, Paproski presented the immigration of people from the US and various northern-Europeans as arising naturally from their possession of skills, professional qualifications and capital. Not only did this further racialize those acquired attributes, it also discursively transformed Australia’s immigration policy from being a racist policy into being a policy that produced economic growth.
by keeping non-whites out. In the process, Paproski helped to produce a common sense of who created prosperity and who created a ‘dormant economy’. Without directly arguing for a Canadian immigration policy based on the preference for whites, Paproski’s statements produced a common sense that such a policy would produce Our prosperity.

Indeed, in the production of the racist ideology that people of colour were less skilled, needed less inducement than Europeans to come to Canada and did not contribute as much to the Canadian economy, the notion of ‘most desirable’ immigrant was brought back to the discourse surrounding the making of Canadian immigration policy. Again, Paproski did not conceal who these most desirable immigrants are. He stated:

...As I said, Speaker, I am not against immigrants coming to Canada from Asia, the Middle East or the West Indies. I simply feel that the current flow of immigrants has been thrown out of balance to the point where immigrants from those areas are a flood and immigrants from Northern Europe a trickle (Ibid.:2013).

In using the historically charged racialized discourse of a flood to describe the entrance of people of colour to Canada, Paproski’s comments constituted a racist discursive practice. They were framed through the use of racialized binary codes that privileged Northern Europeans as people who ought to be encouraged to immigrate to Canada because they were ‘like Us’.

Paproski’s comments were racist because they attempted to legitimize state discrimination against people from everywhere else because They were ‘racially’ not ‘like Us’. From the early period of my study, changes made to Canadian immigration policy in 1967 that eliminated the criteria of ‘preferred nationalities/races’ came to be directly challenged in the House. MP Gerard Laprise stated:

I have not quite understood why the minister felt himself required to justify this drop of ten percent in the immigration figure for the first nine months of the year. However, it is my humble opinion...that quantity is less important than quality in immigration. We know that, particularly during the past few years, the government selection procedures have involved requirements for higher qualifications from would-be immigrants. I wonder,

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5Significantly, Paproski also links the existence of a ‘dormant economy’ to the existence of welfare programs. As I will show in Chapter Seven, the denial of these programs (and others) to people categorized as migrant workers, was a part of how the category was legitimated.
however, whether their moral qualifications are being given sufficient consideration. In fact, during the past five years, among those who appeared before our courts because of participation in demonstrations, mostly in recent months, we find that too often those involved are newcomers to Canada... (Hansard, December 16, 1969:20-14).

Without saying so, Laprise linked the decline in the 'moral qualifications' of immigrants with the admittance of people of colour as immigrants (the major change taking place in Canadian immigration policy in the five-year period he bases his comments on). Consequently, moral decline in the Canadian nation was also linked with the decrease in proportion of whites entering the country. Laprise produced the notion that the implementation of the 'higher qualifications' required by the 1967 'points system' created the problem of how to judge the morality of immigrants. Further, the notion was produced that the use of the racist criteria of 'preferred nationalities' in pre-1967 immigration policy had in fact been a means to establish the morality of immigrants. Morality itself was racialized in the process and the immigration of people of color was thereby produced as a problem for Us.

During the period under study, numerous studies were commissioned by the state to examine the effects of the immigration pattern with a special focus on the 'adaptation' (or lack thereof) of recent immigrants to Canada. The goal of these studies was to study and find solutions to the problem posed by the entrance of people of colour to notions of Canadian-ness (see Hansard, May 13, 1970; November 16, 1970). In the process, the problem of people of colour in Canada was further entrenched and the common sense character of seeing whites as Canadians and people of colour as foreigners was strengthened. At this time, the term 'immigrant' came to stand for people of colour.

The problem with immigrants, then, became the problem of people of colour living, studying and working in Canada. Through parliamentary discursive practices employed in the House, immigrants (read: people of colour) were produced as threats to Our national security, as a financial burden for Canadians, as the source of criminal activity and as usurping the
entitlements belonging to Canadians. The highly racialized discourse that produced people of
colour as foreigners within Canada also came to organize the notion that it was their *permanent
residence* in the country that caused our problems. I now examine each aspect of how people of
colour in Canada were produced as our Collective problem through the parliamentary debates.

**Immigrants as a Threat to the Security of the Nation**

Throughout the period of study, the entry of immigrants was portrayed as a key site for
the breach of Canadian security. This possible security threat was highly racialized. Notions of
societal security (versus state security) focus on issues of national identity. Olson and Fugl point
out that a ‘society’ feels under threat if it loses the ability to feel as a ‘We’ community (1997:4 as
cited in Pettman, 1997). With the construction of Third World immigrants as foreigners within
the Canadian nation, people of colour were portrayed as creating this societal insecurity through
student protests, public demonstrations and speeches urging the overthrow of ruling relations.
Consequently, the political process within Canada was simultaneously nationalized and
racialized and the racialized problem of foreigners was further concretized.

The externalization of the existence of opposition to ruling relations within Canada
helped to further abstract and ideologically conceal the operation of these same relations. The
use of such diversionary ideological practices within parliamentary debates helped to reconstruct
Canadian state practices as being beneficial to Canadians. This is most evident in how
complaints of unruly behaviour within Canada were re-cast as problems caused by ‘foreign
agitators’. Specifically, challenges made by students and/or members of the FLQ to the authority
and practices of the Canadian state were re-organized in the parliamentary debates as external
threats.

Because the threat to Canadian security was constructed as an external one and because
the entry of foreigners was linked to the operation of immigration policies, the problem of
foreign agitators became a problem of the insecurity of Canada’s borders. Parliamentary
discursive practices helped to organize a 'crisis' of border control by presenting Canada's borders as having been infiltrated by foreign agitators whose activities, according to MP Lincoln M. Alexander, resulted in "the whole country...living in fear" (Hansard, March 3, 1969:6115).

This crisis was further organized through parliamentary discursive practices through which MPs increasingly made demands for greater control and protection of Canadian boundaries. For example, MP George Hees, in a debated entitled, "Immigration: Admission of Known Professional Agitators" stated:

In view of the greatly increased frequency of disruptive activities in the past few days, such as the bomb explosion in the Montreal Stock Exchange and the great amount of damage done to Sir George Williams University, is the government giving reconsideration to its open-door policy covering the entry into Canada of people like Stokely Carmichael and other agitators who openly urge the overthrow of the government by force, which agitation has an effect on activities of this kind (Hansard, February 18, 1969, p.5639)?

In discursively re-organizing student and FLQ demonstrations against institutions representing the authority of rulers as events instigated by outsiders - in this case, a leading member of the Black Panther Party in the US - Hees re-cast Canadians as either innocent victims or naive dupes of foreign agitators. Threats to Canadian security were common sensically produced as the collective problem of Canadians and the expulsion of foreigners was produced as a common sensical solution.

Importantly, the shifting of blame for unruly actions from Canadians (or Quebecois) to 'foreign agitators' worked not only to demonize people residing outside of Canadian borders but also certain groups of people living within Canada's borders. Throughout the parliamentary debates, it was immigrants who were held up as the 'foreign agitators' within the nation. With the following question, Liberal MP Warren Allmand helped to both socially define foreigners as

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*"In the Hansard, the official transcript of the parliamentary debates, each debate is titled. For the most part, I have chosen not to record the title as it is not necessary for the purposes of this study."*
immigrants and to shift the focus of the parliamentary debate on national security to the presence of 'foreigner'-immigrants within Canada's borders. He stated:

It has been determined that 45 out of 96 accused in the incident at Sir George Williams University were non-Canadians or foreigners. Could the minister find out exactly what is the immigration status of those 45 accused, to see if they were here as landed immigrants or students, or whether they had visitors' visas? (Hansard, February 13, 1969:5462)

MP (and former PM) John Diefenbaker continued with this approach by adding:

I would also ask him [the PM] if these student revolutionaries here on sufferance whether inspired by Mao's red book or any other book, are going to be allowed to carry on their illegal if not criminal activities with impunity? Should they not be deported? (Hansard, February 14, 1969:5518)

Here, the linking of the citizenship and immigration status of people participating in demonstrations to political perspectives, such as communism that were also presented as simultaneously foreign and threatening to Canadians, had the effect of re-framing student protest in Canada as resulting from the presence of foreigners in Canadian universities. Parliamentary discursive practices such as these helped to make common sensical the call for a joint effort between provincial attorney generals and the Ministers of Immigration and Justice “to decide what will be the future immigration policy regarding the admission to Canada of known professional agitators” (Alexander, Hansard, February 17, 1969).

This was perhaps best captured by PM Trudeau who, in reporting on the conclusions of a Royal Commission looking into matters of natural security, stated:

As the commissioners have stated, and I quote: “Canada remains the target of subversive or potentially subversive activities, attempts at infiltration and penetration, and espionage operations” and they emphasize that: “the duty of the state to protect its secrets from espionage, its information from subversion and its policies from clandestine influence is indisputable; what are matters for dispute are the organizations and procedures established by the State to meet this responsibility in an area which can touch closely upon the fundamental freedoms of the individual.”...[This requires] a careful and methodical build-up of modern technical facilities directed toward the

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*The association of foreign agitators with communism was strengthened by linking communist activity in Canada with the supposedly disruptive activities of foreign governments. For example, MP Henri Latulippe stated: “...In view of the riots which took place at Sir George Williams University, would the minister tell the house whether he deems it advisable to change or to put off the approaches made to China, in order to ascertain whether that communist country was involved in those acts of sabotage?” (Hansard, February 13, 1969:5462).*
detection and prevention of large scale organized crime, as well as the provision of information which the government requires in order to ensure the security and integrity of the state...For this reason...the government...has decided to accept the commissioners’ recommendation for the establishment of a Security Review Board... It is their opinion that such a system of review might be required in the three areas of employment, immigration and citizenship (Hansard, June 26, 1969:10636-37, emphasis added).

Trudeau’s comments signal that citizenship and immigration were ‘security issues’ for Canadians. Not coincidentally, then, this statement was made at a time when the immigration of people from the South was increasing steadily and the whole area of immigration was becoming closely associated with the entrance of people of colour. However, Trudeau was careful to recognize and emphasize liberal notions of individual freedom within the context of selecting entire groups, i.e. immigrants, for special attention. Centering investigations on national security threats on immigrants allowed such practices to be common sensically represented as both protecting the nation while maintaining the ‘fundamental freedoms’ of Canadians.

In this regard it is significant that an association was made between citizenship and immigration, and the issue of employment (and, therefore, unemployment), in the context of identifying security issues. Without saying ‘Canadians are under threat from people from the South who will take away Our jobs’, the making of immigration as a problem enabled the state to racialize and conceal the problems facing Canadians while maintaining a public image of ‘tolerance’.

The common sensical solution was again organized around the strengthening of Canada’s borders and Canadian immigration policy. Shoring up these boundaries helped to socially organize both differences between Us and Them as well as antagonism against foreigners. One MP stated:

...in the case of students coming from foreign countries, who, by their lawlessness here, undermine the rule of law, does the government intend to deport them to their own countries so that they will be able to do their work at home rather than in Canada. Their work here is to the detriment of our people (Hansard, February 14, 1969, p.5517, emphasis added).
The following questions in parliament, written by MP Hales, perhaps best encapsulate the process of discursively producing immigrants as foreigners who were dangerous to Canadians:

1. With regard to the riot at Sir George Williams University, how many people were arrested?
2. What was their Country of origin?
3. How many were in possession of Visas and what status did each one who was from another Country have?
4. What fines were levied?
5. How many were deported as a result of this riot, and to what Countries were they deported?
6. How many of those arrested were receiving student loans, grants, or scholarships from the Canadian government?
7. Were any of those involved receiving grants from the Canada Council and, if so, how many and what was the total amount of the Canada Council grants (Hansard, October 22, 1969:11681, question number 2,596)?

These questions focussed attention not on what prompted these students to protest but on the ‘foreign-ness’ of the people involved in the ‘riot’ and further that, by giving financial aid to foreign students, Canadian state practices may have contributed to the riotous acts. Since the framework of this question established the nationality of protestors as the problem, the common sensical solution was one that was directed at foreigners. The response of MP Yves Forest, Parliamentary Secretary to President of the Privy Council, while noting that seventy-five percent of the ninety-six people arrested were either Canadian citizens (forty-nine) or permanent residents (twenty-six), did nothing to refute the linkage between ‘terrorism’ in Quebec with immigration (Ibid.). Thus, Forest perpetuated the common sensical association between immigrants and foreign threats to national security.

Indeed, parliamentary discursive practices dealing with student and FLQ protests presented a supposedly open immigration policy as creating the conditions for threats to be made to national security. Foreign agitators were re-produced as immigrant agitators. MP Eldon M. Wooliiams helped to produce this common sensical linkage. He stated:

In view of the present crisis which seems to be apparent in our universities, would the government consider setting up a committee of the Senate and House of Commons to
investigate the department of immigration in order to ascertain why we permit a large percentage of foreigners to come into Canada...? (Hansard, February 13, 1969:5461).

As the problem of immigration was racialized, so was the problem of immigrant 'agitators'. This was done in several ways. At times, immigrant 'agitators' were linked to countries in the South. For example, MP Real Caouette wanted to know what Canadian state authorities were doing to monitor the activities of women from Viet Nam and members of the Viet Cong (whom the US state was engaged in an undeclared war with) who were visiting Canada (Hansard, June 16, 1969:10154).

At other times, MPs referred directly to the non-white skin colour of participants in student 'riots'. An example of this latter discursive practice is found in the following question asked by MP J. Edward Broadbent:

...in view of the fact there is some difficulty about the black foreign students in Montreal in relation to the Sir George Williams incident and in view of the request made on Friday I am wondering whether the government will send a federal representative to Montreal to be present during the court proceedings in order to deal particularly with matters concerning external affairs and immigration? (Administration of Justice: Sir George Williams University-Departmental Officer at Preliminary Hearing: March 10, 1969, p.6402).

Finally, MPs directly asked for the 'racial origin' of certain foreigners, such as foreign students. MP Robinson did this when asking, "What is the racial origin of each person (a) male (b) female, allowed entry into Canada as a student during each of the years 1960-68 inclusive?" (Hansard: May 26, 1969:9038).

The parliamentary discursive practices of re-casting protests within Canada as the product of foreign agitators who entered Canada through seemingly lax immigration restrictions helped to ideologically produce immigrants in Canada as the 'foreign threat' within the nation that threatened the well-being of Canadians. With the racialized association of immigrants with people from the South, it was people of colour living in Canada that were produced as threats to the nation's security.
In linking threats to the nation with the arrival of racialized foreigners, the notion of Canada as a unified subject for whom the state acts was solidified. The presence of people of colour was constructed as a problem and threat against which a discursively homogenous, white Canadian nation could unite. The construction of foreigners as a problem for Canadians worked to conceal how ruling relations were structured within the country.

**Immigrants as a Financial Burden**

Parliamentary discursive practice of presenting foreigners within the nation – immigrants from the South in Canada – as a threat to the well-being of Canadians was further advanced with the production of these immigrants as Our financial burden. As with notions of national security threats, this issue was firmly linked to student protests in universities in Canada. MPs consistently asked how much it cost ‘Canadian taxpayers’ to fund foreign students in Canada (Wooliams, Hansard, February 13, 1969:5461). Part of the production of foreigners as a problem at this time also centred on the supposedly high costs that were spent on Them by Us. This was evident in the following statement made by Wooliams:

> I listened to the [Manpower and Immigration] minister's remarks carefully. Since these disturbances are costing the country millions of dollars does the minister not agree that there is a crisis and state of urgency... Because a crisis exists does the minister not agree that we should set up a committee [a joint Senate and House of Commons committee to investigate the department of Immigration] such as I have suggested, before there is further trouble in our universities? (Hansard, February 13, 1969:5461-62).

Again, the linkages between the presence of foreign students in Canada, national security and costs to Canadian taxpayers were racialized. MP Robinson, along with his question regarding the ‘racial origin’ of foreign students (see above), racialized these students in relation to the amount of money Canadians spent on them. He asked: how many students from the Caribbean attended Canadian universities from 1960 to 1970; what subsidy was paid to them; how many remained after completing their education; and whether there was a requirement that
these students must return to what he referred to as ‘their own country’ (Hansard, December 8, 1971:10260).

Discursive practices that racialized the problem of foreigners, thus, produced a common sense about how foreigners abused Canadian taxpayers. This was done, in part, by pitting Canadian and foreign students against one another, again using the discursive practice of constructing a zero-sum game within which Canadians and foreigners competed. MPs consistently linked the funding of foreign students studying in Canadian universities with either the amount the Canadian state offered Canadian students or the amount that foreign governments gave to Canadian students (see Hansard, MP Diefenbaker, May 12, 1969:8550). In consistently comparing Canadian versus ‘foreigner’ students, the two groups were produced as separate and conflicting groups.

**Immigrants as a Criminal Menace**

The construction of foreigners and Canadians as discrete and discordant groups was further produced as common sensical by portraying immigrants in Canada as a criminal menace. This portrayal helped to strengthen the ideological notion that a crisis existed in the ability of the Canadian state to protect the borders of the nation. For example, in the following statement, MP R.N. Thompson helped to produce a common sensical belief that immigrants brought a disrespect for “law and order” with them to Canada. Speaking in reference to the 1967 ‘points system’ with its elimination of formal criteria of ‘preferred races/nationalities’ from Canadian immigration policy, he stated:

...It seems to me that in view of the general breakdown of law and order in the world at large we should be particularly careful about encouraging a further disregard for the laws of our country which I believe the citizens of any country have the responsibility to respect and obey (Hansard, May 22, 1969:8931).

Without saying so, he linked the recent arrival of people from the South with lawbreaking.
Another important ideological discursive practice used within parliamentary debates at this time was to discuss the activities of individual immigrants as if they were representative of the broad group of immigrants living in Canada. Spotlighting unlawful acts by individuals were then used as evidence of the 'need' to impose further restrictions on future immigration. In one example, an attack against an older woman by 'non-Canadians', led to calls for the 'firming up' of present immigration regulations (see Hansard, February 19, 1970:3829).

Often, the solutions for the supposed danger that immigrants posed to Canadians were often extreme and all encompassing. For instance, in order to prevent the entry of certain people described as 'terrorists' from Cuba, a suggestion was made to have the government “immediately close, or cause to be much more selective, the entry into our country of persons from Cuba...” (see Hansard, December 3, 1970:1716-17).

**Immigrant Encroachment on Canadian Entitlements**

Socially organized differences between immigrants and Canadians were further entrenched through the ideological linkages made between immigration and unemployment within the parliamentary debates. Such linkages depended upon parliamentary discursive practices reliant upon nationalist ideologies to (re)produce a common sense that the Canadian labour market belonged to Canadians. This was also racialized in that not all people with the legal status of immigrant was problematized. Parliamentary discursive practices, thus, produced immigrants as the cause of the unemployment of Canadians. As a result, immigrants were presented as a direct and immediate threat to the livelihoods of Canadians.

MP Beaudoin did this when he asked, “[d]oes the government intend to initiate a policy to reduce the number of immigrants to Canada as a result of employment problems in this country?” (Hansard, June 16, 1969:10149). Faced with questions regarding an immigration policy that since 1967 increasingly focussed on matching potential immigrants with occupational shortages in the Canadian labour market, various ministers of Manpower and Immigration did
very little (if anything) to dispel the common sense linkage between immigrants and unemployment. Instead, they tried to present immigration policies in a favourable light while maintaining the ideological notion that immigration, rather than ruling relations, resulted in unemployment.

For instance, Allan J. MacEachen, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, in response to Beaudoin’s question stated:

With the exception of sponsored dependent relatives, all immigrants are assessed on a point rating system which takes account of their occupational demand in Canada. This is not the only factor on which their applications are evaluated, nevertheless, it is one of the most important consideration, the purpose of which is to help equate immigration with employment opportunities in Canada (Ibid.:10149, emphasis added).

By concretizing the supposed link between employment and immigration, MacEachen also concretized the supposed connection between unemployment and immigration. This was not a unique response to such questions. In another parliamentary exchange, MacEachen defended the policy of immigrant labour recruitment as necessary “...because of the improved [economic] situation in Canada” (Hansard, July 14, 1969:11154).

Such responses demonstrated that even when defending the recruitment of immigrants, the notion that entitlements in Canada belonged first and foremost to Canadians was left unchallenged. Instead, these responses relied upon the social organization of difference, for they were hinged upon the notion that only when the economy was strong enough to accommodate both groups should immigrants be permitted to enter. This left the supposedly causal relationship between unemployment and immigration in tact.

Indeed, one of the more important accomplishments of linking the entrance of immigrants with the creation of unemployment was to make common sensical the highly nationalized discourse that only Canadians were legitimately entitled to work - at least in certain occupations - in Canada. Significantly, these sorts of questions arose only in regards to jobs in Canada seen as relatively attractive. For example, MP Mark Rose asked:
In view of the recent brief to the minister [of Manpower and Immigration] from ACTRA [trade union for actors, set and stage crew] concerning the lack of employment protection accorded Canadian artists and writers by our immigration laws, is the minister considering proposing amendments to our laws to provide greater security for Canadian creative people? (Hansard, February 5, 1970:3238).

**Immigrants as a Permanent Stain on Our Character**

The racialization of the problem of immigration helped to produce common sense racism against immigrants of colour from the South living in Canada because it constituted them in an inferior position materially as well as existentially in relation to whites in Canada whose existence was never questioned or problematized during the period of study. This racism culminated, discursively, in associating these immigrants to everything from a threat against national security to criminal activity, a financial drain for ‘taxpayers’ and unemployment. Through the combined use of nationalist and racist ideologies within parliamentary discursive practices, the ability for immigrants from the South to reside in Canada as permanent residents was made into a problem facing the Canadian nation.

This was done in two ways. First, the effect of having more people of colour immigrating to Canada by eliminating explicit racist criteria from the admittance regulations of Canadian immigration policies was made into a problem by presenting them as producing an unwelcome change in the ‘character’ of the Canadian nation. Second, parliamentary discursive practices called into question the Canadian state’s ability to ensure that so-called ‘non-immigrants’ (such as visitors*), who were admitted to Canada on a temporary basis only, would indeed leave Canada once their permission to stay expired.

This was done by organizing a problem around the ability to apply for permanent resident (or ‘landed’) status from within Canada. This problem, like all others associated with immigrants, was racialized, for it was presented as a way for ‘hordes’ of foreigners to remain permanently in the Canadian nation. In other words, the problem of immigration (and now of
visitors) was re-organized discursively as a problem of the permanence (or potential permanence) of 'too many' immigrants from the South. Their permanence was produced as a problem through the racialization of nationalist ideology that posited that the permanence of foreigners in Canada would lead to a deterioration, if not destruction, of the Canadian nation.

As discussed above, one way that parliamentary discursive practices produced the notion that 'too many' immigrants from the South were now residing permanently in Canada was by problematizing the effects of the 1967 changes to Canadian immigration policy. This relied upon racist ideologies to make it common sensical. The changes that were presented as a problem were changes that allowed for the acceptance of people from the South through the removal of the pre-1967 racialized criteria of 'preferred races/nationalities' - criteria that had been in place from the very first Canadian immigration policy.

The following statement by MP Douglas Roche, demonstrated how this discursive problem was organized. He stated:

There has been increasing urbanization, and far too many people, as we know and have mentioned in other debates, have been moving to and living in our major cities. Indeed, the mayor of Vancouver has complained because too many immigrants are coming to his city and compounding social problems. If we maintain our old fashion view of immigration we shall run into such problems (Hansard, June 18, 1973:4963).

By the end of the period under study, it was clear that there was no longer general support for a liberalized immigration policy within the Canadian Parliament. Such a policy, parliamentarians stated had been shown to bring in 'too many' immigrants who caused 'social problems' for Canadians. The ambiguity about what exactly these problems were did not diminish the effect of making common sense of the link between immigrants and problems for Us. Rather, as can be seen by the preceding discursive practices organizing the problem with immigrants during my period of study, such ambiguity allowed for the attachment of common sense racism to any problematic situation.

*The category visitor included tourists, students and people on temporary employment authorizations.
Importantly, in Roche’s statement, what was only six years old (the 1967 changes in immigration policy) and what was only a recent development in Canadian immigration policy was, by 1973, touted as ‘old fashioned’. The Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Robert K. Andras, confirmed both that the 1967 changes were a problem and that it was time to change Canadian immigration policy. In announcing changes to immigration policy that would remove certain rights for both temporary and permanent immigrants, he stated:

I know there are some who would say that we should have acted two or three years ago, and certainly I will say that with the benefit of hindsight. …But I think many of us felt that the act and the regulations of 1967 had been a noble experiment, liberal with a small ‘l’, and certainly represented the consensus of all groups in the House at that time. I think perhaps it was typical of the Canadian concern for people of other lands which has led this country, for example into so many peacekeeping missions, some of them under conditions which more coldly calculating people might have rejected out of hand (Hansard, June 18, 1973:4952).

Andras discursively re-cast immigration policy from being a means to recruit certain people to Canada to meet specific requirements to a form of charity displayed by Canadians for ‘people of other lands’. At the same time, he signaled that the liberalization of Canadian immigration policy – defined as it was by the 1967 removal of ‘race’-based distinctions of ‘desirability’ - was over. We were told that it had now become necessary for the government to start enacting tougher restrictions against immigrants and visitors admitted to Canada.

**Securing Their Return Passage**

The removal of certain rights available to visitors, especially the right to apply for permanent residence (‘landed’) status from within Canada, was at the centre of this display of toughness. Aside from the elimination of ‘race’-based admittance criteria, the ability to apply for permanent residency while holding visitor status in Canada was one of the ways that Canadian immigration policy was liberalized in 1967. A scant few years after these changes were implemented this right was already being problematized within the parliamentary debates.
Indeed, as with those entering Canada with permanent resident status, i.e. immigrants, the discursive practice of presenting temporary visitors or non-immigrants as a problem was already evident in the early years of my study of parliamentary debates. Significantly, visitors were a problem only in so much as they had been granted the possibility of remaining in Canada permanently. Thus, it was their permanence that was presented as a problem in parliament.

In 1970, MP Paproski discursively linked the entry of visitors with the possibility that they would either engage in criminal activity or become a financial drain on Canadians. His following questions began with the presupposition that visitors were, indeed, a problem. He asked:

1. Is it the intention of the government to tighten immigration procedures for persons entering Canada as visitors?
2. Do immigration officers currently require identification from all persons seeking to enter Canada?
3. Are persons who are or may become public charges allowed to enter Canada as visitors?
4. Are known or suspected drug users or peddlers, within the meaning of the Criminal Code, permitted to enter Canada as visitors and, if so, what is the reason for such a policy?
5. In what cases are persons prohibited from entering Canada? (Hansard, November 2, 1970:771).

By 1972, the possibility that those with visitor status would stay permanently in Canada was produced as the paramount problem with temporary visitors or non-immigrants. The following parliamentary exchange shows how this problem was organized. MP Robinson, asked, "[w]ill the government ensure that anyone entering Canada as a tourist deposits sufficient funds on entry to guarantee passage back to his [sic] country of origin?" (Hansard, March 22, 1972:1043, emphasis added). The Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Otto E. Lang, responded by assuring the House that "[a]n improved internal system is being developed to facilitate early detection and removal, if necessary, of those who overstay their legitimate sojourn in Canada as well as those whose immigration status is in doubt" (Ibid.).
Significantly, questions regarding the country of origin not only of immigrants but of visitors receiving permanent residency status began to be raised around this same time period. For example, MP Deakon, asked: “How many visitors to Canada have been granted landed Immigration status during the past 12 months?” and “From what countries did such persons come?” (Hansard, March 13, 1972). Focussing on the country of origin of those being granted permanent status had significant ramifications, since national origin and ‘race’ have historically been cojoined in the on-going Canadian nation-building project. This focus, then, produced a common sense that the nationality of people able to reside permanently in Canada was an important aspect of the immigration process. This was productive of a racialized common sense.

More to the point, the 1967 changes were presented as creating ‘unexpected’, ‘unprecedented’ and even ‘unfortunate’ results. In the following statement, MP Stanley Haidasz linked the removal of ‘race’-based admittance criteria with the creation of a ‘flood’ of applicants. He then produced a common sense about how their ability to apply for permanent residency status and appeal a negative decision created a drain on state resources devoted to dealing with this process. He further problematized these regulatory changes by alluding to how these rights created additional problems of law enforcement. In a question entitled, ‘Immigration-complaints by Toronto police about difficulty in obtaining deportation orders’, Haidasz said:

Since the new Immigration regulations of September 1967, which instituted an assessment system and removed geographical limitations and other discriminatory factors, an unexpected and unprecedented number of applications by people wishing to settle in Canada has been received by Canadian immigration authorities. These potential immigrants saw Canada, with its freedom, its beauty, its richness and great potential, as the best place in the world in which to live. Consequently, immigration offices both at home and abroad have been flooded with many applications. Unfortunately, since many visitors to Canada have decided to stay and ask for landed immigration status the processing of these applications in Canada has become very complex and long. When rejected by immigration officials, applicants have the right of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Board. Today I learned that there is a backlog of about 7,000 cases involving appeals from deportation orders. Furthermore...the difficulty has been compounded by fugitives or people wanted by the police... (Hansard, March 28, 1972:1240-41).
While Haidasz did eventually ask for a greater number of Immigration Appeal Board members to help process the backlog of applications, he helped to produce as common sensical the idea that the combined 1967 changes had resulted in an increasing problem in monitoring Canada’s borders.

In June of 1972, legislation (Bill C-197) was brought in to eliminate the right of visitors or non-immigrants’ to apply for permanent residency status from within the country (Hansard, June 22, 1972:3371). The Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Bryce Mackasey, argued that this right had resulted in a loss of control over the border. The elimination of these rights, then, were produced as necessary for the previous rules were said to discourage and disadvantage “homeland applicants [those who apply from outside of Canada], which are the preferred type” (Ibid.:3372). Parliamentary discursive practices, thus, strengthened the common sense being produced through the parliamentary debates that this right encouraged people to come to Canada as visitors or non-immigrants’ with the hope of gaining landed status and that this was a problem for Canadians.

Significantly, there was all-party consensus that a reversal of the 1967 immigration policy changes was necessary in order to ‘restore order’ to the border. The ideological rhetoric that produced this necessity was crystallized through the parliamentary debates when, in an interesting turn of events, the courts struck down the legislation that re-introduced restrictions to the ability of visitors to apply for landed immigrant status from within Canada (Hansard, July 19, 1973). The need to respond speedily to these court decisions was produced as common sensical through the portrayal of immigration policy as both seriously out of control and overburdened.

Increased restrictions on international mobility were also taking place in other Northern countries in this time period. For example, the U.S. introduced a bill in April of 1971 that would abolish a so-called ‘green-card commuter system’ that allowed easier movement into the US by people authorized to work there but residing in a different country (see Hansard, April 21, 1971:5121).
Bringing in new legislation to deal with these court rulings were enabled by the co-operation of all parties in the House.  

Robert K. Andras, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, couched newly worded legislation within the discourse of the necessity for those in the Canadian state to ‘control’ Canada’s borders against those who would ‘defy’ immigration policy. In particular, he discussed the need for ‘screening’ potential immigrants. This further problematized those who applied for permanent residency from within the country, because even when though they were not breaking any laws (there being no legislation in place to restrict this ability), they were represented as acting in ‘defiance of Canadian immigration policy’ and as undesirable. I quote extensively from the ensuing debates, for they are highly instructive about how the permanence of certain immigrants was problematized.

Andras, in announcing the court decisions stated:

...During the debate and study at all stages of Bill C-197, I certainly sensed a general agreement in this House that Canada must have the right to screen future residents of this country before they establish residence here, and indeed that those who fail to pass that screening should not be able to stay here in defiance of Canadian immigration policy.

...The two events...which threaten to undermine the efforts of parliament to restore order to the immigration process are two recent decisions interpreting immigration law, one by the Immigration Appeal Board and one by the Federal Court of Appeal... When put together, just as we are about to put a new immigration policy into effect, the result is that their combined effect would be that the administration of the system would be hopelessly overburdened and that in fact the props would be knocked from under all our efforts to restore order to the immigration process.

The result of the Immigration Appeal Board decision...is to restore the effect of regulation 34 which before its revocation enabled visitors to apply and qualify within Canada for landed immigration status... The second decision, that of the Federal Court of Appeal, ...says that my department has had no jurisdiction over these many years to make deportation orders against persons who applied for landing in Canada and who after examination were in fact refused... I do not think it is necessary for me to draw a picture for honourable members of what the consequences of this would do to Canada’s image of a country able to control the admission of immigrants to this country, or to the

10Indeed, usual party antagonism was set aside. Opposition MP Ron Atkey summed up the consensus by stating, “...we are going to make every attempt to co-operate” (Hansard, July 19, 1973:5811).
11It is important to note that even when applying from within Canada, people were ‘screened’ for selection as a permanent resident.
horrendous workload which these two decisions could impose on the administration of our immigration system... (Hansard, July 19, 1973:5809).

Significantly, the minister used ideological discursive practices formed through racist ideologies to reinforce the severity of the problem of our borders being out of control. He stated:

"...I would also draw to the attention of honourable members the danger of the exploitation of many innocent people by unscrupulous so-called immigration counselors, who could take the substance of these decisions and convince innocent people to come to Canada, many of whom in countries we can all name and who would do anything to come to this country to get away from the circumstances in which they are presently living" (Ibid.:5810, emphasis added).

Even though those 'who would do anything to come' to Canada were not specifically named, the hegemony of the association of desperation and poverty with the South, i.e. 'in countries we can all name', allowed for a common sense to be produced about the necessity to prevent people from the South from applying for permanent residency status in Canada. The need to restore order to Canada's borders was deeply racialized. Despite Andras' concern about 'innocent people' being manipulated, the minister helped to produce an account that problematized people from the South living permanently in Canada.

Such ideological discursive practices were also evident when the minister debated the merits of whether or not to extend the deadline on applications from within Canada. He did so through some typical rhetorical devices. For instance, when referring to the number of people, i.e. 'countless thousands', who wished to live in Canada he presented this as both unpredictable and overwhelming. Again, he was able to portray as common sensical the problem of an immigration system that was out of control by racializing the people who would breach Canada's borders. This reference to people from the South was ambiguous and relied on racist ideologies that produced the South as full of large numbers of people 'who would do anything to come' to Canada, while erasing the responsibility of Canadian state practices that contributed to increased international migration. He stated:
... On the one hand, if extension is considered, the effect on attitudes of countless thousands of people abroad for whom Canada is so attractive that they will seek and test any loophole which would allow them to come here must be taken into account as well as any apparent lack of will to hold firm to our immigration laws as announced (Hansard, October 15, 1973, p.6827).

Importantly, the notion that the government must show strength of will in 'holding firm' to immigration laws that will protect Us smacked of patriarchal control of the household. The members of the Canadian household were definitely racialized. This is evident in the following comments made by MP Ian Arrol, who argued against an extension of the above-mentioned deadline. He stated:

The farce of anybody from anywhere being allowed to come to this country and the onus being put on the government to get rid of them would once again be played [if the amnesty deadline was extended]... If we feel...that our duty is to the whole wide world, then let us remember New York and the dangers of opening one’s doors completely to the disadvantaged who now form close to the majority population of that city. Let us remember that if we choose, through a points system, to accept people from other countries, that we are often drawing off the best talent of those countries and that we are not, in fact, doing those countries a favour. If on the other hand we were to take hordes of those who are unskilled and whose social conditioning is not that of the work ethic, we could be well on the way to reducing our own standard of living to the standards of those whom we sought to help. ...In our modern technological age our own development should come first, and then the people should be brought in remembering at all times that a nation’s first responsibility is to its own people (Hansard, June 22, 1973:5028).

In a statement discursively organized through reliance on binary codes of Us versus Them based upon racist ideologies of modernization (among other things), Arrol helped to produce as common sensical highly racialized criteria of membership in the Canadian nation.

As with the minister of Manpower and Immigration, this opposition MP relied upon common sensical ideological concepts about the Third World that was/is supposedly full of “hordes” of unmodern, lazy people to racialize those he wished to see restricted from living as permanent residents in Canada. What these statements produced was the common sensical notion

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12 In a related issue, Canada was consistently represented as Our House in the parliamentary debates. There were other homey images in the immigration discourse as well ('doors', 'welcome mats' and so on). As with the patriarchal family, the patriarch (in this case, the state) holds the responsibility (and the power) to protect (as well as control) the members of his household.
that the borders to be controlled by Canadian immigration policy were the boundaries between Us and Them.

Conclusion

During the period under study, parliamentary debates produced a common sense of the problem of immigrants through the social organization of difference between Canadians and those rendered as Others. This process of Othering took place in relation not only to those conceptualized as foreigners living outside of Canada, as seen in Chapter Five, but also those placed within the opposite side of the binary code of Canadian-ness inside the country. Within Canada, it was immigrants who were centred in this ideological frame of Other-ness. Immigration policy was presented as a zero-sum game with immigrants threatening the well being of Canadians.

Being named an immigrant at this time was not a clear-cut process of assessing a person's nationality or her/his citizenship status. Parliamentary discursive practices racialized notions of Canadian-ness, or being Canadian, and notions of being an immigrant. Through these discursive practices, people of colour became ideologically co-terminus with immigrants. Concomitantly, being white - regardless of nationality - was interpellated as Canadian. The legal terms, 'immigrant' and 'Canadian' were ideologically transformed into racialized social categories.

Racist ideologies were made common sensical, in part, by discursively linking the presence of people of colour as responsible for threats to 'national security', a drain on taxpayers, the existence of criminal activity and unemployment. The binary codes of Us and Them were re-cast as the racialized divisions between immigrants and Canadians.

Around the time that explicit racist criteria for admission to Canada were eliminated, there was a continuous discourse reliant on intersecting ideologies of nationalism and racism within the Canadian parliament that helped to make common sense of the undesirability of
people of colour living in Canada. Repeated reference to immigration policy-making as an exercise in protecting Canadians helped to constitute these two supposedly distinct groups of people and mark the borders between them. By consistently comparing Canadians against immigrants/people of colour, the two groups were constructed as separate, conflicting groups. The ‘whiteness’ of Canadians was simultaneously re-inscribed.

Importantly, racist parliamentary discursive practices that organized the presence of people of colour as a problem also helped to discursively construct a supposedly homogenous white Canadian nation for whom state practices were carried out. Consequently, the white population living in Canada was re-imagined (and managed) as a unified community. This shows the importance of immigration policy in the process of identity-formation in Canada.

The particular organization of rules of conduct in parliament contributed to the ideological organization of people of colour as in contrast and dangerous to Canadians. The organization of debates between antagonistic, though not always distinctive, groups in Parliament (the governing and opposition parties) resulted in constant attacks against the governing party over its ability to take care of ‘its own people’. Posed as questions, the goal of the opposition parties was to highlight what they represented as the mistakes of the governing party in order to emphasize their own ability to govern Canadians. For example, by linking threats to law and order with immigration policy, the opposition was able to place the governing party in the position of having to defend its record of controlling the borders of the nation and protecting Canadians. This made the practice of constructing immigrants/people of colour as a problem an especially effective one for opposition members of parliament.

At the same time, deflecting responsibility for actual problems away from how social relations were organized (globally, as well as in Canada) and on to the presence of immigrants/people of colour in Canada enabled the governing party to do three things. First, the use of racist, nationalist ideologies reinforced the common sensical notion that it was foreigners
(and not the rulers) who were to blame for any insecurities facing Canadians. Arguments relying on this notion allowed those in the Canadian state to make common sense of practices that supported these ruling relations.

While nationalist ideologies helped to make state support for capital accumulation common sensical by organizing the negative duality between Canadians and foreigners (see Chapter Five), racist ideologies gave form to this common sense by actually naming the Other. The discourse of immigration was central to this process of legitimation. Racist ideologies materialized notions of difference between Canadians and foreigners by rendering people of colour as the foreigners within.

Indeed, it can be said that such parliamentary discursive practices organized a 'moral panic' regarding the presence of people of colour.

Stuart Hall (1978 as cited in Gilroy, 1987:3) defines a 'moral panic' as existing

when the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when “experts,” in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors, perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk “with one voice” of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solution, when the media representations universally stress “sudden and dramatic” increases (in numbers involved or events) and “novelty” above and beyond that which a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of the beginnings of a moral panic.

While my study is limited to analyzing parliamentary debates, it can certainly be said that within parliament, parliamentarians helped to organize a moral panic of people of colour rendering Our border as out of control. In particular, by the end of 1972, it was the permanence of people of colour in Canada that was portrayed as causing a crisis in Canadian immigration policy.

This was done through various rhetorical devices. First, as previously mentioned, the existence of a foreign presence in Canada was attributed to a weak immigration policy. This helped to produce as common sensical the notion that the borders of the nation were insecure in regards to the movement of foreigners across them and strengthened the association of immigrants with a ‘national problem’. Immigration policy was said to have been weakened by
the 1967 changes to immigration policy that eliminated the categories of preferred 'races'/nationalities, and both opened up immigration to people of colour and made it possible for people with visitors status to apply for permanent resident (or 'landed') status from inside Canada.

Secondly, the foreign presence of people of colour was discursively associated with the lessening of the quality of life for Canadians. In particular, the existence of unemployment was ideologically re-framed as resulting from the entry of immigrants/people of colour who were portrayed as taking away what belonged to Canadians. Indeed, immigration policy was singled out for failing to protect Canadians from competition for jobs. This highly nationalized discourse made common sensical the argument that only Canadians were entitled to work (at least in certain, relatively attractive occupations) in Canada or have access to state-funded programs and protections. Threats to these 'Canadian entitlements' were said to come from immigrants/people of colour and not from the restructuring of society to allow for greater competition for capitalist investment.

Thirdly, the utility of problematizing people of colour in Canada cannot be fully understood without recognizing that throughout the period under study, their problematization did not result in the actual physical exclusion of people of colour from the country. Canadian immigration policy continued to allow people from the South to enter the country. Instead of working to physically exclude people of colour from Canada, the use of racist ideological parliamentary practices that rendered people of colour as the Other within the Canadian nation, allowed a common sense to be constructed around their differential, and often substandard, treatment once in Canada.

I now move to discussing my analysis of parliamentary debates that were productive of the category of migrant worker and its common sensical character within Canadian society. This is done to show how those so categorized were rendered as the quintessential non-citizens within
Canadian society, thereby rendering them cheaper and weaker within the labour market than those represented as belonging to the Canadian nation.
Chapter 7: 
Naming the Other: The Parliamentary Production of Migrant Workers in Canada

Nazi policy was beyond racism, it was anti-matter, for Jews were not considered human. An old trick of language, used often in the course of history. Non-Aryans were never to be referred to as human, but as “figuren,” “stucke” – “dolls,” “wood,” “merchandise,” “rags.” Humans were not being gassed, only “figuren,” so ethics weren’t being violated. No one could be faulted for burning debris, for burning rags and clutter in the dirty basement of society. In fact, they’re a fire hazard! What choice but to burn them before they harm you?

Anne Michaels, Fugitive Pieces

Introduction

Throughout the world, the growing number of people categorized as ‘migrant workers’ are largely those who are forced to migrate in search of work simply to survive. Their migration also results, in large part, from the very processes of globalization that produces a transnational group of managers. As Saskia Sassen (1988:17) points out, “the specificity of labor migration in the current historical period lies not in... general conditions or individual motivations but in its articulation with the internationalization of production.” The transplantation of subsistence farming by ever-larger agri-businesses, the feminization of industrial work in the less economically advanced countries, the expulsion of women from these same ‘global factories’ when considered to be ‘too old’ and the sheer lack of available jobs leaves many people unable to find paid employment in their ‘home’ countries (see Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983). They are forced to offer themselves for sale in the world market for labour power.

Increasingly, their labour power is bought with conditions of unfreedom attached to it. Indeed, the unfree contract labour recruitment system has, in the words of Hassan Gardezi (1995:5), “emerged as the dominant mode of the international transfer of labour.” It is now roughly estimated that one-third of the people involved in the international migration of labour are made to work as unfree, contract labour in the receiving nationalized labour markets (Ibid.:2). In the words of Robin Cohen (1987), they are the ‘new helots’ in the global capitalist economy. In all practical terms, they are virtually stateless while, ironically, being regulated very
much by the state. Their reality is such that they often criss-cross the globe in search of work but are denied citizenship anywhere but a place that cannot sustain them or their families.

As David Goldberg (1993:21) insightfully points out, statelessness has throughout history been associated closely to ‘barbarianism’. Recalling that ‘barbarians’ were produced through various racialized and gendered processes of Other-ization and have been seen (by the Hellenic Greeks for instance) as people who have an “emphatically different, even strange, language, conduct, and culture and [lack] the cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice” (Goldberg, 1993:21), the stateless migrant worker has been cast as today’s ‘barbarian’.

The organization of the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) with its operationalization of the migrant worker category, introduced on January 1, 1973, was largely an outcome of a social organization of ‘difference’ between people of colour and ‘Canadians’ produced through parliamentary discursive practices during the period under study. Indeed, as shown in Chapter Six, the regulatory and legislative changes made to immigration policy by the state in 1972 and 1973 need to be placed firmly within the context of immigrants being constituted as a ‘problem’. Once the problem of ‘immigration’ and the association of people of colour as ‘foreigners’ to the Canadian nation was established and left largely unquestioned in the parliamentary debates, subsequent state practices that targeted people seen as not belonging was also legitimated.

Over the period under study, I show that a major shift took place in Canadian immigration policies as well as in what was considered legitimate behaviour in regards to the treatment of (im)migrants\(^1\) entering Canada. By 1972, parliamentarians agreed that there ought to be an end to the liberalization of Canadian immigration policy begun in 1967, which culminated

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\(^1\) When I use the term ‘(im)migrants’, I am referring to all those entering into the territories controlled by the Canadian state and not only those officially categorized as such. The term (im)migrants, when spelled this way, then, includes those entering as ‘landed’ immigrants, migrant workers and those who arrive without legal documents authorizing their entry.
in the removal of the intersecting racialized and nationalized criteria of admittance. These liberalized policies were characterized in the subsequent parliamentary debates as having created the conditions in which Canada's borders became 'out of control.'

A major aspect of how our borders were becoming 'unmanageable' was the ability for those in Canada on visitors visas of one type or another to apply for and become permanent residents, and, eventually, citizens of Canada. Moreover, the ability of people in Canada on visitors visas to appeal negative decisions regarding landed (or permanent residency) status was also discursively produced as an outrage against Canadians.

I demonstrate how this situation was organized as a problem through the use of intersecting ideologies of nationalism and racism that presented as common sensical the idea that Canadians should not be made to be 'responsible' for just anyone who set foot on 'Canadian soil' (Hansard, June 18, 1973:4951) and that 'a nation’s first responsibility was to its own people' (Hansard, June 22, 1973:5028). Hence, immigration policy changes taking place in the latter period of my study were produced by parliamentarians as necessary in order to clarify the 'obligations' of Canadians to those constructed as falling outside of the scope of the 'nation'.

The revocation in November, 1972 of the 1967 policy of allowing 'visitors', for the first time in Canadian history, to apply for permanent residency in Canada from within the country became one of the cornerstones of the new attitude towards border control at this time. This change, presented by the state as an attempt to 'restore order' to Canada's immigration policy, came a scant few weeks before the introduction of the NIEAP in January of 1973.

It was not the entry of people into Canada per se that was organized by parliamentarians as a problem for us but the ability of visitors (under which legal-bureaucratic category migrant workers fell) to claim some of the entitlements of Canadian citizenship. The removal of certain 'rights' available to what the state categorized as non-immigrants, was, therefore, at the centre of
its display of toughness. From the outset, the NIEAP was intended as a temporary and rotational workers recruitment program whereby those categorized as migrant workers were legally obligated to leave Canada and given no official recourse to staying in the country as permanent residents.

The introduction of the NIEAP in January 1973 needs to be firmly located within the regulatory and legislative changes made in the preceding five years. After the 1972 changes, the numbers of people entering Canada, particularly from the global South could (and did) increase. However, those admitted through the NIEAP were brought in as visitors on temporary employment authorizations. The new changes prevented these migrant workers from applying for permanent residency from within Canada. Thus, they were ensured a migrant worker status for the duration of their time in Canada.

The NIEAP also needs to be located within the ideological organization of the Other-ness of people of colour embedded in the discursive practices of parliamentarians at this same time. The NIEAP created a new ideological category of admittance into Canadian immigration policy: the non-immigrant whose sole purpose in entering Canada was to work for a specified employer, in a specified occupation and in a specified location in the country – all on a temporary employment authorization that was renewable only at the behest of the employer.

I argue that following the reversal of the liberalization policies of the mid- to late-1960s, the racialized criteria of admittance in Canadian immigration policy was shifted from the pre-1967 categories of preferred races and nationalities onto the new category of non-immigrant or migrant worker. This is because the NIEAP helped to ‘solve’ the socially organized problem of the permanence of people of colour. Essentially, this migrant worker recruitment scheme dealt with the problem of having ‘too many’ people of colour in the country. Also, discursive practices within parliamentary relied on racist imagery to secure the legitimacy of the migrant worker
category. This was done by discursively producing people of colour as the quintessential migrant worker in Canada. Statistically, the racialization of the migrant worker category was reflected in the fact that approximately ninety percent of people from the global South admitted under the non-immigrant category were indentured to employers and occupations that most Canadian 'citizens' found relatively unattractive (Sharma, 1995).

The introduction of the NIEAP needs to be placed in the context of greater state involvement in shaping the supply of labour power in Canada during this time as well as in the context of a racist backlash against people of colour living as permanent residents and even de jure citizens in Canada. In discursively pitting (im)migrants against Canadians, parliamentarians participated in the creation of another problem: how to ensure a competitive supply of workers for employers in the country, especially workers who could be made to work in jobs that Canadians and permanent residents could legally refuse while ensuring that Canadians saw state practices as able to control the boundaries between Us and Them.

Throughout the period under study, there were complaints from MPs about specific labour shortages that Canadians were not able or willing to fill. One area that received consistent attention was the shortage of medical personnel, particularly doctors, in the north. Most often, though, the issue of labour shortages was raised in regards to farm work. However, within this discourse there was a noticeable tension between those MPs who wanted a stable supply of migrant workers for farm owners and those who questioned why foreigners and not Canadians were being recruited for this work. The governing party in parliament addressed both concerns by presenting its policies as working to meet both the needs of farm owners and unemployed Canadians.

Throughout the period under study this increasingly became a consideration of how policies were presented in parliament and formed the basis for the introduction of the
employment validation procedure embedded within the NIEAP – the major innovation that distinguished the NIEAP from previous migrant worker recruitment programs. In this respect, the NIEAP allowed the state to accomplish two of the main goals of immigration policy in this period under study: the organization of legitimacy for state actions regarding immigration and ‘border control’ and the provision of a highly competitive workforce for employers and investors in Canada.

An investigation of the EVP illuminates the fact that while the problem of labour shortages was discursively produced by MPs as a problem of a physical lack of workers, the actual reasons for such shortages were related to the quality of working and living conditions offered by certain employers and/or certain geographical locations in Canada. Significantly, the problem of the quality of certain jobs and locations in Canada was ideologically re-framed as a problem of freedom, thereby concealing the political economy of the Canadian labour market and especially the racialized difference between relatively attractive and unattractive employment.

This chapter, then, sets out to investigate the practices of governing in Canada that established what later came to be regarded as natural and necessary – the existence of people as migrant workers in Canada who were indentured to employers as a condition of entry and of staying in the country. I examine the debates concerning the specific changes that were made to facilitate the introduction of the NIEAP and how these changes were a key part of the reversal of the liberal thrust of the 1967 regulations.

I undertake this investigation not only to understand the process by which this category was formulated but also to understand the consequences of its formation in the world. I analyze the parliamentary debates between 1969 to 1973 to see how the particular difference between Canadians, permanent residents and migrant workers were organized through the construction of
the category migrant worker. I investigate how it was constructed as 'reasonable' and what this tells us about the society in which the existence of people as migrant workers is seen as self-evident. I show that in the creation of the problem of the 'foreigner-Other' the discriminatory treatment faced by those so classified became unproblematic.

Taken in conjunction with the previous chapter, the arguments made here show how important both the political economy of the global capitalist system (and Canada's place within it) and the social organization of racialized notions of 'belonging' to the Canadian nation are to the social organization of difference in Canada. Both work in tandem to reinforce binary codes of negative duality that shape inequality and injustice within the world system of nation-states.

Materializing the foreigner Within: The non-immigrant employment authorization Program

With the organization of the category migrant worker, the NIEAP, introduced on January 1, 1973, allowed the social category of 'foreigner' to be fully realized in Canadian society. Through the NIEAP, the ability to legally differentiate between peoples based on whether they were Canadians or foreigners within Canada was made an object of state action. In legislating the category non-immigrant to mean non-citizen, Canadian state practices brought the migrant worker into being. A migrant worker was the temporary worker who had to work for whom the state stipulated and had to leave the country after having done so. Living, working and paying taxes in Canada, even for lengthy periods, would not affect or change this status. Through the regulations of the NIEAP the social organization of difference in Canada was materialized within the Canadian labour market.

Canadian immigration policy had to be changed in order to facilitate the introduction of the NIEAP and the construction of the social category of migrant worker. First, the ability of visitors (a very broad category under which non-immigrants fell) to apply for landed status from within Canada was taken away. This allowed the state to gain greater control over previous
migrant workers programs. Gaining this control was a major goal of the NIEAP as evidenced by the following remark of MP Robert Andras, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration who stated that this change was necessary:

...because it had been evident for some time that control over the length of stay and the employment activities of visitors to Canada was inadequate, particularly in the light of dramatic increases in their numbers, from slightly more than 28 million in 1955 to almost 39 million in 1971 (Hansard, June 18, 1973: 4951).

Removing visitors’ right to become permanent residents from within Canada ensured that those entering the country as a migrant worker would not be able to change their status once inside the country.

By producing the increase in number of visitors as a problem, further restrictions were produced as reasonable. Thus, Andras was able to add:

I really believe that in the light of the experience which has been gained in the 5 years of the operation of the Immigration Appeal Board Act [1967-1973] we must ask ourselves if every person, by the mere act of setting foot on Canadian soil, should gain access to the board and from it access to the federal and Supreme Courts. The bill before you suggests that he or she should not. ...The main permanent amendments...modify the existing appeal rights by confining the future appeal rights to persons who have been issued an immigrant or non-immigrant visa abroad and who are ordered deported for any reason while seeking admission at a port of entry at that precise moment in time. It will also provide the right of appeal to landed immigrants and to persons who come forward under the adjustment opportunity program and to persons, finally, who have a substantial claim to refugee status or to Canadian citizenship (Ibid.:4951-52, emphasis added).

Consequently, the right of visitors to appeal orders of deportation once in the country was revoked. For those so categorized, the right to appeal a deportation order was limited to deportation orders given at the point at which visitors were denied entry to Canada. As a result, migrant workers became unable to appeal orders of deportation after they had started to work in the country. This change in legislation gave greater powers to both employers and the Canadian state, for it immunized them from appeals to deportation from migrant workers in Canada and enabled the NIEAP to work as a temporary worker recruitment system.
Finally, the state extended its previously limited policies of admitting people as migrant workers into the much broader NIEAP that was capable of more efficiently recruiting and monitoring increased numbers of people on temporary employment authorizations. Prior to the introduction of the NIEAP, visitors were able to apply for work visas from inside Canada. Afterwards, employment visas would only be issued to people applying from outside the country. Thus, by limiting the autonomy of visitors to Canada, the NIEAP was able to function as a controlled system of ‘migrant’ labour recruitment. With these changes, the NIEAP, worked as a more precise labour market tool. Together, these changes reversed large parts of the liberalization of Canadian immigration policy that took place in 1967.

An analysis of the terms and conditions of the NIEAP shows how it operated both as a temporary and a rotational migrant workers recruitment program. Those entering under the category of non-immigrant were bound to “…work at a specific job for a specific period of time for a specific employer” (CIC, 1994:1). Those recruited as migrant workers were unable to change any of the terms of their employment without prior written permission from an immigration officer. They were told that they, “…must follow the terms of [their] employment authorization while in Canada. If [they] do not, [they] may be asked to leave the country” (Ibid.).

The NIEAP further functioned as a rotational system of employment through the stipulation that migrant workers could not exceed the length of time stated upon their temporary employment authorization. They were, in other words, recruited to work for a specified period of time only to be replaced with new migrant workers. Through these regulations, migrant workers were denied the freedoms of labour market and spatial mobility available to those within the social categories of citizen or permanent resident. Because of this, the NIEAP greatly increased

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2 The retraction of Section 34 of the Immigration Act that allowed visitors to apply for landed status from within the country was initially made by an order in council in 1972.
the Canadian state’s ability to link and control (im)migration according to labour market demands in Canada.

Existing laws in Canada did not permit the state to restrict the mobility of citizens or permanent residents. Key to the operation of the NIEAP, then, was the provision that those recruited as migrant workers had no legal recourse to apply for permanent resident (or 'landed') status. Only by categorizing as visitors or non-immigrants those who lived, worked and paid taxes in Canada could a group of people be indentured to employers in Canada. Moreover, constructing the non-immigrant or migrant worker category was a crucial part of how differences were socially organized not only between those recognized as Canadians and foreigners but amongst (im)migrants as well.
Table 1

Total Number of (Im)migrant Workers in the Canadian Labour Market by Calendar Year:
Permanent Residents 'Destined' to the Labour Market and Temporary Visa Workers,
1973 to 1993

| Year | Destined \(^3\)  
|------|------------------|
|      | (Immigrant Workers) | Visa \(^4\)  
|      |  
|      | (Non-immigrant Workers) | Total \(^5\)  
|      |  
|      | (All (Im)migrant Workers) |  
| 1973 | 92,228 (57%) | 69,901 (43%) | 162,129 (100%)  
| 1974 | 106,083 (60) | 71,773 (40) | 177,856 (100)  
| 1975 | 81,189 (51) | 77,149 (49) | 158,338 (100)  
| 1976 | 61,461 (47) | 69,368 (53) | 130,829 (100)  
| 1977 | 47,625 (41) | 67,130 (59) | 114,755 (100)  
| 1978 | 34,762 (29) | 14,459 (29) | 49,221 (100)  
| 1979 | 47,949 (60) | 31,996 (40) | 79,945 (100)  
| 1980 | 63,479 (39) | 98,681 (61) | 162,160 (100)  
| 1981 | 56,676 (37) | 96,750 (63) | 153,426 (100)  
| 1982 | 55,023 (35) | 101,509 (65) | 156,532 (100)  
| 1983 | 36,540 (29) | 87,700 (71) | 124,240 (100)  
| 1984 | 37,468 (25) | 113,297 (75) | 150,765 (100)  
| 1985 | 36,949 (22) | 134,167 (78) | 171,116 (100)  
| 1986 | 63,479 (30) | 150,467 (70) | 213,946 (100)  
| 1987 | 56,676 (26) | 157,492 (74) | 214,168 (100)  
| 1988 | 73,134 (27) | 194,454 (73) | 267,588 (100)  
| 1989 | 94,412 (36) | 169,004 (64) | 263,416 (100)  
| 1990 | 109,840 (38) | 176,377 (62) | 286,217 (100)  
| 1991 | 127,870 (40) | 191,392 (60) | 319,262 (100)  
| 1992 | 137,360 (43) | 178,280 (57) | 315,640 (100)  
| 1993 | 65,130 (30) | 153,988 (70) | 219,118 (100)  


As Table 1 shows, with the introduction of the NIEAP, the Canadian state was able to successfully shift immigration policy away from a policy of permanent (im)migrant settlement towards an increasing reliance upon unfree, temporary labour, i.e. migrant workers. For the

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'Destined' refers to the number of people admitted to Canada as permanent residents who have indicated that they intend to enter the labour market. This category includes people admitted under all classes of immigration (family, refugees, self-employed, retired, assisted relative and independent). These people have the right to choose their occupation, their employer and their location of residence. In other words, they are able to work as free wage workers within Canada. This category excludes: entrepreneurs who were added to this category from 1978 and investors who were included from 1988.

'Visa' refers to the number of people admitted to Canada for periods less than or over one year and working in Canada during the calendar year recorded. The total of visa workers includes workers entering through the NIEAP plus the Foreign Domestic Movement Program (1982-1991) and the Live-in Caregiver Program (1992-1993). For the years 1989-1993, the category 'backlog clearance', given to refugees granted temporary employment authorizations while waiting for their status to be determined is excluded.

This category includes all those entering the country under the destined and visa categories.
majority of the years following the introduction of the NIEAP, the number of people recruited to
work in the labour market in Canada as permanent residents declined both in proportion and in
numbers to those recruited as migrant workers. From making up fifty-seven percent of the total
number of recruited for the labour market in 1973, they represented only thirty percent of the
(im)migrant work force by 1993. In looking only at the numbers of people admitted as part of the
independent class⁶, the shift was even more striking. By 1993 only twenty-four percent of all
(im)migrants recruited to the Canadian labour market were given permanent residency rights
while seventy-six percent were recruited as migrant workers (Sharma, 1995: 122).

The introduction of the NIEAP allowed the Canadian state to respond to a changing
global political economy by restructuring the labour market in Canada. It provided employers
with a great deal of flexibility in terms of organizing their workforce according to sudden
changes in demand. Moreover, in conjunction with provincial state apparatuses, it exempted
certain groups, including those working as farm workers or domestics from minimum wage and
standards legislation.

These state practices contributed to the substandard conditions found in jobs performed
by migrant workers. Employers benefited from paying those recruited as migrant workers much
less or having them perform tasks found to be unattractive by taking advantage of the separation
of powers between federal and provincial levels of the Canadian state (see Cornish, 1992; Wall,
1992; Bolaria, 1992, Arat-Koc, 1992). This is because it was claimed that the federal level of the
Canadian state had no jurisdiction in setting or enforcing provincial labour standards. Meanwhile
their provincial counterparts claimed to have no responsibility over migrant workers since they
were recruited through the NIEAP.

⁶ The Independent Class of immigration recruits people as permanent residents through the “points system” that
evaluates applicants according to their occupation, educational qualifications, English and French language skills as
well as “adaptability” to Canadian society and assesses applicants on their ability to meet a minimum number of
points” in these areas.
The result was that federal-level bureaucrats often enforced the migrant workers contract on behalf of employers by maintaining the indentured employment relationship. However, provincial bureaucrats did little, if anything, to ensure the employer was meeting the wage rates and living and working conditions promised to migrant workers before they arrived in Canada (Cornish, 1992). Because those categorized as migrant workers were made ineligible for social programs and services that citizens and most permanent residents had access to, such as health care insurance, unemployment insurance (UI), social assistance and workers' compensation packages, the NIEAP also worked to lessen state expenditures on workers. The NIEAP thus operated (and still operates) as a system of indentured labour recruitment that allows both the Canadian state and employers in Canada to benefit from the legislated vulnerability and lack of entitlements of those placed in the state category of non-immigrant.

While a documentary analysis of Canadian parliamentary debates from 1969 to 1973 shows how immigration legislation was changed in order to allow for the introduction and efficient exercise of the NIEAP, such an analysis also uncovers how the migrant workers category was also a social category. That is, the terms of inclusion in this category were widely regarded by parliamentarians as a normal feature of Canadian society. There were no questions or disagreements concerning the fundamental construction of this category or what it accomplished, i.e. an indentured labour system. Instead, there was complete coherence within the debates about indenturing people categorized both legally and socially as migrant workers. By analyzing these parliamentary debates, it became clear that the conceptual ideological framework for the existence of this category was rooted in existing social relations in Canadian society.

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7 While those categorized as migrant workers are ineligible for a host of social programs, this does not stop the Canadian state from collecting taxes and premiums for these programs from them. For example, Sedef Arat-Koc (1989) shows that in the years between 1973 and 1981, those recruited to work as migrant domestic workers, mainly women from the South, alone paid over $11 million into social program funds but were not eligible to these funds because of their migrant worker status.
I now turn to discussing the discursive parliamentary practices that shaped the social organization of the migrant workers category so as to make it 'common sensical' or rational. I examine the construction of the category of migrant worker in order to understand how discursive practices of parliamentarians produced it as a response that fit into the socially organized realm of possibilities at the time. I begin with the awareness that the construction and subsequent employment of the migrant workers category in 1973 was a response to certain problems thought of as actionable by those doing the job of governing in Canada.

**Producing the Right Kind of Worker**

One of the initial problems that the NIEAP was meant to resolve was the shortage of workers in certain occupations and in certain geographic locations in Canada. The two most cited examples within the parliamentary debates were a shortage of workers for farmers in Ontario and what was called an 'acute' shortage of needed medical personnel in the north (Hansard, January 23, 1969:4712). Within the parliamentary debates, in general, the problem the NIEAP was meant to resolve was constructed as one of finding workers who would take these occupations or live in these locations without changing relatively substandard working and living conditions.

MPs, especially those who represented ridings affected by these labour shortages, usually failed to discuss how such shortages resulted from the quality of the pay and life offered to employees. Rather, they demanded a resolution that would increase the supply of workers while maintaining the terms and conditions of work. For example, MP Ed Schreyer asked the Minister of National Health and Welfare:

> In view of a statement by the national director of northern health services to the effect that the most elementary medical facilities are lacking in the north country, can the minister say whether any specific program or course of action is being contemplated by his department to provide these basic facilities (Hansard, January 27, 1969:4831)?

Minister John C. Munro replied, in part, by stating that the state was “trying to recruit additional and more adequate personnel” (Ibid.:4831).
Munro was indeed successful in increasing the physical number of doctors in Canada. Since 1966, as a result of both greater enrolment and graduation rates in medical school and a twenty-eight percent increase in the number of doctors immigrating as permanent residents (from 995 in 1966 to 1,277 in 1968), there were more doctors practicing in Canada (Hansard, May 21, 1969:8889). However, at the same time, the number of doctors choosing to specialize rather than work as general practitioners (a generally lower paying and lower status medical occupation) increased even more significantly – forty-five percent during this same time (Ibid.). The increases in the number of doctors practicing medicine, then, did not alleviate shortages in precisely those occupations, such as general practitioners, or in relatively unattractive locations, such as the north where these shortages existed.

The trend towards increased specialization by doctors was identified as a problem in the House of Commons. MP George Hees asked:

...has he [the Minister of National Health and Welfare] any plans for reversing this trend, and has he discussed these plans with the provincial ministers of health (Hansard, March 13, 1969:6564)?

One early response by the minister was to establish a joint federal/provincial taskforce directed to arrive at solutions to the problem of medical personnel shortage and specialization (Hansard, February 26, 1969:5977). However, complaints from opposition MPs that continued to be voiced as solutions, such as increasing the number of doctors, failed to work (see Hansard, November 3, 1971:9293; November 9, 1971:9507-09).

Other than questions concerning shortages of doctors in northern Canada, the issue of migrant workers was most often raised in relation to farm labour where there had been a long tradition of recruiting workers as migrant workers (Wall, 1992; Satzewich, 1989; Parr, 1980; Avery, 1979). During the period of study, farm work, as well as life in the north, was considered

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8 Throughout Canadian history and, indeed, prior to the establishment of the Canadian national state, Indigenous people (including Metis) were both enslaved and later indentured to white settlers farming on land stolen from
by many Canadians and permanent residents as (relatively) unattractive (Wall, 1992, Bolaria, 1992). As with the parliamentary debates regarding medical shortages, the discussion concerning farm labour shortages, mainly in Ontario, centred on how best to recruit workers without having to improve existing working and/or living conditions. Unlike the problem of attracting qualified medical personnel, the problem of shortages on Canadian farms was more clearly identified as one of filling jobs that Canadians ‘did not want’. The ‘solution’ of bringing in people as migrant workers was ready at hand. This is evident in the following exchange:

H. W. Danforth: ...My question has to do with the tragedy that is now becoming apparent. In view of the loss of thousands of tons of fruit and vegetables because of the lack of available labour during the harvest season despite high unemployment, will the minister now look into this problem to see if adequate plans cannot be made for the coming season in order to circumvent such a tragedy? (Hansard, November 2, 1971:9248, emphasis added)

Honourable Otto E. Lang (Minister of Manpower and Immigration): ...we endeavor in every way possible to meet manpower needs with regard to harvesting. Perhaps the honourable member might remind his colleagues of this situation should they criticize the Caribbean workers program in another summer (Ibid.:9248).

Importantly, it was recognized that the remuneration paid by farmers, as well as the conditions of work, were a major reason for the shortage of Canadian workers in this sector. MP S. Perry Ryan stated:

...Since on the weekend the PM led the public to believe that farm and tobacco workers in Ontario receive the minimum wage, would the PM inform the House as to what minimum wage law affects farm and tobacco workers in Ontario? ...Ontario farm and tobacco workers are not covered by provincial and federal minimum wage statutes and as forty-two percent of farm workers in Ontario receive less than the provincial minimum wage... (Hansard, March 13, 1972:756).

Indigenous peoples by the British Crown or the Canadian state (Bourgeault. 1992; Bolaria and Li. 1988:187). Moreover, Blacks in Canada were enslaved from the early 17th century to 1800. Most of these slaves were forced to work on the land of large plantation owners as stoop labour (Bolaria and Li. 1988:189). One of the earliest programs to indenture (im)migrants to farm labour was at the turn of the last century when impoverished children in Great Britain laboured as apprentices on farms in Canada (Parl. 1980). During WW II, the Canadian state forced incarcerated Japanese-Canadians to work as farm labour. During and following this war, Polish war veterans were indentured to farm owners in Canada (Satzwich, 1989). The NIEAP, I argue, is substantially different from these programs in that it organized a truly temporary and rotational work force. This migrant workers recruitment program was also broader in scope than previous ones.
However, because the problem here was defined by parliamentarians as how best to recruit workers into existing working and living conditions rather than one of how to improve the quality of life and level of pay in these jobs or locales, the solutions were limited to those that would keep the unattractive elements of the jobs in place while recruiting needed personnel. One of the ways the state responded was to actively search for immigrants (i.e. those with ‘landed’ or permanent residence status) to settle in the north. This was most evident in the earlier part of the period under study (1969 to 1970). The recruitment of immigrants to these places was linked explicitly to capital investment and expansion in the region. For example:

Honourable Robert L. Stanfield (leader of the Opposition): ...could he (the PM) clear up the purpose of the visit to Europe of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development? (Hansard, March 18, 1969:6745)

Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau (Prime Minister): The minister has gone to Europe to interest various European governments and sectors of the population in the development of the Canadian north from various points of view, - capital investment, immigration, development of various kinds (Ibid.:6745).

However, as the problem of a lack of people willing to move to work in the north continued, it became increasingly clear to parliamentarians of both opposition and governing parties that this solution was not working. This is because the state was not able to direct either citizens or landed immigrants to live and work in specified areas. In other words, once people were admitted as immigrants, i.e. permanent residents, they could not be told where to live or what to do for a living by the state. The recognition of this is found in the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Bryce Mackasey’s response to a question about where refugees from Uganda, a high number of whom were professionals, might live. He stated: “...once having admitted these people we do not want to relegate them to a special status and say that they must do this or that” (Hansard, September 1, 1972:3938).

The problem, then, did not concern finding necessary numbers of workers alone. Rather, the problem needing to be resolved was finding the right kind of worker – workers who could be
made to work and live under substandard conditions. This was accomplished by introducing the NIEAP. Both the problem and solution of labour shortages was organized through the global political economy of the international division of labour. For example, regarding the agricultural industry, cutting costs on workers was one of the main ways that farmers could remain competitive and profitable (Brandt, 1999). Improving working and living conditions on these farms, then, would not fit within the structural constraints of capitalist agriculture in Canada. Not coincidentally, in 1973, the year the NIEAP was introduced, farm labour accounted for 13.3 percent of the 69,901 people admitted to work in Canada as migrant workers (Sharma, 1995:109).

As with the provision of much needed farm workers, the NIEAP was also a response to the demand for a cost-effective way to provide more doctors, particularly in locales made unattractive by their location in non-urban, extremely cold sites where the pay was considerably less than that available in the big cities. Improving working and living conditions for medical personnel to live in the north would have meant a great deal more fiscal outlay on the part of employers and the Canadian state itself. A study by the Joint Working Group noted that by the early 1980s, there were approximately 300 doctors recruited annually under the NIEAP and working as migrant workers (1986:ii).

The Perennial Problem of Freedom

Given both the governing party’s (and much of the opposition parties’) unwillingness to make employment in the north or in the agricultural industry more attractive to potential workers by compelling employers to better the conditions and terms of work, the problem of labour shortages was ideologically re-framed as a problem of freedom in the parliamentary debates.

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9 Even when not exporting their products, farmers in Canada generally used the rationale that Canadian consumers’ wanted cheap produce as reasons for maintaining a low-wage work force. Thus, it comes as no surprise that an MP from a rural riding raised "...the fear of consumers that scarcity of food in Canada can cause an undue increase in its price" as a rationale for maintaining a cheap farm labour force (MP H.W. Danforth, Hansard, July 20. 1973:5835).
Hence, both the shortage of doctors in the north and workers on farms were portrayed as resulting from the freedom of labour market and geographical mobility of citizens and permanent residents. This was visible in MPs' complaints about Canadian doctors' ability to choose a specialty or about a lack of workers willing to do farm work under existing labour conditions. Workers having the ability to select their occupation or being able to choose where to work and live were produced as a problem facing the nation.

This problem of freedom was organized through parliamentary debates and was coined by the Prime Minister, no less, as the 'perennial' situation whereby Canadians would not typically accept certain types of work. Notable in these exchanges were repeated calls from opposition MPs to coerce, in one way or another, Canadians or permanent residents into taking these unattractive jobs, particularly in agricultural work. Thus, there were calls to variously have the state 'assign', 'invite' or 'compel' Canadians to work in areas with labour shortages. This is evident in the following lengthy exchange between Prime Minister (PM) Trudeau and opposition MPs:

Gerard Laprise: ...I have a question for the PM. A few days ago, the minister of Manpower and Immigration announced that seasonal workers from the West Indies would be hired this summer to help in picking and canning fruits and vegetables in Ontario. Could the PM then consider the possibility of assigning this work to our unemployed or to our students who for the most part will not find jobs this summer (Hansard, March 23, 1971:4508, emphasis added)?

Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau (PM): Speaker, this is a perennial problem and it must be recognized that this is a type of work that very often students or unemployed will not do. This is why the Department of Manpower and Immigration is admitting foreign workers on our labour market. Should students be willing to undertake this work, they would certainly have the preference. I am not cognizant with the specific case the honourable member is referring to, but I know that this is a problem which comes up year after year with respect to certain types of work (Ibid.:4508, emphasis added).

Laprise: Speaker, a supplementary question. Would the PM consider inviting the young people to do that work during the holidays, not only in Ontario where fruit and vegetables
are grown, but in every province? This would be much more efficient than having them travel (Ibid.:4508, emphasis added).

Trudeau: Speaker, I agree with the honourable member on that score. The purpose of the Manpower Centres is to send the unemployed or the students to take part in this work. But, once again, facts reveal that there are in Canada some types of work which the unemployed and the students refuse to do; this proves, by the way, that the rate of unemployment is at times somewhat artificial (Ibid.:4508, emphasis added).

Roch La Salle [from the Ralliement Creditiste]: ...In view of the statement by the PM to the effect that some unemployed people would refuse to perform such work, would the PM consider compelling Canadians to work if they receive any social benefits? Would the government favour legislation requiring any government pension recipient to work?” (Ibid.:4508, emphasis added).

Trudeau: No, ...the government will not commandeer the work force. The whole political philosophy of the government is based on freedom of choice for citizens to work where they want” (Ibid.:4508).

The problem, then, at least partly, was identified as one of filling jobs that Canadians did not want and could legally refuse. The ‘perennial’ situation that allowed Canadians to not accept certain work was shaped by two processes. One was the availability of social programs, like unemployment insurance or welfare that provided (some)\textsuperscript{11} citizens and permanent residents with an alternative to substandard employment. Secondly, the problem of freedom was also shaped by constitutional guarantees that ensured the mobility rights of citizens and permanent residents, thus, limiting the state’s ability to bind them to specific employers or locations without their (however much coerced) consent.

The above statement highlights what is, ultimately, the crux of the issue. The Canadian state could not, according to its own doctrine of liberal democracy with its concepts of ‘civil society’, indenture those that were represented as the beneficiaries of this system of governing. In the framework of ‘Canadian-ness’ it just did not make common sense to compel Canadians to

\textsuperscript{11} Sunara Thobani points out that immigrants entering Canada under the ‘family class’, mostly women and children, are not legally entitled to access social programs and are instead forced to rely on their (usually male) sponsor for a period of up to 10 years (1998). These sponsorship agreements remain in place even after sponsored immigrants gain citizenship status, thus, demonstrating that there exists a differentiated level of formal Canadian citizenship.
work where they did not wish to. However, notions of liberal democracy did not preclude the existence of people made to work as indentured labour in Canada. It did mean, though, that those exploited in such a manner needed to be rendered as Others – as non-members of the nation-state - through a classificatory system that deemed them migrant workers. With this accomplished, a system of indentured labour was able to proceed.

Given the legal political constraints to ‘compelling’ Canadians to fill the much-discussed problem of labour shortages, the solution that came to make common sense to parliamentarians was to continue using and working on expanding Canada’s migrant workers program. This was aptly captured by PM Trudeau who stated clearly that unemployed Canadians ability to refuse work was “… why the Department of Manpower and Immigration is admitting foreign [migrant] workers” (Hansard, March 23, 1971:4508). In other words, only through the social and legal process of categorizing certain people as not-citizens and not-permanent residents, as literally non-immigrants, was it possible for the Canadian state to indenture workers.

Hence, while within these debates there was a clear tension between those who wanted to ensure a continued supply of indentured migrant workers and those who wanted Canadians to fill these vacant jobs, the governing party consistently refused to consider alternatives to its use of the category migrant workers. In particular, improving the pay and working conditions of farm work was anathema to most parliamentarians, especially those in the governing party, as is evident in the following exchange:

A. D. Hales: …When the government is considering programs related to students, would it also give consideration to subsidizing the wages of students who wish to work on farms during the summer months? Many jobs are available on farms, but the agricultural industry cannot pay the rates which students feel they should be paid. Would the government consider a subsidy program in this regard? (Hansard, May 28, 1971:6164).

Honourable Mitchell Sharp (Acting PM): I do not think we have any program under discussion now which would involve the subsidization of wages. This is a principle.

Moreover, it has been well documented that women, particularly Indigenous women and women of colour, are often forced to take substandard employment regardless of their citizenship status (see Ng, 1988; Estable, 1986).
which has many implications and some of them, as the honourable member can see for himself, are rather undesirable (Ibid.: 6164).^{12}

Reliance on removing the freedom of workers as the only solution to filling current qualitative labour shortages is evident in the following exchange:

H.W. Danforth: ...Will the minister undertake to direct competent Canadian labour to southwestern Ontario or allow work permits to be granted to Mexican and Portuguese labourers in view of the fact that crops of food are now being lost as a result of the lack of harvest labour which local Manpower offices stated as recently as yesterday was not available? (Hansard, July 24, 1973: 5920, emphasis added).

William Knowles: ...We made an approach to the minister’s department some time ago—I am referring to farmers in the area—asking that Mexican families be brought in as a unit on a contractual basis to assist in the harvesting of canning crops (Ibid.: 5920).

Honourable Robert K. Andras (Minister of Manpower and Immigration): ...we have been in regular communication and conversation with the provincial government of Ontario on this matter... We have identified some 4,200 applicants for jobs in this area. They sometimes find that the conditions under which they are asked to work are not satisfactory to them. I would not take sides on that issue. To sum up, in view of representations made, we are looking into it with a view to making special efforts to permit the bringing in of named [i.e. indentured] foreign workers. Where we are absolutely satisfied that this is required, we will move very quickly and we will be in touch with the affected employers within the next few hours as a matter of fact (Ibid.: 5920).

By ideologically re-framing the problem of labour shortages as one of freedom, two realities were concealed: that certain places and jobs in Canada were more attractive than others and that there existed inequalities among workers in Canada. Through the operation of the NIEAP, qualitative labour shortages could be filled without employers or the state having to increase the attractiveness of the jobs or the locations. The NIEAP, with its enforcement of unfree conditions upon those entering Canada as migrant workers, thus, could come to make common sense partly because of the problem was defined as a problem of Canadians being able to refuse to work.

**Liberal Doctrines of Unfreedom**

^{12}Likewise, the state ignored suggestions to meet medical labour shortages in the north by hiring nurse-practitioners rather than doctors (Hansard, May 8, 1969).
The absence of debate in the House concerning the working and living conditions of people admitted under the NIEAP and categorized as migrant workers reflects how the creation of conditions of unfreedom in Canada, in and of itself, was not at issue for parliamentarians. The only debate on freedom centred on the extent to which unfree conditions should be imposed on those categorized as citizens and/or permanent residents. During my period of study parliamentarians from the governing party stated, in no uncertain terms, that they were not prepared, at least at this time, to extend unfree conditions beyond those categorized as migrant workers. This response was organized, in part, in recognition of existing legislation that would make such an extension illegal.

The state’s action of indenturing non-immigrants, then, was organized through what was both legally and socially possible at the time. It was not illegal to make unfree those who did not fall into either the citizen or permanent resident category. The legality of this act was organized through the internationally recognized ‘right’ of national states to deny rights and entitlements to those named as non-citizens and non-permanent residents. At the same time, it was seen as within the purview of legitimate state action in Canada for parliamentarians to decide to indenture those generally constructed as ‘outsiders’ to the Canadian nation. It was not a social problem for those working in the state to declare that Canadians had no responsibilities or obligations for migrant workers.

Both the legality as well as the social legitimacy of indenturing those the state categorized as non-immigrants enabled parliamentarians to leave the question of why people required to fill shortages in the Canadian labour market were not admitted to the country as permanent residents unasked. I argue that with the NIEAP in place, the governing party was able to avoid some of the complaints that opposition MPs made regarding immigrants (i.e. those with ‘landed’ status) throughout the entire period of study (see Chapter Six).
Because migrant workers were denied access to social programs, public education, public health care, etc., they were not associated with the supposed 'high costs' of admitting people of colour as permanent residents, i.e. immigrants. Although there were costs to administer the NIEAP, these costs were not the ones that were problematized within the parliamentary debates. Moreover, since the presence of people as migrant workers was made largely invisible to most Canadians, or was only made visible in association with those jobs that Canadians did not find attractive, migrant workers, unlike landed immigrants with permanent residency rights, were not portrayed by parliamentarians as 'taking Our jobs'.

Finally, the forced temporary stay of those recruited as migrant workers meant that they were seen to represent a far weaker threat to the 'character' of Canadian society than did immigrants able to stay permanently in the country and sponsor family members to join them. The 'temporary-ness' of these foreigners apparently assuaged those MPs who complained about immigrants taking that which was represented as belonging to Canadians alone. Not surprisingly, therefore, there was not any evidence of concern for the life or rights of migrant workers within the parliamentary debates. Significantly, both legally and existentially, the category of 'foreigner' as truly meaning 'outsider' was only fully materialized with the construction of the category migrant worker.

The social and political legitimacy of indenturing migrant workers to employers in Canada was also organized in parliament through two related discursive practices. One was to omit reference to the substandard conditions faced by those categorized as migrant workers. Noticeably absent from the parliamentary debates was any concern shown for the migrant worker her/himself. Instead the focus was mainly on employers or, at times, unemployed Canadians. This was not unusual. Parliamentarians generally drew attention away from the fact
that people categorized as migrant workers were being exploited in ways that the state did not permit Canadians to be.

One of the ways that the super-exploitation of people as migrant workers was rendered invisible was to ideologically reframe Canadian state practices on recruiting migrant workers as a form of charity (Arat-Koc, 1992). This served to reproduce this recruitment practice as a gesture of benevolence instead of a practice aimed to further enrich employers and empower the state. This re-framing of the practices of exploitation into practices of charity was not unique to the period under study. Instead, as Sherene Razak (1998:23-4) has pointed out, “[t]he perception of the outsider as the one who needs help has taken on the successive forms of the barbarian, the pagan, the infidel, the wild man, the ‘native’, and the underdeveloped.”

The ideological framework of charity used by many MPs to discuss the recruitment of migrant farm workers (but not medical workers), thus, allowed the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, for one, to call the creation of a migrant worker category a direct form of aid by Canadians to ‘developing’ countries, i.e. the South. This was evident in the following statement by Minister Allan J. MacEachen who stated that he had “… announce[d] on Friday the continuation of movement of farm workers from the Caribbean countries. It is a very important element in the development policy of these countries and is important to the farming operations in certain parts of Ontario” (Hansard, March 3, 1969:6116).

The second discursive practice used to legitimate the migrant worker category was the naturalization of the differences in living and working conditions that Canadians and migrant workers experienced as essential differences between those so categorized. These two discursive methods constructed an ideological frame of Other-ness that helped to conceal the social organization of these differences by legitimizing the substandard living and working conditions of migrant workers. This process of Other-ing borrowed heavily from historical colonial images.
The exploitation of migrant workers in Canada was, thus, variously concealed by ideologically re-framing the recruitment of people as migrant workers. It became either a charitable act by Canadians or a part of the Canadian state foreign aid program to ‘developing’ countries. Alternatively, the physically demanding work done by some migrant workers was portrayed as a condition which certain peoples, namely those from the global South, were both ‘naturally’ suited for and satisfied with.

The first discursive practice of erasing the substandard conditions that many migrant workers were recruited to work and live in can be found in the following response made by the minister of Manpower and Immigration, Robert K. Andras. In response to MP Danforth, who asked why workers from Portugal were facing delays in receiving temporary employment authorizations, Andras highlighted the ‘increasing effectiveness’ of the NIEAP introduced on January 1, 1973. He stated:

...There are certainly more than 6,000 offshore workers here now [employed in the farming industry], including foreign students, who will work at these jobs and there is an increasingly effective foreign seasonal worker program. We will pay more attention to this. We do not intend to unnecessarily deny any employment visa to Portuguese or any other workers who are in this country or who can be brought to this country. Indeed, we will try to get them here, through the program I have described, to engage in occupations which Canadians will not undertake. I do not think time is available to me in which to embark on a whole discussion about the erosion of the work ethic, and who is or who is not at fault here. I will simply say it is a phenomenon which is occurring throughout the western world (Hansard, July 20, 1973:5838, emphasis added).

By not accounting for the reasons that foreign workers will take jobs that ‘Canadians will not undertake’, the Minister simultaneously erases the political economy of the world market for labour power and Canadian state practices that render migrant workers unfree. Official reasons for the employment of migrant workers simply omitted the reasons why migrant workers would take jobs that Canadians would not. For example, in rejecting as ineffective state subsidies to
farmers for the purpose of hiring Canadian workers, PM Trudeau argued that fruit picking simply "...is a type of work with which students and some unemployed persons do not want to occupy themselves" (Hansard, March 23, 1971:4508).

The PM’s response laid the ideological ground for the second discursive practice of ‘naturalizing’ the differences between Canadians and migrant workers. Within his answer lay the assumption that there were certain qualities inherent to being Canadian that made those so recognized unsuitable for such work and, conversely, inherent qualities that made the migrant worker suitable for it. The continual use of racialized negative dualities between Canadians and migrant workers was part of the ideological frame used to legitimize the substandard treatment of those categorized as migrant workers.

Many MPs, including the Prime Minister, played upon notions that migrant workers could be legitimately denied membership in Canadian society by using binary codes such as Our unemployed or Our students versus foreign workers. As with immigrants entering with landed status, the negative dualities of Us/Them were made common sensical by racializing the criteria of Canadian-ness. In this respect, it is crucial to note that within the parliamentary debates, the discourse regarding migrant workers and the type of work they were hired to do in Canada was racialized.

The process of racialization informed parliamentary discursive practices in several ways. One was to directly refer to migrant workers as people from the ‘developing’ or ‘Third World’ through reference to the countries from which they were recruited or to the colour of their skin. Another was to refer to certain occupations as ‘naturally’ suitable for people from the South. Yet another was to refer almost exclusively to those aspects of the NIEAP that recruited people for

13 In reference to the PM’s use of the term ‘some unemployed’, I believe he structured into his argument the fact that everyone legally recognized as Canadian was not equal, so that ‘some unemployed’ people would be ‘willing’ to pick fruit for a living. In this regard, it is important to note that the majority of farm workers who are either citizens or permanent residents are people of colour (Bolaria and Li, 1988).

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'non-professional' occupations in Canada, particularly for work in the farming sector. Thus, while those entering the Canadian labour market as migrant workers were employed in a wide variety of occupations, in the parliamentary debates they were only associated with work in geographical locations unattractive to many Canadians or with menial, stoop labour typically done by people of colour in Canada during my period of study.

The ideological notion that migrant workers were satisfied with work that Canadians rejected was historically rooted in racist arguments that people of colour were naturally suited for inferiorized labour (Brand, 1993). Thus, although the labour market in which migrant workers were inserted in Canada was highly racialized, as well as being gendered, by discussing only those migrant workers recruited for hard labour in jobs that few Canadians sought out, a racialized common sense was organized around who migrant workers were.

In one example of racializing the people who came as migrant workers in the common sense organized through parliamentary debates, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Allan J. MacEachen, explicitly identified the skin colour of some migrant workers when reporting that "...there will be about 1,200 black workers from the Caribbean coming to work in the province of Ontario" (March 25, 1969:7086, emphasis added), parliamentarians also discussed the natural suitability of certain types of work for people from the South. This was most visible in the following lengthy statement by MP H.W. Danforth:

...I deal with a specific problem faced by our agricultural industry, where we are now depending more and more upon the importation of offshore labour on a seasonal basis in order to adequately harvest and plant crops... The Department of Immigration, through the minister takes the position that when we have high unemployment in Canada, no matter in which region it may be, this justifies their saying that there is sufficient competent labour available for the harvesting of crops. This question is particularly important now because of the fear of consumers that scarcity of food in Canada can cause an undue increase in its price. The attitude of this government has been that if you do not want to work, you should not have to do so. I raise this matter because the PM reaffirmed the position of the government that a Canadian should not have to work if he does not want to. Chairman, many people do not like to work in agriculture. They do not like the monotony, the conditions and the fact that you work sometimes in heat and sometimes in
That is all right; they do not like it and they should not be forced to work at it. We all agree with that. But the department takes the position in most cases that Canadians should want this type of work (Hansard, July 20, 1973:5835, emphasis added).

Danforth adds:

...What do primary producers do? How do they obtain labour? Many of them have encouraged offshore labour over the years which comes from three sources, the Caribbean, Portugal and Mexico. We need this labour...and these people are used to working in the heat. They are used to working in agriculture, and they are satisfied with the pay scale... Everybody is satisfied: the workers are satisfied, the primary producers are satisfied and the consumers of Canada are satisfied because we are getting the crops harvested. Everybody is satisfied but the Department of Manpower and Immigration. They will not grant work visas now to people from Portugal or to people from Mexico. They say they have made an arrangement to grant visas to Caribbean workers. That is fine. We get very good workers from the Caribbean - we also get poor workers from the Caribbean - but they are not available through a sufficient number of outlets. We need more (Ibid.:5836).

Danforth helped racialize notions of ‘satisfaction’ by advancing the idea that migrant workers would take jobs, such as farm work that Canadians legitimately refused because They were ‘satisfied’ with the difficult working conditions and substandard pay scales associated with certain jobs. An essential aspect of the social organization difference in parliament, then, was the process of differential valorization. This process of racialization devalued the skills of certain groups and, as Roxana Ng argues, reinforced people’s social and economic inferiority and was productive of social difference (2000:19).

By relying on already existing racist imagery of who in Canada was entitled to certain things and who was not, the social legitimacy of the category migrant workers was further secured. Accordingly, the context in which people were compelled to accept these jobs was rendered invisible. Such discursive practices worked to conceal the disparities extant in the political economy of the world market for labour power and Canadian state practices that racialized and nationalized the labour market in Canada.

Examining who was named as a migrant worker highlighted the processes of racialization and gender construction in the parliamentary debates. It also allowed us to see how it is that the
ideologies of nationalism, sexism and racism were articulated with the work processes of the Canadian state to create bounded ‘communities’ in Canadian society and reproduce the relations of ruling (Smith, 1990). Locating who worked where and at what jobs helped to locate the material effects of the operation of the ideological processes of constructing race in Canada. Moreover, while largely being rendered invisible in the parliamentary debates, the gendered relations of categorizing certain people as migrant workers could be seen when looking at the occupational position of migrant workers in the labour force.

The labour market in which migrant workers are inserted was highly racialized and gendered. Through the migration process, the sexual and racialized division of labour at the national level was connected with that existing at the global level. This was evident in the types of work that differentiated groups of migrant workers performed in Canada. Following the introduction of the NIEAP in 1973, about seventy-five percent of all people entering through the NIEAP were employed in ‘non-professional’ employment (mostly in the service sector but in the manufacturing and primary sectors as well). There were also a relatively small number of employees of transnational corporations who were regulated by the NIEAP (Sharma, 1995:128-29). These people helped to manage and administer the operations of transnational corporations in Canada.

Significantly, almost ninety percent of people admitted under the NIEAP to work in supposedly ‘skilled’ occupations as professionals, including managers and administrators were from the other capitalist countries in the North- mainly from the U.S. or Japan - where the vast majority of transnational corporations remained headquartered. Overwhelmingly, most were men (Ibid.:133). On the other hand, ninety-two percent of all people coming from the South worked

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14 Annie Phizacklea (1990:24,47) points out that often the categorization of skilled/unskilled is socially organized and can be viewed as a manifestation of the balance of power between labour and capital as well as between labour. Thus, the attachment of the ‘skilled’ label is frequently not a technical classification. As a result, the attachment of the ‘unskilled’ or ‘semi-skilled’ label is often due to the weakened position of the bearers of these labels. Skill, then,
within so-called 'un-skilled' occupations (Ibid.). However, while both middle-class and working class positions were filled through the operation of the NIEAP, the use of the term migrant worker was used in Canadian parliamentary discourse to signify not all people who were admitted under the NIEAP but only specific migrant populations – those who were used as 'cheap', unfree labour (cf. Miles, 1993: 206).

Although the need for medical personnel to work under unfree conditions in the Canadian north was often raised within the parliamentary debates, their entry to Canada was not represented as the entry of migrant workers. Rather, they were represented as professionals meeting the needs of people in the places they would be assigned. The rationality for the unfreedom of medical personnel brought in through the NIEAP was not based on a discourse that naturalized the work itself as inherently unattractive. Rather, it was the location of this relatively attractive occupation that was considered as disagreeable to Canadians. The parliamentary discourse surrounding those recruited as doctors and nurses was certainly nationalized. The unfreedom of doctors and nurses recruited through the NIEAP was rationalized through a discourse that proclaimed that 'foreigners' did not have the 'right' to the freedom reserved for citizens.

However, this discourse was not racialized as it was for the recruitment of people to work as farm labour – the other site of unfree labour discussed often within the parliamentary debates. In the case of farm workers, the rationality for imposition of conditions of unfreedom was rationalized through racist ideologies that posited the natural suitability for people of colour to

"...can most usefully be seen as a constituent of social relations, intimately linked to class, racial and gender divisions of paid and unpaid labour" (Dehli, 1993:95). Dehli further argues that "[w]ithin Western capitalist social formations, those jobs traditionally seen to involve skill (and rewarded accordingly) have been the preserve of white, male workers, who individually and through unions have gone to great lengths to exclude women and minorities" (Dehli, 1993:93).

15 Reflecting the racialized divisions organized by concepts of skill in Canadian immigration policy, workers classified as 'un-skilled' were admitted to Canada mainly through the NIEAP while 'skilled' workers were still able to gain access to permanent resident status in the country through the 'points system' of immigration (Sharma, 1995:125).
work in unfree employment relations. Unlike the discourse surrounding medical personnel, people recruited to work as seasonal, temporary workers as farm labour were represented as ‘lucky’ and satisfied with both the work and their conditions of indentureship. Through the parliamentary debates, it was people of colour working in unattractive sectors of the labour market in Canada who alone came to be known as migrant workers in Canada.

Hence, while the NIEAP facilitated the entry of various groups of people, those who were discussed as constituting the category of migrant worker in Canada were those negatively racialized groups who were made to perform relatively unattractive work in Canada. The category had embedded within it the intersection of class exploitation, racism and sexism.

Alongside class and ‘race’, the NIEAP reflected and built upon the gendered division of labour in Canada. This was not readily apparent in the parliamentary debates but became clear through a breakdown of who was assigned to various occupational categories of employment. The majority of women entering through the NIEAP were employed within non-professional occupations. Women were segregated in the service sector. Eighty-nine percent of women recruited as migrant workers worked in service occupations (Sharma, 1995:130). This is especially so in the personal service sector, i.e. domestic work, where ninety-five percent of all workers were women. Women were also over-represented in the clerical sectors where sixty-five percent of all workers were women (Ibid.). For those jobs that Canadians found to be the least attractive, such as live-in domestic work, a racialized and gendered process articulated with notions of who ‘naturally’ should carry out this work, so that the vast majority (seventy percent) of live-in domestic workers entering as migrant workers were women of colour from Asia or the Caribbean (Cornish, 1992).

Managing Foreigners in the Nation’s Labour Market
Parliamentary discursive practices concerning migrant workers in the labour market in Canada worked ideologically to produce a foreign labour force that was said to be different and distinct from a Canadian one. The employment validation process (EVP) embedded within the NIEAP strengthened this practice. Indeed, the EVP was considered one of the key innovations that distinguished the NIEAP from previous migrant worker recruitment schemes. MP Mark MacGuigan, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Manpower and Immigration, summarized the new EVP by saying:

...As a result of the implementation of the new [NIEAP] on January 1, 1973, the Canada Manpower Centre [CMC] in whose area the employment is to be located, now must determine whether the proposed employment by the non-immigrant will, or will not, adversely affect the employment of Canadian citizens or permanent residents. In making this determination, the CMC will ascertain if Canadian citizens or permanent residents are available and willing to take employment in that occupation at a reasonable wage by reviewing its file of clients seeking employment. The CMC will also have the client files of other CMCs reviewed to identify suitable workers, depending on the mobility of the occupation... Only if Canadian citizens or permanent residents are not available will the Department of Manpower and Immigration issue an employment visa for non-immigrants. (Hansard, June 11, 1973:4607, emphasis added).

The EVP was meant to focus state attention on both resolving the supposedly 'temporary' labour power needs of employers as well as to assuage the potential anger of unemployed Canadians seeking work. From January 1, 1973 onwards, employers were required to have the approval of a Canada Manpower Centre official before being granted permission by the Immigration Department to hire people recruited as migrant workers. This process was said to guarantee that migrant workers would not take the jobs belonging to Canadians. The EVP was brought in as a result of pressure from groups representing Canadian workers as well as the complaints from some parliamentarians who demanded that Canadians rather than foreigners be the ones to fill any and all job vacancies in the country (see Hansard, June 2, 1971:6293).

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16 The EVP also addressed questions expressing concern over the lack of coordination between the two departments of manpower and immigration in the Ministry (Hansard, March 8, 1971: 4038)
17 This was re-affirmed by all three of my key informants (Hopkins, 1998; Gordon, M., 1998; Harvey, 1998).
As evidenced by the above quote, a key organizing framework for the EVP was the notion that it was only when Canadians refused a particular job that a migrant worker ought to take it. The EVP, therefore, reinforced the nationalist notion that jobs in Canada were meant, first and foremost, for ‘Canadians. Such notions helped to reinforce notions that there were, indeed, two labour markets in Canada – one that was Canadian and another that was foreign - each with their differential entitlements and rights. In this way, the EVP operated to conceal the ongoing disparities between the working and living conditions of Canadians and migrant workers.

The governing party’s ongoing assertion that the EVP would simultaneously ‘protect’ Canadian unemployed workers while ensuring a supply of migrant workers to employers was part of how the legitimacy of continuing to recruit people as migrant workers was organized through parliamentary debates. For example, MP H.W. Danforth asked the Minister of Manpower and Immigration:

...In view of the fact that local manpower offices, by their own admission cannot supply adequate labour for harvesting in fruit and vegetable areas, will the minister now reconsider the cancellation of Mexican and Portuguese work permits which had been granted in this and other years (Hansard, July 16, 1973:5629)?

Robert K. Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, answered by stating:

...if there are no Canadians available to do the job and a visitor or foreigner who is in this country is not otherwise disentitled from doing it, we will issue work permits. There are odd occasions when this has not worked out. I have had a conference with the directors general of immigration and manpower officials from across the country this morning on this matter, and any rough edges that may have occurred putting this into practice are being smoothed out. We have no desire to impede the operations of employers where work permits can be issued (Hansard, April 18, 1973: 3428).

The EVP also gave greater legitimacy to the temporary, rather than permanent, stay of people recruited as migrant workers. Through its operation, parliamentarians were able to argue that migrant workers were being admitted to Canada on a temporary basis only because the jobs
they were recruited for faced only temporary vacancies as employers supposedly continued to search for Canadian workers.

Despite the introduction of the NIEAP and the associated reductions in the legal recourse available to non-immigrants as well as the EVP, questions concerning the employment of migrant workers, while sporadic, continued. Many of these exchanges, however, were aimed at ensuring that the temporary-ness of the employment authorization system was being enforced and migrant workers were not finding ways of staying in Canada as permanent residents. There were also questions concerning the effectiveness of the EVP (see Hansard, March 26, 1973:2578).

Significantly, most of these types of questions were raised in relation to occupations for which migrant workers were not usually associated, i.e. for jobs thought of as generally attractive or lucrative for Canadians. This was found in MP Nesbitt’s written question regarding the number of temporary employment authorizations issued to employers of aircraft pilots. His main concern was to find out why migrant workers were being hired when there were, he stated, “registered unemployed Canadian pilots with the appropriate experience and qualifications” available (Hansard, May 9, 1973:3563). Specifically, he wanted to know whether these unemployed pilots had been contacted by the Canada Manpower Centre (CMC) and “made aware that [these] positions existed prior to the issuance of these work permits?” (Ibid.). The governing party’s answer made it clear that the EVP did not involve having the CMC actually contact unemployed Canadians.

This response, along with the information I was given during my interviews with key informants from the Canadian immigration department, showed that many (in fact approximately eighty percent of) temporary employment authorizations issued in Canada were made exempt from the EVP (Hopkins, 1998; Harvey, 1998, Gordon, M., 1998). So, even though
parliamentarians made common sense of the migrant workers category, in part, by arguing that there were built-in protections for Canadian workers in the NIEAP, these same protections were rarely used.

This also calls into question the effectiveness of the EVP to match unemployed Canadians with potential employers. In part, this ineffectiveness resulted from a lack of sufficient human and financial resources allocated to the CMC to carry out the task of contacting all unemployed persons seeking jobs in certain occupations. However, it also demonstrated that in regards to Canadians or permanent residents, the state could not make those so classified take a job offer if they do not wish to, even if they were registered at or contacted by the CMC.

This fact, however, did not prevent various opposition MPs from calling for an increase in the monitoring and tracking of Canadians or permanent residents so that they could be 'assigned' to fill the labour vacancies of specific employers or locations. For instance, MP Douglas Roche stated, "...practical steps should be taken to put the immigration situation in a better light. That practical step would be to give incentives to newcomers who are coming to this country and want to stay to go to the rural, depopulated areas of the country" (Hansard, June 18, 1973:4963, emphasis added). According to Roche, such 'incentives' would have included the withholding of permanent resident status until immigrants fulfilled a certain amount of time in a specified job or region of the country.

In responding to his question, MPs in the governing party continued to emphasize the need for Canadians and permanent residents to be 'willing' to fill job vacancies (see Hansard, June 11, 1973:4607). The governing party states, in no uncertain terms, that indenturing citizens or permanent residents was irreconcilable with the liberal democratic structure of governance in Canada which, at this time, relied on notions of 'free' labour markets and citizens' rights. Such liberal traditions, however, as I have shown, had their proscribed limits and did not prevent the
use of state practices to organize unfree labour markets where workers were indentured to specified employers for specified occupations. It simply meant that the group being indentured had to be seen as falling outside of the scope of the nation-state and its supposed protection of citizens. In the case of Canada at this historical juncture, the category that best met the needs of employers and the test of social legitimacy was the category migrant worker.

(Re)Naming Racism as a National Right

Ongoing references to the liberal democratic foundation of the Canadian nation-state was one of the key discursive practices that enabled the parliamentarians to render as unproblematic discriminatory actions against those categorized as migrant workers. Essentially, by categorizing those who were indentured through the operation of the NIEAP as non-immigrants, i.e. non-citizens and non-permanent residents, parliamentarians were able to situate such actions within the generally accepted liberal framework of citizen’s rights. This framework enabled parliamentarians to argue that migrant workers existed outside of the population for whom they governed.

In a society Self-defined (by no less than the Prime Minister) as one based on ‘freedom of choice for citizens to work where they want’, indenturing migrant workers made common sense (Hansard, March 23, 1971:4508). Consequently, the NIEAP allowed for the presentation of the liberal democratic foundations for authorizing state power. Meanwhile employers were ensured of the workers they demanded.

During my period of study, it was the social process of organizing differences through differential placement in state categories that allowed for the concealment of the oppression and exploitation of those rendered as Others in Canada. It was a liberal framework that provided the social legitimacy of indenturing migrant workers within Canadian society. Parliamentarians were able to borrow from the legitimacy given to notions of citizens rights in order to deny these same
rights to those named as non-citizens. State practices that worked to both construct these categories and then recruit people as migrant workers (*rather than as permanent residents*), were, in the process, rendered invisible.

The end result was, it appeared perfectly ordinary and natural that migrant workers would be denied the same rights that 'Canadian citizens' were 'entitled' to. Why would migrant workers get the same rights as citizens? They were, after all, migrant workers. The tautological nature of the argument ensnared people categorized as such in a particularly pernicious way. That is, the framework of liberal democracy enabled people to 'not see', as Sherene Razack (1998:23) puts it, the oppression and exploitation of migrant workers. Importantly, though, this process of 'not seeing' was not one borne from the intentional blindness of those in positions of domination and privilege over Others. Rather it was a consequence of parliamentary ideological discursive practices that formed a common sense understanding that, in Canada, only the rights and liberties of some people *mattered*.

The characteristic of creating inequality by naming people as outside of Our Community, i.e. the Canadian nation, was strongly related to the sense of national entitlement shared by dominant groups in Canadian society. The simultaneous process of ensuring differential – and substandard – treatment as well as rendering these differences invisible not by hiding them but by 'naturalizing' them were integral to liberal forms of governance. Importantly, this common sense was organized not only through notions of citizens' entitlements and consequent non-citizen disentitlements but also by *racializing* the criteria of belonging in Canada.

Although the occupations in which migrant workers worked were as varied as those in which Canadians were employed during my period of study (see Sharma, 1995), with few exceptions, parliamentarians discussed migrant workers largely within the context of those occupations that were relatively unattractive for Canadians and where the largest group of
workers recruited were people from the South. Moreover, as shown above, MPs from both the
governing and opposition parties unproblematically (and certainly unquestioningly) naturalized
the racist association of people of colour with substandard labour conditions.

Through parliamentary discursive practices that, first of all, associated people of colour
with all things foreign to Canadians and, secondly, relied on the liberal discursive practice of
disclaiming responsibility over non-citizens, Canadian state practices were successful in
organizing social differences between Canadians and migrant workers. In other words, once the
naming of Self and Other took place, differences in rights, pay, working conditions, etc. between
Canadians and migrant workers could be materialized through legislation with little threat of
public opposition.

This makes it all the more important to account for the existence of legislation on
immigration that explicitly stated that Canadian immigration policy would “be applied without
discrimination as to race [sic], colour, class, origin or creed” (Hansard, December 16, 1969:20
emphasis added). While the operation of the NIEAP did indeed contribute to the organization of
a racist division of labour in Canada (as did other aspects of immigration policy), discrimination
was no longer contingent on state legislation that prescribed that particular individuals or groups
would be discriminated against due to their membership in differential ideological categories of
race or national origin. The social organization of the NIEAP best reflected how racism in
immigration policy was re-organized.

Through the NIEAP, racist practices were systematized and operated through the
institutionalized workings of new categories established by state practices, such as non-
immigrant or migrant worker. Post-1967 racism in Canadian immigration policy existed, then, in
part, through naturalized differences of citizenship or nationality. The lack of rights afforded to
migrant workers was presented, therefore, not as a matter of racialized discrimination but as a matter of the lack of responsibility that the Canadian nation had to non-citizens.

The racism embedded within the NIEAP was also structured through the global political economy in which international migration was organized. Racist practices operated through global disparities in wealth, jobs and social programs. Racialized differences were condensed within Canadian state categories that defined differential access to the necessary requirements for life in a globalized, capitalist world. Differences were still organized through state practices but in this historical juncture, they were organized through the creation of bureaucratically distinctive categories or classifications for various groups of people living in Canada as citizens, permanent residents or migrant workers where the intersection of 'race' and class (at the very least) intersected. As a result the modern day experience of unfree labour within Canada was simultaneously racialized and legitimized by racist ideology.

The decision to decline to indenture those who were classified as citizens can be seen to result from the concern for apparent rationality. In order to materialize a migrant workers program that improved the competitive capacities of employers in Canada, parliamentarians established what Gordon (1991:18) calls a ‘visible border’ between those who faced the coercive powers of the state and those who, for the time being, did not. One of the key mechanisms through which the Canadian liberal democratic form of governance was able to continue to rule during the period of study was to maintain some measure of social support for those legally recognized as citizen-members while denying these same supports to those seen as Other.

As discussed by Gordon (1991:48), Foucault points out that this sheds light on liberalism not as a doctrine but as a style of governance over people who, as Gordon (Ibid.) states, are “willing to exist as subjects.” In regards to the common sensical quality of the category migrant workers, this willingness was contingent upon citizens accepting the rationality of the national
state system and Canada's place in it as a 'First World' nation. Indeed, the notion of 'citizens' rights' served to ideologically re-position those represented as citizens from being the people who were ruled over to the people who, together, the state ruled for.

Moreover, this liberal framework operated to illuminate only those affirmative actions of the state, such as those that created citizens or were said to protect existing citizens rights (see Kymlicka, 1995). In this regard, Carole Pateman points out that the conspicuous attention given by state practices to political freedom has worked to conceal the operation of domination. What was left invisible by a liberal democratic framework of governance, what we could not 'see', during the period in which the NIEAP was discursively presented by parliamentarians, was how citizenship acted as “an architect of inequality” (Fraser and Gordon, 1992: 49). The oppression and exploitation of certain people who had been named as Other was organized through their differentiation from Us by placement in categories that profoundly limited their rights and freedoms in society. It is by seeing that the process of state category construction is ideological and productive of ruling relations that we are unable to uncover the relationships of power organized through practices of nationalism, racism and capitalism during the period in which migrant workers were (re)imagined in Canadian society.

Conclusion

The Self-perception of those represented as Canadian helped to shape the practice of problem-making, as is evident in the parliamentary debates during my period of study. A documentary analysis of these parliamentary debates shows us how historical notions of belonging in Canada were re-enforced through the discourse on (im)migrants and the policy governing the terms and conditions of their entry and continued stay in Canada. At the same time, new notions of belonging or not belonging were created through these discursive practices, as when those classified as visitors or non-immigrants were cast as a problem for We-Canadians.
As shown in Chapter Six, throughout the period under study and certainly by the end of 1972, the permanence of people of colour in Canada was discursively organized by parliamentary debates as one of the gravest problems caused by immigration policy. A reorganization of Canadian immigration policy, thus, took place through the 1973 regulatory changes to Canada’s Immigration Act that rescinded some of the rights gained by those categorized as visitors to apply for landed (permanent resident) status from inside the country in 1967.

These changes had the most serious ramifications for those categorized as non-immigrants, i.e. migrant workers, who following the introduction of a consolidated and expanded migrant workers recruitment program, the Non-Immigration Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) on January 1, 1973, quickly came to represent the largest category of people (im)migrating to Canada. Regulatory changes passed in parliament ensured that migrant workers would remain in Canada only temporarily and have no opportunity to apply for landed status. The problem of increased competition for capital investments alongside the construction of the problem of the permanence of immigrants/people of colour shaped the introduction of the NIEAP. It was a response seen as both appropriate and legislatively actionable in Canada at the time.

This chapter follows the two previous ones that showed how the problem of foreigners both outside and within the borders of the Canadian nation was socially organized through parliamentary debates. Here, I have shown how the creation of a more flexible labour market was dependent upon the naturalization of differential treatment for both citizens and foreigners. The use of racist ideologies was integral to this differentiation. A racialized subjectivity was organized wherein Canadians were interpellated as whites and foreigners as people of colour from the South.
Through a documentary analysis of references to people brought in as migrant workers in the parliamentary debates, I found that the NIEAP was designed to resolve two further problems that challenged the legitimacy of governing practices during this time of global restructuring. One of the major problems produced during this period of study was what Prime Minister Trudeau called the ‘perennial’ situation of Canadians refusing to take work in certain occupations or reside in remote areas of the country, because they had other options available to them and because they could legally refuse. Even though their refusal resulted from the existence of sub-standard working and living conditions, the problem came to be defined as one of the freedom of citizens and permanent residents.

While there certainly were calls to coerce Canadians or permanent residents to work or live where the state ‘assigned’ them, the governing party categorically rejected this approach. This particular solution was, at this time at least, irreconcilable with liberal democracy with its attendant notions of ‘free’ labour markets and the rights of citizens. In other words, those in the governing party recognized that this solution would not appear rational or legitimate to Canadians.

This is because part of the common sense of the national state system (at least in the North), in this period as well as in previous and subsequent ones, was that the national state was the ultimate guarantor of the so-called rights and freedoms of the citizenry. As I have shown, this did not prevent the Canadian state from being able to deny these rights. It was indeed able to deny these rights to certain people by placing them in the migrant worker category. Those in this category were represented as legitimately falling outside the scope of state-provided rights or labour protections.

Working within the hegemonic liberal framework of ‘citizenship rights’, parliamentarians discursively organized a legitimacy for the legal, ideological and, ultimately, social category of
non-immigrant or migrant worker. Those classified as such were defined as the quintessential non-citizens entitled to none of the rights and entitlements of citizenship (or even permanent residency) in Canada. In making common sense of the NIEAP, parliamentarians quietly borrowed the rationality of ruling embedded in concepts of citizenship and by so doing, were able to restructure experiences of the Canadian labour market around ideological notions of citizen entitlements and ‘non-citizen’ disentitlements.

At the same time, parliamentarians racialized representations of the use of unfree labour in Canada. I argue that the racialization of immigrants and the related problematization of the permanence of people of colour in Canada (as shown in Chapter Six) helped to naturalize the exploitation of people as migrant workers in Canada. Both the ideological processes of nationalism (with its framework of citizenship) and racism worked in tandem to reinforce binary codes of negative duality so that national state practices concerning (im)migration re-produced inequality and injustice within a global system of nation-states. Indeed, the category of non-immigrant was racialized so that not all those brought into Canada through the NIEAP were included in its common-sensical definition. Rather, it was people of colour assigned to do work that was seen as relatively unattractive who we came to know as migrant workers.

In the process, parliamentarians helped to produce common sense notions that helped to re-rationalize and legally materialize the Self/Other divide in Canada by ideologically reformulating it as a difference between citizens/migrant workers. When examining the construction of binary codes that organized these differences, then, we see that categorizing a person a citizen or a migrant worker was an ideological practice. Through these categories, the exploitation of migrant workers was concealed and reproduced. The notion that, within the borders of Canada, certain people just were citizens and Others just were not, came to stand as a natural fact instead of as the social organization of human relations in a particularly exclusionary
and exploitative way. As a result, it appeared perfectly ordinary that those categorized as migrant workers would be denied the same protections and rights that Canadian citizens were seen as being naturally entitled to.

The imposition of conditions of indentureship was one of the paramount meanings attached to the classification of certain people as migrant workers. This articulation of notions of Canadian-ness with notions of freedom (and unfreedom) helped to restructure the labour market in Canada. With the introduction of the NIEAP, Canadian immigration policy became even more explicitly linked to a policy of greater state involvement in shaping the supply of labour in the country. In this period of restructuring, the NIEAP allowed the state more direct control in shaping the labour market to the benefit of employers. It enabled the state to recruit people as indentured workers who, as a result, were made cheaper and weaker than other workers in Canada while filling shortages in certain, relatively unattractive, geographical locales in Canada.

The NIEAP allowed the Canadian state to provide employers/investors in Canada with the type of labour force that was in high demand in an increasingly competitive world market for labour power. Moreover, as migrant workers could be easily recruited and just as easily made redundant (indeed they could be seen as Canada’s ‘just in time’ workforce), the NIEAP gave employers greater flexibility in meeting their production requirements. The NIEAP enabled those working in the Canadian state to organize this cheapened, weakened and flexible labour force within the Canadian labour market.

The creation of the NIEAP, with its construction of the category migrant worker, demonstrated the erroneous basis of the idea that the market place functioned to resolve issues of labour shortages. Studies of Canadian immigration policies have usually accounted for the fact that (im)migration helped to supply workers needed for the Canadian labour market. However, a study of the NIEAP shows that immigration policies also worked to shape the price and strength
(or lack thereof) of (im)migrants' labour power. Indeed, during my period of study, producing this effect was a major focus of state practices.

The NIEAP also reflected the state policy of greater adherence to a monetarist program of cost cutting in relation to social supports at this time. By exempting those categorized as migrant workers from receipt of social services and financial assistance, the state created a (sizeable) group of people living and working in Canada who could lay not claim to the revenue collected by the state. The NIEAP, therefore, enabled the state to economize on its own expenditures. Moreover, people classified as migrant workers were required to contribute to state coffers by paying (but being unable to collect upon) unemployment insurance benefits. Thus, even the administrative costs of the NIEAP were, at least partially, recovered.

At the same time, putting together a migrant workers recruitment scheme allowed parliamentarians to be seen as addressing the problem of having 'too many' immigrants from the South. Significantly, parliamentary discursive practices concerning the organization of the migrant worker category made common sense not necessarily of excluding groups of people that were problematized, but of denying these same people the entitlements associated with membership in the Canadian nation. Indeed, during the period of study, two related phenomena developed. First, the total number of people (im)migrating to Canada grew. Secondly, both the numbers and proportion of non-immigrants increased significantly so that by 1976, they greatly outnumbered those 'landed' immigrants recruited as permanent residents.

Despite claims from parliamentarians that post-1967 immigration policy was no longer discriminatory, both legally and existentially the area of immigration policy-making remained a key site in socially organizing racialized differences in Canada. This was concealed, however, by parliamentary discursive practices that produced a common sensical discourse of the 'tolerant Canadian nation' where racism was no longer legal. Through their discursive production of the
migrant worker category as a natural consequence of the differential rights accruing to citizens and non-citizens, parliamentarians were able to re-rationalize the legitimacy of racist and nationalist practices within Canadian society. This enabled state practices to restructure the labour market in Canada to be more competitive within a global political economy.

Contrary to the claim of some state-theorists, then, national state practices were not becoming less powerful or less integral in this latest period of globalization. What was being increasingly limited, rather, was membership in the national community. In particular, Canadian national state legislation was key to socially organizing differences in the conditions under which people engaged in cross-border (im)migration. The borders that were being re-organized were those between South and North. Ongoing Canadian state support for disparities between ‘Third’ and ‘First’ Worlds through critical support for international bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, gave shape to differences organized through ruling relations of racism, nationalism and capitalism within Canada.
Chapter 8: Another Essay in Refusal: Decolonizing Imagination

There were the few... who chose to do good...; those who never confused objects and humans, who knew the difference between naming and the named.

Anne Michaels, Fugitive Pieces

Through my years of involvement in the women’s and anti-racism movements both in Canada and that which exists in spaces unconfined by boundaries of national states, I have come to believe more strongly than ever that no change is possible unless people can imagine it to be. While it is essential that this realization not be used to take away from the struggle to transform structures of dominance, at the same time, it requires from us the recognition that social transformation is not possible unless we (feminist/anti-racist/socialist scholars and political activists) work to change both our material realities, as well the realm of subjectivity that all of us occupy. As borders, fences and boundaries need to be imagined, so does a world without them.

This is not meant to say, in Hegelian fashion, that the task is to liberate others and ourselves from mistaken ideas (Hegel, 1931). Rather, akin to Marx’s understanding of ideology, it is essential to view ruling ideas as being materially linked to ruling practices. The possibility for radical change relies precisely on us knowing that the terrain on which our (varied) experiences and our (varied) consciousness of these experiences exist is one and the same and that existing social relations are consequential for both. The task is to see how the links in the continuous chain of structures, experience and knowledge are forged through the relations of ruling and to expose them so that we can arrive at measures for social change that are as complex as ruling practices are.

In this study, I have attempted to address questions of how our differing experiences and knowledge of the world cannot be understood independently of ideological practices of racism and nationalism and how these shape our understanding of the commodification and exploitation
of people within unfree employment relationships. In particular, I have stressed the importance of investigating the articulation between forms of social differentiation and the existence of specific patterns of social relations that result in some ruling over many others.

Within this investigation I have paid special attention to how negative (and always ideological) dualities of Us and Them, organized through intersecting ideologies of nationalism and racism, have worked to legitimate ruling relations for those incorporated within the dominant half of such binary codes, including those who may themselves be ruled over in other respects. This has been done not to privilege certain social relations over others but to show how the organization of legitimacy for the material operation of these binary codes has worked to realize the existence in Canada of a group of people we have come to know as ‘migrant workers’. I argue that the social coordination of the practices of ruling over migrant workers has involved the creation of national state categories of differentiation that have worked to accomplish, both materially and ideologically, the gendered racialization of class.

By centering my investigation on the ruling relations produced through ideologies of nationalism and racism, I realize that I have glossed over differences among those who were represented by parliamentarians as the ones for whom the Canadian state ruled - Canadian civil society, as well as the differences among those who live and experience the migrant worker relation and name. However, for the purposes of my study, it was necessary to place in the foreground the ideological and material distinctions that were made between those who could claim membership within Canada and those who could not. I did this, for the reason that the issue of belonging acquired great (albeit not always new) significance against the background of concepts of ‘national security’ at play during my period of study. Within such concepts, national security referred not only to the security of the state but the security of national identity as well.

My study has of necessity borrowed the conceptual and methodological tools and insights of different theoretical paradigms and disciplines. Using the ‘tool kit’ approach to theory, where
I utilized the method of institutional ethnography developed by Dorothy E. Smith, enhanced by Foucault’s theories of the interconnectedness of power and knowledge, I was better able to analyze the intersectionality of material and ideological practices. This allowed me to investigate how social relations were productive of human subjectivity.

By utilizing this tool kit approach to theory and research methodology, I was able to show that the processes that put into action the objectification of knowledge were the processes of selecting information and circulating these encoded particulars through discursive practices (and, although this is the topic for future study, a system of organizational processes). It was through such coordinated human activity that at least that segment of the relations of ruling I was concerned with was accomplished.

Such an investigation was made possible by conducting a documentary analysis of Canadian parliamentary debates taking place from 1969 to 1973, inclusive. My analysis showed that the discursive practices of parliamentarians were important not only for the conspicuous comments of individual parliamentarians but also because these debates constructed an ideological framework in which our knowledge of migrant workers was organized. The discursive practices of parliamentarians organized a common sense through which the everyday world was experienced. These debates oriented their readers towards the existence of certain ‘problems’ and their attendant resolutions.

These problems and solutions were not already existing but brought into play through actual social acts, such as those of parliamentarians. Embedded within the discursive practices of parliamentarians were ideological practices that concealed the social relations that made common sense of certain problems and certain solutions and not others. Discourses, in this sense, were not merely phrases but material practices constitutive of the relations of ruling. By investigating the discursive practices of parliamentarians, I was able to uncover how categories and features of Canadian society were constructed, how consciousness and material practices
were socially organized and how migrant workers came to be ‘known’ through the social organization of knowledge.

By problematizing the seemingly normalcy of ‘differences’, as in differential state categories of immigration in Canada, I was able to show that difference is a relational concept and that notions of difference did not make common sense outside of the framework of negative dualities. Indeed, examining the social organization of difference in Canada was one of the organizing frameworks of my efforts. Difference is a highly ideological concept, one linked to the material production of unjust social relations.

Questions concerning the ‘character’ of the Canadian nation and who belongs in it were central to the construction of a new common sense for the restructuring of Canadian state practices on trade, investment, social programs and immigration. In each of these areas, the construction of a foreign threat existing simultaneously outside and inside of the boundaries of the nation helped to restructure material reality in Canada. In my period of study, then, the ongoing processes of Canadian nation-building and state formation relied upon ideologies of racism and nationalism to restructure and reproduce globalized relations of ruling.

This was nowhere more evident than in the parliamentary debates concerning various aspects of Canadian immigration policy and the discursively associated presence of people of colour in Canada. State practices concerning immigration, in this regard, were both material and ideological. The interplay of these practices was constitutive of both a Canadian and a foreign identity within the boundaries of Canada. Changes to immigration regulations that allowed for the introduction of the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) on January 1, 1973 were preceded by the discursive production of legitimacy for the inferior categorization of peoples from the South – both outside and inside of Canada.

These parliamentary discursive practices were especially productive of processes of globalization in that they legitimimized state practices that worked to restructure the labour market.
in Canada in ways that made it more competitive with those existing in other national states. In this sense, Canadian immigration policy was seen as a labour market policy that also carried great consequences for the process of identity formation. In fact, this study illustrated the importance of examining processes of identity formation as productive of the legitimacy of increased competition between workers.

I argued that, in the period of study, the rationality of globalization was based on constant reference to the national interest. Recourse to liberal doctrines of governance that depicted the state as the representative of members of the nation allowed parliamentarians to manage tensions within processes of globalization. The contradiction between legislating growing numbers of benefits to capital investors while simultaneously increasing competition between workers, competition that would eventually lead to lowered levels of wages and decreased levels of social supports, was managed, indeed concealed, through ideological practices that presented this period of globalization as occurring in the best interests of the imagined community of Canadians.

The recruitment of people to work as an indentured labour force in Canada (i.e. migrant workers) was thinkable and made actionable, because ideological practices of racism and nationalism made it possible to discriminate against people of colour subject to the laws of immigration. The liberal foundations of Canadians state practices also made such treatment legal. This is because people of colour (im)migrating to the country were able to be made subject to limitations on their labour market freedom in ways that the state could not, as of yet, apply to Canadians.

The racist and nationalist ideological practices embedded in the parliamentary debates, then, did not work to actually limit, never mind halt, the movement of people of colour into Canada. Instead, the numbers of people (im)migrating to the country, including the number of people of colour, steadily increased throughout my period of study (and to this day). What the
dialectical process of re-inscribing Canadian identity as white and therefore the identity of foreigners as people of colour did do was to exclude certain groups of people in Canada from membership in the ‘nation’. This made them the common sensical objects of greater coercive practices from the state.

Not only were they represented as non-members, the discursive practices of parliamentarians worked to constitute the group known as migrant workers as a specific unfree enclave within the labour market in Canada. Indeed, the implementation of the NIEAP was a specific way in which the Canadian state restructured the labour market in Canada to facilitate and entrench processes of globalization. The unfreedom of migrant workers was organized through state practices that positioned them as a differentiated and politically and economically weakened supply of labour. Immigration policies and the denial of available labour market protections to those categorized as migrant workers were active elements in the organization of differences within the labour market in Canada. This materialized migrant workers as the kind of ‘competitive’ workforce globally in demand by investors/employers.

Importantly, the legitimacy of the migrant worker category rested on the social illegitimacy of the category of immigrant. Parliamentary debates on international migrations of people in my period of study were, therefore, a key discursive site through which the rationality of this latest period of globalization was organized. Immigrants were represented as posing serious threats to the nation’s security. They were discursively represented in the parliamentary debates as a ‘foreign’ threat to both the material as well as existential well being of Canadians.

Indeed, parliamentarians singled out ‘weak’ immigration policies as a major breach in the nation’s security. Importantly, policies were represented as weak if they permitted the entry of ‘too many’ people of colour into Canada as permanent residents. The problematization of immigrants, then, was thoroughly informed by intersecting racialized and nationalist ideologies that saw particular people and their permanence as a foreign incursion into the space occupied by
Canadians. By the end period of my study being a person of colour was tantamount to being a foreign presence in Canada. As a result, We-Canadians were interpellated as white through these debates.

Being admitted as a ‘landed immigrant’ to Canada, then, did not secure for people of colour de facto membership in the Canadian nation. However, while as permanent residents, they were discriminated against in all areas of life in Canada, they could not be denied all of the ‘rights’ of citizenship in Canada. Indeed, even though parliamentary debates that problematized people of colour permanent residing in the country could have led to the re-instatement of explicitly racialized criteria for entry as an immigrant to Canada, I argue that this was not possible at this historical juncture. That is because such a measure would have destroyed the carefully produced image of Canada as a ‘tolerant’ society.

Indeed, it was through the multi-layered discursive practices that included the production of Canada as a tolerant society that the very legitimacy for categorizing people as migrant workers was organized. This was evident in the presentation of post-1967 Canadian immigration policy by parliamentarians as ‘non-discriminatory’. Indeed, the notion that the elimination of the ‘preferred races and nationalities’ criteria for admittance (and the associated introduction of a ‘points system’) in 1967 did away with racialized immigration policies in Canada was always present in the parliamentary debates on immigration. Thus, at the time that there were a growing number of questions regarding the problem of opening up immigration to people from the South from members of all parties in the parliament, questioning the possibility for on-going discrimination against people of colour, rare as this was, was dismissed out of hand as simply impossible, even ‘unworthy’ (Hansard, Dec. 16, 1969:2061).

Significantly, in problematizing the entry of ‘too many’ people of colour as landed immigrants, parliamentarians often stressed that they were not attacking immigrants, rather they were protecting Canadians. This produced a common sense that there was no racism in Canadian
immigration policies and instead that the problematization of immigrants/people of colour was simply the consequence of protecting Our own. Thus, in the parliamentary debates nowhere was the term ‘white’ attached to belonging in Canada. The most effective organization of racist and nationalist ideologies in the discursive practices of parliamentarians was not achieved by demeaning people of colour (although this too occurred with relative frequency).

Instead, another significant aspect of the rationality of ruling during this period was the re-framing of racist state practices as simply acts in the defense of the ‘nation’. Not naming who benefited from the existence of Canada allowed for the continuation of these benefits while working to deny complaints from those who were represented as not belonging. By bringing into play nationalist binary codes of Us and Them, people of colour were simply represented as foreigners in the nation. As the legitimacy for the existence of the Canadian nation was never questioned in the parliamentary debates, discriminating against non-Canadians was never imagined as such. Indeed, since the Canadian nation was continuously re-imagined through parliamentary discursive practices, discrimination against foreigners was presented as its exact opposition – verily as Our duty to protect citizens.

I argue that nationalist discursive practices in parliament helped to naturalize the very categories through which non-nationality was materialized by state practices, such as migrant workers. Legitimacy for the categorization of people as migrant workers was secured by enshrining the rights of those who were placed (and placed themSelves) within categories, such as citizen, that privileged them in relation to Others who were placed within far more inferior categories. Liberal democratic precepts made common sense of the ‘protection of individual freedoms’ but only for those categorized as the citizens the state vowed to protect. Those falling outside of this mode of representation were, therefore produced as having legitimately been denied the entitlements of membership in the nation.
Of course, all this is not to say that the construction of the migrant worker category was not an example of racist state practices, quite the contrary. In the parliamentary debates, migrant workers, almost without exception, were represented as the poor, downtrodden, backwards, pre-modern, hordes of people of colour from the ‘Third World’ who We-Canadians were assisting through the charitable act of permitting them to labour satisfactorily in back-breaking, relatively undesirable work in Our country. It was a racist common sense, then, that made it possible to transform certain people into migrant workers. Indenturing certain negatively racialized groups of ‘foreigners’ – and not those represented as Canadians - was something that parliamentarians could imagine and therefore this category could be taken up in the daily work processes of state apparatuses.

In fact, I argue that it was by not organizing the exploitation of migrant workers through explicit racialized categories that the rationality of ruling over migrant workers was made common sensical during this period. Representing the oppression and exploitation of migrant workers as simply the natural workings of national state policies that owed nothing to foreigners was a powerful way of organizing racism in Canadian society precisely because it did not refer to race as a criterion of exclusion from the criteria of ‘Canadian-ness’. The use of nationalism to conceal racist practices was a significant part of the rationality of governance during my period of study.

It comes as little surprise then that migrant workers, unlike landed immigrants, were not represented in parliament as constituting a threat to the nation’s security/identity. Because they were only able to remain in Canada as temporary workers and, for the time being, would not be in direct competition with the (largely) white, male ‘labour aristocracy’, they were represented as simply filling ‘temporary’ labour shortages for work that Canadians ‘perennially’ refused to do.

Legitimacy for the migrant worker category was organized through ideological practices of organizing differences in Canada. Through claims of natural difference (between ‘sexes’,
'races', 'nations' and so on), subjects were given social definition and discrimination against those falling on the decidedly wrong side of these binary codes was made common sensical. Parliamentary debates on immigration were central to this process. Nationalist and racist ideologies were given form through the discursive practice of \textit{naming} the Other.

Indeed, it was only with the production of the category of migrant worker that the existential meaning of foreigner in Canada was \textit{fully} materialized. People named as migrant workers became the very embodiment of the foreigner in that they \textit{could} legitimately be denied all the protections and entitlements supposedly offered by the state to its citizens. Moreover, they could be removed from the territory of the nation when the state deemed it necessary. Ultimately, then, legitimacy for the migrant worker category was secured by nationalizing racialized entitlements to the benefits of being Canadian.

Constructing migrant workers as a 'foreign' workforce in a Canadian labour market was part of the rationality of ruling during my period of study. Parliamentarians produced the notion that the labour market in Canada \textit{belonged} to Us-Canadians alone. It was Our national market. It was represented as positive, even progressive, and most certainly natural, that We had more benefits than Others did. Herein lay the complicity of membership in the dominant half of negative dualities of power. The fact that both those represented as foreigners and those seen to be Canadian worked within the \textit{same} labour market was concealed. Also, the fact that the cheapening and weakening of one group within that market may have worked to operationalize the 'cheap labour' strategy of attaining capitalists' profits was removed from view and consideration. Contradictorily, then, the rendering of certain people as Others within Canada created the racialized 'cheap' labour force parliamentarians argued that Canadians needed to be protected from.

An important aspect of parliamentary discursive practices, during this time was that they that managed this contradiction in such a way that actually strengthened notions of a naturally
existing national community of Canadians. Parliamentary debates, in this regard, were performative of both the ‘nation’ and the state. Moreover, the rhetorical spectacle of debates was also productive of notions of democracy. By presenting themselves as the protector and guardian of Canadians, parliamentarians also produced the nation on whose behalf they were said to act. In the process, ‘the state’ was re-invented as the natural, even democratic, body to empower the ‘nation’.

The shift in Canadian state practices on immigration from a permanent immigrant recruitment system to a migrant workers program during the early 1970s was particularly productive of the nation and state. The construction of a foreign threat was the foundation upon which parliamentarians acted out the nation. Moreover, the existence of this threat organized the authority of the state to maintain the borders between Us and Them. During the period under study, then, I found that the area of immigration was one of the key avenues for ‘nation’-building and state formation.

Organizing differences between groups of people was a cornerstone of the ongoing importance of state power. Parliamentary discursive practices, thus, were found to be an integral part of how processes of globalization were enacted in Canada at this time. The performative exercise of continuously re-inscribing nationalized spaces, rather than hindering processes of globalization, worked to abstract ruling relations of ruling by imbuing them with the gloss of public will so that national state practices were ideologically re-framed as the very embodiment of the desire of the nation.

Indeed, in this sense, I argue that growing international movements of capital and people did not create the conditions for the erosion of the state but for its persistence. The recognized right for national states to enforce universally established mechanisms to regulate people’s mobility across nationalized borders helped to legitimize state power used against those rendered as Other within the confines of nation-states and weakened those with inferior immigration
status. Concepts of citizenship, then, rather than working to progressively expand the rights and entitlements of people living in nationalized spaces, were the ideological cement that held the repressive power of state practices in place. In regards to the construction of migrant workers, citizenship 'quietly borrowed' from the fictive community of the nation in order to restructure the labour market in Canada.

Importantly, the borders between Us and Them were not immutable. Indeed, during this time, boundaries established by notions of ‘Canadian-ness’ were expanded to include investors holding the nationality of other nation-states. Yet, while borders were opened and re-defined to encompass all capital investors as ‘Canadian’ (another example of the use of nationalist ideologies to legitimize certain activities in Canada), for certain people the borders became increasingly restrictive. Most people (im)migrating to Canada (mostly people of colour) were denied the ability to enter and remain in Canada as permanent residents and eventually citizens and were accorded a migrant worker’ status.

In this regard, it is vitally important for us to expand our definition of nationalism to include any practice that works to ideologically as well as materially reproduce the ‘imagined community’ of the Canadian nation and present it as always realizable. Nationalist practices, therefore, should not be viewed as limited to those chest-beating exercises in which notions of national blood-and-soil are brought into play. Rather, any and all social practices premised on the taken-for-granted assumption of the naturalness (if not always the beneficence) of the national state system need to be seen as part of the repertoire of nationalist activities. Nationalist approaches, then, would include those that reinforced ideological dichotomies between so-called national and international (or global) spaces or between domestic and foreign spaces, for these worked to actively shape our imagination in regards to the nature and identities of social actors within the global relations of ruling.
Furthermore, nationalist practices should not be seen as existing in opposition to processes of globalization. My study has demonstrated that in Canada at least, people working within state apparatuses were a very active participant in the organization of globalization. The relationship between globalization and Canadian state practices was particularly evident in the restructuring of the labour market. Indeed, state practices helped to organize processes of globalization that at the level of individual experience resulted in the simultaneous increase of corporate profitability and the impoverishment of people categorized as migrant workers. While parliamentarians may have tried to write themselves out of the discourse about globalization, my analysis of their debates shows that this too was a socially organized practice.

A growing number of analysts now frame their studies of globalization with the understanding of the importance of national state practices (see Holloway, 1994, Ruccio et al, 1991, Radice, 1984). Others continue to eschew analysis of how such practices have been an integral part of the production of globalization (Teeple, 1995). However, there is still a dearth of studies examining how ideological state practices that are productive of the nation enable processes of globalization precisely because they organize the framework of common sense understanding for their existence.

It was the aim of my study into the social organization of knowledge of migrant workers to fill this lacuna. Throughout my study I argued that it was only by accounting for the material force that ideologies of 'Canadian-ness' carried that we could see how notions of belonging shaped practices that resulted in massive inequalities within Canadian society in particular and in the world in general. The material power of socially organizing differences was perhaps most evident in the creation (and, indeed, expansion) of conditions of unfreedom within Canada.

It was by casting unfree employment relationships as vestiges of pre-modernity within 'advanced' capitalist economies that they were rendered legitimate. Indeed the category of migrant worker gained 'practical adequacy' by centering analysis of capitalist labour markets on
the experiences of white, (usually) male workers and by discursively producing the unfreedom of Others as simply a consequence of their backwardness. This worked to make freedom 'unpolitical' (Brown, 1995: 14).

Yet, in this study, I have shown that freedom within the global relations of ruling, rather than being a philosophical absolute, was the mark of a particular kind of relationship between people. Freedom too was a relational concept whose precise meaning could only be fully realized through the continuous reproduction of certain people as unfree labour. In Canada during my period of study, freedom and unfreedom was as racialized, gendered and classed as any other lived experience.

Naming someone a migrant worker, as in naming citizens involved much more than simply describing their legal status in Canada. The term, through the ideological codes of belonging and not belonging it operated, organized at least a segment of the relations of ruling in Canada. Migrant workers could only exist within the practices organized through ideologies of racism and nationalism. At times, as in the case of the discursive production of migrant workers recruited to work on farms in Canada as racialized foreigners, the two ideological practices intersected. Migrant workers existed because national state institutions, reliant upon a story of sovereignty, could make common sense of Them. In a world where the capital of investors was increasingly being granted 'national treatment' (i.e. citizenship) rights, the denial of exactly this to people who were categorized as migrant workers was very much part of how state practices constituted nationalized labour markets in this latest period of globalization.

In this sense, during this period, as in past and present ones, the existence of racialized and nationalized relations of ruling, including in the labour market, were not simply an aberration of the 'normal' way of doing things in Canada. Rather, these were integral to the way that Canadian society was organized and were foundational to the exercise of state power.
Employers benefited enormously from this social organization of ‘difference’ in the world market for labour power.

How useful, then, is the concept of citizenship in our struggles for justice? Simply put, my answer is that it is not useful at all. Rather, it is extremely harmful to people in general and to indigenous people and other people of colour in particular. The narrative of nation-as-community that the concept of citizenship borrows from, hides from view the fact that the very construction of some people as citizens makes possible the creation of Others as non-citizens who are excluded not necessarily from the space occupied by the nation but from the criteria of membership, thereby inferiorizing their status.

Continued struggle to defend the principles of democracy and justice by naming these as realizable through exercise of the rights of citizenship will not lead to a profound transformation in the global capitalist system. This system was/is built on the acceptance and expansion of the national state system. Fighting for citizens’ rights will only serve to heighten and intensify existing unequal social relations between and within people living in separated nation-states along global fissures of North and South, between men and women, between whites and people of colour and so on. As long we continue to reproduce the social means by which to differentiate amongst groups of people within and across discrete spaces, we will continue to create the conditions by which the vast majority of us will remain alienated from our means of both sustenance and joy. Because of this we need to expose the nation not as our ‘home’ but as a technology of governance. As John Holloway (1994:45) poignantly argues, it is because “the state is racist [that] an anti-racist politics must be anti-state.”

Indeed, what we need now more than ever is a reckoning of how racist, sexist and nationalist ideological practices have legitimized inequalities organized through the present system of global capitalism so that we can arrive at a way of thinking and doing that is productive of people’s self-determinacy or sovereignty and not that of the reified nation. This
kind of self-determinacy is not the kind that currently exists where the Self exists only in violent opposition to Others. This oppressive Self exists within the rhetoric of ‘human rights’, including ‘women’s rights are human rights’, for the contemporary human rights framework (with its profoundly undemocratic institutions, such as the United Nations) entrenches our dependence upon one very powerful technology of ruling - the nation-state – to secure these ‘rights’ for Us and for Us alone.

While I cannot provide a coherent blueprint for effective challenges to current global regimes of ruling, I do know, after having carried out this study, that, at minimum, these would be based on ridding our imaginations of the negative dualities of always-colonizing systems. For instance, we need to re-imagine freedom not as the lack of overt control (e.g. ‘free’ labour) but as a non-binary form of imagination and being. In regards to responses to the current national security policies being undertaken, especially by those states seen as relatively attractive in the global scheme of ruling, we need to captivate people’s imagination through the demand for two, critically associated conditions of non-oppressive, non-violent, non-dualistic self-determination.

First, we need to re-imagine and de-colonize notions of staying. In a socially just world, people must have the power to ‘stay’. That is, people must have the power to prevent their displacement. Currently, the overwhelming majority of those who are forced to become (im)migrants have had to leave due to war, poverty, economic restructuring focussed on trade liberalization and world disparities in income and opportunities of all sorts. Without having the power to ensure that such conditions do not exist, people’s ability to be self-determinate is impossible.

Secondly, people must have the self-determinacy of movement. Indeed, the free and autonomous movement of people is a necessary corollary to the ability to stay. It is essential in order to ensure that local sites do not become holding cells for people that can be exploited because they are denied the option of leaving or that extra-local sites are able to discriminate
against people who are said to belong elsewhere. Global regimes of ruling enable neither of these possibilities. Rather, we live in a world where practices of containment operate alongside those of mobility so that people are unable to actively stay or autonomously move.

To achieve the related demands of staying and moving we must confront those that insist on a divided world reliant on ideological foundations of community. We need to undo the organization of our communities on the axis of inside/outside. Moreover, we have to accept the possibility of radical transformation of our relationships to each other and the planet. We cannot timidly accept changes that only (re)form the game of domination.

Hope in our ability to achieve social transformation lies in our recognition that processes of identity formation are social, are made imaginable through the coordination of human activity and not some inexorable forces. This offers us the possibility for change, because if we can imagine communities based on ‘difference’, we can come to imagine new forms of community based on actual human (and ecological) diversity. This requires a deep criticism of notions (as well as processes) of ‘globalization’. In the hegemonic discourse of globalization, the global is, in actuality, groups with particular parochial interests seeking global control. What we need to put in place of these imperialist machinations is a planetary consciousness, one that thrives on the existence and sustenance of diversity, for while diversity exists in nature, difference only exists through ruling practices. Indeed, honouring and nourishing human diversity, the diversity of life, is the radical response to the social organization of difference.
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