Period, Power and Purpose: Understanding Compellent Threats In the Twentieth Century

By

Troy Stephen Goodfellow

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This dissertation is a quantitative analysis of 125 cases of compellent threats 1919-1990. The author explains that the study is intended to test the conventional, realpolitik based explanations for how states targeted by compellent threats respond to the demands made of them. After discussing the inadequacies of previous attempts to understand the nature of threats in international relations, the author outlines the hypotheses being tested.

In the substantive chapter, the author discusses his findings. Realpolitik explanations, largely rooted in rational models of state behaviour, prove to be inadequate in explaining the historical record. Though, as predicted, the powerful initiator states did tend to be more successful in their use of threats, this success did not depend on the weakness of the targeted state. Therefore, the relative power of the states involved had no relationship to the outcome of the encounter. Other hypothesized variables, such as the nature of the demands being made, or the nature of the threats being issued, had no effect on the outcome of the encounters.

The author concludes with a discussion of the implications for these findings and how the presented research can be refined. The author explains how his findings differ from previous findings in this field, and why the choices made in methodology can have serious implications for the validity of the results presented. The author defends his choices, and concludes that though the dissertation is only presented as a first step towards understanding compellence, it offers a fruitful starting point for further research in this area.
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Chapter One
Defining the Problem and Setting the Terms

Frederick the Great is said to have claimed that diplomacy without the force of arms is like music without instruments - inconceivable. Throughout human history, the resort to arms, or more correctly, the possibility of resort to arms, has directed both the study and practice of international relations. The state of the discipline is likely to maintain this focus so as long as the international system is state-based. Traditionally, the study of international relations has focused on questions of war and peace by focusing on the causes of wars and the avoidance of wars. In this context, the use of force and military power is usually seen as a necessary evil; to be avoided if at all possible.

This implicit confidence in the negative role of force in world politics partially explains a curious gap in the discipline: an understanding of the threat to use force as a policy tool. This reluctance to study compellence, or the threat of force to induce action by an opponent, may be rooted in the common perception of compellence as the policy instrument of thugs and rogue states. This attitude neglects the long history of compellent threats in world politics, being used for “virtuous” as well as “brutish” purposes.

The scholarly attention to compellence is incommensurate with the place of compellence in history. A proper study of compellence is long overdue. The subject of military threat as a policy tool has not been the focus of many researchers, despite the frequency of compellence in the international system. This research project is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature. I examine the history of compellent threats and the contexts in which compellent threats achieve their stated goals. In this chapter, I will outline the parameters of the concept of compellence and the scope of my research project.
Scope of the project

What factors contribute to the effective use of a compellent threat? By understanding the conditions under which the target of the compellent will comply with the demands made under the threat of force, we can better understand the proper role of compellent threats and ultimatums in international relations.

This project is a statistical analysis of 125 compellent threats from 1919 to 1990. I will focus on system level variables, and will use “objective” measures of these variables, as opposed to “subjective/perceptions-of” measures. I will focus on this group of variables for a few important methodological reasons. First, system level variables are the most readily observable variables. It is relatively easy to estimate scores for state power, system structure, and alliance status. It is more difficult to develop coding schemes for regime type, decision-making structure, or power-perception. Second, it is easier to generalize these variables across cases drawn from different points in space and time than it is to generalize about issues of perception or value systems.¹ The information needed to develop rigorous coding schemes for this type of variable is, for the most part, public. Third, many of the subjective variables which scholars use to interpret state responses to threats can be reflected through system level variables. Fourth, the more general variables are easier to code with an eye to avoiding the bias towards European or American sources that pervades most scholarship in this area.²

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¹ I am not saying that this cannot be done. In fact, it can, with enough work. However, to do so would require an extremely close examination of each case. In other words, before we could do the statistical analysis, we would have to do a case study.

² This bias is, of course, unavoidable. The documentary evidence for the European and American cases is extensive, and the archival work necessary to bring African and Asian diplomatic history up to the same level has not been done, with exceptions in those cases where the diplomatic histories of North and South, East and West, have intersected.
On a more practical level, a study of objective, system level variables is a necessary first step in the proper understanding of compellent threats. In the absence of a well established and generally accepted understanding of state behavior under compellent threat, it is important to recognize that even small steps taken towards testing and developing theories of compellence are progress. This project *does not* attempt to develop a complete theory of compellence. Its purpose is to test a specific set of hypotheses against data coded to relate to this set. By focusing on a small range of hypotheses it is easier to understand and compare the outcome of the analysis against a clearly limited set of expectations.

The research design for this project is based on the premise that there is regularity in the way that the targets of compellent threats deal with the threats. As one student of the issue has framed the issue, “Unless there were some predictability to manners in which nations could be expected to respond to threats, such measures [of process and outcome] would be perilous and uncertain forms of international relations.”\(^3\) The premise of predictable patterns to be discovered and described is standard operating procedure in the social sciences.

**The place of compellence in history**

Classic European diplomacy held that no war could begin until the opponent had been given a chance to avoid it by addressing the casus belli, which would be stated in an ultimatum.\(^4\) Both World Wars began once a compellent threat had failed.\(^5\) The Cuban

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\(^4\) Paul Gordon Lauren, “Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy”, *International Studies Quarterly* 16:2 (June
Missile Crisis was resolved (in part) by the use of a compellent threat, and recent years have seen members of the world community use compellence in Bosnia, Haiti and Iraq. Throughout history, the compellent threat has stood as the emblematic “last chance” for the targeted state to resolve a dispute to the satisfaction of the threatening state. The compellent threat, especially when framed as an ultimatum, stated both the terms for agreement and the consequences for failure to comply. But the compellent threat is not simply a last chance for the target; it is also the final opportunity the threatening state has to resolve a dispute without committing large amounts of blood, treasure or prestige.

Origins of the term

Thomas Schelling coined the term “compellence”. His two major works, *The Strategy of Conflict* and *Arms and Influence* have been the starting points of almost all the conflict theory written since. Both books were attempts to theorize about how military force could be used as a policy instrument in a nuclear armed world. To this end, the emphasis was on the “non-use” of military force. The issue at hand was how to avoid total war. This meant an understanding of “[t]hreats and response to threats, reprisals and

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1972) pp. 131-165. An ultimatum is a variant of compellence which includes an explicit time limit (usually brief) for compliance with the demands.

5 It is often argued that these compellent threats were designed to fail by making the demands too odious to be possibly met. However, as we shall see through the course of this study, states comply with all sorts of obnoxious demands. States greater than Serbia have surrendered their sovereignty in more thorough ways, and Germany’s ultimatum to Poland was very similar to the demands it made of Czechoslovakia and Latvia.

counter-reprisals, limited war, arms races, [and] brinkmanship.” Schelling’s discussion of threat-based strategies distinguish compellence from deterrence.

There is typically a difference between a threat intended to make an adversary do something (or cease doing something) and a threat intended to keep him [sic] from starting something. The distinction is in the timing, in who has to make the first move, in whose initiative is put to the test.8

Schelling himself was not pleased with the term compellence, but could not come up with an alternative.

A difficulty with our being an unaggressive nation...is that we have not settled on any conventional terminology for the more active kind of threat…. If we need [the opposite of defense], though, the English language provides it easily. It is “offense.” We have no such counterpart to “deterrence.” “Coercion” covers the meaning but unfortunately includes “deterrent” as well as “compellent” intentions. “Intimidation” is insufficiently focused on the particular behavior desired. “Compulsion” is all right, but its adjective is “compulsive”, and that has come to carry quite a different meaning. “Compellence” is the best that I can do.9

Despite Schelling’s coinage of the term and its definition, his authority has been far from canonical. The definition of compellence has been a subject of mild disagreement.10

Some scholars focus on the level of coercion to be used in a compellent action, while others focus on the purpose of the action. Schelling’s definition (a threat intended to make an adversary do something) should be compared to other definitions:

Joshua Goldstein: “...the use of force to make an actor take some action”11

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7 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 16. Schelling is more explicit on the “non-use” of force in Arms and Influence. Still, even here, limited military actions are held out as examples of “non-use” of force, because they fall short of total war. See especially chapter one in Arms and Influence.
9 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, p.71.
Steven Spiegel: "...attempts to force an adversary to reverse or undo some damaging action that has already been taken."  
Walter Petersen: "...an effort ...to change the status quo."  
Gordon Craig and Alexander George: "...employ[ing] threats or limited force to persuade an opponent to call off or undo an encroachment."

The obvious difference between these four definitions and that of Schelling is the conflation or confusion of threat of force with use of force. Schelling is partially responsible for this confusion. When it came to recommending a compellent policy that would work, Schelling was pessimistic about the possibility that a mere compellent threat could change action. For him, the key to successful diplomacy was forcing the opponent to be responsible for the action leading to war or escalation. In deterrence, the choice to avoid conflict clearly belongs to the target of the threat. In compellence, Schelling argues, the target can easily pass the buck. The initiator of the threat has the final choice to avoid conflict. Therefore, Schelling recommends administering the threatened punishment until the target relents, making the commitment clear. So, as opposed to deterrence, where the non-use of force is the entire point, in compellence, the military force is used in a limited fashion.

This conflation of “compellent threats” with “compellent actions” is still prevalent in International Relations, though the two policies are clearly different. Though Schelling

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15 This, of course, assumes an environment of peacetime deterrence/compellence. As Stephen Cimbala points out, there is no theoretical distinction between intrawar and extrawar uses of this strategy. All that changes is the field of play; the rules are still the same. The theoretical constructs of deterrence and compellence still apply, only more so. State A, already involved in a war with State B, will have to work even harder to persuade State B that its threats of escalation are capable and credible, and, more importantly, able to be withheld once demands are met. See Stephen Cimbala, *Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War.* (Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park
may be correct in assuming that it is easier to “compel” through limited action as opposed to threatening action, this does not make the policies synonymous. The use of force to persuade an actor to change a policy can often bleed into the use of force to make continuation of the offensive policy expensive. This is a subtle, but important, distinction. In the case of limited action, it becomes difficult to determine whether it is the thought of future punishment that induces compliance or whether it is simply the application of brute force to coerce compliance.\(^{16}\) The key to distinguishing between compellent and coercive actions is, naturally, in the intention of the compelling/coercing state. Without doing case studies of each and every “compellent” action, the distinction between the two policy aims can be difficult. For this reason, I have chosen to focus on compellent threats, as opposed to compellence, broadly understood. With a threat, there is no questioning whether the inflicted punishment or the expectation of future punishment is the motivating factor.

### Compellence and Deterrence

For this research, I have limited the attribution of compellence to those cases where the threat of force is used. So, my definition is:

*Compellent threats are those instances where one state threatens to use force on another state unless the second state takes an action it would rather not.*

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\(^{16}\) Schelling, throughout his works, is writing against the belief that brute force is the most effective use of military power. For a more recent take on the fungibility of military power and relation of power possession to power exercise, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc. 1979), pp. 187-9. Waltz is responding to the criticism that concentration on military power in International Relations ignores how rarely military power is called upon in the battlefield. Waltz, like Schelling did twenty years earlier, points out that the measure of the fungibility of military power is more than how often it is called upon to fight. Sometimes mere possession of the power has an impact on other states’ perceptions of capability.
Compellence is one of many policies which aim to change the calculus of a target by altering the way it perceives the costs and benefits associated with taking (or not taking) a particular action. These policies are rooted in subjective expected utility theory, a branch of rational choice theory which argues that an actor’s perceptions of what it believes to be in its interests are the keys to understanding what choices it makes and what actions it takes. A spectrum of such subjective expected utility based strategies, ordered by level of coercion, is:

**COERCION** – the use of force to induce change in the target’s behavior  
**COMPELLENCE** – the threat to use force unless the target changes its behavior  
**DETERRENCE** – the threat to use force if the target undertakes a certain action  
**BARGAINING** – the exchange of promises on both sides of a dispute, until a mutually satisfactory arrangement is reached  
**REWARD** – the offering of gifts in reward for appropriate conduct  
**REASSURANCE** – the offering of gifts or concessions in an attempt to achieve a reconciliation or détente with a hostile or indifferent actor  
**APPEASEMENT** – conceding to an opponent’s demands in an attempt to satiate its desires

Despite the severity of compellence, and its presence in the discipline for thirty years, it has not been the focus of many studies. Stephen Cimbala writes:

> The subject of compellence has received very little scholarly consideration compared to deterrence. The latter subject is almost overwritten, but the former is undersubscribed, if the volume of literature is any measure. Yet compellence is harder to do in that one must persuade an adversary through some combination of threats and inducements that what has been accomplished already, perhaps at great risk or cost, must be undone.17

Studies of compellence have usually been limited to understanding how often compellent threats escalated into wars, or which party “won” the confrontation.18 Scholars put little

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emphasis into understanding what conditions resulted in compliance with the demands made under a compellent threat.\(^{19}\) Compellence is usually discussed in the same breath as its sister policy, deterrence. The two policies have very similar internal logic. In both cases, threats are the primary tool of influence, so they can be confused with each other.\(^{20}\) They are often present in the same case, further muddying the waters of distinction between the two strategies.\(^{21}\)

The major difference between deterrence and compellence is their respective aims. Compellence is *persuasive*, in that it seeks to induce action, and deterrence is *dissuasive*, aiming to prevent action. Schelling notes this as an important distinction, and, in this, has been followed by the majority of international relations scholars. Some, however, believe that this distinction is artificial. David Baldwin finds the disputes over which cases fit which definition to be fruitless.

Students of international relations often make a great fuss over the distinction between deterrence and compellence, dissuasion and persuasion. However, depending on one’s definition of \(X\) (the desired behavior), any influence attempt can be described in terms of \(A\)’s ability to get \(B\) to do \(X\).\(^{22}\)

Baldwin would prefer that the process of the influence attempt be forgotten about and for scholars to focus on the aim (or desired outcome) of the “influence attempt.” By studying deterrence and compellence instead of, for example, preventing a Soviet invasion of West Europe, students of International Relations prejudice both scholarship and policy

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\(^{19}\) A notable exception, focusing on one type of compellent threat, is Robert Mandel, “The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy”, *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (1986) 59-76.


\(^{22}\) David Baldwin, “Thinking about threats”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15:1 (Winter 1971) p. 76.
against reward policies and in favor of confrontation. All this may be so, but it does not, as Baldwin seems to presume, negate the distinction between threat strategies. If the “big picture” renders the distinction between confrontational approaches irrelevant when compared to the distinction between confrontation and reward, this does nothing to reconcile the distinctions within each category.

Karsten, Artis and Allen go even further than Baldwin.

Classification of a threat as “deterrent or compellent” is, in many cases, highly subjective since such classifications involve perceptual judgments by the analyst that may not correspond to those of the actors in the crisis.

In other words, policy makers make little distinction between deterrence and compellence; for them, these policy approaches fall into the general class of “military threats.” This is akin to saying that because German Shepherds see Chihuahuas as “just more dogs”, the distinction is not important. The way to determine whether policy makers see deterrence and compellence differently is not to ask them if they see a difference, but to see if they respond to these threats differently. It is certainly possible to simply study compellence and deterrence as “military threats”, but doing so will render any conclusions about the differences between the two impossible.

The conventional wisdom is that, because it is persuasive in nature, compellence is less likely to succeed. By requiring the target to clearly take action, and retreat from a previous policy, conceding in the face of a compellent threat requires a “loss of face”. A deterrent threat is more likely to work because its preventive aim allows the target to

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23 Ibid., pp. 76-7.
24 Karsten, Artis and Allen, Military Threats, p. 17.
25 As will be discussed later, this is one reason why, some argue, that it pays to offer an incentive along with the threat, as it enables the target to retreat with something in return.
disavow ever attempting anything in the first place.\textsuperscript{26} This reputation for success could be one reason for the plethora of studies of deterrence compared to the dearth of research on compellence in international relations. The potential failures of compellence make it, supposedly, a reckless strategy, and, in the hotbed of Cold War politics where the study of international relations reached its maturity as a discipline, recklessness was to be avoided.\textsuperscript{27} Deterrence, the stable sibling of compellence, became the dominant policy of the great powers. States should prevent disputes before they happen, and not make existing ones worse.\textsuperscript{28}

Whatever the reason for the hold deterrence has had on the discipline, it has had a profound influence on the understanding of threats. As both deterrence and compellence are based on rational choice theory, an argument can be made that an understanding of one makes the understanding of the other easier.\textsuperscript{29} This argument may have some validity.

As both strategies are on the “punishment” end of the subjective expected utility spectrum,

\textsuperscript{26} See Schelling \textit{Arms and Influence} and \textit{The Strategy of Conflict}. Walter J. Petersen “Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom”, \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 30:2 (Summer 1986). Petersen tests the conventional wisdom, but finds it fails. However, the definition of compellence that he chooses to use, “an effort to change the status quo”, is unusual. The role of force is unclear in this definition and the ambiguity of the term “status quo” opens the floodgates of obnoxious policies that fall short of “compellence” as it is usually understood.


\textsuperscript{28} This is not meant to infer that compellence was not studied at all. Schelling, of course, wrote of it, but as he despaired of the utility of a compellent \textit{threat}, his results were not that encouraging. James Cable studied gunboat diplomacy, which is usually little more than naval compellence. See James Cable. \textit{Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991: Political Applications of Naval Force} (3rd ed.) (Houndmills UK: IISS 1994). Compellence was used by both superpowers in Cold War, occasionally against each other, and none of these encounters developed into a major conflict. Therefore, failure to understand a policy does not seem to prevent its use (even in a rational scientific age.)

\textsuperscript{29} For a debate on the place of deterrence within rational choice theory, and the problems inherent in studying it, see the series of articles in \textit{World Politics} 41:3 (January 1989).
there are probably similar factors which affect the calculations in both deterrence and compellence.

There are a couple of good reasons why inferring an understanding of compellence from previous work done on deterrence is not necessarily a good idea. The first is conceptual. The point at which the compellent threat enters the calculation of the target is quite different from the point where a deterrent threat would enter the calculation. In deterrence, one is seeking to prevent a state from taking an action. As the offending action has not yet taken place, the policy is still, for all intents and purposes, "under consideration." The deterrent threat becomes one more variable entered into the calculus of whether or not to commit to the action. In compellence, the decision on the issue of dispute has already been made by the target. The threat must be powerful enough to convince the actor to alter an already chosen policy.

The second reason is related to the methodology of studying international relations. Deterrence has usually been studied through its failures. Most works on this policy aim to explain why deterrence "broke down" in 1914, 1941, or 1973. This emphasis on the failures of deterrence is derived from the one unfortunate consequence of deterrence success – you never know when you have it. When deterrence works, nothing happens. In those rare cases where you have a clear deterrent threat coupled with a clear case of an action the threat was designed to deter, there is usually scarce evidence that the threat had anything to do with the policy change.30 Compellence, for the most part, avoids this problem.31 Compellence requires a clear threat with a clear purpose. If the purpose is

31 When dealing with human beings, especially world leaders who are long dead or not forthcoming about
not achieved, the threat is a failure. When the purpose is achieved, one can, in most cases, reasonably infer success. Whatever the outcome, compellence leaves a behavioral trace. Deterrence does not. This leads to the conclusion that compellence is more difficult than deterrence. As Thomas Schelling writes,

> It is that the very act of compliance - of doing what is demanded - is more conspicuously compliant, more recognizable as submission under duress, than when an act is merely withheld in the face of a deterrent threat. Compliance is likely to be less casual, less capable of being rationalized as something that one was going to do anyhow.\(^\text{32}\)

I argue that conflict scholars have been misguided in pursuing deterrence before understanding compellence. If one accepts that the two policies are simply mirror images of each other, it would make more sense to study the one that leaves the clearer behavioral trace first.

Another distinction between compellence and deterrence is the general immediacy of compellence. Deterrence encounters fall into two major categories: general and immediate. General deterrence is when a state has a defensive posture and a standing threat to respond to undesirable actions by another state. Immediate deterrence is when a deterrent threat is aimed at a specific state in response to a specific threat, usually growing out of an ongoing crisis situation. General deterrence characterized the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Immediate deterrence would characterize the American threat to defend Macedonia from Serbian incursions during the Kosovo War in Spring 1999.

\(^{32}\) Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 82.
Compellence, however, is usually immediate. It is almost impossible to conceive of “general compellence.” It can be argued that some latent threats have a compellent nature. However, on close examination, most latent threats are deterrent. If one limits compellence to a threat aimed at compliance with certain demands, “general” compellence becomes even more difficult to conceive. Compellence is by nature a crisis tool; it is either the trigger of, or state response to, an ongoing crisis. Its immediacy and generally limited time frame makes the boundaries of each case easier to identify and the efficacy of the policy easier to determine.

**How Compellence Works**

If we are to study how compellence works, we have to have a clear understanding of the process of compellence success and compellence failure. If we define compellence, as I have, as *those instances where one state threatens to inflict punishment on another state unless the second state takes an action it would rather not take, or undoes an action already taken*, then we have two separate but related phenomena to explain. The keys to a successful threat, theoretically, are that the threatened punishment be severe enough to outweigh any benefits that may accrue from persisting in the obnoxious policy, and that the threat itself be credible. The important thing to keep in mind is that there is not necessarily an objective threshold to these factors. The important thing is not that the threat be *x*-severe, or *x*-credible, but that it be credible *enough* or severe *enough* in the given circumstance.  

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given case, the number of conditions which may coalesce to make a single threat succeed or fail can be enormous.

This is not to suggest, however, that it is impossible to analyze, in a meaningful way, a large number of cases using relatively objective criteria as independent variables. Though in any single case it may be difficult to determine where the lines between sufficiency and insufficiency lie, this does not make it impossible to determine whether or not there are general circumstances within which lie certain parameters for likely success and failure.

It is easy enough to create a scale of severity; i.e., a line that can be drawn from minor threat to serious threat. Though any line drawn will have problems dealing with the occasional case where a threat of war is not as serious as a threat of air strikes, most observers feel confident in noting which threats promise the most damage.

It is not so easy to estimate the value of a concept like credibility. One reason for this is the sheer number of issues bundled into the concept itself. One scholar writes that credibility

involves the weighing of the cost of compliance, the demand, the cost of the sanction to the target, the cost of the sanction to the threatener, the value of compliance to the threatener, and the number of alternative courses open to the threatener.35

A quick glance at this list of bundled issues reveals that credibility is, in many cases, a concept which includes many individually observable factors. Credibility, therefore, becomes a sort of shorthand for “severity of threat + cost of compliance, etc.” If

this were the extent of understanding about what makes a threat credible, it would be understandable if a scholar chose to simply break the concept into component parts.

However, there is a more troublesome component of credibility: the issue of reputation. It is conventional wisdom in international relations that a state must do as it says it will do, or it will fail, in the future, to make other states believe what it says. Keep your word, back up your commitments, and follow through on threats. Demonstration of resolve and seriousness adds weight to one’s threats, because it removes much of the doubt that the target may have in one’s willingness to carry out one’s threats.

The empirical problem related to reputation is the measurement of it. For example, when Paul Huth and Bruce Russett attempted to test the hypothesis that a state’s reputation for resolve would affect its performance in future immediate extended deterrence encounters, they chose to base resolve on states’ behavior in past immediate extended deterrence encounters. This would be fine if state leaders conceived of the world like political scientists did, breaking down state behavior into distinct categories of international experience. Unfortunately (for political scientists), there is no evidence that this is so. In fact, one state’s perception of another’s resolve may be based on its performance in any number of political situations. How is the serious academic to study a phenomenon whose definition and bases for determination changes with each leader? Can we even speak of a state having resolve?

36 Paul Huth and Bruce Russett. "What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980", World Politics 36:4 (July 1984) p. 511. Later in this article, Huth and Russett refer to states’ behavior in past crisis situations, though it is not apparent that they have moved beyond the study of deterrence encounters. 37 One interpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis argues that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev deployed missiles to Cuba in response to the personal weakness he perceived in American President John Kennedy. If this personalization of reputation is typical of international interactions, the measurement of the concept becomes nearly impossible.
Crisis situations are infrequent enough that each could be seen, conceivably, as distinct from most previous interactions between the states involved with each other. Therefore, I have decided to assume that the concept we know as credibility is based on factors and criteria that are observable in the situation at hand, leaving aside (for the moment) the question of interpreting past behavior or reputation.

**Hypotheses Part I: System Considerations**

Theorists of International Relations have long assumed that the environment in which an international encounter takes place has a series of implications for the outcomes of the encounter. Environmental factors include considerations of the systemic distribution of power (polarity), the alliance system in place, and the power relationship between the disputants. Richard Rosecrance noted that the construction of the international system can have major consequences for those states which find themselves within this system.

How well the international system can control disruptive influences...tends to shift from system to system because disruptive inputs, controlled in one epoch, will not be controlled in another.\textsuperscript{38}

One environmental consideration is the systemic distribution of power. Though concerns about the polarity of any particular system predate Kenneth Waltz, his work *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1979) is the best known and most parsimonious exposition of the precept that the system wide distribution of power opens opportunities and places constraints on the states within this system. Despite the numerous caricatures of Waltzian analysis (often called "neorealism"), Waltz is very cautious in attributing predictive power to his theory that bipolar systems are more stable

than multipolar systems. The power to understand why certain states take certain
decisions in certain circumstances is ceded to theories of foreign policy: it is not the task
of a theory of International Relations.

[B]alance of power theory is often criticized because it does not explain the particular policies of states. True, the theory does not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday. To expect it to do so would be like expecting the theory of universal gravitation to explain the wayward path of a falling leaf. . . . Failure to notice this is one error . . .

Another is to mistake a theory of international politics for a theory of foreign policy.39

Waltz does leave room, however, for structural causes to have lower level effects.

The eighth chapter of Theory of International Politics deals with how the structure of the international system, and whether it is bipolar or multipolar, affects military considerations. Waltz prefers bipolar systems because they are more stable, i.e. they are less likely to undergo dramatic change.40 This stability is rooted in the fact that neither great power can divorce itself easily from disputes anywhere in the world. With each potential conflict bringing with it the possibility of great power confrontation, both powers are more cautious than they would be in a multipolar system, where the lack of transparency exacerbates tensions.41 Drawing from Schelling's argument that compellence is more difficult than deterrence in most cases, Waltz attributes part of this fact to the

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40 This is significant for Waltz because dramatic systemic change is usually the result of a war between great powers, which brings destruction along with the systemic alterations.
41 Curiously, for Waltz, uncertainty is more likely to lead to risky behavior than certainty. Waltz notes that the characteristic caution in bipolar systems also makes overreactions more likely. Great powers are cautious in their dealings with each other (and each others close allies), but matters on the periphery are another thing altogether. For Waltz, overreaction may be a virtue. (Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 172.)
definition of deterrence as a status quo policy. In a bipolar world, "force is more useful than ever for upholding the status quo, though not for changing it, and maintaining the status quo is the minimum goal of any great power." The cautious policies of the great powers makes preservation of the status quo (the precarious balance between the two giants) a high priority, and the transparency of great power relations makes miscalculation less likely.

From these assumptions, one can deduce that, in a bipolar system, threats aimed at preserving the status quo are more likely to be complied with than threats aimed at upsetting the status quo. Revisionist threats are less likely to have great power backing in a bipolar world, and are likely to fizzle out. Though status quo threats are also more likely to be complied with than revisionist threats in multipolar worlds as well, the different rates of compliance should be statistically significant.

The distinction between revisionist and status quo threats is blurry at best. Status quo threats are usually deterrent in nature, always deterrent if one takes the term status quo literally. The exact nature of which threats are more likely to succeed in certain circumstances is not necessary to test Waltz’s expectations of system effect. If the hypothesis is constructed to test the belief that success and failure of different types of threats

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42 Some writers, (e.g. Walter Petersen, “Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom”. International Studies Quarterly 30:2 (Summer 1986) 269-94.) go so far as to define deterrence as a status quo policy and compellence as an attempt to upset the status quo. George and Simons (The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy) emphasize that coercive diplomacy is often an attempt to preserve the status quo; in fact, they limit their examination of the strategy to those cases where preservation or restoration of the status quo (ante) is the aim.
43 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 191.
44 Ibid. p. 172.
45 I will address the specifics of status quo and revisionist threats in the section dealing with threat factors in compellence.
threats is contingent on the nature of the prevailing international system, then I am being true to the theories of Waltz and Rosecrance.

Which systems are more likely to lead to compliance? Certainty is, for Waltz, the key intervening variable between system structure and foreign policy outcomes. Waltz argues that the extent to which power within the international system is concentrated in a few great powers determines how easy it is for all states to estimate the reactions of other states in the system. In a system with only two great powers, Waltz argues, the possible actions of these states and those within their orbits makes predictions of their behaviour relatively straight-forward. In a multipolar system, this predictive power is complicated by the myriad of possible interactions between the four or five states of equivalent capacity and those states “below” them. So, certainty makes it easier to anticipate how a target will react to a compellent threat. Therefore:

**Hypothesis 1:** The greater the concentration of power in the system, the more likely the target state is to comply with a compellent threat.

Related to system wide distribution of power is the alliance structure within a system. Alliance systems themselves often reflect the polarity of the system. However, the presence of alliance dynamics within a given encounter can affect the outcome of a particular dispute.

In extended immediate deterrence encounters, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett find that the presence of formal alliance commitments is inversely correlated with the likelihood

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46 For an intriguing analysis of the varying implications of certainty, uncertainty, and the capacity of states to learn the rules of a system, thereby reducing uncertainty, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22:2 (June 1978) pp. 243-246.
of success for a deterrent threat. In other words, deterrent threats are less likely to succeed when there is a formal alliance between the protégé and the defender. This discovery is attributed to the belief that immediate extended deterrence encounters can be considered a failure of general deterrence, and it is at the general deterrence level where calculations of alliance effects (i.e., whether the protégé’s ally will defend it from the threatening state) take place. Conversely, when there is no formal alliance between the protégé and the prospective defender, immediate deterrence is likely to succeed, because the threatening state may have not anticipated the defender’s intervention in the encounter. The presence of an alliance does, however, make it more likely that the protégé state will resist the demands of the threatening state, with the active support of the ally.

If one can make the threatening state in Huth and Russett’s immediate extended deterrence encounters analogous with the initiating state in compellence encounters, one can make the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** The presence of an alliance between the target state and a great or regional power makes compliance with the initiator’s demands less likely than if the target had to face the threat alone.

One of the most common assumptions about international relations is that militarily stronger states usually prevail over weaker states. “The strong do what they can, and the weak do what they must.”

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48 Ibid., p. 519. “Immediate extended deterrence” refers to the deterrent threat made by a major or regional power to protect a smaller state (protégé) from a specific threat made by a third state.
49 Ibid., 521.
50 This oft cited “explanation” of how disparity in power can lead to a diversity of outcome can be found in Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, V: 89. It has been variously translated, but I have chosen, intentionally, the starkest paraphrase of the matter.
Power based theories have, as Maoz has pointed out, two forms. First, there is the belief that what matters in any given encounter is the immediate balance of power between the conflicting states. This is termed the “local balance of forces” by Huth and Russett, i.e., the amount of military power that can immediately be brought to bear on a given situation. Many scholars have found evidence in favor of the link between military superiority and success in militarized disputes. Huth and Russett find that, in immediate extended deterrence, the local military balance is correlated with the outcome of the encounter. When the threatening state has a favorable balance, the defending state is less likely to defend and support the protégé than when the balance favors the defender. Maoz also finds support for the hypothesis that the amount of force that can be put in field quickly can be definitive in determining the “winner” in serious interstate disputes, but only in those disputes between major powers. The immediate balance of power may affect who wins any war that ensues from the confrontation, but is of little use in predicting the “victor” in a dispute. The works of Maoz and Huth and Russett typify the dispute over the precise relationship between the immediate balance of power and the outcome of militarized disputes.

The second way to use power in understanding the outcome of an interstate dispute is understanding power not just as the existing and immediate military balance, but

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53 Ibid., 514.
55 Ibid., 195.
56 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita includes preponderance of military power as variable in his calculation of expected utility, but is wary of using it on its own as an explanatory variable for the outcome of disputes,
as the potential power each party to the dispute can bring to bear in the case of war.\textsuperscript{57} This is referred to as a state’s “strategic” capabilities. On the relevance of power potential to the outcome of a militarized dispute, Huth and Russett find themselves in agreement with Maoz. Both find no connection between power potential and the likelihood of success in a dispute.\textsuperscript{58} This is largely because most disputes have little chance of escalating into a war of such a scale that mobilizing a national economy or the entire military resources a state has becomes necessary. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, however, argues that, controlling for the distance the state in consideration has to overcome to mobilize its resources on the battlefield, national capabilities \textit{do} have an impact on the calculation of a state’s expected utility, the key independent variable for his research.\textsuperscript{59} However, like Maoz, Bueno de Mesquita spreads his analysis across a wide variety of phenomena, categorized into \textit{Threats, Interventions, and War}.\textsuperscript{60}

One could posit two testable hypotheses on the relationship between power and the outcomes of compellence encounters; one dealing with the local balance of forces, and one dealing with the strategic balance. Can a composite measure of power deal with both the local and strategic balance? Considering the immediate nature of compellence encounters, and the requirement that any threat be backed up by the ability to carry it out

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\item as it is only a piece of a larger power measure. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, \textit{The War Trap}, p. 102.
\item This is a function of both demographics, economics, and rates of growth. See Zeev Maoz, \textit{Paths to Conflict}, p. 165.
\item Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, \textit{The War Trap}, pp. 98-101, 201-209.
\item This categorization is open to a number of criticisms. The biggest complication it introduces is the fact that it ignores the simple fact that many wars and interventions begin as threats. Bueno de Mesquita (following a coding system established by Charles Gochman in “Status, Conflict, and War”, categorizes each dispute by the highest level of conflict the dispute reached, not by each phase of the dispute. This calls his results on threats into question. This “error” is repeated by Walter J. Petersen in “Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom”, \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 30:2
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quickly, the necessity for separate measures of local and strategic power seems to be mitigated. As great powers are, by definition, able to project their power beyond their own borders, it is questionable whether the distinction between local and strategic would ever come into play. If a great power can easily make itself a local power, what is the use of the concept of strategic power? I will go into greater detail on the measurement of power shortly. For now, let us leave the hypothesis to be tested as:

**Hypothesis 3:** The more the power differential favors the initiator, the more likely the target is to comply with the demands made in a compellence encounter.

**Hypotheses Part II: Threat Considerations**

The second broad category of explanatory variables is comprised of those factors related to characteristics of the threat directed at the target state. For the most part, threat related hypotheses fall into two categories: those that classify compellence cases based on the nature of the threat, i.e., the threatened punishment; and those that classify compellence encounters based on the nature of the demands, i.e., the purpose of the threat. However, in Zeev Maoz’s study, only one of his variable categories was related to the threat - the “frustration model”. This model hypothesizes that the state which displays its frustration with a situation more urgently is more likely to win the dispute in question. George and Simons share this hypothesis. They argue that communicating the urgency of a situation is crucial to “victory.”

This hypothesis is difficult to test. George and Simons use a series of case studies, all from American diplomatic history, and rarely move beyond the tautology that if a state backs down, it could not have “cared” as much as the other state. Maoz, using a large-n

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(Summer 1986) 269-94. I will address this peculiar coding decision in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
61 Zeev Maoz, Paths to Conflict, Alexander George and William Simons, The Limits of Coercive
set of cases, is required to define his terms more precisely, so they may be easily quantified. He measures a state's "frustration" or sense of urgency through the severity of the act threatened by it (or the severity of actions taken in response to a threat). The number of times a state is shown initiating serious disputes is also relevant to consideration of the urgency. This attempt at codifying urgency/frustration is flawed in its identification of threat severity with national frustration. Maoz does not consider the possibility in his specification of the model that threat severity itself may be the operative variable, and may represent nothing more than threat severity. His frustration model is a "need driven" hypothesis, and downplays the place of "opportunity driven" actors.

Maoz does find differences in success rates depending on the highest level of severity reached during the dispute. For purposes of compellence, a focus on those cases which are initiated by a threat, regardless of subsequent behaviors (i.e., wars, blockades, limited invasions) is required.

A thorough example of the first classification (that based on the nature of the threatened punishment) is Paul Gordon Lauren's article on ultimata, "Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy." This work was important enough to be included, in a slightly revised format, as a chapter in the second edition of The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Lauren was one of the first to notice that the development of conflict theory had, to some extent, ignored the prevalence and importance of the compellent threat.

Despite their value for understanding bargaining techniques and their appearance during critical watersheds in history, the study of ultimata heretofore has been seriously neglected. The characteristics, requirements, types, uses,

Diplomacy.
62 Zeev Maoz, Paths to Conflict, p. 162-3.
63 International Studies Quarterly 16:2 (June 1972).
and limitations of ultimata have seldom been systematically articulated by practitioners of diplomacy or adequately formulated by contemporary theorists.¹⁶

Lauren’s article is not much help in understanding the limitations of ultimata, but quite useful in articulating the types, uses and history of ultimata. An ultimatum is a specific type of compellent threat, Lauren points out, “…much too specific and unique to be described simply as a warning, a threat, or an expression of categorical terms respecting a dispute.”¹⁶⁵ An ultimatum must make specific demands, have a time limit for compliance, and threaten reprisals for failure to comply with the enunciated demands.¹⁶⁶ This definition is precise enough to exclude borderline cases, and broad enough to capture a wide array of phenomena.

The heart of Lauren’s article is a typology of ultimata:¹⁶⁷

*Threats of the nonviolent break in negotiations.* This includes threats to remove diplomatic representation. (e.g. Russia-Bulgaria, 1915).

*Threats of the nonviolent breach of agreements in force.* In other words, the threat to break bilateral agreements between the disputing states. (e.g. Britain’s threat to end a trade deal with the Soviet Union if Communist propaganda in Britain did not stop, 1921).

*Threats involving the demonstration of force.* Though better known as “gunboat diplomacy,” this practice is not necessarily limited to naval forces. Also, Lauren has a limited practice in mind, “threats involving an exemplary show of force as punishment for noncompliance with ultimata demands.” Lauren’s examples, however, often point to the use of military displays as a coercive tool, and not all his examples have the time limit which makes the ultimatum unique in coercive diplomacy. (e.g. American 7th Fleet off Beirut, 1957).

*Threats of compulsive settlement by force short of limited invasion.* Lauren has in mind embargoes and pacific blockades in this category. (e.g. Britain-Greece, 1850).

*Threats of limited armed invasion.* Lauren includes in this category a wide variety of military actions, including the perceived “Robert Kennedy Ultimatum” in the Cuban

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¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 136.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 137. Lauren includes three “possible elements” of an ultimatum: an introduction, a conclusion, and incentives to cooperate.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. pp. 145-154. Lauren is careful to acknowledge that there are many ways to classify ultimata, and his typology is based on very narrow considerations of only one aspect of the ultimatum. Ibid. p. 144 (fn. 12).
Missile Crisis (1962). If there was an ultimatum in that case (and it is not clear that there was), the threat was almost certainly not "limited armed invasion." Lauren notes that states making this threat must be specific in stating that only a limited action is intended, or the punishment, if carried out, could be seen as a casus belli.

**Threats of war.** In these cases, there is no statement of intent to localize military action, nor is there a commitment to limit damage inflicted on the target state. (e.g. Britain-Germany, 1914).

**Threats of escalating a war.** Drawing from Hermann Kahn, Lauren writes that there are three ways coercive pressure can be increased in the context of war. He/she can threaten to widen the area of conflict, "compounding the escalation," or increasing the intensity of combat. The best example of this would be the threat to use weapons of mass destruction. (e.g. Allies-Japan, 1945).

Though Lauren does not attempt to evaluate the relative efficacy of various types of ultimata, his typology of threats opens the door for a study of how the threatened punishment affects the likelihood of success.

Daniel Ellsberg’s essay on “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail” emphasizes the point, made earlier, that the severity of a threat, as severity, is not as significant a factor as the calculation from the target that the threat is severe enough. However, the likelihood of compliance does increase with the magnitude of the threat.

As compellence theory, like deterrence theory, is largely based on rational actor assumptions,

**Hypothesis 4:** The more severe the threatened punishment, the more likely a state is to submit to the demands made of it.

Accompanying the concern about the severity of threatened punishment is the possibility of offering an incentive for cooperation along with the threat to inflict damage.

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70 Daniel Ellsberg, “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail”, p. 40. The concept of severe enough can be seen as a function of both severity and purpose. Ellsberg’s essay, which looks at bank tellers’ responses to armed robbery tells of one teller that admitted that if the demand for cash had been greater, he would not have given the robber the money; unless he had been certain that the robber was armed.
in the case of non-compliance. George and Simons make much of the value of offering a “carrot” to soften the stick. This concern in coercive diplomacy can be traced to Thomas Schelling, for whom allowing an “honorable” way out for your opponent was central in successful diplomacy. The presence of an incentive, allowing the target to save face and “get something” out of complying, makes the threat more palatable. The incentive could take the form of a reciprocal offer, diplomatic support in future disputes with third parties, certain privileges, etc.

David Baldwin argued in 1971 that the link between “positive sanctions” and policy outcomes was understudied. It is not clear whether we as a scholarly community have made much progress in the understanding of the relationship between the offering of incentives and the accomplishment of desired goals. Still, the basic hypothesis that there is some positive relationship between incentives and the outcome of a crisis situation is continually advanced. Here, I will test this hypothesis in its relationship to compellent threats.

**Hypothesis 5**: *If the target is offered an incentive to comply, along with the threat of punishment, it is more likely to comply with the demands.*

When it comes to the demands themselves, there are considerably more hypothesized connections. The first hypothesis on compellence comes from Alexander George and William Simons, who divide coercive diplomacy encounters into three main categories:

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Type A: Persuade an opponent to stop short of a policy goal.
Type B: persuade an opponent to undo an action already taken
Type C: Persuade an opponent to make changes in government, 73

These three categories are arranged according to the perceived difficulty in accomplishing the aim. George and Simons refer to a fourth category, “compellence”, which they see in purely offensive terms; as a sort of blackmail (Nazi Germany’s attempt at extorting lands from neighbours comes to mind). As George and Simons are concerned with defensive uses of “coercive diplomacy,” they set this category aside. Still, a Type D can be deduced from their work.

Type D: Persuade an opponent to cede goods or resources.

This four-part typology of threat aims can be seen as the structure of an hypothesis of which aims are more likely to be reached through coercive diplomacy. From the organization of the typology, it can be inferred that the more the aim of the threat violates the target’s sovereignty, the less likely the demands are to be complied with. Sovereignty is the major organizing principle in international relations. States agree to limit their actions to those which do not intrude upon another state’s sovereignty. 74 There is a clear distinction between types A and B (do/undo an action) and Types C and D (government change/cession) recognized by the authors. Types C and D have an offensive component. So, these two types are potentially more threatening to state sovereignty. What can be more intrinsic to sovereignty than the right to choose one’s own government or keep one’s own resources? When the target feels entitled to the resources or government

73 Alexander George and William Simons, pp. 7-9. Type C, aimed at changing an opponent’s government, is recognized by George and Simons as being on the edge of the defensive/offensive distinction they wish to draw.
74 Of course, the perfectly sovereign state is a fiction. All state sovereignty operates within a system of constraints upon it. All international agreements are limitations upon sovereignty. Still, the concept is a
structure in question, these feelings of indignation are even more likely to lead to the rejection of the demands.\(^7^5\) Within each group, one can argue that Type B, because it requires reversal of an action already taken, is more intrusive of sovereignty than Type A.

Another connection between purpose and outcome is approached from the point of view of the initiator of the threat. James Cable's work *Gunboat Diplomacy* classifies gunboat diplomacy encounters by the aim for which the initiator intended the threat.\(^7^6\) His categories, listed in order of their likelihood of success, are purposeful (a specific aim in mind), catalytic (attempting to incite action) and expressive (traditionally known as "signaling"). However, only purposeful threats or some cases of catalytic threats can truly be referred to as "compellence" for my purposes. I am interested in those cases where the target is aware of the demands being made of it, as it is difficult for a state to comply with demands of which it is unaware.

As the George and Simons typology seems to point in the direction most fruitful for analysis,

**Hypothesis 6:** The more intrusive of sovereignty the aim of a compellent threat, the less likely it is to be complied with.

**The Universe of Cases**

Having set out the hypotheses that I want to test, it is now imperative that I outline the case selection. Traditionally, studies of crisis situations have been done through case

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\(^7^5\) For a thorough discussion of the place of "entitlement" and "injustice" and their relationships to state decision-making, please see David Welch, *Justice and the Genesis of War* (New York: Cambridge University 1993).

\(^7^6\) Gunboat diplomacy is no more than naval compellence/deterrence. Robert Mandel's "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy", *International Studies Quarterly* 30: (1986), pp. 59-76 has a good discussion of the relationship of between gunboat diplomacy and compellence.
studies. The merits of a case study approach in theory testing are numerous, and have been set out elegantly by Harry Eckstein, so there is no need for me to outline them here.\textsuperscript{77} The deficiencies of this approach are also well known. Drawing general theoretical conclusions from a few cases can have serious methodological flaws, especially where the cases are very similar to each other, and the subject of study theoretically undeveloped. Though case studies can often provide enormous insight into why, in one instance or another, the theoretical expectations were not met, they are less well suited to comparing the validity of a number of separate hypotheses, each of which emphasizes different factors.

The perils of using case studies to advance hypotheses is clearly evident in Alexander George and William Simons \textit{The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy}. Though this work is one of the most important works yet written on the subject of compellent threats, its general conclusions are hampered by its choice of cases. All of the cases\textsuperscript{78} examined are instances of American coercive diplomacy, and only one case is before 1945. From this set of events, one could conceivably draw conclusions on American coercive diplomacy in the post-war era.\textsuperscript{79} George and Simons, however, attempt to make conclusions about strategies of coercive diplomacy/compellence in general. Their conclusions may turn out


\textsuperscript{78} The first edition (1971) looked at the embargo on Japan in 1941, the Cuban Missile Crisis and Laos in 1961. The most recent edition (1994) has expanded this list to include the bombing of North Vietnam, American policy against Nicaragua in the 1980s, the USA response to Libya's sponsorship of terrorism and the Gulf Crisis over Kuwait in 1990.

\textsuperscript{79} Even these conclusions would be limited, especially if one believed that there is a possibility that American leadership is a factor. In the most recent edition, there is no case between Lyndon Johnson's administrations and those of Ronald Reagan. There are two each from Kennedy and Reagan, meaning that about one half of the cases are drawn from presidents representing 11 of the 49 years at issue.
to be correct (determining this is one of the purposes of this project). However, these conclusions are suspect because of the limited field of cases.

The limitations of George and Simons's case universe are typical of many case study approaches to theory. This in no way invalidates the valuable contribution that good, detailed case studies can make to theory building. I advise the scholar to be cautious in drawing too general conclusions from too narrow a foundation.

Case studies are also limited as an analytical tool by the limitations of the human mind. It is difficult enough to sort out in one's head the interaction of variables in two or three cases. Once the case set moves beyond five or six, the richness and shading of the variables or "factors" being considered in their own peculiar context make cross-comparison and generalization nearly impossible.\(^8\)

There are two alternatives to the case study method. One is the game theoretic model. This is the research model used by Schelling in his pioneering work on conflict theory. Though game theory models can offer interesting insights into the consequences of choices, their abstraction from historical experience severely limits our ability to use games as a reflection of how things play out on the ground.\(^8\) Also, most game models presume an \textit{a priori} relationship between choices and outcomes grounded in a rational choice framework. It is of little use to examine a hypothesis connecting prospective costs and

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\(^8\) This assumes, of course, that the aim of International Relations is generalization.

\(^8\) Of course, all theory is, by definition, an abstraction from experience. The level of generalization necessary, however, for a game theoretic model is of a different magnitude. And, as Rosecrance writes, "[H]istory is the greatest source of data for all the social scientists" (\textit{Action and Reaction in World Politics} p. ix)
possible responses to these costs if the research model already assumes that a relationship exists.82

This leaves quantitative methods, or statistics. Despite the failings associated with quantitative methods (problems with coding, the tendency of discussions over the method to degenerate into quibbles over measurement), it is a robust way to deal with a large number of cases. Just like other research fields, the larger the number of observed instances, the better able one is to observe connections between factors associated with the phenomenon being observed. Quantitative methods, sadly, cannot provide the literary and historical satisfaction associated with the traditional case study method, nor can it give any particular insight into what really happened in a given case. However, its ability to handle data sets with hundreds of cases, and compare each case with every other case is a tremendous asset. So long as the variables being tested are defensibly coded and the measurements are robust and valid, quantitative analysis is usually best way to test a theory or set of theories against a large set of cases. Quantitative methods cannot determine causation, however, only correlation.

Case research

As the subject of compellence has not been studied in any detail, the compilation of a case list will require both the “pillaging” of lists already compiled by other scholars for other purposes, and a measure of independent searching of historical resources. Existing

82 Though game theory and case study research are not incompatible, the design of the research usually attempts to interpret historical cases in light of commonly used game theoretic models. One could see this as a deductive/inductive distinction, as the real issue is how the evidence is used. Still, the prevailing game theory models, at their core, develop hypotheses based on assumptions about human decision making behaviour, not on the historical record.
data sets are either too broad for my purposes or are intended to analyze other phenomena. Therefore, I have devised my own case set from scratch.

The most valuable source of case data has proven to be *Crises in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Pergamon Press 1988) by Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Sheila Moser. The amount of research done to compile this impressive list of crises in the international system between 1930 and 1980 is amazing. The first volume of this three volume set includes a brief summary of each crisis and a bibliography of sources used. From here, it is only a short trip to determine which crises had elements of compellence and which did not. It is similar, in form, to Robert Butterworth's *Managing Interstate Conflict 1945-1974: data with synopses* (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies 1976). Butterworth's collection, though useful, keeps discussions of long and complex cases relatively brief. Butterworth's account of the decade-long struggle for Mozambican independence is as long an entry as the two-week Cuban Missile Crisis. This makes it difficult for the researcher to determine which points in the longer cases had compellent aspects to them. Still, like, Brecher et al., Butterworth provides a bibliography for each case.

More specialized sources include James Cable's classic *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991: Political Applications of Naval Force* (3rd ed.) (Houndmills UK: IISS 1994) and Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan's *Force Without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Brookings Institute 1978). Cable's book mirrors the time period I will cover, and, as well as being a fair theoretical understanding of gunboat diplomacy, includes a chronology. Cable's chronology is not exhaustive, and he clearly
states that he does not mean for it to be so. The absence of a good bibliography is this book’s major shortcoming. Blechman and Kaplan attempt to cover every use of American forces for diplomacy between 1945 and 1975. This includes instances of signaling, reassurance of allies, deterrence, compellence, and coercion, to mention a few. This book is useful for pointing out possible cases of compellence that may have escaped the notice of other scholars. Its exclusive focus on American military diplomacy is a factor which limits its utility as a complete source.

Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz’s works on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) are other sources of case data. The MID data set attempts to include all instances where states considered or used military power in interstate confrontations. The data set covers over 150 years of history, and is encyclopedic. It codes hundreds of variables. But, without summaries of each case, it is not always clear where the coding scores come from. These authors’ list and data are useful for observing how scholars have examined the historical record, and distinguished winners from losers.

I used the works mentioned above as a “master list” of conflict in the modern period. I identified the likely instances of compellence, based on the descriptions of the cases given by the authors or, in the case of the MID data set, based on the coding of the cases.

After compiling a tentative list of cases, I went to regional histories, accounts of particular crises (when possible) and contemporary descriptions of ongoing disputes. If the foundation works included bibliographies for their case descriptions, I consulted these

83 Cable writes that some years (e.g., 1927) have too many cases of gunboat diplomacy for him to include every one in his chronology.
sources to confirm that the interpretation offered by the author was a reasonable one.

For the latter, I have relied on *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Facts on File, and The New York Times*. Information on some of the more recent cases can be retrieved from the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, a collection of media clippings from many nations and regions, compiled by the American government. A list of the cases included and a summary of each is attached as Appendix Three to this thesis.

**Coding the Cases**

**Case Characteristics**

Compellence requires that there be a “threatener” and “threatenee”, an initiator and a target. Naturally, the state that is making the demands is the initiator and the state that is being asked to change its policies is the target. In most cases the determination of the initiator and the target is not difficult to make. There are two instances where this determination complicates what is the most basic coding issue.

First, there is the issue of multiple initiators, i.e., a coalition making demands upon a state. Who is the initiator? All the states? Some of the states? The sum of the states? This is an important problem, because when it comes time to estimate the relative powers of the initiator and the target, the distinction of who (or what) is initiating the compellence encounter is crucial.

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84 In most cases, the “original” interpretation of the cases was reasonable. There were some instances, however, where the author described a compellent threat that could not be substantiated by the sources cited by the authors. The most perplexing incident was the crisis over Alexandretta (the Sanjak of Hatay) in 1938. This Franco-Turkish dispute over jurisdiction in a northern Syrian province is sometimes described in secondary sources as having a compellent element. However, diplomatic histories of the region, contemporary descriptions of the crisis and biographies of the leaders involved refer only to Turkish maneuvers, with no necessary connection to the disagreements over the region.
I have chosen to call the "leading" state in the initiating alliance the Initiator. The leading state is not necessarily the most powerful state in the group making the demands. It is the state that either (a) takes the initiative in the determination of the demands and the threats, or (b) would be expected to take most of the action should the use of force become necessary.

By using one initiator, the threat remains one threat. If each initiator was coded separately (i.e., a coalition of three initiators becomes three threats), the case set becomes too "unreal." The target of a coalition threat does not see a separate threat from each state, it sees one big threat. By focusing on the leader of the coalition, the coding decision avoids the problem of adding or multiplying state power into an unwieldy coalition power score.

The mirror problem to multiple initiators is multiple targets. Sometimes one state makes similar demands on a number of states within a short period of time or simultaneously. To code the target as I have coded the multiple initiators (counting only the leading target) would imply that the various targets of the threats are linked in action, or take their lead from the most important of the targets. Politically, this is plausible. But its implications for a test of rational choice models are troubling.

This step would be an explicit disavowal of the solitary, unitary rational actor assumption of most rational realist models. It would be, in fact, equivalent to presuming on what the calculations of the lesser actors were based. As for the charge that this step would more closely reflect political reality, the historical record of these instances is not unanimous. In some cases of multiple targets under threat, some targets deviated from the path set by its partners. For example, The smaller Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania) complied with the demands made by the Soviet Union, but similar demands were rejected outright by Finland. This case holds out the possibility that states can or do act independently when choosing how to respond to compellent threats.

I will treat each threat to a separate target as a separate compellent threat. This way, each target will treated as making its decision on compliance or noncompliance as if it were making this decision based on its own "national interest". This is true to the realist tradition and easier to deal with than by deciding which target was the "primary target."

**The dependent variable**

The standard way to code the outcome of crisis is the dichotomous success/failure coding. This is used by Bruce Russett, Paul Huth, Paul Karsten, and James Cable. The appeal of the dichotomous variable is clear. By establishing an either/or dependent variable, the contentious fixing of a case along a success spectrum is avoided. The data set is clearly divided into what works and what does not work, and the conclusions that can be drawn are firmer. How would one refer, in writing, to a success score of two along a five point scale? Marginally successful? Barely successful? A dependent variable should be clearly understood, and easily translatable into policy advice, if any is to be given, and a dichotomous variable is as clear as they come.

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85 It is clear in some cases that there is a primary target of a compellent threat directed against a number of states. For example, in the threats that led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, it was quite obvious that the United Arab Emirates was of lesser concern to Iraq than Kuwait was. However, the demands made to each of the targets were different, so, though the cases were linked and Kuwait was the primary target, the threat to the UAE cannot simply be dismissed.

In other instances, the primary target is not obvious. In the Soviet threat to the Baltic states, it would difficult to assume that Finland, or Lithuania, were the primary targets of the compellence.

The obvious rejoinder to the dichotomy is that this does not reflect reality. Of what use is a dependent variable that neglects the partial successes, where one or two of a set of demands are complied with, while the rest of the demands are ignored? By ascribing a dummy variable to as complex a phenomenon as a political outcome is near-sighted and more utilitarian than scientific. At the very least, a three level <no success>, <partial success> and <success> should be used.  

Let us concede for the moment that these arguments are valid, and a three level scale will be the simplest dependent variable coding scheme used. There is another problem with this coding scheme - the term “success”. What do we mean when a compellent threat “succeeds”?

[A] simple dichotomy of “success/failure” obscures not only variations in degree but also the various dimensions for measuring success. Establishing the intended scope and domain of an influence attempt is a basic first step in assessing effectiveness.  

Any policy has a number of goals, and influence attempts are no different. A policy may not achieve a smaller goal (getting an opposing state to back down on a specific issue) but achieve a larger strategic goal (demonstrating one’s commitment to one’s allies). In measuring the “success” of a policy, we raise the possibility of every case being a “partial” success, as few attempts at compellence are outright successes in all of their purposes.

This criticism can be neatly avoided by focusing on operational objectives, as opposed to strategic objectives, as this allows “the consideration of more objectively

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87 This of course, only puts the problem of the “reflection of reality” another level down. Partial successes also come in different shapes and sizes.
determined and empirically verifiable phenomena without risking the validity of the study's results". In other words, focus on the issue at hand. If the compellent threat is about changing a specific policy, consider the case a success if the policy is changed. Any additional "signaling" purpose should be ignored, or classified separately.

Success also implies that there is a necessary connection between the policy option and the outcome of the dispute. Few compellence encounters are isolated from the wider world of international relations. Though, in many cases, one can draw a straight line from the compellent threat to the outcome of the crisis, in other cases, the linkage between the threat of military action and the response of the target is unclear. So long as the terms "success", "failure" or "effectiveness" are used, the writer is putting in the minds of the readers, maybe unintentionally, the idea that the threat was the sole or major factor in determining what followed.

The best way around this semantic dilemma is a purely behavioral measure of outcome. "Neither success nor failure, but outcomes". Establishing what the demands of the initiator are, simply determine whether or not the demands are complied with within a reasonable period after the demands are made. By choosing a behavioral measure of outcome, I hope to avoid implying that the compellent threat was certainly the determining facto in the outcome. As I am studying compellence and outcomes, it is clear that I do

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90 James Cable in *Gunboat Diplomacy* has a coding system that mixes strategic and operational goals of gunboat diplomacy. Cables is not attempting to do a systematic analysis of these cases, but simply listing and coding according to what he believes was the most important purpose of the action taken. A more rigorous and less impressionistic analysis of gunboat diplomacy would require a stricter coding system.
believe that there are probably patterned links between the two. I want to avoid making this assumption in any particular case by using as loaded a term as “success”.

Now to return to where this section began: How many levels? I left off by making the argument that leaving room for partial successes was crucial to a proper reflection of reality. Having now decided that “compliance” will be the standard, not success, we are left questioning whether, simply to determine how many compellent threats did result in only partial satisfaction or not there should be room for partial compliance.

The initial coding for this study included a “partial compliance” variable between compliance and non-compliance of the demands. It soon became clear that there were, in fact, few cases of partial compliance. They accounted for roughly five per cent of the cases found between 1919 and 1990, making inclusion of this intermediate variable insignificant for analytical purposes. For the sake of clarity, I recoded these cases as either compliance or non-compliance, according to how the key issue at stake in the dispute was dealt with. The key issue was defined as that which was the center of the crisis; not necessarily the most intrusive demand.

System Characteristics (independent variable set #1)

Hypothesis 1: The compliance rate with certain types of threats is significantly correlated with the distribution of power within the international system.

The distribution of power in an international system is usually conceived in terms of “polarity.” This is useful shorthand if one can reduce the distribution of power in a system to being synonymous with the number of major states within it. In fact, distribution
of power within a system is associated with the number of small states within a system, as well.92

I am limiting my study to the period between 1919 and 1990, or roughly period covering the years between the end of World War I and the end of the Cold War. I choose these points for convenience. Both World War I and the Cold War were system altering events of enormous magnitude. The period marked by the conclusions of these events can be seen as covering the “modern” period of international relations. States are the major actors, security issues dominate the agendas of the states, and the concept of general war (and the horrors that go with it) is alien to no one.

In defining the “polarity” of a system, I will go beyond the simple dichotomy of the declaring 1945 to be the dividing line between a bipolar and a multipolar world. I choose to divide the post-World War I period into three eras. First, I will refer to the period 1919-1945 as the interwar (multipolar) era. There were five or six states of roughly equal power and involvement in international relations, in a system which was, as Singer and Small note, primarily European.93 I will refer to the twenty year period between 1946 and 1965 as the Cold War (bipolar era.) The system was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, who tried to set the agenda of international relations. Both superpowers towered over blocs of states, which included other major powers. I will call the period 1966-1990 the post-imperial (diffuse bipolar era.) By 1965, the Sino-Soviet

92 This makes sense if one imagines power as a relative commodity, and one’s lack of it can be mitigated by joining with other states. The more states there are within a system, the more chances a state has to augment its power. Though the realists may be right in considering minor powers to be insignificant actors in the international system, this is probably only true if one considers them in isolation from each other and from the major powers. Both World Wars were preceded and provoked by concerns over minor powers.

split rigidified, creating a third major independent power, loyal to no bloc of interests. The beginning of American involvement in the Vietnam War demonstrated the limits of superpower force. Also, the period was, in many ways, dominated by the jockeying for preference by the newly independent states of the developing world. Though the two superpowers still made the East-West rivalry the prevailing prism through which world politics was viewed, the large number of new states made effective control of the world agenda difficult. Ranked, in order of increasing “bipolarity”,


Hypothesis 2: The presence of an alliance between the target state and a great or regional power makes compliance with the initiator's demands less likely than if the target had to face the threat alone.

I will use a modified form of the definition of “alliance” provided by Bruce Russett. Russett defines an alliance as “a formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the conditions under which they will or will not employ military force”.\(^{94}\) This is, for the most part, a fine definition. It correctly chooses to include only those agreements which are not global in nature, and places defense issues at the center of alliance politics.\(^{95}\) However, the inclusion of the adjective “formal” makes an unnecessary limitation on the scope of alliances. Many authors consider informal alliances, or “alignment”, to be important factors in the considerations of states. For instance, there is no formal alliance committing the United States to defend Israel if it finds itself under

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\(^{95}\) Russett refuses to consider global organizations like the League of Nations or the United Nations as true alliances. They are simply too broad. I choose to place regional organizations like the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity under the same category as these global organizations. Membership is not “selective” enough, and their military component, i.e., collective security, is neither robust nor the primary purpose of the organization.
attack. However, the informal relationship that has connected the two states is a fact everyone recognizes. Therefore, an alliance is "a mutual agreement or understanding between a limited number of states concerning the conditions under which they will or will not employ force in the pursuit of a mutual objective."

For the purposes of this study, I have limited my use of this variable to only those alliances which bind the target or to a great or regional power. I limit myself to the target because it is its behavior I am trying to explain. There are, also, few cases of alliances in the post-1919 period which stipulate or assume the common use of "offensive" force to achieve an objective. When initiators act in concert, it is usually in the form of a coalition. The reason for the limitation of alliances to those with great powers is largely practical. There are few states which have never had an alliance with one state or another. To consider all alliances equal, regardless of the alliance partner, would be counterproductive. Also, the consideration of great or regional power alignments is a rough measure of how major players line up on each side of a dispute. The presence or absence of great/regional power support for the initiator or target is a fair estimate of the potential distribution of capabilities of each "bloc".

I coded the military agreements of states in three different ways, each measuring different ways of understanding the alliance dynamic.

1) **Alignment**: Does the state have a close relationship to a great power? This measure includes all formal expressions of goodwill or affinity between the target state and a sponsor. (e.g., "friendship treaties", ententes, technology sharing agreements, defensive alliances, military cooperation pacts, military base leasing agreements, etc.)

2) **Alliance**: Does the state have a defensive alliance with a great power? This measure includes only those relationships which commit a great power to the defense and protection of the target state.

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96 I have coded the leading state in the initiating coalition as the initiator.
3) **Alliance status**: How close is the target state to a great power sponsor? This status will be measured: *no relationship* (0), *loose relationship* [friendship treaties, information sharing treaties, etc.] (1) and *tight relationship* [military alliances or base leasing agreements] (2).

These three ways of coding alliance relationships reflect three ways of understanding how the possibility of great power protection affects the likelihood of the target state complying with demands made under threat of force. The first (alignment) tests whether the presence of a relationship between the target and a great power affects this calculation. The second (alliance) tests whether the presence of a defensive alliance between the target and a sponsor affects the likelihood of compliance. The third (alliance status) tests whether the "tightness" of the relationship affects the likelihood of compliance. Each of these interpretations of the place of alliance dynamics in compellence encounters is reasonable and worth examining.

**Hypothesis 3**: *The more the power differential favors the initiator, the more likely the target is to comply with the demands made in a compellence encounter.*

For as widely used an indicator as relative power, it is amazing that no satisfactory measure of military power has been developed. Though it is generally agreed, for instance, that India is militarily more powerful than Pakistan, the margin of this superiority is not agreed upon. The presence of a nuclear power in any given encounter confuses things even more. Does a small state with a couple of nuclear devices dramatically improve its military balance vis-à-vis a larger state with no nuclear devices, but a well-equipped conventional force? To some extent, military power is a variable further enhanced by intangible attributes of battlefield encounters. A state with thousands of tanks but no skill
in using them is definitely in a weaker position than a state with smaller forces but better soldiers or more advanced equipment. States may take these intangibles into consideration in evaluating a potential opponent’s military prowess. The puzzle for the scholar is how to reflect the discrepancies in power distribution without quantifying things which seem, at face value, inherently unquantifiable.

There are two possible approaches to measuring power. First, one could go the route used by Robert Mandel in his study of gunboat diplomacy. Borrowing from Cox and Jacobson, Mandel codes states on a power scale that simply rates states based on a rough categorization. States are ranked as smallest, small, middle, large and super. The alternative approach is an attempt to actually “quantify” the power available, as Zeev Maoz does, by counting the number of troops each party can bring to bear.

I use a modified Cox/Jacobson scale. As the original is designed around 1960s data, and leaves out important information (troops, military spending, level of technology, etc.), I have modified their scale. I use 1990, the final year of my study, as the base year. All monetary values have been converted to 1990 American dollars. The scale being used is printed in Appendix I.

Threat Characteristics (independent variable set #2)

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97 The numerous Arab-Israeli Wars demonstrate this point more than adequately. In each war, especially the Yom Kippur War (1973), a vastly outnumbered Israel defeated a well-armed opponent (or group of opponents) through superior training, command and control, and technology.

98 Earl Barbie holds that anything can be measured or quantified. All that is needed is an adequate conceptualization of the item to be measured. See Barbie, Earl, The Practice of Social Research (6th ed.) (Belmont Ca: Wadsworth 1992). (Ch. 5, 114-122).

Hypothesis 5: The more severe the threatened punishment, the more likely a state is to submit to the demands made of it.

Measuring the severity of a threatened punishment can be done in a number of ways. One could, as Maoz does, simply categorize the threats themselves; i.e., differentiating between threats to blockade, threats to declare war, threats to seize goods, etc. Bueno de Mesquita, in his calculation of expected utility in numerous conflicts, seems to consider the possible damage inflicted as a function of the initiator’s distance from the conflict zone, and its power, relative to that of the target. As state power is being measured elsewhere, I will use a measurement similar to that of Maoz. I have identified five separate “levels” of threat.

1: **Minimal cost**: blockade
2: **Low cost**: punitive strikes
3: **Medium cost**: limited invasion
4: **High cost**: intervention
5: **Extreme cost**: war, intervention in ongoing war.

The criticism that these divisions are artificial is obvious. In some cases, a state may consider the threat of a blockade as a more serious step than facing punitive strikes against military installations. Though this may be true, and is certainly worthy of investigation, I will refrain from speculation on the target’s perception of the severity, in favor of more “objective” categories.

It is important to keep in mind that the “severity” of the threat is different from the “expected cost” of the threat. As will be seen in the next chapter, a complete measure of

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100 I say “seems to”, because Bueno de Mesquita never refers to possible damage as such. Yet, the nature of expected utility calculations implies a comparison of costs to benefits in the execution of an action. Reference to the “costliness” of a war is akin to, but not synonymous, with the concept I am interested in. See The War Trap. pp. 177-8, and Walter Petersen, “Deterrence and Compellence” pp. 269-94.
the expected cost (or "true severity") necessitates examining the interaction between the severity of the threatened punishment and the capabilities of the initiator and the target.

**Hypothesis 6:** *If the target is offered an incentive to comply, along with the threat of punishment, it is more likely to comply with the demands.*

There should be little controversy over the measure of the presence or absence of an incentive to cooperate. The incentive must be offered in the context of the threat, i.e., not a bargaining chip offered in negotiations once the crisis has passed. The incentive must be clearly offered, or agreed to. In some cases, the incentive may be proposed by the target, and agreed to by the initiator; it is the initiator who has the last word on whether or not such an incentive is consistent with its policy aims. The coding will be a basic dummy variable, noting the presence or absence of the "carrot". Take note that the value of the incentive is not being measured. The contextual nature of incentives to cooperate makes this more complicated than the measure of the value of punishment.

**Hypothesis 7:** *The more intrusive of sovereignty the aim of a compellent threat is, the less likely it is to be complied with.*

The measurement of this variable is problematic. First, there is the assumption that one violation of sovereignty may be more offensive than another. Second, there is the organization of these "degrees" into a coherent hierarchy.

Are there degrees of sovereignty? If so, how does this affect interactions in the international system? The concept of sovereignty has been the organizing principle of international relations since at least 1648, and is enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The date 1648 is not quite arbitrary, but it is a little deceptive. Though international relations scholars date the concept of sovereignty from the Treaty of Westphalia, it would be wrong to assume that states were, all of a sudden, sovereign. Like most revolutions in political organization, it was gradual, and there
jealously guard certain areas of their political “life” with more energy than others. Those policies which are more closely related to the “independence” of a state are more likely to be guarded if under attack from outside forces. The policies more tightly connected to the ability of a state to survive are most likely to be protected.

Alexander George and William Simons consider the purpose of the coercive threat to be an important variable in the likelihood of compliance with a coercive strategy. They outline four possible aims of a coercive strategy, as was discussed earlier. Their typology only roughly conforms to a pattern of intrusiveness. George and Simons themselves, in their limited examination of a few case studies, find little hard evidence to corroborate their assumptions. This project may be a chance to apply their typology to a larger set of cases, and determine if their categories have any explanatory weight.

I also plan to code the cases according to an original classification based on the intrusiveness of the threat.

My “intrusiveness scale” of threats to sovereignty is:

**Change in foreign policy of target**: As the aim of the threat is the external politics of a country, it can be considered “fair game” for other foreign powers.

**Change in domestic policy**: Domestic issues go to the heart of question of sovereignty. There is, however, a long history of states intervening in other states affairs.

**Change in security policy**: Security issues are central to the definition of statehood. Having one’s security policy dictated by another state is hard to take.

**Change in government**: There are few things more important to questions of sovereignty than the right to construct one’s own government. As this issue could include the demand that the target government undo itself, the difficulty in attaining this goal is considerable.

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were transitional moments before and after 1648. In fact, when the Thirty Years War began changing in form from a religious to a political conflict, the seeds of the separation of religious and temporal jurisdiction were sown.

102 George and Simons (1994) 7-9. George and Simons do not consider Type D a type of coercive diplomacy, but do concede that it is a coercive strategy. I have chosen to call it “Type D”. George and Simons choose not to study it at all.
Cession of state control: The cession of sovereignty over certain territories or over the state itself is the clearest assault on the principle of sovereignty.

In those instances where there are multiple demands, the encounter will be coded according to the most intrusive demand. This scale will be tested alongside the George and Simons typology.

Summary

The study of compellence has been, in large part, underdone or done unsatisfactorily. This research project is an attempt to fill this gap in the discipline through a large-\(n\) study of historic compellence encounters. This exercise is primarily one of theory testing, in which I will compare some of the prevailing hypotheses about compellence in light of the actual historical experience. I attempt to do so by using only those variables which are readily observable at a single point, avoiding the minefield of issues that comes with any compound measure.\(^3\) A statistical evaluation of these hypotheses is the best way to explore trends and patterns within compellence; both in general and in certain historical periods.

\(^3\) The major exception here is my power variable. There is no avoiding controversy here.
Chapter Two
The Results of the Analysis

Having set out the hypotheses being tested, and the procedures I followed for case selection, I will now discuss the results of the analysis. I will evaluate the reliability of the hypothesis based on the outcome of the data analysis. In those instances where the statistical analysis suggests that the proffered hypotheses are inadequate, I will posit alternative explanations and hypotheses that fit the data better than the original, at least in those cases.

Bivariate Analysis

In order to determine which of our many variables are most important in reaching an understanding of compellence, we must start with bivariate analysis, i.e., an analysis of the relationships between a single independent variable and the dependent variable, outcome. For bivariate analysis, I rely on non-parametric measures of correlation between the variables under consideration, especially Spearman's rho.¹ Kendall's tau-b is another non-parametric measure, but Spearman's rho is the preferred score here because it handles tied scores and rankings better than tau scores.² Keep in mind that the correlations will, generally, be low. Compellent threats are complied with less than half the time, so, all things being equal, any threat has only a forty percent chance of success.

PERIOD: THE EFFECTS OF SYSTEM STRUCTURE

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¹ Non-parametric measures are appropriate for the analysis of variables that are not measured in an "interval" manner, where a score of 2 is twice as high as a score of 1. I use ordinal (ranking) and nominal (categorical) measures. Therefore you will not be seeing the familiar Pearson's $R$, which is appropriate only for interval values.

The first step in the analysis of the various theories under investigation is to examine the effect that system structure has on the outcome of compellence encounters. In other words, does "period" matter?

The original hypothesis on period effect dealt with the polarity of a system, but I have included other period measures besides polarity in order to get a better picture of what exactly is going on in each period of the seventy years under examination.

I have measured the period effects of the 70 years under study in two ways. First, and most obviously, I coded each case by the year in which in occurred. This measure allows me to spot the general trend of compliance across the decade. Was compellence "easier" before World War II or after? The second measure is like unto the first. The 70 years were divided into three "eras", roughly organized according to the polarity of the systems in these eras. This allows me to determine if there are significant differences between eras of different power distribution. As the era measure is consynchronous with the year measure, it has been recoded to reflect increasing levels of bipolarity.

### Table 2:1 System Structure Correlation Coefficients

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<th>Spearman's rho</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>bipolar</th>
<th>era</th>
<th>year</th>
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<td>Correlation Coefficient</td>
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<td>-.153*</td>
<td>-.238**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
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<td>.004</td>
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<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).
**Bipolar Disordered**

Table 2:2 Crosstabulation (Outcome by Polarity of System)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome * bipol Crosstabilation</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Diffuse bipolar</th>
<th>Bipolar</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome non-compliance</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count % within bipolar</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome compliance</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count % within bipolar</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count % within bipolar</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Symmetric Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Asymp. Std. Error</th>
<th>Approx. T</th>
<th>Approx. Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient</td>
<td>.240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b</td>
<td>-.144</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>-1.672</td>
<td>.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation</td>
<td>-.153</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>-1.712</td>
<td>.089c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interval by Interval Pearson's R</td>
<td>-.138</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>-1.549</td>
<td>.124c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Based on normal approximation.

The first hypothesis set out in this work is that the polarity of any given international system has an impact on the chance of compliance with a compellent threat.

Specifically, a bipolar system is more conducive to compliance because the initiating state is more likely to know the strategic/diplomatic situation of the targeted state. A multipolar
system multiplies the possible variations in diplomatic status and state alignments beyond
the possibility of the initiating state to calculate.

As can be seen from the above tables, the bipolar hypothesis is not substantiated by
the data. The correlation is negative, meaning that as bipolarity increases, the chance of
compliance decreases. The correlation of bipolarity with outcome is significant, but only to
.05 -- not especially significant for a data set of 125 cases. Also, the Spearman's rho figure
is much lower than would be expected.

What sense can be made of this finding? The compliance patterns are clear from
the crosstab, and they run contrary to the expectations of the bipolar hypothesis. Instead
of compliance being more likely in a bipolar system, it seems that the multipolar interwar
system (1919-1945) has the greatest rate of compliance. The rate declines sharply in the
Cold War period (1945-1965), and then makes a sharper move downward in the diffuse

Table 2.3 Crosstabulation (Outcome by Era)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome × era Crosstabulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symmetric Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nominal by Nominal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinal by Ordinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kendall's tau-b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spearman Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interval by Interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson's R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. Based on normal approximation.

Here, a gradual decline in the effectiveness of compellence threats can be traced the century. Actually, the decline from the Cold War to the Post-Imperial System is not so gradual.

The correlation between year/era and outcome are much higher than the correlation between bipolarity and outcome. Also, they are significant to the .01 level, meaning they should be taken more seriously than the bipolarity correlation. Once, again, the correlation is negative, meaning that compliance with compellence was easier in the earlier part of the century. This explains why there was a marginally significant negative correlation between outcome and bipolarity -- as the first period was also the least bipolar, the strong negative relationship between era and outcome was refracted when translated into bipolarity.

If the significance and negative correlation were stronger, the interpretation of this data would be easy. The bipolar hypothesis, as stated, is simply backwards, and multipolar systems are more conducive to compliance than bipolar ones. However, the significance
and negative correlation are not stronger, so there must be an alternative explanation for the results.

**The Hitler Anomaly**

Daniel Ellsberg, in his series of lecture on "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail", argues that Adolf Hitler was the "supreme blackmailer", one whose perverse talent at exploiting his strengths and others' weaknesses enabled Germany to pull off acquisitions beyond the scope of the ordinary blackmailer. "There is the artist to study, to learn what can be hoped for, what can be done with the threat of violence." Using Ellsberg as a starting point, it is possible that Adolf Hitler represents a compellence anomaly - someone whose remarkable success (only one case of non-compliance, Poland 1939) is partially attributed to his own talents, and partially to the unique historical position of Germany in the 1930s. Germany was a disaffected power, facing a coalition of appeasers eager to make up for the injustices of the Versailles agreement.

By removing most of the cases where Adolf Hitler's Germany was the initiating state, we can see if Hitler's success has a significant bearing on the place of his period as the "golden age" of compellence. We do not want to completely eradicate the "Hitler effect", as this presumes that Germany would not have made any compellent threats in the period between 1933 and 1945 if Hitler had not been in power. I left a random number of cases (less than five) in which Nazi Germany was the initiator in the analysis to test the hypothesis that the "Hitler Factor" accounts for the high period correlation.

---

Table 2:4 Correlation (Outcome by Era), Hitler Anomaly test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>era</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spearman's rho</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.193*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td>-.193*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>era</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>era</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).

The altered list was smaller than the original, so we cannot accept a lower significance barrier. The correlation drops sharply, as well, demonstrating that Hitler’s success is a factor in the results. Does the removal help the bipolar variable, though?

Table 2:5 Crosstabulation (Outcome by Bipolarity of System), Hitler Anomaly test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>multipolar</th>
<th>diffuse bipolar</th>
<th>bipolar</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bipol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bipol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bipol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In fact, this is the only period in the study where Germany did make compellent threats, but Italian and Japanese threats are similarly limited in time and space.
There is no change in relative importance of bipolarity in determining outcome. So, we are left with era being the most important period variable, though the correlation is not as significant as when Hitler is in.

Can we, therefore, agree with the “Hitler Anomaly” thesis? There are several theoretical problems with doing so. First, is Hitler’s amazing rate of success any more remarkable than Idi Amin’s repeated failures on behalf of Uganda in the 1970’s? The fact that Uganda’s compulsive threats were ignored is not as surprising as President Amin’s persistence in making threats that would almost certainly be ignored. Josef Stalin’s successes in the 1940s are also noteworthy. As a leader of a dissatisfied power, Hitler’s successes certainly depended on the number of opportunities presented to him, as well as any innate talent for “blackmail”. We have no clear evidence that Hitler was an anomaly. All successful leaders adapt to their situations, and Hitler was no exception. If we could control for the leadership of each state involved in each encounter (initiator and target), we might be able to determine if, indeed, the leader’s identity matters. This type of work
requires detailed analysis beyond the scope of this project, and is best reserved for a series of detailed case studies. For now, the Hitler Hypothesis must be held in abeyance.

**Normative Shift**

One hypothesis that cannot be tested adequately from this data set is the possibility of a normative shift in the perception of the validity of concessions made under threat, and the validity of threat-based diplomacy itself. Note that the biggest change comes in the post-imperial period, when colonies had freed themselves from the often oppressive yokes of their more powerful masters.\(^5\) Legitimate authority was no longer based on the power that could be brought to bear on an issue, but on the free consent of the governed. The birth of a non-aligned movement that tried to separate itself from the East-West power struggle may have also led to a "we're not going to take it any more" attitude on the part of formerly subject states. Before we can accept this possibility, however, there is another testable notion that must be examined.

**Another relationship reflected in era correlation**

Another possibility, and one that can be tested, is that the phenomenon being observed is a reflection of another hypothesis being tested, specifically, the relationship between the relative powers of the initiator and the target. The post-imperial period saw the birth of many small states who were initiators as well as targets. Weak initiators, the hypothesis goes, are unlikely to succeed in their efforts to get the target to comply with their demands, so the explosion of small states would mean a similar explosion in the cases of noncompliance. The interwar period was dominated by large or middle powers, so their

\(^5\) More attention should be paid to the year/outcome correlation than the era/outcome correlation, for despite their synchronicity, the era measure is dependent on the years I have chosen as the cutoff points. A
ability to bring more punishment to bear on the target was reflected in a greater frequency of compliance. As this hypothesis can be readily tested, I will now move on to discover the relationship between measures of power and the outcome of compellence encounters.

POWER

The estimate of the relative power of opposing forces is still the dominant shorthand explanation for many international phenomena, despite the retreat of "realist" thought within international relations circles. The persistence of this type of explanation for events or outcomes of crises is a puzzle in itself, as the battle does not always go to the stronger, nor the race to the swifter. Still, there is a general expectation that, most of the time, a stronger state will have a major advantage over a weaker one. The closer the issue is to traditional "high politics" security issues, the stronger this relationship is supposed to be. When the power at issue in a dispute is not intangible diplomatic influence, or mercurial economic power, but "hard", "concrete", military, barrel-of-a-gun power, many of us expect brute force to triumph.

My measures of power, or more precisely, capability, are calculated from objective indicators of state resources. I assign the initiators and targets a rank between "small" and "super". The scores calculated for each state had high face validity, i.e., they made intuitive sense. Few states received unusual or surprising scores, so I am very confident in the validity of the measurement used

---

recoding, using 1961 as the beginning of the post-imperial period (as the first big wave of new states was in 1960) reveals no major difference in correlation (-.232 instead of -.238).
Table 2:6 Power relationships Correlation Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spearman's rho</th>
<th>Outcom</th>
<th>Power/ Initiator</th>
<th>Power/Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation Coefficient</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.326**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).

Table 2:7 Crosstabulation (Outcome by Power of the Initiator)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Power of Initiator</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power of Initiator</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Power of Initiator</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>small</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minor</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>major</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>super</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Symmetric Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordinal by Ordinal</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Asymp. Std. Error</th>
<th>Approx.</th>
<th>Approx. Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kendall's tau-b</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>3.941</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spearman Correlation</td>
<td>.326</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>3.829</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson's R</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>3.680</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. Based on normal approximation.

Beginning with a look at the initiating state, we find support for the hypothesis that strong states tend to have their compelent threats met with compliance. The correlation is
highly significant, though the correlation coefficient of .326 is not as high as one might expect. A correlation of .500 or .600 could have been expected with a case set 125. Still, power politics theorists find some corroboration for their hypothesis. But, looking at the corresponding correlation for target power, this theory is called seriously into question.

Table 2:8 Crosstabulation (Outcome by Power of the Target)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>non-compliance</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Power of Target</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>small</td>
<td>minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Symmetric Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordinal by Ordinal</th>
<th>Kendall's tau-b</th>
<th>Spearman Correlation</th>
<th>Pearson's R</th>
<th>N of Valid Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>-.041</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymp. Std. Error</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. p</td>
<td>-.480</td>
<td>-.482</td>
<td>-.177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. Sig.</td>
<td>.631</td>
<td>.631</td>
<td>.859</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. Based on normal approximation.
Here it is clear that something unusual is going on. We expect that a target's power would be inversely correlated with compliance, that weaker states are more likely to comply with demand made of them under the threat of force. In fact, we find no significant relationship, and a correlation coefficient that could not be much lower without being no relationship at all.

Before trying to solve this puzzle, where there is one strong correlation and one insignificant correlation, I must deal with the likely objection that my measurement of capability is not appropriate. In lieu of stopping here to devise a new measurement, I will compare the above results using my own measurement with results using one of the most common “measures” of power, the “major/minor” distinction. This “guesstimate” of capability is an intuitive estimate of a state’s power based on impressions of military, diplomatic and economic strength, and the assignment of a label of major or minor based on these impressions. For the purposes of this study, I will use a list adapted from Jack Levy’s *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975.*

Table 2:9 Correlation Coefficients (Outcome by J. Levy power scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spearman’s rho</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Levy GP Init?</th>
<th>Levy GP Tar?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Correlation Coeff.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sig. (1-tailed)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).*

---

Table 2:10 Crosstabulations (Outcome by J. Levy power scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crosstab</th>
<th>Levy Great Power Initiator?</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Levy Great Power Initiator?</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Levy Great Power Initiator?</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Levy Great Power Initiator?</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crosstab

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Levy Great Power Target?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Levy Great Power Target?</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Levy Great Power Target?</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Levy Great Power Target?</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Here we see a repetition of the earlier pattern. In fact, the Initiator Power Hypothesis is more strongly substantiated by my data. The Target Power (or Target Weakness) Hypothesis does not do much better under the Levy measurement, and the relationship is in the wrong direction, being a positive, not a negative correlation, as is expected.

**What about the interaction between the two?**

I will take a brief step away from bivariate analysis to deal with this argument, as this is probably a more accurate reflection of the power hypothesis. Upholders of the capability hypothesis argue not simply that “powerful states win” and “weak states lose”, but that the difference in power, the relative power, is what determines the outcome of most international crises.

First, a caveat. Any categorical scoring of state capability is inadequate to precisely measure relative power. Because it is categorical, there is no way to estimate the power differential within any category. All attempts to measure relative power with mathematical precision have either floundered in the wake of face validity or require immense amounts of data, largely inaccessible for earlier periods in history.

My power rankings, though categorical, should be able to reflect evidence for the relative power hypothesis, but it will be able to detect only large differences in relative capability. We can determine whether or not there is a relationship between power differential and compliance with demands made under compellent threat by running a partial correlation between target power with outcome, while controlling for the power of the initiator.
Table 2:11 Correlation (Outcome by Power of the Target, Controlling for Power of Initiator)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OUT</th>
<th>PTA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUT</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>-0.0884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P =</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>-0.0884</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(121)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P =</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>.120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 1-tailed Significance).". " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed

As the table demonstrates, there is no significant relationship between power disparity (PIN by PTA) and outcome. The correlation score still does not meet any tests for statistical significance.7

It appears that there is no significant interaction between the strength of the initiator and the weakness of the target, invalidating the part of expected utility theory that places importance on the relative punishment to be inflicted. What can explain this?

If we stick to a bivariate explanation, and accept that my data are valid, one possibility is that capability as I measure it is not simply material capability, but also a reflection of "prestige" or "authority". Other states, regardless of their own "prestige", are often willing to recognize a powerful state’s complaints as important enough to bow to.

A more likely hypothesis is that a target state’s expected utility is not measured in relative terms, but in absolute terms. Even given a major power’s ability to defend itself against another major power, it could not do so without absorbing heavy losses. Not many leaders are ready or willing to absorb that level of punishment, except in exceptional circumstances. So, though it is true that power is a relative concept, applied power could

---

7 A logistic regression analysis of the power variables and outcome determined that the prediction power of using both power variables (67.74% correct, coefficients of .585 for PIN and -.257 for PTA, significances of .0004 for PIN and .2332 for PTA) was less than that of using initiator power alone (68.55% correct).
be more properly seen as an absolute concept. The issue is not which state gets hurt more; it is whether a state can absorb any losses beyond a certain level.

A third possibility is that the initiating state is likely to make lesser demands of a major power, making the compellent threat more palatable to the target. The initiator, not willing to provoke the target, keeps the dispute on a lower level. I will test this multivariate hypothesis later in this work.

**Powerful Friends**

One aspect of power not reflected in the above analysis, especially on the part of the target, is the possibility that a targeted state may see its capabilities magnified by the chance of a powerful friend intervening and defending it from any encroachments. This ally may ensure that any costs absorbed by a punitive strike are covered, or may directly intervene in the crisis to effect a peaceful resolution to the crisis or cause strategic headaches for the initiating state.

To address this hypothesis, I have measured alliance presence in three ways. First, I determined whether or not the target had any significant association with a major power*: treaties of friendship, or significant arms sales, for example, as well as straightforward alliances. I called this variable “alignment”. Second, I determined which of the target states had only “alliances”: mutual defense pacts. Thirdly, I coded the “alliance status” of each state on a ranking scale (0 for nothing, 1 for just alignment, 2 for an alliance).

Table 2:12 Correlation Coefficients (Outcome by Alliance Variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spearman's rho</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Alignment</th>
<th>Alliance Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corr. Coeffi</strong></td>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.215</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.062</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

* For the purpose of this analysis, I used the Jack Levy list for determining what a “major power” was.
Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).

The interesting result from this analysis is that the level of commitment from a major power does not matter as much as the presence of any commitment at all. Whether or not the major power that is the “guardian” intends for a “friendship treaty” to be seen as a promise to preserve and protect seems to be immaterial to the threatened state.

Table 2:13 Crosstabulation (Outcome by alignment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome * Is target aligned with major power?</th>
<th>Crosstabulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is target aligned with major power?</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Is target aligned with major power?</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count compliance</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Is target aligned with major power?</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Is target aligned with major power?</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The crosstabulation above makes the strength of this relationship clear. In those
instances where the target stands fast in the face of the threat of force, over 73 per cent have a commitment of some kind from a major power. And, in those cases where the target is aligned with a major power, almost two thirds refuse to comply with the demands made of them. Compare these number to those in the tables below, using the other alliance variables.

Table 2:14 Crosstabulation (Outcome by Presence of Alliance)
Table 2:15 Crosstabulation (Outcome by Alliance Status of Target)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Is target allied with major power?</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Outcome</th>
<th>% within Is target allied with major power?</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>73.6%</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Outcome * Alliance Status Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alliance Status</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>none</td>
<td>aligned</td>
<td>allied</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome non-compliance Count</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Alliance Status</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance Count</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Alliance Status</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Count</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Alliance Status</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data makes it clear that the formal status of an alliance is of little use in estimating whether a targeted state will comply with a given compelling threat. This is the first hypothesis under examination that has been substantially corroborated by the data. Friends matter, and it doesn’t matter how close these friends are.

Why is this? Is it not more reasonable that when a state is under pressure, it will rely most heavily on those commitments that “guarantee” amity and support? Alignment is a loose concept, and most states have, at one time or another been aligned with a great power. As the alignment variable includes all instance of alliances, the greater likelihood that a state would have an alignment of some kind makes the predictive power of the concept a little unusual.

As is evident in all the tables, compliance is much less likely than non-compliance, implying that getting a state to submit to demands under threat of force is difficult at the
best of times. The decision-making phenomenon known as “bolstering” could reveal how “alignment” works to amplify the chance of non-compliance. Bolstering is when a decision-maker, already preferring one option over another, grasps onto any other piece of information in the environment that reinforces the “wisdom” of this option. The potential support of an ally, or sponsor, who could “deter” or “punish” the initiator is likely to be an environmental factor that a bolstering leader would look to. As it is the mere possibility of support, and not the probability of support, that would appeal to many bolstering leaders, “alignment” has a better correlation with outcome than “alliance”.

PURPOSE

The threat itself

Now we move on to examine whether how the threat presents itself (i.e., the demands, the incentives, the scale of likely punishment, etc.) has any relation to the likely outcome of the encounter. This examination is right at the heart of the expected utility calculation. Here is where the likely costs to be incurred by defiance or submission in the face of threat present themselves most clearly.

The severity of each threat in the case list has been coded, based on the level of its threat to the sovereignty of the targeted state. It has been hypothesized that a target state is more likely to submit to a severe threat than a light one, because the severe threat has

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9 For a more thorough discussion of “bolstering” and other cognitive phenomena which could interfere with the decision making process, see the open chapter of Richard Ned Lebow’s Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 1981).

10 Though these issues may also be function of the size of the initiator, this relationship will be dealt with in the multivariate analysis.
the likelihood of imposing greater costs on the target state. There are a number of contextual variables through which the severity of threat may be viewed or re-evaluated, but I will deal with these in the section on multivariate analysis.

Table 2:16 Correlation Coefficients (Outcome by Severity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spearman's rho</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Severity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation Coefficient</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>0.8601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The correlation table reveals one of the lowest correlation scores in the entire data set. The unreliability of threat severity can be seen very clearly in the crosstabulation on the next page. Aside from the remarkable fact that threats of war have been very common, the effect of this severe threat seems to be almost random. It is more likely that severity interacts with another variable that makes the utility of simply threatening severe punishments negligible.

This is an important discovery, especially in light of recent United States and NATO policies towards Yugoslavia and Iraq, which have focused their efforts on threatening to “hit Milosevic/Hussein where it hurts”. If the severity of the threat delivered by the initiating state has little relationship to the likelihood of the target complying, it is questionable whether a state does itself any good by pledging itself to carry out a threat that would be costly to the initiator, as well as the target.
Table 2:17 Crosstabulation (Outcome by Severity of Threat)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>punitive strike</th>
<th>limited invasion</th>
<th>intervention to effect change</th>
<th>war</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>blockade</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Severity</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>blockade</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Severity</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Severity</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sporadic success of these threats has occasionally been credited to the severity of these threatened punishments. When these threats are not complied with, the targeted state or leader is usually labeled as “stubborn”. It is more likely, according to these results, that a different element of the threat environment is missing.

**You want me to do what?**

A separate, but logically linked, measure of the cost of submission/defiance is the scale of the demands made of the target. Some have hypothesized that the nature of the demands play a large role in the decision to comply with a request under compellent threat. The greater the demands made of the target, the less likely it is that the state will comply.

Of course, measuring the “scale” of a demand is not as straightforward as measuring severity. How can one generalize about the “threat” posed to a state by a particular demand? I have chosen to generalize based on the intrusiveness of the demands.
made, i.e., how much the demands intrude into the sovereignty of the state. As a more
general measure of the place of demands in the compellence equation, I have included the
“coercive diplomacy” classifications of George and Simon, which are based primarily on
the nature of the goal of the coercive policy.

Table 2:18 Correlation Coefficients (Outcome by variables on the aim)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spearman's rho</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Aim of threat</th>
<th>George &amp; Simons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation Coeff.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>-.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>.331</td>
<td>461</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).

The correlations here are also very low. This is a little more troubling than the low
scores for severity. The number of other variables which could possibly interact with
severity is large: aim, initiator capability, resolve; things which could mediate against
taking a severe threat seriously. The aim of a threat is not simply an objective variable,
but, in many ways, a psychological variable. A demand that strikes to the heart of state’s
primary interests arouses not only concern to protect these core values, but, often,
indignation of the “How dare he/she!” variety. So we would expect, on both counts, that
states would be more likely to ignore demands that require concessions that offend the
very nature of what being sovereign is all about.

The measure of aim could be inadequate. The crosstabulation does reveal that,
within certain categories, if not across the variable, some aims are “beyond the pale”. The
two lowest level aims have distributions almost identical to the highest level aim, and the
aim most clearly offensive to state sovereignty - cession of sovereign rights over land.
Table 2:19 Crosstabulation (Outcome by the Aim of the Threat)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aim of threat</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>change</td>
<td>change</td>
<td>change</td>
<td>change</td>
<td>cession</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in foreign</td>
<td>in domestic</td>
<td>in security</td>
<td>in government</td>
<td>of claim to or occupation of territory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Aim of threat</td>
<td>policy</td>
<td>policy</td>
<td>policy</td>
<td>policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Aim of threat</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Aim of threat</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Aim of threat</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, in two of the categories, compliance is slightly more likely than non-compliance, an unusual result in light of distributions of outcome for other variables, but not much should be made of a difference of one.

What are we to make of the absence of relationships between aim or severity and outcome? The most likely explanation is that severity is only a relevant factor when controlled by the aim of the threat, i.e., severity and aim interact to affect outcome. I will deal with this possibility in more detail in the section on multivariate analysis, but I will briefly outline this argument. There is a possibility that a severe threat is connected to an aim that makes the threat either disproportionately high or low. The means threatened are insufficient to the ends desired.
**A spoonful of sugar**

Another hypothesis that bears on the target’s calculations of utility is the possibility that offering an incentive to the target of the threat makes compliance more palatable. A “carrot” could be used by the initiating state to offset the costs that would afflict a state that complied with the demands being made of it. However, as the data on severity and aim demonstrates, it is unlikely that this hypothesis will bear out. After all, we have already rejected two bivariate explanations based on the alteration to a targeted state’s cost/benefit calculation.

**Table 2:20 Correlation Coefficients (Outcome by the presence of incentive)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spearman's rho</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Carrot offered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation Coefficient</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).

Unexpectedly, based on the outcomes of previous hypotheses geared toward expected utility calculations, the presence of an “incentive” or “carrot” is significantly correlated with the outcome of a compellent threat. A correlation of .24 is not high, by any standard, yet it proves to be statistically significant. This is probably rooted in the scarcity of carrots offered in the context of a compellent threat. The crosstabulations will prove more insightful here than the pure correlation data, as the table will allow us to see the break down.
Table 2:21 Crosstabulation (Outcome by the presence of an incentive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Carrot offered</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Carrot offered</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Carrot offered</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Outcome</td>
<td>91.2%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Carrot offered</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are only eleven instances of carrots being offered in the context of a compellent threat. Why are they so rare? The infrequency is probably rooted in my strict definition of compellence, which emphasizes overt coercive behavior, and neglects the negotiation stage which often precedes compellent threats. More ambiguous styles of coercive diplomacy would probably demonstrate a higher frequency of incentives offered than in my data set.

With fewer than ten per cent of the cases having the presence of an incentive being offered or approved by the initiator, any conclusions on incentives based on this case set should be approached cautiously. Still, any variable that results in compliance over 80 per cent of the time must be seen as an important finding.
If we have rejected previous cost/benefit calculation hypotheses, we cannot approve another cost/benefit hypothesis, especially when the hypothesis depends on expected utility. There is, however, a variant of the carrot hypothesis that puts little weight on the idea of utility. It is possible that the value in an incentive is not in its utility, but in its symbolism. By allowing a targeted state to accept a carrot, which may or may not offset the costs involved in complying with the demands made, the state is allowed to “save face”. A state can back down with “honour”, saying that it got something out of the interaction.

Is there an alternative to this image saving hypothesis which, once again, leads us down the slippery slope of psychological gamesmanship? Only if it is likely that “carrot” interacts with “severity” and “aim” to give a more rounded view of the cost/benefit calculation. Bivariate estimates of the expected utility calculations may be inadequate to capture the essence of something as complex as the comparative weighting of multiple variables in a decision-making context. This point is well taken, and is a nice segue to my discussion of multivariate hypotheses of compellence outcomes.

**Multivariate Analysis**

Multivariate analysis is considerably more complicated than bivariate analysis for a number of reasons. Any correlation score or regression analysis for multiple variables interacting with each other is only that: a numerical score. Whereas the hypothetical “causal chain” is easy to conceive when only one X and one Y are at issue, any statistical analysis of X₁, X₂, X₃ and Y is unable to determine how any detected relationships interact to produce a given outcome. It can inform, but it cannot tell us precisely what is going on.
All political science analysis, even quantitative analysis, is a theory driven enterprise. Though it is possible to throw all of my variables into a logistic regression analysis and get some interesting scores, the numbers and scores would be meaningless without a theoretical hook to hang the numbers on. A theory is more than “all these things fit together somehow in some sort of way at this confidence level”. Social science begins with the hypothesis: not the evidence.

What hypotheses are to be tested through multivariate analysis? Many have cropped up while discussing the bivariate analyses, and they will be dealt with as they came up. I will rely most heavily on partial correlations. I will occasionally use logistic regression, but only when the number of independent variables implicated in the hypothesis to be tested is larger than can be properly dealt with by other methods.

**Power Plus**

The preliminary analysis of the place of power in the compellence equation determined that the capability of the initiating state was a significant factor in “predicting” the outcome of a compellent threat, regardless of the power of the target state. It was hypothesized that this could be explained by a relationship between the aim of a threat and the relative power of the states. A major power, not willing to provoke another major power, may make smaller demands of it than it would a smaller state. Therefore, the missing relative power dynamic is simply an illusion of this interaction.

Having already ruled out the aim a compellent threat as a significant factor in the anatomy of a compellent threat, we should expect no improvement in the correlation
between the power of the initiator and the outcome, after controlling for the power of the
target and the aim of the threat.

Table 2:22 Partial Correlation of Outcome and Power of the Initiator, Controlling for Power
of the Target and the Aim of the Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OUT</th>
<th>PIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUT</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.3240**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( 0)</td>
<td>( 120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>= .</td>
<td>P = .000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIN</td>
<td>.3240**</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>( 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>= .000</td>
<td>P = .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 1-tailed Significance)
" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed

The correlation after controlling for the two variables implicated in the hypothesis
is .3240, which is quite high, especially considering the scores for other relationships.
.3240 is, however, lower than the correlation from the power of initiator variable alone
(.326). This hypothesized relationship is weaker, but still significant . It is likely that the
score is only significant because the excellent PIN score is slightly dragged down by the
other variables being considered.

A logistic regression analysis confirms that all of the heavy lifting is being done by
the PIN variable. It has a beta of .5753 (significance level of .0005) while the others have
scores of:

AIM: Beta: -.0238, sig.: .8527
PTA: Beta: -.2156, sig.: .2137

If we measure the "seriousness" of threat by using severity, not aim, as our
yardstick, we get similar results.
Table 2:23 Partial Correlation of Outcome and Power of the Initiator, Controlling for Power of the Target and the Severity of the Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUT</th>
<th>PIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUT</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIN</td>
<td>.3277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 1-tailed Significance)
". " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed

Here, the correlation does improve, but very slightly, and an examination of the regression scores demonstrates that, once again the power of the initiator is doing most of the work.\(^{11}\)

Power of the initiator stands alone. No hypothesis related to this variable, which can be tested from the data I have collected, is as strong or as simple as the basic bivariate relationship between the power of the threatening state and the outcome of the compellent encounter.

**Purpose**

Most multivariate explanations of the outcomes of compellence encounters rely on the relative costs of compliance and noncompliance. This means that most of the multivariate analysis of compellence will focus on the measures of aim and severity, and those other variables implicated in the hypotheses being tested.

As I have reported, I discovered no bivariate relationship between outcome and either aim or severity. This conclusion called into question the expected utility explanation

---

\(^{11}\) Logistic regression scores from the three variables are: PIN: Beta .5773, sig: .0004, PTA: Beta -.2123, sig: .3153, SEV: Beta: -.0610, sig: .6756. The prediction power of the regression formula goes down from 68 to 67 per cent correct.
of compliance with demands under compellent threats. Then I hypothesized that it is in fact the interaction of these variables that determines outcome. As both variables are essential in the calculation of costs, this expectation is natural. The hypothesized interactions would be:

a) As the price of compliance (aim) decreases, and the costs of noncompliance (severity) increase, the likelihood of compliance (outcome) increases.

b) There is a point of equilibrium where a severe threat loses credibility, especially when the demands made are of low cost. For example, threats of war over a very minor issue may not be taken seriously, making compliance unlikely. The target does not see the threat "credible".

These two hypotheses are mutually exclusive. The first relies heavily on a strict interpretation of expected utility theory. The only calculation is about costs to be incurred, so an imbalance between the high severity of the threatened punishment and the low cost of the aim would make compliance more likely. The second hypothesis is more subtle, implying that the target places the threatened punishment in the context of the demand being made, with the target questioning whether there is a reasonable connection between the severity of the threat and the demands being made.

Partial correlation will be a sufficient analytical tool for the testing of the first hypothesis. If we control for the aim of the threat, the severity of the threat should be significantly correlated with the outcome of the encounter. I control for aim instead of severity because the aim of the threat (the demands of the initiator) comes before the decision on the severity of the threat to be made. A state does not begin with a threatened

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12 It goes without saying that, in this paradigm, a low severity threat and a high cost demand would not be complied with.

13 If it helps, think of this from a child’s view, upon being told that he or she will be grounded for a month for not eating broccoli.
punishment and then find an issue to apply the threat to. So, I control for the issue over which the initiator has the most control.

Table 2.24 Partial Correlation of Outcome and Severity, Controlling for the Aim of the threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OUT</th>
<th>SEV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUT</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEV</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(121)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(P = .492) (Coefficient / (D.F.) / 1-tailed Significance)

"." is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed

This table clearly shows that there is no relationship between the outcome of the compellence encounter and severity, controlling for the aim. Again, an expected utility hypothesis fails the testing of real world data. In light of the poor bivariate scores for AIM and SEV, this is not surprising.

What of the hypothesis regarding unbalanced threats? Is there a point where a target refuses to submit to a threat based on the punishment being too harsh for the perceived slight? The next table deals with this hypothesis and has some interesting results. A threat of limited invasion has a contingency coefficient of .518, which is the highest score, but even this fails to reach even a .05 standard of significance.

A contingency coefficient states the point at which a variable, when compared to another variable, reaches its strongest correlation. In this example, the interaction between severity and aim is only significant at the mid-point on the severity scale (limited invasion). The crosstabulation table demonstrates why this relationship holds. In this category of severity (and ONLY this category), the frequency of compliance rises as the issue at stake
rises until the final (and most intrusive) aim. If the contingency coefficient for limited invasion was high enough to be significant, this would mean that when the threatened punishment is a limited invasion, the threat is too severe to be taken seriously when dealing with mere changes in the target’s government’s policy, but not severe enough to effect a cession of territory. The punishment is “just right” for effecting changes in the target’s government or security policy.

However, this does not hold for the other threatened punishments. There is no clear pattern established for any of the other scores. What this means on a theoretical level is not clear. Leaving aside the significance score not reaching the high standard of .05, let alone .01, the fact that only one of the variable values comes even close calls into question the general proposition that proportionality of the threatened punishment has an impact on the outcome of the encounter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>non-compliance</th>
<th>compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>blockade</td>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>punitive strike</td>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limited invasion</td>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intervention to</td>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effect change</td>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war</td>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2:25 Frequencies of Outcomes, Classified by Severity and Aim of Threats**
### Symmetric Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Nominal by Nominal</th>
<th>Contingency Coefficient</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Approx. Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>blockade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>punitive strike</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.318</td>
<td>.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limited invasion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intervention to effect change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>.544</td>
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<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. No statistics are computed because Outcome is a constant.

**Table 2:26 Contingency Coefficients, Severity of the Threat by the Aim of the Threat**
**Power with a push**

Another multivariate hypothesis related to the issue of threat severity is that certain threats, no matter how punitive they seem on the surface, are not credible because of the source of the threat. Some states, because of their small capability, are perceived to lack the resources necessary to carry out the threatened punishment. The formal hypothesis would be that compliance with demands made under a compellent threat are more likely when the initiating state is perceived to be capable of carrying out the threat of force.

Like the previous hypothesis, this can be tested through both partial correlation and contingency coefficients. By controlling for the power of the initiating state, we would expect a high partial correlation between severity and outcome if the hypothesis is correct. However, even if the correlation is high, a contingency test is needed to see how this relationship works. And, as was seen in the previous contingency table, a low partial correlation can mask a significant relationship along one of the variable scores.

**Table 2:27 Partial Correlation of Outcome and the Severity of the Threat, Controlling for the Power of the Initiator**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OUT</th>
<th>SEV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUT</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>-.0415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEV</td>
<td>-.0415</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 1-tailed Significance)
"." is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed

This table shows a very small (and very insignificant) correlation between the three.
Outcome * Power of Initiator * Severity Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>non-compliance</th>
<th>Power of Initiator</th>
<th>small</th>
<th>minor</th>
<th>middle</th>
<th>major</th>
<th>super</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>blockade</td>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>punitive strike</td>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limited invasion</td>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>compliance</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intervention to effect change</td>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>war</td>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2:28 Frequencies of Outcomes, Classified by Severity of the Threat and the Power of the Initiator
Table 2:29 Contingency Coefficients, Severity of the Threat by the Power of the Initiator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Nominal by Nominal</th>
<th>Contingency Coefficient</th>
<th>N of Valid Cases</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Approx. Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>blockade</td>
<td>Nominal by Nominal</td>
<td>Contingency Coefficient</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limited invasion</td>
<td>Nominal by Nominal</td>
<td>Contingency Coefficient</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intervention to effect change</td>
<td>Nominal by Nominal</td>
<td>Contingency Coefficient</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war</td>
<td>Nominal by Nominal</td>
<td>Contingency Coefficient</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>.402</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. No statistics are computed because Outcome is a constant.

This contingency table, and accompanying crosstabulation table, shows that the threat of war may fit the hypothesis, but the other threat levels may not. Note that the significance level of the threat of war does not reach the .01 level of significance, but it does meet the .05 level. The crosstabulation table shows that threats of war seem to be more effective at inducing compliance when the initiator is a major or super power. The lower levels of initiator capability have a much smaller chance of having a threat of war lead to compliance with demands.

This contingency table partially supports the hypothesis that target states “consider the source” of a threat before deciding whether or not to comply. However, they seem to
do so only under certain circumstances. As war is, generally, expensive to carry out, and requires much of the states involved, it is logical that the effects of this “credible source” phenomenon would be most noticeable at this level.

**The Kitchen Sink**

It can be argued that I have not, in fact adequately tested all of the variables I have presented. Don’t these variables all interact with each other, and isn’t it this interaction which makes compellence work? A partial correlation, controlling for one or two variables while testing for another, can only take you so far.

The most powerful tool available to quantitative analysts is the multiple regression equation. Because of the mathematical demands of regression equations, there are limits on the conditions under which they should be used.\(^\text{14}\) True regression equations require an interval dependent variable. With a dichotomous dependent variable like the one that I have, there are modified forms of regression equations that can be used. The most commonly used types are probit analysis and logistic regression. Probit analysis is generally the preferred format for calculations related to designed experiments, and where the variables under observation are independent from each other. Logistic regression is more suited to observed phenomena beyond the scholar’s control, and where the independence of the variables under analysis is not clear. The two types of regression are similar in their mechanics, however they are not identical.

\(^{14}\) See Bryman and Cramer, *Quantitative Analysis for Social Scientists.*
I have chosen to use logistic regression, because the cases under examination are pure observation. It is also unclear if the variables under examination are truly independent from each other - politically or mathematically.

I entered all the primary variables under examination into the regression analysis.

The outcome follows:

Table 2:30 Logistic Regression of Observed Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>non-compliance</th>
<th>compliance</th>
<th>Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The formula predicts sixty-eight per cent of the cases (68.00 %), a prediction rate identical to a formula using the power of the initiator alone. The significant variable noted by the regression (p<.05) are the ones noted by other forms of statistical analysis (alignment and the power of the initiator). The relationships highlighted by the equation (R $\ll$.000) are these three.
Chapter Three
Interpretations, Implications, and Final Thoughts

The tests run in the previous chapter have many implications for our understanding of compellence in the twentieth century. Most of the theories tested proved to be either inadequate or incomplete in explaining why the target state resisted or complied with demands made under duress. This wide failure of contemporary international relations theory forces us to reassess the place that the prevailing paradigms have in our comprehension of state decisions in crisis situations.

Realist Thought and Historical Context

The scorecard for realism is mixed. As would be expected from realist thought, the power of the states involved is an important concern to students of compellence. The power of the initiating state is strongly correlated with the response of the targeted state to demands made under threat. So, if realism were as simple as “The strong get their way”, realism would be vindicated by the results of this analysis. The realist expectation that allies are an asset in an international crisis is also supported by the data examined in the previous chapter. So, realists should not be completely disappointed by the analysis.

However, they should not be celebrating either. The realist school that emphasizes rational choice in its predictions of state behavior has been utterly routed. Relative power (or weakness) appears of little concern to the targeted state, and the tightness of a great power alliance is of less interest than the mere illusion of support. So, if rational thought is seen as the careful weighing of relative costs, benefits and risks, rationalism has failed to account for the vast majority of target decisions in twentieth century compellence encounters.
A common charge against realist thought is that it is antiquated or archaic, even obsolete; which implies that it once had some explanatory value. These critics argue that realism explains a world that has passed, a world before nuclear weapons, or decolonization, or the United Nations. As my data set only covers the years between 1919 and 1990, I cannot test whether realism is an artifact of nineteenth century Congress politics. However, I can test to see if relative power has ever made a difference in the twentieth century, or if state decision makers were ever "rational".

A partial correlation between the power of the target and the outcome of the threat, controlling for the power of the initiator, for those cases from the interwar era, has a correlation coefficient of -.1831 (a weak inverse relationship), and is an insignificant relationship (P = .112). This period (1919-1944) was the one in which a compellent threat was most likely to be complied with. So a poor score here would indicate a poor score elsewhere in similar tests.

Though it could be argued that if relative power fails the early era test it would fail any other era, for the sake of thoroughness, I examined the scores for the second (1945-1964) and third (1965-1999) eras as well. The middle period had a correlation coefficient of -.0255 (P = .449) and the final era had a correlation coefficient of -.1238 (P = .201). So, it would seem that the realpolitik model does not adequately explain any of the periods under consideration.

As the data sets for each of these subsets is quite small, we must be very cautious in attributing too much weight to the results. A better test of the "historicist" hypothesis would be a quantitative analysis of a wider range of interstate crisis situations (compellence, deterrence, coercion, etc.). Still, the correlations between relative power and outcome remain low and insignificant, and this obtains throughout the twentieth century. So, as far as compellence

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1 All correlations coefficients to be reported will be considered significant at the p = .01 level.
encounters are concerned, "relative power" interpretations are neither archaic nor obsolete; they are simply wrong, at least if one accepts the validity of my study.

The psychology of minor powers

The realist model operates on the assumption that all states behave in a similar fashion if faced with similar circumstances. As states are all like actors, they have like ambitions. Kenneth Waltz writes that the primary goal of all states is survival. However, this "survival" can take many forms.

[N]o state always acts exclusively to ensure its survival. It allows for the fact that some states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival; they may, for example, prefer amalgamation with other states to their own survival in form.

It would be easy to caricature this as saying no more than "States seek survival except for when they don't", but Waltz's point is a little more subtle, and a little more confusing than that. Just as Hans Morgenthau wrote that the power does not have "a meaning that is fixed once and for all", having survival as an aim depends on how one defines survival. Is it survival of the state, which is the usual understanding of Waltz's term? Is it survival of the ethnic group, whose interests are best served by unification with a neighbouring state? Is it survival of the political leadership, which may require a suicidal war against overwhelming odds? This, of course, drains the explanatory value from the term "survival", but it is the only way to salvage Waltz from tautology.

What does this have to do with compellence? The key question that comes out of my analysis is how to account for the stubborn resistance that small powers offer to great powers,

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2 As states do not, in reality, face identical circumstances, I have weakened the universalism of the typical realist paradigm with similar. The absence of identical circumstances would make the more restrictive statement unfalsifiable.

3 Kenneth Waltz, A Theory of International Politics, p. 92.
and the fact that the relative power between states, in general, has no relation to the probability of compliance. This problem is rooted in a theory which presumes that, in the interests of "survival", a small state is willing to appease a larger state. The threatened punishment is a threat to existence and survival for smaller states, so to avoid costs, we expected that small states would accept the costs.

What if this is not the proper psychology of small states? Instead of relative weakness leading to compliance, what if relative weakness made compliance unlikely? Robert Rothstein has argued that

[Testimony]

[The Small Power has only peripheral control over its own fate. It has fewer realistic policy options than a Great Power and its spectrum of choices is more limited. It can do less, by itself, to counter a threat which may be more extensive than a similar threat to a Great Power. If a Small Power is threatened by a Great Power, that threat is a total threat to its independent existence (whereas a Great Power threat to another Great Power may concern only marginal values.)]

While rational realism recognizes that the possible cost of resistance for a small power may be high, it does not recognize that the costs of compliance are also higher. If power and resources can be accrued, certainly the loss of these scarce resources may be a sensitive issue to those that have few of these resources to begin with.

Prospect theory offers an alternative to the traditional rational choice model by framing decision making calculations in the realm of losses. For a small state, both a great power compellent threat and a war with a great power put it firmly in the realm of loss. A war with a great power is an almost certain loss, but it is not a sure thing. The threatening state must carry

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out its threatened punishment. So, a small state may gamble that the great power will not bother with carrying out its threat.

The problem with prospect theory analysis is the emphasis that it puts on the decision makers' reference points. What is the target state's ground zero? From where does it measure its losses? Assuming that the reference point is the status quo, as rational choice does, the previous paragraph makes sense. However, prospect theorists are adamant on the need for a clear reference point in decision making. Confirmation of this hypothesis will require greater examination of the cases.

Liberal Institutionalism and Compellence Encounters

One of the most interesting findings in my study is that compliance with compellent threats is less common as the century progresses. I advanced the hypothesis that this could reflect a change in international norms related to the legitimacy of threats of force in interstate relations. This normative change could be a result of the increasing institutionalization of international security affairs as the century goes on.

In the field of multilateral conventions, since 1918 history has been filled with general treaties for the renunciation of war and force, culminating in the United Nations Charter of 1945, with its overall ban on the use of or the threat of force, with some notable exceptions, and its attempt to restrict the use of force to the organ responsible for peace and security in the international system as a whole, the Security Council.\(^6\)

The League of Nations, one of the first universal interstate organizations with a responsibility for security, "fostered the growth of an internationalist ethic which, by making wars

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\(^6\) For an introduction to prospect theory, please see D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk” in *Econometrica* 47:2, pp. 263-91.

and aggressions seem more barbaric, may have indirectly facilitated the survival of those states which were most defenseless.⁸

It is difficult to assess the role of institutional expressions of the illegitimacy of force in this hypothesized revulsion to coercion. The failure of the United Nations Security Council to act as an international security force for most of the post-war period makes any test of the distinction between “legal” and “illegal” threats pointless. It is interesting to note that the two cases of Security Council endorsement of compellent threats in my study (Korea 1950 and Iraq 1990) both ended in the target state ignoring the demands made of it. Also, both threats demanded that the target state end its aggression against another state. However, as the United Nations has evolved in the post-Cold War world into a legitimizing agent for state action, we may begin to see a distinction between institutional threats and autonomous state threats.

If the involvement of an international organization in the crisis at issue in a compellence encounter can be identified with an institutional statement on the points of disagreement, then it might be possible to determine what role, if any, international organization has in the persuasion of the targeted state. The wide range of international approaches to crisis, however, necessitates a scale measure of “legitimacy”, as opposed to a dichotomous “yes/no” measure. Having not yet developed such a scale, I can only speculate on the relationship between the growing institutionalization of international security and the decline in rates of compliance across the twentieth century.

**Evolving Evaluations**

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Another explanation for the changing patterns of compliance across the century is that the nature of the demands being made of states changed across the century. Though the evaluation of these demands may not, as we discovered, have any relation to the objective cost of the demand, it is possible that within certain time periods contemporary evaluations of the costs of a demand have more relevance. In other words, territory only became "fixed" and "beyond the pale" in recent years.

This possibility is reflected in many discussions of the nineteenth century as a period when "territorial compensations at the expense of the small states of Europe" were the rule, rather than the exception. The legal equality of states - the equality conferred by sovereignty - is a relatively new concept. The Congress of Vienna conferred unique rights and responsibilities on the Great Powers, and preservation of the minor powers was not one of these responsibilities, except for when their protection preserved the delicate balance of power between the major players. However, the development of international institutions tended to obscure the simple distinctions which had previously served to separate the Great from the Small Power. In theory, [the League of Nations] sought to provide for their security and to justify their presence and their influence.11

[T]he frightened small power tends to place exaggerated reliance on demands for formal recognition of its status...[F]ormal recognition of equality serves to bolster hopes which have been endangered by substantive weakness.12

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10 The negotiations of the Congress of Vienna and the "benevolent autocracy" of the Great Powers over Europe in the Congress System is a fascinating story, and provides many archetypes of the duplicitous, amoral, "raison d'etat" statesmen which gave diplomacy a seedy reputation. I recommend Henry Kissinger's A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 (Houghton Mifflin: Boston ) to any interested in this period and its implications for system building.
11 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 17
12 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 27
The entrenchment of sovereignty in legal language was, then, a break from the nineteenth century international regime as it encouraged small states to maintain their independence from influence and domination by major powers. As my data set is drawn exclusively from the legal sovereignty period, the steadfastness of the minor power should not be surprising. As small states are more often the target of compellent threats, this reliance on legal sovereignty is magnified in the data set.\textsuperscript{13}

Was there, in fact, a greater quiescence in the minor powers during the nineteenth century? This can only be confirmed by examination of the pre-League period. For now, this interpretation of small power resistance in the 1919-1990 period is purely speculative.

Why so different?

The biggest question raised by this study is why its results are so different from similar studies conducted by other students of decision-making under threat. I will go through each of the major studies that conflict with my results and highlight the differences between them and the assumptions within them to clarify why the above results are at variance with prevailing wisdom.

\textit{The War Trap}

One of the landmarks in quantitative analysis of international crisis situations was Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's \textit{The War Trap} (Yale; New Haven 1981). His purpose was to "present a general theory of war and foreign conflict initiation and escalation".\textsuperscript{14} His general conclusion is that states initiate crises because they conclude that their expected utility is greater than that of the

\textsuperscript{13} The greater frequency of small power targets may be interpreted by some as reflecting that the initiating state is more likely to "pick on" a weaker state. It is just as likely, however, that this is merely an artifact of the larger number of small states in any international system.
target states in any given situation. What’s more, the initiator almost always “wins” these encounters because of its greater expected utility.

How does Bueno de Mesquita calculate the expected utility of a state? He explains expected utility as a function of a state’s military capability, alliance partners and the state’s distance from the geographic area of crisis. However, despite spending thirty-five pages explaining how one measures expected utility, Bueno de Mesquita does not walk us through a single “sample calculation”. “Capability” is the single most problematic factor in the expected utility calculation. It is given great explanatory weight, but the reader is never clear on what it is. This lack of transparency makes it difficult for the reader to understand just how expected utility relates to readily observable phenomena and nearly impossible for the scholar to critique the model or replicate the results.

Assuming that Bueno de Mesquita’s measures of expected utility are accurate, there are still major problems with his conclusion that expected utility is the determining factor in interstate encounters. He breaks interstate conflicts into three categories:

1) *Threats*: “an explicit verbal statement by a high official on behalf of a member state’s government declaring an intent to use military force against another member state for other than strictly defensive purposes; or, overt mobilization of armed forces by a member state, during disputes or high tension, clearly directed against another member state for other than strictly defensive purposes.”

2) *Interventions*: “hostilities between armed forces involving at least one member of the interstate system on each side, or hostilities between the armed forces of a member state directed against the territory and people of another member state.”

3) *Wars*: a militarized interstate dispute that resulted in at least 1000 fatalities.¹⁵

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These definitions are, for the most part, adequate. One could quibble over the inclusion of ambiguous troop movements in the definition of threat or the requirement of a casualty threshold in the definition of a war, but I will leave these aside. It is not the definitions themselves that are inadequate, but how the author treats them. In his analysis of interstate crises, Bueno de Mesquita treats these categories as mutually exclusive within a given case. The effect is to code each crisis situation according to the highest level of conflict reached. So, instead of having World War II broken down into its component parts (the threats by Germany to Poland, by the United Kingdom and France to Germany, and the war between Germany and the Allies), it is coded simply as a war between Germany and Poland (!) with Poland as the winner, despite its lower expected utility.\textsuperscript{16} The effect is to magnify the number of wars, and minimize the number of threats or interventions. So, the resistance of the smaller state, which results in war, is missing completely from the data set. As smaller states tend to have lower expected utilities than larger states, the effectiveness of expected utility theory is exaggerated by missing these cases.\textsuperscript{17} This is a major oversight. If a state with high expected utility defeats in a war an opponent with a low expected utility, Bueno de Mesquita's theory is validated. However, by omitting the compellent threat that may have preceded this war - a threat which was defied by the low "expected utility" target - Bueno de Mesquita misses a case which calls his theory into question.

\textsuperscript{16} Bueno de Mesquita, \textit{The War Trap}, p. 209. A related curiosity in the War data set is the complete omission of the Pacific War. The Japanese/American conflict, which was both politically and militarily divorced from the European theatre in very important way does not appear at all. This despite the fact the Japanese initiation of a war it knew it would probably lose is a major puzzle for expected utility theory.

\textsuperscript{17} The data set used by Bueno de Mesquita was adapted from that used by Charles Gochman in his doctoral thesis (U. of Michigan, 1975), and Bueno de Mesquita follows Gochman in some of his coding decisions. However, Bueno de Mesquita makes it clear that he altered many of Gochman's codes to suit his own interpretation of the cases (\textit{The War Trap}, p. 101). This data set became the backbone of the commonly used Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, created by Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz. They also code each case according to the highest level of conflict reached, but the encounter codes have gone beyond the simple tripartite division into threats, interventions and wars.
The coding is also curious when it comes down to certain cases. The coding decisions made regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis are typical of many of the more curious coding decisions. Bueno de Mesquita breaks the Cuban Missile Crisis into two threat encounters. The first is a threat initiated by the Soviet Union targeted at the United States. Given the inclusion of military deployments in his definition of "threat", this can only refer to the deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba. Subsequent research has raised the probability that this deployment was largely defensive, and therefore not a threat by Bueno de Mesquita's definition. In 1981, Bueno de Mesquita's reading of this part of the case can be considered reasonable, as the emphasis in the literature at this time was on the balancing nature of the deployment. The second phase of the case, however, is coded with the United States as the initiator and Cuba as the target. This is clearly wrong. Though the air strikes threatened would have hit Cuban soil, Cuba was not the target of the threat. The Soviet Union was. Cuba had no control over the missile deployment, and, were it Fidel Castro's decision to take, the outcome of the encounter could have been very different.¹⁸

This case reveals the central failure of the definition of threat used in this study. There is no sense that the threat is aimed at achieving something. Interstate conflict is almost always policy oriented. War is a continuation of politics, as are compellence and intervention. By divorcing interstate encounters from their political context, Bueno de Mesquita makes strange coding decisions, like considering a war as a single encounter and by considering Cuba as a central decision maker in the missile crisis.

Does Bueno de Mesquita ignore the political context - the aims - of the military postures taken by the states in crisis? His measure of expected utility in any given crisis is, as I have said,

¹⁸ For a revealing discussion of the Cuban side of the Missile Crisis please see James Blight and David Welch,
unclear in many instances. He never discusses, however, how he measures the issues at stake in a crisis. Each conflict is seen as a battle of wills between strong-weak, allied-non-aligned, or risk averse-risk prone states. The issue at stake seems to be immaterial to the state’s expected utility calculations.

There is a high-low cost estimation made of the participants’ views of the crisis, but this estimation is based on how the participants define the costs. This approach to cost measurement is problematic. Does a decision maker consider concession to be a high cost strategy, and resist because of it, or does a decision maker decide to resist and therefore publicly defines concession to be a high cost strategy? With no “objective” measure of the types of costs involved, we as social scientists are no closer to understanding why states often refuse to bow to superior force over minor issues.

*Karsten, Artis and Allen*

Karsten, Artis and Allen’s book *Military Threats* is another statistical analysis of military threats through history. As I noted in Chapter One, Karsten et al. place deterrent and compellent threats under the same microscope and study them as parts of the same phenomenon. Their case set has seventy-seven cases drawn from 431 BC to 1976 AD, with these cases divided into four further historical categories.19 The authors test a wide range of theories and hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of military threats, making their study one of the most similar to my own, though, admittedly, the range of theories they test is wider than mine.

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19 These categories are 1) Ancient to 1790 [13 cases], 2) 1791 to 1914 [38 cases], 3) 1915 to 1945 [7 cases] and 4) 1945-present [33 cases].
In many instances, the conclusions that Karsten, Artis and Allen draw from their study are not so different from my own. They find that the role of allies is crucial in determining the outcome of threat encounters.\(^\text{20}\) They find that the more recent in history a threat is made, the more likely it is to fail, though they credit this to the role of morality or ideology in threat discourse.\(^\text{21}\) They also find that the disparity in power between the initiator and target is not a reliable predictor of the outcome of the dispute.\(^\text{22}\)

They go further than that, however. The authors argue that there is no relationship between the power of the states involved and the outcome of the dispute, contrary to my finding that powerful states tend to be more successful in compelling opponents than weak states. This is an important difference, and is one of the key conclusions drawn by Karsten et al. What can account for this different result? Despite their fortuitous agreement with me on a number of issues, a close examination of their study raises some methodological and conceptual problems which undermine the conclusions that they come to.

Even if I concede that it is legitimate to study both deterrence and compellence as types of a single phenomenon of military threats, it is troubling that a group of scholars that finds the distinction between compellence and deterrence “highly subjective”\(^\text{23}\) would have no problem with reliably coding such variables as “regime stability” or “degree to which the threat was understood”.\(^\text{24}\) I am not saying that these cannot be reliably coded; certainly they can, though the authors give us no clues as to the process by which scores for these variables were derived. I am

\(^{20}\) Karsten, Artis and Allen, Military Threats, p. 68.
\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 81. Their premise is that moral or ideological threats hold out less hope for compromise and paint both parties to the dispute into corners. This is similar reasoning to Morgenthau’s critique of morality based foreign policy as being prone to a “crusading” character which undermines any hope for limited goals. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (3rd ed.) (Knopf: New York 1960) pp. 11, 561-2.
\(^{22}\) Karsten, Artis and Allen, Military Threats, p. 73.
\(^{23}\) Ibid. p. 17.
saying that the authors have a peculiar sense as to what is or is not subjective, and the limits of objectivity in the social sciences.

The authors selected their cases for study in an unusual manner as well. Though 77 cases is roughly two thirds the size of my case set, it would be a reasonably sized data set if the cases were in fact the universe of compellent threats. This is not the case. Karsten, Artis and Allen choose cases based on how much information is available about them. So, the data set is not representative of military threats in general, but of the types of cases that interest diplomatic historians. For example, of the 33 cases drawn from the “post-nuclear period” (1945-present), seventy per cent involve the United States as the initiating state. Though the American share of military threats in this period is certainly high, it in no way approaches seventy per cent. By biasing the study towards those cases which are thoroughly documented, the study overrates the inadequacy of power. The authors do not compare the American rate of “success” against a universe of cases where smaller powers get their demands rejected.

This American bias in the later period is likely also responsible for the prominent role attributed to ideology in the later period. With seventy per cent of the cases involving the Cold War United States, ideology takes a larger part in the story of compellence than it otherwise might, clouding the issue as to whether or not ideology and morality are the reason why compellent threats in the post-nuclear period tend to fail. The authors do not consider that the reason for the increased chance for non-compliance in the post-nuclear period could be anything but ideology.

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24 Ibid., p. 39-42.
The inclusion of cases from the pre-state period is also troublesome, especially when the case set is weighted heavily towards the present. With only 13 cases from the Peloponnesian War and the French Revolution, it is unclear whether any important conclusions can be drawn about where this period fits in a general historical understanding of military threats.

So, even if some of Karsten, Artis and Allen's conclusions are similar to my own, their study is flawed on so many levels that its validity is suspect. Where I have chosen a clearly delimited historical period (post WWI through the Cold War, Karsten at al. chose all Western history; where I have studied all recognizable cases of compellent threats, Karsten at al. chose 77 cases on which they could find ample information.

**Implications: practical and theoretical**

What are the implications of my findings? It is clear that the results of my study are, in some major ways, at odds with conventional wisdom regarding when a compellent strategy should work. Is there any link between my findings and the "real world" political decisions that must be made?

Before we get into the practical implications of my findings, it is important to underline why compellence is such a common strategy in international relations. Only then can we see where my findings fit in the general picture of the place of threat based strategies in a sound security policy.

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25 So long as documentation is the major criteria for inclusion, the imbalance between early and late eras is unavoidable.

26 Or put another way, I cover 71 years and have 125 cases, they study 2300 years and have 77 cases.
As George and Simons point out, the attraction of coercive diplomacy, and compellence, is its cost. Compellent threats hold out the possibility of getting something for almost nothing. Talk is cheap; threats have the potential to cost you near nothing in blood and treasure. Of course, this only obtains if the compellent threat works. A threat that does not work places the initiator in the uncomfortable position of having the "last clear chance" to avoid conflict. Having the final chance to avoid war puts enormous pressure on the initiator to not follow through on its threats, a policy which also costs nothing in blood and treasure, but which can undermine a state's prestige and reputation for resolve, each of which can be traded on as alternate sources of power. So, it is important that a state have a good idea when a threat based strategy like compellence is likely to work.

Keep in mind that compellent threats are difficult to pull off. Schelling's caveat that the best compellence strategy is to begin the bombing as soon as possible is a reminder of the uphill climb that successful compellence can be. Also keep in mind that compellent threats still are, in many cases, the formal statements of the casus belli in war-prone crises, and serve as the formal warning of impending destruction.

One of my key findings is that compellence strategies are not profitable for small states. Though the final half of this century has seen many conflicts and crises in the developing world, the record of small states in compellence encounters is not a good one. The almost complete inability of small states to project power beyond their immediate border areas makes threats of

28 For a further discussion on the consequences of this status, see Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. . For an empirical test of the place of this status in conflict situations, see Walter Petersen, "Deterrence and Compellence", p. 279-81.
force almost ridiculous to conceive. It is advisable that a small state either prevail upon a larger ally or associate to act on its behalf (though this may raise additional credibility issues), or seek other means to redress its grievances. Compellent strategies that fall short of the threat of immediate force, such as threats to terminate economic contacts or to aid opposition groups in authoritarian targets, may be easier to achieve than those that require power projection, though much scholarship still has to be done regarding policy options for states with resource constraints.

Secondly, powerful states must remember that it is as difficult to bully a small target as a big one. Rigid calculation of the amount of armed opposition that the initiator would face, or blind obedience to the "resistance is futile" mantra may convince powerful states to rely on compellent threats in those cases where they have little or no desire to get involved militarily, should the threat fail. Many writers on the recent Kosovo War, scholarly and otherwise, think that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, was not completely prepared for the possibility that Serb obstinacy and refusal to submit would prevent a quick and relatively bloodless campaign. It took the large scale massacres and expulsions in Kosovo by Serb paramilitary groups for NATO to recalculate the ends and means of the action. Conversely, there is no "effectiveness" justification that prevents the West from using compellent threats to keep larger states in line. If one accepts that coercive diplomacy can be constructive

29 Sadly, it is easier for small states to wage bloody and protracted wars than it is to use their power to compel their neighbours. The recent stalemate in the Horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Eritrea is an all too common archetype of African conflicts of the last 30 years.
30 See “Stumbling in to War” in The Economist 350:8112 (March 27, 1999), p. 17. “A bungled war” in The Economist 351:8118 (May 8, 1999), p. 11. In Edward Luttwak’s “Letting Wars Burn” in Foreign Affairs 78:4 (June/July 1999), the author argues that the clear reluctance to absorb casualties, even after the bombing had begun and the massacres of Kosovar civilians had stepped up, made this conflict the “first post-heroic war”.
31 There may be in these cases issue regarding the future relations between these large states that may make compellent threats an impolitic strategy. This takes nothing away from the question of whether or not the threat would be effective.
force in international relations, the potential to use compellent threats to keep big bullies, as well as small bullies, in line.

Those who choose to ignore my data, and continue to accept the conventional wisdom that the cost of a war with these states is too high for the threat to be credible should keep in mind how frequent compellent threats from one great power to another were in the pre-war period. One could argue that the destructive force of great power war was not a going concern until the compellence failures of 1914 (Austria-Serbia, Germany-Belgium, Britain-Germany), making the powers more willing to risk war by attempting compellence of equals. This possibility, however, cuts both ways, as the belief that war between the powers would be “short and sweet” would, in a rational choice model, make compliance with these threats less likely.32

This piece of advice should be taken with the sobering grain of salt that, in general, compellent threats are less effective than they once were. Threats of force are no longer reliable tools of foreign policy. I have advanced a couple of suggestions as to why this could be, and, within these hypotheses there may be an avenue for creative use of compellent threats in the contemporary international environment.

If the reason for the difficulty of inducing compliance with demands made under threat is the prevailing normative proscription of force as a legitimate tool of foreign policy, then the best way to ensure that a compellent threat is effective is to portray it as the voice of legitimacy. If I am correct in ascribing this normative belief to the institutionalization of foreign policy (the United Nations, NATO, SEATO, etc.) then the best way to legitimize a compellent threat is to issue it under the auspices of an international organization. The legitimization of the threat of force by an appeal to an international body has the potential to remove the “aggressor” from the
initiator, transferring the question of legitimacy from the making of the threat to the offensive actions of the target state.

This is not a magic bullet. Legitimate authority may be a fact in international politics, but in a specific issue area the target of a compellent threat may reject the legitimacy of an international action. Though a regional organization (NATO, the Arab League) may think itself competent to act in certain jurisdictions, the target of the threat may appeal to a higher law or a “higher” authority. Another complicating factor is the necessary multilateralism that accompanies any institutional initiative. Collective action problems such as veto restrictions (the UN) or “lowest common denominator thinking” (NATO) may limit the type of actions that can be considered by a coalition.

Taken in conjunction with my finding that target states tend to count on the support of larger states with whom they are aligned, the dilemma of collective action may throw caItrops in the path of any multinational compellence enterprise. The only true remedy to this problem is the diplomatic isolation of those states which are the likely targets of collective action. This is not easy, by any means. States enter diplomatic arrangements for reasons, and convincing great powers to sever these relationships for “the greater good” is not a straightforward task. Bear in mind that it is not enough for the sponsor power to publicly abstain from assisting the target. The target must no longer be able to convince itself that help, in some form, is coming. This can only be done by isolating the target before the crisis occurs.

In other words, the compelling powers must have some foresight as to which states are likely to be the targets of compellent threats so they may begin the isolation of these states. This is certainly a tall order. In a system that has acknowledged “rogue” or “maverick” states, a priori

32 By raising this alternative interpretation of compellent threats pre-1914 and post-1918, I am in no way
identification of the likely targets of these threats may be accomplished, though the realization of their isolation can be done only with difficulty.

Keeping in mind the finding that the severity of the threatened punishment has no relation to the likelihood of compliance with the demands made, it is clear that states should limit their threats to those which they are willing or able to carry out. Threatening the wrath of the heavens will not increase the chance the target meets the demands, even if the threat is credible, so by restricting threats to those which the initiator will be obviously willing to exercise, any credibility problems that may otherwise arise can be avoided.

The finding that the severity of the threat has no relation to the likelihood of compliance also implies that there is no general pattern of what target states may consider costs not worth bearing. States' calculations may be truly subjective expected utility calculations, though a subjective rationality, as an analytical tool, is too malleable to be a rigorous theoretical device. However, as a political concern, the target's subjective perceptions of what its priorities are (or should be) may be a better avenue for inducing compliance than simply threatening to inflict high levels of casualties or collateral damage. This may, in fact, be what is already happening in the international arena. However, the rhetoric of compellent threats usually focuses on the scale of the impending attack as opposed to the costs to be inflicted on the target's values.

The companion finding to this one is that sovereignty is a poor guide to what states consider to be important. Certainly many states invoke their "sovereign rights" whenever they feel themselves to be under pressure from other states. Historically, however, there is no reason to ascribe state resistance to demands made under compellent threats to their relative concern for their sovereignty. Can sovereignty ever be understood as a reliable guide to state behaviour?

endorsing the widespread belief that the great powers entered into the war with few compunctions.
One can see *every* compellent threat as a potential violation of the target's sovereignty, and there remains the possibility (which cannot be tested outside of a series of case studies) that the century's increase in non-compliance is rooted in a growing inflexibility in state perceptions of their prerogatives under legal sovereignty. In other words, there may be no such thing as a small violation of state sovereignty, at least in the perception of many target states in compellence encounters. If this is the case, state sovereignty remains an important concept, but it is unitary, not divisible into gradations of sovereignty. Therefore, rejection of the demands, no matter how unintrusive they may seem, is in itself an assertion of sovereignty; complete sovereignty.

There is also the possibility, once again, of subjective perceptions of which aims are off limits. The unitary rational state assumption has the effect of imposing the rational concerns of the state (sovereignty, state power, development) upon the decision maker. Government leaders may have their own priorities, divorced from the effect that these priorities may have on the future of the state which they lead. My findings on sovereignty could merely reflect the fact that government leaders do not necessarily, or as a rule, consider the national interest, rightly understood, to be the lens through which to view an ongoing crisis.

This need not be a cynical possibility; that government leaders have only their own self-interest in mind when they find themselves in a tight spot. The identification of the national interest is not an easy exercise, and the various cognitive restrictions on decision making can make this difficult task even tougher. One could see the subjectivity of state interest as decision makers simply making do in a confusing situation. Richard Ned Lebow and Irving Janis have found that decision-making processes have the potential to break down under the stress of crisis.
situations. If some cognitive decision making processes are pathologies, and not "normal" decision making, then it is likely that these pathologies will be accentuated in those instances where time constraints and the costs of failure make the stress of a situation worse.

In those states which have one man or one party rule, it may be impossible to avoid this problem, unless the autocrat is benevolent indeed. Even democracies are not immune from considering the survival of the regime as one the factors in determining how to respond to a crisis. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, a crisis situation which exhibited, for Irving Janis, the model decision making process, concern over the election of a Republican majority in the upcoming mid-term elections convinced many of President Kennedy’s aides that a forceful and vigorous response to the missile installation was the appropriate course of action. If we can speak meaningfully of a national interest, it is imperative that decision makers not let their perception of it be clouded by "selfish" concerns.

Theoretically Speaking

Of course, the greatest theoretical revision to be made is a reconsideration of the place of realist rational thought in the study of international relations. Despite study after study calling for reconsideration, re-evaluation or rejection of the realist paradigm, decision makers continue to assume that the targets of their influence strategies are guided by rational and objective

34 See, for example, Richard Ned Lebow’s brief, but excellent, account of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s breakdown under the pressure of the July Crisis in 1914. (Between Peace and War).
36 Of course, there are rare instances where the political survival of a leader or of a regime is, in fact, the national interest. A notable example from ancient Greece was the occasion when Alexander promised to spare the rebellious Athens so long as she surrendered to him those orators who had been most energetic in preserving Athenian liberty under the Macedonian yoke, including Demosthenes, who compared the demand to asking sheep to give their guard dogs to the wolves. Athens paid a tribute instead, and Demosthenes resigned from public life. “The Life of
perceptions of the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. Unless one wants to rely on the methodological morass of subjective rationality, wherein anything is rational if perceived from the often warped sense of reality of the subject, this generalization of how leaders make decisions seems to be quite limited in its power. This is especially true if the scholar chooses to look at the usual pieces of environmental data from which leaders supposedly drawn their conclusions.

In other words, there is an element of unreality to the real world. The place of costs and benefits, strengths and weaknesses, plus a myriad of other objective factors is apparently not in the calculations of decision makers, no matter their existence outside of the consciousness of the decision maker. Even if one can defend the use of theoretical concepts that do not describe the world they purport to explain, these concepts must at least be theoretically useful or powerful. Objective rational choice explanations of compellence encounters are clearly not powerful, and it is certainly not clear why they would be useful if they are powerless.

The failure of the rational power politics model to explain compellent threats is probably rooted in its unusual portrayal of the parties to a threat encounter. The realpolitik model assumes that the initiator is risk acceptant (willing to inflict and absorb costs to effect change) and that the target is risk averse (unwilling to risk accepting costs in return for marginal benefit). Or more precisely, it assumes that the effectiveness of a threat depends on the initiator's ability to present itself as risk acceptant and to play upon the risk aversion of target.37

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37Bruce Bueno de Mesquita observes that many theories of international relations are, in fact, based on assumptions of the relative risk aversion of the actors involved. For example, theories about the influence that the polarity of a system has on the war proneness of that system are rooted in the likely responses of the states in that system to the relative uncertainty of the attitudes of other states in the system. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War" in Journal of Conflict Resolution 22:2 (June 1978) pp. 244-246.
This rational approach to threat relationships may be appropriate when applied to individual or small organizational decisions. Rational choice theory, however, neglects that states have both more resiliency than your average individual and considerably more resources on which to draw. Hence, states (or their leaders) may overestimate the reliability or utility of these resources, or overestimate the resource potential of their opponents.

To narrow my critique of the rational choice paradigm, my results demonstrate that if rationality *is* a valuable concept and important analytical tool, it is fruitless to base analyses of rationality on those factors exclusively external to the state. Not only are states not unitary rational actors (no serious analyst has ever claimed that they are, in reality) but they do not behave like unitary rational actors in the international arena. Calculations of costs and benefits, if they are indeed important, cannot be analysed by examining only those factors which concern the power relationship between states or the menace which they present to each other.

The most significant finding in my research is that compellent threats are becoming less effective as a policy tool as the century progresses. This is certainly in line with the thought of a classical realist like Hans Morgenthau, who emphasized both the changes in the nature of power and the perennial struggle for power, though he is better known for the latter. As the nature of power changes, the tools used to control it must also change.

[The] content [of power] and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man....While the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the national state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history.38

It is indeed possible that, sometime late in this century, world politics crossed the threshold which made the manipulation of military prowess as a tool of influence impractical. The role left for theorists is to identify what the nature of this threshold was.

The implications of this finding are clear. The term “power” is now and always has been a malleable one.

International relations, and realist theory in particular, has done a poor job in explaining or predicting large scale change in the international system. Contemporary international relations theory, despite its emphasis on system structure in the recent past and in the “construction” of ideas in the current literature, has ignored or side-stepped the important issue of how scholars and policy makers can recognize shifting power structures around them. We know that systems (political, cultural, and moral) change, but, aside from major upheaval (war or ideological revolution) we have no clear idea how, or how quickly, they evolve. It is not clear whether any scholar who has lived through this evolution can step out of the cave, so to speak, but unless we wish to see policy makers resort to policy tools that are clearly not suited to the times, it is important for the academic and policy communities to investigate how and where the concepts of power and influence have changed in the last fifty years.

**FUTURE RESEARCH**

My research is by no means the final word on compelling threats. This study is very limited in its focus and methods. I have chosen to emphasize third image, system level factors (system structure, power relationships) and those factors which address objective measures of potential cost. I have used very basic (but robust) statistical tools to analyze a universe of cases drawn from a seventy-year window. This study can be complemented in a number of ways.
**Bigger would be better**

The first step after any initial quantitative analysis is to expand the universe of cases studied to see if the conclusions derived still obtain. As international relations scholars constantly struggle against the quantitative limitations opposed by history (i.e., not enough conflicts to examine) the expansion of the list of compellent threats to account for those before Versailles and after Kuwait would be an important step to take. A longer time frame would allow us to compare threat and power relationships within eras with greater confidence.\(^{39}\) The Militarized Interstate Dispute data set is a magnificent library of conflict that gives future scholars of compellence a list of conflicts to search for signs of compellent threats. It begins in the mid-nineteenth century and is constantly being updated. Were it modified to flag those MIDs that underwent a compellent threat phase, this library would be the best resource for expanding the case list beyond the period studied in my research.

Once this list expansion was accomplished, many questions could be answered. *Are my conclusions only valid for post-World War I history?* Does the Great War mark a turning point in ultimatum history, as well as military history? It could be argued that the failure of the compellent threats to avert war and intimidate rivals in 1914 underlined their unreliability as instruments of influence, and so became more of a “desperate measure” in international relations, turned to only when the crisis had reached a point where resolution was unlikely, anyway. It is important to understand the impact that Europe’s first experience of total war in a hundred years had on the strategic thinking of the great powers in the twentieth century. A longer and more inclusive list of

\(^{39}\) As noted above, only three eras and 125 cases makes it difficult to understand if conditions are different within each era because the “small” n effect is magnified.
compelling threats could address questions of frequency and compliance rates before and after 1914.

*Does rational realist theory explain a reality that once existed - a European, scientific, nineteenth century reality?* This question is related to the first one, in that it posits that ultimatums and compelling threats are historical phenomena which may have once been more effective. The realist school which developed in the interwar and immediate post-war period was founded on the belief that British, French and American leaders were stumbling into another world war because they had learned the wrong lessons from history, and valued peace more than security. Morgenthau was interested in discovering and devising the scientific laws which govern international relations.⁴⁰ Both he and Carr operated on the oft unspoken assumption that something went awry in the capitols of the world in the twentieth century. The hardheaded rational power calculations of a Bismarck or Disraeli were replaced by the pleas for justice and law from Wilson and Chamberlain. A wider historical view could determine whether realism is in fact an artifact of a smaller, simpler system.

*Does expansion in system size change the way that states approach threats?* The period from 1815 (the Congress of Vienna, and in many ways, the real beginning of international relations) to the present has witnessed repeated expansions and contractions. The eradication of "primitive" states in the colonial wars eliminated a number of limited, but still legitimate, actors in the world. Continuous outburst of national consciousness have both reduced (1860-1875) and expanded (1890-1920) the central international system. Decolonization (1948-1970) increased the size of the international system threefold. An analysis of system size which included all these dramatic shifts in the number of states and potential relationships between these states would

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provide great insight into how the organization of a system affects strategic calculations in compellence encounters.

*Do changes in military equipment or strategies affect compliance rates?* With an historical perspective which includes the most significant changes in military technology and security strategy, it can be determined whether those strategies or technologies which favour taking the initiative (i.e., favour offensive strategies/technologies over defensive ones) make compliance with compellent threats more likely. As defending oneself would be futile, why not yield, and spare your state the damage? Similarly, did the introduction of nuclear weapons, and therefore the potential destruction of humankind, significantly change how states behaved in compellence encounters?

The expansion of the list would allow the student of compellent threats to develop a rigorous and comprehensive theory of the conditions under which compellent threats are effective tools. Then we can undertake the following tasks with greater confidence.

**Anomalies in Space and Time**

A comprehensive and robust theory of compellence threats will allow the scholar to begin the really interesting and rewarding work of International Relations - understanding why things go wrong in particular instances. The better the theory of compellent threats we have, the better able we are to identify which cases are anomalous. These anomalies are rewarding in that they enable the scholar to see which of the significant factors in the international system are most likely to break down and how.

The examination of anomalies is, to my mind, the best use of case studies in International Relations. A case study should keep in mind which significant theoretical factors the case in
question met, and then examine why the outcome was not that which was predicted. Case studies can also be used to illustrate speculative interpretations of quantitative data. Bear in mind that statistical analysis cannot make theory – it can only show scholars where to look. Quantitative analysis can, as this study has shown, eliminate explanations, but it cannot build them.

A good entry point for case studies into this thesis would be my curious findings regarding the place that alliances and alignments have in the compellence equation. As you may recall, I found that target states are less likely to comply with demands made under threat if they have a relationship with a great power, but this pattern does not obtain for purely defensive arrangements or grow stronger as the commitments between the states grow. One could argue that this alliance analysis omits the crucial credibility/reliability factor, which could determine when target states will count on a sponsor’s support. However, if this were the case, one would still expect that the relationship between defensive alliances and non-compliance would be as strong as, if not stronger than, the relationship between simple alignment and non-compliance, because defensive agreements are intended to be more credible and reliable than a friendship treaty or entente.

Following further statistical testing of the alliance data (coding on reliability for those who insist and controlling for the number of potential alliance partners) case studies of encounters from each area can determine precisely what role the alliances have on the calculations of decision makers. If some cognitive failure is going on (bolstering, defensive avoidance, etc.) these can only be detected through extensive analysis of a number of cases. Generalizing from the specific to the universal would still be a problem, as it is with many case studies. However, by developing new

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41 This is, admittedly, difficult in the social sciences, as prediction in the human arena is usually the claim of pundits and prophets, not professors.
theories and new hypotheses on the relationship between decision making processes and the
external stimuli facing state leaders, the scholar can then return to quantitative analysis to see if
the specific case does describe a general phenomenon. Then the anomaly search can begin again.

Digging up the roots

International Relations scholars must also reconsider their devotion to the realpolitik
model that still dominates contemporary discussions of world politics. The discipline as it stands,
and this work is no exception, positions its works as either a vindication of or criticism of the
power politics model. At least this work presents itself as no more than a preliminary examination
of the whether or not compellence works as power politicians would expect. Instead of
discovering exactly what the observable world does look like, many scholars seem content to state
that the dominant model is or is not accurate. Saying that the world consistently mimics the
expectations of realpolitikers is inaccurate and incomplete. Saying that it doesn’t is not
particularly helpful. It is only a first step.

An important issue for scholars to investigate is the common realist assumption that states
all seek a primary goal, and this primary goal is identical across states. This work does not
question that assumption, but accepts it as an integral part of the realist model under examination.
In an interesting study of the circumstances under which the realist model works, Thomas Cusack
and Richard Stoll find that the “attitudes” that states have to the conduct of foreign policy is an
important condition of how the international system will reward or punish the states involved. In a
world composed of one half balancers and one half power hungry states, the survival rate of states

42 In other words, correlation does not demonstrate causation, but lack of correlation usually means lack of causation.
in the system was only one quarter that of a system where the balancers were replaced by believers in collective security.\textsuperscript{44} Though this was an ahistorical computer simulation, the conclusion is clear: system outcomes depend on the role that units in the system choose to assume. We should, in the words of one scholar, bring the revisionist (and status quo) states back in. By abandoning the barren concept of universal goals for state actors, a more accurate picture of interstate relations would be drawn, and would enable us to move beyond the simple realist model that attributes opportunity driven motives to each state.\textsuperscript{45}

**Compellence on the couch**

In the final analysis, compellence is, like many social science phenomena, an example of decision making. Any proper explanation of threat based strategies and their execution must be based on a clear understanding of the ways state leaders make decisions. If a general explanation of human behaviour like the rational actor model of state policy cannot adequately account for the variation in the outcomes of compellent threats, it is necessary to move to a categorization of decision makers’ psychology. From here further analysis can be done to see if certain psychological “types” are more or less likely to be compelled.

Certainly there are problems with this task. First, it is difficult to determine which decision maker(s) to focus on. Certainly one cannot rely on the official title(s) of the decision makers or their putative powers (else Kaiser Franz Josef should have a more prominent role in explanations of World War I). Each compellence encounter would have to be done as a deep case study to

\textsuperscript{43} So, instead of seeing quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis as opposite and incompatible methodologies, it behooves all students of international relations to take part in this cycle of theory development and theory testing.\textsuperscript{44} Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll, *Exploring Realpolitik: Probing International Relations Theory with Computer Simulation*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications 1990), p. 148.
determine who the key decision maker in the encounter was, though this may lead to irregularities at times.\textsuperscript{46}

But one cannot rely on the behaviour in each instance to be emblematic of the state leaders' profile. This is a concern with much of the cognitive psychological literature on international relations. Our explanation of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's behavior in the July Crisis of 1914 is rooted only in his performance in the July Crisis. Similarly, our confidence that Khrushchev's compliance in the Cuban Missile Crisis was based on his fear of nuclear war is based almost exclusively on his performance in that one instance. Any competent psychologically profile must be based on examples of behaviour before the encounter which is to be explained. The outcome of the encounter in question is the dependent variable, and as such, should not be used as the basis of a general theory to explain itself. This does not mean that the case cannot be used for illustration when a relationship between behaviour before the case and the subsequent outcome has been detected. Once again, this is a good place for a case study.

Despite these constraints on developing a complex psychological explanation for compellence, there are many potential payoffs for such a study. First, so long as the typology of psychological profiles is rigorous and internally consistent, it can reveal which personal characteristics are most likely to contribute to or interfere with the ideal "rational" type.\textsuperscript{47} Secondly, the ability to recognize those characteristics which are associated with "stubbornness" or "resistance" in the face of overwhelming force could allow policy makers to develop

\textsuperscript{45} Most realist literature attributes any variance in state motives to the power of the states involved in the system. As states can exploit fewer opportunities, they limit their horizons.

\textsuperscript{46} For example, there is some debate over the relative prominence of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger towards the end of the Nixon regime. Should a cabinet minister ever be considered the primary decision maker in an elected government?

\textsuperscript{47} The best typology would necessarily address a wide range of behaviour from relative risk acceptance to patience to tolerance of dissent. There is no need for any decision maker to fit only one characteristic.
alternatives to compellent threats. As an unsuccessful ultimatum puts pressure on the initiator to make its threat good, avoiding the failure of a compellence strategy gives the initiator more latitude in dealing with a recalcitrant target.

The Credibility Gap

I will take this opportunity to address the major gap in my research, and the one that leaves me most open to the criticism that my study is incomplete or invalid – my failure to address the “credibility” of any given threat. As I explained in my introductory chapter, the entire concept of “credibility” is confusing. Divorcing the believability of a threat from the capability component of credibility is difficult. Credibility, as usually described, attributes a substantial weight to the perceived capacity of the initiator to exercise the threatened punishment. The interaction between this aspect of capability and the question as to whether or not the initiator has the “guts” or “heart” to carry out the threat is complex, and the relative weight attached to each is not addressed in any of the literature. Having dealt with the capability question in this study, I will address these comments to the place of the initiator’s resolve in measurements of credibility.

It is too easy for estimates of initiator’s resolve to become post hoc rationalizations of the all too obvious outcome of a compellence encounter once the encounter has concluded. For example, when a compellent threat fails, it soon becomes clear whether or not the initiator has any intention of carrying out the threatened punishment. Either it implements the punishment or it does not; either it has the resolve or it does not. However, this (in and of itself) tells us nothing of the target’s perception of the initiator’s resolve which is, one suspects, what really matters. Unlike capability, which has, in some sense, a measurable, objective reality, the resolve of the initiator (or
more precisely, the relative resolve of the initiator and the target) is a question of recognition.\textsuperscript{48}

While only a fool would ignore obvious signs of an opponent's capability (economic muscle, size of military forces, nuclear capability), the subtleties of sending messages in international relations makes the demonstration of resolve a task of questionable effectiveness.

The problem is even greater in those cases where the target complies with the demands made under threat of force. Certainly some of those states whose compellent threats worked were bluffing. It is unlikely that anyone was told that they were bluffing. And it is even more unlikely that the target state would ever concede that the threat it yielded to was not to be taken seriously.

Is there any way around this difficulty? Maybe. Should we leave credibility out entirely? Certainly not. I only wish to illustrate the barriers to doing a proper test of the credibility hypothesis. When doing a quantitative analysis of an hypothesis, questions of measurement are paramount. Keeping in mind that there are four possible subsets in this hypothesis (credible>compliance/noncompliance, not credible>compliance/noncompliance), it is imperative that we develop ways to recognize each subset. An immense amount of documentary evidence would be necessary to properly evaluate the credibility of a given threat. Thinking back to events in recent history, would one consider the Allied threat against Iraq in 1990-91 to be credible or not? Certainly the Allies demonstrated that they meant business once the ultimatum's deadline had expired. But had they properly communicated that commitment to the Iraqi leadership? Only Saddam Hussein and his cabinet know for sure. Certainly we could limit our study to those which

\textsuperscript{48} George and Simons refer to this as the need to convey in the target a "sense of urgency". The initiator must demonstrate that it "cares more" than the target. Any failure to do this will likely end in defeat for the initiator. See George and Simons, \textit{The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy}.
have been adequately documented from the side of the target, but that could constrain our case set to such an extent that its general validity would be questionable.49

**Concluding Remarks**

This dissertation has tested, and found wanting, the conventional and widespread realist assumptions about how compellence works. The traditional understanding of threat relationships as being guided by concerns for relative power, relative cost or sovereignty preservation have been found to be inadequate, inaccurate or indefensible. The evidence from the cases I have studied is clear, and the relationships that were expected could not be discovered.

There is still much work to be done before the dynamics of threat based policies (or for that matter, incentive based policies) are properly understood. My study focused on only a subset of threat based strategies, and, some would argue, a subset of compellence, by focusing on the threat itself, as opposed to the "active" form of compellence, where limited force is used to induce action. Therefore, any conclusions drawn from research should only be applied out of their context in a cautious and tentative manner.

Still, my work has uncovered interesting relationships (or lack thereof). It is clear that any understanding of international relations that pays primary attention to power disparity is ill equipped to deal with the outcomes of many crisis situations, such as those I have studied. Power is an important variable, but it is not clear from my study just how the power of the initiator affects the target's decision making.

On a personal note, I must admit that I was surprised by the outcome of my research, which I was convinced would demonstrate the robust explanatory power of *realpolitik*

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49 See the comments above on the Karsten, Artis and Allen study of military threats to see the deleterious effects of
approaches to understanding international relations. I was also convinced that states were sensitive to infringements on their sovereignty. In short, most (but not all) of my expectations were dashed. The failure of realpolitik to pass the simple tests that were set up for it does not bode well for its ability to pass more complex statistical tests.

I have not, unfortunately, explained just what makes compellence work. Most of the time it doesn’t. Compellent threats are usually late in the cycle of a crisis situation, so perhaps failure is to be expected. However, the lack of any firm pattern within those that do work, except for the presence or absence of an incentive, precludes any definitive statement on how to make a compellent threat work.

As for the finding that compellence is becoming, apparently, less effective as time marches on; this could have either a positive or negative effect on the peacefulness of the international system. On the bright side, the refusal of targets to yield to the threats of a bullying state will force these rogues into considering the implementation of their threats. Though the schoolhouse trope that the bully is a coward is as inaccurate in the international arena as it was in the schoolyard, the attraction of compellent threats is their cost-effectiveness. It is possible to win with words. As the pattern of unyielding targets continues, the number of destabilizing threats in the international system should decrease.

Unfortunately, this also applies to threats directed at rogue states on behalf of the international system. As we can expect that compellent threats aimed at stopping obnoxious policies in renegade states will fail, we can also expect that the international system, focusing more and more on the issue of “human security”, will have to put its troops where its mouth is. The transition to a more humane world cannot, and will not, be accomplished through threats or

narrowing a quantitative analysis to the “most studied” or “most studiable” cases.
bluster alone. It will require a serious appraisal of the costs that the “peace-loving states” are willing to bear to enforce their vision of humanity and stability on a reluctant world.

Compellence can be a tool of the virtuous and the vicious, but, despite my efforts, remains an inadequately understood policy.
Appendix I
The Measurement of Power

The philosopher's stone of International Relations is a rigorous, comprehensive and reliable measure of state capability or power.¹ The scales developed have been as basic as the simple major/minor dichotomy and as sophisticated as the weighted power measures of Ray Cline. In my analysis, I have used a power measure which I have developed on my own, though the efforts of those scholars who have gone before me can be seen in the final product.

The major problem I faced in developing a rigorous measure of state capability was the fact that my cases are drawn from a seventy-year period. Certainly, this time span is small when placed against the entire history of interstate relations. However, the technological and ideological progress across this period was significant. Can a scale developed by attention to 1990 factors be deemed relevant in a world before nuclear weapons, globalized economies or communication satellites? This is the attraction of the “category” method of power measurement. By assigning a state a place in the major/minor rankings, based on intuitive estimates of their time-based power resources, one can fit a state into a power scale easily. This ease, however, complicates things when one wishes to compare power relations in the 1980s to power relations in the 1920s. By assuming that, for instance, military might mattered at one point more than at another, the reliability of the power variable (statistically speaking) becomes corrupt. It would be similar to

¹ There is, in fact, disagreement over exactly how important a precise measure of state power or capability is. Some realists or power political theorists prefer a more imprecise estimate of state power. On this point see Thomas Cusack and Richard Stoll, Exploring Realpolitik: Probing International Relations Theory with Computer Simulation, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1990)., p. 30-31.
changing one’s definition of “state” or “compellent threat” depending on the time one is studying.

The categorization aspect of the measure does, however, have the attraction of avoiding the difficulty of deciding precisely where a state fits in a power ranking. Is the Soviet Union 1.5 times as power as the United States or 1.2 times as powerful? These types of questions, enthusiastically answered by the Ray Clines of the world, are unanswerable, except in the roughest possible way. The major/minor dichotomy is, unfortunately, imprecise. It may be attractive to some realists to see states as either great powers or nothing at all, but states are powerful in different ways across a continuum of capability. If one insists on considering “major powers” as roughly equal in capability, one is forced to put the United States and the Soviet Union of the 1950s in this category, relegating France and the United Kingdom to the “minor” category, with Mexico and South Africa. If one puts France and the UK in the same category as the United States and the USSR, the explanatory value of the “major power” category is lost - there is no way to note the significant disparity between the “super” powers and the “major” powers. Throwing a “superpower” category into the mix only pushes the disparities down a level. Is the difference in capability between Turkey and Cyprus unimportant?

These categories are, certainly, always controversial in this way. One cannot be precise and categorical at the same time. My point is that if one wants to use power or capability as a variable in a large-n study, and this variable is a key to one of the hypotheses being tested, it is crucial that the categories being used to estimate state capability note significant differences in capability between states. When one is analyzing
cases which exclude the "great powers", it is even more important that the attention paid to the big/small disparity is given to the medium/smallest disparity.

I have chosen to use a five category scale of power measure - super, major, middle, minor and small. This five tier scale is intended to measure large differences in capability, but is, naturally, less reliable at the margins of each category. How much difference is there between the least powerful middle power and the most powerful minor power? There is no avoiding this problem unless one wants to resort to the precise calculation of state capability, eschewing categorization altogether. As I stated above, this is almost impossible to do well.

Once a general scale was developed, I had to decide how to determine which states fit in which categories. I chose the final year of the study, 1990, as the base year for my development of a capability measure. Information for this year was easy to come by, and was generally reliable. I gathered information on a wide range of indicators used by scholars, journalists and laymen to evaluate the power of states. Some of these indicators were difficult to score as they can be read in opposite ways. For instance, population density can be a power asset as it implies that the population can be easily mobilized in times of crisis. It can be a liability if one sees large population centres as inviting targets for bombardment or conquest. These variables were interpreted in both ways if possible, so that separate tests could be run.

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2 For all years of this study, the reliability of information posed a potential problem. Estimates of economic and military capability for closed societies (Communist states, Nazi Germany, Third World dictatorships) are often guesswork. In these cases, what is being measured is perceived capability more than actual capability, but as I am studying the responses of the targeted states, perceptions are as good as reality.

3 These factors included gross national product, per capita income, nuclear capability, number of troops, size of defense budget, level of spending per soldier, literacy, number of troops per 100 000 people, level of industrialization, alliance status, form of government, population, area and population density.
After coding the states for these variables, I ran a factor analysis on the scores for the data. A factor analysis allows the scholar to group separate variables into "factors", which are then weighted according their importance in differentiating between the objects under study; i.e., states. The factor analysis isolated five of the variables under study as being responsible for over two-thirds of the differences between states. These five variables were then coded according to their individual weight within the isolated factor.

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<th>Gross Domestic Product (billion $US 1990)</th>
<th>Level of Development</th>
<th>Size of armed forces (thousands)</th>
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<th>Total capability (cumulative score based on five above variables)</th>
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<td>6-11 small</td>
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4 One variable, nuclear capability, scored well in the factor analysis but also had near perfect correlation with a number of the other variables, so it was discarded as redundant.

5 This is very impressionistic, but can be gauged from a variety of indicators, including levels of urbanization, ratio of industrial production to agricultural production, and size of the service sector. A more robust measure of this factor could probably be developed. I limit post-industrial states to the period after 1970.
12-16 minor
17-21 middle
22-27 major
28-32 super

There are problems with any additive scale, and this one is no different. The scale's reliability depends on the proper weighting of each component variable. I used 1990 data and this scale to see how closely the scale would approximate "common sense" or "impressionistic" evaluations of which states were the most or least powerful in 1990. If the scales results were close to what one would expect through individual estimation, then the scale could be said to have, for 1990, high "face validity", i.e., its results look accurate. This test of the scale proved to be reasonably accurate. The United States and the Soviet Union were the only superpowers, and the major powers included all the usual suspects (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, China) and a few reasonable inclusions (Canada, India, Iran, Brazil). Most states fell into the bottom two categories, with progressively fewer states in the middle and upper categories.

Once I deemed this scale accurate for 1990 data, I proceeded to research historical information, converting all dollar values into 1990 dollars. The 1990 scale proved remarkably robust in determining power levels throughout the twentieth century. The superpower is demonstrated to be a World War II phenomenon, as the Soviet Union and the United States reached this level mid-way through this conflict. As the international

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6 The issue of accuracy was determined according to the categorical score, not the numerical total. Though the cumulative score could be used, I prefer to err on the side of caution and refer to the category.
7 The middle powers were mostly small European states (Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, etc.).
8 If one accepts the scale as accurate, then it is interesting to note that though the United States maintains its superpower status from WWII on, but the Soviet Union wavers between major power and superpower for much of the immediate post-war period until the economic reconstruction of Russia was completed.
system expands, there is an increase in both major powers and small powers, as middle states catch up to larger states and new political entities are born.\textsuperscript{9}

It remains to be seen if this power scale can be applied to the period before World War I, where the alliance variable becomes more difficult to score and the economic and military data becomes more inconsistent and unreliable. It proved difficult to get reliable data for Communist and Fascist states across the century, though estimates by foreign “experts” were readily available. It was nearly impossible to get consistent and clear information on small states in the interwar period. League of Nations bookkeeping was clearly inferior to that developed by the United Nations. In these cases, an estimate was made based on regional and historic capabilities. If a researcher had to determine whether the Ottoman Empire was a major or middle (or even minor) power in 1860, the number of guesses would multiply until the scale became unreliable.

\textsuperscript{9} One issue of controversy for this scale is its exclusion of colonies as power factors for the interwar period. I believe that this exclusion is justified because the colonies themselves added little to the power reserve of the state itself, except in the number of “colonial troops” provided, though these were rarely deployed for international compellent purposes. The economic clout that a colony adds to the home economy would be accounted for by this scale.
### Appendix Two

**Data Input and Coding**

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## Appendix Two

### Code Sheet

 Ini = Initiator  
 Tar = Target  

State Abbreviations:

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Era = Era

1 = interwar period (1919-1944)  
2 = post-war period (1945-1965)  
3 = post-imperial period (1966-1990)
**Bipol** = *How bipolar is the system?*

1 = multipolar
2 = diffuse bipolar
3 = bipolar

**Out** = *Outcome*

0 = non-compliance
1 = compliance

**Pin** = *Goodfellow Power of the Initiator*

**Pta** = *Goodfellow Power of the Target*

1 = small
2 = minor
3 = middle
4 = major
5 = super

**Levi** = *Levi Power rating for Initiator*

**Levt** = *Levi Power for Target*

0 = minor power
1 = major power

**Alli** = *Is the target allied with major power?*

0 = no alliance
1 = alliance

**Alin** = *Is the target aligned with major power?*

0 = no alignment
1 = alignment

**Allst** = *Alliance Status*

0 = no association
1 = only aligned with major power
2 = allied with major power

**Aim** = *Aim of the threat*
Appendix Three
Case Summaries

What follows is a brief account of each case used in the analysis of compellence encounters since 1919. Each summary includes a description of the issues at stake, the specific demand and threat, and the major parties to the dispute. The lengths of the summaries have more to do with their respective obscurity than their relative importance. Some cases, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Munich Crisis, are so well known that a more detailed summary than that provided is unnecessary. The crises in east-central Europe following the armistice in 1918 are not as well known, so some contextual information had to be included with the account of what actually happened.

As for the sources listed with each case, where general histories of the area or the period were in general agreement with each other, or provided enough detail to draw a valid conclusion, only these sources are listed. The more obscure or contentious cases forced me to rely more heavily on detailed case summaries only available in case or country specific histories. For some cases, Keesing’s Contemporary Archives or Facts on File were the only source available to me. For those seeking a more detailed list of sources for the cases, I direct you to Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld’s A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan 1997) which has appended a comprehensive list of sources consulted for the crises they include in their study.

The outcome of each case is listed in the header of the summary. [C] notes compliance with the demands made, [N] notes non-compliance, and [P] notes partial compliance. As there are too few of these cases from which to draw sound conclusions, they were coded as compliance in the analysis.

Vix Note (March 1919) [N]

Following the First World War, the former Austro-Hungarian Empire fell apart into a number of successor states. The determination of the borders of these states was complicated by the claims of the Allied powers that bordered the dissolving empire, as the Austrian and Hungarian components were still considered enemy powers. The resolution of the Hungarian situation was very complicated. Hungarian refusal to withdraw from lands awarded to other states or lands in dispute led to a number of confrontations. France was the Great Power most concerned with the settlements of this regions problems, seeing a chance to create a friendly power on the eastern side of Germany that could also serve as a launching site for intervention against the Bolsheviks in Russia. In March 1919, General Vix was sent to Budapest with a note from Paris. This note instructed the Hungarian government to withdraw from disputed lands, including Transylvania, along the Romanian border and accept the Allied proposal of a neutral zone in the area. If these demands were not met, the French government would consider a military solution to the problem, authorizing Romania to take action in removing the Hungarian forces from the region. Hungary would also face economic isolation. The Hungarian government resigned power to the Communists, led by Bela Kun, instead of acquiescing to these demands. (Source: Ormos, M., pp. 161-185)
Romanian Territories (May 1919) [N]
While busy with the intervention against the Communists in Hungary to the west, Romania suddenly faced a threat from the east. The Soviet Union, undergoing a violent period of civil war and reconquest, demanded that Romania cede Bessarabia and Bukovina to the Soviets. If Romania did not cede these territories willingly, the Soviets would simply take them. Hungary seemed to be quickly collapsing in the east, so Romania decided to redeploy its forces to meet the Bolshevik threat. (Source: Ormos, M., 292-297)

Hungarian Offensive (June 1919) [C]
The Hungarian Army, strengthened by military experience, made quick gains against Czechoslovakia while Romania waited for the Soviet threat to dissipate. The Hungarian offensive into Slovakia threatened to undo all that the Allied powers had wanted to do for the Czechs, one of the first defectors from the Hapsburg Empire. In response to this threat, France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States threatened to intervene in the Czech conflict unless Hungary ceased all hostilities against Prague, and stopped its offensive. As an incentive, the Allies held out the possibility of Hungary being allowed to represent itself at the Paris Peace Conference, something that had been denied until now. Confident that this offer constituted a recognition of Hungarian concerns, the Hungarian government agreed to an armistice along the Czech front. (Source: Ormos, M.)

Costa Rica/Panama Conflict (February 1921) [N]
A thin strip of land along the border between Costa Rica and Panama had been in dispute for some time. Eventually, an American arbitrator awarded the land to Costa Rica. Costa Rica's failure to take effective control of this region led to a Panamanian effort to overturn the arbitrator's judgment by force. Panama occupied the disputed region. Costa Rica threatened to go to war and invade Panama itself unless Panama ceded the disputed land, effectively recognizing the arbitrator's judgment. Panama refused to leave the territory, confident that it could hold the land. (Source: McCain, W.)

Costa Rica/Panama Conflict (March 1921) [C]
The dispute on the Costa Rican border became a concern to the United States which had long been concerned with stability in the Panama region. Refusal of the Panamanian government to accept the validity of the arbitrator's ruling on the disputed land led to an American threat to intervene and enforce the judgment of the arbitrator unless Panama withdrew from the region awarded to Costa Rica. Faced with the prospect of even deeper American involvement in Panama and a certain loss of the territory, Panama withdrew. Costa Rica soon established control over the area. (Sources: Conniff, M., McCain, W.)

Reparations Demands (March 1921) [N]
The Allies decreed Germany to be in default of its reparations payments at a series of conferences in early 1921. The Allied powers (Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy) presented a demand to Germany for prompt payment of overdue reparations or face
military sanctions, specifically, another occupation force. After an evasive reply by the German government, the French army occupied Düsseldorf, Duisberg and Ruhrort.
(Sources: Langer, W. 957, Carr, E.H. 54, Trachtenberg, M. 204-5, Schmidt, R. 29-30)

Reparations Ultimatum (May 1921) [C]
At the London Conference, the Allied Powers (GBR, FRA, ITA, BEL) presented an ultimatum to Germany over the issue of reparations. Unless one million gold marks were paid by the end of May, the Ruhr would be occupied by Allied forces. Germany managed to raise the money (on a loan from London) and avoided the occupation.
(Sources: Langer, W. 957, Carr, E.H. 55, Trachtenberg 209-10)

Hapsburg Restoration (November 1921) [C]
Though Hungary had been allowed by the Allied powers to retain a monarchy, The Hungarians opted, for the time being, to be a republic. The political upheavals in Hungary since the end of the war, however, seemed like an opening to the deposed Emperor Karl (deposed in 1919) who, in October 1921, landed in Burgenland and prepared to reclaim his throne. The Hungarian government may not have even considered the restoration of the Hapsburgs, but, if they had, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia mobilized to deter any of these feelings. The Hungarians exiled Karl. This outcome, though pleasing, was not enough for Czechoslovakia which kept up its mobilization and threatened to intervene in Hungary unless it agreed to exclude any member of the Hapsburg family from assuming the throne. Czechoslovakia also demanded an indemnity to pay for the costs of mobilization but did not get it, though Hungary did agree to the exclusionary legislation. (Sources: Gathorne-Hardy, G.M. 76-7, Langer, W. 957).

Corfu Incident (August 1923) [N]
Italian officials sent to delimit the Greco-Albanian border were assassinated. Unsatisfied with the official Greek explanation of what had happened, the Italian government sent a flotilla of ships to the Greek coast and issued an ultimatum demanding an indemnity for the death of these officials and Italian participation on the investigating team. When the Greek government hesitated, the Italian navy bombarded and occupied Corfu. A Greek appeal to the League of Nations brought English pressure to bear on both parties. One month later, after its demands had been met, Italy withdrew. Those this could be considered a success of coercive diplomacy (the occupation did bring about the desired results), the compellent threat had no effect. (Sources: Barros, J., 56-73, Langer, W. 988).

Sudan Ultimatum (November 1924) [C]
Following the termination of the Protectorate in 1922, Egypt aspired to a more independent path from Britain, despite the continued presence of British soldiers in Egypt. A lingering dispute over control of the Sudan was held over for future negotiations. In 1924, Sir Lee Stack, the governor-general of Sudan and titular head of the Egyptian army, was assassinated in a wave of anti-British sentiment in Egypt. Despite Egyptian promises to punish those responsible, Britain demanded more: punishment of the assassins, an official apology, payment of an indemnity, suppression of anti-British
demonstrations and the withdrawal of all Egyptian forces from the Sudan condominium. After a little hesitation and the resignation of the nationalist premier, the Egyptians yielded to all the demands. (Sources: Fabunmi, L.A., 84-94, , Langer, W. 1083).

Demir Kapu (October 1925) [N]
The border area between Greece and Bulgaria flared into violence in late 1925. Though the origins of the skirmish are still in dispute, two Greek killed soldiers in the border area (including one sent under a white flag) raised tempers in Greece. Aware that the Bulgarian army had been severely weakened by the Great War, Greece issued an ultimatum, demanding an apology and indemnity over the "murder" of its soldiers. When the Bulgarians equivocated, Greece carried out its threat to seize and occupy Bulgarian territory in the area where the killings took place. The League of Nations quickly intervened. When the Greeks were made aware that the League Council was considering sanctions, they withdrew from Bulgaria. (Sources: Barros, J., passim).

Egyptian Army Ultimatum (June 1927) [C]
Further unrest and growing nationalism in Egypt led to a British effort to assume even greater control over military affairs in the nominally independent state. A period of discontent and protests, with the return of Nationalist majority to the Egyptian Parliament, convinced Britain to send a naval force to the Egyptian coastline and present the parliament with demands that the Egyptian army be limited in size and strength and that British officers be placed at key points in the Egyptian command structure. Apparently intimidated by the size of the British force off Alexandria, the government accepted these demands, eventually leading to a new treaty extending British military occupation for ten years. (Sources: Langer, W. 1083, Mansfield, P.)

Nanking Incident (February 1927) [P]
The Chinese Civil War between the Communists, Nationalists and local warlords encouraged all parties to the conflict to use anti-foreign rhetoric to rally support for their cause. One of the most sensational demonstrations of anti-foreign hostility was the attack on the foreign quarter of Nanking in early 1927. Many Europeans were killed in what seemed to many a repeat of the outbursts which preceded the Boxer Rebellion. The powers with concessions in China met to discuss appropriate measures to deal with the incident in Nanking. Though most of the powers wished only to send a strong warning to the Nationalist government, which many held responsible for the incident, Britain convinced the powers to demand an apology and reparations for the damage done, or face a blockade of the Yangtze and other ports. The Chinese government denied responsibility for the attack, and refused to pay reparations, but it did apologize for any role it may have unwittingly played in the attack. (Source: Bamba, N., pp. 262-80)

Freedom of Assembly Ultimatum (April 1928) [C]
To put pressure on the British military occupation force, the Egyptian parliament prepared a bill that would guarantee freedom of public assembly for Egyptians. Aware that this would mean more anti-British protests and the risk of further disturbances, the British
once again sent a naval force off the Egyptian north coast and demanded that the bill for free assembly be killed. Once again, the Egyptians agreed to the demand. (sources: Langer, W. 1083).

Chinese Eastern Railway (July 1929) [N]

Ever since the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, it had been managed jointly by Russians and Chinese officials. The Soviet Union inherited these rights, and took advantage of these rights to disseminate Communist propaganda to Chinese in the area. The Chinese government, in 1929, arrested the Soviet managers of the railway and terminated their rights, citing interference in Chinese politics. Moscow threatened (and took) diplomatic action, but the recall of the Soviet ambassador did nothing to settle the dispute over Soviet rights. On July 13, the Soviet Union sent a harsher note, accompanied by military movements; a clear threat to use force in a punitive manner unless the Soviet officials were released and Moscow's rights over the railway were recognized. China mobilized its troops, responded negatively to the note, and was beaten in a short series of skirmishes. Clearly outclassed on the battlefield, China gave in to the Soviet demands. (Sources: Wu, A. 186-212, Vinacke, H. 412, Toynbee, A SIA 1929, 344-369).

Nakamura Murder (September 1931) [N]

The mysterious killing of a Japanese officer (Nakamura) by Chinese soldiers in Manchuria led to a Japanese claim against China for an apology and indemnity. The threat of punitive force against Chinese interests was used to convince the Chinese government to pay the indemnity. Failure by the Chinese officials to respond to these demands led to the Mukden Incident, in which a minor explosion along a railway (probably staged) was used as an excuse by Japan to seize Mukden and other parts of south Manchuria. (Sources: Gathorne-Hardy, G.M. 307-8)

Shanghai I (January 1932) [P]

The murder of some Japanese citizens around Shanghai, including a Buddhist monk, led to five demands being made of the mayor of Shanghai. These demands included swift punishment of those who had perpetrated these outrages against Japanese citizens and an abolition of any organization devoted to anti-Japanese behavior. This threat to China was backed up by a naval force and a clear threat to attack if these demands were not met within four days of the ultimatum. The mayor was willing to meet most of the demands, but hesitated on the abolition of anti-Japanese organizations. Meanwhile, the Municipal Council declared a state of emergency, provoking the Japanese to bomb Chapei District. (sources: Carr, E.H. 167, Gathorne-Hardy, G.M. 312, Keesing's, 165F).

Shanghai II (February 1932) [P]

After a brief truce, conflict erupted again. To prevent further conflict, Japan demanded that China withdraw its troops from around the International Settlement, which Japan was using as base from which to launch its attacks. Failure to do so led Japan to make an assault on the surrounding troops. (Sources: Gathorne-Hardy, G.M. 312, Keesing's, 187I, 188N)
Jehol (February 1933) [N]

Jehol, a mountainous region that separates Manchuria from the Great Wall, was an area of dispute between China and the Japanese puppet regime in Manchukuo. The Japanese War Office pressed the Manchukuan claim, and soon issued an ultimatum over the region. **Chinese troops were to leave the region and the Nanking government was to recognize Manchukuo's rights in the area.** If these demands were not met, **Japan would use force to evict China from Jehol.** A little over a week later, in face of Chinese resistance, Japan invaded the area, completely occupying the region within two weeks. (Sources: Gathorne-Hardy, G.M. 317).

**Durazzo Demonstration (June 1934) [C]**

After a long period of Italian dominance in Albanian affairs, King Zog of Albania attempted to steer a more independent course. In 1932, Albania rejected a proposed customs union with Italy, and, a year later, Italian schools were closed. Evidence of Italian interference in Albanian affairs was used as a reason for Zog to terminate relations with Italy. Unwilling to lose its satellite in the Balkans, Italy sent a fleet of ships to the Albanian port of Durazzo (Durrës). **Italy demanded that Italian schools be reopened, Italian advisers be admitted to the Albanian military command, and that Italo-Albanian relations be restored.** Admires of King Zog call the outcome a diplomatic success for Albania because he said he refused to discuss the issues with Italian ships in his harbors, and waited until the fleet was reduced before caving in to all of Italy's demands. However, most consider this confrontation to be a humiliating defeat of Albania, which virtually ended Albania's political autonomy, because the demands were accepted, with no concessions on the part of the Italians aside from moving some boats. (Sources: Fischer, B. 143-147, Langer, W. 1020, Toynbee, A. SIA 1934, 535-536.).

**Japanese Rights in China (June 1935) [C]**

The Chinese governor in Chahar was accused by the Japanese of violating the Tangu truce by moving troops into provocative positions and encouraging anti-Japanese activities. **Unless the troops were withdrawn, anti-Japanese activities ceased and the governor dismissed, Japan would intervene militarily in the region to suppress the disturbing activities.** The demands were quickly met by China, and further military confrontations were avoided for the time being. (Sources: Gathorne-Hardy, G.M. 324, Langer, W. 1126).

**Mongolia (June 1935) [N]**

The arrest of a Japanese survey party along the Manchukuan-Mongolian border led to further strains in the already tense Soviet-Japanese relations. **Japan demanded of Outer Mongolia (a soviet client state) that Japanese military observers be allowed to operate in Mongolia and that a telegraph line be built to link the two disputing regions. Refusal would be met with the forced “demilitarization” of eastern Mongolia.** The demands were refused by the Mongolian government, probably under instruction from Moscow. Though frontier incidents continued through the year, no general attack on Mongolia resulted. (Sources: Toynbee SIA 1935 vol. I pp. 332-333)
Seven Demands (September 1936) [N]

As the Communist insurgents carried their rebellion into Northwest China, the Japanese forces in Manchuria grew more anxious. Unhappy with the measures being taken by Nanking to deal with the Communists, who were exhorting all of China to oppose the Japanese threat, Tokyo presented the Nationalist government with a series of demands, the most important of which were: Japanese advisors in the Chinese government, allowing the Japanese army to fight the Communists wherever they were (i.e. throughout China), greater autonomy for the five northern provinces of China, and a reduction in tariffs. Japan threatened immediate invasion of North and Central China. Despite these threats and the presence of Japanese troops around Shanghai, the Chinese government refused to relent. No invasion took place at this time. (Source: Langer, W. 1120)

Amur River (June 1937) [C]

The Amur River served as the border between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union. The Red Army and the Imperial Japanese forces eyed each other warily over this natural boundary. When Soviet troops began occupying islands in the middle of the river, skirmishing broke out between the border guards. Japan threatened more serious military reprisals unless the Soviet soldiers withdrew from these islands. Unwilling to face the Japanese army at this time, the USSR took its soldiers off the islands in question. (Source: Toynbee, A., SIA 1937 (vol. I) 149-152.)

Austrian Government (February 1938) [C]

Nazi demonstrations in Austria had long been a threat to the stability of the government in Vienna. The demonstrators loudly clamored for the union of Austria with Germany. As many of these demonstrations turned violent, or called for violence, many Austrian Nazi leaders were arrested and imprisoned. Schuschnigg, the leader (front führer) of Austria, was invited to Adolf Hitler's retreat at Berchtesgaden, where he was informed that unless he agreed to grant amnesty to imprisoned Nazi leaders and admit Nazis into the Austrian cabinet, Germany would have no choice but to intervene in Austria. Schuschnigg agreed to these terms. (Sources: Langer, W. 1008, Shirer, W. 440-50).

Anschluss (March 1938) [C]

After a speech by Hitler that seemed to threaten the independence of the Austrian state, Schuschnigg began taking efforts to re-establish control over his nation. He finally resorted to a plebiscite on the future of Austria; a plebiscite in which only Yes to independence ballots would be distributed (dissenters had to bring their own ballots). The nation descended to unrest and chaos, as the Austrian Nazis protested against the plebiscite. Germany mobilized troops along the border, threatening to intervene if the plebiscite was not canceled and Schuschnigg did not resign. The demands were met by Austria and the new chancellor invited Germany in to restore order, culminating in the union between Germany and Austria. (Sources: Langer, W. 1008, Shirer, W. 451-60)
Polish Ultimatum (March 1938) [C]

The status of Vilna (Vilnius) had long been a source of agitation between Poland and Lithuania. The Curzon Line, drawn in December 1919, awarded Vilna to Lithuania. This situation was accepted by the Russians eight months later, when they made peace with Lithuania in order to focus on Poland. Then, in October 1920, Polish troops swept into Vilna and claimed it for Poland. A plebiscite held in 1922 found that a majority supported staying in Poland. A state of war between Poland and Lithuania continued until 1927, when a tense truce was declared between the feuding states. The Vilna issue was still a sore point, with Lithuania, which, in a fit of pique over the status of their former capital, severed relations with Poland and closed the border. The Poles had had enough of Lithuania's complaints and sent their troops to the frontier. If Lithuania refused to normalize relations and formally accept the status of Vilna, Poland would declare war. Rather than face the much larger Polish army on the battlefield, the Lithuanian government agreed to resolve all outstanding issues of dispute since the end of the Great War. (Source: Langer, W. 1043, Keesing's, 2992)

Munich Crisis (September 1938) [C]

The Sudeten German population in Czechoslovakia, probably under instructions from Berlin, agitated for self-determination (i.e. union with Germany or autonomy from Prague). For months Europe was tense in anticipation of a German invasion of Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Sudeten Germans. In May 1938, reports of German mobilization in the south led to deterrent threats from France and Britain (it now appears that this May Crisis was based on erroneous reports). As demonstrations in Sudetenland got more riotous, the German remonstrations grew in intensity. In September, Germany threatened to go to war against Czechoslovakia unless actions were taken to ensure the rights of the Sudeten Germans were protected. These demands were understood to be requests for a transfer of Czech territory to German hands. In spite of Czech wishes to stand up to the Germans, Prague's allies informed Czechoslovakia that they would not fight beside it. At a conference in Munich at the end of September, France, Italy and Britain agreed to transfer Sudetenland to German rule. (Source: Shirer, W. 490-565)

Teschen Dispute (September 1938) [C]

As Czechoslovakia was being sacrificed by Britain and France to avert general war, other nations saw an opportunity to assert their own claims on Czechoslovak lands. Poland had long been interested in the coal rich Teschen region in Slovakia. With a little encouragement from Germany, Poland threatened to invade the weakened Czechoslovakia unless a plebiscite was held in the largely Polish area. Though this demand was never met, the Czechs did acquiesce in the cession of the Teschen district at Munich, without the trouble of a plebiscite. (Sources: Gathorne-Hardy, G.M. 473, Carr, E.H. 271-2, Shirer, W. 525-6, 568-9).

Dissolution of Czechoslovakia (March 1939) [C]

The problems of Czechoslovakia continued the next year when independence movements in what was left of Ruthenia and Slovakia threatened the stability of the already tottering regime. To try and restore order, the central government in Prague...
ordered the dissolution of the autonomous governments in these rebellious regions, and the arrests of the independence ringleaders. As these separatist regimes had been supported by Germany, Berlin found an opportunity in this crackdown to abolish the state of Czechoslovakia altogether. The Slovak provisional government declared independence from Czechoslovakia. The president of the rump Czech state was summoned to Germany and told that German troops were already preparing to take control of his state. Germany would destroy what was left of Czechia unless the order was given for Czech troops to acquiesce in the dissolution of their state and accept the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich. The Czech leadership accepted the inevitable and their was no resistance to the German takeover. (Source: Shirer, W. 593-603).

Memel (March 1939) [C]
Memel, the Germanic port that had been seized by Lithuania in 1923, continued to agitate for incorporation into Germany. Just as in Austria and the Sudetenland, Germany prepared to seize the district by force, but first presented Lithuania with an ultimatum to transfer the port to German control, or face invasion. After a slight delay, the ultimatum was accepted. (Source: Shirer, W. 620-1, Keesing's 3498).

Conquest of Albania (March 1939) [N]
With Albania already under much Italian influence, the Italian government saw no reason why the relationship should not be formalized as an official protectorate over the Balkan state. The ultimatum of acquiescence or war was sent to King Zog in much the same way that Germany sent its ultimatums to victims of pacific aggression. However, Albania would not give up its independence without a fight, and the ultimatum was rejected. In little over a week, Albania was annexed to the Italian empire. (Source: Carr, E.H. 274, Shirer, W. 630.)

Tientsin Crisis (June 1939) [N]
Anti-Japanese activity in occupied China led to a series of "crimes" committed against Japanese officials. If these violations occurred in the areas around foreign concessions in China, the foreign powers could hardly avoid being drawn into the Sino-Japanese conflict. When Chinese "murderers" took refuge in the British concession in Tientsin, the British officials were reluctant to turn the offenders over to Japan for trial. They preferred to try the Chinese in Tientsin, but this was, naturally, unsatisfactory to the Japanese who wished to make examples of all Chinese who caused trouble in the occupied areas. Japan threatened to blockade the British concession if the Chinese were not immediately turned over. The British officials in the concession refused, unless certain changes were made to the anticipated conduct of the trial. The blockade was instituted, and negotiations continued. (Source: Toynbee, A. SIA 1935 (vol. 10) 640-652)

Danzig (August 1939) [N]
The Versailles Treaty provided for a "corridor" of Polish territory separating Germany from East Prussia. Danzig, once a major German port, was established as a "free city" that was under de facto Polish protection. During the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, Germany asked Poland for the return of Danzig to Germany and the
establishment of an extra-territorial route through the Polish Corridor, providing a unification of the German peoples. In exchange, Germany would provide Poland with compensatory lands in Ukraine, Slovakia or Russia. A cautious Poland politely rejected these requests, leading to further unrest in an already unstable Danzig. The German requests soon became demands, and troops were mobilized by both states. Though it is clear that Germany had settled on a military solution to the problem in early August 1939 (as is shown by the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact), it had, by this time, become very clear that the Poles were not going to back down in the face of German demands. The threat was clear (war), the demands were clear, and, by early August, the answer was clear (no). (Sources: Sontag, R. 354-80, Shirer, W. 612-791).

Invasion of Poland (September 1939) [N]

The German invasion of Poland finally forced France and Britain to stand up against German aggression. The collapse of Polish resistance at the borders, and the need to oppose Germany's hegemonic ambitions led to a clear ultimatum from London and Paris to Berlin. Germany had one day to begin its withdrawal from Polish territory or a state of war would exist between Britain & France and the German Reich. Aware that the Allied powers were unable to assist Poland, and unprepared for an offensive war in the west, Germany continued its war until Poland was destroyed and partitioned. (Source: Shirer, W. 805-823).

Baltic Threats (September 1939) [C]

The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 provided for the partition of northeast Europe between the two great powers. The USSR desirous to lessen the trouble of the occupations of the Baltic states, presented Estonia with a demand for the leasing of military bases in Estonian territory until the threat from the German Polish War was over. If the bases were not handed over, USSR, in its own interests, would occupy the nation. Similar threats were delivered to Latvia and Lithuania. The only difference between the three threats was that the USSR offered to return Vilna to Lithuania as an incentive for cooperation. Clearly unable to put up an effective resistance, and, aware of the German threat to the west, the three states agreed to the demands. (Sources: Langer, W. 1145).

Finnish Bases (October 1939) [N]

In its bid for Baltic hegemony, and securing its western front, the Soviet Union was concerned about the security of the Leningrad region, a major city close to the front and a key port for the USSR. Just as it had presented ultimata to the Baltic states, USSR demanded bases from Finland, and also the cession of land surrounding Leningrad and Lake Ladoga, as well as the demobilization of troops on the border. Finland, one of the few remaining democracies in Europe, was wary of Soviet influence, and rejected the demands, even on threat of war. The Russo-Finnish War subsequently broke out. (Source: Langer, W. 1145).

Burma Road (June 1940) [C]
The Japanese campaign against China was slowed by the considerable aid that passed to Chinese forces through British colonies in Asia. The Burma Road and Hong Kong were two of the main conduits for Chinese assistance. Aware that British military forces were more concerned with the ongoing war in Europe, Japan used threats to invade British possessions in Asia, specifically Kowloon in an attempt to force British cooperation in halting the smuggling to Chinese forces. With national energies poured into the European war effort, and unwilling to risk another war in Asia, Great Britain agreed to stop the flow of resources into China. (Dear, I and Frost, M, 178; Best, A., 112-124.)

**Bessarabia (June 1940)**

The Soviet Union had claimed jurisdiction over the Bessarabian and Bukovinan regions of Romania (now Moldova) ever since the readjustment of Romania's borders after World War I. These regions had been given up in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany (1918), but were awarded to Romania by the allies once the Russo-German treaty was nullified. In 1940, the USSR reopened the issue of these territories and threatened to invade Romania and seize these territories unless they were given up peacefully. With the growth in German power in the center, Romania was unwilling to antagonize the Soviets, so the lands were transferred to the Soviet Union. (Keesings 4121, Cioranescu, G., 108-124.)

**Transylvania (August 1940)**

The Soviet seizure of Bessarabia and Bukovina worried the German government, because it placed Soviet troops close to its main source of oil supplies. Desirous of having friendly forces close to the oil fields, Germany assisted Hungary in pressing its claims to Transylvania, a largely Magyar region ceded to Romania following the First World War. Romania was anxious to avoid war, and entered into negotiations with Hungary to set the line of demarcation. Romania's desire to reopen other Balkan borders for negotiation led to a collapse in the talks and preparations for war. An inter-Balkan war was the last distraction that Germany needed, as it might provoke further Soviet incursions into the region, and jeopardize the oil reserves Germany needed from Romania. Germany and Italy intervened in the dispute, claiming the right for the Axis to act as an arbitrator. Both states grudgingly agreed, but Romania balked when the scale of the partition of Transylvania was decided, as it heavily favored Hungary. Germany demanded that Romania submit to the partition or face invasion from Germany, and potentially the Soviet Union. Faced with the possibility of non-existence as a state, Romania agreed to sign. (Sources: Shirer, W. 1049-51, Langer, W. 1150, Toynbee, A. SIA 1939-1946 vol. II pp. 322-328).

**Balkan Invasion (October 1940)**

Italy was desirous to increase the security of its position in the Mediterranean so it turned to Greece, whose de facto alignment with Britain posed a threat to Italian security in Albania. Italy demanded to occupy certain strategic points in Greece and a cessation of Anglo-Greek cooperation. Greece refused this demand, even on threat of war. There is some disagreement about whether this is a case of compellence, as Italy had
resolved on war in the Balkans. To my mind, this case is no different from Germany's successes in 1938. If Greece had accepted the demands, Italy would likely have seized the bases yielded to it by Greece, and then moved up to war. Greece preferred to count on British and Russian assistance, something that Austria and Czechoslovakia could not. (Sources: Shirer, W. 1069-70, Langer, W. 1050, Royal Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 117-8.).

Yugoslavian Alliance (March 1941) [C]

German concerns about the war in Greece and how it affected its Mediterranean position led it to offer the Yugoslavian government an offer of alliance. Refusal to accept the offer would lead to an Axis invasion of the Balkan nation, but acceptance would earn Yugoslavia the reward of Salonika once the war with Greece was brought to successful conclusion. This combination of threats and bribes, given in secret, induced the regent, Prince Paul, to agree to the alliance. However, three days after the agreement was reached, a military coup toppled the regency and the alliance was annulled, precipitating the threatened invasion. (Sources: Shirer, W. 1079-80, Langer, W. 1050).

Occupation of Iran (August 1941) [N]

The beginning of the German war on the Soviet Union limited Germany's oil supply to a few sources. Romania was now under a friendly regime, so this source was, for now, secure. Still, the German war effort required access to the large reserves in the Middle East. To this end, the German government maintained a large number of technicians in Iran (a neutral state), whose expertise in exploiting Iranian oil fields kept open a source of oil for the German armies. The British and Soviet governments demanded that Iran expel these technicians, on threat of armed intervention as their continuing presence in Iran opened the possibility of an extended war. If the oil could be cut off, Germany would weaken. Iran refused, claiming the rights as a neutral to employ who it pleased. Iran did say it would monitor the actions of these technicians and also cut off oil to all belligerents, but this answer did not suit the allies. The intervention took place, and a friendly government was put in place. (Sources: Langer, W. 1136, Rezun, M. 63-73).

Bulgarian Alliance (February 1941) [N]

The increasing ties between Bulgaria and Germany reached the point of virtual occupation in early 1941. German military advisors and German language signs appeared in Bulgaria, and the government arrested or outlawed various opposition groups. These new links with Germany worried Britain which warned Bulgaria that any major continuation of its pro-German policy would lead to a recall of the British minister in Sofia and declaration of war. Firmly in Germany's grip, Filoff, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, flew to Vienna on March 1, adhering to the Tripartite Pact, bringing Bulgaria into the axis Powers. The anticipated full occupation of Bulgaria by the German Army soon followed. (source: Keesing's 4485A)

Finnish War (November 1941) [N]
Finland cooperated with the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which perturbed Great Britain, which had sympathized with Finnish hardships during the Russo-Finnish a year earlier. In August 1941, Britain severed relations with Finland in an effort to signal British displeasure with Finland's new allegiance. In November, Britain declared that unless Finland withdrew from the campaign against the Soviet Union and ended its alliance with Germany, a state of war would exist between Britain and Finland. Finland ignored the British threat, so war was declared. Despite this state of war, one limited air raid on a German-Finnish military site was the only armed action taken against Finland by Britain. (Source: Keesing's 4820).

Communist Romania (February-March 1945) [C]
As the Red Army swept through eastern Europe, liberating and occupying nations once held by German forces, the Soviet Union became concerned with establishing friendly regimes in those states to its immediate west. With Soviet troops in the country, it was easy for the Soviets to use their military muscle to influence the government options open to the king of Romania. The democratically popular government was rejected by the Soviet officials, and they threatened to forcibly eject any government unfavorable to Moscow, effectively demanding that the Romanian governing class approve and accept a Communist government. Having no real option except a series of foreign induced coups, the Romanian king yielded to the demands. (Keesing's 7195).

Trieste I (May-June 1945) [C]
As World War II was winding down in Europe, the Western allies found themselves in a race with the Communist allies to liberate certain towns in central Europe. New Zealand forces in Italy were on the losing end of the race for Trieste, a port town on the Adriatic, arriving shortly after Yugoslavian partisans liberated the city. Despite the fact a dividing line for the region had been agreed to by the great powers, Yugoslavia claimed the city as a spoil of war. Italy protested that its service to the Allies since 1943 exempted it from punitive measures like the loss of territory. The original dividing line gave the rural areas to Yugoslavia and the town (which had both Slovene and Italian residents) to Italy. Yugoslavia's refusal to withdraw from the parts of the city it had occupied led to a serious crisis. Though the Western allies were very reluctant to use force, and risk another European war, there was a belief that a firm stand on the division of the city was necessary to prevent the impression that the agreed-on post-war settlement was unimportant. American and British forces were moved up to line of conflict after a clear statement from the United States that it would forcibly expel Yugoslavia if the partisan forces were not withdrawn. The threat was softened by an agreement to temporarily alter the agreed to line of occupation. (Source: Rabel, R. pp. 55-63.)

Turkish Straits (August 1946) [N]
Soviet pressures on Turkey continued after the failure to achieve land concessions in Kars-Ardahan. With the Cold War beginning to pre-occupy the superpowers, the USSR became concerned about its access to the Mediterranean. Under international law, the Turkish Straits (Dardanelles and Bosporus) were an international waterway and any changes to access through these straits required an international agreement of all powers.
The USSR demanded an agreement among Black Sea powers (of which only Turkey was not under Soviet control) that only Black Sea states would have control over the straits. There were veiled threats that USSR would force its way through the straits in violation of the international agreements. Turkey said it would continue to abide by the international regime governing the use of the straits.

Marshall Plan (July 1947) [C]

Reconstruction of Europe after the war required a massive influx of money from those states unaffected by the damage of war. The Marshall Plan was the United States' plan for European reconstruction. The plan was offered to every state in Europe, including those which found themselves behind the Iron Curtain of Soviet influence. Czechoslovakia considered accepting the offer of aid, counter to the wishes of the Soviet Union, which was wary of any American influence in Eastern Europe. The Soviet government made it clear that unless Czechoslovakia reversed its position on the offer of American aid, action would be taken against the Czech government. The Czech government backed down in view of the Soviet pressure. (Source: Kaplan, M. 93-5, Facts on File 1947, 213C).

Trieste II (September 1947) [N]

At the conclusion of World War II, the Adriatic city of Trieste was in a position of limbo. Liberated by Allied and Yugoslav forces in 1945, the region was placed under a temporary military administration of British, American and Yugoslav forces. The permanent status of the city was left up in the air. Both Italy and Yugoslavia had claims on the port city. Tired of the delays in deciding the fate of the city, Yugoslavia threatened the Allied force in Trieste (USA, UK, ITA) with an invasion of the city unless the city was soon turned over to Yugoslav control. A reinforcement of the Allied brigade showed a commitment to continue the occupation. Yugoslavia, uncertain of Soviet support, backed down from its inflammatory gestures. (Source: Jessup, J, 25.)

Hyderabad (September 1948) [N]

The British withdrawal from India left two nations where there was once one colony: Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India. The princely states of India, which were not under direct British rule, were given the option to join either of the new states, or to continue in an independent status. Hyderabad, a majority Hindu princely state with a Muslim ruler, was in the middle of the new Indian republic, and opted for a form of independence. India wanted Hyderabad to organize a plebiscite, giving its people the option to join India. The Hyderabad Nizam refused, claiming that it was, for now, an independent state. Within Hyderabad, conditions deteriorated, with Muslim bands terrorizing Hindu citizens of Hyderabad, and Indian incursions into Hyderabad territory. With Hyderabad falling into an anarchic condition, India massed troops around it. The Indian government demanded that the Muslim militias be disbanded by the Government, and that Hyderabad accede to the Indian Union. Hyderabad appealed to the United Nations for support for its independence, but the invasion proceeded without UN action. (Sources: Brines, R. 60-1, Franck, T. 47-51, Choudhury, G.W. 41-3).
Sinai Incursion (December 1948) [C]

Israel's War of Independence was a great success. The Israeli forces carved out a living space larger than that intended by the partition of Palestine, and, in late 1948, threatened to push into Egypt. Israeli military success on the southern front led to the conquest of the Negev desert and, despite a UN security Council resolution in November 1948, continued to fight, pushing some of its troops into Egypt. Britain was bound to protect Egypt and the Suez canal by a 1936 Treaty, which, ironically, Egypt had long resented. Now, Egypt applauded as Britain threatened to carry out its treaty obligation to defend Egypt if Israel did not immediately withdraw from Egyptian territory. Israel said that it was not invading Egypt, merely performing tactical maneuvers which put its troops in Egyptian territory, but it would withdraw its troops as requested. (Source: Loreh, N. p. 520).

Korean War (June 1950) [N]

The North Korean invasion of South Korea gave the United Nations a chance to show how it would deal with clear cases of aggression. With the Soviet Union boycotting the Security Council meetings, the United States and its allies passed a resolution calling for North Korean forces to withdraw to the 38th parallel. Showing no sign of doing so, the United States moved more troops into the area and implored the UN to authorize military sanctions against North Korea. Another Security Council resolution was passed, demanding that North Korea withdrawal from South Korea, authorizing and organizing an international force to push back the aggressor if the demands for withdrawal were not met. Having driven South Korean and American forces towards the tip of the Korean peninsula, North Korea saw no reason to pull back. (Sources: Keesings 10805-10807)

Suez Troops I (October 1951) [N]

In 1951, Egypt abrogated the 1936 treaty that provided for the continuing presence of British military bases in Egypt. Despite this, the United Kingdom continued to maintain bases in the Suez Canal region. The Egyptian government, failing in attempts to negotiate the removal of these troops, eventually turned to threats of attacks on the British army groups protecting the Suez Canal if they were not withdrawn. The British government, anxious to ensure the continued freedom of British movement in the Suez region ignored the threats. Though guerrilla attacks on the British forces continued, London did not see fit to withdraw its troops at his point. (Keesing's, 11745-11746, Facts on File 1951, 339)

Buraimi Oasis (September 1952) [N]

The Buraimi Oasis lies on the border between Oman and the United Arab Emirates. In 1952, this border, the extent of Saudi penetration into this region was mostly undetermined. The UAE, then Trucial Sheikdoms under the protection of Great Britain, had exercised control over most of the oasis. In August 1952, a Saudi Arabian official with a troop of armed men marched into the oasis villages, claiming that they were, and always had been, Saudi. After an initial request for withdrawal was unheeded, Great Britain reiterated their claim to the land and dispatched a force from Abu Dhabi to evict
the invaders. Seeking to avoid bloodshed, the British offered to submit the dispute to arbitration once the Saudis removed their troops. This offer was rejected. After a small skirmish, both parties agreed to arbitration. (Source: Keesing's 12890, 13743)

Suez Troops II (April-May 1953) [N]

In 1952, a rebellion in Egypt deposed the king and placed a military government in control. This government, headed by General Naguib, continued the national policy of attempting to displace the British troops in the Suez. This strategic waterway and commercially crucial shipping land lay in Egyptian territory, but was policed by British troops. Egyptian nationalists often attacked British troops in the area, increasing pressure on both sides to reach an agreement. A spring conference called to deal with the dispute quickly broke down, as the British claimed that no withdrawal was possible until they were certain that Egypt could handle Canal defense and operation without British assistance. An irate Premier Naguib warned of the “big battle” that would soon come unless there was a British promise of unconditional withdrawal. The British held firm, reinforced the Canal, and repulsed a few isolated attack by nationalists. The “big battle” never materialized. ( Facts on File 1953 150-151, Keesing's 12914, 13045).

Trieste III (October 1953) [C]

The lingering Yugoslav resentment over the disposition of Trieste erupted in the autumn of 1953 when the American and British occupation forces announced that they would be withdrawn from their occupation zone (Zone A), and the territory turned over to Italian administration. Yugoslavia’s response was immediate. Protests were raised to the UN Secretary General with the warning that if the decision was not reversed, and a four power conference called to settle the issue, Yugoslavia would send troops into Zone A “at the moment” Italian forces accepted control. The threat was backed up by tank and troop movements along its borders with Italy and Trieste. Italian counter-manuevers, and rioting against Allied property in Yugoslavia raised the crisis to such a point that both the United States and United Kingdom agreed to reopen the issue of Trieste for further negotiation, including a special Security Council meeting on the issue. By December, all Yugoslavian and Italian troops had been returned to quarters. (Source: Facts on File 1953 337, 348, 374, 427; Keesing's 13189-13198.)

Polish Uprisings (October 1956) [N]

October 1956 saw an attempt to open up the Communist government in Poland. First Secretary Gomulka praised “different roads to socialism” and regretted “past errors” made in the name of socialism. Stalinist ministers were dropped, and liberalization in some areas was embraced. Soon after these changes were made, a delegation from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party arrived in Warsaw. In heated talks, the Soviet Union demanded the retention of hardliners in the government and a slow down in democratization. Their threat to intervene in the matter was backed up by Soviet armored divisions moving from their Polish bases towards Warsaw. The Polish government stayed firm and the Soviets relented, once assurances were given that the Soviet bases in Poland were not at risk. (Sources: Keesing’s 15161).
Suez Crisis I (November 1956) [N]

In June of 1956, Great Britain removed the last of its troops from the Suez Canal region. A month later, the Egyptian government nationalized the Canal, provoking an international crisis for Britain and France, the two states with the largest stake in the Canal. Collusion with Israel led to an Israeli invasion of Egypt, and British and French intervention to "protect" the Canal. This operation was largely aimed at the removal of President Nasser from control in Egypt. Great Britain and France sent ultimatums to both Egypt and Israel, demanding that both states withdraw their troops from the Suez Canal region and allow French and British troops to take control of a buffer zone around the waterway. Refusal to give way peacefully would result in France and Britain seizing control of the canal. Though the ultimatum was delivered to both warring states, only Egypt is considered a target of this threat, as collusion between the western powers and Israel meant that Israel knew that it was expected to play along and comply. Egyptian refusal to submit to the demands led to the allied invasion. (Sources: Nutting, A., 193-4)

Suez Crisis II (November 1956) [C]

The Soviet Union, eager to demonstrate its solidarity with the Egyptian government, condemned the Anglo-French invasion, and threatened nuclear strikes on French and British cities if the invasion was not halted. Though the invasion was halted, there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet threats had anything to do with this. In fact, the evidence points to the absence of American support for the action against Egypt as the primary international factor taken into account by the British and French. Still, to keep coding consistent, and to avoid inferring the relationship between threat and outcome, this case is coded as compliance, as Britain and France did meet the demands of the Soviet Union. (Nutting, A., passim, Gorst, A. and Johnman, L., 122-3, Troen, S. and Shemesh, M., 160).

Sino-Indian Border (October 1959) [N]

The Sino-Indian border is full of mountainous areas where the demarcation lines are unclear or in dispute. The border was drawn by the British, in negotiations with the then semi-independent Tibetan regime. This line (McMahon Line) derives its name from the official who negotiated its limits. The Communist government in Beijing and the post-colonial government in Delhi both had problems with McMahon line, so both regimes tried to subtly move into the areas where this line was most nebulous. This line became a bone of contention between India and China, especially in the late 1950s, when Chinese plans for greater control over Tibet were an additional irritant between the two nations. Since 1958, each side blamed the other for violating the border, which was easy to do, as the McMahon Line was never properly demarcated. In 1959, the Longju area of the borderlands was the issue of dispute as Chinese forces drove Indian troops from their posts in the region. India protested this “deliberate aggression” and said that if China did not withdraw from the Longju, it would resort to forceful means of expulsion. Chinese troops remained at Longju, but this point became the site of the immediate cause of the Sino-Indian War three years later. (Sources: Liu, X. 20-27, Chatuverdi, G.W. 62-67).
U-2 (May 1960) [C]

In the spring of 1960, an American spy plane, a U-2, was downed over the Soviet Union. The revelation of an active and advanced aerial reconnaissance by the United States of the USSR led to the cancellation of the scheduled superpower summit between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. The plane had flown from a base in Pakistan, and was scheduled to land in Norway. The USSR threatened to attack bases in Norway, Pakistan and Turkey unless the governments of these three states promised to discontinue use of its airfields for spy missions over the USSR. Some sources characterize the allied response as equivocal, denying that such flights had ever taken place with their knowledge. However, I classify this case as an instance of compliance because the governments of these states made a point of seeking, and receiving, assurances from the United States that its airspace would not be used for spy flights.

Bizerte (July 1961) [N]

The conclusion of the Sakiet Crisis in 1958 included an agreement for the eventual withdrawal of all French forces from Tunisia. In 1961, it appeared that France was, in fact, increasing its presence at its base at Bizerte, a town on the northern tip of Tunisia. The arms buildup at the base coincided with the escalation of a territorial dispute between Tunisia and Algeria (then still under French rule). The Tunisian government decided to force the issue by threatening to blockade the French base at Bizerte and march its troop into the disputed Saharan lands if the French did not withdraw its troops from the base and recognize Tunisia's territorial claims. France was more annoyed than threatened by these statements, and ignored the claims. Tunisia subsequently blockaded the base and marched into the disputed lands. Before long, France was shooting at the blockading troops and bombing Tunisian military posts. An agreement was reached within a month, which included another promise to phase out the French presence in Tunisia.

Breakup of UAR (September 1961) [N]

In 1958, Egypt and Syria united to form the United Arab Republic. This union was difficult for Syria, which constantly felt that its interests were being ignored in this, essentially Egypt-led, union. A short three and a half years after the union was declared, Syria decided to leave it. Syria declared its separation from the union in September 1961. The Egyptian government was initially hostile. President Nasser sent troops to Syria, threatening to use force unless the Syrian government revoked its declaration of secession and made room for a government more conciliatory towards Egypt. Before the troops even reached Syria, it became clear that the entire Syrian army was supportive of the move away from Egypt, so Nasser called off the intervention and offered peace with the separate Syrian government.

West Irian II (December 1961) [N]
Western New Guinea (West Irian) was still under Dutch control in late 1961, and Indonesia was still agitating for its cession to Indonesian control. The Netherlands was convinced that it was in the best interests of the colony to let it decide its own fate in a plebiscite, fulfilling the Dutch commitment to the principle of self-determination. Aware that a plebiscite in Irian could remove the possibility of admitting the colony to Indonesian control. Declaring that the Dutch supervised plebiscite was imperialist control, the Indonesian government ordered a mobilization of its forces and threatened to go to war to liberate West Irian unless the Netherlands removed its presence from the region. The Netherlands appealed to the United Nations for assistance, but it was of little help. Indonesian troops began parachuting into West Irian in 1962, establishing control over parts of the region. The Netherlands fought back, and the threat of a full scale war was only lessened by UN and American intervention; devising an agreement for the transfer of West Irian sovereignty to Indonesia. (Sources: Keesing's 18635, Franck, T., 81-2, Facts on File 1961 462B1).

Goa (December 1961) [N]

The continuing Portuguese presence on the Indian subcontinent was embarrassing for an Indian government that had dedicated itself to eliminating imperialism in all forms. The Portuguese colony/province of Goa was targeted by Nehru again in 1961. India massed a large military force around the port city, claiming that Portuguese sponsored guerrillas were crossing the boundary and harassing Indian citizens. India demanded that the colony of Goa be peacefully handed over to India by Portugal, or the Indian government would be forced to use other means. Portugal had long claimed that Goa, a Portuguese possession from the sixteenth century, was an integral part of the nation. After refusing to back down, the Portuguese in Goa faced an invasion from land and sea. India had finally liberated the Goans. (Sources: Keesing's 18635).

Sino-Indian War (October 1962) [N]

Chinese refusal to discuss its troop placements along the disputed Sino-Indian border in 1959 led to a series of border clashes between the two states. India was adamant that China accept the McMahon Line as the legal boundary between the two. Chinese refusal to withdraw its army from disputed land led to a more forceful India policy. India announced in 1961 that, though it preferred diplomatic means, it would resort to war if necessary to expel China from Indian territory. When this threat did nothing to move China closer to a settlement, India sent regular army forces to reinforce a border post. China moved troops into the same region and the shooting war began. The war was brief, and ended in a standstill. (Sources: Liu, X. 30-34, Chatuverdi, G.W. 71-6).

Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) [C]

The Soviet Union took a major gamble in the fall of 1962 by placing medium range nuclear missiles on Cuba, either to deter an American invasion of their island ally or to redress the strategic imbalance between them and the United States. Once these missiles sites were discovered, the American government instituted a blockade of the island, deterring the Soviets from delivering new missiles to the sites. There still remained the issue of the missiles already on Cuba, and the Soviets stepped up construction of the sites
already there. The United States put its troops on alert, and served notice that the USA was willing to strike the missile sites from the air if the missiles were not removed. To induce action from Moscow, Washington offered Khrushchev an incentive: a pledge not invade Cuba and the removal of American missiles from Turkey. Not willing to risk escalation of this dispute in to a nuclear war, the Soviets agreed. (Sources: Allison, G., 228, Blight, J. and Welch, D., 261-6, Kennedy, R.)

Dominican Embassy (April 1963) [C]
A small rebel group in Haiti, aiming at the usurping of President Duvalier, were forced to take refuge in the embassy of the Dominican Republic. The Haitian government began a blockade of the embassy, laying siege to all those inside, in contravention of international convention regarding the sanctity of diplomatic quarters. The Dominican government was furious with this violation, and declared that as these people had sought political asylum in their embassy, it was not proper for Haiti to pressure their officials by holding them hostage. The Dominican Republic moved troops to the border and warships off coast, threatening to take action if Haiti did not end the blockade. Haiti was ill-equipped to face the militarily stronger Dominican Republic, so it acceded to the demand. (Source: Facts on File 1963 154C1).

Cyprus I (December 1963) [N]
A sizable minority of Greek Cypriots had long clamored for the union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis). The threat that this possibility posed to the Turkish minority on the island nation led to conflict between the two ethnic groups, and, consequently, their two mother nations. After a period of especially brutal fighting had the Turkish Cypriots on the run, the Turkish government moved a number of troops to port cities on the Mediterranean, and moved warships closer to the Cypriot coast. Turkey threatened to intervene on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots if the attacks on Turkish Cypriots around Nicosia were not ended. Cyprus continued to condone, if not sponsor, discrimination and attacks against the Turkish minority. (Sources: Bitsios, D., 126-7, Keesing's 20714).

Cyprus II (March 1964) [P]
As the attacks on Turkish Cypriots continued, the Turkish government delivered an ultimatum to the Cypriot government. If the attacks were not ended, prisoners not released and freedom of movement not restored, Turkey would invade the island. Evaluations of the success of this threat vary. Makarios, the leader of Cyprus, was defiant in speeches, and condemned the methods of the Turkish government. However, attacks were substantially reduced and a number of prisoners were released. This confrontation led to the decision by the UN Security Council to introduce a peacekeeping force to Cyprus. The presence of the force appeased the Turks, to some extent. (Sources: Keesing's 20120, Bitsios, D. 159, Panteli, S. 360-1, Ehrlich 63-4).

Turkish Bombings (August 1964) [C]
The attacks on Turkish Cypriots continued, despite the presence of a UN force. The Turkish government decided to bomb the Greek Cypriots into accord with their
promise to halt their attacks. Greece, in the UN Security Council chamber, threatened to go to war with Turkey if the bombings did not cease. Turkey acceded, not willing to go to war at this point. (Sources: Panteli, S. 366-7, Bitsios, D. 176, Keesing's 20265).

Kashmir War (August 1965) [N]

Sovereignty over the Kashmir region of South Asia has been under dispute ever since India and Pakistan received their independence in 1947. Defeat in the wars that immediately followed independence meant that Pakistan had to delay attempts to get influence in the majority Muslim Kashmir. In 1965, Pakistan began sending infiltrators into the region in an attempt to destabilize India's control there. As the attacks heated up, an armed confrontation in the Rann of Kutch raised the tempers of both sides. In August, India threatened to go to war against Pakistan unless it put an end to the destabilizing infiltrations. Confident that its new tanks and aircraft could repel any Indian attack, and lead to an effective counter-attack, Pakistan rejected the demands. India soon began an invasion of West Pakistan that ended in the rout of Pakistan's forces. (Sources: Keesing's 21103-4, Choudhury, G.W. 250-6, Barnds, W. 204-6).

Sikkim (September 1965) [N]

While the war against Pakistan continued to turn in India's favor, Pakistan's major ally, China, took the opportunity to gain concessions on its Indian border, and maybe alleviate the pressure on Pakistan. Claiming that India had built a series of fortifications along the boundary between China and Sikkim, China threatened to invade India if these fortifications were not demolished. India claimed that there were no fortifications along this border, and that it had no idea what China was referring to. The existence of these fortifications is still a subject of disagreement. India ignored the demands, and a few days after the ultimatum was delivered, China backed down, claiming that India had met the demands. Therefore, China claims a success. I code this as non-compliance because there is no evidence that India took any action in region greater than redeploying a border guard. With no evidence of "fortifications" being destroyed, or even of a let up in pressure on Pakistan (if this was the actual motive of China's threat) it would faulty to consider this true compliance. (Sources: Keesing's 21118-9, Barnds, W. 206, Choudhury. G.W. 256).

Yemen (May 1966) [N]

The North Yemeni royal family was usurped in 1962 by a revolutionary military group. The king was assassinated by this group, but his heir and some loyalists fled to the mountains where they began a guerrilla campaign against the new regime. The new government appealed for aid from Egypt, which was sympathetic to the republican nature of the revolution. The royalists found an ally in the Saudi Arabian government, which armed the royal rebels in their campaign. Egypt found its troops bogged down in a long civil war, and believed that the only way to end the war quickly was to remove Saudi support for the rebels. In May 1966, Egypt threatened to attack Saudi airfields along its border with Yemen unless it stopped arming the royal forces. Saudi Arabia ignored the threat, and no action was taken. The war continued until 1970, when a coalition government was negotiated between the royalists and republicans. (Source: Keesing's 21542).
Ghanaian Regime (May 1966) [N]

Spring 1966 saw a coup in Ghana depose the longtime dictator-president Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah fled to nearby Guinea, where he was given asylum by President Sekou Toure. Guinea promised to do what it could to restore Nkrumah to his nation and threatened to go to war with the new Ghanaian government if Nkrumah was not restored to his presidency. As a war with Ghana would necessitate marching through the Ivory Coast, the threat was perceived by both states. The two states said they would respond militarily to any attempt to restore Nkrumah to his position, so the exile continued, with no action by Guinea. (Source: Keesing's 21275).

Aqaba Closure (May 1967) [N]

Tensions were mounting in the Middle East in the spring of 1967. Egypt had moved large numbers of soldiers to its border with Israel, and Nasser's rhetoric was reaching new levels of belligerency. Israel was cautious, and sought assurances that it could rely on international pressure to keep Israel secure. This security seemed to evaporate when Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran, the southern tip of the Gulf of Aqaba, to all traffic. This waterway was of vital importance to Israeli shipping, as this was its only opening to the eastern markets. When international pressure failed to get Egypt to change its mind, on May 26, Israel threatened to force the opening of the canal to Israeli ships if Egypt did not end the blockade peacefully. Egypt ignored the threat, and prepared for war with Israel, a war which came two weeks later and saw the expansion of Israeli border from the Suez Canal itself to the Jordan River. (Source: Keesing's 22068).

Cyprus III (November 1967) [P]

The presence of Greek troops in Cyprus encouraged the Greek Cypriot population to continuing violations of Turkish Cypriot rights. The Greek forces themselves were reported to have participated in some of these outrages, and the commander of these forces was supposedly behind a number of attacks on Turkish Cypriots. Taking advantage of political uncertainty in Greece following the military takeover of the government, Turkey threatened to invade Cyprus and go to war with Greece if the Greek troops in Cyprus were not withdrawn and an indemnity not paid in compensation for Turkish lives lost. After an initial hesitation, Greece recalled its commander in Cyprus and began the withdrawal of all of its forces from the island. No indemnity was paid, and Turkey waived this demand in light of Greek acquiescence in the other demands. (Sources: Panteli, S. 374, Keesing's 22435-6).

Pueblo Seizure (January 1968) [C]

The North Korean government seized an American patrol ship, the Pueblo, near its territorial waters. The North Korean government suspected that this ship was involved in spying on the goings on in Korea. The seizure of this ship provoked a diplomatic crisis, as the North Koreans refused to release the crew or the ship until it had concluded its investigation of what the ship was doing off its shores. The United States moved a number of ships into the region, including an aircraft carrier from the Seventh Fleet, and sent a number of messages to North Korea hinting at military repercussions for their
holding of the ship, demanding the return of the crew and Pueblo immediately. The Communist regime in North Korea then marched out the captain of the crew, who confessed to having carried out espionage on behalf of the American government. The Korean government held on to both the crew and ship for a number of weeks, before releasing the crew, which subsequently recanted on its admission of guilt. There is no evidence tying the possibility of American action against North Korea to the release of the crew. In fact, the American warships were moved away from North Korean waters just prior to the confession and release of the Pueblo's crew. But, as the demands were complied with, so for the sake of coding accuracy, this is compliance. (Sources: Keessing's 22586, Simmons, J., passim, Rusk, D.).

Prague Spring (July 1968) [C]
1968 saw the beginning of a liberalization in Communist Czechoslovakia. An opening of the press and allowing limited freedom of assembly resulted in calls for greater democracy in the state, including multi-party elections. The Czechoslovakian government was divided over the extent of liberalization, so moderates, led by Alexander Dubcek, took control of the agenda. This opening of Czechoslovakian society was dubbed "The Prague Spring", and was seen in Moscow as a direct challenge to Soviet authority in the Warsaw Pact. A series of meetings in the spring of 1968 underscored the risks Czechoslovakia would be running if steps were not taken to restore "socialism" to its primary place in Czech society. Talks culminated in a meeting at Ciera, where Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin met the Czech leadership. The Soviet officials reiterated their demands for a commitment to scale back the liberal measures taken earlier in the year and restore the Czech Communist party's leading role in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev reminded Dubcek of the fate of Imre Nagy in Hungary in 1956, when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary to retain its hold on that state. Kosygin stated that the USSR could occupy Czechoslovakia in 24 hours, and would be ready to do so. After all, the only border that mattered was that between East and West, Communist and Capitalist. These were unambiguous threats to use use force if concessions were not made. A shaken Dubcek agreed to take steps to reduce the level of liberalization in Czechoslovakia, including placazing hardliners in his government to ensure loyalty. (Source: Williams, K. pp. 63-103.)

Prague Spring (August 1968) [N]
After the Ciera meeting, it became clear that it was one thing to make concessions, and another to carry them out. The decisions on how to implement the socialist measures agreed to at Ciera became bogged down in Prague. The reformers and moderates were able to delay agreement on implementation for weeks. Dubcek protested to Brezhnev that "rightist elements" were at work in the Presidium. The Soviet Union pushed for a deadline on implementation, but the Czech leadership responded that nothing could be done until the Central Committee met, and no meeting was planned until the end of August. Repeated reminders of Soviet strength and the importance of maintaining solidarity in the Warsaw Pact had little effect on the Czech government. (There is evidence that Dubcek kept many of these threats and reminders secret from his colleagues in the Czech Politburo.) On August 20, a Warsaw Pact invasion force, led by Soviet
troops from East Germany, Poland and Hungary, crushed the Czech efforts at liberalizing socialism. (source: Williams, K. pp. 103-114).

Shatt-al-Arab (April 1969) [N]

The Shatt-al-Arab waterway on the Iraqi-Iranian border had been under dispute for a number of years. A treaty signed in 1937 divided sovereignty for the waterway between the two nations. Iraq, with fewer access points to the Persian Gulf than Iran, resented this treaty, and claimed that the stronger Iran was taking advantage of Iraq's weakness. In spring 1969, Iraq declared that the Shatt-al-Arab waterway was now completely under Iraqi control. Iraq threatened to fire upon any ships flying the Iranian flag and halt all ships heading for Iran as long as Teheran refused to recognize Iraq's sovereignty. Iran ignored this threat, and continued to use the waterway in the manner prescribed by the treaty the states had agreed to many years earlier. Iraq took no action in face of this determination, and dropped the issue. (Source: Keesing's 23544).

Sino-Soviet Border (September 1969) [C]

The long border between the Soviet Union and China was not adequately demarcated in many areas. Added to confusion over where the border actually was, China refused to accept many Soviet claims, as they were based on the one-sided treaties that Tsarist Russia signed with a weak Chinese Empire. Tensions spilled over into bloodshed along the Ussuri River, Amur River and Kazakh border in March and April 1969. To reduce the likelihood of the skirmishes spilling into a real war in East and Central Asia, the USSR proposed negotiating where the border actually was. China refused to meet, charging that the Soviet Union had provoked the clashes and was aiming at extending its imperialist designs in Asia. As skirmishes continued through the summer and fall, the USSR, quietly, sent a message to the Chinese government that it would consider bombing the Chinese nuclear facility in Xinkiang if China did not agree to negotiate the border and move its troops from the disputed region. The evidence of this threat being made is vague. There are reports that Premier Kosygin delivered such a threat during his brief visit to Beijing in September. The best evidence is that the planned transfer of Chinese nuclear materials from Xinkiang to Tibet was hastened considerably in September. The workers at these facilities began working harder and longer in order to meet an earlier deadline, evidence that China had reason to believe that the Xinkiang site was in danger. To induce cooperation, the USSR offered an incentive: it too would withdraw its troops from the region until an agreement was satisfactorily negotiated. China agreed to negotiate the border, and renounced their claims on lands seized by the Tsarist Russians. (Sources: Kissinger, H. 171-86, Keesing's 23644).

Lebanese Guerrillas (March 1970) [N]

In 1970, Lebanon was a major site for the launching of guerrilla attacks against Israel. After a particularly blatant attack aided and abetted by the Lebanese government, Israel threatened to launch a series of reprisal raids unless the guerrilla attacks were ended or reduced in frequency. Though it is not clear how much control Lebanon had over the many groups of Palestinian guerrillas that used Lebanon as a base, Lebanon took no steps to secure the border with Israel, which would have been at least a sign of good
faith in complying with the demands. Therefore, the threat failed, and Israel conducted a number of reprisals against Lebanon. (Source: Facts on File 1970 14002).

Black September (September 1970) [N]
The large number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan included Fedayeen guerrillas, who established camps from which to launch attacks on Israel. Jordan's increasingly soft position on confrontation with Israel angered the Fedayeen, which then began attacks on the stability of the Jordanian monarchy, including an attempt to assassinate King Hussein in the spring. The King was reluctant to crack down too heavily on the Fedayeen, which was taken as a sign of weakness by the Palestinians. A second attempt to assassinate King Hussein on September 1 triggered a number of clashes between the Jordanian army and the well armed Fedayeen. These clashes were going bad for the Fedayeen, when Iraq, which had almost 20,000 troops stationed in Jordan, threatened to take action to protect the Palestinian guerrillas unless Jordan stopped shelling Fedayeen positions by late that evening. Iraq never carried out its threat, in fact its troops never moved far from their quarters. (Sources: Kissinger, H. (1979) 594-600, Keesing's 24225).

Black September II (September 1970) [C]
The Jordanian victories over the rebellious Fedayeen triggered a Syrian invasion of Jordan, aimed at the overthrow of the moderate Jordanian regime. The Syrian intervention triggered a major crisis for the United States and Israel. A pro-Syrian regime in Jordan would have been destabilizing to Israeli security, but an intervention by USA or Israeli forces could prove fatal to King Hussein's legitimacy in the Arab world. The initial successes of the Syrian invasion force forced the American and Israeli governments to act. Israel began a build up of forces in the Golan Heights and made clear movements towards conducting air strikes on Syrian forces. At the same time, the United States applied diplomatic pressure and moved airborne troops in a signal to Syria to end its operations in Jordan. A major Jordanian victory applied further pressure on Syria, but the fact that there was no attempt to reinforce the Syrian army or give the troops in Jordan air support is evidence that Syria had resolved to end its intervention in Jordan. Soon after its defeat at Irbid, Syria pulled all of its forces out of Jordan. (Sources: Kissinger, H. (1979) 617-631, Facts on File 1970 671E2, Keesing's 24225).

East Pakistan (October 1971) [N]
Pakistani elections in 1971 resulted in a victory for a group of secessionist legislators. This threat led to a brutal crackdown in the region by the central government of Pakistan, which was dominated by the Western part of the country. The repression of the Bangla Desh Movement led to drove millions of refugees across the East Pakistani border with India. This massive influx of refugees was a severe strain on India, which soon moved its own troops to the border to control the flows and protect them from possible West Pakistani reprisals. India was covertly aiding the secessionists in their rebellion, but publicly called for international guarantees that Pakistan would re-admit the refugees once conditions in East Pakistan were safe. As the year went on, and international concern over the plight of east Pakistan grew, India became more forceful in its statements, declaring that Pakistan should take definitive steps to end the repression and
persecution in Bangla Desh, or India would act to end the unrest itself. This was interpreted as support for, if not secession, at least autonomy, for East Pakistan and the release of the jailed secessionist leaders. Pakistan attempted to stall to get United Nations action, but Indian adamance, and Soviet support of India, led to the third war on the subcontinent between the two former British colonies since their independence. (Source: Keesing’s 24991-24993, Kissinger, H. (1979), 854-818.)

Sudanese Civil War (December 1971) [C]

Sudanese forces in pursuit of rebel troops chased their quarry across the southern border into Uganda, which had been aiding the rebels. Uganda threatened retaliation against Sudan and its troops if they were not withdrawn immediately. They were. The next year, to avoid future confrontations, Uganda and Sudan settled their difference, with Uganda promising to limit its assistance to the Sudanese rebellion to humanitarian aid. Facts on File 1971 1010F).

Kuwait (March 1973) [N]

Iraq’s lack of substantial coastline had limited it to Basra was its major port and naval base. Basra is a poor place for a port because its access to the Persian gulf is the Shatt-al-Arab waterway, which is dominated by Iran. In 1972, Iraq began building an alternative ports at Umm Qasr. Just north of Kuwait. It would also be limited as a port, because the Kuwaiti emirate controls its access to the Gulf. As the border between Iraq and Kuwait had not yet been properly demarcated, Iraq simply moved into the strategically important region, leading to a brief skirmish at a border post. Iraq heavily reinforced the border area, and then made further demands of Kuwait. It had to cede a strip of coastline around the border post of Al-Samitah, and the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. Kuwait refused these demands and requested Arab mediation. Eventually, under Arab and Iranian pressure, Iraq withdrew from the disputed area. (Source: Kelly 2-4).

Yom Kippur War (October 1973) [C]

The Yom Kippur War was another defeat for the Arab states in the Middle East. After initial successes forced the Israeli armies back on the Sinai front, Egypt found itself the target of a determined counter-attack which ended in the isolation of Egypt’s Third Army along the Suez Canal. A cease-fire in place, negotiated by the superpowers, left this army in an uncomfortable position, surrounded by the enemy, cut-off from reinforcement or supply. The cease-fire soon broke down, and the Third Army was in danger of being eliminated. The USSR, holding the United States responsible for the actions of its ally, sent a threatening note to the State Department. It invited the United States to participate in a joint intervention in the region in order to separate the two nations’ armies and maintain the cease-fire. If the USA refused to participate in such an enterprise, the USSR would have little choice but to take action on its own to see to it that the Egyptian Third Army was saved from annihilation by the Israeli army. The simultaneous mobilization of Soviet airborne troops and naval units underlined the threat. The United States did not like the prospect of Soviet forces helping Egypt, especially if the intervention included forcing Israel into a retreat. The USA put its forces in the region on
alert, a clear signal to the Soviet Union that any attempt at intervention would be met with resistance. At the same time, the American government worked on persuading the Israeli government to reinitiate a cease-fire, and agree to keep any future cease-fire. (Kissinger, H. (1982), 545-585)

**Omani War (February 1975) [N]**

As the Omani war against leftist rebels in Dhofar continued, the Sultanate received much welcomed aid from Iran, the bastion of Western influence in the Gulf region. The cooperation between these two states irritated the enemies of American influence in the area, especially Libya which threatened to wage war on Oman if foreign forces were not removed from Omani land. Oman, in response, only stepped up its integration with pro-West forces, receiving missiles and aircraft from the West and its allies. (*Keesing's* 27483).

**Mayaguez (May 1975) [C]**

The American merchant vessel *Mayaguez* was seized by the Cambodian government. The national embarrassment in Vietnam may have led to the loud protests in Washington against this seizure. A US naval task force was sent to the area, with the stated intention of attacking Cambodian military sites to liberate the captive vessel if the ship was not released. In a tragic miscommunication, the American marine force did attack a Cambodian naval installation (the wrong one, it turned out) with many casualties, not knowing that the Cambodians had already agreed to release the vessel and its crew intact. (*Keesing's* 27239).

**Syrian Dam (June 1975) [N]**

The lack of a reliable water supply in the Middle East has often led to political conflicts between the states in the region. 1975 saw the commencement of a dam project on the Euphrates River in Syria to increase its water supply. This dam, however, could lead to the reduction in water supply for Iraqi farmers, who had relied for centuries on the northern Euphrates ample flow. Iraq threatened to bomb the dam project if Syria did not agree to a freeing of the water in the area, and a guaranteed share of the water reserve for Iraq’s farmers. Syria ignored the protests, and Iraq took no action. (Sources: *Keesing’s* 27284-5).

**Kenyan Oil (July 1976) [N]**

Uganda’s eccentric leader Idi Amin often made speeches which referred to Uganda’s outstanding territorial claims on its neighbors. One such speech referred to Ugandan lands being occupied by Kenya. Frustrated with such provocative behavior, Kenya stopped supplying with Uganda with the oil it relied on. An irate Amin threatened to go to war with Kenya if it did not reopen the flow of oil to his nation. Kenya was firm in its resolve to keep Uganda without oil until Amin ceased his claims to Kenyan lands. Amin soon stated that he would never press Uganda’s claims its neighbor’s territory. This seems to have resolved the dispute. (Sources: *Keesing’s* 27892, *Facts on File 1976 548*).
Ghanaian Secession (November 1977) [P]

A secession movement in the Volta region of Ghana was suspected of being financed by Togo. The Ghanaian government accused Togo of undermining the Ghanaian economy through black marketeering and funneling funds from North Africa to secessionists in an effort to annex the Volta region. Press reports of imminent war and military threats convinced Togo to send a delegation to Ghana which announced a new policy to stop black marketeering on their common border. Ghana continued to claim Togo was funding secession, but talks of military action subsided.

(Sources: Keesing's 29069).

Shelling of Beirut (July 1978) [C]

Syrian troops in Lebanon resumed shelling Christian areas of Beirut in July 1978, as retaliation for Christian attacks on Syrian forces. Syria only let up once certain conditions were met, conditions which would amount to the removal of the Christian faction as a serious force in Lebanese politics. As casualties from the shelling mounted, Israel threatened “serious consequences” if the shelling did not cease. This was accompanied by an overflight of Kfir attack planes, and the Lebanese president’s threat to resign. Syria submitted, and the shelling stopped the next day. (Sources: Keesing’s 30006-7).

Sino-Vietnam War (February 1979) [C]

Historically tense relations between Vietnam and China exploded in early 1979 when a border dispute, coupled with the extended Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, led to a massive Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Global reaction was mixed. Some roundly condemned the invasion, while others saw the fight as a form of late justice for the Cambodian people, who had been occupied by Vietnamese troops since 1978. The Soviet Union was one of the most outspoken critics of the Chinese action. It sent military supplies to Vietnam, and deployed a strong naval force in Vietnamese waters, including vessels not usually docked at the Soviet base at Cam Ranh. In a veiled threat, the USSR said that as long as the Chinese were out soon, there would be no need for Soviet intervention. This was made more explicit on March 2, when the USSR said that “the more crimes the PRC commits, the more severe the retribution would be”. On March 5, China announced that its goals were met, and the People’s Liberation Army would soon leave Vietnam. China, had, in fact, suffered military reverses after some initial successes. (Sources: Keesing’s 29873).

Ouster of Amin (March 1979) [N]

The continual interference by the eccentric Ugandan President, Idi Amin, in the affairs of his neighbors finally provoked his one of his powerful rivals into action. In late 1978, the Tanzanian army responded to a Ugandan occupation of lands in the north of Tanzania (the Kagera Salient) by invading Uganda. The aim was to depose Amin and replace him with Milton Obote, the man whom Amin had deposed years earlier. The Tanzanian invasion was a striking success. Amin, who had few friends or allies, appealed to his Libyan sponsor for aid. Libya threatened to intervene on behalf of Uganda if Tanzania did not halt the invasion and withdraw its troop from Ugandan territory.
Tanzania paid no attention to the Libyan threat. Libya did send a small brigade to Uganda to fight for Amin, but it was quickly routed by the Tanzanian army. Amin fled to Libya, and Obote was reinstated as President of Uganda. (Sources: *Facts on File 1979* 257F1, *Keesing's* 29674).

**Soviet Threat to Pakistan (June 1979)** [N]

Afghanistan was sinking into civil war. The Soviet-leaning Afghan government was under assault from a number of rebel groups. These groups resented the land reform policies of the Takriti government, which subsequently called for Soviet assistance in the form of arms and advisors. Pakistan feared a strong socialist regime on its borders and gave the rebels whatever aid it could, or so it was assumed by the Soviet Union. Frustrated by its ally’s inability to quell the revolts, the USSR demanded that Pakistan end its assistance to the rebels, as Moscow could not “look with indifference” on Pakistan’s involvement. Pakistan understood this as a threat directed at itself and its advisors in Afghanistan, but persisted in its assistance to the anti-Takriti party. The Soviet Union opted for an invasion of Afghanistan as the best solution to its problems. (*Keesing’s* 29878-29880).

**Syrian Missiles (May 1981)** [N]

Israeli intervention on behalf of the Christian warriors in the Lebanese civil war, led to a Syrian decision to install SA-6 anti-aircraft missiles in the Bekaa Valley. Israel claimed that this violated an agreement reached in 1975 regarding which types of weapons would not be employed in Lebanon. Syria denied that any such agreement existed. Israel demanded that the missiles be removed, or Israel would take them out. Superpower diplomacy failed to defuse the tense situation, and each side deployed troops to underline their determination. Syrian reinforcements and missile launches at Israeli reconnaissance drones provoked Israel to expand its demands to include removal of all SAMs along the Lebanese border, and a cessation of launches at Israeli drones. Still no removal occurred. Even Israeli attack on Libyan SAMs in the area did nothing to induce Syrian cooperation. (Sources: *Facts on File* 301,323).

**South Talpatty Islands (May 1981)** [N]

South Talpatty Island (known as New Moore Island in India) was formed by a fierce storm in 1970. Lying on the estuary of a border river, it was claimed by both Bangladesh and India. A apparent agreement to determine ownership by joint survey was reached in 1979. In May 1981, however, India began an independent survey operation, without consulting the Bangladeshi government. After a polite protest from Dacca was ignored, Bangladesh sent gunboats to the area to menace the survey ship and induce the Indians to withdraw. India countered with a frigate. The dispute continued, with a formal Bangladeshi demand for withdrawal of all Indian ships from the area, accompanied by more gunboats. India obstinately continued its survey, leading Bangladesh to call for a peaceful settlement, offering new talks over the status of the island. By September, all ships in the region were gone. (Sources: *Keesing’s* 31090-1, 31385).

**Falkland Islands (April 1982)** [N]
In April 1982, Argentina pressed its claims to the Falkland Islands in a dramatic way. Argentina invaded and occupied the islands, claiming it was liberating Argentine territory. The British response was swift. A naval task force was assembled and dispatched to the south Atlantic to impose a blockade of the islands. Peace talks brokered by Peru and the United States failed to achieve anything, as Argentina refused to budge on the *sine qua non* of complete withdrawal from the Falklands. The arrival of the British fleet and its position in the South Atlantic conveyed Britain's threat to take military action (a probable war) to free the islands if Argentina failed to freely remove its soldiers. Argentine intransigence removed the likelihood of a peaceful outcome. The shooting war arrived with the sinking of the Argentine cruiser *Belgrano*, and, a little over a month later, the Falklands were back under British control. (Sources: *Keesing's*, 31525-31534).

**Gulf War Allies (May 1982) [N]**

The war between Iran and Iraq, in some way or another, involved every state in the Persian Gulf. The Arab monarchies and emirates threw their money and resources behind Iraq, in an effort to weaken the threatening revolutionary government in Iran. Iran, in an attempt to bring home to the oil rich states the risks involved in helping Iraq, threatened to launch attacks on Bahraini, Kuwaiti, Omani, Qatari, Saudi Arabian and UAE targets. The flow of continued, despite these threats, and may even have been increased in the following months. Once Iraq began attacking Iranian oil shipments, Iran extended its attacks to include any tanker associated with Iraq or its allies. This step began the so-called Tanker War, leading to great power intervention in the region. (Sources: *Keesing's* 31848, *Facts on File* 1982, 380C)

**Cuban Influence (May-June 1983) [C]**

Surinam was a small maverick state in the early 1980s. Its strong leftist leanings made it one of Cuba's staunchest allies in the Americas. This association was troubling to Surinam's neighbors, who remembered Cuban inspired efforts to spread revolution two decades earlier. In 1982, the military government executed a number of prominent politicians and businessmen, leading to a new period of alienation from the United States and the Netherlands. In June 1983, Brazil, wary of Cuban influence on its border, threatened to invade Surinam unless the military junta took steps to reduce Cuban influence in its government. This threat, accompanied by the offer of much needed Brazilian economic assistance, led to the dismissal of the Minister of Culture, who was known to have close ties with the Cuban government. (Sources: *Keesing's* 32558).

**ANC raids (January 1986) [N]**

The death by land mine of two white South Africans along the Botswana border was seen as more evidence of Botswanan complicity with ANC guerrillas. In a strong statement, Pretoria threatened to go into Botswana itself to root out the guerrillas unless Botswana pledge to stop ANC incursions into South Africa. A South African raid in Gabarone a year earlier was clear evidence of South Africa's willingness to take the fight against the ANC to its sponsor states. Botswana took no action against the guerrillas this time, either, and, in May, the South African military hit targets in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. (Sources: *Facts on File* 10F1, 369A1).
Iraqi Allies (March 1986) [N]

The expansion of Iran’s war effort to the tanker traffic in the Gulf failed to disturb the flow of support from the Arab Gulf states to Iraq. Iran, aside from back door support from Syria, was isolated in the region. In an effort to end the support offered by the rich Gulf monarchies to the enemy in Baghdad, Iran threatened to extend the war to attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi targets if the aid to Iraq were not ended. This threat achieved nothing. (Sources: Facts on File 1986, 206-D3-207-D1.

Renamo Aid (September 1986) [N]

Mozambique National Resistance (MNR, Renamo in Portuguese) guerrillas continually harassed government troops in Mozambique. Evidence of Malawi aid for Renamo (funneled from South Africa) provoked the government into threatening to blockade Malawi and ring their mutual border with Soviet made surface to air missiles unless the aid was halted. This threat seemingly provoked Renamo, which, in response to the threat, launched a major assault from their bases in Malawi, seizing many towns in the border regions of Mozambique. (Sources: Facts on File 787-E4).

Aegean Exploration (March 1987) [C]

The Greek government’s position on its maritime limits in the Aegean has long been opposed by Turkey. The extension of Greece’s maritime limit, with the large number of Greek owned islands in the Aegean Sea, could lead to the sea’s virtual closure to Turkish traffic. Turkey claims that its continental shelf, which extends far into the Aegean, should be the basis of maritime claims. In an attempt to establish its claim to resources off its continental shelf, Turkey sent an exploration vessel into an area to which Greek government could lay claim under its proposed extension. This action provoked the Greek government into threatening armed expulsion of the Turkish ship if it did not pull out. Another war scare between Turkey and Greece ended in a Turkish pullout from the contested area. Both sides claimed victory in this dispute. Despite complying with the demands, Turkey claimed a political victory because it had raised its concerns over the proposed Greek action in a dramatic way. (Source: Keesing’s)

ANC Incursions II (April 1987) [N]

As it had many times before, South Africa threatened retaliation on the “front-line states” on her northern border which were accused of aiding ANC guerrillas. In this case, Zambia and Botswana were responsible for a policy of filtering Zambia based guerrillas through a cooperative Botswana. After receiving no satisfaction, the South African Defense Force launched raids on Zambian soil, killing four. South Africa claimed the victims were ANC operatives; Zambia claimed they were civilians. (Sources: Facts on File 303-B2).

Venezuelan Waters (August 1987) [C]

In the summer of 1987, Colombia sent a small naval flotilla to a disputed area of the Gulf of Venezuela, hoping that the presence of these forces establish its claim to the region. Venezuela, puzzled by this provocative movement, sent its own ships to the area,
with a message that if the Colombian ships did not move from the area, the Venezuelan navy would be asked to clear the area of their presence. After a tense few days, the Colombian ships withdrew. (Sources: FBIS-LAT-87, 157-161).

Kashmir Rebels (April 1990) [N]
After slightly improving relations in 1989, India and Pakistan again rattled sabers over Kashmir in early 1990. Continual unrest in the disputed region was seen as being fomented by Pakistan. The latest round of violence resulted in numerous gun battles and cycles of revenge killings, following the shooting of a Muslim leader by Indian police. India repeatedly issued deterrent threats against outright invasion, saying that Pakistan would not take Kashmir without war. Furthermore, India would consider military reprisals if Pakistan continued aiding the rebels, reminding it that Pakistan would come out worse in any combat between the two nations. This threat was followed by reciprocal charges of troops movements along the border. In the end, this latest outbreak of violence wound down, but only after a long period of unrest. (Sources: Keesing's 37377, Facts on File 293D2).

Iraqi Demands (July 1990) [P, N]
The Iraqi treasury was bankrupted by Iraq’s prolonged war with Iran. A large debt, owed to the various Gulf states which had supported its war effort, was almost unpayable because of the low price of oil. Iraq perceived the oil rich emirates of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates as the forces keeping oil at an artificially low price through overproduction in contravention of the OPEC agreements regulating the levels of production. Iraq used this opportunity to press its claim to the oil field straddling the Iraq-Kuwait border. Iraq threatened to use force to protect its economic interests if Kuwait and the UAE persisted in their overproduction, and if Kuwait continued pumping oil from the disputed oil fields. The demands placed on Kuwait were later expanded to include a request for land concessions, especially in the Rumaila oil field. Kuwait and the UAE protested their innocence, but an Iraqi buildup on its border with Kuwait convinced its government to offer limited concessions on the Iraqi debt. Iraq refused these concessions. In early August, Iraq invaded Kuwait, quickly conquered it, and announced its annexation to Iraq. (Sources: Schofield, R. 138-141, Keesings, New York Times)

Kuwait Crisis (November 1990) [N]
Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990. This violation of established norms of international relations (the first such complete seizure since World War II), as well as the clear threat the invasion posed to the stability of the west’s supply of oil from the Middle East, provoked the United States and a number of Arab states into sending a deterrent force into Saudi Arabia to protect its northern border. A United Nations Security Council resolution applied economic sanctions on Iraq in an attempt to convince it to withdraw from Kuwait. By November, Iraqi intentions to stay in Kuwait apparently clear, the Security Council, led by the USA, France and Great Britain, issued a clear ultimatum to Iraq. If it refused to withdraw from Kuwait, the international community would be authorized to “use all necessary means” to induce the withdrawal. This was an
unambiguous message that the international coalition would use force to push Iraq out. A flurry of diplomatic activity following the ultimatum achieved nothing, and Iraq remained in Kuwait, which it claimed as a long lost province of the Iraqi people. The expiration of the deadline for compliance on January 15 led to initiation of the Gulf War. (Sources: Keesing’s, Facts on File.)


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