"Formerly Approved and Applauded"

The Continuity of Edwards's *Treatise Concerning Religious Affections*

with Seventeenth-Century Puritan Analyses

of True Piety, Spiritual Sensation and Heart-Religion

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_Stirps radicibus orta:_ I dedicate the thesis to my mother and to the memory of my father.
Chapter 1: Religious Affections in Recent and Contemporary Scholarship

1: Introduction

It is a widespread scholarly commonplace that the theology of Jonathan Edwards represents, in many respects, a decisive departure from puritan tradition. Perry Miller described Edwards himself as "unique, an aboriginal and monolithic power." Everett Emerson declared that Edwards's thought is "so original that it is misleading to call him a puritan." The editors of a recent anthology of Edwardsean selections have asserted that "he reshaped and refashioned a seventeenth-century Puritan world view into something that was entirely different." A large number of important scholarly claims for Edwards's originality, or at least his discontinuity with the puritan past, relate particularly to his theological reflections on the nature of religious experience, generally as presented in his works occasioned by the Great Awakening, and especially in A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections. Perry Miller argued, with reference to Religious Affections, that Edwards "spoke with restraint, but he was none the
less declaring a break with the New England past.™ Norman Pettit commented
that, in respect to the issues explored in Religious Affections, "Edwards's views,
although rejected by many, launched a new system of theology as well as a new
era in the history of New England divinity."™ J.M. Bumsted and J.E. van de
Wetering argued that Edwards's theology of the Great Awakening represents a
"sharp departure" from conventional puritanism.™ John E. Smith warns readers
of Religious Affections that they will be unable to follow the train of Edwards's
thought "in its originality," if they are encumbered with certain presuppositions
supposedly typical of conventional puritanism.™ Thomas Yarborough
considers Edwards's description of religious experience a "revision" of earlier
puritan discussions of the subject.™

Where precisely are the novelties of Religious Affections and other Great-
Awakening treatises supposed to lie? What are the ideas which purportedly
constitute a marked departure from puritan tradition? As the next section will
describe in greater detail, much of the secondary literature has claimed for
Edwards a wide range of innovations: an emphasis on experience rather than

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™Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 77; 178.

™Norman Pettit, The Heart Prepared: Grace and Conversion in Puritan Spiritual Life (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 212.

™ J.M. Bumsted and J.E. van de Wetering, What Must I Do to Be Saved? The Great
Awakening in Colonial America (Hinsdale, Ill., 1976), 102.

Chapman, 1993), 41.

™ Stephen R. Yarborough, Delightful Conviction: Jonathan Edwards and the Rhetoric of
dogma, on the emotions rather than the intellect; a tendency to identify the
will with the affections, rather than with the reason; a definition of true piety in
terms of a "sense of the heart," rather than of systematic knowledge; a
description of human nature as a unified whole, rather than as an aggregate of
discreet psychic faculties; a distinction between genuine and spurious piety
based on "signs" of grace, rather than "steps" in a formalized process of
conversion; a revaluation of the relationship between faith and repentance; a
peculiar emphasis on such concepts as "beauty," "delight," and divine
"excellency;" a unique propensity to describe religious consciousness by using
analogies drawn from the physical senses, especially sight and taste.

However, a careful investigation of seventeenth-century puritanism indicates
that none of these positions is especially distinctive of Edwards. All were
articulated, and most received considerable development, in his puritan
predecessors, especially those closely associated with the traditions of
"experimental" piety. The purpose of this thesis is to argue that, so far from
being discontinuous with mainstream traditions of pietistic puritanism,
Edwards's *Religious Affections* is, in fact, a conservative extension of traditional
puritan "heart religion" into the context of the Great Awakening.

In the following section, I shall describe separately the various features of
*Religious Affections* which, according to much of the scholarly literature,
represent Edwards's departure from puritan tradition. As complex as this
catalogue appears at first glance, the innovations themselves generally fall into
one of two categories: 1) those relating to Edwards's understanding of religious
psychology, and 2) those relating to his method of distinguishing true from false piety. The former category, which has been the more controversial, I shall deal with in Sections Two and Three of this chapter. The second category, which ought to be more controversial than it is, I shall deal with in Section Four.

2: Edwards as an Atypical Puritan Psychologist

Perry Miller, in his study Jonathan Edwards, has conditioned much, if not most, of the academic discussion of Edwards's religious psychology. It was in this study that Miller first argued that Edwards revolutionized not only puritan theology, but also evangelistic practice, by abandoning the "medieval" psychology of traditional puritanism, and redefining religious experience in terms of Lockean sensationalism: "The simplest and most precise definition of Edwards's thought is that it was puritanism recast in the idiom of empirical psychology."¹⁹

Miller's dissociation of Edwards from puritanism was based on a particular interpretation of the latter, which, if it did not entirely overlook, yet it substantially underemphasized, certain aspects of that tradition. As George Marsden has pointed out, Miller's erudite studies of the puritans were developed in reaction to a view of them, widespread in the scholarship of his time, as "irrational bigots," clinging to the residues of medieval superstition,

¹ Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 62.
and opposed to the humane rationalism of the renaissance. In countering this view, Miller emphasized the intellectualism of the puritans, evidenced not only by their continued commitment to scholastic philosophy, but also by their predilection, indeed "obsession," for Ramist logic and the systematic organization of theology.  

Miller's 1949 biography of Edwards was prepared within a different polemical context. Politically conservative and, although an atheist, sympathetic to the neo-orthodox view of human fallibility, Miller presented Edwards as an antidote to the political liberalism of his day. In order to make Edwards's attitudes seem pertinent to contemporary debates, he presented him not as the voice of an irrelevantly pre-enlightenment puritan past, but as a fully "modern" intellectual, who nevertheless attacked the follies of modern liberalism: "While he speaks from a primitive religious conception which often seems hopelessly out of touch with even his own day, yet at the same time he speaks from an insight into science and psychology so much ahead of his time that our own can hardly be said to have caught up with him." In order to make Edwards an effective voice against contemporary liberalism, Miller needed, on the one hand, to dissociate Edwards from puritan tradition and, on

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12 Ibid., xiii.
Although, as I shall discuss in the next section, Miller’s reading of Edwards’s religious psychology as essentially a product of Enlightenment and empiricist thought has by no means gone unchallenged, it has proven remarkably influential and enduring, and has been frequently repeated. C.C. Goen asserted that Edwards “refracted the data” of the Great Awakening “through the insights of a new psychology derived from John Locke” in order to make the revival more acceptable to educated critics. Patricia Tracy noted that “Edwards’s great achievement” was to use Locke, as also Newton, “to reformulate classic Reformed dogma,” with “Lockean psychology” being used to explain “how man experienced God directly, but passively.” Many similar examples will be introduced during the course of this chapter.

The most conspicuous current proponent of the theory that Edwards’s religious psychology is derived principally from Locke, is John E. Smith, who characterizes Edwards’s theology, especially his account of “experimental religion,” as “theological empiricism.” Although Smith acknowledges other

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influences upon Edwards, such as Cambridge Platonism, he tends to ignore the
puritan contribution to Edwards's thought, and has often identified late
seventeenth and eighteenth-century empiricism as the key to understanding
Edwards's "original conception of the religious affections."\textsuperscript{17} In his 1992
monograph on Edwards, Smith argued that Edwards used earlier puritan
writings not as sources for his ideas, but merely as convenient illustrations. In
contrast, Smith saw the works of Locke as formative and fundamental in a way
that puritanism was not. Locke's thought, according to Smith, exerted a
"commanding influence" upon Edwards. It cannot be understood, as can the
Puritan contribution, in terms of "supportive quotations and piecemeal
borrowings." Instead, Locke's impact was "something pervasive, colouring his
entire outlook."\textsuperscript{18} According to Smith, Edwards had been prepared for his task
of interpreting the Great Awakening \textit{primarily} by his study of the "empirical
philosophy of John Locke" and other Enlightenment thinkers.\textsuperscript{19}

There are two elements of evidence often adduced in support of the theory
that Lockean empiricism exerted a fundamental influence upon Edwards's
thought in general, and on his theory of religious psychology in particular.
1) Edwards himself directly referred to his interest in and enthusiasm for
Locke. According to Samuel Hopkins's early biography, Edwards had, shortly
before his death, produced a copy of Locke's \textit{An Essay Concerning Human}

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 169.


Understanding, and declared that "he was beyond expression entertain'd and pleas'd with it, when he read it in his youth at college; that he was as much engaged, and had more satisfaction and pleasure in studying it, than the most greedy miser in gathering up handfuls of silver and gold from some new discovered treasure." The significance of this story, especially with regard to the development of Religious Affections, has been asserted by some recent scholars, such as Miklos Veto. The discovery of Locke had been made by the youthful Edwards while still a student. Miller asserted that Edwards's reading of Locke's Essay "had been the central and decisive event in his intellectual life." 20

2) Edwards's use of the language of sensation to describe the "new birth" seemed to provide more direct evidence for the theory of Lockean influence on Religious Affections. However, as Miller himself recognized, explicit references to Locke in Religious Affections, and clear examples of Lockean vocabulary used in a Lockean sense, are extremely few. Edwards made no specific mention of


22 There is some controversy as to where and when Edwards read Locke. Miller, following Hopkins, thought that Edwards read him at Wethersfield at fourteen years of age. Current scholars, following Leon Howard ("The Mind" of Jonathan Edwards: A Reconstructed Text, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), tend to locate the first exposure to Locke to his "senior year" at Yale, that is, in 1719, when Edwards was about seventeen.

23 Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 52.
Locke in the Religious Affections, except in a general list of "men of great genius."\textsuperscript{24} In addition, Edwards made explicit use of the Lockean technical term, "simple idea," only twice in the whole of the treatise.\textsuperscript{25} To explain the absence of overt references to Locke, Miller argued that Edwards was forced by the prejudices of his puritan colleagues, who were bound to "an antiquated metaphysic,"\textsuperscript{26} to conceal his debt to empiricism. Edwards "had to be extremely cautious about avowing what Locke meant to him."\textsuperscript{27} He generally avoided Locke's technical vocabulary, but he used ordinary, non-technical words "in the Lockean sense without confessing or defining it."\textsuperscript{28} In sum, Miller regarded Edwards's works as a Lockean "cryptogram." Only those who, like Edwards himself, had been converted to empiricism could apprehend the esoteric doctrines hidden beneath the "enigmatic" expressions.\textsuperscript{29} His opponents in the Great Awakening, such as Charles Chauncey, whom Miller considered representative of traditional puritanism, were doomed to misunderstand him, because they "did not have the key."\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{24}Jonathan Edwards, A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, John E. Smith, ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 299. Other persons named in the list are Homer, Cicero, Milton, and Addison.
\item \textsuperscript{25}Ibid., 205: "There is [i.e. in the mind touched by divine grace] what some metaphysicians call a new simple idea."
\item \textsuperscript{26}Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 56.
\item \textsuperscript{27}Ibid., 58.
\item \textsuperscript{28}Ibid., 58-59.
\item \textsuperscript{29}Ibid., 33.
\item \textsuperscript{30}Ibid., 59.
\end{enumerate}
In spite of the limitations of the evidence, which he himself recognized, Miller understood Edwards predominantly as a crypto-Lockean because he believed that Edwards's conception of the spiritual life was fundamentally atypical of puritanism and needed to be interpreted in accordance with some other intellectual tradition. Empiricism seemed to explain Edwards's purportedly unusual vocabulary and conceptualization. Many subsequent scholars, even where they have significantly modified Miller's interpretation, have agreed with him in recognizing Religious Affections as constituting a departure from traditional puritanism and as requiring explanation in terms other than of puritan theology.

One of the principal features of Religious Affections frequently considered uncharacteristic of puritanism is its emphasis on the affective dimension of the human personality. For Miller, one of puritanism's principal qualities was its arid intellectualism. He described it as characterized by a "thirst for abstract, logical formulations," and Jonathan Edwards as the discontented "heir of a tradition which often found its happiest formulations in the terms of formal logic." He considered the rationalism of Charles Chauncey as typical of puritan tradition. Similarly, John E. Smith has seen Chauncey's preference

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for doctrinal correctness over "heart religion" as a specifically puritan trait.\textsuperscript{34}

J.R. Fulcher believed that puritan piety was bedeviled and frustrated by a residual medieval rationalism: "the primacy assigned to the intellectual power in the Thomist revision of the Peripatetic psychology posed a problem for its subsequent adaptations by Puritan theologians in the seventeenth century."\textsuperscript{35}

Loren Baritz declared that "almost nothing in the history of New England could assist [Edwards] in trying to teach his people the vocabulary of emotion" because "the legalistic mentality of covenantal theorists had dominated the New England landscape."\textsuperscript{36} Such scholars, emphasizing the rationalistic aspect of puritanism, have seen Edwards as an "original," revolutionizing his theological heritage by introducing affectivity into a hitherto frigid piety, and blazing a trail for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century revivalism and evangelicalism. Miller wrote that Edwards's account of religious experience involved "a radically new definition of the religious man, not as right-thinking, but as 'influenced by some affection, either love or hatred, desire, hope, or fear.'"\textsuperscript{37} According to Ralph Gabriel, it was Edwards who had, in the eighteenth century, "introduced the idea of the importance of emotion into what had been


\textsuperscript{37} Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 159.
a coldly logical intellectual structure."  

Some commentators have recognized that an affective element already existed in puritanism before Edwards, but have argued that this element was poorly integrated with the intellectual dimension. For them, puritan pastoral theology suffered from a general and pervasive dichotomization of rationalism and emotionalism. Fulcher believed that "the Puritan chose the unrelieved tension between piety and intellect, the ambivalent strains of feeling and thinking." Smith has argued that Edwards's account of religious affectivity was misunderstood in his own day, because his puritan colleagues suffered from a "heart-head dichotomy." Bumsted and Wetering asserted that the opponents of the Great Awakening, Charles Chauncey and Samuel Johnson, who "not only separated reason and affection, but insisted, in true medieval fashion, that the former must dominate the latter," were "unreconstructed traditionalists," representing conventional, pre-Edwardsian puritanism. More recently Richard B. Steele has argued that, although the Reformers of the sixteenth century had held a view of human nature as a totality, effectively integrating the intellect, will and emotions, this holistic view was largely lost during the seventeenth century, rendering impossible any "reconciliation"

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41Bumsted and Wetering, What Must I Do to Be Saved?, 120.
between orthodoxy and pietism. According to Steele, the more holistic psychological approach had to be rediscovered by Edwards and Wesley in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{42}

These two closely related scholarly conventions represent Edwards either as introducing a new, emotional dimension into puritan piety, or, where an already existing affective strain is recognized as indigenous to the tradition, as resolving a psychologically divisive "head-heart dichotomy." Edwards is supposed to have argued, more or less for the first time in puritan history, that "mind, heart, soul, reason and emotion could not be separated into categories, could not be compartmentalized."\textsuperscript{43} And he is supposed to have accomplished this feat by completely revising the whole puritan understanding of human psychology. It is generally believed, for reasons that I shall explain below, that this revision was chiefly carried out along empiricist lines.

The reason usually given, both for the excessive rationality of puritanism, and for its inability to integrate the intellectual and emotional aspects of religion, was its supposed reliance on the Aristotelian-Thomistic "faculty" psychology, a relic of medieval philosophy. Miller, who had, in \textit{The New England Mind}, provided a large list of puritan faculty psychologists, argued that "no other concept" of human psychology, "was available" to the puritans.\textsuperscript{44}


\textsuperscript{43}Bumsted and Wettering, \textit{What Must I Do to Be Saved?} 105.

\textsuperscript{44}Miller, \textit{New England Mind}, 242, 515.
John Morgan, in other respects critical of Miller's analysis, agreed that puritan psychology was a "primarily Aristotelian scheme." C.L. Cohen argued that puritan psychology was generally organized around the faculty model (amplified with the theory of the four humours), which "long before the Reformation had become an automatic reflex in the European intellect."46

According to Miller and others, the faculty theory viewed the human mind as an aggregate of autonomous functions ("faculties"), which were believed to operate discretely and in a prescribed order. The reason apprehended truth and recognized ultimate ends. The will, defined as a "rational appetite," sought the rationally defined good. The affections, or passions, which constituted the "animal" part of human nature, followed sensually defined goods, such as food, sex or other sources of sensual pleasure. Scholars have argued that "faculty psychology" involved the puritans in two significant problems.

First, because the puritans supposedly viewed the "faculties" as operating in an invariable order, like a "system of gears," they understood the elements of the conversion-experience as having necessarily to follow a certain prescribed order, usually with the doctrinal content taking precedence, just as the reason took precedence over the will. Hence the supposed rationalism of conventional puritanism as well as the novelty of Edwards's assertion, that the "steps" of the


Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 178.
conversion did not necessarily follow a certain order.48

Second, since puritan faculty psychology supposedly "hypostasized" or "substantiated" the powers of the soul, seeing them as autonomous "agents," it fractured the human personality, creating the radical distinction between intellect and emotion which contorted the puritan understanding of religious experience and created deep divisions during the Great Awakening. Fulcher noted that, "when the powers of the soul are construed in substantive terms, such as 'reason' and 'will' would suggest, this view of the soul is fractured into a compartmental psychological theory." 49 Robert Middlekauf attributed to puritanism in general the tendency to "separate thought and feeling and ascribe a duality to the mind."50 Conrad Cherry noted that, even where puritans tried to conceive of the spiritual life as embracing "the whole man," they were "often markedly frustrated by a faculty psychology that proved inadequate for expressing the unity of the subject."51 According to Robert W. Jenson, puritan faculty psychology, which "substantialized dispositional properties of the soul," prevented the puritans from developing, as Edwards did, a concept of the


49 Fulcher, "Puritans and the Passions," 125.


continuity of consciousness." 52 Richard Steele has seen the "acceptance of faculty psychology among the Orthodox scholastics of the early seventeenth century" as a major cause for the loss of psychological holism which he believes characterized the early Reformers. 53

Edwards is said to have rejected the psychologically fissiparous notion of the human personality as an aggregation of distinct, hierarchically arranged "faculties" and replaced it, supposedly for the first time in puritan history, by a psychologically unitive concept, sometimes called the "heart," and sometimes the "inclination." These terms, in Norman Fiering's words, are "almost synonymous with the inner essence of the whole man." 54 They indicate a fundamental disposition of the entire personality, which determines the operations of both the will and the intellect. Miller quotes Edwards's own description of the situation: "This faculty is called by various names; it is sometimes called the inclination: and, as it has respect to the actions that are determined and governed by it, is called the will: and the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, is often called the heart." 55

By reinterpreting the "faculties" of intellect and will as two aspects of a single psychic disposition, sometimes called "heart," and sometimes


53 Steele, "Gracious Affection" and "True Virtue," 11, 18.


55 Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 183. He is quoting from Religious Affections, 96.
"inclination," Edwards is credited with having overcome the traditional, puritan
"head-heart" dichotomy, reuniting the human personality into an integrated
whole, a "monistic organism."\(^{56}\)

In addition, it is important to note that Edwards is not merely supposed to
have reorganized the old notions of will and intellect under a new, unifying
principle. He also redefined their natures, as well as their relationship to one
another. The will was no longer understood as a "rational appetite." Instead, it
was identified with the "affections" and considered an aspect of the
fundamental disposition of the personality, the "heart" or "inclination," and, as
such, largely determinative of the intellectual function. As Miller notes, "by
identifying the will with the affections, and by striving to unite the
understanding to the will, he came in the end to declare the supremacy of
passion."\(^{57}\) It was specifically here, in his identification of the will with the
affections, and his understanding of the affections as constituting the central
and determinative aspect of the human personality, that Miller believed
Edwards's "modernism" to lie. Bumsted and Wetering have made the same
point:

Edwards objected strenuously not only to a separation of
the affections and the will (by which most
contemporaries understood emotions and mind), but to
a philosophy that identified the "affections of the soul"
not with "the noblest part of the soul, but the meanest
principle that it has, that belong to man, as partaking of
animal nature, and what he has in common with the
brute creation, rather than anything whereby he is

\(^{56}\) Miller, *Jonathan Edwards*, 182.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 183-4.
conformed to angels and pure spirits." He chose to counter such a demeaning view by uniting affections and will, and by insisting that "all aspects of the will are truly acts of the affections." This is a truly modern position.56

Because Edwards identified the fundamental orientation of the personality with, and located the centre of human nature in, the "affections," recognized since antiquity as the sensual aspect of the soul, Miller inferred that he must have derived his analysis of human psychology from Lockean "sensationalism."

Miller's own account of Edwards's psychological theories are full of what he considered a terminology derived from empiricism: "By the understanding [Edwards] conceived the soul as it perceives, and by the will he meant the soul perceiving as a sentient, passionate being, with hopes and fears, and therefore perceiving according to its vital inclination."59

Miller developed an extreme, naturalistic interpretation of Edwards's empiricism. He believed it to be Edwards's view that "all a man needs [for conversion] is his senses."60 In his discussion of the famous sermon, "A Divine and Supernatural Light," Miller affirmed that "the supernatural light is imparted not as a mystical infusion, but as a rational conveyance through the senses."61 As I shall note in the next section, this extreme view has been generally criticized and abandoned since the mid-1960's. Far more influential,

56Burnsted and Wetering, What Must I Do to Be Saved?, 121.
54Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 182.
55Ibid., 6.
56Ibid., 68.
however, has been Miller's attribution of much of Edwards's vocabulary and procedures to the sway supposedly exercised upon his mind by empiricism. Miller identified a large number of the words, themes and procedures conspicuous in Religious Affections and related works as atypical of traditional puritanism and requiring explanation in terms of empiricist influences. In this he has been followed by a wide range of scholars. In general, words relating to experience, the senses, sensual pleasure, aesthetic appreciation, the emotional life and the human personality conceived as a psychologically integrated whole are considered uncharacteristic of earlier puritanism, and freely attributed either to Edwards's study of the empiricists or to his own, native originality.

For Miller, the first and most obvious evidence of Edwards's debt to enlightenment fashions of thought was his emphasis on "experience." Miller's view of earlier puritanism was that it was dogmatically ideological, given to filtering experience through a priori intellectual structures. Edwards, however, "always exalted experience over reason."62 John E. Smith sees Edwards's use of "signs" for distinguishing true from false piety as a form of Lockeanism. Edwards's "theological empiricism," Smith notes, "resides in the belief that the distinguishing marks of genuine piety can be found in experience."63 Smith also claims that Edwards himself regarded the "experimental" religion of the Great Awakening as something "new."64

61Ibid., 45.
Edwards's numerous references to the senses, the "sense of the heart," "perception," the "delight" arising from sensation and the appreciation of the "beauty" and "excellency" of divine things are also taken as indicating a departure from traditional puritanism. Miller thought that Edwards's contemporaries found "puzzling" his "repeated though unexplained emphasis upon conversion as 'sensible.'" Edwards's "concentration" upon the term "excellency" was decidedly "odd." Harold P. Simonson, although critical of Miller, and careful to note the dissimilarities between Locke's empiricism and Edwards's mature theology, nevertheless sees Edwards's theology of the "heart," of "experience" and "sensation," as "initially" inspired by Locke, rather than by earlier puritanism. Similarly, Wayne Proudfoot has found the "language of sensation and taste," so prominent in Religious Affections, as evidence for the "striking" influence of Locke. John E. Smith sees in Edwards's claim that he attempted, through his homiletic practices, to make his listeners "sensible of their condition," a sign of his empirical tendencies. Smith also asserted that Edwards's emphasis on the "beauty" and "amiableness" of divine things was

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Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 32.

Ibid., 32.


Smith, Jonathan Edwards, 30.
somewhat unusual for a puritan. Atypical, too, was Edwards's interpretation of spiritual illumination as "a real sense and apprehension of the Excellency (the presence of God) in the Word:"

Edwards distinguishes the two forms of knowledge—speculative or "notional" knowledge and that knowledge which is the sense of the heart. The former is exhibited in judgments that something is the case and represents understanding proper apart from will and disposition. Sense of the heart is delight or pleasure in the presence of the idea of the thing; will and inclination are involved and the person is no longer a mere neutral spectator.

Again, Smith sees the influence of empiricism in Edwards's characterizing conversion as the reception of a "new sense," and his description of faith in terms of direct apprehension, of "seeing" or "tasting." The "new, inward perception", or "sense of the heart" Smith considers "the most important and original idea" in the entire Religious Affections. No idea in all Edwards's works," he writes elsewhere, "is more original and no doctrine was more far reaching in its influence on the course of puritan piety." Douglas J. Elwood agreed that Edwards's "originality lay in the precise formulation of the doctrine of immediate perception, as well as his ability to recognize that this was the

—Smith, ibid., 40.
—Smith, "Testing the Spirits," 32.
—Ibid., 38.
—Smith, "Introduction" to Edwards, Religious Affections, 30.
missing ingredient in the piety of New England.\textsuperscript{75}

Because the radicality of Edwards's religious psychology is supposed to involve an identification of the will with the emotions, as well as the assertion that the basic disposition of the emotions, or "heart," was the unifying principle of the personality, scholars have tended to see his numerous references to the affective life, as well as his insistence that conversion affects the "whole" person, as indicating a departure from conventional puritanism. According to Fulcher, it was Edwards who would "find a place for love, hope, and joy as well as hate, fear and grief," the whole range of human affectivity.\textsuperscript{76}

Although, as already discussed, Miller considered Locke to be the greatest influence upon Religious Affections, he nevertheless believed that, in Edwards's emphasis on human affectivity, he went "beyond" the nominalism of Locke and entered "the realm of the passions, and linked the word not only with the idea, but also with that from which Locke had striven to separate it, with the emotions."\textsuperscript{77} Miller believed that Edwards's emotionalism served as the basis, not only for a new psychology of piety, but also for a revolutionary, new approach to homiletics: "Edwards's great discovery, his dramatic refashioning of the theory of sensational rhetoric, was his assertion that an idea in the mind is not only a form of perception, but it is also a determination of love and hate.... To apprehend [things] by their ideas is to comprehend them not only


\textsuperscript{76}Fulcher, "Puritans and the Passions," 139.

\textsuperscript{77}Miller, "The Rhetoric of Sensation," 130.
intellectually but also passionately. Because Miller regarded Edwards's opponents as representative of traditional puritanism, and because they objected to Edwards's views of the Great Awakening, Miller considered Edwards's rhetorical practices, the purpose of which was to "rouse the affections," as a new development within Puritanism.

Finally, many of Edwards's references to the "whole" person as the subject of conversion, are considered evidence of Enlightenment, or at least non-puritan, influence. A person's wholeness, or "coherence," is not the "mathematical sum of his faculties, but his abiding disposition, of which his reason and will are expressions." Because the organizing and unifying principle of the personality is identified with the affective dimension, the concept of wholeness is associated with the "sensational" psychology of Locke, rather than the medieval faculty psychology supposedly universal among puritans. The connection is made clear in Miller's discussion of Edwards's rhetorical theories, in which Edwards is supposed to have applied the Lockeian notion of an "idea" in such a way "that it became a principle of organization and of perception not only for the intellectual man but for the passionate man, for the loving and desiring man, for the whole man." In Edwards's organization and unification of the human personality under a predominant will, Fulcher

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78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 131.
80 Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 182.
81 Miller, "Rhetoric of Sensation," 131.
saw him as "successful in maintaining the equilibrium between piety and intellect" that had eluded earlier generations of puritans.82

3: Edwards and Empiricism: An Alternative Scholarly Tradition

There is an alternative tradition in Edwardsean scholarship which has seriously challenged this view of Edwards as primarily a creature of the Enlightenment, and has suggested that he was, or may have been, more indebted to sixteenth and seventeenth-century theological and philosophical currents than Miller and his followers appreciated. This tradition has sometimes accepted Miller's description of the content of Edwards's theology while criticizing his view of Edwards's sources. Sometimes it has rejected both.

In 1966, Conrad Cherry published The Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Reappraisal, already cited above. The purpose of this volume was to demonstrate and emphasize the conservative nature of Edwards's puritanism as a whole. With specific reference to the issues treated in Religious Affections, Cherry was generally in agreement with Miller's analysis, but with certain important reservations. As already noted in the previous section, Cherry agreed that the psychological assumptions of the puritans, deriving from medieval "faculty" theory, frustrated their attempts to understand the unity of the human subject. According to Cherry, it was Edwards's peculiar

82Fulcher, "Puritans and the Passions," 139.
achievement to have overcome the "head-heart" dichotomy, resolving the intellectual-volitional functions into the expression of an organic wholeness, into different modes of the same act of faith. Although Cherry suggested that Edwards's psychology of the heart might have been due partly to his study of the Bible, as well as to some ideas of his grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, yet he also accepted that Edwards "did find that the insights into the nature of the mental act in Locke's Essay provided an appropriate way of conceiving the character of 'faithful knowledge." Edwards accepted Locke's concept of the "simple idea" as a suitable model, or "description" of the act of faith. Like perception, faith is "affective knowledge, or knowledge that is thoroughly penetrated by the lively, vigorous exercises of the will."

Cherry accepted that Edwards used Locke's account of sensation as one model for explaining the type of knowledge involved in the act of faith. However, Cherry added that, in addition to Lockeanism, there was another tradition which described faith in terms of sensation, a tradition already firmly imbedded in puritan theology. This was Augustinian illuminationism, which characterized faith as a "light" infused into the mind and eliciting a "full mental response" in a manner similar to the "simple idea" imparted through perception:

Edwards alternately refers to the illuminating divine light of faith as both the source of the mental reality that

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2: Ibid., 15.
3: Ibid., 19.
elicits understanding and will, and the mental reality itself. Here it is sufficient to note that the simple idea, the divinely bestowed light in the mind, enlightens the man so that he has a "sense of the heart" - a kind of knowledge in which understanding and "will or disposition" co-operate and interpenetrate.\footnote{Ibid., 20-21.}

Thus Cherry finds the concept of the "sense of the heart" derivable directly from Lockeanism, yet informed or prepared by Augustinian illuminationism. In fact, Cherry believed that, for Edwards, "the categories of infusion and illumination" were more fundamental than empiricism, and provided the "framework" in which Locke's simple idea was fitted.\footnote{Ibid., 26.}

In one special instance, Cherry was more fully critical of Miller. He rejected Miller's thesis, noted above, that Edwards subordinated thought to feeling. This view had led some scholars, such as Ola Winslow and A.O. Aldridge, to locate Edwards within the tradition of religious anti-intellectualism.\footnote{Ibid., 22.} Cherry cited several passages from Edwards indicating that the "sense of the heart" involved a cognitive equally with a volitional element. There is a judgement, or "conviction' directly involved in the sense of the heart:"

The sense of the heart is, in its very essence, an act of judgement, not an unconscious state of feeling. The reality of faith's object demonstrates its truth to the mind and, through such demonstration, evokes man's judgement as to its truth. The judgement is one of the fully responsive person: it is affective, volitional
Paul Helm challenged Miller's literal and naturalistic interpretation of Edwards's supposed Lockeanism. While acknowledging that Locke had exercised some influence over Edwards, Helm rejected Miller's view that Edwards considered faith "scientifically explicable" and "empirically verifiable." Helm argued that Edwards had used Lockean empiricism "as a model for religious experience and nothing more." Edwards had used some of Locke's language, particularly the notion of the "simple idea," merely to illustrate the peculiar character of religious experience, not to reduce spiritual experience to natural sensation. So far from introducing a new religious psychology, Edwards was merely expressing the old, "experimental" theology of traditional puritanism in more contemporary language. Miller had mistaken what was merely a model of religious experience for a theory of religious experience. Empirical, or apparently empirical terms, such as "sensation" "perception" and "simple idea" were merely being used analogically to express supernatural, not natural experiences.

David Laurence emphasized not Edwards's empirical departures from judgement.89

89Ibid., 23.


91Ibid., 54.

92Ibid.

93Ibid., 55.
puritanism, but his puritan departures from empiricism. Laurence sees Edwards as differing from Locke in two particulars:

1) Whereas Locke denied that personal illumination was a necessary and indispensable qualification for a true Christian, Edwards defined the true Christian according to this very criterion. Locke considered "submission to Scripture" and "assent to the religious truths set forth in scripture" sufficient to make a true Christian. For Edwards, mere assent of this kind was not enough to constitute genuine piety.

2) Edwards's notion of the "simple idea" differs significantly from Locke's. Edwards included in his definition of "idea" a necessary emotional component, absent in Locke, who confined the notion to mere perception without reference to any possible emotional or volitional response. In fact, Edwards's notion of "idea" was a conflation of Augustinian illumination with empiricist perception. The "idea" was not merely the content of revelation, but also that intellectual insight and emotional appreciation which constituted "illumination" and distinguished the true from the false Christian. In order to receive this "idea,"

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85Ibid., 110. It is important to note that "illumination" is not the same as "inspiration." The latter term refers to religious knowledge conveyed directly to the mind by God. According to the orthodox view, the scriptures are the result of inspiration ("original revelation"), and are the only source of religious knowledge. Illumination refers to an intellectual insight into the contents of the original revelation, laid down in scripture. Locke accepted that such "enlightenment by a ray darted into the mind immediately from the fountain of light" was neither irrational nor objectionable, but he denied that possession of such light was necessary for a Christian in order to be a Christian. Both Edwards and Locke were in agreement, however, in rejecting the view that Christians were subject to "inspiration," new revelations, or new knowledge imparted directly from God. It was in such terms that both understood "enthusiasm."
the person must have a God-given supernatural sense, which Edwards called the "sense of the heart." "With this concept Edwards moved beyond Locke to an account of ideas that emphasized the determinations of will, and the influence of innate capacities beyond will, in the creation of knowledge and belief."96 That is, the "sense of the heart" always implies, as the Lockean concept of sensation does not, a volitional/emotional element so that its object, the divine reality, is always sensed as beautiful, amiable and excellent. Because the "sense of the heart" includes both the perception and the emotional response, Edwards uses it sometimes to refer to the supernatural organ of perception, and sometimes to the "sense of divine excellency" arising from it.97

Terrence Erdt has argued that Edwards's terminology of the senses is not entirely, nor even necessarily, attributable to eighteenth-century empiricism.98 Erdt argued that a "Calvinist psychology of the heart" was available to Edwards, directly from Calvin's own writings, to inform his view of regeneration "as an aesthetic experience."99 He notes that the concept of the heart's disposition, or inclination, played an important role in Calvin's theory of religious knowledge. According to Erdt, Calvin, like Edwards, identified the scholastic concept of the will with the "heart," the affective centre of the self, and understood regeneration as a change of basic disposition or bias at this level of the

96Ibid., 114.
97Ibid., 117.
99Ibid., 166.
personality. For Calvin, as for Edwards, faith is not defined so much as a form of religious knowledge, as a "unique emotional feeling, or sense." Indeed, Erdt suggests that the language of perception, including the vocabulary of "sensing," "tasting", "sweetness" and "delight," so conspicuous in Edwards, permeated Calvin and became part of the "standard lexicon among Calvinists." He argues that much of the terminology and conceptualization so generally attributed to the Enlightenment might equally well have been appropriated from earlier Calvinism.

Norman Fiering has strenuously opposed the thesis that Locke was the predominant intellectual influence upon Edwards. He has argued that "on hardly any single point in moral philosophy does he follow Locke, and in logic and metaphysics his differences from Locke were fundamental." Fiering regards as a "myth" the idea that the youthful Edwards was extensively influenced by Locke. He notes that Samuel Hopkins's anecdote, alluded to in the previous section (pp. 7-8), neither suggests that Edwards was convinced by all that Locke wrote, nor explains what exactly it was in Locke that gave him such pleasure:

It was surely not Locke's empiricism or his tendencies toward skepticism and positivism, nor could it have been the materialist implications of his work. For if one thing

100 Ibid., 170.

101 Ibid., 178.


103 Ibid., 35, 39.
is certain, it is that Edwards remained a philosophical rationalist, a supernaturalist, and a metaphysician all his life.\textsuperscript{104}

Fiering observes that Locke himself was not isolated from earlier currents of thought, implying that he and Edwards might have shared common intellectual ancestors. He notes that not every reference to the term "idea" in Edwards is necessarily a reference to Locke. In fact, the term "idea" was in common use among other seventeenth-century philosophers whom we know that Edwards studied. Nor (as David Laurence had already observed), does Edwards always, or often, use the term in a Lockean sense.\textsuperscript{105}

Fiering also rejected the thesis that Edwards's religious psychology had been developed principally on the basis of empiricism. First, he argued that Miller's presentation of medieval faculty psychology was a caricature. It is true that Locke rejected a view which conceived of the faculties as "distinct agents."\textsuperscript{106} But this objection referred more to an abuse of scholastic psychology than to the "best" scholastic opinion. Locke's own view, that "faculties" (in accordance with the Latin etymology), referred to abilities of the soul, rather than substances in the soul, in fact agreed with the standard theory taught at Harvard during the seventeenth century. Locke's own view, published in 1690, was anticipated by two Harvard commencement theses of 1675 and 1684, one arguing that "the two faculties of the rational soul differ only conceptually from

\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., 36.

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., 37.

the soul," and the other arguing that "intellect and will are the soul understanding and willing." In addition, Thomas Aquinas, whose works were well known in seventeenth-century New England, described the faculties in a unified manner that differed little from Locke's formulation.  

Fiering also sees Edwards's psychology of the "heart" not against the background of empiricism, nor as the original product of Edwards's genius, but rather as deriving from Augustinian voluntarism. This tradition opposed classical "intellectualism" (which saw the will as an aspect of the "rational soul," following the dictates of the reason), arguing that the will was not a "rational appetite" at all, and tending to identify volition with "the inner essence of the whole man," associating it closely with the affective dimension of the personality and referring to it by the biblical term, "heart." Such an attitude toward volition was held, in one form or another, by Augustine, Anselm, Bernard of Clairveaux and Duns Scotus. According to Fiering, Augustinian voluntarism was "more powerfully at work in the Christian anthropology of the seventeenth century than at any other time before or since, affecting Catholic and Protestant circles equally." Voluntaristic assumptions were endemic in puritanism. Nor was Edwards the first to develop an explicit, systematic psychology based on such views. In this he had been anticipated by William

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108 Ibid., 117.
109 Ibid.
Thus, this alternative scholarly tradition generally suggests, although with differing degrees of emphasis, that there is little in Edwards's religious psychology which necessarily derives from empiricism, and much—although how much exactly is not always clearly stated or precisely assessed—which is indebted to pre-Enlightenment traditions. Not all the scholars surveyed here agree among themselves. For instance, whereas Conrad Cherry saw Edwards as having achieved an equal balance between the functions of the intellect and the emotions in the religious life, David Laurence argued that Edwards clearly emphasized the heart over the head. Where Conrad Cherry saw Edwards as significantly influenced by Locke, Fiering has denied any significant influence at all. Nevertheless, all these scholars agree in seeing Edwards's religious psychology not as deriving exclusively from empiricism, but at least partly from older currents in Protestant and Catholic Christianity; not as departing entirely from the past but rather as exploiting some well established, and very old, theological and philosophical traditions.

4: Edwards as an Atypical Theorist of the Conversion

The second major academic commonplace concerning Edwards and the *Religious Affections*, is that in this work he revolutionized the manner in which the puritans understood the conversion experience and the method by which

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they distinguished genuine from spurious piety. It is generally agreed that, until Edwards, the puritans determined one's standing before God according to whether or not one had passed through a prescribed series of steps, constituting a true process of conversion. In the secondary literature, Edmund S. Morgan has given the classic description of this process as originally formulated by various English puritans of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and especially by William Perkins.\footnote{Edmund S. Morgan, Visible Saints: The History of a Puritan Idea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 66-69.} Morgan has shown that these early theorists had established a "morphology" which described the legitimate conversion as a process including at least ten separate steps or aspects. These steps were distinguished, in the broadest system of categorization, according to whether they were merely preparative to faith or aspects of unfolding faith. According to Morgan, this pattern dominated puritan theories of piety until Edwards "was able to furnish a new morphology of conversion."\footnote{Ibid., 152.}

The morphology as systematized by Perkins received considerable elaboration by Thomas Hooker in a long series of sermons and treatises published throughout his career. During the antinomian crisis (1636-1638) the necessity of the preparatory stages of the conversion, and especially the stages of "contrition" and "humiliation," were among the controverted points. In addition, the role of sanctification as an indication of genuine conversion...
was questioned. Hooker insisted on both these points. The defeat of the Hutchinsonians established Hooker's "preparationism" as "part and parcel of the New England Way." 

Edwards's supposed innovation involved a rejection of the idea that conversion must happen according to a certain series of steps, and that a person's spiritual status must be judged accordingly. In place of the old morphology, he proposed that the genuineness of one's election should be evaluated according to certain "signs" relating not to the process of conversion, but to the state of the regenerate soul. In other words, Edwards attended not to the process of conversion, but to its ultimate psychological and spiritual effects.

According to Bumstead and Wetering, "this abandonment of the sequential process was a sharp departure from tradition." David Laurence agreed with this view, arguing that Edwards's concentration on the effects, rather than the process of conversion, on the nature of spiritual knowledge, rather than on the manner in which it occurs, "was the clarifying insight that set Edwards's Treatise [i.e., Religious Affections] apart from the efforts of earlier Puritan writers to describe how the saints might know their calling." John E. Smith declared that Edwards's substitution of the notion of signs for steps was a "novel" idea,

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114 Ibid., 56.

115 Bumsted and Wetering, What Must I Do to Be Saved?, 102.

which he had to "justify" to his more conservative colleagues.\textsuperscript{117} Bumsted and Wetering understood the innovation to be due to the peculiar circumstances of the Great Awakening, and particularly appropriate to the kind of evangelism then practiced.\textsuperscript{118} David Laurence felt that it originated in Edwards's reflections on his own conversion, which lacked that element of "terror" considered by Hooker and other preparationists as one of the essential steps in the process of conversion.\textsuperscript{119} John E. Smith argued that Edwards's abandonment of steps for signs was due to a "radical empiricism" inspired by Locke.\textsuperscript{120}

Smith regarded Edwards's use of signs as introducing "two novel features into the Protestant tradition."

First, by specifying "evidences or necessary conditions for the existence of genuine piety, he removed the process of judging from introspective immediacy and made it open to the possibility of objective appraisal."\textsuperscript{121} Edwards recognized, as apparently all earlier puritans had not, that it was impossible to determine one's sincerity through immediate intuition. By identifying the signs, Edwards, supposedly for the first time, offered objective criteria sufficient to make a reliable distinction between genuine and spurious piety.

\textsuperscript{117}Smith, \textit{Jonathan Edwards}, 31.

\textsuperscript{118}Bumsted and Wetering, \textit{What Must I Do to Be Saved?}, 102.


\textsuperscript{120}Smith, "Jonathan Edwards, Piety and Practice," 173.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., 172.
Edwards's second novelty, according to Smith, was that he did not confine his signs to "enclosed states of mind whose meaning can be understood apart from the behaviour or total bearing of the person who has them." Here, Smith is making a special reference to Edwards's twelfth sign (Christian behaviour and holy practice). Again, Edwards is imagined as recognizing, apparently in distinction to the generality of puritan divines, that personal holiness must be "discovered only in some process that takes us beyond the 'interior' of the person to his behaviour in the world." Smith considers Edwards's approach to the determination of true piety as foreshadowing the pragmatism of William James, and also as expressing "the characteristic American attitude not only to the genuineness of religion but to the whole of life, namely, the idea that the real, the genuine, is revealed in practice, in individual deeds, and in an entire course of life."

Although David Laurence regards Edwards's general abandonment of the traditional morphology of the conversion as significant, he places special emphasis on Edwards's rejection of one step in particular, "terror" of divine wrath, also called "legal fear." According to Edwards's autobiographical

122: Ibid.
123: Ibid. 173.

"Terror, also called legal fear, or humiliation, constituted the fourth step in Morgan's morphology. This step, taken together with the preceding three (hearing the word, understanding the law, awareness of one's own sinfulness) is sometimes referred to, especially in the New-England context, as the preparationist phase in the process of conversion. See Norman Pettit, The Heart Prepared."
fragment, the Personal Narrative, written about 1739, Edwards's own conversion had lacked this element, and for this reason he had at one time doubted his own condition before God. In addition, during the Great Awakening Edwards had observed that many people had apparently been genuinely converted without going through a preparatory period of fear and "humiliation," or that some people had gone through a stage of humbling and repentance after they had come to real faith. Edwards is supposed to have explained these phenomena, which Laurence supposed did not conform to the traditional puritan pattern, by "rethinking both the concept of humiliation and the picture of the pilgrim's self-understanding that the preparationist tradition had constructed." The result was a redefinition of humiliation which located it not among the preparatives, but among the "effects of special grace." The result was a redefinition of humiliation which located it not among the preparatives, but among the "effects of special grace." 

Whereas earlier puritan tradition (as represented by the theories of Solomon Stoddard) had understood "repentance" as outside the bounds of faith, Edwards "wrought a change" by asserting that repentance presupposes faith. In this reading of Edwards's understanding of repentance, Laurence was in agreement with Norman Pettit, who had argued that, for Edwards, "religious sorrow and brokeness of heart were not preliminary steps to conversion but distinguishing marks in the character of a Saint." 

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125Ibid., 271.
126Ibid.
127Ibid., 274.
128Ibid., 270.
Thomas Yarborough has broadly agreed with Laurence's thesis. He, too, has argued that Edwards's rejection of "terror" or "legal fear" as a necessary and indispensable constituent of the conversion, his denial that "terror" is not always evidence of grace, and his understanding of repentance as an aspect of a pre-existent faith, are major innovations within puritanism.  

The idea that Edwards's Religious Affections and related works include a radically new proposal for evaluating the genuineness of the conversion has never been seriously questioned in the secondary literature. This is very curious indeed since even a cursory glance at earlier puritan writers reveals what is at least an apparent anticipation not only of Edwards's use of signs in general, but also of many signs in particular. But the relationship of most such authors to Edwards, some of whom are explicitly cited by him, has very rarely been investigated.

More complex is the issue of "terror" and its role in the conversion. A careful reading of Edwards's works occasioned by the Great Awakening suggests that he did not reject terror's role in the conversion as completely as some commentators seem to suggest. In addition, a survey of puritan literature indicates that, like Edwards, not all puritans regarded terror as an indispensable constituent in the conversion of a sinner, and certainly that no specific degree of terror could be prescribed to sinners. Finally, Edwards did not differ from his puritan predecessors in regarding repentance as a constituent, rather than as a preparative to, saving faith.

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Yarborough, Delightful Convictions, 6-11.
The preceding discussion indicates, in summary, the three following points.

1) Scholarly opinion regarding Edwards's religious psychology tends to fall into two main camps.
   a) Some see Edwards's religious psychology as constituting a departure from puritan tradition. Such scholars, although critical of certain aspects of Miller's analysis, nevertheless agree with him in attributing, or tending to attribute, Edwards's language of sense perception, as well as his concept of the "heart" to non-puritan influences, and particularly to empiricism.
   b) Some deny the influence, or the exclusive influence, of empiricism on Edwards. Cherry accepts the Lockean origin of Edwards's language of "sense" but suggests Augustinian illuminationism as point of departure from within the older tradition. Helm and Laurence argue that the similarities between Edwards and Locke are insignificant, and that their points of disagreement are far more substantial. Erdt acid suggests that Edwards may have derived his language of sense from Calvin. Fiering, like Helm and Laurence, sees Locke's philosophy as basically repugnant to Edwards, and suggests that Edwards's heart-language is more closely related to traditional Augustinian voluntarism.

2) All scholars who have published on the issue seem to be in agreement that Edwards's use of signs of regeneration to determine genuine piety, rather than conformity to a pre-conceived process of conversion, is a significant departure from puritan tradition.

3) All published opinion seems to agree that a) Edwards rejected not only
the necessity, but also the normativity, of "terror" as a factor in the process of conversion; and that b) this was a significant departure from earlier puritanism.

One thing that has long been missing from discussions of Edwards's theory of religious psychology, or his methods of evaluating the sincerity of a believer's piety, has been a careful comparison of his position with that of earlier puritan authors. As the survey indicates, although many scholars have been eager to suggest the ways in which Edwards's Religious Affections departs from earlier puritanism, especially in the latter's intellectualist manifestation, very few have systematically investigated or seriously evaluated how much it shares with that tradition, especially in its broader trans-Atlantic dimension. This is particularly odd in the case of Religious Affections, which contains far more citations from earlier puritan literature than most of Edwards's other works. John E. Smith, in his introduction to the Yale Edition of Religious Affections, is of two minds about the influence of Edwards's puritan and Protestant predecessors on the work. At one point he notes that it is "likely" that their contribution to the formation of his thought has been "underestimated." At another point he asserts that the numerous quotations from their works "appear more as illustrations and confirmations of his position than as influences from which it might be derived." D.J. Elwood is more positive about the influence of Richard Sibbes and John Owen, as well as of the Dutch theologian Peter van Mastricht and the Cambridge Platonist John

131 Smith, "Introduction," 52; 22.

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Smith, although his reference to them is extremely brief (confined, in fact, to a single parenthetical remark), describing their contribution in very general terms relating to the "experimental" character of the *Religious Affections*.\(^{132}\) In neither case has the influence of Edwards's puritan predecessors been adequately described or assessed. This lacuna in current scholarship has been noted by Janice Knight, who, commenting on the apparent influence exercised on Edwards by seventeenth-century Cambridge puritanism, and especially by Richard Sibbes, observes that, "though Edwardsean scholars neither trace the instances nor consider the implications, they often remark on his indebtedness to Sibbes."\(^{133}\) In fact, scholars have not noted the possible influence of Sibbes as "often" as the case deserves. Knight herself adduces only two instances in which a possible connection is recognized, that of D.J. Elwood, in the passage mentioned above, and of John E. Smith in his introduction to *Religious Affections*. However Knight is correct in suggesting that, by omitting to investigate the considerable parallels between Sibbes and Edwards, scholars have missed a significant source for Edwards's ideas.

Even the influence of Thomas Shepard, whose works are cited more than seventy times in the course of Edwards's discussion, has received almost no attention. The only study to appear so far is a recent paper by William K.B.


Stoever, published in 1996. Stoever, noting that analogous circumstances produced both Shepard's *Parable of the Ten Virgins* and Edwards's *Religious Affections*, has explored the continuities between the two pastors concerning their views on the nature of sanctification and the evidence of genuine piety.

The fact that the specifically puritan contribution to Edwards's *Religious Affections* has never been systematically and thoroughly investigated is a curious academic omission, especially considering the amount of ink spilled in tracing his debt to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. There are at least five possible reasons for this omission.

1) Because of the influence and authority of Perry Miller, not only through his work on Edwards in particular, but also on American puritanism in general, many scholars have tended to accept without question the thesis that Edwards represents a significant, if not a radical, departure from his puritan heritage. Although, more recently, such scholars as Charles Hambrick-Stowe and Janice Knight have revised Miller's understanding of that heritage, arguing, for instance, that "heart-religion" was a more conspicuous feature of puritanism than Miller allowed, yet this revisionism has generally left Edwards out of consideration, and its implications relative to Edwards have not been pursued in depth.135

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2) There has been a general tendency to view Edwards chiefly, and sometimes only, within the context of New-England puritanism. Before the recent publication of William Sparkes Morris's important study, *The Young Jonathan Edwards*, relatively little effort had been made to relate him to the broad tradition of British puritanism and continental Calvinism, with which we know that Edwards (like most New-England intellectuals) was well acquainted. This omission has led to a misunderstanding of the relationship between Edwards's ideas, as stated in opposition to other New-England ministers, and his *broad* puritan and Calvinist heritage. It may well be that, where Edwards opposed some of his New-England colleagues, it was not with a radically new theology derived from Enlightenment sources, personal experience, or an unusually original and independent theological imagination, but from an alternative, though quite old and quite well-established, puritan tradition. The fact that no one has considered it necessary to produce a systematic account of Edwards's relationship to earlier puritanism and Calvinism suggests not only a certain misunderstanding of the sources for Edwards's theology, but also of the nature of puritanism in general. Puritanism was not a monolithic theological tradition. The fact that Edwards may have disagreed with some of his New-England colleagues does not necessarily mean that he disagreed with all strains and branches of puritanism.

This possibility that Edwards may have been working out of an alternative

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puritan, rather than a non-puritan tradition, has recently been made much clearer by Janice Knight's *Orthodoxies in Massachusetts*, already mentioned. She argues that, side by side with the focus on "divine power" and the "logic of contract," by which Miller had characterized puritanism, New England had also inherited a "passionate mysticism" and an "emphasis on charity;" and that seventeenth-century American puritans included not only "Intellectual Fathers," but also "Spiritual Brethren." 137 That a warm, pietistic strain had been, since the late sixteenth century, an important element in the puritan movement, has, of course, been recognized for many decades, especially among scholars who have concentrated on English puritanism. William Haller, in his classic study published in 1938, defined puritanism *principally* in terms of its tradition of "affectionate" piety and of the "spiritual brotherhood" who were the chief proponents of this form of spirituality. 138 In another, now standard work, Ernest Stoeffler described the formative role played by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century puritanism in the development of continental pietism. 139 Although the co-existence, within New England puritanism, of these two strains has only recently come under detailed investigation, it has long been recognized by a few scholars. Alan Heimert, for instance, had noted that the "old light" and "new light" parties during the Great Awakening "marked the independent fulfilment of one of the strains that in Puritanism had been held in

137 Knight, *Orthodoxies in Massachusetts*, 2.


precarious balance: piety and reason."\textsuperscript{140}

3) Some scholars have tended to emphasize the discontinuities with earlier traditions arising from the circumstances of the Great Awakening. This tendency has probably been encouraged by the popular nomenclature spawned by the Great Awakening itself, during which the opponents of revival were called “Old Lights,” who “sought to restore the decorum of the traditional New England Way,”\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{141}} while its defenders were called “New Lights,” who, although doctrinally Calvinist, “were heavily influenced by the philosophy of the Enlightenment and saw the need to articulate the traditional concept of regeneration in terms of recent advances in epistemology and moral psychology.”\textsuperscript{142} Some scholars seem to suggest (even if no more than merely to suggest), that the Great Awakening involved broader innovations in theology, and especially in religious psychology, than is perhaps the case. For instance, J.M. Bumsted, in his anthology significantly entitled \textit{The Great Awakening: The Beginnings of Evangelical Pietism in America}, declared that Whitfield represented “a new movement of spiritual concern and rejuvenation” and that the revivals of the 1740’s “produced a dynamic new spiritual posture


\textsuperscript{141}Steele, “\textit{Gracious Affections}” and “\textit{True Virtue}”, 216.

\textsuperscript{142}Ibid., 217.
Claims for the novelty of Edwards's own theology and psychology of revival have been, as already described, especially common. Heimert, who believed that Edwards's vocabulary of religious psychology was derived principally from "Lockean psychology and Newtonian physics," asserted that the ideas of the "loveliness of God" and the "delight" conceived by the saint in apprehending that loveliness, were the "central premise of eighteenth-century Calvinism," constituting an "experimental religion" which he considered "the distinctively American pietism." The implication here seems to be that a concern with the emotional and aesthetic elements in religious experience was not a significant feature either of seventeenth-century puritanism in general, or of English puritanism in particular.

The fact that the patterns of conversion observed during the Great Awakening did not conform to the classic morphology has suggested to some commentators that Edwards's response was to provide a more or less entirely new theory to make sense of the new phenomena. However, while one may grant the peculiar religious and cultural conditions of New England in the 1740's, it is nevertheless important to note that there existed, among the proponents of the Great Awakening, a theologically conservative and retrospective dimension. There was a revival of interest in the classics of seventeenth-century puritanism. Samuel Blair noted that "excellent books that

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145 See, for instance, Yarborough and Case, *Delightful Conviction*, 13; 42.

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had lain by much neglected were then much perused, and lent from one to another: and it was a peculiar satisfaction to people to find how exactly the doctrines they heard daily preached, harmonized with the doctrines maintained and taught by great and godly men in other parts and former times. Thomas Prince, in his 1744 account of the revivals, wrote that "the people seemed to have a renewed taste for those old pious and experimental writers, Mr. Hooker, Shepard, Gurnal, William Guthrie, Joseph Allein, Isaac Ambrose, Dr Owen and others," adding also the names of Matthew Mead, John Flavel and Cotton Mather. Shepard and Owen are explicitly cited in Religious Affections. In addition, we know that Edwards was much impressed by the work of Alleine. The testimonies of Blaire and Prince have been corroborated by contemporary research. W.R. Ward, for instance, has shown that an enthusiasm for seventeenth-century puritan authors was a common feature of eighteenth-century pietism and revivalism, both in America and on the European continent. Charles Hambrick-Stowe has listed a large number of seventeenth-century puritan classics which were reprinted during the Great

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147 Ibid., 353.

148 See Morris, *Young Jonathan Edwards*, 266.

4) Scholars have not fully located the *Treatise Concerning Religious Affections* within puritan literary traditions. There has been a tendency, as noted in the previous section, to compare *Religious Affections* with early discussions of the morphology of the conversion, such as those of Perkins, Culverwell and others listed by Morgan, or with those analyses of Thomas Hooker which exerted such a strong influence on New-England piety. However, *Religious Affections* bears a much closer resemblance to the numerous treatises, published throughout the seventeenth century, dealing with the nature of regeneration, the signs of the new birth, and the analysis of self-deception and hypocrisy. Like the *Religious Affections*, most of these pneumatological works ignored the morphology of conversion, focusing the discussion on the "signs" or "marks" by which true piety ought to be evaluated, discussing the nature of religious knowledge and describing the affectivity of the elect.

5) Edwards's own writing has conveyed to scholars a misimpression of his relationship to his puritan heritage. There are two special examples of this.

a) According to his own autobiographical *Personal Narrative*, already mentioned, Edwards noted that his own conversion experience did not conform to the traditional morphology. As David Laurence remarks, Edwards "marked a discrepancy between what he had experienced and what the

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theorists of conversion said he ought to experience,” and this motivated him to develop a different approach for evaluating the “symptomatology of grace.”

Many scholars have supposed that Edwards’s different approach was also a new approach, and have not inquired into possible anticipations within earlier puritanism.

b) Edwards’s pattern of footnoting in Religious Affections suggests that that work is less reflective of earlier puritanism than seems to be the case. Although Edwards refers many elements of his treatment of the distinction between genuine and spurious piety to earlier puritanism, those elements which modern scholars have considered original or innovative (the psychological model, the analysis of religious response as aesthetic, the characterization of the new birth as a perception), Edwards does not generally relate back to the seventeenth-century authorities. The omission of citations for such ideas, when so many other points are footnoted, has naturally suggested to readers that Edwards had no puritan authorities for these ideas.

In the following discussion, I want to present a case for the essential similarity between Edwards’s treatment and interpretation of religious interiority, and that of standard seventeenth-century puritan pietism, suggesting a significant, if not a preponderant influence of the latter in determining both the structure and content of Edwards’s Religious Affections. 1

wish to argue that Religious Affections, so far from constituting a revolution from, or even a discontinuity with, the puritan past, is basically a conservative extension of earlier puritan ideas, and more or less fully anticipated by seventeenth-century puritan sources. I wish to indicate that, with the exception of certain details of emphasis and focus, there is no aspect of Religious Affections which had not already received fairly full development by the puritan divines of the seventeenth century.

That Edwards’s Religious Affections is heavily, if not preponderantly, dependent on earlier Puritan sources is established by two basic arguments.

1) A significant number of major puritan authors closely anticipate Edwards’s Religious Affections, not only in the manner by which they analyze the distinction between genuine and spurious piety, but also in the specific criteria of judgement which they establish.

2) The fundamental psychological model adopted by Edwards in Religious Affections was not only available to, but also exploited by, his puritan predecessors. So far from being derived from Enlightenment sources, Edwards’s model of human interiority has roots in Scriptural, patristic, Augustinian, monastic and neo-Augustinian traditions. Seventeenth-century puritans were, like Edwards himself, broadly familiar with these traditions and, like Edwards, used them as the basis for understanding the distinction between genuine and spurious piety.

The first of these arguments is elaborated in Chapter Two. The second is elaborated in Chapter Three.
1) Chapter Two presents a survey of earlier puritan works which undertake essentially the same task as *Religious Affections*: to describe the nature of the regenerate soul, and to determine the signs of true piety. This section will indicate a) that Edwards's procedures for discussing regeneration differed little from those used during the seventeenth-century, and b) that Edwards's interpretation of the "new birth" in terms of a fundamental inclinational or volitional change, and by a new, affective percipience of divine reality, was well established, and had received considerable development, by seventeenth-century puritans. The survey will include descriptions of works by fifteen authors, most of them standard puritan divines, probably all of whom were known to Edwards, and many of whom were cited in *Religious Affections*. I will indicate how these works anticipate *Religious Affections*, and where they differ from it.

I will conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of Edwards's understanding of the role of "terror" in the conversion. It will be seen that a) Edwards did not, in fact, reject the normativity of terror in the conversion process; b) his understanding of pre-faith and post-faith repentance did not differ from earlier puritan pastors; and c) his general view of the role of terror differed little from some other seventeenth-century puritans, such as Giles Firmin and John Owen.

I shall confine my survey mainly to puritan authors who were published between the last decade of the sixteenth and the last decade of the seventeenth century. I shall not follow the tradition beyond the death of John Flavel (1694).
This cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary. It may well be that further
anticipations of Edwards’s *Religious Affections* are to be found in the eighteenth-
century extension of puritan traditions. However, my interest has been merely
to show the extent to which Edwards was anticipated by the standard puritan
divines of the puritanism’s “golden age.”

Although I have attempted to be reasonably comprehensive in my
presentation of the earlier literature anticipating *Religious Affections*, I am aware
that my survey is not exhaustive. I believe that, to trace the parallels between
Edwards’s views of religious experience and those of even a single author, such
as Perkins, Sibbes, Owen or Goodwin, would constitute a major research
project. My own survey cannot be considered as more than an introduction to
Edwards’s relationship to his puritan predecessors. However, I believe that it
will be sufficient to indicate that Edwards’s indebtedness to seventeenth
century puritanism, so far as concerns his *Religious Affections*, has been
seriously underestimated, and that, in fact, seventeenth-century puritanism is
one of the principal, if not the principal source for the basic procedures
adopted, as well as the ideas developed, in that treatise. This position will, I
hope, be further strengthened by the discussion in the third chapter.

2) Chapter Three presents a more detailed investigation of Edwards’s
religious psychology, and especially his language of the “heart.” I shall
describe the notion of religious psychology which Edwards opposed in
*Religious Affections*. An analysis of Edwards’s “heart-religion” will reduce
Edwards’s discussion to ten basic features. I shall then briefly trace the origins
of “heart-religion” in biblical, Greek, patristic, medieval and Renaissance-Reformation traditions. Finally I shall describe the presentation of heart-religion among the seventeenth-century puritans, indicating how all ten features characteristic of Edwards's conception of religious psychology had already been articulated in their work. I shall also indicate that a concept of the heart, similar to that articulated by Edwards, played an important role in seventeenth-century puritanism, both in the theology of regeneration and also in the Arminian controversy.

It should be stated that, in describing puritan anticipations of Edwards's Religious Affections, I am not arguing that Edwards must have read, and consciously borrowed from, all the authors whom I cite. Although I shall generally evaluate the evidence for Edwards's familiarity with the texts under discussion, the evidence of direct borrowing is rarely conclusive. I do argue, however, that a comparison with the earlier literature indicates that Religious Affections does not constitute nearly so radical a discontinuity with the puritan past as has often been supposed.

The third chapter concludes with a brief comparison of the main features of Edwards's heart psychology and similar concepts in Locke's Essay. It will be seen that there are serious differences between Edwards and Locke. Edwards's psychology of the heart does, in fact, bear fewer resemblances to Locke's view of human interiority than to that of seventeenth-century puritan pietism.

A final chapter summarizes the conclusions reached in the previous chapters.
Chapter 2: Religious Affections and its Seventeenth-Century Background

1: Introduction:

When compared with earlier works having the same purpose, to delineate the nature of regeneration and to determine the signs by which the genuineness of regeneration, and the sincerity of the Christian, may be evaluated, Religious Affections can be recognized as belonging to a genre of puritan pastoral and pneumatological theology going back to the late sixteenth century. Such a comparison indicates that 1) Edwards was very far from being the first Puritan to use “signs” of regeneration (rather than the “steps” of the conversion process), in determining genuine piety; 2) Edwards was not the first puritan to concentrate exclusively on signs, as opposed to steps, and 3) many of Edwards’s signs, including those often considered most peculiar to Edwards, were well established in the seventeenth century.

Toward the conclusion of the chapter I will briefly discuss Edward’s attitude to the role of “terror” in the conversion. I will indicate that, although Edwards’s position differs from that of some of the early New England preparationists, such as Thomas Hooker, it agrees with that of other seventeenth-century puritans, such as Giles Firmin and John Owen. That is, Edwards rejects one puritan tradition, but follows another.

In my conclusion I will offer, on the basis of the preceding survey, some
general remarks on the manner in which Edwards used his sources and predecessors. It will be seen that Edwards frequently, although not always, cited authorities to support what modern scholars regard as his more commonplace positions, but he did not cite those authorities, or those passages in his authorities, which supported those ideas which modern scholars have considered the most peculiar or original to Edwards, and hence judged discontinuous with earlier puritan tradition.

This chapter is presented in the form of a survey. I shall describe a large number of treatises which thematically and methodologically anticipate Edwards's *Religious Affections*, noting both the similarities and the differences. It is necessary to enter into a lengthy descriptive and expository discussion because this background literature has rarely been described or discussed in its relation to Edwards.¹

I will investigate two kinds of sources: 1) works, or passages from works, actually cited by Edwards, and 2) works or passages from works, not cited by Edwards, but bearing close parallels with the *Religious Affections*. As my interest is in the general continuities between seventeenth-century puritanism and *Religious Affections*, rather than in Edwards's citations specifically, I have not confined myself to the latter. It will be seen that some of the closest parallels to Edwards's *Religious Affections* are found in works, or passages from

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¹ The only general descriptions of Edwards's predecessors in relation to *Religious Affections* is that contained in John E. Smith's *Introduction* to the Yale edition of that work (pp.52-73). Smith's survey is perceptive, but very brief. Nor does he take account of works not cited by Edwards.
works, not cited by him, and hence overlooked by modern scholarship.

In discussing earlier puritan authors not cited by Edwards, I am not suggesting that he made use of them in preparing Religious Affections, but failed to cite them. I am attempting to indicate that the ideas contained in the Religious Affections, including those often considered most original to Edwards, were part of the general heritage, or intellectual environment, of seventeenth-century puritanism, in which Edwards was educated. It is quite likely, of course, that, in the course of the vast reading which Edwards maintained during the course of his life, he encountered, and was influenced by, a number of these authors, or works, which are uncited in the Religious Affections. A good example is Thomas Goodwin, whose writings on regeneration bear many striking anticipations of Edwards. Edwards does not cite Goodwin, but we know that Edwards read at least some of Goodwin’s works. Another example is Daniel Dyke, who is, apparently, never mentioned anywhere by Edwards. Yet Dyke is cited by Edwards’s grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, in his Guide to Christ (1714), which Edwards used in preparing Religious Affections. Indeed, it would seem almost incredible that Edwards was

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2 Morris, Young Jonathan Edwards, offers a detailed account of Edwards’s immense reading. Almost all the authors discussed in this chapter were familiar to Edwards, as Morris’s discussion indicates.


4 Dyke does not appear in the index of Morris’s Young Jonathan Edwards, the most exhaustive study, so far, of Edwards’s youthful reading.

unfamiliar with Dyke, who was one of the most influential of puritan writers during the seventeenth century.6

Finally, by discussing puritan sources which, although similar in theme and content to the Religious Affections, were yet not cited by Edwards, I hope to indicate, contrary to the views of Miller and his followers, that to eighteenth-century readers familiar with seventeenth-century puritan literature, the Religious Affections would not have seemed particularly strange, let alone incomprehensible.

The final purpose of this chapter is to serve as an introduction to the third chapter, on Edwards's psychology of the heart. In that chapter I have adduced many parallels in earlier puritan literature indicating that Edwards's heart-language, and the psychological model implied by it, were fully established in puritanism before the onset of the eighteenth century and the rise of Lockeanism. The present chapter will offer a wider context to the themes discussed in the third chapter.

Finally, because I am in this chapter attempting to present the general background to the Religious Affections, it will be necessary for me to anticipate some of the discussion of the third chapter, which focuses specifically on Edwards's religious psychology.

I will begin by presenting a synopsis of the Religious Affections itself,

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describing its structure and its most important themes. I hope that this synopsis will provide a reference to the discussion of Edwards's predecessors, which follows it.

2: Edwards's Religious Affections: Structure and Contents

The Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, for all its complexity of detail, has a simple structure, comprised of three major sections. The first (pp. 93-124) argues that “true religion, in great part, consists in holy affections.” The second (pp. 127-190) lists ambiguous “signs,” from which one cannot form a conclusion as to the genuineness or spuriousness of a subject's piety. The final section (pp. 193-461) lists twelve signs of true religion, or authentic regeneration.

The first section is divided into three main parts. The first defines “affections,” adumbrates a theory of human psychology, makes some remarks on the relationship between the mind and body, and briefly explains the vocabulary of affectivity, with a list of various kinds and degrees of affections (pp. 96-99).

The second part adduces evidence to support the proposition that “true religion, in great part, consists in the affections” (pp. 99-119). Edwards's first argument is based on the overwhelming significance of religious or spiritual issues to the human person. Such superlatively important matters must, by
their nature, elicit a powerful emotional reaction: "The things of religion are so 
great, that there can be no suitableness in the exercises of our hearts to their 
nature and importance, unless they be lively and powerful." Their second argument is drawn from the "practical" nature of religion: "As 
true religion is of a practical nature, and God has so constituted the human 
nature, that the affections are very much the spring of man's actions, this also 
shows, that true religion must consist very much in the affections." This 
argument operates on two assumptions: 1) religion is essentially a matter of 
practice, or action; and 2) practice and action spring from the affections. 

Edward's third argument is that it is a matter of ordinary experience that no 
one is converted, whose heart and affections are not captivated by the great 
ideas and themes of the scriptures, of which he gives many examples: "There 
never was anything considerable brought to pass in the heart or life of any man 
living, by the things of religion, that had not his heart deeply affected by those 
things." Edwards introduces a vast array of scriptural quotations supporting his 
thesis, that true religion largely consists in holy affections. These quotations 
cover the whole range of religious affectivity, culminating in "love," the "chief of 
the affections, and fountain of all other affections." He also describes briefly 

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7 Edwards, Religious Affections, 99-100.  
8 Ibid., 101.  
9 Ibid., 102.  
10 Ibid., 106.
the role of the emotions in the lives of David, Paul, the apostle John, and Jesus. He notes that many "duties" and "ordinances" appointed in scripture, such as prayer and singing, are intended to excite certain emotions and affections.\textsuperscript{11}

Edwards's last argument, that true religion is largely a matter of affections, is to note that the scriptures often define sin as "hardness of heart," or a lack of emotional response to God (pp. 116-119).

Edwards concludes the first part of the treatise by asserting that, "as there is no true religion, where there is nothing else but affections; so there is no true religion, where there is no religious affection."\textsuperscript{12}

As on the one hand, there must be light in the understanding, as well as an affected, fervent heart, where there is heat without light, there can be nothing divine or heavenly in that heart; so on the other hand, where there is a kind of light without heat, a head stored with notions and speculations, with a cold and unaffected heart, there can be nothing divine in that light, that knowledge is no true knowledge of spiritual things.\textsuperscript{13}

It is important to note that, although Edwards devotes thirty pages to arguing the centrality of affectivity to true religion, yet he considers his position uncontroversial: "Who will deny that true religion consists, in a great measure, in vigorous and lively actings of the inclination and will of the soul, or the fervent exercises of the heart?"\textsuperscript{14} Perhaps in ordinary times no one would deny

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., 115.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 120.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., 120
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 99.
the role of emotion in religion, but because of the excesses and the
disappointments of the Great Awakening, Edwards notes, religious affections
"have grown out of credit." Significantly, Edwards considers the acceptance
of religious affectivity, and of the means of exciting religious emotions, to have
been normal in earlier times, while he views the hostility of his own day as a
recent development:

Such a kind of means [i.e. "as have a tendency to move the
affections"], would formerly have been highly approved of
and applauded by the generality of the people of the land,
as the most excellent and profitable, and having the
greatest tendency to promote the ends of the means of
grace. But the prevailing taste seems of late strangely to
be altered: that pathetical manner of praying and
preaching, which would formerly have been admitted and
extolled, and that for this reason, because it had such a
tendency to move the affections, now, in great multitudes,
immediately excites disgust, and moves no other
affections, than those of displeasure and contempt.16

According to Edwards, the right way of proceeding "is not to reject all
affects, nor to approve all; but to distinguish between affections, approving
some, and rejecting others; separating between the wheat and the chaff, the
gold and the dross, the precious and the vile."17 This program is pursued in
the remainder of the treatise.

Having in Part 1 "proved"18 that affectivity is an essential aspect of piety,
Edwards proceeds in the second part to show that not all affections are conclusive proof of true religion. It is here that he introduces one of the central concerns of the treatise, to establish criteria for assessing the sincerity, or genuineness, of a person's religion, and for distinguishing false from true "signs."

The signs discussed in the second part are ambiguous: they indicate neither that the affections in question are "truly gracious" nor that they are not. Edwards presents twelve such inconclusive signs for an in-depth discussion. The fact that their number equals that of the "true" signs presented in the third part, suggests that Edwards might have been aiming for a certain parallelism in Parts Two and Three. The parallelism is, however, of presentation only. The signs of Part Two do not thematically parallel their numerical correspondents in Part Three.

Here follows a synopsis of the twelve ambiguous signs.

1) The fact that the affections are lively, or "raised very high:" such affections may merely be "temporary."\(^{19}\)

2) The fact that affections might have "great effects upon the body:" In fact, Edwards devotes most of his discussion here to proving that genuine affections can and do affect the body, and does not explicitly discuss the grounds upon which to consider bodily reactions as inconclusive in determining genuine piety. One assumes that the reason given for the inadequacy of sign one, are also applicable to sign two.

\(^{19}\text{Ibid., 130-131.}\)
3) Loquacity on religious subjects: That a person is “fluent, fervent and abundant in talking of the things of religion”\(^{20}\) is no sure sign because, even if such loquacity arises from excited emotions, those emotions may be false or vitiated in some way. Again, Edwards refers the reader to his discussion of the first sign, which indicates that there can be “religious” affections without grace: “And therefore persons talking abundantly and fervently about the things of religion, can be an evidence of no more than this, that they are affected with the things of religion, but this may be (as has been already shown), and there be no grace.”\(^{21}\) Again, the fact that there is no grace, may be revealed by the temporary nature of a person's commitment. In addition, Edwards makes an observation from experience, that persons affected with spurious religious emotion, tend to be more loquacious than the genuinely pious. He supports this position with quotations from scripture, as well as from Shepard and Flavel.\(^{22}\) Accordingly, loquacity may more likely be a sign of false religion than true.

4) That affections arise spontaneously, and do not “originate” in the subject affected, does not mean that they are “gracious.”\(^{23}\) They may be genuine, or they may be excited by “false spirits.”\(^{24}\) They may be merely the result of

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\(^{20}\)Ibid., 135.

\(^{21}\)Ibid., 136.

\(^{22}\)Ibid., 137.

\(^{23}\)Ibid., 138.

\(^{24}\)Ibid., 141.
“common” works of the spirit, that is, they may originate in the Holy Spirit, but not be of salvific character. Or such affections may arise spontaneously as “natural impressions,” upon the imagination, especially in persons of a “weak and vapoury habit” of body and brain.

5) The spontaneous irruption of scripture texts into consciousness, exciting religious emotions, is not a conclusive sign of genuine piety. In this section Edwards is concerned with two issues: 1) the spontaneity of the “recollection” of scripture texts, and 2) the individual’s reaction to, or construal of, these experiences of spontaneous recollection.

As to the first matter, Edwards notes that such experiences can be caused by evil spirits, as well as good. As to the second, he observes that the emotions arising in response to these scriptures may be illegitimate: “Affections may arise on occasion of the Scriptures, and not properly come from Scripture, as the genuine fruit of Scripture, and by right use of it.”

As to the other issue, Edwards is here referring to a particular kind of misconstrual, that concerning the “comfortable and precious promises” of God’s forgiveness to sinners, misapplied by the unconverted “to remove the rising doubt, and to confirm the false joy and confidence of a poor, deluded sinner.”

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25 Ibid., 142.
26 Ibid., 142.
27 Ibid., 143.
28 Ibid., 144.
6) The "appearance of love" in a person is not conclusive evidence of genuine piety. Love to God and Christ may well be "counterfeit," even if not the result of calculated and deliberate misrepresentation. People may be deluded, either by Satan or by their own tendency to self-deception that their love is genuine. However, time will reveal the truth. False love will fail. Christ may be abandoned.

7) Multiplicity and diversity of affections are no conclusive sign. They may all be counterfeit. False love, discussed in the preceding section, can excite counterfeits of all the emotions which arise from love. Again, Edwards is arguing upon the assumption, mentioned earlier, that love is the "spring" of all human affectivity. Thus, if the love is false, so is all the affectivity that arises from it.

8) The fact that spiritual comforts and joys seem to follow convictions of conscience in a particular order does not conclusively indicate genuine piety. Here Edwards is referring to the famous "morphology" of the conversion, in which terror of sin and damnation is followed by comfort and joy in the promises of the gospel. Edwards concedes that the idea of God's effecting conversion through a particular sequence is not only reasonable, but also

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29 Ibid., 146.
30 Ibid. 146.
31 Ibid., 147.
32 Ibid., 150-151.
33 Ibid., 151.
reflective of normal experience, and "God's ordinary manner of working salvation." But, again, the emotions apparently conforming to the traditional pattern may be spurious. For instance, it is not so much "terror" that God requires, as conviction of conscience, and not all terror is the same as conviction of conscience: "Though convictions of conscience do often cause terror, yet they don't consist in it; and terrors do often arise from other causes." Furthermore, even if the terror arises from true conviction of conscience, it does not follow that the comfort and joy succeeding the terror are anything but counterfeit: "The unmortified corruption of the heart may quench the Spirit of God (after he has been striving), by leading men to presumptuous, and self-exalting hopes and joys, as well as otherwise." Also, if the devil can inspire false emotions, he can also organize them to imitate the traditional morphology: "If the Devil can make A, B, and C, 'tis as easy for him to put A first, and B next, and C next, as to range 'em in a contrary order." Not only that, but it is also conceivable that God might excite all the emotions requisite to prepare the sinner for conversion, and yet never complete the process: "We have no certain rule to determine how far God's own spirit may go in those operations and convictions which in themselves are not spiritual and saving, and yet the person that is the subject of them, never be converted, but fall short

34 Ibid., 154.
35 Ibid., 156.
36 Ibid., 157.
37 Ibid., 159.
of salvation at last.”

In a sort of post-script to this section (pp. 160-163), Edwards notes that the fact that a sinner does not experience the traditionally prescribed emotional sequence during conversion “plainly and distinctly,” does not indicate that he or she is not converted. Quoting Thomas Shepard in support, Edwards asserts that all the emotions requisite to conversion may be present, but in a “confused chaos.” He concludes by noting, “We are often in Scripture expressly directed to try ourselves by the nature of the fruits of the Spirit; but nowhere by the Spirit’s method of producing them.”

9) Spending a lot of time in the external duties of religion may indicate genuine piety, or it may arise from counterfeit affections, or a deluded religiosity. Edwards adduces as examples the Pharisees, the recluses of the “Romish church,” and, in contemporary times, a devout Jew who had once been his next-door neighbour.

10) Frequent glorification of God is no sure sign. It depends on what one glorifies God for. Persons who yet “remain with unmortified pride and enmity against God,” may still praise him for the “unmerited” benefits he may bestow upon them.

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38Ibid. 159-160.
39Ibid., 161.
40Ibid., 162.
41Ibid., 164-165.
42Ibid., 167.
11) Confidence in the divine origin of one's affections and experiences, and assurance of one's salvation do not infallibly indicate true religion. Edwards allows that assurance is indeed possible, but denies that a sense of confidence in God's mercy toward oneself can in itself be taken as proof of genuine piety. Such assurance may arise entirely from self-deception, self-flattery and self-exaltation. In fact, true saints tend to be distinguished by "awakening and caution," while false comforts tend to "stupefy the mind" and excite the complacency and presumption, which are often mistaken for assurance. Nor is the Devil accustomed to trouble such complacency with doubt, as he does the faith of many true saints. Nor is the complacent Christian likely to notice the imperfections which might shake his false confidence.

At this point Edwards distinguishes between two types of hypocrite: 1) those who are deceived into self-confidence by "outward morality and external religion," and 2) those who are deceived by "false discoveries and elevations; which often cry down works, and one's own righteousness, and talk much of free grace, but at the same time make a righteousness of their discoveries, and

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43Ibid., 167.
44Ibid., 170.
46Ibid., 172.
47Ibid., 172.
48Ibid., 172.
of their humiliation, and exalt themselves to heaven with them." Edwards notes, again referring to Thomas Shepard, that these two types of hypocrites are traditionally called "legal" and "evangelical" hypocrites. In modern language they would probably be called "moralizers" and "antinomians."

Edwards concludes by affirming that assurance must be based neither in presumption nor in private revelations, but "on a holy frame." The truly pious place their confidence in Christ. False professors believe not in Christ, but in the goodness of their spiritual conditions.

12) It is not proof of genuine religion that one's account of one's spiritual experience gratifies the godly. The truly godly may have experiential knowledge of true religion, but cannot have direct knowledge of the genuineness of another's experience. True religion cannot be judged from narratives of experience, but from holy practice: "'Tis by the mature fruit which comes afterwards, and not by the beautiful colours and smell of the blossom, that we must judge by." Again, Edwards sees time and religious practice as crucial factors in determine authentic piety.

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49 Ibid., 173.
50 Ibid., 173.
51 Ibid., 177-181.
52 Ibid., 185.
Whereas Part Two of *Religious Affections* discusses ambiguous signs, Part Three (pp. 193-461) identifies twelve signs which differentiate “gracious” affections from those that are otherwise, and which may serve as signs to identify true religion. In his preface to this discussion, Edwards makes three cautions.  

First, these signs do not enable anyone to distinguish, with any certainty, the spiritual status of another.

Second, they do not enable anyone who is “very low in grace, or such as have much departed from God, and are fallen into a dead, carnal and unchristian frame,” to know with certainty his own “good estate.”

Third, if, in using these signs, Christians fail to determine their spiritual condition, the defect lies not in the signs, but in the limitations of the Christians’ insight.

Here follows a synopsis of the twelve “distinguishing signs of truly gracious and holy affections.”

1) Truly gracious affections arise from a supernatural and divine influence on the heart. This is the most famous section of the *Religious Affections*. It is principally here that Edwards elaborates his theory of human psychology and presents his view of the “new creature” as a “perception,” or “sense of the heart” of divine things. As I intend to devote the entirety of Chapter 3 to discussing Edwards’s psychology of the heart, it is not necessary to enter into an exposition of it here. However, I wish to make some remarks on the manner

53Ibid., 193-194.
of Edwards's exposition.

In discussing the psychology of the regenerate and the unregenerate, Edwards reintroduces the concept of common and saving works of the Holy Spirit. In saving works, the Spirit not only effects in the believer a change which is permanent, but also supernatural, constituting a "principle or spring of new nature and life," in which God "exerts and communicates himself in his own proper nature." In distinguishing common from saving grace, Edwards concludes:

Thus not only the manner of the relation of the Spirit, who is the operator, to the subject of his operations, is different; as the Spirit operates in the saints, as dwelling in them as an abiding principle of action, whereas he doth not so operate upon sinners, but the influence and operation itself is different, and the effect wrought is exceedingly different.

2) Gracious affections arise in response to the "transcendentally excellent and amiable nature of divine things as they are in themselves, and not in any conceived relation they bear to self, or self-interest." Thus the saint properly and primarily loves God, not for any benefits which the saint may receive from him (even devils, who cannot apprehend any "amiableness" in God, are capable of loving God out of self-interest), but for God's inherent beauty, glory and excellence. After defending the philosophical coherence of the

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54 Ibid., 200.
55 Ibid., 201.
56 Ibid., 202.
57 Ibid., 240.
58 Ibid., 242.
concept of unself-regarding love toward God, Edwards proceeds to explain how even such affections as gratitude, which seem to arise in response to benefits received, are, in the case of the saints, ultimately derived from the love of God's inherent perfections for their own sake.

3) The divine attribute which excites the love of the saint is properly God's moral perfections, not any of his natural excellencies, such as omnipotence, omniscience or aeseity. God's moral perfections include those attributes "whereby the heart and will of God are good, right and infinitely becoming, and lovely; such as righteousness, truth, faithfulness and goodness, or, in a word, his holiness." Holiness is the first and proper object of sanctified love because 1) holiness is the source of all other moral virtues, and 2) no natural virtue can be perceived as beautiful, if not accompanied by holiness.

4) Gracious affections do not constitute a free-floating emotionalism, but arise from some "information of the understanding, some spiritual instruction." That is, gracious affections occur in response to that knowledge one has about God, and especially of his moral perfections, normally derived from Scripture or preaching. This knowledge is accompanied or characterized by a certain "relish," or sense of sweetness, felt in the "heart," which only the

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59 Ibid., 253.
60 Ibid., 255.
61 Ibid., 255, 257.
62 Ibid., 266.
Thus religious affections arise from a percipience, or feeling knowledge, "when the mind don't only speculate and behold, but relishes and feels."\(^{64}\)

5) Gracious affections are accompanied with a sense of certainty. For the saints, the "doctrines of the gospel" are not mere "matters of opinion," but are points "settled as undoubted and indisputable."\(^{65}\) This conviction is powerful and enduring because it arises from the kind of forceful and emotionally transforming apprehension associated with sense perception: "if it be so, that is a spiritual conviction of the divinity and reality of the things exhibited in the gospel, which arises from a spiritual understanding of those things, I have shown already what that is, viz., a sense and taste of the divine, supreme and holy excellency and beauty of those things."\(^{66}\) Such a certainty is not to be confused with 1) "common illumination," or knowledge without an emotional sense of the loveliness of the content of that knowledge; 2) imaginative visions, which, although temporarily impressive, and perhaps persuasive of the reality of the spiritual world, do not evoke a sense of God's moral perfections; and 3) the certainty of divine reality which endures so long as one is confident in one's election, but which disappears as soon as one suspects that one is bound for

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\(^{63}\)Ibid., 271.

\(^{64}\)Ibid., 272.

\(^{65}\)Ibid., 291.

\(^{66}\)Ibid., 297.
6) Gracious affections are attended with “evangelical humiliation.” This differs from “legal” fear inasmuch as, whereas legal fear is a terror of God’s majesty and avenging power, without any hatred of sin, or without a desire of self-abasement on the one hand, or the exaltation of God on the other, evangelical humiliation loathes sin inasmuch as it is an offence against God’s moral perfection and contrary to his “beauty” and “holiness,” and is attended with renunciation of self and exaltation of God. Edwards extends this section by presenting a number of signs of secret pride and false humility (pp. 315-320).

7) Gracious affections are attended with a “change of nature.” Edwards is not here referring to the new creation which is bestowed on the regenerate, but to a change in the moral “disposition” of the saint: “A man may be restrained from sin, before he is converted; but when he is converted, he is not only restrained from sin, his very heart and nature is turned from it, unto holiness: so that thenceforward he becomes a holy person, and an enemy to sin.”

8) Gracious affections are accompanied by a “Christian spirit” of “love, meekness, quietness, forgiveness, mercy and other similar dispositions.”

67 Ibid., 308-311.
68 Ibid., 311.
69 Ibid., 340.
70 Ibid., 341.
71 Ibid., 345.
9) Gracious affections "soften the heart" and are attended by a Christian "tenderness of spirit."\textsuperscript{72} By this phrase, Edwards particularly means a tenderness of the conscience. For while false affections tend to "harden the heart," and "stupefy the conscience,"\textsuperscript{73} gracious affections make the heart "more sensible, more easily and thoroughly discerning the sinfulness of that which is sinful, and receiving a greater conviction of the heinous and dreadful nature of sin."\textsuperscript{74}

10) Gracious affections are "symmetrical" and "proportionate."\textsuperscript{75} That is, the true saint does not possess some qualities of sanctification but not others. "Holy hope" is balanced by "holy fear;" joy and comfort are balanced by godly sorrow for sin, etc.\textsuperscript{76} True saints do not possess the more spectacular virtues, and yet lack the humbler ones.\textsuperscript{77} They are universally obedient.

11) The more lively the gracious affections, the greater the soul's appetite and longing after further spiritual attainments. False Christians are satisfied with the "least measure of grace," and desire no more than they have already received.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., 357.
\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., 357-358.
\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., 363.
\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., 365.
\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., 366.
\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., 370.
\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., 380-382.
12) Gracious affections have their "exercise and fruit" in "Christian practice." The true saint is "universally conformed to and directed by Christian rules." Holy practice is the saint's primary business in life. He or she persists in it always and until the end of life. Even if Christians back-slide, they never grow "habitually to dislike or neglect" religion. At this point, Edwards explains the relationship between the inward experience of the saint and its outward expression, thus integrating the first eleven signs with the twelfth, and the psychological aspect of the treatise with the moral, or "practical." The reason why the true Christian perseveres in holiness is because his or her holiness is founded on affections which arise from 1) the power and efficacy of their spiritual and supernatural origin (sign one); 2) the objective excellency of divine things in themselves, rather than on definitions of one's own self-interest (signs two and three); 3) a sure conviction and certainty as to the reality of divine things (sign five); 4) a change of nature (sign seven); 5) a new spirit of humility and obedience (signs six and nine); 6) a dove-like spirit, which fulfills all duties (sign eight); 6) the constancy and stability of proportion (sign ten); and 7) the perpetual self-renewal of spiritual appetites (sign eleven). Edwards concludes by asserting that Christian practice is the "chief of all the signs of grace, both as evidence of the sincerity to

79Ibid., 383.
80Ibid.
81Ibid., 390.
82Ibid., 392-397.
others, and also to their own conscience."  

A survey of the *Religious Affections* in its entirety suggests an overall similarity to traditional puritan pietistic writing, a similarity which I wish to examine in the remainder of this chapter. The opening pages of Part One, and the first and fourth signs of Part Three (where Edwards is commonly viewed as most original, or most indebted to non-puritan traditions), have received more comment than the rest of the *Religious Affections* combined. This focus has conveyed a false impression to readers of the secondary literature of the book's overall content and its relationship to other puritan works of a similar kind.

The preceding synopsis has included references to many important themes in *Religious Affections* which, while placing the work very squarely in a particular tradition of puritan literature (to be described shortly), have very rarely received comment from scholars. Among them are such issues as "temporary" faith, common versus saving works of the Spirit, misapplications of "Gospel promises," counterfeit affections, the distinction between terror and conviction of conscience, appreciating God for his "moral" as opposed to his "natural" perfections, the manifold types of "hypocrisy," loving God without reference to self-interest, evangelical humiliation, change of "nature," tenderness of spirit, proportionableness of religious affections, and Christian practice as the chief sign of regeneration. For an example of the neglect which

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83Ibid., 406.
these themes have suffered, one might consult the index to the Yale Edition of
Religious Affections, which contains no mention of any of these subjects, except
"evangelical humiliation." Most surprising is the omission of any reference in
the Yale Index to the concept of "hypocrisy," although it pervades the treatise,
discussions of, or references to it occurring on pages 135, 151, 170, 172, 173,
183, 193, 194, 197, 249, 251, 252, 253, 335, 365, 373, 382, 383.

Although one might argue that such themes as I have alluded to,
representing the commonplaces of puritan pastoral theology, have elicited little
scholarly comment, because scholars in general, and Edwardsean scholars in
particular, tend to concentrate on that which makes their subject distinctive or
even unique, yet the omission of such themes from almost all discussions of
the Religious Affections creates a false impression of its relationship to earlier
puritan literature.

The themes listed above, as well as the more widely recognized
Edwardsean subjects of "affection," "sense," and "heart," place the Religious
Affections squarely within the broad category of puritan pneumatological
literature. More specifically, they were the peculiar subject matter of that
aspect of pneumatology which investigated the regenerative work of the Spirit
on the human soul, the distinction between true and false conversion, and the
signs of genuine piety.

Edwards considered the subject matter of the Religious Affections to be of
surpassing significance to all persons: "There is no question whatsoever, that is
of greater importance to mankind, and that it more concerns every individual
person to be well resolved in, than this, what are the distinguishing qualifications of those that are in favour with God, and entitled to his eternal rewards? He was also aware that his subject was commonplace, having been treated frequently before: "It would be endless to reckon up the variety of opinions in this point, that divide the Christian world."

The project of determining the "distinguishing qualifications of those who are in favour with God" belonged to a traditional branch of puritan pneumatology, which dealt with the assurance of salvation. The purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to suggest where the Religious Affections falls in this tradition, and to describe the similarities it bears to other contributions to the central pastoral questions involved.

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84 Ibid., 84.
85 Ibid., 84.
3: The Earlier Traditions

It appears that Christians have always had some basis, however vague or incompletely articulated, for the sense of certainty or assurance concerning their salvation. According to Ernest Stoeffler, there had existed, before the Reformation, three main foundations for assurance: 1) direct apprehension of divine favour (particularly associated with the early church); 2) trust in the divinely established institution of the church (particularly associated with the high middle ages); and 3) rational inference. However, before the high-to-late middle ages, the question of personal assurance was rarely addressed with any thoroughness or precision, possibly because theologians were preoccupied with other concerns, or because the issue was not perceived as problematic, or because a doctrine of assurance was considered undesirable. Augustine’s own inconclusive meditations on assurance, although anticipating the Reformed discussion, seemed ultimately to favour the ecclesiological-sacramental foundation emphasized by the medieval church.

The preponderant significance which the question of assurance assumed during the Reformation is attributable to at least two factors:

1) The reformers’ hostility to the sacramental, and more specifically, the penitential institutions of the late medieval church. As noted above, what

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88 Ibid., 12-14.
assurance the church of that period recognized as possible or desirable, was offered through these institutions. If the role of the sacraments was to be reinterpreted, and medieval penitential traditions were to be discarded, assurance had to be placed on a new foundation.

2) The pastoral problem of religious anxiety. The fear of eternal damnation was a psychological reality which pastors were compelled to deal with in the ordinary course of their duties. Between the thirteenth and the eighteenth centuries religious anxiety reached, in western Christianity at least, a ubiquity and intensity probably unequaled either before or since in Christian history, as Jean Delumeau has described in exhaustive detail.  

The task inherited by theologians and pastors of the Reformation was to determine an adequate foundation of assurance, which would at once strengthen and encourage weak Christians, without exciting either presumption or antinomianism. According to Beeke, the outlines of a doctrine of assurance had been sketched by the reformers of the first generation. It was left to subsequent generations to “augment and clarify” the position. The degree to which later protestants adhered to or departed from the basic insights of the reformers of the first generation is controversial. Fortunately, it is not necessary to enter into the controversy here.


90Beeke, Assurance of Faith, 21.

Calvin was aware of the pastoral challenge of dispelling religious anxiety without encouraging presumption. His approach anticipates that taken by many of the puritan authors to be investigated in this chapter.

Calvin defined faith as necessarily involving assurance: "Now we shall possess a right definition of faith if we call it a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevolence toward us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit." Similarly, in his commentary on Acts 2:39, he declares:

This is required necessarily for the certainty of faith, that everyone be fully persuaded of this, that he is comprehended in the number of those unto whom God speaketh. This is the rule of a true faith, when I am thus persuaded that salvation is mine because that promise appertains to me which offereth the same.

However, Calvin was aware of the distinction between faith as ideally defined, and faith as actually experienced in the lives of Christians. He accepts, as a matter of observation, that believers "are not only tried by the disquiet, which they often experience, but they are repeatedly shaken by the gravest

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Calvinism to 1649 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), are the two classic discussions of a Calvinist departure from Calvin's essential teaching on assurance. They have excited a voluminous discussion of the question. Beeke, in Assurance of Salvation, argues the continuity between Calvin and the Calvinists.


terr~rs;"94 that "unbelief is, in all men, always mixed with faith,"95 that "certainty not tinged with doubt" is unimaginable;96 that believers "are in perpetual conflict with their own unbelief,"97 and that believers may have assurance without being conscious of it.98

Calvin explained the distinction between the ideal of faith and the reality of lingering doubt and terror, by arguing that faith can be "weak," especially at first, when it is in its "infancy," assailed by residual doubt, ignorance and the weakness of the flesh impinging on conscience:

The greatest doubt and trepidation must be mixed up with such wrappings of ignorance, since our heart inclines by its own natural instinct toward unbelief. Besides this, there are innumerable and varied temptations that constantly assail us with great violence. But it is especially our conscience itself that, weighed down by a mass of sins, now complains and groans, now accuses itself, now murmurs secretly, now breaks out in open tumult.99

Calvin was also aware of the opposite problem, that of presumption, or of falsely imagining that one has been fully "entrusted" to Christ and fully converted.100 Not all those who seem to be Christ's actually belong to Christ. Calvin notes several forms of counterfeit faith, most notably "temporary" and

94Calvin, Institutes, 3.2.17. Battles, trans.: 1:562.
95Ibid, 3.2.4. Battles, trans.: 1: 547.
96Ibid., 3.2.17. Battles, trans.: 1:562.
97Ibid., 3.2.17. Battles, trans.: 1:563.
99Ibid., 3.2.20. Battles, trans.: 1:566.
"transitory" faith, as well as "hypocrisy," as David Foxgrove has pointed out. The counterfeits of faith can be experienced in a manner virtually indistinguishable from faith itself: "Experience shows that the reprobates are sometimes affected by almost the same feeling as the elect, so that even in their own judgement they do not in any way differ from the elect."  

Calvin explains counterfeit, or temporary, faith ("temporary" seems to be a general term covering all forms of false faith), mainly in terms of "hypocrisy" (Latin: *hypocrisía*). This term bore a wider signification for Calvin than it does for moderns, who usually understand it as a deliberate, conscious and calculated misrepresentation of oneself. Calvin did recognize several degrees of deliberate, conscious, false self-representation, which he termed "gross hypocrisy." However, he also recognized a more subtle form of "hypocrisy," not implied by the modern use of the term, and closer in meaning to our concept of "self-deception." This form of "deceit" or "guile" refers to "another inward hypocrisy, when men are so blinded by their sins, that they deceive not only others, but themselves as well." Simon is adduced as an example of the "inward hypocrisy," an illustration that the "human heart...is so
decked out with deceiving hypocrisy, that it often dupes itself."\(^{105}\) This is the "more deceptive" hypocrisy of those who "not only keep up a pretense before men, but even dazzle their own eyes, so that seem to themselves to be worshipping God aright."\(^{106}\)

Foxgrove notes that, for Calvin, this "inward hypocrisy" is the "result of a lengthy process of self-deception and self-flattery," ending in the stupefaction of natural conscience, thus preventing a sense of conviction of sin. In his comments on Hebrews 12:75, Calvin suggests the process by which this moral-spiritual insensibility develops:

> When we turn aside from the straight way, we not only make excuses for our views to others, but also impose them on ourselves. Satan creeps upon us stealthily, and allures us gradually by subtly hidden devices, so that when we go astray we are not conscious of so straying. We slip down gradually, until at last we fall head-long. A long, continued inactivity leads almost always to a lethargy which is followed by mental alienation.\(^{107}\)

To avoid falling into hypocrisy, or self-deception, Calvin prescribes self-examination, "to search whether those interior marks by which God distinguishes his children from strangers belong to us."\(^{108}\) Such self-examination is recommended "lest the confidence of the flesh creep in" and displace genuine assurance of faith.\(^{109}\)


\(^{107}\) Quoted by Foxgrove, "Temporary Faith," 230.


It is not necessary to proceed further into Calvin's own doctrine of assurance, the controversies surrounding his treatment of the foundations of assurance, or his use of the syllogismus practicus. From the passages cited so far, it will be clear that the essential project, and several of the most important themes, of Edwards's Religious Affections had already been initiated by this representative of the first generation of Reformers. Specific anticipations of Edwards's discussion are noticeable in Calvin's concern with "temporary" faith, hypocrisy in its various forms, and the "marks" (notae) of genuine piety. However, between Calvin and Edwards falls, as a connecting link, a vast body of puritan discussion which attempts to understand the nature of true faith, of self-deception and hypocrisy, and to determine the "marks," "signs" or "notes" of genuine piety. Calvin's discussion of these matters, however acute and perceptive, is terse and succinct in comparison with the expansive and minutely detailed treatment given to them by the puritans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The puritans who undertook to elaborate the discussion of pastoral concerns centering upon the nature of regeneration, and the "signs" distinguishing true from false piety, very generally belonged to a tradition of pastoral and pneumatological theologians, often personally and inter-generationally connected with one another. The secondary literature sometimes refers to them as the "godly preachers," or "spiritual preachers." As a line of teachers and students (as well as, especially in the early generations, fathers-in-law and sons-in-law), their spiritual "genealogy," so to speak, has
been described by several scholars. They represent a tradition of pastoral reflection extending from the mid-sixteenth century as far as (in their last representatives), the early eighteenth century. Not only the subject matter, but also the numerous citations and footnotes, of the Religious Affections indicate, as will shortly be discussed in detail, that Edwards himself was consciously operating out of this tradition.

4: John Bradford (1510-1555)

Both Breward and Stoeffler recognize John Bradford as a precursor of the tradition under discussion here. He had been a student of Martin Bucer, whom Brewer describes as “interested in the analysis of feeling and the place of good works as a testimony of election.” Breward considers Bradford as “the first English Reformer whose writings were strongly marked by an experimental emphasis.” Bradford’s “Sermon on Repentance” anticipates a

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\item Breward, “Introduction,” 28.
\item Ibid., 29.
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number of themes to become conspicuous in the tradition of reflection leading ultimately to the Religious Affections. He begins with a definition of genuine repentance, distinguishing it from false. Although his analysis is rudimentary in comparison with later puritan discussion of the nature of conversion, yet his message is broadly similar. Repentance is a “sorrowing or forthinking of our sins past, an earnest purpose to amend, a turning to God with a trust of pardon.”¹¹⁴ Repentance includes 1) a sorrowing for sin, and 2) a trust in pardon, “which otherwise might be called a persuasion of God’s mercy by the merits of Christ for the forgiveness of sins.” The effect of repentance is a “purpose to amend, or conversion to a new life.”¹¹⁵ Bradford distinguished his view of repentance not only from the penitential ceremonial of the medieval church, but also from the scholastic analysis of repentance in terms of contrition, confession and satisfaction.¹¹⁶ He redefines these three scholastic terms as 1) a “hearty sorrowing for sin” (contrition); 2) “faith of free pardon in God’s mercy by Jesus Christ” (confession); and 3) Christ’s sacrifice (“satisfaction”).¹¹⁷ True “penance” is not just a lenten exercise, but “must be continually in us” and “must increase daily more and more in us.”¹¹⁸ Bradford then exhorts his listeners to search their hearts, recognizing and lamenting

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 45.
¹¹⁶ Ibid., 45-46.
¹¹⁷ Ibid., 51.
¹¹⁸ Ibid., 52.

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their sins and trusting in God's mercy, while Bradford threatens with hell-fire "all who neglect this duty." He cautions against the self-deception involved in believing that repentance is under one's control, rather than a divine gift that must be requested. He recommends the use of "means" to excite true sorrow for sin: one must pray; one must use the law as a mirror to reveal sin, not only external sin, but also the secret lusts and "inward motions" of the heart: "let us consider the heart, and so shall we see the foul spots we are stained withal at least inwardly, whereby we the rather may be moved to hearty sorrow and sighing." If neither prayer nor meditation upon God's law excites sorrow, then Bradford recommends consideration of eternal punishment to terrify the sinner. If unmoved by this, the sinner should consider God's hatred of sin as attested to in Scripture, and the extreme remedy prescribed in the death of God's own Son.

To deal with anxiety of sin, Bradford recommends a perusal of the Bible: not the parts which inspire terror, but "the other parts which serveth specially to consolation and certain persuasion of God's love toward thee, that is, the gospel or publication of God's mercy in Christ, I mean the free promises." If

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119Ibid., 52.
120Ibid., 53.
121Ibid., 55.
122Ibid., 57.
123Ibid., 57-63.
124Ibid., 65.
one is insensitive to Gospel promises, Bradford recommends the consideration of the blessing one has received from God, both worldly and spiritual, as testimonies of God's love.¹²⁵

I have quoted Bradford at length to suggest the extent to which he anticipates and adumbrates the later tradition. He attempts to distinguish true piety (which he refers to as "repentance") from false piety (which he associates with the medieval penitential system); he recommends the application of the law to reveal hidden sin, dispel self-deception and excite a concern for the soul's status before God; he consoles the anxious sinner by presenting some grounds for assurance. Finally, he indicates, like most puritans, including Edwards himself, that a sanctified life is the chief fruit, or sign, of an effectual conversion: "Newness of life is not indeed a part of penance, but a fruit of it, a demonstration of the justifying faith, a sign of God's good spirit possessing the heart of the penitent."¹²⁶

It is also to be noted that Bradford comprehends faith within his definition and description of repentance. As discussed in Chapter 1, some scholars have considered the inclusion of faith within the experience of repentance as a peculiarity of Edwards's theology of conversion. This error arises from a confusion, occurring occasionally in the scholarly literature, between "legal terror" and repentance, a distinction which should become clear during the

¹²⁵Ibid., 69-71.
¹²⁶Ibid. 78-79.
course of his chapter. Unfortunately, the pastors and theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sometimes contributed to the confusion by applying the word “repentance” both to pre-faith anxiety regarding the eternal consequences of one’s sins, and to post-faith “sorrow for sin.” William Ames made the distinction clear, although he used the word “repentance” for both the anxiety which precedes faith, and the “godly sorrow” which follows the reception of faith:

Repentance, as far as it comprises the care, anxiety, and terror connected with the law, precedes faith in order of nature, as a preparing and disposing cause, and is even found in the unregenerate; but insofar as it turns man away effectively and genuinely from sin, by which God is offended, it follows faith and depends upon it as an effect upon its cause and so belongs to those who have faith.\(^\text{128}\)

However, that repentance, properly so-called, was a consequence rather than a pre-condition of faith, was a commonplace of sixteenth and seventeenth-century protestant theology. As Thomas Watson wrote poetically:

Doubtless repentance shows itself first in a Christian’s life. Yet I am apt to think that the seeds of faith are first wrought in the heart. As when a burning taper is brought into a room the light shows itself first, but the taper was before the light, so we see the fruits of repentance first, but the beginnings of faith were there.

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\(^{127}\) This confusion was mentioned in Chapter 1 particularly in connection with Thomas Yarborough’s synopsis of Edwards’s theology. It also occurs frequently in Pettit’s work, as when he notes that, because of their concern with the “preparatory” stages of the conversion, the “spiritual preachers” held that “conversion itself no longer implied immediate assurance of final election.” Heart Prepared, 56.

5: Richard Greenham (1535-1594?)

Bradford’s “experimental” spirit, as well as his pneumatological concerns, were further expressed and developed by Richard Greenham, the rector of Dry Drayton from 1570-1591. His Works, published in 1599, contain eight treatises, sermons and letters discussing the grounds of assurance, the “marks” and “signs” of regeneration, and the distinction between genuine and spurious conversion. Haller has described Greenham as “the patriarch of Baxter’s “affectionate, practical English writers.” Haller saw puritanism as a “brotherhood of preachers detailing the spiritual life for their auditors,” a “brotherhood of spiritual preachers,” and Greenham as the head of this

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brotherhood. As Haller’s reference to Baxter indicates, Greenham was recognized, even in the seventeenth century, as a the fountainhead of the “affectionate” or pietistic strain in puritanism. He was the first in a sort of spiritual genealogy, which can be described in the following scheme:

Greenham’s treatises show a twin concern: 1) to communicate the grounds of assurance for those troubled in conscience ("Grave Counsels and Godlie Observations," "Treatise for an Afflicted Conscience," etc.); and 2) to awaken

133Ibid., 54.
"sleepy professors" from their "carnal security" and "hypocrisy" ("Sermon on Humilitie," "Sermon of Repentance and True Sorrow for Sinne"). In his works these themes, though pursued in some detail, are still relatively rudimentary in comparison with the discussions of later generations. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to compare his work briefly with Edwards's Religious Affections. Such a comparison indicates the degree to which many of Edwards's themes, methods and positions, as well as his emphasis on the interior disposition of the will and affections for determining true piety, and of the "sweetness" of experiencing, or "tasting," God, were already commonplace in Greenham's work.

Like Edwards, Greenham desired to identify the "marks," "notes" or "signs" of genuine piety. In the course of his work he presents a number of "rules to know whether we have the Spirit."134 Throughout, he emphasizes not externals, but the inward, affective disposition. He recommends that Christians consider their fundamental amative disposition toward holiness: "what liking or misliking we have to sin."135 It is not enough to reject sin. One must actively hate it as offensive to God:

Repentance is not a bare leaving of sin, but an utter condemning and misliking of that sin which we have left. For though we have left it, yet it may make us sorrow for it many years after, yea even after the point of death.136

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134 Greenham, Works, 94.
135 Ibid., 94-95.
136 Ibid., 178-179.
Abandoning sin is not the same as repentance. If, after we have abandoned
sin, we feel no remorse for it, or if we even continue, deep down, to love it, we
have not truly repented. Everywhere Greenham regards not the act, but the
underlying motivation, the secret disposition of the will, the heart, and the
affections. The purpose of self-examination is principally to plumb these
depths: “Let us examine ourselves, if our knowledge be better, if our affections
be holier.” He cautions against “hypocrisy” and “temporary” faith. He
distinguishes between genuine and spurious piety through a series of
comparisons: Whereas hypocrites “are grieved when they have
sinned...because their sin hath, or will bring, some punishment upon them,”
the godly grieve “because they have offended God, and give him an occasion to
draw his favour from them.” Similarly, while hypocrites “only desire to be
in the favour of God because they would be freed from grief,” the godly “find
such a sweetness in the favour of God, that for the desire thereof, they cannot
but be content to forego all the pleasures of this life.” The idea that the godly
have a “true taste” of God’s Spirit, and of his “sweetness” is frequent in
Greenham, as in Edwards. And just as Edwards insists that the affections,

137 Ibid., 244.
138 Ibid., 175.
139 Ibid., 99.
140 Ibid., 100.
141 Ibid., 100.
142 Ibid., 446.
insofar as they are holy, are founded on the "loveliness and moral excellency of divine things," (sign 3). Greenham asserts that the godly principally love God "for his goodness, his righteousness, and his holiness," while hypocrites love him "for his benefits toward them." 143

Greenham notes that many people do not undergo a full conversion. Some persons deceive themselves as to the question of their conversion: "Many persuade themselves that their sins are forgiven, when they are not so." 144 But there are signs to expose their "hypocrisy." Whereas true Christians, once they have suffered full compunction for their sins, are "made more careful in a godly conscience," hypocrites become "careless" and become "more hardened than before." Greenham here anticipates Edwards's ninth sign: true affections turn a "heart of stone" into a "heart of flesh" 145 and "fill the heart with a dread of sin," making conscience "more sensible, more easily and thoroughly discerning the sinfulness of that which is sinful." But "false affections," and a false sense of forgiveness, "harden the heart." and make the subject "much more careless and froward about committing acts of sin." 146

In his short treatise "The Marks of a Righteous Man," 147 Greenham anticipated other Edwardsean signs. For instance, he argues that genuine

143Ibid., 100-101.
144Ibid., 174.
145Edwards, Religious Affections, 360.
146Ibid., 358.
147Greenham, Works, 280-287.
Christians will forsake not just some sins, but all sin. They will “love all good things as well as one, and hate all sins, as well as one.”\textsuperscript{148} Here he anticipates Edwards’s insistence, in his discussion of his twelfth sign, on “universal obedience,” \textsuperscript{149} or the “universality of sanctification,” which is the basis of the “beautiful symmetry and proportion” of truly gracious affections, described in the tenth sign. \textsuperscript{150} Again, Greenham notes that, insofar as we are true Christians, “we never content ourselves in ourselves, nor in things we have done, but still go forward and draw nearer to God,”\textsuperscript{151} anticipating Edwards’s eleventh sign of gracious affections: “the higher they are raised, the more is a spiritual appetite and longing of the soul after spiritual attainments increased.”\textsuperscript{152}

Another subject broached by Greenham is the role of “terror” in the conversion. This is not an issue which Edwards, although alluding to it, discusses extensively in the \textit{Religious Affections}, although he does discuss it at length in his \textit{Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God}, as will be examined later in this chapter. Greenham views terror of conscience as an indispensible feature of the conversion experience: “Before trouble, terror and quaking at the judgements of God, we will never be brought to offer ourselves

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{148}Ibid., 281-282.
\item \textsuperscript{149}Edwards, \textit{Religious Affections}, 384-387.
\item \textsuperscript{150}Ibid., 365.
\item \textsuperscript{151}Greenham, \textit{Works}, 283.
\item \textsuperscript{152}Edwards, \textit{Religious Affections}, 376.
\end{itemize}
to Christ alone." In this view, Greenham, like other early members of the "spiritual brotherhood," differs from Edwards, and anticipates such New-England preparationists as Thomas Hooker, who regarded terror as an indispensable prerequisite to genuine conversion. However, as shall be discussed later, Edwards was not the first puritan to depart from the strict preparationist model.

The "spiritual brotherhood" emanating from Greenham followed him in concentrating on, and further refining their understanding of, the nature of conversion and regeneration, the signs of genuine piety and the dynamics of hypocrisy and self-deception. Many members of the "spiritual brotherhood," especially in the earlier generations, were associated with Cambridge, either with Christ's College or, when it was founded by Sir Walter Mildmay in 1584, with Emmanuel College. These divines, whose anticipations of Edwards will be investigated in the following pages, were recognized early on as constituting an important tradition of pastoral reflection. Selections from the works of Greenham, Rogers, Perkins and Webbe, were anthologized together in A Garden of Spiritual Flowers, published in London in 1618.

6: Richard Rogers (1550-1618)

Richard Rogers took his M.A. at Christ's College, Cambridge, in 1574. He

153Greenham, Works, 171.
was described as "another Greenham."^154 His principal work was Seaven Treatises, leading and guiding to true happiness, published in London in 1605. The purpose of this book, according to Ezekiel Culverwell, the author of the preface, was "to help the frailty of God’s children" by examining "the infinite secret and deceitful corruptions of the heart."^155 Rogers’s own explanation of his objective in writing is that he wished to show "who were His, and who they are which in a holy, and humble manner may rest satisfied with his promises."^156 Although much of the book is casuistical in character, the first part explains at length the “marks” or “signs” of a genuine conversion and true piety, describing the psychological states of the true Christian, and the normal process of conversion. ^157 He analyzes the nature of “holy affections,”^158 especially of true sorrow for sin, which he distinguishes from various forms of “hypocrisy.”^159 As Edwards did in Part 2 of Religious Affections, Rogers also gives a lengthy description of “not unfallible marks” of genuine piety. ^160 This section is followed by eight signs, or “companions” of true faith, all of which are psychological states: joy for the gift of Christ, “holy admiration” or awe at

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^154Haller, Rise of Puritanism, 35.  
^155Rogers, Seaven Treatises, A.  
^156Ibid., B2.  
^157Ibid., 7-27.  
^158Ibid., 19.  
^159Ibid., 19.  
^160Ibid., 48-58.
one's change of spiritual status in Christ, love, gratitude, desire for communion with God, shame at one's former "unkindness" toward God, and a desire for the conversion of others. Although Rogers's work bears such general similarities to Edwards's Religious Affections as just noted, there are few similarities of detail.

7: Lawrence Chadderton (died 1640) and John Dodd (1549-1645).

I include these pastors not because they left works anticipating Religious Affections, but to indicate the continuity of the tradition under discussion here. A number of their "disciples" are clear precursors of Edwards.

Lawrence Chadderton, a fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, and a lecturer at St Clement's Church, Cambridge, for fifty years, was another disciple of Greenham. In 1584 he was chosen by Sir Walter Mildmay as master of the newly founded Emmanuel College. Chadderton published little, but appears to have exerted an immense personal influence over other puritans: some forty preachers attributed their conversions to his preaching. He was an important influence on William Perkins, to be discussed shortly.

John Dodd, the last of Greenham's direct disciples, was also Greenham's son-in-law. Dodd was well known both for his writing and for his direct,

161Ibid., 58-70.

162Haller, Rise of Puritanism, 54.
personal influence. He had a reputation for skill in dealing with matters of conscience, and acute insight into the process of conversion. He was a teacher to Sibbes, Preston and John Cotton, the grandfather of Cotton Mather.

8: William Perkins (1558-1602)

Perkins was one of the predominant pastoral theologians in the second generation of the "spiritual brotherhood" emanating from Greenham. He enrolled at Christ's College in 1577. There, as a disciple of Chadderton, he took his B.A. (1581) and his M.A. (1584). Perkins's immense influence was exercised upon his contemporaries through his lectureship at Great St. Andrews and, upon subsequent generations, through his extensive writings. His complete works were published in three volumes in 1612.

Perkins's principal theological interests were pastoral and pneumatological, rather than ecclesiological. He organized the insights of earlier generations of "affectionate" and "experimental" divines, such as Edward Deering, Thomas Wilcox, Richard Greenham and Richard Rogers, into a lucid, systematic presentation. Although Americanists, such as Perry Miller and Janice Knight, have tended to view the neo-scholastic Perkins as an "Intellectual

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163 Ibid., 57.
165 For Perkins's objectives and sources, see Breward, "Introduction," 28; and Beeke, Assurance of Salvation, 106.
Father" rather than as one of the "Spiritual Brethren," he has also been commonly regarded as one of the most significant figures in the early development of pietism.\footnote{For the Americanist view, see Knight, *Orthodoxies in Massachusetts*, 3. For Perkins as a neo-scholastic, see Richard A. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987): 1:44. For Perkins's role in the early development of pietism, see Breward, "Introduction," 107; and Stoeffler, *Rise of Evangelical Pietism*, 50-58. For other studies of Perkins's influence on pietism, see Breward's bibliographical notes in Perkins, *Select Works*, 130-131.}

It is important to note that, in the case of Perkins (as also in the case of Ames and Preston, whom Miller considered chiefly as rationalists), neo-scholasticism and Aristotelian rationalism do not preclude strong pietistic, "experimental" and "affectionate" attitudes. In any case, as will be shown, Perkins anticipates certain elements of *Religious Affections* which are considered particularly characteristic of "heart religion," and which are sometimes regarded as distinguishing Edwards from earlier puritanism.

Perkins is the first in a long line of pietistic authors who wrote in a systematic, rather than a sermonic or epistolary manner. His neo-scholastic methods were continued by his pupil William Ames, another pietist whose *Medulla Theologiae* exerted an immense influence on Edwards (as indeed on almost all New England theologians), both directly (as will be indicated both in this and the next chapter) and through Ames's follower, Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706), whose *Theoretico-Practica Theologia* was one of Edwards's favorite theological text-books.\footnote{On Ames's influence on Mastricht, and Mastricht's influence on Edwards, see J. D. Eusden, "Introduction" to William Ames, *The Marrow of Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1968): 65.}
Congruently with his pastoral emphasis, Perkins was deeply concerned both with the doctrine of assurance and with the task of distinguishing true from false piety. His best known work investigating these issues is *A Treatise Tending Unto a Declaration, Whether a Man Be in the Estate of Damnation or the State of Grace.* ¹⁶⁸ This was a most influential work, and appears to have furnished the model for later, similar discussion, such as Matthew Mead’s series of sermons on Acts 26:28. ¹⁶⁹ It was also cited by Edwards himself in *Religious Affections.* ¹⁷⁰

In the first section of *A Treatise Tending Unto a Declaration,* “How far a reprobate may go in the Christian Religion,” Perkins anticipates Edwards’s treatment of ambiguous signs, although Perkins’s discussion is more wide-ranging than Edwards’s. Whereas Edwards concentrates on those false signs which are peculiarly associated with charismatic movements, Perkins includes in his survey false signs associated not only with charismatic manifestations and with antinomianism, but also with moralism. Consequently, Perkins includes, for instance, obedience to divine commandments among his ambiguous signs, where Edwards omits it, possibly because the tendency of charismatic movements was more typically toward antinomianism.

Perkins describes the many features by which the unconverted can


resemble, and yet fall short of, the true Christian. For instance, one may know that God exists, acknowledge the "equity" of God’s law, "hear" the call of the Gospel, understand, acknowledge and profess God’s word, "feel" one's sins, suffer terrors of conscience, confess and repent of sins committed, humble oneself, realize that salvation comes through Christ, pray and desire others to pray for oneself, show zeal for religion, mend one's ways, manifest powerful charismatic gifts, preach and prophesy, even have a certain "taste" in one's "heart" of the "sweetness of God's mercies," and yet, after all that, be a mere hypocrite.\footnote{Perkins, \textit{Works}, 1:356-359.}

What, then, does the true Christian have, that the hypocrite lacks? Perkins attempts to answer this question in his next section, "How far the elect may go beyond the reprobate," in purpose and theme corresponding to Part Three of \textit{Religious Affections}. His view of the essential characteristic differentiating true from false Christianity, is almost identical to Edwards's own view. Although Perkins does not use the words "perception" or "sensation," he does characterize true faith as involving a special kind of "apprehension,"\footnote{Ibid., 362-363.} a new "knowledge" joined with a "feeling and inward experience of the thing known,"\footnote{Ibid., 363.} producing benefits "inwardly felt in the heart."\footnote{Ibid., 368.} Perkins's language of "feeling knowledge" extends the sense of certainty associated with
direct experience of the sensual world, to the experience of the spiritual or divine world, and thus establishes a basis for a sense of assurance. As Perkins explicitly states, “benefits” which are “inwardly felt, serve for better assurance.”175 We thus find, as early as the late sixteenth century, when Perkins composed the Treatise Tending Unto a Declaration, that the attempt to identify grounds for assurance has already led to an emphasis upon states of spiritual consciousness analogous to sense-experiences. These experiences which, for Perkins, are foundations of assurance, are also, both for Perkins and for Edwards, the defining characteristics of true religion.

Perkins presents numerous signs of genuine conversion, many of them similar to those of Edwards. His list of “sanctified affections,” including zeal, fear of God, hatred of sin and “joy in the heart,”176 resembles Edwards’s list in Part One of Religious Affections.177 The difference, however, is that Perkins is not trying to prove, as Edwards is, that affections are an essential component of true religion. Perkins takes this for granted.

9: Daniel Dyke (died 1614).

Dyke is not normally associated with the “spiritual brotherhood.” However, 

175Ibid., 368.
176Ibid., 371-372.
177Edwards, Religious Affections, 102-106.

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I introduce him here to preserve chronological coherence. He was suspended for non-conformity by Bishop Aylmer of London in 1583. Thereafter he entered St. John's College, Cambridge, where he took a B.A. in 1595-1596. Three years later he was awarded an M.A. from Sidney Sussex College, where he was made a fellow in 1606. After receiving a B.D. he became minister of Coggeshall, Essex. His Mystery of Self-Deceiving, or, a Discourse and Discovery of the Deceitfulness of Man's Heart, first published posthumously in 1615, became one of the standard classics of puritan literature, seeing six editions before the middle of the seventeenth century, and greatly influencing not only English and American puritans, but also German pietists and French Jansenists.

Dyke's Mystery of Self-Deceiving is an extensive investigation of the many ways in which the false Christian deceives not only others, but also himself, as to his true spiritual condition. The work has a dichotomizing structure conforming to normal Ramist procedures of analysis and presentation.

According to Dyke, self-deception can operate both in the mind and the affections "jointly together" or in the affections alone.

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179 1614, 1628, 1630, 1633, 1634, 1640.

In the first category Dyke includes such phenomena as erroneous judgements regarding our spiritual state, either believing ourselves not so bad as we really are, or as possessing certain graces that we lack. Here Dyke introduces four distinct classes of hypocrites: 1) the “rich worldlings who falsely deduce from their material prosperity that they are the “special darlings of God;” 181 2) the “civil judiciaries,” who mistakenly believe themselves in a good spiritual condition “because they live without scandal, honestly, quietly paying every man his own, etc.;” 182 3) the “carnal gospellers” who use the concept of free grace as an excuse to commit sin; 183 and 4) the “temporary,” the most complex and subtle of the hypocritical types. The temporary are “enlightened” by the gospel, and “ravished” in their “affection.” They “sorrow” for sin, and they “rejoice” at the comforts of the Gospel, “finding a comfortable relish therein.” 184 They even “express their inward grace by outward obedience.” 185 In short, the temporary believe that they have “true faith, repentance or obedience.” 186

Dyke proceeds to show how the faith, repentance and obedience of the temporary are actually false. Of particular importance for the present

181Dyke, Mystery of Self-Deceiving (London: 1640), 51.
182Ibid., 58.
183Ibid., 60.
184Ibid., 65-66.
185Ibid., 66.
186Ibid., 67.
discussion is Dyke's description of the false faith of the temporary. The temporary may have "knowledge" and "enlightenment," but this "knowledge" is not a "practical, a feeling and experimental knowledge." 187 It is not a "heating knowledge, which warms a man at the very heart." 188 It is not a "humbling" knowledge. 189 Although Dyke does not use the language of "sense" and "perception," it is clear that his conception of "experimental" and "heating" knowledge is broadly similar to Edwards's "sense of the heart," a kind of apprehension which reorientates the affectivity of the believer toward God.

The temporary also deceive themselves in, among other things, judging the "signs" of faith, which Dyke identifies with "those feelings, those delights and joys which are felt in hearing the word in prayer, in meditating of the promises." 190

Dyke then describes the manner in which the hypocrite deceives himself as to his outward acts. The true criterion for determining the goodness of an act, declared Dyke, is by the goodness and honesty of the "heart," or voluntative origin of the act. 191

In the second section of the Mystery of Self-Deceiving, Dyke analyses the deceptions of the "affections alone." By this expression, he intends principally

187 Ibid. 69.
188 Ibid., 70.
189 Ibid., 70.
190 Ibid., 77.
191 Ibid., 130.
the tendency of the affections to change (for instance, to grow from hot to cold in matters of religion), and also to blind the judgement.\textsuperscript{192} He surveys some of the chief religious emotions (spiritual love, anger, hatred, joy, sorrow, desire, confidence), describing how the hypocrite feels all these affections, but in the wrong way: he loves Christ, not for Christ's self, but for the benefits he gives; he hates sin, not because it dishonours God, but because it offends himself; he rejoices, but not so much in God as in God's benefits; he sorrows for sin, but not because sin offends or alienates God, but because it provokes punishment; he desires God, but not so much for God's self as for his blessings; he is confident, but in the means of grace rather than in God's power.\textsuperscript{193}

Dyke offers "six notes" by means of which we can discover our true spiritual condition: the mirror of God's law; our behaviour in affliction and prosperity; "inequality of carriage" (i.e. lack of universality of sanctification); occasional lapses into sin; habitual lapses into sin with the removal of the "props and stays" of godliness; and lapses into sin at suitable opportunities.\textsuperscript{194} Finally, Dyke adds one more criterion, "trial by our affections:"

> For upon what our heart is set, that is our treasure. Our great joy when things go current with us in the world, according to our heart's desire, shows plainly what kind of hearts we have to Godward.\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{192}Ibid., 280-281.

\textsuperscript{193}Ibid., 284-299.

\textsuperscript{194}Ibid., 323-342.

\textsuperscript{195}Ibid., 342.
“God, ” declares Dyke, “regards not so much the matter, as the form of our obedience, not so much the thing that we do, as the affection wherewith we do it.”\textsuperscript{196} Thus Dyke most resembles Edwards in his insistence that true religion is to be principally determined by the fundamental amative orientation of the soul, the sincere inclination of the will toward divine things. Election may be judged by external “evidences,” but it is felt chiefly in the basic attraction of the affections to God. These themes will be treated in greater detail in the next chapter.

10: Richard Sibbes (1577-1635)

Sibbes was very much a member of the spiritual brotherhood, being descended, so to speak, from Greenham via his mentor, Paul Baynes (d. 1617), a disciple of Richard Rogers. Sibbes will figure more conspicuously in the next chapter as an exponent of the “psychology of the heart” as well as for his tendency to associate regeneration with spiritual sensation. However, like other members of the “brotherhood,” he was also interested in the signs of genuine piety, of which he had occasion to treat in his voluminous writings.

Of particular relevance to the present discussion is Sibbes’s most famous work, \textit{The Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax}, cited by Edwards.\textsuperscript{197} In chapter 11 of

\textsuperscript{196}Ibid., 368.

\textsuperscript{197}Edwards, \textit{Religious Affections}, 433.
this work, Sibbes deals with the signs indicating genuine piety. His discussion anticipates Religious Affections, Part Three, sections One to Five, insofar as it emphasizes affective knowledge and apprehension of divine things as a principal, if not the principal sign of grace. The elect "discern" heavenly things by a "heavenly" light. This particular phraseology corresponds rather to the traditional language of intellectual illumination than to the sense-language of Edwards. However, Sibbes adds that this light also has "heat within it in some measure." By introducing the concept of heat into that of light, Sibbes goes beyond the "spirit of illumination" to propose a "spirit of power" which he associates with spiritual sensation, as it puts a "taste and relish into the will, suitable to the sweetness of these truths." A "natural man" will not, of course, enjoy this spiritual sensation. Furthermore, Christian practice is, as an evidence of election, not founded on "carnal reason and policy," but, as with Edwards, founded on the affections which arise from this "heavenly light" and the "relish" of the "spiritual palate." As Edwards sees religious affections as "softening the heart," so Sibbes sees them as making the heart "pliable" and "malleable." And, as Edwards affirms that "gracious affections, the higher

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199 Ibid., 1:59.
200 Ibid., 1:60.
201 Edwards, Religious Affections, 397.
202 Ibid., 357., ff.
203 Sibbes, Works, 1: 61.
they are raised, the more is a spiritual appetite and longing of soul for spiritual attainments," so Sibbes notes that the "fire" of the Spirit "mounteth high and higher," whereas the false heart will "set ourselves a measure in grace, and to rest in beginnings."

Although Sibbes's discussion of signs constitutes only a single chapter in *The Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax*, while Edwards's discussion ranges over 260 pages, yet the structure and content of Sibbes's Chapter 11 is similar to that of Part Three of *Religious Affections*. Sibbes lists ten signs (to Edwards's twelve), and also emphasizes mental and emotional states, described both in terms of illumination and perception, as the basis for determining genuine piety. As the next chapter will indicate, this approach pervades Sibbes's work, and presents many remarkable anticipations of Edwards view of religious psychology.

11: William Ames (1576-1633)

Ames was probably Perkins's most influential pupil. He took his B.A. at Christ's College, Cambridge in 1607, and was shortly afterward made a fellow. Ames's strong non-conformity prevented the attainment of either an academic or a pastoral career in England. He removed to Holland in 1610. After twelve years of various pastoral activities, and continued persecution by the English

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authorities, Ames was appointed a lecturer in theology at the University of Franeker. It was during his years at Franeker that Ames wrote his influential works, especially the *Medulla Theologiae* (1627), which saw nine editions before 1660, and the *De Conscientia* (1630), which was published in English Translation in 1639. 206 A projected emigration to New England was prevented by death in 1633. 207

Ames's immense influence on New-England puritanism is widely recognized. 208 He is one of the few pietistic puritans whose influence on Edwards has been carefully examined. 209 Although Janice Knight identifies Ames with the "Intellectual Fathers" associated more closely with the Hookerian tradition than with the "Spiritual Brethren" associated with John Cotton and, ultimately, with Edwards, yet Ames's view of human interiority and practical piety was very close to that adopted by Edwards in the *Religious Affections*, a fact that will be described in greater detail in the next chapter.

206 William Ames, *Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof* (place of publication not indicated, 1639).


Ames exerted a powerful influence, either directly or indirectly, on Edwards's view that "true religion is of a practical nature." Like his contemporaries, Perkins and Bartholomaeus Keckerman (1571-1609), Ames defined theology according to a teleology of praxis. It was a *doctrina* which, unlike a *doctrina theoretica*, was valued not for itself, but for the sake of the end toward which it directs the knower. Keckerman had argued that theology was not *sapientia* or *scientia*, but a religious prudence (*prudentia religiosa*) and a practical discipline (*operatrix disciplina*), whose goal was the glory and enjoyment of God. God is not known in a scientific or theoretical sense, but in a practical sense as the end or goal of human loving. Keckerman argued that "theology is not a naked knowing, but a faithful apprehension such as is rooted in the affections." Similarly for Ames, "theology" was essentially "not a speculative discipline, but a practical one, the purpose of which was to enable the knower to "live to God." As a matter of *euzoia*, or living well, Ames regarded the human will as the "first and proper subject of theology." The will was understood not as a "rational appetite," but as a fundamental

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212 Ibid., 219. The final quotation is from Barthomolaus Keckerman, *Systema Sacrosanctae Theologiae* (1602), 1:1.

213 Ibid., 78.

214 Ames, *Marrow*, 77-78.
inclination of the affections.\textsuperscript{215} The affections, as “acts of the will” and the “springs” of all practice, were thus central to the religious life, and also the criteria by which practice was to be judged. Like Dyke, Ames declared that “God is better worshipped by inward affection than outward deed.”\textsuperscript{216} But it was the affections which originated the “outward deed,” and which constituted the religious life understood principally in terms of holy practice.

Ames wrote nothing closely resembling \textit{Religious Affections} in purpose or structure. However, his \textit{Conscience, with the Power and Cases Thereof}, which Edwards cites occasionally, bears a few minor structural similarities to \textit{Religious Affections}.\textsuperscript{217} His fundamental division of cases of conscience into matters of faith and matters of obedience, reflects Edwards’s own division of Part Three of \textit{Religious Affections} into signs pertaining to the affective consciousness of divine things, and Christian practice.\textsuperscript{218} Both books also make extensive use of “signs, or arguments”\textsuperscript{219} for judging one’s spiritual condition.

Ames’s assertion, that true love to God is based not on divine “benefits

\textsuperscript{215}Ibid., 87, 239, 259; \textit{Conscience}, 2:5.

\textsuperscript{216}Ibid., 238.

\textsuperscript{217}Edwards, \textit{Religious Affections}, 174-75, where Ames is quoted on the difference between the peace of mind enjoyed by hypocrites and that enjoyed by the truly godly; 362: Ames is cited on “holy modesty as a sign of true humility”; 374: on secret obedience to God as a sign of sincerity. Edwards’s references are to the Latin edition, according to Smith.

\textsuperscript{218}Ames, \textit{Conscience}, 2:2. “Now every question, or case of conscience (as the nature of the thing itself and experience showeth), is either about the state of man before God, or about those actions which in that state he doth put forth and exercise.”

\textsuperscript{219}Ibid.
conferred upon us” but on God’s “goodness and perfection in itself considered” and on the “lovely nature of God,” anticipates Edwards’s second sign.220 His discussion of “true” grief for sin as being more “in respect of the offence done to God” than of the punishment due to sin, anticipates Edwards’s sixth sign.221 It is, however, in his bipartite psychology, his identification of the will with an underlying affective disposition, his view of the affections as being of the essence of the religious life, and his notion of the “heart” as a perciipient-volitional-affective function that Ames most anticipates Edwards, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

In one respect Ames, like Greenham, differed from Edwards: he was a strict preparationist. In Conscience he lists a number of steps preliminary to faith “necessarily required” for “pulling a man out of the state of sin.”222

12: John Preston (1587-1628)

One of Richard Sibbes’s most celebrated disciples was John Cotton (1584-1652), grandfather of Cotton Mather. In addition to being a pupil of Sibbes, Cotton also came under the influence of William Ames. He was dean of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and emigrated to New England in 1633.

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220Ibid., 4:20.
221Ibid., 2:20.
222Ibid., 2:8.
Although Cotton's writings are not relevant to the present discussion, he is mentioned here on account of the charismatic influence he seems to have exercised over John Preston, whom he converted, according to Haller.  

Although Preston generally appears in the scholarly literature as a neo-scholastic or a neo-Aristotelian, he had, like other scholastic puritans, such as Perkins and Ames, a strong pietistic side. Like Ames, Preston tended to identify the will with the affections, rather than as a “rational appetite.” “The affections,” he wrote, “are the several motions of the will.” Edwards cites three of Preston's works in *Religious Affections*. Smith briefly describes the relation of these works to Edwards's treatise, noting in particular Preston's use of five tests, or signs, of sincerity in his *The Church's Carriage.* Smith notes that “a complete discussion would point out some interesting parallels between these tests and Edwards's signs of gracious affections,” but does not himself undertake the study. In the next chapter I will have frequent occasion to indicate that Preston resembled Edwards not only in his use of signs, but also in his voluntarism, as well as in his notion of an affective apprehension of God's attributes.

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225Smith, “Introduction,” 63-64.
Thomas Goodwin entered Christ's College, Cambridge, in 1613, where he fell under the influence of Sibbes and Preston, among others. Through a conversion experience he became more deeply committed to puritan piety about 1620. He was elected lecturer of Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1628 and, four years later, its vicar. Distressed by pressures to conform, he resigned his vicarage in 1634 (Sibbes succeeded him), and, probably under the influence of John Cotton, became an independent. He was one of the “dissenting brethren” at the Westminster Assembly. In 1650 he was made president of Magdalen College, Oxford, where he influenced the next generation of puritans, including Theophilus Gale (1628-1678, cited by Edwards in Religious Affections), Stephen Charnock (1628-1680) and John Howe (1630-1705). In 1658 Goodwin was paired with John Owen in the leadership of a committee of the Savoy Conference to draw up a confession, confirming the Westminster theology. Losing his position at Oxford with the Restoration, he removed to London where he spent the last twenty years of his life as the head of an independent congregation.

Goodwin was one of those puritans who, about the middle of the seventeenth century, began producing vast dogmatic studies systematizing the insights of previous generations of puritan pastors and theologians. Richard

226 For details of Goodwin's biography I am indebted to the Dictionary of National Biography, 8:148-150; and to Haller, Rise of Puritanism, 75.
Muller refers to this period as that of "High Orthodoxy," ca. 1640-1700, and includes in his list of English representatives Edward Leigh (1602-1671), John Owen (1616-1685), Thomas Watkins (died ca 1689) and Stephen Charnock (1628-1680). Although Goodwin does not appear in Muller's list, he produced, like Owen, a number of voluminous treatises on various theological subjects, including *The Work of the Holy Spirit in Our Salvation*, which constitutes one of the classics of Puritan pneumatology.

Whereas Edwards's *Religious Affections* focuses more narrowly on the nature of regeneration, with special emphasis on its psychological effects, Goodwin's *Work of the Holy Spirit* is more general, and deals broadly with all the technical and dogmatic matters involved in pneumatology. However, Books 4 to 8 deal generally with the nature of regeneration and the distinction between "those truly called" and "hypocrites," or "temporary believers." Like Sibbes before him, and Edwards afterward, Goodwin identifies the psychological changes resulting from conversion as the "great distinguishing character" of regeneration. Although he does not need to defend the place of the affections in the religious life, he emphasizes, as Edwards does, the Spirit's effects as being primarily upon the volitional aspect of the personality, the "inward inclinations of a man's heart and nature," producing a "new disposition or temper of man's heart," adapting the "spirit of the mind" to "things spiritual, as

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227 Muller, *Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics*, 1:46-49.

Indeed, Goodwin describes the "spirit" within a human being as being the basic "disposition." Goodwin proceeds to explain what is meant by having the "heart elevated and suited to all things spiritual, as spiritual." Spiritual things are the "things of God," revealed by the Spirit, "another world or spirit of things opposed to things of the flesh." Like Edwards, Goodwin describes the mind's being made suitable to "spiritual things, as spiritual" in terms of sense perception: "You know, by analogy from nature, what it is to have the soul, in the powers and faculties of it, suited to the object of it; as the eye is suited and fitted to colour, and the ear unto sounds." Just so, "whenas God regenerateth any man, and constitutes him a new creature, lo, that man hath a new eye to see, an ear to hear, and all sorts of new senses to take in all sorts of spiritual things." In passages such as this, Goodwin comes very close indeed to defining the "new creation" as Edwards does, as a new perception. Edwards had at his disposal, as Goodwin did not, a recent technical term deriving from John Locke, the "new simple idea," to describe the new creature. But the aptness of this term would have been clear to Edwards at least partly because he had been accustomed by the tendency of earlier puritans, such as Goodwin,

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299Ibid., 6:162.
300Ibid., 6:162.
311Ibid., 6:164.
322Ibid., 6:164.
333Ibid., 6:165-166.
to understand and to describe the new creature in terms of new spiritual senses and sensations.

Having broached the idea of a spiritual sensation, or perception, Goodwin proceeds precisely as Edwards does. For, as Edwards, in *Religious Affections*, Part Three, Sign Two, argues that "the first objective ground of gracious affections is God's transcendentally excellent and amiable qualities as they are in themselves, and not in any conceived relation they bear to self, or self-interest," so Goodwin argues that spiritual things are to be "considered barely and nearly as they are in themselves and their own nature, abstracted from all other considerations and concomitants adherent to them, and abstracted from such benefits as are accidental, external and foreign to them." The spiritual sense, given to believers upon regeneration, enables them to "savour" spiritual things, as spiritual, without reference to "self love." Goodwin lacks some of the overtly aesthetic language of Edwards. Where Edwards speaks of the heart responding to the "beauty" of divine things, Goodwin speaks in more Aristotelian terms of like being capable of like: a spiritualized heart attracted to and perceptive of the nature of spiritual things. However, both Goodwin and Edwards are agreed that to love spiritual things in themselves, and not in any relation they bear to self-interest, does not mean that one loves them contrary to one's inclinations. Both theologians agree that

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236 Ibid., 6:170.
the regenerate person is given an inclination, an amative bias, toward spiritual things. For Edwards, the saint “finds his happiness,” and “seeks his fulfillment” in divine things.\textsuperscript{237} Likewise Goodwin asserts that, although the saint does not seek spiritual things out of self-love, yet he must “affect both the [spiritual] things for themselves and for his own good also.”\textsuperscript{238} Quoting Virgil’s phrase, trahit sua quemque voluptas, Goodwin remarks,

Now then, take a carnal heart, and change the inward radical disposition of it, make and render it suitable to God and Christ, and all other spiritual things as they are in themselves, and instantly that soul is taught, and hath an instinct for its own good, and greedily and naturally (according to the measure of grace), runs out unto and after these spiritual things as spiritual, and placeth its happiness and good in them, as ever it did in another.\textsuperscript{239}

Goodwin proceeds to explain the distinction between “sanctified self-love” and natural self-love\textsuperscript{240} and anticipates Edwards own discussion, in the same context, on the difference between love based on self-interest and love based on the inherent qualities of the beloved object, as well as on the difference between “spiritual” and “natural” gratitude.\textsuperscript{241} In both Goodwin’s and Edwards’s views, “spiritual self-love” and “spiritual gratitude” arise from a prior delectation in spiritual things “as spiritual” (Goodwin) or “as conceived in themselves” (Edwards). Both Goodwin and Edwards are in agreement that, in


\textsuperscript{238}Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 6:171.

\textsuperscript{239}ibid., 6:172.

\textsuperscript{240}ibid., 6: 172-174.

\textsuperscript{241}Edwards, \textit{Religious Affections}, 241-242; 244-248.
the case of "hypocrites," the consideration of one's own well-being and self-interest is prior to, and even exclusive of, any pleasure conceived in spiritual or divine things as experienced in themselves.242

Goodwin proceeds to explain how one may love and value spiritual things in themselves, and "yet view them as a blessing to us." Here he anticipates Edwards's discussion, arising in the same context in Religious Affections, of the same apparent paradox.243 Edwards argues that the saint's loving God for God's sake, and also finding his own happiness in the glory and excellency of God, does not necessarily imply that the saint loves God because he finds his happiness in God:

Is not this the fruit of love? A man must first love God, or have his heart united to him, before he will esteem God's good his own, and before he will desire the glorifying and enjoying of God, as his happiness. 244

Goodwin's explanation is similar. To be regenerated, and to bear the image of God in oneself, means to love God for himself ("as spiritual"), and oneself in relation to God. "And indeed," Goodwin asserts, "God in commanding us to love him above all things, yea ourselves, hath withal given leave to love ourselves, in so doing, in an answerableness to his own loving us, whilst yet he aimed so eminently at his own glory, as if nothing concerning us had moved

244Edwards, Religious Affections, 241.
him."\textsuperscript{245}

Just as Edwards, having established the possibility of unself-regarding love to God, proceeds to explain how even "gratitude" implies, in the saints, a love of God for himself, rather than for his benefits,\textsuperscript{246} Goodwin demonstrates how the believer values divine "blessings" without a primary reference to self-interest.\textsuperscript{247} In both Edwards and Goodwin, sanctified gratitude is based not on the benefit received, but on the inherent perfections and amiability of the benefactor. The saint is grateful not so much for the gift, as for the giver. "\textit{non tam dono quam abs te dato}, I rejoice not so much in the gift, as because it is by so noble a hand and so noble a mind."\textsuperscript{248}

Book 5 of Goodwin's \textit{Work of the Holy Spirit} explains the idea of regeneration as involving a "new creature," a "permanent and abiding principle," the primary result of which is "a change of heart."\textsuperscript{249} Goodwin's discussion here anticipates Edwards's account, developed in his discussion of the first unambiguous sign, of the new creature as a "new principle of nature" resulting in a "new kind of exercises" of the will, or heart.\textsuperscript{250} Goodwin's extensive use of heart language will be investigated in the next chapter. Here

\textsuperscript{241}Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 6: 175.


\textsuperscript{248}Ibid., 179.

\textsuperscript{249}Ibid., 6: 187-205.

\textsuperscript{250}Edwards, \textit{Religious Affections}, 206.
one might merely note that Goodwin, like Edwards and all orthodox Calvinists in opposition to Arminians, takes the position that regeneration involves the implanting of a new "nature" or a new "creature" in the human soul. This was sometimes referred to as the "physical" theory of regeneration, as articulated by Petrus van Mastricht, one of Edwards's favorite theological authorities.251

In Book 6, Goodwin explains the difference between the change of heart effected by regeneration, and "natural conscience." This distinction, a commonplace in puritan writing, has already been alluded to in connection with other writers discussed in this chapter. Edwards himself discusses the topic in connection with the distinction between evangelical humiliation and natural conscience.252

Book 7 of Goodwin's Work of the Holy Spirit discusses the differences between "temporary believers" and those "truly called." The contents of this section are similar to signs 5 to 11 in Religious Affections. However, Goodwin places greater emphasis than does Edwards on the selflessness of Christian motivation as the principal and fundamental "sign" of regeneration: "The soul hath in it a radical disposedness to give up itself to Christ, to be acted by him, and to be made sensible of its own insufficiency to act itself, and so to glorify


Christ as its root for sanctification, as well as its saviour for justification.\textsuperscript{253} Goodwin’s position vis-a-vis Christian selflessness does not contradict Edwards. It does indicate, however, that, whereas Goodwin will, in one section, speak of regeneration principally in terms of spiritual sensation and, in another, of egolessness, Edwards adheres more systematically to his concept of spiritual sensation, subordinating all other elements of regeneration to it.

Thus Goodwin’s Work of the Holy Spirit bears considerable similarities to Edwards’s Religious Affections, both in form and content. His discussion of regeneration as, essentially, a change in the disposition of the will, or heart, affecting one’s perception of divine things, and resulting in a love of “spiritual” things as they are in themselves, and not as they relate to one’s self-interest, as well as his explanation of the two apparent paradoxes of unself-regarding love and gratitude, closely parallels, both in the content and sequence of presentation, Edwards’s first two signs of true piety.

Before departing from Goodwin, it will be worthwhile to consider another of his treatises which bears considerable similarities to Religious Affections, his Of Gospel Holiness: Implanted in the Heart and Continuous in the Whole Conversation of Life.\textsuperscript{254} This work, like Religious Affections, attempts to describe the nature and indications of grace in the soul. It repeats much of the material contained in his Work of the Holy Spirit. Again, regeneration is discussed in psychological terms. Goodwin gives special attention to the Pauline phrase kai

\textsuperscript{253}Goodwin, Works, 6:345.

\textsuperscript{254}Ibid., 7:129-336.
"Sense is here added to knowledge, to express the true nature of spiritual faith."

Again, Goodwin insists that "in the new creature suitable spiritual senses are made to entertain" spiritual things. As Edwards distinguishes mere "notional" knowledge of divine things from the "sense" or "relish" which only the saints have of them, so Goodwin distinguishes between the "knowledge of faith" and the "sense" of faith, which is experienced through the aistheteria, or organs of the spiritual sense given upon regeneration. As in Edwards, this spiritual sense gives a knowledge of God's qualities. Goodwin compares the experiences of the regenerate soul, through its spiritual sense, to those of the experimental scientist: "Now experience is an acquired knowledge in matters spiritual, founded on sense--a collection of conclusions from what we have sense of, as all artists gather conclusions from experiments made." The divine sense imparts "deep and glorious impressions" on the soul, so that believers "come to have experience with hope or assurance from the love of God shed, not manifested or apprehended by knowledge so much as shed, whereof the subject is said to be

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255Ibid., 7:134.
256Ibid., 7:135.
258Goodwin, Works, 7:134.
259Ibid., 7:135.
260Ibid., 7:137.

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the heart rather than the understanding.\textsuperscript{261} Here again, as in Perkins, one can see that the language of percipience is introduced to explain how assurance can be based on experiences analogous to, and hence as persuasive as, experiences deriving from the physical senses. It is also to be noted that the "subject" of the experiences deriving from the spiritual sense is properly the "heart." Finally, it is most interesting that Goodwin illustrates this point, that the assurance of the saints is based on a kind of experience of God mediated through spiritual sensation, by quoting 1 Peter 1:8, which also serves as the epigraph to Edwards's \textit{Religious Affections}.

In his discussion of the "inward fruits and effects that flow from a principle of holiness," Goodwin notes that a saint is not only able to judge the "excellency of things in the way of religion," that is, issues of moral holiness, but also views them with "an approving judgement, a savouring, relishing, closing with and cleaving to the goodness of it as good and best for him."\textsuperscript{262} In this description of the saint's intellectual and aesthetic response to moral goodness, Goodwin anticipates Edwards's assertion that the delight which the saint takes in divine things is principally and properly founded in the "loveliness" of their "moral excellency."\textsuperscript{263} Like Edwards, Goodwin recognizes that the saints enjoy a peculiar aesthetic response to the moral dimension of religion. This response itself helps the saint to distinguish between the holy

\textsuperscript{261}Ibid., 7:138.

\textsuperscript{262}Ibid., 7:139.

and the unholy. In discussing the "readiest and speediest way" for every Christian to "come to discern and judge" of the various aspects of the spiritual life, Goodwin asserts that they need love, knowledge and sense: "Take sense here in all the senses I have mentioned; for faith, as it hath all senses annexed to it and found in it, Heb. 5:15, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, so faith conduceth to the discerning of things spiritual, which are not taken by reason only, but by a spiritual sense joined thereunto."\(^{264}\)

Thus, for Goodwin, as for Edwards, the spiritual sense 1) conveys "experimental" information about God, or God's qualities, which can be communicated by no other means; 2) conveys this information in a more impressive and spiritually transforming manner than mere words or speculative knowledge; and 3) serves as the basis for an aesthetic appreciation of the beauty of the holiness of divine things. In addition, Goodwin, like Perkins, sees the spiritual sense as a basis for assurance.

Thomas Shepard entered Emanuel College, Cambridge, in 1619. There he came under the influence of Lawrence Chadderton and John Preston. After his ministerial career in England was throttled by the hostility of Bishops Laud and Neile, Shepard emigrated to New England in October 1635. He was installed as pastor of the newly organized church of Newtown (later Cambridge), Massachusetts. Shepard played a conspicuous role as an opponent of Mrs. Hutchinson in the antinomian controversy.

In the course of Religious Affections Edwards quotes passages from three of Shepard’s best known works. The first is The Sincere Convert, which Edwards cited once. In this relatively short treatise, Shepard mixes a theoretical treatment of sin and justification with a discussion of the psychology of conversion. In Chapter 5, he concludes with a comparison of the regenerate and the hypocrite, showing in what way the former “go beyond” the latter in holiness.

1) The sincere convert renounces and abandons all sin, while the hypocrite usually nourishes at least one sin central to his personality, indicating that he is not completely content with God. This is the passage which Edwards quotes in Religious Affections. 2) While the humility of the

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266Edwards, Religious Affections, 402.

267Shepard, Works. 1: 62-64.
sincere convert is total, the hypocrite never attains such poverty of spirit as will induce him to look entirely to Christ for his justification. The hypocrite will always retain some place for his own righteousness in his salvation. 3) Hypocrites, unlike sincere converts, are never entirely satisfied with Christ: "They will not content themselves with Christ alone, nor with the world alone, but make their markets out of both, like whorish wives, that will please their husbands and others, too."268

After listing nine types of hypocrites who, after making, or appearing to make, some headway in genuine piety, fall short in some essential respect, 269 Shepard concludes with a long discussion of the various failings, misconceptions and forms of self-deception by which human beings "cozen their own souls" out of salvation. The material included in this section is broadly similar to that included in Religious Affections, Part 2. In both, "evidences" of piety are presented, but it is shown that they are within the capacity of the unregenerate. In Religious Affections, various interior phenomena are presented from which a conclusion of piety is often mistakenly drawn. This corresponds to Shepard’s "errors of the understanding" and "false conceits" derived from various psychological states. For instance, not all trouble of conscience is repentance; not all striving with conscience against sin is a striving of spirit against the flesh; not all "good affections of the heart"

268 Shepard, Works, 1:64.
269 Ibid., 65-68.

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spring from love toward God.  

Shepard's *The Sound Believer* is an analysis of the conversion process. Shepard differs from Edwards in being a strict, explicit preparationist: "Faith is wrought in us in that way of conviction and sorrow for sin: no man can or will come by faith to Christ to take away his sins, unless he first see, be convicted of, and loaded with them."271  

Shepard describes the stages of preparation in great depth, distinguishing the preparative works from their counterfeits.272 He then discusses the nature of faith, again distinguishing it from its facsimiles. One of Edwards's quotations from *The Sound Believer* derives from this chapter.273 The work continues with a discussion of the blessings received by all those who have faith: justification, reconciliation, adoption, sanctification, audience of all prayer to God, and glorification.274 The list is almost identical to that presented in Ames's *Medulla Theologiae*, describing the constituents of the "application of Christ" to believers.275 It is from the section on sanctification that Edwards draws his second quotation from this work, supporting his contention that

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270Ibid., 1: 78-82.
271Ibid., 1: 117.
272Ibid., 1:117-190.
273Ibid., 1:198.
274Ibid., 1:237-274.
sanctification is the principal evidence of the saint’s election (sign 12).\textsuperscript{276}

Shepard’s \textit{Parable of the Ten Virgins} originated as a series of sermons, preached between 1636 and 1640, in response to the antinomian crisis.\textsuperscript{277} The story of the ten virgins was commonly seen by puritan preachers and writers as illustrating, and was used as the basis of disquisitions on, the distinction between genuine piety and hypocrisy.\textsuperscript{278} Edwards cites Shepard’s \textit{Parable} about 67 times during the course of the \textit{Religious Affections}. In order to place in the context of their source so preponderantly large a number of quotations, I will briefly describe the structure and content of Shepard’s \textit{Parable}.

Shepard wishes to argue that genuine Christianity is to be identified with, and evaluated according to, the love which the believer feels for Christ. But what does it mean to love Christ? How does one know that one \textit{really} loves Christ? The parable attempts to answer this question by means of a vast analysis which, in Albro’s edition, extends for 635 pages.

Shepard begins by presenting signs indicating whether or not one truly loves Christ. One must be “divorced” from the love of all created things for their own sake, and find no contentment in one’s own righteousness.\textsuperscript{279} But how does one know that one is so qualified? Here Shepard offers signs of those

\textsuperscript{276}Edwards, \textit{Religious Affections}, 459.

\textsuperscript{277}See Jonathan Mitchell’s preface to the \textit{Parable} in Albro’s edition, 8-9; also Albro’s “Life of Shepard,” cxix.


\textsuperscript{279}Shepard, \textit{Works}, 2:26-33.
who fall short of the true love of Christ. One does not truly love Christ if one does not sorrow for the loss of God as mediated by Christ; if one takes comfort in forsaking sin, rather than in possessing Christ; if one complains for “want of grace” rather than for the want of Christ; if one rejoices more in a little grace received than in “all the fullness of Christ;” if one performs duties to ease the conscience rather than out of love for Christ; if one is satisfied in one’s own righteousness rather than that of Christ. 280 After expounding the reasons why someone ought to love Christ, 281 Shepard explains that all true spiritual acts are “brought forth” as a response of love toward Christ, and for the sake of Christ. All acts performed for any other motive, are tainted with self-origination and self-interest, and, “though good in themselves, yet are most vile before God.” 282 The soul is to act entirely and exclusively from Christ and for Christ. All acts acceptable to God must originate in lively “affections” for Jesus. In order to excite such affections, one must avail oneself of “all the means by which Christ approaches the soul,” 283 and must attempt to acquire a true knowledge of Christ’s love toward the sinner. Shepard warns that one not attempt to do good or spiritual acts until one has actually “felt” love for Christ. 284

280Ibid., 2:33-41.
281Ibid., 2:41-50
282Ibid., 2: 56-68.
283Ibid., 2: 57.
284Ibid., 2:59.
But loving Christ is often hindered by doubting Christ's love toward oneself. In an effort "to quicken up all those doubting, drooping yet sincere hearts that much question the love of Christ to them," Shepard initiates a discussion of the grounds of assurance.\(^{285}\) He exhorts his readers to make their "calling and election sure" by 1) considering the gratuitousness of Christ's love to sinners; 2) guarding against personal sin; and 3) developing a strong love toward Christ.\(^{286}\) They must "close with Christ," an act of faith in which the soul accepts Christ "by the affections of hope and desire" and "true love," while forsaking one's preoccupation with the "world."\(^{287}\) The "object" of true faith is the person of Christ; of false faith, the benefits of Christ.\(^{288}\)

But how does one come to love Christ? It is chiefly by "seeing him."\(^{289}\) Knowledge of Christ involves "an intuitive or real sight of him as he is in his glory."\(^{290}\) Hypocrites do not make a true act of faith. They approach Christ not for himself, but 1) for a "load" of his righteousness, that they might be right with God; 2) for the promise of salvation; and 3) for his peace, consolations and joys.\(^{291}\)

\(^{285}\)Ibid., 2: 77.
\(^{286}\)Ibid., 2:77-110.
\(^{287}\)Ibid., 2: 112-114.
\(^{288}\)Ibid.
\(^{289}\)Ibid., 2: 120.
\(^{290}\)Ibid., 123.
\(^{291}\)Ibid., 2:129-134.
Shepard then devotes several chapters to discussing the nature of hypocrisy. He describes several categories of “gospel” hypocrites, the name most commonly used to describe antinomians. They are persons who recognize Christ as the saviour, deny their own righteousness, but, instead of turning entirely from sin, harbour “lusts” of various kinds. He attributes hypocrisy to a “want of saving illumination in the understanding.” Those who are deprived of this illumination can neither know the amiableness of Christ nor the repulsiveness of their sin. He describes the psychological ruses by which sinners evade the experience of conviction. Hypocrites avoid the “means of grace” or use them “ineffectively.” According to Shepard, “all” the elect are saved by these means. He notes that the Holy Spirit bestows a new nature upon the saints, which is the principle of their spiritual life and holiness. Shepard devotes the remainder of Part One of the Parable to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in believers, sanctification, and the permanence of “true, saving grace.”

Part Two of the Parable warns the contemporary church against “carnal

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292 Ibid., 2:183-229.
293 Ibid., 2:229
294 Ibid., 2:229-232.
296 Ibid., 2:238-240.
297 Ibid., 2:240.
298 Ibid., 2:260
security,” a careless, thoughtless, apathetic attitude attributable partly to the
peace and freedom prevailing in New England, and partly to Christ’s physical
absence, a “tarrying” that makes Christians forget their duty toward God.
Shepard describes the nature of “counterfeit grace” and describes in what ways
hypocrites are similar to, and yet fall short of, true believers in their desire for
grace. He concludes with a warning that “none shall enjoy Christ hereafter, but
those that are prepared here.”299 The whole of the second half, which
concentrates on corporate, rather than individual lack of grace, is pervaded
with warnings against antinomianism, as well as an apocalyptic sense of
Christ’s return.

Although in its extensive discussion of the distinction between genuine and
counterfeit faith, and the nature of regeneration, *The Parable of the Ten Virgins*
represents that tradition of pneumatological writing which is the central focus
of this chapter, and which provides a point of departure for the *Treatise
Concerning Religious Affections*, yet it bears a more limited resemblance to
Edwards’s work—especially in those points which modern scholars have
considered original to Edwards—than does the work of Sibbes, Goodwin or, as
will shortly be discussed, John Owen. Nevertheless, Edwards cites Shepard
more frequently than any other authority.

How did Edwards use Shepard’s *Parable*? In fact, references to the work
appear fairly regularly throughout the *Religious Affections*. In Part Two there are
six citations, which illustrate or support various positions articulated by

299Ibid., 2:549.
Edwards: that hypocrites tend to draw attention to themselves,\textsuperscript{300} that joy following terror of God's wrath is not a conclusive sign of genuine conversion,\textsuperscript{301} that not knowing the precise moment of one's "closing with Christ" is not a sign of unregeneracy,\textsuperscript{302} that a distinction exists between "legal" and "evangelical" hypocrites;\textsuperscript{303} that there is a difference between Christian "peace" and carnal presumption;\textsuperscript{304} that the appearance of piety is not the same as genuine piety.\textsuperscript{305}

Edwards tends to use Shepard to illustrate or to support his own assertions. For instance, when Edwards argues that spiritual "impressions" (images of spiritual things presenting themselves to the mind), are not in themselves "spiritual" or indicative of saving grace, but rather it is the "spiritual sensation" elicited by such images which indicates saving faith, he cites Shepard's own view, that "if any man should see, and behold Christ really, immediately, this is not a saving knowledge of him."\textsuperscript{306} Again, as Edwards argues that divine promises of salvation spontaneously occurring to the mind are no indication of election, when there is no actual faith in Christ, he cites Shepard again: "Is

\textsuperscript{300}Edward. Religious Affections, 137.
\textsuperscript{301}Ibid., 156.
\textsuperscript{302}Ibid., 162.
\textsuperscript{303}Ibid., 173.
\textsuperscript{304}Ibid., 174.
\textsuperscript{305}Ibid., 182.
\textsuperscript{306}Ibid., 214.
Christ yours? Yes, I see it. How? By any word or promise! No, this is delusion. And where Edwards insists that election is not known through immediate revelation, but by the Spirit's sanctifying influence and effects "wrought in the heart," he seeks confirmation from Shepard.

Edwards uses Shepard's authority for numerous positions in all twelve signs of gracious affections, except the fifth (for which no authorities, except scriptural, are cited). He invokes Shepard's support for several assertions: that "natural" and "spiritual" love for Jesus Christ are distinct, that not all affections arise from "light in the understanding," that "evangelical hypocrisy" can be characterized by covert forms of self-righteousness, that false affections tend to excite complacency, that genuine piety is never satisfied with its present degree of blessedness, that the "change" effected in hypocrites is merely temporary, that hypocrites "affect applause," that free grace can be abused as an excuse for sin, that some of those who honour

307 Ibid., 222.
308 Ibid., 233-235; 237.
309 Ibid., 242.
310 Ibid., 267.
311 Ibid., 318-319; 320.
312 Ibid., 320.
313 Ibid., 337.
314 Ibid., 341.
315 Ibid., 352.
316 Ibid., 353.
God publicly neglect him privately;\(^{317}\) that true Christians are universally and permanently obedient to the will of God;\(^{318}\) that Christian practice is the "chief of all evidences of sincerity;" \(^{319}\) that trials and tribulations test the mettle of and reveal the true Christian.\(^{320}\)

The above references relate to those commonplaces of puritan theology on which Edwards and Shepard are agreed, which occur in Edwards, and which modern scholars have not considered original to Edwards. There are, however, a few parallels between Shepard's views and those of Edwards which are commonly regarded as distinctive of Edwards.

Although Shepard does not express a concept of spiritual sense as unambiguously as Edwards (or Perkins or Sibbes or Goodwin), yet he does assert that the genuine Christian is differentiated from the hypocrite by a special "sight" of Christ: "There is a seeing of Christ after a man believes, which is Christ in his love; but I speak of that first sight of him that precedes the second act of faith; and 'tis an intuitive, or real sight of him, as he is in his glory." \(^{321}\) Shepard's language seems more clearly reflected in Edwards's A Faithful Narrative, in which he describes a woman who, although well acquainted with the Bible all her life, was not converted until old age, when for

\(^{317}\)Ibid., 347.

\(^{318}\)Ibid., 402.

\(^{319}\)Ibid., 426.

\(^{320}\)Ibid., 431; 433.

\(^{321}\)Ibid., 246, note 6.
the first time she “saw” Christ’s suffering for sinners “as a thing real;”322 or in Edwards’s description of Abigail Hutchinson, who enjoyed spiritual “views” of Christ’s “glory and fullness.”323 Some would probably wish to argue that Shepard’s language is more closely related to the traditional concept of illumination than that of spiritual “sense.” And yet, Edwards himself, in the Religious Affections, identifies Shepard’s language of the “special sight of God’s glory,” with his own concept of the “spiritual supernatural sense” which bestows “that knowledge of divine things from whence all truly gracious affections do proceed,”324 citing in support a passage from the Parable in which Shepard declares: “Now there is a light of glory, whereby the elect see things in another manner: to tell you how, they cannot: it’s the beginning of light in heaven: and the same Spirit that fills Christ, filling their minds, that they know, by this anointing, all things.”325

A perusal of Shepard’s Parable of the Ten Virgins reveals other passages, not cited by Edwards, in which Shepard seems to be using the language of “experimentalism” and the concept of a spiritual sense associated with it, rather than the language of illumination: “Saints have an experimental knowledge of the work of Grace, by virtue of which they come to know it for a certainty...as by a feeling heat, we know fire is hot; by tasting honey, we know it

323Ibid., 194.
324Edwards, Religious Affections, 275.
325Ibid., 276.
is sweet." Shep;ard, like Perkins, Goodwin, and Edwards himself, associates spiritual experiences analogous to physical sensation with the saint's sense of "certainty" and "assurance." Shepard often speaks of a "seeing" of Christ, which results in a special "knowledge" of Christ distinct from knowing "by report," by Christ's works, or by theological education. This seeing of Christ is the foundation of faith: "Hence see a necessity of seeing and knowing Christ, before a man can believe, or if ever the soul believe; for if faith closes with the person of the Lord Jesus, the same faith must first see that person." And, "there must precede this act of understanding, to see Christ, before a man can close with Christ by his will." Such passages indicate that, for Shepard, "seeing" is not the same as intellectual understanding ("illumination"), not only because "seeing" is prior to "knowing," but also because it involves the same kind of "certainty" which arises from feeling and tasting.

This "seeing" of Christ is, for Shepard, as for Edwards, not only the beginning, but the defining characteristic, of true piety. It is "the first, chief evangelical working as it appears to us; nay, indeed, it is in a manner all." Shepard acknowledges that even sinners can "see" something of Christ's

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326 Shepard, Works, 2: 222.
327 Ibid., 2: 121-122.
328 Ibid., 2:120.
329 Ibid.
330 Ibid.
attributes, but not as the saints see them. The difference is judged by the result. For when a saint "sees" the glory of Christ's person, there is a "shining into the heart," and a "kindling of an infinite esteem of him." Thus, both for Shepard and Edwards, the language of "seeing" is associated with the language of the "heart," and the voluntative dimension identified with it.

Edwards and Shepard are agreed that the saints see a "beauty" in Christ which reprobates fail to see. And this beauty is principally associated with Christ's holiness. Edwards quotes Shepard to this effect:

To the right closing with Christ's person, this is also required, to taste the bitterness of sin, as the greatest evil: else a man will never close with Christ, for his holiness in him, and for him, as the greatest good. For we told you, that is the right closing with Christ for himself, when it is for his holiness. For ask a whorish heart, what beauty he sees in the person of Christ; he will, after he has looked over his kingdom, his righteousness, all his works, see a beauty in them, because they do serve his turn, to comfort him only. Ask a virgin, he will see his happiness in all; but that which makes the Lord amiable, is his holiness, which is in him to make him holy too. As in marriage, it is the personal beauty draws the heart.

A final, important similarity between Shepard and Edwards, and which Edwards acknowledges in a footnote, is the tendency to associate the "new creature," or the effects of the new creature, with a changed voluntative "inclination," "preponderation," "bias" or, as Shepard calls it, "inward bent."

As Shepard said, in the passage quoted by Edwards:

I would not judge of the whole soul's coming to Christ, so much by sudden pangs, as by an inward bent. For the whole soul, in

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[331] Ibid., 2:124.

affectionate expressions and actions, may be carried to Christ; but without this bent, and change of affections, is unsound. 333

To conclude this discussion of Shepard, I would argue that, although Shepard does not develop a theory of spiritual sensation as explicitly or systematically as does Edwards, Perkins, Sibbes or Goodwin, yet the concept is present in his references to "seeing" Christ in such a way as to have an effect upon the "heart;" in his references to experiencing Christ in a manner analogous to feeling and tasting; and in his references to gaining such certainty about Christ as is comparable to the certainty derived from physical sensation. Furthermore, it would appear from the manner in which Edwards cites these passages, that he considers Shepard's references to "seeing" Christ as implying and supporting his own concept of the "spiritual sensation."

15: John Owen (1616-1683)

Thomas Shepard is the last in that spiritual "genealogy" extending from Richard Greenham, whom I will discuss. Although the "brotherhood" may be said to have continued into the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, with Stephen Charnock, Theophilus Gale and John Howe, enough has been said to suggest Edwards's debt to this tradition of pneumatology focusing on the nature of regeneration, and the distinction between genuine and spurious piety. The members of this tradition, as already noted, were all educated at Cambridge, each generation being personally acquainted with, and influenced

333ibid., 340, n.4.
by, the preceding. At this point, however, it is necessary to investigate some writers who, although they synthesized and developed the insights of the "spiritual brotherhood," were not personally connected with it as teachers or disciples. All of them are considered standard puritan authors and, as will be indicated, known to Edwards. Some of them were cited by Edwards, and show some remarkable anticipations of the Religious Affections.

John Owen, unlike most of the pastors discussed so far, was educated at Oxford. His voluminous writings include a number of works which bear a relationship of apparent influence on, or similarity to, the Religious Affections. The first is his Pneumatologia, or, a Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit, first published in 1674. Edwards has two citations from this work, both of which deal with the difference between "common" and "saving" works of the Spirit.

334 On Edwards's acquaintance with Owen, see Morris, Young Jonathan Edwards, 234, 241, 270, 283.


336 Owen's Pneumatologia is published as volumes 3 and 4 of Owen's Works, edited by William H. Goold (Edinburgh: Johnstone and Hunter, 1850-1853).

337 Edwards, Religious Affections, 250-251, n.7; 372-373, n.3.

338 Smith, in his Introduction to the Religious Affections has briefly commented on these two citations: "The passages quoted concern the difference between a common work of the Spirit as it operates 'on the affections' and a spiritual operation in the proper sense. Edwards found himself in full agreement with Owen's contention that a gracious operation must 'fix' the affections and 'fill' them." On page 251, note 7, Smith directs the reader to pages 68-69 of his Introduction for an explanation of the influence of "Owen's illumination doctrine on Edwards." But no such explanation can be found on those pages.
Owen's *Pneumatologia*, which comprises two volumes in Goold’s edition (about 867,000 words), is much broader in scope than Edwards’s *Religious Affections*, investigating all aspects of pneumatology. Nevertheless it occasionally touches on the same issues as does Edwards, especially in its long discussion of regeneration.

In his chapter on regeneration, Owen opposed those who suggested that the Holy Spirit operates “only in a human and rational way, leading our understanding by the rule of reason,” rather than “miraculously, in and by outwardly visible operations.”339 Like Edwards, Owen attempts to understand what regeneration and the “new creature” are essentially: “the nature of the work itself.” 340 This work is not baptism, repentance, a profession of faith or moral reformation.341 Regeneration involves the “infusion of a new, real, spiritual principle into the soul and its faculties, of spiritual life, light, holiness and righteousness, disposed unto and suited for the destruction or expulsion of a contrary, inbred, habitual principle of sin.”342 It involves a “new creature,” a “divine, supernatural principle of spiritual actions and operations,” which is “infused” or “created” in us.343 It is not to be confused with “enthusiastical

340Ibid., 3: 216.
341Ibid., 3:216-217.
343Ibid., 3:220-221.
Edwards would not disagree with any of these general statements about the nature of regeneration. However, there is no anticipation here of anything which is normally regarded as distinctive of Edwards.

In the next section, Owen investigates how the Spirit prepares the soul for regeneration. This preparatory stage "ordinarily" occurs as "antecedent" and "dispositive" to regeneration, with which it is not to be confused. He describes the duty of applying oneself to the means of conversion and the danger of not doing so. He notes that, by the use of the ordinary means, the Spirit produces three "internal spiritual effects" preparative to, but not identical with, regeneration. They are illumination, conviction and reformation.

The illumination to which Owen here refers is a special kind "previous" to regeneration, and is to be distinguished from "saving" illumination. It refers to any kind of knowledge which one might have about spiritual things. Merely preparative illumination can arise from an "industrious application of the rational faculties of our souls to know, perceive and understand the doctrines of truth as revealed to us," or can come spontaneously, as a sort of gift which "variously affects the mind, and makes a great addition unto what is purely natural, and attainable by the mere exercise of our natural abilities," but

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344 Ibid., 3:224.
345 Ibid., 3:229.
346 Ibid., 3:230-231.
347 Ibid., 3:231.
is not in itself salvific.  

Conviction of sin requires little explanation. It involves a "disquieting sense of the guilt of sin," as well as sorrow and remorse for sins committed "because past and irrevocable." This is "legal" sorrow or humiliation. It is non-salvific because it does not involve, as does repentance proper, any faith in Christ, or any conception of sin as hateful because offensive to God. It involves merely a fear of the consequences of sin for the individual sinner.

Reformation of life is third possible consequence of common, non-saving illumination. It simply refers to attempts by frightened sinners to ease their conscience and ingratiate themselves with God by amending their behaviour. It has no salvific character.

Illumination, conviction and reformation, although all produced by the Spirit, are yet non-salvific because of their psychological limitations: they affect the "mind, conscience, affections and conversation," but not the will, which is "neither really changed nor internally renewed." The soul which is only preparatively illumined does not conceive "delight, complacency and satisfaction" in the spiritual things it apprehends, which is the effect of the "direct intuitive insight" arising from saving illumination.  

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348 Ibid., 3:232.
349 Ibid., 3:233.
350 Ibid., 3:234-235.
351 Ibid., 3:238.
352 Ibid., 3:239.
experience many religious affections through non-salvific illumination, such as “fear, sorrow, joy and delight,” but these affections are neither “fixed” nor fully satisfied by spiritual things, nor, consequently, are they entirely alienated from sin. Finally, preparative illumination, because it does not change the will, or entirely displace affection for sin, does not result in a complete reformation of life, since the soul will continue to cling to many dearly-loved sins.

This passage shows both parallels and dissimilarities with Edwards. The psychological model which Owen is using is not so clearly defined as that used by Edwards. For instance, at first Owen separates, or seems to separate, the affections from the will, saying that non-salvific illumination moves the affections, but not the will. However, he suggests that, when the will is savingly moved, there follow the affections of “delight, complacency and satisfaction,” implying some kind of connection or identification. It would appear that, in this passage, Owen associates the will particularly with a permanent and immovable voluntative disposition, but the affections with more transient emotional responses. However, when the will is savingly moved, the affections become “fixed ” and fully satisfied by spiritual things. Although this passage lacks the psychological clarity of Edwards, it was, in fact, one of the two passages in Owen which Edwards approvingly cited in Religious Affections to illustrate the distinction between common and saving works of the Spirit.

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353Ibid., 3:239-240.
354Ibid., 240-241.
After two more chapters, one on the corruption of the mind by sin, and the other comparing natural and spiritual life, Owen finally arrives at his positive discussion of regeneration. He speaks of regeneration principally in terms of its effects upon the will. The will is not "compelled" into conversion, which would destroy it.\textsuperscript{356} It is rather "persuaded" and "allured."\textsuperscript{357} But how can the will be "allured" if its "bent and inclination" are against the things of religion? The bent and inclination of the will must be changed by "circumcising" the "heart." This metaphor refers to two things: 1) negatively the "removal of all obstacles and hindrances" to the soul's ability to appreciate the divine, and 2) positively, the giving to the sinner a sort of spiritual sense to experience the beauty of the divine: "an heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear."\textsuperscript{358} The subject both of the removal of impediments and the reception of spiritual perception is the "heart." Owen associates the heart, at least in this passage, with the will, not as an individual act of choice, but as the fundamental amative "inclination" and "bias" of the personality. The heart is the "whole rational soul, not absolutely, but as all the faculties of the soul are one common principle of all our moral operations."\textsuperscript{359} Thus for Owen, as for Edwards, the heart is the principle of human wholeness, and is associated with mind, will

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\textsuperscript{356}Owen, \textit{Works}, 3:319.
\textsuperscript{357}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{358}Ibid., 3:324.
\textsuperscript{359}Ibid., 3:326.
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and affections operating together.360 A fuller discussion of this model of human interiority will be undertaken in the next chapter.

What, according to Owen, are the affects of regeneration on the “faculties” of the soul considered distinctly?

The mind is given to “understand spiritual things in a spiritual manner and to “understand savingly.”361 The “eyes of the understanding” are so “opened” as to “discern” spiritual things. God communicates a “light” to the mind, by which believers shall “see” and “perceive” the things propounded to them in the Gospel.362

The will is also freed from the “depravation” which alienates it from God. Grace renders the will “willing and obedient,” “freely of choice” believing and obeying.”363

In the affections “love” is implanted, “causing the soul with delight and complacency to cleave to God and his ways.”364

The preceding review of Owen’s discussion of regeneration in his Pneumatologia has indicated that Owen anticipates Edwards by 1) introducing the language of perception into his description of saving “illumination;” 2) by occasionally speaking of the will as the fundamental “inclination” or “bias” of

360Ibid., 3:252.
361Ibid., 3:330-331.
362Ibid., 3:333.
363Ibid., 334-335.
364Ibid., 3:335

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the personality, and 3) by identifying the "heart" as the principle of psychic unity. However, these points are presented in a context in which Owen is, somewhat confusingly, using the word "will" in different senses, and suggesting more than one model of human interiority. This leads to certain contradictions. For instance, at one point Owen speaks of the will as the "ruling" faculty of the soul. At another point, it is the reason, or "mind" (distinguished from the will), which is called the "ruling faculty." Also, whereas Edwards always identifies the will with the affections, Owen sometimes distinguishes them, as when "will" is used in the sense of rational choice, and sometimes identifies them, as when "will" signifies the fundamental affective disposition of the personality. Finally, Owen sometimes describes the will as a "rational, vital faculty," distinctly subordinating it to the mind, suggesting a view of the will as a Thomistic "rational appetite." But at other times he speaks of the will as being the fundamental "inclination" or "bias" of the personality, suggesting a more Augustinian model of human interiority, such as Edwards adopts in Religious Affections, as will be described in the next chapter.

In his treatise, Gospel Grounds and Evidences of the Faith of God's Elect, first published, posthumously, in 1695, Owen describes the "signs" of genuine piety with a view to strengthening the believer's sense of assurance.

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365Ibid., 3:238.
366Ibid., 3:250.
367Ibid., 5:405.
Owen regards faith as essentially a “choosing, embracing and approbation of God’s way of saving sinners by the mediation of Jesus Christ, relying thereon, with a renunciation of all other ways and means pretending unto the same end of salvation.” 368 Faith, so conceived, “sees” and “discerns” that the way of salvation through Jesus Christ reflects “God and all his divine excellencies.” This view anticipates Edwards’s own, especially as emphasized in A Faithful Narrative, that one of the distinguishing marks of true religion is the appreciation of believers for the “excellency of the way of salvation by Christ, and the suitableness of it to their necessities.” 369 Of vital importance for Edwards was the believer’s ability to see the “justice” of their condemnation as sinners and to appreciate the “excellence” of the Gospel way of salvation through Christ. 370 These sentiments are further developed in Religious Affections, where they are associated with the delight which the saints conceive in the moral beauty of God: “Herein does consist the spiritual beauty of the way of salvation by Jesus Christ, that it is a holy way.” 371 It is a sign of true religion that the saints “love Christ, and that their hearts delight in the doctrines of the gospel, and sweetly acquiesce in the way of salvation therein revealed.” 372

Owen proceeds to describe faith in terms of spiritual perception. Faith is

368Ibid.


370Ibid., 170.

371Edwards, Religious Affections, 259.

372Ibid.
not a "mere assent" to the truth of the Gospel, but a "spiritual discerning, perception and understanding," a "spiritual sense" of the "power, glory and beauty" of the things of the Gospel. Faith affects the mind with an "ineffable sense, taste, experience and acknowledgment" of the "greatness, the glory, the power, the beauty" of the "things revealed and proposed in the way of salvation." It enables the believer to "see," "sense" and "experience" the "excellencies of the gospel."

Both Owen and Edwards are agreed that it is not God's "natural" excellencies (his omnipotence, omniscience, aseity, and so on), which particularly impress and enrapture the saints, but his "moral" holiness. In Gospel Grounds and Evidences of Faith Owen particularly identifies God's moral holiness with his "justice" in saving sinners by Christ. The delight and approbation which true saints feel in this is what preserves them from Socinianism (the position which Owen is opposing in this work). And the pleasure the saints feel in God's moral holiness is extended to the righteousness which they themselves attempt to realize. They do not merely behave in a universally righteous manner. They "love" holiness, and their "approbation" of it is accompanied with choice, delight, and acquiescence; it is

373Owen, Works, 5:418-419.
374Ibid., 5:419.
375Ibid.
376Ibid., 5:413.
377Ibid., 5:424.
the acting of the soul in a delightful adherence unto the work of God; it is a
resolved judgement of the beauty and excellency of that holiness and
obedience which the gospel reveals and requires."\(^{378}\)

The last of Owen’s works which it is helpful to compare with Edwards’s
*Religious Affections* is his *Phronema tou Pneumatos, or, The Grace and Duty of
Being Spiritually Minded*, originally published in 1681. The “mindedness”
(*phronema*), which Owen is describing does not refer to “speculation and
ratiocination merely.” It also includes the “the habitual frame and inclination
of the affections also.”\(^{379}\) It represents the mind’s capacity “to conceive of
things with a delight in them and adherence unto them.”\(^{380}\) “No where doth it
design a notional conception of things only, but principally the engagement to
the affections unto the things which the mind apprehends.”\(^{381}\) Thus Owen’s
*phronema*, or “spiritual mindedness,” corresponds very precisely to Edwards’s
“sense of the heart:” “There is a distinction to be made,” writes Edwards,
between a mere notional understanding, wherein the mind only beholds
things in the exercise of a speculative faculty, and the sense of the heart,
wherein the mind don’t only speculate and behold, but relishes and feels.”\(^{382}\)

“Spiritual mindedness” consists not only in meditative exercises, but also in

\(^{378}\)Ibid., 5:426.

\(^{379}\)Ibid., 7:269.

\(^{380}\)Ibid.

\(^{381}\)Ibid.

the “inclination, disposition and frame of the mind, in all its affections,” as well as in a “complacency of mind, from that great relish and savour, which it finds in spiritual things.” Like Edwards, Owen finds the analogy of sense perception, and especially of taste, as the best way of describing “spiritual mindedness.” This form of religious apprehension yields a complacency of mind, from that gust, relish and savour, which it finds in spiritual things, from their suitableness unto its constitution, inclinations, and desires. There is a salt in spiritual things, whereby they are conditioned and made savoury unto a renewed mind; though to others they are as the white of an egg, that hath no taste or savour in it. In this gust and relish lies the sweetness and satisfaction of spiritual life. Speculative notions about spiritual things, when they are alone, are dry, sapless, and barren. In this gust we taste by experience that God is gracious, and that the love of Christ is better than wine, or whatever else hath the most grateful relish unto a sensual appetite. This is the proper foundation of that “joy which is unspeakable and full of glory.”

And just as, for Edwards, the “sense of the heart” is what determines genuine piety, so for Owen, “to be spiritually minded is the great distinguishing character of true believers from all unregenerate persons.”

Owen proceeds to discuss in more detail the nature of spiritual mindedness and its “evidences” in believers. He explains that “thoughts and meditations as proceeding from spiritual affections are the first things wherein this spiritual

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383 Owen, Works, 7:270.
384 Ibid., 270-271.
385 Ibid., 7:271.
mindedness doth consist, and whereby it doth evidence itself. Thoughts of spiritual things must be "voluntary," that is, they must rise from the "inward principle, inclination or disposition of the soul." If spiritual thoughts do not rise from this habitual inclination, but are called forth only intermittently, as by "convictions" or pangs of conscience, or by "outward occasions," they do not indicate a truly regenerate mind. Owen then presents a list of "outward occasions" of spiritual thoughts, which do not "prove" someone to be spiritually minded.

But how do we know that the thoughts we have of spiritual things "are from an inward fountain of grace" and indicate true spiritual mindedness? Owen suggests that proof lies in our emotional response to spiritual things, particularly when the believer experiences a "sweet" and "holy complacency" and a "delight" in the "excellency of God's loving-kindness, which is comprehensive of his goodness, grace and mercy." The last chief proof is "the daily fruit and advantage of spiritual mindedness," that is, "the preservation of our souls in a holy, humble, watchful frame." Thus Owen and Edwards are agreed in evaluating true religion principally in terms of 1) a delight, or "relish" of divine things arising through a special, spiritual

386 Ibid., 7:275.
387 Ibid., 7:279.
388 Ibid., 7:280-281.
389 Ibid., 7:292-293.
390 Ibid., 7:295.
percipience, and 2) the habitual moral holiness of the believer.

Part Two of Owen's *Grace and Duty of Spiritual Mindedness* is devoted specifically to "spiritual affections, whereby the soul adheres unto spiritual things, taking in such a savour and relish of them as wherein it finds rest and satisfaction." He defines spiritual affections as the "spring and substance of our being spiritually minded." Affections are essential to religion because "the great contest of heaven and earth is about the affections of the poor worm which we call man." To "recover" human affections toward himself is the "chief design" of God's "effectual grace." All moral good or ill is determined by the "affections wherewith we do it." It is by the disposition of the affections that "sincerity" and "hypocrisy" are to be judged. The affections are "in the soul as the helm in the ship." Here, like Edwards, who considered the affections as "very much the spring of men's actions," Owen acknowledges the centrality of the affections, insofar as they are the sources of action, to religion as praxis. He is thus well within the tradition of pietiestic voluntarism and practical piety, which has often been alluded to, especially with reference to Ames, and of which Edwards himself is a late representative. Finally,

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301 Ibid., 7:395.
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid., 7:396.
305 Ibid.
306 Ibid., 7:397.
Owen asserts that believers must examine the “prevailing bent” and “predominant inclination” of their affections to determine their moral and spiritual state. Here Owen is clearly in the tradition of Daniel Dyke who, as already discussed, also evaluated sincerity according to affective motivation of internal and external acts. And like Dyke, Owen is anticipating Edwards’s own position, that piety is to be judged principally in terms of the affective dimension.

Owen devotes the rest of the treatise to explaining 1) what makes affections spiritual; 2) what the “actings” of spiritual affections are; and 3) what the means are, by which affections may be kept in a “spiritual frame.”

In order for affections to be “spiritual” they must be “changed, renewed and inlaid with grace, spiritual and supernatural.” In this Owen anticipates Edwards’s famous assertion that “truly spiritual affections” arise from “influences and operations” which are “spiritual, supernatural and divine.”

Owen then gives examples of non-spiritual influences on the affections, including “temporary impressions” and “education.”

The peculiar “renovation of our affections” arising from grace differ from “temporary affections” in that the change affects the whole personality, or

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397 Ibid.
398 Ibid., 7:411.
399 Edwards, Religious Affections, 197.
400 Owen, Works, 7:412-414.
"whole heart," as Owen calls it, using the same concept as Edwards does to indicate the principle of psychic wholeness which allows the regenerative change to be "universal." As in the *Pneumatologia*, Owen describes the change according to the metaphor of circumcision, with the same suggestion of heightened spiritual sensitivity.  

Spiritual mindedness results in the "delight" and "relish" of all spiritual things, as spiritual, but especially in God himself and all his "excellencies." God must be loved "for himself, or his own sake." God must be loved "for the glorious excellencies of his nature," and particularly for "the manifestation of himself in Christ, and the exercise of his grace therein." True believers, in short, love God because they "see an excellency, a beauty, a desirableness, in the glorious properties of his nature, such as our souls are refreshed and satisfied with the thought of, by faith, and in whose enjoyment our blessedness will consist, so that we always rejoice at the remembrance of his holiness." Owen reiterates this insight at the end of the work, declaring that "spiritual affections" arise from a "spiritual discerning and apprehension" of the "divine excellencies," and especially, "that view of the excellency and goodness and love of God in Christ, as thereby alone to be drawn to him, and to delight in

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401 Ibid., 7: 419.
402 Ibid.
403 Ibid., 7:420.
404 Ibid., 7:421.
405 Ibid.
him.  

To conclude this section, I will briefly summarize the most significant parallels between Owen's *Grace and Duty of Being Spiritually Minded* and Edwards's *Religious Affections*:

1) Both Owen and Edwards recognize a level of the mind, which Owen calls "spiritual mindedness" or the "heart," and Edwards calls the "sense of the heart," in which the intellectual and volitional aspects are not distinguished; in which mental apprehension is characterized by a sensual experience, a "delight," and a "relish," and is analogized to physical perception.

2) Both see the essence of true piety as being in "spring and substance" (Owen), or "consisting in great part in" (Edwards) "spiritual" or "holy" affections.

3) Both believe that true piety is chiefly evidenced by a) a percipient-volitional-affective apprehension, which they tend to describe in terms of a sensation or perception of "divine things," and b) holy practice.

4) Both Edwards and Owen emphasize God's moral attributes as being the principal and most important source of his "beauty" to spiritual persons as spiritual.

It is important to note that, of all the works surveyed in this chapter, Owen's *Grace and Duty of Being Spiritually Minded* bears the greatest general and over-all similarity to Part Three of Edwards's *Religious Affections*. In addition to the resemblances of detail noted above, the two works also share a

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406 Ibid., 7:476.
similar unitary psychological model. Whereas, in his *Pneumatologia*, Owen seems to shift between the Aristotelian-Thomistic and the Augustinian-pietistic psychologies, in *Grace and Duty of Being Spiritually Minded*, he adheres to an Augustinian-pietist model essentially similar to that of Edwards. As the quotations above indicate, Owen’s starting point for judging the sincerity of spiritual affections is, like Edwards’s starting point, a form of mental apprehension which is not characterized as “speculation and ratiocination merely,” but also includes an “engagedness of the affections unto the things which the mind apprehends.” This apprehension is analogous to sense perception, especially the sense of taste, and yeilds to the believer a sweet “savour” “relish,” “delight” and “complacency” in spiritual things. It does so because it suits the “prevailing inclination” and “bent” of the “heart” toward divine reality.

Thus Owen, like Edwards, defines “spiritual mindedness” as a form of “apprehension,” best described according to the analogy of sense perception, determined by a predominant “inclination, disposition and frame of the mind,” or fundamental “disposition of the heart,” and giving rise to truly spiritual affections. This percipient-volitional-affective function within the soul serves as the core psychological concept both for *Grace and Duty of Spiritual Mindedness* and *Religious Affections*.

16: Richard Baxter (1615-1691)
Richard Baxter never went to university and was largely self-taught in theology. He is not mentioned in Edwards’s *Religious Affections* or other writings relating to the Great Awakening. However we know that Baxter was a favorite author to the youthful Edwards. His extensive works provide several treatises which deal with hypocrisy, sincerity and the “marks” and “notes” by which “real” Christianity is distinguished from false. Among these are the *Christian Directory*, Part 3: “Directions Against Hypocrites,” *Directions and Persuasions to a Sound Conversion*, *The Character of a Sound, Confirmed Christian*, *The Right Method for a Settled Peace of Conscience and Spiritual Comfort*, which includes five “certain marks of sincerity in real Christians,” *The Mischief of Self-Ignorance and Benefits of Self-Acquaintance*, and Chapter 9 of *The Saint’s Everlasting Rest*: “a more exact inquiry into the number and use of marks; the nature of sincerity; with other things of great moment in the work of self-examination.”

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410 Ibid., 8:1-252.

411 Ibid., 8:379-506.

412 Ibid., 9:1-287.

413 Ibid., 9:63-65.

414 Ibid., 16:1-280.


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In his *Method for a Settled Peace of Conscience* Baxter recognizes, as does Edwards, that there are both fallible and infallible signs of true religion, and lists five of the latter. But whereas Edwards discusses the psychological underpinning of the act of faith, Baxter is less precise: the true Christian is “heartily willing” to “take God for his portion;” to take Jesus Christ “as he is offered in the Gospel;” to “live in the performance of those holy and spiritual duties of heart and life, which God hath absolutely commanded;” and to “close with Christ,” practicing “the most strict and holy, the most self-sacrificing, costly and hazardous duties” which God requires.⁴¹⁶

Baxter’s “marks” normally concentrate on attitudes toward God and holy practices rather than on a special percipience that might give rise to them. Although, as I shall indicate in the next chapter, Baxter does recognize a special spiritual percipience bestowed on the soul at regeneration, he does not explicitly relate it to the signs of genuine piety.

However, in the *Character of a Sound, Confirmed Christian*, Baxter suggests that there is something fundamentally different about the spiritual knowledge of hypocrites and genuine believers. The hypocrite believes, “but with a human faith, which resteth but on the word of man, or else with a dead, opinionative faith.” On the other hand, the believer has not only a “clear,” but also a “delightful” sight of the fundamental tenets of Christianity, while the hypocrite’s knowledge is without delight, since he knows merely

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⁴¹⁶Ibid., 9:63-65.

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The genuine Christian does not only have a conceptual apprehension of religion, but also an "inward, continual principle, even the Spirit of God, which is a new nature, inclining and enlivening him to a holy life; where by he mindeth and savoureth the things of the spirit." Here Baxter obviously anticipates Edwards more clearly, identifying a special mental apprehension of God, which involves a "savouring" of spiritual realities. He associates such a response with a special "inclination" affecting the way one apprehends divine things: "It is a spiritual appetite in the rational appetite, even the will, and a spiritual, visive, disposition in the understanding." The new creature is "not a faculty in a faculty, but the right disposition of the faculties in their highest objects." Again, like Edwards, Baxter sees the new creature as a substrate, called an "inclination" or a "disposition" which influences the manner in which mind apprehends spiritual realities: "It is neither a proper power in the natural sense, nor a mere act, but the nearest to a seminal disposition or habit." However, whereas Edwards strongly connects this "inclination" or "disposition" with the peculiar percipience it yields, Baxter does not develop the language of percipience, beyond the reference to "savouring."

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417 Ibid., 8:386–387.
418 Ibid., 16:387.
419 Ibid.
420 Ibid.
421 Ibid.
Arising from this "seminal disposition or habit" is a love of God which is peculiar to believers. God is loved in three "gradations," reminiscent of the gradations in Bernard of Clairveaux, which from lowest to highest are 1) "for that goodness which consisteth in benignity" to sinners; 2) for "that goodness which consisteth in his benignity to the church;" 3) for "all his infinite perfections and essential excellencies; his power, and wisdom and goodness, simply in himself considered." To explain how one loves God for himself, Baxter introduces an analogy, reminiscent of Aristotle's concept of philia toward the good person for his own sake: "As I love a good and virtuous person, although he be one I never expect to receive anything from, and therefore love him for his own sake, and not for his benignity or usefulness to me, so must I love God most for his essential perfections."  

The most important of God's "essential perfections" is his holiness. The hypocrite cannot appreciate this aspect of God: "A seeming Christian hath a common love of God as his good, both in himself, and unto the world, and unto him, but this is not for his holiness." But whereas Edwards argues that God's holiness is the chief spring of religious affections, because "no other attributes are truly lovely without this," Baxter argues the primacy of God's holiness by analogizing the human response to God to Aristotle's view of human love, or philia, based on the virtue of the beloved person, without reference to self-interest.

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422Ibid., 390.

423Ibid., 391.
17: John Flavel (1630-1691)

John Flavel, a presbyterian divine, was ordained in 1650 and ejected in 1662. He spent most of his life in, or in the vicinity of, Dartmouth. He was a popular pastor and maintained his preaching activities, whether legally or otherwise, throughout his life. Edwards, for whom Flavel had been, in his youth, a favorite author, refers to five of his books in Religious Affections. He cites the Touchstone of Sincerity (1679) in support of his contention (related to ambiguous sign 3), that sincere "affections" tend not to advertise themselves. The same work is quoted in support of Edward's denial, that confidence in the divine origin of one's experiences, or in one's "good estate" is conclusive proof of grace. Flavel's Husbandry Spiritualized (1669), is quoted to the same effect nearby. Edwards agrees with Flavel that the approbation of the "truly godly" is no certain sign of grace, again citing the Touchstone, as well as Husbandry Spiritualized on the same issue.

In Religious Affections, Part 3, Edwards cites Flavel's Preparations for Suffering (1682) to the effect that mental images of Christ and heavenly things do not

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423 See Morris, Young Jonathan Edwards, 239.


426 Ibid., 170.

427 Ibid., 171.

428 Ibid., 182; 186.
indicate genuine piety.\footnote{bid., 213-214.} In the same section, he quotes Sacramental Meditations in support of the proposition that assurance is not to depend on "an audible voice" or "immediate extraordinary revelations."\footnote{bid., 235.} Another passage from the Sacramental Meditations supports Edwards's argument, that the joy of salvation is never wholly unmixed with fear of God's judgements.\footnote{bid., 366.} In the next section, Flavel is cited with regard to the self-advertisement of hypocrites.\footnote{bid., 374-375.} Finally, a very long passage from the Touchstone of Sincerity is quoted, arguing that "holy practice under trials" is the "greatest evidence of grace."\footnote{bid., 433.}

Edwards has generally cited Flavel in connection with false or ambiguous signs of grace. This creates a not entirely false impression that Flavel contributed little in the way of positive ideas to the Religious Affections. However, like Edwards, Flavel understood the converted soul to be "swallowed up in the infinite excellencies of God and Christ."\footnote{bid., 434.} Like Edwards, he considered the chief "beauty and glory of God" to be his "holiness."\footnote{bid., 435.} He

\footnote{Ibid., 2:350.}
\footnote{Ibid., 2:352.}
asserted that regeneration yields a "sensible sweetness" to believers. His *Touchstone of Sincerity* is organized like the *Religious Affections*, inasmuch as it presents both ambiguous and certain signs. Flavel, like Edwards, notes many superficial and apparent similarities between hypocrites and saints, and that it is only at the psychological level that they can be distinguished. Like Edwards, Flavel recognizes that the Holy Spirit not only enlightens the mind, but also awakens a "spiritual sense" which causes believers to "taste" and "experience" the excellencies of the divine. In true believers, he writes, "you will find also tasting as well as enlightening: so that they seem to abound not only in knowledge, but in sense also; i.e., in some kind of experience of what they know: for experience is the bringing of things to the test of the spiritual sense." Flavel's joining of knowledge to sense anticipates Edwards's own view, described at length in Sign 5 of Part 3, that spiritual affections, if genuine, normally arise in connection with knowledge of the Scriptures, when they are not only read and understood, but appreciated and savoured for the beauty they contain.

Interestingly, Flavel notes among his signs of genuine affections, that "natural beauty consists in the symmetry and comely proportion of parts each with the other; spiritual beauty in the harmony and agreeableness of our souls to God." The first clause of this sentence is reminiscent of Edwards's Tenth

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436*ibid.*, 2:322.

437*ibid.*, 5:523.

438*ibid.*, 5:529.
Sign of Part 3: “Another thing wherein those affections that are truly gracious and holy, differ, from those that are false, is beautiful symmetry and proportion.”

18: John Smith (1618-1652)

John Smith was educated at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. His Select Discourses (1660), do not, as a whole, fall into that category of literature which I have been discussing here. However, he includes two essays (numbers seven and eight), which discuss the nature of and distinction between “legal” and “evangelical” righteousness, as well as self-deception and hypocrisy in religion generally. The latter discourse was cited by Edwards, from which he extracts a very lengthy quotation. In this essay, Smith describes a variety of “mistakes” and “errors” which people commonly make in trying to determine the genuineness of their piety:

1) Some people are only partly religious, or religious in certain respects and not others. Their spirituality is “confined or over-swayed by some prevailing lust.” In such persons, the “spirit of religion” does not “actuate the whole man.”

2) Some people confuse a “mere compliance of the outward man with the

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440 Ibid., 217-219.
441 John Smith, Select Discourses (London: J. Flesher, 1660), 353.
law of God" to be true religion, although untouched within.\textsuperscript{442}

3) A "constrained and forced obedience of God's commands" is mistaken for religion, although it is little better than "superstition" and "slavish fear." True religion arises from an "inward sense of divine goodness" and a love toward God arising from this sense.

4) Figments of the imagination, which excite "false" affections, are often mistaken for true spirituality and the genuine "internals" of religion. It is the closing paragraphs of this section, dealing with the "boilings up of our imaginative powers" and the "glowing heats of passion" which Edwards quotes at length in Religious Affections, introducing it as a "remarkable passage."

As already noted in the previous chapter, all commentators since John E. Smith have recognized that John Smith's own discussion of the "spiritual sensation," presented in the first chapter of the Select Discourses, constitutes a clear anticipation of Edwards, and probably exercised a direct influence upon his own thinking. Smith's concept of the spiritual sensation, which he all but identifies with the essence of true religion, will be described in the next chapter. Here it is interesting to note that, although Edwards refers to Smith's criticisms of "imagination" and "passion" as evidences of grace, yet he nowhere mentions Smith's theory of spiritual sensation. I will return to this observation in the conclusion of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{442}Ibid., 357.
19: Signs versus Steps, and the Role of “Terror” in the Conversion

a: The traditional morphology of the conversion

As discussed in Chapter One, most scholars have regarded Edwards’s “abandonment” of the traditional morphology of the conversion as a significant departure from Puritan norms. Instead of evaluating the conversion according to the psychological processes by which conversion occurs, Edwards concentrated on the resulting characteristics of the regenerate soul. Instead of studying the steps of the conversion, he focused on the signs of regeneration.

It will be clear from the foregoing survey that the use of “signs,” “marks” and “notes,” of regeneration, as opposed to the steps of the conversion experience, had already appeared during the sixteenth century, and was well established during the seventeenth century, at which time it received considerable refinement, often in a manner anticipatory of Edwards. Nor was it unusual to discuss the signs of regeneration, as Edwards does, without reference to the morphology of the conversion. This approach is found, for example, briefly delineated in Sibbes’s Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax, and much more extensively in Goodwin’s Work of the Holy Spirit and Owen’s Spiritual Mindedness.

The morphology of the conversion, which will be described below, had, as
is familiar from several studies already alluded to in Chapter One, played an extremely important role during the first generation of the New England churches. Jonathan Edwards's puzzlement at the morphology is well known. In his diary for August 12, 1723, Edwards, not yet eighteen years old, wrote:

The chief thing, that now makes me in any measure to question my good estate, is my not having experienced conversion in those particular steps, wherein the people of New England, and anciently the dissenters of Old England, used to experience it. Wherefore, now resolved, never to leave searching, 'til I have satisfyingly found out the very bottom and foundation, the real reason, why they used to be converted in those steps.

The classic description of the traditional morphology is found in Edmund Morgan's Visible Saints. Morgan's description is itself based on that of William Perkins. The morphology comprises ten steps, divided into two main classes, those preparatory to faith, and those constituting faith:

Preparatory to Faith:
1) Attendance on the Ministry of the Word.

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443 Morgan, Visible Saints; Pettit, Heart Prepared; Ball, Chronicling the Soul's Windings.


445 Morgan, Visible Saints, 68-69. Morgan's ten-stage presentation of the "morphology has been confirmed by other scholars, such as Mark Shaw, "Drama in the Meeting House: the Concept of Conversion in the Theology of William Perkins." (Westminster Theological Journal, 1983) 45:41-72; and Beeke, Assurance of Faith: 109-118.

2) Knowledge of the “law” (i.e. knowledge of what God considers morally good and evil).

3) Recognition of one’s peculiar sins (conviction).


_Faith:_

5) A serious consideration of the promises of salvation to repentant sinners.

6) A desire to believe the message of the gospel.

7) Fervent, constant invocation of pardon.

8) A sense of assurance, or persuasion of God’s mercy toward oneself.

9) Grief of one’s sin because it is sin, and because offensive to God (“Evangelical” sorrow).

10) The grace-assisted endeavour to obey the commandments with “new” obedience (i.e. obedience from a principle of love toward, rather than fear of, God).

Joel Beeke has further noted that these ten stages fall more precisely into four, rather than two, major heads: humiliation (1-4); faith (5-8); repentance (9) and “new” obedience (10).

It is to be noted that steps 1-4 are merely preparatory and not necessarily associated with salvation. That is, one may undergo these steps and yet not be saved. 5-10, however, belong necessarily to “saving” faith. It is also to be noticed that true repentance (not to be confused with “humiliation”), follows
rather than precedes faith.

It is not clear from the passage quoted above whether Edwards was puzzled by all the steps, or factors of conversion, or just some. And if some, which? In another autobiographical passage, the *Personal Narrative*, written about 1739, Edwards alludes more specifically to that aspect of the morphology, or phase of the conversion process, which particularly disturbed him. Edwards describes how, imperfectly converted, he attempted to "break off all former wicked ways, and all ways of known outward sin," seeking salvation and practicing the "duties of religion," although without pleasure or delight:

My concern now wrought more by inward struggles and conflicts, and self-reflections. I made seeking my salvation the main business of my life. But yet it seems to me, I sought after a miserable manner: which has made me sometimes since to question, whether ever it issued in that which was saving; being ready to doubt, whether such miserable seeking was ever succeeded. But yet I was brought to seek salvation, in a manner that I never was before. I felt a spirit to part with all things in the world, for an interest in Christ. My concern continued and prevailed, with many exercising things and inward struggles; but yet it never seemed to be proper to express my concern that I had, by the name of terror.\(^\text{447}\)

It is clear from this passage that Edward's principal difficulty with the traditional morphology centered upon a particular stage in the preparatory phase of conversion, stage 4, or "terror," also called "legal fear," and sometimes "humiliation." Some of the earlier New-England ministers, especially the influential Thomas Hooker and Thomas Shepard, had indeed argued that "legal fear" was a necessary and indispensable pre-requisite to the faith-stages of

the conversion. Thomas Hooker had declared that "the true sight of sin is the only door to life and salvation: if ever you receive mercy at the hands of the lord, it must be by this way, or not at all."  

b: Edwards's attitude to the role of terror in the conversion

The puzzlement, perplexities and doubts which Edwards expressed as to the role, or necessity, of "terror" or "legal fear" in the conversion, has suggested to David Laurence that, in his mature reflections, Edwards abolished "terror" or "legal humiliation" as a preparatory experience by identifying it with a post-faith stage, which Laurence also calls "humiliation." In other words, Edwards reinterpreted "terror," according to Laurence, by assimilating it to the believer's sense of total dependence on God. Terror, or "conviction" (Laurence equates these), lose their preparative status and are assimilated and absorbed into faith.  

This is, however, not the case. Although it is true, as noted above, and as will be discussed in more detail below, that Edwards denied the necessity of preparatory terror, yet Edwards accepted the experience of pre-conversion terror as a frequent (if not universal) concomitant to the conviction of sin. It is essential to recognize, as the traditional morphology recognized, that "terror" (step 4) is not the same as conviction, or recognition, of sin (step 3). John


Preston (1587-1628) described "conviction" as a kind of non-salvific illumination, distinguishing it from the "fear" which may or may not follow it:  

I say, the Holy Ghost enlightens us, which enlightening discovers to us, and convinceth us of sin, and then we look on the Law, and there find, cursed is he that continues not in these commandments to do them. Then observing our hearts, and seeing how far we are from that rectitude the law requires, our spirits begin to fear.  

Terror is an emotional response to the sinner's recognition of his/her own sinfulness, but it is not the same as that recognition. Edwards himself recognized the distinction in Religious Affections:  

Terror, and conviction of conscience, are different things. For though conviction of conscience do often cause terror, yet they don't consist in it.  

Edwards denied the universal necessity not of conviction, or the recognition of sin, but of the emotional response to that recognition, "terror" or "legal humiliation." Laurence himself has confused these two stages, or has mistakenly identified them with one another, stating that Edwards "was convinced yes, but convicted, no." It is clear from his autobiographical writing that, although he did not undergo terror, he was certainly "convicted" of sin, and recognized that he was a sinner. It is also clear from his Faithful Narrative of Surprising Conversions, which I shall review at greater length below,  

451 Edwards, Religious Affections, 156.  
452 Ibid., 271.
that Edwards regarded conviction (though not terror), as an essential aspect of
the conversion experience. Although conviction may occur in different ways, it
apparently occurs to all. Edwards never suggests that anyone was converted
without conviction:

Persons are first awakened with a sense of their miserable
condition by nature, the danger they are in of perishing eternally,
and that it is of great importance to them that they speedily
escape, and get into a better state. Those that were secure and
senseless, are made sensible how much they were in the way to
ruin in their former courses. Some are more suddenly seized
with convictions; it may be by the news of others' conversion, or
something they hear in public, or in private conference, that their
consciences are suddenly smitten, as if their hearts were pierced
through with a dart. Others are awakened more gradually.453

Laurence has attempted to support his case, that Edwards abolished the
concept, or the role, of pre-conversion “terror” and “humiliation” by absorbing
it into a concept of post-conversion “humiliation.” To describe Edwards's
concept of post-conversion humiliation, he refers to several passages in which
Edwards explains “evangelical humiliation” (which constitutes the sixth
unambiguous sign in Religious Affections).454 However, as has already been
discussed, especially in connection with Thomas Shepard’s Parable of the Ten
Virgins, which Edwards cites in this regard, puritans had long distinguished
two kinds of humiliation, a pre-faith kind, called “legal” humiliation (which
was never considered an unambiguous sign of genuine piety), and a post-faith
kind, called “evangelical humiliation” (which was considered an infallible

453Edwards, Great Awakening, 160.
454Ibid., 273-274.
sign). And indeed, the traditional morphology, as articulated by Perkins, also recognized this distinction, referring to “legal” humiliation, “terror” and “legal fear” (step 4) on the one hand and, on the other, to “evangelical” sorrow (step 9), also known as “evangelical repentance,” and sometimes just as “repentance” (in its narrow sense as “gospel sorrow” rather than in its wider sense of “conversion” as a whole). Thus, the concept of post-faith humiliation and repentance had been established in puritanism long before Edwards.

Edwards devotes at least some space in most of his Great-Awakening treatises to the role of terror in the conversion. The subject receives consideration in the *Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God* (1737). It is important to note that, although Edwards recognizes that some periods of “legal” conviction “wrought more kindly”;\(^455\) that in some convicted persons “terrors don’t seem so sharp” as in others;\(^456\) that “there have been some that have not had great terrors, but have had a very quick work;”\(^457\) and that there were “some that are less distinctly wrought upon, in what is preparatory to grace,”\(^458\) yet nowhere does Edwards describe, or suggest the existence of, a person who was completely spared some fear, or distress of mind, accompanying conviction of sin. Although Edwards notes that there was a

\(^{455}\text{Jonathan Edwards, Great Awakening, 162.}\)

\(^{456}\text{Ibid., 163.}\)

\(^{457}\text{Ibid., 166.}\)

\(^{458}\text{Ibid., 167.}\)
"great variety as to the degree of fear and trouble,"\textsuperscript{459} and also "with respect to the time of their being under trouble,"\textsuperscript{460} yet he neither rejects at least some degree of terror as an element of conversion, nor re-identifies it with evangelical humiliation. In the \textit{Faithful Narrative}, his general descriptions of the conversions which he observed \textit{normally} include some reference to a preparatory episode of "terror,"\textsuperscript{461} "fears"\textsuperscript{462} "hurtful distresses,"\textsuperscript{463} "exceeding terror,"\textsuperscript{464} a "terrifying sense of God's anger,"\textsuperscript{465} "legal strivings,"\textsuperscript{466} "fears of perishing,"\textsuperscript{467} "great fears,"\textsuperscript{468} "legal humiliations,"\textsuperscript{469} and periods of being "broken with apprehensions of divine wrath and sunk into an abyss under a sense of guilt."\textsuperscript{470}

The \textit{Faithful Narrative of a Surprising Work of God} was published in 1737,

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{459}Ibid., 161.
\item\textsuperscript{460}Ibid., 167.
\item\textsuperscript{461}Ibid., 161.
\item\textsuperscript{462}Ibid., 162.
\item\textsuperscript{463}Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{464}Ibid., 163.
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\item\textsuperscript{466}Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{467}Ibid., 165.
\item\textsuperscript{468}Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{469}Ibid., 166.
\item\textsuperscript{470}174.
\end{itemize}
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with a second edition appearing in 1738. Edwards's *Personal Narrative*, the unpublished autobiographical fragment in which he denied that his own conversion had involved any element of terror, was completed after the *Faithful Narrative*, possibly in 1739 or 1740. Accordingly, one might wish to argue either that 1) Edwards changed his mind between the earlier and the later works, coming to recognize, after the publication of the *Faithful Narrative*, the possibility of conviction without terror; or that 2) Edwards was not willing to publish what he was willing to commit to a private document.

However, it does not appear that Edwards changed his mind. In works published after the *Personal Narrative*, such as *The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God* (1741), and *Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of Religion* (1742), so far from abandoning the concept of preparatory "terror," Edwards continued to advocate and defend the provocation of terror as an indispensable pastoral and sermonic strategy for precipitating the conversion experience.471 Moreover, when Edwards broaches the subject in *Religious Affections*, published in 1746, so far from rejecting preparatory terror, he asserts that terror is "God's ordinary manner in working salvation for the souls of men."472 Even in this late work, Edwards does not, as Laurence claims, reject terror, or redefine it as post-faith repentance, but retains a place for "fears

\[\text{\footnotesize 471\textit{Ibid.}, 246-248; 389-394.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 472Edwards, Religious Affections, 154.}\]
and awful apprehensions” and “great distress and terror,”473 before the reception of faith: “And that is God’s manner of dealing with men, to lead them into a wilderness, before he speaks comfortably to them.”474 Nor does Edwards completely disown the use of “steps.” In fact, in a passage undiscussed by recent commentators, Edwards defends the traditional morphology against its critics:

Many persons seem to be prejudiced against affections and experiences, that come in such a method, as has been much insisted on by many divines; first, such awakenings, fears and awful apprehensions followed by such legal humblings, in a sense of total sinfulness and helplessness, and then, such and such light and comfort: they look upon all such schemes, laying down such methods and steps, to be of men’s devising: and particularly if high affections of joy follow great distress and terror, it is made by many an argument against those affections. But such prejudices and objections are without reason or Scripture. Surely it can’t be unreasonable to suppose, that before God delivers persons from a state of sin and exposedness to destruction, he should give them some considerable sense of the evil he delivers from.475

In Edwards’s own account of the conversion process, included in the Faithful Narrative of Surprising Conversions, he notes that, after “legal troubles,” the “next thing that appears” is a “conviction of the justice of God in our condemnation, in a sense of their own exceeding sinfulness and the vileness of all their performances.”476 At this realization some cry out, “‘Tis just! ’Tis

473Ibid., 151.
474Ibid., 152.
475Ibid., 151-152.
476Ibid., 168.
Edwards notes that the sinner's recognition of the justice of his/her condemnation does not originate from "new legal terrors and convictions," but rather "from an high exercise of grace, in saving repentance and evangelical humiliation." This is because such an appreciation of the justice of God in the condemnation of sin involves "a sort of complacency of soul, in the attribute of God's justice." Edwards reported that sinners recognized that "the glory of God would shine bright in their condemnation, and they are ready to think that, if they are damned, they would glorify his justice therein." Such an appreciation of, and pleasure in, the apprehension of divine justice must be considered one element of saving faith. It suggests Edwards's notion of a spiritual perception, although this notion is not explicitly introduced in the *Faithful Narrative*.

In Edwards's presentation, the next step, after the acceptance of, and even the "complacency" in, the apprehension of God's justice in condemning sinners, is sometimes for believers to have "earnest longings of soul after God and Christ, to know God, to love him, to be humbled before him, to have communion with Christ and his benefits." This longing arises from a "sense of the superlative excellency of divine things, with a spiritual taste and relish of

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477Ibid., 170.
478Ibid.
479Ibid.
480Ibid., 172.
em and an esteem of em as their highest happiness and best portion."481 Sometimes believers do not "explicitly" conceive of Christ as their personal saviour, but are nevertheless "comforted with a joyful and satisfying view, that the mercy and grace of God is sufficient for them."482 In addition, converts become "convinced of the reality and certainty of the great things of religion."483 They often find a newness and freshness in the old doctrines. In a passage alluded to earlier, Edwards describes one old lady who, though hitherto unconverted, had read the Bible thoroughly: "she had often heard it, and read it, but never 'till now saw it, as a thing real."484 Believers are "drawn out in love to God in Christ."485 However, their "discoveries of God" do not lead to arrogance, but to a "spirit of meekness, modesty, self-diffidence, and low opinion of themselves."486 They spend much time in meditating upon the "glorious excellencies of God and Christ."487

c: Terror in some of Edwards's puritan predecessors

481Ibid.
482Ibid.
483Ibid., 179.
484Ibid., 181.
485Ibid.
486Ibid., 182.
487Ibid., 182-183.
Edwards's account of the conversion experience, however arguably dissimilar, whether in emphasis or content, to that of the earlier New-England puritans, was not unprecedented, if English puritanism is also taken into account.

In the earlier part of the seventeenth century, the members of the spiritual brotherhood seem generally to have insisted on the necessity, or at least the inevitability, of an episode of terror, or legal fear, concomitant with conviction of sin. John Preston, the mentor of Thomas Hooker and Thomas Shepard, regarded an episode of terror, which he called "the spirit of bondage," as an indispensable prerequisite to an effectual conversion: "That [i.e. terror] of necessity must go before, so that if thou never hadst the spirit of bondage, certainly, thou hast not yet received the spirit of the Son." On the other hand, Preston recognized that the degree of legal fear varied in various persons: "I confess it is different, it is sometimes more, sometimes less." Preston also on occasion seems to recognize that conviction of sin alone may be sufficient to effect a full conversion, and prescribes an experience of fear only "if with this thou art not satisfied." Yet, even if the "spirit of bondage" is considered indispensable to the conversion process, Preston does not regard it as proof of a genuine conversion. Such proof must be sought in one's attitude to Christ. Preston does not prescribe any particular degree of terror, except so much as

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489 Ibid., 396.
490 Preston, *The Saint's Qualification*, 100.
will bring one to Christ:

It is such humiliation as hath brought thee to Christ. To count him the chiefest good, to overgo anything rather than him, to stand against all persecutions, rather than to forsake him; canst thou forsake all sirens, all lusts and pleasures which allure thee? Art thou thus brought home to Christ, to esteem him above all things, that come what will come, hadst though a hundred lives to part with for him, all were nothing?  

By the second half of the seventeenth century, attitudes toward terror were becoming more flexible. Terror was then considered normal, but could not be demanded as a "duty." Nor, if anyone was afflicted with "legal stirrings," could any degree of terror be prescribed.

Giles Firmin (1614-1697) published The Real Christian in 1670 to question the necessity of legal terror, or compunction, as he often calls it, as a preparative to faith. In this work he argues that faith, not compunction, is the indispensable "duty" of all human beings, and that "elect infants" are proof that it is possible to be saved without undergoing an episode of legal terror. Like Edwards, Firmin notes that "the ways of God in converting, or drawing the soul to Christ," are, "in preparatory works, very various." This variety shows itself in several ways. Like Edwards, he notes that the length of

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491Ibid., 20.
493Ibid., 2.
494Ibid., 8-9.
495Ibid., 11.
time persons “travail” in the preparatory stages, including the stage of compunction, can differ considerably, and can be extremely short.\footnote{Ibid., 14.} Again, like Edwards, Firmin observes that, in the process of conversion, the steps associated with preparation on the one hand, and faith on the other, can be mingled: “in some only legal works, terrors, fears, sorrows, no mixture of Gospel with them; in others a mixture of both, Law and Gospel, go together.”\footnote{Ibid., 14-15.}

Firmin also noted that the steps of the conversion, although logically sequential to one another, may, in actual experience, occur simultaneously, so that the process of conversion cannot, “in order of time,” be observed as a series of distinct steps.\footnote{Ibid., 25.}

Firmin agrees with Edwards in another particular. He argues that sinners manifest saving grace in “their quiet subjection to God’s justice and sovereignty” in their condemnation.\footnote{Ibid., 108.} According to Firmin, Hooker and Shepard had argued that this phase of the conversion process was merely preparative. But Firmin notes, as does Edwards, that an appreciation of God’s justice implies faith.

John Owen’s analysis of the conversion in his \textit{Pneumatologia} (1674) also rejects the necessity of terror. He lists three main “internal spiritual effects”
which “ordinarily,” precede the work of regeneration.\textsuperscript{500} The second of these is “conviction of sin,” which, according to the normal distinctions, involves not only a recognition of sin, but also a “disquieting sense of the guilt of sin.”\textsuperscript{501} But Owen notes that, although persons convinced of sin are “variously affected with fears and anguish,” yet the “degrees” of these fears “are not prescribed as necessary duties unto persons under their convictions, but only described as they usually fall out.”\textsuperscript{502} Elsewhere Owen describes the “disquieting and perplexing affections” associated with conviction as only “ordinarily” occurring. \textsuperscript{503} But “no certain rule or measure of them can be prescribed as necessary in or unto any antecedaneously unto conversion.”\textsuperscript{504} “Perturbations, sorrows, dejections, dread, fears, are no duty unto any; only they are such things as sometimes ensue or are immitted into the mind upon that which is a duty indispensable, namely, conviction of sin.”\textsuperscript{505} For Owen, as for Edwards, conviction of sin is necessary to conversion, but not terror. And just as Edwards asserted that God is “far from limiting himself to any certain method,” and that “there is a vast variety” in conversion,\textsuperscript{506} so Owen notes that, in the

\textsuperscript{500}Owen, Works, 3:231.
\textsuperscript{501}Ibid., 3:233.
\textsuperscript{502}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{503}Ibid., 3:359.
\textsuperscript{504}Ibid., 3:360.
\textsuperscript{505}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{506}Edwards, Great Awakening, 160.
case of conversion:

God is pleased to exercise a prerogative and sovereignty in this whole matter, and deals with the souls of men in unspeakable variety. Some he leads by the gates of death and hell unto rest in his love, like the people of old through the waste and howling wilderness into Canaan; and the paths of others he makes plain and easy unto them. Some walk or wander long in darkness; in the souls of others, Christ is formed in the first gracious visitation.  

Finally, like Edwards, Owen sees not terror as imperative, but "to own the sentence of the law under which he [i.e. the sinner] suffereth, justifying God in his righteousness and the law in its holiness, whatever be the issue of this dispensation towards himself." Like Edwards, Owen insists that the soul must be "satisfied" that it is indeed "obnoxious unto the curse of the law," and that its condemnation is just.

To conclude this section, I would like to note that

1) Edwards, in evaluating the genuineness of one's conversion, was neither the first puritan to use signs of regeneration rather than steps in the conversion, nor the first to concentrate exclusively, in the Religious Affections at least, on signs, as opposed to steps.

2) Throughout his various writings on the Great Awakening, Edwards evinces a great deal of interest, not only in the signs of regeneration, but also in the process of conversion. Although he is not so interested in the morphology of the conversion as earlier New-England pastors, he does not repudiate it. In

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507 Owen, Works, 3:360-361.

508 Ibid., 3:361.

509 Ibid.
fact, as late as 1746, when he published *Religious Affections*, Edwards even defended "such methods and steps" against their detractors.

3) Although, in the *Personal Narrative*, Edwards denied that "terror" had played a role in his own conversion, this does not mean that "conviction of sin" did not play role. Edwards recognized, as did the traditional morphology, that conviction of sin was distinct from terror, and that there could be no conversion without it.

4) Again, although Edwards denied that terror had played a role in his own conversion, and although, unlike some of his early New-England predecessors, Edwards never affirmed that terror was an indispensable element in the conversion, yet he acknowledged, not only in the *Faithful Narrative*, but also in *Religious Affections*, that terror of varying degrees was a normal factor in the conversions of others, and perhaps of most persons. He also continued to prescribe, in his later Great-Awakening writings, a role for terror in pastoral and sermonic practice.

5) Edwards's views on the conversion experience were anticipated by Giles Firmin and John Owen, especially a) in their refusal to prescribe any certain degree of terror in the preparatory phase of the conversion, as well as in their recognition of a significant variety in the preparatory phase; and, especially in the case of Owen b) in emphasizing the believer's acceptance of God's condemnation as "just," rather than the servile fear of that condemnation ("terror"), as the true indication of a genuinely converted soul.
Edwards's *Religious Affections* belongs primarily to a tradition of puritan theological discussion centering not upon the process of conversion, but the nature and signs of regeneration, and the distinction between genuine piety and pretense. These themes had, since the sixteenth century, been central in the attempt to determine the grounds of one's assurance, to evaluate one's spiritual state, and to allay one's religious anxiety. Since questions concerning regeneration refer to the work of the Holy Spirit, the discussion of the signs of true piety, and the difference between the regenerate and the "hypocrite" belongs properly to pneumatology.

The nature and signs of regeneration, as well as of hypocrisy, having received an early analysis in Calvin, became a primary concern for the English puritans, especially those whom Baxter called the "affectionate, practical English writers." Although their work was anticipated by such early figures as John Bradford, they are usually identified with the "godly preachers," a "spiritual brotherhood," descending from Richard Greenham, and normally associated with Cambridge University. They include such standard puritan authors as Rogers, Baynes, Perkins, Sibbes, Ames, Preston, Goodwin and Shepard. Other significant figures, such as Dyke, Owen, Baxter and Flavel are, in terms of their theological concerns and methods, squarely within this tradition, although they were not personally connected with Cambridge or, at least, with Christ's and Emmanuel, the peculiarly puritan colleges at that
It should also be noted that, among the "affectionate, practical English writers," are such neo-scholastic Aristotelians as Perkins and Preston (not to mention Owen), indicating that even the more "rationalist" puritans made a significant contribution to the development of pietist traditions, and anticipated Edwards's affective emphasis. It is also worth noting that, whereas Edwards, writing in the mid-eighteenth century, has to defend his thesis, that "true religion, in great part, consists in holy affections," this was, or seems to have been, taken for granted by all his seventeenth-century predecessors investigated here.

From the beginning, the "affectionate, practical English writers" were deeply concerned both with the nature and signs of regeneration, and also with the process of conversion, especially in its preparatory phase. In Greenham and other early figures, one often finds that a discussion of "signs," "marks" and "notes" of regeneration is mixed with a discussion of the process of conversion. In writers of the succeeding generations, there is a tendency to separate the two subjects. Some theologians, such as John Preston and Thomas Hooker, write entire treatises describing the process of conversion, often devoting minute attention to the preparatory episodes. Others, such as Sibbes and Goodwin in the treatises examined here, and Owen, in his *Grace and Duty of Spiritual Mindedness*, tend to concentrate exclusively on the nature and signs of regeneration, rather than on the process of conversion.

In his more comprehensive *Pneumatologia*, Owen attends both to the
process of conversion and to the nature and signs of regeneration. His approach bears many similarities to that adopted by Edwards in his *Religious Affections* and the *Faithful Narrative*. The preparatory episode is simplified from the elaborate discussions of the earlier preparationists, being reduced to conviction of sin, an indispensible prerequisite to faith, and to mental "disquiet," "dread" and "terror," understood as a normal emotional reaction to conviction, but not in any degree prescribable to anyone "antecedaneously" to faith. Like Edwards, Owen's discussion of the preparatory episodes is brief and distilled, while his discussion of regeneration is more extensive and detailed. Owen recognized, as did Edwards, that the process of conversion could be characterized by considerable variety, and could occur so covertly and rapidly as to preclude observation and analysis. Hence the tendency to concentrate on the nature and signs of the resultant regeneration.

In examining the nature and signs of regeneration as presented by the seventeenth-century puritans, one finds many remarkable anticipations of Edwards's analysis. In my own discussion, although I have noted anticipations of most of the twelve Edwardsean signs, I have naturally emphasized parallels to those features of Edwards's discussion which have conventionally been considered most original to him, and least continuous with earlier puritanism. Among the important parallels are:

1) Many earlier puritans had produced investigations of regeneration, either as works in themselves, or as parts of larger works, which not only undertake the same task as Edwards's *Religious Affections*, but are also organized in the
same manner: first discussing signs which are ambiguous, then moving to
unambiguous marks of true piety (for instance, Rogers, *Seven Treatises*,
Perkins, *A Treatise Tending Unto a Declaration*).

2) Hypocrisy and self-deception are, as Ava Chamberlain noted (see
Chapter One), fundamental concepts for the structure and presentation of
*Religious Affections*. But this dichotomy had been an essential structural factor
in the protestant analysis of regeneration since at least Calvin.

3) The use of a concept of "spiritual sensation" is found as early as Perkins,
and is extensively developed by Sibbes, Goodwin, and Owen, as well as by
John Smith, and is recognized and used by Baxter and Flavel. Perkins had
introduced the notion of a spiritual sensation (he doesn't use the term, but
refers to a "feeling and inward experience"), into his discussion of assurance,
because it implied a degree of certainty about spiritual things not included in
the older concept of illumination. Goodwin and Shepard also favoured the
notion of a spiritual sensation for the same reason. Although the precise term
'spiritual sensation" does not occur in Perkins, it is found in Sibbes, Goodwin,
Owen, Smith, Baxter and Flavel. In addition, Edwards believed that Shepard
had a concept of a spiritual sensation.

4) As in Edwards, so in his predecessors, the notion of a spiritual sensation
provides the basis for discussing regeneration in sensual and aesthetic terms.
Hence appear innumerable references to "seeing" and "tasting" the divine
attributes, of experiencing, "relishing," "delighting" in the "beauty" of God, and
of valuing God's "beauty" as it is in itself, and without reference to self-love.
Several authors, including Sibbes, Goodwin and Owen, consider the "affective" knowledge of God, derived from the "experience" of divine realities mediated through spiritual sensation, as one of the fundamental signs, if not the fundamental sign, of true grace. "Delectation" in God is the basis of holy love and gratitude toward God.

5) The concept of the spiritual sense also involves a notion of the "heart," where the "experience" of God mediated through the spiritual sense is "inwardly felt," as Perkins said. As in Edwards, so in his predecessors, the spiritual sense is related to, and often occasions references to, a percipient-volitional-affective psychic core, called the heart. The heart is the seat of the fundamental "inward inclinations," "affections" and "bias," which are the chief subject of regeneration, and the principal criteria for judging genuine piety. The concept of the heart in seventeenth-century puritanism will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

6) The principal beauty of God which the saints as saints appreciate, or "relish," is his "justice" or "moral beauty." This is mentioned by several puritans, but is particularly emphasized by Shepard and Owen.

In the preceding discussion, I have examined not only material cited by Edwards, but also material which, although not cited by him, demonstrates considerable parallels with his thinking. However, when one compares what one finds in the work of Edwards's predecessors to what Edwards actually cites in his footnotes, an interesting pattern appears: Edwards, while often appealing to writers supporting those assertions of his which represent what
most contemporary scholars would consider the commonplaces of puritan pastoral theology, does not generally cite passages, or authorities, who support those positions which modern scholars have conventionally considered either unique and original to him, or derived from non-puritan sources. A good example, as noted earlier, is his reference to John Smith. Although he adduces a "remarkable passage" from Smith's *Select Discourses*, describing the difference between real religious insight and mere figments of the imagination, he does not mention Smith's theory of spiritual sensation, elaborated in the "First Discourse." Nor does he adduce any other references to spiritual sensation among such predecessors as Sibbes, Goodwin and Owen, where it is a highly developed concept. The only reference to something resembling the spiritual sense in his predecessors which Edwards cites, is his reference to Shepard's concept of a special "sight" of "Christ in his love," peculiar to the saints. But Edwards does not refer to Shepard's "experimental knowledge of a work of grace," which Shepard likens to "tasting honey." Nor, for that matter, does Edwards refer to any of the other similes to "tasting" honey, or fruits, which abound in seventeenth-century puritan literature, illustrating the manner of the saint's experience of God, and of which further examples will be included in the next chapter.

In over-emphasizing, or insisting too much upon, the distinction between Edwards's *Religious Affections* and earlier preparationist treatises on the process of conversion, and by over-stating Edwards's criticism of the preparationist model of conversion, many scholars have failed to appreciate Edwards's
Religious Affections within the broader pneumatological traditions of puritanism. Neither the project of determining the signs of genuine piety, nor the method by which Edwards carried this out in Religious Affections, can be regarded as particularly unusual. Nor did Edwards's reservations toward the preparationist model, nor his attitude toward “terror,” constitute a complete rejection of traditional preparationism, or a radical departure from earlier puritan norms.

It may well be that the manner in which Edwards has cited, or not cited, his predecessors has suggested to scholars that Edwards drew less from seventeenth-century puritanism than the evidence indicates. In the preceding summary, I have indicated that virtually all his “signs” of regeneration, and even his understanding of the nature of regeneration in terms of spiritual sensation, had been at least adumbrated, if not considerably developed, by his predecessors. This is because, as I will describe in the next chapter, he shared with his predecessors, to a greater or lesser extent, a similar model of human interiority. This model was not derived from Lockeanism, but from very old Christian traditions extending at least as far back as Augustine, and which were commonly accepted, even if not fully articulated, among the more pietistic of Edwards's puritan predecessors.
Chapter Three: The Language and Psychology of the Heart in Religious Affections and in Edwards's Predecessors

1: Introduction:

Edwards's model of human interiority, his understanding of the relationship between intellect and will, between volition and emotion, and his conspicuous use of such terms as "heart," "sense," "affection," and so on, had been fully anticipated by earlier Christian traditions, and not least by earlier puritanism. The following discussion will be divided into nine sections.

1: A description of the occasion of Edwards's articulation of his religious psychology, indicating the views of his rationalistic opponents, and especially of Charles Chauncey.

2: A review of the medieval, Aristotelian-Thomistic psychology, which served as the basis for Chauncey's views, and which Miller and others have often supposed was the only psychological model available to puritanism before Edwards. This section will also serve to illustrate attitudes against which Edwards's own view may be defined by way of contrast.

3: A description and discussion of Edwards's psychology of the heart.

4: A description of Edwards's view of the role of the intellect in the religious life.

5: A summary of the Edwards's heart-language and its connotations

6: A brief survey of "heart-language" in Scripture, Greek physiology, and in earlier Christian traditions, from the patristic period to the Reformation.
7: A discussion of "heart-language" in pre-Edwardsean puritanism, indicating clear parallels between the psychology of seventeenth-century pietistic puritans and that of Edwards, and arguing that, in all essential features, Edwards's "psychology of the heart" had already received considerable development by his puritan predecessors.

8: A brief comparison of Edwards's psychology, as presented in Religious Affections, with that of John Locke, indicating that Edwards had less in common with Locke than with his puritan predecessors.

9: A concluding summary evaluating both the extent of Edwards's debt to earlier puritanism, and also indicating the peculiarities of his own use of the tradition.

2: Edwards and his Opponents

The position against which Edwards was to argue in Religious Affections was described by him three or four years earlier in Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of Religion in New England.⁠¹ According to Edwards, some opponents of the Awakening subscribed to a "false philosophy." ² They held that "the affections of the soul are something diverse from the will, and not appertaining to the noblest part of the soul, but the meanest principle that it has, that belongs to men as partaking of animal nature, and what he has in common with the brute creation, rather

⁠¹ Although its title page is dated 1742, it was in fact published in March 1743, according to G.C. Goen, "Introduction" to Jonathan Edwards, The Great Awakening (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972).

² Edwards, Great Awakening, 297.
than anything whereby it is conformed to angels and pure spirits." Because these persons, unnamed by Edwards, identified human affectivity not with the spiritual dimension of the personality, but rather with the "animal nature," they dismissed the Awakening in general, and its emotionalism in particular, as of little or no religious value.

Even if, as Edwards himself acknowledged, the opponents of the Awakening allowed that "there is a good use to be made of affections in religion," nevertheless, in Edwards's view, they considered religious affections as something merely "adventitious and accidental" to Christianity, and not, as Edwards was to argue in Religious Affections, as constituting a "great part" of true religion.

Edwards's attitude to the Great Awakening, especially with regard to its emotionalism, is normally contrasted with that of Charles Chauncey (1705-1787). And indeed, Chauncey's Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New England was written in response to Edwards's Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival. A predilection for rationalism, whether of the medieval or Enlightenment variety, and a tendency to assign a secondary role to emotion in religion, had revealed itself early in Chauncey's career, and seems to reflect a significant aspect of his

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'Ibid., 296.
'Ibid., 297.
'Religious Affections, 95.
'See Gaustad, Great Awakening, 89-90.
personality. His initial openness to the emotionalism of the Great Awakening rapidly gave way to a lively hostility. During the course of his long life, Chauncey fell increasingly under the influence of Enlightenment rationalism, and to some extent assimilated Arminianism and Unitarianism into his thought. In later life he referred to Edwards as “a visionary enthusiast, and not to be minded in anything he says.”

Chauncey's Harvard Commencement Sermon of 1742, "Enthusiasm Described and Cautioned Against," presents a position similar to, although not as extreme as, the position described by Edwards as "false philosophy."

You must not lay too great stress upon the workings of your passions and affections. These will be excited, in a less or greater degree, in the business of religion; and 'tis proper they should. The passions, when suitably moved tend mightily to awaken the reasonable powers, and put them upon a lively and vigorous exercise. And this is their proper use. And when addressed to, and excited to that purpose, they may be of good service: however we should mistake the right use of the passions, if we place our religion only or chiefly in the heat and fervour of them. The soul is in the man, and unless the reasonable nature is suitably wrought upon, the understanding enlightened, the judgement convinced, the will persuaded, and the mind entirely changed, it will avail but to little purpose, though the passions should be set all in a blaze. And if while you are solicitous that you may be in transports of affections, you neglect your more noble part, your reason and your judgement, you will be in a great danger of being

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See Lippy, *Seasonable Revolutionary*, 25, 60, 63, 85, 112, 130; also Steele, “Gracious Affection” and “True Virtue”, 256, n.61.

Quoted in Lippy, *Seasonable Revolutionary*, 27.
carried away by your imagination.  

Two important positions ought to be noticed here:

1) Although Chauncey does not describe the affections as "base" or "animal," and considers it appropriate that they be engaged in the things of religion, especially in order to "awaken the reasonable powers," yet he clearly regards reason as "more noble" than the emotional component. A few sentences later he declares that the affections ought to be kept "under the regimen of a sober judgement."  

He was to repeat this view the following year, in direct response to Edwards's *Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival*. Here he is speaking specifically of the psychological effects of regeneration:

One of the most essential things necessary to the new forming men, is the reduction of their passions to a proper regimen, i.e., the government of a sanctified understanding: and 'till this is effected, they may be called New Creatures, but they are far from deserving this character. Reasonable beings are not to be guided by passions or affections, though the object of it should be God and the things of the other world: they need, even in this case, to be under the government of a well instructed judgement.

Not only did Chauncey value the role of affectivity, even in the religious life, less than the function of rationality, he also came very close to regarding religion as chiefly a matter of the intellect: "The plain truth is, an enlightened mind, and not raised affections, ought always to be the guide of

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12 Ibid.

those who call themselves men, and this in the affairs of religion as well as other things. This contrasts markedly with Edwards's position, whether expressed in the more emphatic phraseology used in Some Thoughts, or in the more cautious articulation of Religious Affections. In the former work Edwards had identified sanctified affectivity with the essence of religion, declaring that "true virtue or holiness has its seat chiefly in the heart, rather than in the head.... It consists chiefly in holy affections." In Religious Affections Edwards was more modest, arguing that religion consisted not "chiefly" but rather "in great part" in holy affections. In either case, however, the value which Edwards ascribes to the emotional component of piety is much higher, and its function in the religious life considered more central, than Chauncey was prepared to allow.

2) The passage from the Harvard Commencement sermon quoted above indicates that Chauncey distinguished the will from the affections, and placed volition in the category of rational functions. Edwards clearly stood against this position:

The affections of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will, as though they were two faculties in the soul. All acts of the affections of the soul are in some sense acts of the will, and all acts of the will are acts of the affections.

Edwards would continue to maintain this position in Religious Affections, affirming that the affections and passions were nothing other than "the

\[\text{Ibid., 327.}\]

\[\text{Edwards, Great Awakening, 297-98.}\]

\[\text{Edwards, Religious Affections, 95.}\]

\[\text{Edwards, Great Awakening, 297.}\]
more vigorous and sensible exercises" of the will. 18

To summarize these two principal points of difference between Chauncey and Edwards, it can be said that, whereas Chauncey subordinated affectivity to rationality, emphasized the rational component of the religious life, and saw volition and emotion as generically distinct, associating will principally with judgement, Edwards understood the emotions as essential to piety, and understood them as an aspect of the will.

As seen in Chapter 1, Perry Miller identified Chauncey's position with the main-stream Puritan past, and Edwards's with empiricism. G. C. Goen considered such views as Chauncey's, in which the passions are understood as "sub-rational appetites to be held in check by the reason" as "classical." He regarded Edwards's identification of volition with affection as an adaptation of "Locke's sensationalist psychology." 19 Similarly, Conrad Cherry, following Miller, described Chauncey as "a captive of the scholastic psychology" while Edwards's dissent from Chauncey's rationalistic appraisal of the revivals was "dictated to a large extent by his adoption and adaptation of the Lockean psychology." 20

Although it is true, as will be explained in greater detail shortly, that Chauncey's view of human psychology, at least as represented in the Harvard Commencement Sermons, was derived from an ancient, "classical" tradition, particularly as articulated by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, yet it is also the case that Edwards's "psychology of the heart" originates in a

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18 Edwards, Religious Affections, 96-97.
20 Cherry, Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 167-68.
tradition at least as old. Nor was Edwards the first puritan to make use of this tradition. Its peculiar phraseology and its distinctive conception of human interiority can be found in many earlier puritans, especially those of a more pietistic bent. Edwards, in seeking a psychological model to explain and justify revivalistic experience, did not therefore need to make use of Locke, even if Locke did offer such a model, which, as will be indicated later, is questionable. However, such a model had been well established within earlier puritanism, and within the more affective traditions of Christianity generally.

In the next section I will briefly describe the intellectualistic psychology of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, partly to illustrate the tradition out of which Chauncey is working, and partly to provide a contrast to Edwards's position, which will be described in the following section.

3: The Aristotelian-Thomistic Psychology

Chauncey's view of the intellect's superior value, his separation of volition from affectivity, and his inclusion of the will among the intellectual functions of the soul, rather than in the soul's emotional aspect, clearly originate in an ancient "intellectualist" tradition of psychology. Its ultimate origins are Aristotelian, but the version of it presented by Chauncey seems more directly derived from Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who gave it its most influential expression, and who was well known in New England.21

For Aristotle, human moral excellence lies in the subordination of the non-rational aspects of the soul to prudence, or practical reason, operating through deliberation and rational choice. The objects of deliberation and choice are normally presented by the senses, which combine percipience with affectivity, and which represent the animal aspect of the soul. Choice is thus carried out within a psychological environment of emotion, of "sensitive appetite" and "desire." Emotion, or desire, competes with rational deliberation, to determine action. The "uncontrolled" person (akrates) is not moved to act by the command of reason, but by sensation and desire. The self-controlled person (enkrates), while experiencing sensitive appetite and desire, is not moved to act, except by the determination of the intellect. In the self-controlled person, the emotions and desires have been brought, normally by an elaborate and lengthy process of education, to a state of such tranquillity and equilibrium as permits rational choice to operate without interference. Thus the affections contribute to human moral excellence only negatively, by being so carefully controlled as not to overpower rational choice. There is no suggestion that, in themselves, sensation and desire can constitute human moral excellence.


For this synopsis of Aristotle’s moral psychology, I am following Theodore James Tracy, Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1969), especially Part Four.
This Aristotelian analysis passed to Thomas Aquinas, who identified the concept of rational choice, or "rational appetite," with the Latin word *voluntas*, or "will." Thomas asserted, and used a variety of arguments to prove, that the intellect is a "nobler" faculty than the will. To review the details of his arguments is not so much my concern here, as it is merely to notice the precedent Thomas gives for Chauncey's hierarchy of psychological values. Of greater importance is Thomas's analysis of the relationship between intellect, will and the affections.

Thomas speaks in general terms of inclination, or appetition, and reserves the word "will" for a special kind of appetition. There are three kinds of appetition.

1) "Physical," which is a natural inclination, or propensity, toward a particular kind of motion, or "behaviour," determined by the form, or physical constitution, of the entity. Here Thomas is speaking of such phenomena as the "propensity" for fire to rise, or of metal filings to "seek" a magnet. This kind of "appetition" need not, for the purposes of the present discussion, be of further concern.

2) "Sensitive," or "animal," appetition includes the responses of attraction to or repulsion from an entity apprehended through sense-cognition. Typical forms of such appetition would include responses of attraction to

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\(^{24}\) Coplestone, *Aquinas*, 185.
food or water; or responses of aversion to physically threatening situations. Appetitive responses, whether desires or aversions, to the good or evil apprehended by sense, evoke the "passions" or "affections" of the sensory appetite. Hence the traditional association, still operative among the New-England divines criticized by Edwards, of the emotions with the "lower," or "animal" nature.

3) "Rational" or "intellectual" appetition is elicited by goods apprehended by intellection, rather than by sense. Such goods would include, for instance, honour, health, wisdom and other "universals." Only this form of appetite is properly called "will" in Thomas's system. As Bourke explains, "to wish for peace or health would be an act of willing; to desire a drink of water, when thirsty, would be an act of sensory appetition." Water itself is properly not the object of volition, but rather the object of "affection." Only the universal good, in this case presumably health, is, strictly speaking, the object of will.

Thus, by distinguishing between the psychic capacities of sense and intellection, Thomas clearly separated the volitional and affective aspects of the human person. In making this separation he was followed by a long line of philosophers and theologians, including Cajetan (1469-1534), Dominic Soto (1494-1560), Bartolomeo Medina (1522-1580) and Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621), a list extending into the seventeenth century. As already observed, Thomas and his intellectualist views were well known

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See V. J. Bourke, Will in Western Thought, 64.

Ibid., 64-65.

among the puritans, and Perry Miller has traced their predominating influence in a large number of puritan psychologists.\textsuperscript{20}

It is necessary to note, however, that Thomas's views contain certain subtleties absent in Chauncey's clear, but over-simplified, delineation of human psychology as presented not only in the Harvard Commencement sermon, but also in his much longer \textit{Seasonable Thoughts}. These subtleties constitute not only a more refined and detailed position than Chauncey's, but also a somewhat different one. There are two main differences.

1) For Thomas the intellect is not only nobler than the will, but also anterior to it, insofar as it provides the will with a \textit{known} good to serve as the final cause of volitional activity. However, the intellect and the will are not independent of one another. Rather Thomas speaks of them as including one another: "The intellect knows that the will wills, and the will wills that the intellect knows."\textsuperscript{30} Similarly, "the good is contained under the true inasmuch as it knows, and the true is contained under the good inasmuch as it is a good desired."\textsuperscript{31} This assimilation of function is more reminiscent of Edwards's views (as will be described in detail later), than Chauncey's, although it should be noted that Thomas's manner of associating the intellect and the will differs from that of Edwards.

2) More significantly, Thomas does not, in fact, entirely disassociate the will from the affections. "Love" is included in the will as its "first

\footnote{\textsuperscript{20} Miller, \textit{New England Mind}, 239-279.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{21} Davitt, \textit{Nature of Law}, 128.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.}
movement." In so far as love may be considered as the basis of the whole emotional life, this position admits the possibility of including all the affections within the function of the will, as Edwards does.

Thomas's assimilation—however minimal—of intellect and will, as well as his inclusion of the affection of love within the will, indicate that the "scholastic" psychology, which Edwards is commonly represented as opposing, is not, at least in the works of one of its principal exponents, as completely irreconcilable with Edwards's views as normally supposed. It could even provide Edwards with hints—though perhaps no more than hints—toward that understanding of human psychology which he eventually articulated in Religious Affections. However, there was, as already noted, another view of human interiority, widespread through Christian theology since antiquity, and well known to Edwards's puritan predecessors, which provided him with all the basic concepts and vocabulary needed for the development his own pietistic psychology. Before describing this, however, I wish to offer a brief overview of Edwards's conception of human interiority, at least as presented in the Religious Affections.

4: Edwards's Analysis of Religious Psychology

As already noted, Edwards opposed the view of some New-England pastors who, according to him, identified the affections in general with "animal" nature. Edwards himself recognized that some emotions do indeed have their "seat" in animal nature, and owe their existence to the

\[1\] Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 20 1.
"constitution and frame of the body." However, he denied that all affections originated in physical sensation. There are also affections which are "high," "great" and "holy." So far from being "accidental and adventitious" to religion, such affections "appertain to the substance and essence of Christianity."34

In *Religious Affections* Edwards gave considerable development to the concept of "holy" affections, arguing that they are evoked by the perception, not of physical, but of "spiritual, supernatural and divine" realities.35 The capacity by which such realities are "perceived," thereby exciting "holy" affections, Edwards attributes to a "new principle of nature," a new "spiritual sense, as it were," a new "sense of the heart," divine in origin and bestowed in regeneration, eliciting a new "sensation" or "perception" of divine things.36 This new "principle" is not a new natural "faculty," but "a new foundation" laid in the human nature, serving as the basis of "new exercises" of natural intellect and will, and constituting a "new, holy disposition of the heart." The new "sense," or "perception," of divine reality arising from the new principle is identified with the "new creation" alluded to in Scripture.37 It will be necessary to return to the concepts of "spiritual sensation" and "sense of the heart" for more detailed commentary shortly.

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34 Ibid., 297-299.
36 Ibid., 205-206
37 Ibid.
In addition to asserting a concept of affections which do not originate in natural sensation, Edwards argues, both in Some Thoughts and Religious Affections, that "holy" affections, like all emotions, belong to the volitional dimension of the personality: "The affections of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will." 38

It is to be noted that Edwards connects volition with affection just as Thomas does, by a primary identification of the will with love:

All exercises of the will are in some degree or other exercises of the soul's appetite or aversion; or, which is to say the same thing, of love or hatred. But love and hatred are affections of the soul, and therefore all acts of the will are truly acts of the affections. 39

Again, as love is voluntative, and all other emotions originate in love, which is, as Edwards says, their "fountain," then all emotions must be considered as voluntative in nature. 40

As to the vocabulary of the emotions, Edwards argues that the various terms used to describe human affectivity indicate different degrees of vehemence in volitional acts. So "passions," for instance, do not indicate something generically different from the will, but rather signify the will as "exercised in a high degree, in a vigorous and lively manner." 41

In Religious Affections Edwards develops a fuller psychology. He divides the human soul into two basic "faculties":

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39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 106; 149; 240.
41 Ibid.
1) The "understanding," whose basic acts are "perception" and "speculation," discerns, views and judges of things. It becomes clear, as the argument of Religious Affections unfolds, that, in Edwards's view, "perception" always has an affective dimension, which distinguishes it from "speculation" and mere "notional" thinking. It represents the mind, when it "don't only speculate and behold, but also relishes and feels." Thus, Edwards attributes a certain sensuousness and affectivity to the "understanding," insofar as it is percipient.

2) The second faculty has several names. Broadly it may be called the "inclination," because it inclines toward, or disinclines from, its various objects. Inclination toward is called "volition." Disinclination from is called "nolition." Because, as already indicated, this aspect of the soul comprehends the emotions, it represents the voluntative and affective aspect of the soul.

Edwards explained that the "inclination" is also called the "will," but specifically in respect of the "actions that are determined and governed by it." The actions "determined" by the inclination include 1) individual affections and emotions, which are duly referred to as "actings of the will," and 2) individual acts of choice or decision, as when he describes moral

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1: Ibid., 96.
2: Ibid., 272.
3: Ibid.
4: Ibid.
5: Ibid.
6: Ibid., 97.
good as subsisting in beings which have "will and choice." 47

Occasionally Edwards uses will interchangeably with "inclination." In such cases, "will" signifies the fundamental affective disposition of the soul in general. This is clearly the meaning, for instance, where "faculty of will" is being compared or opposed to the "faculty of understanding," as in the following passage:

So this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but it is a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of understanding. So that new holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of will. 48

Edwards not only distinguishes the exercises of inclination in terms of "volition" and "nolition," but also in terms of degree of vehemence. The least such degree is that in which the soul "is carried very little beyond a state of perfect indifference." 49 There are also more "vigorous and sensible exercises" of the inclination, and it is these which are called "affections." 50 As in his earlier Great-Awakening writings, Edwards notes that the affections are properly aspects of the inclination, or will: "the will, and the affections of the soul, are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of the

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47 Ibid., 254.
48 Ibid., 206.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 97.
Among the affections, the most vehement are termed "passions," which are "more sudden, and whose effects on the animal spirits are more violent, and the mind more overpowered, and less in its own command." Furthermore, Edwards makes a special point of adding that these "more vigorous and sensible" acts of the inclination always have effects upon the body: "There is never any case whatsoever, of any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or inclination of the soul, without some effect upon the body, in some alteration of the motions of its fluids, and especially the animal spirits." Edwards's point is clear, if viewed within the context of the Great Awakening and its controversies. Physical reactions to preaching are not necessarily merely corporeal: they may originate in spiritual affections. If the inclination is strongly drawn to God, the vehemence of its tendency will be registered by strong emotions, and these will necessarily affect the physical constitution. The stronger the love, the stronger the bodily reaction is likely to be. And yet, as Edwards insists, it is still the soul, and not the body, which is the subject of the affections: "As 'tis the soul only that has ideas, so 'tis this only that is pleased or displeased with its ideas." The motions of the body "are only effects or concomitants of the affections, that are entirely distinct from the affections themselves, and no way

Ibid., 97.
Ibid., 98.
Ibid., 98.
Ibid.
essential to them.  

Edwards's most important psychological concept, at least the one that has excited most comment, is the "heart." For Perry Miller the significance of this concept was derived from the supposed fact that, in the sense intended by Edwards, 1) it played no very significant role in traditional, mainstream puritan psychology; 2) Edwards's special "sense" of divine reality was located in, or closely associated with, the heart; and 3) it was a unitive concept, integrating the intellectual and voluntative faculties, which traditional puritanism had supposedly failed adequately to integrate.

Of course, Miller was well aware that the term "heart" occurred frequently in the works of the more pietistic puritans. However, he believed that, in seventeenth-century puritanism, "heart" was merely a synonym for the will, as opposed to the intellect, and did not serve, as it did in Edwards, to unify and integrate the human personality.  

Edwards introduces the concept of "heart" in the paragraph concerning "inclination" and its various aspects. He explains that the "mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty [i.e. volition, or the "inclination"], is called the heart." It should be noted that, for Edwards, "mind" does not refer narrowly to the cognitive and speculative aspect of the soul. For not only does the mind have "thoughts, it is also the "proper seat" of the

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55 Ibid.
56 See Miller, New England Mind, 250.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 119.
affections. It "loves and rejoices." It is the subject of both the intellectual and the volitional-affective activities of the human person: "The mind don't only speculate and behold, but relishes and feels." Thus, for Edwards, the "mind" is broadly taken as a synonym for the human "soul" in its entirety.

That the mind is termed "heart" with regard to the exercises of the inclination, means simply that the heart refers to the mind as inclinational, when, in any of its activities, its volitional-affective dimension is engaged. Such activities would include, with reference to Edwards's own catalogue of psychic functions, any volitional-affective operation, as well as the act of perception, in so far as that involves a voluntative or emotional response of "liking or disliking." What it does not include, so far as Edwards is concerned, are purely theoretical, or "notional" acts of the understanding, insofar as these have no voluntative or affective aspect:

There is a distinction to be made between a mere notional understanding, wherein the mind only beholds things in the exercise of the speculative faculty; and the sense of the heart, wherein the mind don't only speculate and behold, but relishes and feels.

Edwards had clearly differentiated between two types of knowledge, the "merely speculative and notional," and the "sense of the heart," which involved the emotions in mental apprehension, long before composing Religious Affections. In his well-known sermon of 1734, "A Divine and

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* Ibid., 98.
* Ibid., 113.
* Ibid., 272.
* Ibid.
Supernatural Light," Edwards had articulated the distinction:

There is a twofold understanding or knowledge of good, that God has made the mind of man capable of. The first, that which is merely speculative or notional: as when a person only speculatively judges, that anything is, which by the agreement of mankind, is called good or excellent, viz. that which is most to general advantage, and between which and a reward there is a suitableness; and the like. And the other is that which consists in the sense of the heart: as when there is a sense of the beauty, amiableness, or sweetness of a thing; so that the heart is sensible of pleasure and delight in the presence and the idea of it. In the former is exercised merely the speculative faculty, or the understanding strictly so-called, or as spoken of in distinction from the will or disposition of the soul. In the latter the will, or inclination, or heart, are mainly concerned. 

Thus "heart" refers not only to volition and affection, but also to sensation, or perception, the "understanding" as simultaneously apprehending reality, and responding affectively to what it apprehends. In other words, the "heart" has both a volitional-affective dimension, and also a cognitive-percipient dimension. Hence it could act as a unifying principle to the intellectual and voluntative aspects of the soul, counteracting the intellectual-affective dichotomy which, according to many commentators, had bedevilled traditional puritanism.

It will have been seen from the foregoing that, although the heart has a cognitive or percipient dimension, its essential and defining aspect is voluntative and affective. This is corroborated by Edwards's use of the term "heart" interchangeably with "will" or "inclination," as in the passage quoted above from "A Divine and Supernatural Light," or with "will" and "affection,"

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Jonathan Edwards, "A Divine and Supernatural Light, Immediately imparted to the Soul by the Spirit of God, Shown to be Both a Scriptural, and a Rational Doctrine" (1734), in Smith, Stout, Minkema, ed., A Jonathan Edwards Reader, 111.
as in his remarks on holiness in Religious Affections:

The moral excellency of an intelligent voluntary being, is more immediately seated in the heart or will of moral agents. That intelligent being whose will is truly right and lovely, he is morally good and excellent.64

The heart, as identified with inclination, refers to the fundamental amative orientation of the human person, that which Edwards elsewhere describes as the "habitual inclination," "bias," or "preponderation" of the soul conceived as a volitional-affective entity.65 This fundamental affectivity both underlies and determines not only individual acts of wills and choice, but also the manner in which one perceives, or feelingly apprehends something either as "amiable" and "delightful," or "loathsome" and "nauseous."

Although Edwards often uses "heart" to indicate "inclination" or "will," he normally emphasizes its cognitive or percipient dimension, which he expresses in terms of "sense," and according to the analogy of sense perception. The "sense of the heart" not only involves the simultaneous action of the cognitive and volitional-affective elements in grasping, and responding to, divine reality, but also confounds these elements, so that a distinction between them cannot be clearly made:

I say, sense of the heart; for it is not speculation merely that is concerned in this kind of understanding; nor can there be a clear distinction made between the faculties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly and separately in this

64 Edwards, Religious Affections, 255.

For Edwards, regeneration chiefly and principally affects the "sense of the heart," making the human person capable of "a new inward perception or sensation" of divine reality.\(^{67}\)

And here is, as it were, a new spiritual sense that the mind has, or a principle of new kind of perception or spiritual sensation, which is in its whole nature different from any former kinds of sensation of the mind, as tasting is diverse from any of the other senses; and something is perceived by a true saint, in the exercise of this new sense of mind, in spiritual and divine things, as entirely diverse from anything that is perceived in them, by natural men, as the sweet taste of honey is diverse from the ideas men get of honey by only looking on it, and feeling of it.\(^{68}\)

Edwards cautions that the "new spiritual sense" is not a new natural "faculty" in the soul. It is rather a new "principle." Recognizing the vagueness of this term, Edwards explains that it indicates a "foundation" or a "habit" within the personality, affecting the "manner" in which the natural faculties are exercised, and bestowing the "ability and disposition" for exerting the natural faculties in a particular way.\(^{69}\) Thus, in the regenerate, the new principle, although called a spiritual sense, is not so much a new faculty, as a new capacity of the natural soul for experiencing the divine:

So this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of understanding. So that new, holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense, is not

\(^{65}\) Ibid., 272.

\(^{66}\) Ibid., 205.

\(^{67}\) Ibid., 205-206.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 206.
a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the
nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the
same faculty of will.\textsuperscript{70}

It is to be noted that, throughout Religious Affections, the terms “sense,”
“perception” and “sensation” can refer both to the act of perceiving or
sensing, and to the resulting perception, or sense impression, within the
mind. It is not always clear, when Edwards is talking about the “new
creature” of perception or sense, whether he is referring to the new ability,
or act, of perceiving and sensing, or the new mental content resulting from
the act. The advantage of adopting the Lockean term “simple idea,” is that it
unambiguously refers to the mental content, rather than to the mental act.\textsuperscript{71}

However, Edwards does not confine himself to this term. As the quotations
above indicate, he continues to use the more ambiguous language of a
“sense,” “perception” and “sensation” interchangeably with the terminology
of “idea.” And since the mysterious new “principle of nature” issues chiefly
in new “perceptions” or “sensations” of divine realities, Edwards does not
consider it inappropriate to characterize it as constituting, “as it were,”\textsuperscript{72} a
new “spiritual sense” analogous to the “faculty” of a physical sense.

It should be noted that, in sometimes characterizing the new creature as
a new “spiritual sense,” Edwards risks being misunderstood as saying that
regeneration does involve the creation of new “faculty” within the soul. It

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 205. For Locke’s view of the "simple idea," see his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Dover, 1961), 1: 144-150. For a fuller discussion of Edwards’s and Locke’s understanding of perception, see section 9, below.

\textsuperscript{72}Edwards, Religious Affections, 205.
is for this reason, perhaps, that he sometimes avoids the term "spiritual sense," or uses it metaphorically, with the phrase "as it were." However, as the quotations above indicate, Edwards does not completely reject the term.

Thus the new creation is, or issues, a new "sense," so to speak, or a new perception of divine reality, involving new feelings for, and a new disposition of love and admiration toward, God's "amiable" and "delectable" qualities. Edwards's description of his own conversion is a good illustration of what he is describing:

The first instance that I remember of the sort of inward, sweet delight in God and divine things that I have lived much in since, was on reading those words, 1 Tim. 1. 17. Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honour and glory for ever and ever, Amen. As I read these words, there came into my soul, and was as it were diffused through it, a sense of the glory of the Divine Being; a new sense, quite different from anything I ever experienced before. Never any words of scripture seemed to me as these words did. I thought with myself, how excellent a Being that was, and how happy I should be, if I might enjoy that God, and be rapt up to him in heaven, and be as it were swallowed up in him for ever."

Edwards insisted that "spiritual understanding" consists principally in just this "sense of the heart," which not only apprehends the true qualities of spiritual things, but also appreciates and "relishes" their beauty and excellence, feels delight, and inclines toward them in love.

We come necessarily to this conclusion, concerning that wherein spiritual understanding consists, viz. that it consists in a sense of the heart, of the supreme beauty and sweetness of the holiness or moral perfection of divine things, together with all that discerning and knowledge of the things of religion,

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that depends upon, and flows from such a sense.  

Edwards chose to conceive of "spiritual understanding" according to the analogy of sense perception because, as already noted, he understood sense perception as including both cognitive and volitional-affective elements. The "sense of the heart" refers to "that sort of knowledge, by which a man has a sensible perception of amiableness or loathsomeness, or of sweetness and nauseousness." And just as perception is not only affective, but also instructive and informative, so the "sense of the heart" does not merely respond affectively to what it apprehends of God through scripture, it also conveys new knowledge regarding God's properties and qualities. The "sense of the heart" is a condition of the mind by which one is enabled to perceive realities one could not otherwise apprehend. Here the sense of taste provides the most common illustration:

And yet there is the nature of instruction in it [i.e. the sense of the heart]; as he that has perceived the sweet taste of honey, knows much more about it, than he who has only looked upon it and felt of it.

The concept of spiritual perception also had the advantage of implying the same sort of mental certainty with regard to divine realities as physical perception supposedly implied about physical realities. Edwards had made this point in "A Divine and Supernatural Light":

A true sense of the divine excellency of the things of God's Word doth more directly and immediately convince of the truth of them; and that because the excellency of these things is so superlative. There is a

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74 Edwards, Religious Affections, 272.
75 Ibid., 272.
76 Ibid., 272.
beauty in them that is so divine and godlike, that is
greatly and evidently distinguishing of them from
things merely human, or that men are the inventors
and authors of; a glory so high and great, that when
clearly seen, commands assent to their divinity, and
reality."

Edwards reiterated and elaborated this point in his fifth unambiguous
sign in Religious Affections, that “truly gracious affections are attended with a
reasonable and spiritual conviction of the judgement, of the reality and
certainty of divine things.” This was because the “spiritual
understanding,” or “sense of the heart,” provides the mind with a “right
apprehension or idea” of divine things, on the basis of which is established
a firm “conviction of the judgement” as to their reality. It does so,
“remotely” and “indirectly” by breaking down the heart’s “natural enmity”
toward, and removing the mind’s prejudices against, the “great things of the
gospel,” and “directly” by communicating to the mind a vivid sensation of
the “divine glory and beauty of divine things” which is, in itself, “real
evidence of their divinity, and the most direct and strong evidence.” Just
as one is thought to be convinced of the reality of a physical object by a
lively and impressive sensation made by that object upon the mind, so one
may be convinced of the reality of divine things by the lively and impressive
sensations they also excite upon the regenerate.

Edwards’s heart-language also involves an idea of the pleasure conceived

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"Ibid., 296.
"Ibid., 298.
"Ibid., 307.
by the saint in the apprehension of divine things. As Edwards notes, making reference to a long theological tradition, spiritual knowledge "is often represented by relishing, sensing or tasting." And indeed, as many of the passages already cited indicate, metaphors of sensing and tasting occur frequently throughout Religious Affections. Agreeably to the idea of a "tasting" or "relishing" of divine reality, Edwards emphasizes the prevalence of "delight" or "complacency" in, and "enjoyment" of, divine realities, in the life of the saint: "Love to God causes a man to delight in thoughts of God, and to delight in the presence of God, and to desire conformity to God, and enjoyment of God."

To complete the description of what Edwards's heart-language involves and connotes, a few additional points should be noted. As used by Edwards, the sense of the renewed heart involves the "delight," "complacency" and sense of "relish," which arise from un-self-regarding love. It is in an amative response to the "transcendently excellent and amiable nature of divine things, as they are in themselves, and not in any conceived relation they bear to self, or self-interest," that religious affections properly consist. This is Edwards's second sign of the genuineness of religious affections:

It was before observed, that the affection of love is, as it were, the fountain of all affection; and particularly, that Christian love is the fountain of all gracious affections: now the divine excellency and glory of God, and Jesus Christ, the Word of God, the works of

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<sup>*</sup> Ibid., 272-273.
<sup>†</sup> Ibid., 208.
<sup>‡</sup> Ibid., 240.
God, and the ways of God, etc. is the primary reason, why a true saint loves these things; and not any supposed interest that he has in them, or any conceived benefit that he has received from them, or shall receive from them, or any such imagined relation which they bear to his interest, that self-love can properly be said to be the first foundation of his love to these things.

Finally, the special objects of the sense of the heart, in so far as it is sanctified and renewed, are not the "natural" qualities of God, his omnipotence, omniscience, aseity, and so forth, but his "moral" excellency, or "holiness," his "purity and beauty as a moral agent, comprehending all his moral perfections, his righteousness, faithfulness and goodness." Although the saints love God's "natural" perfections as well, yet it is the love of God's holiness which is "most fundamental and essential" in their love. Holiness is the foundation of all of God's other beauties inasmuch as, without holiness, none of his other excellencies could be considered beautiful: "strength and knowledge don't render any being beautiful, without holiness; but more hateful: though they render them more lovely, when joined with holiness."

It is interesting to note that the oft-quoted description of Edwards's youthful conversion experience, as given in the Personal Narrative, and quoted above, does not fulfill Edwards's own criteria, as articulated in Religious Affections, for a genuine conversion. In that passage, there is no

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"Ibid.

“Ibid., 254.

“Ibid., 256.

“Ibid., 257."
mention of God's holiness as the source of Edwards's rapture, only of God's natural excellencies of eternity, immortality, invisibility and wisdom.

In summary, the concept of the "heart," in its essential aspects, denotes for Edwards several closely related ideas.

1) It represents the volitional-affective dimension of the soul. As identified with "inclination" it represents the basic affective "bent," "bias," "preponderation" or, as I have called it, the fundamental amative orientation, of the personality, either toward God and the divine world, or away from it. The heart, as identified with "will," is also associated with the specific emotional "acts" arising from the fundamental inclination. As the seat of the emotions, the heart is also associated with perception, insofar as perception is conceived by Edwards as always involving affectivity.

2) As the fundamental amative orientation of the personality, the heart is the principle of psychic unity, determining both cognitive-percipient and volitional-affective exercises of the soul. That is to say, the heart determines, or at least affects, the manner in which one 1) perceives reality, and 2) wills, feels, and chooses.

3) As the principle of psychic unity, the heart can refer to the entire soul, not as an aggregation of discreet faculties, but as an integrated totality, comprising the simultaneous and inter-dependent operations of the cognitive and volitional-affective aspects of the personality, unified, even fused, by its fundamental amative orientation. The soul, conceived as the "heart," is "a being that not only beholds, but has inclination, and is pleased
or displeased."89

It is to be noted that although "heart" is, for Edwards, a unifying concept, it does not, according to his own description of it, comprehend the whole of the mind. It includes "inclination," "will" and the percipient aspect of the "understanding." But it does not include the "speculative" and "notional" dimension of the understanding, insofar as these are unaffected by inclination. For Edwards, true piety is essentially a matter of "heart," and not of speculation, strictly and narrowly understood. Presumably, however, the purely theoretic or notional aspect of the soul can be integrated into the percipient and affective aspect, by speculating in a manner agreeable with affective experience.

When Religious Affections is viewed within its polemical context, and Edwards is understood, as he conventionally is, as a moderate and mediating figure between the rationalists and the emotionalists of the Great Awakening, the value of the heart conceived both as a cognitive-percipient and as a volitional-affective entity, is easily appreciated. Its volitional-affective dimension counteracts the excessively speculative character of rationalist religion. Its cognitive-percipient aspect counteracts the indiscriminate emotionalism of the enthusiasts. Having in this section emphasized the affectivity of the heart, as understood in Religious Affections, I shall, in the next section, concentrate more specifically on the relationship between heart and intellect.

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5: The Role of the Intellect in Religious Affections

As essential as is the role played by the “heart” as an affective concept in Edwards's understanding of religious psychology, it is necessary not to overlook the function he attributed to the intellect conceived as distinct from the percipient-voluntative-affective complex. Edwards devotes all of Part Three, Chapter Four of Religious Affections to the purely intellectual aspect of personal piety.

Edwards declared that “holy affections are not heat without light.” He insisted that they originate in “some information of the understanding,” some “spiritual instruction that one receives,” resulting in “light or actual knowledge.” In other words, affections are responses to knowledge: “the child of God is graciously affected, because he sees and understands something more of divine things than he did before.” Knowledge is “the key that first opens the hard heart and enlarges the affections.”

Edwards compares affections derived from understanding with those which are unrelated to knowledge, and which have, in his words, “nothing of the nature of knowledge or instruction in them.” Edwards gives some examples of the kinds of experiences he has in mind.

1) Affections which are excited by “impressions of the imagination,”

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"Ibid., 166.
"Ibid., 266.
"Ibid.
"Ibid., 267.

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external ideas," and "glorious outward appearances," are not genuine.

2) Affections arising from texts of scripture spontaneously suggested to
the mind, "when no instruction received in the understanding of those texts,
or anything taught in those texts, is the ground of the affection," are also
spurious. An example of the kind of situation visualized by Edwards is
offered by the case of someone to whom a scriptural text spontaneously
occurs to mind, but that person concludes from that text something not
actually taught in scripture. In such a case, the affections actually
originate in ignorance, rather than in knowledge.

3) Spurious, too, are affections arising from, or giving rise to, volubility
in prayer, which in itself is no evidence of genuine piety, as argued in Part
Two of Religious Affections.

4) Apt thoughts, occurring spontaneously in response to the scriptures,
and flattering the vanity or conceit of those to whom they occur, are no
evidence of God's special favour.

5) Bodily sensations of a pleasant kind often excite spurious affections.
Such "exhilarations of the animal spirits" and "pleasant external sensations"
may and often do arise spontaneously, and not in response to any

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4Ibid., 267-268.
5Ibid., 268.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., 269.
8Ibid.
9Ibid., 269.

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understanding or instruction derived from the scriptures.\textsuperscript{100}

Edwards further asserts that, even if the affections arise from the understanding, those affections are not evidence of grace, "unless the light which is the ground [of those affections] be spiritual." A spiritual light is one which conveys "loveliness of divine things."\textsuperscript{101} More specifically, it is the knowledge of the "beauty of the moral perfection" of divine things.\textsuperscript{102}

Thus the knowledge, or instruction, which excites properly religious affections, is knowledge of the moral perfection of divine things. God's moral perfection is distinguished from his "natural" perfections of omniscience, omnipotence, aseity and so on. It is properly his moral, rather than his natural perfection, that excites genuinely religious affections. Instruction of God's moral qualities will, in a regenerate heart, excite volitional responses, or "sensations of the mind,"\textsuperscript{103} consisting in delight and love. Insofar as these affections originate in the apprehension of God's moral qualities, they are genuinely religious.

Although, throughout Religions Affections, Edwards describes "religious understanding" as properly consisting in a volitional-affective apprehension, or a "sense," of divine reality, it is to be noticed that this percipient-volitional-affective experience is a response to "knowledge" or "instruction" about God's moral qualities as articulated in Scripture. Although what Edwards is describing is not the same as Miller's "faculty

\textsuperscript{100}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., 271.

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{103}Ibid.
psychology," yet Edwards does recognize a distinction between the intellectual dimension ("knowledge," "instruction") and the volitional-affective dimension ("sense") in religious experience. Not only does he recognize the distinction, but he regards both the intellectual and volitional-percipient dimensions as playing not only a positive, but also a necessary role in religious experience. Finally, not only does Edwards admit a positive and necessary role for both the intellectual and the volitional-percipient aspects of the soul, but he also regards the purely intellectual as conceptually prior to the percipient-volitional. Conceptually, God's moral perfections must first be presented to the intellect, before there can be a volitional-affective response to them. This is so even if, experientially, the volitional-affective response is simultaneous with the intellectual apprehension.

To recognize a distinction between the roles of the intellect and the volitional-percipient complex is not, of course, to mistake a "mere notional understanding" for that "sense of the heart," in which the mind "don't only speculate and behold, but relishes and feels."\textsuperscript{104} It is, however, to recognize that "all true experimental knowledge of religion"\textsuperscript{105} is still knowledge, not feeling without conceptual content.

Thus, in Chapter Four of Part Three of Religious Affections, Edwards establishes a point of contact with his Aristotelian-Thomistic detractors. Like them, he recognizes not only that true religion includes a purely conceptual dimension, but even that this conceptual dimension is logically

\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., 272.

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., 275.
(if not experientially) prior to the volitional-affective response. His concern, as his examples of false affections indicate, is to maintain the centrality of Scripture and orthodox theology, particularly as regarding God's moral excellence, as the basis of religious affections. The concept of God's moral excellence presupposed an elaborate doctrine of a particular scheme of redemption, which the mind had first to grasp, before the heart could perceive it, and "relish" it, as "amiable" and "delightful."

6: Summary of Heart-Language and its connotations in Religious Affections

To summarize the distinctive points in Edwards's religious psychology, as delineated here, is also to adumbrate what is connoted when Edwards uses heart-language.

1) Human interiority tends to be analyzed into two broad capacities, or "faculties": a) the "understanding," which includes the speculative and percipient acts of the intellect; and b) the "inclination," which includes the will and the affections.

2) Perception is considered affective in nature. It represents that aspect of the understanding, or intellect, which is volitional-affective.

3) Affectivity is identified with will. The connecting point between the two is provided by the concept of love, which is considered a form of volition. The affections, understood as aspects of the will, rather than merely of physical sensation, take on some of the value and importance traditionally ascribed to the will.

4) The heart refers to the mind as inclinational. The concept of heart
includes a) inclination as the fundamental amative orientation of the person, b) volition, or will, c) the affections as individual acts of the will, and d) sensation or percipience, which Edwards understands as affective in nature.

5) The heart is a unifying principle, by which the “understanding” and the “inclination” are integrated and sometimes fused, so that they cannot clearly be distinguished. Heart can refer to the soul as a totality, an integrated whole, although Edwards sometimes uses it interchangeably with “inclination” or “will.”

6) Among the elect, the heart is endowed with a special percipience, by which it apprehends divine reality, or more specifically, the qualities which characterize God, and perceives these qualities as “beautiful” and “amiable.” This spiritual perception also impresses the saint with a sense of the certainty and reality of divine things.

7) God’s beautiful and amiable qualities elicit “delight,” “complacency” and a sense of “relish,” which cause the saint to love God for his own sake.

8) God’s principal beauty is his holiness and it is this which principally excites religious affections. The beauty of God’s holiness is the source of all his other beauties.

9) This cognitive-volitional-affective apprehension of divine reality is identified with "spiritual knowledge."

10) True piety principally consists in, and genuine religious affections arise from, this “spiritual knowledge,” or sense of the heart, which perceives and relishes the excellency of divine things.
In describing human religious psychology in this way, Edwards has been generally regarded as departing from mainstream puritan traditions. Perry Miller argued that the Aristotelian-Thomistic analysis, which tended to distinguish and separate, rather than unify human faculties, monopolized puritan psychological theory, declaring that "no other concept was available."\(^1\) More recently John Morgan, although in other respects critical of Miller, has followed him in regarding puritan psychology as a "primarily Aristotelian scheme."\(^2\) Hence, there naturally arose a question as to the origins of the model of religious psychology adopted by Edwards in *Religious Affections* and related works.

It needs to be observed that Miller's description of Puritan psychological theory is illustrated from a panoply of primarily academic psychologists working within the Aristotelian-Thomistic schema.\(^3\) But the heart-language characterizing Edwards's *Religious Affections*, and involving a very different understanding of human interiority, belonged to an equally old, if not an older tradition. It was derived principally from Scripture, Greek physiology and Augustine. Although often lacking the precise philosophical articulation of scholasticism, it was not only available to puritan divines but also, as will be seen, was much used by them. This approach was generally used, often in parallel with the scholastic view, not so much in philosophic psychology as in pietistic works emphasizing the intimate, affective relationship between God and the human person.


\(^{107}\) Morgan, *Godly Learning*, 46.

\(^{515}\) Listed in *New England Mind*, 515.
7: Traditional Heart-Language before Puritanism

That the affections were an aspect of the will; that the will could be characterized principally in terms of an inclination of love; that human interiority could be adequately described according to merely two "faculties," the cognitive and the volitional; that there was an aspect of the personality, sometimes referred to as the "heart," which possessed a sort of percipience analogous to sense perception, and in which the cognitive and volitional were so closely conjoined, inter-related and inter-dependent, that their operations could not be clearly distinguished, were views which had roots both in middle-eastern and biblical culture, as well as Greco-Roman antiquity. From both these sources they passed into Christian theology.

a: Biblical, Greek and Patristic Sources, especially Augustine

According to H.-J. Fabry, in ancient Egypt the heart was considered the "focus of the individual—body, spirit, soul, will— the centre of the whole personality and its relationship to God." Likewise, in the Old Testament, the heart "functions in all dimensions of human existence, and is used as a term for all the aspects of a person, vital, affective, noetic and

The heart is the "seat of the affections" as well as the power of intellectual vision. Cognition in the heart is related to sense perception: "It is prior to seeing with the eyes and hearing with the ears, because it initiates the operations of the senses." Furthermore, "the line between the rational function of the heart and the activity of the will is blurred." It is the "driving force" behind the voluntative endeavours of the individual. It is the seat of conscience, as well as the source of vice and virtue. Claude Tresmontant points out that, in Old Testament thought, the heart does not refer to the sensibility as opposed to reason, but rather includes reason. It is the seat of human liberty, "the centre in which are taken fundamental decisions." Vernon Bourke summarized the biblical view of the heart as seeming "to cover all the higher functions of the human soul." Such uses pass over into the New Testament, and are found extensively in the letters of Paul.

Another influential source for heart-traditions is found in Greek

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11: Ibid., 414; 419.
11: Ibid., 419.
11: Ibid., 423.
11: Ibid., 423.
11: Ibid., 425; 426; 429.
11: Bourke, Will in Western Thought, 130.
physiological literature, especially in the Aristotelian *Parva Naturalia* and *De Partibus Animalium*. Here a view of human interiority characterized by the power and functions of the heart, is systematically articulated.

For Aristotle, the heart is the principal organ of the soul, through which the soul carries out its vital functions. It is the seat of sense perception, affectivity and motion. Aristotle identifies perception with the emotions, whether they be appetitive or aversive: "the faculty of appetition is not different from that of avoidance, nor are either of these different from the faculty of sense perception." The affectivity identified with perception determines motion, or action insofar as this is understood as emotional response. To the extent that ethical categories are applicable to emotional responses, the heart may be said to be the seat of "natural moral excellence," although it is not, in Aristotle's view, the source of the peculiarly human virtue understood as rational choice. The elemental constitution of the heart, and the resultant emotions which predominate in the personality, affect how a person perceives reality.

Biblical and Greek traditions of heart-language were inherited by patristic writers, who adapted both the poetic language of Scripture, as well

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122 Ibid., 229-230.
as the physiological-psychological concepts of the Greeks. By retaining the idea that the heart was the seat of sense perception, and by identifying the emotions associated with sensation with the concept of volition, or will, they established a concept which united the intellectual, volitional and emotional dimensions of the soul. The term heart (kardia) was frequently used to indicate the volitional-affective complex, as well as the whole soul as a cognitive-volitional entity. This conception of the heart finds particular expression in Augustine, by far the most influential patristic exponent of heart-language in the Western Church.

Edgardo de la Peza has argued that Augustine's conception of the heart is as broad as the biblical, involving the total interiority of the person: "The heart, in the vocabulary of St. Augustine, generally refers to the interior man as active, to the dynamism specific to the rational soul (mens) as in exercise and focused upon truly human acts." Mens here does not refer to the reason simply, but includes volitional and affective elements as well, and is often used interchangeably with voluntas.

Teselle notes that, in Augustine, volition is identified with the fundamental affective orientation of each person, realized either as caritas or as cupiditas. Indeed, in De Trinitate, Augustine, anticipating Edwards's

\[\text{References:}\]


Ibid., 79.

own view quoted above, notes that love (amor), desire (cupiditas) and lust (libido), are merely names for the more "violent" (violenta) forms of will. They are so violent, in fact, that they can "exert a powerful influence on the body." Elsewhere in the same work, Augustine describes love (amor) and charity (dilectio), as stronger forms of the will (valentior voluntas) .

In the Civitas Dei Augustine declares that the emotions are "all essentially acts of will."

For what is desire or joy but an act of will in agreement with what we wish for? And what is fear or grief but an act of will in disagreement with what we reject? We use the term desire when this agreement takes the form of the pursuit of what we wish for, while joy describes our satisfaction in the attainment. In the same way, when we disagree with something we do not wish to happen, such an act of will is fear; but when we disagree with something which happens against our will, that act of will is grief.

Thus, for Augustine, as for Edwards, the will includes both the appetitive and aversive emotions. This is so because the will is primarily identified with the particular love which fundamentally characterizes the soul. This love originates all other emotions, as they are elicited by circumstances either promoting or opposing the fundamental orientation of love.

The goodness or badness of the will depends on the orientation of the individual's fundamental love (amor). A rightly directed will is love in a

\[\text{Augustine, De Trinitate, 11.2.5. trans. Stephen McKenna (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1962), 321.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., 15.21.41. Trans., McKenna, 507.}\]

\[\text{Augustine, Concerning the City of God: Against the Pagans, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 1972), 555-556.}\]

\[\text{Augustine, City of God, 14.7; Bettenson, trans., 556.}\]
good sense and a perverted will is love in a bad sense." Anthony Levi notes that, in *De Civitate Dei*, Book 4, Augustine determines morality not by rationality, "but by the quality of the love which is in the will, and the affections take on the moral quality of the love from which they derive." Finally, it is important to note that Augustine regards the enjoyment (*fruitio*) of and delight (*delectatio*) in God as "will-acts." "Delight" in the "excellency of God" has been considered an important and significant theme in *Religious Affections* by Miller and Smith. As will be discussed in greater detail later, it is a concept equally conspicuous in Edwards's puritan predecessors. This is not surprising when one considers the seventeenth-century enthusiasm for Augustine's works.

b: Monastic and Other Medieval Traditions

The language of the heart, with its tendency to identify volition with affectivity, and to ascribe a percipient, cognitive dimension to the will, as well as a volitional aspect to the understanding, was not extinguished in the middle ages. It survived particularly in the more pietistic literature emanating from the monastic tradition.

Heart-language is conspicuous, for instance, in Bernard of Clairveaux. Bernard's use of heart-language is particularly notable here, since he was

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131 Ibid., 557.
one of the three medieval authors most popular among the puritans. In the following passage, Bernard not only associates the will with the emotions, but also associates a form of perception, analogous to sense-perception, with the volitional-affective complex:

O holy and chaste love! Oh sweet and lovely emotion! O pure and undiluted intention of the will, certainly so much the more undefiled and pure, as nothing of its own remains admixed in it; the more lovely and sweet, as all that is sensed, is divine. Bernard often refers to a spiritual "taste," enjoyed by those who truly love God: "Thus it happens that the taste of God's sweetness attracts us more to the pure love of God, than our necessity presses us." And similarly:

"From the occasion of frequent necessities, God must be addressed by man with frequent importunities, and being addressed he must be tasted, and being tasted the sweetness of the Lord will be experienced." Elsewhere, Bernard attributes "eyes" and "ears" to the heart. In his sermons on the Song of Songs, he describes the "contemplation of the heart," in which cognition, volition, emotion and a sort of spiritual sensation are fused in

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135 Bernard of Clairveaux, De Diligendo Deo, Chapter 10.

136 Ibid., cap. 9.

137 Ibid.

138 Bernard of Clairveaux, De Conversione, 1.2; 3.4.
According to Jacques Hourlier, both Bernard and his associate, William of St. Thierry, developed a theory of mystical contemplation in which the cognitive and volitional-affective were fused and unified. The idea was summarized by the phrase amor ipse intellectus, "love itself is understanding." The phrase is derived from a similar one, coined by Gregory the Great, amor notitia est: "love is knowledge."  

Although the term "heart" rarely appears in scholastic writers, certain positions associated with heart-language, such as the tendency to blur the boundaries between intellect and volition, and to identify the will with the affections, occur among the schoolmen, not only those who reacted against the intellectualism of Albert and Thomas, but also some who pre-dated them.

Among the latter, Hugo of St. Victor (d. 1141) believed that "intellectual lucidity flows from love, blindness from sin." 141 Bonaventure (1217-1274), influenced by Hugo, regarded theology as more affective and practical than speculative. He termed it a scientia affectiva. 142 According to Principe, Bonaventure considered reason as, by itself, incapable of higher truths: the desire for wisdom could only be fulfilled through "affective, experiential

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139 See Walter Principe, Introduction to Patristic and Medieval Theology (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987), 214.


141 Quoted in Heinz Heimsoeth, Six Great Themes of Western Metaphysics and the End of the Middle Ages, Ramon J. Betanzas, trans. (Detroit: Wayne State, 1994), 235.

142 Ibid., 237.
knowledge. According to Bourke, Bonaventure did not radically distinguish intellection from volition. In addition, he located syndesesis, the habit by which we conceive universal moral principles, in the will. Syndesesis is the "fine point" of the will, which "directs the will spontaneously toward what it is to desire." Bonaventure tends to understand syndesesis as the fundamental affective inclination. He borrows the Augustinian term pondus ("weight," "gravitation"), to characterize syndesesis: it is the "natural weight" (naturale pondus), of the emotions (affectus), and of the will (pondus voluntatis). "I say, therefore, that syndesesis means that which goads toward the good, and therefore it is to be understood as of the nature of the emotions." Bonaventure thus characterizes the will, to use the Augustinian phraseology which he is developing, as a pondus amoris, an affective gravitation, within the soul. The will includes the emotional dimension, and its fundamental inclination is expressed by the syndesesis.

In view of his influence upon much Reformation theology, brief note should be made of Duns Scotus (1266-1308). In asserting that God was attainable chiefly through operatio, rather than cognitio, and in accordingly

143 Principe, Introduction, 255.

144 Bourke, Will in Western Thought, 134.


147 Ibid., 945.
defining theology as primarily a *disciplina practica*, rather than *speculativa*,
Scotus is in a line with Keckerman, Ames, Perkins and ultimately Edwards.\(^{148}\) He also rejected the Thomistic notion of the will as a “rational appetite.” It is rather a “bias” or an inclination (*inclinatio*), understood as a fundamental affectivity (*affectio*) or love (*amor*). This fundamental affectivity expresses itself either as an *affectio commodi*, by which one loves for the advantages one hopes to derive from the loved object, or as an *affectio justitiae*, by which one loves because of some excellence, or absolute value, inherent in the loved object, which makes it lovable for its own sake\(^{149}\) God is, of course, the proper object of the second form of will, affection, or love. It is curious that Duns Scotus called un-self-regarding love, *affectio justitiae*, and that Edwards considers the special object of such selfless love to be God’s moral excellence.

At the end of the medieval period, Jean Gerson (1363-1429), in his *On Mystical Theology*, compared scholastic and “spiritual” traditions with regard to divine knowledge, and asserted the superiority of the latter. For Gerson, the spiritual tradition derived knowledge of God from the “evidence of divine presence in the recorded history and tradition of the heart.”\(^{150}\) He argued that the mystical tradition placed more trust in the “affections” than the reason, and sought God more as the highest “good” than the highest


"truth." Gerson's ideal of religious knowledge he called *sapida sapientia*, a "savory" knowledge, a knowledge that can be tasted and relished, felt and applied. Importantly, Gerson's ideal of "mystical theology" had a democratic dimension, for "even young girls and simple people (idiotaes)" could become experts in this form of religious knowledge, "where love and personal experience, not formal university training were essential requirements." 

C: Renaissance and Reformation Currents, and especially neo-Augustinianism

Whereas, during the middle ages, heart-language had survived principally in the monastic tradition, and to a lesser extent among the scholastic voluntarists, it regained immense prominence during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The revival of heart-language was largely due to the generalized Augustinianism which, according to William Bouwsma, was one of the defining aspects of renaissance humanism. 

The aspect of early-modern Augustinianism most relevant to the present discussion is, of course, the psychological. Augustinianism, in contrast to...

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Ibid.

Ibid., 76.

Ibid., 74.

the general tendency of Thomism, saw the human person not as a system of objectively distinguishable faculties reflecting ontological distinctions in the cosmos, but as a "mysterious organic unity." The will was understood to take its direction not from reason, but from the affections. These are not merely the disorderly impulses of the treacherous body, but "expressions of the energy and quality of the heart, that mysterious organ which is the centre of the personality, the source of its unity and ultimate worth." Anthony Levi notes that the moralists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, following Augustine, "did not accept the ethical criterion of rationality, but referred to the Augustinian distinction, expressed in the Civitas Dei, between two possible loves in the soul, a virtuous love, and a vicious one."

Melanchthon clearly adopts neo-Augustinian psychology and heart-language in several passages. First he identifies the affections with the will: "The faculty from which the affections (affectus) rise is that by which we either turn away from or pursue things known, and this faculty is sometimes called will (voluntas), sometimes affections, and sometimes appetite." Not only does Melanchthon reject the Thomistic interpretation of the will as a "rational appetite," he even identifies the Thomistic view with

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"" Ibid., 36.
"" Ibid., 38.
"" Levi, French Moralists, 2.

hypocrisy: "When a man who hates decides to lay aside his hatred, unless he has really been overcome by a more vehement affection, it is plainly a fictitious thought of the intellect and not a work of the will." Melanchthon associates the late medieval system of penance with this form of inauthenticity. Clearly the value of moral decision lies, for him, in the actual inclination of the volitional-affective complex.

Third, Melanchthon does not recognize a "separation" between the feelings and the intellect. On the contrary, he claims that "reason," properly speaking, is to be understood as "intellect joined with the will."

In addition, Melanchthon regards the "heart and its affections" as the "highest and most powerful part of man." The intellect is clearly subordinate to the will: "Just as the senate is subject to the despot, so is knowledge to the will, with the consequence that although knowledge gives good warning, yet the will casts knowledge out, and is borne along by its own affection."

Finally, Melanchthon avoids a minute classification of the human personality into separate, painstakingly distinguished faculties. As Edwards does in the opening pages of Religious Affections, Melanchthon broadly distinguishes only two main dimensions of human interiority, "the cognitive faculty and a faculty subject to the affections, subject, that is, to love, hate, and other affects."
hope, fear and the like.\textsuperscript{164}

In 1538, Juan Luis Vives published his \textit{De Anima et Vita}, one of the most influential treatments of human psychology produced during the Renaissance. Vives had studied Augustine deeply and, at the suggestion of Erasmus, had produced an edition of the \textit{Civitas Dei}. His discussion of human nature reflects Augustine's perspective in a number of ways which are by now familiar. He regards the "heart" as the centre of personal identity, so that people, when speaking of themselves, tend to move their hand to their breast.\textsuperscript{165} It is the heart which originates both the affective and rational activities of the soul. The physiological mechanism is explained this way:

When the spirits, which are the inward instruments of all cognition, are cold, being evaporations of cold blood around the heart, the activities of the mind are sluggish and languid; for this reason human beings become dull and torpid. Again, when the spirits are hot, mental activities are quick and active. Hence it happens that the disposition and affection of the heart do not a little contribute to thought and understanding, and for this reason, too, "heart" is often taken to mean "mind," as in Scripture. Nor will the mind understand, or grow angry, or fear, or feel grief, or shame, before these spirits rising up from the heart reach the brain.\textsuperscript{166}

Like Melanchthon, Vives understands the will as illumined by reason, but not controlled by reason. Thus the will is the "controlling ruler" \textit{(dominatrix et rectrix)} of the entire soul. However, the will itself is

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\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{165} Juan Luis Vives, \textit{De Anima et Vita} (Basileae: 1538), 49.
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\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 78.
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controlled by love, drawing it to its own good: "Love is the swiftest of all the motions of the will."\textsuperscript{167} And, as love is the source of the entire emotional life, so the entire emotional life is included in the will.\textsuperscript{168}

Calvin, too, reflects these neo-Augustinian currents and uses heart-language throughout his works. Sin, for him, is not identified with "lust," or the "disorderly motions of the appetites," in Thomistic fashion. It seizes upon "the very seat of reason and the whole heart."\textsuperscript{169} Like Melanchthon, Calvin reduces human interiority to two main categories, intellect and will.\textsuperscript{170} Sometimes Calvin identifies the "heart" with the will as opposed to the intellect. For instance, he describes the assent of faith as being "more of the heart than of the brain, and more of the disposition than of the understanding."\textsuperscript{171} Sometimes he regards the heart as principally the seat of love, or inclination. One of the chief works of the Holy Spirit is to "enflame our hearts with the love of God and zealous devotion."\textsuperscript{172}

However, as one of the greatest biblical commentators of the period, Calvin was well aware that "heart" also has a cognitive dimension: "Under the word heart, the Hebrews sometimes include the understanding."\textsuperscript{173} Or in

\begin{itemize}
\item Ibid., 168.
\item Ibid.
\item Calvin, \textit{Commentary on Genesis}, 3:6.
\item Ibid., 1.15.7.
\item Ibid., 3.1.3. Battles, 540.
\end{itemize}

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his comments on Acts 16:14: "By the word heart, the Scripture meaneth sometimes the mind, as when Moses saith, 'God hath not given thee hitherto a heart to understand." It is in the "heart" that knowledge "takes root." Calvin knew that "heart" could also indicate an integral intellectual-volitional-affective complex, as in his comments on the phrase, "Lydia's heart was opened": "In this place, Luke doth not only signify unto us that Lydia was brought by the inspiration of the Spirit, with affections of heart to embrace the gospel, but also that her mind was enlightened, that she might understand it." Finally, Calvin noted that "the word heart no doubt means the whole soul." Thus Calvin recognized all the major connotations of the biblical heart language as indicating and referring to the will and affections as opposed to the reason; the intellect as opposed to volition; an intellectual-volitional-affective complex in which reason, will and emotions were all simultaneously operative; and a psychic totality, the entire soul. So important was the concept of the "heart" for Calvin, that he chose as his emblem a flaming heart on an out-stretched hand, bearing the motto cor meum quasi immolatum tibi offero, domine.

Calvin not only had a developed concept of the "heart" but also of the spiritual sense. As is well known, he attributed to the human soul a natural

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175 Calvin, Institutes, 1.5.9. Battles, 1: 61-62.
176 Ibid.
178 See Battles, footnote 6, page 540 in volume One of Calvin, Institutes.
"sense" of the divine: "We assume it beyond controversy, that there exists in
the human mind, by a sort of natural endowment, a sense of the divine."

This natural sense of the divine is, however, not salvific in character. The
saving sense is given only to the regenerate. In his biblical commentaries
Calvin makes reference to such a sense: "Such is the blockishness, such is
the blindness of men, that in seeing they see not, in hearing they hear not,
until such time as God doth give them new eyes and new ears." Charles
Partee has emphasized the importance of the concept of religious
experience in Calvin, and has adduced several significant examples of his
use of the verbs experiri and sentire in his works. Terrence Erdt has
emphasized the importance of the concept of sensus suavitatis, "sense of
sweetness" in Calvin's theology.

Before departing from sixteenth and seventeenth-century
Augustinianism, it would be well to observe two more points made by
Bouwsma. First, neo-Augustinians tended not only to value the affections
highly, but also viewed the impulses of the body tolerantly. Secondly,
neo-Augustinianism, like the "mystical theology" of Jean Gerson described
earlier, tended to take a democratic view of personal spirituality, and was

172 Calvin, Institutes, 1.3.1.
179 Calvin, Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, Henry Beveridge, trans. (Edinburgh:
Calvin Translation Society: 1844), 2:103.
169-181.
182 Bouwsma, "Two Faces of Renaissance Humanism," 40.
generally sympathetic to populist religious movements.\textsuperscript{184} These aspects of neo-Augustinianism are of particular significance to students of the Great Awakening. Persons influenced by such neo-Augustinian attitudes might be expected to have a peculiar sympathy to both for the physical and for the populist dimension of the Awakening.

Finally, neo-Augustinianism contributed to the importance assigned so generally by Renaissance intellectuals to the art of rhetoric as a technique of public persuasion valued for its ability to move and "mould" the will by appealing to the emotions and thereby form opinion and convince judgement.\textsuperscript{185} The primarily emotional understanding of rhetoric promoted during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries should be kept in mind when evaluating the historical lineage of the "sensational" sermons for which Edwards and many of his colleagues were noted. As Edwards wrote, in a note to himself in preparation for a possible treatise, "Why is it proper for orators and preachers to move the passions—needful to show earnestness, etc. How this tends to convince the judgement and many other ways is good and absolutely necessary."\textsuperscript{186}

Before tracing the manifestations of heart-language among the puritans, it would be useful to mention very briefly two writers, one Roman Catholic and the other Protestant, who extended scholastic traditions into the

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 48.


seventeenth century, and who exercised an influence on English and American puritans.

Francesco Suarez exercised considerable influence upon seventeenth-century philosophy in general, as has been investigated by J.H. Mora. The central role played by Suarez on New England intellectual life has been noted by Norman Fiering, while his immense impact on Jonathan Edwards has been traced by W. S. Morris. Suarez had been an intellectualist in his youth, but was later convinced by voluntarism. In his writings on the will he was an "eclectic." He attributed to the will a number of important cognitive and intellectual abilities. He included, as aspects of volition, all eleven traditional acts of the lower appetitive faculties (love, joy, desire, revulsion, delight, sorrow, hope, despair, fear and anger), but, like Edwards, "in a higher, spiritual way." Also, like Edwards, Suarez emphasized the importance of the will's fundamental "inclination" in the religious and moral life.

Bartholomaeus Keckermann (1571-1609), already mentioned in connection with Ames (Chapter 2, Section 11, above), taught theology at

188 Fiering, Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard, 120.
189 Morris, Young Jonathan Edwards, passim.
190 Levi, French Moralists, 22.
191 Davitt, Nature of Law, 87-88.
Heidelberg until 1601 and philosophy at Danzig until his death. Like Ames and Edwards, he followed the Scotist line in classifying theology as a disciplina practica, the purpose of which is to mould the will and the affections to moral ends. He calls theology not a science, but a form of prudentia, "by which we learn to govern our life and behaviour prudently" toward a certain end. It is a religiosa prudentia, aiming at the "eternal sanctification of the will and the affections, which is a great part of the image of God." Theology differs from ethics because, while ethics is that "prudence which pertains chiefly to external discipline," theological prudence has to do with "an eminently internal discipline, and includes a more profound sort of virtue, a supernatural illumination of the intellect and sanctification of the will and affections."

Keckermann's discussion of the heart (cor), like that of Vives, combines physiology and psychology, and unites Aristotelian analysis to Scriptural spirituality. He locates perception, volition, affectivity and the first principles of action in the heart. The heart is the "principal seat of

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13See Muller, Post-Reformed Reformation Dogmatics, 43.

14Bartholomaeus Keckerman, Operum Omnim Quae Extant (Geneva, apud Aubertum, 1614), 1:27: Finis ex Philosophia Practica is quaeiritur, ut voluntas et affectus hominis recte informatur ad bonum persequendum, et malum seu vitium fugiendum.

15Ibid., 1:17-18.

16Ibid., 1: 475-476.

17Ibid.: Nam ethica illa prudentia praecipue ad disciplinam externam pertinet, ut sciamus, quae leges quibus legibus sint praeferendae, item quo tempore, quo loco, quibus personis, quaelibet actio virtutis moralis sit exercenda; religiosa autem prudentia internam praecipue disciplinam spectat, et includit altius aliquod principium, supernaturalem scilicet illuminationem intellectus et voluntatis atque affectuum sanctificationem, id est ipsam imaginem Dei, cuius recuperatio est salus, et finis theologiae nostrae.
sensation" by which "the powers and operations of a sentient soul are procured."\textsuperscript{198} The heart, as determining the "animal spirits," establishes the fundamental "disposition" of the being, which the "brain" is powerless to alter. The heart determines both perception and rationality, conditioning not only imagination and memory, but also apprehension and judgement.\textsuperscript{199}

From the heart's conditioning of the intellect comes the phrase \textit{vir cordatus}, meaning an ingenious and judicious person.\textsuperscript{200} Its constitution, whether predominantly "moist," "dry," "hot" "cold" or some combination of these, determines personality. Finally, the heart is the seat of the moral principles of the will and the affections. Hence, in Scripture, "in an infinite number of passages," the heart may be termed "evil," but not the brain.\textsuperscript{201}

Thus, for Keckerman, the heart, as the seat of sensation, will, and affections, conditions not only personal disposition, but also how one perceives and judges. As involving both the intellectual and inclinational aspects of the personality, the heart is a unitive concept, integrating virtually the whole of human interiority.

\textsuperscript{198}Ibid., 1:1515. \textit{Cor est to proton aistheteron, primum sensorium sive primum principium et primum instrumentum, per quod animae sentientis virtutes et operationes expediuntur.}

\textsuperscript{199}Ibid., 1:1515-1516: \textit{Cor quidem principatum habet primo in praeratione spirituum animalium, siquidem omnino in corde fit principium eius dispositionis, qua ex vitali spiritu animalis generatur, nec fieri ulla ratione potest, ut cerebrum corrigat animalem male dispositum et quasi decoctum in corde... Vis ingenii tam sensitivi quam rationalis primo dependet a corde, ita quidem, ut si cor sit humidum et frigidum, etiam statim defectus sit in ipso ingenio tam sensitivo, id est in imaginatione et memoria, quam in rationali, id est, in vi apprehendendi et iudicandi, sive intellectu hominis... Et in ipsis vivis varietas judiciorum et ingeniorum a cordis dispositione pendent.}

\textsuperscript{200}Ibid., 1516.

\textsuperscript{201}Ibid.
When, in the opening pages of *Religious Affections*, Edwards offers his introductory analysis of religious interiority, he notes that, in speaking of the inclination, will, affections and heart, there are difficulties of expression due to the inexactitude of traditional language: "It must be confessed, that language is here somewhat imperfect, and the meaning of words in a considerable measure loose and unfixed, and not precisely limited by custom, which governs the use of language." Whether he was speaking specifically of puritan conventions, or had in view the broader perspective surveyed in the previous section, is not clear. However, it may be argued that one of the most notable achievements of *Religious Affections* is that it organized, perhaps for the first time since Augustine, William of St. Thierry and William Ames, and in a manner more exhaustive than any of them, a systematization of traditional heart-language into a fairly coherent, clearly defined analysis of religious interiority.

However unsystematically used before Edwards, heart language had been, as noted in the previous section, and as recognized by Edwards himself, a fairly constant feature of Christian literature since antiquity, and was particularly conspicuous in the Augustinian, monastic and neo-Augustinian traditions. Edwards's pietistic puritan predecessors, as the heirs of these traditions, make considerable use of heart-language with all

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*Religious Affections*, 97.

Ibid., 96-97: "The mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty [i.e., the will], perhaps in all nations and ages is called the heart."
the same conceptual implications as exploited by Edwards.

Perry Miller recognized, of course, that the word "heart" occurs frequently in puritan literature. However, he believed that it was merely a synonym for the faculty of will, conceived as distinct from the intellect. This was an odd identification for Miller to make, since he tended to view the puritan "will" as a Thomistic "rational appetite," or rational choice, while the term "heart" clearly has affective and emotional connotations. In any case, there are examples in puritan literature, in which "will," meaning rational choice, is clearly distinguished from "heart." John Flavel comments that the will "can move, or not move, the body, as it pleases; but it cannot move towards Christ, in the way of faith, as it pleaseth; it can open or shut the hand or eye at its pleasure, but not the heart."

Miller had also believed that, whereas Edwards viewed the human personality as an integrated whole, and identified the "heart" as the principle of psychic unity, his puritan predecessors understood the personality as an aggregation of discreet "faculties," hierarchically arranged with the reason commanding, the will following as a "rational appetite," and the affections confined to the physical-sensational dimension. As noted in Chapter One, many scholars have agreed, and continue to agree with Miller's assessment. Even Conrad Cherry, who did not see puritan psychology as constituting so purely an Aristotelian-Thomistic scheme as Miller described, argued that pre-Edwardsean puritanism, frustrated by the limitations of "faculty" psychology, was unable adequately to express the

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It should be noted, however, that the controversial situation of the puritans provided a strong motivation for developing a model of psychological wholeness and integration. In opposition to Arminianism and antinomianism they had frequent occasion to assert that regeneration is not merely a matter either of profession and obedience on the one hand, nor of affectivity, without intellectual formation, on the other. John Owen insists that the regeneration of the believer consists principally "in the uprightness, rectitude and ability of his whole soul, his mind, will, and affections, in, unto, and for the obedience that God required of him." Similarly, Stephen Charnock (1628-1680) described regeneration as a "universal change of the whole man," which "extends to every part: understanding, will, conscience, affection: all were corrupted by sin, all are renewed by grace.

Catalogues of psychic elements do not, of course, constitute a theory of an integrated and unified interiority. However, the puritans inherited from the kind of Augustinian and voluntaristic traditions described in the preceding section, a way of conceptualizing the integrating principle in terms of will, inclination and "heart." William Ames is explicit on this point. He declared, in reference to regeneration, that "the will is the proper and prime subject of this grace; the conversion of the will is the effectual

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"unity of the subject."

See Chapter One, 13-14.

John Owen, Works, 3:222.

principle in the conversion of the whole man."\textsuperscript{208} Owen agreed that the "real change" and "internal renewal" of the "will" was the essential and defining characteristic of regeneration as affecting both the understanding and the affections.\textsuperscript{209} In such passages, "will" does not refer to a "rational appetite," or to individual acts of choice or preference. It corresponds to the emotional dimension of the personality as a whole. Karl Reuter commented, in connection with Ames,

> Apart from the will, the emotions have no real home, according to him, but live rather within it, be they good or bad, and give the will corresponding activity. Ames feels the kinship between feeling and will to be so close at their deepest point that they are at times for him interchangeable terms.\textsuperscript{210}

Again, the will, as the integrating principle of human interiority, is not understood as a particular emotion or volitional act, but as the basic affective inclination of the soul, the general disposition of the emotions, the fundamental amative orientation of the soul. Norman Fiering describes it as "the deep, habitual inclination of the personality."\textsuperscript{211} In thus identifying the volitional-affective aspect of the personality as the principle of psychic wholeness and totality, Ames essentially reduces the human personality to volition. In so doing, he is well within the tradition of Augustine, who

\textsuperscript{208}Owen, \textit{Works}, 3:328.


\textsuperscript{211}Norman Fiering, "Benjamin Franklin and the Way to Virtue," \textit{American Quarterly} 30 (1978), 204-205.
described human persons as "nothing other than wills." It will be seen
during the course of this section that Ames was by no means the only pre-
Edwardsean puritan who understood the will as essentially affective, or who
identified it as the principle of psychic unity.

The will, understood broadly as the basic amative orientation of the
individual, and as integrating the total personality, is usually referred to as
the "heart." As the integrating principle of the personality, "heart" often
refers to the whole human soul. "The heart is put for the whole soul,"
commented Richard Sibbes tersely. Elsewhere he was more expansive:

The word heart, you know, includes the whole soul,
for the understanding is in the heart, there is its
memory, and to cleave in heart is to cleave in will. To
"rejoice in heart," that is in the affection. So that all
the powers of the soul, the inward man, as Paul
calleth it, is the heart.

Oliver Heywood (1630-1702) asserted that "by heart, I understand the
rational soul with all its faculties of understanding, memory, will and
affections." By "rational soul" he does not mean the rational faculty, but
the peculiarly human soul. Likewise John Owen commented that "the heart
in Scripture is taken for the whole rational soul." Thomas Goodwin noted
that "the natural faculties of the mind, and will, and affections, are in
scripture termed the heart, or are connoted at least when the heart is spoken

212 Voluntas est quippe in omnibus, immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt. Quoted in Heimsoeth, Six Great Themes of Western Metaphysics, 232.
213 Sibbes, Complete Works, 6:525.
214 Ibid., 2:46.
216 Owen, Works, 3:326.
John Ravel interpreted Prov. 23:26 ("My son, give me thy heart"), as a reference to the whole "soul" or "spirit." Charnock, commenting on Gen. 6.5 noted that "heart here is used for the whole soul, because the soul is seated chiefly in the heart, especially the will, and the affections, her attendants; because, when my affection stirs, the chief motion of it is felt in the heart.

The heart is understood as the "whole soul," but not as a mere aggregation of discreet faculties. The heart refers to the soul as an affective unity, a totality, underlying the separate psychic potencies and serving as the single spring of the internal and external acts of an individual person. Thoughts, feelings and actions all arise from the heart. "Generally," wrote Owen, "it [i.e. the heart] denotes the whole soul of man and all the faculties of it, not absolutely, but as they are all one principle of moral operations, as they all concur in doing good and evil."

Similarly, as Owen writes in another work, the heart is taken for the entire soul, "not absolutely, but as all the faculties of the soul are one common principle of all our moral operations." Likewise, Oliver Heywood sees the heart as the single spring of all external and internal acts: "The heart in man is the first mover of the actions of man, even as the first mover carrieth all the spheres of heaven about with it; so doth this little thing in the little world of man, animate all

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218 Flavel, Works, 2:534.

219 ibid., 3:326.

217 Goodwin, Works 6:212.

his operations.\textsuperscript{222} In a similar vein, Goodwin commented, making an analogy between the heart as a physiological reality and as a spiritual one:

\begin{quote}
The heart doth, in the language of nature, speak the primary intrinsical cause of motion and action, being the first seat and forge of all the vital spirits by which we act and move. And so in the soul there is that answers to it, which is the spring; and actions as the streams that issue from thence.\textsuperscript{223}
\end{quote}

Similarly, Stephen Charnock saw the "heart" as the foundation and unitive centre of the soul, comprehending its intellectual, voluntative and affective aspects: "By the 'imaginations of the thoughts of the heart' are meant all the inward operations of the soul, which play their part principally in the heart; whether they be the acts of the understanding, the resolutions of the will, or the blusterings of the affections."\textsuperscript{224}

As the unifying principle of the psychic life, and as the source of interior and exterior action, the heart is identified with the fundamental emotional "inclination," "bent," "bias," "weight," "propensity," "preponderation," "disposition," or what I have called the basic amative orientation, of the individual personality. John Preston defines an "uncircumcised heart" as the fundamental love, or inclination, of an individual toward the world, rather than toward God.\textsuperscript{225} A "circumcised" heart indicates a basic emotional propensity toward God and the things of religion. Regeneration, says Stephen Charnock, "is quite another bent of heart, as if a man turn

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{222} Heywood, \textit{Works}, 2: 3-4.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 6:212.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Charnock, "Sinfulness and Cure of Thoughts," 387.
\item \textsuperscript{225} John Preston, \textit{The Breastplate of Faith and Love} (London: Nicholas Bourne, 1634), 2: 104.
\end{itemize}
from north to south.

William Ames, as noted above, believed that the work of regeneration was effected principally on the “will,” and regarded the first sign of effectual vocation as a “constant inclination of the will towards God, as towards the chief good.” Goodwin affirmed that the principal work of the regenerative Spirit was upon “the inward inclinations of a man’s heart and nature.” Richard Baxter believed that, in conversion, "the soul receiveth a new inclination; it liketh that which before it disliked, not only by a mere approbation, but by a willing closure of the heart therewith." Likewise, "this is the first change that God by his renewing grace doth make upon the heart; he turneth it to himself, he giveth it a new inclination and bias." John Owen believed that the principal work of regeneration was "spiritual mindedness," involving "the inclination, disposition, and frame of the mind, in all its affections, whereby it adheres and cleaves unto spiritual things." Peter van Mastricht (1630-1706), the Dutch theologian deeply influenced by English puritanism, and especially by William Ames, wrote that, upon regeneration, the will receives a “new inclination or propensity unto spiritual good.”

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226 Charnock, Works, 3:95.
227 Ames, Conscience, 2:10
228 Goodwin, Works, 6: 158-59.
229 Baxter, Practical Works, 7:32.
230 Ibid, 7:33-34.
231 Owen, Works, 7:270.
232 Peter van Mastricht, Theoretico-practica Theologia (Amsterdam, 1715), 662: Confert autem Spiritus Sanctus cordi seu voluntati, per regenerationem, novam quandam inclinationem, seu propensionem, versus bonum spirituale.
It is important to note that this fundamental "inclination," or "bias" of the soul is generally understood as more basic than either the intellect or individual acts of the will. In other words, it determines the actions of the individual faculties, whether these actions be the perceptions of the understanding, or individual acts of "volition" and "nolition." Richard Sibbes, in one passage describing the process of conversion, emphasizes the intellectual apprehension of the gospel (much in the way which Miller thought typical of all pre-Edwardsean puritanism). But, in the same passage, Sibbes insisted that, before such intellectual apprehension is possible, the "heart" must be "circumcised," "sanctified" or "opened:" "The heart must first be open, then it attends."3 The fundamental change of heart, which Sibbes associates with the "spirit of power," as opposed to the "spirit of illumination" in the speculative intellect, underlies both the mind's perception of "truth" and the acceptance of the will:

This prevailing light in the soul is because, together with the spirit of illumination, there goeth, in the godly, a spirit of power to subdue the heart to truth revealed, and to put a taste and relish into the will, suitable to the sweetness of the truths; else a mere natural will will rise against supernatural truths, as having an antipathy against them.34

The concept of the "heart" as an underlying "inclination," "bias," "propensity" or amative orientation of the soul, more fundamental than, and largely determining, both perception and individual voluntative acts, was an essential one in many puritan authors. It served two important functions in puritan theology:

21 Sibbes, Works, 6: 525.

23 Ibid., 1:60.

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1) It explained how God could convert a person without a) altering, or destroying human nature by introducing a new "faculty"; or b) overpowering human liberty and power of choice. In regeneration, insisted Charnock, "the essence of the soul and faculties remain the same." And, with special reference to will, as determining choice, the same theologian noted that regeneration does not constitute a "destroying" of the will, but a "putting a new bias into it." Owen, writing in opposition to the Arminians, noted,

Not that I would assert, in opposition to this, such an operation of grace as should, as it were, violently overcome the will of man, and force him to obedience, which must needs be prejudicial unto our liberty; but only consisting in such a sweet effectual working as doth infallibly promote our conversion, make us willing who before were unwilling, and obedient who were not obedient, that createth clean hearts and reneweth right spirits within us.

Just as Edwards was later to insist, so the puritans of the seventeenth century noted, that the new creation was not a new, natural faculty, but rather a "new spring," or a "new principle," which re-orientated the natural faculties so that they operated differently than before: the intellect apprehended differently, the heart felt differently, the will chose differently. Sibbes noted:

A saint differs from an hypocrite in many respects, but this one mainly, that a true saint of God is altered in the inward frame and qualification of his soul. He is a "new creature." Therefore there is a spring of better thoughts, of better desires, of better aims in him than in other men. And he labours more after

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the inward frame of his heart than after his outward carriage.?

Similarly, Owen understands the "new creature" as essentially a new, underlying "principle of all spiritual and moral actions." Charnock regarded regeneration as a powerful change "wherein a vital principle, a new habit, the law of God, and a divine nature, are put into, and framed in the heart." Similar language appears in Peter van Mastricht, who spoke of the "new creature" as a "seed (semen), animating and quickening the whole regenerate man, and all the several parts and faculties of him."

The theory that the "new creature" was a new "spring," "seed" or "principle" of spiritual life, specifically affecting the fundamental "inclination," "bent," "propensity" or "bias" underlying, as a kind of substrate, individual affective acts and the exercise of perception and choice, also elegantly explained how God could succeed in converting the "whole man, mind, will and affections" without directly altering any faculty separately from another. The renewal of particular, natural faculties could not accomplish the change of the personality as a whole, as Charnock argued:

If it [i.e. grace] dwelt only in one faculty there could be no spiritual motion of the other. The principles in the will would contradict those in the understanding;

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239 Owen, Works, 3: 221-22.
240 Charnock, Works, 3:88.
241 Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, 661.
242 Owen, Works, 3:222.
the will would act blindly if there were no spiritual light in the understanding to guide it. The light of the understanding would be useless if there were no inclination in the will to follow it, and grace in both faculties would signify little if there remained an opposing perversity in the affections.\textsuperscript{243}

The concept of the fundamental bent or inclination also provided an elegant explanation as to how the soul could be renewed by a single, unified operation of grace, rather than by a grace divided and distributed among various faculties. William Ames had criticized theologians who had placed true faith "partly in the understanding and partly in the will." "This is not quite correct," he argued, "for it is a single virtue and brings forth acts of one quality throughout, not partly of knowledge and partly of the affections."\textsuperscript{244}

For Ames, it is the "heart" which unifies the cognitive and volitional dimensions of faith:

The firm assent to the promises of the gospel is called both faith and trust, partly because, as general assent, it produces faith and partly because, as a special and firm assent, it flows from trust as it takes actual possession of grace already received. The firm assent leans on the trust of the heart as a middle or third term, by the strength of which alone a conclusion about faith can be reached.\textsuperscript{245}

Stephen Charnock was particularly explicit that regeneration, although affecting the intellectual and volitional faculties, was not located in either. Following Suarez, whom he cites in a footnote, he declared that grace "is the form whence the perfection both of understanding and will do flow; it is

\textsuperscript{241} Charnock, Works, 3:96.

\textsuperscript{244} Ames, Marrow, 83.

\textsuperscript{245} Ibid.
not therefore placed in either of them, but in the essence of the soul."\textsuperscript{246} And again: "It is not one particular faculty that is perfected by grace, but the substance of soul."\textsuperscript{247}

It will be noted how much Ames's and Charnock's understanding of conversion differs from that described by Perry Miller and attributed by him to Puritanism as a whole. For, whereas Miller believed that, for puritans generally, regeneration was principally exercised upon the reason, with the will following as a kind of natural, automatic response, these theologians placed regeneration neither in the reason nor in any individual act of volition, but in a stratum of the soul more fundamental than either.\textsuperscript{248} This stratum is sometimes called the heart, as the fundamental affective disposition, and sometimes the "essence" of the soul.

2) The concept of the heart as the fundamental "disposition of the will,"\textsuperscript{249} and the affective centre of the personality, was also an important weapon in the Puritan arsenal against Arminianism. As Giles Firmin noted in a personal reminiscence, "My reverend Tutor, Doctor Hill, laying his hand upon his breast, would say, Every true convert hath something here, that will frame an argument against an Arminian."\textsuperscript{250} The Arminians had argued, according to their puritan opponents, that it was within the natural ability

\textsuperscript{246} Charnock, \textit{Works}, 3:96.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{248} See Miller, \textit{New England Mind}, 281 ff.
\textsuperscript{249} Ames, \textit{Conscience}, 2:5.
\textsuperscript{250} Giles Firmin, \textit{The Real Christian}, 26.
of a human being to believe the Gospel and obey God's commandments. However, the Calvinists pointed out that belief and obedience had no necessary association with salvation. Several puritan analysts of hypocrisy, including William Perkins, Samuel Crooke and Matthew Mead, described in exhaustive detail how a person might believe the Gospel and obey all the divine commandments, and yet have not the slightest love for God. Such a person could not be considered regenerate. It was therefore love, or the "constant inclination of the will toward God," rather than belief or obedience, that was the fundamental mark of regeneration. As Samuel Crook noted, the "believing hypocrite," while assenting to the Gospel, has a heart which remains "frozen." But the true Christian believes and is emotionally "transformed" by his faith: "it kindleth in him the fire of love, the flame of zeal; it stampeth and imprinteth goodness in his heart, abateth in him the love of the world, and of himself." However, although one might, in the manner prescribed by the Arminians, choose to believe and obey, yet, as the puritans insisted, it was not in one's natural power to love, where one felt no love. A person could not change the fundamental orientation of his own heart, will and affections. This was one of Ames's.

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251 For a puritan representation of the Arminian position on belief and obedience, see John Owen, "A Display of Arminianism," in Works, 10:114-123.


253 Ames, Conscience, 2:10.

254 Crook, Divine Characters, 287-88.
basic arguments against the Remonstrants. Owen, in his *A Display of Arminianism*, demanded,

Is it in the power of a stony heart to remove itself?
What an active stone is this, mounting upwards!
What doth it at all differ from the heart of flesh that
God promiseth? Shall a stony heart be said to have a
power to change itself into such a heart of flesh as
shall cause us to walk in God's statutes?  

Owen declared that the "will," or "heart" was "merely passive" in
regeneration, "as a capable subject of such a work, not at all concurring co-operatively to our turning." The first act of God's grace was to transform
the fundamental disposition of the will and the affections:

Internal grace is by divines distinguished into the
first or preventing grace, and the second following co-operating grace. The first is that spiritual, vital
principle that is infused into us by the Holy Spirit,
that new creation and bestowing of new strength,
whereby we are made fit and able for the producing of
spiritual acts, to believe and yield evangelical
obedience. By this God gives us a new heart, and a
new spirit he puts within us; he takes the stony heart
out of our flesh, and gives us an heart of flesh; he puts
a new spirit in us, to cause us to walk in his
statutes.

Thus, to summarize the preceding discussion, two assertions can be
made.

1) Many puritans did indeed conceive of the "heart," not merely as a

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257 Ibid., 10:134.

258 Ibid., 10: 135.
synonym for the will, as opposed to the speculative intellect, but also as a) a fundamental "inclination," "bias," "bent," "propensity" or, as I have called it, amative orientation, within the personality, underlying and unifying individual acts of intellection and volition, and b) as the whole soul seen as a totality unified and integrated by its fundamental "inclination."

2) The concept of the heart as the underlying affectivity of the personality played an important role in seventeenth-century puritanism because a) it explained how regeneration could affect the personality as a whole, both in its cognitive and volitional dimensions, without directly altering the separate faculties, or eliminating human liberty; and b) it provided an important argument against the Arminian belief in even the limited ability of human persons to turn to God.

Insofar as it is partly and fundamentally volitional in nature, the heart is also affective. Edwards was, of course, hardly the first puritan to identify the affections with the will. Any puritan writing with an eye on Augustine made this identification. Even John Preston, a noted Aristotelian, and an admirer of Thomas Aquinas, asserted in one of his more pietistic works that the "affections are the several motions of the will." William Ames, as already noted, clearly regarded the affections as belonging to will. The affections are, in fact, "acts of the will." "Perverse affections" are a sign

\[^{255}\text{See Miller, New England Mind, 104.}\]

\[^{256}\text{Preston, Breastplate of Faith and Love, 3:6.}\]

\[^{256}\text{Ames, Marrow, 87, 239.}\]
of one's "disposition of will," whether oriented toward God or self. The "affections of the will" are presented to God in prayer.

The close association of heart, will and affections is noted by Baxter in his discussion of the effects of regeneration:

"Before conversion the very bent of man's mind is toward the things below, and his heart is against the things of God: he relisheth the things below as sweet; and it pleaseth him to possess them, or to think of possessing them, but he hath no pleasure in God, nor in thinking or hearing of the life to come: all things please or displease a man, according as they agree or disagree with his inclination."

It is partly from their inclusion in, or identification with the will, that the affections derive their "great use and dignity." As aspects of the will, they are the basis of all interior and exterior activity. "The author of human nature," wrote Edwards, "has not only given affections to men, but has made 'em very much the spring of man's actions." Indeed, he added, "he that has doctrinal knowledge and speculation only, without affection, never is engaged in the business of religion." In Sibbes's view, it is love which "first sets us a work." "Affections are as the wind, to carry us on in a holy life."

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263 Ames, Conscience, 1:5.
264 Ames, Marrow, 239; 259.
266 Flavel, Works, 2:524.
267 Edwards, Religious Affections, 100.
268 Ibid.
269 Sibbes, Works, 5:368.
270 Ibid.
As noted earlier, puritan pietists tended to define theology as "not a speculative discipline, but a practical one," as Ames said. As the basis of practice, of *euzoia*, or "living well," the will was regarded as the "first and proper subject of theology." And the affections, understood as the "will in exercise," shared the central focus of practical religion. A. E. Aldridge, referring to Edwards's view of "holy practice" as one of the most important signs of regeneration, agreed with John E. Smith, that "it is no small irony that a skillful and vigorous defense of the primacy of practice of religion should have found expression in a treatise on the religious affections." But given Edwards's agreement with Ames and other Augustinian pietists that action or "practice" originates in the affections, Edwards's position can be seen, not as ironic, but as a logical consequence of his understanding of motivation.

Not only do the affections originate action, they also direct and guide it. Even so scholastic a theologian as Owen declared that the "affections are in the soul as the helm of a ship." This is far from the hegemonic rationalism that Miller attributed to puritanism as a whole. Owen noted:

> The predominant inclination of a man's affections is his edge. According as that is set, so he cutteth and works; that way he is sharp and keen, but blunt unto all other things. 

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271 Ames, *Marrow*, 78.

272 Ibid.


275 Ibid.
As the springs and guides of internal and external action, the affections could ultimately be identified with the heart itself, as the fundamental amative orientation of the individual. As Sibbes noted, appropriately citing Augustine's *City of God*:

Our affections will tell us of what city we are, whether of Jerusalem or Babylon, as one of the ancients well said. Whither dost thou weigh down in thy love? Doth earthly love as a weight press down to things below, or is it a sanctified love, which carries thee to Christ and to the things of God? Examine thy affections of love, of joy and delight, to see of what city thou art.²⁷⁶

For Owen, the "prevailing love" of the soul is "implanted upon the affections," causing the soul "with delight and complacency to cleave to God and his ways."²⁷⁷ Indeed, for Owen, the affections are of the essence of "spiritual mindedness." In a series of passages which are among the clearest precursors for Edwards's view that "true religion, in great part, consists of spiritual affections," Owen remarks that "the foundation" of spiritual mindedness "lies in the affections and their immediate adherence to spiritual things."²⁷⁸ "Thoughts and meditations as proceeding from spiritual affections are the first things wherein this spiritual mindedness doth consist."²⁷⁹ And elsewhere:

Spiritual affections, whereby the soul adheres unto spiritual things, taking in such a savour and relish of them as wherein it finds rest and satisfaction, is the peculiar spring and substance of our being spiritually

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 7:271.
²⁷⁹ Ibid., 7:275.
mined.  

For Owen, as for Edwards, the affections are, in the last analysis, the alpha and the omega of piety. To them belongs the most essential act of the religious life:

Our affections are upon the matter all. They are all we have to give or bestow, the only power of our souls whereby we give away ourselves from ourselves and become another's. Other faculties of our souls, even the most noble of them, are suited to receive unto our advantage; by our affections we can give away what we are and have. Hereby we give our hearts to God, as he requireth.

It is principally in our affections that we discover our fundamental amative orientation. It is the "bent" of the affections which indicates the genuineness or spuriousness of our piety. "Our affections show us what we are in religion," said Sibbes. It was a theme he often repeated: "Look to thy heart whether God have taught it to love or no, and to relish heavenly things." Elsewhere he exhorts his readers:

Look to your aims, to your affections, and to your inward relish and bent of soul, which way your conversation is bent, and how it relisheth; and these will discover to us our estate.

And finally:

The inward affections are the best discoursers of the estate of our soul, where our joy and delight is.

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280 Ibid., 7: 395.
281 Ibid., 7:396.
282 Sibbes, Works, 4:102.
283 Ibid., 4:182.
284 Ibid., 4:102.
As these passages indicate, discussion of the role of the affections in religion tends to introduce the ideas of "relishing" the divine, taking "delight" or having "complacency" in God, and "enjoying" the things of religion. Such themes, as already discussed in Chapter One, have often been considered peculiar to Edwards, and traceable to his supposed empiricism. But they pervade earlier puritan literature.

In fact, the ideas of "delight" (delectatio) and enjoyment (fruitio), both considered as volitional acts, are important themes in Augustine's theology, as Vernon Bourke has shown at length.286 "Delight" is also an important concept in puritan theology because it indicates that very engagedness of the affections in the spiritual life which, as has been shown, many considered the sine qua non of true religion. Mere "notional" or speculative understanding of God was considered affectively neutral. If the individual had undergone a true conversion, and was engaged at the fundamental level of the "heart," there would be a sense of "delight" and "complacency" in divine things. Matthew Mead wrote:

Till the affections are made spiritual, there is no affection to things that are spiritual. God is a spiritual good, and therefore hypocrites cannot delight in God.287

Baxter noted that "the first change that God maketh in the heart or will in the work of conversion" is "in the complacency or displacency of it."288 At the sinner's conversion, wrote Baxter, "the things that he before saw not, nor

286 Bourke, Joy in Augustine's Ethics.
287 Matthew Mead, Almost Christian Discovered, 38.
well believed, the things which he distasted and loathed, are his delight.\textsuperscript{[289]}

Accordingly he compared the unregenerate and the regenerate in terms of delight and pleasure:

So it is with the sick, unrenewed soul: he hath no pleasure in God, nor any holy things: it goeth against his heart to think of them, or seriously to speak or hear much of them, He marvelleth how other men can find so much delight in reading, and hearing, and praying, and the like.\textsuperscript{[290]}

Likewise, for Owen, the affections of the unregenerate, whose amative orientation is toward earthly things, cannot be engaged "into an adherence unto or delight in spiritual things."\textsuperscript{[291]} Owen argued that religious affections always contain a "true delight" in God and divine realities.\textsuperscript{[292]} For him, true spiritual mindedness involves delight because spiritual realities answer to and satisfy the new, fundamental inclination or bent of the soul. To put it in his own words, there is always a "complacency of mind, from that gust, relish and savour, which it [i.e., the soul] finds in spiritual things, from their suitableness unto its constitution, inclination and desires."\textsuperscript{[293]} Indeed, for Owen, true holiness itself is accompanied with "choice, delight and acquiescence," and can be defined as an "acting of the soul in a delightful adherence unto the whole will of God."\textsuperscript{[294]} Charnock saw that "in the affections" of the regenerate "there is love instead of enmity, delight instead

\begin{footnotes}
\item[289] Ibid., 7:74.
\item[290] Ibid., 7:33.
\item[291] Owen, Works, 7:412.
\item[292] Ibid., 7:423.
\item[293] Ibid., 7:270.
\item[294] Ibid., 5:426.
\end{footnotes}

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of weariness. Thomas Manton (1620-1677), described a kind of ecstasy that the saints sometimes experience: they are "so swallowed up with the thought of God, and carried beyond themselves by their high love to God, and earnest desires that they stand in special need of, so that they seem to be rapt into heaven in their admiration of God and delight in him." According to John Howe (1630-1705), the saints enjoy "delectable communications of the spirit," issuing in "sensitive delight" in God, raising their minds to "delight in God" as the "delectable object" of their meditations.

Such references to the "sensitive delight" and the "relish" which the saints experience in their thoughts and apprehensions of God, introduce the last aspect of heart-language, the cognitive and percipient dimension of the "heart." As noted earlier, Edwards described the kind of cognition exercised by the heart not in terms of speculation, which is non-affective in character, but according to the analogy of sense perception, "wherein the mind don't only speculate and behold, but also relishes and feels." The heart "not only beholds, but has inclination, and is pleased or displeased."

The special form of apprehension, by which the saints are supposed to experience divine things, was termed by the puritans a "spiritual sense," a term used by Edwards, and associated with his concept of the "sense of the heart" as affected by spiritual, supernatural and divine influences. The

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205 Charnock, Works, 3:97.
207 Howe, Works, 375; 354.
208 Edwards, Religious Affections, 272.
former name indicates that this special sense is not natural in origin, but
divine. "Heart" indicates that the emotions and the fundamental disposition
of the will, rather than the speculative reason, are chiefly engaged in this
form of apprehension.

Describing religious cognition according to the analogy of sense
perception was also a natural and useful means of expressing that elusive
Puritan ideal which Paul Baynes had termed "affectionate knowledge" and
Daniel Dyke called a "practical, a feeling and experimental knowledge."\(^{399}\)
This was an act by which the saint apprehended God in a manner
simultaneously and inter-dependently cognitive and volitional-affective. It
was a form of apprehension which communicated God's special qualities,
his "beauty," "amiableness" and "excellency" to the heart, much as did, on
the level of natural sensation, the taste of honey (to use Edwards's example).
In fact, as will shortly be seen, taste was perhaps the analogy most
frequently used to express the spiritual sense.

Spiritual sensation is essential to the spiritual life, as Sibbes remarked:

> We must have spiritual senses. The spiritual life of a Christian is furnished with spiritual senses. He hath a spiritual eye and a spiritual taste to relish spiritual things, and spiritual ear to judge of holy things, and a spiritual feeling. As every life, so this excellent life hath senses and motions suitable to it. Now we should labour to have this spiritual life quickened in us, that we may have a quick sight of spiritual things.\(^{300}\)

Why, asked Sibbes, do the wicked not appreciate God's beauty? It is

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because
they have no spiritual senses at all; as Saint Austin
saith of men that complain, that they do not taste and
relish these things. Surely, saith he, thou wantest a
spiritual palate to taste these things.301

The spiritual sense is given upon regeneration. Goodwin wrote that, just
as God fitted Adam with natural senses to perceive the natural world, so he
provides the saint with spiritual senses to apprehend the spiritual world:
"whenever God regenerateth any man, and constitutes him a new creature,
lo, the man hath a new eye to see, an ear to hear, and all sorts of new senses
to take in all sorts of spiritual things."302 The spiritual sense brings an
essential "subjectivity" to the saint's apprehension of divine matters: "And
for the discerning of these things spiritually, a man must not simply have
the Spirit of God to reveal them objectively, but he must subjectively be
made by that Spirit a spiritual man, and have spiritual senses given to
him."303

Just as Edwards was to insist that the sense of the heart was not only
delightful, but also informational, having "instruction" in it, because it
communicated and provided experience of God's peculiar qualities,
Goodwin remarked that the "delectable communications of the Spirit" afford
"an acquired knowledge in matters spiritual founded on sense."304
Moreover, the spiritual sense issued in mental certainty. Citing the well-
known Aristotelian axiom, that "sense is never deceived about its proper

301 Ibid., 2:236.
302 Goodwin, Works, 6:166.
303 Ibid., 6:168.
304 Ibid., 7:135.
object," Goodwin infers that "if it be a spiritual sight and a spiritual sense, it hath a certainty joined with it."305

John Owen also emphasized the importance of the "spiritual sense," or "spiritual perception." Loss of this spiritual sense had been, he argued, the key to the degradation of religion to empty ceremony: "when men had lost all spiritual sense and savour of the things of God, to supply the want that was in their own souls, they invented outwardly pompous and gorgeous ways of worship."306 But in regeneration God gives an "aisthesis pneumatiken, a spiritual sense, a taste of the things themselves upon the mind, heart and conscience, when we have the aistheteria gegumnasmena, senses exercised to discern such things."307 Owen tends, like Edwards himself, to identify the "circumcision" of regeneration with the new percipience of the heart: "Circumcising the heart" says Owen, is the "giving an heart to perceive and eyes to see and ears to hear."308 Faith itself "is not a mere assent unto the truth of the revelation or authority of the revelation, but it adds thereunto a spiritual discerning, perception and understanding of the things themselves revealed and declared."309 Indeed, faith "affects the mind with an ineffable sense, taste, experience, and acknowledgement of the greatness, the glory, the power, the beauty of the things revealed and

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305 Ibid., 7: 265.
306 Owen, Works, 6:188.
307 Ibid., 16.
309 Ibid., 5:418.

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proposed in the way of salvation. Without the spiritual sense, theological knowledge is useless: "What am I the better if I can dispute that Christ is God, but have no sense of sweetness in my heart from hence that he is a God. In a manner similar to Perkins and Goodwin, Owen identified the certainty or "assurance" of the saints with the spiritual sense: "So we discern spiritual things in a spiritual manner; and ariseth full assurance, or a spiritual sense of the power, glory and beauty of the things contained in this mystery.

These themes were also pursued by John Smith, the Cambridge platonist, whose influence on Edwards has already been recognized by several commentators: "The soul hath its sense, as well as the body, and therefore David, when he would teach us how to know what the divine goodness is, calls not for speculation, but sensation: taste and see how good the Lord is. Smith, like Ames and similar pietists, tends to define theology in terms of living, rather than speculating. And, as living implies sensation, so spiritual living implies spiritual sensation: "Were I indeed to define divinity, I should rather call it a divine life, than a divine science; it being something rather to be understood by a spiritual sensation, than by a verbal description."

The concept of the spiritual sense, and "sense of the heart," also occurs in

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11: Ibid., 5:419.
12: Ibid., 12:52.
13: Ibid., 5:419.
5: Smith, Select Discourses, 3.
14: Ibid., 1-2.
some of the protestant scholastics. Francis Turretin (1623-1687), cited by Edwards in another connection, noted that, in regeneration, God removes the “stony heart, hard, dry and deprived of sensation” and bestows a “fleshly heart, flexible, yielding and obedient, possessed of a lively sense.”

Peter van Mastricht closely anticipated Edwards’s language of perception to convey the mind’s apprehension of spiritual realities. After describing the intellectual effects of regeneration in terms of a “new spirit,” a “spiritual light,” and “illumination,” he notes that these effects, as pertaining to the will, may be termed “simple understanding, or perception,” by which the regenerate “know spiritual objects, not only speculatively as true, but practically as good.” It will be noted how similar van Mastricht’s term for a perception, intelligientia simplex, is to Locke’s term, “simple idea.” It is also to be noted that van Mastricht, like Edwards, but unlike Locke, understands perception as essentially volitional.

The spiritual sense is often described analogously to the sense of sight.

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315 Edwards, Religious Affections, 289. Here he quotes Turretin on the ability of angels to act upon, or influence, the human imagination.

316 Francis Turretin, Institutio Theologiae Elencticae (Pittsburg: Robert Carter, 1847) 2:485: Cor lapideum, durum, aridum, et sensus omnis expers; et indum carneum, id. flexile, molle, et obsequens, vivido sensu praeditum. Turretin’s Institutio was originally published from 1679 to 1685.

317 Van Mastricht, Theoretico-practica Theologia, 661: Imbuit autem lux ista spiritualis regenerandorum...simplicem intelligentiam seu perceptionem, qua spiritualia cognoscant, non tantum theoretice, sub ratione veri, sed etiam practice, sub ratione boni.

318 The expression simplex intelligentia, used to describe a perception, may be derived ultimately from Aristotle De Anima 431a9: to men aisthanesthai homoiou to phainai monon kai noin, which Tracy translates as “sense perception is like a simple spoken word or act of understanding.” Physiological Theory, 249.

319 See Section 8, below.
"That which you must principally do," said Preston, "is to look to the essence of God, to see such excellencies in him, that thereby you may be led home to him."\(^{320}\) That this form of "seeing" refers not merely to intellectual apprehension, but to a cognitive-volitional-affective percipience, is often made clear. Preston wrote:

There is a manner of seeing proper only to the saints, and that is the proper work of the Spirit in them, where we shall so see them [i.e., the excellencies and riches of Christ], as to be affected with them. Otherwise, you may read the Scripture a thousand times over, you may understand them, yet you shall not be affected with them, till the Holy Ghost shew them unto you.\(^{321}\)

And elsewhere:

There is a teaching by men, and a teaching by God; that is, when God shall enable a man to see things in good earnest, otherwise it will be but as a man that sees a thing, when his mind is upon another matter: so we shall see, and not see: but when the Holy Ghost shall show you these things, you shall see indeed; till then you may hear oft enough of these things, but your hearts will be minding other matters; some about their profits, and some their pleasures, etc., but when the Holy Ghost shall show you these things; that is, when he presents them to us, he draweth the heart from minding other things, to seek after Christ, to long after him, and not to content your selves till you be united to him.\(^{322}\)

"We must pray to God," wrote Robert Burton (1577-1640), "that he will open our eyes, make clear our hearts, that we may be capable of his glorious rays."\(^{323}\) Goodwin remarks that the soul would have nothing to do with


\(^{321}\) Ibid., 1:162.

\(^{322}\) Ibid., 164.

God, "if there were not a new eye given to the soul to see with, and a heart to love him." The affective nature of spiritual "sight" is also emphasized by Owen: "The true nature of saving illumination consists in this, that it gives the mind such a direct intuitive insight and prospect into spiritual things as that, in their own spiritual nature, they suit, please and satisfy it, so that it is transformed into them, cast into the mould of them, and rests in them.

The spiritual sense was just as often, if not more frequently, described in terms of taste, "whereby," as Edwards said, the saints "perceive the excellency and relish the divine sweetness of holiness." Richard Sibbes declared that true divine knowledge is "knowledge with a taste," for God "giveth knowledge per modum gustus." In a similar vein, he elsewhere remarks:

In the godly, holy truths are conveyed by way of a taste; gracious men have a spiritual palate as well as a spiritual eye. Grace altereth the relish.

Sibbes insisted that there is a "divine and heavenly relish in the word of God" which only the saints can "taste": "There is a sweet relish in all divine truths, and suitable to the sweetness in them, there is a spiritual taste, which the spirit of God puts into the soul of his children." Sibbes

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324 Goodwin, Works, 6:190.
325 Owen, Works, 3: 238.
327 Sibbes, Works, 4: 334.
328 Ibid., 1:60.
329 Ibid., 2:155.
330 Ibid., 6:541.
suggests that Christians might test their spiritual state by reference to their spiritual "taste": "Let us therefore discern our estate in grace by this, how do we relish divine truths?"331

One of Owen's definitions for "spiritual mindedness" is "that which the spirit savoreth."332 For Baxter a sign of conversion was a new taste or relish in the will. At conversion God "causeth that to savour or relish sweet to the will, which before was bitter."333 "A wonderful change" is made in the regenerate: "they that had no savour of God and glory before, do now savour nothing else so much."334 Likewise, John Smith notes that "there is an inward sweetness and deliciousness in divine truth, which no sensual mind can taste or relish."335 But in the saints, knowledge of divine things "will be sweet to our taste, and pleasant to our palates, sweeter than honey or the honeycomb."336

That which precipitated the "delight" and "relish" experienced by the spiritual sense was the "beauty" and "excellency" of divine reality. John Smith, as noted in Chapter One, has stated that the "aesthetic" dimension of religion, the sensitivity to the spiritually beautiful, was not much emphasized by the puritans. But the sources do not support his view.

331 Ibid., 2:155.
334 Ibid., 7:34.
335 Smith, Select Discourses, 9.
336 Ibid., 16.
Robert Burton regarded "beauty" as "not the least" of God's attributes.337

The beauty of the created reality could scarcely compete with that of the divine: "If ordinary beauty have such a prerogative and power, and what is amiable and fair, to draw the eyes and ears, hearts and affections of all spectators unto it, to move, entice, allure, how shall this divine form ravish our souls, which is the fountain and quintessence of all beauty."338 "What is it that makes anything worthy of love?" asked John Preston. "It is the excellency that we find there. Now in the Lord there is all kinds of excellency."339 Indeed, one of the three chief ways by which the Spirit works, is "by shewing the excellency and the riches of Christ."340 Moreover, the sincerity of piety is determined by a due appreciation of divine excellency: "We must principally love God for his excellencies, not for our own advantages."341

Sibbes regarded that "that which most of all stirs up holy affections to search after Christ is the large explications of his excellencies."342 So far as Baxter is concerned, the first step in conversion happens when God "openeth men's eyes to see God's excellency and the excellency of those glorious things which he hath promised, and thereby draweth their hearts

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338 Ibid., 313-314.
340 Ibid., 1:162.
341 Ibid., 2:107.
unto them."\textsuperscript{343} Similarly, Ames sees the excellencies of God as exciting piety in human persons to whom it is given to sense them:

Religion is related to God through that divine excellency which shines forth in his sufficiency and efficiency. This is not one attribute, but a perfection arising from all his attributes. All the individual attributes of God have power to beget religion in us.

The excellency and beauty of God were frequent themes for John Owen. Like others, he considered a sense of God's excellency to be the essence of Christian sincerity: "How few there are who have that spiritual discerning and apprehension of the divine excellencies, that view of the excellency of the goodness and love of God in Christ, and thereby alone to be drawn after him and to delight in him: yet this is the ground of all sincere, real love unto God."\textsuperscript{344} Owen remarked that, because of its fallen condition, humanity is prevented from "discerning the glory and beauty of spiritual, heavenly truth, and from being sensible of its power and efficacy."\textsuperscript{345} Therefore a person must "labour to possess the mind with the beauty and excellency of spiritual things, that so they may be presented lovely and desirable to the soul."\textsuperscript{346} This is all the more essential, argued Owen, because "the blessedness of man in another world doth consist in the soul's full satisfaction in the goodness and beauty of the divine nature."\textsuperscript{347} And similarly, "it is indeed because we see an excellency, a beauty, a

\textsuperscript{343} Baxter, \textit{Works}, 7:34.
\textsuperscript{344} Owen, \textit{Works}, 7:476.
\textsuperscript{345} Ibid., 4: 176.
\textsuperscript{346} Ibid., 6:188.
\textsuperscript{347} Ibid., 7:336.
desirableness in the glorious properties of his nature, such as our souls are refreshed and satisfied with the thought of, by faith, and in whose enjoyment our blessedness will consist, so that we will rejoice at the remembrance of his holiness.\textsuperscript{348} The heavenly realities communicated by the divine nature of Christ have an infinite beauty, goodness, and amiableness in them, which are powerfully attractive to spiritual affections, and which alone are able to fill them, to satisfy them, to give them rest and aquiescence.\textsuperscript{349}

Finally, the beauty and excellence of God was, as in Edwards's Religious Affections, especially associated with his holiness. Greenham asserted that the elect love God principally for "his goodness, his righteousness and his holiness."\textsuperscript{350} Jeremiah Bourroughs (1599-1646), inquired:

\begin{quote}
What is that excellency of God that your soul closes with? What is it in God that draws your heart to Him and causes your soul to love your God, to bless your God, and to delight in your God? It is the very person of God himself that our hearts must be taken with, and it must be the person of God in his excellency, and what is that? His holiness.\textsuperscript{351}
\end{quote}

Shepard maintained that "that is the right closing with Christ for himself, when it is for his holiness."\textsuperscript{352} According to Baxter, the mark of saintliness

\textsuperscript{348} Ibid., 7: 475.

\textsuperscript{349} Ibid., 7: 475.

\textsuperscript{350} Greenham, Works, 100.


\textsuperscript{352} Shepard, Parable, 81.
is to love God "for his holiness" rather than for any other perfection.\textsuperscript{353} Holiness is, according to Charnock, "the most beautiful perfection of God, and most valuable with him."\textsuperscript{354} Flavel considered the principal "beauty and glory of God" to be his "holiness."\textsuperscript{355}

\textsuperscript{353}Baxter, \textit{Works}, 16: 391.

\textsuperscript{354}Charnock, \textit{Works}, 2:192.

\textsuperscript{355}Flavel, \textit{Works}, 2:350.
In the foregoing pages I have traced in earlier Christianity, and especially in earlier puritanism, a fairly well developed "psychology of the heart," anticipating, in all essential aspects, the psychology presented in Edwards's Religious Affections. My purpose in doing so has been 1) to indicate some hitherto under-explored sources for the ideas presented in Edwards's work, and 2) to argue Edwards's essential continuity with seventeenth-century puritanism, particularly in its pietistic manifestation.

Before concluding this chapter, it seems desirable to compare briefly Edwards's Religious Affections and Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. It will be seen that, with regard to the ideas developed in Religious Affections, there are more differences than similarities between the Calvinist and the empiricist.

Some of my own observations on the differences between Edwards and Locke corroborate the points made by Paul Helm and David Laurence in their papers cited in Chapter One, Section Three.

Like Edwards, who noted that "God has endued the mind with two faculties," Locke distinguishes in the mind "two great and principal actions." Edwards's first faculty "is capable of perception and speculation,

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by which it discerns and views and judges of things; which is called the understanding."358 Locke's first faculty, is "perception, or thinking," which he, too, calls "understanding."359

It is to be noted, however, that Locke and Edwards have different conceptions of the two aspects constituting the first faculty, which both call the "understanding." Where Edwards speaks of "perception and speculation," Locke speaks of "perception, or thinking." That is, Edwards distinguishes the two dimensions of the understanding, Locke identifies them. Locke describes the understanding entirely in terms of "perception," which is of three kinds: 1) perception of ideas (phenomena) in our minds, or simple apprehension; 2) perception of the "significations of signs," or meanings of words; and 3) perception of the "agreement or disagreement," "connection or repugnancy" between ideas. The second and third of these constitute "knowledge." The third alone constitutes "understanding."360

Thus Locke includes what Edwards calls "speculation" under the category of perception. This is quite contrary to Edwards, who, as has been described, insists on distinguishing perception from speculation. This is because Edwards understands perception, unlike speculation, as having a volitional-affective dimension:

There is a distinction to be made between a mere notional

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358 Edwards, Religious Affections, 96.
359 Locke, Essay, 1:159.
360 Ibid, 1: 314. See also Fraser's note 2, ibid., 159.
understanding, wherein the mind only beholds things in the exercise of a speculative faculty; and the sense of the heart, wherein the mind don't only speculate and behold, but relishes and feels. That sort of knowledge, by which a man has a sensible perception of amiableness and loathsomeness, or of sweetness and nauseousness, is not just the same sort of knowledge with that, by which he knows what a triangle is, and what a square is. The one is mere speculative knowledge; the other sensible knowledge, in which more than the mere intellect is concerned; the heart is the proper subject of it, or the soul as a being that not only beholds, but has inclination, and is pleased or displeased.361

Although Locke recognizes that many ideas, or perceptions, are often "joined" or "blended" with ideas, or perceptions, of pleasure or pain,362 yet he does not attribute to perception in itself any necessary affectivity, as is clear from his identification of ideas with "knowledge" and "understanding" above. Edwards, however, confines the significance of "perception" to those apprehensions which involve an affective response. More will be said concerning "perception" below, where I address the subject of "simple ideas."

Locke's other "great and principal" action, or faculty, of the mind is, as noted above, "volition, or willing." However, there are considerable differences between Locke's and Edwards's account of volition. Edwards identifies volition with 1) inclination, that is, affective perception, when the "soul does not behold things, as an unaffected spectator, but either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting," 363 and with 2) "will," which is the name given to "inclination" as it originates action. The

361Edwards, Religious Affections, 272.
363Edwards, Religious Affections, 96.
mind, as inclining and willing, is called the "heart." Thus Edwards identifies volition with affectivity: "The will, and the affections of the soul, are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of the exercise."

Locke, however, identifies the will, properly so called, with choice and preference, either to do, or to forbear doing, any action:

For can it be denied that whatever agent has a power to think on its own actions, and to prefer their doing or omission either to other, has that faculty called will? Will, then, is nothing but such a power.

Volition is "an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action." Locke is very careful not to associate volition, or will, with affectivity. He warns his readers not to take "choosing, preferring, and the like terms" to imply affectivity, or desire:

This caution of being careful not to be misled by expressions that do not enough keep up the difference between the will and several acts of the mind that are quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary, because I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially desire, and one put for the other; and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them.

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364 Ibid.
365 Ibid., 97.
367 Ibid., 1:330.
368 Ibid., 1:331.
Locke considers the equation of volition with affection to have been "no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter" and insists that volition be considered as "conversant about nothing but our own actions; terminates there; and reaches no further; and that volition is nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action it takes to be in its power."\(^{369}\)

For Locke, the affections, and especially "desire," which is also called "uneasiness," are related to the will chiefly as "motives" for choosing, or preferring, to initiate, continue or discontinue action.\(^{370}\) However, as noted above, desires are in no way identified with the will.

Locke's position, that the will is determined by desire, is somewhat closer to Edwards's view, that a significant relationship exists between volition and emotion, and that the "affections" are the "springs" of action, than is the scholastic position, that the will is a "rational appetite." However, Locke's identification of volition with choice and preference is contrary to Edwards's identification of volition with the affections. Nor does Locke have any use for a concept of the "heart" as understood by Edwards, a unitive dimension of the soul in which there cannot be "a clear distinction made between the two faculties of understanding and will, as acting distinctively and separately."\(^{371}\)

The heart, as an intellectual-volitional-affective complex, is much more clearly

\(^{369}\)Ibid.

\(^{370}\)Ibid., 1: 332-34.

\(^{371}\)Edwards, Religious Affections, 272.
anticipated in seventeenth-century puritanism where, as in Edwards, it serves as the psychological basis for the comprehensiveness of regeneration, explaining how the human personality can be renewed as a whole, without the separate faculties being directly altered.

The differences between Locke's and Edwards's understanding of religious knowledge (I use the word in a loose, un-Lockean sense), or faith, are arguably even greater than the differences between their respective psychologies. It is not necessary to review Locke's entire account of "faith and reason." I shall limit my comments only to those passages relevant to Religious Affections.

Locke distinguishes between "original" and "traditional" revelation. The former refers to "that first impression which is made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set any bounds."372 The example which Locke offers is of St. Paul, "when he was rapt up into the third heaven."373 This sort of revelation is extraordinary and supernatural. By it, God can convey to the recipient "new simple ideas," of such things as, in Locke's example, creatures on other planets.374

"Traditional" revelation, on the other hand, comprises those "impressions" of spiritual things, "delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another."375 Scripture or preaching furnish

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373 Ibid.

374 Ibid.

375 Ibid., 2:418.
the most obvious examples of this. In traditional revelation there is no possibility of conveying "new simple ideas" to the mind. Again, speaking of St. Paul, Locke asserts that "he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men those ideas imprinted by that sixth sense, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour, by the sound of words, into a man who, having the other four senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth, of seeing." 376

Locke continues:

For our simple ideas, then, which are the foundations, and the sole matter of all our notions and knowledge, we must depend wholly on our reason, I mean our natural faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation.377

This language is clearly contrary to Edwards's notion that regenerate persons can and do receive from Scripture or preaching "new simple ideas" concerning God and divine things. Locke has no concept of a "spiritual sense" or a "sense of the heart" such as may furnish the mind, upon reading Scripture or hearing a sermon, with new simple ideas.

It is clear from this comparison of Locke and Edwards on religious knowledge, that Edwards's concept of religious "perception" is merely analogous to Locke's notion of natural perception. Nor does it correspond to Locke's notion of original revelation. In Edwards, regenerate persons have no "new simple ideas," in the Lockean sense, about divine things. It would be more correct to say, if one were using Locke's language, that they have a

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376 Ibid., 2: 417.

377 Ibid.
different feeling about divine things than they had before. However, because Edwards tends to identify perception with feeling, he can say that those who have new feelings about the matters of Scripture, have new “perceptions” of these matters. But this is to use “perception” in a loose, un-Lockean sense. Such “perceptions” as Edwards describes, would not, in Locke’s view, constitute new, simple ideas, but merely changes of feeling, of the sense of pleasure or pain accompanying old ideas.

Edwards uses the language of new perceptions and new simple ideas of divine things, in order to suggest the radicality of the change occurring in regeneration, wherein things of the Gospel suddenly impress the mind not only as beautiful and loveable, but also “real.” So the old lady who is described in A Faithful Narrative of Surprising Conversions, reading of “Christ’s sufferings for sinners” was affected by a sense of the reality, wonder and newness of the story: “at first, before she had time to turn her thoughts, she wondered within herself that she had never heard of it before; but then immediately recollected herself, and thought that she had often heard of it, and read it, but never till now saw it as a thing real.”

Again, to have a new feeling about something is, for Edwards, to have a new “perception” of something. To have a new perception, is to apprehend a new reality. He has used Locke’s technical language of “new simple ideas” figuratively, and has adapted it to a loose, popular way of speaking.

The preceding discussion can be summarized in four points.

378 Edwards, Great Awakening, 181.
1) Both Locke and Edwards distinguish two major “faculties” in the mind, “thought” and “volition.” However, where Locke characterizes thought entirely in terms of various types of “perception,” Edwards distinguishes between “perception” and “speculation.” For Edwards, perception is always affective (and so volitional) in nature. For Locke, perception is not in itself affective, although perceptions are often joined, or blended, with a sense of pleasure or pain. Edwards is, in fact, much closer to Aristotle, as described in Section 6, below, or to van Mastricht, as described in Section 7, than he is to Locke, in understanding perception as essentially volitional.

2) Edwards views volition as affective in nature. Locke denies that volition can be identified with affectivity. For Locke, volition is defined in terms of choice or preference. Affections merely supply volition with motives.

3) Locke does not adopt heart-terminology. Nor does he have a concept of a percipient-volitional-affective complex, which Edwards calls “heart.”

4) Edwards's “new simple ideas” arising in the “sense of the heart” are not the same as Locke’s “new simple ideas.” Edwards adopts the term in a merely metaphoric manner. Nor is the metaphor very exact. Locke would probably regard Edwards's “new simple ideas” as referring merely to new feelings arising in response to the Gospel. Edwards understands feeling as being an essential attribute of perception, so that, if one has new feelings, one has new “perceptions,” or “new, simple ideas.” But, as noted above, Locke does not recognize an essential identification of perception with affectivity.

Having made these distinctions between Edwards and Locke, in their conception of several key concepts, it might be useful to ask, if Locke's Essay
did exercise substantive influence over Edwards, what might it have been? To phrase the question less speculatively, it may be asked, what do Locke's Essay and Edwards's Religious Affections have in common, beyond occasional similarities of vocabulary?

The most striking similarity between the epistemological part of Locke's Essay, and Part Three of Edwards's Religious Affections, is that both use the concept of an "idea," although in either case understood differently, as a fundamental principle, on the basis of which, and around which, other concepts are organized. For Locke, all our ideas ultimately come from sensation, and knowledge is ultimately founded on these ideas. For Edwards, the true Christian's ideas, or "sense," of God, and the affections essential to these ideas and perception, come from a spiritual perception of God as God is presented in Scripture or preaching. Edwards's first five signs of sincere piety are clearly and obviously developed and organized closely upon the concept of spiritual perception. Thus Locke ultimately bases his epistemology, and Edwards his piety, on a notion, however differently understood in either case, of ideas, perception or sensation.

However, Edwards was not the first puritan to build a theory of true piety based principally on the notion of spiritual sensation. As already noted in Chapter Two, John Owen had based, and systematically developed, his concept of heavenly or spiritual mindedness squarely upon the notion of mental apprehensions which do not comprise "speculation and ratiocination merely," but the "habitual frame and inclination of the affections also;" "not a
notional conception of things only, but principally the engagement of the affections unto the things which the mind apprehends.” Like Edwards, Owen compared “spiritual mindedness” to sense perception, and especially to the sense of taste. Finally, Owen, like Edwards, considered this intellection-percipient-affective mental activity as “the great distinguishing character of true believers from all unregenerate persons.”

Thus, what Edwards shares with Locke's treatment of epistemology, the use of the concept of sensation as a central and fundamental organizing principle, he also shares with Owen, in the latter's concept of “spiritual mindedness.” Moreover, since Owen is discussing the nature of true piety, and also understands perception in a manner similar to Edwards, Owen's work presents a much closer analogue to Religious Affections than does Locke's Essay.
10: Concluding Summary

Edwards's bipartite conception of the soul was articulated in opposition to a version of the tripartite Aristotelian-Thomistic psychology, invoked by some opponents of the emotionalism of the Great Awakening. The advantage of Edwards's psychological model, as a basis for defending affective religion, lay in its identification of the emotions with the will. This equation invested the emotions with some of the dignity and "nobility" traditionally associated with "volition."

Edwards's psychology, and the definition of true piety associated with it, can be reduced to ten basic features:

1) Human interiority is broadly distinguished into two main "faculties," the intellectual ("understanding"), including perception and speculation, and the voluntative, including inclination and will.

2) Perception is considered affective in nature. It represents that aspect of understanding, or intellect, which is voluntative.

3) The emotions are regarded rather as an aspect of volition, or will, than of physical sensation, or automatic physiological responses.

4) The heart is understood as the mind as inclinational. It is identified with a) the basic inclination, or fundamental amative orientation, of the individual, underlying individual acts of perception and volition; b) the will, or individual volitional acts arising from the fundamental inclination; c) sensation, or perception. The word "heart" is often used interchangeably with "inclination," "will" and their synonyms. It is considered the "seat" of sensation and
perception.

5) As comprehending both intellect and will, the heart is loosely taken for the “whole soul,” not as a mere aggregation of discreet faculties, but as an integrated totality of perception and volition, determined by the basic affective inclination, or fundamental amative orientation.

6) The regenerate are given a special supernatural "sense" or “perception” which conveys an “idea” of God’s qualities as “beautiful” and “amiable.” The sense also convinces the saint of the certainty and reality of divine things.

7) As "beautiful" and “amiable, God’s qualities elicit affections of “delight,” “complacency,” issuing in an un-self-regarding love toward God for his own sake.

8) The principal "beauty" or "excellency" of God is his "holiness." None of his other qualities can be amiable without this.

9) “Spiritual” knowledge, properly speaking, consists in this “sense of the heart,” or affective apprehension, of God’s beautiful and amiable qualities.

10) True piety consists largely in this spiritual knowledge, or sense of the heart.

Because many scholars have believed, and continue to believe, that the Aristotelian-Thomistic scheme was the only psychological model available to seventeenth-century puritans, there has been a tendency to view Edwards’s own model, and hence, perhaps, his definition of true piety, as dependent on that model, as either original to Edwards, or derived from Enlightenment thought. However, Edwards’s psychology of the “heart” belongs to a tradition equally as old as the Aristotelian-Thomistic scheme. It has several important
sources:

1) Ancient middle-Eastern and biblical psychology, which viewed the “heart” as the vital, intellectual, volitional and affective centre of the personality, signifying the soul as a totality.

2) Greek physiology, which considered the heart as the seat of perception and emotion, as well as the determiner of the basic “disposition” of the personality.

3) Augustine, who blended the biblical and Greek language, and regarded the heart as the centre of intellectual, percipient and emotional activity. He also identified the affections with *voluntas* (the “will”). He developed a notion of the fundamental amative orientation of the personality, which he calls the “love” (*amor*) or “weight,” or “gravitation” (*pondus*) of the soul, either of, or toward, heavenly or earthly reality. Finally, Augustine considered “delight” (*delectatio*) in God as a “will-act” distinctive of true piety.

4) Monastic traditions, and especially Bernard of Clairveaux and William of St. Thierry, who attributed perception to the “heart” and developed a theory of “mystical contemplation” as a cognitive-volitional-affective apprehension of the divine.

5) The scholastic voluntarists, particularly a) Bonaventure, who tended to identify intellection with volition, and used the Augustinian language of *pondus voluntatis* to signify the fundamental amative orientation of the personality; and b) Scotus, who defined theology as a *disciplina practica*, and regarded the “will” as a fundamental inclination (*inclinatio*) of the affections. Although the
scholastic voluntarists rarely use the word “heart,” their understanding of volition is basically similar to that of Edwards.

6) Renaissance-Reformation neo-Augustinianism, which revived Augustine’s heart language and identified the “will” with the affections. This group includes Melanchthon, Vives and Calvin.

7) Roman Catholic and Protestant neo-scholastic voluntarists. Suarez is an example of the former, and Keckermann of the latter. Keckermann defined theology as a *prudentia religiosa*. His account of the “heart” mixes Greek physiological language with biblical heart-psychology.

These various traditions passed into puritan pietism. Pietists such as Ames defined theology as a practical, rather than a speculative, discipline, and duly honoured the affections as the “springs” of action and practice. They identified the affections and the will. The term “will” could be associated narrowly with individual voluntative acts, or defined more broadly as the basic “inclination,” “bent,” “bias,” “weight,” “propensity,” “preponderation,” “disposition,” “love,” or fundamental amative orientation of the personality. As such, it was often regarded as the principal object of the regenerating Spirit. The “will” was also identified with the “heart” as signifying the whole soul, not as an aggregation of discreet faculties, but as an integrated totality, and “one principle of moral operations” (Owen), the single “spring” of all action (Goodwin) and the seat of “all inward operations,” intellectual, volitional and affective (Charnock). The regenerate heart, as percipient, was often termed “circumcised,” indicating that it was made “sensible” of divine reality (Owen). As such, it had not only a new “bent” or “bias,” but also new sensations and

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perceptions of God's excellent and beautiful qualities. These perceptions were attended both with a sense of certainty as to the reality of spiritual things, and with "delight" and "relish." The principal "beauty" of God was holiness. Many puritans defined true piety, or "heavenly mindedness," chiefly in terms of an "affectionate" or "heating" knowledge of spiritual reality. In so doing they reconciled the intellectual and emotional dimensions of religious experience.

The concept of the "heart" as the affective, integrating principle of the personality was theologically important to puritanism as providing 1) an elegant explanation of how a single regenerating grace can affect the entire personality; and 2) a weapon against Arminian rationalism.

Many of Edwards's puritan predecessors used heart-psychology along side the Aristotelian-Thomistic model, shifting back and forth between heart-language and intellectualist language according to their polemical context.

Edwards inherited the above traditions and, in Religious Affections, organized them into a coherent, systematic whole. Unlike his predecessors, he commits himself more consistently to the voluntaristic psychology. Religious Affections, perhaps for the first time in the history of pietism since Augustine, offers the kind of systematic articulation of heart-psychology which the intellectualist model had received under Thomistic scholasticism. In this sense, Religious Affections is unique in puritanism. However, all the individual concepts from which Religious Affections is constructed, and all the elements of Edwards's heart-psychology, had already been developed and expressed in seventeenth-century puritanism.
Edwards’s notions of will and perception, as articulated in *Religious Affections*, bear only a superficial resemblance to the corresponding concepts in Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Locke neither identifies volition with affection, nor considers perception as essentially affective. Nor does the concept of “heart” occur anywhere in the Essay. Finally, Edwards’s concept of religious knowledge, as an affective apprehension of divine things, little resembles Locke’s view of religious knowledge.
Chapter Four: General Summary and Conclusion

When *Religious Affections* is compared with earlier puritan treatises dealing with the nature of regeneration and the distinction between genuine and spurious piety, it can be seen as faithfully preserving an important tradition of puritan pietistic pneumatology extending back to the late sixteenth century. *Religious Affections* is heavily indebted to that tradition for 1) its analysis of the criteria of religious sincerity and hypocrisy, 2) the method it follows, concentrating on signs of regeneration, rather than on the process of conversion, and 3) the model of human psychology which it adopts. So far from being *fundamentally* innovative, either in form or content, *Religious Affections* is a conservative extension of standard, seventeenth-century puritan pietism into the mid-eighteenth century.

The puritan tradition which shaped the ideas expressed in *Religious Affections* is essentially that of the "spiritual brotherhood," described by Haller, Irvonwy Morgan, and other earlier scholars. To this tradition belong such figures as Greenham, Baynes, Sibbes, Shepard, Goodwin, Charnock and others who emphasized "experimental" piety and "affectionate knowledge" of the Gospel. They are Baxter's "affectionate, practical English writers." Other puritans influenced by this tradition include Owen, Flavel and Baxter himself.

Also included among the spiritual brotherhood are Perkins and Ames. Because of their explicit covenant-theology, Janice Knight classifies Perkins and Ames among the "Intellectualist Fathers," who constituted a tradition opposing
the "Spiritual Brethren." However, both these theologians were associated with
the spiritual brotherhood, not only personally as youthful disciples, but also in
their attitudes to the issues treated in Religious Affections. Perkins articulated a
theory of a special "apprehension" and "feeling knowledge" of divine things,
analogous to sense perception and conveying a degree of certainty concerning
spiritual realities analogous to that conveyed by the physical senses with regard
to natural reality. Ames espoused an Augustinian voluntarism anticipating
Edwards's own psychological model. Both Perkins and Ames, like Edwards,
declared theology teleologically as a practical, rather than a speculative, science.

Edwards differs from some of the earlier spiritual brethren, such as
Greenham, Ames and Shepard, in rejecting the necessity of terror in the process
of conversion. However, in this rejection, Edwards was anticipated by other
seventeenth-century authors. Preston, often regarded as a strict preparationist,
ocasionally questioned the supposed indispensability of terror in conversion,
and he rejected the idea that terror was proof of regeneration. Owen asserted
that terror was not a necessary duty, but merely a normal feature in the
conversion experience, and often so slight as to be almost imperceptible. Like
Edwards, Owen distinguished conviction of sin from terror, and regarded
conviction, the recognition of God's justice in condemning sinners, and
approval of the "Gospel-way" of salvation, as the true requisites of conversion,
and signs of genuine faith. Edwards's own qualified acceptance of the
normativity of terror, and his defense of a step-wise analysis of conversion
suggests, once again, that the distinction asserted by Janice Knight between the
"intellectual" and "spiritual" traditions within puritanism is not absolute.

An interest in the signs of genuine faith had been a feature of puritanism since the late sixteenth-century. While preparationism was fashionable, discussion of signs coexisted with analyses of the step-wise process of conversion, as can be observed in Greenham's writing. However, with recognition of the theological problems inherent in preparationism, as well as the difficulty of systematizing the "unspeakable variety" characterizing the conversion experience, the focus of discussion tended to shift to the nature of regeneration, and the signs distinguishing the "sincere convert" from the "close hypocrite." Goodwin's pneumatological work, for instance, contains no discussion of preparation, concentrating exclusively on the nature and signs of the new birth. By the 1660's, treatises by Perkins, Dyke, Mead and Crook had appeared, analyzing the nature of, and explaining the distinctions between, faith and hypocrisy. The contrast between these two categories is, of course, an important structural principle of Religious Affections.

Many of the earlier works investigated here, such as those by Perkins, Rogers, Mead and Crook, adopt a structure similar to Religious Affections, systematically presenting ambiguous and fallible signs, followed by certain and unambiguous marks of true piety. The two chief signs of true piety are sincere, un-self-regarding love and "obedience," or sanctified conduct.

The psychology employed by Edwards to describe true piety fuses Augustinian voluntarism, which finds its purest expression in William Ames, with the language of the spiritual sense which, although it occurs in most of the
authors surveyed here, finds its most developed puritan expression in Sibbes, Goodwin and Owen.

Voluntarists, such as Ames, divided human interiority into two, rather than three, basic constituents, the understanding and the will. In this view, the will is not understood as a “rational appetite,” but as a fundamental amative “inclination,” “bias” or “propensity,” orienting the human person affectively either toward the world of sin and self, or toward God and divine reality. As such, the will not only comprehends the affections, but also constitutes, as a fundamental love, a form of affection.

As the fundamental inclination, or amative orientation, of the soul, the will not only determines how one feels, but also how one perceives reality, either as “amiable” or “loathsome.” The influence which the voluntative inclination exercises on perception, constitutes the link between the emotional and the intellectual dimension of the personality, between the “affections” and the “understanding.”

The mind, insofar as it is inclinational, or characterized by feeling, whether at the volitional or intellectual level, is called the “heart.” This was a term which the puritans inherited from several sources, including Scripture, Greek physiology, Augustine, monastic literature and the neo-Augustinianism of the Renaissance and Reformation. In these sources, “heart” was described as having both an intellectual-percipient and a volitional-affective dimension. As such, “heart” was a unitive concept, fusing understanding and will. It stood loosely for the human personality conceived as a totality, integrated by its fundamental inclination, affection or amative bent.
The concept of the “heart” was an important one for seventeenth-century puritanism. First, it provided an elegant explanation as to how God could, by a single regenerative act, affect the entire personality, “mind, will and affections,” by simply altering the fundamental amative orientation. This interior process is what many puritans referred to as the “circumcision of the heart,” indicating the sensitization of the mind to the beauty and amiableness of divine reality.

Second, it provided an argument against Arminianism, since, as the puritans insisted, conversion does not occur at the level of belief or obedience per se, but at the level of the heart, the fundamental amative orientation of the soul, over which a person has no control or power of determination.

Because of the percipience traditionally attributed to it, the puritans associated the heart with the “spiritual sense” bestowed in regeneration. This special percipience conveyed to the believer a strong impression of the beauty and amiableness of divine reality, thereby provoking a strong response of love, and reorienting the fundamental inclination away from the “world” to the things of God. The spiritual sense was associated by some puritans, such as Richard Sibbes, with the “spirit of power” contrasted with, and complementing, the “spirit of illumination.” This latter “spirit” represented a conceptual apprehension of the Gospel, without implying an emotional response. In some authors, such as Perkins and Goodwin, the spiritual sense also involves that same sense of certainty about divine realities, as physical sense is supposed to convey about the natural world.

Although any of God’s qualities might be the objects of the heart’s spiritual
perception, exciting a sense of sweetness and delight in the believer, many
puritans insisted that is was God’s moral qualities (justice and holiness) rather
than his natural qualities (omnipotence, omniscience, aseity), that the
regenerate properly relished and loved. This point, although it occurs as early
as Greenham, is found more frequently in the latter part of the seventeenth
century, articulated by such authors as Owen, Charnock, Flavel and Baxter. It
is interesting to note that Edwards’s own youthful conversion experience, as
described in the oft-quoted Personal Narrative, does not, according to
Edwards’s own criteria articulated in Religious Affections, constitute a genuine
conversion.

Owen, in his Grace and Duty of Spiritual Mindedness, probably the single
puritan treatise most resembling Edwards’s Religious Affections, asserted, like
Edwards, that “spiritual affections” were the essence (“spring and substance”)
of true piety; that they were founded principally on God’s “moral” attributes of
justice and holiness; and that, conjoined with “holy practice,” the affective
apprehension of God’s “excellence” was the principal evidence of true piety.

Jonathan Edwards inherited the traditions of seventeenth-century heart
language, and re-articulated all the points noted above. He also contributed to
the tradition by giving it a more precise and coherent expression than it had
received under earlier puritans. Noting that the conventional language was
considerably “loose and unfixed,” he carefully defined “inclination,” “will” and
“heart.” Having done so, however, Edwards did not always observe the
semantic distinctions he had established, and sometimes uses these three
Edwards also seems to have been the first puritan pietist, since William Ames, to adhere scrupulously to the bipartite model of human interiority. In many of his predecessors, such as Sibbes and Owen, one finds a tendency to shift back and forth between the bipartite pietist psychology and the tripartite Aristotelian-Thomistic model. By not committing themselves to a single psychological model, Sibbes and Owen may have reaped certain rhetorical advantages. However, it involved them in conceptual inconsistencies which the philosophically more precise Edwards would not have tolerated. In addition, by opposing those pastors who, during the Great Awakening, had denigrated the role of the affections in the religious life, Edwards committed himself to presenting a coherent account of the bipartite model traditionally associated, however loosely, with the pietist strain of puritan tradition.

Edwards differs from his puritan predecessors not only in the systematic consistency and exhaustiveness of his presentation of religious affectivity, but in his polemical and defensive posture. None of his seventeenth-century predecessors suggests that the role of affectivity in religion needs to be defended. Although traditional rationalist-voluntarist controversies continued throughout the seventeenth century, and informed attitudes to spirituality, there is little evidence in the authors investigated here that that degree of hostility to religious affectivity, of which Edwards complains, provides a polemical context for their work.

Edwards also develops the tradition of heart-language by twice using the Lockean technical term “simple idea” to characterize the “new birth.” The
advantage of this term is that, whereas the traditional language of “sense,” “sensation” and “perception” can refer both to the percipient act and to the resulting mental content, the term “idea” unambiguously refers only to the latter. However, it is not clear that Edwards particularly valued this advantage, since not only does he not confine himself to this term, but he rarely even uses it. It is possible that Edwards might have wished to avoid the terminology of a spiritual “sense,” lest he convey the impression that regeneration introduced a new “faculty” into the soul. But Edwards does not entirely avoid the language of the new sense.

The traditional language of spiritual sensation would have suggested to Edwards the appropriateness of adapting the Lockean term “simple idea” to his discussion of the nature of regeneration. However, Edwards reinterprets the term, investing it with a necessary affectivity which it does not possess in Locke. In fact, the significance of the term as used by Edwards corresponds more closely to traditional puritan concepts of affective perception, as well as to the concepts of perceptio and simplex intelligentia as used by Peter van Mastricht.

In addition, Edwards's understanding of will, as being indistinguishable from affectivity also differs from the Lockean concept of will. Finally, Edwards's concept of religious knowledge bears little resemblance to that of Locke.

For the contemporary scholar, Edwards's pattern of footnoting in Religious Affections presents a puzzle. On the numerous occasions on which Edwards
cites his seventeenth-century predecessors, it is to support assertions which a
modern scholar would consider uncontroversial from the point of view of
conventional puritanism. However, where Edwards asserts ideas which
modern scholars would consider uncharacteristic of earlier puritanism,
Edwards rarely cites any authorities, even where plenty of authorities existed
and were known to him. For instance, John Smith is cited concerning
Christian obedience and enthusiasm, but not about the spiritual sense. The
problem, of course, may lie rather with modern scholars than with Edwards.
Nevertheless, it seems odd that Edwards should cite authorities for many, but
not all, aspects of Religious Affections.

Edwards's Religious Affections is perhaps unique in puritan literature as
apparently being the only work which attempts to articulate the kind of
thorough, coherent, and systematic treatment of heart-psychology, as the
intellectualist model had already received under Thomism. However, the
individual concepts out of which Edwards constructs Religious Affections,
although not previously systematically organized and given philosophic
treatment, had already been, in all essentials, developed, expressed and
exploited in seventeenth-century puritanism. In addition, it should be noted
that Religious Affections is not the only work which presents a unitary pietistic
psychology, and attempts to evaluate sincere piety in terms of a percipient-
volitional-affective function of the soul analogous to sense perception. This
had already been attempted by Owen in The Grace and Duty of Being Spiritually
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