Exploration, Knowledge, and Empire in Africa: The Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, 1886-1890

by

Ruth Rempel

A Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of History, University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT

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A Dissertation for a Doctor of Philosophy Degree
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The Emin Pasha Relief Expedition travelled from the mouth of the Congo River to Zanzibar between 1886 and 1890. The Expedition’s ostensible purpose was to bring relief supplies to Emin Pasha, the governor of Equatoria, in the Egyptian Sudan. However, the Expedition was also linked to the formation of the Imperial British East Africa Company and to Leopold II of Belgium’s nascent Congo Free State. The Expedition’s aftermath included months of public debate in Britain and elsewhere about its purpose and conduct, as well as broader discussion of the nature of European travel in Africa. Within Africa, the Expedition attempted to create a new route between the upper Congo River and Lake Albert. In this effort it built on and competed with the east-coast based traders active in the region, thus becoming part of a broader process of violent transformation on the expanding frontier of long-distance trade.

To date, scholarly and popular writing about the Expedition have focused on its place in European imperial politics and on its European participants. This thesis employs newly available primary sources to examine previously neglected aspects of the Expedition and of late nineteenth century travel in East-Central Africa. Drawing on recent work in the sociology of science and technology, it examines the ways in which European travellers made use of African expertise and resources for travel. It traces the dynamic links the Expedition created between persons, institutions, objects, texts, and the physical environment in East-Central Africa and elsewhere. It provides an opportunity to study the construction of agency and identity, as well as the ways in which power was constituted and deployed in specific interactions between Africans and Europeans. These interactions were part of a mutual, but contested construction of Africa and Africans on which subsequent European imperial activities in the region were based. Further, because this Expedition was so well-documented, it allows an intensive study of the strategies of the its Zanzibari
porters. Accounts of the Expedition also provide a unique opportunity to study the dynamics of unequal access to food within large European-led caravans, using the concept of entitlement.
Acknowledgments

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**Maps**

- The Route of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition: vii
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Notes on Terminology

Geographical place names present difficult choices for writers about European exploration in Africa. Use of the names bestowed by explorers reiterates in a little way European control over the terrain of Africa, though some of these explorers were concerned to collect and apply indigenous names to natural features. On the other hand, some modern Africanized place names present problems as well. It is not clear to me, for example, that Lake Mobutu Sese Seko is to be preferred over Lake Albert. Further complicating matters is the partial change in geographical terms which accompanied the recent change of government in the Congo/Zaire. Since I quote a great deal from European sources on the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, I believe it will be less confusing for readers if I use the same geographic labels that my primary sources do. However, I try to balance this by calling into question beliefs about the powers of the imperial initiative which helped to put those names on the African landscape.

Further, I will use the generic terms European and African to describe persons descended from the inhabitants of either of these two continents. These terms explicitly include persons who were born in or lived in North America. Where more specific designations, like Englishman or Zanzibari, are helpful for my argument, I will use them. I recognize that these terms mask tremendous diversity of origin in their stress on a geographic foundation of identity.

Abbreviations

BLEM British Library Exported Manuscripts Collection
BMS Baptist Missionary Society
CFS Congo Free State
CMS Church Missionary Society
DOAG Deutsche Ost-Afrika Gesellschaft
IBEACO Imperial British East Africa Company
IDA In Darkest Africa
JRTC John Rose Troup Collection
HMS Henry Morton Stanley
MP Mackinnon Papers
RGS Royal Geographical Society
The Route of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition
Based on John Bartholomew, "New Map of Central Africa, showing the route and discoveries of Stanley's Emin relief expedition,"
Edinburgh Geographical Institute, 1890
Introduction

The roots of this thesis lie in my own experiences in Africa. In the late 1980s, I spent three years working at a Teachers’ Training College for women located in the Luwero District of Uganda. Both before and after this experience I had traveled in eastern, northeastern and southern Africa. Throughout those years I kept a diary. Re-reading parts of this diary, I was and am struck by some of the stereotypic images of Africa it contains. To give only one example: The College where I taught was located in a rural community. With the civil war in Uganda only recently over in mid-1986, colleagues and neighbours advised Kathleen Venema, the other Canadian woman teaching at the College, and I that it was not safe to take walks off the main road. We decided one afternoon, after two years of keeping to the road, to have an off-road adventure. We chose a path at random. It took us through swamps, across streams, up hills and around over-grown coffee fields. The path kept branching and we branched with it. It finally ended at a farm, to our surprise and that of the family who lived there. When we explained, with some embarrassment, that we had not come to visit but were lost, a group of children escorted us back to the road. The diary passage that described this little expedition was full of stereotypes of the exotic character and essential impenetrability of Africa. How, I wondered, did a late twentieth century woman with a liberal education and a childhood that included several years in Africa acquire such stereotypes? Coming back to Canada to do graduate study, I pursued this question. I went back in time, looking for the roots of such images. I was convinced I would find
answers in work by or about explorers, especially in descriptions of first contact between Europeans and peoples in the interior of Africa.

My travels in Africa also exposed me to the realities of catastrophic hunger and its connection to inequity. In Ethiopia at the height of the 1984-85 famine, I saw irrigated fields of tobacco within half an hour’s drive of emergency feeding centers where people were dying. Kenya, I knew through the research of my father, was experiencing as severe a drought and food shortage as Ethiopia, but few Kenyans were dying of hunger. My father introduced me to Amartya Sen’s theories of entitlement as a way to explain these phenomena. In Uganda during the war in 1985, I saw that in the hands of an ill-paid soldier, a gun became as important a tool for gaining access to food as a hoe or cooking pot. The activities of Obote’s undisciplined army created an escalating cycle of outrage that made it impossible for the soldiers to consider laying down their weapons and returning to civilian life. These military depredations were compounded by the actions of civilian opportunists, one of whom explained to a colleague that while the Bible forbade theft, nowhere did it say “Thou shalt not loot.” In the aftermath of the war, I saw the devastating impact of an army encampment on the village of Ndejje in Luwero District, where I lived and taught. It took years for members of this formerly prosperous community to rehabilitate the remnants of their houses, fields and flocks. A surplus of food and a local market in food also reemerged slowly. I have incorporated these insights and theories into my descriptions of the dynamics of hunger within the Expedition and of the Expedition’s impact on the indigenous communities from which it took food and shelter in Chapters 3 and 6. These insights are also reflected
in my discussion of the dynamics of conversion among the followers of Zanzibari traders in Chapter 6.

Second, this thesis grows out of my political engagement with issues of debt and structural adjustment in Africa. I have been involved with debt issues since my return from Uganda, first for Mennonite Economic Development Associates, then for the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa. This led to a term representing Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on the World Bank-NGO Committee and three years on the World Bank's External Gender Consultative Group. Through this activism I became aware that there are true believers on both sides of the structural adjustment debate. The question over which I puzzled was: how do economic experts, mostly from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but also African Ministry of Finance officials, observe conditions in African countries and then construct them as places where structural adjustment is the answer. Even more puzzling, when they evaluate these programs, how do they construct Africa as a place where structural adjustment is working?

I see strong parallels between this twentieth century process of constructing Africa and the way in which late nineteenth century European explorers constructed Africa as a place where particular kinds of European intervention were necessary. The twentieth century economist Robert Klitgaard, reflecting on his years as an economic advisor and surf connoisseur in Equatorial Guinea, noted that expert missions were the main form of engagement between African governments, African societies and the

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1 See, for example, H. Rempel, "The Food Situation in the Horn of Africa," Working Paper No. 420, Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, 1985.
international financial institutions. He felt these groups conducted themselves like fighter pilots making bombing runs and like religious groups bent on conversion. Both these behaviours were contained in the word mission. What was it about these modern day missions or expeditions to Africa that produced this mixture of power and conviction? I wanted to find a way of explaining how these missions, whose members came from various parts of the world though they were usually educated and employed in the North, constructed Africa. How were they, in turn, constructed by their activities in Africa and by their interaction with Africans and African institutions? Also, how did their constructions overlap with or conflict with those of groups within adjusting countries?

These were not easy topics to research. Working on this kind of current history presented many methodological and practical problems, especially before the World Bank instituted new policies on information disclosure. I decided to transfer my interests to the nineteenth century, hoping I could work out an approach that I could bring to these late twentieth century questions. Looking at the construction of Africa associated with self-styled European explorers seemed to be a topic suited to working out the methodological approach in which I was interested.

I chose to use Actor Network Theory, a body of theory developed within the sociology of science and technology, as the starting point for my work on exploration. This theoretical approach highlights the ways in which knowledge of Africa held by both Europeans and Africans was embedded in persons, practices and things, as well as inscribed in texts. As I discuss in Chapter 1, John Law’s application of this theory to

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2 R. Klitgaard, *Tropical Gangsters: One Man’s Experience with Development and Decadence in*
sixteenth century Portuguese exploration first suggested to me the possibilities of using this theory to study nineteenth century European exploration in Africa. The main thing I have taken from Law’s work is the concept of route. To create and maintain a route, I argue, is to build a network that draws together a variety of elements: land and nature, persons, institutions, items of technology, and knowledge stored in various forms. At the same time, there are aspects of Actor Network Theory that I have not used or used only in very limited ways, especially the theory’s most distinctive and controversial element—the ascription of agency to non-human entities.

The study of exploration has struggled to break free of assumptions that have come in the baggage train of travel that is defined in terms of contact with the unknown. These include assumptions about indigenous geographical knowledge and technology for travel, as well as assumptions about the figure of the explorer. Actor Network Theory is an interesting tool with which to take a new look at exploration. Use of this theory makes it easier to see the connections and continuities, as well as the changes and conflicts between the activities of European explorers and African travellers. Viewing a route of travel as a network that combine heterogeneous elements reveals the extent to which and, more importantly, the means by which European exploration appropriated indigenous expertise, labour, and resources for travel. In doing so, this theoretical perspective also offers a new look at indigenous systems for travel. While explorers were busy trying to co-opt and build upon these systems, they were necessarily engaged in additional discursive work. They needed to construct the unknown land as exotic and

undeveloped, and its inhabitants as primitives, lacking the technology for travel and incapable of progressing without European intervention. Explorers were simultaneously engaged in self-construction, creating themselves as historical actors and as the unique kind of travellers who incorporated new lands and peoples into the known world. This was a specialized and concentrated form of a broader process of invention—other Europeans were constructing themselves, with mixed success, as new and powerful agents in Africa. Powerful, African agents with rival networks of travel based on competing visions for regional transformation in Africa were constructing themselves in corresponding ways. Actor Network Theory reveals the connections between these various discursive and material activities. It offers an orderly way to combine disparate elements, such as texts, objects, practices, people and land into an understanding of these activities. In addition, it raises interesting questions about the flow of causality and the creation of agency in the course of these constructions of Africa.

Although I spent a great deal of time thinking through my theoretical approach, my choice of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition was somewhat arbitrary. It was the episode of exploration about which there was the most information available in Toronto. Also, for Stanley, the head of Expedition, European interaction with Africa was structured around transportation, trade, and development, which provided an opportunity for me to reflect on these issues in a late nineteenth century context. In addition, the Expedition turned out to be one of the best-documented European expeditions of the late nineteenth century. This wealth of information was both a blessing and a curse in writing

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my thesis. In fact, the Expedition turned out to be such a large topic that I was forced to make difficult choices about the aspects of it on which I would write. I chose to focus on two key groups within the Expedition, the porters and the officers, on some activities and ideas connected to issues of power, and on the process of making routes in the one area where the Expedition was actually pioneering—the equatorial forest.

Iain Smith’s 1972 monograph is the only other scholarly study of the Expedition. 4 When it appeared, Smith’s book remedied the lack of a history of the Expedition, a gap he had noted with surprise, given historians’ recognition of the Expedition’s role in the European partition of Africa. 5 Smith not only drew on the established body of published primary sources about the Expedition, 6 he was the first to make use of the many sources of unpublished material on the Expedition, particularly the records of the Emin Pasha Relief Committee. Smith also aimed to contribute to the history of Egypt’s empire in the southern Sudan through his use of primary sources from the Mahdist regime, from Emin Pasha’s administration, and from British Army Intelligence interviews with Emin’s soldiers. I am indebted to Smith’s ground-breaking research. He identified the important archival sources on the Expedition, many of which I have also consulted. Since the publication of Smith’s study, however, new archival sources on the Expedition have become available. 7 Chief amongst these are Stanley’s private papers, the diaries of William Bonny, and the papers of William Hoffmann. I have also found an account of the Expedition written by the translator

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5 Smith, Expedition, viii. When Smith was writing, the only modern account of the Expedition was that of Olivia Manning. Her work is discussed in Chapter 2.
7 The location of these various sources is described in my bibliography of archival sources. Two sources that have recently come to light and have not yet been incorporated into writing about the
Assad Farran. Though I have used these new sources to make modifications to Smith’s account of the Expedition, I have largely accepted and built on the framework of events, actors and motives he established. Smith’s work provides the narrative foundation that draws together my thematically organized reflections on the Expedition.

My reflections on the Expedition also need to be seen in the context of the growing literature on trade and transportation in East-Central Africa. Like this literature, I look at changes in the regional system of transportation and at the role that trade and competing groups involved with trade played in these transformations. As the Expedition crossed the continent and thus several nationally defined areas of historical study, it gives me opportunity for an unusually broad look at the regional transport system. Actor Network Theory offers a somewhat different view of the nature of this system and of the changes occurring in it. In pursuing this alternate view, I have drawn heavily on Steve Rockel’s thesis on Nyamwezi caravan porterage. His insight that East-Central African routes were defined by the needs and skills of porters is central to my view of the regional system. Study of the Expedition also allows a look at the frontier of the regional transportation system, at that time in the north-east part of the Congo River basin. The Expedition and groups of Zanzibar-connected traders were both striving to create routes there, the latter much more successfully than the Expedition. The Expedition’s conduct in the Congo forest also gives a sense of the impact of a large caravan on the communities and land through which it passed. The Expedition’s other unique attribute is its wealth of documentation. This allows an unprecedented look at

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8 Relevant portions of this literature are summarized and discussed in the second half of Chapter 1 and the beginning of Chapter 2.
the experience and strategies of the Expedition’s porters, as well as a study of the effects of the Expedition’s inequitable and coercive system for access to food.

My work on the Expedition is also part of the recent revival of interest in the period of high imperialism in Africa. This revival represents a moderation of the understandable reaction against the Eurocentric African history that was done up to and even some years after the end of colonial rule in Africa. I start with the assumption that “movement and contamination” are the primary historical forces; “stasis and purity,” to the extent that they exist, “are asserted creatively and violently” against these forces.

My focus is thus on ways in which parts of both Africa and Europe were being changed, being “invented” in encounters between their inhabitants. Europe and Africa were not two “sociocultural wholes... brought into relationship” by the actions of the Expedition, but “systems which [were] already constituted relationally.”

Through the activities of groups like those involved with the Expedition, the inhabitants of these continents were constructing new relationships, unfortunately often ones characterized by high levels of inequality and coercion. My questions about this encounter, in common with other studies of late nineteenth century imperialism, focus on issues of power and agency. For instance, I question assumptions about the powers of Europeans in Africa, answering the call for studies which “analyze in specific situations how power is constituted, aggregated, contested, and differentiated” in colonial encounters.

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10 J. Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 7. Although Clifford addresses himself to the twentieth century, I believe his assumptions can also be applied to the late nineteenth century.
11 Ibid.
important role in the discursive construction of Africa for Europeans and the parallel
collection of Europeans as actors in Africa offers insight into the way identities, practices,
and institutions were shaped through colonial encounters.

I believe that it is not possible to understand events or structures in many parts of
Africa without some reference to the possibilities and constraints introduced through
contacts with other parts of the continent and other parts of the world. Thus I seek to
place this piece of the late nineteenth century African past in the broader context of
world history as well. One contribution of my thesis is its re-examination of the myth-
laden activity of European exploration. Narratives of exploration are the means by which
Europeans understand—and have taught others to understand—that heroic men from
European countries made connections between different parts of the world. It is,
perhaps, not an accident that there has been a revival of interest in the history of
exploration and in accounts of modern travel at a time when globalization, in its
multitude of material and discursive forms, is understood to be making new connections
between various parts of the world. My study of the Expedition queries the narrative of
European exploration, pointing to some of its silences and misrepresentations. In my look at
the structures, purposes and practices of travel by Europeans in late nineteenth century
Africa, I stress the continuities between European and non-European travel. I also
identify ways in which European "explorers" were crucially dependent on indigenous
knowledge and systems of travel.
My study of the Expedition can be situated in the comparative study of imperialism as well.\(^{13}\) I question, for example, whether the Expedition, which possessed some of the archetypal tools of late nineteenth century European imperialism, like the map and the machine gun, was effective in its material re-construction of Africa. Where European members of the Expedition were effective, I argue, was in constructing powerful images of Africa for themselves and for other Europeans. My thesis is thus also a contribution to the history of ideas about Africa.\(^{14}\) I contribute a description of the origin of particular ideas about the equatorial forest held in Europe, as well as a look at how these ideas were related to and competed with the ideas of Zanzibar-based traders active in same region. More importantly, I offer an explanation of why these particular ideas about Africa became powerful. I describe the growing international structures for creating, marketing and consuming information about places like East-Central Africa in the late nineteenth century. I show how texts that were created in and circulated in these structures gained power through their connection with persons, lectures, visual images, institutions and objects.

My approach to the history of ideas about Africa is closer to Curtin's *Image of Africa* than it is to recent works, like Mudimbe's *Invention of Africa*, which focus on the analysis of discourse.\(^{15}\) Like Curtin, I consider aspects of the political economy, as well as elements like philanthropic societies and military campaigns, diseases and machinery, in addition to texts. However, with my narrower focus on ideas associated with just one

\(^{13}\) A good example of this new comparative literature is F. Cooper & A.L. Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

\(^{14}\) This literature is discussed in Chapter 1.
enterprise, I am able to take a more detailed look at those ideas, and at the structures and activities associated with them. In addition, I go farther than Curtin in bridging the two competing analytical approaches to entities like disease and nature. These have been presented as either historical actors in their own right or as changeable social constructs, as “texts.” Actor Network Theory brings together elements of both these approaches, simultaneously viewing these entities as socially constructed objects and as material phenomena that act and are acted upon.  

In writing this thesis I also faced challenges and difficult choices. Three of these require mention. The first challenge is one faced by any historian trying to reconstruct the experiences of low-level members of a hierarchical group from records created by those at or near the top of the hierarchy. I have been able to draw on accounts left by several persons at intermediate levels of the Expedition’s hierarchy, including the translator Assad Farran, the junior officer William Bonny, and Stanley’s servants William Hoffmann and Sali bin Osman. However, my discussion of the strategies of the Expedition’s porters is primarily based on records kept by Stanley and his European officers. I have chosen not to engage the substantial theoretical literature that deals with the ways in which subordinates’ experiences are refracted through the records of superordinates in a colonial context.  I have concentrated my energies on analysis of the unusual wealth of documentation left by those leading the Expedition. I have combined


17 See Cooper, “Conflict and Connection” for a discussion of the implications of one major branch of this literature, subaltern studies, for the study of colonial history in Africa.
a close reading of various written accounts by participants in the Expedition with a careful qualitative and quantitative analysis of the porter lists kept by Stanley and his officers. These document such things as deaths and illnesses, punishments and rewards, debts and bequests, the names of headmen and porters, and the daily allocation of loads. Most of these records had not yet been used by scholars.

The experience of the many indigenous people who encountered the Expedition during its march across Africa created a closely related and much more intractable challenge. As Actor Network Theory emphasizes, the Expedition was trying to make the numerous and heterogeneous elements in its network into a smaller number of more homogeneous and easily controlled entities. Thus Stanley and his officers tried to construct a more easily managed body of Zanzibaris out of the hundreds of porters in their employ, men who had disparate origins and experience. In similar fashion, they and the other members of the Expedition attempted to condense the diverse multitude of peoples they encountered into a small number of comprehensible and tractable groups. This effort produced “natives” and “washenzi.” At times, it also produced tribes and kingdoms, or just forest “natives” who were distinct from the savannah “natives.” However, along the Expedition’s line of march, the “natives” were never as homogenous or predictable as those constructing them wished. These constructions were much more effective in the discursive work of the Expedition.

The historian trying to reconstruct the responses of these peoples to the Expedition from the Expedition’s records consequently faces many problems. These problems are particularly evident in the Expedition’s passage through the forest, the area

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18 See S. Rockel, “Relocating Labor: Sources from the Nineteenth Century,” *History in Africa* 22
on which I have chosen to focus. In many cases, it is even difficult to say with any
certainty whom the people encountered by the Expedition were. The Expedition rarely
spent more than a few days in any one area, and in many parts of the forest the indigenes
fled at the its approach and stripped or even destroyed their villages. These actions
limited the availability of information about their identities and lives, even had the
Expedition’s members had the skill, interest or leisure to collect it. Only one of the
Expedition’s officers, Herbert Ward, had much interest in ethnography. Where the
Expedition created settled camps, better acquaintance with indigenous peoples was
possible. In practice, though, the officers and others collected little better information.
At Ibwiri, the Expedition drove the community’s inhabitants into the forest within days.
After Fort Bodo was built, the Expedition’s garrison kept indigenes out of an area several
miles in radius around Ibwiri and described any who returned as undifferentiated and
hostile “savages.” At Yambuya, many of the former residents made a temporary
community for themselves just across the river and had dealings with members of the
garrison. It is still difficult to identify these people with certainty, though. Stanley noted
that the area around Yambuya “was the resort of all the fragments of tribes for many
degrees around.” The disruption that generated this mixture of people at Yambuya
presaged the upheaval the Expedition observed throughout its time in the forest. The
incursions of long-distance traders and the depredations of the Expedition itself caused
displacement and death, through outright killing and abduction, but also because people

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19 The Expedition’s experiences in the forest are recounted in greater detail in Chapter 6.
20 HMS to F. de Winton, 19 June 1887, Mackinnon Papers, School of Oriental and African Studies, Box
were driven away from their communities if these lay near established paths. The survivors created settlements deep in the forest or were forcibly resettled along the routes being created by the traders, but these new communities were socially mixed and physically transient. The fact that this region of the forest has been one of the areas of Sub-Saharan Africa least studied by modern anthropologists and historians only compounds the lack of information about indigenous peoples in accounts of the Expedition. The description of the peoples the Expedition met in the forest and the reconstruction of their responses to the Expedition is, in itself, a major research project and one I have chosen not to undertake in my thesis. I have said what I felt I could say with any certainty about the Expedition’s encounters with indigenous people in the forest on the basis of the primary source material I assembled. I recognize, though, that the silences of these documents and the scarce secondary literature on the peoples of this region leave a gap in my work on the Expedition.

Last, but not least, is the problem of how to talk about terrible actions for which the Expedition was responsible. These included the harsh discipline meted out to members of the Expedition, and the Expedition’s exploitation, displacement and killing of indigenous peoples. The choice of appropriate language is further complicated by the contemporary politics surrounding depictions of violence and hunger in Africa. Is the choice, as Michael Taussig states, “a matter of finding the right distance”? Of holding these actions and reactions “at arm’s length,” yet not “so far away in clinical reality that we end up having

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21 These contemporary upheavals were layered onto older ones. The area traversed by the Expedition contained markers of two earlier incursions: the spread of cassava cultivation and settlement by speakers of Sudanic languages from the northern forest fringes.
22 R. R. Grinker, Houses in the Rainforest: Ethnicity and Inequality among Farmers and Foragers in Central Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), x & xiv. The pygmy peoples have been the one exception to this lack of scholarly attention.
substituted one form of terror for another." As Taussig also notes, the "right distance" and the right words are all but impossible to find. I have tended to err on the side of dispassionate distance, in part because I am questioning the construction of European travellers as powerful figures in nineteenth century Africa. Continual outrage over their actions and attitudes may imply that these travellers enjoyed a high degree of certainty as well as consistency in thought and action, and that they had powers they did not in fact possess. I have tried to balance this dispassion with clear-sighted depictions of the strategies and tactics of power and, wherever I can with certainty, the naming of its objects.  

CHAPTER 1:
Re-Interpreting European Exploration in East-Central Africa

A late-nineteenth century schoolgirl, much quoted by her contemporaries, wrote on an examination paper: “The interior of Africa is principally used for purposes of exploration.”¹ Henry Morton Stanley, one of the best-known of the explorers who used Africa in this way, pointed out that he not only created geographical knowledge of the interior of the continent, he also created new relationships in time and space. Invited to address the inaugural meeting of the Scottish Geographical Society in late 1884, he told his audience that “geographical knowledge clears the path for commercial enterprise, and commercial enterprise has been in most lands the beginning of civilisation.”² Civilization, for Stanley, implied that a society became part of historical time and that the society experienced progress. Further, he noted that every major city in Britain was linked to Africa and to other parts of “abroad” by lines of transportation, whether actual or potential, and by ties of production and consumption. Consequently, Stanley reminded his audience, the “effect...of the travels, researches, and explorations of a host of bygone travellers is visible to-day in every great centre of industry and commerce throughout the British Empire.”³ The exploration of “abroad” not only left visible traces on the cities, factories, roads and ports of Britain, exploration also marked the bodies of its citizens, since imported food provided sustenance for some thirty million of them.⁴

¹ The Sunday Chronicle, 2 November 1890, Royal Geographical Society Archives, John Rose Troup Collection, vol. III. Hereafter JRTC, vol. III.
³ Ibid., 6.
⁴ Ibid., 2.
However, Stanley’s grand vision of the multitude of links between exploration, knowledge and British imperial expansion finds few echoes in the twentieth century literature on exploration. Much of this literature focuses on individual explorers and gives relatively little attention to the broader implications of their activities. The existing literature on exploration, both that intended for popular audiences and some of the scholarly literature, accepts the standard image of the explorer. He is a white male who penetrates and passes unaided through terrae incognitae and, after a series of marvellous adventures, returns to deposit his new knowledge in the intellectual coffers of Europe. All too often, this means that Africans are bit part players or even props in the explorer’s drama of discovery, and the African landscape is little more than a backdrop. Comparative study is limited to matters like the novelty or perceived difficulty of routes, or to weighing the motives, methods, and legacies of various explorers. Structures or patterns of travel are overlooked. While some of this literature is insightful, well-researched history and biography, a surprising amount, even among works intended for more than the popular market, is still shaped by the conventions of ‘leave no swash unbuckled’ adventure writing.\(^5\)

The literature on travel and travellers, as opposed to explorers, often exhibits more analytic depth. Some of the studies of women travellers and women’s travel writing have been particularly good.\(^6\) However, in studies of both explorers and travellers, there is a tendency to understand the motives and actions of individual explorers or travellers as products of static,

\(^5\) For example, F. McLynn, *Hearts of Darkness: The European Exploration of Africa* (London: Hutchinson, 1992). He intends to provide a sociology of exploration, but remains caught up in the themes of the traditional narrative of European exploration: Africa’s isolation and primitive exoticism, male protagonists who battle external dangers and inner torment, and the conflation of natural and human elements into a single hostile African environment. His work is descriptive rather than analytical, and he makes judgments about the relative greatness of different explorers based on idiosyncratic criteria relating to their style and personality.

taken-for-granted social categories, such as class, ethnicity, or gender. Psychologically inclined writers invoke a similar stock of internal structures such as the "action neurosis," the "death drive" and "mother fixation," or the "schizoid personality disorder." 7 The growing literature on the creation of identity based on class, national, sub-national, or gender affiliations in the home countries of explorers is only minimally incorporated into the study of exploration.

I want to pose a different set of questions about nineteenth century European exploration in Africa, questions that revolve around the issue of knowledge. I believe that European exploration was centrally, though not exclusively, about knowledge. It generated a diverse body of knowledge about Africa and Africans in a variety of contexts, for a variety of purposes. It was complemented by a much less well documented body of knowledge about Europe and Europeans accumulated in various African settings. 8 In both cases, these bodies of knowledge combined information derived from direct observation and that obtained from informants and authorities of various kinds. The knowledge included both descriptive and explanatory material, as well as the applied knowledge that allowed its users to operate successfully in the social, economic, or political situations they encountered.

Above all, the knowledge of Africa accumulated by Europeans at the end of the nineteenth century constructed the continent and its inhabitants as colonizable. European imperial intervention made sense in this constructed Africa. Intervention was not only feasible, it was desirable. How was this kind of knowledge of Africa created and how was it made believable to a European public whose interest in Africa was limited, as well as to a

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7 These are drawn from J. Wasserman's biography of Stanley and F. McLynn's work on Speke and Stanley, all discussed in F. McLynn, *Hearts of Darkness*, 340, 351-2 & 358.

8 One exception is a study which looks at the manipulation by Tswana leaders of knowledge about Britain and the British gained during their travels there. This is N. Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe, and the
sceptical political, intellectual and commercial elite? How was this colonizable Africa translated into initiatives that met with any response but violent opposition from Africans? Also, to what extent did the feasibility and desirability of colonizing Africa depend on self-perceptions of European power derived from their technology for mapping, for healing, and for coercion?\(^9\)

I want to examine aspects of the relationship between exploration, knowledge creation and imperialism through a look at an unusually well documented episode of exploration, the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition. Led by Henry M. Stanley, this Expedition crossed Africa between 1887 and 1889, travelling from the Congo River, via Lake Albert and Lake Victoria, to Zanzibar. It was sponsored by British businessmen, by the Egyptian and British governments, and by King Leopold II of Belgium. The Expedition's ostensible purpose was to provide relief supplies and assistance to Emin Pasha, the governor of the southern-most province of Egyptian Sudan, who was under attack by Mahdist forces. The Expedition's additional purposes included strengthening and expanding the Congo Free State's influence over the upper Congo region, and negotiating with the Sultan of Zanzibar for a concession which became the basis of the Imperial British East Africa Company. The Expedition's aftermath included months of public debate in Britain and elsewhere about its purpose and conduct, as well as a general discussion of European travel in Africa. Public interest in the Expedition sparked a variety of popular and scientific publications about Africa, as well as lecture tours, exhibitions and works of fiction. Stanley's account of the Expedition, *In Darkest White Queen: Victorian Britain through African Eyes* (University of Chicago Press, 1998).\(^9\) McLynn, *Hearts of Darkness*, 175-6.
Africa, was widely read. He sold 150,000 copies of the book in English; it also appeared in numerous translations.¹⁰

One body of literature on exploration for which knowledge is a central issue comes out of literary criticism, rhetoric, and cultural studies.¹¹ While some of this literature deals with the European exploration of Africa, much of it concerns discoveries in the Americas, in Oceania, or in the polar regions. It looks at the (mis)representation of land and indigenous peoples in travel writing. It highlights the strategies and techniques through which representations of other places and peoples were created and then assembled into larger discourses. It also points to the important links between these textual constructions and the simultaneous construction of the self and home country by the European traveller and reader. While valuable, this literature often pays little attention to the context in which the texts it studies were generated, with a consequent tendency to ahistorical generalisation about phenomena like imperialism. In the case of the Expedition, this approach would flatten a context of multiple imperialisms, including non-European imperial expansion and different visions of European imperialism, into a homogeneous enterprise. More problematically, these studies focus so exclusively on the discursive creation of landscapes that they have neither reason nor method to distinguish between, for example, the descriptions of terrain in Bruce Chatwin’s In Patagonia and his Utz, or between the activities described in Ursula Le Guin’s “A Summary Report of the Yelcho Expedition to the Antarctic, 1909-1910” and

¹¹ See, for example, N.T. Simms, My cow comes to haunt me: European explorers, travellers, and novelists constructing textual selves and imagining unthinkable lands and islands beyond the sea from Christopher Columbus to Alexander von Humboldt (New York: Pace University Press, 1995) or D. Spurr, The rhetoric of empire: colonial discourse in journalism, travel writing, and imperial administration (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993).
Robert Peary's *The North Pole.*

While offering a sophisticated look at the textual treatment of "natives" and indigenous assistants, this literature assumes the equivalence between textual violence, on the one hand, and, on the other, the physical activity of the explorer and the historical experience of particular indigenous people who encountered him or her. Underlying this approach is the assumption that there is no subsequent access to the particular time and space that provoked the texts of explorers, and thus no means of evaluating the material causes or effects of exploration.

Some of the questions raised by this literature are exciting. For example, how were the activities of the Expedition represented in a range of texts extending from best-selling first editions to inexpensive pirated ones, from private diaries and letters to public lectures and official reports? How did particular images of Africa and Africans emerge in these different contexts? However, I want to be able to link images, such as those of Africans, with particular encounters in concrete settings. I also want to be able to link texts with social and material phenomena that both precede and follow the creation of the texts. Accounts of the Expedition, for instance, need to be linked with institutions like the geographical societies, newspapers, sponsoring businesses, and governments in England, Egypt, Belgium, Buganda, and the eastern Congo. Further, these institutions were changing as a result of their connection to the Expedition.

Approaches to the history of ideas which do consider these questions are also frustrating. While they pay attention to the ways in which ideas change over time and to historical context, they tend to focus on a recognized body of texts and their authors. One

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recent study of ideas about Africa, for example, focuses on "seminal works of politicians, creative writers, and philosophers." Scholars, like Mudimbe, who use Foucault as their starting point, follow the same path. Mudimbe examines the dialectical relationship between an epistemological field and a discourse about Africa, represented by a number of key texts, such as those of Edward Wilmot Blyden. How was this discourse disseminated beyond the elite spheres in which these texts were generated? Were the ideas in these texts popularized, used, adapted, disputed, or ignored? The assumption by these scholars of a dialectical relationship between ideas and their social contexts is helpful. However, their analysis depends on the choice of a historical time and a place in Africa where literacy characterized not only the upper levels of European society, but also a significant group within Africa and its diaspora.

Other studies avoid the concentration on texts, but make a problematic assumption about causality. They begin with a social, cultural, political or economic context that generates a mental filter of assumptions and stereotypes. These are then brought to bear in contacts with other lands and peoples. The filter determines the images generated by an episode of contact, and these images then cause particular actions and policies toward that land and its peoples. Comaroff and Comaroff, for example, open their study of interaction between the Tswana and Nonconformist missionaries from Britain with a chapter on economic, social, and political change in Britain. They demonstrate how "ideological

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13 K.A. Appiah, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), x. To give an idea of the stature of the persons and texts on which Appiah concentrates his analysis, the creative writer on whose work he focuses is Wole Soyinka, one of Africa's two Nobel laureates in literature.

14 Mudimbe, *Invention of Africa*. Brantlinger, who also uses Foucault as his starting point, considers a wider range of texts, but does not take his analysis outside the realm of these texts. See "Victorians and Africans."
categories and symbolic practices, born in the refashioned culture of industrializing Britain, were to direct [the] civilizing mission" of the missionaries. \(^{15}\) Causality runs from the interests and structures of industrializing Britain, through "a hegemonic worldview" of which the missionaries are "human vehicles," to the beliefs, policies and practices of the missionaries in their interactions with the Tswana. \(^{16}\) Some scholars also consider the mental filter which generated European ideas about Africa to be very resistant to change stemming from either new social, cultural, political or economic alignments in the home country or from new and anomalous data in the visited country. \(^{17}\) This implies that the persisting use of particular metaphors, characterisations, plots, or tropes indicates a significant underlying continuity both in authors and their societies. It assumes, for example, that talk of cannibalism in Ward's *Five Years with the Congo Cannibals* refers to the same concrete practices and has the same discursive and historical effects as the talk of cannibalism in Shoumatoff's "The Emperor Who Ate His People." \(^{18}\)

The Expedition, however, was not only about knowledge and texts, it was also about people, technology, the land, and about struggles over the use of all of these. How do they fit together with texts and the struggles the texts represent? I want to be able to talk about how ideas are embedded and embodied in persons, institutions, objects, and practices as well as in a series of texts. How, for example, were members of the Expedition and the Zanzibari


\(^{16}\) Comaroff & Comaroff, *Revelation and Revolution*, 1:310. The Comaroffs do discuss ways in which the missionaries were "deeply affected" by their interactions with the Tswana, but the structure of their opening chapters suggest the direction in which the authors believe causality chiefly flows.


communities in the eastern Congo simultaneously constructing the forest discursively, living in it and using its resources, and physically modifying it? In addition, through the Expedition persons, institutions, objects, practices and texts were all being transformed. They were simultaneously changing in response to each other through activities taking place both in Africa and in Europe. Some things, ideas and practices—the Maxim gun, cannibal, gentleman, and military discipline, for instance—were clearly important in the conduct of the Expedition, in accounts of the Expedition, or in the structures that grew out of it. How can these be presented as part of the causes and effects of the Expedition? How are they factored into discourse about Africa, into the emerging structures of European imperial control, or into activities by Africans?

An Alternative Framework for Understanding Exploration and Travel

An intriguing alternative approach to exploration can be found in a set of studies done in the sociology of science and technology. In them, John Law draws on Actor Network Theory to sketch the creation of the Portuguese Carreira da India in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In doing so, he suggests a new way to look at the methods of long-distance control central to imperialism. He argues that the Portuguese effort to find a sea route to India and to dominate Indian Ocean trade required the mobilisation of interrelated elements from the technological, economic, political, social, and natural spheres. He uses

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the metaphors of “translation” and “engineering” to describe the “process [by] which sets of relations between projects, interests, goals, and naturally occurring entities—objects which might otherwise be quite separate from one another—are proposed and brought into being.”

One of the important insights of Law’s approach is that such networks are made up of heterogeneous elements. In particular, social networks or structures have technological and natural objects inextricably woven into them. Indeed, this body of theory believes that it is the non-human elements built into a social network that give it durability and power. Law thus argues that a combination of texts, people, and machines or physical objects are the essential raw materials of long-distance control and of imperialism.

The creation of a network also involves the redefinition of its constituent elements. Their characteristics, their functions, and their relationship to entities inside and outside the network must be made clear. For example, the success of the Portuguese route to the Indies required the redefinition or transformation of pilots—men skilled with the magnetic compass, dead reckoning, and observation of ocean or coast—into astronomical navigators. This “social engineering” was carried out in a school established to create a group of men with the requisite knowledge and skills. They were then incorporated into the maritime

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21 The practice of drawing in objects, whether natural or “made,” is presented as the reason why networks built by humans are more powerful than those of other primates, who build their networks almost entirely out of social elements. M. Callon & B. Latour, “Unscrewing the big Leviathan: how actors macrostructure reality and how sociologists help them to do so,” in Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an integration of micro- and macro-sociologies, ed. K. Knorr-Cetina & A. V. Cicourel (Boston:
network. The network also contained redesigned astronomical instruments, charts that redefined known destinations in terms of astronomical data, and rules for the conversion of astronomical observations into routes of travel. These objects and texts were implicated in the knowledge and practices that defined a competent navigator and thus helped to sustain both the role and the individuals in it.

According to Law, the builder of a network also uses its definitions of others to construct monolithic entities whose interests it is able to represent in the context of its project, and whose resources and energies it can use. This involves the conversion of "objects that are numerous, heterogeneous, and manipulable only with difficulty into a smaller number of more easily controlled and more homogeneous entities." These entities are, however, still sufficiently similar to the heterogeneous objects they represent that manipulation of the proxy entities allows the originals to be managed and used as well. Law's discussion of maritime exploration implies that currents, winds, sun and stars were not only being harnessed, but transformed through their incorporation into the Portuguese maritime network. For instance, the multitude of celestial bodies was reduced to a tiny number of useful ones. Theories about the nature of the heavens were abridged into charts giving the position of the sun and polestar at various latitudes. Invisible, but implicit in Law's account, are similar efforts to create consumers and producers of spices with known tastes, production capacities and price responses, as well as efforts to construct malleable

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24 Callon & Law, "Sociotechnical Networks," 64.
entities out of rivals and allies in the existing Indian Ocean trade systems. The Portuguese attempted to impose and maintain their definition of the elements in their network with a variety of devices and strategies, some persuasive, some coercive. Unfortunately, the only specific example that Law discusses is the use of ship-borne cannon by the Portuguese in their early voyages to the Malabar coast.26

In theory, a successful process of translation creates a network of "passive agents" that can be shaped by the network's builder. Ideally, they are subject to its direction and function reliably within its network. Law suggests that networks of long-distance control depend on three interrelated strategies: one for the creation of "docile bodies," a second for the creation of "powerful yet passive and transportable documents," and a third for the creation of "docile devices," whether machines or objects of other kinds.27 In the case of Portuguese maritime expansion, these "docile" elements were supposed to include navigators, astronomical tables, quadrants and astrolabes.28 Having created a network, the network builder is then in a position to "borrow the force" of these passive agents.29 The terms "passivity" and "docility" are Law's attempt to combine Foucault's ideas about power and discipline with McNeill's description of the way military drill creates a controllable unit by making a mass of persons, weapons and other objects into predictable parts of the unit. Such units can be flexibly employed to fulfil the purposes of their leader in both routine and

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26 "Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering," 127. Law omits from his thumbnail sketch of the confrontation between the Portuguese fleets and various opponents on the Malabar coast a large amount of information that could have provided more support for his model than the few details he does include. See, for example, K.M. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance (New York: Collier Books, 1969), 33-4.

27 Law, "Editor's Introduction," 17.

28 While the tables and instruments proved reasonably co-operative, Law observes that despite a concerted effort to make competent navigators out of pilots, "inexpert" navigators were a frequent problem and constituted the "weakest link" in the maritime network. "Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering," 126.

29 Law, "Editor's Introduction," 16.
novel situations precisely because all of their elements are docile.\textsuperscript{30} Consequently, Law suggests that the long-distance control exercised by the Portuguese depended as much, perhaps more, on the fidelity of its envoys and their ability to recruit animate and inanimate allies than it did on their mobility or forcefulness.\textsuperscript{31}

Networks that are built up in this way differ in scope, durability and influence, depending on the elements that are incorporated into them. Networks like the Portuguese route to the Indies that have substantial resources committed to them over extended periods of time are likely to be experienced as "givens" by those in and around them, as well as by subsequent scholars.\textsuperscript{32} However, this network building is also subject to controversy. Elements of the network can question and re-negotiate the ways in which they are defined and expected to act. Externally, a multitude of other network builders and their competing versions of reality can also challenge the network.\textsuperscript{33} Actor Network Theory is thus trying to describe the process "by which...social and natural worlds take form" through continual debates about their origins, their characteristics and boundaries, and through the ability of some actors to define and control others using the versions of reality they have built into their networks.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{30} See Law, "On the methods," 256.
\textsuperscript{31} I will return to Law's ideas on fidelity in Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{33} M. Callon, "Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay," in Power, Action and Belief, 219. Law, "On power," 6. Law does not discuss this aspect of the Portuguese route to the Indies, though the devotion of substantial resources to the construction of the route created strong internal opposition. There was also opposition from the Ottoman Empire, various Indian Ocean states and merchants, as well as from pirates and rival European groups. See, for example, Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance, chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{34} Callon, "Some elements," 224; B. Latour, "The powers of association," in Power, Action and Belief, 270.
One of the exciting things about Law’s approach is that it understands ideas to be both embedded and dynamic. It also provides a clear means of linking texts and their associated discourses to persons, organizations and things in the process of creating knowledge. It shows “the simultaneous production of knowledge and construction of a network of relationships in which social and natural entities mutually determine who they are and what they want.”

Society, in this approach, is not composed of relatively static structures generating durable identities and other social phenomena, it is an ongoing and variable performance. People and things are linked together in a variety of shifting and overlapping structures for a multiplicity of purposes. Further, causality does not only run from stable social structures to phenomena like stereotypes about Africans or the shape of machine guns. Social structures, people, texts and items of technology are all mutually and simultaneously shaped by their ongoing interaction.

Law’s approach provides a way to avoid the clichés of exploration and discovery. It demonstrates that the creation of knowledge about the interior of Africa in the late nineteenth century did not occur ex nihilo through the work of a handful of Europeans. At the same time, it does not present knowledge of Africa as the product of pre-existing social, economic, or political structures in either Africa or Europe. The analytic task in Law’s approach to exploration is one of “discovering the methods by which actors and collectivities articulate conceptions of the natural and social worlds” and the ways in which they then “attempt to impose these on others and the extent to which such attempts are met with success.”

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While intriguing, Law’s approach also has its problems. Law defines an imperial system as one in which a particular nation has developed the “technical capacity for relatively undistorted communication at a global level.” Law sees imperialism as the ideal type of a network in which initiative and decisions flow from the centre outward.

Periphery must respond, as it were, mechanically, to the behest of the centre. Envoys must not be distorted by their passage, and interaction must be arranged such that they are able to exert influence without in turn being influenced.

This model of the Portuguese imperial system is both ahistorical and uninformed by ongoing debates about the nature of imperialism. Robinson’s “excentric” theory of imperialism, to give only one example, suggests that there are a multitude of points in any imperial system where the decisions and actions that define particular episodes of imperialism are taken.

Another problem with Law’s approach is the way a key actor—the network builder—is allowed to define the characteristics of the network it builds, the entities which are recognized to be a part of it, and the language with which they are described. This is the substance of Actor Network Theory’s methodological injunction to “follow the actors.”

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38 “On the methods,” 241. Law goes on to argue that Portugal and Spain were the first nations to develop such a capacity. To be able to say this he acknowledges that he has to exclude China from consideration, though he does not explain his reasons for doing so or for not considering any other instances of imperialism. His definition functions to emphasise the singularity of European expansion after the fifteenth century.

39 Law, “On the methods,” 256. Law allows in a footnote that the pragmatic Portuguese “wisely worked on the assumption that undistorted communication was possible for strategy, but not for tactics” [p. 258, note 9].

40 The kindest interpretation that can be put on Law’s model of imperialism is that he assumes, without adducing evidence to support his assumption, that early Portuguese imperialism was a stable and uncontested system whose construction was widely ascribed to the Portuguese head of state and whose existence and operation were taken for granted by both its builder and by everyone else involved with it. See Callon, “Techno-economic networks.”


42 The injunction arises from Actor Network Theory’s objection to the idea that “the professional sociologist has a more warrantable account of social interests than those whom he or she studies and that expressions by actors of their own interests or those of others must at best be seen as data for the hidden version of events that is visible only to the sociologist;” Law, “On power,” 3. This obviously applies equally to historians.
injunction is a challenging one. It draws attention to aspects of a network that might be ignored by historians or sociologists, but which participants or contemporary observers considered significant. In the case of the Expedition, it highlights the time that Stanley and the Expedition’s sponsors spent generating and trying to control information about the Expedition. They considered this a very important part of their enterprise, but historians have not paid attention to this activity. It also draws attention to the rules by which the “authorship” or creation of a network is attributed to a particular actor or group of actors. However, recreating the perspective of a network’s builder is likely to obscure substantial parts of the network. The route to the Indies, for example, contained many elements invisible in Law’s account, such as the pilot from Malindi who showed Vasco da Gama the way to Calicut. These invisible elements were connected to the long-standing structures of travel and trade in the Indian Ocean that the Portuguese struggled to co-opt and dominate. The fact that Portuguese network builders did not acknowledge these entities does not mean that they were not important, even essential parts of their enterprise. Law’s approach also involves the unexamined reinstatement of the terms and categories of the network builder, such as the concepts of religion, race, gender, class and nature associated with the projects of Portuguese imperialism.43

As a consequence of these choices and assumptions, Law is captured by the standard plot of European exploration and imperial expansion, despite the potential for his theoretical framework to take him beyond it in interesting ways. There is only one significant agent in his description of the Portuguese maritime network—the ruler of Portugal, the clichéd “great man” of conventional history. The named participants in his account are other elite males:

43 See for example, S.L. Star, “Power, technology and the phenomenology of conventions: on being
scientific experts and leaders of expeditionary fleets. Law does not even try to reconcile the brave, ingenious, risk-taking male protagonists of his narrative with the passive envoys of his theoretical model. Law's imperial system is overly coherent, centralised and, despite occasional qualifications, powerful in relation to that which it sets out to explore and dominate. It is also persistent and creative in the face of all opposition, giving its eventual success a whiff of inevitability, despite Law's emphasis on the contingency of networks.

While the Portuguese maritime network is characterised by agency, imbued as it is with order through the purpose and energy of its builder, the Indian Ocean region into which it expanded is a sphere governed by the operations of chance. Fixated on conflict as the means by which actors are defined and networks created, Law also uses the trope of hostile nature that is standard in accounts of European exploration. Law gives the hoary confrontation between Man and Nature a new twist, though. The success of the Portuguese network is predicated not on the defeat of Nature, but upon "her" conversion into an ally, a cooperant in the project of establishing the route to the Indies. In contrast to the detailed attention Law gives the struggle with nature, the peoples of the Indian Ocean are a barely sketched backdrop for Portuguese activities. In Law's account they are much less lively actors and adversaries than the Atlantic.

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44 These men are identified in terms of their occupational categories, their professional ties, and their ethnicity, despite the scepticism of Actor Network Theory about the meaning of such categories. Law appears simply to have used the same categories used in his (secondary) sources. There is no indication of how the prince identified these men, how they identified themselves, or how these identities were developed, invoked, sustained or challenged through the project they undertook together. Law's inconsistent application of the principle of letting the network builder determine how entities are described slants his account toward the conventional narrative of exploration.

45 Law describes the environment in which the Portuguese built their maritime network in terms of a series of contingencies. "It happened that there was no well-armed Muslim shipping in the Indian Ocean. It happened that the Chinese had retired to their coasts." See Law, "Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering," 128-9; "Social Explanation," 247-8. While "lucky chances" played an occasional role in the successes of Portuguese envoys, they had a minor role in the functioning of the Portuguese maritime network; see for example, "Social Explanation," 245.

46 Law, "Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering," 120.
Law's definition of exploration is consequently a limited one, consistent with the traditional narratives of European expansion and scientific discovery. Exploration means heading out into the absolutely unknown, and the explorer who blazes trails through this terrain has no goal other than to be the first to traverse and to know the new territory. Visits to less exotic areas, to merely "little-known" lands, are the task of the traveller rather than the true explorer. Also, according to Law, travel that mixes the pursuit of knowledge with other purposes, such as commerce is, at best, quasi-exploration. This definition of exploration accepts the Eurocentric concept of "unknown" lands. It also dismisses the similarities and continuities between various kinds of travel, and assumes that the construction of geographic knowledge occurs only through activities that are "purely" scientific. It ignores the connections between exploration and commerce identified by explorers like Henry Stanley.

Though Law's studies of Portuguese maritime expansion can be subjected to significant criticism in these and other areas, his approach is still "productive to think with." It can be modified to make visible the activities and views of persons other than the "great man" building a network. It can also be adapted to recognise inequalities among historical actors, and the contingency of the networks they create. With these changes, his approach offers a systematic way to look at the creation and use of knowledge by specific enterprises like the Expedition. In addition, it enriches historical studies of knowledge.

47 "Social Explanation," 245; see also McLynn, Hearts of Darkness, 341.
48 "Social Explanation," 245.
50 Star, "Power, technology, and the phenomenology of conventions."
creation by provoking an examination of their writers’ assumptions about the nature of historical actors and processes.\(^5\)

Further, Law’s approach can generate a productive definition of exploration and travel, one based on his idea of a route as a defined space, a zone of competence, in which travellers can be expected to maintain their integrity and to succeed at their designated tasks. A route is *known*, meaning that it has predictable and manipulable characteristics.\(^6\) To explore is to attempt to create a route by building a network that draws together land and elements of nature, persons, institutions, items of technology, and knowledge stored textually and in other forms. None of these elements or the practices used to draw them together need be new, though the network made from them will be. The Portuguese *Carreira da India* was, for example, a new route only in a limited sense. It had new some new elements, such as ships, navigational practices and winds in Atlantic, but it was also built out of existing routes, sailing practices, ports, products, and goals. Similarly, European exploration in Africa involved the creation of routes out of combination of new and existing elements and practices. These routes existed as parts of a series of overlapping networks for transportation created and maintained by a variety of actors for purposes that were sometimes congruent, and at other times in conflict.

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5. One example of the potential of Actor Network Theory to enrich historical analysis is Mukerji’s study of royal gardens and political power in seventeenth century France. She presents nature as a “laboratory” for the development of a new material culture of political power, a sphere in which power could be accumulated and centralised rather than a vehicle through which it was diffused throughout society. She raises interesting questions about the changing ways in which states relate to land, with new ways of acting on the land and new ways of representing the land generated through military, technological, scientific, and aesthetic practices. C. Mukerji, “The political mobilization of nature in seventeenth-century French formal gardens,” *Theory and Society* 23, no. 5 (1994): 651-77.

Networks of Travel in Late Nineteenth Century East-Central Africa

Travellers in East-Central Africa in the late nineteenth century, whether African or European, entered well-established networks of for the movement of persons, goods, and less tangible things like diseases and ideas. It is worth quoting at some length from the work of a British traveler, Henry Drummond. He described both his experience of travel in Africa and the image of African travel held by his contemporaries in Britain:

Talking of native footpaths leads me to turn aside for a moment to explain to the uninitiated the true mode of African travel. In spite of all the books that have been lavished upon us by our great explorers, few people seem to have any accurate understanding of this most simple process. Some have the impression that everything is done in bullock-wagons—an idea borrowed from the Cape, but hopelessly inapplicable to Central Africa.... Others... suppose that the explorer works along solely by compass, making a bee-line for his destination, and steering his caravan through the trackless wilderness like a ship at sea. Now it may be a surprise to the unenlightened to learn that probably no explorer in forcing his passage through Africa has ever, for more than a few days at a time, been off some beaten track. Probably no country in the world, civilised or uncivilised, is better supplied with paths than this unmapped continent. Every village is connected with some other village, every tribe with the next tribe, every state with its neighbour, and therefore with all the rest. The explorer's business is simply to select from this network of tracks, keep a general direction, and hold on his way. Let him begin at Zanzibar, plant his foot on a native footpath, and set his face toward Tanganyika. In eight months he will be there. He has simply to persevere.... [H]e plods on and on, now on foot, now by canoe, but always keeping his line of villages, until one day he sniffs the sea-breeze again, and his faithful foot-wide guide lands him on the Atlantic seaboard.

Nor is there any art in finding out these successive villages with their intercommunicating links. He must find them out. A whole army of guides, servants, carriers, soldiers, and camp-followers accompany him in his march, and this nondescript regiment must be fed. Indian corn, cassava, mawere, beans, and bananas—these do not grow wild even in Africa. Every meal has to be bought and paid for in cloth and beads; and scarcely three days can pass without a call having to be made at some village where the necessary supplies can be obtained. A caravan, as a rule, must live from hand to mouth, and its march becomes simply a regulated procession through a chain of markets. Not, however, that there are any real markets—their are neither bazaars nor stores in native Africa. Thousands of the villages through which the traveller eats his way may never have victualled a caravan before. But, with the chief's
consent, which is usually easily purchased for a showy present, the villages unlock their larders, the women flock to the grinding stone, and basketfuls of food are swiftly exchanged for unknown equivalents in beads and calico.

The native tracks which I have just described are the same in character all over Africa. They are veritable footpaths, never over a foot in breadth, beaten as hard as adamant, and rutted beneath the level of the forest bed by centuries of native traffic. As a rule these footpaths are marvellously direct. Like the roads of the old Romans, they run straight on through everything, ridge and mountain and valley, never shying at obstacles, nor anywhere turning aside to breathe. Yet within this general straight-forwardness there is a singular eccentricity and indirectness in detail. Although the African footpath is on the whole a bee-line, no fifty yards of it are ever straight.... Probably each four miles, on an average path, is spun out by an infinite series of minor sinuosities, to five or six [miles]. Now these deflections are not meaningless. Each has some history—a history dating back perhaps a thousand years, but to which all clue has centuries ago been lost. The leading cause probably is fallen trees. When a tree falls across a path no man ever removes it. As in the case of the stone, the native goes round it. It is too green to burn in his hut; before it is dry, and the white ants have eaten it, the detour has become part and parcel of the path. The smaller irregularities, on the other hand, represent the trees and stumps of the primeval forest where the track was made at first. But whatever the cause, it is certain that for persistent straight-forwardness in the general, and utter vacillation and irresolution in the particular, the African roads are unique in engineering."

In physical terms the system Drummond described was a flexible network, a web of pathways representing permutations among all the "viable communities" in any given direction of travel. Viability, Rockel argues, was defined by the need for human porterage, and thus by the presence of food, water, and the other services necessary to reproduce caravan labour. Considerations of toll, security, local markets for trade goods, or taxes at coastal termini were secondary to a regular supply of suitable food and water in determining the combination of paths that could make up a route. These considerations also determined

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54 Rockel, "Caravan Porters," 14, citing H. Kjekshus, Ecological Control and Economic Development in East African History (London, 1977), 121-2. There were three main routes between the interior and the coast in the late nineteenth century: a central pair of routes starting from the Mirma coast opposite Zanzibar and running to the Great Lakes and beyond, a southern route starting at Kilwa and running east and south, and a northern route running east and north from Pangani. Their course and origins are described in Rockel, "Caravan Porters,"
the actual choice of particular paths by a caravan. The importance of food was illustrated by one of the nicknames given to the prominent Zanzibari trader Hamed bin Mohammed el-Murjebi. He was called *Mkangwa Nzala*—Afraid of Hunger—from his saying that "he does not mind a road where there is plenty of fighting, for there there is food, but a road without fighting means hunger." Physical geography, in the form of large natural obstacles was, as Drummond noted, not a primary determinant of routes. These obstacles were not avoided. They were incorporated into routes through the use of technology like canoes to cross rivers and lakes, or through practices like forced marches to pass through areas without water.

Routes not only had a flexible relation to the land through which they passed, they also varied in a relationship with time. In part this was because routes were composed of interconnected networks for movement associated with local, regional and long-distance activities. Local and regional markets, whose trade made up the bulk of movement on pathways in the interior, each had their own rhythm of market days and places, with daily markets emerging at state capitals and caravan provisioning centers. Long-distance trade was temporally defined by a preference for dry season travel, using porter labour during a lighter part of the agricultural cycle. The dry season also allowed greater ease of movement over many kinds of terrain and meant a lower incidence of disease in the caravans. Long-distance trade was also episodic, especially when caravans came from deep

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56 Indirectly, of course, the character of the land set parameters for the availability of food and water. In areas where rainfall was highly variable, the location of communities was flexible. Rockel, "Caravan Porters," 34.
57 Rockel, "Caravan Porters," chapter 2.
59 Rockel, "Caravan Porters," 140-1.
in the interior, as they increasingly did in the late nineteenth century. Leading merchants would accumulate ivory and other goods for years at their settlements in the interior before leading massive caravans to the coast. As will be noted below, long-distance trade also experienced larger spatio-temporal trends associated with the changing dynamics of the trade in goods like ivory and slaves.

Routes were also defined by networks of relationships. The relationships generated by different kinds of polities were particularly important. Polities, which governed the movement of people, trade goods, and less tangible things, could relate to routes in various ways. Large centralized polities generally attempted to maintain a partial or complete monopoly on the production of key export items and, by extension, on the goods for which these were exchanged. They also attempted to control the contact of foreign traders with citizens, and the movement of people along routes passing through their territory. Powerful polities modified routes to promote these aims. Buganda, for example, exerted itself to push regional trade into routes across rather than around Lake Victoria, since they could better control the former.60 Other polities, such as the chiefdoms and lineages of the Nyamwezi and Akamba, cultivated intermediary roles in long-distance trade. They shaped routes through the operation of their caravans, the establishment of trading links and trade diaspora settlements, and the marketing of their expertise, whether for porterage or hunting.61 Some polities, such as the chiefdoms in Ugogo, systematized the routes through their territory by regularizing the collection of tolls from passing caravans. In exchange, they provided access


61 See Rockel, “Caravan Porters;” A. Roberts, “Nyamwezi Trade;” in Pre-Colonial African Trade, 39-
to food in local markets, water in protected wells, and security from theft and attack.\(^6^2\)

Polities and roving groups who plundered caravans were engaged in predatory versions of these efforts to control routes and trade.\(^6^3\) Polities in the making, such as those of the coast-based traders in the eastern Congo, both consolidated routes to new sources of exports and sent out caravans to pioneer extensions to existing routes out of pathways and communities not yet linked into the long-distance trade system. The Sultanate of Zanzibar embodied yet another relation to routes. It facilitated and taxed trade at the crucial junction between the network of land-based routes and the maritime ones that led to markets around the Indian Ocean and elsewhere in the world.\(^6^4\)

Routes were defined by many other kinds of relationships that facilitated the movement of people, things, ideas and practices. Traders, porters, and others who moved along the routes drew on relations of kinship, marriage and blood-brotherhood. These helped assure individuals and caravans under their leadership access to food, water, services, information, protection, and markets. Powerful traders supplemented these ties by making agreements of alliance or tribute with leaders of important polities along their preferred routes. Relations of cooperation and amity were not the only ones that shaped routes. Polities at war frequently refused to allow caravans to travel on routes that led to the territory of their enemies. Even the reputation for hostility could be used to structure routes. There is

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\(^{62}\) Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 31-3.

\(^{63}\) Lamphear, for example, describes the organized theft of trade goods from caravans for resale by some Kamba groups; see “The Kamba,” 98.

some evidence, for example, that the ferocity of the Maasai was played up by traders who wished to monopolize use of the northern routes to the coast.65

Another widely influential kind of relation that structured routes was that of debt. Coast-based traders assembling caravans for the interior acquired their stocks of trade goods on credit, usually provided by Indian financiers based in Zanzibar. These debts had to be paid on the caravan’s return, so the traders often spent years in the interior searching out goods like ivory. They attempted to ensure a profitable return to the coast by amassing large stocks of export goods at a minimal cost in the imported trade goods for which they were indebted. Long-distance traders consequently developed additional sources of capital through participation in the regional trade in goods produced in the interior.66 They also used “low cost” methods—ones that involved coercion rather than the outlay of scarce imported goods—to acquire ivory and other goods, as well as to maintain their followings and caravans.67 These methods were especially prevalent on the fringes of established long-distance trade zones. The leading long-distance traders set their senior followers up in business with loans of trade goods and guns, as well as an allocation of territory and servile labour. Further, a porter’s relationship with a caravan was structured around a system of deferred payment that functioned like debt to tie porters to the caravan’s leader until the caravan arrived at its destination.68 Debt thus played a part in structuring both caravans and

68 See Chapter 4 for a description of how this system functioned for Expedition porters. Since porters could also be indebted to traders, to the labour recruiters who assembled caravans, to their masters if they were hire-slaves, or to other porters, they were likely under pressure to profit from the extra-curricular activities also described in Chapter 4.
trade communities in the interior. There is, however, little evidence that long-distance traders used debt to expand and control their spheres of activity, as is claimed for parts of West Africa.  

The constellation of relations which characterized the areas linked by long-distance trade was not synonymous with the Sultanate of Zanzibar, though its commercial hegemony was an important element in all late-nineteenth century routes into the interior. This hegemony was, like the routes themselves, flexible and not easily defined. It involved little overt political control or exercise of military power. Control of access to credit and trade goods, especially guns, was much more important, as was the spread of a hybrid coastal culture. Outside of towns like Ujiji or Kassongo, which had trader settlements of varying sizes, the commercial and political power of the Sultanate in the interior was embodied in, and limited to trade caravans. Both on the coast and in the interior, the Sultanate rested on a series of situational allegiances to the Sultan’s political authority and the financial power of Zanzibar-based bankers and brokers. The ties connecting the Sultanate’s various parts were strongest when the whole system was lucrative and expansive. These ties allowed for a diversity of political, economic and social arrangements within the Sultanate. In general, though, the Sultanate was a hierarchical system, with wealth, ethnicity, education, religion, 

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69 Mabogunje and Richards suggest that debt played a crucial role in shaping West African societies both relationally and spatially. Merchants expanded their trade networks by extending credit, so that market centers acquired hinterlands of indebted producers. They postulate the existence of “deep rural” areas inhabited by those who resisted (with varying success) indebtedness to and ensnarement by merchant capital. Consequently, when people in these areas chose to participate in production for the export economy, they benefited because they were better able to set the terms under which they would interact with it. “The Land and Peoples of West Africa,” History of West Africa, 3rd ed., ed. J.F.A. Ajayi & M. Crowder (Longman Group, 1985), 43-6.

70 Citing Burton, Sheriff notes that these caravans were too strong to ignore or easily defeat, but not strong enough to establish formal territorial control; see Slaves, Spices and Ivory, 194.

71 The nature of these allegiances is described in Wright, “East Africa,” 546-7. See also Bennett, who argues that this was a typical pattern for Muslim rule in Africa. N.R. Bennett, Arab versus European: Diplomacy and War in Nineteenth Century East Central Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1986), 123.
and gender all playing stratifying roles. The geographical and social length of the hierarchical chain connecting the elements of the Sultanate allowed its elite agents a great deal of initiative. People at lower levels of the hierarchy experienced diminishing levels of sustenance, esteem and freedom. At all levels, though, the nature of the Sultanate permitted “considerable mutual adaptation” and “the maintenance of a certain degree of autonomy by those...further down the hierarchy.”

Long-distance trade caravans became an element in the opportunities and risks of many people. Caravans often contained large numbers of people, some of whom were comparatively well armed, and thus constituted a potential resource in political disputes. Caravans were also a travelling store of trade goods, control of access to which was also an important source of power. The presence of these caravans thus “entered strongly into the calculations of leaders in all manner of polities.” Caravans also featured in the calculations and experiences of lesser people. Swema, a girl sold to a passing Zanzibari caravan in payment of her mother’s debt, reflected:

Who does not know how the passage of caravans is always dangerous for the weak? Evil subjects habitually steal children and poor people, whom they sell to the Arabs for salt, cottons, and beads. Creditors profit from circumstances to extract payment of debts. When the debtors are unable to pay, one seizes their slaves or their own children.

Thus, contrary to Drummond’s observation, by the late nineteenth century many communities and polities had made long-distance trade a part of their life, some regularly,

72 Wright, “East Africa,” 547.
74 Austen, African Economic History, 66; Bennett, Arab versus European, 122.
75 Wright, “East Africa,” 540.
others intermittently. They produced agricultural surpluses for sale, provided services to caravans, and made trade goods an important part of local relations and transactions. They were able to parley their resources, labour and location into stocks of trade goods that could be invested in cattle, followers, dependents, slaves, and other forms of productive wealth. Thus, over time, the long-distance trade sphere—characterized by the production, exchange and consumption of luxury or prestige goods—became increasingly inter-twined with the regional and local spheres in which subsistence goods circulated. The prestige goods of long-distance trade—ivory, slaves, cloth, guns, and beads—came to embody power in production, exchange and consumption systems of all scales. However, the meaning and value of these goods changed as it “became increasingly possible, and even routine, for the people who produced subsistence goods to exchange them for prestige goods,” thus eroding the boundary between these two spheres. This process of change tied its participants into a system in which “the factors that determined exchange values were increasingly divorced from local conditions.”

Another ramification of the evolving long-distance trade system was the “escalating cycle of violence that joined the ivory and slave trades” in a novel manner on the system’s


77 It is worth noting that while much of the labour and expertise that supplied these goods and services was that of women, most of them did not control the resulting wealth. Many women and girls were consequently vulnerable to downward pressures within a system where control over these goods was an important source of security and an avenue for advancement. M. Wright, Strategies of Slaves and Women: Life-Stories from East Central Africa (New York: Lilian Barber Press, and London: James Currey, 1993), 4-9.

78 Appadurai defines luxury goods not as unnecessary ones, but as ones “whose principal use is rhetorical and social.” They are goods that respond to political necessities rather than purely economic ones. “Introduction: commodities and the politics of value,” in Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, ed. A. Appadurai (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 38.


80 Glassman, Feasts and Riot, 52.
leading edge, then located around the upper Nile and Congo Rivers. While violence was most evident on the long-distance trade frontier, societies within it also used more coercion in both production and exchange. Low-cost methods of acquiring trade goods have already been mentioned, and the rise in the use of slave labour on the coast and in the interior is noted below. Increased coercion in exchange was evident in such things as the aggressive efforts of polities like Buganda to assert control over regional trade, or in the use of force by Maasai to obtain ivory from Dorobo and Okiek hunters for minimal compensation. The creation of "regular corps of armed enforcers" was a frequent response by leaders to the need for improved powers of surveillance and enforcement to maintain control over trade goods and to monitor the activities of traders and caravans. Another response was the emergence of "strategic settlements." These allowed leaders to simultaneously "create economic focal points" and protect their growing number of followers and dependents. This militarization was associated with a strengthening of principles of territoriality, though it is not clear whether this included a shift from territory defined by its centers to territory defined by its periphery, as had occurred in early modern Europe.

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83 Wright, Strategies of Slaves and Women, 6. She argues that the tactics, aims and discipline of immigrant Ngoni groups were the inspiration for these bands. See also Austin, African Economic History, 66 for the formation of similar groups by coast-based traders.
84 Both quotes from Wright, Strategies of Slaves and Women, 7.
85 Until the late seventeenth century in Europe, power "was located spatially in citadels, fortresses, and cities that were separated by spaces whose political status were often ambiguous....The great empires would control strings of these power centers, but not all the land in between them, only roads and waterways that connected them. Land was politically marked by these centers, but not bounded by them." The shift to territory defined in terms of its periphery was associated with efforts to shape both the land and the people within that boundary in accordance with images of the national character. See Mukerji, "Political Mobilization of Nature," 657.
Trade, though not the only purpose of routes, had a dynamism that made it central to changes in them. The most significant long-term trend in trade was the continually rising export of ivory during the last half of the nineteenth century. Additionally, the terms of trade ran steadily in favor of African ivory exporters during this period, since ivory prices were rising while those of manufactured goods like cloth fell. This allowed for substantial accumulation by intermediaries in the trade even as their costs grew with the increased distance of the frontier of ivory acquisition from the coast.86 There were also important changes occurring in the slave trade. The old, but relatively limited trade in slaves expanded in the early nineteenth century, with especially rapid growth between the 1840s and 1860s.87 By this time, the trade drew slaves from deep in the interior. It both supplied an overseas market and met the rapidly growing demand for plantation labour on Zanzibar and the mainland coast. Slaves were also increasingly being used on plantations around commercial settlements in the interior, as well as to provide labour in societies whose members were devoting more of their energies to trade and production for trade. The slave trade declined again after the mid-1870s as the overseas trade was choked off, only to revive briefly during the famine and wars of the late 1880s. The large-scale trade in slaves ended with European imperial control.

Another trend, less often noted, was the rapid expansion of the trade in guns and gunpowder to the region in the latter half of the nineteenth century. On the supply side, this was linked to continuing advances in gun technology in Europe. As European armies

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87 This paragraph draws on F. Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), chap. 4 and P.E. Lovejoy, Transformations in slavery: A history of slavery in
repeatedly re-armed themselves, large numbers of obsolete weapons were thrown onto international markets. Within East-Central Africa the demand for guns, especially newer models, continually outstripped supply. Guns, which initially functioned mostly as prestige items, quickly became tools of the hunt. They were also crucial tools for the growing militaries of polities in the region and for bands of freebooters.

One consequence of these trends was the increasing geographical scope and elaboration of the network of routes. Another was the increasing size of caravans, which employed hundreds, sometimes thousands of porters by the late nineteenth century. The number of caravans underway at any given time also rose. Consequently, routes were increasingly defined by standardized practices, and by professionalization and specialization among caravan personnel. Specialized groups and institutions to facilitate trade and travel were also developing.

The Authorship of Routes

As will have been evident from this summary of the structure and operation of routes, trade of various kinds was the most visible and frequent purpose of routes in the late nineteenth century. Not surprisingly, the creation of routes was often ascribed to those who played a role in trade. Oral tradition associated the creation of older regional routes with leaders who made significant trade initiatives, like Omukama Mihigo II of Bukerebe. By the late nineteenth century, it was the long-distance traders who played a highly visible role


89 See “Rockel, “Caravan Porters” for an analysis of these processes.

90 See Hartwig, Art of Survival, chapter 2.
in these networks, especially traders based at the coast. The creation of all of the trade routes was consequently ascribed to them. Contemporary European observers identified these traders as “Arabs,” since they assumed that Zanzibar-based traders of Omani descent had always played the prominent role in trade that they did during that period. But, while trade may have been important in opening, maintaining and expanding routes, they served other functions too. They permitted the migration of peoples, pilgrimage, and the spread of crops and diseases. Routes were also important for the movement of ideas and practices, some directly connected with trade, like the wearing of cloth or the use of Kiswahili, and others not, such as the transfer of expertise in making rain. Hartwig argues that these non-economic uses of routes became more important as the long-distance trade resources of particular areas were played out.

As Drummond’s comments indicate, the issue of “authorship”—of the creation of routes—was a crucial one for European travellers, especially explorers. The image of an explorer was, and is, that of a man who heads out into virgin land and makes routes where there were none before. His enterprise is driven by altruistic motives, heroic virtue and extraordinary energy. He is not connected to or supported by indigenous networks of travel. This is symbolized by his travelling “alone,” meaning he is not accompanied by anyone he considers a social equal. He is also not supported by an indigenous network of geographical knowledge. His enterprise is guided by scientific principles, endowing his observations with

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91 As Wright notes, in East-Central Africa the long-distance traders were collectively known as alungwana rather than Arabs, the former term “suggesting a Muslim religious identity and linkages with coast-oriented commerce, but not necessarily with ancestry external to Africa.” European use of the term “Arab” had more to do with the anti-slavery movement and the legitimization of European involvement in the region than it did with the origin of the traders in question. See Strategies of Slaves and Women, 8.
92 Art of Survival, 89.
93 An example is Stanley’s attempt in Through the Dark Continent to claim that it was he who first suggested a route across Lake Victoria to Kabaka Mutesa, when this route had already been in existence for
qualities that cannot be matched by Africans, no matter how widely travelled. In Drummond's description, the explorer's purposeful, individual activity stands in contrast to the timeless, mindless, collective activity of Africans who make footpaths.

Nineteenth century European travellers in Africa devoted significant energy to creating and maintaining themselves as explorers—the only category of agents to whom the creation of routes could be attributed—and to defining others in congruent ways. Their success is evident in the continuing acceptance of this definition and this attribution of authorship by modern writers of history, biography and literature. Revisionist writing has tended to look for African counterparts to the European explorers—men like Leif bin Said or Said bin Habib—rather than to examine the idea of the explorer.

One symptom of this preoccupation with authorship was the peculiar self-consciousness of European travellers. Most were (re)constructing events discursively in journals and letters on a regular basis. They were simultaneously constructing themselves and those around them through the activity of travel, through little ceremonies of identity, and through writing about all of these. Their preoccupation with this process of construction also manifested itself in obsessive concern for the load that contained their writing materials, and in the amount of time and energy devoted to writing and sketching. The consequent mystification and consternation of "natives" at the evident power of these inscriptions was one of the clichés of European travel. While these texts had important

94 Bassett points out that the convention of displaying "unknown" areas as blank spaces on maps, adopted in the mid-eighteenth century, by excluding any information that was not verifiable fact "came to mean that only European or European-trained explorers were reliable informants" and that indigenous geographical knowledge was suspect or non-existent. T.J. Bassett, "Cartography and Empire Building in Nineteenth-Century West Africa," Geographical Review 84, no. 3 (1994): 322-3.

95 For example, Drummond, Tropical Africa, 89.
functions for the individual traveller, for many they also represented a hoped-for relationship with a publisher and through it a reading public.

European Travellers and the Routes of East-Central Africa

While the burning desire to claim authorship of routes was an important difference between European and non-European travellers in East-Central Africa, it was not the only one. In the years before European powers established control over the interior, most of these differences were small in scale, an indicator of new directions rather than a notable divergence from the existing structure of routes. One long-term impact of European travel was a change in the way territory was defined and controlled. The existing practice was to gain access to territory by establishing appropriate relations with the people living in key centers and peoples along the routes between centers. Toward the end of the century the Sultans of Zanzibar were pushed by European Consuls and explorers as well as by intensifying trade, toward the direct control of key centers and routes. More importantly, they were pushed to consider the spaces, peoples and resources around and beyond these centers as well. While subsequent European claims to the interior were asserted in terms of peripheries, initially the Europeans also had to attempt to establish effective control through the older pattern of centers and routes.

The purposes of European travellers were different from those of indigenous travellers, though this was often more a difference in emphasis than in kind. They shared with long-distance traders an interest in promoting commerce, exercising political influence, and spreading culture and religion. An emphasis on the accumulation of knowledge was possibly the most divergent aim, though Europeans shared an idea of travel as a form of self-
improvement for young men with some groups in the region. European travellers created a body of knowledge about Africa and Africans that was stored in new forms and places, with a new set of experts. One of the features that distinguished this knowledge from indigenous knowledge was that it was designed to be incorporated into large-scale assemblages. For instance, European observation of Lake Victoria and the Nile River linked these bodies of water together within a spatial frame of latitude, longitude and altitude, and a temporal frame of questions about origins stretching back to ancient Greece and Rome.

To say that the purposes of European travellers in Africa differed from those of indigenous travellers is another way of saying that the entities that they drew into their networks of travel were different. Learned societies, humanitarian lobby groups, publishers, and newspapers were all new entities, as were cameras, altimeters and machine guns. While there were parallels between European and African purposes in the fields of commerce, politics, or religion, their institutions in these spheres were constituted differently and they defined themselves differently in relation to their African involvements.

Though Europeans, like the coast-based merchants before them, used existing networks for travel, there were differences in the way they did so. Some of these arose from the different resources they devoted to travel, and some from European ideas about relations with foreign peoples. Late nineteenth century European observers believed that:

Practically there are two distinct methods of travelling in safety through Africa, and it is unwise to attempt to combine the two. The one method is to take a well-armed, well-organized force with you, and go, injuring no one unprovoked, by permitted roads when there are such, and only by forbidden ones when there is no alternative, and always endeavouring to come to terms before proceeding to force. The other is, to take no more arms than necessary to resist attacks from

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96 See, for example, Glassman’s comments on the Nyamwezi in Feasts and Riot, 59.
highwaymen between villages, going only by permitted routes, paying what charges are insisted upon, or else turning back, and going into no new district without first asking and obtaining permission from the local chief. The former is practically Stanley’s method, and the method adopted by traders; the latter, Livingstone’s, and the method adopted by missionaries.  

These styles represent the construction of two personae for Europeans in Africa, as both Stanley’s forcefulness and Livingstone’s gentleness were heightened in the published accounts of their travels. These styles represented points on a continuum where the practical issues were the size of the traveller’s caravan, the number of its members who were armed with guns, and the quality and amount of trade goods it carried. Some European travellers, like Stanley, wanted big, well-supplied caravans and had the official contacts and financial backing to assemble them. Such caravans differed from indigenous ones mainly in the amount and quality of their weaponry. There were, though, also potential differences in the quality of commercial intelligence—knowledge of the right kind of cloth, beads, or wire to exchange for food at points along the route—available to European versus indigenous caravan leaders. In some cases, their ability to gain access to additional resources in interior may also have differed, with indigenous leaders usually better placed to draw on both information and resources in the interior. At the other extreme, Europeans travelling with only a handful of employees differed significantly from the indigenous norm for long-distance travel. This was especially true of those who deliberately

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99 Helly notes that Livingstone’s reputation for gentleness was maintained through a careful editing of his Last Journals (1874). His editor omitted many of the difficulties Livingstone experienced with his “faithful followers,” particularly the mission-educated ones, as well as the disciplinary measures he took to address these problems. See D.O. Helly, Livingstone’s Legacy: Horace Waller and Victorian Mythmaking (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1987), 163-4 and 184-5. See also H.A.C. Cairns, Prelude to Imperialism: British Reactions to Central African Society, 1840-1890 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 44.
travelled without supplies, like a would-be missionary who believed “that if he has nothing the natives will give him things & help him for nothing.”

The Livingstone-Stanley distinction also applied to methods for running a caravan. The crucial issues were the kind of discipline applied to porters, the amount of consultation and respect for the expertise of headmen and guides, the system of entitlement to food, and the exploitation of ethnic divisions as a labour management tactic. At the root of differences in these areas was the desire of European travellers to maintain a much greater social distance between themselves and their indigenous employees. Such distancing also occurred to some extent in the caravans of the coast-based traders, where the merchants set themselves apart from and above their porters, especially those from the interior who had only superficially absorbed the culture of the trade settlements. However, for European travelers the distance was described and justified in racial terms rather than those of culture, religion, wealth, or experience. The deliberate distance from indigenous employees maintained by European travellers was exceeded by their distance from the peoples through whose land they passed. Europeans usually had a corresponding ignorance of the natural environment through which they were travelling. In both spheres they required intermediaries and assistance to function effectively, and even to survive. This produced a

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100 W.H. Bentley to A.H. Baynes, 21 December 1887, Baptist Missionary Society Archives, Congo-Angola Mission A/31 (1887-1888). Hereafter BMS. Bentley was referring to the young missionary Graham Wilmot Brooke, who planned to pioneer a route from the upper Congo to the Sudan. Brooke was inspired by Livingstone.

101 On the Expedition, one example of this distancing occurred when Troup, the experienced Congo Free State caravan organizer, was returning home sick. Near the mouth of the Congo River he was being carried in a hammock by porters from Manyanga, some of whom he knew. He witnessed and, to a very limited extent, participated in a joking relationship with these men, part of his attempt to mitigate the powerfully charged activity of carrying a European. He indicated that at “night we would all camp together by the side of some little stream, where the kettle would speedily be boiling, and if I did not take care I would find they had all drawn in close to my tent in almost too cosy a fashion.” J.R. Troup, With Stanley’s Rear Column (London: Chapman & Hall, 1890), 271-3.

102 See, for example, the Arab headman Muni Somai’s comments on the Expedition’s Manyema porters, whom he felt “were not men, but simply ‘meat like beasts’” because of their alleged dietary and sexual
volatile combination of extreme dependence and deliberately distant authority, a mixture rooted in the hypertrophied markers of class, gender, race and power out of which European travellers built their identities.

Another difference between European and indigenous travel in Africa was that, at least in the early stages of contact, Europeans generally anticipated only a single passage through territory. European travellers sometimes even returned by a different route than they used to enter the region. This offered the temptation of flouting the rules and practices of local travel, especially paying toll or paying for rations, if the caravan was large and well-armed enough to intimidate communities along the route. European travellers’ lack of knowledge about or concern for the structures of local markets occasionally caused localised food shortages and the inflation of trade currencies in areas where well-endowed European caravans had passed, threatening the viability of communities along those portions of the route. Traders and porters who anticipated a career of travelling in the interior could not afford such behaviour, especially on established routes. European travellers were also more likely to attempt inhospitable terrain or to experiment with radically new combinations of paths, since commercial return and minimising risk were not as important in their planning.

Finally, most European travellers entered the region with the belief that indigenous travel practices were morally flawed as well as inefficient. They believed that slave trading was the chief purpose of indigenous caravans, and they believed that human porterage was irremediably problematic. Many of the porters were presumed to be slaves, and even if they were not, the kind of discipline needed to keep porters working was that of the slave preferences. Jameson, Story, 319.
caravan. Even in the best of circumstances, porters, being human, were less controllable than other forms of transportation; they were likely to "smell, or mutiny, or eat up all [the] biltong!" While explorers entertained visions of establishing transportation routes based on roads, the wheel, and the steam engine, European travellers not far behind them were already surveying to establish lines of rail or supervising the transport of steamer parts to inland waterways. These new routes were supposed to eliminate the evils of slavery and the slave trade, as well as make travel more efficient and more predictable. This, it was envisioned, would rapidly transform both the land and the peoples of the interior.

In many ways, the Expedition was the embodiment of this emerging pattern of European travel. This was particularly evident in the importance of writing and the discursive creation of self and surroundings for the Expedition's European members. The Expedition was also connected to different institutions. The depth of its ties to firms who trafficked in information, like publishers and newspapers, was distinctive even among European travellers, as were its links to firms, like Burroughs & Wellcome, who used the Expedition for advertising purposes. The Expedition also helped to entrench the trend for European travellers to draw on a European firm—in the Expedition's case Smith, Mackenzie & Co.—rather than an Indian or Swahili firm to recruit porters and assemble trade goods. As the controversy that followed the return of the Expedition confirmed for the British public, the Expedition was the epitome of the Stanley style, which was becoming the

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103 See, for example, Jameson, Story, 14.
104 E. Maturin, Adventures Beyond the Zambezi of The O'Flaherty. The Insular Miss. The Soldier Man, and The Rebel Woman (Bell's Indian and Colonial Library)(London: G. Bell & Sons, 1913), 218.
105 Rockel, "Caravan Porters," 344-5.
dominant one for European travellers. The Expedition was, however, an exception to the rule that European travellers, as well as long-distance traders, moved into the interior only along well-established routes. Both the Expedition and Stanley's earlier travel on the upper Congo were one of the few instances of genuine "pioneering" in European travel. Stanley's attempts to build routes in this region opened up new areas to long-distance traders. 107

Questions about the Expedition

These ideas about travel and exploration in late nineteenth century East-Central Africa suggest a number of new questions about the Expedition. To provide a foundation for these questions, I describe the events of the Expedition in Chapter 2. My narrative focuses on the creation of knowledge and the construction of routes. The Expedition involved activity by a group of people who, given a starting point of limited knowledge of the interior of central Africa envisioned a particular set of possibilities for the region, and then devised strategies to implement them. These strategies centred on a caravan, whose heterogeneous members needed to be transformed into simpler, more manageable groups—the European officers, the Zanzibari porters, the Sudanese soldiers, and the Somali assistants—able to address themselves effectively to the diverse purposes of the Expedition. Central to these purposes was the Expedition's attempt to generate a series of alternative routes into Equatoria. One of these was to run through the forests of the upper Congo River. The other was supposed to be an east coast that avoided Buganda and ended at Mombasa rather than Zanzibar. Many existing institutions and groups also tried to use a connection with the

107 J. Vansina, "Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa," Journal of African History 3, no. 3
Expedition to strengthen or change themselves. These ranged from philanthropic, advocacy, and mission groups to learned societies, through European and African polities and their leaders, to commercial interests like ivory traders of several nationalities, transport and communications companies, caravan outfitters, book publishers, and newspapers.

Stanley and his officers succeeded to some extent in creating manipulable groups out of the caravan’s members, assisted in this by the partially congruent interests of groups like the porters, as well as by the incapacity, desertion and death of some members of the Expedition. However, the efforts of Stanley, the officers, and other members of the caravan to make the peoples and the resources of the territory through which they passed into predictable, tractable and useful parts of their enterprise were much less successful. The Expedition’s attempts to renew and re-situate the administration of Equatoria province and to provide a foundation for the Imperial British East Africa Company were similarly problematic. Nonetheless, at the end of the Expedition, a body of knowledge about certain parts of Africa had been created and it had been connected to structures for the management of information, embodied in persons, texts, and objects.

In Chapter 3, I focus on the practices by which Stanley and his officers attempted to create order in their caravan, an order that was intended to allow the Expedition to realize its broader purposes. I focus on two issues, first, on the use of a military model of order and, second, on attempts to structure access to food. By what means was order instituted in each of these areas, and to what extent was it successfully created? What were the strengths and the limits of this order? What role did practices and instruments of coercion play in this order? Did this order assist the Expedition’s leaders to draw together and hold together the
people and resources they wanted to build into a route that would allow Emin Pasha and Equatoria to become the core of new economic and political structures in East-Central Africa?

In Chapters 4 and 5, I examine the construction of two groups of people for and by the Expedition. The first group, the subject of Chapter 4, is the Expedition’s porters. The porters’ labour, skills, knowledge, initiative, and loyalty were essential to the Expedition. I use the concept of porter strategies to see how the purposes and powers of the porters interacted with those of the Expedition’s officers. As Latour has noted, each participant in an initiative does much more than simply co-operate with or resist it. Each one “picks up” the initiative and “shapes it according to their different projects.” In what way did this happen when the porters picked up both the loads and the purposes of the Expedition?

In Chapter 5, I study the construction of the Europeans on the Expedition. I consider Law’s question: did European imperialism succeed because it kept its agents faithful? How did the Europeans on the Expedition attempt to stay faithful to themselves and to the groups that sent them on the Expedition? I discuss threats to Europeans in Africa arising from the African environment and from the Europeans’ interaction with Africans. How did Europeans on the Expedition respond to these threats to their fidelity? I also look at the efforts of two of the Expedition’s European members to construct themselves as particular kinds of actors—the gentleman traveller and the hero or historic agent. These self-constructions both helped and hindered the broader work of the Expedition.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I show how these two groups of people and the practices discussed in Chapter 3 came together with texts and items of technology in the Expedition’s
attempt to create a route through the Ituri forest. Though the passage through this forest was not intended to be the focus of its energies and resources, the Expedition’s failure to draw the peoples and resources of the forest into a route made its passage through this region a central part of its activities. I will examine both the material and the discursive work of constructing a route through the forest, and the ways in which these two efforts were interrelated. In particular, I ask what was responsible for the durability of the Expedition’s discursive route and the extreme fragility of its material route through the forest?

Chapter 2:
What Really Happened on the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition

The story of the Expedition has been told numerous times by its European participants and, presumably, also by its non-European ones, though few of the latter have left written records.¹ There are also several accounts of the Expedition by contemporary European observers, as well as twentieth-century academic and popular writers of history, biography, and plays.² Among the European accounts, an outline of the Expedition’s course and conduct is widely shared, though the context for and interpretation of these events is not. The emergence of new primary sources on the Expedition has modified rather than substantially changed this existing outline of events.

Consequently, I have chosen not to make the revision of the narrative of the Expedition the focus of my thesis. Instead, I offer an outline of events as a framework into which readers can fit the diverse reflections on the Expedition that make up the heart of my dissertation. This outline is based on existing accounts of the Expedition, as indicated below, though supplemented

¹ The most prominent of the accounts written by a non-European is that of the Expedition’s Syrian translator, Assad Farran, who was a member of the Rear Column; see his Account of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, n.d., in W.H. Bentley correspondence, BMS, Congo-Angola Mission A/34. Tippu Tip’s autobiography—H. bin Muhammed el-Murjebi, Maisha ya Hamed bin Muhammed el Murojebi yaani Tippu Tip, trans. & ed. W.H. Whitely (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1974)—also contains important material on the Expedition. See also the limited account of Stanley’s servant Sali in “Saleh Ben Osman’s Statement,” Times, 17 November 1890. Smith drew on the book by Emin Pasha’s Tunisian assistant, Vita Hassan, Die Wahrheit über Emin Pascha, die ägyptische Aequatorial-provinz und den Sudan (Berlin, 1893), as well as on contemporary interviews with a number of officers from Emin Pasha’s garrisons in Equatoria for his monograph on the Expedition. See Expedition, 306-8.
² The main nineteenth century accounts of the Expedition are compendia of Stanley’s published letters and his report to the British Consul general in Zanzibar. Many of these appeared in newspapers such as “Stanley’s Emin Pasha Relief Expedition Through Central Africa,” Illustrated London News, special edition, 3 March 1890. See also A.J. Wauters, Stanley’s Emin Pasha Expedition (London: Nimmo, 1890). Twentieth century accounts of the Expedition intended for a popular audience include the novelist Olivia Manning’s 1947 non-fiction work, The Remarkable Expedition, discussed below; Tony Gould’s In Limbo: the story of Stanley’s Rear Column (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979); and Simon Gray, The Rear Column and Other Plays (London: Eyre
with my own research. My approach should not be taken to imply that any consensus about the principal events of the Expedition corresponds to a real account of it, or to rule out the possibility that parts of this consensus might undergo revision as new sources are revealed or new methods are brought to existing sources.

My summary of events is shaped by the themes that are developed in my other chapters, and by the ideas about networks and routes discussed in the preceding chapter. Further, I have chosen to concentrate on the British Expedition as it was the enterprise in which interest in Emin and his province, resources and political opportunity most effectively coalesced. The conduct of the Expedition in Africa and the ways in which this was part of an ongoing construction of Africa in both Europe and Africa are my primary concerns. My outline of events thus focuses on encounters between Europeans and Africans as structured by the conventions of travel. It also examines the ways in which the Expedition helped to bolster and to re-create these conventions, connecting them in new ways to trade, political and military activity, and to the bodies of knowledge that emerged from and enabled these activities. In addition, I consider the controversy about the Expedition, which involved disputes and debates among both Europeans and Africans, to be a part of the Expedition. Consequently my story of the Expedition ends when this controversy wound down in 1891, not when the final surviving members of the Expedition returned to their homes in early 1890.

The Context of the Expedition

The primary context in which writers have placed the Expedition was the history of European exploration and the development of geographical knowledge in Europe. The

Methuen, 1978). The accounts of the Expedition intended for both scholarly and popular readers are noted and
vicissitudes of Egyptian involvement with the Sudan formed a secondary context; for some writers this involvement stretched back to Pharaonic times. These contexts were linked by three themes. First, that geography is a determiner of both national character and of the possibilities for historical change. Second, concern for the impact of the slave trade and the moral imperative of ending it. Third, the heroic activities of individual Europeans working as explorers and as agents of Egyptian rule in the Sudan.

Imperial activity was an important, though often implicit part of this context. This is most evident in novelist Olivia Manning's 1947 popular non-fiction account of the Expedition. Manning's Egypt was an "Oriental chaos of despotic inefficiency" and its policies of modernization and expansion were necessarily inadequate and doomed imitations of transformations undergone by Europe. Europeans, particularly Englishmen—possessors of expertise, energy, and moral authority—were therefore needed to step in and deal with the "muddle-headed" mess of Egyptian domestic policy, as well as with its rapacious regime in the Sudan. The Sultanate of Zanzibar, like Egypt, was an exploitative foreign irruption linked to the evils of slave trade. The Sultanate's activities in Africa thus cried out for European intervention as well. Later writers aiming for both popular and academic markets leave unspoken their opinions of European intervention, but deploy the same themes: long-standing, but incompetent and exploitative Egyptian interest in the Sudan and the evils of the slave trade. Heroic Europeans, both those employed by Egypt and independent travellers, acted to correct these

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4 Manning, *Remarkable Expedition*, Introduction & Chapter 1. Interestingly, she describes Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in the same negative terms. Britain also had to rescue Egypt from the greedy clutches of this French "intruder."
abuses and to open up the region to positive external influences. In contrast, accounts by contemporaries of the Expedition forthrightly debated the question of how Europeans, both individually and collectively, should involve themselves in Africa. In these discussions, the Expedition provided both an occasion for debate and exempla for a variety of positions on imperialism.6

Iain Smith's scholarly history of the Expedition re-established imperialism as the primary context for understanding the Expedition. In choosing to focus on Equatoria, Smith was able to study the long-established imperial structures of Egypt and the actions of its diverse agents in the southern Sudan as well as to examine the actions of rival European imperial powers. Smith's writing, in contrast to that of nineteenth century writers about the Expedition, was shaped by debates marking the end rather than the beginning of European high imperialism in Africa. The Expedition, for Smith, represented a turning point in British imperialism. It aroused the interest of "colonial strategists and schemers" at an important phase in the European partition of Africa.7 Study of the Expedition thus contributed to the modern debate about the changing nature of empire in the nineteenth century.8 For Smith and others, the Expedition was part of the transition from informal to formal empire in Africa.9 Smith's account of the Expedition also contributed to parallel discussions about whether sources of change in the empire were located in the metropole and its government, or with figures acting in the colonies and on the imperial frontier. Smith's imperial actors were a motley crew of businessmen, missionaries,

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7 See, for example, H. R. Fox-Bourne, *The Other Side of the Emin Pasha Expedition* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1891) and E. L. Godkin, "Was the Emin Expedition Piratical?" *The Forum* 10, no. 2 (1891): 633-44.

8 Smith, *Expedition*, viii.

traders, travellers, military officers, consular officials and colonial governors. They interacted with a powerful and equally mixed group of religious leaders, merchants, financiers, military leaders, chiefs and rulers in Africa. The British government, in contrast, was often hostile to the idea of imperial expansion and reacted reluctantly and in a piecemeal fashion to the dynamics of empire created by other actors in Britain and Africa.

Nineteenth century contemporaries saw the Expedition as a transition of a different kind. It marked a change from exploratory efforts characterized by scientific or philanthropic goals and pacific methods to exploratory expeditions that were “huge quasi-military affairs backed by powerful political and commercial interests,” whose “progress resembled that of an invading army.”¹⁰ The Expedition also marked the end of an era of heroic geography. The “romance of Africa...is dead,” declared one journalist, since the continent that had been almost unknown a few decades earlier was now thoroughly “mapped out.”¹¹

I will start my narrative outline of the Expedition with a sketch of the political actors and structures that formed the background for its activities. This sketch is organized on a regional basis, while the narrative that follows is organized chronologically. I have also added information on the German Emin Pascha Expedition, the formation of the Imperial British East Africa Company, and press coverage of the Expedition at appropriate points in my narrative. This narrative outline is heavily indebted to Smith’s scholarship, as well as to McLynn’s recent biography of Stanley.¹²

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¹⁰ See also Simpson, Dark Companions, 177.
¹¹ Smith, Expedition, 297.
Egypt and the Sudan

Egypt’s empire in the Sudan was part of the early nineteenth century modernization program of the Khedive Mohammed Ali (governed 1805-1848). The creation of a modern military lay at the heart of this program, but it also included reforms in education and taxation, as well as encouragement for industry and export-oriented agriculture. Egypt’s international standing was another of Mohammed Ali’s concerns. While accepting nominal Ottoman suzerainty, he worked toward effective autonomy. He wanted Egypt to become an imperial power in its own right. His empire, the first of the consciously-planned nineteenth century empires in Africa, was “a symbol of Egypt’s claim, as a modernised, civilised and ‘civilising’ power, to equality of status with the...nations of Europe.”

Egypt’s southern conquests began in 1820. It established control over the northern parts of the Sudan within the next few years. A provincial capital was built at Khartoum and trade along the Nile promoted. The Egyptian regime instituted few economic or social programs; its aim was to use the resources of the Sudan to promote the development of Egypt. Muhammad Ali’s policies of modernization and imperial expansion were intensified under some of his successors, particularly the Khedive Ismail (governed 1863-1879). However, Egyptian rule over the Sudan continued to be more profitable for the individuals involved than it was for the Egyptian government.

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While the official focus of Egypt’s imperial expansion in the Sudan was eastward, Egyptian influence was also spreading up the Nile, driven southward by Khartoum-based traders.\(^\text{15}\) They armed bands of dependent followers with guns and used them to establish fortified camps (zaribas) from which they raided and traded, primarily in ivory and slaves. The Egyptian government attempted to control this anarchic frontier by appointing some traders to government positions and by establishing a series of stations to regulate trade. The construction and administration of these stations was contracted out to a series of Europeans. The most notable of these was Charles Gordon, who became governor-general of the Sudan in 1877. Under Gordon, the tensions between the concerns of foreign administrators, the Egyptian government, and traders in the Sudan became very evident. The slave trade was a particular source of tension.

The Egyptian empire experienced a variety of crises. While Mohammed Ali’s vision had been for control of the entire north-east of the continent, the empire’s expansion was blocked militarily by Abyssinia as well as by kingdoms around the Great Lakes. Further, the geographic isolation of much of the Sudan as well as the tenuous nature of the Egyptian regime there made it difficult to respond effectively to either the subversion of its authority by powerful traders or the resistance of indigenous peoples. The most serious episode of resistance was that led by Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abdullah. After a series of visions in 1881, he proclaimed himself Mahdi and launched a *jihad* directed against the “Turks.” His initial successes in the Kordofan added groups disaffected with Egyptian rule to his band of religious followers. The Mahdists took the Darfur and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces, followed

\(^{15}\) A description of this trade in the 1850s can be found in J. Petherick, *Egypt, the Sudan and Central Africa with Explorations from Khartoum on the White Nile to the Regions of the Equator* (Edinburgh & London:
by Khartoum, in early 1885. The Mahdi's successor, the Khalifa Abdallahi, established a
Mahdist state and concentrated its military efforts on Abyssinia and Egypt. Efforts to extend
the Mahdist state to the south, both in 1884-85 and 1888, met with limited success due to the
hostility of indigenous peoples there, the resistance of the Equatorian garrisons, and divisions
within the Mahdist forces. Another problem was that the death of Gordon in the siege of
Khartoum had aroused a great deal of European interest in the Sudan.

The empire also had serious financial problems rooted in the methods of Egyptian
modernization. While the government succeeded in extracting additional resources both
from its own citizens and from the Sudan, state income was continually outstripped by
expenditure, especially after the collapse of international cotton prices in the mid-1860s.
Large parts of the modernization program, especially prestige projects like the Suez Canal,
were financed through borrowing in European bond markets. The near-bankruptcy of the
Egyptian government led the French and British governments, acting to protect the private
interests of bondholders as well as their new strategic interest in the Suez, to assume joint
control of Egyptian finances in 1876. Britain took effective control of Egyptian affairs after
suppressing the nationalist uprising led by Arabi Pasha in 1882. Although continually trying
to avoid formal political control, Britain's Consul General, Evelyn Baring became de facto
governor of Egypt. A combination of financial and military crises led Baring to push for
retrenchment in the Sudan. Equatoria province should be permanently abandoned, he
believed, while the less isolated northern provinces might be reclaimed at some point in the
future.

William Blackwood & Sons, 1861). See also P. Gladstone, Travels of Alexis: Alexis Tanne, 1835-1869 (London:
Equatoria Province

Equatoria, the southernmost province of the Egyptian Sudan, was created in 1870 when the Khedive Ismail contracted with the English explorer Samuel Baker to establish it. Baker, together with his wife Florence, set up two stations on the upper Nile and transported to them the parts for two steamboats. These stations were to form part of a chain that would maintain Egyptian authority in the region, encourage legitimate trade, and suppress the slave trade. Charles Gordon followed Baker as the administrator of Equatoria province. He established eleven stations along the Nile together with several outlying ones east and west of the river. However, this exercise of Egyptian authority involved more continuity than change. In many cases the zaribas of the traders were simply made over into government stations. Their inhabitants, formerly engaged in the ivory and slave trades, were kept on as irregular soldiers. These garrisons maintained themselves by levying informal taxes on the surrounding peoples, a practice little different from their predatory activities as traders. The administration of the province did not extend much further than the management of its stations. Egyptian rule in Equatoria was, in effect, little more than “a half-hearted military occupation of limited extent and duration.”

Dr. Mehemet Emin was appointed governor of the province by Gordon in 1878. He inherited a series of older stations in the northern part of the province that were sliding into decay.

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17 Smith, Expedition, 9.
and disorder. The depredations of their garrisons provoked frequent attacks by surrounding peoples. Conditions in the newer, southern stations were better, and Emin was able to make physical improvements to these communities, as well as maintain less hostile relations with local people. He was unable to change the character of Egyptian rule, though. Like his predecessors, his scope for action was limited by geographic isolation, a poor transportation system, the hostility of indigenous peoples, and the well-entrenched predatory behaviour and situational loyalty of the garrisons. Emin functioned as well as he could within these constraints, but he preferred not to administer in a way that would test the limits of his authority.

Emin himself was an ongoing and fragile construct, created and maintained in the outposts of the Ottoman and Egyptian empires. He was born into a middle-class Prussian family in 1840 and baptised Eduard Schnitzer. He studied medicine, but was disqualified on a technicality from practising in Germany. He took employment in the Turkish Medical Service, eventually working for the governor of northern Albania. He adopted Turkish dress, became fluent in several of the languages of the Ottoman Empire, and called himself Hairouallah Effendi. He also developed a relationship with the governor’s wife. Following the governor’s death, he passed her off to his family as his own wife. After establishing this “wife” and her children in Germany, he disappeared. A month later Hairouallah Effendi, a Turkish doctor educated in Germany, appeared in Cairo. Within a year he was the chief physician of Gordon’s Equatoria province and his name was Mehemet Emin or Emin Effendi. In addition to his medical work, Emin learned Arabic and several African languages, conducted successful diplomatic missions to Bunyoro and Buganda, and engaged in exploration and natural science. He also married an Abyssinian woman, who died in 1887 when their only surviving child, a
daughter, was just a few years old. When Emin and his province became a cause in Europe, he underwent further reconstruction, though this time at the hands of others, diminishing his control over his public identity. As one contemporary remarked: “It would have been better for his reputation if no expedition had been formed for his relief.”

Though Equatoria’s communication system was poor, Emin learned of Mahdist activity in northern Sudan. He also received news of the fall of Darfur and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces, and the siege of Khartoum. The Mahdists demanded he surrender his province in mid-1884. Emin’s initial impulse was to capitulate, but his largely black garrisons feared death or enslavement if they gave themselves up to the Mahdists. At the end of 1884 the Mahdist army besieged the Equatorian station of Amadi, which fell several months later after a heroic defence by its garrison. In early 1885 Emin received another ultimatum from the commander of the Mahdist army. He also received from him news of the fall of Khartoum but, while he believed its truth, none of his garrisons did. Pessimistic about outside help and doubtful of the extent of his authority in a province facing the even more serious threat of internal disintegration, Emin decided to move his headquarters south from Lado to Wadelai. The fear of imminent attack receded when the Mahdist army retreated to Bahr al-Ghazal to deal with a mutiny there, and then returned to Khartoum after it received word of the Mahdi’s death. Emin remained in the south, though, and concentrated his energies on re-opening a route for communication and trade through the kingdoms south of Equatoria.

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18 Amalie Leitschaft, the abandoned “wife,” anonymously published her story as *Enthüllungen über Emin Paschas Privatleben* (Leipzig: Carl Winde, 1895).
The East-Central African Interior

Zanzibar was the leading power in East-Central Africa, possessed of an extensive empire based on trade and the spread of coastal culture. The transfer of the Omani Sultanate's seat of government to Zanzibar earlier in the nineteenth century laid the foundation for an expansion of trade with the interior. Both long-established coastal families and recent Omani immigrants became increasingly active in the trade settlements and caravans of the interior. The Sultanate was also connected to expanding production for overseas trade, especially of cloves. As these and other trade crops were increasingly cultivated on slave-worked coastal plantations, they sparked a boom in the regional slave trade, despite European efforts to curtail it. Sultan Barghash, who took power in 1870, supported this commercial expansion and instituted reforms, such as modernizing the army and attempting to diversify the economy with sugar mills and a fleet of ships. The Sultanate was, though, also increasingly tied to Europe-oriented trade systems, to the financial power of Indian bankers and tax farmers, and to the diplomatic muscle and navy of Britain.

By the late nineteenth century, the eastern Congo had become an important element in the Sultanate, since the Zanzibari settlements there stood closest to the ivory frontier. Nyangwe, the first of these settlements, had been established in 1869. Others grew up

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quickly under the aegis of Zanzibari traders, the most prominent of whom was Hamed bin Mohammed al-Murjebi, better known as Tippu Tip. These settlements became centers for provisioning trade caravans. They produced local trade goods and had extensive slave-worked plantations to grow food. They also served as bases from which to promote the expansion of trade.

By the 1880s, Zanzibaris on the upper Congo River were butting up against Leopold II's nascent Congo Free State. 21 This had ostensibly been created to facilitate the suppression of the slave trade, establish a free trade in "legitimate" goods, and advance the cause of science through exploration. It had evolved, through Leopold's adroit diplomatic maneuvering, into a personal kingdom formally recognized by other European powers in 1885. Prior to this, Leopold had contracted with the explorer Henry Stanley to lay the foundation for his empire. Between 1879 and 1884, Stanley, at the head of a caravan of Zanzibaris, constructed an overland route around the lower Congo rapids to Stanley Pool. He also established a series of nine stations between the mouth of the Congo and Stanley Falls. Like the Egyptian empire in the Sudan, the Free State was extractive in intent. The power of its stations was extremely limited, constrained by a lack of resources and personnel. The State's tenuous authority faced challenges from powerful indigenous traders on the middle Congo and the Zanzibaris on the upper river, as well as from the peoples living around its stations.

The Free State’s confrontation with the Zanzibari settlements sparked a showdown at Stanley Falls in 1886. The Zanzibaris drove out the State’s garrison and took possession of Stanley Falls station. The subsequent appointment of Tippu Tip as governor of the province of Stanley Falls was an attempt to resolve this conflict. It was also a pragmatic and inexpensive way for the State, which had been all but eliminated from the upper Congo, to keep a toehold in the region, albeit at the sufferance of the Zanzibari traders. The Free State provoked additional tensions within the Zanzibari community by offering the opportunity to ship ivory down the Congo, which threatened the economic foundation of the Sultan’s power.

The east coast was also experiencing increased tension as a result of European activity. Since the mid-nineteenth century a status quo had prevailed, based on the exercise of informal British economic and diplomatic influence over the Sultanate. Agreements to curtail the slave trade made during the 1870s were one sign of this influence. However, this status quo was subject to a variety of indigenous pressures, as well as to those generated by competing factions within the British and German governments, business and philanthropic circles. The Society for German Colonization caused the first major crack in the uneasy status quo in the Sultanate with a series of 1884 treaties, obtained by Carl Peters, ceding local sovereignty in the Tanganyika hinterland to the Society. Since neither the British nor German governments were eager to undertake direct political responsibilities in the region, and neither was eager to upset the European diplomatic balance, they negotiated an 1886 agreement which recognized the Sultan’s rights over Zanzibar and a strip of the mainland coast. A British and a German sphere of influence were identified beyond this coastal zone. Both governments envisioned chartered companies would be the means of exploiting these spheres. Accordingly, the British East Africa Association and the Deutsche Ost-Africa Gesellschaft signed concession agreements with the
Sultan in 1887 and 1888 respectively. The British Association, soon renamed the Imperial British East Africa Company, got off to a slow start. Its capital was limited and it favoured a cautious approach. Its initial plan was to use the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition to establish its concession. The Ost-Afrika Gesellschaft was more aggressive and its claims, when added to existing local tensions, provoked armed revolt in several coastal communities. This paralyzed inland trade and further complicated relations between Zanzibaris and Europeans in the interior. Though the revolt was quashed in 1889, a reluctant German government was forced to step in and administer the region, since the Ost-Afrika Gesellschaft was clearly incapable. Further imperial rivalry prompted the negotiation of a new Anglo-German agreement in 1890, one that more clearly spelled out their respective territorial claims and made Zanzibar itself a British protectorate.

Polities like Buganda and Bunyoro, though beyond the sphere of Zanzibari claims, were tied into its commercial network. They were also affected by some of the same economic and political forces buffeting both Zanzibar and Egypt. They were concerned as well to shape and profit from long-distance trade. Both kingdoms also feared encroachment on their trade hinterlands by the Egyptians, and wished to control any movement of persons or goods south from Equatoria. While Emin had earlier entertained cordial diplomatic relations with the rulers of both kingdoms, by 1887 he was unable to get either goods or mail through these kingdoms on a consistent basis.

In addition, both kingdoms were caught up in the militarization of the region, and went to war against each other. Buganda was experiencing additional upheaval, with Kabaka Mwanga less able to manage the rival factions at court than his adroit father Mutesa had been. Civil war broke out in 1888. Mwanga, deposed in the fighting, fled to the Sesse
Islands in Lake Victoria and sought allies, who later succeeded in placing him back on the throne. Throughout this troubled period, travel in the region was more than ordinarily difficult, and the European missionaries in Buganda were in a vulnerable position. In this situation, any movement by Emin and his garrisons, or by a large, heavily armed caravan such as Stanley was to propose, would be viewed as provocative by all parties.

**Emin’s Plight**

“Send forth words of thunder that will open the eyes of all the world!...It is absolutely necessary that Emin Bey should receive help without delay,” exhorted the traveller Wilhelm Junker. He arrived on the east coast in early 1886, fresh from a two-year stay in Equatoria province and determined to publicize Emin’s plight. After almost two years without direct word, the news that Emin and his garrisons remained at their posts came as a surprise to Egyptian and British officials, as well as to the reading public in Europe.

In early 1886 Emin, in his turn, received the first direct communication from outside Equatoria in several years. These letters confirmed the fall of Khartoum and Egypt’s intention to abandon its provinces in the Sudan. Nubar Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, suggested Emin and his garrisons return to Egypt via Zanzibar. Emin was both angry and discouraged by this, knowing that his garrisons were vehemently opposed to such a move, while he was personally disinclined to abandon his post for an uncertain future in Egypt. Four months later, Emin received a letter from Alexander Mackay, who worked for the Church Missionary Society in Buganda. Mackay urged Emin to maintain or even expand his position in Equatoria, and to offer

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22 W. Junker to G. Schweinfurth, 16 August 1886 as quoted in Smith, Expedition, 40.
the province to Britain as a protectorate. Attracted by this advice, Emin appealed to various of
his correspondents for the assistance necessary to carry out this plan. He would need supplies, he
indicated, chiefly arms and ammunition. More importantly, though, a "safe road to the coast
must be opened up" if Equatoria province was to be developed.

Emin’s British advocates launched a campaign on his behalf in the press, and in the
philanthropic and scientific organizations with which he had ties. In this campaign, Equatoria
became a profitable nucleus of civilised light and order in the heart of Africa. Emin was
mythologized as a worthy successor of the martyred Gordon, while his troops were models of
African courage and devotion. These images, later the subject of much controversy, become a
resource for several overlapping circles of commercial, political and philanthropic interests.
The campaign also successfully evoked the long-standing British moral engagement with Africa,
with the result that "a deep and painful sense of responsibility for the situation of Gordon's last
lieutenant pervaded a large section of the public mind." Given this climate of opinion, a
response to Emin’s appeals became politically desirable, despite the British government’s dislike
of direct involvement in the interior of Africa.

Ideas about Relieving Emin

There were two early and unsuccessful efforts to contact Emin and re-open a route to
Equatoria. The first, led by Dr. G.A. Fischer and financed by Junker's brother, a German banker,

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23 Smith, *Expedition*, 29; Mackay to J. Kirk, 24 August 1886, as quoted in Smith, *Expedition*, 33. This
advice was seconded by others among Emin’s correspondents; see for example, R. Felkin to Emin, 8 July 1887,
Staatsarchiv der Senat der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, Emin Pascha Nachlaß, 622-2 C.III. Hereafter
Staatsarchiv Hamburg. The possibility of making a similar arrangement with either Germany or the Congo Free
State, the latter favoured by Junker, was much less attractive to Emin. Smith, *Expedition*, 34-5.

24 Emin to R. Felkin, 17 April 1887 as quoted in Smith, *Expedition*, 36.

25 See Smith, *Expedition*, 149 for a discussion of the origin of these images in Emin’s correspondence and
the discrepancy between them and the dispassionate descriptions of the disintegration of his province in Emin’s diaries.
left Zanzibar in August 1885. Fischer was contracted to bring aid to Junker and to the other Europeans stranded in Equatoria. The hostility of the Kabaka forced his caravan to turn back on the eastern edge of Buganda. On the way back to the coast, they suffered from severe hunger and skirmishes with the Maasai. Of greater interest, since it chose the route eventually taken by Stanley, was the expedition led by Oskar Lenz and sponsored by the Imperial Geographical Society of Vienna. Lenz travelled up the Congo in 1885 and he faced many of the difficulties Stanley later encountered. However, without the political connections or intimidating size of Stanley’s caravan, Lenz’s group was dependent on the travel plans of Free State officials and missionaries. Their progress upriver was consequently slow. Arriving at Stanley Falls in February 1886, Lenz made arrangements for porters with Tippu Tip, but a shortage of porter labour and the lack of security in the region made northward travel impossible. Eleven months later Lenz was back in Zanzibar, having followed the established caravan routes running east from the upper Congo.

In Britain, a variety of groups and individuals floated plans for relieving Emin in late 1886. The most credible was that of the Scottish Geographical Society, which recommended that the government send out a "pacific Relief Expedition" under the leadership of Joseph

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27 Contract between F. Junker and G.A. Fischer, Berlin, 12 March 1885, copy in Emin Pascha Nachlaß, 622-2 E.II. Junker also contracted Fischer to assemble ethnographic and zoological collections for two Berlin museums.
28 G.A. Fischer to A. Bastian, 15 June 1886, copy in Emin Pascha Nachlaß, 622-2 E.II; W. O'Swald and A. O'Swald (Zanzibar) to W. O'Swald & Co. (Hamburg), 17 June 1886 and 5 July 1886, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, William O'Swald & Co., Bestand 621-1, #4 Band 37.
Thomson. Other, more fanciful plans, involved caravans travelling up the Mobangi River, or across Abyssinia, or via the Zambezi, Lake Nyassa and Lake Tanganyika.

Emin’s appeals also fired the imagination of William Mackinnon, a Scottish industrialist and philanthropist. He was part of a group of British businessmen and politicians who had, since early 1885, been quietly advancing plans to obtain a concession to exploit part of the mainland territory of the Sultanate of Zanzibar. His partners, particularly the Manchester businessman James Hutton, were more interested in the prospects of a railroad and trade with the interior than in the plight of Emin. They were, however, willing to support a compromise proposal for a "Syndicate for establishing British commerce and influence in East Africa and for relieving Emin Bey." The syndicate was to "open a direct route to Victoria Nyanza and the Sudan and thereby establish stations and commerce in the interior of East Africa," all of this to be operated by a chartered company. A proposed expedition to relieve Emin satisfied Mackinnon’s desire for a role in international politics and philanthropy, while simultaneously advancing his partners’ commercial aims by signing treaties for the new company with leaders along its line of march from Mombasa to Wadelai.

The commercial and political possibilities inherent in Emin Pasha’s province intrigued the Zanzibari merchant Tippu Tip as much as they did Europeans. He wanted to open a line of trade with Equatoria that would by-pass Buganda and Bunyoro, and thought a caravan which
brought relief supplies to Emin and purchased Emin's stock of ivory would help accomplish this. On his arrival in Zanzibar in November 1886, he began to organise a caravan for Equatoria. However the news, received in late December, of hostilities between the Zanzibari trade community and the Congo Free State at Stanley Falls caused him to lay aside these plans. Subsequently, he was persuaded that collaboration with Stanley's Expedition was the best available means of opening a route to Equatoria.

Formation of the Emin Pasha Relief Committee

In mid-autumn 1886, Mackinnon and Hutton took their plans to Stanley, who had collaborated with them in political and commercial activities related to the Congo Free State. Stanley had been recommended to them as the best person to consolidate their proposed concession. Stanley, frustrated in his dealings with his employer, Leopold II of Belgium, and desirous of returning to Africa, was happy to involve himself in their scheme. Stanley outlined four possible routes for an expedition to Equatoria, three via the east coast and a fourth, which he favoured, via the Congo River. He was confident that he could reach Emin by mid-June 1887. Initially, they discussed an expedition that would carry the instructions of the Egyptian or British governments to Emin and assist him to withdraw with his garrisons. However, the arrival in

in Smith, *Expedition*, 55.

Pruen, *Arab and African*, 213-4 recounts conversations Tippu Tip had with missionaries at Mpwapwa in 1886 on these matters. See also Bennett, *Arab vs. European*, chapter 6.

Holmwood to Salisbury, 8 January 1887, FO 84/1851. The value of Emin's ivory was reported to exceed £100,000.

John Kirk, Mackinnon's advisor on east Africa, recommended Stanley for work on the new concession. J. Kirk to W. Mackinnon, 6 November 1886 as quoted in Anstey, *British and the Congo*, 213.

See McLynn, *Stanley*, 2:128-30 & 135-8 for a discussion of Stanley's frustrations. These included Leopold II's rejection of the British Congo railway syndicate in which both Stanley and Mackinnon had been involved, and Stanley's disappointment in love.

See HMS, *In Darkest Africa, or the Quest, Rescue, and Retreat of Emin Governor of Equatoria* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1890), 1:31-4. Hereafter IDA.
mid-October of news that Emin hoped to remain in Equatoria raised the possibility that Emin and his garrisons might play a role in establishing the proposed concession. The re-conceived expedition was to take supplies to Emin and evacuate only a few Egyptian officials and their families. Work on the East African concession would still be done en route. Stanley estimated the cost of the expedition at £20,000. To defray the cost of relieving Emin, Mackinnon laid claim to a "just proportion" of the "considerable quantities of ivory" Emin was believed to possess.

With no particular sense of urgency attached to the relief project, Stanley left for a lecture tour of the United States. Meanwhile, Mackinnon and Hutton pursued their proposal in a series of meetings with Foreign Office contacts. The combination of an opportunity to promote British interests in East Africa and a chance to alleviate the public pressure to assist Emin, all without direct financial obligation or political responsibility, made the proposed expedition attractive to the British government. Mackinnon committed himself to raise privately half of the projected cost, while the British government undertook to provide the remainder "out of the resources of Egypt." The government also assisted in the acquisition of the necessary arms and ammunition, and provided consular services for negotiations with the governments of Egypt and Zanzibar. In obtaining the approval of British government and, through it, that of the Egyptian

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42 Smith, Expedition, 61. The evolution of these plans is not clear, as only the parts of the Expedition connected to its public purpose of assisting Emin are well documented.
45 W. Mackinnon to Iddesleigh, 27 November 1886 and enclosed "Memorandum on the subject of the Relief of Emin Bey," by W. Mackinnon, in "Correspondence Respecting the Expedition for the Relief of Emin Pasha: 1886-87," Public Record Office, C. 5601/Africa No. 8.
46 W. Mackinnon to Lord Iddesleigh, 27 November 1886, MP 85/23. The Committee did not solicit public donations for the Emin Pasha Relief Fund. This would have involved an undesirable level of publicity for the Expedition, and likely allegations of conflict of interest with respect to its commercial purposes as well.
government, the Expedition had access to a wider range of resources than the other, so far unsuccessful efforts to reach Emin.

Over the next month, Mackinnon took the initiative in raising funds and assembling an organizing committee.47 Besides Mackinnon and Stanley, the initial members of the Emin Pasha Relief Committee included men with military and government backgrounds, like Guy Dawnay and Francis de Winton, or those like James Grant with backgrounds in exploration and links to the British geographical establishment. Several of these men had also been involved with Leopold II and his Congo Free State. Another important group represented on the Committee were philanthropists, including some, like Horace Waller and Alexander Bruce, with ties to Livingstone.48 Mackinnon and members of his family were the largest private contributors to the Relief Fund. While a few of the other Committee members also contributed substantially, several had little or no financial stake in the Expedition.

With a Fund and Committee falling into place, Mackinnon telegraphed Stanley:

"business very urgent & vital importance delay dangerous your instant return required."49 The source of this new urgency is not clear. It may have been John Kirk's counsel that the East African concession needed to be pursued immediately.50 However, by the time the Expedition reached the Congo, the urgency was associated with Emin. After the Expedition, Stanley indicated that it was the press coverage of Emin's plight, portraying him as a second Gordon

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47 For a list of contributors to the Fund and members of the Committee, see Appendix 1.
49 W. Mackinnon to HMS, 13 December 1886, BLEM Stanley Papers. Mackinnon sent an initial, less harried telegram to Stanley on 11 December; see IDA, 1:34.
50 J. Kirk to W. Mackinnon, 30 October 1886 and 6 November 1886, MP 24/94. The Committee's sense of urgency was certainly increased by a fear of delays on the Congo River and the need to get the Expedition through the CFS before it could even begin to pursue the business of the British East African
beleaguered on the Nile, which generated the feeling that he was in immediate need of relief.\textsuperscript{51} Whatever its source, this sense of urgency contributed substantially to the problems of the Expedition since at several points it led Stanley to divide his caravan so as to travel more quickly.

**Preparations and Departure**

Stanley returned to London in late December to make preparations for the Expedition. Although Stanley was given a free hand in arranging supplies and recruiting personnel,\textsuperscript{52} the Committee demurred at his proposed Congo route. Stanley explained that it was geographically the shortest route to Equatoria.\textsuperscript{53} What was more, his porters would arrive on the upper Congo rested from their steamer passage, rather than exhausted by the march from the coast. He also argued that the route would prevent the usual desertion of porters. The Zanzibaris would be far from familiar territory, with their homes ahead of, not behind them. This would reduce the number of porters required from eight to six hundred.\textsuperscript{54} The Committee, however, preferred Stanley's second choice, an east coast route that ran along the west side of Lake Victoria and thus avoided hostile Buganda. Indeed, they had already begun making preparations based on the use of this route. The ability of the Expedition to establish a concession in the interior was another important consideration, and the Committee feared that use of the Congo route would significantly hamper this work. Stanley acquiesced in their decision.


\textsuperscript{53} *IDA*, 1:34 & 36.

\textsuperscript{54} HMS Diary, 29 December 1886, cited in McLynn, 2:142.
Stanley was, however, still nominally in the employ of King Leopold II of Belgium and visited him to request permission to undertake the Expedition. Leopold did not want to lose Stanley's services, but had no immediate task on which he could be employed. He agreed to allow Stanley leave from his contract, provided the Expedition took the Congo route. Leopold saw this as an inexpensive way to promote his desire to open up a route between the upper Congo and the upper Nile Rivers. Stanley was also instructed to offer Emin, if he wished to remain in Equatoria, employment for himself and his garrisons under the Congo Free State, though Leopold had little expectation that this offer would be accepted. The Relief Committee members, several of whom did not want to jeopardise their own long-standing ties to Leopold II, consented to the Congo route, provided the King could guarantee sufficient steamer transport on the upper Congo. Mackinnon made it clear, though, that the Expedition must return via the east coast, preferably north of the German sphere, so that Stanley would be able to assess the prospects for the British East African Association's concession.

Stanley chose to keep many aspects of these multiple commitments to himself. Several overlapping circles of people possessed of varying amounts of information about the purposes of the Expedition, but Stanley was the only one with access to all the information. This kept decision-making power concentrated in his hands and created conflicts of interest. These

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55 Leopold contemplated putting Stanley at the head of a punitive expedition to retake Stanley Falls station, which had fallen to Zanzibari attack in August 1886, but the time did not seem right for such action. Smith, Expedition, 77; McLynn, Stanley, 2:143.
56 Smith, 77-8; McLynn, 2:144. While there is no evidence that Stanley manipulated these discussions to support his position against the Committee, he can hardly have been displeased by their outcome.
57 Smith, Expedition, 81.
58 Minute Book, 9 January 1887, MP. See also, McLynn, Stanley, 2:145.
59 W. Mackinnon to HMS, 6 January 1887, 10 January 1887 & 11 January 1887, BLEM Stanley Papers. Stanley confirmed his intention to take the east coast route back from Equatoria when he ordered a cache of trade goods to be made for the Expedition at the CMS's Msalala station. The "Strictly Confidential" heading on this letter suggests Stanley and the Committee did not wish to publicize the additional purposes of the Expedition. HMS to G. Mackenzie, 9 March 1887, MP 86/29.
dynamics created tensions in Stanley's relationship with the Committee who, while they gave him a great deal of latitude to respond to conditions on the spot, expected that their interests would be the primary ones motivating him. They also contributed to Stanley's conflict-ridden relationship with his officers, whose contracts were "made out in such language as to convey the idea that [they] were employed solely for the relief of Emin Pacha," and who learnt piece-meal of some of Stanley's other purposes. These tensions and conflicts jeopardized the success of the Expedition.

The last minute decision in favour of the Congo route necessitated rapid preparations. The Committee entered into talks with the Egyptian government and the Sultan of Zanzibar for approval of the new route. They obtained a steamer from Mackinnon's British India Steamship Company to take the Expedition from Zanzibar to the mouth of the Congo River. After receiving word of food shortages on the lower Congo and the inadequate fleet of Free State steamers on the upper Congo, they scrambled to compensate, arranging to stockpile supplies along the river and requesting assistance from mission societies that had steamers. These arrangements were not completed before Stanley's departure and a flurry of telegrams followed him to the mouth of the Congo.

Stanley and the Committee also needed to recruit officers to assist in running the caravan. With the high public profile the Expedition had attained, they were inundated with offers. They ended up selecting eight men in rather haphazard fashion. Edmond Barttelot, William Stairs, Robert Nelson, and William Bonny all had military backgrounds. Another, John

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60 See Smith, Expedition, 81-2.
61 Mackinnon, for example, wanted it clearly understood by "all parties" that for Stanley the Expedition's work would take priority over that of the CFS. W. Mackinnon to HMS, 6 January 1887, BLEM Stanley Papers.
62 E. Barttelot to H. Sclater, 19 July 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.
63 The Committee had first asked the government to provide a steamer for the use of the Expedition.
Rose Troup, had worked in the Congo Free State. Arthur Mounteney Jephson and James Jameson were well-connected travellers who were accepted after each contributed £1,000 to the Relief Fund. The Expedition’s doctor created the only difficulty, as the one originally engaged refused to accept some of the clauses in the officers’ contract. Thomas Parke, an army surgeon who volunteered to join the Expedition in Egypt, took his place.

The supplies that the Expedition acquired were mainly military—560 rifles, 215,000 cartridges, and 2 tons of gunpowder, as well as a stock of trade goods for barter en route. While most of these were obtained in Egypt or Zanzibar, through arrangement with the British government or by firms connected to members of the Committee, some specialized items for use by the officers were acquired in England. There were also some high-profile donations. The pharmaceutical firm Burroughs & Wellcome provided medicine chests and kits, and were later able to make advertising mileage out of their connection to the Expedition. Hiram Maxim, the inventor of an improved machine gun, donated a prototype to the Expedition for field-testing and publicity purposes.

Another crucial task undertaken by the Committee was the establishment of a system to manage the creation and dissemination of information about Expedition. Stanley expected that profit from publication of his accounts of the Expedition would substitute for his lack of a wage and recoup the loss he sustained in abandoning a lucrative lecture tour to undertake the
Expedition. In order to maximize this profit, he needed to be sure that his account of the Expedition would not suffer competition from those written by its other participants.\textsuperscript{69} This monopoly on information was protected through a clause in the officers’ contracts that set out the times when they were not allowed to publish information about the Expedition. Another element in the system was the Royal Geographical Society, who agreed to be a sponsor of the Expedition provided they had the first right to publish any geographical discoveries it made.\textsuperscript{70} The Committee also set up a syndicate of several large newspapers. Each paper made donations to the Relief Fund in exchange for the right of first publication of Stanley’s letters. Though the resulting monopoly of information was profitable for all concerned, it was also fragile. The Committee consequently devoted a good deal of time to maintaining its and Stanley’s control over information during the course of the Expedition. Further, the controversy around the Expedition made the Committee anxious to control access to particular information.

The Expedition in Egypt

The Expedition left for Egypt in late January 1887. Stanley, having sent his officers off a day earlier, was able to monopolize the cheering crowd assembled to witness the Expedition’s departure from London and to present an image of appropriately solitary heroism. Public interest in the Expedition was fuelled both by the romance of this heroic effort to relieve Emin and a sense of mystery, since the route to be used by the Expedition had not yet been announced.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{69} See F. de Winton to Messers. Blackwood & Sons, 7 May 1889, MP 93/55. This legal firm was acting on behalf of Troup, whom the Committee sued for breach of this part of his contract.

\textsuperscript{70} Minute Book, 2 February 1887, MP 93/53.

\textsuperscript{71} See, for example, “The Departure of Mr. H.M. Stanley,” \textit{Morning Post}, [22] January 1887, JRTC, vol. I. The sense of mystery was not limited to the reading public. The British Foreign Office believed, for example, that the choice of the Congo route might mean Leopold II intended the Expedition to recapture Stanley Falls station from the Zanzibaris. McLynn, \textit{Stanley}, 2:148.
Arriving in Egypt, Stanley learned that there were official objections to several aspects of the Expedition. The situation was complicated by rumours that Emin was in the process of rescuing himself and had already fought his way through Buganda.\(^2\) Junker and Schweinfurth, travellers who were advising the Egyptian government, deplored both the Congo route and the heavily armed character of the Expedition. Stanley met with them, won them over, and acquired Junker’s maps of the region as well as his servant Binza to act as a guide. However, powerful figures in the Egyptian government believed that the current plans for the Expedition meant it would do little to promote Egyptian interests. They threatened to withdraw Egyptian financing unless the Expedition used an east coast route. Baring, the British Consul, remained solidly behind Stanley, though, and in the end the Egyptian Prime Minister “deferred to Sir Evelyn’s superior judgement” in the matter.\(^3\) Stanley, who had earlier exploited the press to support his vision of the Expedition, took action to minimize public mention of this discord.\(^4\)

Stanley’s ability to appropriate both the resources and the authority of the Egyptian state for the Expedition was crucial for its success. To become a credible spokesperson for the government, Stanley planned to supplement the official letters and proclamation he carried with Sudanese soldiers from the Egyptian army. These soldiers were to stand witness to the legitimacy of the Expedition with the Equatorian garrisons. Sixty-one Sudanese soldiers joined the Expedition at Suez.\(^5\) At Aden the Expedition picked up twelve Somalis recruited to act as servants and assistants to Stanley and his officers.


\(^3\) *IDA*, 1:49-51.

\(^4\) “Mr. H.M. Stanley and Emin Pasha,” 29 January 1887 and other untitled articles of this date in JRTC, vol. I; HMS telegram to W. Mackinnon, 29 January 1887, MP 85/16.

The Expedition in Zanzibar

During the Expedition's three day stop in Zanzibar, Stanley conducted negotiations crucial to the conduct of the Expedition, the purposes of the British East African Association, and Leopold II's plans for the upper Congo. Stanley later coyly glossed over these "little commissions" in his public account of the Expedition. The first of these was a meeting with Tippu Tip. Stanley, on behalf of Leopold II, offered him the post of governor of Stanley Falls district. A sceptical Tippu Tip, confident of his strength relative to the Congo Free State, required a good deal of persuading. In the end he agreed, believing the position might reduce conflict between the Zanzibari traders and the Free State, increase his standing in the Zanzibari communities of the eastern Congo, and strengthen his claims to new territory along several lines of expansion. Stanley, acting for the Expedition, also contracted with Tippu Tip to supply porters to carry relief supplies from the upper Congo to Equatoria, and to transport ivory and evacuees from the Equatorian garrisons back to the Congo. Though the exact number of porters was not specified, Stanley and his officers expected six hundred. Stanley was to pay these men and supply them with gunpowder and ammunition, while Tippu Tip was to provide their guns. Stanley also pressed Tippu Tip to accompany the Expedition to Stanley Falls by boat so that he would be present to implement the contract for porters immediately. Peaceful passage through the eastern Congo and the porters to be supplied by Tippu Tip were so important

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76 *IDA*, 1:68.
78 Agreement between Henry Morton Stanley and Hamed bin Mohamed al Marjibi Tippu Tib, 24 January 1887, BLEM Stanley Papers.
79 Tippu Tip's understanding of the contract was that Stanley was to supply the recruited men with guns, gunpowder and caps, while Tippu Tip supplied their bullets. See the translation of M. bin Juma el-Marjebi to F. Holmwood, 21 July 1887 in MP 88/33.
to the Expedition that, had these negotiations not been successful, Stanley would have been forced to adopt an east coast route.

Stanley also met with the Sultan to discuss a concession for the British East Africa Association. Sultan Barghash, increasingly worried about maintaining his claims on the mainland, had been discussing policy options with advisors like Tippu Tip and Holmwood, the Acting British Consul, for months. Heightened concern about the recent actions of several European powers made him receptive to Mackinnon’s renewed overtures as conveyed by Stanley. A day after the Expedition’s departure, Holmwood notified London that the Sultan had agreed in principle to the proposed concession, an outcome of which Stanley had already been confident.80

The Expedition’s public business in Zanzibar was the acquisition of trade goods, gunpowder, donkeys and porters, all arranged by Smith, Mackenzie & Co. The firm, in which Committee member George Mackenzie was a partner, had engaged in trade and transportation on the mainland for almost a decade, but the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition was by far the largest caravan it had yet assembled.81 While Stanley’s officers oversaw the loading of the supplies, Stanley, accompanied by Holmwood, witnessed the mustering of the Expedition’s porters at the British Consul’s compound. As the contracts were signed and advance pay distributed, Stanley reminisced with those of the porters whom he had employed on earlier caravans, re-establishing a bond with them.82 The porters were then escorted to directly to the waterfront,

80 See Smith, Expedition, 95-7 for the debate about the role Stanley played in this early stage of the Imperial British East Africa Company.
82 Holmwood to Salisbury, 25 February 1887, FO 84/1851.
where a crowd had gathered to see them off. The Sultan's guard were also out in force to prevent desertions as the porters embarked on the steamer. Holmwood, having seen the Expedition off the next day, reported that it was "in every way the most perfectly organized expedition that has hitherto entered tropical Africa."

The first day underway was, perfect organization notwithstanding, marked by a tremendous fight over shipboard accommodations between the Zanzibari porters and the Sudanese soldiers. Stanley and his officers restored order with clubs, but the fight established a pattern of suspicion and antagonism between these two groups for the entire Expedition. Stanley proceeded to organize the men into companies, each under the direction of a European officer. He also issued "General Orders" establishing a daily regimen of duty for officers and men. He distributed rations and supplies with a generous hand, which formed a sharp contrast to the stinginess of which everyone later complained. The three weeks aboard the steamer were also a time in which the officers were consciously getting to know one another. Initially, they were also curious to meet Tippu Tip, who was "almost an historical personage now." The petty annoyances of living in close quarters with his seasick entourage soon outweighed this pleasure, though. Stanley for the most part stayed deliberately aloof and kept his concerns and plans for

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83 This scene is most fully described in W. Hoffmann Diary, February 1887, Wellcome Institute Library, WMSS #6010.
84 Bonny Diary, 24 February 1887 (E47); T.H. Parke, My Personal Experiences in Equatorial Africa as Medical Officer of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1891), 19.
85 Holmwood to Salisbury, 25 February 1887, FO 84/1851.
86 These orders are quoted in full in Parke, My Experiences, 20-21. See Chapter 3 for further discussion of the order established at various points during the Expedition.
87 Parke, My Experiences, 23; E. Barttelot to M. Godman, 26 February-10 March 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.
88 E. Barttelot to his parents, 1-18 June 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.
the Expedition to himself. He also spent a good deal of time in private conversation with Tippu Tip.

The Expedition in the Congo Free State

The Expedition arrived at the mouth of the Congo River on March 18\textsuperscript{th}, six days earlier than expected, only to find that the steamers that were supposed to take them to the head of navigation on the lower Congo were not assembled. A broken telegraph had kept back news that the Expedition was ahead of schedule. Fortunately for the Expedition, it also delayed the arrival of instructions from Leopold II that would have sent some of the Free State steamers promised to the Expedition upriver on other tasks. While Leopold II’s motives are not clear, he appeared to be intent on making opportunistic use of the Expedition while investing a minimum of the Free State’s scant resources in supporting it. The Expedition also had to contend with the State’s barely functional infrastructure, its tenuous authority, its officials’ lack of knowledge of conditions in most of its purported territory, and the relations of non-cooperation or hostility towards the State of various peoples along the river. These problems were compounded by the “gentle malice” directed at Stanley by the officials who had replaced him in the administration of the Free State. Stanley took out his frustration over these problems in verbal and physical attacks on his European and African subordinates.

Using a makeshift flotilla, the Expedition made it to Matadi, the head of the overland route to Stanley Pool. On March 25\textsuperscript{th} they made their first, short march upriver. It taxed the

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\textsuperscript{89} HMS Notebook, BLEM Stanley Papers, Lot E46. Hereafter HMS Notebook (E46).
\textsuperscript{90} Smith, \textit{Expedition}, 109 and McLynn, \textit{Stanley}, 2:164 & 173. McLynn notes that in addition to advising CFS officials that assistance to the Expedition was to be given only when it would not “prejudice the service of the State,” Leopold II had instructed one official to take the steamer \textit{Henry Reed} on an exploratory trip up the Ubangi River, anticipating that Stanley would commandeer it for the Expedition.
porters, many of whom were in poor condition. "It is a fine sight to see our people going about the Country over hill & through vale with their different coloured cloths & 800 men stretching for miles," Bonny observed the next day, their first full day on the road.\textsuperscript{92} For the porters, though, the march to Stanley Pool was trying rather than picturesque. It constituted a seasoning or, for many, a re-conditioning period, both in terms of the physical work and the strategies of porterage.\textsuperscript{93} The physical difficulties of the route—hills, rocky ground, lack of shade, and a problematic supply of food—all made the seasoning process more difficult.\textsuperscript{94} Travelling in the rainy season, they had the additional problem of slippery paths, wet loads, wet camps, and high water in the Congo's many tributaries.\textsuperscript{95} It took three weeks before the porters settled in to their work.\textsuperscript{96} The march to Stanley Pool consequently took 28 days rather than the customary 15 to 20 days, and mortality and morbidity were both problems for the porters. Also, despite Stanley's argument for the Congo route, so was desertion.

For the Sudanese soldiers, the march up the lower Congo was a time of disillusionment and discontent.\textsuperscript{97} They and Barttelot, who both rubbed Stanley the wrong way, were punished with each other. The Sudanese were sent ahead of the body of the caravan under Barttelot's leadership, to make their way to Stanley Pool as best they could with limited rations.\textsuperscript{98} The European officers also experienced this as a period of disenchantment with the Expedition. A
good deal of this stemmed from Stanley's style of caravan management. Most of the officers were appalled by the means they were expected to use to keep order among the porters in their charge. After barely a week, Jameson complained: "The work we are doing is not fit for any white man, but ought to be given to slave-drivers." Stanley's explosive temper and his inability to delegate or show confidence in his officers caused other problems. "If I had known what a brute [Stanley] was, and how infernally he was going to treat us, I would never have come," Barttelot confided in a letter to his brother-in-law.  

At Manyanga, they found Troup, who had been sent ahead to arrange the transport to Stanley Pool of the thousand odd loads of food and trade goods the Expedition would use on the Congo. Troup was hampered in this work by shortages of food and of local porters, as well as the poor packaging of many of the loads. Herbert Ward, a Free State official on his way home to Europe, encountered the Expedition near Matadi and volunteered to join. Stanley accepted him since he immediately used his connections as a labour recruiter to conjure up an additional 300 porters.  

Once at Stanley Pool, Stanley confronted even more problems than he anticipated finding steamers to take the Expedition upriver. Worse, a severe shortage of food in the area made it imperative that the Expedition move on quickly. Stanley resorted to a combination of high-handed and under-handed methods to appropriate steamers from both the mission societies and
State officials. Even so, they were not able to take all the men and loads. The excess loads were left in Troup's charge at Leopoldville. The 127 porters who could not be fit onto the steamers were sent upriver to the abandoned Free State station at Bolobo, where, under the direction of Bonny and Ward, they made a fortified camp and settled in to wait until the steamers could make a second run up the river.

The voyage upriver took one and a half months. This meant long hot days of immobility and tedium for the men, as the steamers and the boats were crowded enough to make movement difficult. The tedium was punctuated with the terror of occasional accidents caused by hidden sandbars and mechanical problems. The steamers also made regular stops to obtain wood for their boilers, which was collected and cut by the porters, usually at night. While the officers had more freedom of movement, they shared the tedium, which was broken only by stops at infrequent mission or Free State stations. At some stops, Stanley was able to re-activate ties to chiefs with whom he had once made treaties, drawing on his prestige as Bula Matari, the forceful creator of the Free State. This was a workable strategy on the middle Congo, but broke down as a means of mobilizing resources on the upper river, where the Free State had never been established or where its authority had given way to that of the Zanzibari traders.

In mid-June the steamers finally reached the cluster of villages at Yambuya, the head of navigation on the Aruwimi River. After several hours' negotiation failed to produce permission to land and set up a camp, Stanley sent in armed Zanzibaris under cover of blasts from the steamer whistles, with the Maxim gun ready in reserve. However, the inhabitants fled, leaving the Expedition to occupy the main village. Stanley immediately set everyone to work building a fort protected by a wooden palisade and ditch. He was also anxiously awaiting the return of the
steamer that had gone on to Stanley Falls station, carrying Tippu Tip and his entourage with Barttelot and forty Sudanese soldiers as escort. This errand took several days longer than Stanley anticipated. He worried that the delay might be caused by conflict between Zanzibaris at the Falls and the Expedition's Sudanese.\(^{105}\) He did not, however, anticipate that Tippu Tip would need to re-establish his position after a year's absence or that, in his new capacity as a Free State governor, Tippu Tip's authority would be refused by prominent rival traders.\(^{106}\) Stanley also chose to ignore Tippu Tip's anger that the gunpowder Stanley was to supply for Tippu Tip's porters had not been brought up the river.\(^{107}\)

The Advance Column

For some months already, Stanley had planned to create a fortified base camp at Yambuya and to divide the Expedition, leaving some men and many loads behind, while pressing rapidly ahead with a smaller group and the relief supplies most urgently needed by Emin—ammunition.\(^{108}\) Accordingly, he re-organized the Zanzibaris into new companies on the journey up-river. Barttelot and Jameson, joined later by Troup, Ward and Bonny, were to stay and supervise the Yambuya group, which became known as the Rear Column. They were to

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\(^{103}\) For a discussion of Stanley's Bula Matari persona, see Chapter 5.

\(^{104}\) Stairs Diary, 15-16 June 1887, *IDA*, 1:112-4; HMS to F. de Winton, 19 June 1887, MP 86/29.

\(^{105}\) Stanley Diary, 21-22 June 1887 as cited in McLynn, 2:182. HMS to W. Stairs, 22 June 1887, W.G. Stairs Fonds MG9/63 which details Stanley's fears is unfortunately largely illegible.

\(^{106}\) E. Barttelot to Sir W. Barttelot, 1-23 June 1887, Barttelot Family Papers; HMS to W. Mackinnon, 23 June 1887, MP 86/29.

\(^{107}\) E. Barttelot to H. Sclater, 19 March 1888, Barttelot Family Papers; W.G. Barttelot, *The Life of Edmund Musgrave Barttelot...from his letters and diary* (London: Bentley, 1890), 108-9; M. bin Juma el-Murjebi to F. Holmwood, 21 July 1887, MP 88/33; *Maisha*, sec. 172. For a discussion of Stanley's double-dealing with the gunpowder, and its consequences for the Expedition, see McLynn, 2:182-3.

\(^{108}\) The *Report to Subscribers* implied that already in Zanzibar, Stanley had planned to divide the Expedition on the upper Congo and leave most of its loads behind in a depot there [pp. 18-19]. By the time the Expedition arrived at Stanley Pool, Stanley had definitely decided to press ahead with a small, lightly burdened group, leaving the rest behind at a secure camp in the Stanley Falls area, as he explained in HMS to W. Mackinnon, 26 April 1887, MP 55/218. The re-organization of the men and officers occurred on May 13th at Bolobo; see *IDA*, 1:105-6.
await the porters from Tippu Tip and the return of the Advance Column, which was going to pioneer a route to the Lake. Stanley expected that it would take five months to reach Lake Albert and return. His instructions to the Rear Column officers imply that he had no expectation that all of Tippu Tip's porters would have arrived in the interim.

The 389 members of the Advance Column left Yambuya on June 28th. The porters were in a festive mood, and the five officers glad to be on the move as well. Stanley's memo of instruction for the Column's officers established a daily routine and an order of march. A group of pioneers went ahead of the Column to mark and clear the path and to deal with hostile indigens, while a group of guards at the tail were to drive on stragglers and respond to attacks from the rear. As elsewhere in his travels, Stanley expected to find a series of paths connecting villages in the forest. He was to be disappointed. While there were some villages along the river, they were not always connected by paths and such paths as existed were not suited to the passage of a large body of porters with bulky loads, or were not running in the direction Stanley wished to travel.

After several fruitless days in the forest searching for paths, Stanley returned to the river, concluding it was the path used for local traffic. The steel boat was assembled and a collection of canoes started, some confiscated from "abandoned" villages, others taken after fights with villagers. The Advance Column separated into a land and a river party, the latter under the direction of Stanley. Travel on the river reduced the burdens of the land party, since the boat itself required forty-four porters. A number of other loads, as well as sick or injured porters were also put in a collection of canoes added to at various points along the river. Both groups made

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109 Jephson Diary, 28 June 1887.
110 A copy of this memo is printed in IDA, 1:129-31. Issues of order arising from this memo will be discussed in Chapter 3.
uneven progress, though they tried to stay together. They averaged between four and five miles a day. The river party was slowed by rapids; the land party by swamps and numerous tributary creeks, as well as undergrowth and cut trees in cleared areas. They made camp most nights in villages abandoned as the Column approached, and supported themselves with food taken from village fields.

As the Column progressed slowly up the Aruwimi, hunger became a more frequent and serious problem. By the end of the first month of travel, the porters were living precariously. A few days without finding a village with fields left them weak and inclined to concentrate on foraging rather than porterage. Food became a flashpoint for conflict, both among officers and porters, as it was also to prove in the Rear Column. Hunger also made everyone more vulnerable to disease, especially the ulcerated sores that developed from small injuries or insect bites and quickly became a "terrible plague." The small wooden spikes villagers concealed in the ground around their communities as a defensive measure also caused numerous foot injuries, many of which became ulcerated and incapacitating for the porters. Not even the boots of the officers offered complete protection against such injuries. A poor diet also made it difficult for those suffering other health problems to recover, and survivable illnesses like diarrhoea began

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111 IDA, 1:129. See Chapter 6 for a further discussion of this problem.
112 HMS to E. Barttelot, 18 September 1887, MP 86/29. Stanley had expected to average ten miles a day, as the caravan would have on established routes. IDA, 1:129.
113 See, for example, the account of Musa bin Dhama, an Advance Column porter left behind at the end of the first month’s march, in Jameson, Story, 109-11.
115 IDA, 1:142, Stairs Diary, 11 July 1887.
to prove fatal. While the first losses did not occur until early August, after that the numbers of sick and incapacitated mounted quickly, as did the deaths.

The Advance Column also frequently engaged in confrontations with indigenous people. The confrontations began with a fight at Yankondé, on the first day’s march from Yambuya. While the villagers were driven out after a lively exchange of gun and arrow fire, they burnt the village as they retreated, and continued to harass the encamped Column with guerrilla tactics and verbal intimidation during the night. In the weeks following, often “on the approach of the [Column] the natives crossed to the other side of the river” rather than fight. Even so, Stanley guessed they engaged in thirty fights, most of them in the first eight weeks after leaving Yambuya. With the exception of a small battle at Avisibba in mid-August, these confrontations consisted of brief exchanges of fire when small groups of villagers encountered Expedition members scouting or foraging away from the Column. Stanley had expected an angry reaction to their passage. His policy was to respond with overwhelming force to deter further attacks. He believed that the Column would be protected by a combination of its rifles and continuous movement, so the indigenes would not have time to ally and assemble against them. In practice, Stanley and his officers used significant force when their objective was merely to capture a local guide, a canoe, or some livestock. The porters also tended to over-

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116 Stairs Diary, 27 August & 24 September 1887; Parke, My Experiences, 355-6.
117 Stairs believed that the Advance Column’s substantial losses were avoidable. They were due to “privations in the way of food caused by bullheaded plunging through the bush, not stopping for food when it was to be got.” Stairs Diary, 13 July 1888.
118 IDA, 1:138-40 & 142; Jephson Diary, 30 June 1887.
119 Statement of deserters from the Advance Column who returned to Yambuya, in Jameson, Story, 222. From this deserter’s point of view, there was not much fighting with the indigenous people.
120 HMS to E. Barttelot, 18 September 1887, MP 86/29. While there had been no Expedition deaths as a result of these fights, more than fifty members of the Column were injured, four seriously.
121 Memo to Advance Column officers, in IDA, 1:129. Stanley expected to lose more porters as a result of their indifference to order than he did in open warfare. IDA, 1:131.
122 Stanley Diary, 1 September 1887, BLEM Stanley Papers, Lot E37. Hereafter Stanley Diary (E37).
react in their encounters with indigenous peoples, either with immediate heavy gunfire or with flight.

With no end in sight after two months in the forest, Stanley suffered “spasms of despondency:” “The dearest passion of my life,” he wrote in his diary, has been I think to succeed in what I undertake, but these last few days have begun to fill me with a doubt of this Expedition. We are not yet half way to the Albert. The people are fading away. Every march must be attended with a loss of life. We have nothing with us save a few brass rods for barter money.\textsuperscript{123}

He wondered whether it wouldn’t be wiser to return to Yambuya for the Rear Column and the Expedition’s stocks of trade goods, “rather than urge the tired people in this mad fashion,” but decided to persevere in the hope that the terrain ahead would prove less difficult.\textsuperscript{124}

The Advance Column did enter a new phase in its passage through the forest when they met a small band of raiders and traders at the end of August, though it was not the improvement for which Stanley had hoped. Seventeen days later, the Column reached Avadori, the settlement at which this group was based. It was under the authority of Ugarrowwa, formerly a porter known as Uledi Balyuz and now a trader tied to Said bin Abede of Nyangwe.\textsuperscript{125} The porters were delighted to meet other members of the Zanzibar trade diaspora. The officers, though, complained of the growing demoralization of the men, as contact with these traders had prompted a sudden increase in desertions and the deserters were taking their guns and loads with them.\textsuperscript{126} The Advance Column left Ugarrowwa’s on September 19\textsuperscript{th}, having left 56

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{122} Stanley Diary, 21 August 1887 (E37). For officer morale see Jephson Diary, 16 August 1887; Stairs Diary, 1 September 1887.
\textsuperscript{123} Stanley Diary, 21 August 1887 (E37).
\textsuperscript{124} Ugarrowwa’s background and activities are described in \textit{IDA}, 1:206-8. Said bin Abede, a powerful trader based at Nyangwe, was a rival of Tippu Tip’s. See Jameson, \textit{Story}, 230-4, 251 & 312 and Stairs Diary, 9 March 1888.
\textsuperscript{125} For example, Stairs Diary, 1-4 September 1887; Stanley Diary, 4 September 1887 (E37). Stanley believed porters preferred life in the trade settlements to caravan work; Jephson Diary, 2/3 September 1887.
\end{quotation}
incapacitated porters behind.127 After three more porters who deserted the next day were returned by Ugarrowwa, Stanley took the “extreme measures” he had long felt necessary, and had one of these deserters executed.128

Within days of their departure from Avadori, hunger, ulcers and dysentery were again taking a severe toll. The porters were dragging themselves along, frequently dropping their loads to forage or hunt. Both porters and officers were subsisting on wild foods collected in the forest. Throughout, the Column continued to struggle with difficult terrain, both on land and water. In early October, at a point where rapids made the river impassable, 81 loads were left in a camp with a group of the weakest porters and Nelson, who was also unable to march. Five headmen were sent to scout for the trade settlement they knew to be ahead, while the rest of the Column floundered on behind them.129 After a week, with no sign of food or the settlement, and with some of the porters threatening to strike, Stanley held a series of shauris or consultations. Many options were debated, but the porters eventually voted to go forward, though on the other side of the river, in the hope of finding food. The Column’s situation was desperate: it was badly fragmented and few porters were able to carry their loads, many were too weak even to forage. The theft of food and other goods was widespread. Stanley suffered acute anxiety, believing that the fate of the Expedition was “hanging in the balance.”130

Three days later, they reached the settlement of Ipoto. There was little relief from hunger, though, as Stanley had few trade goods with which to purchase rations and was unwilling to barter either guns or ammunition. Both porters and officers were forced to sell personal

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127 Stanley Diary, 18 September 1887 (E37). Those left behind were mostly the “crawlers with rotten limbs,” but also included the “goe-goers” [i.e. lazy ones] and the sick. Stairs Diary, 18 September 1887.
128 See Chapter 3 for a further discussion of this incident.
129 This course of action was decided on after a consultation with the headmen and officers. A few days later, Stanley concluded that 84 porters must have been left with Nelson.
possessions to obtain food, often at high prices. “Starving in the midst of plenty” when they had been coaxed forward with promises of food provoked discontent among both officers and porters, and led to escalating thefts from the Expedition and from the settlement’s residents. Stanley, blaming these problems on the inhabitants of Ipoto, initiated a potentially disastrous confrontation that was only defused through the adroit mediation of his headman Uledi Pangani.

On October 26th Stanley mustered the Column. The 144 fit porters were to go ahead under Stanley and Stairs, with two porters for every load to allow more rapid movement. Jephson was to retrieve the loads and men left with Nelson, while Parke was to remain at Ipoto with the sick. Few of the porters and loads left behind rejoined the Expedition. While Jephson was successful in rescuing Nelson, only four of the porters and sixty of the loads left with him reached Ipoto. Nelson and Parke remained at Ipoto several months, hungry and ill, since Stanley had not made adequate provision for their upkeep and the traders were not inclined to charity. The porters left with them also suffered intensely from both hunger and ulcers. A few enslaved themselves, while others preferred to forage or to work for food. Of the porters left

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130 Jephson Diary, 16 October 1887; Stairs Diary, 12 October 1887.
131 Jephson Diary, 19 October 1887; Stairs Diary, 17 October 1887.
132 Stanley Diary, 21 October 1887 (E37); Stairs Diary, 20 October 1887.
134 Nelson, in particular, reproached Stanley for leaving himself and Parke “entirely dependent on the Charity of slaves.” See R.H. Nelson to HMS, 6 November 1887, BLEM Stanley Papers. This charge infuriated Stanley, especially the implied threat that followed it: “what would people at home say—” See Jephson Diary, 17 November 1887.
135 Parke, *My Experiences*, 183 & 188; T. Parke to HMS, 6 November 1887, BLEM Stanley Papers.
at Ipoto, only 13 went forward with the Expedition when Stairs was sent back for them in January 1888. 136

In the meantime, Stanley and Stairs marched to Ibwiri, the first cluster of villages beyond the sphere of activity of the Zanzibari traders and their local followers, known as Manyema. Jephson and his small band of porters caught up with them there in mid-November. Moving forward together, they found travel in this part of the forest much easier. Villages were more frequent and food was easier to acquire. The health and morale of the remnants of the Column improved dramatically. In early December 1887 they crossed the Ituri River and shortly thereafter reached the savannah.

After two days of marching through the grassland they came to a populous area and began to encounter significant opposition to their movement, and to their appropriation of food and shelter. To keep open a route between the forest and the lake, Stanley felt they had two options: either make a treaty for safe passage or teach the indigenes a decisive military lesson. When negotiations failed, several days of fighting followed. Stanley repeatedly halted the caravan to fight. Each time the Expedition's Winchester rifles proved decisive and the Column suffered no casualties. Over the next two days small parties were also sent out in repeated sorties to burn all the huts and granaries they could find. The Column reached the edge of the plateau above Lake Albert and descended on December 13th, experiencing ongoing harassment and hostility, but no further battles.

At the lakeshore they were dismayed to find no news of Emin. The community who lived on the shore kept the Column at a careful distance. They offered a guide to Mswa, where

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136 T. Parke to HMS, 17 February 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers; Stairs Diary, 25 January 188. Forty-six porters may have been left at Ipoto; of these only twenty-three were still living when Stairs arrived. Ten or twelve of these, the strongest ones, were out with Manyema raiding parties and did not rejoin the Expedition.
the white man lived, but Stanley was leery of pushing through unfriendly territory on the west shore of the lake with such a small force. He knew the Column could travel more easily through Bunyoro, but they had neither boats to cross to the east shore nor trade goods to pay for food and protection once they got there. The next day Stanley consulted with his officers and held a *shauri* with the porters. Jephson and Stairs favoured finding immediate means to reach Emin's emissary in Kibero, across the lake. Stanley instead proposed either returning to Ipoto for the steel boat, or returning for the Rear Column and its supplies before attempting to contact Emin. This last plan was agreed upon.

The Column returned to the plateau above the lake three days later. They still faced intermittent hostilities, although some chiefs made overtures of peace. However, as suspicion remained high on both sides, they did not undertake formal talks. The Column returned to the Ituri River on December 23rd, where they were delayed several days by the need to repair bridges deliberately broken since they first crossed. Skirmishes and retaliatory raids against the now hostile community around the crossing followed. In the forest once more, the Column sought a better path than the one they had used on the way out, but without much success.

Early January found them camped in the Ibwiri clearing once more, the village now abandoned and burnt by its inhabitants. Here Stanley presented a new plan of action: build a fortified camp on the site and use that as a base from which to send parties back to Ipoto and Yambuya, while leaving loads and the sick men in safety. As "[e]veryone at once saw the advisability of this plan," the building of Fort Bodo and the re-planting of its fields proceeded apace. Stairs was sent back to Ipoto with a group of 94 porters and returned 25 days later. Stanley held another *shauri* and found that the headmen and porters now unanimously favoured a

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137 Stanley Diary, 14 December 1887 (E38).
return to the lake rather than first going back for the Rear Column. Stanley suggested a compromise. A group of messengers would be sent back to the Rear Column, to be escorted as far as Ugarrowwa’s settlement by Stairs, who would collect the porters left to convalesce there in September. Stanley would lead a caravan to the lake at the end of March. Stairs and the group of 20 messengers set out in mid-February; Stairs believing it impossible that he could make it back to Ft. Bodo in the allotted 38 days. The message the couriers took for Barttelot instructed him to proceed, if he had sufficient porters, but to build a fort on the western edge of the area in which the Zanzibari traders were active and wait there for Stanley.139

Stanley departed for the lake on April 1st, as planned, with Jephson, Parke and 122 men, leaving behind Nelson and the 45 weakest porters. Stairs, Nelson and their porters were to remain at Ft. Bodo until Stanley returned. Stairs finally made it back to Ibwiri in late April, his caravan having come close to starvation. Only 14 of the 25 porters who followed him from Ugarrowwa’s reached Ft. Bodo.140

Contacting Emin

The Column skirmished again at the Ituri river crossing. However, where they had fought battles the previous time, villagers now observed them from distant hilltops, but offered no violence. Stanley made overtures of peace, which were accepted by the paramount chiefs of the three districts between the forest and the lake plateau. While Stanley entered into blood-brotherhood with the first of these leaders, relations with the other two were tributary: “chiefs &

138 Jephson Diary, January 1888. The order established at this fort is discussed in Chapter 3.
139 HMS to E.M. Barttelot, 14 February 1888, MP 86/29; and Barttelot, Life, 184-92.
140 Stairs, as he had expected, found that 29 of the 56 men left at Ugarrowwa’s had died of their illnesses and that more than half of those still alive were out raiding with the Manyema to obtain food. Stairs Diary, 14 March & 26 April 1888.
elders have tendered their submission to me, saying the country is mine."\(^{141}\) Having secured his line of march, Stanley moved on to the lake, arriving on April 18\(^{th}\).

To Stanley’s intense relief, Emin had left a letter there in late February 1888. He had come after hearing rumours of a European-led caravan in the area.\(^{142}\) Jephson, accompanied by a crew of experienced porters, was dispatched to Mswa in the steel boat to notify Emin of the Expedition’s arrival. They returned by steamer eight days later, together with Emin. Stanley’s initial impression—of a physically small, slight man who was perfectly dressed and whose face showed “not a trace of ill-health or anxiety”\(^{143}\)—marked the beginning of his disillusionment with Emin. Stanley handed over letters and limited relief supplies, though these were far outweighed by the gifts of food, clothing and other supplies made to the Expedition by Emin. These gifts confirmed for Stanley that Emin had not been in the dire straits he claimed in his letters, and there had thus been no need to endure terrible privations in order to reach him quickly.\(^{144}\)

Stanley and Emin established a joint camp nearby at Nsabe, where they remained for a month, holding numerous private discussions.\(^{145}\) Stanley presented the offers he carried to Emin

\(^{141}\) Stanley Diary, 19 April 1888 (E40). Stanley expected of his new allies only that they would allow the Column to move freely and provide sufficient food for its stay at the lake. In return, Stanley distributed gifts from his limited store of goods and, later, assisted his allies militarily against their local enemies.

\(^{142}\) The rumours were of a band of European-led soldiers who inquired for Emin, and made numerous cattle raids near the southern end of the Lake, causing of much fear. Emin thought these raiders must belong to either Tippu Tip or Kabarega. Tagebücher, 14, 16 & 24 February 1888, iv, 8-9, 37, 47-8 as J. Gray, “The Diaries of Emin Pasha—Extracts IX,” Uganda Journal 29, no. 1 (1965): 80-1. Hereafter Gray, “Extracts.” See also Emin to HMS, 25 March 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers.

\(^{143}\) IDA, 1:396. Virtually the same description of this encounter appears in Stanley’ diary. In both, it is Casati who, though younger than Emin, looked appropriately “gaunt, care-worn, anxious, and aged” by his experiences.

\(^{144}\) Stanley Diary, 14 May 1888 (E40).

\(^{145}\) These discussions are described in IDA, 1:401-28; Stanley Diary, 30 April-7 May 1888 & 14 May 1888 (E40); and Emin Tagebuch, 30 April-9 May 1888 & 22-23 May 1888 in Gray, “Extracts X,” 203-10. Parke’s account of this month, given privately to Stairs, led Stairs to expect a future confrontation between Stanley and Emin. See Stairs Diary, 9 July 1888.
in a careful sequence, trying in this way to minimize the conflict of interest they represented. They first discussed the letters from the Egyptian government, which contained nothing Emin had not known since early 1886. The choices they offered were neither clearer nor more palatable. He and his subordinates could either return to Egypt with the Expedition, or they could cut ties with Egypt and stay in Equatoria as free agents. Given the strongly expressed preference of the garrisons to stay and their particular distrust of routes to south, as well as Emin’s own desire to remain in Equatoria, the former was hardly an option. The Expedition, having failed to open a viable new route for communication and supplies, and having failed to bring much stock of latter, did not augur well for pursuit of the second option.

Only after Emin had repeatedly said that neither he nor the majority of his soldiers wanted to withdraw, did Stanley lay before him a second option. This was Leopold II’s proposal that Emin remain as governor of Equatoria, but operate it as a province of the Congo Free State and construct a link between the Congo and Nile rivers. Stanley advised him not to accept this offer, and Emin appears not to have seriously considered it, though they discussed it for several days. When this proposal had also been definitely rejected, Stanley presented Emin a third option. Emin and his garrisons could become agents of the East African Association, soon to be the Imperial British East Africa Company. Since communication and trade with Equatoria would continue to be difficult, at least until Buganda and Bunyoro had been brought under European influence, he suggested that Emin and a group of his best soldiers establish themselves at the north-east end of Lake Victoria, in the Kavirondo area. They would be a “civilizing” force, and establish a station that would anchor the Association’s line of posts running inland from

146 IDA, 1:410. See also Smith, Expedition, 157 and McLynn, 2:158-9. Stanley asked Emin to keep the additional proposals presented to him secret. Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 14 March 1890, FO 84/2060.
147 Stanley Diary, 30 April 1888 (E40); see also Smith, Expedition, 155.
Mombasa. Both Emin and Stanley were excited by this plan. It closely matched Emin's earlier, though vague, idea of retreating to a place on the edge of Bunyoro or Buganda from which he might later re-establish control of Equatoria. When the two parted at the end of May, Emin had definitely decided to withdraw himself and his garrisons from Equatoria as per the Khedive's instructions. Then, to those who were willing, he would offer the opportunity to settle with him in the Kavirondo area.

To effect this plan, Emin and Jephson, acting as Stanley's deputy, intended to visit each of the garrisons. They would present the options given by the Egyptian government and outline the assistance to be offered by the Expedition. Jephson hoped to convince the garrisons to leave the province together with Emin. Emin hoped that Stanley's prestige would incline the garrisons to withdraw from Equatoria, though he observed that the proclamation Stanley wanted read out at each of the stations was likely to cause offence. Stanley was also aware of the potential problems posed by the uncertain loyalty of Emin's garrisons and the reluctance of all but a few officials to leave Equatoria. He recognized that persuading any of Emin's people to leave with the Expedition and assembling them to do so would both be lengthy processes. He anticipated having to make personal visits to some of the stations after his return with the Rear Column.

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148 This proposal is discussed in some detail in Smith, *Expedition*, 71-81 & 157-8.
149 Emin Tagebuch, 1 May 1888 in Gray, "Extracts X," 204.
150 Jephson MS Diary, 11 July 1888 as cited in Smith, *Expedition*, 162.
151 Emin confirmed this decision in his later interview with Euan-Smith. See Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 14 March 1890, FO84/2060. In *IDA* [1:417], Stanley indicated only that Emin found the proposal attractive and agreed to consider it while Stanley was bringing up the Rear Column.
152 HMS to J.A. Grant, 8 September 1888, MP 86/29; Stanley Diary, 14 May 1888 (E40); Emin, Tagebuch, 10 May 1888 in Gray, "Extracts X," 208. See also Smith, *Expedition*, 209-10.
153 Stanley met privately with a number of Emin's officials while camped at Nsabe. See HMS to J.A. Grant, 8 September 1888, MP 86/29.
154 Emin Tagebuch, 10 May 1888 in Gray, "Extracts X," 208; Stanley Diary, 14 May 1888 (E40).
Return for the Rear Column

Stanley and Parke left Nsabe on May 24th, their caravan bolstered by an additional 130 Madi carriers provided by Emin. These men all immediately deserted and had to be recaptured, roped together, and kept under guard.\(^{155}\) On this first day’s march from the lake Stanley also sighted a range of mountains, the Ruwenzoris, for whose discovery he took credit.\(^{156}\)

Ascending the plateau, Stanley was secretly informed that the enemies of his new savannah allies planned an ambush.\(^{157}\) Stanley, fearing his small caravan would be overwhelmed, mobilized his local allies and ordered a pre-emptive night attack on one of his adversaries. The assembled army found, though, that their opponents had fled. This non-battle moved all the chiefs in the region to sue for peace with Stanley, and the remainder of the Column’s march back to the forest was uneventful. They returned to Fort Bodo on June 8th.

At Ft. Bodo they found the condition of its garrison of 59 not much changed. They still suffered from fever and ulcers, and those who had experienced extreme hunger remained thin and anaemic. The garrison had busied themselves with harvesting and replanting the fields, construction inside the fort, Koranic studies, and with a low-intensity conflict against local peoples that led to the evacuation of the villages near the fort.\(^{158}\)

Three days after his return, Stanley mustered the entire Column. The porters were not keen to make another journey through the forest, but Stanley offered to distribute the “excess”

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\(^{155}\) Stanley Diary, 24 May 1888 (E40); Emin to HMS, 25 May 1888 and Emin to HMS, 26 May 1888, both in BLEM Stanley Papers.

\(^{156}\) Stanley Diary, 24 May 1888 (E40). See also Smith, Expedition, 167 for a discussion of possible earlier sightings of these mountains by Europeans. Parke and Jephson had certainly seen a large snow-covered mountain a month earlier, but while Stanley noted this in his diary, he failed to mention it in public accounts of the Expedition.

\(^{157}\) These maneuvers are described in Stanley Diary, 25-31 May 1888 (E40).

\(^{158}\) Stanley’s summation of the conditions at Ft. Bodo can be found in Stanley Diary, 8 June 1888 (E40) and IDA, 1:454-6. Stairs’ account of life at Ft. Bodo can be found in Stairs’ Diary, 26 April-6 June 1888. See also Parke, My Experiences, 238.
trade goods carried by the Rear Column among the porters willing to follow him. \(^{159}\) Stanley chose not to take any of the other officers with him to keep the caravan's baggage to a minimum, though he was accompanied, as always, by Hoffmann, his personal servant. \(^{160}\) Comments in Stanley's diaries, all altered or omitted in his published accounts, indicated that he expected to find the Rear Column at or near Yambuya. "Our duty was therefore to proceed to Yambuya, select the most necessary material equal to our portable force, and march back to the [lake] again with what speed we may." \(^{161}\) Stairs, Parke and Nelson, meanwhile, were to remain at Fort Bodo with a garrison of 64 sick and weak porters. They expected that in three months time Jephson would come for them and that they would then join Emin and his people in a camp near the lake. There they would all await Stanley, who expected to be with them again in early January 1889. \(^{162}\)

Stanley left Ft. Bodo on June 16\(^{th}\), accompanied by 113 Zanzibaris, as well as Parke and 14 porters who were to pick up loads left at Ipoto. The 95 Madi porters Stanley took with him meant that the Zanzibaris would not have to carry any loads to Yambuya. The hapless Madis were even made to carry the Zanzibaris' personal "kits." \(^{163}\) As they carried stocks of food from Ft. Bodo, the caravan was able to pass quickly through the area west of Ibwiri where they had been desperately hungry on the outward journey. At Ipoto, the porters

\(^{159}\) Stanley Diary, n.d. [June 1888] (E40).
\(^{160}\) Stanley Diary, n.d. [June 1888] (E40). Stairs believed Stanley wanted no officers with him so he would not have to share his provisions, or have European witnesses present when he cheated the Manyema porters out of their pay. Stairs also thought Stanley wanted to be able to say, later, in his book about the Expedition, that he single-handedly braved the terrors of the forest and rescued the Rear Column. Stairs Diary, 6 July 1888.
\(^{161}\) Stanley Diary, n.d. [June 1888] (E40).
\(^{162}\) Stairs Diary, 16 June 1888.
\(^{163}\) Stairs Diary, 9 June 1888; Stanley Diary, n.d. [June/July 1888] (E40). Stairs did not expect many of the Madis to survive, as they had none of the porters' skills for survival on a march, such knowledge of how to build quick grass shelters for night. Of the 101 Madis, only 26 survived the journey to and from Yambuya.
also fared much better because they had looted ivory to trade for food. Beyond Ipoto they re-entered the sparsely populated wilderness through which they had struggled the previous year. Initially they covered ground quickly, but when they were unable to find the path Stairs had taken to Ugarrowwa’s they spent days wandering in circles. Once again they were not able to find food and spent a good deal of time foraging. When food was found, the porters completely lost discipline, Stanley complained. The Madis suffered the most from this hardship, dying and deserting in large numbers. After the first month, the caravan acquired several canoes, and again split into a land and a river party. The guerrilla activities of local peoples also resumed. Stanley’s caravan found Ugarrowwa’s settlement abandoned and stripped. They encountered Ugarrowwa and his followers almost a month later, also on their way down-river. With them were 17 of the 20 couriers the Column had sent out in February. The hostility of peoples along the river had made it impossible for them to reach the Rear Column. Ugarrowwa also informed Stanley that a “native” had told him that “there are some white men below carrying goods from one place to another, & proceeding very slowly.” Five days later, Stanley found the remnants of the Rear Column at the settlement of Banalya.

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164 Stanley Diary, 23/24 June 1888 (E40).
165 These wanderings are described in Stanley Diary, 29 June-12 July 1888 (E40); see also Stanley Diary, 17 July 1888 (E41).
166 Stanley Diary, 25 July 1888 (E41).
167 For example, Stanley Diary, 15 & 18 July 1888 (E41).
168 Stanley Diary, 10 August 1888 (E41). The experiences of the couriers are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
169 Stanley Diary, 12 August 1888 (E41).
The Rear Column at Yambuya

When Advance Column left Yambuya in June 1887, Barttelot and Jameson remained behind with 126 men and a stockpile of goods. They were joined in mid-August by Troup, Ward, Bonny and the men and loads brought up on the second steamer trip from Stanley Pool. The written and verbal instructions left by Stanley enjoined these officers to promote the recovery of the sick, protect and conserve the Expedition's stores, and impose more effective discipline on both the Sudanese and Zanzibaris. However, since Barttelot and Jameson insisted that they preferred action to waiting five months for the return of the Advance Column, Stanley left instructions concerning the circumstances in which it would be possible for them to follow on his trail. His instructions clearly left the Rear Column with the option of remaining at Yambuya, though, and his parting comments to Barttelot and Jameson implied he would not be surprised to find them there when he returned. If Tippu Tip supplied porters, the task of moving the Column ahead "would be comparatively light;" if not, they should "proceed by double or treble stages until [they] should be met by the advance column returning from the Albert Nyanza." After the fact, Stanley maintained that the Rear Column had been ordered to follow the Advance Column and he represented the decision to remain at Yambuya and await Tippu Tip's porters as a "perilous course" chosen by an inexperienced Barttelot.

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171 See Smith, Expedition, 125 for a discussion of Stanley's instructions.
172 Stanley to Euan-Smith, 19 December 1889, published as Africa No. 4 (1890), 6.
173 Stanley's most blatant reinterpretation of the Rear Column's position occurs in undated and unpublished material in one of his Notebooks (E44). See also Barttelot, Life, 111-2 and 116; Troup, Rear Column, 14. As Barttelot's brother pointed out: "even if [Barttelot] had been able to advance (which Mr. Stanley in his letters to Major Barttelot from the front doubted), Mr. Stanley had sent to order him not to advance beyond Mugwe's in the forest." Times, 10 July 1890, JRTC, vol. III.
The porters contracted from Tippu Tip were expected daily. For both officers and men, life at Yambuya had a makeshift, temporary character as a result, an attitude that persisted despite changed expectations about Tippu Tip's assistance.\textsuperscript{174} On August 18\textsuperscript{th}, a small group sent by Tippu Tip to locate the Expedition informed them that the promised porters had been sent out several weeks earlier. They had struck the Advance Column’s track above Yambuya and, finding an empty camp there, concluded that Stanley had gone on and no longer required their services.\textsuperscript{175} The officers, though, considered this a face-saving fiction.\textsuperscript{176} They believed that the porters had not been sent because Tippu Tip was angry that Stanley had broken faith with him about supplying gunpowder for the contracted porters or because Tippu Tip's men were reluctant to shoulder a full porter's load. In late September, learning that Tippu Tip would have to send to Kassongo to find more porters, the dismayed Rear Column officers realized they would be forced to wait at Yambuya for Stanley's return.\textsuperscript{177} Bartelot opined: “I have done all I can now till Stanley puts in appearance, and, failing that, I shall not take any decided step till February.”\textsuperscript{178}

Although Stanley was later to claim that the Rear Column was a "completely equipped and well-organized column,”\textsuperscript{179} in fact he left behind, together with a miscellany of stores, those

\textsuperscript{174} J.R. Troup to Sir F. de Winton, 18 October 1887, MP 85/17; Bonny Diary, 1 September & 14 October 1887 and 21 May 1888.
\textsuperscript{175} Jameson, \textit{Story}, 113; Bonny Diary, 18 August 1887 (E47); Troup, \textit{Rear Column}, 151; Bartelot, \textit{Life}, 149; Ward, \textit{My Life}, 41.
\textsuperscript{176} J.R. Troup to F. de Winton, 18 October 1887, MP 85/17 and Troup, \textit{Rear Column}, 161-2. The officers were told that the porters had given up trying to contact the Expedition because of a combination of attacks by indigenes on the lower Aruwimi, exhaustion from battling the Aruwimi’s strong current, and inability to find the Expedition’s camp. In fairness to these porters, these problems were also ones experienced by Expedition members on the lower Aruwimi; see, for example, Bonny Diary, 10 August 1887 (E47). Jameson found Tippu Tip’s version of events much more convincing after hearing corroborating evidence during his April 1888 visit to Kassongo; see \textit{Story}, 251.
\textsuperscript{177} Troup, \textit{Rear Column}, 161; Jameson, \textit{Story}, 141-2.
\textsuperscript{178} E.M. Bartelot to M. Godman, 14-21 October 1887, Bartelot Family Papers.
\textsuperscript{179} Stanley to Euan-Smith, 19 December 1889, published as Parliamentary Papers 1890, vol. 51, \textit{Africa No}. 4, 10.
men who were "weakest in body," most of them suffering from ulcerated sores. Stanley also chose to leave behind men who posed discipline problems, particularly the Sudanese. Stanley took only five of these soldiers, whose sole purpose was to convince the Equatorian garrisons of the Expedition's legitimacy, with the Advance Column because he considered them more trouble than they were worth. Stanley also chose to leave behind only one of the originally hired nyamparas or headmen—the least satisfactory one.

The Rear Column experienced a variety of discipline problems as a result. While a few of these originated with "trouble-makers," most had structural causes. The men's lack of enthusiasm for the make-work projects their officers considered important for morale and order often provoked punishment. The officers' were, in effect, attempting to make the porters, whose norms of conduct were built around caravan life with its alternation between ordered movement and unregulated stop-overs in caravan entrepôts, into a military garrison. Further, since the rations provided by the Expedition were inadequate, the depletion of the easily collected food around Yambuya caused dissatisfaction among the men and made the theft of the Expedition's stocks of trade goods and tools all but inevitable. The officers' disciplinary methods, particularly collective punishment and suspension of the ration allowance, provoked protests and additional infractions, which prompted further disciplinary action.

The Rear Column's most serious problem, though, was not discipline, but hunger. The men suffered from both under-nutrition, especially during the rainy seasons, and from

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180 Barttelot indicated that of the 76 Zanzibaris left at Yambuya, 40 were incapacitated by illness. All 4 of the Somalis were sick, but only 4 of the 45 Sudanese; Life, 116-7. Jameson said that Stanley's re-organization of the companies of men in mid-May was designed to allow him to leave behind at Yambuya all the "bad ones;" Story, 42.

181 Issues of discipline in the Rear Column are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

182 Hunger and entitlement to food are discussed in Chapter 3.
malnutrition, since cassava made up the bulk of their diet. Hunger made them vulnerable to illness and injury, and the incapacitated were less able to find food, creating a vicious circle of deprivation that often ended in death. The failure of the officers to organize their men for farming, as was done at Fort Bodo, also had a negative effect on the food supply. While mortality rates varied, morbidity increased progressively over the course of the Rear Column’s stay at Yambuya, and its chief cause was ulcerated sores. Parke later called them "the most formidable pathological obstacle to the success of the...Expedition." 

Despite a ceremony of blood-brotherhood between Ngunga, the chief at Yambuya, and Barttelot, relations with the local people were strained from the start. The inhabitants of Yambuya resented the expropriation of their village, which forced them to occupy a much less desirable site across the river, and the lack of access to food from their own fields. The model for relations between the Rear Column and local people was a tributary one, like that established by Stanley with peoples on the plateau around Lake Albert. However, at Yambuya the possibilities for such a relationship were limited by the lack of goods and services to be exchanged: local communities did not have the food that the Rear Column wanted, while the Column was unable to protect locals from the depredations of the trade settlement Zanzibaris

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183 E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.
184 Parke, "Ulcer," 1270.
185 Barttelot, Life, 115-6; Jameson, Story, 75. Smith [Expedition, 177] suggests that the gifts given by the leaders of Yambuya during this ceremony signaled their contempt and hostility. A subsequent ceremony to establish mutual respect and peaceful intentions, carried out by Bonny, included assurances, which he was in no position to make, that raiders from Stanley Falls would leave the Yambuya villagers alone. Bonny Diary, 19 August 1887 (E47); Jameson, Story, 114-5.
186 It is difficult to say with certainty whom these people were. Stanley observed that Yambuya and its surroundings were occupied by the “fragments” of numerous tribes, suggesting regional conflict. See HMS to de Winton, 19 June 1887, MP 86/29. The So and Mba peoples lived along the lower Aruwimi River; see J. Vansina, Paths in the Rainforest: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
187 Barttelot, for example, remarked: “Capturing their women has had a salutary effect on them for they trade much more freely with us & on lower terms, now and again I exact tribute from them just to let them know we are the masters here.” E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.
and unwilling to assist in local conflicts. These tensions were heightened by the Rear Column's attempts to stimulate trade by kidnapping women and children who were to be ransomed with food, and by the various forms of intimidation used when the officers felt the terms of trade were unsatisfactory.  

Relations with the Zanzibari trade diaspora were also tense, particularly after Selim bin Mohammed, one of Tippu Tip's senior followers, established a camp of Zanzibaris and Manyema at Yambuya in September 1887. The officers became convinced that its purpose was not to aid the Expedition, but to gain possession of its stores either through control of the local food trade or through looting if the Expedition collapsed. Conflicts between the Expedition's men and Selim bin Mohammed's Manyema followers were initially only an annoyance. However, as the officers became increasingly worried by the lack of news from the Advance Column, their paranoia grew. They feared that the quarrels were being instigated to justify an attack on the fort, as they believed had happened in the 1886 attack on Stanley Falls station. They were also fearful that the Expedition's Zanzibari porters would be encouraged to desert or mutiny by the Zanzibari traders.

As Zanzibari traders and their followers established themselves more firmly on the lower Aruwimi, their methods of dealing with the indigenous people became an additional concern for the officers, who construed themselves protectors of the villagers they had

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188 For example: Jameson, Story, 83-9, 135-9; Barttelot, Life, 154-6; Barttelot MS Diary, 10 July 1887 and E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887, the latter two both in Barttelot Family Papers.
189 For a discussion of this issue, see Smith, Expedition, 186.
190 See E.M. Barttelot to H. Sclater, 24 May-10 June 1888, Barttelot Family Papers; Bonny Diary, 14 March 1888 (E47).
191 See, for example, E.M. Barttelot to H. Sclater, 19 March 1888, Barttelot Family Papers and Bonny Diary, 8 February 1888 (E47). Such fears were not unique to the Rear Column officers; Stanley told Tippu Tip that he would not bring the Expedition's Zanzibaris to Stanley Falls, as he feared they would desert. See el-Marjibi to Muhammed Masood and Saif bin Hamed, n.d., MP 88/36.
evicted. Increased interaction with the Stanley Falls Zanzibaris also gave the officers a sense of how the Expedition fit into the larger plans of leaders like Tippu Tip. They were frustrated to observe that in the last six months more than five hundred men had been sent out along Stanley's route by various traders, and an additional two hundred had gone to the mouth of the Aruwimi, but the men contracted for the Expedition were still not forthcoming. They were consequently sceptical that Tippu Tip would either make sufficient porters available to them or that he would intervene to prevent his subordinates from exploiting the Expedition.

All of the Rear Column's problems were made more intractable by disunity among the Expedition's officers. The Rear Column officers were not only uncertain of the Advance Column's whereabouts, they lacked knowledge of Stanley's plans and were convinced that Stanley was concealing from them the ultimate purpose of the Expedition. Barttelot, who had quarrelled bitterly with Stanley, wanted to stick to the letter of his instructions to avoid the criticism he was sure Stanley would later heap on him. Since these instructions made no allowance for the disappearance of the Advance Column or a protracted stay in impoverished surroundings, Barttelot's inflexibility brought him into conflict with the other officers, especially those with experience working in the Congo Free State. Additional, personal conflicts among the Rear Column officers developed and festered, producing two camps that were barely on

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192 For example, Barttelot, Life, 156; Jameson, Story, 137-8; Troup, Rear Column, 176.
193 For example, Jameson, Story, 145-6.
194 "Precis of Events" attached to E.M. Barttelot to W. Mackinnon, 28 March 1888, MP 85/17.
195 See, for example, E.M. Barttelot to W. Mackinnon, 21 October 1887, MP 85/17; Ward, My Life, 64.
196 E.M. Barttelot to H. Sclater, 19 July 1887, Barttelot Family Papers; see also Bonny Diary, 27 March 1888 (E47).
197 See E.M. Barttelot to his family, 4 June 1888, Barttelot Family Papers.
speaking terms. Bonny, who shifted between these two groups, fanned and, in some cases, fomented these conflicts.

By early February 1888, the officers recognized that their situation at Yambuya was untenable. Food was in such short supply that the men had to forage a day's walk up-river, and the officers' control over them was increasingly tenuous. The idea that the Advance Column had been halted, perhaps even annihilated, by hostile indigenes was also taking hold of the officers' minds. They floated a variety of plans to rescue both Stanley and Emin Pasha. Deteriorating relations with the residents of Yambuya—Zanzibari traders, Manyema, and indigenes—as well as the worsening condition of the Expedition's men heightened their sense of the need for action. The forward movement of the Rear Column seemed the best solution to all these problems. Barttelot wanted to re-open negotiations with Tippu Tip. He would lighten the loads Tippu Tip's porters were to carry and accept a smaller number of porters if necessary, but he wanted to add to their number a body of "fighting men" that would allow him to search for Stanley. Barttelot and Jameson set out for Stanley Falls in mid-February to present their plans, but finding Tippu Tip was not expected back from Kassongo for some time, Jameson was dispatched to negotiate with him.

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198 J.R. Troup to W.G. Barttelot, 12 June 1890, and H. Ward to W.G. Barttelot, 27 October 1890, both in Barttelot Family Papers. See also Jephson Diary, 18 February 1889 and Bonny Diary, 21-22 April 1888 (E47) for an example of these quarrels. Bonny's activities will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
199 Jameson, Story, 207. By late May, the nearest manioc was five miles from the fort; Bonny Diary, 21 May 1888 (E47).
200 See, for example, Jameson, Story, 261 & 266; E.M. Barttelot to W. Mackinnon, 28 March 1888, MP 85/17.
201 Smith, Expedition, 180. The urgency of their need to move, to be doing something can be gauged by some of the wild proposals the officers floated. They thought of sending to recruit Hausas from Nigeria or to recruit Zulus from Natal; Bonny Diary, 10 February 1888 (E47).
202 Troup, Rear Column, 203-4. If nothing else, the officers hoped to be able to put together a forward column, carrying mainly ammunition, that could force a way through the hostile tribes that they believed must have impeded Stanley's progress. Barttelot and Jameson planned to offer Tippu Tip additional money, to be paid by their families, for the "fighting men." The majority of the loads and the sick porters would be left at Stanley Falls; Jameson, Story, 198.
there. Barttelot and Jameson also decided to inform the Relief Committee of their situation and their plans. Ward, escorted by a small group of Sudanese and Zanzibaris was sent with a telegram to the mouth of the Congo.\textsuperscript{203}

Jameson reached Kassongo in mid-April 1888 and went directly to Tippu Tip.\textsuperscript{204} While Tippu Tip refused to enter into a new contract that would supersede his agreement with Stanley, he reassured Jameson that he planned to leave Kassongo within a month. He would take with him the contracted porters, and it would be easy to hire separately an additional group of fighting men. Tippu Tip was also quite confident that nothing had happened to the Advance Column, though he had had no direct news of them since the arrival of group of ivory traders who had encountered Stanley on the Ituri River.

Tippu Tip and Jameson returned to Stanley Falls in late May with a following of several hundred men.\textsuperscript{205} There they found both Barttelot and Van Kerckhoven, a Free State official who had come upriver on hearing from Ward that the Rear Column was still at Yambuya. Barttelot and Jameson were dismayed to find that Tippu Tip was now prepared to make only four hundred men available to them and, of these, three hundred were to carry forty pound loads and the remainder only twenty pound loads. Barttelot blamed this change of heart on Tippu Tip's discussions with Van Kerckhoven, who had encouraged him to send

\textsuperscript{203} The Committee's reply, which never reached Barttelot, was: "Committee refer you to Stanley's orders...If you cannot march in accordance with these orders then stay where you are, awaiting his arrival or until you receive fresh instructions from Stanley. Committee do not authorize engagement of fighting men." The Committee also indicated that word received via the east coast indicated Emin was well, in no immediate need of supplies, and had not, as of November 1887, heard any news of Stanley's Column. W. Mackinnon telegram to E. Barttelot, May 1888, as quoted in Ward, \textit{My Life}, 113.

\textsuperscript{204} Jameson's visit to Kassongo is described in \textit{Story}, 249-76 and J.S. Jameson to W. Mackinnon, 15 April 1888, MP 85/17.

\textsuperscript{205} Jameson believed that the promised 800 to 1,000 men would be made up from the 400 that accompanied them from Kassongo, from the 700 sent upriver earlier by Tippu Tip and from the 250 men already at Stanley Falls under Selim bin Mohammed's direction. \textit{Story}, 301-2.
men to take control of the ivory-rich areas along the Mobangi River before one of the European powers did.206

Barttelot and Jameson returned to Yambuya at the end of May, accompanied by Tippu Tip's porters. The next several days were spent organizing and re-packing the loads. During this time, Tippu Tip and three Free State officials arrived by steamer from Stanley Falls. On the morning of June 8th, Tippu Tip formally inspected the loads.207 As many were over the stipulated weight, Tippu Tip refused to accept them. Barttelot was aggrieved, since Tippu Tip had approved some of the same loads during negotiations the previous day; he accused Tippu Tip of breaking faith with the Expedition.208 An uproar followed, as Tippu Tip's sheiks believed he had been insulted. Tippu Tip pacified his followers with difficulty.209 Many of the objectionable loads were lightened and repacked the next day, though Tippu Tip was persuaded to accept the indivisible loads of specially packed ammunition. Tippu Tip, though, left Yambuya agitated by the confrontation and anxious about the welfare of the men he was sending with the Expedition.210

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206 Barttelot to H. Sclater, 24 May-10 June 1888, Barttelot Family Papers. Salmon claims that Van Kerckhoven could not have been responsible for diverting porters from the Expedition since he only met with Tippu Tip the day after Barttelot had seen him. P. Salmon (ed.), Le voyage de Van Kerckhoven aux Stanley Falls et au camp de Yambuya (1888) (Brussels: Académie royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, 1978), 53, note 111.

207 These events are described in Jameson, Story, 305-6; Troup, Rear Column, 252-4; Barttelot Diary, 8 June 1888.

208 Barttelot felt that Tippu Tip refused the loads not because of their weight, but to show his dissatisfaction at the poor quality of cloth out of which he had received his guarantee for the Expedition's payment. Barttelot, Life, 253.

209 During the uproar, the Manyema porters were alleged to have asked Tippu Tip what they should do if Barttelot ill-treated them; he reportedly replied, "Shoot him." J. Werner, A Visit to Stanley's Rear Guard (London: Blackwood, 1889), 271; Troup, Rear Column, 254, 256, & 260. Subsequently, one of the CFS officials present reported that it was the Expedition's porters who had rioted, and Tippu Tip had intervened to prevent a conflict. See Vivian to Salisbury, Despatch No. 45, Africa, 18 September 1888, MP 88/34.

210 Troup, Rear Column, 256.
The Rear Column on the March

On June 11, 1888 the Rear Column left Yambuya, inaugurating its long-awaited march with celebratory gunfire.211 The Column consisted of 110 Zanzibaris, 22 Sudanese, and 430 men obtained from Tippu Tip, together with numerous dependents. Tippu Tip's porters were led by Muni Somai, one of his followers. Barttelot and Jameson, assisted by Bonny, led the Column. They planned to stick as closely as possible to what they knew of Stanley's plans, aiming for the south-west corner of Lake Albert and hoping to find either the Advance Column or word of it from Emin's agents around the Lake. If the Advance Column and Emin's people had already left for the east coast, or no longer survived, the Rear Column would return to the coast via Ujiji.212

Initially, the march went well. However, after a week a frustrated Barttelot complained: "The Zanzibaris came out in their true colours, perfect brutes; the road a little bad, so they said they could not carry."213 They struggled with the same physical obstacles that had slowed the Advance Column. The human geography of the area had changed since the passage of the Advance Column, though, with Zanzibaris and Manyema in control of several of the villages along the river. However, there were still only limited paths between the villages and, while Stanley's track was clearly marked in some places, it was impossible to find in others. In spite of this, the Column averaged six to eight miles per day.214

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211 This section draws heavily on the Rear Column Log, 11 June-19 August 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers. Lot E50 that chronicles the march of the Rear Column. Hereafter Rear Column Log.
212 E.M. Barttelot to H. Sclater, 24 May-10 June 1888, Barttelot Family Papers.
213 Barttelot MS Diary, 19 June 1888, Barttelot Family Papers.
214 E.M. Barttelot to W. Mackinnon, 3 July 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers. In comparison, Stanley and the more fit and lightly burdened Advance Column had averaged a little over 4 miles a day in the same region. HMS to E.M. Barttelot, 18 September 1887, MP 86/29.
The officers were anxious to keep a close order in the Column and maintain its momentum, a desire frustrated by the behaviour of both the Expedition porters and the Manyema. While some Expedition porters dropped out due to illness, desertion was a much more serious problem. The defection of fourteen porters in a single night after only a few days on the road, coupled with indications from the headmen that many more were considering desertion worried the officers. Over the next week, six more porters deserted, this time with their loads and rifles. “This desertion is terrible & there is no reason for it,” Barttelot recorded in an agitated hand. However, this was a period in which the porters saw little reason for confidence in the path-finding abilities of the officers. There were also ongoing disputes, especially with the Manyema, about the choice of campsites and the need for stop-overs. Barttelot believed though, that the main stimulus for desertion was the encouragement porters received to join the trade settlements now dotting the route: “they have been told by certain of the Arabs, if you come to us we will make you great men, but bring your rifle and load.”

Friction between the Expedition porters and the Manyema was another concern. Only a day out from Yambuya, Jameson observed: “Our men are afraid of them, but taunt them for not carrying heavier loads, and for being cannibals.” The next day, the Manyema porters had fallen a little behind. While this helped to reduce tensions, it made monitoring the porters and loads more difficult. It was soon apparent that Muni Somai, the headman hired to manage the Manyema, was not able to exert over them the kind of authority the

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215 See E.M. Barttelot to W. Mackinnon, 3 July 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers.
216 Rear Column Log, 22 June 1888. Barttelot’s handwriting in his last entries in the Log is messy and erratic compared to that of his earlier entries.
217 Barttelot to W. Mackinnon, 3 July 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers.
218 Story, 312.
officers wished. While some of the Manyema were willing to travel expeditiously, others expected a loosely-structured caravan in which they would have the freedom to determine their own line of march and to look after their own interests, as well as the timing of halts to collect and process food. Muni Somai, for instance, had been hired with the expectation that he would be allowed to keep any ivory he collected en route.

While the porters were all called Manyema, they were, in fact, a group with diverse backgrounds and expectations. Almost a third were captives from villages near Riba-Riba, which Tipu Tip attacked during a dispute with Said bin Abéde. The majority were recruited in villages along the river below Nyangwe and told they were needed to fight and collect ivory up the Aruwimi. These partially “arabized” peoples were not accustomed to travel far from their home area. They brought with them both guns and auxiliary female labour, expecting that “the women would...carry most of the loads, while [they] would ‘play the soldier’.” These porters were supplemented by slaves taken from several recently subdued areas who, though armed, were kept in chains for fear of desertion.

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219 Ibid., 313, 317 & 329.
220 Ibid., Story, 302.
221 While the officers used the term Manyema as if it referred to a tribe, it was in fact a loose geographical term, indicating the area around the upper Congo or Lualaba River where senior Zanzibari traders had their settlements. By extension, Manyema became all the parts of the eastern Congo that had come under the influence of the Zanzibar-based traders, as well as the peoples from this larger region who had been incorporated into the Zanzibari trade system. The term Manyema could suggest both a region of fabulous wealth and opportunity, and a minimally cultured person from the far interior. See, for example, Bennett, Arab vs. European, 112-4.
222 Jameson, Story, 250-1, 259.
223 M. bin Juma el-Marjib to F. Holmwood, 21 July 1887, MP 88/33.
224 Selim bin Mohammed as reported in Ward, My Life, 89. The headmen serving under Muni Somai said of their followers: “Every porter is considered a free man and has eight wives.” See Jameson’s testimony, 6 August 1888 in Vivian to Salisbury, Despatch No. 60, Africa, 10 November 1888, in MP 88/35.
225 The slaves came from Maléla, from the area across the river from Kassongo, and from the mouth of Lomami River. Jameson, Story, 278.
By mid-July a fifth of the Zanzibari porters were gone and many of the remainder were weak and ill, as were the Manyema, among whom smallpox was rife. The Column was spread out between several camps and its members were making frequent halts as well as repeated short trips to carry extra loads. The Zanzibari porters had been disarmed to prevent further desertion, and travelled under the guard of either the Sudanese or Manyema. Efforts to recover the deserters and their loads were largely unsuccessful. Barttelot accordingly set out for Stanley Falls in late June to request Tippu Tip's assistance with the recovery efforts, his support for stricter disciplinary measures, and additional porters, preferably slaves, to replace the missing ones. Jameson, Bonny and Muni Somai were left to collect all the disparate parts of the Column at Banalya, Abdullah Karongo's trade settlement. Bonny, the remaining Expedition men and some of the Manyema reached Banalya on July 15th. Jameson was several days behind, bringing up remainder of the Manyema.

Barttelot arrived at Banalya on July 17th, pleased that he had got the assistance he wanted from Tippu Tip and confident that the march would now proceed more smoothly. He found, though, that the leader of the trade settlement at Banalya was unable to supply slaves, as directed by Tippu Tip. The Manyema porters further annoyed Barttelot with indiscipline, especially by firing their guns within the settlement. Roused from sleep on the morning of the 19th by loud drumming and singing followed by gunfire, Barttelot went to discover those responsible and was shot dead as he passed near some houses. The Expedition members and Manyema

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226 Barttelot to H. Sclater, 6 July 1888, Barttelot Family Papers.
227 Rear Column Log, 17 July 1888 (Bonny's entry).
228 E.M. Barttelot to W.B. Barttelot, 5 July 1888, Barttelot Family Papers.
229 Bonny Diary, 19 July 1888 (E48) and J.S. Jameson to W. Mackinnon, 3 August 1888, MP 85/19. Bonny's accounts of this incident, at which he was not present, vary. Later versions emphasized Barttelot's irrational anger, echoing the pre-occupation of Bonny's diary entries in mid-July with what he believed was Barttelot's unfitness for leadership. Barttelot's violent confrontation with a drumming woman, with its sexual overtones, were also later additions. These details, Bonny claimed, came from Chama, the Somali who witnessed the killing.
immediately fled the settlement, many of them looting Expedition loads in the ensuing chaos. Bonny did his best to restore order. He buried Barttelot, sent a message to Jameson, coaxed the porters to return to the settlement, and collected what he could of the loads.

Jameson, stricken by grief, arrived three days later. He set off again almost immediately for Stanley Falls, leaving Bonny in charge of the remnants of the Column. At Stanley Falls he participated in the trial of Senga, the man identified by the Manyema as Barttelot’s murderer. This trial was conducted under Tippu Tip’s aegis.230 He also negotiated with Tippu Tip for additional men and a better headman to resuscitate the Rear Column.231 However, both Tippu Tip and his nephew Rashid, the two persons capable of leading the Manyema, would accompany the Expedition only under conditions that Jameson did not feel comfortable accepting without instruction from the Relief Committee. He decided to travel down-river to Bangala station, where Barttelot had ordered Ward to remain. Jameson left for Bangala in a canoe on August 9th, but contracted a fever en route and reached Bangala barely conscious. He died a day later.232 Ward hastily travelled down-river again to obtain fresh instructions from the Relief Committee. They told him to leave a stock of relief supplies at Stanley Falls, sell the remainder of the Rear Column’s loads to the Free State, and return the Column’s porters to the mouth of the Congo for transport back to East Africa.233 These instructions were pre-empted by Stanley’s return to Banalya, word of which Ward received while still at Stanley Pool.

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230 Copy of Despatch No. 60, Africa, to Lord Salisbury, FO, 10 November 1888, MP 88/35 describes the trial.
231 J.S. Jameson to W. Mackinnon, 3 August 1888, MP 85/19 and J.S. Jameson to W. Bonny, 12 August 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers.
232 See H. Ward to W. Mackinnon, 19 August 1888, MP 85/19.
233 H. Ward to W. Mackinnon, 6 December 1888, MP 85/22. Before they heard of Stanley’s return, the Committee had instructed Ward to leave some relief supplies for Emin Pasha at Stanley Falls, to sell the rest of the loads to the CFS, and then to return to the coast with Bonny, the porters and soldiers. See Herbert Ward's Report, MP 85/22.
Bonny, who felt forlorn and despondent in the immediate aftermath of Barttelot’s murder was, by early August, beginning to envision himself the legitimate commander and the saviour of the Rear Column. With no word from Jameson, he resolved to move the remains of the Column forward on Stanley’s track and tried to tighten the discipline of its remaining members. His vague plans were also preempted by Stanley’s return.

Stanley reached Banalya on August 17th. He was met with a tale of woe. Bonny was the only remaining officer, losses from the Rear Column stood at around 70 percent, and only a third of the stores and ammunition were left. Stanley appears to have been initially unable to take in the scale of this disaster. Over the course of several days he received Bonny’s highly partisan version of events. He also spoke to the Sudanese and Zanzibaris, hearing a variety of grievances from them, and to the Manyema headmen. On August 21st, Stanley moved the entire camp upriver to Bungangeta Island. It was here that he began to construct an account of the Rear Column in which he blamed all its problems on the incompetence and misconduct of its officers.

The Expedition Re-united

Stanley’s force and the remains of the Rear Column set out again for Lake Albert at the end of August 1888. Stanley reduced the number of loads to be carried by distributing wholesale

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234 See, for example, Bonny Diary, 7 August 1888 (E48).
235 See, for example, Bonny Diary, 10 & 13 August 1888 (E48).
236 Stanley Diary, “Notes,” n.d. [August 1888] (E41); IDA, 1:494 & 504-5.
237 Stanley wrote no diary entries other than “Halt at Banalya” for 18-20 August. His account of his encounter with the remnants of the Rear Column was not written until August 21st.
238 See IDA, 2:1-10 for a highly coloured account of these discussions.
to the porters many of the trade goods he had ordered Barttelot to conserve.\textsuperscript{240} He mustered and organized the porters and determined that of the Manyema, only one headman with his eighty porters were willing to proceed with the Expedition.\textsuperscript{241} Though Selim bin Mohammed said he would ask Tippu Tip about joining the Expedition, Stanley felt that he would do what the Zanzibaris traders had all along intended—rather than supply men to the Expedition, they would simply exploit its route in their own search for new trade areas.\textsuperscript{242}

Stanley, always sanguine that the next passage through the forest would be easier than his previous ones, put into practice what he believed to be the main lesson from his earlier journeys—it was important to stay near the river and to use canoes as much as possible. He assembled a fleet of twenty-nine canoes, some provided by Ugarrowwa and others taken from villages. He used these to transport most of the loads and the 198 weakest members of the party, while the remainder marched along the riverbank under the leadership of the headman Rashid and Bonny.\textsuperscript{243} This leg of the Expedition was distinguished by frequent small “engagements” with indigenous groups all along the route, causing several deaths and many injuries in the Column.\textsuperscript{244} The indigenes used guerrilla tactics: attacks on foragers, harassment of the column’s rear, and quick surprise attacks on porters or their followers as they marched or while they prepared camp. In addition, many villages along the way were not just abandoned, but burnt.\textsuperscript{245} Stanley complained that the formerly peaceful indigenes had become “bold aggressors.”\textsuperscript{246}

\textsuperscript{240} \textit{IDA}, 2:13.
\textsuperscript{241} Stanley Diary, 30 August & 7 September 1888 (E41).
\textsuperscript{242} Stanley Diary, 4 September 1888 (E41).
\textsuperscript{243} Stanley Diary, 12 September 1888 (E41).
\textsuperscript{244} H. Stanley to W. Mackinnon, 5 August 1889, MP 86/29.
\textsuperscript{245} For example, Stanley Diary, 1, 3, 17 & 21 September 1888 (E41).
\textsuperscript{246} Diary, 20 September 1888 (E41). He ascribed this change to the indigenes having developed a taste for the flesh of Expedition members. Stanley Diary, 4 October 1888 (E41).
Throughout the journey, though, Stanley was preoccupied with fate of Rear Column; he spent a good deal of time assembling information and shaping his account of it.

The canoes were abandoned at the end of October, some four days up-river of Ugarrowwa’s former station at Avadori. Having experienced severe hunger on the south bank of the river, Stanley decided to pioneer a route on the north bank that would bypass both a large southward loop of the river and the trade settlement at Ipoto. The column, though, quickly found itself in a sparsely inhabited area where food was no more readily available than it had been south of the river. Short intervals of hunger in September, combined with the poor condition of the Rear Column and Madi porters, caused rapid losses during a two week period without food in early November. Both in mid-November and in early December the Column was forced to make “starvation camps” from which a party of foragers was sent out while the weak and sick remained, together with the officers and loads, waiting for food. In addition, smallpox was running rampant among the Manyema and Madi, and an epidemic of mumps afflicted the whole caravan. Stanley was also twice compelled to bury loads for which he no longer had carriers.

The caravan arrived at Fort Bodo on December 20th. The situation of the Fort’s small garrison had been difficult in the previous six months. Local people made increasingly aggressive raids on their fields, so Stairs sent out regular bands of raiders who cleared the inhabitants out of an area fifteen miles in radius around the Fort. Jephson’s failure to arrive by

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247 IDA, 2:36.
248 See Stanley Diary, 27 October, 5-9 November, and 11-14 December 1888 (E41). Stanley later said that this was the closest he had come to starvation in all his African travels; HMS to Mackinnon, 5 August 1889, MP 86/29.
249 About 16% of the porters were lost. This figure is based on the difference between Stanley’s estimate of porter numbers on 31 August and on 15 December 1888. Stanley Diary (E49).
September had caused concern among the porters. Many urged that the fort be relocated to the lake; alternatively, they wanted Stairs to send messengers to find out what was happening in Equatoria. Further, at the beginning of September a severe storm destroyed many of their crops, leaving the garrison to manage on short rations. These problems fuelled simmering discontent among the porters, making the maintenance of order a difficult task for the officers.

Three days after the arrival of Stanley and the Rear Column, the re-united Expedition left once more for Lake Albert, burning the Fort Bodo behind them. They were forced to make multiple trips as many of the "ulcerated people and weaklings" were unable to carry loads. After entering the savannah, Stanley separated out the incapacitated porters and left them in a camp at Kandekore with Stairs, Parke and Nelson, and the bulk of the Expedition's loads.

Stanley and his party of able-bodied Zanzibaris and Manyema arrived at the plateau above Lake Albert in mid-January 1889. There were no confrontations en route, though Stanley was several times requested to assist his allies in local conflicts. At the lake, Stanley found a packet of letters from Jephson and Emin informing him of the mutiny of the Equatorian garrisons and renewed Mahdist attacks. Worse yet, Emin was still undecided as to what he would do. "I could save a dozen Pashas if they were willing to be saved," declared an exasperated Stanley.

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251 Parke, My Experiences, 265-6; Stairs Diary, 20 October 1888.
252 These problems are discussed in Chapter 3.
253 Stanley Diary, 23 December 1888 (E41). At this point, the Expedition consisted of 209 Zanzibaris, 15 Sudanese, 1 Somali, 111 Manyema (both men and women), 26 Madis, 2 of Emin's soldiers, 40 "followers," and 6 Europeans.
254 Parke, My Experiences, 347.
255 Stanley Diary, 16 January 1889 (E43).
256 Stanley to A.J.M. Jephson, 18 January 1889, as quoted in Stanley to W. Mackinnon, 5 August 1889, MP 86/29.
In Equatoria

Having seen off Stanley and his column, Emin returned to Tunguru in early June 1888, accompanied by Jephson, two of the Sudanese soldiers brought with the Expedition, and Binza, Junker’s former servant. They planned to visit all the province’s stations, in each formally reading out to the assembled garrison the letters from the Khedive and Nubar Pasha, as well as the statement prepared by Stanley.257 The government letters presented the garrisons with a choice: they could either stay in Equatoria, thus forfeiting their pay and all other official assistance, or they could be evacuated to Egypt by the Expedition, though there was no commitment as to their further employment once in Egypt. Stanley’s statement strongly urged evacuation.258

The Kavirondo scheme was to be kept secret until the garrisons had decided on one of the Khedive’s options. This would prevent allegations that Stanley “had not done his best to bring the people to Egypt...but had used the money Egypt had subscribed to further a scheme in which he had such a keen interest.”259 Jephson and Emin hoped that they could persuade the best of the province’s Sudanese soldiers to leave with the Expedition. Then, at some vague later date, they would reveal the East African Association’s offer of employment to these men. The Egyptian clerks and officers, of whom Emin hoped to rid himself, would continue on to Egypt.260 In spite of this policy of secrecy, rumours of the Expedition’s hidden, additional purposes were rife in the stations and, in some cases, were not far from the truth.261 Indeed, rumours about the

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259 Jephson MS Diary, 11 July 1888 as quoted in Smith, Expedition, 211.
260 See Smith, Expedition, 211.
261 Jephson was asked several times whether those who chose to leave Equatoria would be “settled in some
Expedition had been circulating in the stations for over a year, provoking both high expectations and intense fears. On top of this, two disaffected Egyptian officials launched a campaign of seditious accusations against Emin and the Expedition.\textsuperscript{262}

Emin and Jephson’s plans, pursued in a situation where Emin’s authority was weak and the garrisons were preoccupied with their own long-simmering grievances, precipitated a crisis of loyalty. As a result, Jephson encountered a serious, but unanticipated problem—the Expedition was not accepted as a legitimate agent of the Khedive.\textsuperscript{263} Egypt lay to the north, and a group arriving from the south-west could not have come from it. The official letters brought by the Expedition could not possibly have come from the Khedive, as he would not write such stuff. Stanley was merely a traveller, not the Khedive’s representative, and he and Jephson were the agents of “some English conspiracy to which Emin himself was a party.”\textsuperscript{264} The ragged and ill-supplied condition of the Advance Column when it reached Lake Albert did not help the Expedition’s credibility.\textsuperscript{265}

Each of the southerly garrisons visited by Emin and Jephson protested their loyalty and willingness to follow Emin anywhere. But Jephson, like Emin, believed that with the exception of a few Egyptian officials, they had no desire to go to Egypt.\textsuperscript{266} The situation in the northern hospitable region of the East African interior within easier reach of the sea.” They also believed Emin wanted to break with Egypt and cede his province to a foreign power. See Smith, \textit{Expedition}, 214 and Jephson, \textit{Rebellion}, 53 & 74-5.

\textsuperscript{262} The two men, among the officials brought to Nsabe to meet Stanley, returned early to Tunguru. There they spread the rumour that the Expedition was nothing but a group of adventurers and the official letters they carried were forgeries, as Khartoum had not fallen to the Mahdists and the Khedive had no intention of giving up Equatoria. Stanley and Emin, they suggested, planned to take the garrisons out of the province in order to make them slaves of the English. Smith, \textit{Expedition}, 214-5.

\textsuperscript{263} This problem may have been exacerbated by Stanley’s decision to leave behind with Rear Column most of the Sudanese brought to support the Expedition’s claim to represent the Egyptian government. The experience of the two Sudanese who accompanied Jephson suggests that the presence of additional soldiers might not have been decisive, though. They were initially denounced as impostors by the rebels, though when tested on their knowledge of Egyptian army drill, they passed. Smith, \textit{Expedition}, 231-2.

\textsuperscript{264} Smith, \textit{Expedition}, 213.

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid. See also “Stanley’s Expedition: A Retrospect,” \textit{Fortnightly Review} NS 47, no. 1 (1890): 93-4.

\textsuperscript{266} See Jephson Diary, 22-23 June 1888 for Jephson’s analysis of the situation at Tunguru station.
stations was different, though, as these had been out of Emin's control for some time. Emin and Jephson's visit to Kirri, near the headquarters of the first battalion, caused the latent mutiny in this battalion became open. The garrisons of other stations, including Dufile, the headquarters of the hitherto loyal second battalion, soon mutinied as well. While the mutinies had particular triggers in each station, they were all rooted in the garrisons' long-standing disinclination to leave the province and their particular worry about southward movement. This was mixed with the new fear that, using the firepower of the Expedition, Emin would somehow be able to compel them to this course of action. The leaders of the mutiny were mostly those Egyptian officials who had little to gain from a return to Egypt—the political exiles and ex-criminals. The soldiers, most of them from southern Sudan, acquiesced in the mutiny, but did not play as active a role, having little love for the Egyptian officials.

Emin, greatly surprised and distressed, was forced to resign his post of governor. He and Jephson were held under house arrest in Dufile station for almost three months while a council of mutineers held hearings, investigated Emin's record of administration, and debated their course of action. However, after dealing with the few grievances they all shared, the various factions were unable to agree on program of action. The reappearance of Mahdist forces in Equatoria in mid-October provoked panic. Convinced at last of the fall of Khartoum, the closure of the route to the north, and the possible need for assistance from the Expedition, the mutineers turned to Emin. He refused to resume his position, but advised them to withdraw from the northern stations. News of the fall of Rejaf and an unsuccessful attempt to retake that station led to the abandonment of northern part of the province. Many of the soldiers deserted to their home areas,

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267 The description of the mutiny that follows is based heavily on Smith, *Expedition*, chapter 9.
but some came as refugees to the southern stations. Emin and Jephson were also allowed to
withdraw south to Wadelai in early November.

The southern stations were in a state of confusion and exhibited rising discontent with the
administration of the mutineers. Early December brought news that the remaining northern
stations had fallen to the Mahdists and that Dufile was under attack. From the south came word
that Stanley had returned with the Expedition. Stanley communicated by letter with both Emin
and Jephson. Jephson was offended that Stanley assumed that he, like the Rear Column officers,
was personally responsible for the disastrous events in which he had been caught up.268 Emin,
who still wanted to pursue the Kavirondo plan, was offended that Stanley no longer mentioned it,
and he again became ambivalent about leaving Equatoria.269

Stanley, encamped at Kavalli’s on the plateau, received a delegation of the mutineers in
mid-February.270 They were led by Selim Bey and accompanied by Emin, whose services as
interpreter they had requested. The mutineers, fearful that the Expedition might be used against
them militarily, wished to determine Stanley’s intentions. They all stated their desire to leave
Equatoria with the Expedition, though Emin and Stanley both believed that the most entrenched
rebels were planning to stay. They requested time in which to assemble their families and
baggage for evacuation, which Stanley granted.

Collecting Emin’s People

Stanley’s camp at Kavalli’s grew steadily. The sickly members of the Expedition left at
Kandekore came in on February 18th with Stairs, Parke and Nelson, as did the first batch of

268 Jephson Diary, 26 January 1888.
269 Smith, Expedition, 248.
270 These meetings are described in Emin, Tagebuch, 18 February 1889 in Gray, “Extracts XIII,” 70;
evacuees from Equatoria. Over the next month, a total of 126 men, chiefly those from Egypt and northern Sudan, joined the evacuees. They were accompanied by 444 of their dependants, the bulk of which were women and children, as well as by some 1300 loads of baggage. 271

This growing camp created two problems for Stanley: the first was provisions, the second was labour to bring up from the lakeshore the baggage the Equatorians brought in by steamer. Both problems were solved by systematic depredations against local people. 272 Foraging parties led by officers were sent out every few days to collect food. Their looting also brought in numbers of livestock and slaves. The Expedition’s porters, appalled by the mountain of household goods to be carried up to the plateau and angered by the contempt shown them by the Equatorians, mutinied in early March. 273 Stanley punished them, but found an alternative source of labour. Herds of local cattle were captured and their owners forced to do a stint as porters in order to redeem them. 274

During the two month stay at Kavalli’s Stanley and Emin engaged in intermittent discussions about the future. 275 Stanley no longer spoke of the Kavirondo plan, as he no longer considered Emin or his followers suited to carry out such a scheme. Lacking such an option, Emin was ambivalent about leaving Equatoria. While their relations were superficially cordial, Stanley became increasingly impatient with Emin’s indecision. Their differences came to a head in early April with reports that the Equatorians were conspiring to take the Expedition’s weapons and then settle themselves somewhere south of the lake. Stanley used these reports as

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Stanley Diary, 18 February 1889 (E43); IDA, 2:151-5.

271 A partial list of these evacuees can be found in Emin’s List of Personnel, n.d., BLEM Stanley Papers. See also IDA, 2:204-5.

272 Smith, Expedition, 253; see also Stairs Diary, 25-26 February 1889.

273 Stanley Diary, 10 March 1889 (E43); Parke, My Experiences, 381-2.

274 Stanley Diary, 26 February & 1 March 1889 (E43). Some local labour had already been provided as tribute or in return for payment; see, for example, Stanley Diary, 24 February 1889 (E43).

275 See Smith, Expedition, 253-5 for relations between Stanley and Emin during these two months.
a pretext to stage a theatrical confrontation in which he coerced both Emin and his followers into
a decision to leave for the coast. Stanley also set April 10th as the date of departure from
Kavalli’s, with all concerned recognizing that it would be impossible for those of the garrisons
still collecting themselves at Wadelai to meet this deadline. During the next few weeks,
Stanley’s ascendancy over the caravan was increased by a court of enquiry into an alleged
Equatorian plot to steal the Expedition’s arms, as well as the execution of a deserter among the
Zanzibaris who was associated with this plot.

The German Emin Pascha Expedition

In the meantime, Anglo-German rivalry was spreading from the coast into the interior of
East Africa. With no definite news of Stanley’s Column since mid-1887, Karl Peters and a
German Save Emin Pascha Committee began assembling resources for an expedition to
Equatoria in late 1888. However, controversy over the activities of the Deutsche Ost-Afrika
Gesellschaft and the disfavour in which Peters stood precluded official support for the
expedition. Indeed, the German Consul in Zanzibar was instructed to use the Anglo-German
blockade of the coast to prevent its landing. Peters and his companions managed to land secretly
in June 1889 near the mouth of the Tana River, where they assembled a small caravan. On
reaching Busoga, Peters learned that Stanley and Emin were already on their way to the coast.
With Wadelai no longer an objective, he changed course for Buganda. There he signed a treaty

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276 This confrontation is described in Stanley Diary, 5 April 1889 (E43) and Parke, My Experiences,
402-5. See also Stanley Diary, 26 March 1889 (E43) and McLynn, Stanley, 2: 278-82.
277 Jephson Diary, 27-29 April 1889 and Proceedings of a ‘Court of Enquiry’, 2 May 1889 in BLEM
Stanley Papers.
278 The German Emin Pascha Expedition is described in K. Peters, Die deutsche Emin-Pascha-Expedition
(Munich & Leipzig: Oldenbourg, 1891) and A. von Tiedemann, Tana-Baringo-Nil mit Karl Peters zu Emin Pascha
(Berlin: Walther & Apolants Verlag, 1892). An expurgated summary is provided in C. Peters, "From the Mouth of
the Tana to the Source-Region of the Nile," Scottish Geographical Magazine, 7, no. 3 (1891): 113-23. See also
of friendship with the re-instated Kabaka Mwanga in February 1890. Peters later presented this as a treaty that ceded sovereign rights in Buganda to Germany.

The Imperial British East Africa Company and Jackson’s Expedition

The businessmen of the British East African Association on whose behalf Stanley negotiated a concession with the Sultan of Zanzibar promptly formed the Imperial British East Africa Company and received a charter for it in September 1888. As the only definite news from Stanley’s Expedition to that point was of the Rear Column’s difficulties, they determined that additional efforts would be necessary to establish the Company’s concession.279 With positive reports from those sent out to make initial surveys from Mombasa, the Company prepared an expedition aimed at Equatoria to be led by Frederick Jackson. It was to determine the best route into the interior, establish stations, sign treaties and engage in trade as it went. Jackson was to set up a station in the Lake Baringo area and from there proceed to the north-west corner of Lake Victoria, where the Company hoped he would find Stanley, Emin and the Expedition.280 Failing that, the caravan was to travel to Wadelai and look for Emin. Jackson and his caravan set out from the Company’s first station, at Rabai, in November 1888.281

To strengthen the Company’s position in Equatoria, Mackinnon and de Winton also contacted Robert Felkin, an Edinburgh doctor and former missionary, to whom Emin had given the authority to negotiate on his behalf with British commercial interests. Felkin, once admitted

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279 W. Mackinnon, telegram to F. de Winton, 25 September 1888, MP 85/24.
280 In 1888 the Committee received “circumstantial” news that Stanley and Emin were establishing themselves at the northwest corner of the lake, as Stanley had indicated to Mackinnon that both of them were keen to do. See HMS to W. Mackinnon, 3 September 1888, MP 85/20; G.S. Mackenzie to Secretary, Emin Pasha Relief Committee, 30 December 1889, MP 86/30.
281 G.S. Mackenzie to Lt. Swayne, 11 October 1888, MP 63/1A; IBEACO, “Report of the Court of
into the confidence of the Company's founders, enthusiastically urged Emin to work together with them. The British East Africa Company, he explained, planned to establish entrenched camps every 15 or 20 miles from Mombasa to your country, arming them with one or two rapid firing guns...and garrisoning them by an Indian officer and some 20 Indian soldiers, and as soon as they hear from you that you will agree to their proposals; they intend to commence laying down a railway from Mombasa.  

In the months that followed, Felkin became increasingly concerned by the activity of both the Germans and rival British commercial interests in eastern Africa. He negotiated a provisional agreement with the Company that gave Emin a position in the Company’s administration of Equatoria. He urged Emin to endorse the agreement. However, Felkin’s letters did not reach Emin before his arrival at the coast.

The Journey to the Coast

On April 10th, the Expedition, now consisting of almost 1500 people, started for the coast. Substantial desertions, especially among the locally obtained porters, made both additional labour exactions and the abandonment of loads necessary. However, after a march of only two days, the caravan halted for almost a month at Mazamboni’s to allow Stanley to recover from an illness.

Directors to the Founders of the Company,” 6 June 1889, in Emin Pascha Nachlaß 622-2, C.IV.

282 M.R. Felkin and R.W. Felkin to Emin, 5 June 1888, Emin Pascha Nachlaß 622-2, C.III. Felkin outlined several possible forms of cooperation between Emin's administration and the Company.

283 R.W. Felkin to Emin, 10 June 1889, Emin Pascha Nachlaß 622-2, C.III.

284 The caravan contained 280 of the Expedition's original personnel, 130 Manyema of whom only 50 were porters, some 570 Equatorians, two-thirds of them women and children, and some 350 local porters. The 200 persons unaccounted for may have been captives belonging to members of the Expedition or additional, coerced porters from around Kavalli's. See IDA, 2:210.

285 Jephson Diary, 10 April 1889; Stairs Diary, 15-21 April 1889; Emin, Tagebücher, 11 & 17-18 April 1889 in Gray, “Extracts XIII,” 74-5.

286 Both here, at Mazamboni’s, and in early 1888 at Ft. Bodo Stanley suffered an attack of acute gastritis. On both occasions, the Expedition ground to a halt for a month while Stanley recuperated.
In late April, Selim Bey sent messages to say that he and his followers were now camped at the south end of the lake and wished to join the Expedition. Stanley, still suspicious of an Equatorian conspiracy, took measures to disarm the evacuees already in his camp before he told Selim Bey that he could catch up to the caravan. Selim Bey found this an impossible task, however, since he had only a small following, little ammunition, and the Expedition’s activities at Kavalli’s had made the surrounding peoples extremely hostile. Selim Bey was also unable to return to the stations on the lake, since the hard-core mutineers had entrenched themselves there. Accordingly, he and his followers dug in and stayed at Kavalli’s.287

The Expedition finally left Mazamboni’s on May 8th, escorted by Chief Mazamboni and his followers. The caravan’s first days on the road were chaotic as the Equatorians were entirely unaccustomed to marching and there were insufficient porters for all their loads, despite an earlier slave raid authorized by Stanley.288 Regardless, Stanley was determined to quickly re-establish the daily schedule of a trade caravan. It took almost two months before all the members of his caravan were conditioned to this pattern of travel. Those unable or unwilling to keep up were simply left behind.289 Difficult terrain on the east side of the Semliki River and a spate of fevers in July were responsible for many such losses.290

Stanley worried about the march to the coast, anticipating problems every bit as severe as those of travelling in the forest. He foresaw two months of potential fighting as the Expedition passed through areas claimed by the Omukama Kabarega of Bunyoro or by rulers tributary to

287 F.R. Wingate, Report on the arrival of officers and their families from Equatoria, n.d., Sudan Archive, Wingate Papers 253/8/26-45. In 1891, Lugard, then working for the IBEACO, found Selim Bey and his followers at Kavalli’s and they agreed to take service with the Company in Uganda. Smith, Expedition, 256-61.
288 See Stanley Diary, 6 May 1889 (E43).
289 For a summary of this march, see W.G. Stairs, “From the Albert Nyanza to the Indian Ocean,” The Nineteenth Century 29, no. 172 (1891): 953-681; for the seasoning process see pp. 955-7.
290 See Stanley Diary, 24 May 1889 (E43), Parke, My Experiences, 446-57. Some of these were members of Emin’s garrisons who used fever as a reason to drop out of the caravan with their entire households.
him. While some of Stanley’s Lake Albert plateau allies urged him to pre-empt Kabarega’s forces, he preferred to respond only if provoked. As it turned out, Kabarega’s abarusura or armed bands began to attack almost as soon as the Expedition left Mazamboni’s territory. The two groups fought intermittent skirmishes over the next seven weeks. Stairs commented that the “duties of looking after the Pasha’s people, fighting natives, etc., have made this expedition more like a small army fighting its way through the country than a geographical expedition.”

There were relatively few casualties on either side, though, as, for the most part, the abarusura retreated ahead of the Expedition. The salt trade centre at Katwe, dominated by the abarusura and hastily abandoned at the Expedition’s approach, was the biggest loss suffered by these armed bands. The villages at Katwe also furnished quantities of loot for delighted members of the Expedition.

Stanley also worried about provisioning his caravan and paying for its safe passage. In unexplored areas west of Lake Victoria he felt confident sending out regular foraging parties when food became scarce. Even in densely populated areas, the strength of the caravan allowed its members to help themselves to the “prodigious abundance” of food under cover of uneasy safe passage arrangements. However, Stanley worried about areas further south where he would be expected to pay for food and to pay toll. His stock of trade goods was meagre and he remained unwilling to barter either the guns or ammunition that the Expedition still possessed.

Parke believed they planned to settle in hospitable Ankole; Parke, My Experiences, 453-4.
291 HMS to J.A. Grant, 8 September 1888, MP 86/29.
292 See HMS to W. Mackinnon, 17 August 1889, MP 86/29 and Stanley Diary, 11 & 18 May 1889 (E43), for example. The Expedition’s occupation of Katwe is described in Stanley Diary, 17 June 1889 (E43).
293 Stairs Diary, 19 June 1889.
294 Stanley’s reflections can be found in Stanley Diary, 31 May 1889 (E43). Although members of the Expedition took food when they wanted it, Stanley punished porters who stole from villagers. See Parke, My Experiences, 457 and Jephson Diary, n.d. [7 August 1889].
Pioneering through the country south-east of Lake Albert, the Expedition “discovered” three more lakes at the foot of the Ruwenzoris, as well as their connection to the Nile river system.\(^\text{295}\) Stanley also made six verbal agreements “on the same terms as Treaties are made” with rulers in this region.\(^\text{296}\) Stanley’s actions in the kingdom of Ankole were likely typical. He participated in a limited ceremony of blood brotherhood—which included an inspiring demonstration of the Maxim gun’s capabilities—with a member of the royal clan. This pact of non-aggression was intended by both sides to assure quick passage of Expedition through the kingdom.\(^\text{297}\) Stanley later re-formulated the agreement as a written treaty that ceded sovereign rights to the Imperial British East Africa Company. Mackinnon used it, and Stanley’s other agreements to forestall rival claims to the area during negotiations for the 1890 Anglo-German Agreement.\(^\text{298}\)

While in Ankole and Karagwe, Stanley received two delegations of Christians from Buganda, through whom the deposed Kabaka Mwanga requested assistance in recovering his throne from either Stanley or Emin.\(^\text{299}\) When the Expedition reached the Church Missionary Society station at Usambiro, the missionary Alexander Mackay, who had retreated there from Buganda, also begged their assistance for Mwanga and the Christian faction.\(^\text{300}\) Stanley turned down these requests, as well as Emin’s demand that he either be allowed to assist Mwanga or to

\(^{295}\) These discoveries are described in *IDA*, 2, chapters 28-31, as is the history of geographical ideas in which Stanley placed them.

\(^{296}\) HMS to W. Mackinnon, 6 February 1890, MP 55/218.


\(^{298}\) See Smith, *Expedition*, 266-9 for a discussion of this “treaty” process.

\(^{299}\) See Smith, *Expedition*, 269-70.

\(^{300}\) Mackay encouraged Mackinnon and the IBEACO to act promptly and take advantage of the confusion caused by the civil war to establish their influence in Buganda. Mackay believed that Buganda offered even better prospects for trade than had Equatoria. A. M. Mackay to W. Mackinnon, 2 September 1889, MP 70/36.
join Jackson’s caravan and establish himself in Kavirondo. Emin had, in fact, made repeated pleas to be left in the interior with his followers, all of which Stanley refused. As Emin had earlier foreseen, he had become a trophy that Stanley was determine to bring out of Africa to satisfy both his ego and the demands of his planned narrative.301

During their three weeks of rest at Usambiro, the Europeans caught up on news of many kinds.302 Stanley was angered by the fact that Mackinnon had sent out Jackson’s caravan to find him and bothered by the negative press coverage of the Rear Column. He was also concerned by news of the conflict between Germans and Zanzibaris at the coast, and by growing Anglo-German rivalry. He decided nevertheless to use a route through the German sphere, though this did nothing to establish a route to Mombasa, as Mackinnon had wished. Stanley was determined to avoid both Jackson’s and Peters’ expeditions, desiring to act alone and concerned to keep Emin from pursuing any independent options, particularly German ones.

The Expedition, reduced to just over 700 persons, left Usambiro in late September. They left behind some loads and acquired the stock of trade goods that Stanley had earlier ordered to be created there. With their reduced numbers they needed to hire additional Nyamwezi porters, especially after their Manyema transferred to one of Tippu Tip’s westbound caravans.303 Entering established caravan routes did not end the Expedition’s troubles, though. They encountered significant hostilities in Usukuma and difficulties in Ugogo, both related to the toll charged for their passage and the services offered in return.304 They finally reached the German

301 Emin, Tagebuch, 14 January 1889, 4:202 as quoted in McLynn, 2:262-3. See also Smith, Expedition, 271.
302 See Jephson Diary, n.d. [27 August-16 September 1889]. For Stanley’s reactions see HMS to W. Mackinnon, 31 August 1889, MP 55/218 and Smith, Expedition, 277-80.
303 IDA, 2:428 and McLynn, Stanley, 2:305.
304 Jephson Diary, n.d. [18-21 September 1889], IDA, 2:434-8 & 446; see also McLynn, Stanley, 2:304-6.
post and caravan entrepôt of Mpwapwa on November 10th. Stanley became anxious enough at the way Emin was courted by German officials there that he began to treat him politely again. Emin, depressed and cynical about the Expedition, was noncommittal about his future plans. A few days’ march from the coast, the Expedition also got its first taste of the publicity to come in an encounter with two journalists, each anxious to claim a £2,000 reward for the first news of Stanley’s arrival.

Encamped a day’s march from the coast, the caravan could hear the signal for evening prayer from Zanzibar town, which provoked a night of celebration among the returning porters. The Expedition made a triumphal entry into Bagamoyo on December 4th. That evening, during a celebratory banquet, Emin fell from a first floor window and had to be hospitalized for a fractured skull and broken ribs. Two days later Stanley bid Emin an abrupt farewell and took the remainder of the Expedition to Zanzibar. Ensconced in the home of the British Consul, Stanley prepared an official report on the Expedition. He also took further steps to establish his version of the Expedition, a campaign that he had intensified at Usambiro with letters that denigrated Emin. In Zanzibar’s Consular Court, acting on behalf of the Relief Committee, Stanley sued Tippu Tip for breach of his contract to provide porters to the Rear Column. This suit, eventually dropped, infuriated Tippu Tip, who returned to Zanzibar the

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307 Stairs, “From the Albert Nyanza,” 967-8.
309 HMS to Euan-Smith, 19 December 1889, published as *Africa No. 4 (1890)*.
310 See HMS to W. Mackinnon, 17 August 1889, MP 86/29 and HMS to W. Mackinnon, 31 August 1889, MP 55/218. Later, in Cairo, Stanley ascribed Emin’s vacillation to fear of the “wife” he had abandoned in Germany, though it is not clear whether Stanley publicly circulated this story. See Stanley Diary, [March 1890], pp. 515-21 (E45/2).
311 Copies of some of the court proceedings from Emin Pasha Relief Committee vs. Ahmed bin Mahommed al Marjiba, Tippu Tib can be found in the Barttelot Family Papers; see also McLynn, *Stanley*, 2:314-
following year to defend himself. The suit also angered Mackinnon, whom Stanley had not consulted before taking legal action.

Emin remained hospitalized in Bagamoyo, suffering from depression and making a slow recovery from his fall. While Stanley and his officers made efforts to contact him and learn his plans, the Imperial British East Africa Company’s effort to hire him was half-hearted and designed less to claim his expertise, which Stanley had thoroughly run down, than to keep him out of German hands.312 The Germans made a much more determined effort to acquire his services and, after much soul-searching, Emin accepted an offer to head an expedition to extend German claims in the Lakes region.313

While the stay in Zanzibar tied up the Expedition’s loose ends, it also revealed thinly concealed tensions and problems. The Expedition’s porters were paid their back-wages and substantial bonuses, but the eighty hire-slaves among them expressed dissatisfaction at the customary payment of half their wages to their masters, among whom was the Sultan.314 Debate about the propriety of British citizens hiring slave porters shortly added fuel to the controversy about the Expedition. Responsibility for the Equatorian evacuees was another problem. Some of the Sudanese soldiers chose to take employment with the British East Africa Company.315 The Egyptian government hired a steamer for those wishing to repatriate, and 190 embarked. They arrived in Egypt in early June 1890, and were put into a temporary camp under Egyptian Army authority.316 Lastly, the Expedition’s European officers were, with the exception of

5 for the reactions of Tippu Tip and Mackinnon.
312 Notes on the employment of Emin Pasha by IBEACo., n.d., MP 69/31.
314 “Slaves hired for Emin Relief Expedition,” [May 1890], JRTC, vol. III.
315 Smith, Expedition, 287.
316 The ultimate fate of these evacuees is not clear, though there are hints from British Army officials who later handled the return of Selim Bey’s followers that the evacuees were not particularly happy. Their back-pay had not been sufficient to “establish them well.” and many drifted toward poverty as they aged, while their
Jephson, not on terms of amity with Stanley, though he now bestowed unaccustomed public praise on them. They had also for some months been disillusioned with the Expedition, feeling that herding a band of unworthy and ungrateful Egyptians to the coast was an unheroic task, coupled as it was with the discovery that the object of their quest was "merely a scientist." Bemused by the unaccustomed spotlight of publicity and the interest in what they believed to be an unsatisfactory Expedition, they embarked for Egypt with Stanley at the end of December.

**Acclaim and Controversy**

Stanley and the officers who returned with him, as members of "the most famous expedition of modern times," were greeted with public acclaim "such as neither he nor any previous African explorer had ever received before." The adulation, though, was mixed with questions about the conduct of the Expedition that had long formed an undercurrent in the tide of intense public interest in it.

The public interest in Emin created in late 1886 by advocates like Robert Felkin had quickly been transferred to the British Expedition. However, after a spate of articles on the Expedition’s progress up the Congo, there had been no new information about it for months.

This silence was broken in late 1887, not by news of Stanley, but with letters from the Rear

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317 M. Nicol to W.G. Barttelot, 8 December 1890, Barttelot Family Papers; see also McLynn, Stanley, 2:313.


320 The chronology of the European press coverage of the Expedition that follows is based on the five volume collection of clippings created by Troup [JRTC] in the RGS Archives.
Column officers reporting their difficulties. Further reports, published in June 1888, showed the Rear Column continued to be in “a very critical position” as a result of Tippu Tip’s failure to provide porters. This elicited calls for the relief of the Rear Column and raised the question of whether Stanley had deliberately abandoned it.  

Press commentary and letters to the editor questioned the route and conduct of the Expedition and the intentions of its backers, but touched on broader issues as well. They raised questions about how Europeans travelled in Africa, which built on debates about Stanley’s earlier African expeditions. The issue of how Europeans should involve themselves with Africans in the era of “legitimate” commerce was also discussed. The scarcity of news about the Expedition and scepticism over its professed purposes ultimately led the New York World to commission the journalist Thomas Stevens to “find Stanley or Emin, or both,” with the additional goal of discovering the “real” purposes of the Expedition. These were alleged to involve an unholy alliance of Leopold II’s Congo Free State, British businessmen, and “Arab” slave traders.

The shocking news of Battelot’s murder reached Europe in mid-September 1888, followed shortly by word of Jameson’s death. Allegations of serious misconduct by the Expedition’s officers while in the Congo and reports of atrocities committed by the Manyema employed by the Expedition made a simultaneous appearance. Meanwhile, there was still no firm word of the Advance Column. There were rumours from Egypt of a “white pasha” leading

322 For a thematic summary of the controversy about the Expedition, see McLynn, Stanley, 2:343-7.
324 The allegations were contained in letters from missionaries working on the Congo. These were, in part, based on statements made by Assad Farran, one of the Expedition’s translators. He had been dismissed and
a caravan in the Bahr al-Ghazal region, whom many believed was Stanley. There were other
rumours, originating with Advance Column deserters, of battles with indigenes in which Stanley
had been seriously wounded.125 October 1888 brought word of an encounter between Stanley’s
caravan and Zanzibari traders, who reportedly found his Column much diminished by desertion,
disease, and fights with indigenous peoples.326 These conflicting rumours produced a roller-
coaster of headlines—“Reported Massacre of Mr. Stanley’s Expedition” followed shortly by
“Mr. Stanley Safe and Well.”327 Mid-December saw a new wrinkle with the reported capture of
Stanley and Emin by the Mahdists.328 Various Africa experts weighed in with views on the
whereabouts and fate of Stanley’s Column. The continuing lack of news also produced wild
speculation, with commentators suggesting that Stanley might emerge on the Niger, or that he
planned to unite with Emin’s forces and march on Khartoum.329

The long drought of news ended in late December 1888 with confirmation from the
Relief Committee that Stanley had returned to Banalya and been in communication with Tippu
Tip.330 In the next three months, while Stanley’s letters made their way to Europe, the press
scrambled to find information on Stanley, Emin, and the Expedition. For over a year, the public

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325 See, for example, Garnet Wolseley’s and James M. Hubbard’s contributions to the symposium “Is
326 See contributions by Wolseley, Charles P. Daly and Franz Boaz to the symposium “Is Stanley
Dead?” 603, 607-8 & 613.
327 Times, 30 October 1888 & 3 November 1888, respectively, in JRTC, vol. I.
328 The rumour was based on the possession of copies of the official proclamations carried by the
Expedition, captured by Umar Salih’s army at Rejaf. See E. Baring to Lord Salisbury, Despatch No. 2, Africa, 8
January 1889, copy in MP 88/36; and Smith, Expedition, 235-9.
329 See, for example, H.H. Johnston, “Where is Stanley?” Fortnightly Review, N.S. vol. 44 (10) 1888:
596-7 and Wolseley, “Is Stanley Dead?” 604.
330 Smith, Expedition, 204.
appetite for news about the Expedition had been huge. Public interest in the interior of Africa stood at levels not seen since the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon.331

The publication of Stanley’s August 1888 letters and the Expedition’s arrival at the coast both revived long-standing questions about the conduct of the Expedition. There were also hints of new scandal in the reportage—speculation about Emin’s accident, Stanley’s thinly veiled criticism of Emin, and the failure of the British East Africa Company to engage him. These were all placed in the context of Anglo-German rivalry in East Africa and conditions in Equatoria after Emin’s departure.332 The Expedition was also greeted with another salvo in the long-standing campaign of criticism from Stanley’s opponents in Exeter Hall. Horace Waller wrote a letter to the editor of the Times drawing attention to reports of discontent among the Expedition’s slave porters.333 Coverage of Stanley’s court case against Tippu Tip and his speech at an official reception in Cairo raised additional questions about the role of the “Arabs” or Zanzibari traders in Central Africa, and how European travellers and colonial powers should deal with them.334 These were drops in the larger ocean of praise, however. In the early months of 1890 the American press seized eagerly on “any, even the slightest scrap of information about Mr. Stanley and his movements,” as did correspondents from further afield.335 The British press

331 Kertish Independent, 29 September 1888, JRTC, vol. I. This, and many similar articles in the collection indicate that interest in the Expedition was not limited to the major metropolitan papers in Britain.
333 H. Waller, “Mr. Stanley’s Porters,” Times, 1-2 January 1890. The implication was that Stanley and the Expedition’s sponsors, which nominally included Waller since he was a member of the Relief Committee, had knowingly employed slave porters. This was technically permissible as long as the slave’s owner had no part in the labour contract. The appropriation of part of the Expedition’s slave-porters’ wages by their owners called into question the Expedition’s compliance with this part of the law. See Proclamation by British Consul-General in Zanzibar, C.B. Euan-Smith, 9 November 1888, copy in Politischer Bericht, O’Swald & Co., Staatsarchiv Hamburg. Bestand 621-1, #4 Band 39. For a history of the Anti-Slavery Society and Aborigines Protection Society’s opposition to Stanley, see Driver, “Henry Morton Stanley and His Critics,” 155-64.
reported all Stanley's movements "as carefully and reverently as if he were a royal 'personage'," though there was an undercurrent of distaste for the want of gentlemanly restraint evident in his comments on Emin and the Rear Column.336

After three weeks occupying the public spotlight in Cairo, Stanley sequestered himself in a quiet hotel and disciplined himself to work. Though he experienced uncharacteristic difficulty in bringing himself to write about the Expedition, he set himself a gruelling pace of 8,000 words a day.337 Stanley's editor, Edward Marston, joined him in Cairo to expedite the writing process.338 Stanley maintained this level of output for fifty consecutive days, a greater feat than the Expedition itself in the eyes of fellow journalists.339

During the six month hiatus while Stanley's book In Darkest Africa was being prepared, the reading public's appetite was whetted with the publication of pictures culled from the officers' notebooks and accounts of the Expedition cobbled together from Stanley's letters and his official report.340 It was also fed with the numerous lectures and speeches Stanley gave after his return to Britain. A court case over the premature publication of Troup's book, launched a year earlier on Stanley's behalf, was settled in May 1890.341 By that time, Stanley and his publishers were waging a much larger international legal and publicity war against pirated

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337 McLynn, Stanley, 2:317.
338 Marston, How Stanley Wrote, especially 62-72.
341 Sir Francis de Winton, acting on Stanley's behalf, got a court order restraining the publication of Troup's book, but the matter was eventually settled out of court when Troup agreed to delay publication. See "Settlement of Troup and Stanley Dispute," Pall Mall Gazette, 24 May 1890, JRTC, vol. III.
accounts of the Expedition.342

Stanley returned to Europe in late March 1890. The Expedition’s other members having by this time quietly dispersed, he was able to monopolize the royal reception. A round of public events and honours followed. Groups both large and small used Stanley and the Expedition to build support for a variety of causes ranging from the anti-slavery movement to imperial expansion in Africa, from African missionary activity to the Salvation Army’s campaign on behalf of England’s poor. Manufacturers of various kinds also had a field day, using images of Stanley and the Expedition in advertising campaigns of all sorts.343 This adulation made Stanley all the more sensitive to criticism. He engaged in a public quarrel with Quaker members of the Anti-Slavery Society, for instance, over a question about the Expedition’s slave porters raised in the House of Commons.344

The Expedition became a cause célèbre in 1890. The heroic pedestal on which Stanley had been placed only increased the subsequent public appetite for scandalous news concerning him and the Expedition. The result was a “storm of oratory compared to which those downpours in the African forest,” described in the recently released In Darkest Africa, were “the merest trifle.”345 The Society of Friends, not surprisingly, considered the Expedition one of the “appalling manifestations of evil” which characterized the year, causing “deep humiliation to

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342-343 Aspects of this are described in Marston, How Stanley Wrote and in Another Traveller, How Emin Pasha was Beguiled: Henry M. Stanley's Book "In Darkest Africa“ CRITICIZED and its Fictions and Misrepresentations EXPOSED (Halifax: n.d.).
344 The use of images of Stanley and the Expedition is discussed further in Chapter 6.
344 See C.H. Allen to HMS, 14 May 1890, Rhodes House Library, Anti-Slavery Society Papers, MSS Brit Emp S 20 E3/8. For a sense of how this quarrel expanded beyond a parliamentary question, see A.E. Pease to C.H. Allen, 5 June 1890 & 9 June 1890, both in Anti-Slavery Society Papers, MSS Brit Emp S 18 C64/154 & 155. See also Smith, Expedition, 286-7.
347 From the toast to Stanley by the President of the Royal Geographical Society, in “The Geographical Dinner to Mr. Stanley,” Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society N.S. 12, no. 8 (1890): 488.
all true lovers of their country and of the human race."346 Others were concerned as well, both with conduct of the Expedition and with broader issues stemming from the British presence in Africa.347

The aspect of the Expedition that received the most attention was the Rear Column. The outrageous allegations made about its officers sent a titillating "thrill of horror throughout the civilized world."348 Stanley fanned the flames of controversy by releasing titbits of information about even more serious misconduct by the Rear Column's officers whenever he was unsuccessful in deflecting criticism for the Rear Column's problems onto others.349 The reading public was also kept in a state of heightened interest in the Expedition by the delay in the publication of books and articles by other members of Expedition. While the publicity generated by the controversy angered Stanley and distressed his new wife, it guaranteed huge sales of his books around the world and large audiences for the lecture tours of Britain, North America and Australia on which he embarked.350 Lacking new fuel, though, the controversy about the Expedition had already faded by late 1891.

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346 "Some Reminiscences of 1891," The Friend N.S. 31, no. 363 (1891): 1-2. This article was dated 1 January 1891 and reflected back on the year 1890.
347 See, for example, "The Stanley Affair," Land and Water, 1 November 1890 and "Exit Mr. Stanley," Piccadilly, 6 November 1890, both in JRTC, vol. III.
348 The Times, 8 November 1890.
349 Riffenburgh, Myth, 133.
350 See McLynn, Stanley, 2, chapter 18 for a description of these events.
Chapter 3: Problems of Order

In this chapter I will examine the problems the Expedition’s leaders had establishing and maintaining order. While specific to the Expedition, these problems raise broader questions about the conceptualization of power and order in histories of European imperial activity in Africa. I will focus on two recurring problems of order, ones that had implications for the broader networks the Expedition was trying to build. The first is the way military models shaped the order instituted by the Expedition’s European leaders. The second is the protocol for entitlement to food on the Expedition. In both cases, I look at order imposed “from the top” by those directing the Expedition. The norms and standards of the East-Central African caravan trade conflicted with, but also contributed to the order Stanley and his officers attempted to institute. This alternative order derived from the regional caravan trade will be the subject of Chapter 4. In addition, I contrast problems of order on the march with those arising in the settled camps or forts established by the Expedition. The stationary camps, while departures from caravan life, were an important ingredient in European imperial plans for the region. They also had parallels in the trade settlements built by coast-based merchants and traders from the interior. The problems and practices that emerged in the Expedition’s camps thus had echoes in a variety of regional systems for trade and settlement. I will ignore the other major problem of

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1 My thinking on the need to study the methods of power owes a great deal to Taussig’s “Violence and Resistance in the Americas.” Taussig is concerned with the unproblematized ideas about violence and resistance appearing both in the national mythologies of imperial countries and in the work of scholars who study histories of conquest. Taussig also suggests that it is time to turn the scholarly gaze from the “poor and the powerless to the rich and the powerful.” After all, he asks, “who benefits from studies of the poor, especially from their resistance? The objects of the study or the CIA?” [p. 52].

2 See, for example, J. Lamphear, “The Kamba” for a description of the establishment of both seasonal and long-term trade settlements.
order the Expedition faced, the mutiny among the garrisons of Equatoria province, since this is the focus of Smith’s work on the Expedition.

How was the Expedition able to function and to accomplish at least some of its aims? This is a basic question to be asked of all European imperial initiatives in Africa. Historians have assumed that Europeans possessed superior power as well as the desire to apply this power to creating or directing change in Africa. The power of Europeans is usually attributed to their technology, especially military technology, and to their science. A few historians also consider military drill to be among the technologies that permitted European imperial expansion, although its role in particular episodes of imperialism has not yet been studied. The foundations of these assumptions about European power need to be examined, though, both for the Expedition and for other imperial initiatives. Where did the power of the Expedition’s Europeans lie and to what extent was this power responsible for the Expedition’s accomplishments? More specifically, how and when were some of these supposedly powerful technologies actually used on the Expedition? In answering these questions, I have chosen to focus on military order. It is not sufficient to assume, as Smith does, that military order was employed on the Expedition simply because there were “officers in charge of companies of men with orders to perform specific tasks.” What did military order consist of on the Expedition? When and why was it invoked, and by whom? Did military order allow those who employed it to accomplish

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5 I will discuss the Expedition’s guns in Chapter 6.
their aims? The differences between the Stanley's practices and the rhetorical construction of his methods are particularly intriguing. Beliefs about the efficacy of Stanley's methods of caravan management and the role that military order played in them had implications for the emerging European colonial order in Africa. These beliefs also played an important role in the emergence of the "Stanley style" as a model for Europeans travelling in Africa in the late nineteenth century.

Access to resources was another crucial issue on the Expedition, as it was for any caravan, whether led by traders from the interior, coast-based traders, or Europeans. As caravans grew in size and covered increasing distances, access to resources took on new urgency. It is not, however, an issue that has received attention from writers about European exploration and travel in Africa. Treating access to resources as an aspect of the Expedition's order reveals new things about the Expedition. Further, the Expedition's unusual level of documentation allows a unique look at the dynamics of access within a caravan. In the section on entitlement below, I will use access to food as a window into this issue. I have chosen to focus on food because it is one of the foundations of agency. Access to food is a necessary part of the capacity and the freedom to achieve things, both individually and collectively. The control of access to food thus marks out structures and flows of power. It forms an important part of the "geography of enablement and constraint" in which historical agents operate. In addition, food was a preoccupation of both the porters and officers on the Expedition. The porters' concerns about and strategies to ensure access to food will be

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6 Smith, Expedition, 110.
8 The impact of the Expedition's use of resources on the forest communities through which it passed is discussed in Chapter 6.
discussed in Chapter 4. For the officers, the structures for access to food were connected to military order in several ways. The Expedition’s structures of access reflected the inequities of distribution to which they were accustomed in the army. At times, they justified these structures with explicit appeals to military principles. Further, these structures of access were enforced with disciplinary measures drawn from the military. Foraging, a frequent means of obtaining food for the Expedition, was also an activity associated with military campaigns.

Power

Power has been a preoccupation of various kinds of social theory in the last decade. Actor Network Theory, with which I am working, is no exception. Its approach to power grows out of Foucault’s views on the subject. It understands power to be an effect, not a cause of action. Power is something always being made, not something possessed.⁹ Power can be manifested, exercised, experienced—and thus also analysed—only in the context of the particular relationships among which it is generated. The application of this understanding of power to European imperialism in Africa has been challenged by a number of scholars. Vaughan, for example, points out that in Foucault’s view, power neither “emanate[s] from any identifiable social group” nor is it “exercised’ in any deliberate fashion.” Because it is “capillary” in nature—that is, “constitutive of every speech act and movement and practice of day-to-day life”—it is not possible for individuals or groups to be positioned differently in relation to power, as this would imply that power was something external to them, something

they could possess. Cooper argues that power in colonial Africa was not capillary, but arterial in its flow. It was “concentrated spatially and socially, not very nourishing beyond such domains, and in need of a pump to push it from moment to moment and place to place.”

I view power as a quality possessed by historical actors, but a constructed, contingent and variable quality. The possession of some kinds or amounts of power does not imply either the permanence or efficacy of this power. Power is thus not a static and inherent quality of persons, items of technology, or practices. This view of power raises a number of questions. For example, by what means was power constituted, aggregated, contested and limited during the Expedition? I will argue that in the case of military order these processes involved the interaction of many heterogeneous elements in the Expedition. These elements included officers, soldiers and porters, stockades and overnight lean-tos, flogging posts and caches of looted goods, punishment parades and mass protests, military manuals and formal statements of accusation. Another question that emerges from my view of power is whether Europeans did actually possess a “much greater power” in the “colonial encounter” of the Expedition? My discussion of entitlement indicates that the power generated through the interaction of different elements within the Expedition had strengths that its leaders did not always expect or intend. However, this power also had many limits, as I will show in my discussion of military discipline.

11 Cooper, “Conflict and Connection,” 1533.
12 Law’s statements on the nature of power move Actor Network Theory in this direction. See Law, “Power, discretion and strategy,” 170.
13 Cooper, “Conflict and Connection,” 1533.
14 Ibid., 1529.
**Order and Deviance**

Stanley and his officers established an order that they intended to encompass themselves, the members of their caravan, the garrisons of Equatoria, and the indigenous peoples and coast-based traders they encountered in their travels. Stanley and his officers used a variety of means to establish and enforce this order: they issued general orders, they instituted a daily schedule, they monitored the Expedition's loads and equipment, they set up a hierarchy of entitlement to resources and, where possible, they restructured the physical environment of the Expedition's camps and forts. When they detected violations of this order, they responded with a range of individual and collective punishments. At some points this order was clearly articulated and consistently enforced. At other times, the visions of order held by various of the Expedition's leaders diverged. They also experienced failures of consensus on the means to construct and maintain order. At all times, though, the order of the Expedition was layered onto alternative orders envisioned and maintained by porters, soldiers, traders, and indigenous peoples. Elements of these alternatives are revealed, though often only in a fragmentary way, at points of friction or conflict with the order developed and enforced by the European officers.

What were the limits of this order and the challenges to it? I will use the concept of deviance to answer this question, an approach that requires some explanation. The issue of opposition to the Expedition's order arises in three contexts. First, the Expedition represented a departure from some of the regional norms for caravan travel. Second, the Expedition's activities were an intrusion into the lives of peoples along its route. Third, like other large European-led caravans, the Expedition can be considered a "movable colony" initiating the
transformations of imperialism. In describing opposition to these aspects of the Expedition's order it would be easy to resort to the concept of resistance. The denotation of this term has been broadened by historians and social scientists to include any kind of action, more or less organized, regardless of how conceived and intended by its initiators, which opposed, thwarted, criticized or generally aligned itself with purposes or practices different from those in positions of power. In the case of the Expedition, porter resistance would include desertion, theft, illicit trade, unauthorized movement, insubordination, failure to pass on gossip, and unsupervised visits to trade settlements. If actions such as desertion, theft, and insubordination constituted resistance by Africans in European-led caravans, what were they in caravans financed and led by Zanzibar-based traders or traders from the interior? The rudeness, non-cooperation and active hostility of indigenous peoples would also all have constituted resistance to the Expedition. Such an interpretation assumes that the initiators of these actions identified themselves in limited ways and that they operated with a constant awareness of broad imperial goals and structures. It goes without saying that the porters and soldiers of the Expedition, the indigenous peoples they encountered, and the Zanzibari traders and their followers saw themselves as much more independent and flexible actors. They responded to an environment more complex and confused than that of an overwhelming, undifferentiated and unchanging European imperial stimulus. This is not to deny, though, that actions were interpreted differently in a complex and charged setting where a connection between race and power differentials was experienced as a growing factor.

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16 This is a loose paraphrase of a statement about resistance and collaboration by peasants in the context of expanding capitalism, taken from L. Vail and L. White, "Forms of Resistance: Songs and Perceptions of Power in
Use of the twin concepts of resistance and collaboration thus sets up a model that explains some, but obscures many other of the activities associated with the Expedition. I will limit use of the term resistance to more or less organized actions consciously intended to hinder or eliminate persons or groups seen to initiate undesired change (or continuity) in the political, economic, or social structures of a community. Collaboration will refer to actions intended to facilitate or assist such persons or groups. This leaves a large grey area of behaviour which, while not intended as a specific response to the imperial aspects of the Expedition, still differed or deviated in some way from the norms of order its leaders attempted to impose. I will use the term deviance to cover this grey area. This concept focuses attention on norms or definitions of a situation, and on the way these were contested. It also highlights the multiplicity of norms present in any given setting. It reveals the means by which norms were established, enforced, changed, or reinterpreted. Deviance, though generally associated with individual behaviour and criminality, need not be such a limited concept.

Military Models of Order

One of the primary definitions of order employed on the Expedition was military, specifically the order of the British Army and the British Indian Army.¹⁷ This order affected the conduct of the Expedition, and shaped the large caravan-and-station pattern of development used by the Imperial British East Africa Company.

The choice of a military model reflected the background of several members of the Expedition’s organizing committee and of its European participants. Stanley’s experience and

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¹⁷ The British Indian Army contributed many officers and subalterns to British imperial initiatives in East Africa, as well as to earlier exploratory efforts in the region.
preferences were crucial, as the Committee had given him “full discretion” in the organization and conduct of the Expedition. Stanley had served in the military of both sides during the American civil war, though his role was a limited one and his experience with military order negative. More importantly, he made his name as a journalist covering colonial wars, first against plains Indians in the United States and later the British military expeditions to Kumasi and Magdala. Of Stanley’s subordinates, Barttelot, Stairs, Nelson, Parke and Bonny all came directly from the Army. Barttelot had studied at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and served as an officer in the Royal Fusiliers in India, Egypt and the Sudan. Stairs was a graduate of the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario and an officer in the Royal Engineers. Parke was an Army surgeon with experience in both Egypt and the Sudan. Nelson was a cavalry officer who had participated in the Zulu Wars and other southern African campaigns. Bonny had been a non-commissioned officer in the Army Medical Department, and had also served in southern Africa. Troup came from a family with an army tradition, as his father was an officer in the Indian Army. Troup was educated in a military preparatory school, passed the Army’s entrance exam, but chose to take employment with the Congo Free State. The remaining three

18 Report to the Subscribers, 10.
19 See McLynn, Stanley, 1, chapter 2 for Stanley’s Civil War experiences. Stanley described as eye-opening his first exposure to military discipline when he was a recruit in the Confederate Army. He stigmatized the daily round of duty that constituted military order in an army on the march as “a mighty list of harassments.” Autobiography of Stanley, 176-8.
21 Barttelot, Life, 14-55.
23 Barttelot, Life, 54.
Expedition officers—Jameson, Jephson and Ward—had no direct military connections, though Jameson had read for the army entrance exams.\(^{25}\)

Consequently, one of the benefits of a military model was that it tapped into a set of assumptions about order shared by most of the European members of the Expedition. It also overlapped with the ideas about order of the Expedition's Sudanese soldiers, many of whom had been involved in the same military campaigns in the Sudan as the Expedition's European officers. While this overlap was significant, it was only partial. Officers given responsibility for the Sudanese—Stairs, and later Barttelot—had frequent clashes with the soldiers. The officers blamed these on the incomplete military socialization of the Sudanese. Some of the clashes, though, were clearly due to what Sudanese saw as an undesirable dilution of military order with caravan culture. They were particularly incensed by the expectation that they would do porter work or other kinds of manual labour.\(^{26}\)

The military model of order also had an overlap, though a much smaller one, with the norms of order subscribed to by the Zanzibari porters. The Expedition's pattern of movement and temporary settled camps echoed the large caravans and settlements that were the means of Zanzibari expansion in the interior. Further, the role of askari and the work of rugaruga were also part of the behavioural vocabulary of experienced caravan workers.\(^{27}\) One of the porters

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\(^{26}\) See, for example, Bonny Diary, 11 & 20 Oct 1887 (E47). Emin's garrisons apparently shared this attitude, as either Expedition porters or local conscripts had to be found to carry their possessions. See Parke, *My Experiences*, 381, for example.

\(^{27}\) Askari translates as guard, soldier or policeman. The same term was used both for the armed guards who accompanied caravans and for soldiers in subsequent colonial armies. Rugaruga refers to both the activity of raiding and the small, mobile bands of armed men who carried it out.
engaged for the Expedition, for example, gave his name as Ruga Ruga.\textsuperscript{28} It is also interesting that the crowd that saw the Expedition’s porters off from Zanzibar hailed them as \textit{askari na Bula Matari}\textsuperscript{29}—Stanley’s soldiers—suggesting that this was a recognized and prestigious image of work in his caravans, whatever the frequently less glamorous reality might have been.

During the Expedition, the preference for military order manifested itself in the organization of the caravan. Stanley organized the Expedition’s personnel into companies, each under the direction of a European. Stanley called his European subordinates officers—a term they also used to describe themselves—and expected unquestioning obedience from them.\textsuperscript{30} The companies were further sub-divided into squads of fifteen to seventeen men, each managed by a Zanzibari headman. These companies and squads were assigned to accomplish specific tasks. They were also used to keep track of loads and to monitor Expedition equipment, especially guns and ammunition. While the Expedition had some specialized personnel, most of the porters were treated as interchangeable. The officers categorized them as either effective—meaning capable of using their rifles and working—or non-effective.\textsuperscript{31} This terminology suggests the Expedition’s model was the order of a professional army, in which soldiers were “replaceable parts in a sort of human machine,” rendering them flexible but predictable parts of an organization that could reliably carry out the wishes of its commander.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{28} Porter #162 in “Men Engaged for Stanley’s Expedition,” n.d., Smith, Mackenzie & Co. \textit{Notebook}, Zanzibar Museum. Ruga Ruga was one of the porters listed as speaking English, suggesting previous work for Europeans. Access to this list of porters was provided by Steve Rockel.

\textsuperscript{29} Hoffmann Diary, February 1887. Bula Matari was Stanley’s nickname. Its meaning and use are discussed further in Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{30} Of his officers, Stanley said: “They have not a particle of affection for me, but they give me an implicit, prompt and dumb obedience, which is what I wanted.” Notebook, n.d., (E46).

\textsuperscript{31} For example, “Garrison of Fort Bodo,” n.d. in Scrapbook, 1890, Stairs Fonds MG9, Vol. 63. The clearest record of the officers’ efforts to organize the porters can be found in Stairs’ Memoranda Book, Stairs Fonds MG1, Vol. 877, No. 6.

Another aspect of military order on the Expedition was the deliberate gulf maintained between the officers and their men. Officers used the same social categories to describe their porters and soldiers as they would have used to refer to enlisted men in Europe. The Sudanese and Zanzibaris were “riff-raff,” the dregs of society scraped from the gutters and prisons of Zanzibar, Alexandria and Cairo. The officers also invoked race as a further distancing strategy. They used this distance to magnify their authority. It also served as the basis for another important aspect of the Expedition’s order, the hierarchy of entitlement, discussed below. As in the Army, the gulf between officers and men was bridged by a series of intermediaries. In the Expedition’s case, these were the headmen and translators. Bonny, the only non-commissioned officer among the Europeans, was pushed into this role as well.

Military order was also evident in the Expedition’s activities. On the march, the use of an advance guard and rear guard were borrowed from the military. The Expedition’s advance guard was to feel “the pulse of the country,” scout out the best path and clear it for the laden porters who followed. Stanley expected that the Expedition’s swift movement would prevent organized opposition by indigenous peoples along the line of march. Its passage would spark only impulsive, small-scale hostilities. Both the advance guard and the officers were to be prepared to deal with these. The caravan was followed by a rear guard made up of an officer

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33 E. M. Spiers, The late Victorian army, 1868-1902, Manchester History of the British Army (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), chapter 4. However, the use of this kind of social distance to create order in the army was undergoing change. Wolseley, for example, advocated distinctions based on professional capacity and experience, not social status. See G. Wolseley, The Soldier’s Pocket-Book for Field Service, 5th ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1886), 1-3. I cite this guide because at least one of the Expedition’s officers, Stairs, kept it with him and referred to it during the Expedition.

34 See, for example, Barttelot, Life, 56; E. Barttelot to Major Tottenham, 19 June 1887, Barttelot Family Papers; Bonny Diary, “The Congo,” March 1887 (E47).

35 The officers considered the Zanzibari headmen to be a kind of non-commissioned officer. Parke, My Experiences, 116.

36 These details are all taken from HMS, Memorandum for the Officers of the Advance Column, 26 June 1887, in IDA, 1:129-31.
and a group of thirty porters without loads who were to protect the tail of the caravan from attack. More importantly, they were to keep order in the caravan by assisting weak porters and by driving on stragglers "at any cost." The loss of porters meant the loss of their loads and guns, in addition to the loss of their labour. Stragglers, though, were assumed to be deviants bent on looting or desertion, and thus in need of discipline. Stairs, one of two officers assigned to the rear guard on the march between Lake Albert and the coast, made the military function of this group most explicit. However, keeping the Equatorian evacuees moving in an orderly fashion, rather than defence against attack, made up the bulk of its work. The use of these two bodies of guards was the Expedition’s biggest departure from regional caravan norms, in which groups of specially hired askari were dispersed throughout the caravan and were intended to protect it, not discipline its members.

Each evening on the road, the Expedition made a defensible camp or boma and posted sentries. Both of these were military practices, though the former was one the military had learnt from indigenes during its African campaigns. In addition, all but the most untrustworthy or incapable of the porters were armed with rifles provided by the Expedition, and these guns and their ammunition were carefully monitored. Stanley used his large, well-armed force to respond overwhelmingly to any hostile action by indigenes. While this force would not have been very

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38 See, for example, Parke, My Experiences, 38-9. The assumption that stragglers had deviant intentions likely came from the army, where officers were warned to be vigilant for stragglers on the march since “it is by such men that crimes are committed.” Wolseley, Soldier’s Pocket-Book, 177.
39 Stairs, “From the Albert Nyanza,” 955-7; Stairs Diary, 23 & 25 May 1889.
40 Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 232 & 312. See also J. Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, African Social Studies Series no. 25 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 45, who indicates that the guards who marched with the traders at the rear of the column “herded stragglers” among the porters.
41 V.G. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815-1960, Fontana History of European War and Society (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982), 11 & 126. In the forest, the Expedition made its camps in villages, using their fortifications or making temporary ones from materials taken from village buildings. In the savannah, bomas or zeribas were enclosures made out of thorn bush.
effective if matched against "guns and determined men," \(^\text{42}\) against surprised villagers, it was sufficient to open a path for the caravan. It also succeeded in forcing a way past the larger-scale, organized opposition of communities on the Lake Albert plateau. Though he did not deliberately provoke fights, Stanley's methods of travel engendered them, as will be discussed in the section on foraging and looting below. Military order also evident in the Expedition's settled camps. These, as will also be discussed below, were run as military garrisons in hostile territory.

For Stanley, the military provided part of the organizational vocabulary for his style of travel. However, it was a vocabulary invoked in particular situations, such as during sustained hostilities with indigenous peoples on the Lake Albert plateau. Here Stanley designated skirmishers to assist the advance and rear guards of the caravan and sent out companies of porters to make sorties from a fortified encampment established on a hilltop. \(^\text{43}\) However, in day to day marching, Stanley completely ignored the highly ordered patterns of army marching, adopting regional caravan practices instead. \(^\text{44}\) Emblematically, while Stanley liked to travel in pseudo-military outfits of his own design, he preferred names bestowed on him by his porters—\textit{Bula Matari}, Breaker of Rocks, being a favourite—to quasi-military titles, like Commander.

Stanley acquired his knowledge of travel in Africa from Zanzibar specialists rather than military expeditions. \(^\text{45}\) Regional caravan practices consequently played a large role in the order Stanley imposed on the Expedition. This was particularly true of the schedule for daily work, though Stanley also made use of other caravan practices, such as the \textit{shauri} or consultation. In these meetings all members of the caravan could express their opinion on important decisions.

\(^{42}\) Stairs Diary, 3 March 1889.

\(^{43}\) \textit{IDA}, 1:309-10, 315-6.

\(^{44}\) See the instructions for marching in Wolseley, \textit{Soldier's Pocket-Book}, 319-51. It specifies such details as the optimum number of paces between soldiers, the number of paces per minute, and the timing and location of halts.
facing the caravan. However, as will be explained below, Stanley sometimes stage-managed these consultations in collaboration with senior headmen, allowing the porters the appearance rather than the substance of a voice. The porters recognized the hybrid character of Stanley’s caravan order. As the headman Murabo explained to Jephson, Stanley was “half a white man & half an Arab.” Interestingly, though, Stanley constructed his methods of caravan leadership as European rather than indigenous in the published accounts of his travels. This construction was validated by contemporaries, who considered the “Stanley style” to be one of two European models for travel in Africa. Stanley’s most significant departures from caravan practice were his use of capital punishment, the heavy corporal punishment he inflicted on the porters, and the indiscriminate violence he occasionally unleashed on them. As will be discussed below, the porters were apparently willing to tolerate more of this treatment from Stanley than they did from his officers, suggesting a charismatic aspect to his leadership.

Stanley’s officers, whose military experience was stronger and more recent, attempted to institute military order more consistently and completely when Stanley delegated authority to them. For them, military order addressed gaps in caravan practice, especially during protracted halts. During these stopovers, it provided a template for daily rounds of inspection and duty. It also provided a means for dealing with sanitation problems which caravans avoided through constant movement. From the officers’ point of view, military order also regularized and mitigated the harsh and arbitrary discipline Stanley imposed on the caravan. This discipline, they believed incorrectly, was the product of the indigenous travel practices adopted by Stanley.

46 Jephson Diary, 24 April 1888. Murabo had also been on Stanley’s 1874-77 journey across Africa.
47 See Pruen, *Arab and African*, 185-6, as discussed in Chapter 1.
These they stigmatized as the methods of the slave caravans. They also believed that Stanley’s inappropriate discipline stemmed from his willingness to give free rein to his temper. Stairs, for example, complained that Stanley had no idea of discipline—which for Stairs meant the use of force only when expostulation had failed—and terrorized the men into obedience by responding to all problems with immediate violence. Troup wrote of the Rear Column porters:

There is no doubt they have been very roughly handled by the whitemen coming up from Matadi to the Pool, but they can have nothing to complain of whilst they have been at Yambuya camp; they are never allowed to be knocked about promiscuous like being only punished after their offence has been tried by the chief in command of the camp, flogging only being administered for grave offenses.

**Military Discipline**

The most obvious application of military order on the Expedition was the use of military discipline. Military law encompassed a much wider range of activity than civilian law because it was intended to create a disciplined collective body that would respond promptly and unquestioningly to orders. This vision of order fit well with the idea of the Expedition’s porters as both a substitute for mechanized transportation and as an army feeling its way through uncertain territory. The definition of offences for members of the Expedition was

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48 Several of the officers complained about the discipline they were expected to enforce during the march on the lower Congo. Bonny, for example, opined that “of all I have read heard or seen Our Expedition caravan exceeds in brutality anything that is practices amongst any slave raider.” Bonny Diary, April 1887 (E47). See also Jameson, *Story*, 14. Others felt that a good deal of *fimto* [stick] was needed to keep order among the porters and to keep the column moving; see, for example, Parke, *My Experiences*, 38-9 and Stairs Diary, 17 April 1887.

49 Diary, 22 July 1888.

50 J.R. Troup to F. de Winton, 18 October 1887, MP 85/17.

correspondingly broad, though not an exact match with the list of military offences. Some punishable offences, such as desertion and insubordination, were the same. Other categories of offences, like those to do with loads, were unique to porterage, while yet others, such as those concerning appearance, were completely ignored on the Expedition.

Military practice was also evident in the procedures for the judgement of offences. At the settled camps, the senior officer determined the disciplinary measures to be applied in cases brought to him by his subordinates. In difficult cases, he made his judgement in consultation with other officers. Stanley used a similar process, though he was as likely to consult with his Zanzibari headmen as with his officers. For the most serious offences, courts-martial were established. This was done for Senga, the Manyema porter accused of killing Barttelot, and for Rehani Pasha, accused of desertion and of inciting disorder among the Equatorian evacuees.

Military models of order were even more evident in the kind of punishments meted out to offenders. These included floggings administered at punishment parades, punitive drill, fines, imprisonment, and capital punishment carried out either by firing squad or hanging. Stairs described his regimen of military-flavoured punishments at Fort Bodo:

My punishments are as follows: flogging up to 100 strokes and in addition one month’s stone drill, then, of course, any combination of these: tying a man up till he is repentant; standing in one position up to two hours with a heavy stone on one’s head—this they dislike most of all. Stone drill means marching up and down in the square four hours per day with a 50-pound stone on a man’s head.

52 The main offences under military law were “mutiny, desertion, insubordination, fraudulent enlistment, absence without leave, drunkenness, disgraceful conduct and quitting or sleeping on post.” Soldiers committing crimes such as treason, murder, manslaughter, or rape were generally tried in civilian courts. Spiers, *Late Victorian army*, 71-72.

53 See Foreign Office Despatch No. 60, Africa in MP 88/35 and “Proceedings of a ‘Court of Enquiry’ Held at Mazamboni’s, 2nd May 1889,” in BLEM Stanley Papers for the proceedings of these two courts.

54 Stairs Diary, 25 June 1888.
This range of punishments reflected an uneasy mixture of current and long-outdated army practices, particularly in the use of flogging. The number of strokes and the offences for which flogging was prescribed initially bore some resemblance to recent Army standards, albeit wartime rather than peacetime ones. Over the course of the Expedition, though, floggings regressed to the standards of the early nineteenth century army.\(^{55}\)

Twentieth century writers about the Expedition gloss over the issue of discipline by pointing vaguely to the much harsher standards of military and civilian punishment that prevailed at the time. In doing so, they overlook important nineteenth century debates about and changes in military discipline. As with contemporary reform of the criminal code, the reform of military law tended toward fewer capital offences and less severe corporal punishments. Public and parliamentary debates about military discipline focused on branding and flogging, as capital punishment had rarely been used for military crimes since the mid-1860s. After 1867 only those soldiers labelled "bad characters" could be flogged in peacetime, and only for serious offences; in wartime, flogging could be used more extensively.\(^{56}\) The flogging of soldiers during the Zulu War of 1879 sparked heated debate though,\(^ {57}\) and the practice was ultimately abolished in 1881. As a summary punishment, flogging was replaced with imprisonment for up to three months. Such confinement was often accompanied by punitive military drill and hard labour.\(^ {58}\) By late

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\(^{55}\) In 1830 military reforms limited floggings to 300 lashes and its use to the offenses of "mutiny, insubordination and violence towards superior officers, drunkenness on duty, and theft or 'making away with necessaries'." E.M. Spiers, *The Army and Society, 1815-1914*, Themes in British Social History (London: Longman, 1980), 62-3.

\(^{56}\) Peacetime offences for which flogging could be used were mutiny, aggravated insubordination, or disgraceful conduct. In wartime, flogging could also be used for desertion, drunkenness, misbehaviour, or neglect of duty. Spiers, *Late Victorian army*, 73-74.

\(^{57}\) Much of the public debate over this war concerned British policy toward the Zulu; see Robinson, *et al.*, *Africa and the Victorians*, 62-3. However, during the war a private who stabbed a corporal was punished with 50 lashes, the "last severe sentence" of flogging prior to the abolition of this practice in the army. This incident is described in L. James, *The Savage Wars: British Campaigns in Africa, 1870-1920* (London: Robert Hale, 1985), 246.

\(^{58}\) Spiers, *Late Victorian army*, 73-74.
1888, the British Colonial Office was also seeking to regulate the corporal punishment of African soldiers, though harsh discipline continued to be the rule in colonial armies well into the twentieth century.59

I will use one of the cases of discipline on the Expedition singled out by European contemporaries to look at patterns of discipline, the influence of military practices on them, and the perceived impact of this discipline. This case began with a theft. Late on the night of December 1, 1887, someone crept into Ward's house and stole half of a butchered goat.60 Bones, picked clean, were discovered the next morning near the quarters of the Sudanese. Barttelot threatened that if the culprits were not revealed, everyone on sentry duty the previous night would be flogged, as would all the indigenes who had slept in the fort that night. The greater part of the missing meat was shortly found hidden in the roof of the hut used by Bugari Mohammed, one of the sentries on the main gate. He was arrested, sentenced to receive 150 lashes and fined three months pay. In addition, he was to be kept perpetually in chains and to parade daily in them. Since Bugari said Barttelot's servant Uledi had helped him, telling him where to find the meat, Uledi was also sentenced to a flogging, although a lighter one, a substantial fine, and banishment from the camp.61

Three days after the theft, Bugari was flogged before the assembled Rear Column. The flogging was administered by three of the Sudanese. “The Soudanese are wonderfully plucky in

59 D. Killingray, “The ‘Rod of Empire’: The Debate Over Corporal Punishment in the British African Colonial Forces, 1888-1946,” Journal of African History 35, no. 2 (1994): 201-16. Discipline imposed on indigenous members of regular forces in British imperial service was harsh. Flogging “for often quite trivial offenses” was common even in the twentieth century. Sentences imposed on black soldiers for serious offences like rape were much harsher than those imposed on white soldiers for the same offence, and these sentences were less likely to be commuted. See James, Savage Wars, 255 and 236.
60 This account is drawn from Barttelot MS Diary, 2-5 December 1887 & 4 February 1888; Barttelot, *Life*, 170 & 197-8; Bonny Diary, 2-4 December 1887 & 9-10 February 1888 (E47); Jameson, *Story*, 164-5 & 204-8; Troup, *Rear Column*, 134 & 203; and Ward, *My Life*, 71-4.
61 This was apparently later commuted to a fine, expulsion, and punishment drill—Uledi was to march around
bearing pain,'" Jarneson commented, "for although he received 150 strokes, which cut him up very much, he never uttered a sound."62 When Bugari admitted a day later that Uledi had not been involved in the theft, the servant was reprieved, but Bugari was fined an additional six months' pay for lying. He was also sentenced to receive another 150 lashes as soon as he was sufficiently recovered for them.

Two months later, Bugari escaped from the guardroom in which he was imprisoned. He took with him the rifle, ammunition, and sword of his Sudanese guard. Bugari Mohammed later explained that "he passed through the gate when we were at dinner with the rifle under his blanket that noone [sic] stopped him."63 He fled into the bush and there discarded his chains. A search party was immediately dispatched to look for him, despite the late hour. Selim bin Mohammed was also informed of the escape and he promised to assist in the search. A few days later, a porter out looking for manioc, saw Bugari. The porter, Kuja, informed Selim bin Mohammed's men, whom he found nearby in a village under the control of the trader Abdullah Korona. Under guise of friendship, Selim's men captured and disarmed Bugari, then returned him to Yambuya.

After lunch on the day Bugari was recaptured, the officers discussed his punishment. As Troup recounted:

"It was argued that the Zanzibari deserters had been flogged, and that this man ought to receive the same punishment. But it was held by some of the officers that the Soudanese were engaged as soldiers, and were under military discipline, therefore this case should be dealt with as desertion in an enemy's country."64

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62 Story, 165.
63 Bonny Diary, 9 February 1888 (E47).
64 Troup, Rear Column, 203.
Troup and Jameson both pointed out that this was a civilian, not a military expedition and that military discipline should not be applied. They also believed they had already lost too many men to be able to afford the execution of deserters, and that a less severe punishment would have a sufficient deterrent effect on the others. In addition, Troup thought it unfair to have different penalties for the same offence. Jameson felt also that leniency was appropriate:

No one can deny that, according to military law on active service, he ought to be shot, and there is no doubt that it ought to have a very good effect upon the others; but when one thinks what a miserable poor wretch he is, and from what a miserable existence he tried to escape, one cannot help pitying him.

However, the officers had also been told that Bugari believed “his life was not worth living, marching up and down in the sun all day, and that he knew he would be shot when caught, and that he intended shooting Barttelot dead before he would be captured.” Ward and Bonny both favoured execution, as a result. Bonny believed it necessary because of the seriousness of the crime and the man’s “general character which is very bad.” More importantly, Selim bin Mohammed had made a plea for clemency and Bonny did not wish him or any of the other traders to establish themselves as “Saviours” of the men. Barttelot held the deciding vote in the divided council of officers and “not unnaturally looked at the offence from a military point of view.” Bugari Mohammed was accordingly sentenced to be executed by firing squad.

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66 Bonny Diary, 9 February 1888 (E47).
67 Story, 207.
68 Ward, My Life, 73. Bugari Mohammed confided this to Selim bin Mohammed, who repeated it to Ward.
69 Bonny noted in his diary: “Salem asked Barttelot not to shoot [Bugari Mohammed] because if we did their men would not bring any more runaways back for they would think the sin of his death would fall on them!! I am in favour of shooting him as much because the Arabs want to set up as Saviours of our men as I am for the man [sic] crimes & general character which is very bad.” Bonny Diary, 9 February 1888 (E47).
70 Troup, “Stanley’s Rear-Guard,” 827. The military point of view was emphasized by Barttelot’s family, who substituted “deserted” for “escaped” in the published version of Barttelot’s diary.
The next morning, Bugari was silent as he was led out before the men of the Rear Column, mustered to witness his execution. He submitted coolly to being tied to the flogging post in the road outside the fort. A firing squad of eight Sudanese carried out the sentence. Death was instantaneous. Bonny, who had taken precautions against discontent arising from the death sentence, felt afterwards that the execution did not have much effect on the other men. Ironically, Kuja, the porter who found the escaped Bugari, himself deserted a few days later. He also headed for the upriver trade settlements of Abdullah Korona, but was quickly recaptured.

Bugari Mohammed’s case shows the influence of military models of order in the Rear Column. Military order was evident in the debate about the definition of his offence. Was Bugari Mohammed an escapee or a deserter? If the officers determined him to be a “bad character,” he could legally be sentenced to much harsher discipline even in peacetime. Further, the process of determining Bugari’s punishment followed military procedure. The summary punishment for his theft and perjury were determined by Barttelot, the commanding officer, while the penalty for his desertion was debated by a council of officers. Though contemporary commentators referred to this as a court martial, it was in fact a consultation over sentencing, not a trial. The punishments ordered for Bugari were also military in character, as was the

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71 The execution of Bugari Mohammed stands in sharp contrast to that of Sanga, the man convicted of murdering Barttelot. A firing squad of six Hausas in CFS employ fired two rounds at the condemned man, but only succeeded in seriously, and painfully injuring him. In the end, Sanga had to be dispatched by a CFS officer. See Jameson, Story, 362. The Expedition’s Sudanese, whose marksmanship was never the subject of praise, seem to have been careful to ensure a quick death for their compatriot. Bonny’s comment [Diary, 10 February 1888] that the Sudanese all approved the sentence passed on Bugari Mohammed and would, in fact, have preferred a more painful method of execution, is contradicted by the actions of the firing squad.

72 Bonny Diary, 10 February 1888 (E47).

73 Barttelot, Life, 197; Troup, Rear Column, 213; Bonny Diary, 15 February 1888 (E47). Kuja’s story is discussed again in Chapter 4.
punishment parade at which they were administered. However, these punishments were a mixture of current, outdated, and archaic army practices.

The punishment of Bugari Mohammed did not end either thefts or desertions from the Rear Column. A reduction in the rate of theft preceded his punishment for this offence by three weeks, indicating that other factors were responsible for the change. His execution took place at the beginning of a period of deviance that included insubordination, refusal to work, desertion, leaving camp without permission, building unauthorized huts outside the camp, and having unsanctioned relations with Manyema women. All of this suggests that Bugari’s punishment was not particularly effective in reinforcing the officers’ order. Bugari’s actions did, though, provide an excuse for the tightening of this order. Two days after the theft, Barttelot gave Bonny permission to establish a police force in the fort. There is no subsequent mention of this force in connection with any of the detected deviance at Yambuya, though. It may have had more of an impact on the officers’ sense of themselves as effective authority figures than on the deviants it was supposed to control.

Finally, the officers did not take for granted the appropriateness of military order, as their debate about disciplinary options in this case shows. Interestingly the Sudanese, although they were on the Expedition as volunteers, did not protest the application of military discipline. However, the ease of Bugari’s escape from a guardhouse and a gate guarded by Sudanese, and the failure of a search party led by a Sudanese officer to find him hint that his punishment was not generally approved by his fellow soldiers. The presence of persistent hunger at this time, including the death of a Sudanese from “starvation” at around the time of Bugari’s escape, may

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74 Bonny Diary, 3 December 1887 (E47).
have contributed to a feeling of dissatisfaction.\textsuperscript{75} Such feelings were no doubt heightened by the fact that Bugari's escape occurred while the officers were holding a feast to celebrate Jameson's third wedding anniversary.\textsuperscript{76} I will now turn to consider more closely the place of food in the order of the Expedition.

**Entitlement to Food**

For Europeans, both those on the Expedition and contemporary observers, discipline and the Expedition's military style of relating to indigenous people were singled out for comment and censure. However, as the following account of conditions in the Rear Column by Assad Farran makes clear, for the Expedition's other members, access to food and other necessities were a bigger concern.

We had to wait 12 months in that camp [i.e. Yambuya] feeding mostly on maniack roots as there was nothing to be gotten except sometimes the natives brought some fish, but we had nothing to buy with, the men were all starving from hunger and cold, all lying sick and naked, it was a very miserable camp, a great many of the men died there, they made a burial place but it was quickly full so they had to make a second one the number of the men who died exceeded a 100.\textsuperscript{77}

Assad Farran, one of the Expedition's translators, also included information about conditions in the Advance Column culled from deserters who ended up at Yambuya. They told him that illness and fatigue were responsible for the numerous desertions and deaths among the men with Stanley.\textsuperscript{78} Again, discipline was not a primary concern.

\textsuperscript{75} Bonny Diary, 5 February 1888 (E47).
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. When the Rear Column officers interviewed these deserters, they were told of terrible food shortages, hostile indigenous peoples, bad roads through dense bush, and the draconian measures employed by Stanley. See, for example, the story of Musa bin Dhama as recounted in Jameson, *Story*, 109-11.
The study of modern famines offers helpful insight into the issue of access to food on the Expedition. A key concept is that of entitlement, meaning the legally and socially defined right to command resources, whether for production, exchange or consumption.\textsuperscript{79} The Expedition, like any community, had a system to determine its members’ right of access to food. The entitlement of most of the Expedition’s members came from the exchange of their labour for rations, and from their access to the means of extortion.\textsuperscript{80} Many of them also possessed additional resources that they could trade for food, such as savings from advance wages, looted ivory, and clothing. These forms of entitlement were often supplemented by gathering, fishing or hunting. In some situations, they were also supplemented by the use of land to cultivate crops.\textsuperscript{81}

Working with these varied methods of access, the Expedition’s officers attempted to establish a hierarchy of entitlement to food. Naturally, they stood at the pinnacle of this hierarchy. Next were intermediaries like the Sudanese officers and Zanzibari headmen, and other specialized personnel like translators and the Somalis. The officers’ servants, both Hoffmann and the Zanzibari “boys,” were also in this intermediate category. Intermediaries received higher wages. They also received occasional gifts of food from the officers.\textsuperscript{82} Intermediaries had greater access to the Expedition’s stores, to its guns, and to the property

\textsuperscript{79} The concept of entitlement was initially advanced in A. Sen, “Ingredients of Famine Analysis: Availability and Entitlement,” \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics} 96, no. 3 (1981): 433-64. Summaries can be found in several more recent works, such as J. Drèze & A. Sen, \textit{Hunger and Public Action} (Oxford University Press, 1989): 9-11.

\textsuperscript{80} The Sudanese, Somalis, and Zanzibaris on the Expedition all received wages, as did two of the Europeans. The contracts of the European volunteer officers entitled them to “a due share of European provisions taken for the party besides such provisions as the Country can supply.” The officer contracts can all be found in BLEM Stanley Papers.

\textsuperscript{81} The Zanzibaris’ strategies for access to food are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{82} The Zanzibari headmen, for example, were given some fish at a point where the men were protesting the non-payment of their food allowance as a collective punishment for theft, a convenient means of purchasing their loyalty. Bonny Diary, 24 November 1887 (E47).
of the officers. In addition, they experienced fewer restrictions on their movements, giving them opportunities to forage or loot, and they accompanied the officers on visits to the trade settlements, where those with connections or resources could obtain food. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the ordinary porters and soldiers, though in practice indigenous dependants, unofficially acquired by members of the Expedition, stood lower still. Although there is no direct evidence of a hierarchy within the ranks of the Expedition’s porters, distinctions were observed among their contemporaries in other caravans, based on the kind and weight of the loads they carried.  

While inequities in access to food were and are commonplace, in the Expedition they were much more extreme than in comparable communities, such as the Zanzibari trade settlements in the eastern Congo. Indigenous people at Yambuya were able to distinguish between the Expedition’s porters and those at the lower levels of the trade settlements’ hierarchy because of the poverty of the former. This suggests the inequities within the Expedition were greater. The one point where it is possible to make direct comparisons between the food allowances of Expedition members and those of Tippu Tip’s following was during the steamer voyage on the upper Congo. The Expedition men received one *metako* per day, though this was reduced to three-quarters of a *metako* per day after they passed Bangala Station. The officers received a food allowance of 30 *metakos* per day on the voyage. On the steamer where Tippu Tip provisioned his followers, the food allowance for

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84 Bonny Diary, 5 March 1888 (E47).

85 E.M. Barttelot to his parents, 1-23 June 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.

86 Troup, *Rear Column*, 114-5.
each member of his entourage was two *metakos* per day. When Barttelot accompanied Tippu Tip to Stanley Falls, he was given eight *metakos* per day.87

The great disparity between the food allowances of officers and porters or soldiers on the Expedition appears to have had its root in the inequities of the British Army. The disparities in basic pay between officers and enlisted men in the late nineteenth century ranged from five to one, for the most junior officers, up to twenty-one to one.88 Military allowances for field service likely magnified these inequities.89 Military analogies were also used to justify the inequity in access to resources among members of the Expedition. Stanley, for example, argued that disparities in the allocation of food among the Europeans were legitimate because:

The chief of an Expedition if he is sole chief, ought to receive a larger share than the subalterns. He it is who has provided everything. The General in chief is allowed [more] rations than the Brigadier, more horses, & more servants, the Brigadier in like manner more than the Colonel, the Colonel more than the Captain.90

At lower levels of the hierarchy, this military model of entitlement was overlaid by ideas of what was due a white man relative to a black one.

The officers used a variety of means to enforce the hierarchy of entitlement. They attempted to control the existing stores of food, especially the stock of specialty foods brought for their use. They also monitored the Expedition’s stock of things that could be exchanged for food—trade goods, tools, and especially guns and ammunition—and controlled the distribution

87 Barttelot to Tottenham, 19 June 1887, Barttelot Family Papers. Though Stanley controlled the amount of currency available to Tippu Tip’s following, there is no evidence he controlled how it was distributed within this group.
88 See Spiers, *Late Victorian army*, 105-6 & 133.
89 It is difficult to find precise information on military allowances. The figures I found were for the 18th century and involved only the allowances paid to officers. Within the officer corps, the disparities in forage allowance and *batta*, the cash allowance paid to officers in the field, were even more extreme than those of pay. See A.J. Guy, *Economy and Discipline: Officership and Discipline in the British army, 1714-63* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 102.
of these items. On the march, the loss of loads and guns was as much a concern as loss of labour whenever porters went missing from the caravan. This concern, and the controls which enforced it were most evident where the purchase of food was a possibility, in the trade settlements. The officers also wanted to be the only members of the Expedition with the right to structure trade. They wanted, for example, to be the ones who determined when either coercion or ceremonies of brotherhood would be used to obtain food. The officers also indirectly and unintentionally reinforced their privileged position in the food trade by generating inflation in food prices. In addition, the officers claimed for themselves the first right of access to the choice foods brought into camp, whether by foragers or traders. They attempted to determine when and where foraging took place as well, as will be discussed below. Porters who left the caravan for unsanctioned foraging were punished with floggings, especially those who found livestock and did not share it with the officers.

The effectiveness of these methods of control was limited, though. Stanley, for instance, discovered that the Manyema chief Sadi had appropriated four cases of European provisions which Stanley had hoarded for himself. Stanley could not punish him, though, without losing the services of his followers. The records of discipline on the Expedition point up numerous other failures to control access to food, to tradeable goods, or to foraged items. And there is no way of knowing about the transgressions of order the officers failed to detect. In spite of these

90 Stanley Diary, 7 August 1888 (E 41).
91 For example, Stanley Diary, 19 October 1888 (E41).
92 See, for example, Stanley Diary, 24 & 27 July 1888 (E41).
93 Diary, 10 November 1888 (E41). The eighty porters under Sali were the only ones provided by Tippu Tip who chose to remain with the Expedition.
94 Parke, for instance, complained that the foraging parties of porters sent out from Ft. Bodo hid the better food they found, and brought the officers only small, inferior items. J.B. Lyons, Surgeon-Major Parke's African Journey, 1887-89 (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1994), 112.
failures of order, occasional descriptions of the relative condition of the Expedition's members give clear evidence that a hierarchy of entitlement to food was functioning:

We are all frightfully thin, but the whites are not much the worse...[ ] blacks have faced more, but over 50 of them are still excellent, the rest are skeletons only gray of skin and worn out [ ] feeble people, unable to do anything but creep.  

The European officers were clearly successful in protecting their position, but unevenly able to control the hierarchy below them. There is no way to determine where the fifty men in good condition stood in the ladder of authority instituted by the officers. The group of experienced porters assigned to carry the steel boat sections, for example, were clearly pushed toward the lower end of the hierarchy of entitlement, a position at variance with the importance the officers assigned to their work.  

In general, the officers were able to exercise more effective control over access to food during protracted halts in forts constructed by the Expedition than they were while the caravan was on the march. While the impact of inequitable entitlement in these forts was thus heightened in an atypical way, the systems that produced the inequity were similar to those operating on the march. Since the better documented life at these camps allows careful study, what follows is an examination of two settings in which the dynamics of entitlement to food are particularly clear—the Rear Column's twelve month stay at Yambuya and the twelve month stay of a small garrison at Fort Bodo.

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95 Stanley Diary, 16 October 1887 (E37). There were 169 porters with the Advance Column at this point, while the servants, cooks and Sudanese were an additional twelve persons.
96 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of their situation.
Entitlement at Yambuya

As noted in Chapter 2, when the Expedition established itself at Yambuya it appropriated both the cluster of villages there and the extensive fields of cassava that surrounded them. These fields supplied the bulk of the men’s diet, which consisted of manioc tubers eaten together with a relish of manioc leaves and palm oil. Plantains, bananas or maize could occasionally be obtained by foraging. The men were also given a small weekly cash allowance to supplement these staples. At Yambuya, fish and palm oil were the two items that could be purchased from the village’s former inhabitants. Meat was scarce, and the men ate rats, bats, and crocodiles when they could get them. Their diet also lacked small but significant elements like salt. The officers, in contrast, were given a much more substantial allowance, intended to entitle them to a regular supply of meat, fish, eggs, vegetables and preferred staples like maize. They also had access to the small stock of rice brought up from the lower Congo. This was supplemented by items like tea and jam from the Expedition’s stock of European provisions. In spite of growing hunger among the men, Jameson could exclaim: “Thank goodness we have always now plenty of food & can get more from the Falls whenever we want it.”

The expectation that the Rear Column would have access to adequate supplies of food was based on presumptions about the possibilities of trade, the size of Yambuya’s fields, and the

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98 E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887 and Barttelot MS Diary, 30 July 1887, Barttelot Family Papers; also Bonny Diary, 2 September 1887, 2 March 1888, and 24 May 1888 (E47). The Sudanese were much less particular about the kind of meat they ate than the Zanzibaris; Troup, Rear Column, 159. Other European travellers commented that a refusal to eat “unclean” meat was one of the few evidences of Muslim faith among their Zanzibari porters. See, for example, Pruen, Arab and African, 203 and W.M. Kerr, The Far Interior (London: Sampson Low, Marston, & Co., 1886), 2:287.

99 E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.

100 Jameson Diary, 19 November 1887 as quoted in Stanley Notebook (E44).
hazards to be faced by both the Rear Column and the Advance Column. These assumptions all proved untenable. However, neither Stanley nor the Rear Column officers were able or willing to recognize the inadequacy of their plans and provisions, or to take action to address the failures of entitlement that resulted.

As Parke had prophesied when he surveyed the food resources at Yambuya in June 1887, it was difficult to establish a trade in food with the ex-inhabitants of the community. Stanley tried, nonetheless, confident that the villagers had a food surplus to trade. Stanley had the people his scouts "arrested" around Yambuya released with small gifts of trade goods to promote "amicable intercourse." He and the officers believed that the Expedition's trade goods were so attractive that the indigenes had only to see them to be willing to trade their livestock for them. This despite indications that the Expedition's goods were less in demand than those provided by the Stanley Falls-based traders. Stanley also orchestrated a ceremony of blood brotherhood between Barttelot and Ngungu, the chief of Yambuya. As Ngungu offered a chick and a woven bonnet in exchange for a liberal gift of trade goods, he appears not to have taken the ceremony very seriously. When these overtures produced neither a satisfactory volume of trade nor prices the officers considered acceptable, they resorted to the kidnap of

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101 Stanley believed, for example, that the villagers had flocks of fowl and livestock that they had removed from Yambuya just prior to the Expedition's occupation of it. See HMS to de Winton, 19 June 1887, MP 86/29. Though Stanley simultaneously observed that the Yambuya area was occupied by the "fragments" of many tribes, he did not entertain the idea that this evidence of regional disruption might presage a limited food supply.

102 HMS to F. de Winton, 19 June 1887, MP 86/29; see also IDA, 1:114.

103 My Life, 51-2; see also Bonny Diary, 15 September 1887 (E47); Jameson, Story, 136-7; Troup, Rear Column, 158. The axe-heads offered by the Zanzibari traders were much preferred to the Expedition's metakos and cloth, while the cowries which were part of the allowance paid to the porters were so little valued they were not accepted in trade at all.

104 Barttelot, Life, 115-6; Jameson, Story, 75. A subsequent ceremony to demonstrate mutual respect and peaceful intentions, which involved assurances by Bonny that the Tamba Tamba [i.e. 'Arab' raiders] had been instructed to leave Ngungu's village alone, took place when Bonny assumed responsibility for the food trade. Bonny Diary, 19 August 1887 (E47).

105 IDA, 1:132. Smith suggests this was a deliberate gesture of contempt; see Expedition, 177.
women and children who were then held to ransom for choice foodstuffs.\textsuperscript{106} Jameson maintained these measures were necessary because the indigenes refused to bring any food for trade, while Barttelot said they were needed because they would only trade in fish and manioc bread, which was not good enough.\textsuperscript{107}

These kidnappings were supplemented with predations designed to show local peoples their place in the Expedition's order: "Capturing their women has had a salutary effect on them for they trade much more freely with us & on lower terms, now and again I exact tribute from them just to let them know we are the masters here."\textsuperscript{108} The officers primary interest was the guarantee of their own food supply. They were not willing to apply the same coercive measures to structure the trade in food for their men. They also attempted to keep a monopoly on the use of coercion to structure trade. The men were instructed not to injure or steal from the villagers, though some were found to have disobeyed this order.\textsuperscript{109}

In pursuit of their ends, the officers also tried to reserve first right of access to food brought to the fort for trade. Jameson, for instance, was outraged when Matajabu, his servant, was pre-empted in the purchase of food offered for sale by the ex-residents of Yambuya:

\begin{quote}
 a number of Zanzibaris ran out with matakas, and, although Matajabu told them that the plantains were for us, they made the natives sell them to them. I was very
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{106} Jameson, \textit{Story}, 83-9, 135-9; Barttelot MS Diary, 10 July 1887; Barttelot, \textit{Life}, 154-6. There was a good deal of negotiation around the size and content of the ransom, and proceedings were sometimes complicated by the escape of kidnap victims, or by the villagers taking hostages of their own from among the Rear Column porters. Ironically, the officers' methods for stimulating trade were almost identical to the much reviled ones the "Arab" traders used to collect ivory. As Ward explained, though, they were "following the custom of the country...The natives brought the food to ransom their women in the most matter-of-fact way, and laughed heartily with us over the whole transaction." \textit{My Life}, 148.

\textsuperscript{107} Jameson, \textit{Story}, 92; E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.

\textsuperscript{108} Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887, Barttelot Family Papers. The problems with this tributary relationship were discussed in Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{109} See Barttelot's general orders, Barttelot, \textit{Life}, 141. For an example of the contravention of this order, see an incident described in Jameson, \textit{Story}, 162-3 and Troup, \textit{Rear Column}, 181. Omar Mohammed, a Sudanese officer, threw stones at villagers when he was dissatisfied with their trade; they subsequently refused to trade with him.
angry at this, and when the men paraded at 1.15 I told them that when my boy was sent by the Major and myself to buy—especially in a case like this, when the natives had already promised the plantains to us—he should have the first chance of buying, and if prevented, I would shut the gates in future whenever a canoe came, and not let a man out until we had got what we wanted.110

Subsequent unauthorized trading was punished with fines taken from the food allowance of the porters involved, or floggings.111

The various rules in place to control the movements of the men were reinforced by the re-construction of the fort in October 1887.112 Since their arrival at Yambuya, the men had simply occupied the huts of the evicted villagers. These were scattered across the area inside the fort, and the officers’ tents were pitched in their midst. In the re-designed fort, not only were the external walls strengthened, an internal wall was built to divide the fort into sections, one for the officers and their servants, and one for the men. All now occupied new rectangular houses laid out in neat lines.113 Coincident with the re-construction, the porters had been disarmed to prevent desertion.114 Their guns as well as all the Expedition's stores were placed in specially constructed buildings, many of which were attached directly to the officers' houses. Further, to go through the camp’s main gate, the men now had to pass through the officers’ section of the fort.115 These measures were not sufficient to end unsanctioned trade, however. Five men were flogged in early December for “nefariously trading with the Natives for fish, to our [i.e. the

110 Story, 82.
111 For example, Jameson, Story, 106-7; Bonny Diary, 5 December 1887 (E47).
112 Bonny was largely responsible for this construction project. His passion for physical order was complemented by his desire to clarify and strengthen the social order with record-keeping, inspection, drill, regular supervised work and leisure, and strong, consistent discipline. Records of his earlier building efforts at Bolobo show the way in which these concerns were linked in his mind. See, for example, Bonny Diary, 14 and 15 May 1887 (E47).
114 All the Zanzibaris were disarmed on October 14th, though the headmen were allowed to keep their rifles. See Jameson, Story, 148-9; Bonny Diary, 13 October 1887 (E47).
115 Bonny Diary, 12 December 1887 (E47).
The measures were successful in constraining the men’s ability to trade, though, and their ability to supplement their purchases of food with either foraging or looting in the area around Yambuya. The officers also indirectly controlled the trade in food through their level of expenditure relative to that of the men. The Expedition paid out approximately 10,927 metakos for the porters’ food between June 1887 and June 1888. During the same period, the five officers spent a minimum of 9,100 metakos on their own food. This liberal spending by the officers eroded the purchasing power of the men’s already meagre food allowance. Bonny estimated that the European officers together spent an average of 25 metakos per day on food, and they would have spent up to 40 if there had been anything to buy. This exercise of the officers’ effective demand in a context of ongoing scarcity kept the price of choice foods sufficiently high that few if any porters could afford them, thus limiting their participation in the food trade.

A further complication in the food trade at Yambuya was the growth there of a settlement of Zanzibaris from Stanley Falls together with their Manyema adherents. It started in August

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116 Barttelot MS Diary, 5 December 1887, Barttelot Family Papers. The men were selling manioc from Yambuya’s fields back to the village’s ex-inhabitants in exchange for fish, and they were doing this when they were supposed to be cutting grass. See Bonny Diary, 5 December 1887 (E47).

117 Barttelot noted, for example, that when he explored the area around Yambuya, the men liked to come with him “as they always bring back something.” E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.

118 See R.W. Harms, River of Wealth, River of Sorrow: The Central Zaire Basin in the Era of the Slave and Ivory Trade, 1500-1891 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 222-4 for the significant price inflation caused by Europeans on the middle Congo, suggesting this problem was not uncommon in the early colonial period.

119 This figure is based on the payment of one metako per man per week. It takes into account the deaths each week, as well as the two occasions on which the men’s pay was doubled for holiday celebrations and the five weeks in which their rations were suspended. It does not take into account extra metakos paid out to headmen or other intermediaries, for which there are no reliable figures.

120 Diary, 26 November 1887 (E47).

121 Fish cost roughly 2 metakos per pound. Goats ranged in price from 40 to 50 metakos, while fowls cost between 1½ handkerchief and 2 handkerchiefs. Bonny Diary, 20 August 1887 and 6, 17, 18 October 1887 (E47). Goats were only available in the Zanzibari trade settlements, there were none in the local villages. Fowls were scarce in the villages, but more plentiful in the trade settlements. This distribution suggests raiding and other forms of conflict were disrupting the regional food supply.
1887 with the arrival of a small group under Abdullah Korona, which Tippu Tip had sent to assist the Expedition. They initially camped near the fort, but by mid-September had established camps farther upstream and the camp at Yambuya came under the authority of Tippu Tip’s nephew, Selim bin Mohammed. This camp grew slowly and, by early 1888 had become an active trade settlement in its own right. It participated in regional trade, and also profited by inserting itself into the food trade around Yambuya. Selim bin Mohammed sent his followers to collect a large amount of manioc every day. He kept half of it to feed his camp, and sold the other half back to the ex-villagers of Yambuya for fish and other foodstuffs. This worked because Selim bin Mohammed successfully kept the former villagers out of their own fields. Selim bin Mohammed’s followers also set up a small market just outside the fort, offering tobacco, fish, knives, and other items for sale. The Rear Column’s officers made various attempts to exert control over this settlement’s trade. For example, they extracted a promise from Abdullah Korona that his followers would not raid or otherwise coerce the former Yambuya villagers. The officers also complained of interference in their food trade to Selim bin Mohammed and to Tippu Tip or his brother in Stanley Falls. The officers blamed the interference of middlemen from the settlement for the high prices and short supply of food at Yambuya. They saw their activities as part of a plot to acquire the Column’s supplies, either through trade at inflated prices or through looting if the Expedition collapsed. 

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123 Jameson, *Story*, 153. The Rear Column men tried to set up a similar system, but were less successful because the officers did not allow them to turn the villagers away from their fields. Bonny Diary, 2 & 5 December 1887 (E47).
124 Bonny Diary, 13 November 1887 (E47).
126 See, for example, Jameson, *Story*, 136-7.
127 Smith remarks that “Selim Mohammed and Abdullah and their followers were... interested in acquiring the loads of ammunition and the other stores at Yambuya by a process of attrition,” much as Ugarrowwa and Kilongalonga had done with the modest supplies of the Advance Column. See *Expedition*, 186.
officers' attempts to dominate the trade in food around Yambuya proved ineffective, though. They neither improved the food supply nor kept Selim bin Mohammed's settlement from restructuring and exploiting local trade opportunities.

The camp of Stanley Falls traders, like the Rear Column, were parasitic users of Yambuya's main food resource, the cassava fields planted by its inhabitants. Parke had surveyed these in June 1887 and pronounced them sufficient to sustain the Column for several years. Stanley planned for a stay of only a few months, however. "The more people the more food of course," was his blithe assumption, one workable when a caravan stayed no more than a few days in any given locale. Stanley implicitly considered the indigenes to be only producers, not rival consumers of food. Further, he did not consider the lack of incentive for anyone to replant Yambuya's fields in a situation where no one could expect that they would be the ones to benefit from such labour. Stanley also did not foresee all the additional groups who came to draw on Yambuya's fields. Along with the ex-villagers and Selim bin Mohammed's followers, people from the villages of Yaraweko, Yambau and Yarilua—all within the Stanley Falls trade orbit, and all within a day's walk of Yambuya—were also collecting manioc from its fields. Because no one was effectively in charge of these fields, they seem to have become a resource free to anyone with the means to exploit them. Consequently, the depletion of the fields was already becoming noticeable by the end of

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128 Parke, Experiences, 66. Stanley estimated Yambuya's fields to be one square mile in size. HMS to F. de Winton, 19 June 1887, MP 86/29.
129 HMS to F. de Winton, 19 June 1887, MP 86/29.
130 These problems were complicated by the disruptions associated with the violent frontier of the ivory trade. These disruptions intensified during Expedition's tenure, further reducing the food resources of the area and ability of villagers to cultivate food. This will be discussed in Chapter 6.
131 Bartelot, on the road from Yambuya to Yallasulla in mid-May 1888, encountered people from these villages on their way to Yambuya; see Bartelot, Life, 237. It is not clear when these people began drawing on the fields at Yambuya.
1887. By early 1888 the Rear Column porters were going far afield to find manioc; in late May Bonny observed that the nearest manioc was five miles distant from the fort.132

Another unforeseen complication of the Rear Column's reliance on Yambuya's fields to provide its porters with their staple food was cassava poisoning. Manioc or cassava tubers contain toxic hydrocyanic acid that can be removed only by special processing.133 "It takes four days to get the manioc ready the way the men like it," Bonny observed. The first "to get it & clean it The other to burn & sun dry it, the third to pound into flour & cook it on the fourth day."134 Some of men could not be bothered to complete this laborious process, some had no stores of food to tide them over the intervening days, and others were too enervated by sickness to process the manioc at all.135 The physical symptoms ascribed to cassava poisoning were "retching, and quaking of the limbs," "vertigo and pain in the head," "weakening of the knees," and "softening of the muscles," as well as a deadly apathy.136 Stanley alleged that manioc poisoning was the primary cause of death at Yambuya.137 It is more likely that it was a contributing factor in both deaths and illnesses, pushing those at

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132 Bonny Diary, 17 December 1887 & 21 May 1888 (E47); Jameson, Story, 207. This suggests that the fields of the small villages lining the river for miles on either side of Yambuya were now being exploited. See HMS to de Winton, 19 June 1887, MP 86/29 for a description of these villages.

133 See Parke, Experiences, 484 for a summary of contemporary scientific knowledge on this subject.

134 Bonny Diary, 3 November 1887 (E47). Other of the Rear Column officers commented on the indigestibility of manioc for those who were sick, but none showed any awareness of the toxicity of the tubers. See Troup, "Stanley's Rear-Guard," 822; Troup, Rear Guard, 60; and E.M. Barttelot to W. Mackinnon, 28 March 1888, MP 85/17.

135 Parke, My Experiences, 494 and Troup, "Stanley's Rear-Guard," 822. Tippu Tip also noted that caravan porters, though they knew how to prepare manioc, sometimes lacked the energy or interest to carry out the process. He described a caravan in which hungry porters ate raw cassava and became very ill. Forty of the seven hundred porters in the caravan died; the rest were cured with a mixture of goat broth, ginger and pepper; see Maisha, sec. 63.

136 IDA, 2:10. These symptoms bear a striking resemblance to the symptoms of hunger and powerlessness described in a community of impoverished sugar plantation workers in modern Brazil. For a discussion of this political and economic malady and its individual and collective physical and psychological manifestations, see N. Schepet-Hughes, Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

137 IDA, 2:9-10.
lower levels of the hierarchy of entitlement into even more marginal positions. Sick men, for example, were supplied with food once a week, as the officers detailed other men to collect manioc for them. These invalids, though, would be the men least likely to be able to process the manioc, to supplement it with other foods, or to have remained active in *makambi* or kitchen associations that would do such things on their behalf.

The incidence of manioc poisoning at Yambuya was likely also a reflection of gender segregation, as the processing of manioc was a task generally carried out by women. However, in the stationary and physically bounded setting of the fort where the presence of indigenes required the permission of the officers, the porters' ability to acquire dependants to perform domestic work was extremely limited. The few men who could afford to purchase dependants were not always allowed to keep them. In addition, Stanley had instructed the Rear Column's officers to maintain amicable relations with local peoples. This precluded the systematic raiding carried out by the garrison of Ft. Bodo, raiding that produced captives for men who wanted them. At Yambuya the men were expected to contract for the services of women with the leaders of Selim bin Mohammed's settlement, or those of indigenous villages. As a result, the Rear Column may have achieved a degree of gender segregation unique in the experience of the Expedition.

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138 See Bonny Diary, 13 December 1887, and 23 & 28 March, 26 May 1888 (E47). There is no evidence this manioc was also processed for the sick.

139 Other feminine domestic chores were also shirked unless, like the daily cleaning of the camp, they were supervised by the officers. For example, Jameson ([Story, 153] complained that the men took the wooden grave markers out of the graveyard rather than go a short distance further into the bush to look for firewood.

140 For a discussion of this porter strategy, see Chapter 4.

141 A Sudanese officer, for example, purchased a slave girl from Selim bin Mohammed. When Jameson heard about her, he ordered the girl expelled from camp; Story, 153-4. The Sudanese was later given permission to purchase a slave boy, though. Bonny Diary, 5 November 1887 (E47).

142 Bonny Diary, 14 March 1888 (E47).
Finally, while the Rear Column officers observed the uncertain food supply, the growing impoverishment, hunger and ill health of their men, they appeared genuinely puzzled about the reasons for the men's poor condition. "Our men seem [sic] to be failing in health very much they are awfully thin some of them mere skin & bone. Yet they get plenty of Bananas & Mandioc." Since dearth or serious hunger was understood to be a consequence of population outstripping the supply of staple food, by contemporary lights, hunger should not have been a problem at Yambuya. Added to this conceptual framework were unquestioned assumptions about the distribution of food in the military, discussed above, as well as the officers' determination to stick as closely as possible to Stanley's orders, which did not adequately provision the Rear Column. The officers consequently constructed the situation as one where they lacked agency—they were helpless to do anything about the suffering of the porters. They believed that these problems would diminish or disappear, though, if only they could move the Column forward. The officers consequently focused their energy on acquiring porters from Tippu Tip, rather than on obtaining additional provisions for their men. The officers also saw their situation in a military light. Their plans for travel in the forest assumed that hostile indigenes rather than food shortages were the main danger for which they needed to prepare.

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143 Bonny Diary, 30 January 1888 (E47).  
145 For a critique of Stanley's provision for the Rear Column and Barttelot's decision to follow these orders strictly, see Troup, "Stanley's Rear Guard," 822-6.  
146 Ward [My Life, 57], for example, exclaimed: "Poor wretches! if we could only help you. But we cannot. May the Great Spirit pity and succour us all!" See also Jameson Diary, 29 July 1887 as quoted in Stanley Notebook (E44) and E.M. Barttelot to W. Mackinnon, 28 March 1888, MP 85/17.  
147 As Rockel, "Caravan Porters," 274-5 notes, quickly leaving an area suffering from food shortages was also a porter strategy. So even if the Rear Column officers had been inclined to consult with the experienced Zanzibaris, they might not have received much encouragement to redirect their energies.
In this context, the officers' hierarchy of entitlement, imperfectly enforced as it was, led to the impoverishment and incapacity of most, but not all of the Rear Column men. During the year the Rear Column spent at Yambuya, 108 of its 253 men died. Accounts of the Rear Column by its officers and European contemporaries were emplotted as tragedies with death and demoralization accelerating among the men. However, the rate of death was not linear and it did not rise steadily during the time spent at Yambuya. The distribution of deaths, when combined with information about the weather, the changing availability of food, and patterns of deviance among the men reveal a good deal about the functioning of the system of entitlement.

In the early weeks at Yambuya there were an average of 1.3 deaths per week, less than the average weekly rate for the Rear Column’s entire year there. Initially most of the dead were Sudanese, Somalis, or Syrians; many had been ill for some time before the Expedition reached Yambuya. After a month at Yambuya, the officers observed that the men, both Zanzibaris and Sudanese, were discontented, even mutinous. Harsh discipline, which contemporaries blamed for many of the Rear Column’s problems, was likely not the cause, since the flogging of sentries found asleep on duty was the main exercise of order in these initial weeks. More likely, the dissatisfaction stemmed from the daily labour of constructing the fort. This was not porterage and the men did not believe the work would benefit them. They did not expect to be long at Yambuya and did not feel the indigenes posed enough of a threat to justify a stockade. Rather, they believed Stanley would sell the

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148 Average deaths for the first fifteen weeks were below the number to be expected if the deaths were distributed randomly across the year spent at Yambuya.

149 Jameson, Story, 80-1, 87.

150 As discussed below, sleeping sentries were a chronic problem of order at all the forts set up by the Expedition. At the beginning of July 1887 Barttelot and Jameson began to monitor the sentries, which may have
fort, at a handsome profit, to the Congo Free State.151 In addition, there were several incidents involving food during the initial weeks at Yambuya. The porters formally protested the payment of part of their food allowance in cowries. In response, the officers told them that this form of payment was "Stanley’s orders."152 The first recorded incident of porters interfering with the officers’ trade in food also occurred in these weeks.153 Lastly, the men were released from work early to collect manioc at least once during this period.154 Since the porters took an active part in organizing their work hours to their liking, this points to an intervention by porters.155 Taken together, these suggest that the officers’ establishment of a hierarchy of entitlement and the men’s discovery of the limitations of the local food supply were also a part of the mutinous feeling in the Rear Column.

By late September 1887, Zanzibaris made up an increasing proportion of the dead, and the theft of food and trade goods had become the primary occasion for discipline.156 Thefts from the officers and from the Expedition’s stores accelerated. Axes and other tools, trade cloth, metakos, knives, dried meat, salt, sweet potatoes, and even manioc flour were taken. Saleable items were stolen from the headmen as well—Msa, for example, stole a knife and a Koran from Munichandi.157 There were also thefts among the men, though likely not all of these were brought to the attention of the officers.158 These thefts were a response

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151 Jameson, Story, 81. Jameson’s lament—"If the men would only show a little more spirit, and work less reluctantly"—seems to refer both to the sentries and to the men constructing the fort.
152 Ibid., 82.
153 Ibid., 81.
154 Ibid., 81.
155 Bonny described a later incident in which the porters protested in order to maintain a preferred work schedule. Diary, 13 December 1887 (E47). This is discussed further in Chapter 4.
156 See Jameson, Story, 93 for a description of the first such episode. Jameson linked the guards’ inability to identify the culprits with the spirit of discontent among the men.
157 Story, 129.
158 Bonny disciplined Zanzibaris who were found to have stolen ammunition or guns issued to other porters.
to the hierarchy of entitlement, as the consumption of stolen food and the purchase of food with stolen trade goods became a means to supplement inadequate rations.  

Between mid-October 1887 and early January 1888—a period of heavier rains—the average number of deaths per week almost tripled. Although a spate of deaths occurred at the beginning of the rains, surprisingly, Jameson could record with relief that there was a “much brighter tone among the men,” which expressed itself in leisure activities they organized for themselves. The thefts continued, however, although it tended to be food rather than tradeable items that were taken. During the rains there was likely less food available for sale, reducing the attractiveness of trade goods to thieves. The improved morale despite a high death rate and continuing thefts suggests a process of adaptation to the officers' system of entitlement. The fact that the identities of many of those responsible for the thefts did not come to light until there were disputes among the men suggests that they viewed theft as a legitimate or at least quasi-legitimate activity.

The men's adaptation to the hierarchy of entitlement was complicated by two changes that took place in October 1887. First, the porters were disarmed on October 14th, on the pretext that the Expedition's guns were not being well enough maintained when they were kept in the porters' huts. Only the headmen and the Sudanese were allowed to keep their weapons. This not only had the effect of enhancing order by concentrating control

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159 See Chapter 4 for further comment on this porter strategy.
160 Story, 99 and 150. Another factor which may have altered the perception of deviance by the officers was that Bonny, frustrated by the perceived laxity of the others, quietly started to take a number of disciplinary matters into his own hands at this time. Bonny Diary, 18 October 1887 (E47).
161 As some thefts of metakos and cloth were detected only when these items were repackaged or taken out of their usual storage areas, it appears that many thefts were neither detected nor reported. Bonny Diary, 23 November 1887 and 31 May 1888 (E47).
162 Jameson, Story, 148-9; Troup, Rear Column, 169-70. The fact that Bartlet ordered the disarmament during his visit to Stanley Falls suggests that concerns about the intentions of the traders there were as much, if not
over the most effective means of coercion—especially since the Sudanese were responsible for enforcing order among the Zanzibaris—but also served to reinforce the officers’ hierarchy of entitlement. While the guns could be used to hunt, the lack of game around Yambuya did not make this an effective strategy for dietary improvement. More importantly, guns were the tools of looters and foragers, and the guns and their ammunition were also valuable items of trade. The second change was the reconstruction of the fort. In the redesigned fort, the men were isolated from the stores of trade goods and the confiscated guns, as well as from the officers’ food supplies. This limited thefts from official supplies to those with the right of access to these areas—servants and sentries—or limited thieves to items like axes and spades that could be legitimately removed from the officers’ part of the fort. One response to this change was the sale of items that were still under the men’s control, like the “kit” of the Sudanese. There were a number of losses of kit detected between mid-December and early February, though the thefts likely occurred earlier. By mid-November, the rate of theft had slowed, suggesting the measures taken by the officers were having some effect. A period of relative quiet followed. However, in the wake of Bugari Mohammed’s early December theft of meat, the officers attempted to enhance their order by establishing a police force. Additionally, the officers attempted to deal with thefts through collective punishment. Three times they withheld the men’s weekly food allowances when axes or spades belonging

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more of a factor in this decision than the discontent of the men. See E.M. Barttelot to H. Sclater, 19 March 1888, Barttelot Family Papers.

163 In addition to a rifle, the “kit” included items like bayonets, ammunition, ammunition belts, ramrods, and rifle slings. The initial losses were detected during inventories of the belongings of dead Sudanese. Barttelot then instituted more frequent inspections of equipment. The losses were punished with fines payable out of future wages. See “List of fines levied against Soudanese soldiers,” n.d. in E.M. Barttelot, Notebook, 1887-1888, Barttelot Family Papers.

164 Bonny Diary, 3 December 1887 (E47). This appears to have been Bonny’s initiative.
to the Expedition went missing. Though the officers thought this an ideal method of
discipline, it was deeply unpopular among the men. The first time this collective punishment
was imposed, in August 1887, one of the porters was persuaded to act as a scapegoat and
accept a stiff flogging so that payment of the food allowance would resume.165 This act of
altruism was not repeated. Two weeks after the third stoppage, in November, the Sudanese
almost mutinied, telling Barttelot that if they were not paid, they would not do sentry work or
obey orders.166 Unnoticed by the officers, these stoppages had a significant impact on the
death rate. After four weeks without a food allowance in the five weeks between October
24th and November 27th, the rate of death rose to 5 per week in the first half of
December.167 The surviving men were also deteriorating in condition. On December 10th
Jameson observed that they were “living skeletons,” suffering terribly from ulcerated sores,
especially on their legs. He estimated there were “not more than 130 who could carry
loads.”168 This marked deterioration and sudden jump in the death rate suggest that the
strategies the men were using to cope with the system of entitlement were workable, but
precarious. A conjunction of seasonal food shortages and health problems during the rains,
together with the lack of an allowance and the redesigned structure of the fort was enough to
push many toward serious debility or even death.169

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165 After a week without their food allowance in August 1887, delegations of both Zanzibaris and
Sudanese protested to Barttelot. Both groups accepted a compromise in which Abdullah, the Zanzibari who had
last used the axe, was given fifty lashes and the men’s food allowance resumed. It later emerged that Abdullah
had been persuaded to accept the role of scapegoat because none of the men wanted to miss a second instalment
of their food allowance. See Jameson, Story, 108-9, 116, and 135.
166 Bonny Diary, 29 November 1887 (E47). The confrontation ended when Barttelot sent Bonny for his
revolver, at which point the Sudanese assembled themselves for duty.
167 In the last three weeks of November, the average death rate had been 1.0 per week.
168 Story, 167. On the day Jameson made this observation, there were 227 men at Yambuya.
169 The one week food allowance stoppage in mid-August, in contrast, did not claim as many victims because
it was shorter and because it did not coincide with the rains.
Between mid-December and the beginning of the rains in mid-March 1888, the weekly death rate was almost as high as it had been during the previous rainy season. There were clusters of deaths in the weeks in which there were occasional heavy storms and cold nights.\footnote{170} Abdullah Musa, who died on February 3, 1888 was typical of these casualties. He had been sick since November 1887 and then "seemed to be getting better, but the last two or three nights have been very cold, and have evidently finished him."\footnote{171} Although the dry season should have lowered the death rate, the men, weakened by the food allowance stoppages, succumbed to small adverse changes. The men were not dying of starvation, but malnutrition and under-nutrition made them more likely to succumb to illness or injury, which were often fatal when they need not have been. As Jameson noted: "The moment a man gets really ill in his stomach...having nothing to eat but manioc, he simply wastes away & slowly dies becoming a living skeleton sometimes for weeks before he finally goes out."\footnote{172}

The men's hunger stemmed from impoverishment, more than from an absence of available food. The experience of those at the Expedition's camp at Bolobo on the middle Congo suggests that a higher food allowance and an established trade in food could make a significant difference in the men's condition. After two months at Bolobo, the porters, many of whom had been sick on arrival, regained their health.\footnote{173} As at Yambuya, their staple food was manioc and they suffered from a variety of their officers' disciplinary measures. However, at Bolobo their food allowance was 6 \textit{metakos} per week.\footnote{174} At Yambuya it was one
metako and six cowries per week and, of this, only the metako was accepted for local trade. The allowance at Yambuya was only twenty percent of the allowance the men had been given on the journey up the Congo River, and even the earlier allowance had been insufficient to provide an adequate diet.

Consequently, at Yambuya, the Zanzibaris and Sudanese exhausted the stocks of trade goods they brought with them or acquired en route. They then gradually divested themselves of their saleable assets as a means of supplementing their food supply. By mid-February the poverty of the Rear Column men clearly distinguished them from the followers of the Zanzibari traders. When Bonny interrogated a porter who had been absent from the fort for two days, the porter told him:

I went to get Manioc the natives caught me & took me to their village They believed my statement that I belonged to Tooka Tookas [i.e. white men] & not to the Tamba Tamba (Arabs) because I wore only a small bit of dirty cloth

In April 1888, Selim bin Mohammed told Bonny that although local people brought things to the market set up at the fort, the Expedition men had “no matakoes to buy.”

However, as Ward observed, there were exceptions to this general impoverishment. Troup confirmed that while “most of the men had sold all their garments to buy food with,” around Bolobo. See Harms, River of Wealth, 244.

175 The only time cowries are ever mentioned as a medium of exchange at Yambuya was an episode in mid-December when some Stanley Falls traders sold green tobacco for cowries. Bonny Diary, 17 December 1887 (E47).

176 The allowance of 1 metako per day paid out on the lower Congo was reduced to ¾ metako per day after the steamers had passed Bangala station on the upper Congo. See Troup, Rear Column, 114-5 and E.M. Barttelot to Major Tottenham, 19 June 1887, Barttelot Family Papers. The reduced allowance allowed the men to purchase only manioc bread, with an occasional bit of banana or dried fish. Barttelot observed that this was not sufficient for their needs; see E.M. Barttelot to his parents, 1-23 June 1887, Barttelot Family Papers. This allowance was also significantly less than that allotted to the Advance Column porters. On the one occasion when the Advance Column traded peacefully for food, the porters were given one metako and three cowries for two days' rations; see Stairs Diary, 29 July 1887.

177 This porter strategy is discussed further in Chapter 4.

178 Bonny Diary, 5 March 1888 (E47). “I let him off,” Bonny added.

179 Bonny Diary, 8 April 1888 (E47).

180 Ward, My Life, 74. Ward believed that almost all of the thirty men in bad condition were slave-porters.
the headman Munichandi "being a great dandy, had managed to have a wardrobe, though not very extensive." 181 The better off porters were those, like Munichandi, with specialized positions that placed them higher in the officers' hierarchy of entitlement. An incident in which the officers' cook purchased a knife from a Manyema, suggests that others among the Rear Column's specialized employees also still had sufficient resources to buy non-food items. 182 Such a position was not an absolute guarantee of health or survival, though it likely reduced the chances of succumbing to the rigours of camp life. 183

The average number of deaths per week during the March to May 1888 rains was lower than that of the preceding dry season and that of the Rear Column's first rainy season at Yambuya. 184 This surprising phenomenon was not observed by the officers. When placed beside the changing patterns of deviance among the men during the last five months at Yambuya, it suggests a significant change in way some of the men responded to the hierarchy of entitlement. Between February and May of 1888 the officers dealt with new types of deviant activity. Much of this had clearly been going on for some time before it was detected. It came to light either through unanticipated changes in the movements of the officers, or through conflicts amongst those involved. The activities included insubordination, refusing to work, desertion, leaving camp without permission, building unauthorized huts outside the camp, and having unsanctioned relations with Manyema women. The officers also found some porters taking on work outside the Expedition.

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181 Troup, Rear Column, 221. Emphasis in original.
182 Bartelot, Life, 222; Bonny Diary, 2 April 1888 (E47); Troup, Rear Column, 245
183 Deaths recorded in the highest level of entitlement for black members of the Rear Column included: the Sudanese officer Mohammed Daud, Derrier Moussa the Somali cook, and one of the camp's policemen. In this last case, the policeman was healthy, but had an ulcerated sore on one leg. He bled to death in his sleep when the ulceration opened a vein adjacent to the sore. See Jameson, Story, 95, 146 & 199.
184 Troup to de Winton, 31 March 1888, MP 85/17; and Jameson, Story, 183. There were an average of 2.4 deaths per week during the 1888 rains, that is during weeks 38-47 of the Rear Column's stay at Yambuya.
Traders from Selim bin Mohammed's settlement, particularly Salem bin Sudi, were regularly employing Expedition porters as intermediaries to trade with the local people. These activities allowed some of the porters to survive, even to prosper. This activity indicated the independence of its perpetrators from the order of the camp. Those who had no option but to depend on the hierarchy of entitlement within the camp continued to experience hunger, impoverishment and incapacity. The difficult conditions at Yambuya eventually took a toll on even the most successful porters, though. Those who Stanley found among the remnants of the Rear Column, and who survived the trek through the forest to Ft. Bodo were "very thin, with very unhealthy-looking sallow skins. They do not put on flesh quickly like the others. They are also very despondent, and greatly subject to extensive ulceration.""\textsuperscript{186}

Entitlement at Ft. Bodo

The situation at Ft. Bodo, though similar to that at Yambuya in some ways, also had some significant differences, and consequently a different outcome. The Advance Column first entered Ibwiri in early November 1887. It was one of several large, wealthy villages in a region of prosperous communities with a well-developed exchange system.\textsuperscript{187} The Advance Column's Manyema escort and a small group of pioneers from the Column forcibly took control of the community. Stanley's attempts to put a veneer of negotiated access and order

\textsuperscript{185} Troup, \textit{Rear Column}, 158; Jameson, \textit{Story}, 136-7; and Bonny Diary, 15 September 1887 (E47). This may have been because the locals discriminated between the Expedition's porters and the followers of the Stanley Falls traders in favour of the former.

\textsuperscript{186} Parke, \textit{My Experiences}, 380. Parke ascribed their poor condition to the lingering effects of manioc poisoning experienced at Yambuya.

\textsuperscript{187} For evidence of economic specialization and exchange, as well as general prosperity, see descriptions of villages in Stanley Diary, 28-29 October 1887 (E37). There were also better roads in this area; see Stanley Diary, 31 October & 2 November 1887 (E37).
on the days of looting and foraging that followed were minimally successful. For "some reason or another," the villagers and their chief, Boryo, fled into the forest. When the Advance Column returned to Ibwiri in January 1888 they found the village burnt by its inhabitants. They had, though, first removed food and other goods from their village and hidden them in the forest nearby. The Advance Column laid claim to the site and built a fort to serve as a base from which to reconsolidate the Expedition. They constructed granaries, and extended and re-planted the village fields. Stanley instructed that this cultivation continue, both to support the garrison and to provision his caravan when it returned from the lake. Though the officers, and presumably the men as well, grumbled about masumba [settlement] work, they carried it out. From the first, guarding these fields from their former owners was also an important part of the work at the fort. Stanley's orders did not assume trade as a source of food, and did not enjoin peaceful relations with local peoples, unlike at Yambuya. Extensive foraging and raiding, some of it directed by the officers and some by headmen, provided additional food for the garrison. Occasionally it also provided labour from captured women and children. The garrison had little competition from ivory traders, as the pioneering group of Manyema that escorted the Advance Column from Ipoto to Ibwiri was not immediately followed by other traders.

Ft. Bodo thus provided many more resources for the support of a garrison than did Yambuya. Relative plenty notwithstanding, the officers made efforts to institute a similar

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188 This order included a division of the community's fields between the Expedition and the villagers, control of raiding by the Column's Manyema escort from Ipoto, and "detectives" who informed Stanley if the porters were concealing looted livestock from him. See Stanley Diary, 11 November 1887 (E37) & 12 November 1887 (E38).
189 Stanley Diary, 7 January 1888 (E38).
190 The purpose and construction of the fort were described in Chapter 2.
191 HMS, "Memoranda," 24 June 1888 in Parke, My Experiences, 244-6; Stairs Diary, 26 April 1888.
192 IDA, 1.351-5.
hierarchy of access to food. From the start, Stanley claimed the right to allocate food and other resources at Ibwiri. He considered any activity that violated this order, whether carried out by members of the caravan, by Manyema traders or by local people, to be either theft or a deliberate attempt to incite conflict. Stanley and the officers had privileged access to choice foods. They also supervised work in the fields, controlled the granaries and, to a limited extent, asserted themselves to control goods acquired through foraging or raiding. The men received rations from the granaries. They also had land for personal vegetable gardens in a fenced area near the fort.

The men left behind at Ft. Bodo were the weakest in Stanley’s Column, many of them suffering from hunger-induced debility and ulceration. Given better food and rest, many experienced a slow improvement. However, despite the food available in the area, the garrison experienced periods of hunger. The most severe one occurred after the granaries were emptied in early June to provision Stanley’s caravan for its return to Yambuya. The rains and re-planting did not come till mid-July. Also, Stairs believed that what food remained in store should be kept to provision Jephson, Emin and their caravan when they arrived from the Lake, as was expected daily. Storms and elephants damaged the young crops in August 1888, on top of continuing clandestine harvests by local people. The

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193 See, for example, Stairs Diary, 18 May 1888, and Stairs, “Shut Up,” 47.
194 Stanley Diary, 10-11 November 1887 (E37) and 16-17 January 1888 (E38).
195 For example, Stanley Diary, 15 November 1887 (E37); Parke, My Experiences, 196; Stairs Diary, 26-27 April 1888.
196 Stairs Diary, 21 July 1888.
197 Stairs Diary, 1 October 1888; Stairs’ plan of Ft. Bodo reproduced in J. Konczacki, Victorian Explorer: The African Diaries of Captain William G. Stairs, 1887-1892 (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 1994), 114; Parke, My Experiences, 273. Stairs set up the personal gardens and distributed seed to between twelve and fifteen men as a means of reducing their interest in desertion.
198 See, for example, Parke, My Experiences, 207.
199 Stairs Diary, 5 May 1888.
200 Stairs Diary, 21 July 1888.
garrison experienced food shortages, as a result, and feared serious hunger. "Mzungu [the European] intends making a long stop here, we shall all starve!" the porters complained.201 Wild foods became important again, even in the diet of the officers.202 Meat was scarce as well. There was little opportunity for hunting, so both officers and men fished, and collected termites and locusts. In terms of staples however, while the men were subsisting on unripe bananas foraged from the fields of surrounding communities, the officers were rationing out some of the stored corn for themselves.203 Stairs distributed a little corn to the men when he became convinced, in mid-October, that Jephson and Emin would not come to Ft. Bodo. Small rations of rice were also given out in early December when these fields were harvested.204

The health of men deteriorated under these conditions. Of the forty-nine porters and soldiers in the garrison in late August, eleven were unfit for work, nineteen fit only for light work, and another nineteen were able to work, though their condition was not good.205 Half of the men suffered from ulcerated sores.206 This suggests again that there were differences in the men’s access to food, as hunger was considered an important cause of debility and ulceration. Stairs’ headman, Khamis Pari, appears to have been one of those who was eating well.207 The officers at Ft. Bodo, though better off than the most of the men, were less insulated from shortages than the officers at Yambuya, since there were no trade settlements

201 Stairs Diary, 13 September 1888.
202 Parke, My Experiences, 255; Stairs Diary, 13 August & 16 September 1888.
203 Parke, My Experiences, 255-6, 258 & 260.
204 Parke, My Experiences, 328. Parke’s estimate of the harvest implied that an officer’s share would be nine times the share of each of the men.
205 Parke, My Experiences, 260.
206 Of the 30 men who were ill, 25 were suffering from ulcers. Parke, My Experiences, 256 & 259; Stairs Diary, 19 August 1888.
207 Stairs Diary, 13 December 1888. Stairs also noted that Khamis Pari lived by himself, suggesting he may not have been a member of a kambi.
from which to buy food. Indeed, Stairs observed that some of the porters were faring better than the officers. By mid-October, the number of sick had fallen, while the number of men in good condition remained constant. In spite of the period of hunger, only ten men were lost during the six months Stanley was away collecting the Rear Column. Of these, two were lost while foraging and three were men who died of injuries sustained in fighting local people.

The experience of the Ft. Bodo garrison suggests that the orderly cultivation and defence of the fields at Yambuya might have mitigated the effects of the food allowance problems for the Expedition members there. It also provides clear evidence for dynamics of entitlement that can only by surmised at Yambuya and other parts of the Expedition. First, illness and weakness rooted in hunger threatened the *makambi*, the kitchen associations that were an established porter strategy for pooling food resources, easing their domestic workload, and providing other kinds of mutual assistance. Stairs observed that porters too sick to contribute to their *makambi* were pushed out to fend for themselves. He noted this at the point when repeated damage to Ibwiri’s fields was making the food supply increasingly precarious, and when thefts of food, talk of desertion, and hunger-related ulceration were all on the rise among the garrison. There were by this time five or six men are too weak to

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208 The officers lost weight, were subject to protracted fevers, and suffered from small ulcerated sores. Parke, *My Experiences*, 258; Stairs Diary, 10 October 1888.
209 Stairs Diary, 2 October 1888.
210 Parke, *My Experiences*, 284 & 286. Twenty men were in good condition at this point.
211 Stairs recorded eight deaths between July and mid-October 1888. Parke’s figures imply two additional deaths between mid-October and late December; *My Experiences*, 335-6. Deaths in which hunger was likely a contributing factor—those of ulcers or lengthy illnesses—took 9% of the garrison. See Ammendations to Stairs, “Garrison of Fort Bodo,” 16 June 1888, PANS Journal 3. The death rate at Ft. Bodo for the six months between July and December 1888 was 14% whereas for the Rear Column’s twelve month stay at Yambuya it was 43%.
212 *Makambi* are discussed further in Chapter 4.
213 Diary, 20 October 1888. See Chapter 4 for a further discussion of this point.
work in the fields or to gather food, and Stairs expected they would die.\(^{214}\) However, only one recorded porter death fits the profile of this group.\(^{215}\) Either the ties of *kambi* membership were stronger than the porters indicated to Stairs, or Stairs program of feeding men too weak to collect food was effective.\(^{216}\) The failure of the Expedition to give its porters adequate and dependable rations, as well as the multiple re-organizations of the caravan, disrupted this form of porter organization. This undermined the viability of caravan and contributed to the discontent that threatened the Expedition’s order at a number of points. It is no surprise to find that food was a central issue in the deviance at Ft. Bodo.\(^{217}\)

Second, Stanley’s practice of leaving behind trouble-makers as well as invalids at the settled camps he established clearly shaped the patterns of deviance and deprivation at Ft. Bodo. Stairs’ record of punishments for the Ft. Bodo garrison show two kinds of offences against order: sleeping on sentry duty and stealing food from the fields.\(^{218}\) These offences fall into neat periods. From May to the end of August, a number of men were punished for sleeping on sentry. From September or October through November—the period of food shortages—the punishments were for theft of food. Several of the men disciplined at this time were multiple offenders, punished for more than one theft as well as for earlier episodes of being asleep on sentry duty. Four of these multiple offenders were porters who accompanied Stanley to the Lake but whom he did not take with him when he left for Yambuya in mid-June. They may well have represented long-standing discipline.

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\(^{214}\) Stairs Diary, 29 September 1888.


\(^{216}\) Stairs Diary, 23 July 1888.

\(^{217}\) Stairs Diary, 23 August 1888.

\(^{218}\) “Punishments,” in Stairs’ Journal #2, Stairs Fonds. One man was also punished for loss of ammunition in late June. This list covers May 1888 to December 1888, but was not a complete list of punishments administered by the officers during this period. See, for example, Stairs Diary, 11 July 1888.
problems. Fetteh, one of the men Stanley left behind was an inciter of mass desertion, while Ali Simba, another of these men, forwarded a porter protest over food scarcity to Stairs. They were part of a group of ten porters that Stairs believed were mutinous malcontents, responsible for most of the discipline problems in the garrison. But thefts of food and talk of a mass departure for the Lake may have indicated more than the “bad character” of these men. These actions may have been their response to hunger and marginalization, as they were likely excluded from the makambi established among the porters who had been at the fort for months.

Finally, it was at Ft. Bodo that the officers recognized that while hunger provoked mutinous discontent, the consequences of hunger prevented the porters from acting on their feelings. The garrison was “nearly ready to desert us at any time but fortunately so many of them [were] laid up from ulcers that the healthy ones [were] not strong enough to fight their way” to the Lake. Unlike the deliberate imposition of exhausting work, there is no evidence that the officers deliberately used hunger to keep the men in line. They merely recognized its effects and were thankful for them.

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220 Fetteh was the chief advocate of mass desertion; Stairs Diary, 23 July 1888. Ali Simba, the porter who made formal complaint of the food problem, suggested two courses of action that may have had broader support, though Stairs interpreted his message as coming from the group of trouble-makers; Stairs Diary, 4 September 1888.

221 Stairs Diary, 21 July 1888. Parke [My Experiences, 267] named five of these trouble-makers: Ali Jumba (Ali Simba), Tabebu (Mtabibu), Fetteh, Kasembi (Kassim) and Msomgesé (Mabruki Msengessi). All but the last of these were men left behind by Stanley in June 1888.

222 Parke MS Diary, 24 October 1888 as quoted in Lyons, Surgeon-Major, 111. See also Parke, My Experiences, 286.

223 On the use of hard labour to control the men, see Stairs to Barttelot, 12 June 1888 copied in Stanley Diary, 6 August 1888 (E41) and Parke, My Experiences, 207.
Foraging and Looting

The Advance Column, Stairs said acidly, had made its way through the forest “by rifle alone, by shooting and pillaging...Stanley is not a ‘cloth giver’. He prefers [a] leaden means of securing respect and food.”²²⁴ Stanley’s discussions with Emin make his attitude toward foraging and looting on the Expedition even clearer. When Emin expressed concern about how his people would be fed on the journey from Equatoria to the coast, Stanley replied that they would acquire food from the country through which they passed. “But such a large number of people will be like locusts eating up everything. It will be like robbery on the natives,” protested Emin. To which Stanley responded: “We use a better term than robbery—We call it foraging.”²²⁵

While the Expedition was on the march, foraging and looting were significant problems of order. They were an immediate, practical problem because they hindered the expeditious movement of the caravan, as well as the control of its personnel. Porters who looted or foraged were consequently disciplined not for the acquisition of goods—and, correspondingly, no attempt was made to compensate communities for their losses—but for disorderly movement. For example, at Mwembi on the lower Congo, porters had no sooner established camp “than they rushed like madmen among the neighbouring villages, and commenced to loot native property, in doing which one named Khamis bin Athman was shot dead by a plucky native.”²²⁶ The next day, Stanley decided to enforce stricter discipline

²²⁴ Stairs Diary, 10 September 1888. Bonny made a similar comment for the Expedition on the lower Congo, see Diary, Leopoldville, March/April 1887 (E47).
²²⁵ HMS to W. Mackinnon, 25 August 1888, MP 86/29. I define foraging and looting as the forcible acquisition of goods without compensation, foraging involving food and looting involving non-edible property. The officers further distinguished “grazing”—the collection of wild foods—from acquiring cultivated plants or domestic animals through foraging.
²²⁶ Stanley, IDA, 1:86. The dead porter was a headman. Members of Tippu Tip’s entourage also participated in the looting; see Parke, My Experiences, 38.
as the stragglers were continually wasting our time in trying to keep them up, and the history of the previous day had demonstrated that they were commencing to make the worst possible use of their opportunities. The number of desertions since we left Mataddi now amounted to about thirty, and the straggling and pilfering were becoming intolerable.227

Similarly, during the Advance Column’s march through the forest, porters were punished not for the theft of food or goods, but for their unsanctioned absence from the caravan and their violation of the hierarchy of entitlement. Porters who lingered to process the food they foraged, who contravened orders by going out in groups too small to ensure security, or who failed to give choice foraged foods to the officers were the ones most likely to be punished.228

Stanley frequently turned a blind eye to looting, as he did to the acquisition of dependants by his porters, because it provided a useful supplement to their wages and allowances. More importantly, the cost of effective discipline would be unacceptable levels of discontent and desertion. Stanley warned his officers to use “proper discretion” in the punishment of erring porters so as “to avoid irritating their men by being too exacting, or unnecessarily fussy.”229 On occasion, Stanley went further and used the misbehaviour of his porters to achieve specific ends. Just as he deplored the porters’ mutilation of dead enemies, but used it as a tactic in skirmishes south of Lake Albert, 230 Stanley used his potential inability to control looting and foraging by his caravan to force Free State officials at Stanley Pool to provide the steamers he needed to travel up the Congo River.231

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227 Parke, My Experiences, 38.
228 For example, Stanley Diary, 24 & 27 July 1888 (E41).
230 Stanley Diary, 17 December 1887 (E38); see also 10 December 1887 (E38).
231 McLynn, Stanley, 2:172-3. With the Baptist missionaries, Stanley was somewhat gentler, pointing only to the likelihood of severe inflation and worsening food shortages if his large caravan was forced by the lack of steamers to remain at Stanley Pool. HMS to W.H. Bentley, 5 April 1887, BMS Congo-Angola A/34.
Foraging, as opposed to looting, was an officially condoned and even officially organized activity during some parts of the Expedition. Only in two areas—on the lower Congo and on the established trade routes south and east of Lake Victoria—did Stanley make any attempt to provision his caravan through the local trade in food, or through negotiated agreements with rulers through whose kingdoms they passed. In these areas, and in the settlements of east coast traders where claims to property could be effectively enforced or where witnesses could report the Expedition’s lapses in Europe, Stanley made efforts to curb both looting and foraging. For example, south-east of Lake Victoria, entering areas connected to established long-distance trade routes, Stanley was “very careful & punished the Zanzibaris severely whenever the natives had reason to complain of them.” Elsewhere, foraging was not merely a supplement to official rations, but often the only source of food for the entire caravan. The Expedition “need have no commisariat [sic],” Stanley declared. While Stanley often deplored the need for foraging in the forest, his decision to leave the bulk of the Expedition’s trade goods at Yambuya and their subsequent loss in the wreck of the Rear Column, made it a necessity. Twice Stanley rejected what promised to be easier and quicker routes to Equatoria because he did not have the trade goods to pay for food and was unwilling to exchange either guns or ammunition for it. He expressed the sententious hope that on a subsequent trip through the forest the Expedition

232 For example, on entering Karagwe, Stanley informed the members of his caravan that “any person detected robbing plantations, or convicted of looting villages, would be made a public example;” IDA, 2:360. One looter, one of the Expedition’s Sudanese soldiers, who killed and injured protesting villagers was surrendered to the village elders for execution. IDA, 2:415-7; Parke, My Experiences, 468-9; Jephson Diary, 11 August 1889. See also Simpson, Dark Companions, 181-3.
233 Jephson Diary, n.d. [7 August 1889].
234 Stanley Diary, 26 May 1889 (E43).
235 In the forest, Junker’s servant Binza indicated that following the Nepoko River north would take the Advance Column into an area where food was more easily available; Stanley Diary, 26 August 1887 (E37). Similarly, Stanley decided not to take the Column up the east side of Lake Albert to contact Emin because they had “no goods to maintain friendship” in Bunyoro; Stanley Diary, 14 December 1887 (E38).
would be able to pay for what they had taken earlier. However, the only record of compensation offered for the Expedition’s systematic foraging occurred at the south end of Lake Albert. And the compensation was paid not to the affected villagers, but to a regional chief who had allied himself with Stanley. All this “free” food, like the housing the Expedition “borrowed” from villagers on a regular basis, made up for the inadequacies of Stanley’s planning and supplemented the limited capital of the Expedition’s backers. To the extent that high profile travellers like Stanley legitimated such practices, the resources of African communities subsidized European travel.

Systematic foraging created its own problems of order. The officers tried to model the Expedition’s foraging on military practice—sending out larger foraging parties supervised by headmen or officers, and preferring a trade in food whenever possible. The officers considered the former particularly important in hostile areas and the latter to apply in friendly ones, a distinction they tried to impress on the porters. For instance, when one of the Expedition’s steamers landed to cut wood two days upriver of Bolobo, some of the porters who went ahead of the main body of axemen “came running back saying the natives were unfriendly & meant to fight them.” The porters and Sudanese then “made a rush into the village looting everything & setting a house on fire.” Jephson and Stairs did their best to curtail the looting, having determined that it “was all a hoax, the villagers were not unfriendly but were only afraid

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236 Stanley Diary, 26 August 1887 (E37).
237 *IDA*, 2:223. Chief Mazamboni received forty head of cattle and sixteen large tusks of ivory.
238 See also Chapter 1, p. 53 for an instance of Livingstone’s use of “free” indigenous resources inspiring subsequent European travellers.
239 Wolseley, *Soldier’s Pocket-Book*, 262. This guide recommendssummary punishment “in the most exemplary manner” for any soldier found to be ill-using or defrauding “the people of the country” who offer food for sale. The assumption, most clearly articulated in the section on requisitioning houses, is that the military has the right to draw on the resources of areas in which it operates, but that it needs to do so in an orderly manner, working through local authorities as much as possible and recognizing the needs and resources of the civilian population [pp. 266-7]. The officers are also enjoined to “render every protection in [their] power to the
at seeing so large a force landing.

The next morning, each of the men had "an enormous bundle of loot consisting of food, spears, chickens etc." As they came on board the steamer, Stairs and Jephson relieved them of their stolen goods, tossing some of them into the river. When the steamers arrived at Lukolela mission station later in the day, a large delegation of headmen and porters went to Stanley to protest this treatment. Stanley chose to support the porters, who asserted they bought the food in question. He publicly disciplined and humiliated the two officers, instead, though he did later instruct the headmen to respect the officers' policy on looting. In areas where both Stanley and his officers saw the need for foraging, their organization of it made it easier for them to claim the right to distribute the food it produced, thus incorporating foraging into their system of entitlement. The foraging also needed to be organized, they believed, because the porters were so recklessly and stupidly indifferent to danger that both they and their guns were likely to be lost if they were left to their own devices. Stanley's efforts to send porters out in groups large and vigilant enough to deal with hostile indigenes were resented and frequently ignored by the porters. They particularly disliked having officers supervise the foraging parties, protesting "who can gather bananas if they are continually watched and told to 'Fall in, fall in'." One deserter believed that the reason for the food shortages the Advance Column experienced was Stanley's refusal to let the porters forage as they wished. By his third journey through the forest Stanley was allowing the porters to organize inhabitants of the country" [p. 177].

240 All three quotes are from Jephson Diary, 27 May 1887.
241 Jephson Diary, 27 May 1887.
242 Parke, My Experiences, 55.
243 All the officers believed that Stanley acted in this way in order to deliberately undermine their authority with the porters and increase his own. This was a source of much subsequent distrust and dislike of Stanley. See McLynn, Stanley, 2:178-80 for comment on this incident.
244 IDA, 1:182-3. See also Parke, My Experiences, 115. Looting and foraging as porter strategies are discussed in Chapter 4.
245 Jameson, Story, 160. Deserters later told Bonny they left the Advance Column because "they were badly
the foraging themselves, in spite of the occasional losses that resulted. If he sent officers to supervise them and keep them from looting as well as foraging “they would not obey...so it is best to let them alone,” Stanley believed.246

Stanley’s policy on foraging, produced tensions between Stanley and his officers, between officers and porters, and between the Expedition and officials and missionaries in areas claimed by European powers. It also sparked conflict between the Expedition and communities from which food and other the items were stolen. As Stanley noted on his third journey through the forest, in many formerly quiet areas the inhabitants were now “bold aggressors.” He attributed this to indigenous concupiscence, which he believed was excited by the “tasty flesh” and valuable property of the Expedition’s deserters.247 More plausibly, these people were determined to prevent further thefts from their communities and had learned that an armed response would deter roving bands of looters and foragers. The Expedition’s activities provoked continual guerrilla attacks, the extensive mining of paths with booby-traps, the abandonment of villages, and the destruction of buildings and fields in a scorched earth response to their use by the Expedition. Stanley’s policy of systematic foraging, regular occupation of villages, and tolerance for looting hindered rather than facilitated the development of a new route in the forest, one of the Expedition’s stated aims. While Stanley made a greater effort to control looting and foraging on established trade routes, the size and weaponry of his caravan allowed it and its members to engage in predatory activities. This was especially true in areas where the structures of authority were weak or contested, like the route to from Matadi to Stanley Pool. The

treated about food. Although there was plenty of manioc (and plantains) on the road, Mr. Stanley would not allow them to take it, and in fact often took manioc from them,” Story, 183-4.
246 Bonny Diary, 23 September 1888 (E47). Stanley claimed that sending out foraging parties supervised by officers had been very successful in preventing the loss of porters.
247 All quotes from Stanley Diary, 20 September 1888 (E41).
Expedition thus contributed to the changing balance of power between caravans and people living along regional trade routes.248 Some of the porters continued to do caravan work after their time with the Expedition. Their experience on the Expedition may have contributed to the evolution of porter work norms, especially norms applied in areas beyond the established caravan routes.249 In addition, published accounts of the Expedition added to the body of travel literature through which Europeans rehearsed and justified their claims to the resources of Africa by rationalizing or concealing the use of coercion in appropriating these resources.

The Efficacy of the Expedition’s Order

The limited successes of the Expedition suggest that there were distinct limits to the order its organizers and leaders were able to create, as well as limits to the powers of Stanley and his officers to enforce that order. I will examine some of these limits as well as the circumstances in which the order instituted by Stanley and his officers was most effective.

The caravan was kept together and moving mostly because its leaders drew on regional caravan practices. The order of the officers, particularly military order, was most effective when it reinforced or built on these caravan norms. The rear guard, for example, was a departure from caravan norms, but one that echoed the practice of having the porters’ merchant employers travel at the rear of the caravan to deter desertion.250 The rear guard was also attempting to enforce caravan-style movement rather than military-style marching. The rear guard’s record as a source of order for the Expedition on the move was nonetheless mixed. It helped keep weak porters moving, for example, by lifting loads back onto their heads after they

249 Rockel, for instance, discusses looting by members of Stairs’ Katanga expedition, some of whom were alumni of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition; “Caravan Porters,” 287.
had stopped to rest. It also appears to have played an important role in enforcing “discipline and order” on the Equatorians in their first two months of marching. It was not always effective in dealing with loiterers and would-be looters or deserters, though. The officers, encouraged by Stanley, came to believe that the more harshly this guard punished infractions, the more effective it was. When Stanley decided to impose stricter discipline on stragglers along the lower Congo, he joined the caravan’s rear guard for a day. Parke observed that this

made a very happy difference in our day’s progress—after a few examples had been made by whipping in the incorrigible loiterers. Whatever may be said or thought at home by members of philanthropic African societies, who are so anxious about the extension of the rights of humanity, there is no getting an expedition of Zanzibari carriers across this country without the use of a fair amount of physical persuasion. In its absence they become utterly reckless, and soon forget all discipline.

A later incident hints at limits to the efficacy of these methods, though. Parke “used some gentle remonstrance... with my fist” on his headman after he had ignored an order to pick up a load dropped by an ailing porter. Wadi Osman, the headman, then became “very submissive” and willing to “do whatever [Parke] asked without a murmur of dissent.” However, the next day Parke complained that those of his men who were not sick were “confirmed goee-goees (too lazy to do anything).” On three succeeding days all of his porters engaged in what appears to have been work-to-rule action. Also, while the sick porter’s load was kept with the caravan, Khamis, the porter who was the occasion for the discipline, was lost despite two search parties sent to look for him. Stanley seems to have been able to get away with this kind of

251 Parke, My Experiences, 249; Stairs, “From Albert Nyanza,” 955-7.
252 For example, several Advance Column deserters who reached Yambuya said they avoided discipline by lying down in the grass beside the path until the rear guard had passed by see Jameson, Story, 154.
253 Parke, Experiences, 38-9.
254 All quotes from My Experiences, 247. At this point Parke was leading thirteen porters from Ipoto to Ft. Bodo, and acting as his own rear guard.
255 Parke, My Experiences, 246-9. Parke did not associate his violence against the headman with the
casual violence against porters and headmen, behaviour that was not tolerated from the other officers. Stanley ascribed this to his position, carefully cultivated, as the “Big Master,” while his officers were only “Little Masters.” A caravan was not like the military, he believed, “where men will obey a senior officer or his subordinate in just the same way.”

An example that shows clearly the problems caused by trying to enforce an order quite different from that of the regional caravans was the effort to turn porters into military-style sentries at night. Stanley’s instructions for the Advance Column called for guards to be posted at their camps every night. The officers’ records do not indicate that this guard duty was problematic. This could mean that it was accepted by porters, or that it was less stringently enforced than in the settled camps, where officers checked up on the sentries several times each night. At both Yambuya and Ft. Bodo, sleeping on sentry duty was the most persistent reason for discipline, though over time it made up a diminishing proportion of the total number of violations of order. It was a problem the officers took very seriously, though. The standard punishment was a flogging of 25 strokes. At Ft. Bodo Stairs instituted much more severe floggings, extra work, and fines deducted from future pay for repeat offenders. The continual problem of sleeping sentries indicated to the officers that their punishments had little deterrent effect. “I have lectured a man for sleeping on sentry at the same time giving him 50 strokes and 30 days stone drill, yet on his next guard that man

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256 For example, Bonny Diary. Leopoldville, March/April 1887 (E47) & 18 December 1889 (E49).
257 Bonny Diary, 23 September 1888 (E49).
258 HMS, “Memorandum,” 26 June 1887, in IDA, 1:131. Stairs was made responsible for these guards.
259 See Stairs Diary, 11 July 1888 and Jameson, Story, 78-8 & 87, for example.
was asleep and got 100 lashes,” Stairs complained. Stairs’ conversations with the deviant porters suggest they were operating with a different idea of order:

they invariably answer on being charged with sleeping, ‘Hakuna ku lala bwana, macho tu’ (Not asleep, master, eyes only); that is, they could hear and see, but had their eyes shut. A Zanzibari has a very odd expression, ‘kulala macho’; we have no equivalent; it means to sleep with one’s eyes open—always to be on the qui vive. If by themselves almost all African natives sleep ‘macho’ (with eyes open). It really means they hear or see nothing until some one in the camp is stabbed by the enemy and yells out; then there is a wild seizing of arms and loosing off of rifles. It is most difficult to make natives like the Zanzibaris into good sentries.

The problem, in Stairs’ eyes, was the Zanzibaris’ collective character. While peerless porters, he believed, the Zanzibaris were hopeless material from which to make soldiers. Stairs did not consider that the problem might be his effort to impose a foreign military order for which the porters saw little need.

The use of capital punishment, the Expedition’s most severe sanction for disorder, shows even more clearly the forms and limits of the order Stanley instituted. With capital punishment, Stanley aimed to get the maximum psychological effect by making an example of a few offenders. He was keenly aware that killing, or even incapacitating, large numbers of porters to achieve discipline among the remainder was counter-productive. The death penalty was consequently used sparingly. It was first applied to porters who deserted the Advance Column near Avadori.

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261 Diary, 11 July 1888. Officer records—likely incomplete—show few repeat offenders though, implying that their punishments were effective as an individual deterrent, even if not a collective one.
263 Diary, 11 July 1888.
264 The story of the deserters that follows is culled from IDA, 1:211-6; Stanley Diary, 12, 15, 19-22 September 1887 (E37); Stairs Diary, 19-21 September 1887; Parke, My Experiences, 111-2; Parke MS Diary, 22 September 1887 as quoted in Lyons, Surgeon-Major, 61-2; and Jephson Diary 19-21 September 1887.
After a difficult day's march beyond this trade settlement, a canoe caught up to the Column at dusk. It carried three porters who had deserted back to Avadori during the day. Ugarrowwa had each of them given fifty strokes and returned them to Stanley, indicating that he would serve other deserters in similar fashion. Stanley gave him a revolver and 200 rounds of ammunition in gratitude for his assistance. The three deserters were tied to a tree for the night and, first thing in the morning, brought out in chains before the mustered caravan. Stanley had been concerned about desertion and the loss of rifles and loads for some days. He informed the assembled men that one deserter would be hanged that morning and another one on each of the following two mornings. The condemned men drew straws to determine the order of their deaths. The lot fell to Mabruki bin Ali, a slave-porter belonging to the headman Farjalla Bilali of Stanley’s company. Amid the “greatest order and silence,” a rope was placed around Mabruki’s neck and his two fellow deserters were made to hang him from a tree.\textsuperscript{265} The first tree cracked, but a second hanging succeeded. The doctor pronounced him dead after a few minutes and the Column immediately filed out of camp, leaving Mabruki’s body dangling.

In camp that evening, the two remaining deserters were again tied up. One, Osemi, escaped during the night. The other, Mohandu, was brought out before the Column, again assembled to witness an early morning execution.\textsuperscript{266} The rope was placed around Mohandu’s neck and over a tree limb. At that point Stanley halted the proceedings to make a fiery speech about the number of desertions, the threat they posed to the security of the caravan, and his immutability of purpose. “I have come here not to lose men and

\textsuperscript{265} Parke MS Diary, 22 September 1887 as quoted in Lyons, \textit{Surgeon-Major}, 61.
\textsuperscript{266} Stanley describes these two men as slave porters as well, one belonging to a Banyan or Indian merchant in Zanzibar, and the other to an artisan working in Unyanyembe; \textit{IDA}, 1:212.
ammunition, but am sent by one Queen and two Kings to rescue the Muzungu [European]. Don’t think I’m afraid to go on, even if you desert me,” Stanley told them. At a covert signal from Stanley, the headmen came in a body to prostrate themselves before him and plead for clemency, a piece of theater Stanley had arranged during an earlier consultation with the senior headman, Rashid bin Omar. Stanley pardoned Mohandu, and the porters responded with passionate exclamations of loyalty: “Even until we bury the white cap shall we be by your side in peace or war.” When the escaped deserter, Osemi, returned to camp that evening, he too was pardoned following another harangue by Stanley.

Stairs believed Mabruki’s execution would “prove of great value in preventing further desertions,” and the headmen all “agreed that it was good and of use.” However, if the accounts of men who deserted after that point are any indication, the theater and Stanley’s speech made a greater impression on them than the hanging, and even that was not enough to deter them. What effectiveness this episode of discipline did have thus rested on Stanley’s rapport with his headmen, his dramatic flair, and his command of Kiswahili. His apparent magnanimity was also important, since the capital punishment of porters was not a prerogative of regional caravan leaders at that time. Such tactics were not infallible, however. A headman, brought for punishment because he sold his rifle at Ipoto, fell asleep.
while "a knife was [being] ostentatiously sharpened to terrify him [in]to revealing his accomplices," thus converting Stanley's disciplinary theater into a farce. 272

Despite his threats to execute anyone else who absconded with a rifle, Stanley was well aware that he could not afford such draconian measures. The punishment parade, the main military element in this episode, was thus important in increasing the deterrent effect of the discipline by having all the other porters assembled to witness it. Strictly punitive measures, like executions and floggings, were also much more effective when combined with preventive measures such as the confiscation of porters' rifles or rifle breech blocks, and tying together either groups of would-be deserters or their loads during the march. 273 Certainly there was only one recorded desertion in the five weeks after these measures were taken, though desperate food shortages and the lack of a clear alternative to the caravan likely also played a role. The assistance Ugarrowwa provided in punishing deserters indicated to the porters that his settlement would not be an easy refuge. Osemi, the escaped deserter, does not appear to have made any effort to return there. Not surprisingly, another spate of desertions occurred when the Column left Ipoto, the next trade settlement along their route and one whose leaders were not nearly as accommodating of the Expedition. 274

The other recorded execution of a porter was that of Rehani Pasha, a porter who deserted during the month the Expedition spent camped at Mazamboni's settlement south of Lake Albert. It illustrates not only the same mixture of forms and methods of order that were

272 Parke, My Experiences, 127. This performance should have been highly effective, since another porter had been executed earlier in the day for the same offense. For the idea of discipline as theater see G. Dening, Mr. Bligh's Bad Language: Passion, Power and Theater on the Bounty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

273 These preventative measures had been adopted after the Advance Column first encountered Zanzibari traders in the forest. Jephson Diary, 5 September 1887; Stairs Diary, 3 September 1887.

274 Stanley Diary, 23 September & 27 October 1887 (E37). This does not include the desertions associated with Nelson's starvation camp.
evident in Mabruki’s case, but the need of Stanley and his officers to believe that such extreme disciplinary measures were efficacious. Rehani, after his capture by a patrol of Equatorians, was court-martialed for stealing his Expedition rifle and inciting the Equatorian evacuees to desert. Rehani, after his capture by a patrol of Equatorians, was court-martialed for stealing his Expedition rifle and inciting the Equatorian evacuees to desert.275 Stanley, in insisting on the death penalty, portrayed him as a ringleader in a vast and murky plot involving mass desertion, the seizure of the Expedition’s weapons, and making common cause with the hard-line mutineers still in Equatoria. Rehani’s execution was intended to intimidate Emin and the Equatorians, rather than the Expedition’s porters. Stanley later said that this execution affected the rebellious profoundly, for during all their service in the Equatorial Province not one death sentence was passed. They seemed to perceive that now there was another régime, and to understand that to play at revolt and mutiny was dangerous. We may observe the effect of the lesson taught in the absolute peacefulness of the march hence to Zanzibar.276

In a similar vein, Stairs noted a few days later that Emin had no authority with the Equatorians. He believed it was “only their fear of Stanley and the other European officers that keeps them in order.”277 The execution was one of several measures, including the earlier removal of the mainsprings from the Equatorian soldiers’ rifles and a public confrontation with Emin, designed to give Stanley ascendancy over Emin and the fearful and discontented Equatorians.278 All of this may well have helped get the caravan on the road a week later. However, emphasizing, even exaggerating the efficacy of these disciplinary measures was a justification made for the officers’ peace of mind. Their rationalizations were also made with an eye to the judgment of the reading public in Europe. Needless to

275 See Stairs Diary, 21 April-4 May 1889; Stanley Diary, 2 May 1889 (E43); Jephson Diary, 5 May 1889; “Proceedings of a ‘Court of Enquiry’,” 2 May 1889 in BLEM Stanley Papers.
276 HMS to Euan-Smith, 19 December 1889, published as a Parliamentary Paper, Africa No. 4 (1890), 13.
277 Stairs Diary, 7 May 1889.
say, the march back to the coast was far from the model of peaceful order described in
Stanley's official report to Her Majesty's Consul General in Zanzibar. In *In Darkest Africa*
Stanley acknowledged some of the lapses from "absolute peacefulness." At the same time,
he disclaimed responsibility for Rehani Pasha's execution by claiming that it was his officers
and the other porters who pressed for the death penalty over his objections.279

One additional constraint of which the officers were conscious was disagreement among
themselves about the methods necessary to enforce order. This was a matter of debate among
Stanley and Expedition's officers, as well as a source of friction between them and Emin,
together with his officers. The differences between the order envisioned by Stanley and by his
officers has been noted. The debate amongst the Rear Column officers over Bugari
Mohammed's punishment is another example of the diverse opinions of the officers on the
desirability of military order. Even amongst those officers who favoured military order, there
were different ideas about what this meant and about how best to achieve it. The ideas of
Bonny, for example, were very different from those of Barttelot or Stairs. The officers were,
however, concerned to present a united front to their men, which was not always easy.280 They
were aware that their "divide and rule" tactics, such as exploiting the mutual dislike between the
Zanzibaris, Sudanese and Somalis to manage the caravan, could as easily be used against them as
by them. For example, the Rear Column porters threatened mass desertion when they heard of
the plan to execute John Henry Bishop, a Zanzibari deserter. They told their officers "flog him if
you like but our people are never shot."281 Their action sparked a debate about John Henry's

279 These are discussed at length in McLynn, *Stanley*, 2:278-87.
279 *IDA*, 2:212-6.
280 See, for example, Bonny Diary, 10 April and 31 May 1888 (E47); Jephson Diary, 6 April 1887. This
issue is discussed further in Chapter 5.
281 Bonny Diary, 22 April 1888 (E47).
punishment among the officers, one that sent him to face a flogging, albeit a fatal one, rather than a firing squad.  

Consciousness of public opinion in Europe and North America was an additional, though occasional constraint on the exercise of power by Stanley and his officers. They were conscious of possible reaction to accounts of the Expedition they planned to publish in the future, and of reaction to critical accounts being published by eyewitnesses of the Expedition, such as the missionaries on the lower Congo. Their awareness of potential public reaction is reflected in the accounts they published, though it is not always possible to determine whether this consciousness developed while they were on the Expedition or after their return from Africa. Their need to justify punitive measures in their diaries and letters does suggest a concern for the reaction of others, though. The officers displayed more of this concern than did Stanley, who, while always conscious of his reading public, was more likely to alter his writing than his behaviour to conform to their expectations.

The public debate over the Expedition focused on two issues, both connected to military order. The first was the propriety of applying military discipline on a civilian expedition, particularly the legality of capital punishment. The severity of the corporal punishment used on the Expedition was the second issue. Fox-Bourne of the Aborigines' Protection Society, for example, condemned the “sham court-martial” of Bugari Mohammed as illegal. He noted acidly, though, that “there was much more form of law in this case than in some of Mr. Bartelot, Life, 229 and Bonny Diary, 22 April 1888 (E47). This protest is also discussed in Chapter 4. Stanley and the officers became aware of some of these critical accounts during and shortly after their stay at the CMS mission at Msalala. See Stairs Diary, 19-28 August & 26 October 1889 and Jephson Diary, 28 August 1889, for example. For occasions where officers expressed consciousness of how events would be perceived by Europeans who heard or read about them, see Ward, My Life, 148; Parke, Experiences, 39 & 268; Bonny Diary, April 1887 (E47). These expectations of behaviour will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
Stanley’s summary executions,” and that Bugari Mohammed’s treatment was “humane in comparison” with the floggings meted out to porters such as John Henry. Another critic, objecting to the flogging and ironing of “mutineers” on the Expedition, commented: “You would think this would be sufficient to maintain ‘order’ in an expedition, but it is not enough for Mr. Stanley: he must introduce that other civilizing influence—the gallows—into the African wilds as well.” Discussions of corporal punishment focused on the Rear Column. Critics of the Expedition called Barttelot, the senior officer at Yambuya, a “martinet,” who inappropriately “exact[ed] from...native soldiers the same discipline that would have been expected from the flower of the British Army.” His defenders responded that only the “fear of dire punishment by flogging and the death penalty” prevented wholesale desertions. If Barttelot had “for a moment...allowed the gentler feelings of his nature to outweigh his knowledge of the military necessities of his position,” his men would have become “utterly demoralized” by the surrounding trade settlement Zanzibaris. “The camp was...in a state of siege, and discipline alone saved it,” they believed.

While members of the Expedition would not have known about these particular statements, the sentiments and the groups that produced them would have been familiar. They would thus have been conscious of their role in the ongoing process of defining what was expected of a white man or woman in Africa. Insofar as these debates about the Expedition played a part in the evolution of the “Stanley style” of travel, they affected subsequent travellers.

286 Fox-Bourne, Other Side, 119 & 120-1.
287 D.J. Nicol, Stanley’s Exploits; or, Civilizing Africa, 2nd ed. (Aberdeen: James Leatham, 1891), 25. Nicol was commenting on an account of the execution of Rehanti Pasha.
289 All quotes from Barttelot, Life, 264.
and imperialists. For instance, the traveller May French-Sheldon learned about caravan management from her friendship with Stanley and her correspondence with Stairs and Ward. Nonetheless, she wished to demonstrate with her own travels that "the extreme measures employed by some would-be colonizers is [sic] unnecessary, atrocious, and without the pale of humanity."290

A more immediate constraint was the officers' awareness of opinion about the order they were trying to impose on the Expedition in the trade settlements of the eastern Congo. Reports of privation and severe discipline at Yambuya and in the Advance Column were circulating in the region.291 The Zanzibari traders took these reports seriously, and made sure that the officers knew of their concern about both these problems. Selim bin Mohammed's intervention in Bugari Mohammed's case has already been noted; he also provided food to some of the Rear Column porters.292 Tippu Tip, who had already once intervened to mitigate discipline on the Expedition, was not only concerned for the condition of the Expedition's porters but also worried that negative stories about conditions on the Expedition would make it difficult for him to recruit local porters to fulfil his contract with Stanley.293 Among other things, Tippu Tip exacted a promise from Barttelot that deserters who had taken refuge with him or his subordinates would not be punished until Stanley returned.294 Tippu Tip was also concerned about disciplinary

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290 M. French-Sheldon, Sultan to Sultan: Adventures among the Masai and other Tribes of East Africa (Boston: Arena Publishing Co., 1892), Foreword.
291 Jameson, Story, 197. Selim bin Muhammed indicated that in the trade settlements it was being said that the many deaths and desertions from the Advance Column were "principally owing to [Stanley's] treatment of them on the road." For stories of privation and harsh discipline in the Rear Column which circulated in the trade settlements, see Troup, Rear Column, 175.
292 Bonny Diary, 2 April 1888 (E47).
293 el Marjebi to Muhammed Masood & Saif bin Hamed, n.d. MP 88/36. For the earlier incident in which Tippu Tip interceded on behalf of Expedition headmen Stanley had harshly disciplined see Jephson Diary, 18 April 1887 and Jameson, Story, 24-6.
294 Troup, Rear Column, 166; E.M. Barttelot to H. Sclater, 19 March 1888, Barttelot Family Papers. For Barttelot's action on this promise, see Bonny Diary, 31 October 1887 (E47).
measures arising from the officers’ unwillingness to tolerate certain cultural practices, such as
drumming and singing by caravan members in the evening or morning. Tippu Tip’s
investigation into Barttelot’s death indicated that the underlying issue in the conflict that led to
his murder was the Major’s prohibition of dances among the Manyema, dances that they
considered to be “the great joy of caravan life.”\(^{295}\) The Manyema porters considered this attempt
to order their recreational practices unreasonable, and therefore illegitimate.

The officers were at times painfully aware of these limits on their power to discipline
members of the Expedition. This was most clearly articulated by Stairs at Ft. Bodo. He
would have preferred a softer disciplinary regime there, but Stanley’s policy of deliberately
undermining the authority of his officers so as to “atone to [the men] in a measure for his
own cruelty” meant that the serious malcontents in his garrison did not respect him.\(^{296}\) At the
same time, Stairs’ hands were tied by the fear that he and the other officers would be left
sitting in the forest with their loads if harsh discipline and lack of food caused the men to
desert.\(^{297}\) But this would not always be the case. “Wait my boys!” Stairs vowed,

Wait till I have more power, then as sure as my name is Stairs if I don’t warm
up your cowardly hides....Just now you have [us] in a hole but I hope some
day we shall be on the [ ] and you in the gutter. To be your slave, to pander
to you, to avoid every punishment when punishment is due, to sympathize
with your little whims and be all smiles and chaff is what one will have to
endure for a season but when the time comes you will find once more that the
white man must either have the reins or get out of the trap.\(^{298}\)

Stanley’s instructions and comments to his officers, discussed above, also show an awareness
of the limits to his power to order the caravan. Stanley, a pragmatist, was willing to

\(^{295}\) el Marjebi, *Maisha*, sec. 175. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 4.
\(^{296}\) Stairs Diary, 21 July 1888.
\(^{297}\) Stairs Diary, 4 September 1888; Parke, *My Experiences*, 286.
\(^{298}\) Stairs Diary, 21 July 1888.
compromise some aspects of order, such as foraging and looting, to maintain others, chiefly the caravan's forward movement and the security of its loads and guns.

Discipline of any kind was most effective when it was combined with control of the porters' capacity for action through control of the food supply and control of their environment. Consequently, military order could be most effectively instituted in the walled forts set up for extended stays by sub-groups of the Expedition. However, even in these settled camps there were limits to the order that could be constructed from disciplinary measures, as well as from control of the movement of the men and of their access to guns, trade goods, women, and food. The experience at both Yambuya and Ft. Bodo suggests that these latter aspects of order, when they could be managed, were much more powerful than military discipline alone. However, when food was too limited, discipline of any kind was all but impossible. As Stanley noted:

Full and regularly fed, [a porter] is a well-governed being capable of being coaxed or coerced to do anything love and fear sway him easily, he is not averse to labor however severe, but starve him it is well to keep the motto cave canem before one in earnest, for a starving lion over a raw morsel of beef...is not more ferocious, or so ready to take offence. Discipline however severe never gall'd my Zanzibaris when I pampered their stomachs...but even hanging to death was only a temporary damper to their inclination to excessive mischief when their stomachs were pining and pinching.  

In creating, albeit with limited success, an order that was supposed to build up their own powers, were Stanley and his officers diminishing the powers of those whom they attempted to build into this order—their porters, soldiers, and the surrounding indigenous peoples? The hierarchy of entitlement provides the clearest answer to this question. By enhancing the capacities of the Europeans on the Expedition through the consumption of a

299 Stanley Diary, 11 November 1887 (E37). These reflections occur at the end of a passage where Stanley deplored the porters' theft of food from friendly indigenes, but decided not to discipline them because of
better diet, especially where there were shortages of food and they had the power to shape the distribution of food, their order diminished the capacity of their porters and soldiers. It also diminished the capacity of the indigenous peoples from whom they were taking food and other necessities. Ironically, this was the aspect of their order that Stanley and his officers were generally least conscious of directing against others in an instrumental way. It is important to note, though, that in most cases capacities were being diminished, not extinguished. Also, while the capacity to act, either in violation or support of Expedition's order was reduced, this did not necessarily have any effect on the intentions of the individuals caught up in this order. The officers were, however, able to shape the perceived options of opponents to their order when they could restructure the physical environment in which they operated. This was most evident in the construction and reconstruction of the Expedition's forts.

The impact of military order is more complex. Military practices and especially military punishments that inflicted physical harm or immediate economic penalty on members of the Expedition diminished their capacity for action. Sometimes this diminution of capacity was temporary, though if it coincided with other sources of vulnerability, like hunger or disease, it could have disproportionately serious consequences for the individuals affected. Punishments that produced a loss of status, such as the demotion of headmen or personal servants, could also diminish capacity, both through loss of authority and through loss of privileged access to food and other goods. On the other hand, arming the porters and soldiers as part of the military order of the Expedition enhanced their capacity for action,


especially in relation to indigenous peoples, though this varied with the ability of individuals to make effective use of their guns. The arming of the caravan also gave its members the "dignity of a gun," which enhanced their esteem and their sense of themselves as agents.\textsuperscript{301} At the same time, Stanley and his officers were careful to keep the most effective guns for themselves, to monitor the guns and ammunition distributed to members of the caravan, and to disarm those they suspected of deviance. In this way, they controlled to some extent the enhanced capacity they conferred with guns.

The effectiveness of the Expedition was also circumscribed in several ways by the self-limiting dynamics of its members' use of coercive powers. To begin with, the Expedition's order encouraged a kind of relationship between officers and porters that heightened distrust and the divergence of their interests. It also encouraged the counter-productive expenditure of energy on concealment, detection and punishment. Further, despite Stanley and his officers' efforts, at least during certain parts of their journey, the order they instituted turned the caravan into a strong and largely uncontrollable force in relation to the communities through which they passed. In a purely utilitarian sense, the foraging, looting, enslavement and killing carried out by Expedition members reduced the value of the very resources they were eager to secure for themselves. These actions also undermined the Expedition's ability to establish a route to Equatoria.\textsuperscript{302} In the longer term, the Expedition's order, as part of the "Stanley style" of travel, contributed to the crude and inefficient systems of European colonial power instituted in Africa. As Cooper suggests, violence such as that employed by the Expedition was an indicator not of European power, but of their weakness.\textsuperscript{303} This was true at an individual as well as a collective level. The

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The phrase is borrowed from Ward, \textit{My Life}, 86.
\item This will be discussed in Chapter 6.
\item Cooper, "Conflict and Connection," 1529 & 1530, n. 49 and Sean Hawkins, personal
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
Expedition's officers experienced the caravan, the human and physical environment through which it moved, and their own persons as threatening sites of disorder. As will be explored in both Chapters 5 and 6, the fears that this potential disorder generated were a potent source of violence.

Finally, the Expedition's sponsors, Stanley and his officers all proclaimed the Expedition to be a civilizing force in Africa. However, the Expedition's order and the frequent use of violence to enforce it were regressive aspects of its presence in Africa. This was evident, for instance, in the way that military discipline on the Expedition moved back to archaic models, rather than following the direction of contemporary reforms in military practice. The Expedition's activities also made an outrageous mockery of the philanthropic justifications given for its involvement in Africa. The contradictions between this humanitarian rhetoric and the Expedition's order consumed a good deal of collective political energy back in Britain, as well as individual psychological energy on the part of the Expedition's officers, as will be explored in Chapter 5.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, the assumption that military order was a method or model for European imperialism in Africa needs to be examined, as does the assumption that military order explains the successes of that imperialism. This look at the order of the Expedition demonstrates several points. To begin with, military order on the Expedition was neither complete nor constant. Indeed, at some points it was little more than a verbal veneer over a lack of order or the competing order derived from regional caravan practice, though this was often obscured in communication.
accounts of the Expedition. Further, military order on the Expedition was most successful when it either extended or reinforced parallel elements of regional caravan practice, as well as when it was supported by a congruent hierarchy of entitlement to food. In addition, neither military order nor the capacity for violence can be considered sufficient explanations for the Expedition’s accomplishments or the successes of other European imperial initiatives. As will be shown in Chapter 6, the possession of advanced military technology is similarly insufficient as an explanation. Conversely, the efficacy of the coercive powers of the Expedition’s European leaders were enhanced in ways they did not always clearly understand by their ability to control access to important resources, particularly food. In the chapter that follows I will examine the most important of the alternate visions of order for the Expedition, that of its porters. I will also address their power to avoid or oppose the officers’ order, and to institute their own, based on the norms of the regional caravan trade.
Chapter 4
Strategies of Survival and Profit:
The Porters of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition

In my description of the Expedition in Chapter 2, I tried to draw the experiences of the porters out of the Expedition’s unusual wealth of documentation. In doing so, I provided an important counter to the view, common both among scholars who make use of the concept of networks and those who write about European exploration, that the purposes and plans of the explorer or the creator of the network are the only ones that matter. In this chapter I focus on the use of strategies by porters, both individually and collectively, to ensure their survival and improve their profit or benefit from caravan work. In particular, the Expedition’s porters were pressed to modify or invent strategies when they encountered unique situations as a result of the Expedition’s travel off established routes and its several lengthy halts. They also struggled to assert and practice their strategies in the context of the military order the Expedition’s European leaders attempted to institute.

Strategies and Porterage

In choosing to use the term strategy to describe the activities of porters, I highlight the element of “careful forward planning” and prioritizing in their behaviour.\(^1\) Power is also a crucial issue in the definition of strategies. De Certeau distinguishes between strategies, which are the plans and activities of the powerful, and tactics, which are employed by those with less or little power. These tactics have an improvisational and opportunistic character.\(^2\) While porters

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\(^1\) This draws on Jane Corbet’s discussion of strategies, as opposed to coping mechanisms, in the response of households to famine in “Famine and Household Coping Strategies,” *World Development*, 16, no. 9 (1988): 1100.

used tactics, in de Certeau's sense, they also used strategies because they were in fact possessors of considerable power in caravans, particularly those led by Europeans. The authority of the officers on the Expedition was frequently tenuous, and their knowledge of places, practices, and languages in the interior slight or non-existent. Consequently, their ability to survive without the supplies and the services provided by porters was limited. While many of the porters were also inexperienced, especially in areas off the established caravan routes, their ignorance was usually significantly less than that of the officers. The cooperation of the porters in recognizing the officers' authority, at least in a partial way, was essential to its perpetuation. The cooperation of the headmen and other intermediaries, like the Somalis or Sudanese, was also important in upholding the officers' authority. The farther from the coast and the sphere of substantive European knowledge and effective European intervention the Expedition went, the more true this was. In addition, strategies recognize that porters were more than simply elements in the network of the Expedition. They were not just circuits possessed of varying properties of resistance through which the initiatives of Stanley and the officers passed. Like the loads of the Expedition, its many purposes also went through the hands of its porters, giving them the power to drop them, to modify, divert, add to or appropriate them, as well as to carry them relatively unchanged.

The porters crafted their strategies from a vocabulary of behaviour that emerged in the system of long-distance trade and the norms of work on caravans associated with it. A recent dissertation by Steve Rockel describes the development of these patterns and norms from practices of Nyamwezi caravans that pioneered the routes running through modern Tanzania and Kenya. By the mid-nineteenth century these patterns and norms had become widely

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3 Neither the officers nor the porters were monolithic groups. Levels of experience and ability varied widely among both, but on the whole, the porters had greater knowledge of travel in the region than did the European officers.


5 Rockel, "Caravan Porters." The Nyamwezi caravans travelled the entire distance from interior sites of
accepted standards. By the 1880s, caravans sponsored and led by coast-based merchants out-numbered ones from the interior, though the latter continued to operate. Also, despite such shifts and challenges, both the established routes and the norms of caravan work were by and large maintained.

Patterns of caravan organization were initially based on dry season travel, which allowed porters to participate in the agricultural economy of their home areas. Over time, though, long-distance trade transformed this economy. Professional porters increasingly employed or purchased others to do their agricultural work. Enslaved porters, though, had connections to the coastal towns or inland trade entrepôts rather than to the rural agricultural economy. In addition, caravan work also allowed porters some socio-economic mobility. The porters’ wages, their latitude to engage in small-scale trading on their own account, and a decision-making process that gave them some say in the conduct of the caravan, allowed porters to accrue both resources and status. The resources and experience acquired by porters could be used in a variety of ways: to purchase freedom, to improve their position in a future caravan, to invest in the agricultural economy, or to engage in further trade. Women and children who were acquired by porters en route were also a part of their potential profit from caravan work.

Caravan work involved accepted patterns of work authority, expertise, and discipline. Caravans were organized under headmen (wanyampara), drawing on political models from the kin-based trade operations of the Nyamwezi. In addition to the travel experience embodied in headmen, most porters considered it desirable that a caravan should contain trade to the coast and back, thus transforming the earlier pattern of trade in which goods passed to the coast through a relay of intermediaries. In addition to pioneering long-distance trade routes to the coast, the Nyamwezi continued to dominate both the interior trade and porterage until late in the 19th century.

6 Ibid., chapters 4 & 5.
7 Ibid., 140-1 & 239-51.
8 Ibid., 144-6.
some veteran porters, able to provide knowledge and assistance to others.¹ Caravans also often employed a doctor or diviner (mganga).¹⁰ This practice was challenged as the Islamic norms of the coast-merchants became more powerful in the caravan trade, and as many porters made at least nominal conversions to Islam. Under European caravan leaders, most of whom were at least nominally Christian, indigenous religious specialists were not deliberately hired. The use of their expertise by porters was probably overlooked, either through ignorance or a "blind eye" policy. Discipline, though, was an area in which established caravan norms were strongly challenged by the beliefs and practices of European caravan leaders, as well as by the ideas of coast-based traders about authority and discipline.¹¹

Another established part of caravan work culture was the selection from a caravan's personnel of a guide (kirangozi) to determine the route and set the pace of the march.¹² Guides and headmen applied widely recognized norms for the pace, length, and timing of daily travel, as well as the alternation of work and rest days.¹³ In European-led caravans, however, guides and headmen were more likely to be selected by the caravan leader than by the porters. They were also subordinated at times to the compass and map that embodied European geographical expertise. This was most likely to happen when new routes were being pioneered. There were additional norms concerning the selection of preferred loads by porters and the ascription of status based on different kinds of loads.¹⁴ Another norm was the display of fine clothing by porters at important stop-overs along the route. One of an employer's obligations was to provide the caravan's porters a suitable outfit at agreed upon

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¹ Ibid., 152.
¹⁰ Ibid., 145.
¹¹ Rockel indicates that caravans headed by coast-based merchants were more hierarchical than ones organized by Nyamwezi merchants or those from other parts of the interior; Ibid., 139.
¹² Ibid., 146.
¹³ Ibid., 228.
¹⁴ Ibid., 231-2.
By the late nineteenth century, the sense of professional status and pride developed by Nyamwezi porters had spread to porters of other origins. This process of professionalization was overlaid with socio-economic and cultural dynamics associated with the fluid, but hierarchical society of the coastal trade entrepôts. In these communities, slave status or origin and recent arrival from the interior were undesirable. The response of many porters with such backgrounds was to link themselves in a more desirable way to the society and economy of the coast. Many porters thus called themselves waungwana. As Glassman notes, this self-identification was a strategy for enhancing the low status granted to these porters by the coastal society in which they wished to ground their professional and social identities.

Although today mwungwana is often taken to mean a freeman as opposed to a slave, a more exact translation would be "gentleman." In the nineteenth century, the word was used to connote not any particular social status, but rather the general qualities of urbane gentility. Thus a person identifying with the urban culture of the coast, slave or free, might presume to call himself mwungwana, as opposed to an mshenzi..., a "barbarian" or "bumpkin" from upcountry.

Waungwana saw themselves as "autonomous participants in the communal and commercial life" of the coastal towns, and of the trade settlements of the interior where similar hierarchies were reproduced. No doubt, some among the waungwana also preferred to see caravan porterage as "a prestigious quest for honor and adventure" and as a test of manhood, as the Nyamwezi porters did. The construction of gentlemanly identities through caravan travel suggests interesting parallels with the experience of some of the European members of the Expedition, like Bonny, who also sought to define themselves as gentlemen though

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15 Ibid., 160 & 235.
16 Ibid., 149.
17 Glassman, Feasts and Riot, 62.
18 Ibid.
The Selection of Porters for the Expedition

Six hundred Zanzibari porters, plus twenty "boys" or servants, were recruited for the Expedition. Parke described them as follows:

The average age of the members of the Zanzibari contingent is about twenty-seven. They are rather well-built men, strong and muscular; average height, about 5 ft. 9 in. The native Zanzibaris have some Arab blood in their veins; but a large proportion of our men were captured as slaves when young. They accordingly include representatives of nearly every tribe in Equatorial Africa.

Those of the porters who were slaves were likely hire-slaves (vibarua or hamali), ones who were hired and paid wages by employers, but owed a portion of those wages to their master. Mufta, Parke's servant, for example, was a slave of Mohammed bin Said of Zanzibar. Mufta had had to surrender his advance pay to his owner before leaving Zanzibar and would pay his owner half his wages on his return to the coast. Other of the porters, though free, were likely indebted to Zanzibar merchants who made a business of supplying labour to caravans and plantations, labour which they controlled through debt. The Expedition's porters, though, all preferred to identify themselves as waungwana.

In its selection and hiring of porters, the Expedition conformed to many of the established norms and practices in Zanzibar, but it was also a sign of changes occurring in this area. The terms of employment with the Expedition were accepted ones for the kind of work being undertaken: the porters were paid MT$5 per month and given a four month

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19 Ibid., 59.
20 Bonny's self-construction as a gentleman traveller will be discussed in Chapter 5.
21 In addition to the porters and servants hired in Zanzibar, the Expedition’s caravan also included twelve Somalis from Aden, sixty-one Sudanese soldiers and two Syrian translators.
22 Parke, My Experiences, 19.
23 Parke, My Experiences, 285.
24 Glassman, Feasts and Riot, 60-1.
25 See, for example, Stairs Diary, 11 September 1887.
advance, both of which were standard in the late 1880s. The porters and servants contracted for the Expedition were recruited by the Zanzibar office of Smith, Mackenzie & Co., however. This represented a European preference for dealing with a European outfitter rather than a local one, or for hiring porters and collecting supplies on an individual basis. Permission to recruit porters for the Expedition, and subsequent permission to change the route which the Expedition would take, were negotiated with the Sultan of Zanzibar by the Acting British Consul. Similarly, the signing of the porters' contracts and distribution of their advance pay were witnessed by the British Consul at his compound. The role played by the Consul and the Sultan indicated the political importance of the Expedition, but it was also a sign of increasing official involvement in regulating certain aspects of caravan operation.

After signing their contracts and receiving their advances, the porters were escorted directly to the waterfront, where a large crowd of family and friends had gathered to see them off. The Sultan's guard were also out in force, patrolling the dock and the water around the ship in small boats to prevent desertion. As the porters prepared to embark for the steamer, many gave their women what money they could spare from their advance wages and sang farewell songs. After the porters were all on board, the steamer was anchored two miles from shore as a further measure against desertion.

A study of the Expedition's muster roll indicates that some of the expertise porters thought necessary to run a caravan was present. For example, one of the porters on the

26 IDA, 1:65.
27 History of Smith, Mackenzie, 27-8. This firm had close connections to Mackinnon through his British India Steamship Company. While the firm had dabbled in trade and transportation on the mainland since the late 1870s, the Expedition was the largest caravan it had yet recruited and supplied.
28 Bonny Diary, 24 February 1887 (E47), and Parke, My Experiences, 19.
29 Hoffmann Diary, 24 February 1887. Hoffmann, already learning Kiswahili, imperfectly transcribed one of these: "Quaheri bibi Yanko na wu [Todo] Junka na wu Rafiki joti sisi tu rudi siku moja." He translated this as: "goodbye wife and my children and all my friends we shall come back some day."
30 Parke, My Experiences, 19 and Bonny Diary, 24 February 1887 (E47).
muster list was named Musa wadi Mganga, suggesting ritual expertise or at least a family connection to the roles of diviner and doctor. The Expedition had a number of widely experienced porters as well. Uledi Pangani, for example, had been part of Stanley's expedition to find Livingstone. He was among the porters who helped carry Livingstone's body to the coast, and had been with Stanley both in his journey across Africa and in his subsequent work founding the Congo Free State. He had also traveled to Uganda, was well-acquainted with the Tanganyika caravan routes, and had been a porter on a European-led elephant-hunting expedition. It is interesting to note that about eight percent of the Expedition's porters were listed on the muster roll as speaking some English, while six percent had nicknames suggesting they had previously worked in European-led caravans. To the extent that these men were in positions of formal or informal leadership among the porters, they could help smooth the process of adaptation to European ideas about caravan management.

Porter Strategies on the Expedition

A few days into the Expedition's initial march on the lower Congo, Stanley observed that

31 Smith, Mackenzie & Co. Muster List, "Stanley's Expedition," n.d., Zanzibar Museum. This reference was supplied by Steve Rockel. The name Mganga, as noted above, literally means diviner or ritual healer.
32 See Jepson Diary, 25 March 1888, for example.
33 Ward, My Life, 83. Ward gives this porter's name as Uledi Pangana; he may have been the Uledi Stanley (450) on the Smith, Mackenzie muster roll.
34 Smith, Mackenzie & Co. Muster List. There is an overlap of 17 men, or three percent of the total, between the two groups mentioned here.
35 IDA, 1:84.
Stanley, while concerned about the rapid institution of order in his caravan, nonetheless recognized that the effectiveness of his porters depended on their mastery of certain skills. In particular, Stanley recognized the importance of load carrying skills, which inexperienced porters needed to learn and which experienced porters needed to revive. These skills, however, were only one of many porter strategies. I will describe twelve sets of strategies observed in use among the porters, though not often recognized as such by the Expedition's officers. These strategies concern access to food, the creation of *makambi* or kitchen associations, acquiring dependants, carrying loads, maintaining established patterns of work, extra-curricular activities, creating patronage ties with officers, cultivating ties in communities en route, ensuring health, ensuring good leadership, dealing with discipline, and desertion. I will conclude with an evaluation of the relative success of these strategies.

I will treat the strategies of the Expedition's porters as the application of a vocabulary of possible actions to two presumed goals in their working life—survival and profit. These strategies could be conceived and pursued by individual porters, by small groups of porters, or by an entire caravan. Some strategies could be pursued simultaneously, thus reducing the risk of any one of them failing. Others were mutually exclusive, while yet other strategies might be pursued sequentially. The porters' vocabulary of action derived from the accepted norms of porterage and caravan travel, but were constrained both by available resources and by the order which Stanley and his officers attempted to impose.

Because the accounts of the Expedition were largely created by its officers, it is difficult to extract porters' experiences and attitudes from these accounts. The porters' application or adaptation of some caravan work norms appeared as situations of conflict in the officers' accounts. Because the strategies of porters were most visible when they clashed with officers' expectations, those elements of porter strategies that were mutually accepted have the invisibility of the taken-for-granted. Consequently, the adoption by Europeans of
established regional norms for caravan travel was not, and often is still not recognized as an element in the successful functioning of European-led caravans like the Expedition. These taken-for-granted strategies were, however, occasionally revealed in comments by those of the Expedition's officers who had not traveled in East-Central Africa before.

Another issue raised by descriptions of porters in accounts of the Expedition is that of identifying ways in which the stereotypes of them held by European travellers scripted the behaviour of the officers toward the Expedition's porters. Foolish, improvident, but usually good-natured porters—less exalted versions of Livingstone's "faithful followers"—were among the stock figures of travel literature. These porters needed the constant guidance of the "wiser" European because their character supposedly suited them to provide only the brawn of travel. This stereotype inclined the officers to over-manage the porters, to disregard porter expertise, and to react strongly, often violently to any perceived challenge to their authority. This stereotype also allowed porters to manipulate the officers' ignorance and arrogance in pursuit of their strategies. I will discuss the issue of stereotypes and scripts in greater depth in Chapter 5.

Securing Adequate Rations

The obligation to provide food for the porters employed by a caravan while it was on the road was a widely accepted one. Lamden argues that porters regarded a sufficient supply of food en route as more important than their wages. Strategies to ensure access to adequate food were central to porters' survival and thus indirectly to their potential to benefit from caravan work. On the Expedition, the porters' conversation, said Stairs, revolved around food: "of how much food they had at such and such a place and how little they get now....Always the same, on the march,

36 Helly, Livingstone's Legacy, 151.
37 "Aspects of Porterage," 159. The amount and kind of food provided for Expedition members was a source of debate and dissension not only for porters, but for the Sudanese and for the officers as well.
on sentry, in their huts, everywhere it is food and *pombe*. Should they get plenty, it is all the same, delicacies are then talked of. As Stairs' comment implies, porters strategized beyond the minimum ration to the consumption of choice foods, and talked of good employment as that in which delicacies were regularly available.

By the late 1880s there were well-developed norms among porters operating on routes to the east coast concerning an adequate daily ration. This consisted of either a standard measure (kibaba) of grain, or tubers when grain was not available, together with small amounts of meat or fish, and salt. Stanley preferred to pay his porters an allowance which they could then use to purchase their own food. His calculations of this allowance depended on his estimates of the price of food in areas he had traversed previously. Keeping down the Expedition's budget seems to have been more important in determining the size of the food allowance than providing adequate nutrition for the porters. The effects of this economizing were heightened by problematic transport which, for example, brought a store of rice for the porters to Leopoldville long after the Expedition had left. They were also magnified by the Expedition's highly inequitable hierarchy of entitlement to food. Even had these problems been addressed, food would still have caused difficulty because of the size of the Expedition, and because it was often passing through sparsely populated areas or areas not accustomed to producing surpluses for

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38 Diary, 23 August 1888. Stairs attributed this preoccupation to the porters' race, overlooking the lengthy and frequent passages in his own diary devoted to food.

39 Stairs, "Shut up," 55.

40 Rockel, "Caravan Porters," 186-95. Alternatively, porters could be paid, either daily or every few days, an amount of cloth, beads or other trade goods sufficient to allow them to purchase roughly this amount of food. Rockel describes the advantages of these different systems of ration distribution in different food supply situations.

41 Stanley's information about prices on the upper Congo, for example, derived from his travels there in the late 1870s and early 1880s, supplemented by occasional reports from CFS officials. This knowledge was outdated, however, as the arrival on the upper Congo of increasing numbers of Europeans with bundles of *metakos* led to a devaluation of this currency. Already in 1886, travellers on the middle Congo were reporting significant increases in prices as compared to those mentioned by Stanley in 1882 [Harms, *River of Wealth*, 222]. There was no information on prices in the Yambuya area prior to the Expedition's arrival. Jameson noted that Stanley was the only European who had been any distance up the Aruwimi River and he had not travelled as far as Yambuya, *Story*, 54.

42 See E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 19 May-23 June 1887, Barttelot Family Papers; Jameson, *Story*, 40;
caravans. These latter problems were further aggravated by the ravages of conflict and smallpox.

Porters had a repertoire of individual and collective strategies through which to ensure and enhance their entitlement to food. My use of the term entitlement suggests parallels between porter strategies and the coping strategies observed by modern analysts of hunger. Entitlement to food is determined by social relations, which tend to be characterized by both cooperation and conflict. The Expedition’s officers and sponsors, its porters, and also the communities it encountered en route all shared an interest in seeing that the Expedition moved forward promptly. But within this common interest, there was significant conflict over how food resources in a particular area should be divided. Analysts of hunger also note that much of the mortality during a time of severe hunger is due to disease, to which the hungry are unusually vulnerable, and to violence. Consequently, mortality is not necessarily highest at the time of greatest food deprivation. People who are displaced by hunger are the most vulnerable to disease and death, but for porters displacement was a chronic condition. It allowed them to pass through areas of local food shortage, disease, or conflict. At the same time, it deprived them of the web of social relations that would protect them from calamity in times of scarcity.

Additionally, the expansion of a market economy brought new sources of vulnerability to hunger for some groups, particularly those, like career porters, who relied on the sale of their labour as their primary means of access to food. All of these factors spurred caravan porters to develop strategies to deal with inadequate and uncertain supplies of food.

For porters, a first strategy, and a collective one, was to hold their employer to his contractual obligation to provide prompt and regular payment of a ration allowance in a currency

and Stairs to Bartelot, 12 June 1888, in Stanley Diary, 6 August 1888 (E41).

43 For porters, this was part of a recognized strategy of staying on the move so as to pass through areas of food shortage as quickly as possible. Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 274-5.

and an amount appropriate to the locale. As discussed below, Rear Column porters protested against the suspension of their ration allowances as a collective punishment. They also demanded gifts of money with which to purchase supplies to celebrate Muslim holidays, which effectively reimbursed them for the allowance missed during one such suspension. In addition, Rear Column porters protested the payment of part of their allowance in cowries. When it was initially paid out, "they at first refused to take the cowries, saying the natives would not take them." There is no record of this protest recurring. There is likewise no record of formal protest over the inadequate amount of the allowance. A related, but individual strategy was to taking on extra work for the Expedition. This often brought additional, though usually deferred pay; it rarely involved additional rations. The primary attraction of extra work was that it potentially put the porters in a position to forage or loot in new territory.

Looting and foraging were favourite strategies of the Expedition's porters. Their preference for looting and foraging coincided happily with Stanley's desire to keep down the costs of the Expedition. Indeed, foraging was an official activity on numerous occasions, and raiding parties were sent out to obtain food under the leadership of headmen or officers. From the porters' point of view they were low cost, low risk strategies for enriching their diet in times of relative plenty, and a necessity when the Expedition failed to provide food for them. Looting and foraging also offered opportunities to acquire dependants and resources for extra-curricular activities, as discussed below. The risk of looting and foraging increased in areas where the indigenes were numerous and well-armed. It also increased where the caravan trade was well

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45 Jameson, Story, 79. The only time cowries were ever mentioned as a medium of exchange was an episode in mid-December when some Zanzibari traders sold green tobacco for cowries; Bonny Diary, 17 December 1887 (E47). The only other mention of cowries as a preferred currency was at a village down-river of Upoto on the Congo. However, though the indigenes wanted cowries and refused to accept *metakos*, the men were paid only *metakos* there; Bonny Diary, 2 August 1887.

46 European observers generally and incorrectly believed sanctioned, regular foraging by porters to be the *modus operandi* in the caravans of coast-based traders, once away from the coast. See, for example: J.A. Moloney, *With Captain Stairs to Katanga* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1893), 50; and W.R. Foran, *African Odyssey* (1937), 200 as quoted in Lamden, "Some Aspects of Porterage," 159.
enough established that larcenous porters and the caravan leaders who failed to discipline them would make future travel for themselves and others extremely difficult. In areas where the caravan trade was well-established, experienced porters were conscious of the order represented by strong, centralized polities and respectful of the leaders of these states. In areas off the beaten east-coast trade routes, the character of the Expedition—large numbers of porters armed with breech-loading rifles—made looting and foraging easy. The contempt of the waungwana for the washenzi of isolated areas also made it easier to contemplate violence against them and the theft or destruction of their property, which became a self-perpetuating way of relating to such people.

Stockpiling food, both staples and choice foods like meat, against expected shortages was another established porter strategy. Halts long enough to allow porters to dry or otherwise prepare foods were important parts of this strategy. This both reduced the weight of the food, and prevented spoilage. However, the Expedition’s officers frequently complained that porters failed to stockpile sufficient food. The porters, they said, also consumed stockpiled food too quickly to cover the expected period of shortage, or even discarded stores of food distributed to them. A close look at the officers’ accounts suggest this failure to stockpile food had two aspects. First, inexperienced travellers like the Sudanese soldiers and the Madi porters were the ones who most frequently engaged in such behaviour. Second, experienced porters would sometimes also discard extra rations. Stanley was astounded to find, at one point, that in spite of his warning that stores of food for a certain number of days were necessary, the porters had

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47 See, for example, Jephson’s description of his diplomatic mission to the King of Karagwe, a visit on which his senior headmen and porters accompanied him. The porters were quite disturbed by Jephson’s disrespectful attitude toward the king. Jephson Diary, 2 August 1889.

48 This raises the issue, touched on by Rockel, of the changing relations between caravans and communities along caravan routes; “Caravan Porters,” 285-7.

49 There were numerous instances where the officers felt that the porters treated the indigenes from whom they were stealing with unnecessary violence. Jephson, for example, was disturbed and angry to find that porters had shot two men. “It was such a cruel ruthless, unnecessary thing, for neither were armed & both were running away, & here they were lying all huddled up & bleeding to death, all we wanted was the food & that we could take—unjustly
trusted an indigenous woman who told them that there was a village with food only two days ahead. This suggests porters’ confidence in indigenous information about the terrain, discussed below, as well as their concern not to add unnecessarily to the weight of their loads.

A less visible form of stockpiling food was gorging. As Saa Tatu, an experienced porter, commented: “Such... is the life on the continent in a caravan. One day a feast the next a famine. The people will eat meat now until they are blind. Next month they will be glad to get a forest bean.” In fact, both European and African members of the Expedition gorged when they could. After a long period of severe hunger in the forest, for example, the porters with Stanley took the opportunity of a several day halt at Ibwiri to eat: "they are sleeping & making flour all day long & it is surprising even with the unlimited amount they have how quickly they are getting fat, a few days makes quite a change in their appearance." The officers, less accustomed to an uncertain supply of food, took longer to regain lost weight.

When these strategies proved inadequate, porters reduced their food consumption. They also began to gather wild foods. Wild foods, gathered by the porters or their dependants, was the least satisfactory kind of food. Porters generally postponed this strategy as long as possible, but it could keep them functioning at a minimal level when no other food was available. In the unfamiliar environment of the forest, though, some of the gathered foods proved toxic or indigestible. The seeds of a particular tree, for example, were plentiful, but caused upset stomachs and did not satiate hunger in either porters or officers. The seeds became food only when a captured woman taught them to prepare flour from the grated kernel of the seeds and make it into cakes. In another instance, porters and officers learned to eat the boiled stalks of

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50 Stanley Diary, 9 December 1888 (E41).
51 Stanley Diary, 18 December 1887 (E38).
52 Jephson Diary, 21 November 1887. For a discussion of gorging as one of a series of modern strategies for coping with an uncertain food supply in the Ituri forest, see Bailey & Peacock, “Efe Pigmies,” 88-117. Interestingly, the research for this article was carried out in the area of one of the Expedition’s starvation camps.
53 Stanley Diary, 10 October 1887 (E37) and IDA, 1:225.
another plant they had not previously regarded as edible from indigenes attached to their Manyema porters. 54

Persistent short rations seem to have inspired a feeling among porters that pilfering Expedition supplies—food, bullets, or trade goods—and the theft of tools, guns, or even entire loads, was a quasi-legitimate activity. 55 The fact that porters rarely betrayed each other in pilfering suggests that they shared a sense of entitlement to more food than they were receiving. 56 These depredations were a continual worry for the European officers as a result, even in the relative plenty of the established caravan routes. Stanley, for example, counselled Stairs to take special care of the loads of trade goods acquired at Msalala:

Observe carefully the loads of Beads & Cowries with you as the people will surely steal, since the natives show such a decided predilection for them, selling chickens &ct for them. Our fellows are also so extravagant [sic] that they give a bunch of beads for a couple of fowls, & 20 cowries for one. Give them [i.e. these loads] to particular men, take their names, and note their loads, observe them morning & evening. 57

A further strategy for difficult times was to steal items from others in the caravan. This was much riskier, as discovery and retaliation or punishment were likely unless the theft was a prelude to desertion. An ideal situation for the thief was one in which the officers would hold the victimized porter responsible for the loss. At the trade settlement of Ipoto, for example, the Advance Column porters were hungry and discontented. One of them was overheard to complain, “What use is there going on? We are told again and again that there is plenty of food ahead. We never get any of it; all is finished.” 58 Both porters and officers resented that Stanley expected them to purchase food out of their own resources, especially since food was expensive

54 Stanley Diary, 17 September 1888 (E41). The indigenous people in question were from Uchwa, sixteen days’ march north of Yambuya, but it is not clear how they joined the caravan.
55 I distinguish pilfering, or the surreptitious removal of a small amount from a larger stock of goods, from theft. The officers rarely detected pilfering, while they were quick to notice the theft of entire loads, guns or tools.
56 See, for example, Stanley Diary, 27 July 1888 (E41).
57 Note in HMS’s hand, n.d., on the back of H.M. Mackay to W.G. Stairs, 9 May 1889, Stairs Fonds, MG9, vol. 63.
at Ipoto. Among other things, porters began to exchange their Expedition rifles for food. Many porters claimed that they lost their rifles. Four of these missing rifles were recovered from the Manyema and their sellers identified. They were Mse Saadi, who had crossed Africa with Stanley. He had sold two rifles for two goats. Futheh, a slave of Said bin Said’s had employed the “tent-boy” Musfa to steal the rifle of Marzouk the cook and had sold it for a goat. The other culprit was Swadi, a canoe man, who had been persuaded by Terekezo, Nakhosa and Muini Ku, the other members of his makambi, to sell his rifle for their mutual benefit. These men were each given twenty five lashes at a muster of the porters.59 However, as one of them was about to be flogged, another porter stepped forward to confess to Stanley:

This man is innocent, sir. I have his rifle in my hut. I seized it last night from Juma... son of Forkali as he came to sell it to a Manyema in whose house I was a guest. It may be Juma stole it from this man. I know that all these men have pleaded that their rifles have been stolen by others while they slept. It may be true as in this case.60

In the meanwhile, Juma the cook fled. After a lengthy search he was discovered hiding in a corn field. “He confessed that he had stolen the rifle, and had taken it to the informer to be disposed of for corn or a goat, but it was at the instigation of the informer.”61 Having been found guilty of selling an Expedition rifle to the Manyema, “a party that might at any time declare open war” on the Expedition, Juma was condemned to be hanged, the sentence to be carried out by the owner of the rifle and the porter who had informed against him.62

Thieves were probably also subject to sanctions from other porters, though some may have preferred to report these thefts so that the officers would be responsible for punishing the thieves. In another incident, also during a time of extreme hunger in the forest, a porter named Amani told Stanley that the small store of banana flour kept by his makambi had been stolen:

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58 Stairs Diary, 20 October 1887.
59 IDA, 1:243-5; Stanley Diary, 21 October 1887 (E37); and Parke, My Experiences, 126-7.
60 IDA, 1:243-4.
61 IDA, 1:244.
62 Stanley Diary, 21 October 1887 (E37).
"Sulemani, the carrier of it, put it down by the road while he went to gather mushrooms. When he returned, our food was gone." 63 Amani and his companions believed the Manyema porters with the Expedition had taken the flour, it being preferable to believe outsiders, rather than other porters capable of such a deed.

Both the porters and the Expedition's Sudanese soldiers sold personal items to supplement their food allowance. Experienced porters carried with them a small, personal stock of trade goods, either purchased with their advance wages or out of other funds to supplement their rations. 64 As Jephson noted with some amazement:

You may strip a Zanzibari of everything he's got & still he'll find something to buy food with. I thought the men were pretty well cleared out by the Manyema [at Ipoto] & yet they have found something to buy Indian corn & even chickens with—perhaps they bought food with some of the cartridges they had stolen, they will be perfectly useless to the natives, but they may have been taken with the brass cases.

In another forest village, Advance Column porters "were giving clothes, buttons, empty cartridge cases, knives, anything to get food." 65 While some of these items were superfluous, the loss of others, like clothing or knives, affected a porter's welfare. This was a strategy of last resort, used after porters had exhausted the stocks of trade goods they might have brought along or acquired. By mid-February 1888, for example, many of the Rear Column porters had sold their last remaining assets for food, leaving them with only a ragged loin-cloth. Sale of productive assets, especially clothing and blankets, had a dual impact. It diminished a porter's ability to supplement his food allowance in future, and might well lead to indebtedness or threaten his livelihood once the period of hunger was past. These sales also had an immediate impact. A porter without clothing or a blanket became more vulnerable to cold as well as to injury or insect bites, the latter both sources of debilitating ulcerated sores.

63 Stanley Diary (E41) and IDA, 2:47-8. Stanley indicated that Amani was 19 years old and that he carried a 60 lb. box of Remington ammunition.
64 Rockel, "Caravan Porters," 222.
65 Jephson Diary, 8-12 November 1887.
Conflict over food—Rear Column porters fighting over manioc, the least desirable and most easily available food, for example—was a sign of increasing deprivation. The breakdown of cooperation among the porters was also symptomatic of serious food shortages. One element of this breakdown, removing incapacitated porters from a kambi, suggests an established strategy for reducing collective vulnerability to hunger. Ordinarily, the failure to share among healthy members of a kambi provoked strong reactions. Jameson reported a parallel incident among a “mess” of Sudanese soldiers:

Last night Turgamus Mahommed woke up and found Murjad Redwan eating something by himself, and asked him, in a rage, what it was. He replied, ‘A rat,’ which it was. Turgamus said that he must also eat something, and thought of the tortoises, and he woke up a third man to take them, and a fourth to share them!

In spite of such conflicts, there are numerous accounts of two or three men going off together to find and prepare food, likely without other members of their kambi, and less frequent accounts of lone men doing so.

An additional and far less common strategy, developed in response to the Expedition’s long periods of immobility, was the cultivation of gardens. Though some, perhaps even most of the porters had agricultural experience, this was a departure from their routine in two important ways. First, much of the agricultural labour would likely have been done by women in the porters’ home communities. Second, the regular movement of most caravans made the effort of cultivation when there was little possibility of harvest seem an unproductive use of the porters’ time and energy. During the lengthy stay at Ft. Bodo, the cultivation of gardens to stock the fort’s granaries was part of the expected daily routine of work for porters. However, they were

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66 Stairs Diary, 30 July 1887.
68 A further source of conflict in time of shortage was the expectation of the European officers that food, especially choice food, was their special prerogative. They expected that porters who found any would either give it to them or share it with them.
69 This strategy is discussed in the section on ensuring health, below.
70 Jameson, Story, 139. The incident reveals the potential for conflict and betrayal within the makambi, though it may have been a bigger problem among the Sudanese than in the well-established work culture of the
also allowed time and space to cultivate small personal gardens, which some of them did. This contrasts with the situation at Yambuya, where both the porters and officers expected an imminent departure. This expectation made cultivation seem a less desirable strategy.

Underlying these specific strategies to ensure access to food was a foundation of skill and information acquired by successful porters. A knowledge of languages and ease in acquiring new ones, for example, allowed porters to trade for food in communities both on and off the established caravan routes. Knowledge of a variety of foods and their preparation was another asset, especially the ability to preserve food. Flexibility in diet enabled porters to survive in areas where preferred foods were not available. These strategies were closely linked with the related strategies of makambi, acquiring dependants, and patronage. Porters’ expectations about the lengths to which they would have to go to obtain food were also an important factor in choices about desertion.

**Joining a Kambi**

The self-organization of porters into makambi—messes or kitchen associations, sing. kambi—was a well-established part of porter work culture. The division of labour involved in a kambi allowed for the rapid and efficient performance of daily domestic tasks. For instance:

The men divided themselves into sets or camps of five or six each, in this way saving themselves much trouble in their commissariat arrangements. One did the cooking, two or three fetched fuel and water and went to the nearest village to barter for food, whilst the others built the hut for the night.

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71 Rockel discusses instances where porters abandoned both food preferences and taboos in times of severe hunger; “Caravan Porters,” 276 & 280.

72 Kambi was also the word used to refer to the camp and campsite of a caravan; see Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 265-71. The term “messes” reflects the military background of several of the Expedition officers and many of the other European travelers who observed these groups.

73 Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 268-70.

74 Pruen, Arab and African, 173-4.
In addition, by pooling food resources, each porter had access to a greater variety of food than if he ate alone. The makambi were also vehicles for cooperation in times of difficulty. The Expedition's officers used these groups as channels for the distribution of goods in times of scarcity as well. Makambi thus improved the productivity of the porters, economized scarce resources for caravans, and likely reduced porter mortality. The kambi also substituted for services that might otherwise be provided by women. When porters acquired either women or children as dependents this reduced their workload; it may also have changed their relationship to the makambi.

The makambi were an important site of social life on caravans. Rockel believes it likely that porters in the makambi of Nyamwezi caravans were "tied by family relationships, origin in the same village, or prior experience travelling together." The Expedition's porters, waungwana with diverse origins and employment records, had fewer pre-existing bonds. Once underway though, eating and socializing together strengthened the bonds that already existed and created new ones through the shared experiences of the journey, recounted in song and story in the setting of the kambi.

The re-organizations carried out by Stanley at various points during the Expedition were a significant challenge to this strategy of self-organization. Initially, on board the steamer Madura, Stanley grouped the porters into companies of 111 men. Each company was headed by a European officer, and each had six headmen and six junior headmen. As this significantly exceeded the number of men hired as headmen, additional leaders were selected, not by the porters but by Stanley or his officers. In subsequent reorganizations, which occurred each time the Expedition's forces were divided, the weakest and most

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75 "Caravan Porters," 269.
76 Parke, My Experiences, 20 and Stairs Diary, 25 February 1887. A sixth company was made up of
troublesome porters in each company were left behind. The remaining porters were made into new companies. While some of these new companies were created by simply removing marginal porters and leaving the remaining ones together under the same headman, more substantial reorganizations were carried out at Leopoldville, Yambuya, and Ibwiri.77

This periodic re-organization doesn’t seem to have been a matter for collective protest, though it must have disrupted the porters’ organization into makambi. However, disruption of makambi may have been a contributing factor in the desertion of porters, since they often mentioned problems with food as a reason for desertion. The reorganizations may also have been a factor in the hunger and health problems among the Rear Column porters. Since these men were the “dregs” of the Expedition and were culled from a number of companies, they may have been the least desirable members of makambi and had difficulty forming effective new ones.

Acquiring Dependants

Another strategy porters on the Expedition used to enhance their welfare was to acquire dependents. This was consonant with the norms of regional caravan work, in which women played an important role:

Although there were rarely as many women as men in a single caravan, a kind of partnership [was] evident in the division of labour. Men provided protection and, when paid, access to food and clothing through their wages and posho [rations]. Women provided domestic and sexual services, companionship, and lightened the men’s burdens by carrying loads themselves.78

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77 Both kinds of reorganizations can be seen in Stairs’ porter lists, Memoranda Book, 1887, Stairs Fonds, MG1, vol. 877, no. 6. Stanley had a habit of taking the best headmen and porters out of his officers’ companies and placing them under his own command.
78 Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 239. Rockel notes that women participated in caravan travel not only as dependents, but sometimes also as porters or traders.
The acquisition of dependents through purchase, but more commonly through capture, was an important part of the welfare of the Expedition’s porters and it facilitated the Expedition’s work. Dependents acquired en route could be kept, or sold for gain when the caravan reached its destination, making this a strategy of both survival and potential profit.79

A variation on this strategy, also employed the Expedition’s porters, was to hire women at caravan stops to perform either domestic or sexual services. At Yambuya, the European officers expected that if the Rear Column porters wished the services of women, they would make appropriate arrangements through the headmen of either the Zanzibari traders, the Manyema, or the indigenes.80 These transactions were yet another use for advance wages, leftovers from the ration allowance, or other resources porters might have.81 For the Expedition’s porters, such transactions were difficult because their food allowance was low relative to local food prices. In addition, the exchange of women’s services for goods was more likely to be possible along established caravan routes than in the areas where the Expedition was pioneering. As with food, the Expedition’s porters tended to acquire these services by force rather than exchange, especially in areas where Congo Free State and Zanzibari expansion had already disrupted indigenous communities.

“During our many months of marching in the forest we must have captured some hundreds of the large and small natives,” Stanley stated.82 Many of these captives were released or escaped within a few days. Their usual purpose was to provide information about

79 At several points the Expedition encountered men who had served as porters and had now retired to create and head prosperous villages; see Chapter 6. Some of the dependents in these villages may have been acquired during the travels of these ex-porters.
80 Bonny Diary, 14 March 1888 (E47). The relationship of the headman Munichandi with a Manyema woman that occasioned this instruction appeared to involve the exchange of services for gifts. However, it was carried out without the consent of the man whose dependent or wife this woman was.
81 See, for example, Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 244; this example seems to refer to sexual relations rather than domestic services. Prum gives an example of porters purchasing food at Mpwapwa and then borrowing the mortar and pestle or mortar stone of the food vendor to process it, though many of the porters were “either too lazy or too tired to perform this further labour,” Arab and African, 117.
supplies of food in the area and about the terrain ahead. Some of the captives, however, became the dependents or slaves of porters. As Stairs noted, the porters “delighted in capturing a woman or two and giving her immense loads to carry besides making her a slave to his person.”

He pointed out that women were of immense help to the men, and consequently to the leader of an expedition. The porter, loaded with his box or bag of sixty pounds, his rifle and ammunition and mat, has quite enough to carry through eight hours of marching, and is thoroughly fatigued at the end of it. His wife then...carries for him his cooking-pots, and food enough, perhaps, to last both of them six or eight days. On arrival at camp she prepares his evening meal, gets the camp ready, and, if necessary, washes his cloths for him, and helps in a hundred ways her tired husband. Besides doing this, the women on the march enliven everybody with their pleasant chatter and cheery singing.

Though men, women and children were captured, women and older children were the ones retained, a pattern consistent with preferences for dependent labour in the Zanzibari trade communities of the eastern Congo. Some of these captives may have been general Expedition property, or the property of a kambi. This seems to have been the case with the two women captured separately near the village of Balia in early July 1888. They were supposed to guide Stanley’s column back to Ugarrowsa’s settlement, but were “sent to the rear, to assist in carrying the plantain-provisions” after they misled the column. Other captives became the property of individual porters. After a number of pygmies were captured in another incident, one of the porters acquired “a shrewish old lady” with a two bushel hamper on her back. Her captor used her to carry his personal belongings and provisions.

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82 Stairs Diary, 23 August 1888.
83 Stairs, “From the Albert Nyanza,” 958. While Stairs used the vocabulary of marriage to give legitimacy to his argument for allowing porters to bring women on the march, this was far from being the only means by which porters could acquire domestic services.
84 Stanley Diary, July 1888 (E40). Stanley’s published account of this incident indicates that the women were “sent away home” when they failed to lead the column in the desired direction [IDA, I:475]. This is a clear example of the concealment of the acquisition of dependents or slaves by members of the Expedition.
The sketch of a female member of the Expedition below gives further evidence of their importance in assisting the porters. The unnamed woman carries a package of some sort, likely the personal possessions and rations of a porter as well as her own things, if any, topped by a cooking pot. The fact that she carries this load on her head indicates she was not one of the women captured in the forest, as they carried loads on their backs. In one hand she has some kind of bag or bundle; in the other she carries a rifle, which was likely a porter's as there is no record of these closely monitored items being issued to women. In addition, she carries a child on her back, suggesting that the provision of sexual services was another of her roles. The many women accompanying the Manyema porters hired from Tippu Tip were another indicator of the importance of female dependents to porters.

According to their Manyema headmen, each of these porters had eight wives. As Selim bin Mohammed told Ward:

When I remarked that I did not think the Manyemas were able to carry our loads, he replied...that the women would probably carry most of the loads, while the men would "play the soldier" with their guns.

The evident advantages of bringing along or acquiring dependents en route suggest that if more porters had pursued this strategy, or pursued it more continuously, some of the death and disability on the Expedition might have been avoided. Emin Pasha's travels west of Lake Albert in 1891 provide a point of comparison, not least because a number of his porters had also been employed on Stanley's Relief Expedition. Emin noted the importance of women for the welfare of porters in European-led caravans:

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87 From a collection of miscellaneous sketches of weapons, indigenous people, etc. labeled "Aruwhimi" and ascribed to either Stanley or H. Ward. These are located in the RGS Stanley Collection 5/1.
88 Ward, My Life, 89.
89 Jameson's testimony at the court martial of Sanga, Stanley Falls Station, 6 August 1888 in Vivian to Salisbury, Dispatch No. 60, Africa, 10 November 1888, MP 88/35. Bonny also noted that the Manyema who came to Yambuya under Selim bin Mohammed had brought many women with them [Diary, 27 February 1888 (E47)]. As both Selim bin Mohammed's followers and the Expedition's Manyema porters believed they would be engaged in the customary patterns of Zanzibari trade and travel in the region, each porter's possession of a gun and numerous dependents was also part of an anticipated strategy of extra-curricular activity.
90 Ward, My Life, 89.
The health of the men has been splendid. We have several of those who served with Stanley, Wissman, and Cameron. They are delighted, as there are very few ulcers and only five cases of smallpox. They cannot understand why we have not suffered, but I do. Every one of our men has at least one woman; every man builds a house every night on the road. The women carry all the food and prepare it, so the men are well housed and fed. On the road the men only carry a gun and 200 cartridges, and a long knife and a mat. If a man is sick, the women carry even these. In this way we made a march of seven days without seeing a living thing or a bit of food, yet the men hardly suffered at all.  

He contrasted the health of his porters with the substantial losses suffered by Delcommene's caravan returning from Katanga: "the whole expedition lost eighty-seven per cent of their soldiers and men. They had no women"  

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92 Ibid.
Woman and child, members of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition
Source: H.M. Stanley Collection, RGS Archives, Box 5/2
Used by permission of the Royal Geographical Society

Porter, Emin Pasha Relief Expedition
Source: H.M. Stanley Collection.
RGS Archives, Box 5/2
Used by permission of the Royal Geographical Society
Stanley’s choice of the Congo route hampered his porters’ access to the usual sources of women’s services. Because the Expedition was pioneering, its porters were less able to obtain through exchange the services that would have been available in settlements along established trade routes. Also, the controlled access to the steamer that carried the Expedition to the mouth of Congo made it impossible for dependents from Zanzibar to tag along. This made the forcible acquisition of dependents by porters more likely. However, the zeal some of the officers, especially those of the Rear Column, displayed in keeping the porters from acquiring dependents hindered pursuit of this strategy. This action by the officers was much more effective in the closed setting of a fort than on the march.

European expedition leaders might discourage the acquisition of dependents by porters for a number of reasons. In a context where public opinion justified imperial intervention in Africa on the grounds of curbing the slave trade and providing a “civilizing” influence, the acquisition of dependents by porters in European employ was morally unacceptable. It was particularly unwise to allow porters to do this if the European’s travel was funded by institutions dependent on public support, or if the leader expected to profit from published accounts of his or her travels. In spite of these concerns, a number of the Expedition’s officers acquired dependents themselves. A “plump little queen of a pigmy tribe,” for example, became Parke’s cook and personal servant. He kept her for over a year.93 While she likely regarded her situation as slavery, Parke constructed her textually as both a faithful follower and a pseudo-wife, though a sexual relationship was carefully never mentioned in his public account. The young woman suffered several serious bouts of fever outside the forest zone and, when she could march no farther, Parke regretfully left her with

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“friendly natives” at a village in Karagwe. Parke acknowledged that his dependent kept him much better fed than the other officers because of she knew the foods to be found in the forest. Some of the Rear Column officers purchased women as concubines and purchased additional slaves to be their servants. Not surprisingly, these purchases were rigorously omitted from public accounts of the Rear Column.

**Strategies for Carrying Loads**

In theory, loads were prepared to meet a standard weight, customarily between 60 and 65 pounds. There were also standard procedures in Zanzibar, much inveighed against by some European travellers, for packaging various kinds of loads. Boxes, much favoured by European travellers, made awkward, uncomfortable loads for porters. In practice, even apparently identical loads varied in weight, sometimes by just a few ounces, but sometimes by many pounds. The loads may also have varied in preparation or have been damaged in transit, resulting in unevenly distributed weight, awkward shapes, or rough surfaces, all of which affected their desirability for porters. The contents of a load also affected the status of the carrier associated with it.

There is no record that this was a factor in the Expedition porters’ preferences for particular

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95 My Experiences, 277.
96 See Bonny Diary, 7-11 & 13 March 1888 (E47).
98 For example, the fifty boxes of Remington ammunition carried by Stairs’ No. 2 Company averaged 51 pounds each, but varied between 36 and 61 pounds. List, n.d., Memoranda Book, 1887, Stairs Fonds.
99 Troup described the uneven quality of the Expedition’s loads, especially the loads of trade goods purchased on the Lower Congo. Some porters may have preferred these damaged loads, though, as it was possible to surreptitiously remove some of the trade goods they contained. The cases of powder, ammunition, and percussion caps, as well as the coils of wire and bales of cloth packaged in England were the loads in the best condition. See *Rear Column*, 102-6.
100 In trade caravans, according to Burton, ivory carriers had the highest status. They were followed by carriers of cloth, beads, wire, iron, salt, tobacco and other regional trade goods. These porters were in turn followed by those carrying the equipment and supplies of the caravan, who were often slaves, women or children. Burton, *Lake Regions*, 414 as cited in Cummings, “History of Porters,” 113.
loads, but it may have been a consideration of which the officers were unaware.

Porters responded to variation in the loads they were given to carry in both individual and collective ways. Individually, porters competed to select the most desirable loads, "as an unusually heavy, hard, or awkward load could mean grave difficulties for a struggling porter....Such loads could cause sores on the head or shoulders, or handicap the carrier so that he was forced to lag behind his companions." 101 This exposed him to attack by robbers or hostile indigenes. It also deprived him of assistance in they event of difficulties and reduced his access to foraged foods and choice shelter in campsites. During a period of severe hunger in the forest, for example, the Expedition porters assigned to carry sections of the steel boat "almost refused to work." They complained that the awkwardness and weight of their loads put them so far in the rear of the column that they had "not the same chance of picking up food as their brothers in advance." 102 The opportunity for Expedition porters to select preferred loads was limited, but not eliminated by the officers' insistence on assigning loads to particular companies of men, and often to particular porters. 103 In this situation, a porter wishing to be assigned a preferred load had to cultivate a relationship with either the headman or the officer who allocated them.

As it was a favourite tactic of Stanley's to issue ammunition, rations, or ration allowances to porters at points where he had too few carriers for his loads, porters also had to cope with periodic increases in the weight of their personal kits. Porters with dependants to carry their kits had a definite advantage when this happened. Porters who carried their own kits had to secure these personal items to their bodies or attach them to their loads. The Expedition porter in the sketch above chose to tie several items to the outside of his load, which was probably an officer's tents. He also has a small bag suspended from one shoulder. This porter has also made a pad.

102 Both quotes from Stairs Diary, 8 October 1887.
103 The selection of loads as a factor in a porter's ability to work and to thrive is discussed further in the section on leadership below.
likely of cloth or grass, to protect his head, a long-standing work practice. In common with other waungwana porters, he preferred to carry his load on his head, using one arm to balance it when necessary and the other to hold a staff. A late-nineteenth century traveller in east Africa described the technique of a porter:

The Zanzibaris carry their loads sometimes balanced with their hands extended overhead one either side of the load, but with their bodies and heads perfectly erect, never looking at the immediate footpath, avoiding with deftness the overhanging branches or side projections. They put one foot directly in line of the other, without turning the toes out, making a very narrow tread....They universally carry long stout staffs...which they thrust ahead of them, and bear upon when ascending or descending mountains, and employ to sound streams when fording.

This method of carrying, a set of learned skills, was in itself a strategy developed by porters.

A number of the collective work strategies discussed elsewhere in this chapter also had a direct bearing on the ease with which porters carried their loads. Maintaining a steady rhythm of work during the march, with the help of a guide, singing, or drumming made the work easier, especially where the terrain was difficult or where several men carried one load together. An appropriate daily pattern of work and rest, with sufficient food and water were crucial to porters’ ability to carry well, as was a careful choice of route. To ensure appropriate patterns of work, it was important that porters had confidence in the leadership of the caravan and that they had a measure of input into decisions made about the caravan.

In European-led caravans, individual porters were generally made responsible for particular loads, so that they could be fined or otherwise punished if the loads were lost or damaged. On the Expedition, loads were a part of the order the officers strove to create,

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104 For a fuller description of these individual carrying strategies see Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 217-20.
105 French-Sheldon, Sultan to Sultan, 122.
107 Ward, a transport official with the Congo Free State, described the system used on the lower Congo. State officials opened loads where “carelessness being noticeable in the manner of carrying the load, or marks of unnecessary violence showing on its exterior” and fined the porter assigned to that load for any damage to its contents. See Ward, Five Years, 83-4.
though their records suggest that keeping track of rifles was a bigger concern than keeping track of loads. There was a daily muster of the Expedition’s personnel on the march, carried out by the headmen or the officers; Stanley was consulted only when there were problems. The loads were inventoried as each was placed in a central, secured storage area for the night. Stanley also made periodic extra-ordinary inspections, especially when the Expedition was being re-organized.

In practice though, the association between a particular porter and a particular load was looser, modified by cooperation among the porters. This cooperation, whether a strategy developed specifically for European-led caravans or not, helped to even out the disadvantages or benefits of carrying particular loads. Such cooperation was evident during Stanley’s march back through the forest to find the Rear Column. Arriving in camp one afternoon, Stanley made an inventory of the loads, and found his porters to be

1 Box of Remington Ammunition short, and yet the muster of men was complete. By great questioning [I] found Box belonged to Uledi’s Co. and that its carrier generally was Uledi wadi Saadi. Wadi Saadi however denied that it was his turn to carry it, as he had carried it for several days, and imputed blame if there was any to Hassan wadi Nassib. Hassan said that he had gone to the tent, and found all the boxes gone and therefore came on empty handed. Turning to Wadi Saadi he was asked why as it was his duty to daily carry that box he had not carried it as usual. Because we relieve one another, he answered. When Stanley could get no further information about the box, he prepared to hang both Hassan and Uledi. As they were being tied up for execution, Uledi Wadi Saadi confessed. “Passing close to the river,” he said, “I dropped the box into it.” Uledi and Hassan were released and sent back to recover the box, together with Umari their headman, who had failed to report the missing load. When the were unable to recover it, Stanley sentenced them “to convey a box of ammunition from Yambuya to the Albert Nyanza, or each pay 175

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108 See IDA, 2:66 for an illustration of this central storage area in a camp.
109 Stanley Diary, 22 July 1888 (E41).
110 Stanley Diary, 22 July 1888 (E41).
dollars the value of the box and its carriage."

There is no mention in Stanley’s diary of sanctions applied by porters among themselves in a case like this. Would the loss of a box in the charge of another porter make Hassan wadi Nassib an outcast? Would being sanctioned as a member of a work cooperation agreement also involve sanctions in the kambi, affecting his access to food, shelter, and health care? The answer to these questions depends in part on what actually happened to the box. If its contents were stolen for later sale, it would represent a gain for the makambi of those involved and sanctions would aim to make sure that all those penalized by Stanley shared in the gains as well. If the box was thrown in the river or otherwise lost during the march, its loss may have been a form of protest. Alternatively, it may have indicated the physical deterioration of a porter whose position in a kambi was or might soon be in jeopardy. As both Uledi Saadi and Wadi Nassib were listed in the 29 August-6 September 1888 muster done by Stanley, and as both were assigned to carry boxes, their physical condition cannot have deteriorated to any great extent either before or after this incident. Because Stanley generally kept the most fit men in his own company, and also chose the fittest men to accompany him back to find the Rear Column, these men can be presumed to have been good at surviving.

Stairs’ porter lists for a portion of the Advance Column’s march in the forest show two competing systems of load allocation. For one five-day period on the first list, the loads were allocated sequentially, the first porter on the list carrying load number one, the second, load number two, and so on. This organization of both porters and loads suggests the direct control of Stairs or one of the other officers. The remaining days in this list show an apparently random

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111 Stanley Diary, 24 July 1888 (E41). Uledi had by this time confessed that he had not thrown the box into the river; he had said that only to avoid execution. He had no idea what had become of the box.
112 Stanley Diary (E41). Neither of these men is included in the partial list of porter fatalities (n.d.) in the BLEM Stanley Papers.
113 List, n.d., Memoranda Book, 1887, Stairs Fonds MG1 877 No. 6. The list was made after the 24 October 1887 re-organization, but the dates given in the list do not always correspond to the days of marching for October and November as indicated in Stairs’ diary.
allocation of loads among the porters. However, a statistical analysis of the distribution of loads indicates that it was not, in fact, random.\textsuperscript{114} Particular porters were associated with particular loads much more frequently than would be consistent with a random distribution. Most of these porters belonged to one of two squads within Stairs’ company. Interestingly, the porters whose load carrying patterns were least random were among those most likely to have survived and to be still carrying difficult loads—that is, the boxes of ammunition—in a second list covering an ill-defined, but clearly subsequent set of marching days.\textsuperscript{115} These porters fell into two categories. The first was a small group consistently assigned to carry Stairs’ personal baggage, possibly indicating a strategy of patronage on their part.\textsuperscript{116} The second group, whose survival rate and ability to carry were higher than the first, were mostly porters in the squad under the headman Muini Pemba. They frequently carried particular boxes of ammunition, suggesting a strategy of choosing preferred loads. In contrast, those porters who showed the least consistent choice of loads were the ones most likely not to appear on the second list of porters, indicating death or desertion. If they appeared on the list, they were more likely to be incapacitated, that is not assigned a load at all. Although I cannot precisely date these lists, they definitely cover the period after the Advance Column left Ugarrowwa’s trade settlement at Avadori in late October 1887. They thus represent a period of hunger and difficulty in the forest, a time during which the order of Stanley and his officers was being challenged and the strategies of the porters tested as well.

\textsuperscript{114} Two sets of load lists, ostensibly covering seventeen marching days after 24 October 1887 and ten marching days in early November 1887 were combined. Data for these twenty-seven days, involving 73 porters and 39 loads, were coded and re-arranged to form a table with the loads across the top and porters down the side. Starting with a hypothesis that the loads were randomly distributed among the porters, the probability of a particular porter carrying a particular load on a particular day was the product of the probability of a porter carrying any load that day (39/73) and the probability of a particular load being carried (1/39). The expected value of a particular load being carried by a particular porter was the product of the cell (as just calculated) multiplied by the number of days a particular load was actually carried. A Chi-square test was then carried out with 72 x 38 degrees of freedom. The Chi-square value obtained was 6,738 which is significant at the one percent level. Thus the hypothesis of the random distribution of loads must be rejected. Henry Rempel carried out these calculations and assisted in their analysis.

\textsuperscript{115} List, n.d. Memoranda Book, 1887, Stairs Fonds.
Maintaining an Established Pattern of Work

The established pattern of work on a caravan began with a 6 A.M. departure from camp. The caravan took a short break at mid-morning for the first, small meal of the day, and halted around noon. Porters preferred not to work at mid-day to avoid the worst heat of the sun. In the afternoon, porters constructed a new camp, prepared their main meal of the day, and carried out other tasks necessary for the reproduction of their labour. In the evenings, they gathered around the camp’s fires to converse, smoke, drink, sing, tell stories, play games, or, occasionally, hold dances.

While the Expedition was on the march, these caravan norms generally prevailed. However, serious conflicts arose between the porters and officers at times when all or parts of the Expedition were stationary. The officers felt a need to keep up order and discipline by imposing a military schedule during these halts and by creating work for the porters. Both at Bolobo and later at Yambuya, the officers’ attempts to organize the porters’ day around work that was at best marginally necessary to the welfare of the caravan was a source of discontent. The construction of forts and roads, for example, was labour which the porters did not believe would benefit them. Jameson’s servant summarized an animated porter conversation about work on the fort at Yambuya:

He told me that the men said that they knew why the place was being made so strong: Mr. Stanley was going to sell it to the Belgians for two or three hundred pounds, for a new station, as it could not be for us only, for our guns were quite enough without the boma and trench to keep off the natives.

At Ft. Bodo, the daily work of cultivation, foraging, and defense appears to have been more acceptable to the porters; possibly, they believed it directly benefited them.

116 These porters were Baruti Uledi, Mseh Mirabu, Hamadi bin Ali, and Heri bin Ali.
117 Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 231.
118 Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 270-3; Parke, My Experiences, 327.
119 Story, 81.
Officers felt that regular work was crucial to the maintenance of order, and complained when porters worked slowly or half-heartedly. Jameson, for example, felt that if the men would only be considerate enough to "show a little more spirit, and work less reluctantly," sensitive officers like himself would not be forced to resort to floggings to maintain the daily routine. Porters, on the other hand, likely expected more of the freedom they associated with stops at caravan entrepôts, a time of leisure and celebration which was an important part of caravan life. Interestingly, one use that porters made of their leisure time in the Expedition's settled camps was educational. During the stay at Fort Bodo, porters "who could write Swahili were teaching the others." Koranic instruction using homemade blackboards was also part of this educational effort. It is not clear whether this was a customary activity for porters in caravan entrepôts, or whether the European officers' attention to ceremonies of identity that involved texts and writing played a role in the porters' interest in literacy. It was likely no accident, though, that this kind of activity was observed at Fort Bodo, where the porters were relatively better fed than those who made a prolonged stay at Yambuya.

At Yambuya it became clear that porters accepted the imposition of the officers' daily work schedule only to the extent that it corresponded with their own preferences for organising work time. In mid-December 1887, Bonny and Troup changed the work schedule, postponing the start of work from 6 A.M. to 8 A.M. each day. They wanted to allow the porters to avoid the wet and cold of the early morning and to have a meal before starting work. The porters were then supposed to work for several extra hours in the afternoon. The new hours were in force for only one day before the Zanzibaris protested. They complained of "having to work through the hottest part of the day—12 to 1 o'clock—

120 Story, 81.
121 Rockel, "Caravan Porters," 265.
122 Stairs, "Shut Up," 58.
and would sooner have the old hours, so they have gone back to them."  

Another example of conflict between officers and porters over work schedules occurred at Bolobo. The Rear Column porters also took collective action to ensure the addition of Muslim holy days to the list of Christian holidays on which the officers allowed the men time off from work.

The use of leisure time was another area of where porter norms generally prevailed, in spite of occasional sharp conflicts with officers. The most significant of these was the confrontation that led to the killing of Barttelot. He intervened to prevent early morning drumming and singing by the women of some of the Manyema porters, possibly an accompaniment to spirit possession. Commenting on the murder trial of the porter who shot Barttelot, Tippu Tip said that the issue for the porters was Barttelot's prohibition of dances, which they considered to be "the great joy of caravan life." They felt the application of officer expectations to their recreational practices was illegitimate: "are we to be mournful as though bereaved?" they inquired. This rhetorical appeal raises interesting questions, since the Expedition's Manyema porters were recent and still limited participants in the caravan trade and its associated culture. Their appeal to norms governing leisure for caravan porters suggests the rapid spread of these norms among men and women with limited caravan experience.

Extra-Curricular Activities

Enterprising porters could use their advance wages, their savings, or resources provided by their kin to acquire and trade goods, in addition to porterage work for which they

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123 Jephson Diary, 25 March 1888.
124 Troup, *Rear Column*, 185-6. See also Bonny Diary, 13 December 1887 (E47).
125 This conflict is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
127 The activities of a spirit-possessed woman among the Expedition's Manyema are described in Stanley Diary, 7 September 1888 (E41).
were contracted.\textsuperscript{130} As discussed in the section on rations above, one use for these additional resources was to ensure a porters’ survival. The acquisition and sale of items by porters could also be a strategy of profit. Pruen, a missionary based at the caravan entrepôt of Mpwapwa, noted on the arrival of a caravan from the “far interior,” that a number of its porters had items to sell:

Besides ivory there was quite an assortment of miscellaneous articles, which the owners were only too ready to barter to a white man. One brought me a baby ostrich...which he wanted me to buy for fifteen rupees; and another brought me a talking parrot from Manyuema on the Upper Congo...for which he suggested I should give him forty rupees. I did, in the end, purchase some cloth made from the bark of trees which came from Uganda, and a baby gazelle....\textsuperscript{131}

These items came from a variety of points along the caravan’s route, but all were luxuries, exotic items chosen by the porters for their high value-per-weight and brought to trade settlements or coastal towns where a market for such items was anticipated.\textsuperscript{132} Porters on the Expedition were clearly acquiring items like these, though frequently through looting rather than purchase. Porters clearly made use of these goods during the Expedition, often for purposes of survival. At the trade settlement of Ipoto, for example, some porters exchanged looted ivory for food.\textsuperscript{133} However, there are only minimal accounts of the porters’ behaviour when they returned to the coast and thus no record of whether they kept items for sale and profit there.

**Creating Patronage Relationships**

Some of the Expedition’s porters and some of the Sudanese tried to create patron-client relationships within the Expedition, mostly with the European officers. In times of shortage,
these relationships could be a channel for borrowing or for general assistance.\textsuperscript{134} An example of this strategy is a pleading letter sent by the Zanzibari interpreter John Henry Bishop to Bonny. Bonny considered John Henry something of a protégé: "I had been very kind to this man & had made him my interpreter."\textsuperscript{135} John Henry invoked this relationship as a strategy to avoid impoverishment and hunger in a pleading letter to Bonny sent in February 1888.

Dear Mr. Bonny—

I you please Master, I begging something to you, that is I want a cloth to you because I have no cloth in this days. I got only written one, so be unkind [sic] to me your boy and try to help me, your boy, in a cloth if you please Sir. I beg you my Master, I cannot beg any place again except you my Master, please master be unkind [sic] to me your boy & try to help me in all days & I hope I shall get my answer back.

I am your boy in Christ,

John Henry\textsuperscript{136}

This letter invoked several different ties of dependence: that of servant to master, pseudo-child to adult, and Christian to fellow-Christian. In all of these relationships, Bonny had an obligation to see to John Henry's welfare. In his diary, Bonny placed John Henry's entreaty together with Selim bin Mohammed's appeal for clemency for Bugari Mohammed, the Sudanese soldier condemned to death for desertion. Bonny feared and resented this latter appeal, which he judged to be an attempt by Selim bin Mohammed to set himself up as a "Saviour" of the Expedition's men. John Henry's letter allowed Bonny to see himself in the flattering light of saviour and master to at least one of the men, an effect John Henry must have counted on. There is no record, though, that John Henry received anything as a result of this appeal.

Some of the men's solicitations were successful, though, as Barttelot's provision for manioc and firewood to be brought daily by his servant Uledi to the Sudanese Ahmed el-Shugi

\textsuperscript{134} Rockel notes that headmen and other influential porters also acted as moneylenders for porters who needed additional resources to supplement their food allowances or to pay debts to other porters, "Caravan Porters," 207.

\textsuperscript{135} Bonny Diary, 23 February 1888 (E47).

\textsuperscript{136} Barttelot MS Diary, 9 February 1888; Bonny Diary, 9 February 1888 (E47). There is no indication of the date on which the letter was written.
indicates. The porters who brought unsolicited specimens to add to Jameson's natural history collection may have been trying to establish a patronage relationship as well, as might those who posed for Ward's sketches. Further evidence that strategies of patronage were successful ones for both individuals and groups among the men was the sensitivity of some of the officers on this point. Several of the Rear Column officers quarrelled over what they saw as attempts to create a favoured relationship with the men through the distribution of gifts, extra food, or privileged access to medicine. Some porters—the servant Sali, Mbaruku, and the headman Farag Bill Ali, for example—were known to use information about other porters and the officers as the basis for a patronage relationship with Stanley. The pursuit of such a strategy clearly alienated these porters from the officers. It quite likely alienated them from their fellow porters as well, which would make the pursuit of cooperative strategies by these porters difficult, if not impossible.

Cultivating Ties in Communities En Route

Another strategy porters used to enhance their well-being and to create access to resources was to cultivate relations with members of trade settlements along the line of march. This strategy made most sense along the established caravan routes leading to the east coast, where attention to these relationships could provide long-term benefits to career porters. As many of the areas traversed by the Expedition were off the established routes, few of the porters could build on existing relationships. Nonetheless, porters with the Rear Column relished the opportunity to visit the Zanzibari trade settlement at Stanley Falls.

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137 Troup, Rear Column, 206. In this case, the strategy of entering into a patronage relationship did not ensure survival, as Ahmed el-Shugi died of debility two months later.
138 For example, a sick porter brought Jameson a rare beetle; Story, 190. For Ward's sketching of sick porters, see My Life, 67 and Jameson, Story, 167.
139 Bonny Diary, 12 December 1887, 23 & 28 March 1888 (E47). For a similar quarrel among the Advance Column officers, see Parke, My Experiences, 284.
140 W.G. Stairs to E.M. Barttelot, 12 June 1888 in Stanley Diary, 6 August 1888 (E41).
When Selim bin Mohammed established a settlement at Yambuya, porters visited it, both with permission, but also against the wishes of the Rear Column officers. Porters also enjoyed the visits of members of these communities to the camp. Two months after the Expedition's arrival at Yambuya, for example, during a visit by an outward-bound trading party under Sheik Abdullah Karongo, the porters were found to be exchanging conversation, gifts and food with the Sheik's men.

Ensuring Health

Health was a serious concern for porters, and they developed a variety of strategies to maintain it. These strategies conflicted with the officers' expectations, though. Bonny, for example, complained that the men had to be disciplined before they would care for sick comrades, presenting health care as a problematic part of the order the officers were trying to create on the Expedition. The officers explained the porters' unwillingness to care for each other with a racial stereotype: Africans, they believed, possessed an underdeveloped moral sense, particularly a lack of either empathy or sympathy. Jameson, for example, reported that one morning at Yambuya Bonny had told one of his men to cook some for the sick in his company, and also told him to bring the food, so that he might see it given to the sick. When the man brought it, he went up to the huts where the sick are, and, after seeing some of them, he turned to one of the huts and said, "Who is in here?", at the same time pushing the door open, and was astonished to find a man inside dead and quite cold. When asked, they said it was not long since they had attended to him; but I expect the truth is they had not seen him since yesterday. Unless made to do it, they would not move a hand to help a sick man, but just leave him to die, even if he were their own brother.

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141 One exception was the servant, Salem bin Omari, discussed in the section on Ensuring Health below.
142 For example, John Henry, a Zanzibari who was found to be leaving the camp on a regular basis and had built himself a hut outside the camp, was given 50 lashes. Troup, Rear Column, 214 and Bonny Diary, 22 &23 February 1888 (E47).
143 Bonny Diary, 18 August 1887 (E47).
144 Bonny Diary, 9 December 1887 (E47).
146 Jameson, Story, 167-8.
The lack of practical care or concern for each other among porters, even in situations where familial bonds existed, was in fact a frequent complaint of European travelers in Africa. In the absence of “proper” feeling among the porters, the European were “forced” to minister to the sick.

This racial stereotype was contradicted by the evidence of the officers’ own accounts of the Expedition. The few porters on the Expedition who had family—whether the kinship was biological or social—to appeal to were precisely the ones who did receive care when they were sick. For example, Stanley said of the porter Khalfan, wounded in the neck by a poisoned arrow: “For a Zanzibari he was pretty well nursed as he had a brother and several friends.” As Khalfan’s death occurred eleven days after the injury and for much of this time he had to be specially fed, his care was no light task. In another case, the trader Selim bin Mohammed had one of the Expedition’s sick servants, Salem bin Omari, cared for in his own tent because Selim bin Mohammed was indebted to the young man’s brother. Some porters may have tried to ensure their health by enrolling for the Expedition together with other family members. They were hindered in pursuit of this strategy by the frequent reorganizations and lengthy separations of parts of the Expedition. For example, Msengessi Idi, a porter who died of a stroke after becoming severely agitated about a poisoned arrow wound, had a brother who had been left behind with the Rear Column.

Porters who were sick or injured also counted on a certain amount of care and concern from their colleagues in the kambi. Rockel argues that shared cooking, eating and socializing in the makambi created “real obligations to work-mates and deep friendships.”

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147 See for example, Moloney, With Captain Stairs, 93.
148 Stanley Diary, 21 August 1887 (E37), and IDA, 1:173 &190.
149 Bonny Diary, 10 April 1888 (E47).
150 Parke, My Experiences, 280-2.
151 “Caravan Porters,” 270. It is possible that this difference in attitude was associated with a higher proportion of waungwana as opposed to Nyamwezi porters in the caravan.
Stanley's description of the activity of *makambi* in a camp during his second trek through
the forest illustrates one aspect of this mutual assistance:

> at an Early hour, the Camp was emptied of nearly every able hand excepting
sentries to procure food. In the afternoon, the well furnished foragers
returned often in couples with an immense bunch [of bananas] between
them... During the absence of the foragers the weaker of the messes had
erected the wooden grates, and collected the fuel for the drying.\(^{152}\)

However, at other points during the Expedition it seemed that adequate functioning of a
*kambi* depended on all its members being able-bodied. Those who were not were a drain on
the resources of the group sufficient to jeopardize its well-being. As Stairs reported of the
porters at Ft. Bodo:

> Among the Zanzibaris in a camp... where three or four men are living together,
should one get sick and [be] unable to go for food, the others unanimously
will hunt him out of their mess. What then becomes of him, I ask. *Ah ta cufa
pekiaki* ("Oh, he will die by himself.")\(^{153}\)

It is not clear whether this lack of care was the result of the marginal status and multiple re-
organizations of the porters left at Ft. Bodo, or whether it was an element of caravan practice.
Regardless, injury or illness were potent factors creating unequal access to resources among the
porters. Removing the incapacitated from their usual sources of assistance with food and shelter
exacerbated these inequalities. Not surprisingly, ailing porters were often among those who tried
to create a patronage relationships.

Given the potential lack of assistance from fellow porters, another strategy for coping
with serious illness or injury was suicide. In mid-November 1887 a porter named Simba
received two arrow wounds while out drawing water from a stream near Ibwin. One of the
wounds was serious, a barbed arrow deeply embedded in his abdomen. As Simba would not
allow the arrow to be cut out, Stanley secured it so that it would not penetrate further and then

\(^{152}\) Stanley Diary, n.d., probably mid-July 1888, (E40).
\(^{153}\) Stairs Diary, 20 October 1888. This comment was likely occasioned by the death of Sudi Salmini the previous day. He had been sick for some time before his death, but his position at the top of the list of Rashid's company suggests that he was a senior porter not a marginal one. See Stairs Diary, 10 October 1888;
left him to lie down in his hut. A short time later, a gunshot rang out and those who went to investigate found that Simba had committed suicide "by blowing out his brains."154 Sali, Stanley's servant and his main source of camp gossip, reported the general reaction among the porters to this suicide:

Think of it, Simba, a poor devil owning nothing in all the world, without anything dear to him, neither honor, nor name to commit suicide! Were he a rich Arab, a moneyed Hindoo, a Captain of Soldiers, a Governor of a district, or a white man who had suffered misfortune, dishonor or great shame; Yea! I could understand it, but this Simba no better than a slave, or outcast of Unyanyembe, with no friends in all this world but the few in his own mess in this camp—to go and kill himself. Faugh—Pitch him into the fields and let him rot. 155

This condemnation of Simba's action suggests suicide was not an accepted or popular strategy, though at least two others among the Expedition's porters chose it.156

The porters' strategy of choice for illness or injury was to rely on the healing services they could provide for each other, though they could also be forced to this when the officers had no medicine to treat them.157 In some areas of health care, such as the removal of ticks, porters seem to have had a well-developed system for dealing with what must have been a common occupational health problem.158 In the case of tropical ulcers, which Parke described as the main health problem faced by the porters, their methods were less effective, judging by the widespread

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154 Jepson Diary, 17 November 1887; Stanley Diary, 17 November 1887 (E38); and IDA, 1:273-4.
155 Stanley Diary, 17 & 18 November 1887 (E38). The phrase "outcast of Unyanyembe" is added in the IDA, 1:274 version of this incident.
156 Tam, a porter from the Comoro Islands, threw himself into rapids when he found that he had smallpox; he was one of the few porters for whom vaccination proved unsuccessful. Stanley Diary, 24 September 1888, (E41). Masudi wadi Uledi also known as Mrima committed suicide in late February 1889, apparently dispirited by a severe ulcer on his foot; see Stanley Diary, 23 February 1889 (E 43).
157 See, for example, Bonny Diary, 17 December 1887, (E47). Stanley recorded, likely at the porters' request, a transaction between Muini Kombo and Mabruki Usajara. The latter provided a cure for rheumatism at a charge of $2, Stanley Diary, 1 November 1887 (E37). Stanley Diary, 14 February 1888 (E38) includes a similar transaction for a cure for leprosy. Morgan Morgarewa, and others of the literate porters wrote verses from the Koran on scraps of paper or banana leaf, which were then tied over a sore or injury. These verses were used as cures by themselves, or were used to increase the efficacy of European medicine. See Stairs Diary, 14 September 1888, Stairs, "Shut Up," 56-7. Porters may also have sought medical services from people in communities through which the Expedition passed, though this is not recorded by the officers.
and serious nature of these sores. Parke noted, though, that he “encountered a good deal of obstinacy on the part of our carriers, who, like other aboriginal peoples, had their own primitive remedies, to the use of which they were for a considerable time disposed to cling tenaciously.”

The porters’ main preventative strategy was to avoid the injuries or insect bites which could quickly become serious ulcers. This involved collaborative action, a prime example being that of the warnings about hazards in the path routinely called back along the line of march from those who first encountered them. As is discussed below, porters would also co-operate to avoid exposing others to floggings, which often also led to ulcerated sores. Acquiring dependants or sufficient status to allow the porter to reduce or eliminate the work of carrying loads, collecting and processing food, or other tasks that might bring risk of injury was an additional, individual strategy for maintaining health.

Another strategy, though not always the first one chosen by porters, was to take advantage of the health care available from the officers. This could include medical treatment, assistance with food, lighter duties, and carriage in a canoe or hammock when these were available. The latter two aspects of officers’ care were the ones that porters were most interested in. Exaggerating or feigning illness or injury to obtain these benefits was a common enough strategy to be the subject of humour.

Porters also provided for their well-being through organized recreational activities. These included dancing and story-telling, which were important and long-established parts of the culture of caravan life. Collective and individual religious observance also served to maintain

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159 The nature and causes of the tropical ulcers that afflicted the Expedition’s porters are discussed in Konczacki, “Comments on Disease and Hygiene,” 617-9.
160 “The Ulcer,” 1270-1. Parke’s treatment of ulcers made a slow but, he felt, lasting inroad into the porters’ preference for indigenous medicine.
161 See, for example, IDA, 1:469.
162 See, for example, IDA, 2:4, where Stanley indicated the reasons a porter might be labelled a goi goi (lazy or useless). When called to do work, these porters would come “slowly—lazily—little by little, and say they had pains in the head, or in the body, back, chest, or feet.” This was not only a matter of contravening the expectation of officers, avoiding legitimate work could also subject a porter to the sanction of humour and reproach from other porters.
the mental and emotional health of porters. Porters’ well-being suffered during the Expedition when they were too hungry, tired or discontented to engage in such activities. As Parke noted for the Advance Column, “progressively increasing inanition reduced almost every individual in our ranks to a condition in which he was able to do but little for himself, except what he was compelled to do by the direst necessity, and next to nothing for the general welfare of his suffering comrades.”

Ensuring Good Leadership

Porters desired caravan leadership that was responsive to their concerns and that respected established caravan norms. They operated to eliminate or reduce inappropriate leadership practices. Sometimes they protested; at other times they responded with poor quality work or desertion. Ensuring good leadership for the caravan was an enabling strategy for porters. Without good leadership, the members of a caravan could not count on adequate food and water, or the safety of the caravan. Porters’ benefit from the caravan, whether through the payment of wages and bonuses or through possibilities for extra-curricular activities could also be jeopardized by bad or inexperienced leadership. Porters thus considered it important to sign on with a known and experienced caravan leader, a criterion Stanley met for many porters.

The Rear Column’s difficulties in recruiting porters in the Stanley Falls area is one example of porter concern about caravan leadership. Tippu Tip’s insistence on the hiring of an experienced Zanzibari headman was part of the solution to this problem. While these leadership problems were highlighted in accounts of the Rear Column in order to discredit its officers, it is clear that leadership, involving the issues of both authority and expertise, was a also a concern for the porters in other parts of the Expedition.

\(^{163}\) "The Ulcer," 1270.
This on-going concern was heightened by the divergent views of authority and expertise held by the porters and the Expedition’s leaders. The post of headman was something that Stanley and some of his officers regarded as a privilege to be held at their discretion. Headmen were thus subject to evaluation and discipline just like other porters. An incident early in the Expedition reveals the conflict between this view and the porters’ view that the position of headman and its authority were not easily transferred from one porter to another. Arriving at the Expedition’s camp at Nkalama on the lower Congo, Jameson found that one of the ammunition boxes assigned to his company of porters was missing. When two of headmen sent back over the day’s line of march were unable to find the missing load, Jameson reported the matter to Stanley. Stanley had the headmen who could not account for the missing load publicly flogged by the Somalis, as well as the porter he considered responsible for the loss. The headmen were then demoted to porter status and chained together in the slave chains Stanley kept for disciplinary purposes. The next morning the headmen, still chained, were each made to carry boxes of ammunition. Two other porters were promoted to the status of headman by Stanley, men in whom Jameson had no confidence. He commented despairingly on the effect of these measures on morale: “Mr. Stanley succeeded in breaking up my company, I think for good.” The following day, to Jameson’s intense relief, Tippu Tip interceded with Stanley on behalf of the demoted headmen. Stanley ordered the men unchained and Jameson immediately reinstated them, also returning their Expedition rifles, which had been confiscated. Stanley’s action in this incident not only violated the contracts of men specifically hired to act as headmen, it also violated the porters’ expectations about the personal qualities and experience necessary to hold the position of headman. As Stairs had said in his diary a day earlier of Rashid, the senior headman in his company: he is “a splendid fellow, far away the best of the men...All

164 The entire incident is recounted in Jameson, Story, 24-6. See also Jephson Diary, 18 April 1887.
the men like him and would do anything for him. In this conflict of expectations, porter norms ultimately prevailed, though the prerogative of Stanley to flog and humiliate headmen seems not to have been directly challenged.

This incident also reveals another area of conflict over the exercise of authority in the Expedition. The employment of small sub-groups of different ethnic backgrounds, in this case the Somalis, by European caravan leaders was a recognized practice. It was an innovation, answering a need evident in an imperial context: the need for intermediaries whose loyalty could be ensured through their isolated and dependent position, but who could still operate across the lines of language and culture that few Europeans were able or willing to cross. It was a practice which often inspired resentment and created conflict, but was not singled out for special protest by the porters.

Adapting caravan norms for leadership to his own purposes, Stanley made use of the established forum of the shauri, or consultation with the porters to discuss possible courses of action in times of difficulty. Stanley’s accounts of these consultations suggest a great deal of participatory democracy. They also suggest that porters were free to bring their concerns to Stanley, establishing his authority through appeals to images of European paternalism and to the decision-making practices of the Nyamwezi caravans. In some cases though—the consultation at which Stanley pardoned the porter Mohandu, condemned to hang for desertion, being a notable example—the proceedings were carefully managed to produce the outcome desired by Stanley. However, even if the consultation was sometimes more show than substance, the use of shauris was part of Stanley’s success as a caravan leader. Some of Stanley’s subordinate officers learned from this approach, while others were impatient with it. During a period of doubt and apprehension about the Advance Column’s best course of

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165 Stairs Diary. 17 April 1887.
166 For the latter, see Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 298-9.
167 See Chapter 3, pp. 214-5.
action, for example, Jephson wrote: “Stanley had another rubbing Shauri this morning in which every one gave his opinion & a good many suggestions made as to our plans & much valuable time was wasted in talk which led to nothing as far as any of the suggestions made being followed.”

Stanley’s policy of consultation needs to be viewed in the context of a spectrum of options open to European caravan leaders. While leaders like Karl Peters, who made a point of never consulting with his porters, were condemned even by European contemporaries, few Europeans approached the level of consultation standard in Nyamwezi caravans and maintained to some extent in those of the coast-based traders.

Reliance on headmen for much of the day-to-day management of the porters was another area in which Stanley made a pragmatic adaptation to norms of caravan work. When Bonny appealed a dispute with the headman Rashid to Stanley, wanting Stanley to make Rashid tell the men to follow his orders, Stanley counseled Bonny to leave the men alone. He told Bonny to “let everything go as quietly as possible” and leave direction of the men to the headmen to prevent further desertions. This style of management violated Bonny’s sense of himself as a hero and authority figure, governing and guiding all aspects of the life of those in his charge. While Bonny’s resentment of his ostracism by the other officers heightened his need to control his African subordinates, this tendency appears to have been present to some extent in all of the officers.

Bonny’s confrontation with Rashid also reveals a headman refusing to acquiesce in leadership practices that he saw as a threat to his own authority, and thus to his ability to pursue his own interests and to manage his porters in such a way that they were also able to thrive and

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168 Middleton, *Jephson Diary*, 165. Middleton’s footnote on this passage draws attention to the democratic slant Stanley put on these consultations in his published account of the Expedition.

169 Tippu Tip, for example, balanced episodes of discipline with respect for the knowledge porters had about routes and their suggestions about courses of action. He described occasions on which porters presented unsolicited opinions on such matters, and occasions on which he convened meetings of the *waungwana* and slaves of his caravan to hear their opinions. See el-Murjebi, *Maisha*, sec. 18 & 25.

170 Bonny Diary, 9 September 1888 (E49).
benefit. It raises the question of whether the porters saw overall caravan leadership or the immediate leadership of their headmen as more important to their welfare. A variety of porter protests against the leadership of the European officers are visible in accounts of the Expedition; protest against the problematic leadership of headmen is less visible. One piece of indirect evidence suggesting the importance of good leadership by headmen comes from a comparison of survival and load carrying capacity among the porters of Stairs’ company during a period of difficulty and privation in the forest. One squad of porters under the headman Muini Pemba had a better than average survival rate. Though the survival rate in the squads under Massoudi and Msa Heri was slightly higher, Muini Pemba’s porters had a notably higher capacity for steady, difficult work, suggesting the surviving porters in his squad experienced better physical condition than did porters in other squads.172 Several of the porters in his squad also showed an unusual level of preference for particular loads, possibly choice loads, suggesting the ability of these porters to make decisions about their work was also a factor in their capacity to work well and consistently.173

The periodic reorganizations of the Expedition, which broke the connection of porters to particular headmen, was another problem for both the maintenance of authority by headmen and the ability of porters to benefit from good leadership. The disruption that these reorganizations could cause can be seen at Yambuya. Munichandi, the headman left behind with the Rear Column was given charge of the unruly and weak men culled from several companies. He was "the worst Maniapara" and had "no authority with the men," who did not "care one rush for what he says," the officers complained. The porters responded to Munichandi’s leadership with slow, poor quality work. The officers blamed Stanley for not

171 This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
172 Muini Pemba was a veteran of Stanley’s 1874-77 expedition across Africa. He was subsequently selected by Stanley to accompany him back through the forest to find the Rear Column. Stanley Diary, 14 December 1888 (E41).
173 These observations are drawn from a comparison of two undated load lists and the list of No. 2
leaving behind a headman “whom the men would respect and obey.”

They believed that the problem lay in Munichandi’s personal inadequacies, rather than in the difficult position in which the re-organization placed him. They also did not take into account the difficulty Munichandi had exercising leadership in a situation where the porters did not consider the work they were assigned to be important to either their profit or their welfare.

The recognition of porter’s geographical expertise was another, somewhat different issue. In traversing unfamiliar territory, as was often the case with the Expedition, the expertise of Zanzibari guides was of less direct use than on well-established routes. An incident in early July 1888, when Stanley was trying to find a way back through the forest to Yambuya illustrates the potential for conflict between the geographical expertise embodied in compass and map and that embodied in persons who knew the local paths. Two local women, captured by porters guided the caravan on three consecutive days. Stanley, who had been taking compass readings was convinced they were being led in circles. The porters, though, “were so wedded to their belief that the natives knew their own country best, that in a fit of spleen, I permitted them to rest in that opinion.” Only when they re-entered the campsite they had occupied four days earlier did the porters recognize that they had been led astray. The women were threatened with death, but eventually merely demoted to the rear to carry food. Stanley, “with compass in hand” then set out triumphantly at the head of the column. While this was a morality tale about the quality of his leadership and the powers of his scientific instruments for Stanley, there is no evidence that the porters involved experienced it as an epiphany that led them to abandon their faith in local geographic knowledge.

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174 Barttelot, Life, 116, and Jameson, Story, 77.
175 This incident is described in Stanley Diary, July 1888 (E40) and 10 July 1888 (E41). Stanley’s fit of spleen may have originated in the unspoken acknowledgment of his inability to force the porters to recognize his expertise, an indirect testimony to the strength of porter norms.
Dealing with Discipline

The issue of leadership was connected to that of order, in that one response to problematic European leadership was to subvert the order the officers attempted to establish on the Expedition. Porter strategies to avoid discipline or to mitigate its harshness are of particular interest. The importance of such strategies for the health of porters has been mentioned. There were likely additional, psychological benefits to avoiding the humiliation of public corporal punishment and to maintaining a familiar order based on widely accepted norms enforced by peers.

The porters’ protest against the death sentence pronounced on the Zanzibari translator John Henry at Yambuya shows the strength of their feeling against capital punishment. This feeling was also evident in their discontent when John Henry died a few days after the severe flogging which had been substituted for the planned execution.176 There was, however, no protest against capital punishment when Stanley executed Mabruki bin Ali in September 1887. While the death penalty for porter crimes was not unknown in Nyamwezi caravans, it was generally carried out only after a hearing involving the concerned parties and senior members of the caravan. The power of life and death over porters also seems to have been forbidden to the Nyamwezi merchant elite after the early 1880s.177 The strength of the porters’ protest in John Henry’s case can be gauged from the fact that despite his record of thefts from other porters and his minority status as a Christian convert, they were willing to take collective action to prevent what they believed was inappropriate punishment.

The frequency and severity of flogging on the Expedition also occasioned protests to Stanley. Porters complained about several of the officers, not just those of the Rear

176 See John Henry’s case was discussed in Chapter 3; see also Bonny Diary, 25 April 1888 (E47).
177 Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 301.
Deserters from the Advance Column also indicated that floggings ordered by officers, including Stanley, were one of the reasons for their desertion. Disapproval of the disciplinary measures used in both the Rear and Advance Columns was also implicit in the occasional intervention of Tippu Tip in the Expedition. It was also evident in the difficulty he had recruiting porters for Expedition in areas where tales about the rigors of Expedition life were circulating.

The flogging of Expedition porters went far beyond the standards of labour discipline accepted in caravans led by coast-based merchants or in Nyamwezi ones. Nonetheless, porters who did not protest through desertion—and many did—appeared to accept flogging as something to be grudgingly tolerated on European caravans. As Parke noted, though the porters were very “clannish,” if one of the officers commanded them to carry out a flogging, they would “immediately seize on one of their comrades, hold him down, and give him the rod, till told to stop.” At the same time the porters acted, both individually and collectively, to obscure punishable behavior from the eyes of the officers. After the detection of porter “crimes,” the officers frequently complained that porter solidarity prevented the apprehension of the culprits. Stanley dealt with this problem by maintaining special informants among the Zanzibaris.

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178 In *IDA*, 2:2-11 Stanley created a scene in which the Rear Column porters poured out their grievances. This scene does not appear in either Stanley or Bonny’s diaries. Stanley, though, does seem to have investigated the conduct of the Rear Column officers and recorded in his diary some of the extreme disciplinary measures ordered by officers of both the Rear and Advance Columns. Stanley Diary, 24 August 1888 (E41).

179 Bonny Diary, 15 & 27 October 1887 (E47).

180 Tippu Tip, writing to his brother and son, said: “I sent my people to the place where Major Barttelot had his camp, who saw the Zanzibar people receiving bad treatment & after 4 months most part of the Zanzibaris deserted... Stanley, some of these reached the surrounding village & others were killed by the Washenzi & those who could reach said that they received bad treatment & no food. The people on hearing this were terrified & ran away from us also.” Translation of Hamed bin Mohammed el Murjebi to Mahomed Masood & Saif bin Ahmed, n.d., MP 88/36. See also E.M. Barttelot to W. Mackinnon, 28 March 1888 and J.R. Troup to F. de Winton, 18 October 1887, both in MP 85/17.

181 *My Experiences*, 326 & 327.

182 See, for example, Jameson, *Story*, 93.

183 See, for example, Stanley Diary, 27 July 1888 (E41).
Inappropriate forms of informal discipline were also the subject of protest, though not as consistently. For example, when Bonny struck a porter with Barttelot’s iron-tipped walking stick, severely cutting his head, the porter “wrenched [the stick] out of Bonny’s hands & was about to strike him when [Stanley’s] boy Sali, shouted to him to beware.” The angry porter broke the stick in two and, “his face streaming with blood,” brought it before Stanley as evidence of his complaint. A similar incident, in which Stairs used an iron-tipped stick to strike a porter, in the process piercing his shoulder, led to a good deal of openly mutinous talk and insubordination at Ft. Bodo. However, an incident in which Jephson beat recalcitrant porters with a stick, cutting open the head of one man who refused to take up his load, occasioned no protest. A head injury for a porter was crucial, as it made it difficult, if not impossible for him to carry a load.

Several writers, both contemporaries and modern scholars, suggest that porters preferred flogging to other punishments, particularly a suspension of rations, but also fines, confinement, or punitive labour. This preference can be seen in an incident at Yambuya in August 1887. In response to a series of thefts by Rear Column porters and soldiers, the officers instituted collective punishments as a means of forcing the men to identify the culprits. As a second week without a food allowance loomed, giving rise to much discontent, delegations of both Zanzibaris and Sudanese protested to Barttelot. Both groups accepted a compromise in which Abdullah, the porter who had last used the axe, would be given fifty lashes and the men’s allowance would be resumed. Abdullah was punished the

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184 Stanley Diary, 16 October 1888 (E41).
185 Parke MS Diary, 21 July 1888 as quoted in Lyons, Surgeon-Major, 107; Parke, My Experiences, 252-3.
186 Jephson Diary, 11 November 1887. Jephson was conscious at the time of the inappropriateness of his action, but justified himself in his diary with a plea of bad temper due to fever. He also noted the many earlier days in which he had been patient in the face of great provocation from reluctant porters.
187 Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 312-16 offers a discussion of standards of discipline and some evidence of a porter preference for flogging over fines from the travels of Joseph Thomson. See also Killingray, “The ‘Rod of Empire’,” 207 for a similar preference on the part of African soldiers in colonial armies.
188 Jameson, Story, 108.
following day, and "from the quiet way in which he received [the flogging], I begin to think that he stole the axe himself, or lost it," commented Jameson. However, several weeks later five Sudanese soldiers were revealed to be responsible for the theft.\textsuperscript{189} Apparently Abdullah had been persuaded to accept the role of scapegoat by other porters, despite their bitter dislike of the Sudanese. An unjust flogging was clearly preferable, in the porters' estimation, to the threat posed to their collective welfare by the lack of a food allowance. A second stoppage of the food allowance began on October 30\textsuperscript{th} and while it lasted less than two weeks, it was followed shortly by another stoppage beginning on 15 November 1887. After two weeks the Sudanese refused to work unless their pay was resumed. They were only persuaded to return to duty when, in a confrontation, Barttelot called for his revolver.\textsuperscript{190}

\textbf{Desertion}

Desertion was not always a measure of last resort for porters. It could function as a means of improving welfare long before the point of desperation was reached, or as strategy for improved benefit. It was a risky strategy, though, and the decision to pursue it depended on porters' perceptions of their chances of survival and profit with Expedition versus elsewhere. The risk of desertion was naturally lessened when porters were on familiar ground along the established caravan routes. This was one of the reasons Stanley had argued for the Congo route to Equatoria—Zanzibar and home would be ahead of the porters not behind them. The Expedition's porters, however, interpreted their options somewhat differently. Some of those who deserted desired to return to Zanzibar, but others were attracted by the possibilities in communities along the route. It was no accident that most desertions occurred near Zanzibari or Manyema trade settlements. Desertions of desperation, though, were likely to occur if one or

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 135.
more porters experienced something that suddenly changed their perception of the risk of staying with the Expedition—the threat of serious punishment, for example—whether or not there were nearby communities or caravans to accept them.

The deserters whose stories are most clearly presented in the Expedition accounts are those who were partially successful: they survived to reach a trade settlement, but were forcibly returned to the Expedition by the leader of the settlement. A group of deserters brought to Barttelot and Troup at Yallasulla provide an insight into the hopes and the fate of men who left the Advance Column. They were a subset of a group of eight that had arrived at Abdullah Korona's camp at Upoi. Among these men were seven who had deserted Stanley and one who had been left behind due to illness. The deserters had gone ahead of the column, deliberately taken the wrong path, and then lay down to hide in the grass until the Column had passed. The deserters offered various reasons for their choice. They told Tippu Tib's people that they left Stanley because "nearly every day they were fighting natives who used poisoned arrows, and there was some kind of fly where they were, whose bites nearly killed them." The deserters told Bonny, who questioned them separately, that they deserted because the Europeans flogged them a lot. Many porters were choosing to desert because of the increasingly harsh discipline, they said, implying that desertion was a form of individual protest as well as a powerful collective bargaining tactic by porters. These deserters told Bonny that the Advance Column had only had small fights with the indigenes. Also, while there was no manioc, bananas and goats were plentiful, though there were areas of shortage in places where there were no villages.

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190 Bonny Diary, 15 & 29 November 1887 (E47).
191 Jameson, Story, 154. Mufta, who provided these details claimed that only seven men deserted Stanley. Dahoma, the sick man, said there were eight deserters, with himself making nine.
192 Jameson, Story, 148.
193 See, for example, the use of the threat of mass desertion in the case of John Henry Bishop discussed above.
194 Bonny Diary, 15 & 27 October 1887 (E47).
deserted because they were "badly treated about food. Although there was plenty of manioc and plantains on the road, Mr. Stanley would not allow them to take it, and in fact often took manioc from them." The deserters had a variety of goods with them: ivory, cloth, clothes, and guns taken from the Expedition, as well as spears, knives, and other items taken from villages on their way back down the Aruwimi. The sick man, Dahoma, stayed behind at Abdullah's camp, as did Mufta, a deserter injured after leaving Stanley. Five of the deserters went on to Stanley Falls, while Abdullah kept one man at his camp to show him the way to the place where the deserters said ivory could be found. The Stanley Falls deserters took their stocks of ivory to Tippu Tip, offering it in exchange for his help. Like earlier deserters from the Advance Column, they wished to return to Zanzibar. Despite the request for his protection, Tippu Tip turned the deserters over to Barttelot and Troup, but, concerned for their well-being, he elicited a promise that Barttelot would not punish them till Stanley returned. In early September 1888, Selim bin Mohammed returned to Stanley an additional group of ten or eleven deserters who had gone to Stanley Falls. They had all deserted with their Expedition rifles and other equipment, and most had also taken their loads with them.

Near Ipoto, Jephson found one of a pair of porters—Sadi Manijapara and Hatib wadi Khamis—who had deserted on the Advance Column’s first day out from the settlement. The two porters had each taken their rifles and, between them, a box of ammunition. The porter Jephson found was dying. He had lost his companion and the box of ammunition, though he still

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195 Jameson, Story, 183-4.
196 Jameson, Story, 152.
197 The arrival of the deserters with ivory and stories of plenty more up the Aruwimi River had caused considerable excitement at Stanley Falls and other settlements. Bonny Diary, 25 October 1887 (E47).
198 See, for example, Bonny Diary, 31 October 1887 (E47).
199 Stanley Diary, 7 September 1888 (E41).
200 Stanley Diary, 27 October 1888 (E37). Comparing these names with the Smith, Mackenzie Muster Roll, suggests that both were likely experienced porters. Sadi Munijapara may have been the headman Sadi wadi Balozi (#7) or alternatively, Sadi Bateman (#462). Two porters with the name Hatib wadi Khamis were listed on the muster roll, one was also among the originally hired headmen.
had his rifle. Presumably the two deserters had made plans to go somewhere other than Ipoto. In this case, though, neither travel experience, a partner, nor a stock of weapons and ammunition were sufficient to achieve the deserters’ aims. One of the two deserters had then attempted to return to the settlement, but was too reduced by hunger to reach it.

Earlier, after an encounter with a small group of Manyema ivory traders in the forest, there had been a spate of desertions and a strong feeling of discontent among the porters. This stemmed from the “bad food, heavy loads, and...the long dreary marches through the bush, [with] the men doubting greatly that we shall ever get out of the bush.” In this context, it was not only the strong and the bold who planned to desert. Stairs put in chains one porter caught in the attempt whom he described as “a poor sort of chap and not the kind of man one would imagine a deserter.” While reasonable health clearly increased the deserters’ chances of success, it was not a pre-requisite, particularly in cases where staying with the Expedition held out no hope of improvement. Of the fifty-some severely incapacitated porters left behind with Nelson at Starvation Camp, approximately thirty deserted, some in large groups. Stairs’ headman, Jumah Unyamwezi, together with eight other porters and two servants, took the biggest canoe in the camp one night and headed down-river together. Suedi and Rehani, two porters who deserted from the group that had gone ahead with Stanley, came into Nelson’s camp another night and attempted to steal some of the goods stored there. They ended up taking another of the canoes and headed off down the river accompanied by six of Nelson’s porters.

There were also desertions from the Rear Column. A porter nicknamed Kuja deserted on the 13th of February. Bonny indicated that he had deserted to join a party of Zanzibaris from Stanley Falls who were travelling to Abdullah’s camp upriver. It is possible that Kuja deserted

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201 Jephson Diary, 4 November 1887. Jephson left this deserter to die in the road, believing it would be “a salutary lesson to the men who are with me not to run away unless they want to die of hunger.”
202 Stairs Diary, 3-4 September 1887.
203 Stairs Diary, 4 September 1887.
204 Jephson Diary, 28 October 1887. Accounts of the number of porters left with Nelson vary from
because he feared retaliation from the Sudanese, since he was responsible for the recapture of Bugari Mohammed, the Sudanese soldier who had been executed three days earlier. At any rate, when Ward called upon Kuja to explain his actions, his "defence was that he had no sense." Ward offered no indication that he challenged this explanation. The claim of "no sense" played shrewdly and with blatant sarcasm on the officers' limited, stereotypic ideas about Africans. It also pointed to differing interpretations of the options for survival and profit available to the porters. The porters, having taken pains to cultivate relations with the Zanzibari traders in the area, clearly viewed a change in employer as a viable, albeit not risk-free strategy for improving their situation. The officers believed that the porters were best off staying with the Expedition. Employment with a European traveller offered "steady work & steady pay," but some porters preferred the opportunities and freedom of life in the trade diaspora, even though they were not often paid if they became the dependants of a Zanzibari trader. However, the measures designed to prevent and punish desertion as well as to isolate returned deserters from the other men indicate a persistent fear that the porters would not understand their best interests in the same way the officers did.

The officers had a racially-based image of porters as lacking in foresight, prudence, and the ability to learn from mistakes. However, the evidence of porter action suggests that deserters were well aware of the risks associated with their activities. A campfire fable, which Stanley ascribed to Farjallah Bilali, suggests that porters were not unaware of recapture, punishment and death as risks of desertion, but that death was sometimes preferable to continuing with their

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205 Stanley, Story, 207. Kuja's role in the recapture was discussed in Chapter 3.

206 This incident is described in Ward, My Life, 75 and Bonny Diary, 15 February 1888 (E47). Troup, who also mentions it, said the runaway could "give no account of himself; we think he is a little off his head," Rear Column, 213.

207 In contrast, when Jameson made inquiry into a knife fight among the porters, he was told by the man he considered the aggressor that "the devil had entered into him, and made him do it." Jameson was clearly not impressed by this explanation, and proposed to drive out the devil with a flogging, Story, 146.

208 Jephson Diary, 3 September 1887.
current employer.

An ass one time made friends with a camel, & complained grievously to one another of weary burdens. The ass proposed to camel to desert. Ah but said the camel you are not fit companion for such work you are too fond of braying, & your bray would betray us. No, I solemnly promise, overpersuaded the camel consented, & one [fit morning] both took their departure & travelled till 10 a.m. When feeling tired both agreed to rest. Camel laid down & cropped belly full—Ass stood up & browsed untill also filled. 'When Ass said How do you feel camel. Quite contented replied camel. Do you know Camel I should quite like to sing to relieve my joy. Ah did I not warn you, you were not fit Companion, better restrain yourself or you will betray us. Nonsense, said Ass. We are a long distance off now. [May] you had better take my advice or I know what will happen. What is it? Why our master will hear & catch us. You of course will return. As for me, I shall remain here & you will bend under weight of my [meat]. Pooh what a gloomy companion you have become & then Ass was unable to contain himself set up a [triumphant] bray. The Master & his servants heard, quickly came. Szieed on ass, & with sticks belaboured camel. The latter resolved to die stirred not & master in rage cut its throat, cut up the [meat] loaded his servants & ass with meat, as Camel foretold.209

Interestingly, in this fable, the danger most feared by the deserters and the danger they actually experienced came from their master, not from anything they met with outside the caravan. This fable may have been a disguised criticism of Stanley, since Mabruki bin Ali, the deserter executed a month earlier had been a slave-porter belonging to Farjallah Bilali. Nonetheless, Stanley and the officers continually harangued the porters with the threat of cannibalistic "natives" as a disincentive to desertion. "I took the occasion this morning at muster," Stanley noted after the porters Mbaruku Kirangozi and Muini Ku had been missing several days, "to point out to the people how after gaining for themselves money & honor these two men deliberately & of their own accord sought to find their graves, in the entrails of cannibals."210

Porters tended to be fairly contemptuous of the indigenes, though, an attitude fostered by both the size of the Expedition and their possession of functional breech-loaders. The presence of numerous porter skeletons along parts of the Expedition’s trail, some still clad in rags of clothing

209 Stanley Diary, 21 October 1888 (E41). Farjala Bilali [Muster Roll #30] or Farjalla wadi Bill Ali was a porter promoted to headman. Stanley described him as a “Congo man,” indicating previous work for the CFS. Stanley Diary, 14 December 1888 (E41).

210 Stanley Diary, 11 September 1888 (E41).
and clutching undisturbed bags of supplies, suggests that cannibalism and persecution by indigenous peoples were greatly over-rated threats.  

The level of risk in deserting to join a trade settlement in the forest depended on whether the deserters had acquired some ivory, trade goods, special expertise, or a gun so as not to enter the Zanzibari trade diaspora at its lowest level. Accounts of these ivory-raiding bands and of trade settlements in the region indicate that the highly dependent followers that traders recruited locally tended to be of low status. They consequently made a relatively poor and precarious living. Avoiding such status would allow deserters a better chance of a decent living and of upward mobility. A breech-loader was particularly helpful in this regard, as many of those in the raiding parties had “not yet attained to the dignity of a gun.” When the Rear Column experienced a number of desertions near trade settlements between Yambuya and Banalya, Barttelot complained that the porters had been told “by certain of the Arabs” that “if you come to us we will make you great men, but bring your rifle and load.” Minimizing the risk of desertion also depended on finding a patron who would be willing to keep deserted porters despite demands for their return by the Expedition’s officers. Two deserters from the Rear Column, Bartholomew and Msa, tried to enter Tippu Tib’s service while at Stanley Falls. They attempted to smooth this change in employment with a stock of goods taken from the officers. Tippu Tip, however, had the two placed in chains when their thefts were discovered, and turned them over to Jameson. When the two deserters later escaped, Tippu Tip had them recaptured and returned to Yambuya. Some porters were successful in finding asylum with Tippu Tip’s chief rival in the eastern Congo, Said bin Habib, though. Others were able to take advantage of the cupidity of distant subordinates of Tippu Tip’s to avoid being returned to Expedition.

211 Jephson Diary, 6 January 1888.
212 Ward, My Life, 86. See also, Salmon, Le Voyage, 76.
213 E.M. Barttelot to W. Mackinnon, 3 July 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers.
Evaluating the Success of these Strategies

Stanley expected substantial losses among the Expedition’s porters, due both to death and to desertion.215 He was not to be disappointed. Of the 620 Zanzibaris he employed, 225 returned with the Expedition to Zanzibar in 1889. Of those who were lost, 136 were considered deserters and 259 died.216 The survival rate among the porters who did not desert was 46 percent. The heaviest loss of life was among the porters of the Rear Column, whose survival rate while at Yambuya was only 35 percent.217

In common with Assad Farran, I consider that access to food was the most serious problem the Expedition’s porters faced.218 The porters consequently had well-developed, multiple strategies to deal with the lack of access to food. Though the hunger experienced by members of the Expedition was extreme, large food surpluses were not to be taken for granted by porters in caravans travelling elsewhere in East-Central Africa. As the size of caravans and the distances they covered increased in the late nineteenth century, strategies for access to food became increasingly important for porters. As will be seen in Chapter 6, the exercise of some of these strategies also had a significant impact on the communities through which caravans passed, particularly those unaccustomed to regular caravan traffic and those located near the violent frontier of the ivory trade.

Hunger, disability and death were, however, not universal experiences for porters on the Expedition. As was noted in Chapter 3, in both the Advance and Rear Columns, visible inequities developed between a small group of porters who managed well despite the hardships of both the forest march and the camp, and the majority who did not. It is difficult

214 Jameson, Story, 128-9 & 141.
215 HMS to W. Mackinnon, 3 September 1888, MP 85/20.
216 HMS to Euan Smith, 19 December 1889, published as Africa No. 4 (1890), 16.
217 HMS amendments to the Rear Column Log, n.d. (E51).
218 Assad Farran, Account of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, BMS Archives. This account was
to determine which porter strategies were responsible for this relative success, since it is not easy to identify the groups of porters who did well. Nonetheless, it appears that collective action to ensure that porters received the rations to which they were entitled was important, especially in the Rear Column. The success of this strategy and the potential for collective action to obtain higher pay was limited, though, by the small stock of trade goods carried by the Expedition and the limited amounts of food available in many areas. Porters consequently emphasized individual and small group strategies, such as foraging and looting while the caravan was on the move. In stationary camps like Yambuya, they favoured pilfering, theft and illicit trade.

One small group strategy that was crucial was the formation of *makambi*, though the Expedition provides mixed evidence of the strength of these groups in times of extreme difficulty. However, an indirect indicator of the importance and the success of this strategy was that it was adopted by the Sudanese soldiers on the Expedition. In the journey up the Congo, Stairs was struck by how poorly the soldiers looked after themselves:

> At making themselves comfortable in camp and in foraging for food they are not a patch on the Zanzibaris. Why, when we draw up to the shore at nights to camp, the Zanzibaris in fifteen minutes have their fires going, their shelters made and pots boiling, whereas one sees these Soudanese wandering aimlessly about, bemoaning their fate....In fact, [they] do anything but make themselves comfortable.\(^{219}\)

By the time they reached Yambuya, the Sudanese soldiers had learned some things about making camp from the Zanzibari porters, particularly cooperation in domestic work through the formation of "messes." This greatly improved the condition of the Sudanese.\(^{220}\)

In dealing with hunger as well as other difficulties on the Expedition, the porters also relied on indigenous knowledge and labour. These were often accessed through dependants

\(^{219}\) Stairs Diary, 2 June 1887. As a result, Stairs observed, many of the Sudanese suffered disproportionately from ulcerated sores and other complaints. See also Troup, *Rear Column*, 72.

\(^{220}\) E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.
acquired along the way. Indigenes provided information about the location of food, as well as knowledge of the preparation of new foods. This was particularly important in the unfamiliar environment of the forest. Captured indigenes also acted as intermediaries in the trade for food, as will be seen in Chapter 6. The labour of indigenes, especially of women, whether appropriated indirectly in the form of food taken from local fields, or directly in the form of dependants was also important for porters.

Control over work, addressed through a combination of collective and individual strategies, seems to have been the other issue important for porter survival, and likely for their profit as well. Establishing a preferred schedule of work, ensuring good leadership, mitigating discipline, and preserving some autonomy for activity beyond carrying loads were all important to porters. The latter seemed particularly important for the non-professional porters supplied to the Expedition by Tippu Tip. Porters used this autonomy for looting, independent trading, acquiring dependants, or for cultivating ties in communities along the way. As was noted in the analysis of Stairs' load lists, control over work is an intriguing explanation for the differing capacity of porters to do the most demanding work on the Expedition—regularly carrying loads of ammunition in a situation of extreme privation. Whether this control over work was achieved through working under a good headman, making a choice of preferred loads, or as a result of patronage is not clear, however.

Conclusion

The wealth of documentation about the Expedition allows an unprecedented look at the experience of porters on large caravans, even though European leadership and the forest route were not typical for most contemporary caravans. I have not given much attention to the methodological problems of extracting the voices of porters from the texts of the officers. However, I believe that supplementing the analysis of diaries and letters with the
quantitative analysis of lists of deaths, illnesses, loads, punishments, rewards, and transactions between porters can provide some access to the experience of porters on the Expedition, even though these lists were shaped by the concerns of the European officers who kept them.

Glimpses of the porters’ experience obtained in this way reveal that they did strategize around their involvement with the Expedition. They were not merely reacting to the initiatives of the Europeans running the Expedition. The activities of the Expedition’s porters are thus a concrete example of the existence of powers and plans on the African as well as the European side of late nineteenth century imperial encounters. The relative scale of these plans and the scope of the powers possessed by these two groups were not always congruent, however. Further, the porters’ ideas about caravan life and work in general, and about the Expedition in particular, acted as both a resource for and a limit on the ideas and powers of Stanley, his officers, and the Expedition’s sponsors.

Finally, the successful functioning of the Expedition as a caravan depended on its ability to accommodate and incorporate many of the porter strategies discussed here. Indeed, as was noted in Chapter 3, Stanley’s success as a caravan leader and an explorer was based on the incorporation into his style of caravan management of many practices derived from the regional caravan trade. The hybrid nature of his methods was always obscured in the textual reconstruction of his travels for European audiences, though.
Chapter 5
Fidelity and Heroism: White Men in Africa

Just as the previous chapter focused on the porters, this one examines another distinct group within the Expedition—the Europeans. This group is broader than the Expedition’s officers, since it also included Stanley’s servant William Hoffmann. In Chapter 3 I looked at the European officers’ efforts to construct an order out of the persons and things around them. In this chapter I look at their construction of themselves as characters and historical actors of a particular kind. I examine their construction of themselves as white men and as gentlemen since their African travels brought to the fore race and class as elements in their identities. I suggest the implications of these self-constructions for the conduct of the Expedition and for the debates the Expedition sparked in the home societies of these men.

The Europeans on the Expedition were not inventing themselves, but conducting and evaluating themselves in relation to established models of behaviour. They did not see themselves as creating an identity—though in retrospect they were contributing to a process of identity creation—so much as striving to attain or to remain faithful to one. Fidelity, together with related terms like loyalty, thus appears frequently in contemporary writing about the Expedition as well as in the accounts of its European participants.¹ Fidelity implies a relationship to established models conduct, but it does not mean that these are taken-for-granted, inevitable, or static. This approach allows a look at the constructed and contingent nature of particular roles and at the identities individuals built around them.

¹ Fidelity refers to the qualities of “faithfulness, loyalty, [and] unswerving allegiance.” In the nineteenth century, it was used in phrases like “staunch fidelity to the expedition” in descriptions of arctic exploration. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. on-line, s.v. fidelity.
To begin with, I present some of the tools and processes used by the Expedition’s European members to maintain and build identities for themselves while in Africa. As travellers in Africa, their characters and bodies were sites of potential disorder. They used various methods for maintaining fidelity to the Expedition and to their images of themselves to address this worrisome problem. Second, I look at the way one of the lower-status Europeans on the Expedition made use of these tools to construct himself as a gentleman traveller. Interestingly, this process of self-construction through travel in Africa had parallels with the self-construction of porters as waungwana through participation in regional caravan trade, as discussed in Chapter 4. Third, I examine two strong challenges to the maintenance of fidelity by white men in Africa—the African environment and the necessity of interacting with “savage” Africans. Finally, I investigate the way in which Europeans on the Expedition constructed themselves as historical agents by examining the process through which a man became a hero by travelling in Africa. In particular, I study Stanley’s self-construction as a heroic white man and as a historical agent. His self-construction was closely linked to the issue of efficacy, raised in Chapter 3, in that it involved the effective exercise of certain powers. It also involved managing and at times limiting the agency of others associated with the Expedition.

**Fidelity**

In Stanley’s opinion, “breach of promise” was to blame for the many deaths and disasters on the Expedition.² The porters broke their contracts by deserting at the least provocation, anxious to “escape the tyranny of work,” or failed to obey orders about such things
as foraging. The wreck of the Rear Column was the result of wilful "breach of contract" by TippuTip and the Rear Column officers' "dereliction of duty," Stanley believed. Tippu Tip's conduct was allegedly the product of a habitually "fraudulent and perfidious manner." The officers' behaviour, on the other hand, Stanley ascribed variously to their inexperience, to their "indifference" or forgetfulness of his instructions, or to outright "revolution" and mutiny.

Stanley also initially interpreted the failure of Emin Pasha, Jephson and the Equatoria garrisons to rendezvous as arranged at Fort Bodo as a "breach of promise." For their part, Tippu Tip and Stanley's officers all felt that Stanley had broken elements of his contracts with them. Emin Pasha and the Committee sponsoring the Expedition also felt that Stanley had let them down.

In various ways, the issue of fidelity stands at the heart of the Expedition. But how is fidelity to be understood in this context? While Stanley's rants about "breach of promise" indicate the importance of the issue, they are also a narrow approach to it. The Expedition's European members believed that its success depended on the maintenance of both their physical capacity and the integrity of their character and purpose. Stanley summed up this belief: "As an Army is what its officers may be, an African Expedition is precisely what the Europeans attached to it make it." He went on to praise the Advance Column officers' courage, intelligence, daring, confidence, skill, energy, physical fitness, loyalty, diligence,

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2 IDA, 1:509-510 and 2:21 & 24, for example.
3 HMS to Euan-Smith, 19 December 1889 in Africa No. 4 (1890), 6. See also IDA, 1:195.
5 For Tippu Tip's conduct see HMS's deposition in Emin Pasha Relief Committee versus Ahmed bin Mahommed al Marjiba, 26 December 1889, British Consular Court, Zanzibar, copy in Barttelot Family Papers. For the conduct of the Rear Column officers, see HMS to Euan-Smith, 19 December 1889 in Africa No. 4 (1890), 10; HMS to W. Mackinnon, 12 August 1888, MP 86/29; and "Notes," August 1888, HMS Diary (E41). Contrarily, in several official statements on the problems of the Rear Column much was made of Barttelot's "anxiety to discharge his responsibilities with fidelity" which led him to a "too strict and literal adherence" to Stanley's orders after circumstances arose which required independent judgement; see Report to the Subscribers, 69 & 73.
unobtrusiveness, consideration, kindness, and self-restraint, all in the face of privation, illness, unpleasant daily duties, a dearth of praise from their leader, and an uncertain outcome for the Expedition. "The above mentioned officers," Stanley concluded, "were gentlemen." Stanley attempted to manage his European subordinates, both on the march and back in Europe, by invoking expectations of gentlemanly conduct. As both his officers and contemporary commentators pointed out, this was not a standard of behaviour by which Stanley allowed himself to be limited.

The debates about the Expedition raised questions about heroes, and even more uncomfortable ones about gentlemen. The latter was a role in which moral and socio-economic attributes wrestled with one another. Stanley, while not born a gentleman, had become a prominent public figure. As will be discussed below, he was in the process of making himself a heroic traveller and state-founder. After the Expedition, he succeeded in being recognized, at least by the British and American press, as "the chief hero of the hour." While Stanley could be agreed to be a successful man of action, and thus a hero in some senses of the word, he was clearly not the ideal figure who would "unite the courage and resource of the hero with the manners of the gentleman and the morals of a saint."

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6 HMS to Euan-Smith, 19 December 1889 in Africa No. 4 (1890), 10.
7 HMS to W. Mackinnon, 25 March 1890, MP 86/30.
8 Ibid.
9 See, for example, "Mud-Throwing and Running Away," St. James Gazette, 28 October 1890, JRTC, vol. III.
12 Ibid. See also, the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. on-line, s.v. hero, which differentiates between two relevant meanings of hero: one a man "distinguished by extraordinary valour and martial achievements" and the other a man who "exhibits extraordinary bravery, firmness, fortitude, or greatness of soul" and is "admired and venerated for his achievements and noble qualities."
Acknowledging, as many contemporaries did, that Stanley had accomplished a great deal in Africa raised the question of whether heroic men who were successful agents of empire could also be gentlemen. Or, put another way, did the training and the self-understanding of a gentleman equip a man to survive in Africa? Further, were such men able by their presence and their action to transform Africa from "savage" chaos to "civilized" order? Gentlemen in Africa were consequently ambiguous creatures. Both fidelity and heroism might involve them in situations where they must admit their powers to transform Africa were limited. If these powers were perfect, after all, gentlemen would have no obdurately "other" Africa against which to measure and test themselves. If they were not threatened by the loss of their powers and positive qualities, their sojourn in Africa would satisfy neither themselves nor their readers.

Fidelity is also raised as a key problem in exploration and imperialism by Law's work on the Portuguese route to the Indies. Law suggests that the long-distance control exercised by the Portuguese depended as much on the fidelity of its envoys as it did on their mobility or forcefulness, the qualities to which the successes of Portuguese expansion are usually ascribed. Law argues more broadly that "[i]f the West achieved hegemony," it was due to revolutions in their "methods for creating loyal, mobile, yet otherwise passive agents." These were knowledgeable and skilful agents who were able to apply their energies to an imperial enterprise, while possessing limited freedom to make decisions about its course or character. This raises intriguing questions about the physical, social, and psychological forces brought to bear on the overseas envoys of imperial powers, questions which Law does

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13 "On the methods," 256.
14 Law, "Editor's Introduction," 17. As noted in Chapter 1, Law places unnecessary emphasis on the need for passivity or docility on the part of the persons in imperial networks.
not address. For example, what were the practices by which the Expedition's European members attempted to make agents of themselves and of each other? Agents who would be both loyal and effective at a distance from the society and institutions which sent them out. Did these efforts help or hinder the work of the Expedition? How were these strategies of fidelity reinforced by texts and objects? What fears of physical, moral, political or economic infidelity preoccupied the European members of the Expedition? These questions mesh with the observation, made by scholars who look at travel from a cultural studies perspective, that "going native" was a persistent fear for nineteenth century Europeans in Africa.15

Ceremonies of Identity

For Europeans, maintaining personal integrity and capacity while travelling in Africa required effort. However, supporting the role of a white man, especially a gentleman, was supposed to be effortless. Indeed, important elements of these roles were supposed to be innate rather than acquired. Ideally what was visible to observers was not the construction or the maintenance, but the effortless performance of these roles. In Africa, though, Europeans were transposed out of the settings in which the process of negotiating of these roles was understood and the resources to support them lay to hand. "They were deprived of...meat & bread, wine, books, newspapers, the society & influence of their friends."16 Worse yet, they were exposed to actively malign influences:

Fever siezed them...wrecked souls, minds & bodies. Good nature was banished by anxiety, pleasantness was obliterated by toil...engaging manners fall into disuse, until they became but shadows morally & physically mentally & bodily of what [they] had been in English Society.17

15 See, for example, Brantlinger, "Victorians and Africans," 194-8.
16 HMS Diary, 24 August 1888 (E41).
17 Ibid.
In such a context, efforts by the Expedition's Europeans to maintain identities built around these roles were not merely tolerated, but deliberately made visible, both in daily practice and in writing. The resulting ceremonies of identity were similar to those they might have performed in Britain, but the ceremonies took on additional meanings and a heightened significance in their transposed setting. While these ceremonies were focused around the identity of the individual performing them, they also had broader significance, since failure to adequately carry them out was seen to reflect badly on Europeans as a group. These ceremonies highlighted the issues around which their identities as white men in Africa were built. Important among these were race, class, gender, and age. Nationality became an issue at times, as when the imperial activities of Belgians or Germans were derided by the Expedition's English officers. However, they all saw themselves as English rather than defining themselves around their places of origin in Ireland, Canada or Wales. Nationality also became an issue when the controversy over the Expedition had dulled Stanley's heroic lustre sufficiently that the British press were no longer eager to claim him, via his birthplace in Wales, as one of their own, but were happy to call him an American.

These ceremonies of identity had several intended audiences, and varied emphases as a result. With indigenous peoples, and with the Expedition's porters, the Europeans were most interested in the basic and powerful category of whiteness, and were concerned to present a

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19 See, for example, Land and Water, 1 November 1890, in JRTC, vol. III.
20 C. Hall, "New Histories for Postcolonial Times," presentation to the Canadian Historical Association, St. John's, Newfoundland, June 1997. Hall stressed that the performative self is made up of a hierarchy of identities which are invoked and constructed at particular times and places, and in the context of particular relations of power.
united white front in relation to these groups. They were also directed at the coast-based traders, and it was here that issues of class crept in. Since race submerged other normally important markers of identity, like those of gender and class, these had to be emphasized if they were to be maintained. The Europeans wished to present themselves to these traders as powerful men, possessed of superior socio-economic standing in Europe. Another audience for these ceremonies, and a far more critical and contentious one, was their fellow Europeans. Last, and far from least, the reading public in Europe and its colonies of settlement were also an audience, and it was in textual reconstruction of ceremonies of identity for this audience that gender became a more important element of identity.

Unlike white females in Africa, who struggled to define themselves against and within the male type of the traveller, white males worked to maintain and develop an established identity. They were able to take much more of this identity for granted as a result. Travel in a "wilderness" such as the interior of Africa, though, made limited violations of European gender and class-based norms of labour allocation acceptable. The officers on the Expedition thus cooked, sewed, and nursed each other, though often with teasing, and rueful comments in their diaries. Such limited lapses, when acknowledged, served only to emphasize the intensely masculine identity of the white traveller in Africa. On the trail in Africa, the white middle- or

21 See, for example, Bonny Diary, 10 April and 31 May 1888.
23 Bonny, for example, was contemptuous of Ward’s self-presentation as a big man, both to the chief at Bolobo and to the Zanzibari traders of the upper Congo. Bonny Diary, 29 May 1887 and 14 March 1888 (E47).
24 See, for example, the account of cooking a Christmas dinner in which both gender and age identities are mentioned in Troup, Rear Column, 190-1 and Ward, My Life, 55.
25 The problematic identity of nineteenth-century European females travelling in Africa indicates the strength of the gender expectations attached to this activity. With their female gender subsumed under a powerful whiteness, they both accepted the honorary status of men in African communities and struggled to identify and legitimate themselves as women in their own eyes, as well as those of others in Europe and Africa. See Birkett, Spinsters Abroad, and Barnes Stevenson, Victorian Women Travellers.
upper-class male traveller expected that, as in Europe, he would have others to do his domestic work for him. Indeed, the regular assignment of such tasks to African males travelling with him—tasks reserved for women in the general cultural milieux of both continents—was a means of de-sexing and subordinating these men, and thus of making them less threatening. Describing adult Africans as children served a similar function.

I will look briefly at four kinds of ceremonies of identity: those associated with maintaining a schedule, those associated with clothing and cleanliness, those associated with hunting and natural science and, finally, those associated with reading and writing.

A Schedule

Keeping a schedule was an important ceremony of identity, both because of the order it implied for the self, and because it provided a framework for other activities related to identity. The Europeans disciplined themselves with a daily routine that included duty, mental activity, and physical exercise. They also celebrated events of importance, such as birthdays, wedding anniversaries, public and religious holidays, and annual social events in the racing and hunting calendar. These reinforced both individual and collective identities built around age, gender, class, and ethnicity. Sometimes the European social calendar was marked with no more than a mention in the diary, as with Stairs wistfully noting the sport-fishing season in Nova Scotia.\(^{26}\) On the road, much of this routine was subordinated to the schedule of marching, largely that of regional trade caravans. Ceremonies of identity were mostly confined to the halt at the end of the day’s march. In the Expedition’s settled camps, though, these routines and ceremonies were

\(^{26}\) Stairs Diary, 7 August 1887.
highly elaborated and formalized. They were considered much more important in the settled camps because the Europeans there experienced their inability to march toward the Expedition’s goals as a diminishment of their sense of purpose and capacity, and thus a threat to their well-being. Schedules were assisted by, but not completely dependent on texts and objects for ordering time. Barttelot, for example, spent six days creating a “most complete” year’s almanac for himself. He considered the breakdown of his watch “a great misfortune,” though he kept up a daily routine even without his time-piece.

Ward described the daily routine of the Rear Column officers in January 1888, for example:

> Jameson and I are generally sketching, Major B. walking up and down; Troup and Bonny smoking, chatting, reading, &c.... We take it in turns to be the orderly officers of the day, to keep order, to see the camp cleared up, to visit the sentries, and turn the guard out three times during the night.

Parts of this daily routine were also imposed on the porters and soldiers, though as discussed in Chapter 4, they firmly maintained their preference for caravan working hours. Sunday as a day of rest was part of the schedule, though none of the Europeans on the Expedition were particularly devout Christians. The officers also made Sunday a day of rest for the porters and soldiers, though they were allowed to keep Islamic holy days as well.

Leisure activities were especially important. The Europeans pursued leisure activities which in Britain would have been carried out in clubs whose memberships marked fine

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27 See, for example, Barttelot’s “Orders of the Camp by the Officer Commanding,” 28 June 1887, in Life, 140-2.
28 Barttelot, Life, 129.
29 My Life, 60-1.
30 Interestingly, the traveller Richard Burton identified the simple fact of having leisure time as a distinguishing mark of men in Central Africa and, implicitly, also in Europe. On a visit to the Gabon River in the early 1860s, he noted: “as throughout inter-tropical Africa, the men are fond of idling at their clubs; and the women, who must fetch water and cook, clean the hut, and nurse the baby, are seldom allowed to waste time.” R. Burton, Two Trips to Gorilla Land and the Cataracts of the Congo (London: Sampson Low, Marston, & Co., 1876), 1:199.
gradations of social status. Thus, eating meals in the segregated comfort of an officers’ mess, followed by an hour or so of companionable smoking and talk marked them as men, as white men, and as gentlemen. Bonny, who would not have rated the officers’ mess in Britain, was here included by virtue of his colour. Two officers together were enough to establish parts of this collective ceremony. Bonny and Ward at Bolobo, for example, set up a mess where they “smoked chated & read enjoyed our good grub & turned in at 9 PM.”31 Where only two officers were present this practice often broke down in quarrels over food, though, leaving the officers to the troublesingly inadequate company of porters or indigenes. In such a situation, Stairs lamented the lack of identity-sustaining conversation in his native tongue: “From morning to night I hardly utter an English word, all work is done in Swahili.”32 Where two officers got along, as Barttelot and Jameson did, sitting and talking together “of home and old times” after dinner made all the privations of the Expedition bearable.33

**Clothing and Cleanliness**

The Europeans’ clothing, based on the informal attire of a sporting gentleman, was another important part of their identity. At a basic level, it separated them from the indigenes who wore few if any clothes. It was thus an important marker of the Europeans’ “civilized” status. Clothing, especially of the lower body, also distinguished the Europeans from the porters, who wore loincloths or wrappers, and the Zanzibari traders in their long robes. Head coverings, whether a standard helmet or the specially designed cap that was Stanley’s trade-mark as an

31 Bonny Diary, 20 May 1887 (E47).
32 Bonny Diary, 26 May 1887 (E47) and Stairs Diary, 22 June & 3 July 1888. Stairs could barely stand to talk to Nelson, his companion, by this point. A lack of European food, needed to maintain their native culinary vocabulary, made their solitary meals even more unsatisfying a means of maintaining identity; see Stairs, “Shut Up,” 47 and Stairs Diary, 6 June 1888.
explorer, were also important markers of identity. Several of the formal, studio portraits of the Expedition's surviving officers depicted them in helmets. They wore clean, untorn versions of their travelling outfits, and carried walking sticks or rifles to further identity themselves as travellers. The entire ensemble also protected its European wearer from the sun, thus preserving their whiteness of skin, which was a mark of both racial and class identity.  

Personal hygiene was another concern, though not only for reasons of health. The officers distinguished themselves from the porters and soldiers by emphasizing the poor hygiene of the men, especially their infrequent bathing. In doing so, they more often invoked the social meanings of personal hygiene than concern for the health of the porters or the sanitation of the camp. The epithet "filthy" formed part of a standard litany of complaint or abuse applied not only to the soldiers and porters, but also to the Manyema followers of the Zanzibari traders. Indeed, lack of cleanliness was one of a constellation of characteristics including laziness, lying, disloyalty, cowardice, stupidity, and avarice that the European officers assigned to Africans generally. As with indicators of savagery, the presence of one indicator was presumed to imply the presence of others. The "Arab" traders, distinguished by the spotless whiteness of their robes and often described as gentlemanly in bearing or conduct, occupied a shifting middle ground this racially dichotomized world.

Personal cleanliness also served to demarcate groups of Europeans. Barttelot observed with disgust the way the white crew of his Congo steamer let themselves go with regard to

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33 Jameson, Story, 103.
34 As Birkett, Spinsters Abroad, 115-16, notes, "Colonialism stressed the importance of physical appearance... which [was] used to form an absolute distinction between the ruler and the ruled. To a greater extent than other systems of control of one people by another, British colonialism rested upon the embodiment of power in individual colonial officers and informal representatives, displayed through dress, housing and, most simply and importantly, the colour of their skin." In England itself, skin colour was also a marker of class, as manual labourers were tanned, while gentlemen and ladies were not.
hygiene. The Captain in particular was a “perfect hog.” Barttelot, in contrast, prided himself that he “still manage[d] to shave and keep [his] teeth clean and have a sort of bath in a bucket.” Changing to a new shirt and collar, or new socks were events that Barttelot recorded in his diary, keeping these scarce physical markers of his status as a gentleman for significant dates like the New Year and Easter. That his family chose to include these quotidian details—details that should have been obvious and invisibly unmentionable parts of a gentleman’s life—in Barttelot’s posthumously published diary indicate how important these details were in establishing that Barttelot had not lost either his identity or his sanity in the African forest.

**Hunting and Natural Science**

Hunting and natural science were both means by which European travellers in Africa occupied and defined themselves. The hunt often yielded specimens for the natural history collection. The collection in turn legitimated travel by linking it to the progress of scientific knowledge in Europe. For travellers who wanted to publish, hunting anecdotes were an important element in the largely masculine genre of travel writing. In a good anecdote the hunter displayed appropriate emotion, together with martial skill and a knowledge of his prey and its habitat that paralleled the knowledge of the natural scientist.

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35 Barttelot MS Diary, 30 May 1887.
36 E.M. Barttelot to Sir W. Barttelot, 1-23 June 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.
37 Barttelot, *Life*, 195 & 221-2. Barttelot also recorded when he started using a new shaving lotion; Ibid., 159.
38 The inclusion of these details also helped to validate the published diary. They implied that no other details, no matter how insignificant, had been edited out.
39 Some writers introduced their narratives by explaining that they were going to leave out many hunting anecdotes so as not to weary their readers; for example, Kerr, *Far Interior*, 1:ix. Even writers who did not share a passion for hunting were forced to deal with this topic. Drummond, for instance, described an encounter with a rhinoceros in which his gun bearer had fallen behind, arriving only after the animal had gone. “I broke my heart over it at the moment, though why in the world I should have killed him I do not in the least know now. In cold blood one
Hunting was an important activity for the Europeans on the Expedition, as for other European travellers. It both supplemented their diet and constituted an important ceremony of identity.  

Hunting marked them as men. The love of and skill at blood sport was an important part of masculine identity in Britain, further emphasized when men travelled in the game-rich "wilds" of other continents. Hunting also marked them as gentlemen and as white men, since it was often performed with the assistance of servants; in Africa these were indigenous guides, bearers, and beaters. In addition, white hunters used the latest rifles as opposed to the bows, snares, traps, or muzzle-loading muskets of "natives" or "Arabs." Ironically, though, the sportsman's code of tracking, stalking, and preparing game called upon "primitive" skills and emotions. Hunting also enhanced a sense of ethnicity. The English saw themselves as keener and better hunters than the men other European nations, and better imperialists as a result. Hunting was an activity that emphasized class identity too, since, while the appreciation of sport had spread across class lines in Britain, the skill and opportunity for it were concentrated among the elite.

From a sportsman's point of view, the Expedition was a disappointment, though. The noise made by their large caravan ensured that they encountered little game while on the march. At the same time, the scarcity of porters limited the Europeans' ability to collect hunting 

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resents Mr. Punch's typical Englishman—"What a heavenly morning! let's go and kill something!" but in the presence of temptation one feels the veritable savage." Drummond, Tropical Africa, 107.

40 For examples of the former, see Jameson, Story, 29-30. Some of the porters, such as Saa Tatu, were also skilled hunters who contributed to the Expedition's food supply. See IDA, 1:395.


42 Ibid., 180 & 183.

43 Ibid., 178-9.

44 Ibid., 189.
trophies. In addition, the Expedition’s pace precluded the leisure for proper hunting. Those officers with too much leisure on their hands lamented the shortage of game. Barttelot and Jameson agreed that of “all the countries we have been to, we have never seen any place so utterly devoid of all sport.” Nonetheless, the ceremony of the hunt was still important and Jameson generally made two trips a day out from camp with a gun, looking for new specimens or game for the table.

Despite the dearth of opportunity, hunting anecdotes were still an obligatory element in published accounts of the Expedition. In some of these, the Expedition’s officers could rhetorically demonstrate their superior skill and sang froid by simultaneously carrying out two ceremonies of masculine identity, as with Ward travelling by canoe down the Congo:

Nothing of interest occurred until daylight the next morning, when we received another crashing bump from a hippopotamus, whilst I was shaving. After a bullet from my rifle, the beast retired hastily into deeper water.

The importance of hunting in the adventures that readers anticipated from the Expedition was evident in one of the pirated accounts that appeared before In Darkest Africa. Buel’s Heroes of the Dark Continent was full of hunting anecdotes, with the movement of the Expedition at times merely providing fresh game and a new backdrop for sport. As Ward remarked to his publisher, “[a]mong other absurdities,” Buel’s book contained “an illustrated and detailed

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45 Jameson, Story, 93.
46 Story, 201. Hunting was also an important part of Barttelot and Jameson’s extended visit to Stanley Falls in February 1888.
47 Ward, Five Years, 298 & 301.
account of a highly exciting rhinocerous hunt which we are supposed to have enjoyed” at Yambuya, despite the fact “that there are no rhinoceroses within 500 miles of the Aruimi River.”49 The Expedition’s officers did not always come out the victors in these fabulous hunts, but their behaviour nevertheless clearly distinguished them from less manly hunters like Tippu Tip. He, according to Buel, unexpectedly confronted a monstrous crocodile on the banks of the Congo. Tippu Tip succeeded in shooting it, but “was immediately after...so prostrated with fear that his wives had to fan and coddle him for two hours, and give him the restorative of admiration for his valor.”50

Science was another activity through which many nineteenth century European travellers in Africa constructed identities. Making systematic, replicable observations, recording them, and collecting specimens of or sketching the observed phenomena were ceremonies of knowledge in which men and women travellers of all social classes could and did participate. The fact that minimal training and little in the way of fancy equipment were necessary to make observations or collections made this a popular activity for many travellers. These activities served both to legitimize travel and to structure the activities of travellers in time and space. They were also activities with strong imperial and Christian overtones—a systematic naming and classifying of flora and fauna made order out of chaos both in nature and in the European scientific community.51 A network of clubs and societies for those pursuing various fields of science were formed in the mid-nineteenth century.52 Amateur researchers, both women and men, provided valuable research material for the recognized experts in the natural sciences. Formal recognition

Enlivened with Stories of Marvellous Hunts and Wonderful Adventures among Wild Animals, Ferocious Reptiles, and Curious and Savage Races of People who Inhabit the Dark Continent.”

49 H. Ward to Charles Scribner’s Sons. 20 March 1890, RGS Stanley Collection 9/1.
50 Buel, Heroes, 417.
of the value of a collection was conferred by these experts, as in the preface by R. Bowdler Sharpe to the "Natural History Appendix" of Jameson’s published diary.\textsuperscript{53} Jameson believed he had been engaged by the Expedition for natural history research, and was bitterly disappointed that Stanley allowed him neither time nor resources for this work. "The sport and natural-history part of this Expedition is a regular farce," he complained to his wife.\textsuperscript{54} Several of the other officers collected as well. Those who didn’t noted how much it helped their fellows to meaningfully pass time.\textsuperscript{55} For the Rear Column officers in particular, hunting, collecting and sketching provided a sense of purpose during their stay at Yambuya, which they felt excluded them from the real work of the Expedition. The Expedition’s scientific contributions, however, were mostly geographical. This work was supported with a grant of £1,000 from the Royal Geographic Society. While a number of the European officers shared in the work of observing, measuring and recording terrain, it was Stanley who monopolized the geographical discoveries.

**Reading and Writing**

Two loads (i.e. 120 lbs.) of books were taken on the Expedition. These were chosen by Stanley and consisted of reference material, a Bible, a selection of plays, poetry, novels, histories, and travel literature, including several works by Stanley.\textsuperscript{56} Some of the Europeans also brought books with them in their personal baggage, which they shared amongst themselves. Reading from this small stock of books in their leisure moments was another ceremony which marked

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\textsuperscript{52} The paragraph that follows draws heavily on Birkett, *Spinsteris Abroad*, 99-109.
\textsuperscript{53} *Story*, 392-8.
\textsuperscript{54} *Story*, 30. As Sharpe noted: "singularly poor as Mr. Stanley’s Expedition has been in scientific results, the efforts of Jameson and some of the officers of the Rear Guard were not altogether unproductive. The collections of Butterflies made by Mr. Bonny at Bananya and by Mr. Herbert Ward...were found to contain several novelties." See Jameson, *Story*, 396-7.
\textsuperscript{55} Stairs Diary, 29 August 1888; also Jameson, *Story*, 99-100.
\textsuperscript{56} HMS to E.T. Cook, 1 October 1891, British Library ADD MS 39927, f. 45.
them as persons of education and culture. The novels, such as the “Walter Scotts were read through three times over,” said Stanley.

I am almost sure they kept some of us from unhealthy brooding, and melancholia. Think of Nelson in the Starvation Camp 25 days! Nelson and Park in the Manyema Camp 4½ months....I must admit that Books kept me from caring over much what I ate, or how much work was to be done. They assisted me to enjoy my surroundings and were constant [ ], refreshing my inner life.57

The Europeans’ reading was often reflected in their journal writing, through comments or paraphrases of poetry. Stanley made even more extensive use of literary and historical references in his published writing, though not nearly all of them appeared in his diaries. These references linked him and his readers in a shared world of privileged reading defined by class and shaped by gender. Reading, like writing, also set the literate Europeans apart from most of the Africans and many of the “Arabs” with whom they came in contact, adding to the sense of racial distance.

Stanley observed gloomily that each of his European subordinates on the Expedition had with him a “portentously large journal.”58 They wrote in them daily when they had the time, or caught up on several days’ worth of events when a halt was called.59 Stanley kept pocket notebooks in which to scribble thoughts as they occurred to him, as well as larger volumes for a fair copy of his diary, written with much greater care and polish. When opportunity offered, all of the officers also wrote letters home, occasionally letters to each other as well. They considered the notebooks, diaries, and paper on which they kept these records to be among their vital possessions. The ink and candles which permitted writing were also important, and frequently unavailable, leading one group of officers to experiment with “Arab” ink-making

57 Ibid. Cook was a magazine editor, and he had apparently written to Stanley about the books taken on the Expedition as part of a series he planned about the one hundred favourite books of prominent persons.
58 HMS Notebook, n.d. (E46).
technology. Writing, like reading, marked them as literate and educated. It also maintained mental and emotional ties to the families and friends that most of the officers expected would read their writing, providing a substitute for conversation when satisfactory interlocutors were not available. They were also travelling during a time when travel literature was in vogue. All the Europeans on the Expedition expected to publish after their return from the Expedition. Keeping diaries and writing letters thus represented a tie to an expected reading public as well.

For Stanley writing was also a comfort, as when he played with potential titles for his book while wandering hungry in the forest. In addition, writing was a means by which the Europeans narratively became objects of consciousness for themselves, thus both preserving and developing the various components of their self-identities. Writing was also important because it was a practice which gave meaning and power to all the other ceremonies of identity, as they were (re)constructed textually, preserved, and subsequently circulated among readers.

These ceremonies, built up from actions reinforced by a few heavily symbolic objects, were recognized to be an important part of European travel in Africa. As May French Sheldon, an American traveller in Africa and a friend of both Stanley and Ward, remarked: "The observances of little ceremonies and indulgence in certain refinements, as well as some few luxuries, conduced not only to my prestige in the natives' eyes, but to my personal comfort and

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59 See A. Hassam, "'As I Write': Narrative Occasions and the Quest for Self-Presence in the Travel Diary," Ariel, vol. 21, no. 4 (1990): 33-47 for reflections on the process by which travellers wrote and the implications of this for the content of their writing.

60 Stairs Diary, 18 May 1888.


62 Stanley Diary, 23 August 1887 (E37).

63 Hassam, "'As I Write'," 37.
French Sheldon also advised that the props or accessories needed to stage these ceremonies added little to the expense of travel in Africa, but provided a tremendous dividend for both the traveller and the travelled—among “in appearance, in instructiveness as to the white people’s customs, and not the least, to personal convenience and comfort. All talk explanatory of such, not illustrated by actual representation, could not do half the service of certain observances adhered to consistently by a leader.” Such ceremonies, scripted by European self-expectations about the meaning of their presence in Africa, attempted to produce, or reproduce and reinforce appropriate identities for all participants. While the social distance thus created was an important adjunct to physical and military force in the face of an overwhelming imbalance in numbers between Europeans and Africans, it also played an important role in keeping the Europeans faithful to their visions of themselves as gentlemen, Englishmen, and officers. Stanley’s repeated accusation that, by sending some of his personal baggage back down the Congo, the Rear Column officers left him “naked & deprived even of the necessaries of life,” needs to be seen in this light. The loss of some clothing, photographic supplies, candles, soap, medicine and a silver tea service threatened his ability to carry out the ceremonies of identity he believed necessary to maintain his position as a white man, as the leader of a relief Expedition, and as an explorer in Africa.

The section that follows will take up the story of one of the Europeans on the Expedition, William Bonny, and examine the way he made use of these ceremonies of identity. His story is an interesting one since, being of low socio-economic status in Britain, he was looking to create,

64 Sultan to Sultan, 199. Women travellers like French-Sheldon, who were generally much more conscious of their construction of identity, provide the most clearly articulated sense of the meaning and importance of these ceremonies.
65 Sultan to Sultan, 199.
66 HMS to W. Mackinnon, 25 August 1888, MP 86/29.
rather than protect a gentlemanly identity. Bonny desired the threats of the African
environment—at least certain of those threats—since they were fires in which to forge his new
identity. Bonny’s acts of self-construction also provide a clearer view of the dynamics of identity
among European travellers, since he was consciously attempting to manipulate elements of his
identity. Bonny’s reconstruction of himself as a gentleman traveller would have been challenged
and constrained at home in Britain. In Africa it was a possibility, although never an easy task.

A Hero in the Making

I should like to accompany the expedition organizing for the relief of Emin
Pasha. I have served in the Zulu, Zekoni, Boer, Egyptian, and Soudanese
Campaygnes. I belong to the Medical Staff Corps.67

So William Bonny addressed himself to the Expedition’s organizers, one of hundreds who
applied to participate.68 He had also applied to join Stanley’s 1874 expedition to cross
Africa and applied for employment in the Congo Free State that Stanley founded five years
later. This time he pressed his application for “service in any capacity” with a visit to
Stanley’s lodgings. When Bonny could not be deterred with a refusal, Stanley agreed to take
him on.69 Though Bonny’s extensive overseas field service recommended him, as did his
medical experience and strong references, Stanley chose him mostly because he was
persistent.70 Bonny left the interview with a £40 allowance for his travelling “kit” burning a
hole in his pocket. In his heart blazed a keen anticipation of “the great Trip to Central

67 W. Bonny to the Emin Pasha Relief Committee, 13 December 1886, MP 85/16.
68 The Times, 17 January 1887 as cited in McLynn, Stanley, 2:145. Some 4,000 applications were
received.
69 IDA, 1:41. For Bonny’s earlier applications see Stanley Diary, n.d. [August/September 1888] (E40).
70 Bonny’s military service was supplemented by such overseas adventures as planting coffee in Brazil;
McLynn, Stanley, 2:157-8. For Stanley’s recollection of why he selected Bonny see Stanley Diary, n.d.
[August/September 1888] (E40).
Africa" that would allow him to cross "that Great Dark Continent about which so little is Known & through which so few (at least white men) have passed." At Plymouth a few weeks later, he was tremendously pleased to be briefly mistaken for Stanley.

If these were Bonny’s dreams, his exit from England fell far short of them. On the day of departure, he abandoned de Winton’s former servant, Baruti, who had been put in his charge, at a London railway station. He then missed the ship on which he was to have sailed for Egypt. Bonny blamed this on de Winton’s instructions, though he later confessed that he had been waylaid by his wife, whom he earlier discovered had committed bigamy in marrying him. He had fled to escape her.

Stanley debated dismissing him on the spot, but refrained because he had not as yet been able to find a doctor for the Expedition. Bonny deeply resented the scold Stanley gave him for this little fiasco, averring that “Stanley treated me very badly throughout from this date.”

Stanley was unsure what to make of Bonny, initially seeing him as a soldier shaped by “a martinet’s drill,” stolid and unreflective, “with not an idea in his head, beyond so many months will give him so many month’s pay.” Stanley would later comment on Bonny’s “somnolence,” his “imperturbable complacency,” and the curious way in which he isolated himself from all that went on around him, appearing unaffected by either present vicissitudes.
or the fear of future trials. In fact, Bonny was often wandering through an exotic and mysterious Africa of the imagination, one in which he was the solitary protagonist and hero.

A brief stop at the Lamu archipelago in February 1887 provided the first sight of Bonny's Africa:

I went on shore here & came across Human Bones, whole frames scattered about for miles & numbering some thousands. They were bleached by the exposure to the sun & air. Some of the sculls & jaws were well together & contained filed teeth....I asked the Missionary if he could tell me anything about them & he said No I have been here 26 years but I could never find out anything about them some say that there was a big battle here others that a Plague but it is only a guess no one knows how or when they came there Sometimes the wind will remove the sand & uncover thousands of fresh ones in quite another place.

Bonny was not so lost in his new world that he was unaware of the amusement of the “natives” at his interest in these bones, but he nonetheless returned to the steamer “rather pleased” with all he had seen and heard.

Like the other officers, Bonny suffered sharp disillusionment during the Expedition’s initial march on the lower Congo. His enthusiastic descriptions of the “fine sight” made by the caravan, the magnificent scenery, the good missionaries and happy indigenes soon gave way to complaints about refractory porters, poor food, the mismanagement of the Expedition, and the incompetence of the its other European members. A good deal of this appears to be the habitual contempt of a non-commissioned officer for those above him in rank, but not necessarily, he was convinced, above him in experience or skill. Bonny’s disgust was most

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77 Stanley Notebook, n.d. (E46) and Stanley Diary, n.d. [August/September 1888] (E40). Stanley later ascribed this to opium addiction; Stanley Diary, 16 September 1888 as cited in McLynn, Stanley, 2:253. The allegation that Bonny ate opium daily appears in the fair copy of Stanley’s diary (E45/2 vols. 1 & 2), where he devoted a great deal of attention to the failings of others as explanations for the problems of the Expedition. Stanley’s notebook diaries for September 1888 (E40 & E41) make no mention of Bonny’s supposed addiction.

78 Bonny Diary, 20 February 1887 (E47).

79 Bonny Diary, 26-29 March 1887 (E47).
often directed at Barttelot, who represented for him the type of the commissioned officer: young, out for a “lark,” inexperienced, arrogant, officious, and in command in spite of it all “because he is the son of his father. It cannot be on account of his ability.” Bonny freely extended this contempt to the other Europeans when they violated his ideas of military order, or his sense of proper conduct generally. With this contempt, Bonny accepted, indeed emphasized the distance the other officers placed between him and themselves, but gave himself the power to define his position apart from the others. His sense of superiority was not particularly well concealed. Stanley later wrote that he had set himself up as the “moral Instructor” of the Rear Column officers.81

While Stanley saw some aspects of himself in Bonny—they were both older, both social outsiders, and both responded by making “work [their] fellow”—Bonny distanced himself from Stanley.82 He had built his dream of being a hero-explorer in Africa around accompanying Stanley, but he did not take Stanley for his model.83 Indeed, he seems not to have thought much about the day-to-day realities of being one of several of Stanley’s subordinates, only about getting to Africa and being engaged in a heroic task. He ended up treating Stanley as he would any other superior officer whom he neither respected nor trusted. Bonny noted that Stanley had already “began to shew that he was getting away from Civilisation by now & then shewing his tempter [sic]” on board the steamer from Zanzibar.

80 Bonny Diary, 2 April 1887 (E47).
82 Stanley Notebook, n.d. (E46).
83 Hoffmann, in contrast, presented himself as someone happy to be in the great man’s company, to learn from his example and to shine with the reflected light of Stanley’s greater glory: “At night, sitting at our camp fire, he would tell me once again the story of his life: one more I would hear tales of the soul-destroying workhouse in Wales, the voyage to America, the Civil War and, best of all, the search for Livingstone, which had taken place in the very land, and among the same damp, dark forests, where we were now encamped. And I would realize anew that the man who sat cross-legged beside me, warming his hands at the blazing logs, was a hero indeed.” W. Hoffmann, With Stanley in Africa (London: Cassell & Co., 1938), 73-4.
On the lower Congo, Stanley outraged and likely frightened Bonny with his violence, unpredictability, and lack of concern for the welfare of the caravan’s members. “I suppose our progress in Europe will be read with some curiosity,” Bonny reflected. He hoped, though, that not all the missionaries and state officials who witnessed it were under Stanley’s thumb.

There are some surely who will write & say that Stanley’s route was marked by the no. of dead ore dieing ore by men who have rec’d injuries on the line of march... The natives fled from their villages when ever they heard of our approach Our men robed them with aproveal to the last shred How Stanley snubed his white men & treated them like dogs all this you will here from some person or other I can only say this for myself that of all I have read heard or seen Our Expedition caravan exceeds in brutallity anything that is practices amongst any slave raider...I have therefore decided to call this Bully Matardy’s Slave Caravan

Bonny’s two month stay at Bolobo on the middle Congo with Ward and 127 porters allowed him to re-animate his visions of Africa, Africans, and himself as a heroic white man and agent of civilization. Establishing order was his first concern. This involved musters, lists, work rosters, and laying out the plan of a fortified camp which the men were immediately set to building. Ward appeared as a prop, not an agent in these activities, and as a companion in ceremonies of identity. After the two of them quarreled over food, Ward figured most often as peg on which to hang blame for any failures of order. Bonny’s complaints of Ward’s arrogance and incompetence suggest that he established his ascendancy over Bonny as senior officer in the camp. Once the camp’s fence and the officers’ houses were built, there were clearly defined spaces for the various members of the

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84 Bonny Diary, Leopoldville, March/April 1887 (E47). As later with Barttelot, Bonny ascribed Stanley’s mistreatment of his porters and other subordinates to madness.
85 Bonny Diary, 14-16 May 1887 (E47). Ward’s view of the work to be done at Bolobo was quite different: “My camp duties were of a purely nominal character, and my ample leisure was pretty well filled up
encampment, for the Bobangi people who lived in the town of Bolobo, as well as a place in which the town’s chief and his followers could be properly received. Bonny then began “to feel at home here & to look upon these cannibals as not bad fellows at all.” He displayed a surprising enjoyment of the long afternoons he spent in companionable smoking, drinking and small talk outside his house with Chief Legenze of Bolobo and members of his family. As in his earlier relations with Tippu Tip and his entourage, Bonny noted the admirable, at times gentlemanly characteristics of these leaders. He approvingly described their status and power, while deriving a corresponding enjoyment from the fact that they treated him respectfully. At the same time, Bonny needed to find evidence of their savagery in order to make them appropriate inhabitants of his Africa. Bonny reminded himself that these same “natives” of Bolobo had risen several times in the past against the CFS station there, burning it to the ground and causing “the white man to fly for his life.”

Bonny’s imaginative African scenarios were constructed in his mind and in his diary, but they also shaped his conduct toward the inhabitants of Bolobo, creating situations in which he could experience their latent savagery. A dispute over rights to a canoe and a

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86 Bonny Diary, 14, 17 & 22 May 1887 (E47). Two days’ travel down-stream of Bolobo, Bonny had declared the indigenes to be “the most ugly & repulsive” he had ever seen in his travels to any part of the world. He also noted that “They are all canibals here & I believe from here up Congo;” Bonny Diary, 9 May 1887.

87 See, for example, Bonny Diary, 21 May 1887 (E47).

88 Bonny described Tippu Tip in a way that emphasized both his status, his admirable personal qualities, and the markers of his exotic difference such as his “harem” and the danger that must be lurking beneath his “very polite manner.” Although Bonny clearly liked interacting with Tippu Tip, Bonny needed to believe that he was nonetheless a man who “if you were a trouble to him he would cut your throat as he had many thousands before.” Bonny Diary, 3 May 1887 (E47).

89 Bonny Diary, 24 May 1887 (E47). Bonny blamed these earlier uprisings on the “ignorant arrogance” of the CFS officials, but did not engage in any critical introspection about the reasons for his subsequent dispute with the inhabitants of Bolobo.

90 Later on the Expedition, Stanley commented that Bonny managed his “small following of slaves” harshly, prone to “belabor & strike hard all around to manifest his zeal, or to appease his craving for startling incidents.” Stanley Diary, 7 January 1889 (E41).
hippo carcass, for example, was likely sparked by Bonny's high-handed demands and his anger at the contemptuous reaction of the townsmen. Bonny responded by closing the fort and arming the porters. While armed "natives" came to view the fort, but then retired—a promising start for a satisfyingly heroic confrontation—Bonny was much more interested in the various chiefs who came to negotiate peace. Bonny wanted to find in himself the courage, resolution, resourcefulness and inspirational leadership that would allow him and the porters to "give a good account" of themselves. This was, after all, the behaviour scripted for the white man and his band of faithful followers when facing hordes of angry indigenes. However, the cowardice of the Zanzibari porters undermined this heroic scenario. They, instead of swaggering around the Bolobo villages in their usual "bombastic manner," were subdued for days, afraid to go out of the fort. They crept every night to their beds like dogs. Bonny's description suggests a displacement of his fears and his worry about his heroic inadequacies onto the porters' convenient backs. So does his denunciation of Ward's continuing high-handedness with both the inhabitants of Bolobo and the porters, now a potentially disastrous rather than a heroic form of conduct.

Bonny's activities in the week and a half that followed the end of this conflict reveal what he believed he needed to do to re-establish himself as a proper white man in Africa, both in his own eyes and those of the indigenes. Bonny, who had never before seen large game, let alone hunted it, set out to bag a hippopotamus the day after the end of the stand-off. He then returned to the fort to record this as a carefully written up hunting anecdote in his diary.

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91 The information about the dispute is taken from Bonny Diary, 7-9 June 1887 (E47). In Bonny's diary, neither the reasons for this dispute nor its events are very coherently described; Ward's account of the Expedition does not mention it.
92 Bonny Diary, 9 June 1887 (E47).
93 Bonny Diary, 11 June 1887 (E47).
While Bonny clearly enjoyed his authority over his indigenous and Zanzibari assistants, as well as the chase and kill, the tone of his diary entry was mock-heroic. He included deflating details like the misfiring of his gun, the escape of potential quarry, and his decision to abandon the field when a crocodile surprised him.94 His second excursion, a trip to hunt buffalo in the forest a few days later, was even less satisfying in terms of actual hunting. Irony was even more evident in his description of it. He departed on one of the Expedition's donkeys, accompanied by bearers to run before and behind him. However, he quickly re-emerged from the forest, his clothes "torn to pieces" and his body "scratched beyond recognition. I said no more Buffalo hunting for me I cannot spare the cloth."95 At the same time he was both pleased and amused that on his return, the sight of him on his donkey caused villagers to flee screaming, and then creep back to watch from behind trees as he passed with his entourage. His descriptions suggest an ambivalence about the identity of the white big game hunter and his ability to sustain it. His satisfaction that both Bolobo residents and the porters responded to this identity in ways he felt were appropriate was clear though.

Bonny followed up these hunting trips with a renewed interest in ethnography, of which there had been no evidence in his diary for two weeks. His earlier diary entries contained broad and occasionally admiring descriptions of the people and community at Bolobo.96 His new ones focused narrowly on the execution of criminals and emphasized the nakedness, drunken revelry,

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94 Bonny Diary, 12 June 1887 (E47). He also recorded the following two days of negotiations to divide up the meat of the hippo he shot.
95 Bonny Diary, 15 June 1887 (E47). Bonny did, though, derive considerable entertainment from the amazement and fear of the inhabitants of the villages through which he passed with his hunting entourage.
96 Bonny's earlier ethnographic efforts included collecting information on topics typical of contemporary travel literature: the shape and arrangement of huts, and the appearance of the "natives," especially their nakedness and their adornments. He was also interested in their weapons, in warfare, in the execution of criminals and captives, and in cannibalism. However, Bonny also included non-traditional information on the work of women, the well-developed regional trade system, and the skill of indigenous blacksmiths. See Bonny Diary, 24 May 1887 (E47).
bloodlust, and cannibalism of the indigenes. In one instance Bonny encountered men preparing to execute a thief. They told him they would gladly sell the thief into slavery if Bonny were willing to pay. Bonny was convinced that this was only a ruse to keep him from witnessing the execution, and the cannibal feast he believed would follow. He recalled that he had “been told down country that it would be very dangerous to be present when they saw blood after working themselves up into a state of fury,” so he drew his revolver. This brought an immediate halt to the proceedings, as the executioners, familiar with muskets, were curious about its capabilities. “[It] would go on killing until I told it to stop,” Bonny told them, determined to recreate the ignorant and blood-thirsty savages of moments before. He then “slowly sauntered away” telling himself that “discretion was the better part of valor.” Here and at another execution he conducted himself as a gentleman interacting with “primitive” Africans. He displayed his nonchalant courage, wider knowledge, better technology, as well as the confidence that he came from a society with a superior criminal justice system. He was also perspicacious enough to know about cannibal feasts even if the Africans were cunningly careful to make sure he never witnessed one.

The day after this encounter, Bonny gave the porters time off from their work of cutting wood for the steamers so they could participate in a festive sports day he had organized for them. In doing so, he placed himself in the modern, progressive school of military leadership which recognized that creating order and good morale required positive as well as punitive measures. Despite the cash prizes, “after the first race [the men] went away into their houses & would have no more of it.” Bonny had to acknowledge the event a “miserable failure,” made all the more embarrassing because he had invited spectators from

97 Bonny Diary, 18 June 1887 (E47).
Bolobo. This non-event, he concluded, showed the quality of the manhood of Zanzibar. That he also believed that it reflected on his ability as an officer was evident in the way he and Ward felt it necessary to re-establish order the next day. In Ward’s words:

As a result of the light work they had to perform, and the natural absence of rigid discipline, our men became lazy and neglectful of those formal duties which marked the opening and closing of each day’s life in camp….eventually it became necessary to put a stop to the demoralization, which we found spreading day by day. I determined to make an example of one black...who completely ignored orders, and altogether placed our authority at defiance.

The confrontation with this recalcitrant porter ended with Ward flogging him, after which “every man was in his place & they were as quiet as mice.” Bonny gave the same porter another heavy flogging the following morning at an official punishment parade, evidently to be sure his authority was clear as well.

These experiences show some of the main elements—and contradictions—of the image of a white man in Africa in the late nineteenth century. It was an identity that had to be efficacious in negotiating a traveller’s objectives with “Arab” traders, porters and indigenous peoples, though this behaviour could be quite at odds with fidelity to aspects of the ideal. Bonny, exercising his valour in leaving the scene of the execution described above, reassured himself “that it would be worse than folly to force myself on these people” by intervening to prevent cannibalism as a civilized man should.

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98 Wolseley, Soldier’s Pocket-Book, 2-3.
99 Bonny Diary, 19 June 1887 (E47).
100 Ward, My Life, 20-1. Ward described this merely as one of “those awkward incidents, so unavoidable when the white man has to deal in an executive capacity with the blacks” and made no mention of what led up to it. See R. Rempel, “Those Awkward Incidents: Conflict and the Creation of New Work Norms by Zanzibari Porters on the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition,” paper presented to the Canadian Association for African Studies, St. John’s, Nfld., June 1997, 14 for a further discussion of this incident.
101 Bonny Diary, 20 June 1887 (E47).
102 Bonny Diary, 18 June 1887 (E47). The behaviour expected of a European when confronted by African cannibalism is discussed below.
The identity created also had to be convincing and satisfying to the one creating it. Fellow Europeans were an equally demanding audience, and one with which Bonny struggled. While he could effectively ignore Ward at Bolobo, the presence of the four other Europeans at Yambuya was another matter. He found it difficult to make a place for himself in a setting where Barttelot and Jameson shared a friendship and a superior social standing, while Ward and Troup shared the experience of work for the Free State and laid claim to some, albeit lower, social status. Like the other officers Bonny sought activities which would both pass the time in a meaningful way and support the identity of a gentleman traveller in Africa. Bonny began butterfly collecting, and later branched out into birds and beetles. His efforts were not accepted by the other officers, though. Barttelot refused to let Bonny send his collection down-river with Ward, saying that Jameson was the Expedition’s naturalist. Bonny responded that he had offered to let Jameson take any specimens he wanted, but that Jameson had said Bonny’s beetles were all very common, a snub which Bonny resented. In addition to exclusion on the basis of social status and occupation, Bonny also suffered sharp teasing about his age from the other officers.

Added to all this was Bonny’s resentment when he found that Stanley had excluded him from the formal decision-making processes in the Rear Column. He challenged this

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103 Barttelot was known to be the second son of an old and well-connected Sussex family, while Jameson was the grandson of a wealthy Dublin whisky distiller. Ward was recognized as the nephew of the noted naturalist and taxidermist Roland Ward of Picadilly, while Troup was the son of General Sir Colin Troup of the Indian Army. See E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 8 August 1887, Barttelot Family Papers. Bonny, as a former non-commissioned officer stood outside this world.

104 See Bonny Diary, 22 September 1887 (E47).

105 Bonny Diary, 20 April 1888 (E47).

106 Bonny Diary, 21 April 1888 (E47). Rather than give up his collecting, Bonny resolved to collect as much as he could and to keep his specimens to himself. Bonny later received another brutal snub, this one from Stanley, who told him that he was both an employee and a poor man, and that Stanley “like[d] a man to know his place.” Bonny Diary, 21 October 1888 (E47).
exclusion during the officers’ January 1888 debates about their course of action. Bonny was not particularly at home in either of the two factions that had emerged among the officers by this point. He struggled to be accepted in both by peddling confidential information about each side to the other. He also promised members of both factions that he would support them in their present disputes, as well as on the return of the Advance Column at which point they all anticipated attacks from Stanley.

Bonny made a position of sorts for himself by undertaking the trade in food and other dealings with the former residents of Yambuya, the reconstruction of the fort and, later, the medical duties. As these activities were close to those that would have been expected of him in a military context, and dealing with the “natives” was a task the other officers considered demeaning and unpleasant, Bonny’s work was not perceived as threatening by the other officers. In carrying out these activities, though, Bonny consistently worked to protect and enlarge his sphere of responsibility whenever opportunity offered itself. For example, when he became frustrated by the perceived laxity of the other officers, he quietly took a number of disciplinary matters into his own hands.

Bonny’s pose of heroic isolation was much more difficult to maintain on a stage crowded with other Europeans, though he still had visions of himself engaged in solitary exploration. This was evident in his request to Barttelot for permission to pioneer by canoe up the Aruwimi for thirty days. When Bonny began to keep the Rear Column’s official

107 Bonny Diary, 10 December 1887 (E47). Bonny was 41 years old, while Barttelot, Jameson, Troup and Ward were all in their 20s.
108 Bonny Diary, 5-6 January 1888 (E47). See also Stanley Diary, n.d. [August 1888] (E40).
109 See, for example, Bonny Diary, 5-6 January or 1 & 4 February 1888 (E47).
110 Bonny Diary, 18 October 1887 (E47).
111 Bonny Diary, 1 February 1888 (E48). Bonny does not indicate what purpose this pioneering would serve, but blamed Barttelot’s refusal of this project on jealous ambition.
log in mid-July 1888, his use of the first person in all his entries implied that he was the only person carrying out all the actions described, even though some of the entries cover events before Barttelot’s death and Jameson’s departure for Stanley Falls.

Bonny’s opportunity for crucial, independent action came in dealing with the immediate aftermath of Barttelot’s death, and he acquitted himself well. In his report of events he depicted himself as the older and wiser head who tried and failed to restrain Barttelot, and then had to pick up the pieces afterward. His vision of himself grew, though, as he reflected on these events, and described those of the month that followed. This was evident in the titles with which he signed his entries. Initially he was “W. Bonny, Commanding Advance Party,” then “William Bonny, Commanding” and, when he had convinced himself that Stanley and the Advance Column must have come to grief, “William Bonny, Commanding Emin Pasha Relief Expedition.” He relished the idea of himself as the potential savior of the Expedition and of Emin Pasha. Months earlier, he had daydreamed in his diary: “If I could relieve Stanley & Emin Bey it would be the making of me....” While he waited for Jameson to return to Banalya, he asserted his authority over the remaining porters and Sudanese soldiers. He also made plans to move forward, plans that assumed he rather than Jameson would be in command. Although these plans were cut short by Stanley’s return, and then bitterly frustrated by his subordination to the Zanzibari headmen by Stanley, Bonny’s heroic vision of himself did not disappear. On the march south from Lake Albert, Bonny flabbergasted Stanley with a request for permission to

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112 Rear Column Log (E50), entries between 12 July & 9 August 1888. Barttelot and Jameson both merely initialed their entries. The Advance Party was the group of porters Barttelot sent ahead to Banalya under Bonny’s direction.

113 Bonny Diary, 6 February 1888 (E47). Bonny added that such a deed would “rub off all my past misdeeds,” but did not specify what these were.
pioneer a route from the Victoria Nyanza to the Mobangi River and then back down the Congo. Stanley remarked acidly that Bonny would do better to aspire to distinguish himself with exemplary service on the Expedition rather than dreaming of “impossible adventures” and “startling episodes in some imaginary journey he hopes to undertake.”

Maintaining and building on the identity of a gentleman traveller when back in Europe was as important as constructing it in Africa. Bonny struggled with this task as well, and ultimately failed. On the Expedition’s return to Zanzibar and afterward in Egypt, Bonny annoyed Stanley with his demands that Stanley publicly recognize “his merits as being Equal to that of Stairs and the others,” as well as his drinking and fights. However, since Stanley believed he might need Bonny’s testimony about the Rear Column, Stanley could no more wash his hands of Bonny than he had been able to when Bonny was causing problems on the march to the coast. Bonny made some limited public appearances in Stanley’s company on the latter’s return to Britain. However, Bonny’s only published accounts of the Expedition were a statement prepared for publication in the London Times, followed by a brief interview. Both of these appeared in early November 1890 at a time when they benefited Stanley. In these articles, Bonny confined himself to supporting the allegations made by Stanley against Barttelot and Jameson, though, in vilifying them he also painted himself into

\[114\] Stanley Diary, 7 January 1889 (E41).
\[115\] Stanley Diary, 2:515 [January 1890] (E45/2), and McLynn, Stanley, 2:296, 299 & 315-6.
\[116\] See the account of Stanley’s visit to Manchester in late June 1890 in “The Stanley Reception,” Journal of the Manchester Geographical Society 6, no. 7-9 (1890): 144-5. Bonny also published some statements on the slave trade in the Anti-Slavery Reporter and donated artifacts to the Stanley and African Exhibition, both of which helped to establish him as a proper traveller in Africa; see “New-Found World,” 243.
\[117\] “Stanley’s Rear Column: Mr. Bonny’s Statement,” Times, 10 November 1890 and “Mr. Bonny and the Cannibal Story,” Times, 14 November 1890. The letters Bonny wrote to Sir Walter Barttelot and to Sir William Mackinnon describing Barttelot’s last days were also published by The Times in November 1890, as was the Rear Column Log. Bonny was the only one of the Expedition’s officers who publicly supported Stanley’s account. See F W H. Meyer to W. Mackinnon, 14 December 1890, MP 94/60.
the scenes he described as a contrastingly heroic figure. Bonny clearly planned to write a book, but did not, for reasons that are not clear. He may have been deterred by the loss of his diary, of which Stanley took physical possession, as he also had of Jameson's. However, legal action by Jameson's family forced Stanley to return his papers. Bonny, who had no comparable social and legal resources, was not able to keep control of his story, despite his determination to maintain a course independent of other members of the Expedition. Like Stanley's servant, Sali, who also submitted a statement to The Times, Bonny's account of the Expedition was subsumed into Stanley's narrative. There is no record of whether he, like Hoffmann, was persuaded to surrender what he had written about the Expedition in exchange for cash. Unlike Hoffmann, Bonny was either unable or unwilling to parlay either his silence or his connection to Stanley into employment. Bonny slid into poverty and obscurity, ending in a workhouse. He died in 1899.

White Men Endangered in Africa

Stanley, argued Troup, broke the contract he made to supply his officers with equipment for the Expedition: "I did not receive a tent or bed to protect me from the
climate, a Winchester rifle to protect myself from the natives, or proper food or medicines to preserve my health. In consequence, Troup's health broke down and he "narrowly escaped death." Troup's charges highlight the dangers which Europeans believed they faced in tropical Africa, dangers stemming from both the physical and the social environment. These dangers raised two questions: First, how could Europeans, bred to a temperate climate, function in a tropical environment? Second, how could Europeans relate to Africans so as to transform African societies in ways desired by the Europeans, while at the same time ensuring that the European agents of these transformations were not negatively affected by contact with that which they sought to change?

In the case of the Expedition, these questions of collective identity and purpose were addressed through public debates in Britain and other areas of European settlement. These debates were triggered by small, but deeply symbolic events or problems. The public eagerly seized hold of bizarre or extreme examples, which the Expedition provided in abundance, to fuel its debates. Issues from different realms, medical and moral, for instance, were also mixed in unpredictable ways in these debates. In this section I will briefly examine two debates that were connected to the Expedition. The first of these was the effect of tropical fevers on Europeans in Africa, and the role they were alleged to have played in the conduct of Barttelot. The second,

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125 W. Hoffmann to H.S. Wellcome, 26 June 1907, RGS Stanley Collection 12/2; McLynn, Stanley, 2.385. Hoffmann said variously that Bonny ended "in the workhouse" and "in the Gutter."

126 J.R. Troup to HMS, 11 July 1890, published in "Mr. Stanley's Rear Guard," New York Sun, 31 October 1890, JRTC, vol. III.

127 Affadavit of Defendant, In the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division...Between Henry Morten [sic] Stanley (plaintiff) and John Rose Troup (defendant) 1889, MP 86/28. The seriousness of Troup's illness was disputed and its nature never clearly stated in public. Bonny's note of medical discharge said only that he was "suffering from general debility, consequent of his long residence on the Congo;" see "Mr. Stanley's Rear Guard," New York Sun, 31 October 1890, JRTC, vol. III. The condition which Troup believed placed him at death's door was an abscess on one of his testicles; Barttelot MS Diary, 2 May 1888.
the proper relationship of white men to cannibals and to African women, was debated through
the allegations made against Jameson.

**African Fever**

Fever and other African illnesses were not only a practical problem for nineteenth
century Europeans. They were psychological and rhetorical problems as well, involving fear
of the loss of identity and, at the same time, serving to justify perceived lapses of
gentlemanly conduct. Fevers were also a social and political problem, raising questions
about both the possibility, and the desirability of European activity in tropical Africa.
Discussions of fever implied the question of whether Europeans should acclimate themselves
to Africa, and the question of what this would involve. The transformative power and danger
ascribed to these fevers are suggested by contemporary beliefs about them. Sufferers from
African fevers could continue to experience relapses years after they left the continent,
Europeans understood. Further, they believed that African fever sufferers of both sexes
could pass on the malady when they conceived children.128

Seventeenth and eighteenth century images of tropical Africa as the “white man’s
grave” were still strong ones, though changes in European medical practice were beginning
to erode it in the latter part of the nineteenth century.129 Indeed, the Expedition was a part of
this process, since the pharmaceutical firm Burroughs & Wellcome donated specially
designed medical kits to the Expedition.130 The firm was keen to identify itself as a purveyor
of medical supplies that would allow Europeans to remain healthy in Africa. They promoted

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128 R.W. Felkin, *Observations on Malaria and Enteric Fever and on the Suitability of Tropical Highlands
for European Settlement* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1891), 4.
a range of drugs for this purpose, such as the "Livingstone Rouser" which acted as a "tonic, cathartic and antimalarial." They also developed a special "tabloid" format for their medicines—powdered drugs compressed into tablets to be dissolved in water or alcohol prior to use. This ensured "the highest degree of permanence, activity, and portability." Stanley used his friendship with Henry S. Wellcome to obtain a donation of medicines. The firm, in its turn, used its connection to Stanley and the Expedition to promote its products. Stanley and Parke both endorsed Burroughs & Wellcome in their accounts of the Expedition. Burroughs & Wellcome advertisements featured the Expedition, and one of the specially designed medical chests sent with the Expedition was later used in company displays at medical conventions.

Despite this growing medical sophistication, tropical diseases were still not well understood. Fevers, for instance, were a frequent problem for the Europeans on the Expedition. Parke estimated that each of them suffered "about 150 attacks of fever." These were fevers of the "so-called malarial type," the characteristic ones of tropical Africa. The cause of this fever was not definitively known. However, many doctors, such as Felkin, a lecturer on tropical diseases in the Edinburgh School of Medicine as well as a confidant of Emin Pasha, believed malaria was caused by a poison created by the action of heat and moisture on "decomposing
organic matter.” Immersion in water, exposure to sun or sudden drops in temperature, labour, or "operative interference" were important contributing factors to fever, since they lowered resistance to this widespread poison.  

If the causes of this non-specific fever were not clear, and some of them, like labour and "operative interference" implied social as well as biological vectors, Parke was nonetheless able to list a "well-defined series of premonitory symptoms" for an attack of fever:

These were not at all unlike the well-known phenomena of alcoholic intoxication. The individual became flushed and talkative, and impatient of contradiction; the eyes were prominent, staring, and glistening; the movement of the limbs was less restrained, so that the dress soon presented signs of more or less disarrangement, and the hair became dishevelled. The temperature was rapidly running up all this time, its ascent usually preceding any observable illness.  

Thus, any "perceptible deterioration of temper" among the Europeans immediately caused the others to suspect an incipient attack of African fever. Anxiety and paranoia, often taking the form of hallucinations, were also characteristic symptoms of fever sufferers. Ward provided an after-the-fact description of his mental state while ill:

Now a comrade's face would look in upon me, and anon a friendly hand clasp mine; but still the pain went on, till the fevered imagination pictured the friendly glance as the face of a grinning fiend, the outstretched hand as the uplifted weapon about to strike. Then a troubled sleep would come, and I would live again through past dangers and difficulties, with horrors multiplied one hundred-fold.

Oh, those long nights! How I used to hate them!...Through the chinks of my hut-wall I could gaze upon the dying camp-fires, peopling with my fancy the dying embers which lay together. Then it might be the breath of a shivering

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137 Observations on Malaria, 3-5.
139 Ibid. See also Parke, My Experiences, 259
140 McLynn suggests that fevers were "known to produce abnormal sensitivity and the feeling that comrades were plotting against one another," Hearts of Darkness, 237. The repeated attacks of fever suffered by all late nineteenth century European travellers in Africa were thus a source of the "petty hatreds, personal animosities and suspicions" which marked the accounts of many travellers.
black man, seeking warmth, would bring them into new life, and send up such a weird, uncanny flash, as would transform the crouching figure, in my sight, into a frowning demon out of darkness, ready to do battle with all humanity. No flight of fancy was too great, no conception too horrible for my fevered imagination. 141

Moral factors were also crucial in explaining why a much higher proportion of the European than the African members of the Expedition survived. Africans suffered the same fevers as did Europeans, though their physical rather than their psychological symptoms were considered important. The fevers of Africans were not a license for misbehaviour.142 The Europeans were better able to overcome fevers and the hunger they suffered on the Expedition because of their superior physique and character, Parke believed. The Europeans' "tenacity for life," a consciousness that their lives were worth living rooted in their "education and moral pluck," was particularly important.143

When African fevers, at least the ones that infected Europeans, had anger, anxiety, paranoia and loss of restraint in their train of symptoms, the disease could and did become an accepted explanation for the violent conduct of Europeans in Africa. Stairs, for example, received a letter from a friend stationed in Sierra Leone which described how, at the urging of the Colonial Office, a man named Crawford was to be indicted for murder. Crawford had ordered a servant flogged, and the young man had died from it two days later. The friend concluded: "I

141 My Life, 47-8. A compendium of mental symptoms noted by European explorers suffering from African fevers can be found in McLynn, Hearts of Darkness, 234-6.
142 Parke, My Experiences, 391, 445, 477-9 and Guide to Health in Africa, 83. Parke did allow even his African fever-patients a brief, initial stage of fever which resembled the "early stage of alcoholic intoxication;" My Experiences, 478.
143 "Address to the Tyneside Geographical Society," 150. Parke asserted that with the exception of tea and coffee, the European and African members of the Expedition ate the same food. He also ruled out the unburdened state of the Europeans, as compared to the Zanzibaris' daily labour of carrying 65lb. loads, as an explanation for their higher survival rate, since the porters were "accustomed to that work from their youth."
have not the least doubt that at the time of the flogging Crawford was off his head with fever.\textsuperscript{144} Moral responsibility for misconduct and, implicitly, agency were thus displaced onto the fever, and indirectly onto the physical environment that caused the fever. To be accepted as an explanation for violent conduct, though, the loss of agency had to be clearly shown to be involuntary. This issue shaped the debate about fever and responsibility on the Expedition.

One of the explanations offered for Barttelot's conduct was that fever, privation and anxiety had driven him mad by the time the Rear Column left Yambuya. This supposedly led him to treat the porters with extreme violence and to make outrageous demands of leaders at trade settlements like Banalya. Madness also explained the confrontation with the Manyema porters that cost Barttelot his life. Bonny promoted this explanation.

After sitting quietly & reviewing the Majors conduct of late I am compelled to come to the conclusion that his mind had become affected. His strange way of staring at people, calling them names & shewing his teeth at them without any cause & a lot of other item go to shew that there was something wrong with him\textsuperscript{145}

Stanley picked up on Bonny's allegations, not to absolve Barttelot by crediting his conduct to a fever, but to further castigate Barttelot and the other Rear Column officers, who had acquiesced in his behaviour. Just as Barttelot was alleged not to have dealt well with Africans, Stanley now suggested that he did not respond properly to an inescapable aspect of the African environment,

\textsuperscript{144} H.B. Mackay to W.G. Stairs, 9 May 1889, Stairs Fonds. Mackay was a friend from Stairs' student days at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario and, like Stairs, he served in the Royal Engineers. See von Straubenzee, Sketch of the Lives.

\textsuperscript{145} W. Bonny to W. Mackinnon, July 1888, MP 85/19. See also Bonny Diary, 18 July 1888 (E48). With a physically vague and socially complex illness like African fever, it is difficult to determine after the fact how it may have affected any one individual. However, a review of the accounts of the Rear Column officers suggests that the only occasion on which illness may have negatively affected Barttelot's judgement was on his return from Stanley Falls in late March 1888. Barttelot was very unwell then and "almost beside himself with his fever, weakness, and the preparation of letters." See Ward, My Life, 92; Troup, Rear Column, 224-5; Bonny Diary, 24 March 1888 (E47); and Barttelot, Life, 212-3. At that point Barttelot chose to believe stories told him by Bonny, stories which caused a break-down in his relations with Ward and Troup and worsened the atmosphere of suspicion in his dealings with the Stanley Falls-based traders.
illness. Stanley accused Barttelot of having sent down the river—or even thrown into the river—medicine that might have saved lives among the porters and kept the officers better fit for command. More importantly, he and the other Rear Column officers allowed themselves to surrender “without a decent struggle for [their] reputation as officers and Englishmen, and freemen” to the moral and physical miasma of Yambuya. Rather than following the dictates of “duty and common-sense,” they chose “to brood sullenly in [their] huts” or, in other words, to claim illness. Others on the Expedition were sick too, Stanley jibed, Africans as well as Europeans, yet none of them followed a course of inaction.

Being properly ill involved stoic fortitude and good timing; one should not claim illness when there was a lot of work to be done. A European who was legitimately sick with fever suffered the fever, but was not transformed by it. Transformations could easily happen, though, especially if the fever suffer was a European isolated among Africans, and had been in “long residence on the Congo.” Whether the illness presented itself first through febrile symptoms or through a loss of temper, it needed to be overcome through power of the will, as with the other obstacles thrown up by a continent so inimical to Europeans. Stanley set the heroic example in this, as he did in other aspects of travel. During the month-long illness he suffered at Mazamboni’s settlement, his “patience and strength of will were evidently tried as they never were tried before, but ultimately his iron constitution got the better of disease.” As his officers resentfully noted, the fact that the entire Expedition came to a halt whenever Stanley was sick

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146 See, for example, HMS to J.R. Troup, 5 July 1890, in Troup, Rear Column, 297-302, and the marginalia, likely by Dorothy Stanley, on G.M. Mackenzie’s copy of the draft “Report of the Committee to the Subscribers of the Emin Pasha Relief Fund,” 77. “Barttelot had all the medicines—cases of these he flung into the Congo—D.S.” The medicines were, in fact, contained in Stanley’s private baggage and would not have been available to the rest of the caravan in any case. See J.R. Troup, “A Word About The Rear-Guard,” North American Review, vol. 152, no. 411 (1891): 329.

147 These accusations are all contained in HMS to J.R. Troup, 5 July 1890, in Troup, Rear Column, 297-302.
was at least as important in speeding his recovery. Nonetheless, the Europeans tacitly accepted the idea that health was an important part of what allowed them to establish and maintain their identity as white men in Africa. Hoffmann, for instance, constructed his worthiness to follow Stanley as a matter of resistance to fever: “At a place called Bodo all our officers were sick with fever and malaria,” he said, freely reconstructing events after the fact, “and I was the only white man fit to return [to Yambuya] with Stanley.”

White Men and Cannibals

If that document is true, it will not only cover with shame the memories of two of Mr. Stanley’s principal lieutenants, but it will cast dishonour upon the whole expedition, and leave an ineffaceable stigma on the history of British enterprise in Africa.

The document in question was a signed statement by Stanley in which he accused Barttelot of “persistent, vindictive, and most malignant cruelty” to those under his command. More shockingly, Stanley accused Jameson of “standing by while a young girl whom he had purchased for the purpose was deliberately murdered in order that he might be an eye-witness of an act of cannibalism and record the ghastly scene in his sketch-book.” Quite a number of Europeans on the Congo had seen the sketches, and a London taxidermy firm was rumoured to have mounted for display in the Jameson family home the head of an African that he had sent back.

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148 “Another letter from Stanley,” Scotsman, 26 November 1889, in Emin Pascha Nachlaß, 622-2 D.II.
149 “With Stanley in Africa,” Evening News, 1 January 1907.
150 “Mr. Stanley's Statement,” Daily Graphic, 10 November 1890, JRTC, vol. IV.
151 Times, 8 November 1890. Stanley’s statement, given to a correspondent of the New York Times, immediately followed the editorial from which these quotes were taken.
152 “Mr. Bonny and the Cannibal Story,” and the following untitled items from correspondents, Times, 14 November 1890.
Stanley’s accusations rested chiefly, though, on the testimony of Assad Farran, the Expedition translator who had been with Jameson at the time of the alleged cannibal feast.  

Jameson, who died of fever just as these tales were beginning to circulate in Europe, offered his side of the story in his diary and letters, published posthumously by his family. “The day after our arrival at Riba-Riba,” Jameson wrote,

the chief sent for me, and on arriving at his house I witnessed a very curious dance, performed by some Wacusu slaves.... Tippoo Tib, who was at the house, said:—“This dance is generally followed by a lot of people being eaten,” and told me a lot of cannibal stories. I laughed at him, saying that since I had been in the country I had heard many such stories, but did not believe them. Another Arab present...then told me another horrible story, which I told him flatly I did not believe could happen in any country in the world. He, laughing, said, “Give me a bit of cloth and see.” I only thought this another of their plans for getting something out of me, and having some cloth of my own...sent my boy for a small piece of six handkerchiefs, which I gave him. Then followed the most horrible scene I ever witnessed in my life.  

A young girl was led forward by a man who stabbed her twice; a number of men then quickly cut her body into pieces, taking them away to wash in the river. Jameson believed the whole thing a joke, until the killing, which happened so quickly he had no time to react, let alone sketch. He

153 Assad Farran's initial accusations against Jameson and Barttelot were published by missionaries and CFS officials to whom he gave information as he travelled down the Congo after his dismissal from the Expedition. See “Atrocities on the Aruwimi,” Times, 19 September 1888; “The Stanley Expedition, Major Barttelot's Fate,” Standard, 19 September 1888; G. Wilmut-Brooke, “Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, Some details of its progress,” 25 July 1888, MP 85/19; and “Report of action taken on behalf of the Emin Relief Committee since receipt of the intelligence of Major Barttelot's death on September 13, 1888,” MP 86/27. After discussions with members of the Emin Pasha Relief Committee in London, Assad Farran issued a public retraction of his allegations. See P.L. McDermott, “Note,” n.d. and “Memorandum of a conversation with Assad Farran, 26 September 1888, both in BLEM Stanley Papers, as well as W. Burdett-Coutts telegram to P.L. McDermott, 27 September 1888, MP 85/24. At Stanley’s instigation, Assad Farran prepared a second statement about the Rear Column in Cairo in early 1890, despite Assad’s promise to the Committee of silence on the subject. See P.L. McDermott to Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, 19 October 1888, MP 88/34 and L.K. Wilson, Letter to the Editor, Times, 13 November 1890.  

154 J.S. Jameson to W. Mackinnon, 8 August 1888, in Times, 15 November 1890.  

155 Although it was later alleged, by Bonny for example, that Jameson’s sketches included depictions of cannibals cooking and eating the girl, according to Jameson the final picture in his series of six, marking the end of his observation, was of pieces of the girl’s body being carried to the river. Compare Jameson, Story, 291 and “Mr. Bonny and the Cannibal Story,” Times, 14 November 1890.
did make sketches from memory later that evening, though. "The girl never looked for help," he wrote, "for she seemed to know what was her fate, and never stirred hand or foot or head." Assad Farran painted a more damning picture: the slave girl was offered to the cannibals with the words "this is a present from the white man, he wants to see how you do with her when you eat her," and while "the girl did not scream, [she] knew what was going on; she was looking right and left as if looking for help."!

This episode, which grew more lurid with each retelling, opened a wriggling sack-full of moral dilemmas for European contemporaries. To begin with, could or should African accounts of European misconduct be accepted? Stanley, a partisan of Africans, was willing to accept even accounts which had been specifically denied by his European officers. Stanley’s critics, huffed the explorer James Grant, showed themselves "all to be burnt by the same iron—they look upon Natives as only fit to be kicked and shot—they would never take a natives word—oh no—Mr. Stanley has no right to believe in them!"!

Jameson’s intentions were another issue. Some of Jameson’s defenders argued that he had not intended to abet the cannibals, and that to “suggest that there was any crime in simply witnessing such a sight is to condemn Mr. Stanley and hundreds of other explorers and scientific

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156 J.S. Jameson to W. Mackinnon, 8 August 1888 MP 85/19; Jameson, Story, 291.
157 J.S. Jameson to W. Mackinnon, 8 August 1888 MP 85/19.
158 "Stanley’s Rear Column, Assad Farran’s Affidavit," Times, 14 November 1890.
159 See, for example, “A European Cannibal,” the translation of an article making the rounds in Swedish and Danish newspapers, in which the girl was still alive and screaming whilst the butchering was going on and Jameson “looked coolly on, and made a drawing of the horrible scene.” The translated article was enclosed in J.M. Cridland to F. de Winton, 2 November 1888, MP 86/27.
160 See, for example, “Some Very Black Mud,” St. James’s Gazette, 8 November 1890 and “I Was Told,” Globe, n.d. [November 1890], both in JRTC, vol. III. Assad Farran was a resident of Palestine and of Syrian descent, rather than an African, though he tended to be lumped together with the Expedition’s other non-Europeans. Tippu Tip, the only African of international stature present at this alleged cannibal feast also flatly denied it had occurred: “That he [i.e. Stanley] should say Jameson would do such a thing! Or that I would allow it!” See Maisha, sec. 179.
men, who have seen and described scenes equally horrible.” A critic opined, though, that Central African cannibals were hardly in the habit of eating little girls. When they ate human flesh at all, it was that of their dead enemies. This cannibal feast could only have come about through special inducement. Had Jameson wanted to see acts of cannibalism, either from morbid curiosity or from scientific enthusiasm run amok? Did he in fact “take pride in the fact that he was the only living European who had ever seen this atrocious act?” After the fact, Jameson’s motives could only be speculated upon, though he was hardly alone in his interest, as a forthright but anonymous commentator pointed out:

How many are there among the numbers who are casting up their eyes in holy horror of poor Mr. Jameson’s conduct who would not crowd to the doors of, say, the Westminster Aquarium, with their shillings in their hand, if it were announced that a party of cannibals from Central Africa would kill and eat a fellow-creature twice daily?

Yet others said that Jameson should have known better than to give cloth to someone who said he would use the money to commit a crime, whether or not Jameson believed the man.

Throughout this debate, Jameson’s gentlemanly credentials were also under scrutiny. Ward had described him as one who, though “bred in the lap of luxury,” was quiet, modest and unassuming, with a most refined expression of countenance and a pleasant voice which suggested scholarly pursuits. He was always cheerful, turned off suffering with a joke, and did not speak critically of others. In addition, he was widely travelled and a keen sportsman. He possessed muscular strength, as well as courage and determination. He was, in short,

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161 J.A. Grant to H.W. Bates, Assistant Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society, 8 November 1890, RGS Archives, Correspondence Files, 1881-1910. Grant’s comments were directed at the Barttelot family in particular.

162 Troup, “A Word About the Rear-Guard,” 325.

163 “Mr. Bony and the Cannibal Story,” *Times*, 14 November 1890.

164 “Further Statement by Mr. Stanley,” *Times*, 10 November 1890.

165 Letter to the Editor, *Times*, 19 November 1890.
“one of nature’s noblemen.” Critics, though, argued that anyone who claimed that Jameson had behaved throughout like a gentleman was raised in a very strange “school of gentility” indeed.

At a deeper level, the question of whether the girl looked to Jameson for help pointed to the issue at the heart of the debate about his actions. White men, and English gentlemen in particular, were not in Africa merely as observers. If they were to be true to themselves and to the society that shaped them, they must also act to change the evils they perceived there. As Robinson observed, British concern for Africa “flowed from some of the most vivid experiences of Victorian religious and political life. And for this reason the chief African questions for the Victorians were ones of atonement and duty.”

To be present in Africa and to be faithful to this vision of self and mission was to be engaged in the transformation of Africa and Africans. This enterprise was linked to ideas with the power to mobilize and direct people and resources, ideas such as Livingstone’s legacy, as well as to institutions like mission societies, scientific societies and anti-slavery organizations. The debate about Jameson and the cannibals, by engaging these ideas and institutions, both confirmed and challenged the project of transforming Africa.

Mudimbe uses the metaphor of conversion to describe this project. Its intent was to transform a primitive African from paganism to Christianity, from childish nakedness to clothed and civilized adulthood, and from beastly cannibal to humanized évolué. This conversion involved three complementary sets of actions: first, “the domination of physical space,” second, “the reformation of the natives’ minds” and, third, the integration of local economic histories.

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166 My Life, 35-6.
167 Comments on Rear-Guard Controversy, enclosed in F.W.H. Meyers to W. Mackinnon, 16 December 1890, MP 94/60.
168 Robinson, et al., Africa and the Victorians, 27.
169 Mudimbe, Invention of Africa, 50.
into a Western one. European travellers, while not the primary agents of these transformations, nonetheless played an important role. Their travel accounts implied and illustrated a model of history built around "the discrepancy between 'civilization' and 'Christianity' on the one hand, 'primitiveness' and 'paganism' on the other, and the means of 'evolution' or conversion' from the first stage to the second." The goal of these accounts was to "justify the process of inventing and conquering a continent" by "naming its 'primitiveness' or 'disorder', as well as the subsequent means of its exploitation and methods for its 'regeneration'." If there was scant direct evidence for some of the savage customs, like cannibalism, that justified the project of conversion, the repetition of hearsay and circumstantial evidence in travel accounts gave these ideas credibility.

While in theory, travel accounts contributed to a growing stock of knowledge about Africa and Africans, the project of conversion rested more on the confirmation of its presuppositions than it did on current and flexible information about its objects. The result was a body of images of African primitivism that were remarkably resistant to change despite centuries of contact. The African savage possessed several "apparently disparate traits," such as paganism, nakedness, and cannibalism, which formed a syndrome. The possession of any one trait became an indicator of the existence of the other traits in the syndrome. Thus, nakedness or "fetish-worship" implied that cannibalism was also practised. Other markers of primitivism,

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170 Ibid., 2. Emphasis in the original.
171 Ibid., 20.
172 Ibid.
174 Hammond & Jablow, *The Africa That Never Was*, 36-7. Many Africans were equally convinced that the Europeans who came to Africa were cannibals, an idea which has also persisted despite centuries of contact. See Arens, *Man-Eating Myth*, 10-13, for example.
such as filed teeth and scarification also suggested cannibalism. Further, cannibalism in Africa was presumed to be a dietary choice. While a number of factors such as “the pressure of famine, the fury of hatred, and...certain motives of religion and magic” might have led to its adoption, once started in the habit, cannibals showed a “strong tendency...to develop a confirmed appetite which subsequently [was] indulged for its own sake.” Moreover, seasoned travellers in Africa believed that the “damp and depressing atmosphere of equatorial Africa render[ed] the stimulus of flesh diet necessary.” Where other meat was scarce, this encouraged cannibalism.

Cannibalism in its turn suggested a cluster of social-psychological characteristics that cried out for conversion. These included a lack of close familial ties, and the predominance of personalities with underdeveloped capacities for sympathy, morality or abstract reasoning. Ward, for example, was quite surprised to observe more gestures of affection for children and wives among men he identified as cannibals than among those he did not. Cannibalism was also associated with violent and capricious forms of political organization, if not with completely demoralized anarchy, since cannibal communities were believed to wage wars or execute citizens on the slightest pretext to obtain their favourite food. Further, cannibalism and the slave trade went hand in hand, as cannibals were thought to accompany slave-traders on their raids to eat the slain. Cannibals would also trade ivory and other goods to slave traders in order

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176 Arens, Man-Eating Myth, 84.
177 C. W. Darling, Anthropophagy (Utica, N.Y.: Privately printed by T. J. Griffiths, 1886), 13-14. While cannibalism had been practiced in a Europe in ancient times, Darling believed that the “aversion to cannibalism...must have been established at a very early period.” Modern instances of European cannibalism involved men driven to desperation by such circumstances as being lost at sea or trapped in collapsed mines. For a discussion of public disbelief and outrage over reports of European cannibalism in nineteenth century polar exploration see Riffenburgh, Myth of the Explorer, 17, 27-31, 103-8.
178 R. Burton, Two Trips to Gorilla Land, 1:213.
179 Ward, Five Years, 138-140.
180 See Ward, Five Years, 160 and Bonny Diary, 18 June 1887 (E47), for example, as well as Darling, Anthropophagy, 21.
to obtain captives for their tables, with the plenitude of slaves and consequent low prices being
an incentive to eat more of them.\footnote{Darling, Anthropophagy, 22-3.}

The Europeans on the Expedition thus had many reasons to expect to find a cannibal
behind every bush in Central Africa. They also had reason to want to find cannibals. Lurking
and hungry cannibals, as was noted in Chapter 4, were used to try to prevent desertion by the
Expedition's porters. More importantly, though, as for Bonny, cannibals were necessary figures
of exoticism and danger on the African stage where would-be heroes constructed themselves.
Cannibals also played a crucial role in travel accounts. They assisted writers who wanted to
present an Africa with which their readers were familiar and comfortable, an Africa that
confirmed them in their "civilized" status and sense of mission.\footnote{Parke, My Experiences, 61, for example, makes this association explicit.} Cannibalism improved book
sales, too, sending a titillating "thrill of horror" up the spines of readers. It also appealed to
readers' prurient interests, since an African's appetite for human flesh was believed to be directly
correlated with his or (better yet) her degree of nakedness.\footnote{Ward, for example, thought his Five Years Among the Congo Cannibals was "just the sort of book
that boys would revel in." See H. Ward to M. French Sheldon, 1 February 1890, RGS Stanley Collection 9/1.}

African cannibals frequented some literary environs more than others, though, writing for
boys being a particular haunt.\footnote{E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887 and E.M. Barttelot to E. Sclater, 3 August
1887, both in Barttelot Family Papers.} Barttelot, for example, in his letters home used stock phrases
like cannibal to describe the people living around Yambuya. The personal observations of
indigenes he offered included no information to support this designation, though, and he did
include some admirable aspects of their lives, such as the lack of theft in their communities.\footnote{\textup{\textastern}}
A letter to Barttelot's seven year-old nephew Walter Balfour Barttelot, however, presented "natives" appropriate to tales of adventures in the African jungle:

I am now living amongst bloodthirsty savages, who delight in eating the flesh of the white man and drinking his blood while yet warm. Their favourite dish is English boy roasted whole and stuffed with bananas. They are copper-coloured, and rejoice in the name of Watuku. They are armed with spears, shields, and knives, with the latter of which they whip off your head before you can wink. They wear but little clothing, and are of such savage aspect that if you look long enough at them you don't feel at all afraid. Their bravery is such that, always on our approach, they immediately run away with lightning speed.186

Master Bobbie was invited to stare at the fearful savages with his uncle, and to develop courage and a sense of the rightful place of "civilized" white men in the African world.

How should Europeans on the Expedition have responded to cannibalism and cannibals? With even a leading figure in the Aborigines Protection Society acknowledging that "however much the natives were entitled to humane consideration, their cannibal propensities necessarily rendered them repulsive to the white visitors," this was not an easy question to answer.187

Consistent with the enterprise of conversion, the first step was clearly to expose and deplore acts of savagery like cannibalism.188 This would ideally promote a sense of shame for their actions in the cannibals, and provide the foundation for the future amendment of their behaviour. Bonny's encounter with cannibalistic executioners, in which he exercised discretion, was minimally acceptable in this regard. Hoffmann's behaviour while "traversing cannibal country" was better. Entering a forest clearing he confronted the "dreadful sight" of the "newly-washed body of a young woman" lying beside "two cooking pots and a pile of raw plantain.... The thought of what

187 Fox-Bourne, The Other Side, 115.
188 Inducing a sense of shame for cannibalism in indigenes was not the main problem, said "old Africa hands." Stairs, responding to the publicity surrounding Assad Farrahn's first set of allegations, noted scathingly that there was never any direct evidence of cannibalism to be seen, since indigenes were so ashamed of the
we had interrupted so sickened me that, with Stanley's consent, I ordered two of the Zanzibaris to dig a hole and bury the body." Jameson's situation was admittedly more difficult, and some felt that if he had intervened to rescue the girl, he would have sacrificed his own life without being able to save her from the thwarted cannibals. Such dilemmas of situational ethics aside, the long-term response of Europeans to African cannibalism was clear. Where Europeans had the authority and ability, as around Congo Free State stations, they must intervene to stamp out cannibalism. And, over time

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the influence of white men of upright character, as missionaries, traders and government officials, dwelling among them...will effect great changes....As civilization spreads, and the ways of the white man become known to the dwellers in the far interior, a desire to imitate the more agreeable modes of living then presented to their gaze will spring up in the breasts of these poor African savages.
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The change that Ward observed in the people around the station at Bangala was an example of how this conversion was supposed to work. In the space of just two years, through "intercourse with civilization in the shape of the station, and their emigrations to Boma as police," the formerly savage inhabitants of the area had "become useful, pleasant people."

Jameson's story raised two additional questions that were somewhat obscured by the sensational issue of cannibalism, but were nonetheless important ones for contemporaries.

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custom that they not only concealed it from Europeans, but even hid the evidence from each other. Stairs Diary, 26 October 1889.

Hoffmann, *With Stanley*, 77-8. This appears to be a revised version of a cannibal story Stanley told in his public lectures on the Expedition, a story in which Stanley was the protagonist. Stanley, though, made no mention of what happened to the woman's body. See HMS, "Great Forest," 18 and HMS Diary, July-August 1888 (E40).

Troup, "A Word About the Rear-Guard," 325.

This was also something the Zanzibar-based traders in the eastern Congo were concerned to do. As Ward remarked: "The Manyemas themselves are cannibals in their own country, but out here, under the Arabs, they affect horror at the eating of human flesh. The Arabs have told me that they punish such an offence by summary death, and let the natives have the corpse," *My Life*, 85.

Ward, *Five Years*, 163.

These were the problem of responding to slavery in Africa and the problem of relating to African women. The first of these problems was the most straight-forward. The British laws which banned slavery and the slave trade had an extra-territorial aspect, forbidding the purchase or use of slaves by British subjects anywhere in the world. Jameson's purchase of a slave, for whatever purpose, was clearly wrong. The seriousness with which his contemporaries viewed such conduct was evident in the later public concern over, and Stanley's furious response to, accusations that the Expedition had knowingly employed slave porters. Since the eradication of the slave trade and of slavery stood at the heart of the conversion project, such behaviour made a mockery of European, and particularly British claims for a moral right to intervene in Africa. The purchase of a slave was worse even than the loan or gift of a slave, which Jameson also recorded in his diary. It implied an acceptance of, even a willingness to further the slave trade. There were numerous other instances of the purchase of slaves and the violent acquisition of dependents on the Expedition. Though not nearly all of these were public knowledge, they were enough to cause some contemporaries to cry shame that any expedition "under English auspices" should be "guilty of worse acts than an African slave foray."

By this point in the controversy, there was a general feeling that the Expedition's philanthropic aims were a sham. Troup's quip that Stanley had "no more philanthropy than my boot" circulated widely, as did his accusation that the Expedition was a speculative

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194 See, for example, Godkin, "Was the Emin Expedition Practical?" 643-4.
195 See Chapter 2, pp. 146-8.
196 Not surprisingly, the press in continental Europe emphasized this point. See, for example, the Paris correspondent's report. Times, 10 November 1890; also "The Stanley Affair," Land and Water, 1 November 1890, JRTC, vol. III.
197 Tippu Tib gave Jameson the servant-boy, Farani; Story, 262.
venture got up by capitalists whose real interest was in ivory. Terms like filibustering, piratical, and buccaneer crept into discussions of the Expedition. A frank and cynical editorial summed up the main points at issue:

We have never had much relish for these raids into Africa, of which Mr. Stanley has been so far the most noted leader. Their thin veneer of philanthropy, their high-falutin' programmes, and their miserable record of suffering and death, petty war and retaliatory massacre make them for all the world like nineteenth-century versions of the Spanish forays into America 300 years ago. The slow and steady march of colonisation is the true method of opening up Africa; raids like this latest exploit of Stanley's only make straight the path for the Arab slave-hunter and the European rum-barterer. There is much talk of an anti-slavery crusade in Africa; but meanwhile it is curious to read of the explorer with his gang of negroes hired from the slave-owners marching across Africa, enforing discipline with whip and halter, shooting down any misguided native who objects to the horde of strangers tramping through his country, and all for two volumes in ten editions, many banquets, some lectures and speeches—in a word, dollars and fame supplied with a liberal hand by a stay-at-home public that likes to have a little excitement at other people's expense.

There was less clear legal or social guidance for white men trying to determine how to relate to African women. This was not an unimportant point, since the status and treatment of women was one of the means by which late nineteenth century Britons measured the level of progress toward "civilization" in other societies. Almost all travellers in Africa had to deal with women since they were an inevitable part of the fluid group of local porters, guides and others who accompanied a caravan. The status of these women was a difficult issue for European travellers of both sexes. Ironically, women travellers in Africa were often opposed to both the promotion of women's rights at home and

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199 For example, "The Stanley-Barttelot Controversy," Times, 30 October 1890; "Mr. Stanley's Quarrel with his Lieutenants," n.d. JRTC vol. III.
200 "Exit Mr. Stanley," Piccadilly, 6 November 1890, JRTC, vol. III.
of those of women in Africa. In practical terms, some travellers acknowledged the
women’s usefulness, and sought to deliberately include them in the caravan. Stairs went so
far as to suggest that they be paid a wage, like male porters.

However, relationships of any kind between male European travellers and African
women, whether they were temporarily or permanently a part of the caravan, posed
problems. When Munichandi, the senior Zanzibari headman at Yambuya, got into a conflict
with a Manyema man from Selim bin Mohammed’s camp over a woman, Bonny told the
Rear Column porters that maintaining friendly relations with the Manyema required that if
they wanted women, they “must go to the chief & arrange with him.” He also reminded the
assembled porters “that our Boma was made to keep out the enemies but that I found the
enemy was inside the Boma.” His warning, delivered only days after several of the officers
had purchased concubines for themselves, hinted at the dangers these women posed for the
Europeans as well. While the officers fretted over the security risk posed by local women
who might observe the Expedition’s weaknesses, the “enemy within” suggests an additional
inner conflict between ideas about the treatment of women dictated by mores related to
gender or class and those of race. One of Battelot’s partisans, for example, discounted

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203 Birkett, Spinsters Abroad, chapters 5 & 6. One woman traveller sketched this stereotypic figure, on
her return from Africa: “Muddlethorpe will give her a royal welcome....Triumphal arches are already talked of, a
band at the station, and lectures upon her travels at the winter spelling-bees—to finish with a collection for
providing the ‘Cannibals with combinations’ or some such charity. The anti-Suffragettes are also badly needing
her services, and hope she is prepared to draw enthusiastic audiences with descriptions of how much happier and
better-off women are, when they are kept well under, as in the case of the savages.” See Maturin, Adventures
Beyond the Zambesi, 382.
204 Stairs, “From the Albert Nyanza,” 958.
205 The Manyema man stated “whenever we go away your men take our women & this man is always
taking mine. This morning I found him & my woman in the bush.” Bonny Diary, 14 March 1888 (E47); see also
Troup, Rear Column, 220-22.
206 Bonny, Ward, Troup and Battelot all apparently purchased concubines for themselves from the
traders at Stanley Falls, and acquired other slaves as well. See Bonny Diary, 7-11 & 13 March 1888 (E47). Stairs, “Shut Up,” 47 described similar concerns over indigenous women brought into Ft. Bodo by the porters.
Stanley’s allegations of sexual impropriety simply because a gentleman like Barttelot would have been too “particular” to want to touch an African woman. On the other hand, Bonny was clearly excited by the idea that in kissing his “cannibal” concubine he might be tasting human blood on her lips. Stanley avoided the rhetorical problems of African women by declaring publicly that he had remained chaste and “looked down on women” throughout the Expedition. Jameson’s case offered little in the way of extenuating or cloaking ambiguity for his conduct. However unintentionally, he was responsible for the murder of a girl, and irrespective of her race, this posed a threat to his status as a gentleman and a “civilized” white man.

Jameson’s story, and the wider controversy about the Expedition in which it was embedded, had an immediate impact on individual and collective identities and enterprises. But the controversy in the year following the Expedition did not exhaust debate about its participants and their conduct. These debates became ingredients in powerful morality tales that are still circulating, such as Conrad’s cautionary *Heart of Darkness*. This story, among other things, explored the possibilities of apostasy rather than conversion. The debates about the Expedition also contributed to reassuring fables like *Tarzan of the Apes*.

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207 K. Balfour to W.G. Barttelot, 24 November 1890, Barttelot Family Papers. Balfour was one of Barttelot’s brothers-in-law and a fellow-officer.
208 Diary, 26 March 1888 (E47).
209 “Stanley the Saint,” *Sporting Truth*, 1 November 1890, JRTC, vol. III. The declaration was made during a speech at London’s Savage Club.
210 Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* was published in 1899. While evidence for the direct influence of the Expedition on the content of the story is limited, Conrad was the captain of a Congo river-boat in the period immediately after the Expedition passed through the CFS. He would have heard the many stories circulating in the European communities on the river at first hand. Some Conrad scholars “believe that the story of Stanley’s rear column was the direct inspiration for *Heart of Darkness*.” See J. Bierman, *Dark Safari: The Life Behind the Legend of Henry Morton Stanley* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), 329.
Burrough's white hero, though steeped in the African environment, shunned the cannibalism practiced by his ape family and the forest "natives." He went on to rescue both woman and forest from the machinations of those who wanted to treat them inappropriately. This specimen of noble English manhood innately knew right from wrong in the African forest, and he acted effectively on this knowledge. Stories like *Tarzan* continue to "form part of our culture's sense of what it means to be manly."  

**Becoming a Hero**

Henry Morton Stanley was a self-construction in a very literal sense. He not only created a career for himself, he invented his name, personal history and nationality. As with Emin Pasha, important elements of Stanley's self-construction were associated with imperialism. The identities he assembled were intimately connected to the land and people of regions at the fringes of expanding empires, as well as to the conflict and hybridism that characterized these areas of contact and conquest. The details of Stanley's self-construction have been well chronicled in recent biographies. Several of the crucial elements in his self-construction are summed up by

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(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 26-27. Burroughs was in his impressionable early adolescent years during the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition.


214 Emin Pasha's self-creation was summarized in Chapter 2. The only substantial modern biography of Emin is R. Kraft, *Emin Pascha: ein deutscher Arzt als Gouverneur von Äquatoria* (Darmstadt: Turris-Verlag, 1976).


the inscription on the granite boulder that marks his grave: HENRY MORTON STANLEY, BULA MATARI 1841-1904, AFRICA.217

Stanley, the journalist and explorer, made out of John Rowlands, the illegitimate son of a Welsh chambermaid, was his first and longest-lasting act of self-creation. At the age of sixteen he left the workhouse to which his maternal relatives abandoned him to take work in Liverpool. He then signed on as a cabin boy with an American merchantman, but jumped ship in New Orleans. There he recreated himself as the protégé and namesake of the cotton broker Henry Hope Stanley. He fought in the American Civil War and afterwards travelled in Asia Minor. Returning to the United States, he made a name for himself as a war correspondent, covering the pacification of the Indian nations of the American plains and the Napier expedition to Magdala in Abyssinia (1868). This, and his subsequent New York Herald assignment to find Dr. Livingstone (1871-72) were his first experiences with African travel and the beginning of his fame as a writer and speaker on Africa. He later covered Wolseley's punitive expedition to Kumasi (1873-74) and led an expedition across Africa which clarified the shape of Lake Victoria and the course of the upper Congo River (1874-77). Under contract to Leopold II of Belgium, he laid the foundations of the Congo Free State (1879-84). The Emin Pasha Relief Expedition was Stanley's last major undertaking, though not his last visit to Africa, as he made a brief trip to South Africa in 1897 to witness the opening of the Bulawayo railroad. In 1892 he entered British politics, winning election to parliament in 1895. While this embroiled him in domestic economic and political issues, he remained a public advocate of African causes. His death in 1904 left his final act of self-creation to be completed by his widow, Dorothy Stanley. She published his autobiography in 1909.

217 McLynn, Stanley, 2:390.
I am not so much interested in the life-long construction of self in which Stanley was engaged as I am in particular aspects of this construction. The Expedition and the controversy that followed it highlighted some elements of Stanley’s self-construction, elements that played a role in contemporary debates about what was expected of white men in Africa. These aspects are summed up in the BULA MATARI of his epitaph. The phrase identifies Stanley as the heroic founder of states, the transformer of continents, and the agent of Europe in Africa. It also hints at Stanley as a pioneering traveller in Africa, and at his acclamation as the pre-eminent explorer of his generation. Bula Matari was an important part of Stanley’s self-understanding and of the way he operated in the field. It, like the Stanley style of travel, became one of the late-nineteenth century types of the European in Africa. In addition, Stanley as a founder of colonial states, as Bula Matari, was and continues to be an element in the history of European imperialism in Central Africa. The figure of Bula Matari was a narrative of empire which drew together elements of past and present to construct new individual and collective identities, both in the 1880s and in the present.218 While I will point to some of these larger issues, I will focus on aspects of Stanley’s self-construction specifically associated with the Expedition. On the Expedition Stanley tried to combine the roles of both explorer and state-founder. He used Bula Matari to construct himself as undisputed leader, as a successful man of action, a heroic figure, and as a historical agent.

The nickname Bula Matari or Bula Matadi—Breaker of Rocks—was bestowed on Stanley at Vivi in 1879.219 As Stanley later recounted in his diary:

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219 The dynamiting of a path through the mountain at Ngoma some months after the nickname had initially been bestowed further established it; McLynn, Stanley, 2:41.
“It was bestowed on me by Nsakala Bakki—subchief of De-de-de, a young man of 25 who is quite a native humourist. I had just received a consignment of sledgehammers and had passed them out to a party of Zanzibaris to break some rocks that were in our way when we first began roadmaking.” Stanley added that the Zanzibaris did not know how to use them and were pounding the tops of rocks into dust at such a rate that they would not have finished until 1890. “Impatient at their dense understandings, I seized a sledgehammer and in short time one of the rocks had been reduced to such portable fragments that it was carried away to the roadside. Nsakala, who was standing by, admiringly called out, ‘Ah, that is the way to break rocks’.”

“It is a marvel to me how quickly this name has come into general use,” Stanley declared. He himself made use of Bula Matari in dealings with groups along the river in the early 1880s. He contrasted Bula Matari’s negotiated treaties and his transformation of trade with the violence Stanley the explorer had used on his first journey down the Congo in 1877. Other Europeans used the name as a shorthand with which to identify themselves in the fluid world of middle Congo politics in the 1880s. “I told them we were Stanley’s children, for Stanley’s native name, Bula Matadi...acts as a talisman throughout the Congo country” said Ward of an incident near Bangala during his journey down the river to cable the Emin Pasha Relief Committee. Zanzibari porters, many of whom worked under contract to the Congo Free State both under Stanley and his administrative successors, also used Bula Matari as a collective form of identification, as the Expedition’s departure from Zanzibar in 1887 made clear.

Bula Matari was more than a nickname for Stanley, though, and it was more than a way for others to position themselves in relation to the Congo Free State and to him. Stanley

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220 McLynn, Stanley, 2:410, quoting Stanley Diary, 8 December 1880. The substitution of Matari for Matadi was a variant pronunciation, used by the Zanzibari porters. McLynn suggests that for indigenous people on the Congo, the name was likely used “to denote a ruthless individual whose head was so hard that he could break rocks with it;” Stanley, 2:103.

221 See McLynn, Stanley, 2:101, for example.

222 Ward, Five Years, 239.

223 The Expedition’s porters were hailed as “askari na Bula Matari”; see Chapter 3. Individual porters, however, tended to use Stanley’s surname to identify themselves as ones who had travelled with him, as in the case of Uledi Stanley or Khalfan Stanley on the Expedition’s Muster Roll.
attempted to use the connections he had developed as Bula Matari to obtain resources for the Expedition along the Congo River. This was evident in his insistence on stopping at the sites of the stations he had built, even though many of them had since been abandoned by the Free State. At some of these, Stanley was able to reanimate on old ties. At Mswata, for example, the “old chief was most friendly and anxious to see ‘Bula Matadi’.” This chief had already contributed to the Expedition by hosting a group of porters and two officers for several days. Stanley’s strategy was far from universally successful, though. At Upoto, the officers had to negotiate access to food and other resources with their own ceremony of blood brotherhood. The arrival of Bula Matari a few hours later caused the inhabitants of the former station to flee. Outside of the Free State’s sphere, however, Bula Matari meant little to indigenous people. Stanley did not make an effort to establish the name and all it represented in the forest, or beyond it, despite Leopold II’s ambition, embodied in the Expedition, to extend his Free State toward the Nile.

Bula Matari was also an element in Stanley’s style of caravan management. On the Expedition, Stanley put on Bula Matari like a super-hero costume. Bula Matari was a vital, forceful, and at times erratically violent persona who embodied powerful elements of both European and regional caravan leadership. “You dont know me yet dont you? I’ll soon let you know who I am dam you!...I am Bully Matardi to-day! I’ll fight! I’ll fight!” he shouted early one

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224 Jameson, Story, 37. Barttelot described an incident near Equator Station where local people brought gifts for Bula Matari; Life, 99.
225 Parke, My Experiences, 61. The indigenes fled at the arrival of a second steamer, even though they were told Bula Matari was on board.
226 The only appearance of Bula Matari in the forest was in the report of the 20 porters sent down the Aruwimi River with a message for Barttelot in March 1888. They told Stanley that they failed to complete their mission because of the unrelenting hostility of the indigenes. During one night attack they overheard a chief say “These men have run away from Bula Matari, not one of them must live,” Stanley Diary, August 1888 (E40) and 10 August 1888 (E41). If the porters actually said this to Stanley, I suspect they invented it to justify their failure to reach the Rear Column in terms that flattered Stanley, since he contemplated not paying them the substantial bonus he had promised them for their extra work.
morning on the lower Congo, using whip and fist on the porters around him. While Bonny did not identify a particular trigger for this appearance of Bula Matari, Stanley was frustrated by the growing disorder among the porters during this part of the Expedition’s march. At around this time he also threatened the Sudanese, among whom mutiny was simmering, that if they deserted he would inform the inhabitants of surrounding communities that they were Bula Matari’s enemies and should be shot on sight.

On another occasion, Stanley was summoned to deal with a group of mutinous porters. He “was at once ‘Bula Matari to-day’, knit his brows, started up without delay, buckled on his revolver, took his rifle” and emerged from his tent to muster the entire caravan into its companies with a whistle. He called forth the mutineers, had their leaders flogged, disarmed the others and sent them under guard to carry out the task they had earlier refused. During the floggings, Stanley said to one of the cowed Zanzibaris, “My name is Stanley Bulamatari...and not only Ibrahim, like yours.” The whole performance was “a wonderful instance of the extraordinary influence Mr. Stanley exercises over the men, and of the respect and confidence with which they invariably treat him,” Parke opined.

Bula Matari could be used against others, besides the porters, as well. Stairs expected, for example, that Bula Matari would make an appearance when Stanley and Emin had

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227 Bonny Diary, Late March 1887 at Leopoldville (E47). Similarly, Barttelot said of him: “Stanley is a different person altogether out here to what he is at home, he is subject to fits of ungovernable passion, when he is really quite mad & says & does the most outrageous things. I have seen him fly out of his tent & flog as many men as he could get hold of, his wretched European servant often gets a flogging.” E.M. Barttelot to Major Tottenham, 19 June 1887, Barttelot Family Papers. Interestingly, Hoffmann, whose diary during his later work for the CFS contains a number of references to things he learnt from Stanley about travel in Africa, reminded himself of “Stanley’s dictum of forbearance” when he had trouble disciplining his porters; Hoffmann, Congo Journal, 5 June 1892, Wellcome Institute Library, WMSS #6010.

228 McLynn, Stanley, 2:168. See also Barttelot, Life, 96-8.

differences. Stanley certainly seems to have assumed elements of this persona—“my character” he called it—in his dramatic confrontation with Emin and the Equatorian refugees at Mazamboni’s, though he did not specifically invoke Bula Matari. For Stanley, Bula Matari appears to have been a useful shorthand to employ in his relations with others for whom the name meant something. It indicated that he expected a certain kind of relationship with them. It also signified to others and to himself that he could and would act in particular ways. Additionally, it may have been a way of dissociating himself from some of the violence he used against his porters, allowing him to benefit from their trust and cooperation at other times. More broadly, the comment overheard by Emin’s associate, Casati, suggests that for Stanley, Bula Matari meant that he was a figure of power and significance. He had a name by which history would remember him.

This theme is developed further in his autobiography. Stanley’s work for the Congo Free State became the greatest single enterprise of his life, and the one that revealed his true nature:

When the observant savages watched him, as the rough ground of Vivi was subdued; when, later, they saw him, as the fifty-mile roadway was bridging the hills and chasms, and with drill and hammer he taught and led his followers, they gave him the name of BULA MATARI, ‘Breaker of Rocks’. By hit, or by wit, they struck his central quality—concentrated energy, victoriously battling with the hardest that earth could offer, all to make earth goodly and accessible to man. A Maker of Roads, a Breaker of Rocks, was he all his life long—Bula Matari!

Speaking for Stanley, and consciously working to build his legacy, Dorothy Stanley identified Bula Matari as the aspect of Stanley that shaped both physical and human landscapes on a

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230 My Experiences, 381. The punishment of the porters was not the only reason for Stanley’s effectiveness in dealing with this situation, though. Over the next few days he also addressed the mutinous porters’ main grievance.

231 Stairs Diary, 9 July 1888.

232 IDA, 2:198-207; the quote is found on p. 207. See also Chapter 2, pp. 133-4.

233 McLynn discusses the way Stanley used the Bula Matari persona in his work for the CFS to dissociate himself from violence he had earlier employed as an explorer on the Congo. He displaced this violence onto a fictional separate person, a subordinate called Tandeley. See Stanley, 2:101.

234 Stanley, Autobiography of Stanley, 352; emphasis in original.
massive, world-changing scale. Stanley opened Africa to the world’s knowledge. He realigned Africa, Europe and America, bringing these continents into a new relationship: "He broke down the wall between a savage and a civilised people, and the tides rushed together, as at the piercing of Suez."235 Stanley was, like Bonny, trying to recreate Africa. Unlike Bonny’s Africa, though, Stanley’s continent was a progressive one. He envisioned and worked toward "the transformations of [Africa’s] millions of peoples from barbarism, the transformation of those who were oppressed by all the ills of ignorance, superstition and cruelty, into happy and virtuous men and women."236 Another contemporary biographer saw him as an exemplar of "Anglo-Saxon pluck and muscle" who, before the amazed and bewildered people of Vivi, initiated the physical and socio-economic transformation of the continent.237

Even if this overdrawn, heroic Stanley was not swallowed whole by readers,238 Stanley’s place as a leading actor in late nineteenth century European imperialism in Africa has been accepted. Stanley, more than any other explorer, turned the "somewhat abstract enthusiasm for Africa" generated by the anti-slave trade campaign and travel literature "into action on the part of the States of Europe," judged one contemporary historian of the partition of Africa.239 For indigenous contemporaries in the Congo, the name Bula Matari was closely associated with the Free State and its abuses, regardless of whether Stanley was personally responsible for them.

235 Stanley, Autobiography of Stanley, 352. While Dorothy Stanley modestly claimed that her husband only acted as an instrument of Providence in his dealings with Africa, the scriptural allusion in this passage hints at divine salvific powers and a divine concern for the welfare of these lands and peoples; compare Ephesians 2:11-16.
236 J. Wassermann, Bula Matari: Stanley, Conqueror of a Continent, trans. E. & C. Paul (New York: Liveright Publishers, 1933), 158. Wassermann was not, strictly speaking, a contemporary, but he described himself as someone influenced by Stanley, whose "triiumphs were gained while I was an adolescent; the whole world was talking of him then; he was the hero of the lads of my generation" [p. x].
238 For the disappointing reception of Stanley’s Autobiography, see McLynn, Stanley, 2:389.
Among modern writers Stanley appears in a variety of contexts, but always as an important historical agent or as a representation of important historical ideas: Stanley is the metaphoric agent of European colonization in one popular history of Congo-Zaire, a visual synecdoche for the inexorable use of force during colonization in a modern textbook on underdevelopment, and Bula Matari is a metaphor for the colonial state in Africa in a recent political history.²⁴⁰

Significantly, it was not Stanley’s fellow-Europeans, but Africans, “the constant witnesses of his prowess, his conflicts, and his triumphs over every obstacle,” who most truly saw his character and who named him appropriately.²⁴¹ This points to an important aspect of Stanley’s self-construction and of his identity as perceived by contemporaries—an aspect some of them referred to as his Negrophilism. Stanley saw himself as a champion of Africans against those Europeans whose behaviour was ruled by dangerous and narrow-minded racial bigotry.²⁴²

While Stanley, too, thought Europeans were superior to Africans, he recognized virtues in Africans. At his death, his wife believed, throughout

Africa there will be mourning for Bula Matari, who loved the Black Man—and was loved by them—How often he spoke of their pleasant kindly natures, their quick appreciation of justice, There [sic] response to human sympathy—He was always so tender to helplessness, Africans were to him as little children, and little children seemed very divine to Stanley.²⁴³


²⁴¹ Little, Stanley, vi.

²⁴² On the Expedition, for example, Stanley noted the failure of his Rear Column officers to mention the “Excessive mortality” among their porters in the Rear Column Log Book. “Had this garrison consisted of British troops, I feel sure that English people would have better understood my surprise at this omission & probably the officers would have been [ ] of censure. As they were Zanzibaris I probably will be left alone with my thoughts.” Stanley Diary, 12 September 1888 (E41).

²⁴³ D. Stanley, notes sent to H.S. Wellcome, n.d. [probably 1904], RGS Stanley Collection 3/2. See McLynn, Stanley, 2:95–6 & 102 for further discussion of this point.
While Bula Matari was a workable strategy for obtaining resources along the Congo River and for relating to caravan porters, this persona made it more difficult for Stanley to deal successfully with his European subordinates. In part, this was because they believed that Stanley's Bula Matari methods undermined rather than promoted order in the caravan, as was discussed in Chapter 3. More importantly, Bula Matari put contradictory pressures on them. On the one hand, they were pushed to re-create themselves in Stanley's image. Managing the porters, Jameson wrote, "was truly sickening, as every twenty yards one had to stop to put a load on a man's head who had flung it down, and very likely give him a good dose of stick before he would go on."

While the officers became inured to this kind of violence over time, they bitterly resented the way Stanley engineered situations in which his officers were made to appear brutes for following Stanley's orders to use coercion while he presented himself as "a sort of guardian-angel" who looked out for the porters. The Europeans also feared that Bula Matari would be turned on them, though Hoffmann, who frequently received both verbal and physical abuse at Stanley's hands, was the only one among them exposed to the full force of this persona. The others were threatened by it though, especially after the incident at Lukolela on the Congo where Stanley had publicly disciplined Stairs and Jephson. The porters had complained of their treatment at the hands of these officers, and Stanley responded with "a disgraceful scene." He cursed the two officers, dismissed them from the Expedition, and told the porters to respond with violence if these two officers gave them any orders. "I had no idea until to-day what an extremely dangerous man Stanley was," Jameson confided to his diary. He and the other officers all believed that Stanley had deliberately and permanently undermined their influence

244 Story, 17.
245 For example, Jameson, Story, 20.
246 Jameson, Story, 47-9; Barttelot, Life, 97-8; Jephson Diary, 27 May 1887.
over the porters, making mutiny a definite possibility. Among the Rear Column officers, mistrust of Stanley grew as their situation became more difficult. They had dreams about the difficulties they expected when Stanley returned to Yambuya. They worried that they might suffer "accidents" if they went into the bush alone with porters commanded by Stanley, and they discussed amongst themselves how to respond if Stanley threatened any of them. They were hardly alone in these fears and suspicions. Nicol, an employee of Smith, Mackenzie & Co. who hosted the Expedition's officers at Mombasa in 1890, explained to the Barttelot family: "Hitherto Stanley has come back alone—and could write what he chose—this time there were too many Europeans to wipe out."250

Early in the Expedition, Stanley opined that the seasoning march on the lower Congo would make heroes of the men of the Expedition.251 Whatever he hoped for his porters, this was far from what he actually wanted to see happen to his officers. His preference was, in fact, for subordinates who would not challenge his authority, a factor which helps to explain why he selected a group of relatively young and inexperienced men to assist him with the Expedition.

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247 Story, 48.
248 Jameson, Story, 169. Troup, for example, dreamt that Stanley came back alone, "without any of the other white officers, and when asked where they were he quite calmly remarked that he did not know, and evidently did not care, merely saying that they had each chosen their own road." Barttelot dreamt that Stanley returned with his servant, Hoffmann, and that when Barttelot went to Stanley's tent, he "found him with a lawyer, upon which he at once remarked, 'Oh, you are for the Crown, I won't say anything'; and the dream ended."
249 See, for example, Bonny Diary, 24 & 29 November, 1 December 1887 (E47); Barttelot, Life, 170-71 and Barttelot MS Diary, 6 December 1887.
250 W. Nicol to W.G. Barttelot, 8 December 1890, Barttelot Family Papers. Nicol prefaced this with the comment that Stanley had driven Frank Pocock, the only one of his European assistants to survive his last journey across Africa, to commit suicide in the Congo rapids, but later claimed that his death was accidental. The "true" story was told by the Congo indigenes who had been present, and was well known to those who had worked on the Congo, like Ward.
251 Stanley Notebook, n.d. (E46).
He rejected applicants like the fellow-explorer Joseph Thomson, who would certainly have challenged his preference for “implicit, prompt and dumb obedience.”

Even with relatively weak subordinates, Stanley struggled to establish and maintain his authority, a problem both noted and resented by his officers. Barttelot was incredulous and angry when Stanley asserted himself by threatening Barttelot’s military career. Jameson, describing a row between Stanley and Parke in which it became clear that Stanley used Africans to monitor the behaviour of his European subordinates, fumed that it was “impossible for any one calling himself a gentleman, and an officer, to stand this sort of thing. The fact is, this is the first time Stanley has ever had gentlemen to deal with on an expedition of this sort.” Jephson was sure that Stanley would have done much better without European officers; “he should merely have Zanzibar chiefs & see to all the work himself.” Even Bonny, who had scant pretensions to gentlemanly status, was outraged by Stanley’s treatment of his officers. For Stanley, the loyalty of his officers to himself and to the work of the Expedition was a recurring concern, as was the fear that they were somehow conspiring to oppose him. Stanley’s retort in situations where his authority was challenged was that he needed no subordinates, “he could carry on the Expedition without any of [them].” As Stairs noted, there was a part of Stanley that wanted the approval of “English people of the very highest circles,” and this aspect of his personality contended with “the hard-working, keen Stanley as he appears at times when there really is a

253 E.M. Barttelot to Major Tottenham, 19 June 1887 and Barttelot MS Diary, 8 April 1887, Barttelot Family Papers.
254 Story, 32.
255 Jephson Diary, 2 November 1887.
256 Bonny Diary, Leopoldville, March 1887 (E47).
257 See, for example, Barttelot, Life, 97-8.
258 Barttelot, Life, 98.
need for him. Stanley's outrage when he discovered Stairs' privately expressed poor opinion of him suggests that his harsh treatment of his officers was rooted in fear of his inability to win their respect or to manage them.

Stanley's response was to limit the scope of his officers for independent action by limiting the information about the Expedition's purposes to which they had access and by assigning them work that kept them away from the Expedition's 'front line' and isolated from one another. In addition, in his regular re-organizations of the caravan, Stanley consistently reassigned the best men to his own No. 1 Company and transferred weak or troublesome porters to the companies commanded by his officers, thus curtailing their capacity to accomplish tasks and setting them up for criticism. He worked to undermine the officers' authority with the porters, as has already been noted, and made little effort to train them to manage a caravan. It could also be argued that Stanley's unwillingness to share the food, medicine, and other essential supplies he kept for himself was a subconscious means of limiting the effectiveness of his European subordinates. Thus, Stanley constructed his authority and his subsequent status as a heroic explorer by limiting the powers of his European subordinates.

While they resented and feared this, they also accepted Stanley's status as a leader who could accomplish things where

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259 Stairs Diary, 4 January 1888.
260 Stanley Diary, 6 August 1888 and 28 September 1888 (E41), commenting on W. Stairs to E.M. Barttelot, 12 June 1888, which he intercepted.
261 Jephson Diary, 26 October 1887.
262 Jephson noted that in addition to an amazing indifference to the welfare of his officers, Stanley seemed "to take no interest whatever in what they do or how they manage to get on," Jephson Diary, 2 November 1887. Nevertheless, some contemporaries felt that one of the accomplishments of the Expedition was that it created a small "college" of Europeans "who have served a hard apprenticeship under Bula Matari and are now fitted by their singular experience to guide others." See "New-Found World," 246.
263 What, if any, influence Stanley's choice of reading material for his officers—materials which included accounts of his earlier explorations and other classics of heroic manhood from contemporary fiction and non-fiction—had on their attitude towards him is unclear.
they had failed.\textsuperscript{264} The subordinates whom Stanley could not adequately subdue in the field, he pummelled with public criticism in Europe, calling his Rear Column officers, for example, "utterly incompetent."\textsuperscript{265} Stanley's officers were thus in a difficult position: they knew that Stanley would be harshly critical if they failed to live up to his standards, but if they did, they were ruthlessly cut down to size. As Casati observed, bruised from his own encounter with the great man, Stanley had an "inordinate desire for doing everything himself" and an "ardent wish not to let a crumb of glory fall into the lap of others."\textsuperscript{266}

Images of Stanley heroically striding off at the head of his expedition, like the explorer in Drummond's popular stereotype of African travel,\textsuperscript{267} were created by contemporaries, even though Stanley rarely described himself walking at the front of the caravan, compass in hand. However, his implicit depictions of himself as the agent in the Expedition were absorbed by contemporaries. In describing the Advance Column's passage through the forest, for example, Stanley used the plural pronoun in passages like: "The suffering had been so awful, calamities so numerous, the forest so endless, apparently that they [i.e. the porters] refused to believe that by & bye we should see plains, & cattle & the Nyanza....We felt as though we were dragging them along with a chain around their necks."\textsuperscript{268} The entity represented by that 'we' was clear to people who knew Stanley, though. Having read this letter, de Winton believed that "[n]othing but Stanley's determination and personal energy would have pulled them through the horrors they suffered in the forest region."\textsuperscript{269} Stanley, said others commenting on a subsequent

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{264} Jephson MS Diary, 1 September 1888 as quoted in Smith,\textit{Expedition}, 232. See also Troup,\textit{Rear Column}, 291 and Troup, "Stanley's Rear-Guard," 819.
\item \textsuperscript{265} HMS to Mackinnon, 3 September 1888, MP 85/20.
\item \textsuperscript{266}\textit{Ten Years}, 2:163.
\item \textsuperscript{267} See Chapter 1, pp. 36-7.
\item \textsuperscript{268} HMS to W. Mackinnon, 25 August 1888, MP 86/29.
\item \textsuperscript{269} F. de Winton to W. Mackinnon, 2 April 1889, MP 86/30.
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letter, was “the leader and director of events,” the “chief and hero” of a “narrative...full of
adventure and noble struggles,” a “quest” to “rank beside those which, handed down from a
cloudy antiquity, have been enshrined in the poetic lore of the world.” This ascription of
agency was translated into the literal image of Stanley at the head of his caravan.
Legitimized by repetition, this representation of Stanley’s agentive qualities is perpetuated by
modern scholars. Thus, in the 1990s, we have Stanley, back on his feet after a month’s serious
illness at Mazamboni’s, striding “purposefully at the head of the column, a pipe in his mouth, a
stick in his hand, guiding the destinies of 1500 people with his adamantine will.”

Conclusion

In Africa, lacking the habitat—the “civilized restraints”—that produced and sustained
white men and gentlemen, “every one degrades truly awfully...unless he happens to be a man
of exceptional moral fibre such as was Livingstone.” The European members of the
Expedition were not alone in fearing the threat of negative transformation posed to both their
bodies and characters by exposure to the African environment. Lesser men than Livingstone,
they might easily suffer infection, might experience violent impulses and outrageous hungers,
might find that the enemy was not without the walls of self, but within. Discovering means by
which the African environment, both physical and social, could be rendered tolerable, if not
safe, for Europeans was thus a central part of any imperial project that required the presence of

270 “Another letter from Stanley,” Scotsman, 26 November 1889 and an untitled, undated clipping, both
in Emin Pascha Nachlaß, 622-2 D.II.
271 McLynn, Stanley, 2:287.
272 Letter to the Editor signed Anglo-Australian, Times, 14 November 1890.
Europeans in Africa. Europeans hoped to be able to say of their emissaries, at the least, that they did “good” in Africa “despite the ethical effects of climate.”

On the Expedition, medical interventions were an important part of the effort to deal with the dangerous African environment. Indeed, some of the worst failures of the Expedition, involving both Europeans and Africans, were judged by the Expedition’s organizing Committee to be “chiefly due to the want of the necessary medicines.” However, as my analysis reveals, the social effects of European exposure to Africa and Africans were as important as the physiological ones. Social remedies, such as the ceremonies of identity discussed above, were consequently crucial to maintaining the fidelity of Europeans in Africa, as were the props that made these ceremonies possible. Like the more obvious tools of the explorer—the compasses, maps and guns—the practices which protected the fragile integrity of European travellers were essential parts of making routes in Africa. The fact that the identities being conserved had limits and contradictions in their utility for imperial enterprises like the Expedition did not make them any less important to European travellers. In addition, these problems failed to dim the attraction for Europeans like Bonny of Africa as a place to construct identities like gentleman and officer.

The Europeans on the Expedition were also striving to construct themselves as particular kinds of actors, as heroes and historical agents in Africa. These efforts were in conflict with their maintenance of fidelity and with the purposes of the Expedition at some times; at other times they were congruent. The Europeans constructed themselves as figures with the powers necessary to establish the order they envisioned, though this power was often contingent and

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273 Land and Water, 1 November 1890, JRTC, vol. III.
274 Report to the Subscribers, 77. The Committee was referring specifically to the loss of life in the Rear Column.
limited. At times, this effort of construction involved the simultaneous constraint or diminishment of the agency of others. At other points, though, the Europeans constructed themselves as non-agents, as figures without power or choice in the face of indigenous peoples determined to remain hostile, obstinately irresponsible and mutinous porters, or the overwhelming powers of disease and hostile nature.

The identities that the European members of the Expedition sought to maintain and to construct needed to be accepted by others, both in Africa and by more distant figures in Europe. This was part of the task of constructing a material route to Equatoria. It was also an important aspect of the construction of rhetorical routes into the interior of African for Europeans, as will be discussed in the following chapter. The textual construction of the European traveller in Africa and the narratives in which these constructed characters appeared were important in shaping European popular opinion about involvement in Africa. These constructions were also important models for Europeans travelling in Africa, whether for personal reasons, or as agents of mission, commerce or imperial administration. The particular constructions of identity found in widely read texts, like those about the Expedition, were influential in shaping the subsequent interaction between Europeans and Africans.
Chapter 6:
Making a Route in the Forest

As was discussed in Chapter 1, a route is a defined space, an area with predictable and manipulable characteristics, a zone of competence in which travellers can expect to maintain their integrity and succeed in their purposes. A route is also a network that combines land, nature, persons, institutions, items of technology, practices, and knowledge stored textually or in other forms. Existing routes in the East-Central African interior were flexible, a series of overlapping networks drawing together varying elements. They were permutations among the paths linking viable communities in a desired direction. The permutations reflected the changing availability of human and natural resources, as well as variations in the practices and relationships out of which these routes were built. European travellers, though small in number, promoted distinctive changes in the way routes were constituted, understood, and used. Chief among these was an increase in the physical fixedness of routes, which became anchored by mechanical transportation technology and other new objects. Changes in knowledge about routes also linked the routes to new institutions, persons, practices, and to texts.

The Expedition was an embodiment of some of these changes and a precursor of others. It was also a touchstone for broad visions of the transformation of Africa based on the possibilities of Emin's administration and Equatoria's ivory. These visions for Equatoria, all associated with actors external to the region, saw its future in terms of a connection to long-distance trade. Ideas about the products that should be traded, and about the appropriate agents and beneficiaries of trade differed, though. What all of these visions shared was a concern for routes by which to access the interior. As Emin explained to his supporters in Europe:

[a] safe road to the coast must be opened up, and one which shall not be at the mercy of the moods of childish kings or disreputable Arabs. This is all we
want, and it is the only thing necessary to permit of the steady development of these countries.¹

While Emin’s immediate problems were the rulers of Bunyoro and Buganda, and the traders responsible for the murder of his agent, Mohammed Biri, his general problem was one of a reliable route that no one user had the power to dominate or disrupt. For those who were already powerful players in trade to and around the Lakes region, the problem was also one of control over routes. This control implied power to shape the distribution of the benefits and costs of long-distance trade.

The major work of the Expedition was supposed to be the construction of a route from Equatoria to the east coast, a route that ended at Mombasa and dealt effectively with the obstacles of Buganda and Bunyoro. For reasons noted in Chapter 2, the Expedition failed to create such a route. With the exception of a few pseudo-treaties signed west of Lake Victoria, it also failed to establish a concession for the Imperial British East Africa Company. Further, the Expedition did not succeed in facilitating a change in imperial “ownership” of Equatoria, in maintaining any kind of imperial order in the province, or in transplanting that order to an area more reliably tied into existing routes from the coast to the Lakes. As Mackinnon feared, the choice of the Congo route effectively subordinated the work of the nascent East African Company to the concerns of Leopold II and his Congo Free State. Leopold’s vision included a route that linked the watersheds of the Congo and Nile Rivers. He wanted to make the resources of Equatoria more effectively available to a long-distance trade network built out of political, commercial and transportation elements that he controlled. However, the Expedition was only able to create a temporary and highly problematic route to Equatoria, one that did not permit significant movement of persons, trade goods or supplies for imperial expansion. In the longer run, the Expedition established how and where not to travel through the forest of the north-east Congo basin.

¹ Emin to R. Felkin, 17 April 1887 as quoted in Smith, Expedition, 36.
The Expedition’s biggest successes were, in fact, in a different sphere, that of texts and information. The Expedition was the occasion for the publication of widely circulated and profitable information about the interior of Africa. Indeed, the Expedition created images of Africa and Africans that have persisted long after the Expedition itself has been forgotten. It also succeeded in the aim of geographic discovery, as this was defined in Europe, and in arousing interest in Africa among a variety of groups in Europe and its colonies of settlement. The Expedition’s biggest discoveries were the tropical forest and its pygmy inhabitants. Stanley considered these, after the rescue of Emin, to be the most important and certainly the most interesting aspect of the Expedition’s work. He was influenced in this judgement by the intense public interest in these topics.

This mixed record of accomplishments suggests that a study the Expedition’s effort to make a route through the Ituri forest will provide insights into the way the Expedition tried to draw together the elements of a route identified earlier. Since I have already looked in some detail at two groups of people drawn into this network—the Expedition’s porters and its European members—I shall focus in this chapter on the role of key objects and of the environment in the route the Expedition was trying to build. The indigenous people of the forest region were another important, though generally intractable resource that the Expedition tried to draw into its route. As with other groups of people in its network, the Expedition sought to turn these diverse and little known peoples into a homogeneous, predictable and tractable body—the forest “natives.” The other element of the Expedition’s route I consider is the texts it used and generated in this part of its travels. The interdependent nature of the rhetorical and material constructs generated by European exploration and imperialism in Africa are clearly evident in the Expedition’s attempt to create a route in the forest. The divergence between these constructs, as in the case of the powers claimed for objects like the Expedition’s guns, are of particular interest to me.

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2 See the text of Stanley’s public lecture, *Across Africa, and the Rescue and Retreat of Emin Pasha*
The organization of this chapter, starting with an abstract discussion of ideas and moving to concrete applications of them, should not be taken to mean that I see causation running only from ideas, which appear *ex nihilo*, to events and structures. An idea does not exist by itself. Ideas about race, for example, are bound up with ideas about trade and religious observance, forming complex and at times contradictory clusters that I have earlier referred to as visions for transformation or projects of conversion. These clusters of ideas, as well as some of their main components have histories. A few of them are well-documented aspects of Western history. While these clusters of ideas may be articulated by particular individuals, they are not limited to them. For reasons of consistency and economy, though, I will focus here on the statements of two such individuals. Ideas also have contexts of acceptance or rejection, of adaptation and use. They can be debated, adopted and added to, disassembled and reconfigured, made esoteric or popularized. These contexts have not been as well studied by historians. In the case of economic ideas, they have not been studied at all. Further, an idea is more than speech and texts, it is attached to structures, practices, and things throughout its history. While the summary that follows can only hint at these connections, I will explore some of them in more depth in the remainder of the chapter.

**Competing Visions for the Transformation of the Interior of Africa**

Before looking at the Expedition's attempt to make a route in the forest, I will outline the vision on which its work was based, building on my discussion of conversion in the preceding chapter, but focusing specifically on Stanley's ideas. I will also look at another crucial vision for the transformation of the interior, that of senior traders associated with the Sultanate of Zanzibar. Here I will focus on the ideas of Tippu Tip, since he was directly linked with the Expedition and, among the major Zanzibari traders, his ideas are the best documented ones. These two visions were similar in important ways, and proponents of each

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tried to incorporate the work of the other. The visions were thus also competing ones. Indeed, at the time of the Expedition they were competing more sharply than they had during earlier decades of contact between Zanzibari traders and Europeans.

**Stanley’s View of Conversion**

During his third trek through the forest, Stanley meditated on the process of trade and transformation in Africa:

I may say that however incorrigibly fierce in temper & detestable in their habits these wild forest tribes may be today, there is not a tribe of them which does not contain germs by whose means at some future date civilization may be spread, & with those manifold blessings inseparable from it. We find our pioneering beset with difficulties daily, but they will be less for the Arab ivory hunter, they will be still less for those that followed him, until by & bye the difficulties will have vanished and peaceful settlements for regular & lawful barter will be established, where the articles manufactured by England, America, & Belgium will become the currency of the land.3

Stanley called this a “Fire Speech” and dedicated it to Sir James Mackintosh. In this way he linked his thought to the culture of regional trade caravans, in which story-telling and other displays of rhetorical skill around the evening campfire were a cherished leisure activity. He also linked it to decades of European debate about the nature of societal progress, especially those about how “primitive” peoples fit into both the histories and the contemporary political economies Europeans were constructing for themselves.4 In particular, Stanley linked himself to the Scottish thinkers who propounded a hierarchical schema of social progress. This started from savagery, associated with hunter-gatherers whose only form of social organization was the family, and ended with civilization, which was characterized by industry, commerce, and complex, large-scale forms of social and political organization.5

While these thinkers believed many parts of Africa had progressed beyond savagery to

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3 Stanley Diary, 27 September 1888 (E41).

4 For leisure activities in regional caravan culture, see Rockel, “Caravan Porters,” 270-1. Sir James Mackintosh (1765-1832) was a medical and legal scholar, historian, political philosopher, journalist, colonial official, and parliamentarian. See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed (1900), s.v. “Mackintosh, Sir James.”

barbarism, via settled agriculture and tribal forms of organization, the continent was now stuck at this stage of development. Like these late eighteenth century political economists, Stanley assumed that economic activity was a crucial yardstick for assessing the level of development in any society.  

Like his late nineteenth century contemporaries, he believed that trade was a particularly powerful catalyst for societal transformation and that positive change in Africa would not be self-generating, it would require some form of external intervention. Indeed, isolation from external influences, deliberately maintained by every little tribe "upholding with tooth, spear, and arrow its singular African Monroe doctrine—Ugogo for the Wagogo, Uganda for the Waganda...and so on" caused moral and physical deterioration, Stanley believed. All Africans would end up "as degraded as the Pygmies and the Bushmen" as a result, he feared.

In Stanley's view, a progression of traders and trade goods from outside the continent would save Africans both from the cruel "Arab" slave traders and, more importantly, from themselves. Brought within the fold of civilization, Africa would be raised up from its state of "undevelopment and inutility." The continent would be assisted to "mature into usefulness" and its inhabitants "taught how to be human." In this he followed David Livingstone, the leading exponent of the power of trade to transform Africa. Like Livingstone, Stanley was also more concerned with the conversion of regions and societies than of individuals. The right kind of trade—"legitimate" commerce—would squeeze out the slave trade. In so doing, it would reduce or remove many of the evils late nineteenth century Britons associated with this trade. These included cannibalism, as well as the low

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6 Ibid., 1:64.
7 Cairns, Prelude to Imperialism, 190.
8 Ibid., 1:64.
9 Cairns, Prelude to Imperialism, 190.
10 HMS, "The Story of the Development of Africa," Century Illustrated Magazine N.S. vol. 29, no. 4 (1890): 506. Stanley ascribed all the supposed primitive evils of tribal Africa to this determined isolationism: "Murder in every conceivable shape rioted throughout their territories. Naked and bestial they had lived from prehistoric time. It was death to any unarmed stranger to come among them, and death to any member of their communities who showed the least sign of capacity or genius."
11 HMS, "Inaugural Address," 10 & 15.
13 For a summary of Livingstone's views, see Cairns, Prelude to Imperialism, 192-8.
value placed on human life and the concomitant maltreatment of individual Africans. The slave trade was also believed to be the primary cause of tribal wars. Trade in a series of "legitimate" goods, starting with ivory and other collected products and ending with cultivated ones, would flourish once the easy profits of the slave trade were no longer obtainable. Such trade and production for it would initiate a virtuous cycle involving disciplined labour, the clearing and cultivating of wilderness areas, clearly defined property rights, the removal of despotic leaders, religious conversion, and the consumption of the products of European industry. British engagement with Africa through "legitimate" commerce took on a particular fervour because of the perceived need to atone for the leading role that Britain had played in the slave trade and "the frightful legacy of crime and degradation we have left behind."\(^{12}\)

The discovery of new routes into the interior was the first step in Livingstone's vision. These routes would allow missionaries, traders and colonists "to feed a host of civilizing impulses into the hinterland."\(^{13}\) After areas had been "mentally mapped out" by exploration, the next step was the establishment of stations that would facilitate European trade and settlement. The construction of railways and the introduction of steamers on navigable waters would follow.\(^{14}\) Mechanized transport in the interior was essential because it would allow the development of trade in items of lower value-per-weight than ivory.\(^{15}\) Such transport would also make human porterage, and all the evils associated with it by contemporary Britons, unnecessary.\(^{16}\)

The classical trade theorists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were agreed that trade between countries would bring a significant increase in the "mass of

\(^{12}\) J. Thomson, "The Results of European Intercourse with the African," *Contemporary Review*, vol. 58, no. 3 (1890): 344.
\(^{13}\) Cairns, *Prelude to Imperialism*, 193.
\(^{14}\) HMS, "Inaugural Address," 4, 8 & 15. Stanley was ambiguous on the precise role that either European administrators or a police force would play when the stations were established.
\(^{15}\) HMS, *My African Travels* (London: Printed for the Author by W. Clowes & Sons, 1886), 37 & 42-3. This was one of the talks Stanley gave on the 1886 lecture tour that he abandoned to lead the Expedition.
\(^{16}\) L. Pelly to W. Mackinnon, 29 January 1890, MP 45/179 makes this argument in the context of the
commodities, and therefore, the sum of enjoyments" or, in other words, the static benefit of increased national income for all trading partners. They also hypothesized dynamic benefits from trade. These included the diffusion of new ideas and techniques, the inflow of foreign capital, and a stimulus for the "energy and ambition" of a population through the temptation of possessing new trade goods. More importantly, trade, by expanding a country's market, prompted continual improvements in productivity. It promoted elaboration in the division of labour and greater use of machinery in production, as well as encouraging invention. The classical theorists assumed that such trade would be free and that it would be voluntarily engaged in by all participants, trammeled by neither the protectionist measures nor the coercive control of the old mercantilist empires. Countries would thus produce and exchange goods on the basis of their comparative advantage, and the benefits from this trade would be equally distributed between the trading partners.

Such theories, diffused through political parties as well as through Christian missionary groups and the anti-slavery movement, became an assumed part of the interpretation of British national interests and of Britain's economic interaction with Africa. However this process of diffusion also gave ideas about trade a much more evangelical character, as with Livingstone, who saw trade as an essentially Christian phenomenon and equated measures preventing free trade with paganism. Trade in Africa, for example, would "demolish the isolation engendered by the parochialism of heathenism and...make the tribes feel themselves to be mutually dependent on and mutually beneficial to each other." While

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19 Johns, Colonial Trade, 2-8. As Johns notes, these theorists made no attempt to explain actual trade flows.
20 Livingstone believed that in "the body corporate of nations, no one member...can suffer without the others suffering with it;" Missionary Travels, 28 as quoted in Cairns, Prelude to Imperialism, 193. The scriptural allusion is to 1 Corinthians 12:26.
the precise mechanisms through which the benefits of trade would be generated in either Africa or Britain were vague, and the degree of either military or administrative power needed to establish “legitimate” trade was debated, the all but magical power of trade to transform societies was assumed. As Joseph Thomson, a prominent trade skeptic, sourly observed: “There are still those who believe that every trading station, once the slave-traffic was stopped, became a beacon of light and leading, beneath whose kindling beams the darkness of heathen barbarism was bound to disappear.” Critics of the gospel of trade in Africa differed as to whether the main problem preventing the conversion of Africa was the nature of commodities presently traded or the character and practices of individual traders. Even Thomson believed that if commerce could be purged of its present “criminal iniquities” and joined “with religion in the work of civilization, what may not be predicted of the future of Africa!”

British attitudes and policies toward Africa also need to be understood as part of a larger nineteenth century project to create a particular kind of international order. This order was rooted in concern over the burden of national debt which had mushroomed during Britain's long wars. It was also linked to the problems of population growth, overcrowding and food supply, the periods of excess capacity and low profitability experienced by many industries during the nineteenth century, and the perceived dangers of political radicalism at home and abroad. This new order was built around a vision of progress, a vision of economic, political and moral improvement that reinforced rather than threatened established structures of privilege and property. “International commerce, financed and managed by Britain, was to provide the material basis of the new world order.”

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21 Cairns, Prelude to Imperialism, 192. For an example of the debate about what was needed to ensure the virtuous cycle of “legitimate” trade see Helly, Livingstone’s Legacy, 198-215.
25 Ibid., 247.
class of "urban gentlemen were invented in Britain...to be agents and beneficiaries of this programme."26

These agents required collaborators and intermediaries abroad. In Africa, identifying these led to debates about the capacity of Africans to absorb British civilization, debates grounded in racism and coloured by ambivalence about educated, Westernized Africans. Some of those most skeptical about the conversion of Africa and Africans recommended that the "Arabs" be allowed to introduce a faith and a form of civilization more suited to the perceived low condition of Africans. The benefits of British society could be introduced at some point in the future, when Africans were capable of appreciating and absorbing them.27 Even those sanguine about the possibilities of trade and conversion in Africa believed that with Zanzibaris already established as "merchants...settlers, rulers, and colonists" in the interior, it was pragmatic to enroll them in the British project of conversion. It was unrealistic to hope that they would disappear, and attempting to drive them out of the interior with a crusade or a nineteenth century *reconquista* was impracticable.28

As the British debating their role in Africa implicitly recognized, the "Arabs" or Zanzibaris were also promoting a project for the conversion of East-Central Africa, one similar in many respects to their own. This similarity caused economic and political conflicts in the interior. It also created a rhetorical problem for Europeans. They needed to explain how their project of transformation was different from and superior to that of the coast-based traders. Appeals to British historical mythology were a popular solution, a favorite motif being the activities of British merchant-adventurers in the Americas during Elizabethan period.29 This implied a parallel between the enslavement and mistreatment of American Indians by the Spaniards, as enshrined in the "Black Legend," and the enslavement and

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26 Ibid., 246-7. Hopkins argues that the "representatives of industry had a place in the design but did not draw it up." [p. 259].
mistreatment of Africans by "Arabs," who were seen to be as foreign to Africa as the British were. It also presented and legitimated a neat solution to the problem of the slave trade—the substitution of enlightened British commercial and colonial activity for that of the cruel Spanish or "Arabs."

Conversion as envisioned by Tippu Tip

The ideas about the conversion of Africa held by traders connected with the Sultanate of Zanzibar, while they shared concepts and practices with the British, tended to be less grandiose in scale and more pragmatic in focus. Tippu Tip, the Zanzibari trader whose ideas and activities are best documented, was consciously working to transform the societies and physical environments in which he operated. His program of transformation was most clearly evident in the eastern Congo in the 1880s.

Tippu Tip's ideas about the development of the interior revolved around three interconnected transformations. First, through training and example, indigenous people were to be weaned away from their "barbarous" practices and introduced to more "civilized" ones. Page notes, though, the ambivalence of Zanzibari traders about admitting assimilated "savages" to positions of equality. Zanzibari ideas about washenzi or savages focused on deviant diet and sexuality, as when the headman Muni Somai disparaged the Expedition's Manyema porters by declaring them not men but beasts, or even just meat, since "they will sleep with a man or woman & eat them both next day." These images paralleled those of

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29 See, for example, V.L. Cameron's contribution to "England and Germany in Africa," The Fortnightly Review N.S. vol. 48, no. 7 (1890): 130 and "The Geographical Dinner," 489.
30 This interpretation is consistent with Bennett's argument in Arab versus European that the merchant-adventurers responsible for the Zanzibar sultanate's expansion into the interior established as much political control as circumstances allowed; they were not merely interested in commerce.
33 Bonny Diary, 4 July 1888 (E48) and Jameson, Story, 319.
the Europeans, for which they often formed either foundation or reinforcement. The transformation of these peoples involved the removal, or at least a reduction in the primary markers of their barbarism: paganism, cannibalism and nakedness. The elimination of these savage practices would have important collective as well as individual consequences.

Cannibalism, in particular, was part of a constellation of resistance to the expansion of Zanzibari spheres of trade. Jameson, travelling the Congo River between Nyangwe and Kassongo, was told that “until a short time ago all the villages near here were peaceful; but they lately took to looting canoes, killing and eating the Arabs in charge of them, and taking the ivory.”

Removing indigenous people from their communities was crucial to this process of transformation. This could be accomplished either by recruiting young men as dependent followers or by enslavement, which tended to involve women and children. The “conversions” thus effected were often superficial. Selim bin Mohammed, for example, planned to increase his following from thirty to one hundred and fifty by going to Kassongo and its environs. There he would “take hold of a man and shave his head, put a gun in his hands, and give him enough cloth to make him decent,” and thus make him a follower. For the young men in raiding parties, though, these conversions had a self-perpetuating dynamic, since their activities generated such hostility that they could not consider returning to their former lives and communities. The new identities and loyalties of these converts were thus attached to and sustainable only in the settlements of the coast-based traders.

The second transformation involved bringing peace and order to areas in which local

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34 In addition to the cannibal tales recounted by traders that initiated the supposed cannibal feast witnessed by Jameson, Ward also recorded many such stories. See for example, My Life, 68. These stories included such outrageous details as a tribe whose women wore live chickens for loin-cloths.

35 Story, 214. See also Ward, Five Years, 160-2. Stamping out cannibalism therefore provided a justification for attacks on groups alleged to practice it; see, for example H. von Wissmann, My Second Journey through Equatorial Africa from the Congo River to the Zambesi in the years 1886 and 1887 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1891), 198.

36 Jameson, Story, 131-2.

37 Ward, My Life, 85.
people would otherwise be fighting each other.\textsuperscript{38} Tippu Tip said when he first arrived in the eastern Congo he found that “[i]n this country there are no hereditary chiefs.” Rather, outsiders came and offered goods to those who “own the land” and the people accepted these foreign chiefs for a few years, until another such outsider appeared.\textsuperscript{39} This interpretation of existing political processes made control of the region by Zanzibari traders both legitimate and an improvement over the conflict-ridden rule of small independent chiefs.

As the acceptance of trade and trade goods, together with the socio-political changes they implied were central to the program of transformation, the conflicts engendered by these changes and by competition between various traders needed to be controlled. Sometimes this could be accomplished through negotiation. At other times, “enforcers” were necessary, especially to deal with communities that obstructed or refused to participate in trade. Attacks on trading parties were not uncommon since their preference for low-cost methods involved what appeared, to their victims, to be theft rather than trade.\textsuperscript{40} Bonny also noted that it was “a custom adopted by Tib [sic] that when he makes a raid on a village he disarms the people & causes a man to live among them to keep them disarmed.”\textsuperscript{41}

In spite of the rhetoric of peace and order, the destruction at the leading edge of Zanzibari trade expansion in the eastern Congo—which included raids on villages, removal of persons and property, confiscation or destruction of food crops, and the inadvertent spread of smallpox—was only slowly followed by the establishment of a new order. Senior traders like Tippu Tip were the ones most interested in establishing order and most likely to benefit from it. Those at lower levels in the Zanzibari trade system were more likely to focus on maximizing short-term gains and keeping the system open for advancement, regardless of whether their actions and the consequent lack of order diminished the prospect of long-term prosperity.

\textsuperscript{38} Page, “Tippu Tip,” 114.
\textsuperscript{39} Both quotes from el-Murjebi, \textit{Maisha}, sec. 87.
\textsuperscript{40} Lenz, “Oesterreichische Congo-Expedition,” \textit{Mittheilungen} 29 (1886): 265.
The third area of transformation involved reorienting the economies of communities in the region. Tippu Tip said he intended to train those in areas under his authority to make the land productive. This included the introduction of new crops like rice, maize, citrus fruits, and various vegetables. In major trade settlements like Nyangwe or Kassongo this agriculture was increasingly carried out on plantations by slaves. In the multitude of small communities located along regular lines of travel through the forest, production was also reorganized, though not with plantations, and the inhabitants encouraged to produce surpluses of a variety of crops. These communities were connected by improved trails, from which traps and other defenses installed by indigenes had been removed. Tippu Tip desired to see these communities incorporated into an effective network of paths, labour and resources that fed into the Zanzibari commercial system. As the region’s inhabitants often responded by withdrawing from areas through which trading parties were advancing—evacuating their villages, removing their property, burning their villages to the ground and razing their fields in the hope of deterring the traders from creating a settlement—they sometimes had to be forcibly returned to their villages and made to resume cultivation. They were also made to provide food, drink, and labour to passing groups of traders, as the Rear Column officers appreciated on their many trips between Yambuya and Stanley Falls.

Both of these visions for transformation were essential ingredients in the routes being built in the forest and elsewhere in East-Central Africa in the late nineteenth century. They provided ordering principles for both rhetorical and material constructions of the forest and its inhabitants. The visions articulated by men like Tippu Tip and Stanley were not individual enterprises, but grew out of the ideas, practices and resources of the groups and institutions to which they were connected. These visions were large ones, they incorporated many elements

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41 Bonny Diary, 29 November 1887 (E47).
42 Salmon, Le voyage, 78-9.
44 See el-Marjebi to Holmwood, 29 Shawal 1304/21 July 1887, MP 88/33.
and assumed the power necessary to hold these diverse elements in place. The encompassing nature of these visions, in which the forests of the eastern Congo were only a part, did not mean that there were no other visions operative in the region, though. Others—persons with varying amounts of political, economic and socio-cultural status—also had visions for themselves, their societies and their surroundings. Many of these visions were smaller in scale, both in terms of their purposes and the resources on which they could draw. They co-existed, cooperated or competed with the larger visions of transformation, but often on terms determined by those involved in the larger visions. Nonetheless, plans and visions of more limited scope, such as those of chiefs who refused to acknowledge a new tributary relationship or those of villagers who withdrew into the forest, had to be taken seriously by both Tippu Tip and Stanley, as did a physical environment that refused to be easily mastered.

The Problems of Pioneering a Route in the Forest

As was noted in Chapter 1, the Expedition’s travel through the north-east corner of the Congo River basin was one of the few instances of genuine pioneering in the history of European travel in Africa. Stanley was trying to make a route in an area only minimally and recently touched by long-distance trade from either the east or west coast, and one where there were as yet no established long-distance routes. Routes for local movement and trade existed, as did those for regional trade, though in sparsely populated areas of the forest, they were not plentiful. This region was even more isolated from the sphere of European trade and geographical knowledge. As will be evident below, for the Expedition, the forest was a foreign environment, one in which neither European nor Zanzibari travel expertise provided much guidance.

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45 Vansina, “Long-Distance Routes,” 388.
46 Vansina, Paths, 167 and Vansina, “Long-Distance Routes.”
If this was the case, why did the Expedition go through the forest at all? In the proposal Stanley prepared for the Emin Pasha Relief Committee, the Congo route was only one of four possible routes to Equatoria, and the Committee clearly favoured an east coast route. Stanley, however, wanted to take the Congo route. It would include travel through still-unexplored parts of a region in which he was ambitious to make geographical discoveries.\textsuperscript{48} Further, because travel with a large caravan was expensive, most Europeans travelling in Africa sought sponsorship for their efforts. The government, geographical associations, and the press were the main sources of funding for exploration, and the Expedition sought money from all of them.\textsuperscript{49} Getting support from the latter two required novelty in the traveller’s itinerary, something which the addition of “untrodden” territory in the eastern Congo made possible.\textsuperscript{50} The fact that traversing “primeval forest” was the dream of every European armchair traveller was an added attractant for these sponsors.\textsuperscript{51} Crucially, Leopold II also insisted on the Congo route if he was to release Stanley to the Expedition.

Last, but not least, Stanley appears to have genuinely believed the arguments he made to the Committee that the Congo route was not only feasible, but superior to the east coast routes. Stanley told Mackinnon and Hutton that the choice of route boiled down to a question of resources. “With money enough every route is possible;” with limited funds and limited time, the Congo route was better because it was shorter.\textsuperscript{52} Stanley believed, mistakenly, that only 322 miles separated the head of steamer navigation on the Aruwimi River from Equatoria.

\textsuperscript{48} G. Grenfell to W.H. Bentley, 22 January 1883, BMS Congo-Angola A/21 (1883-1896). Grenfell noted that Stanley had proceeded to the head of steam navigation on the Aruwimi on his 1882 trip to Stanley Falls, but that he was maintaining an “obstinate silence” about these travels, a silence Grenfell attributed to a desire to keep as much of the glory of Congo exploration as possible to himself. Grenfell suspected that Stanley had “something startling to tell to about it and the Muata Nzige” [i.e. the Aruwimi and Lake Albert]. See also Smith, \textit{Expedition}, 69 & 75.

\textsuperscript{49} Cairns, \textit{Prelude to Imperialism}, 22.

\textsuperscript{50} W. Mackinnon to HMS, 6 January 1887, BLEM Stanley Papers. Although the monies from these sources in the end made up only 10\% of the total Relief Fund, they were not insignificant. They were viewed at the outset as a welcome financial cushion against cost over-runs, which turned out to be a substantial problem for the Expedition’s sponsors. See Appendix 1 for details of the Relief Fund.


\textsuperscript{52} \textit{IDA}, 1:33.
province. The Congo route would also be less costly because it would prevent porters from deserting with their loads. Further, it would eliminate the need for expensive detours around hostile kingdoms, though Stanley’s public account of his decision-making process avoided the issue of the military power of African polities relative to European-led and armed caravans. Finally, Stanley foresaw no serious obstacles in the terrain or from the region’s inhabitants, and estimated a rate of travel not much slower than on the lower Congo or in the savannah. Water would be easily available, as it was not in many parts of East Africa, and the rich vegetation of the forest argued for a plentiful food supply.

As elsewhere in East-Central Africa, Stanley expected to find “a native path more or less crooked connecting the various settlements” in the area. Paths and the villages they linked meant food, shelter, guides, information, and the other services necessary to maintain a caravan. Although the Advance Column carried a small stock of trade goods, Stanley seems to have expected from the outset that it would be possible to acquire food and shelter in villages deserted by their inhabitants. He also expected to be able to draw on regional labour supplies, through his contract with Tippu Tip, to augment his caravan. However, from the first day out of Yambuya, travel in the forest proved not to be so simple. I will examine the Expedition’s efforts to build a route in the forest through a look at its failures, which were more prominent and more revealing than its successes.

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53 IDA, 1:34 & 36. These were “geographical miles,” measured in a straight line on a map. He expected to have to march further to cover that distance on the ground. Stanley later acknowledged that they marched 680 miles between Yambuya and the Lake [IDA, 2:496-500]. In an earlier prospectus for Leopold II, Stanley presented an even more optimistic estimate: “the Equatorial provinces...are but a step as it were from the Dépôts and steamers of the Congo state...They are as easy of access from the Upper Congo flotilla as Stanley Pool is from the sea-coast, the mileage being the same.” HMS to Leopold II, 18 March 1886, copy in British Library, Gladstone Papers, vol. 411, ADD MS 44496 f. 154-59.
54 HMS, Memo for the Advance Column officers, 26 June 1887, in IDA, 1:129-31; Copy of HMS to Leopold II, 18 March 1886, Gladstone Papers.
55 IDA, 1:34-5.
56 IDA, 1:129.
57 HMS, Memo for the Advance Column officers, 26 June 1887, in IDA, 1:129-31. Stanley seems to have expected them to be backward and ignorant about trade as a result of their isolation. For Stanley’s views on the effects of isolation, see HMS, “Story of Development,” 506.
Resources and Repeated Passage through the Forest

The Expedition found that the resources it needed to make a route were nowhere very plentiful in the forest, though they varied in availability in different zones of the forest. These variations were particularly apparent during the Advance Column’s initial trip through the forest. Over the course of the Expedition, these zones changed and blurred, in part as a result of the activities of the Expedition. I will briefly describe the resources for travel the Expedition found in each of these zones, and then sketch the ways in which they changed. These zones are indicated on the accompanying map of the Expedition’s trek through the forest.

58 The Advance Column encountered different ecological zones within the forest, but did not clearly or consistently describe these. Similarly, they encountered a variety of peoples in the forest, but the process by which chiefs, villages, districts or languages were assigned names, often multiple names, does not make it easy to attach names that are meaningful in the late twentieth century to these groups. I will discuss the experiences of the Expedition in different parts of the forest without attempting to recreate in detail either an ecological or ethnographic map of the Ituri region in the late 1880s.
The Expedition's Passages Through the Forest

Adapted from H.M. Stanley, "A Map of the Great Forest Region showing the routes of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition," published with *In Darkest Africa* (1890)
The first zone the Advance Column encountered in the forest took them a month to traverse. This zone also encompassed the entire march of the Rear Column. In this zone, the Advance Column found clusters of villages along the south bank of the river, but these were hastily abandoned as the caravan approached. The flight of villagers made it difficult to obtain information about the land or people around and ahead. Their flight also makes it difficult for the historian to determine who these people were, though some may have been Mba or Angba. Their abandoned villages indicated that they engaged in a mixture of farming, fishing, and likely also hunting. The villages were linked by paths, but these paths were not always helpful ones for the Expedition. More problematic yet, these clusters of villages were separated by tracts of uninhabited forest. In these the Column was forced to use either game trails or to cut its own path, as well as to camp in the bush and live on the food they carried with them.

When they had sufficient warning, the villagers who fled from the Expedition took with them as much of their property as they could carry. This flight behaviour was unusual in Stanley’s experience of African travel, and he was not sure what to make of it. He was, though, thankful for the huts, fields and other items left “at our disposal,” without need for payment from the Advance Column’s limited stock of trade goods. The porters also appreciated the opportunity provided by abandoned villages and took unauthorized breaks from the caravan for foraging and looting. Many of these porters were confronted by indigenes in the forest near villages and fields. Only one village, Yankondé, was defended by its inhabitants, though. Both Yankondé and nearby Yambuya were large, walled villages, suggesting that they were part of the process of social and political innovation that characterized the lower Aruwimi River region. This process created tightly organized districts able to mobilize large numbers of men for war and large amounts of labour from women or slaves to meet important constraints in the production of

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59 *IDA*, 1:156.
60 Vansina, *Paths*, 170.
61 *IDA*, 1:149.
62 Jephson Diary, 10 July 1887. These unauthorized breaks were punished by Stanley and the officers, usually with floggings.
63 See Chapter 2, p. 98 for a description of this confrontation.
crops like cassava.  

The second forest zone the Advance Column passed through began with the villages of Mariri. The Column still encountered clusters of villages interspersed with forest along the river in this zone, but most of the villages were now on the north bank of the river. In a number of these villages, the Column engaged in limited negotiations and trade with the inhabitants. This was “the first barter [they] had been able to effect on the Aruwimi,” and a kind of indigenous behaviour with which Stanley was comfortably familiar. At Mugwe’s villages, trade was well-developed enough that the porters were given *metakos* and cowries with which to purchase rations, though the trade degenerated into fighting, foraging and looting a day later. Ten days later, at Avisibba, a strong community offered the Column a sustained fight, another kind of behaviour with which Stanley was familiar. Together with the fight at Mugwe’s two weeks earlier, these were the first major confrontations with indigenes since the fight at Yankondé which had inaugurated the Advance Column’s march through the forest.

Since the Column was still travelling on the south bank, the villages in this zone were not automatically exposed to its full force. Contact with villages and villagers required that members of the Column cross the river in their limited stock of boats, which no doubt facilitated friendlier relations. Through these contacts, the Column was also able to learn more about the area through which they were passing. They were told of the extensive trade along the river. They also saw evidence of regional trade in the ivory and copper they saw in these communities, as well as in a piece of a Birmingham-forged sword that must have come from the Sudan. In this zone, the

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65 *IDA*, 1:158-9. Stanley commented that the inhabitants of this part of the river were as sophisticated in their trading as those of the middle Congo.

66 Jephson Diary, 30 July 1887. Stanley intervened in the trade to enforce prices he considered fair after members of the Column encountered significant price inflation and porters started to barter the Expedition’s ammunition and tools in order to stock up on food. The inhabitants were also upset by the kidnap of a man from whom Stanley wanted information. When Stanley tried to ransom the man for several goats, a fight followed.


68 Parke, *My Experiences*, 83, 85-6. The presence of trade goods in these villages may not have been
Column also encountered well-developed paths that ran perpendicular to the river. These paths led, they were told by their indigenous informants, to numerous villages “inland.”

Stanley identified the people of this zone as Ma odé and Medze, likely Mabodo and Meje. The former group spoke a Bantu language and organized themselves politically with a village and district system. The Meje were a Mangbetu people. They, like the Popoi whom the Expedition likely also encountered, settled along the Aruwimi and the lower Nepoko Rivers. While they borrowed culturally and linguistically from their Bantu-speaking neighbours in the forest, they organized themselves politically into Houses, each of which constituted a village. In a way similar to the forms of organization among the peoples on the lower Aruwimi River, these tightly structured Houses made possible the mobilization of large amounts of labour. They were also characterized by specialization and inequality. This zone, as the officers observed, was also an area where the cultivation of cassava as staple food crop gave way to the cultivation of bananas.

With the falls at Panga, the Column’s river party encountered its first major obstacle to navigation since the Yambuya rapids. Upriver of this cataract lay a stretch of river with many bad rapids and few villages. It took the Column eleven days to cross this and they began to experience serious hunger. Stanley would have preferred to abandon the river, whose northerly course was taking them increasingly out of their way, but hesitated as it would mean “leaving a country where we can get food, for a jungle in which there is in all probability nothing & where he [was] certain to lose a lot of men from hunger.” They experienced a reprieve in late August, opposite the mouth of the Nepoko River. Here they found many prosperous villages, likely of the

unique to this zone. In villages down-river, where the inhabitants had had time to remove their valuables, there may have been trade goods of which the officers were never aware.

69 Stanley Diary, 23 August 1887 (E37).
70 For example, Jephson Diary, 28 July 1887.
71 See Vansina, Paths, 173-5.
72 For example, Jephson Diary, 4, 10 & 12 August 1887. Jephson noticed this transition in the sparsely populated area upriver of Panga Falls.
73 IDA, 1:169.
74 Jephson Diary, 21 July 1887.
Bali people. The villagers again fled before them, though. They also found plenty of food and “good broad cut tracks, the best we have yet seen,” connecting “village after village” in a long chain running inland. Binza, Junker’s Monbuttu servant who had been sent with the Expedition as a guide, urged Stanley to follow the Nepoko north, as it was a route that would take the Column into areas where food was abundant. The Mamvu chiefdoms on the upper Nepoko River would welcome the Expedition, Binza said.

Four days past the Nepoko junction and still travelling east along the river, the Column encountered a small group of Manyema, as they called the followers of Zanzibari ivory traders. This marked the start of the third zone in their journey through the forest. The river, now called the Ituri, became increasingly intractable in this region. The Column abandoned its purloined canoes, and returned to indigenous paths, though these continued to be problematic. Within this zone, they found three trade settlements tied economically and politically to Said bin Abede, a Nyangwe-based rival of Tippu Tip’s. The settlement at Avadori was headed by Ugarrowwa, also known as Uledi Balyuz or Balozi. Ugarrowwa had a secondary settlement, south of Avadori on the track running from the Ituri to Kibonge. This settlement was run by Ugarrowwa’s subordinate, Kalunga. Ipoto, the second settlement visited by the Advance Column was headed by Khamisi and two other chiefs. Spatially, these settlements were all linked by the track running south-west to the settlement of Kibonge, located between Stanley Falls and Nyangwe on the upper Congo. The trade caravans also made paths that linked the trade settlements together, but this network was not well developed and even guides from the settlements sometimes lost their way. At the trade settlements, Stanley got a good deal of

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75 See Vansina, *Paths*, 174-5. The Bali were known for their ironwork.
76 Jephson Diary, 26 August 1887.
77 Stanley Diary, 26 August 1887 (E37); *IDA*, 1:193-4.
78 The men who headed these settlements all said they were subordinates of Abed bin Salim. He was recently deceased, though, and had been succeeded by his son Said bin Abede. See Jephson Diary, 2 November 1887; Parke, *My Experiences*, 138; Jameson, *Story*, 233-4 & 251.
79 Stairs Diary, 9 March 1888.
80 The trader Kibonge, originally from Madagascar, was based in the settlement that bore his name. Though largely independent, he was not in the first rank of the Zanzibari traders in the eastern Congo and consequently owed some allegiance to Said bin Abede. See Jameson, *Story*, 230-34.
81 For example, Jephson Diary, 31 October 1887.
information about the area and he learned about the regional trade system, which included trade between forest peoples and the kingdom of Bunyoro.  

In the trade settlements, members of the Column were also able to trade for food. However, in the areas around the settlements they found little to eat and suffered numerous losses due to hunger. Indeed, the caravan twice came close to complete collapse. Stanley later said that in this region he made "the nearest approach to absolute starvation in all my African Experience." The small groups of porters headed by a single officer that Stanley repeatedly sent through this zone fared better than did the entire Column in finding food and benefiting from the services of local guides.

This zone was sparsely inhabited, and the peoples the Expedition encountered here were likely Sudanic-speaking farmers, such as the Lese, who had ties of interdependence to Pygmy peoples, such as the Efe. In the eastern part of this zone they may have encountered Bantu-speaking Bira peoples who were, like the Lese, linked to Pygmy peoples; in the case of the Bira these were the Mbuti pygmies. Many of the villages the Column did find in this zone were long-abandoned, though, and showed signs of having suffered raids by ivory traders. Once the village fields were no longer protected, elephants fed in them and finished the work of destruction. Some villages were "semideserted," meaning they had been stripped of ivory and livestock and their huts were mostly ruined, but the inhabitants were hiding in the forest nearby. Though these villagers now acknowledged "the supremacy of the Manyema," they were far from confident that this "peace" would mean the end of depredations.

The fourth zone through which the Advance Column travelled lay near the eastern edge of forest. Stanley said it began at Ibwiri, the first village they came to which lay beyond the trade settlements' sphere of influence. In this zone the Column made no attempt to follow the river.

82 Stanley Diary, 15-16 September 1887 (E37).
83 HMS to W. Mackinnon, 5 August 1889, MP 86/29.
84 See Grinker, Houses in the Rain Forest, especially pp. 19 & 28.
85 For example, Stanley Diary, 10 November 1888 (E41).
86 Jephson Diary, 10 November 1887.
87 IDA, 1:265.
They found the forest increasingly open and dry, though also hilly. More importantly, they found many prosperous villages standing in large clearings, and these villages were generally connected by good paths. There was food in plenty, and few fights as the villagers again fled at their approach. They were able to capture a few indigenes though, and gain information about the territory ahead.88 As in the third zone, the inhabitants of these villages of farmers were linked to pygmy peoples. The farmers were likely Bira, linked to Mbuti pygmies. Some Lese peoples, linked to Efe pygmies, may also have been living in the area.

Officers and small parties of porters making multiple journeys through the third zone in late 1887 and early 1888 encountered changes. Some villages had been entirely abandoned. Between the raids of trading bands, foragers from the Expedition and wild animals, their fields had been stripped completely bare.89 Although the trade settlements all had extensive fields, a good deal of their food, especially livestock, was obtained by raiding. Ugarrowwa, for example, was making plans to move both his settlements further down the Aruwimi, following the track opened by the Expedition, because after a two year stay they had largely exhausted both the livestock and the ivory within range of his existing settlements.90 In another example, the arrival at Ipoto of the trader, Kilonga-longa, together with his following of four hundred, put severe pressure on the settlement’s resources. To sustain itself, the settlement sent out a series of large raiding parties that foraged over a very wide area.91 This raiding was not the only source of conflict in the region though. The officers also observed fighting between indigenous communities in the forest that was serious enough to lead to the destruction of villages as well.92

Stanley observed bigger changes on his return through the forest for the Rear Column in mid-1888. He found Ugarrowwa’s trade settlement at Avadori abandoned. Food continued to be

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88 See, for example, Stairs’ survey of the area between Ibwiri and the upper Ituri River in Jephson Diary, 21 November 1887.
89 For example, Jephson Diary, 7 November 1887.
90 Stairs Diary, 9 March 1888.
91 T.H. Parke to HMS, 17 February 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers; and Parke, My Experiences, 156 & 185. This occurred in January 1888.
92 For example, Stairs Diary, 9 March 1888. For a similar area of “internecine conflict” down-river, see IDA, 1.151.
hard to come by around the settlement. However, Stanley’s caravan found that even outside the area where raids had occurred, food was increasingly scarce. Some villages whose fields had fed the entire caravan now contained only small amounts of food. Other villages, like Avisibba and Mugwye’s, had been camped in by Ugarrowwa’s following as it descended the river. They were now completely abandoned and their banana plantations cut down. The Stanley made only one limited attempt at negotiation and trade in this region. In almost all the communities, the remaining inhabitants fled. On the positive side, Stanley was easily able to pick up the Expedition’s track below Avadori. He commented: “Road along River now very good. Nearly a thousand pair of human feet have trodden a good path.”

Returning to the first zone, Stanley found that communities whose inhabitants he believed had only temporarily left while the Expedition made use of their huts and fields were completely abandoned and overgrown. The group of villages at Banalya, where he found the Rear Column, were now a trade settlement called Unaria. It had been established by Abdullah Karongo not long after the Advance Column’s departure from Yambuya. The settlement was now under a subordinate named Muni Hamela, and Abdullah Karongo was off pioneering elsewhere. Unaria was, in fact, now one of three trade settlements on the Aruwimi, stretching back to Yambuya. All of them were subordinate to Tippu Tip and linked by overland paths to the Congo River below Stanley Falls.

As the Rear Column discovered when they marched through this area, the Advance Column had not established a clear track. The Rear Column travelled parallel to the river, but further away from it than had the Advance Column. They found a number of “inland” villages,

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93 For example, Stanley Diary, 14 July 1888 (E41).
94 Stanley Diary, 31 July & 9 August 1888 (E41).
95 Stanley Diary, 6 August 1888 (E41).
96 Stanley Diary, 17 July 1888 (E41).
97 Stanley Diary, 16 August 1888 (E41).
98 Jameson, Story, 312 & 335. The trader Nasoro bin Saef had a settlement on this section of the river as well. So did Said bin Habib, Tippu Tip’s greatest rival and the trader most opposed to his policy of cooperation with Europeans. His settlement proved a haven for a number of the deserters from the Rear Column. See J.S. Jameson to W. Bonny, 12 August 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers; Ward, My Life, 46.
some apparently made up of a mixture of several different groups. While a number of these had a few “Arab” houses in their midst, representing the influence of the trade settlements, the network of paths between the villages was not much better developed than the Advance Column had found it. Reliable guides were also still difficult to find, as most of the villagers fled at the approach of the Column. However, one chief named Umbi who found the Column camped in a village under his authority, requested that they move on immediately to the nearest trade settlement because the caravan was making his people afraid. As the officers were largely concerned with the desertion of their porters and the spread of smallpox among their Manyema contingent, their records do not indicate how they obtained food, though it was occasionally a problem for them.

The major change experienced by the reunited Expedition on its second trip up the river was the more active hostility of peoples all throughout the forest. While open battle was still rare, there were frequent small ambushes and skirmishes in which porters and their dependants were lost. Also, some communities deliberately destroyed their villages to discourage occupation by any invaders. Hunger continued to be a problem in many areas as well. Trying to avoid an area in the third zone where the Advance Column had had serious difficulties, Stanley pioneered a new track, making a large detour north of the trade settlement at Ipoto. Here, however, the caravan twice came close to starvation and disintegration. They found one large village in this region. It was still under construction in an area of dense forest. Most of the villages they found, though, had been badly damaged by bands of traders and elephants, and they contained little food. Also, despite a number of captured indigenous guides, the caravan had a great deal of

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99 For example, Jameson, Story, 315. Stanley had observed already in mid-1887 that the area around Yambuya “was the resort of all the fragments of tribes for many degrees around.” See HMS to F. de Winton, 19 June 1887, MP 86/29.
100 Bonny Diary, 27 June 1888 (E48); Rear Column Log, 27 June 1888 (E50). The chief provided guides to expedite the caravan’s departure.
101 See, for example, Rear Column Log, 14 June 1888 (E50) and Jameson, Story, 320. Both the Zanzibari and Manyema porters were pilfering trade goods from their loads, so there was undoubtedly some trade going on as well as foraging. See, for example, Rear Column Log, 25 June 1888 (E50) and Jameson, Story, 323.
102 For example, Stanley Diary, 1-4 September 1888 (E41). As the trader Selim bin Mohammed was also in the area, the villagers were likely directing these actions at his followers as well as the Expedition.
103 Stanley Diary, 3 December 1888 (E41).
difficulty finding their way through this “region of horrors.”

Food

The availability of resources for caravans was one problem faced by the Expedition as it travelled through the forest. The Expedition’s other, perhaps equally serious problem was that the methods they used to try to tap into these resources were not particularly effective. Indeed, in some cases they were disastrously ineffective. Obtaining enough food for the caravan was the most serious of these failures. A continuous lack of food was outside Stanley’s experience of travel. The “want of sufficient & proper food, regularly, pull people down very fast, and they [i.e. the porters] have not that strength to carry the loads which have distinguished them while with me in other parts of Africa,” he lamented. As has been discussed elsewhere, the lack of food, exacerbated by the effects of the hierarchy of entitlement, weakened the porters, made their other health problems more intractable, and threatened both morale and discipline.

Stanley, in planning and running the Expedition, made assumptions about what he would find in the forest on the basis of his earlier experiences on the Congo and on the established routes in East Africa. He assumed a sizeable population of farmers in the forest. He also assumed the agricultural fertility of the forest. Working from these assumptions, Stanley planned to obtain food for the Expedition by two means: trade, and theft or foraging. Both of these methods proved problematic because the Expedition found that many parts of the Ituri forest were sparsely populated. They also found that even where there were larger communities in the forest, they did not necessarily have agricultural surpluses.

Two further obstacles to obtaining food through trade in the forest were, first, the kind and amount of trade goods carried by the Expedition and, second, the unwillingness of the indigenes

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104 Stanley Diary, 26 November & 7 December 1888 (E41). They were further north of what Stanley believed their position to be, as he mistook the Dui River for the Ihuru River.

105 HMS to E. Bartetot, 18 September 1887, MP 86/29. Stairs also noted the direct correlation between caravan functioning and food: when plenty of the local staple food was available, “our men feed up and march well; if we get none for five or six days, they go down at once;” Stairs Diary, 9 August 1887.
to deal with the Expedition. The Expedition's stock of trade goods was not large, a consequence of its under-capitalization, which has already been noted. In addition, most of the trade goods the Expedition possessed were concentrated in two depots—Yambuya and the mission station of Usambiro south of Lake Victoria. The Advance Column, in particular, had very few trade goods with them and much of this minimal stock was lost in a canoe accident at Panga Falls in early August 1887.\textsuperscript{108} The \textit{metakos} that remained were not accepted as currency in the area upriver of the accident.\textsuperscript{109} Stanley assumed the presence of prosperous communities, but unsophisticated traders and underdeveloped markets in the forest.\textsuperscript{110} He apparently believed it would be possible to obtain food cheaply. He was pleased, for example, to be able to trade garbage like "empty sardine boxes, jam and milk cans, and cartridge cases" for food at one community.\textsuperscript{111} He also hoped a large, well-armed caravan would also awe these backwoods people, and that its power would reinforce the irresistibility of the trade goods it was bringing into a supposedly "virgin" market. Stanley also assumed that travel in the forest would not be particularly difficult. The Advance Column was supposed to reach Lake Albert and return to its depot at Yambuya in five months. In fact, it took them more than five months simply to reach the edge of the forest and it was almost fourteen months before they had access to the Rear Column's trade goods again.\textsuperscript{112}

The second problem with obtaining food by trade was the unwillingness of many of the inhabitants of forest communities to deal with them in any way, let alone engage in significant trade. The flight of villagers at the advent of the Expedition was, Stanley claimed, "unlike anything I had seen in Africa before. Previously the natives may have retired with their women,\textsuperscript{113}
but the males had remained with spear and target, representing ownership. It was probably not a coincidence that the communities in which trade occurred were on the north bank of the river where the villages were not automatically exposed to the full force of the Column, whose land party was travelling on the south bank. In addition, in two of the four villages where the Column engaged in trade captured indigenes—a boy called Bakula, in one case, and in the other an unnamed woman—acted as intermediaries to initiate the contact.

In the end, the main places where the Expedition relied on trade to obtain its food were the trade settlements. However, the trade that did occur, both in the settlements and in villages, was often unsatisfactory to members of the Expedition. The amount of food offered was small, the prices were high, and much of this food did not percolate far down the hierarchy of entitlement. The officers who made extended stays at the settlements also had difficulty negotiating a satisfactory interpretation of the arrangements Stanley made for their maintenance. From the point of view of those willing to trade, the trade goods the Expedition had to offer were either not acceptable or much valued. The items they wanted in exchange for food—cloth, or the Expedition’s guns, ammunition and tools—were either not available, or Stanley was opposed to trading them.

When both trade and foraging failed to provide enough food, the Expedition fell back on collecting wild foods in the forest. The porters and officers often collected greens to make a sauce to accompany either cassava or plantain. When they were desperate, they ate anything they could find. Their food gathering was hampered by their ignorance of the forest, though. They became more effective users of wild foods only when captured women taught them to find and to prepare these foods. For example, when the Advance Column was “in

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113 IDA, 1:149.
114 Jephson Diary, 20 July 1887, Parke, My Experiences, 82; IDA, 1:159.
115 See Parke, My Experiences, 84 & 86.
116 See, for example, R.H. Nelson to HMS, 6 November 1887 and T.H. Parke to HMS, 17 February 1888, both in BLEM Stanley Papers.
117 For example, Stanley observed that neither cowries nor beads were accepted by the residents of Mugwe’s villages; IDA, 1:166.
118 IDA, 1:166; Stairs Diary, 19 October 1887.
imminent danger of being lost by Starvation” they ate large bean-like seeds they found in the forest, but these made them sick. A captured indigenous woman prepared cakes for her porter owner by peeling and grinding the beans and, in doing so, showed the others how to make these plentiful seeds digestible.\textsuperscript{119} In addition, during times of hunger at Ft. Bodo, Parke fared better than Stairs or Nelson because the pygmy woman he kept as a dependent fed him on food she gathered in the forest.\textsuperscript{120} The haste of the caravan, and the officers’ preference for tight order during the march also limited the effectiveness of gathering, as did the fact that this was usually carried out as a desperate measure when the porters were too weak to do it well. Hunting was also not a major source of food for the Expedition in the forest. The noise of the caravan scared off game, and even when they shot animals they generally were not able to kill them or to find the carcasses afterward.\textsuperscript{121} What game and fish they did acquire were mostly taken from the traps and nets of villagers.

A contemporary exploratory expedition headed by Hermann von Wissmann offers an instructive comparison with the Expedition. Wissmann travelled in an area of the forest southwest of that traversed by the Expedition. Like Stanley, he headed a large caravan made up of porters, local auxiliaries and European subordinates.\textsuperscript{122} Wissmann’s journey through the forest fringes south of this area in 1881 had led him to expect much easier travel.\textsuperscript{123} He found the region through which he was now passing inhabited by a series of groups pushed north and west from the upper Lomami River by the incursions of Zanzibari traders seeking ivory and slaves.\textsuperscript{124} Some of these people were living in temporary villages close enough to their former homes to allow them to scavenge food in their fields on dark nights, or even to return to cultivate when the

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{IDA}, 1:225; Stanley Diary, 8 & 10 October 1887 (E37); A.J.M. Jephson, “Our March with a Starving Column,” \textit{Scribner’s Magazine}, vol. 9, no. 3 (1891): 274. For a similar instance, likely involving dependents of the Manyema porters, see HMS Diary, 17 September 1888 (E41).

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{My Experiences}, 277.

\textsuperscript{121} For example, Jephson Diary, 11 October 1887; \textit{IDA}, 1:204; Stairs Diary, 27 September 1887.

\textsuperscript{122} These travels are described in von Wissmann, \textit{My Second Journey}. Wissmann and his party travelled west from the Kasai River to the Sankuru River, across to the upper Lomami River and then to Kassongo. His caravan numbered 900 persons; his auxiliaries were Bushilange from the Luluaburg area.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Wissmann, Second Journey}, 178.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 162-3.
raiders left. But, since these bands of traders supported themselves solely on raided food, they often reappeared just when the fields were ready for harvest. Communities subject to repeated raids found their bravest members killed in fighting, a number of their women and children enslaved, while the surviving majority fled to safety in the forest. "The necessary consequence of the repeated devastation of the fields was a dreadful famine, with small-pox, brought in by the Arabs, following at its heels." Formerly well-populated areas were now all but empty and their scattered inhabitants were leading a hand-to-mouth life as refugees deeper in the concealing forest.

The closer Wissmann's large caravan came to the haunts of the traders, the more they suffered from food shortages, as "the scanty population of this forest [was] only cultivating their own necessary food in the small clearings." Trading for food was difficult, partly because such trade was not well established, but mostly because the caravan was unable to provide the kind of trade goods demanded by those now farming in the forest. "Formerly we used to make purchases in exchange for cowrie-shells and cheap beads," Wissmann noted. However, "nobody...would take these now," they wanted the cloths and coloured beads which they had seen with the Zanzibari traders, and "everything [was] dear on account of the famine." In some areas though, gunpowder and percussion-caps were "almost the only article of exchange demanded by the poor hunted natives," and Wissmann had great difficulty keeping his porters from selling those issued to them. At first he tried to regulate the trade in food and to punish the would-be looters in his caravan. They ended up, though, surviving on what they could forage from abandoned fields, just like the traders. Wissmann was forced to keep his exhausted caravan constantly on the move in

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125 Ibid., 180.
126 Ibid., 185-6.
127 Ibid., 186.
128 Ibid., 180-1 & 185.
129 Ibid., 169. The deeper forest was largely uninhabited, except for small groups of Batua pygmies whose knowledge of forest plants, insects and small animals allowed them to thrive there; see pp. 163 & 166-7.
130 Ibid., 209.
131 Ibid., 181 & 191.
order to find any food at all. 132 “Our goods were of no avail,” Wissmann said ruefully, “nor even our numbers, for eatables were nowhere to be found or bought.” 133

Wissmann’s account of his caravan’s experiences offers a deeper analysis than do the Expedition accounts of the problems of using trade to provision a large caravan in the forest where, in the late nineteenth century, an “escalating cycle of violence” characterized trade on the ivory frontier. 134 On the other hand, the Expedition offers a much clearer description of the consequences of systematic foraging on which both caravans were forced to rely for food, Wissmann much more reluctantly than Stanley. Stanley felt it politic to deplore the necessity of foraging, and claimed the Expedition tried to do “no more damage” to indigenous communities “than eating our fill.” 135 Nonetheless, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Stanley expected from the outset to be able to rely on foraging to provision his caravan, at least in areas where there were no powerful opponents or international observers.

The workability of foraging as a means of provisioning the Expedition depended on the size of the caravan and on its well-armed character, both elements in the “Stanley style” of travel. Even when Stanley divided the Expedition, the parts usually consisted of at least a hundred persons and often several hundred. While these large numbers made trade a less feasible means of provisioning the caravan, they did make it easier to intimidate indigenous people or to win when it came to fighting. 136 Smaller sections of the Expedition were relatively safe when travelling in zones dominated by coast-based traders, but outside of these faced serious difficulties. The twenty porters sent down-river with a message for Barttelot in

132 Ibid., 207. Amazingly, though many members of Wissmann’s caravan were suffering “foot sores”—likely the same ulcers that afflicted the Expedition’s porters—and many were drooping as a result of hunger, there were initially only five deaths among his porters. Later though, as many as fifty of his indigenous auxiliaries died of hunger-related problems, despite their ability to forage for forest foods. See pp. 170, 201, 204, 212, 219.
133 Ibid., 181.
135 Stanley Diary, 26 August 1887 (E37). This diary passage has all the hallmarks of one intended as public justification of the Expedition’s conduct. Interestingly, it was not included in his book—compare IDA, 1:194—whether because Stanley decided such justification was unnecessary or because he hoped to avoid drawing critical attention to the issue is not clear. At least one reviewer of In Darkest Africa found plenty of reason to exonerate Stanley of responsibility for the foraging done by his porters. See “Mr. Stanley’s Book,” The Spectator 65, no. 3237 (1890): 53.
136 See, for example, Stanley Diary, 12 September 1888 (E41).
March 1888 faced unrelenting hostility and "unprecedented" fighting. They failed to reach the Rear Column, and were able to travel safely only in the company of Ugarrowwa's much larger following. Further, small groups of foragers were quite vulnerable to attacks by indigenes, and such attacks were the main source of the deaths due to fighting in the forest.

In addition to its numbers, the Expedition was unusually well armed by the standards of regional trade caravans. This was especially true in the forest, where guns were scarcer and concentrated in the hands of coast-based traders, though the traders also armed their senior dependents and the influential chiefs among their indigenous allies. Most of these guns were muzzle-loading muskets, many of them discards sold off when European armies equipped themselves with new breech-loaders, and then with repeating rifles. As these guns were old, dangerously unreliable, and not often placed in the hands of skilled users, they did not always provide the overwhelming advantage to their users that might be expected. Further, gunpowder and percussion caps were scarce and expensive in the eastern Congo. This was a significant constraint for those dependent on guns for their position. The body of porters Tippu Tip initially recruited for the Expedition, for example, dispersed in part because their ammunition ran out when they were confronted by hostile peoples on the lower Aruwimi.

The Expedition's porters, in contrast, were all armed with Winchester repeating rifles and the Sudanese soldiers with Remington's, while the officers had pistols and hunting guns as well.

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137 For the couriers' story, see Stanley Diary, 10 August 1888 (E41). From the summary of their story given by Stanley it is not clear whether these men faced hostility because they were identified with the Expedition or because they were mistaken for Zanzibari traders.
138 Jephson Diary, 21 July 1887.
139 See, for example, Wissmann, Second Journey, 190-1 and Ward, My Life, 86. At the time of the Expedition, the CFS was also arming the people around its Bangala station, intending them to form a buffer against the expansion of Zanzibari traders down the Congo River. See G. Grenfell, unpublished letter to the editor, 24 July 1888 enclosed in G. Grenfell to A.H. Baynes, 26 July 1888, BMS Archives.
140 Beachey, "Arms Trade," 452.
141 Beachey, "Arms Trade," 451. For an example of these guns in the hands of a raiding party, see Ward, My Life, 84-6. The people living around Yambuya were fearful of the guns when they first encountered them, though. They "told Selim [bin Mohammed] that when they first saw the Arabs with their guns they decided among themselves that they were men from some other world and in connection with the elements, as their guns, belching forth fire, resembled the lightning, and the report that followed reminded them of thunder." Ward, My Life, 62.
The Expedition also had extensive stocks of ammunition, though a good deal of this was intended for Emin's garrisons. A few of the Zanzibaris and the Sudanese were skilled marksmen, but most, especially the porters, were barely competent with their guns. "Some of the men were sent out after natives to-day," Parke reported laconically. The porters "fired a few shots; but, as usual, hurt nobody." Nonetheless, the simple possession of guns gave the entire Expedition confidence. Firing a single shot was sometimes enough to disperse hostile indigenes, as was firing one volley into a village. Even when most of the bullets went wildly off target, the gunfire itself provoked great fear. Wounding or killing two or three persons at a considerable distance, usually the work of Stanley or one of the officers, was also highly effective. In spite of these demonstrations of the power of guns, they were not always that effective against small numbers of indigenes using guerrilla tactics in dense forest, or for hunting in such areas. In one fight where members of the Advance Column fired some 300 rounds at a determined group of indigenous archers, only four of the indigenes were killed while the archers managed to hit an equal or greater number of Expedition members, two of whom died within days. The Expedition learned the hard way that the bows and arrows of forest peoples were far from contemptible weapons, especially when the arrows were poisoned. Sometimes even the fear of a poisoned arrow wound was sufficient to cause death. One porter died of a heart attack or stroke brought on by worry about an arrow wound he received, while another committed suicide rather than face the possibility of an agonizing death when he was hit by an arrow.

The largest potential benefit from the Expedition's large stock of rifles and ammunition

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142 Ward, *My Life*, 41. Tippu Tip's anger at Stanley's failure to honour his contract to provide gunpowder to these recruits needs to be seen in this context.  
143 *My Experiences*, 290.  
144 See, for example, Stanley Diary, 24 July 1888 (E41) and *IDA*, 1:182-3. The officers also felt more secure as a result of their guns; see, for example, Stairs Diary, 10 August 1887.  
145 For example, Stairs Diary, 30 July 1887; Jephson Diary, 30 July & September 28 1887.  
146 For example, Stanley Diary, 12 December 1887 (E38).  
147 For example, Jephson Diary, 28 July 1887; Parke, *My Experiences*, 83. The twenty couriers sent down-river with a letter for Bartelot also found that while their Winchesters protected them during the day, they were of limited help when indigenes attacked them at night. Stanley Diary, 10 August 1888 (E41).  
149 Jephson Diary, 13 August 1887; *IDA*, 1:180.  
150 Parke, *My Experiences*, 280-2; Jephson Diary, 17 November 1887.
would likely have been to use them as trade goods to obtain food in the forest. Both the porters and the officers traded their weapons for food, though never with Stanley’s approval. Stanley was vehemently opposed to the sale of arms, and did his best to recover any bartered guns or ammunition. Stanley’s policy on trading arms was likely based on his custom of responding “instantly” and with “utmost force” to any sign of opposition from African communities, as well as to the general feeling among Europeans in Africa that good guns must be kept out of both indigenous hands and those of the Zanzibari traders.

The Expedition’s other weapon of note was the Maxim machine gun. In the British press before the Expedition’s departure, much was made of its ability to fire six hundred rounds per minute. It was described as the “chief defensive weapon” of the Expedition. Stanley considered it “a powerful weapon...when in perfect order.” But, he added, “if it jams or its mechanism gets deranged, I discard it & rely on my Winchester Repeaters & Remingtons.” The Maxim, however, was not used much in the forest. Twice it was fired in display for the edification of Zanzibari traders—once at Matadi on the lower Congo for Tippu Tip and his entourage, and again at Ugarrowwa’s settlement on the upper Aruwimi. In both cases, the capacity of the gun provoked admiration, but there is no evidence that the display changed the conduct of these traders toward the Expedition. The expectation in Britain, though, was that “merely exhibiting” the Maxim gun would be “a great peace preserver.” Though it was kept in reserve when the Expedition took over Yambuya, it was actually fired at forest peoples only once, as a brief test after Stairs had cleaned it while the Advance Column was camped at the mouth of the Nepoko River. Its utility was further reduced by the loss of a number of boxes of its special ammunition in the forest. Several boxes of Maxim ammunition went overboard in the canoe

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151 For example, Stanley Diary, 21 October 1887 (E37) and Stairs Diary, 19 October 1887.
152 Stanley Diary, 1 September 1887 (E37) and Beachey, “Arms Trade,” 452.
155 Id., 1:80; Stairs Diary, 18 September 1887; Jephson Diary, 18 September 1887.
156 W. Mackinnon to Lord Iddesleigh, 10 January 1887, MP 86/25.
157 Stairs Diary, 27 August 1887. After another test of the Maxim gun on the savannah in early 1889, Parke commented that “it did not work satisfactorily—like all machine guns, which are good in theory, but do not
accident at Panga Falls and several more were abandoned due to a lack of porters in November 1888.\textsuperscript{158} Far from inspiring a sense of confidence in their power among the Europeans or in the Expedition generally—"Whatever happens, we have got / The Maxim Gun, and they have not"—the machine gun was largely a superfluity in the forest.\textsuperscript{159} In fact, it had already made difficulties, since its presence nearly led one missionary society to refuse the Expedition the use of its steamer for the trip up the Congo River.\textsuperscript{160}

The Expedition’s consistent use of its numbers and guns to facilitate foraging made its work in the forest more difficult. At the immediate level of simply making a temporary passage, regular foraging generated strong centrifugal forces in the caravan, especially where food was scarcest. It also added to the problems of order, as was discussed in Chapter 3, especially once porters began to assume the right to forage or loot. However, in the longer term, systematic foraging undermined the route the Expedition was trying to establish. Stanley initially believed that the "excellent arrangement" by which indigenous people gave up their villages and fields for the use of the Expedition, would, in time lead these communities to welcome caravans and make the route feasible.\textsuperscript{161} He found, though, on his return journeys through the forest that villages he believed had been only temporarily evacuated had in fact been completely given up by their inhabitants. "They probably abandoned them on our account," he admitted in his diary.\textsuperscript{162} The Expedition, in fact, had the same kind of effect on the areas through which it passed as did the "Arab" caravans and trade settlements that the Expedition’s European members so deplored.

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\textsuperscript{158} See Jephson Diary, 4 August 1887 and Stanley Diary, 23 November 1888 (E41). The shield that was supposed to protect the person firing the Maxim was left behind at Ipoto. See T.H. Parke to HMS, 17 February 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers.

\textsuperscript{159} Hillaire Belloc, \textit{The Modern Traveller in Bloomsbury Thematic Dictionary of Quotations} (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1988), 311. See also Stairs Diary, 3 & 10 August 1887.

\textsuperscript{160} Robert Arthington, a leading sponsor of the Baptist Missionary Society, having read about the Expedition’s Maxim gun—that "terribly effective instrument of destruction" whose "abhorrent details" were dwelt on so lovingly by the papers—wrote to instruct the Society that the steamer "Peace" should not be lent to the Expedition. See R. Arthington to A.H. Baynes, 31 January 1887, in Minute Book of the Western Sub-Committee of the BMS, January 1185-June 1887, BMS Archives. The Baptist missionaries on the Congo were forced to make a decision about the steamer without being aware of these instructions. The Maxim gun and the Expedition’s many rifles also caused the Egyptian government to have doubts about its support for the Expedition. See \textit{IDA}, 1:52.

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{IDA}, 1:152.
They caused displacement, famine and depopulation; they also spread smallpox in their wake.\textsuperscript{163} And these were not short-term problems.

The Congo Free State, while interested in developing the Aruwimi route to Equatoria after the Expedition’s passage, mostly used a more northerly route via the Itimbiri River.\textsuperscript{164} They found the Aruwimi area very unhealthy for Europeans. More importantly, depopulation and hunger along the Aruwimi made travel and the establishment of stations extremely difficult.\textsuperscript{165} Visiting Yambuya in 1894, the missionary-explorer George Grenfell reported: “I have never seen such a famine stricken place. The men who could look after themselves were not so meagre, but the women & children constituted sights I shall never forget.”\textsuperscript{166} In addition, the peoples higher up the river continued to be hostile to travellers, even after the last of the Zanzibari traders had been driven out of the area in 1893.\textsuperscript{167} While Grenfell blamed all of this on the “Arabs,” the Expedition clearly contributed to the hunger and hostility as well. It was not until 1899 that the Aruwimi River became a dependable route for the CFS, though it appears to have continued to serve both Zanzibari and indigenous traders throughout. In 1899, the lingering effects of the depopulation were still evident, though it was also clear that this had never been a well-populated area. However, as only the “fittest” people had survived, they made up for their lack of numbers

\textsuperscript{162} Stanley Diary, 16 August 1888 (E41).
\textsuperscript{163} Stanley Diary, 29 September 1888 (E41). Only a few—either two or four—of the Zanzibari porters who had been vaccinated contracted smallpox; see Stanley Diary, 24 October 1888 (E41) and Parke, \textit{My Experiences}, 490. It was ripe among the Manyema porters and their dependents, though. The Madi porters were also spreading guinea worm in the forest. See Stanley Diary, 1 December 1887 (E41) and Konczacki, “Some Comments on Disease and Hygiene,” 618 & 622.
\textsuperscript{164} G. Grenfell to A.H. Baynes, 14 March 1891 and G. Grenfell to R. Arthington, 13 July 1894, BMS Congo-Angola A/19 and A/21 respectively. The Itimbiri route was, believed Grenfell, the most direct route from the Congo to the eastern Sudan and was “destined ere long to be recognised as one of the most important in all Central Africa, for two very successful expeditions have already made it their starting point for Gordon’s lost province;” Grenfell to Baynes, 14 March 1891. At the time of the Expedition, the CFS was also exploring the Uele and Mobangi Rivers as a possible route to the upper Nile; see Capt. Vangele, “Explorations on the Welle-Mobangi River,” \textit{Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society} N.S. 11, no. 6 (1889): 325-41 & 404.
\textsuperscript{165} G. Grenfell to A.H. Baynes, 14 March 1891 and G. Grenfell to R. Arthington, 13 July 1894, BMS Congo-Angola A/19 and A/21 respectively. The BMS was deeply interested in these efforts because one of its leading sponsors, Robert Arthington, gave them money to establish a line of mission stations along the Aruwimi to Lake Albert. Grenfell made a trip up the Aruwimi to the Yambuya area in mid-1894, and a second trip in late 1899 that took him to the area below Panga Falls. In 1891 when Grenfell first promised Arthington that he would survey the route, the ascent of the Aruwimi was too difficult.
\textsuperscript{166} G. Grenfell to R. Arthington, 13 July 1894.
\textsuperscript{167} G. Grenfell to R. Arthington, 13 July 1894.
with exceptional vigour and capacity, Grenfell felt.  

Paths

The Expedition’s other problem in the forest, after food, was the difficulty of finding paths out of which to make a route. This problem became evident very early in the Advance Column’s travel through the forest. The first day out of Yambuya, they found a path of sorts running east along the river, but it was “very narrow & bad, led up & down through ravines & streams” and “in some places the men carrying high loads had to go down on their knees to avoid the creepers which hung in tangled masses above the path...& in some places they [i.e. local people] had stuck small poisoned wooden needles in the path to lame our men.”

Stanley, worried by the northward trend of the river, decided to strike off through the forest, making use of his compass and game trails. They wandered for several days in an “interminable forest totally uninhabited,” progressing no more than fifteen geographical miles from Yambuya. Afraid then “to lose [them]selves altogether” and running short of food, they cut their way back to the river which, Stanley concluded, was the path used by local peoples. The Advance Column’s first week of marching illustrates the problems they experienced with paths throughout the Ituri forest. I will look at the methods they used, with mixed success, to try to find or make better paths for themselves.

To begin with, the paths they found in the forest were rarely suitable for a style of porterage developed in the savannah. The Expedition’s porters were accustomed to carrying their loads on their heads or shoulders, while the forest’s inhabitants tended to carry loads on their backs. Within days of first entering the forest, Stanley had learned to send out a special group

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169 Jephson Diary, 28 June & 15 August 1887. See also IDA, 1:141; Parke, My Experiences, 80.
170 IDA, 1:142 & 144.
171 HMS to E. Bartelot, 18 September 1887, MP 86/29; Jephson Diary, 4 July 1887.
172 HMS to E. Bartelot, 18 September 1887, MP 86/29.
173 For the carrying customs of forest peoples, see Parke, My Experiences, 187 and Jephson Diary, 29 October 1887. Some of the paths were so narrow that even European boots were a hindrance in following indigenous guides who moved easily along them. See Jephson Diary, 16 November 1887.
of "cutters" ten minutes ahead of the main body of porters to widen the path and clear away creepers.\(^ {174} \) The porters participated uncomplainingly in this gruelling work, rather than change their method of carrying loads.

Second, in areas without a clear network of human paths, the Column learned quickly that the compass was not a very effective means of creating a passage through the forest despite its status as the emblematic tool of explorers.\(^ {175} \) Though it occasionally provided a valuable corrective to the Expedition’s porter-guides and their indigenous informants, and it was invaluable in determining the Expedition’s geographical position,\(^ {176} \) it was of no assistance in finding food in a sparsely populated area. Thus, although Stanley’s compass told him that the Aruwimi river was taking the Expedition north of its desired line of travel, he did not want to change course because of the uncertainty of finding food away from the river and because the use of boats significantly reduced the burdens of the caravan.\(^ {177} \)

Stanley quickly concluded that the river was "the highway of the natives" and that building up as large a river party as possible was the best means of travelling through the forest.\(^ {178} \)

On July 4th the Advance Column assembled the Expedition’s boat and acquired the first in a slowly growing collection of canoes, creating a river and a land party out of the Column. The Expedition’s boat was the core of the river party, though in terms of carrying capacity, the canoes appropriated by the Column were more important. The steel boat, named "Advance," could be disassembled into loads for porters. It was one of the distinctive items of technology associated with the Expedition, as was highlighted by the British press prior to its departure.\(^ {179} \) The steel boat, together with the Maxim gun, were to open up the interior of Africa for the Expedition. The

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\(^ {174} \) Stairs Diary, 10 & 12 July 1887. As Parke made clear, the party of "pioneers" or advance scouts sent out ahead of the column were initially intended to find and mark a path, and to deal with any indigenous opposition; *My Experiences*, 72.

\(^ {175} \) See Drummond, *Tropical Africa*, 32-6, quoted in Chapter 1.

\(^ {176} \) See, for example, Stanley’s use of a compass as described in Chapter 4, p. 276-7. Parke noted that since the forest canopy made the use of sextant and theodolite difficult, the compass was very important in determining their position; *My Experiences*, 80.

\(^ {177} \) *IDA*, 1:156; Jephson Diary, 10 July 1887.

\(^ {178} \) *IDA*, 1:149; HMS to E. Barttelot, 18 September 1887, MP 86/29 and HMS to J.A. Grant, 8 September 1888, MP 86/29.

\(^ {179} \) See, for example, *Illustrated London News*, 5 February 1887.
"Advance" was part of a broader European effort to supplant human porterage with more efficient, manageable, and less morally problematic forms of transport. As railroads and steamers, the preferred substitutes, were costly and slow to be constructed, travellers and traders experimented with a variety of low-technology alternatives on east coast routes. Most of these involved animals and wheeled conveyances. The absurdity of the powers associated with this technology were pointed out in a spoof of the Expedition, whose impedimenta included a "Portable bath, to serve also as cooking stove and steam launch with engine, and full-sized billiard table complete." This mythical marvel, patented by Stanley, could be "packed away in a hat-box and fold up like a concertina."

In Stanley's initial proposal, he indicated the Congo route would be feasible if the Expedition were equipped with fifteen whale boats to supplement the inadequate fleet of steamers on the upper Congo. On the Aruwimi, he "regretted more than ever that I had not insisted on being allowed to carry out my own plan of having fifteen whale-boats." The Expedition's lack of resources were made up with "free" local ones, though, as on the river above Yambuya they found "the canoes are numerous and tolerably large." There was only one short period, though, when there were sufficient canoes and boats to carry the entire caravan by water. Some of the canoes they acquired were badly in need of repair; one was newly constructed and not yet hauled to the river. Their owners may have considered these to be property neither easily evacuated nor worth defending, like the furniture and cooking pots left in "abandoned" villages. The canoes in good condition that the Column acquired in the river were mostly taken from their owners after fights in which the Expedition's rifles featured prominently.

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181 IDA, 1:33.
182 IDA, 1:151. The decisions about supplies for the Expedition had, in fact, been left to Stanley. How much difference these boats would have made to the outcome of the Expedition is not clear.
183 HMS to E. Barttelot, 18 September 1887, MP 86/29.
184 They had sufficient canoes for the entire group travelling back to find the Rear Column between 11 & 17 August 1888. See Stanley Diary, 11 August 1888 (E41).
185 For example, Jephson Diary, 11 & 14 July, 26-27 August 1887.
186 For example, Jephson Diary, 4 & 16 July 1887. On July 4th, Stanley fired on several canoes he saw being paddled down-river and one of them pulled over to the opposite bank of the river. Stanley then "sat down
However, the effective use of either canoe or boat required a skilled group of watermen, which the Zanzibari porters most definitely were not. Stanley lamented that in the Advance Column, only fifty porters were of any use on the water. Rapids, which increased in number and severity as they progressed up-river, caused many problems for these inexpert boatmen. Grenfell, ascending the Aruwimi in 1899, observed that the men who ran canoes on the river had to be individually and collectively expert in the use of both paddles and poles to take the canoes through the river’s many rapids. Even so, canoes and valuable loads of trade goods were regularly lost. The Expedition lost numerous rifles and many important loads in the river, as has already been noted, and there were several deaths by drowning as well, most notably that of the Zanzibari headman Wadi Mabruki.

Another important method the Expedition used to try to find paths for its land party and to evaluate alternatives to remaining on the river was to draw on indigenous geographical knowledge. It was standard practice in east coast caravans for the kirangozi or guide to use indigenous informants to supplement his own knowledge of local paths and resources. However, since along much of the Aruwimi “the aborigines disappeared like rats into their holes on one’s approach,” accessing local geographical knowledge was difficult. Members of the Advance Column hunted out informants and detained any they found. Generally, Stanley put “them in chains for a few days & when he has got all the information he can out of them he [let] them go.” Sometimes the language of these captives was incomprehensible, though as indigenous

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& kept firing on the canoe” to prevent its occupants from recovering it until the Expedition’s boat could be rowed across the river. For public consumption, Stanley described this as a canoe “abandoned” after an “adventure;” *IDA*, 1:149.

187 HMS to E. Barttelot, 18 September 1887, MP 86/29. The 50 porters represented about 15 percent of Stanley’s Column.


189 Stanley Diary, 4 August 1888 (E41). Wadi Mabruki and several Madi porters were lost at Panga Falls, the same rapids that took the Advance Column’s trade goods.

190 *IDA*, 1:156.

191 For example, Parke, *My Experiences*, 85; Stairs Diary, 21 July 1887.

192 Jephson Diary, 28 June 1887. Stanley used similar tactics to try to establish trade around his settled camps, taking captives who were shortly released “with small gifts & good words,” the “seedlings I hope of a future amicable intercourse.” HMS to F. de Winton, 19 June 1887, MP 86/29.
dependants were added to the caravan this became less of a problem.\footnote{193} Other captives were not forthcoming. One man remained silent in spite of reassurances, threats, and finally a beating.\footnote{194} Others may have been deliberately misleading the caravan. One old woman, for example, failed to take a foraging party to the fields she said she knew about. When “Parke threatened to cut her throat and give her to the men to eat,” she became “terribly frightened” and then took them to a very rich field.\footnote{195} Most frequently though, the informants they encountered were children or young women, whose geographical knowledge was sometimes limited.\footnote{196} An additional problem was that the experienced guides among the porters were not always able to parlay the information obtained into a good path. For instance, Baroko a porter “who generally went ahead of the scouts, as he was supposed to be a good pilot in the forest,” used information from a captured woman, but still led the land party into a foodless wilderness where they wandered for several days.\footnote{197} Guides obtained from the trade settlements in the forest generally did better, though even they sometimes had problems finding paths.\footnote{198}

Maps and mapping were another technique the Expedition employed to make better use of paths in the forest. Stanley took daily astronomical readings, when this was possible, and made sketch maps in his pocket notebooks, as well as larger maps in which he incorporated information from his daily maps and notes.\footnote{199} Since the Ituri forest was unmapped when the Expedition entered it, they had no maps to guide them and the maps they made were of little use in areas they

\footnote{193}{For example, Stanley Diary, 8 September 1887 (E37). Stanley decided to keep one group of women and children captives with the caravan because he knew he would be returning by the same route and hoped the porters would learn some of their language. Jephson Diary, 2 July 1887.}

\footnote{194}{Jephson Diary, 28 July 1887.}

\footnote{195}{Stairs Diary, 12 August 1887. See also Jephson Diary, 12 September 1887.}

\footnote{196}{For example, in one area where the indigenes were “not in arms against us” they encountered a woman with her child in a field, but “they could not tell us anything about the country.” Parke, My Experiences, 83.}

\footnote{197}{Parke, My Experiences, 95-6; see also Jephson Diary, 20 August 1887. The porter’s name is also given as Mbaruku.}

\footnote{198}{See, for example, Jephson Diary, 31 October 1887.}

\footnote{199}{For the astronomical readings, see Parke, My Experiences, 80. Stanley’s sketch maps can be found in almost every diary entry in his pocket notebooks (Lots E37-43). Some of his larger maps, mostly of the territory east and south of Lake Albert, are in “Route Maps of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, 1887-1889,” British Library ADD MS 41259 A, B1-11 & C. Stairs was also an experienced surveyor.}
were traversing for the first time. On their second and third journeys through the forest, these maps may have been more helpful, though the non-textual knowledge of the terrain kept by Stanley and the Expedition's guides was likely a crucial supplement to the maps. However, this knowledge was effective in making their passage through the forest easier only when they had resources to avoid the hazards they knew to be ahead. For example, when they carried large stocks of food with them from Ft. Bodo they were able to pass safely through the hungry area between it and the trade settlement of Ipoto. The other necessary supplement to the maps was the blazes or marks left on trees to indicate the path used by the Column. These were helpful for repeated travel through some areas, but not others, as the Rear Column found trying to move upriver from Yambuya using Stanley's trail.

In any case, the maps Stanley made were not so much intended as guides for immediate use in the forest as they were intended for consumption back in Britain. They were an important part of the return expected by the Royal Geographic Society for its sponsorship of the Expedition. They also constituted proof of Stanley's "authorship" of this new route and thus of the legitimacy of his passage through it as an explorer. More broadly, maps connected the Expedition's activities to a network of instruments, practices, and institutions, as well as to a genealogy of geographic expertise embodied in persons and texts, though aspects of this connection involved dispute and debate as well. Maps also made a concrete association between the Expedition and the process of colonial claims, as many of the maps accompanying books about the Expedition presented its route against a backdrop that indicated areas claimed by various European powers. The choice of names for geographical features was another part of the process of laying claim to territory. In the forest, mapping was limited by the Expedition's narrow line of march, as well as by the extent and quality of the local geographic information

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200 The small maps Stanley included with the letters of instruction he sent back to Barttelot were never received by the Rear Column, and thus could not assist them.
201 For example, Bonny Diary, 14 July 1888 (E48).
202 For an evaluation of this contribution see Keltie, "What Stanley Has Done."
which supplemented and interpreted direct observation. Outside the Expedition's line of
march, much of the map of the forest published with In Darkest Africa was simply shaded an
undifferentiated green, with the occasional river conjectured in dotted lines.

The one area untraversed by the Expedition for which Stanley did have a map was
Equatoria province, together with its southwestern fringes. This map had been given to
him by its creator, Wilhem Junker, in Cairo. The map was supplemented and also linked to
the areas through which the Expedition planned to pass by Junker's Monbuttu servant, Binza,
whose services were donated to the Expedition. Binza made two contributions to the
Expedition. He, together with two of the Sudanese soldiers, accompanied Jephson to
Equatoria as a sign of the Expedition's legitimacy, and he told Stanley of an alternate route
through the forest via the Nepoko River. Stanley rejected this route because the Advance
Column had neither guns nor cloth to trade for food and safe passage. Lacking these, a route
through such a populous area would not be possible "without war." However, as the Column's
onward march through the forest became increasingly difficult, Stanley did consider going back
to try the Nepoko route, though he expected it would mean additional months on the road and the
loss of half the porters.

The decision not to take the Nepoko route points to one of the Expedition's major failures
in the forest—its inability to make effective use of existing structures for the movement of people
and things when it found them. The good paths they discovered in the region ran in the wrong

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204 The map of the Expedition's journey through the forest that accompanied In Darkest Africa has much
less detail for the part of the lower Aruwimi River where the villagers most consistently fled from the Expedition.
There are few named villages along the river, and no indication of what lay inland of the river bank. See HMS,
"A Map of the Great Forest Region showing the routes of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition from the River
Congo to the Victoria Nyanza" (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1890).

205 Junker's travels south and west from Egypt's Bahr al-Ghazal and Equatoria provinces are
9, no. 7 (1887): 399-420 & 466. He travelled on the upper Uele, Bomokandi and Nepoko Rivers, visiting, among
others, the Azande, Mangbetu, Momvu and Madi peoples.

206 Jephson Diary, 5 February 1887; IDA, 1:194.

207 IDA, 1:194 & 427.

208 Stanley Diary, 26 August 1887 (E37). This decision was criticized by at least one armchair explorer
in Britain, who noted that the Advance Column was at that point only forty miles from Junker's route, which
would have taken them through a "fine savannah country abounding in food." See the review of IDA in The
Atheneum, no. 3271 (1890): 30.
direction, that is, they moved toward the northern rather than the eastern edge of the forest and lay perpendicular rather than parallel to the river. The Column found evidence of a strong regional trade system in one zone, trade which used these paths in combination with the less treacherous parts of the river. The Expedition, however, only made limited use of these paths for foraging.

The Expedition's lack of flexibility was due to its large size, its limited supply of trade goods and the accidental loss of many of the trade goods they had. The Europeans' growing fear of the forest, discussed below, and their fear of hunger based on their short, disastrous forays away from the river, were also important factors in their unwillingness to make use of existing systems for travel in the forest. In addition, Stanley's personal ambitions as an explorer, which did not incline him to make addenda to the routes of other Europeans, and the ambitions of his multiple employers favoured as direct a route east as possible. Further encouragement to perseverance on their eastward path was the information, acquired at Ugarrowwa's trade settlement, that indigenous trade caravans exchanged forest ivory for salt from Bunyoro, though the they used was not clear.

In similar fashion, the Expedition failed to make effective use of the long-distance routes being developed in the forest by the Zanzibari traders. Their paths and settlements, and the alliances that went with them, made use of the river, as did indigenous trade and travel. However, the focus of this developing network, both on the lower Aruwimi and the Ituri, was north-south movement across the river. For example, Selim bin Mohammed, one of Tipu Tip's

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209 Jephson Diary, 21 October 1887; Stairs Diary, 20 October 1887.
210 Grenfell noted in 1899 that the village of Bululu was the river port for a rich iron mining district two days' march north of the river, and that it was under the authority of a chief named Pangani, the only one in the region who had never submitted to the "Arabs." G. Grenfell to A.H. Baynes, 25 November 1899, BMS Archives. Grenfell's Bululu may have been either Babua or Balulu on Stanley's map of the forest, both situated in the area where the Advance Column found trade and trade goods. Werner, a contemporary visitor to the lower Aruwimi also noted that the region was well known for the quality of its worked iron. J. R. Werner, "The Congo, and the Ngala and Aruwimi Tributaries," Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society N.S. 11, no. 6 (1889): 348.
211 Stanley Diary, 15-16 September 1887 (E37).
212 One reason for the development of the Zanzibari routes toward the northern edge of the forest was an interest in opening this area to the ivory trade. The hard ivory from forest elephants was less valuable than the soft ivory from those living on the forest fringe or in the savannah. Sheriff notes that around 1873 hard ivory, probably from the eastern Congo, first appeared in Zanzibar and fetched MT$32 per frasela, as compared to MT$35.15 for soft ivory. See Sheriff, "Ivory and Commercial Expansion," 438. In the heavily populated areas at the northern edge of the forest there were also better food supplies and better opportunities for the regional trade on
subordinates, gave some attention to the area immediately up and down-river of Yambuya, where he had established a settlement. But his interest and resources were concentrated on the development of overland tracks south toward Stanley Falls and north toward the Uele River. Banalya, under the leadership of a chief allied with the Zanzibari traders was in the process of becoming a major transportation hub. It stood at the point where canoe traffic from the lower Aruwimi connected with traffic from the south, which came from Stanley Falls via the Lindi River. This route was linked to routes running northeast and east to the edges of the forest. Similarly, at Avadori, the Advance Column found itself on a route that linked the trade center of Kibonge on the upper Congo with the northern edge of the forest. Tippu Tip told Jameson in April 1888 that the Expedition should have taken this route, as it was both shorter and better than the one Stanley was pursuing.

The paths and skills the traders needed to access these forest resources were being built on indigenous ones. Traders like Tippu Tip had learned to function in the forest in the late 1870s by incorporating into their followings people with forest expertise, many of them from the Matampa region between the upper Lomami and Lualaba rivers. While the traders’ long-distance routes were still being developed during the Expedition’s time in the forest, they were not as limited and slow as some of the Expedition accounts suggested. Stanley also believed them to be as foodless as the areas around the trade settlements. He may have suspected, too, that travelling

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which the Zanzibari long-distance trade system was dependent. See Austen, African Economic History, 66.

213 For example, the Rear Column encountered Selim bin Mohammed near Yambuya in mid-June 1888. He was escorting the senior chief of Uchwa, named Golema, from his territory on the Uele River to Stanley Falls, where Golema wanted to make a treaty with Tippu Tip. Uchwa had been the focus of Selim bin Mohammed’s activities from Yambuya. See Jameson, Story, 314-5.

214 G. Grenfell to A.H. Baynes, 25 November 1899, BMS Archives. It is not clear from Grenfell’s account what combination of land and water these latter two routes involved.

215 Jameson, Story, 280 & 298. The preferred Zanzibari route to Equatoria was through Buganda. Though Tippu Tip also had subordinates stationed near the western borders of Emin’s province, there had not yet been any direct communication from the Lakes area through the forest to Stanley Falls; see Ward, My Life, 65. Routes that ran directly north from Ujiji to Equatoria were not workable ones at that time, though traders from Ujiji had made settlements on Lake Kivu; see Wissmann, Second Journey, 250-2.

216 Vansina, Paths, 240. These followers were known to those they raided and traded with as the Matambatamba. While the Expedition officers occasionally used this term to describe the indigenous members of Zanzibari trading bands, they generally called them Manyema. They used this term as a tribal designation and did not distinguish different languages or places of origin among the “arabized” followers of the coast-base traders.

217 Stanley, for example, noted that it took Ugarrowwa seven months to travel from Kibonge to Avadori, a distance only 30 miles greater than that the Advance Column had come Yambuya. See Stanley Diary, 16.
these routes would involve the Expedition in conflicts connected to them, both among the
Zanzibari traders and with peoples along them whose labour and resources they exploited.\footnote{For example, Tippu Tip, who supported the Expedition, was in conflict with Said bin Abede, to whom the Ituri trade settlements and Kibonge were tied. Though the conflict involved territory, it had begun with the decision of Said’s father, Abed bin Salim, to send his ivory down the Congo rather than to Zanzibar, an act of economic insurrection against the Sultan. See Bennett, \textit{Arab versus European}, 217-8 and Jameson, \textit{Story}, 250-1.} This may have been the case in some areas, but the routes and alliances being made by the
Zanzibari traders were flexible, shifting in response to the availability of food and trade
resources like ivory. Indeed, contemporary European travellers in the region observed that while
indigenous communities had always had a degree of mobility, allowing them to respond to floods
on the river or to practice shifting agriculture in the forest, they had become “nomadic” and
highly flexible as they were connected into the Zanzibari network of routes. Villages whose
inhabitants acknowledged the authority of these traders were being rebuilt as communities of
“rough shelters of sticks and leaves” or as even more mobile communities living on canoes.
These transitory groups were anchored by the presence of a few more permanent buildings
housing Zanzibari representatives at particular sites.\footnote{Werner, “The Congo,” 347-8 and G. Grenfell to A.H. Baynes, 25 November 1887, BMS Archives.} It was not until the Congo Free State
made a route out of the Aruwimi River that communities became more fixed. The houses were
then built using a different kind of architecture, and the communities were structured around
different political and economic expectations, though the forms of transport on the route initially
remained the same.\footnote{Grenfell to Baynes, 25 November 1887, BMS Archives.}

The Expedition’s other failure to tap into existing structures for travel in the forest
was its failure to obtain porter labour from Tippu Tip. In mid-August 1887, the Rear
Column officers learned that the six hundred men contracted from Tippu Tip had been
sent out under his nephew Rachid bin Mohammed some time earlier, but having struck
the Advance Column’s track above Yambuya, and finding an empty camp there, they
concluded that Stanley had already left for Lake Albert and no longer required their

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September 1887 (E37) and Keltie, “What Stanley Has Done,” 133.
The assembled porters had dispersed to other tasks, and Tippu Tip was unable to recruit a second batch in the Stanley Falls area. He even had some difficulty finding men at his base in Kassongo. Tippu Tip's recruiting problems were due to a general shortage of labour relative to the demand for it in the areas he and other traders controlled in the eastern Congo. In addition, stories of "the weight of the loads, the hardness of the road, and shortness of supplies" with the Expedition were beginning to circulate. Tippu Tip ended up recruiting some of the porters for the Expedition through deception, telling them that they were going to fight and collect ivory up the Aruwimi. Many of these recruits had female dependants with them to carry the loads, while they planned to "play the soldier' with their guns." Most of the remaining porters were captives taken after fighting between Tippu Tip and Said bin Abede near Riba-Riba, or ones taken from recently subdued areas west of Kassongo and near the mouth of the Lomami River. Some of these porters, though armed, were initially kept in chains to prevent desertion. Many of those recruited were unaccustomed to caravan porterage or to travelling more than a few hours from their own country, and the captives posed problems of other sorts. Muni Somai, the headman hired to manage these porters, found them "hard people to deal with." Many of the four hundred porters supplied by Tippu Tip had expectations about the kind of the work they were to do for the Expedition that differed from those of the officers. The pace of

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221 Various reasons were given for the failure of this body of porters to connect with the Expedition. These included the strong current on the Aruwimi which exhausted the canoe paddlers, their inability to locate the Expedition's camp, and the fact that "their ammunition had given out, and the natives had proved too strong for them" on the lower Aruwimi. See J.R. Troup to F. de Winton, 18 October 1887, MP 85/17; Troup, Rear Column, 161-2 and Ward, My Life, 41.
222 These labour shortages were not new. A year earlier, Tippu Tip experienced a similar shortage in the Stanley Falls area after he sent 500-600 men north under Ali bin Mohammed. Lenz to Geographischen Gesellschaft, 19 February 1886, in Mitteilungen, 29 (1886): 257-67.
223 Bartelot to Mackinnon, 28 March 1888, MP 85/17. Tales about the hard road and dangerous tribes to be found on the upper Aruwimi—tales arising from the early attempts of traders to travel through this area—were circulating around Stanley Falls even before the arrival of the Expedition. See Lenz to Geographischen Gesellschaft, 19 February 1886.
224 Jameson, Story, 251.
225 Ward, My Life, 89.
226 Jameson, Story, 278 & 251.
travel, the discipline governing their work, the degree of freedom they had to pursue their own interests, and the loads they were expected to carry were all areas of disagreement and conflict.\footnote{229}

However, an important reason the Expedition had difficulty drawing on regional labour supplies was the lack of support Stanley and Leopold II gave Tippu Tip in his new and difficult position as the Congo Free State’s governor at Stanley Falls, a position Stanley had been instrumental in negotiating.\footnote{230} While the actions of Leopold II and his officials were beyond Stanley’s control, the trade goods the Expedition was to supply to Tippu Tip were not. Stanley’s decision to leave the Expedition’s loads of gunpowder at Stanley Pool for later shipment up the river outraged Tippu Tip. When Tippu Tip asked Stanley

whether he had gunpowder ready with him, because, according to the Agreement, the powder, caps, and 600 guns were to be supplied by him, and the bullets by me. He replied that he did not carry gunpowder, which I thought was a joke.\footnote{231}

Tippu Tip’s dealings with Stanley apparently revived a lingering grievance dating from Stanley’s 1876-77 journey down the Congo River, as well.\footnote{232} Tippu Tip may also have been angered by the poor quality of the cloth that formed part of his payment from the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[227] el-Marjebi to Holmwood, 29 Shawal 1304/21 July 1887, MP 88/33.
\item[228] Jameson, \textit{Story}, 317.
\item[229] For disagreements over the weight of the loads, see Jameson, \textit{Story}, 305-6; Werner, \textit{Visit}, 271; and Barttelot MS Diary, 8 June 1888, Barttelot Family Papers. For examples of differences over the pace of the caravan, see Rear Column Log, 11-12 July 1888 (ES50). Regarding their freedom to pursue other activities, many of these porters “openly avow their intention...to go a certain distance [with the Rear Column] & when they come to a good village fling down our loads & begin ivory hunting.” J.S. Jameson to W. Bonny, 12 August 1888, BLEM Stanley Papers.
\item[230] See Smith, \textit{Expedition}, 181-3 for a discussion of Tippu Tip’s difficulties on his return to Stanley Falls in June 1887 and his plea for assistance to Leopold II and the British Consul in Zanzibar.
\item[231] el-Marjebi to Holmwood, 29 Shawal 1304/21 July 1887, MP 88/33 and E.M. Barttelot to M. Godman, 27 July-15 August 1887, Barttelot Family Papers. The lack of this gunpowder was one of the reasons for non-arrival of first porters Tippu Tip recruited: “When the people of Usuku [i.e. Basoko] see they want to fight every day they stabbed my people with spears, and as I had not sufficient gunpowder I was not able to fight.” Tippu Tip was apparently also piqued that Stanley’s orders to Barttelot on escorting Tippu Tip to Stanley Falls in June 1887 did not allow Barttelot’s men to assist Tippu Tip in reprisals on the village of Mbugua. Barttelot, \textit{Life}, 238-9.
\item[232] Stanley promised to send several rich presents to Tippu Tip in return for his assistance in finding and keeping men with which to travel down the Congo River; Jameson, \textit{Story}, 299-300. Kibonge told Jameson that Stanley gave him nothing despite the men Kibonge gave him at that time. “He said that if Mr. Stanley had behaved well to him then, he would have sent all his men after him now;” \textit{Story}, 298. Tippu Tip also had to deal with the “intense distaste of all the other Arabs to [him] giving any aid to Stanley’s Expedition.” See Barttelot to Holmwood, 9 June
\end{footnotes}
Stanley's subsequent court action against Tippu Tip in Zanzibar, accusing him of breach of contract, rubbed salt into these injuries.

Thus, for a variety of reasons, the Expedition did not draw effectively on the existing and emerging systems for travel and trade in the forest, as it was later able to do when travelling the established east coast caravan routes. Indeed, Stanley claimed the east coast trade system—the devastation created by Manyema raiding and Tippu Tip's failure to supply porters—was the primary obstacle to the Expedition's passage through the forest. "These Arabs have wrecked us," he lamented. "Had I known them to be on the river I should never have come this way." Nevertheless, Stanley's public assessment of the route was a positive one. Confident of his ability to exploit the knowledge he acquired in his first journey through the forest, Stanley told Grant, a fellow explorer and a member of the Relief Committee, that "I feel convinced that we could not have chosen a better route." His officers did not share his conviction. Stairs, for instance, called the Congo route "the most difficult one that could be chosen." Stanley did not, however, suggest using the Congo route for the evacuation of refugees and ivory from Equatoria, as had originally been planned with the Relief Committee. Even if Stanley had felt sufficiently confident of his forest route, it is not clear the Equatorians would have followed him. The Expedition's porters told them the difficulties and dangers of the road through the forest were such that it would be better to flee than to face them. The forest was fatal, the porters said, and "there is nothing to eat but grass."

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234 Stairs Diary, 20 October 1887. See also Stanley Diary, 12 September 1887 (E37) and HMS to E.M. Barttelot, 14 February 1888, MP 86/29.
235 HMS to J.A. Grant, 8 September 1888, MP 86/29.
236 Stairs Diary, 5 October 1887.
237 See F. de Winton to Foreign Office, 19 May 1887 and F. de Winton to Foreign Office, 25 April 1887, both in MP 85/23.
238 "Proceedings of a 'Court of Enquiry' Held at Mazamboni's, 2 May 1889" in BLEM Stanley Papers. These statements were attributed to the porter Rehani Pasha, who had also told the Equatorians of the weight of the Expedition's loads and Stanley's harsh treatment of his porters.
Writing the Forest

While the Expedition’s effort to make a route through the forest failed, the Expedition was a stunning success in creating an imaginative or discursive route into the forest for Europeans. “Let me guide you... through this forest, and I promise not to mislead you,” Stanley told his audience at a gala meeting of the Royal Geographical Society not long after his return to England.239 Stanley’s descriptions of the Ituri forest and its inhabitants became defining images of Central Africa in the late nineteenth century. These images were powerful enough that they persist in popular and academic writing about Africa in the late twentieth century, though the Expedition which generated them has been long forgotten.240 I will outline the image of the forest and its inhabitants presented by the Expedition, and look at some of the ways in which these images both grew out of and shaped the Expedition’s experience of travel in the forest. Finally, I will suggest reasons why the Expedition’s image of the forest became so influential and long-lasting.

The Forest and Its Inhabitants

The main description of the forest generated by the Expedition was that of Stanley. His earliest accounts of the forest were contained in letters to the Relief Committee, published by a syndicate of British newspapers and several geographical journals.241 These descriptions were short and pragmatic. They were largely concerned with the problems of finding food and paths in the forest, as well as with the Advance Column’s interactions with the forest’s inhabitants. The forest was huge; it was also “continuous, unbroken” and “compact.” Its dark, homogenous mass was clearly demarcated from the grassland to the

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239 HMS, “Geographical Results of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition,” *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* NS 12, no. 6 (1890): 314. This speech, delivered on May 5th, was Stanley’s second public appearance after his return and the first in which he discussed issues of geography and ethnography.

240 For the academic legacy of Stanley’s depiction of the forest, see Vansina, *Paths*, 3, 5 & 39.

241 Stanley started to work up the material that went into his published writing and lectures on the forest early in the Advance Column’s journey through it. The forest in his trial descriptions was dark and dense with undergrowth. It was “pathless, vast & gloomy.” See Stanley Diary, 29 September 1887 (E37).
east, forming "bays & capes, just like a sea shore." The forest was sparsely populated, and many parts of it were a foodless, trackless wilderness. The forest denizens either inexplicably fled from the Column or were persistently hostile. The Zanzibari traders and their Manyema followers were the other people to be found in the forest. They were invaders busily engaged in despoiling the land and indigenous people, as well as exploiting the Expedition by trying to extort trade goods from it or tempting its porters to desert. Huge, dark, damp, dense, and hostile—these remained the dominant images of the forest despite the later publication of more nuanced and varied accounts by Stanley and the other European members of the Expedition. These later accounts did not refine or correct the initial images of the forest so much as supplement them with colourful and emotive detail.

Stanley subsequently provided two major descriptions of the forest. The first was contained in his public lectures; the second was that of In Darkest Africa. Stanley offered public lectures in Scotland and England in 1890. The following year he undertook speaking tours of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Of the three lectures he used on these tours, one dealt primarily with the forest and another offered an extensive description of it. The third lecture focused on the affairs of Equatoria. However, Stanley seems to have modified it early in his tour of Scotland, substituting a description of the forest from one of the other lectures for a long, harshly critical passage on Emin Pasha. Such was the interest in the forest that some of the reporters covering Stanley's lectures added lengthy excerpts about the forest from In Darkest Africa, material that Stanley had not included in his talk. Publishers also recalled to the public spotlight the other British "expert" on the

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242 Both quotes from HMS to W. Mackinnon, 25 August 1888, MP 86/29.
243 See HMS to W. Mackinnon, 15 August 1889, MP 86/29.
244 The first edition of In Darkest Africa appeared in June 1890. Its main depiction of the forest and forest peoples can be found in volume 2, chapter 23.
245 These were HMS, Great Forest and HMS, Across Africa.
247 See, for example, "The Stanley Reception," 117-8.
equatorial forest, the traveller Paul du Chaillu, commissioning an article from him and reissuing popular editions of his earlier books. Stanley’s American publisher also printed a special article on the pygmies to coincide with the beginning of his American lecture tour.

The main elements in Stanley’s depiction of the forest were, first, its size, which he estimated at 224 million acres, or four times the size of England, Scotland and Wales combined. But Stanley was chiefly anxious to demonstrate to his auditors and readers the unique character of this forest. So different was the equatorial forest from any of its temperate counterparts, that Stanley repeated stressed the poverty of language to describe it. Unlike the pleasantly sun-dappled northern woods, in this forest the thick canopy of interlaced leaves completely blocked even the “glaring sun of the tropics,” producing a characteristic “cheerless gloom” or “mystical twilight” during the day, and a “palpable” darkness at night. The sun was only visible in clearings made by forest agriculturalists or in spots where the tallest trees had been felled by storms. Even in here, or on the river, the sun was often obscured by clouds.

Frequent rain was another characteristic of the forest. Stanley estimated some 150 days of rain per year, or one hour in fifteen. This rain often came in the form of “drowning” downpours. It was almost always preceded by violent “squalls, storms, tempests, or tornadoes,” complete with thunder like the explosion of planets and “blinding forks” of flaming lightning. These storms were “Berserker” battles in an ongoing war between the elements and the army of trees. The volume of rain suggested comparison with the biblical flood, while the violence of the storms inspired fear and desolation in their human

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248 du Chaillu, “Great Equatorial Forest,” and P. du Chaillu, Adventures in the Great Forest of Equatorial Africa and the Country of the Dwarfs, abridged ed. (London: John Murray, 1890). Du Chaillu made two extended trips into the forest in the late 1850s and early 1860s, both in areas considerably to the west of the region traversed by the Expedition.  
250 HMS, Across Africa, 27.  
251 For example, HMS, Great Forest, 2 & 5.  
252 HMS, Across Africa, 27; Rescue, 12; “Geographical Results,” 314.  
253 IDA, 1:149-50.  
254 HMS, Great Forest, 8; “Geographical Results,” 314.  
255 HMS, “Geographical Results,” 314-5; Across Africa, 30; Great Forest, 10; IDA, 1:153.
The forest soaked up this water like a sponge and then suspired it in fetid, suffocating, "reeking exhalations." These slowly dispersing clouds of vapour turned the forest into a hot-house; Parke called it a conservatory of malaria.

Dense growth was another distinguishing mark of the equatorial forest. The forest was characterized by "seething life" and "over-vigorous exuberance." It contained a bewildering variety of plant life, much of it possessed of either distinctive size or exceptional vigour: "There is no langour or drooping," only an "extreme sappiness, everlasting greenness, and eternal vitality." This superabundance of life was threatening and negative, however. Many of the plants were either "ravenous" parasitic ones that preyed on the trees or they were the products of rot and decay, which were also over-abundant in the forest. The forest was a "sepulchre," a "region of horrors" in which death took numberless forms. It was also a vast womb into which the Expedition penetrated. However, the luxuriant life in which this womb submerged them was a "demon world," a deceptive green wilderness of hunger, exhausting labour, and danger.

The forest was crowded and chaotic, a disorderly region in which it was impossible to create the discipline necessary for progressive enterprises like the Expedition. The hindering disorder of the forest was most evident in the Expedition's struggles with undergrowth. Stanley distinguished between areas of primeval or virgin forest where the unbroken canopy limited the undergrowth, and areas where fallen trees or the clearings made by farmers let in light, creating "jungles" of all but impenetrable secondary growth. The river bank, near which Stanley tried to keep the caravan, was another area of the forest which

257 IDA, 2:82; "Geographical Results," 315.
258 HMS, Great Forest, 10; IDA, 1:188.
259 HMS, "Geographical Results," 315; IDA, 1:145; Great Forest, 11.
260 HMS, Great Forest, 2; Parke, My Experiences, 73.
261 HMS, Across Africa, 29; Great Forest, 2.
262 HMS, Great Forest, 2-3.
263 HMS, Great Forest, 9; IDA, 1:469 & 2:77-8.
264 HMS, Across Africa, 30; IDA, 1:138; Great Forest, 11.
265 HMS, Across Africa, 7; IDA, 2:46.
266 HMS, Great Forest, 9 & 14; IDA, 2:24.
267 IDA, 2:76-7. Elsewhere Stanley was less precise, suggesting dense undergrowth was present even
tended to have denser undergrowth. While Stanley sometimes described the forest canopy in positive terms as being like a cathedral, its characteristic silence and dimness inspired, at best, a sense of the forest's other-worldliness. More often though, the forest was oppressive and desolate, evoking fear and hate. The image of the forest as a sea, parting reluctantly before the bow of the caravan and closing again immediately in its wake was a recurring one.

The forest also seethed with non-vegetative life, especially insects whose "minute tribes" were filled with "venom, fury, voracity, and activity." Birds, monkeys, reptiles, and frogs also abounded, but were more often heard than seen. While there was plenty of evidence of game, it rarely offered itself as either food or sport to members of the Expedition. The animals of the forest, like its human inhabitants, were seen to be unusually wild and degraded. The forest provided food in abundance to those who knew it intimately—the pygmies—but to the Expedition it most often presented itself as a foodless wilderness.

The Expedition also experienced the forest as a prison, a dungeon, and a hell. These images were heightened by contrast in the moment the Expedition crossed the boundary between forest and grassland. They "emerged upon a rolling plain, green as an English lawn," whose young grass "sparkled like emeralds." The "smiling blue of heaven" looked down on a land "spread out in flowery fields and pastured slopes, soft mounds and rounded hills, dipping into silent vales and rising into great billows of sweet herbage."

This beautiful landscape, welcomingly feminine where the forest had been threateningly

where the canopy was unbroken; see *Great Forest*, 3 & 8-9.

267 IDA, 2:83.
268 IDA, 2:81. Stanley's descriptions of the forest became a little more positive as forest became drier and more open in the east. See, for example, IDA, 1:262 or 2:281-2.
269 IDA, 1:152 & 282; *Great Forest*, 10.
270 HMS to W. Mackinnon, 25 August 1888, MP 86/29; IDA, 2:46.
271 IDA, 2:75-6.
274 IDA, 1:292; *Great Forest*, 11.
masculine, reinvigorated the men of the Expedition and made them "radiant with the fulfillment of dear desires." All of them gave spontaneous thanks for their deliverance.

This image of the forest as a wilderness hell from which they had been saved was reinforced with additional biblical imagery. Stanley named the peak from which he first caught sight of the edge of the forest Mt. Pisgah, thus constructing himself as a second Moses leading a refractory and disbelieving people toward the promised land.

The forest was, in fact, so inimical to human life that its inhabitants were particularly degraded, Stanley averred. The main symptoms of this exceptional savagery were the constant warfare in which they engaged both against the Expedition and each other, and their "obstinate sullenness" in burning their villages after the Expedition had passed through them. Their refusal to trade or supply information to the Expedition also marked them as "unusually unresponsive, debased, and dull." The assumed extent of cannibalism among the inhabitants of the forest was the other proof of their backwardness in Stanley's eyes. This degradation was not innate, but due to the effects of their environment. The forest did not allow "amicable intercourse." Its dense vegetation meant that "[s]trangers cannot see one another until they suddenly encounter, and are mutually paralysed with surprise.... Instinctively they raise their weapons." This invariably led to feuds and wars, with the result that tribes preferred isolation, each keeping to "its own place." In fact, Stanley ascribed all the supposed primitive evils of Africa to this kind of determined isolationism:

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277 HMS, Great Forest, 12.
278 IDA, 1:292 & 295.
279 IDA, 1:281 and Deuteronomy 34:1-4. The providential appearance of a guinea fowl when the officers were desperately longing for meat also echoed the miraculous provision of quails when the children of Israel complained of their diet of manna; see Numbers 11.
280 IDA, 1:278-9 & 2:100; "The Pigmies," 14. Jephson noted in his diary that the forest Africans also had particularly degraded ways of fighting, relying on booby traps and ambushes rather than the open, honest, and comprehensible style of fighting used by residents of the grassland. Jephson Diary, 9 December 1887.
281 HMS, Great Forest, 19.
282 HMS, Great Forest, 17-8; "The Pigmies," 8. Stanley noted that cannibalism was "a current fact everywhere throughout the forest region, and I am forced to believe it, though I have never seen the cannibals indulging in their repasts." Captured indigenes naturally "stoutly denied" that they were cannibals, though they always accused neighbouring groups of the practice. HMS, "Pigmies," 9.
283 IDA, 2:89 & 100, Across Africa, 31-2.
284 IDA, 2:100.
Murder in every conceivable shape rioted throughout their territories. Naked and bestial they had lived from prehistoric time. It was death to any unarmed stranger to come among them, and death to any member of their communities who showed the least sign of capacity or genius.285

The lack of sunlight in the forest and the poor diet available there also contributed to the degradation of its inhabitants.286

Two kinds of Africans inhabited Stanley's forest. One were the agriculturalists, "settlers" who made clearings in the forest for their fields and villages. They were distinguished by their fine craft-work, especially in iron, and the well-constructed order of their villages.287 While the inhabitants of the forest were degraded, Stanley was careful to emphasize that they were capable of improvement.288 Though savage, they were industrious, and thus potentially a good source of labour. The forest they cultivated was extremely fertile, and also possessed exploitable natural resources like india-rubber and ivory.289 The second kind of African was the pygmies, distinguished by their short stature. Stanley believed the pygmies had been driven into the forest centuries ago by the activities of more progressive peoples.290 They were prime examples of the degrading effects of the forest environment, in Stanley's eyes. He believed they used to be a much more developed people, but now lived like animals.291 They pursued a nomadic life in the forest between the Ihuru and Ituri rivers.292 They exchanged their expertise in hunting and gathering forest resources for the manufactures of the agriculturalists, and for right to forage in their fields. Pygmy villages were always located in virgin forest, though close to communities of agriculturalists on whom

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287 Stanley identified the forest tribes as the Ababua, Mabode, Momvu, Bakumu, Baburu, Balesse and Babusesse [IDA, 1:97]. Some of these were clearly related to peoples living north of the Ituri forest, while the Bakumu and Baburu who lived south of the Aruwimi apparently shared the language of the people living east of Stanley Falls. Compare Vasina, Paths in the Rainforest, 170.
288 IDA, 1:99-100.
289 HMS, "Geographical Results," 319; Great Forest, 16-17; IDA, 2:111.
290 For Stanley's theory that the pygmies had been driven south from Egypt in ancient times, see "The Pigmies," 4.
they lived like parasites, Stanley believed, tolerated but resented. 293

Stanley went farther, hypothesizing the existence of two nations of pygmies, the Batwa and Wambutti, inhabiting different parts of the forest. 294 However, he primarily distinguished between two physical types of pygmies. One had “longish heads and long narrow faces, reddish, small eyes, set close together, which [gave] them a somewhat ferrety look, sour, anxious, and querulous.” 295 They were “very degraded” specimens, dark of skin, displaying “excessive prognathy of jaw,” and “more nearly approaching what one might call a cousin of the simian than was supposed to be possible, yet thoroughly human.” 296 A close reading of Stanley’s account suggests that the entire “degraded” type was hypothesized from the appearance of one pygmy woman captured together with another pygmy woman of very different, and more desirable, appearance. 297 Stanley’s second type of pygmy had “round faces, gazelle-like eyes, set far apart, open foreheads, which give one an impression of undisguised frankness, and are of a rich yellow, ivory complexion.” 298 In fact, the individuals who fell into this latter type were those who were acquired by members of the Expedition, and who proved themselves trainable, loyal, hard-working, and willing to put their forest skills as the disposal of their masters. 299 The “degraded” and vicious type of pygmy tended to be found among those who attacked the Expedition or raidied its fields at Ft. Bodo. 300

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293 IDA, 2:100-03; Great Forest, 16; “The Pigmies,” 6.
294 IDA, 2:104. There were, in fact, a number of Pygmy peoples living in the Ituri forest. These included the Efe, Mbuti, Sua, and Aka. Modern scholars distinguish them culturally rather than by appearance. All of these peoples lived interdependently with groups of farmers and spoke languages closely related to those of the farmers. See Grinker, Houses in the Rain Forest, for a description of the relations between the Efe and the Lese peoples.
295 IDA, 2:104 and 1:374-5. Elsewhere, Stanley specifically rejected not only the idea that these “degraded” pygmies were a Darwinian link between man and ape, but that humans were the products of evolution at all. See “The Pigmies,” 3-4. The elements of biological and social Darwinism that Stanley used and rejected in various contexts is an area for further study.
297 See IDA, 1:374-5.
298 IDA, 2:104.
299 Across Africa, 32-4; “The Pigmies,” 11-14. This group also included temporary captives who provided useful information to the Expedition; see “Geographical Results,” 317-8. Stanley estimated that during their time in the forest, the Expedition captured fifty pygmies of whom six became the dependents or property of Expedition members, though Stanley stressed the voluntary nature of this attachment. See “The Pigmies,” 5 & 11.
300 See, for example, IDA, 1:457. This flexibility of this distinction was evident in the capture of a “good,” useful, attractive young man from among a group of pygmies trying to abscond with a box of the
A final characteristic of the equatorial forest was its relation to time. The biggest
trees were "stately forest kings" who had stood witness to such events as the great plague in
London and the Crucifixion. Although experiencing cycles of birth, growth, death and
decay, the primeval forest stood outside of historical time. It slumbered, "a virgin locked in
innocent repose," waiting to be awakened to "her duties" by the "trumpet-call of
civilization." The pygmies, the forest's distinctive inhabitants, were also insulated from
the flow of historical time. They were, Stanley maintained, the last remnants of an ancient
race. They were a living link, albeit ignorant of their heritage, to the ancient world and its
knowledge. The pygmies, though now degraded, were worthy of respect for this reason,
and because they were rational beings just like those "civilized" persons who questioned their
humanity. Stanley further emphasized the pygmies' ancient and untouched nature by
calling them savage Adams and Eves living in a wild African Eden.

While Stanley evinced no desire to see either the forest or its pygmies preserved in a
pristine, primeval state, he was concerned to replace the malign transformation initiated by
the coast-based traders with a beneficent European order. At the same time, though, he
transferred to the forest his concerns about the nature of change in Britain itself. The largest
trees were venerable patriarchs, strong and stately leaders of their arboreal tribes. When
overthrown in elemental battle or fallen to disease, ax or old age, a host of ruthless successors
crowded in to seize their place in the sun. Stanley viewed the secondary growth that so
hindered the Expedition with the same distaste and dismay as the jostling "mob of a race-day"
in England. Disrespectful, greedy, unruly young trees competed in a crude, noisy way for

IDA, 2:53-4 and Across Africa, 33.
301 IDA, 2:81; "Geographical Results," 316; Great Forest, 6.
302 IDA, 1:155.
303 "Geographical Results," 317-8; Great Forest, 22-3.
304 "The Pigmies," 3-4. The capacity for emotion, for "finer feelings" was another mark of their
humanity; see IDA, 2:44.
305 "Geographical Results," 317-8; IDA, 2:44. Stanley, who named them and gave them a place in
history, was implicitly "God" in this metaphor.
306 Great Forest, 3. Interestingly, the trees of temperate forests were organized into families rather than
tribes; see Great Forest, 1.
307 "Geographical Results," 315; IDA, 2:87.
dominance, displaying a "shameless disregard for order and decency."\textsuperscript{308} Which trees were elevated and which left in the shade in these Darwinian struggles was determined, disturbingly, by "curious inequalities of vigour."\textsuperscript{309} The structure of the primeval forest, savage though it might be, was much to be preferred. Unacknowledged under Stanley's fervour for the conversion of the forest was a deep ambivalence about change, and especially about competition as an engine of progress. Stanley was an exemplar of the new breed of gentlemen described by Hopkins, ones who promoted and benefited from a program of economic, political and moral improvement which reinforced rather than threatened established structures of privilege and property.\textsuperscript{310} In Stanley's later parliamentary career, not surprisingly, he campaigned on a reactionary platform of "imperialism, social discipline and vehement opposition to Home Rule" in Ireland.\textsuperscript{311}

Stanley anthropomorphized the forest as he transposed to it his concerns about change in Britain. However, the forest underwent another, subtler transformation at his hands. It became an agent, responsible for the Expedition's poor health and morale, and for its heavy loss of life. While Stanley cast a large portion of the blame for the problems of travelling in the forest onto convenient human agents, especially the Zanzibari traders, the forest itself also played an important role. The forest—referred to with this singular noun, making easier the ascription to it of individual characteristics—opposed itself to the Expedition.\textsuperscript{312} This opposition was not conscious. The forest was wild. It hindered because it was in its nature to do so, and it communicated that same obstructive wildness to everything within it, from hippopotami to chickens and goats, from rapids to residents. "All things are savage in this region," Stanley said when the Advance Column encountered serious obstacles to travel near

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{308} \textit{IDA}, 2:77.
\item \textsuperscript{309} \textit{IDA}, 2:86.
\item \textsuperscript{310} Hopkins, "New International Economic Order," 240-64.
\item \textsuperscript{311} McLynn, \textit{Stanley}, 2:372.
\item \textsuperscript{312} The one time Stanley referred to the forest as a living, individual entity it was "a great beast," vast as a continent, drowsy, and covered with "monstrous fur." See \textit{IDA}, 1:282.
\end{itemize}
While there was no suggestion that the Expedition was singled out for special hostility, Stanley's descriptions at times imply an active, conscious agency in the forest, as when the forest murdered members of the Expedition. The forest's agency is especially noticeable in Stanley's ascription of emotion to it. The forest was by turns ruthless, relentless, remorseless, sullen, cruel, and gloomy, though once it also displayed tenderness. The construction of the forest as an agent opposed to the Expedition and, indeed, to most kinds of human enterprise, helped to justify the failures of the Expedition, especially the large loss of life. However, by playing up the active hostility of the forest, Stanley simultaneously undermined the route he was trying to create. His descriptions of the forest usually ended with statements about the forest's wealth of resources and the potential for its profitable conversion. These necessarily lost a good deal of their persuasive force when preceded by colourfully detailed and emotionally charged depictions of the problems of travelling in and even surviving in the forest. Stanley's image of an abrupt change from forest to grassland and the sharp contrast he painted between these two environments was one way he tried to resolve this tension. Beyond the fascinating, but hellish forest, he assured his readers and listeners, Africa was bright, open, richly prosperous, and not inimical to European initiatives.

Stanley's concentrated descriptions of the forest took note of and offered explanation for variation in both its physical and human geography. They also emphasized the potential value of the forest and its inhabitants, and uncompromisingly supported their capacity for conversion. However, these aspects of his depiction were undercut by the many small

\[313\] \(IDA, 1:169-70.\)
\[314\] \(IDA, 1:282.\)
\[315\] This is an important point since the ability to experience emotion was one of the key characteristics of humanity for Stanley, and a part of his argument that Africans were fully human. In this context, it is interesting to note that any strong emotions felt by the European members of the Expedition were usually transposed onto their porters in published accounts of the Expedition. See, for example, \(IDA, 1:281-2.\)
\[316\] \(IDA, 1:221, 231, 282 \& 2:78.\) These adjectives are densely packed into the scene where Stanley decided to leave Nelson and all the incapacitated porters behind at a starvation camp.
\[317\] See, for example, \(IDA, 2:110-11.\)
\[318\] Stanley did not invent the rapid transition from forest to savannah. Turnbull, entering the forest in the same area sixty years later described crossing the Ituri River which had on one bank open grassland and on the other "a huge black wall of trees:" see C. M. Turnbull, The Mbuti Pygmies: Change and Adaptation, Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1983), 24. However, Stanley
comments on the character of the forest that appeared in the narrative of his multiple journeys through it. These passing comments highlighted the inexplicable and intractable hostility of the forest’s inhabitants, their savagery, their cannibalism, and their backwardness in choosing to flee from the Expedition. They also emphasized the constant need to hack through dense undergrowth, the depressing darkness, and the hunger and ill-health that dogged the Expedition while travelling in the forest. Stanley’s dislike and thinly veiled fear of the forest, foreshadowed in his comments on the Advance Column’s departure from Yambuya, were a refrain throughout the narrative that followed.

With In Darkest Africa Stanley offered this “absolutely unknown region opened to the gaze of and knowledge of civilized man for the first time.” Stanley wanted his depiction of the forest as a “region of horrors” to stand uncontradicted by rival accounts. However, the contradictions within Stanley’s own descriptions of the forest did not go unnoticed by critical reviewers:

If an African traveller should say that he stood on the banks of a certain river where there was a village or town densely populated, and surrounded by acres of cultivated fields, and the next moment would state that this same spot was a dense primeval forest, where the light of day could scarcely penetrate; and inhabited by savages and cannibals; we could not believe both of these statements; both might be untrue, but one of them must certainly be false....But when the former and more probable statement is made to a friend, and the latter and more improbable one is made to the public for the purpose of exciting their curiosity and sympathy in order to make money out of them; it is not very difficult to arrive at a conclusion.

The accounts of the Expedition by Stanley’s officers supported his aims in writing about the forest. To begin with, they said relatively little about the nature of the forest, likely

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319 IDA, 1:138. Stanley’s dispute with the traveller Henry Drummond illustrates the he importance he attached to providing the “true” description of the forest. For Stanley, both his commercial advantage and public credibility were at stake. See IDA, 2:73-4; “Geographical Results,” 313-4; and H. Drummond, Tropical Africa, 4th ed. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1891), v-vi.

320 The more positive descriptions of the forest offered by Paul du Chaillu were largely overlooked by the public. He emphasized that he had less difficulty in the forest because he travelled without a caravan and relied on the food and shelter offered him by forest peoples. See du Chaillu, Adventures in the Great Forest (1890), Preface.

321 Another Traveller, How Emin Pasha was Beguiled, 9. The friend referred to was William Mackinnon, to whom Stanley’s published letters of report to the Relief Committee were addressed.
unwilling to trespass on discursive territory claimed by Stanley.\textsuperscript{322} What they did say reiterated the negative, general images in Stanley’s narrative.\textsuperscript{323} The forest was isolated in both time and space. It circumscribed and diminished the lives of its unusually savage inhabitants, a process exacerbated by the activities of the “Arabs” and their Manyema followers. To its European visitors, the forest showed itself interminable, hateful, hungry, and hostile.\textsuperscript{324}

These negative images of the forest became stereotypes applying equally to all parts of the forest in all seasons, and to all of its inhabitants. In the process, important and potentially embarrassing connections between these images and the experience of the Expedition in the forest were obscured. For instance, a study of Jephson’s unpublished diary suggests the characteristics of the forest “natives” had more to do with his perception of the Expedition’s position than they did with any variation in the appearance and behaviour of the forest’s inhabitants. Three days out from Yambuya, but still confident, the Advance Column was subjected to an apparently hostile ritual: “In the middle of the night a lot of savages came within a hundred yds of the camp & sang.” To Jephson the sound of the music expressed hate and fury, but as the singers slowly withdrew, “in the distance their singing sounded sad & pathetic, particularly when one remembered how perfectly impotent the poor people were against us.”\textsuperscript{325} The forest at that point, though dark, had little undergrowth. It provoked a sense of anticipation and excitement, rather than fear, reminding Jephson of the forests in

\textsuperscript{322} By definition, the forest started east of Yambuya, so that none of the Rear Column officers narratives entered it, though Ward and Jameson both provided some information from their conversations with Zanzibari traders who had travelled in the forest.

\textsuperscript{323} The one exception was Hoffmann, for whom the forest was, at times, a tropical wonderland full of picturesque cannibals. This fabulous forest served as a backdrop for his interaction with the heroic Stanley, his mentor as well as his employer: See Hoffmann, \textit{With Stanley}, chapter 8. Hoffmann’s unpublished writing sketches a hungry and hostile forest environment closer to that of the Expedition’s officers. See W. Hoffmann, “Across Africa with the great explorer, Sir Henry M. Stanley” and “How the Pygmies were discovered who are now in this country,” both in Wellcome Institute Library, WMSS 6011, file 1.

\textsuperscript{324} Jephson, “Our March,” 281.

\textsuperscript{325} Diary, 30 June 1887. A few days later, an encounter in which several fleeing indigenes were shot by foraging Zanzibaris inspired intense pity: “I felt sickenly sorry for them & awfully choky.” Jephson Diary, 5 July 1887.
children's tales of magic and adventure.\textsuperscript{326}

Almost a month later and much deeper in the forest, the indigenes who were willing to trade with the Expedition were "fine looking men but very wild & savage looking."\textsuperscript{327} This marked a point of transition in Jephson's descriptions of the forest peoples. The Column was moving into an area where trade and the confidence to interact with the Expedition suggested a high level of development among the forest's inhabitants. Indeed, Jephson described some of them as "powerful people."\textsuperscript{328} But at the same time, he saw them as much more savage and backward than the peoples the Advance Column had encountered earlier. "The savages here are regular cannibals & look like man eaters the way they look at you as if you were meat is very creepy," he wrote. Further, "they are such cowards & smell so nasty one cannot look on them as human beings hardly, besides too one would fare badly if one got into their hands."\textsuperscript{329} Jephson's comments give the impression that the growing savagery of the "natives" had more to do with his fear of them and of the forest than it did with their conduct or appearance.\textsuperscript{330} Thankfully, though, these people still "ran in terror from [the Column's] guns."\textsuperscript{331} Indigenes who were not cowed and who attacked in organized fashion became a type whose negative features could be generalized and given a pseudo-scientific explanation. Thus, one of the indigenes killed at Avisibba had "a most low, villainous face & looked capable of anything. These bushmen are...a very low type of men, their food is poor & that generally means a poor race of men."\textsuperscript{332} The romance had gone out of the forest too, by this

\textsuperscript{326} Jephson Diary, 1 July 1887. See also the entry for 9 July 1887.
\textsuperscript{327} Jephson Diary, 20 July 1887.
\textsuperscript{328} Jephson Diary, 30 July 1887.
\textsuperscript{329} Jephson Diary, 23 & 28 July 1887.
\textsuperscript{330} Jephson Diary, 28 July 1887.
\textsuperscript{331} Jephson Diary, 30 July 1887.
\textsuperscript{332} Jephson Diary, 14 August 1887. Jephson later elaborated on this theme: "the poor unenlightened bush nigger shut in for ever by a thick wall of jungle, has his vision cut off & moves in semi darkness & in the twilight of ignorance. He is content with his badly cultivated field of manioc, pea nuts or bananas, his few chickens & goats, & lives in happy ignorance of their being any other way of living." The inhabitants of the grassland, though just as determined in their opposition to the Expedition, were of a more advanced type, because they fought in a way the Europeans understood and because they lived in a terrain which held no terrors for the officers. See Jephson Diary, 9 December 1887.
point. It was an endless wilderness, a jungle, or just “this awful bush.”

Though Jephson’s fear of being lost in the forest, or of being abandoned in it as Nelson had been, intensified in the following weeks, the forest’s inhabitants did not become any more degraded in his eyes. In fact, with the Advance Column’s entry into the sphere of the trade settlements, the peoples who had been safely mastered by these traders were, in the guise of victims, once more objects of pity rather than fear. The villagers Jephson encountered were “friendly enough,” though they lived in “great dread” of the Manyema. In appearance they were “short & thickset & strong looking though they look a very low class of people...they have better clothes than some of the bush natives & the women are not entirely naked” as they had been lower down the river. In the two articles Jephson published on these experiences, the forest became a “dark, haunted cavern,” a “desolation” in which members of the Expedition felt “small and helpless.” Indigenous people were largely erased from this “lonely” scene, making brief, isolated appearances as captives or as solitary attackers. Alternatively, they appeared as the hapless, pitiable victims of the Manyema, who were busy turning the forest into a wilderness. Jephson did not parlay his observations into scientific papers as did Ward and Stanley. Nonetheless, in the context of intense public interest in the Expedition his writing contributed to the popular perception, which also had currency in learned circles, that the inhabitants of the forest were a very low form of humanity and that their lack of development was due to a combination of the forest environment and the depredations of “Arab” slave traders.

The images of indigenous savagery and hostility not only obscured the fear and the powerlessness of the Expedition’s members, they also became part of a vicious cycle of aggression. These stereotypes justified Stanley’s policy of promptly and harshly resisting the

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333 Jephson Diary, 30 August 1887.
334 Jephson Diary, 10 November 1887. The Advance Column was still a month from the edge of the forest at this point.
"impulsive attacks" of peoples whose lands the Expedition entered, and justified foraging rather than trade as a means of obtaining food. In fact, such behaviour helped to create the hostility to which it was supposed to be a response. The deeper the Expedition went into the green sea of the forest, the stronger grew Stanley's paranoid sense that "like the waves divided by a ship's keel unite & close in at the stern, so is our track closed in by bands of natives." This made it necessary for Stanley and his subordinates to shoot at any indigenes they sighted, even if their purpose was merely to obtain information from them. Not surprisingly, over time the forest's inhabitants became "bold aggressors" against whose hostility the Expedition had to defend itself. And the indigenes they killed always proved to be extremely savage. A boy shot as he was foraging in the Ft. Bodo fields, for example, was a "most horrible looking wretch, a regular man-eater." Additional retroactive justification for the Expedition's hostility and savage conduct toward the forest's denizens was provided by Stanley's theory that the forest environment caused its inhabitants to shoot first and ask questions later when they encountered strangers.

The very limited evidence available suggests that the indigenes who encountered the Expedition in the forest also constructed images of its members which shaped their conduct in similar fashion. These images and encounters became an ingredient in the route Stanley was trying to construct. They established the "character" for caravans travelling through the forest and a series of reciprocal roles built around this character. Cannibalism was one

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338 See HMS, Memo to the Advance Column officers, 26 June 1887 in IDA, 1:129-31.
339 Stanley Diary, 14 September 1887 (E37).
340 Stanley Diary, 14 September 1887 (E37). The incident Stanley describes occurred the previous day.
341 Stanley Diary, 20 September 1888 (E41).
342 Stairs Diary, 21 August 1888.
343 IDA, 2:89.
344 Stanley recounted one incident in which his interpreter, Fetteh, told indigenous interlocutors tall tales about the fabulous origins and supernatural powers of the white men with the Expedition; see Diary, 12 April 1888 (E40). While this incident occurred near Lake Albert, it is quite possible that similar stories were told in the forest.
345 Establishing the "character" of travellers and their forms of transportation is a concern and a phrase taken from Stanley's correspondence about the steamer "Peace" with the Baptist missionaries at Stanley Pool. See W.H. Bentley to HMS, 15 April 1887, BMS Congo-Angola A/34.
aspect of the indigenous image of the European members of the Expedition. Inexplicable aggression, a willingness to exploit, and a strange mixture of power, ignorance and weakness were likely also elements of the character ascribed to the Expedition by people living in the forest. Aspects of this character were no doubt mingled with that of the Zanzibari traders and their caravans.

Unfortunately, only the subset of responses to the Expedition by indigenous people that were observed by its European members, generally ones that fit their “native” stereotypes, are available for study. These included avoidance, hostility and cautious trade. However, on his second journey through the forest Stanley discovered in an abandoned hut at Mabengu an artifact made from part of one of his tent poles, a piece of paper, the green velvet lining of the Expedition’s surgical instrument case, and a cartridge. This suggests an attempt to deal with or even appropriate the powers of the Expedition. It offers a glimpse into a body of responses to the Expedition to which its European diarists were not privy.

The Power of the Expedition’s Images of the Forest

Whatever the power of the Expedition’s images to shape its contact with forest peoples, or to shape the conduct and writing of subsequent travellers and colonial officials in the forest, the general power of these images in Europe and its colonies of settlement was undeniable. This power can be gauged in several ways. First, these images spread with great extent and rapidity. For example, by the time Stanley’s officers were publishing their accounts of the Expedition, the forest could already be largely taken for granted as an understood backdrop to their activities. As Parke noted, after the Expedition the interior of Africa had three popularly recognized environments: a deadly coastal strip, a “burning,

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346 Several forest chiefs came to visit the Europeans at Yambuya, for example, because they wanted to see the white cannibals for themselves. Bonny Diary, 22 October 1887 (E47).
347 While some attempt was made in the 1960s to trace the Expedition’s route through Ankole and to collect oral history about its passage, I am not aware of similar efforts in the forest region. For Ankole, see Kabwegyere, et al., “Stanley’s Journey Through Ankole.”
sandy, hopeless desert,” and “an almost impenetrable forest.” The power of these images can also be gauged by their persuasiveness. Stanley’s depiction of a “dense forest of immense extent, choked with bushy undergrowth and obstructed by a network of creepers” through which the Expedition had to hack a path was accepted by J. Scott Keltie, the Secretary of the Royal Geographic Society, for example. He re-circulated the image with the implicit weight of his and the Society’s reputation behind it. A final measure of the power of the Expedition’s images is their persistence in time. As has already been noted, these have persisted into the late twentieth century, especially in the popular form of Tarzan’s jungle home. I will conclude this chapter by suggesting reasons for this remarkable power.

First and foremost, Stanley and the Expedition were linked into systems for the commercial production and circulation of information. Stanley was a journalist and the author of international best-sellers, as well as a regular participant in public lecture circuits on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, Stanley’s career in Africa was as much concerned with discovering publishable material as it was with discovering geographical features. To transmute these discoveries into profitable text, Stanley maintained both personal and professional ties with newspapers and journalists’ clubs, book and journal publishers, learned societies, and promoters who organized public lecture tours.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, creating and circulating information about exotic travel had become a thriving business. An ever increasing number of travel accounts were being written and published. In addition, a symbiotic relationship had developed between exploration and newspapers in the United States and Britain. Newspaper

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348 HMS Diary, 30 July 1888 (E41) and 31 July 1888 (E40). He also found a collar made of iron rings and brass cartridges one day’s travel down-river at Avisibba, where the Advance Column had fought a battle.
350 Keltie, “What Stanley Has Done,” 132. Keltie also accepted the image of a “gloomy and dreaded forest” which gave way suddenly to grassland, and the image of hostile “natives” who “harassed” the Expedition on a daily basis, ibid., 132-3.
352 Youngs, “My Footsteps on these Pages,” 230.
353 The growth and nature of this relationship is documented in Riffenburgh, Myth of the Explorer.
publication had become a particularly important resource for travellers, and by the 1880s most would-be explorers tried to establish a connection with one or another of the major newspapers. They could “not only obtain fame and wealth directly from the newspapers, the exposure gained could increase other sources of income, such as lecture audiences, book sales, and independent contributions.” Stanley was at the forefront of these changes in travel writing, making a profitable business of the specialised, multinational production and circulation of information about Africa. As his publisher observed:

If there was a time when...great men “wrote not for gain, but to delight and instruct the world,” it is to be feared that such a time is not the present....authors in these times, although they write for fame, do not, nor is there any reason why they should scorn the commercial aspect of their productions; those amongst them who have once gained the ear of the public very properly make the best possible bargain for themselves....

Among the late nineteenth century explorers, Stanley was one of the most successful at this business.

Stanley and members of the Relief Committee made much of the fact that Stanley had abandoned a lucrative lecture tour to undertake the Expedition and that he received no payment for his work on it. However, from the start they anticipated that his recompense would come from publication of his account of the Expedition. Indeed, some of his critics claimed Stanley undertook the Expedition for no other reason than to provide himself with a new story of African adventure to peddle. The Expedition’s slow passage through the forest, these critics alleged, was due to Stanley’s loitering about dealing with the “natives,” “catching dwarfs” and “photographing himself and pigmies, and other objects, with which to illustrate his book.” Further, they pointed out, no matter how hasty the preparations for the Expedition and how woefully ill-equipped it was in some respects, all the arrangements for publication were carefully made before its departure.

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Riffenburgh, Myth, 56.
355 [Edward Marston], Copyright National and International with Some Remarks on the Position of Authors and Publishers by A Publisher (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1887), 42-3.
Riffenburgh, Myth, 2.
357 IDA, 1:34 and F. de Winton to J.R Troup, 7 May 1889, MP 93/55.
Whatever Stanley’s personal motives, control of the production and circulation of information was incontrovertibly an important aspect of the Expedition from its earliest stages. This control had two aspects. First, controlled publication of news about the Expedition was a source of funding for its activities. The Times and a few other British newspapers were invited to join a syndicate for the exclusive publication of Stanley’s letters about the Expedition in January 1887. Both Stanley and the Relief Committee were involved in creating this syndicate, and it was they not the newspapers who took the initiative in setting it up.\(^{359}\) Each of the participating papers made a contribution to the Relief Fund and then paid for each of the letters they received.\(^{360}\) Beyond immediate revenue, these articles also served to create access to a more valuable long-term resource—public interest in Stanley and the Expedition.\(^{361}\) Indeed, the Committee timed the release of some of Stanley’s letters to keep public interest in the Expedition as high as possible.\(^{362}\) The syndicate experienced a variety of operating problems, though.\(^{363}\) The Relief Committee consequently devoted a good deal of energy to the syndicate’s maintenance.\(^{364}\) Members of the Relief Committee also policed the unauthorized publication of letters by Stanley’s officers.\(^{365}\) This served to protect the monopoly of the syndicate, but it also helped to control the kind of information about the

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\(^{358}\) For example, Another Traveller, How Emin Pasha was Beguiled, 1.

\(^{359}\) J. MacDonald of the Times, to J.A. Grant, 26 January 1887, MP 83/1. However, at least two groups which did not become part of the syndicate had proposed a monopoly on news about the Expedition. See J. Worlcott to HMS, 21 January 1887 and J.F. Andrews to W. Mackinnon, 23 January 1887, both in MP 83/1.

\(^{360}\) Minute Book of the Emin Pasha Relief Committee, 2 February 1887, MP 93/53. The Committee’s simultaneous agreement with the RGS was also premised on their exclusive right to publish the geographical results of the Expedition.

\(^{361}\) See, for example, W. Campbell to W. Mackinnon, 25 November 1889, MP 94/59. Campbell, a resident of Inverness, wrote to Mackinnon after reading several articles about the Expedition in the Scotsman. He made a small, unsolicited contribution to the Relief Fund, indicated his interest in Stanley, the Expedition, and the African company of fellow Scotsman George Mackenzie, as well as his respect for Mackinnon’s activities in Africa.

\(^{362}\) For example, F. de Winton to W. Mackinnon, 2 April 1889, MP 86/30.

\(^{363}\) See, for example, E. Arnold, Memorandum for the Proprietors of the Daily Telegraph, 3 April 1889, MP 84/10 which details the series of events which led this paper to withdraw from the syndicate.

\(^{364}\) These efforts are chronicled in a series of letters to and from the Relief Committee, most of them in MP 84/10, 93/55 and 94/56.

\(^{365}\) See, for example G.S. Mackenzie to A. Kinnear, 26 January 1888 and F. de Winton to A. Kinnear, 28 March 1888, both in MP 93/55. These letters concerned the publication of information from one of Troup’s letters to his family in The Whitehall Review, apparently at the instigation of a younger brother who was short of cash. Nelson and Ward were also objects of the Committee’s concern and censure.
Expedition to which the public had access. 366

The other aspect of the control of information about the Expedition was the conditions Stanley and the Relief Committee placed on publication by its officers. A clause in the contract the officers all signed stated that they would “not publish anything connected with the expedition, or...send any account to the newspapers for six months after the issue of the official publication of the expedition by the leader.” 367 This served to ensure both Stanley’s profit from the sale of his writing and the primacy of his version of the Expedition. This clause was enforced against Troup by members of the Committee acting on Stanley’s behalf. 368 The Committee even attempted to discourage the early publication of books about the Expedition by persons not connected with it, most notably John Werner, the engineer who had accompanied Van Kerckhoven to Yambuya and Stanley Falls. 369

The enforcement of Stanley’s proprietary rights was only one aspect of his control over the publishing of accounts by other members of the Expedition, though. As with other Expedition resources, Stanley monopolized some of the supplies needed for writing a publishable account—photographic equipment, candles for writing in the evening, and the services of porters to carry extra personal loads. 370 Unlike his officers, Stanley never ran short of paper and ink. This was yet another area in which Stanley enhanced his powers as an historical agent at the expense of his officers.

The process by which Stanley’s account was prepared for publication is yet another example of the resources devoted to managing information about the Expedition. This

366 See, for example, C.A. Cooper to F. de Winton, 2 April 1889, MP 84/10. The Committee’s concern also extended to control of information about the Expedition released privately to the families of its European members. See P.L. McDermott to W. Mackinnon, 3 February 1890, MP 94/56. Mackinnon also made careful plans for the publication of information in the press about the emerging IBEACO. See W. Mackinnon to Acting Secretary of the Emin Pasha Relief Committee, 24 January 1890, MP 84/12.

367 These contracts are all to be found in BLEM Stanley Papers. Stanley was a pioneer in this matter, and other explorers followed in his footsteps. For example, Robert Peary, another profitably published traveller, insisted that his companions in polar exploration sign non-publication agreements; see Riffenburgh, Myth, 170.

368 See F. de Winton to J.R. Troup, 7 May 1889, MP 93/55. De Winton got a court order restraining the publication of Troup’s book, but the matter was eventually settled out of court when Troup agreed to delay publication. See “Settlement of Troup and Stanley Dispute,” Pall Mall Gazette, 24 May 1890, JRTC, vol. III.

369 F. de Winton to Blackwood & Sons, 7 May 1889, MP 93/55.

370 See, for example, Stairs Diary, 6 September 1887.
process was also an element in the system for producing and circulating information that was set up alongside the Expedition. As was noted in Chapter 2, Stanley wrote *In Darkest Africa* while ensconced in a Cairo hotel. Edward Marston, his publisher, joined him there, noting as he did so that it was unprecedented for a publisher “to travel so far to give practical assistance to an author in the preparation of his manuscript.” He, like Stanley, was motivated by the book’s anticipated international best-seller status and the need to protect the proprietary rights of those legally entitled to profit from it.

In Cairo Stanley and Marston set up a factory-like work process to allow rapid preparation of the manuscript. Stanley, referring to his pocket notebooks and diaries, dictated to a secretary who wrote in copy-ink. Marston made multiple copies of each manuscript page in an adjoining room, arranged for the processing of Stanley’s photographs, and mediated in daily sessions between Stanley and Joseph Bell, the artist Marston contracted to make illustrations for the book. Marston also arranged appropriate security for each stage of production, supervised the movement of manuscript and proof copies between London and Cairo, ensured the transfer of manuscript copies to firms who had contracted for rights to publish *In Darkest Africa* in other countries, and vetted requests from advertisers for permission to use images from the Expedition. He ran interference for Stanley as well, putting off all but the most important of visitors and correspondents. The quasi-industrial nature of *In Darkest Africa*’s production was further highlighted at the celebratory party thrown for contributors and industry insiders by Sampson Low. It was noted there that the British editions alone required 65½ tons of paper, 1½ tons of ink, 2½ miles of binder’s cloth and the operation of eighteen printing machines and ten hand presses. With ten additional editions published simultaneously in America and Europe,

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372 As an example of the stakes Marston was protecting, his firm sold the American rights to the book to Scribner Bros. for £40,000. See McLynn, *Stanley*, 2:316.
373 The system is described in Marston, *How Stanley Wrote*, 62-72. The reproduction of Stanley’s labour was taken care of by the hotel staff and by Sali, his Zanzibari servant, who stayed on with him after the Expedition.
374 Marston and Bell had different accounts of how Bell got this contract. See Marston, *How Stanley
Mr. Stanley may comfort himself with the reflection that during the last four months his fifty days' labour of brain and pen has given employment to an army of probably seven thousand men and at least as many women and girls.  

All of Stanley and the Committee's efforts to manage information about the Expedition were not wasted. Consumption of Stanley's book became the final "weird seizure" in the Stanley-induced "African fever" that gripped the English-speaking world in mid-1890. In Darkest Africa was identified as the most widely read book of the year and hailed as the most "vivid and entrancing record of travel" ever written. The structures for creating and managing information that generated this reception for Stanley's depictions of the forest and its inhabitants were an important element in the power of these images.

The nature of the story Stanley told, appealing to both the imagination and the intellect, was another reason for the power of the Expedition's images of the African forest. Gripping narratives of adventure had become the standard format for published travel accounts by the late nineteenth century. Indeed, travellers whose trips went too smoothly to allow much adventure were often not successful in marketing the accounts of their journeys. Stanley's account of the Expedition was a very salable product. The Expedition's near-disasters, combined with an exotic setting and a noble quest offered excellent raw material for a tale of adventure. The resulting book was captivating, "full of action and valour," the story of "one of the most stirring episodes in the history of exploration." Many reviewers, though, preferred to praise the work's scientific, historical and literary contributions and, in doing so, added legitimacy to its depictions of Africa. The descriptions of the forest and the pygmies were the most widely

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375 Marston, How Stanley Wrote, 73-4.
379 Riffenburgh, Myth, 41-5.
380 Ibid., 142-3 & 158-61.
381 Geddie, "In Darkest Africa," 411.
382 See, for example, the reviews which appeared in The Athenaeum, no. 3217 (1890) 30-31; Edinburgh Review 172, no. 352 (1890): 372-88; The Spectator 65, no. 3237 (1890): 52-4. These comments are not based on a comprehensive survey of the reviews of Stanley's book, however.
anticipated and quoted parts of *In Darkest Africa*, an appetite whetted by the prominent place given these topics in the lectures and speeches Stanley gave on his return to Britain. Stanley’s depictions of the forest and its inhabitants—including details like the two “races” of pygmies—were accepted as valuable additions to the body of European knowledge about Africa, even if the brevity of Stanley’s descriptions merely whetted the scientific appetite. The emotive concomitants of Stanley’s descriptions—the “impression of weird horror” associated with the forest, for example—were also embraced, as was, for the most part, Stanley’s evangelical confidence in the capacity of the region and its inhabitants for conversion.

The third reason for the power of the Expedition’s images of the forest was the way in which their textual versions were reinforced by non-textual means. One of these was maps. The maps that accompanied *In Darkest Africa* were carefully prepared. They were “a perfect treasure” according to one reviewer. As noted earlier, maps helped to establish a traveller’s claim to be an explorer. They also placed the new knowledge generated by episodes of travel into a framework of existing knowledge. In addition, maps offered yet another merchandising opportunity, as with the preparation and sale by John Bartholomew of a “New map of Central Africa, showing the route and discoveries of Stanley’s Emin relief expedition.” In addition to maps, illustrations and photographs were included with books, newspaper and magazine articles on the Expedition. These pictures also supplemented the textual images of the forest. An additional kind of visual aid, used by Ward, was lantern slides. He used them to illustrate his public lectures. While a detailed analysis of the content of these images relative to those contained in the texts they accompanied is beyond the scope of this chapter, the visual images emphasized some of the main textual ones. The illustration of a pygmy community, for example,
showed the darkness of the forest and the narrow horizons and primitive life of its inhabitants.\(^{389}\) Another illustration depicted members of the Advance Column cutting their way through dense undergrowth.\(^{390}\) Images like this, which combined a dense canopy and dense undergrowth, assisted in the homogenization of the forest environment. They also represented the forest in terms of those of its elements most inimical to human, or at least European activity.

Public lectures and speeches were yet another non-textual means by which the Expedition’s textual images of the forest were reinforced. Stanley, the most assiduous public speaker among the Europeans on the Expedition, spoke from carefully prepared texts. But, though Stanley was not a great orator, the verbal format and the sense of occasion generated by large meeting halls and the presence of the “great man” brought the forest even more vividly to life for his listeners than did his books and articles.\(^{391}\) Some of Stanley’s addresses and lectures were also combined with public ceremonies where the sense of occasion was heightened with additional civic or organizational display.\(^{392}\) Public lectures, as well as exhibitions about Africa, discussed below, expanded the potential audience for Stanley’s depictions of the forest beyond the circles of people who did or could read his books and articles.

The main non-textual reinforcement of the Expedition’s image of the forest was provided by the display of objects associated with the Expedition. Some of these objects were brought back as souvenirs by members of Expedition, others were generically African objects associated with the Expedition by adoption. A small example of the public interest in objects connected with the Expedition was the request made to a member of Bonny’s family for the loan of curios he had sent home from the Congo to use in a local Church Missionary Society exhibit in

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\(^{390}\) "Carrying the Steel Boat and Cutting a Path Through the Forest," in "Stanley’s Emin Pasha Relief Expedition Through Central Africa," a special issue of the *Illustrated London News*, 3 March 1890. Interestingly, the first five pictures in this issue all depicted the forest.


\(^{392}\) See, for example, the descriptions of the ceremony associated with Stanley’s talks in Manchester in “The Stanley Reception.”
The scientific and ethnographic collections assembled by some of those associated with the Expedition also served to reinforce the texts of the Expedition, though many of these circulated in a different network of institutions and exhibitions. Of the Europeans on the Expedition, Ward made the most systematic use of objects to supplement his textual accounts of his African experiences. He organized a London exhibit of objects combined with drawings, both stemming from his years on the Congo. The items in this exhibit were described for viewers in terms that emphasized the themes of war, weaponry, cannibalism, ivory, trade, textiles, and the scanty dress of African women.

The primary display of objects associated with the Expedition was the Stanley and African Exhibition which opened at the Victoria Gallery in March 1890. Members of the Relief Committee had been invited to participate in the planning of this exhibition. Stanley's officers were invited to contribute their travelling outfits and other items from the Expedition.

Several Committee members took up this invitation, as did Stairs, Parke and Nelson. While the Exhibition covered all of Africa, it was clearly organized to take advantage of the public interest in Stanley and the Emin Pasha Expedition. Like most British public exhibitions at that time, this one was organized privately as a commercial venture. Its purpose was to engage the sympathies of the English Public in opening up Central Africa to commerce and civilisation, by showing objects explanatory of the geography, geology, botany and natural history of that region, its produce and manufacture and the conditions

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393 E. Thomas to F. de Winton, 24 April 1889, MP 86/28.
394 Some of these items remain in the collections of major museums and that of the RGS. See, for example, the British Museum, Ethnography, Registry of Antiquities, vol. 3 (1913-1919) and the Exhibition Guide for "Livingstone's Successor: Henry Morton Stanley (1841-1904)," at the RGS, 1-16 June 1994.
395 See the invitation to "a Private View of Central African Curiosities Photographs and Sketches kindly loaned by Mr. Herbert Ward (Stanley Expedition) collected during his five year travels in the Cannibal Districts of the Upper Congo from whence he has just returned" at the Van der Weyde Light Studios, London, July 1889, in RGS Stanley Collection 9/3.
396 List of exhibits at the Van der Weyde Studios, July 1889, RGS Stanley Collection 9/3.
397 Advertisements in The Times indicate that the Exhibition closed in early November 1890.
398 E. Lee to P.L. McDermott, 28 January 1890, MP 84/12.
399 See the list of the Exhibition's organizing committee in the Exhibition catalogue, "The Stanley and African Exhibition," (London: The Victoria Gallery, 1890), B2. A copy of this catalogue is in the RGS Archives.
400 A.E. Coombes, Reinvecting Africa: Museums, Material Culture and Popular Imagination in Late Victorian and Edwardian England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 63-5. The commercial opportunities represented by the Exhibition included the sale of mementos of the Exhibition, which included photographs of the Expedition's surviving officers. See the advertisements at the back of Marston, How Stanley Wrote.
of its native races. 401

Like In Darkest Africa and the other texts generated about the Expedition, this exhibit appealed to a public desire for both entertainment and self-improvement. 402 It was intended to allow viewers to understand both the present condition of Africa and the reasons for the slow opening up of Africa to the influences of "civilization." 403

The narrative of the Exhibition placed the Expedition at the end of a line of heroic European exploration in Africa that had projected "line after line of light...across the face of the Dark Continent." 404 The content and layout of the Exhibition made visitors into vicarious explorers of Africa, beginning with a representation of "The Explorer’s First Camp" for which Nelson had served as design consultant. 405 Visitors entered this camp, apparently located like many of the Expedition’s camps in an "abandoned" village, through a simulated "pallisade ornamented with skulls." 406 Once inside, they were to imagine that tents were being pitched and that preparations for the evening meal were underway.

On all sides palm groves, quaint huts, and half-clothed negroes—a foretaste of the feast of marvels in store. Hardships and dangers looked forward to as only likely to give zest to travel. Meanwhile the traveller makes himself as comfortable as possible, and succeeds wonderfully, thanks to modern ingenuity. 407

In the imaginative journey through Africa that followed, they saw objects and photographs representing indigenous life in different parts of the continent, maps illustrating the progress of geographical knowledge about Africa, portraits of "eminent men connected with African enterprise," and implements from the slave trade. 408 To make "the conditions of life in Africa" more vivid, visitors also passed through a diorama of an African village and of the "African

401 Illustrated London News, 29 March 1890 as quoted in Coombes, Reinventing Africa, 68.
402 Coombes, Reinventing Africa, 64.
407 Ibid., 9.
408 Ibid., 6-7.
primeval forest." This “gloomy forest of the Aruwimi,” in which “vegetable nature reigns supreme, and seems to bid defiance to the power of man,” sheltered in “its awe-inspiring depths” both gorillas and pygmies. The sudden change from forest to “grass country” was also depicted in the diorama. The latter was a fertile, rich, populous land “where man is king.” But, “though there is plenty” in this region, “there is no peace” as a result of the activities of slave traders, who brought “death and desolation.” The display of “relics” from the Expedition, together with Livingstone “relics” and those of other “martyrs” like Gordon and Hannington, served to link all of them in the enterprise of converting the continent.

Such displays helped to narrow and fix conceptions of the forest and its inhabitants, letting them function as physical metonyms for jungle and primitivism. At the same time, objects and illustrations were also more flexible and open than texts, accommodating shifts of meaning. They also served as posts to which a variety of narrative lines could be attached. Consequently, these visual images and objects were used by a variety of groups for a variety of purposes. So, to a lesser extent, were the texts, such as the excerpts from accounts of the Expedition that Burroughs & Wellcome used in their advertising.

One of the Expedition’s most popular objects was the person of Stanley himself. He was, as one observer noted, put on view after his return to Britain “to make many an honest shilling” by the Relief Committee and “everybody and everything that has any private purpose to serve by the utilization of STANLEY.” The Expedition’s image and Stanley’s endorsement were sought out and used by a host advertisers, though the forest was only one of many Expedition images used in advertisements. One example was an ad for electric lighting from the firm Woodhouse and Rawson, which showed the Expedition encamped in a very dense, dark forest. From one of the trees hung an electric light, to the amazement of the porters. “What is Wanted in

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409 Ibid., 7.
410 Ibid., 47.
411 Ibid., 47.
413 “Lord Stanley of Congo?” [April 1890], JRTC, vol. III.
414 Marston, How Stanley Wrote, 53.
Darkest Africa is the Electric Light,” proclaimed the ad.415

Images from the Expedition were also used by a variety of institutions and causes. The Stanley and African Exhibition, for instance, was used as a site for anti-slavery meetings, which connected the Expedition to various missionary organizations and to the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society.416 Expedition images also appeared in William Booth’s Salvation Army campaign on behalf of the poor in Britain. His program of action, published in 1890 as In Darkest England, and the Way Out piggybacked on the popularity of Stanley’s book.417 Poverty became a “dark forest” from which people needed to rescued.418 However, one critic who was in agreement with Booth’s analysis, if not his program of action, deplored the way the General had “unadvisedly connected his survey so closely with the last infamous journey of the canting and murdering filibuster Stanley.”419 The effect of these appropriations of objects, pictures and texts from the Expedition was to give wider circulation to its images of Africa. The appropriations also associated these images with powerful and durable institutions and with causes, like that against slavery or for Christian missions, which gave them a different kind of credibility than that bestowed by learned societies.

Conclusion

Reviewers of In Darkest Africa praised the quality of the maps that accompanied it. The map of the forest, said one, “will be of use to all future travellers, if any one cares to follow or to avoid a track marked by so many disasters.”420 However, the builders of twentieth century roads through the Ituri forest chose to follow the tracks made by indigenous and Zanzibari traders rather

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415 An example of this ad can be found in the unnumbered back pages of Marston, How Stanley Wrote.
416 Such a meeting is reported in The Times, 31 October 1890.
419 H.M. Hyndman, General Booth’s Book Refuted (London: Justice Printery, 1890), 4.
than the path of the Expedition.\textsuperscript{421} This choice is lasting testament to the inability of the Expedition to assemble a route from the resources they found in the forest and those they brought with them. Stanley’s assumptions about the resources of the forest were shown to be untenable. Indeed, the size and nature of the forest upset all his calculations and plans.\textsuperscript{422}

Equally important, the practices, persons, objects and texts that he and the other members of the Expedition used to try to harness these resources for their route proved to be ineffective.

As with military order, historians need to examine carefully the activities of exploratory initiatives like the Expedition to determine the source of such powers as they possessed, as well as the limits to those powers. It is particularly important not to take at face value the touted powers of objects like the Maxim gun. As one reviewer of In Darkest Africa confidently noted: “We are not told whether it [i.e. the Maxim gun] was ever brought into action, but it was carried by the expedition with a large amount of weighty ammunition, and it is evident that the fire of such an instrument…would have been irresistibly destructive.”\textsuperscript{423}

But while this gun was apparently being used with great effect by German troops at the coast,\textsuperscript{424} it played little role in the either the successes or the failures of the Expedition in the forest. As this chapter has shown, it is similarly easy to make assumptions about the powers of less exotic tools of imperial expansion. The Expedition’s activities in the savannah would make an interesting comparison with its attempt to make a route in the forest since, in spite of more familiar terrain, the Expedition still had relatively little success in achieving its ends in the grassland.

While at a loss in the forest and largely unsuccessful in the savannah, on Stanley’s native terrain—the world of writing, publishing and lecturing—he was skilled and confident. Here he harnessed a variety of resources to create a highly successful discursive route into the Central

\textsuperscript{421} See Map 2, in Turnbull, The Mbuti Pygmies, 3. Turnbull indicates that the current road was “little more than a consolidation of the old slave trail” but adds incorrectly that this was the route Stanley also used through the forest [p. 27].

\textsuperscript{422} HMS, Across Africa, 7; Rescue, 10 and IDA, 1:454.

\textsuperscript{423} Edinburgh Review 172, no. 352 (1890): 377.
African forest from which he and others could benefit. This success both contributed to and challenged the purposes of the Expedition. For instance, Stanley’s success in presenting the forest as an exotic, timeless and highly inimical environment created a tension between his short-term profit from accounts of the Expedition and his long-term interest in promoting European commerce and settlement in the interior of Africa. However, Stanley did try to convince his readers that beyond the forest, Africa was richly prosperous and capable of conversion.

This chapter has shown that texts of various kinds were an important part of the Expedition’s efforts to make a route in the forest and elsewhere. They were also, as Hawkins has noted, an important, but neglected aspect of the European colonization of Africa in general. As was noted in Chapter 5, texts were also objects. Together with the practices of reading and writing, they played an important part in ceremonies of identity that took on heightened significance in contact between Europeans and Africans in the late nineteenth century. In addition, there is some evidence, noted in Chapter 4, that at least one other party to the Expedition, its porters, also experienced a heightened interest in literacy as a result of their participation in its activities. This chapter has shown, though, that the powers of texts cannot be taken for granted. The largely unsuccessful negotiations of Parke and Nelson for the food they believed Stanley’s letter to the leaders of the Ipoto trade settlement entitled them, stand as only one example of the limits to the power of texts. As was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, texts like muster lists and lists of punishments were used by the Expedition’s officers to assist in their management of the porters, though with uneven results. However, the porters also used texts as a resource. They had the officers keep for them records of wills and payments for services in transactions amongst themselves.

This chapter has also examined the textual construction of the forest’s inhabitants by Jephson. Like Bonny’s construction of the inhabitants of Bolobo, discussed in Chapter 5, this

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grew out of a welter of circumstances, activities and emotions. The relationship between the contents of these texts and the things or events described in them is a complex one, not well-captured by the distinction between an objective versus a distorted description of reality. As this chapter has also shown, the context in which texts need to be interpreted includes more than the circumstances of their production. It should include those of their consumption, circulation, and subsequent use as well. This is particularly important with travel accounts, which entered a well-established market for information. The reception of travel accounts in this market was one of several factors which shaped subsequent European travel in Africa.

The Expedition was seen by contemporaries to mark a point where the pursuit of philanthropy and "pure" science by European explorers of Africa gave way to travel in the service of colonial acquisition and commercial opportunity. The role played in this transition by texts generated by the Expedition gives them a special weight and interest. At the same time, I have shown that these texts must be understood as linked to and interacting with items of technology, with practices, and with the physical landscape, as well as with the people who featured in them and those who produced and read them. In the case of the Expedition, this interaction failed to create a useable route through the Central African forest, but it nevertheless assisted in the construction of a colonizeable Africa.
Epilogue

On the evening of September 11, 1890, a crowd of 250 to 300 prominent Haligonians squeezed into the council chambers of Halifax's City Hall. This “brilliant assemblage” had gathered to witness the bestowal of civic honours on fellow townsman William Stairs. After a brief discussion of finances and sewers, members of the city council put aside their regular business for a testimonial to a man they hailed as “the hero of Central Africa.”¹ Stairs was visibly affected by emotion and nerves during the ceremony. One journalist thought Stairs would “have preferred to have been once more in the wilds of Africa than to run the gauntlet of so many bright eyes.”² Stairs had only one professed concern, though, and that was dispelling misconceptions about the motives and conduct of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition. To clear away “any existing doubts,” he told the assembled crowd,

I would say that though the expedition, as with most other African expeditions, was accompanied by great sacrifices and must have to some extent changed the existing political condition of affairs among the tribes of Central Africa, still the benefits that have and will accrue to the British Empire and civilization generally are such as to have fully warranted the expenditure of life, money and labour necessary to its fulfillment. The openings that will be afforded to the expansion of English and other trade in supplying new markets for the goods of the world, the improved condition of the natives that will ensue, the suppression of the slave trade, through the influence of railway and telegraph lines, are only some of the benefits that will spring directly from the Emin Pacha Relief Expedition.³

¹ The details in my description of this gathering were culled from “Him We Delight to Honour,” The Morning Herald (Halifax), 12 September 1890 and The Morning Chronicle (Halifax), 12 September 1890.
² “Him We Delight to Honour.”
³ Ibid.
A little over a year later, Stairs was again back in Africa, leading an expedition charged with claiming the Katanga region for King Leopold II's Congo Free State. A number of porters who had participated in the Emin Pasha Expedition were also members of Stairs' caravan. Within two years, Stairs was dead of an African fever. A Halifax newspaper stated that news of Stairs' death was "received with deep regret, as his knowledge of Africa was considered highly valuable."4

Stairs' speech and his subsequent imperial initiative were all outcomes of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition. The Expedition and its members were all actors responsible for particular changes in Africa, some intentional and many others not. In particular, the Expedition contributed to the development of a certain style of caravan operation and of structures for colonial acquisition and rule. Some of these became institutions of different kinds—the Imperial British East Africa Company and the "Stanley style" of travel, for example. Some were contained in influential texts like *In Darkest Africa*, or incorporated into the design of objects like Burroughs & Wellcome's tropical medical kits. Others were embodied in the Expedition's porters and officers, many of whom were involved in subsequent caravans and colonial ventures. These imperial initiatives, like the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, were among the many actors from both within and without East-Central Africa who were busy creating "a geography of enablement and constraint."5 People in the region, as well as those in European countries, would subsequently plan and act within this changing landscape. In doing so, they were also building up the roles around which they would construct identities for

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5 Quote from Law & Bijker, "Postscript," 300.
themselves and others, both during their encounters in Africa and in other contexts. What I have demonstrated in this thesis is the essential inter-relatedness of all these realms of activity. The "valuable knowledge" Stairs embodied and employed, like that of his porters, was part of a network of heterogeneous, but interconnected elements.

What Stairs’ speech obscures, as did other accounts of the Expedition, were the indigenous constructions of East-Central Africa that contributed to and competed with that of the Expedition. The Expedition was an object of thought, as well as of action in the many communities through which it passed. Though relatively few of these responses are available for historical analysis, the Expedition motivated a range of people. These included bright-eyed boys who followed the Expedition for days at a time, captured women and girls who worked complainingly for new masters as well as ones who staged daring escapes, warriors who engaged in guerrilla tactics, and tight-lipped old men who endured beatings rather than communicate their knowledge to the Expedition’s guides. It also included many people—traders, chiefs and ordinary villagers—who attempted to appropriate some of the Expedition’s powers for themselves through carefully structured trade, through alliances, or through the construction of ritual objects from the Expedition’s goods. In the settlements of Zanzibar-connected traders, the Expedition was one of many European initiatives that made demands and provided resources. They became an element in the changing landscape of opportunity and risk in which the traders and their followers operated. Stanley’s account of the Expedition also
provoked a response in these communities. It led an infuriated Tippu Tip to declare: “I’ve never seen a European nor, for that matter, any human being who is such a liar.”

Finally, Stairs’ speech indicates the importance of the Expedition as an occasion for and object of thought by Europeans throughout their growing empires. As the Acting Mayor of Halifax explained in introducing Stairs, “In common with the whole civilized world we have followed with keenest interest the varying fortunes of the Stanley expedition in Africa.” The Expedition’s influential legacy included particular images of Africa, especially its “black and dreary forests.” The Expedition also contributed to the construction by Europeans of a narrative of progressive change in Africa. Stairs’ speech offers a good summary of this narrative: The expansion of trade in European products, together with the suppression of the slave trade as new forms of transportation were introduced under European auspices would improve the condition of the inhabitants of East-Central Africa. However, Stairs’ awkward enumeration of the costs and benefits of European initiatives like the Expedition recognized, perhaps unconsciously, that these costs and benefits would not be equally distributed. This inequity, and the passing mention of changes in “the existing political condition of affairs among the tribes” hinted that the Expedition’s power to transgress was greater than its power to transform in East-Central Africa. However, Stairs’ speech, like most other accounts of the Expedition and like many of the contemporary commentaries on it, accepted the discursive construction of Europeans’ power to transform Africa and Africans. Despite Stairs evident discomfort with public acclaim, he was also willing to accept the corresponding construction of

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6 el-Marjebi, Maisha, sec. 179.
7 “Him We Delight to Honour.”
8 Ibid.
himself as a special kind of actor in Africa, one of a line of “brave and heroic men” who attempted to “explore the recesses of the dark continent.”

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9 The comments on power are borrowed from Cooper, “Conflict and Connection,” 1529
10 “Him We Delight to Honour.”
APPENDIX 1: Emin Pasha Relief Committee and Relief Fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members of the Emin Pasha Relief Committee</th>
<th>Major Subscribers to the Relief Fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Mackinnon (Chair)</td>
<td>William Mackinnon £3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Sir Francis de Winton (Secretary)*</td>
<td>Peter Mackinnon 1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry M. Stanley</td>
<td>John Mackinnon 450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. J.A. Grant</td>
<td>Henry J. Younger 500†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Guy Dawnay</td>
<td>Baroness Burdett-Coutts 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.F. Kinnaird</td>
<td>W. Burdett-Coutts 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Horace Waller</td>
<td>J.S. Jameson 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Sir Lewis Pelly</td>
<td>Countess de Noailles 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Denny</td>
<td>P. Denny 1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander L. Bruce</td>
<td>A.L. Bruce 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James F. Hutton</td>
<td>Gray, Dawes &amp; Co. 1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Burdett-Coutts</td>
<td>S. Low, Marston &amp; Co. 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Kirk</td>
<td>Duncan MacNeill 1050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George S. Mackenzie</td>
<td>J.F. Hutton 250</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sir T.F. Buxton 250</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.A. Grant 100</td>
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<td></td>
<td>James M. Hall 375</td>
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<td></td>
<td>N. MacMichael 375</td>
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<td>Lord Kinnaird 100</td>
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<td>B. Edington 250</td>
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<td>J. Siltzer 100</td>
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<td>Royal Geographical Society 1000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egyptian Gov't 14000†</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newspaper Syndicate 2200‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total £32000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Both G.S. Mackenzie and Peter L. McDermott served as secretaries in de Winton's absences

†Paid by Mackinnon on Younger's behalf

The Egyptian government kept £1000 of its £15000 grant for the expenses of the Equatoria returnees in Egypt

‡IDA lists this amount as £1850

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Archival Sources

Baptist Missionary Society Archives, Angus Library, Regent’s Park College, Oxford University

The papers of the Congo Mission of the Baptist Missionary Society contain a number of items concerning the Expedition, especially the account left by one of its interpreters, Assad Farran. The correspondence of the missionaries William Holman Bentley and George Grenfell contains information about the Expedition, as well as conditions on the Congo River. Grenfell’s letters concerning his own subsequent travels up the Aruwimi River are also of interest.

I consulted the Congo and Angola Mission Correspondence Files for W.H. Bentley (1882-1888), T.J. Comber (1886), and G. Grenfell (1885-1899). Assad Farran’s account is contained in Bentley’s correspondence. I also consulted the Minute Book of the Western Sub-Committee of the Baptist Missionary Society, January 1885-June 1887.

Barttelot Family Papers, Stopham Estate, Pulborough, Sussex

The Barttelot family have kept a collection of papers related to Edmund Barttelot. These contain his diary, as well as a copy transcribed by his family prior to publication of The Life of Edmund Musgrave Barttelot. This copy is the MS Diary to which I have referred. There are letters from Barttelot to his family and to his fiancée written while he was with the Expedition, as well as letters written to Barttelot and to his family by several of the other officers on the Expedition. There are statements from Congo Free State officials concerning Barttelot’s death, as well as copies of materials from Stanley’s 1890 case against Tippu Tip in the Zanzibar Consular Court. There are also several packets of letters and newspaper clippings concerning the controversy about the Rear Column and the posthumous publication of Barttelot’s diary. Access to these papers was kindly granted by Sir Brian de Barttelot.

British Library, London

In addition to copies of many published primary sources on the Expedition, the Official Publications section of the library has Parliamentary papers, several of which concern the Expedition. I consulted: PP 1888, vol. 74, Africa, nos. 8 & 9, and PP 1890 vol. 51, Africa, no. 4.

More importantly, the Library’s Exported Manuscripts Collection contains microfilmed copies of the H.M. Stanley Papers. I consulted the following notebooks, journals and letters:

In RP 2435 (i) Box 5
- HMS Notebook, 21 August 1887 to 11 November 1887 (Lot E37)
- HMS Notebook, 12 November 1887 to 7 April 1888 (Lot E38)
- HMS Notebook, 8 April 1888 to late May 1888 (Lot E39)
- HMS Notebook, 8 April 1888 to 30 September 1888 (Lot E40)
- HMS Notebook, 9 July 1888 to 7 January 1889 (Lot E41)
In RP 2435 (i) Box 6
HMS Notebook, 8 January 1889 to 22 June 1889 (Lot E43)
HMS Notebook, 29 June 1889 to 16 September 1889 (Lot E44)
HMS Notebook, n.d. (Lot E46)
W. Bonny Diary, 3 January 1887 to 31 May 1888 (Lot E47)
W. Bonny Diary, 14 June 1888 to 6 September 1888 (Lot E48)
W. Bonny Diary, 7 September 1888 to 8 April 1889 (Lot E49)

In RP 2435 (i) Box 7
Stanley's Personal Journal of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, vols. 1 & 2
[selected dates only] This is the fair copy of Stanley's diary, a revised version prepared from
his pocket notebooks.
Rear Column Log, 11 June 1888 to 19 August 1888 (Lot E50)
Stanley's Copy of the Rear Column Log (Lot E51)

In RP 2435 (ii) Batch 3, Lot D
This lot contains letters, contracts, telegrams, lists, and other papers concerning the
Expedition.

In RP 2435 (ii) Batch 4, Lot E
This lot contains Stanley's correspondence with other explorers. I read his correspondence
with Samuel Baker.

The Exported Manuscript Collection also contains Robert Nelson's Expedition diary (RP 860 & 870),
but unfortunately the microfilmed copy is illegible.

The Library's Additional Manuscripts collection contain Stanley's Route Maps of the Emin Pasha
Relief Expedition (ADD MS 41259A, B1-11 & C), which cover its journey on the savannah. There
are also a few miscellaneous letters by Stanley and Emin Pasha in this collection.

Church Missionary Society Archives, University of Birmingham Library

The Letterbook (1886-1888) for the Nyanza Mission contains some information on the Expedition,
viewed in relation to the CMS missionaries in Buganda. I also consulted the correspondence files of
several of the missionaries from the Nyanza Mission between 1878 & 1890; the correspondence of A.
Mackay and R. Felkin was of particular interest.

Public Archives of Nova Scotia, Halifax

William Stairs' diaries, notebooks, letters (MG 1, Vol. 877), and scrapbook (MG 9, Vol. 63) from the
Expedition are kept in this archives. Most of these diaries and notebooks are available on microfilm,
though I have also relied on the published transcriptions of the diaries by J. Konczacki and R.
MacIaren. The Memoranda Book (MG 1, Vol. 877, No. 6) which contains Stairs' records for the
porter in his charge, those of No. 2 Company, was particularly important for my research.
Public Record Office, London

Here I consulted only some of the correspondence relating to Emin’s situation in Equatoria, proposals to assist him, and the Expedition. These were all contained in FO 84 (Zanzibar).

Rhodes House Library, Oxford University

The Anti-Slavery Society Papers contain Emin Pasha’s correspondence with Charles Allen, as well as information concerning conditions in Equatoria, the controversy about the Expedition, and the early years of the Imperial British East Africa Company. I consulted several of the letterbooks for the years 1886-1890, as well as the Society’s Minutebook, vol. 5 (1873-86).

Royal Geographical Society Archives, London

The Henry M. Stanley Collection at this archives contain a variety of correspondence and other material relating to the Expedition and to the controversy that followed it. These include material from Dorothy Stanley, Henry Wellcome, May French-Sheldon, Herbert Ward, William Stairs, James Grant, J. Scott Kelting, J.B. Pond, and William Hoffmann. The guide to the Stanley and African Exhibition, the Guide to the Medicine Chest prepared by Burroughs & Wellcome for Stairs’ 1891 expedition to Katanga, and the MS copy of Stanley’s speech at the Society’s gala reception for him in 1890 are also of interest. The five volume collection of newspaper clippings concerning the Expedition assembled by John Rose Troup was particularly helpful. In addition, the Spiro Collection of the correspondence of C. Giegler contains letters that provide interesting background on events in the Egyptian Sudan.

School of Oriental and African Studies Library, University of London

The Mackinnon Papers, held in the SOAS archives, are the single most important source on the Expedition. I consulted all of the Emin Pasha Relief Committee papers (Boxes 83-94). These include letters from Stanley and the Expedition’s officers, correspondence concerning the Expedition, records of the Committee’s activity, miscellaneous newspaper clippings, and the official Report issued by the Committee. I also consulted Mackinnon’s private correspondence files for correspondence from H.M. Stanley, A.J. Mounteney Jephson, John Kirk, Lewis Pelly, A. Mackay, W. Nicol, G.S. Mackenzie, and P.L. McDermott.

Staatsarchiv der Senat der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, Hamburg

Emin Pasha’s papers are kept in these archives (Emin Pascha Nachlaß, Bestand 622-2). I consulted his MS diaries selectively for the years 1889-90, as well as his correspondence with Wilhelm Junker (1885-87), and Robert and Mary Felkin (1887-89). Emin’s papers also contain miscellaneous newspaper clippings, some information on the Fischer expedition sent to assist Emin by Junker’s brother, and on the Imperial British East Africa company.
I also checked the letterbooks of the firm William O'Swald & Co. (Bestand 621-1) for correspondence between the Hamburg and Zanzibar offices of this firm between 1886 and 1888.

Sudan Archive, University of Durham

The Wingate Papers contain some material on the Expedition, of which I consulted the newspaper clippings, the Egyptian Army reports on Emin's situation, Wingate's correspondence concerning conditions in Equatoria, and Wingate's report on the return of the Equatorian garrisons to Egypt.

Wellcome Institute Library, London

The Western Manuscripts collection at this Library holds some correspondence addressed to William Hoffmann (WMSS 6012), and seven unpublished papers by Hoffmann (WMSS 6011), three of which concern the Expedition. They also have Hoffmann's diary (WMSS 6010), which has some material from the early stages of the Expedition, though much of it covers Hoffmann's later experience in the employ of the Congo Free State.

In addition, Steve Rockel kindly provided access to a copy of the "Men Engaged for Stanley's Expedition," n.d. from the Smith, Mackenzie & Co. Notebook in the Zanzibar Museum.

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