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HITLER'S CLEAN SLATE

*Everyday Life in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, 1941–1944*

by

Karel Cornelis Berkhoff

A Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
Graduate Department of History,
in the University of Toronto

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Abstract

Hitler’s Clean Slate: Everyday Life in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, 1941–1944
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This is the first detailed study of the impact of Nazi rule on the largest colony of Germany’s Third Reich, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. It should be of interest to students of the Soviet Union, eastern Europe, Nazi Germany, and the Holocaust. Although the majority population—Ukrainians—receive the most attention, this is intended as a territorial history and, therefore, takes into account the experiences and perceptions of non-Ukrainians as well. The focus is on three aspects of everyday life under civilian Nazi rule: (1) socio-economic conditions—work, housing, food, and famine; (2) spiritual life—religious and popular culture, ethnic identity, and political loyalties; and (3) special targets of the Nazis—prisoners of war, Jews, Roma/Gypsies, ethnic Germans, and candidates for forced labor in the Reich—as well as the relation of these people with the rest of the population.

This work is based on many published materials and in particular on a wide range of primary sources that were previously not available to researchers. German-language sources include documents produced by the Nazi authorities, dealing with the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and the SS. Other sources are the records of the auxiliary native administrations in the Kiev region; records of Communist underground activists and partisans; contemporary newspapers, magazines, brochures, leaflets, and posters; folkloric materials, diaries, and memoirs; and interviews conducted by Soviet historians during the 1940s as well as by the author during the 1990s.

One of the contentions of the study is that Nazi rule, besides being mortally dangerous for the inhabitants, was a tremendous disappointment for the vast majority of the population. Nonetheless, throughout this period prewar mentalities continued to have a tremendous hold
over the native population. In particular, it is very doubtful whether the Nazi experience prompted more than a limited nostalgia for Soviet rule, and it is also unlikely that Ukrainians became more conscious of their ethnicity. In the final analysis, the Nazi regime did little more than kill people. It hardly had any impact on the Weltanschauung of those who survived.
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Abbreviations

ark. = *arkush* = page

CHPWU = Commission on the History of the Patriotic War in Ukraine
d. = *depo* = file

DAKO = Derzhavnyi arkiv Kyïvs'koï oblasti = State Archive of the Kiev Oblast

*Ereignismeldung UdSSR* = one issue from the series *Ereignismeldung UdSSR*
f. = *fond* = collection

IMFE = Instytut Mystetstvoznavstva, Fol'kloru ta Etnohrafii im. M. T. Ry's'koho, Viddil rukopysnykh fondiv = M. T. Ryl's'kyi Institute of Art Studies, Folklore, and Ethnography, Manuscript Department

l. = *list* = page

*Meldungen* = one issue from the series *Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten*
od. zb. = odynytsia zberihannia = file

op. = *opis* or (Ukr.) *opys* = inventory

Scholarly Reference Library = Naukovo-dovidkova biblioteka tsentral'nykh derzhavnykh arkhiviv Ukraïny = Scholarly Reference Library of the Central State Archives of Ukraine

SD = Sicherheitsdienst = the Security Service of the SS as represented by the *Einsatzgruppen*

TsDAHOU = Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkiv hromads'kykh ob"iednan' Ukraïny = Central State Archive of Civic Organizations of Ukraine

TsDAVOV = Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkiv vyshchych orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia Ukraïny = Central State Archive of the Highest Organs of Authority and Government of Ukraine

USNA = United States National Archives
Introduction

Already well before World War II, Adolf Hitler believed that as a people, Germans would become extinct unless they acquired additional "living space" in eastern Europe. To him and his followers, the territories to the east of Poland held the promise of a rural Germanic lifestyle that Nazi ideology glorified but that was disappearing from Germany itself, the most industrially developed country in Europe. In the east, perhaps most of all in the fertile lands of Ukraine, the German "race" would regenerate itself. Moreover, the raw materials from these lands would make the Third Reich economically self-sufficient. The fact that this Lebensraum was already populated did not mitigate the Nazi plans. On the contrary, the elimination of the native peoples—with the exception of the ethnic Germans—was an integral part of Hitler's way of providing Germans with a clean slate. As his virulent anti-Semitism made clear already at the time, the Jews would be top priority in the "cleansing" process.

In order to realize his vision, the Führer organized a war of the Third Reich against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. As the German armed forces and their Hungarian, Italian, Romanian, and Slovak allies occupied Ukraine, a military administration was installed. Soon thereafter, civilian Nazi rule arrived, in the form of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. This entity, ruled by a Reich Commissioner, grew steadily in size. By the fall of 1942, it was the Reich's largest colony, although it did not exist long. By late 1943 the Red Army was back at the Dnieper river, halfway across the Reichskommissariat, and by March 1944 the German armed forces lost all of its territory. But even though the Reichskommissariat Ukraine existed only for a brief period, Hitler and his fellow-Nazis from the beginning made a frantic effort to realize their racial and economic utopia there. The following study describes what everyday life in this "clean slate" was like for the native population—those who lived in the region when the German armed forces arrived.
What do we know already about the Reichskommissariat Ukraine? Not very much, as a survey of the literature shows. Here I generally mention only those studies which proved to be most useful to this dissertation. For more extensive bibliographical information about studies dealing with German-ruled Ukraine, I refer to my bibliographical essay on the subject.¹

Almost all the Western studies deal primarily with German policy-making. These are valuable surveys of the way in which policies on nationalities, religion, the economy, and culture were formulated at the highest levels. They describe the countless German agencies that wanted to have a say in the "east," and the numerous struggles for power among them. Among the best of them are the general surveys by Alexander Dallin,² Timothy Mulligan,³ and Jonathan Steinberg.⁴ What remains unclear, however, is the role of the native-staffed "auxiliary" administrations. The ultimate objective of the Nazi leadership for the "eastern" territories—the elimination of the native peoples—has become particularly clear through the works of Ihor Kamenetsky⁵ and Rolf-Dieter Müller.⁶ These works show how Nazi bureaucrats made detailed, long-term plans.

²Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies, 2nd rev. ed. (Boulder, Colorado, 1981). Dallin writes himself that although his book does not treat "in any detail" the feelings and behavior of the non-Germans, these were "at least partially cause and effect of German occupation policy." Ibid., p. v.
There are several valuable studies of branches of the economy in Ukraine. Why and how the collective farms were essentially preserved in the first year of German rule is shown in some detail in Ralf Bartoleit's M.A. dissertation, while an article by Christian Gerlach has shown how a policy of reform took shape and was implemented in the "east." Both argue that German actions were primarily driven by the Nazi ideology, and thus confirm the overall interpretation first proposed by Dallin and accepted by most scholars. Surveys of the state of industry in German-ruled Ukraine are essentially non-existent. To what extent were factories reconstructed? And what did they produce? These questions still need to be answered. There is only one survey by Matthias Riedel, which shows some of the German successes in mining. It does not show what it was like to work in these mines. In this regard, this survey is typical for the existing historiography. Valuable as all these studies are, they are written almost exclusively from a "top-down" perspective. Rarely does the situation "on the ground," as the native population in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine experienced it, come to life.

This problem is less pronounced in studies of religious life. Several works provide both facts about it and a sense of "what it was like." This is probably because these are semi-memoirs—studies which are difficult to distinguish from memoirs in the usual sense, because the authors participated in or witnessed the events and included personal recollections. Friedrich Heyer, a former soldier who met many hierarchs and priests in Ukraine, has described events from a perspective sympathetic to those Orthodox clergy who wished to be part of the Russian Orthodox church. The work of Ivan Vlasovs'kyi, the secretary of the


leader of the Autocephalous Orthodox church, provides a contrary but equally lively account. There is still, however, no account which combines the information provided in these and other sources.

Regarding secular popular culture, essentially nothing has been published. Instead, there are studies of the perhaps more prestigious topic of nationalism. The 1955 classic monograph by John A. Armstrong (third revised edition in 1990) is still the standard survey of Ukrainian nationalist activity during World War II. His conclusion that nationalism remained a minority view, however, has been challenged by Bohdan Krawchenko in a brief general survey about "Soviet" Ukraine under German rule.

The prisoners-of-war issue is treated at length in a monograph by Christian Streit. What is still lacking is an account of the fate of these prisoners from the perspective of the prisoners themselves and the non-German bystanders. Regarding the Holocaust of the Jews, particularly valuable are the standard, "all-European" account by Raul Hilberg (1985 edition), a description by Philip Friedman about eastern Galicia and western Volhynia, and a monograph by Shmuel Spector about Volhynia. In addition, there are brief surveys dealing with the Jewish Holocaust in the entire territory which had been part of the Soviet Union.

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before 1939 or even in early 1941. All these works discuss the non-Jewish population, but only very briefly. As a result, the stance of the non-Jews on the Holocaust remains essentially unclear and unexplained.

The state of scholarship on the Holocaust of the "Soviet" Roma (Gypsies) is even more modest. There is only one brief study specifically on this topic, by Wolfgang Wippermann. The ethnic Germans in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine have received attention in a study by Ingeborg Fleischhauer. Here, however, the reader still wonders to what extent the response of these people to the Nazi experience was really that different from that of the non-Germans. Specifically on the recruitment and arrest of Ukrainians and other Slavs for work in Germany, the most up-to-date work is by Rolf-Dieter Müller.

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20In this regard, a recent study dealing with the Holocaust in the Distrikt Galizien of the Generalgouvernement is a great advance. Dieter Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenvernichtung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens (Munich, 1996).


In conclusion, the existing historiography does not convey a sense of everyday life in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. "Ordinary" Ukrainians and other civilians—the silent majority—have remained unstudied. There are various reasons for this lacuna, not the least of which is the lack of access to Ukrainian and Russian archives until 1991. This gap in the existing research applies to other Ukrainian territories as well as to Russian territories. In contrast, everyday life in the Weißruthenien Generalkommissariat, and Belarus as a whole, has recently been studied by Bernhard Chiari.24

The voluminous literature published in the Soviet Union about the World War II era is mostly based on Soviet-published documents and memoirs, which, as I have argued elsewhere, are heavily censored.25 Equally problematic is the lack of German proficiency on which the Soviet studies are based. While it was rare for a scholar in Soviet Ukraine and in the rest of the Soviet Union to study the Nazi period, it was even rarer to find researchers able to read German. There is even reason to suspect that most references in Soviet publications to German-language archival holdings in Ukraine are based on a familiarity not with the original documents, but rather with Russian translations prepared by others. The microfilms of German documents purchased from the United States National Archives are known to have been mostly translated in the late 1970s and 1980s. The reason was candidly admitted in Ukraine's leading history journal: "not all researchers are sufficiently proficient in German."26 Even if Soviet publications on World War II were reliable, they would nonetheless be of limited use for this dissertation, since almost all deal only with the Communist underground and particularly the Soviet partisans. After Ukraine achieved independence in 1991, the situation does not appear to


have improved. Nevertheless, useful information was frequently obtained from the work of Mykhailo V. Koval', the leading Ukrainian historian on Ukraine under Nazi rule. All information from Soviet studies cited in this dissertation can be verified, for I only cited when the study provided a reference to a specific archival record.

Among the sources for this dissertation are published documents, published diaries, and published memoirs. Most of these sources are listed, along with archival holdings relating to Ukraine under Nazi rule, in my bibliographical essay. I have also consulted and cite here German-language documents from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, located in the Central State Archive of the Highest Organs of Authority and Government of Ukraine (TsDAVOV—Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhyv vyshchychkh orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia Ukraïny) in Kiev, the Central State Archive of Civic Organizations of Ukraine (TsDAHOU—Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhyv hromads'kykh ob"iednan' Ukraïny) in Kiev, and various reports by Nazi intelligence (in particular the Einsatzgruppen) which are conveniently available in microfilm copy from the United States National Archives. Most of these extensive secret reports, which are generally considered to be reliable, were mimeographed by the SS itself. Therefore, I cite the mimeographs in footnotes as publications for the sake of brevity. Thus, one particular issue (x) from the series called Ereignismeldung UdSSR (June 1941 through April 1942) will be cited as "Ereignismeldung UdSSR, x (date)”; one from the successor series Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten

27Among the best recent studies is M. V. Koval', "Dolia ukraïns'koï kul'tury za 'novoho poriadku' (1941–1944 rr.)," Ukraïns'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal, 11–12 (Kiev, November-December 1993), pp. 15–38.

28Among the best Soviet studies are M. V. Koval', Bor'ba naseleniia Ukrainy protiv fashistskogo rabstva (Kiev, 1979); M. V. Koval', "Za hratamy 'novoho poriadku'," Ukraïns'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal, 5 (Kiev, May 1981), pp. 119–128; and M. M. Zagoni'ko and A. F. Iudenkov, Krakh plana "Ol'denburg": (o sryve ekonomicheskikh planov fashistskoi Germanii na vremenno okupirovannoi territorii SSSR). 3rd exp. ed. (Moscow, 1980). There is also a Polish, Communist-influenced study: Wlodzimierz Bonusiak, Polityka ekonomiczna III Rzeszy na okupowanych obszarach ZSRR (1941–1944) (Rzeszów, 1981).

29Berkhoff, "Ukraine under Nazi Rule. Part I" (archival holdings) and "Part II" (published materials).
(which ended in June 1943) will be cited as simply "Meldungen, x (date)." The microfilms from which they were taken are listed in the bibliography.

Other unpublished sources produced during the Nazi period that are used here are in Ukrainian or Russian. These include: (1) records of the "auxiliary" administrations of the city of Kiev and raions and villages in the Kiev region (almost entirely in Ukrainian), located in the State Archive of the Kiev Oblast (DAKO—Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Kyiv's'koi Oblasti); (2) records of Communist underground activists, partisans, and officials, produced either in the Reichskommissariat or in the Soviet hinterland (generally in Russian), located in the TsDAHOU; and (3) several diaries, also in the TsDAHOU. Also consulted are contemporary newspapers, magazines, brochures, leaflets, and posters, mainly in Kiev in the branch library (Filiia) of the V. I. Vernads'kyi Central Scholarly Library of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and in the Scholarly Reference Library of the Central State Archives of Ukraine. Several issues of the newspaper Volyn' were held on microfilm at Robarts Library, University of Toronto. Folkloric materials located at the M. T. Ryl's'kyi Institute of Art Science, Folklore, and Ethnography in Kiev are studied as well.

Among the unpublished sources produced after the Germans and their allies were driven out of Ukraine—some of which produced while the war was still being fought—, the main ones employed are manuscripts of memoirs, mostly found in Kiev, and interviews. In Soviet Ukraine, the Communist party briefly in the 1940s provided for a Commission on the History of the Patriotic War in Ukraine. Among other activities, that commission conducted interviews with people who had lived under the Germans. The stenographic records of these interviews were typed out, and although the questions were deleted, they still are a valuable source, also because the interviews took place shortly after the events. They were among the few relevant archival holdings in Ukraine that were previously accessible to local historians trusted by the Communist authorities. To my knowledge, they have not been used by Western researchers before. Aside from employing these stenographic records, I interviewed eighteen people myself, mainly in Kiev and in the Bohuslav raion of the Kiev oblast during the summer of 1995. These interviews were tape recorded.
There are eleven chapters. The first chapter describes events in the territory which later became the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, from the start of the German invasion of the Soviet Union (22 June) through the first few weeks after the German arrival. Chapter 2 surveys the German administrative apparatus set up in the Reichskommissariat. Then follow three "socio-economic" chapters on life in the countryside and in the cities (3, 4, 5), three chapters about spiritual life (6, 7, 8), and three chapters on special targets of the Nazis—prisoners of war (9), Jews, Roma, and ethnic Germans (10), and candidates for forced labor in Germany (11).

Chapter 11 also briefly notes that the partisan zones, which emerged in the Reichskommissariat in 1943, could not be studied in detail here, but need further attention. In particular, the complicated events in western Volhynia, where the civilian population, and especially the Polish population, was caught in a war between various partisans, need serious attention in the future.

This dissertation was written on the premise that, based on our present state of knowledge, the only workable framework for study are territories within borders as they existed during World War II. This is not, however, the premise underlying the vast majority of publications about German-ruled eastern Europe and Russia. Ukrainian authors often assume that one can study collectively events during World War II in any territory where Ukrainians lived. The unstated assumption is that one narrative—usually Ukrainian—can combine events in three territories ruled by Germany (the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the military zone, and the Distrikt Galizien of the Generalgouvernement), three ruled by Romania (the present-day oblast of Chernivtsi, the south of the present-day oblast of Odessa, and Transnistria), and one ruled by Hungary (Subcarpathian Rus'). On the other hand, Western and Russian authors usually assume that one can study collectively the wartime events in all territories that had been part of the Soviet Union in mid-1939, or even in early 1941. The result are titles such as "German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union" or even "German Rule in Russia." (In fairness, the Western studies tend to have separate discussions of Ukraine or other territories.) Polish authors often assume that one can study collectively events in 1939–1945.
"in the Second Republic" or, somewhat more carefully, "on the territory of the Second Republic," even though there was no such republic after 1939 or 1945.

This study is strictly limited to events in the territory which ultimately became part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Even though events in other Nazi-ruled territories may have been similar, integrating information about other territories into the narrative would likely distort the picture. In fact, as the reader will find, the focus on one entity does actually uncover some differences with events in the military zone. In the end, it is not possible, except superficially, to compare events in the Reichskommissariat to events anywhere else in Europe during World War II. If any comparison is made here, it will be with the pre-1941 situation in Ukraine itself, the only one the natives knew.

I researched and wrote the following study as much as possible in an inductive fashion, without employing models or theories. The aim was, as it were, first "to let the facts speak for themselves," and only then draw conclusions. Hence, terms like "collaboration" and "collaborators," old favorites in studies of German-ruled Europe, are not used in this study at all except when they appear in quotations from other authors. For eastern Europe of the mid-twentieth century, with its frequent border changes, these words are of very limited use. If anything people did under Nazi rule is to be understood, the morally loaded term "collaboration" must probably be discarded. Should such a term be used, it would have to be followed by the tedious formulation "with the German authorities." Similarly, the word "occupation" in this study refers only to a military action: the capturing of new territories, in this case by the German army.

The dissertation studies what I call "natives" or the "native population." While it is customary to consider as "native" only those people who are of the nationality after which the state is named, this is not done here. Instead, "natives" are considered all those who lived in Ukraine before the Germans arrived. In that regard, the experience and perceptions of Jews, Roma, Russians, and ethnic Germans are included as much as possible. Thus, this study aims to be a territorial history, not the history of one particular ethnic group. It is nevertheless inevitable that the majority population—Ukrainians—will receive the most attention.
All placenames are given in a modified Library of Congress transliteration based on present-day Ukrainian usage, also when quoting English-language sources. In the cases where places presently have an entirely different name, the present one is used, but at first mention the former name is added. For example, "Khmelnits'kyi, former Proskuriv,..." The first time a village is mentioned, it is followed by the name in parentheses of the raion (German: Rayon) in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. For example, "the village of Zarubyntsi (Pereiaslav)." A few places are according to common English usage, such as Kiev, Brest-Litovsk, and Odessa. The noun "Germans" identifies those who were officially Reich Germans (Reichsdeutsche) during the war. "Nazi" as a noun deals only with members of the Nazi party. For the use of the adjectives "Nazi" and "German," no specific rule is employed.

The names of Ukrainian archives are provided in full when first mentioned. Hereafter, an abbreviation is used throughout the thesis. A list of these abbreviations is provided on page vi. References to archival collections employ either Russian or Ukrainian, depending on the usage on the collections themselves (most of them use Russian). A typical reference will use abbreviation according to the generally accepted model used in English-language Slavic studies: f. = fond = collection; op. = opis' = inventory (cf. Ukrainian: op. = opys); d. = delo = file (cf. Ukrainian: spr. = sprava, or: od. zb. = odyntsa zberihannya); and l. = list = page (cf. Ukrainian: ark. = arkush).

I owe thanks to various people for making this research possible. None of them, of course, shares responsibility for the interpretations and any errors of fact or omission. First of all, they are the directors and staff members of the archives in Ukraine: Larysa V. Iakovlieva and L. A. Pykhtina of the TsDAVOV; Ruslan Ia. Pyrih and Iryna L. Komarova of the TsDAHOU; and Nionila P. Voitsekhivs'ka, Liubov F. Velychko, Ol'ga I. Primas, and Ekaterina I. Dotsenko of the DAKO. To these should be added the staff of the V. I. Vernads'kyi Central Scholarly Library of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, of the Scholarly Reference Library of the Central State Archives of Ukraine, of the M. T. Ryl's'kyi Institute of Art Science,
Folklore, and Ethnography, and of the Interlibrary Loan department of Robarts Library at the University of Toronto.

For helping to find people willing to be interviewed and for helping to arrange interviews, I thank Eileen Consey (Toronto), Petro Hohulia (Muzei istorii Bohuslavshchyny im. B. M. Levchenko, Bohuslav, Kiev oblast, Ukraine), Liudmyla Hrynevych (National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kiev), Vladyslav Hrynevych (National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kiev), Maryna Kravets (Toronto), Iurii Maniichuk (Kiev), and Svetlana V. Petrovskaia (Kiev). I also benefitted from those attending four presentations based on my research that I delivered at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Section on the History of Ukraine during the Second World War, Institute of History of Ukraine, Kiev); the Department of History of the University of Toronto; the 29th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (Seattle, Washington); and the Center for Russian & East European Studies, Stanford University (Stanford, California).

I owe a debt of special gratitude to the readers of this dissertation, Professor Paul Robert Magocsi, Professor Andrew Rossos, Professor Michael Marrus, Professor Jacques Kornberg, Professor Peter H. Solomon, Jr., and Professor Mark von Hagen (Columbia University). Professor Magocsi in particular I thank for his supervision and for helping to make my graduate study at the University of Toronto an enjoyable experience. Thanks are also due to Dr Robert Austin (University of Toronto) for his comments on the dissertation and to Professor Amir Weiner (Stanford University) for his comments on three draft chapters. Finally, I wish to thank my family.
CHAPTER 1

The Soviet Retreat

In order to understand why people in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine acted the way they did, it is important to know what transpired in the weeks or months before the Germans arrived. This chapter will argue that during those months, the communist regime displayed its essential features in a particularly stark way. These features were to be remembered by all former Soviet citizens, whether in the countryside or in the cities, and were to serve as yardsticks to evaluate the new regime.

On the eve of World War II, several states ruled Ukrainian-inhabited territories. The largest of these was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with its Russian-speaking capital Kiev (Ukrainian: Kyiv; German: Kiew). Soviet Ukraine was an integral part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or Soviet Union, formed in 1922. By early 1939, Soviet Ukraine was divided administratively into fifteen oblasts (districts) and the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Republic. The Crimean peninsula, which never was to be incorporated in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, was an autonomous republic within the largest of the nine Soviet republics, the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.

The state with the second-largest number of Ukrainians was Poland, which was restored as an independent state after the conclusion of World War I and further struggle in the revolutionary period. In Poland, Ukrainians were concentrated in the western part of historic Volhynia and in the eastern half of the former Habsburg province of Galicia. Western

1The following account of pre-1941 Ukraine is mostly derived from Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine (Toronto, 1996), Part Nine.

2The oblasts were Zhytomyr, Kiev (including a part which is now the Cherkasy oblast), Chernihiv, Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi (the present-day Khmel'nyts'kyi oblast), Vinnytsia, Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrov's'k, Zaporizhzhia, Voroshilovgrad (the present-day Luhans'k oblast), and Stalino (the present-day Donets'k oblast).
Volhynia, with its Polish-dominated towns of Luts'k (Polish: Łuck; German: Luzk) and Rivne (Polish: Równe; German: Rowno), had been part of the Russian Empire before the revolution of 1917. Now it was a palatinate centered in Luts'k. But despite its name Wołyń, this palatinate actually covered only western Volhynia, for eastern Volhynia was in Soviet Ukraine as the oblast of Zhytomyr.

Eastern Galicia, with its predominantly Ukrainian population, after the fall of the shortlived West Ukrainian National Republic fell under Polish military rule according to the Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye of 1919. Its final status remained unsettled for several years. Only in 1923 did the victors of the Great War relinquish their theoretical authority over the territory and recognize Polish sovereignty. The main cities in the region were L'viv (Polish: Lwów; German: Lemberg), Ternopil' (Polish and German: Tarnopol), and Ivano-Frankivs'k (then called Stanislawiv; Polish: Stanisławów; German: Stanislau). These cities were capitals of three palatinates named after them. Most Galician Ukrainians belonged to the Greek Catholic church. In contrast, the Ukrainians of western Volhynia, like the Ukrainians in Soviet Ukraine, were almost all Orthodox. Finally, besides Soviet Ukraine and Poland, there were also Ukrainian-inhabited lands in Czechoslovakia and Romania, in particular Subcarpathian Rus' and northern Bukovina.

All Ukrainian-inhabited territories in the 1920s and 1930s were alike in being overwhelmingly agrarian, but otherwise there were significant differences between them. Soviet Ukraine was nominally administrated by a system of soviets (Ukrainian: rady) or councils. It existed at all levels: from the top, Soviet Ukraine's Supreme Soviet, downward to the level of the oblast, raion (raion), city, town, and village. There was also a republican government called the Council of People's Commissars. But real power resided in two other organizations. One was the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP(b)U), which was itself a generally subordinate branch of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), led by Joseph Stalin. The other source of power was the secret police, more precisely the republican branch of the successor of the Cheka, Lenin's weapon against real or imagined enemies. Until 1934, it was called the OGPU and then, under direction of Stalin's close associates, the
People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, or NKVD. The OGPU and the NKVD were not entirely "secret." Most agents of this large organization wore uniforms, and at every place of work in the cities it was generally known to have its representatives.

From a Ukrainian perspective, there were some positive aspects of living in Soviet Ukraine. These became evident during the period of Ukrainianization. Ukrainians gradually assumed positions of influence in the CP(b)U, previously dominated by Russians, Jews, and other non-Ukrainians. The cities became more Ukrainian in composition and outlook. Several prominent Ukrainians returned from emigration, such as the historian and former president of the Central Rada of the revolutionary period, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. An extensive literacy campaign achieved significant success, and by the late 1920s, the status and presence in the media of the Ukrainian language, as compared to that of the Russian language, had risen significantly.

The overall standard of living in Soviet Ukraine was low, however, and was to decline in the 1930s. A major tragedy that affected most people took place as a direct result of the implementation of the First Five-Year Plan for the Soviet Union from 1928. The plan's main purpose was the development of heavy industry. For Ukraine, this meant industrialization in the Dnieper bend (Dnipropetrovsk, Kryvyi Rih, and Zaporizhzhia) and in the eastern Donets' Basin (Donbas). Nevertheless, Soviet Ukraine remained a generally rural society. Most of all, the Five-Year Plan to Ukraine meant the collectivization (nationalization) of agriculture. The collectivization began in 1929 and was accompanied by the expulsion or deportation, assisted by urban workers, of any peasant who resisted or seemed to resist. These peasants were labeled kulaks (Ukrainian: kurkuli) who, as Stalin put it, had to be "liquidated as a class." Thus party officials assisted by poor peasants and the Red Army conducted a class war, confiscating grain in the process. As a result, in the years 1932–1933, a Great Famine occurred which cost the lives of at least 4.8 million people in the Ukrainian countryside, or 15 percent of the population. Conditions were so bad that cannibalism became common. Soviet authorities argued, however, that there was no famine. Although scholars still do not agree as to the cause or causes, it is clear that the famine did not have to happen.
The famine was followed by extensive purges of the Communist party and society as a whole. Those who had vigorously promoted the Ukrainian language were among the first victims of a seemingly random—and still not fully explained—campaign to arrest "enemies." In the years 1937 and 1938, most of Ukraine's leading Communists were killed. On the other hand, the purge opened up possibilities for people like Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's emissary to Ukraine in those years, who became the leader of the CP(b)U in 1938. But the purge ruined or ended the lives of even more "ordinary" people. In the Vinnytsia region alone, thousands of poor, mostly male peasants were arrested, and they were rarely seen again. Their relatives were told that for anti-Soviet views they were performing forced labor somewhere, without the right of correspondence. In fact, most were condemned to death and shot. Among the casualties were virtually all clergymen, so that church life was almost entirely rooted out. Thus, altogether conditions in Soviet Ukraine were by the 1930s far worse than in any place to the west.

Meanwhile, in neighboring Poland, the country's non-Polish inhabitants were subjected to a concerted campaign to polonize what politicians called Poland's "eastern borderlands" (kresy). This did not mean that Ukrainians living there could not advance their status at all. This they did through their own cooperatives, political parties, schools, and the Greek Catholic church. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction was such that an underground Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) emerged. The OUN wanted to create an independent Ukrainian state and emphatically stated that the end justified the means. Thus it resorted to terrorism, particularly in its base in Galicia. The Polish government responded with a violent campaign of its own against Ukrainian villages, conducted in 1930. Several years later it set up a concentration camp for arrested OUN activists. From 1935, an attempt at normalization was made between the government and the largest legal Ukrainian party, the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, but it failed.

In the late 1930s, new border changes took place in central and eastern Europe as a result of the political demands of Adolf Hitler. Soon after becoming chancellor of Germany in 1933, the Austrian-born Hitler became the undisputed dictator of the Third Reich. After
building up a strong, militaristic economy, he proceeded to expand the state. In early 1938, Germany annexed Austria, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles (1919). Then Hitler set his eyes on Czechoslovakia, and in particular on its German population in that state's so-called Sudetenland. In September 1938, Hitler was able to obtain a settlement at Munich from Great Britain and France, which transferred the Sudetenland to Germany. A federalist Czecho-Slovakia remained, but it was a rump state. Several weeks later, Germany's ally Hungary acquired the southern regions of the provinces of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus'. In the part of Subcarpathian Rus' that Hungary did not annex, Ukrainians supported by local and Galician members of the OUN created an autonomous entity called Carpatho-Ukraine. This was meant to be the nucleus of an independent state incorporating all Ukrainian territories. It existed only briefly, however. On 15 March 1939, Germany annexed the rest of Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia was allowed to proclaim independence as a Nazi client state, and Hungary annexed Carpatho-Ukraine.

Hitler now set his sights on Poland. He was even able to secure help from his arch-enemy, the Soviet Union. Although Stalin had been issuing propaganda attacks against Nazi Germany and fascism in general, he realized that his prospects for winning a possible war with Germany were dim. This was not only because he knew that most of his own subjects hated him and the system he represented, but also because in 1937 and 1938 he had "purged" the Red Army of its best and brightest leaders. Thus, both Hitler and Stalin needed time to prepare for their inevitable clash. In August 1939, the Third Reich and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression treaty which became known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. It included a trade agreement and a secret clause which divided Poland into a German and a Soviet sphere in the event of war.

That war came just days later, when on 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Two days later, Britain and France declared war on Germany. On 17 September, the Soviet Union invaded from the east and annexed the eastern half of Poland, where it proclaimed the "reunification" of "Western Ukraine" and "Western Belarus" with the Ukrainian and Belarusian
Soviet republics. Thus, western Volhynia and eastern Galicia became six oblasts of an enlarged Soviet Ukraine.

Within the course of the next year, Hitler conquered most of western Europe, while Stalin started and lost a war with Finland and annexed the Baltic states, which he turned into Soviet republics. He also added the Ukrainian-inhabited parts of Romania—the northern part of Bukovina and the southern part of Bessarabia—to Soviet Ukraine. Ukraine's Moldavian ASSR was raised to the status of a Soviet republic. The Sovietization imposed on the new territories included deportations eastward of hundreds of thousands of Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Jews. While church life managed to survive, independent cultural and economic life was destroyed. State-run Ukrainian institutions appeared instead, such as a branch of the Kiev-based Academy of Sciences of Soviet Ukraine.

Already by 1940, there were some Ukrainian-inhabited lands under Nazi German rule. These included territories to the west of the Nazi-Soviet border (along the San and Buh rivers): the Lemko region, the Chelm (Ukrainian: Kholm) region, and Podlachia. These formerly Polish-ruled territories were not formally annexed to the Reich, however, but rather to the larger so-called Generalgouvernement for the Occupied Polish Territories (Generalgouvernement für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete), ruled from Cracow by Hans Frank. Ukrainians in that entity were supervised by a German-sponsored umbrella organization based in Cracow called the Ukrainian Central Committee (Ukraïns'kyi Tsentral'nyi Komitet or Ukrainischer Hauptausschuss). Young OUN activists led by Stepan Bandera were released from Polish jails. They did not, however, recognize the newly proclaimed leader of the OUN, Andrii Mel'nyk, and in 1940 formed their own organization called the OUNSD (OUN Independentists Statists). The bitterness on both sides surrounding this issue persisted and would consistently prevent any cooperation between the two factions of the OUN.

Thus, by early 1941, Nazi Germany had a huge territory under its control. What did the people of the Soviet Union, and particularly Ukraine, think about this? Did they expect a war with their new powerful neighbor? The evidence is scanty and not conclusive. Some city dwellers,
particularly school children, felt by 1940 that there was a war scare, such as in messages on the loudspeaker system saying, "If there's war tomorrow, if the enemy attacks, if the black force descends/The entire Soviet people will rise to a man for its free motherland."3 But others, such as some university students and members of the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) in Kiev, who were "very apolitical," did not expect war.4 Certainly people did not consider themselves to be already at war, although this was the case from a Baltic, Polish, and Romanian perspective.

In any case, when more than three million Germans crossed the 1939 Nazi-Soviet border in the early hours of Sunday, 22 June 1941, the citizens of the Soviet Union were greatly surprised. They were told about it in a radio address later that day by premier Viacheslav Molotov over the wire radios and loudspeaker system. Among other things, Molotov mentioned that Kiev had been bombed. Many Communist Party members were dismayed, and others were surprised, that the Soviet Union had not been the first to attack.5 At this time, males aged 19 to 22 were already in the Red Army. Now all non-"suspect" men aged 23 to 36 (that is, those born between 1905 and 1918) were mobilized, while males aged 16 to 18 in cities had to join the organization for civilian air defense, Osoaviakhim, and be on the look-out for fires.6

3"Esli zavtra voina;/ esli vrag napadet;/ esli chernaia sila nagrianet;/ kak odin chelovek/ ves' sovetskii narod za svobodnuiu rodinu vstanet." Antonina Khelemendy-Kokot, Kolhospne dytynstvo i nimets'ka nevolia: spohady (Toronto, 1989), p. 122. This woman, born in 1925, heard this in the city of Berdians'k in 1940.

4Valentyna Pavlivna Kravchenko (Ukrainian born in 1922 in Kiev), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, Ukraine, tape recording.


Nazi Germany's war with Britain and France now became World War II. Hitler hoped that the Blitzkrieg strategy which had been so successfully employed against Poland would work against "Russia" as well. And indeed it did for most Ukrainian territories, which he captured by November 1941. Army Group South, assisted by Hungarian, Italian, Romanian, and Slovak units, rapidly advanced through Ukraine. L'viv, the main eastern Galician city, was taken on 30 June. The western Volhynian cities of Luts'k and Rivne fell on 25 and 29 June. Khmel'nyts'kyi, formerly Proskuriv, was the first major city in pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine to be captured, on 8 July. Next were Zhytomyr (9 July), Bila Tserkva (16 July), and Vinnytsia (19 July). Next, while the defense of Kiev was reinforced, the German advance was fastest in southern Ukraine. After the battle for the central-western region near Uman' ended with an encirclement in early August (capturing 103,000 Red Army soldiers), the way was open to the southern cities of Kirovohrad, Kryvyi Rih (both 14 August), Mykolaïv (16 August), and Kherson (19 August), as well as to two cities on the Dnieper river, Cherkasy and Dnipropetrovs'k (22 and 25 August).

The fate of central Ukraine was decided in mid-September, when the southwestern front of the Red Army, entrenched to the east of the Dnieper river, was fully encircled. In less than two weeks, on 26 September, the enormous battle was over. About 665,000 Red Army soldiers became prisoners of war. Meanwhile, on 19 September, the Germans entered Kiev—Ukraine's capital, which Stalin had ordered to be kept whatever the price. In the middle of October 1941, four months after the start of the German invasion, the entire territory which was to become part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was in German hands. Melitopol', close to the Sea of Azov, fell on 6 October. All this was at the cost of a great many lives of Red Army soldiers.7

7The POW figures for the Uman' and Kiev encirclements come from Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colorado, 1981), p. 69n1. In battles in the Kiev region, from 7 July to 26 September an average of 8,543 Red Army men were wounded or died every twenty-four hours. A total of 616,304 Soviet military died. G. F. Krivosheev, ed., Gif sekretnosti snyat: poteri vooruzhennyykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviakh i voennykh konfliktaakh: statisticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow, 1993), p. 196. Among the casualties was Colonel-General M. P. Kyrponis, the commander of the Southwestern Front, who died on 20 September. "O gibeli komanduiushchego voiskami Iugo-Zapadnogo fronta Geroia Sovetskogo Soiuza general-polkovnika M. P. Kirponos i drugikh generalov v
The question arises why the German armed forces (Wehrmacht) were able to advance so quickly. Stalin had not responded to countless warnings of an imminent attack. One example of the resulting disarray was that the Red Army in the western regions had hardly any maps. Another frequent problem was a lack of arms. Much more important than lack of preparation, however, was desertion. Despite the threat of the death penalty at the hands of the military commissars—whom Stalin held personally accountable—desertion took on a massive scale. Almost all Ukrainians from western Volhynia and eastern Galicia who had been drafted deserted, and the remaining Red Army soldiers, mainly members of the Communist Party and the Komsomol from east-central Ukraine, while retreating also had to face sniper fire from locals. In central Ukraine, enormous numbers of reservists evaded mobilization. Fedir Pihido, a Ukrainian native of the region and a reliable observer, wrote six years later (when he was about sixty years of age): "I remember well the Russo-Japanese war, which is well-known to have been very unpopular. I remember just as well the First World War. Having spent three years at the front, I have a feeling for the mood of the soldiers. But never before had I seen or heard about anything like this." The authorities tried to arrest deserters by blocking all the roads, but it made little difference.


8In Kherson, a lieutenant on horseback did not know the way, and people wondered, "Doesn't he have his map?" V. Ost [pseud.], Repatriatsiia (Germany, 1946), pp. 54–55.

9S. Oleksenko, "Doklad o Kamenets-Podol'skikh partizanakh (1943?)," Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob"iednan' Ukraïny [hereafter: TsDAHOU], Kiev, f. 1, op. 22, d. 10, l. 77; Party Archive of the Rivne oblast, 1964 report about evacuation, TsDAHOU, f. 57, op. 4, ll. 230–231; Pihido-Pravoberezhyi, "Velyka Vitichynsiana viina," pp. 74–75.

10Pihido-Pravoberezhyi, "Velyka Vitichynsiana viina," p. 33. These memoirs were written in 1947. On 16 July 1941, Stalin apparently issued a secret order which acknowledged that many Red Army members were "given to panic and even oriented toward the enemy," and "at the first pressure throw away their weapons.... and drag others along with them," while "the number of firm and steady commanders and commissars is not very great." Dallin, German Rule, p. 64n2, without reference to a source.

11Nicholas Prychodko, One of the Fifteen Million (Toronto and Vancouver, 1952), p. 153.
Pihido saw a large group of Red Army soldiers of various nationalities who were captured by the Germans in the Kiev encirclement. Because they were guarded by relatively lenient Slovaks, they were able to talk to the locals. He himself thus "spoke with hundreds of Red Army soldiers. All of them complained about the terrible chaos which existed in the army. The Red Army soldiers were always hungry and had to beg or steal. There was no underwear, no soap, many had lice. Footwear was mostly broken, they had to fight barefoot, or with rags wrapped around. There were no blankets. Most of them complained that the Red Army soldiers were left to their own devices, that only sergeants and sometimes lieutenants from the reserves were with the soldiers, while the rest was somewhere in the rear. Neither company commanders nor battalion commanders were ever fighting."12 Most important of all, Pihido and the villagers realized that "the Red Army soldiers don't want to fight":

'They want us to die for them—no, we are not as stupid as they think'... — 'They sucked our blood for twenty-five years, enough already!' — 'They left our children without bread, to starve to death, but force us to defend Stalin and his commissars...' Thus it came from all sides....
'About two hundred of us got together,' one Siberian driver related. 'We decided to force our way back, at all cost, toward the Germans. We armed ourselves with sub-machine guns and grenades and moved toward the Dnieper. Twice we had to force our way through with grenades—the commissars tried to turn us back, to "our people" ["svoi"]. We killed them and moved on. That's how we reached the Dnieper. Here we gave our weapons to the Germans and they moved us across, to the Right Bank.'13

As can be seen from this quote, the draft dodging and voluntary surrender did not mean that these people lacked courage. Rather, as a popular song written down in Dnipropetrov'sk in 1944 put it succinctly, "We threw away our rifles and fled to the Germans/And expected a

12Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 84.
13Ibid., p. 83.
better fate from them."\textsuperscript{14} In the words of another observer, "There was nothing that they wanted to defend."\textsuperscript{15}

As soon as the war with Germany started, the NKVD ordered office workers to keep guard against "German spies" around the clock, in groups of at least two persons. The same guard duty was demanded for factories, collective farms (Ukr. sing. \textit{kolhosp}), and state farms (Ukr. sing. \textit{radhosp}), where people had to stay in the fields to keep guard.\textsuperscript{16} Some city dwellers organized their own vigilantes in their neighborhoods against possible looters.\textsuperscript{17} After an order from Stalin on 24 June, the NKVD also organized special "security" units in cities and raions: "extermination battalions" (\textit{istrebitel'nye batal'ony}). Each battalion had between one hundred and two hundred carefully selected members, mainly from the Communist Party and the Komsomol. Armed with machine-guns, rifles, revolvers, and other weapons, their task was, among others, to catch parachutists and saboteurs. Around 650 of them existed in Soviet Ukrainian territory by early July.\textsuperscript{18}

As before the German invasion, the NKVD—more precisely, the People's Commissariat of State Security, or NKGB, which had been created from the NKVD in early 1941 but reunited with it in July 1941 while retaining its name—devoted most of its attention to what it considered to be "the unreliable element" (\textit{nenadezhnyi element}). Such "unreliables"

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\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{14}[Hvyntivky kydaly do nimtsiv tikalyl i krashchoï doli vid îkh ozhydaly.] Instytut Mystetstvoznavstva, Fol'klom ta Etnohrafi im. M. T. Ryl's'koho, National Academy Sciences of Ukraine, Kiev, Viddil rukopysnykh fondiv [hereafter: IMFE], T. Krasyts'ka collection, f. 14–3, od. zb. 20, ark. 173.
    \item \textsuperscript{15}Prychodko, \textit{One of the Fifteen Million}, p. 141.
    \item \textsuperscript{16}Arkadii Liubchenko, \textit{Shchodennyk: knyzhka persha} (Toronto, Ontario, 1951), p. 150, editor's note.
    \item \textsuperscript{17}D. Karov [Dmitrii Petrovich Kandaurov], "Organy samoupravleniia v okkupirovanych oblastakh SSSR v gody vtoroi mirovoi voiny," \textit{Vestnik Instituta po izuchenii istorii i kul'tury SSSR}, 5 (12) (Munich, September-October 1954), p. 73; Tatiana Fesenko, \textit{Povest' krivykh let} (New York, 1963), p. 68.
    \item \textsuperscript{18}Postanovlenie Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) No. 112, published in part in V. V. Cherepanov, ed., "Shli na front dobrovol'no. O narodnom opolchenii iazykom dokumentov," \textit{Voennno-istoricheskii zhurnal}, 1 (Moscow, January-February 1996), pp. 9–10, which cites RTsKhIDNI (Moscow), f. 17, op. 3, d. 1041, l. 115; Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U Khrushchev to Stalin, in "Organizuetia narodnoe opolchenie. Telegramma iz Kieva. 5 iulia," \textit{Izvestiiu TsK KPSS}, 7 (Moscow, July 1990), p. 198.
\end{itemize}
were not mobilized into the army or even the irregular "popular levy" (narodnoe opolchenie). This very broad category of people—generally males whose relatives (such as priests) had been persecuted, or simply people who had studied in Germany years ago—received a stamp in their passport designating them as "not liable for call-up," and received other tasks or at least were ordered to stay put. On 23 June, the head of the NKGB in Moscow, Vsevolod N. Merkulov, instructed his subordinates in Kiev and other cities in the western Soviet Union to review the cases of all prisoners and to "compile lists of those whom You deem necessary to shoot." He wanted the lists within a month, presumably to approve them, but there was not enough time. For the entire territory of the 1941 Ukrainian SSR—thus including the eastern Galician cities, where particularly large massacres took place—the NKVD's own records say that "during the evacuation," 8,789 prisoners were "executed in the prisons." In all likelihood, in many places the extermination battalions cooperated in them.

The evidence on the massacres in the territory which would become the Reichskommissariat Ukraine is most conclusive for western Volhynia, a region which had been incorporated in the Soviet Union only two years earlier. Here the NKVD was naturally the most pressed for time. While villagers near Luts'k were drafted into the army, the NKVD

19Organizing the latter proved to be difficult, as there were no weapons for them. "Organizuetsia narodnoe opolchenie," p. 198. See also Fesenko, Povest', p. 69.

20Kostiuk, author interview (this source received this stamp, being the son of a priest and having bad eyesight) and Klavdia Iakovlivna Hrynevych (Ukrainian born in 1930 in Klyntsi [Kirovohrad oblast]), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, tape recording (her father was the son of a priest).


22Polish translation of NKVD document dated January 1942 in Krzysztof Popiński, Aleksandr Kokurin, and Aleksandr Gurjanow, Drogi śmierci: ewakuacja więźniów sowieckich z Kresów Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej w czerwcu i lipcu 1941 (Warsaw, 1995), pp. 144–145. The document also lists the following other numbers for the Ukrainian SSR according to its May 1941 borders: 4,568 prisoners of the NKVD were "released during the evacuation" (probably mainly criminals); 3,536 "remained in the prisons on occupied territory"; 312 "died on the way"; 270 were "released as a result of an attack by a gang"; 155 "fled from the convoy"; 123 were "executed by the escort on the way during the suppression of uprising and resistance"; 55 were "unjustly executed on the way by an escort"; 48 were "killed while attempting to escape"; and 17 were "killed on the way during bombardments."
told the "unreliables" among them to go home but also to show up immediately when told to do so. In the first night of the war, it busied itself with those 120 prisoners condemned to death earlier, and killed them with bayonets. On 22 June, a German bomb hit the prison. It was the signal for the thousands of remaining Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish prisoners to stage a revolt, and they were able to take control of the building. Still, they remained surrounded by the NKVD troops with tanks and what accounts call a group of armed Komsomol members—that is, a precursor of an extermination battalion. In the morning of 24 June, the day after Merkulov's order, an NKVD lieutenant addressed the prisoners in clear Ukrainian. He read out loud an order allegedly from Stalin which closed the cases of those accused of political offenses ("article 54") and instead mobilized these people into the army. The prisoners took what seemed to be a better chance to escape and lined up outside. Suddenly the tanks' machine-guns started firing at them, and grenades fell on them from the windows. When the shooting stopped, a call went out in Russian: "Those still alive, get up! We won't shoot anymore!" (Kto eshche zhivoi, vstavaite! Bol'she streliat' ne budem!) They numbered about 370, and they spent the rest of the day and the next day burying the hundreds of dead. The NKVD fled in the afternoon of 25 June when a German advance unit arrived.23 Estimates of the number of victims of this massacre range from 4,000 (survivor Prysiazhnyi), to 2,800 "Ukrainians" of a total of 4,000 prisoners (the SD and German military intelligence, both of which likely omitted Jewish and Polish victims), to "some 1,500 Ukrainian political detainees" (the German Foreign Office).24

23Mostly based on T. Prysiazhnyi, "Masovi vbyvstva v Luts'ku," Litopys Volyni, I, 1 (Winnipeg, 1953), pp. 65–70, which says the first killings were in the night of 21 to 22 June, which seems to be a mistake, and on "S. D., Germany," in Zlochyny komunistichnoi Moskvy v Ukraini v liti 1941 roku. (New York, 1960), pp. 43–45, which is a reprint from the newspaper Shliakh peremohy (Munich), 5 June 1960. This last source renders the shout virtually the same: "Kto zhivoi, padnima'st! Streliat' bol'she ne budem!" Sources by those who were not in the prison at the time of the massacre are Panas Khurtovyna [Mykhailo Podvorniak], Pid nebom Volyni: (voienni spomyny khrystiyiany) (Winnipeg, 1952), pp. 83–85 and 90–92 (who writes that some "unreliables" obeyed an order to show up a few days later and were among those murdered) and Russian Oppression in Ukraine: Reports and Documents (London, 1962), p. 190.

There was an even hastier bloodbath in the three-story prison of Dubno, somewhat more to the east, which was well documented in accounts published by two survivors—Valentyna Petrenko, whose Polish husband had been deported, and the teacher Oleksii Satsiuk—as well as in contemporary German reports based on interrogations of at least four named survivors, including Petrenko. In the evening of 24 June, the guards ordered all inmates to go to sleep at the wall facing the door. Half an hour later, they started going from cell to cell to kill them. When cells had only men in them, or simply a large number of inmates, the NKVD guards did not enter, but shot from their pistols and sub-machine guns through the window, or threw grenades. After the war, Petrenko recalled that "particularly startling were the screams of children, of which there were many downstairs—those screams one can never forget..." (The presence of children is not confirmed elsewhere.) When the massacre had gone on for at least forty (Satsiuk) and possibly ninety (Petrenko) minutes, the NKVD men apparently fled for a while. This was because a local who had dressed up as one of them ran into the building shouting that the Germans were there. To enhance the effect, he was helped by others who resounded shots nearby. The ensuing interlude did allow a number of prisoners to escape, although many were nonetheless shot while climbing over a wall. The shooting resumed in the early hours of the following morning. Altogether around 550 detainees, including about a hundred women, were killed at the Dubno prison.


Information about other western localities is less detailed. In Volodymyr-Volyn's'kyi, close to the German-Soviet border, the atrocities were committed on the very first day of the war. That day, Hryhorii Stetsiuk, a young man who later became a member of the Mel'nyk faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (hereafter, OUN-M) met in the street Stepan Ianiuk, a Baptist who had been arrested as a "kulak." This man told him about the shootings in the prison that morning, which he had miraculously survived because two bodies covered him. Stetsiuk later saw the bodies and estimated that perhaps twenty of the five hundred prisoners had survived. In Sarny in northern Volhynia, several hundred male and female prisoners were shot, while in the southern town of Kremenets' the toll was about 150 people. Some of the victims were found without skin, leading people to conclude that they had been thrown into boiling water.

In the central and eastern Ukrainian regions, the NKVD had more time to leave and possibly evacuate its prisoners. Still it shot many people in the final days before leaving. For example, in the town of Chyhyryn just west of the Dnieper, several days before the German arrival, the NKVD arrested ten people (including a German-language teacher and the son of a priest), shot them in the back of the head, and buried them. In Kirovohrad, a woman who had apparently worked in the local prison later told one author that the NKVD had released criminals but had shot its "political" prisoners; other locals told a Ukrainian interpreter in the German army that many prisoners had been shot recently. The prison of Uman' was the site

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28 De Zayas, Wehrmacht, p. 211.


31 Pavel Negretov, Vse dorogi vedut na Vorkutu (Benson, Vermont, 1985), p. 48 and O. Horodys'kyi, "Iurii Klen - voiakom (Prodovzhennia)," Kyiv, IV, 3 (Philadelphia, May-June 1953), p. 150. From the latter: "Locals recounted that the retreating Bolsheviks shot many prisoners. In the prison yard I saw the death wall, which was colored red, and at the level of the head the traces of many bullets were visible." According to Kulakovs'kyi, "Rozstriliani na
of hasty shootings of prisoners who earlier had been forced to walk from the prison of Chortkiv in Galicia.\textsuperscript{32} There are similar accounts of murders in the prisons in Berdychiv and Vinnytsia.\textsuperscript{33} Not everywhere, however, were prisoners killed by shooting. In Poltava, a former prisoner of war "found out" that the prison and its 240 inmates had been burned.\textsuperscript{34} In Khmel'nyts'kyi, twenty-two "political" prisoners were simply abandoned in the prison and left to starve to death.\textsuperscript{35} More people than in western Volhynia may have been aware of the danger and have gone into hiding. Mykola Prykhod'ko, a former camp inmate, barely escaped arrest in the town of "N" on the lower Dnieper. He stayed in hiding until the Germans arrived in August. Had he been found by the Soviets, he undoubtedly would have received a bullet in the back of the neck, like the 148 unfortunates who were later found in the local prison.\textsuperscript{36}

In Kiev, the first "unreliables" were arrested at night in early July, at which time the Wehrmacht was still 250 kilometers away. The climax was reached in the last two weeks before the fall of the city.\textsuperscript{37} To be sure, these measures could not possibly hit every "suspect" person. For example, a man in Kiev was not mobilized into the army because his father, an Orthodox priest, had been shot in the 1930s, but he was also not arrested.\textsuperscript{38} The fate of those who were arrested in Kiev is not entirely clear. Merkulov's order did allow for the possibility of evacuating prisoners, but it seems likely that most were shot, either in prison or at the pits pochatku viiny,\textsuperscript{39} p. 191, fifteen prisoners were shot in the city.


\textsuperscript{33}Russian Oppression in Ukraine, pp. 188-189 and 196; Zlochyny komunistychnoï Moskvy, pp. 23-26.

\textsuperscript{34}Dmytro Chub, \textit{V lisakh pid Viaz'moiu: spohady pro Druhu svitovu viinu}, exp. 2nd ed. (Melbourne, 1983), p. 118.

\textsuperscript{35}Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 38 (30 July 1941), p. 10.

\textsuperscript{36}Prychodko, \textit{One of the Fifteen Million}, pp. 142-169.


\textsuperscript{38}Hrynevych, author interview (about her father and grandfather).
near the hamlet of Bykivnia just east of the city. A man from L'viv who emigrated to North America after the war heard shots while under arrest in Kiev,\(^3\) and many other authors—not themselves survivors or eyewitnesses—say atrocities were committed in the city.\(^4\) One of the archivists of the Security Service of Ukraine, the successor to Soviet Ukraine's KGB, has said that 524 prisoners initially held in Kiev were shot in those days.\(^4\)

Besides the elimination of "unreliables," equally important to Stalin was material destruction—a scorched earth. On 27 June, he issued a secret order to the local authorities of regions that were being evacuated. He was outspoken about the results he desired: "All valuable materials, energy and agricultural stocks, and standing grain which cannot be taken away and can be used by the enemy must, in order to prevent such use—upon order of the Military Councils of the fronts—be immediately made completely worthless, that is, must be destroyed, annihilated, and burned.\(^4\) Two days later, on 29 June, he and Molotov issued a longer order along the same lines to all Communist Party and government officials of the regions "near the front." In case of a retreat, it said, cattle and grain had to be taken along, but added, "All valuable property that cannot be removed including non-ferrous metals, grain, and fuel, must absolutely be destroyed." Partisan and sabotage groups should "create intolerable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their


\(^4\)Kulakovs'kyi, "Rozstriliani na pochatku viiny," p. 191.

\(^4\)"O poriadke vyvoza i razmeshcheniia liudskikh kontingentov i tsennogo imushchestva. Postanovlenie TsK VKP(b) i SNK SSSR. 27 iunia 1941 g.," in "Iz archivov partii," *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, 6 (Moscow, June 1990), p. 208. Emphasis in the original.
measures." This order was supposed to apply only to regions near the front, but in practice all party organizations believed it applied to them and started removing and destroying food supplies. In his memoirs, the then second secretary of the party committee of the Dnipropetrovs'k oblast correctly reproduces the thinking among the authorities of the time. "At that time [29 June] the Dnipropetrovs'k oblast was not considered a frontline region, as the front was still far away from us. But after reading such a critical and important document, it was impossible to think formally." The CP(b)U and the government of Soviet Ukraine ordered party and government organizations to select people who would destroy grain, sugar, and other valuables in case they could not be evacuated. Ordinary people found out about Stalin's intentions when he finally addressed them on the radio on 3 July.

Stalin differed with Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of the CP(b)U, about the extent of the destruction that was desirable. On 9 July, Khrushchev proposed to Stalin that agricultural machines should be destroyed in a much larger territory than Stalin had ordered, namely in a zone 100 to 150 kilometer to the east of the front. Pigs and birds would have to be killed and then given to the army and the members of the collective and state farms. On the other hand, he proposed to hand some collective farm property—seed grains and the like—out to the farm workers. Stalin rejected this suggestion in a telegram back to Kiev the next day. "Birds, small cattle, and other food-stuffs, which are necessary for the remaining population" should not be killed, and destruction should only take place in a zone of seventy verst (about 74 kilometers) from the front, after "all adult males, working cattle, grain, tractors, and

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43Translation in Robert V. Daniels, ed., A Documentary History of Communism in Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev (Hanover and London, 1993), pp. 223-224, based on the first publication of this order in Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 6 (Moscow, 1991), pp. 218-220.

44K. S. Grushevoi, Togda, v sorok pervom... (Moscow, 1972), p. 31.

45According to G. A. Kumanev, "Sovetskaia ekonomika i evakuatsiia 1941 goda," Soviet Union/Union Soviétique, XVIII (Pittsburgh, 1991), p. 166, this was on 4 July 1941. Kumanev's source reference, however, is not more specific than "Arkhiv TsK KPSS."

46"O poriadke evakuatsii i unichtozhenii imushchestva. Telegramma TsK KP(b) Ukrainy. 9 iulia 1941 g.," in "Iz arkhivov partii," Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 7 (Moscow, July 1990), pp. 206-207.
combines" had been taken away.47 But it is unlikely that this made much difference to ordinary people. Most likely Khrushchev was trying to justify a situation which had already existed.

The impact of the call for evacuation and destruction varied from west to east. In the western Volhynian countryside, neither the NKVD nor other officials had enough time to undertake either a comprehensive evacuation or destruction. In fact, in many places the collective farms were voluntarily disbanded while the Soviet authorities were still around. In one village, the peasants took such action after they heard that a neighboring village had decollectivized itself. Encouraged by the chairman of the farm ("It seems the Lord has pity on us after all... But please take only what is yours"), everyone took out his collectivized horse, plow, and cart. Hours later all that was left of the I. V. Stalin Collective Farm were its records and stacks of grain and hay, which were equally divided several days later.48

In the central-western region of Ukraine, known as the Right Bank, the destruction was on a limited scale. A German army report from Ukraine, dated 17 July, stated that the agricultural machines had been made useless because of the removal of parts, although the fields had not been damaged.49 Even this removal of parts was not necessarily meant to destroy them. There must have been many cases where people refused to demolish the machines and merely hid their disassembled parts.50 Further to the east, many peasants ignored the government order to harvest the fields both during the day and night.51 As with the demolition, it is very

47"Otvet na telegrammu iz Kiev. Telegramma Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta Oborony. 10 iiulia 1941 g.,” in “Iz arkhivov partii,” ibid., p. 207.

48Khurtovyna, Pid nebom Volyni, pp. 87 and 93.


50Ol’ha Mykolaivna Kutsenko (Ukrainian born in 1926 in the village of Poberezhka), author interview in Ukrainian, 18 July 1995, Bohuslav, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording. She is referring to her father.

51"Komunisty Ukrainy v 1941 r.,” Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 5 (Kiev, 1990), pp. 101–103, regarding the Iakymiv raion in the Zaporizhzhia oblast, in mid-August 1941, where the Germans arrived in the first week of October. M. M. Zagonil'ko and A. F. Iudenkov, Krakh plana "Ol'denburg": (o sryve ekonomicheskikh planov fashistskoi Germanii na vremenno okupirovannoi territorii SSSR), 3rd ed. (Moscow, 1980), p. 101, acknowledge that the harvest in [central] Ukraine in 1941 started "much later" than usual, but ascribe it to the weather, to the fact
difficult to quantify the evacuations (of people, cattle, horses, grain, and tractors).\textsuperscript{52} In fact, much of the "evacuated" cattle was merely abandoned on either bank of the Dnieper. Later many villagers went out to catch them.\textsuperscript{53}

The destruction of grain and cattle which could not be taken eastwards mostly affected villages located close to main roads. Here harvested grain was collected, cattle were driven across the Dnieper, and machines were taken away or destroyed.\textsuperscript{54} The destruction of the crops was often done by chasing cows across the fields.\textsuperscript{55} But the villagers tried to save the crops, and, they were convinced, themselves from starvation. Near the river bank village of Staiky, the villagers were too late to prevent the destruction of plows, harrows, and other equipment, but when the head of the farm arrived with Komsomol members and started to kill the pigs, the alarmed villagers managed to save most of them. The collective farm was dissolved in the process. When three tractors came to destroy the fields, hundreds of women were on the scene within half an hour. Some laid themselves down before the tractors, while others pulled the drivers off the machines.\textsuperscript{56} Such resistance, or even complaining, carried great risks. The

that most people able to work were mobilized, and to the mobilization of many tractors, cars, and horses for other purposes.

\textsuperscript{52}As also argued in M. I. Lavrynovych and V. I. Tomek, "Do pytannia pro istoriohrafiu trudovoho podvyhu kholhosnoho selianstva Ukrainy v period Velykoï Vit'yzhynianoï viiny 1941–1945 rokiv," Naukovi pratsi z istorii UPRS: mizhvidomchyi zbirnyk, 42 (Kiev, 1970), pp. 66–67. Soviet historiography asserted that a "at least 3.5 million citizens" were evacuated from Ukraine, along with, from July through October 1941, 1,667,400 tons of grain, over six million pieces of cattle, and almost 550 large industrial enterprises. Ukrainskaia SSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941–1945 gg., Vol. 1 (Kiev, 1975), pp. 269, 271, 273, and 275, imprecisely cited in Kumanev, "Sovetskaia ekonomika," p. 171. Cf. Zagorul'ko and Iudenkov, Krakh plana "Ol'denburg," p. 101, which accepts figures provided by other scholars, according to which 1.25 million tons of grain and other produce were taken from Ukraine from 1 August 1 through 23 September 1941.

\textsuperscript{53}Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 85 (16 September 1941), p. 11; Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vit'yzhyniana viina," pp. 46–47: undated list of people from the village of Maksymovychy near Poliss'ke/Khabne in the north of the present-day Kyiv oblast, who are crossing the Dnieper to acquire horses, Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyivs'koï oblasti [hereafter: DAKO], f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 28–29.

\textsuperscript{54}Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 47 (9 August 1941), pp. 16–17.

\textsuperscript{55}Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vit'yzhyniana viina," pp. 40–41, referring to the village of Khalep'ia (Obukhiv raion, Kyiv oblast) on the bank of the Dnieper.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., pp. 42–44.
villagers of Ivanivka were chased into the fields and ordered to destroy the grain crops. On the way, two carts loaded with bags of grain passed them by. Two women, Mariia Savchenko (born Zhyvotivs'ka) and Khyma Raba, complained to the driver, who was also the head of the village council, that he had forced them to destroy the crops, but was now himself fleeing with the grain. The next day they were arrested by two officers (one of the NKVD, another of the militia) and disappeared. Their fate became known only three months later, when Savchenko's daughter and another villager recognized their bodies among several hundred others immured in a hidden basement in the prison of Uman'.

In many other cases, it was the arrival of the Germans which served as the signal to disband the collective farms. In other cases, de-collectivization was completed after the German army had passed through. In any case, in many villages in central Ukraine, already in early July many collective farms were dissolved: grain, pigs, small cattle, birds, but also horses and cows were taken out. Usually the event was led by women. The de-collectivization generally restored the pre-1929 property relations. People felt they were taking back their former property. No peasant had forgotten which horse had been his or hers, or of his or her family.

In those villages and small towns where there was enough food, there was time to arrange a reception for the Germans. Veterans of World War I assured their fellow-villagers that they had nothing to fear. In villages in western Volhynia, the Germans were treated to

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57Ibid., pp. 117-118. I assume that Pihido's rendition, two times, of the unusual name "Khyma Raba" is not a spelling error.


large dinners to thank them for chasing out the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the peasants "cried with joy" when seeing posters which announced that a Ukrainian state had been proclaimed, and organized large parties celebrating "statehood." (These posters had been prepared by activists of the Bandera faction of the OUN.) The Germans did not interfere.

In the villages and small towns of Dnieper Ukraine, most people were also glad that the Germans arrived. Garlands and other welcoming signs were placed across the main street and the Germans were showered with flowers. In the small town of Makariv, 56 kilometers west of Kiev, the garland had swastikas painted on it and a text in German that read: "We Greet the German Army as Liberators from Bolshevism, Heil Hitler!" When the first German soldiers arrived in one Podolian village, "the whole village lined up along the side of the dirt road. Girls would offer the soldiers flowers, and people would offer bread and water, but not many soldiers took anything. Hitler's army had better provisions than the village peasants could offer. We were all so happy to see them, they were going to save us from the Communists who had taken everything and starved us." In the small, secluded village of Huta, the first sign of the Germans were leaflets dropped from the air. The people expected good things and welcomed the Germans with flowers and bread. In the words of a local woman, "Everybody was glad that the Germans had come." (Het' usi radily, shcho nimtsi pryishly). A German

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61 Ulas Samchuk, Na bilomu koni: spomyny i vrazhennia (Winnipeg, 1972), p. 146 (about his native village, with the comment that such receptions took place "all over Ukraine"); Theodor Oberländer, Der Osten und die Deutsche Wehrmacht: sechs Denkschriften aus den Jahren 1941-43 gegen die NS-Kolonialthese (Asendorf, 1987), p. 52.


soldier wrote in his diary about the reception in the countryside to the east of Kiev, just across the Dnieper, on September 20:

The population came toward us. They hesitated at first, but when they saw that we were not beasts, they came closer with great joy and pointed the way to the east, where the Bolsheviks had gone. Then they brought flowers. Women carried their children and showed them to the German soldiers.... All gave the general large bouquets. Elderly people, who still remembered the time of the tsars, bowed deep and humbly. An old woman, in tears and giving thanks, fell to her knees.66

Nobody expected the Germans to be cruel.67 Far to the east, however, the population was initially reserved and sometimes quite fearful. The news of the murderous activities of the Einsatzgruppen (Operational Groups) must have traveled fast. Here there were villages where everyone stayed inside for a long time, fearing that the Germans would be hanging and shooting people.68 Some parents ordered their young daughters to wear their oldest dress and not to go out to wash.69 But soon the traditional and thus mandatory hospitality took over.70

The limited industry in the towns of western Volhynia suffered little or no damage.71 The evacuation and destruction of industry and produce from oblasts such as Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi, Zhytomyr, and Vinnytsia also appears to have been superficial. As a German reported upon arrival, "In part, the destruction was not carried out professionally, so that the

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66Russian translation entitled "Kiev. Kopiia," sent by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR to D. S. Korotchenko, secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 119, ll. 6–7.

67Kutsenko, author interview.


69Wolfgang Schöler, "The soldiers showed the villagers their photos," in Johannes Steinhoff et al., eds., Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral History (Washington, D. C., 1989), p. 136. East of the former pre-1939 border, "the attitude of the population was one of wait-and-see," according to Oberländer, Der Osten, p. 52.

70Bienert, Russen und Deutsche, pp. 63 and 68.

71E.g., in present-day Lukiv, where the Germans arrived on 26 June. Mykhailo Lebid', "Chasy nimets'koï okupatsii v Matiivs'komu raioni na Volyni (Spohady kol. holovy raionovoï upravy)," Litopys UPA, Vol. 5 (Toronto, 1985), p. 199.
[German] technical battalions could quickly restore this or that electrical or water station. Still, all food stacks in the city of Zhytomyr were destroyed. More to the east, the railway bridges across the Dnieper in Cherkasy, Kremenchuk, Dnipropetrov'sk, and Zaporizhzhia were blown up. While the Germans had only taken Berdychiv, from Kiev every evening fires could be seen in the distance—burning factories.

One memoirist, Ivan Zhyhadlo, has left a detailed description of the situation in the town of Lubny in the Poltava region in the Left Bank. Almost immediately, spy-mania was rampant and the streets were filled with extermination battalions. Citizens were ordered to organize observation of the sky at night. School children, students, and the intelligentsia had to dig trenches, "although there were in the city many military who did not have any work."

Some schools were evacuated. Leading party members and officials drove off with women and children and also furniture and houseware, even plants. "Unreliables" were arrested and buildings were blown up. When the Germans finally arrived, on 13 September, this author did not see people offering bread and salt, "but one could see that the population was not sad or afraid, and scrutinized 'the German' very favorably... The Germans made themselves comfortable for dinner and were happy to treat the children and the most importunate adults with heavy noodles and minced meat..." The Germans merely laughed at the looting which started that day.

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73 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 27 (July 19, 1941), p. 5; ibid., 38 (July 30, 1941), p. 7.

74 Zagonil'ko and Iudenkov, Krakh plana "Ol'denburg," p. 108.


76 Pavlo Ternivs'kyi [Ivan Zhyhadlo], "Spohady emigranta," pp. 19–23, Autograph manuscript, 1945, Library and Museum, Ukrainian Cultural & Educational Centre, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. In Novi Sanzhary, which is also in the Poltava region, retreating Red Army soldiers destroyed everything they could: the large mill; the transfer point and storehouse of the raion consumer cooperative (raispozhyvspilka); bridges; and the archive of the raion administration (raivykonkrom). Then looting started, which lasted for three days, with German participation. H. Sova [Hryhorii Kariak], Do istorii bol'shevyts'koï diis'nosty: (25 rokiv zhyttia ukrains'koho hromadianyna v SSSR) (Munich, 1955), p. 73.
In the Right-Bank city of Kryvyi Rih, after machines had been evacuated, an order went out to the workers to blow up the factories. But its implementation was delayed, for instead they started a sit-down strike. The shafts in one mine could only be blown up by bringing in engineers from elsewhere.\textsuperscript{77} Often such explosions were without warning. In Zaporizhzhia, one of the large industrial cities on the lower Dnieper, most of the factories were blown up. One bread factory was blown up during the workday, causing the death of more than three hundred male and female workers. The large adjacent bread store exploded at the same time. Many people in the line-up in front of it were killed by flying parts. The population started a rescue operation which managed to save some.\textsuperscript{78}

The demolition of the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Station (Dniprohes), some ten kilometers upstream from Zaporizhzhia, took place on 17 August, while the German army was still near Kryvyi Rih, 135 kilometers away. (They entered Zaporizhzhia on 4 October.) Red Army units were on the dam, retreating across the river, and in the lowlands. In the afternoon, without warning, the dam exploded. An immense water avalanche destroyed everything and everyone in its path, including thousands of horses and cattle, dozens of ships, and the entire southern district of the city of Zaporizhzhia. It was rumored that 20,000 soldiers had died. The Communist leaders left the city, only to return the next week for one more month. They blamed the premature destruction of the Dniprohes on "sabotage."\textsuperscript{79} It is probably true that no specific order had been given to blow up the dam as early as 17 August. At that time, however, a small German advance unit apparently reached the Dnieper island of Khortytsia, only about three kilometers from the dam.\textsuperscript{80} Konstantyn S. Hrushovyi, then second secretary of the oblast

\textsuperscript{77}Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 81 (September 12, 1941), pp. 8 and 10.

\textsuperscript{78}Pihido-Pravoberezhyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," pp. 50–51; Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 143 (December 8, 1941), pp. 5–6.


\textsuperscript{80}According to M. G. Pervukhin, the then vice-chairman of the Soviet Union’s Evacuation Council, it was a unit of paratroopers. This account claims that not Red Army soldiers, but Germans died from the explosion. Segbers, Die Sowjetunion, pp. 112–113, quoting M. G.
committee of the Communist Party (who himself claims to have heard about the explosion only after the fact), wrote later that the Germans "had managed to suddenly break through our defenses at a narrow part of the front. They threw motorized troops into the breach, in order to capture the dam of the Dniprohes and, by using it as a bridge, to break though to Zaporizhzhia. The German armored troop carriers were only noticed when they were already approaching the dam." At that moment, the two military engineers at the dam, A. F. Petrovskii and B. A. Epov, panicked, and, without authorization, Epov turned the switch.81

The large city of Dnipropetrovsk was also full of panic and spy-mania. Notices on telegraph poles warned that people hoarding food would be shot.82 Factories and other buildings were blown up without warning. Looting started, for the people were terribly afraid of famine. Many were workers.83 Ten militia men on horses arrived at the canteen of the large Petrovskii Factory where women were looting, but they were chased away in a hail of plates.84 According to a member of the OUNSD who covertly arrived, "most of the population went from store to store, together with the Germans, and took out whatever it needed. The Germans went by car and took valuables, especially radios. The population took food. Children pulled out toys. Unlike in the western lands, nobody was interested in weapons and ammunition."85 Meanwhile, the city was still under Red Army fire from the Left Bank. It would continue to be for three months, and this caused many casualties.86


81Grushevoi, Togda, p. 108, selectively quoted in Zagorul'ko and Iudenkov, Krakh plana "O'ldenburg," p. 105. Petrovskii apparently died from an illness in 1943. Epov continued serving in the army and received the Stalin Prize for work in military engineering. In the 1970s, he taught explosive techniques at a military chair at "one of Moscow's institutes." Grushevoi, Togda, pp. 108–109. Pictures of both are in idem, p. [130].

82Kostiuk, author interview. According to the then second party secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, food stacks, partly from evacuated regions, were put up for sale in this oblast at lower prices, or given to the army. He claims that the Communist party only ordered vodka and wine to be flushed into the sewage system. Grushevoi, Togda, pp. 49–50.

83Fevr, Solntse, p. 196.

84Kostiuk, author interview.

There was looting in every single city or town. Hundreds of women from the countryside came to the cities of Zhytomyr and Berdychiv to look for their men. They used the occasion to empty thoroughly uninhabited apartments (cloths, food, tobacco, etc.), a large number of which were probably owned by Jews and Communist officials. Kirovohrad experienced one day without any authority. The large, unevacuated machine factory "Red Star," where 13,000 people used to work, was completely destroyed by the time the Germans arrived. All of this was apparently caused by looting by the population. In the city's button factory, leather straps were taken from the transmissions. The looting stopped after German notices appeared with the announcement that "who loots will be shot" (Khto hrabuie, bude rozstriliani). In the southern city of Kherson, the looting started while there were still Red Army units in town. The bread factory was burning, but Red Army soldiers prevented the crowd from saving the flour that was inside. Other objects were no longer guarded, however.

An eyewitness describes the angry mood which accompanied the looting:

'Soviet citizens,' who up to then had been submissive, especially Jews of which very many had remained, threw themselves at the 'socialist property.' They destroyed, beat, burned, robbed... Drunkards cried out and shook their fists at the other side of the Dnieper. Women were eager to help them: 'Those scumbags, the blood-suckers, they robbed us, exploited us, and now they also burned everything. Why did they keep those reserves, why didn't they give us anything?!' 'Neighbor, come quickly to the harbor, melted soap is streaming from a store which is still burning.' 'Those bastards, those parasites, for how many years didn't they give us soap, and now they set fire to it...'. And off went the people, to get the soap, the preserves, and all kinds of things which had been hidden in the stores and for which those ragged and hungry people had waited up to that day, when it was all destroyed... Brawls, fighting, shouts...
Because of its symbolic importance, Stalin ordered Kiev to be held at all cost. For the same reason, there are many memoir accounts about the events in the capital of Ukraine. Thus it is possible to describe in detail what transpired there before, during, and immediately after the German arrival on 19 September.

Black-outs became mandatory in Kiev following Molotov's radio address on 22 June. Immediately people started to hoard anything money could buy, standing in line-ups for days. By 24 June, there were huge ones simply for bread. At the same time, a spy-mania erupted. For example, in the Luk'ianivka district, the authorities sent people to smear lime on the edges of the sidewalks, in order to make it easier for people to move around in the dark. The fact that this went unannounced caused people to surround a man who came to see his wife who was working in the area. "There he is," they shouted, "that spy who made signs to enemy planes where to throw the bombs. Yes, it's him, in the blue shirt." At the district militia, the officer on duty exclaimed, "Again!", checked some documents, and released the man. Even then the crowd remained unsatisfied, for "can one really trust the militia chief, now spies are everywhere." Only after the woman leading the group, a house custodian, had made several phone calls, verifying whether a man who was also in the group was really a party member, was the man released. Because of the same lack of trust, many girls who merely asked the way spent several hours at the militia's prisons, as did apparently even "Germanic"-looking blond and blue-eyed males.

In late June and July, the small number of people who owned a wireless radio received an order in the mail to hand them in "for temporary storage." Those not complying would be

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92Turkalo, Tortury, p. 177. Cf. Kravchenko, author interview, according to which even the electricity was disconnected.


94Turkalo, Tortury, pp. 179–182. Turkalo was himself this man, and he adds that there were "countless" such cases.

95Fesenko, Povest', p. 69. See also Ost, Repatriatsiia, p. 53.
held "criminally responsible according to the laws of wartime." Phone company workers visited those few Kievans with a telephone and confiscated the machines. This happened to Pihido three times, and it was only his neighbors who talked the phone company workers out of ramming down his door. Meanwhile, the wire radio (a radio receiver with only one station) and the street loudspeakers started denouncing Ukrainian nationalist émigrés who had formed a government. This was a reference to the declaration of statehood made in L'viv by the OUNSD on 30 June. These broadcasts also repeated until the very end that "Kiev was, is, and will be Soviet." The city was buzzing with rumors.

From 2 July, the NKVD supervised the burning of official records up to 1940 and non-essential current records. The result was there for all to see: a "black snow" came down. The entire city was covered with ashes, which flew from all chimneys as burned shreds of paper and landed on pedestrians and their clothes. If one were dressed in white clothes, one risked dirtying them. The wind took up these ashes and blew them from street to street, like black clouds. In short, it was like Pompeii—a city under ashes." Later, people themselves destroyed records on their own initiative. For example, the teachers of School No. 94 held the last lesson on 17 September and the next day destroyed the lists of all the children's names and addresses.

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97 Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, "Velyka Vitvyzhnia viina," p. 47.


100 Ol'ga Sergeyevna Gudzenko-Tyshkova (Ukrainian born in 1901), interview in Russian by the Commission on the History of the Patriotic War in Ukraine [hereafter: CHPWU], 14 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report (signed on 5 June 1944), TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 44.
Stalin's radio address of 3 July galvanized Kiev's elite into frantic action. It immediately took on the form of flight—from the first days of July until a week before Kiev's fall. Many panicked, but not all: "The commanders, with their chests well out, walked full of themselves and assumed a heroic air. They gave orders with much aplomb."101 Meanwhile, on 9 July, mobilization into the army started in the city.102 As the Germans came closer to Kiev, Soviet Red Cross wagons could be seen which brought wounded from the front. But "more often one saw glimpses of other cars: lorries stacked to the hilt with goods. Sometimes, between the spring mattresses, mirrored wardrobes, and tightly rolled carpets, one could see rubber plants and palms."103

Thousands of writers, engineers, physicians, and agronomists were evacuated to the east, whether or not they wanted to go. The scale of the evacuation of enterprises from Kiev is difficult to determine. One estimate indicates a total of 197.104 It soon became apparent that people who did not belong to the privileged elite had few possibilities to leave. A woman whose husband, a communist, had been shot in the 1930s, thought of leaving, but an acquaintance who worked in the NKVD strongly advised her not to try, "for you will die. You don't have the means to be able to evacuate. Secondly, no devil is as bad as people describe him, so don't worry."105 Many lower-rank employees wanted to flee as well, but often waited at the railway station in vain. For instance, the school directors were all party members, and they sensed correctly that their lives were in great danger. They fled already in early July, simply abandoning the teachers, many of whom were party members as well.106

102Juri Mikhailovich Markovskii (Ukrainian born in 1904), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 12 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 13v.
103Fesenko, Povest', p. 68.
104Zagorul'ko and Iudenkov, Krakh plana "Ol'denburg," p. 94.
105Liudmyla Stanyslavivna Khmilevs'ka (Ukrainian born in 1923 in Kiev), author interview in Russian, 13 July 1995, Kiev, tape recording. The reference is to her mother.
106Gudzenko-Tyshkova, CHPWU interview, l. 44.
some party activists said openly that those who did not evacuate would die, because nothing
would be left behind.\(^{107}\) There are also unconfirmed horror stories about the way children were
evacuated. According to a Kievian who later emigrated, thousands of schoolboys and almost all
men were chased on foot eastward for many days, without any food or water. "The trip lasted
many days, and many, especially children, died and remained lying on the road next to cattle
which had fallen from exhaustion. In the last night before the surrender of the city, when it
became clear that was impossible to lead them through the encirclement, several hundreds of
children were chased over the mine field in the Pechers'k district beyond the Lavra [Caves
Monastery], 'in order not to hand them over to the enemy.'\(^{108}\) A Ukrainian woman who later
arrived from the west says that "Kievans told us how the Bolsheviks had evacuated children.
They simply gathered them from the schools, disallowing them to say goodbye to their
families. The children did not even know where they would be sent. Some of them, frightened
by the perspective of the unexpected departure and separation from [their] parents, jumped out
of the school windows, in order to flee home."\(^{109}\)

At an early stage, thousands of bags of flour, sugar, and salt were thrown into the
Dnieper, apparently by sinking barges. Medicines and shoe leather were also thrown into the
river in large quantities. Other food stacks were spoiled by pouring fuel over them, were
poured into the streets (oil), or were flushed into the sewage system (liquor).\(^{110}\) On the other

\(^{107}\)Ost, Repatriatsiia, p.55.

\(^{108}\)Chekh, "Pravda o razrushenii."

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\(^{110}\)Fesenko, Povesti', pp .76 and 79; Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 112;
Leontii Forostiv's'kyi, Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy (Buenos Aires, 1952), p. 22; Ost,
Repatriatsiia, p. 55: Chekh, "Pravda." An unidentified person told one author that the destruction
was premature—two months before the German arrival. Hereafter, new food was hastily imported
l'Association d'Études et d'Informations Politiques Internationales, supplement to no. 50 (Paris,
1–15 July 1951), p. 5. This may well be true.
hand, in mid-September suddenly flour, sugar, and other products were put on sale from stocks.  

For about a month, while the Red Army was being encircled to east of the city, the German army waited to the west of it. There were few bomb shelters, so ordinary Kievans started digging their own on their own initiative. The result gave the impression that huge moles were living in the parks and gardens. (Soon before the Germans arrived, the Soviet authorities covertly destroyed most of the real bomb and gas shelters and the gas filters.)  

But after the Germans dropped leaflets saying that Kiev would not be bombed, few people considered it necessary to hide. One popular rumor explained the absence of a bombardment by stating that Hitler was a descendent of a Russian princess and loved Russian architecture.  

There were other tasks to be done, however, such as trench digging and joining the army. Militiamen rounded up people in movie theaters and from line-ups outside, while many men tried to make themselves look too old for trench-digging by growing a beard. Self-mutilation to escape the army draft was not uncommon. In the last weeks of Soviet rule, extermination battalions hunted for and shot "suspect" men in the streets. Finally, in the last days before the fall of Kiev, all men were ordered to leave. But by then many, including young,

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111 Turkalo, Torture, p. 191.  
112 Forostivs'kyi, Kyiv, pp. 20–21; Fesenko, Povest', p. 67; Chekh, "Pravda." On the absence of air-raid shelters, see Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 140.  
113 Fesenko, Povest', p. 68; Ievhen Onats'kyi, "Ukraina ochyma italiiss'kykh korespondentiv u druhii svitovii viini," Samostiina Ukraina, XVIII, 1 (191) (New York, January 1965), p. 33. Onats'kyi writes that he replaced every mention of "Russian" in the Italian reports with "Ukrainian." In this case, however, people must have told the correspondent the word "Russian" (russkaia).  
115 Ibid., p. 72.  
116 N. Iu. Pushkars'kyi, "Iak horiv Kyiv," Ukrains'kyi zbirnyk, 5 (Munich, 1956), p. 164; Chekh, "Pravda." That these were extermination battalions is not specifically stated but is obvious.  
unarmed members of the extermination battalions, were already in hiding in cellars and wardrobes.118

Late on 18 September—the day before Germans would enter the city—huge explosions were heard. Kiev's four Dnieper bridges, the new electric power station in the Podil district, the cannery, the water tower (and thus the water supply) were blown up. Food stacks at the train station were also dynamited.119 Because these places were considered military objects, Kievans were not particularly angry.120 Few knew that a number of soldiers were still on the Derevianyi Bridge when it was blown up.121 There was little panic in the city that day. Iryna Oleksandrivna Khoroshunova, then a young woman sympathetic to the Soviet system, wrote in her diary. Even on that day, she apparently believed that Kiev would not fall. She recorded that people looked "anxious" and "serious," partly because they were afraid of assaults by criminals. (Criminals were widely believed to have been released several days before.) But she also saw "many happy, smiling faces."122 That day looting started. The objects of looting were primarily the buildings which had been blown up, for there was food there,123 but also stores and offices. Here the shop-windows were smashed and everything was removed, including things like dishes and furniture.124 Just one event was later described by an eyewitness.

118 Fesenko, Povest', pp. 69 and 72; Turkalo, Tortury, p. 191.

119 Pushkar'skyi, 'Iak horiv Kyïv,' p. 164; Hrynevych, author interview; Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 183 (March 20, 1942), p. 10.

120 Pushkars'kyi, "Iak horiv Kyïv," p. 164.

121 Dimer, Ogladivaias' nazad, p. 23; Fesenko, Povest', p. 71; Turkalo, Tortury, p. 192; Chekh, "Pravda."

122 I. A. Khoroshunova, "Kievskie zapiski. 1941–1944," [photocopy of selected pages of typed manuscript], in Erhard Roy Wiehn, comp., Die Schoah von Babij Jar: das Massaker deutscher Sonderkommandos an der jüdischen Bevölkerung von Kiew 1941 fünfzig Jahre danach zum Gedenken (Konstanz, 1991), pp. 268 and 271. She calls herself Ukrainian in a letter to the compiler in ibid., p. 38. On the issue of release of criminals and attacks by them, see also Dimer, Ogladivaias' nazad, p. 23 and Chekh, "Pravda." Cf. Velychkivs'kyi, "Sumni chasy," Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, XII, 1 (London, 1965), p. 45, which says incorrectly that there was order in the city and "no banditry at all was visible."

123 Fesenko, Povest', p. 71.

124 Pushkars'kyi, "Iak horiv Kyïv," p. 166; Kravchenko, author interview.
I was going in the streetcar down Bul'varo-Kudriavs'ka Street, which is now Vorovs'kyi Street, when it stopped at the corner of the Jewish Market, right in front of the bakery. I thought that it would stop for just a while and waited for it to move on. Then I noticed that a crowd had burst into the bakery. People were coming out, completely dirtied with flour, with bags full of flour. Passions rose high. One pushes the other, that one pushes a third. One person falls down somewhere, another is hurled to the ground. Bags are ripped apart, flour spills on the street. There was shouting, noise, and coarse language.125

In the morning of 19 September, German soldiers entered the city, and at noon the swastika was raised above the citadel.126 The Kievsans reacted in various ways. Some balconies were decorated with flowers.127 Nazi intelligence (the Sicherheitsdienst or SD, that is, the Einsatzgruppen) even reported that the Germans were given "a happy reception."128 More accurate, however, is what a German soldier noted in his diary: "The surprised population is in the streets. They still don't know how to behave. Here and there are a few timid greetings. Whenever German soldiers halt, they are immediately surrounded by a large crowd prepared to give friendly assistance and help." Somewhat later he added, "In the first days we still noticed several times just how much the Ukrainians fear[ed] a return of the Bolsheviks and therefore [kept] their distance from us."129

That most city residents came out to watch and filled the streets, but did little more, is confirmed by most accounts from Kievsans who later emigrated. One report stresses how much

125Vladimir Mikhailovich Artobolevskii (Russian born in 1874), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 and 25 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 16. The start of the looting on that day is confirmed by Khoroshunova, "Kievske zapiski," p. 272. Cf. Forostivs'kyi, Kyïv, p. 23, which asserts that the looting was initiated by young Soviet activists and took place according to a plan. This seems unlikely.


127Chepurnoi, zam. zav. orinstruktorskim otdelom TsK KP(b)U, "Informatsiia o sostoyanii raboty kievs'koiz podpol'noi organizatsii KP(b)U," Starobil's'k [Luhans'k oblast], 26 March 1943, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 11, l. 10.

128Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 106 (7 October 1941), p. 9 ("einen freudigen Empfang").

the Kievan were curious, having been cut off from the outside world for so long. Another comments specifically about the Khreshchatyk, Kiev's main street: "The soldiers tried to strike up conversations and exchange jokes with the public which was standing in rows on the sidewalk. Almost all the onlookers were sullenly silent while looking at the victors. I felt that my spiritual state was merging with the general somber and reticent, depressed mood of the crowd. One spectator shouted in broken [German]: 'Long live the victorious German army!' People looked at him with bewilderment and shrugged their shoulders." Likewise, Khoroshunova wrote in her diary that she saw by the telegraph office (near Hotel Red Kiev) how Kievan and Germans simply looked at each other. She found that no one particular mood prevailed. A man who had been persecuted as a former member of the Central Rada of the Ukrainian National Republic recalls his tremendous relief. "The devil's regime [vlada satany] was gone and I had become a human being. I thought to myself, how fatally tragic it is for a citizen to wish the defeat in war of his own state." But such feelings were not necessarily visible to others.

To be sure, in certain streets the mood was openly upbeat, with some people dancing, embracing, and drinking. But even here most adults were apparently sitting inside. According to one Kievan, who also writes that hundreds of draft-age males came out of hiding, even the Khreshchatyk was "filled with thousands of Kievan in festive clothes. Many women were holding bouquets of flowers, which they were throwing at the soldiers and officers passing by. It was a rare case in history when the defeated rejoiced about the victors' arrival." Among those who offered bread and salt were also Jewish artisans. (The issue of

130Fesenko, Povest', pp. 71-72.
131Ckekh, "Pravda."
133Turkalo, Tortury, p. 192.
134Hrynevych, author interview.
135F. P. Bogatyrychuk, Moi zhiznennyi put' k Vlasovu i Prazhkomu manifestu (San Francisco, 1978), p. 127. The sudden appearance of the draft-dodgers is also mentioned in Fesenko, Povest',
Jewish expectations will be discussed separately in chapter 10.\textsuperscript{136} Anatolii Kuznetsov, then a twelve-year-old living in the Kurenivka district, writes in his reliable memoir that the mood in those days was happy, partly because of the sunny weather. He was amazed that the Germans who arrived in Frunze Street were smiling and laughing and that their infantry did not walk but was being driven in trucks.

The pavements were quickly filling up with people rushing in from all sides. Like us, they first looked at this armada in amazement, then began to smile at the Germans in reply and to try and start up conversations with them. As for the Germans, practically all of them had little conversation-books which they were quickly looking through and called out to the girls on the pavement: 'Hey girl, miss...! Bolshevik—finish. Ukraina!' 'Ukrap'éena,' the girls corrected them with a laugh. 'Ja, ja. U-kray-éena! Go walk, spazieren, bitte!' The girls giggled and blushed, and all the people around were laughing and smiling.

A group of elderly men and women wanted to offer these Germans bread and salt, but arrived too late on the scene.\textsuperscript{137} Many people were actually too busy looting to receive the Germans. In the Podil district, for example, the streets, full of broken glass, were packed with people carrying and moving things. Germans joined in, and neither group paid much attention to each other.\textsuperscript{138} When it was clear that the Germans were minding their own business, another night and morning of looting followed, this time of the Khreshchatyk. At first the Germans tried to chase the lootors away with threats and beatings, but then they simply joined in.\textsuperscript{139}

Part of the reason why German soldiers were smiling was that there were no battles inside the city. The barricades and obstacles which had been placed in all the streets (sand bags

\textsuperscript{136} Kravchenko, author interview.

\textsuperscript{137} A. Anatoli (Kuznetsov), \textit{Babi Yar: A Document in the Form of a Novel} (London, 1970), pp. 28–29.

\textsuperscript{138} Kuznetsov, \textit{Babii iar}, p. 68. Cf. \textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 106 (7 October 1941), p. 10, which says that after the Germans secured main buildings and factories, "significant \textit{in grössem Masse} plunder by Wehrmacht members and populace has not taken place."

\textsuperscript{139} Kuznetsov, \textit{Babii iar}, p. 78.
and barbed wire) were not used. Moreover, while the long encirclement battle near Kiev had caused much damage in the countryside and in the suburbs, the Germans caused almost no damage in Kiev itself.\textsuperscript{140} They were soon to be surprised and enraged, however. Already on 19 September, there were fires in several houses, stores, and stacks, extinguished by neighbors.\textsuperscript{141} On 20 September the first Germans died in Kiev, as a mine exploded in the citadel, where a German artillery staff was quartered, killing all officers and soldiers inside.\textsuperscript{142} It was also about this time that the first Jews were arrested in the streets. This was done by Germans who checked people's passports. The Soviet entry on "nationality" proved to be a great liability.\textsuperscript{143} Meanwhile, rumors started blaming the Jews for the defeat of the Red Army. Perhaps these were started by Germans, as Khoroshunova believed.\textsuperscript{144}

On 24 September, thousands of people were standing patiently in line-ups along the Khreshchatyk.\textsuperscript{145} They were obeying orders to register at the Feldkommandantur in a former hotel at 1 Prorizna Street (then still called Sverdlov Street), and to hand in hunting rifles, gas masks, and radios (many of which they had actually removed from the NKVD stacks the day before) across the street, at a former toystore ("Detskii Mir," 2 Prorizna Street). Around 2:00 p.m., a mine exploded on the first floor at the latter location,\textsuperscript{146} followed moments later by an

\textsuperscript{140}Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 106 (7 October 1941), p. 9; Turkalo, Tortury, p. 190. On casualties in a suburb, see Turkalo, Tortury, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{141}"Kiev. Kopia," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 119, ll. 3–4; Pushkars'kyi, "Iak horiv Kyïv," pp. 165–166; Chekh, "Pravda."

\textsuperscript{142}Warned by Kievans, Germans sappers had earlier searched the place for mines, but had not found any. Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 97 (28 September 1941), p. 23; ibid., 106 (7 October 1941), p. 11; "Kiev. Kopia," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 119, l. 7.

\textsuperscript{143}Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 73–74.

\textsuperscript{144}Khoroshunova, "Kievskie zapiski," pp. 277–278.

\textsuperscript{145}My main sources for the following paragraphs are the generally reliable Pushkars'kyi, "Iak horiv Kyïv" and Oleg Chekh, "Pravda o razrushenii Kyieva," Novoe russkoe slovo, 30 January 1948, 2 and 31 January 1948, 2. Additional sources are indicated where used. A much shorter account, based on fewer sources, is Titus D. Hewryk, The Lost Architecture of Kiev (New York, 1982), pp. 38–39.

\textsuperscript{146}This was perhaps as a result of bombs which Soviet agents had hidden in radios which they had handed in. This interpretation also became a rumor. See K. Radzevych [Osyp Vynnyts'kyi], "Usorokarichchia Kyïvs'koï pokhidnoï hrupy OUN," Kalendar-al'manakh Novoho Shliakhu 1982
even louder blast from the third floor. The second explosion blasted Germans from the vehicles in which they were passing by, made the entire top of the building fall on the people waiting below, and started a large fire.\footnote{Professor N. A. Shepelevskii, "Prebyvanie nemtsev v Kieve," Typewritten document, signed, Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchyykh orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia Ukrainy [hereafter: TsDAVOV], f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, l. 53.} There were both German and Kievian casualties, also because a panic ensued in which people were trampled to death. About fifteen minutes later, another, even louder blast destroyed the Grand Hotel, the site of the German Main Staff; the Germans inside were killed. Moments later, the Arcade (Pasazh) blew up, and still more explosions were heard in Hotel Continental in Karl Marx Street (which ends on the Khreshchatyk). Besides casualties, the explosions also brought freedom for more than three hundred Jews, mostly gray-bearded men, who were held in a movie theater on the Khreshchatyk. They had expected to be killed, but now their guards had fled.\footnote{"Kiev, Babi Yar," in Ilya Ehrenburg and Vasily Grossman, eds., The Black Book: The Ruthless Murder of Jews by German-Fascist Invaders throughout the Temporarily-Occupied Regions of the Soviet Union and in the Death Camps of Poland during the War of 1941-1945 (New York, 1981), p. 4.}

All evening and night, and also the next day, with intervals of several minutes, more explosions followed at 2 Prorizna Street and the Khreshchatyk. What emerged was a detailed plan by the NKVD to destroy the entire city center. Short- and long-term mines had been skillfully laid. Some apartments had easily detected fake mines, while real ones were behind a new layer of wallpaper and were triggered by things such as the light switch. Moreover, underground agents spread the fires by throwing bottles of fuel ("Molotov cocktails").\footnote{Pushkars'kyi, "Iak horiv Kyïv," p. 165; Fesenko, Povest', p. 73; Zhuk, "Pozhary," p. 107; and Paul Werner, Ein Schweizer Journalist sieht Rußland: auf den Spuren der deutschen Arme zwischen San und Dniepr (Olton, 1942), pp. 99–100. During the war, and again briefly in the 1960s, Soviet publications took pride in the destruction. See Yuri Sherekh [Turi Shelev], "Why Did You Not Want to See Me, Mr. Steinbeck?," Ukrainian Quarterly, IV, 4 (New York, 1948), p. 322 and Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 86.}

Extinguishing the fires proved difficult, for there was still no water supply. On the third day, however, a large fire-hose arrived from Warsaw or Breslau/Wroclaw. It started pumping water from the Dnieper. Soon this too was sabotaged, however, when about five young people

(Toronto, [n.d.]), p. 75 and Fesenko, Povest', p. 73.
were caught ripping it open. These people were shot and left lying for two days. A special emergency train was requested but could not arrive. On the fourth day of the fires, the Kievan fire brigade returned from its evacuation and joined the extinguishing effort in which already many Kievs were mobilized. In order to check the spreading fire, the Germans shot the inhabitants of houses adjacent to those where mines exploded, and also eventually themselves blew up apartments, but neither had much effect.

The fire affected an area of about two square kilometers. The Khreshchatyk was cordoned off. Through loudspeakers from cars and Germans running door to door, people living in adjacent streets were ordered to leave their homes. Altogether, about 25,000 people became homeless. They spent about a week on the streets, squares, and in the park on Volodymyr Hill. Many of the elderly did not survive. After some time, those whose apartment were checked—and thoroughly emptied—were allowed to move back in. The center burned for over a week. The fire was so large that nighttime no longer seemed to exist in the neighboring streets and streetlights were not necessary. If people at home slept at all, they kept their clothes on, in order to be able to flee quickly. On street corners, people could be seen holding icons and praying.

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155 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 106 (7 October 1941), pp. 12–13; Harry Mielert, Russische Erde: Kriegsbriefe aus Rußland (Stuttgart, 1950), p. 19 ("Alte Leute sterben, und zahlreiche Leichen trägt man fort"); Chepurnoi, "Informatsiia," l. 2; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 82. Hans Koch reported that the fire raged until 29 September and made about 50,000 people homeless. He wrote on 5 October that these people were "provisionally housed in abandoned apartments"—i.e., the former homes of the Jews. Document 053-PS, partly published in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal [TMWC], Vol. 25 (Nuremberg, 1949), p. 100.
156 Zhuk, "Pozhary," pp.109–110; Iaroslav Haivas, "V roky nadii i beznadii (Zustrichi i rozmovy z O. Ol'zhychem v rokah 1939-1944)," Kalendar al'manakh Novoho Shliakhu 1977 (Toronto, [n.d.]), p. 111; Khoroshunova, "Kievskie zapiski," p. 289; Kravchenko, author interview. For six weeks, a large black cloud continued to hang over the city, according to Markovskii, CHPWU interview, l. 221.
Both the population and the Germans were outraged. Already on 24 September a crowd started looking for perpetrators. In the process, many innocents were handed over to the Germans and shot. Kievans eagerly helped find NKVD agents and bombs. Thus bombs were found in the Lenin Museum before they could be detonated.\textsuperscript{157} A released prisoner of war came forward and made himself known as an engineer who had been forced to place mines in twelve buildings, including "Red Army Home."\textsuperscript{158} Altogether, according to the SD, the Germans discovered and removed 670 mines. On their own, they found them for example in the Opera (one ton of explosives), the former building of the Central Rada of the revolutionary years (the present-day Teachers' Building; three tons), the Bank, the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, and the NKVD headquarters.\textsuperscript{159} The Slavist Dr Hans Koch wrote generally objective reports about Ukraine for German military intelligence (the Abwehr), but he probably exaggerated when he reported (and also told foreign journalists who visited Kiev in October) that over \textit{ten thousand} mines had been rendered harmless. At least seven thousand of these, he said, were without any tactical justification, as they were located in places such as churches, museums, private apartments, and office desks. Koch also reported that 100,000 tons of explosives had been found under the thirteenth-century Dormition Cathedral (Uspens'kyi Sobor) of the Kievan Caves Monastery.\textsuperscript{160} Perhaps surprisingly, the Tsarist Palace and Kiev's most prestigious district Lypky were not mined.\textsuperscript{161} Despite the searches, even in late October the former Duma

\textsuperscript{157}These were to supposed to have been detonated via short-wave radio signals. \textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 106 (7 October 1941), pp. 11 and 14; "Zerstörung von Kulturgütern durch die Bolschewiken und Wiederherstellung durch die Deutschen," TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 1, d. 27, ll. 280–282.

\textsuperscript{158}\textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 119 (20 October 1941), p. 10.

\textsuperscript{159}Forostivs'kyi, \textit{Kyïv}, p. 21


\textsuperscript{161}\textit{TMWC}, Vol. 25, p. 101; Forostivs'kyi, \textit{Kyïv}, p. 31.
building and the Supreme Soviet building exploded (through long-term devices). The Germans prevented the fire department from extinguishing the fire in the latter.\textsuperscript{162}

As soon as the fires had started, house searches for Jews began as well, and hundreds of them were arrested, along with the NKVD agents, political commissars, and partisans.\textsuperscript{163} Rumors spread that Jews were to blame for the destruction of the city center, in particular that a Jew had delivered a radio which was a bomb.\textsuperscript{164} This ominous atmosphere reached its climax on Sunday, 28 September. That day, large announcements with text in Russian, Ukrainian, and German appeared all over Kiev. As Einsatzgruppe C later reported, they were posted "by the members of the appointed Ukrainian militia."\textsuperscript{165} The posters said in large letters that all the Jews "of the city of Kiev and its vicinity" had to appear on Monday, 29 September, before 8:00 a.m., "at the corner of Mel'nykov and Dokterivs'ka Streets (near the cemeteries). They must take with them documents, money, and valuables, and also warm clothing, underwear, etc." The latter street did not actually exist—what was meant was Dehtiarivs'ka Street. The largest, Russian text described the Jews as zhidy (kikes). The rest of the Russian text was as follows: "Those kikes who will not follow this order and will be found elsewhere will be shot. Those citizens who will enter apartments abandoned by Jews and appropriate things will be shot."\textsuperscript{166}

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\textsuperscript{162}Pushkars'kyi, "Iak horiv Kyiv," p. 172. The fire in the Supreme Soviet building broke out on 31 October. The next day, the head of the fire department wrote to Mayor Bahazii that the Germans had prevented four fire brigades from extinguishing it. M. V. Koval', "Dolia ukraïns'koï kul'tury za 'novoho poriadku' (1941-1944 rr.)," \textit{Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnol}, 11-12 (Kiev, November-December 1993), p. 24.


\textsuperscript{166}A reduced photocopy is in Wiehn, \textit{Die Schodh}, p. 144. My quotations are from the Russian text. The Ukrainian text spoke of "Mel'nyk [sic] and Dokterivs'ka [sic] Streets." Worthy of mention is the absence in the order of a threat against non-Jews for helping Jews escape.
\end{flushleft}
All Kievans, Jews and non-Jews alike, agreed on one thing: this order was provoked by the explosions and fires. One Mr. Raizman, a friend of Pihido's, told him, "This is the work of those tramps [boshiaki—a pun on bol'shevik]. They decided to play on us Jews a final trick. Without these terrible explosions, the Germans would have left us alone."167 Now the SD, and probably the "Ukrainian militia," spread the rumor that the Jews would be concentrated in a ghetto and put to work there. Many Jews may have thought that they would be sent to Germany, because the chosen location was close not only to the Jewish and Orthodox cemeteries, but also to a cargo train station.168 Another rumor said that the Jews would be exchanged for German prisoners of war.169 But there were already on the 28th and 29th many Jews who took fate into their own hands and committed suicide.170 Others suspected that death awaited them. A Ukrainian woman recalled years later that she heard how her Jewish neighbors talked before leaving: "Khaim, why are you taking that pillow, for we are going to our death?" "I am going to sit on it."171 Karaite men were later rumored to have prayed all night in their synagogue and to have told everybody the next morning to get ready to die.172 Whatever the sentiments which predominated among the Jews of Kiev, it will probably never be known.

What did the non-Jewish Kievans think when the anti-Jewish posters appeared? According to Pihido, "nobody expressed thoughts about the possibility of that which happened [at Babyn Yar]." Fedir Bohatyrchuk, another Ukrainian from Kiev, wrote later that "few

169A Russian woman who had a Jewish husband in the Red Army believed this. She went to Babyn Iar and pretended to be Jewish, in the hope of rejoining him. She was taken out at the last minute by an ethnic German. "Kiev, Babi Yar," in Black Book, p. 8.
172Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 95.
considered the possibility of the terrible truth: mass murder."\textsuperscript{173} Indeed, many, if not most non-Jewish Kievans apparently believed that the Jews would "merely" be deported. Kuznetsov describes how his Russian-speaking Ukrainian grandfather reacted that day: "I've great news for you! ... From tomorrow there won't be a single kike left in Kiev. It seems it's true what they said about them setting fire to the Khreshchatyk. Thank the Lord for that! That'll pay them back for getting rich at our expense, the bastards. Now they can go off to their blessed Palestine, or at any rate the Germans'll deal with 'em. They're being deported!" Kuznetsov himself, who had a good Jewish friend, thought that the Jews would be sent to Palestine and that this was for the best.\textsuperscript{174}

All of Monday, 29 September, Jews—men, women, and small children—along with their non-Jewish husbands, wives, other relatives, and even friends, walked to the designated street corner in Kiev's Lukšianivka district (west of the city center). There are several testimonies about the exodus. The Russian middle-aged teacher L. Nartova wrote in her diary about what she saw from her balcony: "People are moving in an endless row, overflowing the entire street and sidewalks. Women and men are walking, young girls, children, old people, and entire families. Many carry their belonging on wheelbarrows, but most of them are carrying things on their backs. They walk in silence, quietly. How awful.... It went on like this for very long, the entire day and only in the evening did the crowd of people become smaller." She even adds, which is not confirmed elsewhere, but may be true: "And they were walking the next day and so it went on for several days..."\textsuperscript{175} Pihido was on Artem Street, then called L'viv Street, around 11 a.m. that Monday, and writes:

\textsuperscript{173}Pihido-Pravoberezhniy, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," pp. 106–107; Bogatyrchuk, Moi put', p. 130.

\textsuperscript{174}Anatoli (Kuznetsov), Babi Yar, pp. 90 and 92. I replaced the translator's "Yid" with "kike" and "put paid to them" with "pay them back for." Cf. Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 106 (7 October 1941), p. 15, which states: "The 'resettlement measure' implemented against the Jews has generally found agreement [hat durchaus die Zustimmung der Bevölkerung gefunden]. That the Jews were actually liquidated has hardly become known so far."

\textsuperscript{175}iz dnevnika uchitel'nitsy gor. Kieva L. Nartovoi," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 347, l. 1. The note is under the incorrect heading "28 September 1941."
Many thousands of people, mainly old ones, — but middle-aged people were also not lacking, — were moving toward Babyn Jar. And the children... My God, there were so many children! All this was moving, burdened with luggage and children. Here and there old and sick people who had no strength to move by themselves were being carried, probably by sons or daughters, without assistance on carts. Some cry, others console. Most are moving self-absorbed, silently, with a doomed look. It was a terrible sight...¹⁷⁶

Bohatyrchuk describes the exodus as follows:

On the morning of 30 [sic?] September I could not yet know about what had happened and met on the way to work a large number of Jews who were walking to the cemetery with stony faces, paralyzed with fright. They already instinctively foresaw what was going to happen to them. Only the children had no suspicions and ran business-like, with bags in their hands or knapsacks on their shoulders. I remember a group of Jews who carried on a stretcher a gray-haired old man, apparently a rabbi, and sang a sad song.¹⁷⁷

All these witnesses were clearly shaken by the experience. Another observer, a female factory engineer, generalized later when talking to the Commission on the Patriotic War in Ukraine, "When they walked, it was such a weight on the hearts of all."¹⁷⁸ However true this may have been for her and her acquaintances, by no means all observers were sad. Bohatyrchuk writes that "unfortunately and to my shame, I have to say that I saw quite a few of my co-religionists who observed this exodus with happy faces [s radostnymi litsami]. These short-sighted people, blinded by hatred, simply did not realize what was going on."¹⁷⁹ Kuznetsov saw the exodus of the mostly poor Jews from the Kurenivka district and writes:

Deeply affected by what I saw, I went from one group of [onlooking] people to the next, listening to what they were saying; and the closer I got to the Podil the more people I found out on the streets. They were standing in the gateways and porches, some of them watching and sighing, others jeering and hurling insults at the Jews. At


¹⁷⁷Bogatyrchuk, Moi put', p. 131. The date is in doubt because he writes incorrectly that the poster appeared on the 29th. Ibid., p. 130.

¹⁷⁸Nadezhda Petrovna Konashko (Ukrainian born in 1913), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 2.

¹⁷⁹Bogatyrchuk, Moi put', p. 131.
one point a wicked-looking old woman in a dirty head-scarf ran out on to the roadway, snatched a case from an elderly Jewess and rushed back inside the courtyard. The Jewess screamed at her, but some tough characters stood in the gateway and stopped her getting in. She sobbed and cursed and complained, but nobody would take her part, and the crowd went on [its] way, [with] eyes averted. I peeped through a crack and saw a whole pile of stolen things lying in the yard. I also overhead someone say that in one place a cabby who had been specially hired to transport the luggage belonging to several families simply whipped up his horse and dashed off down a side-street, and they never saw him again.180

He also saw later along the deserted streets a few latecomers who walked fast, "to the accompaniment of whistles and shouts from the doorways."181 Among the onlookers were also many Germans. On Artem Street, they called out to Jewish girls, "Come do my laundry!" (Komm waschen!).182 The remaining non-Jewish population was to find out about what happened next only on 30 September and 1 October. (How they reacted to the news will be discussed in chapter 10.) At the same time, "certain suspect people" tried to sell fur and jewelry in the streets.183 Many of the Jews' apartments were eventually occupied by those who had become homeless because of the fires.184

Once the Jews and those who accompanied them arrived at the designated corner of Mel'nykov and Dehtiarivs'ka Streets, they continued to walk further west. One Jewish girl, G. Ia. Batasheva, came there with her family relatively late, around 10 a.m. She saw how about fifteen trucks with heaps of clothes on them passed them by in the opposite direction.

Nevertheless, people kept saying that they would be deported by train. The point of no return was at the intersection of Mel'nykov and Puhachova Streets. From then on, they were guarded

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180Anatoli (Kuznetsov), Babi Yar, p. 94. I replaced the translator's "Podol" with "the Podil" and made some other changes, indicated by the brackets.

181Ibid., p. 96; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 95 ("iz vorot im svisteli i uliuliulaki vdogonku").

182Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 101, based on his long interview with D. M. Pronicheva (see note 187).

183Fesenko, Povest', p. 75. Bohatyrchuk writes that he and others found out the truth "only after several days" because the SS had concealed the operation carefully. Bogatyrchuk, Moi put', p. 130.

by German soldiers and the all-German Police Battalion 303. Many non-Jews were sent away at this stage. There were also Germans standing along both sides of the street, who ordered the Jews to drop their bags and suitcases. The Jews were chased toward the entrance of a ravine, known to all Kievans as Babii Iar (in Ukrainian: Babyn Iar), located between Luk'ianivka and two other districts (Kurenivka and Syrets'). Suddenly semi-automatic gunfire could be heard. The procession took a left (southward) turn into Sim' Kiokhlovych Street, then called Kahatna Street, which had the Jewish cemetery on its right (west). Then it took a right (westward) turn into Dorohozhyts'ka Street, which was between that cemetery and the Luk'ianivka cemetery.

The record of Batasheva's testimony says that "both sides of Dorohozhyts'ka Street were densely planted with young trees, and between them stood Hitlerites armed with automatics and sticks. Many had dogs. At the end of the cemetery terrain the people were chased to the right, along Babyn Iar, where, as it were, a living corridor of sub-machine-gunners [avtomatchiki] had been formed. It led [downward] to a large even ground. Those who tried to move aside [in the corridor] were beaten severely with sticks and attacked by dogs. People were also beaten without any reason." Another survivor, Dina Mironovna Pronicheva (born Vasserman in 1911 in Chernihiv), who arrived relatively early at the site, told the Commission on the History of the Patriotic War in Ukraine in 1946 that the point of no return was at "the gate of the Jewish cemetery" (i.e., not already at Puhachova Street), where

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186Batasheva questioning in Wiehn, Die Schoah, pp. 165–166. She and another girl told a German there that they were not Jewish. He took them to a group of car drivers. One driver drove them to Mel'nykov Street and let them go. I have concluded that this record means the Jewish cemetery when referring to the "military" cemetery.
"at the entrance were standing Germans and *politsai* [native policemen]." Nobody was let out, "except for interpreters." She continues:

I left my relatives at the gate of the cemetery and walked on my own to see what was going on further on. Opposite the Jewish cemetery is a long fence which turns to the left, I went straight to see where the people were taken, why they are walking that way. I thought there would be a train standing there, but I saw that the Germans were immediately taking off and seizing fur clothes, they took food and put it in one place, the clothes in another, while the people walked on. The Germans took out a large number of people, stopped those walking for some time, and took people out again. When it was my turn, I wanted at first to get out, but they did not let me. I returned to my parents and did not tell them anything, in order not to upset them, and went with them....

[In the corridor,] if somebody fell, a dog was let loose which ripped things and the body, the person just had to get up and run downward, and there fall into the hands of *politsai*, who undressed people completely, and while doing so beat them terribly, wherever and however they could: with their hands, feet, some of the *politsai* had knuckledusters. The people went to execution covered with blood.187

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187Pronicheva, CHPWU interview, ll. 116–118 (full reference in note 164). This text has been published in Feliks Levitas and Mark Shimanovskii, *Babii iar: stranitsy tragedii* (Kiev, 1991), pp. 22–32 (the quotations provided so far in my account are in ibid, pp. 23–24) and also in a Ukrainian translation in "Babyn iar (veresen' 1941 – veresen' 1943 r.)," *Ukrains'kyi istorichniyi zhurnal*, 9 (Kiev, 1991), pp. 80–86. Both publications are based on a second copy of the report which is located at TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 281, ll. 1–21.

There are three other records based on statements by Pronicheva. All confirm the presence of Ukrainian policemen. (1) On 9 February 1967, she testified at a Soviet trial. A German translation of this testimony is in Longerich, *Die Ermordung*, pp. 124–127 and Wiehn, *Die Schoah*, pp. 175–177.

(2) Anatoliy Kuznetsov interviewed Pronicheva for several days in a year which he does not mention. His record, which he vows is correct, says that at the entrance of the Jewish cemetery stood Germans and "Ukrainian policemen in black uniforms with grey cuffs." There instruction were given by "a very striking figure, a tall, energetic man in a Ukrainian embroidered shirt, with a long Cossack moustache.... Everyone called him 'Mr Shevchenko,' like the Ukrainian poet. Maybe that was his proper name, or maybe somebody had dubbed him that because of his moustache, but it sounded rather frightful, like 'Mr Pushkin' or 'Mr Dostoyevsky.'" Anatoliy (Kuznetsov), *Babi Yar*, pp. 101 and 104; Kuznetsov, *Babi iar*, pp. 101 and 104. Kuznetsov's text speaks of western Ukrainian accents. It also says that the orders to undress were given by the Ukrainian policemen, who, if people hesitated, "tore off the clothes by force, kicked them and beat them with knuckledusters and clubs, drunk with fury, in some sadistic rage." *Babii iar*, p. 106. It is worth noting that the published translation by David Floyd mistakenly adds "by the Germans." See *Babi Yar*, p. 106. The Russian original clearly refers to the Ukrainian policemen. Kuznetsov's text also has this quote: "Demidenko! Davai prikidai!" Here, as on several other pages in his book, Kuznetsov translated from Ukrainian into Russian without indicating that he did so.

(3) The final and least reliable text is Shimon Kipnis, "Zhivoi privet iz ada," in Iosif [Joseph] Vinokurov, Shimon Kipnis, and Nora Levin, eds., *Kniga pamiaty posviashchenzhia zherivar Bab'ego lara* (Philadelphia, 1983), pp. 21–33, with an English translation on pp. 108–118. Kipnis was a writer who emigrated from the Soviet Union to the United States. He wrote this account on the basis of two days of conversation with Pronicheva. He does not say when or where this was. He does say that she fell ill on the third day, was taken to a hospital, and died there. This text mentions *politsai-ukraintsy*, one of whom supposedly told a German, "Don't believe her, she is a Jewess. We know her...." (p. 22). This is contradicted by all three earlier records, which speak of a Ukrainian policeman who believed that Pronicheva was Ukrainian and wanted to release her.

Viktor Nekrasov, a Russian writer from Kiev, has written that his mother begged her many Jewish friends in vain not to go, and even offered to hide them at her place. She, and many others...
For the presence of Ukrainians at that site there is also a German source. A former member of the main murder team, Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppe C, years later testified to German prosecutors that the Jews were received, undressed, pushed, and kicked "by the Ukrainians."\textsuperscript{188} Is is likely that most of these Ukrainians were members of the so-called Bukovinian Battalion, an unofficial unit led by the OUN-M which comprised hundreds of OUN members and sympathizers from Galicia as well as Bukovina.\textsuperscript{189}

who accompanied the Jews, were chased away somewhere near the Jewish cemetary by what Nekrasov calls "robust German soldiers with rolled up sleeves and \textit{politsai} in black uniforms with grey cuffs. Somewhere further, ahead, shooting was audible, but mother did not understand a thing then..." Viktor Nekrasov, "\textit{Zapiski zevaki}," \textit{Kontinent: literaturnyi, obshchestvенно-politicheskiy i religioznyy zhurnal}, IV ([Paris?], 1975), p. 73, cited in Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Methodological Problems and Philosophical Issues in the Study of Jewish-Ukrainian Relations during the Second World War," in Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj, eds., \textit{Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective} (Edmonton, 1990), p. 380. Another second-hand mention of the \textit{politsai} is in Levitas and Shimanovskii, \textit{Babii iar}, p. 20.

The record of the questioning of Bataueva speaks only of "Hitlerites" and "fascists." Another survivor who crawled out, Elena Efimovna Knysh, only mentioned "German soldiers." \textit{Black Book}, pp. 9-10. For another account by this survivor, see Levitas and Shimanovskii, \textit{Babii iar}, pp. 18-19.

\textsuperscript{188}Höfer of Sonderkommando 4a, testimony, 27 August 1959, Germany, reproduced in Ernst Klee et al., comps., \textit{"Schöne Zeiten": Judenmord aus der Sicht der Täter und Gaffer} (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), p. 67, and translated in Ernst Klee et al., comps., \textit{Those Were the Days: The Holocaust through the Eyes of the Perpetrators and Bystanders} (London, 1991), p. 63.

\textsuperscript{189}A recent "official" history prepared by veterans of the Bukovinian Battalion indicates that members of the battalion were present in Kiev from the time of the fires in the center and were functioning as part of the Ukrainian police. After mentioning the encirclement of the Red Army near Kiev and the date of the German arrival in Kiev, the account says: "Less than a week after these events, the Bukovinian Battalion, which at that time had 700 to 800 members, arrived in Kiev." The history adds that several members took jobs in the city administration or created police units in Vasyl'kiv, Bila Tserkva, and other places in the Kiev region. Then follows a history of the Ukrainian police in Kiev, which starts as follows: "With the remaining members of the Battalion, a military course was held. They participated in rescue efforts, helping the inhabitants of Kiev to extinguish the fires and to liquidate the consequences of the massive explosions."

Andrii Duda and Volodymyr Staryk, \textit{Bykovyn's'kyi Kurin': v boiakh za ukrains'ku derzhavnist, 1918, 1941, 1944} (Chernivtsi, 1995), pp. 84 and 86.

Two emigré publications from the 1950s also state that the Bukovinian Battalion arrived in Kiev soon after the Germans. According to an official OUN-M publication, it arrived "shortly after its liberation from the Bolsheviks" and "the largest part joined the Ukrainian police." A man who volunteered in L'viv for police work in Kiev wrote in 1957 that he arrived on 9 November 1941 as part of a group of 280 similar volunteers, all people who were "thirsting for revenge." They were accompanied by Captain (\textit{sotnyk}) Petro Voinov's'kyi, the leader of the original Bukovinian Battalion and officially, since 1940, the leader of the Regional Executive of the OUN[-M] in Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the police station in Korolenko Street, these Galicians met "a group of about 350 volunteers; the sons of Green Bukovina and Transcarpathia who also had volunteered for active struggle against the Muscovite occupiers. That group had advanced right behind the front line." Vasyl' Shypyn's'kyi, \textit{"Ukrains'kyi natsionalizm na Bukovyni," in Orhanizatsiia Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv, 1929–1954: zbirnyk statei u 25-littia OUN} ([Paris], 1955), p. 220. Iu. Pasichnyk, "Ukrains'kyi 115 i 118 kureni v borot'bi z soviet's'komu dyversiieiu
According to Batashëva, "at the brink of the ground were elevations [vozvysheniia], and between them narrow aisles leading into the ravines." The ravine was about 150 meters long, thirty meters wide, and fifteen meters deep. Pronicheva after the corridor was able to convince a police officer in Ukrainian that she was a Ukrainian. He told her, "Sit, wait until the evening, when we shot all the Jews, we will let you go." She sat and saw how "babies were taken from their mothers and thrown upward through some kind of sandy wall [peschanaia stena]. All the naked people were lined up two or three at a time and led to some kind of height, to the sandy wall, which had cuts [prorezy] in it. The people went there and did not return.

In the evening a car drove up and the German officer sitting in it ordered all of us to be shot, with the argument that if just one person got out of here and talked in the city about what [s]he had seen here, not a single Jew would show up the next day. After getting out of the so-called door, that cut [razrez], on the left was a small ledge [nebol'shoi vystup], where all people were placed and from the opposite side, from machine-guns they were shot." She jumped and pretended to be dead. Later she was covered with sand by men, one of whom spoke Ukrainian ("Demydenko, davai siudy, zasypai"). The murderers kept count: at the end of two days 33,771 Jews had been slaughtered. This figure may not include the non-Jewish spouses and other relatives who shared their fate.

The weeks or months before the German arrival revealed most of all that the regime which was retreating did not trust or care about those citizens who were slipping out under its control.

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191 Pronicheva, CHPWU interview, II. 118–120; Levitas and Shimanovskii, Babii iar, pp. 24–25. The text in the book by Levitas and Shimanovskii translates the quote into Russian: "Demidenko, davai siuda, zasypai." This kind of editing causes confusion.

From the very beginning, Stalin and his associates gave first priority to making life in the German-held territories impossible. They deceived the population about the true state of affairs at the front, committed atrocities against "unreliables," and pursued a scorched-earth policy. Meanwhile, there was an often panicky flight by an elite who was in the know and had access to transportation. By "Western" standards, all of this suggested that the Soviet authorities were not a native government, but a conqueror being forced out. The scorched-earth policy was not a Communist invention, but essentially a return to tsarist warfare. This applies even to the destruction of major cities; after Napoleon entered Moscow, he soon found himself in a completely leveled city unfit for habitation. Indeed, had Moscow been taken by the Germans in 1941, there is little doubt that Stalin would have had it destroyed in much the same way as Kiev.193

On the other hand, the way the population of Ukraine (and other Soviet territories) responded to the change of authorities may well be unprecedented in the history of European warfare. The spy-mania in the cities was probably greater than in other countries being invaded by the Germans. But most striking was that the vast majority of drafted soldiers did not want to fight. In 1941, they felt there was nothing worth fighting for. Having been cordoned off from the outside world for twenty-five years and constantly deceived by the state-run media, they did not expect that their lives would be at stake.

The looting was not, as many intellectuals concluded, a sign of lack of civilization of the "mob" (chern'), but logical behavior during the collapse of an economy with hardly any private property. To be sure, many people, especially city dwellers, felt that looting was necessary to avert death by starvation. More important, however, was their sense, whether they lived in the cities or in the countryside, that they had the moral right to loot. These people who had been exploited and owned virtually nothing felt that they were not stealing, but merely

193On 15 October 1941, Stalin ordered the evacuation of government and other offices from Moscow, along with, upon the appearance of the Germans at the outskirts, the blowing up of enterprises, stacks, offices, and the power supply to the subway. The water supply and the sewers were apparently excluded from this order. Kumanev, "Sovetskaia ekonomika," p. 177. The comparison with Napoleon's arrival in Moscow is from Lashchenko, "Povorot," Samostiina Ukraina, XI, 7 (115) (New York, July 1958), p. 9.
were taking back their "share." As they shouted in Kiev in response to a question why they were looting: "They took enough of us! We're taking from them whatever we can! It's ours anyway, our blood and sweat!" 194

In the case of Kiev, it is remarkable how the Germans were caught off guard. They had started arresting Jews immediately after their arrival. Stalin's destruction of the city center was immediately followed by the total "deportation" of the Jewish men, women, and children of Kiev, which was welcomed by a significant number of the other Kievans. It was unthinkable—as it is still today—that all of them were systematically massacred. Ukraine's capital had never seen such tragedy as in those days in the fall of 1941. We now know that the massacre would have taken place anyway. But at the time, to the vast majority of Kievans, Jews and non-Jews alike, the poster was provoked by the destruction of the city center.

194Chekh, "Pravda" (the quote); Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 81 (12 September 1941), p. 16.
CHAPTER 2

The Administration of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine

As early as 16 July 1941, Hitler appointed the fervent Nazi Erich Koch (1896–1986) as The Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine (Der Reichskommissar für die Ukraine). Koch, a man in his mid-forties, had a radically left-wing past. He actually admitted once that had he not met Hitler, he would have become a convinced Communist. Even while a member of the Nazi party he published a book in praise of the Soviet Union, Construction in the East (Aufbau im Osten, 1934). Perhaps in order to prove that he had overcome his earlier pro-Soviet attitude, Koch was an extremely and proudly brutal Reichskommissar. He is said to have remarked once, "If I find a Ukrainian who is worthy of sitting at the same table with me, I must have him shot." In Königsberg, present-day Kaliningrad, an admirer heard him deliver a speech once and found it to be "not talking, but beating." Koch's brutality showed in his very first public announcement, "To the Population of Ukraine!", which he actually made only on 25 December 1941, after he had been Reichskommissar for over five months. Although Soviet power would never return, Koch's announcement said, the war went on, for England, the cause of the war, had not yet been defeated. For Ukraine's population—there was no word of "Ukrainians" or other nationalities—this meant one thing—working.

Twaddle and talk are of no use now; only the willingness of each to put all his force at [our] disposal. Now there is no place for loafers and gossipmongers. All forces of the


3Dallin, German Rule, pp. 126–127, is convinced that his pro-Soviet past was the main reason.

4Alfred Frauenfeld, Denkschrift, 10 February 1944, quoted in Dallin, German Rule, 167.

5Kurt Nestler, "Die Ukraine, wie ich sie sehe," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 71, l. 127.

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land belong to the struggle against the enemies of mankind, well-being, and happiness! We will judge everyone only by the extent to which he actually helps the reconstruction of this land. Each of You will have the possibility to live according to your faith and views and to be happy. Only by industry and labor, by the highest production and achievement, by the best working of the land, and by exemplary breeding of your cattle live-stock will you prove that you are willing to build a new happy time.

Anybody who resisted would be hit by the "implacable severity of the law." "We will punish every idler and violator of the peace."6

Koch's policy, and that of his like-minded and influential deputy, Regierungspräsident Paul Dargel, the chief of the Political Division, remained consistent until the end. It led to protests from Koch's formal superior, the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, or Ostministerium for short) and its head, Reichsminister Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946). In response, Koch banned the widespread flogging of people (18 April 1942).7 But this had no effect on his subordinates, who were well aware of his real opinion, and he himself continued to propagate a hard line. In late August 1942, just back from a visit to Hitler, with whom he got along very well, he told a conference of officials in Ukraine that "the very last must be extracted from the civilian population without regard for their welfare," and prohibited any socializing with the Ukrainians, who were "inferior in every respect." "If this people works ten hours daily, it will have to work eight hours for us. There must be no acts of sentimentality. This people must be governed by iron force, so as to help us to win the war now. We have not liberated it to bring blessings on the Ukraine but to secure for Germany the necessary living space [Lebensraum] and a source of food."8 Even after the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943, Koch instructed his

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7Dallin, *German Rule*, p. 140n1 (does not provide a source). A copy of the order is USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292728.

8Dallin, *German Rule*, p. 143.
subordinates not to be any less "harsh." In fact, "on the contrary." He also told a Nazi party conference in Kiev on 5 March 1943, "We are a master race that must remember that the lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here."10

The Reichskommissariat Ukraine (RKU) was activated six weeks after Koch's appointment as commissioner, on 1 September 1941. It bordered on the Reich province of East Prussia (Ostpreußen), of which Koch was the Nazi administrator (Gauleiter). In this capacity—which he clearly preferred, as he spent most of his time in Königsberg—he was accountable to the head of the Chancellery of the Nazi party, his close friend Martin Bormann.11 On 20 October and on 15 November, parts between the Southern Buh and Dnieper rivers were added to the Reichskommissariat, so that formally Koch ruled a territory stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The last expansion of the Reichskommissariat took place as late as 1 September 1942, when the Left-Bank parts of the pre-1941 oblasts of Kiev, Poltava, Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhia, and Mykolaiv were added. (These parts are presently in the oblasts of Kiev, Cherkasy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson).12 At its greatest size, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine comprised a little under 340,000 square kilometers.13 It included a swampy forest region which had been part of the Belarusian SSR,

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9The order was dated 20 February 1943. Ibid., p. 156.


11Dallin, German Rule, p. 85. Even in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, Koch demanded that he be addressed as Gauleiter. Ibid. Gerald Reitlinger estimates that as Reichskommissar Koch spent at most six months in Ukraine. Reitlinger, "Last of the War Criminals," p. 35.

12Dallin, German Rule, pp. 85 and 127; order by Hitler, 12 August 1942, accompanied by a map, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frames E292759–760. The order even speaks of "the former Soviet administrative districts (oblasts) Cherson, Saporoshje, Dnepropetrovs, Poltava, and Kiew east of the Dnieper," although the oblast of Kherson was only created in March 1944 (out of the oblasts of Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia). The error must have originated from the map he was shown. Cf. John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd ed. (Englewood, Colorado, 1990), p. 82n44, which fails to mention the Left-Bank parts of the pre-1941 oblasts of Kiev and Mykolaiv.

13To be precise, 339,275.83 square kilometers. The sizes of the Generalbezirke (GB) at their greatest extent (in square kilometers and in decreasing order of size) were 80,507.99 for the Volhynia-Podolia GB; 71,790.10 for the Kiev GB; 64,800.11 for the Zhytomyr GB; 52,397.63 for the Dnipropetrovs'k GB; 46,880 for the Mykolaiv GB; and 22,900 for the Crimea GB.
that is, as the south of that republic's oblasts of Brest and Homel, including the cities of Brest-Litovsk, Pinsk, and Mazyr. The most densely populated part of Koch's Ukrainian domain was the northern part of the Right Bank.¹⁴

Nazi plans foresaw a Reichskommissariat Ukraine that would extend all the way to the Caucasus, but even several regions of pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine never became part of it. These included the former oblasts of Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv in the northeast and the industrial Donbas in the east, which remained under German military administration. Likewise, the Crimea remained under the Germany military. The military zone was officially called Army Rear Area 103 (rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet 103), although it was also referred to as Army Rear Area South (rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet Süd). Ukrainian-inhabited eastern Galicia remained outside the Reichskommissariat as well. This former part of the pre-1918 Habsburg Empire was joined as the Distrikt Galizien to what since 1940 had been called simply the Generalgouvernement. Finally, Germany's ally Romania received back northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia that the Soviet Union annexed in 1940. Romania was also granted control over Ukrainian lands up to the Southern Buh river, the present-day equivalent to most of the Odessa oblast, the south of the Vinnytsia oblast, and a western strip of the Mykolaiv oblast. This new acquisition was called Transnistria, but it never was fully integrated into the Romanian state.

The Reichskommissariat Ukraine consisted of six Generalbezirke (general districts) headed by Generalkommissare: Volhynia-Podolia (Wolhynien und Podolien, under SA-Obergruppenführer Heinrich Schöne, in Luts'k); Zhytomyr (Shitomir, under Regierungspräsident Kurt Klemm, in Zhytomyr); Kiev (Kiew, under Gaumtsleiter Waldemar Magunia, who arrived in Kiev only in mid-February 1942¹⁵; Mykolaiv (Nikolajew, under

¹⁴Soviet report, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 597, l. 70.

¹⁵Poslednie novosti, 16 February 1942, p. 1. Before then, Landrat Dr. Ackmann, the leader of the
NSFK-Obergruppenführer Ewald Oppermann, in Mykolaïv); Dnipropetrovs'k (Dnjepropetrowsk, under Oberbefehlshaber der NSDAP Claus Selzner, in Dnipropetrovs'k); and Crimea (Krim, under Gauleiter Alfred Frauenfeld, in Melitopol'). The Crimea Generalbezirk was actually never more than a Taurida Partial District (Teilbezirk Taurien), for the Crimea proper never actually fell under civilian rule.16

In turn, the Generalbezirke consisted of districts, called Gebietskommissariate or simply Gebiete (Ukr. sing. okruha), each ruled by a Gebietskommissar. In the above-mentioned Generalbezirke there were respectively, 25, 26, 24, 13, 15, and 5 districts. The Reichskommissariat's largest five cities were ruled apart from the districts and were called Stadtkommissariate or Stadtgebiete ruled by a Stadtkommissar. The five cities were Kiev (Kiew-Stadt17) and—in declining order of size, all in the Dnipropetrovs'k Generalbezirk—Dnipropetrovs'k (Dnjepropetrowsk-Stadt), Kryvyi Rih (Kriwoi Rog-Stadt), Zaporizhzhia (Saporoshje-Stadt), and Dniprodzerzhyns'k (Kamenskoje-Stadt).18

At Koch's headquarters in Rivne/Rowno (i.e., not in Kiev) there were about eight hundred Germans in 1942. From mid-1942, Koch dismissed many of them, so that by March 1943 only 252 remained. The office of a Generalkommissar apparently had only about a

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17 Thus, Stadtkommissariat Kiew-Stadt was not part of the Kiev district (Gebiet Kiew-Land). The latter district consisted of the four raions Borodianka, Byshiv, Kiev (Kiew-Land, i.e., the Sviatoshyn region), and Makariv. Kiev-Land's Gebietskommissar was a man called Handke. In May 1943 he was replaced by a certain Behrens. Clipping from Deutsche Ukraina-Zeitung, 11 May 1943, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419709.

18 "Übersicht über die Verwaltungseinteilung." Initial appointments, never realized, also called smaller cities such as Poltava, Kremenchuk, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, and Brest-Litovsk Stadtkommissariate. Bundesarchiv Berlin, Bestand R 6, file 15, fols. 6–8. Because the official "Übersicht" speaks of Gebiete and Stadtgebiete, and not of Gebietskommissariate or Stadtkommissariate, the former terms are used in this study. The alternative terms did not entirely disappear from use, however, even after the publication of the "Übersicht."

The leaders of the Stadtkommissariate initially called themselves "mayor" or "supreme mayor" (Bürgermeister, Oberbürgermeister), but this soon became Der Stadtkommissar.
hundred Germans, while most Gebietskommissare (according to a complaint by Koch) had only two or three German aides.\(^{19}\) The small number of German civilian officials was felt all the more because of bad communications. For example, Koch never ever had a phone connection with his Generalkommissare in Mykolaïv, Dnipropetrovs'k, and Melitopol'.\(^{20}\)

A Gebiet or district consisted of between two and twelve Rayonstraiony, which in fact were the same raions as in the Soviet period. The raions, cities, towns, and villages were the only level of administration where the local population was allowed to govern. They were called the "Ukrainian auxiliary administration" (ukrainische Hilfsverwaltung). Their specific names were Rayonverwaltung or raionova uprava (raion administration); Stadtverwaltung or mis'ka uprava (city or town council); and Dorfsverwaltung or sil's'ka uprava (village council, also known as starostat). These administrations were headed, respectively, by a Rayonchef or shef raionu (raion chief); a Hilfsbürgermeister/Bürgermeister or holova mista (mayor); and a Dorfältester/Dorfsvorsteher/Dorfschulze or starosta (elder). The latter was sometimes also called burhomistr (mayor), from the German Bürgermeister. The main authorized sources of income to keep these administrations running were taxes on trade and charges for services.\(^{21}\) If the population did not obey German orders passed on by a raion chief or a mayor of a large city, the latter were authorized to impose a fine of 200 roubles (20 Reichsmarks) or two weeks of forced labor or incarceration, without right of appeal for those involved. For this, they were supposed to employ the native police (discussed below).\(^{22}\)

\(^{19}\)Koch to Rosenberg, 16 March 1943, in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal [TMWC], 25 (Nuremberg, 1949), p. 257, cited in Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, p. 23. According to Hilberg, Destruction, Vol. 1, p. 348, the average Gebietskommissar had about six German staff members.

\(^{20}\)TMWC, Vol. 25, p. 257.


\(^{22}\)Von Wedelstadt in Koch's name to all Generalkommissare, Rivne, 5 December 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 111, l. 36. This is confirmed in a note by the Gebietskommissar to all raion chiefs in the Polis'ke district (Gebiet Chabnoje), DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 21, l. 82.
Legally, the raion chief had only jurisdiction over forest exploitation, wood delivery, and financial taxes. For this, he passed on orders from the Gebietskommissar to the villages. He was not allowed to handle agricultural matters, for these were supposed to be fully controlled at all levels by German agricultural leaders with officer ranks. At the village level, these were called Landwirtschaftsführer or simply La-Führer or Landwirte. Each raion had one Kreislandwirt (Kraislandwirt), while the district had a Gebietslandwirt. The latter's superior was the Bezirkslandwirt in the capital of the Generalbezirk, who in turn was responsible to a Wirtschaftskommando (Economic Commando) in a large nearby city such as Kiev or Dnipropetrovs'k. The task of the Landwirte, who moved about in light carriages, was immense. In central Ukraine, the average Kreislandwirt was in charge of no less than 108 collective farms, each with an average size of 1,020 hectares. Almost all Landwirte were convinced that collective agriculture was more productive than private agriculture, and put the presumed needs of Germany and themselves above those of the peasants.

All German agricultural officials employed native agronomists, whose skills made a favorable impression on them. Their salaries were much above the average for the rest of the natives. For example, the office of the Gebietslandwirt in Polis'ke, formerly Khabne (Ukrainisches Landwirtschaftsbüro Gebiet Chabnoje) employed in 1942 thirty-two locals, including a "chief agronomist" (Oberagronom or holovnyi ahronom) who earned 950 Marks.

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23 Ralf Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik in den besetzten Gegieten der Ukraine vom Sommer 1941 bis zum Sommer 1942 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Einführung der 'Neuen Agrarordnung': eine Studie über die strukturelle Durchsetzung nationalsozialistischer Programmatik" (M.A. thesis, Universität Hamburg, 1987), p. 56 and appendices 5a and 5b; TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 8-9; Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, p. 28.

24 Ibid., p. 55.

25 Ibid., p. 85; Siegfried Vegesack, Als Dolmetscher im Osten: ein Erlebnisbericht aus den Jahren 1942-43, mit 12 Bildern nach Aufnahmen des Verfassers (Hannover-Döhren, 1965), p. 120.

several other agronomists who each earned 700 Marks, and ten sectional (uchastkovi) agronomists who each surveyed five villages and earned 600 Marks.27

The Landwirte and the members of the Wirtschaftskommandos were employees of a military organization called Wirtschaftsinspektion Süd (WiInSüd—Economic Inspection South). Besides the agricultural section, this WiInSüd also had four other departments, for industry, troop requirements, forestry, and labor. It was the southern (Army Rear Area South) branch of the Berlin-based Wirtschaftsstab Ost (Economic Staff East), an organization with ill-defined and frequently altered limits of authority.28 In regions where civilian rule was introduced (and, as noted, this took some time in regions more to the east), the names of its subdivisions were officially changed. Thus the WiInSüd became Rüstungsinspektion Süd (of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt) and Wirtschaftskommandos became Rüstungskommandos. The name WiStabOst was never changed, however.

WiStabOst had representatives of Germany's Four-Year Plan, the Supreme Command of the Army, and three ministries—the Ostministerium, the Ministry for Food and Agriculture, and the Ministry of Economics. WiStabOst was the main agency in charge of the "eastern" economy, even though it was formally subordinate to an Economic Command Staff East (Wirtschaftsführungsstab Ost) chaired by Reichsmarschall Göring, the Minister of Economy and Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan.29 In addition, much of the "eastern" economy was led by independent, private German corporations which employed thousands of non-Germans.

27Document on wages, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 85, l. 99.

28It was led by General Wilhelm Schubert and, from July 1942, General Otto Staph.

29The day-to-day management of the WiFuStabOst and the Four-Year Plan was in the hands of Paul Körner, who also headed Koch's Main Section Food and Agriculture (Hauptabteilung Ernährung und Landwirtschaft beim Reichskommissar für die Ukraine). Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, p. 28; Dallin, German Rule, pp. 314–316; Reinhard Rürup, ed., Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941–1945: eine Dokumentation (Berlin, 1991), p. 93 (includes a portrait).


Food collection for the German army in Ukraine—rather than for civilian Germans—was the task of still another organization, with the confusingly similar name Rüstungsinspektion Ukraine (RüInUkraine), called up to October 1941 Wirtschaftsinspektion Ukraine (WiInUkraine). Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," p. 57.
In agriculture, this was the Central Trade Corporation East (ZHO—Zentralhandelsgesellschaft Ost). In industry, private corporations operated as "trustees" (Treuhänder). Thus the Mining and Metallurgical Corporation East (Berg- und Hüttenwerksgesellschaft Ost m. B. H.) headed by Göring's industry manager Pleiger controlled all the mines and production factories in the Dnieper bend (including Kryvyi Rih) and the Donbas.

Policing, or more precisely, terror duties were at first mainly performed by the Nazi intelligence agency RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt). These were the Einsatzgruppen (Operational Groups), divided into Einsatzkommandos of the SS, or more precisely of the Security Police (Sipo—Sicherheitspolizei) and the Security Service (SD—Sicherheitsdienst). In northern and central Ukraine, this was Einsatzgruppe C, and in the south this was Einsatzgruppe D. These men immediately started open-air massacres of Jews, Roma (Gypsies), "partisans," and what were described as "suspect" persons. By early 1942, the Einsatzgruppen in Ukraine (like elsewhere in the "east") were no longer mobile, but stationary and led from Kiev by SS-Gruppenführer Dr Max Thomas, a man who got along well with Koch. In this study, these Germans will be referred to as "Nazi intelligence" or the SD.

"Policing" authority was also executed by another organization, however. When German civilian rule was introduced, the local militias, which the local population and also OUN activists had organized, were purged and integrated into a larger police organization, the Schutzmannschaft (police), or Schuma for short. This organization also consisted of Germans. Its leader in Kiev was entitled The Higher SS and Police Chief [HSSPF] at the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine (Der Höhere SS- und Polizei-Führer beim Reichskommissar für die Ukraine). Initially, until 11 December 1941, the post was held by Obergruppenführer Friedrich Jeckeln (1895–1946). He was succeeded for the rest of the war by

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31Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, p. 66.
Obergruppenführer and General der Polizei Hans Adolf Prützmann (1901–1945).32 Jeckeln and Prützmann also ruled territory to the east of the RKU, the Army Rear Area South.33

Prützmann ruled over six SS and Police Chiefs (SS- und Polizeiführer) in the Reichskommissariat, who functioned alongside the Generalkommissare. (Although one was based in Simferopol' instead of Melitopol'.) Formally, this police answered not only to Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler in Berlin, but also to Koch and his Generalkommissare. The reality was otherwise, however. Until the very end, Prützmann and Koch struggled for power.34 Alongside the Stadtkommissare, there were even SS-Polizeistandortführer, despite the fact that the order to create them was rescinded after protests from Koch and Rosenberg.35

The non-German policemen usually had no uniform, but merely a yellow and blue armband with the word Schutzmann.36 There were four categories: (1) stationary (Einzeldienst); (2) "closed units" (Geschlossene Einheit); (3) "auxiliary" (Hilfsschutzmannschaft); and (4) firemen (Feuerschutzmannschaft).37 In June 1942, there were


33In late October 1943, Prützmann's title became "The Highest SS and Police Chief in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine," along with the usual title of "HSSPF Russia-South." At the same time, a new HSSPF was appointed for the Black Sea region, based in Mykolaiv. This was Ludolf von Alvensleben (served from 29 October 1943 to 25 December 1943), who was succeeded by Richard Hildebrandt (served from 25 December 1943 to 25 September 1944). Birn, Die Höheren, p. 74.

34The HSSPF also had four other SS- und Polizeiführer based in Kharkiv, Donets'k, Chernihiv, and the Russian city of Rostov. Ibid., pp. 220–221, 223, and 231.


37Birn, Die Höheren, p. 225n2.
thirty-six battalions of native policemen in the Reichskommissariat. The Schutzmänner were mostly Ukrainians, but Poles, ethnic Germans, and Russians were also represented. They received a political training full of slogans such as, "The Jew must be destroyed," and were armed with clubs and truncheons.

The Schuma had different names depending on their location. In the cities, they were called "protective police"—Schutzpolizei (Ukr.: okhoronna politsiia). In the countryside, they were called Gendarmerie (Ukr.: zhandarmeriia). On 25 November 1942, there were in the Reichskommissariat a total of 8,669 native Schutzpolizei members (along with 2,799 German colleagues). On the same date, there were 42,579 native Gendarmerie members (along with merely 3,734 German colleagues).

With these figures it needs to be realized that those enrolled for the Crimea Generalbezirk were not only stationed in the Taurida Partial District, but also in the Crimea, which was not actually part of the Reichskommissariat. Besides the Schutzmannschaft (Schutzpolizei and Gendarmerie), there were also Police Battalions, which

38 Seven in the Volhynia-Podolia Generalbezirk (battalions 101 through 107); three in the Zhytomyr GB (battalions 108 through 110); ten in the Kiev GB (battalions 112 through 121); three in the Mykolaiv GB (battalions 122 through 124); three in the Dnipropetrovs'k GB (battalions 129 through 131); and ten in the Crimea GB (battalions 147 through 156). Georg Tessin, "Die Stäbe und Truppeneinheiten der Ordnungspolizei," in Hans-Joachim Neufeldt, Jürgen Huck, and Georg Tessin, Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei 1936–1945 (Koblenz, 1957), pp. 66–67 and 104–106.

Tessin's total of 30,000 Schutzmannschaft members for the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in June 1942 is incorrect, for it includes too many territories. Tessin accepts his source's view that territories identified as "Tschernigow," "Charkow," "Staline," and "Rostow" were part of the Reichskommissariat. The mistake has been repeated in subsequent studies that used Tessin's valuable survey.


40 Dean, "German Gendarmerie," p. 178.

41 Native Schutzpolizei members in the Volhynia-Podolia Generalbezirk: 2,317; in the Zhytomyr GB: 538; in the Kiev GB: 3,552; in the Mykolaiv GB: 700; in the Dnipropetrovs'k GB: 886; and in the Crimea GB: 676. Tessin, "Die Stäbe," p. 65. The numbers of their German colleagues were, respectively, 453, 310, 694, 371, 623, and 348. The same comment as the one in note 38 regarding Tessin’s calculation applies.

42 In the Volhynia-Podilia GB: 9,553; in the Zhytomyr GB: 5,144; in the Kiev GB: 9,464; in the Mykolaiv GB: 4,946; in the Dnipropetrovs'k GB: 7,000; and in the Crimea GB: 6,468. Ibid. The numbers of their German colleagues were, respectively, 954, 772, 689, 410, 488, and 421. The same comment as the one in note 38 regarding Tessin’s calculation applies.
were staffed exclusively by Germans. The two categories together constituted the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei).

Not surprisingly, ordinary people did not use all the various names. When referring to Germans whose job it was to arrest people, they simply spoke of "the Gestapo" (Gestapo). The most neutral name used for the non-German policemen was the adopted German word for police—politsai (e.g., etot politsai and tsj politsai).

Alongside the terror apparatus, there also developed a judicial system for the native population. On 8 May 1942, all (male) jurists were summoned and ordered to handle civilian and criminal cases on the basis of a printed directive. Hereafter, most raions received one judge for civilian cases, the so-called Schlichterlshlikhter (mediator). He was essentially a reincarnation of the pre-revolutionary Justice of the Peace (mirovoi sud'ia). He had a superior at the district center, the also non-German Oberschlichter. Criminal cases—and these included wood "theft" and unauthorized cattle slaughter—were handled by a so-called Schöffe (juror, also called Strafschöffe—criminal juror), which became in Ukrainian shefen (and in the unofficial Russian language sheffen). Often, even at the district level, one judge had both jobs and titles. The Schöffe were officially employed by the German Courts (Deutsche Gerichte), of which there was one in each Generalbezirk capital, and which handled civilian cases against Germans and ethnic Germans. The Gebietskommissare also handled cases. Some examples of the way this unstudied judicial system operated will be provided in the discussion on the countryside in the next chapter. But of course natives could also be formally prosecuted by the SS and police: in court-martials (Standgerichte) or the more fixed SS and Police Courts (SS-und Polizeigerichte).43

43Already in September 1941, "there [was] generally the notion that it [was] the same as the NKVD." Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 81 (12 September 1941), p. 20. The word "Gestapo" shows up in almost all the interviews and memoirs that were used for this study.

The relationship between Koch and Rosenberg was marked by conflict. As one student of their differences has argued, Koch stood for "immediate gains through intensive exploitation," while Rosenberg favored "a long-term policy of indirect control and more popular cooperation."\(^{45}\)

Rosenberg, a Baltic German intellectual who spoke Russian without accent, wanted to destroy the Soviet Union and perpetuate German rule in eastern Europe by creating a wall around "Muscovy" of de-russified satellite states. These were to be Greater Finland, the Baltic region, Greater White Ruthenia, "Idel-Ural," Turkestan, Siberia, and especially Greater Ukraine.\(^{46}\) In order to achieve this goal, he considered it necessary to win popular support among the non-Russian populations (except for Jews and Roma). This was not because of any sympathy he may have had for them.\(^{47}\) Thus he issued proposals for a Ukrainian satellite state, education for the Ukrainians including a university, and even a Ukrainian political party.

Hitler consistently preferred Koch's approach, however. In fact, in 1941 he deceived Rosenberg into believing that he had nothing against his proposals for Ukraine. On the day before Kiev's capture, Hitler and Koch agreed in conversation that none of them would be realized.\(^{48}\) Rosenberg never had a chance for success, for Hitler considered him useless. "Incapable of intrigue, yet also incapable of straightforward outspokenness to the Führer," Rosenberg was soon "ignored, circumvented, [and] forgotten" by most Nazis.\(^{49}\)


\(^{47}\)Like the other Nazi leaders, Rosenberg wanted to preserve the collective farms, to facilitate the collection of food and later settlement by German colonists, and insisted that Ukraine should be exploited as a "military colony." Moreover, both before and after the invasion, his ministry issued orders to prevent emigrés from returning or moving east out of the Generalgouvernement. Only in the summer of 1942 were those who were considered reliable and had German citizenship allowed to be used in the "east." Dallin, *German Rule*, pp. 54, 112–113, and 668; Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," pp. 38–39 and 73–74.

\(^{48}\)Diary of Dr. Werner Koeppen, Hitler's private secretary, 19 September 1941, describing 18 September, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 387, frame 770.

In 1942, the conflict between Rosenberg and Koch centered around the issue of education. Initially there was no problem: on 21 January, Rosenberg ordered all institutions of higher learning in the Reichskommissariat to be closed, except for medical, veterinary, agricultural, forestry, and technical faculties, and Koch repeated the order on 4 February. On 2 February, Koch banned the teaching of the German language, which was also in accordance with the wishes of the Ostministerium, although not of Rosenberg himself. The real problem between the two men started in the fall. On 24 October 1942, Koch ordered all educational institutions other than the (four-year) primary schools closed, including the craft and vocational schools in agriculture and forestry. On 21 November 1942, Rosenberg ordered him to withdraw the decree. Koch refused, and the next month dropped in unexpectedly at Rosenberg's office to harangue him about interference. After another shouting match in March 1943, Rosenberg asked Hitler to dismiss Koch (26 March 1943). On 19 May 1943, Hitler finally explicitly backed Koch, while reducing Rosenberg's task to the issuing of general guidelines.

Besides Rosenberg, there were others who called for policy reforms in the eastern territories. Among the earliest was the army. In February 1942, Field Marshall Walther von Reichenau, the commander of the Sixth Army based in Ukraine, called for a land reform, food relief, and political autonomy. In mid-December 1942, army representatives at a conference made even more radical proposals. Other calls for changes came from the army intelligence officer Dr. Theodor Oberländer, Dr. Otto Bräutigam (the deputy head of the political section of the Ostministerium, the ministry's representative at Army High Command, and a former consul

50Ibid., p. 463.
51Ibid., pp. 467–468.
54Mulligan, Politics, pp. 13–14 and 50.
in Ukraine), and certain circles in the SD. Even one of Koch's own Generalkommissare, Alfred Frauenfeld in Melitopol', a convinced Nazi, considered him too rigid vis-à-vis the non-Jewish population and criticized him in memoranda. But Rosenberg lost these potential allies, for he remained too inflexible in his hatred of Russians to be able to come to an agreement with the army, and, most importantly, failed to secure the support of Hitler or Himmler.

Koch's victory over Rosenberg meant that no "Ukrainian" political life could develop. Probably in Rivne, a Ukrainian Council of Trust in Volhynia (Ukrainischer Vertrauensrat in Wolhynien, Ukrain's'ka Rada Dovir"ia na Volyni) was created on 31 August 1941. Its head Stepan Skrypnyk wrote in a letter to Koch on 11 September that the creation of "the Ukrainian state" would have to wait until "after Germany's complete victory."

In his response via the Generalkommissar (then still in Brest-Litovsk) on 20 September, Koch allowed the council to engage in cultural activities, but emphatically rejected its demand for the right to appoint Ukrainian administrators and judges and to run cooperatives. Not even a branch of the Ukrainian Central Committee based in the neighboring Generalgouvernement was allowed to be established in the Reichskommissariat.

Ukrainian activists nevertheless tried to create their own institutions in Kiev. Soon after the Germans arrived, activists of the Mel'nyk faction of the OUN created a city administration, eventually known as Mis'ka Uprava m. Kyieva (City Administration of the City of Kiev). The local historian Oleksander Ohloblyn gave way to their pressure and became mayor. The appointment was made in a school in the Podil district in the presence of Germans.

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55Ibid., pp. 47-48, 53, 55, 64-5. and 69; Dallin, German Rule, pp. 146-175 and 513-514.

56Mulligan, Politics, p. 94; Dallin, German Rule, pp. 264-266 and 546n2. See also Alfred E. Frauenfeld, Und trage keine Reu': vom Wiener Gauleiter zum Generalkommissar der Krim: Erinnerungen und Aufzeichnungen (Leoni am Sarnberger See, 1978).

The views and policies of the individual Gebietskommissare remain to be studied. One Ostministerium official said in August 1942 that 80 percent of those in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine disagreed with Koch's policies. Mulligan, Politics, p. 64.

57Mulligan, Politics, pp. 50 and 55-56.

58"Abschrift. Satzung des Ukrainischen Vertrauensrats in Wolhynien," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 41, l. 42-45; letter by Skrypnyk to Erich Koch, 11 September 1941, ibid., ll. 38-41.

59TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 41, ll. 23-25.
several days after the start of the fires. Another Kievan, Volodymyr Bahazii, was much more willing to take the post, but the OUN-M feared that he might be a Soviet agent and insisted upon Ohloblyn. Bahazii became deputy mayor, but soon he so impressed the Germans that he could take over as mayor on 29 October. He was apparently sympathetic to the OUN-M, telling for example foreign journalists that "all Ukrainians praise Mel'nyk."  

On 4 or most likely 5 October 1941, in a small building near a school in the Podil district, OUN-M activists led by Oleh Kandyba (pseud. Ol'zhych) created what they hoped would be the nucleus of a Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian National Council (Ukrains'ka Natsional'na Rada). They persuaded Mykola Velychivs'kyi, a local university teacher (dotsent) who had been imprisoned by the NKVD in 1938–1939, to chair it. The council apparently declared openly that its goal was an independent Ukrainian state. After several days, the council moved to the city center, to a room in the building of the presidium of the Academy of Sciences. Although the council had many members who were not OUN activists, it was essentially a front organization for the Mel'nyk faction of the OUN. To be sure, some members accepted the strong advice of Hans Koch, the German military intelligence agent, to change its  

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60 An OUN-M activist who entered the city on 19 September as an interpreter in German army service (perhaps with Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppe C, which was attached to the army), says that this was on 22 or 23 September. Stepan Suliatyt's'kyi, "Pershi dni v okupovanomu nimitsiamy Kyieve," in Kost' Mel'nyk, Oleh Lashchenko, and Vasyl' Veryha, eds., Na zov Kyieva: ukrains'kyi natsionalizm u II Svitovii Viini: zbirnyk stattei, spohadiv i dokumentiv (Toronto and New York, 1985), p. 162. According to an author who says he arrived four weeks after the Germans, it was within days after the German arrival. Ia. Shumelda, "Pokhid OUN na skhid," in Orhanizatsiia Ukrain's'kykh Natsionalistiv, 1929–1954: zbirnyk stattei u 25-littia OUN ([Paris], 1955), p. 262.  

Kost' Pan'kiv's'kyi writes that when he arrived in Kiev on 28 September 1941 (also as an interpreter), there was already an administration and a mayor. Kost' Pan'kiv's'kyi, Vid derzhavy do komitetu (New York and Toronto, 1957), pp. 105–106. Iaroslav Haivas merely places the formation of the administration some time after 20 September. Iaroslav Haivas, "V roky nadii i beznadii (Zustrichi i rozmovy z O. Ol'zhychem v rokah 1939-1944)," Kalendr-al'manakh Novoho Shliakhu 1977 (Toronto, [n.d.]), pp. 111–112. Another OUN-M member even speaks of "sometime in the second half of October." K. Radzeyvych [Osyp Vynnyts'kyi], "U sorokarichchia Kyivs'koi pokhidnoi hrupy OUN," Kalendr-al'manakh Novoho Shliakhu 1982 (Toronto, [n.d.]), p. 76.  

61 The order from Berlin with Bahazii's appointment was dated a few days earlier. Dmytro Kslytysia, Svite iasnyi: spohadiv: vid r. Vovchi z Naddniprianshchyny do r. Sv. Lavrentiia na Ottavshchyni (Ottawa, 1987), pp. 182–183.  

name into "Civic Ukrainian Council" (Suspiľna Ukraïns'ka Rada). But the OUN-M and Velychkivs'kyi protested and reinstalled the original name.63 On 7 October the leader of the Bukovinian Battalion marched with a honor guard and the battalion's banner to the top floor of the Academy building, and swore in the name of his subordinates to "faithfully serve the Lord and the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian National Council."64

In November 1941, the Ukrainian National Council issued a declaration entitled "Ukrainian People!" It stated that "Russian-Jewish-Bolshevik rule in Ukraine and over the Ukrainian people is gone once and for all." Now the first task was to help the Germans in their anti-Bolshevik struggle, particularly in the fight against partisans and saboteurs.65 But it is doubtful whether many Kievans even knew of the declaration or even of the council's existence, since nothing ever appeared in the press about it. Velychkivs'kyi and his secretary, the Volhynian agronomist Antin Baranivs'kyi, also wrote a letter to Erich Koch. Here they expressed the hope that the council's activities would bring about "both the final victory over Communo-Bolshevism and the USSR as well the final victory and reconstruction of our country, which has been ruined by Jews and Russians."66 That same month, however, the council, which had never been formally registered, was banned, probably by the SD.67 In the same month, a regional organ was disbanded by the Germans, the Kievan Oblast

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64Zenon Horodys'kyi, "National'nor-derzhavnyts'ke znachennia marshu Bukovyn's'koho Kurenia do Kyieva 1941 r. (istorychno-politychnyi ohiad)," Kalendär'-almanakh Novoho Shliakhu 1996 (Toronto, [n.d.]), p. 55; Horodys'kyi, Ukraïns'ka Natsional'na Rada, p. 35.

65"Ukrainisches Volk!," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 77, ll. 6–8.

66"An Seine Excellenz den Herrn Reichskommissar für die Ukraine Erich Koch," typed, undated, and unsigned letter, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 77, l. 14. A typed, unsigned, and undated "Denkschrift des Ukrainischen Nationalrates in Kiew" is on ibid., ll. 9–13. The letter to Koch has been published, from another archival copy, in Rüüp, Der Krieg, p. 141.

67Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 78.
Administration (Kyivs'ka Oblasna Uprava), which anyway existed mostly on paper. Such regional bodies were also disbanded in other cities.

These actions were part of a growing, unannounced German assault on the Ukrainian nationalist activists. In late November, the first OUN-M activists were executed, in the town of Bazar (where a large nationalist commemoration had been held) and in Zhytomyr. More executions of OUN-M members and sympathizers took place in Kiev some time later, in February 1942. Mayor Bahazii, accused by the SD of a host of flaws, also fell in this wave.

The method and location of the executions is unknown, but the bodies were probably dumped at Babyn Yar. Even earlier, in early September 1941, the first activists of the Bandera faction of the OUN were shot. From 29 October 1941, the official policy of the Einsatzgruppen was to shoot them all secretly as "plunderers."

The presence of Ukrainian nationalist activists, whether locals, former emigrés, or people from Galicia, did not only make itself felt in short-lived organization, however. There was also the issue of national symbols, and here they were more successful. Already on 19 September, an OUN-M activist hoisted a yellow and blue flag to top of the St Sophia Cathedral in Kiev. The rival OUNSD two times managed to turn it around, with the blue on top, until the OUN-M placed a guard. By the end of the year, it had lost its colors because of the weather, so that the Germans never bothered to remove it (presumably a Red Army soldier did).

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68 Shumelda, "Pokhid OUN na skhid," p. 264; letter by Quitzrau to Erich Koch, Kiev, 21 January 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 8. The council was headed by the lawyer M. Bahrynivskyi, who openly declared he that was a supporter of the UNR (Ukrainian National Republic) emigrés. Lashchenko, "Povorot," Samostiina Ukraina, XI, 11 (119) (Chicago, November 1958), p. 12.

69 "Lagebericht" for December 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 27, l. 11.

70 Apparently, the only announced execution was that of the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Ukrains'ke slovo, the Carpathian-born Ivan Rohach. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 77 and 83–84; Elie Borschak, "Le IIIème Reich et l'Ukraine, 1939–1945," Bulletin de l'Association d'Études et d'Informations Politiques Internationales. Supplément to no. 50 (Paris, 1–15 July 1951), p. 7.

71 Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 69; Bartoleit, "Der deutsche Agrarpolitik," pp. 51 and 141n90. The date, provided by Bartoleit, differs from the one mentioned by other scholars (25 November 1941).

72 Haivas, Koly kinchalasia epokha, p. 61; M. Mykhalevych, "Sorok rokov tomu..." in Mel'nyk, Na
November 1941 the yellow and blue flag could be seen in many places and on streetcars in Kiev, alongside the German flag. They were removed in early 1942, along with tridents and portraits of Symon Peliura, Ievhen Konovalets', and Mel'nyk. This was not the end of the issue, however. In June 1942, the uprava convened a committee of nine people (headed by Ohloblyn) to decide which emblems were appropriate—for what, remained unclear. It recommended, among others, the trident, but the exercise was futile. In other cities and towns, Ukrainian nationalist symbols stayed in place much longer. In Polissia (also known as the Pripet Marshes), tridents and yellow and blue flags were still displayed in the spring of 1942. Not all upravy where stamps with tridents on them had been prepared appear to have replaced them. In the Poltava region, portraits of Petliura and Konovalets', yellow and blue flags, and tridents were still displayed in offices and restaurants in the summer of 1942. When the region was incorporated into the Reichskommissariat they were all removed, to the surprise of many locals. In contrast, Russian national symbols were absent in the Reichkommissariat. Later, the one exception were people wearing uniforms with the letters ROA on their sleeve.
which stood for the German-sponsored, largely fictional Russian Liberation Army led by General Vlasov.78

Meanwhile, Communist street names were not changed thoroughly. In the town of Tarashcha, for example, New Soviet Street and Komsomol Street continued to exist until late 1942.79 Kiev, however, received many new street names such as Wotanstraße and Nibelungstraße. The Khreshchatyk was renamed Eichhornstraße. As before the war, when the avenue had briefly been renamed Vorovs'kyi Street, Kievsans continued to call it in Russian the Kreshchatik.80

Now that the administrative system has been discussed, two additional issues need to be addressed. One concerns the expectations people had about the duration of the German presence; the other is the pervasiveness of violence and terror.

German propagandists hammered away that Stalin had been beaten and even that they had captured Moscow. A poster proclaimed, "Moscow, the nest of Bolshevism, is in German hands," and even in the spring of 1942, composite photographs showed Hitler taking a parade on Red Square.81 In many villages in the Kiev and Poltava regions, portraits of Molotov and General Timoshenko and sometimes Voroshilov were deliberately not burned by the Germans, as part of a strategy to present them as pro-German leaders who had turned against Stalin.

78Pavel Negretov, Vse dorogi vedut na Vorkutu (Benson, Vermont, 1985), p. 51. He knew a Russian from Yugoslavia who used to visit the office of the Kirovohrad newspaper dressed this way.

79At that stage, the Gebietskommissar ordered them to be renamed Kotsiubyns'kyi Street and Ivan Franko Street. Vidrodzhennia, 1 November 1942, p. 4.


81Naukovo-dovidkova biblioteka tsentral'nykh derzhavnykh arkhiviv Ukrainy, Kiev [hereafter: Scholarly Reference Library], collection "Afisy ta plakaty okupatsiinooho periodu," item 30 sp; Mikhail Mikh. Skirda [et. al.], "Otchet o podpol'noi partiinoi rabote i partizanskoi bor'be v Kirovogradskoi oblasti (avgust 1941 goda - mart 1944 goda)," n.d., typewritten document, signed, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 9.
Such an impression was reinforced by spreading rumors via the village elders. In cities like Kiev, other planted rumors said that Stalin and Kaganovich were on their own, that Stalin had shot himself, that he had been shot by Voroshilov, or even that he had fled to Washington.

But despite this vigorous propaganda, doubts (or hopes, depending on one's perspective) remained. In early August 1941 the SD found that in the Ukrainian territories east of the pre-1939 border, "large numbers are not yet fully convinced of the final victory of the Germans over the Bolsheviks." In western Volhynia, these doubts were probably much less pervasive. From Kiev, the SD even reported in early October 1941 that its population "by no means consider[ed] it possible that the Bolsheviks could return." In general, however, it is fair to say that throughout most of the Nazi period, most Ukrainians, Russians, and other non-Germans in the Reichskommissariat were not convinced that the Germans would stay. (There will be a longer discussion of the doubts about the duration of the German presence in chapter 8.)

The Reichskommissariat Ukraine was Nazi Germany's largest colony. As Jonathan Steinberg has argued, it displayed central features of Nazism which remained somewhat muted in the Reich proper. One was administrative chaos. The other was de facto supreme authority by the SS. The Reichskommissariat Ukraine, like the Reichskommissariat Ostland, but unlike the Reich, was a full-blown police or SS state, where the SS faced no serious German competitors for power. Altogether, the administrative system of the Reichskommissariat was

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84 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 47 (9 August 1941), p. 15.

85 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 106 (7 October 1941), p. 14 ("...keineswegs damit rechnet, dass etwa die Bolschewiken zurückkehren würden.")
very much like Hitler himself: "violent, brutal, pedantic, insecure, half-educated, and aggressively male in tone."  

It should be stressed, however, that violence was widespread from the start, well before the introduction of civilian rule. Of the largest scale were murders of Jews and Roma, to be discussed in chapter 10. Moreover, as part of anti-partisan warfare, the army leadership insisted upon ruthlessness. Already on 25 July 1941, the army ordered large-scale executions of locals in case those directly responsible for sabotage or partisan activity were not found. In mid-September 1941, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel of the Armed Forces demanded the public execution of between fifty and a hundred "communists" for any German killed by "communist insurgents." On 10 October 1941, Lieutenant General Karl Kitzinger, the commander of the armed forces in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Ukraine), ordered that at least half of all hostages had to be Jews. But a study of such "reprisals" in the military zone to the east of the Reichskommissariat (Army Rear Area South) has concluded that most of the victims were in fact Ukrainians.

The risk for the Dnieper Ukrainians was increased by the simple fact that they were dressed very poorly. As has been frequently been the case in the history of humanity, this fact


87Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, p. 170.


Similarly, General Field Marshall Von Reichenau of the Sixth Army, who had already demanded "radical action" against the Jews of Kiev (Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 97 (28 September 1941), instructed his soldiers on 9 November 1941 to be merciless against the partisans, whom he called "murderous animals" (Mordbestien). They should hang in public all "partisans of both sexes in uniform or civilian clothes.... All villages and farmsteads which hosted or took care of partisans are to be punished by confiscation of food, burning of houses, shooting of hostages, and hanging of accomplices whenever it is not absolutely clear that the population has defended itself against the partisans and has endured casualties in this." Rürp, Der Krieg, pp. 129–130. By early December 1941, Army Group South reported that it had executed "several thousands" and spoke of a "total success." Ibid., p. 130.


alone was one reason why they were treated badly.91 To this were added people's "rough" or "un-European" public manners. Hans Koch described these manners in some detail. It is notable that even this man, who sympathized with Ukrainians, wrote in a rather condescending tone.

The clothing, also of the educated, is not only objectively ragged, but also deliberately neglected. Shaving, personal hygiene, shirt collars, polished boots, clean finger nails until now were apparently considered bourgeois prejudices. People spit and blow their nose here right on the floor. Body odors of people are not regulated here, tooth cleaning is rare, and because everybody smokes only the strongest tobacco (dried beech leaves rolled into thick newsprint), sessions even with learned and high-placed bodies can become an ordeal for a Western European. Similar are gatherings of peasants, even when they are in the open air.

In personal conversation, each former Soviet citizen lacks the manner and courtesy which is customary among us. Hands in the pocket, the stinking smoking butt in the corner of the mouth, very close to the body of the person one is talking to (but only rarely looking him in the face)—that is the customary way of contact, also among the better and indisputably loyal circles. Even the returning or forcibly transported prisoners of war only take the cigarette out of their mouth for German officers when shouted at.92

While this observer merely was taken aback by such "proletarian" manners, most Germans became furious. For example, while arriving for a meeting in the village of Kuntseve (Novi Sanzhary), the local teacher did not take off his cap while approaching the local German commandant. The latter threw it off and then forced him, for all to see, to return and greet him while holding his cap in his hands.93 A boy in Chyhyryn saw how Germans shouted "Jude!" or "Lenin!" at people who stood with their hands in their pockets, and beat them in the face.94 Einsatzzgruppe D reported that it ordered people to take their hands out of their pockets.95

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92 Hptm. [Hauptmann] Prof. Hans Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass in der Ukraine. Stimmungs- und Erfahrungsbericht. Abgeschlossen 30. 9. 1941," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 26, II. 6–7. This author even compared looters to termites, which shows how much even this Ukrainophile had been influenced by Nazi racism. Ibid., I. 5. The subjectivity of Koch's statements about manners is shown by the fact that another observer, a Russian emigré, reported seeing bad manners, but also "well-raised youngsters who had not finished the ten-year school who gallantly kissed the hands of ladies." Nikolai Fevr, *Solntse voskhodit na zapade* (Buenos Aires, 1950), p. 163.

93 Sova, *Do istorii*, p. 80.

94 Mykhailo Demydenko (Ukrainian born in 1928 in the village of Trusivtsi near Chyhyryn),
In addition, natives were at risk from their own kind. The Soviet period had left behind bitterness, hatred, and the desire among many to denounce their enemies.\(^{96}\) Now those who had been informants for the NKVD or officials of the Communist regime as a whole were living in permanent fear, for others often knew about their past. For example, Mykhailo Podvorniak was a Ukrainian Baptist in the Vyshnivets' region in western Volhynia who had been forced to sign a promise of cooperation before being released by the NKVD. After the German arrival, he feared for his life. Fortunately for him, his name was discovered on an NKVD list of "unreliable elements."\(^ {97}\) Others were not so lucky, however, and, according to Soviet practice, were often denounced to the authorities. Unless a native authority such as the raion chief vouched for such people, the Germans often shot such "Bolsheviks"—for example unpopular village Soviet or collective farm heads. Execution had not necessarily been the intention of the denouncers.\(^ {98}\) It was especially likely to happen if the denunciation was made to a unit of the *Einsatzgruppen*, who in any case were shooting Jews, Roma, and all non-natives who could not identify themselves.\(^ {99}\)

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\(^{95}\) *Ereignismeldung UdSSR*, 108 (9 October 1941), p. 23.

\(^{96}\) Already in the 1930s, the atmosphere in villages in the Soviet Union was one of "free-floating malice," according to Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization* (New York and Oxford, 1994), p. 233. Although this study focuses on the RSFSR, it is safe to assume that the conclusion holds for the Ukrainian SSR as well.

\(^{97}\) Panas Khurtovyna [Mykhailo Podvorniak], *Pid nebom Volyni: (voienni spomyny khristyanyna)* (Winnipeg, 1952), p. 92. The geographical indicator comes from M. P. [Mykhailo Podvorniak], "Vid smerty do zhyttia (Spohad)," *Litopys Volyni*, 7 (Winnipeg, 1964), p. 91.


\(^{99}\) *Ereignismeldung UdSSR*, 47 (9 August 1941), p. 8. On the alleged secrecy of these shootings of Communists, see *Ereignismeldung UdSSR*, 81 (12 September 1941), pp. 20–21. At that stage, the SD considered not all Communist party members "dangerous." Ibid., p. 15.
In many villages, the Germans gave the local Communist Party members—of which there were few in the villages—a chance to remain and merely kept a close watch on them. The hatred which the previous regime had installed was such, however, that many acted on their own. In the western Volhynian countryside, a wave of lynchings (samosudy) of unpopular heads of farms and village Soviets appears to have broken out. In the Kremenets' region, one NKVD informant managed to hide in a village for a month, but then women whose husbands were gone and who had been harassed by him found him. They beat him with sticks for so long that he died at the end of the day. Later there were also anonymous murders. Not surprisingly, information about them is scarce. For example, in the small Volhynian town of Torchyn, an estimated forty-five former Soviet activists are said to have been killed in secret in 1942. In a village in the Novi Sanzhary raion in the Left Bank, the native Gendarmerie started murdering Communists on its own initiative.

Jews proved to be particularly vulnerable in western Volhynia. In at least twenty-seven townlets and villages there, Jewish property was looted in pogroms by "many, including peasants from surrounding villages," during which a small number of the looters murdered Jews. In larger towns, the discovery of the bodies of prisoners killed by the NKVD was met with outrage and immediately, through rumors, turned into a "Jewish" issue. There was talk among the Ukrainian (and presumably also Polish) population about murderers "known" to have been Jews. In Dubno, people talked about the exploits of an NKVD major called

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100 Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants*, p. 177; Nina Serhiïvna Zozulia (Ukrainian born in 1929 in Oksaverivka [Vasyl'tkiv raion, Kiev oblast]), author interview in Ukrainian, 21 July 1995, Bohuslav, tape recording; Seleshko, *Vinnitsia*, p. 55; Z. Serdiuk, Sekretar Kyïvs'koho obkomu KP(b)U, "Politinformatsii Po Kyïvs'koï oblasti na 10.XII-1943 roku," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 633, ll. 24–25. In a village near Kirovohrad in August or September 1941, a woman aged about sixty gave the local German commandant the names of fourteen members of the Komsomol. He told her she should be ashamed of herself. I. Kuzenkos [sic?] (Ukrainian born in 1916), interview in Ukrainian by the CHPWU, 29 October 1946, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 62.


103 Sova, *Do istoriï*, p. 78.

Vinokur, said to have been the prison chief. He was said to have fled to the local castle and to have shot still more people there. Then he shot his driver and female assistant and moved on, until finally he was killed himself. He was firmly believed to have been a Jew from Kremenets'. Oleksii Satsiuk, a survivor of the NKVD massacre in Dubno, reproduced his conversation with a man who had just returned from the hospital, where he had talked to other survivors.

'What are they saying? Who murdered the prisoners?'

'All say that they were NKVD agents, prison guards, and some kind of civilians [probably an extermination battalion]. All saw Vinokur. He shot with a revolver, the civilians [shot] with semi-automatic guns. Among them was also a woman, a real vampire. She also shot people.'

'A woman? Really?'

'It's a fact! Hanna Berenstein. You may remember her: black hair, portly, she wore an NKVD uniform? She was a guard in the prison.'

'Oh yes, I remember now.'

'They say that during her work she treated the women in a beastly manner, and that terrible night made one victim after the next. She did it with great pleasure. She was the first to run to the women's cells, where she grabbed one by one by the braid and shot them in the forehead roaring with laughter.'

'The sadist!'  

Such was the poisonous atmosphere which served as the prelude to the anti-Jewish pogroms which are reported to have taken place in the towns of Dubno, Kremenets', and three other western Volhynian towns (Korets', Shums'k, and Tuchyn). The largest was apparently in Kremenets', a town captured by the Germans on 3 July. Here several hundred Jews were arrested—by a Ukrainian militia according to Jewish witnesses, by Germans according to one

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\[105\] Valia Petrenko, "Trahedia Dubens'koi Tiumy (Spomyn)," Samostiina Ukraina, I, 5–6 (Chicago, June-July 1948), pp. 18–19.


Ukrainian witness. In the local prison, they were forced to dig up the victims of the NKVD, and then, according to an SD report, their Ukrainian guards clubbed 130 of them to death. Hereafter the German army command put an end to the violence. At the current state of research, it is unknown whether or not such acts also took place in territories more to the east. (The general issue of the perception and treatment of Jews by the Ukrainian and other non-Jewish populations will be discussed in chapter 10.)

Heinrich Himmler stepped up the terror in 1942, as part of his desire to exterminate all remaining Jews and to provide a clean slate for German settlement, as also propagated in the "General Plan East" which he had commissioned. In 1945, the former chief of the Schutzpolizei and Gendarmerie for Kiev and surroundings, Lieutenant-general Paul Albert Scheer, told Soviet interrogators how he and about 120 other SS and police leaders from Ukraine were ordered in June 1942 to attend a meeting with Himmler in his headquarters in a forest near Zhytomyr. Among those present were also Thomas and Prützmann. Himmler apparently held a long speech, of which he did not allow a record to be made. The interrogation report—as customary not a literal rendition, but a summary prepared by the interrogator—continues:

Himmler said that it was our task, that is, the task of the punitive organs, to clean the territory of Ukraine for the future settlement of Germans. For those purposes, we had to pursue the massive extermination [massovoe istreblenie] of the Soviet citizens, the Ukrainians. The civilian Ukrainian population, Himmler said, in the occupied territory must be brought to a minimum. [Mirnoe ukrainskoe naselenie, govoril Gimler, na okkupirovannoi territorii nuzhno svesti do minimuma.] Arrest and destroy as many as possible under the cover of struggle with the anti-German movement. Be sure to destroy any about whom there is the slightest suspicion of fighting the Germans or resisting our order.

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109 According to Mel'nyk's secretary Mykhailo Seleshko (who never went to the countryside), a number of peasants in the Right Bank took to lynching after hearing the OUN-SD slogan "Ukraine for the Ukrainians." Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 141–142.

While giving this directive, Himmler warned all the leaders of the German punitive services to implement his instructions and orders without questioning. In particular, he noted that at one time he had issued the order to exterminate in full the entire Jewish population in the occupied territory, but, in Himmler's view, this order of his had not been carried out with the necessary thoroughness. In this connection, he ordered [us] to carry that matter to the end immediately after returning. All Jews had to be destroyed immediately, for he could no longer stand the situation where there were Jews in the place where Germans lived. All the measures about which Himmler talked at the conference were presented as the immediate tasks of the punitive organs.\textsuperscript{111}

The result was what is known in scholarship as the "second sweep" against the Jewish population, together with a more slow-paced assault on the Ukrainians. The memoirs of the former chief of the Novi Sanzhary raion, then still under military rule, suggest that this anti-Ukrainian sweep took place under the cover of "anti-Bolshevism." This was one of the most loyal raions, apparently without any partisans. (It also had no Jewish population.) Already in the early summer of 1942, four (former) Communists (three from a village) and the former investigator of the raion prosecutor's office were arrested by the Schutzpolizei and shot. Then, in July, a group of "Gestapo agents"—probably officers of the military Secret Field Police (Geheime Feldpolizei)—unexpectedly arrived in Novi Sanzhary. These twenty men, including a Russian emigré who translated, started to investigate the men aged 18 to 55 in town—all five thousand of them—during an entire month. All these males had to show their papers. Because membership in the Communist Party was indicated in them, the unit could arrest on the spot thirty-five long-term members. At the same time, the investigators invited complaints about them from the population. This call received a massive response, which also implicated others. Thirty-two of the arrested were shot. Altogether, even if one excludes the victims who died during the German retreat in September 1943, during the entire Nazi period up to two hundred people were killed in this raion alone.\textsuperscript{112}


\textsuperscript{112}Sova, \textit{Do istorii}, pp. 93–96.
In the Vinnytsia region, the last surviving registered Communist Party members were shot already in May 1942.\textsuperscript{113} In the village of Medvyn (Bohuslav), almost all Communist Party members were shot in 1943.\textsuperscript{114} Such assaults could also hit the family members of Communists: in July 1943, seventy-five of them were shot in the Kiev region village of Manuïl's'ko-Lytokovo alone.\textsuperscript{115} In the Vasyl'kiv district, many "prominent" peasants and intelligentsia are said to have been shot.\textsuperscript{116} Also at high risk were those unable to work. In the village of Stari Bezradychy (Obukhiv), a veteran of the Civil War, aged about fifty, showed his wooden arm to a German, in order to explain why he was not scything like the others. By way of response he was shot to death on the spot.\textsuperscript{117} By mid-1942 at the latest, such acts of terror were common everywhere.

\textsuperscript{113}Savchenko, Zam. NKVD USSR, to D. R. Korniets, "Spets. soob. O polozhenii v g. Vinnitsa i Vinnitskoï oblasti," 26 January 1943, Borisoglebsk, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 32.


\textsuperscript{115}Serdiuk, "Politinformatsiï [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 633, l. 13.

\textsuperscript{116}F. Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina" (Winnipeg, 1954), p. 162.

\textsuperscript{117}Moskovs'ka, author interview.
CHAPTER 3

Work and Food in the Countryside

What was it like to work as a peasant under the Germans, and how difficult or easy was it for peasants to obtain food? These will be the main questions in the discussion below. It will be argued that on the one hand, the Germans were able to make the collective farm system significantly more efficient. On the other hand, however, a large number of peasants had on average more food at their disposal in the two to three years under the Germans than they used to have in the preceding decade.

As noted in chapter 1, the peasants, who called themselves khliboroby, welcomed the Germans and their allies as liberators. Food and lodgings were shared, German wounded received treatment, and in most places a cordial relationship was established, only hampered by the almost total lack of comprehension of each other's language. The words used most often by the Germans were "jajko" (eggs), "matka" (mother), and "Russe kaputt" (Death to the Russian). When the front-line soldiers, many of whom were rather young, stayed a bit longer, something resembling family life developed. To be sure, the Ukrainian peasants had no choice but to help them, if only because hospitality to visitors was traditional.

Despite this, there were from the beginning sporadic shootings of local peasants. For example, in the village of Semenivka in the Poltava region, a woman ran crying after a German who took her flour. When the other peasants gathered to find out what was going on, the German took out his revolver and killed the woman on the spot. This was an exceptional incident, because most of these early shootings concerned captured partisans or saboteurs. For example, in the village of Staiky, a twenty-two-year-old member of the Komsomol who was

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2Mikh. Stepanovich Kolesikin, "Ob"iasnenie," 25 November 1941, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 177, l. 92.
caught cutting the German phone wire was shot. Often such executions were preceded by extreme cruelty. On 11 September 1941, the Germans gathered the entire population of the village of Pidhaine, formerly Khaniv, to show them how they dealt with a captured Soviet partisan and the chairman of the collective farm (not a party member). The two were beaten, their ears and noses were cut off, and then they were shot.4 In September or October 1941, twenty-seven members of the Communist Party and the Komsomol were shot by a German unit in the village of Obolon'. Among them was a sixteen-year-old Komsomol member, Mykola Hladun, who was first horribly tortured in front of his mother.5

Nevertheless, for most villagers, these early shootings did not spoil their generally positive mood, if only because arrests and shootings were hardly new to them. Fedir Pihido, a native of Staiky, recalled several years later that "relations between the population and the German troops immediately became benevolent, even friendly. The German soldier was a welcome guest everywhere. At various family occasions and feasts, German soldiers were treated as good friends."6 Meanwhile, there were villages where the people did not even designate a herdsman, for "the authorities" did not order them to do so.7

The peasants hardly ever believed what Soviet media had told them about Nazi Germany and thus unambiguously supported what they assumed was a war against Stalin and

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4Pidhaine was then in the Rozvazhiv raion; presently it is in the Ivankiv raion. Evtikhii Alekseevich Sidorenko, "Kopiat. Nachal'niku politicheskogo otdela 21 armii," 13 December 1941, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 118, l. 65.

5"Akt," 3 October 1943, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 599, l. 29.

6Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 122. Similarly, about the Kremenets' region: "When the German army entered our land, they acted as real people: they treated our people well and calmly. But this was when the first army units came. Later, when the Gestapo arrived and started to install its power and order, [these Germans] turned out to be completely different." A. "Z starykh lystiv," Litopys Volyni, 3 (Winnipeg, 1956), p. 105.

7Hptm. [Hauptmann] Prof. Hans Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass in der Ukraine. Stimmungs- und Erfahrungsbericht. Abgeschlossen 30. 9. 1941," TsDAOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 26, l. 9. A colleague of Koch's also found that east of the former 1939 border of Ukraine "the attitude of the population was one of wait-and-see [abwartend]." Theodor Oberländer, Der Osten und die Deutsche Wehrmacht: sechs Denkschriften aus den Jahren 1941–43 gegen die Kolonialthese (Asendorf, 1987), p. 52.
his system. Hans Koch, who was born in L'viv and spoke fluent Ukrainian, had much sympathy for the Ukrainians (if a sometimes condescending one). After spending much time in the Ukrainian countryside, he concluded on 30 September 1941:

The vast majority of the population of the Ukraine has turned out to be anti-Bolshevik. Almost all of them see their political future on the side of the Axis powers, first of all, the Greater German Reich. In countless gatherings, people speak spontaneously about 'Adolf Hitler,' our greatest leader and liberator. Mothers instruct their children to address the German soldiers as 'uncle.' Every day, peasant men and women put fresh flowers on the graves of German soldiers on their own initiative.8

Hans Koch and other observers were also struck by the extreme poverty of the peasants of central Ukraine. This started with their huts, which looked very poor and lacked fences around the gardens.9 A typical hut, according to a native of Kiev, was "a very low building, seeming to grow out of the ground, with tiny little windows peering out beneath the thatch, which had holes in it where it had rotted. Inside it was like a cave, with an uneven earth floor on which lay some old rags and dolls made of straw, and children and kittens were crawling about. In the middle stood a stove built of plain bricks, and next to it a sort of wooden shelf, with some old rags thrown down on it, known as the 'floor' on which they all slept side by side."10

Koch met about six hundred village elders (starosty) within two months in 1941, none of whom were dressed better than the poorest vagrant in Germany. Most wore rags, and those lucky enough to possess shoes still tended to go barefoot in order to save them for the fall and winter. In contrast, in formerly Polish-ruled western Volhynia the peasants were dressed well

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8Koch, "Sowjet-Nachlass," I. 1v.


10A. Anatoli (Kuznetsov) [Anatolii Kuznetsov], Babi Yar: A Document in the Form of a Novel (London, 1970), p. 191, regarding the village of Lytvynivka in the Kiev region.
and had shoes. In general, the "Soviet" peasants owned almost nothing. "Again and again," wrote Koch, "the impoverished population visits the battle fields to look for a piece of belt, a discarded ammunition holder, a piece of cloth. The houses of Jews who fled [or were murdered] are ransacked for remaining goods or clothes as if by termites. Every single worthless scrap or utensil is rare here. When once in a peasant house I lit my kerosene lamp (which I had carefully taken with me), the peasant woman whispered to her full-fledged daughter, 'I haven't seen such a lamp since my wedding.'" Indeed, peasants rarely had kerosene lamps and used what they called "Stalin's lightning": an exploded artillery shell filled with a piece of linen and any kind of fuel.

The peasants lived on a very meager diet and, again according to Koch, were "badly fed." At one location, a heap of salt was left at a train station. Soon from miles around came countless peasants to fight for a share. "At gatherings of village elders and teachers, where I was present, the only food (as a matter of course taken from home by way of precaution) of all—and I mean all—participants consisted of a piece of brown bread, garlic, and gherkins. I stayed the night at [the homes of] collective farm chairmen or elders who could not [even] offer me a mug [Topf] of milk. Either there was no milk, or literally no mug."

Already well before the war, most villagers were female. This situation did not change. Most men had been mobilized, but many deserters and escaped or released former soldiers returned. Many male peasants who had fled to the city during and after the collectivization of agriculture returned to their native villages as well. On 1 May 1942, the


12Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass," l. 5.


14Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass," ll. 4–5.

typical village of Romashky (Rokytne, Bila Tserkva district) had 1,333 inhabitants, of whom 828 were female and only 505 male. It also had many children: 397 below the age of fourteen. There were 862 persons aged 14 to 65 (572 of whom were female) and 72 persons 65 or older (55 of whom female). Romashky's basic age structure did not change, so that by February 1943, 792 persons out of 1,301 were female and 509 were male. In an unidentified village in the Berdychiv district, on the three collective farms worked on 1 January 1943 twice as many women as men—399 females (aged 14 to 55) against 190 males (aged 14 to 65). Besides working the fields, women also took care of the children (in this particular village, 256 under the age of 14). Many villages had twenty-year-old mothers with three or four children. The lack of Ukrainian men obviously increased the danger for women and there were cases of rape by German, Romanian, and Hungarian soldiers and by German officials. Few women in the countryside strove for a physical relationship with the Germans, which was in contrast to the situation in the cities (more on that in the next chapter).

Despite being in the minority, men held all positions of authority in the village. Not only was this the norm accepted by both sexes, it was also the policy of the Germans, who

16"Oblik naselennia s. Romashki 1942 r.," DAKO, f. r-2294, op. 1, d. 1, l. 1.

17"Oblik Naselennia s. Romashok na stanom na 20 liutoho 1943 roku," DAKO, f. r-2294, op. 1, d. 1, l. 57.

18"Suchasne ukraïns'ke selo (Vid vlasnoho korespondenta)," Ukrain's'kyi visnyk (Berlin), 4 April 1943, pp. 6–7. The disparity was somewhat less at the "Shevchenko" farm in southern Ukraine. Here, on a territory of twelve square kilometers, 112 women and 80 men were working in 1942 and 1943, along with 38 boys and girls. Siegfried von Vegesack, Als Dolmetscher im Osten: ein Erlebnisbericht aus den Jahren 1942–43 (Hannover and Döhren, 1965), p. 109.

19Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 40 (1 August 1941), p. 18.


21Countrywomen "don't and did not have physical relationships" with the Germans, according to Petr Timofeevich Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii na okkupirovannoi territorii," n.p., n.d., typewritten document, signed, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 74.

22Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants, p. 182.
appointed them at village meetings (sing. *skhod*). The pre-1941 function of chairman of the village Soviet now became the *starosta* (elder), a title from the tsarist period. He had a male secretary and perhaps other assistants. The name elder did not mean that he was actually very old. In the Rokytne raion in the Bila Tserkva district, the average age of elders in mid-1942 was forty-one. Elders seem to have been replaced quite regularly. In this particular raion, for example, nine were replaced by the end of the year and another six by the end of 1943. The elder received a monthly state salary which depended on the size of the village and (officially, at least) ranged from fifty to sixty German marks, or—the official equivalent—500 to 600 Reichskommissariat *karbovantsi.*

Elders conducted censuses in their villages and supplied such data to the raion center, which in turn passed them on to the *Gebietskommissar.* In his records that were always handwritten and in Ukrainian, the elder was supposed to indicate who was able to work and how reliable each villager was. Officially, the worst category were Jewish villagers. A close second were the "most unreltables," that is, members and candidate-members of the Communist Party, former Soviet officials, and teachers. Those with relatives in the Red Army were "merely" "unreliable," whereas only those with relatives who had been persecuted ("repressed") by the NKVD were unambiguously "reliable." The elder also was supposed to

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23List of elders and their year of birth of the "37" (actually, only data for 35 are provided) villages, 1 July 1942. DAKO, f. r-2292, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 1–4. The raion was called in German Rakitno/Bila Zerkwa, probably to avoid confusion with the Rokytne raion (Rokitno) in western Volhynia.

24H. Sova [Hryhorii Kariak], *Do istorii bol'shevyts'koï diis'nosti: (25 rokiv zhyttia ukraïns'koho hromadianyna v SSSR)* (Munich, 1955), p. 89.

25Ivan Levkovych Tubolets' (Ukrainian born in 1942), interview in Ukrainian by the CHPWU, 10 August 1946, village of Lukavytsia [Pereiaslav-Khmel'nyts'kyi raion, Kiev oblast], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 249, 26v. Four examples of such lists are: *Vidomist' pro represirovannoho [sic] hromadianyna s. Petrivs'koho [Petrivs'ke (Rakitno/Bila Zerkwa] orhanamy NKVD Sovits'koi vlyady 18/III42 r.,"* by elder Jakiv David Zifennan (b. 1904) and his secretary, DAKO, f. r-2292, op. 1, d. 4, l. 5; "Spysok politychnykh zaslantsiv s. Romashky, Rokytians'koho raionu, Kyïvs'koi oblasti, areshtovanykh orhanamy NKVD. Skladen 23/II-42 r., by elder Fedir Oleksandrovych Slobodianyk, his secretary, and a representative of the Ukrainian Red Cross, DAKO, f. r-2292, op. 1, d. 4, l. 8; "Spysok politychnykh zaslantsiv (i ikh sem'tv) po s. Zhytni-Horakh [Zhytni-Horyl], Rokytians'koho raionu," by Ukrainian Red Cross representative M. H. Byba, 8 February 1942, DAKO, f. r-2292, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 10–11; and "Spysok selu Romashkakh Rokytians'koho r-nu rozkurkulyenkh," n.d., DAKO, f. r-2292, op. 1, d. 3, l. 9.
transmit German and raion orders to the population. He received these orders himself in typed notes from the raion and the Landwirt\textsuperscript{26} or at the occasional general meeting (narada) of elders at the raion chief's office.

All villagers still had identification papers from the Soviet period, with a German stamp in it, until the spring of 1942, when passes in the German and Ukrainian languages were distributed to those 18 years and older. Persons not from Ukraine and Communists officially could only receive a residence permit, but payment to a German official of an adequate amount of chickens and eggs would be enough to get a real pass.\textsuperscript{27} For brief trips out of the village, permission from the elder was required, as had been the case with the chairman of the former village Soviet. For longer trips, however, a special permit (Sonder-Ausweis) had to be obtained from the Germans.\textsuperscript{28}

All villages had a curfew, which often started at 9:00 p.m., although the time varied depending on the season and the raion's general "reliability." Trespassers could be shot by the Gendarmerie without warning. Taking in overnight guests without permission was strictly forbidden.\textsuperscript{29} In more "reliable" villages people still went about as necessary.\textsuperscript{30} It was not uncommon for ordinary peasants to keep guard themselves at night.\textsuperscript{31} A strong motivation was

\textsuperscript{26}For example, on 17 December 1941, all elders in the Polis'ke raion (Rayon Chabnoje) received a note from P. Okhrimenko, the raion chief, which said that the Gebietskommissar wanted them to "proclaim to the entire population that those guilty of hiding Jews and partisans will be punished severely according to the laws of wartime." DAKO, f. r-2210, op. 1, d. 3, l. 55.

\textsuperscript{27}Sova, Do istorii, p. 91; Savchenko, Zam. NKVD USSR, to D. R. Korniets, "Spets. soob. O polozhenii v g. Vinnitsa i Vinnitskoi oblastii," 26 January 1943, Borisoglebsk, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 30.

\textsuperscript{28}For an example of a special permit, see TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 139, l. 16.

\textsuperscript{29}TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, ll. 29–30; Ukrains'kyi holos (Khmel'nyts'kyi), 15 October 1942, p. 1; ibid., 7 January 1943, p. 4; Nina Serhiivna Zozulia (Ukrainian born in 1929 in Oksaverivka [Vasyl'kiv raion, Kiev oblast]), author interview in Ukrainian, 21 July 1995, Bohuslav, tape recording; Ievheniia Makarivna Moskovs'ka (Ukrainian born in Stari Bezradychy [Obukhiv raion] in 1930), author interview in Ukrainian, 29 July 1995, Kiev, tape recording.

\textsuperscript{30}Oksana Sarapuka (Ukrainian born in 1927 in Medvyn), author interview in Ukrainian, 17 July 1995, Medvyn, Bohuslav raion, Kiev oblast Ukraine, tape recording; Mariia Prylipko (Ukrainian born in 1913 in Medvyn), author interview in Ukrainian, 17 July 1995, Medvyn, Bohuslav raion, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording.

\textsuperscript{31}Mariia Khtodosiïvna Hohulia (Ukrainian born in 1927 in Medvyn), author interview in
the German principle of collective responsibility. In the summer of 1942, Koch's deputy Dargel issued a public warning that deliberately causing damage to the "food economy" would be penalized by fines, confiscation of property, imprisonment, or even death. As his order made clear, it was easy to commit that crime: "The food economy is damaged by a person who (1) does not follow orders; (2) obstructs work which serves the food economy; (3) does not prevent apparent damages and does not report them; [or] (4) consciously gives false data about the number of cattle, vegetables, and other matters which are important for the food economy." In cases where guilty persons could not be identified, punishment would be inflicted upon "the entire community or the responsible leaders and members able to protect [against damage]."  

Every reliable source indicates that the overwhelming majority of the peasants wanted the collective farm system to be disbanded and private farming to be sanctioned. Peasants who had fled to the city in the 1930s had high hopes when the Germans arrived, and they started returning to their rural places of birth. From Zhytomyr, over 1,500 of an estimated five thousand former peasants went to the countryside at once with permission. Every village made plans for the expected privatization, and, as noted in chapter 1, in many villages the collective farms were at least initially disbanded.

The peasants, who were generally in a good mood, themselves never spoke of "privatization." They always considered their former land that was part of the collective farm

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(kolhosp) still their property. All that was necessary was to "dissolve the kolhosp" or "divide the land." In places where this was done, private landholding patterns were indeed restored. To be sure, among younger peasants, who did not know the pre-1929 lifestyle, there were doubts. In the Right Bank (near Chyhyryn, Kam"iianka, and Oleksandrivka), according to a communist agent, "many" peasants "simply feared being left without means after a division of the land, and therefore wanted some kind of [collective] farm." He observed this "even" among mothers whose husbands were in the Red Army. For example, they might have caught an "evacuated" horse, but "did not know what they would do with it."

The general desire for land is not contradicted by reports about peasants who awaited German orders to start harvesting or who "calmed down" about the issue after the Germans ordered them to preserve or restore the collective farms. The first such order, with the threat of severe punishment, came from the Ostministerium on 15 August 1941, but soon a leaflet distributed by the German army about the order raised hopes again. The leaflet said that Germany had only private agriculture and that "this is how it should be with you" as well. Thus it became necessary to repeat the ban on dividing land, cattle, equipment, buildings, or


37 One of the people to observe this was Otto Schiller, a high-placed German adherent of privatization, who had worked on German agricultural estates in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, and was now back in the "east." Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," p. 81. For a denial of a generational difference in this regard, see Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 52 (14 August 1941), p. 7.

38 Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 65.


40 Ibid., p. 68. Bartoleit notes that Alexander Dallin mistakenly says the order was issued on 19 August. Ibid., 145n51.

41 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
other property.\textsuperscript{42} Even hereafter, there were villages which put parts of the farm buildings up for sale.\textsuperscript{43}

In 1941, the harvest started later than usual.\textsuperscript{44} In most villages, it appears to have started after instructions were given, not on private initiative. In Pihido's native region, it started upon a Soviet order and continued during and after the German arrival. Harvesters were covered in black to be less visible to Soviet planes who attacked the fields.\textsuperscript{45} In some places, the peasants started to harvest after being warned by itinerant OUNSD activists from Galicia that the Germans would retain the collective farm system.\textsuperscript{46} But in many other regions, the harvest only started after a German order to this effect.\textsuperscript{47} As the SD found in the Zhytomyr region, the peasants were "generally willing to work, but await[ed] directives."\textsuperscript{48}

The peasants worked hard that fall.\textsuperscript{49} The harvest was taken in fastest in western Volhynia, where agriculture did not depend on tractors. More to the east, there was a severe lack of equipment and pulling power, so that almost everything had to be done by hand, with sickles.\textsuperscript{50} The peasants were motivated by a fear of famine.\textsuperscript{51} Another reason was that the

\textsuperscript{42}For example, "NAKAZ no. [...] Do raioniv Kyïvs'koï Okruhy," 24 October 1941, DAKO, f. r-2160, op. 1, d. 1, 2.

\textsuperscript{43}"Vytiah z protokolu n 26. Zasidannia Sil's'koï Upravy s. Buda-Radyns'ka," September 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 49, ll. 4–4v; "Protokol," administration of Steshchyna, 19 July 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 17, ll. 74–77. Both Buda and Steshchyna were in the Polis'ke raion.

\textsuperscript{44}One scholar has ascribed this to the weather, which in his view was unusually humid and cold, and thus delayed the ripening of the grain. M. Z. Daniliuk, "Trudovoi podvig kolkhoznogo krest'ianstva Ukrainy v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny," Voprosy istorii, 6 (Moscow, June 1959), p. 5. But it is more likely that the peasants had deliberately delayed harvesting as much as possible, until they found themselves on the German side of the front.

\textsuperscript{45}Pihido-Pravoberezhni, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," pp. 56 and 77–79.

\textsuperscript{46}Orest Zovenko, Bezimenni: spohad uchasnyka nivitvykh vyzvol'nykh zmahan' (n.p., 1946), p. 66; Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 52 (14 August 1941), p. 10; ibid., 107 (8 October 1941), p. 12–13; ibid., 129 (5 November 1941), p. 15.

\textsuperscript{47}Sarapuka, author interview; Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 40 (1 August 1941), p. 19; ibid., 47 (9 August 1941), p. 8; ibid., 107 (8 October 1941), p. 11; ibid., 128 (3 November 1941), p. 2.

\textsuperscript{48}Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 26 (18 July 1941), p. 6.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., 112 (13 October 1941), p. 6.

\textsuperscript{50}Pan'kivs'kyi, Vid derzhavy, p. 104; Hohulia, author interview.
Germans paid well. In the village of Medvyn, about thirty kilometers from the town of Bohuslav, the unripened grain had been flattened by the retreating Red Army. It was raised again by the population after the passing of the front. One in three sheaves was promised and given to the harvesters. In places where no rules were announced, peasants constantly asked how the harvest would be divided. In some places they were to be deceived and the entire harvest was taken away. The final reason for the hard work was an expectation of privatization, caused also because in some places the harvest actually took place on individually designated strips. The threshing of the harvest, equally hampered by a lack of equipment, lasted until the end of the year, when a severe winter started in which temperatures dropped to minus 30 degrees Celsius. "In the daytime you could hear the sound of chains clanking: the old men and women, the girls, and the children were busy threshing the wheat. Then they would grind the grain between two big stones and pass the flour through a hand sieve." In places where threshing was done collectively, upon German order, motivation dropped significantly.

Despite all the obstacles, the 1941 harvest was very good. In late October, the village of Lytvynivka, forty-five kilometers north of Kiev, still had no German authorities. Everybody had selected a piece of former collective farmland and harvested from it. People "ate their fill" to an extent which even old people could not recall. "They laid in stores for years ahead; the

51Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 107 (8 October 1941), p. 12.

52Hohulia, author interview; Zozulia, author interview; Moskovs'ka, author interview; Sarapuka, author interview; Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 85 (16 September 1941), p. 13; Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 120.


54Belov, History of a Soviet Collective Farm, p. 20.

55Hohulia, author interview; Sova, Do istorii, p. 95.

56Anatoli (Kuznetsov), Babi Yar, p. 193.

cellars were bursting with vegetables, the attics were piled high with apples and pears, and strings of dried fruits hung under the eaves."58 An author who traveled on foot from the Left Bank to the countryside of the Right Bank in December 1941, found the situation in the latter quite different, for there "the villages were satisfied."59 In the Left Bank he had just left, destruction or evacuation of the crop had been more extensive, fear of famine persisted, and peasants continued to work hard on the winter sowing. In the farms in the Novi Sanzhary raion, which remained under military administration until September 1942, "a harmonious work started which is only possible when one's life is on the line."60 This did not apply anywhere, however. In the northern village of Maksymovychy, there were cases of illegal (individual) sowing. As for the collective sowing, the local elder complained to the men in October that "everybody is working at half power."61

On 27 February 1942, a new propaganda campaign started. It was aimed at preserving the collective farm system while convincing the peasants that Hitler—special portraits of whom were supplied for the occasion—had decided to do away with it. The village population was ordered to assemble for special fifteen-minute radio broadcasts at 12:15 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. The slogan was: "The hard-working peasant gets land of his own!" (Robotiashchomu selianynovi — svoia zemlia!). The next day, on 28 February, every collective farm in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (as well as in the regions administered by Army Group South) was renamed a "communal farm"—hromhosp, i.e. hromads'ke hospodarstvo, or Gemeinwirtschaft (sometimes also referred to as sil's'kohospodars'ke toварystvo).

Starting on 3 March, German propagandists, in cooperation with the Landwirte addressed the peasants in meetings62 and told them that a "New Land Order" (Novyi Zemel'nyi 58

58 Anatoli (Kuznetsov), Babi Yar, p. 192; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 192–193.
59 Maistrenko, Istoriia moho pokolinnia, p. 337.
60 Sova, Do istorii, p. 77.
61 Administration of Maksymovychy, "Protokol n. 11," [early October 1941], DAKO, f. r-215, op. 1, d. 1, l. 16.
62 Ortwin Buchbender, Das törende Erz: deutsche Propaganda gegen die Roten Armee im Zweiten

Lad) had been introduced by the "Ministry for the Liberated [sic] Eastern Territories." They said that eventually, the "communal farm" would be changed into an "agricultural cooperative" (kliborobs’ka spilka or Landbau-Genossenschaft). In such a cooperative, the fields would still be cultivated collectively (hurtom), but other work, including the harvesting, would take place on individually designated strips (sing. nadil). Cooperatives which operated efficiently might even be allowed to become individual farms (odnoosibni selians’ki hospodarstva). Meanwhile, according to the "temporary" communal farm statutes, every single farmer in the village had to become a member (with German sanction). Thus, many peasants who had not even been members of the former Soviet kolhosp were now forced to join the German hromhosp. This indeed occurred. For the peasants, the whole campaign was all too similar to Soviet propaganda, and they were disappointed or at the very least suspicious. All the same, they did not pass by the opportunity to celebrate.

It is not clear how many peasants were allowed to cultivate a plot on their own, as part of the "New Land Order" or perhaps even before this decree. In any case, these peasants worked hard. But at harvest time in 1942, they were bitterly disappointed, for, according to a communist report, "the Germans took the fruits of their labor....These individual farmers


63Dr. Shiller [Otto Schiller], Nadzvychaina komisiia dlia poriadkuvannia zemel’noho pytannia v Ukraini, "Do ostatochnoho uporiadkuvannia ustaluiet’sia taki napriamni [sic] shcho do [sic] ustroiu i zahospodariuvannia hromads’kykh hospodarstv (tymchasovi postanovy pro pratsiu)," translation from German, n.d., n.p., TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 114. Excluded from the communal farm were people whose "personal or political behavior" made them "unworthy" of membership, as were children of members younger than 16. On entry into the collective farms in the Nazi period, see also Mykhailo Seleshko, Vinnytsia: spomyny perekladacha Komisii doslidiv zlochyniv NKVD v 1937–1938 (New York, Toronto, London, and Sydney, 1991), pp. 99 and 104. In German, the term was actually not "New Land Order" but "New Agrarian Order" (Neue Agrar-Ordnung).

64Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," pp. 99–100; Meldungen, 7 (12 June 1942), p. 6; Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 67. For a misjudgement, see "Teilbericht Politik über die Bereisung des Reichskommissariats mit Prof. v. Grünberg in der Zeit vom 13.8. bis 3.9.1942" (Rivne, 20 September 1942), TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, ll. 33 and 38, which speaks of "in general a success" and "great satisfaction."

65As for example in Kremenchuk, where the announcement by the Gebietslandwirt attracted between 2,000 and 2,500 peasants. Meldungen, 7 (12 June 1942), p. 9. They were interested in the cooperatives. Ibid., p. 10.
sometimes [started to] hate the Germans more than those who [were] still 'obtaining the right' to land.\textsuperscript{66}

In the communal farms, as planned by the Nazis, little seemed to change. The system of brigades and teams (sing. \textit{lanka}; Russian: \textit{zeno}) was preserved, although these units were renamed "labor units" (\textit{hurtky pratsi}). As in the 1930s, the teams could be formed on a family basis.\textsuperscript{67} In conversations among themselves and in documents that were not meant for the general population, the Germans did not mince words and spoke frankly of \textit{Kolchosten}.\textsuperscript{68} In certain places, even their communist names ("The Path to World Revolution," "Rosa Luxemburg," "The Commune of Paris," etc.) were retained.\textsuperscript{69} The main differences—beside the new organization in charge of the crop—were the above-mentioned demand that all villagers become communal farm members, and the requirement that all such members actually work in it. (During the Soviet period, there had been many members who did not contribute.\textsuperscript{70})

A final change concerned the increase in manual labor. By 1942, work on many farms was done with tools (ploughs, harrows, cultivators, etc.) made by the peasants themselves or by released prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{71} In most places, farm work remained manual labor and tractors were rarely used. Although Ukraine's nine hundred Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) were preserved,\textsuperscript{72} they were often idle because of lack of fuel. Before the war, the tractor drivers had

\textsuperscript{66}Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 67. Pihido, writing about the Kiev region, noted a leap in motivation among "the people who had gotten rid of the yoke of the collective farm." It is unclear whom he means and which period he describes. Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," pp. 158–159.

\textsuperscript{67}Shiller, "Do ostatochnoho uporiadkuvannia [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 115.

\textsuperscript{68}E.g., Order (nakaz) by a Kreislandwirt to the Chief Agronomist (\textit{Hauptagronom}) for the Polis'ke raion, 25 July 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 85, l. 28; Vegesack, \textit{Als Dolmetscher im Osten}, p. 108; Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sd in Kiew to Befehlshaber [...], Kiev, 14 December 1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 418930.

\textsuperscript{69}Vegesack, \textit{Als Dolmetscher im Osten}, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{70}Fitzpatrick, \textit{Stalin's Peasants}, p. 172.

\textsuperscript{71}Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 159.

been an elite group in the Soviet countryside. Under the Germans they retained their status. For example, in the Polissian village of Tarasy (Polis'ke, then Khabne raion) the local tractor driver did not work for two days until the populace agreed to pay him 1.5 pood per ploughed hectare. In many villages in the Vinnytsia region, where the repaired tractors could not be used because of a lack of fuel, the peasants did the digging themselves with spades. Together with a lack of seed material, such manual labor resulted in only a small area sown by the spring of 1942. In the village of Hanshchyna, for example, it was only 150 of 600 hectares. Everywhere, peasants were very reluctant to use cows as pulling power, even though German posters urged them to do so, "as has been done for a long time in Germany." Many thought that cows were unable to plow and even might overstrain and die. Altogether, from the Nazi perspective the first year of the "new" agricultural system was a great success. Both the army and the Reich were fed from Ukraine in amounts which had been calculated before the invasion.

Officially, the working week in the Reichskommissariat was fifty-four hours. From 1 May 1942, every peasant between the ages 18 and 60 had to work five days per week. Exceptions could be made for the chronically ill, disabled persons, and women two months before or after

73 Polis'ke raion administration to the director of the MTS, 13 May 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 22, l. 307; Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants, pp. 140-141.

74 Savchenko, VIIO NKVD USSR to Khrushchev, "Razvedvodka No. 11: O polozenii v okkupirovannoi protivnikom Vinnitsoi oblast po sostoianiiu na 30. 9. 42g." 16 October 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 16; Savchenko to Korniets, "Spets. soob. [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 31.

75 Vegesack, Als Dolmetscher im Osten, pp. 114 and 119 (at the "Shevchenko" farm in southern Ukraine). See also Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitsdienst und des SD in Kiew to Befehlshaber der Sicherheitsdienst und des SD für die Ukraine in Kiew, Kiev, 28 September 1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 418946; and the poster, "Zaprihaite Vashykh koriv," Filia, Tsentral'na naukova biblioteka im V. I. Vernads'koho, Natsional'na akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Kiev. Viddil starodruhiv, item no. 1495.


77 TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 51, d. 15, l. 492.
Impatient local Germans transgressed these rules, however. In the Podolian district of Proskuriv, during the spring sowing campaign in 1942 every day was officially a working day, including Sundays and other religious days. Working hours were from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., with only one ninety-minute break for the main meal of the day. Despite such regulation, however, absenteeism and lateness were very common. Many peasants spent their time petitioning the raion authorities for "petty" affairs or merely partying (what people called *hulianka*). For this reason, newspapers and posters regularly called upon them as follows: "Peasants, you must also provide food for your brothers in the cities!", "If you won't sow you will go hungry," and "Don't be lazy! The Fatherland calls you to work!"

The official punishment for work evasion (*Arbeitsverweigerung*) was a 200 rouble fine or—more often applied—two weeks of labor camp. By all accounts, however, the most widely used punishment for lateness or absenteeism was beating. When a peasant did not show up, he or she was ordered to the elder's office and publicly beaten. If a German did the beating, it was usually with a whip. If the elder or farm chairman did the job, it was with a birch or stick, or simply their hands. One farm chairman even used an old Russian army rifle.

The *Landwirte* were firm believers in the beatings. Quite typical was a *Gebietslandwirt* in the south. There this tall man, with a very short haircut and renowned among other Germans as "the Khan of the Nogai Steppe," told a visitor: "The fellows here understand only one language: this one!," as he raised his hand. "Personally," he added, "I prefer not to beat, but

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78 Shiller, "Do ostatochnoho uporiadkuvannia [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 115.


80 Note by the chief of the Polis'ke raion to all elders, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 13, l. 21.

81 *Ukrains'kyi holos*, 26 April 1942, p. 3; ibid., 30 April 1942, p. 3; "Ne ledariui!", Scholarly Reference Library, collection "Afishy ta plakaty okupatsiinoho periodu," item 147sp.

82 Chief of the Polis'ke raion, 21 April 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 13, l. 14. For an example of the punishment with two weeks forced labor, see the verdict (*Strafverfügung*) by a *Gebietskommissar* in the Kiev Generalbezirk, 14 August 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 22, l. 402.

83 Gerhard Lohrenz, *The Lost Generation and Other Stories* (Steinbach, Manitoba, 1982), p. 56; Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka No. 11: O polozhenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 16.
one cannot function here without it. You wouldn't believe how such a slap in the face [Backpfeife] works wonders!"°⁴

Peasants could be beaten up by Germans for the smallest things, such as for not saying a proper greeting,°⁵ not greeting fast enough, or having one's hands in one's pockets. Some Kreislandwirte, especially in regions where partisans were active, beat up ten or even twenty peasants in their raion per day.°⁶ Peasants often complained about the abuse in letters to relatives working in Germany as Ostarbeiter ("eastern workers"). Reports by German censors about letters they opened contained typical passages. One of 136 verified letters sent from Ukraine in July and August 1942 reported: "Life is bad here, the Germans beat us with batons if we come late for work. And every day we are chased to work."°⁷ Among 582 such letters from Ukraine studied later (between 11 September and 10 November 1942), the censors considered the following statement typical enough to be quoted: "They chase us to work with anything they can beat with, batons or sticks. Yes, these people are really civilized, literate, they are cultured.... This is how we live: we are beaten and are not allowed to cry. The good thing is that we are free. All desire to live and work has been taken away from us. When there is work, we work. Otherwise we stay home. Then the Germans come during the day and beat us hard."°⁸

The longer the Germans stayed, the more vicious the beatings seem to have become.

Once the entire village of Chervonyi Iar (Kirovohrad) was punished for going out to work late.

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°⁵Mikhail Mikh. Skirda [et. al.], "Otchet o podpol'noi partizanoi rabote i partizanskoi bor'be v Kirovogradskoi oblasti (avgust 1941 goda - mart 1944 goda)," n.d., typewritten document, signed, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 14.

°⁶For example, Alfred Krauze and Peter Fleker in the village of Tsybul'ove in the Kirovohrad region. Skirda, "Otchet [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, ll. 15–16.

°⁷"Stimmungsbericht" by the Auslandsbriefprüfstelle, Berlin, 11 September 1942, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292556.

°⁸"Stimmungsbericht" by Auslandbriefprüfstelle, Berlin, 11 November 1942, in Norbert Müller [et al.], ed., Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den zeitweilig besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion (1941–1944) (Berlin, 1991), p. 361. Müller does not provide the entire report; it can be found on USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frames E292549/12–18. Another testimony that peasants were chased to work in the morning is Hrynevych, author interview.
After half of its 130 inhabitants were beaten with whips, the others tried to flee, but dogs hunted them down. Peasants beaten by the village elder sometimes filed a complaint with the regional Schlichter (mediator). At trial, elders usually said that they had been beaten themselves by Germans, and been ordered to do the same to the peasants to get them to work. Had they not complied, the work would not have been done and they would have been beaten to death. After such explanations, elders were usually acquitted or given only a small fine.

Rumors about the beatings in the countryside also quickly reached the cities. The Landwirte believed that the former Soviet citizens would recall Soviet practices and would appreciate being released with only a beating instead of being placed under arrest. In actual fact, in the Soviet period agricultural officials had also meted out beatings. Those beatings had been sporadic, however. Most important of all, the German-sponsored beatings were meted out for all to see and thus much more humiliating. The overall result was hatred of the Germans. A new folklore also developed around the beatings. Among the many new sayings and rhymes were: "Unable to work and you're fleeced with leather for it" (Za nevminnia derut' reminniam); "We thought the German would give us land, instead he flogs with a whip" (Dumaly, shcho nimets' dast' pole, a vin nahaikoiv pore); and "You can't live with German laws: It's rubber on your back and a rest in the grave" (Nimets'ki zakony zhytiu perepony: Rezyna na horbu, vidpochynok v hrobu).

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89 Skirda, "Otchet [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 32.


91 "Iz dnevnika uchitel'nosti gor. Kieva L. Nartovoi [Nartova diary]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 347, l. 4, entry for 14 February 1942.


93 Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants, pp. 180 and 302.


95 IMFE, Krasyts'ka collection, f. 14-3, od. zb. 20, ark. 46 ("1942") and 222 (also at ark. 39 under "1943"); "Fol'klor Velykoi Vitchyzniarenii viiny," typed manuscript (Kiev: IMFE Akademii nauk Ukrain'skoï RSR, 1945), edited by M. T. Ryl's'kyi, IMFE, f. 14-3, od. zb. 56, ark. 488 (under "1943"), originally from IMFE, le. I. Prytula collection, f. 14-3, od. zb. 24, ark. 71.
But beatings were not the only danger. In October 1942, the Gebietskommissar in Tarashcha ordered all offices to apply "the most severe measures" against those who showed up for work only at 8:00 a.m. or not at all. This could mean the death penalty. Even without announcements, people's lives were at risk. For example, in the spring of 1942, peasants from the village of Tahancha (Kaniv) were once feeding horses instead of working in the field when the Landwirt showed up. Immediately he started firing shots at them. In the village of Medvyn worked a young peasant from another village. Because he came late, the local Gendarmerie beat him to death.

Among the victims of such terror were certainly many women. In the summer of 1941, as Hans Koch found, they had generally been more anti-Communist and more eager to own property than men. Nothing in their situation improved, however, because the collective farms continued to function or were restored. It was still not unusual for them to be working under a male "brigade leader," who urged them on with a whistle. In general, the women seem to have been busier than the men, probably because they felt the most responsible for the fate of their children. Once the editor of a regional newspaper noted that Germans thought that women worked the hardest and noted himself, "They can be seen at work in the garden or in the field, they repair houses and paint them white." It was the women who went to the market. Meanwhile, "our man likes to ride on his cart, to stand in the street doing nothing, or to lay around and smoke cigarettes." Quickly the women became at least as anti-German as the men. At first they were very assertive vis-à-vis the Germans, often with tragic results.

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96 *Vidrodzhennia* (Tarashcha), 1 October 1942, p. 4.

97 "Doklad pribyvshego iz tyla protivnika CHEREVIK Sergeia Maksimovicha," 25 March 1943, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 22, l. 24.

98 Prylipko, author interview.

99 Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass," l. 7.

100 Vegesack, *Als Dolmetscher im Osten*, p. 110.

(male) author of a communist report found that women in early 1942 "openly, to their face, insult[ed] the Germans. At the butter factory of Oleksandrivka, women rioted about the need to hand over 100 percent of the milk yield. When the supervisor, a [native] policeman, reminded them that there was no Bolshevik regime now, the crowd shouted, 'We will kiss the Bolsheviks, the sooner they come back the better.' The crowd was dispersed by the Germans who, apparently misunderstanding what it was all about, beat up the policeman. In Chyhyryn, one woman gave a German officer the finger [dulia, a vulgar gesture] instead of the butter he demanded and called him a devil, for which, of course, she was immediately hanged from the acacia tree near her hut."

When the Gendarmerie executed villagers in public, it was on gallows which eventually were placed in the center of every village. In Medvyn, young men had stolen or sabotaged something. An eyewitness recalls:

We are all at work. Then the alarm rings in the village: Everybody is off to a meeting at the school. We all go, because if not, we'll be beaten terribly. We all gather. And there were these gallows, for hangings. The Germans...no, the Germans are just standing there—our volunteers read out loud who has done what wrong. Then they bring them up one by one and hang them. Everybody sees how they are punished.

The hangings and general terror installed a well-founded and intense fear. A woman who was in her early twenties at the time still remembers it vividly more than fifty years later.

Every day we had to work in the fields. I remember, once I stayed at home. I wanted to pull out the weeds in the garden. As soon as I went to the garden to start weeding, the village chief came walking by. I saw all these people and [gasps for air]—the German [Nimets' ide]. I looked and died of fear [umerla]. I thought I had died. We had those plum-trees, I ran there and hid in the bushes. And they came closer and walked under the pear-tree, but didn't find me. And all the time I thought: They will kill me, they will kill me [Mene ub"liut', mene ub"liut'].

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102Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...], TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 74. This source deals mainly with the (former) Kiev and Kirovohrad oblasts since early 1942, that is, since the introduction of civilian rule there.

103Hohulia, author interview.

104Oksana Iatsenko (Ukrainian born in 1919 in the village of Mysailivka), author interview in Ukrainian, 21 July 1995, Mysailivka, Bohuslav raion, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording.
In certain regions, people worked hard even in the communal farms.\(^{105}\) In general, however, despite the threats, once the peasants got to the fields they worked as slowly and as little as possible.\(^{106}\) At the farm in Borodianka, the workday lasted from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. The (male) brigade leaders told their fellow-villagers to work normally when the Landwirt arrived, but otherwise slowly. There were risks involved, as one woman from this farm recalls: "Once we were sitting and did not see him [the Landwirt] coming. We were taking a break. But he came, and it was terrible how he started shouting at us. The interpreter said, 'If you remain seated, he will kill you.'"\(^{107}\) Because of the slow pace of work, less than two-thirds (63 percent) of arable land was sown in the farms in the spring of 1942.\(^{108}\)

The main reason for the lack of peasant motivation was that the Germans confiscated all they could take. Initially, during the 1941 harvest, the Germans paid much better than the Soviet authorities. But then the "labor-days" (trudodni) were reinstated, that is, the Soviet system of payments which took into account the time worked, the skill involved, and the size of the harvest, and which effectively ensured that the peasant received very little.\(^{109}\) In the communal farms in the Kiev region, one labor-day entitled one to 100 to 200 grams of millet or

\(^{105}\)This view is in Pihido-Pravoberezhny, "Velyka Vitchyniana viina," p. 159.

\(^{106}\)As also noted in "Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 32.

\(^{107}\)Tetiana Ivanivna Pyskovets' (Ukrainian), interview in Ukrainian by the CHPWU, 22 January 1946, village of Borodianka, Kiev oblast, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, l. 71.

\(^{108}\)Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," p. 108, dealing with both the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and the territory administrated by Wirtschaftsinspektion Süd. As Bartoleit notes, while the area cultivated was less than in other former Soviet territories, the difference with these territories was perhaps outweighed by the fact that partisan activity started later than there. Nazi intelligence called the fall 1942 harvest satisfactory; see Meldungen, 32 (4 December 1942), p. 8, regarding the Volhynia-Podolia and Kiev Generalbezirke.

\(^{109}\)In the Soviet period, a hard-working collective farm worker received—or at least was supposed to receive—in the fall for a year's work, per laborday 0.70 to 1.50 roubles (for most peasants, the came to a total of about 400 roubles); 1 to 1.5 kg. grain; and 3 kg. potatoes. Often, depending on the harvest, it was even less. A hard-working farm worker earned per year between 300 and 325 labordays. (Meanwhile, a pair of leather high boots cost 400 roubles.). The average kolkhoznik earned less then 200 labordays in 1937, which meant 438 for the average household, all paid in kind. Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 28 (20 July 1941), p. 10; ibid., 45 (7 August 1941), p. 4; Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants, pp. 145, 192, and 197.
some leftover other grain.\textsuperscript{110} In the Borodianka raion, the paper norm by March 1943 was payment in kind according to labor-days earned each month and a standard 12 kg. grain per month.\textsuperscript{111} But reality was probably more like the village of Borodianka, where work was not paid for at all. "They said that labordays were written down, but we did not receive anything for the entire period of work."\textsuperscript{112}

On paper there was one German innovation in the payment system. This was advance payment, of at most 500 g. of grain per day worked (and for those with large families even 750 g.)\textsuperscript{113} Part of this payment was to be given directly from the arable potato or beet fields, from a separate section (at most 12 percent of the total area) subdivided by household after sowing.\textsuperscript{114} It is unclear to what extent this innovation was actually introduced. If it was, it could explain why Pihido found that many peasants in villages to the south of Kiev received three times more per labor-day than during the Soviet period, namely 3 to 4 kg. grain, and why a peasant from Medvyn remembered later that the Germans "paid well."\textsuperscript{115} In the small village of Lukovystsia, payment in kind was made regardless of the number of labor-days; 300 g. per day (and 100 g. per child).\textsuperscript{116} Altogether, the situation seems to have varied from district to district.

The most extensive food confiscation campaign took place in July 1942. The goal of this "threshing and confiscation action" (\textit{Drusch- und Erfassungsaktion}) was twofold: to force

\textsuperscript{110}Z. Serdiuk, Sekretar Kyïvs'koho obkomu KP(b)U, "Politinformatsïi Po Kyïvs'koi oblasti na 10.XII–1943 roku," n.p., n.d., TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 633, l. 14 (uses the term \textit{cholovikoden}).

\textsuperscript{111}As follows: 1 to 10 labordays—150 g. for each; 11 to 20 labordays—300 g. for each; and 21 to 31 labordays—450 g. for each. Chief of the Borodianka raion to the elder of N. Buda, 5 March 1943, DAKO, f. r-2160, op. 1, d. 4, l. 8. This also applied to workers at state farms.

\textsuperscript{112}Pyskovets', CHPWU interview, l. 71.

\textsuperscript{113}Shiller, "Do ostatochnoho uporiadkuvannia [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 117.

\textsuperscript{114}Ibid., l. 116.


\textsuperscript{116}Tubolets', CHPWU interview, l. 26v.
people to thresh the grain which had remained from the 1941 harvest and to confiscate all grain from storage facilities and people's homes. In each Generalbezirk, the campaign was led by a special emissary (Sonderbeauftragter) from the Reichskommissariat's food and agriculture department in Rivne. It was implemented by the Gebietskommissare, the Landwirte, and the Gendarmerie. The latter searched the peasant homes, yards, and gardens, and also mills and markets. The grain was taken away on guarded carts. In the process, many people were robbed of their cows as well, by way of punishment for not providing the requested amounts. That month, in the Kiev Generalbezirk 26,570 tons of grain were confiscated. (38,470 tons had already been taken in June.) The final 7,960 tons of the German target were obtained in early August. After personally making random checks, the agent for the Kiev Generalbezirk, Kriegsverwaltungsrat Schumann, concluded, in the words of the SD, that "no more grain quantities which can be confiscated are in the possession of the producers."117

The large deliveries (postavky or kontynhenty) were in keeping with the belief of Koch and other Nazis that "the delivery target [Ablieferungssoll] of the Ukrainian population in agricultural produce must be fulfilled whatever the circumstances, including a disregarding of its own food situation." This was in accord with Reichmarschall Göring's principle, "If there is famine is Europe, it will not be in Germany."118 Meanwhile, German propaganda explained the high rate of grain requisition by the needs of war. Some peasants may have accepted this

117Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Kiev, to Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD für die Ukraine, Kiev, 10 August 1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frames 418845–849, emphasis in the original. On confiscation of cows, see also Auslandbriefprüfstelle, 11 September 1942, T-120, roll 2533, frame E292557. The house searches for grain are also mentioned in "Teilbericht Politik [...]" TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 30. In the village of Lytvynivka in 1942, the entire harvest (from the previous year) was confiscated, and people had to work harder than before 1941 to pay all the taxes. Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 273. See also, on the village of Rykun', ibid., p. 270. Other evidence for the total requisition of grain is provided in Laskovsky, "Practicing Law," p. 123; Sova, Do istorii, p. 86; and ""Teilbericht Politik [...]" TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 31v. Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 160 and Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, p. 96 also note that not everywhere the delivery quotas in kind were less than in the Soviet period. Note also this statement from a Ukrainian woman: "We handed in everything, the Germans took it." Zozulia, author interview.

118Letter by Erich Koch to the Generalkommissar in Dnipropetrovs'k, 17 November 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 1, d. 232, ll. 9–10.
In any case, peasants came to the conclusion that their life was as bad or even worse than before 1941. In July and August 1942, peasant letters contained complaints like the following: "It's going to be just like under the Bolsheviks, for we have to hand in everything. It's misery." Letters often complained that "everything" was gone—while actually supplying evidence to the contrary: "There is little bread, it was all taken away." Some even ventured, "Our life used to be bad, but now..." By the end of 1942, peasants in the Tarashcha region were saying, "There is no difference whatsoever: we gave a lot under the Soviets and we are giving a lot now." Letters sent at that time contained many complaints from peasants about the lack of food, that the 1942 harvest was bad, and expectations of famine during the coming winter and spring. "It's harvest time, and yet we have no bread. The guys gather halms, and we mill them on the hand mill, to make some bread. This is how we live up to now, and we don't know what will be next."

Before 1941, the peasants had survived by taking ("stealing," if that is the right word), bit by bit, produce from the collective farms field for themselves. For grain, they used the so-called "kolhosp pocket" (kolhospne kyshenia): a pocket sown on the inside of a person's clothes specifically for this purpose. Cucumbers, potatoes, tomatoes, onions, and beets were taken in the buckets, milk jars, and in other utensils used during work. These methods were still practiced under the Germans. Some peasants in Volhynia used still another method. They secretly threshed the harvested grain, set fire to what had become useless sheaves, and

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119 Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 104, regarding peasants in the Nemyriv raion, based on a conversation with the raion chief.

120 Auslandbriefprüfstelle, 11 September 1942, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292557.

121 Vidrodzhennia, 12 November 1942, p. 3 (reporter's phrase, summarizing popular opinion).

122 Auslandbriefprüfstelle Berlin, 11 November 1942, in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, pp. 359 and 361. In the Zhytomyr region, peasants already in October 1942 were expecting a famine as bad as the one of 1933. Meldungen, 24 (9 October 1942), p. 9.

123 Ukrains'kyi visnyk, 4 April 1943, pp. 6–7.
reported that fire had destroyed the harvest. This trick was eventually uncovered.\textsuperscript{124} Indeed, a major deterioration of the living conditions of the peasants, from their point of view, was that it became more difficult to "steal."\textsuperscript{125} Events like the following occurred everywhere. In Medvyn, several villagers were caught in the act of "stealing" grain by the Landwirt (popularly known by his first name as Emma, or simply as "the commandant"—komendant). On the same occasion, the Landwirt also discovered samohon, home-brewed vodka. Through his interpreter, he demanded to know who owned the bottles. When no answer came, he started lashing everybody at random with his whip. Then he left, but that evening several suspected thieves were arrested by the Gendarmerie and beaten all night.\textsuperscript{126}

Very common was wood "theft," as were attempts to combat it. How these cases were handled is illustrated by the following example. On 11 November 1942, a forester near Iakovets' (Polis'ke) caught a peasant in the act of cutting wood. This man, Hryts'ko Samoilenko (b. 1923), showed a statement from the elder of the village of Maksymovychy giving him permission to collect wood, but it turned out to be forged. He and the real author of the document, Demyd Dubodil' (b. 1908, arrested on 3 December), were interrogated by the Schutzmannschaft (which also called itself Ukraïns'ka Politsiia) in Polis'ke, who then (on 5 December) sent a report about the case to the SS und Polizeigebietsführer of the Polis'ke district, Scheider. The men were released, but then summoned to appear at trial at the Court [Kamera] of the raion Schöffe. The criminal case on "theft" and fraud (shakhraistvo, Schwindlerei) was heard by Schöffe (also Schlichter) M. Ivanov on 19 December at 10:00 a.m. The "thief" Samoilenko was fined 600 karbovantsi or, in case of non-payment, two months confinement; the forger Dubodil' was fined 400 karbovantsi or six weeks confinement.

\textsuperscript{124}Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 133 (14 November 1941), p. 34.

\textsuperscript{125}That theft was combated severely is noted by Hryts'ko Salata, author interview, and Prylipko, author interview.

\textsuperscript{126}Sarapuka, author interview; Hohulia, author interview.
Both also had to pay the cost of the trial, 100 karbovantsi. A German translation of the verdict went to Schneider.\textsuperscript{127}

The sentence followed the guidelines set by Koch in May 1942: payment of the supposed value of the wood or confinement. Often in cases like this, however, the German authorities—the German police or the Gebietskommissar—thought the verdict too lenient and broke the rules. For example, the Gebietskommissar would return the case for a retrial by another Schöfffe, accompanied by a threatening note that the punishment should be made more severe.\textsuperscript{128}

Besides "theft," there were also several other factors that could make the Nazi system of exploitation more bearable. One was lack of transport facilities, which could prevent the export of the crop. Isolated villages in the Uman' region lost all grain in the fall, but in the summer there was no transport for the perishable fruit and vegetables; thus they were left to the peasants.\textsuperscript{129} In rare cases, the Landwirt was a reasonable man. In the village of Zarubyntsi (Pereiaslav), the farm could operate according to the "desiatky" principle (more on this below) and, according to a villager, the Germans "took very little. This was because the German agronomist was not very severe. The peasants would show him the hilly and steep fields, he took a look around and did not demand much grain."\textsuperscript{130}

Best situated to cope with the high delivery quotas was the village elite. The German agrarian authorities simply could not check them often. During the entire period, each Landwirt could speak to each hromhosp head (kerivnyk) at most once a week.\textsuperscript{131} As before 1941, the head and the brigade leaders did not work in the fields themselves and earned substantially

\textsuperscript{127}The outcome of the case is not known. DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 19, ll. 1–20.


\textsuperscript{129}Werth, Russia at War, p. 727.

\textsuperscript{130}Serhii Romanovych Rudenko (Ukrainian born in 1900), interview in Ukrainian by the CHPWU, 9 August 1946, village of Zarubyntsi, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 249, ll. 20-20v. Rudenko was secretary of the elder.

\textsuperscript{131}Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," p. 55.
more labordays,\textsuperscript{132} partly by concerted illegal action. (They were related to each other or at least good friends.) Most importantly, when these people caught ordinary peasants "stealing," the goods still did not end up in German hands: "They thresh the grain with the threshing machine and with flails, take it to the [farm] store, and then it starts: the store-keeper does not weigh it, the accountant does not record it, the brigade leader does not see it, the collective farm head keeps quiet, and the elder pretends to see nothing."\textsuperscript{133}

Even better off were the Ukrainian (more rarely Russian) officials who worked at the raion level. They had some leeway because bad road conditions during the mud season in central and northern Ukraine (late March to late April) and during the winter made it difficult for the Gebietskommissar to keep a close watch on them.\textsuperscript{134} To be sure, agricultural deliveries—from the farms as well as from the peasants' gardens—were not supposed to be handled by the raion administrations, but by the Ukrainian agronomist subject to the Kreislandwirt of each raion. This agronomist, whose office was called the raizemviddil, was supposed to mediate between the Kreislandwirt and the communal and state farms (more on the latter below). During the harvest, the agronomist had to work every day and submit a report to the Kreislandwirt every week. This formal arrangement greatly displeased the raion chiefs.\textsuperscript{135}

But in actual fact the German control over the confiscation was far from complete. Some raion chiefs are reported to have managed to shift most of the quota on to people they disliked, for example people of another nationality, while others even increased the quota.\textsuperscript{136} In many raions, peasants had resurrected cooperatives, and here agricultural deliveries went via the union of consumer cooperatives (raispozyvspilka). Naturally, the raion authorities could

\textsuperscript{132}Tubolets', CHPWU interview, l. 26v.

\textsuperscript{133}Ukrain's'kyi visnyk, 4 April 1943, pp. 6–7.

\textsuperscript{134}"Lagebericht" for December 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 27, l. 10.

\textsuperscript{135}DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 21, l. 209; Order from the Kreislandwirt to the Chief Agronomist in the Polis'ke raion, 25 July 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 85, ll. 28–29.

\textsuperscript{136}Koch to the Generalkommissar in Dnipropetrovs'k, 17 November 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 1, d. 232, ll. 9–10.
exert influence on it. In the Novi Sanzhary raion, inhabited by some 60,000 people, the raion chief, the chief agronomist, and the head of a separate Raion Land Administration (raizemuprava) that dated back to the year of military rule, managed to hide the real size of the harvest in 1942 and 1943 from the Germans. (The 1942 harvest was mainly corn and sunflowers). Had the German norms been followed, then each peasant would have received only 120 kg. of second-rate grain for a whole year. But the troika convinced the hundreds of Ukrainian officials in the raion—elders, farm heads, and accountants—to prepare two records: one real, another fake. In his proud account about this episode, the former raion chief (Hryhorii Kariak) writes that in this way the peasants were paid more grain than they had ever received in the Soviet period.

Not only did most peasants receive merely a below-subsistence wage in kind from the farm, they were also—as before 1941—charged with financial taxes. They as well were charged a tax in kind on their gardens (discussed below). The first tax was for the use of land in 1941 (pozemel'nyi podatok), at 80 roubles per hectare. There were also personal (podushni) taxes, a one-time tax (odnorazovy zbir) which supposedly benefited the development of the countryside (100 roubles, in May 1942), and taxes on cows, horses, houses, and even dogs. The dog tax was annually 150 roubles (payable in Soviet currency) in late 1942 per dog.

At first the Nazi authorities tried to raise these financial taxes directly from the farm. Apparently this created so much chaos that they were in effect charged to households or

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137 Sova, Do istorii, p. 88; Pihido-Pravoberezhyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 160; DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 21, l. 131.


139 Decree by the chief of the Ivankiv raion, Ivankiv, 19 December 1941, DAKO, f. r-2457, op. 1, d. 16, l. 3.

140 Notes from the elder of Liuten'ka (Hadiach), September 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 139, ll. 2–3; Serdiuk, "Politinformatsii [...]", TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 633, l. 14.
individuals. Each raion had an official taxation commission, comprising a tax inspector, the head of the raion financial department (rafinviddil), and an agronomist. This commission surveyed statements about taxes from elders or "citizens" (hromadiane, i.e., peasants). Peasants, or the elder writing for them, would ask to be freed from a certain tax because they were unable to pay. By way of explanation, the elder could characterize the person as "disabled," "old," "ill," or, sometimes, "insane," and he could also point out that it concerned a single person unable to work, a teacher, or family without an adult male. Still others the elder could characterize as being very poor (ne maie nichoho), or as "very poor, husband is in the [Red] army." The German law allowed for exceptions for old age, so these were often granted. One peasant had returned to the village of Marianivka near Polis'ke in late September 1941, when the harvest was already in full swing. Therefore in 1942 he was allowed to pay less of the land tax (100 roubles). For the elder, however, it meant that he had to obtain the rest of the money from other villagers. In cases of doubt, the tax inspector paid a visit to the person(s) in question. However these taxes were levied, clearly the chaotic system allowed for influence by the elders and raion officials.

Can we now answer the question whether the material situation of the peasants, as compared to the situation before 1941, worsened, stayed the same, or improved? What has been said so far actually does not allow us to draw any definitive conclusions. First several other aspects of the

141 One raion chief tried to persuade the Gebietskommissar to adopt individual taxation by claiming—falsely—that the collective farms no longer existed. Raion chief of the Polis'ke raion to the financial inspector of the Gebietskommissar, 15 March 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 21, l. 93. That the one collective farm in Maksymovychy was restored is indicated by the record of an uprava meeting, which "resolved: all citizens must hand in what they took from common property." "Protokol n. 20," 30 December 1941, DAKO, f. r-215, op. 1, d. 5, l. 3.

142 List, compiled by the elder of Blidcha, of thirteen people unable to pay the personal tax, 12 August 1942, DAKO, f. r-2457, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 11–12; note by the elder of Dybenets' (Bohuslav), freeing people from the one-time tax, 6 June 1942, DAKO, f. r-2107, op. 1, d. 12, l. 9; notes by the elder of Vil'khovets' (Bohuslav), on the same matter, 25 May and 5 June 1942, DAKO, f. r-2107, op. 1, d. 13, ll. 2–3v and 6–7v.

143 Shiller, "Do ostatochnoho uporiadkuvannia [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 116.

144 "Zasidannia Raiopodatkovoi komisii Khabens'koho raionu pry Raifinviddili, 16 February 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 18, l. 9v."
peasants' living conditions must be considered in some detail. These are: (1) the garden; (2) private cattle; and (3) barter with city dwellers.

During the Soviet period, the garden (horod)—which was not private property—had been the peasant's main source of subsistence, even though quotas of its yield (and of any cattle on it) had to be surrendered to the state. (This did not apply to the plots of city workers.) The size of the peasant gardens varied between 15 sotky—that is, 1.5 hectares—and 60 sotky (4 hectares), but tended to be close to the former, especially in 1939 and 1940, when they were aggressively cut down to size. (At that time the collective farms had to provide more grain in an apparent attempt to secure a steady supply to Germany.)

On 15 August 1941, Wirtschaftsstab Ost (Economic Staff East), on the condition that work on the farm would not be impaired, decided to double the size of the gardens (officially called Hofland; Ukrainian: prysadybna zemlia) and to free them from taxation. Immediately, the measure was sabotaged by a significant number of Landwirte, however. Koch had promised them that they would eventually own the farms and thus it was in their interest to keep them as large as possible. Indeed, many Landwirte seem to have started living already as de facto landlords. In the Bobrynets' district, a certain Schiffer stole cattle and fowl from the peasants and consumed it. At one time he possessed six horses, two cows, five pigs, five sheep, fifteen geese, eight beehives, three foxes, and one marten—all stolen from the peasants. Moreover, he forced peasants to work for him on "his" plot as well as elsewhere. Because of such obstruction by the Landwirte, WiStabOst felt compelled to repeat its order (14 January 1942).

145 Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants, pp. 135–136 and 149. On the impact of the Nazi-Soviet pact, see Belov, History of a Soviet Collective Farm, p. 19. On the average size, see Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 45 (7 August 1941), p. 4. A letter by the chief of the Polis'ke raion to the Gebietskommissar of 12 June 1942 says that the size varied between 30 and 60 sotky. DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 21, l. 141

146 Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," pp. 72 and 115; Dallin, German Rule, pp. 327 and 339. Dallin has as the date 18 August 1941 and says that the plots were at the same time declared private property. This is not confirmed by Bartoleit or elsewhere, however.

147 Letter from a young Ukrainian to Germans, quoted in Dallin, German Rule, p. 346.

It is likely that the first time that most peasants heard about the decision to increase the garden size was during the propaganda campaign related to the "New Land Order" of February 1942. That campaign stated unambiguously, "The prysadybna zemlia which You, as member of the communal farm, have in use, is Your private property, free from taxes" [Tvoia pryvatna, vil'na vid podatkiv, vlasnist']. The privatization program was well received.

If the "New Land Order" propaganda was to be believed, peasants did not need to meet any specific condition in order to increase the size of their garden, except "that You cultivate [it] as needed with your own personal means without any impact on the work in the communal farm." In fact, as was also mentioned in the German-language booklet about the "new agrarian order" (which was longer), there was more to it. The request for enlargement should be made at the farm, which should then make a plan and have it confirmed beforehand by the raion administration. Moreover, priority should be given to those peasants who had been working hard and were strong enough. Reichskommissariat officials allowed the lease (arenda) of fallow land within the village to individual peasants, but also wanted to enlarge the gardens in only one in ten villages—those which had supplied the Germans with the most produce.

This general caution regarding garden enlargement was in accordance with statements made by Hitler soon after the proclamation of the land reform.

Thus, what actually came of the enlargement and tax-free status of the gardens? Increases took place on a wide scale, in many if not most cases during the spring of 1942. In many "reliable" villages, it appears to have taken place very soon after the German arrival.

149Brochure, Seliany!, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 34, ll. 1–2v.

150"Teilbericht Politik [...]" TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 32 ("eine gewisse Befriedigung"; regarding the Oleksandria region); Meldungen, 7 (12 June 1942), p. 10 (regarding the Poltava region).

151Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," appendix 18, which is a photocopy of the brochure, Die neue Agrar-Ordnung, from the original in the Bundesarchiv.

152"Lagebericht für März 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 337.

153This was in early March 1942. Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," pp. 112–113. But it does not follow, as Bartoleit states, that from then on, the increase was largely dependent upon the conversion into cooperatives.
before any Landwirte had arrived. This was the case in Medvyn, where the most literate local man was charged early on with enlarging all of the gardens up to one hectare, an average increase of 40 sotky. Increases appear to have been most common in regions which were the longest under military rule. For example, in the Zin'kiv raion north of Poltava 1,502 hectares in total were added to all gardens; in the Hadiach raion even more—5,772 hectares. Meanwhile, in a village in the district of Berdychiv in the Right Bank, the gardens were still only on average 0.60 hectares by early 1943. In some Right-Bank regions, there were cases where peasants actually declined to accept more garden land. As a result of the deportations to Germany, these families did not have people to cultivate a larger plot. The privatization of the gardens may have had a side effect which the Germans had not anticipated. In the Soviet period, one of the motivations for going out to work in the farm had been the danger of being punished by loss of the right to use the garden if one did not. This threat was now gone, so that the new situation may have led to increased slacking in the communal farms.

Sometimes peasants encroached upon each other's garden and a dispute arose. Formally, such disputes were not brought to court. All the Schlichter was supposed to do was to make a proposal to the Gebietskommissar, based on the situation which had existed at the start of the Nazi-Soviet war. In reality, however, Schlichter took on complaints about land use as full suit actions and resolved them, unbeknownst to the German authorities. In fact, land

154Hryts'ko Salata, author interview. That the increase took place at an early stage is confirmed by Iakiv Nesterovych Vasylenko (Ukrainian born in 1924 in Medvyn), interview in Ukrainian by author, 22 July 1995, Medvyn, Bohuslav raion, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording.

155"Sil's'ke hospodarstvo," Soviet report, no author indicated, not older than 12 October 1943, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 49. In the Dnipropetrov's'k region, the enlargement was up to one hectare. "Teilbericht Politik [...]" TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 33.

156Ukrains'kyi visnyk, 4 April 1943, pp. 6–7.

157This was the case in the former oblasts of Zhytomyr, Kam"ianets'-Podil's'kyi (the present-day Khmel'nits'kyi oblast), and Vinnytsia, according to Burchenko, Komissar soedineniia, report, 31 August 1943, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 10, ll. 1–3. This author was the second secretary of the Communist party committee for the Vinnytsia oblast.

158Belov, History of a Soviet Collective Farm, p. 176.
disputes were a major part of their work load, despite the fact that they were not supposed to handle "criminal" cases.\textsuperscript{159}

In contrast to the prewar period, the gardens also cultivated wheat and rye. Most peasants had at first more cattle than before the Soviet retreat: one cow, one pig, and several chickens. These had often been taken from the collective farm or simply found abandoned after the "evacuation." While all this was positive, the gardens continued to be taxed—despite the propaganda but in accordance with the hromhosp regulations.\textsuperscript{160} The peasants had to supply milk, milk products, eggs, meat, potatoes, and grain. Although there were official norms for such household deliveries, they were often exceeded.\textsuperscript{161} For example, in the Vasyl'kiv raion each household was to supply 180 eggs annually from its garden. In actual fact hundreds more were taken.\textsuperscript{162} Non-fulfillment of the delivery quotas was punished by the native or German authorities with fines,\textsuperscript{163} confiscation of the cow or cows,\textsuperscript{164} a beating, or confinement in a labor camp.\textsuperscript{165} In regions where delivery quotas were not met, the Gebietskommissar might simply ban any private sales until the quotas were fulfilled.\textsuperscript{166} The deliveries went according to the price-list and system of the Soviet period (via the zahotskot, raimoloko, etc.). Later, the


\textsuperscript{160}Shiller, "Do ostatochnoho upiadiokuvannia [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 116; Meldungen, 7 (12 June 1942), p. 10.

\textsuperscript{161}Officially, per year per household in the Novi Sanzhary raion by late 1942, the norms were one sheepskin per sheep; one of every two pigs; 360 eggs; and 4 chickens or 5 kg chicken. Sova, Do istorii, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{162}Serdiuk, "Politinformatsii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 633, ll. 14–15.

\textsuperscript{163}Resolution from the administration of the Khorol raion, ordering the elder of Pavlivka to collect within three days 200 roubles from each of six named villagers (four female, two male), for "non-fulfillment of the milk delivery plan for 1942," 13 February 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 17, l. 6.

\textsuperscript{164}Resolution from the administration of the Khorol raion, ordering the elder of Pavlivka to confiscate the cows of two male villagers and to deliver them, for non-fulfillment of the milk delivery plan for 1942, 15 January 1943, ibid., l. 4.

\textsuperscript{165}Skirda, "Otchet [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 15; Serdiuk, "Politinformatsii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 633, l. 15.

\textsuperscript{166}Announcement in Vidrodzhennia, 20 September 1942, p. 4.
Germans supposedly rewarded deliveries by premium "points." Such "points" meant little to the peasants, however, so that in the Novi Sanzhary raion, for example, the premium actually consisted of factory-made vodka. 167

The mandatory garden deliveries caused many peasants without adequate pulling power to seed only a part of the garden, small enough to ensure a quick harvest and hiding of the crop. For example, in the small village of Shatryshche (Korosten'), only 300 or the total of 720 hectares arable land was under cultivation, despite the fact that the gardens had been expanded to one hectare and much land had been leased. 168 Much seems to have depended on the presence of partisans. In the Uman' region, which had no partisans, about 80 percent of the pre-1941 area was under cultivation. 169

Horned cattle had to be given once in a while by the entire village, whether from gardens or the farm. This much resented measure was most severe in the months before the German retreat, but in many places the last cow was confiscated long before. 170 There were several ways in which the villagers tried to cope with these seizures. In the village of Zarubyntsi, the villagers exchanged the farm cows for private cows of lower quality and sent those off to town. 171 Cattle were also hidden in the wood if possible. In Medvyn, one family had a cow while two others each had a heifer. When the heifers were taken by the Germans (who were more fond of pork than the Ukrainians were), the three shared the cow, passing it on to each other once a week. 172 But the most common reflex was illegal slaughter of the cattle.

167 Sova, Do istorii, p. 88.
168 D. S. Korotchenko to N. S. Khrushchev, "O sostojanii partizanskogo dvizheniia na pravoberezhnoi Ukraine," 22 July 1943, n.p., TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 6, l. 26–28. This source speaks of the village of "Shatritsa" in the Korosten' raion, which must be Shatryshche.
169 Werth, Russia at War, p. 728.
170 Sova, Do istorii, p. 88; Meldungen, 32 (4 December 1942), p. 23; ibid., 43 (26 February 1943), p. 10 (on the Mykolaiv Generalbezirk and the Kryvyi Rih district). In the Uman' region, the confiscations of livestock apparently started only about two months before the German retreat. Werth, Russia at War, p. 728.
171 Rudenko, CHPWU interview, l. 20.
172 Sarapuka, author interview.
The slaughters became especially massive in the Kiev Generalbezirk during the first months of 1943.173

There were waves of cattle slaughter even without an immediate or real threat of confiscation. For example, in the Polis'ke region pigs were slaughtered on a large scale in November 1941, as a result of a rumor that they would be marked and confiscated.174 Slaughter could also take place on the occasion of a wedding. For any slaughter, peasants were supposed to get permission from the Kreislandwirt and then give up half of the meat. As in the case of wood "theft," illegal slaughter was not a criminal case. The penalty varied. The raion chief in Polis'ke in December 1941 announced the penalty to be two months arrest and confiscation of the meat.175 That same month, the penalty announced—and perhaps imposed—in the Borodianka raion was simply death.176 In the Zhytomyr Generalbezirk in early 1943, German courts handed out sentences of two or three years in prison.177 If a case was brought before the Schöffe, he followed the general directive from Koch and the abstract from the German criminal code with which he had been supplied, and imposed one year. This, and particularly their apparently frequent decision to release the accused from police confinement before the trial, caused conflict with the Gebietskommissare, who consistently insisted on at least one year of jail or even "the utmost punishment," while threatening uncooperative Schöffe with arrest and deportation to Germany as Ostarbeiter.178

173Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), pp. 8–9. Still, the SD noted later that there was more cattle in the districts of Vasyl'kiv, Bila Tserkva, Tarashcha, and Korsun' on 1 May 1943 than in the year 1942. Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Kiew, to Befehlshaber (...), Kiev, 7 August 1943, on USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 418933.

174Raion chief P. Okhrimenko to the elders, 2 December 1941, DAKO, f. r-2210, op. 1, d. 3, l. 23. Cf. Ukrains'kyi holos, 17 May 1942, p. 4, on the slaughter of cows in the Khmel'nyts'kyi/Proskuriv district.

175Raion chief Okhrimenko to the elders, 2 December 1941, DAKO, f. r-2210, op. 1, d. 3, l. 23.

176Letter by chief Tyshchenko of the Borodianka raion and the German commander (Komendant raionu) to all elders, 19 December 1941, DAKO, f. r-2145, op. 1, d. 1, l. 15.

177Laskovsky, "Practicing Law," p. 131. Prison terms were usually served in Germany, according to Boldyrev, "Mestnye sudy," p. 69, but this is not confirmed elsewhere.

The very extensive barter with townspeople (to be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter) provided the peasants with clothes, shoes, and watches in exchange for bread, salt, birds, honey, and other food. But their acquisition of non-food items should not be exaggerated. Nikolai Fevr, a veteran of the Russian Civil War who traveled in Ukraine as a journalist for the Berlin-based Russian newspaper, Novoe slovo, spent several days during the fall of 1942 in about a dozen villages between Kiev and Bila Tserkva. The peasants told him that they had more clothes as a result of the war, because many Red Army soldiers had sold their uniforms for bread or potatoes. All the same, Fevr was shocked by how badly they were dressed. Generalkommissar Magunia also reported around that time from Kiev that there was great scarcity in the countryside of goods, in particular shoes, clothes, kitchen ware, house ware, and tools. Many peasants in the Reichskommissariat continued to walk around barefoot and in rags in mid-1943, as noted in reports about the countryside between Koziatyn and Shepetivka and indeed the entire Right Bank. The barter with townspeople also certainly did not mean that the peasants had much food to give away. Guests received food, but feeding them was demanded by tradition. It was not a sign that the peasants had a lot to give.

We still have some other sources about the food situation of the peasant population. These reveal that the situation varied considerably from region to region as well as from household to household. In April 1942, before the above-mentioned July 1942 campaign, the SD found the "food situation" (Verpflegungslage) for the population in the Kiev Generalbezirk to be "significantly worse" (wesentlich schlechter) than in the Soviet period. This generalization included the starving city of Kiev. At the same time, the SD thought that in the Volhynia-Podolia Generalbezirk, "the food possibilities in the countryside can be considered

181"Auszug aus dem Lagebericht des Generalkommissars, Kiew, den 1.9.1942.," USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419196. An exception were "certain goods, such as clay pots, wooden goods, and basket items, which are produced locally [in den Gebieten]."
182Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 21–22 and 24; Korotchenko to Khrushchev, "O sostoiianii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 6, ll. 26–28.
sufficient. In Podolia this question is today solved better than in the time of the Bolsheviks.\textsuperscript{183} Baptists visiting northern Podolia later that year found a population which was "starving" (\textit{holoduvalo}).\textsuperscript{184} In the Kirovohrad region, Soviet partisans heard by 1943 sayings such as, "The German says, 'Give grain'/But where can one get it/They stripped us like an oak tree/We're going to die"; "Look how we became rich under the Germans: The Germans liberated everything, only the cat is in the hut"; and "Hitler came with a cross [i.e., swastika] and ate the cow including its tail."\textsuperscript{185} Especially in the less fertile Polissia region there were peasants who lived close to famine.\textsuperscript{186} Particularly vulnerable were widows, orphans, families with many small children, and persons who had no cow or pig, or who for some reason did not cultivate a garden.\textsuperscript{187} We also saw the effects of the July 1942 confiscation campaign.

Nevertheless, because they cultivated a larger garden and had more cattle, many—and probably most—peasants of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine had \textit{more} food at their disposal than before the German arrival. Some peasants from Medvyn told this author that they "ate well" and that "there was something to eat, we were not hungry."\textsuperscript{188} In Klyntsii near Kirovohrad, the villagers "lived a normal life" because "there was everything."\textsuperscript{189} At the market in Pervomais'k on the Southern Buh river in August 1942, "one could obtain for little money

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{183}Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 191 (10 April 1942), pp. 24 and 29.


\textsuperscript{185}"Nimets' kazhe 'khliba dai'/ A de ioho vziaty/ Obidraly iak dubok./ Pryidets'sia [sic] vmyraty." "Podyvit'sia iak my staly/ Pry nimtsiakh 'bahati'/ Nimtsi vse 'vyzvialy'/ Kit odyn u khati." "Pryishov Hitler z khrestom/ Z'iv korovu z khvostom." M. M. Skirda, "Otchet [...]", TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391 et. al., Otchet, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 15.

\textsuperscript{186}For example, by mid-March 1942, in the forty villages of the Polis'ke raion, 1,767 people (of whom 873 younger than 14) requested grain aid from the raion center, and 1,285 asked potatoe aid. List compiled by the chief of the Polis'ke raion, 18 March 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 21, l. 99.

\textsuperscript{187}Prylipko, author interview; \textit{Ukraïns'kyi visnyk}, 4 April 1943, pp. 6–7.

\textsuperscript{188}Hohulia, author interview; Iakiv Vasylenko, author interview. Vasylenko was a member of a family of former "kulaks" who did not join the kolkhoz after their return to Medvyn in 1941.

\textsuperscript{189}Hrynevych, author interview.
\end{footnotesize}
vegetables, fruit, milk products, and even chickens."\(^{190}\) In the countryside near Zaporizhzhia, the peasants had enough surplus food to enable them to feed the city. "In the fall of 1943, when the Germans started retreating, the markets were so full of agricultural produce that they brought to mind the years of NEP [in the 1920s]."\(^{191}\) According to the raion chief in Novi Sanzhary who deceived the Germans about the harvest, the peasants in neighboring raions were "half-hungry."\(^{192}\) but accounts by others from that Left-Bank region show this to be hyperbole. In the Pyrityn raion, for example, "there was no need to organize the food supply. The locals had done away with all large stocks, and all had their own vegetables, a cow, or pigs. There were no food shortages."\(^{193}\) In the Velyka Bahachka raion, "the people lived as they had not lived for a long time, perhaps since the revolution."\(^{194}\) According to a former Schlichter from the Zhytomyr Generalbezirk, because of the increase in size of the gardens, "the standard of living seemed to rise for the majority of the peasants," even though the collective farms were more "feudal" than ever.\(^{195}\) Pihido, who traveled a lot in the countryside, "often heard from peasants in the Kiev and Dnipropetkov'sk regions that they drank more vodka and ate more lard and fowl in the two years of German occupation than in the twenty-five years of Soviet rule." To be sure, he adds that the situation was very bad in some regions, especially those where partisans were active. Nevertheless, as far as food was concerned, "in 1942 and 1943 the main mass of the peasantry lived rather well, especially considering the fact that there was a war going on, and indisputably, immeasurably better (bezperechno, nezmirno..."


\(^{192}\)Sova, Do istorii, p. 86.

\(^{193}\)Unpublished memoir by Ivan Senko, quoted in Pennar, "Selbstverwaltung," p. 68.


\(^{195}\)Laskovsky, "Practicing Law," p. 123.
than in the time of Soviet power." Considering the near-starvation rates of the late 1930s, this is not all that surprising.

When the kolhosp became a hromhosp, the formation of a new cooperative had been made conditional upon several factors: the proper technical conditions, hard work, and especially the peasants' fulfillment of the delivery demands. Nobody told them that the leading Nazis wanted only five percent of all Ukrainian farms to make the transition. This low number—compare the twenty percent allowed for the regions controlled by Army Groups North and Center—was in keeping with Hitler's conviction that "I need the Ukraine, so that we cannot be starved into submission again, as in the last war." Eventually, however, the secret five percent limit was exceeded. Of the 16,193 farms (probably excluding state farms) in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, 1,318 or 8.1 percent were cooperatives by 1 December 1942, and 370 of the remaining communal farms were measured in preparation for a transition. By 25 May 1943, there were slightly more cooperatives, 1,688. Over the remainder of the year 1943, their number increased rapidly, as even Koch and his associates finally agreed to have twenty percent of all farms changed into cooperatives in 1943. By 10 August 1943, the Reichskommissariat had 2,780 cooperatives—16.8 percent of its then total of farms.

The transition of a farm into a cooperative was marked by ceremonies and parties, at which native raion and village authorities and often hundreds of ordinary peasants were present. Present would be also the Gebietskommissar and the Gebietslandwirt. At the first conversions in the Zhytomyr and Kiev Generalbezirke in early October 1942 (in the


198Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," appendix 17b. As in many contemporary German documentation, the distinction of geographic units is imprecise. The WiStabOst document reproduced in this appendix speaks of the following "provinces" (Provinzen) as part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine: "Podolien," "Shitomir/Winniza," "Poltawa," "Saporoshje," "Taurien," and "Kirowograd," "Kiew," "Dnjepropetrowsk," and "Nikolajew." Only the last three actually existed—not as "provinces," of course, but as Generalbezirke.

199Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, p. 97.
Korostyshiv and Boryspil' regions, respectively), even the deputy Generalkommissar was present.\textsuperscript{200} The Gebietslandwirt and other German authorities gave a speech, accompanied by a translation into Ukrainian or Russian.\textsuperscript{201} According to the prepared model text, such a speech started by blaming the Bolsheviks for the fact that the collective farms could yet not be dissolved. Then it continued with a condescending note that "in those isolated cases when peasants divided up the land among themselves without permission, this only led to chaos and dissatisfaction and soon they came to us and asked us to restore order." Moreover, "if we would give everyone the freedom to do what he likes, many a person among you, after the many years of Bolshevik oppression and collective work, would prefer to work just for himself, not taking into account whether you would produce much or little." In the cooperative, the peasants were told, there would be individual strips, but these should not be given permanent markers, for these would "only lead to the spreading of weeds." The harvest would be collected individually, but most work, factoring in local conditions (particularly the amount of tools), would still be collective.\textsuperscript{202}

After the speeches, the Germans handed out documents (hramoty) about the conversion, accompanied by handshakes. At the first conversion in the Zhytomyr Generalbezirk, young peasant women first presented the Germans with gifts, and the ceremony was followed by a large party which included folk dances and concerts.\textsuperscript{203} Such large parties took place at almost all conversions.\textsuperscript{204}

\textsuperscript{200}Vidrodzhennia, 4 October 1942, p. 4 (on Stryzhivka, Korostyshiv district, Zhytomyr Generalbezirk); ibid., 11 October 1942, p. 4 (on Kodaky, Vasyl'kiv district, Kiev Generalbezirk); ibid., 1 October 1942, p. 3 (on the Shepetivka district, Volhynia-Podolia Generalbezirk).

\textsuperscript{201}"Zrazok promovy do selian pry zasnuvanni khliborobs'koï spilky," 14 August 1942, Kiev, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 85, ll. 38–40. A Russian text, delivered in Polis'ke, is filed at ibid., ll. 41–43.

\textsuperscript{202}The Special Staff for the Agrarian Order allowed collective harvesting, but only if the peasants initiated it. Dr. Miller, note, Russian translation, n.d., n.p., DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 85, ll. 143–145. According to this note, cooperative members who harvested 35 centners (3,500 kg.) could keep 11 kg. for themselves, while those who harvested 28 centners (2,800 kg.) could keep 4 kg.

\textsuperscript{203}Vidrodzhennia, 4 October 1942, p. 4, regarding events in Stryzhivka.

\textsuperscript{204}Some ceremonies were more modest and, if held indoors, excluded ordinary peasants. This was the case with the one in the Tarashcha district, conducted in Tarashcha's movie theater,
The question remains whether or not most "cooperatives" actually differed from the communal farms.205 Some Germans made it clear from the start that they really wanted no change. Thus, the Gebietslandwirt of the Vasyl'kiv district declared at the ceremony that even the harvest should be gathered collectively.206 The peasants used the ceremonies as a rare opportunity to party, but were and remained very skeptical. On 2 and 3 December 1942, agricultural officials (Referenten) of the Reichskommissariat held a conference in Kiev and concluded that "the foundation of agricultural cooperatives is generally not welcomed, for the fixed price for agricultural produce is so low that the proceeds are by no means sufficient to live on."207 In August 1943, the SD reported that the population of four districts to the south of Kiev mistrusted the conversion and "consider[ed] the agricultural cooperatives as veiled collective farms, because field cultivation and harvest must be retained as [they were] before."208

In any case, many of the "cooperatives" that came about appear to have been reformed in 1943. Pihido appears to refer to this when he says that in many raions in the Kiev region, peasants did not work in collective farms, but merely practiced "common cultivation." Although the peasants cultivated the land together, they themselves supplied seeds. Then the harvest was again divided at the roots, that is, it was gathered individually from individual pieces of land. According to Pihido, people worked hard here, because they "knew that everything which would grow there would be theirs."209 That such a (covert?) system caused deliberately on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution (7 November 1942). The Ukrainian agronomist at the district level, one Boinivs'kyi, was allowed to address the audience. Vidrodzhennia, 12 November 1942, p. 3.

205As also noted by Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik," p. 121.

206Vidrodzhennia, 11 October 1942, p. 4.

207Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Kiew to Befehlshaber [...], Kiev, 14 December 1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frames 418928–931 (quote from 418930).

208These were the Vasyl'kiv, Bila Tserkva, Tarashcha, and Korsun' districts. The report adds that because of the parties, the Gebietskommissare believed that the creation of the cooperatives were very popular. This shows how little the latter understood the peasants. Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Kiew to Befehlshaber [...], Kiev, 7 August 1943, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frames 418932–935 (quotes from 418934).

peasants to work harder appears to be confirmed by a report by Reichskommissariat officials from the spring of 1943.210

Besides cooperatives, there was also the system of desiatykhatkı, reported to have been practiced, apparently covertly, within numerous farms, for example in several raions in the Kiev Generalbezirk.211 In all likelihood, these "ten-households" were the same groups of households that banded together as separate economic units within the farm and of which WiStabOst became aware in Ukraine in June 1942.212 In the territory of the former Mykolaïv oblast that was part of the Reichskommissariat (namely east of the Southern Buh river), the "ten-households" were created to replace the collective farm, as a first step toward individual cultivation, slated for the spring of 1944.213 In the already mentioned village of Zarubyntsi, the farm was divided—not dissolved—into desiatky. Each desiatka received part of the equipment and pulling power (oxen) and was headed by one person, who received instructions from the head of the farm. Three or four households worked on one parcel. People's wages depended on the individual desiatka head. One peasant who worked there said the peasants received only barley, while all the winter grain went to the Germans.214

At the time of the German arrival, there were 1,875 state farms (radhospy, in Russian: sovkhozy) in Ukraine, popularly known as rabhospy, "slave farms." During the entire German presence they were retained under a slightly different name as "state properties" (Staatsgüter, in Ukrainian: derzhavnı majetyk). Unlike the communal or "cooperative" farm, each state farm

210"The agricultural cooperatives which were created last year (ca. 10% of all farms) are starting to work according to the new system [...]. The diligence of the peasants in the agricultural cooperatives is positive. It is essential that the gathering of the harvest be executed in a way which gives the peasants a stake in the height of their yields." "Lagebericht für die Monate März und April 1943," Rivne, 14 May 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 652.

211These raions were Baryshivka, Berezan', Boryspil', and Dymer. Serdiuk, "Politinformatsii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 633, l. 12.

212Dallin, German Rule, p. 354.

213Filippov, Upolnomochennyi TsK KP(b)U po Nikolaevskoi oblasti, "Dokladnaia zapiska," [December 1943], TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 552, ll. 99–100.

214Roman Ober’ianiv Shevchenko (Ukrainian), interview in Ukrainian by the CHPWU, 7 August 1946, village of Zarubyntsi, Kiev oblast, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 249, ll. 4i–5.
was headed by a German, called *Betriebs-Landwirtschaft-Führer* or *Betriebslandwirt.* At the state farms in Irpin' and Stoianka, just west of Kiev, the laborers were both Kievans and local peasants. They worked with little or no tools from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., with a thirty-minute break. Twice a day they received a watery soup, up to half a liter of distilled milk, and 150 grams of bread. The monthly wage was twenty roubles (which immediately was spent on more food). Like the communal farms, most state farms did not have enough money to pay the official wages. On the state farms in western Volhynia, which had not been part of the Soviet Union before 1939, payment differed from those farms more to the east. Here wages appear to have been only in the form of produce and to have left room for private initiative.

Work in both the communal and state farms lasted from the early spring to the late fall. It should be stressed, however, that many peasants were forced to do non-agricultural work as well. Men could be put to work in a quarry, to provide bricks for road construction. During the winters of 1941–1942 and 1942–1943, thousands of people, including women and children, who were guarded by soldiers, Gendarmerie, or the German infrastructure organization Todt, were forced day and night to shovel snow from the roads. People could also be ordered to complete other tasks, and they were always under threat of severe punishment. For instance, in August 1942, the raion chief in Polis'ke asked the *Gebietskommissar* to condemn eleven people who refused to work in the woods to seven years

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216Vera Filippovna Kal'bitskaia ([Russian?]), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, [no date], [Kiev?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, ll. 82–83. This woman, a "teknik-konstruktor" from Kiev, describes conditions from June to October 1942.

217Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Kiew to Befehlshaber […], Kiev, 14 December 1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 418930.

218"Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 267.


labor camp. In June 1943, Stepan Oleksiienko of the village of Stanovysche in this same raion was sentenced to one month in a labor camp by the chief himself for refusing to work at a bridge construction site in Polis'ke and for disobeying all orders from the village elder.

Soon after the German arrival, former "kulaks" and other victims of prewar persecution in the countryside started to return by the thousands from the cities and industrial centers (such as the Donbas) to where they had fled. The German authorities, who wanted to depopulate the cities anyway, did not block this de-urbanization. Before the introduction of the "New Land Order," former peasants who returned to their former village or went to another village could be registered as residents if the Kreislandwirt gave his permission. After February 1942, even permission to leave the city was required. The authorities also issued a number of complicated decrees, the thrust of which was that property taken away from "dekulakized" peasants should be returned to them as soon as possible. In rare cases, nobody else had taken possession of the houses of the "dekulakized" in their prewar place of residence. Then the other villagers had nothing to worry about and could be heard saying, "They were good farmers, with God's help they will return some time." But usually others had taken possession of the houses of the "repressed" peasants. There were cases where the potential problem was settled amicably without any outside involvement. For example, the daughter and granddaughter of a priest who had fled the village of Klyntsi near Kirovohrad returned in 1942 and found other people in their house. These (poor) people immediately allowed them to move into one of the rooms, while they started building their own house next to it. A former

221 Raion chief, 6 August 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 21, l. 202.
222 Raion chief Halushko, 25 June 1943, DAKO, f. r-2215, op. 1, d. 15, l. 54.
223 Shiller, "Do ostatochnoho uporiadkuvannia [...],” TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 113.
224 Sova, Do istorii, p. 91.
225 Fevr, Solntse, p. 167.
226 Hrynevych, author interview.
"kulak" who returned to Medvyn easily received the land he and his ancestors had cultivated back. When he refused to join the collective farm nobody bothered him.227

But often the issue of returning "kulaks" led to a renewed "class struggle." During the "dekulakization" campaign that began in 1929, the village Soviet had legally sold the houses of the "kulaks" at a bargain rate to Communists and other Soviet activists. During the ten years or so since then, the new owners had made extensive renovations and additions.228 According to German law, all victims of Communist persecution should be helped by the raion administration, but in many villages the authorities were the same persons as before the war. Not only did they not help the "repressed," they even demanded more state deliveries and taxes from them than from others. The returning "kulaks" also often received very small gardens.229 To be sure, there were also elders and raion officials who immediately helped the returnees by evicting the current occupants.230 In either case, the aggrieved party often filed a suit with the Schlichter.

In the Novi Sanzhary raion, where there were about a thousand houses of "dekulakized" peasants, a special commission, consisting of three members of the raizemuprava, was created. With the agreement of the Kreislandwirt, it decreed that no current occupant of a "kulak" house should be made homeless. The former "kulaks" got angry and went to German offices asking for help, while denouncing the raion administrators as

227Iakov Vasylenko, author interview (referring to his father).

228Problems after a return of "kulaks" had been anticipated by the village population already before the war, according to Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants, p. 239.

229In one village, the garden they received was only 0.15 hectare, and not on their former plot. Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 99. Cf. Ukrain's'kyi visnyk, 4 April 1943, pp. 6–7. According to Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 66, former "kulaks" received their houses back only in a few cases, depending on "the personality of the German Kommandant."

230Laskovskiy, "Practicing Law," p. 135. Some contemporary sources documenting such support—though not indicating if people were evicted—are: Elder and secretary of Cheremoshnia, letters to the administration of the Polis'ke raion, 5 December 1941 and 30 January 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 22, II. 212–213; and administration of Maksymovychy, "Protokol n. 19," 17 June 1942, DAKO, f. r-215, op. 1, d. 5, l. 31.
communists. The Germans interfered by issuing orders to the raion chief to solve such cases within days.231

Some time in 1943, Koch changed somewhat the German policy on the former "kulaks." Those who had inhabited a house at the time of the German invasion should be considered the legal owners (that is, for the duration of the war), provided they could demonstrate that they had acquired it in a legal way. In subsequent court cases involving the "class struggle," the Schlichter, according to the memoir of one of them, generally interpreted the order to mean that acquisition at a bargain rate, as shown in the contract, was not fair, and ordered that the house be returned to the "repressed" person or family.232

After the battle of Stalingrad, there were from the perspective of the peasants changes both for the better and for the worse in German policy. Improvement, if only on a small scale, concerned: (1) privatization of land; (2) aid societies; and (3) rules on their treatment by Germans.

Despite opposition by the Nazi party, privatization had early on been allowed in the Russian and Belarusan regions controlled by Economic Inspection Center (Wirtschaftsinspektion Mitte), and it had brought about a great increase in yields.233 On 3 June 1943, the Nazi leadership at last gave the go-ahead for total privatization of agriculture in all the "eastern territories." Despite Hitler's support for the measure, Koch appears to have been hesitant to distribute the announcement. Rosenberg's decree said that Ukrainian peasants would still have to supply produce to the Germans, but any surplus would be theirs. Those peasants who had already received land for their individual use now received the right to call it their "private property." Even peasants who were in the Red Army or in the Soviet hinterland, the decree said, could claim land.234

231Sova, Do istorii, p. 92.
234Announcement poster, "V imeny Nimets'koho Uriadu. Raikhsminister ROZENBERH, 'Dekliaratsiia Nimets'koho Uriadu pro pryvatnu vlasnist' selian na zemliu v zvil'nenykh
Historians have concluded that the measure was not enacted (Mulligan) or had a negligible impact (Dallin).\textsuperscript{235} Although more research is needed, it is already clear that the actual state of affairs was more complicated. In fact, there seems to have been a sizable number of farms which were disbanded with local German permission even before June 1943, at least in the Poltava region. There is some detailed evidence on the Novi Sanzhary region. Here, the \textit{Kreislandwirt} already after the 1942 harvest started to divide up the farm land. The process lasted an entire year, but by the end of the summer of 1943, all of the 97 communal farms in the raion had been abolished. In those farms where land measurers were deployed, each former farm member received the same amount of land. In order to meet the great demand for land, in early 1943 the peasants were officially allowed to divide the land themselves—not per former farm member, but per person able to work. Everywhere in this raion, the land division was celebrated with food and vodka, with the participation of the \textit{Kreislandwirt}. The 1943 harvest was good, and the peasants gave the Germans about three hundred kg. (three centners) of grain per hectare.\textsuperscript{236}

It is possible that privatization was more widespread in the Poltava region because it remained relatively long under the somewhat less strict military authorities. Several farms were also disbanded in the region's raions of Hadiach, Lokhvetsyia, and Velyka Bahachka, and one was divided in the Zin'kiv raion. Each household received six to seven hectares, while a leftover was kept as a fund.\textsuperscript{237} Privatization apparently went slower in the rest of the Kiev Generalbezirk and in the Dnipropetrovsk's region. One place where it is known to have occurred is the Vasyl'kiv raion.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{235}Mulligan, \textit{Politics of Illusion}, pp. 98–101; Dallin, \textit{German Rule}, p. 361. Even before the declaration there were rumors about it, at least in the Uman' region. \textit{Meldungen}, 54 (14 May 1943), p. 12.

\textsuperscript{236}Sova, \textit{Do istorii}, p. 97. He claims "his" raion was given a chance because it was particularly productive. Ibid., pp. 96–97.

\textsuperscript{237}"Sil's'ke hospodarstvo" [Soviet document], TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 49; Bykovets', "Case History LH 33," p. 409.

\textsuperscript{238}Report, 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, l. 52; Pihido-Pravobereznyi, \textit{Velyka Vitchyzniana viina,"} p. 157; Serdiuk, "Politinformatsii [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 633, l. 12.
As with the earlier announcements, the occasion was cause for a party. On Sunday, 22 August 1943, a large celebration was held in the village of Vil'na Tarasivka (Velykopolovets'ke) to mark the disbandment of its two farms and two others in two neighboring villages. Even the deputy Generalkommissar was present. He thanked the locals for the traditional bread-and-salt greeting, blamed the Jews for the collectivization of agriculture, and announced the replacement of "the collective farm system" by individual cultivation on private land. He shook hands and handed out documents. Then a meal followed, after which there was long-lasting "massive merry-making of the peasants with the participation of a brass band."  

The peasants realized that the reform was introduced because the Germans were retreating at the front. As one saying had it, "For the third time the Germans issue land laws/That's a sure sign that they're taking to their heels" (Vzhe nimtsi tretii raz zakony pro zemliu vypuskaiut'/ Tse virni znak, shcho p'iatamy makhaiut'). Some peasants therefore refused to accept land. Had the situation at the front been otherwise, they might have accepted it. Many peasants, however, do appear to have eagerly accepted land whenever it was offered.

A more important obstacle to privatization was a lack of people or equipment for full-time individual cultivation. This problem could be solved by voluntary cooperation among households, however. In ethnic German villages such as Liebenau near the Dnieper bend, peasants in 1943 dealt with the lack of farm implements and animals by dividing up the few that were available among groups of about four households. Each group worked this way for the rest of the year. In the places in the Berdychiv raion where the farms were disbanded by

239Presently the village is in the Bila Tserkva raion. L. N., "Khliborobs'ke sviato," Dzvin voli (Bila Tserkva), 29 August 1943, p. 4. An apparent picture of one such celebration—a table with food with German officials and Ukrainians—is in Ukrains'kyi holos, 12 August 1943, p. 3.

240IMFE, le. I. Prytula collection, f. 14–3, od. zb. 24, ark. 81 (recorded from V. A. Kazmiruk in Berdychiv in 1943).

241E.g., written requests to the administration of the Polis'ke raion in July 1943 to be registered as peasant (khliborob)—and thus included in the land division, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 91, ll. 30–37. Cf. Sova, Do istorii, p. 97, on refusal.

242Lohrenz, The Lost Generation, p. 58.
August 1943, there was also a lack of implements. Therefore, the peasants worked in groups of ten households. According to a probably exaggerated German report, all were "extremely satisfied" and were working "better than ever."\(^{243}\)

All humanitarian aid, including the Red Cross, had been banned in early 1942.\(^{244}\) Later in 1942, some Gebietskommissare ordered the formation of regional "self-help" committees. (Koch first mentioned this after he had held office as Reichskommissar for one year.\(^{245}\)) For example, the Gebietskommissar in Polis'ke released some money for the formation of a Ukrainian Aid Society, headed by the raion chief, who proceeded to demand that all village councils create local committees which should gather money and food.\(^{246}\) Many of these societies appear to have existed mostly on paper,\(^{247}\) but others were real—especially after 25 June 1943, when Koch allowed all raion administrations to raise their own taxes for administrative purposes.\(^{248}\) A mutual aid committee in Bohuslav (Bohuslav'skyi raionovyi komytet Vzaiemodopomohy) reportedly served 56 meals to 378 refugees and other needy from early 1943 to mid-August 1943.\(^{249}\)

A final improvement concerned the judicial system. On the one hand, punishment for illegal cattle slaughter was made less severe. The official penalty became three months in prison.\(^{250}\) Moreover, in the middle of 1943 a circular went out to all German officials


\(^{244}\)E.g., in Novi Sanzhary. Sova, Do istorii, p. 82.

\(^{245}\)"Aktual'ni pytannya ukraina's'koï polityky. Svidchennia Raikhskomisar Erikha Kokha," Dzvin voli, 30 August 1942, p. 3.

\(^{246}\)Raion chief Halushko to all elders, letter, 6 July 1943, DAKO, f. r-2215, op. 1, d. 15, l. 55. The statutes are on ibid., l. 56.

\(^{247}\)E.g., Pecheniuk, "Pikluvannia pro liudei," Ukrain's'kyi holos, 22 November 1942, p. 4.

\(^{248}\)"Samofinansuvannia raionnykh upravlin',' Ukrain's'kyi holos, 25 August 1943, p. 4.

\(^{249}\)Note from the adminstration of the Bohuslav raion, 16 August 1943, DAKO, f. r-2107, op. 1, d. 35, l. 20.

\(^{250}\)Laskovsky, "Practicing Law," p. 131.
forbidding them to beat the population. As in the case of many other decrees, the numerous interpreters working for the Germans found out about the decree and told the native population about it.\(^{251}\)

Besides changes which were perceived as improvements, the year 1943 also saw a significant deterioration in peasant living conditions. In many raions, the peasants were required to wear a tag with a personal identification number and the name of their village of residence. Those without such a tag were considered partisans and subject to being hanged.\(^{252}\) In the Bila Tserkva district, beginning in April 1943, every house had to have on the inside of the main entrance a list of all its inhabitants, of which the elder (or town mayor) was supposed to have a copy.\(^{253}\) In many raions, the *Kreislandwirt* system was supplemented with a system based on the *Stützpunkt* (in Ukrainian: *shtutspunkt* or *kushch*). This was a supervisory unit formed on a former Machine-Tractor Station. Each "point" was subject to the *Kreislandwirt* and supervised about ten farms or cooperatives. Its German or native *Stützpunktleiter* forced peasants to work the fields even on important holidays.\(^{254}\)

Another worsening was the difficulty of working after many relatives had been deported to Germany or had become partisans. As a result, children in their early teens could be put to work. The scale of the phenomenon—which had already existed (illegally) in some

\(^{251}\)Ibid., p. 133.

\(^{252}\)Skirda, "Otchet [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 41 (on three raions in the Kirovohrad region).

\(^{253}\)Gebietskommissar Dr. Stelzer [Stel'tser], Bila Tserkva, 12 April 1943, DAKO, f. r-2292, op. 1, d. 3, l. 51.

regions during the Soviet period—remains unclear. The children affected were usually legally too old to go to school, but old enough to be deported to Germany. In the Zaporizhzhia region, where massive deportations to Germany took place, children on some farms were forced to pull plows. It is conceivable that their parents preferred this option to having their children deported.

In the countryside the collective farm system was changed—more specifically perfected—into full-blown serfdom. One reason why the system became more efficient was that more villagers then ever had to work on the collective farm fields. Moreover, "theft" was more difficult than before 1941. The peasants had always referred to collective agriculture as the second serfdom, the corvée without a whip. Now the whip, abolished in 1861 along with tsarist serfdom, returned with a vengeance. Hence there was a good basis for the initial rumors that the former landlords, chased away after the revolution, would be allowed to take their former property back. Moreover, because of the ever-increasing terror, by mid-1942 most peasants feared for their lives whenever a German was around.

We have also seen, however, that a large number of peasants had on the average more food at their disposal in the two to three years under German rule than they used to have under the Communists. This was mainly because of their hard work in their gardens, and a measure of the extreme poverty they had lived under before 1941.

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256 "Lagebericht für die Monate März und April 1943," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 656v.

257 Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 20.


259 Ukrains'kyi holos, 26 March 1942, p. 2, referring to Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung; Buchbender, Das tösende Erz, p. 309.
CHAPTER 4
The Famine in Kiev

The Nazi German regime implemented a ruthless starvation policy vis-à-vis the population of Kiev that achieved significant success. Until now, there have been only few and brief references to the starvation of German-ruled cities in the so-called "eastern territories." The limited historiography which appeared in the Soviet Union, Communist Poland, and East Germany about life in the "eastern" cities under Nazi rule focused on the planning for famine. These publications stressed that for various reasons—mainly resistance directed by the Communist Party—these plans, like any plan for economic exploitation for that matter, were doomed (as the seemingly mandatory buzzword had it) to "crash" (krakh).¹ It was very rare to find any admission of an actual famine in Kiev, and even the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo V. Koval' underestimated it. He stated that the "real famine" started only in the winter of 1942–1943.²

In the West, Alexander Dallin, John A. Armstrong, and Ihor Kamenetsky devoted somewhat more attention to the issue. Dallin (1955) spoke of plans for "de-industrialization," but not of a desire to starve people. He simply mentioned that "industrial labor as a social force scarcely figured in German calculations." Dallin seemed unsure about the extent of famine, speaking both of "the starving cities in the East" and the "severe material hardship and near-


starvation, especially during the first winter."3 Armstrong, who did not study social and economic issues as such, briefly focused on the actual state of affairs. He stated that the large cities of Ukraine suffered famine in "the winter and spring of 1942." This was caused by several German "failures." Among these was the decision "to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers." The "most valuable materials left in the cities were requisitioned by the Germans." Moreover, "the peasants in turn had little to sell," partly because of "unauthorized" confiscation by German soldiers. Armstrong did not, however, raise the possibility that the Germans might have actively planned to starve the cities.4 Only the Ukrainian-American historian Ihor Kamenetsky stressed on several pages in his pioneering book, Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe (1961), both the planning for famine and its devastating results.5

Several decades later, the matter has still received little attention. Timothy Mulligan, in his 1988 study of German policy in the "east" in the years 1942 and 1943, mentioned starvation in Ukraine's cities "in the late winter of 1942" and believed it was caused by "wartime dislocations, priority requisitions by the Wehrmacht, and a lack of German planning."6 The major study of the planning for famine was an article by the West German historian Rolf-Dieter Müller on "'Operation Barbarossa' as an Economic War of Conquest" (1984).7 He spoke of a deliberate "famine policy" (Hungerpolitik) vis-à-vis the formerly Soviet civilian population. Its aim was genocide (Völkermord). Nevertheless, Müller, like Dallin,
seemed unsure about the extent of famine among the civilians, which he argued "did not break out in the anticipated extent, even though there were locally famines and countless deaths."

Available sources deal almost exclusively with Kiev. Until evidence to support the contrary is found, I am convinced that the events in Kiev were not essentially different from those in the other major cities of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhia, etc.) or indeed from those in other "eastern" cities to the north and east of the Reichskommissariat.

Any discussion of this topic must start with Hitler. The Führer engaged in "table talk" at his wartime headquarters, "Wolfsschanze" in East Prussia and "Werwolf" fifteen kilometers from Vinnytsia. He was in the latter from mid-July to October 1942 (and again in February and March 1943). His comments were written down and thus became known to many other Nazis, but the interpretation of his statements is not an easy matter. I argue that much of what he said about the cities in the "east" did serve as a general guideline and was at least partially implemented, with the famine as a result.

Hitler seems to have tempered his contempt for the Ukrainian people in the early summer of 1942, when he flew to the Poltava region to visit Army Group South and saw Ukrainian women with blond hair and blue eyes. But he never stopped hating the "Russian" cities and their inhabitants. (He does not appear to have entered any of them while he had the chance.) Under no circumstances should the Germans actually live in these cities, which he argued had been entirely emptied of things of cultural value by the Bolsheviks. Even living in barracks was preferable. During the initial advance, Hitler insisted that the large cities—Kiev, Thnstopher Browning, "The Decision Concerning the Final Solution," in his Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution (New York and London, 1985), p. 14. An example of easily misinterpreted words is Hitler's August 1939 statement that he had ordered "all men, women, and children of the Polish race or language" be killed. Ibid, "Introduction," p. 5.

9Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1942, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 381 and 470 (2 June and 22 July 1942); Adolf Hitler, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1944: die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims herausgegeben von Werner Jochmann (Hamburg, 1980), pp. 331 and 334 (6 August 1942). This was not the first time Hitler sat foot on Ukrainian soil, for in late August 1941 he and Mussolini arrived by plane at Uman', to visit Army Group South. B. N. Petrov, "Kak delili Ukrainu Gitler i Mussolini," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 8 (Moscow, 1993), p. 14.
St Petersburg, Moscow—should be razed to the ground. On 8 July 1941, Chief of General Staff Franz Halder recorded in his diary that Hitler wanted to flatten St Petersburg and Moscow with the air force, "to prevent from staying there people whom we will have to feed in the winter." Halder reported that Hitler predicted a "national catastrophe, which will rob both Bolshevisation and Muscovy [das Moskowitertum] of its centers."10

Hitler first ordered measures directed specifically against the city of Kiev one month later. On 12 August 1941, his Headquarters issued a "supplement to directive 34" (Ergänzung der Weisung 34), signed by Chief of Army Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel. The attack on Kiev should be halted, for "it is proposed to destroy the city by incendiary bombs and gunfire as soon as the supply positions allows."11 On 18 August, Generaloberst Halder, the chief of the General Staff of Army Command, noted in his war diary, "'Reduce to rubble' ['in Schutt und Asche'—i.e., Hitler's words]: Half of the job must be done by the Air Force."12

Apparently because of a lack of bombs for such a large operation, Kiev in actual fact was not bombed in a significant way.13 The German army eventually entered a virtually intact city on 19 September. Hitler was furious and later recalled his anger. On the evening of 8 August 1942 at "Werwolf," he insisted once again that Petersburg "must be razed to the ground," and then added: "I was so enraged back then when the Air Force did not want to let Kiev have it. Sooner or later we must do it after all, for the inhabitants are coming back and want to govern from there."14


13This is the opinion of Christian Streit, Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945 (Stuttgart, 1978), p. 369n199.

14Hitler, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, p. 334. Note that the translation in Hitler's Table Talk 1941–4: His Private Conversations (London, 1973), p. 622, is incorrect. It gives the false
Because neither Kiev nor any other major city in the "east" was ever razed to the ground, a second option regarding the city dwellers—starvation—quickly gained prominence. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that Hitler himself never discarded his desire for destruction. Plans for starvation were formulated before the attack on the Soviet Union. On 2 May 1941, a meeting of state secretaries (Staatssekretäre) noted that "doubtless x millions [zweifellos zig Millionen] will starve when what we need is taken out of the country." One of these men had persuaded Hitler that Ukrainian agriculture could solve all of Germany's food problems. This was state secretary Herbert Backe of the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture (Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft), a longtime Nazi and agrarian expert who was born in the Russian Empire (in Batumi on the Black Sea). On 23 May, this man sent guidelines to the Group Agriculture (Gruppe Landwirtschaft) of Wirtschaftsstab Ost which almost equally bluntly foresaw "a dying off of industry." Backe's scheme divided the to be conquered Soviet territory into a "deficit region" (Zuschußgebiet)—the forest zone, mainly present-day Belarus—and a "surplus region" (Überschußgebiet)—the black soil zone. "The population of the forest zone will, especially in the cities, have to suffer great famine." A longer version of this document says something else: "Many tens of millions

impression that Hitler was referring not to Kiev, but to St Petersburg: "I was furious when the Air Force were reluctant to attack the place from their bases in Kiev." The original German is "Ich habe eine solche Wut gehabt, daß die Luftwaffe damals über Kiew nicht hat drüber wollen."

The next day Hitler made his comment about the preferability of barracks to the cities, referred to at the beginning of this chapter: "A living of Germans in Ukrainian cities should be prevented under all circumstances. Even accomodation in barracks of the Germans outside the Ukrainian cities is better than their accomodation inside these cities and similar ones. The Russian or Ukrainian cities must, however, not in any way be organized or even cleaned. For it is not our job to raise the native population to a higher level." Picker, Hitler's Tischgespräche, p. 470.

15Regarding Leningrad/St Petersburg, Hitler's two options remained intricately connected. On 10 September 1941, still before Kiev's capture, Hitler personal secretary, SA-Unterführer Dr. Werner Koeppen, noted that "the Führer does not want street fights, which will lead to many casualties on our side. The city is only going to be surrounded, shot to pieces, and starved out." Koeppen reports, USNA microcopy, T-84, roll 387, frame 767.


of people become superfluous in this region and will have to die or migrate to Siberia." Both versions continue as follows: "Attempts to save the population from starving to death by bringing in surpluses from the black soil zone would come at the expense of Europe's sustenance and would limit Germany's staying power and blockade strength in the war. There must be absolute clarity about this." Most relevant here is what Backe said about the black-earth zone, which included most Ukrainian territories. Here the peasants and others working in the collective and state farms could be "granted livable conditions." But only they, nobody else.

Several months later, on 4 September 1941, Wirtschaftsstab Ost dutifully issued a special regulation regarding food and city-dwellers, *Besondere Anordnung Nr. 31*. The next day, Wirtschaftsinspektion Süd's Chief Group Agriculture (Chefgruppe Landwirtschaft) released it as a top-secret regulation to its *Wirtschaftskommandos*. The regulation posited that the "allocation" (*Zuteilung*) of food to civilian city dwellers should be "limited to the essentials," for the German armed forces had priority. It should be paid for, tightly supervised, and essentially limited to those in direct service of the German authorities. It specified several maximum rates per food item; for example, a maximum of 300 g. bread per person per day.

Three days before Kiev's capture, on 16 September, Göring, the Minister of Economy, held a morning conference with Backe, by then acting Minister of Food and Agriculture (actual minister from May 1942), that also included *Ministerialdirektor* Hans-Joachim Riecke.

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21 Gez. [Helmut] Körner, KVVCh [*Kriegsverwaltungs vicechef*]. Wirtschaftsinspektion Süd. Chefgruppe Landwirtschaft Tgb.-Nr. La III 329/41. O. P., den 5.9.1941. "An die Wirtschaftskommandos. Betr.: Lebensmittelzuteilung an die städtischen Zivilbevölkerung." TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 14-16v. That the author's first name was Helmut was deduced from ibid., l. 32.

22 Riecke held three jobs, at the Wirtschaftsstab Ost, the Four-Year Plan, and the Ostministerium. See Müller, *Wehrmacht und Okkupation*, p. 95 and "Stellenbesetzungsplan La" (undated), TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 119, l. 26. As late as March 1943, Riecke rejected an army proposal
Generalmajor Nagel of the WirtschaftsrüstungsAmt (the name for Wirtschaftsstab Ost in civilian-ruled territories), and other army representatives. Göring restated what had essentially been decided in May. Captured food supplies should by no means be allowed to be "devoured by the Gypsy-like population."23 "In the occupied territories, as a matter of principle only those who work for us must be assured of the appropriate food. Even if one wanted to feed all the inhabitants, one would be unable to do so in the newly conquered territory."24 As for the "Bolshevik" prisoners of war, they should be fed according to their "productivity."25 For major cities, it was not necessary to change Hitler's general view that, in Görings' words, "from economic considerations, the occupation of large cities is not desired. It is more economical to close them off."26

On 18 September 1941, the day before Kiev's capture, Erich Koch visited Hitler at the "Wolfsschanze." Hitler made it clear that he wanted the eastern colonies to be ruled like the Englishmen were supposedly ruling India. Therefore, the Slavs should not be allowed any education, which they did not even want. Teaching the Ukrainians how to read would merely create "semi-educated" people, who consequently would be dissatisfied and anarchistic. Thus Kiev should have no university. A report by Hitler's secretary Koeppen shows that Koch readily agreed: "In any case, hardly anything of the city of Kiev is to remain standing. The Führer's tendency, which considers the destruction of the major Russian cities as a prerequisite for the permanence of our power in Russia, was made stronger by the Reichskommissar, who

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23Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 145, based on one of two sources that exist about this meeting: a document by Göring's Referent, Ministerialrat Dr Ing. Görmert, located in the Bundesarchiv.


25Ibid., p. 108.

26Ibid., p. 109.
wants, if possible, to smash Ukrainian industry and to drive the proletariat back to the country."  

The leaders (Referenten) of the central office of the Reichskommissariat first met on 3 October 1941. All agreed that no-one (except of course Germans and ethnic Germans) should be able to consume weekly more than 1 kg. bread and 10 to 50 grams of meat. On the same day, SS chief Heinrich Himmler was in Kiev as part of a fast tour of five cities in central and southern Ukraine. After his return, he came to Hitler's headquarters. Koeppen's record of the conversation over dinner on 5 October does not indicate whether they mentioned the Babyn Iar massacre of the week before, but it does show that Himmler, having seen the poorly dressed Kievan population for himself, had internalized Hitler's goal that the Kievan population should somehow disappear. Himmler "gave his impression about Kiev. Only one district has burned down completely, but the number of Kiev's inhabitants is still very high. These inhabitants generally made a bad, proletarian impression, so that one 'can easily do without 80 to 90 percent of them'!"

Koeppen's report does not say how Hitler responded. Less then two weeks later, however, the Führer dispelled any doubts about his intentions. This was the evening of 17 October 1941, one month after the Germans had captured Kiev. Hitler was pontificating to

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27 Hitler, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, pp. 62-63; Koeppen, report of 19 September 1941, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 387, frame 770. An imprecise translation is in Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, p. 11. On this occasion, Koch also claimed falsely that General Eichhorn, the German leader of the Ukrainian satellite state in 1918, had been assassinated by Ukrainian nationalists.

28 Bericht über die Referentenbesprechung," 3 October 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 157.

29 Himmler travelled in Ukraine from 2 to 4 October 1941 and visited Berdychiv, Zhytomyr, Kiev (arriving in the evening of 2 October and flying off in the next evening), Kryvyi Rih, and Mykolaiv. Meir Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs – ein Fall doppelter Loyalität? (Gerlingen 1984), pp. 321n99 and 374.

Reichsminister Dr. Fritz Todt, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel, and Ministerialrat Böttcher from Göring's office about the importance of constructing highways. Koeppen: "No German should enter the Russian cities, including large ones, in as far they would even survive [überdauern] the war. Petersburg and Moscow should not in any case. They must vegetate further in their shit along the highways!" (Sie sollen abseits der großen Straßen weiter in ihrem Dreck vegetieren!). Another record of Hitler's statements on this occasion is even more specific. "We are not going to enter the Russian cities, they must die off [sie müssen vollständig ersterben.] We don't have to feel any remorse here." After all, "we are also eating Canadian wheat without thinking about the Indians."

These plans seem to have brought about the decision not to make Kiev the capital of the Reichskommissariat. The main reason for this German decision was not the destruction of Kiev's center or, as has been assumed, the city's national prestige. Hitler was still undecided as late as 18 October 1941, concerned "that in the large city in the winter there might easily arise food problems and, as a result, disturbances [Unruhen]."

The army leadership actively supported the starvation policy. The Supreme Commander of the Sixth Army, Generalfeldmarschall von Reichenau, issued a secret note about the "Conduct of the Troops in the Eastern Space" of 10 October 1941, which Hitler reportedly called "excellent." Besides being full of anti-Semitism and other hatred (not surprising considering Reichenau's cooperation in the Babyn Iar massacre), the note banned the release of food from field kitchens to the population and prisoners of war, even when it "originate[d] from the loot." Rank-and-file soldiers were prepared for such a policy through the army

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31Koeppen, report of 18 October 1941, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 387, frames 809–810.

32Hitler, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, pp. 90–91. In the early hours of the next morning he added, "The people over there are something totally strange. Anything resembling culture has been removed by the Bolsheviks, and I feel nothing when I raze Kiev, Moscow, and Petersburg to the ground." Ibid., p. 93.

33In the original: "... das Bedenken, daß in dieser großen Stadt im Winter leicht Ernährungsstockungen und infolgedessen Unruhen auftreten könnten." FHQ., den 18. Oktober 1941, USNA microcopy, T-120. roll 2533, frame E292711.

newspapers. These blamed the Soviet regime, which had evacuated or destroyed food supplies, for any possible problems and underlined the need to both live off the land as well as supply food to the Reich. Such army propaganda made fully clear the Nazi view that if locals were allowed to eat this was tantamount to theft.

Each gram of bread or other food which I give to the population in the occupied territories out of good-heartedness, I am withdrawing from the German people and thus my family.... Thus, the German soldier must stay hard in the face of hungry women and children. If he does not, he endangers the nourishment of our people. The enemy is now experiencing the fate which he had planned for us. But he is also alone responsible for the world and history.35

On 4 November 1941, Wirtschaftsstab Ost issued "Special Order No. 44" (Besondere Anordnungen Nr. 44) regarding food, which annulled the 4 September order with its daily limit per person of 300 grams of bread. The new rules applied to the occupied eastern territories (except for the Baltic region). As before, no rules were set for people in the countryside, who were supposedly "generally able to feed themselves." WiStabOst granted that one of its tasks was "to assure the feeding of the population, as far as this is possible without influencing the German interests,"36 but stressed that great problems were inevitable: "The ruthless plundering and destruction of the Bolsheviks have very severely shaken the economic and trade life in the occupied territories. Need and misery are the unavoidable result for the native population, particularly in the major cities. The responsibility for this lies exclusively with the Soviet rulers, who gave the order for senseless destruction."37 Its general policy was as follows:

The rations [supplied to city dwellers] are to be kept as low as possible in the first period, to force the population to consume its own hoarded supplies and to prevent any influencing of the needs of the Armed Forces, which can often only be met with difficulty because of the transport situation. Meat and fat are not to be given at all for

35Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 162 (does not provide a date).


37Ibid.
now. Potatoes are to be replaced as far as possible with turnips, beets, and carrots, and bread with buckwheat and millet. The rations can then gradually be raised to the planned maximums.\(^{38}\)

"A real emergency situation" would supposedly "generally arise only later."\(^{39}\) The food caps, to which the rations were allowed to be "gradually" raised, were as follows:

\textit{Maximum weekly amounts of food allowed to be supplied to city-dwellers, in grams}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>category</th>
<th>meat and meat products</th>
<th>fat</th>
<th>bread</th>
<th>potatoes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) People doing &quot;constantly heavy physical work&quot;</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2,500 (Army Group South; elsewhere 2,000)</td>
<td>3,500 (Army Group South; elsewhere 5,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) People doing &quot;useful work&quot;</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,000 (Army Group South; elsewhere 1,500)</td>
<td>2,500 (Army Group South; elsewhere 4,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) People not doing &quot;work worthy of the name&quot;</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Children under 14 years of age; Jews</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category (a) only applied to people employed by firms that were "in the German interest." At most twenty percent of the population could ever receive the maximum amounts of (b).\(^{40}\)

\(^{38}\)Ibid., p. 214.

\(^{39}\)Ibid., p. 213.

\(^{40}\)Ibid.
Propaganda, it said, should blame the "food difficulties" (*Ernährungsschwierigkeiten*) entirely on the Soviet destruction and dumping of stocks and means of production. It needs to be remembered that these rates were not actual targets, but maximum rates allowed in some undefined future.

The commander of Army Rear Area South (east of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, of which Kiev was not yet part), von Roques, as well as his staff seem to have been concerned with the food regulations. Just two days after the order was issued, staff members led by von Roque's deputy, *General der Infanterie* Friderici, met with representatives of Wirtschaftsinspektion Südt. They said that they were in charge of legislation and orders regarding the economy. Friderici also insisted that "the nourishment of the population must be insured to a certain level, as we must enlist them for work. He who should work for us in industry and commerce must not absolutely starve [*darf nicht absolut verhungern*]. This is not a humanitarian matter, but an entirely expedient measure in the German interest." But the chief of Wirtschaftsinspektion Südt, *General Stieler von Heydekampf*, insisted that his mandate was actually quite large. Moreover, he said that "after the increased demands of the *Führer* and upon urging of State Secretary Backe, *Generalfeldmarschall* von Rundstedt [Supreme Commander of Army Group South] has issued a document which authorizes WiInSüdt to proceed radically to fulfill the increased rate, also regarding the troops." He insisted that "the demanded delivery can only be reduced by an order from the *Führer*. It is the population which

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41This section of the document is not reproduced by Norbert Müller. I found it in the original: I. A. gez. Dr. Musset. Abschrift. Wi Stab Ost. F/la. Za. B. Nr. 6730/41, Besondere Anordnungen Nr. 44, O. U., den 4.11.1941, Bundesarchiv Berlin, Bestand R 6, file 13, fol. 76. I thank Dr Erich Haberer for showing me his photocopy of this document.


is going to suffer. Those who work will be taken care of—to be sure only with small supplies—but not the families and non-workers." Thus, Friderici achieved nothing.

There were also other German military who complained about talk "that in Russia easily several millions can starve." The sharpest criticism was to come at the end of 1941 from Lieutenant General Hans Leykauf, the head of the organization in charge of food collection for the army (rather than for civilian Germans) in the Reichskommissariat, Rüstungsinspektion Ukraine. He passed on in full agreement a 29 November 1941 report about the Reichskommissariat which had been prepared by a high-placed military observer, Professor Peter-Heinz Seraphim. Besides mentioning the Einsatzgruppen shootings of Jews, this report also stated that a policy was being implemented which it described as "extermination [Ausmerzung] of superfluous consumers (Jews, the population of the Ukrainian large cities, which like Kiev do not receive any food)." Seraphim also reported "utmost reduction of the ratios provided to the Ukrainians of the other cities." Together with objections, however, there is also a statement issued on 20 November by the chief of staff of the Army Group South, von Manstein, about what he called "the enemy cities":

The food situation of the fatherland makes it necessary that the troops largely feed themselves from the land and that in addition as great amounts as possible be put at the disposal of the fatherland. Especially in the enemy cities a large part of the population will have to go hungry [wird hungern müssen]. In spite of this, none of the goods which the fatherland supplies [sic!] at the cost of great privation may, out of wrongheaded humaneness, be distributed to prisoners and [to the] population, as long as they are not in the service of the German Armed Forces.

Meanwhile, Göring kept pushing for starvation. He met at his Reich Aviation Ministry on 8 November 1941 with Rosenberg, Erich Koch, and other high-placed officials to explain what WiStabOst was doing. Göring stated that wages and prices had to be stabilized at all cost,

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44Ibid., p. 194.


and was reported to have said: "The fate of the large cities, especially Leningrad, is entirely alien to [me]. This war will witness the greatest starvation since the Thirty-Years' War."47

Another and longer record of this meeting, from Göring's own office, notes his other demands: "Any supply of high-quality consumer goods to the population is out of the question. Rather, all tendencies for increasing the general standard of living [are] in advance to be faced with the sharpest means."48 He singled out several cities as the prime targets: "The city population can receive only very small amounts of food. With regard to large cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev), for the moment nothing can be done. The resulting consequences are severe, but unavoidable. People who work in the direct German interest are to be fed by food supplies at their workplace so that their ability to work is somewhat preserved."49 Regarding harvesting, a large number of German observers should be present. "Its task is (1) to prevent that the grain stored on the land is consumed by the city population; (2) to make it possible in emergencies to make a violent confiscation (Erjussung); [and] (3) to secure the transport itself."50

Hereafter it was inevitable that the Army Rear Area South finally, on 15 November issued itself, as Anordnung Nr. 26, WiStabOst's order of 4 November.51 All agrarian specialists such as Backe fully agreed. As Otto Bräutigam, the deputy head of the Main Department of Politics (Hauptabteilung Politik) of the Ostministerium, writes in his memoirs:

47Document from the Chief of Staff of WiStabOst, 13 November 1941, in Ueberschäir, "Ausgewählte Dokumente," pp. 385-386. The author is unknown, for the signature is illegible.

48Document signed by Dr. Bergmann, 18 November 1941, in Ueberschäir, "Ausgewählte Dokumente," p. 387, and also in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, p. 217.


50Ueberschäir, "Ausgewählte Dokumente," p. 388; Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, p. 218. Later that month, at a conference from 24 to 27 November, Göring told the Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano: "This year between twenty and thirty million persons will die in Russia of hunger. Perhaps it is well that it should be so, for certain nations must be decimated. But even if were not, nothing can be done about it. It is obvious that if humanity is condemned to die of hunger, the last to die will be our two [German and Italian] peoples." Dallin, German Rule, p. 123.

51Anderson, "Conduct of Reprisals," pp. 210-211.
"'Kiev must starve' [Kiew muß verhungern] was a saying which our agronomists put forward during conferences in cold blood."52

Let us look more carefully at specific events in Kiev. On 1 July 1941, before the evacuation and mobilization and before the Babyn Iar massacre, Kiev had just under 850,000 inhabitants.53 By October of the same year there were an estimated 600,000 people in the city.54 Ukrainian memoirs published in the West basically agree that beginning in October "the Gestapo," that is, members of Einsatzgruppe C, barred people at the city outskirts who did not live in Kiev from entering and confiscated food imports. Iaroslav Haivas arrived early on in Kiev illegally as a leader of the OUN-M. He writes that he and his fellow-activists appointed people who should avert a famine in the city. These people then approached "economic circles, first of all former cooperators," and as a result products started to trickle into the city. "Many collective farms gave up products without any payment," he writes, "and only with a note that payment would follow. When it seemed that things would start to work, the German military command closed [zamknulo] the city and blocked the entrance not only of cars, but also of individuals."55 Nina Mykhalevych, a member of the OUN-M, writes that in late 1941 transport

52 Otto Bräutigam, So hat es sich zugetragen...: ein Leben als Soldat und Diplomat (Würzburg, 1968), p. 401; no date provided. He writes that bringing food to Kiev was banned and that it was "often" confiscated. He says that he objected, but this must be taken with a grain of salt. After all, Bräutigam also claimed not to have been involved in the Jewish Holocaust, which is false as shown by an 18 December 1941 letter that he signed. See the photoreproduction in Rürup, Der Krieg, p. 91.

53 See the appendix, "Official population figures for selected cities and towns." Einsatzgruppe C estimated Kiev's pre-1941 population to have been "about 850,000 people." Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 106 (7 October 1941), p. 13.

54 The estimate is mine. A Ukrainian who arrived in Kiev in German army service, perhaps as interpreter for the advance unit (Vorkommando) of Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppe C which arrived with the army on 19 September, says Kievans told him that at least forty percent of the pre-1941 population had evacuated. In his words, "almost all rich city-dwellers, mainly of Jewish descent, had fled." This would mean over 338,500 people, which would leave, even before the Babyn Iar massacre, less than 507,800 inhabitants. This figure appears to be too low. Stepan Suliatyts'kyi, "Pershi dni v okupovanomu nimbtsiamy Kyievi," in Kost' Mel'nyk, Oleh Lashchenko, and Vasyl' Veryha, eds., Na zov Kyieva: ukrains'kyi natsionalizm u Il Svitovii Viini: zbirnyk statei, spohadiv i dokumentiv (Toronto and New York, 1985), p. 160.

of food to Kiev was blocked by patrols on the bridges: "Milk for Lesia [her little daughter] was brought by a woman from Darnytsia across the frozen Dnieper. She had to sneak it in, masterfully hidden under a large plaid on her shoulders so that the German would not see it. On the bridges the Germans had placed guards who intercepted any people bringing the Kievans food from the countryside and they confiscated everything!"56 Halyna Lashchenko, a woman who returned to her native Kiev at her own initiative and was close to the OUN-M, writes more vaguely that the Germans "somewhat obstructed" the food supply of Kievans. She noted that the city administration sent cars into the countryside and tried to get food there, but "did not always succeed."57

Both Lashchenko and Haivas describe a large convoy of food which arrived in Kiev on 9 October 1941. Peasants from the Tarashcha region 120 kilometers away brought a "present" to the city, apparently after an appeal by the Ukrainian Red Cross (discussed below), which consisted of 128 carts with forty-five tons of meal, ten thousand eggs, poultry, lard, butter, and apples. The vice-head of the administration and his secretary met the delegation and expressed their gratitude. According to Lashchenko, the leader of the transport said, "We know that these [foodstuffs] won't be consumed by the commissars, as under the Soviets, but by the Ukrainian population." Haivas writes that "the German command let it in on the condition that the food would be used for ill people and hospitals, and so for a short time the Germans had been forced to lift the 'blockade.'"58

Dmytro Kyslytsia, a Kievan close to Mayor Bahazii, writes with admiration about the mayor's efforts to prevent and alleviate the famine. "Kiev was condemned to forced starvation of its population, for the Germans banned any delivery of food to the stores." Bahazii protested

56Nina Mykhalevych, "Do Kyieva! Fragment zi spohadu," in Mel'nyk et. al., Na zov Kyieva, p. 225.


58Ibid.; Haivas, Koly kinchalasia epokha, p. 65. A semi-official OUN-M publication mentions a transport of more than a hundred carts into Kiev in just the month of November 1941. In all likelihood, this is the transport of 9 October. OUN u viini 1939 1945 ([n.p., n.d.]), p. 61.
once against the fact that "the Gestapo police in a suburb of Kiev trie[d] to confiscate or destroy food which with difficulty had been obtained in villages for the hospitals, [and] food which had been delivered in a convoy of peasant carts." When this did not work, "Bahazii ordered Medianyk, the leader of the Supply Department [Viddil postachannia] at the city administration, to open the stacks with supplies and to save the hungry Kievans." He even brought food with his own driver to old scholars and "deserving" cultural and civil activists. A contemporary SD report confirms that he tried to save people by handing out food.

In early December 1941, Dr. von Franke, a German historian who had recently arrived in Kiev as part of Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (an organization which looted the libraries), called representatives of all scientific institutes to his office. Von Franke told his guests bluntly that "Kiev cannot support its population"; the latter, including the scientists, should disperse into the countryside. His Einsatzstab would be happy to take their scientific books and equipment for safekeeping. But what, he asked, had the city administration done so far to bring about the eviction of Kievans? Mykola Andrusiak, the Galician vice-head of the administration's Culture and Education Department (Viddil Kul'tury i Osvity), acknowledged that the Germans were not responsible for feeding the population, but asked Von Franke at least to put an end to the German confiscation of food imports. Then, the political officer of the Gebietskommissariat, Reinhardt, who was also present, said angrily that "the Germans have not taken anything from the Ukrainians" and that anyway the only person deciding their fate was Hitler.


60 Ibid., p. 194.

61 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 191 (10 April 1942), pp. 39-40. Unlikely, however, is what Osyp Boidunyk, an OUN-M member who was one of the secretaries of the Ukrainian National Council, has written. According to his memoirs, the Ukrainian police not only "brought food from the countryside for itself," but also "from time to time" shared it with the population of Kiev. In fact, as will be argued below, more likely the opposite was the case; certainly by 1942. Osyp Boidunyk, Na perelomi: (uryvyk spohadiv) (Paris, 1967), pp. 104-105.

62 Nykon Nemyron [Mykola Andrusiak], "U zbudzenii v ohni stol'ysi Ukraïny (Slavnii pam'miati muchenykiv za Ukraïnu v Kyievi v 1941-42 rr.)," in Mykhailo H. Marunchak, ed., V borot'bi za ukrains'ku derzhavu: eseï, spohady, svidchennia, litopysannia, dokumenty Druhoi svitovoï viiny
The famine started quickly. On 9 October 1941, the first canteens (hromads'ki ídal'ni) opened, where people could buy food for roubles. Almost immediately long line-ups appeared and fights broke out at the entrance to the canteens. Particularly vulnerable were members of the intelligentsia, since most had not looted during the Soviet retreat or after the departure of the Jews, and the elderly. In one Home for the Disabled located in Kiev's outskirts, "in the fall and winter people started to die in large numbers. There were many days when five people died." All were buried in one mass grave. There are several descriptions of the famine in Kiev in late 1941. A former official of the Kiev Communist party committee made an intelligence trip to the city. After his return, he provided the following description of its streets in the middle of a November day:

Kiev was a dead city. Besides Germans and policemen, one rarely met a passer-by in the street. Those whom I happened to see were all mainly disabled old men and women. Emaciated or swollen from hunger, they roam the streets, going from house to house, searching for charity. Kiev has become a city of beggars... Walking on Kirov Street, I saw worn and dirty men, women, and children. They begged anyone getting closer to them for charity, but did not receive it. There I also came across people who were lying and sitting; they were so emaciated that they were unable to move.

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64 Tat'iana Fesenko, Povest' krivykh let (New York, 1963), p. 78; Klavdiia Iakovlivna Hrynevych (Ukrainian born in 1930 in Klyntsii [Kirovohrad oblast]), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, tape recording; Iurii Mikhailovich Markovskii (Ukrainian born in 1904), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 12 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 41v.

65"Kopiia. Gospodinu Golove Gorodskoi Upravy g. Kiev. Ot invalidov, nakhodiashkhsia na izhdevenii v Dome Invalidov, Kiev, khutor Kitaevko, 2/VI 1942 goda." DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, ll. 92–95v. This letter also says that the staff in early 1942 fed itself first. Coffins were hard to obtain and burials were costly: the rate was 3,000 roubles in April 1942, according to "Izdannykh uchitel'nykh gor. Kievskii L. Nartovoi [Nartova diary]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 347, l. 9.

66 Mikhail Iakovlevich Gerenrot, quoted in Chepurnoi, "Informatsiia o sostoianii raboty kievskoi podpol'noi organizatsii KP/b/U," Starobil'sk, 26 March 1943, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 11, l. 3.
Kirov Street, today's Mykhailo Hrushevskyi Street, was renamed by the Germans Dr. Todt Street in honor of Germany's main roadbuilder, although ironically Todt in German means death.\textsuperscript{67} Anatolii Kuznetsov described years later the same "city of beggars" as it was in December 1941:

I hopped off [the streetcar] in the Podil and walked down Andriiivskyi Uzviz [Andrew's Hill], which was lined with beggars all the way. Some of them were whining and begging openly for money, others exposed their amputated limbs in silence. There were other, quiet, intelligent-looking elderly men and women, some with spectacles and pince-nez, standing there; they were professors and teachers of various kinds, like our math teacher who had died. In the case of some of them who sat there you couldn't tell whether they were alive or dead. There had always been plenty of beggars about even before the war, but now there were so many it was simply frightful. They wandered all over the place, knocking on people's doors, some of them people who had lost their homes through fire, some with babies, some of them on the run, and some swollen with hunger. It was bitterly cold and the people walked down the streets with grim expressions on their faces, hunching themselves up from the wind, worried, in ragged clothes, in all sorts of strange footwear and threadbare coats. It was indeed a city of beggars.\textsuperscript{68}

The unemployed teacher L. Nartova wrote in her diary:

Today is Boxing Day. The Germans are celebrating. They all walk full and content, all have lights in Christmas trees. But all of us move about like shadows, there is total famine. People are buying food by the cup and boil a watery soup, which they eat without bread, because bread is given out only two times per week, 200 gram. And this diet is the best-case scenario. Those who have things exchange them in the countryside, but those who have nothing swell up from hunger, they are already dying. Many people have typhus.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{67} Anatolii Kuznetsov (A. Anatolii), Babii iar: roman-dokument (New York, 1986), p. 332; USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 418722. I replaced the translator's "Podol" with "the Podil."

\textsuperscript{68} A. Anatoli (Kuznetsov) [Anatolii Kuznetsov], Babi Yar: A Document in the Form of a Novel (London, 1970), pp. 221–222; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 222–223.

\textsuperscript{69} Nartova diary, ll. 3–4, note from 26 December 1941. Meanwhile, the loudspeaker system broadcast German music, according to [O. P. Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zagsa: (iz shchodennyka kyianky) (Kiev 1960), p. 44. Sharandachenko's little-known book, based on a diary, is remarkably reliable. It is doubtful, however, that it was originally written in Ukrainian and not Russian, considering the fact that almost all Kievans spoke Russian. Biographical data about the author, a woman born in Kiev in 1910 "in a worker's family," are on p. 362, but her nationality is not revealed. There exists also a Russian-language "translation from Ukrainian," which is not used here: A. Sharandachenko, Registratorka zagsa: (iz dnevnika kievlianki) (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1964).
Contemporary German reports displayed an awareness of the famine and of the fact that it had been brought about deliberately. On 27 November 1941, WiStabOst prepared its report for the second half of October. It noted that urban residents did not receive "the maximum rates established for the cities" and that Kiev had since its capture "officially not received any grain from the outside." It is somewhat surprising to find one report stating that the "food situation" in the cities in the regions of Army Groups South and Center gave "cause for serious concerns." The report also noted that the peasants, who were supposedly hoarding food, had been urged to help prevent starvation. On 23 February 1942, the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt inspector for the South, Generalmajor von Nostitz-Wallwitz, actually argued that "something must be done for the maintenance of the civilian population, as it cannot go on in the present form if one does not want to lose all labor forces and achievements." But such "serious concerns" went unheeded at the higher level. Reports by the Einsatzgruppen strongly suggested there was a big famine, but lied about its causes. The starvation policy remained in place. That same month of February 1942, the Reichskommissariat produced definitive guidelines regarding the cities. These were very similar to the previous guidelines, as shown by the following table.

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70Streit, Wehrmacht, pp. 154 and 362n102.

71Document about a 23 February 1942 meeting, in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, p. 254. The meeting was led by General der Infanterie George Thomas (1890–1946), the head of the Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt from 1939 to November 1942. About him, see Müller, "Unternehmen," pp. 182–183 and Rürup, Der Krieg, p. 93.

72Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 191 (10 April 1942), pp. 24 and 30. This report states that grain, vegetables, and cattle are available in the south of the Kiev Generalbezirk, but "cannot not be brought [to Kiev] because of the transportation situation, in particular the occupancy of the roads, fuel shortages, and similar difficulties." It calls the "food situation" in Kiev "very bad," but falsely blames it on "the premature winter, the long period of cold, and the large amounts of snowfall." Kamenetsky, Secret Nazi Plans, pp. 147–148, discusses the first comment, but mentions the wrong month.

73I. A. gez. Dr. [Friedrich] Ackermann KVACh [Kriegsverwaltungsabteilungschef]. Der Reichskommissar für die Ukraine, Hauptabteilung III, Abteilung Ernährung u. Landwirtschaft, Rundschreiben La Nr. 16/42 (Abschrift!), Rivne, 20 February 1942, "Betreff: Versorgung der städtischen Zivilbevölkerung mit Lebensmitteln." TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 65, ii. 17–18v. The author's first name was deduced from ibid., i. 36.
**Maximum provision rates per person and per week in grams**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>category</th>
<th>meat</th>
<th>bread</th>
<th>foodstuffs</th>
<th>sugar</th>
<th>potatoes</th>
<th>vegetables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Hardest workers&quot; (group IV)</td>
<td>300 (c)</td>
<td>2,500 (d)</td>
<td>500 (d)</td>
<td>250 (e)</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>depending on stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Workers who work in the German interest&quot; (group III)</td>
<td>200 (c)</td>
<td>2,000 (d)</td>
<td>500 (d)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>depending on stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Family members&quot; of group III (group II)</td>
<td>100 (a)</td>
<td>1,500 (b)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>depending on stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Ordinary consumers&quot; (Normalverbraucher); children (group I)</td>
<td>100 (a)</td>
<td>1,500 (b)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>depending on stock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**
(a) "Meat and meat products generally cannot be provided to these population groups in the current food situation."
(b) "Instead of bread, foodstuffs (buckwheat, millet, etc.) can be given out."
(c) "In cities where there are meat factories, special attention should be paid to the preparation of blood sausage etc. and the purposeful application of entrails. As long as local circumstances dictate, up to a third of the meat ration can be given out as fat. The supply of butter for the civilian population is, as long as the need of the Wehrmacht has not been fully met, out of the question."
(d) "As long as it is necessary as a result of the local circumstances, bread and foodstuffs can be interchanged during the distribution."
(e) "When sugar is not available bread can be distributed instead of sugar."
Group III actually excluded a whole host of employees, including those in army institutions, food enterprises (sugar factories, mills, bread factories, abattoirs, dairy farms, grain offices, etc.), sawmills, consumer goods factories (leather factories, soap factories, tanneries), and utilities. As before, real ration cards were banned. In small towns no food supply was organized at all.

To what extent were Kievnans able to organize themselves? At first, the Ukrainian Red Cross operated.74 Founded in early October 1941, it had a starting capital of 10,000 roubles, supplied by the city administration. (It is unclear where it got the money; one wonders if it included money stolen from Jews.) OUN-M activists asked the radiologist Dr Fedir Parfeniiovych Bohatyrchuk (1892–1984) to take charge of the organization.75 At that stage, the Stadtkommissar did not ban its work, which was mainly concerned with prisoners of war. Most of the Red Cross staff were women. The food it obtained came from donations from peasants and was mainly gathered by a steadily growing number of envoys (120 by the time of the abolition of the Cross). Located at 30 Pushkin Street,76 the Red Cross ran a dining room (elsewhere) to which many needy had access.77 The primary beneficiaries of the meals (200

74The four main sources on the Red Cross used for this paragraph are F. P. Bogatyrchuk, Moi zhiznennyi put' k Vlasov i Prazhskomu manifestu (San Francisco, 1978), pp. 128 and 132–133; Liudmyla Ivchenko, "Ukraïns'kyi Chervonyi Khrest u Kyivu (1941–1942)," in Modest Ripeckij, ed., Medychna opika v UPA = Litopys UPA, Vol. 23 (Toronto and L'viv, 1992), pp. 37–50; [Nenadkevych?], "Dopovidna Zapyska pro robotu Komiteta [sic] Vzaemdomopomohy/kol. Chervonyi Khrest/," 15 March 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 15, d. 21, l. 1–2v; and Markovskii, CHPWU interview, ll. 14i–15.

75Mykola Velychkiv's'kyi says that the Ukraine National Council organized the Ukrainian Red Cross, and chose as its leader Dr. Orest' Levyts'kyi. Because Levyts'kyi had heart problems and did not live in Kiev, Bohatyrchuk became the "temporary" choice, and Dr Dmytro Lepkyi became his deputy. When Levyts'kyi showed up in Kiev from Bohuslav, Bohatyrchuk, still according to Velychkiv's'kyi, refused to step down and convinced the Germans to replace the Red Cross with the Aid Committee (to be mentioned below). None of this is confirmed by other sources. Mykola Velychkiv's'kyi, "Sumni chasy nimets'koi okupatsii (1941–1944 roky), Vyzvol'ni shliakh, XII, 1 (London, 1965), p. 51 and ibid., 2 (1965), p. 161. Bohatyrchuk's own memoirs do not even mention the Aid Committee.

76Letterhead, dated 20 March 1942, in DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 15, d. 22, l. 8. Cf. Ivchenko, "Ukraïns'kyi Chervonyi Khrest," p. 41, which says incorrectly that it was 40 Pushkin Street.

77Bogatyrchuk, Moi zhiznennyi put', p. 133, says it was open to all, but another person who was in Kiev at the time says access to the Red Cross dining room at 5 Tarasivs'ka Street was "for a limited
free or cheap ones per day) were elderly people, those considered to be "eminent people" (vyznachni dliachi) and their families, as well as initially even employees of the city administration. Every day, a total of between 3,000 and 5,000 roubles in financial aid was given out, and per month 350 rations. There was also a kindergarten, a children's home, and a sewing workshop for wives of "repressed" or evacuated men. In late 1941, the first public canteens for children up to the age 13 opened, and others for old people.

On 18 December 1941, Stadtkommissar Rogausch (who also called himself "supreme mayor"—Oberbürgermeister) ordered the Kiev administration to close all kindergartens and schools. As Kiev's smallest children received meals there, this was a direct threat to their very survival. Fortunately, other cities also had their own Red Cross organizations, which acted independently from the one in Kiev. In late December 1941, a Kievan delegation led by Bohatyrchuk came to Rivne to ask for help. "Several trucks with food" were sent which apparently reached their destination.

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number of people." M. Mykhalevych, "Sorok rokiv tomu...," in Mel'nyk et. al., Na zov Kyieva, p. 217. According to Ivchenko, "Ukrains'kyi Chervonyi Khrest," p. 41, it was located at Shevchenko Boulevard, near the corner with Pushkin Street, but according to "Dopovidna Zapyska," I. Iv, it was at 9 Tarasivka Street.

78Lashchenko, "Povorot," Samostiina Ukraina, XI, 11 (119) (Chicago, November 1958), p. 9. The civilian aid section was headed by Lesia Rybachuk, while Olena Chekhivs'ka headed the section for aid to former political prisoners.

79According to Markovskii, CHPWU interview, eventually there were days when 60,000 roubles were handed out. This seems unlikely, however.

80Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 163 and 212.

81Nemyron, "U zbudzhenii v ohni stolitsi Ukraïny," pp. 809–810. He does not give the date, but writes that it was "on the very day before St Nicholas day." St Nicholas day is on both 19 December and 22 May.

82The Red Cross in Poltava had a section, led by Ms. Kushnir-Burko, for victims of Soviet repression—that is, those directly affected and their widows and orphaned children. Halyna Vi'un, Pid znakom Chervonoho Khresta v Poltavi 1941–42 rr.: spohad-svit dlia istorii (Neu-Ulm, 1973), p. 31. In Khmel'nyts'kyi in December 1941, the Ukrainian Red Cross collected money, clothes, and food for repressed people, wounded people, and Ukrainian POWs. Ukrains'kyi holos, 8 December 1941 and 11 December 1941.

83Ulas Samchuk, Na koni voronomu: spomyny i vrazhennia (Winnipeg, 1975), p. 113. In February 1942, the Ukrainian Mutual Aid Committee thanked Rivne's Red Cross for supplying food which had allowed it to feed "11 families of Ukrainian civic activists, 12 actors [artysty], 4 artists, and 26 scientific workers." Pozhars'ka, "Lyst-podiaka z Kyieva," Volyn', 22 February 1942, p. 3.
By 1942, the Nazi authorities wanted to do away with the Red Cross as such, mainly because of its work on behalf of prisoners of war (more on this in chapter 9). A name change some time in January 1942 to the Ukrainian Mutual Aid Committee (Ukraïns'kyi Komitet Vzaiemodopomohy (Kol. Ukraïns'kyi Chervonyi Khrest)) could not save it. In early February 1942, the SD briefly arrested its main organizers and dismissed most others. Stadtkommissar Rogausch placed a man called Hulianyts'kyi, a lecturer (dotsent) who had worked in the administration's Medical Department, at its head under a German supervisor. By March the organization was fully "denationalized" and was simply called "Kievan" (Kyïvs'kyi). Despite this interference, however, it is important to note that the original organization's core activities were not banned. It continued to run a dining-room, workshop, children's home, daycare center, dormitory, and several polyclinics and hospitals. In February 1942, about ten children's canteens were reopened in the city. By October 1942, Kiev had 26 children's canteens with 7,490 children, six children's homes with 540 children, and one boarding house (internat) with two hundred children. These were very important, as they allowed single parents to hold a job.

Unemployed scientists received for a while social assistance from the city administration. It was called the "pension" (pensiia), a payment which in the Soviet period had

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84 Professor Bohatyrchuk to the Gebietskommissar in Polis'ke, letter in German, 16 January 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 22, l. 132.


87 DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 15, d. 21, ll. 8–9.

88 Nartova diary, l. 4. From April 1942, Nartova worked as a waitress in one of these canteens. She received a daily meal and each month 3 kg. bread and 150 rubles. Ibid., l. 7.

89 Solodovnyk, Kerivnyk viddilu kul'tury i osvity, 12 October 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 6–6v. The canteens are also mentioned in [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 157. According to Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Kiew, den 30. Juli 1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 418938, every day "about 15,000" children received a mid-day soup and 100 g. bread (in addition to the general ration of 100 g. bread) at schools and daycare centers. The same applied to "disabled, old ill people, etc." The report noted that the meals were by no means sufficient to serve all who needed them and contained almost no fat.
been given even to people who were still working. For its distribution, the Department of Welfare (Viddil Suspil'noi Opiky; German: Fürsorgeabteilung) established a Commission of Ukrainian Civic and Cultural Leaders (Komisiiia Ukraïns'kykh Hromads'kykh i Kul'turnykh Diiachiv) chaired by S. Iu. Haievs'kyi, which met regularly in early 1942 (until at least mid-March). It allotted the financial aid on a person-by-person basis (also to Russians). The actual amounts were usually lower than those promised. For example, Professor Borys Bukreiev, who at the age 82 was the oldest university professor in Kiev, had received neither a wage nor a pension since 1 November 1941. He was promised 800 roubles, although in fact he received only 560. In several city districts, corruption was so widespread that no financial aid to the disabled or to pensioners was distributed at all. Soon it no longer mattered, for on 16 March 1942, the Stadtkommissar forbade the further distribution of any money, whether pensions, rent [renty], or personal aid. It appears, however, that the ban was actually disobeyed.

There was also the House of Scientists (Budynok vchenykh, Russian: Dom uchenykh), located in the former building of the Writers' Union, which had a dining room. The House was first headed by Professor Leontovych and then by the lecturer M. Vovk. Vovk helped old scholars as much as he could, visiting them and offering them whatever food he could find.

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90DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, passim.
91Letter by Bukreiev to vice-mayor Volkanovych, 30 March 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, ll. 57–58.
92This was revealed by an audit on 15 May 1942. DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, l. 99.
93DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, l. 48. For example, hereafter the seventy-year-old philologist Mykola K. Hrun'skyi, who had been assigned 1,000 roubles and had in actual fact received only 700, did not receive anything. Mykola Kuzmych Hruns'kyi to Mayor Forostivs'yi, Kiev, 22 April 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, l. 76; Nikolai Kuz'mich Grun'skii (sic) (Ukrainian born in 1872), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 19 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, ll. 1–5v.
94In May 1942, Kiev's Department of Welfare officially paid "aid" to 5,582 people, at an average of about 47 roubles per person. The total was 263,558 roubles. Nenadkevych and Pension Inspector Cheres to vice-mayor Volkanovych, 17 June 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, l. 97.
96For example, he visited the Russian director of the Zoological Museum and offered him millet. Vladimir Mikhailovich Artobolevskii (Russian born in 1874), interview in Russian by the
The House also sometimes gave out rations. But all this could not possibly suffice. Many teachers and scientists visited colleagues at home, in groups specially organized for this purpose. It was rumored that they could do little more than ease the dying. There were apparently many suicides among the intelligentsia.

On 31 August 1942, the Stadtkommissar ordered Mayor Leontii Forostivs'kyi to subject the Kievan Aid Committee to the administration's Department of Welfare. Mykhailo V. Nenadkevych, the head of the latter, now also became head of the former. At about the same time, Rogausch ordered the Welfare Department to limit access to the one remaining civilian canteen and the canteen for members of the House of Scientists to those who were really unemployed and to scientists who really needed it. It is instructive to make a comparison with the situation of scientists in regions which were still under military rule. They suffered as well, but before Poltava became part of the Reichskommissariat, its local newspaper issued a supplement, Science and Art, meant to support scientists and scholars who had fled the starving city of Kharkiv.

CHPWU, 22 and 25 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, ll. 35–36.

Gruns'kii, CHPWU interview, l. 3.

Nartova diary, l. 9, note of 15 April 1942.

According to Nartova diary, l. 20, which mentions one case: the wife of the Polish doctor Tsukerman, December 1942.

Letter, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 15, d. 20, l. 5.

Letter from the vice-head of the Trade and Food Department (viddil torhivli i kharchuvannia), 27 August 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 9, l. 90. A small number of elderly Academy of Sciences members were fortunate to have the Stadtkommissar order the Aid Committee to give them free meals and a one-time financial donation. This was just before the currency exchange, however, so the money must have helped little. Letters dated 16 and 26 June 1942 regarding the 72-year-old Volodymyr Sapozhnikov and his wife, who received 3,000 rubles, and the 65-year-old Mykhailo P. Valkovych, who received 2,400 rubles. DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 15, d. 22, ll. 25 and 41. Cf. the case of the 75-year-old widow of the chemist K. I. Ivanov: the Stadtkommissar ordered that she be given the one-time amount of 900 rubles. Letter, 16 July 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 9, l. 58.

Nauka i Mystetstvo, supplement of Holos Poltavshchyny. It includes articles about geology, plants, Chekhov, and the Germans in nineteenth-century Poltava.
Food was also obtained through cooperatives and commission shops. In Kiev (and Dnepropetrovs'k), a consumer cooperative helped out somewhat. In its special stores one could buy certain food items (such as bread and eggs) below the market price, with an additional reduction if one had previously paid a membership fee. Cooperatives appear to have developed more extensively in western Volhynia.

Commission shops, of which there were many, sold second-hand but often first-rate ware for their former owners. Once, in early April 1942, the German authorities confiscated the items on sale in all these stores and apparently sent everything to Germany. In the late summer of 1942, these stores sold things such as a clergymen's vestments, Caucasian felt cloaks, paintings, coins from the time of Peter I, snuff-boxes from the time of Catherine II, and all kinds of books and even manuscripts from the early seventeenth century. A Russian journalist from Berlin, Nikolai Fevr, found nothing produced in the Soviet period on sale other than deluxe editions of Kazak poetry about Stalin. The writer Arkadii Liubchenko in December 1942 received 2,000 karbovantsi for a Gobelin in such a store. After Stalingrad,

103 Meldungen, 13 (24 July 1942), p. 11 give the following examples, without specifying which city from where they were taken. A kg. bread cost 70 to 80 roubles for non-members and 50 roubles for members, while the market price was 100 to 110. Ten eggs cost 70 roubles for non-members and 25 roubles for members, while the market price was 130.

In addition, there were initially in Kiev sixteen cooperative stores which sold things like toys, besoms, and records. Most of them closed soon, apparently because of a lack of products to sell. See Strokach and Martynov, 'Dokladnaia zapiska O torgovle na okkupirovannoi territorii Ukrainy' Po sostossil'yu na 29 ianvaria 1943 g., TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, ll. 71–72 and Savchenko, VRIO NKVD USSR, to N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvesvodka No. 32/67. O deiatel'nosti ukrainskich natsionalistov na okkupirovannoi nemetsko-fashistskimi zakhvatchikami territorii USSR. Po sostossil'yu 1. 9. 42." 19 September 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 115, ll. 58–61.

104 Samchuk, Na koni voronoum, p. 71.

105 Nartova diary, l. 9; [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 104.

106 Nikolai Fevr, Solntse voskhodit na zapade (Buenos Aires, 1950), pp. 134–135. The stores are also mentioned in A. Kabaida, "1941," Kalender-al'manakh Novoho Shliakhu 1991 (Toronto, [n.d.]), p. 50; Samchuk, Na koni voronoum, p. 84; and [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 40. By mid-April 1942, they were apparently closed, and everything inside was shipped to Germany. [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 104. Pre-1917 books were still on sale in Kiev in the winter of 1942–1943, according to Bohdan Liubomyrenko, Z Khrystom v Ukraini: zapysky viruiuchoho za roky 1941–1943 (Winnipeg and Toronto, 1973), p. 94.

according to one memoir, "the most lively trade was in the commission stores, which were opening in various corners of the city, but mostly on Vasyl'kivs'ka Street. All who had something took it to those stores (private and of the city administration), where most of it was sold for virtually nothing, and the store owner made a good profit, selling items to German or Hungarian soldiers and officials, who frequently visited these stores."  

Most important for survival, however, was the market. As soon as the Germans arrived, a very lively trade started. Every day was market day, as great numbers of peasants took food on their carts to the cities, and the markets were overflowing. Above we noted that Wirtschaftsinspektion Süd ordered the Wirtschaftskommandos on 5 September 1941 to limit the food supply in cities to "the essentials." This also meant action against the abundance of markets. All commandos were instructed to allow market only two days a week and, if necessary, on Sunday. Kiev's three main markets were the Bessarabka (Bessarabian Covered Market) at the end of the burned-out Khreshchatyk; the Haymarket (Sinnyi Bazar, also called Grain [Zhytnii] Market) in the Podil; and the Galician Market (Halyts'kyi Bazar) at the western head of Shevchenko Boulevard (presently Victory Square), the largest market, which continued to be known as the Ev-Baz (Ukr. Iev-Baz [Ievreis'kyi Bazar]; the Jewish Market).

Initially, the markets appear to have been subdued affairs, as people were mostly silent and hesitant to talk to strangers. This was because it was forbidden for more than three people to stand together at any one time. German, Hungarian, and other soldiers and authorities as

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109 Vasiliy Ivanovich Iablonskii (Ukrainian born in 1908), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 February 1944, [Kiev], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op.3, d. 246, l. 3; TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 4, d. 9, l. 29.

well as the Ukrainian police also frequented the markets. They either paid a price which seemed right to them or simply confiscated the item they wanted.111

Among the things being traded were bread, homebrewed vodka (samohon), lard (salo), eggs, pastry, oil, garlic, matches, candles, cigarettes, clothes, dishes, books, and sometimes bread, dried carp, soap, and strawberries. The salespeople were called in Russian torgovki.112 Cows and pigs were sold at the lively Haymarket.113 From 1942, some of the food (lard, sugar, flour, etc.) which was put up for sale originated from Germans who collected it in trips to distant regions and sold it for money to traders, generally known as "speculators." These Germans spent the money obtained this way on non-perishable goods.114

The streets also were teeming with business. Peasants sold pasties (Russian: pirozhki) or other food.115 Young teenagers hawked matches, seeds, saccharine, sweets, cold water and—after buying them for money from Germans or Hungarians—cigarettes.116 Lower-rank German soldiers sold flint for cigarette lighters, cigarettes, bread, liquor, and saccharine.117

The markets continued to exist in 1942, despite the new danger represented by roundups for forced labor in Germany. The civilian German authorities continued their attempts to "regulate" trade by imposing price ceilings (amounting to significant price decreases) and banning barter. Following such decrees, the markets virtually disappeared, only to reappear

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111 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 107 (8 October 1941), p. 16; Solomon Abramovich Peker (Jew born in 1884), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 1 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, l. 6.

112 Mykhalevych, "Do Kyieva!," p. 225.

113 Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 344.

114 Professor N. A. Shepelevskii, "Prebyvanie nemtsev v Kieve," typewritten document, signed, TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, l. 60.


117 Shepelevskii, "Prebyvanie," TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, l. 60.
after the price ceilings were lifted. In the meantime, the trade (barter or sale) continued underground or moved to adjacent streets. Harassment was particularly strong during visits by high-placed officials. "On those days, the market was simply closed completely. [Ukrainian] police detachments at dawn made sure that there was not a single person at the market place. This was especially notable during Rosenberg's visit [in June 1942]." (The same trends occurred in the other large cities.)

Until mid-1942, the Soviet rouble officially remained legal tender, with a value of one Reichsmark. Salespeople preferred the German Mark, which they hoarded, or Reich Credit Certificates (Reichskreditkassenscheine). Soon, however, they refused to take any money altogether and insisted on barter. By late October 1941, it was very difficult to obtain any food for money at Kiev's markets. A Kievan could acquire, for example, 10 kg potatoes for a padlock or for a box of shoe polish, twice as many potatoes for a piece of linen (0.70 x 2.00 cm.), and two poods of (millet or barley) flour for a pair of used shoes. City dwellers were shocked that the peasants at first demanded virtually new things. Some considered the peasants


119 For example, in the Kiev Generalbezirk except for the city of Kiev, starting in 1942 Thursday was declared the official market day. In the Polis'ke raion (Rayon Chabnoje), it was to be only allowed in Polis'ke. Several weeks later, all trade went underground. In retaliation, the raion chief declared every village elder personally responsible for arresting those involved and sending them to him. Announcement poster, 25 December 1941, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 2, d. 130, l. 2v; note from raion chief to all village elders, 16 February 1942, DAKO, f. r-2210, op. 1, d. 3, l. 106.

120 [Sharandachenko], Reisestratorka zahsu, p. 175.

121 Shepelevski, "Prebyvanie," TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, l. 60.

122 For example, from March 1942, markets in Kirovohrad were only allowed on Sunday and, as Stadtkommissar Markus warned, could only sell "fresh vegetables and goat milk from goats from private farms of peasants who live near the city." In addition, he categorically banned transport of vegetables by carts. Mikhail Mikh. Skirda [et. al.], "Otchet o podpol'noi partiinoi rabote i partizanskoii bor'be v Kirovogradskoi oblasti (avgust 1941 goda - mart 1944 goda)," n.d., typewritten document, signed, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 18.

123 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 74 (5 September 1941), p. 7 (on the Uman' region); ibid., 107 (8 October 1941), p. 16; ibid., 135 (19 November 1941), p. 15; ibid., 191 (10 April 1942), p. 29; "Lagebericht für März 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 343; Hrynevych, author interview. The Gebietskommissar in Khmel'nyts'kyi announced in December 1941 that anybody who refused money could be fined 100 roubles. Ukrains'kyi holos, 21 December 1941, p. 1.

124 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 125 (26 October 1941), p. 6.
to be avenging themselves on the city for their suffering during the Great Famine of 1933.\textsuperscript{125} Throughout 1942, despite frequent official bans, barter prevailed over currency use at the markets.\textsuperscript{126}

In early 1942, the price of food continued to increase rapidly. Put another way, the rouble continued to lose its value. For example, a kg. bread which had cost 45 roubles in late January cost 160 roubles by early May.\textsuperscript{127} In early July 1942, it was suddenly announced that from the 6th through 25th of that very month, the currency would be changed. The stated reason was that the Bolsheviks had been flooding the markets of the Reichskommissariat with large amounts of roubles imported from the Soviet hinterland.\textsuperscript{128} Bills of 5 or 10 roubles had to be exchanged for the equal number in bills of 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, and 500 karbovanets\textsuperscript{t}, (sing. karbovanets\textsuperscript{s}, Germ. Karbowanez), a new currency designed specifically for the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and officially worth ten times less than the German Reichsmark.

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\textsuperscript{125}Fesenko, \emph{Pvest'}, p. 78. Cf. Khoroshunova, "Iievskie zapiski," pp. 303 and 305, notes of 11 and 17 October 1941.

\textsuperscript{126}[Der Kommandeur...] III D/St. 1.12.42, "Die Geldwerteung im Generalbezirk Kiew," USNA microbiopy T-84, roll 120, frames 419074–078 (includes examples of prices). In Dnipropetrovsk and the surrounding countryside in early 1942, a quilted jersey was worth 25 kg. course-ground wheat flour; new leather boots were worth 10 poods [163.80 kg.] flour; and a bar of soap was worth a cup of tobacco. Savchenko, VRIO NKVD USSR to N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvedvsodka no. 33/68 o polozenii v okkupirovannom protivnikom g. Dnepropetrovskie. Po sostoianiui na 20. 10. 42g.," 21 October 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 1 24, ll. 89–90.


\textsuperscript{127}Meldungen, 13 (24 July 1942), pp. 10–11.

\textsuperscript{128}This was also the belief of Nazi intelligence, which noted an increase in the circulation of roubles. Meldungen, 13 (24 July 1942), p. 11. Considering the date of this report, the increase may also have been a reaction to the announcement of the currency change.

This report also notes that forged roubles are circulating in Kiev and especially the countryside near Uman', Bila Tserkva, and Tarasbcha. According to I. H. Vietrov, "Finansowa viina' tret'oho reikhu na okupovannii terytorii Ukrainy v 1941–1944 rr.," \textit{Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal}, 3 (Kiev, May-June 1995), p. 98, the Germans had themselves been printing false roubles, but this is doubtful. Vietrov's article refers to a source that I was unable to obtain.
The bills did not mention any territory but only that they had been issued by the "Zentralnotenbank Ukraine." They also contained a warning in Ukrainian and German that "counterfeiting is punished by long imprisonment [tiazhkoiu tiurmoiu]."129 For higher bills, people received for the moment receipts. Bills of 1 and 200 appeared in the fall.130

Because the announcement came so late (even though the bills said themselves that the decision had been taken already on 5 March), those who still had many roubles panicked and were unable to exchange them all. In any case, the measure was not trusted. People often changed their minds about changing their larger bills when they heard that they would only receive promissory notes. Those who had accumulated money in the Soviet period, especially Communist party members, now lost it. Among workers, who had never had much money, there was some malicious delight about this.131 In March 1943, there was a "clear flight" back to the rouble and away from the karbovanets'.132 (Meanwhile, in western Volhynia, the black market was apparently less interested in either roubles or karbovanets than in tsarist money.133)

The most severe measures against the markets of Kiev were taken in July 1942, at the height of the "threshing and confiscation action" (Drusch- und Erfassungsaktion) in the countryside. These two decrees (Verordnungen), issued on 15 July 1942, have apparently not been preserved, but their essence can be deduced from other sources, particularly a letter which

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129Leaflet, "Uvaha ukraïntsii! Obminiuite vashi hroshi!," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 35, l. 2. The bills—coins were not issued—are reproduced in Mykola Hnatyshak, Derzhavni hroshi Ukraïny 1917–1920 rokiv: iliiustrovanyi istorychno-ikonohrafichnyi rys (Cleveland, Ohio, 1973), pp. 147–150. The Ostministerium ensured that the currency was called karbovanets' instead of rouble and that the bills had no Russian words on them. Initially it also demanded Ukrainian national figures on the bills, instead of the German professions, but it dropped this demand by late 1941. Prof. Dr. von Grünberg, Königsberg, 2 February 1942, "Vermerk für den Gauleiter und Reichskommissar betr. Geldwesen in der Ukraine," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, ll. 13–16.

130Vidrodzhennia, 8 October 1942, p. 4; ibid., 11 October 1942, p. 3.

131Liubchenko, Schchodennyk, p. 80; Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), p. 19; ibid., 24 (9 October 1942), p. 10 (about workers); Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 337; "Teilbericht Politik über die Bereisung des Reichskommissariats mit Prof. v. Grünberg in der Zeit vom 13.8. bis 3.9.1942," Rivne, 10 September 1942, ll. 27 and 30.

132[Der Generalkommissar], Kiev, 4 March 1943, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419259.

133Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 196.
Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD of the Kiev Generalbezirk sent to Generalkommissar Magunia many months later. In this letter, dated 24 February 1943, the unidentified SS-Obersturmbannführer und Kommandeur, "in agreement with the Stadtkommissar and the [military] Stadtkommandant of Kiev," proposed to Magunia to repeal the two orders. This strongly suggests that Magunia had issued them and had asked the Schutzpolizei to enforce them. Such an impression is reinforced by a statement in one of Magunia's own reports in 1942 that "in the countryside [im Gebiet], the German Gendarmerie, as far as it is at the disposal of the Gebietskommissare for the price control, has been ordered to take severe action against the black market and to confiscate all goods it seizes.'

The first July 1942 decree dealt with "the supply of and trade with foodstuffs in the city of Kiev." It effectively banned unsupervised trade in food at the markets (and set slightly different maximum food rates for the population). The other decree dealt with "street controls in the area surrounding Kiev." It led to the placement of official roadblocks manned by members of the Schutzpolizei in the outer districts of Kiev (and other cities of the Kiev Generalbezirk). The policemen at these roadblocks had orders to check everyone entering or leaving and to confiscate anything above a basic "one-day" amount—one bird, ten eggs, 1 liter milk, 10 kg. potatoes, 1 basket of vegetables, and 1 kg. bread—and pass it on to the relevant Gebietskommissar. As an unidentified SS-Sturmbannführer of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD of the Kiev Generalbezirk wrote to his superior, SS-Gruppenführer Thomas: "In order to stop the illegal black supply of grain to Kiev, the population was only allowed to use the public

134Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD of GB Kiew, Kiew, den 24.2.43, an den Generalkommissar für den Generalbezirk Kiew, Pg. Magunia, Kiew. Betr: Lebensmitteilung der einheimischen Bevölkerung von Kiew, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frames 418941–943. The same document—that is, the original in the Bundesarchiv—is used in Bohatiuk, "The Economy of Kiev." The reference is imprecise, however: "R 70/1, p. 1."

135Auszug aus dem Lagebericht des Generalkommissars, Kiew, den 1.9.1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419196.

136The new maximum rates are in the 5 August 1942 copy from the Sipo and SD, "Versorgungshöchstsätze je Kopf und Woche in Gramm," USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 418936.

137Nove ukrain's'ke slovo, 2 August 1942, p. 4; "Povidomlennia," Vasyl'kivs'ki visti, 6 August 1942, p. 4.
streets and roads for entering and leaving the city. In addition, on the main transport roads controls for transported foodstuffs were made by police forces.\textsuperscript{138}

As we saw above, the police had been robbing people before. The teacher Oleksandra Sharandachenko wrote in her diary on 17 May 1942 that the police "confiscate everything but potatoes, and are cruel to boot when someone had been able to barter fat."\textsuperscript{139} Still, slipping through had not been that difficult. In early June 1942, Sharandachenko successfully passed a German guard after a visit to the markets in the small towns of Demydiv and Dymer to the north of the city.\textsuperscript{140} After the 15 July decrees, however, this became much more difficult.

Clearly referring to the month of July, Kuznetsov writes that a little house was built along the Dymer highway leading to Kiev. It had at least three policemen in it. He knew that their orders were to stop any transport of more products than those "necessary for one day's sustenance," but saw them actually confiscate everything, accompanied by a cynical, "See you later" (\textit{do pobachennia}).\textsuperscript{141} Some time later, Kuznetsov and his grandfather walked for half a day to Pushcha-Vodytsia, north of Kiev. On the way, distraught people who came from the opposite direction warned them that they had been robbed of all food near the children's TBC sanitarium. Indeed, there they saw three policemen next to a pile of bags and cans. "All the roads to Kiev were blocked, it was sheer legalized robbery." Nevertheless they went on and with some difficulty were able to barter two bags of corn, beans, and flour. They got a ride home from a German, so that all that remained was a three-minute walk.

\begin{flushright}
We no longer had any feeling in our feet or shoulders, and we staggered along like long-distance runners at the finishing line. At that point we were stopped by two policemen. 'Been carrying it far?' asked one of them ironically. We stood there in silence, because it was just unbelievable: it just couldn't happen like that. 'Put it down,'
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{138}USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 418846.

\textsuperscript{139}[Sharandachenko], \textit{Reestratorka zahsu}, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{140}Ibid., p. 129. On 22 February 1942, a colleague brought "a column of carts and drivers" into Kiev. Ibid., p. 85.

\textsuperscript{141}Kuznetsov, \textit{Babii iar}, p. 268. Earlier, he had been able to bring bags of food into Kiev without a problem. Ibid., p. 194.
said the other one and proceeded briskly to help Grandpa remove his sack. 'Listen, friends,' said Grandpa, quite dumbfounded, in a whisper. 'Listen...'

'On your way, now, on your way,' said the first policeman. 'But friends, listen...'

My grandfather was ready to fall on his knees. The police paid no attention to him, but simply took our sacks and put them down by the post where there were several others lying already. They appeared to have set up a new checkpoint here, on the approach to the market. I dragged Grandpa along by the sleeve, because he was quite beside himself and couldn't believe it had happened.142

The roadblocks remained in place until at least late February 1943. Arkadii Liubchenko wrote in his diary in mid-September 1942: "Near Kiev there are thick police pickets who do not let anyone pass with food, they confiscate it and make arrests."143 In early August 1942, Kiev's Schutzpolizei complained in the Kiev newspaper, Nove ukraïns'ke slovo, about the reproaches and insults it received. They were merely carrying out orders, and "rumors that the Ukrainian protective police uses [the confiscated food products] are malicious slander."144

Around smaller cities, such as Vasyll'kiv, and in the countryside, there were the same Schutzpolizei guards with the same instructions.145 But here at least people often had a garden from which they could survive,146 and their markets, though just as frequently "regulated" as in the large cities, continued to have a reasonable supply.147 The markets in Kiev, however, initially emptied dramatically. Potatoes, lard, beets, and sorrel disappeared altogether and what

142Ibid., pp. 283–287; the long quotation is from Anatoli (Kuznetsov), Babi Yar, p. 284.


144Nove ukraïns'ke slovo, 2 August 1942, p. 4. The German authorities had it easier: they could simply ban the population from complaining to them or even entering their premises altogether, as did the Stadtkommissar. Nove ukraïns'ke slovo, 30 August 1942, p. 4.


146To be sure, vegetable gardens in Kiev also existed. [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zaehsu, pp. 106, 127, 179, and 237.

147One example of such "regulation": in October 1942, the Gebietskommissar in Khmel'nyts'kyi banned any market sale of cattle, meat, grain, birds, milk, dairy products, eggs, fruit, vegetables, oil, oil products, and onions. Ukraïns'kyi holos, 22 October 1942, p. 4.
remained was very expensive. They now became totally dependent upon supply by the "speculators," for most peasants stopped coming rather than risking having their wares confiscated.

The SD never seems to have liked the orders. In an internal memorandum on 30 July 1942, the agency noted "that the closing off of the city [die Absperrung der Stadt] has economically no essential benefits. Apart from the seizure of grain, which is presently necessary for special reasons, one cannot see what use can be derived from the confiscation of fresh milk, vegetables, and fruit." Moreover, informants told the agency that for various reasons, the closure was not total. One was the sheer size of Kiev and the Dnieper shore. Another reason was the behavior of the non-German police: "From all sides, it is pointed out that the Ukrainian Schutzmannschaften completely fail at the implementation of the control. While in some cases they are much too severe, in others they are said to be abstaining from regular control out of carelessness. Moreover, they are said to be participating to a great extent in shady deals." In other words, they could be bribed. Finally, the closure was also "inadequate" because the population had seen it all before:

Already in Soviet times, according to sources, such closures were carried out. Then, however, it was done with a far greater deployment of controlling organs. Nevertheless, they were never able to achieve a full closure. Now the population has experience in evading such measures. Particularly the speculators have the relevant experience at their disposal and thus are the primary beneficiaries of the decree.

148 Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, pp. 87, 92, 95, and 105; DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, l. 112; Nartova diary, l. 13. In early September 1942, Kiev's mayor said market sale was allowed on Wednesday and Saturday, but only from a shelf and with a permit. Nove ukraïns'ke slovo, 5 September 1942, p. 4.

149 Unsigned report reproducing findings of "a source who has returned from a business trip to the Ukraine," sent by the Foreign Office to the representative of the Foreign Office at the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine (Der Vertreter des Auswärtigen Amts beim Reichskommissar für die Ukraine), von Saucken, in Königsberg, Berlin, 31 December 1942, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292536. The same is reported about Dnipropetrovs'k in mid-1943 in Jacob Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, My Private War: One Man's Struggle to Survive the Soviets and the Nazis (London, 1993), p. 215.


151 Ibid., frame 418939.
This was a reference to the measures taken during the Great Famine of 1933 to prevent the starving peasants from entering the cities. Actually, the SD wrote, "despite the closing off of the city the market is richly supplied as before, according to sources even better than before. This is ascribed to the fact that goods were held back by the speculators immediately after the decree became known, in order to bring them now to the market at higher prices."\(^{152}\)

In September, Magunia himself noted that there were not enough policemen available for the "price controls" (Preisüberwachung) to eliminate "the undesirable conditions on the markets."\(^{153}\) Periods of allowing the markets in Kiev alternated with their dispersal.\(^{154}\) On 1 December 1942 the SD of the Kiev Generalbezirk reported that because of "the ban on trade in foodstuffs on the open markets," people could supplement their rations only in the black trade, where prices were high.\(^{155}\)

Already in late 1941, city dwellers had been fleeing to the countryside, either to barter (as did those who had managed to get their hands on oil or kerosene) or simply to beg or steal.\(^{156}\) They also flooded the markets of smaller towns such as Bila Tserkva.\(^{157}\) Train travel to such towns was banned and those found at the station without a special permit could be—as trilingual announcement boards warned—arrested or, if found on the platform or track, shot on

\(^{152}\)Ibid., frame 418938.

\(^{153}\)Auszug aus dem Lagebericht des Generalkommissars, Kiew, den 1.9.1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419196.

\(^{154}\)Statement from an informant, late 1942, in USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292536.

\(^{155}\)[Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD], III D/St., 1.12.42, "Die Geldentwertung im Generalbezirk Kiew," USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419076.

\(^{156}\)Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 191 (10 April 1942), p. 24; Velychkiv's'kyi, "Sumni chasy," Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, XII, 3 (London, 1965), p. 303; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 284; Savchenko, VIIO NKVD USSR to Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka No. 11: O polozhenii v okkupirovannoi protivnikom Vinnitsoi oblast po sostoyaniu na 30. 9. 42g.," 16 October 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 21 (about the fact that the city population is "starving" (golodaet) and often begs in the countryside).

\(^{157}\)Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), p. 11.
the spot. Nevertheless, by mid-1942 both passenger and cargo trains were packed with people. This was probably made easier because of the fact that these trains were apparently driven by natives, at least until the approach of the Red Army. An example of the risks and courage involved is provided by Vasyl' Iablons'kyi, a factory worker born in 1908 in Kiev. He once took clothes, cotton textiles, and sheets to the countryside to barter them. He went by train, despite the threatening ban. "You won't scare people like us [nash brat]. We hopped on [tseplalis'] and went. What's the difference how you're done for, you gotta eat." Near Uman' the Gendarmerie robbed him and told him to go home. While returning, it was wise to bring some vodka to bribe the police. Once close to the city, people would use special paths to evade the police. Other smuggling tricks included putting butter in a non-transparent jar and pouring milk on top, or filling a footwarmer with oil and binding it on to one's body.

What, in the end, did Kievans actually eat? The staple diet was bread. Through December 1941, Kiev's residents received at a fixed price upon order of the Stadtkommissar only 200 grams per week (!) if they had no job, and an additional 600 grams of bread per week if they worked. Other than that, they received nothing. The sale of the bread started on 10 October 1941, when primitive bread cards (khlibni kartky), prepared by city-dwellers themselves the day before, were distributed. The cards were given out monthly on the basis of lists of names

158Dzvin voli, 6 November 1942, p. 4.
159Ibid.; Fevr, Solntse, p. 172.
160Iablonskii, CHPWU interview, l. 2v.
161Ibid, ll. 2--2v. On civilians and train travel, see also Liubomyrenko, Z Khrystom v Ukraïni, pp. 82--84 and 91.
162Hrynevych, author interview.
163[Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 165.
164Letter by Mayor Bahazii to Stadtkommissar Muss, pointing out that "cases of swelling because of famine have started to become more frequent." Wiehn, Die Schoäh, p. 492, citing a document from the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) as reproduced in a Soviet publication. I have not been able to see the original document. The document is also known to be at DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 1, d. 60, ll. 3--3v.
Each store was supposed to serve about eleven streets beginning at 6:00 a.m. After spending hours waiting in lines, one still was not assured of obtaining anything. This was because the cards were not ration cards, which were not allowed. Halyna Lashchenko in 1941 sometimes got up at 5:00 a.m. and quickly walked to the store, which was not far away. Always she found a line-up already waiting, and sometimes the bread ran out before her turn. Kuznetsov used to go to the Bessarabka with the four cards (for himself, his mother, and his grandparents). After fighting a crowd of about two thousand people, he went home with the official loot—half a loaf of bread. From January 1942, those with jobs picked up their additional bread in a line-up at the Stadkommissar's office in the Pechers'k district (1,200 grams every two weeks).

By April 1942, Kievans had the right to receive a bit more: 400 grams of bread per week, whereas people with work received at their place of work an additional loaf per week or two weeks, as well as small amounts of flour, barley, grouts, and even "sometimes a bit of meat." As Ihor Kamenetsky has noted, this total was below that in besieged Leningrad (St Petersburg) at that time. By 30 July 1942, the official rate was set still higher: 600 grams per week (namely, "100 g bread per day") and, if working, an additional daily 120 grams plus "some flour, millet, and vegetables, depending on what is available, and sometimes a mid-day soup." But it is unlikely that these rates were ever actually met.

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165[Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, pp. 198, 220, and 231. She did so herself in late 1942 and early 1943. It is noteworthy that her information about the first period differs from other sources. She writes that she had still not seen bread on 7 November 1941 (ibid., p. 21); that as a teacher, she received 600 g. per week in late November 1941 and mid-January 1942 (ibid., pp. 31 and 64); and that in early December 1941, the non-working population received only 200 g. per month (ibid., p. 33).


167[Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 64.

168 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 191 (10 April 1942), p. 30; Kamenetsky, Secret Nazi Plans, pp. 147 and 229n27.

169 Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Aktenvermerk, Kiev, 30 July 1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 418938.
It should be noted that the so-called "bread" was actually a surrogate. In southern cities, it was made of corn; in others, such as Kiev, of millet. Adults nicknamed it "brick" or, because of its yellow shine, "emery" (nadh). Children called it "golden bread." At first clay-like, the millet bread crumbled after one day. It could only be taken home in a newspaper or a basket, and it fell apart when one tried to cut it. Additives such as lupine and chestnut gave it a bitter taste. The bread caused a lot of people stomach illness, but children liked it and most adults got used to it. Kuznetsov describes it as "very crumbly and dry, with a crust like cardboard covered with millet husks. It was baked from some flour substitute made from maize tops, millet husks, barley and horse-chestnuts. It was gritty to eat and had a bitter-sweet taste." By August 1942, thirty percent of the bread consisted of grouts. By January 1943, the "bread" was no longer made primarily from millet but from husks, and "in the evening it [shone] like a pearl in the light of the kahanets', and its crust [was] totally emerald."

On the occasion of Hitler's birthday in 1942, the Stadtkommissar promised in the newspaper that each person could collect on 19 or 20 April 1942 with their bread cards 500 grams of actual wheat flour. Kuznetsov showed up early in the morning and found a crowd of 1,500 people, already unruly even though it was far from opening time. "Near the doors people were already fighting, and a sweating, red-faced policeman barely contained the crowd." When by 4 o'clock in the afternoon supplies were running out, actual fighting erupted.

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170 Hrynevych, author interview; Fesenko, Povest', p. 82; Gruns'kii, CHPWU interview, l. 5v; Nadezhd Petrovna Konashko (Ukrainian born in 1913), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 2v; Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 125; [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, pp. 65 and 174. In Melitopol', the bread was made of corn. Evgeniia Dosifeevna Ponizovskai ([Russian] born in 1899), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, [date and place unknown], stenographic report (signed by her on 19 January 1946), TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, l. 29.

171 Anatoli (Kuznetsov), Babi Yar, p. 227; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 228.

172 III D/ST., "Versorgungshöchstsätze je Kopf und Woche in Gramm," USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 418936.

173 [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 226.

174 Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 250-251 and 255.
Potatoes were eaten with the peels. In fact, many Kievan simply bought potato peels, washed them, put them through a meat mincer, and fried them with some flour into little pancakes, or first boiled and then minced them and added some flour and vinegar. To hungry children, the taste was "unbelievably nice." 175 The newspaper Nove ukrains'ke slovo wrote several times about the alleged benefits of chestnuts and printed orders from Mayor Forostivs'kyi about their distribution: 500 g. per week from the stores. Kuznetsov ate nothing else for days on end. 176

Because of the hunger, there were also less socially accepted and even criminal ways in which people obtained something to eat. One female student at the Medical Institute caught and ate cats. 177 In the first days of 1943, there was a widespread rumor about cannibalism. In some versions, a gang of cannibals had been uncovered in the Podil who murdered people and sold the meat. Other versions said one man had been arrested after a piece of a finger was found in the sausages he had been selling for a year. 178 The press said it was just one man in his early fifties, who had eaten at least one sixteen-year-old girl. The man (named Korniienko) was hanged on 27 January at the end of Shevchenko Boulevard, near the Khreshchatyk. 179

Many people survived through theft (for lack of a neutral term), both on and off the job. It was dangerous. The already mentioned factory worker Iablons'kyi once went stealing with a friend. They were caught stealing three poods of salt from a train wagon, beaten up, and thrown into jail. The next day, his family came to the prison. One German guard spoke of 175

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175 Ivan Maistrenko, Istoryia moho pokolinnia: spohady uchasnyka revoliutsiinykh podii v Ukraini (Edmonton, 1985), pp. 338–339; Fesenko, Povest', p. 79; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 163; [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 43; Valentyna Pavlivna Kravchenko (Ukrainian born in 1922 in Kiev), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, Ukraine, tape recording; Hrynevych, author interview (the quotation). In the fall of 1942, many Kievan ate pumpkins. Nartova diary, I. 18.

176 [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, pp. 174–175; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 162.

177 Markovskii, CHPWU interview, II. 15–15i.

178 Nartova diary, I. 20; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 352. Kuznetsov worked himself for a man who made sausages from horse meat. The man told him that there had been for a while a gang which, in collaboration with a grave digger, dug up bodies and fed them to pigs.

sending them to the camps, but another, elderly guard let the two prisoners go.\textsuperscript{180} Older teenagers were also involved. One group once hunted for bed sheets by simply pulling them from under the wounded and escaping through the window.\textsuperscript{181} For this they could have been shot on the spot. In little more than the first three months of 1942 alone, the \textit{Einsatzgruppen} in Ukraine executed 1,009 "plunderers," that is, on average eleven every day. (To be sure, among them must also have been OUNSD activists, who were also shot as "plunderers.")\textsuperscript{182} Many burglars took their children along by way of protection, because the Germans rarely hit or shot at young children who were not Jewish or Romani.\textsuperscript{183}

Much of the robbery was accompanied by murder. The SD received news about one murder in the city \textit{per day}. Part of the reason for the high rate was that the Germans rarely investigated them if no German was involved.\textsuperscript{184} In September 1942, \textit{Generalkommissar} Magunia explained most of the crime in his Generalbezirk as the result of "the poverty [\textit{Not}] which is still prevalent at the moment. Remarkably great is the number of killings of children by mothers [\textit{!]}, as well as the ever-increasing number of petty and greater thefts among Ukrainians. If possible, the public prosecutor [\textit{Staatsanwalt}] passes these cases on to the \textit{Strafschöffe} for further processing. Not inconsiderable is the number of serious bloody deeds among Ukrainians (murder, manslaughter, wounding causing death)."\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{180}Tablonskii, CHPWU interview.

\textsuperscript{181}Hrynevych, author interview (referring to older children).

\textsuperscript{182}Along with 121 "saboteurs" and 185 "political officials." \textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 190 (8 April 1942), p. 29.

\textsuperscript{183}Artobolevskii, CHPWU interview, 1. 25. For the same reason, young children in Kiev could collect leftovers near trains which transported coal and vegetables. While keeping adults at bay, the German guards let the children pass. Hrynevych, author interview.

\textsuperscript{184}\textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 191 (10 April 1942), p. 24. Two examples: In December 1941, the composer Dmytro Revuts'kyi and his wife were murdered, and in July 1942, a shoemaker was robbed and killed. Kabaida, "1941," p. 57; Liubchenko, \textit{Shchodennyk}, pp. 90-91.

\textsuperscript{185}"Auszug aus dem Lagebericht des Generalkommissars, Kiew, den 1.9.42.," USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419191.
For women, there was one other option to diminish the specter of death from famine (or possible deportation to Germany). This was to find a German boyfriend. There are many sources—all written by men—which say that this phenomenon was widespread in Kiev and the other major cities. Regarding Kiev, one man recalls that women "immediately" found German friends; two others recall that the vast majority of young women had one. In Kirovohrad, "it was not shameful for a girl to have a German admirer. Not all of them walked with the Germans, but there were girls and young women who said openly that they preferred the Germans to our boys, for ours were employed in dirty work." In 1941, a German soldier and devout Christian found the moral standards regarding pre-marital sex in the city to be the opposite of those in the countryside. That same year in Zaporizhzhia he "often met German soldiers with Russian girls." Hans Koch, writing about both the cities and the countryside, found that "many a virtue has wavered for a loaf of bread, preserves, or a good piece of linen."

Officially, German military and administrative personnel were not allowed to have "any relation with the local population," allegedly because women and girls had been found to work for Soviet partisans ("gangs"). Clearly this ban was widely violated. Ulas Samchuk, a writer and nationalist from western Volhynia, visited Poltava in August 1942 (that is, just before its

186 I have no information about female relations with Hungarian, Italian, Romanian, or Slovak military.

187 Shepelevskii, "Prebyvanie," TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, l. 62; Iablonskii, CHPWU interview, l. 3; Aleksei Mikhailovich Bashkulat (Ukrainian born in 1909), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 28 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 40v; Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, pp. 83-84. Shepelevskii, a medical doctor, adds that there was in Kiev a special organization which searched for women who "spread" sexually transmitted diseases. Those caught were kept "behind bars like detainees." He adds that it was rumored that they were shot if they had syphilis.

188 Pavel Negretov, Vse dorogi vedut na Vorkutu (Benson, Vermont, 1985), p. 50.

189 Walther Bienert, Russen und Deutsche: was für Menschen sind das? Berichte, Bilder und Folgerungen aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stein am Rhein, 1990), p. 38.

190 Hptm. [Hauptmann] Prof. Hans Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass in der Ukraine. Stimmungs- und Erfahrungsbericht. Abgeschlossen 30. 9. 1941," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 10-11. He added that he found no "commercial or even organized" prostitution.

191 Ban, 3 December 1941, in TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 99, l. 20.
incorporation into the Reichskommissariat) on the holiday of Spasa. He found many young girls in the sunny main street. "They walk in pairs and groups, sometimes hand-in-hand with boys, sometimes with [German] soldiers. I listen to their loud talking. Not a word of Ukrainian anywhere. They talk about dancing, courtship, and about the Germans in the sense of soldiers." He concluded that the Germans were "by no means shunned." 192 Girls also had German boyfriends in smaller towns such as Chyhyryn.193 In early 1943, the SD reported that what it called "secret prostitution" had increased (since when, it did not say) in cities such as Kiev and Rivne. "Often native women [in the cities] try to establish relations with Germans or allies, in order to obtain some kind of food." 194 This apparently changed after the German defeat at Stalingrad. In Vinnytsia in mid-1943, Mykhailo Seleshko found that most women avoided the Germans. He even says that young Germans complained that they were much harder to approach than those in other countries. By that time, there were also many Russian-language compositions (chastushki) about women who slept with Germans, such as: "Don't yell at me mother/ For bombing Kiev flat/ My wife was sleeping with a German/ I merely woke her up." 195

At all times, there was a widespread conviction, also among women, that most young women who had relatively good jobs, such as interpreting and translating documents, were having sexual relations with a German. In one word, they were "tart-Germans"—shliukh-doiche.196 Men and women despised such women anyway, believing them to be incompetent

192 Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 255.


196 Nartova diary, l. 10 (the pun); Fesenko, Povest', pp. 81–82. In other jobs, women were apparently beaten like the men. Prof. Paul W. Thomson, 19 October 1942, Document 303-PS, TMWC, Vol. 25 (Nuremberg, 1949), p. 344.
or to abuse their alleged power. In western Volhynia, Ukrainian nationalists were all the more enraged because many of the local office workers were Polish.

Not surprisingly, there were also women who actually became full-time prostitutes. In Kiev, some street prostitutes earned as little as three mandarin oranges. In October 1942, the city administration conducted a campaign to register all prostitutes. The building at 72 Saksahans'ka Street and the Deutsches Haus (the former Pioneer Palace) were well-known brothels.

The question arises what Kievans actually thought of the famine. Throughout 1941, the SD found that they tended to blame their misery on "speculators," while wondering why so little action was underway to curb prices and import food. By the end of the year, Einsatzgruppe C reported that they were disappointed, primarily because the economic situation had worsened. Kievans also wondered whether their treatment as inferior people was a passing or permanent phenomenon. A rumor that marriages with Germans were not allowed caused consternation. By early 1942, after the first winter of starvation, the great majority had seen the light and concluded that the famine was artificial. Nartova wrote in her diary in April 1942, "Again a ban on trade [i.e., barter] at the markets. What can one do, how to live? They probably want to give us a slow death. Obviously it is inconvenient to shoot everybody." At that time there were many who believed that the main purpose of the artificial famine was to force them to go to Germany as Ostarbeiter. This was the case with Liubchenko, who had

197 H. Sova [Hryhorii Kariak], Do istorii bol'shevists'koï diis'nosti: (25 rokiv zhyttia ukraïns'koho hromadianyna v SSSR) (Munich, 1955), p. 76.
199 Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 340; [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, pp. 195–196.
201 Ibid., 142 (5 December 1941), pp. 2–3.
202 Nartova diary, l. 11, note of 25 April 1942. In the original: "Veroiatno oni khotiat umorit' nas medlennoi smert'iu. Ochevidno neudobno vsekh postrielat'."
203 [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 155, note of 22 July 1942.
been very pro-German. In the summer of 1942, he recorded in his diary, with some surprise, that the famine in Kiev "borders on indifference and... criminality."204

In the fall of 1942, the conversations of people in Kiev and the rest of the Reichskommissariat centered around the famine and the deportations; they talked little about politics or developments at the front. Both Nartova and the SD in September and October 1942 picked up comments in line-ups and elsewhere such as, "They finished off the kikes [zhidy] first, but they scoff at us for a whole year, exterminate us every day by the dozens, destroy us in a slow death"; "We are supposed to die of starvation, to make place for the Germans"; and "It's better to revolt than to starve slowly."205 Small children referred to the famine as an animate object—"him" (on); that is, a bony, yellow, and terrifying old man with a cane and a bag who took people away.206

Every hungry person was reminded each day that the German men and women in Kiev were living comfortably. Liubchenko's diary contains one such scene. It was in late October 1942, near a German-only store on the corner of Fundukliïvka and Nesteriv'ska Streets.

They [Germans] are pushing a large cart with white bread. The smell is all over the street. Passers-by stop, and so do I. There are far more of us, it is a large crowd already. One can think that something special has happened here: somebody has been arrested, somebody is fighting, there has been an accident... No! This huge crowd is eagerly drinking the smell of fresh white bread, this crowd is hungry and emaciated. It stands silently and is looking gloomily. The Germans carry the bread and glance at the crowd with suspicion and somewhat hurriedly, like thieves. But the crowd keeps getting bigger and stands gloomily. Behind this reticence boils a deep rage and fury. Here people understand one another without words. Any minute, it seems, they will lash out, seize that bread, smash the cart, and trash the store.207

When the Battle of Stalingrad was drawing to an end, the Aid Committee was apparently allowed to increase the scope of its work, or so it would appear from press reports.

204Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 106; Samchuk, Na koni voronому, p. 263.

205Nartova diary, l. 17 (the first quote); Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), pp. 12 and 14. The SD reports never speak of "famine" but of problems in the "food situation" (Ernährungslage).

206[Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 47.

207Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 147, note of 29 October 1942.
At that time it employed some 640 people. It reportedly provided in its dining rooms food to 16,000 people per day. The city administration reportedly freed disabled, old people (pensionery), and poor people in several districts from payment of rent, water, and guards (wartovi). It also introduced taxes for the benefit of the committee; for example, five karbovantsi were due for (re)registering as a resident. Committee chairman Nenadkevych and Mayor Forostivs'kyi also called on the population to support its work with gifts. By September 1943, what was then called the "All-Ukrainian Aid Committee" in Kiev supposedly provided meals for 36,000 persons per day. Although all this may have happened, it should be noted that the memoir literature—already rare for events in Kiev in 1943—does not confirm this.

On 9 February, when the Germans announced their defeat at Stalingrad, food prices soared. Within two weeks, bread at the market in Kiev was ten times more expensive and milk five times. The salespeople at the markets openly asked for roubles and started refusing the karbovanets'. The inflation was also caused by Ukrainian refugees who arrived from the

208 Maluzhenko, "Kyïv za 1942 r.," p. 179, provides the figure of 621 for 1 December 1942 and 643 for 1 January 1943.

209 Nove ukraïns'ke slovo, 26 January 1943, p. 4; ibid., 29 January 1943, p. 4.

210 Ibid., 27 January 1943, p. 4. The authors added the usual phrase that people should realize that the Germans and their allies "are carrying heavy casualties and are shedding their blood for the destruction of world plutocracy and Jewish Bolshevism and for the provision of a new, better life for all the workers in the New Europe."

211 Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 168, citing Nove ukraïns'ke slovo, 19 September 1943.

212 Similar events are reported about other cities, and are equally unsubstantiated. For example, in Bila Tserkva a Committee of Ukrainian Self-Aid (Komitet Ukrain's'koï Samodopomohy) supposedly collected 8,000 karbovantsi, 9 ton potatoes, 3 tons of millet flour, clothes, and houseware, and fed 300 babies and children and 43 disabled and elderly. Dzvin voli, 4 March 1943, p. 4.

213 Liubchenko, "Shchodennyk," Novi dni, III, 33 (Toronto, October 1952), p. 2. Also Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 8. Not surprisingly, the German Reichsmark lost much of its value. In mid-February, one bread in Kiev could only be bought for 45 RM; a glass of salt only for 15 RM; and a horse cost up to 4,000 RM. [Der Kommandeur...], "Allgemeine politische Angelegenheiten," Kiev, 1 March 1943, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419253.

Left Bank and brought many roubles with them.\textsuperscript{215} The markets were now lively affairs, in marked contrast to their earlier silence, and sold virtually every kind of food or ware.

Ivan Zhyhadlo arrived as a refugee in Kiev in early 1943 and found that the only food on sale in stores was millet, millet bread, and sugar. Meanwhile, the markets were very lively, with high but fluctuating prices. "The most agile women baked and took to the market buns, pierogies, potato pancakes, fritters, even ice cream and pastry, and they were selling all this rarely for less than 10 roubles \textit{[karbovantsi]} a piece. Still others carried kerchiefs \textit{[khustochky]}, dresses, underwear, trousers, etc. to the market, hastily sowed from painted fabrics; their little tables were the prototype of clothes stores." The streets were also busy, with "many people selling cigarettes and matches, fruit and vegetables, self-made sweets, and some kind of household commodities and toys."\textsuperscript{216}

There were still many hungry people in the city. Zhyhadlo saw "a large number of beggars, among whom a large percentage were the so-called 'intelligentsia,' or, in old terminology, the 'noble' \textit{[blahorodni]} people. In the streets which led to the markets, as well as on the markets themselves, stood 'former people' \textit{[Bolshevik term for disenfranchised nobles and others from a despised background]} who asked for charity, without any shame: either money, a pickle, or a cucumber. Many were sick and emaciated; their 'requests' saved them from death by starvation. But there were also young and healthy people, who apparently did not want [sic] to work."\textsuperscript{217}

Although Kiev's markets may have been lively by that time, they remained under threat. Sometimes the Germans for some reason banned the markets or conducted round-ups and searches, "from which the speculators fled and those captured bought themselves off."\textsuperscript{218}

In this regard, Kiev's markets differed from the markets in most other cities. Those markets

\textsuperscript{215}Seleshko, \textit{Vinnytsia}, pp. 106 and 139, regarding Vinnytsia in mid-1943. He says Soviet airplanes had dropped these roubles, but no other source confirms this.

\textsuperscript{216}Ternivs'kyi, "Spohady emigranta," pp. 53–54 (quotes from 54).

\textsuperscript{217}Ibid., pp. 53–54.

\textsuperscript{218}Ibid., p. 53.
were by then much more extensive operations, in which the Germans were themselves much more involved. At those markets, Germans bartered household commodities and clothes from Germany for eggs, butter, meat, liquor, and furs. Germans leaving or returning from holidays in the Reich transported the items or food, or used the mail. High-placed officials bribed train employees and used entire wagons for transports of items to and from Ukraine. To the Germans, Ukraine had become "the flea market of the Reich."  

We have some detailed information about one of those cities, Vinnytsia, in the summer and fall of 1943. Here peasants were allowed to supply their produce for sale via carts. They even sold bread from wheat after bribing the local German in charge. There were also "desperate peasant women who conducted a brisk trade in home-brew." It was "intoxicating" for refugees from Kiev to see the "dozens of carts with quacking ducks and bristled up hens, sieves of eggs, fatty cottage cheese [tvorog], mat lumps of lard, and magnificent onion wreaths. The long stands with freshly baked, 'real' bread, so unlike the Kievan mixture... The rows and rows of tall pitchers with fermented baked milk [riazhenka], with tasty rosy crusts mixed in... And everywhere, wherever one looked—on rows, on shawls spread out on the ground, in buckets, baskets, and boxes—apples."  

Round-ups for Ostdeutsche were no longer held at this market. German soldiers paid with things like mirrors, nails, and needles. To be sure, even here the prices were very high and virtually out of the reach of non-Germans.  

Indeed, there were hungry people, including peasants; there were permanent line-ups in front of the office of the Gebietskommissar for written permission to buy food in the stores.

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219 Fragment from an Auslandbriefprüfstelle report, probably from July 1943, in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, pp. 453-455; also cited in Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, p. 31.

220 Fesenko, Povest', pp. 96 and 98.

221 Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 47, 83-84, and 138-139. Some examples of prices: shoes—500 RM; 250 g. of cheese—2.5 RM; 1 liter gas (benzyna; the salesmen had bought it from Germans)—6 RM; 1 kg meat—150 karbovantsi. Higher-placed Germans also illegally sent food to Germany—not by mail, but by train. Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 48.

222 People with other requests were often simply beaten up and thrown out. Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 75. The best stores and restaurants remained "Only for Germans (Nur für Deutsche)." Ibid, pp. 44-45.
By 1 April 1942, well after the first winter of famine, Kiev had officially 352,139 inhabitants (including a probably too low figure of 2,797 Germans). On 1 July 1943—over four months before the German departure and the arrival of the Red Army—Kiev had officially 295,639 inhabitants.223 The drop from the estimated 600,000 of October 1941 to less than 300,000 cannot be exclusively ascribed to the famine, but it seems to have been the most significant cause.

The famine was clearly artificial. We know that peasants were very eager to visit the cities and barter with the proceeds of the rich harvest. But roadblocks, manned by native policemen, were installed which by mid-1942 had the express purpose of confiscating "surplus" food. Although not a complete blockade, such cordonning off cost many lives. The situation was a reversal of the one which had existed in 1933. At that time, starving peasants tried to enter the cities to get some food and were arrested. Now it was the peasants who were in a "privileged" position. This undoubtedly caused resentment among some city-dwellers who attributed the high cost of bartering at the markets and in the countryside to a peasant desire to take "revenge."224 Besides starvation, other consequences of the famine were de-urbanization—large-scale migration into the countryside,225 just as Hitler and Koch wanted—and a fierce hatred of the Germans.

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223See the appendix, "Official population figures for selected cities and towns."

224This point of view can be found in Fesenko, *Povest*, p. 78.

225According to Rolf-Dieter Müller, "Das 'Unternehmen Barbarossa'," p. 188, these migrations ultimately "benefitted the partisan war" because they "destabilized" (verunsichtern) the countryside. Moreover, they supposedly made it difficult to get the harvest in. I have found no evidence to support either of these statements.
CHAPTER 5

Working Conditions in the Cities

This chapter deals with two aspects of the everyday experience of city dwellers. First their housing conditions are discussed. The second and longer part describes work: what kind of work did city dwellers do, and what was that like? Unlike in the previous chapter, German policies will receive no systematic attention. This is partly because there does not appear to have been a systematic policy, but mainly because the source base that has been preserved leaves much to be desired. The emphasis will be on living and working conditions in Kiev, but information about other major cities, such as Dnipropetrovsk, is included as much as possible. Along the way, we also discuss several other aspects of city life: the curfew, dangers in the street, and clothing.

As soon as the Germans arrived, people in Kiev and other cities had to deal with very real dangers and problems. One was the German practice of hostage-taking for acts considered sabotage. If a fire broke out, or some mishap took place, the inhabitants of the house or houses involved, and even entire streets could be held collectively responsible. This applied in particular to men. In November 1941, arson, wire-cutting, and other cases of sabotage and violence were still going on in Kiev. For that reason, many prudent Kievans had a full suitcase ready and slept in their daytime clothes. In those first months, they wished that there were more policemen patrolling their streets. They even organized vigilantes to protect themselves against saboteurs and criminals. Regarding the former, they were convinced that they did not care if hostages were taken and shot. From the latter, they feared burglary or worse. Many doorbells had been out of order for years, so that a note on doors indicated the times one had to knock to see each particular person or family. After knocking, visitors also had to answer the question, from behind the still-closed door, "Who's there?" (Kto?). Only after an answer had
been provided might the inhabitant remove the bolts and chains from the door and eventually open it.¹

Another change in the living conditions was the usurpation of power by the house custodians (sing. Ukrainian: kerbud; Russian: upravdom or domuprav; German: Hausverwalter). In the Soviet period, such custodians had reported any "suspicious" behavior of the tenants to the NKVD. During the retreat of the Red Army, the NKVD replaced many of them by more productive agents. At that stage, the custodians provided help in the hunt for deserters, for example by entering rooms while people were out of the house. After the German arrival, many of these feared and hated people declared themselves the owners of the building. The new "landlords" raised the rent and told those unable to pay the new rates to move out within days.² Under the Germans, they also resumed their role as informants, this time for Nazi intelligence. Eventually many were still dismissed and replaced by ethnic Germans.³

Thousands of Kievans had to move as a result of the fires in the center. To assist anybody who might be looking for them, they wrote extensive directions on the walls of their former houses.⁴ Many of them were able to move to a more spacious place, vacated by others who had left before the German arrival or, in the case of Jews, who had been murdered.⁵ But quickly it became again difficult to move, as the city administration took control, that is, each


⁴Fevr, Solntse, p. 144.

⁵Tat'iana Fesenko, Povest' krivykh let (New York, 1963), p. 83.
district's Housing Department (*Zhytoloviddil, Wohnungsamt*). The new city bureaucrats claimed the right to distribute houses according to people's background. Particularly those with a history of persecution by the Soviet authorities were likely to be successful in this regard.⁶

As a result, most people in Kiev, and those in other cities, continued to live in the same house, and according to the same communal system as had existed before 1941. The Berlin-based journalist Nikolai Fevr spent two months in Kiev at the end of the summer of 1942. He delivered letters from Germany to many people and thus was able to see dozens of apartments. The first apartment he saw was actually the house which he, as a young White Russian soldier, had left in 1919. Now it was a *kommunalika* or communal apartment.

All adjacent doors in the rooms were either bricked up or crammed with plywood partitions. The bathroom had been turned into a living room, and here lived the old woman I mentioned. This way, the apartment consisted of six cages. Four of them were inhabited by four families, of two to four members each. The fifth cage was for the old woman. In the sixth one (a servant's room) was a student.

In the common kitchen, the inhabitants of the place had no way of controlling the expenses for firewood. Therefore the stove had not been burning for years. On it were six very old primus stoves, on which dinners and suppers were prepared. A corner in the kitchen was fenced off by a blanket. Here the inhabitants changed clothes when they had guests. The kitchen was also the place where they washed, straight from the tap above the sink. Because the kitchen was unheated, in the wintertime a real skating-rink formed on the floor. Then the people wore felt boots when preparing meals.⁷

All the other apartments Fevr saw were essentially like this, and the inhabitants told him that they had not changed for years. In Dnipropetrovsk, workers either lived in communal apartments or in the outskirts in shacks or barracks. They preferred to live in the outskirts, for there it was possible to hold chickens or geese. (This was illegal in the Soviet period.) Those

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workers who were best-off had one room and a kitchen for a family of four, or two rooms and a kitchen for a family of five to six.\(^8\)

A minority of city-dwellers lived relatively spaciously. They faced a real danger of being evicted, however. Notices might even order them to get out within days. In the last quarter of 1942, many Kievans in the center received such notices. They had to make space for German civilian administrators and for ethnic Germans, whom the *Stadtkommissar* wished to concentrate in the center.\(^9\) The new apartments these Kievans were assigned were either too small or entirely unfit for habitation. If they wished something else, they could buy one illegally from the custodian-landlords. Some families were even evicted several times. Officially one could not move into apartments in the Pechers'k, St Sophia, and Bohdaniv districts, and from late October 1942, any move had to take place within one's current district. Wherever it went, the move itself was expensive, as renting a cart and driver cost around 200 Reichsmarks. Not surprisingly, the SD at that time reported "ill feeling and nervousness" among Kievans about the housing situation.\(^{10}\) Undoubtedly, similar situations existed in other major cities. In Vinnytsia, people were not only evicted from the best quarter, but it was completely, except for large buildings, deliberately demolished, as part of a stated plan to germanize the city.\(^{11}\)

Heat and light were scarce commodities. New houses had a system of central heating, but this was not operating. Thus the inhabitants spent much of the winters in the kitchen, heating it with wooden sheds, fences, and anything else that would burn. The same was

\(^8\)Fevr, *Solntse*, p. 190. He saw at least twenty workers' apartments in Dnipropetrovs'k during two weeks in the fall of 1942.


\(^{10}\)“Misstände und Schwierigkeiten” (see preceding note).

\(^{11}\)Mikhail Ivanovich Sokolov, interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 20 January 1946 [Vinnytsia?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, ll. 39–40.
customary in private single-family apartments. Fuel was consistently on people's mind, for it was important to hoard it well before the very cold winters actually arrived. Electricity returned to Kiev two weeks after the German arrival, when the sabotaged power station was restored. (The water supply was restored several days later, on 6 October.) Only Germans, ethnic Germans, and high-placed officials received electricity, however. The latter were told to use it sparingly. Thus virtually all houses in Kiev were mostly dark at night. The exception was the Lypky district, the most prestigious part of Kiev, which had not been destroyed and where the Germans lived. As for ordinary Kievs, they used oil-lamps, candles, long wooden chips, and especially the kahanets', a gas-fueled night-lamp, in order to create light. The darkness imposed a way of life: most Kievs got up around 6:00 a.m. and went to bed around

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9:00 p.m. In the middle of 1943, electricity in Kiev became available again for at least some of them.

In other cities, the situation was essentially the same, although there were local variations. In Vinnytsia, all inhabitants apparently received electricity by mid-1943. In Dnipropetrov'sk, however, only Germans had electricity as late as 1943. Some locals could afford carbide lamps, which stank but gave a bright light. Most common, though still hard to afford, was what Russian speakers called the koptilka—a small bottle of kerosene and a burning wick that provided "a gray wispy trembling flame, which barely shed its light two feet around it. The ceiling was left in profound darkness."

The authorities ordered the city populations to register at the Labor Office (Arbeitsamt, Ukrainian: Birza pratsi; referred to by Russian speakers as the Birza truda). This institution, invariably headed by a Reich German or ethnic German, was directly subject to the Stadtkommissar or Gebietskommissar. In Dnipropetrov'sk, people were lured to register with the false promise of a bread booklet. Communists who registered were given special conditions: they were ordered to register again at regular intervals, sometimes every week. In Dnipropetrov'sk, they also had to wear a white or (in the case of Komsomol members) yellow armband with their number on it.


18 Fesenko, Povest', p. 87.


20 Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, My Private War, p. 220.


22 Ibid.; Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka No 33/68," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 72.
Anybody who lived in a city, like anybody who lived in the countryside, was supposed to have work. At first, ethnic Ukrainians were thought to be given preferential treatment in job-placement. "Everybody grabbed their passports and many people discovered incomprehensible things," a Kievan woman wrote in her diary on 25 September 1941. "In one and the same family, brothers and sisters were Russian and Ukrainian. For none of us had given any meaning to nationality. And many were glad to find that because of circumstances or by chance, they turned out to be Ukrainian."23 They were glad, because having a job seemed essential for survival. For the same reason, all Kievans and other city dwellers tried to register as being Ukrainian. They often succeeded, which explains the very high number of "Ukrainians" in the subsequent city censuses.24

Because hirings were often unregulated, Reichskommissar Koch tightened the system in March 1942. He announced that employers who hired (or dismissed) a person without the permission of the Labor Office would be fined or imprisoned, unless the job involved lasted just for one week or (in the case of dismissal) four weeks. Employers had to certify every week that their employees were actually working for them, by way of the "labor card" (trudova kartka; German: Arbeitskarte).25 City-dwellers who did not register at all were labeled saboteurs and could be killed. In mid-July 1942, a verification took place in Kiev: all card holders were checked, and those people without a card got a final chance to register in a new census.26


24Ol'ga Sergeevna Gudzenko-Tyshkova (Ukrainian born in 1901), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 14 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report (signed on 5 June 1944), TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 44v; Fesenko, Povest', p. 76.

25"Rozporiadzhennia Pro vvedennia trudovoï kartky," Kiev, 13 February 1942, Filiia, Tsentral'na naukova biblioteka im V. I. Vernads'koho, Natsional'na akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Kiev. Viddil starodrukh, item no. 919; note from the administration of the Polis'ke raion, August 1943, DAKO, f. r-2210, op. 1, d. 14, l. 10.

26Newspaper clipping containing an 8 July 1942 order from Mayor Forostivs'kyi, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 17, d. 7, l. 1. The verification is confirmed by Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 81 and [O. P. Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu: (iz shchodennyka kyianky) (Kiev, 1960), p. 155.
Actually getting a job was not easy; on the contrary. In fact, Kiev's Labor Office was "besieged by hungry [unemployed] people." At first, more than twice as many Kievans with work were female than were male. For various reasons, including the arrival of former Red Army soldiers, this situation was reversed. On 1 April 1942, of Kiev's 352,139 registered inhabitants (including at least some 2,800 Germans), 101,490 were officially employed. Of these "employed" (samodiial'ni, a term in the statistics that apparently included people working in German offices), 64,316 were male and 37,174 were female. In rounded numbers, of the 50,000 employed "Ukrainian" men in the city, over half (about 26,000) were employed as "workers" (robityky). Meanwhile, of the 27,500 female employed "Ukrainians," over 12,000 had office jobs (sluzhbovtsi). The next-most common registered "Ukrainian" occupations were handicrafts (kustari) in the case of males (2,800), and "various kinds of day-labor" (rizni podenni roboty) and agriculture in the case of females (3,800 and 2,000).

Getting to work posed special problems. In Kiev, the streetcar which ran along the Dnieper returned to service on 11 October 1941. Initially Kievans were allowed to use the streetcars, but only if they got on at the back. The cars circulated very irregularly. Moreover, beginning in early 1942, they were generally reserved for transport of wood and for garbage collection, and no non-German was allowed on. Some Kievans could ride illegally, if the driver accepted their money. They could also simply hop on, although this carried the risk of a

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27 Nartova diary, l. 4, note of 26 December 1941.

28 In October 1941, of the 65,900 Kievans officially employed, 20,700 were male and 45,200 were female. "Lagebericht für die Zeit vom 1.–15. Okt. 1941," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 212.


30 Ibid., 166.


32 Nartova diary, l. 2; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 225 and 227; [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 40.
The employees of many enterprises or firms, such as Kiev's bread factory, were taken to and from their work on specially reserved streetcars. In the morning, they were transported between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. The streetcar was also operating in Vinnytsia.

Private carts driven by two horses served as taxis in Kiev by at least the middle of 1942. There was apparently no bus transport within any city.

Given such conditions, city-dwellers spent much of each working day walking. Some walked three kilometers, others fifteen, on streets that were generally kept clean. In smaller cities and towns, which often looked more like villages, this was not the case, even though Germans ordered locals to remove weeds and snow. For instance, Bila Tserkva continued to look as it had for decades. Some of its long and wide streets were unpaved, and in the summertime they were "covered with an ankle-thick layer of dust [with] the imprints of bare feet, boots, and intricate crosses from chickens' feet."

33 Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 173, 222, and 350. A "source" reported about Kiev in late 1942 that "neither the electricity nor the streetcar are working." USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292536.

34 Information regarding early 1942: Dmytro Kyslytsia, Sviite iasnyi: vid r. Vovchi z Nadniprianshchyny do r. Sv. Lavrentiia na Ottavshchyni (Ottawa, 1987), p. 201; Mykhalevych, "Do Kyieva!," p. 229; Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 75; Nartova diary, I. 9. About the subsequent period: Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, pp. 87 and 104-105; Ukrain's'kyi holos, 28 February 1943, p. 4; Mikhail Nikolaevich Sviridovskii (born in 1908), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 3 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, ll. 9-14; [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, p. 233.

35 Savchenko to Korniets, "Spets. soob.," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, I. 30. In Dnipropetrovs'k, only three streetcar wagons were operating, according to Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsovdka No 33/68," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, I. 89.

36 Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 343. For emergencies, first aid workers used rickshaws. Otherwise, they employed stretchers on bicycle wheels or, in the winter, sledges. Iu. N. Kvitnitskii-Ryzhov, "Iz istorii zdravoookhraneniiia v Kieve vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945," Sovetskoe zdravoookhranenie, 5 (Moscow, [May] 1990), p. 64.


39 Fevr, Solntse, pp. 171-172.
Every city, whether large or small, had a curfew. It started at varying times, depending on the season, the city, and the mood of the local German authority.\textsuperscript{40} Posted announcements warned that anybody caught violating the curfew would be shot on the spot. To deter people even more from venturing outside, the native Schutzpolizei, if carrying firearms, periodically fired shots into the air.\textsuperscript{41} Other than this sound, most city streets were quiet during the curfew, especially when it was cold outside.\textsuperscript{42} Observing the curfew required some planning, for few people had watches. A person who wanted to be sure but lacked a working clock might first ask a neighbor for the time, or wait for a passer-by.\textsuperscript{43} Of the major cities, Kiev apparently had the harshest curfew regime. In the fall of 1941, it was changed to start as early as 6:00 p.m. and to last until 5:00 a.m. The poster announcing the change was put up very late—on the very day it came into effect. Consequently, the next morning the streets were littered with corpses, apparently mainly former Red Army soldiers.\textsuperscript{44}

Corpses in the street were a permanent feature of Kiev in the entire period.\textsuperscript{45} In addition to shot curfew violators, hanged "saboteurs" or "Jews" were a frequent sight. These victims

\textsuperscript{40}The indicated time was always in "German time," for the clock in Ukraine had been equalized to central European time. Jews, if still alive, had to be inside much earlier. For example, while the city of Pervomais'k on the Southern Buh River had a general curfew from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., Jews could not show themselves for fifteen hours, between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. Vera Vas'ilev'nna Ponomareva, interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 20 January 1946, [Pervomais'k?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, l. 57.

\textsuperscript{41}Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 31, 33, and 46 (mentions the 10:00 p.m. curfew in Vinnytsia in mid-1943); Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 154; Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 60; Lashchenko, "Povorot," Samostiina Ukraina, XI, 6 (114) (New York, June 1958), p. 18.


\textsuperscript{43}Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 220.

\textsuperscript{44}Announcement, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 121, l. 6; Velychkivs'kyi, "Sumni chasy [...]." Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, XII, 2 (London, 1965), p. 160. Cf. Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 81, who says it started in Kiev in late November 1941 at 5:00 p.m.

\textsuperscript{45}Nikolai Kuz'mich Grun'skii [sic] (Ukrainian born in 1872), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 19 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 5v; Velychkivs'kyi, "Sumni chasy [...]." Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, XII, 1 (London, 1965), p. 47.
were left suspended from balconies or public gallows for days. Initially, such "reprisals" were announced. This is how we know that a hundred people were shot in Kiev on 22 October 1941; three hundred more on 2 November; and four hundred men on 29 November 1941. Among these victims were those caught in a random round-up on the central boulevard, Khreshchatyk, after the former Duma building on Kalinin Square burned down as the result of an explosion. From then on, the number of publicly or secretly executed Kievans was no longer announced. During the month of December 1941, "the machine-gun in the ravine [of Babyn Iar] banged away every day." People talked a great deal about the executions, about how the victims had been arrested, and what could have caused the Germans to arrest them. Additional dangers in the cities were arrests on suspicion of being Red Army deserters (in the case of young males) or, from early 1942, arrests as candidates for forced labor in Germany. As if this was not enough, Kievans also had to endure the sight of gas vans (actually, one van stationed in the city) speeding by. They called the mobile gas-chamber a dushehubka—the destroyer of the soul.

The situation in other cities was similar. In Dnipropetrovsk, a particularly cruel round-up took place in February 1943, when the German authorities were devastated by the news of their recent defeat at Stalingrad. On 17 February 1943, all Germans fled Dnipropetrovsk.

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46 "Lagebericht für Februar 1942." TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 260 (says the first public hanging in Kiev was in February 1942); Poslednie novosti, 30 March 1942, p. 1; Nartova diary, l. 6; Iaroslav Haivas, "V roky nadii i beznadii (Zastroch ci rozmovy z O. Ol'zhychem v rokh 1939–1944)," Kalendár-al'manah Novoho Shliakhu 1977 (Toronto, [n.d.]), p. 119; Liubomyrenko, Z Khrystom v Ukraïni, p. 80.

47 Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 152; Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 60.

48 Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 220.

49 Klavdiia Iakovlivna Hrynevych (Ukrainian born in 1930 in Klyntsi [Kirovohrad oblast]), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, tape recording. The permanent presence of a gas van in Kiev from late 1941 is confirmed in Eugen Kogon, Hermann Langbein, and Adalbert Rückerl, eds., Nazi Mass Murder: A Documentary History of the Use of Poison Gas (New Haven and London, 1993), p. 62. Unconfirmed word of mouth has it that the mobile gas van was invented by the NKVD in the 1930s. See Petro G. Grigorenko, Memoirs (New York and London, 1982), p. 209. Whether this is true or not, certainly incorrect is the notion that the German authorities in Kiev got the idea from an NKVD agent who had voluntarily started to work for them. Cf. Kyslytsia, Svite iasnyi, p. 200.
convinced that the Red Army was on the verge of capturing the city. When this did not happen, several days later they returned and put up posters ordering any civilians in the possession of weapons—the retreating Italians had probably sold many of them; see below, chapter 8—to hand them in by 9 a.m. on Sunday, 21 February. The standard threat of death for non-compliance made no impact, however. When the deadline had passed, dozens of men and women were randomly rounded up and put on trucks. These trucks stopped at lamp posts, fastened ropes on them, fastened the other ends on the necks of the captives, and drove away.

"About sixty street lamps in the busiest places in town were decorated in this fashion, to celebrate the return of the German authorities," a witness wrote later. "During the night the Germans wrapped the heads of the corpses in cloth—it seems the sight was too monstrous even for them."50

All these dangers caused people to stay inside whenever possible, and to travel to work with caution and as quickly as possible. A woman who lived in Kiev recalls: "If I went out or my mother left the house, we always said goodbye, for there were no guarantees that we would return.... Whenever we saw a group of Germans, we would hide immediately, somewhere on the side or under a gate [v podvorotniu]."51 City dwellers behaved this way even though many Germans actually refused to "see" them. Such deliberate German neglect was felt to be very insulting. Since they did not "see" the locals, some of these German men seemed to have no shame. For example, when waiting for a streetcar in the company of locals, they, "as if alone, indifferently let their pants down, picked their nose, blew with two fingers, and urinated openly."52 There was also an increasing number of German women, brought to Ukraine by their husbands to save them from the Allied bombardments in Germany. The


51Liudmyla Stanyslavivna Khmilevs'ka (Ukrainian born in 1923 in Kiev), author interview in Russian, 13 July 1995, Kiev, tape recording.

52Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 225 (the quotation); Nartova diary, l. 23; Vasilii Ivanovich Iablonskii (Ukrainian born in 1908), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 February 1944, [Kiev?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, l. 2.
women were often seen walking with dogs. The only Germans who always acknowledged the locals were children. Anatolii Kuznetsov once saw a streetcar pass him by which was decorated with Hitler's portrait and swastika flags. The German (and presumably ethnic German) boys and girls inside spat at him, "with a particularly cold contempt and hatred in their eyes."

Published eyewitness accounts about actual interaction in public between adult Germans and locals are rare. One such glimpse is provided by Jacob Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, a Jew who escaped from the L'viv ghetto, assumed a Polish identity, and was able to reach Dnipropetrovs'k in early 1943. Despite all his experiences as a Jew in the Generalgouvernement, he was still shocked by the Germans' behavior toward Russian speakers who he thought were Russians, but were mostly Ukrainians. The situation in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was for him "so abysmal that we, who came from the West, simply could not adjust to it."

Here the Germans could really feel like the Herrenvolk. The Russians [Ukrainians] were put on the same level as cattle. It was inconceivable that a German would walk shoulder to shoulder with a Russian. If it happened that a German was obliged to walk with a Russian, he always strode a few paces behind him or in front. Germans sitting down with the locals in a café or a restaurant? The very idea was ridiculous! A German did not stand in line, whatever his rank was. He would commandeer the barber's chair even if ten people were waiting for a haircut. He had a free ride in the trams and always had the right to a seat. The examples could be multiplied a hundred-fold, and though these were minor irritations, they humiliated the Russian population painfully and unceasingly.

For most of the Nazi period, people in the street looked more or less the same. Not wanting to stand out, Ukrainians who arrived in Kiev from the "West" brought very modest clothes with them. Still the newcomers inevitably stood out. As one of them recalls: "The men

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53Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 228; Nartova diary, ll. 14 and 20. Even a small town such a Lubny in the Poltava region had many German women; see Pavlo Ternivs'kyi [Ivan Zhyhadlo], "Spohady emigranta," p. 38. Autograph manuscript, 1945, Library and Museum, Ukrainian Cultural & Educational Centre, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.

54This was in April 1942. Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 254.

were recognized by their raincoats, the different style and quality of the jackets, and their shoes, for under the Soviets men wore canvas shoes or boots. The women who arrived were recognized by the shape of their costumes and coats, by their short dresses which were then fashionable (under the Soviets, until the German occupation, the women wore rather long dresses), by different hair styles, and by thin stockings. By the late summer of 1942, males in Kiev, according to Fevr, wore "shabby shirts belted by laces, turned double-breasted jackets, frayed ordinary trousers, and canvas shoes on bare feet, or black boots. On their head [they] sometimes [wore] a very old, flabby hat, more often a cloth cap or tiubeteika [embroidered Central-Asian skull-cap], or still more often, nothing." The women wore "some kind of bag-shaped, faded dresses, patched coats with peasant scarves on top, black, coarse stockings or no stockings at all, and worn-out shoes and often men's boots. On their heads [they wore] in rare cases a yellowed straw hat. More commonly, a short beret or some kind of self-made little cap from fustian. Still more often, an ordinary white shawl." In the wintertime, women wrapped their face, leaving only space for their eyes. A particular category included local males who worked at the city administrations. They tended to look "patriotic" because of their Ukrainian embroidered shirts and long mustaches.

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56Lashchenko, "Povorot," Samostiina Ukraina, XI, 10 (118) (Chicago, October 1958), p. 9. Regarding cosmetics, she adds that local women generally did not use it because of the bad Soviet quality. There is no scholarly description of clothing in Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s. In Lubny before 1941, "everybody" is said to have walked "in ragged and dirty clothes, especially the peasants." Ternivs'kyi, "Spohady emigranta," p. 16.

For a description of the "extremely poor" clothing and footware of Kievsans in October 1941, see Ievhen Onats'kyi, "Ukraïna ochyma italio'kykh korespondentiv u druhi svitovii viini," Samostiina Ukraina, XVIII, 3 (193) (New York, March 1965) p. 37, which is a translation of a newspaper article by an Italian correspondent that was published on 31 October 1941.


58Mykhailo Hartymiv, "Zemleiu ukrains'koiu...," in Mel'nyk et. al., Na zov Kyieva, p. 122.

About Vinnytsia in mid-1943, it is reported that many locals went barefoot and in rags, that men were often unshaven, and that even people who had better clothes were reluctant to wear them. This was a precaution which dated back from the Soviet period and was meant to avoid standing out from the crowd.\textsuperscript{60} By 1943, a certain "fashion" had actually developed in many cities. Most city-dwellers made their own clothes from brightly-dyed potato sacks or military blankets. Also popular were German army clothes, traded with soldiers in return for homebrew. Women in a suburb of Kryvyi Rih are said to have carried themselves in their self-made clothes "with the dignity and grace of big city models."\textsuperscript{61} Men made shoes by cutting up rubber tires and stitching up the openings.\textsuperscript{62}

When military rule was replaced by civilian Nazi rule, the regulations on being late for work and for being absent actually became more lenient. This paradox came about because the German military authorities had preserved the Soviet regulations, which were quite harsh. A Soviet law of June 1940 held that a person with a regular job who quit without permission could be sentenced to two or even four months' imprisonment. Moreover, merely missing all or part of a day at work, for example by arriving more than twenty minutes late, carried a sentence of one to six months of "corrective" labor and a salary reduction of up to 25 percent.\textsuperscript{63} The relaxation of the rules brought about by the transition to civilian Nazi rule did not last long, however. After some time, the penalties for lateness and absenteeism became quite harsh—but whether the Germans could always impose them must be doubted. In the

\textsuperscript{60}Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{61}Ajzensztadt, Endurance, p. 61 (the quote, regarding the suburb of Dovhyntseve/Dolgintsevo); Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, My Private War, pp. 269–270 (in Dnipropetrovs'k).

\textsuperscript{62}Ajzensztadt, Endurance, p. 62.

major cities this was likely the case, but in the small towns (as in the villages) this was difficult because of the lack of German supervisors.64

Wages were paid in roubles, and from July 1942 in karbovantsi. Erich Koch and his associates wanted the salaries to be about ten percent higher than in the Soviet period.65 This was hardly an improvement, since the Soviet salaries had already been below subsistence levels. In actual fact, salaries often remained the same or were even lower than the Soviet rate. The latter was particularly likely to happen in enterprises in small localities, where all salaries came directly from the treasury of the raion administration.66

Female employees, wherever they worked, were initially discriminated against and paid 20 percent less than males. If they were not married, the rate was 28 percent less. Such discrepancies were new to Soviet citizens, although they were in accordance with the situation in the Reich. At some stage, however, a new law for the "East" made their wages equal to men's wages.67 Employees had no health insurance until late 1942, when small percentages started to be deducted from their wages.68

64 Two journalists from the town-like village (selyshche) Tarashcha checked the situation in offices and factories on 27 November 1942. Nowhere was there a registration system, and lateness was widespread, even among bosses. Vidrodzhennia, 3 December 1942, p. 4. That people hurried to work in the town of Lubny in the 1930s is mentioned in Ternivs'kyi, "Spohady emigranta," p. 10.

65 "Bericht über die Referentenbesprechung," Rivne, 3 October 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 157.

66 An example was the butter factory in Bobrivka in the Polis'ke raion, which employed seven people. Its director complained to the Gebietskommissar in January 1942 that the raion chief had lowered the wages of the director from 850 to 500 roubles, those of the main accountant from 650 to 400, and those of the two guards from 200 to 150. Before 1941, the factory employed forty-one people, including as many as seven accountants and ten (!) guards. DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 22, l. 31.

67 Ukraïns'kyi holos, 5 November 1941, p. 4; Mariia Alekseevna Novitskaia (Ukrainian born in 1896), interview in Russian by the CHFWU, 22 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, ll. 8–11v.

68 There were apparently regional variations. Mayor Maikivs'kyi of Bila Tserkva ordered 3 percent of people's wages to be set aside, while saying that this was in response to a general Reichskommissariat order of 18 June 1942 and an order from the Gebietskommissar of 14 November 1942. Dzvin voli, 29 November 1942, p. 4. The Stadtkommissar of Kherson allowed sick pay amounting to 75 percent of people's wages, for a period of up to three months. In the first half of 1942, 585,000 karbovantsi were paid out this way. TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 76, l. 53v.
The remainder of this chapter will discuss various kinds of people at their places of work: (1) employees in German offices; (2) employees in the "auxiliary" administrations; (3) workers employed in various industries and elsewhere; (4) the private sector; and (5) scientists and scholars.

People who worked in German offices had the best salary and working conditions of all the city-dwellers lucky enough to have a job. The main reason were the meals to which such employees gained access. For instance, while a cleaning woman at the Railroad Administration, based in famine-ravaged Kiev, earned a sub-subsistence salary, she also received a daily meal (millet soup and millet kasha).69 At an office in the same city where medicinal herbs were processed, people frequently received payment in kind such as pumpkin seeds, and also "luxurious" daily meals of dried mushrooms, berries, and millet porridge with cherries. Perhaps as important was the fact that such places of work were heated in the winter.70 A minority, always working in German-run offices, earned salaries that were far above the average for city-dwellers. A specialist at the film studio in Kiev (in Ukrainian: Ukrfil'm) received not only a regular ration (pailok), but also 2,000 karbovantsi.

Meanwhile, German supervisors and colleagues at such institutions were still far better off. Even an ordinary technician at the studio just mentioned received, simply for being German, 22,000 karbovantsi, besides a much higher ration, and of course had access to all "Germans-only" restaurants.71 From 1942 on, there was an unknown number of Polish "guest workers" from the Generalgouvernement in the Reichskommissariat. Two accounts testify that their salaries and rations were, rather surprisingly, at the German level. Thus they could pick

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69 Valentina Pavlivna Kravchenko (Ukrainian born in 1922 in Kiev), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, Ukraine, tape recording.

70 Fesenko, Povest', p. 86.

71 Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 121.
up every week food and even cigarettes and tobacco. Such incentives must have attracted them to the jobs in the "east."

Another relatively privileged category were women who cleaned in German homes. Their official income was low, but again it could be supplemented with a more important meal. Wherever men and women worked, if there was close German supervision, the former were always treated worst. For women, it was rare to receive death threats from their German bosses, but for men they were not uncommon. Eyewitness accounts are rare, but one shows how intimidating such threats must have been. Mykola Kostiuk was a handy middle-aged electrician in Dnipropetrovs'k. Once his German supervisors asked him to prepare a new key.

They said, 'You can make keys, so make one.' They had lost many of them or did not have a lot of them. I asked, 'Will I get a second salary?' He said, 'Yes.' So I thought that was true. But when payment day came, they paid me only for the electric work, not for this. I told [the German], 'I was told that there would be a second salary.' He said, 'Another? Isn't this enough?' I said, 'I was told, I didn't insist on it.' 'Follow me.' And we went. He said, 'Look at that switch.' I looked at it. 'Look at me!' I looked and he was pointing a gun at me. 'Here's your second salary! Do you want it?' Then I got scared.

The editors of the newspapers were scarcely treated any better than the rest of the population. Kiev's Ukrainian and Russian newspapers, Nove ukraïns'ke slovo and Poslednie novosti, were located in the same building as the Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung. An announcement said that only Germans and ethnic Germans were allowed access to the front entrance, forcing

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72 Poles working for German firms in "Russia" had "master" status along with the Germans, according to Gerstenfeld-Maltiel. As a "Polish" person, who pretended to be employed by a German firm, he received the full German ration (the so-called Verpflegung) at train stops. Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, My Private War, p. 249. Another Jewish Holocaust survivor from the Generalgouvernement writes that the salaries of native workers in Dnipropetrovs'k could be raised simply by Polonizing their names—that is, by adding ski or wicz. While natives officially earned about 15 karbowantsi per day, "the imported Poles were paid 150 karbowantzy a day." Moreover, "the Poles and all the other imported foreigners were given German military rations including six German cigarettes per day, while the locals were given a cheaper type of food and kolkhoz-grown makhorka tobacco." Amnon Ajzensztadt, Endurance: Chronicles of Jewish Resistance (Oakville, New York, and London, 1987), pp. 55 and 63. A group of Polish workers arriving in eastern Ukraine is mentioned in Barbara Baratz, Flucht vor dem Schicksal: Holocaust-Erinnerungen aus der Ukraine 1941–1944 (Darmstadt, 1984), p. 123.

73 Khmilev'ska, author interview (referring to her sister).

74 Kostiuk, author interview.
the Ukrainian and Russian journalists to use the back.\textsuperscript{75} The editors had very little room for initiative. Konstantyn Shtepa, who became editor of \textit{Nove ukrain's'ke slovo} under threat of death, apparently did little more than sign articles provided by German propagandists.\textsuperscript{76} Ulas Samchuk, the first editor of the Rivne newspaper \textit{Volyn'}, for a while printed editorials which were widely regarded as covert criticism of German policy. Nazi intelligence came to suspect (wrongly) that he was the leader of the OUN-M in the Volhynia-Podolia Generalbezirk and kept him under arrest for several months.\textsuperscript{77}

In major cities, the "auxiliary" administrations were the biggest employer. Kiev had not only a central Administration of the City of Kiev (Uprava m. Kyieva), but also eleven district (\textit{Rayon, raion}) administrations, which also included the Left-Bank region of Darnytsia and even several villages in the south and southwest. Under Kiev's second German-controlled mayor, Volodymyr Bahazii, the city's \textit{uprava} employed some 20,000 people.\textsuperscript{78} It should be noted that among these thousands were also teachers and many factory workers. By 1 January 1943, the Kiev administration still employed 18,734 people.\textsuperscript{79}

Higher-placed officials were under constant stress. They were constantly supervised and frequently questioned by the Nazi intelligence service. Many officials had to pay regular visits to intelligence offices to talk about their colleagues' thoughts and deeds.\textsuperscript{80} Even Bahazii's

\textsuperscript{75}According to a "source," in USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292537.

\textsuperscript{76}Velychkiiv's'yi, "Sumni chasy [...]," \textit{Vyzvol'nyi shliakh}, XII, 3 (London, 1965), p. 298; Nykon Nemyron [Mykola Andrusiak], "U zbudzenii v ohni stolicy Ukraïny (Slavnii pam'iat muchen'kyiv za Ukraïnu v Kyievi v 1941–42 rr.)," in Marunchak, \textit{V borot'bi za ukrain's'ku derzhavu}, p. 809; John A. Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 3rd ed. (Englewood, Colorado, 1990), p. 80. Earlier, Shtepa was for a while the head of the city administration's Section of Culture and Education (Viddil kul'tury i osvity).

\textsuperscript{77}He was arrested in February 1942 and was released in an amnesty on 20 April 1942, Hitler's birthday. Samchuk, \textit{Na koni voronomu}, pp. 113, 140, 149–155, and 177; \textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 191 (10 April 1942), p. 36.

\textsuperscript{78}Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 165.

\textsuperscript{79}Maliuzhenko, "Kyïv za 1942 r.," pp. 178–181. According to the same source, 19,732 people were employed by the Kiev administration on 1 December 1942.

\textsuperscript{80}For example, Kiev's deputy mayor, Vsevolod Demydovych Volkanovych, who was one of the few who were released after the purge of Mayor Bahazii and his staff in February 1942. Kyslytsia, \textit{Svite iasnyi}, p. 203; editorial note in Liubchenko, \textit{Shchodennyk}, pp. 148–149.
obedient successor as mayor, Leontii Forostivs'kyi, was harassed. In the night of 5 November 1942, he was arrested along with his entire family. They were all released the next day, supposedly because there had been a misunderstanding.81

Each city administration had its own dining room or rooms and controlled much of the food supply to locals in the entire city. In this regard, there was no difference with the Soviet period. The only difference was that during the war years most of these bureaucrats, or upravtsy as Russian speakers might call them, went hungry. In the fall of 1941, those in Kiev felt the impact of the famine, as "now and then" they received no breakfasts or warm meals at all.82 A woman who worked in the administration of Vinnytsia told a Ukrainian employee of Nazi intelligence in 1943 how she tried to make ends meet. She worked eleven hours per day and received a monthly salary of 400 karbovantsi. She also received food cards, for which she could buy 200 grams of bread per day and a little more than 500 grams of grouts per week. Effectively, this meant she ate only once a day. Moreover, she had her old mother to feed.83 Such cases were typical. An employee named Oleksandra Sharandachenko worked as registrar (reiestrator) at the registry office (Biuro metryk, the former Soviet Zags) in one of Kiev's districts in early 1942. She worked until 5 p.m. for 400 roubles per month and received a ration (apparently monthly) of 10 kg. of sugar beets, 4 kg. of jam, 100 g. of sausage, and 100 g. jellied meat. The vice-head of that district (Kurenivka) earned 1,200 roubles. At the district canteen, uprava employees and teachers received a soup devoid of fat, and some nameless substance consisting of beets, carrots, or potatoes—although the latter might run out before


83Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 84–85. The woman was a teacher before 1941. She had been dismissed from her job at a German office after a false accusation of Ukrainian nationalism. That city administration employees were "permanently hungry" is confirmed by an OUN-M member who worked in the Kiev city administration until late February 1942: M. Mykhalevych, "Sorok rokiv tornu....," in Mel'nyk et. al., Na zov Kyieva, p. 217. The average uprava official (sluzhbovets') in Kiev earned 700 to 800 karbovantsi per month, according to Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 105, note of 6 August 1942.
By the end of 1942, most official salaries paid by the Kievan *uprava* were below 500 karbovantsi.\(^8^5\)

At first, Kievan *uprava* employees might receive on an irregular basis slips which authorized them to pick up potatoes or other vegetables—not in the city, but in the countryside. The following scenario was not atypical. Oleksandra Sharandachenko heard in mid-November 1941 that she and her fellow-teachers could pick up a "potato warrant" (*nariad na kartopliu*) at the city's Department of Supplies (*Viddil postachannia*). Just finding out where and how actually to obtain it proved to be a hassle. Eventually, on 9 December, she picked up coupons for her "collective" of teachers from the deputy head of the district administration. On 28 December, she had them authorized at the *Stadtkommissariat*. On 27 January 1942, she went to the Department of Supplies, and after showing the documents, including a statement proving that it was for teachers, she obtained a signature. Only then was she allowed to get the potatoes, which were relatively nearby, in a village 18 kilometers away.\(^8^6\) On 15 February 1942, it was announced that all such "warrants" given out by Ukrainian offices were annulled.\(^8^7\)

The meager salaries and rations of most *uprava* employees led them to demand various forms of "tribute."\(^8^8\) The Kiev administration employed about ten price inspectors, who were supposed to ensure that market prices remained at a "reasonable" level. They worked in pairs. Ivan Maistrenko held this job for a while in early 1942. His experienced partner, an architect by profession, showed him how he "lowered prices" in restaurants: "He started out in a


\(^8^5\)Maliuzhenko, "Kyïv za 1942 r.,” pp. 178–181, gives an average for the city administration of 494 karbovantsi and, for the district administrations, 444 karbovantsi.

\(^8^6\)Sharandachenko, *Reiestratorka zahsu*, pp. 23, 37, 41, 48, and 74.

\(^8^7\)Ibid., p. 82.

monotonous voice, like a sacristan in the church: 'Will you lower the prices? The prices must be lowered. The prices should not be high.' 'Sure, sure, we're lowering them,' the restaurant owner said. He seated us at a table and gave each of us a plate of food.'

Those who had been teachers before 1941 were generally employed. At first these people (generally women) were screened in interviews. Those who were holders of a Soviet prize or whose parents were members of the Communist Party posed a problem. Those who were themselves members of the Communist Party or its youth organization (the Komsomol) were, in accordance with a German order, automatically excluded from teaching. Hence, in Dnipropetrovs'k, no teachers were allowed to work in their profession, unless they had been educated before 1922 and knew the Ukrainian language and literature. Teachers' salaries, like those of others paid by the city administrations, varied from place to place. In Kiev, male teachers received 400 karbovantsi for every 24 hours of teaching, and female teachers 20 percent less. Both groups also received bonuses, depending on overwork or performance. At the Sixth School in Kiev, they also received the following weekly ration: 500 g. of millet, 2 kg. bread, and an unusual 200 g. of meat. In November 1941 all schools were ordered closed, but the ruling from the Reichskommissariat allowed the teachers to receive temporarily 75 percent of their regular wage. These payments were likely suspended in early 1942. At that stage, the uprava or the Germans assigned the teachers other tasks, such as collecting food or clothes or assisting in the process of registering people for work in Germany.

89Maistrenko, Istoriia moho pokolinnia, p. 339.

90Gudzenko-Tyshkova, CHPWU interview, l. 47 (on the school at "25a 1 B. Podval'naia Street"); Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsovodka No 33/68," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 92. Salaries must have varied over time, and the female salaries were probably eventually raised to the male level.

91In the city of Kherson, the payment was continued until late 1942, when an auditor from Rivne banned the practice. This case was probably exceptional. Der Reichskommissar fuer die Ukraine to the Generalkommissar in Mykolaiv, Rivne, 27 November 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 50.

92Gudzenko-Tyshkova, CHPWU interview, l. 47; Bokii, administrator of the Railroad district of Kiev, to Mayor Forostivs'kyi, letter, 12 April 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 1, d. 107, l. 23.
The workers wanted to get to work again as soon as possible in order to make a new and hopefully better living. Most workers in heavy industries were unskilled, since the skilled ones had usually been evacuated. Those who remained behind had been unable or unwilling to join them. Many, if not most, of those who had been offered the chance to evacuate fell into the latter category: they had run off. At the sites of the iron industry in the Dnieper bend, up to eighty percent of the unskilled workers who had worked there before 1941 were available, while in the case of skilled workers and engineers, the percentage was only thirty. As will be recalled from chapter 1, the workers in Kryvyi Rih, the center of the entire Soviet iron industry, had tried to prevent the destruction of the factories. These workers and engineers restored and reopened the plants without any German assistance. What Einsatzgruppe C reported about them in September 1941 held true for all workers—they were "very loyal" (denkbar loyal) and wanted nothing but "to find work again as soon as possible and to get a higher wage."97

Workers were taken on slowly, however. Anybody who hired a worker had to guarantee that the person was reliable and at the very least not a member of the Communist Party or Komsomol. In practice, party or Komsomol membership was often concealed. Moreover, many Germans slowly came to realize that many such members had not joined out of a real conviction. The SD estimated that only 2 to 4 percent of the workers had been "really

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93To define "workers" would be difficult. Eventually, many employees at the "Lenkuznia" (Lenin Forge) were young people who wished to evade deportation to Germany, or accountants and other members of the intelligentsia. Vladimir Grigor’evich Koniushevskii ([Pole?] born in 1907), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 February 1944, [Kiev], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 6v.

94Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 37 (on Kiev); Fevr, Solntse, 196 (on Dnipropetrovsk’i).


97Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 81 (12 September 1941), p. 10.
active" members. Thus, Germans in that initial stage often turned a blind eye to a person's communist past, especially if the man involved had valuable skills. For example, in the city of Dnipropetrovs'k Communists had to wear armbands, but it was possible for one Communist to become the main engineer of the H. Petrovs'kyi Metallurgical Factory. The workers at that factory were "very diligent, reliable, and absolutely loyal to the enterprise." Even more important than a Communist past was one's ethnicity. In one unidentified factory in Kiev, Russians had to wear the letter R and were treated worse than those registered as Ukrainians.

The destruction by the retreating Soviet authorities posed a problem. In Kirovohrad, for example, the large agricultural machine factory "Red Star," which had employed 13,000 workers, was entirely destroyed. Only ten factories in the city were able to start functioning immediately, and they employed only 1,200 people. Even more important than physical damage was the successful Soviet evacuation of machines from factories close to the Dnieper bend. A German engineer found that in some factories where no explosions had taken place, most or even all machines had been removed. He estimated that only 20 percent of the electric motors (Elektromotoren) had remained. Even in Kryvyi Rih, which is more to the west, only fifty of an estimated two thousand motors were present.

On 15 October 1942, a total of 13,258 people were employed in the mining industry in the Dnipropetrovs'k Generalbezirk. This Generalbezirk included almost all cities in the

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98Ibid., p. 9 (estimates also that 10 to 15 percent of the workers had been members); Koniushevskii, CHPWU interview.

99His name was Mykola Stepanovych Orlenko; before 1941, he was a leading mechanic. Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsovdka No 33/68," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 80.

100Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 118 (19 October 1941), p. 3. The prisoners of war there were also working "very well," this report adds. Meanwhile, German engineers were less satisfied. Riedel, "Bergbau- und Eisenhüttenindustrie," p. 252.

101Dina Mironova Pronicheva (Jew born in Chernihiv in 1911), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 24 April 1946, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, l. 127.


Reichskommissariat with heavy industry—Dnipropetrov'sk, Dniprodzerzhyn'sk, Kryvyi Rih, Nikopol', and Pavlohrad. (The other cities were Kiev and Kirovohrad.) Of these native workers, 1,202 were miners and 7,009 were (male) workers doing other tasks (of which 2,626 skilled). The others were women with unknown tasks, probably loading and cleaning (2,300), and prisoners of war (3,346), who likely did the same work as the miners.104

In Kryvyi Rih, there was not much mining during the first year, because most heavy machines had been evacuated and the shafts, conveyors, and electric installations had been blown up. The few machines that did remain were repaired and transported, along with many workers, to Nikopol'. That city on the Dnieper had been the center of the manganese industry in the prewar Soviet Union. Damage there was equally extensive.105 In Kryvyi Rih itself, some iron mining started in late 1942,106 employing less than five thousand natives.107

Yet another major handicap in the reconstruction effort was the sabotage of the Dniprohes dam. But because initially the Nazi leadership was convinced that Ukraine should be reserved for agriculture, there was little interest in repairing the dam. Hence, it was not until January 1943 that it was restored. From then on it supplied electricity to area on both sides of the Dnieper bend, as well as to the Donbas in the military zone.108 Besides the damage, the

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104Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 17. The calculation in this report must contain a mistake somewhere, for when all categories are added, the total is 13,257, not 13,258.


107Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 17 (provides the number of 4,485). At that stage, the 192 who worked underground still did nothing but cleaning and preparing.

Soviet evacuation, and the initial lack of interest in "Russian" industry, another reason for the delays were the round-ups of people for work in Germany.109

The Germans concentrated their efforts on manganese extraction in Nikopol'. People were simply rounded up from the countryside for work. Meanwhile, the region was apparently declared off-limits for worker round-ups destined for Germany.110 Many laborers escaped but were caught again. On 15 November 1942, the Nikopol' site formally employed 7,738 miners (2,321 underground and 5,417 above ground). According to Nazi intelligence, one in five was ill, mainly because they received little food and lacked proper shoes.111 By late December 1942, these laborers had extracted about half of the annual peacetime Soviet production. In the last half of that year alone, they extracted well over Germany's total needs.112

Work in the metallurgical plants was not substantive in nature. At Dnipropetrovs'k's Petrovs'kyi Factory, civilian workers and prisoners of war initially were preoccupied with gathering leftover metal and equipment, much of which was then sent to the Reich. By early 1942, they were repairing caterpillar tractors and tanks.113 At the Comintern Metallurgical Factory in the same city, leftovers were turned into tinplate.114 In several places, ammunition

110Riedel, "Bergbau- und Eisenhüttenindustrie," p. 266.
111Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), pp. 18 and 20. According to "Lagebericht für die Monate Januar und Februar 1943," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 640, there was among the workers "general complaining because of bad footwear and bad clothing."

This report also notes "a high number of breaches of discipline, breaking of labor contracts, and flights." That was no major change, however. The civilian Nazi administrators complained from the very beginning that the population of Ukraine, both workers and peasants, was not very eager to work. See the reports at TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, li. 191, 204, 212, and 236.

112Namely, 128.6 percent. Riedel, "Bergbau- und Eisenhüttenindustrie," p. 272; Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft, Vol. 1, p. 470. Although both sources speak of the extraction of half of the annual Soviet production, the numbers they provide differ. According to Riedel, 642,000 ton was extracted by late December 1942; according to Eichholtz, only 125,700 ton. Cf. Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, p. 109, which gives the percentage of 126.6 for the second half of 1942, as compared to 40 percent for the period July through December 1941, and 112.7 percent for the period January through June 1943.

113Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsovdka No 33/68," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 81.
114Ibid.
industry was developed, after Hitler ordered the start of this so-called Iwan-Programm in April 1942. The German firm Dynamit Nobel AG, for example, was co-owner of the Metallurgical Plant in Zaporizhzhia. Apparently even more than in construction and in the metal industry, many of the workers were women.115

Kiev had several large metal-processing factories. Initially, the seventeen largest were controlled by the Generalkommissar, but by early 1942 at the latest the Stadtkommissar supervised them. Among them were several that retained their old name: the "Bolshevik" factory, the "Lenkuznia" (Lenin Forge), and the "Sport" factory. Only a few shops in each factory operated.116 Most seem to have done repairs; train wagons at the "Bolshevik."117 The "Lenkuznia," among other things, repaired anti-aircraft guns and produced furniture for its German director.118

Industrial wages in the Soviet period had been very low. For example, a metal worker in Dnipropetrovsk reported that he used to earn 300 roubles per month, claiming that was not even enough for a pair of boots. Such workers assumed that under the Germans life could only get better. Older workers especially remembered that before the Bolshevik revolution a metal worker's salary bought him three pairs of boots.119 But the hopes were quickly dashed. The


117"Unternehmungen" (see preceding note); "Razvedovat. [sic] svodka n. 29 po sostojaniu na 16/XII. 42 g.," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 29.

118Before 1941, the "Lenkuznia" used to make steamboats, steam-engines, and boilers for the river fleet. Under the Germans, it made castings for railroads and did repairs similar to those at the "Bolshevik," until May 1942, when it became part of the Vienna-based firm "Usma," together with two other Kievan factories and the shipyard. From then on, the "Lenkuznia" produced cast-iron ovens, turned cars into gas generators, and repaired anti-aircraft guns. Nadezhda Petrovna Konashko (Ukrainian born in 1913), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, ll. 2–3; Burdeniuk, Sekretar' Kyivs'koho obkomu KP/b/U, "Politinformatsiia na 10 hrudnia 1943 roku," 15 December 1943, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 633, ll. 32–33.

hourly wage officially ranged from 0.70 rouble, for unschooled workers aged 17 or less, to 2.50 roubles, for master workers. The Reichskommissariat rules allowed for bonuses and subtractions depending on performance.\footnote{Der Reichskommissar für die Ukraine, IIb/d/41, "Anordnung zur Regelung der Lohn- und Arbeitsbedingungen gewerblicher Arbeitskräfte," Rivne, 1 December 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 111, ll. 28–29v. There are virtually no reliable data to allow any comparison with the pre-1941 wages. Before 1941, a metallurgical worker in Ukraine apparently earned 500 to 600 roubles per month, before the subtraction of taxes and "voluntary" state bonds and memberships. Stephen Protsiuk, "Labor Conditions in the Metallurgical Industry of Ukraine," \textit{Ukrainian Quarterly}, VI, 1 (New York, 1950), p. 41. See also V. Ost [pseud.], \textit{Repatriiastia} (Germany, 1946), pp. 62–65.}

Moreover, the food the workers received at the workplace was inadequate. At first the rations were good enough, to attract enough workers for heavy physical tasks such as loading. But that soon changed. A boiler-maker at the "Ganebek" firm in Kiev earned per day 2 Reichsmarks (20 karbovantsi), plus twelve times per month 200 g. bread. The meal was a watery soup (balanda) with a sausage.\footnote{Iablonskii, CHPWU interview, l. 1.} In the "Lenkuznia," a trained engineer was degraded to a position in the foundry's laboratory simply because she was a woman. She earned per month 700 karbovantsi, a millet ration (4 kg.), and sometimes sugar. The two meals consisted of millet (for dinner [obed]) and millet porridge (for supper).\footnote{Konashko, CHPWU interview, ll. 2–3.}

In 1942, the salary and food situation improved somewhat. In Dnipropetrov'sk, at least, the factory directors at some stage tried to ease the situation by organizing barter with peasants. Cars and boats, in the case of the Molotov Factory, were sent out into the countryside to purchase food for consumer goods such as nails, spare parts for carts, cutlery, cooking pots, shovels, and hooks.\footnote{Riedel, "Bergbau- und Eisenhüttenindustrie," pp. 265–266.}

What was these people's work on the shop floor like? It should be stressed that some things remained the same as before 1941. Mutual spying and denunciation were not daily phenomena, but remained widespread. Workers denounced for example former members of...
the NKVD-controlled extermination battalions. The threat of harsh penalties for various offenses also remained. The "Lenkuznia" had a detention room where people could be kept for 24 hours, as well as a fifteenth shop in the Luk"ianivs'ka prison where offenders were penalized with mysterious and probably gruesome tasks.

At the same time, it was in the discipline and general atmosphere that the biggest changes occurred. For one, the amount of directives on how to make things, and of which quality, was much less than in the Soviet period, to the workers' great surprise. Most importantly, there was now the official threat of corporal punishment. As at other kinds of workplaces, it was applied frequently, even for simple matters such as not understanding an order. The German director of the "Lenkuznia" "often beat the workers," a woman worker recalled in 1944. "He often threw them on the floor and started to trample and batter them. These people could not get away. He would come, find somebody who was sitting and not working, and start beating."

Sometimes the beatings deliberately were turned into spectacles. First an announcement would be made, telling people to assemble. In the "Lenkuznia," this was done two or three times during the entire period of German rule. Soon after taking control, its general director (a man called Rentel) ordered all employees to gather in the mechanical shop to watch a beating. The victim was a skilled worker in his fifties who had been caught stealing gasoline. He was undressed and beaten. The ten blows—twenty had been announced—with a stick were dispensed by a former Communist party member, a man called Muzyra. Interestingly, no

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124 Koniushevskii, CHPWU interview, l. 6. This worker, a former extermination battalion member, was himself subjected to denunciations.

125 Ibid., ll. 7–7v. He told the person(s) interviewing him, "I am not going to tell you what kind of shop this was. If any of the workers committed an offense, Rentel or his deputy sentenced them to that fifteenth shop."

126 Konashko, CHPWU interview, l. 2v.

127 As reported about Kiev by a "source" in USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frames E292537–538.

128 Konashko, CHPWU interview, l. 2v. The man was called Schmidt.
German was present. On another occasion, this same Muzyra and a guard publicly beat up four teenagers for undisciplined behavior. Every shop master and shop head had the right to beat workers. At this factory they apparently did not exercise it, but at Kiev's "Ganebek" firm at least one shop head did.

Unpleasant as these beatings were, for many industrial workers in Kiev there was altogether less supervision than before 1941. In this regard, these workers were exceptional, for supervision was intense at the sites of the mining and armaments industry (even though those too had no German workers). In the "Lenkuznia," few Germans were actually stationed in the factory and those who were present rarely came out of their offices. "In this regard, we felt free," recalled engineer Nadiia Petrivna Konashko in 1944 to the Commission on the History of the Patriotic War in Ukraine. Her colleague Vladimir Koniushevskii agreed: "To work in our factory was a blessing [blagodat'], because these were all our own people [svoi], Russians. Almost everybody who worked in the 'Usma' administration [a Viennese firm which controlled the place from May 1942] had worked there before. They ruled as they wanted." The absence of Germans meant that people could work slowly without being incited to work harder, that they had the chance to steal (aluminum parts, coal, or melias), and that it was easy to just leave. In the "Lenkuznia," work was officially from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., but Germans generally visited only between 9:00 and 11:00 a.m. As a result, the only thing keeping the worker on the job was the mid-day meal. "As soon as the workers had eaten, they took off [smyvalis]," recalled Koniushevskii. "No matter how many guards they placed, no matter how they searched for how the workers got out, they found nothing." He even says

129Ibid.; Koniushevskii, CHPWU interview, l. 7.

130Konashko, CHPWU interview, l. 2v.

131Iablonskii, CHPWU interview, l. 3. The shop head was a local cobbler.

132Konashko, CHPWU interview, ll. 2–3; Koniushevskii, CHPWU interview, l. 7v.
that of the two hundred foundry workers, usually only about eighty were on the job, although this likely describes only the situation from the middle of 1942.\textsuperscript{133}

The situation was similar in the "Ganebek" firm, where there were no skilled Germans either. Although the work lasted officially from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. (and later 8:00 p.m.), people left, and were not arrested for this. A boiler-maker named Vasyl' Iablons'kyi recalled in 1944 how "the absentee policy was such that one could still live a life."\textsuperscript{134} The "Sport" factory, which before 1941 produced sports equipment and beds, by early 1943 retained very few workers. As Kuznetsov noticed, they tended to exchange gossip in a corner, "while one of them hammered on a piece of iron to let the boss know what effort they were putting into their jobs. They would tinker with all sorts of junk, mending some things, breaking others. Everybody was working for himself and went away with cigarette-lighters, buckets and pans to use in barter."\textsuperscript{135} At the "Artem" factory in Kiev were Dutchmen, who treated female drawers they supervised well, and even several marriages came about. Here work lasted from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 or 6:00 p.m.\textsuperscript{136}

The situation in what may be broadly termed the light industry of central Ukraine started off rather differently. "While the roar of the battles had not yet faded, as soon as the Germans showed up, the workers and employees of the factories crept out of the holes where they had been hiding from the Bolsheviks, as deserters, and gathered for the reconstruction of their factories. The German commissars watched and wondered, where is all this coming from?"\textsuperscript{137} This is how Fedir Pihido describes the situation at the sugar refineries. Many of these were actually in town-like villages. Many had been destroyed, but most were

\textsuperscript{133}Koniushevskii, CHPWU interview, II. 4–7v. The SD was well aware of the thefts in Kiev's factories; see Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 163 (2 February 1942), pp. 9–10.

\textsuperscript{134}Iablonskii, CHPWU interview, I. 2v.

\textsuperscript{135}A. Anatoli (Kuznetsov) [Anatolii Kuznetsov], Babi Yar: A Document in the Form of a Novel (London, 1970), 363; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 368. Kuznetsov's mother, a teacher by profession, was a cleaner and messenger there.

\textsuperscript{136}Khmilevs'ka, author interview.

reconstructed within months, with only partial German assistance. This was possible because many employees had hidden machines and machine parts (possibly following Soviet orders), which they now uncovered from wells, ponds, among scrap-iron, or from cases buried in the ground. The same seems to have occurred with other light industrial sites.

New professional associations were created about which little is known. A new association of engineers (Tovarystvo Inzheneriv) in Kiev and surroundings received a ten-year lease of the cement factories, the ceramics factory, and about ten brick-roof factories in the countryside. Most operated normally by 1942, without any German involvement. Association member Pihido directed three brick-roof factories on the Dnieper bank.138

Thirty-three "metalworking" factories were functioning in Kiev under the supervision of the city administration. The city also boasted fourteen "metalworking" cooperatives, and seven other factories or units which were in various hands, such as the Polytechnical Institute (discussed below) and an apparently major cooperative called "Kievsoiuz." All these native-supervised factories made things like spoons, nails, plows, instruments, and pocket knives.139

Kiev and other cities had many cooperatives, but it remains unclear in which activities they were involved. The major cooperative in the Reichskommissariat with semi-legal status—that is, existing in all but its initial name—was the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Society (Vukoopspilka). Its main activity appears to have been that of a mediator in the barter between peasants (supplying produce) and Germans (supplying objects such as tools). According to the Ostministerium official, Otto Brüutigam, "the amount of agricultural produce seized by the Cooperative Society for the Germans in 1943 was very significant."140

The city administration also supervised most working food-production factories. By late 1941, thirty-two were reportedly making bread, wine, sausages, plant oil, and also a host

138Ibid., pp. 143–144 and 155. The factories were in Staiky (Kaharlyk), Khalep"ia (Obukhiv), and Rzhyschchiv (Rzhyschchiv) in the present-day Kiev oblast.

139"Unternehmungen der Metallbearbeitungs-Sektion der Abteilung für Industrie," USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frames 418565–570.

of other wares such as cigarettes. At the time, twenty-four others were not operating, including five of Kiev's six bread factories. Of the other working food factories, two were headed by the "Mukomol" company (flour production), one by "Vlasna pomich" (Self-help, an ice-production company), seven by the cooperative "Vil'na Ukraina" (Free Ukraine; pasties, kvass, and mineral water), and one by a cooperative of disabled people (sausages, non-alcoholic beverages, wine, cakes, and pastries).141

As to the working conditions in these places, a day in the life of Anatolii Kuznetsov was not untypical. He was responsible for loading pumpkins at the canning factory in Kiev. The work started at 7:00 a.m. and lasted officially twelve hours, with a break for a meal in the canteen, and a search at the exit. Once the foreman (master) caught Kuznetsov stealing. "He beat me so viciously, with such a professional touch, holding me firmly by the shoulder, punching me in my ribs and my back, that my little head nearly came off."142 Otherwise, nothing is known about these food factories, and one wonders if they even continued to exist after 1941.

Indeed, major obstacles to such light industry appeared. There was always the risk of German intervention, with tragic results. In one case, the director of a sugar factory sent molasses to the black market. Nazi intelligence officers, convinced that he sabotaged the sugar and was anti-German, hanged him in the factory yard.143 Moreover, Germans began themselves to expropriate the raw materials they were supposed to process and sent them to Germany. As a result, textile, soap, leather, and wool factories had to stop production altogether.144 The German Army often took control of the reconstructed enterprises, if only

141 "Unternehmungen der Nahrmitte-Sektion," USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frames 418576-581.

142 Anatoli (Kuznetsov), Babi Yar, p. 288; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 290.

143 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 183 (20 March 1942), p. 10. The report gives the place as "Korowinze," in the Zhytomyr Commander Unit (Kommandeurbereich Shitomir), but I was unable to establish its location.

144 Ibid., 107 (8 October 1941), p. 15. To some extent this explains the virtual absence of light industry in the Rivne region, but the main reason was the Jewish Holocaust. V. A. Begma et al., report to Khrushchev and Strokach, 25 May 1943, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 16, l. 27.
because many Germans were convinced that the Ukrainians lacked the qualifications to lead any of them. Eventually, by early 1943 all light industry had come under direct German control. In Staiky, for example, most enterprises then were supervised by a brutish SS official who forced peasants to work. As Pihido recalls, "His baton and heavy fist became renowned in the entire region."

Aside from heavy and light industry, there were other places where people did manual labor. Police round-ups for the reconstruction of Dnieper bridges and other damaged open-air sites in Kiev took place regularly from at least mid-November 1941. In January 1942 some 1,600 natives worked on the reconstruction of a car bridge, alongside 2,440 Germans. Meanwhile, 1,840 men worked at the railroad bridge, and 132 women at the construction of an anti-ice dam along the railroad track. The railroad was consistently one of the biggest German employers, but few workers seemed to have appreciated working for it. In Pechanivka (Dzerzhyns’k raion, then called Romaniv), in early 1942, railroad workers rarely showed up for work, but this must have changed after Germans hanged two of them as a warning on 12 March. By January 1943, at least 300,000 natives (probably including prisoners of war) were employed by the railroad. Most positions involved manual labor, not the least of which was adjusting the railroad track to the central and western European—narrower—width. They received little or no food and earned a pittance, in some places no more than 200 karbovantsi.

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145 Ortwin Buchwender, Das tödende Erz: deutsche Propaganda gegen die Roten Armee im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart 1978), p. 318; Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 107 (8 October 1941), p. 14. The last source says that experiments, apparently held in Berdychiv, where natives were allowed to direct enterprises were "a total failure."

146 Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 163. The man’s name was Pianowski.

147 [Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu, pp. 14, 24, and 43.

148 "Lagebericht für Januar 1942," TsDAVOW, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 36. The reports adds that the people received soup, bread, and coffee and, on an individual basis, bonus rations.


150 Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsovodka No 33/68," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 85; Savchenko, VIIO NKVD USSR, to Khrushchev, "Razvedsovodka No 11: O polozhenii v okkupirovannoi protivnikom Vinnitskoi oblasti po sostoianiiu na 30. 9. 42g.,” 16 October 1942,
There was also a legal and semi-legal private sector in many urban areas. A good example were
the private hairdressers. There were also private bars (budky), which sold spirits and lard,
and restaurants, although the best of the latter were invariably only for Germans. The bars
and teahouses were often in cellars. A visitor from the Generalgouvernement described those in
Dnipropetrovs'k as "filthy" and what passed for tea as "coloured water to which some suspect
ingredients had been added." Restaurant owners in Kiev were often Ukrainian or from the
Caucasus region. Because of the high prices they were able to charge—in April 1942, a meal
there cost 30 roubles—these owners apparently became wealthy. It seems all restaurants
were closed in September 1942, although probably not for long.

Other than the stores where only Germans could buy, there were also several private
stores. They sold things such as icons, crosses, paint, door knobs, glass jars, and toys. One
store in Kiev offered Ukrainian embroidered shirts, rather popular among Germans, which
were made by women who received cloth and threads to sow at home. For one finished shirt,
such women received money worth the equivalent of several cups of millet and ten potatoes.

There were also many second-hand book stores.

TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 21. The number of employees comes from "Lagebericht für die
Monate Januar und Februar 1943," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 640.

151 Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsovdka No 33/68," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 89.

152 Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsovdka no. 11," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, ll. 21–22;
Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 44–45.

153 Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, My Private War, p. 212. In Kiev in November 1941, a western Volhynian
visitor saw an Armenian-owned bar in a basement. Its "coffee" only vaguely resembled the real
thing, while the food "tasted like sugar beets." Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 43.


155 Kabaida, "1941," p. 50; Nartova diary, l. 9; Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 121. One source says
that restaurants and bars did not operate in early 1942, but does not say what the situation was
before then: Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsovdka No 33/68," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d.
124, l. 89.

156 Strokach and Martynov, "Dokladnaia zapiska 'O torgovle na okkupirovannoi territorii Ukrainy'
Po sostoianiu na 29 Ianvaria 1943 g.,” TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, ll. 72–73 (on Kiev and
Zaporizhzhia); Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 44.

157 Fesenko, Povest’, p. 84.
Artisans and photographers were officially regulated, but in reality their work was virtually privatized. Unlike all other manual laborers, Germans gave them favorable attention, or to be more precise, did not obstruct them from working. Even Jews were initially not prevented from running a store. Restrictions gradually increased, however. In Vinnytsia in mid-1943, a shoemaker officially needed written permission from the Gebietskommissar to accept any task. In reality, artisans only worked for payment in kind. A man who processed films in Kiev for a German clientele recalled later that "the artisans did not have it all that bad—the barbers, shoemakers, and so on. Those without a gesheft [i.e., Geschäft, German for business] of their own lived badly." De facto privatization also took place in the medical profession. Patients had to pay for virtually everything. The former Soviet socialized health care system, which had already been corrupt before the war, became virtually indistinguishable from "real" private doctors, of which there were many. Particularly well-off were the specialists, who also treated Germans. One doctor in Kiev told Soviet historians the following rates for "non-private" health care. For a visit to a polyclinic, a patient paid 3 karbovantsi; for transport to a hospital 50 karb.; for a stay of one day in the hospital from 5 (in a raion hospital) to 15 or 25 karb. (in a city hospital). Most expensive was the actual work of the doctor or specialist, 1,200 and 1,600 karbovantsi, respectively. In reality, these rates may well have been much higher. Patients, moreover, had to bring basically everything with them—sheets, medicine (perhaps obtained from the German

158Dallin, German Rule, pp. 397–398.

159On 9 March 1942, the Army Commander Ukraine (Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Ukraine, i.e., Lieutenant General Hans Kitzinger) noted that many German soldiers bought things in these Jewish stores, and ordered them to stop doing so. "Besondere Anordnungen Nr. 47," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 72, l. 24.

160Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 76.

161Ukrains'kyi holos, 28 March 1943, p. 4.

162Aleksei Mikhailovich Bashkulat (Ukrainian born in 1909), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 28 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 43.

163Kravchenko, author interview. Cf. Iu. N. Kvinitskii-Ryzhov, "Iz istorii zdravookhraneniiia v Kieve," pp. 63–64, which denies, implausibly, that private practise existed, after an effort by two surgeons in the fall of 1941 failed.
pharmacy with the help of ethnic German acquaintances), bandages, cotton wadding, ether for anesthesia, food, and in the winter even a heating device. The situation was particularly difficult for city-dwellers, who had little access to food. In Kiev, it was not uncommon to see "rows of people in dressing gowns, with their hands out, asking passers-by for food."  

Although most scientists and scholars had been evacuated from Kiev during the Soviet retreat, a good number remained. Of the middle- and lower-ranking staff of the institutes and the university, basically all stayed behind. Before 1941, the scientists and scholars had been among the privileged elements in Soviet society. Yet even they found it difficult to make ends meet. After overtime pay, a forty-percent deduction for taxes, compulsory state bonds, "voluntary" membership dues of associations, rent, heating, and light were all taken into account, a scientist was left with only 770 roubles to live on for a month. Meanwhile, for a "specialist" after such deductions only 534 roubles remained. How little this was can be understood when Soviet food and consumer prices are taken into account. For example, a kg. of meat cost 10 roubles; a kg. butter—28 roubles, a kg. sugar—5 roubles, men's shoes—120 roubles. Thus, with the German arrival, scientists and scholars hoped that their standard of living would rise.

164Iu. Iu. Kramarenko, "Politika nemetskikh okkupantov na Ukrainе — v Kieve v oblasti zdravookhraneniia," TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, II. 92—94, which is a copy of the original in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) in Moscow, where it is held at f. 7021, op. 65, d. 5, II. 77—78; Liubchenko, "Shchodyennyk," Novi dni, III, 26 (March 1952), p. 17; ibid., III, 27 (April 1952), p. 3. For two other descriptions of the health system in Kiev, see Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 229—230 and Professor N. A. Shepelevskii, "Prebyvanie nemtsev v Kieve," typewritten document, signed, TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, II. 57—58.

The city of Kherson appears to have been an exception, for it officially only charged money (20 karbovantsi daily) to those not living in that city. TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 76, l. 52v.

165Shepelevski, "Prebyvanie," TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, l. 57.

166For names regarding Kiev, see Ihor Verba, "Sproby vidnovlennia Ukrains'koï Akademii Nauk u Kyievi (kinets' 1941 — seredyna 1942 rr.)," Ukrains'kyi istoryk, XXXII, 1—4 (124—127) (New York, 1995), pp. 88—89. Although the author does not say so, almost the entire text of this article was published earlier as I. Verba, "Storinki istoryi Ukrains'koï Akademii Nauk v nimets'kii okupatsii (kinets' 1941 — pochatok 1942 rr.)," Rozbudova derzhavy, 3 (34) (Kiev, March 1995), pp. 45—50.

167T. S., "Working Conditions of Scientists and Specialists in Soviet Ukraine," Ukrainian Quarterly, V, 3 (New York, 1949), pp. 261—271. This study is based on a survey conducted among "displaced persons" in 1946 and 1947 by the author, a former professor of economics in
Such hopes were quickly disappointed. In fact, the new German authorities seemed intent on obstructing the work of these people in every possible way. Hitler fully agreed, for he was against "founding [sic!] a university in Kiev." At that university, no classes were ever allowed and in February 1942, the institution was officially liquidated and its buildings looted. The closure was in accordance with a decree passed for the entire Reichskommissariat that closed all institutes of higher education, while reorganizing some of their departments for the teaching of "practical" subjects—medical science, veterinary medicine, forestry, applied physics, and agricultural and technical subjects. In the spring of 1942, a group of medical professors in Kiev obtained permission to reopen the Medical Faculty, but it is unclear what that actually meant in practice.

The situation in Dnipropetrovs'k was similar. Initially, the military authorities allowed the start of the academic year at the university, which now incorporated Medical, Agricultural, and Veterinary Institutes. But when Einsatzgruppe C arrived, it banned all lectures and thus virtually strangled university life. Nevertheless, activities apparently did not grind to a halt.


169 Acting Generalkommissar Quitzrau to Koch, letter, Kiev, 21 January 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 8; Grun'skii, CHPWU interview, ll. 1–2. Konstantyn Shiepa was president (rektor) of the university according to two sources: Vladimir Mikhailovich Artobolevskii (Russian born in 1874), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 and 25 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 34; and Nemyron, "U zbudzhenni v ohni stolytsi Ukraïny," in Marunchak, V borot'bi za ukraïns'ku derzhavu, p. 808. Cf. Grun'skii, CHPWU interview, according to which the first university president was one Hruzyns'kyi ("Gruzinskii"), who was succeeded by a professor of Russian linguistics called Holub.

170 The 4 February 1942 decree was preceded by an Ostministerium order for the Reichskommissariat Ukraine of 21 January 1942 to the same effect. Ostministerium to Erich Koch, copy of letter, Berlin, 21 January 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 23, ll. 6–7.

171 Bogatyrychuk, Moi zhiznennyi put', pp. 135 and 141. Another source says that a medical institute was functioning, with intervals. Artobolevskii, CHPWU interview, l. 34.

172 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 132 (12 November 1941), pp. 12–13; Brüttigam, Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete, p. 74. Brüttigam based his account on "the report of a Ukrainian professor from Dnipropetrovs'k." Incorrect is the statement in one semi-official OUN-M source that this university operated with seven faculties and instructed over 3,200 students. OUN u viini 1939–1945 ((n.p., n.d.)), pp. 86–87.
Apart from the universities, Soviet Ukraine had an academy of sciences that was largely devastated during the 1930s by the NKVD terror. Under the Germans, at some time in late 1941, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was renewed. The initiative apparently came from Mayor Bahazii and a self-proclaimed Presidium headed by the chemist and pre-1941 akademik V. O. Plotnikov. The academy faced the problem how to obtain actual members. The Germans recognized as full members only those who had been elected as such in the Soviet Union. Only three were left, however; Plotnikov, Shaposhnikov and Lysenko. Therefore the academy organizers tried to hold secret new elections, but the secret was quickly disclosed, after which the Germans must have annulled them.

The staff at the various institutes of the Academy received a salary, rations in the distribution room of the city uprava, and products from a cooperative run by the city administration. This relatively tolerable situation was quickly eradicated by the civilian Nazi authorities in the person of the acting Generalkommissar, S. A. Brigade-Führer I. Quitzrau. In late January 1942, he declared the Academy closed ("conserved" was the official formulation), briefly arrested its Ukrainian nationalist secretary Chudinov (a doctor of mathematics), and proclaimed that he wanted 75 percent of the staff to go to Germany and study there. The scientists received the same message that month in letters from a certain von Franke, who was Stadtkommissar Rogausch's political "expert" (Referent). The only scientific institutes von Franke wanted in Kiev were institutes of practical military importance. The uprava's Culture and Education Department pointed out that the staff of the institutes worked for free and that the


174Iuriy Mikhailovich Markovskii (Ukrainian born in 1904), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 12 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, ll. 16–16v.

175As testified by Mykola Kuz'myych Hruns'kyi, a newly elected akademik who headed the "Historical-Philological Department" of the academy from 15 November 1941, while retaining his pre-1941 position as professor at the Chair of Ukrainian Philology at Kiev University. Hruns'kyi to Mayor Forostivs'kyi, letter, Kiev, 22 April 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, l. 76.

176Quitzrau to Koch, Kiev, 21 January 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 8; Polons'ka-Vasyleno, Ukraїns'ka Akademiiia Nauk, Vol. 2, p. 64; Markovskii, CHPWU interview, l. 16v. The real Generalkommissar, Waldemar Magunia, arrived only on 13 February 1942. Poslednie novosti, 16 February 1942, 1.
city administration could take care of the buildings, but these arguments were in vain. The scientists were apparently not deported and many kept showing up for work, although they received no more rations or food from the uprava, and were basically on their own.

Kiev's large Polytechnical Institute shared this fate. This was a large institution apart from both the university and the academy. Under the Germans it initially had eight faculties, two hundred professors, six hundred senior lecturers (dotsenty) and assistants, and also many laboratory workers. Former dotsent, now professor, Mykola Velychkivs'kyi was the rektor. (He also headed the Institute of Economics, Statistics, and Geography of the Academy of Sciences, and, as noted in chapter 2, the Ukrainian National Council.) None of these people received a salary. Some money was acquired by selling salt at the market. The institute was officially closed in February 1942, but well before then its activities were obstructed. For instance, early one morning in late 1941, Germans arrived in several cars at the laboratories of the chemical faculty and proceeded to destroy everything inside. When an assistant protested, one of the Germans grabbed her by the neck and threatened her with a revolver. He also shouted that none of the onlookers could ever demand anything from a German officer.

Dnipropetrov'sk also still had a Polytechnical Institute. This was the place where all the staff members of seven institutes of higher education and research institutes in the city who had not been deported or evacuated by the Soviet authorities gathered. Initially, it had about 260 people on its staff, including twelve professors and eight lecturers. When civilian Nazi rule arrived, the staff was officially decreased to just over a hundred people, ruled by a curator. For about three months, lectures were given, but then they were banned. The instructors then resorted to holding seminars, which subsequently were banned as well. Then individual

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178Hruns'kyi to Forostivs'kyi, letter, Kiev, 22 April 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, l. 76.

tutoring started until it too was banned. From then on, the only activity at this Polytechnical Institute was technical work.  

The Medical Institute in Kiev was allowed to reopen and accept students in early 1942. More than 2,000 enrolled. In the summer of that year, however, most of them were sent to work in the countryside. Its director, Professor Oleksii Savych Lazorenko, at some stage was killed by the SD. The Pedagogical Institute incorporated upon German order some of the former staff of the university and the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogy (UNDIP). Its director spent the winter of 1941–1942 in the secretary's room, where burning classics of Marxism-Leninism provided some warmth. The institute was closed on 18 September 1942. The Germans who came to announce the closure simply ordered everybody to clear out within fifteen minutes.

The only scientists who retained a place to work were those who could show they were economically useful. Primary among them were the agronomists. They worked mostly in the centers of the districts and raions, but also at the Generalbezirk level in Kiev, at the Reichskommissariat's Ukrainian Agricultural Office (Ukrainisches Landwirtschaftliches Büro; Ukraïns'ke sil's'ko-hospodars'ke biuro). By mid-1943, Kiev housed seventeen research institutes relating to cultivation, exploitation, and animal husbandry. Among them were a Regional Institute for Economic Research and Regional Studies (Landesinstitut für

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180Bräutigam, Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete, pp. 74–75, based on "the report of a Ukrainian professor from Dnipropetrovs'k."

181There will be more about this institute and the students' subsequent fate in chapter 11.


183Kyslytsia, Svitiasnyi, p. 197. The director was Vayl' P. Zavitnevych. Mayor Bahazii had been a doctoral candidate (aspirant) at this institute (besides a lecturer at Kiev University). Grun'skii, CHPWU interview, I. 4.

184Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 126. The institute existed until 1 September 1942, according to a report by the city administration's Department of Schools (Sektiiia shkil), Kiev, 10 November 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 18–21.

185It was led by SS-Untersturmführer August Klockow and was located at 6 Khreshchatyk. Note from manager (Geschäftsführer) Kyrlova, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 85, II. 77–78; USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frames 419656 and 1418807.
Wirtschaftsforschung und Landeskunde), a Regional Institute for Chemistry and Chemical Technology, and a Geological Institute. In addition, there were ten other institutes in Dnipropetrovsk, Iakymivka, Kherson, Sarny, and Uman.\textsuperscript{186} The working conditions were apparently very difficult, with much German obstruction and deliberate destruction.\textsuperscript{187}

The academic, medical, and technical libraries in Kiev were all looted and the books that remained were united at one location. Initially, the Germans had been surprised to find women in Ukraine doing traditional male, physical work, but they quickly accepted it. As a result, the librarians, who were usually women, had to do the moving of the books. They "either carried the books in parcels themselves or carried them on wheelbarrows."\textsuperscript{188}

Finally, among the city-dwellers were scholars in the humanities. Considering the Nazis's generally negative view of Slavs, it is not surprising that these scholars were rarely employed in their profession. (Writers and artists will be briefly discussed in chapter 7.) Some of them prepared reports for the German authorities, mainly Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (to be precise, its "Special Staff on Science," Sonderstab Wissenschaft). These reports dealt with themes such as, "Ukraine as Germany's Ancestral Homeland" (by Mykhailo

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186\textit{See the list by Koch's deputy Dargel in Blanka Jerabek, \textit{Das Schulwesen und die Schulpolitik im Reichskommissariat Ukraine 1941–1944: im Lichte deutscher Dokumente} (Munich, 1991), pp. 108–109. The economist Svitozar M. Drahomanov, a son of the famous historian Mykhailo Drahomanov, worked at the institute for economic research and regional studies, which he called the "Institute of Regional Studies and Economic Research of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine." Letter to Mayor Forostiv's'kyi, 20 October 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 1, d. 108, ll. 14–14v. According to this letter, Drahomanov also wrote articles for Ukrainian newspapers in Berlin. There was apparently also an Institute of Experimental Medicine, organized by native scientists, which experimented on animals and was headed by Dr Fefir P. Bohatyrchuk. See Bogatyrchuk, \textit{Moi zhizhennyi put'}, p. 141. On events at the former Institute of Hydrobiology, see Markovskii, CHPWU interview, ll. 17–17v and 18v.\textsuperscript{187}

187Some more examples: the carefully preserved materials at the Mining Institute in Dnipropetrovsk were destroyed. Prof. Paul W. Thomson, 19 October 1942, in \textit{Trial of the Major War Criminals}, Vol. 25 (Nuremberg, 1949), p. 344. The Physiological Laboratory of the University of Kiev was destroyed. Shepelevski, "Prebyvanje," TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, l. 61. Books were thrown out of the former residence of the presidium of the Academy of Sciences when the German police occupied it. Khoroshunova, "Kievskie zapiski," p. 302. Germans occupying part of the Humanities building of the academy threw books and manuscripts out the window. Grun'skii, CHPWU interview.\textsuperscript{188}

188\textit{Artobolevskii, CHPWU interview, ll. 16–18 and 21 (quotation from 21); Novitskaia, CHPWU interview, ll. 8–11v.\textsuperscript{188}}
Most working city-dwellers were glad they had a job. Being employed made them legal residents, provided a meager salary and meal, and was an opportunity to feel some solidarity by sharing experiences with others. But most of them probably disliked their work. This was because they could not, or only barely, make ends meet, and because having a job involved hazards that began with the commute to the workplace, where a German or native supervisor might point a gun to their heads or give them a beating, for no particular reason.

There were some major differences between the jobs. Those working in German offices and homes were relatively well off, working in heated places and with relative job security. Moreover, such jobs offered a measure of power, which enabled those who had them to demand significant "tributes" from other natives. Workers in the city administration and in heavy industry were frequently unemployed on the job, and frequently supervised by their prewar bosses and colleagues. This made it possible for some major factories in Kiev to become places where it was easy to do nothing but steal and to leave after the meal. It is very unlikely that similar conditions prevailed at industrial sites which the Germans took more seriously, particularly in cities like Kryvyi Rih and Dnipropetrovs'k.

Conditions in light industry remain virtually unknown and will hopefully become clear after further study. The worst kind of job was held by those rounded up for temporary tasks

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189 Korotchenko to Khrushchev, "O sostojanii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 6, ll. 36–37.

190 German text, copy, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 1, d. 197, ll. 50–145.

such as bridge reconstruction. The fate of scholars engaged in those sciences and studies which the German authorities considered useless was bleak as well. These people were unemployed and were left to their own devices, which meant famine.

Finally, there was a small but probably growing upper layer of city-dwellers who ran a private or semi-private business. To them, the hazards on the job felt by the others barely existed. These were the new restaurant owners, the new artisans, and the prewar medical specialists. These people—presumably mostly men—earned more, or at least had more food at their disposal, than before 1941. To some of the other working city-dwellers, working conditions may altogether have been less stressful as well—those who had hated the earlier, pervasive NKVD supervision and now worked in a barely operating factory such as Kiev's "Lenkuznia." To be sure, a thorough comparison of a subjective matter such as job satisfaction under and before the Germans would be premature, considering the absence of studies of the pre-1941 conditions. But if there is such a thing as objective working conditions, it seems fair to say that for most city-dwellers they became worse.
The concern in this chapter is religious life. It will describe the religious revival and will evaluate its scale. Any study of popular religiosity must start, however, with an outline of the basics of Soviet and German policies toward religion as well as the competition among the leaders of what eventually became two Orthodox churches, an Autonomous Orthodox church and an Autocephalous Orthodox church.

The revolutionary period that started in 1917 brought great changes to church life. Ukraine's Russian Orthodox church received a certain autonomy from Russia, but also lost ground against new competitors. By the 1920s, there were officially in Soviet Ukraine three Orthodox churches. The largest was the Russian Orthodox church, also called the Patriarchal church. Since 1918, the Ukraine-based part of the Patriarchal church had autonomous status as an exarchate, and in 1921 it received its first Exarch. A new, independent Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church appeared on the scene in 1920. After one year, it ordained its own metropolitan, Vasyl' Lypkivs'kyi. The consecration was not done in accordance with Orthodox canon law, but in the form of the supposedly ancient, but controversial ritual of a "laying on of hands." A third Orthodox tendency was called Renovationism. From 1925, its representative in Ukraine was the Orthodox Autocephalous Synodal church, also with its own metropolitan.1

In 1927, the militantly atheist Soviet authorities recognized that the Russian Orthodox Patriarchal church had a right to exist. From then on, its two Orthodox rivals went into decline. Although this process was aided by the fact that the vast majority of faithful preferred the

Russian Orthodox church, the decline of the others was significantly hastened by the state. In 1930 the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church was forced to declare at a synod that it no longer existed, and an estimated half of its clergy were arrested thereafter. Another synod later that year declared that the remnants of the church be renamed the Ukrainian Orthodox church. It functioned until the mid-1930s, when its metropolitan was arrested, possibly shot, and its parishes were closed down.\(^2\) Meanwhile, in 1936, the metropolitan of the Synodal church (Renovationists) was banned from holding church offices and one year later arrested as well. All Synodal bishops were forced to resign. In other words, the Autocephalous and Synodal (Renovationist) hierarchies were eliminated and only the Russian Orthodox (Patriarchal) church remained.\(^3\)

The Russian Orthodox church in Ukraine (Patriarchal Exarchate) suffered as much as its rivals, however. In 1935 and 1936 two of its bishops were arrested, and in 1937 it was the turn of its exarch, who was probably shot. The remaining Russian Orthodox hierarchs soon shared this fate.\(^4\) The assaults on the church were also felt at the parish level. For example, in early 1938 all priests in the border region of Zhytomyr were deported. By the end of the decade, there were only about a hundred priests left in Ukraine, none of whom were allowed to hold sermons, besides a number of "underground" priests.\(^5\) The campaign against Orthodoxy was more extensive than in Soviet Russia, where hierarchies of the Synodal church and of the Russian Orthodox church, while depleted, nevertheless continued to exist.\(^6\)


\(^4\)Ibid., pp. 115–116, 118–120, and 125.

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 126. On the small number of priests present immediately after the German arrival, see ibid., p. 207 and the letter by Bishop Nikanor (Abramovych) in Osyp Zinkevych and Oleksander Voronyn, eds., Martyrolohiia ukraïns'kykh tserkov u chotyr'okh tomakh, Vol. 1: Ukraïns'ka pravoslavna tserkva (Toronto and Baltimore, 1987), p. 711.

\(^6\)Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 126; Bociurkiw, "Renovationist Church," p. 72.
Meanwhile, there existed an Orthodox church in neighboring Poland, recognized since 1924 as autocephalous by the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul. When Germany and the Soviet Union destroyed Poland in 1939, in the German-ruled Generalgouvernement this church was renamed the Holy Orthodox Autocephalous church in the Generalgouvernement, led by Metropolitan Dionysii (Valedyns'kyi), archbishop of Warsaw.7 In Soviet-ruled western Volhynia and eastern Galicia, most Orthodox bishops pledged allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergii (Starogorodskii) of Moscow and Kolomna. Although they did this under duress, it is conceivable that among them were those who were pleased to be rid of their "Polish" autocephaly. Barely had this new situation come about, however, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union.

As the Germans occupied Ukraine, they put up posters which announced: "The Time of Stalinist Atheism Is Gone. The German Authorities Give You the Opportunity to Pray in Freedom Again."8 In fact, in various ways, representatives of the German Army were deeper involved. Some commanders issued orders for the re-opening of the churches, and many German soldiers and officers helped clean and restore church buildings.9 Ukrainians who worked as army interpreters apparently told Orthodox priests that their services should be in the Ukrainian language. If they did not know it, Church Slavonic might be used, although it should be pronounced with a Ukrainian accent.10


There were, however, instances in which the Germans acted with caution or even with disdain. In the southern city of Kherson, the regional Wirtschaftskommando gave the local Orthodox clergy 30,000 roubles for the restoration of the church building in exchange for a promise to conduct services in Church Slavonic, a written statement of loyalty to the Germans, and a vow to "reject all efforts to make the church a political tool of Ukrainian nationalists." There were also cases when soldiers turned just restored churches into stables.

All these various kinds of German involvement displeased the German High Command, and it banned any further interference of Germans in church life. From then on, the army at most played a mediating role. For example, in Boryspil' east of Kiev in November 1941, the local commander ordered a referendum on language use. When the pollsters disagreed about the outcome of their poll, he ordered the church building to alternate between being an "Old Slavonic church" and a "Ukrainian church."

When civilian Nazi rule replaced military rule, a more elaborate system of control over religious life was implemented. All "Ukrainian organizations of a non-productive and non-economic character" had to register with the city mayor or raion chief, and were obliged to

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11"Erklärung des orthodoxen Kirchenrates von Cherson, abgegeben am 21.10.41 auf Veranlassung des Kreislandwirtschaftführers, Sonderführer Linke," TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 1, d. 50, l. 27, signed by twenty-two clergymen and church elders. In early 1942, these Orthodox clergymen asked for permission to send one of them to Greece, Romania, or Bulgaria, to be consecrated bishop. This request proved unnecessary, for Bishop Serafym (Kushneruk) arrived. "Abschrift. Eingabe der prawoslawischen Geistlichen der Stadt Cherson," TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 1, d. 50, l. 25; Russian-language original at ibid., ll. 26–26v.


13Fireside, Icon and Swastika, p. 118; Walther Bienert, Russen und Deutschen: was für Menschen sind das? Berichte, Bilder und Folgerungen aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stein am Rhein, 1990), p. 92.

14Mykola Rybachuk, "Vidrodzhennia tserkovna-relihiinoho zhyttia v zvil'noum nimes'kom viis'kom Zolotoverkhnomu Kyievi i oblasti," n.d., n.p., Typewritten manuscript, DAKO, f. r-2412, op. 2, d. 199, ll. 19–20, which is an account based on original documents quoted in ibid., ll. 121–122 and 124–125.
inform them once a month about changes in their structure or personnel. The civilian German authorities also placed more emphasis on the separation of church and state. In late 1942, Koch warned that any transgressing mayors or raion chiefs would be dismissed. The official ban on religious instruction at schools amounted to a radical change for western Volhynia, where such instruction had existed under Poland and even during the brief period of Soviet rule.

Aside from the above measures, the Nazis interfered in several other ways in church life. Church charity was never allowed. Neither were seminaries, with the exception of one Autonomous seminary in Kremenets' that was sanctioned and created in 1943. There were also ad hoc decisions aimed at preventing the emergence of a united Orthodox church, and an almost total ban on newspaper items about church life. From mid-1942, Koch and his associates started to support what had become the Autonomous Orthodox church.

15 DAKO, f. r-2292, op. 1, d. 2, l. 23v, regarding a 16 January 1942 order to this effect issued by Generalkommissar Magunia.

16 Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 189.


20 Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 197.

21 For example, a priest could defend the 1921 Synod of the UAOC in the Bohuslav newspaper: Zvil'nena Ukraïna, 22 October 1941. The same issue announced services in the local church to mark the twentieth anniversary of that Synod. In early 1942, a weekly published in Luts'k carried a statement from the Autonomous bishops to the clergy of "the Orthodox Church" which said, "We still do not have such a church authority which would release us from the canonical tie with the Russian Church [Tserkva Rosïs'ka], from which we are cut off." Ukraïns'kyi holos, 2 January 1942, quoted in I. Vlasovs'kyi, "Iak bulo z obranniam na kyiv's'ku katedru Arkhiepypsksopa Ilariona (Ohiienka) roku 1941," Tserkva i narid ([Winnipeg], April-May 1949), p. 21.

The Church Council in Kiev (discussed below in note 99) was never mentioned in the press, and neither was the first Autocephalous service in the St Andrew Cathedral. Also refused was an article by Konstantyn Shtega which proposed to create a new church hierarchy on the basis of the old monk and former bishop Antonii (Abashidze), who had survived the Soviet period in the Monastery of the Caves. (This man headed the seminary in Georgia when Stalin
Most difficult to ascertain is the role of the Gebietskommissare. Much of their policies vis-à-vis church life appear to have depended on a personal agenda. Some used the general ban on public gatherings as an excuse to do away with local church councils or to ban celebrations. During the harvest, many Gebietskommissare and Landwirte banned church services at certain times. As for the SS, it closely monitored the clergy, banning and destroying any publications issued by the Orthodox churches. Until the summer of 1942, the agency rarely intervened in disputes. When it did, however, it tended to support the Autocephalists.

studied there.) Rybachuk, "Vidrodzhennia," ll. 6–7 and 16; Heyer, Orthdoxe Kirche, pp. 127 and 172.

Professor Hans Koch, interview AD G-20 by the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project [HURIP], 1 June 1941, Salzburg, Austria, p. 9. Typed transcript in English, Archives, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California, Alexander Dallin collection, box 1, folder 14. The first page of the 12-page transcript is not in this folder but at ibid., box 7, folder 6, p. 9.


For example, in the Iziaslav district [Gebiet Saslaw] in western Volhynia, which comprised over two hundred villages, Gebietskommissar Knochenhauer banned all gatherings for the first three weeks of 1942, supposedly to stop the spread of typhus. This was just before the holy day of the Water Blessing. When he found out that people were saying that the Germans were perhaps not so different from the Bolsheviks, he agreed to make an exception, but told a delegation of clergy and laypeople that they would be arrested if a single new case of typhus should come to his attention. The celebration took place without problems. At dawn, near wells and rivers, ice altars and crosses were prepared and placed near the river, which symbolized the Jordan River. S. Hauk, "Vodokhreshchi," Litops Volyni, I, 1 (Winnipeg, 1953), pp. 85–86.

For example, in Kiev the SS seized and burned the entire edition of a book printed there by the Autocephalous church called Vechirnia ta Rannia. That church did manage to print illegally some liturgies, prayer books, psalm books, and New Testaments (levanhelia) in Luts'k and Kiev. It also published some materials legally in Poltava, before the introduction of civilian Nazi rule there. Dublians'kyi, Ternystym shliakhom, p. 40; Vlasov's'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, pp. 236–237.

In the middle of 1941, seven Russian Orthodox bishops found themselves in German-ruled western Ukraine. On 18 August 1941, Archbishop Aleksii (Hromads'kyi, 1882–1943) of Volhynia called a Regional Synod (Oblasnyi Sobor) in the monastery of Pochaïv in far southwestern Volhynia, near the Reichskommissariat's border with the Generalgouvernement. Aleksii obtained the provisional title of Regional Metropolitan (Oblasnyi Metropolit), but the bishops in attendance still felt canonically bound to the Russian Orthodox church. They called their church by various names (the Ukrainian Orthodox church, the Orthodox Ukrainian church, the Orthodox church in Ukraine, or the Orthodox Autonomous church in Ukraine), but it was generally referred to as the Autonomous church. The leaders also agreed in principle to accept the Synodlists (Renovationists) into their ranks, an offer which was accepted.

Another synod of the Autonomous church was held on 8 December 1941, and it established that the best candidate for the vacant but important Archeparchy of Kiev and Pereiaslav was a respected Ukrainian patriot based in the Generalgouvernement, Archbishop Ilarion (Ohienko) of Cheh and Podlachia. It was decided to ask Ilarion's agreement to the transfer, which he gave, and—more importantly—that of his superior, Dionysii of Warsaw. The plan was to convene in Kiev, with German approval, a special synod where bishops,

28These were (1) Archbishop Aleksii (Hromads'kyi) in Kremenets'; (2) his first vicar, Bishop Polikarp (Sikors'kyi) in Luts'k; (3) Aleksii's second vicar, Bishop Antonii (Martsenko) in Kamin'-Kashyrs'kyi; (4) Aleksii's third vicar, Bishop Symon (Ivanovs'kyi) in Ostroh; (5) Archbishop Oleksander (Inozemtsev) of Pinsk and Polissia; (6) Bishop Veniamyn (Novyts'kyi), also in Pinsk; and (7) Bishop Damaskyn (Maliuta) of Chernivtsi in northern Bukovina. A. I. Kishkovskii, untitled review of an article by W. Alexeev, Vestnik Instituta po izucheniiu SSSR, 2 (27) (Munich, May-August 1958), pp. 130–131.

29The Synod also decided that only Aleksii was obliged to mention Metropolitan Sergii of Moscow and Kolomna in prayer. Zinkevych and Voronyn, Martyrolohiia, Vol 1, pp. 677–679; Heyer, Orthodox Kirche, pp. 175–176.

30The August 1941 Synod spoke of the "Orthodox Church in Ukraine" (Pravoslavna Tserkva na Ukraïni) and the "Ukrainian Orthodox Church" (Ukrains'ka Pravoslavna Tserkva). In October 1942, three bishops who disagreed with Aleksii over policy vis-à-vis the Autocephalous church spoke of the "Orthodox Church in Ukraine," the "Orthodox Autonomous Church in Ukraine" (Pravoslavna Avtonomna Tserkva na Ukraïni), and the "Orthodox Ukrainian Church" (Pravoslavna Ukraïns'ka Tserkva). Zinkevych and Voronyn, Martyrolohiia, Vol. 1, pp. 677–678 and 731.

31Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 188.

32Vlasovs'kyi, "Iak bulo," p. 21.
priests, and laypersons would elevate Ilarion of Kiev to the position of Metropolitan of Kiev and All Ukraine.\textsuperscript{33}

Two hierarchs based in Ukraine did not participate in either of these synods, however: Bishop Polikarp (Sikors'kyi, 1875–1953) of Zhytomyr and Archbishop Oleksander (Inozemtsev) of Pinsk and Polissia. Like Aleksii and his associates, these two men did not want to submit to the "Polish" Autocephalous Orthodox church in the Generalgouvernement, but they did not wish to obey the Russian Orthodox Patriarchal Locum Tenens in Moscow either. Under Soviet rule, they had not recognized the Moscow Patriarchate as fully as the other hierarchs.\textsuperscript{34} Polikarp made it clear from the start that he wished to revive the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church.\textsuperscript{35} Laypersons in Rivne urged him to sever all ties with the Autonomists under Aleksii.\textsuperscript{36} They were particularly startled when the latter started calling


\textsuperscript{34}In 1939 or 1940, Polikarp held a service in Luts'k with Archbishop Nykolai (Borys Iarushchevych), a man appointed by Sergii of Moscow to handle affairs with the Orthodox clergy of Western Ukraine. In this service, Polikarp and Nykolai consecrated Veniamyn (Novyts'kyi) as Bishop of Pinsk. But Polikarp never acknowledged either Nykolai or Sergii in writing. On this consecration, see Mykola Velychkivs'kyi, "Sumni chasy nimets'koï okupatsiii (1941–1944 roky)," \textit{Vyzvol'nyi shliakh}, XII, 5 (London, 1965), pp. 520–521. Nykolai left Ukraine for Moscow one week before the German invasion and was therefore proclaimed dismissed by the Orthodox hierarchs who held the first synod in Pochaiv in August 1941. Nykolai admitted in 1942 that Polikarp never put down in writing that he was canonically subject to the Moscow Patriarchate. See his 28 March 1942 letter to the Orthodox clergy and parishioners of the Kievian and "other Ukrainian" eparchies, printed in \textit{Russkaiia pravoslavnaia tserkov' i Velikaiia Otechestvennaia voina: sbornik tserkovnych dokumentov} (Moscow, [1943]), p. 67.

\textsuperscript{35}As noted in a resolution adopted by the Ukrainian Council of Trust in Volhynia, of which Polikarp was a member. "Pershe zasidannia Ukraïns'koï Rady Dovir'ia na Volyni," \textit{Volyn'}, 7 September 1941, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{36}These laypeople constituted the Volhynian Church Council (Volyn's'ka Tserkovna Rada). It met for the last time on 23 August 1942 and dissolved itself when Generalkommissar Schöne demanded a list of its members. Vlasovs'kyi, \textit{Narys istorii}, Vol. 9, part 2, pp. 210 and 228; interview with Matyslav (Skyrynnyk) in Zinkevych and Voronyn, \textit{Martyrolohiia}, Vol 1, p. 737.
himself Exarch of Ukraine and Metropolitan of Volhynia and Zhytomyr, and they decided to "recognize" Polikarp as a so-called Administrator of the Orthodox church in Ukraine. At that stage, Dionysii, heretofore shunned because he was in Warsaw and "of foreign blood" (namely Russian), was allowed to be involved, apparently because he had become a Ukrainian patriot. After he was informed of the state of affairs, he decreed on 24 December 1941 that Polikarp was "Temporary Administrator of the Orthodox Autocephalous Church in the liberated lands of Ukraine." After some time, without a specific decision, the adjective "temporary" simply disappeared.

The emergence of a rival Orthodox church was complete when, in February 1942, three new bishops were consecrated, two of whom at a synod in Pinsk. That synod also decided to accept any surviving priests of the original Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church without

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37Vlasov's'kyi, "Iak bulo," pp. 21 and 24–25. Aleksii never seems to have called himself "Exarch of All Ukraine" (my italics; Ekzarkh visiei Ukraîny), although this was his full title, at least according to three Autonomous bishops who eventually opposed him in October 1942.


39In Ukrainian: "Tymchasovyi Administrator Pravoslavnoi Avtokefal'noi Tserkvy na zvil'nenykh zemliakh Ukraîny." Vlasov's'kyi, "Iak bulo," p. 26; Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 174. That being "of foreign blood" was a problem had been noted a the first (31 August 1941) meeting of the Ukrainian Council of Trust in Volhynia. "Pershe zasidannya Ukraïns'koï Rady Dovir'ia na Volyni," Volyn', 7 September 1941, p. 2. The initial antipathy to Dionysii is confirmed in an intelligence report by one Matsiuk to German intelligence: "In Volhynia there is great confusion regarding the church question. Polikarp has been against Ilarion for a long time. Skrypnyk now follows a new line, protecting Polikarp. Aleksii supports Cheľm [that is, Ilarion]. The mood in Volhynia is generally anti-Warsaw." "Aus dem Schreiben des Herrn Matzjuk," copy, n.d., n.p., TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 41, l. 47–47v.

40One can see the start of this in a published interview, in which Polikarp called himself "Administrator," even while stating that the administration he headed was "temporary" and would be disbanded after the election of the new "head of the church." Fedir Dudko, "Interv'iu z vladykoiu Polikarpom (vid vlasnoho korespondenta)," Volyn', 26 February 1942, p. 3.
a second consecration.41 The new church functioned under varying names, but most "official" was the Holy Orthodox Autocephalous Church in the Liberated Lands of Ukraine.42

Both the Autonomists and the Autocephalists agreed that Ilarion was the best candidate to lead Orthodox church life in Ukraine, so a failure to unite into one Orthodox church, recognized by the Moscow Patriarchate or not, was not inevitable.43 The Reichskommissariat leadership, however, refused to grant Ilarion a travel permit.44 The Nazis, who already felt that they were generous in allowing church life in central Ukraine to resurrect itself, were adamantly opposed to Ukrainians arriving from the Generalgouvernement and speeding up the process. This obstruction was damaging enough, but in May 1942, Koch decided to become deeper involved. Orthodox church representatives were summoned to Rivne and were notified—not by Koch, who never met any such people—that the Nazis acknowledged the existence of two Orthodox churches in the Reichskommissariat, an Autonomous church led by Aleksii and an Autocephalous church led by Polikarp. They were also told to put an end to any polemical exchanges.45 Soon hereafter, the five Autocephalous church hierarchs found out that

41 "Iedyna Pravoslavna Tserkva v Ukraïni," Volyn', 19 February 1942, p. 1. The bishops consecrated at the synod were Nikanor (Abramovych) of Chyhyryn and Ihor (Huba) of Uman'. The consecrations were performed by Polikarp, Oleksander, and probably Bishop Iurii (Korenistov) of Brest, who was himself consecrated on 8 February by Polikarp and Oleksander. The less-than-perfect circumstances of these consecrations—traditionally, three bishops were required—explain why no member or sympathizer of the wartime Autocephalous church has ever published the names of those who performed them.

42 In Ukrainian: "Sviata Pravoslavna Avtokefal'na Tserkva na vyzvolenykh zemliakh Ukraïny." Document from the May 1942 Synod in Kiev, 17 May 1942, DAKO, f. r-2412, op. 2, d. 199, l. 68; Vlasov'skyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 177 (speaks of zvil"nenykh instead of vyzvolenykh). The May 1942 Synod also spoke of the "Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church." In a letter to Hitler in June 1942, hierarchs spoke of the "Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church." In a unification agreement with Metropolitan Feofil (Buldovs'kyi) of Kharkiv of 27 July 1942, hierarchs spoke of the "Orthodox Autocephalous Ukrainian Church," while a "Temporary Statute" dated 28 July 1942 spoke of virtually the same, namely the "Holy Orthodox Autocephalous Ukrainian Church." Letter to Hitler, Kiev, 22 June 1942, unsigned copy, DAKO, f. r-2412, op. 2, d. 199, l. 74; Vlasov'skyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, pp. 226 and 229–230.

43 On the support of the candidacy by the Volhynian Church Council, see Vlasov'skyi, "Iak bulo," p. 23 and Nesterenko, Mytropolyt Ilarion, p. 78.

44 Aleksii requested it according to "Lagebericht für Januar 1942," Rivne, 14 February 1942, TsDAOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 34.

45 The meeting was on 4 May. Vlasov'skyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 221. This author was Polikarp's secretary and was present at the meeting.
consecrations of bishops would be banned. In response, they quickly consecrated six more bishops. On 26 May, it was indeed announced that bishop consecrations were not allowed unless Koch agreed to them in advance.\textsuperscript{46} (He was to ban them altogether in September 1942.\textsuperscript{47})

Koch's most radical intervention occurred several days later, on 1 June. A "Regulation of the Legal Position of Religious Organizations" proclaimed freedom of worship, but actually constrained church life. Henceforth, a \textit{Generalkommissar} could dismiss the leaders of religious organizations if he had "objections of a general political nature" against them. New denominations needed to be licensed by Koch, and he reserved the right to disband any denomination deemed a threat to "order and security" or simply involved in more than "religious tasks."\textsuperscript{48} Koch also decided that he did not want any autocephalists in Kiev. His officials ordered Polikarp to remove bishops Nikanor and Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) from there and to send the latter east of the Reichskommissariat. Mstyslav, the former head of the Ukrainian Council of Trust in Volhynia and despised by Koch, was "not allowed to be in territory with a population which is mostly Ukrainian." Both bishops actually stayed put.\textsuperscript{49}

On 29 June 1942, Aleksii asked Polikarp on his own initiative for a meeting to obtain "some kind of concord."\textsuperscript{50} When in October the next Autocephalous synod convened, it agreed

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., p. 222. The consecrations, by Bishop Nikanor (Abramovych) and Bishop Ihor (Huba), took place from 9 to 17 May in Kiev in the small church near St Andrew Cathedral. The new bishops were Fotii (Tymoshchuk) of Podolia; Hryhorii (Ohiichuk) of Zhytomyr; Mstyslav (Stepan Skrypnyk) of Pereiaslav; Sy'lvestr (Haievs'kyi) of Lubny; Manuil (Tarnavs'kyi) of Bila Tserkva; and Mykhail (Khoroshyi) of Ielysavethrad (Kirovohrad). Also consecrated this month—probably in the same place—was Hennadii (Shyprykevych) of Sicheslav. Additional consecrations of bishops, at unknown locations, involved Volodymyr (Malets') of Cherkasy (23 June) and Serkhii (Okhotenko) of Melitopol' (at an unknown date).

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., p. 230.


to start negotiations for a unification.51 (The synod was described as "unofficial," for on 1 October Koch's deputy Dargel directed the Generalkomissare to ban all synods. When the bishops received the news, they were already on their way to Luts'k.)52) The result was the proclamation, on 8 October 1942, of a single Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church, led not by Aleksii or Polikarp, but by Dionysii of Warsaw.53 The German authorities opposed the act of union, however, and forbade any mention of it in the press.54 There was also opposition against the union within the Autonomous church. Three of its hierarchs demanded that Aleksii remove his signature and relinquish his title of exarch.55 Aleksii could not comply with their demand for a synod and eventually disavowed the union (15 December), while holding on to his title.56

Along with the attempt at unification, the fall of 1942 also saw the emergence of an outright destructive Nazi line vis-à-vis the Orthodox hierarchies. Representatives of all six

51 The Synod (2–9 October 1942) also asked Polikarp and Oleksander to take on the title of Metropolitan (4 October), which they did. Meanwhile, Nikanor started calling himself Archbishop. Decisions on both title changes apparently had been made at the May 1942 Synod in Kiev. Vlasovs'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 241.

52 Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 154 and 154n42.

53 The document was signed by Aleksii, Nikanor, and Mstyslav. See the text in Zinkevych and Voronyn, Martyrolohiia, Vol 1, pp. 729–731; Vlasovs'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, pp. 242–243; and Dublians'kyi, Ternystym shliakhom, pp. 46–47. I found no evidence to confirm Armstrong's view that Aleksii accepted the terms of the unification because of the strength of the Autocephalous church. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 155.

54 Vlasovs'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 243. When Mstyslav, in a conversation with Koch's deputy Dargel in Rivne, refused to retract his signature from the agreement, he was arrested and transported to prisons east of the Reichskommissariat. He was released at the end of the year, with orders to report regularly and to refrain from conducting church services. Typically, Polikarp was not informed about the arrest. In early March 1943, Mstyslav was rearrested and placed on death row in Kiev. Then the German Army took charge and released him. According to Mstyslav, his life was probably saved by an interpreter in Kiev who was the sister of Georg Leibrandt. (The latter was the head of the political department of the Ostministerium and a veteran of the Ukrainian army during the struggle for independence in the revolutionary period.) Ibid., p. 248; interview with Mstyslav in Zinkevych and Voronyn, Martyrolohiia, Vol. 1, pp. 742–743.

55 The hierarchs were Symon (Ivanovs'kyi) of Chernihiv, Panteleimon (Petro Rudyk) of Kiev, and Veniamyn (Novyts'kyi) of Pinsk. Zinkevych and Voronyn, Martyrolohiia, Vol 1, pp. 731–733.

56 Aleksii added in his announcement that German officials in Rivne agreed with him that the church should no longer be called Autonomous, but the Exarchate Orthodox Ukrainian Church (Ekzarsha Pravoslavna Ukrains'ka Tserkva). Ibid., p. 735; Vlasovs'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 246.
Generalkommissar told church leaders that neither Orthodox orientation should have lines of authority across the borders of any Generalbezirk. Moreover, each Generalkommissar appropriated the leadership of the churches located in his Generalbezirk from Polikarp, Aleksii, and all other hierarchs. Bishops who did not live in the Generalbezirk capital had to move there.\textsuperscript{57} From now on, each Generalkommissar also insisted that he had the authority to select one leading bishop per church. Synods were allowed, but only of bishops from one Generalbezirk. Permission was needed for bishop consecrations, while the Gebietskommissare had to be consulted before the appointments of priests. The Generalkommissar could dismiss any priest. Thus, in fact the Autocephalous and Autonomous churches were each divided into six jurisdictions, so that the Reichskommissariat Ukraine had now twelve Orthodox churches.\textsuperscript{58}

The new situation inevitably caused abuses, most strikingly in the Zhytomyr Generalbezirk, which was by then led by SS-Brigadeführer Ernst Leyser. For reasons that remain unclear, Leyser insisted on retaining two bishops who were obviously Soviet spies. The first concerned the Autocephalous Bishop Fotii (Tymoshchuk) of the Podolian Eparchy. In August 1942, it came to light that the Polish state had convicted him as a Soviet agent and that he had been stripped of the priesthood. Polikarp declared him dismissed and expelled him from the church, but Fotii stayed put in Vinnytsia. He said the act of unification amounted to reconciliation with "Moscow," so that he was compelled to create "my own Ukrainian church."

\textsuperscript{57} Nikanor received the news from Generalkommissar Magunia on 25 September 1942. Dublians'kji, Ternystym shliakhom, p. 43; Vlasovs'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 249. Most or all other bishops were notified in October 1942. The order to move to the Generalbezirk capital mostly affected the Autocephalous bishop Mykhail (Khoroshyi), who had to move from Kirovohrad to Mykolaiv. Archbishop Mykhail, "Moľ zurtric iz Ivanom Vlasovs'kyym," in F. K u l'chyns'kyi and Mykhailo Mukha, eds., Ivan Vlasovs'kyi: propam"iatna knyha (Toronto, 1974), p. 95.

Polikarp and Aleksii were told about these changes at the office of Generalkommissar Schöne on 11 and 12 January 1943. Record (protokol), 11 January 1943, by archpriest M. Maliuzhyns'kyi and statement by Polikarp, in Zinkeych and Voronyn, Martyrolohia, Vol. 1, pp. 751–752; Vlasovs'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, pp. 252–253. (Polikarp had already sent a letter of protest to Koch by then. As usual when hierarchs wrote to Koch or a Generalkommissar, it received no answer. Vlasovs'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 252.)

\textsuperscript{58} Vlasovs'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, pp. 252–253; Zinkeych and Voronyn, Martyrolohia, Vol 1, pp. 751–754.
The Generalkommissar had a strange sympathy for him and "appointed" him in early November 1942 as "the highest representative of the Autocephalous Orthodox church." Fotii's one potential contender, Bishop Hryhorii (Ohiichuk) of Zhytomyr, meanwhile was under arrest. He was released after Polikarp wrote a letter to Koch about the issue, but not earlier than mid-March 1943. Only at that stage did Fotii disappear, never to be seen again.59

This scandal was barely over when it was the turn of the Autonomous church. In early 1943, a Russian arrived in Kiev from the Caucasus Mountains with retreating German soldiers and claimed to be Bishop Nikolai (Avtonomov) of Piatigorsk in Russia. Bishop Panteleimon (Rudyk) appointed him as a priest, but instead the man went to see Aleksii, who even created a new eparchy for him, in Mazyr in Belarusian Polissia. Soon rumors started circulating that "Nikolai" was an impostor, fanned by his demeanor during mass and at German parties. German military intelligence confirmed that he was a spy for the Soviet Union. Still Generalkommissar Leyser kept "Nikolai" in office until the very end.60

Besides Orthodox Christians, there were also Protestants and Catholics. A comparison of their status with that of the Orthodox hierarchs reveals that they were treated much differently—either significantly better (in the case of the Protestants) or much worse (in the case of the Catholics). The SD considered the pacifist Baptists and Evangelical Christians, collectively known as Stundites (Shtundysty), to be harmless. Therefore it decreed that they be treated with "magnanimity."61 The civilian German authorities took the same line, and lifted bans on Evangelical Christian activity that some "auxiliary" authorities had imposed.62 As a result, this denomination flourished. Evangelist missionaries even stealthily traveled about


60Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, pp. 216–217. According to Heyer, "Nikolai" retreated with the Germans, after the German surrender was appointed Metropolitan for all German-based "Russian" Greek Catholics by the Pope, and in early 1948 was arrested as a Soviet agent by the American secret service.

61Zinkevych and Voronyn, Martyrolohiia, Vol 1, pp. 745–746. The mainly ethnic German Mennonites and Lutherans are not discussed here. The Mennonites are discussed in chapter 10.

62One case is mentioned in Panas Khurtovyna [Mykhailo Podvorniak], Pid nebom Volyni: (voienni spomyny khrystianyna) (Winnipeg, 1952), pp. 102–104.
Dnieper Ukraine, preaching and distributing literature at great risk of denunciation and arrest.\textsuperscript{63} In Kiev and most other cities, Evangelical communities were created or recreated, and the one in Zhytomyr even managed to get a booklet published.\textsuperscript{64} The Islamic faith was also allowed. Kiev’s approximately seven hundred Muslims had a mosque in the Podil district since October 1941.\textsuperscript{65}

In contrast, Greek and Roman Catholic priests were persecuted. The SD considered the Greek Catholic church, led by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi in the Generalkommissariat, an “outpost” of the Vatican in the Reichskommissariat, and therefore banned it. Whenever Greek Catholic priests from Galicia tried to move into the Reichskommissariat, they were turned back.\textsuperscript{66} In the case of the Roman Catholics, Nazi hostility to the Vatican was combined with hostility to the Poles, who in Ukraine constituted the vast majority of these Christians. Thus the Roman Catholics were refused places for worship, existing churches were closed, and in some cases priests were shot.\textsuperscript{67} Even the Roman Catholic church in Mykolaïv, where


\textsuperscript{64}Ibid., pp. 81, 90, and 101–102; I. Korovyts’kyi, “Vidrodzhennia Tserkvy v Ukrajini ta Kyievi,” Kiev, 22 July 1942, DAKO, f. r-2412, op. 2, d. 199, l. 64.

\textsuperscript{65}Korovyts’kyi, “Vidrodzhennia tserkvy,” l. 64; L. Maliuzhenko, “Kyiv za 1942 r.,” \textit{Nashe mynule}, 1 (6) (Kiev, 1993), pp. 163–164. The 1942 Kiev city census registered 714 Muslims, including four with Ukrainian, two with Russian, and two with Polish nationality.


\textsuperscript{67}On the refusal of church buildings to Roman Catholics in the Oleksandriivka district of the Mykolaïv Generalbezirk (affecting 37 Poles) and in the Dnipropetrovs’kyi Generalbezirk (affecting one about two thousand people, of whom about 1,500 Poles), see "Teilbericht Politik [...]", TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, II. 30v and 33v–34. In the fall of 1942, the Roman Catholic church in Polis’ke was closed and its Jesuit priest was arrested, according to "Auszug aus dem Lagebericht des Generalkommissars," Kiev, 1 September 1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419181. In Zhytomyr, the closure was preceded by a service in October 1941 in which the congregation sang a Polish song. The SD killed all or some of the priests involved. (Its report said they were "sent away" (ausgewiesen), which is an obvious euphemism.) In May 1942, the \textit{Generalkommissar} in Zhytomyr reported that he had banned a Roman Catholic priest from practising. \textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 128 (3 November 1941), pp. 5–6; Ingeborg Fleischhauer, \textit{Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion} (Stuttgart, 1983), p. 164. On SD hostility toward Polish priests in Volhynia in 1942, see \textit{Meldungen}, 5 (29 May 1942), p. 12; ibid., 11 (10 July 1942), p. 2; and Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, p. 153.
most members of the congregation were ethnic Germans, was closed. An exception was the Vinnytsia district, where the Gebietskommissar allowed the one Roman Catholic church (in Hnivan') to function, apparently because most of the six thousand parishioners were registered as Ukrainians.

Clearly, the official German treatment of churches varied considerably, depending on the denomination and the length of the German presence. As the war went on, Nazi policies became harsh and even destructive. Now that this has been established, it is possible to deal with what the question of the role, if any, that the churches and religion played in "ordinary" people's lives.

After the German arrival, there were many signs of popular piety and religious life was quickly resurrected. Peasants again dared to cross themselves in public, and some even did so upon seeing the first German tanks, which had white crosses painted on them. Peasant women and children started to wear crosses, sometimes even before the German arrival. Old peasants frequently participated in German field services. The clearest sign of the religious revival was the restoration of churches. In villages and small towns, it was rare for a local not to participate in the process. The buildings were painted white and church bells—improvised from iron rails—were installed. Often ordinary buildings were used, whenever the original church had been demolished before the war. People who had been hiding icons, communion cloths (antyminys), church books, utensils, towels, and garments now brought them to the surface.

68Teilbericht Politik [...]." TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 37.

69Ibid., l. 28. Apparently, there were by mid-1943 also services in the Polish church in Vinnytsia. Many of those attending were German soldiers. Mykhailo Selesko, Vinnytsia: spomyny perekladach' Komisii doslidiv zlochyny NKVD v 1937–1938 (New York, Toronto, London, and Sydney, 1991), p. 137.

70Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 171.

71Diary of F. K. Kushnir, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 259, l. 9v, about the village of Prydniprovs'ke, then called Moisynsyt, in the present-day Chornobai raion of the Cherkasy oblast. Almost every house had an icon in a designated corner; see Bienert, Russen und Deutsche, p. 95 and Maksym Skorups'kyi, U nastupakh i vidstupakh: (spohady) (Chicago 1961), p. 187.

72Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 120 (21 October 1941), p. 10.
In the town of Vasylivka south of Zaporizhzhia, a magnificent iconostasis was put back together from parts saved by various people.73

The first services were held within days, or at most weeks, and in some places even before any Germans arrived. There were not enough priests, so villages were forced to invite visiting priests from elsewhere.74 In the village where Fedir Pihido stayed, "the women prayed, all the time wiping away the tears which were trickling from their cheeks in small drops. The people greeted each other as if it were Easter. From both sides of the church, which was in an ordinary building, one could hear the refrain, 'Christ has risen!' and 'The Lord wished [spodobyv] us to live to see this happy day.'"75

Soon there was a flood of people of various ages who wished to be baptized, often in large crowds. In accordance with Eastern Orthodox tradition, which prescribes immersion, these baptisms were frequently held in rivers. Many people also got themselves remarried by a priest. Baptisms and religious marriages were to remain a constant feature during the Nazi period.76 Initially there were also reburials, with or without a priest, in which coffins were opened and a cross or icon was placed inside. This phenomenon became more rare after October 1941, however, when the SD started banning it.77 Particularly noteworthy burials


were of the victims of the NKVD. In Luts'k in August 1941, 3,862 shot prisoners were buried in five mass graves, in a ceremony conducted by Bishop Polikarp.\(^78\) A similar mass burial of victims took place in Rivne on 31 August. As General Kitzinger, who happened to arrive that day, looked on, young people at this event carried portraits around and chanted, "Ukraine for the Ukrainians" and "Long live Bandera, the Leader of Ukraine."\(^79\)

The largest religious gathering of the entire Nazi period was the celebration in honor of St Iov near the Pochaïv monastery and church. On 10 September 1941, for the first time in twenty years, some fifteen thousand pilgrims from the Right Bank gathered there. (In the tsarist period, tens of thousands used to gather.) The mostly female pilgrims had been informed through word of mouth and some had traveled for days. The event was used by German propagandists, who instructed the local authorities to put up large posters with Hitler's portrait and wall newspapers. The Germans themselves handed out small German flags, postcards with Hitler's portrait, and copies of the Rivne-based newspaper Volyn'. One poster was embellished and taken along in the procession. Most of the pilgrims had never seen a picture of Hitler before and were impressed, as the propagandists alleged. An old man smiled broadly at the postcard and told others, "That's our father Hitler," while some women even kissed the portrait. The orderly proceedings were led by Archbishop Aleksii, who prayed for Hitler and the German Army. In a speech to the clergy and laity, he "demanded that they always remember in their prayers the Führer, the most brilliant present-day leader, and the German people. The blood sacrifice of the German people should never be forgotten. He and all Ukrainians, he said, wanted the intentions and thoughts of the Führer to be realized in full."\(^80\)


\(^80\)Abteilung IIa, Betr. Bericht über eine Kundgebung [...], Rivne, 15 September 1941, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 41, II. 26–27. This report must have been written by one of the correspondents of the German News Agency who travelled to Pochaïv with Ulas Samchuk and Stepan Skrypnyk. Samchuk, Na bilomu koni, pp. 204–205. There were also at the gathering two bishops who "had been sent [there] from Moscow in the Bolshevik period, had stayed here and, as
Most especially under the military authorities, but even after the introduction of civilian German rule, the "auxiliary" native administrations generally promoted Orthodox Christianity. A raion chief might for example tell village elders to repair church buildings. The native administrations also returned many traditional Orthodox holidays and made them official. For example, Mayor Bahazii of Kiev did so with fourteen holidays. Celebration of these holidays according to the Old Style calendar was reinstated in many places; this meant for example that Christmas fell in early January. In vain, the German military authorities warned the native administrations against such practices and against organizing—or banning—any religious activity. Ukrainian school inspectors also "completely forgot the democratic principle of the separation of church and state." This way, Orthodox Christianity (Zakon Bozhyi—the Law of the Lord) was taught in many schools in the school year 1941–1942. In one school in Kiev, which was probably typical, every class received religious instruction once a week. In what likely was a typical village grade school, first-graders during the 1941–1942 school year had a subject called "Ethics" (Moral'). Among the topics were: "The Creation of the Universe"; "The Suffering on the Cross, the Death, and the Resurrection of Our Lord Jesus Christ"; and "The Lord's Prayer." The Ethics subject also comprised secular topics such as the work ethic and the

people said, were the eye and ear of the NKVD," asserts Samchuk in ibid. Dionysii of Warsaw wanted to attend but was not allowed to leave the Generalgouvernement. Vlasov's'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 208. On pilgrims during the Nazi period, see also Khurtovyna, Pid nebom Volyni, p. 105 and Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, pp. 172 and 201–202.

81Note by raion chief Okhrymenko, 1 January 1942, DAKO, f. r-2210, op. 1, d. 3, l. 112.

82"Postanova no. 252 Holovy mista Kyieva vid 12.horudnia 1941 roku," DAKO, f. r-2412, op. 2, d. 2, l. 72.


84E.g., Ortskommandatur in Iahotyn to raion chief, 8 January 1942, DAKO, f. r-2418, op. 1, d. 13, ll. 3–3v.

85Pavlo Ternivs'kyi [Ivan Zhyhadlo], "Spohady emigranta," p. 57. Autograph manuscript, 1945, Library and Museum, Ukrainian Cultural & Educational Centre, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.

86Klavdiia Iakovlivna Hrynevych (Ukrainian born in 1930 in Klyntsi [Kirovohrad oblast]), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, tape recording.
proper way to treat the elderly. Any such instruction, usually by Orthodox priests, was banned everywhere by mid-1942 at the latest. The Poltava district was an exception, for there religious instruction continued, due to its influential school inspector, an ethnic German woman who lived with the regional military commander.

There is still more evidence which suggests that there existed a generally pious mood. In population censuses, the vast majority of natives identified themselves as "Orthodox." Very few identified themselves as "without religion" or gave no answer. Traces of a religious way of thinking also showed up in expressions which some Ukrainians, in particular peasants, used to identify the Soviet authorities; most notably, dyiavol's'ka vlada or vlada satany—the devil's regime. In one village, as the noises from the front became louder, a man over eighty took off his cap, crossed himself, and told his fellow-villagers, "I never thought, children, that I would live to see the day, but now you see that the Lord had mercy. Pilate's empire [tsarstvo lhemona] is coming to an end."

Upon closer examination, however, popular attitudes in Dnieper Ukraine toward churches and religiosity in general turn out to be more complex. For instance, the massive participation in the reconstruction of the churches in the villages and towns, even by the young

87Records of the village of Pleskachivka (Smila), DAKO, f. r-2505, op. 1, d. 5, ll. 14, 15, 25, 27, 29, 30, and 34; ibid, d. 8, ll. 11 and 24.

88The woman, Frigga Tyrel', was a Lutheran who used to teach the German language before 1941. As school inspector, she allowed only certain laypeople to do the teaching. Each grade had two hours of religious instruction per week, based on a syllabus. At one school in Poltava, a woman taught religion to all fifteen grades and also took classes out to attend church services. The German commander who allowed all of this was one Brodowsky, a German born in the Russian Empire. Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, pp. 200–201; Halyna V'yun, Pod znakom Chervonoho Khresta v Poltavi 1941–42 rr.: spohad-zvit dlia istorii ([Neu-Ulm], 1973), pp. 13, 19, and 29.

89Of Kiev's 352,139 legal inhabitants, only 583 people gave no answer (473) or declared themselves to be "without religion" (110). The remaining 351,556 registered as being Orthodox (338,517), Protestant (3,051), Roman Catholic (8,898), other Christian (233), Muslim (714), or of "another faith" (143). Maliuzhenko, "Kyiv za 1942 r.," pp. 163–164.


generation, was as much, or perhaps even less, motivated by piety than by the fact that these buildings were the most prominent symbol of the better life that people expected. That new life would include a work-free Sunday. In the 1930s, it was rare for all the members of a peasant family to have their weekly "labor-free day" on the same day. Moreover, even their "free" day was often designated for "voluntary" labor, so that people's lives were restless and monotonous. When a German army chaplain asked male peasants in 1941 about this, they started cursing. "The women, however, tended to let out a flood of complaints. They often pointed out that the present defeat of the Bolsheviks was a just punishment by the Lord for their fight against God and the church, and in particular for the abolition of the Sunday, which made one's entire life miserable."93

Regarding baptisms, there appears to have been a certain amount of compulsion. A communist underground activist stated in a report about the Kiev and Kirovohrad regions that native authorities made baptism mandatory for all children up to the age of twelve and that the village elders summoned up those who refused.94 Although not confirmed by other sources, this information may well be correct. The military intelligence agent Hans Koch was surprised at the strength of the religious revival, but he thought it was partly a reaction to the Soviet period—that is, a way to celebrate the demise of the Soviet system. In a postwar interview, he even said that a peculiar opportunism was involved. The Ukrainians supposedly wanted to impress the Germans, whom they expected to be religious. This sounds rather unlikely, however.95

One possible way to measure the extent of the religious revival is to wonder whether believers actually cared about the controversy between the Autonomists and the Autocephalists.


93 Ernst Benz, Die religiöse Lage in der Ukraine: Erlebnisbericht eines Divisionspfarrers. Als Manuskript gedruckt (Marburg (Lahn), 1942), pp. 15–16 (quotation from 16).

94 Petr Timofeevich Berndik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii na okkupirovannoi territorii," n.p., n.d., typewritten document, signed, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 64. He adds that rebaptisms took place whenever the parish priests were replaced.

95 Hans Koch, HURIP interview, p. 8.
Hans Koch found that most faithful had a wait-and-see attitude and wanted the Germans to settle the matter, but this is an overstatement. True, bishops from both orientations were besieged with requests for priests. Once people had more information, however, and especially once they had an option to choose because both churches were represented in their community, the vast majority preferred the Autonomous church. In the fall of 1941, Einsatzgruppe C estimated that just under 55 percent of the Slavic population favored the Autonomous church, while 40 percent supported the Autocephalists. Hereafter the number of adherents of the Autocephalous church declined, because, in the words of the former head of the Church Council, in Kiev and beyond "gradually the word got around that the priests of the Church of Metropolitan Vasyli Lypkivs'kyi [that is, the church represented by Polikarp] were uncanonical and that they should be named 'Lypkivsky-ites' and 'self-consecrators'..."

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96Ibid., p. 11.


98Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 117 (18 October 1941), p. 8. The remaining 5 percent were Protestants or people affiliated with the Synodal church (Renovationists).

99This was a body based in Kiev and named in full Church Council of the Holy Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine (Tserkovna Rada Sviatoi Avtokefal'noi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy v Ukraini). It was created on 17 October 1941 and was dominated by Autocephalous priests and their sympathizers. It proved unable to control developments in church life in Kiev after the arrival of an Autonomous bishop (Panteleimon) on 18 December 1941. The SD disbanded the Council on 11 February 1942. Dublians'kyi, Ternystym shliakhom, pp. 31–32. On the council, see also the letter by Archpriest Mykhailo Ivaskiv, Panteleimon's secretary, 4 January 1942, to Dr Boss, Personalchef, German translation of a Russian original, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 1, d. 50, II. 1–2; and Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 191 (10 April 1942), p. 41. The record of one of the council sessions is in Zinkevych and Voronyn, Martyrolohiia, Vol 1, pp. 693–705. The version in Iu. Boiko-Blokhy, "Vazhlyvyi dokument Tserkovnoi Rady Ukraïn's'koï Avtokefal'noï Tserkvy z 1941 roku," Ukrains'kyi istoryk, XXIV, 1–4 (93–96) (New York, 1987), pp. 128–136 seems orthographically closer to the original, but lacks the final part, which discusses Ilarion's arrival.

The council's first president was Mykola Mykhailovych Rybachuk, a former emigré who was a lieutenant-colonel in the new city police. He writes in a memoir that one of his goals in Kiev was "to work in the organization of the Ukrainian police," and that he and his wife (Lesia Rybachuk, the head of the civil aid section of the Ukrainian Red Cross) arrived there on 29 September 1941, at 6:00 p.m. There is no evidence placing him at the site of the Babyn Jar massacre which started that day. His memoir does express the view that the "Jew-Bolsheviks" (zydo-bolsheviky) had "denationalized" the Ukrainian masses. Rybachuk, "Vidrodzhennia," II. 1–2, 12–13, and 18. He eventually became a priest in the Autocephalous church, according to Zinkevych and Voronyn, Martyrolohiia, Vol. 1, p. 737.
The former head of the short-lived Section of Denominations of the Kiev city administration confirmed this trend in a 1942 memoir. He recalled that the "overwhelming" (bezperecthna) majority of Ukraine's Orthodox faithful supported the Autonomous church. The Autocephalous Bishop Nikanor lamented in a letter that the parishioners of the supposedly Autocephalous Pokrov church in Kiev "loathe us as 'self-consecrators' and yearn for Moscow." In the Poltava region, an estimated eighty percent of all churchgoers attended only Autonomous services.

In fairness, there are some reports about a continued strength of the Autocephalous orientation. According to Generalkommissar Magunia, by the fall of 1942 both Orthodox churches were equally represented in the Kiev Generalbezirk, with the south being "strongly autocephalous." Another German report, based on conversations with Nazi officials in August 1942, said the Autocephalists were "dominant" in the Cherkasy and Kirovohrad regions. Presumably both reports refer to the distribution of parishes.

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100 Rybachuk, "Vidrodzhennia," l. 18.

101 Korovyts'kyi, "Vidrodzhennia Tserkvy," l. 33. The author, Ivan Ivanovych Korovyts'kyi, was born in Volhynia in 1907. He held the degree of Master of Theology and before the war taught Church Slavonic at Warsaw University. The Section of Denominations (Sektsiia viroispovidan') which he headed for some time was part of the city administration's Section of Culture and Education (Viddil kul'tury i osvity). Korovyts'kyi's successor as section head was one Ostryts'kyi, until January 1942, when the position was eliminated by the German authorities.


103 Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 189.

104 "Auszug aus dem Lagebericht des Generalkommissars," Kiev, 1 September 1942, USNA microcopy, T-84, roll 120, frame 419181.

105 "Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, II. 30v, 31v, 32v, 33v, 36, 37, and 38. The report found the Autocephalous church to "dominate" the Oleksandrivka district; to be "somewhat stronger" than the Autonomous church in the Oleksandriia district; to have "the most adherents" in Kirovohrad; and to be "stronger represented" than the Autonomists in the Zvenyhorodka and Uman' districts. In April 1942, Generalkommissar Oppermann of the Mykolaiv Generalbezirk wrote to Koch that he feared that the Autocephalous church was becoming a "national" church, by which he presumably meant that it was "dominant" there. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 154.

Regarding the Dnipropetrovs'k Generalbezirk, the "Teilbericht" noted the following: "The large masses support the autonomous-Orthodox orientation, whose churches are always well-attended. In the autocephalous-Orthodox church, the intelligentsia assembles. It has less a desire for spiritual care than the urge to realize its political objectives with the help or under the cover of the church." "Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, I. 33v.
The evidence dealing with changes of denominations by entire parishes is scarce, but it seems clear that most such changes were moves toward the Autonomous church, as for example in the Mykolaïv region in late 1942.\(^\text{106}\) In contrast, when Volhynia became a partisan zone in 1943, parishes started to abandon the Autonomous church and to join the Autocephalous church. There is reason to doubt whether this was actually according to the will of most Orthodox, for considerable pressure was exerted by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the leaders of which were hostile toward the Autonomists.

Most Orthodox faithful had two problems with the Autocephalous church. One was their conviction that it was uncanonical. At least as important was that church's insistence on the use of the Ukrainian language, which proved to be very unpopular in Dnieper Ukraine. On this matter, the Autonomous church was more flexible—Church Slavonic was its liturgical language, but a bishop could allow the use of Ukrainian if most parishioners preferred it.\(^\text{107}\) As a result, it was not unusual for Autonomous parishes in western Volhynia to have officially the service, in part or even entirely, in Ukrainian, and to have any Church Slavonic pronounced in Ukrainian.\(^\text{108}\) In Dnieper Ukraine, however, any priest who tried to introduce Ukrainian in the liturgy faced, sooner or later, dissatisfaction and resistance from parishioners.\(^\text{109}\)

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\(^{108}\) Velychkivs'kyi, "Sumni chasy [...]", Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, XII, 6 (1965), p. 801. Nazi intelligence reported in August 1941 from Zhytomyr that Orthodox faithful wanted the liturgy in Church Slavonic and the preach in Ukrainian, and that the priests were "little interested in national issues." Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 52 (14 August 1941), p. 14. According to Bishop Panteleimon's secretary, Mykhaïlo Ivaskiv, "all parishes in Volhynia [were] saying prayers in Ukrainian." Zinkevych and Vorony, Martyrolohiia, Vol 1, p. 698.

\(^{109}\) The opposite view is in Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 191: "...As more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry." This is based on two articles in Krakiv's'kyi visti and one article in the Prague-based weekly Nastup.

Before the suppression of Ukrainian nationalist activity in Kiev, services there were generally conducted in Church Slavonic with Ukrainian pronunciation. Rybachuk, "Vidrozhennia," l. 24, referring to the Holy Trinity Church in V.-Vasyl'kivs'ka Street. Cf. Leontii Forostivs'kyi, Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy (Buenos Aires, 1952), p. 59, who writes, with much exaggeration, that the Autonomous clergy in Kiev's churches "was forced to pronounce sermons and even to conduct the [entire] service in Ukrainian and demonstrate its independence from the Muscovite Church, while hiding under 'autonomy.'"
Sviatoshyn, a western suburb of Kiev, an Autocephalous priest asked the choir to sing in Ukrainian. As he reported in December 1941, "the congregation did not want to do this, and when I hold service, the former choir singers plant themselves onto the rood-loft [krylos] and start to sing in Slavonic, and all behave as they see fit." In Kiev's Pokrov church, soon morning services in Church Slavonic had to be allowed. In Dnipropetrovsk, unidentified activists even placed a bomb under the cathedral where Ukrainian-language services were conducted. The explosion caused little damage, but it apparently set in motion a struggle which involved vandalism against both Orthodox denominations.

The resistance against Ukrainian in the church was no less in the Dnieper Ukrainian countryside. A glimpse is provided by the record of a 20 November 1941 regional conference ("Synod") in Bucha, a village about 25 kilometers west of Kiev, of forty-five faithful and priests from thirteen villages (or five parishes). Most delegates were laypeople (thirty-five), Ukrainians (forty; the other five were Russians), and women (probably). An autocephalous archpriest (mytrofornyi protoierei) from Kiev urged everyone to build "one single Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, with one language, spirit, and administration." It was important to "liquidate all hostile leftovers of groups that were artificially created under the influence of Jew-Bolshevik propaganda." The minutes note that this speech was "debated vividly."

'Ukraine must be independent and the church Ukrainian,' says Synod delegate Mr. Zhovkov'skiy, Bucha.

10 Rybachuk, "Vidrodzhennia," II. 21–22, quoting from an original letter by Father Myron Karpan located at ibid., II. 107-108. This priest had been consecrated in the UAOC in 1921.


12 This involved the Transfiguration Cathedral (Preobrazhens'kyi Sobor), where Bishop Hennadii (Shypkykevych) of Sicheslav was based after his arrival in June 1942. (A month later, the Autonomous bishop Dymytrii (Mahan) of Dnipropetrovsk arrived.) The Gebietskommissar participated in a public ceremony in which he handed Hennadii a bishop's staff and granted him the use of the building. Hennadii got along well with both factions of the OUN. Mykola Pavlovych Kostiuk (Ukrainian-Canadian, 1915 [present-day Dnipropetrovsk]-1997), author interview in Ukrainian, 1 March 1996, Downsview, Ontario, Canada, tape recording; Vlasovs'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 233; Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 218; Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 157.
'We want the divine service to be in Old Church Slavonic,' says Mrs. Borzokovskaja from the village of Bucha, a Russian woman and a very pious person who devoted her life to saving the church in Lychans'k [Kyievo-Sviatoshyn's'kyi raion] from Bolshevik destruction.

'In Hostomel' the divine service is in Ukrainian, that's why the people don't attend it,' say delegates who are uneducated women from the village of Shybene, Borodianka raion.

The Autocephalous priest countered that Church Slavonic was not accessible enough. But, typically, he was forced to make a concession. Until printed Ukrainian translations of the service would become available, he said, services should at the very least be pronounced with a Ukrainian accent. After some more discussion the delegates resolved to reject all "schismatic agitation."113

To the Autocephalous minority, it was hard to face the fact that most Ukrainian Orthodox opposed them. Therefore they called all of them "Russians" or even "Muscovites" (moskali), a by then antiquated term for Russians.114 But contrary to the belief of the Autocephalists, the popular distaste for the vernacular language in the church did not signify any commitment to a Russian national identity. Most Orthodox faithful simply felt strongly that to contact the Almighty, one should use the most elevated language they knew—as one western Volhynian peasant put it, "the language which God spoke."115 There was possibly also a subconscious reason. The archaic Slavonic language kept the message at a distance, which seemed to make the commandments less compelling.116

113"Protokoll Nr. 1 des kirchlichen Organisations-Sobor im Kiewer Bezirk, der am 20. November 1941 in der Peter-Paul-Kirche im Dorf Butscha-Lisna stattfand," TsDAOV, f. 3676, op. 1, d. 50, ll. 12–20. This is a translation of the original minutes in Ukrainian typed by the Church Council in Kiev that was sent to Dr Boss, the Personalchef of Kiev, as an appendix to a letter by Bishop Panteleimon's secretary, on 4 January 1942. The archpriest in question was Ivan Potapenko, a man consecrated before 1920, that is, not in the UAOC. He represented the Kiev-based Church Council.

114Korovyts'kyi, "Vidrodzhennia tsedcvy," l. 52. A trace of this mentality can also be found in Vlasov's'kyi, "Iak bulo," p. 28, which states that the Autonomists wanted to use Ilarion to "hide ... their Muscophilism and spread the agitation that they were also Ukrainians."

115Khurtovyna, Pid nebom Volyni, p. 99.

The strongest basis of support for the Autocephalists was among the small Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{117} But even here support for the Ukrainian language was not a given. Kiev's Ukrainian Orthodox intelligentsia frequently attended the Greek Catholic services which from January 1942 were held in the formerly Roman Catholic St Oleksander church. In accordance with Greek Catholic practice, these services were in Church Slavonic with Ukrainian pronunciation, and with a Ukrainian sermon. Father Iurii Kostiuk's success aroused the envy and ire of the local Autocephalists, who knew nothing about church life in Galicia. The head of the Ukrainian National Council, Mykola Velychkv's'kyi, even asked Kostiuk to change to Latin-rite services, in exchange for a payment. The "problem" solved itself in June 1942, when the priest received a German order to return to the Generalgouvernement.\textsuperscript{118}

To determine the extent of the religious revival more fully, it would be useful to employ figures. Unfortunately, most administrative records were lost or are difficult to access. For instance, the records of the Church Council in Kiev and its Autocephalous successor, the Supreme Church Administration, were almost certainly destroyed.\textsuperscript{119} There exist figures on denominations and clerics at the parish level, copies of originals which the raion chiefs sent to

\textsuperscript{117}``The intelligentsia everywhere is streaming toward the autocephalous Orthodox church."

`Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 40v. See also, regarding cities, Heyer, Orthodox Kirche, p. 189.

\textsuperscript{118}According to Korovyts'kyi, "in connection with the popularity of the Greek Catholic divine service among Kiev's Ukrainian Orthodox intelligentsia, Metropolitan A. Sheptyts'kyi's pastoral letter for church unification [of 3 March 1942, which was actually for "reconciliation"] found resonance there." Korovyts'kyi, "Vidrodzhennia tserkvy," ll. 62–63. See also Nykon Nemyron [Mykola Andrusiak], "U zbudzhenii v ohni stolitysi Ukraïny (Slavni pam"lati muchenykiv za Ukrainu v Kyievì v 1941–42 rr.)," in Mykhailo H. Marunchak, ed., \textit{V borot'bi za ukrains'ku derzhavu: esel', spohady, svidchennia, litopysannia, dokumenty Druhoi svitovoi viini} (Winnipeg, 1990), pp. 811 and 817. Velychkv's'kyi's antipathy against the Greek Catholic church is confirmed by his memoirs: Velychkv's'kyi, "Sumni chasy [...]," \textit{Vyzvol'nyi shliakh}, XII, 4 (1965), p. 399. On Sheptyts'kyi's letter "To the Ukrainian faithful Orthodox intelligentsia," see Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, p. 152. A copy of this letter is at DAKO, f. r-2412, op. 2, d. 199, l. 97.

\textsuperscript{119}The SD confiscated the Church Council's records and never returned them. The records of the Supreme Church Administration (Vysche Tserkovna Upravlinnia) were evacuated by car, but Germans who wanted space for themselves threw the bags on the road. The personal records of the members of that administration were burned in Kiev, so as not to let them fall into the hands of the NKVD. Letter by Nikanor in Zinkevych and Voronyyn, \textit{Martyrolohiia}, Vol 1, p. 714; Dublians'kyi, \textit{Ternystym shliakhom}, p. 41n32.
the Gebietskommissare. Unfortunately, these documents are "hidden" among mountains of others. The records from Polikarp's administration were taken into the emigration in 1944 and are still not available to outside researchers. As a result, the only figures available come from published primary and secondary sources.

According to its fall 1942 Synod, the entire Autocephalous church in both the Reichskommissariat and the regions to the east of it had a total of 513 parishes. Of these parishes, 298 were in the "Kiev region" (Kyïvshchyna), that is, probably what was considered the Eparchy of Kiev. A little over five hundred parishes in such a large territory does not strike one as a very high number. No such general figures are available for the Autonomous church.

Friedrich Heyer, a former soldier who met many hierarchs and priests in Ukraine, estimated after the war that when parishes from both Orthodox churches are added, by the summer of 1943, about two thirds of the pre-1917 number of parishes had been restored in the Kievan eparchy and about half of them in the Eparchy of Zhytomyr. When counting only Autonomous parishes, a third of all pre-1917 parishes in the eparchies of Podolia and Vinnytsia came back to life. The following table contains actual numbers of Orthodox parishes as provided in the literature. Unfortunately, there are no such numbers whatsoever for five Autonomous and five Autocephalous eparchies (to be sure, some of which were small in size). Unless indicated otherwise, the information comes from Heyer's work.

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10An example is the handwritten "Reiestratsiiia pravoslavnykh parafii Rokynians'koho r-nu," DAKO, f. r-2292, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 13-15, prepared in response to an order of 5 August 1942 from the raion chief. It also includes information about Protestants.

11Letter by Polikarp of 1956, quoted in Vlasovs'kyi, Narys istorii, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 234. These figures, for 1 September 1942, are also in Dublians'kyi, Ternystym shliakhom, pp. 44-45, with the comment that they originate from Nikanor's speech at the unofficial October 1942 Synod. Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 206, has the number of 298 parishes for the Autocephalous Kievan eparchy and the number of 226 for the Kiev region.

12These eparchies are, in the Volhynia-Podolia Generalbezirk: the Autonomous Eparchy of Volhynia (Aleksii) which had four vicariates (Luts'k, Rivne, Pochaïv, and Volodymyr-Volyns'kyi); the Autonomous Eparchy of Brest (Ioan); the Autocephalous Vicariate of Dubno (Viacheslav); the Autocephalous Eparchy of Polissia and Pinsk (Oleltsander), which included the Vicariate of Brest; in the Zhytomyr Generalbezirk: the Autonomous Eparchy of Mazyr ("Nikolai")
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eparchy (Bishop/Archbishop, Generalbezirk)</th>
<th>Number of parishes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Podolia (Autonomous; Damaskyn, V-P GB)</td>
<td>nearly 500 by October 1942&lt;sup&gt;125&lt;/sup&gt;; declining to 250 by the fall of 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luts'k and Kovel' (Autocephalous archeparchy; Polikarp, V-P GB)</td>
<td>over 400 by early October 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krem'ianets'-Rivne (Autocephalous; Platon, V-P GB)</td>
<td>220 by early October 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyr (Autonomous; Leontii, Zh GB)</td>
<td>300 by summer 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnytsia (Autonomous; Ievlhoii, Zh GB)</td>
<td>298 by fall 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyr (Autocephalous; Hryhorii, Zh GB)</td>
<td>100 by summer 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev (Autonomous; Panteleimon, K GB)</td>
<td>410 by late 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava and Lubny (Autonomous; Veniamyn, K GB)</td>
<td>at least 140 by early 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev (Autocephalous; Nikanor, K GB)</td>
<td>298 on 1 September 1942&lt;sup&gt;126&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uman' (Autocephalous; Ihor, K GB)</td>
<td>60 by September 1942&lt;sup&gt;127&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava (Autocephalous; Potul'nyts'kyi/Syl'vestr, K GB)</td>
<td>150 in 1943, excluding the Lubny region&lt;sup&gt;128&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the Autocephalous Eparchy of Podolia (Fotii); in the Kiev Generalbezirk: the Autocephalous Eparchy of Pereiaslav (Mstyslav); in the Mykolaiv Generalbezirk: the Autonomous Eparchy of Mykolaiv (Antonii); the Autonomous Eparchy of Kherson (Serafym); and in the Crimea Generalbezirk (i.e., the Taurida Partial District): the Autocephalous Eparchy of Melitopol' (Serhii).


<sup>125</sup>Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 196.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ielysavethrad (Autocephalous; Mykhail, M GB) incl. the vicariate of Novo-Myhorod</th>
<th>over 100 until October 1942, declining thereafter(^{129})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovs'k (Autonomous; Dymytrii, D GB)</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicheslav (Autocephalous; Hennadii, D GB)</td>
<td>over 100 until Christmas 1942; eventually over 150(^{130})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the maximum numbers from this table are added—which may count twice parishes that changed allegiance—the total is 3,500. In addition, it may be estimated that the unlisted eparchies covered about a thousand parishes. Thus, the total estimated number of autonomous or autocephalous parishes in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, a territory which officially had 16,910,008 inhabitants on 1 January 1943,\(^{131}\) was 4,500. This means that to every 3,750 natives, there was only one church. This shows that despite all the efforts to revive church life, the number of parishes remained rather low.

The figures which exist for certain cities confirm this general impression. In Kiev, churches were basically confined to the outskirts and suburbs. To be sure, this was also partly because the Soviet authorities had destroyed most of those located in the center. The Germans did not agree to hand over the St Sophia cathedral for services.\(^{132}\) The Dormition Cathedral (Uspens'kyi Sobor), dating back to the eleventh century and the centerpiece of the Monastery of the Caves, could not be used either, for it was demolished by dynamite on 3 November 1941. It is still unclear who set off the explosion.\(^{133}\) Only one large cathedral was open for

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\(^{131}\)"Uebersicht über die Verwaltungseinteilung des Reichskommissariats Ukraine nach dem Stand vom 1. Januar 1943," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 231, l. 45.

\(^{132}\)Interview with Mstyslav in Zinkevych and Vorony, *Martyrolohiia*, Vol 1, p. 739. Cf. Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, "*Velyka Vitsyzniana viina,*" p. 149, which says there were (at first) services in its small church.

services, St Andrew Cathedral (Andriivs'kyi Sobor). Besides this church, the Autocephalists had two other church buildings at their disposal.\textsuperscript{134} All twenty-five other churches were Autonomous by the spring of 1943.\textsuperscript{135} The large St Volodymyr Cathedral had its first (Autonomous) service only on 19 September 1943, the second anniversary of the German arrival.\textsuperscript{136} Thus, altogether rather few parishes existed in Kiev. Dnipropetrovs'k eventually had ten working churches, all Autonomous, but as in the case of Kiev, this was little compared to the pre-1917 situation, when the city had had twenty-seven churches.\textsuperscript{137} Poltava also had ten Orthodox churches,\textsuperscript{138} Vinnytsia only seven (all but two Autonomous).\textsuperscript{139}

Another way to measure the religious revival is by studying church attendance. There is strong evidence that many people showed up for major religious events. Large numbers of city-dwellers went to the Dnieper in 1942 for the Water Blessing (Vodokhreshchi).\textsuperscript{140} The next year, as many as 60,000 people came for the same occasion to Dnipropetrovs'k's Transfiguration Cathedral (Preobrazhens'kyi Sobor) and made the two-kilometer procession to

\textsuperscript{134}Vlasovs'kyi, \textit{Narys istorii}, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 233. These were the Pokrov church in the Solom'ianka district and the Ascension (Voznesens'ka) church in the southern Demiivka district. Until at least early November 1941, there were also priests from Lypkiivs'kyi's UAOC in the Pokrov church in the (Priors'ka-)Kurenivka district and in the Ascension (Voznesens'ka) church on the Baikove cemetery. Rybachuk, "Vidrodzhennia," l. 23. They must have left of their own accord or were forced to leave.


\textsuperscript{136}The building, which had been a museum before 1941, was made available by the German authorities only in the spring of 1942, to the Autonomous church. Restoration took much time. Letter by Nikanor in Zinkevych and Voronyn, \textit{Martyrolohiia}, Vol 1, p. 716; Heyer, \textit{Orthodox Kirche}, p. 209; Dublians'kyi, \textit{Terny tym shliakhom}, p. 51; Tatiana Fesenko, \textit{Povest' krivykh let} (New York, 1963), p. 90.

\textsuperscript{137}Heyer, \textit{Orthodox Kirche}, p. 208.

\textsuperscript{138}According to ibid., p. 207, four churches were Autocephalous, while six were Autonomous. According to Vlasovs'kyi, \textit{Narys istorii}, Vol. 9, part 2, pp. 233–234, who perhaps describes an earlier state of affairs, six churches, including two in suburbs, were Autocephalous, while three others were Autonomous. Because Heyer visited the city, his figures appear more reliable.

\textsuperscript{139}Heyer, \textit{Orthodoxe Kirche}, p. 207.

\textsuperscript{140}Ibid., p. 171.
the river.\textsuperscript{141} Easter was a festive occasion everywhere in 1942 and in 1943. In the last year it drew a crowd to Dnipropetrovs’k which was so large that the procession around the cathedral could be carried out only once, instead of the prescribed three times.\textsuperscript{142} In the countryside, almost the entire population participated in Easter. In the evenings, as curfews were lifted for the occasion, the people enjoyed choirs, bandura music, and amateur theater.\textsuperscript{143} The festivity of Thanksgiving (\textit{Spasa}) also returned, as did carolling by small children.\textsuperscript{144}

One wonders, however, how much of all this participation proves more than a widespread desire to use legitimate occasions to celebrate.\textsuperscript{145} It seems more important to focus on church life on regular days. According to Hans Koch, the number of churchgoers kept increasing "until 1943."\textsuperscript{146} As for the peasants, the meager evidence does not quite confirm this. In a village in southern Ukraine in 1942, a German visitor saw "old women, graybeards, but also women, young girls, and many children crowding around the entrance" of a small church. He saw no boys or young men, and assumed they were harvesting and perhaps not interested.\textsuperscript{147} According to Heyer, "the enormous market of Poltava was filled every Sunday morning with many thousands of peasants, who came there singing and laughing on their sleds and carts to trade. Few of them failed to visit the market church, which, white and newly plastered, rose above the bustle."\textsuperscript{148} It is unknown if this describes the situation before or after

\textsuperscript{141}According to the Autonomous bishop Dymytrii, who by then held services there. He told Heyer that censorship allowed the \textit{Dnipropetrovs’ka hazeta} of 23 January 1943 only to speak of 20,000 people. Ibid., p. 208.

\textsuperscript{142}Ibid. Dymytrii saw similar crowds during his visits to Pavlohrad and Zaporizhzhia.

\textsuperscript{143}For example in the Baryshivka raion in 1942. Raion chief Spodoba to the \textit{Feldkommandatur} in Iahotyn, DAKO, f. r-2418, op. 1, d. 13, l. 64. Cf. Ortwin Buchbender, \textit{Das tönende Erz: deutsche Propaganda gegen die Roten Armee im Zweiten Weltkrieg} (Stuttgart, 1978), p. 278.

\textsuperscript{144}Heyer, \textit{Orthodoxe Kirche}, p. 172.

\textsuperscript{145}The same comment is in Wilhelm, "Der SD," p. 91, citing \textit{Meldungen}, 2 (8 May 1942), p. 9, which reported from Belarusian territories north of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

\textsuperscript{146}Hans Koch, HURIP interview, p. 9. He felt certain that not all were actually believers.


\textsuperscript{148}Heyer, \textit{Orthodoxe Kirche}, p. 207.
the introduction of civilian Nazi rule. A German report based on statements by Ukrainian propagandists noted that in mid-1943, church attendance in several regions was "very high." But a man from a village in the Kiev region recalled in an interview that "nobody" went to church. Altogether, the evidence regarding the villages is ambiguous.

Regarding the major cities, the evidence on church attendance or regular days is more straightforward. In 1941 and early 1942, Kiev's St Andrew's Cathedral, where a "State Choir" sang, was generally filled. But there were services in the city which not a single person attended, as Heyer discovered. To his mind, secularism remained predominant in Kiev, and a local actor told him: "What do Kievans believe in? A piece of bread, that's all!" Similarly, according to a communist report of October 1942, church attendance in Dnipropetrovs'k was "insignificant—based on the very old." In Vinnytsia, the churches in mid-1943 had bishops, clergy, and choirs, but, as Mykhailo Seleshko found, "none had a large number of faithful, and the churches were deserted.... Even the oldest people rarely went to church." Whatever the attendance by city-dwellers in 1941 and 1942, by 1943 it was certainly not more than modest.

149 Report based on Ukrainian propagandists, Berlin, 30 November 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, l. 55, on the Dnipropetrovs'k, Mykolaiv, Melitopol', and Kirovohrad districts. It notes in general "very high church attendance. Everywhere and often church weddings."


151 Letter by Nikanor in Zinkevych and Voronyh, Martyrolohiia, Vol 1, p. 717, which says that those attending were members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Cf. Hartymiv, "Zemleiu ukrains'koiu...", p. 126; Paul Werner, Ein Schweizer Journalist sieht Rußland: auf den Spuren der deutschen Armee zwischen San und Dnjep (Olton, 1942), unnumbered page in back with picture; Italian journalist F. Berlotti, quoted in Onats'kyi, "Ukraine [...]," Samostiina Ukraina, XVIII, 2 (192) (February 1965), p. 20; and Fedir Haiovych, article in the Prague-based weekly Nastup in 1941, reprinted as F. H. (Fedir Haiovych), "Kyiv u zhotvni 1941," in Mel'nyk et. al., Na zov Kyieva, p. 163. The choir was conducted by Petro H. Honcharov, according to Dubians'kyi, Ternystym shliakhom, p. 36.

152 Heyer, Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 209.

153 Savchenko, VRIO NKVD USSR, to N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka No 33/68 o polozhenii v okupirovannom protivnikom g. Dnipropetrovske. Po sostoianiu na 20. 10. 42g.," 21 October 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 97.

154 Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 102. He got an unfavorable impression of the Orthodox priests he met; they were rarely more educated than the average person and only seemed to know the rituals.
There were several reasons why attendance was not as high in the countryside, and particularly the cities, as it could have been. In the countryside, one reason were the occasional German bans during the harvest period. Such local bans meant that attendance was forbidden on holidays which fell on weekdays, or on Saturday evening (vespers), in middle of the Sunday, and sometimes even on the entire Sunday. Germans who caught transgressors chased them out and ordered the priest the lock the building. The *Gebietslandwirt* might lash the people out with his whip.\(^\text{155}\) Priests could be beaten up for ignoring bans on mid-Sunday mass and were often forced to participate in the harvesting.\(^\text{156}\) Fear of being apprehended at the church and deported to Germany also diminished attendance, as did a fear of exposing oneself as a Christian, in light of a possible return of the Soviet authorities.\(^\text{157}\) The latter applied only to city-dwellers, however, for villagers already knew such things.

But the main reasons for staying away from the church were indifference and alienation. Seleshko was told that, as before 1941, people cared only about the baptism.\(^\text{158}\) People also felt alienated from their priests. They quickly found out that "the Gestapo" used the clergy for various political tasks. All new priests had to sign a vow to spy on their communities.\(^\text{159}\) Moreover, like all bishops, they were themselves closely monitored by the Germans and their informers. Among other things, this was to verify whether the priests

\(^\text{155}\)Heyer, *Orthodoxe Kirche*, p. 209. Heyer mistakingly calls such cases exceptional.

\(^\text{156}\)Vlasov's'kyi, *Narys istorii*, Vol. 9, part 2, pp. 237–238; Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]", TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 64.

\(^\text{157}\)Fear of exposing oneself as a Christian may also explain why priests who went door to door in Poltava in 1942 during the forty-day fast before Christmas were rarely let in, even though they had been welcomed the year before. Heyer, *Orthodoxe Kirche*, pp. 208–209.

\(^\text{158}\)Seleshko, *Vinnytsia*, p. 103.

\(^\text{159}\)Father Kovtun of the village of Moshoryne (Nova Praha), quoted in a postwar report: Mikhail Mikh. Skirda [et. al.], "Otech o podpol'noi partiinoi rabote i partizanskoi bor'be v Kirovogradskoi oblasti (avgust 1941 goda - mart 1944 goda)," n.d., typewritten document, signed, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 24.

Priests were supposed to receive a salary from the parish, which would then be taxed. In practise, this German regulation was ignored and they were paid in kind, usually with a loaf of bread. "Auszug aus dem Lagebericht des Generalkommissars," Kiev, 1 September 1942, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419181; Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 191; Vlasov's'kyi, *Narys istorii*, Vol. 9, part 2, p. 235; Hans Koch, HURIP interview, quoted in Fireside, *Icon and Swastika*, p. 154.
obeyed the repeated orders from _Gebietskommissare_ to incite the parishioners to assist them in every possible way. On Hitler's birthday, 20 April 1942, all priests had to pray for the _Führer_ in special services, and they reportedly did so "in part." The priests were driven to do all this by mortal fear. Father N. P. Stukalo of Oleksandria, a town east of Kirovohrad, is known to have received weekly instructions, and probably threats to his life; undoubtedly, his case was typical. Another (or perhaps the same) priest in the same town once in early 1942 suggested in a homily that the Germans might leave. He was lucky to be let go after fifty birchblows.

Popular revulsion against priests was the greatest in central and eastern Ukraine, particularly its cities. As early as October 1941, those Kievnians who were still shaken by the Babyn Jar massacre undoubtedly became disgusted with Autocephalous priests who praised the Germans and apparently called them "light-haired knights." Very important was the fact that people's husbands, sons, and brothers had been drafted into the Red Army and were hoped to be still alive. When the above-mentioned Father Stukalo asked his congregation to help defeat

160 For example, in August 1942 all the clergy of the Vinnytsia district were summoned for a meeting. Present were sixteen Autonomous priests, eleven Autocephalous priests, Bishop Fotii (Tymoshchuk), and four Protestants. (The representative of the Roman Catholic church in Hnivan' did not show up.) Here the regional _Kirchenreferent_ Höhn ordered these representatives to incite the faithful to collaborate with the Germans. "Teilbericht Politik über die Bereisung des Reichskommissariats mit Prof. v. Grünberg in der Zeit vom 13.8. bis 3.9.1942," Rivne, 10 September 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 28. See also "Erklärung des orthodoxen Kirchenrates von Cherson," TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 1, d. 50, l. 27.

161 Announcement in _Poslednie novosti_, 20 April 1942, p. 4. The quotation is from a September 1942 report on the "eastern territories" authored by Dr Eberhard Taubert, the head of the Eastern section of the Propaganda Ministry and Eugen Hadamowsky, the director of Radio Berlin, quoted in _Fireside, Icon and Swastika_, p. 112. Of course this report is self-serving. It also says that the posters with the text "Hitler, the Liberator" have become "sacred possessions in all peasant and worker shacks throughout the east."

162 Skirda, "Otchet [...]." TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 24.

163 Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhnenii [...]." TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 64.

the "enemy," the parishioners got angry and attendance dropped. Old people said the place of worship had become "debauched."165

It is also instructive to look for generational differences. Anecdotal evidence provides no surprises about young females in western Volhynia: they were generally pious. When the Red Army returned to the region, one of its soldiers asked a local Ukrainian girl to sow a button on his clothes. It was a Sunday, so that the request brought this frightened reaction: "Hrikh!"—That's a sin!166 In Dnieper Ukraine, however, there existed a deep generational divide regarding religion.167 The "Komsomol generation," those born in the 1920s and 1930s, was clearly little interested in going to church. In fact, the vast majority of males, and many females, from this generation did not attend church at all. In the countryside they helped reconstruct the churches, but that was mainly out of solidarity and because they had never seen a mass.168 As early as the fall of 1941, the SD estimated that half of the young generation was atheist.169 The young people quickly found that to them, masses were far less interesting than movies. They stopped attending or went "as if to a theater," as Seleshko discovered. "They listened for a while how the choir sang and left. Young people said that the liturgy meant nothing to them, it was a nothing but a nice show. They complained that it was boring, for every week the performance was the same."170 Young people also frequently behaved as if in a

165Skirda, "Otchet [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 24. See also: "At first even the youth reached out to the church, mainly out of curiosity, but it quickly became disappointed. Hereafter, gradually adults also started to cool down and to lose respect for the church, especially in connection with appeals by the priests to [G]od to help defeat the Red Army and to let the Germans win." Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 64.

166Mikhail Koriakov, Osvozhdienie dushi (New York, 1952), p. 197. For a similar observation in Polissia, see Maksym Skorups'kyi, U nastupakh i vidstupakh: (spohady) (Chicago 1961), p. 52. A supposedly new increase in interest in the church among young people, particularly female ones, in the Lut'sk and Pinsk districts, is noted in a German report from Berlin, 30 November 1943, located at TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, l. 48.

167The observation has been made before, but with little supporting documentation; see Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 156 and 189.


169Ibid., 120 (21 October 1941), p. 10.

170Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 102. Additional evidence regarding young city-dwellers is in Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 52 (14 August 1941), p. 14; in "Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAVOV, f.
circus, for example by touching the priests' gowns.\footnote{Heyer, \textit{Orthodoxe Kirche}, p. 201, referring to church life in Poltava.} Altogether, church attendance by the young was "significantly less than in the pre-Soviet period."\footnote{Heyer, \textit{Orthodoxe Kirche}, p. 218.}

The lack of interest even extended to the middle-aged. Einsatzkommando 6 of Einsatzgruppe C reported as early as August 1941 from the Vinnytsia countryside that "a rejection [of the church] could not be observed, but unambiguous support comes only from some women and elderly men. The young generation and the middle-aged [peasants] appear to be indifferent on this issue, but also willing to participate once asked."\footnote{Benz, \textit{Die religiöse Lage}, pp. 36–37. See also "Suchasne ukraïns'ke selo (Vid vlasnoho korespondenta)," \textit{Ukraine's'kyi visnyk} (Berlin), 4 April 1943, pp. 6–7, regarding a village in the Berdychiv district.} A German chaplain who spoke Russian and spent much time in the countryside arrived at the same conclusion. In his words, "religious life" only existed "there where it already existed before the Communist period, namely [among] the older generation, that is, those older than thirty-five." Those up to twenty-five were almost all "completely alienated and indifferent."\footnote{Ereignismeldung \textit{UdSSR}, 81 (12 September 1941), p. 15. Similar evidence is provided in "Teilbericht Politik [...]", TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, ll. 30v, 32v, and 33v. According to this source, in the Oleksandriia district "the youth is little interested in religion"; priests in the Oleksandrivka district "have the people behind them, but the youth only to a small extent"; and in the Dnipropetrovsk Generalbezirk "the youth is extremely indifferent about the denominations."} The lack of interest in religion was particularly pronounced among young and middle-aged peasants in the industrial regions. The SD found "a marked indifference" there in the fall of 1941.\footnote{Heyer, \textit{Orthodoxe Kirche}, p. 218.}

After civilian rule was introduced and the Soviet separation of church and state was declared still in place—or, more precisely, restored—young peasants started to express objections to, or otherwise disrespect, people's piety. The administration of the Autonomous Eparchy of Vinnytsia even complained to the Germans about the phenomenon.\footnote{Evangelical 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 31v, regarding Kirovohrad; and in a report from the Supreme Command of the German Army, dated 6 April 1943, on the treatment of the civilian population in the entire "east," published in Buchbender, \textit{Das törende Erz}, p. 319.}
missionaries held public meetings in villages (and cities). These meetings were apparently well attended; a Communist report even spoke of a "large pull" in the Right Bank toward the Evangelists. But the audience invariably included people who shifted in their seats and asked each other, "Who allowed them to preach here?" There were also militant atheists, who were momentarily powerless. According to a former missionary, their faces were "distorted with malice."

Only one report, based on intelligence gathered by Ukrainian propagandists, found that by the middle of 1943, young people in the Zhytomyr and Kiev districts participated in the supposedly "abundant" church attendance. But the many testimonies to the contrary cast grave doubt on this finding. Indeed, even the fact that many young males with a higher education became priests does not mean as much as it might seem. At least in part, these males had "negative" motives for joining the priesthood—a lack of other proper employment and a wish to evade manual labor.

This survey of religious life should conclude that the religious revival was in many ways a failure. As time went on, German authorities interfered and obstructed church life more and more. Most importantly, among the young and even the middle aged, particularly in the cities, there was little or no genuine interest in or respect for the Orthodox church. This was because of official German obstruction, but also because of events in Soviet Ukraine before 1941, in particular the official campaigns against church life and indeed any religiosity.

177Liubomyrenko, Z Khrystom v Ukraini, p. 51; Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 64. There were reportedly by 1943 east of the former pre-1939 border 713 Evangelical communities with a total of 32,000 members. H. Domashovets', Naris istorii ukrain's'koj ievanhel's'ko-baptyst's'koj tserkvy (Irvington and Toronto, 1967), pp. 222–224.

178Liubomyrenko, Z Khrystom v Ukraini, p. 40.

179Report, Berlin, 30 November 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, ll. 51 and 53, regarding the Zhytomyr and Kiev districts.

180"Teilbericht Politik [...]" TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 40v. Generalkommissar Magunia also reported in 1942 that young people in the Kiev Generalbezirk were "not very interested" in the church and merely "use[d] the service to evade work." Auszug aus dem Lagebericht des Generalkommissars," Kiev, 1 September 1942, USNA microcopy, T-84, roll 120, frame 419181.
Reichskommissar Koch was very much opposed to any vibrant cultural life for the native population of his Reichskommissariat. This was in keeping with Hitler, who had nothing against music for the Slavic masses, but thought that the Germans "should not allow anything to be published." At a speech in Rivne in August 1942, just returning from Hitler's headquarters, Koch insisted as usual on a hard line vis-à-vis the "inferior" Ukrainians. Naturally, this also had implication for cultural policies. He put it as follows: "As for culture, we have given [sic!] the Ukrainians both churches. Further cultural work is out of the question." This was overall an accurate description of the general line of the Nazi German administration. All the same, cultural activities that were alternatives for religion did exist in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Here follows a discussion of: (1) movies; (2) reading; (3) performances and exhibitions; (4) political gatherings; (5) sports; and (6) private socializing. The main question is to what extent these matters were available and how popular they were. Comparisons with the Soviet period will be made as far as the meager state of knowledge about cultural life in prewar Ukraine allows.

Cinema enjoyed popularity, if only because it seemed a way to get to know other countries. Apart from the many films showing for Germans only, the numbers of movies and newsreels playing never reached the scale it had in the prewar Soviet Union. By February 1942, there were only fifty movie theaters open to the native population of the

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1Adolf Hitler, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1944: die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims herausgegeben von Werner Jochmann (Hamburg, 1980), pp. 311–312, statements of 3 March 1942.

Reichskommissariat, and they were mostly in large cities. There was also an unknown number of itinerant "movie wagons."

Movies were often preceded by Germany's weekly newsreel. This so-called Wochenschau, in a Ukrainian or Russian translation, was reportedly watched with great interest. Lack of supply was a persistent problem, however. For example, in August 1942 Dnipropetrovsk's single Ukrainian movie theater was still showing newsreels from the previous winter. As for movies, they were generally German situation and love comedies, with subtitles or dubbing in Ukrainian or Russian. Nazi intelligence found that initially the spectators were "stunned that they completely lacked agitation" or only included the fascist greeting. In early April 1943, Kiev's movie program for non-Germans was typical:

Hloriia (formerly 'October'; 26 Konstantynivs'ka St): 'Between Hamburg and Haiti'
Liks (95 'Livis'ka St): 'The Queen's Heart'
Orion (79 M. Volodymyrs'ka St): 'Ms. Luna'
Lira (40 V. Zhytomyrs'ka St): 'Hawk Girl'
Ekho (61 V. Vasyl'kivs'ka St): 'He's on His Own, There Are Seven of Them'

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3"Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 262. By late November 1942, there were reportedly about three hundred permanent movie theaters in use in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, apart from itinerant projectors on cars. "Rik pratsi fil'movoho t-va v Ukraïni," Dzvin voli, 27 November 1942, p. 3. Most of these facilities were likely meant only for Germans.

4"Lagebericht" for December 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 27, ll. 5–6; Meldungen, 25 (16 October 1942), p. 15. The last source adds, "Here it should be noted that in the Soviet film industry the so-called chronicle—similar to our Wochenschau—was the weakest part. The spectator considered it a necessary evil, which one had to watch. Many spectators made sure that they entered the theater only after the showing of the chronicle, as it was often downright monotonous."


There were also showings of pure propaganda movies, such as "The Life of the German Farmer and Workers and the Life of the People under Stalin's Yoke," as well as anti-Semitic films ("Süß the Jew," "The Jews and the NKVD"). Apolitical Soviet movies which had been displayed also returned to the screen.

The smaller the town, the more likely the native population was allowed to go to untranslated showings for Germans. A glimpse of the situation in the provinces is provided in a German report about the Oleksandriia district in August 1942.

In the villages the film equipment is generally bad. The movies shimmer and break often, the beam is too weak. Many movies are not synchronized. Wochenschauen are often not supplied. Thus, a constant phenomenon is that movie visitors leave the room before the end. There should also be showings of cultural movies and movies about German crafts and German industry. The people are interested in this.

The village population had been introduced to movies on a significant scale during the 1930s and had loved them. The peasants were very dissatisfied with the decline in showings. As a very popular rhyme said (in one of many versions), "There were the Soviets [soviety]... Who

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8Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 1 April 1943, p. 4; Anatolii Kuznetsov (A. Anatolii), Babii iar: roman-dokument (New York, 1986), p. 337.

9Savchenko, VRIO NKVD USSR, to N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka No 32/67. O deiatel'nosti ukrainsikh natsionalistov na okkupirovannoi nemetsko-fashistskimi zakhvatchikami territorii USSR. Po sostoianiu 19 September 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 115, l. 54; Ulas Samchuk, Na bilomu koni: spomyny i vrazhennia (Winnipeg, 1972), p. 230. A list of propaganda movies is in Ortwin Buchbender, Das törende Erz: deutsche Propaganda gegen die Roten Armee im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1978), pp. 338–339, but it remains unclear to what extent these movies were actually displayed.

10Petr Timofeevich Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii na okkupirovannoi territorii," n.p., n.d., typewritten document, signed, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 61. This source mentions the following titles: Muzykal'naia istoriia, Pische liubvi, and Bol'shoi val's.

11"Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 32. For similar comments about the Oleksandrivka district, see ibid., l. 30v.

gave us movies and a kilogram of grain/ The liberator came/ And gave us a church and a hundred grams."

Newspapers, to which one could subscribe, were available, at least in towns and cities. In the Reichskommissariat according to its January 1942 borders, there were forty-five newspapers in the Ukrainian language. The circulation of each was at most 20,000 and they generally appeared at most four times per week. By late 1942, after the inclusion of the Poltava and other Left-Bank regions, the total of newspapers was around sixty. No single newspaper was available in all Generalbezirke, but Volyn' from Rivne was among the best-known. In the countryside, newspapers were hard to obtain, often only when a villager took some along on the way back from the city.

There was also the German-language Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung. When one of its articles in March 1942 discussed a plan to have German veterans colonize Ukraine, it provoked anxious discussion. German newspapers from the Reich were eagerly bought at markets (although they were supposed to be sold in kiosks)—not for reading, but to roll cigarettes.

Ukrainian-language newspapers from the Generalgouvernement and the Reich were usually

13"Buly soviet/ To davaly nam kino i khliba po kilo/ Pryishov vyzvolytel'/ To dav Bozhyi khram i khliba po sto hram." (Berdychiv, 1942). IMFE, Prytula collection, f. 14-3, od. zb. 24, l. 35. Cf. "Koly my khodyly v kino/ Bulo u nas khliba kilo/ A teper khodymo v khram/ I maiemo mukyi iashnoi [iachnoi] sto hram"; "Pry Stalin khodyly v kino/ Poluchaly khliba kilo/ Pry Hitleri khodym v bozhyi khram/ Poluchaiem khliba 300 hram." "Iz dnevnika uchitel'nitsy gor. Kieva L. Nartovoi [Nartova diary]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 347, l. 20, note of 3 January 1943; IMFE, T. Krasys'ka collection, f. 14-3, od. zb. 20, ark. 216 (also on ark. 111), from the Dnipropetrovs'k region in 1943.

14The total circulation was 1.5 million. "Lagebericht für Januar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 31.

15Calculated from "Die Fremdsprachige Zeitungen und Zeitschriften im Reichskommissariat Ukraine," TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 97, ll. 63-80. This document dates from the time when Poltava was already but Berdians'k and Kremenchuk were not yet under civilian Nazi rule. It mentions some titles from localities which were never part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine; they were excluded from my count.

16As was the case in the Rivne region. Meldungen, 24 (9 October 1942), p. 13. See also the report from Zhytomyr in ibid., 32 (4 December 1942), p. 12.


18Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 78–79.
confiscated by the mail censors. Apparently easier to obtain was a Russian-language newspaper from Berlin, Novoe slovo. One could even subscribe to it at a Kievan bookstore until mid-November 1942, when Germans closed the store.

After a brief period of some editorial freedom under the German military, once the German civilian authorities were in place the newspapers were thin and almost entirely filled with articles supplied by German agencies, especially Ukrain's'ka Korespondentsiia in Rivne, a branch of the German News Agency (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro). They were full of anti-Semitism, sometimes with a "national" slant. One article claimed, for example, that "Ukrainian society" was becoming more diverse, for Ukrainians were "returning" to professions previously dominated by Jews and other "foreigners." Articles on history were rare. One that dealt with the famine of 1933 remarked: "Only one section of the population did not feel famine. These were the Jews. They quietly used the services of "Torhsin," in the stores of which was every product you could want. But one could buy them only for gold and foreign currency. And the Jews lacked neither gold nor dollars."

The population initially read the newspapers with great interest. All 12,000 copies of the first issue of Volyn' (1 September 1941) sold out in half a day. The OUN-M-controlled Ukrain's'ke slovo (Kiev, 1941, initially printed in Zhytomyr) went on sale the day after the German arrival. A correspondent of a Prague-based OUN-M newspaper reported several weeks later that "Ukrains'ke Slovo is literally torn from one's hands, although as many as


22Vidrodzhennia, 6 December 1942, p. 4, an article supplied by Ukrain's'ka Korespondentsiia.

23Samchuk, Na bilomu koni, p. 181.
50,000 copies are printed. People start lining up already an hour before the appearance of the periodical in the kiosks. Memoirs confirm that Kievans were very eager to read anything which had not passed Stalin's censors. They indeed started reading the newspapers as soon as they obtained a copy. Peasants also read the newspapers with interest and passed them around.

But for the population the newspapers had two major flaws. One was the lack of interaction with the readers. In the Soviet Union, people distrusted the press, but had also gotten used to writing letters to the editor about their life, requesting things and denouncing people. Even if they did not see these letters published, they believed that such letters were taken seriously. In short, the main flow of information was not to, but from the readers.

Under the Germans, readers also sent letters and submissions to the papers. Volyn' was apparently flooded with requests and badly written poetry, and an article criticizing the Russian poet Pushkin for defending the Russian Empire provoked protest letters from far and wide. Berlin's Novoe slovo is said to have received hundreds of submissions from the formerly Soviet regions. But very few such materials were printed (usually requests for information

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26 "Lagebericht" for December 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 27, l. 4; "Lagebericht für Januar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 31; Meldungen, 32 (4 December 1942), p. 12; Ol'ha Mykolaivna Kutsenko (Ukrainian born in 1926 in the village of Poberezhka), author interview in Ukrainian, 18 July 1995, Bohuslav, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording.

27 As formulated in Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants, p. 271.

28 Samchuk, Na bilomu koni, p. 218; Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, pp. 145–146.

29 Fevr, Solntse, p. 182.
about missing persons). Soon sending in materials was believed to be useless or even dangerous. It devalued the press enormously in the eyes of the people.30

The second major flaw, from the majority perspective, was the language of the newspapers. Most city dwellers disliked reading Ukrainian. *Nove ukrain's'ke slovo* sold badly for being in Ukrainian; therefore those buying the Russian-language *Poslednie novosti* (the only Russian-language periodical in the entire Reichskommissariat) had to buy a copy of the former as well.31 In the cities of central Ukraine, the vast majority used not Ukrainian but Russian as their daily language (as had been the case for centuries). When the first OUN-M activists arrived in Kiev, only "some intellectuals" spoke Ukrainian. Most Kievans spoke Russian, while still others spoke a mixed language.32 To be sure, in October 1941 some Kievans tried to speak Ukrainian in public, mainly because *Ukrain's'ke slovo* warned them to do so.33 But after the suppression of the Ukrainian nationalists in late 1941 and early 1942, all but Kiev's leading *uprava* officials reverted back to Russian. In late 1942 or early 1943, the editors of the newspaper in military-ruled Kharkiv fled westward and arrived in Kiev. Their first visit was to a barber, who said, "What, you speak Ukrainian? Well, such brave people are here no more."34 In early 1943, a man wanted to provide a young child in Kiev with a

30In contrast, Berlin's *Novoe slovo* did publish readers' submissions. Ibid.

31Ibid., p. 265.


Ukrainian-speaking environment. Only one daycare center met this condition, the one at the Sugar Central (Tsukrotsentral'), where many "western" Ukrainians worked. Everywhere else, children spoke Russian or a mixed language, even though instructors talked to them in Ukrainian.35

Similarly, some Ukrainian could be heard in Vinnytsia in mid-1943, but mostly from peasants and people talking to them at the market. In the village-like Vinnytsia suburb of Stare Misto, young people spoke Ukrainian to their parents but switched to Russian once among themselves.36 In the Left-Bank town of Lubny, the "auxiliary" officials spoke Russian, and teachers and children at schools in Khmel'nyts'kyi did the same.37 In contrast, the cities of western Volhynia apparently saw a marked increase in Ukrainian-language use.38

Paradoxically, it was risky to speak Ukrainian, for one might be considered a nationalist, but any written communication with the authorities had to be in it. The bureaucracy's records were in Ukrainian as well, and even the courts conducted affairs in Ukrainian.39 All this was based on unpublished orders by Rosenberg and Koch (of 13 January and 2 February 1942).40 Indeed, if one considers only the language in which people received


36Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 45, 85, 155, and 160.


38Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 71.

39Nikolas Laskovsky, "Practicing Law in the Occupied Ukraine," The American Slavic and East European Review, X, 2 (New York, 1952), p. 126. According to a broadcast by Radio Bratislava on 15 May 1942, people were dismissed from institutions and schools for speaking Russian. It is unclear whether this report deals with the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the military zone, the Distrikt Galizien, or perhaps a combination of the three. Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka No 32/67," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 115, l. 16.

printed news and corresponded with the authorities, the Nazi period saw the most thorough
and most successful Ukrainianization campaign in the history of Ukraine. Koch noted about it
in a report in early 1942:

To me and each of my Generalkommissare it is a self-evident political principle that the
Ukrainian language and culture shall always get preferential treatment over any other
Slavic language and culture. This pre-eminence exists in most cases, with virtually no
exceptions.

It cannot be denied, however, that the Ukrainian cities and also Kiev have a population
which to a very great extent consists of Russians [sic]. According to the estimate of the
Generalkommissar in Kiev, in the city of Kiev about 85 % of the population speak
Russian and 15 % Ukrainian.

My efforts to push through the Ukrainian language and culture in Kiev—for example
through the appearance six times of a Ukrainian and single appearance of a Russian
newspaper per week, as through the granting of the best church to the autocephalous
Ukrainian church, etc.—find only little support among the Ukrainians themselves. For
example, Ukrainian artists in Kiev create problems when they are ordered to produce
themselves in the Ukrainian language, and declare that Russian is the language of the
educated and Ukrainian the language of the peasants.

Nevertheless, it is a matter of course that despite the conditions in Kiev, and despite the
lack of cooperation from the mass of the Ukrainians, everything is being done to give
Ukrainianness [Ukrainertum] in Kiev and in the other Ukrainian cities a controlling
position [beherrschende Vorrangstellung] over Russianness.41

Even in the countryside, the use of Ukrainian in printed communications led to
difficulties. People with little education had trouble understanding the Ukrainian language
being used in official publications because it was composed by Galician journalists, who spoke
and wrote in a Ukrainian which differed somewhat from literary Ukrainian.42 A lack of
knowledge of literary Ukrainian was much less of a problem, for most "Soviet" Ukrainians

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41"Lagebericht für den Monat April 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, ll. 350–351. This
was one of the rare occasions when Koch wrote something regarding Ukraine himself, instead of
letting a subordinate write and sign in his name.

42Fevr. Solntse, p. 265; Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), p. 18; "Teilbericht Politik [...]","TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 36.
had learned it at school. Still, Koch's deputy Dargel once told Ukrainian leaders from the Generalgouvernement that the Gebietskommissare were telling him that the population did not understand Ukrainian announcements. The Russian language they understood, he added, but that language could not be allowed for political reasons.

There were several magazines to read, all of them little more than newspaper supplements, that rarely found their way far from the place of publication. For adults, the main ones were Ukraïnka (Ukrainian Woman, Kostopil'), Sil's'kyi hospodar (Agrarian Master, Rivne), and Ukraïns'kyi khliborob (Ukrainian Farmer, Kiev, though apparently printed in Rivne). For children, there were Orlenia (Young Eagle, Rivne), Ukraïî'ka dyfyna (Ukrainian Child, Kostopil'), and Shkoliar (Pupil, Vasyl'kiv). Their content was similar to the newspapers, although remarkably Orlenia referred to the Third Universal of the revolutionary period, a document which proclaimed the existence of a Ukrainian republic, even as late as November 1942. Shkoliar contained bloodthirsty language. Directly from the Reich came

43 In western Volhynia, some peasants spoke a language situated between Polish and Ukrainian. In central Ukraine, because of their Soviet education, people spoke a Ukrainian which was closer to the literary standard. In the north of the Volhynia-Podolia Generalbezirk, the population spoke a Polissian dialect. Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 15; Hptm. [Hauptmann] Prof. Hans Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass in der Ukraine. Stimmungs- und Erfahrungsbild. Abgeschlossen 30. 9. 1941," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 26, l. 15.

44 Dargel then mused that using only German might be a good idea. His guests were Volodymyr Kubiovyč, the head of the Cracow-based Ukrainian Central Committee, and Iaroslav Kal'ba, the head of that committee's very short-lived Volhynian branch. When Kubiovyč objected that using only German would make it impossible for people to follow his orders, Dargel allegedly proclaimed, "Then I'll shoot them." This meeting was in the fall of 1941. Volodymyr Kubiovyč, Meni 85 (Munich, 1985), p. 102.


47 For example, in November 1942 it had the following short story. "The treacherous partridge. A hunter caught a partridge and wanted to kill her. She started to plead: 'Don't kill me, and I will thank you by luring my comrades to you.' The hunter got angry and said: 'No, it's better that I kill you, so that you won't destroy your comrades through treason." Shkoliar: misiachnyi chasopys dla shkoliariv, 2 (Vasyl'kiv, November 1942), p. 8.
brochures about Hitler (distributed at schools) and colorful posters, and leaflets printed in Ukraine were also distributed.

Few books appeared, almost all under the military administration. Writers who had lived under Soviet rule were almost never allowed to publish, not even a man like Arkadii Liubchenko, who was very anti-Semitic and (until 1943) very pro-German and anti-Communist. The authorities did not import books and confiscated Ukrainian books at the border.

Nevertheless, books, at least in Kiev, were readily available in large numbers at second-hand bookstores and commission stores. (It had been difficult to buy any before 1941.) These books often came from the libraries of scholars and party leaders. Most popular were books from abroad, however. People kept asking for them in stores and bought any at once regardless of the price. Particularly popular were novels and memoirs by White Russians. People also borrowed them from each other. The Novoe slovo correspondent Nikolai Fevr knew a person who was number 137 on a waiting list for one such novel. Books could also

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48 Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, ll. 62–63. Initially, "several" brochures were also published in Kiev, according to F. H. (Fedir Haiovych), "Kyiv u zhovtni 1941," p. 164.

49 Among them were Ulas Samchuk's novel Mariia (Rivne: Volyn', 1941; 15,000 copies); Mykhailo Pronchenko, Kobza (poetry, Kryvyi Rih: Dzvin, 1941?); Ivan Kryp'iakevych's book Istoriia Ukrainy (History of Ukraine. Kryvyi Rih: Dzvin, 1941?); and two collections of Ukrainian poetry published in Vinnytsia. Samchuk, Na bilomu koni, p. 188; Samchuk, Na koni vonomonu, p. 109; levhen Stakhiv, "Kryvyi Rih v 1941–1943 rr.," Suchasna Ukraina (Munich), 22 January 1956, p. 10; Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 156–157.

In February 1942, the publishing house "Volyn" announced the publication of two series of books, the "Library The Anti-Communist" and the "Theatrical Library." Among the former were the following titles: "Jewry and Its Role in the East of Europe," "History of the Struggle with the Jew-Commune," and "The Truth about Our Past." It in unclear whether these books or booklets actually appeared. "Oholoshennia," Volyn', 12 February 1942, p. 3.

50 Somehow the German authorities had become convinced that he had received a Lenin Prize. As a result, he was most of the time unemployed, and only allowed to prepare subtitles. Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, pp. 61, 109, 141, and 146.

Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 98. He writes that the Germans did import Russian books, which is not confirmed by other sources. Ibid., p. 125.

52 Fevr, Solntse, p. 135 (regarding Krasnov's novel From the Two-Headed Eagle to the Red Banner); Fesenko, Povest', p. 86. The existence of antiquarian bookstores in Kiev in November 1942 is confirmed in Nartova diary, l. 19.
be read at libraries, after an initial period of looting and systematic purging. Some people probably hesitated to ask for Ukrainian-language books, fearing being considered a nationalist.

There were cultural performances of various kinds. Amateur drama existed in every region, although not in every single town or village. Where they did exist, they started immediately, to the amazement of the German military. The civilian authorities did not ban such theater, but proclaimed that it had to be in Ukrainian. According to Reichskommissariat reports in early 1942, "in large sections of the Ukrainian population there is a strong need for cultural activity. Teachers and intellectuals are giving new life to drama and song, even in the smallest towns." "In the provincial cities as well, cultural life is back to life. Here there are numerous theaters with amateur actors."

Performances were coordinated by local societies, usually called Prosvita (Enlightenment), which were apparently under close German supervision. They also involved choirs and ensembles of bandura players. Two Communist reports state that the Prosvita activists were mainly children of people working in offices and the police—that is,

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53In Kiev's one functioning library, only 26,000 of its 170,000 books were allowed to be given out to readers. M. V. Koval', "Dolia ukrains'koï kul'tury za 'novoho poriadku' (1941-1944 rr.)," Ukrain's'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 11-12 (Kiev, November-December 1993), p. 32. In the Illintsi district, neither libraries nor individuals were allowed to possess any Soviet ("Bolshevik") propaganda; any works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Lamarck, Rousseau, or Darwin; any books based on them; any "anti-Ukrainian literature printed before 1917," any "so-called Soviet belles lettres"; or any Soviet textbooks. The libraries were not supposed to give out Russian-language literature, "but scientific non-Bolshevik literature and the works of the Russian pre-revolutionary classics are not removed." Order from Iampil's'kyi, school inspector of the Illintsi district, to all school inspectors, 29 March 1942, DAKO, f. r-2412, op. 2, d. 37, l. 2. The chief of the Academic Library stole costly books, according to Professor N. A. Shepelevskii, "Prebyvanie nemtsev v Kieve," Typewritten document, signed, TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, l. 61.

54Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 98-99.


56"Lagebericht für Januar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 30; "Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 262.

57Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 172.
people with some guaranteed income and not liable for deportation for work in Germany—and that non-Ukrainians were barred from participating.58 Neither of these statements could be confirmed, however.59 The performances brought in money.60 Germans also attended and in small towns even sat among the Ukrainian spectators.61

The plays were Ukrainian classics62 as well as old vaudeville-like plays with titles such as "They Were Duped" (Poshylys' u durni). The quality of the performances was high.63 How the programs were established remains unclear. In Khmel'nyts'kyi, where there was apparently no Prosvita society, the local newspaper complained several times in late 1941 and early 1942 that the plays being performed were not patriotic. The mayor himself told regional theater leaders in person, "Enough vodka on the stage." Such pressure probably had little effect, however.64

58Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]." TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 60 (adds that "in the countryside, any [such] work is completely absent"); Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka No 32/67," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 115, l. 46.

59That such reports need to be handled with special care is shown by another report, also written at the highest level of the CP(b)U, which claims mistakingly that the Prosvita societies in Right-Bank Ukraine were created by the Germans, and that "'through the Prosvita's' the Germans engage in propaganda and agitation among the Ukrainian population and especially the youth." D. S. Korotchenko to N. S. Khrushchev, "O sostojanii partizanskogo dvizhenia na pravoberezhnoi Ukraine," 22 July 1943, n.p., TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 6, l. 20.

60Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka No 32/67," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 115, ll. 48 and 50.


62Such as Natalka-Poltavka and Svatannia na Honcharivtsi. Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]." TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 61.

63Kravchenko, author interview (regarding Kaharlyk in 1942); Demydenko, author interview.

64In the city of Khmel'nyts'kyi, eventually Mykola Kulish's play Myna Mazailo, about the Ukrainianization campaign in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s, was performed. Ukrains'kyi holos, 3 December 1941, p. 4; ibid., 21 December 1941, p. 1; ibid., 22 January 1942, p. 4; ibid., 30 April 1942, p. 2. In the fall of 1942, the director of the music and drama theater in Zvenyhorod submitted a proposed program for 1942-1943, which eventually even ended up at the highest level in Rivne. TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 74, ll. 1-1v and 17-23v. The school inspector of the Illintsi district, Iampil's'kyi, instructed raion school inspectors to warn elders and cultural groups that his permission was needed for any public performance. Undated order [early 1942], DAKO, f. r-2412, op. 2, d. 37, l. 8.

I found no evidence to support John Armstrong's view that the actors were "generally amateurs interested in using this medium of expression of their nationalist feeling," and that
There was also a Kievan Ensemble of Bandurists (Kyïvs'ka Kapela Bandurystiv), consisting of seventeen players-singers directed by Hryhorii Kytastyi, who had done the same for Soviet Ukraine's ensemble. In June 1942 this group made a tour along with several opera singers. It started with three shows for Nazis in Rivne (Koch was out of town), who then gave permission for a month-long tour of towns and villages in western Volhynia. But Ukrainian audiences spontaneously burst out in what was generally considered the Ukrainian national anthem (Shche ne vmerla Ukraina). The ensemble was speeded back to Kiev and in mid-July 1942 sent to the Reich to perform for Ostarbeiter.65

The countryside saw the appearance, or more precisely reappearance, of the traditional blind minstrels, who sang songs while playing a small plucked lute (kobza) or hurdy-gurdy (lira), for which they were rewarded with food. They traveled on their own from village to village. It is hard to reconstruct what they actually sang and when they did so (as is the case with songs sang by "ordinary" people.) They were colorful figures. One blind "Uncle Levko" born around 1860 toured the villages of the Kirovohrad region. A Soviet journalist was told later that this man "in a worn russet overcoat and home-woven trousers used to feel his way with a long lime pole. On his head was a large straw hat, from his shoulders hang the bandura, locally called lira, just as old as him, and a canvas bag in which he put his charity. His face was stern, wrinkled. He shaved his beard, but wore a long mustache, yellowed from tobacco." Among his songs were new compositions about contemporary life, which his audience quickly picked up. After about a year, he was denounced and hanged as a "partisan."66
The countryside south of Kiev also had such a minstrel; he is said to have started singing satirical songs about Hitler when the Red Army was almost back.67 Old or young minstrels also performed at city markets, where they could earn much money. Seleshko saw them at the market in Vinnytsia in September 1943, where he also encountered vagrants who sang Russian songs and chastushki (two- or four-line rhymes) with topical texts that audiences really enjoyed.68

There was also a circus group ("Demon") of the "Kievan theater of the Section of Propaganda of Ukraine," which even toured regions where there was partisan activity.69 A final category of itinerant performers were actors and opera singers. In late 1942, the western Volhynian village of Derman' was visited by artists calling themselves the Kievan Happy Theater (Kyïvs'kyi Veselyi Teatr). First a mezzo soprano sang arias from Madame Butterfly, then there was dance and satirical songs to the accompaniment of an accordion. The reception was very good. The chastushki, however, fell flat (perhaps they were pro-Soviet?).70

In the major cities, many performing artists continued to work in their profession. In Vinnytsia plays were performed in the fall of 1943, mostly in Russian. The first few performances were always for Germans only. These actors were at most second-rate and made little effort when performing for the locals.71 In smaller towns, scenes such as the following, from a suburb some fifteen kilometers from Kryvyi Rih, could be observed by the summer of 1943:

With no self-consciousness at all and with their heads held high, the people danced with the verve and care-free ease of millionaires on the huge wooden stage in the center of the park where a harmoshka accordion quartet, accompanied by flute, guitar and


68Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 139 and 151.

69Ivankivs'ki visti, 29 June 1943, p. 4.

70Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 291.

71Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 151.
violin, played waltzes, fox-trots and sentimental tangos. 'We both met in life coincidentally – thus by chance we parted. We were not aware of each others’ happiness, thus by chance we parted.'

A young mezzo-soprano in a fine silk gown and high-heeled shoes crooned with professional know-how and feeling to much applause from the audience. There were no ice-cream booths, no chocolate bars, no candy, and no lollipops. Everyone munched sunflower seeds and elegantly spat out the shells into their hands so as not to litter their beautiful park.72

Several plays were performed in Kiev for the population, although it is unclear where exactly and which ones.73

The opera-and-ballet theater in Kiev was accessible to locals, if they had some way to get tickets. For example, a woman’s German boyfriend could obtain them. The woman would have to use the separate “non-German” cloakroom. From late November 1942, officially only Germans and allied nationalities were allowed in, supposedly to ensure soldiers a seat. (In fact most visitors were German officials.) Kievans felt humiliated.74 That theater’s first artistic director was a man called Sheremet’ev, replaced after several months by Wolfgang Brückner, who directed a radio orchestra in Königsberg and was the brother of the well-known German composer. The building, now renamed the Large Opera Theater, had 140 musicians (including two Jews with Ukrainian passports, one of them called Iasha Goldberg). Brückner, somehow


73 In March 1942, Reichskommissariat officials reported that Kiev’s Ukrainian drama theater would start performances soon and that the "Kievan Theater" (Kiewer Bühne) was already performing plays and concerts, in Ukrainian and German. "Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 262. In early February 1943, Kiev’s Stadtkommissar ordered the creation of a Ukrainian drama theater, according to Liubchenko, "Schchodennyk," Novi dni, III, 32 (Toronto, September 1952), pp. 4–5. According to Bashkulat, CHPWU interview, l. 40, the Drama theater performed the Ukrainian plays Shevchenko and Denshchyk.

74 Source "Gewährsmann," in a report by Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 31 December 1942, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292536; Bashkulat, CHPWU interview, passim (he was before and after 1941 photographer there); Bogatyrchuk, Moi zhiznennyi put’, p. 136; Nartova diary, l. 18. The opera theaters were "packed," according to Friedrich Heyer, Die orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945 (Cologne and Braunsfeld, 1953), p. 205.
related to Erich Koch and therefore confident that he could not be removed, tended to strike the musicians physically and generally treated them as slaves.75

On the other hand, the entire staff of a thousand (!) received German food rations. The soloists (although not the best, who had been evacuated in 1941) lived particularly well, as Germans delivered additional food to their homes.76 Among the shows were Italian variations and symphonic concerts (Beethoven, Tschaikovsky, Brückner77), ballet (Tschaikovsky's Queen of Spades78), and operas (Aïda, Lohengrin—in Ukrainian, for the actors knew no other version79). The building closed altogether in January 1943.80

Small-scale performances of song and music were particularly numerous in western Volhynia. For example, on 28 June 1942 Rivne's movie theater saw a celebration of song marking the 100th birthday of the Ukrainian composer Mykola Lysenko.81 In early 1942, a show featuring popular songs (estrada), produced by "the well-known entertainer Moshinskii," opened in Kiev.82 This may be the place identified by Arkadiii Liubchenko as the "Var'iete," which had shows in Russian until early September 1942, when the Stadtkommissariat ordered it to perform in Ukrainian.83 Particularly popular also were choir concerts in the building of the

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75Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Kiew, report, Kiev, 29 January 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 101, ff. 1–8; Bashkulat, CHPWU interview, passim.

76Of the one thousand staff members, about two hundred received every ten days five breads, 700 g. butter, 600 g. sugar, jam, and various groats. Bashkulat, CHPWU interview, l. 38v.

77Ibid., l. 40; Nove ukraїns'ke slovo, 4 September 1942, p. 4.

78Poslednie novosti, 2 January 1942, p. 6 (photograph); ibid., 8 January 1942, p. 6.

79Had they known a Russian version, they could not have performed it, for Koch had ordered that all theater and opera performances had to be in Ukrainian. Bashkulat, CHPWU interview, l. 40; Brütingam, Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete, p. 76.

80Operas were also performed elsewhere, such as in Vinnytsia. During the performance there of the opera Rigoletto, some singers sang in Russian while others sang in Ukrainian. Few people noticed this difference. Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 148 and 153–154.

81Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 197.

82Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 61.

83Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, pp. 57 and 120.
Kiev city administration. As this discussion of the performing arts has shown, Russian music and Russian-language culture were not completely eradicated. (Indeed, classical Russian composers were also played on the radio.)

There were some places where the conditions for cultural performances were relatively favorable. The Shevchenko theater in Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi received financial support from the Gebietskommissar. Apostolove southeast of Kryvyi Rih apparently had the Reichskommissariat's only conservatory with qualified instructors in song, piano, and wind or string instruments. Shows in Kherson were attended by Germans and non-Germans at the same time.

Altogether, however, few "official" cultural performances took place once civilian rule was in place. A western Volhynian writer and journalist, Ulas Samchuk, traveled through several cities as a reporter. When he arrived in Poltava in August 1942, he was stunned by the contrast with the Reichskommissariat. The population seemed happier and able to get along well with the Germans; movie theaters, restaurants, and bars were open; and a great variety of shows was being performed.

Kiev had an Academy of Painting (Akademiia maliarstva) headed by Professor Fedir Krychevs'kyi and a painters' association with some sixty members. In the summer of 1942,

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84 For example, on 31 January 1943 about seven hundred people, mainly Galicians, attended a concert there of "epiphany carols [shchedrivky] and historical songs" directed by N. Horodovenko. Ternivs'kyi, "Spohady emigranta," p. 56; Liubchenko, "Shchodennyk," Novi dni, III, 32 (September 1952), p. 4.

85 Bashkulat, CHPWU interview, l. 40.

86 Dmytro Kyslytsia, Svite iasnyi: spohady: vid r. Vovchi z Naddniprianshchyny do r. Sv. Lavrentiia na Ottavshchyni (Ottawa, 1987), p. 216. The theater was led by Mykhailo H. Bilychenko, a native of the city who had returned from emigration.


88 Report by a Stadtoberinspektor from Rivne, November 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 76, l. 43v.

89 Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 255.

90 Ibid., p. 210; "Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 262. Cf. Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 204, about the painter Vasyl' Hryhorovych Krychevs'kyi, also in Kiev.
Kievan painters and sculptors sold works for an exhibition organized by the Gebietskommissar in what was called "the former Museum of Ukrainian Art." The prices offered by the organizers were so low that some withdrew their work. Most of the paintings on display were bright landscapes, many barely finished. According to Samchuk, Kievan visitors were "impressed by the absence of the so-called socialist themes and also of portraits of leaders." In September 1942, Magunia and his Gebietskommissare issued a call for another exhibition, this time in "support of the best artists of the Kiev Generalbezirk," to be opened in December.

The only other museum open to Kievans was the short-lived Museum-Archive of the Transitional Period (Muzei-Arkiv perekhodovoï doby/Museum-Archiv der Übergangsperiode). Funded by the city administration and headed by the historian and former mayor, Oleksander Ohloblyn, it existed from April 1942 until the next winter. Its exhibition was called "The Ruination by the Bolsheviks of the Cultural Treasures of the City of Kiev."

The countless propaganda meetings to which the population had been subjected in the Soviet period essentially were not replaced by German equivalents. This had a big impact and one that was not in the Germans' favor. As before 1941, most people trusted orally transmitted information far more than any printed information. The few political lectures and meetings held at or outside the workplace were not enough to satisfy the demand for information.

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91 Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 114; Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, p. 266.

92 Ukrainian-language leaflet from Generalkommissar Magunia, 6 September 1942, in file of the editors of Vasyl'kivs'ki visti, DAKO, f. r-2359, op. 2, d. 2, l. 118; appeal by the Gebietskommissar in Tarashcha, in Vidrodzhennia, 26 November 1942. This Gebietskommissar apparently issued the call very late, so that he could organize instead his own exhibition, marking the first anniversary of his own rule. Vidrodzhennia, 3 December 1942, p. 2.


94 Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), pp. 17–18; ibid., 25 (16 October 1942), pp. 12–13. As Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants, pp. 268–269 states, the very frequent meetings, where attendance was mandatory, had been "the core of the new Soviet culture in the village."
villagers even continued the Soviet tradition on their own. Thus, in the village of Cherepivka (Khmel'nyts'kyi/Proskurov-Land), peasants—probably only males—spent winter evenings at the elder's office for talks and collective readings of the newspaper.95

Before the Battle of Stalingrad, basically the only kind of oral propagandists were Ukrainians who returned from a so-called "tour of Germany" and told organized gatherings that they liked what they had seen and that the Ostarbeiter were doing well.96 There were also occasional official celebrations, such as May Day (marked as in the Reich on 2 May). By 1943 there were more propaganda meetings: by associates of the defected Soviet Russian general Vlasov and his German-sponsored "Russian Liberation Movement," by the former mayor of Kharkiv, and sometimes even by the Generalkommissar.97

Secular commemorations other than those marking the death of Taras Shevchenko (March 1942 and March 1943)98 were very rare, at least in the cities. Poltavans soon felt the impact of civilian rule when it arrived. In September 1942, they organized a large requiem at the grave of the father of modern Ukrainian literature (Ivan Kotliarev's'kyi), with the permission of the Gebietskommissar. Thousands were ready to participate in the ceremony, led by the Autocephalous Bishop Syl'vestr. Just minutes before the start, however, a ban was

95Ukraïns'kyi holos, 1 February 1942, p. 4.

96"Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, ll. 33v and 37; Ivankivs'ki visti, 27 December 1942, p. 2.

97Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 101, 122–123, and 129; Ukraïns'kyi holos, 6 May 1943, p. 1. The latter source includes an announcement of a speech by the Generalkommissar in the park of Khmel'nyts'kyi.

98Heyer, Orthdoxe Kirche, p. 196 (on Rivne in 1942); Ukraïns'kyi holos, 21 March 1943, p. 4 (on Bishop Platon in Rivne); Dzvin voli, 7 March 1943, p. 4 (on Bila Tserkva); Mitrofan Vasil'evich Reutovskii (Ukrainian born in 1896), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 28 February 1944, [Kiev?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, ll. 8–8v (on Bishop Nikanor in Kiev).
issued.\textsuperscript{99} Many villages had their own local commemorations. The village of Medvyn, for example, had a requiem for those Ukrainians who had died in an "uprising" in 1920.\textsuperscript{100}

Kiev held a commemoration for the writer Lesia Ukrainka (Pedagogical Institute, 23 August 1942)\textsuperscript{101} as well as a Writers' Day (city 	extit{uprava}, 18 July 1943).\textsuperscript{102} Lectures on topics in the humanities, linguistics, and social sciences were allowed to be held in the dark and unheated House of Scientists. Word of mouth made people gather there on 24 November 1942 to commemorate Ukraine's major historian and first president, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi.\textsuperscript{103}

A striking ceremony took place in 1943 in Kiev on the occasion of a Soviet air raid. In the early hours of 11 May, as daylight was breaking, Soviet airplanes, assisted by bright lamps on parachutes, carried out a three-hour-long bombardment of the city. They targeted bridges, factories, and hospitals. Afterward, they flew over the district of Luk'ianivka, at a low altitude, which they could afford to do because Kiev still had few anti-aircraft guns. Many residents ran outside, shouting enthusiastically: "Our people have come!" (\textit{Nashi prileteli!}). However, for unknown reasons, the pilots opened fire and killed dozens of them. The German authorities eagerly exploited the event. On 15 May, a mass burial procession for the non-German

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100}Mykola Iosypovych Syn'ohub (Ukrainian born in 1924 in Medvyn), author interview in Ukrainian, 22 July 1995, Medvyn, Bohuslav raion, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording. The newspaper of Bohuslav carried a memoir by an unidentified participant of what was called the fall 1920 "uprising" in Medvyn. Several times, according to this memoir, the "Bolsheviks" had to flee, shouting in Yiddish, "We're done for." Then the "uprising" was suppressed, and "the best sons of Ukraine fell in the fight against Bolshevism and Jewry [zhydova]." \textit{Zvit'lena Ukraïna}, 22 October 1941.
\item \textsuperscript{101}The presidium consisted of ten people: Mayor Forostiv'skyi, deputy mayor Volkanovych, the head of the Section of Culture Solodovnyk, Solodovnyk's deputy Mykola Prykhod'ko, Vasyl' Zavitnevych, Ukrainka's sisters Ol'ha and Izydora (one of whom was called Borisova), Ukrainka's cousin Svitozor Drahomanov, Ulas Samchuk, and Arkadii Liubchenko. Liubchenko, \textit{Shchodennyk}, pp. 114–115; Samchuk, \textit{Na koni vorononom}, p. 269; Lashchenko, "Povorot," \textit{Samostiina Ukraïna}, XI, 10 (118) (October 1958), p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{102}\textit{Dzvin voli}, 1 August 1943, p. 4. This report says that "several hundred" intellectuals participated, which seems exaggerated. The meeting was not reported in the Kiev press.
\item \textsuperscript{103}Nikolai Kuz'mich Grun'skii [sic] (Ukrainian born in 1872), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 19 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 4; Liubchenko, "Shchodennyk," \textit{Novi dni}, III, 30 (July 1952), p. 2 and ibid., 32 (September 1952), p. 4.
\end{itemize}
casualties assembled in front of the university at 2:00 p.m. First Mayor Forostivs'kyi addressed the crowd. He probably spoke along the lines of an article that he published the day before: seeing the dead children, "we recognize the mug of Jewry [morda iudeistva] which hates us Ukrainians so much." Then Bishop Nikanor spoke and a church choir sang. Nikanor and his Autocephalous clergy directed the coffins and the people to St Sophia Square, where the procession was taken over by Bishop Panteleimon and the Autonomous clergy. At the Luk"ianivka cemetery, the dead were buried in a common grave. The memorial, made of materials from the destroyed Jewish cemetery, had this text: "For the Victims of the Air Raid of the Jew-Bolsheviks." On no occasion did Panteleimon condemn the air raid, however.

Forostivs'kyi, according to his own memoir, then asked the Germans to "deport" the bishop by way of sanction. At that stage, Panteleimon issued a printed condemnation.\textsuperscript{104} Sports played a small role in people's lives. Initially, OUN-M activists in Kiev created an organizational groundwork in the form of the "Sich," a sporting organization whose secondary aim was the promotion of nationalism. Consequently, the German authorities suppressed it.\textsuperscript{105} Even swimming in the Dnieper River was banned in Kiev as of 4 September

\textsuperscript{104}Forostivs'kyi, "Do hromadian m. Kyieva," \textsl{Nove ukrains'ke slovo}, 14 May 1943, p. 1; article in \textit{ibid.}, 16 May 1943, p. 3; Korotchenko to Khrushchev, "O sostoianii partisanskogo dvizhenii a [...]," TsDAHOU, f. I, op. 22, d. 6, l. 30; Iu. N. Kvitnitskii-Ryzhov, \textsl{Nekropoli Kiev} (Kiev, 1993), pp. 26–27; A. Dublians'kyi, \textsl{Ternystym shliakhom: zhyttia Mytropolyta Nikanora Abramovycha: do 20-littia arkhypastyrs'koho sluzychinnia, 1942–1962} (London, 1962), p. 49; Forostivs'kyi, \textsl{Kyiv}, pp. 33–36; Fesenko, \textsl{Povest'}, pp. 88–89. Among these authors, Kvitnyts'kyi-Ryzhov is the only person who lived in Kiev at the time and stayed behind during the German retreat, and the only one who mentions that people ran outside and were shot. According to another man who was also in Kiev at that time, but who left in 1943, there were over a thousand casualties; this seems exaggerated. See Ternivs'kyi, "Spohady emigranta," p. 63.

The pilots may have shot at the people because they considered the population under Nazi rule to be traitors, as Kvitnyts'kyi-Ryzhov suggests. They may also have been under orders not to return with unused ammunition. The Soviet authorities after their return to Kiev removed the inscription plate from the memorial, which still existed without it in the late 1990s. There were also bombardments on 2 May 1943 and in the night of 2 to 3 June 1943. In the former attack, a bomb hit the Opera theater. It did not explode but killed about seven Germans and caused a panic. The June 1943 bombardment was apparently more extensive than the 10–11 May bombardment and hit military targets. Kuznetsov, \textsl{Babii iar}, p. 374; Nartova diary, l. 22, note of 8 June 1943.

\textsuperscript{105}OUN \textit{u viini 1939 1945} [n.p., n.d.], pp. 62–63; Mikhail Nikolaevich Sviridovskii ([Svyrydovs'kyi]), born in 1908, interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 3 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, II. 9–14. Cf. Savchenko to Khrushchev, "Razvedvodka No 32/67," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 115, l. 57, which says misleadingly that the "Zaporiz'ka Sich" was created by Germans.
1942. Apparently the only sport which was allowed some organized development was soccer. In the summer of 1942, several teams competed in Kiev's Zenit stadium. One of the teams was "Rukh," apparently the successor to "Sich," and possibly composed of native policemen. Two other teams, "Almaz" and "Start," consisted of people with jobs at, respectively, the Jewelry factory and the Bread factory. Many of "Start"'s players had been in the leading soccer team of the Ukrainian SSR, "Dynamo Kiev." "Start" played against a Hungarian team and in matches—how many and on which dates is unknown—against German teams. The German players were anti-aircraft gunners, pilots, and railroad employees. Aside from German and Hungarian spectators, all matches attracted local Kievan spectators. The natives and the Hungarians paid three karbovantsi to get in.

"Start" played its last match on Sunday, 16 August 1942, against "Rukh." "Start" routed the latter 8:0. Two days later, eight of its players were arrested and accused of being NKVD agents. The SD's accusation was correct in the sense that Ukraine's NKVD had sponsored "Dynamo Kiev," while other People's Commissariats had sponsored other teams. Moreover, after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, at least one player worked briefly for the NKVD as a car mechanic.

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106 Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 92; Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 4 September 1942, p. 4.
107 Unless indicated otherwise, the following information about soccer comes from Sviridovskii, CHPWU interview. The stadium, at 28 Sholudenko Street, is now called "Start." The "Dynamo" stadium was not allowed to be used.
108 The players of "Start" included Makar Honcharenko, Oleksii Klymenko, Mykola Korotkykh, Ivan Kuz'menko, goal keeper Mykola Trusevych, and the trainer Mykhailo M. Svyrydovs'kyi. "Start" beat "Rukh" four times (2:0, 4:1, 6:2, and 9:0). "Start" played three times against the Hungarian team "GZ SZERO" (2:0, 4:0, and 1:2). Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 16 August 1942, p. 4.
109 Announcement with the following text: "Stadion 'Zenit.' 9 serpnia futbol. Revansh. 'Start' /khlibzavod/ 'Flakelf' /nimets'ka chast." Scholarly Reference Library, collection "Afisny ta plakaty okupatsiinoho periodu," Items 729ca through 732ca. The word "Flakelf" is a combination of the words Flugzeugabwehrkanone and Elf.
110 Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 18 August 1942, p. 4; ibid., 19 August 1942, p. 4.
111 Oleksander Skotsen', Z futbolom u svit: spomyny (Toronto, 1985), p. 258
112 That player was Svyrydovs'kyi, who fell later into German hands as a soldier. At his interrogation by the SD, he saw what he called later a "traitor" sportman. That man, "Viachkis," may have been the initial denouncer.
one who had not been in "Dynamo" (one Balakin), were sent to the Syrets' concentration camp near Babyn Iar. "Almaz" played a benefit match and with the proceeds passed on bread and lard to these soccer players, but four were eventually shot. The three other players managed to escape, two because the police guards at the shoe factory where they worked during the day looked the other way.

Finally, people also gathered for private socializing. To be sure, the workload and (in the cities) the curfew impeded parties and the like. Still, city dwellers tried to assemble for birthdays and impromptu afternoon meetings. Group activities ranged from dancing (to a piano, a record player, or radio music) to staging charades (by young people) and playing cards or dominoes. At an engineer's name-day party (imenyny) in Vinnytsia in 1943,

It is also worth mentioning that as soon as word got out in Kiev in 1941 that some western Ukrainians had fired shots at the retreating Red Army, the goal keeper Trusevych and other players denounced their Galician teammate Oleksander A. Skochen' to the NKVD as a spy, sabotage agent, and nationalist. The NKVD arrested Skochen', but quickly released him. Skotsen', Z futbolom, pp. 277–280.

One day, the commandant gathered a hundred prisoners, took out the "specialists," and shot every fifth one of those remaining. Among those shot were Klymenko, Kuz'menko, and Trusevych. Korotkykh was also killed, or died at some later stage. He is not mentioned in Sviridovskii, CHPWU interview, but he is mentioned by Makar Honcharenko, as quoted in H. Levitsky, Kiev: A Short Guide (Kiev and Moscow, 1980), p. 116. Cf. Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 310.

Tiutchev escaped first. The other two were Svyrydovs'kyi and Honcharenko, who escaped on 19 September 1942. The accepted notion is that the arrests and executions of the "Start" players were the result of a so-called "death match" (match smeritii) between "Start" and the German pilots' team. The "Start" players supposedly did not heed an open threat that they would be killed if they would win, and proceeded to win the game at 5:3. This story can be found in Soviet publications, such as Ukrain's'ka RSR u Velykii Vitchyznii (Kiev: A Short Guide, 1941–1945 r.), Vol. 1 (Kiev, 1967), p. 362; Levitsky, Kiev: A Short Guide, p. 115; and A. V. Kudritskii, ed., Kiev: entsiklopedia cheshkoi spavochnik (Kiev, 1982), p. 611. The former publication even says that the players were inmates of the Syrets' camp already before the game. The "death match" account can also be found in Ukrainian diaspora publications; see N. N. [very likely Nykon Nemyron, i.e., Mykola Andrusiak], "Likvidatsiia zmahuniv 'Startu' v Babynomu lari," in Marunchak, V borot'bi za ukrains'ku derzhavu, pp. 904–906, and its slightly different version [Anon.], "Traichnna podiia v istorii Ukrain's'koho sportu," in Me'nyk et. al., Na zov Kyieva, pp. 312–314. The "death match" version is not confirmed in the above-mentioned articles in Nove ukrains'ke slovo or, more importantly, the Sviridovskii [Svyrydovs'kyi] CHPWU report. Thus, it appears to be a case of postwar mythmaking.

To be sure, the valuable Sviridovskii report is itself not entirely clear about the affair. It says that the score after the first round against the pilots was 2:1 for the pilots. Then "Start" kicked two Germans off the field, and a German "general" observing the game got angry. The report is also unclear about the outcome. On the one hand, it says it was "Start"-pilots, 8:10, while on the other hand it says, "We won the last match 8:0." Cf. Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 292–297.

Evgeniia Dimer, Ogliadivaias' nazad (New York, 1987), pp. 35–36 (on dancing); Fesenko, Povest', p. 87 (on charades); Jacob Gerstenfeld-Malti, My Private War: One Man's Struggle to Survive the Soviets and the Nazis (London, 1993), p. 219 (on a card game called durak); Walther Bienert, Russen und Deutsche: was für Menschen sind das? Berichte, Bilder und Folgerungen aus
Seleshko to his surprise found everybody talking in Ukrainian. Moreover, the people "behaved as if in a solid bourgeois home. There was music and singing, and a sociability in an unforced Soviet form. It was something totally opposite to the street, where everything had been dragged down to the looks and manners of the proletariat and where everything was coarse, shabby, and badly dressed. At home, everything was beautiful and in a form of which could be the envy of any European."\textsuperscript{116}

Once it got dark and people were back in their own home or perhaps merely visiting the neighbors, there were other simple ways to enjoy oneself. Fevr describes Kiev in the early fall of 1942 after start of the curfew at 10 p.m.

In those evening hours, Kiev's wounds [destroyed buildings] are not visible, neither are its beggarly rags, and it appears to be the beautiful city it once was. Sitting on their balconies, in the dark, the Kievans call out to each other. 'Svetlana, hi!' someone shouts from the neighboring balcony. 'Cuckoo!', answers Svetlana from the other side of the street. 'Cuckoo, how old are you?\textsuperscript{117}'... From the dark, 'cuckoo' resounds, sixteen times.

Fevr also noted that "from the [open] windows, besides gramophone melodies and the radio, come the sounds of the piano and singing. The central blocks of the city then seem to be a gigantic conservatory."\textsuperscript{118} The noise must have annoyed the authorities, for the mayor at some stage ordered all gramophone discs with "compositions with Jewish and Soviet content" to be handed in.\textsuperscript{119} In the countryside, socializing, certainly of men only, inevitably was accompanied by or consisted of nothing but bouts of hard drinking, to be discussed in the next chapter.

\textit{dem Zweiten Weltkrieg} (Stein am Rhein, 1990), p. 70 (on dominoes); Kravchenko, author interview.

\textsuperscript{116}Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 154.

\textsuperscript{117}Fevr, Solntse, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid., p. 160.

\textsuperscript{119}Nove ukraïns'ke slovo, 12 August 1942, p. 4.
Like religion, cultural events played only a small role in the lives of most natives. Movies, performances, exhibitions, and political gatherings existed, but on a much smaller scale than before 1941. Such events were unable to satisfy the demand. As for the printed media, they were felt to be non-responsive to the readers. All of this made the natives understand that the rulers did not take them seriously. In this regard, they were nostalgic for the Soviet period. The following chapter deals with people’s thinking in more detail.
CHAPTER 8

Ethnic Identity and Political Loyalties

Life in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine consisted of more than working, acquiring food, going to church or the movies, and generally trying to survive. This chapter aims to reconstruct the mental attitudes and loyalties of those Ukrainians who had lived under Soviet rule before 1939, identified here as Dnieper or "Soviet" Ukrainians. Similar information about Ukrainians in formerly Polish-ruled western Volhynia is scarce at the present stage of the research, but it is added wherever possible for the sake of comparison. The main thesis which will be proposed is that the Nazi period had little or no impact on the thinking of the vast majority of Dnieper Ukrainians, with the exception of the emergence of hatred of the Germans. The discussion will also deal with the future people expected. Ultimately, the viability of any political system may depend largely on the expectations of the populace, including in a time of war.

In order to address the typical Dnieper Ukrainian mental attitudes and loyalties, they will be analyzed from five perspectives. What was Dnieper Ukrainians' level of mutual (mis)trust? What was their primary identity? What did they think about "Europe"? What future did they expect? Were there any generational differences?

The Soviet Union of the 1930s had been a society virtually without trust. In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, public trust and public solidarity were similarly scarce, and perhaps even absent altogether. Baptist missionaries found in Khmel'nyts'kyi in July 1942 that the population saw "an enemy in every person." In Vinnytsia in mid-1943, Mykhailo

1This is shown by the existing scholarship. Two more testimonies to this effect are Jacob Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, My Private War: One Man's Struggle to Survive the Soviets and the Nazis (London, 1993), p. 34; and Arkadii Liubchenko, "Shchodennyk," Novi dni, III, 31 (Toronto, August 1952), p. 10.

Seleshko's acquaintances warned him not to take any former Soviet citizen's word. He himself frequently heard about and experienced broken promises.3

The culture of mistrust is shown strikingly in the memoirs of Ivan Maistrenko, a left-wing and patriotic intellectual from eastern Ukraine. When in 1943 he arrived in L'viv, the capital of the Distrikt Galizien, he noticed how streetcar passengers had a habit of paying money to the driver without asking or receiving a ticket. Only when a conductor entered the car to check did the driver quickly hand out tickets. Thus the mostly Polish L'vivans boycotted "the system," while supporting one of their own. This solidarity amazed Maistrenko. He frankly says that in such a situation, most "Soviet" Ukrainians would make a huge fuss and accuse the driver of living off their backs.4

The larger a city, the less its inhabitants seemed to trust each other. Chapter 1 noted that spy-mania—the surest sign of mistrust—had broken out in Kiev immediately and on a large scale. The writer Arkadii Liubchenko noted in July 1942 that "in Kiev, almost everybody appears to be either afraid, evil, or completely disillusioned." Even the non-Soviet Galicians in the city were convinced that Liubchenko was a Soviet agent.5 The photographer Oleksii Bashkulat, in an interview in 1944, described the atmosphere among the Ukrainians working at the Kiev opera-and-ballet theater, where he worked as well. "Somebody would come and start to curse Soviet rule. To object was impossible, for you wouldn't know him. Or, in contrast, he would start to praise it. We did not know the people surrounding us. One could not trust anyone, one could not say a word to anyone."6


6Aleksei Mikhailovich Bashkulat (Ukrainian born in 1909), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 28 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 42. See also [O. P. Sharandachenko], Reiestratorka zahsu: (iz shchodennyka kyianky) (Kiev 1960), p. 121.
"Western" Ukrainians were always struck by this mentality. Dmytro Myron, the Galician leader of the OUNSD underground in Kiev, wrote in a letter on 18 October 1941 that he found that Kievans had a Soviet heritage of "slyness, scrutinizing, and distrust." The Autocephalous Orthodox Bishop Nikanor (Abramovych) found that parishioners in the Pokrov church in the Solomyanka district, and indeed all Kievans, had "some kind of persecution mania: they fear one another, everybody thinks the other is a spy and traitor, and each accuses the other of dishonesty, theft, and venality." His parishioners invited a stenographer to record and distribute his outspoken sermons. For anything said or done, there was sooner or later somebody who was prepared to report it to the authorities. A native Kievan recalled later that there was "extraordinary treachery" in the city. Those who had been "repressed" by the NKVD for some unknown reason were particularly motivated to denounce others or even to become official German informants (sing.: V-Mann, from Vertrauensmann)—they wanted revenge. The Germans generally took denunciations seriously and meted out punishment to the "offenders." Among matters reported were acts which could be construed as Ukrainian nationalism. For example, in 1943 Bishop Nikanor celebrated Epiphany (Zeleni Sviata, 13–15 June) in Kaniv with a sermon on the local Cossack graves. He also held a sermon on the grave of Ukraine's national bard

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9Iurii Mikhailovich Markovskii (Ukrainian born in 1904), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 12 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 19v.


11Pavlo Ternivs'kyi [Ivan Zhyhadlo], "Spohady emigranta," p. 31. Autograph manuscript, 1945, Library and Museum, Ukrainian Cultural & Educational Centre, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. While discussing events in Lubny, Zhyhadlo puts it as follows: "The Germans blindly believed denouncers and punished merely on the basis of denunciations, not taking into account that denunciations had been a daily phenomenon in the Land of Soviets and had almost always been based on lies and deceit."
Taras Shevchenko, and had a cross placed on it. The event was denounced afterwards, some 180 participants of the event were arrested, and 37 of these were killed.12

Interestingly, the mistrust under the Germans coexisted with remnants of the traditional hospitality, apparently even in Kiev (more on this below).13 A young Kievan emigré reports something else about behavior. She was struck in October 1941 by "the strange sentimentality of the Kievan, that is, [among] the men. The women seemed to be stronger. In the City Administration I witnessed several times how old acquaintances ran into each other. They 'cried, sobbed bitterly,' and publicly embraced each other for so long that it was embarrassing to watch. These were old people."14

Terminology on how to address people became confused. In public people no longer called each other "comrade" (tovarishch, rarely in Ukrainian: tovarysh). But which term should replace it? Even the word "citizen" (grazhdanka/grazhdanin, rarely in Ukrainian: hromadianka/hromadianyn) was rejected in places.15 Peasants visiting the Kiev administration apparently addressed the female officials there as "lady" (damochko) or "madam" (baryshen'ko, pannochno).16


15Nikolai Fevr, Solntse voskhodit na zapade (Buenos Aires, 1950), pp. 174–175, based on observations during a train ride from Bila Tserkva to Dnipropetrov's'k in the fall of 1942. He adds, "I heard the word 'comrade' only once, said by habit, and immediately ridiculed in the words of one of those present: 'Hear that, he remembered the comrades; they were here, but they're all gone..."" Halyna Lashchenko was told by a woman who stood with her in an unruly line-up at an office in Kiev in the fall of 1941: "Observe the line up, citizen [grazhdanka]!" The bureaucrat in charge objected: "There are no citizens anymore!" Lashchenko, "Povorot," Samostiina Ukraina, XI, 11 (119) (Chicago, November 1958), p. 10.

16[Sharandachenko], Reieistratorka zahsu, pp. 114–116. Among themselves, peasants addressed middle-aged peasant women as "aunt" (titko or t'oto), and elderly ones as "grandma" (babo). Antonina Khelemendyk-Kokot, Kolhospne dytystvo i nimets'ka nevolia: spohady (Toronto, 1989), p. 140.
People discovered the sudden importance of nationality and generally registered as "Ukrainian" (ukraïnets’ukraïnka, Ukrainer). Einsatzgruppe C also found that when it asked about people's nationality, the answer was almost always "Ukrainian" and rarely "Russian." But people's actual self-identity remained often based on something other than ethnicity—professional status or religion. The typical peasant considered him- or herself foremost just that—khliborob (peasant or farmer, literally a "grain-maker"). Women of Polish descent in the Vinnytsia region in mid-1943, when asked for their nationality, answered "Catholic." Once the concept of nationality had been explained to them, the answer became "Ukrainian." By far the most popular forms of self-identification, however, were the traditional (but strikingly unstudied) adjectives-turned-nouns svoï (in Russian svoï) and nashi. Both words meant "our people," or literally "one's own" or "ours." For example, a Ukrainian-speaking woman from the town of Bohuslav was in her mid-teens in early 1944 when the front passed her. She survived by hiding. A Red Army soldier who saw her called out, "Who's there?" She and the others answered, My, svoï—us, our people. Even one person might say "ours" (svii, in Russian: svoï) when asked to identify him- or herself.

Svoï and nashi were rather intangible terms, which was precisely why they were so popular. In Dnieper Ukraine, "our people" almost certainly included Russians and perhaps also local assimilated Poles. A man found in the Vinnytsia region that even nationally conscious Ukrainians considered Russians (Ukr.: rosiiany) to be svoï. In fact, these Ukrainian speakers called them russki. When Seleshko asked instead about katsapy, an old derogatory word for

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17 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 88 (19 September 1941), pp. 14–15. To be sure, there were many Russians who called themselves Russian. This was the case with all those whom the SD interpreter Mykhailo Seleshko met in Vinnytsia. Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 132.

18 Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 132.

19 Nadiia Fedorovna [Fedorivna] Bondarenko (Ukrainian born in 1930 in Bohuslav), author interview in Ukrainian, 20 July 1995, Bohuslav, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording. The Russian cry svoï was also used among Red Army soldiers who could not see each other, in order to identify oneself as "friendly forces." Peter Repa, A Footnote to My Epitaph (Singleton, NSW, [Australia], [1992?]), p. 90.
Russians, people said that these were not *russki*, and unpleasant people. Jews, however, were probably generally not considered to be *svoi* or *nashi*.

One finds the same preference for vagueness in the way people referred to the former authorities, in public and among acquaintances. These authorities were thoroughly unpopular, but they controlled the lives of those relatives who were still serving in the Red Army, or were otherwise living in the Soviet hinterland. Nationally conscious Ukrainians who eventually fled westward spoke of "the Bolsheviks" (the traditional Russianism *bol'shevyky*, rarely the Soviet Ukrainian *bil'shovyky*), "the Soviets" (soviety), or "the Reds" (chervoni). Some Russian-speaking city-dwellers used "Soviet rule" (sovetskaia vlast'), "the Bolsheviks" (bol'sheviki) and, if fearless, "the tramps" (bosiaki). Most "ordinary" people, however, apparently simply did not name the former authorities whenever they could be overheard. Merely mentioning Stalin, they feared, could result in one's execution. They might say "those" (*ti*, in Russian: *te*), while adding a sign of the hand toward the east, or "the former government. "Ordinary" people did speak of "the Reds" (krasni, in Russian krasnye, in western Volhynia more likely chervoni). This usually meant simply the Red Army.

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20Seleshko, *Vinnytsia*, pp. 150 and 152.


22Anatolii Kuznetsov (A. Anatolii), *Babii iar: roman-dokument* (New York, 1986), pp. 26, 28, 60, and 195. The pun also existed as an adjective—as in, for example, "Slava tebe, Gospodi, konchilas' eta bosiatskaia vlast'"—and as a verb, *bosiakovat'*. Ibid., pp. 28 and 53.


25"Iz dnevnika uchitel'nitsy gor. Kieva L. Nartovoi [Nartova diary]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 347, II. 5 and 8 (Kiev, March-April 1942); "Fol'klor Velykoi Vitchyznianoii viiny," typed manuscript (Kiev: IMFE Akademii nauk Ukrain's'koi RSR, 1945), edited by M. T. Ryl's'kyi, IMFE, f. 14-3, od. zb. 56, ark. 496, reproduced from IMFE, T. Krasys'tka collection, f. 14–3, od. zb. 20, ark. 39 ("Doshchych ide, bude slyz'ko../ Tikai frys'ku, krasni blyz'ko." Dnipropetrov's'k region, 1943); Alexander Werth, *Russia at War, 1941–1945* (New York, 1965), pp. 717 and 728 (in the Uman' region shortly after its recapture by the Red Army; he also heard peasants refer to
As the violence of the Nazi regime went on, the word ti disappeared from use and was more and more replaced by the openly used nashi. This does not mean that people could not have thought the latter term before then.26 The newly public term immediately divided people, however. The Kievan Tat’iana Fesenko (born around 1915) met a friend who had just spent months in a prisoner-of-war camp. The young man, full of hatred of the Germans, was impatiently awaiting the return of those he called nashi. She recalls: "We could not connect; to me, neither the Soviets nor the Germans were mine [svoi] anymore."27 At the time of a Red Army offensive, some people in the Poltava region started saying, "Soon nashi will come!" Others questioned them: what good could those nashi of theirs bring—not their sons, who had been killed in battle long ago. Instead, these objectors said, what would come was "that same devil's regime which oppressed us," perhaps even a famine like the one of 1933.28

Of course, by the time the Red Army returned, such objections were no longer expressed. In Kiev there were happy shouts in the street: "Why are you sitting inside, nashi are already at the Jewish Bazaar!"29 In contrast, in western Volhynia in August and September


27Tat’iana Fesenko, Povest’ krivykh let (New York, 1963), p. 86.

28Oleksander Bykovets’, "Case History LH33," in James E. Mace and Leonid Heretz, eds., Oral History Project of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Vol. 1 (Washington, 1990), p. 409. Bykovets’ says that this particular Red Army advance was led by General Timoshenko and took place near Lozova and Barvinkovo. This was in May 1942.

29Klavdia Iakovlivna Hrynevych (Ukrainian born in 1930 in Klynts’i [Kirovohrad oblast]), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, tape recording. Similarly, the Jewish Holocaust survivor Evgenia Gural’nik (born as Kulikiwskaja in or around 1928) shouted in January 1944, "You can come out! These are nashi! Do you understand! Nashi, the Reds [krajnye] have come!" [Evgenia (Zhenia) Gural’nik], "Iama v Pavlovychakh," in David Zil’berman [comp.], I ty eto videl (New York, 1989), p. 30.

It is worth mentioning the words used by the peasant women and men interviewed by this author in Kiev and the Bohuslav region in 1995. The word nashi comes up all the time: nashi arrived (Moskov’ska); nashi came (pryshly nashi, Iakiv Vasylenko); krasni came, nashi came (zaishly krasni; nashi zakhodyly, Mariia Vasylenko); nashi started to attack (staly nastupat’ nashi, Bondarenko); nashi, ruski came (Kutsenko); nashi krasni (Prylipko); nashi came, nashi, nache zh
1943 people often asked the writer Ulas Samchuk what would happen after the return of "those" (ti). In this region, the equally current nashi rarely meant the Red Army, for few of people's relatives were serving in it. More likely it meant the rank-and-file of the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

The next question is to what extent Dnieper Ukrainians were patriotic. If they were, of what were they patriots—Ukraine, the Soviet Union, or perhaps both? Or were they even nationalists? John Armstrong's 1955 study of Ukrainian nationalism during World War II was the first scholarly work to address these issues. He found that there existed a certain patriotism. There also was a Ukrainian nationalist "movement," but he concluded that "the essential mass remained uncommitted." Armstrong provided no sources for this last statement, however. This largely explains why his view rarely found acceptance among the few other scholars in the west who studied wartime Ukraine.

Bohdan Krawchenko proposed the entirely opposite in 1985. His main sources were interviews with former Soviet citizens conducted by the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System in 1950 and 1951. Krawchenko's premise—based on other research data as well—was that a Ukrainian "national consciousness" had developed in Soviet Ukraine in the years 1921 to 1941. In his view, this at least partially explained why local administrations, schools, and

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31One memoirist recalls that in 1941, a group of isolated Red Army soldiers asked him in Russian: "Where are our people?" [Gde nashi?]. The western Volhynian man responded, "Your people? [Vashi?] Your people are already far away... Do you hear the grenades exploding over there? That's where your people are already." Satsiuk, Smertonosti, p. 113. To Satsiuk, nashi were the people who lived in this western Volhynian region, or at least the Ukrainians. He identified himself as svii. Ibid., pp. 60, 79, 81, 92, and 99.

32John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd ed. (Englewood, Colorado, 1990), p. 218. At the time of writing, the sources on which he based this statement, probably the SD reports, were largely classified.
newspapers were established so soon after the Germans arrived. But Krawchenko's causality actually seemed to work both ways, for in turn, "all this activity led to a strengthening of national consciousness." Even after this brief "period of national revival," which ended in his view with the executions of OUN-M activists in Zhytomyr on 31 August 1941, the conditions remained conducive to nationalism. This was because German actions provoked hatred of the Germans, which "expressed itself in an affirmation of a Ukrainian national identity." In other words, whatever the Germans did in Ukraine, it had to strengthen Ukrainian national consciousness.

Clearly, the issue still demands thorough investigation. The following discussion provides an answer, but it should be noted that it remains preliminary until nationalist and communist sources have been studied to a much larger extent than could be done for this dissertation research.

First of all, it needs to be emphasized that the first phase of the war with Germany had an overwhelmingly humiliating impact on the Dnieper Ukrainians. Desertion was a major reason for the rapid advance of the Germans and their allies, but the local population also considered that the advance was the result of their own failure to resist. Not surprisingly, few have actually recorded the painful memory for posterity. A Russophone Ukrainian notes in his memoirs that during the first weeks of the war with Germany, in the Kirovohrad region "everyone as in concert cursed the government for the loss of the war without any glory, and that it was lost, nobody doubted, including myself. Old people recalled the previous war and said that then the Germans came to us only in the fourth year of war. Now, after all our five-year-plans, in the second month."36

34Ibid., p. 21.
35Ibid., p. 29.
36Pavel Negrof, Vse dorogi vedut na Vorkutu (Benson, Vermont, 1985), p. 27.
Soon the humiliation was overshadowed by new expectations. Many people, in particular the higher educated or intelligentsia, came to think that some kind of semi-independent Ukrainian state led by a Ukrainian government would be created. Kiev had barely been taken by the Germans, when small groups of people talked in the street about who was part of the Ukrainian government that would arrive. Some mentioned Symon Petliura, the Ukrainian nationalist leader of the revolutionary period, but others corrected them. These others were sure that the Soviet media had not lied when reporting his murder in 1926. The socialist and former leader Volodymyr Vynnychenko was mentioned as the premier. In Kiev and elsewhere, former Soviet citizens also often asked Galician Ukrainians and others who came from the west about Vynnychenko and sometimes Petliura. A Galician who interpreted for the German army recalls that he was often asked whether there was already a Ukrainian authority and, after Kiev's capture, why no instructions were forthcoming from there. Moreover, in Kirovohrad it was rumored that a Ukrainian army would be created. Nobody was interested in emigre politicians, however.

The origin of these rumors is not clear. Nazi intelligence (SD), which reported from the Zhytomyr region in mid-August 1941 that "the more intelligent Ukrainians in the area under discussion are strongly convinced that a free Ukraine under German leadership is being created," ascribed the perception to Soviet propaganda, that is, the pre-1941 campaign regarding the fictitious Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. Probably more important,
however, were Soviet media reports about the proclamation of statehood by the OUNSD in L'viv on 30 June 1941. (Interestingly, some Ukrainians simply spoke of "Ukraine" when they meant "a Ukrainian state." Thus, a prisoner of war might ask a civilian: "What about that Ukraine which was declared in L'viv?" In some regions, the Germans themselves are known to have planted the rumor. In the Left-Bank town of Lubny, Volhynian German soldiers told locals in fluent Ukrainian that Ukraine would become a German protectorate and that it already had its own government. They also mentioned names of those in it.

In Kiev, most of the expectation seems to have dissipated after a swastika flag was placed next to the Ukrainian blue-and-yellow flag on St Sophia cathedral on 13 October 1941. But elsewhere many people continued to believed for months that a Ukrainian government would arrive. An activist of the Mel'nyk faction of the OUN continued to meet many people in December 1941 who expected the arrival of a Ukrainian government.

The above suggests that people not only expected, but also wanted some kind of regional Ukrainian government. They do not, however, prove the presence of the ultimate nationalist demand—a Ukrainian semi-independent or fully independent state. From the very beginning, all German agencies were concerned with the demand for independence. They found it only among the OUNSD and the small Ukrainian intelligentsia. In January 1942, the Reichskommissariat leadership noted "national Ukrainian aspirations [Bestrebungen]" among the latter. The nationalism of some of these intellectuals was of a particularly radical kind. As

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42Ibid. Cf. the statement by a Volhynian policeman in 1941: "Now there is a Ukraine" (teper ie Ukraïna). Panas Khurtovyna [Mykhailo Podvorniak], Pid nebom Volyni: (voienni spomyny khrystiianyna) (Winnipeg, 1952), p. 102.


45Hartymiv, "Zemleiu ukraïns'koiu...," p. 147.

46"Lagebericht für Januar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, ll. 29–30.
was noted in chapter 2, the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev rejected all Russians and Jews. The Ukrainian intelligentsia in Vinnytsia in mid-1943, according to an OUN-M member who interpreted for the SD, hated Ukraine's cities because they were Russophone. They wanted them destroyed along with their populations, so that new ones should be built exclusively for Ukrainians, by which they meant Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians.47

The majority of the population thought otherwise. Military intelligence agent Hans Koch wrote on 30 September 1941 that "the Ukrainian state concept [Staatsbegriff] is at the moment very muted.... Only the very few intellectuals and the illegally returned emigrés think about larger organizations on a regional or even national [gesamstaatlich] scale. The population's interest does not rise above the village, raion, and the nearest market."48 The SD reported the same lack of interest, or at least a lack of precise political notions. Because such reports can easily be misinterpreted, the relevant passages will be quoted at some length.

In the Vinnytsia region in August 1941, the SD found that in pre-1941 Ukraine, "the concept [Gedanke] of a united Soviet Russia with annexation of the Ukraine and led by Stalin could not win over the youth. Rather, up through the last years, especially with the more mature youth, the idea of a Ukraine completely separated from Russia has always been present to a certain extent, although there were no more forces actively working toward this goal."49 All other reports contradict this, however. The Einsatzkommando near Zhytomyr found that during the German arrival "national state tendencies" (nationalstaatliche Tendenzen) "did not exist."50 It elaborated in early September 1941 on the issue as follows:

Throughout it could be observed that there can be no question of the presence of some kind of political national trends, and that not even the spiritual breeding ground for such

47 Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 164. The same sentiment is in Liubchenko, Schchodennyk, p. 25 (a note written in Kharkiv in December 1941). Armstrong also found that Ukrainian nationalism "attracted a large proportion of the intellectuals [i.e., the intelligentsia] and technicians." Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 218; cf. ibid., pp. 91 and 215.

48 Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass in der Ukraine," II. 10 and 17.

49 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 45 (7 August 1941), p. 10.

50 It ascribed this to the purges of the 1930s. Ibid., 52 (14 August 1941), p. 9.
Traveling OUN activists, the SD found, "did not leave behind a lasting impression." This must have been because they stayed only briefly. In some regions, however, peasants are reported to have worked less hard after OUN activists visited them, and there is even one German report of "considerable support" for the OUNSD in the Vinnytsia region by August 1942.53

Nazi intelligence even found that those Kievan who had wanted a Ukrainian government actually opposed the idea by November 1941: "The idea of an independent Ukrainian state finds little support. Immediately after the arrival of the German troops in Kiev, very often the question for Ukrainian self-government was raised. Now the desire is more and more expressed that a Ukrainian self-government should under no circumstances be introduced, as the Ukrainians were by no means capable of governing themselves." This must in part have been caused by their distaste for the OUN—as the SD put it in a report about

51Ibid., 81 (12 September 1941), p. 17. Also, regarding the Volhynia-Podolia Generalbezirk: "During the invasion of the German troops it could be observed that the idea of independence of the Ukraine in the regions which earlier had not belonged to Poland was hardly present [kaum verbreitet] and only was imported by the Western Ukrainians arriving from Galicia." Ibid., 191 (10 April 1942), pp. 20–21.

Likewise, regarding the Berdychiv region: "The non-Jewish population is politically largely indifferent. Particular ideas about the future political shape of the country are not present in the broad mass, disregarding the natural exceptions. There is only the wish that the German occupation leave the little which the Bolsheviks did not destroy to the population. Cohesive ideas [Ein ideenmäßiger Zusammenhalt], also in the smallest communities, do not exist, so that it should be very easy to win the population [over] through skillful propaganda and appropriate measures." Ibid., 40 (1 August 1941), p. 18.

52Ibid., 112 (13 October 1941), pp. 4–5.


54Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 135 (19 November 1941), p. 17. The report thought the reason was the corruption of the work- and housing bureaucracy.
the Kiev region in early 1942: "the rejection experienced by Western Ukrainians and re-emigrés." The latter constituted a large part of what the SD called in mid-1942 the "national extremist elements" in all administrations. In the fall of that year, it repeated that "in the old-Bolshevik regions the national consciousness has moved very far into the background or is overshadowed by the communist ideals."

Nazi intelligence considered western Volhynia to be an exception, but only in part. To be sure, by early 1942 it reported that "Ukrainian nationalism," particularly the OUNSD, was "the strongest political movement" there. But even this meant little:

Again and again one can come to the conclusion that in the people itself the Ukrainian 'state' consciousness on the whole is not present.... A small part of the native population in this space wishes—as a consequence of the observations [it] has made—a development of the Ukraine under German leadership until the day when the Ukraine is viable as independent state. These Ukrainians are counting on a purge [Bereinigung] of their ruling strata by Germany, as they are convinced that the party discord among the Ukrainians would bring about the collapse of any immediately founded Ukrainian state. By far the largest part of the population, which thinks less about the political structuring of the country, is also concerned with acquiring private property again and otherwise living in peace and quiet.

This seems an accurate description for that period. By the fall of 1942, the SD modified the picture: "In Podolia, so far one has managed every time to uncover prepared attempts at rebellion, but in contrast in [western] Volhynia, the national resistance movements until today have not been completely uncovered. This testifies to the fact that the Ukrainian in [western] Volhynia has a much stronger political will to live, and that again and again enough forces are found who are prepared to put their life on the line for their work and idea." The agency also

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57Ibid., 24 (9 October 1942), p. 15.
59Meldungen, 13 (24 July 1942), pp. 4–5. Underlined as in the original.
60Ibid., 24 (9 October 1942), p. 15.
found that Soviet written propaganda in the Reichskommissariat as a whole was still supporting a "national tendency," "in order to accommodate the national endeavors present in the Ukraine." This was the SD's last own estimate of the strength of Ukrainian nationalism.

Ukrainian sources provide very little additional evidence. The folklore that has been preserved, particularly songs of those being deported to Germany, often mention "Ukraine," but in a patriotic, not nationalist way. The Dnieper Ukrainian Fedir Pihido says that peasants continued to hope for a government of their own in 1942. Peasants "often" asked him with despair, even as late as the fall of 1942, "so where are our leaders, who is going to lead us, so that we can defend our borders with our own lives [svoi my hrud'my]?" Although this may be true, it is a shallow basis for generalization.

Another anecdote of Pihido's suggests that a provincial Ukrainian patriotism existed from the start— that is, a patriotism of Ukraine as part of the Soviet Union (what used to be called Landespatriotismus in the Habsburg Empire). Soon after the German arrival in Kiev, it was announced that those whose passport showed that they were Ukrainian were allowed to pick up a radio. Pihido's Russian friend "S.," a doctor who had been telling him for years that only the Germans could get rid of Stalin, reacted as follows: "What do they want from us? We are all citizens of Ukraine, all of us are anti-Communists!" All Ukrainians in Vinnytsia with whom Seleshko, a leading OUN-M member, spoke called themselves Ukrainians, but "this consciousness was territorial, not internal, spiritual." They spoke of "our rich country" (nasha

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62 In one of its last Meldungen, the SD reported that the intelligentsia of western Volhynia believed that a desire for independence had taken root in central Ukraine. Ibid., 54 (14 May 1943), p. 11.

63 See for example "Nadpysy radian'skykh hromadian, iakykh nimtsi vidpravlialy, pidchas okupatsii' Ukraiiny v Nimechchynu," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, ll. 97-105.


65 On 21 September 1941, the measure was rescinded and all radios had to be returned. Ibid., p. 131; Khoroshunova, "Kievskie zapiski," p. 274; Vasilii Ivanovich Iablonskii (Ukrainian born in 1908), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 February 1944, [Kiev?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, l. 3; Fesenko, Povest', p. 76. According to Nartova diary, l. 3, all radios had to be handed in on 30 November 1941.
bogataia strana) when they meant the Soviet Union, and of "Poland" when they meant Galicia (and sometimes also western Volhynia).66

Part of the reason why the Dnieper Ukrainians were very little interested in nationalism was the way they remembered things. The following evidence about remembrance does not show that "the Russians" were collectively blamed for anything. The famine of 1933 was a frequent topic of conversation. At least at first, it was discussed much more than German policies. Finally people could get the horrors they had seen in 1933 off their chest. Any visitor from Galicia, western Volhynia, or anywhere else west of the former Soviet border was told about the Great Famine. The Volhynian evangelist Bohdan Liubomyrenko found that "anywhere we visited people [in 1941], without fail every one of them mentioned, as something very terrible, the days of famine they lived through. It was not at all new to us [after a while] when our hosts told us all night about the horrors they lived through during the artificial famine."67

Hans Koch saw and heard eyewitnesses address public gatherings in the countryside about the total starvation of villages in the Zhytomyr and Berdychiv regions. "The neighbors of these villages confirmed the truth of these events with great calm, as if a matter of course. Cases of cannibalism certainly occurred then, at least several times I was told about or shown men and women who in the villages are openly accused of cannibalism, without those involved protesting against it. The population considers these cases as consequences of extreme adversity and does not condemn them."68 Peasants who had written diaries of the events of 1929–1933 took them out of hiding and submitted them to the local newspapers. (They were

66Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 132, 144, and 153. Armstrong was the first to suggest that in some regions, particularly the south, patriotism was more pronounced than nationalism, but it remained unclear what grounds he had for making the statement. In this regard, he spoke of "the northwestern area around the see of Kirovograd." Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 205 and 210.

67Liubomyrenko, Z Khrystom v Ukrai'ni, p. 97. Some of stories he was told are in ibid., pp. 16 and 98–101.

68Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass," l. 6. See also Hartymiv, "Zemleiu ukrains'koiu...," pp. 128–129 and 144, regarding the Kiev, Kryvyi Rih, and Apostolove regions.
never actually published.) Older Kievans also invariably raised the topic with visitors from "abroad." None of the sources say that ordinary people blamed "the Russians" for the famine.

Other events of the past were talked about less often. There was still an unselfconscious knowledge of folkloric songs and customs. Older people did not necessarily speak badly of the tsarist period, and they might even praise it. In the fall of 1942, the Russian journalist Nikolai Fevr visited the sugar factory between Bila Tserkva and Kiev and struck up a conversation about its former owner, Count Bobrinskoi.

'He owned this factory and still four others, and had 30,000 desiatyns of land,' says one of the peasants who work at the factory. 'That was not fair,' I say, 'that one person had so much.' 'Of course it wasn't fair,' he answers, 'but there was order! That man understood the business, the enterprise really prospered! And he was not the only one to eat from it. Thousands of people lived from this business and how!'

Another peasant added that everything had worsened after 1917. "The Bolsheviks chased these Bobrinskoiis away, so that everything fell apart! Would you believe that [in the 1930s] we worked in the sugar industry, but often had to travel to Kiev and stand in line there for sugar? Everything up to the last particle they took away from us, and nobody knew whereto. In Kiev there was still sugar, but in Bila Tserkva there wouldn't be any for months..."

Another kind of nostalgia was felt by people of noble or well-to-do descent. Their hopes were also raised when the Germans invaded. In Kiev, a woman called Vira Andriïvna Levyts'ka disclosed her big secret to her friends. She was a "former person"; that is, from a despised social and political background. She had married a worker in order to save herself.


71 Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass," l. 16. Another view, based on observations in the Vinnytsia region, is in Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 45 (7 August 1941), p. 6. It says that "all these things are only known to the older generation, which experienced the tsarist period."

72 Fevr, Soltse, p. 171.
Now she started talking about the elegant balls she attended in the old days and anticipated a claim to her family's nationalized property, which had eight houses, the Pioneers' Palace, and the electrical power station on it.73

Recollections of the revolutionary period were often vague, and rarely expressed. Many people considered Petliura to be just one of many warlords of that time.74 Others talked about the persecution of Christians in the Soviet Union.75 There were large public burials in western Volhynia of those killed by the NKVD in 1941. Moreover, all villages and towns there seem to have had large symbolic grave mounds with a cross and texts like "To the Memory of Those Who Fell for the Freedom of Ukraine."76 At the current state of research, there is no evidence of similar ceremonies and sites in east-central Ukraine.

At first, it appeared that the NKVD terror of the late 1930s would be allowed to become a topic for public remembrance. As soon as Einsatzkommando 6 of Einsatzgruppe C arrived in Vinnytsia, it forced Jews to dig up twenty-eight bodies in the backyard of the former NKVD building. (These Jews were probably shot afterward.) The SS men then organized an autopsy and identification of several bodies, after which all victims were buried in a ceremony in which thousands of city dwellers, mostly women and children, participated. One of the Einsatzkommando members wrote about the victims: "Who were these people? Intelligentsia, capitalists, former land owners, officers? Nothing of the kind—instead, without exception, [they were] working men, laborers, and peasants of the smallest and most modest rank." This he found out by talking to the relatives at the ceremony.

When one started a conversation, immediately dozens and hundreds gathered around, who wanted to tell their fate. This fate is almost always the same: one day after 1937.


75Liubomyrenko, Z Khrystom v Ukraini, pp. 13 and 18.

76Khurtovyna, Pid nebom Volyni, pp. 107–108.
the NKVD appeared at the home. The man/father/brother/son/fiancé was taken away. The next day, or a bit later, a printed card arrived: citizen X was sentenced to 10 years of forced labor for anti-Soviet views. Correspondence is not allowed. When was that? In 1938. Where is he? A shrug. Since then, no more news. Amazingly, almost every one of the thousands of old and young women always carries the printed card with the creased and soiled message from the NKVD. 77

But only in 1943 would the SD allow the Vinnytsia graves to become a public affair.

In Kiev the Red Cross section on aid to "repressed" people prepared a card catalogue of Soviet camps, under the direction of the historian Nataliia Polons'ka-Vasylenko. 78 Both the central city administration and that of the district of Damysia asked the German civilian authorities to publicize an NKVD mass grave seven kilometers east of the city, near the hamlet of Bykivnia. Not surprisingly, considering the Babyn Iar massacre, the Nazis refused any publicity about that site and gave no permission for the installments of the memorial objects which the city administration had prepared. The "discovery" of the Bykivnia site apparently still became a topic of conversation in Kiev, so that the SD felt compelled to place a guard around the terrain. 79

I would conclude for now that Armstrong had it right. 80 There is simply no evidence to support the notion that the many deprivations under Nazi rule made the Dnieper Ukrainians more conscious of their ethnicity. They were, and continued to be, very little interested in

77 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 81 (12 September 1941), p. 11. That those who dug up the bodies were Jews is not mentioned here, but is very likely considering what is known about the Einsatzgruppen in general.


79 The wooden wall placed by the NKVD had been removed earlier. Leontii Forostivs'kyi, Kyïv pid vorozhymy okupatsiyami (Buenos Aires, 1952), pp. 75–78.

80 On the other hand, Armstrong exaggerated when saying that in the cities, the deprivations mainly "promote[d] passivity and resignation." Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 189–190. Hans Koch took note of passivity already in the fall of 1941, but added that once people's survival was at stake, they acted "smartly, inventively, and consistently." By way of examples, Koch mentioned the looting of machine parts, the restoration of churches, the opening of schools, and "all kinds of clandestine activities, which [the population] thinks should it do, and has done, vis-à-vis the new order." Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass," II. 9–10.
ethnicity, let alone nationalism. As a result, from a Ukrainian nationalist point of view, they were not "real" Ukrainians.

What did Dnieper Ukrainians think of what they called "Europe" and the "Europeans," that is, the world west of the Soviet Union and the people who came from there? Here we shall discuss the view of the Germans, of Adolf Hitler, of the "western" Ukrainians, and of the émigrés who returned. (Public perceptions of native policemen and officials, who could be relatives or acquaintances, is a complex issue which needs a separate study.81)

Attitudes were evident already in forms of address. German and other soldiers and non-native officials were addressed as pan (Sir) by Ukrainian and Russian speakers.82 People thought a lot about what Ukrainian speakers called the nimtsi or hernantsi. (Russian speakers called them nemtsy or perhaps, more circumspectly, "them"—eti.83) First of all, people were amazed that the officers received the same food as the rank and file (unlike the situation in the Red Army), and yet maintained a disciplinary distance. Equally stunning was the living standard of the common German soldier, with his daily shave, tooth brushing, boot cleaning, and dishwashing.84 It made people feel all the more sorry for the Red Army soldiers.85

Peasants frequently believed the German officers were landlords or rich nobles. When shown a

81 Some examples of antipathy from peasant folklore: "Vid mashyny shum i hul/ I obdaie parom/ Íde starosta-kurkul'/ Z nimtsem-komisarom." "Nimtsi starosti-chortovi/ Khochut' orden daty/ Shcho prymushuvav selian vin/ Den'-nich pratsiuvaty." "Politsai khiba liudy'/ Zaprodantsi kliat'/ Pomahaiut' nimtsiam-iudam/ Selian hrabuvaty!" "V tserkvi hosti - nimtsi/ Politsai vinchaiet'sia/ Natsiluiu nichku/ Benket pochynaiet'sia." IMFE, Tol'chennikova collection, ark. 59 and 63–64. It should be realized, however, that those who had nothing against such people probably did not sing about them or, at the very least, would have hesitated to provide the songs to people collecting folklore.

82 Letter of 17 July 1943, printed in Leo Meter, Briefe an Barbara: mit einem Nachwort von Barbara Meter (Cologne, 1988), unnumbered page; Hrynevych, author interview.

83 Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 279.

84 Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass," 1. 12.

picture of a German farmstead, few of them believed that the inhabitant was an ordinary farmer.86

Kievans considered the first soldiers to be incredibly trustful. A young woman recalls the first days in German-ruled Kiev: "Because we were used to Soviet suspiciousness, we were simply stunned by the German's amazing trustfulness. They entered completely unknown apartments without fearing [booby] traps, were very sociable with the population, and did not care at all about their weapons, which they just threw anywhere while unbuttoning."87 Another young woman was "horrified" to see a twelve-year-old boy caught with a stolen sub-machine gun and merely told, "Dumm, dumm!" (stupid).88

Besides words, there were of course also actions. The peasantry first generally supported the German army and Hitler, as will be recalled from earlier chapters, and spontaneously placed flowers at German graves. In the winter of 1941–1942, the Reichskommissariat authorities organized a drive for winter clothing. In its report for January 1942, the leadership noted that "again and again, it has been shown that the Ukrainian population generally donated very willingly. Besides the winter clothing, in places spontaneous fund-raising actions were held by the Ukrainian population."89 Old and also many young peasants had what may be termed a "pre-modern" sense of compassion. At first they disregarded nationality and frequently cried over the death of fallen German soldiers, simply out of a sense of human tragedy.90 The Kievan Anatolii Kuznetsov heard about a village where two very young German soldiers were killed by partisans—a woman whose own son had


87Fesenko, Povest', p. 77.

88Liudmyla Stanyslavivna Khmilevs'ka (Ukrainian born in 1923 in Kiev), interview in Russian by author, 13 July 1995, Kiev, tape recording. Her phrasing is that they were "awfully [do uzhasa] trustful."

89"Lagebericht für Januar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 49.

fallen during the Soviet-Finnish war cried over them. Such human sentiments did not entirely disappear, even when the locals had become "numb" by witnessing many more tragedies.

What was gone by 1942, however, was the amazement and affection. By then most city dwellers hated the Germans as a people. One Kievan wrote in her diary on 21 March 1942: "I never thought I could hate this much, as I have come to hate these barbarians. Everything about them is repulsive—their well-groomed mugs, so smug and arrogant, they always look at you as at something wretched, good-for-nothing, they don't care about the basic rules of decency." The looting by Germans, whether official or illegal, also caused great resentment. A saying had it that "Among the little people, theft is called mania, among the nobles kleptomania, and among the Germans Germania."

The mood in Kiev changed such that by late 1942, according to an informant "about 90 percent" of Kievnans were "dissatisfied" with the German administration, even though "again and again one hears very positive and favorite opinions of individual German officials and bosses." Kievnans constantly complained that before 1941 they were not beaten at the workplace. "With the increasing darkness, there are said to have been already several murders

91Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 298.

92Typically, some peasants in Medvyn later gave food to hungry German prisoners of war, simply because they were human beings who needed it. Maria Khotodsiivna Hohulia (Ukrainian born in 1927 in Medvyn), author interview in Ukrainian, 22 July 1995, Medvyn, Bohuslav raion, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording. In May 1943, the SD found out about independent pilgrimages in the countryside south of Kiev by about forty women and children. These had been going on since at least March 1943. The pilgrims prayed for peace, distributed "holy" bread to the poor, and moved toward the front, convinced that their action could end the war by June. They prayed for the dead and the prisoners of war of both the Red and the German armies. Meldungen, 55 (21 May 1943), pp. 9–10.

93Nartova diary, l. 6. See also Chepurnoi, zam. zav. orinistruktorskim otdelom TsK KP(b)U, "Informatiia o sostoianii raboty kievskoi podpol'noi organizatsii KP(b)U," Starobil's'k, 26 March 1943, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 11, l. 10, according to which "the overwhelming majority [of Kievnans] sees in every German their enslavoir, robber, and murderers." It is also instructive to observe the transformation of the thinking of the writer and ultra-nationalist Arkadii Liubchenko. After an extended pro-German period, in August 1942 he wrote in his diary that the German attitude regarding the famine in Kiev bordered on "criminality." Still he kept hoping for a change. Only in December 1942 did he admit in his diary that he had been wrong to believe that the Germans would change their ways. Liubchenko, Shchodenyky, p. 106; "Shchodenyky," Novi dni, III, 30 (Toronto, July 1952), p. 3.

94Himmler at a 17 August 1942 meeting, quoted in Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion (Stuttgart, 1983), p. 173.
of Germans in Kiev. At the moment a Bolshevik major Kalashnikov, who knows German and acts in German uniform, is doing his evil deeds. All of Kiev speaks about him as a legendary hero. A year ago he would generally have been considered a bandit.  

The peasant women who came to a hospital in Kiev in late 1942 and early 1943 told a woman teacher who worked there some of the songs they were singing with lyrics like: "The damned Germans have fat lips/Swollen/ Yet they say we are coarse/ Uncivilized." "During the day we are in the fields/ At night we tend to the horses/ Only the damned kraut [kliaty
nimchura] Plays the gramophone." "During the civil war the Ukrainians/ Chased away the bourgeoisie/ But the damned Germans appeared/ And became lords [pany]."

By early 1943, after another hungry winter, Kiev was seething with hatred of the Germans. German (and native) policemen felt compelled to walk only in groups and armed with rifles. The mood was captured in Dnieper Ukraine by expressions such as: "You have a German conscience" (Sovist' u tebe nimets's'ka) or in rhymes like: "You sow, the German takes it. You don't sow, the German fleeces. May the devil take them!" (Posiiav, nimets' bere. Ne posiiav, nimets' dere. Khai ikh short zabere!). The derogatory word frys' (from the German name Fritz) was also used. In letters people sent to relatives who worked in Germany, censors...
found that they generally called the Germans "worse than the Bolsheviks; they had promised a lot, but had not kept any of it."99

Hitler was first considered a great leader, and his portrait (with the text "The Liberator") was in great demand.100 At the official celebrations of his birthday on 19 April 1942 (which became a holiday), the population "embellished the portrait in its [own] way."101 It was still displayed in people's homes as late as August 1942,102 but that did not necessarily mean they admired him. (After all, peasants had earlier displayed Stalin's portrait in order to appear loyal.) By that time, there were people who ventured saying things like, "That 'liberator' thinks [only] of himself, not a word about us," or even, "Have you ever seen that a good borsch was made from a dog's tail? No, this 'liberator' is one of a kind with Stalin...[na odyn kopyl iz Stalinym shytyi]."103

Songs and rhymes began to mention Hitler by name more and more. For example, in Berdychiv some time in 1942, people said, "Hitler wants to rule the world/ But he is going to die like a dog."104 In the Kiev region (not later than early 1943), peasant women sang, "The tsar in Russia/ Already long ago abolished serfdom/ But here Hitler ordered/ To install

99The letters expressed this disappointment "many times." They contained numerous complaints about the "auxiliary" and German authorities (the issues were theft, embezzlement, corruption, injustices, string-pulling, and alcoholism), and more complaints than ever about bad treatment, hard work, and round-ups for work in Germany. There were only "isolated" expressions of hatred of the Soviet system and of gratefulness for its removal. "Stimmungsbericht auf Grund von Briefen, die im April und Mai 1943 ausgewertet sind, über: Ostarbeiter (Post aus und nach der Ukraine)," by Auslandbriefprüfstelle Berlin ("Im Entwurf gez. Tornau"), Berlin, 18 June 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, ll. 31–31v.

100"Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 74 (5 September 1941), p. 9 (regarding peasants in the Uman' region).

101"Lagebericht für den Monat April 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 351.

102"Teilbericht Politik über die Bereisung des Reichskommissariats mit Prof. v. Grünberg in der Zeit vom 13.8. bis 3.9.1942," Rivne, 10 September 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, ll. 31v and 33v (regarding Kirovohrad and Dnipropetrov'sk).

103Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, "Velyka Vichyzniana viina," p. 162.

104"Dumaie Hitler vsim svitom keruvaty/ To pryiet'sia iomu sobakoiu zdykhaty." IMFE, Prytula collection, f. 14–3, od. zb. 24, ark. 30. See also the long song "Hitler do Ukrainy zalystsivia," recorded from children-shepherds in the village of Slobodyshche, twenty-four kilometers from Berdychiv, in July 1942. Ibid., ark. 18.
slavery." The Kam'ianets-Podil's'kyi region knew this saying by the summer of 1943: "Down with Hitler the liberator, long live Stalin the oppressor." (Het' Hitler-vyzvolytelia, khai zhyve Stalin-hnobytel'). People in the Dnipropetrovsk region might call somebody "as crazy as Hitler," (durnyi iak Hitler), which may have happened even before the Red Army's return.

One group of soldiers received a particularly hostile reception from the inhabitants of Dnipropetrovsk in 1941. Because their green uniforms had white five-pointed stars on them, they were believed to be Whites from the revolutionary period. Soon this rumor was overtaken by the news that these were Italians—and thus supposedly womanizers little inclined toward cruelty. After the Battle of Stalingrad, the Italians withdrew from the war. Through the next summer, Ukrainians saw them pass westward from town to town. The Italians looked and acted like beggars. The Germans refused them food, causing them to loot German supplies if they could. They offered to work for food and also sang for it, earning them in Kiev the nickname of "running tenors" (begushchie tenora). They even sold or bartered their arms and machine-guns to locals. They were not even averse to distributing Soviet propaganda material.


106 S. Oleksenko, secretary of the Communist party committee of the Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi oblast, report "po sostoianiiu na I avgusta 1943 g.," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 10, l. 74.

107 "Fol'klor Velykoï Vitchyznianoï viiny," l. 490, copied from IMFE, Krasyts'ka collection, f. 14–3, od. zb. 20, ark. 40 ("1944").


In contrast to the Germans (and perhaps the Hungarians, about whom Slavic sources say very little), Kievans helped the Italians "as they could," despite threats from the city commander against doing so. In Dnipropetrovs'k as well, "their unkempt appearance aroused such pity that the townspeople shared with them whatever they could, although they themselves did not have much. Secretly, however, everybody felt good at the sight of such poverty afflicting the allies of Germany."

"Soviet" suspiciousness notwithstanding, peasants received returning emigrés from the revolutionary period with the traditional hospitality. This applied both to former Ukrainian independence fighters and former "Whites." A former officer of the Ukrainian army of the revolutionary period, born in Pereiaslav-Khmel'nyts'kyi and employed by the German Organisation Todt, which built roads, arrived in Bila Tserkva in the spring of 1942. Pihido witnessed how many people surrounded him, asked him many questions, and pulled him by the sleeve, begging to "please drop by Mr. starshyna, have some bread and salt, you won't regret it." The former White Russian Nikolai Fevr also was in the Bila Tserkva region and had great difficulty convincing his hosts that one week was plenty for a stay at somebody's place.

The rule of hospitality also was applied to legally or illegally arriving Ukrainians from "Polish" Volhynia and Galicia. These people almost invariably had to refute the Dnieper Ukrainians' belief that they were Germans, who somehow were able to speak "like us" (ponashomu). In large part, this was because the western Ukrainians were dressed much better


than Dnieper Ukrainians. The rule seemed to be that someone not poorly dressed could not be one of "our people." In Poltava, the western Volhynian Samchuk was looking at a statue when he heard a young girl suggest to her friends, "That German probably doesn't know who it is. Let's tell him!" Galicians in particular, who were often referred to as "westerners" (zapadniki), were not expected to speak the same Ukrainian. They were also eventually feared, for people knew that Germans persecuted them.

As a result of years of isolation and indoctrination, the things the "westerners" (Ukrainians and others) and former emigrés said about their life in "Europe" were met with disbelief or, at the very least, amazement. Slovak soldiers were asked by peasants to tell about life "at home" (u vas).

They readily struck up conversations and told how workers, peasants, and intellectuals in their country lived; how much, and what, each of them could buy for their monthly earnings. They said that in their country, almost every peasant and worker owned a radio receiver, a bicycle, and three or four suits. Every citizen could work where he wanted, in agriculture or somewhere in the city. When something was not to his liking, he was free to move to another city or village, or to go to work in another factory.

The peasants were captivated, but now and then they shook their heads in disbelief: according to our Soviet standard, this life was a fairy-tale.

The journalist Fevr traveled by train from Bila Tserkva to Dnipropetrovs'k in the fall of 1942.

His fellow-travelers, a large group of people, asked him about ration cards in "Europe," the darkening of cities, curfew times, and whether people's radios had been confiscated when

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115 Samchuk, Na koni voronomu, pp. 254-255. He was looking at a statue of the father of modern Ukrainian literature, Ivan Kotliarev's'kyi. The girls spoke Russian.

If people did not think better dressed people were Germans, then they considered them Jews from "Poland." Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, My Private War, pp. 212-213; Barbara Baratz, Flucht vor dem Schicksal: Holocaust-Erinnerungen aus der Ukraine 1941–1944 (Darmstadt, 1984), pp. 103 and 110.

116 Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 90.

117 Pihido-Pravoberezhniy, "Velyka Vit'czyniana viina," pp. 81–82. These Slovaks were guarding prisoners of war, in 1941.
Germany attacked the Soviet Union. When he answered the last question in the negative, "they could in no way recover from their amazement."\textsuperscript{118}

Did the populace have shared expectations about the future and, if so, what were they? The first thing to mention is that the vast majority of the native population were never fully convinced that the Soviet regime would not return. Hans Koch found the peasants in the fall of 1941 to be fearful and passive. Their main fear, in his view, was "for the return of the Soviet system."

People are definitely impressed by the German tanks and planes. But have the rulers not changed about fifteen times within three decades, including two times the Germans? And don't the Jews whisper about the great Anglo-Saxon-Soviet coalition against Germany? People want the German victory with all their hearts, but are hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men still not in the Soviet army, in Soviet labor battalions, concentration camps, and prisons? Are they not hostages in the hands of Moscow?\textsuperscript{119}

The observation also held true for city-dwellers. Many Kievs thought in the first days of the German presence that the Germans would leave the city again.\textsuperscript{120} To be sure, an unknown number of others thought the opposite. A pro-Soviet woman estimated on 11 October 1941 in her diary that at most five percent of her acquaintances doubted that the Germans had won the war.\textsuperscript{121} Another Kievan recalled later that as the Germans continued to advance, many of his fellow-Kievans "expressed satisfaction and a radiance in their demeanor."\textsuperscript{122} The SD noted in November 1941 that there was "generally" an "impatient hope for the fall of Moscow and Leningrad. The population [of Kiev] expects from this an extraordinary acceleration of the war

\textsuperscript{118}Fevr, Solntse, p. 177.


\textsuperscript{121}Khoroshunova, "Kievskie zapiski," p. 300.

\textsuperscript{122}Vladimir Mikhailovich Artobolevskii (Russian born in 1874), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 and 25 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 22.
and an early peace. Here one cannot speak of a real war-weariness. Indicative of the wishes regarding the quick end of the war are in the first place economic considerations, and secondly the hope for the return of the exiled and conscripts."\textsuperscript{123} The Reichskommissariat leadership noted in its report about the month of December 1941 that events at the front "led in part to unrest among the population, as it fears a return of the Bolsheviks. The slogan of the Soviets during their retreat, according to which it was for strategic reasons, is also still believed by a considerable percentage of the population, so that—the more to the east, the more—the attitude of the Ukrainians toward the Germans is one of wait-and-see."\textsuperscript{124}

The uncertainty continued in 1942. In February of that year, there were many rumors about successes of the Red Army and a quick return of the Soviet regime.\textsuperscript{125} From August to November 1942, rumors persisted that the Germans would soon be chased out of the Left Bank and Kiev. Meanwhile, the entire Right Bank was to be handed over to the Romanians. In some versions, areas in Podilia had already been taken over by the Romanians. The Romanian authorities were now demanding that the Germans return all the "eastern workers" (Ostarbeiter) and prisoners of war who originated from those regions.\textsuperscript{126} Meanwhile, in Dnipropetrovs'k, the Red Army was believed to have retaken Kharkiv, the Germans were believed to be retreating, and the British had supposedly captured several German cities.\textsuperscript{127} By the end of the

\textsuperscript{123}\textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 135 (19 November 1941), p. 17.

\textsuperscript{124}\textit{"Lagebericht" for December 1941}, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 27, l. 4.

\textsuperscript{125}Nartova diary, II. 5 and 8; \textit{"Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 260; Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 177 (6 March 1942), pp. 2–3;

\textsuperscript{126}Nartova diary, l. 15; Liubchenko, \textit{Shchodennik}, p. 118; Auslandbriefprüfstelle Berlin, Berlin, 11 November 1942, Stimmungsbericht, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292549/17. There was also the more modest rumor that Kiev or Vinnytsia would be handed over to the Romanians. According to the SD, "this rumor is said to have been received lively in the widest circles, as people expected to get from the Romanians better living conditions, as for example in Odessa." \textit{Meldungen}, 25 (16 October 1942), p. 8.

The author of an unreliable report, based on talks with Nazi officials in August 1942, noted that the population of the Oleksandriia district was "not entirely free from the thought that Bolshevism could still return." On the other hand, in the Mykolaiv Generalbezirk officials thought that "the successes of the German troops in the southern section of the front have contributed to an improvement of the mood of the population. The Ukrainians have become friendlier and more trusting." \textit{"Teilbericht Politik [...]"}, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, ll. 31v–32 and 36v.

\textsuperscript{127}\textit{Meldungen}, 25 (17 October 1942), p. 12.
year, people in Dnipropetrovs'k rumored that the Germans were almost defeated and that there would be a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{128}

At noon on 9 February 1943, the radio officially announced the defeat of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad.\textsuperscript{129} Only by that stage did the vast majority of the population become convinced that the Germans would not stay because they would lose the war.\textsuperscript{130} Nevertheless, the SD did manage to find people who thought otherwise. "It was reported from the countryside districts of the Kiev region that because fresh German troops passed through with their entirely new and technically advanced equipment, the population got the impression that the present breakthrough of the Soviets would soon be cast back."\textsuperscript{131} In Kiev and Rivne the SD found a lack of belief that the German would lose among people as well, especially among the (small) intelligentsia and what it called "the middle classes."\textsuperscript{132} Any such thoughts must have evaporated during the rest of 1943. The situation at the front was actually not discussed that often.\textsuperscript{133}

There were many fortune-tellers and palm readers, particularly at markets, whose popularity increased constantly. They predicted for example that the war would be over "when the potatoes come into flower."\textsuperscript{134} The peasants recalled later that "under the Germans we found our way back to the fortune-teller" (\textit{Za nimtsiv do vorozhky} / \textit{Znov proterly}

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\textit{Za nimtsiv do vorozhky} / \textit{Znov proterly}
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\textsuperscript{128}Ibid., 32 (4 December 1942), p. 9.


\textsuperscript{130}Meldungen, 47 (26 March 1943), pp. 12 and 16 (regarding Kiev, Dnipropetrovs'k, and Rivne).

\textsuperscript{131}Ibid., p. 12. This report adds that the lesser access to Soviet radio broadcasts in these districts may have been the cause.

\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., pp. 13–14.

\textsuperscript{133}Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, \textit{My Private War}, p. 218.

\textsuperscript{134}Kuznetsov, \textit{Babii iar}, p. 174.
Besides fortune-telling, chain letters and the occult were very popular in Kiev by late 1942. An old witch held seances at 17 Dmytrivs'ka Street.

The popularity of fortune-tellers can be an indicator of despair or agonizing insecurity about one's future. Kievans in particular realized that the hunger they were experiencing was artificial, and that it was meant to kill them or at least drive them to Germany. One version of a saying said to have been popular among them was: "The Jews are done for, the Gypsies too/And you, Ukrainians, we will get later." (Iudam kaput, tsyganam tozhe/ A vam, ukrantsy, pozhe). In late 1942 (not earlier than late October), it was rumored that the inhabitants of the Pechers'k and Sophia districts would be evicted to make space for thousands of German families from bombed-out German cities. If they refused to go to Germany to work, those evicted would be killed at Babyn Iar.

In this situation, it is not surprising to find persistent complaints from the Nazi leadership that the Ukrainians had little "enthusiasm to work." There was widespread

135"Fol'klor Velykoï Vitchyznianoï viiny," l. 489, copied from IMFE, T. Krasyst'ka collection, f. 14–3, od. zb. 20, ark. 46 (Dnipropetrov'sk region, 1944).


137Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, pp. 62 and 68.

138Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 157. A different version, in a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, is as follows: "Nimtisiam 'hut,' ievreiam 'kaput'/ Tsyhanam tozhe, ukrailtsiam pozhe." "Fol'klor Velykoï Vitchyznianoï viiny," l. 488. supplied by M. Rodina, Kiev region, "1942." Cf. ibid., l. 623, where the same text appears under the month September 1943. The phrase was probably recorded from Soviet partisans near Kiev, whom the woman who recorded it joined at some stage.

139The rumor started when house custodians were ordered to have a hundred apartments ready, with heating and not located higher than the second floor. "Misstände und Schwierigkeiten in der Wohnungsfrage in Kiew. Lagebericht Material." USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419083.

140"The desire to work [Arbeitswille] of the Ukrainian population is little." "Lagebericht für die Zeit vom 1.–15. Okt. 1941," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 204. "The desire to work [Arbeitswilligkeit] of the Ukrainians is again considered to be little." "Lagebericht für die Zeit von 16.–30.10.1941," ibid., l. 191. "The desire to work [Arbeitswille] of the Ukrainians is as before little. In part, the necessary labor forces could only be supplied forcibly." "Lagebericht" for November 1941, ibid., l. 212. "The desire to work [Arbeitsfreudigkeit] of the population has remained little." "Lagebericht" for December 1941, ibid., l. 236 (a second copy of this report is at f. 3206, op. 2, d. 27, l. 7). "The enthusiasm for work [Arbeitslust] leaves as before much to be desired, especially in the cities; among other things, the bad food situation is the cause." "Lagebericht für Januar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 30.
alcoholism, which was particularly common among males in the countryside, where the materials for home-brew were found. Home-brewing (samohon) and its conspicuous consumption at parties had already existed in the countryside in the 1920s and 1930s, but now it reached a truly spectacular scale. Home-brewing was easier than making bread, for the mills were controlled by the authorities. Peasants crushed the grain in small grind-stones (zhorny), or they soaked and grounded it in pots. Also employed were sugar beets, onions, horseradish, and elder.

Especially in the beginning, the military and civilian authorities issued bans on the practice, arguing that it was a waste of resources and warning of severe punishment. The native Gendarmerie was supposed to prosecute the practice. All this had little effect, however, and by the spring of 1942 in the Novi Sanzhary raion "home-brew was prepared in every village and nobody was banning it anymore." Morale was so low, according to raion chief Hryhorii Kariak, that "hard drinking became a general phenomenon." Village women generally gathered not for drinking, but for spinning, weaving, and sewing (during what were traditionally called vechnytsi), while singing newly composed songs. But a man who was in a village in the Left Bank in November 1941 found not only that "it was rare to find a hut where people did not make home-brew," but also that "everybody drank, even girls learned to drink during the war."
The resources spent on home-brewing were significant. Pihido found that at least one of every four peasant households was distilling its own vodka.\textsuperscript{147} A magazine edited by a priest said a teacher had calculated that in his village in western Volhynia, at least three hundred poods of grain from the 1942 harvest had been used for home-brew. Volhynian boys aged 15 to 18, the magazine added, were not only avid smokers, but also "often" drank themselves "senseless."

This is especially notable in places where [the youth] works in offices or enterprises and already has its 'own' money. In the countryside, the means for it are obtained in a different way. The woman of the house loses eggs and chickens, grain disappears from the bins, sometimes also money is 'somewhere' misplaced, and all of this is spent on tobacco and vodka.

Everybody drinks: the spiritual and secular intelligentsia, peasants, workers, and even the school youth. They drink 'for an occasion' and 'without any reason.' There used to be one inn for the entire village; now there is an inn in every third hut.

Meanwhile, "often in one and the same village the poorest people [had] not a crumb of bread."\textsuperscript{148}

The picture of people's expectations would not be complete without a discussion of what they believed to be happening on the Soviet side of the front or, as some said, "in the Soviet Union."\textsuperscript{149} Little is known for the years 1941 and 1942, however. A Reichskommissariat report for February 1942 states that people believed that radical reform had taken place: Stalin re-introduced religious freedom, abolished the state obligations and the collective farms, and liberalized the economy as a whole.\textsuperscript{150}

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\textsuperscript{149} Khoroshunova, "Kievskie zapiski," pp. 298 and 300, notes from 8 and 11 October 1941.
\textsuperscript{150} "Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 260.
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By at least January 1943, as shown by various sources, a conviction spread of even
greater changes. Although Stalin and the Politburo were still in charge, Communism had been
discarded. The USSR had become officially Russia (Rossiia), with the tsarist flag. The Red
Army had become the Russian army, and officers had their old rights and decorations back.
Jews had lost any Soviet medals and had been placed into a separate army unit. Because of the
return to Russian nationalism, the former persecution was now really a thing of the past. A variation of the rumor held that Stalin had stepped down and that Russia was being led by
Molotov (premier), Shaposhnikov (minister of defense), and Zhukov (supreme
commander). Kuznetsov's grandfather, an anti-Communist who had also become anti-
German, heard at the market that not only were 
naşi going to defeat the Germans, but "now the Bolsheviks have learned." Once back they would allow private agriculture, property, and
business. German propaganda did not deny the introduction of ranks in the Red Army, but claimed it made no difference.

The role of propaganda from the Soviet hinterland in the formation of such notions of radical change has not been properly studied. But it appears that radio broadcasts in particular encouraged them and may, indeed, have been their main place of origin. Soviet broadcasts apparently even said that Stalin had not been aware of the famine of 1933 and would punish those responsible.

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151 Liubchenko, "Shchodennyk," Novi dni, III, 31 (Toronto, August 1952), pp. 11 and 31, notes of 18 and 27 January 1943; Meldungen, 47 (26 March 1943), pp. 12 and 17; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 369. According to Generalkommissar Magunia, rumors that the Red Army had been reformed and that the churches were treated differently were "believed by large parts of the population [of the Kiev Generalbezirk]." He ascribed it in part to Soviet radio broadcasts. Report by the Generalkommissar, Kiev, 1 March 1943, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419253.

152 Meldungen, 47 (26 March 1943), p. 18.

153 Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 315 ("Teper' bol'sheviki uchenye").


155 E. Pavliuk [Ievhen Stakhiv], "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh 1941–1944 (Spomyny ochevydtsa i uchasnyka)," KalendárovprovidyinniaSTovaryshrenniaUkraïnivKatolykivvAmerytsinapSvychaivnyirik1947(Philadelphia[n.d.]),p.56.According to this source, Soviet radio also promised Ukrainian independence.
There were by early 1943 also frightful rumors, several of which were based on reality. People found out that in the regions recaptured by the Soviet authorities, they wrote "Was in Occupied Territory" in people's passports. (The full meaning of this measure is not known.) The German-controlled press informed its readers in mid-1943 correctly that when the Red Army retook the city of Kharkiv, large letter-boxes were placed for denunciations, which became full. There were also, partially because of German propaganda, significant numbers of people who feared that Stalin would have them hanged.

Considering all of this, it is no easy matter to interpret reports about popular opinion about "Soviet rule" (the phrase used in Communist intelligence reports) or "the Bolsheviks" (the term used in German intelligence reports and Ukrainian emigré memoirs). True, it does seem clear that by 1943, the vast majority of Dnieper Ukrainians looked forward to the arrival of "the Russian Army," "the Reds," nashi, or whatever else they might call them. For example, the SD reported from Mykolaïv, still before the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, "a certain indifference of the population about a possible or suspected return of the Bolsheviks." The number of people who wanted "the Bolsheviks" back had grown, "as the conviction is spreading more and more that the population could not fare worse under the Bolshevik regime." More specifically, all Ukrainian "echelon regions" (Staffelgebiete) reported that in January and February 1943, 70 percent of the population tried to evade the westward

According to a contemporary German report, Soviet propaganda promised that the collective farms would be dissolved after the war. Propaganda-Abteilung Ukraine, "Stimmungsbericht für Monat März 1943," 1 April 1943 (USNA microcopy T-77, roll 1035, frames 507693–696), partly published in Hubatsch, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos, p. 1424, and cited in Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, pp. 64, 72n20, and 191.


157Dzvin voli, 11 July 1943, p. 3; Werth, Russia at War, p. 567.

158This fear existed at the Institute of Hydrobiology, according to Markovskii, CHPWU interview, l. 18.

159For instance, as early as late November 1941, members of the Fourth Division of NKVD troops who escaped encirclement by the German army reported that the entire population of the Poltava region wanted "Soviet power" to return. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122, l. 77.

160Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 11.
evacuation. A Communist report noted in the middle of the year that in the Right Bank, all but "the most inveterate enemies of Soviet power" wanted the Red Army to return and supported the Soviet partisans. German propaganda officials reported in the late summer of 1943 that about sixty percent of the population of Kryvyi Rih "at the moment waits for the Red Army as liberators." (It estimated that initially 94 percent had been pro-German.)

Some of the folkloric materials later submitted to the Academy of Sciences of Soviet Ukraine—itself a process of selection—express pro-"Soviet" attitudes, as evidenced by the following aphorisms from the period: "Oh, oh, how can we live without Soviet power?/ Who has been to the Gestapo hurts all over" (Kiev region, late 1942 or early 1943); "Give us the regime with the star, even if with only rusk and water;" and "When Stalin ruled us, the kolhosp knew no trouble/ But when the German rule came, struggle appeared in the kolhosp" (Berdychiv and Chudniv regions, 1943). A saying held, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises." With jokes, as with other folklore, the extent to which people passed them on is hard to establish. By 1942 the following "joke" was

161 Hubatsch, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos, p. 1425.
162 Korotchenko to Khrushchev, "O sostoyaniy [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 6, ll. 28–29.
165 "Knoch sukhari z vodoiu, aby vlast' iz zvizdoiu." "Iak Stalin namy keruvav, to kolhosp bidy ne znav/ A nimets'ka vlast' znaishlasi, v kolhosp triasia zavelasia." "Fol'klor Velykoï Vitchyzniaï viiny," ark. 486, copied from IMFE, Je. I. Prytula collection, no page indicated. With these materials, it seems certain that they were composed and recorded under the Germans.

In general, the dating of the folkloric materials that were preserved and submitted to (formerly Soviet) repositories is no easy matter. Consider, for example, the following items, written down afterwards, and possibly composed afterwards, and thus possibly describing post-Nazi conditions: "In the kolhosp there was enough bread/ Now we have become naked;" "Before the German there was meal/ Now there's emptiness (both from the Boryspil' raion, August 1944). In the original: "U kolhosp khliba bulo dovoli/ Teper staly holi"; "Do nimtsia bulo borosho/ Teper porozhno." "Fol'klor Velykoï Vitchyzniaï viiny," ark. 487–488, selections from IMFE, I. Adamets' collection. Also: "Life is good in the kolhosp! There is something to eat and something to drink"; "In order to live well! Stalin teaches how to work well. " In the original: "U kolhospi dobre zhyt'/ Ie shcho isty, iе shcho pyt';" "Shchob u dobri zhyty/ Stalin uchyt' chesno robyty." IMFE, T. Krasys'tka collection, f. 14–3, od. zb. 20, ark. 188.
166 Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 87.
circulating: "What was Stalin unable to achieve in twenty years what Hitler achieved within one year? That we started to like Soviet rule."

Intelligence reports, however, do not support the view that people became pro-Soviet. For most, hope and fear about "Soviet rule/the Bolsheviks" appear to have existed side by side. One informant of the Germans "often" heard Kievans say in late 1942, "Let the Bolsheviks return. They will shoot half of us, but the others at least will live and the misery will be over." The Leaflet Propaganda Group of the German air force reported in September 1943 about the eastern territories, and Ukraine in particular, that "statements from natives such as, 'The red terror was succeeded by the German terror and if we have to be terrorized, then rather by people who at least understand our language' — are of the order of the day." The lack of love for "Soviet rule" is even confirmed by a British journalist. Alexander Werth visited the Uman' region just after its recapture by the Red Army and found that "many peasants were aloof and seemed indifferent to what was happening; it was clear that the Soviets—or 'the Reds,' as the peasants here called them—would have a job to develop a proper 'soviet-consciousness' among these people." Thus, there is doubt whether the Nazi period prompted more than a limited fond remembrance of "Soviet rule." There is no such doubt, however, regarding perceptions in western Volhynia. A Baptist Christian passed the front westward and told villagers that he had seen "the Bolsheviks." "The people were terrified. The women started to cry. To them, the Bolsheviks were the worst of all."

167 Negretov, Vse dorogi, p. 50. Slightly different was: "The Germans achieved within one year what the Bolsheviks were unable to do in 23 years. They implanted love for Soviet rule (pryshcheplyi liubov do soviets'koï vlady)." Undated note, probably from late 1942, rendered from one of Arkadii Liubchenko's notebooks in Marko Tsarynnyk [Marco Carynnyk], "Nashi taimnytsi," unpublished typewritten manuscript ([Toronto, 1996]), p. 95n111.


169 Buchbender, Das törende Erz, p. 329.

170 Werth, Russia at War, p. 728.

171 Khurtovyna, Pid nebom Volyni, p. 179.
There was one group in east-central Ukraine for which the sources leave no doubt about its views regarding the future and "Soviet rule." This was the young generation; those born in the 1920s and 1930s. These people not only believed in Soviet Communism, but rarely lost their faith during the Nazi period. Pavel Negretov, who was born in 1923 in Kirovohrad, notes in his memoirs that the famine of 1933 had not affected the loyalty of his generation to the political system.

We were not bloodthirsty, but when Western Ukraine and the Baltic republics were annexed, we were glad about the successes of our policy. I remember that at that time, one of my schoolmates said: 'So, now the NKVD will clean things up there...' And none of us said anything against him. Our Stalinjugend was molded just as successfully as our peers in Germany were molded in their Hitlerjugend.172

Einsatzgruppe C, reporting in the fall of 1941 about the Kiev, Poltava, and Dnipropetrovsk regions, noted that only young people believed in Communism, although among them were "very few fanatics and really convinced fighters."173 Hryhorii Kariak also found the youth to be "completely on the side of the Bolsheviks." Two young women around 27 came from nationally conscious families and had not been in the Komsomol. Nevertheless, they were "under the influence of Soviet literature and had a romantic notion about the revolution." Thus they were "committed [ideini] patriots of the Ukrainian SSR."174

Young people's Soviet consciousness by no means implied sympathy for Stalin. In fact, hatred of him could go hand in hand with respect for Lenin. An Italian newspaper correspondent, reporting on his talk with young women in Zaporizhzhia in May 1942, stated: "They praise Lenin, for they know him only from the official biographies, which render him a radiance of holiness. But they hate Stalin as much as they can—in a subdued voice, for they


173Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 112 (13 October 1941), p. 2.

174Sova, Do istorii, pp. 95–96. The big exception in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was western Volhynia. Here the young intelligentsia supported the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and warned the peasants against the older intelligentsia. Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 191 (10 April 1942), p. 20.
are surrounded by a permanent fear, which never leaves them."\(^{175}\) This does not change the general picture that young people, unlike adults, were not merely against the Germans from the beginning, but were loyal to the basic tenets of Communism.

Like most adults, the young generation was not at all interested in national identity and even had trouble understanding what it meant. They all used the ambiguous term *nashi* to describe themselves and others. A Ukrainian from western Volhynia asked a young male student from the Kharkiv Construction Institute, who was living in the Poltava region in August 1942, what he thought of the Red Army. His answer: "They let us down [*Podkachali*]. The Germans were bombing like hell, but nothing from *nashi*! Maybe something was missing. Not enough technology? No! We have a lot of technology. But there's no spirit, no culture. Under the tsar things functioned better. Then both the French and the English were against us [*proty nas*], but still they didn't reach the Volga..."\(^{176}\) (This young man obviously mixed up World War I with the revolutionary period.) Seleshko "often" spoke to young people in Vinnytsia and found that they "completely lacked a feeling of national hatred and did not wish to delineate national differences." He "tried to steer their thinking back to national rails, but to no avail: they did not understand. National ideals were foreign to them. To them, the stomach, that is, social affairs came first."\(^{177}\)

What were the reasons for the pro-Soviet attitude? Without a doubt, indoctrination was a major factor. Young people thought that Moscow was the center of the world.\(^{178}\) Directly related to this was a lack of knowledge of the outside world that was even greater than among the older generation. A Kievan who returned from the emigration found that young Kievnans

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\(^{175}\)Onats'kyi, "Ukraïna [...]," *Samostiina Ukraïna*, XVIII, 8 (198) (New York, August 1965), p. 24, a translated section of an article by Manero Lualdi in *La Stampa* (Turin), 25 May 1942.


\(^{177}\)Seleshko, *Vinnytsia*, pp. 146 and 164.

\(^{178}\)Ibid., p. 150.
simply "understood nothing about either the west or the events there." The Italian journalist in Zaporizhzhia who was just mentioned discovered the same about the young women:

Most striking of all, almost all the girls know algebra and some trigonometry, but they don't know where Rome, Berlin, or Paris are. A complete lack of knowledge about the outside, foreign world. They say that the steam engine was invented in year x by a Muscovite worker. They solve technical problems, write about machines, and can talk about the construction of the Dnieper dam—but they are starving and don't have, and never had, anything to put on. When they see a handkerchief or some piece of [Western] fabric or linen, they stare [at it] as if at a miracle.

Seleshko also noted that the youth "generally did not consider the situation in Ukraine under the Soviet regime to be abnormal, as did the older people, for [it] did not know any other life and had nothing to compare it with." In the fall of 1943, "People [in Vinnytsia] were no more hiding their sympathies for the Bolsheviks, especially the youth. I talked to some of them then, and they said that the old system—that is the Bolshevik one, for they did not know any other—was better than the new one. The new one had brought them disappointment. Fascism had turned out to be much worse than even the Bolsheviks had presented it in their propaganda." All this does not exclude the possibility that certain youths in Dnieper Ukraine may have joined or sympathized with one of the two factions of the OUN.

Among the strongest complaints were the round-ups for work in Germany, which targeted young people. Another was sheer boredom. As the SD noted when it was already too late, "several reports stress that it should be taken into account that the young lack an

182Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 164.
183Halyna V"iun, Pid znakom Chervonoho Khresta v Poltavi 1941-42 rr.: spohad-zvit dlia istorii ([Neu-Ulm], 1973), p. 41. She says that many young people in Poltava were arrested as OUN activists.
organization of their leisure time and are too much left to themselves. They are said to be incapable of doing really something in the evening. There is no light for reading, few visits can be made because of earlier curfews, and movie and theater tickets are allegedly hard to get."\(^{184}\)

The main grievance of the young, however, especially in the cities, was the sense of having no future. The Germans offered them no chance to get ahead in life, which the Soviet system did at least promise. The following were typical complaints. "When I was at school, my biggest wish was to become a doctor. But now I must leave the tenth grade and see that I make my living somewhere else. My life is ruined" (a girl). "I sit at home and help my mother in the household. I cannot go to school because it's far away and I don't have any shoes. In the past I wanted to be an engineer" (a sixteen-year-old boy).\(^{185}\)

This brings us to the issue of the schools. In accordance with an order from Rosenberg of 12 December 1941, all grades other than the first four were abolished.\(^{186}\) One month earlier, Rosenberg had already instructed Koch not to allow the Ukrainians to learn the German language.\(^{187}\) Only western Volhynia apparently had a gymnasium (in Kostopil').\(^{188}\) The school buildings, many new and with modern equipment,\(^{189}\) were often destroyed or occupied by soldiers after the locals had repaired them.\(^{190}\) There were basically no textbooks, for the Soviet

\(^{184}\)Meldungen, 54 (14 May 1943), pp. 15–16.

\(^{185}\)Ibid., p. 16. German propagandists were most concerned about young city-dwellers, for the same reason. Buchbender, Das tönende Erz, p. 268.

\(^{186}\)Volodymyr Kosyk, "Nimets'ka shkil'na polityka v Raikhskomisariati Ukraina (1941–1944)," Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, XLVII, 3 (352) (London, March 1994), p. 354. An exception was the Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi district, due to its relatively liberal Gebietskommissar. Its teachers' college was upgraded to a university, there were ten grades, and new textbooks were printed. Kyslytsia, Svite iasnyi, pp. 207–114 and 216.

\(^{187}\)Kosyk, "Nimets'ka shkil'na polityka," p. 358. In contrast, Rosenberg did allow German instruction in the Reichskommissariat Ostland.

\(^{188}\)Iaroslav Haivas, Koly kinchalasia epokha ([n.p.], 1964), p. 71.

\(^{189}\)Both Italians and Germans were struck by this. Onats'kyi, "Ukraïna [...]," Samostiina Ukraïna, XVIII, 1 (191) (New York, January 1965), p. 32; True to Type: A Selection from Letters and Diaries of German Soldiers and Civilians Collected on the Soviet-German Front (London, New York, Melbourne, and Sydney, [1945]), p. 20.

\(^{190}\)Velychkivs'kyi, "Sumni chasy," Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, XII, 2 (London, 1965), p. 155. He writes, "It was interesting to observe those German soldiers who, for no reason, destroyed property. While
ones were banned or became useless after references to the Soviet Union and its leaders had to be removed. (According to a Communist report, "essentially in the textbooks nothing remained.")

Even the schools that remained were generally closed during the winter because of lack of heating, or because of German orders. Attendance in the few months of instruction was low, especially in the countryside. This prompted the "auxiliary" authorities to impose fines on the parents of children who did not attend. The mood at school was soon anti-German. At schools in Kiev (54 by November 1942, with 12,377 children), the children and the teachers were very little motivated, and Hitler's portrait was often vandalized. One teacher recalls: "The children were against the Germans. Almost all of them had their mum taken away, they were all hungry, all of them felt a permanent fear that the police would come and drag them away somewhere, that their mum would be taken to [the "recruitment" office at] 24 L'viv Street, and sent away. All of us experienced this grief." In the Kiev and Kirovohrad regions, children were very unruly at school already in early 1942. They refused to adopt local innovations (crosses on their necks, the answer of "Glory" to the teacher's greeting, "Glory to Ukraine"), and argued during religious instruction. As a Communist report noted, "In the high school in Chyhyryn, during a dictation lesson, they were breaking and smashing everything, their faces were swollen. Moreover, the Germans executed this vandalism with great pleasure." Cf. about the town of Korosten': Ol'ga Sergeevna Pominchuk ([Ukrainian?], interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 20 January 1946, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, l. 53.

Ol'ga Sergeevna Gudzenko-Tyshkova (Ukrainian born in 1901), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 14 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report (signed on 5 June 1944), TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 46; Savchenko, VRIO NKVD USSR, to N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka No 33/68 o polozenii v okupirovannom protivnikom g. Dnepropetrovsk. Po sostoianiyu na 20. 10. 42g.," 21 October 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 93.

*Meldungen, 13 (24 July 1942), p. 8; Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 60; Ukrains'kyi holos, 4 June 1942, p. 3; letter from Okhrimenko, chief of the Polis'ke raion, 30 April 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 50, l. 10.

That was at the end of a German-sanctioned period of instruction which lasted from 18 May to 1 November. Report from Kokot of the School Section (Sektsiia shkil) of the Section of Culture and Education, 10 November 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 18–20.

Kyslytsia, Sviite iasniyi, p. 219; Gudzenko-Tyshkova, CHPWU interview, l. 46v.

Gudzenko-Tyshkova, CHPWU interview, l. 46v
while writing the sentence, 'The workers of our city very happily greeted their liberator, the German Army,' one pupil threw the piece of chalk at the woman teacher and shouted, 'Liar!' [Breshesh!] As a result, he and his father were arrested, their fate is unknown. There are many such cases, but the teachers are afraid to raise the issue outside the school."196

Meanwhile, the older children had no school at all. They might be put to work instead: joining the harvest, cleaning parks, digging up roots, and collecting chestnuts.197 In Melitopol', in the summer of 1942 even the fourth grade was closed. The children were supposed to help demolish buildings so that the materials could be sent to Germany.198

The generation gap in attitude persisted until the very end of the German presence. By 1943 it was common within a single family for the older people to worry or be sad, but the young to be glad about any Red Army advances. Diaries show that in Kiev in late February 1943, "many fear[ed] the coming of the Bolsheviks,"199 but that the wish for the arrival of the Red Army was increasing, "especially among the youth."200 According to the SD in May 1943, "It is said to happen frequently that parents reject the Soviet system, while the children long for its return."201 Seleshko noticed the same in September and October 1943 when visiting his acquaintances. All of them wanted the Germans to leave, but "the older people were all sad, while the youth made merry. There was a divide between the mood of the older and the younger ones. The older people feared the Bolsheviks, but the youth wanted them."202

196Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]." TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 60.
197Nartova diary, ff. 12–13 and 17; Ternivs'kyi, "Spohady emigranta," p. 27.
198Nikolai Makarovich Kharchenko ([Ukrainian?] born in 1906). interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 January 1946, [Melitopol'?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, l. 92.
199Nartova diary, f. 21.
201Meldungen, 54 (14 May 1943), p. 16.
202Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 146.
Hence, one might say that there was such a thing as a typical Dnieper Ukrainian mental outlook, which existed already before the Germans arrived. It was marked by mutual mistrust, a vague sense of national or even ethnic identity, a need to talk about the famine of 1933, amazement and disbelief about the "European" living standard and way of life, and a sense that guests should be welcomed. All these features remained in place under the Germans. From a Ukrainian nationalist point of view, the Dnieper Ukrainians were not "real" Ukrainians. The one proven significant change in their mental outlook was that the Germans, who initially were not disliked, were eventually hated as a people.

Finally, a sense developed that one had no future under the Germans. This was expressed primarily in an unprecedented rise in alcoholism, particularly in the countryside, even though people felt throughout the Nazi period that the Germans might be driven out. But there is no conclusive evidence that Dnieper Ukrainians who had disliked the Soviet system now started to like it. Even regarding the young generation, there is no conclusive evidence for a change of mind. Before 1941, it had been successfully indoctrinated with Communism. Under the Germans, it simply felt its opinions confirmed.
CHAPTER 9

The Prisoners of War

Countless soldiers and officers of the Red Army were imprisoned by the Germans. This chapter attempts to provide a sense of what it was like to be a captive member of the Red Army in that part of Ukraine which became the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The existing literature does not discuss this subject. The main reason is that researchers have been unable—because Ukrainian archives were closed and because of the linguistic demands—to integrate German with non-German sources. Moreover, most German sources that have been preserved deal with those prisoners who were taken to the Reich; few deal with those who remained in Ukraine. The following discussion also aims to integrate the civilian population into the tragic story of the prisoners.

Existing accounts, most notably the work of Christian Streit (1978), focus on policy-making. These studies have shown that the Nazi leadership was responsible for millions of deaths among the "Soviet" prisoners. Their treatment was a campaign much like the campaign to starve Kiev. Historians have all but neglected the role of the civilians, however. I will argue that taking the actions of civilians into account shows that the prisoners were treated even worse than scholars have thought. From the very beginning, all over the territory which became the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, sadistic treatment and "indifferent" shootings during marches toward the prisoner camps and in those camps were common. Moreover, the civilian population was rarely allowed to save the prisoners from starvation.

Although the primary concern here is not to explain why so many Germans treated the prisoners badly, it is hoped nonetheless that this discussion will initiate a full debate about the causes of massive prisoner mortality. Despite some excellent research, such a debate barely exists at present. I am convinced that the German authorities believed that the more prisoners died the better.
The problem of nomenclature needs close attention. The captured Red Army soldiers (krasnoarmeitsy) and commanders (komandiry), as these military were officially called in Russian, were labeled "Bolshevik" prisoners of war in German propaganda. Locals called them "Red Army soldiers" or simply plenni, "prisoners." Most Germans called them "Russian prisoners of war" (russische Kriegsgefangenen), and much of western historiography does the same or uses the adjective "Soviet." The first adjective imposes an identity upon the prisoners which would have sounded offensive or strange to many of them. In this study, the generic term "the prisoners of war" will be used, with the addition of an ethnic designator when necessary.

As the German armed forces pushed deeper into the Soviet Union in 1941, defeatist attitudes were widespread, which explains why such huge numbers of Red Army soldiers and officers fell into German hands. German Army Group South counted 103,000 captured near Uman south of Kiev (early August); 665,000 near Kiev (by 26 September); 100,000 near Melitopol' and Berdians'k near the Sea of Azov (by 10 October); and 100,000 at Kerch on the Crimea.

By the time these men—and a number of women—surrendered or were taken captive, they were hungry and under severe physical strain. Among those who survived the Kiev encirclement were people who had become old; some cried all the time. The prisoners quickly realized that things were going to be difficult. In the Right Bank, the bodies of fallen Red Army

1 Or, in the rarely spoken Ukrainian standard, poloneni; in Russian, plennye.


soldiers were apparently not allowed to be buried for two months. The prisoners also became aware of the utter ruthlessness against those who did not hand themselves over to the Germans. That ruthlessness was in accordance with a 10 July 1941 "Führer order" to the armed forces which stated that "soldiers in civilian clothes, [who are] generally recognizable by their short haircut, after it has been found that they are Red soldiers, are to be shot (except for deserters)." In the Vinnysia region, Einsatzkommando 4B shot all "Asians" and civilians who could not give details about the region. Among the latter were former prisoners of war who earlier had been released after saying they were Ukrainians.

Einsatzgruppe C shot all "prisoners of war roaming the country roads" who had no identity papers and whom it suspected of planning sabotage. Undoubtedly, they were among the "about 8,000 persons who could be found on the basis of investigations to be engaged in anti-German or Bolshevik activity," whom the unit shot, besides the tens of thousands of Jews, by early November 1941.

In the Left Bank, many soldiers tried to flee eastward at night, but were caught all the same. For example, ten were caught in the small village of Zabridky. The German military Kommandantur shot them on the spot. One female soldier survived with a face wound and was saved by the locals. Such cases were common at that stage of the war (mid-September to early November 1941). At the same time, local civilians generally helped individual soldiers in every

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5Petr Timofeevich Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozenii na okkupirovannoi territorii" n.p., n.d., typewritten document, signed, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 68.


7Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 47 (9 August 1941), p. 9.


9H. Sova [Hryhorii Kariak], Do istorii bol'shevyts'koi diis'nosti: (25 rokiv zhyttia ukrains'koho hromadianyna v SSSR) (Munich, 1955), p. 79.
possible way. They told them how to evade the Germans, hid them, provided food and water, and treated wounds.10

The Red Army soldiers who became prisoners were treated by the army in cooperation with the SD on the basis of two instructions, a so-called "Commissar Order" of 6 June 1941 and "Guidelines for the Conduct of the Army in Russia" of May 1941 (the precise day is unknown) with a supplement dated 25 July 1941. The first order, entitled officially "Guidelines for the Treatment of Political Commissars," concerned the komissary in the Red Army, who reported directly to the NKVD and who, while officially sharing command, often even issued orders on their own. The guidelines transferred some of the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen to the German army. The commissars were not to be considered as soldiers but taken aside while still on the battlefield and simply shot.11 The army's propaganda staff justified the measure in bloodthirsty language which called them sub-humans and "to a large percentage Jewish."12 It is unclear to what extent the army actually performed the shootings itself or "merely" passed them on to the SD.13

Had the death verdict been limited to commissars (officially called voennye komissary—military commissars), then, contrary to what historians have assumed, it would have found ample support among the Red Army rank-and-file. Most military commissars were hated. Prisoners captured near Kiev made this clear to Fedir Pihido in their account of what they had done to a military commissar who opposed their effort to surrender. One of them said:

In our regiment, the commissar of the division gathered the privates and commanders and started to incite the people to get going, in order to force our way east. He assured us that there were very few Germans and that it would be very easy. The Red Army men frowned and said nothing. So did the commanders. Then the commissar issued an

10 A. S. Koziura and V. R. Drolle, "Kopiia. Zam. nachal'niku 4-go Otdela NKVD USSR majoru tov. Kniazevu," 12 November 1941, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 17, l. 33. This is a report by two Soviet partisans about the Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkiv regions.


12 Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 86.

13 Cf. ibid., p. 94, which assumes that they were carried out by the SD and/or the police alone.
order to line up. The Red Army soldiers became agitated. Our regiment commander called out to the privates: "Who do you obey? Away with the damned chekist!" (Gnat' prokliatogo chekista!) The commissar instantly drew his revolver and shot. The commander fell down. Our second lieutenant and a group of Red Army soldiers jumped on the commissar—in less than a minute, he was torn to pieces...

The soldier added by way of conclusion, "You see, the men of our regiment don't let themselves be deceived." Others joined in, "That's right, we killed the damned Stalin-dog." "A dog gets a dog's death!"14

In practice, the German army or Nazi intelligence also shot all Jewish soldiers and the so-called "political leaders" (politicheskie rukovoditeli or politruki). Like the military commissars, these were the Communist party's "political workers" (politicheskie rabotniki). Like the commissars, they shared command, but only within small units (companies, batteries, and squadrons). Although members of the Communist party, they were often reasonable and by no means fanatical.15 The German Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, however, explicitly stated that the politruki should be considered commissars.16 In late September 1941, the Supreme Command asked Hitler if any changes should be made; he gave a negative answer.17

14F. Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina" (Winnipeg, 1954), p. 85. That the commissar shot the "deserting" commander on the spot was in accordance with an order from Stalin of 16 August 1941. This order also said that the family members of deserting officials would be arrested, while the family members of soldiers who "[gave] themselves into captivity" would be ineligible for any state benefits. It is published in O. A. Rzheshhevskii, ed., Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina, 1941-1945: sobytia, liudi, dokumenty: kratkii istoricheskii spravochnik (Moscow, 1990), p. 423.

15The Russian terms for the units which had politruki were rota, batareia, and eskadron. The voennoye komisary served at the regiment (polk), division (divizia), and staff (shtab) level, and in military offices and organizations.

Before 19 July 1941, the Red Army only had "political workers" (politicheskie rabotniki), who did not share command with the military. From 19 July, when the system of "military commissars" and "political leaders" was introduced, the terms "political workers" and "commissars" became informal terms, designating "political leaders," "military commissars," or both. On 3 October 1942, the pre-1941 situation was restored, and the term "political workers" became official again. Rzheshhevskii, Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina, pp. 420 and 437.

16Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 84. A photo reproduction is in Streim, Sowjetische Gefangene, pp. 226-228.

17Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 87. I disagree with Streit's view that after this request, the order was less frequently implemented. Cf. Sova, Do istorii, p. 80, about a case in November 1941.
Meanwhile, the Einsatzgruppen received orders in mid-July 1941 for the killing in the POW camps of even mid-level Soviet civilian officials. In the second week of September 1941, these orders were made more specific. A meeting of officials defined the "eggheads" (Intelligenzler)—i.e., educated people—as "professional revolutionaries, writers, editors, Comintern officials, etc." This again was a death sentence.

The Germans also had "Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops [Truppe] in Russia." By what process they were established is not known, but the Supreme Army Command sent them to Army Group South on 23 May 1941. German soldiers were told they were fighting "Bolshevism" and that this demanded "ruthless and energetic drastic measures against Bolshevik rabble-rousers, irregulars [Freischäler], saboteurs, and Jews and the total elimination of any active and passive resistance." Regarding Red Army soldiers, including imprisoned ones, this meant "utmost reserve and the sharpest attention." "Particularly the Asiatic soldiers of the Red Army," the Guidelines said, "are devious, unpredictable, eager to ambush [hinterhaltig], and callous." Several weeks into the campaign, on 25 July 1941, the Army Supreme Command (OKH) issued an elaboration on the guidelines. The first part dealt with reprisals against civilians. All civilians were responsible for keeping order in their region of residence at all times. The army should consider former Red Army soldiers who did not make themselves known as "irregulars." They had to be "treated accordingly," along with all civilians who somehow assisted them.

The second part of the instruction dealt with the prisoners of war. Already one month before (16 June 1941), ruthless orders had destroyed the terms of the 1929 Geneva treaty

18Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 91.

19Ibid., p. 98. The meeting also noted that the Einsatzgruppen were shooting all "Asians," along with thousands of Muslim POWs (the latter merely because they were circumcised). The meeting warned against killing all Ukrainians, Belarusians, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, North Caucasians, and Turkic peoples.

20Ibid., pp. 49–50 and 318n128.

21Müller, Die fashistische Okkupationspolitik, pp. 169–171; Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 106.
Now, in the supplemental instructions of 25 July, every German soldier was ordered to treat the POWs in ways "which bear in mind the fierceness and the inhuman brutality of the Russian during battle."

The feeling of pride and superiority must remain visible at all time.... Where it is necessary to overcome insubordinations, revolts, etc., armed force must be employed immediately. Especially fugitive prisoners of war must be shot immediately, without even first ordering them to halt. Any delay in the use of arms can constitute a danger. On the other hand, any arbitrariness is prohibited.

To those Germans inclined to treat the prisoners as human beings, the order had the following to say: "Any leniency or even chatting [with the prisoners] must be punished severely."23

The Red Army veteran Leonid Volyn's'kyi has provided a rare memoir about the implementation of the Commissar Order and of the general conditions during and after his capture. On 18 September 1941, Volyn's'kyi and other soldiers were captured in a Left-Bank village. First they all were beaten hard in the face. Then they were chased into the yard of a collective farm in the nearby village of Kovali. This provisional camp quickly filled up and eventually held around ten thousand prisoners. On 19 September, an SD commando arrived. A uniformed interpreter ordered all commissars, "Communists," and Jews to step aside. This selection lasted for about an hour. Then the interpreter announced that anyone giving up a remaining commissar, Communist, or Jew could take possession of his things. Somebody denounced Volyn's'kyi, who was a member of the Communist party. But when the interpreter found out that he was not a commissar, he turned him back after consulting with a German. Then all those who had been taken out, some four hundred people, were counted, and shot.

They were taken away in groups of ten, past the trees. There, the first ten men dug themselves a common grave (the required amount of shovels had been arranged), and

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23Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, pp. 169–171; Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 106. Emphasis in the original.
a brief volley of automatics rang out. The next ten were ordered to cover the grave with earth and to dig a new one. Thus it went on till the end. All died in silence, only one suddenly fell down with a heartrending cry. He crawled across the ground to the legs of the soldiers [SD men] who were coming to get the next ten. He screamed, 'Don't kill me, my mother is Ukrainian!' They kicked him hard, kicked his teeth out, and dragged him away under his arms. He fell silent, his bare feet dragging.24

The number of casualties of such SD shootings can never be established. Precise record-keeping started only in December 1941, after the shootings had reached their peak (between August and that month).25

Among those killed were commanding officers (in Russian: komandiry or komsostav). It is worth mentioning that they were shot simply because they held such positions. Their fate was apparently sealed after Einsatzgruppe C heard from a Soviet official that officers from the first lieutenant rank were all Communist party members.26 On 6 May 1942, Hitler agreed to lift the Commissar Order "on a trial basis" (versuchsweise). But this did not mean that the SD actually stopped shooting those prisoners it disliked. It merely refrained from doing so near the troops. In any case, Hitler's decree reveals an awareness on his part of the shootings of commanders, for it speaks of "Soviet commanders [Kommandeuren], commissars, and Politiwks."27

After the initial "purges," the remaining prisoners were marched westward to permanent camps (in German, sing.: Stalag). The marches lasted very long. Those captured at the Kiev encirclement walked in September and October 1941 for over four hundred


26Ibid., p. 100. In the open-air POW camp at the outskirts of Kremenchuk, it was rumored in March 1942 that officers would be taken to another camp. Several officers made themselves known as such, hoping for better conditions in that other camp. All were shot, however. Vera Fedorovna Bogdanova ([Russian?] born in 1911), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 20 January 1946, [no place], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 116 (a former inmate). In the Darnytsia camp in Kiev, officers were starved to death in an inner enclosure along with Jews and politwku. Anatolii Kuznetsov (A. Anatolii), Babii iar: roman-dokument (New York, 1986), p. 179.

27Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 254. Cf. Streim, Sowjetische Gefangene, p. 96n49, which incorrectly ascribes the use of the word "commanders" to an error by the person writing down the order.
kilometers.\textsuperscript{28} Prisoners who arrived at the camp in Kovel' in western Volhynia had walked "several hundred kilometers."\textsuperscript{29} Although historians have noted the brutality that occurred during these marches, neither Streit nor any other scholar has ever called them what they really were—death marches. The direct cause of the brutality were the army orders, including those mentioned above. Volyn's'kyi was in a convoy which walked from Kovali to the Stalag in Kremenchuk, via the transit camps (in German, sing.: Dulag) in Lubny, Khorol, Semenivka, and Hradiz'k. This is how the prisoners got going: "Having finished what they were doing, the black-uniformed men handed us over to guards who wore ordinary gray-green uniforms. Four of them stood at the exit, shooting and brandishing sticks. Almost every person who went out received a hit on the back, head, or arms if he tried to cover himself."\textsuperscript{30} The convoy was guarded by guards on horseback.

They moved along the sides, constantly riding toward the marchers, flapping whips and shooting in the air with pistols and carbines. But soon the shooting took on another character. A column of several thousands of prisoners is not a homogeneous organism. Among us were people of varying age, health, endurance, spirit, or persistence. By the middle of the first day [19 September 1941], the first stragglers appeared. The further we went, the more often one heard shots from the tail of the column. Soon we found out what each shot from there meant.\textsuperscript{31}

Indeed, not only "fugitive" soldiers were shot. Stragglers, that is prisoners too tired and emaciated to walk, were shot on the spot. As German army intelligence reported on 31 October 1941, "the 6th Army [that is, its leader von Reichenau] has ordered all collapsing prisoners of war to be shot."\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{28}Streit, \textit{Wehrmacht}, p. 164.


\textsuperscript{30}He discovered later that "this tactic was employed everywhere." Volyns'kyi, "Skvoz' noch,'" p. 125.

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid.

Because this issue has not been discussed by historians in detail, it is worthwhile reproducing several other eyewitness accounts. Fedir Pihido writes that "the weakened and enfeebled ones were shot on the spot. Some time in early December [1941], on the embankment, not far from the landing place, I personally saw a German escort shoot an utterly exhausted prisoner because he lagged about ten steps behind... Later, during my stays in the Kiev and Chernihiv regions, I often heard stories about mass shootings of prisoners on the march, during transports.") Mykhailo Podvorniak writes: "On the road from Kiev to Rivne and L'viv walked countless new rows of voluntary prisoners. Now they saw that the Hitlerites did not give them freedom, but it was too late.... Many of them fell on the road, and the escorts shot them dead. Therefore aside the road were many graves, embellished by our people with bluebottles and red field poppies." Ulas Samchuk saw a column of emaciated POWs near Korets' in October 1941. Some fell and were "nonchalantly" (baiduzhe) shot on the street and left behind.

Shooting also took place during pauses. In Volyns'kyi's march, each stretch was about forty kilometers, with one or two ten-minute stops. At those stops, the guards fed themselves and their horses. Then the command to move on would go out.

One had to get up quickly, in order not to incur a blow with a whip, boot, or rifle butt. But many had no strength to get up, and after every stop there were those who continued to lie. That was the easiest way to put an end to one's suffering. An exhausted person would be sitting on the side, an escort would come on his horse and lash with his whip. The person would continue to sit, with his head hanging. Then the escort would take a carbine from the saddle or a pistol from the holster.

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36Volynskii, "Skvoz' noch," 125–126 (quotation from 126). He adds, "The road to Kremenchuk was paved with dead bodies. They were buried by the people from the nearby villages."
That the order to shoot stragglers was implemented is also evident from many German sources. The above-mentioned army intelligence report about the order said that the shootings were taking place "by the roadside, [and] even in towns [Ortschaften]." In October 1941, a representative of the German steel industry reported from the Kryvyi Rih and Dnipropetrovsk regions that prisoners who were unable to walk were shot. On 8 December 1941, the head of Wirtschaftsstab Ost, General Wilhelm Schubert, reported callously on what he saw: "the Soviet prisoners are beaten with sticks, and ill ones unable to march remain lying and have to be shot." Even Rosenberg mentioned these shootings, in a letter of protest to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Generalfeldmarschall Keitel) on 28 February 1942. The letter, probably composed by Otto Bräutigam, spoke of "many" such cases. Streit has estimated that in the entire "east" tens of thousands were shot during these marches.

The main cause of prisoner exhaustion was hunger and thirst. The lack of food and drink was not the result of the large number of prisoners, but because of German policy. The German army refused to feed them properly and prevented the local population from giving them food and water. Volynskyi received daily only one scoop of watery lentil or pea soup during his march. "Along the roads stretched the abandoned autumn fields. When there was something to eat in them, no force could hold us back. The escorts skirted us on the left and right, beat us with sticks, and opened fire, but it was all in vain. Leaving behind those killed [as a result] in the dogged-through and trampled field, the column moved on, crunching on

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37 Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 152.

38 Ibid., p. 171.


40 Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 167.

41 Volynskii, "Skvoz' noch'," p. 126.
mangel-wurzel [fodder beets], carrots, or potatoes. Once prisoners grabbed some pumpkins. A young man about eighteen years of age ran far into the field and came back with a pumpkin. "He was running as fast as he could to the road when an escort [aged around 30] shot him with a pistol.... At the sight of water, the column simply lost its mind. We were ready to drink from any dirty pool, but they did not allow us to drink, not even from a river." As if this were not enough, some German military engaged in sadistic teasing.

In a village a German unit was stationed. The yards under the trees were full of cars, [and] half-naked Germans were pouring each other with water from wells. An officer in ironed breeches with lowered suspenders was standing in the shadow in the hurdle, with his arms behind his back. A soldier standing next to him had taken a bundle of concentrated buckwheat from an opened case, and was throwing one package in the air, like a ball. This was our army concentrate, very tasty, soft-boiled, with fat and fried onions. When somebody from the column leaped to catch the packet, the officer whacked him with a stick.

The population avidly tried to feed the prisoners. The belief was that if everybody did this, somehow one's own relatives would be saved. Volyn's'kyi is merely one of many witnesses who have described these efforts. "Sometimes, fearless old women brought rusks [sukhari] or bread to the road. They were instantly knocked down and a scuffle would ensue. The escorts became enraged and broke into the swarming heap with their horses." It was indeed very risky for the locals to get involved. The doctor Vera Bogdanova was taken captive on 23 September 1941 in the Poltava region. For a month, she was marched to a camp on the outskirts of Kremenchuk. "On the way we received nothing to eat, and when the population tried to give us something, they were chased away and beaten. But the women sent their children, and some of these managed to throw a piece of bread, potatoes, or groats." This

42Ibid.
43Ibid., p. 127.
44Ibid., pp. 127–128.
46Bogdanova, CHPWU interview, l. 114. On civilians throwing food, see also Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 152.
account is typical. Podvorniak saw that the convoy guards "did not allow any person on the road, did not allow the women to give the poor prisoners even a cupful of cold water."47 German onlookers might want to help as well, but faced ostracism if they actually did. One German soldier who saw such a transport responded to the pleading for bread ("Khleba, khleba") and gave away a loaf, but was "roared" at by the column guard.48

The first Germans who arrived in the Podolian village of Nove Selo brought prisoners of war with them. An old peasant tried to give them water, but, as a local girl saw, the guards blocked his way. This is the only memoir which mentions popular hostility against the prisoners, whom its author, a Ukrainian-American woman, calls Russians. "People threw sticks and clumps of dirt at them."49 Such behavior was unusual, however. Most civilians tried to help.

One account by a former prisoner of war reports that those who tried to pick up bread which locals deliberately left on the ground were shot.50 In the village of Bobryk in the Romny region, which never became part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, a girl in the sixth grade wrote the following in a school essay in early 1944: "Once the Germans brought our captured soldiers. They were very hungry. One came to ask for something to eat. I brought him something to eat, but a German came and started to beat the soldier with a butt and to shout at him. Out[side] the village, the German shot the soldier and kicked [bshepnuy; sic] him

47Khurtovyna, Pid nebom Volyni, p. 106. Likewise, Rosenberg complained on 28 February 1942 in a letter that "during the march[es] toward the camps, the civilian population was not allowed to give food to the prisoners of war." TWMc, Vol. 25 (Nuremberg, 1949), pp. 156–161; Uberschär, "Ausgewählte Dokumente," pp. 399–400; Klee and Dréßen, "Gott mit uns," pp. 142–147.

48Walther Bienert, Russen und Deutsche: was für Menschen sind das? Berichte, Bilder und Folgerungen aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stein am Rhein, 1990), pp. 57–58.


50Sha’va Georgievich Gordeladze ([Georgian?] born in 1905), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 11 June 1945, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 65 (a former POW).
away." Halyna Lashchenko, referring to 1941, provides the most disturbing account. She saw the usual, how the prisoners were chased "without food or drink" and how stragglers were shot. But she adds that "when civilians gave the prisoners food, then [the guards] shot both those who gave and those who took." In response, "Ukrainian peasant women started to place bread, potatoes, corn, cabbage, and beets on the roads across which the prisoners were being driven."52

Events were much the same in 1942, although it is possible that by then people who tried to help were treated less harshly. In the villages along the way to Poltava, the locals—mostly women and children—threw pieces of bread and boiled potatoes at the POWs passing through. This caused crowding. "The Germans shot in the air and chased the women away, but they did not leave until they had given away everything they had."53

Feeding the prisoners while a convoy was at rest was somewhat easier, as Iryna Khoroshunova's diary shows. While looking for a relative who was in the Red Army, on or after 24 September 1941, she came across a transport east of the Dnieper. The estimated 35,000 prisoners of war were pausing on their way from Brovary to Darnytsia.

They are sitting. They look so terrible that our blood turns cold. It is very clear that they don't get food. The women bring them food, but the Germans don't allow them to approach. The women are crying. There are heartbreaking scenes at every turn. The women throw themselves toward the prisoners. The prisoners throw themselves like animals on the offered food, grab it, and rip it apart. But the Germans beat them on the head with rifle-butts. They beat them and also the women.54

Some time later at this site, when women saw relatives and threw themselves toward them, some Germans again chased them away and beat them. But others "allowed them to approach

51"Pis'mova robota z ukrains'koi movy uchenytsi 6 kl. Bobryts'koi shkoly Iukhno V. P.,” TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 254, l. 5.


and even talk." Khoroshunova was herself able to give her relative the food. He said they had not eaten for nine days.\textsuperscript{55}

So far, only scenes in the countryside have been provided. But the very same scenes took place in the middle of cities. Chasing prisoners of war through cities was meant to intimidate the locals and to convince them that, as Hitler announced on the radio on 3 October 1941, the Soviet Union had been defeated. On almost every day in early October 1941, there were several marches of POWs through Kiev. The length of these convoys was enormous. Gerhard Kegel, a Berlin-based official at the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), wrote in his memoirs that on 3 or 4 October he waited in Kiev for two hours at a pontoon bridge—that was the time it took for one POW convoy to march across. Afterwards, "in the two-part street, which had a green strip in the middle and along which the prisoners of war had been driven, lay dozens of dead Soviet soldiers.... The escorts shot with their submachine guns any prisoner who displayed signs of physical weakness or wanted to answer the call of nature on the green strip. I saw for myself how the Nazi escorts approached them from behind, murdered them, and moved on without deigning a further glance at the victims."

Hans Koch confirmed to Kegel that this happened all the time. At the Kommandantur, an officer told Kegel that they were responsible for arranging wagons to collect the bodies. Sometimes the Kommandantur found out about such transports only afterwards, in which case the bodies, "almost always dozens," remained in the streets for hours.\textsuperscript{56} Kievan, in diaries and recollections, also note the horror. "Those who could not walk were shot. And when the column passed, bodies were lying on both sides," recalled one woman.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{56}Gerhard Kegel, In den Stürmen unseres Jahrhunderts: ein deutscher Kommunist über sein ungewöhnliches Leben (Berlin, 1984), pp. 302 and 305-307. The wide street must have been the present-day Lesia Ukrainka Boulevard or Taras Shevchenko Boulevard.

\textsuperscript{57}Valentyna Pavlivna Kravchenko (Ukrainian born in 1922 in Kiev), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, Ukraine, tape recording (the quote); Klavdiia Iakovlivna Hrynevych (Ukrainian born in 1930 in Klynts [Kirovohrad oblast]), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, tape recording.
As in the countryside, the guards tried to prevent the locals from helping. On 5 October 1941, over the course of an hour thousands of prisoners from Darnytsia passed through the street where Khoroshunova lived. As she noted in her diary: "The women brought water and rusk. The prisoners hurled themselves toward them, knocked over each another and the women, ripped the rusk from their hands, and fought over them. Everybody around was crying. But the German guards with their brutal faces beat the prisoners with sticks and rubber batons.... We stayed behind and six bodies remained."58 Two male Kievans confirm that both the prisoners who wanted to accept food and the Kievans who tried to give it were beaten. One says, "Whenever I saw prisoners of war, the population tried to help. Most of the time, the Germans did not allow it and beat the people."59

The Kievian professor of medicine Nikolai Shepelevskii also witnessed the almost daily prisoner parades through Kiev. He later did not recall stragglers being shot. This, he said, was done outside the city. (Perhaps by that time an order to such effect had been issued.) But he saw everywhere beatings of prisoners who were barely alive. "Obviously the loss of strength was so great that the people quickly lost consciousness, which also explained the loss of sensitivity. Remarkably, even during the very worst punishment, there were no moans. At the end of the row, hanging on the shoulders of their comrades, somehow dragging themselves along, were those who already expected to die from hunger.... These living dead broke everybody's heart."60

It is worth mentioning the Hungarian escorts of these transports through Kiev. They appear to have behaved much like their German colleagues. "Regarding the treatment of the prisoners there was no difference between the Germans and the Hungarians," the Red Cross


59Iurii Mikhailovich Markovskii (Ukrainian born in 1904), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 12 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 22; Aleksei Mikhailovich Bashkulat (Ukrainian born in 1909), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 28 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 43v (the quote).

leader Liudmyla Ivchenko recalled later. "When a prisoner fell, they beat him with a rifle butt to get him up, and when he had no strength to do so, they shot him right there on the spot. Both Germans and Magyars did this. When women pedestrians tried to throw bread at the prisoners, the soldiers—German and Hungarian—threw themselves with rifles ready-to-fire [na perekis] at the women, who dispersed in all directions."61 I have no information regarding the behavior of Romanian guards in 1941.62

Oleksandra Sharandachenko's diary confirms that the patrols beat and shot those who stayed behind or who throw themselves at food. It is the only source which adds that people were not afraid of the guards and snapped at them. What they really feared, she writes, was recognizing a relative. They handed out bread, boiled potatoes, apples, peaches, melon slices, and baked beets.63 She also writes that she and some others quickly grabbed several prisoners who fainted and took them into a yard—the guards "were not nearby."64 Later, when prisoners were again marched through the city, Kievans again "gave them what they could."65

There are many testimonials from other cities and smaller towns. Soon after the German arrival in Novi Sanzhary, a column of hungry prisoners of war passed through. "The population met them with various kinds of food aid," Hryhorii Kariak recalls. "The guards did not allow that group to make a stop. The people threw the food at the crowd of prisoners. This caused the marching order to be broken. On this occasion, before my eyes, one captive Red


62One former prisoner captured in the Kharkiv encirclement in 1942 was escorted by Romanian soldiers. First they robbed him and the other prisoners of all valuables, but hereafter they were "very friendly." Lugin, Polglatka svobody, p. 172.

63[O. P. Sharandachenko], Reiestrorka zahsu: (iz shchodennyka kyianky) (Kiev 1960), p. 20, note of 20 October 1941.

64Ibid., p. 21, note of 20 Oct. 1941. For a similar episode in late November 1941, see ibid., pp. 29–30.

65Arkadii Liubchenko, Shchodennyk: knyzhka persha (Toronto, Ontario, 1951), p. 120, note of 3 September 1942.
Army man was shot." Many POWs passed through Poltava, most of them westward to the camp in Khorol. According to the former leader of the local Red Cross, they were chased "literally like cattle." Although in captivity for only a few weeks and mostly young, they had "lost even their human appearance."

When a civilian looking at this sad sight threw something to eat into the crowd of wretched ones, they threw themselves at it with such senselessness, of people mad with hunger, that they threw each other off their feet. Then the Germans beat them and even fired shots, in order to get a hold of the disorder. Sometimes the Germans even shot prisoners dead in front of the latter's own countrypeople. In particular, they shot those who were too weak to walk any further. This was something which even we found unbelievable. We had seen something similar only in the behavior of the Soviet people-catchers of the NKVD, when they drove masses of Ukrainian detainees toward slave camps in the 1930s, and before their flight from Ukraine during the war.67

Everywhere, helping prisoners and thus "causing unrest" carried grave risk. In September or October 1941, a major "disorder" occurred in Vinnytsia. The mayor, Sevastianov, announced in the newspaper that thousands of prisoners would pass through the city on a particular day. He called on the population to feed them, because they had not eaten for days. Immediately, city-dwellers and villagers spread the word and prepared food. When the day came, they were waiting for kilometers on end. It was a hot day. Villagers had carts, women carried pots and pans with food, and there were heaps of apples and bread. When the prisoners (arriving from Uman') saw the reception, they quickened their pace. The guards stopped them, however, while some of them tried to disperse the locals. Then the prisoners broke through. Upon an order from the convoy officer, shots rang out at the prisoners. The civilians fled, or tried to flee, leaving everything behind. Because of the shooting and squeezing, several of them were killed as well. Some guards trampled on the food and threw it from the vessels. When it was all over, many locals concluded that the mayor and the Germans had wanted to trick them.68

66Sova, Do istorii, p. 80.
68Mikhail Ivanovich Sokolov, interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 20 January 1946 [Vinnytsia?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, ll. 29–30.
Children were less likely to suffer from helping, but they were not safe either. When prisoners of war were chased along Zhytomyr's Khlibna Street on 14 October 1941, Ms. M. A. Iakivs'ka sent her ten-year-old daughter Nina out with a piece a bread. A Soviet investigation later found that "when the girl wanted to give the bread to a prisoner, one of the guards shot her twice and killed her on the spot."69

Nothing changed even weeks later. In the city of Oleksandria, word got out in November 1941 that many prisoners would be passing through. Despite the rain, thousands of people went to the city outskirts to look for any relatives and friends and to give them food. They witnessed the spectacle of human misery which is by now familiar to the reader. A witness recalls the following about a prisoner who remained. "With a whip lash on his head, he is knocked from his feet by a German. The escort-butcher takes aim. The Oleksandriians froze. He won't...? A shot. The blood of prisoner Krivoshapko covers the ground, the inhabitant of Oleksandria is dead." This witness also saw how those grabbing the unharvested corn along the road (the Kremenchuk road, from Poltava to Kirovohrad) were shot. In general, "the entire path of this tragic procession was paved with the bodies of murdered and dead prisoners. They were not removed. Cars drove across them, crushing extremities and squeezing out intestines."70

During the transports, any Jewish prisoners of war who had survived were treated the worst of all. Often they walked only in underwear, for those who "exposed" them were usually allowed to steal their clothes. Several days before the Babyn Iar massacre, Khoroshunova saw in the Left Bank Jewish "prisoners [who were] dressed in only underwear, in a tight convoy of German soldiers. All columns which we had seen so far were guarded by ten to twenty [Germans]. But here the Germans were all around. When they approached buildings, one prisoner asked for water. He went to the building and started to run. Two shots rang out and


70Former partisan Rybalko, quoted in Mikhail Mikh. Skirda [et. al.], "Otchet o podpol'noi partiinoi rabote i partizanskoj bor'be v Kirovogradskoi oblasti (avgust 1941 goda - mart 1944 goda)," n.d., typewritten document, signed, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 16.
he was killed on the spot. The Germans did not allow anybody to approach this group of prisoners. They were even more terrifying than those we had seen before."71 Of the prisoners she saw being marched through Kiev in early October 1941, she noted that the Jews were being chased along "without clothes" and were "killed when they ask for water or bread."72 These Jews were part of an estimated three thousand Jewish POWs who were marched through the city toward Babyn Iar in those days.73

Equally memorable was a large group of sailors of the Dnieper flotilla, who were also chased through Kiev. Nartova, perhaps herself a witness, wrote in her diary: "It was already very cold, it was freezing, but they were chased in nothing but shorts and shirts. They were blue, their faces were bitter, but they were staunch [stoikie]. Passers-by expressed their sympathy and threw bread and potatoes at them, but some of them threw the tips aside while saying: 'Feed your deliverers [izbaviteli], the Germans.' Then they all together sang the International."74 Two other Kievans also recalled that the sailors declined bread and cigarettes.75 Still another says that she witnessed how sixty to seventy sailors were shot at Babyn Iar.76


72Khoroshunova, "Kievskie zapiski," p. 294, note of 2 October 1941. A Soviet underground agent saw on 25 October 1941 how around 1,500 POWs were transported from the Darnytsia camp to the Syrets' camp in Kiev. Although his report does not say so, these were very likely Jews: "All POWs were dressed only in underwear. The German guards beat them with rubber batons. Some stayed behind because they had frostbite; they were shot. There were up to 200 executed prisoners on the road from Darnytsia to Boryspil' on 26 October." Evtikhii Alekseevich Sidorenko, 13 December 1941, "Kopia. Nachal'niku politicheskogo otcela 21 armii - brigadnomu komissaru tov. Mikhal'chuk," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 118, l. 66.


74"Iz dnevnika uchitel'nitsy gor. Kiev L. Nartovoi [Nartova diary]." TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 347, l. 6, note of 21 March 1942.

75Bashkulat, CHPWU interview, l. 43; Shepelevskii, "Prebyvanie nemtsev v Kieve," l. 59.

It took the German defeat at Stalingrad to put an end to shootings during the POW marches, or at least to decrease their frequency. According to Mykhailo Seleshko, those marching through Vinnytsia in mid-1943 were "ghosts who barely resembled people." If they collapsed, they were "immediately gathered on to carts which were riding at the back. The Germans tried to chase along those who fell, but if they saw that people were really exhausted and could not walk any further, they took them on the carts and drove them."77

It is impossible to determine the number of prisoner-of-war camps. Many were likely former Soviet camps. The Right Bank was particularly full of camps, mostly unheated wooded sheds.78 The treatment of the inmates was based on secret orders of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (8 September 1941).79 Army intelligence objected to them, but Generalfeldmarschall Keitel dismissed this, saying that what was at issue was "the destruction of a world view."80 The orders said that the camp guards were liable for punishment if they did not use their weapons, or simply not enough.81 Most guards seem to have complied. They were mostly reservists, men who had been trained during or even before World War I.82 Besides the German guards, there was also a Lagerpolizei (camp police) of former prisoners, who were armed with sticks and whips. These men seem to have acted even more cruelly.83

80Streim, Sowjetische Gefangene, p. 34.
81Ibid., p. 145.
82Ibid., pp. 16 and 145; Iaroslav Haivas, Koly kinchalaasia epokha (n.p., 1964), p. 54. Haivas probably observed the camp in Zhytomyr. He writes that "worst of all was that the executioners and mass murderers were not young, unreasonable soldiers, but that the camp guards were old men over the age of fifty."
83Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 181; Streim, Sowjetische Gefangene, p. 145. The camp police of the Darnytsia camp was apparently led by Konstantyn Mykhailovych Tyshchenko, a former Red Army lieutenant. He is said to have been crueler than any German guard. Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 182.
It is worth mentioning that the camps included civilians—or to be more precise, males in civilian clothes. In the Zhytomyr camp, for example, a former inmate recalls seeing many of them, "old men and teenagers." The Jews again were singled out. The SD simply visited the camps and took them out for shooting. The military authorities overwhelmingly cooperated and were also themselves involved. To be sure, there were some exceptions. The camp commander in Vinnytsia initiated a court-martial in late 1941 against his deputy and two others for shooting 362 Jewish prisoners. In the Zhytomyr camp, "Russian" doctors did a "medical" check on all newcomers. Those found to be circumcised were taken away and shot. In the camp in Khorol, in early October 1941 a Volga German interpreter asked Jews to come forward. He assured them that nothing would happen to them. A few believed him and were shot. Hereafter ethnic Germans in the employment of the camp authorities continued to look for Jews. In this particular camp, those caught were publicly murdered in various ways, for example by setting German shepherds on them. "The dogs would chase the people, who ran in all directions, lunge at them, rip their throats open, and drag dead or near-dead victims to the commandant's feet."87

One principle behind all camp policy was that feeding the prisoners amounted to stealing from the German people. Thus, the camps were treated the same as the major cities. Any feeding of the prisoners had to be specifically reported. Under such conditions, starvation started immediately. On 16 September 1941, Göring himself became involved and demanded that the "productivity" of the "Bolshevik" prisoners of war should decide how they

84 Motel'e, "O moem partizanskom otriade "Pobeda ili smert'," report written after 16 October 1941, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122, l. 84. Motel'e was taken prisoner in late August 1941, was taken to the POW camp in Zhytomyr, and somehow got out. Cf. Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 37 (29 July 1941), p. 7. There were also civilians in the POW camps in the Kirovohrad region, according to Skirda, "Otchet [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 35.


86 Motel'e, "O moem partizanskom otriade [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122, ll. 81–82.


88 Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 143.
could be fed. The result was a further reduction of food rations. Even ordinary German soldiers were frequently warned to give the prisoners only minimal amounts of food. Thus starvation continued, despite attempts by some lower-rank military to alleviate the situation.

In late October 1941, German policy changed. On 31 October, Keitel ordered that the food made available should be enough to enable people to work. Göring followed with a similar order on 7 November. Streit has concluded that those responsible for the starvation had initially assumed that the supposedly primitive "Russian" took longer to die than more "civilized" people. While this is likely correct, Streit is mistaken when he adds that Göring, Keitel, and the other policy-makers had underestimated the threat of famine. He argues that the German leaders "did not anticipate the rapid increase in mortality." The fact is that starvation was deliberate.

It is true that the German military were faced with a difficult situation and were surprised to find that the Red Army units lacked field kitchens. But far more important was the view which prevailed in the German military hierarchy. As late as 20 November 1941, von Manstein, the chief of staff of the Army Group South, banned the "release" of food to city-dwellers and prisoners "as long as they are not in the service of the German Wehrmacht." That would be "wrongheaded humaneness." What Streit and other historians have not considered is the role of the civilian population. Study of this aspect shows that there was plenty of food available for the camps, all supplied by the locals. Unless a Red Cross branch was active, however, almost invariably this food was refused by or largely confiscated by the guards.

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89Ibid., pp. 143-144.
90Ibid., p. 161.
91Ibid., p. 145.
92Ibid., p. 154.
93Ibid., p. 150.
94Ibid., pp. 161-162.
There is evidence from various localities. Up to 20,000 prisoners of war were crammed behind barbed wire in the camp in Rivne. The head of the local Ukrainian Red Cross told one author in 1941 that peasant women who brought food had to flee because they were shot at by the guards. There was also plenty of food in storage that had remained intact after the Red Army's retreat. In July 1941, a delegation of Ukrainian women asked the commander of the POW camp in Zhytomyr for permission to feed the prisoners. He said this was impossible. The Ukrainian who interpreted recalls that the man added: "I have to follow strict directives. The Führer has decided to exterminate Bolshevism, including the people spoiled by it." The "visibly shaken" Austrian commander added, "May God save you from the worst." In July 1942, the commander of the camp (possibly another man) announced that food could be given on Mondays and Thursdays between 9:00 and 11:00 a.m. This did not help much, however, for the guards tended to keep the gifts for themselves.

In August 1941, the population of the town-like village of Onufriïvka, south of Kremenchuk, brought much food to the local camp. The Germans rarely allowed it to be delivered. Around the Darnytsia camp, in the woods near Kiev, were farm fields with potatoes and beets which had not been dug and they could easily have been given to the POWs. Moreover, the guards stole all or part of the food which women brought. As a last resort, the women started to bring only potatoes, carrots, or moldy bread. If they threw it over the fence, the guards fired shots. Peasant women told Lashchenko, probably in 1941, about a transit camp in a village some fifty kilometers from Bila Tserkva. The prisoners there only received 100 grams of bread per day and sometimes soup. "Ukrainian women came up to the wire in


96The interpreter was a member of the OUN-SD: Borys Lewytyckyj, *Die Sowjetukraine 1944–1963* (Cologne and Berlin, 1964), p. 398n9.


98I. Kuzenkos [sic?] (Ukrainian born in 1916), interview in Ukrainian by the CHPWU, 29 October 1946, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 56.

order to give bread to the prisoners through the wire. A German who saw that started shooting. The prisoners threw themselves at him and confiscated his weapon. By way of punishment, the German authorities quickly assembled the prisoners in the square in front of the barracks and shot every tenth one.\textsuperscript{100} The woman who headed the Red Cross in Poltava, Halyna V"iun, visited the local camp and concluded that the prisoners were being deliberately starved to death.\textsuperscript{101}

Even Rosenberg wrote a statement about blocking attempts by civilians to save lives. In his above-mentioned letter of 28 February 1942, he wrote that he had seen reports which showed that the civilians wanted to feed the prisoners. "Some reasonable camp commandants have indeed allowed this with success. In the most cases, however, the camp commandants have forbidden the civilian population to provide the prisoners of war with food and have preferred to have them starve to death."\textsuperscript{102} Considering the above-mentioned evidence, this statement should be taken seriously by scholars.

The camps had both written and unwritten rules. In the Zhytomyr camp, there were many beatings every day, at the very least in the period before mid-October 1941. One of the pretexts guards used for beating inmates was relieving themselves beyond the totally inadequate number of toilets. When such beatings failed to produce the line-ups at the toilets that the guards wanted, they shot some prisoners. The inmates officially received daily raw (non-grounded) millet, and on Sundays boiled horse-meat. Only the lucky or most aggressive ones actually got a hold of it. A former inmate who escaped described soon afterwards in a Soviet report how sadistically the food was distributed.

Food is given out in the evening. We are standing in formation, but instead of leading us into the kitchen in an organized way, they shout, 'To the canteen,' 'Run.' All the hungry people rush to the kitchen, where there are several dirty barrels with a millet


\textsuperscript{101}V"iun, \textit{Pid znakom Chervonoho Khresta}, p. 16.

slop. Everybody knows that there is not enough food and tries to get at it first. Jostling starts. Now the 'order supervisors' appear and start to establish order, a line-up. They use sticks, cleaning rods [shampola], rubber truncheons, and anything one can beat with. The results are usually a cut in the head, an all but broken arm, or the murder of an emaciated and weak prisoner. The beatings last for hours. Meanwhile, half of the prisoners already don't want to eat anything at all, and abandon the carnage. They lie down on the damp ground—for there are not enough sheds for all—and sleep until 5 a.m.

The day started as follows: "At five in the morning, a furious whistle, shouting, and barking resound all over the camp. This is the reveille. The hungry, tired, and still sleepy prisoners slowly start to get up. They are incited again by sticks, rubber truncheons, and rods. Moreover, some Germans have German shepherds and chase the prisoners into formation by setting them upon them."103

A similar sadistic and deadly waiting game was employed with the bread which was actually distributed in the Darnytsia camp, as a man who escaped told Kievans.104 The situation was at least as bad in the Left Bank. In late 1941 in the Khorol camp, "almost every day, and sometimes several times a day, the camp commandant came to watch the food being distributed. He would spur his horse and cut into the line. Many people were killed under the hooves of his horse."105 Officially a transit camp, Khorol was on the premises of a former brick factory. Once during a hard rain fall, a German "shot with an automatic pistol at anyone who tried to get under the overhangs."106 In the camp in Poltava, imprisoned doctors told visiting Red Cross workers about the sadism of some of the guards, equally unrelated to food distribution. One guard enjoyed setting his dog on weak prisoners and seeing them torn to death. Another practiced rifle shooting by using prisoners as targets.107

103Motel'e, "O moem partizanskom otriade [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122, l. 83.
104Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 181.
105"In the Khorol Camp [...]" in Ehrenburg and Grossman, Black Book, p. 386.
106Volynskii, "Skvoz' noch'," p. 128.
107V"iun, Pid znakom Chervonoho Khresta, p. 17.
In all camps, the starvation was overwhelming. In the many camps in Bila Tserkva and Kirovohrad, by early 1942 the prisoners were receiving only a thin balanda (flour soup), even though they worked from dawn till dusk. According to a Communist report, every morning six to ten carts loaded with corpses were taken out of the camp.108 Pihido confirms this, for he saw that "in the Bila Tserkva camp, for example, where conditions were particularly harsh, every morning several cars went out, loaded to the top with dead and frozen prisoners."109 The camp at Khorol was a particularly notorious death trap. Meanwhile in Kiev, all shuddered when they thought of the forest camp they called Babii Iar (Babyn Iar), near the ravine of the same name. (It was officially called Syrets', even though the real Syrets' district was much further away.)110 On the outskirts of Kremenchuk was the Stalag, an open-air camp overcrowded as the others. Its inmates in the fall of 1941 received at most 200 grams of bread made of burned grain. Every morning new bodies were thrown into a pit. The survivor Bogdanova, one of 49 female prisoners from this camp, stated in 1946 that sometimes even living people were thus discarded.111 Among the immediate causes of death were dysentery and typhus.112 The director of Kiev University's Zoological Museum advised Germans how they might deal with the typhus, but he quickly realized that they did not want the prisoners to survive.113

108Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, l. 68.


110Later Soviet historiography also designated the site with the official German name. Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 305. An extensive account of the conditions there, apparently based on a conversation with a Jewish survivor, is in ibid., pp. 300–314.

111Bogdanova, CHPWU interview, ll. 114 and 116.


113Vladimir Mikhailovich Artobolevskii (Russian born in 1874), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 and 25 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 18.
The desperate prisoners, who were also tormented by lice, ate anything. In a camp in Rivne, a German noticed, on 7 September 1941, how a tree was virtually without bark up to the highest branches. "On top two prisoners try to reach the last remaining bark, in order to alleviate their hunger." In such conditions, cannibalism occurred and even murder for the specific purpose of cannibalism. A representative of the German steel industry reported in October 1941 from the Kryvyi Rih and Dnipropetrovs'k regions. Not only did he note that those POWs unable to walk were shot, but also that in one transit camp, "at night the prisoners roasted and ate their own comrades." They were shot for doing so. A German diary writer noted in late September 1941 that the "doctor" of the camp in Shepetivka reports that cases of cannibalism occur in which prisoners overpower their comrades, in order to consume human flesh. The "doctor" took the trouble to film the spectacle.

Before prisoners were driven mad by hunger, they had plenty of time to think about their predicament. Anger against "them"—the NKVD, the commissars, and the Communists—competed with frustration and regret of having given oneself up. There was also anger at the Germans and the OUNNSD. In mid-October 1941, the prisoners of Stalag no. 365 in Volodymyr-Volyns'kyi were almost all Dnieper Ukrainians, and mostly officers. One officer asked a local about the state which had been declared in L'viv. The local responded that nobody was talking about it. Two other officers said that they had heard about it while still in the Red Army. They were now convinced it had been a German trick to have them surrender and then starve them to death. "Now we curse this proclamation, which dragged us into this captivity and we are dying from hunger and cold like flies in the fall." 

114V"jun, Pid znakom Chervonoho Khresta, p. 28.


116The inmates of this camp, mainly prisoners from the Kiev encirclement, received only potatoes, supplied by the local population. They received at most two potatoes per day. Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 152. For another example of cannibalism, see Klee and Dreßen, "Gott mit uns," p. 141, quoting from a May 1944 Soviet report about the camp near Novoukraïnka.


News of the starvation of the prisoners passed through the front with the speed of light, by word of mouth and active Soviet propaganda (emaciated prisoners who were displayed to the Red Army soldiers). The population of Ukraine was convinced that this knowledge increased the Red Army’s fighting spirit and caused a drop in the rate of surrender and desertion, and they were right.119

It is important to note that not all prisoners remained in captivity. Many were released, especially in the first months of the war. For two months, release specifically of Ukrainians was sanctioned by the highest level of the German authorities. On 8 September 1941, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ordered that Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Baltic prisoners of war (Russians were not mentioned) were eligible for immediate release.120 On 29 September, in a meeting with Rosenberg, Hitler personally spoke out in favor of large-scale releases of Ukrainians.121 Several weeks later, however, on 7 November, Göring told a conference of officials that Hitler had ordered an end to the release of Ukrainians. (He did not give Hitler's reason, which remains unknown.)122 Still, this did not put a complete end to the releases. Reichskommissar Koch noted five weeks later that his Gebietskommissare "frequently" gave documents to natives which were addressed to POW camp commanders and requested the release of named prisoners. Koch reminded his subordinates that this practice

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121 Müller, Die fashistische Okkupationspolitik, p. 200.

should be ended, for "the release of prisoners of war is presently forbidden." Nonetheless, some releases continued to take place.

There were "random" and "organized" ways of release. Initially, in western Volhynia, the Right Bank, and the Left Bank, "random" releases occurred on a very large scale. Russian prisoners simply had to pretend to be Ukrainian. In the Zhytomyr camp, long-term inmates told a newcomer in late August 1941 that initially releases occurred through announcements such as: "Zhytomyr oblast, Cherniakhiv raion, get out." These people received passes and were not asked any questions. Pihido confirms that in the Right Bank, at first a prisoner merely had to call himself Ukrainian, or else a local woman merely had to call a prisoner her husband, brother, father, or son. Another local confirms that in the first few weeks prisoners in a field camp near Chyhyryn could be taken out by local peasant women who claimed that they were relatives, even if they were Russians. After this initial "random" stage, the camp authorities started demanding that local Ukrainian authorities—a raion chief or at least a village elder (and usually several other villagers)—submit a statement, which vouched for the prisoner's loyalty. Such statements were demanded perhaps because some of those released earlier started partisan activity. That is hard to confirm; most may simply have tried to cross the front line, and therefore have given the impression of being partisans.

If a prisoner's village of origin was near the camp, the elder might be called in. The elder would select those he wanted and take them with him after signing for their loyalty.

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124 Motel'e, "O moem partizanskom otriade [...]." TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122, l. 84.


127 This is the reason provided in Motel'e, "O moem partizanskom otriade [...]." TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122, l. 84 and in F. P. Bogatyrchuk, Mai zhiznennyi put' k Vlasovu i Prazhkomu manifestu (San Francisco, 1978), p. 132. Natives called such a loyalty statement a spravka or pryihvor. E.g., see the letter to a camp commandant by a woman from the village of Stebly about her son, 15 December 1941, and the accompanying spravka about the man's character, written by the elder and five other villagers, in DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 119-120.
Those who came from more distant raions were apparently taken to their place of origin under guard and shown to the elder. Elders also visited camps to "recognize" locals on their own initiative, at least in the Zhytomyr region. There is similar evidence regarding the release of many local peasants in the Poltava region, even from the Khorol camp.

In and around Kiev, releases were also initially rather common. Ukrainian POWs at Brovary in late September 1941 were promised release if they found 15 signatures vowing for them. An unknown number of men in the Darnytsia camp whose wives found them there were released. In general, it seemed that female POWs (if Slavic), had the least difficulty getting released.

"People's mail" (narodna poshta, narodnia pochta) was an important tool for locating one's imprisoned relatives. Women avidly collected notes from all soldiers they met and passed them on to the addressees. Khoroshunova for example received in this way a note from her relative, and she distributed herself eighteen such notes in Kiev on 27 and 28 September 1941.

"Wherever we went with the notes, other people had preceded us and told about the prisoners. Now all were united in surprising solidarity. Everybody felt exactly the same—we must tell and we must help."

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128Motel'e, "O moem partizanskom otriade [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122, l. 84, describing events in the Zhytomyr region.


130"In the Khorol Camp [...]," in Ehrenburg and Grossman, Black Book, pp. 387–388.


132Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 180. According to a Kievian doctor, until the late fall of 1941 "all" Ukrainians were released from this camp. Shepelevskii, "Prebyvanie nemtsev v Kieve," l. 59.

133One woman in Kiev saw how female prisoners were released and two of them told her that they had been fed twice daily, while the men received nothing. This was in late September 1941. Khoroshunova, "Kievskie zapiski," p. 281.

As late as 1942, prisoners captured in the Kharkiv encirclement heard and passed on rumors that those who lived in German-occupied Ukrainian regions would be released. One of these prisoners thought, probably correctly, that the rumor was planted to dissuade them from escaping, but he also saw how "those in civilian clothes and those whose relatives came" were released. In the Lukiv raion in western Volhynia, appeals to release Ukrainian prisoners of war met with success as late as the "early spring of 1942." In this particular wave, many others who pretended to be Ukrainian came out as well. Many of these former prisoners started working in local villages. The Gebietskommissar in Kovel' probably was reprimanded for these releases, for some time later, he ordered all of them to report. Nothing appears to have come of it, however. It is unclear to what extent such late releases also occurred in other districts.

There were also "organized," semi-official ways of release. One option was to join recruitment drives for the local police. Frequently OUN-M activists were involved in these campaigns, particularly in the camp in Zhytomyr, the city which was the first base of OUN-M activity in Dnieper Ukraine. In July 1941, an OUN-M activist, Bohdan Onufryk (pseud.: Konyk), who was probably an army interpreter, visited this camp for this purpose. The recruitment drive lasted for weeks. All newly arriving prisoners were subdivided. Jews were taken out during the "medical" exam and shot; Russians and those belonging to "national minorities" were placed into the camp. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian newcomers would be addressed by a Ukrainian nationalist, who proposed they join a "Ukrainian national militia" which would "defend Ukrainian interests: defending the rights of Ukrainian prisoners of war and even serve not only in the camp, but also in some villages and cities." He emphasized his

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135Lugin, Polityka svobody, p. 173.


words by pointing at the emaciated long-term inmates. New militiamen were allowed to steal clothes and footwear from the latter, which they did.\textsuperscript{138}

How many policemen and indeed police units were organized in this way in Zhytomyr is unclear. In any case, many seem to have moved on to Kiev. The earliest group was apparently taken there by a veteran of the Ukrainian army led by Petliura, the OUN-M sympathizer R. Zakhvalyn's'kyi.\textsuperscript{139} Another (or the same?) unit of former prisoners created by the OUN-M was initially called Battalion Kyiv (Kurin' Kyiv). The one source which mentions this battalion, a memoir by an OUN-M activist who joined after its arrival in Kiev, says that it arrived there "in October or in early November 1941." It was disbanded in late 1941 by the civilian German authorities and undoubtedly merged into the Schutzpolizei.\textsuperscript{140}

Another little-known category of former POWs were the so-called "Free Cossacks" (Vil'ne kozatstvo or Vil'ni kozaky). They were a semi-legal category. Such "Cossacks" reportedly fought Soviet partisans between Novomoskov's'k and Pavlohrad, and by early 1942 worked in Dnipropetrov's'k.\textsuperscript{141} In the second half of March 1942, a similar group was formed in the Vinnytsia region, also to fight Soviet partisans. In fact, they joined the partisans as soon

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Motel'e, "O moem partizanskom otriade [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122, ll. 82–83. Cf. the second-hand account, "The Story of M. Sheynman, Former Prisoner of War," in Ehrenburg and Grossman, Black Book, pp. 514–515, according to which prisoners who arrived in this camp in September 1941 were told that "by order of camp headquarters," Ukrainians would be released if they pointed out the Jews and commissars among them. But Motel'e's first-hand account seems more accurate.

\item There he was soon replaced by the Galician Ukrainian Roman Bida. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 67.

\item It was stationed at the former Soviet militia building on Bohdan Khmel'nits'kyi Square. K. Radzeyvych [Osyp Vynnyts'kyi], "U sorokarichchia Kyiv's'koï pokhidnoï hrupy OUN," Kalendar-al'manakh Novoho Shliakhu 1982 (Toronto, [n.d.]), p. 77. The editors of this memoir add the information that its leader was one captain (sootnik, i.e., Hauptmann) Omelianiv.

\item The group was led by a (former) lieutenant-general called Korneev. Savchenko, VRIO NKVD USSR, to N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvedvodka No. 32/67. O deiatel'nosti ukrainskikh natsionalistov na okkupirovannoi nemetsko-fashistskimi zakhvatchikami territorii USSR. Po sostoiiani 1. 9. 42g." 19 September 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 115, l. 28; Savchenko, VRIO NKVD USSR, to N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvedvodka No 33/68 o polozenii v okkupirovannom protivnikom g. Dnepropetrovskie. Po sostoiianiu na 20. 10. 42g.," 21 October 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, ll. 76–77.
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as they received weapons.\textsuperscript{142} (Having one's own weapon was often a precondition for joining the partisans.)

The most common "organized" escape from captivity was recruitment by the German army as a \textit{Hilfswilliger} (\textit{Hiwi})—a "voluntary helper." Because Hitler hated the notion of "Russians" in army service, the \textit{Hiwis} remained an open secret, officially without duties or rights, until as late as October 1942. They performed various tasks, ranging from carrying ammunition, blacking boots, cooking, driving trucks, healing, and interpreting. A probably small percentage consisted of those who had "really" volunteered, since they had not been prisoners. The number of \textit{Hiwis} in the Reichskommissariat or in Ukraine as a whole is unknown. In the entire "east," there were by the spring of 1942 perhaps around 200,000 and a year later about 310,000. Thereafter, their number probably continued to increase.\textsuperscript{143} Finally, some ten thousand Ukrainians, presumably former POWs, constituted an actual military formation. This was the so-called Sumy, or Ukrainian, Division, about which virtually nothing is known. It was apparently formed in late 1941 and early 1942, probably in the Sumy region (which never joined the Reichskommissariat), and was virtually obliterated at the Battle of Stalingrad.\textsuperscript{144}

The Red Cross played a major role in many releases. In Kiev, the Red Cross had a special section for prisoners of war (\textit{Viddil dopomohy viis'kovopolonenym}), led by Liudmyla Ivchenko. First it sent out pairs of young women to find out the location of the camps and to

\textsuperscript{142}Savchenko, VIIO NKVD USSR to Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka No. 11: O polozhenii v okkupirovannoi protivnikom Vinnitsoi oblast po sostoianiiu na 30. 9. 42g." 16 October 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, II. 27-28.


compile lists of the interned. These emissaries, who wore arm bands and traveled by train, also questioned the camp inmates about their treatment. As a result, by December 1941, the Red Cross in Kiev had forty thousand names at its disposal (and by February 1942, when the SD banned this activity, about sixty thousand). The names were posted outside the office.145

Kiev's Red Cross also answered requests from relatives for the location of prisoners. By January 1942, if not earlier, one mailed request to locate a prisoner cost fifty roubles.146 If the organization received a statement signed by a group of people, vowing that a particular prisoner of war had not been a member of the Communist Party (VKP(b)) or an NKVD informant, it tried to get the person released, presumably also for a fee. It also ran a canteen (at the city administration) and a 24-hour shelter, where released prisoners could delouse, wash, eat, and sleep.147 A subsection organized fund-raising concerts (two or three times per week) attended by German soldiers.148 Finally, the Red Cross delivered food to camp inmates. Its large amounts of food were all apparently gifts from peasants, who had been approached by its emissaries.149

145Ivchenko, "Ukraïns'kyi Chervonyi Khrest," pp. 43 and 45; Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 191 (10 April 1942), p. 39. All Red Cross materials were later confiscated by the SD and have not been found since. İvchenko, "Ukraïns'kyi [...]", p. 50.

146Professor Bohatyrchuk to the Gebietskommissar in Polis'ke, letter in German, 16 January 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 22, l. 132; raion chief Okhrimenko to all elders of the Polis'ke raion, letter, 29 January 1942, ibid., l. 131. In his memoirs, Bohatyrchuk writes incorrectly that the Red Cross searches for named POWs were "completely free of charge." Bogatyrchuk, Moi zhidnennyi put', p. 132.


148"Dopovidna Zapyska," 15 March 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 15, d. 21, l. 1.

149Mazurchuk, chief of the Kahrlyk raion, to elder of Sloboda, handwritten letter, 17 December 1941, DAKO, f. r-2679, op. 1, d. 1, l. 26; Liashchenko, chief of the Borodianka raion, to elder of Nemishaivo, letter, 23 December 1941, DAKO, f. r-2145, op. 1, d. 1, l. 17. The first letter is an announcement of the arrival of two emissaries of the Ukrainian Red Cross, who will help gathering gifts for the wounded and the POWs. Afterwards, this village elder is supposed to report to the raion "aid inspector" (inspektor opiki). The second letter tells an elder that food and money should be sent directly to the Red Cross in Kiev, while search requests regarding POWs should go to the Red Cross branch in Borodianka.
Red Cross chief Bohatyrychuk was convinced that the first and main reason why the German authorities started to dislike its work was "the success of our voluntary collections." He recalls that in "late 1941" camp authorities started to obstruct Red Cross workers and "sometimes" to expropriate the food deliveries. Thus, in late November 1941, Bohatyrychuk felt compelled to ask Mayor Bahazii to help. Many people, he wrote, had asked him to do something about the treatment of the "Ukrainian" POWs. He asked Bahazii to demand improved conditions; a ban on random executions and theft of clothes; a transfer of all emaciated prisoners to hospitals; Red Cross access to all prisoners; a list of POW camps in Ukraine; and a German order to the raion authorities to collect items for the prisoners. It is unknown how Bahazii responded, but there is evidence that the city administration tried to get prisoners released on its own.

In late December 1941, Bohatyrychuk, Ivchenko, and other Red Cross activists visited high-placed German military authorities. Bohatyrychuk recalls that he visited the head of the camp administration in Rivne, an old general he does not identify by name. This man showed him the secret starvation orders, but claimed to be defying them. "At the end of the meeting, General Ch. promised to issue (which he did) an order to the camps, regarding obstruction-free supply to our plenipotentiaries of any needed information, and banned the confiscation of parcels." Whether the German actually did so must be doubted.

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151 Bohatyrychuk to Mayor Bahazii, letter, 26 November 1941, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 1, d. 58, ll. 33–34.

152 The city administration received many letters from relatives who already knew the camp holding the person in question but needed help to secure a release. In response, the city administration might send a short note to the Kommandantur of the city closest to the camp. It indicated the prisoner's name, nationality (never "Russian"), and the names of those who depended on him. In addition, such a note stated that the person in question was not a member of the Communist party and had not worked "in the NKVD." These letters do not mention the Red Cross at all. DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 17, d. 1, passim.

dealing with the same occasion, writes that they visited "Major-General Feichmayer," who she says promised to allow disabled and hospitalized POWs to be released, ordered Ukrainian prisoners to be placed in a separate camp section, and allowed the Red Cross to mediate in the delivery of food and clothes by civilians. 154 Kiev's Red Cross did indeed distribute clothes, underwear, and medicines. 155 Altogether, however, it seems that these appeals had little or no effect.

By December 1941, the impact of the Red Cross was bound to be limited. This was because the freezing cold in the camps alone constituted a mortal threat which no parcel could alleviate. Frozen bodies were piled up in stacks. "And although during every transport of prisoners from Darnytsia or Kiev to Zhytomyr the URC and [local] women brought to the station warm food, tea, and all the warm covers [nakryvaly] they could find, half of the [prisoners] froze to death in the unheated wagons (teplusky) and were thrown out and piled up like firewood." 156

In the Poltava region, the German authorities made it known that they could not deal with the large number of prisoners because they had their own soldiers to worry about. Then Poltava's mayor (Borkiv's'kyi) appointed a woman to organize and lead a Red Cross unit, which he, like many males, thought was women's work. The person chosen was Halyna Ivanivna V"iun, an energetic woman who got along well with both factions of the OUN. 157

154Ivchenko, "Ukrains'kyi Chervonyi Khrest," pp. 47-49. In early 1942, she apparently even spoke with the Army Commander for Ukraine, Kitzinger.

155"Dopovidna Zapyska," 15 March 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 15, d. 21, l. 1. This anonymous report, presumably written by a Ukrainian, also says that "under the permanent care of this [POW aid] section were 12,000 prisoners of war, held in Kiev and vicinity." It is unclear what this exactly means.

156Ivchenko, "Ukrains'kyi Chervonyi Khrest," p. 47.

157V"iun was born as Hryshko in Dubno in 1912 and died in the United States in 1972. She and her family lived in Soviet Ukraine before 1941. Her brother and her father, a veteran of the Ukrainian army led by Petliura, were arrested in 1929, and again in 1937 or 1938. The brother was probably Vasyl' Hryshko. Veryha, Vraty OUN, p. 114n82. That V"iun headed the Poltavan Red Cross is confirmed by ibid., pp. 91-92 and by Riasnov, Narodnyi komissar vnutrennykh del USSR, to D. S. Korotchenko, "Dokladnaia zapiska o vskrytoy "Organizatsii Ukrainskikh Natsionalistov" v gor. Poltave," 26 October 1943, Kharkiv, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 527, ll. 9-10.
early November 1941, she set up the Society of the Ukrainian Red Cross of the Poltava Region (Tovarystvo Ukraїns'koho Chervonoho Khresta Poltavshchyny). Unlike the Red Cross in Kiev, it received official status. It had two departments, one to aid prisoners of war and the other to aid victims of Soviet persecution.158 Like their Kievan colleagues, the Poltavan activists—over a hundred by the end of the year—visited camps and posted lists of names.159 From the very beginning, what V"iun called Little Russians and Soviet agents tried to sabotage her work through slander and denunciations. They supposedly hated the organization "simply because it was Ukrainian."160

The Poltavan activists quickly realized that the camp authorities were starving the prisoners to death and issued calls for food donations. They, and later also imprisoned doctors, tried to ensure that the food deliveries actually reached the prisoners.161 The regional Kommandant, one Brodowsky, allowed them to repair a school and use it as a "hospital," which proved valuable even though it was little more than a heated place with food.162 In addition, western Ukrainians who worked for Brodowsky secured permission for trips to the countryside to collect food; because Poltava itself was going hungry, there was no lack of volunteers. Peasants also brought food on their own initiative. In contrast to civilian-ruled Kiev, none of the transports were barred, and on the whole Red Cross activities were rather successful.163

158V"iun, Pid znakom Chervonoho Khresta, pp. 9–10 and 12–13. The departments were led by Z. Potul'nyts'ka and A. Kushnir-Burko, respectively. These people were very likely married or otherwise related to two prominent Autocephalous priests in the region, Oleksii Potul'nyts'kyi and Demyd Burko.

159Ibid., pp. 14–15.

160Ibid., p. 15.

161Ibid., p. 18.

162Ibid., pp. 20–23.

163Ibid., pp. 24–25. V"iun estimates that daily mortality in the camps near Poltava dropped from the initial hundreds to "twenty-two."
The Poltavan Red Cross was able to secure releases in the winter of 1941–1942 of Ukrainian prisoners—those disabled or sick who also had local relatives. Even some healthy prisoners who were Ukrainian and who were considered in V"iun's words, "valuable and worth saving," were released. For the same purpose, a Red Cross "hotel" for prisoners opened in December. Officially, those with higher education were not eligible for release, but the two German doctors who were involved in the matter ignored the rule (one in exchange for vodka, the other simply because he wanted to save lives).164 When the ban on releasing prisoners was issued in early November 1941, it still did not put an end to the releases. Now a buyout of prisoners in exchange for furs and coats started. "Although this trade was unofficial (even 'secret'), [the Red Cross] could inform interested families, and rather many of them, especially peasants who had homemade lambskins, were able to buy off their sons, brothers, fathers, etc. from German captivity. The Germans asked one lambskin for each prisoner."165

Like the Red Cross in Kiev, this organization was not allowed to release Russians. Like Ivchenko's memoir about Kiev,166 V"iun's memoir did not clarify the Red Cross's stand on the issue. She says she disobeys the Kommandant's demand that they help only Ukrainian camp inmates. But otherwise she speaks only of helping Ukrainians, and later the same Kommandant accused her of helping only selected Ukrainians.167 Here as in other places, Russians and other non-Ukrainians almost certainly could not expect help if they were unable to conceal their nationality.

Local OUN activists were arrested in the late spring of 1942, but the Poltavan Red Cross continued to exist, in large measure due to Hans Koch and another officer. It was a remarkable achievement, for members of both OUN factions had used the homes of the Red Cross leaders to assemble and had been traveling all over Ukraine with papers from the Red

164Ibid, pp. 17 and 26–27. The doctors were Senior Staff doctor Braun and army doctor Fikus.
165Ibid, p. 28.
166Ivchenko, "Uкраїнський Червоний Хрест," p. 44.
167V"iun, Pid znakom Chervonoh Khresta, pp. 14, 26, and 36.
Cross. Only on 1 August 1942, one month before the official introduction of civilian rule, was the organization replaced by the city Social Aid Department (Viddil suspil'noi opiky).168

It remains unclear to what extent the Red Cross for "the Poltava region" was related to the Red Cross which operated in the Novi Sanzhary raion. It took much effort to get permission for its work. It was led by a group of women headed by a teacher (Tkachenko) and it had branches in all villages. The network gathered money, clothes, shoes, and food (mostly rusk), and went to the camps in Poltava and Kremenchuk. This Cross also ran a hospital. Using the pretext of a lack of hands for threshing, it managed to free "over a thousand" prisoners, including non-locals. Raion chief Turik "only had to bring the camp commander butter and eggs to guarantee his success."169 In February 1942, the new raion chief was ordered to disband the organization and to ban all further food drives. People were "stunned" by this.170

Little is known about the Red Cross in western Volhynia. In Rivne, which had three camps holdings tens of thousands, the Red Cross apparently obtained the release of several thousands of prisoners.171 It was quickly forced to rename itself the Aid Committee (Dopomohovyi Komitet), in which women were particularly active.172 The impact of this organization on those who were not released was limited, however. The then editor of the newspaper Volyn', Ulas Samchuk, subsequently wrote that food was delivered from several organized kitchens, but that this was like a "drop in the sea" which could not avert the mass

168Ibid., pp. 32–36 and 41. The other officer was Oskar Wagner.

169Sova, Do istorii, pp. 80–81.

170Ibid., p. 82.

171Samchuk, Na bilomu koni, pp. 206–207.

172Among them were Kharydia Kononenko (a returned emigré), Halyna Varvarova, and Nadiia Pashkiws'ka. Ibid.; Ivchenko, "Ukrains'kyi Chervonyi Khrest," p. 46 (also mentions one Dr A. Burko). The first head of the Red Cross in Rivne was Lieutenant Leonyd Stupnys'kyi, according to Samchuk, Na bilomu koni, pp. 206–207. He was succeeded by one Dr M. Kornylyv, "who then worked under the name of Vasyliv." Ivchenko, "Ukrains'kyi [...]," p. 46 and Lashchenko, "Povorot," Samostiina Ukraina, XI, 11 (119) (Chicago, November 1958), p. 13.
starvation.\textsuperscript{173} Mykhailo Podvorniak wrote that the committee gathered clothes and food which could have fed "all the prisoners." Then "the Germans disbanded the Committee [presumably in late 1941] and confiscated the food. Now it was clear that their aim was to starve all the prisoners to death, which they indeed did later."\textsuperscript{174} A Soviet investigation later estimated that at least 50,000 prisoners of war died in Rivne.\textsuperscript{175}

Whether they escaped, were released, or were never prisoners at all, former Red Army soldiers lived in large numbers in villages. The phenomenon was particularly widespread in the Right Bank, even as late as 1943. They worked in the fields or as artisans, and started families—or rather, joined them. They lived with women whose husbands had been drafted into the Red Army, and with older peasants whose sons had been drafted. "Nobody was hard then on soldiers' wives [baby-soldatki] or even the girls, for 'after all it's war'." Among former soldiers living in the Right Bank were many non-locals, including Ukrainians who originated from east of the Dnieper, Russians (including Siberians), and peoples from the Caucasus. All had notes from the village elder which stated that they were locals.\textsuperscript{176} Such credentials were first checked in 1941 or 1942. The Ortskommandantur would order the raion chief to have the elders give him lists of "the former Russian soldiers" (or: "the prisoners of war"), including data such as the day they arrived, and whether or not they had been members of the Communist Party.\textsuperscript{177} As a result, when the campaign for work in Germany started, the


\textsuperscript{174}Khurtovyna, \textit{Pid nebom Volyni}, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{175}Klee and Dreßen, \textit{Gott mit uns,"} p. 141.

\textsuperscript{176}Volynskii, "Skvoz' noch'," p. 137 (the quotation); Pihido-Pravoberezhniy, \textit{"Velyka Vitchyzniana viina"}, p. 155. That people with small families accepted POWs as family members is confirmed by Ol'ha Mykolaivna Kutsenko (Ukrainian born in 1926 in the village of Poberezhka), author interview in Ukrainian, 18 July 1995, Bohuslav, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording.

\textsuperscript{177}E.g., Liashchenko, chief of the Borodianka raion to elder of Nemishaivo, letter, 23 December 1941, DAKO, f. r-2145, op. 1, d. 1, l. 16. This letter transmits an order from the Ortskommandantur to provide lists of former Red Army [rosiis'ki] soldiers in the villages. One list had to mention those released from camps with a release document; another had to mention those released without such a document who lived in the village before the war; while a third list had to mention those released prisoners who neither had a release document nor had lived in the village before. Each list also had to state whether or not the person was a member of the Communist party. Cf. DAKO, f. r-2679, op. 1, d. 4, l. 86–97, which is a list, probably dating from late 1941,
former prisoners of war were often the first to be included in the quotas. Many likely volunteered, for they remained "outsiders" and were easy targets for denunciations. Moreover, the German authorities might rearrest them, although it is not clear how often this happened.

If one remained in captivity, the only way to survive was to obtain some kind of daytime work outside the camp. For this, usually a large bribe had to be paid to the native police, such as a watch. But it was worth it, for civilians everywhere did try to feed and otherwise help prisoners they came across. A former inmate recalls that "when the prisoners of war went outside the [Kremenchuk] camp, the local population always threw food toward them. Even when [they went] out to work, the prisoners left their bags behind. Upon their return, they would find food in them, and nobody touched [the bags], not even the most desperate little rascals." Officially, prisoners were not even allowed to talk to civilians. In addition, being outside offered a chance to escape. This was why in Zhytomyr in late 1941, only those who still wore a uniform, which identified them as POWs, were eligible to work outside.

There was virtually no limit to the tasks for which the prisoners were employed. Initially many were used to clear mines; some fifteen thousand were used this way at the airport in Boryspil' east of Kiev. Other tasks included loading flour, cutting hop or wood, digging road ditches, working at a quarry or a mine, carrying stones, railway parts, or luggage at the

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179This happened in Melitopol' and surroundings in April 1942, for unknown reasons. Nikolai Makarovich Kharchenko (born in 1906), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 January 1946, [Melitopol'?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, l. 92.

180Bogdanova, CHPWU interview, l. 115.

181Motol'ë, "O moem partizanskom otriade [...]", TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122 l. 84.

182Ibid.

183Mikhail Nikolaevich Sviridovskii (born in 1908), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 3 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, ll. 9–14.
train station, and cleaning horses, cars, or apartments. The sources suggest that during this work, the German guards often beat the prisoners. In Zhytomyr in the fall of 1941, during work—twelve to fourteen hours per day—"the Germans urge[d] them on all the time, and beat them a lot." A civilian woman sent to work at a bridge construction in Kiev in March 1942 told Nartova about the prisoners of war who also worked there. "They are beaten terribly. They are collapsing from exhaustion, hunger, and cold. If a poor soul staggers under the weight of the load on his back, he immediately gets a hit with a rubber truncheon. They don't care where they beat him. Our prisoners sometimes even get meat, but... dog's meat, and that after they have managed to shoot a stray dog." Nartova herself also saw working POWs in Kiev, on 8 October 1942.

Today I witnessed how cruelly the prisoners are treated. They had been brought in to Korolenko Street, the Gestapo, to load peat. They had to carry it in baskets from the street into the yard. Next to the peat, politsai are standing with rifles and Germans with sticks. When the wretched ones return with empty baskets, or [enter with] not entirely full ones, the scoundrels flog them with the sticks, force them not to walk, but to run. It is a terrible sight. Many people stood still with tears in their eyes. The politsai with the rifles chased them away, while the German animals, without any shame, continued their outrages. And this was happening in the center, for all to see.

Prisoners were also used in large numbers for cultivating fields. This provided the best chance to meet locals. Many peasants girls got to marry these men and thus save them; they attached little importance to the nationality of these men.

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184"Lagebericht" for December 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 27, l. 26 (about prisoners in the Volhynia-Podolia and Zhytomyr Generalbezirke breaking stones for roads); Motel'e, "O moem partizanskom otriade [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122 l. 83. By early 1943, 3,346 POWs were working in the coal mines of the Dnipropetrovsk Generalbezirk. It may be assumed that many had died there before this count was made. Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 17.

185Motel'e, "O moem partizanskom otriade [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 122, l. 84.

186Nartova diary, l. 6, note of 19 March 1942.

187Ibid., l. 17.

188"Lagebericht für die Monate September und Oktober 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 489; Dr Ackermann, KVACH, for Wirtschaftsinspektion Süd, Chefgruppe La, to the Wirtschaftskommandos, 27 September 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 4, d. 6, l. 40.
The conditions of the camps and the places of work were such that many prisoners sustained an injury which disallowed their bosses to continue their exploitation. And there were of course those who were already disabled when taken into captivity. As said, many disabled prisoners were taken into hospitals run by the Red Cross. But no later than the fall of 1942, and probably earlier, simply shooting such people became standard procedure. It seems likely that in the case of Ukraine, a meeting of Himmler with his subordinates near Zhytomyr in July 1942 (mentioned in chapter 2) played an important role. On the other hand, the SD probably was already shooting disabled prisoners at that time. Whatever the origin of the policy on them, on 22 September 1942, Keitel secretly ordered that "Soviet prisoners of war who would have been released according to the previous regulations because they are unable to work" be handed over to the police. The Higher SS and Police Chiefs (in the case of Ukraine, Prützmann), he said, would "arrange forwarding or employment" (für Weiterleitung bzw. Beschäftigung sorgen). This euphemistic language meant that virtually all disabled prisoners would be killed.

One example illustrates what this meant in practice. In late October 1942, a large number of prisoners of war unable to work were removed from the camp (Stalag 358) in Berdychiv and shot. On 24 December, it was the turn of the last remaining 68 or 70, mostly men with one leg or arm. What followed was unusual because many of them escaped. In the morning, SS men of the Sipo and SD took eight prisoners from the police prison in the town and forced them to dig a pit near the village of Khazhyn (Berdychiv), several kilometers away, on the road to Bila Tserkva. In the afternoon, the main group of prisoners was taken there in

189S. Slavko, "Het' z 'internatsionalizmom' v pytanniakh shliubu," Ukraïns'kyi holos (Khmel'nyts'kyi), 21 December 1941, p. 2.

190Cf. Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 184, who writes that wounded and sick prisoners of war at best were released without any treatment.

191Ibid., p. 186.

192According to the decree, Himmler had complained about released prisoners who were traveling about, begging and allegedly posing a danger. Himmler's order, which has not been preserved, applied to the Reich, the Generalgouvernement, and the "east." Ibid., p. 185. Regarding an order of 27 November 1942 about the "treatment" (Behandlung) of POWs unable to work, see ibid., p. 186.
batches in fast-driving cars. Only four SS men were at the site. The first to be shot were about eighteen men who had one leg. Following the standard method, the victims had to lie on top of those killed before them and then were shot in the back of the head. The second group which arrived, however, consisted of twenty-eight prisoners with only slight disabilities. They were taken out of the car in pairs. After three of them were shot, the others reacted. They grabbed the gun from one of the two SS guards standing near the car, shot both guards, and started to run. Two of them were shot dead while fleeing, but twenty-two got away. At the edge of Khazhyn, locals gave them some food. By way of revenge, the Gendarmerie checked the political past of all previously released prisoners in the neighborhood and shot at least twenty "activists and Communist Party members." 193

The full story of such escapes and resistance awaits further research. Escape attempts appear to have been numerous, however. In the beginning, they usually took place during the marches, especially if at night. 194 A soldier caught in the Kharkiv encirclement in 1942 saw how many of his fellow-prisoners had planned their flight well in advance.

To my surprise, many had stocked up civilian clothes. During the march, I saw the following. The prisoner who walked at the front, without halting, took a duffel bag from his shoulders and took out a shirt. Looking around, he started to change clothes. Last came a cap. All the military things he gave to his neighbors. At the next stop near a well in a village, the German guard saw the civilian person among the military ones and immediately chased the one who had changed clothes away. When we moved on, this man for a long time followed us along the street. 195

193 Streim, Sowjetische Gefangene, pp. 119-128; TMWC, Vol. 39 (Nuremberg, 1949), pp. 485-488, quoted in Streim, Sowjetische, pp. 123-126, in Streit, Wehrmacht, pp. 187 and 383n413, and in Klee and Dreßen, "Gott mit uns," pp. 151-154. A report about the case by a Sipo and SD Kommandeur says the prisoners unable to work had been handed over to him in late October "in larger [not: large] numbers" (in einer größeren Anzahl). In other words, the practise was not new.

194 Khurtovyna, Pid nebom Volyni, pp. 106.

195 Lugin, Polglotka svobody, p. 173.
Alfred Streim, an investigator of Nazi war crimes, has found that flight attempts were a daily event in the "east" and that there were cases of entire groups overpowering their guards. Police organs were constantly looking for particular escapees.196

Soviet and other partisans apparently released many prisoners. In the village of Znamenivka (Novomoskovsk's'k), hundreds were reportedly freed at some stage by a Soviet partisan unit. By way of reprisal, a Hungarian division shot almost a hundred locals.197 But partisans were not the only ones who tried to help. In the hospital in Slavuta, the director somehow helped a number of POWs who came there to escape and join the partisans. Those Schutzpolizei leaders whom he could not bribe he apparently tried to kill. Nazi intelligence arrested him and fourteen fellow-conspirators and undoubtedly shot them.198

Prisoners also attempted to escape from worksites and the camps on their own. As in the case of help by civilians or partisans, further study is needed to establish the scale of such attempts. Some examples can be provided, however. On 1 June 1942, thirty inmates of the camp in Volodymyr-Volyns'kyi were working at the cemetery. They killed a guard, tied up the others, and fled. Four covered for them with grenades and rifles. Still, sixteen were caught and shot. Three hundred prisoners who had not been involved were shot by way of reprisal.199 The Darnytsia forest camp based in Kiev had several branches. Because the prisoners were often transferred between these branches, it was difficult for them to get organized. Nevertheless, in


197Trofim Ivanovich Panchenko ([Ukrainian?] born in 1899), interview in Russian by S.P. Lauta of the CHPWU, 22 January 1946, [Novomoskovsk's'k?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, ll. 60–69.

198Meldungen, 19 (4 September 1942), p. 6. The director's name was Mikhailov.

199M. V. Koval' and N. M. Lemeshchuk, "Soprotivlenie sovetskikh voennoplenykh fashizmu na vremennom okkupirovannom territorii Ukrainy," Istoriia SSSR, 3 (Moscow, May-June 1971), p. 116. These authors, who base themselves on the Soviet postwar investigation by the Extraordinary State Commission or ChGK, call this a rebellion inside the camp, but until I have seen the original record, I assume that the cemetery was outside. This article is one of the few useful Soviet publications on the prisoners of war. The few others that exist are usually of little value, if only because they overemphasize the resistance. The best introduction to this Soviet literature is Liubov' Nikolaevna Chirkova, Antifashistskoe dvizhenie uznikov hitlerovskikh lagerei smerti na okkupirovannom territorii Ukrainy (1941–1944 gg.): avtoreferat na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk (Kiev, 1992).
the summer of 1942, over two hundred escaped from the branch at the wagon repair factory. They were assisted by civilian factory workers, who also gave them food and documents. Again, uninvolved remaining inmates likely received a death penalty by way of reprisal and deterrent.

Digging escape tunnels was also practiced, but it rarely seems to have saved many prisoners. In the Zhytomyr camp, prisoners dug a seventy-meter long escape tunnel in the first three months of 1943. Only four of them were able to use it before it was discovered. Ninety men suspected of being involved were apparently shot. At the notorious "hospital" camp in the Podolian town of Slavuta (Großblazarett Slawuta), prisoners at some stage dug a ninety-meter tunnel. The tunnel was completed in six months, but only thirteen prisoners were able to use it.

Quantifying how many Red Army soldiers and officers fell into the hands of the Germans and died as prisoners is barely possible. This applies when one is dealing with the entire "east," and even more for a single section of the eastern European front such as the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Christian Streit have estimated that in the "east" and the Reich combined, at least 3.3 million "Soviet" prisoners of war were shot by Einsatzkommandos or died in German captivity. This would amount to almost sixty percent of those considered to have been in German hands at various stages. One Russian author has recently accepted this mortality figure. Alfred Streim considers the estimate of 3.3 million


201Ibid., p. 116, citing documents in the Zhytomyr oblast archive and in the archive of the Kiev State Historical Museum. The article states merely that the ninety people were "apprehended by Gestapo agents."

202Ibid., p. 117, citing documents in the archive of the Kiev State Historical Museum.


204M. E. Erin, "Sovetskie voennoplyanye v Germanii v gody vtoroi mirovoi voiny," Voprosy istorii, 11–12 (Moscow, 1995), p. 142. Despite its title, Erin's article also deals with the "east." He agrees with Bernd Bonwetsch that figures based on Soviet records are less reliable than those
too high, for it includes those who were reported as having escaped or as having been handed over to the SS. In his view, one cannot assume that they all died. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that no escaped prisoner survived. Streim also excludes from his count those who were executed not as prisoners, but as the so-called "irregulars." Altogether, he arrives at a minimum of 2,545,000 dead.\textsuperscript{205} These are all estimates and the real number is unlikely ever to be known. And all this does not even taken into account those soldiers who were shot while being taken captive, that is, before they were even recorded as being prisoners.\textsuperscript{206} On the other hand, many of the releases were perhaps not officially registered, so that they remained on record as being prisoners.\textsuperscript{207} In any case, the amount of casualties was staggering.

Statistics are least of all available for the very high starvation in the first months of the war. Kitzinger, the Armed Forces commander for the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, estimated in a report to Rosenberg in late 1941 that "every day about 2,500 prisoners" were dying. Mortality peaked most especially during the three winters under Nazi rule. General Mansfeld reported that 134,000 prisoners of war died in the southern rear area (including Ukraine) in February 1942 alone, or 46.4 percent—almost half—of those in the region.\textsuperscript{208}

Leaving aside the issue of numbers, it is clear that the responsibility for the large number of dead lies with the Nazi leadership. Hitler and Himmler did not want to kill all the "Bolshevik" prisoners of war, but, as in the case of city-dwellers, they certainly wanted to reduce their number. For instance, Hitler personally overturned the jail sentence of a major who had murdered four prisoners of war in the "east." The head of the Army Personnel Office who

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\textsuperscript{205} Streim, \textit{Sowjetische Gefangene}, p. 178.

\textsuperscript{206} Streit., \textit{Wehrmacht}, p. 405n45.

\textsuperscript{207} As noted in footnote 177, even released or escaped prisoners who legally lived in villages may show up in village and raion records under the category of "prisoners of war."

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., pp. 130 and 133.
passed on the news noted what the Führer had said in this case: that one could not fault people who realized that the existence of the German people was at stake and who therefore "reject[ed] all principles of humaneness vis-à-vis the Bolshevik enemy of the world." This was in October 1942.209

The issue of the Wehrmacht's responsibility is more complicated, although it may be discussed within a framework which already exists for Holocaust studies. Slightly simplifying matters, one can distinguish an "intentionalist" explanation, which considers ideology (in this case, anti-Slavism) to have been the most important factor, from a "structuralist" explanation, which considers crucial a combination of extreme circumstances and human nature, which inured the perpetrators who were in direct contact with the victims and kept the others from intervening.210 Regarding the German army leadership, I take the "intentionalist" view that was first proposed by Streit.211

In my view, the discussion should focus primarily on the lower ranks. Why was the common German soldier so extremely cruel to the POWs? Was a Nazi frame of mind the cause? As Rosenberg wrote to Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, there were people who said, "The more prisoners that die, the better off we are."212 Streit thinks that the brutality during the transports was mainly caused by army orders. Indeed, even relatively "moderate" orders, which warned against arbitrariness, called for the "harshest means" ("schärfste Mittel").213 But he also notes that when the German leadership decided to use the prisoners as laborers in the Reich (in October 1941), this had no impact on their treatment. Even though the prisoners were

209 Streim, Sowjetische Gefangene, p. 144.


211 Streit found a statement of 28 November 1941 by Alfred Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff (Wehrmachtführungsstab) of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It says that one should "strive to bring back as many as possible" (bestrebt sein, möglichst viele zurückzubringen) "Soviet" POWs. Streit makes the sensible suggestion that this shows that Jodl wanted to decimate them. Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 188.


now supposed to live, they continued to be treated very badly. Repeated official appeals in 1942 to improve their treatment had no effect. As Omer Bartov has argued, not only were members of the Wehrmacht constantly provided with racist justifications for cruelty, but their own actions had brutalized them.

What seems clear is the fallacy of the traditional interpretation, which holds that a certain passive obedience prevailed among the German military and that this was the crucial factor. Although scholars such as Streit and Bartov have challenged this view, some serious scholars still adhere to it, even if in a somewhat modified form. Bernd Bonwetsch has written that despite the shootings, "the real cause for the high mortality among the Soviet prisoners was, however, not to be found in the deeds of the Armed Forces, but in the failure to act [Unterlassung]: the denial of appropriate accommodation and food to the prisoners, especially until the spring of 1942."

Scholars such as Joachim Hoffmann, who do not seriously discuss the fate of the "Soviet" prisoners, do study atrocities committed elsewhere in the "east." Of course these are legitimate subjects for study. While French, British, and American prisoners of war in German hands were almost certain to survive the war, the eastern European theater of war was brutal everywhere and on all sides. On the German-led side, other nationalities may have approached the level of cruelty of the Wehrmacht. We noted the shootings of prisoners by Hungarian

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214Ibid., pp. 161 and 240. By 1 March 1942, 1,202 POWs had officially been sent from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine to the Reich (along with 7,526 civilians). In March 1942, 5,876 POWs were sent (along with 11,394 civilians). "Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, ll. 268–269; "Lagebericht für März 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 319.


216Bonwetsch, "Die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen," p. 138. Alfred Streim wrote in the early 1980s that most German military were passive regarding the "Soviet" prisoners of war, and that the guards had received their military training before or during World War I and had made a vow of obedience. These two factors supposedly "did not allow them to resist openly." Streim, Sowjetische Gefangene, p. 16.

217Of the French POWs in German hands, 14,147, or 1.58 percent, died before 31 January 1945; of the British POWs, 1,851, or 1.14 percent, died before then; and of the American POWs, 136, or 0.3 percent. Only in the last months of the war did mortality among these prisoners increase, but it remained under 4 percent. Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 246.
escorts. The behavior of military units made up of Hungarians, Italians, Romanians, and Slovaks—those most relevant to Ukraine—still must be studied, most especially from sources in the languages of those nationalities.218

Equally horrific must have been the conditions of those Germans shipped eastward in 1941 and 1942 as Soviet-held prisoners of war.219 Their mortality rate remains in doubt, although there is a Russian count of 357,000 dead POWs and 66,000 civilians, that is, about 16 percent of the German captives.220 Deliberate killings of German prisoners by Red Army soldiers were widespread, at least in part because much of Soviet propaganda condoned them. Writers joined in this campaign. Most notorious is Ilia Ehrenburg's leaflet "Kill" of 9 September 1942, which essentially calls for genocide: "The Germans are not human beings.... If there is calm on your section of the front, or if you are waiting before the fighting, kill a German."221 But however horrific and inexcusable, such calls were obviously provoked by the way the Red Army captives were treated and by other Nazi crimes.

An issue which is likely to gain attention in Ukraine is whether the civilian population did "enough" to save the prisoners. The organizer of the Red Cross in Poltava has stated that when she started her work, the population was in the grip of a "bizarre passivity" in the face of the starvation of the prisoners. But then she found many active helpers.222 The same pattern—

218 Almost a third of the "Soviet" POWs held by the Finnish military died in captivity, according to Joachim Hoffmann, Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945, 2nd exp. ed. (Munich, 1995), p. 90.

219 According to one historian, these conditions were even "just as atrocious as those accorded Russian [i.e., "Soviet"] POWs, the death rate in this period possibly being as high as 90 percent." S. P. MacKenzie, "The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II," Journal of Modern History, LXVI, 3 (Chicago, September 1994), p. 511, referring to a study by K. W. Böhme.

220 Bonwetsch, "Die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen," pp. 135–136. Basing himself on German figures, Streit has estimated that at least 35 percent, or over a million, of all German prisoners of war held by the Red Army and/or the Soviet authorities died. Streit, Wehrmacht, p. 246. This estimate is accepted in Streim, Sowjetische Gefangene, p. 178n87 and in Bonwetsch, "Die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen," p. 136.


222 V"iun, Pid znakom Chervonoho Khresta, p. 9.
“Soviet” passivity followed by frantic efforts to save lives—likely prevailed elsewhere. One should not forget that as in the case of helping so-called "saboteurs" or Jews, helping prisoners of war escape, or even failing to report them, carried the death penalty. The threat was frequently announced, such in a June 1942 in a joint announcement by Koch and Kitzinger.223

The extent to which the two political orientations which claimed to represent the population—the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Communist party—were serious about rescuing prisoners awaits serious research. The Mel'nyk faction of the OUN is known to have initiated a letter to Hitler on 14 January 1942, which five prominent Ukrainians signed. It complained cautiously about several issues, including "the non-admittance of the Ukrainians to participation in the armed struggle against their arch enemy." While noting "the magnanimous release of Ukrainians from the prisoner camps," it added that "their return took place under conditions on the way which cost the lives of thousands."224

With regard to the German guards, there is sufficient evidence to argue that the main problem was not that they were passive and obedient. Nor were "material" factors the main cause of the prisoners' suffering and death. Among such factors were: the fact that the prisoners were already hungry when they fell into German hands; the fact that there were so many of them; the fact that road conditions were bad during the winter; and the fact that the winter of 1941–1942 was unusually cold.225 Although important, these factors were not


224Five prominent Ukrainians from five cities signed the letter: OUN-M leader Andrii Mel'nyk (in Berlin); retired General Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko (former army chief under Petliura, and by 1942 leader of the General Council of Ukrainian Combatants, in Prague); Andrii Livyts'kyi (representative of the Ukrainian National Republic, in Warsaw); Mykola Velychkiiv's'kyi (president of the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev); and Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi (president of the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv). The letter contained many "national" complaints, but failed to mention the persecution of non-Ukrainians. A photocopy of the letter, from an unidentified German archive, is in Zenon Horodys'kyi, Ukraїns'ka Natsional'na Rada: istorichni narys (Kiev, 1993), pp. 104–107 (quotations from 105).

225Streit thinks that feeding the POWs captured near Kiev, Viaz'ma, and Briansk would have been very difficult even if the German authorities had wanted to save their lives. Unusual mortality (eine erhöhte Sterblichkeit) was "inevitable." This was so, in his view, not so much because of the large number of prisoners, but because of the bad condition of the roads and the unusually cold winter. Streit, Wehrmacht, pp. 137 and 189.
primary causes. Hoffmann believes that they explain everything. He has written recently that the main cause of the mass starvation in the winter of 1941–1942 was "not so much ill will as the technical inability to adequately feed and house millions of often already totally emaciated prisoners of war." There were supposedly "severe shortages" among the German army, accompanied by an "almost total breakdown of the transport system." In fact, the Ukrainian harvest of 1941 was very good; Germans, allied military, and locals had plenty of food to spare; and the local population eagerly tried to pass it on to the prisoners.

226Hoffmann, Stalins Vernichtungskrieg, p. 89. He provides no sources for this statement. Incredibly, Hoffman even writes that the German army at that time was engaged in a "defensive struggle" (Abwehrkampf). He adds, still without referring to any sources, that the German army command and "many camp commanders" tried to "improve the situation of the prisoners of war and to find certain solutions." They had "only a very limited success," however, because of the difficult circumstances. "In the spring of 1942, however, when the ice melted, many energetic measures were taken to improve the situation of the Soviet prisoners of war." From then on, "sheer survival" in the POW camps in the areas under control of the armed forces and the army supreme command became "soon no longer an issue." Ibid., p. 90. The distortion is complete when the bibliography of this book fails to mention Streit's standard account. Hoffmann is also presumably unaware of Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass," I. 11, which says that the harvest of 1941, under the German authorities, was "gigantic" (riesig).
Nazi racist policies placed three nationalities in a position quite different from that of the Slavs. The nationalities found themselves on opposite extremes of the Nazi racial hierarchy. Two of them, the Jews and Roma (Gypsies), were collectively exterminated. The ethnic Germans, the third group, were treated better than all the others. This chapter will discuss first the Jewish and Romani experience, and then the fate of the ethnic Germans. Its aim is to view events from the perspective of those on the receiving end of Nazi policies. Significant attention will also be devoted to the reactions of the "bystanders."

When Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, its policy vis-à-vis Europe's Jews changed radically. The war was meant to defeat "Bolshevism," which Hitler and his followers equated with "Jewry." From June 1941, the Nazis gained control over hundreds of thousands additional Jews. The so-called "Russian" territories became the scene of fast-paced mass murder by way of shootings and poisonings in gas vans. I will argue that the Holocaust in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, as in the other "Soviet" lands, had two main features. First, the Nazis made no effort to hide the Holocaust, and everybody knew very soon what was happening to the Jews and Roma. Second, the Nazi killers did not depend on a native bureaucracy for the implementation of their plans. Combined with anti-Semitism and the death penalty for obstruction, this fact caused the vast majority of non-Jews and non-Roma to be bystanders at best. The discussion focuses on Dnieper Ukraine. The population of western Volhynia will be discussed as well, but separately. Developments there were somewhat different and most natives there were more than just bystanders.

The term "Holocaust" is a political concept. In present-day usage, in all languages, most people take it to mean what the Library of Congress calls the "Jewish Holocaust." The connotation is that the genocide of the Jews, or Shoáh in Hebrew, was unique—only the Jews were
collectively killed because of their ethnicity. Indeed, Nazi ideology was obsessed with the Jews. In practice, however, Europe's Roma (singular: Rom; adjective: Romani) were also exterminated as a people, even though they received far less attention in Nazi propaganda or even German policy documents. This Potáimós or Great Devouring, as the Roma have called it, was implemented at the same time as the campaign against the Jews. Like the Jews, the Roma were being exterminated up to the last person for racist reasons. Hence, to discuss only the Jewish Holocaust in Ukraine would be a distortion, since the fundamentally similar Romani Holocaust was occurring at the same time.

There is, however, a serious problem—the lack of primary sources. There seems to be no account by a Romani survivor from Ukraine. Meanwhile, accounts by others rarely mention their tragic fate, and if they do so, it is generally in passing. This makes it even more worthwhile to mention those accounts here.

One woman from Kiev saw Roma in the Kaharlyk region, south of Kiev, in the middle of 1942. They were fleeing for their lives. What happened to those captured is shown by a rare account in the memoirs of a Jewish Holocaust survivor about the Lokachi raion. In early 1942, most Jews in this western Volhynian region were still alive and living in ghettos. But the Roma were not secluded like this at all. The Nazis did not bother with such a "transitory" phase. Instead, the 114 Roma were rounded up. They were promised food, land, and shelter, and were told that they would be "settled." On 16 April 1942, they were taken to an open site near a brick factory. The Roma "danced with happiness, singing and playing their violins all through the night, along with their children who were dressed in new clothes." But meanwhile, the Jewish council (Judenrat) of the ghetto of Lokachi was ordered to provide thirty strong men with shovels for the next day. On 17 April, at 5:00 a.m., these men were taken away by the

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2Valentyna Pavlivna Kravchenko (Ukrainian born in 1922 in Kiev), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, Ukraine, tape recording.
local German police officer (Wachtmeister) and ten native policemen. It appears that the author of this memoir was among them.

In the morning when the militia came, all the Gypsies were asleep. They were quickly awakened and asked to line up near the mountain, presumably to be counted. When all of them were standing, the Ukrainian militia's commanding officer ostensibly went to turn the command over to the Wachtmeister, but when he walked far enough away, the shooting by the Wachtmeister and other hidden militia started. The Gypsies could not escape; they were against the wall. Small children trying to get away, hid under their mothers' dresses and this was how they were killed. Babies were shot by the killers, going from crib to crib. Immediately after the slaughter, the militia ransacked the bodies for valuables. We dug large holes, collected the bodies and threw them into a mass grave. Some were still alive.³

Similar open-air massacres of Roma occurred everywhere in east-central Ukraine. The SD did not even bother to mention them in its reports. For example, five Romani families arrived in the Novi Sanzhary raion in the Left Bank at some stage. In December 1942, the Gendarmerie arrested and killed them, twenty-five people altogether, including babies.⁴

The lack of sources about the Roma actually raises new questions. Does it mean that virtually none of the many Roma survived? Might it mean that none of them—unlike in the case of the Jews, as we shall see—were saved by others? Is it a reflection of the illiterate status of most Roma, or the lack of a tradition of written records? These questions cannot be answered here. In any case, it deserves to be repeated that because the fate of the Roma is generally unknown, the following discussion of the Holocaust, like those in other works, is inherently limited.

The literature on Jews is, by contrast, much more developed. That literature is not, however, able to be precise about the number of Jews in prewar Ukraine. According to the unreliable census of 1939, before the annexation of eastern Poland, 1,533,000 Jews were

³Michael Diment, The Lone Survivor: A Diary of the Lukacze Ghetto and Svyniukhy, Ukraine (New York, 1992), pp. 76–78. Diment was born in 1915. He wrote his memoir in Yiddish on the basis of a diary and other information and finished it in 1947. It was translated by Shmuel (Diment) Yahalom.

⁴H. Sova [Hryhorii Kariak], Do istorii bol'shevits'koï diis'nosti: (25 rokiv zhyttia ukrains'koho hromadianyna v SSSR) (Munich, 1955), p. 96.
living in Soviet Ukraine.\(^5\) We do know something about Ukrainian-Jewish relations in pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine. In the countryside, there were both Jews who spoke Ukrainian, and even became peasants, and Jews who did not assimilate linguistically and continued to speak Yiddish. The latter group frequently disdained the peasants, blaming them for the pogroms of the revolutionary period.\(^6\) In the cities, where most Jews lived, many had Ukrainian as their official nationality and called themselves Ukrainians, even though like other city-dwellers they mostly spoke Russian in their daily lives.\(^7\)

In the Soviet Union, anti-Semitism was officially banned. But in the 1930s, the media paid little attention to it, because it was not supposed to exist in a socialist society. Instead, the media emphasized the alleged friendship between all nationalities. Thus, cases of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union were rarely publicized. On the other hand, anti-Semitism in Germany did get attention.\(^8\) Because of its similarity to the derogatory Russian word *zhid* (kike), the traditional Ukrainian word for Jew, *zhyd*, that had no negative connotations, was banned. Public use of either *zhyd* or *zhid* carried a prison term of up to a year.\(^9\) Ukrainian speakers had to use the Russianism *ievrei*. Young Dnieper Ukrainians by and large internalized the taboo, even though they might continue to use the word in private. They were to be shocked by its comeback under the Germans.\(^10\)


During the 1930s, Soviet movie theaters played two films that showed the persecution of Jews in Germany. Immediately after the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, however, these films and any other references in the media to Nazi anti-Semitism were removed.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, as with so many other issues, Jews and other Soviet citizens had to depend on rumors in order to know what was happening in German-held territories. The rumors varied from place to place, but the basic facts do appear to have been transmitted. For example, in the small eastern town of Orikhiv, there was talk in 1940 that the Polish Jews were being exterminated.\textsuperscript{12}

As with the number of Jews in Ukraine, there are only estimates of how many moved eastward to escape the advance of the German army. After the Germans crossed the Soviet border, they initially found most Jews still in place. One scholar has estimated that in those regions east of the pre-1939 border of Soviet Ukraine that saw the change of regimes within the first month or so, two thirds of the Jews originally living there fell under Nazi rule.\textsuperscript{13} The percentage of members of Jewish communities who found themselves under German control decreased in the east, for from those regions, more than half of all Jews managed to flee. Ultimately, among the refugees and evacuees as a whole, Jews were even relatively numerous as compared to their share of Ukraine's total population. This was not due to preferential treatment on the part of the Soviet authorities, but rather because Jews were relatively numerous in the cities and in urban-based offices and factories.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{12}Antonina Khelemendyk-Kokot, \textit{Kolhospne dytynstvo i nimets'ka neuolia: spohady} (Toronto, 1989), p. 123. She also writes that up to the spring of 1941, many Jewish (and also some non-Jewish) teachers migrated eastward because they heard bad news from Jews in Poland. That postal connections between the Soviet Union and the Generalgouvernement remained "fairly regular" is confirmed in Altshuler, "Escape and Evacuation," p. 85.

\textsuperscript{13}Altshuler, "Escape and Evacuation," pp. 97 and 99.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 101. Altshuler adds that Jews were also simply "more mobile than the population at large and more willing to relocate." Nevertheless, he considers the main reason why Jews moved
It should not be overlooked, however, that many Jews did not want to leave and simply stayed behind. One reason could be that they did not want to abandon elderly parents or ill or weak family members. Mordechai Alshuler has noted that "the close family relations for which the Jews were legendary became a trap that prevented the escape of no few young people." Another reason might be attachment to belongings. But perhaps the most important reason for staying, as in the case of non-Jewish natives, was the hope for a better life under the Germans. In this regard, the evidence about Kievan Jews is most persuasive. Among many of these Jews, anti-Communism was widespread. When the German invasion started, the press available in the city stopped the blackout of reporting about Nazi anti-Semitism. But few Jews believed these or other Soviet media reports. One Jewish man managed to pick up German radio broadcasts and warned as many Jews as he could to flee, but he merely obtained the nickname "the panic-monger."

Other Kievan Jews, former artisans and traders, even put a positive spin on what they heard about Nazi Germany. Soviet policies had made them unemployed, and because the Soviet media described Nazism as an extreme form of capitalism, these Jews believed that their living standard would improve or at least remain the same under the Germans. As one Kievan emigré recalls, the Jews said they would not mind wearing a yellow star. In late June 1941, to the east to be the fact that they knew that under the Germans, they would be treated worse than non-Jews.

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15Ibid., p. 91.

16Ibid., p. 90.


19Alshuler, "Escape and Evacuation," p. 90, also finds that such scepticism was "one of the most important reasons" why many Jews did not flee. Disbelief in Soviet reports is also mentioned in Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 141–142, and in F. P. Bogatyrychuk, Moi zhiznennyi put' k Vlasovu i Prazhkomu manifestu (San Francisco, 1978), p. 122.


this witness saw "improvised meetings" at the Podil market of "the little Jewish people." Most participants agreed that they should not leave Kiev and that under the Germans they also would all have a job. The refrain was, 'What's going to happen to the people [s liud'mi] is also going to happen to us.' They also said, 'It can't get worse than this.'" 

A Ukrainian woman who lived in a district (present-day Victory Square) where Jewish (former) artisans lived, remembers that they talked well about the Germans who ruled Kiev in 1918. These Jews all stayed, and some greeted the German soldiers with bread and salt. 

When the Germans and their allies arrived, there were immediately signs of doom for the Jews. As soon as soldiers entered a town, they might shout Juden kaputt! (Down with the Jews!). High taxes, and child-level maximum food rations, were imposed on all Jews. Reichskommissar Koch imposed a special tax on organizations and offices if they employed Jews. Such persecution was facilitated by the old Soviet passport, which had an entry on nationality. Although many Jews officially had Ukrainian nationality, most did not. Thus, the Nazis did not need to create a new bureaucracy to find them.

Within days or at most weeks, the persecution became deadly. The first killings of Jews, carried out mostly by commandos of the Einsatzgruppen, were usually mass shootings with machine-guns in the open air. Less common was poisoning in the mobile gas vans. Thus, in countless towns and villages, thousands upon thousands of Jews died within days. The Holocaust in Ukraine was rather different from the Holocaust in western and central Europe, where Jews were put into ghettos and then shipped away. In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, few ghettos were created. The few that did exist were mainly in western Volhynia,

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22Ibid.

23Kravchenko, author interview.

24This is reported to have been the case with two towns close to each other, Berdychiv and Khmil'nyk. Ilya Ehrenburg and Vasily Grossman, eds., The Black Book: The Ruthless Murder of Jews by German-Fascist Invaders throughout the Temporarily-Occupied Regions of the Soviet Union and in the Death Camps of Poland During the War of 1941–1945 (New York, 1981), pp. 14 and 28.

25Erich Koch, order on taxes, 21 October 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 29, ll. 1–3.
but they did not last long. In the summer of 1942, those ghettos that remained were destroyed as part of what scholars call the "second sweep" against the Jewish population of the "east." At that stage, virtually all the Jews who had survived until then were killed, so that by late 1942, the Jewish Holocaust in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was essentially completed.

If killed by shooting, the Jewish men, women, or children died at the edge or inside their graves, which were little more than large holes in the ground. Often these were anti-tank ditches, but mostly they were pits dug by prisoners of war, by non-Jewish locals, or by the Jews themselves. Actual accounts by survivors of these massacres are very rare, simply because hardly anyone survived. One such account deals with a typical large-scale massacre in the eastern Volhynian village of Pavlovychi (Ovruch). Its author is Evgeniia (Zhenia) Gural'nik, who was born in about 1928 in Novohrad-Volyn's'kyi as Evgeniia Kilikievskaya.26 Gural'nik says initially a relatively small massacre of Jews took place, many of whom were males and Komsomol members. The largest massacre in Pavlovychi occurred much later, on 25 November 1941. At that time, the region also included many Jews from places like Luts'k, Rivne, Berdychiv, and even Warsaw, who, like the local Jews, were put to various forced labor tasks. In early November, all Jews were told to dig a large pit. It was supposedly needed to store beets over the winter and had to be three meters deep, forty meters long, and 2.5 meters wide. Gural'nik's account shows that the Jews were psychologically blocked from fully facing the facts.

Cold weather had arrived. The ground froze, and in the open field a piercing wind was blowing. Next to our field was a Polish cemetery. All through the summer, people had been taken there after round-ups to be shot. 'Somehow I don't like this pit, it's very large, and we never used to store beets in the ground, but in a cellar or barn,' mother said. 'This means no good,' she said while groaning and discarding a shovel of frozen earth with difficulty. This way we dug the pit without interruption for ten days.

Around the 10th of November, the enormous pit was ready. 'Why did they bring this new ladder to the pit, are the beets really not going to be thrown in there? What's the

26[Evgeniia (Zhenia) Gural'nik], "Iama v Pavlovychakh," in David Zil'berman [comp. and ed.], I ty eto videl (New York, 1989), pp. 7–35. Zil'berman recorded, perhaps on tape but probably in writing, the accounts published in this book in Riga in the period 1963–1969, in the first person singular. Although there is some doubt about the extent to which this reproduces the accounts faithfully, the text based on Gural'nik's story does make an authentic impression.
need to walk there! When will be finally carry the beets?" The worried women kept repeating the same questions to the soulless, mustached Ukrainian [policeman] who used to take our group into the field. "When they tell you, you will carry them. For now, do your thing, clean the beets!" With this or that order, he dismissed them. We completed that task as well, but basically there was nothing to do. For several days, we were taken in groups from place to place. Here they found work for us in a barn, there in a storehouse or a cattle yard.27

Then came 25 November. Around 4:00 in the afternoon, the SS arrived, rounded them all up, and transported them to the pit in three cars. "The entire field was cordoned off by SS men and Ukrainian policemen [and] with dogs." Under terrible beatings and kicks, the Jews were forced to undress. If they did not, the dogs were set upon them. Then they were shot, most of them inside the pit. "Before they died, many men cursed the butchers and spat in their faces." Gural'nik managed to evade shooting while in the pit. She pretended to be dead and crawled out in the evening.28

This account is typical in two ways. Not surprisingly, the Jews were unable to realize what awaited them. Second, the local politsai (native Gendarmerie) were present at the shootings.29 One of the reasons for the latter practice was that the SS, for reasons that are still unclear, wanted them to share responsibility. For that same reason, the native policemen were involved in the arrests of Jews and the cordonning off of ghettos.30 In the town of Radomyshl', Einsatzkommando 4a shot the adult Jews on 6 September 1941, and even

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27Ibid., pp. 11–12.

28Ibid., pp. 12–14. I do not consider it necessary to reproduce the graphic details of the massacre. In "Soviet" regions it was apparently not uncommon for victims to refer to revenge by Stalin just before they were shot. See Ehrenburg and Grossman, Black Book, pp. 27, 30, and 37–38, on four localities in Podolia.

29Einsatzkommando 6 reported that it ensured as a matter of policy "the presence of militia men (Ukr. order service) at executions of Jews." Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 81 (12 September 1941), p. 13.

30For example, in Rivne in the evening of 8 July 1941, German soldiers and Ukrainian policemen entered several Jewish homes and took out the men, who were then killed on the city outskirts. One year later, on 13 July 1942, local policemen helped SS men surround the ghetto and take away the Jews toward the killing site. Barbara Baratz, Flucht vor dem Schicksal: Holocaust-Erinnerungen aus der Ukraine 1941–1944 (Darmstadt, 1984), pp. 49–50 and 90–91.
ordered the Ukrainian policemen to shoot the children. Whether this case was exceptional is not known.

In several places, native policemen are known to have actually initiated the persecution of the Jews. In Uman', on 21 September 1941, "members of the militia with the participation of many German members of the Wehrmacht" perpetrated "excesses" (Ausschreitungen) against Jews. In Polissia and northern Volhynia, similar pogroms were very likely perpetrated by the Polissian Sich, a partisan force of Ukrainians which until November 1941 had legal status as a policing unit. Roaming the terrain from its base in Olevs'k, the Sich caught and shot Soviet partisans and very likely Jews, or at the very least handed them over to the German authorities. This seems to be confirmed by a fifteen-year old Sich member, who was interviewed for a newspaper at the time. The boy, said to have "evil eyes," was asked whether he was not afraid to be with the Sich "insurgents." His response: "I did everything they asked. I went everywhere, rode everywhere, fought, and shot Jews who had treated me badly before."33

The municipalities and their mayors initially paid the salary of the native police, sometimes from money obtained from Jews. It seems that many of them were dismayed that


33In the original: "Ia spovniav vs'o, shcho trebuvaly, — vsiudy khodyv i izdyv i byvsia i zhyduf [sic] striliav, kotoryi z mene znushchalys' kolyv.". "Intervy'iu z 'Mizhkoiu'. Piatnadtsiatylitnim povstantsem z Polis'koï Sichi, "Volyn', 21 September 1941, p. 3. The article includes a picture of Sich commander Taras Borovets' (pseudonym: Otaman Taras Bul'ba) and his staff at a gate which had the text, "Freedom for Ukraine! Death to Moscow. Long Live the German Army!" and which carries a trident and a swastika. Cf. John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd ed. (Englewood, Colorado, 1990), p. 71, which says merely that the Sich "cleared" the area of "Communist supporters." The German military also called Borovets' the "Head of the District [Okruzhna] Militia in Sarny." See also note 89.

in this way they helped fund the killings. Hence, when militia men robbed Jewish homes in the western Volhynian town of Horokhiv in July 1941, it caused, according to a Jewish survivor, "an outcry by the local Ukrainian leadership." But there was little local leaders could do about the actions of the native police. Moreover, they themselves were often forcibly involved in measures affecting Jews. For example, a mayor might be ordered by SS men to have pits dug by locals.

In the major cities, massacres similar to the one in Kiev's Babyn Iar took place, with the difference that first the Jews were publicly humiliated. The case of Dnipropetrovsk can serve as an example. German soldiers entered the city on 25 August 1941. Immediately, all Jews were ordered at the threat of death to don a white armband with a star, and to pay the city Kommandant 30 million roubles. Public humiliation also included being forced to pull carts or to lick soup from a trough. Then all Jews were ordered to show up at the large "Lux" department store on Marx Street on 13 October. That morning it was snowing and raining. Dnipropetrovsk had a large Jewish population and thousands, mostly elderly people or women with children, showed up or were arrested and taken to the store. There the three-day food supply and any belongings which the Jews had been told to bring were confiscated. Then they were lined up in columns of six people abreast and marched to the Jewish cemetery. One woman who later escaped, Mrs. B. Ia. Tartakovskaia, testified three years later that they heard shooting from the anti-tank ditches. That was when they realized that they were going to be killed. Many Jews who tried to escape at this stage were "shot in the attempt," according to a man who actually got away.

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35Diment, Lone Survivor, p. 19.
36Ibid., p. 112, regarding the western Volhynian town of Lokachi on 1 September 1942.
38Ibid., p. 62.
39Ibid., pp. 64-65 and 67.
40Ibid., p. 60.
very likely—non-Jewish spouses and children of intermarriages died.\textsuperscript{41} By the time it got dark on the first day, thousands had not yet been shot. They were, according to Mrs. Tartakovskaia, "driven up against a fence and surrounded on all sides." She describes what happened next, including her unusual escape.

It was cold, and the people were standing shoulder to shoulder in the icy mud. The sick and dying were simply lying in the mud. My youngest boy sat on my back, and the older boy (he was two) stood, leaning his face against my knees. In this fashion we spent the long autumn night.

When dawn broke, German soldiers appeared on the lot with cases of bullets. They showed us these cases and guffawed. Then they started forcing us toward the pits at the end of the lot. The crowd lurched to one side, the sick fell under the feet of horror-crazed people, and everywhere screams, shots, and the cries of children could be heard. The Germans dragged old people who had been crushed by the crowd to the pits and buried them together with those who had been shot.

I fell to my knees, embraced my two children, and it seemed to me that I was losing my mind. At that moment a man came up to me and said he would take me and the children out of the crowd. I still do not understand how he managed that, but in a few minutes we found ourselves with him next to a road which ran past the cemetery. We saw a cart being driven by a young peasant. We did not ask him for anything, but he himself stopped and offered to take me and the children to town. I said goodbye to my savior, and we left.\textsuperscript{42}

In early December, another order went out to the Jews of Dnipropetrovsk'. About 150 apparently showed up and were killed.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., pp. 64–65. The Jews were shot not by an \textit{Einsatzgruppe}, but by the police chief for Ukraine, Friedrich Jeckeln, and his men. The number ten thousand appears in \textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 135 (19 November 1941), p. 23, cited in Hilberg, \textit{Destruction}, Vol. 1, p. 298, and also in "Teilbericht Politik über die Bereisung des Reichskommissariats mit Prof. v. Grünberg in der Zeit vom 13.8. bis 3.9.1942," Rivne, 10 September 1942, TsDAOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26 L. 34. The last document states that one thousand other Jews "are still working in the city under strict surveillance." According to Hilberg, \textit{Destruction}, Vol. 1, pp. 295 and 372 (citing the the SD and a German newspaper from Cracow), the city had 30,000 Jews when the German army arrived, but this figure appears too high. Cf. Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, \textit{My Private War}, p. 218, which speaks incorrectly of about 35,000 victims.


\textsuperscript{43}Savchenko, VRIO NKVD USSR to N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvedvodka no. 33/68 o polozhenii v okkupirovannom protivnikom g. Dnipropetrovskie. Po sostoianiu na 20. 10. 42g.," 21 October 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 1 24, ll. 71–72. This report, based on statements by locals, also says that the children were poisoned, but this is not confirmed to have happened here or anywhere else in Ukraine. (Except for the employment of gas vans, which are not meant here.)
In other places in the Reichskommissariat, some ghettos were created. Koch ordered their creation in cities where Jews made up a large percentage of the population. They were ruled by a Jewish Council (Judenrat) and, if considered needed by the German authorities, by an Order Service (Ordnungsdienst), that is, a Jewish police.\(^{44}\) The ghettos were short-lived, however, existing at the latest until the fall of 1942.\(^{45}\) The following discussion of the ghettos is based on sources regarding western Volhynia. Whether the observations about them are correct for "Soviet" ghettos remains unclear at the present state of knowledge.\(^{46}\)

The Jewish councils in western Volhynia made appeals to the authorities or complied with their demands. In general, they did not resist in the usual sense of the word. In that sense, Ukraine's ghettos conformed to the general pattern in Nazi-ruled Europe. As the historian Raul Hilberg has put it, the Jews in the ghettos "hoped that somehow the German drive would spend itself. This hope was founded in a 2,000-year-old experience. In exile the Jews had always been a minority, always in danger, but they had learned that they could avert or survive destruction by placating and appeasing their enemies."\(^ {47}\) But still the Judenrat was far from uncontroversial. Corruption and favoritism appeared and caused major disagreements within the ghettos.\(^ {48}\) Moreover, every ghetto seems to have included a minority, or even majority, of

\(^{44}\) Koch in person to the Generalkommissare, "Hauptkommissare," and Gebietskommissare of "Generalkommissariat Podolien und Wolhynien," Königsberg, 5 September 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 69, l. 5v. He added ominously, "In places with less than 200 Jews no ghetto is to be constructed. The location [Verbleib] of these few Jews will be decided." An extensive discussion of ghetto life in western Volhynia is provided in Shmuel Spector, The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 1941-1944 (Jerusalem, 1990), pp. 116-187.


\(^{46}\) In Khmel'nits'kyi in late 1941, five Jewish teenagers wanted to avenge the local massacre of Jews and prepared a bomb in their home to assassinate the Gebietskommissar. A Ukrainian woman betrayed them. On 29 November 1941, they were court-marshaled by a German police court and shot. "Lagebericht" for November 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, II. 210-211.

\(^{47}\) Hilberg, Destruction, Vol. 3, p. 1038.

\(^{48}\) This was the case, for example, in Rivne and Lokachi. Diment, Lone Survivor, p. 80 reports that "favoritism and not fairness was the determining factor." The evidence about Lokachi raises doubt about Spector's statement that "in smaller localities, when workers were needed to be dispatched to remote places of work, the lists were drawn up thoughtfully and with the greatest possible consideration by the whole staff of the Judenrat." Spector, Holocaust, p. 159.
Jews who insisted that open resistance was needed. In several ghettos (Dubrovytsia, Sarny, Sosnove, and Volodymyrets'), people are known to have planned resistance, only to be forced to stop by the Jewish Council. In the Dubrovytsia ghetto, young people who worked outside during the day wanted to disarm their guards and flee. The council warned them that unless they abandoned this plan, it would have them sent to a camp. Likewise, plans for armed resistance in Kovel' and Dubno came to naught.49

The Order Service consisted of young Jewish men who were accompanied by Jewish so-called "strongmen" (Yiddish: voile yungen). They tended to use force to fulfill the Nazi demands for money, taxes in kind, and laborers. They even tended to round up more laborers than the authorities demanded. Not surprisingly, these policemen and "strongmen" were hated.50 Mechel (Michael) Diment's memoirs about Lokachi provide vivid examples of the violence of the Order Service and its strongmen. When the German authorities demanded laborers, the Judenrat of this ghetto compiled a list. When nobody showed up,

The Jewish militia, holding sticks, accompanied by their Ukrainian equivalents, went looking for the people. Walking between the homes, the Jewish militiamen would point out a person to the Ukrainians, who seized him. Those who refused to go were beaten. Many hid in various places, but the Jewish militia, who knew all of those hiding spots, found them and turned them over to the Ukrainians. Loud name-calling and cursing was heard everywhere. In some cases where they could not find the one they were after, they would take anyone in the home they could, like a brother or sister.51

When a German demand for furniture in May 1942 was not fully met, the Jewish militia and fifteen other men "seized a wagon from a peasant" and proceeded to loot. Thus two of these men earned the nickname "Gestapo agent."52 During the grain confiscation campaign of July 1942 in the entire Reichskommissariat, the Gebietskommissar demanded seven tons (!) of

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50Ibid., pp. 165 and 167.

51Diment, Lone Survivor, p. 80.

52Ibid., p. 85.
grain from the ghetto. The Jewish police performed another violent search and collected some 1.8 tons. Of this, the council reported only 1.6, but that was no consolation to those who lost their grain:

At dawn [on 3 July] the [Jewish] militia and the thugs divided into two groups and entered the synagogue. They were followed by a number of people. Upsetting anything that got in their way, they were obviously looking for something. They found the small 'mills,' broke them and seized all of the grain they could find. This action was repeated in every house in the ghetto. The screaming all through the area was loud, 'Why are you taking the bread away from us?' In the homes that were not yet searched, people hid everything. The militia continued on their rampage, disregarding the crying and screaming. They showed no mercy. Everything was taken. Every home suffered through the search. It was impossible to hide anything from the Jewish militia; they knew all the possible places and they knew how to search.53

In general, on the very eve of ghetto liquidations open resistance of the Jews came about. In western Volhynia, this resistance is known to have taken the form of uprisings in Kremenets', Tuchyn, and Mizoch (in August, September, and October 1942, respectively). The ghetto of the small town of Tuchyn did not include all local Jews. When all of them were ordered to move into the ghetto in September 1942, its council planned resistance with a group of young men and women. Several rifles and grenades were somehow obtained, and even twenty-five guns. On 22 September, German and native policemen surrounded the ghetto. In the early hours of the 24th, shots were exchanged, and an agreed sign went out. The ghetto was set on fire. About two thirds of the inhabitants, some two thousand people, escaped into the woods. Council chairman Getzel Schwarzman remained and gave himself up on the third day of the rebellion, while taking full responsibility.54

Aside from the ghettos, individual and collective acts of resistance took place elsewhere. When the Gebietskommissar visited Liubeshiv (near Kamin'-Kashyrs'kyi) and

53Ibid., pp. 96–97. Still another example, from January 1942 regarding a head tax, is in ibid., p. 65.

54Spector, Holocaust, pp. 214–217. This reference is part of an entire chapter devoted to rescue and resistance during the ghetto liquidations in western Volhynia. The uprising in Kremenets' is also mentioned in Panas Khurtoynska [Mykhailo Podvorniak], Pid nebom Volyni: (voienni spomyny khrystyiany) (Winnipeg, 1952), pp. 117–118.
told the Jews in their synagogue that they would all be killed, a dentist attacked him with a razor blade and badly wounded his throat.\textsuperscript{55} A camp in Sarny at some time in mid-1942 held about fourteen thousand Jews and a hundred Roma. When shootings started in the camp, Jews who had earlier bribed a German guard removed the fence, while Roma set fire to the shacks. About a thousand inmates managed to escape from the camp.\textsuperscript{56}

In Dnieper Ukraine, a number of Jews fled before they could even be registered as Jews. Some Kievan Jews with non-Jewish names did not go to Babyn Yar and traveled around the countryside as late as 1942.\textsuperscript{57} Some Jews fled westward during the recruitment for work in Germany. Kiev's Stadtkommissar found out and ordered the city administration to report any Jewish families from which members had gone to Germany, ostensibly to cut off the financial aid which the relatives of "eastern workers" received. The Department of Social Aid is known to have supplied the names of two families.\textsuperscript{58}

In this connection, it is worth adding that later, in 1943, a number of Jews actually arrived from the west in the Reichskommissariat. These were refugees from the Generalgouvernement who had assumed a Polish identity. The men worked at firms or at construction sites of the German army or air force. For instance, in Dnipropetrov'sk, they worked at the Kuzyk firm under a (Polish) boss who realized they were Jews, but treated them well.\textsuperscript{59} Other small groups that arrived included women, who were escorted to


\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., p. 195. The guards were German and native policemen and members of Organisation Todt.

\textsuperscript{57}Pihido-Pravoberezhniyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 109 (not based on personal observations).

\textsuperscript{58}Two letters, one in German, one in Ukrainian, from I. A. Nenadkevych, head of the Department of Social Aid, to the Stadtkommissar, 4 August 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 9, ll. 76-77. Only the Ukrainian version contains the phrase "in accordance with your verbal order." On 10 April, Zinaida Sydorenko had left (her father, called Meierovych, was Jewish). On 20 April, Oleksandra Borysivna Voľfson had left (her mother was Jewish). On 7 May, Iakiv Solonominova Vernik (b. 1927) had left, and on 15 May Raïsa Solomonivna Vernik (b. 1925). The latter two had a Jewish father and had lived with their Ukrainian mother after a divorce in 1929. This source deals only with one Department, but it may be assumed that others received similar orders.

\textsuperscript{59}Amnon Ajzensztadt, \textit{Endurance: Chronicles of Jewish Resistance} (Oakville, New York, and
Dnipropetrovs'k or Kiev by ten to fifteen Jewish men who wore uniforms and carried forged papers, stating they were employees returning to Ukraine from a holiday. A number of these Galician Jews managed to escape to Romania where they survived the war.

One more question needs to be addressed. What did the Jews think about the non-Jewish bystanders? Or did they even think about them? This question cannot be fully answered here. In many places, the issue was moot because the massacres started so soon. But where ghettos did exist, the Jews lived longer and therefore remained in contact with the surrounding, usually Ukrainian, population. Peasants submitted tasks to craftsmen in exchange for an illegal payment, usually in kind. They also passed on letters from Jews elsewhere.

Mechel Diment's memoirs suggest that many Jews in western Volhynia tended to condemn "the" Ukrainians as a whole for not helping them. Some even blamed them for their predicament. When Jews were arrested in the village of Pryvitne, then called Svyniukhy, in August 1941, a Jewish man blamed "the Ukrainians." When the Star of David arm patch was replaced by two yellow round labels, Diment believed that this had been "decided" by "the Ukrainians, with the approval of the Germans." Later the inmates of the Lokachi ghetto received a letter from other ghetto Jews which urged them to flee. Most Jews eventually agreed that this was the best option, but others wanted to stay in the ghetto and resist from there. One man used the argument that "the villages are the prime source of anti-Semitism." The issue of

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London, 1987), pp. 52–53, 65–66, 98–99, and passim. This author estimates that there were about two hundred Jews who wore Wehrmacht uniforms. Ibid., p. 58.

60Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, My Private War, pp. 243, 271, 275, 278, 288, and passim.

61There were also local Jews who fled to Romania with the help of non-Jews. For example, Hryhorii Zabashtans'kyi of Braïlov helped Fira Kaplun (born as Kohan), her family, and other Jewish families cross the border into Transnistria. Iakiv Suslens'kyi, Spravzhni heroi: pro uchast' hromadian Ukrayni u riatuvanni ievreiv vid fashysts'koho henotsydu (Kiev, 1993), p. 131.

62Diment, Lone Survivor, pp. 36 and 98.

63Ibid., pp. 83 and 107.

64Ibid., p. 26.

65Ibid., p. 33.

66Ibid., p. 114.
flight or resistance from inside was still debated on 4 September 1942. There were those who claimed that there was nowhere to go, because

'There is no one to help us. The fates are against us. The possibility of succeeding and surviving is highly unlikely. The Ukrainians are collaborators and they are largely responsible for our ominous predicament. No one would risk his or her life to help save a Jew.' Many did not want to lie around in the forest hungry, dirty and diseased. 'The Ukrainians will make sure that no Jew survives; otherwise, they would be witnesses to the barbarism of the Ukrainians.' The arguments were repeated over and over again, mostly by Moshe Pechornik. Someone asked him, 'So, why did your children escape last week?' He immediately regretted his statements and declared, 'I am not stopping anyone. You are free to go, as my children did.'

The man was wrong about the issue of responsibility and was too pessimistic. Many Ukrainians in western Volhynia indeed denounced Jews, but, as shown below, a small number tried to save them. In this context, it is important to look systematically at the attitudes and reactions of the non-Jewish population regarding the fate of the Jews, both in Dnieper Ukraine and in western Volhynia.

Anti-Semitic sentiments are known to have existed and to have been expressed in Soviet Ukraine during the 1920s and mid-1930s, in particular in connection with the collectivization of agriculture. It appears that many non-Jews resented the presence of Jews, because of their higher level of education, in positions of authority and prestige. Jews, like Russians, were relatively numerous there. For example, around 1940, about 13.4 percent of the CP(b)U members officially had Jewish nationality, whereas the official Jewish percentage of the entire population of pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine was 4.9. Consequently, many Ukrainians and other

67Ibid., p. 123. "Most people," Diment adds, "were of the opinion that escaping was preferable and that fighting without arms would be fatal." Ibid., p. 122.


69Ibid., pp. 230, 333, 335–336, and 358.
non-Jews assumed that the Jews had some kind of special relationship with the authorities. It is not surprising, therefore, that the term "Jew-Bolshevism," which Nazi propaganda introduced, found fertile ground. To older people, it was actually not the first time they heard the term, for it had come about in the region itself, in the revolutionary period and struggle for independence, both before and during pogroms. Some anti-Semites even spoke simply of "the kike regime." Once the new authorities were in place, many people who asked for favors used such terms.

Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda repeated over and over in movies, periodicals, and especially posters essentially one theme: "there is no place for Jews among us! Down with the Jews!" (Het' zhydiv!). The propaganda could be strikingly explicit. At some stage, probably in late 1941, the brochure entitled, "Ukraine in Jewish Talons," arrived from Berlin. One passage read:

The Ukrainian people did not always allow the Jews to send it to the slaughter without punishment. The history of Ukraine knows many eruptions of national and social anger against the Jews, the allies of Moscow and Warsaw. The Zaporozhians, the Haidamaks, the Ukrainian army of the recent past—all duly punished Jewry for its high-handedness in Ukraine. This struggle is still not over. In due time, the Ukrainian people will stand before the Jews with a very large bill for everything. And this bill they will have to pay in full.

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71 Vetter, Antisemiten, p. 60.
72 Pavel Negretov, Vse dorogi vedat na Vorkutu (Benson, Vermont, 1985), p. 27. He passed through villages near Kirovohrad and heard people speak of the end of "zhidovskaia vlast'." It is possible that these peasants actually spoke Ukrainian and said "zhydivs'ka vlada," i.e., "Jewish rule" or "the Jewish regime."
73 Some examples are: a letter by parishioners in Kiev's Priorka district to the Church Council in Kiev, 1941, DAKO, f. r-2412, op. 2, d. 199, l. 103 ("bil'shovys'tko-zhydivs'ka vlada"); a letter by parishioners in Polis'ke to the raion chief, 4 April 1942, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 21, l. 115 ("zhydo-komunists"); and letters to the authorities of the Bohuslav raion, early 1942, DAKO, f. r-2107, op. 1, d. 131, l. 26 ("zhydivs'ko-bol'shovys'tka vlast"); ibid., l. 27 ("zhydivs'ka vlada, "doma partiitsi ta inshi zhydivs'ki prybychnyky"); ibid., d. 130, l. 5 ("zhydivs'ka vlada"); ibid., l. 130 ("zhydo-bol'shevyts'ka vlada").
74 Scholarly Reference Library, collection "Afishta ta plakaty okupatsiino periodu," items 241sp through 243sp. Some of the other slogans were "Great Britain—it's Israel" and "The Jew is your eternal enemy! Stalin and the Jews are a gang of criminals!" Ibid., items 85sp and 231sp through 232sp.
The indictment will be long. The sentence will be short.\textsuperscript{75}

It is hard to establish what impact such propaganda had. Most difficult to answer is the question to what extent the propaganda caused non-Jews to react in certain ways to what was happening to the Jews. At the present state of knowledge, there is no answer.

Contemporary German sources provide some information about the extent and nature of anti-Semitism among the non-Jewish population. This is especially the case with the reports of those who directly implemented the Holocaust, the \textit{Einsatzgruppen} or SD. (German army records contain very few references to the issue.\textsuperscript{76}) The SD reports for the first few months suggest that most non-Jewish natives expressed anti-Semitic views, but that they did not want the Jews killed. In July 1941, Einsatzgruppe C found in the Zhytomyr region that "the population, besides a small number of exceptions, is consciously anti-Semitic [\textit{bewusst antisemitisch eingestellt}]."\textsuperscript{77} Several weeks later, it reported that anti-Semitic sentiments were actually more intense near the Dnieper bend than in the Zhytomyr and Berdychiv regions. Near the Dnieper, it said, discussion of the "Jewish question" was "always gratefully received by the population."\textsuperscript{78}

But one month later, this same \textit{Einsatzgruppe} was less sure about anti-Semitism among the locals. When surveying the Kiev, Poltava, and Dnipropetrovs'k regions, it noted that "Jewry is rejected by the Ukrainian along with Communism, since the Jews were predominant

\textsuperscript{75}\textit{Ukraïna v zhydivs'kykh labetakh}, TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 2, d. 74, ll. 1–12v (quotation from 12, emphasis in the original). The brochure does not indicate an author, year, or place of publication. It merely says, "B6/Die Ukraine in den Krallen der Juden/ukr. (11)." Since it was sold by the Ostministerium (according to TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 68, l. 9), it was probably published in Berlin.

The anti-Semitic propaganda continued after most Jews had been exterminated. Just two examples are Neofim Kybaliuk, "Zhydivstvo," \textit{Ukrains'kyi holos} (Khmel'nys'kyi), 13 December 1942, pp. 3–4, by Volyn"s correspondent on educational affairs, and \textit{Shkoliar}, 2 (Vasyl'kiv, November 1942), p. 1, which contains a "liberation song" by M. Sytnyk.

\textsuperscript{76}Truman Oliver Anderson III, "The Conduct of Reprisals by the German Army of Occupation in the Southern USSR, 1941–1943" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1995), p. 231.

\textsuperscript{77}\textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 37 (29 July 1941), p. 6.

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., 81 (12 September 1941), p. 13 ("...dass die Judenfrage stets dankbar von der Bevölkerung aufgenommen wird.")
among the CP officials. The Ukrainians could see for themselves that the Jews were virtually the only ones who enjoyed the benefits of the membership of the CP and particularly of the leading positions. A pronounced anti-Semitism on racial and ideological grounds is foreign to the population, however. To persecute Jews using the Ukrainian population is not feasible, because the leaders and the spiritual drive are lacking; all still remember the harsh penalties which Bolshevism imposed on everyone who proceeded against the Jews."79 In particular, Einsatzgruppe C reported that "the careful efforts once undertaken to bring about Jewish pogroms unfortunately have not produced the hoped-for success."80

German reports are particularly ambiguous about the opinion of the non-Jews regarding the massacres of Jews. In September 1941, Einsatzgruppe C repeated its earlier observation that "almost nowhere could the population be moved to take active steps against the Jews."81 But it also reported that the massacres of Jews were "understood and considered positively everywhere."82 Regarding Kievan, it spoke of "conversations of the population" full of "hostility against Communists and Jews,"83 but it also complained that "the Ukrainian" had "no real position on the Jewish question. He views the Jewish question as only a religious conflict and not a racial problem."84

An unnamed Nazi traveled through various places at the height of the "second sweep" of Jews in 1942. His report, based on conversations with civilian German officials, is

79Ibid., 112 (13 October 1941), pp. 2–3.

80Ibid., 47 (9 August 1941), p. 10. The report continues: "Only in Ternopil' and Khorostkiv [that is, in eastern Galicia] has it been possible to remove [zur Erledigung bringen] this way 600 and 110 Jews, respectively."

81Ibid., 81 (12 September 1941), pp. 13–14. This report, like the one mentioned in the preceding note, ascribes the virtual absence of pogroms to "the fact that the Ukrainian population is still too shy because of the Jews' earlier position of power," and supposedly felt an intense fear for a return of the Soviet authorities.

82Ibid., p. 21 ("Exekutionen an Juden werden überall verstanden und positiv beurteilt"). Similar in ibid., 125 (26 October 1941), p. 5.

83Ibid., 135 (19 November 1941), p. 17.

84Ibid., 142 (5 December 1941), p. 3. In early 1942, the SD's wishful thinking reappeared, as Einsatzgruppe C wrote in Kiev that "the treatment of the Jews is followed with understanding [mit Verständnis]." Ibid., 177 (6 March 1942), p. 2.
inaccurate in many unrelated respects. Thus, one should also be skeptical of his claims regarding the Jewish Holocaust—that in Berdychiv "the evacuation [i.e., murder] of all Jews has been received by the population with satisfaction"; that in Vinnytsia "the evacuation of the Jews is greeted enthusiastically by the population"; and that the population of the Oleksandrivka district "considers the evacuation of the Jews to be a generally justified measure."85

A potentially major source for popular perceptions might have been the letters which people sent to their relatives working in Germany. Unfortunately, these letters have not been preserved. There are only two censor's reports based on letters which were checked from 11 August to 10 November 1942. These reports contain several, supposedly representative, quotes from letters. But these quotes tell us little: "The Jews are terribly persecuted. In Kremenets' the Jews have been beaten already for the third day"; "One day, 500 Jews were killed. On 8 August, the Jews were rounded up from all the villages. Soon it will be the end of the Jews"; "About 3,000 Jews were killed."86 Similarly, from the second report: "No Jew is still alive here. The old, the young, the children, the doctors—up to the last they have been

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85"Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, ll. 27–42. The full title of this source is in note 41. This source has one author (see l. 28: "Ich"), but it is unclear who of the participants mentioned on the first page this is—Professor von Grünberg (RKU Department III g), Dr Bureau (III g), Sonderführer Grosser (Rül In), Dr Blume (DNB), or Meinke (II a). The statement regarding Berdychiv is based on a conversation with the unnamed Gebietskommissar. The one regarding Vinnytsia is based on "discussions with Stadtkommissar Margenfeld, Gebietskommissar Halle, and the Church Referent Nachwuchsführer Höhn." The one regarding Oleksandrivka derived from a "discussion with Gebietskommissar Lange and the Gebietslandwirt." The sections dealing with other places do not mention an alleged popular opinion regarding the Jewish Holocaust.

Similarly unreliable is a report based on about 45 recorded statements from Ukrainians sent to Ukraine as "holiday-holding" propagandists: Der Sonderbeauftragte f. d. Arbeitskräfte aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, Berlin, 30 November 1943, TsDAOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, ll. 46–57, which has a section called "Jewish Question." For one, it is unclear whose opinion, and from where, is being reproduced. The author describes the document as "vertrauliche Aussagen von in ihre Heimat auf Urlaub entsandter ukranischer Propagandisten. Auswertung von ca. 45 protokollarisch gefasster Aussagen über Tätigkeit, Eindrücke und Erfahrungen derselben." An example of its content is the following, seemingly contradictory statement about Podolia: "In the region [an] anti-Semitic attitude of the population [is] particularly strong [besonders stark ausgeprägt]. Constant expression [by the propagandists?] of the wish for a significantly stronger propaganda against Jewry" (l. 50).

86Auslandsbriefprüfstelle, "Stimmungsbericht" about letters from Ukraine to Germany checked between 11 August and 10 September 1942, Berlin, 11 September 1942, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frames E292555 (compiler's comments) and E292557.
exterminated"; "And we are doing very well now, for there are no more Jews." The
first
report comments that "several letter-writers express their compassion with the fate of the
Jewish population in the Ukraine." The second report states that "the total extermination of the
Jews is reported from a large number of cities and villages. Almost always this is done without
an opinion. Only in a few cases do the writers express their satisfaction about it."

In a real sense, one has to wonder how important any anti- (or philo-)Semitic
sentiments could be in shaping people's behavior. After all, the Holocaust occurred in people's
home region, and in a situation of all-out terror. The case of Polissia may illustrate this. In this
region alone, 10,844 people were killed in little more than two weeks (27 July to 11 August
1941). The victims, identified in the SS murderers' report as "plunderers and soldiers in
civilian clothes," were mostly Jewish men, women, and children. During its rampage, the SS
brigade reported that the non-Jewish population "generally spoke well of the Jewish part of the
population." But the author added that "all the same, it actively aided with driving the Jews
together." "Ukrainian priests were very helpful and placed themselves at the disposal of every
action." Fear for one's own life was probably the major motivation for such behavior, and
not anti-Semitism. Another SS brigade in the region reported, in September 1941, that "the
Ukrainian population showed itself generally helpful as before regarding the tracing of
partisans. As before, one finds a great fear."

87Auslandbriefprüfstelle, "Stimmungsbericht" about 624 letters and postcards, the vast majority
sent from Ukraine to the Reich, checked between 11 September and 10 November 1942, Berlin,
11 November 1942, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frames E292549/13 (compiler's
comments) and E292549/17. The compiler's comments—not the quotes from the letters—have
been published in Norbert Müller [et al.], eds., Die fachistische Okkupationspolitik in den

88Fritz Baade et. al., comps., Unsere Ehre heisst Treue: Kriegstagebuch des Kommandostabes
Reichsführer SS. Tätigkeitsberichte der 1. und 2. SS-Inf.-Brigade und von Sonderkommandos der
SS (Vienna, Frankfurt, and Zurich, 1965), p. 220; also in Müller, Die fachistische
Okkupationspolitik, p. 185. The figure and the dates come from Baade, Unsere Ehre, pp. 219–
220 and 227–228.

89It added that "Jews are also arrested by the Ukrainian militia and handed over to the German
military sections." This was in mid-September 1941 in the region between Ovruch and Polis'ke.
Baade, Unsere Ehre, pp. 145–146.
As in the case of prisoners of war, Jewish civilians were marched through cities before they were shot. This was meant to make the non-Jewish population more anti-Semitic and to make it an accomplice in what was about to happen.\textsuperscript{90} To generalize about the onlookers is hazardous. The reader will recall from chapter 1 that in Kiev a significant number of onlookers were hostile and glad about what was happening to Jews. Once the non-Jews realized, however, that something more than "mere" deportation was taking place, many were horrified. There is an account of the marching of Jews through the city of Zhytomyr after a first round of mass shootings. An eyewitness, Halyna Lashchenko, writes about it:

\begin{quote}
The remaining Jews who had now been caught walked in a crowd, in silence, and looked forward with unmoving eyes. They knew that they were being taken to their death. Did they still have some hope? German SS men chased them with bayonets. Alongside this funeral procession ran, like little devils, ragged street boys. The people in the street looked in silence at that scene, full of apocalyptic horror. One could only hear the heavy steps of the German soldiers and some mixed walking of feet of the unhappy victims.\textsuperscript{91}
\end{quote}

In Berdychiv, on 15 September 1941, thousands of Jews were walked to their deaths, after hundreds of others had already been shot. Some called out for help. Some witnesses who spoke about it several years later turned pale and cried.\textsuperscript{92} But at every death march, even after initial shootings, there seem to have been also looters and other mean-spirited onlookers. This was certainly the case with this death march in Berdychiv. Some locals "walked past the guards and took scarves and knitted woolen sweaters."\textsuperscript{93} A particularly disturbing testimony exists about onlookers in Pavlovychi, the village in eastern Volhynia where Evgeniia Gural'nik escaped. After the initial shootings (but still before the November 1941 massacre), SS men

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{90}The practice is mentioned for Einsatzkommando 6 in \textit{Ereignismeldung UdSSR}, 81 (12 September 1941), p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{91}Halyna Lashchenko, "Povorot," \textit{Samostiina Ukraina}, X, 11 (107) (New York, November 1957), pp. 21-22.
\item \textsuperscript{93}Ibid., p. 19.
\end{itemize}
frequently visited the village. Once in the fall, all the Jews were gathered and forced to shed all their clothes. One SS man then ordered the local police to march them to the village center, where people were just going to church. As Gural'nik recalls, many of the Ukrainians there were hostile:

With a scream, a crowd of gapers ran over to see this unprecedented sight. There were laughs, giggles, and cynical jokes. Suddenly the German stopped us and ordered everybody to be silent. We cuddled up, as persecuted beings surrounded by a hostile crowd. The SS man walked up and down before us, carefully looking at the line-up, aligning our bare feet. He waited a minute and then roared out, 'Disperse!' Immediately the column turned into a naked gathering. We ran to our homes like crazy, driven on by the crowd's whoops and whistles.94

At present, there is no information to answer the question whether this kind of behavior was commonplace in villages in Dnieper Ukraine.

As with so many other topics, there is relatively abundant information regarding the Jewish Holocaust in Kiev. When non-Jews of the city found out that all Jews were being shot—many heard the shots from their homes—, the general reaction was shock, indignation, and horror. This also applied to those who hated Jews. For example, Kuznetsov's grandfather cried: "Oh Mother of God, Queen of Heaven, what is this, why do they do that to them?"95 From the second day of the shootings, the news was all over town, and people spoke of over sixty thousand dead.96 The diary of Iryna Khoroshunova shows how difficult it was for some to accept the news. At the end of the first day, 29 September, she wrote:

We still don't know what they did to the Jews. There are terrifying rumors coming from the Luk'ianivka cemetery. But they are still impossible to believe. They say that the Jews are shot.... Some people say that the Jews are shot with machine-guns, all of them. Others say that sixteen train wagons have been prepared and that they will be sent away. Whereto? Nobody knows. Probably only one thing is clear: all their documents,

94[Gural'nik], "Iama v Pavlovychakh," p. 10.
96Pihido-Pravobereznyi, "Velyka Vitchyniana viina," p. 109 ("it was said that in that day [should be: in those two days] about 67,000 Jews were shot"); Tat'iana Fesenko, Povest' krivykh let (New York, 1963), p. 75 ("over sixty thousand people had gathered at Babyn Iar").
things, and food are confiscated. Then they are chased into Babyn Jar and there... I don't know. I only know one thing: it is something terrible, horrible, something inconceivable, which cannot be understood, grasped, or explained.97

Several days later it was no longer possible to doubt:

Everybody is saying by now that the Jews are murdered. No, they have been murdered already. All of them, without exception—old people, women, and children. Those who went home on Monday [the 29th] have also been shot. People say it in a way which does not leave any doubt. No trains left Luk'ianivka at all. People saw cars with warm shawls and other things driving away from the cemetery. German 'accuracy.' They already sorted the loot! One Russian girl accompanied her girlfriend to the cemetery, but crawled herself through the fence from the other side. She saw how naked people were taken toward Babyn Jar and heard shooting from a machine-gun. There are more and more such rumors and accounts. Their monstrosity is unbelievable. But we are forced to believe them, for the shooting of the Jews is a fact. A fact which is starting to drive us insane. It is impossible to live while knowing it. The women around us are crying. And we? We also cried on 29 September, when we thought they were taken to a concentration camp. But now? Can we really cry? I am writing, but my hair is standing on end.98

Likewise, the Kievan L. Nartova wrote with despair several weeks afterwards, "I remember my comrades, excellent specialists, good workers. Why did they die? And there were so many of them!" In late October, she saw policemen taking away ill and disabled Jews. "How terrible it is to live here, how hard it is to look at that scene." A little girl in the street asked her with wide open eyes whether these were Jews, and whether they would be killed. "Clearly she cannot grasp this thought. But who of us can."99

The shock was all the greater when, as was often the case, locals saw the shootings. Moreover, some were even forced to bury the dead or still-living victims.100 How frequently


98. Ibid., pp. 293–294, note of 2 October 1941.


100. Martin C. Dean, "The German Gendarmerie, the Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft and the 'Second Wave' of Jewish Killings in Occupied Ukraine: German Policing at the Local Level in the Zhitomir Region, 1941–1944," German History, XIV, 2 (London, 1996), p. 182; Ehrenburg and
non-Jews appealed to save the lives of the Jews remains unknown. An example is the following petition by forty-six villagers in Polissia.

Verdict [Pryhovor]. 1941 October day 5, village of Fedorivka [Polis'ke raion]  
We, the undersigned citizens of the village of Fedorivka of the Khabne raion are giving this petition to the Khabne elder, about the fact that citizen Slutsky Khaim has been living in Fedorivka for over 5 years and has cut off all relations with the Jewish nationality. At the age of 61, he is married to a Polish woman, childless, has a farm, and is by specialization a cobbler. He treats the population of Fedorivka honestly and decently [blahoslovesno], we have never see him misunderstand the law. Because he has been considered a Pole by nationality for a long time already, we also sign for that.

An illegible German word on the back undoubtedly means that the request was declined. A woman who lived in Berdians'k in the south recalls that she and other Ukrainian girls realized that their Jewish classmates would be killed. They also appealed for mercy, to the city Kommandant, but it was in vain. Then they "embraced our Jewish girlfriends and said farewell to them." Some time later, all the Jews were rounded up and driven out of town.

We stood and saw how all of them, both old and young, were put in a row, ordered to undress completely and to put the clothes on a pile, while placing elsewhere golden things such as earrings, bracelets, and chains. A number of Jews was taken out and set aside, while the others were ordered to stand along the anti-tank ditch, which had been dug before the war. That ditch had done nothing against the German tanks. Now it served as the Jews' common grave, for the Germans shot the Jews standing above it from a machine-gun. Then the Germans ordered the Jews who had been taken aside to bury those shot. That is how our girlfriends, beautiful and good Jews, perished before our very eyes.

She and her classmates cried. Older people, however, tended to react differently. After the German arrival, they "recalled tsarist times and accused the Jews of having served every regime and having made life impossible for our poor people. They had fleeced our people of various state taxes and had also occupied high positions under the tsars. Whether this was really so, I did not know, but that is what people were saying.... But when the people saw the


101 DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 48-49.

massive extermination of the Jews, then the old were also against it and indignant.¹⁰³ One man she told about what she had seen was rather laconic: it was like the shootings by the NKVD, with the only difference that those had been secret.¹⁰⁴

The question arises to what extent the non-Jewish natives in east-central Ukraine were more than bystanders. In other words, to what degree did non-Jews denounce or save Jews? Again, it should be emphasized that any aid to Jews was strongly discouraged by Nazi death threats. It was not merely strictly forbidden to have any relationship with Jews.¹⁰⁵ Anybody who kept in touch with Jews on his or her own initiative sooner or later actually received a personal warning from Germans that they would be killed if they tried to save any Jews.¹⁰⁶ Posters and signs also warned that helping Jews escape was an offense that carried the death penalty. In Kiev, such posters appeared on the first day of the Babyn Yar massacre. In some cases, death penalties were actually imposed on entire families.¹⁰⁷

As a result, all surviving Jews were ostracized. With regard to the situation in Kiev, Lashchenko recalls that nine old Jews, 90 or older, appeared in the city center after the massacre and sat down near the former synagogue. They obviously had nowhere to go.

There they sat for days and nights. People went by and clearly felt sorry for them, but did not dare to walk up to them. For that, one would be executed. Then one of [the Jews] died from hunger. How horrible! He died from hunger while a large city looked on. After a while, a second died, and a third, and a fourth... They were dying and nobody took away the bodies. But between the bodies two remained sitting, who were alive. Then one Kievan approached a German guard, who was standing nearby at the

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 137.
¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 138.
¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 17 (Grossman about two priests in Berdychiv in August 1941).
¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 61; Spector, Holocaust, p. 203; Khurtovyna, Pid nebom Volyni, pp. 120–121; Wiehn, Die Schöah, p. 811. The latter is a photocopy of Raisa Dashkevich, "Vospominaniia perioda nemetskoi okkupatsii 1941–1943 gg.," Panorama Izrailia, 266 (Jerusalem, 1 August 1990), p. 38.
street corner. He asked him, while pointing at the bodies, to shoot those two. The guard thought about it and did it.\textsuperscript{106}

Thus, clearly the death threat was a powerful deterrent. Still, it does not fully explain the behavior of all non-Jews, an unknown number of whom saved Jews; these saviors are discussed below. It seems, however, that an even larger number of Ukrainians and other non-Jews denounced hidden Jews to the authorities. Many sources in Kiev provide testimony to such betrayal.\textsuperscript{109} Frequently such people were not so much afraid as greedy, and were after the high rewards (ten thousand roubles, a cow, or food) promised for handing over Jews and other "enemies" such as partisans, high-placed Communists, and ordinary Communist party members who failed to register. Several days after the Babyn Iar massacre, the SS started a hunt for baptized Jews and any non-Jewish spouses. Among them were many doctors. Bohatyrychuk was approached by many of them, but he felt compelled to urge them to flee the city, for there "always could be found informers who might hand them over to be executed."\textsuperscript{110}

In the words of a woman whose mother took care of an old Jewish man, until he too was denounced, "there were plenty of scumbags."\textsuperscript{111}

Kuznetsov also notes that in Kiev Jews "in hiding were usually found, for there were many who wished to earn the money or cow." He gives a disturbing example. A fourteen-year-old boy escaped from Babyn Iar and talked to people about what he had gone through. When Kuznetsov's mother and grandmother heard about this, they told the young Kuznetsov to go and get the boy immediately, so that they might save him. But it was too late. Two soldiers were taking away the boy on a cart. The denouncer was "a Russian woman who lived on her


\textsuperscript{109} Einsatzgruppe C initially noted that the population in Ukraine did not hand over fleeing Jews. But by the time the German army captured Kharkiv, the SD found in Kiev "a strong increase in denunciations [Anzeigen]" of Jews and Communists. Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 127 (31 October 1941), p. 4, cited in Hilberg, Destruction, Vol. 1, p. 309; ibid., 135 (19 November 1941), p. 17.

\textsuperscript{110} Bogatyrychuk, Moi zhiznennyi put', p. 131.

\textsuperscript{111} Kravchenko, author interview ("Podonkov bylo skol'ko ugodno"). Across the street, she says, a blond girl from a "mixed" marriage and her baby were denounced as well.
own on the collective farm, working with the cows." Women were arguing loudly in the yard. "Some were protesting, others argued: 'She did right. Finish with the lot of 'em. That's for the [NKVD's destruction of the] Khreshchatyk.'

Denunciations after the first mass shootings which involved a substantial percentage of the population appear to have been common in every locality. On 16 October 1942, thousands of Jews were shot near a village near Lubny in the Poltava region. As elsewhere, it took a while for Lubny's non-Jewish population to realize what had happened. Most were horrified, writes its then-resident Ivan Zhyhadlo. Then, however, "an epidemic of denunciations" broke out. It hit not only Jews, but also anybody from "mixed" marriages, however distant. According to this observer, the denouncers were the same people who themselves were engaged in denouncing under the Soviet regime. If true, it was a very large phenomenon indeed. Such people were driven by revenge, envy, greed, anti-Semitism, and fear. The latter motive, writes Zhyhadlo, particularly applied to members of the Communist party. They apparently hoped to rehabilitate themselves by blaming others for supposedly forcing them to join the party. Thus, denouncing Jews became an inevitable by-product of the Soviet culture of mistrust. It remains to be seen whether these denouncers of Jews constituted a small or a large minority. But the above strongly suggests that anti-Semitism did not always play a major role, or even any at all, in the decision to denounce a Jew.

Probably more widespread than denunciation was looting of empty Jewish homes. It was a kind of repeat of the looting during and shortly after the retreat of the Red Army.

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114 On this matter, I find confusing Mordechai Altshuler, "The Unique Features of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union," in Yaacov Ro'i, ed., Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union (Ilford, Essex, 1995), p. 178. On the one hand, "informers constituted a small minority within the general population." On the other hand, "extremely large numbers of people contributed indirectly to the murder of the Jews, taking a position somewhere between active participation and passive acquiescence. Many of them did not inform on the Jews who lived in their buildings or neighbourhoods, but whenever they could purge themselves of Jews, they did so. If Nazis appeared in the yard or near their house and asked where the Jews lived, they would gladly point out their homes."
Frequently the goods obtained this way showed up at markets.115 In Berdychiv, those Jews who were massacred in mid-September 1941 actually themselves witnessed the start of the looting.116 Again, the main motive could just as easily have been greed as anti-Semitism.

After the Holocaust was essentially completed, people still talked about the Jews. But their murder was only rarely the topic of conversation. Instead, this talk consisted mainly of anti-Semitic grumblings. This is shown convincingly in the memoirs of Jacob Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, one of the Galician Jews who fled eastward. In early 1943, he and a fellow-Jew arrived in Dnipropetrovs'k with forged documents. As "Polish" employees of a fictitious company, the two young men rented a room in a workers' district. In the afternoons, they had many visitors. "The attraction of our 'salon' was quite strong. Two young men coming from afar, from Europe. Our guests were usually of the fair sex. There were sisters-in-law and nieces of the landlady, workers' wives who were friends of hers, [and] a teacher." These people hardly ever talked about events at the front. Mostly they discussed current events, or the Jews, who were "an endless subject for discussion." To be sure, most thought the murder of the Jews was "a loathsome, provocative and inhuman crime.... It seemed that nobody here was happy about this." The landlady was "decidedly not anti-Jewish. The Communist Party had decreed that the Jews were as good as all the others, so for her it was a self-evident truth, which should not be criticized."117 She was not typical, however.

Others took advantage of the first opportunity to criticize the party's decisions, and had the time of their lives complaining in a hostile manner about the Jews. Their pronounced hostility to the Jews was mainly motivated by envy: these had acquired, by


116Ehrenburg and Grossman, Black Book, p. 19. This information comes from Grossman, who identified the looters as "policemen, members of their families, and the mistresses of the Germans."

117Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, My Private War, p. 218.
various stratagems, positions which were or seemed to be better, than those held by the non-Jews. The granting of equal rights to Jews was their only cause for complaint against the Soviet authorities. Their youthful years had been spent in the glow of fires from the pogroms of Petliura [sic], and this had stamped their souls for life. They had a grudge against the Jews, because they were teachers and taught Ukrainian schoolchildren, were employed in government offices, and so on.

Then, a moment later, someone would remark that it was the Russians [actually, the speaker more likely said "we"] who had the ill-paid jobs of teachers and office workers, while the Jews grabbed the juiciest positions in the state grocery shops and restaurants.118

Gerstenfeld-Maltiel thought that "there was not much logic in these grumblings, but they gained force from the fact that they couldn't have been aired during the years of Soviet rule."

He concluded that "as far as the subject of Jews was concerned, there were so many grounds for personal grumbling against them that their murder, though a crime crying out to heaven, did not hold pride of place among the locals."119 One may counter that there are never "grounds" to dislike all members of an ethnic community, but otherwise the observation likely applied everywhere in Dnieper Ukraine. Whether or not non-Jews considered the Soviet regime legitimate and "theirs," anti-Semitic sentiment was something on which many of them agreed.

By the time the Red Army returned in 1943, anti-Semitic sentiments were widespread in Kiev. A particular role played the return of many Jews, whether they were soldiers or civilians. Many Kievsans, especially those who had appropriated Jewish property, were unhappy to see so many Jews return. Even more than a year later, a Western visitor "kept

118Ibid.

119Ibid. Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, born in L'viv in 1907 and deceased in Israel in 1990, knew Russian and wrote his memoir about a year after these events. His father was arrested by the Ukrainian police in L'viv in 1941 and never seen again. This helps to explain why Gerstenfeld-Maltiel hates all ("the") Ukrainians. He writes about the victims of the NKVD massacre in the city jail of L'viv that the bodies had been "supposedly left by the Russians." Ibid., p. 54. Regarding the killings of Jews in L'viv in 1941 after the discovery of the bodies in the jail, he writes that "almost all Ukrainians were suited to this task. They found their métier and satisfaction in this noble calling, and fully developed their talents for murder and carnage." Ibid., p. 55. Gerstenfeld-Maltiel also speaks of "the Ukrainians' best talents: murder and massacre of the Jews" and calls "the Ukrainians" "a nation with a very thin veneer of civilization, rough, without a tradition or culture," with "a primitive way of thinking." Ibid., pp. 56 and 161. None of this hatred, however, invalidates the information he provides about his "salon" in Dnipropetrov'sk.

Cf. Meldungen, 47 (26 March 1943), p. 17, which says how people in Dnipropetrov'sk were complaining of their treatment as slaves. "In the past, Ukrainians and Jews had robbed the state, but while doing so, they shared among each other. Today, however, the Germans were claiming everything for themselves."
hearing undercurrent[s] of talk 'these Jews are here again.' Such open complaining about Jews, as under the Germans, was a repetition of the situation of the 1920s. But the level of anti-Semitism appears to have been more intense, and in Kiev the result was an actual pogrom. All this evidence raises the possibility that neither the Nazi propaganda nor the Holocaust itself brought about any major changes in non-Jews' prewar perceptions of Jews. Apparently, most non-Jews in Dnieper Ukraine who had been anti-Semitic did not change their thinking at all. The difference was that they felt no longer compelled to hide their prejudice, as most had done before 1941. Once the Red Army returned, however, and with it many Jews, the level of anti-Semitism seems to have surpassed the pre-war level and even the level of anti-Semitism that existed under German rule.

Now that the stance and behavior of the Ukrainians and other non-Jews of Dnieper Ukraine has been discussed, our discussion should turn to western Volhynia. According to German military intelligence, Jews in the territories of former eastern Poland were by 1940 eagerly awaiting the Germans. Whether or not this is true (and it seems unlikely), the Jews immediately suffered persecution after the retreat of the Red Army, mainly at the hands of Germans, but also of locals. Pogroms erupted in several larger towns and in the countryside (see chapter 2). The pogroms came about because of a thirst for revenge for the deeds of the

10M. Philips Price, Russia, Red or White: A Record of a Visit to Russia after Twenty-Seven Years (London, n.d.), p. 60. The sentence, based on a visit in 1945, is preceded by this: "I found them [Jews] in large numbers working in Government offices as junior civil servants, as clerks in municipally-owned businesses or State factories. In fact, they seemed to be the backbone of many of the institutions. But I don't think this was making them any more popular." On this issue, see also Morcechai Altshuler, "Antisemitism in Ukraine toward the End of the Second World War," Jews in Eastern Europe, 3 (22) (Jerusalem, Winter 1993), pp. 40–81 (an article on pp. 40–51, translated documents thereafter) and Z. Serdiuk, Sekretar Kyiv'skohoi obkomu KP(b)U, "Politinformatsii Po Kyiv'skoi oblasti na 10.XII–1943 roku," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 633, l. 30. According to the last source, by December 1943 there was a rumor in the countryside of the Kiev oblast that "the Jews will again take power," supposedly spread by former village elders who were in hiding.


12Weiner, "Delineating the Soviet Body National in the Age of Socialism," p. 30 and passim. According to this source, several Jews were killed and hundreds were injured in the pogrom.

NKVD and because of a popular anti-Semitism, which was perhaps more intense in eastern Poland than in Soviet Ukraine.

Conclusive answers about the general level of anti-Semitic sentiments in western Volhynia cannot be provided at the present state of research. A rather bleak picture of the city of Rivne does emerge from the recollections of Barbara Baratz. After an initial massacre of Jewish men on 8 July 1941, all remaining Jews of the city had to hand in their gold and silverware. While they were standing in line, non-Jews "stood there with sinister smiles, as if it were a funny show." Just before the major massacre of 5 November 1941, a man placed his son and mother-in-law in the care of his Polish former maid, and, upon the latter's advice, also handed over all the family valuables for safekeeping. Then the maid reported her guests to the authorities. This was not an exception, according to Baratz (who heard this story from the man himself). "Many people in those days enriched themselves with Jewish property and helped the Germans to destroy our relatives." In mid-1942, Baratz found Rivne's Ukrainians to be "mostly very dangerous enemies of the Jews." Even without a yellow star, she and other Jews feared showing themselves at public places such as the train station, "Although the Germans would not have recognized us so easily as Jews, the Ukrainians distinguished us very well from themselves and would have handed us over to the Germans immediately." As in the case of the towns and cities of western Volhynia, the present state of knowledge precludes generalization about the perception and treatment of Jews by locals in the countryside. But it is clear that there were a great number of young Ukrainian peasants who enjoyed mistreating Jews. In mid-July 1941, groups of Jews from the village of Pryvitne were

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124Baratz, Flucht vor dem Schicksal, p. 51.

125Ibid., p. 71. Similar reports are mentioned in Philip Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation," YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science, XII (New York, 1958-59), p. 276, although these are not specifically about the year 1941.

126Baratz, Flucht vor dem Schicksal, p. 84. In this city, looting of Jewish homes started after German invitations to such action on 4 and 23 March 1942, according to Spector, Holocaust, pp. 239-240n13.
put to work. As they told Diment, peasants came to watch and beat them. In late August 1941, the situation worsened for the Jews when all native policemen were replaced. "Every evening a large crowd of young Ukrainians gathered in the club house to amuse themselves by mocking Jews."127 In early November 1941, all Jews had to move to Lokachi, into a newly established ghetto. "As we were leaving, the peasants followed us, screaming happily, 'We're finished with the Jews.'"128 Jewish homes were looted. Diment himself was one of six Jews from the Lokachi ghetto who were sent back to Pryvitne to work as craftsmen. "There was plenty of work from the peasants. Every time we met them, the usual themes were insults and laughter."129

Such hostility was encouraged by an unsigned article in the newspaper Volyn' about the "fall of Jewry." It stated that "the fate of world Jewry was sealed at the very moment when Adolf Hitler vowed to combat it, up to final extermination [azh do ostoatchnoho vynyscheniia], and [when he] directed the attention of the peoples of Europe at this danger."130 By mid-June 1942, a total of 250 inmates of the Lokachi ghetto were working on the outside. Again they met a hostile audience.

One example of their mindless pranks was an order for us to pile garbage by hand in one place and immediately demanding that we return it to its original place. The Germans ordered the dismantling of the Jewish homes outside the ghetto. People were asked to demolish two homes a day. The peasants appropriated some wood and the larger share was delivered to the town council. Every day hooligans from the surrounding villages came to this work site and inquired of the supervisors: 'So! Where are our two men?' presumably for work. They then took them into an empty home and ordered them to dance, kiss their behinds and do other humiliating things too shameful to describe. A refusal earned a terrible beating.... The situation worsened as the Ukrainians became the bosses. More and more Jews returned from work beaten and bleeding. The craftsman centers were visited frequently by the town council president, Yakim [Iakym]. When he entered a center, anyone sitting or talking was immediately beaten with his rubber club.131

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127Diment, Lone Survivor, pp. 13 and 35.

128Ibid., pp. 41–42.

129Ibid., p. 52.


131Diment, Lone Survivor, pp. 94–95.
In early September 1942, on the very eve of the liquidation of the ghetto and the murder of its remaining inhabitants, the place was surrounded. Both Ukrainian policemen and some civilians participated. Diment, who at the time was visiting a friend, writes: "A few Jews were gathered at the gate near his home, looking out of the ghetto, pointing to the fully uniformed and equipped fire fighters [Feuerschuma, KB], who surrounded the ghetto, observing every corner. Peasants with wooden sticks, iron bars and pitchforks were stationed wherever there was a gap between the militiamen."\(^{132}\)

A year later, some time in late June or early July 1943, Diment was being hidden by two Ukrainian peasants. Several other peasants came to visit and he overheard their words from the next room.

The entire discussion centered around Jews interspersed with vitriolic and anti-semitic expressions like, 'There are still too many alive in America and in England.' They mentioned who was killed at the mass graves. As soon as they left, Czajko and his wife came in, embarrassed that I had overheard all this. He stated that those were typical conversations, and mentioned that the murderers [had] poisoned the atmosphere. For evil people the poison needed only a short time to take effect.\(^{133}\)

Such attitudes still need to be fully explained. Already at the time, many western Volhynian Jews "could not understand why the gentiles, who, after so many generations of living together peacefully, became such hateful anti-Semites."\(^{134}\) Undoubtedly, one reason why there were so many anti-Semitic words and deeds was the popularity of radical nationalism. A supplementary reason was the fact that many western Volhynian Ukrainians found a justification for the Jewish Holocaust in their Orthodox Christian world view. As one peasant told a Jewish acquaintance who had escaped from the Dubrovytsia ghetto: "Hitler has conquered almost the whole world and he is going to slaughter all the Jews because they had

\(^{132}\)Ibid., p. 128.

\(^{133}\)Ibid., pp. 200–201.

\(^{134}\)Ibid., p. 52.
crucified our Jesus. You think you can get away from this fate?" In this regard, however, it should be noted that not all peasants who employed such an interpretation did it in such a mean-spirited way. This is suggested by the memoirs of a Ukrainian woman from Podolia. When she was a girl, she insisted that her mother tell her what was happening with the Jews she had seen in the wood. Her mother finally did: German SS men and Ukrainian policemen were forcing the men and women to bury their own children alive, and then the adults would be taken to Germany and turned into soap. To her daughter’s anguished why?, this peasant woman said, in a monotonous voice, "The Jews killed Christ." All the while, she had the same stony look as during the famine of 1933, when she saw her son die of starvation. 

The Ukrainians and other natives in western Volhynia and the rest of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine had no leaders who warned them against anti-Semitism. As for the Communist underground, the Soviet partisans, and the Soviet hinterland, there is little information available. On the one hand, Einsatzgruppe C noted in March 1942 that "[air]dropped leaflets" told the Jews to remain in hiding and threatened those assisting the Germans with death. But Communist underground and partisan reports mention aid to Jews very rarely, in contrast to aid to prisoners of war and to people under threat of being deported to Germany. This may reflect the fact that there were hardly any Soviet partisans in the Reichskommissariat during the crucial years 1941 and 1942. But even after these partisans emerged on a significant scale, many of them were apparently anti-Semitic. 

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139Volhynia at that time only had Dmitrii Medvedev’s group and several small other groups, as noted in Spector, Holocaust, p. 228. The Communist underground was likely simply in disarray.

140Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," p. 287. An associate of Tymofii Strokach, the NKVD
was in part because many of them were former policemen and had actively participated in the Holocaust.

Both factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists were anti-Semitic as well, but in a systematic way—in ideology, propaganda, and deed. The matter cannot be fully discussed here. Suffice it to refer to the discussion of the Babyn Jar massacre (chapter 1) and to say that these nationalists had learned exactly the wrong lesson from the struggle for independence at the beginning of the century.

In striking contrast to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, who headed the Greek Catholic church in Galicia, the leaders of the Autocephalous Orthodox church were very anti-Semitic and under the delusion that Communism was a Jewish matter. They condemned "Jew-Bolshevism," but not the Holocaust. In June 1942, the Autocephalous Archbishop Polikarp's name appeared under a statement which dealt with what it called the "rumors" that the Ostarbeiter were living in miserable conditions. It said that all Ukrainian Orthodox had a "holy duty and honor" to oppose that "terrible enemy of humanity and European Christian culture"—"Muscovite-Jewish communism."

One week after the German defeat at Stalingrad, another appeal said to be from Polikarp urged Ukrainians to go work in Germany, for this would help defeat the "communist Muscovite-Jewish state." No longer related to the issue of work in Germany, but particularly mean-spirited, was another published statement, apparently issued by Polikarp on 25 March 1943. It was filled with anti-Semitism. The Germans were fighting the "Jew-communists" and their ally, "the Jewish plutocracy of America and England."

"Victory over Jew-Bolshevism is a matter of life or death for the Ukrainian people." That many people were fleeing with the Germans, even though they had relatives in the Red Army, was

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official who headed the Ukrainian Staff of the Partisan Movement, in existence from 1942, told German interrogators that Strokach constantly ranted against the Jews in general. "Selected Soviet Sources on the World War II Partisan Movement," in John A. Armstrong, ed., Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison, 1964), p. 668. This is an English translation of a document the location of which is not mentioned.

141"Sviaty obov'iazok ukraiins'koho narodu," Ukrains'kyi holos, 21 June 1942, p. 3.

142Ibid., 14 February 1943, p. 3.
logical, "for they know that after this army comes the NKVD, led by the Jew-communists."

But to Polikarp's dismay, many others did not flee. He asked them:

Have you forgotten what Jewry looks like, so vindictive and furious in its revenge, which so destroyed our people during the twenty years of its rule in Great Ukraine and had started to destroy it in Western Ukraine? Do you really have the unnatural desire for the destruction of your own people? No, this cannot be. This is a blinding of the mind, clouded by blind leaders.143

Such sentiments almost certainly reflected Polikarp's own views, and were not inserted by somebody else. After all, during his January 1942 visit to the Reichskommissariat headquarters, he emphatically gave thanks for "the liberation of Ukrainian lands from Muscovite-Jewish rule."144 Several other Autocephalous leaders are known to have propagated the notion of "Jew-Bolshevism" as well. In a letter to Hitler on the occasion of the first anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Autocephalous Bishops Nikanor, Mstyslav, and Syl'vestr assured him that they were praying to God "to give You the strength and health to finish with success the great Cause started by You: the defense of the honor of the German People and the liberation of humankind from atheist-Jewish-communist enslavement [zvil'nennia liudstva vid bezbohnyts'ko-zhydivs'ko-komunistychnoho ponevolennia]."145 Metropolitan Dionysii, in Warsaw, wrote in a private letter to Polikarp on 13 November 1941: "Already since 1919 Ukraine finds itself in an armed struggle with the Jew-Communist power of Moscow [iudo-komunistychna vlasti Moskvy]."146

143Ibid., 6 May 1943, p. 3.


145Kiev, 22 June 1942, copy, DAKO, f. 2-2412, op. 2, d. 199, l. 74. The letter is unsigned, but its presence in the collection of the then official Museum-Archive of the Transition Period makes its authenticity virtually certain.

146Letter, 13 November 1941, DAKO, f. 2-2412, op. 2, d. 199, l. 87.
No sources documenting such anti-Semitism have been found regarding the leadership of the Autonomous church linked to the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate. These hierarchs are not known to have issued statements speaking of "Jew-Bolshevism." This may be due to the general neglect of this church in the press. Still, it is telling that Bishop Panteleimon's secretary Ivaskiv wrote in a letter to the German authorities: "The brilliant Führer of the great heroic [German] people and his victorious army are giving the Ukrainian people the chance to resurrect itself. The Ukrainian people is the cultured and noble people grateful for this and will constantly pray to the Lord for victory of German 'light' over Jew-Bolshevik 'darkness.' Lord, bless the Germans and help them!" 147

The anti-Semitic statements by Polikarp and the others can only have had a detrimental effect on popular morale. At the very least, such talk dissuaded people from saving Jews. 148 Of course, the clergy with whom ordinary people had the most contact were of lower rank. The evidence about the stance of the Orthodox priests is ambiguous. There were certainly those who adhered to the concept of "Jew-Bolshevism" and used it in public. For example, Father Mykhail Kovalenko of Vasyl'kiv invited the population to an evening service on 31 July 1942. The service would mark the anniversary of the town's "liberation from the Muscovite-Jewish yoke [moskovs'ke-zhydivs'ke iarmo]." 149 According to a Jewish memorial book, a Jewish man hid in a house adjoining a church in Kovel' and overheard the following from a sermon in late May 1942: "Dear and merciful people! I ask you and I warn you: Don't give a slice of

147 Letter by archpriest Mykhailo Ivaskiv to Dr Boss, Personalchef and Oberbürgermeister [sic], 4 January 1942, Kiev, German translation of Russian original, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 1, d. 50, ll. 7–8.

148 According to Spector, Holocaust, p. 243, the stance of "the Ukrainian Orthodox Church" can be described as "full identification with the Nazis and their deeds." This stance "exerted a powerful influence on the faithful, who in their overwhelming majority were illiterate peasants." But Spector provides no evidence of this "powerful influence." Moreover, he is unaware of the fact that there were two Orthodox churches in Ukraine; see ibid., p. 242.

Spector also provides the following evidence from the notebook of Master Sergeant Alois Kräutle, who worked for the army in Lutsk: "The members of the church [i.e., ordinary faithful] are rotten to the core and they express joy when Jews are shot." When this German wrote this statement remains unclear. Ibid., p. 243n29; full citation to location at ibid., p. 75n36.

149 "Oholoshennia," DAKO, f. r-2329, op. 2, d. 2, l. 78; pre-publication text of the announcement in the records of the editors of Vasyl'kivs'ki visti, DAKO, f. r-2329, op. 2, d. 2, l. 78.
bread to a Jew! Don't give him a drop of water! Don't give him shelter! A person who knows of a Jew hiding, ought to find him and turn him over to the Germans. No trace must be left of the Jew. We must erase the Jews from the face of the earth. Only after the last Jew is gone, shall we win the war!" 150

On the other hand, there were priests who, together with their families, did everything they could to save Jews. One priest in Vysots'k in western Volhynia saved Jews from the pogrom in 1941. 151 In the town of Poryts'k, Father Piereviezov and his family (including his daughter, who was a member of the OUNSD) hid a Jewish woman. At some stage, in the neighboring village of Liakhiv about 10 km away, OUNSD activists who discovered that a priest was hiding a Jew, surrounded the house and killed all the inhabitants. At that moment, Father Piereviezov arranged for the Jewish woman's admission to a convent. 152

In Kiev's Podil district, Father Aleksei Aleksandrovich Glagolev and his wife Tatiana Pavlovna took an active stand to save Jews. (Glagolev's father, also a priest, had testified in favor of the defense at the anti-Semitic Beilis trial of 1913.) They started rescuing Jews immediately. This case of aid to Jews is worth discussing in some detail, for it shows how extremely dangerous it was.

After the Babyn Iar massacre, the relatives of the Russian husband of a Jewish woman who was still at home appealed to the Glagolevs for help. Father Glagolev turned to Mayor Ohloblyn, who knew these people. Ohloblyn went to the German commandant (Eberhardt), but returned looking "very troubled and pale" and with bad news. He had been told to stay away from Jewish affairs. Then Mrs. Glagoleva gave the Jewish woman, Izabella Naumovna Egorycheva-Minkina, her own passport and birth certificate, allowed her to replace the picture, and advised her to flee to a village (Ukraïnka, then called Zlodiïvka) where Egorycheva-Minkina knew people. This she did. During a subsequent house-to-house search in Kiev, Mrs.

150 Spector, Holocaust, p. 243, citing a Yiddish-language memorial book about Kovel'.
151 Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," p. 294n80, citing a Hebrew source.
152 Ibid., p. 294n80.
Glagoleva barely evaded arrest because of her lack of identification papers; only statements by others saved her. Meanwhile in the village, the elder ordered Egorycheva-Minkina to confirm her identity, and she fled back to the Glagolevs. For the two years that followed, she and her ten-year-old daughter lived with them as family members in their apartment or in hiding in the bell tower of the Pokrov church. The woman not only had to hide as a Jew but also a person subject to mobilization for work or even deportation to Germany. In the fall and winter of 1942–43, she lived with the Glagolevs in villages on the other side of the Dnieper River.

Aleksei and Tatiana Glagolev also helped other Jews. Among them were Tat'iana Davydivna Pasichna (28 years of age) and her mother (Evgeniia Akimovna Sheveleva). This came about after an appeal by Tatiana's Ukrainian husband. Father Glagolev wrote on an old blank baptism record the fake name Polina Danilovna Sheveleva, "born in 1913 in an Orthodox Russian family." Mr. Pasichnyi somehow had it stamped. With the new record, "Polina" and her mother hid in a small house on the estate of Glagolev's Pokrov church, which was managed by someone who also saved Jews (and potential Ostarbeiter), a former associate of the Academy of Sciences (Aleksandr Grigor'evich Gorbovskii). In August 1942, Father Glagolev took Pasichna and Sheveleva to a safer place in Kamianets'-Podil's'kyi, where they survived. The Glagolevs also tried to save the family of the teacher Mykola H. Hermaize. These were Ukrainians of Jewish descent, people who had adopted Christianity before 1917 but looked Jewish. At one stage, the SD visited the Glagolevs and forced Mrs. Glagoleva to sign a statement which said that if Mrs. Hermaize turned out to be Jewish, both would be shot. She lied that she had known the woman for a long time. For three months, this saved Mrs. Hermaize's life. The Glagolevs themselves seem to have survived the war.

The total number of people who saved, or tried to save, Jews will probably never be known. It was probably a small minority, because of anti-Semitism, the culture of denunciation, and the virtual certainty of the death penalty if one were caught hiding Jews. The

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fear of death—the wish not to put one's life on the line—needs to be stressed. It is instructive
to point out that in the Netherlands, a "Germanic" country, the woman who hid Anne Frank
was not even arrested. By contrast, in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, not only the accused
but even the children of those who hid Jews could be and were killed (usually by public
hangings). The following are some more examples of the things people did to save Jews.
Although various tactics were often employed simultaneously, they can be discussed here
separately according to the following categories: "legalizing" Jews; hiding them; and taking
them elsewhere.

Initially, a frequently tried tactic of "legalization" was baptism, even though it was
explicitly forbidden. According to an SD report of early 1942, Mayor Zenytsia of Kremenchuk
"authorized archpriest Romans'kyi to baptize Jews designated by him [Zenytsia] and to give
them Christian or Russian first names." This apparently saved some Jews, but then Zenytsia
was arrested and executed. Other non-Jews tried to give Jews a new identity by marrying
them. Ol'ha Svitnyts'ka in Uman' was hanged for doing so. But the most frequently used
tactic appears to have been the adoption of Jewish babies and young adults and the provision of
false identity papers for them. For example, in Rivne, Mariia Babych adopted the one-year-old
daughter of the Jewish family where she had been a maid. Other women gossiped whether
Babych, who was advanced in years, really had been pregnant. In Kiev, Raisa Genrikhovna
Dashkevich (born in 1916 as Riva Kogut) fell unconscious during the Babyn Iar massacre.
When she regained consciousness, she was lying in the ravine but was unwounded. An old
woman in a nearby house cared for her in a cellar for three days, even though the houses near
the ravine were being searched. Then Dashkevich visited several acquaintances. Some of them

154 Testimony by Ruvin Hrosser about a western Volhynian village, translated in Suslens'kyi,
Spravzhni heroï, pp. 107–108.

155 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 177 (6 March 1942), p. 3. This is the only case of aid to Jews
anywhere in the "east" mentioned in any of the Einsatzgruppen reports.


157 Suslens'kyi, Spravzhni heroï, p. 73.
gave her some food or clothes, but none asked her to stay. But when she arrived at the home of her former colleague, Liudmyla Ivanivna Bondarenko, that family adopted her, gave her a new document, and thus saved her life.158

Placing Jews in a hiding place was another and equally risky tactic. Vitold Fomenko, a Ukrainian born in 1905 in Warsaw, is known to have been particularly active in this regard. He had Jewish friends in Chełm and Luts'k ever since his childhood and knew the Yiddish language. In Luts'k under the Germans he found jobs for Jews, including at his barbershop. After the Luts'k ghetto was created in December 1941, he provided food, medicine, and ultimately false papers. For this he was arrested but released. After the ghetto was destroyed, he hid Jews in his home and with friends. Thus thirty-six of them survived.159 Equally notable was Iasha Sukhenko, a man from Dnieper Ukraine who was proud of his Cossack heritage. Sukhenko had been sent to Rivne in 1939 to work as an engineer. For some transgression, he was sent to a Soviet camp, from which he escaped in 1941. Under the Germans, he worked as an accountant at a factory in Rivne and taught at a technical college. He spent much time in the ghetto and, as Barbara Baratz, whom he saved, recalls, "a relationship developed which was so warm that he was nicknamed 'Yankele.'"160 Sukhenko's tactic was to take Jews eastward with false passes. For example, Baratz and her daughter became his mother and Polish-born wife. Immediately after the Rivne ghetto was destroyed, in mid-July 1942, he took both of them by train to Zdolbuniv, Novyi Buh, and further on to Kirovohrad and Pervomais'k. Ultimately he was arrested and was likely executed.161

Whether in a city, town, or village, it was virtually impossible to prevent others from finding out that one was hiding Jews. Therefore, many saviors built underground shelters.162

158Bondarenko and Dashkevich had both worked at the recreation resort "Berezovaja roshcha." Wiehn, Die Schohü, pp. 810–812. For more about Dashkevich, see ibid., p. 251.
159Spector, Holocaust, p. 245.
160Baratz, Flucht vor dem Schicksal, pp. 82–83.
161Ibid., pp. 84, 113–114, and 121. A friend of Sukhenko's, Ivan Shevchenko, made similar trips.
162One example: in the village of Lopavshe in western Volhynia, Vera Iosifovna Krasov and her
If one did not do so, it was essential to make others share responsibility, or at least to obtain their passive agreement. In Bohuslav, the ultimate form of sharing responsibility evolved. One Jewish woman and her four children were hidden and fed by various households in a rotation system, and thus all survived.\(^{163}\) Evgeniia Gural'nik's account is a source which illustrates how difficult it was to survive in the countryside and how vital it was for Jews to have not just people who came to the rescue, but also others who were simply "on side." After crawling out of the pit in Pavlovychi in November 1941, Gural'nik first came upon a forester and his wife. These were kind people who took care of her. The next day, she moved on to another village. Here she had to flee very quickly, for a man—a policeman?—wanted to have her killed.

Arriving in the small village of Verbivka (Luhyny), she reached a house whose inhabitants helped her. Again she could not stay, however, for they were themselves under surveillance. The man of the house, a communist before the war, had been told to go to the raion administration the next day. He predicted he would not come back alive, and proved to be right. Gural'nik then spent several days in a young woman's home, until the woman asked her to leave, for "the people everywhere are chattering that I am hiding a Jewess in my home."

Gural'nik spent the remainder of the winter walking around begging for food—concentrating on poor homes, where people seemed to be more helpful—and sleeping in the woods.

Recalling that her family had given winter clothes to a woman for safekeeping, Gural'nik returned to Pavlovychi. But that woman was hostile and chased her away. For a while, she joined up with two Jewish children, aged 11 and 3, who had been elsewhere during the November massacre and were now living in a hole. At one stage, Germans saw the two and shot them. Back in Verbivka, Gural'nik stayed at a woman's place, until she was chased out in the summer. Then she was taken in by others (relatives of this woman's husband), who

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\(^{163}\)Nadiia Fedorovna [Fedorivna] Bondarenko (Ukrainian born in 1930 in Bohuslav), author interview in Ukrainian, 20 July 1995, Bohuslav, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording. This woman's family was involved. The Jewish woman was Liza Petrusenko (married to a Ukrainian who was at the front); her children were called Emma, Sveta, Tamara, and Lena.
treated her well. Again, "although the Batrakovs told no-one about me, the people in the village evidently found out."

At that crucial stage, a tall, elderly man came upon Gural'nik in a field. The man, with "a large, luxuriant mustache which covered half of his cheeks, like Taras Bul'ba's," invited her to live at his place. She became the adopted daughter of the childless Marko and Oksana. Now the village elder assured them that he would not denounce them, even though everybody in the village realized what was going on. Gural'nik became a "legal" villager who went out to work in the fields. Once, in the fall of 1942, a car with Germans and politsaï arrived. They asked the peasants about "Jews or partisans." The women and the brigade leader did not give her up. 164

Of all Ukrainians, the Baptists and Evangelical Christians seem to have helped Jews the most. A scholar has estimated that in Volhynia alone they saved "several hundred" Jews. 165 These Protestant groups felt motivated by their Christian faith and were assisted by the fact that they constituted a close-knit community where people trusted each other. In this way Jews could be quickly passed on from one locality to the next. 166 Among the non-Ukrainians, Poles and particularly Czechs in Volhynia are also known to have actively engaged in rescue efforts. 167

There was only one "privileged" nationality in the Reichskommissariat, the ethnic Germans. Most lived as peasants in eastern Volhynia between Korosten', Novohrad-Volyns'kyi, and Zhytomyr, and in the Dnieper bend near Kryvyi Rih, Nikopol', and Zaporizhzhia. Intermarriage with non-Germans had not taken place in large numbers, least of all in the


165Spector, Holocaust, p. 244.

166One Evangelical Christian, Mykhailo Podvorniak, was involved in such a transfer. See his two, slightly different accounts, M. P., "Vid smerty do zhyttia (Spohad)," Litopys Volyni, 7 (Winnipeg, 1964), pp. 91–96 and Khurtovyna, Pid nebom Volyni, pp. 111–113 and 118–123. Cf. Spector, Holocaust, pp. 244 and 371; Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," p. 294n82; and Paldiel, Path of the Righteous, pp. 273–277.

Dnieper bend, where the ethnic Germans were Catholic, Lutheran, and, in particular, Mennonite. After the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939, as part of that agreement Ukrainians were deported eastward to the expanded Soviet Ukraine, and about 64,000 western Volhynian Germans were deported westward, to the Generalgouvernement for the Occupied Polish Territories. According to Soviet figures not older than September 1941, and probably valid for the time up to the German invasion, there were 392,458 "Germans" (nemtsy) in the territory of Soviet Ukraine according to its pre-1939 borders, of which 36,356 in the Zhytomyr oblast, 89,389 in the Zaporizhzhia oblast, 41,682 in the Mykolaiv oblast, and 26,159 in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, apart from many others in the Odessa region and in the Donbas. When the German Army invaded, many ethnic Germans already had been drafted into the Red Army, not as a collective, but along with non-Germans. As a result, in 1941 many became prisoners of war of the German army. Most of them were quickly released and many became interpreters in the Wehrmacht or the Einsatzgruppen.

It appears that Stalin's decision of 28 August 1941 to deport the Volga Germans was considered to apply to the ethnic Germans of Ukraine. The decree mentioned only the former, but according to an NKVD document of September 1941, those ethnic Germans in the oblasts of Zaporizhzhia, Stalino, and Voroshilovgrad were "due to be exiled according to the


171 Meir Buchsweiter, *Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs – ein Fall doppelter Loyalität?* (Gerlingen, 1984), p. 354. Cf. ibid., pp. 363–364, which says that most ethnic Germans were removed from the army in 1941 and sent to the Soviet hinterland to work in labor battalions, popularly known as "the labor army" (trudovaia armiia). This is based on "very, very many" press articles, which are not mentioned.


decision of the State Defence Committee. The document added that the ethnic Germans of the oblasts of Odessa and Dnipropetrov'sk were not covered by the decision; clearly because these regions were already taken by the German Army. Thus, when the war with Germany broke out, ethnic German males aged 16 to 60 still living in villages were de facto subject to deportation. Two authors have estimated that 100,000 ethnic Germans were evacuated from Ukraine as a whole from July to October 1941, leaving an estimated 320,000 behind. Both these figures appear to be too high, however. Even from the Zaporizhzia oblast, where 53,566 ethnic Germans had been "registered," only 31,032 were actually deported. One author has provided data which lead one to conclude that by the time the German army arrived, 140,466 persons of German nationality were in the territory which became the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

Only to the east of the Dnieper was the vast majority of German villages deported as a whole. First came the males, along with cattle and machines, and then the women and girls had to build fortifications or collect the harvest. This was followed by total deportation. In the


175Pinkus and Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, p. 306.


177Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche, p. 287, provides the following population figures for 1941 after the Soviet deportations which, when added, leave the number 147,803: Volhynia (including the Zhytomyr region)—43,988; the Mykolaiv region except for the Kronau region—14,359; the Kronau region—12,719; the Dnipropetrov'sk region except for the Khortytsia and Halbstadt regions (but apparently including the Grunau region near Mariiupol', which never joined the Reichskommissariat, and for which the number was 7,337)—31,140; the Khortytsia region—15,418; and the Halbstadt (Molochans'k) region—7,337. It is unclear whether the following deportation figures, also mentioned by Buchsweiler, apply only to the 1941 deportations, or also to earlier ones. They are: Volhynia—3,288 (7 percent of the total inhabitants; as said, unclear at which stage); Mykolaiv region without Kronau—1,831 (12 percent); Kronau—651 (5 percent); Dnipropetrov'sk region without Khortytsia and Halbstadt—1,989 (6 percent); Khortytsia region—2,691 (15 percent); and the Halbstadt region—20,475 (41 percent). If this applies only to the 1941 deportations, this would mean that 30,925 were deported. This final figure is based on my assumption that the Grunau region, for which Buchsweiler mentions the figure of 12,500 (64 percent), is included in Buchsweiler's figure for the Dnipropetrov'sk region.

178Ibid., p. 278; Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 104.
case of the Mennonite villages in the Left Bank, the deportation of the males started on 5 September 1941. One woman recalls:

One hundred fifty men from our village [of] Gnadenfeld were driven out like criminals. They dared not so much as look back, or they were shouted at by their captors. They were required to walk 60 km. a day. Those who could not keep up were left to perish on the road or were shot. For days they were deprived of a warm meal or water. They almost died of thirst. What dreadful treatment these men had to endure! Only a few escaped, and returned to tell us.179

On 2 October 1941, the 8,500 remaining Mennonites from this village received the same Soviet order and were told to be ready in two hours. They were taken to the train station by the NKVD and militia (one NKVD man for every five militiamen180), where they waited for two days. Then they were ordered to move into a field, while the retreating Red Army blew up railway tracks and burned all the large granaries.181 They were convinced that a Soviet plane planned to throw fire bombs on them. Whether this was true or not, German planes shot the Soviet plane down.182 Altogether, the German army prevented the deportation of about half of the villages in this region.183

Heinrich Himmler not only led the SS as a whole, but also the Reich Ministry for the Consolidation of German Nationality. It is true that the Ostministerium for some time had its own fact-finders in place, fifty men working in the so-called Kommando Dr. Stumpp. This organization had genealogical offices in Zhytomyr and Dnipropetrov'sk. It was disbanded on 31 December 1942, however.184 The official authority over the ethnic Germans remained in the

179Susanna Toews, Trek to Freedom: The Escape of Two Sisters from South Russia during World War II (Winkler, Manitoba, 1976), p. 17.


181Toews, Trek to Freedom, p. 17.

182Ibid., pp. 17–18.

183Of the 57 Mennonite villages in the Gnadenfeld and Halbstadt districts, 27 were deported in 1941, while 28 were not because of the arrival of the German army. Ibid., p. 20.

184Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 97–99 and 157; Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche, p. 325. The commando was led by Karl Stumpp.
hands of the SS, specifically the Seventh Department (Amt VII) of the SS Main Department dealing with the so-called "national Germans" or Volkdeutsche—the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle or VoMi. Its head, SS-Brigadeführer and General der Polizei Horst Hoffmeyer, created thirty commandos (led by a Bereichskommandoleiter) which moved to the east and took over authority over each ethnic German village from the German Kommandant, a member of the Einsatzgruppen who had held it until then. Among other things, Hoffmeyer's commandos evicted or killed any remaining Jews or Slavs.185

The male ethnic German peasants were organized in a so-called Self-Defense Force (Selbstschutz), which was immediately armed with rifles if available. Like the politsai, these men participated in the Holocaust by arresting and guarding Jews (and presumably Roma), translating at the shooting pits, and covering the still-moving bodies.186 Whether any ethnic German saved Jews is unknown.187 But it should also be noted that, as in the case of the Slavs, numerous ethnic Germans were also shot on these occasions, after being denounced by fellow-villagers. The shootings of these "spoiled elements" was explicitly demanded in "Guidelines on the Treatment of the Ethnic Germans" (13 April 1942)—issued not by the SS, but by the very ministry led by former ethnic Germans such as Rosenberg.188

To what extent were the ethnic Germans similar to or distinct from the Ukrainians and other non-German inhabitants of Ukraine? Initially, Ukraine's ethnic Germans had reservations about or even feared the Third Reich.189 In large part this was because they knew very little

185Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 118 and 121–122. Still another organization of the VoMi that was present in Ukraine was Special Commando "R" (Sonderkommando "R"), led by Hoffmeyer himself. Although it was based in Transnistria, it had sections in Nikopol' and Halbstadt. Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche, pp. 325–326.

186Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 110–112.

187Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche, p. 368, says such cases were "apparently... even rarer than cases of help by Ukrainians or Russians," but this statement appears based on just one postwar account by a Jewish Holocaust survivor.

188Ibid., p. 315; Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 115 and 159. The guidelines, authored by Otto Brüning, speak of separating the "chaff" from the "grain" and demand the "exclusion" of "spoiled elements" ("Belastete Elemente sind auszuscheiden!").

189Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 105–106.
about it. Those in the cities lacked a German self-identity, while most of those in the countryside were more distinct and more pious as Christians. Reports about ethnic German opinion of Jews are just as contradictory as in the case of the non-Germans.

More important is the question whether the Nazi ideology, which elevated the ethnic Germans above the Slavic majority, had an impact on them. There were Mennonites who humanely agreed to vow for the reliability of Ukrainian prisoners of war, and thus helped them be released. During the formation of agricultural cooperatives, the ethnic Germans in the Khortytsia region reportedly considered it unfair that their non-German neighbors were discriminated in this regard. According to the Gebietskommissar of the Khortytsia district, these people had even initially "cried over Russia" when the war broke out. He told them several times that they had been liberated and should be glad.

But, as in the case of the Dnieper Ukrainians, there existed a generation gap in mentality among the ethnic Germans. The young generation—or at least the younger males—sympathized with Nazism. Strange as it may sound, this even applied to the traditionally pacifist Mennonites. As one of them recalls in a memoir, "We admired all things German uncritically and were unable to distinguish between good and bad. We had been under the Communist whip too long." His generation adopted the fascist salute ("Heil Hitler!"). Thus, hundreds of Mennonites, ranging in age from seventeen to forty, volunteered for administrative

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190 Pinkus and Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, p. 251; Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche, p. 345.

191 Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 106–108.

192 Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche, pp. 242–243; Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 92–93 and 108.


194 Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 181; Gebietskommissar Rehm, referred to in "Teilbericht Politik [...]", TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 35v.

195 Lohrenz, Lost Generation, p. 46. The person quoted is not Lohrenz, who lived in Canada since the 1920s. Lohrenz writes in the preface that he wrote the book in the first person, but as "the true story of one of these young Mennonites," namely a grandson of "a well known leader among the Mennonites of Russia." Lohrenz gave him the pseudonym Eduard (formerly Jacob) Allert. Ibid., p. 7. This man came from Liebenau, a Mennonite village near the Molochna River southeast of Khortytsia (i.e., in the second Mennonite colony; the first Mennonite settlement was near Khortytsia). This region is the Left-Bank section of today's Zaporizhzhia oblast.
and policing tasks. As one who joined the First Ethnic German Cavalry Regiment recalls, "the principle of non-resistance was forgotten, and the men felt it their duty to assist in the struggle against the fearful oppression we had been subjected to for so long." These younger Mennonites acted arrogantly vis-à-vis the Ukrainians, whom they called Russians. As the police veteran just mentioned puts it,

"We Mennonites had been suppressed for many years and our ethnic background had been made a matter of reproach. We had been called ugly names, had been oppressed in untold ways and our young people very seldom had been admitted to the institutions of higher learning. It was therefore not surprising that under the Germans our people were inclined to be somewhat domineering towards those who had for so long oppressed and rebuked them."

There were "some, but very few" acts of revenge, but this veteran adds that the Swabians were worse in this regard and "exceptionally cruel and vengeful."  

Along with changes in mentality among the younger generation came changes in the ethnic German standard of living. The ethnic Germans were the primary beneficiaries of wood, building materials, and Jewish property, including clothes. For them it was easier than for Slavs to receive permission to create an agricultural cooperative or to de facto introduce individual cultivation. Still, many ethnic German peasants migrated to the cities. This was the opposite direction of the migration of most non-Germans. From 4 March 1942, leaving the collective farm was punishable for all by a year of imprisonment or a fine (as high as the Reich German involved wanted it to be). But life in the city, with its jobs in the civilian

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196Ibid., p. 48. "Allert" was in its third squadron, stationed in the village of Waldheim in the Zaporizhia region. His brother joined the SS, in which he himself was forcibly enrolled later. Ibid., pp. 55 and 58. Pictures of Mennonites in German uniforms are on pp. 51 and 55. The Gebietskommissar in Khortytsia reported that he had "handed over" two thousand ethnic German males to the army and German offices. Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 183.

197Lohrenz, Lost Generation, pp. 48 and 52.

198Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 109; Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 187 (30 March 1942), p. 9. In October 1942, Himmler ordered the SS to provide every ethnic German in Ukraine with clothes obtained at Auschwitz and elsewhere. Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche, p. 373.

199Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 180; Otto Bräutigam, Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete während des 2. Weltkrieges (Tübingen, 1954), p. 79. Bräutigam adds that Reich Germans pretended not to notice when ethnic Germans introduced individual cultivation.
administration, the army, Organisation Todt, or the Central Trade Corporation East (ZHO), had a great appeal. If they worked in the civilian administration, ethnic Germans could indeed hold positions at all levels, ranging from being a mere translator and interpreter to ruling an entire district. Their salaries there were usually merely a tenth of what Reich Germans (Reichsdeutsche) holding the same jobs earned, but the 30 to 60 Reichsmarks—300 to 600 roubles or karbovantsi—were more than most Slavs earned. To ethnic German peasants, city life also lost little of its appeal because the ethnic Germans there did not receive the Reich German food rations. In the cities, as in the countryside, the ethnic Germans did not pay income taxes and paid less of the other taxes.

The ethnic Germans did not enjoy any more religious freedom than the Slavic population. In fact, if they were Roman Catholic they were rarely allowed to hold services. Unlike the Slavs, the ethnic Germans were supposed to receive an education longer than four years. Schools exclusively for ethnic German children were opened. Teaching materials from Germany were distributed, although in many places this happened only in May 1942. In the large cities, the teachers for these schools were re-educated, in part in special

200 The Gebietskommissar of the Korosten' district was an ethnic German called Lori and a former local high school teacher. Ol'ga Sergeevna Pominchuk ([Ukrainian?], interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 20 January 1946, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, l. 45.

201 Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 183.

202 "Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 37v (regarding city-dwellers in the Mykolaiv Generalbezirk).


204 The Roman Catholic church in Mykolaiv was closed, even though most members of the congregation were ethnic Germans. "Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 37.

205 The Kiev Generalbezirk had two such schools, in Kiev and Bila Tserkva. Fragment of "Lagebericht des Generalkommissars in Kiew für den Monat Mai 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 97, l. 60.

206 In February 1942, ethnic Germans received 48,000 primers, 10,000 school notebooks, and many books. "Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 266.

207 Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 165. Fleischhauer assumes that May 1942 was ordinary in this regard, but a fragment of the "Lagebericht des Generalkommissars in Kiew für den Monat Mai
camps in Germany. By the summer of 1942, however, Koch had the ethnic Germans schools closed.

To the dismay of the SS leadership, most Reich Germans did not treat the ethnic Germans with respect and, in fact, many mistreated them. One Gebietskommissar, in Novohrad-Volyn'skyi, even thought many of them were less willing to work and deliver produce than the Ukrainians. Therefore, he admitted to dispensing "harsh penalties," presumably imprisonment. Likewise, the Reich German who was in charge of Kiev's about five thousand "ethnic Germans"—all of whom spoke little or no German—is said to have treated them badly. Beatings with whips were applied to ethnic German peasants, and corporal punishment was also introduced at the schools.

From the outset, there was confusion as to who was an "ethnic German" (Volksdeutscher). Officially, the rule of the Reich Ministry of the Interior in 1941 demanded that an individual have at least three grandparents who were "pure Germans" in order to qualify. But Volksdeutscher status could also be conferred by the SS after "racial review." Moreover, it was even allowed to be granted to those who had no German ancestors at all, but who felt and acted as "members of the German nation" and about whom there were no "racial concerns." But the army officially denied that those of "foreign blood" could receive

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1942," at TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 97, l. 60, complains that the two ethnic German schools in the Kiev Generalbezirk had still not received teaching materials.

208Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 165.

209Ibid., p. 173; Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche, p. 322.

210Pinkus and Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, pp. 271–272.

211Professor N. A. Shepelevskii, "Prebyvanie nemtsev v Kieve," Typewritten document, signed, TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, l. 62 (calls the man Humbert). The figure of 5,000 comes from "Teilbericht Politik [...]," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 29v. Initially, the SD had "found" (erfasst) in Kiev around three thousand ethnic Germans. Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 125 (26 October 1941), p. 5.

212Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 180.

213Ibid., p. 123.

214Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 88–89.
Volksdeutscher status. On 29 April 1942, Koch ordered, and Rosenberg agreed, that it was reserved for those whom the VoMi or a Gebietskommissar recognized as such. Koch also banned any intermarriage between ethnic Germans and others (30 June 1942).

In the second half of 1942, Himmler personally became involved with the matter. In early September 1942, he ordered Koch to introduce an official registry which already existed in the Reich, the German Nationality List (Deutsche Volksliste). To be included in the registry meant that one took the first step toward German citizenship. But Koch was in no hurry and only issued guidelines to this effect on 7 December. Compared to the rules more to the west, they were broad, for reasons that remain unclear considering Koch's stated dislike (shared by most Ukraine-based Reich Germans) of the local ethnic Germans. The guidelines stated that even "carriers of German blood" who did not care about, or even rejected, "Germanness" should be put on the list. This, Koch said, was because Ukraine's ethnic Germans were particularly "pure," by which he meant they had intermarried less than those he knew better, in East Prussia. Even the spouses of ethnic Germans should be listed, unless they were Jewish, in which case they should be killed (receive "the special treatment"), along with any children from such marriages. When people were placed on the list, or at a later stage during the granting of German citizenship, "alien" first names were altered. On 19 March 1943, those on the Reichskommissariat list were made German citizens whether they wanted to or not.

215Ibid., p. 89.
216Ibid., p. 185.
217"National'na spravedlyvist'," Vasylykiv'ski visti, 18 October 1942.
218Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 166.
220For an account of a ceremony in Zhytomyr in February 1943, chaired by the Gebietskommissar, see Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 188–189.
221Ibid., p. 188. Category 1 (those with two German parents and a German identity) and category 2 (those like category 1 but married to a non-German, and the children resulting from such marriages) received citizenship without strings attached. Those in category 3 (people of "pure
The question arises what the Ukrainians and other Slavs thought of the ethnic Germans. Although the question cannot be definitely answered, it is almost certain that they did not consider them "our people," nashi. On the other hand, it is clear that many—"everybody," as one Kievan recalls—wanted to receive the status of Volksdeutscher. For this there were clear material reasons. Aside from lower taxation, being "ethnic German" allowed one to enter the "Germans-only" stores. Remarkably, many civilian German administrators seem not to have realized that there were many "fake" cases among those who reported their German ethnicity.

Acquiring the status of a Volksdeutscher was not that difficult, especially in the first year of German rule. This is something which the existing historiography, which tends to focus on the slow work on the German Nationality List and on the Berlin-based "experts" who objected against Koch's December 1942 order, has not taken into account. According to one Kievan, a bribe of 5,000 roubles did the job. Various memoirs show that many became "falsely" Volksdeutsche, even though both the German army and Koch officially barred those of "foreign blood," or at least "foreigners" who had no ethnic German spouse. Such cases included a Finnish family and a Georgian professor and his Ukrainian wife whose mother had one ethnic German parent. According to Fedir Pihido, most of these pseudo-Germans were

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[German] blood" who had adopted the identity of their non-German spouse, and the children from such marriages) received German citizenship for a ten-year probation period.

222Shepelevski, "Prebvanie," TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, l. 62.

223Pinkus and Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, p. 268.

224Ibid., pp. 268–269; Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 164. These authors do not consider this possibility either.


226Aleksei Mikhailovich Bashkulat (Ukrainian born in 1909), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 28 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 43.

227Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 89.

228Nikolai Kuz'mich Grun'skii [sic] (Ukrainian born in 1872), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 19 February 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 5 (referring to one professor Khokhutov); Kuznetsov, Babii iar, pp. 164–165. The phenomenon was not specific to the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Already before 1941, many Ukrainians who trained in the Generalgouvernement as army interpreters and the like did so as alleged "ethnic
"the same people who also had not felt badly under Soviet rule. Among them were many former members of the Communist party and those who had been trusted. That is, they were the so-called Soviet activists, the very representatives of that 'new socialist society' who had been cherished by and been the pride of the Soviet regime." In Vinnytsia it was rumored in 1943 that many of the local "ethnic Germans" were communists and NKVD agents. Because the ethnic Germans had significant freedom of movement—for example, they were legally allowed to use the train—they were deeply involved in the black market. When Seleshko asked "ethnic Germans" what they were, their apparent answer was "Russian." Others were "really" Poles; locals or those who arrived during the war. In western Volhynia, Ukrainian nationalists were enraged that those whom they considered Poles were registered as ethnic Germans.

In July and August 1942, Himmler told his colleagues in the SS and the Ostministerium that he planned to "resettle" and concentrate the ethnic Germans. The plans were elaborate. The approximately 45,000 ethnic Germans in the Zhytomyr Generalbezirk were to be concentrated in an area around Rivne, Zhytomyr, and Vinnytsia. The 20,000 ethnic Germans in the Mykolaiv Generalbezirk would be moved some place near the city of Mykolaiv. Those near Kryvyi Rih would be joined with those living around Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovs'k (the Halbstadt district, centered in present-day Molochans'k, and the Khortytsia district). The ethnic Germans in Kiev were simply to be "dispersed." Himmler's ultimate goal was to have, within twenty years, German-only cities, each with a maximum of 20,000 inhabitants, that would be surrounded by German-only villages and located at the intersections of highways and railroads.


230Seleshko, Vinnytsia, pp. 124 and 133.

231Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, p. 168.

232Ibid., pp. 170–172.
The implementation of these plans seems to have started only in the two westernmost Generalbezirke. In the Zhytomyr Generalbezirk, it was some time during the late fall of 1942 that many Ukrainian peasants were deported to the Left Bank. They were replaced by ethnic Germans from the infertile north, peasants who looked much like Ukrainians but spoke German. Both groups apparently received only a few hours' notice. By the end of the year, a new district called Hegewald had come into being, with 481 square kilometers and officially 8,000 inhabitants (including non-Germans who were still in the towns). Then the process was halted. The operation was accompanied by a 15 September 1942 decree by Koch, which granted these ethnic Germans use—not ownership—of land and farm houses equivalent to what they had owned years ago, on 1 January 1914. Through word of mouth, the twofold deportation became widely known in Ukraine. Both Slavs and ethnic Germans who heard about it were deeply disturbed.

Beginning in August 1943, the ethnic Germans of Ukraine fled or were deported westward. They moved by trains or with their own carts. Later some ethnic Germans who had been deported eastward by the Soviet authorities in 1941 returned to Ukraine. But the ethnic German communities in the countryside, existing since at least the late eighteenth

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233 Ibid., p. 174.

234 Professor Iu. Iu. Kramarenko, handwritten document, 30 November 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 4620, op. 3, d. 243a, ll. 103–104, a photocopy from the original at the GARF (Moscow), f. 7021, op. 65, d. 5, ll. 84–84v; "Übersicht über die Verwaltungseinteilung des Reichskommissariats Ukraine nach dem Stand vom 1. Januar 1943," TsDAVOV, f. 33206, op. 2, d. 231, l. 46. Kramarenko arrived in Troianiv in December 1942 and spoke to a doctor in the local hospital. "Usually they were ordered to get ready within several hours to hop with two families on one cart." As a result, he adds, it was not possible to take one's winter supplies along. I have concluded that this refers to both the Ukrainians and the ethnic Germans.

235 Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche, p. 332. Cf. Bräutigam, Überblick, p. 79 and Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 174–175, which both state incorrectly that the ethnic Germans received it as property.

236 Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche, p. 332. Cf. Bräutigam, Überblick, p. 79 and Fleischhauer, Dritte Reich, pp. 174–175, which both state incorrectly that the ethnic Germans received it as property.

century, ceased to exist. Even more than in the case of the Jews and Roma, the war put an end to ethnic German life in Ukraine.

It is still hazardous to generalize about the perceptions and behavior of the non-Jewish population regarding the Jews during the Holocaust. Those Ukrainians and others who were anti-Semitic before the war, remained so, even after the massacres, and regardless of their opinion of them. It seems reasonable to assume that Nazi propaganda turned a number of people into anti-Semites. (As did the confrontation with Jews after the return of the Red Army.) As for behavior, there is evidence of denouncing of Jews by large numbers of people, but there is also evidence of a small number who saved Jews. Both of these groups were minorities. The vast majority were simply bystanders.

In general, it is important to distinguish sentiments about Jews, whether positive or negative, from acts. The connection between them is by no means obvious. In a situation where it was possible to obtain quickly property or a reward, or to prove one's "reliability" despite a past membership of the Communist party, anti-Semitic sentiments frequently played a minor role in people's behavior. Moreover, that same situation was one of all-out terror and the death penalty for any subversive act. Thus, having Jewish friends by no means guaranteed that a person would help them.238 Finally, we saw that the so-called Volksdeutsche were privileged over all other natives, but that this did not mean that they were treated well. Even they were at the risk of being denounced and shot.

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238 One can also put it more charitably in reverse order. Many people who did nothing to help Jews did sympathize with them. For example, when the Jews of the Vinnitsia ghetto were ordered in April 1942 to assemble at the stadium, they were "surrounded by a large crowd of the local population. Some had family ties, there were also those who simply felt sorry for them and sympathized." Mikhail Ivanovich Sokolov, interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 20 January 1946 [Vinnysia?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, l. 32.
In early 1942, after many mass shootings of Jews and Roma and the first winter of hunger for city-dwellers and prisoners of war, the German authorities launched a campaign to obtain laborers for factories and farms in the Reich. By late June 1943, a million people had already been sent to Germany, as the campaign continued. This chapter aims to establish who directed and decided who was to be part of this massive and rapid migration, and describes how the potential candidates reacted. Initially, there was enthusiasm for going to work in the Reich. Then a radical mood swing occurred, during which most Ukrainians and other non-Germans became convinced that by going to Germany this was tantamount to death. From then on, the potential "eastern workers" (Ostarbeiter) resisted in every imaginable way. The authorities, for their part, responded with violence in order to fulfill the "recruitment" quotas. I also propose that the escalating violence related to the deportations was the main reason for the emergence of large-scale partisan activity in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

Few workers went to the Reich during the first months of the German presence in Ukraine. On 17 December 1941, 760 miners embarked on a train to Germany from Kryvyi Rih. As Reichskommissariat officials noted, recruiting these men was not easy.1 Some 6,400 unemployed metal workers left Zaporizhzhia for Germany in the same month. They were volunteers in the sense that they wanted to escape the famine in the city.2 But it was only in

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1"Lagebericht" for December 1941, Rivne, 14 January 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 27, l. 8. Cf. Rolf-Dieter Müller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter für die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft," in Ulrich Herbert, ed., Europa und der "Reichseinsatz": ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutschland 1938–1945 (Essen, 1991), p. 235, which states incorrectly that 1,200 were sent away on this occasion. In fact, the "Lagebericht" notes that about half of those initially meant to be on the transport were taken out, because of poor health or because of "defense" reasons, which probably means that the German Army wanted to employ them.

early 1942, when a massive propaganda campaign started, that the number of people transported westward assumed a large scale.

The propaganda appeared mainly in the print media: newspapers, leaflets, brochures, an itinerant exhibition, and a great number of large, brightly colored posters. The newspapers contained supposedly real-life stories about people going to Germany. At work places and as an opening preview in movie houses, the film "Come to Lovely Germany" was shown, which portrayed young people laughing and singing all the way to a warm reception by a German farmer. The radio broadcast accounts from Germany by alleged Ostarbeiter (the official term for "eastern workers" used in Germany but not in Ukraine). In general, however, oral propaganda did not assume a significant scale until the end of 1942. From that point, the propaganda campaign was spearheaded by Ukrainians who were supposedly Ostarbeiter on holiday. As they traveled around Ukraine, they told happy tales of life in Germany, usually in public speeches at movie showings and at specially arranged meetings in market squares.

The propaganda campaign stressed many supposed benefits of working in the Reich. One was simply "getting to know Germany." Erich Koch promised that those working in Germany—as well as those migrating to southern Ukraine to work there—would be the first to

3E.g., Nina Kaliuzhna, "Divchata idut' do Raiku," Dzvin voli, 17 December 1942, p. 3.

4Anatolii Kuznetsov (A. Anatolii), Babii iar: roman-dokument (New York, 1986), pp. 338–339; Vera Filippovna Kal'nitskaia ([Russian?]), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, [no date], [Kiev?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 85.

5Ortwin Buchbender, Das tösende Erz: deutsche Propaganda gegen die Roten Armee im Zweiten Welkrieg (Stuttgart, 1978), p. 280. More common at that stage were radio talks by native officials who had visited German cities and praised them. On talks on 21 September 1942 by the mayors of Dnipropetrov's'er and Dniprodzerzhyn's'er and a peasant, see Savchenko, VRIO NKVD USSR to N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvedsvodka no. 33/68 o polozenii v okupirovannom protivnikom g. Dnepropetrovskie. Po sostoianiuiu na 20. 10. 42g.," 21 October 1942, Engel's, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, l. 75.

6"Ukrains'ki robitynyky z Nimechchyny vidviduiut' Ukraynu," Ukrains'kyi holos, 29 October 1942, p. 4 (item from Rivne about a group of twenty-one visitors); ibid., 1 November 1942, pp. 1 and 4 (announcement of meetings); Meldungen, 32 (4 December 1942), p. 24; ibid., 43 (26 February 1943), pp. 22–23.

receive land once the time was ripe for land distribution. While in Germany, the workers would earn a good wage and would not have to pay for housing or medical care. Every month, part of the wage would be deposited in a personal savings account, which could be used after one's return. In the meantime, dependent relatives would receive financial support. Moreover, the workers would learn skills which would later provide them with good jobs back home.

Because of all of these benefits, the workers would be happy. Posters depicted those abroad with the simple text: "Life in Germany is great! We are happy here in Germany!" Another poster had a longer text: "Who of us, Ukrainians, would have thought that we would be asked whether we would like to work in Germany? Only now do we, who accepted that offer and are living in Germany, understand why Stalin erected a wall around us and did everything to prevent us from finding out what was happening over the last ten years in Germany, which is the land of true socialism."

Besides personal benefits, German propaganda stressed that leaving one's homeland to work elsewhere was a patriotic duty. Such an approach was very similar to Soviet propaganda. Simply put, "While Working in Germany, You Defend Your Fatherland!"

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8"Reikhskomisar Ukrainy Erikh Kokh do ukraïns'kykh selian," Filiia, Tsentral'na naukova biblioteka im V. I. Vernads'koho, Natsional'na akademia nauk Ukrainy, Kiev. Viddil starodrukiv, item no. 1484. Cf. Ukraïns'kyi holos, 26 March 1942, p. 4, which mentions merely a promise by Koch that work in Germany will be taken into account if gardens will be enlarged.

9Buchbender, Das tönende Erz, p. 281.

10Examples of texts on posters: "Vyïzhzhaiate na remisnychy pratsiu do nimets'kykh fabryk, povnete dosvidchennymy fakhivtsiamy." Scholarly Reference Library, collection "Afishy ta plakaty okupatsiinoho periodu," item 87sp; "Id'te na pratsiu do Nimechchyny! Te chomu Vy tam navchaytes', prihodyt'sia Vam piznishe na bat'kivschyni." Ibid, item 310sp; "My pratsiuiemo v Nimechchyni dla myru ta vidbudovy! Koly povnershia na bat'kivschchynu, to z nabutym u Nimechchyni znamiam ty matymesh dobre oplachuvanu pratsiu." Ibid., item 590sp; "On rabotaet v bol'shom, svetlom pomeshchenii. Gernans'kii master daet raz"iasnenia i pokazyvaet kak obrashchat'sia s sovremennymi mashinami." Ibid., item 235sp.

11"Zhizn' v Germanii prekrasna! My shchastlivyi zdes' v Germanii! Priezzhai i ty siuda!" Ibid., items 244sp and 245 sp. Another example: "V Nimechchyni meni duzhe dobre!" Ibid., item 180sp.

12Part of a poster, DAKO, f. r-2519, op. 1, d. 80, l. 250v.

13Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 258.

14Buchbender, Das tönende Erz, p. 282.
More precisely, it would "help destroy Bolshevism." Working in Germany was part of an alleged collaboration between "western Europe" and "the liberated East." The workers of the East do their best in Germany's factories, works, and fields, while qualified German workers help to get life in the East in order. All this is done in order to defeat Bolshevism entirely and to create a better life for all the workers in the liberated territories." A later message argued that "at a time when German youth is going to the front and won't come home until the war is over, Ukrainian youth must perform its duty to work."

Church leaders of both orientations were forced to join the propaganda campaign. In June 1942, an appeal by Metropolitan Polikarp of the Autocephalous church appeared in the press which dealt with the "rumors" about bad living conditions in Germany. He stressed both the alleged benefits and the duty to go. His clergy should "explain to their congregations all the favorable conditions and rewards which surround the work of the worker in Germany, and which also take care of his family which stays home." In addition, work in Germany was considered to be part of the fight against "Muscovite-Jewish communism." Among the leaders of the Autonomous Orthodox church was Bishop Veniamyn (Novyts'kyi) of Poltava and Lubny, who issued a call in late 1942 which was rather different. His statement was neither anti-Semitic or anti-Russian and mentioned merely that the Germans wanted people to leave. In fact, this appeal could be taken to mean that Veniamyn held an entirely different opinion—"every Ukrainian worker should understand his indebtedness to those who are sacrificing their lives at the front for the well-being of all."
Initially the propaganda campaign to work in Germany met with success. In mid-January 1942, around 1,500 young Kievs showed up at the Labor Office (Arbeitsamt) as volunteers. Within a few days they left by train, to the sound of a brass band at the station.\textsuperscript{20} Two more trains with Kievs left in late February. The transports were with good food in cattle cars that were covered with straw, but had no sanitary provisions.\textsuperscript{21} The motivation of the volunteers varied. One was a genuine curiosity about the industrially most advanced country in Europe, which had been "aroused even more by the stories of German soldiers," while other reasons were the expectation of a good salary and the promise of a quick return.\textsuperscript{22} Among those Kievs leaving in February were many who felt that they had nothing to lose, for they were starving.\textsuperscript{23}

In the countryside, there were even more volunteers, young people who had essentially the same motivations (except for hunger).\textsuperscript{24} One woman who did not really volunteer but obeyed a call-up recalls that "we had a certain hope that in Germany we would earn something, even if bad food was tasteless."

\textsuperscript{20}Poslednie novosti, 12 January 1942, p. 4; "Lagebericht für Januar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 35.

\textsuperscript{21}Antonina Khelemendyk-Kokot, Kolhozne dytnystvo i nimets'ka nevolia: spohady (Toronto, 1989), p. 145: "We were fed well, they gave bread, butter, sausage, and sometimes prepared sandwiches. We had never eaten the kind of sausage which the Germans gave us. True, our sausage, spiced with pepper, garlic, and mustard was also tasty, but the German one turned out to be much tastier."

\textsuperscript{22}Tat'iana Fesenko, Povest' krivykh let (New York, 1963), p. 82.

\textsuperscript{23}Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 258; Kal'ntskaia, CHPWU interview, l. 85. According to one Kievan, most Kievan volunteers were former inmates of Soviet camps, but this seems doubtful. F. P. Bogatyrychuk, Moi zhiznennyi put' k Vlasovu i Prazhkomu manifestu (San Francisco, 1978), p. 142.

\textsuperscript{24}Mykhailo Lebid', "Chasy nimets'koi okupatsiï v Matiivs'komu raionі na Volyni (Spohady kol. holovy raiono'vi upravy)," Litops UPA, Vol. 5 (Toronto, 1985), p. 211; Ulas Samchuk, Na koni voronomu: spomyny i vrazhennia (Winnipeg, 1975), p. 199; Julia Alexandrow with Tommy French, Flight from Novaa Salow: Autobiography of a Ukrainian Who Escaped Starvation in the 1930s Under the Russians and Then Suffered Nazi Enslavement (Jefferson, North Carolina, and London, 1995), pp. 58–59. The Ukrainian archives holds many documents prepared by village elders containing signatures of people identified as volunteers, but it is conceivable that some—or even many—signed under duress. One list, from the village of Romashky (Rokytne), dated 5 June 1942, is at DAKO, f. r-2294, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 9–9v.
and would get ourselves some decent clothes. For we saw that all Germans were dressed in quality clothes, made from good fabrics and well sewn."\(^{25}\)

Knowledge of the mistreatment, killing, and starvation of the prisoners of war, Jews, and Roma did not dissuade such people from going to the homeland of the perpetrators. The same woman cited above describes what she, and undoubtedly the volunteers, thought at the time. "True, we still remembered the shootings of the Jews in Berdians'k, but we also recalled the good treatment on the part of Germans during our trip [in 1941] from Berdians'k to our village. We told each other, maybe it won't be that bad in Germany. The Germans are supposed to be a civilized [kul'turnyi] people; why, therefore, should they treat us cruelly?"\(^{26}\)

By mid-1942, however, there were hardly any more volunteers.\(^{27}\) Statistics from the Kiev Generalbezirk show a decline from 4,030 volunteers in June to 425 in August, to a mere five in September, and thereafter none.\(^{28}\) By the end of the summer of 1942, 153,000 people, or almost 7 percent of the population of the Kiev Generalbezirk, had been sent away. At that stage, the regional SD reported that the population no longer wanted to go to Germany, "despite" the frantic efforts at propaganda, confiscation of cattle, and death threats.\(^{29}\) The main

\(^{25}\) Khelemendyk-Kokot, Kolhospe dytynstvo, p. 143.

\(^{26}\) Ibid.


\(^{28}\) In April and May 1942, 41,900 were transported from the Generalbezirk; in June 35,978; in July 17,649; in August 2,178; in September 3,755; in October 19,626; in November 21,486; in December 8,655. There are no figures for January 1943. In February 1943, 8,840 were deported; in March 17,904; in April 26,047; in May 41,943; in June 18,633; in July 13,725; and in August 5,045. Müller, "Rekrutierung," p. 240.

According to Generalkommisar Magunia, in February 1943 "only" 11,259 people were deported from the Kiev Generalbezirk. If Magunia's number for the deportations is correct, the figures in Müller's article may be too low. On the other hand, Magunia may have inflated the number. He blamed the supposedly low number on flights, which in turn he ascribed to the unreliability of native policemen and the lack of German policemen. Magunia report, Kiev, 1 March 1943, USNA microcopy T-84, roll 120, frame 419294.

\(^{29}\) Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), pp. 19–20; Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik,
reason why the number of volunteers declined were the conditions of life and work in the Reich. Particularly resented was the fact that Ostarbeiter, whether or not they volunteered, had to wear a badge with the word "OST." The badge barred them from entering theaters, movie houses, and restaurants. Those working in factories and living in camps were frequently beaten, had bad housing, and received bad food.

It should be said, however, that the overall meaning of the Ostarbeiter experience is not entirely clear. The small number who worked for farmers were generally satisfied with their treatment and payment. Some even wrote initially that they planned to stay in Germany. (Later they became homesick like the others.) On the whole, the Ostarbeiter worked much harder than either western or Balkan foreign workers. Already in Ukraine, women generally used to work harder than men. As Ostarbeiter they did not slow down and actually worked harder than any captive males, whatever their country of origin. As late as 1944, these women were 90 to 100 percent as productive as German workers. Why they worked so hard requires some explanation. A Russian survey of former Ostarbeiter in the 1990s found that many described their time in Germany as the best time of their lives. Does this explain why they worked so hard? The hard work was perhaps simply a habit that was difficult to break, or it

p. 313 (the figure, from an SD report of August 1942).


31There is a substantial literature about this, such as Ulrich Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1997). The SD reported also that "very many" volunteers who worked in factories were disappointed. Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 25.

32Iakiv Nesterovych Vasylenko (Ukrainian born in 1924 in Medvyn), author interview in Ukrainian, 22 July 1995, Medvyn, Bohuslav raion, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording (speaks of a woman who later said her stay at a German farmer had been a better life than in Ukraine); Meldungen, 7 (12 June 1942), p. 14.

33Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 25.


may have reflected an effort to prove oneself too valuable to be killed. The relative satisfaction may have had nothing to do with the working conditions, but with the workers' social life. Pihido also worked in Germany and has noted that even though he and his fellow-Ukrainians were "semi-slaves," they felt free, actually freer than ever. "We talked whatever we wanted to talk about, without fearing that somebody might be eavesdropping, that we would be denounced, or that we would have to give an account to an NKVD investigator for some carelessly expressed thought."36

Back in the Reichskommissariat, on 19 February 1942, Koch ordered that aid be given to family members of Ostarbeiter.37 But it frequently took much time before the aid was issued. The aid usually was in the form of money, 130 or less roubles (and later karbovantsi) per month.38 This family support, released to the native administrations by the Stadt- and Gebietskommissare, was automatically subtracted from the Ostarbeiter wages, even in cases when the latter had not at all supported a family in the past, and often in greater amounts than 130 roubles.39 Although the amounts were very low, at least the relatives received them.40 Late in 1943, the amount was increased in certain parts of Ukraine.41


37Ukraïns'kyi holos, 29 August 1943, p. 4.

38On 31 March 1942, the Stadtkommissar of Kiev ordered the city administration to pay the relatives of Ostarbeiter who depended on the latter—as well as Kievans whom the Labor Office had recruited as car drivers—130 roubles per month and to give them "food rations at hard prices." This involved at that stage the families of 2,912 Kievans who had gone to Germany. Ukrainian translation of letter, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, l. 68; Nenadkevych and Saiko, "Proekt kostorysa [sic] Viddilu Suspiľ'noї Opiky Kyïvs'koї Mis'koї Upravy na vyplatu pensii ta dopomoh [sic] za chas z I.IV 1942 r. d. I.IV 1943 r." DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 7, ll. 60-62. Cf. Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 191 (10 April 1942), p. 32.

39Vice-mayor Volkanovych to Stadtkommissar, letter, 4 June 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 8, d. 9, ll. 25-26.

40That the amounts were too low is admitted in Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 25. Evidence that the amounts were collected (all from 1943) is at DAKO, f. r-2457, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 64-66 and 80; ibid., d. 80, ll. 208, 219, and 233-234; and DAKO, f. r-2519, op. 1, d. 8, l. 5.

41Ukraïns'kyi holos, 2 September 1943, p. 4 (speaks of 180 karbovantsi).
Several weeks after the departure of the first volunteer trains, the German authorities allowed letters to be sent.\(^{42}\) Still later, both Ostbeiter and their relatives in Ukraine were urged to send postcards. These cards had an detachable half which could be used to acknowledge receipt of the letter.\(^{43}\) Still, many relatives had no official mail connection whatsoever with Germany.\(^{44}\) Moreover, letters and postcards could take months to be delivered. This even applied to the vast majority of letters (over eighty percent) that were not opened by the censors in Germany.\(^{45}\) Nevertheless, considering the conditions of war and the huge volume of the mail, the system can be said to have worked well and continued to do so until the very end of the German presence.\(^{46}\)

Normally, Ostbeiter were allowed one letter per month. Most legal Ostbeiter letters were apparently not fully candid. As some writers stated, they could not be.\(^{47}\) It is doubtful, as the Ostbeiter (and the SD) came to believe, that most negative letters were confiscated.\(^{48}\) This was impossible because of the huge numbers. Indeed, many other sources say that the letters minced no words, and mentioned beatings and other bad conditions, even while noting positive

\(^{42}\)Meldungen, 7 (12 June 1942), p. 13. Within and between cities of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, there was also a postal service that natives could use, the Deutsche Dienstpost Ukraine. The word "Ukraine" was printed on stamps from Germany which said "Deutsches Reich." Postcard, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 17, d. 1, l. 88; Liudmyla Stanyslavivna Khmivels'ka (Ukrainian born in 1923 in Kiev), author interview in Russian, 13 July 1995, Kiev, tape recording; A. Peleschuk to deputy mayor Volkonovych, letter, Kiev, 19 August 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 1, d. 108, l. 21v; Arkadii Liubchenko, Shchodennyk: knyzhka persha (Toronto, 1951), p. 100; Arkadii Liubchenko, "Shchodennyk," Novi dni, III, 28 (Toronto, May 1952), p. 12; Україns'kyi holos, 16 April 1942, p. 2.

\(^{43}\)Україns'kyi holos, 17 September 1942, p. 3; ibid, 11 October 1942, p. 3; "Poshta dlia tykh, shcho idut' do Nimechchyny," Dzvin voli, 27 November 1942, p. 3. One such card, sent from Germany to Kiev, is at DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 17, d. 1, l. 87.

\(^{44}\)In such cases, the Ostbeiter involved may actually have died in Germany. Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), p. 12; ibid., 43 (26 February 1943), p. 22.

\(^{45}\)Report, in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, p. 307. Censored letters which arrived sometimes had holes in them and crossed-out sentences, notes Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 259.


\(^{47}\)Meldungen, 24 (9 October 1942), p. 22.

\(^{48}\)Ibid., 43 (26 February 1943), p. 24.
aspects. More circumspect writers somehow conveyed the truth about their living conditions and homesickness. This might be through coded language which had been agreed upon before their departure. For example, a worker might write that she or he lived "like the Shevchenkos," who would be a particularly poor family in the village.

Relatives were permitted to send letters and packages with clothes, food, or money—at least until 1943, when such items started to get "lost" in the mail. Peasants in particular sent their Ostbeiter relatives bread, rusks, lard, and even butter, so that thousands of packages piled up at all post offices every day.

The Ostbeiter quickly found ways to send letters illegally. Usually this was done through a German soldier based in Ukraine, with whom a female Ostbeiter corresponded. A letter to this German would include one or more other letters, which he then hand-delivered. Other illegal letters were delivered by Polish guest workers, apparently in person after returning from holidays.

49 Ibid.; H. Sova [Hryhorii Kariak], Do istorii bol'shevyts'koi diis'nosti: (25 rokiv zhyttia ukrains'koho hromadianyna v SSSR) (Munich, 1955), pp. 87-88; Mikhail Mikh. Skirda [et. al.], "Otchet o podpol'noi partiinoi rabote i partizanskoi bor'be v Kirovogradskoi oblasti (avgust 1941 goda - mart 1944 goda)," n.d., typewritten document, signed, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 18; Bogatyrchuk, Moi zhiznennyi put', p. 142; Meldungen, 7 (12 June 1942), p. 13; ibid., 21 (18 September 1942), p. 12.

50 Tetiana Ivanivna Pyskovets' (Ukrainian), interview in Ukrainian by the CHPWU, 22 January 1946, village of Borodianka, Kiev oblast, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, l. 74.

51 Auslandbriefprüfstelle Berlin ("Im Entwurf gez. Tornau"), "Stimmungsbericht auf Grund von Briefen, die im April und Mai 1943 ausgewertet sind, über: Ostbeiter (Post aus und nach der Ukraine)," Berlin, 18 June 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, l. 13v.

52 "Poshta dla tykh, shcho 'dut' do Nimuchchyny," Dzvin voli, 27 November 1942, p. 3 (apparently does not deal with a specific region); Nina Serhiivna Zozulia (Ukrainian born in 1929 in Oksaverivka [Vasyl'kiv raion, Kiev oblast]), author interview in Ukrainian, 21 July 1995, Bohuslav, tape recording (confirms sending lard). From October 1942, it was not allowed to add letters to packages. Ukrains'kyi holos, 8 October 1942, p. 4.

53 Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), p. 22.

54 Der Sonderbeauftragte f.d. Arbeitskräfte aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, report based on Ukrainian propagandists traveling in Ukraine from June to August 1943, Berlin, 30 November 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, l. 49.
But the most important source of truth about the living conditions were Ostarbeiter who returned from Germany in large numbers from the middle of 1942. Usually these were young people who had fallen seriously ill, suffered an accident, or had become disabled during Allied bombardments. Among the returnees were women who had become pregnant and disabled people over 65, who had somehow been deported to Germany. These people were put on eastbound cargo trains without any food or medical assistance. According to the SD, many women died on the way.55

Hence, through these various means, news about the conditions of the Ostarbeiter reached Ukraine very quickly. Fear spread through word of mouth gradually assumed huge proportions. A Soviet leaflet started a rumor that those who left would be put to work in northern Africa.56 Another rumor held that the deportations were a way to obtain workers for trench digging at the front.57 People in large cities were the first to know that the Ostarbeiter were treated worse than all other foreign workers. They were also the first to exchange stories of people being "sold" and bad treatment by German farmers.58 Girls and women feared that they would be put into brothels.59 People also started thinking and saying that the deportations were just like the deportations to Siberia under Soviet rule.60 In one Podolian village, a man was hanged in the summer of 1942 for saying this out loud at a gathering.61


56Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), p. 15.

57Russian-language leaflet of unknown date which denies the rumor, DAKO, f. r-2209, op. 1, d. 85, l. 4v; similar leaflet in Ukrainian, Filia, Tsentral'naja naukova biblioteka im V. I. Vernad's'koho, Natsional'naja akademia nauk Ukrainy, Kiev, Viddil starodrukov, item no. 1402.

58Meldungen, 32 (4 December 1942), p. 10; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 260.


60Meldungen, 32 (4 December 1942), p. 10 (on the Dnipropetrov's'k region); report by
Many people were mortally afraid of going to Germany. They were convinced that in Germany they would die from famine or Allied bombs.62 Some believed that there was a great famine throughout Germany.63 In the Berdychiv region, one rumor in mid-1942 had the following scenario. Hitler would soon win the war and demand that Stalin release German prisoners of war. Stalin, however, would not do this, perhaps because he had killed them. Hitler therefore would take revenge by having all "Russians" killed, among whom would be Ukrainian Ostareiter.64 People also started to doubt that Germans were only exterminating Jews and Roma.65 During at least one transport of workers from Novohrad-Volyns'kyi (then called Zviahel') in western Volhynia in mid-1942, it was rumored that "in the foreign land" (na chuzhyni), everybody would be shot and turned into soap.66

Deportation to Germany was also the central theme of what might be called the new folklore.67 All preserved songs and sayings about the topic reveal a deep sadness. A typical passage read: "I'm leaving school/ Why should I study?/ I must become a slave/ In a foreign

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61The order to hang the peasant was issued by Gebietskommissar Halle of the Vinnytsia district, not later than mid-August 1942. "Teilbericht Politik über die Bereisung des Reichskommissariats mit Prof. v. Grünberg in der Zeit vom 13.8. bis 3.9.1942," Rivne, 20 September 1942, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 26, l. 28v.


63Meldungen, 24 (9 October 1942), p. 13 (regarding the Berdychiv region).

64Ibid.

65Alexandrow, Flight from Novaa Salow, pp. 72 and 79.

66Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), p. 15. An "immense fear of deportation to Germany" among young people is noted in ibid., 54 (14 May 1943), p. 16.

67"Vid zbyracha," IMFE, le. I. Prytula collection, f. 14–3, od. zb. 24, ark. 5. Prytula collected folklore in the Berdychiv region while the Germans were still there.
land. These materials sometimes stated explicitly that one would die while in Germany. "Goodbye, dear friends/ When you see these names, speak well of us/ We are going to die/ Once we arrive in Germany.../ We got here because of the politsaï/ Who are kissing the Germans' asses" (a writing on a wall).

When there were no more volunteers, Fritz Sauckel, who since March 1942 was the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, sent out commissions to conduct deportations, which were described as "recruitment" (Werbung, verbovka, verbuvannia). His demands on the Reichskommissariat Ukraine were high. The target was 225,000 workers in the last three months of 1942 alone, and another 225,000 in the first four months of 1943.

Still later, Sauckel demanded that beginning on 15 March 1943, three thousand and then six thousand workers be apprehended each day.

Sauckel's commissions told the Generalkommissar in question the number of people they wanted and usually added that they wanted them quickly. At that stage, the number was divided again, and each Gebietskommissar and Stadtkommissar received a target number. The Labor Office, which these Germans headed, then divided the number among the raion chiefs or, in the case of a Stadtkommissariat, simply passed on the number to the native mayor.

68 "Shkolu ia pokyny.../ Nashcho meni vchytys'?/ Dovedet'sia na chuzhyni/ Raboiu zrobytys'." Recorded from peasant women in the Kiev region, late 1942 or early 1943, IMFE, K. Tolchenkovka collection, f. 14-3, od. zb. 25, ark. 27.

Most popular of all were adaptations of the Russian sailors' song, Raskinulov's more shiroko. There are countless versions, some with more than one verse. One example: "Raskinulis' rel'sy shiroko/ Po nim eshelony letiat/ Oni s Ukrainy vyvoziat/ V Germaniiu nashildi rebiat." Tamara Nikol'chenko, "Nevol'nycha pisennist' ukraïns'koho Polissia periodu Velykoï Vitchynzianoï viïny," Narodna ivorchist' ta ethnografiia, 3 (Kiev, 1992), p. 40.

69 "Dopobachennia, shchyri druzi,/ Iakshcho pobachyte tsi imena, zhaduite tykhym slovom,/ My vyîzzhaïemo na smert'/ Iakshcho doïdëmo do Nimechchyny.../ Popaly siudy cherez politsaïv, /laki lyzhut' sr... nimsiam." "Nadpysy radian'skykh hromadian, iakykh nimtsi vidpravlialy, pidchas okupat'si Ukrainy v Nimechchynu," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 99 (probably censored by the Communist party official who wrote this down later). Also: "We probably have to die/ In foreign unknown lands." "Kopii zapisei. Peresyl'nyi punkt po ofravke v Germaniiu shkola-38 po Nekrasovskoi ul. 2," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 601, l. 110.

70 Letter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, 3 October 1942, in Müller, Die fashistische Okkupationspolitik, pp. 337–338.

Kiev and other major cities, additional branches of the Labor Office were set up at each district administration. All the native administrators were threatened with death if they would not supply the requested quota of "recruits."

Some time in late 1942, the procedure changed. Native officials were no longer told to supply a certain number, but simply to hand over all people born during certain years. Hence, in 1943, everybody born in 1926 and 1927 was apprehended.

Thus, in contrast to the Holocaust of the Jews and Roma, for the deportation of workers the Nazis needed native-born local officials. The latter were forced to become closely involved. It is still too early to generalize about their response until there is detailed study of the records of each locality. It appears, however, that the mayors of the large cities did not consult the population at all. In the countryside, the raion chiefs had the luxury of being able to blame subordinates, the village elders. The chief would demand from each elder that he fill a particular quota by compiling a list of names. The elder had to send that list by a certain date to the raion center. Officially, it went not to the raion chief, but to newly created Labor Offices at the raion level. In reality, however, it is unlikely that these raion Labor Offices amounted to much. If they did constitute a separate office, it is unlikely that they were headed by a German, as they were supposed to be, because there was a great shortage of German personnel in Ukraine.

At conferences in the raion center, village elders received further instructions. They were to exclude certain categories from the lists they submitted—forest workers, quarry workers, railroad workers, road builders, and employees of the Machine-Tractor Stations and the state farms. But the elders still had some tough decisions to make. They were not obliged

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72 Otto Bräutigam, Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete während des 2. Weltkrieges (Tübingen, 1954), pp. 92–93; Müller, "Rekrutierung," p. 239; Fesenko, Povest', p. 82.


74 In the Novi Sanzhary raion, the Labor Office was headed by a German (a "Nazi") called Sabin, according to Sova, Do istorii, p. 87.

75 For example, the letter from chief Pustovit of the Rokytna raion in the Bila Tserkva district to the elder of Romashky, 29 May 1942, DAKO, f. r-2294, op. 1, d. 2, l. 5, requesting forty more
to consult the local villagers, and they may or may not have convened a village meeting to decide how the quota would be filled. In fact, such meetings seem to have been rare by late 1942.

In order to avoid being put on the list, it was essential to have the right connections. The family members of policemen and native administrators were especially protected. Otherwise, there was much arbitrariness. From one household, two or more children might be called up, while from other homes none. In general, the first to be drafted were "outsiders," that is, people who did not live in a given village before 1941. Usually, these were former prisoners of war. Also among the first non-volunteers were people particularly disliked by the native authorities. These "undesirables" varied from place to place. In many villages, they might be Communist party members and other Soviet activists. In others, they were known Ukrainian patriots or children of victims of Soviet persecution. Still another vulnerable group were what the Reichskommissariat leadership called "adolescent, undernourished children and infirm gray-haired people of both sexes." For these people, who were reportedly "randomly names by 4 June.

The records of the village administration of the Polissian village of Maksymovychy say the following: "Upon demand of the raion administration, 156 people were chosen for transport to Germany to work, and three people for a commission to deal with this matter." Protokol no. 12, 7 April 1942. At a later meeting, those gathered "talked about the appointment of people for transport to greater Germany, 82 people." "Protokol n. 17," 3 June 1942, DAKO, f. [r-]215, op. 1, d. 5, ll. 21 and 29.


Pihido-Pravoberezhyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," p. 155; Mikhail Nikolaevich Sviridovskii (born in 1908), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 3 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOV, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, II. 9–14 (regarding a village in the Kiev region); Sova, Do istorii, p. 87 (calls them "volunteers").

According to reports from Reichskommissariat officials, 1,202 prisoners of war were deported to the Reich from the Reichskommissariat by 1 March 1942, and 5,876 more by 1 April 1942. It is unclear to what extent these figures include former prisoners who had been living legally in the villages. "Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 268–269; "Lagebericht für März 1942," ibid., l. 319.


Pihido says this was done by the leaders of many raions, whom he calls "hidden Soviet agents." Pihido-Pravoberezhyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniana viina," pp. 162–163.
recruited" as early as April 1942, there was apparently little sympathy or action to prevent their deportation, although in the case of the adolescents it is also possible that they "volunteered" to escape from hunger.81

There were also other natives in a position of some authority who proposed candidates for deportation. In cities, house custodians were involved from the very beginning. In Kiev, for instance, custodians reported to the Labor Office "many ill people, old people unable to work, indeed even cripples, and anybody they dislike[d]."82 According to the SD, "formerly active Communists [in Kiev], who feel threatened by their neighbors, report them for work to Germany, in order to be able to continue their Communist activity without hindrance."83 It is incorrect, however, to say that such denunciations were only practiced by Communist party members. In particular, it was done by supervisors at jobs, who also tended to allow ill or the least productive employees be deported if they had to choose candidates. As a man who worked at Vinnytsia's housing department put it afterwards, "a shef merely had to point at somebody and he was sent to Germany." He recalls a native agricultural official who moved to another apartment and ordered his employees to carry things. One woman protested. Soon hereafter, a car took her to the Labor Office, and within hours she was on a train to Germany.84 Likewise, when the head of Kiev's Aid Committee heard that a man had refused to go to a certain village to load turf, he had him sent to Germany.85

Memoirs by former raion chiefs stress that they did their best to prevent the deportations. Hryhorii Kariak of the Novi Sanzhary raion writes that "we" placed young people in various offices and organizations, whether they were needed or not. "Such measures

81"Lagebericht für den Monat April 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 369. The document does not specify whether this was in cities, the countryside, or both.


83Ibid.

84Mikhail Ivanovich Sokolov, interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 20 January 1946 [Vinnytsia?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, ll. 35–37 (quote from 36).

85Letter by H. A. Lahs to vice-mayor Volkanovych about this action by committee head Nenadkevych, 23 September 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 15, d. 22, ll. 60–61v.
protected hundreds of people," although he concedes that thousands of others had to leave for Germany.\textsuperscript{86} Mykhailo Lebid' of the Lukiv raion writes that parents begged him not to send their children. His administration collected data which supposedly showed that many candidates were needed for work which the \textit{Gebietskommissar} considered important, such as the construction of a railroad, work at a sawmill, and work in the fields. But this happened after 70 percent of the \textit{Ostarbeiter} quota for the raion had been fulfilled. Hence, the \textit{Gebietskommissar} agreed to a lower quota. As a result, supposedly "not more than 200 persons" went to Germany from this raion in two years.\textsuperscript{87}

The actual situation was rather different, however. It was the raion chiefs and the city mayors, who, fearing for their own lives, started arresting people for deportation. They did this with the help of the Gendarmerie or the Schutzpolizei. At the time, Sauckel even blamed the resulting violence on the native administrators.\textsuperscript{88} That was unfair, but the fact remains that the "auxiliary" administrations were deeply involved in the round-ups, which were inherently violent.

There is some good documentation dealing with Kiev. In early April 1942, the head of the Railroad (\textit{ZaIiznychnyi}) District was worried. Since the district was more like a village than an urban area, few people lived in communal houses. Thus, without house custodians it was difficult to supervise the population. Aside from the fact that people were rarely at home, they could quickly flee to the countryside, where they had connections. Thus, only about thirteen persons from the Railroad District signed up each day as volunteers. All this made the overall daily target of fifty "recruits" hard to meet. Therefore, this district head asked his superior, Mayor Forostiv's'kyi, to order the district Schutzpolizei to arrest people. This could be done, he said, on the basis of the police list of "undesired elements," as well as with a similar list which

\textsuperscript{86}Sova, \textit{Do istorii}, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{87}Lebid', "Chasy nimets'koï okupatsii," pp. 212–212.

\textsuperscript{88}Bräutigam, \textit{Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete}, p. 93.
his district administration had prepared. Forostivs'kyi issued the requested order to the
district Schutzpolizei and also authorized the district head to carry out with the Schutzpolizei
large-scale nighttime house searches. As he explained, no order from Stadtkommissar
Rogausch was needed for such searches.

The round-up of laborers was hardly new to Kievan. As late as 1920, the Soviet
authorities carried out daytime round-ups of labor "deserters." In the spring of 1942, L.
Nartova captured the general mood about the deportations (at that stage, mostly of children
aged 14) in her diary: "I am still under 55, I could also be taken and we are all very worried
about this.... We are stuck in a terrifying, terrible captivity and all thoughts center around one
thing—who among our acquaintances and loved ones will lose their children, who will not be
able to hide them. Liusia, Kostia, Galochka, Alesha... God, what a terrible, insane grief for
parents."

The cities experienced massive night-time house searches, conducted by native and
German officials and policemen. Everyone was apprehended, even overnight guests and
mothers of small children. Only those children were left behind. One woman was only caught
after several escapes, in which she ran out into the street via the attic and the neighbors' house.
Kiev's Podil district saw one such massive operation on an early Sunday morning, 12
July 1942, from 3:00 to 11:15 a.m. The main aim was to arrest people without a job or without
the (recently introduced) labor card. The operation was led by the Schutzpolizei, but all Kiev-

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89The district population included "a significant group of former household workers, who
previously worked for the Jews in the city center, but migrated to the city outskirts after their [the
Jews'] liquidation and the fires in the center." Letter by district administrator Bokii to
Forostivs'kyi, 12 April 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 1, d. 107, ll. 21–23.

90Forostivs'kyi to Bokii, letter, 15 April 1942, DAKO, f. r-2356, op. 1, d. 107, l. 24.


92Nartova diary, ll. 10–11, notes of 21 and 28 April 1942.

93Kal'ntskaia, CHPWU interview, l. 85. That even mothers of small children were arrested and
forced to leave them behind unattended (although the mothers were later released), is confirmed
for Berdychiv on 2 August 1942, in Meldungen, 24 (9 October 1942), p. 22.

94Selinchuk, CHPWU interview, l. 16.
based members of the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsschutzmanschaft (native Schuma members borrowed by the Sicherheitspolizei) participated. Each squad consisted of one German and nine native Schutzpolizei members, one Sicherheitspolizei member, one Sicherheitsschutzmann, and an interpreter. Despite its extent, this round-up was a failure. Not only was the timing bad—it was the weekend, when many city-dwellers tended to be out of town—, but the neighborhood had received an advance warning. After several selection rounds, the almost random arrest of some 1,600 people left only about 250 candidates for work in Germany, the vast majority women.95

Round-ups by Germans with dogs and native policemen at markets became a frequent phenomenon throughout Ukraine's cities. Allegedly, the round-ups were conducted to combat speculation, but in fact the hunt was always for laborers, in particular young villagers, for they had no labor cards and were thus unlikely to be rescued by employers. In Kiev, "people rushed about with eyes wide with horror, overturning baskets and stands, but the German policemen implacably shoved the screaming women and pale men into the large cargo vans."96 On 2 May 1942 alone, some 1,400 young people were rounded up this way in Kiev. Their parents were told to bring them underwear, a coat, and shoes. "It astonished [ubito] everybody, people are moving around like dummies," Nartova recorded. "The streets are dead, even the children are in hiding. They fear that the Germans will take them away."97

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95Report by SS-Obersturmbahnführer Erich Ehrlinger, Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Kiev, 20 July 1942, in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, pp. 302–304. This report states that the native policemen were overzealous and "partly" arrested everybody. A total of 1,645 people were arrested, essentially anybody who was found. First the detainees were marched to the precincts (Abschnittsreservestellen), where about 390 were released. Then they were taken to the main precinct (Hauptbefehlssstelle, Revier II "Podol"), where Labor Office officials arrived and released a further 646. The remaining 614 were driven by car to the SD at 15 Korolenko Street. Here still more releases took place, so that only 476 arrived at the transit camp. Even there the releases continued, on the basis of illness (about 75) and appeals by German offices (145). Ultimately only 255 people were left, the vast majority (two hundred) women. Cf. Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), p. 21, which is obviously based on this report.

96Fesenko, Povest', pp. 82–83; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 337. Kuznetsov says that people got used to the round-ups, which is not confirmed elsewhere and must be doubted.

97Nartova diary, ll. 11–12, note of 1 [sic] May 1942 (quote from 12).
Eventually, such post-arrest notices to parents were no longer provided. Persons simply disappeared without a trace until they might send a letter from Germany. Round-ups also occurred in parks and at movie or other theaters. Many people thought that ruses were used, although in reality they probably were not. In Rivne, for example, a sale of consumer goods was held which ended when a round-up started.

From the middle of 1942, people were even shot while attempting to escape from the round-ups. One summer Sunday, German and native policemen cordoned off the market of the town of Oleksandriia and the streets which surrounded it. A man recalls that "the politsai beat with butts and shot anybody who tried to run away. There were many wounded and people were shot dead." In Kiev in October 1942, people were listening to a band at the market when the area was cordoned off. Several people who tried to escape were apparently shot.

At this stage of the discussion, it should be noted that there were several other kinds of "migration." These included: (1) agrarian labor in southern Ukraine; (2) work in the countryside in general; (3) maids for German families; and (4) scientists. The first campaign focused on going to southern Ukraine, where there was a shortage of laborers to work the fields and harvest the crop. The German authorities aimed to move by foot 400,000 people, presumably peasants. The first are known to have left on 3 March 1942. It is unlikely that

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98 Kal'ntskaia, CHPWU interview, 1. 85; requests for information about disappeared relatives in Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 10 January 1943, p. 4, ibid., 9 April 1943, p. 4, and ibid., 22 April 1943, p. 4.

99 Vanda Antoynovna Volovskaia (Pole born in 1923), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, [Dniprodzerzhyns'k?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 150.

100 D. S. Korotchenko to N. S. Khrushchev, "O sostojanii partizanskogo dvizheniia na pravoberezhnoi Ukraïn'e," 22 July 1943, n.p., TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 6, ll. 32–33.

101 Skirda, "Otchet [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 19, quoting one F. M. Antonenko.

102 Nartova diary, 1. 16, note of 6 October 1942.

103 "Lagebericht für Februar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 268.
there were many volunteers among them, and they do not appear to have been promised anything substantial.\textsuperscript{104} Otherwise, nothing is known about this campaign.

The same applies to the practice of forcing city-dwellers to work in the countryside. The plans, made by agrarian officials of the Reichskommissariat, were ambitious. Those officials were enraged that not all land had been cultivated by the time the winter of 1941–1942 arrived, and they planned to send 407,000 city dwellers, including school children, to work in the countryside in the spring of 1942.\textsuperscript{105} Some 50,000 Kievans were to be put to work in the Kiev region. The officials wanted each worker to dig daily a hundred square meters under the supervision of the native police. Groups and subgroups of 5,000, 500, and 50 people should be formed. Salaries were not to be provided, "for such payment would be unprofitable."

Instead, for every hundred square meters dug, a laborer would receive a note giving him or her "priority" during supposed vegetable sales and permission to buy directly from German outlets food worth two roubles.\textsuperscript{106} It seems that the fields the planners had in mind were those belonging to the former Soviet state farms (radhospy). The Gebietskommissar in Zaporizhzhia is known to have sent out city-dwellers to finish the fall ploughing after the deportations to Germany endangered it. Thousands of people were separated from their families in the process. Many managed to flee back to the city, however.\textsuperscript{107}

A particularly notorious hunt for additional workers for the countryside involved the Medical Institute in Kiev, which functioned during the 1941–1942 academic year under the

\textsuperscript{104}The Reichskommissariat leadership doubted from the very beginning whether there would be enough volunteers for such a large-scale migration. "Lagebericht für Januar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 30. A man asked the raion administration in Bohuslav in February 1942 to free his daughter from being sent to southern Ukraine for agricultural work; see his letter to the "Bohuslavs'ka Volost,'" 12 February 1942. DAKO, f. r-2107, op. 1, d. 131, l. 24.

\textsuperscript{105}"Lagebericht" for December 1941, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 27, l. 21; "Lagebericht für Januar 1942," TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 36.

\textsuperscript{106}RKU Hauptabteilung III, Abteilung Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, Hauptsowchensverwaltung und Güterbewirtschaftung to the Generalkommissar in Kiev, 22 January 1942, Kiev, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 121, ll. 1a–2.

\textsuperscript{107}Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 20.
In the spring of 1942, applications for entering the program in the next fall were issued and the number of students increased rapidly. During the summer of 1942, the Gebietskommissar sent about 1,500 medical students into the countryside to work. They actually had a happy time with lots of food, according to one of them. That was not the end of the story, however. Upon return in Kiev in the fall, they were warned to go into hiding, for they would be deported to Germany. On 13 November, all students were ordered to gather and to receive information about "the guiding principles of the work of the Polimedykum."

Less than one hundred out of 2,500 students showed up. They heard that the institute would not reopen and that all students had to report two days later at the "recruitment office" at 24 Artem Street (then called L'viv Street) by 2:00 p.m. The same order was issued over the radio and by Generalkommissar Magunia in the press.

Then a massive hunt for the medical students started. "The first warning to those who did not appear was that the [authorities] would confiscate their parents' bread cards. Then [they threatened to] exile or even execute them for sabotage." Accepting medical students as employees carried the death penalty, while those already employing any had to report it. In practice the parents and relatives of those in hiding not only lost their food cards, but were

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110 Kravchenko, author interview.

111 Of those hundred, only about sixty were not pregnant or not considered too ill to be deported. Reinhardt in Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 12 November 1942, p. 4; Jerabek, Das Schulwesen, p. 114.


113 Nartova diary, l. 19, note of 12 December 1942.

taken hostage. Only then did a number of students give themselves up, while many others fled Kiev altogether.\textsuperscript{115} Others were caught in the street during the periodic large-scale round-ups targeting young people.\textsuperscript{116} Together about a hundred medical students were deported by the end of the 1942, although this was far short of the German goal.\textsuperscript{117}

During the summer of 1942, Hitler personally ordered the additional "recruitment" of 400,000 women and children to help in household work German women, who were themselves often working outside the home. By that time, Hitler had become convinced, after personally seeing "Aryan"-looking Ukrainain peasants, that Ukrainians had traces of "Germanic" blood, supposedly because the Goths had lived in the region. He could be pragmatic and decided that Germans would benefit by assimilating some Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{118} The press called on all "girls" not older than thirty-five to volunteer, citing among the benefits the opportunity to use tap water and to cook with gas or electricity.\textsuperscript{119} Whether any girls or women volunteered is unknown, but by early 1944, an estimated 50,000 such maids were working in German households, most of whom were Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{120} Finally, a number of scientists and technical specialists were pressured to go to Germany. Those who went probably worked under privileged conditions, but little is known about this category of "recruits."\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115}Jerabek, \textit{Das Schulwesen}, p. 115; report based on a source ("Gewährsmann") who visited Kiev and Odessa, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292536.
\item \textsuperscript{116}Liubchenko, "Shchodemnyk," \textit{Novi dni}, III, 27 (Toronto, April 1952), p. 4, note of 23 November 1942. On 27 November 1942, Liubchenko's neighbor, a student, told him that the medical students were being looked for everywhere, but those caught had not left Kiev yet, because there was typhus in the transit camps in L'viv. Ibid., III, 28 (May 1952), p. 11, note of 27 November 1942.
\item \textsuperscript{117}Jerabek, \textit{Das Schulwesen}, pp. 114–115.
\item \textsuperscript{118}Adolf Hitler, \textit{Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1944: die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims herausgegeben von Werner Jochmann} (Hamburg, 1980), p. 331, comment of 6 August 1942; Bräutigam, \textit{Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete}, p. 93.
\item \textsuperscript{119}"Ukrains'ki divchata v nimets'kykh domashnikh hospodarstvakh," \textit{Dzvin voli}, 27 November 1942, p. 4; "Divchata i zhinki! Nimets'ke khatnie hospodarstvo chekaie na Vas!" Scholarly Reference Library, collection "Afisy ta plakaty okupatsiinooho periodu," item 300sp.
\item \textsuperscript{120}Herbert, \textit{Hitler's Foreign Workers}, p. 439n209. Herbert simplifies the matter by calling them Russian maids. Ibid., pp. 187–189.
\item \textsuperscript{121}Müller, "Rekrutierung," p. 242. In May 1942, Mayor Forostiv's'kyi invited scholars and their
Every person who was apprehended in Kiev eventually arrived at 27 Artem Street. This was an assembly point consisting of several houses and a yard fully fenced off and under heavy guard. This place, formerly part of school property and in the tsarist period a barracks, now processed thousands of "recruits," partially under the open air. Doctors, presumably Kievnans, performed a superficial medical check. Despite the tight security, there were escapes. Moreover, some parents were able to bribe the Schutzpolizei to let their child out. Otherwise, the parents simply stood outside and waited for the moment when their child was chased across the street into the "recruitment office" (biuro naboru) at 24 Artem Street. There personal data were recorded before departure. The "recruits" had to cross the street quickly, and the police often lashed those who wouldn't move. After leaving this office, the prisoners were taken on foot or sometimes by streetcar to the train station.122

Peasants who lived in a region where there was no train station nearby were also held at the camp at 27 Artem Street. Almost every morning, the nearby streets overflowed with hundreds of mainly young people from all parts of Ukraine, who were chased along by politsai toward the camp.

Loaded with bags with warm clothes and with trunks on their shoulders, they were sweltering. Behind them was a whole string of rickshaws, which the exhausted 'volunteers' had rented with their last money. They obviously had no more energy to carry everything they needed on the road and abroad. Among them were also very young ones, and some of the women had small children in their arms. The Kievnans usually stopped to watch the extraordinary procession. They looked after it for a long time, full of surprise and horror. But some of the onlookers said ironically, 'Ukraine is being liberated from the Ukrainians.'123

students to Germany, where they were promised work. Nikolai Kuz'mich Grunskii [sic = Grunskii or Hrun's'kyi] (Ukrainian born in 1872), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, TsDAHOW, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, ll. 1–5v. Velychkiv's'kyi gives a proud account of how he was able to prevent scientists being taken to Germany: Mykola Velychkiv's'kyi, "Sumni chasy nimets'koï okupatsii (1941–1944 roky)," Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, XII, 3 (London, 1965), pp. 297–298.

122The "recruitment" office was the former Military Registration Office (Voenkomat). Another deportation site (peresyl'nyi punkt) in Kiev was at 2 Nekrasov Street. Narova diary, l. 22, note of 26 April 1943; Fesenko, Powest', p. 82; Selinchuk, CHPWU interview, l. 17; Bogatyrchuk, Moi zhizhnennyi put', p. 143; Kal'ntskaia, CHPWU interview, l. 85.

123Pavlo Terniv's'kyi [Ivan Zhyhadlo], "Sphohady emigranta," pp. 55–56. Autograph manuscript, 1945, Library and Museum, Ukrainian Cultural & Educational Centre, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. This author was in Kiev from early 1943.
The round-ups in the countryside in 1942 were at least as brutal as those in the cities. The native Gendarmerie went from house to house, initially during daylight. The following is a typical scenario. On 25 June 1942, Ukrainian policemen arrived in the Podolian village of Pochapyntsi (Chemerivtsi) to collect 260 young people. They were merciless, as a woman who was then nineteen recalls. "When they arrived at our house and wanted to pick up Ivan and me, I walked back into the room, and threw myself on the pillow on my bed. I didn't want to go. I cried, 'I don't want to go! I am not going! I'm staying here!' I held the bedstead as tight as I could. A militiaman, who had walked after me into the room, grabbed me by the neck, pulled me up, placed the rifle in my side and led me away." It was peculiar to the countryside that the mothers of those rounded up cried inconsolably, as if they were mourning a dead child.

The arrested peasants might be locked up for the night at the local police station or at the village administration, or they might be lined up immediately for transport. The line-up took place in the village square, as the remaining villagers looked on. The police then surrounded the group on all sides and shouted, "March!" (Rushai!). If the police brought a band, it struck up a happy tune. "Women ran along the column, screaming, sobbing, and throwing themselves on the necks of their daughters," writes Anatolii Kuznetsov. "The politsaï pushed them away and the women fell to the ground. At the back walked the Germans, who chuckled at the scene." Relatives followed the convoy at a distance.

By the fall of 1942, threats and beatings of those peasants who did not go immediately—that is, those who were discovered in hiding—were common. The beatings were

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124Fuhrmann, Schneebruch, p. 53.

125Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 273; Skirda, "Otchet [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 19; "U Nimechchynu divchata/ Na poïzd vidpravliaiut'sia/ Hirko plache kozhna maty/ Iak z mertvymy, proshchaiut'sia." Song of peasant women in the Kiev region, IMFE, K. Tolchennikova collection, f. 14–3, od. zb. 25, ark. 34.

126Skirda, "Otchet [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 19.

127Germans were not always present during such round-ups in villages. Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 274, describing events in the village of Rykun'. Usually the captives were marched away, but Fuhrmann, Schneebruch, p. 54, says they were taken away on carts. For another, rather euphemistic description, see Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 115.
administered by the native police or Germans. For example, girls in the village of St. Bezradychy (Obukhiv) were beaten severely and also were bitten by a bloodhound. In 1942 a girl in the same village who was discovered in the fields was beaten with a whip by a German.128

The round-ups had a great impact upon everyday life of villages. Teenagers and middle-aged villagers started evading the usual roads and paths and walking via little-known ones.129 In the village of Zarubyns (Pereiaslav), from the end of 1942 people took turns standing guard on a hilltop. If the guard left his or her spot, this was an indication to the others that the politsai were on their way across the Dnieper. By the time the policemen arrived, everybody was in hiding and the village was completely abandoned.130 Such devices were practiced everywhere. The deportations may also have made many people work harder, since they hoped that by doing so they would become too valuable to be taken away.131

As in the large cities, movie theaters in the towns became unsafe, for they were occasionally surrounded and those inside deported.132 After a while, the countryside and town raids were carried out mostly at night. During such raids, huts were surrounded and a warning went out that anybody who tried to flee would be shot. As a result, many peasants—and in some regions almost all of them—started sleeping elsewhere than at home, in the garden or perhaps in a hole in the ground.133

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129As for example in the village of Zarubyns. Valentina [Valentyna] Maksymivna Liashchenko [Liashchenko?], (Ukrainian born in 1916), interview in Ukrainian by the CHPWU, 8 August 1946, village of Zarubyns, Kiev oblast, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 249, l. 7v.

130Ibid., ll. 7v–8.

131Mariia Khtodosiivna Hohulia (Ukrainian born in 1927 in Medyn), author interview in Ukrainian, 22 July 1995, Medyn, Bohuslav raion, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording.

132Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123 report, l. 67 (regarding the town of Smila).

133Pyskovets', CHPWU interview, ll. 72–74 (worked in the hromhosp in Borodianka); Auslandsbriefprüfstelle, "Stimmungsbericht" based on letters checked between 11 August and 10
Frustrated by such actions, the German authorities demanded that harsher action be implemented. Generalkommissar Schöne of the Volhynia-Podolia Generalbezirk on 31 September 1942 ordered the burning of the homes of those who refused to go, and the arrest as hostages and transfer to labor camps of any relatives of such resisters.\textsuperscript{134} This guideline was immediately implemented everywhere in the Generalbezirk. Even entire villages were burned down. The following description is from a local letter and describes events in the Kremenets' region village of Bilozirka (Lanivtsi) in the night of 1 October 1942.

An order had come to provide twenty-five workers. The people designated by the Labor Office received recruitment notices, but none of them showed up, they all fled. Then the German Gendarmerie arrived and started to set fire to the houses of those who had fled. The fire became very big, for it has not rained for two months. Moreover, there were hay stacks in the yards. You can imagine what happened. The people who rushed to the scene were not allowed to put out the fire. They were beaten and arrested. As a result, six farms burned down.

Meanwhile, the gendarmes [also] set fire to other houses. People fell to their knees and kissed their hands, but the gendarmes went wild at them with batons and threatened to burn down the entire village. I don't know how it would have ended had [our fellow-villager] I. Sapurkanyi not intervened. He vowed that the workers would be there by the morning. During the fire, the [native] militia combed through the neighboring villages, apprehended the workers, and placed them under arrest. Wherever they did not find workers, they locked up the parents until the children showed up.

In those neighboring villages, the letter continues, "the fires went on day and night," and those slated for deportation who did not appear even then were condemned to death by shooting.\textsuperscript{135} It is likely that the other Generalkommissare issued the same orders. Hostage-taking is known to have been practiced in the Kiev Generalbezirk in late 1942 by at least one Gebietskommissar.\textsuperscript{136}

September 1942), Berlin, 11 September 1942, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292556; SD report about a conference on 12 August 1942, in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, pp. 313–315 (regarding the Polis'ke district and the Zhytomyr Generalbezirk).

\textsuperscript{134}The order appears not to have been preserved. Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, p. 280.

\textsuperscript{135}Auslandbrießprüfstelle, "Stimmungsbericht" based on letters checked between 11 September and 10 November 1942, Berlin, 11 November 1942, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frames E292549/12–15, published in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal [TMWC], Vol. 25 (Nuremberg, 1949), pp. 78–79 and in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, pp. 359–360. This report says such burning was reported, from early October 1942, in letters "from a whole series of localities."

\textsuperscript{136}SD report to Max Thomas, 19 December 1942, in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik,
The boarding of the trains, in large cities or at countryside stations, was yet another occasion for highly emotional scenes. In the square before Kiev's train station, a brass band played in April 1942 during deportations. "Thousands of people with knapsacks on their shoulders are crying and sobbing, bitterly saying farewell to their native land."\textsuperscript{137} Parents were not allowed to approach the locked cargo wagons. They were actually "shot at," according to a Communist report of early 1942. "At the station [and village] of Pisky near Lokhvysia, there were casualties among the old men and women who ran to the station from where their arrested sons and daughters were being sent off."\textsuperscript{138}

Besides the violent "recruitment" measures in cities and villages, the German authorities also introduced medical exams. In Kiev, everybody was called up from October 1942 to be examined by a commission of Labor Office officials and a doctor. Such "medical" commissions eventually existed everywhere in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{139} Nartova in Kiev was among those who went.

We suffered a good deal. But there were also comic moments. One of us female teachers showed up with make-up and we didn't recognize her. She had painted her hair (the Germans don't like gray), made blue spots under her eyes and elsewhere, put on large glasses, stooped, and went before the commission. The Germans were sitting at the tables, acting important and serious. She approached the table. They barely looked at her. Passport! She gave the passport. '\textit{45, nein,}' he said. We couldn't help but laugh to ourselves.

Nartova and the others were also saved by their gray hairs.\textsuperscript{140} Sometimes, the city commissions traveled to the countryside. There was often no real selection. Although officially ineligible, old people and fourteen-year-olds were often taken.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{137}Nartova diary, l. 10, note of 21 April 1942.

\textsuperscript{138}Berdnik, "Kharakteristika polozhenii [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 123, ll. 67–68.

\textsuperscript{139}The commission in Melitopol included a "baroness" Diiul'fin, who was cruel, also according to many Germans. Vera Petrovna Rukosueva ([Lithuanian?] born in 1892), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, [no date, Melitopol?], stenographic report., TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, ll. 128–131. Rukosueva was a teacher of German who worked as a registrator at the Labor Office in Melitopol'.

\textsuperscript{140}Nartova diary, l. 17, note of 28 October 1942.
It was in connection with these commissions that popular resistance assumed a truly large scale. People started mutilating themselves in order to be disqualified. Usually they provoked a skin disease like scabies, which could occur by rubbing one's skin with garlic. The same result came from applying a yellow spring flower (molochai) to one's face, which made it swell, or caustic soda, which roughened one's skin. Still others produced skin sores by rubbing themselves with hard brushes followed by vinegar or paraffin (kerosin).

Some skin afflictions were calculated to be temporary. A middle-aged peasant woman in one village applied grounded "Lylypus" herbs on the skin of her son and nephews. They all walked around for six weeks with swellings and wounds—just long enough to be declined by the commission in Rzhyschiv, after which the skin could be easily healed by applying potato leaves and sugar. If the German authorities found out, women who used such tricks were invariably arrested.

Another common practice was the ingestion of poison. The object was to create a sickly complexion. Young people smoked tea leaves for this purpose. Drinking a "tea" made of

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141 Rukosueva, CHPWU interview, II. 128–131.

142 Ol'ha Mykolaïvna Kutsenko (Ukrainian born in 1926 in the village of Poberezhka), author interview in Ukrainian, 18 July 1995, Bohuslav, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording. A saying from the Dnipropetrov's'k region in 1943 said, "I got scabies, so I didn't end up in Germany"; "Korosty dostala, v Germaniiu ne popala." IMFE, T. Krazyts'ka coll., f. 14–3, file 20, ark. 61 and 493. See also Kal’nitskaia, CHPWU interview, I. 84.

143 Moskovs'ka, author interview (adds that these girls were beaten for doing this).

144 Nikolai Makarovich Kharchenko ([Ukrainian?] born in 1906), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 22 January 1946, [Melitopol?], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, l. 92.

145 Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 260.

146 Memoir of Fydosia Zakharovna Masyna, [Velykyi Bukryn,] 10 August 1946, written down by two teachers of the Pedagogical School in Pereiaslav-Khmel'nyts'kyi, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 249, II. 28–28v.

147 Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), p. 6, about the arrest in the police Kommandeur-Bereich Rowno of a 68-year-old woman who provided young people with herbs that induced wound-like rashes.

148 Evgenia Dosifeevna Ponizovskaia ([Russian] born in 1899), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, [date and place unknown], stenographic report (signed by her on 19 January 1946), TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, l. 30.
tobacco turned one's skin sallow.\textsuperscript{149} Pouring perfume in one's eyes, or otherwise poisoning them was also practiced.\textsuperscript{150} Other types of self-mutilation included chopping off a finger or hand,\textsuperscript{151} cutting one's leg and putting dirt in the wound,\textsuperscript{152} burning one's skin, having oneself bitten by a mad dog,\textsuperscript{153} or having a fake appendicitis operation.\textsuperscript{154}

Self-mutilation became a mass phenomenon. In the town of Znam'ianka (near Kirovohrad) alone, over a thousand young people mutilated themselves between February 1942 and July 1943.\textsuperscript{155} It appears to have been particularly frequent among female deportation candidates.\textsuperscript{156} This was, of course, risky. In numerous cases, the skin disease or other illness turned out to last for the rest of the person's life.\textsuperscript{157} Some people even died from their self-mutilation and poisoning.\textsuperscript{158} (Deliberate suicides were apparently rare.\textsuperscript{159}) Moreover, success

\textsuperscript{149}Ibid.; Kharchenko, CHPWU interview, l. 92.

\textsuperscript{150}Rukosueva, CHPWU interview, ll. 128–131; Mariia Vasylelenko, author interview.

\textsuperscript{151}Kuznetsov, Babii iar, p. 260 (about a woman in Kiev's Kurenivka district); Mariia Khtodosiivna Hohulia (Ukrainian born in 1927 in Medvyn), author interview in Ukrainian, 22 July 1995, Medvyn, Bohuslav raion, Kiev oblast, Ukraine, tape recording (about a sister of a former brigade leader called Dubovy).

\textsuperscript{152}Rukosueva, CHPWU interview, ll. 128–131 (about one Vasha Zhivogliadov, who hereafter had to lie down for two months).

\textsuperscript{153}Both practises are mentioned in Skirda, "Otchet [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 38.

\textsuperscript{154}Nartova diary, l. 16, note of 6 October 1942. She also mentions that people swallowed medicine.

\textsuperscript{155}Skirda, "Otchet [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 38.

\textsuperscript{156}"Before the transportation of the workers to Germany the girls mutilate their arms and legs, and the boys are in hiding. Quite a few escape on the way and return to their parents' homes." Quotation from letter in Auslandsbriefprüfstelle, "Stimmungsbericht," Berlin, 11 September 1942, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frames E292556–557.

\textsuperscript{157}Rukosueva, CHPWU interview, ll. 128–131; Kutsenko, author interview (not referring to herself).

\textsuperscript{158}Kharchenko, CHPWU interview, l. 92; Skirda, "Otchet [...]," TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 38.

\textsuperscript{159}In Pervomais'k, a girl born in 1925 committed suicide after visiting an old fortune-teller who told her that in Germany famine, beatings, and misery awaited her. The German authorities tracked the fortune-teller down on the basis of the suicide note and had her hanged. Viktor Ivanovich Faremchenko, interview in Russian by the CHPWU, [no date, no place], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 246, l. 138.
was not assured. Eventually even an affliction like scabies did not necessarily avert one's deportation.160

Doctors frequently assisted in helping to disqualify people from deportation. To them this was nothing new, as the memoirs of the medical doctor Fedir Bohatyrychuk show. In 1941, during the Soviet retreat, Kievan doctors had "helped all those who wished to stay as much as they could." They had given out statements about fake illnesses, which demanded that people stay in bed; had performed fake operations; had reported on non-existing tests; and had used other people's x-ray pictures. They even had declared some people insane and placed them in the psychiatric hospital.161 Now, under the Germans, doctors again issued fictional statements of illness and made false plaster legs.162 There were apparently cases of doctors who even induced illnesses.163 In the Vasyll'kivka raion, a doctor in 1942 produced sores on people's arms and legs, apparently by arrangement of Communist underground activists.164 In Kremenchuk, almost all doctors tried to declare those caught too ill to go, claims one of these doctors. She says they supplied x-ray pictures as proof of tuberculosis, and hid their hospital "patients" in their own homes if they received word that they would be checked by a doctor from the Raion Health Department.165 In doing this, the doctors placed themselves at great risk. In Kam"ianets'-Podil's'kyi, six doctors were arrested for refusing to treat people with typhus fever and for supplying false medical reports. Their penalty is unknown, but it was probably

160Kutsenko, author interview.

161Bogatyrychuk, Moi zhiznennyi put', pp. 126–127 and 129–130. Bohatyrychuk himself was under treatment in 1941, while pretending to have been bitten by a mad dog. He adds that the fake psychiatric patients were later shot by the SS along with the real patients.

162M. V. Koval', Bor'ba naseleniia Ukrainy protiv fashistskogo rabstva (Kiev, 1979), pp. 75 and 77, cited in Kvitnitskii-Ryzhov, "Iz istorii zdravookhraneniia," p. 64.

163Kvitnitskii-Ryzhov, "Iz istorii zdravookhraneniia," p. 64.

164Trofim Ivanovich Panchenko ([Ukrainian?] born in 1899), interview in Russian by S. P. Lauta of the CHPWU, 22 January 1946, [Novomoskovsk?] stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, l. 65.

165Vera Fedorovna Bogdanova ([Russian?] born in 1911), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 20 January 1946, [no place], stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 117.
Thus it is not surprising that the doctors and nurses sought compensation for helping people in this way. On the other hand, the high rejection rate by some medical commissions should perhaps be explained by a desire to help people evade deportation without cost. Consequently, doctors acquired a good name among the locals, which would be useful after the return of the Red Army.

There were also evasive tactics which did not involve disease. Because initially only single people were taken, many rushed into a marriage. Girls especially tried to become pregnant, for those with children up to the age of twelve were officially ineligible for deportation. A German journalist reported in June 1943 that because pregnancy was the only legal way to avoid deportation, population figures in Ukraine kept rising. By then, however, there were also cases where the authorities forced abortions on pregnant women. People also eagerly took in and adopted children from children's homes and day nurseries. Borrowing children from neighbors and going to the commission with them was also practiced.

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168 In the Mykolaiv Generalbezirk, medical examinations one day rejected 72 percent of those investigated. Usually, about 35 percent was rejected, in Mykolaiv about 58 percent. About two fifths of those declared unfit had tuberculosis. *Meldungen*, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 25.


172 Who carried them out, and in what circumstances, remains unclear. Auslandbriefprüfstelle Berlin, "Stimmungsbericht [...]" Berlin, 18 June 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, l. 13.

173 Nartova diary, l. 16, note of 6 October 1942.

Five people were arrested in Kiev on suspicion of making a fake Labor Office stamp, which declared people ineligible.\textsuperscript{175} Less risky, and more common, although often costly, was paying bribes. A bribe might for example change people's age. All native judges (\textit{Schlichter}) heard countless cases in which parents swore that their child's birth date had been recorded incorrectly. In reality, they said, the child was younger. The parents then produced proof in the form of a godfather or godmother. This method was successful if all sides proceeded quickly and agreed about the nature and size of the bribe.\textsuperscript{176} The house custodians also could be bribed, with money or food, so that they would not report people or would warn of upcoming round-ups.\textsuperscript{177} In exchange for bribes, officials of the native administrations dropped cases, or provided some kind of legal job which lifted the deportation threat. The payments these officials demanded might consist of two or more liters of liquor, or a large amount of money. Initially 1,000 roubles sufficed, but then 15,000.\textsuperscript{178} The native police could be bribed as well, as could Germans who worked in the civilian administrations or the police.\textsuperscript{179} In exchange for sexual favors, the latter might supply a statement that a person was employed by Germans.\textsuperscript{180} At Vinnytsia's Labor Office worked a certain Koval'skaia, who as an official \textit{Volksdeutsche} could afford to accept bribes openly. She apparently demanded gold, foreign currency, and high-quality clothes.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{175}\textit{Meldungen}, 17 (20 August 1942), p. 6.


\textsuperscript{177}Kravchenko, comment on Klavdiia Iakovlivna Hrynevych (Ukrainian born in 1930 in Klyntsi [Kirovohrad oblast]), author interview in Russian, 10 August 1995, Kiev, tape recording; \textit{Meldungen}, 7 (12 (June 1942), p. 13.

\textsuperscript{178}Iurii Mikhailovich Markovskii (Ukrainian born in 1904), interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 12 March 1944, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 244, l. 18; Kal'ntskaia, CHPWU interview, l. 84; Nartova diary, l. 16, note of 6 October 1942; Kuznetsov, \textit{Babi iar}, p. 261.

\textsuperscript{179}"Stimmungsbericht," Berlin, 11 September 1942, USNA microcopy T-120, roll 2533, frame E292557.

\textsuperscript{180}Seleshko, \textit{Vinnytsia}, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{181}Ibid.
After the Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad, the violence surrounding the campaign to obtain Ostasbeiter increased in intensity. For the year 1943, there are countless reports of brutality occurring during round-ups in the countryside. The police acted as if they were hunting for "wild animals." Captives were locked up. The SD described in early 1943 the conditions in the detention site in Uman, which were very likely typical that winter. Captured males and females—probably mostly teenagers—were placed in separate sections of a school, pressed together tightly, even though other rooms were empty. The only heating came from the straw on the floor which the inmates burned. There were no toilets; females who had to go were taken away by the Schuma guards, while the men were not allowed out at all. The inmates received daily a thin meager soup and some bread (one kg. per eight persons) and had to quench their thirst by eating snow. Every day, three to four inmates managed to escape.

On 11 May 1943, about eight hundred young people from the village of Medvyn were marched to Bohuslav by the Gendarmerie. During the "medical" exam they were deemed suitable and locked up in the local church. They ate, played cards, and sang songs. After four days, the group was sent to the train station, surrounded by a thick police cordon. "During boarding, it was horrible," a witness recalls. "The screaming of the mothers, who all but threw themselves under the cars, tore one's heart apart. The police chased them away by beating them with butts." A German lieutenant saw the boarding on 21 August 1943 of hundreds of teenagers born in 1926—i.e., at most seventeen years of age—in the small village of Sharivka, forty kilometers east of Kirovohrad. He described the scene in a letter of protest. In the afternoon, children arrived from the Nova Praha raion under the tight guard of German soldiers and native policemen, who held rifles ready to fire. They were pushed into the cars and

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182 As also noted for the entire "east" in Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, p. 280.

183 Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, "Velyka Vitchyzniania viina," p. 163.

184 Report by the Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei in Kiev, quoted in Müller, "Rekrutierung," p. 243; revised text in Meldungen, 47 (26 March 1943), p. 22.

185 Grigoriy M. Levchenko, "Dnevnik: Puteshestvie v Germaniiu," Medvyn, 1945, pp. 1–2. This is a manuscript of a memoir by a Russian, located in the Muzei istorii Bohuslavshchyny im B. M. Levchenko, Bohuslav, Ukraine.
sometimes beaten in the process. Relatives who had waited at the station tried to pass on luggage and straw, but the police kept them at a distance. Only a few parents managed to break through. Then a German labor official drew his revolver and fired shots. "He grabbed a Ukrainian who was slower than the others, repeatedly kicked him, and shouted, 'Step back, you bastards!'" Another civilian official hit a man on the head so hard that his 1.5-inch baton broke in two. "The Ukrainian made no movement to defend himself and calmly endured this maltreatment." All this was "accompanied by terrible screaming and chasing about—the combined howling of about 800 to 1,000 persons." After about 75 minutes, at 4:45 p.m., the boarding was over. The train departed only six hours later.186

Trying to flee during such boarding meant risking one's life. In the early summer of 1943, a native policeman warned one father in the Podolian village of Nove Selo that his daughter would have to go to Germany, for, as she puts it in her memoir, the police "were killing people who refused to go." She was also well aware that those who helped others escape could be executed. Nevertheless, after consulting her parents, she ran off at the train station. She escaped in a hail of bullets, while tripping over something in the wheat field. The obstacle turned out to be a decaying corpse. The field was full of corpses of victims of unsuccessful flight attempts. As the girl who stumbled upon them realized, the native policemen were "caught up in the Nazi madness" and could not be counted on to hesitate to shoot. Later, while hiding in a forest with help of her parents, only once did she venture out. Suddenly, she met a German and a local policeman.

I turned and started to dash for the forest. 'Julia! Stop, or I'll shoot you!' I stopped in my tracks. I thought of the body in the field; I didn't want Mama to find me like that. 'How did he know my name?' I thought. I turned around: The policeman was holding a pistol at arm's length, pointed right at me. I knew him, he'd gone to school with [my brother] Ivan! He was Ukrainian. He knew me, my brother and my parents, but I somehow knew he would not hesitate to shoot me.187


187Alexandrow, Flight from Novaa Salow, pp. 68, 70, and 72-73 (quotations from 68 and 73). I changed the non-existing word "shootsman" in this source into "policeman."
Such encounters occurred everywhere in the countryside. A German propaganda unit reported in September 1943 about the recruitment of those born in 1926. At one particular train station, according to this report, people who fled "were shot at and a Ukrainian girl was hit in the stomach and soon died of her severe wounds."  

Not all politsai were so likely to shoot, however. Realizing that Germany was losing the war, many actually began to warn people of upcoming round-ups. Some policemen helped people to escape. (A frequent escape technique from trains was to make in hole in the floor.) In the Mykolaiv Generalbezirk, all "recruitment" commissions complained that "the Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft again and again attempt[ed] to sabotage the result of the recruitment measures, by aiding and abetting flight attempts or badly executing round-ups." This even applied to German guards, if they were of the "part-time" kind. On the train track between Kiev and Kivertsi (in Volhynia), 15,900 people were transported westward between 2 February and 20 March 1943. More than one in four (4,047) managed to escape. The guards were native or German policemen, but also Germans (such as soldiers and Organisation Todt employees) who were themselves going to Germany for a holiday. Large-scale escapes from assembly camps and during marches also took place in 1943, and, like the escapes from trains, can only be explained by some kind of passive or active assistance on the part of the guards.

188 Buchbender, Das tönende Erz, p. 329.

189 Hrynevych, author interview (regarding the village of Klyntsi); Oksana Sarapuka (Ukrainian born in 1927 in Medvyn), author interview in Ukrainian, 17 July 1995, Medvyn, Bohuslav raion, Kiev oblast Ukraine, tape recording (about police chief Ivan Fedorovych Sarapuka, who was not a relative of this interviewee).

190 Hrynevych, author interview (referring to a relative).


192 SD report to Max Thomas, 25 March 1943, in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, pp. 399–400.

193 In Oleksandrivka, 468 captives fled from a camp which held 1,059. During a transport in early 1943 from Uman' to Kiev of 369 people, more than a hundred escaped. Meldungen, 43 (26 February 1943), p. 23; ibid., 47 (26 March 1943), p. 22.
The deportations quickly became the main theme of Ukrainian nationalist and Communist propaganda. In the southern harbor of Mykolaïv, for example, a leaflet was distributed which described the deportations as genocide and urged people to join the (Soviet) partisans.\textsuperscript{194} In Dnipropetrovs'k, the German police uncovered what it called a Communist organization. These were mainly young people who agitated against the deportations by writing, for example, "No, no, lies!," on the propaganda posters. Twelve youngsters were arrested, but the leader committed suicide during the arrest.\textsuperscript{195} As for the OUN, some of its members may have initially supported the notion of going to work in Germany, but by mid-1942 the OUNSD is known to have been opposed to the program. According to the SD, that organization's anti-deportation propaganda was "not without effect."\textsuperscript{196} In Novo Praha east of Kirovohrad, a handwritten leaflet "of the Ukrainian resistance movement" was posted on 2 November 1942. It said that four days later three hundred more locals would be rounded up and "sent like animals to their death," and it urged everybody to go into hiding.\textsuperscript{197}

Such activity brings us to the question of armed resistance and of the partisan struggle in the Reichskommissariat in general. How extensive was partisan activity, what form did it usually take, and to what extent was it related to the violent deportations to Germany? With the growing realization that Germany would lose the war, the deportations, as it were, created the partisan movement. Until late 1942, partisan activity was insignificant, but from then on, one can speak of a movement or, more precisely, several movements. German censors who read letters sent from Ukraine concluded that the partisans comprised deserted 	extit{politsai}, parachuted Red Army soldiers, and so-called bandits—but most of all, they were people who evaded the deportations.\textsuperscript{198} One scholar suggests another approach: that the policy of excessive reprisals

\textsuperscript{194}Ibid., 43 (26 February 1943), p. 23.

\textsuperscript{195}Ibid., 47 (24 March 1943), pp. 8–9.

\textsuperscript{196}Ibid., 7 (12 June 1942), p. 12. Among other things, OUNSD activists said that the prettiest and strongest girls were sent to German soldiers at the front. Ibid., p. 13.

\textsuperscript{197}Ibid., 43 (26 February 1943), p. 23.

\textsuperscript{198}Auslandbriefprüfstelle Berlin, "Stimmungsbericht [...]" Berlin, 18 June 1943, TsDAVOV, f.
against all forms of resistance, and the general terror which the German authorities and the native police were meting out, were at least as important for the rise of partisan activity.199

The partisans emerged mainly in the forests of Polissia and northern Volhynia. Still, as the SD reported, by the late summer of 1942, partisan activity broke out "everywhere in the countryside" of the Kiev Generalbezirk.200 After the Battle of Stalingrad, such partisan activity took on a large scale.201 Partisan zones emerged, that is, regions where German authority collapsed in all but name. In northern Volhynia, the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) gained control. Near other forests, partisans emerged who should perhaps be called "Soviet," although their precise identity is another issue that needs to be investigated further.202 By the middle of 1943, around sixty percent of the territory of the Zhytomyr Generalbezirk was under nationalist or "Soviet" partisan control.203

Whenever young people joined the partisans, they put the lives of their parents and even their entire family at risk.204 The parents of new partisans were taken hostage and at the very least beaten. Their property was confiscated, and their houses were burned. To give just one example: in April 1943 the young people of Buda (Chyhyryn) joined the partisans. Gebietskommissar Lange, who considered the village to be a partisan base, raised it to the ground and deported every person who was able to work. Those unable to work—the old, the

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200Meldungen, 21 (18 September 1942), p. 20.

201Auslandbriefprüfstelle Berlin, "Stimmungsbericht [...]," Berlin, 18 June 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, l. 13. This report says that letters sent in April and May 1943 mentioned partisans "extraordinarily" more often than before.

202They appear to have called themselves simply "partisans" or "the partisan movement."

203Generalkommissar Leyser to Rosenberg, letter, 17 June 1943, in Müller, Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik, p. 431.

204Ol'ga Sergeevna Pominchuk ([Ukrainian?], interview in Russian by the CHPWU, 20 January 1946, Kiev, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 245, ll. 46–47 (about the town of Korosten').
very young, and the ill—were shot near a pit.\textsuperscript{205} Such shootings very much resembled the earlier massacres of the Jews and Roma.\textsuperscript{206}

In turn, the partisans killed people as well. In the words of a German letter censor:
"They assault villages and small towns; kill the police, the village elders, pro-German inhabitants, and some German officials and soldiers; release the Ukrainians recruited for labor; and take everything they need. The fear of their revenge often ruins the work of the German authorities. Through [the partisans], the Soviet government has as it were created a second front."\textsuperscript{207} Violence begot violence. Even peaceful villages were burned by Germans and native policemen, so that they could report to their superiors successes in their "struggle against gangs" \textit{(Bandenbekämpfung)}.\textsuperscript{208} One example may illustrate the kind of violence employed in this "struggle." One morning, in January 1943, the village of Borodianka in the Kiev region was attacked by German and native policemen. The Budnik family and several other families, a total of twenty people including women and children, were burned alive. One witness saw the killings from her house thirty meters away. She recalled several years later how one woman, "already almost insane," jumped out. But "the politsei went after her and killed her. They threw her into the fire."\textsuperscript{209}

The partisans, both nationalist and Soviet, still need to be studied in detail, because many questions still need an answer. To what extent did the partisans achieve their aims? What indeed were their aims? Were they driven by a nationalist or communist ideology, or perhaps a national-communist one? Another question is to what degree the partisans obeyed outside

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\textsuperscript{205}Skirda, "Otchet [...]" TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 391, l. 20, l. 30, l. 38.

\textsuperscript{206}This point is also made in Dieter Pohl, "Die Holocaust-Forschung und Goldhagens Thesen," \textit{Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte}, XLV, 1 (Munich, January 1997), p. 29.

\textsuperscript{207}Auslandbriefprüfstelle Berlin, "Stimmungsbericht [...]" Berlin, 18 June 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3676, op. 4, d. 161, ll. 13–14.


\textsuperscript{209}Ol'ha Vasylyevych [Vasyly'ovych] Buhai (Ukrainian), interview in Ukrainian by the CHPWU, 22 January 1946, village of Borodianka, Kiev oblast, stenographic report, TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 3, d. 243, l. 164.
orders, whether from Moscow or from the OUNSD leadership. Finally, little is known about life in the partisan zones.

As for Volhynia, there is a growing body of published accounts describing the killing of Poles in 1942 and especially from mid-1943. It is unclear what kind of Ukrainians were responsible: the UPA rank-and-file or its Security Service (Sluzhba Bezpeky), which was the OUNSD's equivalent of the Soviet military commissars. If these killings of Poles were part of a planned campaign, was it—as argued in one of the few scholarly studies on the subject—one in which the OUNSD wished to drive all Poles out of Ukraine, but not to exterminate them? Perhaps such a distinction is false, however, and was this a case of genocide.

That the deportations to Germany affected virtually every family becomes obvious when the statistics are studied. By August 1942, it was officially reported that 500,000 workers were taken away from the Reichskommissariat. That number reached one million on 24 June 1943. One in every forty inhabitants of the Reichskommissariat and the southern military zone combined was deported by August 1943. Ultimately, there were 1,500,000 workers from these two Ukrainian regions in the Reich. The percentage of villagers who were deported was higher than the percentage of city-dwellers with this fate. While the total number of deportations was a failure by Sauckel's standards, it was still very high, and it


211Oral statement from Koch to Sauckel, in TMWC, Vol. 39 (Nuremberg, 1949), p. 401. In an interview marking his first anniversary as Reichskommissar, Koch said that there were over half a million "Ukrainian" Ostarbeiter, so that the Reich had more "work force[s]" from "Ukraine" that from anywhere else "abroad." He probably meant only to those recruited in, or deported from, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. "Aktual'ni pytannia ukraïns'koï polityky. Svidchennia Raikhkomisar Erikha Kokha," Dzvin voli, 30 August 1942, p. 3.

212"Lagebericht für die Monate Mai und Juni 1943," Rivne, 15 July 1943, TsDAVOV, f. 3206, op. 5, d. 15, l. 666.

213This was an estimate by Sauckel. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 89.

214Ibid., p. 90.

215Cf. the different view in Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, p. 113.
shows that the organized resistance movements failed in their immediate aim of keeping people in Ukraine. Many were able to stay in their homeland by joining the partisans, but these same partisans arrived too late on the scene to prevent most other deportees from being taken away. Before then, people were essentially on their own and disqualified themselves with varying degrees of success.

In the final analysis, did the deportations mean anything to the population other than suffering and death? The deportations were frequently talked about, invariably with indignation. By 1943, people complained loudly that they were living in permanent fear of being sent away as "slaves." After the Germans were gone, the deportations were still "almost the sole object of conversation," as a British journalist discovered. The conclusion should probably be that the deportations became, as several memoirs emphasize, "the last straw." They were probably even the main source of hatred of the Germans. They "immediately severed the still weak bonds between the conquerors and the conquered." "Our people's indignation reached a climax." From the standpoint of popular opinion, the round-ups and deportations were the biggest mistake that the Nazis made in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

Even when the Red Army pushed the German army and the Nazi administration out of Ukraine, the deportations continued. In fact, the Nazi goal became even more ambitious. For every single native, the Nazis allowed only two options: to move westward with them, or to be killed. As Himmler told Waffen-SS division commanders in Kharkiv in April 1943, any retreat should be accompanied by Menschenvernichtung—"the destruction of human beings." He

219Fesenko, *Povest*, p. 82.
asked, "How do we deprive the Russians of as many people as possible, dead or alive? We do this by killing them or rounding them up and really putting them to work; by making sure that captured terrain is really secure and that terrain which we leave to the enemy has no people in it." The natives had to work in Germany or "die in battle." Meanwhile, as he told the Higher SS and Police Chief for Ukraine, any territory being abandoned should be "completely burned and destroyed."

These directives were implemented. While the locals were forced to dig trenches, the "anti-Bolshevik" terror was stepped up. The village of Obolon' provides just one example. Five days before the Germans left, 122 registered "Soviet activists" were shot. All villagers and all city-dwellers were ordered to leave. Homes were burned and people too weak to go, or discovered in hiding places, were shot. In Kiev in September and October 1943, the gas van operated at maximum speed, dumping about fifty poisoned people at Babyn Iar two, three, even four times per day. Indiscriminate round-ups were held to capture such victims.

Quantifying the unnatural deaths in the territory that became the Reichskommissariat Ukraine is difficult, for the figures that were established in the Soviet Union are highly problematic. But it seems reasonable to estimate that the Nazi regime cost the lives of at least

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222 Letter to Prützmann, 7 September 1943, in ibid., p. 232.

223 "Akt," 3 October 1943, TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 599, l. 29.

224 Ukrainian translation of the stenographic report of an interview in 1946 with the former prisoner M. V. Panasyk, in "Babyn Iar (veresen' 1941 – veresen' 1943 rr.)," Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal, 12 (Kiev, 1991), pp. 63–64. According to two Soviet interrogation records from November 1943, of two Jewish prisoners who escaped from that site, the gas van eventually arrived eight to ten times per day. Ukrainian translations of these reports are in ibid., pp. 58 and 62.

225 Panasyk in ibid., pp. 63–64; Hrynevych, author interview. Klavdia Hrynevych related how she escaped from two round-ups for gassings at the Jewish Market. The existence of such round-ups at that time is confirmed, on the same tape recording, by Valentyna Kravchenko. In the interview, both women were absolutely sure that they saw the gas van at such round-ups and that the goal was to gas those caught.

two million civilians or prisoners of war, either in the Reichskommissariat itself or—after deportation—in the Reich.
Conclusion

The goal of this study has been to describe and explain the everyday life of the native population of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. While focusing on those natives who had lived under Soviet rule before 1939, thematic chapters discussed the policies of the new authorities, their impact on the population, and the reactions of the latter. Throughout, the main objective was to trace any evolution in people's thinking about the Germans, themselves, or the former Soviet authorities.

The first months of war with Germany revealed the deep-seated hatred against the Soviet system. The vast majority of the population that was not evacuated or deported welcomed the German arrival, simply because it brought about the disappearance of what some called "the devil's regime." Desertion from the Red Army was widespread. Peasants resisted the Soviet destruction of remaining crops, and in every city or town there was looting by the local population. Almost everywhere the Germans were greeted with relief. Even many Jews chose to stay, hoping for a better life.

Despite the favorable conditions that the Nazis found in Ukraine, they proceeded to install a civilian administration that was thoroughly racist. Moreover, it was ultra-violent. The Nazi goal was to kill all Jews, all Roma, and, at a slower pace, to kill or deport the vast majority of the other natives. Even ethnic Germans had no right to live if Nazis deemed them mentally unhealthy. Such terror was meant to make the Reichskommissariat Ukraine correspond to the Nazi ideal of a clean slate for German settlement. Those natives who were kept alive were violated, beaten, and humiliated at every turn.

Although the peasants had disbanded the collective farms during or after the German arrival, they were ordered to restore them. This was the last thing they expected, for to them nothing symbolized Soviet rule more than the hated collective farm system. If this was not bad enough, conditions under the Nazi regime proved to be worse than under Soviet rule. The Nazis perfected the collective farm system by forcing more peasants than ever to join and by
systematically enforcing attendance and discipline. Paradoxically, the low living standard of the peasants rose somewhat, in large part because they were allowed to expand their gardens and to cultivate anything they wanted. This small gain was overshadowed, however, by the continued forced labor imposed on the peasantry and the pervasive and naked violence carried out against them by their overseers.

The living standard of the city dwellers deteriorated significantly, not simply because there was a war going on, but mostly because the Nazis wished to "smash Ukrainian industry and drive the proletariat back to the country." Those city-dwellers who did not migrate to the countryside were usually unemployed. They were supposed to get work elsewhere or else starve to death. Kiev held a special place in these plans and suffered a major, artificially created famine. Very few city-dwellers, mainly artisans and traders, lived reasonably well.

The churches gained greater freedom in an institutional sense. In contrast to the Soviet regime, the Nazis both in theory and in practice allowed most churches to operate. Among the exceptions were the Roman and Greek Catholic churches. Moreover, the Nazi German authorities did not permit the creation of a united Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church. Most natives, however, remained indifferent toward religion. This was in particular the case among those born during the 1920s or 1930s, who were little interested in going to church, preferring instead secular pursuits such as movies, reading, theater, music, and even political gatherings. These diversions also proved to be a disappointment, however. The Nazis, already feeling generous for having "given" the natives their churches, did not allow any active Ukrainian secular cultural life, which they believed would make the population restless. During the Soviet period, the population had come to appreciate certain aspects of the official culture. Even though the abundant Soviet movies and newspapers were known or suspected to be propaganda, they talked down to the audience far less than their German-sponsored successors. Moreover, the Soviet newspapers were considered helpful because it was assumed that they took readers' letters seriously. Most of all, Soviet citizens had gotten used to meetings, where they could ask questions. In all these respects, the German cultural
environment was considered meager and inferior. The press did not respond to readers' concerns, while propaganda meetings were rare.

The study of mental attitudes and political loyalties revealed that the Dnieper or "Soviet" Ukrainians of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine shared certain traits. Among those were a general mistrust, a need to talk about the famine of 1933, little or no knowledge about the outside world, and attitudes toward the Germans that changed from cautious optimism to hate. It is striking, however, how little their thinking changed about other issues. The vast majority of Dnieper Ukrainians was neither nationalist nor pro-Soviet in 1941, nor did they become nationalist or pro-Soviet over the course of the Nazi period. From a Ukrainian nationalist point of view, they were not "real" Ukrainians, while from a Soviet point of view, they were flawed as well. There is very little evidence to support the view that those Dnieper Ukrainians who had disliked the Soviet system—the vast majority—eventually changed their views. The only thing they wanted was the departure of the Germans. While it is true that they wanted "our people" (nashi—that is, the Red Army or what was often believed to be its successor, the "Russian Army") to come back, they did not want a return of the Soviet system. Nor is there conclusive evidence for any significant change in the mental outlook or political loyalties of the young generation. Before 1941, this "Komsomol generation" had been successfully indoctrinated with Communism. Under the Nazi administration, which stole the future that the Soviet system had promised, the younger generation felt its views confirmed.

Certain groups were singled out as special targets of Nazi policies. Prisoners of war were shot and starved on a massive scale. Those among the civilian population who tried to save them were usually blocked from doing so. The Jews and the Roma, on the other hand, were in a unique situation, because the Nazi regime exterminated almost all of them. This Holocaust was seen by or at least known to Germans and natives alike. Although significant numbers of bystanders were initially pleased to see the Jews being "deported," when the truth emerged about what was really happening, almost all non-Jews were horrified and against the murders. (This does not appear to have been the case in western Volhynia, however. In that region, by 1943 a substantial number of natives approved of the Holocaust. The reasons for
this are still unclear, although radical nationalism must have played a role.) A minority of natives—its numerical strength is unknown—denounced Jews to the authorities, while another minority—certainly a small one—helped Jews. The vast majority, fearing for its life, merely watched the Jewish Holocaust unfold. Popular anti-Semitism existed throughout the Nazi period and was expressed in conversations even after the murders. But it frequently played only a small role, or even none at all, in shaping the behavior of the non-Jews. Greed and (particularly in the case of Communists) anxiety about one's own future were frequently more important motivating factors. As for the ethnic Germans, the Nazis were well on their way to creating a new generations of fanatical adherents, even among the purportedly pacifist Mennonites.

Irrespective of how indignant the population was about the treatment of prisoners of war and the Jews and Roma, the majority initially did not reject the Nazi regime as a whole. Most natives concluded that the Nazi regime should go only in early 1942, when they learned about the living conditions of those who had gone off (voluntarily or forcibly) to work in Germany, or at the latest when the mass round-ups of "recruits" started. Only then did the broad populace realize that the Nazis wanted them to work as slaves or else to die. It was also in connection with the forced deportations to Germany that resistance against the Nazis assumed a massive scale. After the Battle of Stalingrad, this resistance took the form of large-scale partisan movements.

Overall, Nazi German rule was a tremendous disappointment for all natives. At no other period in the history of Ukraine did so many social and ethnic groups suffer so much at more or less the same time. Almost all Jews and Roma were killed. For the others, there were seemingly ceaseless daily humiliations, most notably public beatings, and a permanent sense of danger. Moreover, people had no sense that things might improve. Young people in particular felt with good reason that they were robbed of their future altogether. The Soviet system had also been oppressive and lethal, but it allowed people some dignity and some involvement. They could complain, within strict limits, to journalists, at public meetings, and during personal visits to
the superiors of officials who harassed them. With some effort, ordinary people might find a person in a position of authority who took their problems seriously. During the Nazi period, however, ordinary people were frequently barred from even entering offices. In addition, Soviet propaganda at least tried to convince people of something. The average peasant or worker "had grown accustomed to people taking him [or her] into account, if only in words. People deceived him, but while appealing to his self-esteem, independence, and trustworthiness."¹ In contrast, Nazi propaganda consisted of little more than death threats and warnings not to be "lazy." Finally, the foreignness of the Nazi regime was epitomized by language. Even had the Nazis been less oppressive, ordinary people would probably still have preferred to be oppressed in a familiar language. As they complained, "At least we could understand the Bolsheviks."²

The natives often described their situation as one of captivity (plen) or slavery (rabstvo). "We are like slaves," wrote one woman in her diary. "Often the book Uncle Tom's Cabin comes to mind. Once we shed tears over those Negroes; now obviously we ourselves are experiencing the same thing."³ Although the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was not a slaveholding society, in the end it was far worse. In the vast majority of past slaveholding societies for which there are reliable data, slaveholders and other non-slaves treated slaves with some consideration. This was because they realized that incentives were usually more economically productive than punishment. Slaves, after all, were supposed to be used as

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² Mykhailo Hartymiv, "Zemleiu ukrains'koiu...," in Kost' Mel'nyk, Oleh Lashchenko, and Vasyl' Veryha, eds., Na zov Kyieva: ukrains'kyi natsionalizm u II Svitovii Viiini: zbirnyk statti, spohadiv i dokumentiv (Toronto and New York, 1985), p. 147. The point also appears in a quotation from the record of a German interrogation of a Red Army officer: "In the long run, a people chooses among two tyrants the one who speaks its own language, so we will win the war." Report "Bündnis oder Ausbeutung?" 22 June 1943, published in Theodor Oberländer, Der Osten und die Deutsche Wehrmacht: sechs Denkschriften aus den Jahren 1941–43 gegen die NS-Kolonialthese (Asendorf, 1987), p. 126. According to the editor, who probably consulted Oberländer, the statement was made by Stalin's son Iakob Dzhugashvili, "in October [1941] during interrogation near Poltava."

servants—not to be disabled, let alone killed. In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, however, the natives were supposed to die.

The concept "Nazi occupation" does not convey the intensity of the wartime experience in Ukraine, especially in view of the vast difference when compared with conditions of life of western Europeans under Nazi rule. Mykhailo Marunchak has referred to Ukraine under Nazi rule as one gigantic concentration camp. It is true that the Reichskommissariat Ukraine shared some features with Nazi concentration camps such as Dachau: the all-pervasive terror; the call-ups to witness public beatings or executions; the happy music during sad occasions; the way ordinary people were "invisible" or at most observed with disgust; and the cruelty of the "privileged" few. As in concentration camps, in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine there prevailed the phenomenon known as "psychic numbing." Eventually, ordinary people, in particular city dwellers, lived only for themselves and their immediate relatives. (If one were less charitable, one could call this "brutalization" or "egoism." It is more accurate, however, to follow the suggestion of Jonathan Steinberg, and to call the Reichskommissariat a full-blown police state.

Did the natives living in this police state constitute a "society"? According to Bernhard Chiari, in the Weißruthenien Generalkommissariat (of the Reichskommissariat Ostland), which consisted mostly of western Belarus, society all but disappeared as people became "atomized" along social and ethnic lines. He argues that this was a continuation of a development which started during the imposition of Soviet rule in 1939. Such a characterization can also be

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4Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1982), pp. 198 and 205.

5He indeed uses the term to describe all Ukrainian lands, not just the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. M. Mar. [Marunchak], "Ekspluatatsiina i eksterminatsiina nimets'ka polityka v Ukraini," in Mykhailo H. Marunchak, ed. V borot'bi za ukrain's'ku derzhavu: eseji, spohady, svidchennia, litopysannia, dokumenty Druhoi svitvoi viiny (Winnipeg, 1990), pp. 88–89.

6The word "egoism" is used in Mykhailo Selesko, Vinnys'ia: spomyny perekladacha Komisii doslidiv zlochyniv NKVD v 1937–1938 (Toronto, 1991), p. 81.


8Bernhard Chiari, "Deutsche Herrschaft in Weißrußland 1941–1944" (Ph.D. diss., Eberhard-Karls-
applied to the Reichskommissariat Ukraine's region of western Volhynia. Beyond that region, however, the picture is more complex. There existed among the peoples of Dnieper Ukraine a certain social cohesion, as expressed in "Soviet" views and manners. Before June 1941, these Soviet citizens did not consider themselves at war. Clearly they had accepted the official interpretation that justified the alliance with Nazi Germany and the Soviet attack on Poland.

They also felt deeply humiliated by the fact that the Germans advanced so fast, "after all our five-year-plans." They expressed a sense of community by talking about "our own people" (svoi, svoi, nashi). Another prerequisite for being "one of us" was an almost total lack of accurate knowledge about the outside world.

All the same, most evidence still points to social disintegration in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Ordinary people had only a vague sense of national, or even ethnic, identity. Equally vague were their political loyalties, with the exception of those born during the 1920s and 1930s, who by and large had internalized the Communist ideology. As for political views, there existed a clear generation gap. This divide was partly due to the particularly bad treatment and prospects of young people under Nazi German rule, but it had existed already before 1941. Its main causes were the Soviet educational system, Soviet socialization, and Soviet indoctrination. There was also a divide between Jews (not to mention Roma) and non-Jews, in the sense that they tended to consider each other foreigners or enemies. Although few non-Jews approved of the Jewish Holocaust, there was much anti-Semitic grumbling about how before the war "the Jews" supposedly had "grabbed" the best jobs.

Social disintegration also showed itself in acts which one might call "self-destructive." Mistrust was endemic, and fed on itself as people denounced each other to the authorities. This was partly due to the thirst for revenge of those who had been persecuted by the Soviet regime.

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Universität zu Tübingen, 1997), p. 4.

9It existed also among the Ostarbeiter, even as late as January 1945. F. Pihido-Pravobrezhnyi, "Velyka Vichyzniana viina" (Winnipeg, 1954), p. 191.
Another "self-destructive" feature was the close involvement of native-born mayors, raion chiefs, and policemen in the implementation of Nazi policies.

Until now, it seemed reasonable to assume that the Nazi period had a great impact on the thinking of those who survived the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Scholars who until now studied World War II have assumed that it unified the citizens of the Soviet Union around Stalin, whom they came to see as their one and only savior. Another view held that the Nazi experience made Dnieper Ukrainians more nationally conscious (i.e., nationalist) and eager to create their own state. Recently, Amir Weiner has gone even further, arguing that the war was "a watershed in the articulation of political and ethnonational identities" in the Soviet Union. In a sense, Weiner has combined both earlier views. On the one hand, mythmaking about the "Great Patriotic War"—a term coined by Stalin in November 1944—unified Soviet citizens as never before. On the other hand, that same mythmaking "ended up structuring discourses which articulated particularistic identities."

The results of the research found in this study do not support any of these interpretations. Instead, this study has argued that throughout the turbulent events, prewar mental attitudes continued to have a tremendous hold over the "Soviet" population. Those who fell under Nazi rule wanted the Germans to come, hoped for a better life, became disappointed, started to hate the Germans, and eventually wanted them out. They also became used to living without Jews. But apart from these changes, their other views did not change in any significant way. Once the Red Army started advancing, people naturally became somewhat more sympathetic to the previous system. In times of war, winners are generally liked, or at least respected. But it is very doubtful whether the Nazi period prompted more than a limited nostalgia for Soviet rule. Nor is there evidence which demonstrates that the experience of Nazi

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rule made most natives attach more importance to their ethnicity. In the final analysis, the Nazi regime did little more than kill people. It hardly had any impact on the mental outlook of those who survived.
APPENDIX

Official population figures for selected cities and towns

In parentheses: official name in German
In brackets: Soviet figures for 1 July 1941, if available

**Kiev (Kiew-Stadt)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1 July 1941</th>
<th>1 April 1942</th>
<th>1 July 1942</th>
<th>1 October 1942</th>
<th>1 January 1943</th>
<th>1 July 1943</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[846,300]</td>
<td>[1]</td>
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<tr>
<td>352,139</td>
<td></td>
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<td>315,099 or 293,000</td>
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<td>305,366</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>304,599 or 304,570</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295,639</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: It appears that many ethnic and Reich Germans were not included in these counts.

**Other cities, 1 January 1943**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrov'sk (Dnepropetrowsk-Stadt)</td>
<td>280,000 [500,600]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kryvyi Rih (Kriwoi Rog-Stadt)</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia (Saporoshje-Stadt)</td>
<td>120,000 [289,200]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykolaiv (Nikolajew-Stadt)</td>
<td>84,213 [167,100]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dniprodzerzhyn'sk (Kamenskoje-Stadt)</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava (Poltawa-Stadt)</td>
<td>74,821 [130,300]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melitopol' (Melitopol-Stadt)</td>
<td>65,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirovohrad (Kirowograd-Stadt)</td>
<td>63,403 [100,300]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson (Cherson-Stadt)</td>
<td>59,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnytsia (Winniza-Stadt)</td>
<td>42,500 [92,800]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42,000 [95,100]</td>
<td>Zhytomyr (Shitomir-Stadt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33,563</td>
<td>Brest-Litovsk (Brest Litowsk-Stadt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,531 [41,900]</td>
<td>Rivne (Rowno-Stadt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,495 [35,600]</td>
<td>Luts'k (Luzk-Stadt)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16,233</td>
<td>Kovel' (Kowel-Stadt)</td>
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<td>15,044 [19,500]</td>
<td>Kam&quot;ianets'-Podil's'kyi (Kamenez Podolsk-Stadt)</td>
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<td>12,510</td>
<td>Khmel'nyts'kyi (Proskurow-Stadt)</td>
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<td>12,029</td>
<td>Pinsk (Pinsk-Stadt)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>Novohrad-Volyns'kyi (Zwiahel-Stadt)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9,154</td>
<td>Pervomais'k (Perwomaisk-Stadt)</td>
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<td>8,628</td>
<td>Volodymyr-Volyns'kyi (Wladimir Wolynsk-Stadt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,650</td>
<td>Zdolbuniv (Sdolbunow-Stadt)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This is the Soviet figure from ibid., which also appears in the official statistics of the Kiev city administration, but as the number of inhabitants "on the eve" of the Nazi-Soviet war. L. Maliuzhenko, "Kyïv za 1942 r.," *Nashe mynule*, 1 (6) (Kiev, 1993), p. 157. Although this republication has been censored (presumably for anti-Semitic language), it appears that the figures are reproduced correctly.


Ibid.; "Uebersicht," l. 46v.


Even apart from the issue of who were genuine "ethnic Germans," it appears that many Reich Germans in Kiev were not counted altogether. In January 1942, 20,000 military were living in Kiev, presumably mostly Germans and including the city commander (*Stadtkommandant*). Letter by acting Generalkomissar Quitzau to Koch, Kiev, 21 January 1942, TsDAVÖV, f. 3206, op. 1, d. 78, l. 6. A note from the Hauptabteilung Ernährung und Landwirtschaft III E4 n.1 to the Bezirksleitung of the NSDAP, Kiev, 17 October 1942, gives the following figures for the city of Kiev: 8,000 Reich Germans; 5,000 "Deutsche Wehrmachtsfolge (Eisenbahn, O. T. usw.)"; 10,000 SS and Police units; and 6,000 Volksdeutsche. TsDAVÖV, f. 3206, op. 2, d. 121, l. 5.

Maliuzhenko, "Kyïv za 1942 r.”, p. 157 states that the registered number of Germans on 1 April 1942—2,797—is too low. He gives as the reason that many were not counted as such who eventually fell under this rubric. This seems to mean that they were not yet "ethnic Germans" at the time of the count, and appeared in it as other nationalities.
Sources

1. Primary sources
   1a. Archival holdings
   1b. Tape-recordings of interviews by the author
   1c. Published primary sources

2. Secondary sources
   2a. Published studies
   2b. Unpublished dissertations and other manuscripts
   2c. Bibliographies

1. Primary sources

1a. Archival holdings

Central State Archive of the Highest Organs of Authority and Government of Ukraine
Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia Ukrainy (TsDAVOV)
Vul. Solom'ians'ka, 24, Kiev.

f. 3206, op. 1–6. Reikhskomissariat Ukrainy, g. Rovno.

f. 3676, op. 1–5. Shtab imperskogo rukovoditelia (reichsliaitera) Rozenberga dlja okkupirovannykh vostochnykh oblastei, g. Berlin, g. Kiev.

f. 4620, op. 3. Kolektsiya dokumentiv z istoryi Velykoï Vitchyznianoï viiny 1941–1945 r.r.

Central State Archive of Civic Organizations of Ukraine
Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'iednan' Ukraïny (TsDAHOU)
Vul. Kutuzova, 8, Kiev.

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f. 1, op. 23. Tsentral'nyi Komitet Kommunisticheskoi Partii Ukrainy (Osobyi sektor - sekretnaia chast')


f. 166, op. 2–3. Komisiiia z pytan' istorii velykoi vitchyznianoii viiny pry akademiï nauk URSR. Obshchaia chast'.

State Archive of the Kiev Oblast

Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyïvs'koï oblasti (DAKO)

Vul. Frunze, 113 and vul. Mel'nykova, 38, Kiev.

f. r-2275, op. 1. Kievskiaia shkola n. 5/7 (Kurenevskaia).

f. r-2330, op. 1–2. Editors of Vasyl'kivs'ki visti.

f. r-2356, op. 1–18. Kyïvs'ka Mis'ka Uprava.

f. r-2412, op. 1–2. Muzei-Arkhiv perekhodnogo periodoa.

The following are records from administrations of seven disparate raions in the present-day Kiev oblast, all of them west of the Dnieper River, and the villages in these raions. Only cited inventories (opisi) are mentioned.

Raion administrations

f. r-2107, op. 1. Bohuslav [German: Boguslaw]

f. r-2209, op. 1–2. Polis'ke (formerly Khabne or Kahanovychy) [Chabnoje]

f. r-2292, op. 1. Rokytne [Rakitno-Gebiet Bila Zerkwa]

f. r-2457, op. 1. Ivankiv [Iwankow]

f. r-2509, op. 2. Skvyra [Skwira]

f. r-3110, op. 1. Borodianka [Borodjanka]
Village administrations

f. r-2097, op. 1. Dmytrenky (Bohuslav)
f. r-2145, op. 1. Nemishaieve (Borodianka)
f. r-2160, op. 1. Nova Buda (Borodianka)
f. r-2167, op. 1. Druzhnia (Borodianka)
f. r-2210, op. 1. Polis'ke [formerly Khabne] (Polis'ke)
f. r-2212, op. 1. Steshchyna (Polis'ke)
f. r-2215, op. 1. Maksymovychy (Polis'ke)
f. r-2293, op. 1. Teleshivka (Rokytne)
f. r-2294, op. 1. Romashky (Rokytne)
f. r-2295, op. 1. Ol'shansykia (Rokytne)
f. r-2519, op. 1. Kam"iana Hreblia (Skvyra)
f. r-2679, op. 1. Sloboda (Kaharlyk)
f. r-4760, op. 1. Blidcha (Ivankiv)

Scholarly Reference Library of the Central State Archives of Ukraine

Naukovo-dovidkova biblioteka tsentral'nykh derzhavnykh arkhiviv Ukrainy

Vul. Solom'ians'ka, 24, Kiev.

Collection "Afishy ta plakaty okupatsiinoho periodu"

Filiia. Tsentral'na naukova biblioteka im V. I. Vernads'koho. Natsional'na akademiia nauk Ukrainy


-Old Imprints Department (Viddil starodrukiv):

(1) Uncatalogued collection of leaflets and posters from the Nazi period

(2) Uncatalogued periodicals—*Nauka i Mystetstvo: literaturno-naukovyi dodatok do hazety "Holos Poltavshchyny" (Poltava); Orel'nia (Rivne); Shkoliar (Vasyl'kiv); Ukrainka (Kostopil').
-Newspaper Department (Hazetnyi viddil):

*Dzvin voli* (Bila Tserkva)
*Ivankivs'ki visti* (Ivankiv)
*Nove ukrains'ke slovo* (Kiev)
*Poslednie novosti* (Kiev)
*Ukrains'kyi holos* (Khmelnits'kyi)
*Ukrains'kyi visnyk* (Berlin)
*Vasyl'kivs'ki visti* (Vasyl'kiv)
*Vidrodzhennia* (Tarashcha)
*Zvilt'nenia Ukraina* (Bohuslav)

**M. T. Ryl's'kyi Institute of Art Science, Folklore, and Ethnography**

Instytut Mystetstvoznavstva, Fol'kloru ta Etnohrafiï im. M. T. Ryl's'koho (IMFE)

National Academy Sciences of Ukraine, vul. Hrushev's'koho, 4, Kiev.

Manuscripts Department (Viddil rukopsyshk fondiv)

f. 14–3:

od. zb. 20. Tania Krasys't'ka collection. Title on cover: "Fol'klor (Zapysano na Dnipropetrovshchyny) 1941–1944 r."

od. zb. 24. Ievdokiia Ivanivna Prytula collection.


od. zb. 55 and 56. "Fol'klor Velykoï Vitchyznianoï viiny," typed manuscript, Kiev:

IMFE Akademiï nauk Ukrains'koï RSR, 1945, edited by M. T. Ryl's'kyi.

**Muzei istorii Bohuslavshchyny im B. M. Levchenko**


Robarts Library, University of Toronto
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Pavlo Ternivs'kyi [Ivan Zhyhadlo], "Spohady emigranta." Autograph manuscript, 1945.
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On roll 233 are Ereignismeldung UdSSR, 1–100 (no. 55 is lacking); on roll 234 are ibid., 101–173; on roll 235 are ibid., 174–195 and Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, 1–15; on roll 236 are Meldungen, 16–55.

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Box 2, folder 14 and box 7, folder 6: Professor Hans Koch, interview AD G-20 by the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project, 1 June 1941, Salzburg, Austria, typed transcript in English, 20 pp.
Other documentary materials

Izveshchenie (notification) by Nachal'nik Kievskogo Obl. Upravleniia Sviaz Sviridov to M. Z. Goshon of 30 Levashiv'ska Street, apt. 19. Photocopy provided by Miron Semenovich Petrovskii, Kiev.


1b. Tape-recording of interviews by the author

The tapes are in the possession of the author. All interviewees were Ukrainians. (This was not the result of a decision to this effect by the interviewer.) The interviews were conducted in Ukrainian, unless indicated otherwise.


- Mariia Prylipko (born in 1913 in Medvyn), 17 July 1995, Medvyn.
- Oksana Sarapuka (born in 1927 in Medvyn), 17 July 1995, Medvyn.
- Mykola Iosypovych Sydohub (born in 1924 in Medvyn), 22 July 1995, Medvyn.
- Iakiv Nesterovych Vasylenko (born in 1924 in Medvyn), 22 July 1995, Medvyn.

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