TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION.
THE CASE OF PERÚ: FROM CRITIQUE TO ALTERNATIVES.

by

Alessandra Dibos Gálvez

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Department of Theory and Policy Studies in Education
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the
University of Toronto

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Abstract

This thesis uses political and educational theory to inquiry on democratic citizenship education. My initial question is what to understand by democracy and by democratic education. Since we need to ground our reflections and discussions in experience, this study examines and reflects upon one specific case: Perú. I ask what would democratic and citizenship education mean and imply in Perú, today. I use the curriculum proposal for democratic citizenship education in the National Baccalaureate Pilot Plan in Perú (Bachillerato), as an entry point to examine the extent to which educational initiatives such as the Bachillerato respond to the needs and demands that arise from the social-political, cultural and historical Peruvian context.

I draw upon different authors (Habermas, Dewey, Freire, and Gutiérrez, mainly) and use what I have interpreted to be the general spirit and purpose of their work that contribute to my own argument.
Dedication

A todos mis profesores
y a mi abuela Elsa, que también fue maestra,
y que me enseñó fortaleza y ternura.

To all my teachers,
and to my Grandmother Elsa, who was also a teacher,
and who taught me strength and tenderness.
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Introduction

Education is one of the main means through which our societies transmit and cultivate knowledge, values, philosophies of life (ways to understand or to read the world and act or intervene in it, ways to conceive our relations with others, and also ways in which we [ought to] relate to others). Thus, much of our life orientations are, to a great extent, shaped by the education we receive and by the ways and degrees in which we engage in that education. In other words, we learn modes of thinking, we learn to value certain ideals and principles, certain ways of understanding ourselves and others, as well as certain ways of interacting with one another.

One of the main premises of this study is that educational systems and practices, can indeed be taken seriously as crucial tools for the construction, re-construction, and reproduction of more just societies. Strong democratic citizenship is essential to this project, since it is up to people -- citizens -- themselves, to envision and to strive for the realization of what we/they see as justice and well-being. Democracy and justice are intimately connected. And they can only be processes and outcomes of the agency (or protagonism) of responsible citizens -- members of a community -- who believe in, and are committed to respect and to exercise, their rights.

Today, democracy, peace, and justice continue to be ideals toward which many struggle. For some, in the midst of war (or in a transitional period after war, violence, scarcity, or serious economic depression), the struggle is more challenging and urgent than for others. I believe it is important, necessary, and urgent to think about and work on, an educational project that would respond to many people's demands for authentic democracy, human rights and peace. I also know that there are important challenges to consider. Indeed, one of them, today, is the fact that economic forces (the market for profit) are the predominant forces in our societies. The economic "agendas" are today, the ones to determine and control many other levels of social life. Economics constitutes the "social sphere" upon which other spheres of society depend (including education). Often, it is against economic structures that many other sectors in society, struggle.¹

¹ Habermas discusses this theme. As a commentary on Weber's theory of the rationalization of social spheres in the modern world, Habermas writes: "We must at least regard it as an empirical question, whether the tensions among ever more rationalized spheres of life go back in fact to an incompatibility of
Often times, these economic forces seem not to be consistent with democratic ideals and values in education. Nonetheless, it is possible to put some faith in an education for democratic citizenship, human rights, and peace.

The work in this thesis is motivated by my interest in participating in this project for democracy and justice through the strengthening of democratic and citizenship education. To begin with, then, my purpose is to open up a deeper discussion around the understanding of democracy that we - educators, educational theorists, educational policy makers, as well as everyone interested in education - have.

Thus, an important piece of this thesis looks into values or ideals of democracy. To some extent, what I try to do is to remember (or recuperate) the origins and the meaning of the radical democratic project of emancipation for all human beings. I do this with the hope to invigorate, actualize and strengthen the validity and importance of this project, as well as the priority of values such as solidarity, cooperation, understanding and critical consciousness, over the values of efficiency, profit and consumption that seem to accompany the predominant economic discourses in our societies. Today, the more the concepts “democracy” and “human rights” are utilized, defended, or questioned, the more necessary becomes the task to discuss them in depth. It becomes more relevant also, to search for an understanding of democracy and human rights that is meaningful to us. Only after such examination do we have better chances of experimenting with that understanding, in constructive and useful ways, that is, in ways more in accordance with - - and in response to --what is demanded by real people and communities.

Since interests, needs, and demands are situated in specific contexts, it is required that the ideal takes form, according to the needs and demands that come from specific contexts. In other words, we need to ground our reflections and discussions in experience. Since all experience is situated and is unique, this exercise requires that we begin by looking at a specific example. In my case - a Peruvian citizen studying in Canada -- I have chosen my country of origin.

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abstract standards of value and aspects of validity, or rather to a partial and therefore unbalanced rationalization - for example, to the fact that the capitalist economy and modern administration expand at the expense of other domains of life that are structurally disposed to moral-practical and expressive forms of rationality and squeeze them into forms of economic or administrative rationality.” (Habermas, Jurgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol.1: Reason and the Rationalization of society. Boston: Beacon, 1984. p.183)
Thus, this thesis examines one specific case: the curriculum proposal for
democratic and citizenship education in the National Baccalaureate Pilot Plan in Perú
(Bachillerato). The social, political, cultural and historical context of Perú makes
democratic education in this country a significant example to reflect upon, because its
current context is one in which many different voices in this country demand democracy
and justice; and where the need and relevance of the discussion around democratic
educational projects has clear urgency, meaning, and -- currently -- public voice.²

In chapter 1 I present and discuss the theory that gives light to my ideas on
democracy and democratic citizenship education. The main question I try to respond here
is: What to understand by democracy?

I re-define from a philosophical perspective, the democratic-emancipatory project
in order to highlight the strong ethical character of democracy. For this, I turn first, to the
contemporary German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, who gives us a powerful and
hopeful interpretation of this project, and who -- at the same time -- has clear insights
regarding the challenges that today’s rationalized-capitalist societies pose to radical
democratic projects. Secondly, I present John Dewey’s valuable contributions to my
understanding of democracy and education. I then turn to Paulo Freire and Gustavo
Gutiérrez, who represent radical educational initiatives regarding democracy and justice
in Latin America.

The method I use, with respect to the different authors I draw upon, is a form of
selective commentary on what I have interpreted to be the general spirit and purpose of
their work. I use the central contributions of each author’s work to further my own
argument. I arrange these ideas into complementary pieces of a conversation that will, I
hope, become useful as a tentative framework for a philosophy of education for
democracy, human rights and peace.

² "Puertas Abiertas," “Open doors,” is a governmental initiative to gather the opinion/suggestions of
Peruvians on education. That is, on the adequacy of our educational system and institutions, on the main
problems and challenges it faces, on what Peruvians consider to be the objectives of education, and so
forth. Source: “Puertas Abiertas: Agenda de la Consulta Nacional de Educación.” Editado por la Comisión
In chapter 2, I critically explore the context in which a nationwide educational project in Perú, the Plan Piloto de Bachillerato Nacional, emerges. I develop my own interpretation of the major ways in which Perú’s social-historical reality is un-democratic. I focus on what I consider to be intrinsic forces (internal to our country and its history) that constitute challenges to the successful realization of seemingly democratic citizenship values (including values of human rights and peace). The main question that guides this inquiry is, what would democratic and citizenship education mean and imply in Perú today. I claim that democratic citizenship education requires that we give importance to historical memory and to the facing of our history. This implies that we need to include or integrate, controversial and hard issues of our social, political, historical reality, in the curricula, as important pieces of our education. Along these lines, and with regards to Perú specifically, I argue for the need to inquire and to look into the relation between the war marked by The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and Perú’s history of domination, non-recognition, racism, and extreme socio-economic inequality. In this chapter I also outline my understanding of the intimate connection between human rights, human needs, and democratic citizenship. This connection supports my claim that it is crucial, from an educational perspective for democratic citizenship, to address hard issues of our society such as the theme of Sendero (because in itself, it constitutes an important point of entry to the discussion and understanding of social justice, human needs, democracy and citizenship).

In chapter 3, I give an overview of the National Baccalaureate Pilot Plan and ask: To what extent does the plan’s emphasis on democratic and citizenship education respond to the needs and demands that arise from the social-political, cultural and historical Peruvian context? I suggest that, besides Perú’s own challenges (intrinsic forces) there are extrinsic forces that erode the possibilities of radical democracy. I give an interpretation of the international context and discuss some aspects of globalization that have an important impact on educational discourses and programs, such as the Bachillerato in Perú. I claim that the Bachillerato’s vocabulary and language (specifically the concepts of “democracy” and “citizenship”) are inadequate because they assume democracy is -- to a large extent -- already realized.
This leads me to the examination of the question: educating citizens or subjects? which I address in my conclusions in order to summarize the implications of the work developed in the three chapters.

Given the significant percentage of immigrant populations that come from similar contexts, histories and realities to those from which I come, and to which I refer, I hope that the ideas in this thesis can be considered to represent a voice from the "South" (South America) that is worth including in the discussion and in the making of multicultural and intercultural educational policy in Canada.
Chapter I. Democracy: A Radical Project.

In this chapter I present my conception of democracy that serves as the framework for the rest of this thesis. As I mentioned in my introduction, the more the term democracy is utilized, the more it seems that we take it for granted. (We seem to operate on the assumption that we have a clear understanding of what we mean by democracy, that we are all understanding the same definition and practice). Therefore, the first step in this discussion surrounding democratic and citizenship education has to be to lay out a/my conception of democracy, in order to reach an understanding that will serve to frame and organize the case study inquiry. The content that I draw upon to formulate my concept of democracy and democratic education derives mainly from four sources: Jurgen Habermas, John Dewey, Paulo Freire and Gustavo Gutiérrez (the latter two considered together). I select certain ideas from these different sources and authors that I consider worth highlighting and reflecting upon. Together, the authors and their ideas contribute to give a strong spirited content to the concept of democracy.

For the purpose of this thesis, theories cannot be considered fixed, finished or static, but rather fluid, adaptable, and able to engage in a dynamic relationship with practice and concrete cases. Thus I want to emphasize that the conception of democracy that I develop here, is a preliminary starting point to be developed throughout the thesis. Moreover, because this framework is theoretical, it is only through the other chapters -- where I look at a specific context and case -- that this philosophical framework becomes more meaningful and concrete.

Habermas: Democracy as Historical Emancipatory Project

The theme of democracy is central to Habermas’s work and theory, which is vast and encompasses many themes. I will refer mainly to “Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Theory of Law and Democracy,” and to “The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory.”

I need to say, from the outset, that I do not approach Habermas’s theory with the intention to criticize, question or invalidate his ideas on the basis of finding facts far away

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from his theory. I take from Habermas that which serves as an ideal and inspiration to a project of democratization (in which I situate this project for citizenship and democratic education).

Once we have a clear vision of our telos (a/our democratic ideal), we need to turn our attention to experience in order to have a clear understanding of what things are not working -- of how is democracy not being realized -- and why. Specific contexts and cases will raise different questions and problems for the "theory" we are using as a starting point. In the case of law and justice, for example, we are faced with the problem of different “degrees” of citizenship in our societies, especially in developing societies, and in Latin America. Law and justice benefit, or are accessible to, only certain groups and not (to) the majority. Given this reality, there are many forms in which we can question and dismiss Habermas’s theory. Given this reality, too, we can engage in a critical and creative exercise to reflect on theory and praxis, not in order to undermine the theory but in order to conceive alternatives that would bring us closer to the telos to which that theory points.

What interests me here is Habermas’s interpretation of the spirit of the democratic project, and the connection that Habermas makes between the system(s) of rights (formal justice/law), democracy and communication. Moreover, my interest is in the intersubjective and cooperative character that Habermas attaches to those three realities.

In “Between Facts and Norms,” Habermas’s work and interest in democratic theory cause him to turn his attention to law. For Habermas, law has the potential to represent and express the radical democratic project in social life. Law is an important social sphere that serves as a “medium” through which democracy, in today’s complex societies, can be strengthened and developed.

How does Habermas understand and describe democracy in the first place? The answer is not simple, precisely because Habermas’s theory of democracy is very elaborate. His concept of democracy is complex and has many components. In “Between Facts and Norms,” he approaches democracy from a formal/legal perspective, namely, constitutional democracy.
**Constitutional democracy: A revolutionary project.**

*Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*

*Popular Sovereignty as Procedure*\(^5\) is an essay that Habermas wrote in 1988 in the context of the celebration of the two-hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution. For Habermas, the most relevant contributions of the Revolution are the ideas that inspired constitutional democracy. Habermas believes that the emancipatory project (western and modern) that begun with the French Revolution, is a social and political project that continues to be contemporary. (Later, I will develop and connect this idea with the current struggles for recognition of oppressed and minority groups in today’s complex and plural societies.) The fact that this revolutionary consciousness lost its vitality, the fact that in practice the ideals and principles that motivated it have not been attained (and more often have even been contradicted and violated), does not mean that we cannot recover the revolutionary consciousness from our own location and our needs today. For Habermas,

> The mentality created by the French revolution became both permanent and trivial: no longer surviving today as revolutionary consciousness, it has forfeited its explosive utopian power and much of its rhetorical power as well. But has this transformation of form also depleted its energies? The cultural dynamic released by the French Revolution has obviously not come to a standstill.\(^6\)

According to Habermas, “it is a project we must carry forward in the consciousness of a revolution both permanent and quotidian.”\(^7\)

This means that today we can find many examples of people and groups of people, that engage in efforts to improve the conditions and the quality of their life and the life of others (human rights advocates, trade unions, native communities, environmentalists, different groups of women, ethnic-cultural minorities, social workers, and so forth).

The 18th century French revolutionary consciousness, according to Habermas, gave birth to a new understanding of time and history, a new concept of political practice, and a new notion of legitimation. History opened up to collective intervention and transformation thus enlarging the horizon of future possibilities and giving grounds to the


\(^6\) Habermas, loc. cit. p.470.

\(^7\) Ibid., p.471.
conviction that we can start anew. Hannah Arendt, whom Habermas mentions, shares this conviction and expresses it as follows:

The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything human to ruin and destruction; if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin.8

Consequently, the revolutionary consciousness was also expressed in the conviction that individuals are agents of their destiny. As members of a group, they are called to work cooperatively to coordinate their lives together. Political freedom implies the freedom of people who determine and realize themselves both as individual subjects and as members of a community. It is important to stress the cooperative character of the political9 practice. For Habermas, “this appeal to the promotion of fraternity connected with the idea of citizenship, must be the central message of the celebration of the two-hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution.”10 The notion of citizen in itself incarnates the two equiprimordial constitutive aspects of the “new (modern) person.” (New refers to the citizen’s own revolutionary self-understanding, i.e., seeing herself as protagonist — together with others — of an emancipatory project). Although a citizen is an individual, she is an individual in relation with other individuals with whom she shares certain common interests and with whom she practices conjoint decision and action. Moreover, just as the category citizen needs an individual subject (some-one) whom to qualify, so an individual requires to be in relationship with others (in the form of a community, group, society), in order to be or become a citizen. A citizen is bestowed with rights that grant her freedom (or liberty) to pursue her own idea of the good (life). In other words, the constitutional state and the law grant citizens private autonomy or individual self-determination. At the same time, the constitutional state and the system of rights have to secure equality among individuals, and therefore have to “restrict” certain individual liberties. However, it is misleading to conceive rights as goods that one possesses. Rather, “rights are relationships, not things; they are institutionally defined

9 political comes from the Greek politikos. It means that which concerns — in one way or another — life in the city (polis), or life in the “public sphere”, or life with and together with others.
10 Habermas, Jurgen. loc. cit. p.466.
rules specifying what people can do in relation to one another. Rights refer to doing more than having. To social relationships that enable or constrain action." 11

Moreover, individual rights require those rights that ensure equal liberties to all in order to protect individual autonomy of each and every citizen. There is indeed a tension between the two sets of rights, but this tension is one that binds both sets of rights together. This tension between the rights that protect private autonomy and the rights that protect public autonomy (equality), create a unity that protects each and every citizen. However, the relation between both sets of rights has often been misunderstood as antagonistic. One of Habermas’s claims is that we must re-conceive them as being complementary, and as reinforcing one another. For example, equitable access to social services and social benefits is an important condition for a person’s freedom. Thus the laws that regulate our life in common can either strengthen or weaken the conditions for freedom and realization that the “contexts” in which we live offer us. Mary Dietz, expresses this idea as follows:

[...] at each moment of our lives our every thought, value, and act – from the most mundane to the most lofty – takes its meaning and purpose from the wider political and social reality that constitutes and conditions us [...] matters beyond one’s immediate purview make a great deal of difference with respect to living a more or less free and fully human life.12

The democratic project, then, can be understood as the historical project (unfinished) to give all citizens equal rights so that all have equal possibilities of self-realization. In Habermas’s words, “autonomy and self-realization are the key concepts for a practice with an immanent purpose, namely, the production and reproduction of a life worthy of human beings.”13

Democracy presupposes the law of the people and for the people, where the citizens are both addressees and co-authors of the law. It is the law of the people because the people have made it, it is for the people because the people have made the law in order that it regulates their life in common, for their own good (and it is the people

13 Habermas. loc. cit. p.469.
themselves who have reached an understanding of what is good for them). A democratic society — ideally — is one in which all members rule because it is they who decide the laws which rule their lives in common. In other words, it should be the people (all citizens), who exercise political power (popular sovereignty). Therefore, the legitimacy of the system of rules by which a democratic form of government exercises its functions, comes from popular sovereignty.

_The morality of law, the principle of democracy, and solidarity._

The "system" of modern Law is a unique social sphere that fulfills socially integrative functions mainly because, even though it is a formal and positive system (a system that produces and applies rules or laws), its source of legitimacy comes from structures of general intersubjective communication and mutual recognition that take place in the lifeworld. In this sense, law is situated "between facts and norms," because, as Habermas understands it, it is a social "medium" that functions as a kind of "transmission belt" between the more concrete, practical, and living structures of the lifeworld (in this case, intersubjective, face to face interactions and exchange), and the more abstract, formal, and anonymous systematic structure of the legal regulations that mediate the interactions among citizens (bearers of rights) as such. The subsystem of law is a reflexive social system that reproduces itself together with culture and personality structures through the flow of communicative actions." The subsystem of law is reflexive, as opposed to other subsystems in our societies that function autopoietically. An autopoietic subsystem is one that becomes autonomous and one that closes itself to the "life" and dynamics of other subsystems or spheres in society. An autopoietic subsystem functions independently, not needing nor receiving any feedback or influence from "outside." There is no significant flow or exchange between an autopoietic system and other spheres of the social world. (For example, obsolete forms of state administration and bureaucracy are autopoietic; economic systems that follow their own logic without paying real attention to the concerns that other spheres express — or to the concerns of common citizens on the impact that the system (in this economic) has on other spheres and on the citizen’s lives — are also autopoietic.

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14 ibid., p.448.
15 ibid., p.80.
Law includes all communication oriented by law, such that legal rules refer reflexively to the function of social integration directly fulfilled in the process of institutionalization. But the legal code not only keeps one foot in the medium of ordinary language, through which everyday communication achieves social integration in the life-world; it also accepts messages that originate there and puts these into a form that is comprehensible to the special codes of power steered administration and money-steered economy. To this extent the language of law, unlike moral communication restricted to the life-world, can function as a transformer in the society-wide communication circulating between system and life-world.17

The point here is that Law carries or contains moral values and principles that we find in the life-world. Although we know often times law is an instrument of power, and that sanction and punishment play an important role as factors that make citizens obey the law, it is also true that citizens can obey law because they consider it to be legitimate. That is, citizens can feel compelled to obey the law because it resonates with values and principles that they (citizens) hold and to which they are committed.

For Habermas, at the heart of the system of rights and modern law, there is a democratic principle that functions as the mechanism for establishing the production of legitimate law. "The logical genesis of the system of rights comprises a circular process in which the legal code (legal form) and the democratic principle are co-originally constituted."18

The democratic principle comes from the "discourse principle," which maintains that "only those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses."19 (We can understand what Habermas means by "rational discourses" in light of his concept of communicative action, i.e., citizens' engagement in communication for reaching understanding over problematic validity claims, over conflict, over relevant issues of their life in common). In general, we use the discourse principle in actions of communication in the life-world. Habermas does not say that we always use it, or that it is always the case. The discourse principle functions as the ideal or telos according to which we engage in discussion and debate in order to reach an understanding pertaining important issues of our life in common. When we discuss and ponder what is better for all, we agree – ideally – to the more reasonable ideas and

17 Ibid., p.81.
18 Ibid., p.122.
positions. The *more reasonable* includes consideration of emotions, relationships, particular contexts, and so forth, and does not mean "rational" in the traditional/metaphysical sense of this term. *More reasonable* means that we have *agreed* upon certain issues, and that we have done so on the basis of grounds that we consider valid (grounds that are inevitably tied to, or that express, emotions, ideas, values, relationships, etc) rather than on the basis of the potential for sanctions (punishment), or on the basis of coercion.

The fact that we do not *always*, or even infrequently, act and interact in accordance with this democratic principle, does not mean that the principle does not exist or that it is not worth holding to. I think of it analogously to Levinas's thought on the "the ethical": "it is always other than the ways of the world, but there are many examples of it in the world."

"Where did you ever see the ethical relation practiced?" people say to me. I reply that its being utopian does not prevent it from investing our everyday actions of generosity or goodwill towards the other [...] This concern for the other remains utopian in the sense that it is always 'out of place' (*u-topos*) in this world, always other than the 'ways of the world'; but there are many examples of it in the world.20

Imperfect practice is still practice. The principle of democracy, as the institutionalized procedure for producing legitimate law, derives from the inter-penetration of the discourse principle (a moral principle in the life-world), and the legal form. Therefore, "there is an internal and conceptual relation (and not merely a historically contingent association), between the rule of law and democracy."21 "The source of all legitimacy lies in the democratic lawmaking process, and this in turn calls on the principle of popular sovereignty."22 Popular sovereignty requires the procedural rights that secure equality and freedom for the public or civic autonomy that are at its base. For the people to be *sovereigns* they have to understand themselves as co-authors (agents/protagonists/empowered citizens) of the laws to which they are *subjected* (or to which they have agreed to abide by).

19 Ibid., p.107.
21 Habermas, loc. cit. p.449.
22 Ibid., p.89.
For Habermas, the positive and individualistic reading of rights is problematic. It does not recognize or pay attention to the imminently intersubjective character of rights, and it has led to the apparent contradiction between private autonomy and public autonomy (i.e., between individual rights to freedom and civil rights to equality). This positive and individualistic reading of rights has even led to a misunderstanding of the intimate relation between human rights -- individual rights -- and democracy. The antagonistic interpretation of rights and law has inspired the long debate between liberals and communitarians, as well as the false and unfruitful dichotomy between individual freedom and self-realization on the one hand, and the common good on the other.

In “Struggles for recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State,” Habermas responds to Charles Taylor’s essay “The Politics of Recognition.” Taylor had argued that the liberal model of the constitutional (democratic) state does not satisfy the needs of collective goals such as those of the French-speaking majority in Quebec (minority in Canada). It is a minority that struggles to safeguard, legally, its identity or form of life and values, against the Anglo-Saxon majority culture in Canada. According to Habermas, Taylor has assumed that the protection of collective identities competes with the right to equal individual freedom, so that in the case of conflict one would have to take precedence over the other. Habermas tries to show that this assumption is mistaken, and argues that “the theory of rights is by no means blind to cultural differences.” Habermas claims that Taylor’s interpretation of rights “ignores half of the concept of autonomy because it does not see that those to whom the law is addressed can acquire autonomy only to the extent that they can understand themselves to be the authors of the laws to which they are subject as private legal persons.”

[... ] private autonomy and public autonomy are equiprimordial. It is not a matter of public autonomy supplementing and remaining external to private autonomy, but rather of an internal, that is, conceptually necessary connection between them. For in the final analysis, private legal persons cannot even attain the enjoyment of equal individual liberties unless they themselves, jointly exercising their autonomy as citizens, arrive at clear understanding about what interests and

24 Ibid., p.110-112.
25 Ibid., p.112.
26 Ibid.
criteria are justified and in what respects equal things will be treated equally and unequal things unequally in any particular case.\(^\text{27}\)

(Private autonomy refers to individual rights for freedom and self realization; public autonomy refers to rights that secure equality among citizens). This "equiprimordial" relation between the private and the public is what Habermas considers to be the heart of democracy. In this sense, the democratic constitutional state (law) should not be blind to unequal social conditions or cultural differences, precisely because the identity and self-realization of individuals (who bear rights) is conceived intersubjectively (in relations of communication and cooperation/solidarity with others).

Persons, and legal persons as well, become individualized only through a process of socialization. A correctly understood theory of rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed. This does not require an alternative model that would correct the individualistic design of the system of rights through other normative perspectives. All that is required is the consistent actualization of the system of rights.\(^\text{28}\)

Habermas insists on the idea that, because social life is inter-subjective, it is impossible to conceive the integrity of the individual (her freedom, her identity, her self-realization) as being separate or independent from the social dynamics, structures and context where she is situated. If the system of rights guaranteed that these dynamics and structures enable and support individual freedom and well-being (rather than hinder, limit, or challenge them), then the system of rights would be fulfilling its purpose. Namely, to regulate the life of citizens according to those same citizens' understanding of, and desire for, their life in common. In short, the consistent actualization of rights requires that the system of rules remain always open and receptive to the needs, concerns, values and principles of the addresses of law.

In reality, where unfortunately only a minority in the world exercises (and not only possesses) its rights (and thus have more possibilities of self realization than others), the consistent actualization of rights implies that the constitutional democratic state and law should consider and take into account socioeconomic and cultural differences of distinct communities and groups. The system of rights ought not to be blind or deaf to "the people's" needs and requirements for becoming autonomous.

\(^{27}\) Ibid.
Certainly, oppressed, marginalized, disrespected groups, cultural or ethnic minorities, are not – in fact – recognized as equal bearers of rights. And even when they are, the entrenched un-democratic structures in place impede the proper exercise of their rights. The legal system treats members of these marginal groups as second, third, and fourth class citizens.

If the state is to recognize and protect the rights of the members of these groups, it has, firstly, to recognize that their positions/locations are “un-privileged” in one or more ways. The state has to understand that justice cannot be reduced to distributive justice. For Habermas, the distributive justice of equal legal status and equal treatment (the just distribution of social goods and benefits) is what results from the universalistic character of law that aims at guaranteeing freedom and self-realization for all. Rights are not goods to be merely distributed. They have to be enacted and exercised. But, like Habermas says, there would be little likelihood of this without social movements and political struggles.

Habermas is aware that his “model” is designed for societies that have developed decent democratic cultures. Much of the critiques directed against his ideas are based on the fact that a large part of the world and societies are not actually “democratic.” Many societies deserve the label of “low intensity” democracies:

Many states are democratic in formal institutional terms only. These states do not provide for the reform of social and legal systems that are essential for maintaining the conditions for human rights, including a reduction of inequality, land reform, a free press and access to public office. Trade unions are weak, wages are depressed below a level to sustain a dignified life, legislation on environmental security, health and safety never reaches the statute books and all movements that seek social justice are labeled antidemocratic and quashed [...]

In short, we cannot take democracy for granted. Many countries are considered to be democratic on the basis that “decent” electoral processes take place there, regularly. But, as I am trying to show in this section (and as I will continue to discuss throughout this thesis) democracy means much more than this. Democracy means a commitment to equality for all people based on a commitment to the building up of a better community

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28 Ibid., 113.
29 See quote 11 on page 5.
for all people, where citizens participate, actively and fully in both the benefits of society and in the very process of defining and redefining what is better for all.

I have chosen Habermas -- in spite of many aspects of his discourse and theory that are problematic and certainly criticizable -- because of his vision or ideal of democracy, because of the strong emphasis he puts on democracy as an emancipatory project, and because of his understanding of the latter (Habermas’s view of democracy has a strong ethical and cooperative/social/intersubjective character, which distances him from the liberal and more individualistic view of democracy. At the same time, Habermas’s understanding of the social is different from the socialist/communist tradition in that he gives significant attention to issues of identity, recognition, freedom and self-realization, that the socialist thought had ignored).

I would like to return to the connection between law, democracy and communicative action. According to Habermas, law is (or should be) permeable to the life-world. Law is/should be open to respond to the real needs of the citizens, and should be able to transform the input received from citizens into legal rules that will impact directly on those citizens’ lives. This requires that we (citizens, governments) work to enlarge the public sphere rather than to reduce it, because open and free public discussion and communication are crucial in a democratic society. It is more likely that we hear, recognize and respect the needs, interests, and voices that we express to one another as citizens, if we engage in joint action cooperatively and with an authentic sense of solidarity.

Thus, communicative action and democracy are intimately connected. In other words, empowerment of the people (popular sovereignty) implies that the structures of social integration, solidarity, and communicative/cooperative interaction have to be expanded and strengthened rather than reduced and weakened. As I will argue later, democratic and citizenship education can play an important role as an integrative social force, and it can contribute to the empowerment of citizens. In order for members of a community to organize and rule their lives in common, and democratically, popular sovereignty presupposes democratic processes of political opinion-and-will formation, and of decision making. Here is where Habermas's theory of communicative action comes into play. His discursive or deliberative model of democracy claims that “the legal
community constitutes itself not by way of social contract but on the basis of a discursively achieved agreement."31 A group of people that want to regulate their life together legally, need to communicate and deliberate in order to reach understanding and agreement. The processes of discourse, argumentation (discussion) and bargaining, need to be democratic in procedure by employing forms of communication "that promise that all outcomes reached in conformity with the procedure are reasonable."32 With regards to this point, Habermas quotes John Dewey to claim that it is essential to improve the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. Reasonableness is criterion for evaluation (legitimacy) of different arguments and positions competing for recognition, validity, and power. "Reasonableness," and "more reasonable" as I mentioned in my explanation of the democratic principle (p. 8) has to do with our inclination to agree upon certain issues on the basis of grounds that we consider valid (grounds that are inevitably tied to, or that express, emotions, ideas, values, relationships, etc) rather than on the basis of the potential for sanctions (punishment), or on the basis of coercion. Nonetheless, the concepts of reason and reasonableness are problematic and raises different questions. I. M. Young, for example, proposes an ideal of communicative democracy instead of deliberative democracy. She argues that a theory of democratic discussion, useful to the contemporary pluralistic character of the world, has to address the possibilities and limits of communication across wide differences of culture and social position, and that at the same time these different approaches to communication imply different modes of knowledge (of "reasonableness") and expression, that are not equally respected or recognized.33 I agree with her position and arguments because they acknowledge from the outset that we (citizens in more or less "democratic" societies) are not "equal." Her idea of "communicative" action, then, differs from Habermas's discourse theory mainly in respect to his idea of reasonableness, which may appear to be metaphysical and universalistic. Nevertheless, I think that Habermas's theory already accommodates criticisms like Young's,

Democratic procedure makes it possible for issues and contributions, information and reasons to float freely; it secures a discursive character for political will-

31 Ibid., 449.
32 Ibid., p.304.
formation; and it thereby grounds the fallibilist assumption that results issuing from proper procedure are more or less reasonable.\(^{34}\)

Habermas's concept of democracy, as the possibility for ideas, concerns, reasons "to float freely," implies that those ideas or validity claims are also criticizable.

I agree with Young's claim that we need to include and recognize the different modes of expression of diverse "oppressed" groups, because I consider her arguments to be \textit{reasonable}. My point is that I still believe that Habermas's proposal remains strong and encompassing enough to be taken into account as a basic ideal model of reference, that is worth discussing and revising.

In the meantime it suffices that we look into the connection between reasonableness and communication. According to Habermas, both concepts are connected to action. Since "reason" expresses itself through language, and since language is social and inter-relational, Habermas re-thinks and re-considers the relationship between reason and language, and gives them both (reason and language) a strong intersubjective and cooperative character.

Language, and practical reason through language, are perhaps the most important societal mediums of interaction and cooperation. Language is ambivalent because it does not put us beyond domination and power. Language can be (and indeed is) an instrument of oppression and power. But language has also the potential to contribute to the humanization of modern societies. How? What would this mean?

To begin with, it is through language that we communicate and interact. It is through language that both dominant and subaltern discourses exert their power. Therefore, one important challenge is to \textit{use} language to contest, question, and critique the dominant discourses. If these dominant discourses discriminate against those that come from voices of oppressed groups (groups that are or have been exploited, marginalized, discriminated against, groups that experience powerlessness, cultural imperialism, violence,)\(^{35}\) then these are the discourses that need to be invigorated, re-invented, or included in language, in communication. That is, we need to include culture,

\(^{34}\) Habermas, loc. cit. p. 448.

\(^{35}\) For a description/explanation of oppression, see: Young, Iris Marion. \textit{Justice and the Politics of Difference}. Princeton, 1990. p.39-65. (Chapter 2: "The five faces of Oppression") In the following sections I also present Gutiérrez’s and Freire’s understanding of oppression.
identity, feelings, tradition, etc. in precisely those vocabularies or forms of languages from where these issues (culture, emotions, relationships, etc) have been excluded.

For Habermas, the original or primordial mode of language is what he calls language for reaching understanding, as opposed to the instrumental or strategic use of language. In his *Theory of Communicative Action*, he distinguishes between *illocutionary* and *perlocutionary* speech acts. In the former, the communicative intention of the speaker does not go beyond wanting the hearer to understand the manifest content of the speech act. The latter refer to a context of instrumental action that is beyond the speech act itself.

This distinction is important because it brings us to the connections between critique, validity, and democracy. *Illocutionary* speech acts communicate/express criticizable validity claims that can move the hearer to accept or agree (and coordinate action accordingly) independently of "external" forces such as sanctions, power, and coercion. Validity claims are internally connected with grounds and reasons that are criticizable, and hence, they give the *illocutionary* act a rationally motivated force rather than a force based on the potential for sanctions (as it is in the case of imperatives). Therefore, the "success" of an *illocutionary* speech act (reaching understanding and coordinating action) requires an agreement on its validity. Moreover, validity claims imply intersubjective recognition. For example, the utterance of the sentence "it is important that children in the Andes have a bilingual education: Quechua and Spanish," in the context of a discussion among educators and educational policy makers, is an *illocutionary* speech act. The grounds and reasons that the speaker has to defend her claim are open to discussion and criticism, and hence her claim is *reasonable*.

Democracy, from this angle, means the possibility for discussing crucial issues of our life in common (justice, rights, needs, recognition, identity, inclusion, affection, and so forth), in order to reach understanding and agreement to coordinate our actions. Democracy means that there is always the space or possibility to contest, to question, or to say "no" to what is in place, or to what happens to be the case (especially with regards to issues that are very important to our lives). Democracy means enough openness to

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enable and allow responsible citizens to initiate transformation and change, to become protagonists of their life in common.

The meaning of reasonableness in Habermas, then, has more to do with openness -- to dialogue, to the exchange and to the claim of ideas and values, based on grounds/"reasons" that are susceptible to criticism -- than with specific logical or epistemological criteria. Dogmatism is opposed to openness (and to reason) because it closes or narrows the doors to possibilities and alternatives. Dogmatism (unreasonable) causes stagnation and decay.

To conclude this section, I summarize the aspects of Habermas's conception of democracy that I highlighted, and that will serve as a broader framework for my discussion of democratic and citizenship education. The first aspect I stress is the open/unfinished character of democracy. Ideally, democracy means that there is always room for, and the possibility of, dissent, of disagreement. Democracy means the possibility to say "no" to the prevailing or current status quo (because this status quo does not fulfill our needs and goals). Democracy means open spaces where reformulation, reinvention, questioning, proposing anew or differently, are possible. Democracy means the potential for transforming/changing what we currently have -- not arbitrarily or for "no reason," but precisely because we think that something/s are not working for us, for our well being.

Second, I highlight the ethical character of the radical/emancipatory democratic project: it is a project that strives for the self-realization or fulfillment of the needs of all. Thirdly, the emancipatory/democratic project conceives of the political practice as cooperative and intersubjective (responsibility is the ability and willingness to respond to the needs or claims of others with whom we interact).

Finally, Habermas's conception of democracy suggests the importance of strong citizenship (active, engaged citizens with capacity to influence decision making and transformation). Strong citizenship is indispensable to democracy. In other words, democracy means the commitment to the continuous strengthening of citizenship.

37 Ibid.,p.290-292.
Habermas’s model and theory do not give us unproblematic suggestions or specific and definitive answers or solutions. It does not, for example, speak directly to “low intensity democracies,” such as the current system in Peru.

Philosophies and philosophers like Habermas, are “useful” to us as guides that shed some light on the issues that concern us. In this case, Habermas’s philosophy speaks to our concern for democracy, recognition, and citizenship. From the point of view of an educator, I believe that education can play a very important role in forming and cultivating citizens (protagonists, responsible agents of their life in common) rather than subjects. I believe education can act as an important integrative social force.

At this point I will comment on some ideas of John Dewey that resonate with my discussion in this section, and which are directly connected to education. Dewey’s ideas will also serve as a bridge between Habermas’s democratic theory and Freire’s and Gutiérrez’ pedagogies.

**Dewey: Continuity of experience and agency in social life and in education.**

*As the experience of the spectator favors fatalism, so the experience of the agent produces hope.*

To expand our discussion of openness in democracy and in democratic and citizenship education, I will highlight Dewey’s idea of agency for social transformation and for the re-making or re-“creation” of experience. Richard Rorty, who considers himself to be a Deweyean, expresses this concept in the phrase: “truth is made rather than found.” That is, each person is an agent with the capacity to create, re-create, and transform the “truth” of ourselves and our world.

The relation (“dialectic”) between the social and the individual is an essential part of Dewey’s philosophy. Individual realization is inseparable from the well being of a society as a whole. In *Democracy and Education* Dewey states two ideas relevant to this discussion. First, he asserts that in any social group one finds common interests and some kind of interaction and cooperation between its members (one also finds interaction and cooperation among/between different groups). Second, he argues that isolation and

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exclusiveness of a group “brings its anti-social spirit into relief.” Exclusion and exclusiveness “makes for rigidity and formal institutionalizing of life, for static and selfish ideals within the group.” In other words, groups that are little open to interact and “exchange” with different groups tend to become rigid and isolated.

From these two points, Dewey outlines the democratic ideal: a society with numerous and varied points of shared interest and the recognition of mutual interests. Also, Dewey considers democracy to be a space where there is free interaction between social groups, where there is varied intercourse that produces continuous change and readjustment of social habits:

A democracy [...] is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest, so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the actions of others to give point and direction to his own [...] (It is) the widening of the area of shared concerns, and the liberation of a greater diversity of personal capacities which characterize a democracy.

Maxine Greene comments on Dewey in Can democracy be taught?

A community, a democratic community, said Dewey, always is in the making. Arendt would add that there always are newcomers, always new stories feeding into living history out of which community emerges and is continually renewed.

Dewey believes that we have to engage in a deliberate effort to promote and sustain this democratic form of society. His educational project plays a central role in the continuous democratization (opening to new experiences and possibilities) of social life. For Dewey, experience in education is very important because there is “an organic connection between education and personal experience,” because all genuine education comes about through experience. Not just any experience is positively educative however, but experiences that make possible (and promote) the continuous interaction

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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p.87.
44 Ibid., p.42.
and growth both of individuals (everyone without distinction) and social groups. In Dewey's words:

Experience and education cannot be directly equated to each other. For some experiences are mis-educative. Any experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience.46[...] Everything depends upon the quality of experience which is had [...] Hence the central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences.47

In Experience and Education, Dewey asks: Why do we prefer democratic and humane arrangements to those which are autocratic and harsh? His answer ultimately comes down to the statement of a belief. His belief is that democratic social arrangements promote a better quality of human experience than do non-democratic and anti-democratic forms of social life.

For Dewey, one criterion for discriminating good from bad human experiences is the principle of continuity of experience. Every experience enacted modifies the one who acts and undergoes. This modification affects the quality of subsequent experiences and has an impact on the formation of attitudes, both emotional and intellectual. In this sense, experience does not go on simply inside a person. It also changes the "objective" conditions under which experiences are experienced. According to Dewey, continuity and interaction are the two fundamental principles of experience (to an important extent, these are what a democratic society and democratic education are about). Experience is continuous interaction with others and with the world. It contributes to our growth, nourishment, and development as human beings and as a society. The better the quality of our experiences, the more capable we are of more fruitful interaction with others. Interestingly, Dewey understands "intelligence" as a skill or ability that contributes to improve the quality of social interaction and action. In other words, intelligence, for Dewey, serves a larger purpose or telos – namely, social well being. In Reconstruction in Philosophy he refers to intelligence as "the purposeful energetic re-shaper of those phases of nature and life that obstruct social well-being."48 In this sense, Dewey's use of the term intelligence is analogous to Habermas's use of the term reason/reasonable. In both cases, the emphasis is not on the epistemological or logical aspects of reason or

46 Ibid.
intelligence. Rather, both Habermas and Dewey put emphasis on the social and intersubjective character of reason and intelligence. Moreover, my contention is that a true commitment to a/the democratic emancipatory project: the project of building up better conditions for the well being of every human being, the project of building up "a life worthy of human beings," is what underpins Habermas's and Dewey's philosophies.

In Education and Experience49 Dewey tries to show how education is and should be conceived as a social and co-operative project. He addresses the relation between teacher and students as that of an open-common enterprise. Teacher and students are all part of a community and part of the community's projects. This is why teachers should become acquainted with the conditions of the local community (physical, historical, economic, occupational, etc) in order to incorporate them in the educational process.50 (In the next section, we will see how Freire also emphasizes the importance of integrating the experience/situation of the community in learning)

John Dewey was very aware that there was still much work to be done in the moral realm. He knew that the direction economic liberalism had taken was excluding many people and contradicting the principles of what he understood as political liberalism. In Liberalism and Social Action51 Dewey admits that "coercion and oppression on a large scale exist, no honest person can deny." At the same time, he believes and has hope in humans and their/our capability to act in cooperation and in an organized manner for common aims and purposes, for "the relief of the human estate."52 That is, for human well being. Dewey's own context and experience made him identify human suffering with material and physical hindrances that he believed would be surmountable by science and technology (as products of organized human intelligence). Today, we know science and technology have not prevented the suffering that comes with social structures and dynamics that cause injustice, exclusion, violence. In this sense, Dewey's "experience" and context are very different from those of Freire and Gutiérrez, for example. Yet, I have incorporated Dewey here because he shares with

50 Ibid.p.40.
Habermas (and with Freire and Gutiérrez) the belief that human beings are agents of their own history. These four philosophers have all faith in people as agents of changes and transformations in the social life. They all believe in human dignity and have hope that cooperative action could be directed to promote and fulfill this dignity. Dewey and Freire in particular, believe in education as having an essential social purpose. It is at this point that I turn to Freire and Gutiérrez, and to their pedagogies.


In light of the aspects I have highlighted under my concept of democracy, and in light of our premise that education has the potential to play an important role in this project for democratization of our societies -- especially those societies considered to have imperfect, low intensity democracies -- we are faced with some initial questions. On what grounds and to what extent can we consider education to be an important integrative societal force and a democratizing activity? How would we conceive the nature of such education? What ideas and proposals, in respect to the relation between teachers and students in schools, would come out of this conception and understanding of education? What "extrinsic" forces constitute obstacles to the fulfillment of the democratizing "projects" that emerge from the work around these questions?

No authentic educational project for democratization, and for the realization of autonomous citizens, can ignore our socioeconomic realities. Many human beings still live under conditions of extreme poverty. As Amartya Sen argues, poverty is mainly the deprivation of capacities. People living in poverty and people living under conditions of extreme poverty, have little capacities (means) -- and hence less possibilities -- to become autonomous citizens. Poverty is part of the experience of many oppressed groups (marginalized groups, groups discriminated against, etc) that struggle "for recognition in the democratic constitutional state." (Habermas's theory of law and democracy). Thus the struggle for recognition is also the struggle for overcoming poverty, for overcoming the conditions that oppress them. Oppression narrows and constrains the possibilities for agency and for self-realization. This is the reason why I find fruitful and

worthwhile/suggestive to look at the work of Paulo Freire. The book that I will concentrate on here is his *Pedagogy of Freedom. Ethics, Democracy and Civil Courage*. Most of this book focuses on the ethical character of the educator's activity. Educators have an ethical duty to show civil courage, to denounce injustice and to take a position in respect to the reality/context where they and their students -- the school, the community where the school is -- are situated. Freire claims that an authentic pedagogy of freedom cannot be, and is not, indifferent to the political and the social-economic reality.

Freire critiques neo-liberalism and economic globalization as socioeconomic orders that profoundly challenge the realization of the emancipatory project of human beings. His position is certainly influenced by his experience as citizen of a country that has very stark social and economic inequalities: Brazil. It is not only misery and poverty that he protests against. Freire is outraged by the indifference and the lack of solidarity of a privileged minority toward the less favored. Freire gives tremendous importance to our capacity to learn in cooperation with others. He also believes in the possibility of change, he has faith that things can be different, that today's suffering is not inevitable, and that transformation requires cooperative and solidaristic agency.

**Unfinishedeness: Hope, Possibility and Responsibility.**

In his introduction, Freire tells us that he will discuss the educative practice from a progressive point of view. By “progressive,” he means that which favors the autonomy of the students. At the same time, the idea of autonomy incorporates various other themes. For example, he begins with the question of the unfinishedeness of the human person, “the question of our insertion into a permanent process of searching.” This is a key concept in Freire’s philosophy, and in this book in particular. It constitutes the foundation for his reflection on the meaning and importance of authentic openness in education and in the teacher’s attitude towards education and towards her students. Moreover, it grounds his ideas on ethics, including his ideas on the ethical character of education and on the ethical “obligations” of the teacher’s job. As he puts it:

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55 Freire, Paulo, op. cit. pp.21-27.
56 Ibid., p. 21.
The real roots of the political nature of education are to be found in the educability of the human person. This educability, in turn, is grounded in the radical unfinishedeness of the human condition and in our consciousness of this unfinished state. Being unfinished and therefore historical, conscious of our unfinishedness, we are necessarily ethical because we have to decide. To take options. Our historical unfinishedeness demands it. It opens up a space that we can occupy with ethically grounded attitudes, which can in practice be subverted.\footnote{Ibid., p. 100.}

Education and politics are activities and experiences that we inevitably engage in (in one form or another, to a bigger or lesser extent) by virtue of our inter-subjectivity. Being human means (among other things) that we are always already situated in a certain social fabric (or in certain social fabrics), it means that we respond to and interact with our surroundings and with others.

For Freire, the fact that we are unfinished, open, and able to decide makes us agents who have the capacity to intervene and change our world. Freire links this capacity of ours with the radical nature of hope. Hope is radical precisely because it is inspired by the desire for something that is not the case. Thus it implies change. Moreover, hope requires the conviction in the possibility of change.

Our unfinishedeness is our source of hope and of our capacity to work toward the future. The future is a horizon of possibilities. In this sense, fatalistic interpretations of our world and our reality reduce and harm our capacities to envision, to dream, to hope, to act, and to intervene in the world. Fatalistic interpretations weaken our capacity and our potential to realize our humanity through our creativity and imagination. They leave us with no project. When I think of the notion of “project,” I always imagine many people involved. Much of the realization of our potentials and capabilities for agency, as well as many of our motivations and concerns, involve other persons and our relationships with them. Even if we think in individualistic terms, projects always consider, although to different degrees, other persons. My point is that our unfinishedeness also brings us together. The scope of our agency and intervention in the world is larger when we act cooperatively and conjointly. Hence, each person’s (our) consciousness of our unfinishedeness makes us become more aware of the fact that our humanization, that our well being requires intersubjectivity, cooperation, solidarity.
Though I know that things can get worse I also know that I am able to intervene to improve them. I like being human because I know that my passing through the world is not predetermined, pre-established. That my destiny is not a given but something that needs to be constructed and for which I must assume responsibility. I like being human because I am involved with others in making history out of possibility, not simply resigned to fatalistic stagnation. Consequently, the future is something to be constructed through trial and error rather than an inexorable vice that determines all our actions.58

Carlos Fuentes, in “The Buried Mirror”, comments on the idea of our unfinishedness and on the challenges we are faced with as unfinished beings:

Our problems seem to be our unfinished business. But then, are we not all of us, men and women of the Americas, unfinished human beings?

Thankfully, we have not said our last word [...]59 In the midst of the crisis of “the four D’s”--debt, drugs, development and democracy--we realized that we could only answer the questions from within ourselves—that is, from within our cultures. We realized that we had a balkanized, fractured politics, failed economic systems, and vast social inequalities, but we also had a remarkable continuity of culture, which stood on its own two feet in the midst of our generalized crisis [...] We had to put our houses in order. But to do so we had to understand ourselves, our culture, our past, and our traditions as a source of new creation 60 [...] A basic renewal of democracy from the bottom, through cooperative systems is needed. This agenda proposes a double value that should guide the whole society. Let us feed and educate ourselves first of all; [...] If the majority of people continue to be left out of the process, underfed and uneducated, this will not happen.61

Our “communicative,”62 and solidaristic action with others is an essential component of authentic democratic societies, because it engages us all in a big and beautiful project (the most radical perhaps) -- namely, the emancipation of all human beings, the realization of a life worthy of every human beings’ dignity.

In Freire’s view, the current (neo liberal) economic order and its “ideology” are contrary to this project of humanization and emancipation. Ideologies in general tend to distort reality. They have the ability to impose themselves as if they were revelations of the truth. Having “said it all,” ideologies tend to weaken our curiosity, our awareness, and

58 Ibid., p.53-54.
60 Ibid., p.316.
61 Ibid., p.354.
Our critical consciousness. Freire expresses his indignation against the cynical fatalism of neo liberal thought, which proclaims that mass unemployment, growing and extremely stark inequalities, the conditions of extreme poverty under which a large part of the world’s population lives, and so forth, are inevitable end of the century calamities. Freire does not believe that the dream is dead and that now is the era of the technical-scientific training of the individual and not of his or her integral education. Even more cynical is the fact that neo liberalism speaks of ethics. The ethics of neo liberalism are those of the marketplace, free competition and profit for their own sake, not the universal ethics of the human person. Freire’s indignation regarding this deceit in neo liberal thought, is what makes him exhort us “to struggle courageously if we have, in truth, made a choice for a humanized world.” He directs this exhortation especially to educators.

For Freire, educative practice is “inevitably” ethical (we should remember that we are educable “by nature;” because we are unfinished, we are educable). Thus education cannot mean: “adapt the student to what is inevitable, to what cannot be changed.” Education cannot and should not humiliate us by denying our humanity, i.e., by denying our vital impulses and our capacity to intervene in our world and to transform it. Education should instead respect and defend our capacity to imagine, to hope, to create and to construct, to begin anew, to make things better.

Freire focuses on teacher education, but his view is pertinent for every educative practice and educative role. Teacher preparation should never be reduced to a form of training. Rather, teacher preparation should go beyond the technical preparation and be rooted in the ethical formation both of selves and of history. Teachers have an ethical-political responsibility to condemn the exploitation of labor, to condemn violence in all its forms, including the violence of oppressive social and economic orders that go against our project of emancipation and against the utopia of human solidarity. According to Freire, it is an ethical responsibility to struggle for the sake of the ethics of human emancipation and solidarity. Freire claims that

the best way to struggle for this ethic is to live it in our educative practice, in our relations with our students, in the way we deal with the contents of what we teach. The education of the teacher should be so ethically grounded that any gap between professional and ethical formation is to be deplored. We should devote

63 Freire, op.cit., p. 113.
64 Ibid., p. 114.
ourselves humbly but perseveringly to our profession in all its aspects: scientific formation, ethical rectitude, respect for others, coherence, a capacity to live with and learn from what is different, and an ability to relate to others without letting our ill-humor or our antipathy get in the way of our balanced judgment of the facts.\(^6^5\)

Throughout his book, Freire develops his ideas on the “ethical requirements and demands” that these different aspects of our profession (as educators) demand and entail.

The grounds for these ethics are, again, our consciousness and acknowledgement of our unfinishedess, and our belief in our capacity (in everyone’s capacity) to intervene in the world and to make it better for all.

Teaching, Freire tells us, is a human act that should reinforce and enhance humanity. It requires and demands commitment, respect for the location and autonomy of the students, rejection of discrimination, humility, tolerance, professional competence, generosity, caring, openness to dialogue and to difference, knowing how to listen, capacity to apprehend reality, critical reflection, struggle against the violation of rights and struggle for the rights of educators, decision making, curiosity, joy, and hope all together.

“If the dream that inspires us is democratic and grounded in solidarity, we need to talk and listen to each other instead of talking to others from on high.”\(^6^6\) This is why it is so important that teachers and the school do not “domesticate” the student (make students comply with existing traditions and practices). Students are persons who engage in a process of discovery and comprehension of their lives and their/our world. They should be protagonists of their own learning experience. And it is only among authentic persons and protagonists that we engage in democratic actions and projects. (Habermas’s premise that private and public autonomy are equiprimordial constituents of democratic societies).

Education, according to Freire, is not meant to reproduce the dominant ideology. Even though it may not be the key to social transformation, either, it certainly carries an ethical responsibility to humanization.

The teacher who thinks critically cannot afford to imagine that the course or seminar that she is conducting is going to transform the whole country. On the other hand, she can demonstrate that it is possible to change things, which strengthens the conviction of the importance of the politico-pedagogical task.

\(^{6^5}\) Ibid., p.24.
\(^{6^6}\) Ibid., p.110.
The coherent and democratic teacher who is full of life and hope for a better world, who has proven capacity for struggle and for respect for what is different, knows that the best way to modify the situation of the world is through the consistency with which she lives out her committed presence in the world, knowing that this presence in school, though it is a special and important moment that should be lived with authenticity, is nevertheless only one of many moments.67

Education and educators authentically committed to democracy have an ethical responsibility to live and to practice in accordance with this commitment. This is a commitment that demands a struggle and an effort that begin in our classrooms and in our relationships with our students. The struggle does not end there, though. It is a struggle and a "courage" we engage in as citizens.

In this sense, progressive education is an important "ally" of the project for democratization and emancipation. Our work as committed educators with a specific position in respect to "public life," and to our personal autonomy and self-realization, is in itself an expression of our exercising of rights as citizens. Teacher's "citizenship" does not remain "outside" school or outside our classes and interaction with students. The school is also a public sphere where teachers and students (as well as administration and parents) continue to be citizens with the right to have opinions, to have a position with regards to the "good life," and to engage in democratic discussion and cooperative action to defend and to implement these ideas and opinions.

The school can also be considered to be a special social setting where democratic values and objectives are cultivated and "practiced." In this sense, an important role of schooling is to promote and encourage learning processes that contribute to the formation of healthy democratic identities (strong citizenship) instead of weak identities with no resources, no hope, and little or no capacity and means to become real protagonists of their life in common.

Strong citizens are people who recognize themselves as active participants/agents of their lives. This includes the ideal notion of citizens as being both co-authors and addresses of the laws that regulate their lives in common (as Habermas argues). To be a citizen requires that we not only "possess" rights, but that we exercise them. In today's complex societies and "globalized" economies, our self-realization and autonomy as

67 Ibidem.
individuals is inseparable from what occurs in the public sphere (economic, social, and political realm). Although law and governments do not constitute our life-worlds entirely, they do have an important impact on them. This is why our agency as citizens depends to a large extent in our capacity to make our voices heard. Without our intervention and agency as citizens, our role and “part” in this world is at best “secondary.” Emancipation also means our empowerment as human beings. Empowerment enables us to make history. To “construct” and/or achieve something, we often need to understand both our capacities and our limits. Critical consciousness, awareness of our condition and of our context and world, empower us because they help us to locate ourselves in a position from where we feel confident to act and intervene.

The emancipatory and humanizing project advocated by Freire (and Habermas in his own way) is a project that envisions us all as real subjects and protagonists of our lives in common. Freire asserts the need for the “learners” to become active in understanding their situation in order to act upon it. According to Habermas, popular sovereignty (the rule of people for the people) requires that citizens are also active, and that they engage in the coordination/co-authoring of their life in common. The link between Freire and Habermas is even clearer if we see education as an ethical – political practice. Both Freire and Habermas stress the importance of students’ and citizens’ agency, understanding, critical consciousness, and solidarity.

I return to the central premise of human unfinishedness. This is another way of pointing to our imperfect nature, to our incompleteness, to our always "lacking or needing something." Our projects and struggles will always be motivated by what we believe are our needs. The democratic ideal is radical because it considers everyone’s needs. It includes the multitude of voices that claim that misery, poverty, exploitation, authoritarianism, lack of solidarity, violation of rights, violence, terror, oppression, egoism, indifference, the feeling of powerlessness and hopelessness, are not realities that people (we) need. Neo liberalism and the prevailing contemporary “ethics” are far from being the “necessary” way of satisfying our needs. Rather, it makes them all the more urgent.
Solidarity and critical consciousness in Freire and Gutiérrez: A Pedagogy for Liberation and Transformation

Oppression – overwhelming control – is necrophilic; it is nourished by love of death, not life. The banking concept of education, which serves the interests of oppression, is also necrophilic. Based on a mechanistic, static, naturalistic, spatialized view of consciousness, it transforms students into receiving objects. It attempts to control thinking and action, leads women and men to adjust to the world, and inhibits their creative power. *When their efforts to act responsibly are frustrated, when they find themselves unable to use their faculties, people suffer.*

For both Freire and Gutiérrez, critical consciousness is indispensable for freedom.

Freedom is acquired by conquest not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly. Freedom is not an ideal located outside man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion. To surmount the situation of oppression, people must first critically recognize its causes, so that through transforming action they can create a new situation, one which makes possible the pursuit of a fuller humanity.

Critical consciousness and strong citizenship are inseparable. By strong citizenship we mean persons who understand the context in which they live (including its problems, the possible causes or factors of the problems, and the plausible alternatives to these problems). Strong citizens are persons who understand their rights in connection to their commitment to well being, justice and peace for their community/society (and for all in general). Empowered citizens are persons that believe in their agency as transformative force. Critical consciousness is an important piece of the type of understanding that allows for and supports engagement and action.

What is discouraging, though, is the fact that strong citizenship is not a matter that lies solely within citizens. There are structures and forces in society that have strong impacts on citizenship, and that have the power to either enlarge it or shrink it. In many cases, no matter how strong may be one’s critical consciousness and commitment to participate in the struggle for the real exercising of rights, commitment and critical consciousness are not definitive to influence change or transformation. Certain social

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69 Ibid., p.29. See also: Freire, Paulo. *Education for Critical Consciousness*, and Gutierrez, Gustavo *Liberation and Change*. In respect to this theme of the need and importance of critical thinking in Latin America, many thinkers, writers, social reformers, agree. An interesting perspective and one worth looking at, is Octavio Paz’s. He points out the necessity and the importance of “knowing” our history, of not losing our memories that are essential to critical thinking, and to authentic change. *See* Paz, Octavio: *The Labyrinth of Solitude*. New York: Grove Press, 1985.
structures and forces constrain, weaken, and limit the scope of citizens' agency. Often, this constraint causes, in turn, a weakening of the belief in, and of the willingness to, engage in common projects: it affects hope and solidarity (A common example these days in Ontario, are the strikes that express the commitment of many university graduate students/employees and faculty to improve their work conditions and salary. Critical consciousness and commitment are strong, but often times the costs of standing up for our rights and for what we deem just and fair, are too high. The structures (administrative) in place have the power to impose sanctions that many students (citizens) are not in a position to afford.

Freire uses the concept of conscientizacao (conscientization) to refer to the process of learning to perceive and recognize one's own situation (specifically, it is the process whereby the oppressed become aware of their situation) and how to act upon it. Conscientization requires an educational approach and method that poses problems and questions, and leads to the recognition of one's situation as a problem (problems challenge us to "solve" them, to look for alternatives or solutions). We require understanding, creativity and imagination to transform any problematic historical reality.

Critical thinking cannot be a skill detached from practice. It directs our understanding to praxis, it prepares us to intervene in, or to act upon, the specific situations that it renders problematic.

Accordingly, the point of departure must always be with men and women in the here and now, which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from which they emerge, and in which they intervene. Only by starting from this situation – which determines their perception of it – can they begin to move.

Maxine Greene expresses this idea in relation to the learning experience of a girl who is the protagonist of a story she tells us,

Restless and defiant as she is, she cannot detach herself wholly from her culture or change her gender or her class origin. They are part of her condition, but she is not entirely conditioned by them. The more she is enabled to name them, to become critically conscious of them, the more she will realize that she is not

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70 See Freire: Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New York: Continuum, 1999. p. 90, 94-95. Here Freire makes more detailed distinctions between the different "stages" of awareness from being submerged in a situation to emerging from it, from becoming conscious to consciously getting to intervene.

71 Ibid., p.66.

72 Ibid., p.66.
living inside a container. There are gaps, there are spaces. The more she recognizes the meanings in origins and context, the more she will see that their significance for her depends a great deal on the interpretations she makes in dialogues and collaborative activities undertaken with others like her – and some unlike her, with teachers, with adults she meets along her way.

Critical consciousness helps us interpret and understand our contexts and their significance on us. Freire contrasts the "method" of conscientization with the "banking theory and practice of education," which is "an immobilizing and fixing force and fails to acknowledge men and women as historical beings." The banking theory and practice of education sees the student/learner as a passive "receptacle" in which to "deposit" information, or as an empty sheet where teachers "print" what they consider needs to be "written/learned."

The banking method of education denies the agency and capabilities for creation, invention and re-creation of the learners. It denies transformation and growth, and thus immobilizes and fixes. According to Dewey, this practice would be a "miseductive" experience, since it "has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience." Educational methods that place the teacher on top of the students as a strong/fixed authority, are authoritarian and oppressive. These methods are based on an approach to life, and to "the other," that lacks solidarity.

Education for understanding and liberation, according to Freire, should be dialogical because it should be based on a permanent relationship of dialogue between the students and the teachers or leaders. Education becomes co-intentional when the practice of common reflection and action expresses the consciousness of the students as well as of the others involved in the learning process. Cooperation and solidarity support this dialogical relationship. Freire understands his pedagogy as one for humanization. Humanization requires that we acknowledge the importance of the other, of others (including the oppressors), it requires that we include the others.

This movement of inquiry must be directed towards humanization – the people's historical vocation. The pursuit of full humanity, however, cannot be carried out in isolation or individualism, but only in fellowship and solidarity; therefore it

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74 Freire, op.cit. p.65.
75 Ibid.
76 See Freire, Paulo. op.cit. Chapter 1, p.25-9.
cannot unfold in the antagonistic relations between oppressors and oppressed. No one can be authentically human while he prevents others from being so.77

The dialogical relationship between teachers or leaders and their students/learners allows everyone involved in the learning process to become more human.

Dialogue, cannot exist however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for the people. Love here means strongly willing the good for others. Willing the good for others is the foundation of dialogue, because authentic dialogue requires an openness, and an understanding, that cannot be grounded on reason or argument but on a profound sentiment of solidarity. Thus the task of responsible subjects is to be willing, and to make the effort to engage in dialogue, which cannot take place in a relationship of domination. Domination reveals the pathology of "love:" sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated.78

The place of solidarity in Freire's work is central. I now turn to the connections between Freire's pedagogy and philosophy, and Gustavo Gutiérrez's Theology of Liberation. Liberation of what? whose liberation? liberation by whom? I will let Gutiérrez answer these questions in his own words:

The Theology of Liberation attempts to reflect on the experience and meaning of the faith based on the commitment to abolish injustice and to build a new society [...]. Liberation from every form of exploitation, the possibility of a more human and more dignified life, the creation of a new person—all passes through this struggle. But in the last instance we will have an authentic theology of liberation only when the oppressed themselves can freely raise their voice and express themselves directly and creatively in society and in the heart of the people of God, when they themselves account for the hope, which they bear, when they are the protagonists of their own liberation.79

For Gutiérrez, Christ is in the neighbor, and mostly in the poor and oppressed. We find God in our encounters with real and concrete people, especially the poor. An act of love towards them is an act of love towards God.80 However,

[...] the neighbor is not an occasion, an instrument for becoming closer to God. We are dealing with a real love of man for his own sake and not "for the love of God"[...] love of God is expressed in a true love for man himself. This is the only way to have a true encounter with him. That my action towards another is at

77 Ibid., p.67.
78 Ibid., p.79.
80 Ibid., p.201.
the same time an action towards God does not detract from its truth and concreteness, but rather gives it even greater meaning and import.81

The project of becoming more human – both for Freire and Gutiérrez – is one that involves us all. The sense of duty and responsibility toward the others is founded on a profound sentiment of compassion and solidarity for people. The sense of duty and responsibility toward others is authentic when it comes from our recognition or acknowledgment of our condition of unfinished people in a world with others. The sense of duty and responsibility is artificial when it is understood as an imperative from "above." Our unfinishedeness (our non-perfection, or completeness, our needs; are what connects us and bring us together).

For Gutiérrez, our responsibility includes the facing of our history. Gutiérrez claims it is necessary that we understand and act upon our situation in light of our history. He directs these ideas to the church, which, in his view should express an attitude of historical honesty, based on historical memory. Historical honesty and memory are crucial for democratic and citizenship education, as I will discuss in the following chapters. How we decide to “read” our history, to narrate our history, has a strong impact on our identities, on the way we see others, on how we recognize (or not recognize, or mis-recognize others), and on the social dynamics that result from those ways of considering the others.

The present acquires density and substance when it is nourished by the memory of a journey, when the courage is found to identify unsolved problems and wounds not yet healed [...] Part of this memory means acknowledging our responsibility in what the poor have always had to suffer [...] Only historical honesty can deliver us from prejudices, narrow interpretations, paralyzing ignorance, and deceptions foisted on us by private interests, which lay our history on us like a permanent mortgage instead of transforming it into a thrust of creativity. The recovery of our memory will inspire us to fling to the trash heap as inadequate, and consequently useless, the so-called white legend and black legend of what occurred in the sixteenth century.82

Although Gutiérrez’s focus is on the 16th century history of conquest and colonialism, his theory regarding the importance of historical memory and critical consciousness is relevant to the discussion of contemporary issues, events, conflicts and

problems. Often, to understand these problems, we need to look at their causes, which bring us back to their history. In the following chapters, I will argue for historical "conscientization" with reference to a specific example in Peruvian history (Sendero).

Freire also believes that history is a major issue in his pedagogy and in the process of becoming aware of our situation and of becoming protagonists. For Freire, the fundamental theme of our epoch is domination, which implies its opposite, liberation. Thus, one way to discuss and engage in dialogue about our particular histories and the history of Latin America, could be to use a general theme such as "domination" as our frame for the discussion. The historical "facts" or information that we include and bring up, are "material" open to interpretation, recreation and particular understanding.83

At this point I want to address the impact of history (of how history is told, or read) on the self-respect and identity of persons and of groups of people. This concern comes from my own context, Perú. There is a long history of discrimination and oppression against the indigenous communities (Andean and also Amazonian) in this country. Against this background, the strengthening of self-identity and self-respect becomes a primordial requirement for becoming protagonists, for becoming strong citizens. Many Peruvians have internalized an inferior or demeaning image that others (Spanish conquerors) projected on them. Part of this demeaning image is the idea that Indians/cholos are less intelligent, and thus less able to assume responsibilities. Therefore, Indians need to be told what to do, and they need to obey.

Without self-respect, without belief in their own capabilities for agency and transformation, people do not become strong citizens. Richard Rorty describes the connection between self-respect and moral courage (citizenship). In his book "Achieving our country," he writes,

National Pride is to countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement. Too much national pride can produce bellicosity and imperialism, just as excessive self-respect can produce arrogance. But just as too little self-respect makes it difficult for a person to display moral courage, so insufficient national pride makes energetic and effective debate about national policy unlikely. Emotional involvement with one's country - feelings of intense shame or of glowing pride aroused by various parts of its history, and by various

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83 "generative themes can be located in concentric circles moving from the general to the particular. The broadest epochal unit, which includes a diversified range of units and sub-units - continental, regional, national, and so forth - contains themes of a universal character." Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum, 1999. p.84.
present day national policies – is necessary if political deliberation is to be imaginative and productive. Such deliberation will probably not occur unless pride outweighs shame.  

What I find important here, is the relation between self-respect and identity on the one hand, and moral, social, and political agency, on the other. Education (and the teaching of history) has an important impact on the strengthening (or weakening) of self-respect and the social responsibility of students (citizens).

Democratic and citizenship education requires Peruvians to acknowledge our history of non-recognition, abuse and domination (lack of solidarity) so that the project to start anew, to build and strengthen citizenship is solid. The way we understand our past in my country, and the way history has so far officially been taught in schools, has not helped our people become more aware of our limits and potentials as a society. The uncritical “teaching” of our history has not contributed to a better understanding of who we are, it has not contributed to our living in authentic solidarity, because it has not challenged or questioned the profound structures of non recognition, abuse, and injustice in our society.

One of the major challenges of Latin America and Perú is our cultural plurality [...] many different racial, cultural and spiritual families live in these lands, but they have not yet learned to live together. None of them must arrogate to itself alone the representation of the continent, non must be marginalized and despised. All should participate on equal basis in the building of a just and democratic society. Racism is an assault on human dignity and Christian conscience. (underlining is mine)

As a conclusion of his book “Las Casas: In search of the poor of Jesus Christ,” Gütiérrez claims that we must find our own answers and “solutions” to our present suffering.

Neither Las Casas nor Guaman Poma shows us the way. This is our charge and responsibility. They do give us the impassioned witness of their own quest, which they carried forward with determination and hesitancy, in success and failure, right on target and missing the mark, amid light and darkness – but ever with hope and with love, in the footsteps of Christ’s poor. Rather than fixate on

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85 Human dignity brings us to the theme of human rights, which I will discuss later. I will call attention to the relation between education and poverty as an important human rights issue.
87 Gütiérrez. Gustavo. op. cit.
the past, we are called by them – each of us from his or her own cultural world – to make the present our own and to shape and forge the time to come.\textsuperscript{88}

Freire's and Gutiérrez's ideas have strong implications for democratic and citizenship education, especially in Latin America. Their ideas are motivated by a strong commitment to create and strengthen solidarity, and by a strong sense of hope in transformation, in developing humanity and in improving the living conditions of people.

In this chapter I have tried to present an idea of democracy that is inseparable from the idea of strong citizenship and from the idea of a cooperative emancipatory project that is in turn inspired on an ethics of responsibility and solidarity. According to Habermas, strong citizenship and cooperation translate into popular sovereignty. For Dewey, democratic education plays an important role as a space where students (citizens) have richer experiences and thus more opportunities to grow, develop, and to continue learning and interacting in cooperation (given that we are social beings). Freire asserts that strong citizenship and agency require understanding and critical consciousness. Gutiérrez highlights the need for historical memory in the process of conscientization. Both Freire and Gutiérrez stress the importance of solidarity and cooperation, as well as the importance of openness and hope. In their own way, Habermas and Dewey also share the belief in the human capacity to intervene actively in social life and to transform it, always in light of an emancipatory-cooperative ideal. These are the main ideas that I hold on to as the framework that I will use to discuss democratic citizenship education in Perú, in the following chapters.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p.460.
Chapter II. Case Study: Introduction to Democracy and Education in Perú.

Crisis, Transition, and Critique. Critical times call for critical consciousness.

Perú is the vivid portrait of a country in crisis. Everything, or almost everything, is in question. Which means that many things can disappear and others are to be re-made. All this constitutes, without any doubt, a great challenge to our imagination, intelligence and will. Thus, we shall not be asked to leave subjectivity and passion for the sake of objectivity of analysis. When it comes to Perú and its viability as a nation, it is difficult for us to separate blood and ideas.99

As I write these lines, Peru is in a process of transition. What kind of transition? Transition from what to where? Many Peruvians hope that it is a process of democratic transition, that is, toward democracy, and through democratic means. Peruvians have elected a new democratic government ten years of a regime that gradually undermined our already very weak democratic institutions.

In 1992, Alberto Fujimori -- having won the presidency in 1990 -- forced a coup upon the state by dissolving parliament and annulling the constitution of 1979. Later that year, Fujimori called for new congressional elections, where his party -- Cambio 90-- won. He then elaborated a new constitution that allowed for immediate re-election of the executive. Fujimori was re-elected in 1995. In 1996, the congress (Fujimori’s party) introduced the law of authentic interpretation of our constitution in order to allow Fujimori to run in the 2000 elections and to become president for a third consecutive period. When the opposition, together with several sectors of the civil society demanded (legitimately) a referendum on the law of authentic interpretation, the congress introduced regulations that impeded the referendum. In 1997, several judges of the constitutional tribunal declared that the law of authentic interpretation was “inapplicable.” In response, these judges were removed and the tribunal was dissolved. In

addition, the Inter American Court made denunciations of human rights violations, and of transgressions against democracy committed by Fujimori’s government. The government disregarded this criticism by opting out of the court. The executive circumvented its own court and ministries by filling the bench and public commissions with its own appointments. The government created military justice tribunals that were entitled to judge civilians. In addition, two major television stations were taken over, and their owners and directors dismissed. Wire tapping became very common: politicians of the opposition, public officials, intellectuals, union leaders, etc., were spied upon and harassed. The state managed control over the media taking advantage of its ability to levy taxes and sanction payment of uncollected back taxes. Parallel to this, the state managed to progressively weaken local governments, through cuts in their budgets, and “dirty wars” against local leaders and mayors who represented threats to the national’s government’s absolute control.

In November 2000, Alberto Fujimori renounced and fled to Japan (six months after having been elected president for a third and unconstitutional period in a fraudulent electoral process). A series of scandals of bribery and corruption surrounding the fraudulent elections forced his resignation. Despicable actions of Fujimori’s government came into light and became public. Various sectors of the civil society managed to find spaces to raise their voices and to denounce the numerous irregularities, abuses, and human rights violations, that had been committed by the government -- together with the National Intelligence Service --, during the war against terrorism.90

For many Peruvians, in spite of the growing discontent and disagreement with several of his unconstitutional measures, Fujimori’s government had meant91 the ending of ten years of violence in the form of guerrilla and terrorist war. The violence of The Shining Path92 -- Sendero Luminoso -- (and later by a second guerrilla army: the MRTA -

90 The beginning of terrorism in Perú is associated with Sendero Luminoso’s (The Shining Path’s) outbreaks of violence in the 1980’s. Our criminal code defines “terrorism” as “treason to the nation/home country, and as a crime against it.”
91 I deliberately use “meant” because meanings change, for example, in the light of new “information” and new priorities and values. Today, Fujimori’s government means authoritarianism and corruption.
92 The Shining Path began as a leftist political organization with strong Marxist and Maoist foundations. The Shining Path preserved its commitment to revolution and to armed struggle. It also remained clandestine. In Perú, it is considered to be the major “terrorist” organization in our history.
Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru began to appear in one of the poorest rural areas of the country at the beginning of the 80's. Fujimori's popularity was largely based on the association that Peruvians made between his military-backed/dependent government and the "ending" of a disastrous 10 year period in Peruvian contemporary history; a period marked by violence and by serious economic, political, and social crisis.

Today, many Peruvians ask how it was possible (for Peruvians) to remain blind and deaf to Fujimori's "unruly practices." This is a question charged with moral concern, because it leads to the question of how responsible was the Peruvian citizenry for all that occurred during Fujimori's government, that is, to what extent were Peruvians accomplices of the corruption and the illegal character of this controversial government. Many Peruvians believe these are critical times for Peru. Transitional periods are often critical. The term crisis has a Greek origin and has several meanings. It alludes to separation, differentiation, even dispute, as well as decision, judgement, and the result of judgement or pondering. Crisis comes from the Greek word Krinein, which means to choose, separate, decide, question, judge, ponder. Thus we find an interesting relation between crisis, critique and transition. In a problematic or critical period there are important issues at stake, there are relevant aspects of our lives that we question and

93 Túpac Amaru was an Indian curaca with Inca descent (curaca was an Indian chief or leader with an administrative/official position, in charge of a community or region, during the Spanish domination and viceroyalty in Peru, in the XVI-XVIII centuries). He led an important rebellion movement against the Spanish domination in the 1780's, and represents an historical figure of vindication of the rights of Indian people in Peru.
94 Like many Latin American countries, Peru suffers from extreme centralization. Lima, the capital city, contains a third of the country's population. With the exception of three or four other urban areas (not comparable to Lima, which by far is "the" urban area of Peru) the rest of the country remains rural. Often, the living conditions in rural areas are very poor.
95 In 1980, Fernando Belaúnde Terry was elected president for a second period. In 1969, General Velasco Alvarado had overthrown Belaúnde's first government with a coup d'Etat. In 1975 the military government of Morales Bermúdez came to power, and in 1979 it called for new elections. Belaúnde's second government (1980-1985) is considered to be a return to democracy. However, Belaúnde's "democratic" government did not manage to confront the historically embedded social-economic and political crisis of the period. One of the more extreme symptoms of this crisis was the armed insurgency's violence in the 1980's (Sendero and MRTA).
96 Although this question is in force and must be addressed, we agree, with Carlos Basombrío Iglesias. ("¿Todos somos culpables?" in: Ideele, No 139, Feb.22, 2001), that it would not be fair to ignore the consistent and courageous resistance of many Peruvians, including sectors of the military, of the media, professional Colleges/Associations, Human Rights Organizations, Certain Sectors of the Church, both Catholic and Evangelic, many artists and intellectuals, political leaders, University Students. Trade unions, some corporate businessmen, to Fujimori's abuses.
critique. At a personal level, a critical period is one in which many things are at stake and where we find ourselves in the need to separate, differentiate, opt, and decide. To decide for something implies that we detach and let go of something else. Thus, it is a difficult time because as many transitional periods in our lives, it is painful and tearing. This suffering aggravates when we experience, on the one hand, the need to feel secure and safe regarding that which is uncertain and appears to lack of solidity; and on the other, the impulse and curiosity towards the new. The new often appeals to us as promising but uncertain; it may appeal to us as the right thing to go for, as the just thing to do, yet perhaps not the most “practical” or convenient. These kind of situations or periods of our lives demand that we display moral courage and make decisions. As Freire argues, the fact that we are called to make decisions and choices, to take a stance, is evidence of our ethical and political condition.

As citizens, we make decisions and engage in action, we take stances, we orient ourselves in life guided by certain values and principles. Our ethical condition implies that at certain periods of our lives in common, we experience conflict, transition and pain. Difficulties and conflict, especially in transitions and crises, are inevitable because it is impossible to remain isolated from the world we live in and from the people we interact with, in such a way that nothing will “affect” or influence our lives (As Habermas argues, intersubjectivity characterizes our social life; in the same vein, Freire uses the idea of unfinishedness to ground solidarity and cooperation).

Thus Peruvian society experiences transition, as well as a complex crisis, which calls upon the ethical dimension of our life as a community of people with the potential or capability to transform given undesired orders (un-democratic, unjust, oppressive, violent orders).

There is the awareness of a profound moral crisis, of a crisis of values that has become evident throughout the ongoing uncovering of many cases of bribery and corruption at all levels of the government and society. Vladimiro Montesinos, former president Fujimori’s disgraced spy chief (director of the National Intelligence Service) video-taped thousands of scenarios where he bribed many Peruvians. These videos are proof of the corruption -- at all levels -- in our society/country. Among the people involved we find president Fujimori, members of the military forces, of the judiciary,
ministers, journalists, mayors, lawyers, singers, artists, politicians from the opposition, members and officials of public institutions, people from the media, people from the private and public economic sectors. So far, our judicial authority has reported that there are 1,500 videos (some of which have been aired, nationally, on television and the radio). Mario Vargas LLosa describes Vladimiro Montesinos and calls attention to the disdainful vision of human beings that the videos reveal.

Perú has experienced many tyrannies (the list is long) which have created many disgraceful characters that have tortured and that have robbed public goods. However, none of these characters ever had so much power as Vladimiro Montesinos. No one has done so much harm as this obscure lawyer and military captain --who was discharged because he sold military secrets to the CIA. Montesinos was Fujimori's advisor in all his illegal actions and in the coup that destroyed Peruvian democracy in 1992. Montesinos has been trafficker of weapons to the Colombian guerrilla, representative of large drug cartels, and has put the Peruvian army, and the national Amazonia territory, in the service of drug traffic. He has also been the intellectual author of the terrorist comandos of the state that tortured, assassinated, and disappeared, thousands of people under suspicion of subversion. Montesinos extorted and stole. He systematically manipulated the judicial authority and the media. With few exceptions, Montesinos bought, bribed, extorted or harassed the media in order to silence it around the abuses committed by the dictatorship [...] Our judiciary has 1,500 videos. These videos constitute an invaluable document for us --with no precedents in history --to learn about the mechanisms and the scope of the corruption that an authoritarian regime can produce [...] When one watches the videos or reads the transcriptions of the dialogues (between Montesinos and corrupted lawyers, politicians, bank managers, journalists, judges, militaries, etc), one discovers more than just a method for coercion. One discovers an infinitely disdainful vision of human beings. The videos show how cheap, how corrupted and disgraced, the people that entered that room (where Montesinos was in control and tempted them with money) could become [...] there is a certain philosophy that underlies the long sequence of images where the scene is repeated: elusive and hypocritical introductions to justify, with no arguments, the imminent transaction. And later, in few words, the essential: "How much?" "So much!" "Ok, immediately," and cash. (underlining is mine)

The video-tapes are evidence of the corruption, of the lack of integrity, honesty, and "civic virtue" of so many Peruvians (not only those directly implicated in the scandals and corruption, but all of those who remained passive witnesses, including large part of the civil society). Corruption is today, on of the biggest challenges the new

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99 Again, this does not intend to diminish or ignore the consistent resistance of many others. See footnote 96.
government -- and the country in general -- are faced with. Although corruption is not new (in fact, it has been very present in our history) something new has happened in Perú. Corruption has become a real problem. More importantly, corruption has become a serious and real concern for many Peruvians. The fact that many Peruvians are concerned with, discouraged and demoralized by corruption, is a good thing because it shows the awakening of a stronger moral and civic consciousness. There is a willingness to "moralize" our institutions, to make profound reforms that would enable the building up of solid democratic institutions. It is in the midst of this crisis, that Peruvians are making strong appeals to values and principles of democracy, as well as values of justice and honesty. For example, there are initiatives from the government and from the civil society, for truth commissions on the war crimes -- assassinations, disappearances, tortures -- perpetrated by the National Intelligence Service and the military. It is also in the midst of this crisis, that Peruvians are discussing the moral role of education. The great levels of corruption have brought the question of how, or to what extent, the education we receive is failing to cultivate desirable values of respect, honesty and integrity in citizens. The transitional government of Valentín Paniagua (selected by the congress after Fujimori fled to Japan in November 2000) made a nationwide convocation to every citizen to participate in "Puertas Abiertas." "Puertas Abiertas" ("Open doors") is a governmental initiative to gather the opinion and suggestions of Peruvians on education. That is, it is an initiative to gather the citizen's opinions on the adequacy of our educational system and institutions, on the main problems and challenges it faces, on what Peruvians consider to be the objectives of education, and so forth.

It is in this discussion that I want to participate through this thesis. I believe that this context of "critical transition" -- which will hopefully lead to transformation -- is uniquely propitious. It is as an opportunity to rethink values, principles, and ideals, as well as to brainstorm on strategies and plans to follow. With regards to education, it is very important that we discuss the role that education has had in perpetuating certain social dynamics (where there is racism, discrimination, domination, abuse, injustice) and in promoting attitudes and habits that put little, or not enough value in truthfulness.

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honesty, integrity, cooperation, and "civic virtues." It is important that we discuss ways in which education can help to cultivate and develop skills and values of democratic citizenship. Above all, it is crucial that we discuss why and how, one of education's main priorities should be to develop a vision and an understanding of persons, of citizens, of human beings, quite different from those of Montesinos' and his followers, associates, accomplices. Disdainful visions/understandings of people allow for the kind of crimes, human rights violations, abuse of power, and corruption that Montesinos committed. Worse, he was never alone. He managed to influence and involve many people in his crimes and corruption. Our project for democratic citizenship education has to rely on a philosophy that sees and understands human beings as having dignity, as having the potential and capability to be constructive, to build up better forms of life in common. It has to be a philosophy that understands the value and the importance of hope in, agency for, and responsibility of, the democratic-emancipatory project for all.

The new democratic government of Alejandro Toledo faces many difficult challenges. Here are some indicators of the profound socioeconomic problems (inequities, imbalances) that directly affect education. Perú has a total population of 26 million of whom 8 million live in Lima, the capital city. This figure shows the serious problem of centralization and concentration of resources and of power in the capital city. There are 10.6 million children and adolescents in Perú, who amount to 44% of the total population. 66% of Peruvian children live in relative poverty and 26% in absolute poverty. The national average child mortality is 43 per thousand live births. For children under five, the average is 59 per thousand live births. In provinces outside the major cities, the mortality rate is over 100 per thousand live births. 26% of children under 5 and 48% of children aged 6-9 are chronically malnourished.

Only 52% of the children in Perú attend primary school. This percentage drops to 30% in towns outside Lima. Only 30% of young people who finish secondary education go on to higher education. The average Peruvian child passes 8.7 grades by age 17; in rural areas, the average years of schooling is only 6.5. There are 2.5 million young people

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17 de Marzo de 2001.
101 See block quotation on page 53, and footnotes 126-127 on page 54.
of secondary school age, but only 50% of them (1.3 million) study the right level at the right age. 67% of all illiterate people (12% of Peruvians over age 15% were illiterate in 1993) live in rural areas.103

As the figures show, there is an important gap between rural and urban areas regarding access to, and quality of education in Perú. In Cajamarca and Amazonas (rural and poor provinces in the country) only 52% of the registered students between 12 and 19 years old actually went to school. In San Martín (another marginal province) only 32% went to school. In both achievement and learning levels, upper class children and young people in Lima receive six times as many teaching hours as their rural peers. School attendance reaches an average of 226 hours per student per year in rural areas, 450 in marginal rural areas, and 1,100 in private schools in urban areas.104

The social-economic conditions (inequality and inequity mainly) that these figures reflect, have a long history that cannot be expressed in numbers. In the following section, I try to look closer into this history of racism, non-recognition, domination and abuse.

**On racism, non-recognition, wounded identities, and other labyrinths.**105

He <the Indian> did all the dirty and hard work and this corresponded to his nature. To be Indian meant to be someone that could be stepped upon, hurt, it meant someone that had to be able to do anything, even sleep at the feet of people, take care of people, die because of the cold weather; the Indian was not allowed to be cold, to be hungry, he was used to hunger and so if he didn’t eat one or two days it did not matter because that was his nature. He was less than a person, he did not even speak Spanish... and it was no good for someone (not Indian) to try and learn Quechua because this would ruin his Spanish. Moreover, the Indian was filthy, was the worst, even when eating, one should not give him milk, he would get sick [...]. The Indian was like a child, so one had to teach him and whip him publicly so that everyone would see that he could not just do as he

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105 Octavio Paz has used this metaphor in his *Labyrinth of Solitude* (New York: Grove Press, 1985) where he examines “Mexicaness,” or Mexican identity, if there is one. The effects and consequences that the Spanish conquest and colonialism had on the Mexican identity and Mexican psyche are similar (in the depth of its traumatic effects) to those that the parallel Spanish conquest and colonialism in Perú, had on the identities and psyche of Peruvians. The metaphor “labyrinth” is useful because it expresses the complexity of the issue. Indian and Mestizo identities have strong contradictory elements: pride and shame of their culture, submission and resentment toward the “white Spanish.” The Spaniards have both love and aversion toward the Indian. The case of Perú is no less complex and no less difficult (if not impossible) to grasp completely; in other words, no less of a “labyrinth.”
pleased...also, he did not have any property because he had never owned anything, he was a bugler by nature, a potential killer [...] When we went to our hacienda in the holidays, my grandmother gave instructions to kill a cow and a pig [...] around us, at a distance of approximately 20 meters, a multitude of children, women, men and old Indian people, many, 500 maybe, I do not know, they would be around us and would look at us as we ate. At a certain point one of my uncles [...] would grab a piece of meat he had become tired of and would throw it to some of the Indians [...] and they would pick it up and eat it. I remember this with much sadness. And then the party continued, for two to three days, big banquets and the Indians always apart, totally excluded [...] Then everything ended and the Indians had to clean up everything, and looked for what was left out of the food.106

This is how the Peruvian archeologist Luis Guillermo Lumbreras remembers the way in which the Indian was considered and treated in Ayacucho, in his childhood, during the 1940’s and 1950’s. His description captures the cruelty of the mistreatment, oppression and marginalization of many Peruvian campesinos and Indios. There are many testimonies similar to Lumbreras’s, not to mention the vast Peruvian literature107 that narrates and describes several and different aspects of the cruel dynamic between the Indian and the Spaniards, between the Indian and the “less” Indian.

Until the Agrarian Reform in 1972, 2% of the population owned all the land in Perú, and, it can be said, owned all the campesinos that lived and worked on these lands.

The history of domination begins in 1532, in Cajamarca, when the Inca Atahualpa, with an army of approximately 30,000 to 50,000 men, was “captured” by the Spaniards, who did not exceed the 160 men, led by Pizarro. This episode marks the beginning of a history of racism, mis recognition, exploitation, abuse and injustice, that has deep roots in our identities and lives as Peruvians, and thus invades all aspects of our society and of our life “in common.” To this day, we still find similar patterns -- subtler perhaps - which reproduce this relationship of domination in many institutionalized

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107 I want to mention José María Arguedas (Los ríos profundos, Todas las Sangres, El Zorro de Arriba y el Zorro de Abajo, and so forth) because he was a teacher whose insightful and profound thoughts on education have often been overshadowed by his fame as a novelist. Arguedas was a non-Indian Peruvian who was raised among Indians in la sierra (the Andean region) of Perú, and who expresses his immense love and solidarity for the Indian culture and people in his literature, as well as a profound sadness that came from witnessing the suffering of the Indians, which he felt as his own.
practices in our country. Alberto Flores Galindo\textsuperscript{108} points out an important example of an everyday practice that reproduces domination and abuse: the institution of domestic service in our cities. Domestic serfdom functions in Lima and in the rest of the country, in higher class families, as well as in middle class and in low class families.

The domestic service reproduces on a day to day basis the relationships that existed in the past, on the Andean haciendas: personal dependence of the servant or "colono" with respect to the "patrón"(master). It reproduces the combination of violence and paternalism that impedes any sort of mobility, geographical or social: inalterable hierarchies. Gonzalo Portocarrero,\textsuperscript{109} a contemporary Peruvian sociologist, analyzes the historical-cultural antecedents of this pattern of social interaction that he describes as \textit{total domination}. He explains how an essential characteristic of this kind of relationship is the omnipotence of one of the parts and the impotence of the other. The concentration of power allows for the dominated to become an instrument of the dominant's will, to become a working machine to exploit, and an object on which to satisfy sexual and aggressive impulses. Typically, this relationship creates despotic personalities that exercise their empire arbitrarily, without limit; and on the other hand, it creates servile personalities always scared and unconditionally obedient. The relationship between Spaniards and Indians is very close to the pattern described above. The behaviors and ways of being that are characteristic of this relationship of domination have profoundly marked the Peruvian society. Today, almost two hundred years after Perú's independence, there are still many Peruvians that show lack of consideration for the \textit{more Indian} and that are cruel against the weaker, the poorer, the more marginalized (often, the Indians). We can still identify abuse and cruelty in various different relationships, such as patrón-obrero (worker), man-woman, criollo\textsuperscript{110}-andino (from the Andes), police-


\textsuperscript{110} Criollo originally means someone who had been born in the colonies, but whose parents were Spanish. To be criollo meant that one was not "entirely" or "purely" Spanish. The criollo thus identifies him/herself with the Spanish, though not entirely. He also identifies with the rest of the people in the colonies because he was born there, but again, not entirely. Later, and in time, criollo has come to mean a mixture of culture, too, but with a stronger Spanish/white component than an Indian one.
delinquent, etc. This "traditional" pattern of domination that is so entrenched in Peruvians' identities, begun, as I said, with the Conquest.

The Spanish conquest of Perú -- how the Spanish sacked and stole, tortured and killed -- has no "rational" justification.

I testify that the Spaniards gathered a considerable number of local people and locked up as many of them as they could fit into three large buildings to which they set light, burning to death those inside even though they had done absolutely nothing whatever to merit such treatment [...] I testify that I saw with my own eyes Spaniards cutting off the hands, knees and ears of local people, both men and women, simply for the fun of it, and that this happened time and again in various places throughout the region. On several occasions I also saw them set dogs on the people, many being torn to pieces in this fashion, and they also burned down houses and even whole settlements, too numerous to count. It is also the case that they tore babes and sucklings from the mother's breast and played games with them, seeing who could throw them the farthest. I was a witness to other outrages and hair-raising barbarities, so many and so various that to list each and every one of them individually would be the work of a lifetime.

Many Spanish, like Sepúlveda tried to legitimize the conquest. Sepúlveda argued that, since the Indians had always been told to obey and pay tribute to their leaders (The Incas), therefore Spanish domination was only a matter of a "change" in lordship. Thus the legitimation of the conquest -- massacres of thousands of native people, exploitation, cruelty, abuse -- was based on "the sanctity of what had always existed," and in the fact that, in the XVIth century, Christians were called to take the role of leaders of the Indian people, and to cultivate "human virtues" and "true religion" in the new world.

However, as Bartolomé de Las Casas argued, "total domination" contradicted the Christian ethic, (In fact, de Las Casas can be considered to be the progenitor of today's Liberation Theology, which we have discussed in Chapter 1 -- Gustavo Gutiérrez and the facing of our history). This 16th century Spanish priest challenged the relationship of cruel domination legitimized by Sepúlveda and influenced Spanish-Indian legislation

114 Las Casas de, op.cit.
in favor of the Indian population. However, de Las Casas’ pro-Indian discourse succeeded only in the sphere of official ideas and not in practice. Unfortunately abuse was reified as an institution, and the treatment of the Indian tended to be extremely cruel.\footnote{Portocarrero, Gonzalo. \textit{Racismo y Mestizaje}. Lima: SUR, 1993. p.35.}

The official Spanish domination over Perú lasted almost three hundred years (1532-1821). In 1821, Independence was declared, but the social-economic and cultural structure, as well as the dynamics that had prevailed throughout these three centuries did not change significantly. Although the legal distinction that there had been between “República de Indios” (Indian republic) and “República de Españoles,” (Spanish republic) was abolished, its practices and dynamics prevailed.

Today, almost 200 years after Perú’s “independence” from Spanish domination, 50% of our population remains poor and 20% live under conditions of extreme poverty. More than one third of our population (8 of 24 million) is concentrated in Lima, the capital city, as consequence of massive migrations from the more neglected, and poorer areas, where access to work, health and education is extremely scarce, restricted, and of very low quality. In this sense, migrations from the rural (i.e. poorer) areas to Lima, are struggles for recognition of many Peruvians. These struggles for recognition take the form of struggles for access to basic social services, infrastructure and goods (potable water, electricity, health care, education, transport system, etc.) and to the possibility of a better quality of life.

Migrations from the poorer rural areas to the capital city, have also been an important factor in the transformation of the social dynamics described above. Migration has resulted in more “mestizaje” (cultural/ethnic “mixing”). It has also resulted in more significant interrelation and interaction among different groups (among, for example, groups of poor people from rural and marginal areas that are of direct Indian descent, with more privileged groups in Lima, or with middle class and mestizo groups, both from Lima and from the country’s poorer cities and provinces). Mestizaje — and more interaction between different groups — are complex phenomena that include or involve the formation of new identities and new social patterns and dynamics. In other words,
mestizaje brings with it some kind of inclusion (or has the potential to do so). Thus, migration and mestizaje, have contributed (and continue to do so) to the transformation of our social dynamics.

I consider these transformations to be more “democratic” because they have the potential to --and indeed do-- move toward the recognition and vindication of the citizenship of those who for years and years were second -- or third class citizens in Perú. Moreover, the struggle of many poor people in Perú can be considered to be a struggle for gaining citizenship, given that the Indians and the majority of mestizos were not/have not been, in practice, recognized or treated as citizens (or, they have been treated as second, third class citizens. I will come back to this point later).

Thus the struggles for recognition, for gaining citizenship status, are struggles in process. Hence, the contents that we (Peruvian citizens committed to democracy) give to the concept of “democracy,” require that we acknowledge and respond to those struggles for recognition. Our discussion of democracy is meaningful and useful only if it is directly linked to the projects that our own people and society undertake to reclaim citizenship. Democracy has to include the project to transform the profound patterns of domination/oppression and injustice -- together with cruelty, violence, abuse and suffering -- that have created subjects on the one hand, and citizens-“patrones” on the other. The struggle for democracy here, is a struggle for recognition116 and for reclaiming a dignified identity that is essential to human wellbeing. Identity -- the sense of oneself, as well as the sense of belonging to a certain group or community of people -- constitutes a basic human need and right.

As we have seen in Chapter 1, recognition and identity have a direct impact on citizens’ empowerment, engagement and strength. That is, recognition and identity are very important in a democratic society.

Equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it [...] the projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized. Not only contemporary feminism but also race relations and discussions of multiculturalism are

undergirded by the premise that the withholding of recognition can be a form of oppression [...].[17]

non recognition or mis recognition [...] can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, reduced mode of being [...] Beyond simple lack of respect, it can inflict a grievous wound, saddling people with crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy but a vital human need.[18]

What matters, of course, is how people are recognized. In fact, inequity and oppression reveal forms of non recognition or mis recognition of human beings' dignity. The extreme levels of corruption in Montesinos' video-tapes reveal a disdainful vision of humanity. In the same vein, inequity, oppression, domination, cruelty and abuse, reveal or show an infinitely disdainful vision of (other) human beings.

In order to recognize people as fellow citizens, we need to recognize their humanity first, we need to recognize them as fellow human beings with dignity. That is, we need to recognize them as people vulnerable to suffering, as well as people with the capacity (capability, potential) to decide, choose and realize their own projects of a "good" life. Thus the notion of citizenship that I am sketching in this thesis presupposes a certain way to consider people. It presupposes (or is grounded upon) a respectful and hopeful vision of human beings, it presupposes the belief in people's agency and capability to work in cooperation, in common projects for the building up of better lives for all. Freire says "[it is] a violation of their humanity [...] to alienate human beings from their own decision making, [to do this] is to change them into objects."[19]

We need to remember that poverty affects people's agency and capability to work in cooperation to build up better lives. On the other hand, many poor people are very resourceful and show tremendous strength and determination to overcome scarcity and other challenges they are faced with. In the case of Perú, one good example is, again, migration from rural areas to urban areas. Lima, the capital city, is situated on the coast of Perú, which is very arid. In fact, aside from some valleys and irrigated urban areas, Lima is a desert. The communities or groups of people that migrate, set up shanty towns or human settlements ("asentamientos humanos") in the desert, in the skirts of the city.

These Peruvians build their houses out of straw and cardboard. They have no access to any basic infrastructure, service or good. In spite of their poverty, in spite of the many challenges they encounter, many of the shanty towns that these Peruvians have set up, have evolved into permanent municipalities and districts, and even into satellite cities in Lima. One important example is the case of Villa El Salvador, which has a history of cooperation, and strong participatory democracy.

The point I want to make is that poverty or scarcity alone does not imply or presuppose a disdainful vision of human beings. Stark inequalities and inequity, corruption, abuse and injustice in the face of poverty and scarcity are what reveal a very disdainful vision of humanity. Thus, there are three facts that taken together reveal a lack of recognition (or mis-recognition) of the humanity and dignity (as well as rights and needs) of many people. First, there is poverty, secondly, there is socioeconomic injustice in the form of stark inequalities and inequity, and thirdly, there is much corruption at the governmental level of poor countries (where more than 50% of the population lives in poverty — the case of Perú). The problem or challenge then, is not scarcity or lack of resources, but the unjust distribution and redistribution of resources based on entrenched dynamics of domination, abuse, exploitation and competition. As Nancy Fraser argues, “justice today requires both redistribution and recognition.”

Despite the differences between them, both socioeconomic injustice and cultural injustice are pervasive in contemporary societies. Both are rooted in processes and practices that systematically disadvantage some groups of people vis-à-vis others. Both, consequently should be remedied. Of course, this distinction between economic injustice and cultural injustice is analytical. In practice, the two are intertwined. Even the most material economic institutions have a constitutive, irreducible cultural dimension; they are shot through with significations and norms. Conversely, even the most discursive cultural practices have a constitutive, irreducible political-economic dimension; they are underpinned by material supports. Thus, far from occupying two airtight separate spheres, economic injustice and cultural injustice are usually interenbricated so as to reinforce each other dialectically.

Within this perspective, socioeconomic injustice and cultural injustice are both forms of non recognition or mis recognition of the humanity and dignity of other people.

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The problem is a lack of solidarity. And ultimately, solidarity — as Richard Rorty argues — is about “enlarging” our notion of “we.” In other words, solidarity is about seeing (or understanding) people as dignified human beings, and also as persons vulnerable to suffering, just like “us.” Above all, solidarity implies that we extend this concept or understanding of people to include every person and not only the members of “our” groups or communities (be it cultural, ethnical, religious, etc).

There is a beautiful children’s book by Dr. Seuss, “Horton hears a Who,” where the theme of solidarity has a central place. In this children’s story, solidarity is put very simply and clearly. The elephant Horton cannot see the whoes, and does not know who they are, but this does not matter to him. Horton can hear the whoes ask him for help, and commits himself to help them because he believes “a person is a person, no matter how small.”

On the fifteenth day of May, in the jungle of Nool, in the heat of the day, in the cool of the pool, He was splashing, enjoying the jungles great joys, when Horton the elephant heard a small noise. So Horton stopped splashing. He looked toward the sound. “That’s funny,” thought Horton. “There’s no one around.” Then he heard it again! Just a very faint yelp as if a tiny person were calling for help. “I’ll help you” said Horton. “But who are you? Where?” He looked and looked. He could see nothing there but a small speck of dust blowing past through the air [...] I think there must be someone there on top of that small speck of dust! Some sort of a creature of very small size, too small to be seen by an elephant’s eyes...” some poor little person who’s shaking with fear that he’ll blow in the pool! He has no way to steer! I’ll just have to save him. Because after all, a person’s a person no matter how small.” So gently, and using the greatest of care, the elephant stretched his great trunk through the air, and he lifted the dust speck and carried it over and placed it down, safe, on a very soft clover.

Rorty argues that ultimately, respect for human rights (and democracy) is based on a sentiment rather than on reason or on an argument. Respect and solidarity are based on the sentiment that “the other” -- who ever that may be -- is no less human, is no less a person than “me” or “us.” From this perspective, education for democracy and human rights is the cultivation of solidarity.

In the following section I outline my understanding of the intimate connection between human rights, human needs, and democratic citizenship. This connection also supports my claim that it is crucial, from an educational perspective for democratic

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citizenship, to address the theme of Sendero Luminoso. Sendero directly involves human rights violations and it constitutes an important point of entry to the discussion and to the understanding of issues of social justice, human needs, democracy and citizenship.

**Human rights, human needs and democratic citizenship.**

*There are few presumptions in human relations more dangerous than the idea that one knows what another human being needs better than they do themselves. In politics, this presumption is warrant to ignore democratic preferences and to trample on freedom.*

There is an intimate connection between democracy and citizenship on the one hand, and human rights on the other; and therefore, between human rights education and democratic and citizenship education.

We should not lose sight, of something very basic yet often forgotten. Underlying demands, critiques, conflicts, we find needs and interests. Democracy (as I have suggested in chapter 1), ideally, is deemed to be a form of coexistence which allows for, and is committed to, the realization and fulfillment of everyone’s needs. There is an intimate link between human rights, human needs, and democracy. Democracy is meaningful and authentic when it responds to the demands that come out of real and specific needs of people and their context.

To discuss human rights, as well as human rights education -- as very important pieces of our democratic and citizenship education goals for Perú -- requires that we address the need for recognition of so many generations of Peruvians (indios, cholos, mestizos) that have been mis-recognized or not recognized at all, and thus profoundly hurt. This recognition of many Peruvians requires that we face a terrible fact. Namely, that so many people in Perú have had their most basic human rights violated and disrespected for centuries. Many -- due to internalized and institutionalized traditions of domination, exploitation and violence -- have profound wounds that are not easy to heal. In spite of so much suffering and injustice, our people have also continuously shown strength, hope and determination to resist and transform destructive patterns of domination, violence and abuse. Many have done this “peacefully” and anonymously.

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Some, like Sendero Luminoso, have rebelled using extreme violence and destruction. This is why I insist on the importance of “facing” the phenomenon or experience of Sendero Luminoso. To face it is to face parts of our history (thus of ourselves) that have created profound injustice and suffering, as well as massive violence and destruction.

An authentic project for democratic citizenship education, as well as for human rights education in Perú, needs to articulate the content of citizenship and democracy, with reference to the social issues discussed: extreme social/economic inequalities, extreme poverty, discrimination, violence, abuse, and injustice. This, in turn, implies acknowledging the fact that these issues are not merely “social,” but also, economic and political. Hence, a democratic citizenship project would require the support and congruency of initiatives toward the democratization of the political and economic spheres of society. Moreover, the democratization of these spheres has to be translated into (or has to take the form of) the actual recognition and inclusion (social, economical, political, cultural) of those who have been -- and continue to be excluded.

The strengthening of citizenship (including our roles as decision and policy makers) – is crucial to the struggle for inclusion and recognition. A strong citizenship (agency) is necessary both at the local and global levels, to counteract the forces that seem to affect us at many levels without us having any control over them. Strong citizenship is fundamental in the citizens’ struggle to exercise (rather than merely “possess”) their rights, in their struggle to have their basic needs\textsuperscript{125} met. As I have claimed before, recognition (political, economical, cultural,) and identity are basic human needs. In this sense human rights and democracy are inseparable. If democracy is meant to guarantee that citizens regulate their life in common, and if citizens come together to coordinate their actions and life plans to fulfill their needs, then democracy is meant to guarantee that citizens’ needs and rights are exercised and protected. This implies that democratic processes of opinion and will formation, as well as of decision making, are precisely the means and conditions whereby citizens articulate their concerns, interests and needs, as well as their proposals about which particular actions should be taken in accordance to shared goals and commitments. As Will Kymlicka notes,

the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens: e.g. their sense of identity, and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold political institutions accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands, and in personal choices that affect their health and the environment; and their sense of justice and commitment to a fair distribution of resources. Without citizens who possess these qualities, "the ability of liberal societies to function successfully progressively diminishes."

It is clear that the "liberal societies" Kymlicka refers to, are not the case in Latin America, nor in Perú. Kymlicka's account and interpretation are insufficient to describe Perú because he takes for granted that economic and social rights are not major problems or challenges." What nevertheless interests me here, is Kymlicka's focus on civil society and on the "democratic" attitudes that are crucial for democracies to function well. He explains how today, in liberal and wealthier societies, more attention is given to the important role of civic virtues or social capital, rather than to the basic structure of society -- constitutional rights, political-decision making procedures, social institutions, etc. According to Kymlicka (who follows Galston in this respect), the civic virtues of citizens include their ability to trust, their willingness to participate, their sense of justice. Kymlicka's point is that the virtues and identities of citizens are important factors in democratic governance.127

It is important to acknowledge that the complex realities in countries of the South are different and do not "fit" into descriptions such as Kymlicka's. Certainly, realities to the south of North America are not "flourishing democracies." On the other hand, it is interesting to see, that the "requirements" that Kymlicka alludes to, are requirements that I would expect from Peruvian citizens who do benefit from the status quo -- that is, those citizens whose rights are (in general) protected by the legal system, those citizens whose

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127 [...] "The first task for theorists of citizenship was to specify more concretely the sorts of civic virtues required for a flourishing democracy. According to William Galston's prominent account, responsible citizenship requires four types of civic virtues: (i) general virtues: courage, law abidingness; loyalty; (ii) social virtues: independence, open mindedness; (iii) economic virtues: work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification; adaptability to economic and technological change; and, (iv) political virtues: capacity to discern and respect the rights of others; willingness to demand only what can be paid for; ability to evaluate
economic interests are favored. These citizens -- who constitute a minority -- enjoy a "first class citizenship status."

Thus, one of the more complex and problematic aspects of Latin American societies, including Perú, is the distinction between first, second, and third class citizenship. Although this problem certainly exists also in first world societies, this problem is particularly strong in societies to the south, and certainly in Perú. Also, this problem connects interacting factors such as race, ethnicity, culture, status, class and gender. Thus, there is a very small percentage of our population for whom "reality" may look very similar to the reality of those citizens in "flourishing democracies" that Kymlicka refers to. This fact reminds us of the importance to be cautious with theory and to pay attention to the "particularity" of the different contexts, and the complexities within them, that theory may overlook.

**Education and the strengthening of democratic citizenship.**

In the case of an educational project for democracy and human rights in Perú, it is important to discuss specific proposals with respect to the education of these "privileged" minorities that enjoy a first class citizen status. In the educational arena in Perú, the distinction between first, second, and third class citizenship expresses itself in the distinction between public and private schooling. Within the public school system, we find drastic differences between, for example, public school in rural and remote areas, and public school in more urban areas (see Chapter 2, p.44). Although my main concern is the inclusion of the majorities that have been excluded in so many ways for so long, the way to go about is to (also) consider and re-define the potential role of privileged groups and individuals as "allies" for transformation and change. In other words, it is important to foster the potential for solidarity in those groups that have benefited from certain privileges for decades, and that may be willing to participate in the transformation of entrenched social dynamics, and in the building up of more just societies for all. This is the reason why I do not dismiss positions like Kymlicka's, because they do say something about parts or aspects of Perú's complex reality.

[...]The hard questions arise when we ask what exactly governments can or should do to promote these virtues. How should governments ensure that citizens
are active rather than passive; critical rather than deferential or apathetic in the face of injustice; responsible rather than greedy or shortsighted (or corrupted, I would add); tolerant rather than prejudiced or xenophobic? How should governments ensure that citizens feel a sense of membership in and belonging to their political community, rather than alienation and disaffection? How should governments ensure that citizens identify and feel solidarity with co citizens, rather than indifference or hatred towards others?\(^{138}\) (underlining is mine)

If the privileged minority of Peruvian citizens were “active rather than passive; critical rather than deferential or apathetic in the face of injustice; responsible rather than greedy (corrupted) or shortsighted”, if they had “a sense of membership and belonging to their political community, rather than alienation and disaffection,” it would be easier for them to “identify and feel solidarity with co citizens” (poorer, unprivileged, marginalized citizens) rather than to continue to be indifferent, cruel, unjust, and abusive with others.”

Nonetheless, the hard question for me is as follows. Why does a large percentage of Peruvians remain poor and deprived of capacities to fully participate in democratic life, why do so many Peruvians not manage to gain a more solid and greater space, a stronger voice, in the political decision making arena? why do Peruvians that show much interest in public life (Peruvians that are active, that are already critical, that continuously express their reaction towards injustices, toward abuses) remain second or third class citizens when it comes to influencing important decisions in our country?

In short, why are citizens — that “possess and exercise” civic virtues (in spite of the constraints to do so), not recognized and treated as citizens? Official or formal recognition alone does not have a real effect in practice, where unfortunately, things function on the basis of the distinction between classes of citizens that I have already discussed. The question, then, is: How does education play a role in the perpetuation of an order that does not integrate and respond to democratic demands and initiatives that come from “second, third and fourth class citizens?” Moreover, how has education contributed to the systematic differentiation of “classes/categories” of citizenship? and then: How might education play a role in the transformation of this dynamic, in the elimination of those distinctions? How can education contribute to the project of strengthening democracy and citizenship as well as respect for human rights?

\(^{138}\) Ibid.
As Dewey, Freire and Gutiérrez argue and hope for (chapter 1), education can be transformative and liberatory/emancipatory. Pedagogies for transformation and change need to include experience, particular contexts, problems, and conflicts, in their curricula.

Democratic citizenship education and the facing of our history. The case of the Shining Path

*Todo se hunde en la niebla del olvido*
*Pero cuando la niebla se despeja*
*El olvido está lleno de memoria*
*ocurre que el pasado es siempre una morada*
*pero no existe el olvido capaz de demolerla.*

Everything drowns in the fog of forget
But when the mist lifts
Forget is filled with memory
It happens that the past is ever a dwelling
but there is no forget that can demolish it.

One of the aims of this thesis is to show that it is important to acknowledge and to recognize how un-democratic our Peruvian society has been, how -- in what specific forms -- democracy has not been "realized" in our country -- Perú. (This claim does not preclude the fact that we do find examples of democracy in our society and in our history). I believe there are certain episodes in our (Peruvian) history, that lend themselves as good opportunities to acknowledge injustice, oppression, authoritarianism, and abuse. One of them is the phenomenon of violence and anti-insurgency repression represented by the case of Sendero Luminoso. I claim that it is indispensable to undertake the task of attempting to understand what happened (in this case, to discuss and inquiry on the causes of the origin of Sendero, the circumstances where it arose as a popular, political, armed movement). To understand how and why these radical expressions of social discontent and protest arose, to understand what it was that they resisted, what it was that they demanded, is not an easy task. It entails that we -- Peruvians -- face our own history, it implies that we face ourselves. Sendero represents/is a conflict that we need to

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examine, confront, deal with responsibly, as part of the school life and learning -- even more so as part of citizenship and democratic education.

This task is essential to the construction of our citizenship in Perú, because it helps us understand the profound historical problems and difficulties that challenge us as a people today. As Freire and Gutiérrez argue, understanding and critical consciousness of our situation (and its history, its antecedents) are pre-requisites for agency, responsibility and transformation. The notion of responsibility -- ability to respond -- carries a special sense here. It directs our attention to the citizen's capacity to address historical, social and political questions seriously, and in depth; instead of addressing them irresponsibly; instead of coming up with superficial, inaccurate answers that avoid controversy and critique. Responsibility implies that we make an effort to respond to hard questions. The depth and relevance of the issues hard questions usually unearth, help us have a more profound comprehension of our reality, our history and context. Deep understanding hopefully contributes to a transformation of attitudes and commitments (and thereby, to transformation of social life).

Citizenship cannot be strong if citizens are not willing to face their history, to face themselves. In this sense, one of the challenges for an educational project for democratic citizenship is to create the spaces and the conditions, where this kind of hard questions, are to be raised and addressed responsibly.

My intention is not to explain or "grasp" Sendero here (in this section or in this thesis) and certainly not to defend it or to justify its actions. My interest in Sendero, and the fact that I discuss it here as a complex "phenomenon," is based on the fact that Sendero marked our history; and hence, that it is important to address it, in particular within the framework of a project for democratic and citizenship education.

The challenge we are faced with is precisely to be able to look at this important traumatic episode in our history so that we can come to see what it was about, so that we can grasp its possible "why," or "whys," that will help us understand the historical, social, economic and cultural factors that contributed to Sendero's emergence. So far, the predominant, official discourse on Sendero has not looked into, or even referred to, these questions. More often, "senderistas" (members of Sendero) have been (and still are) portrayed as inhumane, crazy, antisocial. It seems "easier" to condemn Sendero and its
violence as if it were not "Peruvian." In doing so, it is easy to dismiss any discussion around Sendero’s “motives.” Why is it that we haven’t asked what might have made them crazy (fanatic, inhumane, antisocial) in the first place?

This is the reason why it is important that we have a more informed idea of what Sendero might have been about,130 other than simply being a “terrorist/fanatic group.”

Unfortunately, in Peru, the educational spaces where these questions have been addressed are quite limited to the faculties of Social Sciences in universities and to other social organizations leaning toward the left of the political spectrum. There is no nationwide educational plan or project that explicitly addresses the need to work in depth with these difficult questions or that outlines basic plans of action to be taken in this respect.

So far, we have looked at “intrinsic” characteristics and factors that I consider un democratic and that constitute a challenge to authentic democratic citizenship and democratic citizenship education in Perú. In the following chapter, I look at the Bachillerato’s approach to democratic citizenship, to history and Sendero. I argue that the Bachillerato’s concept of democracy is poor and weak (not strong enough, and, certainly different from the one I am arguing for in this thesis). I suggest that the Bachillerato uses and idea of democracy that comes, to a large extent, from the discourse that uncritically defends globalization and liberalization of the world economy in the form of neoliberalism. Thus, in chapter III, I also give an interpretation of the international context and its impact on Perú’s own context, specifically its impact on (the language and spirit/philosophy of) educational initiatives such as the Bachillerato. I now turn to examine the democratic and citizenship axis of the Bachillerato.

130 As we have said, we do not study or analyze Sendero here. However, we can begin to give some basic information of its background/origins. To begin with, it is not a coincidence that Sendero Luminoso emerges in Ayacucho, one of the poorest (if not the poorest) province in Perú at that time. It may not be a coincidence either, that the emergence, organization and action of Sendero, are very closely linked to education, more precisely, to what we might interpret as “problems of democracy” in education. Sendero emerges in the Universidad Nacional de Huamanga (Ayacucho). Sendero’s leader, Abimael Guzmán, had been a former student, and later, he became a professor of Philosophy in that institution. Sendero, as a political and armed group, grew, exerted its influence, and recruited new members, through planned and strategic “educational” initiatives. Also, its emergence is linked to a large popular movement/struggle in Ayacucho against the government at that time, which had introduced a series of laws against publicly funded education in Perú. For more information on the origins of Sendero, see Degregori, Carlos Iván. Ayacucho 1969-1979. El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso. Lima: IEP(Instituto de Estudios Peruanos). 1990.
Chapter III Case Study: The Democratic and Citizenship Axis of the National Baccalaureate Pilot Plan (Bachillerato) in Perú.

As I have mentioned in my Introduction, the broader question that guides my inquiry is what would democratic citizenship education mean and imply in Perú today.

For methodological and strategic reasons, I have chosen to look at the democratic and citizenship axis of the Bachillerato. Hence, in this chapter I give a general description of the Plan and of the curricular axis that I will focus on. I raise several questions based on the ideas that I have developed throughout the preceding chapters. I claim that the citizenship and democratic axis of the Bachillerato is inadequate because it is based on assumptions that do not do justice to the complexity of the challenges to democracy that we are faced with as a society today. These inadequate assumptions come, in part, from influential political economic discourses in the international arena that have a strong impact on our own context, on our own decision and policy making, including educational policy.

Overview of the National Baccalaureate (Bachillerato) Plan and statement of the problem.

The Bachillerato is an educational initiative that is meant to fill a gap in the current educational system, by facilitating the transition from High school to either post secondary education – university, technological studies, continuing studies – or to the labor market. It is a two-year program, and it is directed to 16-18 year old students. It is non-compulsory and it is public (free of charge). It constitutes a requirement for those students that intend to pursue post secondary education, because it is supposed to offer that which basic education does not offer and that is required for successful university attendance.

According to the Ministry of Education,\(^{131}\) the Bachillerato aims at a triple objective with regards to its graduates: (1) The students should be prepared to exercise the rights and responsibilities that the democratic life demands of them as citizens, (2)

The students should be able to adapt to, and to become part of the world of production and labor. The Bachillerato students would receive an efficient orientation with regards to the diverse job areas. Students are expected to strengthen the competencies or skills that would allow them to flexibly adapt themselves to the constant changes in the job market, and to take advantage of the possibilities that the labor world offers. (3) Students would develop indispensable capacities for (ongoing) learning, that would allow them to pursue any kind of further education.\textsuperscript{132} These three objectives imply three curricular axes:

1. The fostering of personal, social, and cultural identity,
2. The development of democratic and citizenship consciousness, and
3. The construction of an innovative and productive culture.

The focus of this thesis is the second axis: the development of democratic and citizenship consciousness. To begin with, I acknowledge that I am discussing only general guidelines (very broad and not detailed). However, I still consider the language and vocabulary of the plan around democracy, to be \textit{too} general and broad, or not "strong" enough, given the profound need for change, democratization and development of our country.

I believe that language is powerful and that it conforms and informs entire conceptions and ways of understanding life, social life, and political life. Language is not only a means to express ourselves, our views, our thinking. Language also impacts on, and influences, our ideas, attitudes, feelings and values, in very subtle yet profound ways. This is the reason why I do pay attention to the Bachillerato's vocabulary, and to what others might consider minor subtleties of language.

In terms of the specific objectives of the second axis (Development of citizenship and democratic education) the Bachillerato states:

The formation of a democratic and citizenship consciousness is not possible without the development of the values and attitudes that constitute personal identity (self-esteem, assertiveness, autonomy and creativity, perseverance, and aspiration), but requires the development of additional values such as self respect and respect for others, own opinion, cooperation and commitment, as well as abilities for communication and written production. With respect to each one of these aspects, the student/graduate of the Bachillerato will be able to show:

\textbf{Respect:} The student will be able and willing to respect, accept, and explain personal, social, cultural, gender differences, as well as differences of opinion.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid. p. 32-33.
differences of her local, national and international context. The student will have a sense of belonging to the Human species, and would show disposition and capacity for solidarity and interchange.

**Opinion:** The student will be able to interact with people of her local, national and international context, she will be able to be assertive. The student will also be capable of expressing her own opinions, to defend them and to show independent thinking.

**Cooperation:** The student will be able to work cooperatively and to complement with others in order to realize common tasks efficiently. The student will know how to interrelate talents, preferences, roles and objectives in the group and among diverse groups.

**Commitment:** The student will be able to find information for herself, and to hold convictions that she will be able to back with personal arguments. The student will be able to discuss problems, possibilities and challenges of her city, country and planet, in the historical context and in the context of the current times. The student will demonstrate her commitment by contributing with ideas, solutions and initiatives.

**Communication:** The student will be able to use diverse linguistic registers in her oral habitual communication, she will develop reading habits, interest for different type of texts, and the capacity to understand technical and scientific information in her mother tongue, in Spanish and in a different language.

**Written production:** The student will develop skills in grammar. She will be able to produce literary, narrative, informative, technical and scientific texts, in her mother tongue, in Spanish, and in another language.\(^{133}\)

The language and vocabulary that the Bachillerato plan uses to describe these attitudes and values (democratic citizenship values and attitudes) express an idea of democracy (and of democratic citizenship) different from the one I have been sketching throughout this thesis. The Bachillerato expresses an idea of democracy and a “democratic ideal” that resonate with discourses that promote and foster economic globalization, Neo Liberalism, “development” and technology (“modernidad”-modernity, in Spanish). How different is the conception of democracy and citizenship that these discourses reveal, from the one I am proposing in this thesis?

Basically, uncritical discourses of globalization emphasize an education where young people develop skills to successfully adapt to the “world market.” Democratic and citizenship consciousness become part of (or are included in) this “package” of skills to

\(^{133}\) Ibid.
develop. What part of the package? How important is democracy, really, according to these discourses?

I want to explain my understanding of the impact of the uncritical discourse(s) pro-globalization in the vocabulary of the Bachillerato. The context in which the Bachillerato was planned was Fujimori’s second government (1995-2000). When Fujimori became president for the first time in 1990, Perú’s economy was in deep crisis. Alan García’s populist and protectionist government (1985-1990) had isolated Perú from the world market. With Fujimori (who ended up applying his rival Mario Vargas Llosa’s neo-liberal economic agenda), the reinsertion of the country into the world market economy, meant that Peru had to abide by the conditions of international financial organizations such as the World Bank (WB), the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organizations play a role as “external” factors that are important to consider when discussing a project for democratic and citizenship education in a Latin American developing country such as Perú. The reinsertion of Perú into the world market economy, and the impact of this reinsertion on Fujimori’s government approach to education and educational reform, can be understood through the larger context of today’s phenomenon of globalization.

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134 Alan García’s government (1985-1990) is considered to have led Peru to one of its most disastrous economic crisis. García’s party, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA, a center-left political party), took a series of unsuccessful populist, nationalist and “anti-imperialist” measures. As Sinesio López puts it: “García’s government demonstrated the caricature like, and perverse, facet of populism: The interventionist and developmental state was only a state that subsidized the more powerful economic groups in the country. The state supported and subsidized the national industries so that imports would decrease considerably. This was the lever of an assisted capitalist system, weak, inefficient and expensive.”(López Sinesio, op.cit p.212-213). In short, García’s populist government meant an economic depression that seriously affected the most vulnerable (poor, marginalized) groups in Perú.


Today, we are faced with an overwhelming and controversial reality that is often referred to as globalization. In general, this term expresses a view of the direction that geopolitics and the world’s economy have taken.

I have no intention to hide my lack of rigor here. With respect to this particular discussion, I commit the petitio principii of using as a premise, that which I am supposed to argue for. Namely, I assume that economic globalization, as it is being carried out now, disrespects and violates many human rights, and that it hinders the conditions for development of democratic processes of will formation, organization, and intervention. Nonetheless, it is precisely by virtue of the difficult challenges that globalization poses, that it also allows for different democratic initiatives to become more radical, more creative. Thus globalization constitutes, too, a rich potential for change and transformation. In other words, the complexity and ambiguity of globalization is evident in the fact that it both erodes and strengthens democracy. Herein lies our hope and challenge.

136 I understand globalization as a complex phenomenon ( economical, political, cultural) that points in the direction of “integrating” the world under a particular system or particular principles (be it economic, political, legal, cultural). My focus here is not on every aspect or implication of “globalization.” I do not believe globalization in itself (the project to “universalize” certain ideas, principles, ways of interacting) is positive or negative. It depends on what is being “globalized.” (In fact, there are a series of perhaps unplanned consequences within the current globalized system, that ironically, or paradoxically, allow for the criticism and potential transformation of the system itself). Rather, my concern is about the specific ways in which globalization is currently being carried out, and the objectives that inspire its current agenda. We evaluate certain impacts of globalization to determine how harmful or constructive these effects are, in the light of our democratic telos/ideal/utopia. This is why my focus at this point, is on the assumptions and effects of economic globalization or liberalization of markets, nation and world wide. One of the effects of globalization has been the weakening of governments (nation states and local powers), and the weakening of civil society’s capacity to influence decision making.

From a pessimistic perspective, the global organization of production and finance means that the nation-state no longer initiates policy but rather, that it reacts to global social forces against which it can mount limited resistance. Hegemony resides with a global complex of transnational core-periphery relations, creating new patterns of economic growth and consumption that are beyond state control. In his introduction to “Human Rights fifty years on: a reappraisal,” Evans argues that “any assessment of the dominant idea of Human Rights must include an analysis of interests, power and hegemony.” He points out to the construction of rights in a particular context, and, by specific authors.

Rights are concerned with establishing and maintaining the moral claims that legitimize particular interests. Following the success of the American and French Revolutions, the emergent bourgeoisie sought to legitimate their alternative order through the inclusive language of natural rights rather than the divisive language of interests and dominance. The separation of private (economic) from public (political) life, which is central to natural rights, was presented as a moral imperative in the interest of all citizens, not as the outcome of new power relationships that served the specific interests of the bourgeoisie.

The fact that law and international law maintain certain power structures intact, does not preclude the fact that several of the moral claims utilized to legitimize particular interests are “desirable” and congruent with an emancipatory project for all.

In the international arena, the project to place human rights at the center of global politics began with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, after World War II, in 1948. It is not inaccurate to interpret the direction of international law and world politics as an expression of the modern project of emancipation for all peoples (We have discussed this theme in Chapter 1, in association with the French Revolution and with the creation of the establishment of modern constitutional states -- in relation to Habermas’s ideas on law and democratic theory).

This emancipatory project is conceived as one of liberation from suffering (in the form of physical or psychological violence, e.g. from torture and war). It is a project for freedom. And freedom requires (to an important extent) that our basic human needs be met (including very basic material/biological needs, and psychological needs such as

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139 Ibid. p.2.
140 Ibid. p.4.
recognition and identity). Individuals and groups of individuals have basic needs they need to take care of. The notion of citizenship reminds us that a person (by virtue of being a person and of being part of a community) is entitled to a series of rights,\(^\text{141}\) and these rights, in turn, correspond (often) to certain needs. Nation-states are meant to fulfill the needs of their citizens: governments do their job – theoretically – by protecting and defending citizen’s rights.

However, the emergence of discourses of human rights as well as of modern democracies, is intimately linked to the emergence and hegemony of (economic) liberalism in the West.\(^\text{142}\) Evans explains that in the post war period, the United States (U.S) emerged with material capabilities far in excess of any other country. The U.S growing economy and its post war over production required strategies that would protect the U.S’s access to natural resources, cheap labor, and most important, markets. According to Evans, one important strategy of the United States was to consolidate itself as global hegemon and as the leader of the human rights project. As self-proclaimed protector of universal human rights, the United States sought to legitimate its role as the leader of the new world order, and to justify intervention wherever and whenever it was necessary. The success of this effect rested upon gaining popular approval for a set of civil and political rights associated with liberalism, more explicitly, the rights already found in the Constitution of the Unites States of America.\(^\text{143}\) Globalization, as it is understood today, unfolds from these conditions of power and hegemony. The weakening of national economies and states is proportionate to the increasingly powerful roles held by international organizations and institutions, where the U.S and its interests have a strong presence.

These institutions and organizations assume the task of providing the rules for action, a group of formal and informal organizations without democratic pretensions. Included here are organizations like the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Trilateral Commission (TC), and the group of Eight (G8, until recently the G7) who determine the norms and rules of

\(^\text{141}\) It is important to note, as does Marion Iris Young, that citizens are to exercise rights rather than just “possess” them: “rights are relationships, not things; they are institutionally defined rules specifying what people can do in relation to one another. Rights refer to doing more than having. To social relationships that enable or constrain action.” See: Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, 1990.p.25.


\(^\text{143}\) Evans, Tony. op.cit. p. 4-7.
conduct that emphasize ‘efficiency, discipline, and confidence; economic policy credibility and consistency; and limitations of democratic decision-making processes’. The rules and norms for social behavior are set at a global level, favoring the interests of global capital [...]"144

According to Evans, international organizations such as the WB, the WTO, the TC, and the G7, have no democratic pretensions. In any case, their understanding of democracy is certainly different to the one I began to sketch in chapter 1.

The neo-liberal ideology that drives and supports this "new" world order prioritizes a particular aspect of human rights; namely, the individual’s civil and political freedom; while it marginalizes the equally important economic and social human rights.145 It is important to clarify my position with respect to critical views (such as Evans') on international law and human rights. My intention is, by no means, to de-value civil and political rights in themselves. Rather, the critique is directed to the hegemonic system that legitimizes itself by claiming that it operates on the basis of human rights principles. What I critique is the lack of consistency between discourse and practice. I critique the fact that many of the discourses that international organizations utilize, include the rights discourse merely as a means to legitimize their actions and their agendas (economic and political hegemony). Many of their actions disregard economic and social rights, which are complementary to civil and political rights, and which, as I have argued, are intimately linked to, and affect, democracy.

No sound project of human rights can be carried out by marginalizing one set of rights (economic and social), because the two sets of rights are complementary and equiprimordial. (This is analogous to Habermas’s position with regards to the relationship between private and public autonomy, which he claims is also equiprimordial; and it is also analogous to Fraser’s claim that economic injustice and cultural injustice are usually interbricated). The priority of certain rights over others is established in relation to the specific situations, contexts, and needs of individuals in a particular social group, region or country. The fact that the U.S and other wealthy countries, have — at least in theory and at a macro level — their economic needs met, may explain the priority that civil and

144 Ibid., p.14.
political rights (rather than social and economic rights) have in these countries. Nevertheless, the shortsightedness of a project like economic globalization lies in the fact that there is no real acknowledgement of the different needs or different priorities, of other societies, countries, and regions. There is a lack of authentic recognition of the different histories, cultures, and social dynamics of poorer countries, such as Perú (and Latin American countries in general).

The implementation of civil and political rights is equally important to the implementation of social and economic rights. Moreover, not implementing the latter results in social and economic injustice, and makes it even more difficult — if not impossible — to enact the former (civil and political inclusion). This makes it clearer why it is crucial that citizens work together to find ways to voice their demands (which arise from real social, economical, political needs) in such forms that sufficient pressure to influence decisions is put at the local and international government level.

Today’s state of affairs suggests it is extremely difficult – almost impossible – to put forward an alternative project that emerges from the urgent demands and concerns of civil societies. Weber’s diagnosis of his time (the early 20th century) and his description of capitalism as the “iron cage” seem to describe our times. It seems capitalism and economic forces have “colonized” all other spheres of our lives:

 [...] the modern economic order [...] determines, with irresistible force, the lifestyles of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only of those directly concerned with economic acquisition. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized fuel is burnt. In Baxter’s view, the concern with external goods should only lie on the shoulders of his saints like a “light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.” But fate has decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage [...] material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men, as in no previous period of history. No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophecies will arise, or there will be a powerful rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self importance. For then it might be said of the “last men” of this cultural development: “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart;” this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved. 146

On the other hand, there is hope that the cage is not inevitable. This hope makes us shift our attention to civil society’s potential to challenge, question, influence decisions, and to

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transform given orders. In spite of the increasing limitations and constraints that come from the overwhelming force of the global economic system and "ideology," there continues to be spaces where we can strengthen citizenship and where we can put forward the alternatives that come from citizen's engagement in their life in common. I have been arguing that education has a role in the strengthening of democratic citizenship. In light of our preceding discussion, let us turn our attention to the Bachillerato's approach to democratic citizenship.

*The National Baccalaureate (Bachillerato) approach to democratic citizenship, history, and the Shining Path. Critiques to alternatives.*

I find that the Bachillerato's vocabulary expresses views of democracy and human rights that we have critiqued in the preceding section. For example, in the case of the value of cooperation ("cooperate and complement with others to realize common tasks efficiently, knowing how to interrelate talents, preferences, roles and objectives in the group and among diverse groups"), the term "efficiently" is the ultimate objective. Certainly, when we engage in a common project it is natural that we aim at "successful" outcomes (efficiency). However, efficiency is not always the ultimate objective of individual or cooperative action, and neither does efficiency constitute the only measurement for "success."

On the one hand, there is a significant difference between an education oriented to mere training (educating people to become "subjects" of a given order) and an education oriented to develop critical consciousness (educating people to become citizens). The former trains and prepares students to "adapt" (successfully) to the labor market and to given social, economic and political structures and dynamics. The latter fosters understanding, as well as values, attitudes, and ways of interacting among peers, that are congruent with authentic citizenship and democratic values.

On the other hand, these two orientations in education do not have to be conceived as being exclusive of one another. Indeed, there is a tension among them; but it is not fruitful to make of this tension a matter of an "either/or" alternative. We need to give children and young people the tools with which they can live in the present world

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147 Ibid. p.35.
system, which, (paraphrasing Marx) has not come about under circumstances of their own choosing. Simply put, this means young people need to be prepared to find a place in the so called “labor market” (i.e., to find a job and earn money so that they can cover the cost of basic needs). However, education has the potential to do more than this. Moreover, an education that primarily trains students to adapt to given orders, is not democratic because democracy, as I have been arguing, means openness to, and possibility for change and transformation. Thus, democracy believes in, and requires, the agency and engagement of citizens in common projects. Therefore, democratic citizenship education sees students as human beings capable of learning, of understanding, as persons capable of becoming agents, and of feeling and cultivating solidarity. Democratic citizenship education wants the students to develop the understanding and the skills that would help them become full agents, more solidary, fully human.

The efforts to prepare young people for the labor market (which emphasize technological expertise and cost benefit analysis) should not “colonize” or dominate the efforts to develop critical skills, and to develop our imagination (and hope) to transform given orders, always in the light of a project that we undertake with others, intersubjectively (in cooperation, and in ways that are more solidaristic rather than individualistic). Habermas's distinction of types of speech acts and speech/communication attitudes gives us some insight into this apparent dilemma.\footnote{Habermas, Jurgen. \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol.1: Reason and the Rationalization of society.} Boston: Beacon Press, 1984. p.290-295 (I touched upon this theme in chapter 1).}

There are different types of speech acts and attitudes that interact and are embedded one in the other, in action-speech contexts. Habermas’s aim is not to do away with those speech acts that are not “communicative” or to diminish their importance in the context in which they are used. Rather, Habermas is concerned with the fact that strategic/instrumental attitudes and speech acts -- the \textit{perlocutionary speech acts} -- “colonize” and “displace” the communicative or illocutionary speech acts, which aim at reaching understanding. According to Habermas, the communicative/illocutionary speech acts are the basis of all other forms of communication (including the strategic or perlocutionary form).
The point that I want to make is that the emphasis on efficiency should not colonize or interfere with the effort to develop skills for engaging in cooperative or communicative action, including skills for handling conflict and for conflict resolution, for example. It is important to develop skills for understanding, and for building consensus. These skills and capabilities are all key elements of citizenship and democratic education. As I have shown throughout the previous chapters, democracy requires strong citizenship. Strong citizens are persons that see themselves as participants -- together with others -- in the community they live in, as people capable of engaging in constructive and cooperative discussion and dialogue with others to reach comprehension around important issues that concern them, and to coordinate action.

Therefore, there is value in cooperation and engagement in common projects, regardless of how “efficient” the results or outcomes are. In other words, cooperation, communication, efforts for reaching understanding, solidarity; are ends in themselves.

Democratic education is at the fundamental level the cultivation of the dialogical self through learning to participate intersubjectively in the public space [...] democracy as a moral project is an account and a practice that the participants together-picture, together-experiment with, forms of life through critical and open discourse. Thus, democratic education as a moral education is cultivation of intersubjectivity derived from, as well as being enabling and sustaining, critical and open discourse.149

Within this perspective, “democratic education as a moral education is the cultivation of intersubjectivity.” Intersubjectivity is interaction and interrelation with others. Thus, communication skills are very important. However, the Bachillerato plan focuses on the more “technical” aspects of communication (see p.63) rather than on the inter-subjective character of communication, which includes, for example, listening and understanding skills, critical thinking and discussion, exchange of ideas around difference, diversity, equity, justice, democracy, and so forth.

These are examples of the somewhat light or shallow idea of democracy that the Bachillerato has. The way in which the democratic and citizenship consciousness axis is formulated does not do justice to the complexity of our critical context and to the different struggles, difficulties, and challenges we are faced with as a society today –

especially the Peruvian struggle for democracy. The efforts to end corruption, to redress a series of injustices, and to implement economic programs and reforms that are in the interest of the majority of Peruvians, are all part of the struggle for democracy in Perú.

There is an urgent need to transform very entrenched social dynamics (of racism, of domination) that perpetuate the distinction between first, second and third class citizens, and that are far from being democratic. The educators that have written and developed the Bachillerato plan, especially this particular axis on democratic citizenship, seem to assume that democracy is already "realized." I disagree with this fundamental assumption, because, as I have discussed throughout this thesis, the democratization of Peruvian society remains a big challenge. The authors of the Bachillerato plan seem to conceive of democratic and citizenship education as a matter of reproducing something that is already there -- rather than as a matter of transforming what is there, and constructing and exercising new social dynamics. In short, the authors of the Bachillerato take democracy and citizenship for granted, as if they were-- to a large extent -- already in place.

In order to achieve the objectives under the three curricular axes, the curriculum has been organized around five main areas:

1. Science and Technology
2. Communication
3. Human Development
4. Economy and Business Management
5. Career/Vocation Orientation.

The different courses that these areas contain are the following:


150 This thesis has attempted to sketch some conception of democracy that responds to the question: What could/would democratic and citizenship education require/simply in Perú today? My concept of "authentic" democracy expresses the belief that the tentative contents that we give to democracy are a response to experience, and to real needs.


3. Communication: Communication 1&2, Computer Sciences, Methodology, Foreign Language 1, 2, 3 & 4.

4. Economy and Business Administration: Economy and Managing 1&2, Business Tools 1 & 2; and

5. Career/Vocational Development: Personal development, professional options, practical career/vocational development, vocational unit.

As we can see, the plan "squeezes" the democratic citizenship "component" into one course in the human development area. The objective of area #2: Human development (which includes "State and Citizenship") is the following:

the student will be able to act as a citizen that has a positive concept of herself, that is reflexive and inclusive, that respects and appreciates differences and diversity, that is committed to the development of Perú, and to the future of humanity; the student will be able to make critical judgements about herself and about social life, politics, culture, ethics, and economics that affect people in the country and in the world, that are coherent and grounded.152

The course 'State and Citizenship' "includes the reflection around society and socialization, politics, rights and responsibilities of persons, the state, law, and justice in Perú", and the course 'Essays on Perú,'

includes the elaboration/production of an essay based on critical reading, critical judgements that are coherent and grounded (on the readings), and the development of an attitude that is committed to the reality of the local context and to our country.153

It is not fair to assume that the plan necessarily avoids certain topics on the basis that it does not include them in the description. The general guidelines certainly allow for different and specific approaches to the themes they mention. For example, in the case of "law and justice in Perú," this topic allows for the questioning of the entire system of law and justice in the country, and for the discussion of inequity among citizens (practical distinction between first, second, third class citizens). Justice could be discussed in relation to this differentiation or categorization of citizenship, which will unearth issues

152 Ibid. p.44.
153 Ibid. p45.
of discrimination, racism, non recognition, etc. The discussion of Sendero, could also have an important place and role here; especially with regards to the fact that many innocent Peruvians (mostly very poor and from rural areas) were accused of being either terrorists or accomplices of terrorism. These people were unjustly convicted to many years of prison. Many were convicted either without trial, or by military trials. As Eduardo Dargent\textsuperscript{154} argues, law and justice in Perú, are not applied equally to every citizen. The differentiation between first, second, and third class citizenship reveals inequity and injustice.

I think that the way these guidelines are formulated, somehow puts more emphasis on \textit{continuation} (in the sense of \textit{adaptation}) rather than on \textit{transformation}. Somehow, the description of the “State and Citizenship” course, for example, presents law, justice, rights and responsibilities as “contents” to be learned and understood, rather than as themes to be interpreted, discussed and questioned, or as “contents” that can be challenged, re-invented.

As I have mentioned, one aim of this thesis is to participate in the democratic “exercise” of trying to reach understanding around democratic and citizenship education. An important part of this exercise is to reformulate terms, to create or include “new” words, ideas in our discourses, in our discussions. We are capable of renewing words or vocabularies, we are capable of giving new contents and meanings according to our new priorities, to our new concerns. Democracy means, among other things, the space where this kind of exercise is possible. Democratic citizenship education entails creating the spaces where this kind of exercise is not only possible but also promoted and supported.

For the purpose of the main argument here, and in light of my claim that democratic citizenship education must address critical, difficult episodes in our history, I now discuss the theme of Contemporary Peruvian History. As I mentioned earlier, the description of the plan seems to begin with the assumption that democracy is a given.

The course XX century Perú, covers the study of Perú at the beginning of the XX century, Leguía and his 11 years in presidency, the 30's and 40's. The course

covers Odría to Belaúnde, military governments, *the return to democracy*, and a brief summary of the current context.\(^{155}\) (italics and underlining are mine).

"The return to democracy" is referring to Belaúnde's second government, after Velazco Alvarado and Morales Bermúdez military governments (see chapter 2, page 39, footnote 95, and see the appendix for a list of Peruvian presidents and the manner they were selected). All the more worrisome is the fact that Sendero Luminoso is not mentioned at all. Sendero's initial violence occurred precisely within this period of "return" to democracy, but is not mentioned in the Bachillerato plan. There is something "out of place" -- not to say incoherent -- in the fact that there is no sign of an attempt to question whether we were living in a true democracy or not during that period of extreme violence (which included human rights violations perpetrated by the government and the military; it included disappearances and unfair trials for innocent people).

It is evident that, as Peruvian citizens, as teachers, as students, as educational administrators, to inquire into Sendero Luminoso is perhaps one of the hardest tasks. Inevitably, to truly inquire into Sendero's roots makes it difficult not to acknowledge that Sendero -- to a large extent -- only "put dynamite in an already corroded building teetering on the edge of collapse."\(^{156}\) It is hard to accept that Sendero is something that Peruvian society produced. We would have to add that Sendero is something that our unjust, *un* democratic and corrupted society produced. It is hard to realize that, many of the causes of Sendero's origin (social injustice, oppression, non-recognition, discrimination, poverty/misery, socioeconomic inequality, among others) still exist. In other words: democracy is not realized.

To face our history is the only sound way to start anew. This is the reason why it is so important that we make the decision to address Sendero consciously and seriously. However, the Bachillerato avoids or ignores this issue, which is contemporary and close to our experience (It has only been eight years since the head of Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán, was captured). As I argued in chapter 1, drawing from Freire and Gutiérrez mainly, the idea of education is that it helps us (students) understand our context and situation better so that we can act upon it. The better we are able to

\(^{155}\) Ibid., p.45. (See appendix for a list of Peruvian presidents and the manner they were selected)

understand, to ask and to inquire about a particular situation that affects us or that has affected us, the better prepared we are to "do something" about it, to take a stance, to be responsible. This is what conscientization is about. There are slim chances of transforming undemocratic and unjust social practices if we do not have the courage to look for the roots and causes of our problems. Are corruption and violence, for example, symptoms/effects of other problems? If so, of which ones? What do about this? To what extent was Sendero a response to, or a result of serious social economic and political problems?

These questions help us understand better and therefore take action based on knowledge and critical consciousness, rather than on ignorance and cynicism or indifference. There is a problem in detaching or "emptying" curriculum from controversial issues that are part of our context and experience. First, the problem is that in doing so, education does not assume a responsible role to cultivate citizenship, and to encourage responsibility and engagement in the reality (problems and possibilities) of our country. Secondly, in avoiding controversial themes, education fails to help the students develop skills for understanding and critical thinking. It fails to help them become aware agents and fully human.

As we saw in chapter 1, conscientization is about understanding the reality and situation of those involved in learning:

Accordingly, the point of departure must always be with men and women in the here and now, which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from which they emerge, and in which they intervene. Only by starting from this situation – which determines their perception of it – can they begin to move.157

Moreover, Freire's insistence on "beginning" with men and women in the here and now, is also an expression of respect and of caring for the people he teaches. Respect implies that we are willing to understand where other people stand, what is their situation or reality --which might be different from ours. Without respect, we cannot pay attention, nor respond appropriately, to the needs of others. In a conference on education, José María Arguedas said,

A teacher cannot educate his kids, cannot develop intimate, affectionate communication with them, if he does not get a good enough sense of their spirit. As you know, children in Lima are quite distinct form children in an Andean setting, and children of an Andean region are different from children that live in a port environment or in a more "criollo" setting [...] Having a Knowledge of the

157 Freire, Pedagogy of the oppressed, p.66.
Above all, teachers should respect the students' opinions. The teacher is there to provide a guiding role in the students' development. The teacher does not have the power to enforce these opinions, but the students learn from the examples set by the teacher. The teacher's role is to stimulate thought and promote a love for learning. Treat students with respect and encourage them to express their ideas freely. The goal is to foster a love for learning, not just for the sake of learning. Learning is an integral part of life, and teachers should help students understand the importance of lifelong learning.

With respect to democratic theory, Habermas does not explicitly use the term "school life" in his critiques. However, his ideas relate to broader issues of democracy and the role of education in promoting democratic values. Education should prepare students to be active citizens, to think critically, and to engage in democratic processes. This means that education should not only transmit knowledge but also promote critical thinking and democratic participation.

In addition to critical thinking, empathy is another important aspect of education. Teachers should develop their students' ability to understand and empathize with others. This involves not only educating students about different cultures and perspectives but also teaching them to listen and consider the viewpoints of others. Empathy is crucial in creating a society that values diversity and respects different ways of life.

Finally, education should prepare students for the workforce and for their future roles in society. This means that education should be relevant and practical, helping students develop skills that will be useful in their future careers. However, it is also important to remember that education is not just about preparing students for the workforce. It is about preparing them to be well-rounded individuals who are capable of contributing to society in many different ways.
Habermas claims that an authentic democratic society/community is one in which its members are actually co-authors and active participants of their life, and of the rules that organize their life in common, he is saying that the members of the democratic community are engaged in the life of their community, and that they are all, in this sense, protagonists of their life in common. Moreover, self-realization and well being require engagement and protagonism in the intersubjective arena of social life.

Ariel Dorfman writes about the intimate relation between these two dimensions: the individual and the collective, the subjective and intersubjective. Dorfman comments on Ernesto's decision to cross the bridge. The boy Ernesto is the main character in Arguedas's “Los ríos profundos” (“Deep Rivers”).

Beyond the bridge, then, is the magnificent risk of living and dying as a human being, facing life ahead on, not turning our back to life, standing tall as opposed to dragging along on the ground, abandoning silence for song... development of a child, development of a people. We need to understand that both developments are the same, that the voice of the child multiplies and guarantees the chorus of the people, we need to understand that without the two dimensions (the individual and the collective, the exterior and the interior), there is no way of moving beyond underdevelopment.\footnote{Dorfman, Ariel. “Puentes y Padres en el infierno: Los ríos profundos.” Revista de crítica Literaria Latinoamericana 12 (1980): 1972-137-160. Quoted by Aibar Ray, Elena. Identidad y resistencia cultural en las obras de José María Arguedas. Lima: PUC, 1992. p.124.} (underlining is mine)

Ernesto decides to cross the bridge that the Indian campesinos have already crossed in order to start a new life, a more free life. Ernesto has decided not to go back to the hacienda, which represents cruelty, abuse, racism, non recognition, and a disdainful vision of humanity. Ernesto has chosen to cross the bridge and move on. This decision expresses Ernesto's choice for humanity and solidarity, which is no different from his choice for his own humanity and his self-realization and happiness. These two go together: “development of a child, development of a people.” ("crecimiento de un niño, crecimiento de un pueblo").

Certainly, school is an important place where children (citizens already) “learn” and “practice” engagement in the social life they share with others. The development and strengthening of citizenship in a child is key to the development and strengthening of a democratic people and society.

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In addition, if democratic citizenship is to be cultivated in schools, then students need to be considered co-participants and protagonists of their learning. It is important that students develop a sense of responsibility that goes beyond the responsibility to "complete" and/or to be "efficient" in specific tasks, exercises, academic requirements. Solidarity and honesty are important values.

There is a relation between responsibility and engagement. To be responsible, (able to respond) enhances self-esteem, motivation, and agency. To be responsible and to be held accountable is certainly demanding. But when someone expects us to respond to her demands, she is recognizing us as persons with potentials and capabilities to do so. The fact that others demand and expect our response to their actions or speech acts, implies a recognition of our capability to do so. The fact that others consider us responsible expresses recognition of our humanity and our intersubjectivity.

The purposes and goals of school life are more engaging the more grounded they are (or the more connected they are) to the real needs, motivations, experiences and aspirations (hopes and dreams) of its members, especially students. In other words, it is important that students’ learning and experience in school be meaningful. Clarity of purpose -- the school's philosophy of education, clarity of purpose of the different courses, activities and exercises undertaken -- is a very important factor that promotes and invites engagement.

The current context in Perú, is a unique opportunity to make the decision -- at educational policy levels -- to clarify the main purposes of education in Perú today. I claim that the main purpose of education is to be an ally of the broader social project to end corruption, and to construct a democratic and just society. The first step is to recognize the undemocratic aspects of our society, the unjust practices and patterns in our society and history. The better we understand this, the more meaningful it becomes to engage -- as persons, as Peruvian citizens -- in the construction of a better (more democratic, more just) country. In school, the more aware students are about the problems and challenges of our country, and the more encouraged and supported they are to understand them, to think critically, to opine and to imagine alternatives; the more meaningful it becomes for them to assume responsibility, to strengthen their citizenship. When students are recognized as persons with needs and capacities/capabilities, when
teachers and the school life in general have hope in the students' humanity and agency for cooperation, for transformation, students become more engaged and committed.

Again, to look at Sendero, is an important piece of this exercise, because as I have argued, to face Sendero is to face our history of domination, of abuse, of extreme social economic inequality, of authoritarianism, of injustice. To face Sendero, to understand better what it was about, is also an opportunity to envision radical different social dynamics and also different alternatives to violence.

There are several factors within our history and traditions -- within ourselves as a people (Peruvians) -- which constitute challenges to an authentic project for democratic and citizenship education. Nonetheless, there are other factors that constitute, in contrast, potentials and possibilities for overcoming these challenges. The ideal is within ourselves, within who we are and what we want to become. The impediments to the ideal are also within us. We need to face our authoritarian and "caudillista" tradition, our paternalist and populist traditions, as well as the racism and the discrimination that we perpetuate against each other (among "cholos", "blanquitos" (whites), blacks, Indians, serranos, limeños (from Lima), selváticos, etc). Above all, we need to face the fact that as long as more than half of our population remains in poverty (54%), no authentic democratic project is viable. In other words, if our projects for democracy are to be viable, then we need to look at, take into account, and challenge, our social-economic dynamics, our distribution of wealth, our habits or practices as citizens, and our entrenched ways of interacting with one another. 

161 That is, the history of social injustice, oppression, mis recognition, authoritarianism, paternalism, populism, discrimination, profound racism, and so forth.
162 Caudillo and caudillismo are variants of dictator and dictatorship in the Latin American world and history. "Caudillismo is an attempt, based upon charisma, to keep political forces under control by promoting allegiance to the person of the leader [...] Caudillismo is a noninstitutional way of satisfying the authoritarian orientation latent in a country's political culture. Due to its reliance on individual leadership, the caudillista solution tends to be temporary." (see: Caudillos. Dictators in Spanish America. Ed. by Hugh M. Hamill. London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992.p. 5-6)
163 These "adjectives" are difficult to explain and would demand thorough anthropological and sociological explanations. However, it may suffice for our purpose just to mention that "cholo" means someone of "mixed" race with a strong Indian component. The term also alludes to a "mixed" culture (cultura chola), and has had derogatory and discriminatory connotations. Lately, and throughout the years though, it has also become a motive of pride. Today, the meaning/intention of the adjective "cholo," depends on the context, on who uses it, to whom it is directed, it depends on the tone of voice and on the intention with which it is uttered. "Selvático" means someone from "La Selva", the Jungle/Amazonia (The ethnicity and culture of the Amazonia is different from the Andean/Indian region). It also has different connotations -- often derogatory-- according to how it is used and by whom.
With regards to the educational system, children, and schooling, it is important that we are aware of the fact that accessibility to schooling (the fact of being or becoming part of the educational system in our country) is already a matter of exercising "citizenship" or not. Somehow, the formulation of the democratic citizenship objective in the Bachillerato -- "that the students consolidate their preparation so that they can exercise their rights and responsibilities/duties that democratic life requires of them as citizens" --, and its correspondent axis: "ii) The development of democratic and citizenship consciousness," ignore (or do not seem to acknowledge) the fact that more than half of young Peruvians do not have access to school, and hence do not exercise the right to education that they are entitled to as citizens.

Thus the Bachillerato program is by no means accessible to all students even in urban areas, and it is accessible to only a minority in some rural areas. This does not mean the objectives of the democratic and citizenship axis are not legitimate or not worth supporting. On the contrary, these are fundamental objectives. In theory, the government intends to reach every young person in Perú with this curriculum. However, a majority is excluded from access to any Bachillerato education. My point is that we need to face and acknowledge these facts of unequal and limited access to school so that the government makes an effort to redress this unfair, undemocratic situation. A Nationwide program like the Bachillerato needs to be bolder in two aspects: 1) in proposing a stronger emphasis on skills and capabilities for agency and transformation — which imply education for critical consciousness — rather than on mere continuity and adaptation (whether to any political order and/or to the "labor market"); and 2) in explicitly acknowledging the need to work in cooperation with other sectors of society and of the government, in order to influence transformation and change at many levels, in order to redress our serious socioeconomic inequities, as well as our weak "democratic" institutions. The current moment in our history — the end of Fujimori's authoritarian and extremely corrupt government (chapter 2) — makes the goals of democratic educational reform particularly important.
Conclusions: Educating Citizens or Subjects?

I have taken this disjunction between citizens and subjects (or second class citizens) from Eduardo Dargent's "Hijos de un Dios menor. Cifras, súbditos e inocentes." In this essay, the author uses the disjunction to show how law and justice are not the same for every citizen in Perú, that is, how law and justice "exist" for first class citizens but not for second, third or fourth class citizens. In this work though, I use this disjunction to express the differences between strong (empowered) citizens and their opposite. The empowered citizen is someone with capacities and capabilities for action and decision (as well as for questioning and for transforming the predominant system). The 'weaker' notion of citizen (such as the one we find in uncritical pro globalization discourses and in documents like the Bachillerato plan), practically reduces citizenship to the capacity that a person has to adapt and to 'function' efficiently within an already existing system. The citizen becomes a mere piece in a mechanism, and her scope of agency is limited to actions that contribute to the non-disruptive functioning of the system or mechanism in place.

Although I have not directly asked whether we are educating citizens or subjects, before in this work, this question underlies my entire thesis. First, because in itself, this question assumes that education does indeed have an important impact (positive and/or negative) on who we are, on how we see and conceive of ourselves, on how we act or intervene in the world, on how we interact with one another at all levels (family, school, community, country), on who we become, and on what kind of citizens we become. Secondly, because in order to answer the question, we need to have a definition or a clear understanding of what citizen and subject mean to us (or what we want them to mean). And so this question motivates the reflection of, and the effort to, understand and become more aware of what the terms citizen and subject mean and imply, of what is at stake here.

Thus in this thesis, in the first place (chapter 1), I have tried to develop an understanding of democracy and citizenship, as the initial and provisional basis for my inquiry on democratic citizenship education. I have argued for an understanding of

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radical democracy as an inclusive emancipatory project with strong ethical grounds. This project expresses the belief in a horizon of possibilities for transformation, for new beginnings. Thus this project represents openness and hope. I have argued that intersubjectivity, cooperation and solidarity are essential to this project. I have also asserted that authentic democracy, and strong citizenship and agency, are inseparable. Strong citizens are persons that understand themselves as active participants of their life in common, as co-authors of the arrangements that organize their life in common, as agents and coordinators of change. I have claimed that solidarity and responsibility toward the other are also part of my understanding of citizenship, and that both solidarity and responsibility are essential to citizenship. Secondly, I have tried to address the question of how education can strengthen citizenship. I have argued that critical consciousness, experience (location, particular context), historical memory and the facing of history in learning, play an important role in the strengthening of citizenship and thus are very important components of democratic citizenship education.

I have directed my attention to the struggles for democracy and citizenship in Perú, and I have discussed the connections between human rights, human needs and democracy, in order to show there are both intrinsic and extrinsic factors that represent challenges to democratic citizenship and human rights education. Then, I have integrated these reflections into my critique (grounded on my conception of democracy and citizenship) of a specific educational initiative for democratic citizenship. I have critiqued the (Peruvian) National Baccalaureate (Bachillerato) plan’s vocabulary and “spirit.” I have argued that that the way in which the democratic and citizenship consciousness axis is formulated, does not do justice to the complexity of our critical context and to the different struggles, difficulties, and challenges we are faced with as a society today. I have critiqued the plan because it assumes that democracy is already in place or already “realized.” I have suggested that an educational initiative for democratic citizenship in Perú, has to be willing to acknowledge and to discuss the ways in which we have been profoundly un-democratic as a country. An educational initiative for democratic citizenship in Perú, would need: 1) to put a stronger emphasis on skills and capabilities for agency and transformation — which imply education for critical consciousness and the facing of our history (Sendero Luminoso) — rather than on mere continuity and
adaptation (whether to any political order and/or to the "labor market"). The emphasis on agency and transformation has to be intimately connected to a strong sense of solidarity, and cooperation, which in turn are expressed through respect, honesty and integrity toward fellow human beings and citizens. Emphasis on individual "success" and efficiency, rather than on cooperation and solidarity, fosters competition at any cost and thereby "justifies" disrespect, dishonesty, lack of integrity, corruption. An educational initiative for democratic citizenship in Perú also needs: 2) to explicitly acknowledge the urgency to work in cooperation with other sectors of the government -- the economic sector mainly -- to redress our serious socioeconomic inequities (that affect education), and to strengthen our very weak "democratic" institutions. That is, education cannot merely consider itself, or function as if it were disconnected from the complex reality of our country.

"Cultivating citizens or subjects?" is an important and useful question but it can also be misleading. To make of this tension a matter of an "either/or" alternative is not fruitful. Children and young people need to be given the tools with which they can live in the present world system. And this implies we need to develop both capabilities to "function efficiently" in the already given system (i.e. have a job, earn a living) and to "disrupt" it (understand, critique, propose anew, re-invent, transform). However, strong citizenship remains the priority and goal. Thus the emphasis on efficiency (adaptation) should not colonize or interfere with the effort to develop skills for critical consciousness and understanding, for engaging in cooperative or communicative action, including skills for handling conflict and for conflict resolution, and for building consensus. Strong citizenship presupposes the possibility of transformation and change, and it points in that direction (rather than in the direction of adaptation or stagnation). Strong citizenship is also based on a positive and hopeful vision of human beings that motivates solidarity, respect, responsibility, and integrity. From a moral and ethical perspective, the main role of education is perhaps to hold on to this vision of humanity.

Overall, this thesis has been an attempt to reformulate, or re-create meanings and contents. I have sketched an understanding of democracy and citizenship that include the following concepts/ideas: openness, unfinishedeness, solidarity, respect, intersubjectivity, responsibility, engagement, honesty, hope, critical consciousness, historical
memory/facing history, agency/protagonism, transformation, understanding, among others. I suggest that we (educators, authors of educational plans such as the Bachillerato, the government) include these terms and ideas in the conception, and in the vocabulary, of our projects for citizenship and democratic education, as well as in the vocabulary of human rights education.


### Appendix

**Presidents of Perú,\(^{165}\) 1821-2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Year(s) in office</th>
<th>manner selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lib. José de San Martín</td>
<td>1821-1822</td>
<td>proclamation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Junta: Gen. José de la Mar Don Manuel Salazar y Baquíjano Don Felipe Antonio Alvarado</td>
<td>1822-1823</td>
<td>congressional selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. José de la Riva-Aguero</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>congressional election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. José Bernardo Torre Tagle</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>congressional election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib. Simón Bolívar</td>
<td>1823-1826</td>
<td>congressional selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Andrés Santa Cruz</td>
<td>1826-1827</td>
<td>council selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. José de la Mar</td>
<td>1827-1828</td>
<td>congressional selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Agustín Gamarra</td>
<td>1828-1833</td>
<td>coup, congressional election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. José Luis de Orbegoso</td>
<td>1833-1834</td>
<td>congressional election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Pedro Bermúdez</td>
<td>1834</td>
<td>coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. José Luis de Orbegoso</td>
<td>1834-1835</td>
<td>civil war, popular uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Felipe Salaverry</td>
<td>1835-1836</td>
<td>coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. Andrés Santa Cruz</td>
<td>1836-1839</td>
<td>civil war, establishment of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. Agustín Gamarra</td>
<td>1839-1841</td>
<td>Chilean defeat of the confederation, congressional election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Manuel Menéndez</td>
<td>1841-1842</td>
<td>constitutional succession after Gamarra’s death at Ingavi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Juan Crisóstomo Torrico</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>coup, civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Francisco Vidal</td>
<td>1842-1843</td>
<td>coup, civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Justo Fuguerola</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>temporary legal succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwn. Manuel Ignacio de Vivanco</td>
<td>1843-1844</td>
<td>coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Domingo Elías</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Justo Fuguerola</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>constitutional succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Manuel Menéndez</td>
<td>1844-1845</td>
<td>constitutional succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. Ramón Castilla</td>
<td>1845-1851</td>
<td>civil war, congressional election</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gen. José Rufino Echenique</td>
<td>1851-1854</td>
<td>congressional election</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. Ramón Castilla</td>
<td>1854-1862</td>
<td>civil war, congressional election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Miguel San Ramón</td>
<td>1862-1863</td>
<td>indirect election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. Ramón Castilla</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>interim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Pedro Diez Canseco</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>interim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Juan Antonio Pezet</td>
<td>1863-1865</td>
<td>constitutional succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Pedro Diez Canseco</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Mariano Ignacio Prado</td>
<td>1865-1868</td>
<td>military proclamation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Pedro Diez Canseco</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>civil war, interim president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. José Balta</td>
<td>1868-1872</td>
<td>civil war, indirect election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Tomás Gutiérrez</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Manuel Herencia Zevallos</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>constitutional succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Manuel Pardo</td>
<td>1872-1876</td>
<td>indirect election (electorial college), popular uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Mariano Ignacio Prado</td>
<td>1876-1879</td>
<td>direct election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Luis La Puerta</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>constitutional succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Nicolás de Piérola</td>
<td>1879-1881</td>
<td>military uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Francisco García Calderón</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>named by committee of notables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilean Occupation</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm. Lizardo Montero</td>
<td>1881-1882</td>
<td>declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Miguel Iglesias</td>
<td>1882-1885</td>
<td>indirect election by northern department representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Antonio Arenas</td>
<td>1885-1886</td>
<td>resignation of Iglesias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Andrés A. Cáceres</td>
<td>1886-1890</td>
<td>direct elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Remigio Morales Bermúdez</td>
<td>1890-1894</td>
<td>direct elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Justiniano Borgono</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>death of Morales Bermúdez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Andrés A. Cáceres</td>
<td>1894-1895</td>
<td>direct election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Manuel Candamo</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>popular revolt, named by junta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Nicolás de Piérola</td>
<td>1895-1899</td>
<td>direct elections, popular revolt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ing. Eduardo López de Romaña</td>
<td>1899-1903</td>
<td>direct elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Manuel Candamo</td>
<td>1903-1904</td>
<td>elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Serapio Calderón</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>constitutional succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr José Pardo</td>
<td>1904-1908</td>
<td>elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don Augusto B. Leguía</td>
<td>1908-1912</td>
<td>elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Guillermo Billinghamst鰬</td>
<td>1912-1914</td>
<td>elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Oscar R. Benavides</td>
<td>1914-1915</td>
<td>coup</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. José Pardo</td>
<td>1915-1919</td>
<td>elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don Augusto B. Leguía</td>
<td>1919-1930</td>
<td>elections, coup</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro</td>
<td>1930-1931</td>
<td>coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Don David Samanez Ocampo</strong></td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>resignation of Sánchez Cerro</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Col. Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro</strong></td>
<td>1931-1933</td>
<td>elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gen. Oscar R. Benavides</strong></td>
<td>1933-1939</td>
<td>congressional elections after assassination of Sánchez Cerro, nullification of elections</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. Manuel Prado y Ugarteche</strong></td>
<td>1939-1945</td>
<td>elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. José Luis Bustamante y Rivero</strong></td>
<td>1945-1948</td>
<td>elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gen. Manuel Odría</strong></td>
<td>1948-1956</td>
<td>coup, elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. Manuel Prado y Ugarteche</strong></td>
<td>1956-1962</td>
<td>elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arq. Fernando Belaúnde Terry</strong></td>
<td>1963-1968</td>
<td>elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gen. Juan Velazco Alvarado</strong></td>
<td>1968-1975</td>
<td>coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gen. Francisco Morales Bermúdez</strong></td>
<td>1975-1980</td>
<td>coup</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| **Arq. Fernando Belaúnde Terry** | 1980-1985 | elections |
| **Alan García Perez** | 1985-1990 | elections |
| **Alberto Fujimori Fujimori** | 1990-1992 | elections |
| **Alberto Fujimori Fujimori** | 1992-1995 | coup |
| **Alberto Fujimori** | 1995-2000 | elections |
| **Alberto Fujimori wins elections for the period 2000-2005** Alberto Fujimori flees to Japan | April 2000 | fraudulent elections |
| **November 2000** | **Dr. Valentín Paniagua** | November 2000-2001 | transitional government congressional elections |
| **Dr. Alejandro Toledo** | 2001- | elections |