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UMI
WAR AND NATIONALITY CONFLICT IN EASTERN GALICIA, 1914-1920:
THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN ANTI-SEMITISM

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of History
University of Toronto

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Abstract

World War I and its immediate aftermath in Eastern Galicia witnessed the most brutal persecution of Jews. In 1914-1915 the Russian army brutalized, uprooted, and forcibly displaced thousands of Jewish civilians for their alleged collaboration with the Central Powers. Between 1918 and 1920, the formation of the new Polish state was accompanied by numerous anti-Jewish riots and pogroms by mobs and undisciplined soldiers. Such a treatment of a minority group in wartime poses two crucial questions -- how do we explain the mechanisms of intolerance and persecution? and why would a state or a dominant society feel threatened by a numerically smaller group? The present study addresses itself to these questions.

There have been numerous attempts to explain the causes of ethnic conflicts and, especially, the antecedents of anti-Semitism. Some sources have focused on traditional, "ancient" resentments towards Jews as driving forces of ethnic violence; others have suggested that power holders skillfully redirected their subjects' economic and social frustrations on a disliked minority. While such arguments offer a valid insight on the issue, it is my contention that ethnic persecution involves more crucial issues than age-old hatreds and cynical manipulation of power. I argue that the following factors -- social or political crisis, collective fears of an allegedly dangerous minority, security concerns of a
militant leadership, exclusionary nationalism, and attempts of a minority group to mitigate persecution by active political participation -- render ethnic conflict particularly acute.

Focusing on these factors, I attempt to provide a broad framework for understanding how various causes of ethnic conflict fit together and interact.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract iii
Acknowledgments iv
List of Maps vi
List of Tables vii

Part One. The Subject, Statement of Arguments, Notes on Terminology 1
Introduction 1
Chapter I The Jews of Eastern Galicia and Their Environment 18

Part Two The Russian Occupation, 1914-1917 43
Chapter II Russia Prepares for War 46
Chapter III Army Politics: "Leveling" the Jews," Summer 1914-Winter 1915 66
Chapter IV Russia’s Internal Front: March 1915-October 1917 119

Part Three Polish-Jewish Conflict, 1914-1920 160
Chapter V Polish-Jewish Relations during World War I 163
Chapter VI Anatomy of a Pogrom: Lwów, November 22-24, 1918 181

Conclusion 262
Bibliography 271
LIST OF MAPS

1. Austro-Hungary in 1914 16
2. Galicia in the Austro-Hungarian Empire 21
3. Galicia in World War I (August-December 1914) 69
4. Galicia in World War I (May-December 1915) 136
5. Galicia in 1918-1920 219
LIST OF TABLES

1.1. The Growth of the Jewish Population in Eastern Galicia (1880-1914) 38
1.2. The Jewish Population in District Urban Centers in 1910 38-39
1.3. The Distribution of the Jewish Population in the Districts of Eastern Galicia in 1910 39-41
1.4. Jewish Students in Galician Schools 41
1.5. Occupational Profile of Jews and Non-Jews in Both Halves of Galicia by 1900 (per thousand of individuals in a given profession) 41-42
5.1. The Overcrowding of Galicia's Urban Centers by the Summer of 1917 175
7.1. Individuals Suspected of Collaboration with the Bolsheviks, July-September 1920 255
PART ONE

*The Subject, Statement of Arguments, Notes on Terminology*

INTRODUCTION

On June 28, 1914, fatal shots in the Bosnian city of Sarajevo plunged the world into a global war. The war lasted for more than four years, left more than ten million military and civil casualties, and at its conclusion toppled four empires and rearranged the political geography of Europe. When the guns fell silent in November 1918, Western Europe received a twenty year breathing space. In Eastern Europe and Russia, however, the long-awaited peace became the opening to a series of prolonged civil wars and ethnic conflicts. Only at the end of 1920 did the struggle reach its end after the warring parties were exhausted by mutual slaughter, and new borders were finally agreed upon.

World War I witnessed the most brutal persecution of ethno-cultural, religious, and national minorities on the Eastern front. The Habsburg troops executed and interned thousands of Galician Ruthenians suspected of espionage for the Russians. The latter uprooted and herded off to Russia hundreds of thousands of Jews and Germans for alleged collaboration with the Central Powers. After World War I, between 1918 and 1920, the formation of the new Polish state was accompanied by numerous anti-Jewish riots and pogroms by mobs and undisciplined soldiers. During the same period, Russian Jews and
German-speaking minorities were caught in the midst of the Russian Civil War and lost thousands of lives to brutal massacres carried out by various bands and formations.

While the aforementioned minorities had different historical, religious, and cultural backgrounds, their sufferings between 1914 and 1920 had one striking commonality -- their respective dominant societies viewed and treated them as hostile and dangerous groups. Such a reaction to minority groups in wartime poses two crucial questions -- how do we explain the mechanisms of intolerance and persecution? and why would a state or a dominant society feel threatened by a numerically smaller group? The present study addresses itself to these questions.

There have been numerous attempts to explain the causes of ethnic conflicts and, especially, the antecedents of anti-Semitism. Some sources have focused on traditional, "ancient" resentments towards Jews as driving forces of ethnic violence, others suggested that power holders skillfully redirected their subjects' economic and social frustrations on Jews. While such arguments offer a valid insight on the issue, it is my contention that persecution involves more crucial issues than age-old hatreds and cynical manipulation of power. I argue that the following factors -- social or political crisis, collective fears of an allegedly dangerous minority, security concerns of the belligerent military leadership, exclusionary nationalism, and attempts of a minority group to mitigate persecution by active political participation -- render ethnic conflict particularly acute. Focusing on these

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factors, I attempt to provide a broad framework for understanding how various causes of ethnic conflict fit together and interact.

For this purpose a particular group, the Jews of Eastern Galicia, has been chosen, a minority perceived as powerful, monolithic, and pernicious by both a foreign state -- Russia -- and a dominant society -- Poland. These two different political entities, the empire and the republic, claimed that Jews as a whole represented a significant danger to Russian imperial expansion and Polish national state-building, respectively. The examination of Russian and Polish responses to the alleged Jewish threat provides, therefore, a basis for better understanding of political and psychological components of ethnic animosities.

Between 1914 and 1917, the Russian military blamed Jews for subversive activities on behalf of the Central Powers and uprooted thousands of Jewish civilians. This massive campaign resulted in the creation of an image of the omnipresent and dangerous Jew. During the same period and after Polish independence in 1918, fears of a Jewish conspiratorial order determined to turn Poland into a Jewish domain captured and dominated the imagination of many Poles. Between 1918 and 1920, these fears shaped policies and collective attitudes towards Jews. Traditional socio-economic anti-Semitism of pre-World War I Russia and Poland was transformed into strong movements based on politics and ideology. The present study examines this evolution at length.

A specific region, Eastern Galicia, was chosen for a microcosmic case study of Jewish-Gentile relations in wartime Poland and Russia between 1914 and 1920. The region was a battlefield of World War I, the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of 1918-1919, and the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. During this period Jewish-Polish relations worsened
appreciably, reaching the point of deep mutual enmity. On the other hand, the birth of the Polish Republic witnessed a short-lived, but close cooperation between Jews and Ukrainians, a remarkable fact considering the tragic and controversial circumstances of Jewish pogroms in Ukraine in 1919.

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Three major themes are tackled in this study. The first theme is the causes and nature of wartime anti-Semitism. The Russian army and local Polish authorities justified their actions as self-defense against Jewish resistance. In modern literature official persecution of minority groups is often referred to as "scapegoating," that is blaming a state's own mishaps and deficiencies on a specific group. However, archival documents indicate that in 1914-1920 charges of conspiracy and sabotage were not merely attempts to blame Jews for military setbacks and political failures, but originated from genuine fear of and belief in an immense Jewish peril. As a result of this fear, Jews were perceived as a formidable foe, which had to be rendered harmless by all possible means.

The second theme is the link between Russian and Polish wartime state policies and the impact of these policies on the "Jewish question" in Eastern Galicia. More specifically, I seek to ascertain how the military and political situation in Russia and Poland was reflected in anti-Jewish regulations, propaganda, and security measures carried out in the front zone. Although states are capable of influencing and directing public opinion, they are also prone to influence from below, and at times are forced by the "voice of the people" to alter their policies. During the period in question the reactions of local administrators, army commanders, politicians, police officials, city dwellers and villagers towards the Jews notably affected crucial decisions made at the very top of the state
hierarchy. Considerations and responses of these individuals and groups to the Jewish question will be analyzed in detail.

It is tempting for any historian who writes about persecution of the Jews to make a connection between his study and the Holocaust. I am no exception. Indeed, anti-Jewish pogroms by the Russian army and Polish units bear a resemblance to the pogroms in the summer of 1941 in western regions of the USSR instigated by the Germans. Similarly, mass expulsions of Jews by the Russian army in 1915, during which thousands died of privation, cold, and hunger, vividly recall the Nazi "death marches." Yet, although the events of 1914-1920 can be seen as a preparation of the psychological grounds for the Holocaust, they did not reach the scope of what has been termed "frontiers of genocide."1 The third theme of this study deals with individuals, institutions, and factors that prevented or mitigated the escalation of anti-Jewish violence into near-genocidal massacres.

It should be noted that the present research is almost exclusively limited to Russian and Polish points of view, and Jewish considerations and reactions are discussed only insofar as they directly pertained to the themes discussed. Jewish history in Galicia abounds with religious, cultural, and psychological dimensions, and is a vast topic much beyond the scope of the present study.

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Although there are many studies of the Eastern Front in World War I, few are
devoted to the treatment of minorities. Similarly, while many primary sources and
memos deal with Jewish life in Galicia, the Russian invasion and occupation of the
province had received much less attention. Certain aspects of Russian policies towards
Germans and Jews are examined in a pioneering work by Daniel W. Graff, while Mark

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4 A general assessment of Austro-Hungarian policies towards the civilian populations in the
Balkans and Galicia during World War I is presented by Hans Hautmann, “Kriegsgesetze
und Militarjustiz in der österreichischen Reichshälfte, 1914-1918,” in Erika Weinzierl and
For Austro-Hungarian reprisals against the Rusins of Galicia see a collection Voennye
prestuplenia Gabsburgskoi monarkhii: Galitskaia Golgota (Trumbill, Connecticut: Peter S.
Hardy, 1964), the memoirs of Dimitri S. Markoff, Belgium of the East (Wilkes-Barre.
Pennsylvania: Peter G. Kohaniuk, 1920), and an analysis by V. K. Osechyn's'kyi
"Avstriis'kyi viis'kovo-politseis'kyi teror v Halychyni pid chas pershoi svitovoi viiny."
Naukovyi visnyk L'viv's'koho Derzhavnoho Universytetu, XLIII: Seria istorichna, 6
(1957), pp. 65-91. On the Central Powers' policies towards the Serbian population in
Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, see Yu. A. Pisarev, Serbia i Chernogoria v pervoi
mirovoi voine (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1968), pp. 182-198; R.A. Reiss, The
Kingdom of Serbia, Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War Committed by the
Austro-Bulgaro-Germans: Letters of a Criminologist on the Serbian Macedonian Front
(London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1919). For the Greek treatment of the
Macedonians, a researcher may consult Stojan Kiselinovski, Grchkata kolonizatsija vo
German atrocities against Polish civilians are examined by Lawrence J. Flockerzie,
"Poland's Louvain: Documents of the Destruction of Kalisz, August 1914." The Polish
Review, XXVIII, 4 (1983), pp. 73-87; and by A.S. Riasanov, "Nemetskaiia armia mozhet
For Russian deportations of enemy aliens, see S.G. Neli pivich, "Repressii protiv
poddannykh 'Tsental'nykh Derzhaev': deportatsii v Rossii, 1914-1918 gg.," Voennno-
Istoricheskii Zhurnal, 6 (1996), pp. 32-42, and by the same author, "General ot infanterii
N.N. Yanushkevich: 'nemetskuiu pakost' uvolit' i bez nezhnostei,'" Voennno-Istoricheskii
Zhurnal, 1 (1997), pp. 42-53; also, see Friedrich Rink and J.M. Richey, "Expulsion of the
5 Daniel W. Graff, "The Rule of the Generals: Military Government in Western Russia,
118-135; and his "Military Rule Behind the Russian Front, 1914-1917: The Political
Levene effectively compared anti-Jewish violence in 1914-1920 with the Nazi murder campaign during the initial stage of the German invasion of the Soviet Union.6

Graff and Levene, however, based their research exclusively on Western sources, and until the 1990s the lack of Russian archival materials was a major impediment to research in the field.7 On the other hand, despite a substantial documentary collection in Vienna’s Kriegsarchiv, the authors of the monumental history of the Habsburg Empire, Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, failed to mention the Russian occupation of Galicia.8

Quite understandably, the subject has evoked even less interest among Soviet and Russian historians. Although Soviet historiography has always been quick to point out the corruption and incompetence of Russian generals, it has been much more lenient towards the army rank-and-file composed of “proletarian workers and peasants.” Some Russian generals, most prominently Aleksei Brusilov, known for his brutal treatment of Jews, took important posts in the Red Army after the Bolshevik revolution. Naturally, their role in the anti-Semitic campaign during the “imperialist” war has been conveniently

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forgotten. Most recently, after the break up of the Soviet Union, Russian historians have tended to glorify the deeds of the imperial army on its "liberating" mission in Europe. One recent study of World War I, for example, suggests that the "knightly" conduct of Russian troops precluded violation of law and military discipline.\(^9\)

There are many documentary collections, diaries, and memoirs that contain numerous references to the subject. Russian military and governmental decrees pertaining to Jewish policies, and situational reports from Poland, Galicia, and Bukovina exist in several collections.\(^11\) Foreign correspondents and observers, who followed the

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\(^9\) Russian generals denied any atrocities perpetrated by the army. Brusilov, in his memoirs, while admitting the heavy-handed Russian rule in Galicia, brushed off Jewish pogroms and persecution merely as “Cossack excesses.” A. A. Brusilov, \textit{Moi vospominania} (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony, 1963), p. 100.


Russian army, also described the Russian treatment of Jews. \(^\text{12}\) Wartime events in Galicia were covered in several Polish\(^\text{13}\) and Jewish\(^\text{14}\) memoirs, diaries, and monographs.

Historiography on the period between 1918-1919 is more extensive, but has concentrated only on limited issues. Thus, the bulk of existing monographs deal with Polish-Ukrainian fighting in Lwów and the Jewish pogrom of November 1918. Polish\(^\text{15}\) and Jewish\(^\text{16}\) sources contain mutual accusations and should be treated with caution. Only a few accounts describe the situation of Jews throughout the Polish-Ukrainian war.\(^\text{17}\)

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\(^\text{15}\) Among others, *Listopad 1.-22.XI.1918 we Lwowie* (L’viv: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich we Lwowie, 1919); Józef Bielizna-Cholodecki, *Lwów w listopadzie roku 1918* (L’viv: Drukarnia Piller-Neumann, 1919); Wacław Lipiński, *Wsród lwowski orłat* (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy, 1931); Franciszek Salezy Krysiak, *Z dni grozy we Lwowie od 1 - 22 listopada 1918 r.* (Kraków: G. Gebethner i Spółka, 1919); Grzegorz Łukomski, Czesław Partacz, and Bogusław Polak, *Wojna*
The last chronological period of this study, the Soviet-Polish war, has been treated extensively by Western and Polish researchers. However, the bulk of the existing literature is devoted to the main events on Poland’s Eastern Borderlands. War in Galicia and the brief Soviet occupation of its eastern districts has been referred to only in passing. Hence, scarce references to the subject are to be sought in the publications that deal with the general situation of the Jews in Poland during the war, and memoirs and diaries of Polish politicians, officials, and war veterans. Devoted mostly to the Polish state-building process, these sources only rarely reflect on the Polish-Jewish relations in wartime Galicia.18


This study is based chiefly, but not exclusively, on archival materials from fourteen depositories in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. Together with primary and secondary literature, these sources constitute a substantial basis for research. For the discussion of World War I, especially valuable are the reports of the Galician General-Governor and the Civil Chancellery of the Russian Supreme Commander, preserved in the Russian Historical-Military Archive in Moscow (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv), the massive collection of documents of the Galician military administration and the gendarmerie department in the Kiev Historical Archive (Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv Ukrainy u Kyevi), the fond of the Galician Viceroy, "Galyts'ke Namisnyts'tvo," in the L'viv Historical Archive (Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv u L'vovi)\(^1\), and Austrian situational reports stored at the Archive of Ancient Files in Warsaw (Archiwum Akt Dawnych)\(^2\).

For the period between 1918 and 1920, I have used files of the Polish High Command in Galicia at the Polish Central Military Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe). This archive also contains large collections of contemporary newspapers, and the correspondence of the Polish government at the State Archive (Archiwum Akt Nowych) in Warsaw. Much valuable data has been derived from files of the Polish administration, police, and gendarmerie at the L'viv Provincial Archive (Derzhavnyi Arkhiv L'vivs'koi Oblasti).

\(^{19}\) Russian and Ukrainian archival materials will be cited in the following order: title of the file, archive, fond/lopis 'delo/page.
I have also used reports and correspondence regarding Russian deportations of Galician Jews, and references to the Soviet-Polish war in Galicia in the Russian State Archive (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii), the Central Depository of Historical Documents (Rossiiskoe Tsentral'noe Khranilishche Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii), the Special Archive (Tsentral'noe Khranilishche Istoriko-Dokumental'nykh Kollektsii), and the State Military Archive (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv) in Moscow. Documents of the Western Ukrainian government and army were found in State Archive of Supreme Organs of State Power in Kiev (Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchykh Orhaniv Vlady ta Upravlinnia Ukrainy).

Less plentiful, but no less meaningful are documentary collections of the Ukrainian National Libraries in Kiev and L'viv (Tsentral'na Naukova Biblioteka imeni V. I. Vernads'koho and L 'vivs 'ka Naukova Biblioteka im. Vasyla Stefanyka Natsional'noi Akademii Nauk Ukrainy). The Kiev library contains parts of the diary of the renowned Jewish activist, Solomon An-Ski, who described the Jewish tragedy in Galicia, Bukovina, and Congress Poland during World War I. The L'viv library possess a rare collection of the Jewish newspaper Chwila for the period of 1919-1920, several collections of Ukrainian newspapers for the period of the Western Ukrainian Republic, and correspondence of a Polish vigilante organization -- Komitet Obrony Narodowej -- dedicated to "dejudaising" Galician society between 1918 and 1920.

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20 Polish archival documents will be cited in the following order: archive, oddziały/sygnatura (if available), page.
21 Library manuscripts from Ukraine will be cited in the following order: document title, library, department, fond/delo/page.
The National Library (Biblioteka Narodowa) in Warsaw contains a large collection of Russian and Polish newspapers including Russkoe Voennoe Slovo, the daily of the Russian military administration in Lwów, and Glos Narodu, the leading organ of the Polish National Democrats.

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A few words are necessary about periodisation, spelling, format, historical methodology, and terminology. All dates, except for Russian periodicals and newspapers, are given according to the Gregorian calendar, which ran thirteen days ahead of the Russian Julian calendar. All translations are mine. For the sake of consistency, Galicia’s geographical places appear in their contemporary Polish spelling, while Russian and Ukrainian names and titles are transliterated in accordance with the Library of Congress.

To show the changing military situation in Galicia, two maps are employed: a map of Austro-Hungary in 1914 from Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1994), page 560, and a map of Galicia from Paul Robert Magocsi, Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide (Toronto-Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1983), page 93. While the international borders on these maps have been left unaltered, I have inserted Polish geographical names for Galician towns and cities and drawn the front lines which ran through the province between 1914 and 1920.

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22 Library manuscripts from Poland will be cited in the following order: document title, library, department, sygnatura, page.
23 Due to financial constraints the author was unable to use rich documentary collections of Vienna’s Kriegsarchiv and the “Mowschowitsch Collection” at the YIVO Institute in New York.
24 The Gregorian calendar was introduced in Russia in 1918.
The study is divided into three main parts. Part One consists of the present introduction and an introductory chapter, which briefly overviews the political, social, and economic situation in Galicia prior to 1914, with particular emphasis on Polish-Jewish and Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Relations between the three groups influenced and shaped their mutual attitudes in wartime. Part Two (chapters II, III, and IV) examines Russian political objectives in Galicia and policies towards the Jews during the occupation of the region between August 1914 and October 1917. Part Three (chapters V, VI and VII) evaluates the events in Eastern Galicia between November 1918 and October 1920. These chapters deal with Polish-Jewish relations during World War I, official and popular attitudes of Polish society towards the Jews after Polish independence, Jewish-Ukrainian relations, and anti-Jewish violence during the Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Soviet wars.

In terms of methodology, I combined an examination of the centripetal and centrifugal forces which influenced responses and policies towards Jews in wartime. Namely, I seek to explore the interlocking impacts of the top political and military leadership, local administration, and the population on policy-making and popular reactions to the Jewish question. As has been noted, events in Eastern Galicia were closely connected to the situation in other Polish regions, and, therefore, comparisons of situations in different areas are frequently called upon. One particularly distressing aspect of anti-Semitism in Eastern Galicia was anti-Jewish violence in various forms -- pogroms, mass expulsions, murder, and robberies. Throughout this study the backgrounds of violence, its manifestations and consequences are dealt at length. At times such protracted descriptions of brutalities inflicted upon Jews may seem gratuitous and overwhelming. I believe, however, that point by point description is extremely important for better
comprehension of nature and ramifications of ethnic violence for Russian-Jewish and Polish-Jewish relations.

The terms "persecution," "pogrom," and "excess" are used repeatedly, and it is necessary to explain their closest meaning. In the context of the period under examination, the term "persecution" refers to official restrictions and limitations in social, economic, and political spheres as well as reprisals, executions, and deportations. The Russian word "pogrom" stands for acts of collective physical assault, destruction, robbery, murder, and rape, while the term "excess" implies individual acts of violence and destruction of property.

The Austrian and Polish term "Ruthenians" ("Ruthenen" in German) was commonly used in official correspondence and literature of the time. This word derived from the latinised form of "Russian" and generally referred to the Ukrainian-speaking population of Galicia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia. While speaking different dialects of Ukrainian, these people were the linguistic and ethnographic kinsmen of Ukrainians living under Russian rule. Therefore, for the convenience of the reader, the terms "Ukrainian" and "Ukrainians" are used in preference to "Ruthenian" and "Ruthenians."

The term "Galician Jews" is used to denote the Jewish population of the entire province before and after 1918. "Austrian Jews" and "German Jews" refer to the Jews
MAP 1.

AUSTRO-HUNGARY IN 1914
living within the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires. "Russian Jews" indicate the Jewish communities within the Russian Empire, both inside and outside of the Pale of Settlement. The term "Polish Jews" is applied to describe all Jews who after 1918 lived in the Polish Republic. In Austrian, Jewish, and Polish literature the term “Galicia” is used in reference to the entire Austrian province of “Galizien.” Its eastern half, Eastern Galicia, roughly included a territory between the Zbrucz River in the east and the San River in the west. The city of Lwów was its administrative and cultural center, and Poles constituted its most numerous group, followed by Jews and Ukrainians. The western part of the province, Western Galicia, with its capital at Kraków, bordered Austrian and German Silesia. In the North, both Galicias faced the Russian Empire, and in the South they were separated from the Hungarian Kingdom by the Carpathian Mountains. In this study, if not otherwise specified, “Galicia” refers to both the eastern and western halves of the province.

The “Eastern Borderlands” included post-1918 Polish-Russian and Polish-Lithuanian contested territories of south-eastern Lithuania with its principal city of Vilna, the western parts of White Russia, the Volhynia region, and Eastern Galicia. Finally, the terms “anti-Semitism,” “anti-Jewish sentiments,” and “Judeophobia” are used here interchangeably to denote hatred, resentment, and hostility to the Jews.
Chapter I

THE JEWS OF EASTERN GALICIA AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT

Attitudes and policies towards Jews in Eastern Galicia were shaped by their history and environment. Before World War I dramatically changed the political, economic, and social life of Europe, the majority of Eastern Galician Jews lived in close-knit communities and maintained a traditional socio-economic and religious way of life under the relatively tolerant Habsburg rule. Their cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage made them a visible and distinct minority among their Polish and Ukrainian co-nationals. Jews predominated in certain occupations such as petty trade, innkeeping, and artisanship, while their tendency to reside in urban areas accounted for the fact that many engaged in free professions.

The particular socio-economic structure of Galician Jews was rooted in the history of the region. Between 1141 and 1340 Galicia was a part of the Galician-Volhynian principality of ancient Rus'; from 1340 until 1772 it was a province of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; and, after the Polish partitions it was integrated into the Habsburg Empire (since 1867, Austro-Hungary) until it collapsed in 1918. During these three periods, the cultural, social, and economic influence of the Jews in the region was immense. Polish rulers granted their Jewish subjects protection from persecution, religious freedom, and internal autonomy, in exchange for economic services, while the nobility welcomed Jewish traders as a steady source of income. In the countryside Jewish
tax and customs collectors provided an important link between peasants and landlords, and between villages and towns. After Galicia was incorporated into the Habsburg Empire in 1772, Austrian rulers continued the tradition of religious tolerance although the state made several attempts to assimilate its Jewish subjects.

This chapter focuses on two main themes: demographic and socio-economic structures that characterized Eastern Galician Jews on the eve of World War I, and the rise of an anti-Semitic movement in partitioned Poland. At the end of the nineteenth century, nascent industrialization in Eastern Galicia sharpened the economic rivalry between Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians. In turn, economic developments gave rise to Polish nationalist groups who embraced anti-Semitism as a powerful ideology in the struggle against foreign domination. Socio-economic and political interaction between the three ethnic groups would play an important role in shaping their mutual perceptions and attitudes after the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914.

Jewish Demography, Socio-Economic Structure, and Political Activities

"... Jews everywhere around, and no matter where I turn, I am in the kingdom of Jews. It seems that nothing runs here without them." So lamented a Russian traveler passing through the Austro-Hungarian crown land, Eastern Galicia, in the mid-19th century. Indeed, to any Russian, accustomed to the sight of the huge ghetto -- the Pale of Settlement -- the density of the Jewish population in Galicia's urban areas, their participation in social life and predominance in the local economy presented quite an

1 Quoted in Tomasz Gasowski, "Galicja -- żydowski matecznik," in Galicja i jej dziedzictwo, Jerzy Chłopecki and Helena Madurowicz-Urbańska, eds., 6 vols. (Rzeszów:...
unusual phenomenon. Visitors from Austria and Congress Poland also did not fail to notice the flourishing religious and cultural life of the Jewish community, and the distinct outlook and conduct of the Galician Jew, the Galizianer.²

The sheer numbers of Jews in the region partially accounted for the bewilderment of outsiders. On the eve of World War I, the Jewish population of Eastern Galicia constituted more than 12% of the total, making them the third largest group after Ukrainians and Poles. In spite of substantial emigration starting in the late nineteenth century, the Jewish population continued to grow, increasing between 1880 and 1910 by 27.5%. More than 64% of Jews lived in cities, towns, and small hamlets -- the shtetlach. In urban areas they constituted the second largest group (after Poles) and predominated numerically in several important commercial and cultural centers such as Brody, Buczacz, Dobromil, and Rawa Ruska. In more than fifty district centers Jews made up more than 37% of the total population, and in the remaining seventy-two towns they constituted between 17% and 25%. In the northern districts of the region, Jews were more evenly spread among Poles and Ukrainians, but in the south and south-east

the Ukrainian population was much larger than that of Jews and Poles together (See Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, pp. 38-41).

Along with Bukovina, Galicia was the poorest province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. More than eighty five percent of the non-Jewish population was occupied in agriculture, while the rest found employment in a few industrial enterprises, and in the backward railroad system. By comparison, 87% of Galicia's Jews made their living by trade and artisanship. Given the ratio of non-Jews and Jews in the region, the predominance of the latter in local commerce is unquestionable.

The Jewish presence was also felt in professions. Although the intelligentsia made up only 2.3% of the total Jewish population, 4,806 Jewish lawyers, artists, journalists, and doctors constituted 19% of all professionals in both halves of Galicia. By 1910, out of 1,389 doctors, 411 were Jews, and among 384 Lwów lawyers, there were more than 80 Jews -- 22% of the total. In the countryside the percentage of Jewish lawyers was even higher -- 28% (140 out of 500). In both halves of Galicia, out of 1,134 lawyers there were 658 Jews -- about 58%. In addition, 10,295 Jews were employed regional administration and educational institutions.³

During the last decade before World War I, the numbers of Jewish students also grew significantly and by 1911 they made up one-third of the total student body in German schools. Fewer Jews attended Polish and Ukrainian schools, but their numbers were steadily increasing. However, the numbers of Jewish teachers (especially females) in

³ Computed on the basis of Haliczanin: kalendarz powszechny zastosowany do potrzeb wszystkich mieszkańców Galicji na rok pański 1918 (L’iviv: Nakładem Drukarni i Litografii Piller-Neumannia, 1918), pp. 64-71; Jedność (Organ Żydów Polskich), n. 40.
Polish and Ukrainian schools gradually declined since Jewish applicants were rarely accepted. On the other hand, there were too few Jewish schools to employ all Jewish teachers.  

(See Table 1.4, p. 41)

Jewish commercial enterprises were prominent in Galicia, and played a considerable role in the development of agricultural technology, cattle breeding, the grain and meat trades, and the alcohol industry. Five hundred fifty seven Jewish merchants and craftsmen in Brody were members of the powerful credit union “Kredit-Verein” which dominated local finances. From the 1850s the Galician oil industry was dominated by the families of the Natansohns, Kallirs, Horowitzes, and Koliszers, and some wealthy Jews even received noble status.

Military service never attracted Jewish-Galician youth, and self-inflicted wounds and bribery were a common practice to shirk service. Nevertheless, Jews did serve in the


army, especially in the artillery and medical corps. Special army regulations allowed Jewish soldiers to perform religious practices and released them from duties on the Sabbath. Although the Austrian-Hungarian military was not immune to anti-Semitism, the fact that it had several generals of Jewish background attests to its tolerance of Jews.⁶

(See Table 1.5, pp. 41-42)

As imposing as these statistics are, they convey only part of Galicia’s reality. For despite the professional achievement and wealth of the few, the majority of Galician Jews lived in abject poverty. In the last decades of the nineteenth century nascent industrialization portended a gradual decline of Jewish trade and commerce. Large foreign (especially German) warehouses and corporations took over trade with Austria, Italy and Hungary, and pushed out petty Jewish tradesmen. The growth of Polish and Ukrainian co-operatives and enterprises made the role of Jewish middlemen in the countryside obsolete, and forced thousands of Jews to seek employment in urban centers. By 1910, only 25% of Jews in towns and cities lived just above the poverty line, and in the

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entire region only 39% of Jews were employed in occupations otherwise than as house-servants. Low income and crushing poverty forced large numbers of Jewish women to turn to prostitution, and in the first decade of the twentieth century almost one-third of prostitutes in Lwów were of Jewish extraction. Rapid pauperization of the Jews coincided with rapid demographic growth and over-population of the region, and thousands of people opted for emigration to Austria, the Czech lands, Germany, or the United States. 

At the end of the nineteenth century, capitalist development in the region caused a radicalization of Jewish political life. Although the majority of Galician Jews remained within the Orthodox mainstream, demands for social and economic improvement led to the formation of the first Jewish political groups, the Jewish Workers’ Party and the Zionists. In 1904-1905, two Jewish Social Democratic groups were founded. Adherents to different ideologies, the Orthodox, Zionists, Socialists, and Social Democrats were at odds with one another and ferociously competed for seats in municipal government and the Parliament. While striving for national and class rights, internal autonomy or a Jewish

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state in Palestine, many politically active Jews remained loyal to the crown. The same
loyalty characterized the majority of Jews who remained uninvolved in provincial politics.
For them the majestic figure of the Emperor symbolized the rule of law and order
extended to all subjects regardless of their ethnicity, social status, or religion. 8

The Roots of Polish and Ukrainian Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism in Eastern Galicia had been governed by several causes and
incentives that fluctuated according to changing economic, social, and political conditions.
An examination of these causes and incentives must, therefore, be placed within the
context of regional socio-economic and political relations between Jews, Poles and
Ukrainians.

Galicia's provincial politics were traditionally dominated by Poles, by far the most
influential group in the area. From the mid-fourteenth century onward Polish magnates

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8 Jacob Bross, "The Beginning of the Jewish Labor Movement in Galicia," YIVO Annual of
Jewish Social Science, V (1959), pp. 59, 66, 69; Walentyna Najdus, Polska Partia
Socjalno-Demokratyczna Galicji i Śląska, 1890-1919 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo
Yiddish Language and Culture: Then and Now (Omaha: Creighton University Press, 1997), pp. 2, 4, 6-7; M. Lozyns'kyi, "Zhydivs'ka sotsial'na demokratia v Halychyni," Literaturno-Naukovy Visnyk, VIII, 32 (1905), p. 8; Archiwum Główny Akt Dawnych
and gentry held key positions in the regional economy and administration. The revolution of 1848-1849 and subsequent military defeats in wars with France, Sardinia-Piedmont, and Prussia forced Vienna to seek a compromise with dominant national groups such as Hungarians, Croats, and Poles. In Galicia, Polish became the official language (on a par with German) in administration, secondary schools, and the Lwów University. The Galician Sejm, the main provincial legislative body, was empowered to legislate in cultural, educational, and social spheres. Controlled by the Polish majority, the Sejm became a major instrument of Polonisation in Galicia.\(^9\)

Although Poles remained the dominant national group in Eastern Galicia until World War I, from the mid-nineteenth century their dominance was increasingly challenged by the Ukrainian national movement. Numerically superior to Poles and Jews, Ukrainians mostly lived in villages and constituted the backbone of regional agriculture. After the Polish partitions at the end of the eighteenth century Galicia became a crown land of the Habsburg monarchy, and Austrian rulers skillfully used the incipient Ukrainian national movement to check Polish irredentist aspirations. The enlightened Austrian monarchs, Maria-Theresa and Joseph II, granted the Greek-Catholic church equal status with its Roman-Catholic counterpart and supported the introduction of Slaveno-Rusyn, a combination of the Church Slavonic and Ukrainian vernacular, in Galicia’s village schools.

During the revolutionary years 1848-1849, the Austrian government supported the Ukrainian drive for political and cultural rights, and emancipated the peasants in the spring

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of 1848. In the 1860s, Ukrainian political activists entered the Parliament and became a factor to be reckoned with in regional politics.

Until the late nineteenth century, with the exception of Jews active in provincial politics, the bulk of the Jewish community in Eastern Galicia limited its relations with Poles and Ukrainians to the economic and social spheres. Accordingly, anti-Jewish animosities arose largely from economic competition. However, the beginning of industrialization witnessed the formation of Polish political groups that made anti-Semitism a political program aimed at consolidating the Polish people and fulfilling national aspirations.\(^\text{10}\)

Starting in the late nineteenth century the combined forces of industrialization and urbanization sharply increased ethnic tensions. In the 1880s capitalistic development in Galicia accelerated the growth of industries, banking and credit institutions, and created a market for bank employees, managers, and white collar and industrial workers. Many of the Polish gentry, the szlachta, were impoverished by industrialization. Trying to adjust to changing economic conditions, they turned to local commerce and industry already occupied by Jewish merchants, tradesmen, and manufacturers. Among the nascent Polish


middle class this clash of economic interests produced very strong anti-Jewish sentiments. At the same time the opening of new industries in Galicia prompted large-scale migration of the rural population to urban areas. For example, between 1880 and 1910 the population of Galician industrial centers such as Brody, Buczacz, Stanisławów, Tarnopol, Drohobycz, Przemyśl, Kożomyja, and Lwów rose by almost 10%. Although the process of urbanization in Galicia went slower than in other more industrially developed provinces of the Empire, this demographic shift intensified economic competition between Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews. The Polish-dominated administration imposed severe veterinary limitations on the Jewish cattle trade, and granted credit and a monopoly on salt, tobacco, and the sale of alcohol almost exclusively to Polish enterprises. During the first decade of the twentieth century, about 40,000 Jews, employed in the alcohol industry, lost their jobs. The proliferation of Polish and Ukrainian banks and cooperatives sharply narrowed the economic opportunities of Jewish merchants and artisans in the countryside.¹¹ In 1893 the Catholic economic convention in Kraków called for the boycott of Jewish enterprises, while several layoffs in the oil industry rapidly reduced the numbers of Jewish workers. This massive loss of jobs was particularly significant since Jews had constituted 20% of the labor force in oil production (Ukrainians made up 9.8% and Poles 70%).¹²

Socio-economic rivalry between Jews and non-Jews, however, was not sufficient to produce an anti-Semitic movement. In fact, from the mid-nineteenth century onward Polish-Jewish cooperation in Galician politics seemed to augur the decline of anti-Semitic

attitudes among many Poles. For example, during the revolution of 1848-1849 Jews played an important part in raising money for revolutionary activities, formed units of the civil guard and civil committees, and sheltered Polish rebels. Such cooperation was instrumental in the struggle for Jewish emancipation, and in the 1860s Polish statesmen such as Count Władysław Badeni, Franciszek Smolka, and Galician Governor Count Agenor Gołuchowski supported the demands of Jewish delegates in the Parliament for civil and political equality.\[13\]

The rise of anti-Semitic political groups in partitioned Poland can be traced to the late period of “positivism,” an intellectual movement that sprang up in the 1860s. After 1864 the last Polish uprising in Congress Poland was crushed by Russian troops, and Polish intellectuals and political activists became convinced of the futility of armed struggle. Grouped around a charismatic journalist, Aleksandr Świętochowski, they began promoting the necessity of so-called organic work, or “positivism,” which encompassed economic and social reforms and peaceful political participation. In the long run these measures were envisioned as the only possible means to achieve national independence.

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The main building stones of organic work were the fostering of a Polish national consciousness and national unity among peasants, burghers, and toilers.

Initially, the "positivists" envisioned cooperation between Poles and Jews as both possible and desirable. Jewish-Polish joint actions in parliamentary elections in 1879 and 1885 seem to encourage such hopes as Jewish candidates joined the Polish faction in the parliament. As long as the terms "nationality" and "nation" were understood as all-inclusive of this ethnically diverse community, and as long the slogan "for your freedom and ours" remained the main rallying cry of Polish political leaders, Jews were perceived as a useful ally in the national struggle. As important was the fact that a number of leading members of the Jewish intelligentsia supported assimilation and promoted Polish national culture and language. However, in comparison to French and German Jews, the majority of Galician Jews remained indifferent to the efforts of the assimilationists and did not identify themselves with Polish society. In addition, as time went by increasing Polish-Jewish confrontation caused many assimilationists to become disillusioned and turn to Zionism.14

In Poland's western provinces, where Poles were subjected to a vigorous Germanisation campaign, the pro-German stance of the Jewish community and sharp Polish-Jewish economic competition contributed to the rise of a strong Polish political

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group, the National Democratic Party. National Democrats rejected the assimilation of “alien” Jews into Polish culture, called on Poles to support their own political and social organizations, and promoted national cohesion and the ethno-cultural exclusivity of the Polish people. The exclusionary ideology of the National Democrats appealed to the growing Polish commercial and professional middle class, middle gentry, and large segments of the clergy in Congress Poland and Galicia. The National Democrats utilized the pro-German and pro-Austrian tendencies of Jews for defining anti-Semitism as an all-encompassing ideology embracing social, economic and political components of the national struggle.

External factors also fueled Polish anti-Semitism. Attacks on Jews in Russia in the 1880s and an influx of Jewish refugees into Congress Poland and Galicia as well as a wave of xenophobia in Austro-Hungary and Germany gave a boost to mounting anti-Jewish animosities in the partitioned Polish lands. Polish writers such as Jan Kominkowski and Teofil Merunowicz emulated German and Austrian anti-Semitic propaganda and emphasized the “harmful” Jewish influence on Polish society. Polish anti-Semitism had a strong clerical coloring, and the Catholic press launched a blend of political, religious, and racial diatribes against the Jews. The myth of Jewish ritual murder was revitalized, and the National Democrats, the spearhead of anti-Jewish agitation, called for “dejudaisation”

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of Polish social and economic spheres. In Galicia, a catholic newspaper, *Grzmot* (Thunder), raved against industrialization, labeling Jews as its main promoters. Simultaneously the paper blamed Jewish socialists for undermining the moral foundations of Polish society. *Grzmot* argued that Jewish biological traits and religious beliefs effectively precluded their assimilation. On the other hand, fulminated the newspaper, assimilation would undermine the “Polishness” of the country and the fusion of Jews with Poles would make the anti-Jewish struggle extremely difficult. *Grzmot* foresaw the economic and social separation of Jews as the most viable solution to the Jewish question.¹⁶

The Union of Polish Peasants Party led by Father Stanisław Stojałowski, directed peasant economic frustrations against Jews. Anti-Semitic propaganda reached its peak in 1898, when violent attacks on Jews took place in several Western Galician localities such as Wieliczka, Kalwaria, Jasło, Nowy and Stary Sącz, Sanok and Gorlice. The majority of Polish political parties condemned the excesses, but anti-Jewish violence again erupted in 1903. In Eastern Galicia, the Polish-Ukrainian political rivalry mitigated the violence because the National Democrats hoped to win Jewish support in the local and provincial elections and they abstained from provoking anti-Jewish riots. Nevertheless, as large numbers of Poles and Ukrainians migrated to the cities, and competition for jobs sharpened, attacks on Jews intensified. In June 1902 anti-Semitic propaganda combined

¹⁶ Aleksander Czołowski, *Mord rytualny: epizod z przeszłości Lwowa* (L'viv: Nakładem autora, 1899), p. 10; *Grzmot*, n. 29, 15 November 1896, pp. 1-2; n. 33, 25 December 1896, pp. 3-4; n. 9, 25 March 1897, p. 1; n. 11, 15 April 1897, pp. 2-4; n. 12, 25 April 1897, p. 2; n. 14, 15 May 1897, pp. 1-2; n. 16, 5 June 1891, p. 1; n. 18, 25 June 1897, pp. 1-2; n. 20, 15 July 1897, pp. 1-2; n. 21, 25 July 1892, p. 2; n. 23, 15 August
with workers’ economic grievances exploded into an anti-Jewish riot in Lwów, when Polish strikers attacked Jews on the streets.  

The expectations of the National Democrats that Jews could be used as a counterbalance to Ukrainians were dashed in 1907 and 1911, when Jewish voters cast their ballots in favor of Jewish and Ukrainian candidates. Similarly, in 1912, during the municipal elections in Warsaw, Jews voted against the leading National Democrat, Roman Dmowski. From his point of view, Jews had unequivocally demonstrated their hostility to the Polish cause. The National Democratic Party responded with an escalation of anti-Semitic propaganda, and a boycott of Jewish shops was organized throughout the land.

Industrialization contributed to the rise of anti-Semitism among the Ukrainian peasantry as well. In comparison to Congress Poland, a large number of Galicia’s Jews lived in the countryside, where they engaged in traditional Jewish occupations of tavern keeping, trade, and renting land. Money-lending especially was a predominantly Jewish vocation, and for Ukrainian peasants usury and Jews became an inseparable image. In the

1897, p. 2; n. 26, 18 September 1897, pp. 1-2; n. 43, 22 October 1898, pp. 1-2; n. 51, 17 December 1898, pp. 1-2.


1880s, the growth of a money economy in Galicia caused a sharp economic decline of Ukrainian villagers, who abhorred Jewish land-leasing and generally perceived the Jews as the main driving force behind industrialization. Jewish membership in municipal governments in small towns and villages was also a cause of friction, and a prominent Ukrainian activist, Julian Romanchuk, asserted in 1903 that the worst enemies of the peasants were landlords, tax inspectors, and the "cunning Jew."19

Resentment towards Jews, state officials, and Polish landlords sporadically flared up in physical assaults, especially when peasants came to market to sell their products. Warmed by vodka and rallying cries such as "death to Jews and Poles!" they looted Jewish shops and beat Jewish traders and bystanders. Such attacks were recorded in Zabłotów (Śniatyń district) in September 1903, and in Karów (Rawa Ruska district) and Śniatyń in 1911, where several Jews were wounded.²⁰

The Ukrainian intelligentsia voiced peasant grievances against Jews stressing their alleged damaging role in the rural economy. At the same time, however, Ukrainian intellectuals recognized the Jews as a legitimate community in Galicia, and promoted a more liberal approach to the Jewish question. Writers Ivan Franko and Les’ Martovych realistically described the miserable economic conditions of the Jewish poor. Starting in


the 1860s, Ukrainian members of Parliament supported Jews in their struggle for national autonomy and the recognition of Yiddish as an official language. In 1907, Ukrainian deputies protested against Polish pressure on Jews during municipal elections in Galicia. Similar instances opened the possibility for closer cooperation in the future.21

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The socio-economic and demographic structure of the Eastern Galician Jews played a crucial role in their relations with Poles and Ukrainians. Traditionally Jews made their living by artisanship and petty commerce. However, from the 1880s onward these occupations became an area of fierce contest between Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians. Common perceptions that Jewish tradesmen and merchants were more successful than their non-Jewish counterparts fueled envy and anti-Jewish resentment.

Economic competition alone, however, does not provide an adequate explanation for anti-Semitism and ethnic animosities in Eastern Galicia. Industrialization of the region coincided with the rise of modern nationalism among Poles and Ukrainians. Starting with the 1890s, notions of national unity and national identity were promoted by Polish nationalists, who attempted to create consensus among Poles that the definition of "Polishness" applied only to ethnically and nationally conscious Poles. This exclusionary ideology rejected Jews as members of Polish society. The main objective of Polish

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nationalists -- national independence -- coalesced with the struggle against "harmful" Jewish influences. Political rivalry between Poles and Jews in regional politics was another crucial factor in fueling Polish anti-Semitism. As Jewish voters cast their ballots against Polish candidates, anti-Semitic propaganda intensified. At the same time, Ukrainian grievances against the Jews, primarily confined to the socio-economic sphere, also gained momentum. Anti-Jewish sentiments were heightened by common perceptions of Jews as alien elements -- as Austrian allies from the Polish point of view, and as urban profiteers from the Ukrainian point of view.

The majority of Jews regarded anti-Semitism and socio-economic pressure as "normal" life difficulties. Given the situation across the Russian border, where official anti-Semitism seemed to be steadily gaining momentum, such an attitude was understandable. Under the moderate Austro-Hungarian rule Galician Jews dealt with economic crises, squalid living conditions in the shtetlach, and random anti-Jewish riots, merely as a part-and-parcel of day-to-day existence. Indeed, while anti-Semitic groups attracted diverse social layers of Polish society, they were unable to generate a mass political mobilization of their followers. As long as Austrian authorities were in control of law and order, anti-Semitic sentiments were confined to propaganda and random outbursts of violence. A major political crisis such as war and the collapse of state institutions was bound to propel anti-Semitism to the forefront of Polish political life and to radicalize ethnic biases.
Table 1.1. The Growth of the Jewish Population in Eastern Galicia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Jewish population</th>
<th>Jewish population in % of the total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,844,770</td>
<td>516,912</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>4,308,151</td>
<td>585,453</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>4,814,171</td>
<td>621,036</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>5,335,821</td>
<td>659,000</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.2. The Jewish Population in District Urban Centers in 1910.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Jewish population</th>
<th>% of the Jews to the total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bóbrka</td>
<td>5,628</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohorodczany</td>
<td>4,378</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borszączów</td>
<td>4,765</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brody</td>
<td>18,055</td>
<td>12,188</td>
<td>67.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzeżany</td>
<td>12,717</td>
<td>4,582</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brożów</td>
<td>4,438</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buczacz</td>
<td>14,286</td>
<td>7,777</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cieszynów</td>
<td>3,438</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czortków</td>
<td>5,167</td>
<td>2,907</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobromil</td>
<td>3,363</td>
<td>2,271</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolina</td>
<td>9,852</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drohobycz</td>
<td>34,665</td>
<td>15,313</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grodek Jagielloński</td>
<td>12,973</td>
<td>3,866</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horodenka</td>
<td>11,223</td>
<td>4,210</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husiatyn</td>
<td>5,799</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarosław</td>
<td>23,965</td>
<td>6,154</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaworów</td>
<td>10,211</td>
<td>2,644</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kałusz</td>
<td>8,653</td>
<td>4,363</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamionka Strumiłowa</td>
<td>8,106</td>
<td>3,549</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kożomyja</td>
<td>42,676</td>
<td>18,930</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosów</td>
<td>5,536</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisko</td>
<td>4,588</td>
<td>2,805</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Łódź</td>
<td>206,113</td>
<td>57,387</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mościska</td>
<td>4,778</td>
<td>2,574</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadwórna</td>
<td>8,080</td>
<td>3,772</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poczeniżyn</td>
<td>6,667</td>
<td>1,777</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>Jewish population</td>
<td>% of the Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bóbrka</td>
<td>88,526</td>
<td>10,171</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohoroczany</td>
<td>69,462</td>
<td>7,479</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borszczów</td>
<td>109,319</td>
<td>12,740</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brody</td>
<td>145,780</td>
<td>22,596</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezany</td>
<td>104,810</td>
<td>10,744</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzozów</td>
<td>81,408</td>
<td>5,325</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buczacz</td>
<td>138,297</td>
<td>17,481</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cieszanów</td>
<td>86,549</td>
<td>10,780</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Lwów</td>
<td>206,113</td>
<td>57,387</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.3. The Distribution of the Jewish Population in the Districts of Eastern Galicia in 1910.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Rural Population</th>
<th>Rural Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czortków</td>
<td>76,447</td>
<td>7,945</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobromil</td>
<td>72,102</td>
<td>7,575</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolina</td>
<td>113,831</td>
<td>12,812</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drohobycz</td>
<td>171,696</td>
<td>29,566</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grodek Jagielloński</td>
<td>79,592</td>
<td>6,882</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>Horodenka</td>
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<td>11.0</td>
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<td>11,276</td>
<td>11.6</td>
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<td>Jarosław</td>
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<td>8,178</td>
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<td>Kołomyja</td>
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<td>23,880</td>
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<td>9,701</td>
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<td>13,884</td>
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<td>Lwów</td>
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<td>11,451</td>
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<td>Peczeniżyn</td>
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<td>9.0</td>
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<td>Podhajce</td>
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<td>7,316</td>
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<td>Przemyśl</td>
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<td>22,540</td>
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<td>Przemyślanie</td>
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<td>9,548</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radziechów</td>
<td>72,246</td>
<td>9,578</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawa Ruska</td>
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<td>16,711</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<td>Rohatyn</td>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<td>Rudki</td>
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<td>6,392</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sambor</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
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<td>5.8</td>
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<td>Skałat</td>
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<td>12,621</td>
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<td>Skole</td>
<td>55,355</td>
<td>5,918</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Śmiatiń</td>
<td>88,705</td>
<td>10,239</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<td>Stanisławów</td>
<td>158,065</td>
<td>29,754</td>
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<td>Sokoł</td>
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<td>16,304</td>
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<td>8.9</td>
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<td>Stary Sambor</td>
<td>60,810</td>
<td>6,480</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strzy</td>
<td>80,222</td>
<td>12,760</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tarnopol</td>
<td>142,138</td>
<td>19,722</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<td>Tłumacz</td>
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<td>9,649</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<td>Trembowla</td>
<td>81,048</td>
<td>7,278</td>
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<td>Turka</td>
<td>85,823</td>
<td>11,668</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaleszczyki</td>
<td>76,957</td>
<td>9,237</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<td>Zbaraż</td>
<td>71,498</td>
<td>5,337</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<td>Zborów</td>
<td>60,764</td>
<td>6,198</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Złoczów</td>
<td>117,364</td>
<td>13,586</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.4. Jewish Students in Galician Schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total numbers of students (state schools)</th>
<th>Jews in high schools</th>
<th>Jews in non-classical secondary schools</th>
<th>% of Jewish students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-1901</td>
<td>17,334</td>
<td>3,193</td>
<td>2.672</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904-1905</td>
<td>23,815</td>
<td>4,697</td>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1911</td>
<td>31,225</td>
<td>7,157</td>
<td>3,562</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.5. Occupational Profile of Jews and Non-Jews in Both Halves of Galicia by 1900 (per thousand of individuals in a given profession).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Catholics (Roman-Catholic and Greek-Catholic)</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural occupations</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and metallurgy</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stonebreaking</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmithery and foundry</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewelers</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical industry</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing enterprises</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather and paper industries</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food industry</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel- and innkeepers</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garment industry</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and transportation</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants and day toilers</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Professions | 638 | 351

PART TWO

The Russian Occupation, 1914-1917

At the turn of the twentieth century, anti-Semitism in Eastern Galicia was largely fueled by the increasing socio-economic competition of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews. Simultaneously, as rivalries in trade and commerce fed the growing national aspirations of the three peoples, modern anti-Semitism -- based on political and racial ideology -- made its first appearance in the propaganda of Polish right-wing groups. However, as long as Europe was at peace, Austro-Hungarian imperial authorities controlled and contained ethnic antagonisms. After the outbreak of World War I, the collapse of the imperial order and the Russian occupation of Eastern Galicia shattered the economic foundation of the region and profoundly exacerbated ethnic animosities.

In August 1914, Eastern Galicia was the only territory in Europe claimed by the Russian government. Poised to integrate this former part of ancient Rus' into the Empire, the Russian military made strenuous efforts to "Russify" the region by introducing imperial laws and regulations. Accordingly, Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians were treated the same as their counterparts in Russia. However, while the entire population of Eastern Galicia suffered from the arbitrary rule of local commanders and the depravations of war, Jews were particularly targeted by the occupiers. Already in the summer of 1914, the anti-Semitic prejudices of the Russian army flared into waves of savage pogroms in Jewish settlements and widespread looting of Jewish shops, houses, and synagogues. Suspicious
of Jewish collaboration with the Central Powers, Russian generals ordered hostage-taking and reprisals against entire Jewish communities, who were expelled from their homes in urban areas and the countryside.

The persecution of Galician Jews was a reflection of Russian attitudes and policies toward ethnic minorities along the entire Eastern Front. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the Russian military launched wholesale expulsions of Jews and Germans in Congress Poland and Courland. The expulsions picked up in May and June of 1915 after a massive Austro-German offensive smashed Russian defenses in Galicia and northwestern Poland. Hundreds of thousands of "unreliables" were uprooted and driven on foot to Russia-proper, and swarms of refugees inundated cities and aggravated economic shortages. While Russian troops often mistreated residents of German settlements, in general they refrained from rape and murder. Jews, on the other hand, were subjected to the most horrible brutalities, and the Russian retreat in the summer 1915 was marked by the mass rape of women and wanton murder of Jewish civilians.

Part Two explores the cultural, psychological, and ideological factors that fueled the Russian military's obsession with Jewish conspiracies and contributed to the widespread destruction levied upon Jews in the front zone. Imperial goals in Eastern Galicia, and Russian attitudes towards Jews prior to the war, serve as a starting point. Other main topics are Russia's occupation policies in the region, and the treatment of Jews as a response to two specific concerns -- ideology and security. Special attention is accorded to the structure of anti-Jewish violence, its rhetoric and role in shaping anti-Semitic attitudes of the Russian army.
Rumor was an inseparable component of ethnic persecution on the Eastern Front, and its harmful potential depended on the emotional and psychological mindset of its recipients. The susceptibility of the Russian military to rumors and the role of rumors in Russian anti-Jewish policies are examined in detail.
Chapter II

RUSSIA PREPARES FOR WAR

Russian Objectives in Galicia

"...If we count the rewards we can expect from this war -- there is no doubt it is mere madness. What should we expect to gain? Territorial accretion? But aren't the lands of His Imperial Majesty large enough?...Galicia? But it is full of Jews!" So on September 10, 1914, Count Sergei Witte, the prominent Russian statesman, grumbled to the French ambassador, Maurice Paleologue, about the senselessness of Russia's participation in the war.1

While in Witte's opinion Galicia was merely a land infested by Jews, and Russia would gain nothing by conquering it, many Russian government and military officials had long held an entirely opposite view. Situated in the foothills of the Carpathians, Galicia provided an accessible route through Silesia to Austria-proper and via Kraków through the mountain ranges to the Hungarian plains. Not surprisingly, therefore, after the Balkans, St. Petersburg considered Galicia the most "sensitive" strategic spot in Eastern Europe. Russian military planners also worried that in the event of war with Germany and Austro-Hungary (and in the first decade of the twentieth century this possibility was looming more prominently with each passing year), the enemy would be able to launch a pincer-like offensive from East Prussia and Eastern Galicia and cut off the entire Russian force in Congress Poland. In 1900 the Russian minister of war, General Aleksei Kuropatkin, reported to the Tsar that Galicia had to be given close strategic consideration and certain "rectifications" of the border were highly desirable.2

Russian strategic objectives in Galicia were augmented by ideological ones, which required as much attention as military planning. The two dominant ethnic groups of the region, Poles and Ukrainians, whose ethnographic borders spread far beyond the Austro-Hungarian state frontiers, had always been a subject of Russia’s close attention. Galicia had long been regarded a part of the “primordial Russian lands” (specifically the Lwów, Tarnopol, and Czernowitz provinces in their entirety and a part of the Przemyśl province), destined one day to return to the bosom of Russia. Thus, shortly before World War I the Russian Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ivan Goremykin, referred to Galicia as the “last diamond to the Tsar’s crown.”

Russian intentions of uniting all eastern Slavs under a Russian protectorate were verbalized already at the turn of the nineteenth century. In 1809, during the first Russian occupation of Tarnopol province, Alexander I urged the Russian governor to undertake policies to win the local population to the Russian cause. From 1809 to 1815, when Russians occupied the province, the Jewish community was left largely undisturbed. The thirteen Jewish kahals were not molested, and the Russian governor, Senator Ignaz Theyls, even won popularity among Jews for his moderate policies.

Beginning from the mid-nineteenth century, Russian Pan-Slavists established close contacts with Galician Russophiles, supplied them with money, and emphasized the common roots of Ukrainians and Russians. Russian contacts with Galician Russophiles accelerated

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4 Except taxation, Jews were left to their own devices, and in November of 1813, in Tarnopol, Joseph Perl organized a Jewish-German secular school where Jewish students learned humanities, sciences, and the Talmud. Jan Leszczyński, Rzady rosyjskie w kraju tarnopolskim, 1809-1815 (Kraków: Druk W. L. Anczyca i Spółki, 1903), 137; Czesław Blicharski, Tarnopol w latach 1809-1945 od periodu epopei napoleońskiej do wypędzenia (Biskupice: n.p., 1993), p. 30.
especially after the Russian revolution of 1904-1905 and exacerbated Austro-Russian tensions. The Polish Viceroy of Galicia, Michał Bobrzyński, reported to Vienna that Russian money was fueling pro-Russian tendencies among Russophile groups. A further headache for the Austrian government was caused by the activities of the “Russian-Galician committees” which had emerged under the patronage of Russian cultural and political circles. The leading figure behind these groups was Count Vladimir Bobrinskii, who never failed to emphasize the “Russian character” of Galicia in his speeches. With the end of the Pan-Slav Congress in Prague in 1908 and Bobrinskii’s subsequent visit to Galicia, the Austrian General Staff recorded the increased activities of 1,450 Russophile educational, cultural and religious institutions. According to Austrian counterintelligence reports, Bobrinskii and other members of the “Galician-Russian Society” often met with leaders of Galician Russophiles and supplied them with money for pro-Russian propaganda. Concerns of the Austrian security service were echoed by Galician-Ukrainian circles who did not mince words in charging Russia with financing Russophiles to subvert the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia and Bukovina.6

In the early 1860s, the growing Polish national movement in Galicia became a major concern for the Russian government. The influential Galician-Polish group in the Austrian Parliament, Koło Polskie, often protested against the heavy-handed Russian rule in Congress Poland. Polish protests, in turn, immediately provoked remonstrations by St. Petersburg to Vienna. Polish dominance in Galicia’s administration gave a moral boost to Polish political groups in Congress Poland, and the Russian police were particularly alarmed by the activities of

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the Polish Socialist Party, PPS, whose major aim was a restoration of Polish independence by revolutionary means.

After the Russian revolution of 1904-1905, under the auspices of Austrian authorities, Polish émigrés from Congress Poland set up para-military organizations in Galicia. These groups carried out espionage and anti-Russian propaganda. After the Bosnian crisis of 1908 the tensions between Austro-Hungary and Russia heated up, and Russian protests to Vienna sounded increasingly belligerent. In May 1909, the newspaper Kievlianin published an article, allegedly based on authentic documents, revealing the activities of Polish para-military groups in Galicia and the involvement of Austrian officials in training and financing Polish revolutionaries. The Austrians, naturally, vehemently denied these accusations.SECRETLY, however, the Austrian military was preparing to deploy Galician Ukrainians for sabotage activities in Russian Ukraine in the event of military conflict. These plans received the full support of the Galician Greek-Catholic Church and its charismatic leader, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi. The testing time for anti-Russian sabotage came during the Balkan wars, when Ukrainians from Galicia carried out acts of sabotage in Ukraine.7


The press war also gained momentum. In May and June of 1910, the Russian newspaper *Novoe Vremia* published a series of articles about the Ukrainian question in Galicia stressing the insidious role of Austrian authorities in inciting nationalist sentiments among Ukrainians. The Austrian press retaliated by charging Russia with interfering in Austro-Hungary's internal affairs. In October 1910, the Lwów police informed the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of the Interior that Bobrinskii planned to buy land near Kiev where a thousand Galician Russophiles would settle; after their thorough "Russification" they would return to Galicia as a Russian propagandist vanguard. The potential of Polish and Ukrainian issues for causing conflict between Russia and Austro-Hungary alarmed several prominent politicians on both sides. In July 1912, the Austrian Foreign Minister Count Leopold von Bercholdt stated that Russian policies towards Galicia "...not only hindered the rapprochement [between Austria and Russia], but also added fuel to the very combustible [political] atmosphere." In November of the same year, the Russian Ambassador to Vienna, Nicholas Girs, emphasized that as long as Galician-Polish and Galician-Ukrainian questions were unresolved, friendly relations between the two states were not foreseeable.9

Austro-Russian bickering over Galicia continued up to the outbreak of the First World War. During the first half of 1914, as a large trial of Russophiles took place in the Hungarian town of Marmaros-Szeget and another in Lwów, the Austro-Hungarian press accused Russia of directing the activities of Russophile groups.10

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While Russian statesmen and generals looked upon Galician Poles and Ukrainians with wary eyes, there are no explicit indications that they had concerned themselves much with the Jewish question in Galicia.\textsuperscript{11} However, until the outbreak of World War I the Jewish question in Russia always drew close attention from top policy makers. It is logical, therefore, to place events in wartime Galicia within the general context of Russia’s internal pre-war Jewish politics.

It is generally taken for granted that before World War I Russia was the most anti-Semitic country in the world.\textsuperscript{12} Nowhere else was the government so persistent in promulgating drastic anti-Jewish laws, confining Jews to prescribed areas of residence, and barring them from politics and institutions of higher learning. Prior to the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Russia had almost no Jews within her borders. This situation changed after the Polish partitions of 1772-1795, when Russia received much of Poland, with a Jewish population that constituted the largest Jewish diaspora in the world. By the turn of the twentieth century, despite emigration, the Jews of Russia constituted about 9\% of the total population. In Russia’s western provinces, including the Pale of Settlement, Jews made up more than 20\% of the population.

The Jewish policies of the Russian government seldom displayed consistency and fluctuated according to the changing political, social, and economic situation in the country.

\textsuperscript{11} Unfortunately, all my attempts to gain access to the Archive of Foreign Affairs of Imperial Russia in Moscow ended in failure. I recognize that Russian planning for Galicia may have included discussions on the Jewish issue. I believe, however, that the Jewish question occupied a marginal place in the minds of Russian policy makers since Galician Jews did not constitute as powerful political group as did Poles and Ukrainians.
\textsuperscript{12} For general description of Jewish history in Russia, see Salo W. Baron, \textit{The Russian Jew under the Tsars and Soviets} (New York: Schoken Books, 1987). On the evolution of Russian Jewish policies, see M. Klier, \textit{Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the “Jewish Question” in Russia, 1772-1825} (Dekalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University, 1986).
Attempts to assimilate Jews at the beginning of the nineteenth century were replaced by draconian laws in the 1820-1830s involving the forcible draft of Jewish youth into cantonist battalions. The 1860s began with reforms, which were supplanted by anti-Jewish legislation from the 1880s onward. Anti-Semitism in Russia initially emanated from religious differences and economic competition between Jewish and Russian traders and merchants. Perceptions of Jews as "aliens" were also reinforced by the traditional Russian animosity towards foreign attire, language, and religion. Since Peter the Great Russia had waged numerous wars, and both the Russian government and people felt themselves constantly threatened by foreign enemies. For many Russians, oddly dressed Yiddish-speaking Jews looked suspicious and were treated with disgust and hostility.

Increasingly from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Russian anti-Semites embarked upon a campaign to impute Russia's misfortunes to Jewish cunning and avarice. In attempts to find empirical evidence of Jewish guilt, they blamed Jews for subverting Russian society by stealthily integrating into it. At the same time, they accused Jews of insulating themselves from the rest of the population by religious and linguistic barriers, as well as a different mentality and appearance. Although racism was relatively weak in economically backward Russia, nascent modernization in the 1880s added a new trend to anti-Jewish biases. The prominence of Jews in western banking and politics as well as the participation of Jewish financiers in Russian industrial development were seen as the emergence of a new threat -- Jewish international financial power. However, anti-Jewish prejudices were not exclusively the prerogative of Russian urban reactionaries. Hateful rhetoric also found fertile ground in Russian villages, where many Russian peasants believed Jews to be guilty of the ultimate crime, murdering Jesus Christ, and trying to "turn [Russia] upside down."\(^\text{13}\)

Nor did Russian revolutionaries (such as the "Narodnaia Volia") shy away from anti-Jewish slogans as an expedient tool to win over Russian peasants. Even Russian liberals who

rejected anti-Semitism as a residue of the old, conservative Russia believed that Jews were "alien" to the Russian soil and potentially dangerous to illiterate workers and peasants. The revolutionary upheaval of 1904-1905, in which Jews played a visible role, further confirmed popular beliefs of the intrinsically "deceitful" nature of Jews. During the last two decades before World War I, traditional anti-Semitism and antimodernism profoundly permeated all layers of Russian society and blended into a peculiarly Russian amalgam that triggered numerous pogroms.

Yet, in spite of years of persecution and oppression, Jewish life in Russia also had its "bright" pages. Notwithstanding the anti-Semitic prejudices of Russian officials, Jews enjoyed substantial autonomy in regulating their internal religious and cultural life. Jewish schools functioned throughout the Pale of Settlement, local communities were the centers of Jewish cultural and religious activities, and except for times of social and political crises, Jewish relations with their neighbors were marked by relative tolerance. From the 1860s onward, the government allowed Jewish professionals and affluent merchants to reside outside the Pale, while in Congress Poland Jews were permitted to buy property and reside in urban areas. Many a Russian intelligent, as well as liberals such as Alexander Blok, Vladimir Nabokov, Paul Milukov, Leonid Andreev, and Vladimir Korolenko publicly supported the struggle of the Jews for civil and political rights. In 1913, amidst vehement anti-Semitic propaganda of right-wing groups, a jury in Kiev acquitted Mendel Beilis, a Jew accused of ritual murder.

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The Russian army, in many ways a microcosm of the psychological and social make up of society, had always been a hotbed of anti-Semitism. During the reign of Nicholas I, Jewish boys were drafted into cantonist battalions where they were forcibly converted to Russian Orthodoxy. Bad housing conditions and undernourishment in the Jewish shtetlach rendered many young Jews incapable of meeting army health requirements. Jews in the barracks felt separated from their Christian colleagues by the language barrier and became primary targets for harassment and humiliation. A common practice for able-bodied Jews was, therefore, to avoid military service by all means.16 Draft evasion, in turn, strengthened the popular conviction that Jews were treacherous and unpatriotic, and would use any opportunity to undermine Russia’s war efforts.

The army’s perceptions of the Jews were demonstrated during the campaigns in Poland in 1831 and 1863, when Russian troops assaulted Polish Jews. The conduct of the Russian army during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 also provided a foretaste of anti-Jewish brutalities in World War I. As Russian troops poured into Bulgaria on a mission to liberate “brother-Slavs” from the Turkish yoke, traditional anti-Semitism, compounded by rumors that Jews were actively aiding the Turks, exploded into mass pillaging of Jewish communities, brutal pogroms, and the mass rape of Jewish women. Simultaneously, the army accused the Jews of reaping profit from Russia’s victories and living off the “blood and sweat” of the Russian people.17

At the turn of the century, the stance of the military towards the "Jewish problem" remained unchanged. In spite of substantial shortages of personnel, the medical corps accepted only a small number of Jewish doctors, since the latter, according to War Minister P. Vannovski.

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“adversely influenced” their Christian colleagues. Subjected to pariah status, the Jewish rank and file was barred from commissions and made liable to severe punishments. In 1907-1909, several military and civil committees requested that Jews be barred from the army as the most corruptive and unreliable element in time of peace and war. At the same time these committees accused the Jews of draft evasion. Descriptions of Jewish soldiers in the Russian press often fluctuated according to the political atmosphere of the period. In 1907 the journal Russkii Invalid praised the valor of Jewish soldiers who fought in the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Japanese wars. In 1911, however, it accused Jews of draft evasion. The journals Novoe vremia and Voennyi mir echoed the charges and added that Jews were of an antisocial and “anti-state [nature].”

Several other periodicals suggested that military reforms, which were taking place in the army at the time, be directed at creating a national army comprised only of ethnic Russians. “healthy politically and physically.” An exception to the rule would be other nationalities "who had organically integrated into the Russian state." Jews, as an “alien” element, were to be excluded. On December 2, 1911, speaking from the Duma rostrum, renowned Russian nationalist N.E. Markov suggested that Jewish soldiers be sent to labor battalions deployed for drainage of the Pinsk marshes and for cleaning latrines. Service in the battalions should be nine years instead of the regular three.

The Russian officer corps carefully protected its ranks from Jews although a number of Jewish converts were commissioned and achieved high rank in the army. Any suspicion of Jewish descent was taken as a great offense by Russian officers, and in 1906-1910 the military emphasized that admission to military schools was contingent upon ethnicity rather than religion. Suspicions of the War Ministry towards the Jews were reflected in the dispersal of

20 Ibid, pp. 119-120.
Jewish recruits around the Empire, while Christian and Muslim draftees from the same regions were grouped together in closed units.22

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In the years before 1914, as international tensions ran high in Europe, the Russian security services geared up for war. Special “black lists” were compiled in which the Jews featured as potential spies and saboteurs. On December 6, 1908, at a joint meeting of the members of the Ministry of the Interior, the Main Department of the General Staff, and the General Staff of the Navy, the first Russian military counterintelligence office was set up to combat espionage and subversive activities against the army. The participants compiled a list of the so-called “groups of risk” which alongside foreign agents contained “…persons of Jewish nationality who attempt to infiltrate and establish congenial relations with military personnel.”23

On August 1, 1914, the day Russia entered the First World War, the commander of the Fifth Russian army, Lieutenant-General P. Pleve, ordered his counterintelligence service to step up anti-subversive measures within the army’s operational zone. Immediate attention, Pleve ordered, was to be paid to all non-Russians (inorodtsy). Instructions to security employees specified that evidence of wrongdoing might include “inconsistent” answers and a “vagabond” style of life.24 Since financial rewards were offered for informing on a spy, the order paved the way for mass denunciations and accorded the counterintelligence and police a remarkable freedom in detaining anybody who even looked suspicious. After the outbreak of war the most densely populated areas of Jewish residence in Eastern Europe, Congress Poland and Galicia, became a


battleground. Russian spy-hunters immediately began stalking Jews, who spoke a completely unintelligible language (for Russians) and looked utterly “suspicious” in their peculiar garb.

The anti-Semitic proclivities of the Russian army would play an important role in the treatment of the Jews in the Eastern Front zone. However, other factors also became instrumental in Russian wartime ethnic policies. One such component was the rapid militarisation of political, social, and economic life in Russia. On July 29, 1914, the Tsar signed a document entitled “The Regulations for Field Administration of the Army in Wartime” ("Polozhenie o polevom upravlenii voisk v voennoe vremia") which set rules for waging war. Apart from specifying the chain of command, the “Polozhenie” stipulated that conquered territories should be formed into military general-governments (general'nye gubernatorstva) headed by general-governors as highest wartime authorities. The territory west of St. Petersboug and Smolensk and south along the Dnieper River to the Black Sea was placed under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander, who was to wage war by any means he deemed fit. The military thus became an absolute authority in the war zone and took over the civil administration. The powers invested in the army were vast, ranging from the setting of tariffs and prices to the imposition of military censorship and martial law. Civil offices in the theater of operations were reduced to adjunct bodies. Areas adjacent to the front line became a virtually independent entity.25 Similarly, the “Polozhenie” abrogated all jurisdictional powers of the Council of Ministers and the War Ministry in the war zone. Later, in August 1914, the authority of the army was additionally

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bolstered when the commander of the South-Western front (facing Galicia), General Nicholas Ivanov, forbade any civil authorities and journalists from visiting military units.26

The transfer of civil powers to the military was neither new, nor unique in Russian history. Historically, the army played a central role in Russia's policy making, especially in securing and governing newly conquered territories. Already during the reign of Ivan the Terrible, his commanders, voevody, often assumed military and civil powers in territories within their jurisdiction. Later, in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries, newly annexed regions in Siberia were also placed under military rule. During expansion into the Caucasus and Middle Asia, Russian generals became virtual rulers of new territories, and often exercised power by imposing high taxes, requisitioning grain and cattle, curtailing native languages and cultures, and resettling native populations. From the 1880s onward Russification policies in Congress Poland were often accompanied by troop deployment in "restless" districts.27

By allocating such immense powers to the military in July 1914, the Tsar inadvertently created two independent governments whose actions often contradicted or canceled one another. Further army measures were equally perilous for the population of the battle zones, Jews and non-Jews alike. On July 27, the Chief of the Main Department of the General Staff, General M.

Beliaev, ordered commanders of military districts to make all German and Austro-Hungarian subjects living or traveling in Russia prisoners of war. They and anybody else “suspected” of espionage were to be deported east of the Volga River. The Supreme Commander of the Russian army, the Grand Duke Nicholas, in a letter to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ivan Goremykin, explained that these measures were a reaction to Austro-German brutalities against the Slavs. “Delay [in countermeasures],” wrote Nicholas, would “cause a justified outrage [at Russian leniency]. No regard was to be given to age, sex, or nationality. Thousands of Germans, Austrians, Poles and Czechs (the latter being the very same Slavs on whose behalf the deportations were launched) were deported to Siberia where many died in the course of the war.

The portrait of the Russian military machine, which was soon to play a fatal role in the history of the Ostjuden, is incomplete without a few words about its commanders and men-at-arms. Described by several of his contemporaries as a "noble and cultured man," the Supreme Commander, the Tsar’s uncle, enjoyed wide popularity within the Russian military as an able officer, and decent and strong-willed field commander. His strategic skills, however, were limited. The Grand Duke was also extremely religious and shared the anti-Semitic biases of the time. His Chief of Staff, General of the Infantry Nicholas Yanushkevich, a future nemesis of the Jews, was seen even in army circles as an extreme right-winger. Since March of 1914 he had served as the Chief of General Staff and had only an average military record. Therefore, his nomination to the Stavka (General Head Quarters) surprised many observers. The Supreme

28"Perepis'ka s departamentom pravitel'stva na sluchai voiny s Avstriei," Tsental'nyi Derzhavniy Istorychnyi Arhiv Ukrainy u Kyevi (hereafter cited as TsDIAUuK), 274/5/11, p. 69.
29Nelipovich, “Repressii protiv poddannykh ‘Tsentralnykh Derzhav’,” pp. 32-35. After Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in October of 1914, a new circular stipulated the deportations of Turkish subjects. Ibid, pp. 32-35.
30 A German term for the Jews who resided in Galicia and the Russian Empire.
Commander and his Chief of Staff were hardly prepared to fight a modern war. One might, therefore, assume that they would immerse themselves only in military issues and relegate civil affairs to their closest subordinates." Yet it was precisely civil affairs to which both leaders devoted much time and displayed a remarkable zeal in presiding over the wholesale persecution of Jews in the battle zone.33

In July 1914, two thirds of the Russian rank-and-file that were poised to engage the enemy in East Prussia, Poland, and Galicia had been drafted from the Slavic population of the Empire.34 Though unsystematic, anti-Jewish indoctrination was strong among many NCOs and rank-file, who had to memorize by heart that Russia was threatened by the external enemies, “Germans and Austrians,” and the internal ones, “Jews, students, and kikes.” The flat terrain of Galicia and south-eastern Poland accorded the Stavka an opportunity to deploy the bulk of its cavalry, consisting of eighteen and a half divisions (more than 80,000 horsemen), against the Austrian-Hungarian army. Half this number were the units of the 3rd and 8th Russian armies positioned against Eastern Galicia, who were later purported to have engaged in anti-Jewish attacks as they

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34 Many ethnic groups of Central Asia, Ural, and Siberian regions were exempted from service; the people of the Caucasus region served under special status. The official imperial terminology did not accord the Belorussians and Ukrainians a separate ethnic status. Handbook of the Russian Army, pp. 7-8; Yakovlev, I avgusta, 28; Knox, With the Russian Army, pp. xvii, xix; Rostunov, Russki front pervoi mirovoi voiny, p. 48; N.N. Golovin, Voenny usilia Rossii v mirovoi voine, 2 vols. (Paris: Tovarishchestvo Obyedinennykh Isdatelei, 1939), vol. 1, pp. 11-12, 86.
35 M.D. Bonch-Bruevich, Vsia vlast’ Soveam (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony, 1964), p. 13. Many Russian soldiers and Cossacks often perceived “Jews” and “kikes” as two different, but equally pernicious groups.
swept through towns and shtetlach, looted, pillaged and then disappeared before senior officers or military administration were able to set foot in the locality. Cossack troops, especially from the Don, Kuban', and Terek territories (voiska), were especially known for their hostility to Jews. Although only a handful of Jews resided within the Cossack voiska, the Cossacks despised the "inner enemies" -- socialists, students, and Jews -- who supposedly threatened the Cossack way of life. Cossack hatred of Jews had received a powerful impetus during the Russian revolution of 1904-1905, when Jews and revolutionaries were often lumped together as one pernicious group.36

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After the declaration of war, Russian Jews, alongside their Christian compatriots, were swept up in an enthusiastic frenzy. The most oppressed minority of the Empire, many Jews hoped that their participation on the front would grant them the rights of full-fledged citizens. In the atmosphere of general exultation, Jewish delegates to the Duma professed their loyalty to the Tsar and swore, despite intermittent persecution over the centuries, to "...stand up as a single man to shield [Russia] with their chests."37 Jewish religious communities prayed for the victory of Russian arms and staged patriotic demonstrations hoisting the scrolls of Torah, national flags, and portraits of the Tsar. Some young Jews, including those whom numerus clausus forced to seek acceptance in foreign universities, returned to Russia to enlist in the army, or volunteered with the Allied forces. Jewish expectations reached their highest peak when the Tsar reportedly thanked Jews for their faithfulness to the crown in a dire time.38

36 Cossack anti-Semitism reached its peak during the Civil War, when Cossacks featured most prominently among White pogromists. Peter Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920 (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 166-177.
38M. Altshuler, "Russia and Her Jews," p. 198; Gregor Alexinski, Russia and the Great War (London: T. Fischer Unwin, LTD, 1915), p. 196; "Perepiska s nachal'nikom zhandarmskogo upravlenia," TsDIAUuk, 365/2/45, p. 71; Pares, Day by Day, p. 17; Abraham G. Duker, "Jews in
Soon, however, the conduct of the Russian army dashed Jewish hopes for a better future. In early August rumors of Jewish espionage in Congress Poland and Courland spread among the troops and reverberated in more distorted forms in Russia. Jews were accused of spotting for enemy guns, guiding Germans through front lines, cutting Russian telephone lines, firing at passing columns, and furnishing German intelligence with crucial information. Army commanders took matters in hand with arrests in Jewish communities. Divisional courts-martial feverishly tried Jewish “spies and saboteurs.” Although the majority of cases provided no substantial evidence, some Jews were still convicted of high treason.\textsuperscript{39} It should be stressed that a number of Jews served in the German and Austrian intelligence service. In the Austrian intelligence branch in Czernowitz, for example, out of five important agents, three were Jewish. The chief of the Russian gendarme corps, General Kruglov, asserted, however, that the numbers of Jewish spies employed by the Central Powers did not exceed those of other nationalities. On the other hand, Jews also worked for the Russian intelligence.\textsuperscript{40}

The defamation campaign soon culminated in the first mass expulsions. In August 1914 Jewish communities in several localities of the Radom, Łomża, and Lublin provinces were ordered to leave within 24 hours on grounds of “security.” After their departure, their property was taken by the local population. In September, expulsions began in Warsaw province and

\textsuperscript{39}Iz 'chernoi knigi' rossiiskogo evreistva," 203f-204f.
continued until November. Accusations of Jewish espionage reached such proportions that in early September Jews of St. Petersburg appealed to the Supreme Commander not to smear the entire Jewish community, which stood loyally by the Russian cause, with rare cases of Jewish spies.

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It should be stressed that in the front zone Jews were not the only group singled out for imagined crimes. The Germans of Courland were equally blamed for seditious activities, and later, after Turkey entered the war, the Muslims of the Trans-Caucasus region were identified with the enemy. Russian policies towards Jews, Germans, and Muslims originated in the same institutions entrusted with military and civil affairs -- headquarters of the armies, military governors, and the Stavka. Nor were reprisals against potentially refractory groups a monopoly of the Russian army. Its Austrian counterpart, susceptible to the rumors of alleged sabotage by the Russophiles, imprisoned and executed many Galician Ukrainians. Upon invading Belgium and France, the German army, spurred on by rumors of the subversive activities of enemy irregulars, francs-tireurs, retaliated by shooting civilians and burning “suspicious” localities.

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42 The Jews in the Eastern War Zone, p. 53.

However, from the beginning of the war there were two striking differences between Russian attitudes towards the Jews and other "suspicious" groups. For the army and the government both Germans and Muslims were associated with the belligerent powers -- Germany and Turkey -- by cultural, ethnic, and linguistic links. On the other hand, Russian Jews, while having no patron power outside the Empire, were identified as a conspiratorial group with German, Austrian, and world-wide connections, and, hence, more pernicious. Accordingly, the vehemence of the anti-Jewish defamation campaign and the scope of violence inflicted upon the Jews surpassed the experiences of the other minorities.

The Stavka was particularly sensitive to information about Jewish sabotage submitted by front-line units and the counterintelligence service. According to the chief of the Tsar's personal guard, the Stavka deliberately exaggerated and shaped rumors about Jewish spies and sharpshooters and then disseminated these rumors in the form of counterintelligence reports to the troops in the field. The vehemence of the anti-Jewish defamation campaign and the scope of violence inflicted upon the Jews surpassed the experiences of the other minorities.

Anti-Jewish brutalities in Congress Poland and Courland became symptomatic of the army's mindset; generals and officers were convinced that if Russian Jews were assisting the enemy, their foreign co-religionists in Eastern Galicia were even more hostile to the Empire. Subsequently, having no inhibition in mistreating Russian citizens, the army would hardly show less restraint towards subjects of the enemy state.

Yet, apart from a firm belief in the perfidious nature and anti-Russian proclivities of the Jews, the army did not have a preconceived plan, nor was it guided by any principle of how to deal with foreign and Russian Jews in the war zone. The only clear concept in the minds of the Russian High Command was that Jews would inevitably pose a challenge to Russian rule. In
Eastern Galicia, it took six months before the Russian command elaborated long-range radical means to render Jews harmless. First came a slanderous campaign to magnify the "Jewish peril" by spreading rumors on all levels of the army and administration. Next came an attempt to drain the Jews of their strength through limitations on their economic activities and movement. Finally, the Stavka and army initiated punitive expeditions, hostage-taking, and deportations of suspects, to instill fear into Jews and handicap them as a potential source of trouble.

Chapter III

ARMY POLITICS: "LEVELING" THE JEWS, SUMMER 1914-
WINTER 1915

From the summer of 1914 until the spring of 1915, the Russian military was the sole ruler of occupied Eastern Galicia. As stipulated by "The Regulations for Field Administration of the Army in Wartime," the military government in Galicia was to fulfill both military and civil functions. The latter, however, were not specified since it was understood that the governors would receive their instructions from the Stavka, as the highest military office. In reality, however, the front and army commanders often intervened in the affairs of the military administration and pursued their own policies often in contradiction to the Stavka's guidance. Clashes of priorities at the top were mirrored at the very bottom of the Russian military machine as local officials and commanders ignored instructions of the General-Governor, and an undisguised Russification campaign blunted imperial efforts to win Poles and Ukrainians to the Russian cause. Initially, rivalry between various Russian offices prevented a coordinated attack on Galician Jews. A concerted assault began in earnest only in February 1915 following the mass expulsions of Russian Jews and Germans from Courland and Congress Poland. This chapter examines the structure and character of the occupational regime, and Russian attitudes towards the national groups of the region in the larger context of Russian ethnic policies in the Eastern Front battle zone. Special attention is given to anti-Jewish legislation and to the nature of violence that marked Russian advances into Galicia.
The Russians are Coming!: Front Zone Violence in the Summer and Early Fall of 1914

Long after World War I, the Jews of Galicia, like their contemporaries elsewhere in Europe, recalled with sadness the last peaceful days of the summer of 1914. The weather was cloudless, and a general atmosphere of serenity and relaxation reigned in the city and countryside. A contemporary described the summer streets of Lwów radiating with "bright smiles, rustle of silk on women, and the whole ocean of flowers." Even the Sarajevo assassination and the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not alter the popular mood. Therefore, when the news of the outbreak of hostilities reached Galicia, many people still lent their ears to government propaganda which kept boasting that the war would be quick and victorious. At the beginning of August, however, while official communiqués were still describing Austrian victories on the battlefields, rumors suddenly spread that the Russians had already crossed into Galicia. In a few days the peaceful atmosphere completely evaporated, panic spread, and the roads westward filled up with hundreds of carts and thousands of refugees. By the second week of August, rail stations were overcrowded, and departing trains were swarmed by a multitude of passengers. Seats were fought over, and respectable gentlemen threw women out of compartments. The chaos was exacerbated by rumors of sabotage on Austrian communication lines; denunciations piled up in police quarters, and the military carried out mass arrests of "unreliables," especially among Russophiles. Drumhead courts martial were set up and meted out death sentences. In several instances, an outraged mob comprised of Jews and
Poles assaulted columns of arrested "suspects." Some Jews also denounced Ukrainians suspected of "Russophilism" to Austrian authorities who carried out swift and merciless justice.⁡

Meanwhile, on the battlefield Austrian troops suffered heavy casualties and were hard-pressed by the superior Russian forces. The two belligerents fought a series of bloody frontier engagements, and on August 18, thirty-five Russian divisions under the command of Lieutenant-General Brusilov penetrated deep into Galicia. On September 2 the Austrians abandoned Lwów to the enemy, and on September 11 the Austrian Commander in Chief, Conrad von Hőtzendorf, ordered a general retreat beyond the San River. The greatest Austro-Hungarian fortress, Przemyśl, was besieged by the enemy.³

From the outset of hostilities, the news of the Russian invasion forced many Jews to flee Galicia. About one-tenth of the total, mostly men of means, managed to evacuate with the first wave of refugees. In September, when the Russian advance was not stemmed, the sound of battle generated the second wave which continued unabated until

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GALICIA IN WORLD WAR I

- International borders
- Boundaries between west and east Galician judicial districts
- Russian advances by December 1914
- Fortress Przemyśl besieged from September 1914 to March 1915

MAP 3.
the late fall of 1914. This time Jews from all walks of life trudged westward. Often without adequate clothing, "drawn by hunger and terror...carts piled high with domestic utensils, furniture, poultry, women, and children," Jews crossed in thousands into West Galicia, Hungary, and, ultimately, Austria.4

The majority of the second wave of refugees were short of money, since on August 1 the Austrian government imposed a moratorium on private and legal debts to allow the debtors to delay payment. Simultaneously, private accounts were frozen. Hence, when a multitude of refugees reached Kraków, the administration hurried to transport them further to Hungary and Bohemia. Thousands were arriving weekly, and by the fall of 1915 approximately 200,000 Galician-Jewish refugees were to be found in Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, and Moravia. In Vienna alone, out of 137,000 refugees, 60% were Jews from Galicia and Bukovina.5

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4 "An-Skii S.A. [Rapoport S.A.]," TsNBUiVV, 339/89, pp. 1-2; Octavian C. Tăslăuanu, With the Austrian Army in Galicia (London: Skeffington & Son, LTD, n.d.), p. 85; Archiwum Akt Nowych (abbreviated AAN) "Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie," Box 61 [Kurjer Poznański, 28 June 1917], [Dziennik Poznański, 1914 (no date)]; [Nowa reforma, 25 September 1917]. This is an unpaginated press-slip collection, and hereafter a newspaper title in brackets will identify a given slip.

The Austrian government and the municipal administration tried to accommodate the refugees, using all resources at their disposal. It financed and organized soup-kitchens and schools for children, and granted subsidies to Jewish families. The population donated food, money, and clothing. Galician Zionists in Vienna set up aid committees for Jewish refugees, while Jewish press and parliament members publicized the plight of Galician refugees. Jewish parliament members, speaking in the Austrian parliament, accused the Russian government of condoning the persecutions of the Jews, and recited numerous instances of the Russian army’s looting, rape, and destruction of Jewish quarters.6

As economic conditions became harsher, the initially friendly atmosphere around the refugees began to dissipate. Concomitant with the gradual dwindling of supplies, the influx of the Ostjuden and their competition with local tradesmen increased ethnic tensions. The “alien” appearance and habits of Galician Jews made even their Austrian and Hungarian co-religionists very uneasy. Financial aid from Britain and the United States, while keeping many families afloat, was not sufficient to ameliorate the situation.7

Jews who stayed in Galicia faced far harsher adversities. Already in mid-August, under Russian pressure Austrian troops and administration began withdrawing from many localities of Eastern Galicia. The void of authority led to the first anti-Jewish outbursts among the local population. Before the arrival of the Russians, the local population plundered and demolished government offices and assaulted Jews in Kosów, Żabie, and

Stryj. The reasons for these excesses are difficult to unravel since Jewish and Russian
sources barely address the ethnic or social make-up of the pogromists. It stands to reason
that these first attacks on Jews were more of a sociological than ethnic character. The
Jews were targeted as allegedly the richest and the most “pro-Austrian” element among
the populace. In addition, mass arrests and executions of Ukrainians by the Austrian
military, and a conspicuously hostile attitude of Jews towards the alleged traitors, enraged
large segments of the population, especially in the Galician countryside. After a series of
assaults by their fellow villagers, in some places Jews awaited Russian troops in hope that
the latter would restore order and put an end to mob violence. However, the arrival of the
first Cossack patrols in Galician towns and villages dashed their hopes, as the Cossacks
joined local hoodlums in looting and burning. In Kożomyja, Berezów, and Myszyn
(Kożomyja district) Cossacks, soldiers, and local residents plundered and burned down
many German and Jewish houses and shops. In Husiatyn and TlUSTe, Cossacks and
peasants robbed the Jews and burned 716 Jewish huts.8

Pogroms soon engulfed many localities, causing widespread destruction in Jewish
communities. While it is difficult to assess the motives behind anti-Jewish attacks by their
compatriots, the mindset of looters in uniform is much more explicable. From the outset,
it was clear that notwithstanding the anti-Semitism of the Russian high command, it
neither planned nor coordinated the pogroms. Pogroms demoralized the troops, and

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8 AGAD, “Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych,” F34, no page; “Svedenia ob
ekonicheskom polozhenii,” TsDIAuK, 365/1/ 235, pp. 4, 7; Golczewski, Polnisch-
Jüdische Beziehungen, pp. 121-122; Prikarpatskaia Rus’, 10 October 1914, n. 1427, p. 4;
discipline, never the strongest asset of the Russian army, became a grave concern for the Russian command, which attempted to stop the rampage. However, a number of company, battalion, or regiment commanders let their subordinates go on rampage as reward for capturing a given locality. A tradition of allowing the troops a day or two of pillage in a conquered place — *otdat' na otkup* — had long been exercised in the Russian army. For example, after conquering a strip of German territory in East Prussia in August 1914, the Russians subjected several towns to severe looting and murdered numbers of German civilians.  

The causes of the pogroms should, therefore, be attributed to several factors present in any combat such as the chaos of the front zone, battle fatigue, and rumors of saboteurs. Most importantly, however, popular beliefs and a war mentality were effectively buttressed by anti-Semitic propaganda, which for years had held sway in the army. After all, many units that entered Galicia in the summer of 1914 were formed in central Russia and Siberia, whose residents had never had contacts with Jews prior to the war. It was the effects of official anti-Semitic propaganda that made Russian soldiers believe that the war was a crusade against the Jews. The notion of Russia's liberating mission to free brother-Slavs crystallized immediately when, upon entering towns and villages, Cossacks and soldiers conveyed to the people that they had come to free Galicia from the "Jewish yoke." Often, the Cossacks stopped passers-by and inquired "gde evrei?"

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*Ukrainische Nachrichten: Mitteilungen des Bundes zur Befreiung der Ukraine*, 18 December 1914, n. 133, p. 1; Schall, *Zydostwo galicyjskie w czasie inwazji*, pp. 6-7.  
9 Ernst Müller-Meinungen, *"Who are the Huns?": The Law of Nations and Its Breakers* (Berlin: Georg Reimer Publisher, 1915), pp. 163-165, 167-168; Stefan Kestler, *Die deutsche Auslandsaufklärung und das Bild der Entemächte im Spiegel*
(where are the Jews?). Presenting a cross, or a locket portraying Jesus Christ, was sufficient to be let go; those who could not provide such “evidence” were unceremoniously robbed. In some instances, the population was incited to anti-Jewish excesses, and frequently, after having looted Jewish stores and houses, the Russians distributed the booty to the Christian populace.\textsuperscript{10}

The scope of the pogroms depended on how long the units stayed in a given place. If officers were not in the vicinity, the Cossacks and soldiers meticulously pillaged every single Jewish house or hut and set them on fire. This swift pillaging perpetrated by Russian vanguard units became a common occurrence during the first weeks of the war.\textsuperscript{11}

After the first wave of pogroms, with the arrival of Russian administration, some semblance of order was restored in large towns and cities. The new authorities issued

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\item \textit{zeitgenossicher Propagandaveröffentlichungen wärend des Ersten Weltkrieges} (Frankfurt am Main-Berlin: Peter Lang, 1994), p. 199.


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orders to maintain discipline, and several Russian soldiers and local hoodlums were reportedly executed for robberies. In addition, Jewish hopes were bolstered by rumors that the Tsar had addressed Galician Jews promising them his protection. However, as was the case with Russian Jews, the Tsar's appeal proved to be just wishful thinking.12

While order in urban areas was more or less restored, in the countryside looting and burning escalated. Soon attacks began affecting non-Jewish quarters and compelled the Russian High Command to take strong measures. On August 20, 1914, the commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant-General Brusilov, appealed to his troops to "honor the rights of residents [of Galicia] regardless of nationality," and ordered that marauding and pillaging be stopped. The conduct of the "liberators" was so appalling that Brusilov admitted that some Russian officers encouraged the pogromists. Protecting the reputation of the army, he stressed that it was mainly the cavalry and rear units which engaged in the excesses, while the bulk of the army was not prone to violence. Apparently Brusilov's appeals were not heeded, for on August 23 he found it necessary to issue another order to the same effect.13

The situation within the operational zone of Brusilov's neighbor, the 3rd Army, was no better, and the army command also issued several orders threatening looters with courts martial. Finally, on September 2 the Supreme Commander addressed the people of Galicia. He promised that the army had come to liberate Galicia from the "foreign yoke."

and Russia sought “nothing but the re-establishment of rights and justice, ... peace and harmony” in the region. The possible impact of the appeal was, however, nullified by a clause authorizing burning and “complete destruction” of localities in which shooting at Russian troops took place. Although the Grand Duke meant territories in East Prussia, the order was distributed among all the armies and was undoubtedly taken by all commanders at face value. Two days later, Nicholas’s appeal was emulated by the commander of the South-Western front, General Ivanov, who issued a directive to his armies advising caution and tolerance towards the population of Galicia. However, the fury of the pogroms, once aroused, was not easily subdued, and both appeals, distributed amidst the sounds of broken windows and screams of violated women, had no visible effect on the troops. On September 3, army units joined local pogromists in Stanislawów in plundering stores and Jewish houses. In the town of Bohorodczany Russian soldiers thoroughly looted the Jewish quarters, taking money, watches, and jewelry. Next day, upon entering Tarnopol, soldiers demolished Jewish houses and gardens. The destructive frenzy even affected some Jewish soldiers who also took part in the excesses.


The brutality of the Russian army also bore upon the non-Jewish population, whose houses were at times looted by passing units. Cossacks and soldiers particularly targeted Galician Germans, forcing them to dig trenches, thoroughly plundering their possessions, and punishing delay in giving up goods by severe flogging. However, while Russian soldiers did not shun from looting and robberies, rape and murder were rare in Ukrainian and German villages. On the other hand, no such inhibition was displayed towards the Jews, who were often murdered on the spot. Eyewitnesses recalled that many Jews were killed immediately by the pillaging units, and the pogromists took special pleasure in group-raiding women and girls, thus striking at the roots of the Jewish community. Some victims later committed suicide. In some instances, the Russians allegedly cut off women’s breasts before murdering them. As attacks on Jews spilled over to non-Jewish houses, it became common for Christians in Galicia to display icons on doors and windows to avoid the intruders.

One specific aspect of anti-Jewish brutalities should be singled out for closer examination. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, attacks on the Jews were correlated with rumors of alleged Jewish subversive activities. The phenomenon of

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TsDIAUuK, 385/7/102, p. 51ob-52; “Vinomosti starostiv pro shkody zavdani evreiskomu naselenniu,” TsDIAUuL, 146/4/3560, p. 96.


rumors preceding Jewish pogroms was not new in Russian history. Almost every riot or attack against the Jews in the 1880s and in 1904-1905 was identified with rumors which insinuated either “official” consent to beating the Jews, or provided sensational accounts of Jewish revolutionary activities and outrages against Christian children. Only a few days into the war, in August 1914, rumors of Jews smuggling gold in coffins, signaling the enemy, and being actively involved in sabotage in Congress Poland triggered the first collective reprisals against Jewish communities.18

In Galicia, Jews were purported to be providing the Austrians with secret information, luring Russian columns into traps, and cutting telephone lines. These rumors were corroborated both by official army reports and eyewitness accounts, and held sway among the officer corps and rank-and-file. Thus, the staff of the 10th Corps reported that fires in Jewish shtetlach and quarters were the “handiwork” of Jews themselves who had burned their own houses before fleeing. On August 22, a private Maksym Chepurnyi wrote to his parents in Chernigov province that the Austrians had set up an underground telephone line, and “...damn Jews were spotting on our units;... if caught red-handed they are shot; therefore, we pillage and burn [Jewish quarters] for their offenses.”19

Fears of Jewish conspiracies led to random arrests and brutalisation of Galician Jews. A senior Russian officer recalled his encounter with the Cossacks who had rounded up a group of Jewish “suspects”:

‘Who are they?’ I inquired of a Cossack NCO. ‘Spies, sir,’ he replied, ‘they cut telephone wires.’...’Did you see them doing that?’ I asked. ‘No, sir,’ answered the Cossack, ‘but it is said they did. At any rate, all kikes, whether Russian or the local ones, are against the Tsar.’

By mid-August, one particular rumor about Jews shooting at Russian troops triggered several pogroms. The main feature of the rumor was a female Jewish assassin named Kharash, who had allegedly shot and killed a Cossack officer in Brody. In retaliation, the Cossacks killed four Jews and burned more than a hundred Jewish houses. An investigation by Russian authorities brought no results since it turned out that none of the “eyewitnesses” actually saw the shooting. In addition, the army filed no report of an officer’s murder. While the allegation proved to be a sham, it kept reappearing, furnished with new details. On September 10, the newspaper Russkoie slovo asserted that a Cossack officer was shot upon and killed from a window when Russian troops entered Brody. The gendarme department added new components to the story and identified the victim as yesaul (captain of the Cossack troops) Komskii of the 12th Don Cossack regiment. While all of the quoted instances proved to be false, the rumors served as a signal for an assault on the Brody Jewish quarters, which were shelled and looted.

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20 Bonch-Bruevich, Vsiavlast’ Sovetam, pp. 24-25.
22 "Donezenia nachal’nikov uezdov,” TsDIAUuK, 361/2/134, p. 18ob; “O neblagonadezhnykh elementakh,” Ibid., 361/1/221, p. 245; “O strel’be po voiskam,” Derzhavnyi Arkhiv L’viv’s’koi Oblasti (abbreviated DALO), 907/1/28, pp. 7-8; “O strel’be po voiskam,” Ibid., 907/1/27, p. 65; Kreppel, Juden und Judentum, p. 76. The father of
Since a female Jewish assassin was rumored to have been seen in other localities as well, a Duma emissary mused to the prominent Jewish activist Solomon An-Ski (Rappoport), who was visiting the front, that the alleged shots were always fired from the best shop in a given place. "Retaliations," therefore, always began with the looting of shops and warehouses. When the myth of the assassin finally lost its appeal, similar rumors triggered new reprisals. In the village of Jabłonów, following rumors of Jews shooting at passing Russian units, soldiers burned more than a hundred Jewish huts.23

Similarly to anti-Jewish pogroms in the last decades before the war, inflammatory charges preferred by the Russian command against Jews in the summer and fall of 1914 did not betoken official approval for pillaging. Although some commanders let their troops loose on the Jewish quarters, the Stavka realized that the army's brutalities might stain its image among the non-Jewish population. In addition, the Russians tried to show a respectable face before their allies, France and Britain, whose "philosemitic" proclivities were well known in the Russian High Command and the government. The rationale for the vilification of the Jews in the front zone came from an almost pathological fear of omnipresent Jewish conspiracies. While the notorious Protocols of the Elders of the Zion would gain widespread popularity later, pre-war police reports of Judeo-Masonic clandestine societies and Jewish cabalistic rituals shaped the mentality of many Russian officers. In wartime, rumors of Jewish sabotage gave a "modern" contour to old tales.

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23 "Perepiska s departamentom politii," TsDIAUuK, 385/7/102, pp. 50-51; "An-Ski S.A. [Rappoport S.A.], TsNBUiVV, Institute of the Oriental Studies, 339/89, pp. 3-4; "Svedenia ob ekonomicheskom polozhenii," TsDIAUuK, 365/1/235, p. 8; Prikarpatskaia
and Russian commanders repeatedly informed the Stavka of secretive Jewish organizations thriving in the rear and Jewish agents directing the enemy's fire. Conversely, their fears, exacerbated by the Stavka's own promptings, came back with vengeance to the sources of their origin. This paranoia of widespread Jewish conspiracy soon permeated the minds of the entire Russian army from the Supreme Commander down to the last Cossack and soldier. The mentality of many Russian officers was later verbalized to An-Ski by his traveling companion in succinct terms "...in Russia the Jews had no civil rights. So they betray us. So we kill them."24

After the establishment of the military administration, the number of attacks went down, though they did not stop entirely. High concentration and constant rotation of troops passing through Galician towns and villages were but two factors that contributed to the spread of anti-Jewish violence. In fact, the initial pogroms in the battle zone began to give way to sanctioned reprisals and punitive expeditions. While the reprisals were conceived of as self-defense against and punishment of alleged Jewish crimes, their actual implementation hardly differed from the earlier violence of August and September. Indeed, under the guise of punitive expeditions, Russian units continued to pillage and burn Jewish houses, and detained Jewish residents for ransom.25

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Since reprisals against Jews were authorized by local officials and commanders, Russian authorities soon found themselves completely at a loss to tell a reprisal from petty robbery. Any attempt to bring looters to justice was extremely difficult since troops did not stay long in one locality. For example, on November 16, upon entering the town of Gliniany of the Przemyśl district, Cossacks of the 5th Orenburg reserve sotnia and a communication unit staged a pogrom. Though Jewish houses and shops were a primary target, the looting soon spread to Christian households. The investigation bogged down since the culprits were soon transferred to different units and thus ceased to function as a single detail. Since the Gliniany pogrom alarmed the population in neighboring districts, Russian officials searched for the perpetrators until the spring of 1915, without any tangible results.

When the administration investigated the charges against the Jews all accusations proved groundless. Thus, in the Złoczów district thirteen Jews were arrested and charged with alleged espionage and shooting. After the accusations proved to be a sham, the Jews were released. However, by the end of the year such cases had become exceptional. More often Russian officials took charges brought by peasants or soldiers against the Jews at face value and imposed punishments such as imprisonment or heavy fines.

The irreconcilability of two mutually exclusive charges -- the "cowardly" nature of the Jews and their stance as a defiant and powerful foe -- never seemed to trouble the military. On the contrary, the allegations of Jewish espionage and shooting fit perfectly well into the mental substratum of the Russian military. Unable to fight the Russian army face to face, Jews resorted to other treasonous methods. While a few calm heads in the army admitted that Galician Jews were rather "restrained" in their attitude towards the Russians, poisonous seeds of hatred had already been sown resulting in mass outbursts of violence.29

_Lwów, September 27, 1914: The Pattern of Violence_

Documentary and literary texts on pogroms in Eastern Galicia are few and laconic. Besides describing afflictions suffered by the Jews, they provide little explanation of the motives of the perpetrators, the degree to which pogroms were spontaneous or organized, and what the reactions of Russian authorities were. The best-recorded instance of anti-Jewish violence in the summer and fall of 1914 is the pogrom in the provincial capital, Lwów, almost four weeks after it was conquered by the Russians. The political and cultural significance of the city contributed to the fact that the pogrom was well recorded in Russian documents and contemporary accounts. Although the outbreak of violence in

Lwów differed from earlier attacks on the Jews in the larger scope of destruction, a close reconstruction of events reveals many similar trends.

After September 3, 1914, the Russian administration set up its offices in Lwów. The provincial capital was the largest railroad crossroads in Galicia and was flooded by huge numbers of Russian troops on the way to their destinations. Dazzled by twinkling shop windows, impressive architectural styles, majestic buildings and churches, and a mixture of different cultures and languages, the Russians crowded city stores and markets buying everything they could afford. Images of this “rich Jewish city” were strengthened by the sight of numerous Jewish shops and Orthodox Jews in their peculiar attire. The temporary character of billeting contributed to lax discipline, and it may be surmised that after long marches and battles, Russian officers were hardly in a mood to keep a watchful eye on their subordinates.³⁰

At first nothing forebode trouble as on September 26 the newly appointed governor of Galicia, Count George Bobrinskii, addressed the residents of Galicia, professing universal religious toleration. Consequently, when on the afternoon of the next day gunfire burst out in the city, it took both the administration and the population by surprise. The first shots were fired in the center of the city, and in an ensuing stampede several people were trampled and wounded. No sooner had the echo of the first salvoes subsided than rumors circulated that a Jew had fired at soldiers in the Jewish quarters.

³⁰AGAD, “Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych,” F34, no page; Lwów po inwazji rosyjskiej, pp. 2-3; Stanisław Maciszewski, Rosjanie we Lwowie: szkic z niedawnej przeszłości (L’viv: Drukarnia Krajowa Szczeńskiego Bednarskiego, 1926), pp. 3, 5-6; "Podorozhnii zamitky sviaschchenyka Blaera,” TsDIAUuL, 694/1/10, p. 5; Ukrainische Nachrichten, 19 February 1915, n. 22, p. 2; AAN, “Centralna Agencja Polska w
The soldiers allegedly returned fire. Moments later, files of soldiers were seen to have shifted towards the Krakowski square, the hub of the Jewish quarters. A commotion in the city center diverted the attention of the crowds as mounted Cossacks fired at windows on Ważowa street, a district of Jewish professionals and tradesmen. In vain, civilians and officers searched the sky trying to locate an enemy airplane, which, in their minds, was the target of the shooting. When darkness covered the city and gunfire died down, rumors spread that many people had lost their lives.31

While the city was recovering from shock, at night large details of soldiers moved to the Jewish quarters. Streets were cordoned off by patrols who shot at windows. Cossacks and soldiers, accompanied by a local mob, broke into Jewish apartments and wine warehouses, and, after indulging themselves, began indiscriminate shooting. Jewish houses were thoroughly searched and looted, and Jews were beaten regardless of sex and age. About three hundred Jews were arrested and taken to military detainment where they were badly beaten. Patrols frisked Jews on the streets and arrested those without documents. At several sites Jewish adults and children were reportedly killed on the spot and left on the sidewalk.32

On the day following the pogrom, the scarce information that the administration had at its disposal was solely based on rumors. Although they varied widely as to who

31Janusz, 293 dni, pp. 160-164; Ivan Petrovych, Halychyna pid chas rosiis’koi okupatsii, serpen’ 1914 - cherven’ 1915 (L’viv: Nakladom vydavnytsva “Politychna Biblioteka.” 1915), pp. 18-20; Schall, Żydostwo galicyjskie, pp. 11-12; Bialynia-Chołodecki, Lwów w czasie okupacji rosyjskiej, p. 91.
had started the shooting or the numbers of casualties involved, the bottom line remained
the same -- it was Jews who had instigated the unrest. Soldiers and Cossacks related to
the residents that a Jew had attempted to rob a Russian soldier. When apprehended, the
thief fired at his pursuers and hid in a house in the Jewish quarters. According to another
version a Jew fired at a Russian patrol. The only tangible evidence of the events was up to
fifty dead and more than a hundred wounded. Investigation by the authorities soon came
to a standstill. Assuming that the Russians indeed tried to find the truth, their efforts were
seriously impeded by a constant rotation of the troops stationed in Lwów. After the
pogrom, the units to which the delinquents belonged may have been transferred to any
part of the front.

The administration did not display any special zeal to find the culprits. Yet,
rumors of Jewish culpability were sufficient to justify reprisals, and Russian authorities
immediately followed the procedure which had already become a trademark of the regime
in Galicia. The city chief, Baron Eiche, ordered a round-up of the "usual" suspects, and
several prominent Jews, including the renowned politician Herman Diamand, were
arrested. When on Saturday, September 29, the frightened Jewish community kept the
synagogues closed, Eiche interpreted it as defiance and forced the Jews to open the

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33The numbers of casualties vary in different sources from seventeen to fifty dead,
including several non-Jews. Kreppel, *Juden und Judentum*, pp. 77-78; *Lwów po inwazji*,
p. 13; Bronisław Dębiński, "Wspomnienia z lat 1914-1918," *Biblioteka Narodowa*,
microfilm 45109, p. 47; *Prikarpatskaia Rus'*, 28 September 1914, n. 1416, p. 1, and 2
October 1914, n. 1420, p. 4; *Ukrainische Nachrichten*, 19 February 1915, n. 22, p. 3.
temples and perform services. To keep at bay potential disturbances, he also imposed a curfew on the city and ordered garret windows to be bricked up.34

Eiche's accusations against the Jews as the main instigators were reiterated and magnified by the local Russophile newspaper *Prikarpatskaia Rus'*. The newspaper replaced a mysterious Jewish sniper with a more imposing story of an abortive Jewish uprising, and insinuated that a "Jewish mob" had fired at "peaceful" Russian soldiers. The alleged uprising was immediately quelled by the army.35 However, the very suggestion that "cowardly" Jews dared to stand up to the Russian army was too much for the military. After all, the supposition of a Jewish armed *coup* discredited both the army and administration, with all potential consequences. Therefore, this version of events was passed over in silence by the Russian press.

Jewish contemporaries were quick to accuse the military administration of staging the pogrom, and even alleged that some Jews had known beforehand what was in the offing and warned leaders of the Jewish community. It is doubtful, however, that the administration had concocted disturbances which disrupted the life of the city shortly after its conquest. The reaction of the General-Governor indicated that at least he was not personally involved in instigating the pogrom. Bobrinskii was visiting the Russian military cemetery in a city suburb when the shooting forced him to return to his quarters. He


35*Prikarpatskaia Rus'*, 29 September 1914, n. 1417, p. 3; Janusz, *Dokumenty urzędowe*, p. 31.
immediately ordered the city chief to investigate what he referred to as a “disgraceful incident.” 36

More significantly, in his report to Brusilov (nominally Lwów was within the jurisdiction of the 8th Army), Bobrinskii did not blame the Jews for the shooting, but cautiously addressed the matter as a “firing from windows” in the course of which several Russian soldiers and Jews were wounded. Bobrinskii’s concurrent report to the Stavka triggered the indignation of Yanushkevich, who already had his own version of the event. Yanushkevich, in his letter to Bobrinskii, insisted that Jews were behind the shooting, and that harsh reprisals “regardless of ramifications” be carried out immediately. Most likely the troops in Lwów received appropriate orders since army patrols began arresting Jews for “creating the atmosphere of panic” and spreading rumors. The disagreement between the General-Governor and the Chief of Staff marked the inauguration of a conflict between the two which would continue throughout the Russian occupation of Galicia. 37

The official communiqué released by the General-Governor at the beginning of October stated that as punishment for the shooting three houses in the city center would be confiscated. Although the communiqué did not specify the culprits and merely referred to the pogrom as “shooting from the windows,” the houses belonged to affluent Jews and Poles, and the confiscation demonstrated the mentality of the administration. Another

36 Schall, Żydostwo galicyjskie, p. 14.
decree issued by the Stavka provided for the confiscation of property of individuals who had fled Galicia, similarly reflecting the mindset of Yanushkevich and his entourage.\textsuperscript{38}

The picture which emerges from the available evidence suggests that the Lwów pogrom and other attacks on Jews in Eastern Galicia shared several important features. Rumors of Jewish subversion either preceded or followed the attacks, and served as a catalyst which intensified and brought to eruption ethnic animosities and social tensions. Many Poles and Ukrainians identified themselves with the main culprits, Russian troops, and benefited from the pogroms by looting and pillaging Jewish houses and stores. Personal animosities and greed became the prime motivation for denouncing Jews, and informants were often rewarded with Jewish possessions.\textsuperscript{39} Cossacks and soldiers, on the other hand, encouraged and incited peasants and urban dwellers to take part in looting, and promoted, if unconsciously, the notion that Jews were being punished for wrongdoing, that authorities knew and connived in the attacks, and that robbing Jews would incur no legal retribution. Pogroms generated rumors of Jewish culpability and thus further intensified a popular perception of Jews as legitimate targets. The accusations of Jews shooting from windows and roofs would be repeated in Galicia throughout the war, and inevitably left their imprint on the memory of the civilian population.

\textsuperscript{39}“O evreiakh,” TsDIAUuK, 361/1/648, p. 16.
It seems certain that the Russian command and administration, while sharing suspicions and resentments towards Jews, did not organize the pogroms. However, while high offices must be exonerated from directly instigating violence, their vocal anti-Semitic attitudes contributed to the belief among the rank-and-file that attacks on Jews were sanctioned. A direct role of lower officials in inciting and organizing the pogroms should not, however, be excluded. On October 4, Baron Eiche summoned three Jewish leaders to his residence and warned them of the consequences of the “Jewish provocation.” Eiche was accompanied by a deputy, one Captain Yatsevich, who was identified by Jewish contemporaries as an “Okhrana” agent. Yatsevich charged Jews with the shooting and demanded they surrender the culprit. If the demand was not fulfilled, three hundred arrested Jews would be held accountable. If Yatsevich indeed was a police agent, given the history of the “Okhrana” in staging provocations, its involvement in the events of September 27 may cast doubts on spontaneous character of the pogrom. In addition, given the rivalry among different administrative and police branches, it is possible that the pogrom instigators might have aimed at undermining Bobrinskii’s position.40

When willing, Russian authorities were capable of preventing or at least mitigating anti-Jewish violence. On October 4, another assault on Jews in Lwów ended with two fatalities. Another rumor served as trigger, when word spread that a Jewish barber had slit the throat of a Russian soldier. The Cossacks again went on a rampage mugging several

40 Jewish hostages were released upon the provision that they would be arrested should any "unrest" take place. Janusz, 293 dni, pp. 166, 171; Schall, Żydostwo galicyjskie, pp. 13-14. The “Ochrana” was a special unit of the Tsarist political police which acted independently from the regular police and the Gendarmerie Department, and was subordinated to a city governor, or to a chief of police. Yeroshkin, Istoria gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdений, pp. 229-230.
Jews and killing two in the ghetto. This time, however, the intervention of a Russian officer prevented further excesses. Attempts to protect Jews, however, entailed the danger of incurring the wrath of pogromists, and only individuals of personal courage dared to stand up to drunken and violent officers and soldiers.41

The Russian Administration and Its Nationality Policies

As Russian troops poured into Galicia, they were immediately followed by members of the imperial administration poised to solidify Russian rule. On September 3 the Stavka issued a decree delineating the rules for the governance of the newly conquered province. The occupied parts of Galicia were combined into General-Government headed by a general-governor who was subordinated to the Quartermaster-General of the South-Western front, Lieutenant-General A. Zabelin (in December of 1914 he was replaced by Lieutenant-General A. Mavrin).42 The general-governor enjoyed almost unlimited power in the General-Government, and could impose martial law, collect taxes, or deport individuals considered hostile to the Russian cause.43

Until the General-Governor took his seat, it was the army that held the highest authority in Galicia. In Lwów the army commenced its rule by requesting sixteen

41 AAN, “Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie,” Box 61, [Wieśeński Kurjer Polski, 2 October 1915]; “Sekretnaia perepiska,” TsDIAUuK, 363/1/70, p. 3; “O besporiankakh.” Ibid., 361/1/959, pp. 1-5; “O proishaestviakh.” Ibid., 361/1/960, pp. 27.
42 Among other responsibilities, the general-quartermaster also participated in operational planning. The Handbook of the Russian Army, p. 27.
hostages, four for each ethno-religious group, Jews, Poles, Ukrainians, and Russophiles. Especially suspicious of nationally conscious Greek-Catholic Ukrainians, whom the Russians labeled "mazepists," the Russian command ordered the arrests of Greek-Catholic priests and prominent Ukrainian leaders suspected of a pro-Austrian orientation. By direct orders of General Brusilov, Metropolitan Andrej Sheptyts'kyi was detained and deported to Russia. The attitude towards the Jews manifested itself immediately when on September 11, the Lwów military commandant, General Sergei Sheremetiev, summoned five prominent Jews to his quarters. The general accused the Galician Jewry of cutting telephone lines, selling alcohol, and lowering the value of the ruble. Should these crimes continue, warned Sheremetiev, he would not hesitate to punish the Jews with all the severity of wartime laws.

On September 18, the army promulgated an order which prohibited the sale of liquor and banned all clubs and educational facilities except regular schools. Publications in foreign languages of a "hostile disposition" were forbidden. In addition, a "Provisionary Statute" prohibited schooling in German and Yiddish and stipulated the dismissal of German and Jewish teachers. The majority of Jewish government employees

in cities and towns were fired, and in Lwów, where there had been more than ten Jewish elders, only three retained their posts.\textsuperscript{46}

Army rule nominally ended on September 18, when the newly appointed General-Governor of Galicia arrived in Lwów to assume his responsibilities. The post of General-Governor was conferred upon Lieutenant-General Count George Bobrinskii, who in 1904-1905 had served at the Supreme Command, and since 1910 had been in the War Ministry. Bobrinskii had a limited knowledge of the region he was to govern. It appears that he owed his appointment to the good offices of the Grand Duke with whom he had once served, and to the fame of his cousin Vladimir Bobrinskii, an ardent Pan-Slavist, whose name was popular among Galician Russophiles.\textsuperscript{47}

Jewish contemporaries often portrayed George Bobrinskii as an ardent anti-Semite. In September 1914, Chaim Weizmann stressed that the appointment of the “notorious” Bobrinskii to the post of General-Governor portended ill for the Jews.\textsuperscript{48} However, while Bobrinskii shared anti-Jewish biases, as General-Governor he displayed no special anti-Jewish propensities. The notoriety that he attained among the Jews most


likely emanated from the fact that in his capacity as General-Governor he personified the hated Russian rule, and also to the anti-Semitic diatribes of his cousin Vladimir Bobrinskii. Whatever racialist sentiments George Bobrinskii may have entertained, they paled in comparison to the morbid anti-Semitism of his two superiors, General Yanushkevich and the Grand Duke Nicholas.

While the General-Governor enjoyed wide powers in the region under his jurisdiction, in reality Galicia became a dual power regime. Galicia was divided into four provinces -- Lwów, Tarnopol, Czernowizt, and later Przemyśl -- headed by provincial governors. Similarly to the territorial organization of the Empire, districts, cities, and towns were governed by chiefs (nachal' niki uezdov and gradonachal' niki). Governors and chiefs were subordinated to the General-Governor. In each province, district, and town the army had its own representatives, commandants, who ran army supply depots, hospitals, and reserve units. The commandants were answerable to divisional and corps commanders located in a given town or city, who, in turn, had their own superiors in the persons of army commanders Brusilov and N. Ruzskii (the latter was replaced in September 1914 by Lieutenant-General Radko-Dmitriev). The two generals could issue their own directives and orders, and often acted without consent of the General-Governor. The multiplicity of security branches in the General-Government also did not contribute to the smooth functioning of the occupation apparatus. As a part of the military

administration, the Temporary Gendarme Department headed by Colonel Mezentsov (Mezentsev) was directly subordinated to Bobrinskii. However, the gendarmes had their own commander, the Chief of the Gendarme Corps, whose instructions would often run afoul of those of the General-Governor. The regular police was in the hands of the governors and chiefs, and Bobrinskii had also at his disposal a military counterintelligence branch which was to combat spies and saboteurs alongside the army counterintelligence offices. All the aforementioned offices vied for supremacy and were often at odds with each other. Accordingly, their directives and actions with regards to the Jews were hectic, frequently contradicted one another, and lacked organizational planning. These factors became major impediments to a full-scale, comprehensive anti-Jewish assault.  

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Since the Russian government and the military had long perceived Galicia as "primordial" Russian territory, from the beginning of the war both attempted to win the population to the Russian cause. To underline the kinship between Russians and Ukrainians, on August 18 the Supreme Commander appealed to the latter postulating Russian aims in Galicia. He accentuated that the Russian army was realizing the long-cherished dreams of Russian rulers, the unification of all Russian lands into one state. To win at least the obedience of the Polish people, in another appeal on August 27 Nicholas implied that all Polish territories would be reunited under Russian rule and called for a joint Russo-Polish front against the Central Powers. As a proof of their good will, Russian troops distributed to the population foodstuffs, wood, salt, and oil appropriated

from the stores (particularly Jewish) whose owners had fled before the invasion. The
Russian press emphasized the common roots of Russians and Ukrainians, and at the same
time insinuated that Jews controlled Galicia’s economy.52

Protestations of fraternal unity between “brother-Slavs,” however, almost
immediately ran afoul of the reality of the occupation. A number of restrictions severely
curtailed the cultural and economic freedom of the region. Orders were issued to
surrender all firearms, forbade liquor sales, and banned educational institutions and
schooling in “hostile” languages. Work hours of stores and restaurants were limited, and
travel was circumscribed. The Russian ruble was made a monetary medium at a much
higher rate than before the war, 30 kopeks for one Austrian kron (in peacetime the rate
was 60 kopeks for one kron). Correspondence was accepted only in Russian, German,
Polish, Czech, Romanian, French and English languages; letters and telegrams in Yiddish
and Ukrainian were destroyed.53

52 Niva: illustrirovannyj zhurnal literaturey, politiki i sovremennoi zhizni, 16 (28) August
1914, n. 33, p. 1. Pravitel’svennyj vestnik,” 10 October 1914, n. 238, 12 November
1914, n. 258, Armeiskii vestnik, 17 August 1914, n. 4, 24 August 1914, n. 7; also,
“Perepiska kantselarii Glavkoma,” RGvia, 2005/1/13, p. 407; Galitsia i Rossia (Moscow:
“Moskovskoe Pechatnoe Proizvodstvo, 1914); A. Burchak, Galitsia, eya proshloe i
nastoiashchee (Moscow: knigoizdatel’stvo “Chitatel’,” 1914); A.V. Belgorodskii,
Galitsia -- iskonnoe dostoyanie Rossii (n.p.: Izdatel’stvo tovarishchestva I.D. Syrins,
1914); Zavoevanie Vostochnoi Galitsii (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Sytina, 1914); A.
Chervinskii, Galitsia, eya proshlaia sudba i nastoiashchee polozhenie (Riazan’:
Tipografia “Bratstva sv. Vasilia,” 1915); E. Vulfson, Galitsia, eya mimvshye sudby i
sovremennoe polozhenie (St. Petersburg: Tipografia “Kolokol,” 1915); An. Varinovich,
Galichina v eya proshlom i nastoiashchem (Moscow: “Zadruga,” 1915). For distribution
of goods by the Russians, see Ukrainische Nachrichten, n. 40, 19 June 1915, pp. 3-4.
“Perepiska z komanduiushchim armiei,” Ibid, 2005/1/12 (1), pp. 16-17, 20; L’vovskoe
Voennoe Slovo, n. 23, 23 October 1914, p. 1; Prikarpatskaia Rus’, 5 November 1914, n.
1449, p. 2.
On September 23, Bobrinskii addressed the Russophile and Polish delegations and laid out his vision of Russian rule in Galicia. He assured the gathering that the Russian army had come to Galicia to free “brother-Slavs” from the Austrian “yoke.” Bobrinskii guaranteed all residents freedom of language and religion, and promised that the inner life of the people would not be disturbed. He also pledged to the Jewish representatives, two rabbis and the city vice-mayor Filip Schleicher, the safety of the Jewish community. In exchange, Jews were to abide by the law. Otherwise, admonished the General-Governor, the consequences would be dire. It portended particularly ill for the Jews when Bobrinskii declared that Galicia was a “primordial” Russian land, in which he intended to impose the Russian language and law. Any interference with the new order would be severely punished. Two days later, September 25, the clock on the Lwów city hall tower was switched to St. Petersburg time. A new era was ushered in for Galicia.

The discrepancies between Russian promises and policies quickly alienated even those circles in Galicia which had initially been well-disposed to Russian troops. Official announcements of intentions to establish “peace and justice,” were predicated, in the mind of the Russian military, on the proper conduct of the population. Since “proper” conduct had a very loose definition, it was no surprise that the Russians were soon seeking out potential enemies. From the Russian point of view, “mazepist” aspirations originated in Galicia, and soldiers of Ukrainian background might be exposed to this virus. Russian troops often engaged in conversations with villagers. The latter, in exchange for

cigarettes, supplied their protagonists with books in Ukrainian, or shared their experiences of living in Austro-Hungary. Such instances of “free-thinking” alarmed Russian authorities, as did the reports of Ukrainian political and military groups that participated in propaganda activities and partisan struggle behind Russian lines.55

Accordingly, the Russian administration undertook measures to eradicate the “mazepists.” While initially shop owners were allowed to display signboards in Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian, the latter soon were removed. Activities of Ukrainian organizations were portrayed as a “betrayal” of Slavdom, and their property and assets were appropriated by the Russians. Ukrainian newspapers were closed and teachers were brought from the Empire to introduce the Russian language in schools. Later in the war, mass proselytizing to Orthodoxy affected entire villages. For instance, in November 1914, the newspaper of the military administration, _Lvovskoe Voennoe Slovo_, reported that in the course of two months 30,000 Ukrainians had converted to Orthodoxy. Speaking in Lwów on December 7, 1914, the Russian Archbishop Evlogii emphasized that Orthodoxy was a dominant religion in Galicia and that Russian army had come to enforce the “reunification” of the Galician-“Russians” with their mother country.56


Russian attitudes towards the Polish population were also a continuation of the pre-war "carrot-and-stick" policy. While more than a century of Russian rule in the Congress Kingdom had convinced the government that Poles remained implacable enemies, the political situation during the war advised a more cautious approach to the problem. Russian leaders appreciated the strength of Polish political groups and the economic power of the Polish nobility, and the appeal of the Supreme Commander in August 1914 was but one attempt at Polish-Russian reconciliation. After the occupation of Galicia the bulk of Polish civil employees retained their posts, several newspapers were allowed to function, and the Roman-Catholic church was not molested. Nevertheless, strict censorship controlled the press and schooling, and Polish politicians suspected of anti-Russian orientation as well as a number of Polish officers were deported to Russia. Nor did Russia's claims to Galicia as the "primordial Russian lands" endear it to Poles, who did not fail to see the menace in such a declaration.  

Relations between Russian authorities and civilians were further aggravated by new prohibitions and regulations. On November 9, the newspaper Pravitelstvennyi vestnik published a decree which stipulated that the property of "hostile elements" was liable for confiscation. Two days later it was announced that individuals who committed war crimes such as sedition and espionage, and resisted Russian authorities were to be

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tried by courts martial.\textsuperscript{58} Bobrinskii also announced that bank accounts of persons “hostile to Russia” would be confiscated. However, since the Austrians retaliated by announcing that the same measures would be taken against Russian deposits in Austrian banks, the confiscation was postponed. The Russian Council of Ministers could not decide whether Galicia should be treated as an integral part of Russia, as Russian propaganda maintained, or still as an occupied territory. In the latter case, bank accounts could be “lawfully” confiscated. The ever-zealous Yanushkevich insisted that Galicia be “equalized” with Russia and thus made liable to imperial laws. Finally, on November 28, a new decree stipulated that payments to customers outside the occupied territories be stopped; the full implementation of Russian laws was put on hold until the end of the war.\textsuperscript{59}

\textit{Seeing the “Internal Enemy”: Motivation for Repression}

In some respects Galician Jews experienced the same hardships as did their non-Jewish compatriots. They were subjected to economic regulations, arbitrary requisitions, limitations on movement, and prohibitions of language and schooling. Yet, unlike their neighbors, Jews had to endure suffering of a different nature. If for the Russians the assimilation of Ukrainians and co-optation of the Poles seemed feasible, neither option was even considered with regards to the Jews. The first two months of the war intensified

hatred for the Jews to such a degree that the “Jewish problem” soon came to occupy a central place in Russian policy-making along the entire Eastern front. At the beginning of the invasion, the Russians declared their intent to “liberate” the population from the foreign “yoke” whose epitome in the region ostensibly was the Jews. By the end of September, the regime initiated mass dismissals of Jewish employees from Galician civil offices and courts. This mass removal of the Jews from the social and economic sphere was to serve two purposes -- to reconcile the non-Jewish population to the foreign rule at the expense of Jews, and to consolidate its rule by economic and administrative changes.\textsuperscript{59}

Jewish land-owning and land-leasing in Galician villages were a special concern for the Russian administration. Within the Empire, Russian laws restricted Jews from residing in villages and owning property outside cities and towns of the Pale of Settlement. Jewish farmers, however, were allowed to settle in colonies in south Russia, Belorussia, and Bessarabia, where many engaged in agriculture. In Galicia, the number of Jews who owned land and made their living from agriculture was larger than in Russia, and Jews leased land from both Polish landlords and Ukrainian peasants. From the Russian point of view, this position of the Jews in Galician villages constituted the sole basis of Jewish economic power in the region. The issue was to be addressed immediately, and already in mid-September the Stavka sent the vice-director of its diplomatic bureau, Chamberlain (\textit{kamerger}) N. Basili, to Galicia, to investigate the issue on the spot. On September 23, Basili reported to Yanushkevich. Knowing full well the expectations of his boss, Basili

\textsuperscript{59}“Ob avstriiskom moratoriume,” TsDIAUuK, 361/1/156, pp. 15, 30, 31-32, 33-34; Janusz, \textit{Dokumenty urzędowe}, p. 35.
asserted that the Ukrainian population of Galicia was well disposed to Russians and expected the army would to free them from the "Jewish yoke." A certain restraint in their attitude, explained Basili, should be ascribed to the fear of Austrian reprisals. Jews, on the other hand, were united in their hostility to Russia. Basili repeated the accusations of the army that Jews were damaging telephone lines, withdrawing coinage from circulation, and jacking up prices. To strike at the Jews and to win over Ukrainians to the Russian cause, he suggested the imposition of Russian imperial laws in Galicia, and the confiscation of Jewish land holdings. The latter, which averaged 7% of total land-holdings, were inflated by Basili to 35%.61

Basili’s report was accepted at face value by the Grand Duke, who wrote on the margin that the army should give the Jews a “lesson” (ostrastka).62 The report made an even stronger impression on Yanushkevich, and he integrated it into his own memorandum to Prime-Minister Goremykin on October 2. While he delegated the Polish and Ukrainian questions to long-range concerns, which were to be approached gradually and cautiously, the Jewish question was to be dealt with instantly. Yanushkevich repeated Basili’s accusations that Jews were mortal enemies of the Russian state and that the war provided a rare opportunity to appropriate the property of Jews who had fled Galicia. The

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Chief of Staff stressed that the Russian government implement “every possible means” to combat the Jewish peril, and that the Supreme Commander had already approved a plan to that effect. Finally, Yanushkevich suggested that the “ultimate” solution to the Jewish question in Galicia was to be carried out concomitantly with the same measures undertaken in Russia.63

The backbone of Jewish power should be broken by the official abolition of Jewish land-owning. War, insisted Yanushkevich, provided an opportunity to carry out this measure without much fuss, once Galician Jews were “granted” Russian citizenship and treated as subjects of the Russian Empire. Their deportation east of the Pale of Settlement and the subsequent confiscation of land would then pose no legal problems. The urgings of the Chief of Staff, however, fell on deaf ears. The government felt that the status of Galicia should be decided after the war, since measures regarding land-owning would antagonize Polish landowners, a power to be reckoned with. Therefore, much to Yanushkevich’s chagrin, Goremykin replied that it was premature to make decisions about Jewish citizenship, and Galician Jews, he implied, were still to be treated as the subjects of Austro-Hungary.64

Talk of Jewish property in Galicia reflected discussions going on at the very top of Russia’s state hierarchy. From mid-October to early November, the Council of Ministers

"Perepiska armii so shtabom Generalnogo Gubernatora," RGVIA, 2005/1/13, p. 11. Yanushkevich, however, was aware that persecution of the Jews might cause remonstrations of the Allies.
debated property rights of Russian citizens of German, Austrian, and Turkish background. Anti-German propaganda, which had gained momentum after the beginning of the war, voiced fears of the army that German colonies in Russia would become a nest of espionage and anti-Russian activities.\(^{65}\)

As the Chief of Staff struggled to actuate his policy views on the Jewish question in Galicia, various offices were troubled by similar concerns. The chief of the Lwów district, Count Lamsdorf, in a report, (likely to the chancellery of the General-Government), complained of “pernicious” Jewish influences within the local administration and the police. The “Jewish danger,” concluded Lamsdorf, could be foiled only through the forcible sale of Jewish-owned land. Lamsdorf accused Jews of “inciting” Russian troops to wreak destruction on the Galician countryside and corrupting the Russian police. The latter charged derived from the fact that Russian Jews had furnished their Galician brethren with “compromising” service records of Russian policemen who had been transferred to Galicia. Fearing blackmail, the hapless police became a mere tool in Jewish hands.\(^{66}\)

The plethora of accusations by other Russian officials followed the same pattern. Thus, the Żółkiew district chief reported to the Lwów governor that in the village of Żółtaniec Jews and “mazepists” intimidated peasants by predicting a forthcoming return


of the Austrians. The chief of the Rawa Ruska district, the collegiate assessor Golubev, also blamed the Jews for undermining Russia's war efforts. He went further than his colleagues and stated that in their anti-Russian zeal the Jews even forsook a profitable deal in preference for sabotage in the army rear. Golubev claimed that after Rawa became the center of field and reserve hospitals, Jews refused to sell meat to the army, condemning wounded soldiers to starvation. On November 3, another Russian official, Equerry Chikhachev, in a letter to General Zabelin, also stressed the favorable moment for the "solution of the Jewish question"-- the confiscation of Jewish land and the deportation of Jewish lessees and landowners to Russia. He pointed out that after the war the "philo-semitic" stance of the Allies would impede any radical anti-Jewish measures. Nor should the question be relegated to the Duma, where the abolition of Jewish land-owning would be opposed by liberals and Polish nationalists. Bobrinskii, who also received a copy of this letter, agreed with the author that some solution to the Jewish problem had to be found.

He maintained, however, that it should be implemented only after the war. As a first step, on November 16, Bobrinskii petitioned Zabelin to create a special committee to investigate the issue of Jewish land-holding in Galicia.

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All of the aforementioned proposals to solve the Jewish question in Galicia manifested a new shift in occupational policies. Traditional anti-Semitism, based on age-old religious, economic, and social stereotypes and animosities, received a powerful

impetus during the initial stages of the Russian occupation. Rumors of Jewish sabotage facilitated the resolve of the Russian military to step up anti-Jewish reprisals.

Radicalization of Russian national policies was also prompted by mass resettlement of potentially unreliable ethnic minorities outside of Galicia. In its pre-war contingency plans, the Stavka looked with growing anxiety at Russian Germans, Jews, and later, after Turkey entered the war, Muslims. Ten days prior to the declaration of war, the Russian military introduced a new measure that became a hallmark of the struggle on the Eastern Front: the transfer of masses of people from strategically important areas. On July 20, 1914, the Russian General Staff and the Ministry of the Interior issued orders to the army to deport German citizens from several areas in Courland, around Riga and Suvalki.69

Soon thereafter the command of the South-Western military district ordered the deportation of German and Austro-Hungarian citizens within its jurisdiction to beyond the Ural Mountains. Initially, the military aimed at preventing able-bodied foreign males from being drafted into enemy armies, but starting in mid-August deportations also included women, children, and the elderly. At the same time, the first deportations of Russian Jews accused of assisting the enemy began in Congress Poland. Russian suspicions were magnified by German propaganda directed at Polish Jews, and preferential treatment accorded to them by the troops of the Central Powers. Deportations from Poland were

further prompted by the proclamations of Galician and Bukovinian Jews encouraging their co-religionists to struggle against Russian despotism.\(^7\)

On October 5, the Director of the Police Department sent a copy of such a proclamation to the Stavka. Issued in August of 1914, it called upon the Jews to stand firm by the Austro-Hungarian crown in the struggle against “barbarity,” and to fight Russia by all possible “means and sacrifices.” Yanushkevich hastened to send it to the Tsar to demonstrate the “ill” intentions of the Jews towards the Empire. Accordingly, the army began taking Jewish hostages to ensure the security of Russian communications, and it stepped up deportations of Jews and Germans from Congress Poland and Galicia. The military also complained to Nicholas II, who visited the Western Front at the end of October, about alleged Jewish sabotage, without, however, providing any proof. While Nicholas II may have consented to harsher measures against the Jews, the army needed no special permission to that effect, since the pre-war “The Regulations for Field Administration of the Army in Wartime” empowered the Supreme Command to take any security measures it deemed necessary.\(^71\)

Hostage-taking accelerated in mid-October, and the first secretary of the Stavka’s diplomatic bureau, V. Muraviev wrote to the Foreign Minister Sazonov that these measures were “bearing good results.” Muraviev denied that atrocities were perpetrated

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against civilians, and stressed that "strict means" were applied only to Jews who had persecuted the Russophiles during the Russian retreat from Bukovina.\textsuperscript{72}

The deportations of Germans and Jews in Congress Poland reverberated in Galicia. On October 3, General Ivanov issued an order which emphasized the increased "espionage activities of the Jews, German colonists, and the vagabonds of different kinds."

Henceforth, troops of the South-Western front were authorized to act "with determination" and to use arms against individuals suspected of spying.\textsuperscript{73} On November 27, the Supreme Commander quoted anti-Russian addresses from Jewish newspapers in Germany. He proclaimed Jews the most resolute of Russia's enemies and authorized the execution of Jewish hostages "in case of necessity." At the same time, the military administration in Galicia ordered the first deportations of potentially unreliable Jews to Tomsk and Yenisei provinces.\textsuperscript{74} As the authorities kept to perfunctory legal proceedings, the numbers of deported were initially small -- sixty-five people in November and December, and after investigation some charges were dropped. For example, in December of 1914 two Jews were charged with anti-Russian agitation in Zólkiew. The deputy chief of the Zólkiew district Muranovich investigated the affair and released the suspects after no evidence of their wrongdoing was found. By the end of the year, however, Russian


\textsuperscript{73} "Dokumenty o presledovaniakh evreev," Arkhiv Russkoi Revolutsii, vol. XIX, p. 247.

officials had increasingly thrown all legalities to the wind and deported Jews on trumped-up charges.  

The army's stigmatizing assertions were also congruent with the reports of security and police branches among whom the fear of Jews was as pervasive. The Gendarme Department compiled lists of potential trouble-makers in Galicia, listing Jews as the number one enemy. However, besides engaging in anti-Semitic rhetoric, these "eyes and ears" of the Tsarist regime possessed limited knowledge of the social and economic structure of the Jewish community in Galicia. This ignorance manifested itself in numerous reports in which the subordinates of Colonel Mezentsov lumped together Zionists, socialists, and the Orthodox as parts of a single, united group. The gendarmes emphasized that Jews, Poles, and Ukrainian "mazepists" were Russia's most inveterate foes. While Poles spearheaded anti-Russian activities, Jews played a crucial role as the main ideological and financial force that propped up the principal Polish newspapers and prepared an armed rising. Especially pernicious were the Orthodox as the most ardent supporters of the Austrian government, while secret Jewish organizations provided liaison between Jewish, Polish, and Ukrainian plotters and Vienna.

Messages sent to superiors by the army counterintelligence service, headed in wartime by gendarme officers, were of the same dubious quality. Used to combat revolutionary groups in the Empire, their merit in combating espionage in the front zone was described by a senior Russian officer as useless. The counterintelligence branch.

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subordinated directly to the General-Governor, was similarly ineffective and, in the words of Bobrinskii, they did not “succeed in capturing a single spy.”

Since the 

*Stavka* and army had no evidence of Jewish sabotage, they based their actions on reports provided by security branches. The gendarmes and the counterintelligence, in turn, also had no proof to back up their “conspiracy theories,” and based their reports largely on rumors, knowing full well that their superiors would not look thoroughly at submitted evidence and would take it at face value. For example, arrests of Jews were often based on possession of a pocket mirror classified as a signal device, or a piece of barbed wire and telephone cable, purported to be evidence of subversive activities and intentions.

“Preventive measures” against Jews included most uninhibited thievery by the local administration and army. When telephone lines were damaged in the vicinity of 

*Kożomyja* (possibly by peasants who often used cable for household purposes), the governor Lobanov-Rostovskii threatened the Jewish community with a heavy fine. Should they fail to pay the fine in three days, the whole community would be expelled. In fact, the 

*Kożomyja* commandant Sechin imposed a heavy fine upon the Jews without any visible

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reasons. Terrorized by plundering and constant requisitions by the commandant and passing troops, Jews paid the large sum of 100,000 kron in cash and gave up valuables. In Lwów, Baron Eiche ordered Jewish shops to be opened on Saturday, and threatened them with confiscation of goods if the order were not followed. A heavy fine was imposed on the city of Stanisławów -- 36,000 kron for Jews and 14,000 for non-Jews. However, only the Jewish part was collected. 80

At least half of all Russian officials in Galicia appointed as city and district chiefs had previously served in the army, or were recalled from the reserve; the commandants were cadre officers. For the majority it was the first time to hold both military and civil power, and they apparently saw little difference between the two. Moreover, a sense of independence from distant superiors bred beliefs that they could rule as they pleased. As products of their time, many held anti-Jewish sentiments, and they did not scruple to take from the Jews whatever struck their fancy, or have Jews flogged for not complying with ransom demands. From the beginning of the Russian occupation, the practice of extorting money from Jews became common. Jews were routinely accused of various transgressions, detained, and released upon the payment of a ransom. 81

Similarly corrupt were the police. An observer from Russia noticed that corruption within all security branches was rampant, and prisons were crowded with people whose only fault was that they were unable to bribe the police. Policemen,

80 "Zvit kolomyis'koho starostva pro shkody," TsDIAuL, 146/4/5335, no page; Prikarpatskaia Rus', 17 October 1914, n. 1433, pp. 3-4. Out of the total amount collected, 3,000 kron was used for setting up street kitchens. Spund, Die Schreckenherrschaft, p. 48.
especially on a district level, were individuals of low capacity and a “dubious” past, who, left without supervision, behaved like “little satraps.” The same opinion was reiterated by another Russian official who admitted that the police personnel in Galicia were normally “cast-offs” from Russia whom their previous superiors had “gladly disposed of.”

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The radicalization of anti-Jewish policies brought to the fore disagreements between the General-Governor and the Stavka. Bobrinskii, while sharing a belief in Jewish sabotage, objected to the army’s heavy-handed rule as impeding the smooth functioning of the administration and the economic life of the region. The prime factor behind Bobrinskii’s reasoning, however, was the fear of large-scale Jewish sabotage in the army rear. On December 16, 1914, General Zabelin demanded that Russian Jews be forbidden to enter Galicia and Galician Jews be barred from entering the Empire. Bobrinskii opposed this measure, arguing that these measures would facilitate Jewish resistance and impede the functioning of the military administration. He suggested that the prohibition of the Jewish movement in Galicia ought to be implemented discreetly, without much noise. Since the Quartermaster-General was adamant, on December 26 Bobrinskii appealed to General Ivanov and complained of Zabelin’s political shortsightedness. Zabelin was backed up by the Chief of Staff of the South-Western front, Lieutenant-General Mikhail Alekseev, who reminded Bobrinskii that the directive originated from the Supreme

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Commander. Alekseev, nevertheless, conceded that the decree had to be carried out gradually.83

The Stavka intervened immediately. Yanushkevich would have no truck with such "niceties," and in an offensive tone he sharply reprimanded Bobrinskii for "toleration" of massive Jewish espionage in Galicia. The Chief of Staff insisted that the decree be immediately carried out and that brutal reprisals against Jews were the only means to break Jewish resistance. As life in the General-Government became unbearable for Jews, it would prompt their mass exodus abroad. Finally, a compromise was reached whereby Yanushkevich and Zabelin consented to a discreet prohibition of the Jewish movement. Bobrinskii, in turn, was authorized to expel Russian Jews who had come to Galicia.84

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How did Galician Jews react to the torments that befell them during the opening stages of the war? After all, the utmost fear of the Russian military was a mighty and coordinated Jewish opposition, which allegedly included sabotage, anti-Russian propaganda, armed resistance, and international financial pressure on the Russian government. In reality, however, Jews were able neither to protect themselves from Russian persecution nor influence any great power to apply pressure on Russia on their behalf. The outbreak of the war and the swift Russian advance took Galician Jews by surprise as much as their co-religionists in Courland, Congress Poland, and Bukovina. Hundreds of thousands of Galician Jews, including political activists, fled to cities within

83"Ob ograničenii prav," TsDIAuK, 361/1/239, pp. 1-5.
their respective regions, or to Austria, Hungary, and the Czech lands. Russian terror demoralized those who stayed in Galicia, while Jews were too deeply divided along ideological lines to offer any concrete counteraction to Russia. The traditional pacifism of Orthodox Jews effectively prevented the Galician Jewish community from engaging in any kind of resistance, while the most active elements among socialists and Zionists fled westward during the Russian invasion. Within the first six months of the occupation Jews practically disappeared from any positions of influence, and confiscations, pogroms, and undisguised robberies by the Russian army and administration left entire Jewish communities economically ruined.

A fear of reprisals and utmost despair gripped Jewish communities exposed to exorbitant fines or conscripted into labor details. An-Ski, during his passage through Galicia in fall and winter of 1914-1915, found no Jews on trains or in railroad stations. They moved at night on country roads, circumventing larger towns, often under guard of a soldier whom they had hired. Jewish shops, synagogues, and warehouses had been either plundered or appropriated by the local military; the local population took over empty Jewish houses or simply dismantled them for firewood. All forms of Jewish civil life disappeared. City mayors, often Russian-installed Russophiles, shut down Jewish schools, and children begged on streets or turned to prostitution.85

The Jewish leadership tried to alleviate the plight of the Jews by raising money for aid, setting up kitchens for the homeless, and negotiating with Russian authorities. Due to their efforts, in January of 1915 Bobrinskii permitted the Lwów community to set up an aid committee headed by a Petersburg Jew, David Feinberg. The committee collected and distributed to Jews medical and financial aid, food, and clothing. The distribution of foreign aid, largely from American Jews, was often taken over by the Russian administration. The aid, however, was inadequate given the numbers of the needy. The majority of the Jews, therefore, tried simply to survive by any means. Many turned to speculation, causing further resentment by the military and the Christian population. Some bravehearts collected arms on battlefields and sold them to Russian merchants, who, free of ideological prejudices, came to Galicia in large numbers and bought wholesale everything of value.

Russian reports of Jewish resistance sometimes contained a grain of truth. The resentment of the Jews towards the occupiers was reflected in certain forms of civic resistance. When columns of German and Austrian POWs were escorted through Galician cities and towns, many Jews, alongside Poles and Ukrainians, provided them with food, clothing, or tobacco. In a number of localities Jews sheltered Austrian POW escapees and Jewish deserters from the Russian army. In Brody, city chief Evreinov threatened to shut down the synagogues and levy “severe punishment” on Jews who hid Austrian POWs from Russian camps. After some Galician towns and villages were liberated, Jewish

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86“O evreiakh,” TsDIAUuK, 361/2/10, p. 1; Schall, Żydostwo galicyjskie, p. 16.
87Janusz, 293 dni, p. 66; Maciszewski, Rosjanie we Lwowie, p. 18.
informants denounced to Austrian authorities Poles and Ukrainians who had collaborated with the Russians.\textsuperscript{88}

According to Russian reports, Jews were most active in spreading rumors of Russia's misfortunes on battlefields and predicting the inevitable return of Austrian troops.\textsuperscript{89} While it can be taken for granted that neither Poles nor Ukrainians were less prone to hearsay than Jews, the latter, subjected to the most brutal horrors of the Russian occupation, disseminated rumors to defy their oppressors and verbalize hopes for forthcoming liberation.

All the aforementioned episodes, however, scarcely measured up to the wave of charges proffered against Jews by the Russian military. With little proof of Jewish resistance, the security branches and the Stavka appealed to emotions rather than the reasoning capacities of generals and soldiers, stressing that all Jews, Russian and foreign, rich and poor, religious and secular, were hostile and intrinsically evil. Treatment of Jews, therefore, depended much upon the willingness of a local commandant, an official, or a military judge to separate rumors from proven events and act upon the latter. This the majority of Russian officials refused to do.

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If the Russian administration had endeavored to evaluate its five-month rule by the end of 1914, it would have had little positive to report. Contrary to expectations, the combination of military and civil powers in the hands of the army had created a multiplicity


\textsuperscript{89} See, for example, \textit{Russkoe Voennoe Slovo}, 30 September 1914, n. 4, p. 1; n. 5, 2 October 1914, p. 6; n. 8, 5 October 1914, p. 2.
of bodies loosely connected with one another. While the Stavka bombarded the military administration with new proposals, army and front commanders in Galicia acted as they pleased within their own zone of jurisdiction. The administration also had no say with corps, divisional, and depot commanders who received their orders from their respective superiors. The relationship between the occupational regime and the Christian population was at its lowest point, the latter exasperated by fixed prices, restrictions, and requisitions. Promises of “justice and order” had long been abandoned for war necessities. Police surveillance and arrests of “unreliables” had promoted an atmosphere of fear and instability in the region. Economic difficulties had resulted in the overcrowding of towns and cities.

Most ominous, however, was Russia’s situation on the front and in the rear. Although by January 1915 all Eastern Galicia was occupied and the Hungarian plains lay exposed to Russian invasion, Russian armies had suffered a serious setback in northeastern Poland at Augustów. A major offensive in the Carpathians had also bogged down. Huge casualties — in the first five months of the war Russian lost over a million killed and wounded — clearly indicated to the Russian leadership that the war had just begun. Total war and economic mobilization was the only solution to the dire situation. Military defeat had to be ascribed to reasons other than mere incompetence, ill discipline, and corruption. Treachery and espionage were seen everywhere, even in the General Staff and the Tsar’s palace. The enemy seemed to have first-rate information on Russian movements and the state of economy, and ethnic groups suspected of hostility to the Empire were increasingly targeted by the Russian army. Jews especially were perceived as a unified, well organized, and crafty foe capable of debilitating Russia’s war efforts. The
inability to find a viable solution to curb Jewish resistance prompted the Russian High Command to intensify the mass resettlement of Jews from sensitive strategic areas.\textsuperscript{90}

Chapter IV

RUSSIA'S INTERNAL FRONT: MARCH 1915-OCTOBER 1917

During the first six months of the war the efforts of the Russian military to bring Galicia into line with the rest of the Empire demonstrated the gap between grand imperial visions and the realities of occupation policies. For such a task, the military lacked three main assets: substantial funds, trained administrators acquainted with Galicia's regional peculiarities, and, ultimately, time. All three were well beyond the capacities of the Stavka and the General-Government. Failures to achieve the envisioned plans were attributed to the incompetence of various offices and the machinations of internal foes such as the "mazepists," Poles, and, overwhelmingly, the Jews. The resilience of the latter and their alleged resistance triggered waves of looting, requisitions, and pogroms throughout the Jewish quarters and shtetlach of the region.

Events in Galicia were only a small part of a larger campaign that was in the making along the Eastern Front. Although the period between August and December 1914 was replete with bloodshed and destruction wrought upon Russian and Galician Jews, the initial assault lacked an organized pattern. In early winter of 1915, however, the Russian military began to mount more coordinated efforts in its struggle against "internal enemies" in Congress Poland and Courland, and in the spring of 1915 it launched mass displacement of Jews and Germans from entire districts and provinces. Concomitantly,
the *Stavka* and the military administration stepped up expulsions of Galician Jews. These measures ran into considerable resistance from Russian authorities in the Empire and generated protests from the government and various political groups. In mid-summer of 1915, the military was forced to stop this policy.

This chapter traces the evolution of anti-Jewish policies, from prohibition of internal movement to large-scale expulsions, and examines the army’s attitudes towards Galician Jews as a reflection of political and social changes in the Empire.

*Expanding Imperial Space and Attempts at Social Redistribution*

During the first eight months of the war, the *Stavka* responded to the alleged Jewish sabotage in Congress Poland and Courland by forcibly evacuating thousands of civilians from the front zone to the Empire. In Eastern Galicia, however, the military had to deal with a half-million foreign Jews whose transfer to Russia was considered highly undesirable. In addition, the Russian advance westward in the fall of 1914 brought more Jews under Russian control, exactly at a time when the army was trying to get rid of them in Congress Poland and Courland. Therefore, from the beginning of the Russian occupation of Galicia the *Stavka* entertained several solutions to resolve the apparent deadlock. Economic restrictions, requisitions of property, and freezing of bank assets were used to expedite voluntary Jewish migration abroad.1 Yet, these measures as well as the dismissal of Jewish civil employees and the closing of markets caused mass internal migration of Jews rather than exodus abroad. By December 1914, more than 40,000 Jews
from the countryside had moved to Lwów alone. Other urban centers were also flooded with thousands of Jewish refugees, and the administration was unable to prevent the outbreak of epidemics and drastic economic shortages.2

As another step to speed up Jewish emigration, on December 16, 1914, the Council of Ministers and the Tsar signed a decree which stipulated that all Austro-Hungarian and German subjects were to leave the Russian Empire. The means for the realization of this measure in the front zone, were not, however, specified. In the midst of the war, passage to Austria or Hungary through Russian positions was out of the question since any Jew apprehended near the front line was imprisoned or tried for espionage. For example, on January 19, 1915, the Russians detained in a Lwów prison twenty-four Jewish families, altogether thirty-six adults and thirty-three children, who had tried to cross into Hungary. A voyage to a neutral country via Finland and Sweden required a substantial amount of money. Given the economic situation of Galician Jews at the beginning of 1915, only very few could afford such a trip.3

The Russian military ascribed the failure to provoke mass Jewish emigration to the unwillingness of Jews to leave Galicia, allegedly to carry on the anti-Russian struggle. These convictions were strengthened by police and counterintelligence reports which purported various Jewish transgressions such as collecting money and information for Turkey, a refusal to accept Russian coin, and the sheltering of dogs which belonged to the

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1*Prilozhenia k stenographicheskim otchetam*, p. 1.
2Schall, *Żydostwo galicyjskie*, p. 10.
Austro-Hungarian army. Prisons were full of suspects who spent months awaiting investigation or trial. Even when the administration tried to investigate such cases, the consistent lack of evidence made the task impossible. The numbers of imprisoned soon reached such proportions that on March 3, 1915, the Commander of the South-Western front ordered an inspection of the prisons to assess the validity of charges.

The Russian government, knew well the army’s abuses, but tried to keep up appearances before its allies and public opinion. Observers from Russia emphasized the complexity of the Jewish issue in Galicia and the good will of the administration in trying to solve the question in the “most positive way for the Jews.” While Russian nationalists in the Duma pressed for the annexation of Galicia and the abolition of Jewish land-holding, the government denied mass brutalities in the front zone. On February 8, speaking from the Duma rostrum, Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov labeled charges of pogroms and persecution as German propaganda: “if Jews suffered, it was due to the exigencies of war, which do not differentiate [between Jews and non-Jews].”

In mid-February a new phase was introduced into Russia’s struggle against “internal enemies,” when the Tsar signed the so-called Liquidation Law prepared by the

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6Prikarpatskaia Rus’, 20 February 1915, n. 1551, p. 5.
7 Gosudarstvennaja Duma: stenographicheskie otchety, 4th convocation, sessions 1-3, 27-29 January 1915, p. 15; L’ovskoe Voennoe Slovo, n. 112, 30 January 1915, p. 2; AAN, “Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie,” Box 61 [Wiederski Kurjer Polski, 8 April 1915]; Russkoie Znamia, 17 January 1915, n. 13, p. 2; “Sekretnye tsirkulare,” TsDIAUuK,
Council of Ministers. The Law provided for the liquidation of land-ownership by Austro-Hungarian and German subjects within 160 kilometers zone of the front line. Since the government still cherished hopes of winning Poles to the Russian cause, the property of Polish landowners in Galicia who had fled abroad was to be sequestrated rather than sold or confiscated. The Law signified an attempt by the government to change fundamentally the ethnic profile of the country's socio-economic sphere, and to bolster the Russian economy by nationalizing foreign property.

Yanushkevich interpreted the Law as a signal for an all-out attack on Jews. From his point of view, the military administration of Galicia had been inexcusably lenient towards Jews. Yanushkevich, therefore, stressed to Bobrinskii that since Jews continued to terrorize the local population, severe reprisals and confiscation of Jewish property should be launched immediately. Visibly offended, Bobrinskii retorted that he professed no leniency towards Jews, and that many Jewish warehouses had already been confiscated. The General-Governor could not resist adding that if Jewish "terror" had indeed taken place, it could have happened only within the army's zone of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, he ordered that the compilation of data on Jewish property in the region be stepped up.

The Liquidation Law was followed by an order from the Supreme Commander on

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385/7/102, 7ob.


February 26. Worded as a response to Jewish resistance, the order forbade Jews from entering Galicia and from moving from one district to another. Jewish spies and hostages would be hanged, and those who moved from place to place without permission would be liable to three months detention. A provision of the order mockingly exempted Jews who wished to resettle voluntarily to Siberia. Since deported individuals were allowed to have only 500 rubles per family, the order dealt a severe blow to Jews, who would have only minimal means to support their families on a long journey. The war severed Jewish economic ties with Austria and Russia, and the limitation on travel drastically reduced Jewish trade in Galicia. The February prohibition effectively shut them off from markets in neighboring districts. An immediate result of the decree was a rapid rise of prices and smuggling on an unprecedented scale. In turn, the administration bombarded the Stavka with reports on Jewish speculation.

On March 2, 1915, the Stavka prepared a memorandum which provided for the restructuring of the Galician judicial system and guaranteed legal protection to all nationalities. At the time of its issuance, however, the memorandum was a mere gesture. Pogroms, reprisals, and discriminatory decrees inflicted irreparable damage on the Jews.

The dismissal of Jewish employees was so thorough that by early April, in the nine districts of Galicia (including Western Galician districts of Lisko, Rymanów, Łańcut, Przeworsk, and Jarosław) out of seven hundred Jews employed in Austrian

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10 Bobrinski dated the decree as of February 11 (24).
11 "Shtab kreposti Peremyshl′," RGVIA, 13142/1/61, p. 94.
administration only thirteen retained their posts. In Tarnopol province all Jewish civil employees were fired. The Russians, however, could not afford to fire all professionals in judicial organs and hospitals. By the end of April, in spite of Yanushkevich, who urged the dismissal of all Jews, including clerks and doormen, fifty-five Jewish employees retained their positions in Galician provincial and district courts, the fire department, hospitals, and the detention system.¹³

Expulsions as Security Measures: Winter-Spring of 1915

The Liquidation Law and the order of the Supreme Commander were preceded by and in turn, facilitated the mass removal of Germans and Jews from the zones of the North-Western and Western fronts. Starting late December 1914, the Grand Duke, Yanushkevich, General Ruzkii (the former commander of the III Army in Galicia), and General N. Danilov gave orders to commanders in field to remove German residents from the areas of the Gulf of Finland and Riga Bay. In January and February 1915 the deportations affected the areas along the Vistula River, and near Kovno and Lublin. At the same time, Jews were expelled from the districts of Lublin and Płock, and more than 20,000 Jews were expelled from areas around Warsaw.¹⁴

The intensification of expulsions was to serve two purposes: to “cleanse” the

¹³"O litsakh iudeiskogo veroispovedania," TsDIAUuK, 361/1/553, pp. 1-12, 13-14, 18-23; "Perepiska kantselarii Glavkoma," RGVI A, 2005/1/13(10), pp. 430, 436, 440-442; Prikarpatskaia Rus’, n. 1665, 3 June 1915, p. 3; “Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie,” AAN, Box 61 [Kurjer Lwowski, 4 August 1917].
¹⁴Nelipovich, "Rol’ voennogo rukovodstva," pp. 266-270; his "Repressii protiv poddannykh," p. 38; his “General ot infanterii N.N. Yanushkevich,” p. 44; “Iz chernoi
socio-economic sphere from potentially hostile ethnic minorities and, concurrently, to evacuate unreliable elements from areas destined to become battlefields. In Congress Poland and Courland the first goal was seemingly bearing fruit, since the expulsions of thousands of Jews and Germans left their property and possessions to the military authorities and the local population. Russian authorities in Galicia marked for deportations Jewish politicians, teachers, rabbis, doctors, and merchants, depriving the Galician Jewry of its most advanced and needed leaders. They and their families were held in prison or sent to remote areas such as Turkestan and Kamchatka. Packed in boxcars, entire Jewish families were directed to Kiev, which became a distribution point. Charges consisted only of a cover-letter stating that the residence of an accused in a given locality was undesirable. The way the police and administration compiled evidence is illustrated by the case of one Mark Kopelman. Kopelman was arrested in Lwów and deported on two accounts -- shooting at troops and the sale of alcohol. After his wife appealed the case, the Lwów governor admitted that there were no papers concerning Kopelman, nor was it known to what area in Russia he had been deported.

While expulsions gained momentum, the army undertook a man-hunt for laborers needed to build fortifications, dig trenches, and repair roads shattered by the war. While

16“O vyselenii iz Galitsii,” GARF, D2/1915/391, computed on the basis of the pages 5-104; “O litsakh vydvoriayemykh iz Galitsii,” TsDIAUtK, 361/1/672, computed on the basis of the pages 1, 4, 6-8, 10, 13, 19, 22, 27, 28; “O litsakh vydvorennykh iz Galitsii,” Ibid, 361/1/679, p. 11; “O neblagonadezhnykh elementakh,” Ibid., 361/1/221, pp. 53-55,
peasants were paid for labor, entire Jewish communities were pressed into labor battalions and worked under the supervision of Cossack guards. Any delay in completing tasks was attributed to Jewish opposition and resulted in deportations of whole details to Russia. Thus, at the beginning of February Jewish workers in the vicinity of Stryj were deported on charges of inciting Ukrainian peasants to sabotage. Bribery, as the only means to avoid labor service, became so widespread that the General-Governor had to send special emissaries to investigate numerous cases. In turn, the administration blamed Jews for corrupting Russian officials.17

On February 23, the Grand Duke issued a circular which clarified deportation proceedings and specified places of exile for deported Jews. The Ministry of Internal Affairs initially directed Jewish deportees to Tomsk province; later Perm’ and Yenisei provinces were added as main destinations. The flow of regulations specifying measures against Jewish resistance was crowned by a decree of the Supreme Commander on March 12, ordering an expulsion of Jews towards enemy positions. As justification for such a drastic order, the Grand Duke blamed Jews for sabotage and for provoking Austrian reprisals against the Ukrainian population. The Supreme Commander stressed that the order marked the end of “six-months of patience [of the army]” and was undertaken “only for the benefit” of the non-Jewish population.18

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57-60.
By the winter of 1915, the process of official vilification of the Jews was complete. The Russian military made no distinction between foreign and Russian Jews, and perceived them collectively as an “internal” enemy financed by the “external” enemies, Germany and Austro-Hungary, and drawing support from international organizations. While reprisals were also directed against other national groups, the notion of “world Muslim” or “German-Masonic” conspiracies did not appear in the reasoning of Russian generals. Nor, from the Stavka’s point of view, did these groups seem to possess the same cunning and tenacity as Jews. Thus, at the peak of mass expulsions during the retreat in the spring of 1915, a leading Russian nationalist, N. Markov, lamented that Austro-Hungary and Germany were governed by “Jewish capital,” and the Russian Empire, therefore, was in mortal combat with “Judeo-Germany.”

In Galicia, the winter of 1915 saw a rapid increase in deportations, which immediately entailed difficulties for local commanders and administration. Between February 27 and March 3, 1915, the army expelled 4,000 Jews from the town of Dobromil to its suburbs, where they were left under the open sky. The situation alarmed the chief of the district, Colonel Eilis, who inquired of Bobrinskii for further directions for the expelled Jews. Eilis complained that the expulsions “depopulated” the town and suggested that only Jewish males of thirteen and older be liable for deportations. However, the Colonel’s pleas as well as Bobrinskii’s intervention with the army resulted only in removal of the Jews from the Dobromil area to the Sambor district. The chief of the district, Krasovskii, also frantically appealed to Bobrinskii for intervention, explaining that Sambor had already

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6 "O mestakh vydvorenia," TsDIAuK, 361/1/674, p. 4.
19 L’ovskoe Voennoe Slovo, n. 170, 7 May 1915, p. 3; n. 174, 12 May 1915, p. 1; n.
been overcrowded by Jews expelled from other localities. Finally, on March 4, Bobrinskii was forced to accept the relocation of Dobromil Jews to Lwów in groups of 500 people.\textsuperscript{20}

In addition to expulsions, the administration and army also took 1,285 Jewish hostages from the city of Lwów, and from Czernowitz and Tarnopol districts. The sweep for hostages was so thorough that in some localities army commanders found no Jews at all. The appropriation of Jewish commodities, one of the principal objectives of expulsions, also did not bring expected results since confiscated livestock and agricultural implements were immediately taken away by the local population.\textsuperscript{21}

Protests of Russian officials in the Empire multiplied. While the Supreme Commander and the Minister of the Interior specified categories of deportees and exact places of exile, the army often sent Jews en masse to places outside of designated destinations. Trains filled with Jews caused traffic on the roads and provoked vehement remonstrations from railroad offices to the General-Government and the army. By the beginning of March, 10,000 Jews had been collected by troops in the eastern districts of Galicia. The administration had neither enough money to provide them with food and clothing, nor adequate facilities to house them. Since the majority of Jews wound up in Russia without any documents, the imperial administration was completely at loss regarding issues of surveillance, place of exile, and supplies necessary for their upkeep.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{175, 13 May 1915, p. 1.}
\textsuperscript{20}"O mestakh vydvorenia," TsDIAuK, 361/1/674, pp. 13-16, 45.
\textsuperscript{22}"O evreiakh," TsDIAuK, 361/1/651, pp. 1, 6; "Ob uchitele Ivane Dombrovskom."
Army commanders, however, were undisturbed by mounting complications and pushed for further expulsions. The Stavka’s barrage of invective against Jewish conspiracies strengthened the resolve of the generals, who perceived the Jews as no less a threat than the enemy armies. Thus, in April Mavrin insinuated that Galician Jews were secretly transferring copper to Austria. Similarly, General Brusilov accused Jews of Żydaczów of spreading rumors which caused that Russian administration to evacuate the town in panic. That the army convinced itself and general public of widespread Jewish sabotage was corroborated by the British Ambassador to Russia, George Buchanan, who confirmed that a large number of Jewish spies were receiving “German pay.”

As the fighting on the front intensified, methods in combating “internal enemies” became more brutal, and troops reportedly used Jewish communities as a moving shield against the enemy. Simultaneously, as more accusations were proffered against Jews and the tone of army reports became more hysterical, fear of Jewish subversion grew more widespread and pervasive. Fear, in turn, generated new accusations, pogroms, and executions. Russian units attacked Jews in Bohorodczany, Sołotwin, Porohy, and


Dichtiniec, where a number of Jewish women were raped and murdered. The future bard of the Bolshevik revolution, John Reed, recorded the expulsion of 8,000 Jews from the town of Zaleszczyki to the eastern parts of Galicia in April. Soldiers slaughtered male Jews and drove out women and children, who, without food and adequate clothing, were marched off from locality to locality. Some collapsed and died on the way.

The removal of the Jews from the front zone culminated at the beginning of April after Russian troops captured Przemyśl. The largest Austrian fortress, Przemyśl had been besieged since September 1914, and the surrender of its 120,000 soldiers and officers dealt a major blow to the prestige of the Dual Monarchy. After the fall of the fortress, the Russian command immediately initiated a mass removal of "undesirable elements" to secure the conquered area fortress. First Austrian POWs and then the Jews were designated for deportation. Transports with Jews from Przemyśl and the adjacent areas left for the eastern districts of Galicia on March 28. A substantial number of Jews were

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set on foot to near-by rail stations. Altogether, 20,000 Jews were sent to Lwów and other localities to await deportation to the east.27

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As the Stavka and army pressed for more deportations, the government and provincial officials in the Empire increasingly resisted the influx of thousands of Jews into Russia-proper. Minister of the Interior N. Maklakov complained to the Stavka that wholesale deportations of Jews from Galicia, Courland, and Congress Poland forced him to expand the areas designed for the deportees to Mogilev, Yekaterinoslav, and Taurida provinces. On March 6, Poltava provincial governor Baggovut protested against the deportation of three thousand Galician Jews into his province. He argued to Bobrinskii and Mavrin that the arrival of thousands of Jews would overburden provincial railroads. Settling Jews in the countryside would violate Russian imperial laws, and the governor agreed to accept only two thousand Jews to large urban sites.28

The Grand Duke and Mavrin blamed the military administration for mismanagement of the deportation process. They insisted that Jews be driven towards enemy lines, and only "unreliable" Jews be shipped off to the Poltava and Chernigov


provinces. Bobrinskii, in turn, refused to be a scapegoat and quite correctly responded to his superiors that from the beginning of the war the Stavka had repeatedly stressed the unreliability of all Jews. He, therefore, refused to accept responsibility for the deportations and blamed the army for the havoc in the Russian rear.29

Accusing Bobrinskii of mismanaging the deportations, the Stavka completely abandoned its own admonitions that Jews must be prevented from contacts with the enemy. To drive thousands of Jews towards enemy positions implied a gross violation of security since every Jew who crossed the front line was allegedly a potential carrier of information about Russian troops. Yanushkevich, however, was typically beyond such nuances, and raved to Bobrinskii about the "lack of initiative" among Russian officials in pursuing anti-Jewish measures. He insisted on completing the registration of Jewish-owned land, and threatened that sloppiness in anti-Jewish actions would be considered as non-observance of order. Yanushkevich’s obsession with Jews was also reflected in secret instructions sent to army and front commanders for information demonstrating Jewish soldiers’ disloyalty to the Empire and their harmful influence on their comrades.30

As the bickering between Bobrinskii and Yanushkevich went on, chaos on the railroads, caused by the deportations, worsened. Bobrinskii, obeying the Stavka, ordered that trains and transports with Jews designated for Russia be redirected to the eastern districts of Galicia. The numbers of collected Jews grew rapidly. About 10,000 people were held in Sambor district alone, while the administration vainly awaited further instructions. Only an outbreak of typhus forced Russian authorities to release Jews to their places of residence.31

_The Great Retreat and Its Aftermath, May-December of 1915_

Until the spring of 1915, the mounting assault on Jews in the front zone had emanated from entrenched anti-Semitism in the army, the subordination of civil authorities to the military, and concerns about a restless ethnic minority. In May, however, the persecution of Jews was integrated into a broader strategic plan designed to alter the deteriorating situation on the Eastern Front. Ethnic politics thus became an integral part of Russian military operations.

Russian euphoria after the victory at Przemyśl and hopes for an offensive against Hungary received a devastating blow on May 2, 1915. After massive bombardment, three Austro-German armies shattered Russian lines at Gorlice and Gromnik (south-east of Kraków). Russian retreat soon spread all along the Eastern front. On June 3, Jarosław and Przemyśl were abandoned, and on June 22, Austrian troops entered Lwów. Unable

to stop the retreat, the Stavka deployed a scorched-earth to prevent the enemy from capturing anything valuable. Orders were given to evacuate machinery, grain, and cattle to the east, and destroy whatever could not be taken along. Bridges, railroads, locomotives, and oil wells were burned or blown up. The evacuation was accompanied by widespread looting, and in Jewish quarters Russian troops staged brutal pogroms.32

On May 11, the Commander of the North-Western front, General Alekseev, ordered wholesale expulsions of Germans and Jews from all areas in Courland and Kovno. Simultaneously, the military announced that it had an important evidence of Jewish collaboration with the enemy. A newspaper of the North-Western Front reported that in the village of Kuzhi of Kovno province Jews hid German troops which then ambushed a Russian infantry regiment. The report was concocted with the consent of the Tsar and was widely circulated in the official press throughout the Empire. Two Duma members, Alexander Kerenskii and Nikolai Friedman, traveled to Kuzhi and found that Jewish residents had been evacuated on May 9, a day before the alleged ambush had taken place.33

The affair thus proved to be a sham. It did, however, influence public opinion (the discovery by Friedman and Kerensky became known only later) and increased the zeal of Russian commanders to clear the front zone of spies and saboteurs. Expulsions gained momentum in Courland and Galicia, where the populace of entire villages and towns

32 Rostunov, Russkii front, p. 246; "Zapiski i informatii," RGVIA, 2005/1/12(3), p. 120; Ukrainische Nachrichten, n. 41, 26 June 1915, p. 6; Schall, Żydostwo galicyjskie, pp. 25-26.
MAP 4.
was forced out and their houses set on fire. Thousands of people were driven eastward adding to the general chaos of retreat, while soldiers and Cossacks ran amok destroying and burning Jewish quarters.34

A telling example illustrates how pervasive belief in Jewish resistance was among Russian generals, who blamed Jews for Russian setbacks. On May 21, the commander of the 11th Army, General-Lieutenant D. Shcherbachev wrote to Bobrinskii suggesting a new solution to the Jewish “Gordian knot.” Since neither deportations nor expulsions had forced Jews into submission, and Jewish resistance intensified day by day, all Galician Jews should be herded to a strip of land along the Romanian frontier, in a gigantic dumping camp. Left to their own devices and with no supplies the Jews would cross en masse to Romania, which, in turn, would expel them to Austria-proper. The arrival of multitudes of Jews would create havoc and economic shortages, severely undermining Austria’s military capacity. Bobrinskii, however, rejected the plan on the grounds of potential complications with Romania, and, more importantly, because of the fear that such an action would immediately trigger large-scale Jewish retaliation.35

Only a handful of Russian commanders and statesmen admitted that the army was scapegoating Jews. The Stavka’s Quartermaster-General Yurii Danilov conceded that Jews “did not enjoy sympathy in certain circles,” and were the first to be blamed as saboteurs. Prince Shcherbatov, a member of the State Council, confirmed to his

35 “O mestakh vydvorenii,” Ibid., 361/1/674, pp. 77-78.
colleagues that Yanushkevich used Jews as an “alibi for his own failures.”

As Russian armies kept reeling back, violence against Jewish communities became an outlet for battle-fatigued and demoralized troops. Executions of “suspicious” Jews became a fundamental principle of military justice. As the army drove out Jews from Galician towns such as Delatyn, Kamionka, Busko, Rawa Ruska, Żółkiew, Brody, Gródek Jagielloński, Horodenka, Śniatyń, and Dupliska, pogroms, executions, and outright murder became common Russian practice in Galicia. Driven on foot by Cossacks and soldiers, Jews often had neither food nor water, and anybody who tried to hand them a glass of water was mercilessly flogged by the guards. Having arrived to the places of exile near the Galician-Russian border, they were left under the open sky, and the army and the local administration denied any responsibility for the upkeep of hundreds and thousands of people. Those who stayed behind after Russian withdrawal were frequently robbed and murdered by peasants and local hoodlums. Pillaging of Jewish houses continued until the arrival of first Austrian patrols who in several instances shot the looters on the spot.

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It should be noted that the entire population of the front zone were subjected to Russian brutalities. Houses and crops were burned, and the populations of entire villages trudged eastward alongside the troops. However, the army's attitude towards Poles and Ukrainians was not marked by ethnic prejudices, and Yanushkevich specified to Mavrin that the application of drastic measures should not be extended to non-Jews. Nor were mass deportations of Germans, which went on in May in Courland, characterized by the brutalities prevalent during the expulsions of Jews.38

Another example of ethnic differentiation in the war zone is drawn from an encounter between a Russian unit and refugees on a road in Poland:

When a soldier seeing another group of refugees made fun of the Jews he was greeted with laughter from his comrades. When a second soldier tried to join in on the fun saying that Poles were no better, no one laughed, and he was quickly corrected. 'Poles are a necessary people,' he was told. 'A Pole is a peasant, he's tied tightly to the land.'39

On May 25, under pressure from the government, the Stavka was forced to stop

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expulsions of Jews from Courland and Congress Poland. In Galicia, however, expulsions to the eastern districts continued, and by May 30 the army had uprooted and shuffled from place to place some 11,000 Bukovinian and Galician Jews. Bobrinskii, exasperated at the reports of thousands of people driven afoot to no definite destination, bombarded Mavrin with pleas to stop the expulsions. He insisted that since Jews would at any rate avoid being drafted into the Austrian army, expulsions served no purpose. However, at this time the chaos at the front had reached such proportions that Mavrin was hardly in a position to influence local commanders. Indeed, violence against the Jews affected the discipline in the army to such a degree that some units acted as bands of thugs rather than regular units. On June 6, the Grand Duke issued an order that subjected commanders who incited pogroms to court martial. The order was symptomatic of the impact of anti-Jewish violence on the army.

At the same time trains with deportees from Galicia reached Kiev and were then sent back without providing food and water to the Jews locked in the cars. On one train carrying 3,000 Galician deportees, seventy-six people died of exhaustion and eighteen went insane. The city administration had no means to provide for growing numbers of deported Jews. The Kiev Jewish community obtained permission from the Ministry of

39 Quoted in Sanborn, “Drafting the Nation,” p. 294.
Interior to open kitchens and temporary facilities to house thousands of people. Due to the intervention of influential Russians and Poles some prominent Jews such as the dean of the medical faculty of Lwów university, Adolf Bek, were sent to exile in Moscow. The rest were shipped further, to Siberia and Turkestan, where local administrations dispersed them in towns and villages.43

On June 12, in one more attempt to stop the enemy's advance, the Stavka ordered the mass evacuation of the entire population from the front zone. This time, as a concession to the entreaties of Russian ministers and Duma members, the Grand Duke stressed that Jews be exempted from the evacuation, but instead be driven towards enemy lines. While in several instances the army carried out the instruction to the letter, during the hastened retreat some commanders still ordered that Jews be expelled eastward, contrary to the urgings of the Stavka.44

It has been estimated that during the Great Retreat more than a half-million Jews were uprooted, expelled, and deported from the Baltic region, Congress Poland, Galicia, and Bukovina. After June 12, when the army launched a mass evacuation of civilians regardless of ethnicity, as many Germans, Ukrainians, and Belorussians were also forcibly removed from the front zone. The numbers of Galician Jews deported to Russia and uprooted within the region is much more difficult to establish. Thus, the St. Petersburg Jewish Aid Committee estimated the numbers of deported Galician Jews in the Empire at

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43 AAN, "Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie," Box 61, [Czas, 7 February 1918]
75,000. During sessions of the Council of Ministers, the deportations from Galicia were referred to as affecting tens of thousands of Jews. Other documentary sources and periodicals mention between 10,000 and 25,000 Galician Jews dispersed around the Empire from Brest-Litovsk to Krasnoiarsk, Khodzhent, and Kamchatka. Given that between March and July of 1915 the army uprooted and shuffled within the province at least 30,000 Jews, it can be estimated that about 50,000 Jews were hit by Russian ethnic purging. In addition to approximately 200,000 Jewish refugees in Austria, Hungary, and the Czech lands, the Russian occupation thus directly affected some 40% of Galician Jews.

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In hindsight the brutal treatment and mass removal of the Jewish population in 1914-1915 seem to have foreshadowed the tragic events of the Second World War. Deportations and expulsions of Jews to Russia ran into technical difficulties and provoked sharp criticism and resistance of the imperial administration. In 1941-1942, similar circumstances caused a fundamental change in Nazi ethnic policies from mass ghettoisation and transfer of Jews from area to area to systematic and organized murder.

256, 259; "O vyselenii iz Galitsii," GARF, D2/1915/391, pp. 5-104.
45 Golczewski, Polnisch-Jüdische Beziehungen, p. 123f;
The uprooting and marching of thousands of helpless people driven on by brutal Russian guards resembled Nazi "death marches" of Jewish prisoners. Furthermore, at the time when the Russian military ordered mass expulsions of civilians from the front zone, the Turkish state successfully carried out a genocidal campaign against the Armenians that ended in the annihilation of more than 600,000 people. Comparable socio-economic position of Jews and Armenians within their respective dominant societies before the war and their alleged connections with enemy states invite a comparative examination of both cases, especially since the assault on the Jews along the Eastern Front never escalated into physical extermination. In fact, while expulsions of Jews continued after the Russians stopped retreating, by August 1915 anti-Jewish violence had clearly passed its zenith. It is, therefore, important to examine forces that mitigated the genocidal potential of the Russian military machine.  

Despite the vehement anti-Semitism of the Russian military, it lacked two major prerequisites for a war of annihilation: a well-defined ideological doctrine and a unified effort of military and civil structures. These were the main genocidal tools of the Nazi Party and the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress. The Russian government, while sharing the anti-Semitic biases of its military leaders, vociferously objected to the army's brutal practices on the grounds that the influx of thousands of deportees into the Empire undermined Russia's war efforts. In August 1915, during meetings of the Russian


Council of Ministers, including its Chairman Goremykin, Minister of the Interior N. Shcherbatov, and Foreign Minister Sazonov, cabinet members were agreed on the "sinister" role played by Jews in the revolutionary movement as well as to their "destructive" nature. They pointed out, however, that mass expulsions eroded Russia's war capacity. Instead of containing Jews in the Pale of Settlement, the Ministry of the Interior was forced to expand their areas of residence to Tambov, Voronezh, and Penza provinces. The expulsions, therefore, resulted in a growth of Jewish settlements outside of long-time traditional boundaries.49

Russian public opinion also denounced the inhuman treatment of the Jews, and even rabid anti-Semites joined in protests against the heavy-handed rule of the army. A plethora of liberal-minded Russian businessmen, writers, and politicians such as Maxim Gorkii, Pavel Miliukov, and Alexander Kerensky courageously criticized the army and the government for its barbaric conduct of the war. Vasilii Maklakov, a leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, asserted that in view of the horrible carnage the Jews were subjected to they should be excused even "if the spy stories were found to be true." The Duma and State Council requested that cases of deported individuals be reviewed and those who proved innocent be set free. On August 20, the Grand Duke was compelled to issue an order to release Jewish hostages taken from the territories occupied by the


Russia's prestige among her allies was seriously damaged by the army's anti-Jewish policies. Since American, British, and French loans and credits were paramount for Russia's war economy, the Council of Ministers was concerned that mistreatment of the Jews would reverberate abroad. Given the belief of the government that foreign banks were in the hands of "international Jewry," expulsions in the front zone were thought to affect directly the efficacy of the Russian military industry.\(^{51}\) Finance Minister Petr Bark admonished his colleagues that if the persecutions of Jews continued, Russia would not be able to obtain foreign credit since

...it [was] in the hands of those very people upon whose co-religionists General Yanushkevich has visited violence and injuries such as are intolerable in any civilized state.\(^{52}\)

 Mostly as a result of these concerns, in August 1915 the Council of Ministers abolished the Pale of Settlement and granted Jews the right of residence anywhere in the Empire except St. Petersburg, Moscow, and the Don area.


Less important, but nevertheless meaningful for the alleviation of the Jewish plight was Russia's announcement that it would abide by international treaties with regards to war conduct. In addition, on May 24, 1915, the Russian government signed a joint declaration of the Allies promising to prosecute the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide. While these announcements remained largely on paper, they increased the determination of the government to restrain anti-Semitic zealots in the army. Fears that the mistreatment of Jews was alienating foreign public opinion came to the fore most vividly in April 1915, when a British delegation arrived in Galicia to organize aid to the population. The arrival of the delegation caused pandemonium in the Stavka and in the staff of the South-Western front, which were particularly alarmed that the delegation would investigate crimes perpetrated against the Jews.53

To the credit of the Russian officer corps, despite the Stavka's pressure, not every commander endorsed the persecution of Jews. For example, the commandants in Rzeszów and Jarosław treated all national groups on an equal basis, and extended to the Jews protection against the depredations of troops and local hoodlums.54 In addition, hostilities between the army and the General-Governor also reduced the impact of anti-Jewish actions. Bobrinskii, though hostile to the Jews, perceived the army's conduct as damaging to the economy and stability of the territory he was responsible for. He therefore tried to protect the reputation of his administration. On April 20, 1915, in an

interview with Russkoe slovo, he asserted that within his jurisdiction Jews “behaved quite correctly,” although they did not sympathize with the Russian cause. Bobrinskii’s revelations outraged the army, and the interview was excised from publications. Later, on June 13, 1915, Bobrinskii sent a memo to the Chief of Staff of the South-Western front, General Alekseev. The General-Governor stressed that while impeding the functioning of the Galician administration anti-Jewish measures did not improve Russia’s war efforts.

The public outcry and protests of the government against the military’s brutalities largely concerned the treatment of Russian Jews. Foreign subjects, Jews of Galicia and Bukovina were less frequently referred to in the minutes of the Duma and the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, as the generals caved in to the pressure, the situation in Galicia improved slightly. At the end of August the military allowed a number of deportees to return to Galicia and even made attempts to reimburse the victims of confiscations. However, since petitions for restitution were to be accompanied by appropriate receipts from the army, only a handful of petitioners were eligible. Out of 1,145 petitions directed to the General-Governor, only seventy were approved. In fact, governmental instructions

for restitution excluded the subjects of enemy states, giving the military an excuse to ignore the petitions of Galician Jews.57

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At the end of September 1915, when the Russian army finally stopped retreating, the situation on the front looked extremely gloomy for the Empire. Congress Poland and Courland with their densely industrialized areas were lost. The once-proud army of the Tsar was shattered, and casualties amounted to 1,500,000 killed, wounded, and taken prisoner.58 In Galicia, the Russians managed to hold on to a small strip of land around Tarnopol, and the defunct General-Government retained a few dozen of its officials in the rear of the South-Western Front. Pressing issues such as stabilizing the front and reorganizing the rear had seemingly rendered the Jewish question immaterial although the press often highlighted appalling cases of robberies of Jews by corrupt Russian officials in Galicia. The Jewish Central Aid Committee, with its seat in St. Petersburg, raised funds and organized medical care for Jewish refugees and deportees in the Empire. It also traveled to the front zone and provided relief to Jews still under the jurisdiction of the army. The increasing role of civil institutions, the Zemstvo, in the war economy also contributed to the fact that the army outwardly mitigated its anti-Jewish fervor. No less


important to the improved treatment of Jews was the influx of many new officers to substitute for huge losses suffered by the Russian officer corps during the first war year. The majority of new commanders came from the Russian intelligentsia, and initially they displayed less nationalistic zeal than their predecessors.59

Yet, the improvement had short limits. Anti-Semitism in the army was deeply entrenched, and the treatment of Jews in the front zone had created a powerful popular image of the evil Jew bent upon Russia’s destruction. Members of the intelligentsia and groups of Russian peasants voiced fears of a Jewish-German alliance and Jewish world conspiracy, and the debacle of the Great Retreat rendered the same fears even more pronounced among many Russian soldiers and generals.60 Moreover, the threat of revolutionary unrest, deteriorating conditions in the trenches, economic shortages, and criticism by the Duma magnified the obsession of the High Command with “internal enemies” embodied by revolutionaries, liberals, the Zemstvo, and, ultimately, Jews, who provided the Socialists and Bolsheviks with some of their most prominent members.

These fears were reflected in measures undertaken by the Stavka in September and


December 1915, when Yanushkevich ordered a compilation of data on the "negative" influence of Jews in the army. Front, army, and corps commanders were to collect information about the low moral qualities of Jewish soldiers, cases of high treason and desertion of Jews to the enemy. The results of the survey generally coincided with views of the Chief of Staff. Many senior officers such as the new commander of the South-Western front, General Brusilov (who replaced Ivanov), repeated tales of Jewish sabotage, stressing that Jews spread revolutionary ideas in the army and murdered wounded Russian soldiers. The General upheld the deportations of Jews in spring and summer of 1915 as "absolute necessity." Yet, previous purges of the army had so thoroughly divested army branches of Jewish personnel that many units simply had no Jews to report upon. Amidst the chorus of anti-Semitic barrages, the response of the commander of the Northern Front, Lieutenant-General Belaev, stands out as a sole exception. Belaev stated that the loyalty of Jewish soldiers had raised no doubts, and that instances of espionage among Jews never exceeded those by non-Jews.61

Although the results of the surveys were kept secret, it can be surmised that the Stavka planned to use them later to discredit Jews publicly, and, perhaps, for legislative measures. That the military might have planned to go public against the Jews was further attested to by the distribution of circulars about the preeminence of Jews in revolutionary activities. In early 1916, the Police Department received such a memo from the staff of

the 12th Army, and sent it to governors and city chiefs in the Empire. The compilation of surveys about Jewish disloyalty and the distribution of army circulars also coincided with anti-Semitic campaign in the right-wing press and a round up of homeless Jews in Moscow.62

In Galicia, the army also blamed Jews for espionage and economic disruption, and in the fall of 1915 about eighty Jews were deported to Russia on these charges.63 Local commandants continued the practice of extorting ransom from Jews for damaging telephone wire, and hunted down Jewish workers for labor details. Sometimes Jewish workers were treated as concentration camp inmates, locked in barns, forced to sleep on the bare ground, and flogged for alleged transgressions. Since the army suffered from malnutrition, the ration for Jewish laborers often consisted of a piece of dried bread and a bowl of steamed water. Living conditions were so appalling that in February 1916, out of three thousand Jews forced to work for eighteen days in low temperature outside Tarnopol, sixty-two died and only half were able to return home on their own. The rest suffered severe frostbite and had to be transported back in horse-drawn carts.64

Russia's Farewell to Galicia

The treatment of Jews in the front zone reflected the ebb and flow of Russia's fortunes in the war. By the spring of 1916, the efforts of the government, the Zemstvo, and the War Ministry to resuscitate the country's military strength achieved considerable results. Great numbers of conscripts were drafted and the war economy managed to produce impressive numbers of shells and guns, necessary for large-scale operations. The improvement of the army's capability, the increasing dependence of Russia on her allies, and most importantly, the worsening socio-economic conditions in the Empire brought about the lifting of some anti-Jewish regulations such as the prohibition of movement within Galicia. Russian officials and Zemstvo representatives also distributed food and provided medical service to homeless Jews. A larger number of Galician Jews were allowed to return home from their places of exile, and many hoped that the worst phase of the Russian occupation was over.65

But these hopes evaporated in June 1916, when the entire South-Western Front erupted in gunfire, and five Russian armies launched a gigantic offensive from Kremenets in the north to Bukovina in the south. Austrian-German troops were caught off guard and began a rapid retreat, and by August 13, the towns of Buczacz, Brody, Stanislawow, Kielomyja, Delatyn, Nadworna in Galicia, and Czernowitz in Bukovina had fallen to the Russians.66 What came to be known as the Brusilov offensive activated a psychological

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66 Armeiskii vestnik, 22 March 1916, p. 1; Rostunov, Russki front, pp. 311-325; “lugo-
code imprinted in the psyche of the army, and pogroms of Jews began immediately, concurrently with the Russian advance. Soldiers and Cossacks routinely set afame synagogues and Jewish houses, and robbed, raped, and murdered in at least twelve localities. As in the summer of 1914, anti-Jewish outbursts resulted both from anti-Semitic proclivities of the rank-and file and bad discipline. The scope of violence depended entirely on the attitude of a given commander who either encouraged or ignored the deeds of his subordinates, or intervened and stopped them. This time Jews were better prepared for Russian practices and entire Jewish communities wandered from place to place to avoid encounters with the pogromists. The offensive generated yet another wave of Jewish refugees to Austria and to Galician urban centers, entirely divesting many localities of Jewish residents. For example, in Kołomyja, out of the pre-war Jewish population of 20,000 only five hundred were still there by the fall of 1916.67

Victories on the front forced the Stavka to resuscitate the defunct General-Government. Bobrinskii, whose name was associated with Russian rule in Galicia, was dismissed, and on June 13, 1916, Fedor Trepov, the former General-Governor of the Kiev province and the chairman of the “Committee for Combating German Predominance” was appointed the new ruler of Galicia. Trepov vouched not to repeat the mistakes of his predecessor and promised universal social and religious tolerance in the area under his

jurisdiction. More Jews were allowed to return from the Empire, Polish and Jewish schools were re-opened, and Yiddish was allowed as the language of instruction.

Although improved, the situation of Jews in the occupied parts of Tarnopol and Stanisławów provinces still left much to be desired. The Russian military treated them with suspicion, and local commanders solved the problem of feeding thousands of wandering Jews by driving them to neighboring districts. Five thousand homeless Jews were crowded into Tarnopol alone, and with winter coming, the front command desperately tried to get rid of them by moving them further from the front zone.

Reminiscent of the Great Retreat, in September-October the army ordered an evacuation of more than four thousand Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews from Brody, Złoczów, and Brzeżany to Volhynia. While the entire population within Russian-controlled areas suffered equally during these expulsions, the army still singled out Jews for allegedly abetting of Russian deserters.

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The revolutionary upheaval in the spring of 1917 did not alleviate the situation of Galician Jews. While the Provisional Government in St. Petersburg did away with all civil

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69 “Perepiska ob arestakh,” TsDIAUuK, 363/1/8, pp. 2, 4-7, 9-10, 13, 24.

and political limitations on Russian Jews, in the General-Government the military still had a decisive voice in civil affairs. After An-Ski visited Galicia in March 1917, he informed the government that Jews were still barred from city and district councils and courts, and the bulk of Jewish cultural and educational institutions were shut down. Multitudes of homeless Jews wandered in the countryside, and their property, livestock, and agricultural equipment was either confiscated by the army or taken by the local population. Russian troops destroyed religious artifacts, used temples as latrines, and schools for barracks. Extortion by the administration and violence by passing units was a daily occurrence.\textsuperscript{71}

An-Ski’s pleas went unheeded. Even if the Provisional Government was willing to ameliorate the situation, it was hardly in a position to do so. By the spring of 1917, the Russian army was in a state of complete disarray. Outright banditry by the rank-and-file became endemic, and from March to August 1917, Russian soldiers deserted at an average rate of 18,000 per month. Eruptions of violence were common, and the entire population suffered from frequent requisitions and confiscations. Intermittent conflicts between the army and the civil administration only underlined the atmosphere of incompetence and corruption.\textsuperscript{72}

Although the Provisional Government dismissed provincial governors and district

\textsuperscript{71} Jüdische Rundschau, n. 18, 4 May 1917, p. 150. On March 2, the Grand Duke was again appointed Supreme Commander of the Russian armed forces. Armeiskii vestnik, n. 476, 5 March 1917, p. 2; Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenographicheskie otchety, 1916-1917, 4 convocation, 5th session, p. 1612; AAN, “Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie,” Box 61 [Nova Reforma, 25 September 1917], ”Spravka komiteta pomoshchi,” GARF, 1800/1/43, pp. 5-6.

chiefs, on a lower level the administration remained intact. Soldiers' committees, the newly created Ukrainian Committee, and the Jewish Central Aid Committee demanded revitalization of self-governing local councils, return from exile of Galician civil and political activists, and autonomy for Jewish communities. The command of the South-Western Front agreed to the creation of local self-governments and the Zemstvo opened numerous canteens and kitchens to alleviate the situation of the population. However, the main objective of the government was to keep Russia at war, and, therefore, it continued to play up to the military. On March 19, the government promulgated a decree giving the army the right to expel from the war zone prostitutes and individuals suspected of espionage and sedition. Barely had Jewish refugees and expatriates returned to Galicia, they immediately were subjected to harassment and expelled on the grounds of security.

The acta finale of the occupation came on June 30, 1917, when Russian armies launched their last offensive. As in the summer 1916, Russians managed to break Austro-German defenses and on July 9 occupied Halicz and Kalusz. However, on July 18, the advance bogged down, and under heavy fire Russian troops began a disorderly retreat which soon deteriorated into a mass flight of thousands of demoralized soldiers. The

73 “Zapiska galitsko-bukovskoi komissii,” GARF, 1800/1/174, pp. 16-17; Nova Rada, n. 3, 29 March 1917, p. 2, and n. 7, 6 April 1917, p. 1; Ibid., n. 77, 1 July 1917, p. 4; “Zapiska Galitsko-Bukovskoi komissii,” NBUIV, XXIX/1836, p. 1. On April 29, Trepov, due to health problems, left Galicia. His responsibilities were assumed by his deputy for military affairs, Leutenant-General N. Usov. AAN, “Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie,” Box 61 [Kurjer Codzienny, 30 April 1917].
Russian administration hastily evacuated Galicia taking along the last Jewish hostages. After the authorities left, mobs of soldiers inundated towns and cities and started looting residential areas. Officers were killed on the spot, and the Austro-German bombardment exacerbated the carnage. Looting soon degenerated into savage pogroms which were accompanied by mass burning of buildings and stores. More than 4,000 ravaging troops gave full vent to their rage in Brody, Husiatyn, Buczacz, Monasterzyska, Podhajce, and Brzeżany. The countryside also suffered arson and looting as Russian troops passed through villages. While the pogromists randomly chose their targets and made no distinction between Christian and Jewish houses, the images of “rich” Jews attracted large numbers of looters to the Jewish quarters turning them into a heap of charred ruins.

Especially destructive were pogroms in Halicz, Stanisławów, Zborów, Jeziernica, Kołomyja and Kalusz where Jewish quarters were almost completely wiped out. Rape followed robberies, while between 250 and 300 people (Jews and non-Jews) lost their lives. In October and November of 1917 two more pogroms in Brody marked the final Russian evacuation from Galicia. The destruction of the Jewish quarters in Brody was so

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75 Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smuty, pp. 104, 168; Nova Rada, n. 84, 9 July 1917, pp. 1-2, n. 86, 12 July 1917, p. 3; n. 85, 11 July 1917, p. 1, n. 116, 19 August 1917, p. 2; n. 126, 31 August 1917, p. 2; Kurjer Stanisławowski, n. 1573, 17 March 1918, p. 2; Farmborough, Nurse at the Russian Front, p. 287; Golovin, Voennye usilia, vol. 2, p. 208; Knox, With the Russian Army, pp. 666-668; AAN, “Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie,” Box 6 [Nowa Reforma, 28 July 1917, 25 September 1917, 21 December 1917], [Czas, 27 July 1917, 28 July 1917, 1 August 1917, 12 December 1917], [Wiedeński Kurjer Polski, 30 June 1917, 31 June 1917, 28 July 1917], [Głos Narodu, 25 July 1917, 28 July 1917, 31 July 1917, 5 August 1917, 23 August 1917], [Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 July 1917], [Dziennik Petrogradski, 9 August 1917], [Neue Freie Presse, 4 August 1917], [Kraj, 5 August 1917], [Gazeta Narodowa, 26 July 1917, 5 August 1917], [Dziennik Kijowski, 24 July 1917, 9 August 1917], [Naprzód, 11 August 1917] [Dilo, 24 July 1917], [Kurjer Lwowski, 18 August 1917], [Frankfurter Zeitung, 31 August 1917], [Basler Nachrichten, 5 September 1917]; Blicharski, Tarnopol, p. 221.
devastating that a Jewish activist in Vienna, Lazar Bloch, appealed to the Austrian Foreign Ministry to intervene with the Russian government.76

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Russian policies towards the Jews on the Eastern Front resulted in the forcible relocation of approximately a half million civilians, whose influx into Russia-proper seriously damaged the country’s fighting capacity. In Galicia, three years of occupation irreversibly damaged the provincial economic infrastructure. About 90,000 houses were destroyed, more than half of all mills rendered defunct, and by the fall of 1917 supplies of grain became almost non-existent. In Lwów district alone more than thirty localities were entirely burned down, and out of 5,389 houses before the war 1,480 -- 27% -- were wiped out. While throughout the war the entire population of Galicia was subjected to the horrors of the war, the Jewish community was particularly targeted by the occupiers. Its economic base was completely shattered, between 50% and 70% of Jewish quarters lay in shambles, and pogroms, deportations, and forced migration reduced the Jewish population in some places to less than half of it had been. The bulk of Jewish schools, synagogues, and cultural institutions were badly damaged or ruined, and thousands of Jews were left homeless.77

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76 Nova Rada, n. 160, 12 October 1917, p. 1; AAN, “Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie,” Box 61 [Neue Freie Presse,” 25 December 1917], [Naprzód, 30 December 1917].

Equally profound was the impact of anti-Jewish policies on the perpetrators themselves. Vehement anti-Semitic propaganda and routinisation of violence against Jews affected both the officer corps and the rank-and-file. The war magnified traditional anti-Jewish animosities, rendered human life extremely cheap, and infected thousands of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peasants with deeply entrenched suspicions towards their Jewish co-nationals. Russian officers became especially susceptible to the rumors of worldwide Jewish conspiracies, and the fall of the monarchy strengthened their views that Jews were to blame for military defeat and revolution. After 1917, a large percentage of officers, Cossacks, and soldiers, who witnessed and participated in the persecution of Jews in the Eastern Front zone, wound up in White armies or in various nationalist and insurgent formations. As the old order collapsed, and the restraining influence of the government was no more, these individuals would organize and implement the most gruesome murder of Jews before the Holocaust.

1916, pp. 110-111; n. 14, 7 April 1916, p. 119; n. 18, 5 May 1916, p. 147.
PART THREE

*Polish-Jewish Conflict, 1914-1920*

The collapse of the Russian front in 1915 was followed by the re-establishment of Austrian administration in Eastern Galicia. Simultaneously, German troops occupied Congress Poland. While the situation improved for Jews after Russian withdrawal, it became evident that the war had profoundly deepened Polish-Jewish animosities.

Between 1915 and 1918, the economic situation in the territories under the rule of the Central Powers worsened, and the conflicting national interests of the two groups presaged a fierce confrontation.

The resurrection of the independent Polish state in November 1918 fortified Jewish demands for civil equality and national autonomy. However, the end of World War I did not bring peace to Poland, and conflicts on its German, Soviet, and Ukrainian frontiers soon grew into full-scale warfare. Between November 1918 and October 1920, the country was in a state of war, and throughout this period Jews were blamed and persecuted for alleged collaboration with enemies of Poland. By the end of 1920, Jewish hopes and expectations for a better future in the country had largely dwindled away.
Part Three of this study focuses on the major factors that patterned Polish attitudes towards Jews during World War I and its immediate aftermath. Four main topics are examined. First is Polish-Jewish confrontation within the context of Russian and Austro-German policies between 1914 and 1918. Experiences during the Russian occupation prompted Jewish political leaders to seek actively the support of Austrian and German authorities in the struggle for national rights and for counteracting Polish anti-Semitism. Jewish appeals to the Central Powers outraged Polish public opinion and contributed to the deepening of anti-Jewish animosities. At the same time, Polish leaders made their bid for political concessions from the Central Powers and tried to limit participation of Jews in Poland’s political life. The impact of Austro-German nationality policies on Jewish-Polish relations as well as the divergent aims of the two people during World War I are assessed to provide a necessary background for understanding political developments after 1918.

A second topic is anti-Jewish pogroms in independent Poland and their ramifications in the country and abroad. Violence during the Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Soviet wars of 1918-1920 deeply affected Polish-Jewish relations, especially as the situation of national minorities in Eastern Europe became a prime topic at the Paris Peace Conference.

A third theme is Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918-1919. Unlike the situation in eastern Ukraine, where thousands of Jews fell victim to ravaging bands of Ukrainian insurgents, relations between Jews and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia provide a rare example of close cooperation between the two peoples. For obvious reasons, this cooperation provoked general outrage in Polish society and heavily influenced Polish policies and actions towards Jews.
The prominence of Jews in the revolutions in Russia, Hungary, and Bavaria strengthened popular convictions around the world that Bolshevism was largely a Jewish creation. During the Soviet invasion of Poland in the summer of 1920, accusations of Jewish sabotage and collaboration with the Soviets sparked a series of violent pogroms in the Eastern Borderlands. A fourth theme under discussion here is the situation of Jews during the short-lived Soviet regime in the eastern districts of Eastern Galicia, and Polish society’s responses to the alleged Jewish threat during the Soviet-Polish war.
Chapter V

POLISH-JEWS RELATIONS DURING WORLD WAR I

Poles and Jews under the Russian Regime

When news of hostilities reached Galicia in August 1914, the reaction of Jews was strikingly similar to that of their co-religionists elsewhere in Europe. Although they feared and resented the war, Jews joined with Poles and Ukrainians in patriotic demonstrations and confirmed their loyalty to the Austro-Hungarian crown in public meetings. Old animosities were temporarily forgotten. A number of Jews enlisted in the Polish Legions as well as in Ukrainian units, the Sich Sharpshooters, and took part in frontier battles during the first months of the war. Jewish leaders participated in the Polish National Committee, the body created to assist the formation of the Legions, while individual Jews as well as entire Jewish communities contributed large sums to the Legions. Even the nemesis of Jews, the National Democratic Party, for a time ceased its anti-Semitic agitation.¹

Yet, as the Russian occupation soon laid bare old grudges, the Polish-Jewish
rapprochement was short-lived. From the beginning of the war, the Russian High Command
stressed its intent to liberate Polish lands from German and Austro-Hungarian rule. On August
1914, the Grand Duke issued a declaration:

Poles! ...a century and a half ago the flesh of Poland was torn to pieces, but her soul
lived on. She hoped that the time would come for the resurrection of the Polish nation
and its fraternal rapprochement with Great Russia. Russian troops are bringing you the
sacred tidings of this rapprochement. Under the scepter of the Russian Tsar Poland will
rise again, free in her faith, language, and self-rule. Russia, for her part, hopes only that
Poland will respect the rights of the people, whose destiny has been closely linked to her
own.²

Given deepening pre-war Polish-Jewish animosities, it was natural for both sides to
interpret the declaration in completely different fashions. National Democrats hailed the Grand
Duke’s protestations as a first step on the road to Polish independence. They expected that their
support for Russia’s war efforts would serve as a powerful lever in the bid for dominance in the
political and social sphere of the country. Jewish political activists hoped that in the time of war
the Russian government would ease anti-Jewish restrictions, and perceived the last line of the
declaration as the inauguration of more liberal imperial policies towards ethnic minorities.³

Both Poles and Jews, however, were badly mistaken. The declaration had little practical
effect since it was signed by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who exercised
enormous power in war theater, but lacked authority to change the political status of imperial

² Niva, 16 August 1914, n. 33, p. 1.
³ Księga teczowa Polaków: Zbiór dokumentów niediplomatycznych od 8 sierpnia 1914 do 4
kwietnia 1915 r., Edward Chwalewik and Stanisława Waroczewska, eds. (Warsaw: Drukarnia
lands. The Russian government failed to endorse the declaration officially. Moreover, in a secret circular sent to the Russian provincial governors in Congress Poland, it stressed that any potential political changes would affect only territories under the Central Powers’ rule. Yet, Russian authorities accepted the fervent anti-Semitism of the National Democrats as a common platform for cooperation, and means to channel Polish national aspirations into an internal Polish-Jewish contest. Indeed, the declaration sparked a vehement anti-Jewish reaction of Polish right-wing newspapers. They stressed the need to “dejudaise” the country’s socio-economic and political sphere as a cardinal tenet of future Polish statehood.4

To encourage Polish-Russian cooperation, the military administration in Galicia left Polish officials in their posts. The latter, under Russian guidance or on their own accord, dismissed Jewish civil and court employees. The right-wing Polish press increased its anti-Semitic propaganda, accusing Jews of speculation, and of pro-Austrian and pro-German orientation. As a wave of pogroms in the region spread, soldiers and Cossacks encouraged Polish and Ukrainian peasants to loot Jewish stores and abandoned houses, and distributed seized goods to villagers. On occasion, Poles denounced Jewish neighbors to the Russian police and guided Cossacks to houses of affluent Jews. Some Polish officials engaged in extortion from Jews, on the pretext of punishing them for “misdeeds,” or as a gratuity for protection against depredations of Russian soldiers.5

Economic shortages caused by the war and Russian expulsions resulted in even higher concentration of Jews in large urban areas. By the winter of 1915, about 80,000 Jewish refugees resided in Warsaw in adverse sanitary conditions. Privation led to outbursts of typhus. Many Jews speculated on the black market, provoking popular resentment. The treatment of Jews by the Russian army and anti-Semitic propaganda by the National Democrats ignited protests of Russian liberals and Jewish organizations abroad.6

As Russia suffered setbacks on the front, the anti-Jewish press campaign gathered momentum. For example, the renowned Polish activist Aleksander Świetochowski accused Jews of speculation, sabotage, and collaboration with the Central Powers. In an article “Wojna trzydziesta czwarta” (The 34th war), he stated that Jewish links with Germany and Austro-Hungary precluded a Polish-Jewish rapprochement. The Polish nation would not tolerate a large ethnic group that associated itself with the enemies of Poland. Świetochowski also popularized racist concepts, asserting that “nomadic” habits and peculiar biological traits made Jews incapable of assimilation. In “pure and true” Poland, he concluded, Jews would have to be isolated from Polish society. Świetochowski’s fears that Jews were bent on creating “Judeo-Poland” were echoed by several newspapers and journals.7

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At the beginning of the war, the Central Powers had their own plans for the future of Poland. Berlin and Vienna took it for granted that while the status of Polish lands within their respective jurisdiction remain unchanged, a buffer state would be formed from the territories of Congress Poland. In addition, some Austrian and German officials believed that the socio-economic and cultural level of Poles did not merit independence or even autonomy. Poland was primarily perceived as a geographic entity and a pool of human resources and raw materials. Outwardly, however, the Central Powers made every effort to assure Poles that they would liberate them from the Russian yoke. In August 1914, at the time of the Grand Duke’s declaration, the two governments issued appeals promising to resurrect Polish state. Although extremely vague as to the territories and political status of the future state, these appeals galvanized Polish public opinion and revitalized hopes for independence. After the Russian retreat in 1915 the Central Powers divided Poland into two occupation zones. Territories of occupied Congress Poland were divided into the German general-government with its seat in Warsaw, and the Austro-Hungarian general-government in Lublin province. The military regimes guaranteed all national groups equality and civil liberties, and retained intact the Polish administration.8

Following the hardships of Russian rule, Jews enthusiastically welcomed Austro-German armies. In Galicia Jews expected that the pre-war order would be fully restored. In Congress

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Poland the discipline and conduct of German troops bolstered hopes that days of oppression were over. Initially German and Austrian authorities believed that Jews might be used as an ally against Russia and an instrument to keep Poles in check. The German military regime, therefore, allowed Jewish cultural, educational, and political organizations to resume their activities, and supported the introduction of Yiddish in Jewish schools. Although the Germans did not grant Jews the status of a national minority (as many Jewish activists had hoped), they fully restored their civil rights in Congress Poland. Jews were excited over these developments. In the words of a contemporary, they "suddenly, as if by magic, ceased to feel like a pariah."9

But these events hardly signified a positive change in Polish-Jewish relations. On the contrary, German and Austrian rule exacerbated the confrontation between the two peoples. Poles resented Jews for their pro-German stance, and particularly despised the activities of the German Zionist organization, "Deutsches Komitee zur Befreiung der russischen Juden" (later renamed "Komitee fur den Osten"). Created in August 1914 by German Zionists, the "Komitee" proposed to the German Foreign Ministry the creation of a buffer state between Russia and Germany. This state would include central Poland and Russia's western borderlands. Jews, the "most reliable pioneers of Germanhood in the East," should be recognized as an autonomous nationality on par with other ethnic groups. The "Komitee" also propagated tight links between Polish Jews and German culture, and argued that Poles lacked "maturity" to have their own state. Germans rejected the plan, but it became known to and infuriated Polish political circles. The World Zionist Organization also criticized the "Komitee," on grounds of

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aggravating Polish-Jewish confrontation. The activities of the "Komittee" coincided with Jewish petitions to the German military regime in Congress Poland to curb anti-Semitic propaganda in Polish newspapers. By the fall of 1915, the Polish press of different political affiliations highlighted pro-German sympathies among Jews and accused them of speculation and draft evasion. This campaign took on such a scope that the German military governor of Warsaw warned an editor of the most notorious newspaper, Gazeta Poranna 2 Grosze.

In many ways, charges that Jews speculated on the black market and avoided army service were true. Drastic economic shortages and destruction wrought by hostilities sharply increased prices. Everybody tried to make his living by any means. Jews, due to their occupations as petty tradesmen and artisans, had more commodities to offer on the black market. Similarly, aversion to military service was very strong among Jews, and many dodged the draft into Austrian and German labor battalions.

As the war dragged on, political and military priorities made the Central Powers rely more on Poles to the point where they gave the Polish administration a free hand in dealing with Jews. In the fall of 1915, the Polish administration in Galicia began a mass dismissal of Jews from public service. With the connivance of Austrian authorities, Polish officials supplanted Jewish employees in Komarno, Lwów, Rymanów, and Borysław. Also, Polish civil employees who had acquired positions during the Russian occupation were largely left in place. As a result, Jews frequently

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11 Kanan, Polsko-vereiskie otnoshenia, pp. 134-135; Die Juden im Kriege, p. 73.
complained that Poles treated them on the "Russian model." Mutual accusations mounted as Poles and Jews competed to obtain positions in the administration and police.\(^\text{12}\)

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Anti-Semitic sentiments in Congress Poland and Galicia reflected in the growing hostility of Poles towards Germany and Austro-Hungary. The Central Powers increasingly treated Polish lands as a bread basket and a source of raw materials. German military authorities dismantled Polish industry, requisitioned grain, cut forests, and imposed high taxation on cities and villages. Increasingly, able-bodied Poles were rounded up and sent to work in Germany's war industries. In the Austrian part of Poland, occupation policies were little different. To the chagrin of Poles, trade was in the hands of Jewish agencies from Austria. In the districts of Chełm, Hrubieszów, and Tomaszów, the home of a large Ukrainian population, public announcements were made in German and Ukrainian. Requisitions by passing troops, the mandatory delivery of food quotas, and mobilization for labor units exerted tremendous pressure on the civilian population in Lublin province and Galicia. If Poles had any illusions as to the intentions of the Central Powers evaporated, by 1916 these illusions were gone. More Poles increasingly defined themselves as a unified national group poised against outsiders, Austrians, Germans, and Jews. Popular resentment was especially strong towards the latter, who openly displayed their pro-Austrian and pro-German attitude, and supported the military regimes as the only guarantors of peace and order. Yet, Polish indignation at the Central Powers could be expressed only through clenched teeth. Jews, consequently, became an easy outlet for popular discontent. Although Austro-

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German authorities effectively prevented public unrest, they often ignored anti-Semitic agitation. As the situation worsened, some Jewish leaders such as a leading Polish Zionist, Herschel Farbstein, predicted that Polish independence would spell disaster for the Jews.13

When the Austrian administration in Galicia forced Polish and Ukrainian peasants to return stolen Jewish goods, anti-Jewish animosities flared up in courts. Many Jews informed on, and testified against, looters and those who had collaborated with the Russians. The Polish public reacted in outrage at what was seen as Jews settling scores with potential political rivals. Hostility also arose when Jewish refugees and deportees returned to claim their houses and belongings, which had been appropriated by the local population. For its part, the Jewish press highlighted Polish anti-Semitic attitudes and professed the loyalty of Jews to the Central Powers as alone capable of protecting them from hostile neighbors.14

wojny, pp. 75, 103-104, 126-127; “Perepiska so starostvami,” TsDIAUuL, 146/8/1884, p. 34; Zielecki, “Żydzi w polskim ruchu niepodległościowym,” p. 295.


Anti-Semitism even made inroads into Polish political organizations which had advocated Polish-Jewish cooperation before the war. In July 1915, a leader of the Polish Socialist Party, Ignacy Daszyński, dismissed Jews from the party leadership and the editorial board of the party newspaper *Naprzód*. To his Jewish colleagues, Daszyński explained that a “philosemitic” stance of his party would seriously undermine its political credibility after the war. Profound political differences precluded attempts of some Polish politicians to find accommodation with Jews. For example, Leon Biliński, a member of the Polish Main National Committee (formed in Galicia at the beginning of the war) sought to persuade Jewish Orthodox leaders to form a joint voting block as foundation of a future Polish-Jewish rapprochement. However, Jewish leaders rejected this action fearing that it would have anti-Austrian overtones. To the chagrin of Polish leaders, Jewish organizations in Poland and abroad accused all Poles of anti-Semitism and questioned their ability to have an independent state.15

The result of mutual hostility was predictable. As anti-Semitism became an integral element of the war, Polish newspapers spread fantastic stories about Jewish collaboration with the Russian army. Jews were blamed for spreading rumors, for being Austrian or German financial agents and disseminating lies about Austro-German victories on the battlefield. Racial anti-Semitism became progressively pronounced: some authors called for action against Jews, as genetically treacherous, “...reckless and unwise, cunning and blind optimists, intolerant [of others], cowardly, and merciless.” Polish nationalism grew increasingly exclusionary and xenophobic. Anti-Semitic convictions were no longer the prerogative of right-wing Polish groups as Polish peasant organizations and liberal-minded politicians voiced popular anti-Jewish

resentments. For instance, a future foreign minister, August Zaleski, told a British activist, Lucien Wolf, that equalizing Yiddish with Polish would be opposed by the entire Polish population.\textsuperscript{16}

Although economic exploitation of the country remained a trademark of the Austro-German occupation, and both military governments refused to grant Poland political concessions, setbacks on the front and fear of popular discontent forced the Central Powers to change these policies. On November 5, 1916, the two Emperors issued a declaration that provided for a Polish state under German and Austrian auspices. The declaration sparked mass enthusiastic response of Poles and Jews. Jewish communities congratulated Polish political representations in Warsaw and Vienna and expressed hopes for a harmonious coexistence in independent Poland. The November declaration signified an important change in the policies of the Central Powers towards Jews. From that point onward, the military regimes effectively surrendered Jewish issues to the jurisdiction of Polish officials. In 1917 the German military regime passed control over general education to the Polish administration, dashing Jewish hopes that the Yiddish and Hebrew languages would receive an equal status with Polish.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{17} On November 5, 1916, on behalf of the two Emperors the military governments announced the creation of a constitutional Polish state. The declaration, however, did nothing to win the Poles since a new truncated buffer-state would be deprived of Poznań, Pomorze (the Baltic Sea shore), Silesia, and Galicia. Grossfeld, \textit{Polityka państw centralnych}, p. 187; Burke, “Polish Policy,” pp. 32-33; Hupka, Z czasów wielkiej wojny, p. 286; Zielecki, “Żydzi w polskim ruchu niepodległościowym,” pp. 294-295; Zechlin, \textit{Die Deutsche Politik}, pp. 198-209, 211-214.
Attempts by Jewish activists to complain about discrimination in social and educational spheres to German and Austrian authorities went unheeded, and were interpreted by Polish political circles as subversive actions. Inflation was particularly felt in the countryside, and peasants blamed the military regimes, the nobility, and Jews for economic shortages and privation. In the territories held by the Central Powers and in the Russian-held part of Galicia, the Polish-Jewish rivalry became especially acute in aid committees created for organizing food supplies.18

Leading Polish circles spawned different concepts of Polish nationhood. The National Democrats promoted the necessity of Polish nation-state, in which ethnic minorities (except Jews) would be gradually Polonised. The followers of Józef Piłsudski advocated a confederation of Poles, Ukrainians, and Belorussians as a power capable of withstanding Russian and German aggression. Despite their differences, the two Polish groups shared a broad consensus that ethnic Poles would be a dominant group in new Poland, whether a nation-state or a confederation. Therefore, as long as the country was occupied by foreign powers, any concessions to ethnic minorities were seen as untimely. In July 1917, a temporary ruling body, the Constitutional Committee of the Temporary State Council, contemplated a declaration that would have guaranteed civil rights to national minorities in the future Polish state. Some Committee members, however, hastened to stress that such a declaration was not legally binding, especially with regards to Jews.19

18 On the committees, see AAN, “Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie,” Box 61 [Kurjer Poznański, 28 April 1917], [Głos Narodu, 16 August 1917]; [Kurjer Lwowski, 31 August 1917], [Głos Narodu, 16 August 1917, 6 September 1917], [Nowa Reforma, 7 September 1917]; Nova Rada, 28, 2 May 1917, p. 2; Wróbel, “Przed odzyskaniem niepodległości,” p. 133.

At the beginning of 1918, the economic situation throughout the Polish areas was extremely dire. Hunger, inflation, and requisitions by the military regimes forced thousands of people to move into urban areas, where populations increased drastically.

### Table 5.1. The Overcrowding of Eastern Galicia’s Urban Centers by the Summer of 1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>pre-1914 population</th>
<th>July 1917</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bohorodczany</td>
<td>4,378</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buczacz</td>
<td>14,286</td>
<td>138,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czortków</td>
<td>5,167</td>
<td>76,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kołomyja</td>
<td>42,676</td>
<td>124,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kośów</td>
<td>5,536</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadwórma</td>
<td>8,080</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peczeniżyn</td>
<td>6,667</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podhajce</td>
<td>5,576</td>
<td>93,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanisławów</td>
<td>33,328</td>
<td>158,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnopol</td>
<td>33,871</td>
<td>142,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tłumacz</td>
<td>5,719</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trembowla</td>
<td>9,075</td>
<td>81,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zborów</td>
<td>5,656</td>
<td>84,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Hungary refused foodstuffs to Austria and Germany, the burden of providing supplies fell entirely on Congress Poland and Galicia. Economic shortages aggravated popular attitudes and in January demonstrations and unrest took place in Kraków. At a time when social tensions ran high, Polish public opinion was shocked by the news of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Signed on February 9, 1918, between the Central Powers and the Ukrainian National Republic, the treaty stipulated the cession of the Chełm province to Ukraine in exchange for grain supplies. Although the province contained a large Ukrainian population, it was located on the left bank of the Bug.
River and was considered by the majority of Poles as an integral part of Poland. Outrage at the treaty was universal, and mass strikes and demonstrations took place in many cities, towns, and villages. The treaty marked the final rupture of Polish-Austrian and Polish-German relations. Vehement indignation was also directed against Jews, who were blamed for complicity with the Central Powers. The fact that the Zionists and assimilators joined their voices against the treaty did not alleviate the situation. The traditional pro-Habsburg and pro-German attitude of Polish Jewry was the main factor behind Polish grievances. While popular resentment was also directed against Ukrainians, they were still perceived as politically immature and incapable of independent action. Attacks on Jews took place in Kraków and Lwów, where mobs broke windows in Jewish shops. In other localities police intervention prevented anti-Jewish excesses. The joint protests of Jewish and Ukrainian Parliament members in Vienna such as Sydir Holubovych, Roman Smal’-Stots’kyi, Mykola Vasyl’ko, and Evhen Petrushevych in Vienna against the attacks were seen as yet another proof of Jewish-Ukrainian collaboration.20

Popular indignation at the Brest-Litovsk Treaty sparked the political mobilization of all layers of Polish society. Although this society was deeply divided along social, economic, and political lines, Polish commoners and politicians came to believe that the Polish nation had been betrayed by the Central Powers and by disloyal aliens, above all Jews. The Treaty became a junction at which the ideological anti-Semitism of politicians and the popular anti-Semitism of the

Polish masses coalesced into a powerful drive for national independence. Such anti-Semitism became both functional and genuine. It absorbed the rational dissatisfaction of Poles with existing socio-economic conditions and the emotional calls of political groups for building a nation on common ethnic and historical foundations. In Warsaw, the National Democrats gained mass support for a boycott of Jewish stores, and a series of mass anti-Jewish riots began at the end of October in Congress Poland. The riots soon spilled over to more than ninety localities in Western Galicia, where peasants and soldiers made up the backbone of the mob. Attacks on Jews and anti-Jewish agitation coincided with the influx of thousands of deserters and prisoners of war from Russia who poured into the countryside in the spring and summer of 1918. Armed gangs terrorized the population, and particularly targeted Jews, who on several occasions armed themselves and beat off the attackers.  

While Austro-Hungarian troops were able to put down these disturbances, it became evident that large parts of the Polish population perceived the visible decline of the monarchy as liberation from hated foreign rule, oppressive state machinery, requisitions, and confiscations. Attacks on Jews sent an unmistakable message to the Jewish leadership that the collapse of the old order would bring more calamity and anti-Jewish violence. In this situation Jewish leaders decided to seek accommodation with Ukrainians whose national aspirations and numerical strength made them a powerful counterbalance to Poles. Ukrainians also prepared for post-war

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contest, and on October 18, 1918, they formed the Ukrainian National Council in Lwów. The Council, headed by Yevhen Petrushevych, claimed its authority of Ukrainian ethnic lands within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and, recognizing the possibility of Polish counteraction called for national autonomy for ethnic minorities -- Poles, Germans, and Jews. Most importantly for Ukrainian-Jewish relations, the Council recognized Jews as a distinct nationality. Two days later, a gathering of Jewish students in Lwów also demanded national rights for Jews, and on October 26 a rally of Zionists, Orthodox, Poalei-Zion members, and socialists demanded that Jews be represented as a separate group in peace talks. As ethnic tensions reached their highest pitch, clashes between Jews and Poles took place in Warsaw, and Austrian authorities in Galicia put troops, field police, and civil guards on high alert.

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Perhaps, in the late fall of 1918 Jews in Congress Poland and Galicia were the only people who sincerely grieved over the break up of the old order. As the press burst out with headlines "Terrible News from Galicia," "Murder and Plunder in Przemyśl," "Attacks in Łańcut," "Pogroms in Brzesko," "Dejudaisation of Poland," Jews recalled with sadness the "good old" days of the Austro-Hungarian and German empires. Polish-Jewish competition in the socio-economic sphere, fierce in the first decade of the twentieth century, had been further aggravated...
by the war, and the brutal treatment meted out to Jews by the Russian military also had brought about an enormous increase of popular anti-Semitic attitudes. The rule of the Central Powers sharpened mutual antagonisms as Poles and Jews tried to win concessions from the military regimes.

As the end of the war drew near, the two peoples had entirely different viewpoints in regards to the future. Before World War I ideological anti-Semitism was a prerogative of Polish right-wing parties, and anti-Jewish sentiments of general population emanated mostly from the socio-economic discourse. While resenting competition with Jewish peddlers and merchants, common Poles still perceived them as legitimate "others," a traditional part of the ethnically diverse Polish life. The war witnessed the evolution of traditional anti-Jewish sentiments into xenophobic ideology of the masses. The heavy-handed rule of the Central Powers strengthened national ties among the Poles, contributed to the development of a highly introverted popular consciousness, and reinforced the beliefs in the putative racial distinctiveness of the Jews. Placed within a doctrine of national unity, anti-Semitism became an important constituent of the Polish struggle against foreign oppression.

The war also witnessed a major psychological transformation among Jews. In 1915-1916, it seemed that the rule of the Central Powers would eventually bring about Jewish national aspirations of civil and political equality. But these illusions did not endure for long. As the situation on the front and in the rear worsened, the Austrian and German military regimes found it expedient to support Poles at the expense of Jews. Nevertheless, the Jewish leadership had become convinced that only strong external pressure on Poles would guarantee Jewish national
and civil rights. Therefore, it was imperative to seek the support of the Allies, whose voice would be decisive in the post-war European political settlement.24

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Chapter VI

ANATOMY OF A POGROM: LWÓW, NOVEMBER 22-24, 1918

At the end of World War I a horrified Jew saw Habsburg emblems being ripped off building walls in Prague, and desperately cried out: “who will shield us now?” Indeed, as the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires crumbled, state institutions that had traditionally protected Jews from the pent-up fury of local nationalisms ceased to exist. New countries emerged on the map of Europe, and independence was soon followed by violence against Jews in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Polish Jews had perhaps more reasons to fear the collapse of the old order than did their co-religionists elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Considered “outsiders” who had openly demonstrated their pro-German and pro-Austrian orientation before and during the war, they were blamed for siding with the enemies of Poland. As the war came to its end, attacks on Jews, who found themselves surrounded by a hostile society, became endemic. In November 1918, news of a pogrom in Lwów spread around the world. Polish-Jewish relations entered a critical stage, pregnant with long-lasting ramifications.

This chapter focuses on the situation of Jews during the initial stage of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, and pays particular attention to the causes and consequences of the Lwów pogrom.

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To appreciate the events which unfolded in Eastern Galicia in November of 1918, one must retrace the evolution of the Ukrainian national movement, which, by World War I, had made remarkable progress. Ukrainian financial, cultural, and educational institutions had grown in numbers, and the intelligentsia unequivocally considered themselves members of a distinct nationality. In the deepening confrontation with Poles, the Ukrainian political leadership was determined to build an autonomous unit within the Habsburg monarchy. Eastern Galicia, it was hoped, might serve as a nucleus around which other areas inhabited by Ukrainians would coalesce. The outbreak of the war served as a rallying flag for Ukrainians who loyally served in Austro-Hungarian armies and fought on all fronts of the Empire. Ukrainian volunteers were formed into a crack unit, the *Sich* Sharpshooters, who put up fierce resistance to Russians in the Carpathians, and incurred heavy casualties. The war gave a powerful impetus to the national aspirations of Ukrainians, who hoped for a favorable post-war territorial settlement and more political representation in Bukovina, Transcarpathia, and Galicia. In the latter, however, their objectives ran afoul of those of the Poles who had dominated the regional administration and politics before the war and would accept nothing less for the future. Most importantly, by the middle of the war the Polish political leadership had formulated its own territorial program, in which Galicia, the Polish Piedmont, was to provide one of the core areas of the future Polish state. The political supremacy of Poles in Galicia was taken for granted. After the declaration of the two Emperors in November 1916, the committee of
the Polish parliamentary group, Koło Polskie, worked out a new constitution, sharply reducing the numbers of Ukrainian deputies in the Parliament. For Ukrainians, given their numerical superiority in Galicia, such an arrangement was unacceptable.\(^2\)

Since Galicia was coveted by both Poles and Ukrainians, chances for a rapprochement between them dissipated as the war progressed, and Vienna’s vague and mutually exclusive promises to the two groups facilitated Polish-Ukrainian animosity. Jews, the third largest group in the province, occupied an important place in the planning of the two protagonists. In October 1916, in conversation with Louis Marshall, a major activist of the American Jewish Committee, Roman Dmowski stressed that Jewish support was paramount for Polish independence. The leader of the National Democrats, however, denied the existence of pogroms in Poland and blamed Russia for spreading anti-Semitic propaganda among his compatriots. Jews, asserted Dmowski, sided with Poland’s enemies -- Russia, Austro-Hungary, and Germany (he passed over in silence the fact that the National Democrats had long advocated collaboration with the Russian Empire). In order to win major powers to their respective causes, Polish and Ukrainian representatives in Vienna claimed to have secured Jewish support for their respective claims in the future political settlement in Galicia.\(^3\)

The Polish leadership’s adamant stand on the future of Galicia convinced the Ukrainian leadership that they needed to seize initiative if they were to determine the fate of the region. On

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October 18, 1918, a Ukrainian National Council, comprised of Ukrainian parliament members and politicians from Galicia and Bukovina formed in Lwów to act as a constituent assembly, and the next day it declared the creation of a Ukrainian state which included Eastern Galicia east of the San River, the Lemko area, north-western Bukovina, and parts of Transcarpathia. The declaration also stipulated the equality of all nationalities. Most importantly for Jews, it granted them equal national status with Poles and Ukrainians as well as a proportional number of seats in the Council.

The creation of the Ukrainian National Council coincided with Polish preparations for a take-over in Galicia. By October 31 Polish paramilitary groups assumed power in Kraków, and the Polish Liquidation Committee, as a temporary governing body, was called into existence. In Lwów, the Polish Military Organization (POW) and the Union of Freedom subordinated themselves to a war veteran, Captain Czesław Maczyński, who had strong ties with the National Democrats. By November 1, the situation in Galicia heated up. The breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian army resulted in mass desertion of multinational rank-and-file who flooded towns and

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4 Lemki or Rusins, an ethno-cultural group which inhabited southern districts of Western Galicia along the Slovak border.

villages of the province. Thousands of deserters formed armed bands and ravaged the countryside. Robbery, murder, and looting became endemic.6

In this situation, on the night of November 1, Ukrainian forces under Major Dmytro Vitovs'kyi arrested Polish officers, disarmed soldiers, and detained the Austrian Military Governor, Count Karl Huyn. At daybreak, the Ukrainian National Council, headed by Dr. Kost' Levyts'kyi, declared itself to have assumed power in Galicia. The Council proclaimed Ukrainian statehood, and guaranteed civil equality and political rights to all national groups. The Ukrainian coup, however, was only the beginning of turmoil and violence.7

Jews were particularly frightened by widespread banditry and looting, which preceded and followed the Ukrainian take-over. Already on November 1, the dregs of society in Lwów and Przemyśl broke into munitions depots, barracks, and warehouses, smashing shop windows and robbing civilians. Jewish stores and houses especially attracted roaming gangs. The Austro-Hungarian command seemed incapable of preventing excesses as multinational units often refused to obey their commanders and joined the looters. The police and gendarmerie were equally powerless as the spirit of anarchy penetrated their ranks.8

That same day, the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation turned into an armed conflict. When the news of the coup spread in the city, strongholds of Polish resistance were hastily organized.

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6Lasocki, Wspomnienia, p. 24; Listopad 1.-22.XI.1918 we Lwowie, pp. 2-4, 23; Bialynia-Chołodecki, Lwów w listopadzie, pp. 17-18.
High school, gymnasium, and university students, augmented by civilians, barricaded themselves in schools and barracks. A Polish Civil Committee was formed, and in cooperation with the POW it endeavored to establish a uniform command among the defenders. Both bodies became spearheads of resistance and rallying points for Poles of all political affiliations, sex, and age. The heroic stance of the Polish youth soon reverberated around the country, and the struggle in Lwów was universally perceived as the ultimate showdown for independence. Even elements of the city underworld joined the defenders, and the fighting effectively separated the city into two hostile camps. A number of Jewish officers and soldiers sided with the Poles. The majority of Jews, however, lived in Ukrainian-held parts of Lwów, and they were determined to await the outcome of the struggle.9

The Jewish leadership also did not want to become involved in the conflict. On November 1, representatives of several Jewish political parties formed a Committee for Public Safety. The Committee announced that Jews would stay neutral, and, to protect the Jewish quarters from criminal attacks, organized a militia. The Polish vice-president of the city, Marceli Chłamtacz, and the Ukrainian commander, Major Vitovs’kyi, were immediately informed of these facts. The

militia was armed and wore white armbands; later it was provided with identification cards in Yiddish.\(^{10}\)

The declaration of neutrality triggered a wave of outrage among the Polish population, who interpreted it as an act of treachery, the proverbial last straw of Jewish wrongdoing. When fighting erupted in Lwów, Polish-Jewish relations had deteriorated to the point where the majority of Poles perceived Jews as hostile bystanders, if not open enemies. This reaction derived from several circumstances. In partitioned Poland, Jews had tended to side with the “stronger” party, whether Austrians or Germans. Hence, their neutrality was seen as a traditional pattern of supporting the more powerful belligerent. Moreover an antiquated story of Jewish “ingratitude” towards the country that had in dire times hospitably received them was magnified by the conflict and lay bare the “true” Jewish nature. Many Poles saw the Polish-Ukrainian conflict as a confrontation between the city and the “unkempt” Ukrainian countryside. Lwów, the cradle of “higher” culture, was being invaded by Ukrainian “Cossack” forces; Jews, who comprised a significant portion of the urban population, had betrayed the Polish cause by choosing to stay neutral. Ukrainians, on the other hand, welcomed the declaration of neutrality. From their point of view, it effectively divested Poles of financial and human resources available in the Jewish quarters.

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Polish and Ukrainian viewpoints made it impossible for either side to appreciate the situation confronting Jews. The escalating conflict had offered them few alternatives. Beliefs that the entire Polish society was utterly anti-Semitic were shared by the Jewish majority. Anti-Jewish riots and vehement anti-Jewish propaganda at the end of World War I confirmed these beliefs and portended grim prospects for Jews at the dawn of Polish independence. Rumors that Polish paramilitary units were robbing Jews circulated from the beginning of the fighting in Lwów.

However, as attractive as Ukrainian promises were, traditional Polish political dominance in Galicia and the relative fragility of the Ukrainian national movement advised caution in siding with the Ukrainians. Therefore, the assimilationists and the Orthodox protested against the declaration of neutrality as dangerous for the future of Jews in Poland. It also mattered that Ukrainian troops were stationed in the Jewish quarters in Lwów and that the shtetlach in the entirety of Galicia were surrounded by Ukrainian villages. On November 1, when Ukrainian forces took over the region, in many localities Jewish communities also proclaimed neutrality. It can be surmised, therefore, that even if Jews nourished desires to join the Poles (which the majority definitely did not), such a move was fraught with dire consequences. Neutrality seemed to be the only sensible course.

While the assimilationists correctly assessed the potential ramifications of neutrality, their protestations of loyalty towards Poles did not change the situation. On November 6, the Committee of Public Safety in Lwów reiterated its intention to use any means to “prevent the Jewish population from being dragged into conflict.” From this moment on the division between Jews and Poles ran along the Polish-Ukrainian front-line through the city, rendering Polish-Jewish understanding impossible. Similarly, the announcement by the Polish government on November 7
that it guaranteed civil rights and liberties to all citizens made no difference in the atmosphere charged with mutual hostilities.\textsuperscript{11}

\textit{The Course of Events}

Given the tragic circumstances that took place in the Lwów Jewish quarters in November 1918, it is no surprise that the issue of neutrality, and especially the activities of the Jewish militia, would later become the subject of heated debates. Jewish contemporaries and historians argued that the militia observed neutrality to the letter, while their Polish counterparts insisted that it broke neutrality from the start of the fighting.

As law and order in Lwów crumbled before the fighting began, the main Jewish quarters, situated on the fringes of the city, were targeted by roving bands. Lawlessness was aggravated by the fact that Austrian authorities had opened prison gates and set free about 800 criminals.\textsuperscript{12} As the only protection for the Jewish population, the militia engaged looters, often in pitched encounters. Patrolling in the Jewish quarters, the militia had its first clashes with the Poles. Since the city was divided into two parts, Poles were trying to cross over into Polish-held parts. Some


\textsuperscript{12} Polish authors claimed that Ukrainians released up to 800 criminals. Ukrainian sources, on the other hand, maintained that the numbers of released inmates were much smaller. See, \textit{Nova Rada}, n. 229, 21 November (4 December) 1918, p. 2, and n. 234, 28 November (11 December) 1918, p. 2; \textit{Gazeta Poranna}, n. 4465, 8 December 1918, p. 3; "Vidozva do pol'skoho naselennia," TsDAVO\textit{Vtć}, 2188/1/278, p. 45; Białynia-Chołodecki, \textit{Lwów w listopadzie}, p. 39; Gella, \textit{Ruski miesiąc}, p. 36; Tomaszewski, "Lwów, 22 listopad," p. 281. According to Polish sources there were more than 2,000 criminals at large at the time of the fighting in Lwów. Łukomski, Partacz, and Polak, \textit{Wojna polsko-ukraińska}, p. 81; Kozłowski, \textit{Zapomniana wojna}, p. 215.
were stopped and frisked by the Jewish militia. The zeal of the militiamen was confirmed by several eyewitnesses, adding to the highly charged atmosphere in Lwów.¹³

Years of Polish-Jewish conflict had made many Jews resentful towards their Polish neighbors. Correspondingly, some militiamen released their anger and mistreated Poles on the streets. Furthermore, the size of the militia greatly alarmed the Polish command. By the standards of street fighting -- initially Ukrainian and Polish forces did not exceed 1,500 men each (among the latter a large number were untrained youth) -- the militia was a power to be reckoned with. By early November it comprised some two hundred armed men; by mid-November it numbered forty-five officers and 302 soldiers. Deployed in its entirety, such a force would be able to turn the tide in any local encounter.¹⁴

A formal agreement between the Committee for Public Safety and the Polish command was signed on November 10, and the two sides tried to demarcate clearly their respective zones of operation. By that time, the activities of the militia’s checkpoints had already triggered numerous protests by the Polish side. Convictions that Jewish neutrality was a mere facade were reinforced by an announcement of the main Ukrainian newspaper, Ukrains’ke Slovo. On November 3, it asserted that “Jews go hand in hand with Ukrainians.”¹⁵ Jewish contemporaries argued that such interpretation of facts was wrong. However, from the Ukrainian point of view the militia’s actions explicitly showed where Jewish sympathies lay. More importantly, the announcement was


directed to Ukrainian troops, who were largely drafted from the countryside and felt uncomfortable in a large and unfamiliar city. The presence of a relatively strong ally definitely fortified their spirits.

After the Ukrainian command recognized the neutrality of Jews, it let the militia control the Jewish quarters. The militia was kept busy keeping order on the streets as there were robberies and unauthorized searches by Ukrainian patrols as well as assaults on Jews by paramilitary groups with no clear affiliation. Already in the first week of fighting the Jewish militia had participated in several clashes with armed bandits. Maintaining neutrality became even more difficult as both Polish and Ukrainian detachments often crossed into the militia-controlled districts. At the same time, supplies were at a premium, and Jewish detachments also violated the demarcation lines and confiscated foodstuffs on the fringes of the city. The motley uniforms of the belligerents -- in the dark of night, Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish insignias were difficult to differentiate -- fueled rumors which added to the general confusion of the street fighting. On the Polish side, stories of Jews who murdered wounded Polish soldiers were especially persistent.16

However active the Poles believed the Jewish militia to be, in truth it constituted only a minuscule fraction of the Jewish population. The majority of Jews in Lwów and other places in Galicia wished nothing but to wait out the storm. In the midst of the conflict, however, this attitude went largely unnoticed. The official newspaper of the Polish forces, Pobudka, published every instance and rumor about the militia’s violation of neutrality. Resentment against “treacherous” Jews flared up on November 12, when a Jewish delegation approached a Polish

15 Lasocki, Wspomnienia, p. 39; Makarchuk, Ukrains'ka Respublika Halychan, p. 92; Bailly, A City Fights for Freedom, 102; Gella, Ruski miesiac, p. 28.
16 “Nakazy nachal’noi komandy,” TsDAVOVtUU, 2188/1/1, pp. 11, 15; “Perepiska i rasporiazhenia,” Ibid, 2188/4/27, pp. 2, 15;
position at the Sienkiewicz school, one of the Polish strongholds. Only the intervention of a commanding officer, Karol Baczyński, saved the envoys from swift and brutal reprisal from his troops. For more perspicacious members of the Committee for Public Safety, this incident must have served as the first premonition of what would happen should there be no restraining force in the city.¹⁷

Other developments added new ingredients to the vilification of the Jews. The nature of street fighting allowed only for a loosely unified command among Polish units, which often fought without support and instruction from Maczyński. Such a lack of coordination resulted in the disarmament and detention of militiamen since some Polish commanders refused to recognize the militia as a legitimate force. Although the Polish command and the Polish Civil Committee confirmed the neutrality of the Jews in a formal agreement on November 10, arrests of militiamen continued.¹⁸

One more factor played into the heating up of the atmosphere in the city. Within the ranks of Polish defenders petty criminals constituted a tangible component. While displaying good fighting qualities, they abhorred any disciplinary limitations, and often engaged in activities diametrically opposite to any military code. Their excesses compelled the Polish command on November 9 (a day after a similar measure by the Ukrainian command) to introduce drumhead

¹⁸ "Raporty," TsDAVOTIU, 2188/2/143, p. 46; "Nakazy nachal’noi komandy," Ibid, 2188/1/1, p. 13; "Nakazy po nachal’nii komandi," Ibid, 2188/2/8, p. 12; Bailly, A City Fights for Freedom, pp. 103, 235-236; Chwila, n. 1, 10 January 1919, p. 3, n. 18, 31 January 1919, p. 2; Nowy Dziennik, n. 145, 3 December 1918, p. 3; Inster, Dokumenty fałszu, pp. 31, 84-86.
courts-martial. The enforcement of the decree, however, was a different matter, and the Jewish militia often fired on bandits wearing Polish insignia. Criminal elements were reported even among the Polish gendarmerie. The thin line between patriot and looter became difficult to detect. Hence, to Poles, for whom bandits were good comrades and valiant compatriots, the militia's shots seemed to be undisguised acts of hostility.19

In addition, the gradual brutalization of fighting triggered atrocities on both sides. Poles and Ukrainians reported being shot upon from roofs, basements, garrets, and windows. Both sides called for retribution against “perfidious enemies” and fired randomly at the sources of alleged attacks. On November 14, Ukrainian units murdered captured Polish soldiers, and a day later, Poles responded in kind, killing captured Ukrainians. Jews and Ukrainians also sometimes fired at each other. While in all instances shooters were not identified, Poles inevitably linked them to Jews.20

Further proofs that Jews directly participated in fighting came on the night of November 15, when in a clash between the militia and Polish detachments two militiamen lost their lives.


According to various sources, the militia tried to curb the activities of an armed gang which was robbing residents in the Jewish quarters. The event unfolded in the militia-controlled part of the city. The command of the militia, receiving reports of armed gangs robbing Jewish houses, sent a unit of thirty men under the command of an officer, Maximilian Straub. The unit attacked and dispersed the looters. In pursuit, it approached the Polish lines with a white flag, but the Poles opened fire and killed two militiamen, including Straub (some sources claim four militiamen, or only Straub). The rest were taken prisoner. While Jewish sources insisted that the militia had informed the Polish command about the impending operation, the Polish side alleged that at least one Ukrainian supported the militia with gunfire. A Ukrainian newspaper, *Dilo*, added fuel to Polish-Jewish mutual accusations as it reported on November 19 that a Polish offensive had been thwarted by a joint effort of the Jewish militia and Ukrainian forces.21

Meanwhile, *Pobudka* reported other instances of Jewish attacks on Polish troops, and caches of munitions and arms in synagogues. Alleged witnesses related numerous instances of Jews guiding Ukrainians to Polish positions, strafing Poles with machine guns, and pouring boiling water on soldiers. On November 17, *Pobudka* warned Jews not to “provoke anti-Semitism” among the Polish population.22


Fear of possible pogroms compelled the Jewish leadership to appeal to the Allies. On November 14, the Committee for Public Safety wrote to President Woodrow Wilson and explained the situation of Jews caught in the midst of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. On November 20, a Jewish delegation asked a French officer, Henry Villaime, a member of an Allied mission in Galicia, to mediate between the two opposing forces and make sure that Jews were represented in the city council. The officer agreed to convey the message to the Polish side.23

The Pogrom: Close-Up 1

On November 21, Polish forces reinforced by units from Przemysł launched an offensive which decided the fate of Lwów. After sporadic fighting, Ukrainians withdrew from the city, and the next morning was recorded in Polish popular memory as one of triumph and glory. On a clear day with a light frost singing Polish troops marched in.

Streets, dead quiet just a moment before, suddenly erupted with... people shouting, hysterically sobbing, and singing... The marching columns were showered with flowers, cigarettes, and tobacco;... an unbelievable rush of joy swept house after house, street after street...” 24

This is how an eyewitness depicted the jubilation of Polish crowds. At the time of the victorious celebration, a mob of civilians and soldiers rushed the Jewish quarters, smashing windows, breaking into houses, and murdering people regardless of age or sex. Referred to by Polish sources as the “mob” (szumowiny), these elements who attacked Jews indeed had all the trappings of the mob in that they were excited, disorderly, and brutal. The conviction that the attack was a

“punitive” expedition against Jews was widely shared among the pogromists. Rumors that the Polish command had “granted” the defenders of Lwów the right to loot Jews drew large numbers of individuals to the Jewish quarters. Discipline in the Polish ranks had never been too strict, and there were many drunken soldiers around. Immediately after Polish troops entered Lwów, the defenders of one city sector, “Bem,” went to a prison and released inmates. While some were later apprehended and returned to their cells, about seventy escaped and more than likely joined the crowds.25

The make-up and lack of discipline among Polish troops was one ingredient in the tragedy. The attitude of the Polish command also contributed to the spread of violence. On the morning of November 22, according to Maćysiński’s memoirs, he had inspected Polish positions around the city. In his communiqué, issued after the tour, he asserted that Lwów was in Polish hands but for Żółkiewska street -- the hub of the Jewish quarters-- and the area around a historical hill, the High Castle. At both sites, he reported, Jews and Ukrainians, armed with submachine guns fought until late that evening. Resistance had been fierce and Jewish defenders had allegedly poured boiling water on Polish soldiers. His report was corroborated by another Polish contemporary who stressed a “very strong” resistance by the militia until afternoon.26

But these allegations were contradicted by the Supreme Command of Polish troops in Galicia, which on November 23 issued an order stating that Ukrainian troops had left Lwów on the night of the 21st-22nd. The order confirmed the presence of armed gangs dressed in uniforms

24 Kozłowski, Zapomniana wojna, p. 213.
25 AAN, “Kancelaria Cywilna Naczelnika Państwa,” 179, part 1, p. 12; Chwila, n. 507, 14 June 1920, p. 5.
26 Listopad 1.-22.XI.1918 Lwówie, p. 27; Maćysiński, Boje Lwowskie, pp. 19-21; Hupert, Walki o Lwów, pp. 92-96.
and the establishment of drumhead courts martial to punish bandits. Several Polish and Ukrainian contemporaries also stressed that there had been no Ukrainian forces in the city since the last Ukrainian soldiers left early in the morning of November 22, and there were no "boiling water, attacks with axes, and [Jewish] shooting" at Polish soldiers. In addition, there was no trace of fighting in the Jewish quarters. Moreover, Major (rotmistrz) Roman Abraham, who commanded the Polish position adjacent to the Jewish quarters, failed to mention Jewish resistance. Other Polish sources reported that the Jewish militia had been disarmed around 8:00AM on November 22 and after that time no fighting was recorded. If Ukrainians withdrew from the city on November 21, and the Jews militia had been disarmed on November 22, what fighting was Mączyński referring to?

To answer this question, the events must be reconstructed step by step. According to contemporaries, and the investigative committee set up by the Polish government, the pogrom had started on the morning of November 22, when soldiers and civilians with Polish insignia had broken into Jewish houses and stores searching for firearms. Shots had been fired everywhere, to intimidate residents or to finish off victims. Furniture had been destroyed, windows smashed, and walls ripped apart in search of gold. Women were raped, and pogromists shouted anti-Jewish slogans before murdering their victims. After thorough looting, hand-grenades had been thrown into stores and apartments. Rumors had it that the Polish command had given Lwów defenders forty-eight hours of free reign. The pogrom had come in waves, with one group of looters

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followed by another, leaving the impression of a systematic assault, a notion suggested by some Polish newspapers.  

Three synagogues were set on fire. Some Jews who tried to save religious artifacts perished in flames. This led to accusations that Poles had on purpose prevented the residents from escaping from burning buildings. Indeed, sometimes after looting an apartment, the pogromists locked up a family in one room and set the whole house afire. Soldiers constituted the bulk of the looters, and Jewish witnesses maintained that the area had been tightly sealed by troops and police, a sign that the pogrom was organized.  

From documentary sources it becomes evident that the Polish command neither ordered nor coordinated the brutal acts of its subordinates. The mob consisted of groups and single individuals who seem to have acted on their own, although Jewish sources reported the presence of NCOs and officers among the pogromists. Yet, given the anti-Jewish mood of Polish troops during the fighting in Lwów, one can conclude that anti-Jewish violence required no organization.

It was enough to let things go, and this is what Polish commanders did. On November 22, a deputation of Jews had approached General Bolesław Roja, who had assumed the general command of Polish forces in the area. Jewish deputies informed Roja that armed groups were breaking into Jewish stores, and asked for protection. Roja consented to the request and sent the

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29 Kuz'ma, Lystopadowe dni, p. 377; Inster, Dokumenty fa i su, pp. 27, 50, 55, 86; Hausner, Listopad 1918 r., p. 70; Tadeusz Kotik, "Walki w dzielnicy Żółkiewskiej," Obrona Lwowa, vol. 2, p. 226; Stanisław Łapiński-Nilski and Aleksander Kron, Listopad we Lwowie 1918 r. (Warsaw: Nakładem Wydawnictwa "Rząd i Wojsko," 1920), p. 53; Chwila, n. 1, 10 January
deputies to Maczyński, who as the immediate officer on the scene was responsible for carrying out appropriate measures. Another officer, the commander of the relieving force, Lieutenant-Colonel Michał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski, tried to convince Maczyński to give restraining orders to the troops. When Jewish deputies reached Maczyński, he promised immediate action. However, his order to maintain law and discipline was issued only the next day, November 23. In his memoirs, Maczyński attributed the delay to the fact that the publisher delayed printing of the order, and that Roja had forbidden its publication. Nevertheless, on November 21 Polish civil authorities had published an appeal to the population to maintain calm and not engage in “outbursts of hate.” Therefore, Maczyński’s version that it was the publisher who had bungled his orders is simply a falsification of events.30

That Polish commanders anticipated disturbances can be seen from the actions of General Roja. On the afternoon of November 22 he requested reinforcements from the Polish Liquidation Committee in Kraków to “uphold law and provide protection against bands of robbers.” Several hours later, he repeated the request, stressing that with no additional forces, it would be impossible to stop the excesses. Polish units in and around Lwów numbered about 3,000 front line officers and soldiers -- a sufficient force to put down armed resistance save for large-scale unrest or popular disorder. Yet Roja requested reinforcements, appreciating the difficulties in restraining his subordinates. Next day, Roja issued an order authorizing the use of arms against

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any "individual, civilian or uniformed, caught red-handed in robberies and violence." On November 24, courts-martial were introduced in the city.31

While the printing house allegedly bungled Mączyński's good intentions, it did not fail to publish another announcement on November 23. As Lwów celebrated its liberation, an address signed by Mączyński and directed to the Jewish community appeared on city walls. It accused Jews of attacking Polish troops with axes, pouring boiling water on soldiers, and shooting in the back of passing units. The address warned Jews that the Polish command

restrains the natural impulses of the Polish population and the troops. All [Lwów] residents regardless of confession have the right for lawful protection. To this end was promulgated a decree stipulating drumhead court-martial and summary punishment. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Jewish population should be obliged to constrain those of their co-religionists who still conduct themselves in such a manner as if trying to provoke an unpredictable misfortune on the entire Jewish community. The Polish Command hopes that the Jewish population, primarily in its own interest, would restrain its co-religionists from any display of hatred toward Polish rule, and by correct and loyal conduct would make it possible for the authorities and the rest of the population to introduce and uphold law and order.32

Whatever Mączyński had in mind with this appeal at a time when the pogrom was in full swing, Jews and Poles agree that the appeal served to further incite the mob, and to effectively exonerate its deeds. At this point it suffices to say that the pogrom went in waves until November 24. Then drumhead courts-martial were finally established, and after the Polish gendarmerie and officer patrols arrested several looters, order was restored. One can conclude,

31 Łapiński and Kron, Listopad we Lwowie, pp. 10, 72; Makarchuk, Ukrains'ka Respublika Halychan, p. 81; Roja, Legendy i fakty, pp. 207, 324; CAW, "Inwentarze kolekcji materiałów drukowanych i archiwaliów prywatnych," 444.1.1, no page; Pobudka, n. 19, 24 November 1918, p. 2; Roja, Legendy i fakty, pp. 190, 203, 324.
32 CAW, "Inwentarze kolekcji materiałów drukowanych i archiwaliów prywatnych," 444.1.1, no page; Gazeta Poranna, n. 4447, 23 November 1918, p. 2.
as did some Polish officers, that the pogrom could have been prevented, or at least tamed, but for a lack of will on the part of the Polish command.33

This conclusion seems fully justified if one looks at developments that took place in Przemyśl exactly at the time of the fighting in Lwów. The Ukrainian take-over of Przemyśl also started on November 1, and the Polish-Ukrainian conflict soon engulfed the entire district. The Jewish community declared neutrality, and the Jewish militia protected the Jewish quarters from roving bands of marauders. The closer proximity to Kraków allowed the Polish Liquidation Committee to promptly dispatch reinforcements to Przemyśl and tip the tide of the battle.34 The Polish side accused the Jewish militia of fighting on the Ukrainian side.35 On the evening of November 11, once the Polish offensive cleared the city of Ukrainian units, there were sporadic attacks on Jews and looting of Jewish shops, and military details and police began searches in Jewish and Ukrainian houses, terrorizing the residents. The excesses, however, were stopped by the energetic intervention of the Polish commander, Major Julian Stachiewicz, who dispatched officer patrols to the Jewish quarters.36


34 Konieczny, Walki polsko-ukraińskie w Przemyślu, p. 29.

35 While Jewish contemporaries in unison denied the involvement of the Jewish militia in the fighting in Lwów, they were silent on the events in Przemyśl. Hence, the situation in the city can be reconstructed only from the Polish point of view.

When daylight settled in on November 25, the Jewish quarters in Lwów presented a miserable sight. Houses, synagogues, and buildings were still smoldering, black smoke was pouring through empty windows, and streets were littered with pieces of furniture, utensils, and linen. Human losses, a matter of long controversy, were heavy. According to different sources, there were between seventy-three and 150 murdered and 463 wounded Jews. Fifty-four houses were completely burned or destroyed, and material losses amounted to more than a hundred million Austrian kron. Precious religious artifacts, manuscripts, and Torah scrolls perished in flames. One of the oldest synagogues in the city, built in 1630, was burned to the ground. The number of rapes remains unknown. Throughout the Polish-Ukrainian fighting in Lwów, Polish casualties reached between 200 and 210, and Ukrainian casualties were more or less the same. Hence, even the lowest estimate of Jewish losses -- seventy-three dead civilians -- was high by any standard.  

The gap between the lowest and highest estimate of victims was conditioned by the provenance of the sources. While the Polish side tried to minimize Jewish losses, Jewish sources tended to stress the extent of the tragedy by inflating the numbers. The Polish military, for example, played down Jewish casualties and reported that seventy-eight Jews were killed in the

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Mroczka, Galicji rozstanie z Austrią, pp. 249-250; Konieczny, Walki polsko-ukraińskie w Przemyślu, pp. 69, 71.

course of fighting, which continued until November 24. The military also stressed that losses of the Christian population between November 23 and 24 were much higher than those of the Jews.\textsuperscript{38}

The government committee sent by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Lwów to investigate the events on the spot, in December of 1919 presented its own estimate of 150 Jews murdered, some fifty houses partially or completely burned, and more than 500 stores looted. The pogrom affected 7,000 families. The committee concluded that the army "craved for revenge and was absolutely sure that Jews collaborated with Ukrainians; [appropriate] orders were given for reprisals.\textsuperscript{39}

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As horrible as the Lwów pogrom was, it paled in comparison to Russian pogroms of 1904-1905, and, even more so to the carnage that befell the Jewish communities in Soviet Ukraine during the Russian Civil War. Yet, the uproar the Lwów tragedy generated in Europe suggests that its impact was much out of proportion to the numbers of casualties. Why?

The Lwów pogrom drew much public attention and became a watershed in Polish-Jewish relations less for what it actually was, than for what it meant and symbolized. The complexity and consequences of the pogrom should be measured and understood only against the situation of Poland in European politics at that time. After more than a century of foreign domination, Poland had emerged as

\textsuperscript{38} C\textit{AW}, “Wykaz statystyczny,” I.304.1.68, no page; “Statystychni danni pro zahybylykh i poranenykh,” \textit{TsDIA\textit{U}uL}, 212/1/33, p. 10. According to various sources, the total casualties for the three weeks of the fighting varied between 210 killed and 760 wounded for the Poles, and 48 killed and 192 for Ukrainians. These numbers seem plausible. Biażynia-Chołodecki, \textit{Lwów w listopadzie}, pp. 43-44; Łapiński and Kron, \textit{Listopad we Lwowie}, p. 82. Also, see \textit{Chwila}, n. 276, 21 October 1919, p. 3; Ibid, n. 277, 22 October 1919, p. 1.
an independent state. The three partitioned parts, with different political traditions, social, and economic structures had to be integrated into one unit. These political and economic difficulties were compounded by military conflicts on all Polish frontiers -- in Eastern Galicia with Ukrainians, in the Poznań province with Germans, and in the north-east of the former Congress Poland with Lithuanians. In Belorussia and southern Lithuania, the simmering Polish-Soviet confrontation would soon erupt in a full-scale war. The Polish economy and defense much depended on the support and good will of the Allies gathering in Versailles to finalize the post-war borders. The Polish struggle for independence had won many sympathizers and supporters in the West. Hence, for Polish political circles it was vital to maintain Poland’s image as a democratic and freedom-loving country rising like the proverbial phoenix. Reports of the Lwów pogrom came as a thunderbolt, badly damaging the country’s reputation.

In the view of the Polish majority, Jews had willfully distorted the events in Lwów and heavily damaged the reputation of Poland. Jewish press agencies in Europe and America had widely publicized the pogrom and highly exaggerated its scope. Thus, on November 30, 1918, *The Manchester Guardian* referred to it as "one of the worst pogroms in Polish history, and a device of the old Polish oligarchy to counter the new democratic tendencies [in Poland]." The communiqué of the Zionist Organization in Lwów published the number of victims as 600, with sixty burned houses. In December, *The Jewish Chronicle* in London asserted that 3,200 Jews had died in the pogrom. Other sources came up with 956, a thousand, or 1,600 casualties. These stories were echoed by the Ukrainian press in Galicia and eastern Ukraine. Almost all reports insinuated that the pogrom had been organized, that soldiers and officers murdered Jews in cold blood, and that the majority of Poles rejoiced at the news of the pogrom.40

40 Ciołkosz, "Dzielnica żydowska obozu w Jabłonnie," pp. 190-191; AAN, “Centralna Agencja Polska w Lozannie,” Box 246 [Kölische Zeitung, 5 December 1918], [Volksrecht, 2 December 1918]; “Spravki o deiatel’nosti PPS,” RTsKhIDNI, 70/5/434, p. 203; Nowy Dziennik, n. 142, 30
Various Jewish organizations abroad sent protests to the Polish government. Prominent politicians, renowned religious leaders, and businessmen in Britain, France, and the USA pressed for economic sanctions against Poland. In January of 1919, under the influence of the news of pogroms in Poland, the newly created League of Nations made recognition of the new states of East Central Europe contingent on guarantees of civil rights for national minorities.

The pressure of the Allies on the Polish delegation in Paris was interpreted by Poles as vivid proof of the "international Jewish conspiracy." The National Democrats, in contact with leading Western politicians, were convinced that Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George were under strong Jewish influence, and that a clandestine international organization headed by Jews was seeking world domination. Jews, they alleged, used the Lwów pogrom merely as a device to destroy Poland.

Galvanized by Jewish actions, the Polish media proceeded to try to dispel what it considered "Jewish slander." But in an atmosphere of anxiety and hatred the Polish version of the pogrom was, not surprisingly, much further from truth than the Jewish one. On November 25, 1918, the Lwów city council blamed criminals released by Ukrainians as the main culprits. Pobudka, which had played such a

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conspicuous role in inciting anti-Jewish sentiments, bluntly declared that the Jewish militia had been formed illegally and without Polish approval. To add insult to injury, Jews themselves were blamed for inciting the pogrom, or participating in it. Thus, on November 29 the Polish Telegraph Agency released a communiqué claiming that criminals released by the Ukrainians and Jewish hoodlums had staged the pogrom. It asserted that the Polish military rigorously prosecuted the culprits and executed fifty bandits. More or less the same story was reiterated by the Polish Liquidation Committee, the Department of Mail and Telegraph, and the Polish embassy in Kiev.43

By December 1918, Polish sources had published a report of the ethnic make-up of the pogromists: 60% Ukrainians, 30% Poles, and 10% Jews. Criminals were pointed to as the main evildoers. The latter allegedly had even had armored cars at their disposal, and Polish troops had arrested as many as 1,600 pogromists. Jews, who actively participated in the pogrom, should blame only themselves, for one “who sows wind, will reap tempest.”44 Spearheading anti-Jewish agitation, the National Democratic press maintained its ideological pattern established during World War I. Słowo Polskie explained the pogrom as the natural outcome of Jewish vices such as speculation, collaboration with Polish enemies, and espionage. Further accusations were adjusted to fit the current political situation. Jews were said to have concocted the Ukrainian coup d’etat, spied on and treacherously shot

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at Polish troopers, and to have tortured the wounded. Jewish rabbis were alleged to have called for joint Jewish-Ukrainian war efforts.45

Moderate Polish politicians also joined in refuting what they saw as an anti-Polish campaign by the Jews. The former Viceroy of Galicia, Michał Bobrzyński, asserted that in Galicia the Polish administration had always treated Jews on an equal basis. In exchange, Jewish assimilation was expected. Instead, Jews sided with Ukrainians and that triggered popular Polish outrage. Bobrzyński accepted, however, that the dregs of society and soldiers had staged the pogrom, and that its consequences had severely damaged the reputation of Poland.46

The question of who had perpetrated the pogrom, and why it had not been curbed immediately, became the focus of further nebulous charges against the Jews. Criminals released from Lwów prisons featured most prominently in every Polish report. Ukrainians followed next. Jews, either as militiamen, petty criminals, or as willful individuals dressed in Polish uniform, consistently emerged as the third factor. Maczyński’s Chief of Staff, Antoni Jakubski, insisted that Jews were demoralized by the Ukrainian defeat, and, having “completely lost sense,” turned against Polish units.47 Roja and Maczyński blamed one another for not acting more effectively in stopping the pogrom. Maczyński also argued that since he had subordinated himself to the commander of Polish reinforcements, Lieutenant-Colonel Michał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski, the latter was responsible for all appropriate measures. The Colonel,

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in turn, contended that Mączyński was on the spot when the pogrom began and should have dealt with the trouble on his own.48

Reports by foreign observers who came to Lwów to investigate the pogrom were based primarily on information presented by both sides, and thus reflected mutual biases. Thus, Captain Wright, a member of the Allied mission which came to Galicia in November of 1919, stressed that at the root of Polish anti-Semitism was German-Jewish cooperation during World War I. Wright asserted that Jews had violated neutrality by siding with the Ukrainians. But he also stressed that the poor discipline of Polish forces had promoted violence, and that the Polish command was able to maintain order by promising its troops forty-eight hours of looting in the Jewish quarters.

Polish officers and soldiers, reported Wright, perceived looting as an integral part of warfare, and anti-Semitism played no major role in the pogrom. Wright concluded that sixty Jews had been killed, and many more robbed, wounded, or raped.49

Israel Cohen, a British-Jewish observer, provided no new details to previous Jewish reports. He stated that the pogrom had been carefully prepared, and that there was another attack on Jews at the end of December.50 A report by an American senator, Henry Morgenthau, stressed that the Lwów Jewish quarters were in the Ukrainian-held territory, and it was hard to verify the facts of Jewish-Ukrainian collaboration. Morgenthau gave the numbers of deserters and criminals at large as 15,000, identified sixty-four Jewish casualties, and asserted that 7,000 people were charged with participating in the pogrom. The senator ascribed the tragedy to the lack of

discipline among Polish troops, and pointed out that determined actions by officer patrols ended the pogrom.  

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Pandemonium generated by the pogrom in Poland and abroad prompted Polish authorities to take measures to prevent the appearance of further compromising evidence. Jews who tried to collect further information on human and economic losses were apprehended by patrols or gendarmerie, and reported to the Polish command. Rumors of secretive Jewish organizations made Polish officials especially nervous about possible Jewish retaliations, and on November 27, the Lwów garrison was put on high alert. Since the Jewish assimilationists also joined in the chorus of protests to the government, to many Poles this apparent shift of a previously loyal group heralded a unified Jewish opposition. Reports from the Polish military recounted stories of Jews collecting arms and preparing retaliation. Fear of Jewish retribution, in turn, caused alarm in the army which repeatedly warned Jews of "unforeseeable consequences" of Jewish subversive activities.  

Polish anxieties were voiced in Pobudka. On December 5 it asserted that Jews were collecting weapons and preparing for armed struggle. A report of the Polish command in Lwów

51 Morgenthau also referred to 164 individuals including ten Jews sentenced by Polish courts. These numbers were not corroborated by any other Jewish and Polish sources. Chwila, n. 394, 18 February 1920, p. 2. See also, "Delo o registratsii," DALO, 1/58/95, p. 16.  
underlined the hostility of the Jews, emphasizing the alleged unity among various Jewish political groups. Jewish aid committees were perceived as instruments of sabotage. The resignation of Jewish city councilors, collection of information regarding the pogrom, and mourning declared for the victims greatly disturbed Polish authorities. The report added that the Jewish Aid Committee had collected and spread abroad “calumnies” about the conduct of the Polish armed forces. Finally, it concluded that through their financial power and influence in the world, Jews would be able to inflict serious damage on the Polish cause.53

Anxiety about what Jews might do reached its peak on December 12, when the military detained five prominent Jewish activists. Although it was announced that the measure was to prevent their contacts with Ukrainians, no evidence was presented to corroborate the charges. A Zionist newspaper, Tagblat, was shut down, and its reopening was made contingent upon printing the texts in Latin. 54

The Lwów pogrom also marked a rising combativeness of Jews in that they vociferously protested to the Polish military and, more importantly, appealed to world public opinion. Although Polish and Galician Jews had lived through the Russian brutalities of World War I, anti-Semitism in the Russian Empire was taken for granted as a traditional pattern of life. Poland, on the other hand, was claiming to be a new, democratic state built on the ruins of the three monarchies. From the Jewish point of view, its very beginnings were marked by brutal and undisguised murder in Lwów. The pogrom augured a grim future that awaited them in

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53 “Donesenia komissiriata politsii,” DALO, 271/1/453, pp. 1-2ob; “Delo o registratsii,” DALO, 1/58/95, p. 3; Pobudka, n. 30, 5 December 1918, p. 2; Ibid, n. 34, 9 December 1918, p. 3.
independent Poland, and they brushed off political, economic, and military difficulties of the young state merely as a justification for an organized anti-Jewish campaign. Jewish views were epitomized on December 5, 1918, by the newspaper Ha-tsfira which stressed that the new Poland was "re-born with bloodstains on [its] forehead."^55

To the credit of some Poles, there were attempts to ameliorate the results of the Lwów tragedy. In fact, during the pogrom several Polish officers were reported to have protected Jews from ravaging bands. The Roman-Catholic Archbishop of Lwów, A. Bilczewski, appealed to the Polish population, saying "...whatever the transgressions of the Jews might be," looting and mob law had to stop. After the pogrom, deputations of Polish szlachta, the Polish Liquidation Committee, and the Lwów City Council donated money to the Jewish community to help repair damages.^56

These protestations of good will, however, were drowned in a chorus of anti-Semitic diatribe that engulfed the country. Besides charges of collaborating with the enemy, Jews were accused of conducting an anti-Polish defamation campaign abroad. Most offensive, however, were attempts of Polish authorities to blame Jews themselves for the pogrom. In spite of the fact that none of Lwów's hospitals and doctors ever reported patients treated for burns, the Polish press kept insisting that Jews had poured boiling water on soldiers and there were Jewish criminals in Polish uniforms among the mob. Another charge that Jews hid munitions and arms in Lwów synagogues derived from a controversy over whether a round slot in the roof of a

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synagogue was a submachine gun-port, as insisted by the Poles, or a ventilation hatchway, as maintained by the Jews.57

While Jewish and Polish versions of the pogrom diverged sharply on every point, some facts can be ascertained and provide a more or less complete picture of the events in Lwów. Jewish collaboration with the Ukrainians was largely prompted by the situation in Eastern Galicia at the end of World War I. Ukrainian promises and guarantees to Jews prompted a number of Jewish political activists to opt for closer Jewish-Ukrainian cooperation. Given virulent Polish anti-Semitism during the war and anti-Jewish excesses, Jewish sympathies lay with Ukrainians. The latter, conversely, looked to the Jews as the only natural partner in the struggle with the Poles.

However, while in November 1918 the Jewish leadership probed into a possible Jewish-Ukrainian alliance, the majority of Jews remained passive. Furthermore, the Orthodox, who comprised the largest contingent among the Galician Jewry, refused to join the Committee for Public Safety and protested against the creation of the militia. Therefore, Polish accusations that Jews presented a unified front against Poland were highly exaggerated. As ungrounded were charges that the whole Jewish militia in Lwów actively participated in fighting on the Ukrainian side. Between November 1918 and March 1919, only eight militiamen and two Jewish civilians were brought to trial for collaborating with the Ukrainians. The two civilians were sentenced to prison, while the militiamen were acquitted.58 It is unquestionable that some militiamen actively supported Ukrainians. However, since the militia was disarmed on the morning of November 22

and ceased to exist as the only armed and the most pro-Ukrainian faction among Jews, "heavy fighting" in the Jewish quarters referred to by Polish sources was simply impossible unless one assumes the Jewish population was heavily armed.

In Polish accounts the role of criminals in the pogrom was also given disproportional weight. As a matter of fact, the Jewish area of the city, Zamarstynów, a habitat of the poor, had a bad reputation before the war. However, the very number of criminals — some Polish contemporaries refer to thousands of felons — seems absurd. After all, such a force could have easily attacked the Jewish quarters in the very beginning of fighting when general chaos and confusion made much easier. The Jewish militia, which numbered about 300 men, would not have been able to sustain the attack of hardened and armed villains. Instead, Lwów thugs allegedly waited until the fighting was over and the Polish military was in control of the situation.

Perhaps the simplest explanation to these ambiguities lies in the make-up of Polish troops. As has been previously noted, many criminals joined the Polish side. They displayed good fighting qualities, but did not necessarily abandon their primary trade. Clashes between them and the Jewish militia became the main basis for rumors of its anti-Polish actions. Contrary to Polish claims, the presence of Jewish and Ukrainian criminals in the mob was extremely limited. At the end of fighting anti-Jewish and anti-Ukrainian sentiments ran high, and any Jew or Ukrainian apprehended on the street would have found himself in a dire situation.

59 Lwów po inwazji rosyjskiej, p. 9; Kozłowski, Zapomniana wojna, p. 215.
The mob was largely made up of Polish soldiers and civilians many of whom had taken part in the three weeks of fighting. Its motley composition was reflected in forty-six courts martial which took place between 1919 and 1921. The pogromists represented all walks of life, and their incentives for participating in the pogrom varied. For example, one Wawrzyniec Nahorski was allegedly a notorious Ukrainian criminal. The majority of the defendants, however, were of Polish background. Włodzimierz Żeliński, who faced trial for extortion in June of 1919, was a retired accountant. Jan Łotowski and his two companions, sentenced to three years of severe imprisonment in September of 1919, had no definite trade. Katarzyna Bołuchówna and Stefania Maksymowicz simply directed Polish soldiers to a supposedly rich Jewish family. Tried in 1921, twenty-two year-old Leon Marek had been dressed in Polish uniform during the pogrom, and threw a hand-grenade into a Jewish apartment. The explosion killed one and wounded four Jews.61

Polish authorities did attempt to prosecute the pogromists, but only a small number of the real culprits were brought to justice. Two men and a woman were shot by a court martial, and several dozen persons received prison sentences. By February 10, 1919, the Lwów Police Department announced it had arrested seventy-six individuals implicated in the pogrom. Out of this number, forty-three were women, and, since the bulk of the mob in the Jewish quarters were

61“Perепіска с чрезвичайної привітелственої комісії,” DALO, 271/1/446, pp. 58, 81-81ob, 111-111ob; AAN, “Centralna Agencja Polska w Łózannie,” Box 246 [Goniec Krakowski, 28 December 1918]; ibid., “Ambassada RP w Paryżu,” 301, p. 44; Chwila, n. 163, 27 June 1919, pp. 4-5, n. 240, 12 September 1919, pp. 3-4; n. 244, 16 September 1919, pp. 5-6; n. 798, 8 April 1921, p. 4.
armed men, this proportion of women among the arrested indicates that the majority of the pogromists escaped justice.62

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The Lwów pogrom, arguably the most consequential episode in Polish-Jewish relations during the first two decades of the 20th century, grew out of several factors. Jewish neutrality in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict triggered the pogrom, but the seeds of violence were sown during World War I. Before November 21 neither the Polish command nor the Polish Civil Committee presented official charges to the Committee for Public Safety about Jewish violation of neutrality. This suggests a limited Jewish participation in the fighting. Ill discipline among Polish soldiers and anti-Jewish sentiments among the Polish population of the city greatly contributed to the outbreak of violence. Popular convictions that the Polish command gave permission for looting the Jewish quarters were widely shared by common soldiers. The punitive character of the "expedition" to the Jewish area was admitted by Jakubski, who acknowledged that "...Jews received an exemplary punishment. The whole area had to be pacified in a military way."63


The search for the final "who is to blame" for the pogrom ultimately clarifies Jewish and Polish attitudes towards the events in Lwów. For Jews, the pogrom marked the beginning of their life in a country where anti-Semitism held sway in the political establishment and among the Polish population. Therefore, Jewish leaders believed that only a widely publicized campaign in Poland and abroad would ensure the survival of Polish Jews. To the Poles, on the other hand, the Jewish campaign abroad revealed that Jews as a whole were hostile to the very idea of Polish independence. Conversely, fear and hatred of the Jews after the pogrom fed a deeply felt threat of Jewish subversion, which grew as the Polish wars on the eastern frontiers got under way.
Chapter VII

POLAND IN FERMENT: OFFICIAL POLICIES AND POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS, 1919-1920

During World War I and its immediate aftermath anti-Semitism in Poland underwent profound changes. The pre-war popular stereotypes of the Jew as peddler, landlord's hireling, and tavern-keeper were supplanted by new images of Jews as a unified, monolithic group with powerful international connections bent upon destruction of the nascent Polish state. Jews were held to be the main allies of Poland's enemies -- Ukrainians, Germans, and Bolsheviks -- as well as the principal movers behind the Minority Treaty imposed on Poland by the Allies in 1919. These convictions, in combination with the country's precarious political and military situation made official and popular anti-Semitism extremely explosive and led to frequent outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence. This chapter aims to elucidate underlying factors that reinforced negative images and reactions of the Polish society towards Jews during the Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Soviet wars between November 1918 and October 1920 -- the weakness of the state machinery, military conflicts, and collective fears of external and internal foes.

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By 1919 the reborn Polish republic faced acute problems. As a main battlefield of World War, the country was devastated by several years of fighting, unbridled robberies of its natural resources and requisitions of foodstuffs by occupying powers, and mass relocation of its
population. The bulk of Polish industry and trade ground to a standstill, inflation, speculation, and crime were rampant, and only rudimentary state institutions were functional. In addition, regional political and economic differences between the three partitioned parts made the process of integration extremely difficult.

Poland's political situation was as menacing. In the west, the Germans still held the provinces of Pomerania, Silesia, and Poznań as well as the southeastern Baltic shore and Vilna. Two thirds of Eastern Galicia, except the districts of Lwów and Przemyśl, were controlled by Western Ukrainian forces. At the beginning of January 1919, the Red Army captured Vilna, and in February the Soviet Lithuanian-Belorussian Republic was proclaimed. At the same time, the Polish-German confrontation in Poznań province exploded into a full-scale armed conflict which continued until the spring. Formed in December 1918 the Polish Communist Workers' Party promoted the establishment of communist rule in Poland and set up revolutionary councils.

One of the most pressing problems for the new state was the Jewish question, and the government paid close attention to this issue from the very beginning of Polish independence. On November 12, 1918, Józef Piłsudski, the most popular political figure and a provisional chief-of-state, received a delegation of the Jewish community in Warsaw. The delegation pledged Jewish cooperation in the reconstruction of Poland and voiced its concerns about widespread anti-Jewish violence and anti-Semitic propaganda in the country. The delegates requested that a department of Jewish affairs be created as one of the governmental branches, and that the internal life of
Jewish communities be regulated by communal councils.\textsuperscript{1} Piłsudski promised to give thorough consideration to these requests and to take measures against anti-Semitism. The Polish leader, however, was in a difficult situation. To establish law and order, he needed a centralized administrative apparatus and strong armed forces. Both branches were still in the making, and communication with many units engaged on Poland's frontiers was almost non-existent. Moreover, anti-Jewish sentiments were shared by many Polish political groups, the military, and large segments of the population. Hence, any public statement contrary to popular convictions would spark the attack of Piłsudski's archrivals, the National Democrats. Indeed, in early January 1919, facing a growing opposition to his government, Piłsudski struck an agreement with the Polish right and appointed Ignacy Paderewski, affiliated with the National Democrats, prime-minister of the new cabinet.

\textit{Minority Rights and the "Cleansing" of the Social Sphere}

The climate of official opinion on the Jewish question was characterized by an emphasis on two particular issues -- the Jewish press campaign abroad and Jewish demands in Poland for the status of a national minority. Jewish-Polish confrontation was heightened as the two groups tried to influence the decisions of the Allies in Paris. While Jewish-American and Jewish-British groups disseminated reports of the Lwów pogrom, the Polish delegation in Paris tried to minimize the impact of these reports and blamed Jews for inciting disturbances. In Poland, the National

Democratic press denied the reports as lies and a Jewish-Ukrainian plot against the state. Jewish requests for national rights were also met with universal hostility. Formed in December 1918 by representatives of Jewish political groups, the Jewish National Council pressed for recognition of Jews as a national minority. All Polish political parties objected to this status since it was seen as the first step to Jewish national autonomy.2

The attitudes of Polish political circles towards national rights of ethnic minorities mirrored official and popular views on the questions of nation and nationality. Polish-Jewish conflict before and during World War I created strong psychological bonds and a sense of national identity among ethnic Poles, whose notion of nation and nationality was based on ethnic and religious distinctions. Jews, “alien” by religion, culture, and language, and despised for their pro-German and pro-Austrian leanings were rejected by most of the Poles as a part of the Polish nation. The idea that “treacherous” Jews were entitled to the same rights and privileges as Poles was, therefore, perceived as outrageous. Concessions to Jews were seen as even more untimely. Jewish organizations abroad -- the American Jewish Congress, the Zionist Organization of America, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and the Joint Foreign Committee -- actively advocated civil and national rights for Jews in the new states of Central Eastern Europe. Fear that Jews were intent on dismantling Poland were voiced by a prominent National Democrat, Stanisław Grabski. Grabski claimed that a representative of the American Jewish Congress made Jewish support for Poland contingent upon two guarantees -- that Jews would hold half of positions in an

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administrative region carved out of the Eastern Borderlands, and that Yiddish would be equalized with Polish.3

Given the reputation of the National Democrats as Jew-baiters, the authenticity of Grabski’s claims may well be doubted. It is unquestionable, however, that the government and Polish political parties were alarmed by the prospect of Jewish autonomy as a dangerous precedent for other minorities, especially the Germans. The possibility of a German national enclave inside the country with strong ties to Germany greatly disturbed Polish politicians. Hence, images of Jews as German allies and a Bolshevik fifth column were shared by the military, large parts of the intelligentsia, and the clergy. In December 1918, Kraków Bishop A. Sapieha, in response to the Lwów Jewish community, stressed that Jews were the main proxies of Bolshevism in Poland. A group of Polish literati and intellectuals made the same insinuations to the Allied mission in Eastern Galicia.4

Voiced by political activists, ethnically defined grievances and stereotypes echoed emotions dominant at the lower levels of the society. Mass hostility to Jews combined with fear


of Jewish plots and reinforced by harsh economic conditions produced a new wave of anti-Jewish violence, especially rampant in war-torn Galicia. In Lwów and its surroundings soldiers beat Jews on the streets, broke into Jewish houses and took away money, jewelry, and food. They found particular pleasure in cutting the beards of Orthodox Jews, forcing them to clean streets, and flogging those impressed into labor details. Jewish cemeteries were vandalized as Polish units searched for hidden arms. The Ministry of Military Affairs tried to calm the situation by issuing a statement condemning anti-Jewish violence. The Polish command in Eastern Galicia also disbanded the two most notorious para-military groups, known for brutal persecution of Jews. These actions, however, did not have much impact on ill-disciplined and badly paid troops.5

While troubled by news about anti-Jewish violence in Poland, the Allies were divided about the course of action to take, and on the issue of minority rights in Eastern Europe. American President Woodrow Wilson was inclined to place Jews as a national minority under the aegis of the League of Nations. The French argued for political and civil rights, without, however, national autonomy, and the British considered supporting the rights of minorities for self-administration in schools and cultural institutions under the auspices of the state. American and British Jewish organizations also disagreed about whether it sufficed to guarantee Jews religious and cultural liberties, or whether Jewish national autonomy would automatically secure

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these rights. Both the Polish Right and Left, on the other hand, objected to the supervision of the League of Nations on the grounds that it would curb Polish sovereignty and relegate the country to a second-class state.⁶

To the Allies another factor was far more important than the Jewish issue. Americans, British, and French dreaded the expansion of communism in Europe and strove to create a powerful cordon sanitaire around Soviet Russia. Poland was envisioned as a main segment of this bulwark and, therefore, the Allies were reluctant to apply strong pressure on the Polish government. No less important to the formulation of policies on minority rights was the stance of many Allied diplomats and state officials, who shared the conviction that Bolshevism was a Jewish creation and doubted the accuracy of Jewish reports about the pogroms in Poland. At the end of January 1919, Allied intelligence also procured the text of a secret German-Ukrainian treaty directed against Poland. As Jews sided with the Germans in the Polish-German conflict in Poznań province, Polish allegations of a German-Ukrainian-Jewish alliance seemed to be confirmed and this contributed to the delay in Allied decision-making on minority rights.⁷

Public dehumanization of Jews in Poland received further impetus at sessions of the Sejm, which opened in January 1919. While Polish delegates at the Peace Conference were busy

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convincing world opinion that reports about pogroms were Jewish fabrications, anti-Semitic rhetoric flew freely in the Polish Sejm. After Paderewski solemnly opened its first session and promised that "...in the radiance of Polish liberty [national minorities] would freely develop their own [cultural] forms, sentiments, and thoughts," inflammatory invective was hurled against Jewish representatives. Polish right-wingers and members of the clergy accused Jews of murdering Polish children and soldiers and "provoking" international sanctions. Jewish deputies were vilified and their speeches interrupted by bellows of: "get out to Palestine!" Requests for Jewish national autonomy sparked off a new cycle of anti-Semitic vitriol. Deeply concerned with the Allied position on minority rights, the Polish government cautiously admitted the existence of anti-Semitism in Poland, but tried to minimize its extent. Piłsudski, for example, in an interview to journalists, condemned anti-Semitism. He stated, however, that it was caused activities of Jewish profiteers. 8

In Galicia, the anti-Semitic campaign in the Sejm coincided with a tightening of police surveillance over Jewish organizations. The local administration withheld state aid to Jews and pursued with double energy the dismissal of Jewish employees from the civil service. Various "initiative" groups filed petitions to the government to speed up "dejudaisation" of railroads, police, and post offices. "Polonisation" of the social sphere was justified by the alleged disloyalty and political subversion of Jews, and the next decisive measure was the introduction of an oath of

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allegiance to the Polish state, which, if taken, contravened provisions of the Jewish neutrality proclaimed on November 1, 1918. In March 1919, the Ministry of Justice demanded that Jewish and Ukrainian lawyers profess their Polish nationality. The bulk of Jewish lawyers in Lwów refused to take the oath and were fired. Jewish volunteers to the army were rejected, and at the same time the military blamed Jews for draft evasion. On April 30, 1919, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers decreed that all civil employees who had not taken the oath of loyalty be dismissed. In Eastern Galician districts already cleared of Ukrainian troops, Jewish administrators, railroad workers, and teachers had to account for their activities during the Ukrainian occupation in order to keep their jobs. A dismissal of Jewish employees took place in Stanisławów and Brody. Jewish medical personnel was also purged, and Jews of "suspicious" dispositions were forced to quit. In some places, Jewish teachers and students were expelled from public schools.

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Deliberations on minority rights in Paris received a new boost in the spring and early summer of 1919, when news of riots, pogroms and executions in the Eastern Borderlands and Galicia were disseminated in the West by Jewish groups. Although citing repeated examples of


10 AAN, "Prezydium Rady Ministrów," Rkt 10/teczka 1, pp. 66; "Lyst upravlinnia yevreis'koj virospovidal'noi gminy," TsDIAUuL, 146/8/3025, pp. 5, 8; "Korespondentsia vhidna i vykhidna," LNABiVS, Department of Manuscripts, KNO-2, p. 26; Chwila, n. 151, 15 June 1919, pp. 4-5.
anti-Jewish violence may seem superfluous, it is necessary to dwell on the nature of the anti-Semitic wave that swept the Polish eastern provinces as the Peace Conference entered its final stage.

Superficially the patterns of hostility towards Jews in the spring of 1919 remained similar to those of November 1918. Jews were arrested on charges of conspiracy, Jewish houses were looted, and a number of residents were murdered. However, anti-Jewish riots that took place between April and June in Lublin, Warsaw, Kraków, Przemyśl, and other places differed in that the mobs contained considerable numbers of regular Polish soldiers. Traditional accusations of Jewish profiteering were augmented by charges of Bolshevism, and local Polish commanders incited their troops to attack Jews in Lida and Vilna. In Pinsk, several members of a Zionist group were executed on charges of Bolshevik activities. In Eastern Galicia, Polish units, especially regiments from Poznań province and the units of General Józef Haller, assaulted Jews on the streets of Sambor, Lwów, and Gródek Jagielloński. In Stanisławów province, the soldiers of General Julian Żeligowski’s division, which had been a part of the French expeditionary forces in Odessa, along with Poznań soldiers murdered twenty-three Jews.¹¹

One strand of anti-Jewish violence remained the same as it had been at the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Poor economic conditions in Galicia contributed to the fact that Polish peasants actively took part in looting and pillaging in the Jewish quarters. While alleged Jewish economic dominance was part of the traditional discourse of Polish-Jewish relations,

attacks on Jews took place against the background of intense resentment towards the inability of the government to carry out land reform. Sense of class-based economic injustice generated popular frustration, and in some instances peasants looted Jewish houses under the slogans “Down with landlords and Jews!” The attacks grew in intensity, and at the end of May Paderewski and the Ministry of Military Affairs issued public appeals to stop violence against Jews and landowners. The violence of Polish troops was often marked by the same class motivations, and poor pay was a determining factor in murder and robbery of Jews. Thus, the commander of the 3d infantry division complained to his superiors in Eastern Galicia that his troops had no supplies and he, therefore, renounced any responsibility for the transgressions of his soldiers.12

In several places, energetic intervention by the gendarmerie and some army units prevented the spread of violence. Progressive political groups and prominent intellectuals such as Dr. Leon Biliński and Andrzej Strug condemned the pogroms. The Polish High Command and front commanders also issued strong statements threatening culprits with court martial. Local commandants and civil officials in Drohobycz and Borysław used force and persuasion to end anti-Jewish riots. Jewish communities in Borysław and Stryj publicly conveyed their gratitude to

General Zieliński and Captain Zawadzki, who in their capacities as the highest local officers, acted without ethnic prejudices.\footnote{13}{"Lysty upravlinnia yevreiskoi virospovidal'noi gminy,\" TsDIAUUuL, 146/8/3025, pp. 1-3, 5, 8, 10, 24-26; "Lystuvannia z starostvamy,\" Ibid., 212/1/250, pp. 2-7; CAW, "Dowództwo WP na Galicji Wschodniej\" 304.1.64, no page; Ibid, I.304.1.63, pp. 213-214; Ibid, I.304.1.63. no page; Ibid., "Front Galicyjski,\" I.310.1.28, p. 84; AAN, "Ambasada RP w Paryżu,\" 301, pp. 44-48; Wróbel, "Barucha Milcha wspomnienia wojenne,\" pp. 96-97; Lasocki, Wspomnienia szefa administracji, p. 15; Hupka, Z czasów wielkiej wojny, p. 420-421, 429; Chwila, n. 97. 21 April 1919, p. 1; Ibid, n. 98, 22 April 1919, p. 2; Ibid, n. 116, 11 May 1919, p. 3; n. 134, 29 May 1919, p. 2; Ibid, n. 136, 31 May 1919, p. 3; Ibid, n. 137, 1 June 1919, pp. 1-2; Ibid, n. 139, 3 June 1919, pp. 2, 5; Ibid, n. 142, 6 June 1919, p. 3; Ibid., n. 144, 8 June 1919, p. 2; Ibid, n. 152, 16 June 1919, p. 3; Ibid., n. 169, 3 July 1919, p. 1; Ibid, n. 177, 11 July 1919, p. 2; Ibid, n. 271, 16 October 1919, p. 4; Jerzy Tomaszewski, "Pinsk, 5 April 1919,\" Polin, 1 (1986), pp. 227-251; also his, Rzeczpospolita wielu narodów (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1985), pp. 144-145; Jerzy Lewandowski, "History and Myth: Pinsk, April 1919,\" Polin, 2 (1987), pp. 55-56; Wiszewski, Brzezany i kresy, pp. 69, 73, 75, 80-81.} Anti-Semitic attitudes, however, were shared by many Polish officers. The majority had received professional training in the armies of the partitioned powers, and it is conceivable that they had been influenced by ethnic biases cultivated in the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian officer corps.\footnote{14}{Dziennik Rozporządzania Komisji Wojskowej i Dziennik Rozkazów Wojskowych, in CAW, n.1, 28, October 1918 - n. 14, 30 December 1918; Tomaszewski, "Polskie formacje zbrojne,\" pp. 103-105. On the atmosphere of relative ethnic tolerance in the Austro-Hungarian officer corps, see} For example, between November and December of 1918, nine hundred ninety Polish officers of the Russian imperial army, including forty-seven colonels and twelve generals, took service with the Polish armed forces. However, the “Russian” origin of many officers only partially explained their anti-Semitic zeal, for the largest contingent -- 6,426 officers -- came from the relatively tolerant Austro-Hungarian officer corps.\footnote{15}{Dziennik Rozporządzania Komisji Wojskowej i Dziennik Rozkazów Wojskowych, in CAW, n.1, 28, October 1918 - n. 14, 30 December 1918; Tomaszewski, "Polskie formacje zbrojne,\" pp. 103-105. On the atmosphere of relative ethnic tolerance in the Austro-Hungarian officer corps, see} Therefore, it can be surmised that the main driving force beyond the ideological predisposition of Polish officers was a widespread belief that Jews and Bolshevism were inseparable entities. The depth of these
convictions can be judged by an episode that took place in October 1918 in Tashkent. The chairman of the Turkestan Council of Commissars, Pole Władysław Figelski, received a letter from Polish members of the anti-Bolshevik underground. His co-nationals accused him of blemishing the reputation of the Polish nation and demanded that he declare himself a Jew and thus exculpate his crime.16

The reports of pogroms again generated a public outcry in the West, and American Jewish organizations pressed the government to impose economic sanctions on Poland. Jewish deputies in the Sejm were concerned that the government was unable to stop the excesses and, consequently, it adopted an attitude of benign neglect to the issue. In turn, Polish right-wingers and government officials insisted that Jewish speculation and Bolshevism were the main causes for the pogroms. As another spiral of mutual Polish-Jewish accusations gained momentum, on May 31, 1919, Paderewski protested to Wilson about anti-Polish propaganda by Jews in America.17

To show its good will, the Polish government suggested that special committees be sent to Poland to investigate the alleged anti-Jewish abuses. At that time, a number of military and political developments forced the Allies to speed up deliberations on ethnic borders and minority rights in Eastern Europe. By June 1919, Polish troops were on the offensive in the Eastern Borderlands, and their potential contribution to the struggle against Bolshevism (the latter seemed more threatening after the establishment of the communist regime in Hungary) was very much appreciated in Paris. This situation provided the Polish delegation with an additional trump card

16 "Biografii, vospondinania i nekrologi," RTsKhDINI, 70/5/314, p. 69.
in dealing with the Allies. Polish delegates argued that granting national autonomy to Polish minorities (especially Germans) would create a separate anti-Polish political entity.\footnote{\textit{CAW}, "Dowództwo Frontu Galicyjskiego," I.310.1.66, no page; Ibid., "Dowództwo Frontu Galicyjsko-Wołyńskiego," I.310.2.11, pp. 64, 217; Antoni Deblin, \textit{Wspomnienia z prac i walk o polskość Stanisławowa: ze specjalnym podkreśleniem akcji P.O.W. z czasów 1918-1920 r.} (Zolochiv: Nakładem autora, 1934), p. 71. That Polish fears were not totally ungrounded was seen in May 1919 when the Gdański Jewish community protested against the possible integration of the region into Poland. Mieczysław Wojciechowski, “Niemcy, Polacy i Żydzi w Prusach Zachodnich w latach 1877-1920,” in \textit{Ze sobą, obok siebie, przeciwko siebie: Polacy, Żydzi, Austriacy i Niemcy w XIX i na początku XX wieku} (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1995), p. 185; Jeziorny, "Sprawa ochrony praw mniejszości żydowskiej," p. 49, 58-59.}

At the end of May, a draft of the Minority Treaty was prepared. As its provisions became known in Poland, a wave of protests swept the country. Polish public opinion was especially bitter over the fact that Germany did not have to sign the Treaty. Although the Treaty was to apply to other national minorities in Poland such as Germans and Ukrainians, popular wrath was directed against Jews, for Jewish “insinuations” in Paris were seen as the prime moving force behind the Allied decision. On May 31, 1919, Paderewski fulminated to the Sejm that Poland was being treated as a second class country:

as if a small and barbarian people, this great and civilized nation, the champion of tolerance and progress is forced to accept law and internal rules imposed from outside. Honest, decent, and wise people, who imposed on us those rules, wanted not to insult us. They were egregiously misinformed. ...These rules we would have established on our own... However, if our friends overseas wish to placate certain co-nationals of ours, so much the better, as long as it would help us to establish internal order and to end the slanderous and insulting campaign.\footnote{\textit{CAW}, “Dowództwo Frontu Galicyjskiego,” I.310.1.66, no page; Ibid., “Dowództwo Frontu Galicyjsko-Wołyńskiego,” I.310.2.11, pp. 64, 217; Antoni Deblin, \textit{Wspomnienia z prac i walk o polskość Stanisławowa: ze specjalnym podkreśleniem akcji P.O.W. z czasów 1918-1920 r.} (Zolochiv: Nakładem autora, 1934), p. 71. That Polish fears were not totally ungrounded was seen in May 1919 when the Gdański Jewish community protested against the possible integration of the region into Poland. Mieczysław Wojciechowski, “Niemcy, Polacy i Żydzi w Prusach Zachodnich w latach 1877-1920,” in \textit{Ze sobą, obok siebie, przeciwko siebie: Polacy, Żydzi, Austriacy i Niemcy w XIX i na początku XX wieku} (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1995), p. 185; Jeziorny, "Sprawa ochrony praw mniejszości żydowskiej," p. 49, 58-59.}

On June 28, 1919, Poland signed the Minority Treaty (it was also signed by Romania, Greece, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians) and guaranteed her national minorities civil, religious, and political rights, and the right to use native languages in
private communication and communal life. With regards to Jews, Poland pledged to place Jewish school committees under state control and thus make them eligible for state funds. Jews were exempted from work on the Sabbath and religious holidays, and the Polish government would not hold elections on Saturdays. Yiddish was to be used in Jewish schools, although Polish could be made mandatory. As citizens of the Polish state, Jews were made liable for military service, and obliged to contribute to national defense as well as to maintain public order. The implementation of the Treaty was placed under the supervision of the League of Nations and its tribunal. However, the Treaty did not provide for a representative Jewish body in the Parliament, nor for a Jewish department in the Polish government.20

On the surface, the supervision by the League of Nations curtailed Polish sovereignty since it allowed Jews to lodge complaints to a foreign institution. However, a provision of the Treaty explicitly stipulated that Jews could appeal to the League only through the Polish government. Direct contact with the League was out of the question. While civil and political rights of Jews were guaranteed, they officially remained a religious minority. Jewish hopes for national autonomy were thus effectively dashed.21

In spite of these provisions the Treaty was denounced by every political group in Poland. While only a handful of intellectuals argued that granting Jews equal civil and national rights would lessen the Polish-Jewish confrontation, the majority of the population was incensed at what they saw as special privileges for Jews. The PPS leader Daszyński fulminated that although Jews

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19 Chwila, n. 197, 31 July 1919, p. 2; Pajewski, Budowa Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, pp. 179-180.
were not a national group, the Treaty accorded them a special status. In the Sejm, anti-Semitic deputies raved that the Treaty imposed a Jewish occupation on Poland and lay the country open to Bolshevism and the Red Terror.22

Reports of foreign missions, which had arrived to Poland to investigate anti-Jewish excesses, added nothing new to the Polish-Jewish confrontation. The American mission headed by Senator Henry Morgenthau stayed in Poland from July to September of 1919. In his report, Morgenthau concluded that pogroms were stirred largely by anti-Semitic propaganda although they had no systematic pattern. The government, however, had not acted effectively to stop the disturbances. Morgenthau admitted that Jewish sources tended to inflate the numbers of casualties and that the Treaty contributed to the deepening of Polish-Jewish tensions. Two other members of the mission, General Edgar Jadwin and Professor Homer Johnson, stressed the alleged pro-German and pro-Bolshevik sympathies of Polish Jews as the grounds for Polish anti-Semitism, and pointed out that only after the war and stabilization of the economy, would the situation change for the better.23 The report of a British observer, Sir Stuart Samuel, was more

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21 Chwila, n. 196, 30 July 1919, p. 2; Bobrzyński, Wskrzeszenie Państwa Polskiego, pp. 82-83; Jeziorny, “Sprawa ochrony praw mniejszości żydowskiej,” pp. 59-60.
23 Dzień, n. 43, 24 November 1919, p. 1; Ibid, n. 120, 19 February 1920, p. 2; Margalith, With Firmness in the Right, pp. 160-165.
strongly worded. He accused Poles of the economic and social boycott of Jews, and stressed the inability of the Polish government to stop anti-Semitic agitation and excesses.24

While these reports reflected personal views and were indicative of the complexity of Polish domestic politics, they were completed after the Treaty was signed and had no further impact on the Allied policies towards the Jewish question in Poland. Since the end of the summer of 1919, other pressing issues drew the close attention of the West. The White armies in southern Russia began a major offensive on Moscow, and huge amounts of war material were being hurried to General Anton Denikin. The Hungarian revolution was also entering its decisive stage, and the Allies were busy organizing a joint Romanian-Czechoslovakian strike at the Hungarian Red Army.

While the Polish government professed to abide by the Treaty, its implementation depended on the good will of the local administration. Since the Allies decided that Polish eastern borders would be defined in some indefinite time in the future, the military and the administration in Eastern Galicia received a free hand in dealing with Jews. By mid-summer 1919, the Polish-Ukrainian war was effectively over, and Polish troops controlled entire Eastern Galicia. With the usual charges of Jewish subversion, the administration continued to "cleanse" the regional social sphere of Jewish employees, and various restrictions such as the requirement of a certificate of baptism effectively barred Jewish applicants from post offices and railroads. A vigilante organization, the National Defense Committee, became instrumental in the anti-Jewish campaign, and its denunciations caused dismissal of Jews from public schools, cafes, and restaurants.25

The Treaty officially secured Jewish civil rights. At the same time, however, it exacerbated popular hostility towards Jews in Poland. Not surprisingly, after being forced to accept the Treaty, local Polish authorities resisted its implementation. “Cleansing” of the social sphere continued unabated even after the cessation of hostilities and by 1923 the numbers of Jewish public employees in Eastern Galicia shrank to 2.3% in comparison to 10% in pre-World War I period.26 Throughout the 1920s appeals by Jewish organizations to the League of Nations included complaints about social, economic, and political discrimination. Reluctance of the Polish political establishment to the implementation of the Treaty grew according to the radicalization of Polish politics and diminishing influence of the Allies. Perceived as the “hand of international Jewry,” the Treaty remained one of major Polish grievances against the Jews throughout the interwar period. Correspondingly, its unilateral abrogation in September 1934 was greeted with common enthusiasm throughout the country.


Since Jewish-Ukrainian collaboration was a hallmark of Polish charges, it is pertinent to analyze this issue in the context of the Polish-Ukrainian war. Until early spring of 1919, the bulk of Eastern Galicia remained under Ukrainian rule. Apart from Lwów and Przemyśl, the Ukrainian take-over was peaceful, and Ukrainian officials took over administration in cities and villages. The Western Ukrainian government granted all national groups equal civil and national rights, and stressed that Poles, Jews, and Germans were willing to cooperate with the new state.\(^{27}\) While such a declaration was more intended to emphasize the legitimacy of the Ukrainian rule than its acceptance by the population, initially the military and the psychological unpreparedness of the Poles spared both sides much bloodshed.

In view of the continuous confrontation with Poles, for many Jews it seemed natural to give at least moral support to the nascent Western Ukrainian National Republic -- ZUNR. No less important was the fact that since Eastern Galicia was effectively controlled by the Ukrainian government, Jews tried not to antagonize the incumbent regime. The position of the Western Ukrainian leadership on the Jewish question also prompted many Jews to back up the Ukrainian cause. The government of the ZUNR officially recognized Jewish neutrality in the Polish-Ukrainian war, granted Jewish communities the status of self-governing bodies, and guaranteed Jews national-cultural autonomy. Already in November 1918, with the approval and encouragement of the government, Jewish National Councils formed in the entire territory of Eastern Galicia. Between December 18 and 20 representatives of the Councils formulated a

\(^{27}\) *Ukrains’ke slovo*, n. 253 (1047), 3 November 1918, p. 2.
political program and established the Jewish National Council, which was to represent Jews to the Ukrainian government and at the Paris conference.28

Still, initially the bulk of the Galician Jewry tried to abstain from enmeshing in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict despite of promises made by the ZUNR. Besides recognizing the Jews as a distinct nationality and Yiddish as an official language, the Ukrainians called for the creation of the parliament (sojm) as the judicial organ of the republic. The sojm was to be elected in June 1919 and would comprise 160 Ukrainians, thirty-three Poles, twenty-seven Jews, and six Germans, thus giving every ethnic group a proportional representation. In April 1919, the Ukrainian government also approved the creation of the Department for Jewish Affairs which was to promote Jewish interests and to have exclusive jurisdiction in Jewish matters. Although the course of the war soon buried these plans, at a time when the Polish government consistently refused to heed Jewish requests and vehement anti-Semitism held sway among Poles, Ukrainian protestations of good intentions won over a substantial number of Jews of different political affiliations. The Jewish and Ukrainian press maintained a mutually friendly tone, and Jewish publishing houses, cultural institutions, Hebrew and Yiddish schools functioned without interruptions. The Western Ukrainian government (and in some places, local Poles) expressed solidarity with Jews after the Lwów pogrom, and collected money to assist its victims. In February 1919 the Ukrainian Council of Ministers raised large amounts of money to purchase textbooks and visual aids in Yiddish for Jewish schools.29

28 Chwila, n. 1, 10 January 1919, p. 3; Ibid, n. 4, 15 January 1919, p. 1; Gazeta Żydowska, n. 4, 12 January 1919, p. 2.
29 CAW, "Inwentarz wycinków prasowych," 410.9.2, p. 2; Vpered, n. 51, 31 January 1919, p. 2; Ibid, n. 59, 11 February 1919, pp. 3-4; Gazeta Żydowska, n. 9, 17 January 1919, p. 4; Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi, Halyczyna w rr. 1918-1920 (Vienna: Drukarnia J.N. Vernau, 1922), pp. 90-91;
Many Jews responded favorably to these gestures and provided financial help to the ZUNR. Jewish political groups also supported the Republic politically, and in March the Poalei-Zion professed to support a “free, independent, and united Ukrainian Republic” in all spheres. The Bund and the Jewish Social-Democratic Party followed suit, refraining, however, from declaring full military participation in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. In return, the State Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian government confirmed the status of the Jewish National Council as the main political Jewish institution in the region.30

Jewish assistance for the ZUNR was particularly important in financial terms and in direct participation in the administration. The Jewish National Council donated money to Ukrainian hospitals and provided gifts to Ukrainian soldiers, and Jewish merchants received numerous concessions from the government, which was eager to revitalize the shattered Galician economy. As crucial for the ZUNR was the cooperation of Jewish civil employees. Beginning in November 1918, many Polish functionaries refused to take the oath of allegiance to the ZUNR and either quit their jobs, or were fired by Ukrainians. The newly created vacancies provided professional opportunities for Jews who willingly filled these positions and took the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian state. They accorded the young Ukrainian republic invaluable help, especially in railroad offices, the post department, and the court system. Jews also served in town councils; Jewish lawyers acted as judges and legal consultants in the courts of Kolomyja, Stanisławów, and Tarnopol. In Stanisławów, Jewish railroad workers were able to handle a huge traffic of 100,000 Russian POWs who were returning home, and thus kept the railroad operational. Still,

30 Pogrebyns’ka and Gon, Yevrei v Zakhidnoukrains’kii Narodnii Respublitsi, pp. 47, 50, 51.
the divisions amongst Jewish political parties was reflected in their stance towards the ZUNR. The Zionists largely sided with the Ukrainians, the Orthodox abstained from collaboration, and the assimilationists retained their pro-Polish stance. Although some Poles and Germans served in the Ukrainian administration and the army, Jews made up the largest non-Ukrainian contingent in all state branches of the ZUNR.31

Jewish assistance was not limited to financial and political support. A substantial number of Jews served in the Jewish militia which was initially retained by the Ukrainians as a police force. In many places, such as Brzeżany and Kołomyja, Jews, especially former Austrian officers, enlisted in Ukrainian units, and were recognized for bravery in battle. In Stryj and Tarnopol they served in the military intelligence, the military administration, and the medical department. Starting in February 1919, in several places local Jewish committees declared the mobilization of able-bodied Jews into the Ukrainian army, and in Radziechów and Sambor Jewish officers and civilians made up a third of the gendarmerie. Especially active were the Jewish youth who served in the Ukrainian intelligence. Although love for adventure was often a main motive for enlistment, anti-Polish sentiments also played an important role in prompting many Jews to side with Ukrainians.32


32 “Lystuvannia z nachal’noiu komandoiu,” TsDAVOViUU, 2192/1/1, p. 267; “Lystuvannia z nachal’noiu komandoiu,” Ibid, 2192/1/2, pp. 203-205; Wiszniewski, Brzeżany i kresy, p. 95;
In the late spring and early summer of 1919, when Polish troops were on the offensive and a wave of anti-Jewish violence swept through Eastern Galician towns, a substantial number of Jews enlisted into the Ukrainian army -- the UHA -- and took part in combat. For example, after the UHA recaptured Tarnopol in June, a Jewish “storm” battalion was formed under the leadership of First Lieutenant Solomon Leinberg. The battalion numbered 1,200 men and alongside UHA units took part in heavy fighting near Tarnopol and Skafat. By the end of July, the battalion crossed the Zbrucz River with other UHA troops. Several other Jewish detachments also fought in the UHA ranks, and crossed to Eastern Ukraine in July of 1919. Paradoxically, these Jewish units later participated in fighting against the Red Army within Symon Petlura’s troops, notorious for their brutal anti-Jewish pogroms. Alongside their Ukrainian comrades, some Jewish officers and soldiers were captured by the Red Army and sent to concentration camps. Those who survived returned to Poland only after the Soviet-Polish war.33

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This summary of Jewish relations with the ZUNR would be incomplete without addressing anti-Jewish perceptions and attitudes of the Ukrainian population. While the ZUNR government

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did its best to promote Jewish-Ukrainian cooperation, attitudes on the local level were often marked by old prejudices and resulted in brutal excesses. The latter were mostly of an economic character, and Ukrainian peasants were reported to have looted Jewish houses as early as November and December of 1918. In November, Ukrainian units smashed Jewish shops in Śniatyń and requisitioned goods from Jews in Kołomyja and Sambor. In the south-east districts of Stanisławów province, where attacks on Jews were more frequent, Jewish communities were reluctant to collaborate with the ZUNR. Some Jewish craftsmen and merchants also refused to accept Ukrainian money, and in reprisals Ukrainian authorities often conducted searches and confiscated goods in the Jewish quarters.34

In January of 1919, in several localities Ukrainian military officials began forcibly drafting Jews into the UHA and labor details. The ill discipline of some Ukrainian units and the weakness of the Ukrainian administration resulted in a rise in anti-Jewish assaults. Between January and April, robberies and murders in the Jewish quarters mounted in Tarnopol, Brzeżany, Buczacz, Stary Sambor, Drohobycz, Sokal, Złoczów, Stryj, Belz, Jezierzany and other places. Peasants and soldiers attacked Jewish stores and warehouses, and in several places only executions of the pogromists reestablished order. In Przemyślany, Ukrainian officials had to protect Jews from the depredations of Petlura’s units, which had arrived to succor the ZUNR.35

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Ukrainian anti-Jewish violence in Eastern Galicia, however, lacked racial motivations, and most contemporaries agreed that it was an expression of traditional social grievances against the ethnically different and allegedly "rich" minority in the time of crisis. The excesses of Ukrainian troops also markedly differed from punitive expeditions of Polish soldiers. While the latter persecuted Jews for cooperating with the ZUNR or siding with the Bolsheviks, Ukrainian grievances revolved around perceived economic injustices. The ZUNR government explicitly condemned the excesses, and forbade forcible mobilization of the Jews into the UHA, while Ukrainian officials often intervened on behalf of the Jews.36

The Ukrainian government was disappointed that Jews refused to declare themselves openly on the Ukrainian side. Already in December of 1918, the Ukrainian press threatened that if Jews did not take part in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, they would lose their rights as Ukrainian citizens. Such charges mounted as the war progressed, and Jews were increasingly blamed for waiting to wager on the stronger party. Symptomatic of Ukrainian attitudes was an article in a Ukrainian newspaper in Kożomyja, Pokuts'kyi visnyk, which in February of 1919 stated that:

The Ukrainian government granted [Jews] political, national, and civil rights. And yet, they retained shop signs in Polish and speak Polish. Are Jews ashamed of [speaking] Yiddish or Ukrainian? If they so lavishly dispensed money to the Polish Legions during World War I, why don't they finance Ukrainian troops? Don't they believe in the just [Ukrainian] cause?37

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36 "Lystuvannia z nachal'noiu komandoiu," TsDAVtUU, 2192/1/1, pp. 184, 222; "Lystuvannia z starostvamy," TsDIAUuL, 146/8/3029, p. 72.
From the beginning of its struggle against Poland, the Western Ukrainian government could count only on its own skills and resources. In January 1919, the Western Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian government of eastern Ukraine, the Direktorja, solemnly declared to have been united into one Ukrainian state. However, the Direktorja, hard-pressed by the Whites and the Bolsheviks, could spare only a few units and little money to aid the ZUNR. Ukrainian diplomatic efforts with the Allies proved also unsuccessful, and the Polish delegation managed to convince the Western powers that the ZUNR was just a Bolshevik springboard to Hungary. Hence, the Western Ukrainian government turned to the Jews, and, by granting them national rights and political representation, hoped for their active participation in the war. However, until the spring of 1919, the majority of the Jewish political leadership exercised caution and refused to commit themselves openly to the Ukrainian side. Given that the majority of Galician Jews were Orthodox, their passivity, while in line with their traditional attitudes, greatly impeded Jewish-Ukrainian collaboration.

The situation of Galician Jews in the midst of the Polish-Ukrainian war closely resembled the predicament of their co-religionists in eastern Ukraine. In 1917-1919 the Ukrainian national governments, the Central Council and the Direktorja, also granted Jews the status of national minority. A Jewish department was created as a governmental branch, and Jewish politicians actively participated in Ukrainian state-building. However, as in the winter of 1919 unruly Ukrainian troops and insurgent bands began murdering thousands of Jews, the Ukrainian government was unable to stop mass murder. In summer of that year, units of the Voluntary Army of General Denikin entered Ukraine and staged brutal massacres in which about 30,000
Jews lost their lives. Caught between Ukrainian nationalist and White armies, Jews turned to the Bolsheviks whose national policies offered them better chances of survival.38

In Eastern Galicia, driven by the brutalities of Polish units and virulent anti-Semitic propaganda, Jews drifted towards Ukrainians. Liberal national policies and, more importantly, the determination of the Western Ukrainian government to prevent anti-Jewish excesses spurred many Jews to throw in their lot with ZUNR. In comparison to their counterparts in Ukraine, a sizable part of the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia and officer corps had lived under the relatively moderate national policies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. While sharing traditional anti-Jewish biases, they recognized and accepted in principle the national, political, and civil equality of Jews. Therefore, notwithstanding the limited Jewish political participation in ZUNR and instances of anti-Jewish violence, and contrary to the long-standing reputation of Ukrainians as pathological anti-Semites, the short-lived Western Ukrainian National Republic provided a fascinating example of coexistence and collaboration of the two peoples in a state-building process.

*Anti-Jewish Violence during the Soviet-Polish War of 1920*

The chronic outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence that occurred in Poland between November 1918 and 1919 reflected deep popular hostility towards Jews, and anger of their alleged role in undermining political and economic stability. However, none of the attacks compared in magnitude to the outbreak of violence during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. The scope and

intensity of these attacks can be attributed to two factors which had previously been missing in Polish-Jewish discourse: collective fears among Poles of losing independence, and the conduct of Polish allies, the White units and eastern Ukrainian troops of Symon Petliura.

By the end of 1919, embattled frontier areas -- Poznań, Cieszyn, and Eastern Galicia -- were partially or completely integrated, and in Belorussia and southern Lithuania the Polish-Soviet war came to a standstill. The relative stabilization of the borders coincided with a sharp decline in anti-Jewish violence. Polish authorities took more stringent measures against excesses, impressment of Jews into labor details became less frequent, and Jewish activists, who had been detained for alleged anti-state activities, were released. Anti-Semitic propaganda, however, remained a main facet of Polish political life. Police reports attributed food shortages and petty crime to Jewish speculation. Polish embassies, civil organizations, and government officials reported Jewish conspiracies to subvert Polish political institutions and to undermine the economy, and rumors of Jews purchasing land alarmed associations of Polish estate owners. The military in Galicia was troubled by rumors of Jewish agents taking over warehouses, railroads, and civil offices. The army's attitude towards the Jewish question was verbalized by Rząd i wojsko, a newspaper connected with Polish military circles. In early February 1920 the newspaper stressed that in the historical struggle for Polish national preservation, there was no place for groups of "alien" background. Jews, "cosmopolitan" by nature, had no ties with the Polish

nation, and, therefore, mass emigration would be the optimal solution to Polish-Jewish conflict. Meanwhile, Jews must stop anti-Polish agitation. The tone of the article emulated the rhetoric of the National Democrats. Jews could not and should not be assimilated, and only emigration and renunciation of political activities would guarantee their existence amongst Poles.41

In general, Jewish political groups shared hopes that the termination of military conflicts would bring stability and peace to the country and, correspondingly, would soothe Polish-Jewish animosities. These hopes seemed to be well grounded. Physical attacks on Jews dwindled, in several places such as Przemyśl and Złoczów the local military administration actively intervened to stop anti-Jewish disturbances, and in early April 1920 the Ministry of Military Affairs issued a strong warning to the population to stop anti-Jewish excesses. Many Jews also believed that the Minority Treaty was also a sufficient warranty for the security of the Jewish community.42

Developments in the Eastern Borderlands soon shattered the relative tranquility of Polish internal politics. On April 21 and 24 of 1920, Piłsudski's government signed two agreements with the chief of the Ukrainian Direktoria, Symon Petlura. The agreements stipulated the creation of an independent Ukrainian state and a joint Polish-Ukrainian offensive against the Bolsheviks. On April 25, Polish troops and Ukrainian units launched a surprise attack against the Red Army, and on May 6 they captured Kiev. Three weeks later, however, a Soviet counter-offensive smashed Polish defenses and Polish troops began rapid evacuation. At this point, anti-

41 Chwila, n. 384, 8 February 1920, pp. 34; Ibid, n. 385, 9 February 1920, p. 3.
42 Ibid., n. 396, 20 February 1920, p. 2; Ibid, n. 397, 21 February 1920, p. 2; Ibid., n. 430, 25 March 1920, p. 5; Ibid., 1 April 1920, n. 437, p. 5; Ibid., 7 April 1920, n. 441, p. 4; Ibid., 21 May
Jewish violence rapidly escalated, and Polish units staged pogroms in Bar and Vinnytsia. By the beginning of July, the Red Army crashed across the Berezina River, a few weeks later it took Vilna and Grodno, and at the beginning of August it was closing in on Warsaw. Panic spread in the Polish army and some units surrendered to the Bolsheviks. The government appealed to the population to rally for national defense, and simultaneously with mass mobilization, the military began detaining potentially harmful elements such as communists and individuals with "left" leanings.43

The Polish retreat reverberated in a wave of anti-Jewish pogroms in cities and towns along the front line. General panic and fears of losing national independence promoted distorted images of Jewish conspiracies, and Polish soldiers, often under the conniving eyes of their commanders, engaged in murders and robberies in Białystok, Siedlce, Płock, Łyków, and Drohiczyn, where more than sixty Jews lost their lives. Brutalities reached such a scope that in July the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Military Affairs appealed to the troops to stop pogroms, threatening the culprits with harsh punishment and courts martial. In August 1920 fourteen Polish soldiers were sentenced to death for attacks on Jews in Minsk.44

Particular anti-Jewish zeal was displayed by Poland’s allies, White and Cossack units. By the end of 1919, these remnants of anti-Bolshevik armies had wound up in Polish internment camps. In the spring of 1920 they welcomed the Piłsudski-Petlura offensive as a last opportunity to return to their homeland and escape less than comfortable conditions in camp barracks. Of varying fighting capacity, these units were so notorious and so viciously destructive in their attitudes towards Jews that they would soon become a liability rather than the asset to the Polish military. But for the moment, when the fate of Poland hung in the balance, the Polish command was eager to use them, turning a blind eye to their predatory habits.45

In Eastern Galicia, eastern Ukrainian and White detachments defied military discipline, and staged brutal anti-Jewish pogroms in more than sixteen localities. The non-Jewish population was also subjected to rape and murder. The most horrible massacres took place in the Żółkiew and Stanisławów districts where thirty-two peasants and 114 Jews were murdered. Entire households were pillaged and burned to the ground, dozens of women raped, and only in a few places did the determination of Polish and Ukrainian commanders prevent the spread of violence. By the lowest estimate, in August and September 1920 in several towns and villages more than 170 Jews were murdered, 190 were wounded, and 350 women and girls were raped. Conduct of Petlura’s troops was so notorious that many Galician Ukrainians, who had joined his army,

deserted for “not wanting to be labeled beasts.” Several Polish units also deserved infamy for violence.46

The brutality of Poland’s allies can partially be attributed to shortage of foodstuffs, boots, and cloth, for looting always accompanied the murder. Yet, instances of drowning pregnant women and slaughtering children imply that depredations were driven by stronger motives than mere privation. In 1918-1919, eastern Ukrainian units and White soldiers had participated in anti-Jewish pogroms that left thousands of dead and wounded. After having withdrawn from Ukraine and Russia under Bolshevik pressure, these units found themselves without a homeland, guidance, or most importantly, purpose. Jews, seen as the villains of the Bolshevik revolution, were now blamed for all the ills and lost hopes, for filthy rooms in cheap Polish and Romanian hotels, or for miserable life in the barracks of internment camps. In the summer of 1920, when defeat was inevitable, eastern Ukrainian troops, and White and Cossack detachments let their frustration loose on the traditional foe, Jews.47


The Polish government, while trying to dissociate itself from such allies, greatly contributed to the atmosphere of popular anti-Jewish hysteria. Mass arrests of “unreliable” elements targeted Jewish communists, socialists, Zionists, but also Jewish activists for civil and political rights. Jewish soldiers and officers in the Polish army were disarmed and sent to a detention camp in Jabłonna, set up in August for isolating “suspicious” elements. Many Jewish soldiers were forced into labor battalions. Jewish-Bolshevik connections were highly publicized in the press, and were corroborated by government sources. War Minister Władysław Sikorski rallied the Polish people for a struggle against “Moscow gangs led by Jewish commissars,” and posters which associated Jews with Bolsheviks were openly distributed by the gendarmerie in Warsaw.48

In spite of the highly charged anti-Semitic climate in the country, anti-Jewish violence that swept the Eastern Borderlands during the Polish-Soviet war never reached the scope of the Hungarian White Terror. Between the fall of 1919 and the spring of 1920, Hungarian officer squads murdered between 3,000 and 5,000 Jews associated with the communist regime of Bela Kun. Supported by the counterrevolutionary leader Admiral Mikłós Horthy, these units ravaged the countryside leaving behind piles of corpses, while courts martial executed hundreds of Jewish

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and Hungarian civilians suspected of communist activities.\textsuperscript{49} In contrast to Hungary, terror in Poland did not become a structural component of state policies. Polish commanders, convinced of the leading role of Jews in the Bolshevik movement, did not adopt banditry and murder as legitimate war instruments, and on several occasions they prosecuted and punished plunderers. Although formally subordinated to the Polish command, White and eastern Ukrainian troops operated outside of any military authority and their conduct was often resented by their Polish allies. A major determinant that spared Polish Jews the experiences of their Hungarian co-religionists was the fact that Poland did not endure the vicissitudes of the Soviet regime, and that the Bolshevik occupation of the Eastern Borderlands was relatively short-lived.

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Since convictions of pro-Communist sympathies or outright Bolshevism among Polish Jews were shared by the government, the military, and large segments of the population, it is imperative to examine Jewish attitudes and reactions to the Bolshevik invasion. Such analysis may shed light on one of the most controversial issues of Polish-Jewish relations, and, in a larger context, the general perception of Jews in Eastern Central Europe after World War I.

From the beginning of the Soviet-Polish war, the conduct of Polish Jews varied as much as that of the Poles. A splinter group of the Bund, led by pro-Bolshevik leaders, announced in April 1920 its entry into the Third Communist International. In Białystok and Płock, sizable numbers of Jewish youth welcomed the Red Army and entered the Bolshevik-sponsored militia. The Polish Communist party and its Jewish members took an active part in the Soviet administration

and the political police, CheKa. In May, the socialist Poalei-Zion accepted the Soviet model of dictatorship of the proletariat and in July its radical elements pressed for joining up with Moscow. At the end of July, in the territories captured by the Red Army, a temporary governing body, the Polish Revolutionary Committee, set up its local committees. A number of Jewish administrators and political commissars led propaganda activities among the local population.\textsuperscript{50}

Arrests of Bund members and the wide publicity given to instances of Jewish collaboration with the Bolsheviks fueled anti-Semitic sentiments and fear of Jewish saboteurs in Polish society. In contrast, cases of cooperation with the Soviet troops by Poles were not made public. Nor did the government press mention that the CheKa arrested members of the Zionist groups, and closed down Jewish cultural organizations and schools. In Minsk, Grodno, and Vilna the Bolshevik administration subjected “bourgeois” elements such as Jewish tradesmen and merchants to heavy fines, while their stores and workshops were confiscated. Participation of Jews in the anti-Bolshevik struggle was passed over in silence by the press. Moreover, the anti-Semitic sentiments of the Polish army were exploited by Bolshevik propaganda. In July 1920, in its proclamation to Polish soldiers, the Bolshevik Supreme Command of the Western Front called on them to overthrow the “counterrevolutionary” government of Piłsudski. The Polish rank-and-file, said the proclamation, by murdering the Jewish poor assisted in reestablishing of the old order embodied by Jewish capitalists.\textsuperscript{51}


The situation was similar in Eastern Galicia, where many Jews volunteered for the Polish army, the Jewish community donated money to the military, and synagogues staged religious services praying for Polish victory. The initial response of Jews to the Bolshevik invasion remarkably resembled the situation in August 1914, when the outbreak of World War I temporarily extinguished Polish-Jewish antagonisms. Analogous to this failed rapprochement, by mid-July 1920 Jewish enthusiasm for national defense evaporated. As the Bolshevik First Cavalry Army closed in on Lwów, the Polish military cracked down on the “usual suspects.” Police reports emphasized the hostility of the Jewish intelligentsia and workers and their sabotage of government defense measures. Jews suspected of a leftist orientation and Bund and Poalei-Zion members were arrested, while the headquarters of these parties were shot down. Arrested Jewish civilians, officers, and soldiers were interned at a camp in Dąbie near Kraków. Searches in the Jewish quarters and arrests of Jews for alleged economic sabotage and political subversion took place in Lwów, Borysław, Kraków, Sanok, and Drohobycz, although no empirical evidence of wrongdoing was found. At the same time, Polish officials complained that masses of Jewish refugees who had escaped the Bolsheviks were inundating cities and countryside, causing economic shortages and social tensions.

A few Polish sources admitted that many Jews had enlisted in the army and partisan units, or served as informants and guides for Polish troops. Yet, the majority of government reports stressed the activities of Jews as Soviet administrators, Red Army soldiers, and members of the *CheKa*. The presence of Jews in the short-lived Soviet government of Eastern Galicia seemingly lent credence to popular identification of Jews with communism. In July 1920, in the eastern districts of Tarnopol and Lwów provinces the Red Army set up a new political entity -- the Galician Soviet Socialist Republic. Its governing organ, the Galician Revolutionary Council -- *Galrevkom* -- established its headquarters in Tarnopol and was initially headed by Feliks Kon, a professional Jewish revolutionary. Besides Kon, three of seventeen *Galrevkom* members were of Jewish background: K. Litvinovich, the commissar of the post service, telegraph, and communications; A. Baral’, the commissar of trade and industry; and one Kulik, the head of the Council of Arts. In the dreaded *CheKa*, Jews constituted approximately a quarter of the personnel. For example, in the Tarnopol branch, three out of eleven *CheKa* members were Jewish. It should be remembered, however, that the majority of Jews in the *Galrevkom* and *CheKa* were not natives of Galicia and came in the wake of the Red Army. On the other hand, many Galician Jews (alongside Poles and Ukrainians) were employed in the militia. High numbers of Jews in the latter branch was a reflection of the Bolshevik class approach to local
administration -- the poverty of many Jews and Ukrainians made them the most suitable applicants.\textsuperscript{55}

However, the statistics collected by the police and gendarmerie after the withdrawal of the Red Army from the region demonstrate that the actual numbers of local Jews who withdrew with the enemy were insignificant.

Table 7.1. Individuals Suspected of Collaboration With the Bolsheviks, July-September 1920.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Total numbers of Bolshevik suspects and sympathizers who left Eastern Galicia with the Red Army</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bóbrka</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brody</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buczacz</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czortków</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lwów district</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radziechów</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Złoczów</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The small number of Jews on the “black” lists of the Polish police reflected the specific nature of the Galician Jewish community -- deeply religious and conservative. In Belorussia and southern Lithuania, where there were more non-Orthodox and secular Jews, cases of collaboration with the Bolsheviks were more numerous. Nevertheless, judging by available sources, Polish propaganda regarding Jewish participation on the Bolshevik side was much out of proportion. How then do we account for two seemingly irreconcilable facts -- innumerable charges against Jews as Bolshevik agents and insignificant numbers of Jewish communists reported in documentary materials?

A plausible explanation can be found in popular perceptions of the niche Jews had traditionally occupied in Polish society. In Belorussia and southern Lithuania, formerly the territories of the Russian Empire, Jews were barred from civil service and constrained to traditional Jewish occupations in trade, small artisanship, and tavern-keeping. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 opened opportunities to Jews in politics, administration, the army, and police. A better educational background guaranteed them high positions in the Soviet hierarchy, while their devotion to the Bolshevik cause made them extremely visible in the eyes of the non-Jewish population. The presence of a Jew as a local Soviet functionary was seen as an anomaly and contributed to the creation of a powerful image of the omnipresent Jew-Bolshevik. The activities of a few Jewish communists often sufficed for the Polish police and army commanders to accuse entire Jewish communities of collaborating with the Reds. Accordingly, that the Jewish majority abstained from politics no longer mattered for the Polish-Jewish discourse. Press reports and rumors of Jewish dominance in the communist parties in Russia and Hungary reinforced these negative stereotypes.
Bolshevik activities in the Eastern Borderlands and Galicia soon alienated even those elements among Jews and Ukrainians who had initially welcomed the Soviets. In August 1920, the Galrevkom abolished private property, nationalized banks, factories, plants and agricultural implements, and confiscated the property of churches and other religious institutions. The CheKa arrested "bourgeois" elements such as the Jewish intelligentsia, rabbis, and Catholic priests. The Soviets particularly cracked down on merchants and craftsmen who were subjected to searches and requisitions. Outright extortion was used to "expropriate the expropriators," while special labor details were set up for the "reeducation" of hostile elements. Soviet commissars, who had arrived with the Red Army, incited the local poor against rabbis and religious Jews. Attacks by Soviet soldiers were also not uncommon. In Stryj, where the Bolsheviks ruled only for sixteen hours, passing Red troops, with the assistance of peasants, looted Jewish shops and houses. The harshness of Soviet rule, its militant anti-religiosity and economic policies turned Jews decisively against the invaders.56

The relations between the Bolsheviks and Polish Jews during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 were multifaceted. Bolshevik national policies of civil and political equality for ethnic minorities combined with Polish anti-Semitic propaganda and anti-Jewish violence prompted a number of Jews to side with the Bolsheviks in the Eastern Borderlands. However, according to Bolshevik class approach, the majority of Jews in the Eastern Borderlands were private owners (sobstvenniki) and were perceived as intrinsically alien to the dogma of classless society. The campaign of nationalization, which started in the wake of the Soviet offensive in the summer of 1920, refuted any hopes for better future that Jews may have entertained and contributed to the fact that the Jewish majority remained strongly anti-Communist throughout the interwar period.

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From the birth of Polish independence in November 1918 to October 1920, when the armistice was signed between Poland and Soviet Russia, Polish frontier wars were accompanied by anti-Jewish violence. Various sources estimated Jewish losses from several hundred to several thousand killed, although it is reasonable to believe that the number of dead did not exceed 2,000.57 In comparison to the tens of thousands of Jews murdered in the Russian Civil War, these numbers seem insignificant. Nevertheless, the pogroms in Poland received wide publicity and generated protests around the world, while the tragic events in eastern Ukraine became public

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57 See, for example, Ettinger, "Jews as a National Minority," in A History of the Jewish People, p. 954, or Boris Savinkov pered voennoi kollegiyei Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR: polnyi otchet po stenogramme suda (Moscow: Izdanie Litzdata N.K.I.D., 1924), pp. 195-196f. The latter source estimated the number of Jewish victims in Belorussia for the period between the summer of 1920 and the winter of 1921 as 1,100 murdered. After the Soviet-Polish armistice in the fall 1920, anti-Jewish pogroms were carried out by various anti-Bolshevik bands, which found refuge on the Polish territory.
knowledge only decades later. The different political status of the two countries provides an explanation for this discrepancy. In Ukraine, the chaotic situation of the Civil War caused a blackout of news to the West. The Western press almost entirely concentrated on the crucial issue of the advances of the White armies, while the press agencies of the White movement avoided any references to the massacres of the Jews. In addition, the leaders of the White movement issued declarations against pogroms, and thus demonstrated to the Allies their willingness to stop the violence. In the territories controlled by the Ukrainian Direktoria the situation was even more complicated. While it claimed the mass support of Ukrainian peasants, the latter only nominally subordinated themselves to Petlura. The Ukrainian government, therefore, had only limited power and resources to stop anti-Jewish attacks. Although reports of massacres of Jews in eastern Ukraine reached the West, contacts of the Allies with Ukrainian leaders were limited to diplomatic exchanges.

On the other hand, Poland was recognized by the Allies as an independent and sovereign state, and was expected to abide by the rules and regulations specified by the Minority Treaty. The multi-party system and relative freedom of press in Poland allowed Jewish activists to voice their grievances and protests to the Polish government and the world community. Supported by Jewish organizations abroad, they publicized instances of anti-Jewish violence and discrimination, and the Jewish question developed into one of the principal issues of the Paris Peace Conference.

In November 1920 the Sejm publicly acknowledged and favorably compared the patriotic stance of Galician and Volhynian Jews during the Polish-Soviet war to the conduct of Jewish communities in Belorussia and southern Lithuania. These praises, however, did not signify a change in Polish-Jewish relations, and emanated from pure political pragmatism. Since the Allies
decided that Galicia was to be administered by the Polish state until a public referendum. Polish ruling circles were determined to secure favorable Jewish opinion. After having experienced the brutalities of the last six years, many Galician Jews were convinced that bad law and order were better than no law at all. They yearned for any semblance of peace and stability, and Jewish communities and political groups throughout Eastern Galicia voted for the integration of the region into the Polish state.58

Secret police reports, however, showed that official and popular attitudes that had prevailed in Polish society for the last years remained unchanged. These reports stressed that the Jews complained to the government and the Western powers about the misconduct of Polish troops and the dismissal of Jews from civil service and the army. The climate of official opinion was verbalized by the Ministry of Military Affairs in December 1920. In response to the protests of Jewish Sejm deputies about the dismissal of Jewish officers, the Ministry stated:

The army is an embodiment of the state’s vitality and strength, and, therefore, officer ranks must be filled by individuals known and capable of love and sacrifice to their motherland. Such sacrifice can be offered only by those whose citizenship as well as nationality bind them inseparably to the state.59

In early 1921, the Polish government promised to maintain the provisions of the Minority Treaty conditional upon the loyalty and “good will” of the Jews towards the state.60 For the

58 "Donesenia direktsii politsii," TsDIAuUL, 146/8/3822, p. 3; “Perepiska so starostvami,” Ibid, 146/8/3857, pp. 4-5, 8, 9; Sprawozdania stenograficzne Sejmu, session 172, 14 October 1920, pp. 49-50; Davies, “Great Britain and the Polish Jews,” p. 135; Chwila, 4 October 1920, n. 616, 4; AAN, “Ambasada RP w Paryżu,” 301, p. 54.
60 Chwila, 2 January 1921, n. 704, pp. 2-3; Ibid., 2 February 1921, n. 735, p. 3; Ibid., 13 March 1921, n. 774, p. 3.
Polish Jewry, however, these promises sounded extremely hollow. Haunted by memories of the recent past they looked gloomily into an uncertain future. Violence, anti-Semitic propaganda, and Jewish national efforts in the years 1915-1920 created in Poland a highly charged psychological atmosphere full of anti-Jewish resentment. This atmosphere was especially propitious for the ascension of the National Democrats, whose ideas in regards to the Jewish question would dominate Polish politics during most of the interwar period.
CONCLUSION

"[Persecution]... drew on ancient, nourishing theological, social, and folkloric roots. It served admirably to shift the enduring question of public and political responsibility... well away from those who had actually wielded political power at whatever was held to be the critical moment.¹

This quotation reflects a generally accepted belief that throughout the ages Jews have been perceived and persecuted as scapegoats for societal ills. It is unquestionable that for centuries the distinct religion and culture of the Jews has invited hostility from their Christian neighbors. In the traditionally agricultural societies of Eastern Europe, no less resentment was caused by the customary occupations of Jews as money-lenders, petty tradesmen, and landlords’ agents in the villages. These factors led to random outbreaks of violence and economic restrictions, which fluctuated according to the political and economic situation in a given region. In Congress Poland, Galicia, and eastern Ukraine a confrontation between a Jew and a non-Jew may have sparked a riot, but unless this confrontation happened in the context of a conducive atmosphere of crisis, the incident would pass without growing into widespread ethnic violence. Although in the last two decades before World War I several Polish political groups adopted anti-Semitism as primary ideology, they were unable to mold their following into mass political movement.

¹ Vital, A People Apart, pp. 727-728.
World War I inaugurated the evolution of traditional Jewish resentments into new anti-Semitism -- ideological, xenophobic, and exclusionary. Between 1914 and 1920, Russia and Poland underwent profound political transformations and emerged as societies with deeply xenophobic world views. Fighting for their very survival, they feared that their Jewish subjects were involved in conspiracies and sabotage. Along the entire Eastern Front from Courland to Bukovina, the Russian army pillaged Jewish settlements and expelled thousands of Jews from their homes. In independent Poland Jews were blamed for collaborating with Poland's enemies and popular resentment flared up in frequent outbreaks of violence. For many Russians and Poles the Jew had become a metaphoric foe, a collective apotheosis of evil, an omnipresent conspiracy poised to dominate the world.

A central argument of the present work has been that in Eastern Galicia between 1914 and 1920 anti-Semitism was an integral part of mass politics and military campaigns pursued by Tsarist Russia and the Polish Republic. While it retained some traits of a traditional socio-economic discourse, its violent expression during wartime can be understood only in terms of contemporary factors such as collective fears of a Jewish threat, security concerns of Russian and Polish authorities, and Jewish attempts to alleviate persecution by procuring assistance from major powers -- Austro-Hungary, Germany, and after 1918, the victorious Allies. From Russian and Polish points of view, Jews threatened the very sovereignty and territorial integrity of their countries.

From its inception, the Russian military regime in Galicia was seriously impeded by the bifurcation of power and irreconcilability of its priorities. While the multiplicity of authorities prevented a smooth functioning of the administration and thus seriously
undermined Russia's war efforts, harsh nationalities policies alienated the Polish and Ukrainian populations whose allegiance Russians had hoped to win. A rare consistency was displayed only with regards to the persecution of the Jews, although rivalries and a lack of cooperation among different branches blunted the assault of the military against its sworn enemy. Nevertheless, the army succeeded in dehumanizing the Jews, while pogroms, requisitions, and expulsions severely damaged the Galician Jewish community.

When in 1915 the Central Powers restored Jewish civil rights and supported cultural and educational institutions, hopes for a better future were revitalized. Yet, concurrently with positive developments, Polish-Jewish relations grew considerably worse. For Polish political circles, Jewish national aspirations, voiced by various groups in Poland and abroad, presented a direct threat to the territorial integrity of the country. The drive to integrate the three partitioned territories into one state involved the strengthening of national ties, and led the bulk of Polish society to perceive Jews as outsiders, if not declared enemies. One other crucial component of collective perceptions of Jews -- Bolshevism -- completed the process of their vilification.

This study has tried to show that anti-Semitic convictions were not the sole prerogative of Russian and Polish policy-makers. Between 1914 and 1920 anti-Semitism turned into a mass political ideology in Russia and Poland. Negative images of Jews were shared by many military leaders, politicians, the intelligentsia, soldiers, and peasants. Anti-Jewish regulations promulgated from the top of the state hierarchy were often prompted by the actions of local officials, and caused violent attacks by soldiers and the mobs. Violence, in turn, created more rumors of Jewish subversion, and provoked what was generally perceived as self-defense measures -- courts martial, mass displacement, and
“dejudaising” of the social sphere. Rumors of Jewish subversion did not need not to be empirically proven because many Russians and Poles were willing to take these rumors at face value. Besides providing an opportunity to loot and pillage, pogroms and reprisals served as an outlet to pacify collective fears of Jews by wreaking physical destruction.

By 1921 Jews of Eastern Galicia had lost 124,099 people, or 19% of its pre-1914 total population. The bulk of these losses resulted from mass evacuation to Austria, Hungary, and the Czech lands in 1914, forced displacement by the Russian army in 1915, and changing fortunes of the Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Soviet wars. However, as brutal as anti-Jewish actions were, neither Russian expulsions nor anti-Jewish pogroms in independent Poland escalated into genocidal massacres on the Armenian level. Both the Stavka and Polish commanders aimed at the pacification of the alleged Jewish enemy rather than mass murder of Jews. The Russian army lacked an exterminatory ideology and was effectively counterbalanced by more moderate policies of the government. The Polish High Command and government officials, while sharing popular concerns of alleged Jewish subversion, issued public appeals to stop violence and thus mitigated the anti-Semitic zeal of soldiers and the mobs.

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Although this study has concentrated on a specific region, it opens a window onto a much larger context of ideological anti-Semitism in its most malignant form after 1917.

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Myths of Jewish subversive forces exacerbated violent reactions of Russia's counterrevolutionary armies, and images of Jewish saboteurs on the Eastern Front haunted many White officers, soldiers, and Cossacks during the Russian Civil War. For them, Jews became symbols of the collapse of the old order and the ascension of the new one, personified in Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, and Yakov Sverdlov. Like the Stavka during World War I, White commanders justified massacres of Jews as self-defense actions against an omnipresent foe. Charges that Jews ambushed passing columns were routinely leveled against Jewish communities in Ukraine and southern Russia and caused bloody pogroms. Popular perceptions of Jews as a monolithic subversive group were also shared by Ukrainian nationalist bands, whose leaders legitimized pogroms as a struggle against Jewish insurgents. Anti-Semitic attitudes were not limited to White and Ukrainian nationalist formations. Some units of the Red Army massacred Jews for the latter's alleged resistance or in the name of saving Russia from Jewish "capitalists" and "commissars."

The period between 1915 and 1920 witnessed growing Jewish resistance against political oppression through a vigorous propaganda campaign in Poland and abroad. Jewish-Polish confrontation during World War I convinced Jewish leaders that active political participation combined with assistance from major powers would curb Polish anti-Semitism. They attempted, therefore, to strengthen their ties with the Central Powers, and later with the Allies. Indeed, until their collapse the Austro-German military

regimes provided a protective shield for Jews against popular violence. After Polish independence in 1918, appeals to the Allies became a major device for Jewish organizations to alleviate their situation in Poland and influence the decisions of the Western powers in regards to minority rights. To prompt the intervention of the Allies Jewish reports about pogroms in Poland often inflated the numbers of casualties. These reports were considered clear-cut perjury by Poles and provoked a universal popular outrage.

After the establishment of ZUNR, the liberal policies of the Western Ukrainian government attracted sizable numbers of Jews who lent their support to the nascent republic. While it can be argued that the Jewish press campaign abroad and collaboration with Ukrainians only exacerbated anti-Semitic attitudes among Poles, at the time of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict any other option seemed non-existent. The emergence of a Polish exclusionary national ideology, based upon ethnicity and religion, effectively prevented Polish-Jewish understanding. In the charged atmosphere of 1918-1920 pervasive fears of Jewish conspiracies developed into a national issue and stimulated popular desires for retribution.

Attacks on Jews subsided after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet war, but "dejudaisation" of the social sphere and the barrage of anti-Semitic vitriol continued in public life. In 1920, *The Protocols of the Zion Elders* made its first appearance in Poland.

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and was disseminated among American-Polish communities by Polish right-wingers. In 1921, the Polish General Staff authorized Lieutenant-Colonel Stanisław Laudański to write a treatise about Jewish attitudes towards Polish statehood. Laudański’s “Genesis of the Jewish Soul” (Genesis duszy żydowskiej) pondered upon the wartime Polish-Jewish conflict and emphasized the danger posed to Poland by the “Jewish race.” Large part of the Polish officer corps shared Laudanski’s fears, and it was no surprise that the rise to power of the Polish military in the mid-1930s was accompanied by the upsurge of militant anti-Semitism.

In retrospect, the events described in this study seemed to have presaged the Holocaust. Perhaps it can be argued that brutalities in the front zone between 1914 and 1920 prepared the psychological ground for the genocide. However, such an argument is tenuous since the inter-war period was much more consequential for Russian-Jewish and Polish-Jewish relations. Stalin’s rule in the 1920s and 1930s thoroughly transformed Russia, and brought to the fore a “Soviet” type of anti-Semitism promoted by the lower level of the Communist party, and “proletarianised” bureaucracy and intelligentsia, which despised Jews as competitors in the social sphere. This anti-Semitism turned into a mainstream of Soviet internal politics after World War II. Collaboration of thousands of Soviet citizens with the Nazis in the Holocaust reflected particular regional dynamics and socio-economic opportunism rather than collective ideological beliefs. For example,

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collaboration in the destruction of Jews was as widespread in Eastern Galicia as in eastern Ukraine, despite the Jewish-Ukrainian cooperation in ZUNR some twenty years before.

From the mid-1930s Polish political life was dominated by the ideas promoted by the National Democrats and other right-wing groups. Economic boycott and anti-Semitic propaganda were an integral part of public life, and after the death of Piłsudski in 1935 the Polish government adopted some ideological viewpoints of the National Democrats to gain wider popular support. Economic, social, and political anti-Semitism was shared by various layers of Polish society and was reflected in predominantly indifferent and often hostile attitudes of the population towards Jews during the "Final Solution."^7

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World War I and its aftermath brought an unmitigated disaster for Eastern Galician Jews. Traditional, "day to day" anti-Semitism was transformed by the war into a virulent force, which manifested itself in the forced displacement of thousands of Jews on the Eastern Front and pogroms in independent Poland in 1918-1920. Russian brutalities against Jews in Eastern Galicia were a part and parcel of a large-scale campaign against potentially intractable minorities in Congress Poland, Courland, and Bukovina. Militant Polish anti-Semitism in Eastern Galicia mirrored official and popular attitudes towards Jews in the former Congress Poland, Russia, Ukraine, and Hungary. In this respect, Eastern Galicia was a microcosm of Eastern Europe.

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While anti-Semitism should be studied as a distinct form of ethnic hatred, the events in Eastern Galicia can be compared to other similar instances, when collective fears of minority groups, security anxieties of militarized ruling circles or political groups, and defensive actions of minority groups cause a violent response of a state or a dominant majority. The conduct of the Central Powers in the Balkans during World War I, the Soviet ethnic “cleansing” of the 1930s, the anti-Polish campaign by Western Ukrainian nationalists during World War II, and the recent civil wars in former Yugoslavia are but a few comparable examples. The rise of xenophobia in the former Eastern Block and the persecution of minorities in the twentieth century in Africa and South-Eastern Asia have clearly and unequivocally demonstrated that the basic patterns of prejudice against “others” have passed the test of time.
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288


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301


